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THE DISSONANCE OF GUILT

AN EXAMINATION OF THE HUMAN CONDITION'S FUNDAMENTAL DYNAMIC OF GUILT FEELINGS, REFERRING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE AND HOW THEY COULD BE COMBINED TO FACILITATE MENTAL HEALTH

by

David Boothroyd

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Supervisors: Professor J.S. Cumpsty and Doctor D. Chidester

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PREFACE

Feeling guilty is an experience we all know. It is a condition that ensures we remain cognisant of our obligations to ourselves and to others so that we live within the bounds of appropriate behaviour. When obligations are violated and deviance is evident, the resultant dissonance between expected and contrary behaviour generates feelings of inner environment discomfort and self-criticism recognised as guilt feelings.

Whether such states of internal dissonance are psychodynamically induced, as Freud maintained, or are the result of not meeting ethical obligations, as decreed by particular religious systems, or are due to an inevitable faculty of being human, they have to be controlled if the mental health of the individual experiencing them is not to be detrimentally affected.

What psychology and religion have to say about ensuring that this control is effective has unfortunately become dichotomous and disparate realms of discourse. A common discourse is necessary if the insights of each are to most effectively deal with mental health care. To this end, this thesis is presented as a means for assisting psychotherapists in a re-assessment of the interface between psychology and religion.

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ABSTRACT

The dissonance of guilt is presented as a fundamental dynamic in the human condition. A phenomenological account of how guilt is experienced in individual functioning, Freud's theory of personality functioning and the Biblical Christian conception of the individual are presented as paradigmatic explanations of the condition and its features. That these paradigms in their distinct realms of discourse are equally concerned with optimal personal functioning, but are compromised by differences in theory and method, means mental health care is disserviced. This thesis examines the similarities and differences in psychological and religious approaches to the dissonance of guilt, and, with particular reference to the psychoanalytic method of psychotherapy and the Christian tradition of confession, suggests some re-definitions of concepts and terms useful for a new discourse in clarifying the interface between psychology and religion.

Literature in Clinical Psychology, Philosophy, Religious Studies, Psychotherapy, Psychology, Psychology of Religion, Sociology of Religion, Philosophy or Religion, Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Linguistics, Christian Studies and Biblical Studies have been the main sources of information and ideas. These resources have enabled an eclectic synthesis to be made of what has been perceived to be the principle features and implications of the individual who feels guilty. The thesis

is thus an appraisal of the situation of such individuals as they find themselves in the milieu of psychological and religious systems of thought.

The conclusions of this thesis suggest that the apparent disparity between the realms of religious and psychological discourse can be resolved when their similarities are strengthened while still valuing their differences. In doing so the task of the psychotherapist for dealing with the dissonance of guilt feelings can greatly be assisted by incorporating the implications of the patient's religious background and predelictions, as well as by using the resources religions offer for meeting the religious needs of the individual human condition.

CHAPTER ONE

DISSONANCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

Human beings live their lives not only in the present. They remember what has happened to them and think about the future. This is why each individual is a unique conglomeration of memories, expectations, and particular here-and-now perceptions. In addition, as social beings, humans communicate and share life. These interactions invariably influence what the individual perceives, remembers and expects.

The individual's perceptions and expectations can differ and conflict with those of the ambient society. The individual can also experience conflict within when two or more thoughts differ and demand different outcomes. When a situation of such internal conflict occurs, the individual is experiencing dissonance. This term refers to the internal state of experiencing incongruity and disharmony when two different entities of thought contend for the suppression of the other. Dissonance is thus the feeling and the actuality of incongruity. Psychological and religious discourse have much to say about states of dissonance which is implicitly and explicitly inherent in what they say about the human condition.

In the human condition, incongruity and feelings of dissonance are primarily realized because the individual functions as

a 'unit' at two levels. The first level is as a part and product of the environment.[1] At this level, the individual 'unit' functions within a purely physical existence, with drives for bodily survival, and, to a certain extent, identity survival as an undifferentiated part of the environment. As such a biophysical unit, the individual has and is a separate identity, but this 'identity' is not realized by the individual.

The realization of identity is a function of the 'me', the second level of personality functioning, and is realized in one of three ways. The first is as spectator or witness, aware of present and past interactions with the environment. The second is as an ally that identifies and connects with others to whom the individual feels a sense of belonging in facing the environment. This sense of belonging means there is an awareness of the self as a particular type that shares with other units a special similar kind of consciousness. The third is the image level which the individual holds about what kind of person he or she is with an awareness of having characteristics and traits. There is thus an awareness of being the sum total of a particular conglomeration of these as the person 'sees' him or herself 'being' a certain 'person'.

At the second level the 'me' 'sees' itself as a part and product of the environment and a particularized centre of

individuality of identity. As such, it can and does feel to be separate from the environment and yet inextricably connected to it. Because this level of identity is dependent upon the environment, there exists a tension between separateness and connection. Individuals question their relationship to the environment and the components of it. This is because, at this level, the individual is not simply the undifferentiated 'unit' as in the first level. In this second level, the individual sees him or herself as separated, conflicting or interwoven with the environment and takes note of drives for survival, or, perhaps more accurately, their consequences, particularly states of dissonance, the cause of them and the discomfort they engender.

This chapter is in three parts. In the first, three issues in the cause of dissonance, namely drives, needs, and goals, psychology and religion will be examined. The second part considers the different types of psychological and religious dissonance. Finally, the third part presents some of the ways for dealing with dissonance. The chapter thus serves as an introduction to the broad fields of dissonance, psychology and religion before particular statements in psychological and religious discourse are examined in more detail.

1.1

CAUSES OF DISSONANCE

(A) DRIVES, NEEDS AND GOALS

Because humankind functions with a mixing of the two levels of identity, as a biophysical unit that observes and thinks about itself, theoretically separating instinctual, unprocessed drives from processed drives is problematic. Basically drives establish the individual in experience by directing his or her interactions with the environment.[2] They are what Freud refers to as instincts and what are referred to as desires in ethical discourse.[3]

In either event, drives can be defined as unobservable motivating forces which incite action. They arise, in context, from states of need and seek the achievement of some goal. Hunger, thirst and sexual gratification are three principle needs that illustrate the drive-need-goal relationship. For example, an internal state of hunger establishes the need for food, with the goal of eating food and not feeling hungry initiating the drive to obtain food to eat.

As such, drives, needs and goals are concerned with the survival of the biophysical unit and the concomitant psychological well-being of the individual. Accordingly, drives work to

ensure a state of equilibrium in the internal environment of the individual, by satisfying needs and achieving goals arising out of situations occurring in the basic processes of living. These processes include autonomic ones like hunger, thirst, sex and sleep as well as the more intrinsic, self-initiated ones like creative work and intellectual activity.

Regardless of cause and context, drives respond to specific situations in the internal environment of the individual. They motivate towards some activity or decision response. In this way, drives seek the achievement of goals by satisfying needs, instigating a driving force which induces the individual to act. In combination with goals, drives thus create the motivation which essentially expresses needs. The motivation of finding food or writing a poem, for example, express the need to eat or be creative, respectively. These needs initiate the drives of hunger and creativity and seek the goals of feeling not hungry and of having written the poem.

Drives can thus be differentiated as either concerned with the goals of individual identity and physical body survival, or with species and social survival. These two kinds of drive together form the life drive but differ in the nature of their goals. Identity or body survival drives have the goal of ensuring the unit survives and that it does so in a state of pleasure. Freud's notion of the 'pleasure principle' operating to avoid pain usefully explains this.[4]

Societal or species survival drives, on the other hand, seek the survival of the species.

Because humankind has intermeshed both individual and species survival with societal constructs, drives in the realm of individual survival need to be viewed as being concerned with ensuring the survival of society. The individual incorporates and subscribes to, or may be in conflict with, drives seeking the maintenance of the society and its values. It is here that conflict situations between individual drives, needs and goals, in the form of norms and values, occur. Because of conflict of interests, the dissonance of guilt feelings can occur due to breaching or transgressing the individual's or society's expectations when the needs of one are met in denial of the other.[5]

Thus, drives can be seen as the direct channelling of energy towards certain goals in order to fulfil certain needs in what is not an easy or straightforward process. The fulfilment of certain needs through the denial of others can cause dissonance within the individual. Similarly, conflicting goals and incompatible needs can complicate the process and prevent the individual from maximizing the possibilities for pleasurable individual or social survival in a state of mental health and well-being.

(B) Psychology and Dissonance

In psychological discourse, mental health is considered to be contingent on the individual experiencing and expressing appropriate thoughts and behaviours that enable individuals to cope effectively. That is, the state of mental health is indicative of a person who feels at ease with the environment and is able to cope with experience. Accordingly, the individual feels, acts and copes appropriately. Everyday experience and its inevitable ups and downs are not unrealistically questioned. Neither are excessive debilitating feelings or questions of self-doubt experienced in this state.[6]

When the individual does experience uncomfortable, inner feelings of conflict, these are generally resolved without too much difficulty. Conflict occurs when two beliefs, thoughts, feelings or actions disagree. Their mutual inconsistency manifests a discrepancy in the individual's inner environment. Because this discrepancy cannot immediately be dismissed or denied, nagging, incessant feelings of discord are produced as the two contrary cognitions compete for supremacy through the suppression of the other.

This condition is called a state of dissonance and has been theorized about in two ways in psychological discourse in attempts to explain the causes and the consequences of healthy and unhealthy dissonance. One theory focuses on dissonance

in terms of its cognitive dynamics. As such it is the theory of cognitive dissonance in Social Psychology. The other theory focuses on the psychodynamics of the causes of inner conflict.

The work of Sigmund Freud (1923)[7] is a paramount example of this second approach. His theory of personality functioning can be construed as one that attempts to explain the aetiology and the prognosis of dissonance within the individual. This is because Freud was concerned to develop a theory of neurosis, and feelings of dissonance can be of a neurotic nature. Hence, Freud's constructs of defence mechanisms can be seen as dissonance-controlling-mechanisms and intra-psychic conflicts as forms of dissonance.

The work of Leon Festinger (1957)[8] is the principle contribution in the theory of cognitive dissonance. This theory focuses on the cognitive processes of the individual. It works from the premise that individual's strive for inner consonance and harmony of their thoughts. Thoughts are seen as consisting of different cognitive structures which are pieces of knowledge about something. The theory asserts that these pieces of knowledge are cognitions. Two different cognitions can create dissonance when their opposition leads to uncomfortable psychological tension. This tension is unpleasant and distressful and motivates the individual to try to restore consonance.

An example illustrates this. The cognition 'Smoking is unhealthy' is consonant with the cognition 'I do not smoke' but will, as the theory posits, be in dissonance with the cognition 'I am a smoker and want to be healthy.' Obviously the levels of dissonance thereby created and experienced is proportionate to the level of importance the individual attaches to the opposing issues, and the degree that they are in opposition.

This proportionment relates to a prerequisite for the arousal of feelings of dissonance. This prerequisite is that some aspect of the individual's self-concept is challenged by the content of their cognitions. That is, in terms of the example, if the smoker was not health-conscious or could lie about smoking, dissonance would not eventuate because states of dissonance are dependent on feelings of opposition, discomfort and discord as well as a degree of self-interest.

There is a measure of similarity between cognitive and psychodynamic forms of dissonance because the inner environment of the individual can theoretically be affected by both. This means that for mental health, all dissonance needs to be brought to and dealt with at the conscious level of awareness and resolved there. If not, continued dissonance may have considerable debilitating consequences.

The basic psychology of the phenomenology of the individual

outlined above indicated dissonance resulted when individuals felt a sense of discomfort over breaching norms. Norms were seen as established either by the self, others or society. In either event they were perceived as important by the individual. Hence, norms, expectations and values that were breached, not met, or devalued, all contributed towards feelings of personal discomfort because the breach invariably initiates questions regarding the self-concept and evaluations of it. Such a crises in self-concept generates debilitating dissonance.

Psychological theory perceives dissonance as that cognitive or psychodynamic state arising out of similar situations of personally felt discomfort. Conflict in these situations is the result of discordant cognitions or psychic entities. These put individuals in a state of disequilibrium with confusion and uncertainty about the kind of person they really are or feel they ought to be. In this regard, the successful resolution of the conflict of dissonance is clearly essential to ensure a state and a feeling of mental health. Interestingly, Jung, Boss and other theorists argue that humankind inevitably is primarily guilty with existential guilt that perpetuates an eternal process of dilemma.[9] In this way, the dissonance of guilt can be perceived to be a universal fundamental of the human condition.

(C) RELIGION AND DISSONANCE

As a psychological term and entity, dissonance is fairly easily identifiable. It is a product and a process within the individual's modes of thinking and feeling. That these differ and are significantly shaped and affected by the religious worldview that the individual ascribes to, creates a more complex dimension for understanding the implications of the causes and consequences of dissonance for mental health.

A particular religious conception establishes a set of norms and assumptions which sets up a network of cause and effect. That the Biblical Christian conception does so is shown in how this conception establishes and maintains notions of creatureliness, sin, sins, forgiveness, redemption and conscience. The individual's memories, perceptions and expectations are influenced, to some degree, by the nature and implications of these notions as he or she accepts or rejects them and interacts with others who do likewise.

When the Biblical conception of things, for example, is accepted, states of dissonance can be established when the individual feels that they are sinners, not good enough, not sufficiently Christ-like or any other evaluation in terms of the ideal of the conception. This is because the individual understands, in terms of this conception, that they are obliged to always compare their actions and thoughts with the ideals formulated

in the Biblical Christian conception. As a result, the individual feels and believes they are obliged to live and behave in certain ways in relation to these conceptions. When these obligations are not met, the individual feels dissonance between the cognition of being a creature obliged to live according to the Will of the Creator God and the cognition of being a creature who has not lived according to the Will of the Creator God.

Not all religions contain such an overt matrix of obligation. However, basic human needs to belong and to strive to fulfil ideals can be found in most systems of religion. Feelings of dissonance may therefore indeed be inevitable when individuals feel inadequate or unsure about their mode or degree of belonging and the fulfilment of ideals. In the Christian Biblical paradigm the conscience functions as a regulative mechanism to ensure and facilitate appropriate belonging and fulfilment. Other religions use other means for regulating their adherents' beliefs and behaviours. It would appear that these are, however, similar in purpose and function to those of the conscience.[10]

The universality of the conscience is apparent in that the faculty of conscience has a role in the process and the feeling of dissonance and this feeling is a fundamental of the human condition. Consequently, as a significant entity which facilitates feelings of dissonance in the individual, the conscience

appears to be synonymous with states of dissonance in that both are negatively induced. They only have a function when things considered to be wrong are done and felt to contravene obligations to do right.

The individual's conscience is that which regulates, initiates and decides upon feelings and particularly feelings of guilt. The conscience makes the individual feel guilty. It passes judgement on the individual in terms of their identity and their interaction and relationship to their environment. It does so by affecting cognitive and non-cognitive feelings. Thus 'feeling guilty about' means that there is a cognitive understanding of the action or thought in question, or there is quite simply the feeling itself.

Three different functions of conscience are discernible within the concept conscience.[11] Their differences are seen in terms of their definition, formation, and function and how their particular effects need to be dealt with in therapy. They are the BEING HUMAN CONSCIENCE, the SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE and the PERSONAL CONSCIENCE. They share the primary role of the conscience, seeking good for the individual, and maintaining the quest for inner harmony and equilibrium with the aim that the personality develops and functions 'normally' and maintains a state of mental health.[12] Similarly, all three determine feelings of guilt, affect self-esteem and self image and the general behaviour of the individual. The

three have differing features nevertheless. These indicate how they function differentially within the conscience system.

The BEING HUMAN CONSCIENCE (BHC) is basically a preconscious mechanism, that 'automatically' gives the individual an awareness of feeling 'bad' or 'guilty' and does not consciously refer to a system of morality or values. It is a faculty that expresses and experiences the pain, discomfort and dissonance. Simply part of being human, it is that which some would argue as being 'God-given' and is something that appears to be intrinsically universal. Pierce (1958) describes the conscience as the capacity in man's nature to react 'painfully'.[13] The Being Human Conscience is then the capacity and the feeling of conscience and invariably needs to be dealt with in therapy by bringing to consciousness the nature and reasons of guilty, bad and dissonant feelings.

The capacity and feelings of conscience are qualitatively and quantitatively witnessed because of the SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE (SC). This second 'kind' of conscience is a conscious one. It refers, albeit unconsciously oftentimes, to a system of preconscious morality because it seeks to refer the individual to society, indicating how he or she has violated, breached or transgressed some specific moral standard. The conscience here is like a checklist or value system. It is a faculty of moral witness which reviews the individual. It does so in the particular terms of the society that has

produced this conscience in a particular process of socialization.

The witness faculty of the SC witnesses qualitatively to produce a 'feeling' of 'good', 'bad' or 'weak' conscience. It also witnesses quantitatively to judge the situation and the acts and thoughts thereof. That is, the SC determines how the conscience, the capacity and faculty, 'feels' about itself, its owner and his or her behaviour. In the case of a bad conscience, the SC will 'feel' to be without goodness, ineffective in controlling the individual's inadequacies, and reject honesty as a means of self-assessment. It would thus be part of a series of events contributing to the result of having this 'bad' conscience.

A 'weak' conscience would be an SC manifested in situations where the individual had inadequate reference to knowledge of some or other morality or value system. It would be ineffective, inoperative and indecisive. Conversely, a 'good' conscience would be an SC free from feelings of 'wrongness', pain and discomfort and aware of its admirable efforts at being good and without weakness and badness.[14]

The SC judges these qualitative feelings quantitatively in terms of the approval-disapproval process. This process refers to the social value system to which the conscience is 'witnessing'. The process is one that works in conjunction

with the judgement the conscience knows it must pass. Together the process of approval-disapproval and judgement form the SC totality. Put another way, the SC is that which witnesses to the moral code that is written into the person's very nature by socio-religious processes. It judges the incidents when the code is breached, transgressed or violated, and does so within a given quality and range of intensity in emotional response, requiring the individual to obey the dictates of an internalized moral code or checklist. Disobedience results in feelings of pain and discomfort when this aspect of conscience activates the individual's capacity to feel 'bad' about the violations. It therefore demands obedience through the 'symptoms' it produces which invariably can be causal factors in psychopathology.[15] In therapy the effects of the SC thus need to be dealt with by ensuring the checklist and reactions to misdemeanours are reasonable and rational.

The PERSONAL CONSCIENCE (PC) is that aspect of the conscience which derives from a personalized understanding of attitude and response to socio-religious codes and systems of morality. In distinction to the prescriptive, deductive function of the SC, the PC is inductive in its function. It is perhaps akin to what Buber (1965) termed the 'Higher Conscience'.[16] Buber argued that the 'Vulgar Conscience' only torments and harasses, whilst the 'Higher Conscience' sought the restoration and restitution of wrongs and that which was 'bad'.[17] It

appears that in this way, the PC seeks the good of the individual without merely only witnessing and judging as the SC does. Clearly this form of conscience is the ideal kind of conscience which is the goal of psychotherapy to instil in the individual.

Within the SC, the RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE can be discerned. As it appears in the New Testament (NT) a particular 'kind' of this religious conscience function can be seen. The work of Pierce (1958) cogently explains the nature of this conscience.[18] This explanation is a theistic conception because Pierce works within a spiritual frame of reference. His account of conscience, and approach to it, differs from humanitarian, psychological approaches to the SC proper. Pierce argues that this conscience type as evident in the NT is <u>not</u> concerned with the future, and it witnesses both overt and covert behaviour.[19] This type thus differs from the SC where only overt behaviour is 'judged' and the future <u>is</u> considered in terms of the possible consequences of violating actions and thoughts.

Generally then, the conscience, as a faculty, works as a corrective and regulative agent. It does so according to certain aspects of its function. It operates automatically as part of human nature (the BHC), with reference to its socialized conditioning, to form a weak good or bad socialized conscience (SC). Moreover, it can be particularly shaped,

in this function, by religious dynamics as exemplified by the NT conscience. These kinds of consciences thus stand as predecessors, and almost as pre-requisites, for the Personal Conscience (PC), that highly individualized conscience that derives from the others and exemplifies the ideal conscience.

Like drives, the conscience is one of the unobservables of the human condition. Basically a faculty within the individual which, as part of his or her nature, it functions as an expression of being human. It is activated automatically in relation to the individual's thoughts and actions; and this is particularly so in regard to 'bad' thoughts and deeds. The conscience is thus basically concerned with specific past acts or thoughts that were 'wrong'. It therefore causes to come to consciousness feelings of discomfort, pain and dissonance as the individual, who, by act or thought, has begun or completed a transgression of some or other moral limit. This means that the individual has to consciously deal with feelings that result whether they be pleasant or unpleasant with the knowledge that unpleasant ones can develop psychopathological implications for personality development and functioning.

The role of the conscience is thus a primary one in the development and functioning of the individual personality. It therefore plays an important role in the maintenance of mental health because it determines, inter alia, guilt feelings and self-esteem evaluations. These two particular complexes

powerfully affect intrapersonal relationships. In turn, the socialized subjective aspect of the conscience influences the social development and social functioning of the personality in interpersonal relationships. It does so by controlling impulses for transitory or opportunistic achievements. This is in deference to more long term goals and consistency with the kind of person that the individual really wants to be.

In essence then, the conscience is dynamically related to the individual's self-image, feelings of self-esteem, long-term goals and feelings of guilt. This is because it functions as a kind of moral witness in the individual's inner world. It experiences and induces discomfort, dissonance and conflict which occurs when thoughts and actions, resulting from the outcomes of drives, are at variance with standards and values that have been internalized as part of the individual's personality. Thus, conscience not only inflicts feelings of discomfort, it is known in the discomforter, and is therefore sometimes spoken of as though it feels the discomfort itself. In terms of the therapeutic situation, it is probably better to emphasize it as witness in order to indicate detachment. The detachment is necessary so that a way of dealing with psychic discomfort is assured.

Clearly the conscience functions on the basis of self-knowledge of the individual's own identity and social relationships.

If this self-knowledge or identity itself is inadequate, underdeveloped or warped in any way, the conscience, although perhaps operative, will be similarly affected. Irrespective of this, however, the conscience is the realm of feelings attached to ongoing conflict between drives and goals and the results of needs. Essentially the conscience ought to be seen as that which establishes, maintains and is the dissonant guilt feelings of the individual, irrespective of the level or kind of the conscience that is operating, and works as a psychological mechanism shaped by religious factors inherent in ethical and moral codes and systems of human behaviour.[20]

The conscience and feelings of dissacilitate positive and negative outcomes. Thice that s facilitation is in effect their purpose. The outcomes are, however, primarily determined by the distressful, uncomfortable inner environment conditions that demand attention. Attention invariably means seeking resolution of conflicting issues and this involves an examination of the grounds of conflict. This refers the individual to their self-concept, belief system and philosophical position.

Thus, for example, the individual who acknowledges or accepts his or her creatureliness, and the implications of this status as formulated in the Biblical conception, ascribes to the notion of obligation. Obligation is a primary dynamic in

the initiation of feelings of dissonance. Dissonance occurs when the individual, as a creature, feels obliged to behave and think according to the will, plan and purposes of the Creator and has not done so. In the Biblical Christian religious conception, a particular lifestyle has been formulated to accord with the paradigm of life it espouses. Inherent obligation is one of its features. When life is not lived according to this paradigm, dissonance results if individuals cannot reconcile expectation with fulfilment, with direct and indirect consequences on the way they function in reference to this conception. A fundamental consequence is what individuals feel about themselves.[21] The different responses to temptation give some clear illustrations in this regard.

When temptation to breach or transgress a norm, and not to fulfil an obligation thereby is resisted, feelings of relief and self-congratulation result.[22] When the temptation is resisted, feelings of hostility, envy, depression and regret could also be directed by the person towards themself because indulgence would have given pleasure. In this second instance, the conflict of interests between different cognitions causes dissonance.

These conflicts of interest can lead to a third situation wherein self-worth, lifestyle and authenticity are questioned in relation to what is believed and partially accepted as 'right.' Such conflicts are evident in disorders like ego

dystonic homosexuality and other less complex dyads of discordant cognitions. In these dyads, the person does not want to accept a certain constellation of feelings and earnestly seeks another.[23] The contrary drives and consequent discrepant obligations create cognitive and/or psychodynamic dissonance that is debilitating.

These three different responses indicate the integral role self-concept and self-interest have in the initiation and implications of dissonance and the condition it creates for mental health. The cognitive and punitive consequences of yielding to temptation and thereby not fulfilling obligations are crucially linked to the individual's options for reducing dissonance and restoring emotional and cognitive equilibrium. Wright (1983) differentiates between cognitive and punitive consequences.[24] The former consists of four possibilities. These are: a revision of the self-concept; the self being seen as an instrument and therefore not personally responsible; the yielding to temptation is excused or dismissed as unimportant, or, self-critical and self-blaming thoughts. Punitive consequences arise out of this last cognitive possibility. They are: a feeling that the individual has to 'pay' for the misdemeanour, make reparation, apologise or confess.[25]

These consequences all reflect varying degrees of dissonance which initiate different outcomes. They all seek to restore

and ensure cognitive consistency and emotional equilibrium. When the consequences of dissonance become a condition of disequilibrium, they can seriously affect mental health. Clearly various cognitive, psychological strategies can reduce cognitive dissonance. These strategies in effect make up the deficit of the missing obligation and restore the individual to subsequently fulfil appropriate, expected, obligatory conditions at a cognitive level. Any psychodynamic implications are not necessarily considered. Although cognitive consonance may be re-established, psychodynamic dissonance can continue to affect mental health, when obligatory conditions are not wholly felt to have been met.[26]

Paul Ricoeur (1969) describes the notion of obligation and its possible consequences in this way:[27]

> ... if I feel, or believe, or know, that I am obligated, it is because I am a being that can act, not only under the impulsion or constraint of desire and fear, but under the condition of a law which I represent to myself ... to act according to the representation of a law is something other than to act according to laws. This power of acting according to the representation of a law is the will. But this discovery has long-range consequences: for in discovering the power to follow the law (or that which I consider as the law for myself) I discover also the <u>terrible</u> power of acting against ...
>
> Indeed the experience of remorse which is the experience of the relation between freedom and obligation is a twofold experience; on the one hand I recognise an obligation, and therefore a power corresponding to this obligation, but I admit to having acted against the law which continues to appear to me as obligatory. This is commonly called a transgression.

In this extract, Ricoeur shows how obligation occurs and what its implications are. He points out the legally and morally binding nature of the understanding the individual has about his or herself and how he or she has to, or ought to, behave if the penalty of transgression is to be avoided. Thus, as is evident in the Christian Biblical conception, individuals understand that they are, as creatures, obligated legally and morally to behave accordingly. If not, they face the consequences of contravening the will of the Creator God. These consequences involve the penalty conceptualized and formalized in sin and sins.[28]

In addition, Ricoeur identifies the role of freedom in this matrix of behaviour choice. The freedom to choose between accepting or going against the demands of the obligation symbiosis is integral to the creature-Creator relationship. Interestingly, Ricoeur refers to the example of the choice and fall of Adam, usefully illustrating how dissonance is so much a part of this paradigm and how it is inevitably experienced in the processes of all decision-making and evaluation of decisions for those within the Biblical paradigm.

Thus Ricoeur shows how the awareness that one not only could have done otherwise, but in fact ought to have done so, can be responsible for feelings of dissonance because the individual invariably feels uncomfortable about a range of things, which are particularized in terms of contravening obligations.

That is, the individual, by acknowledging contravention or that an obligation has not been met, accepts the reality of the misdemeanour and the consequences of it. This acceptance invariably constitutes a cognition which may be inconsistent with other cognitions the individual may hold. In effect this may mean that the individual realizes or acknowledges that they are not quite the kind of person they ought or wish to be.

This matrix of obligation can develop into a situation where individuals live according to what they believe others expect of them. They are therefore not true to themselves and who they really are and live inauthentic, fabricated lives as a result.[29] As such, they are constantly at war with themselves. Such states of dissonance can occur in the cognitive and psychodynamic spheres because the two kinds of person compete for expression but are in conflict due to their opposing natures. Career mothers, recovering alcoholics and ego dystonic homosexuals are examples of persons with such dyads of inner conflict.[30]

The experience of such inconsistency and conflict within the inner environment of the person results when cognitions of personhood are antithetical. The antithesis can be with reference to an incident, episode or entire personality. In each, the feelings of dissonance which the discrepancies initiate are similar to the feelings of discomfort ascribed

to the workings of the conscience. This is because these feelings in the inner environment are the result of conflicting cognitions or conceptions.

Any disclosure of dissonance or conscience is obviously only a part of a larger cognition that relates to the totality of the individual because conflict and inconsistency result when some aspect of the totality seriously undermines or questions the totality and integrity of the whole. When the coherency of the self is thus felt to be threatened and its obligations to itself, others and religion are in a state of disarray and confusion, some form of dissonance results. This is due to the individual evaluating memories, perceptions and expectations negatively in that they are considered to have been inappropriate, wrong or unethical.

Codes of ethics in fact play an important role in determining particular lifestyles.[31] Ethics are sets of moral principles which individuals relate to. They are not necessarily antithetically biased towards other religious or psychological formulations. As codes of behaviour, they establish points of reference to which the individual can evaluate him or herself.[32] The outcome of this evaluation can manifest feelings of discomfort and disappointment and be realized as feelings of dissonance. These are the result of the evaluation mechanism, the conscience, evaluating and judging the performance of the individual vis-a-vis ethical obligations that

have not been met. When they are met, consonance results as does a clear, 'good' conscience.

Christian Ethics, or Moral Theology, seeks to explore and explain the rights and wrongs of life, and to argue for certain behaviours, thoughts, modes of action and lifestyles that will ensure consonance.[33] Thereby, a code for appropriate right and ethical Christian behaviour is established. This code, and indeed the ethical codes of all religions, function in terms of the demand and response of ethical obligations.[34]

David Chidester (1987) has shown there are four possible kinds of response to the demands of such formulations of ethical obligations.[35] He argues that each represents the basic condition of possibility for the individual's response to obligations in any system of religious ethics. These are: Morality - in which what ought to be done is done because the individual wants to do it; Discipline - in which what ought to be done is done because the individual feels it has to be done; Antinomianism - in which the individual does what they want to because there are no ethical laws to be observed; Improvisation - in which the individual does what they want to by creatively responding to ethical situations that enable this.

Each indicates the concomitant possibility of dissonance that occurs when the individual, despite doing what was felt,

ought or wanted to be done, still feels the response was inconsistent with other cognitions. This is because, as Chidester explains, "the normative images of obligation may be in conflict with actual behaviour, desires, and interests."[36] That is, the individual's self-concept and consequent self-disclosure cognitions may be incongruent with cognitions of the normative and expected. This results in a conflict between what the individual was apparently obliged to do and feel and what is actually done and felt.

In his book The Psychology of Religion, Robert Thouless (1971) has a chapter, 'The Moral Conflict.'[37] In it he explores the consequences of yielding to temptation and not fulfilling one's obligations. He states moral conflict within the individual is a direct result of conflict generated in the breach between "behaviour tendencies and an opposing system of requirements of which he recognises the authority."[38]

The system of requirements Thouless refers to are the ethical codes and systems of morality that religions formulate in obligations. In this sense it is interesting to note that Thouless concludes: "the tendency of the experience of the moral conflict is to produce one of the roots of the religious attitude."[39] This substantiates the view that dissonance fuels and fires religions. It does so by facilitating self-evaluations cognizant of the self as something accountable to a paradigm of ideal selfhood. Thus dissonance, and feelings

of guilt in particular, relate to morality, socio-religious controls and systems of ethical obligations. This is because the individual experiences conflict between cognitions of the norm and expected and cognitions of him or herself. This conflict is reminiscent of Nietzsche's argument, in On the Genealogy of Morals (1969),[40] that legal obligations were the antecendants of moral ethical obligations.

Chidester (1987) argues that there is a twofold dynamic inherent in the experience of ethical dissonance arising out of the implications of ethical obligations. One dynamic is the dissonance caused by failures to meet expectations embodied in some ethical obligation. The other is the formation of ethical obligations by religious traditions seeking to ensure response to situations of dissonance. These dynamics together form the dissonance experience in a circular symbiosis that necessitates and requires the other. This is because, as Chidester points out, "normative patterns of obligation both create dissonance and hold the potential for resolving that dissonance in a pattern of ethical harmony."[41]

Consequently, moral harmony, the outcome of ethical harmony, in religious ethics at any rate, "is an attunement between desires and obligation" because desires are "shaped, ordered, and harmonized" in their confrontation with obligations. They are also "frustrated, confused and (made) ambiguous"[42] by them. The result is that desires, that which has been

identified as drives, are basic to the individual human condition as the individual encounters and lives in the worlds of inner and outer experience. These encounters and their manifestations produce the history of religions when right and moral become apparent obligatory absolutes which individuals accept or reject and experience the consequences of their choices. Dissonance and the workings of the conscience are thus integral constituents of this process and its outcomes.

In short, dissonance is caused when the individual realizes and is troubled by conflicting cognitions either of a psychological or religious nature. In both cases, they ply individuals with questions about the kind of person they really are, disrupting harmony of selfhood and thereby affecting personality functioning and mental health.[43]

1.2

TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS DISSONANCE

Irrespective of the types of dissonance and its particular causal attributes, the nature of dissonance experienced invariably involves and consists of one of the basic emotions of subjective experience.[44] Guilt, shame, fear, anxiety, and anger are some of the principal emotions in this regard. It would appear that shame and guilt are actually the two most basic emotions of dissonance because all others seem

to rely on them to some extent.[45]

Differences in the type of dissonance experienced in the condition of feeling guilty and the feeling of a sense of shame has been a significant issue for those involved in this area in the Social Sciences. There have been numerous attempts to compare and contrast the two. The work of David Ausubel (1955), Helen Block Lewis (1972), Ruth Benedict (1946), Piers and Singer (1971) and Thrane (1979), are especially significant.[46]

According to Ausubel, shame and guilt, although "distinguishable from one another, ... are nevertheless neither dichotomous nor mutually exclusive." He argues, guilt "may be conceptualized as a special kind of negative evaluation which occurs when an individual acknowledges that his behaviour is at variance with a given moral value to which he feels obligated to conform" and as such "is a self-reaction to an injured conscience, if by conscience is meant an abstraction referring to a feeling of obligation to abide by all internalized moral values. The injury consists of a self-perceived violation of this obligation." Shame however, is, according to Ausubel, "An unpleasant emotional reaction by an individual to an actual or presumed negative judgment of himself by others resulting in self-deprication vis-a-vis the group."[47]

For Ausubel the condition of shame can consist of either

non-moral shame or moral shame. The former is the embarrassment resulting from "committing a breach of propriety, or, having one's bodily intimacy exposed to public scrutiny, and, 'loss of face' resulting from exposure of ignorance or incompetency," while the latter is "a reaction to the negative moral judgments of others."[48] Ausubel also shows how moral shame has two different aspects. The first is internalized moral shame. This is when shame results from presumed or fantasied reproach. The other, non-internalized moral shame, results when an individual reacts with self-deprication to the moral condemnation of others but does not accept the moral value to which they had failed to conform.

Therefore Ausubel contends, "shame is only one component of guilt - the component involving external judgment and sanction ... and, conversely, the shame of guilt is only one of the many kinds of shame." This is because "Shame relies on external sanctions alone. Guilt relies on both internal and external sanctions."[49] Accordingly, Ausubel suggests that shame and guilt can be more effectively and accurately distinguished in terms of ethnocentric considerations. There are, he posits, two possibilities. One is from the superego models of guilt, which are those evident in the Freudian conception of personality functioning and causes of dissonance. The other is from the view of guilt being seen as a "Shameless, wholly internalized conviction of sin."[50] This is obviously that conception which is the

result of the Biblical Christian paradigm.[51]

Thus Ausubel argues there are three psychological conditions necessary for the development of guilt behaviour. One is that a code of moral values is acknowledged and accepted. The second is that a sense of moral obligation to abide by these values is internalized. Finally, sufficient self-critical ability is required in order that discrepancies between internalized values and actual behaviour are perceived. These perceptions would thus initiate the feelings of dissonance and activate the conscience. This activation would result in feelings of guilt when this was an appropriate response to the dissonance and the discrepancies.[52]

Helen Block Lewis (1972) has also expounded upon the differences between shame and guilt. She critically discusses them in a chapter entitled Shame in Depression and Hysteria.[53] Lewis looks at shame and guilt phenomenologically so as to examine the sequences of these two 'superego states' and how they lead to different paths of symptom formation. This is because, Lewis asserts, symptom formation occurs when guilt and shame together cannot be distinguished in the feeling nexus of the 'confused' individual.

Lewis thus shows how the individual's style of perceptual-cognitive functioning is one determinant in the superego's mode of functioning. Accordingly, she distinguishes between

what she terms field dependent and field independent styles of functioning.[54] Shame is seen as a greater force in the superego of the field dependent patients and guilt as a greater force in the superego of field independent patients.

In this way, Lewis shows how guilt, although related to shame, has different causes and consequences. She asserts that guilt and shame are different regarding three aspects of human functioning. That is, whereas guilt increases cognitive processes, shame inhibits them; guilt renders the self more active whilst shame induces passivity; and guilt leads to isolation and rationalization, when shame leads to denial and repression. These manifest as thought disorders of obsession and paranoia for guilt and affective disorders such as depression for shame. That the two emotions and their consequences invariably overlap and are very similar is of course contingent on specific personality and contextual factors. Lewis' 'Summary of Working Concept for Shame and Guilt' is presented in Appendix A.

Chidester (1987) also differentiates between shame and guilt in terms of their specific natures that effect them as dissonance networks. His conclusions are presented below in point form in order to summarize their essential features vis-a-vis their ethical import. According to Chidester then, shame:

> arises in ethical context that is structured by religious distinctions between purity and defilement ...
>
> is an inner sense of being defiled, polluted, tainted, or stained by violating the ethical boundaries that are established within a religious community ...
>
> is a public embarrassment, chagrin, or distress caused by violating the ethical order ...
>
> is deeply embedded in religious symbolism of impurity ...
>
> emerges as an ethical defilement within the context of an ethical order marked out by taboos ...

whereas guilt

> is an experience of ethical liability ...
>
> is an ethical indebtedness before the tribunal of divine judgment ...
>
> is a sense of basic unworthiness before the demands of obligation ...
>
> a private experience of dissonance resulting from a failure to fulfil the expectations of a system of religious ethics ...
>
> emerges from ethical judgment that accuses, convicts and condemns people of their sinfulness by missing the mark set by ethical obligation ...[55]

This differentiation indicates that there are different levels, in terms of quality and quantity, of dissonance and its ethical delimitations. The implications and strengths of drives and desires intimated that this would be so. This is because the amount of self-interest and self-threatening attributes the cognitions consist of in relation to ethical considerations

determines their possible effects. Some cognitions will naturally be more dangerous and debilitating than others. In addition, some may only be thoughts that never refer to or are realized in action contrary to ethical obligations.

Distinction can be made between dissonant acts and dissonant desires. This has been confirmed by Chidester. He states: "... dissonant actions reveal more fundamental desires that are not in harmony with obligation" and dissonant desires are dispositions that cause conflict and disharmony.[56] There is a difference of opinion about determining culpability of desires as opposed to acts. Human codes of thought and behaviour are to a certain extent arbitrary. Inevitably, codes are responsible for shaping the perceptions, cognitions, memories and expectations of those who ascribe to them. In addition, ethical codes constitute hierarchies of norms and values. Thus their contravention, in thought or in deed, has varying levels of affect on those who are influenced by or through them, and, in certain cases, thoughts and desires are just as debilitating as the acts they may or may not produce.

Moreover, contravening acts, if considered sinful, are seen as specific violations and transgressions of religiously determined ethical norms of behaviour. Actions generally do express the inner nature of the actor. As such, they are disclosures of actual desires. Such desires are basic

to the person. If acts disclose a disposition that is in conflict with the norm and that which is expected, desires too are experienced as dissonant entities. These naturally affect the person's social, religious and psychological functioning, in the same way that undisclosed thoughts and desires can.

The dissonance of guilt feelings, whether due to acts or desires initiates a sense of inertia, of being seized, and overpowered by the emotion of feeling guilty. As such, the emotion of feeling guilty envelopes all feelings, instincts, reasons and sensations into one for a period of time and totally occupies the individual's inner environment.[58]

There is a danger, however, in viewing 'guilt' too simplistically in this regard. It certainly is not a homogenous entity or condition. This is because the word 'guilt' and the term 'feeling guilty' encompasses a host of personalized conditions. It therefore cannot be assumed that the one word all inclusively describes a paradigmatic stability of feelings and a condition of the inner environment. Nevertheless, this inner environment of guilt has particular recognizable effects at a conscious level of the personality and are distinguishable from theose of shame as shown by the theorists above. The guilt feelings are the specific constellation of feelings that the individual 'has'. They affect the individual's thought processes and invariably are reflected

in behaviour. Basically the individual feels incomplete, miserable and worthless and these feelings mitigate against more appropriate and effective attitudes and feelings for optimal personality functioning.

The condition of feeling guilty results in one, all or any combination of the following cognitions in which guilt feelings cause and maintain a certain mental and emotional state of dissonance.[59] They

> lower or even destroy the individual's self-confidence and self-esteem
>
> make the individual feel depressed, hollow and empty because some sense of a firm ground of identity has been lost
>
> make the individual feel unloved and unlovable
>
> destroy any previous feelings of contentment and peace-with-the-world
>
> seek to justify and increase the individual's feelings of anger and resentment about the inadequacy or fault that caused the wrong
>
> generally make the individual feel under attack, alone, vulnerable and separated from others.[60]

1.3

DEALING WITH DISSONANCE

Attempts to deal with the state of dissonance have been formulated because dissonance is an area of concern for psycholo-

gists and religionists who wish to improve the human situation. Both discourses seek to control dissonance and its effects in order to facilitate mental health and thereby justify their own ends. Both view states of consonance within the individual as the ideal. In this regard it is interesting that, as Chidester noted, "the potential for achieving moral harmony is reinforced in religious traditions through specific practical strategies for harmonizing actions and desires."[61] Such a view confirms the contention that the role of religion in controlling dissonance or effecting it to precipitate harmony is one of its major functions. Psychology has explicitly questioned and challenged this role and its outcomes and has offered the world its own permutated methods for attaining mental health.[62]

The practical strategies of religions for controlling dissonance have been looked at encyclopaedically by John T McNeill in his book A History of the Cure of Souls (1977).[63] He concludes that humankind always seeks health of the personality: "the well-being of the soul."[64] McNeill explains that the opposite, what may now be identified as dissonance and the workings of the conscience, are the "painful disorders of mind and spirit" which do not give a sense of health. This is because, McNeill asserts, "for the attainment of full health of personality, man must find a harmonious relationship in the realm of spiritual values."[65] In such a harmonious relationship, dissonance and a troubling

conscience would not occur.

This is because the word 'harmony' is the antithesis of disharmony, a cognate of the concept dissonance. McNeill points out, within the Biblical conception of things, that the primary obstacle to the realm of consonance and harmony is what the "Bible calls sin." He also explains the role and function the conscience has in the process of ensuring such a state of consonance prevails. In addition, McNeill asserts, the conscience ensures there is a sense of guilt when its dictates are violated.[66] For McNeill, conscience is conceived as tied and related to feelings of dissonance. It is activated by them and activates them in turn as part of its function. This is because, the conscience is, feels, and recognises the pains of the discomfort either at a cognitive, or, at a psychodynamic level, when two conflicting discrepancies are causing disharmony in the inner environment of the individual.

McNeill thus concludes that in dealing with dissonance, the voice of conscience has a vital role to play. This is because it is seen as that which, firstly, enables the person to recognise faults and defects in the fulfilment of obligations. Secondly, it points to the actualities of sin when this is a concept to which the individual ascribes and incorporates. Prayer, work and recreative pursuits are three everyday activities which McNeill argues are the means for building stronger

senses of Christian identity which would contend with feelings of needless dissonance.

Other means of dealing with dissonance and pangs of conscience in the Christian Religion are those of redemption, salvation and forgiveness as formulated from the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Forgiveness of sin and acceptance of all are offered as opportunities for real change, growth and maturity. A virtual obligatory demand to change to this new Christian self, that would leave out the dissonance-causing feelings, desires and lifestyle, are clearly strategies for dealing with dissonance.

In these restorative processes, the reasons and the levels of and for dissonance are reduced. They are replaced with a commitment and a more healthy concern with and for the lifestyle of Christian living. This lifestyle more fully meets and recognises its creaturely obligations to the Creator God as well as to the self, as a creature, and others. Doing so reduces the influence, effect and feelings of dissonance of contrary cognitions.

The actual meaning of these Christian concepts and what their processes and outcomes really mean for mental health is a matter of contention. However, the extent that restorative processes also occur in other religions, and is the task of psychotherapy, demands that all the strategies for dealing

with dissonance be accounted for. This is so that dealing with dissonance can be done as effectively as possible. Proposals to this end are presented in Chapter Four.

CONCLUSION

Dissonance is a fundamental aspect of much mental activity. It has its source in conceptions of self-hood that conflict with conceptions of what the person could, should, or wants to be. These conceptions have basically been the product of religions and other ideologies which seek to perpetuate and ensure their particular paradigm of the ideal. That these establish cognitions which individuals compare themselves to, can lead to cognitive and non-cognitive forms of dissonance.

Psychology has tried to explain how dissonance occurs at these cognitive and non-cognitive levels and has also said that religion causes much of it. The two realms of discourse thus often work against each other. Nevertheless, the two agree on the nature and the dangers of dissonance and the need to deal with it to bring about the consonance and harmony synonymous with mental health. This consonance, they agree, is essentially possible by bringing the contents of dissonant cognitions and psychic dynamics to conscious, cognitive levels.

The importance of being able to deal with dissonance at the cognitive levels is that it is only at this level that it can be effectively dealt with. Otherwise it remains at the level of affect. Here the dangers of irrationality and obscurity can debilitate against more appropriate mental and

emotional functioning. The result of this kind of malfunctioning is that the self-concept of the individual can be impaired and coping strategies inhibited. Such debilitating psychological consequences can be related to the individual's religious predelictions. The most important dynamic here is that of ethical obligation. This dynamic causes the individual to think and behave in certain ways, with contraventions and deviations resulting in disharmony and dissonance in the inner environment and this needs to be realized in the therapeutic situation.

Strategies for dealing with debilitating or dangerous levels or kinds of disharmony and dissonance have been evolved by religions and by psychology indicating that they share a task in the field of the care and cure of the human condition. Unfortunately, one discourse can inhibit the healing process when employed inappropriately by the other, when the persons involved in receiving or giving the therapy are not aware of the negative and positive elements in both realms of discourse. This means that the language used to communicate about the condition and its subsequent feelings, needs to be a familiar one to all persons, if the situation is to be properly addressed.

It is in this regard that a need for a common language is evidently not only required but necessary. Differences between the two abound in terms of their means and methods. But,

the two are concerned with the same end, although somewhat differently. This is because psychological discourse seeks to restore consonance by ensuring and bringing about wholeness, integrity and authenticity in the mental health of the individual. Religions appear to seek this too, but add their particular ideological ideal of an appropriate individual and way of living.

Before presenting a response to the need for a common language for dealing with dissonance, further exposition of psychological and religious realms of discourse about individual functioning is necessary. Accordingly, the following two chapters present Freud's theory of personality functioning and the Christian Biblical conception of the individual respectively, as paradigmatic statements from each realm that are essential for clarifying the relationship between dissonance, psychology and religion.

CHAPTER TWO

FREUD'S THEORY OF PERSONALITY FUNCTIONING

For the purposes of this thesis a foothold in psychological discourse about personality functioning is needed because a general theory of how persons function was seen as helpful in setting out an exposition of a particular aspect and process of this functioning. The psychodynamic theory of personality functioning by Sigmund Freud has been chosen for this foothold for reasons of its centrality, consistency and suitability for any analysis of the dissonance of guilt.

Firstly, Freud's theory is a major one in any terms. Practically speaking, all psychologists either work within the basics of his theory, or in some modification of it, or in a way that purposefully seeks to work differently to it. It is thus a central theory. Secondly, the theory is a holistic and relatively consistent one, if a 'final theory' is abstracted from the process of Freud's works and the development of his ideas. Thirdly, Freud's model is particularly well suited to our focus of concern. That is, the condition of feeling guilty particularly lends itself to examination in terms of what the id, ego and supergo are and do in the inner environment of the individual, where guilt too has its 'home.'

This presentation of Freud's ideas is not intended to be definitive. Critics and exponents of Freud abound. It seems that there are as many 'Freuds' as there are books about him and his ideas.[1] Arriving at the truth about Freud is the task of psychology, not this thesis. Our task is to use our understanding of his theory to formulate some conclusions regarding our concern. This is because, after all, Freud is perhaps saying nothing new about the human condition. He nevertheless introduced and mapped out an easier, more systematic theory that can be used to reach new and better conclusions.

This chapter will be in three parts. The first presents our understanding of Freud's model, explaining its structural parts. The second explains the dynamics of the theory and the third assesses its implications for the analysis of the dissonance of guilt.

2.1

FREUD'S THEORY OF MENTAL AND PERSONALITY FUNCTIONING: ITS STRUCTURAL PARTS

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) presented humankind with a way of trying to understand itself. His ideas about the theory of personality, his psychoanalytical theory of neurosis, and the techniques of psychoanalysis he proposed, are milestones in the history of ideas. Moreover, they continue to function as cornerstones in the social sciences, arts and humanities of today. This is because Freud presents a systematic and relatively consistent theory of the mental processes of humankind that seem to be responsible for 'behaviour.' In addition, the theory contains concepts and terms which usefully identify and label specific aspects of these processes.

In the preface to his book Freud, Richard Wollheim (1983)[2] succinctly comments on the revolutionary power of Freud's writings and speculations. Wollheim writes:

> "... Sigmund Freud, by the power of his writings and by the breadth and audacity of his speculations, revolutionized the thought, the lives and the imagination of an age. He contradicted, and in some cases he reversed, the prevailing opinions ... on many of the issues of human existence and culture. He led people to think about their appetites and their intellectual powers, about self-knowledge and self-deceit, about the ends of life and about man's profoundest passions and about

> his most intimate or trivial failings, in ways that would have seemed to earlier generations at once scandalous and silly. IT WOULD BE HARD TO FIND IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, EVEN IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION, SOMEONE WHOSE INFLUENCE WAS SO IMMEDIATE, SO BROAD AND SO DEEP."
> (our capitals)

Freud's thoughts all-pervasively explore the complexity of the 'behaviour' of the human mind. He sought to explain the mechanisms of mental life so the complicated sequences of human thought, behaviour and feeling could be more scientifically understood. This 'scientific' quest is apparent in what Freud himself said:

> "Two aims plague me: to see how the theory of mental functions would shape itself if one introduced quantitative considerations, a sort of economics of nervous energy; and, secondly, to extract what psychopathology has to yield for normal psychology."[3]

Freud's account of the mind is one developed out of two realizations he had about human experience. One was the 'fact' of infantile sexuality. It was this 'fact' that led Freud to be able to explain so much of the subsequent psychosexual development of the individual. This was because he was able to trace trajectories of infantile experience in its confrontations with its external environment in 'problematic' feelings and activities evident in case-studies of children and adults. Such later problems were, Freud argued, the direct results of problems in infantile or earlier stages of development.

The second 'fact' was that repression of desires, sexual ones for example, did not negate or remove the power of the desire. It was merely put into the 'System UCS'[4] where it continued, albeit without the individual's awareness, to exert itself. In recognising this, Freud postulated that the System UCS (unconscious) consisted of all that was repressed and contained instinctual representations of drives and autonomic systems. From this conclusion Freud postulated the concept of the ego. This essentially was the repressing forces. These forces operated unconsciously, although the ego was basically a conscious entity. This was because, as Freud explained, the ego can be seen as the basic sense of identity. Clearly the ego worked to repress drives that could or did give rise to feelings of dissonance.

For Freud, personality was the composite result of the interactivity of this unconscious level and the conscious level. The individual personality was a particular conglomeration of instincts, desires and behaviours which originated in a particular developmental process. This process produced the psychological being. But, as Freud explains, there was inevitably considerable tension and subsequent dissonance between instinctual, primitive urges and needs of the 'biological being' which socialized civilized obligations and conventions do not permit. Freud argues that neurotic behaviour results when the psychological being cannot manage the tension or the dissonance effectively.

This is because, Freud posits, all acts of the individual, including perceptions, sensations, emotions, habits, attitudes, thoughts, memories, ideas, and inner conflicts in these, have to be dealt with by the psychological 'function' of the individual. These psychological functions are: repression to the unconscious level; conformity to social/group/familial standards; use of defence mechanisms such as compensation, intellectualization, sublimation, etc.; and the production of feelings of inferiority, guilt and other 'unhealthy' and self-devaluing behaviours.[5] These functions all ensure the individual functions in response to the environment. Some responses constitute debilitating functions with psychopathological possibilities when the functions are inappropriate or inadequate.

Freud postulated that these psychological functions indicated that the personality consists of three major 'systems.' He showed how they function and what they consist of in Lecture 31, entitled "The Dissection of the Psychical personality."[6] This lecture material derives from his earlier work in The Ego and the Id (1923).[7] The three systems are called id, ego and superego. The formulation of them forms Freud's structural theory of the mind which was a new synthesis of his previously formulated topographical division of the mind into preconscious, conscious and unconscious.[8]

This previous topographical theory had been based on the

criterion of accessibility to consciousness. The 'new' structural theory retained the fundamental distinction of levels of consciousness. In it, the id was named as the unconscious instinctual agent, whilst the partially conscious ego and superego were seen as the mediating, regulating agent and moral derivative of the ego respectively. The features, functions, origins and energy-sources of these three entities Freud conceived as theoretical constructs of the personality, usefully explain how psychodynamic dissonance originates and how guilt feelings can be brought about. (A Summary Table of the features and implications of the id, ego and superego is presented in Appendix B.)

The id is described, somewhat colloquially, by Freud as:

> "... the dark, inaccessible part of our personality ... a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitation ... filled with energy reaching it from the instincts ... has no organization ... knows no judgements of value: ... Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge ... is all there is in the id."[9]

Basically, the id is the instinctual agent and is, as Wollheim (1983) describes, the direct heir of the unconscious.[10] It is, furthermore, the congealment of the unacceptables of personal history because it is, according to Freud, the original system of the personality. It is from the id that the ego and superego develop as differentiated parts of the personality. The id originates, from the time of birth at

least, as the conglomeration of all the inherited dispositions of the psycho-biology of the organism, as well as the instincts concomitant with 'being' such an organism. As such it is the storeroom of all psychic energy, deriving energy for and from bodily processes. In turn it supplies the ego and superego with energy for their functions.

But, Freud posits, the id remains without knowledge of the external, objective reality. It consists solely of a subjective world of inner experience operating according to the 'pleasure principle.' This principle basically works to reduce tension. This is because the id is postulated as not being able to tolerate increases in tension, excitation or need which produce unconscious 'feelings' of 'dissonance' which are uncomfortable and painful. Two processes work to reduce this tension, avoid pain and obtain pleasure and consonance for the id-organism.[11] One is reflex action. This is simple reactions which virtually automatically reduce the state of tension. Sneezing, swallowing and blinking are examples. The other, a more complex process, is the primary process. This alternatively forms an image of the desired object or state in a wish-fulfilment procedure. This procedure is one in which the id imagines images of gratification to fulfil the desire. These internal mental images are the only reality that the id 'knows.' The id does not 'know' objects as they are in external reality. The conscious ego is that which 'enables' the individual

to 'know' these.

This means that the id functions in a way that is characteristic of the unconscious mental life. This is one that is without a sense of time or logic, is wholly internalized and self-sustaining and is without any means for negation. In Freud's words, in the id "contrary impulses exist side by side without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other".[12] This means that the possible effects of contrary impulses not only co-exist but also continue any dissonance, conflict and tension they may cause at the unconscious level.

The characteristics and nature of the ego are, Freud shows, distinguishable from the id in three ways in its mode of relating to the external world. The ego 'evolves' because of the id-organism's[11] need to interact realistically with the external world to ensure survival. The id cannot do this. The three ways that the ego deals with the world are: by perceiving the world (in terms of what Freud called the System Pcpt (perception)); by changing the world (what Freud called 'approaches to motility'; and by adapting to the world (basically with the aid of the systems of defence (defence mechanisms)).[13]

Basically the ego, unlike the id, distinguishes between the objective real world and the subjective inner world of id-

wish-fulfilment. It needs to realistically and appropriately reduce the state of tension and dissonance in the organism that needs and drives may exact. It therefore operates according to what Freud termed the reality principle. This secondary process, in distinction to the primary process of the pleasure principle, seeks to discharge tension only when appropriate objects are available.[14]

By doing so, Freud explains, the ego 'suspends' the id's pleasure principle's immediate quest for pleasure and avoidance of displeasure to test reality. The ego therefore uses cognitive and intellectual functions to 'decide' what best to do. It thus serves an executive function, using the higher mental processes allied to the reality principle which, Freud explains, "promises more certainty and greater success" in dealing with the conflict of interest between id demands and the external world.[15]

As such, the ego has the difficult task of serving what Freud calls 'three tyrannical masters.' These are the id, the superego and the external world. Again, to use Freud's own words, the ego "does what it can to bring their claims and demands into harmony with one another."[16] Naturally this executive function, of mediating and regulating, is not an easy task. Dissonance stress, anxiety and other 'feelings' result. This is because the ego has to ensure individual happiness and survival and that this takes place in a socially

appropriate way. To do so 'id' energies have to be appropriately directed so that external conditions are also advantageously appropriated and states of tension, conflict or dissonance do not debilitate.

It is the fact that the ego is very much a 'bodily ego' that the crux of its executive functioning can be seen. Wollheim usefully makes three points to explain Freud's assertion that the "ego is first and foremost a bodily ego."[17] Firstly, the growth of consciousness and perception of the world result from the ego differentiating itself from the world. Secondly, it is because of this 'growth' that the ego emerges out of the id. Thirdly, the concept of the ego brings self-awareness and the ego itself into existence. The differentiation between levels of identity explains these divisions and developments of awareness in another way in Chapter One above.

For Freud, the ego is the "sense organ of the entire apparatus."[18] It functions as a mediating and regulating agent. As Wollheim reminds us, the ego is "systematic in ways unknown to the id."[19] Furthermore, as Freud himself explained, the ego is "A coherent organization of mental processes."[20] Because this system receives its energy from the id, Freud argues, the id-ego relationship is similar to the horse and rider situation. The former provides the energy whilst the latter decides and guides the employment of the energy.

The ego's role is more complicated than a simple working relationship such as in this analogy. The superego also participates in the process of energy management. Stein (1969) uses the car, driver and parental-instructor-inner voice analogy to explain the id-energy-ego executive and superego inner voice matrix, in the same way that Freud sees the superego as the internalized standards and teachings of the riding instructor. These analogies explain, to some extent, the complex network of psychic functioning. Clearly the basic issue is one of energy control and the effects of the energy not being controlled, if and when the ego does not fulfil it's executive functions.

The superego, the moral derivative of the ego's executive functioning, is essentially a critical agent, judging the ego's control of the id energy. The superego results from the incorporation[21] of parental-authority figures by the child as it grows up. These internalizations need not necessarily accurately replicate the standards and norms of the figures. Nevertheless, the superego, as heir to the Oedipus Complex, confronts the rest of the ego. This is vis-a-vis the ego's mediation and regulation of id demands in contradistinction to the demands of the external world and the constructs the superego holds. The latter in turn imposes another set of demands that can be, by their very nature, normative. That is, the superego stands in judgement of the ego's efforts to control the id and have the individual

live appropriately.

This judgemental stance occurs because, by its very idealistic and moralistic nature, the superego is the internal representation of a particularized tradition of values and ideals. These are those of the ambient socio-cultural environment in which the individual, parents and others are located. The parents interpret and shape these values, ideals and norms in the parenting socialization process. Gradually parental control is replaced with self-control as the individual ego-superego establishes and maintains a personal, self-regulating 'moral' faculty.

That is, the superego a particular result of a particular process, occurs in the development of the functioning of the ego. It results from the internalization of socio-parental standards. It is therefore something that has its own particular history. Thus, Freud argues, it needs to be distinguished from other ethical-religious constructs such as what theologians call a "God-given faculty of conscience" for example.[22]

Freud makes it quite clear that 'conscience' is a term he applies to a particular sub-system of the superego.[23] He does of course use the word somewhat idiosyncraticly. For Freud it is not 'God-given.' It is rather the incorporation of parental standards about 'wrongs' that causes feelings

of inferiority, inadequacy and guilt. This sub-system is, Freud states, different to a second superego sub-system, that of the 'Ego Ideal.'[24] This latter sub-system is the incorporation of parental standards of what they approve of and which can cause feelings of self-worth and pride.

With the aid of these two sub-systems, the superego, Freud explains, "enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, follows its own intentions and is independent of the ego for its supply of energy."[25] This is also because it gets its energy direct from the id. Wollheim's assessment neatly explains the position in this regard:

> "The energy of the superego is aggression. For the superego in its confrontation with the ego, draws upon that portion of the death instinct which was projected upon the parental figure that was its prototype .... This is what Freud had in mind when he wrote ... 'The superego merges into the id: indeed as heir to the Oedipus Complex, it has intimate relations with the id.'"[26]

The superego's aggresive functions of "self-observation, of conscience and of (maintaining) the ideal,"[27] indicate how it does three things. First, the superego inhibits and controls the impulses of the id. Second, it does so whilst seeking the moralistic goals of parental societal 'rights' of behaviour and causes feelings of discomfort when these are violated or breached. Third, the superego strives for perfection in terms of that which Freud deemed to be the

"higher side of human life,"[28] or what he elsewhere calls the ego ideal.

These three functions of the superego are not necessarily easily carried out. Wollheim has identified four features of the superego which "illuminate many of the paradoxes in our everyday life."[29] These are presented below and underlined. A brief commentary follows each by way of explanation.

1. <u>The peculiar harshness of the superego</u>

   The harshness must be related to the superego's aggressive content as indicated by Freud in its relationship to the id. Moreover, the degree of harshness will be determined by the degree of the id's demands. That is, as Wollheim explains, the superego's harshness is a necessary, and by its nature, severe 'mechanism' as it seeks to effect control.

2. <u>The systematic discrepancy between the individual's superego standards and the individual's actual behaviour</u>

   The discrepancy between the superego's standards and the individual's actual behaviour, reflects, in the Freudian view, the differing sources and determinants of moral authority and actual behaviour. The superego, as heir to external moral authority, is an internalized version of the moral authority. Consequently, individuals invariably do behave contrary to the dictates and wishes

of the superego and the discrepancy invokes situations of inner conflict and subsequent dissonance in feelings of guilt.

3. The intertwined erotic and ethical elements of (moral) mental life

The intertwining relates to the basic drives of pleasure-seeking being contrary to appropriate or conventional expression of the desire for pleasure. Thus what is erotic may not be ethically or morally 'permissable.' Ethics and morals are determined in terms of their specific socio-religious contexts and the degree of intertwining between erotic and ethical elements varies a great deal.

4. The connection of the superego with the Oedipus Complex

The connection shows how there can so easily be the continuation of neurosis from early developmental problems into the later years. Clearly the Oedipus Complex is one such network of developmental problems which, as a complex, affects subsequent development and experience.

These 'paradoxes' are all related to issues involved in explaining what it is to 'feel guilty.' The superego can be peculiarly over-scrupulous and harsh in its 'moral' denigration of the ego for some or other 'mismanagement' of the energies of the id. Moreover, dissonance and guilt

feelings over some or other action can also exist independently of any moral feeling about the action. The converse can also be true when the superego seems to function in a third sub-system, differing from the conscience and ego ideal sub-systems. This function could be termed the sub-system of 'personal experience values' that evolves and exists as a consequence of parental-societal internalizations.

As Wollheim explains, the intertwining of the erotic and the ethical is most evident in the dissonance and guilt feelings that so easily develop in the 'first love' experience. The ethics and 'morality' of sexual practice inevitably conflict with the erotics and pleasure-now demands of sexual gratification and desire reflecting and continuing any Oedipus Complex conflict feelings too. The guilt feelings that result from any misdirection of feelings from this latter arena of psycho-sexual development similarly generate paradoxical situations in the individual's inner moral world's confrontation with the external world's morality-system.

This confrontation points to how the superego can at times be opposed to both the id and the ego. Yet, the superego is like the ego in trying to control the id's instincts and demands as well as being like the id in its non-rationality. However, because it seeks to permanently block and control id demands, the superego differs from the ego. It thus may be over-scrupulous in its functioning. It is in this situa-

tion, as an over-harsh construct that pinpoints and inflates discrepancies and misdemeanours in behaviour, that the superego seems to be most influential. This influence is compounded by the superego's ability to seek and attain the permanent repression of material to the unconscious, and therefore non-dangerous but not non-effective, levels of awareness.

This repressed material nevertheless can continue to have unconscious effects on personality functioning. Freud looked at this in terms of the different functions of the ego which manifests resistance to prevent repressed material from returning to consciousness. It appears that to effect this control the ego and the superego co-operate unconsciously. From this it is evident that the ego and superego can and do operate both consciously and unconsciously. Problematic results of repression and resistance provide the 'situation' with which the therapist has to work, if the individual is unable to resolve their own problems.

2.2

THE DYNAMICS OF FREUD'S THEORY

The dynamics of Freud's theory of functioning can be seen, albeit simplistically, as three co-operating, sometimes conflicting, systems. Generally these three differing psychological entities work together as a team to ensure optimal

functioning in a contented inner environment that, free from debilitating tension(s) and dissonance, realistically appropriates the best from the external world in a symbiotic relationship for optimal survival.

In New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (NILOP), Freud gives a useful colloquial illustration of his theory in the analogy of an imaginery "country with a landscape of varying configuration ... with a mixed population ... who carry on different activities. Although there is necessary and evident partitioning, there is also disorderliness and mixing with some deviations in the details."[30] This lucidly and succinctly encapsulates the id, ego, superego differentiation and contiguity.

In essence, Freud's theory of mental and personality functioning is a dynamic one that explores and explains the motivating forces for and of human mental behaviour. He called these motive forces the instincts.[31] These are basically the Freudian psychological equivalent of drives. They constitute the psychic energy that is the individual's and consist of two aspects. One is psychological - Freud called this the wish. The other is biological - this Freud called the need.

Instincts, Freud argued, are either life instincts (eros) or death instincts (thanatos). The former constitute the libido or psychic energy and forms the id. They are construc-

tive forces, seeking survival of individual and species. The latter constitute aggressive, destructive drives. Thus, both kinds of drives or instincts dynamically interrelate in the psychic functioning of the individual. That is, the ego and superego, derivatives of the id, propel and determine the behaviour and nature of the individual in direct relationship to their instincts.

Ideally the id, ego and superego work together as an harmonious team. The ego satisfies the id's demands in ways approved by the superego. The individual is then able to live without psychopathology, expressing emotions reasonably and sensibly without any sense of debilitating guilt and dissonance. Such an ideal situation is clearly qualitatively different from situations in which either the id or the superego dominate psychic functioning. This occurs when the id dominates, and instincts become unbridled and the individual is, at worst, a danger to him or herself and/or society. When the superego dominates, the individual's behaviour is too rigidly controlled and judged. The result is a miserable, oversensitive and lowered self-esteem individual with possible high levels of guilt feelings and constant states of dissonance.

2.3

IMPLICATIONS

Freud's model evolved out of his earlier topographical theory into his structural theory of the human mind because clinical data contradicted and challenged the earlier paradigm. Consequently the model is a self-confirming one because the data used to verify it is obtained through methods which ascribe to the model. That is, the facts of psychodynamic functioning of the human mind are identified and assessed according to psychodynamic theory in the process of psychoanalysis in a circular process of definition.

Moreover, the facts of psychodynamic functioning according to this theory are only theoretical constructs. Their actual observable manifestations are not self-evident. In this way they are similar to the unobservable nature of drives and the conscience whilst similarly being patently responsible for feelings and mental states within the individual that affect visible behaviours. The usefulness of Freud's theory is thus in the way that it nevertheless provides a systematic means of identifying and explaining what is going on inside one person when assessed by another.

The theory, as the paradigmatic statement for psychoanalysis as a therapeutic approach, locates the origins of abnormal

functioning in childhood experiences or events that have been particularly emotionally painful. These painful, discomforting experiences and events have somehow interfered with and affected normal personality development. As a consequence, the individual is unable to resolve conscious and unconscious conflicts, dissonance and impulses except by maladaptive strategies. The location of causes of feelings of dissonance and conflict in specific events and experiences intimates how and where the therapeutic process has to begin so that effective resolution will occur and facilitate appropriate adaptive strategies.

Freud's theory of psychodynamic structures of the human mind is holistic as it recognises the relationships between the different components of the personality and their functioning as observed in behaviour. Similarly, the theory accounts for the multiple determinants of actions and does not attribute results to single causes. Specific causes, once identified in earlier events and experiences, are allied to the entire case history of the individual with references made to other aspects of Freudian analysis such as psychosexual development, defense mechanisms as well as the general role and understanding of the unconscious in personality functioning.

By making the individual life the centre of the individual's control and experience, the theory does not conceive of any component or role to be played by some outside agency such

as Christ in the Christian conception. That is, Freud's theory is egocentric rather than Christocentric and sees the individual unit as a self-contained entity which, although influenced by the outside environment, is not directed or required to live in any particular way such as the Christian conception advocates. In this way, the theory sees the individual totally responsible for his or her actions and reactions with no recourse to any outside agency.

The theory is therefore a secular conception of personality functioning which means that the points of reference for ethical obligations are different to those in conceptions that are construed by systems of religion. That is, the ethical obligations in Freud's theory are construed in terms of egocentric and anthropocentric considerations about what is right and wrong for the individual and humankind. The considerations are thus formulated without reference to conceptions of what is right and wrong according to some system of religion but are construed more explicitly in relation to norms of appropriate, adaptive personality functioning and behaviour.

The view that individuals are not motivated by instinctual drives which control psychic energy behind all human action thus explains how the dissonance of guilt feelings can occur when instinctual drives initiate disharmony in id ego and superego functioning. The drives, or instincts, in confronta-

tion with how and when they can be expressed in need satisfaction and goal attainment, indicate how dissonance can eventuate when appropriate goal objects are unavailable or when goal objects are incongruous. In this way, Freud's theory neatly confirms the conclusions of the phenomenological consideration of the individual presented in Chapter One. That is, the id can be seen as that which was described as the 'unit' in differentiation to the 'identity' that is known by the ego. Similarly, the id consists of needs which the ego seeks to satisfy. The process of satisfaction also involves the superego judging the appropriateness of the id's 'needs', 'drives' and 'goals' and how the ego deals with them.

In this regard it is interesting to note that Freud used the German word 'trieb', meaning drive and the word instinct has been used, "for reasons of style and grammar and to avoid anachronistic misrepresentation of Freud's ideas."[32] Freud's own words best explain his conception of the instincts and how they are in effect instinctual drives:

> An instinct, then, is distinguished from a stimulus by the fact that it arises from sources of stimulation within the body, that it operates as a constant force and that the subject cannot avoid it by flight, as is possible with an external stimulus. We can distinguish an instinct's source, object and aim. Its source is a state of excitation in the body, its aim is the removal of that excitation; on its path from its source to its aim the instinct becomes operative psychically. We picture it as a certain quota of energy which presses in a particular direction. It is from this pressing that it derives its name of 'Trieb'.[33]

The implications of the theory's self-confirming nature, its usefulness as a therapeutic theoretical system, its location of causes in specific events and experiences, its holistic, secular and egocentric conceptions of the individual and its appraisal of instinctual drives all indicate the extent and importance of Freud's theory in any consideration of the human condition. It clearly stands as a third possibility for viewing personality functioning with the phenomenological view from the inside and the religious conceptions as reified proscriptions from the outside being the two principal theoretical formulations it differs from.

CONCLUSIONS

Freud's theory affords a useful means of looking at the processes involved in psychopathology, and, more specifically, how the condition and experience of 'feeling guilty' can be viewed psychodynamically. Issue has not been taken with neo-Freudian, anti-Freudian or any other assessment of Freud's theory. This is because his theory has been set out here for use in referring to a theoretical construct of mental and personality functioning in which the condition and experience of 'feeling guilty' can begin to be understood.

The extent to which it is a closed-system model suits this purpose. This is because the condition of feeling guilty is also a closed-system of cause and effect in the inner environment of the individual. This means the aim is to find the most appropriate means to enter this closed-system in order to effect therapy when this is required.

It can be concluded therefore that Freud sets out a useful theory of personality functioning with particular reference to the role of the unconscious. From this theory it can be seen how, when motives are unconscious, the motive itself and the distress it gives to consciousness are invariably responsible for psychopathological symptoms and inhibitions of dissonance.

In short, Freud's theory of the effects of the unconscious gives three astute perceptions about personality functioning. These are, firstly, that the individual possesses networks of ideas, feelings, beliefs and attitudes which are not consciously realized. By their nature these networks consist of sub-networks which can conflict and cause dissonance. Thus, second, the networks and their conflicts influence the individual at the conscious level. These influences can be related to specific personal-history events, so that, third, some networks establish complexes which have particular effects in later years after their genesis in childhood. The Oedipus Complex is one such theoretically hypothesized network-complex.

Freud's theory of personality functioning is thus a fundamental paradigmatic statement in psychological discourse. As such it is a particularly secular and egocentric conception of the status, purpose and functioning of the individual. The Christian Biblical conception of the individual alternatively propounds a distinctly religious conception of the individual. Accordingly, a presentation of this conception therefore appears necessary to gain a foothold in religious discourse about the individual and states of dissonance.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CHRISTIAN BIBLICAL CONCEPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The Bible, the cannonized collection of Christian writings consisting of the Old and New Testaments, has presented the world with a particular conception of life and living. Its writers, and those who accept what they wrote, hold a network of convictions about the world and the place of the individual in it. The nature and the content of these convictions has shaped the lives of many. This is because the Bible is regarded as authoritative writ for Christianity, a major world religion.

For the purposes of this thesis a basic outline of the Biblical Christian conception of the individual was considered necessary. The debates about revelation, scripture and authority, as well as what religion is, will not be entered into. This chapter is intended to provide an outline of the Bible's basic conception of the individual as a creature. How this notion of creatureliness affects the individual will be discussed.

Several pertinent Biblical and Christian words and concepts form the basis of the presentation. The analysis of them traces their meanings and significance as comprehensively as possible in and for the lives of individuals with particular

reference the dissonance of guilt feelings and how these have been engendered by this conception.

The exclusive language some texts of the Bible use for details and ideas about the nature and functioning of the individual is oftentimes unclear because of masculine terminology. The many different original Hebrew words denoting differences in age, sex, status, rank and position had their specific nuances negated in translation to the Greek words for man and mankind, anthropos and aner. The Biblical sense of man will nevertheless be taken as referring to humankind and used accordingly.

Complexities of literary and historical criticism has meant using references from the Bible has been a selective process to prevent quoting out of context and ascribing thoughts to the wrong writers. The presentation below is therefore intended to provide the salient and pertinent aspects of the conceptions of the Bible in outline form so an appropriate understanding of this major conception of human nature, and its influential implications, is achieved.

This chapter thus consists of three parts. The first considers the Old and New Testament's conceptions of the individual to arrive at a general statement of the Biblical Christian conception of the individual.[1] The second part explores some of the implications of this conception. In particular,

the nature and the role of sin and sins is dealt with. The implications of sin, contiguous on the development and faculty of conscience, with the concomitant advent of guilt feelings, forms the Part Three.

3.1

THE OLD TESTAMENT, NEW TESTAMENT AND CHRISTIAN BIBLICAL CONCEPTION

The Old Testament (OT) conception of the individual is contained in its understanding of the particular weakness, transitory mortality and creatureliness of humankind whilst taking note of the general significance of humanity in creation as a whole. Both accounts of Creation, as found in Genesis 1 : 1 ff and 2 : 4 ff, place human beings as the most important factors to come out of the process.[2] In both accounts, the human creature is presented as second only to the Creator God in terms of the role that humanity is to have in the grand design of the Creation.[3]

This status, is evident in the way humans have power and authority over all else (Gen 1 : 26), are required to cultivate and protect their environment, (Gen 2 : 15) and were responsible for naming all the other created things (Gen 2 : 19). Moreover, they are in close, direct communication with the Creator God. This relationship enforces the notion that humankind existed solely in terms of having been given life from the Creator and would inevitably be tied to the Creator as creatures. Thus, despite the breaking off of direct communication because of the Fall (Gen 3), the notion of creatureliness continues to make humankind cognizant of their Creator.

The rationale and the implications of the Story of the Fall are not pertinent at this point.[4] It is simply necessary to note that, as 'fallen creatures,' human individuals are presented in the OT as whole units with different aspects. These aspects make them what they are. This is because these aspects are not conceived of as differentiated parts, as was later to be expounded in the Greek division of the individual into body, mind and soul. In the OT conception of the individual, the different aspects are represented in the words flesh, spirit, heart and soul. Each individual consisted of these four aspects, none of which was seen as existing independently of the others.

The Hebrew word for flesh, bāśār, refers to humankind's origins in the material dust and indicates transitoriness. Psalm 78 v 39 uses the word so that the English version is translated to read: "He remembered they were only mortal beings, like a wind blows by and is gone." Similarly, the Hebrew word for spirit, rûah, refers to humankind's relation to the Creator God as a creature made alive by this God. The third aspect of the individual in the OT conception, the soul, is represented by the Hebrew word nepes. This referred to humans being life bound up within one body and living as one body. It did not refer to a separate or pre-existent or immortal part of the person. It was conceived of as an aspect of the particular, living whole.

The word for heart in Hebrew, lēḇāḇ, refers to the individual's actual inner essential nature as opposed to any nature that may be presented or assumed. This inner faculty was considered to be the controlling instrument which regulated the individual's life appropriately, and was seen as the centre of self-understanding and self-knowledge as well as knowledge and understanding of the environment.

In this regard, the heart was seen as specifically concerned with morality, particularly religious morality. The reason for this was that OT morality was wholly bound up in considerations of divine law as the fabric of all law. As such, the heart was seen as a controlling mechanism of the individual and as a personal, ultimately public, index of the individual's essential nature. In this sense the OT conception of the heart can be seen as a correlate of the faculty of conscience. In fact, the Hebrew word lēb, meaning conscience, is clearly cognate with lēḇāḇ.

This mainstream OT conception of the individual human being is still extant in Rabbinic Judaism.[5] As such it still shapes the lives and worldviews of many individuals who are directly or indirectly linked to the Jewish world religion. Two seminal alternatives to this mainstream conception are found in subsequent developments that produced Gnosticism and Christianity.

The New Testament (NT) Christian conception of the individual

continues from that of the OT. That is, the individual is always and absolutely known in relation to the Creator God. The three basic OT assumptions of creatureliness, mortality and disobedience remain cornerstones of the NT conception. Human existence remains contingent only in and through the presence, plans and grace of the Creator God whom, the NT argues, has now gone to the extent of Sending His Son to Save humankind from Sin.

Consideration of the doctrines, beliefs and attitudes attached to the words capitalized in the sentence above are beyond the orbit of this discussion. Suffice to say the NT sets out the elements for constructing the world view these words relate to. A simplistic outline of this worldview indicates that in it, all individuals are seen as sinners, and they can be redeemed from their sin only through the life and death of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.

Hence, according to the NT, individuals have the opportunity and purpose of seeking God-like, or Christ-like, perfection because the Creator God has made this possible. He also provided a model in Christ.[6] From this, the NT conception asserts, the Creator God values humankind. Therefore, humanity owes obedience and service within a renewed symbiotic Creator-creature relationship which would evince Christian living.

As a major exponent of the Christian worldview on life and

living, one of the principle NT writers, Paul, elaborates on this particular conception of the individual. The Pauline conception seeks to sharply differentiate between the old self, who, without Christ was perverted, culpable and bound in sin, and different to the new, Christian self. This new sense of self the individual can have, Paul argued, was one that enabled the individual, through Christ, to be free, renewed and led by the Holy Spirit. What Paul meant is explained in this passage from his letter to the Ephesians:

> So get rid of your old self, which made you live as you used to, - the old self that was being destroyed by its deceitful desires. Your hearts and minds must be made completely new, and you must put on the new self, which, is created in God's likeness and reveals itself in the true life that is upright and holy. (4 : 22 ff)

This points to a rather radicle lifestyle change and marks a shift in personality theory from the OT. The OT conception of the individual could not have theoretically construed two distinctly different lifestyles in the way that Paul has. The OT only pointed to the deviation from the normal, without positing a new life taking over from another. In addition, the OT could not conceive of a Christ-like power affecting this. This was because the individual, in their fallen state, was seen as personally responsible for ensuring that he or she remained as close to God and the norm as possible.

Paul is responsible for introducing two other new notions into the NT conception of the individual that differ from the OT. The new self, is Paul argues, complemented with the soul, which, as part of the existence of the individual in this life, is sown in a physical body (some psychikon). This would be raised, through Christ, in a spiritual resurrection body (some penumatikon) when the dead are raised to life. This second notion, as presented in I Corinthians 15 : 42 ff is a clear shift from the OT idea of the soul. The OT conception of the individual did not see the possibility of a soul existing or developing in this way, as it was considered an aspect, not a part, of the individual that had a purpose of its own.

The other notion Paul introduced results from his use of the word pneuma. This word means spirit and refers to the inner-self state and concept of self-consciousness. This knowledge of self, Paul argues, seeks to experience, to understand experience, and to relate the individual to the environment, in terms of the will of God through Christ. Thus, Paul asserts, Christians have a mechanism obliging them to live not as human nature dictates, but to

> "live as the Spirit tells you to - if, in fact, God's spirit lives in you."
>
> (Rom 8 : 9)

This is Paul's theme in his Letter to the Romans, Chapter 8,

which deals with the practicalities of 'Life in the Spirit.' He argues that it is the spirit which wills the individual to be rational, moral, upright and true, with these cognitive processes primarily realized in the mind of the individual. These realizations, Paul concludes, are the faculty and function of syneidesis - the conscience.

The Johannine conception of the individual in John's NT writing is also important for assessing the NT understanding of individual functioning and the worldview it is located in. John has, like Paul, specific concerns which build on and differ from OT concerns. Humankind's beligerent living in opposition to the Creator God is one issue of concern. John argues it is wrong humanity continues to fall victim to the ways of the world that do not accord with the will of the Creator. John therefore points to the decision choice that is necessary for the individual to make between the world and God. Evidence for this can be found in John 15: 19 and 19 and I John 5 : 3 ff:-

> "If the world hates you, know that it has hated me before it hated you. If you were of the world, the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you," and
>
> "For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments. And his commandments are not burdensome. For whatever is born of God overcomes the world; and this is the victory that overcomes the world, our faith. Who is it that overcomes the world but he who believes that Jesus is the Son of God?", respectively.

Clearly then, in Paul's and John's conceptions of humankind in the NT, the conceptions of the OT world assumptions remain. These are that the human creature need and can only be considered in terms of his, or her relationship to the Creator God. Human existence is seen as contingent only on this God. Life is therefore effective and correct only in so far as it is carred out in accordance with the will of God. This is because, as creatures, individuals are dependent on this God. Individuals therefore are responsible beings, accountable to God. That the relationship has been broken or is misconstrued because individuals are not always willing to accept or acknowledge this symbiosis.

3.2

SIN AND SINS

Because the symbotic Creator-creature relationship is not always acknowledged or accepted, the concepts of sin and sins became part of the Biblical conception. This was because these concepts reified defects in the relationship.[7] In addition, they pointed to the implications of the defaults either explicitly or implicitly. Thus it was both assumed and declared in the Biblical conception that, because of the sin and sins of default, individuals were no longer whole, free creatures as originally intended by the Creator.[8] Instead they lived with a sense and in a state of alienation from

Him and this alienation affected all other aspects and activities of their being human.

To a large extent the Story of the Fall (Genesis 3) is taken therefore as doctrine to explain this curious state of affairs.[9] In addition, the Story of the Life and Resurrection of Jesus Christ is taken as doctrine to explain the means of changing this state of affairs. Consequently, Jesus Christ is conceived of as the last new Adam, who points to the possibility and actuality of an un-alienated form of existence. This point of view is lucidly explained by Paul in I Corinthians 15 : 45 ff. Here he deals with the culmination of Christian hope and belief, in the resurrection of the dead through Christ, when the state of alienation would be ended for ever. Paul writes:

> "Thus it is written, 'The first man Adam became a living being"; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit .... Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven ... we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed ... and the dead will be raised imperishable .... For this perishable nature must put on the imperishable, and this mortal nature must put on immortality."

The Bible writings as a whole presented the world with a set of 'Christian' assumptions and attitudes which, as the constituents of conceptions, have shaped a particular worldview. One consequence of this particular worldview, in which there are many permutations, is that humankind has a particular

role and destiny to fulfil and has the freedom to contravene any or all aspects of either or both role and destiny. In essence contravention meant sin as contravention was considered to be against the will of the Creator God. This understanding seems implicit in the decision-choice made by Adam and Eve, in which all people throughout the decision choices of their own lives share in, as a necessary consequence of being human. That is, each individual, in this conception, has the propensity to commit sins or be in a state of sin simply because he can choose not to obey the will of God. This notion confirms and relates to the issues of the universality and inevitability of the dissonance of guilt in human experience.

It is important to note differences between the OT understanding of sin as compared to the NT. In the OT, it is apparent that sin is universal and that humankind are all sinners by nature and by relation. This mysterious state of affairs is taken as a given in the religion by which it was formulated. Attempts were made nevertheless to explain the origins and the implications of the mystery of the actuality of sin and humankind's separation and alienation for the Creator God. The Story of Adam and Eve and the serpent (Genesis 3) and of Satan in the life of the good man Job are two notable examples (Book of Job).[10]

These two stories function as religious myth to illustrate basic assumptions of this particular religion and represent

basic doctrinal beliefs continuing through the OT into the New Testament. One of these is that every sin brings a consequence of punishment because it was conceived to be in the very nature of the Creator God to be angered when affronted by His creatures' wrong doing. Another is that evil is a real force in the creature and is at work as a part of the nature of things.

Evil is seen as something within and beyond the realm of things contrary to the will of the Creator God.[11] In either situation, humankind was obliged and responsible, despite the contrary pressures of evil, to try to live as free but obedient creatures. Sin was seen as being the total state of not doing so. Sins were seen as the specific acts which were not concordant with such standards of obedience and therefore constituted being in a state of sin.[12]

Sins were considered to be actions which were wrong because they were contrary to the normal. In going against the normal they were immediately perceived as against the Created Order and will of the Creator. Thus, in OT writing and thought, all sins were seen as against God primarily and thereby also against the community, social justice and normality. Therefore, any and all sins were perceived as resulting in a state of sin. Judaism and its OT antecedents developed an elaborate system of ritual and sacrifice to negate these effects and re-establish atonement. This was because being in a state

of a sin was an undesirable condition to be in. The ritual of atonement in Leviticus 16 indicates one means of changing this condition.

To understand the OT conception of sin and abhorrence of it, it is useful to refer to Pidoux's (1958) article on the subject.[13] Pidoux explains the Israelites differentiated good actions from evil actions. This was because actions were seen as expressions of the real nature of the actor. As the normal and good was taken to be that which accorded with the will and the laws of the Creator God, that which was abnormal in any way was seen as being necessarily contrary to the divine will. Accordingly, good actions were taken as disclosures of normal, well balanced personalities. Bad or evil actions however were considered disclosures of personalities in conflict and lacking real moral and mental health. Hebrew words used to denote evil actions connote something distorted and twisted, something unjust or plainly rebellious.[14]

Two other points explain the OT understanding of sin. The first is that because of the importance of the community and the relative unimportance of any particular individual in it, any breach of norms or violation of them by an individual was taken as something that damaged the community as a whole. This was because the community was seen as instituted by the Creator God. Transgression against His will

therefore also devolved into and out of any transgression against the community. The reason for this was that any transgression meant consequence, and the consequences would affect the community, not only the transgressor.[15]

The second point is that because the community of the people of Israel was seen as being instituted by the Creator God, and His laws were taken as the Law, there was no possibility of any secularizing differentiation between religious sin and other sin. In terms of the Mosaic covenant, all law-breaking was sin because all were inevitably ultimately direct offences against the Creator God.

Despite this apparent conceptual unity about sin in the OT being any and all contraventions of the Divine Creator God's will, resulting in the individual's alienation from the Creator God, there is no actual semantic unity. Gottfried Quell (1951), in a comprehensive coverage of sin in the OT, points out that the OT does not contain a unified exposition of what sin is, if it is indeed a single concept or term in it at all.[16]

This discrepancy can be resolved when it is considered that the original Hebrew vocabulary was far more complex and varied than could be accurately translated into other languages. Consequently nuances of meaning and linguistic specifics of the original writers' contexts have been affected. Never-

theless, a fairly exhaustive idea of sin, made up from a re-examination of the many words and terms and their application, does constitute a fairly sound and accurate theological unity.

The basic theological idea of sin, Quell argues, is thus that sin is some or other action which is deemed a deviation from the prescribed norm. These norms were determined by and within the specific doctrinal beliefs and assumptions contained in the OT worldview and the religion it referred to. However, as Quell points out, there is generally an emphasis on the psychical aspect of the action itself or of the situation it causes to result. This psychical condition of the actor constitutes concerns for mental health. This is because it is posited that by deviating from the norm and feeling bad about doing so, debilitating feelings of dissonance, such as those of guilt, can occur.

It is significant that Quell states a considerable number of Hebrew words we can translate to mean sin "frequently seem to justify, or actually demand, the English word 'guilt' for their translation." Quell's conclusion in this regard cogently explains the situation. He writes:

> "... the Hebrews attached little importance to the distinction between sin and guilt, the causal connection being obvious between abnormal behaviour and an abnormal situation."[17]

From this it can be seen why there is little or no explicit exposition of the dissonance condition of feeling guilty in the OT. This is because having committed a sin, feeling guilty was a concomitant response in the creature who was automatically cognizant of culpability before the Creator God. Obviously feelings of guilt were in direct correspondence to cognizance of culpability and responsibility and prescribed guilt did not necessarily mean felt guilt.

Further enlightenment on this issue is provided by Günther (1978).[18] In looking at the Septuagint (LXX) translation of Hebrew words denoting sin, Günther points out that a relatively small number of Greek words are used as translations for the many Hebrew words. For example, the Greek word adika (guilt) used 250 times in the LXX, represents some 36 different Hebrew words. Some examples of Hebrew words are awon (offence guilt punishment), awlah (perversity wickedness), hamas (injustice) and seqer (lie). These words all refer to occasions of wrong, abnormal, anti-community and thereby anti-God behaviours. They are seen as sins and demand the actor to feel guilty about his or her wrongdoing.

Thus the LXX manages, by using one word in place of thirty-six, to present a more concisely organized and more simply unified doctrine of sin than does the many worded Hebrew language of the OT. Georg Bertram (1951)[19] argues that the LXX doctrine

of sin is expressed in consistent language usage in order to propound the notion of fundamental sin. Fundamental sin is that which humankind inherits through relation to Adam and sharing in his Fall and is also the general state of humankind's predeliction to being against God. As proposed by Bertram, this concept of sin refers to that which occurs whenever human folly, presumptuousness, idolatry, wealth and power pollute and breach the natural, normal creature-Creator symbiosis.

Because of the Jesus event and all its implications, the NT conception of sin and humankind, although grounded in the world of the OT, has new dimensions.[20] These shape an even more particular worldview differing from the OT. In the NT there is a general conception of sin being the misunderstanding, by the created, of the Creator God's will.[21] This obviously has its roots in the OT conception of sin being any and all actions which, in deviating from the norm, are against God.

In the NT there are warnings, from Jesus Christ himself, against prescriptive legalism and hypocrisy. In fact, Pharisaic standards and attitudes are derided as exemplified in Matthew 12 and 23. Nevertheless, sin in the NT is not seen as a less powerful and less threatening anti-God construct.[22] Jesus himself recognizes and unceasingly points out the reality of sin with of course the added dimension of His victory

over it. His life and resurrection create a new world situation and worldview because He is seen as having conquered sin.

This new situation is seen to mean humankind can no longer be unconditionally alienated from God simply because of sharing in humanity's Fall and alienation through Adam. However, the Creator-God-created relationship is not yet fully restored. Life needs to still be lived with freedom to err in the quest of becoming more and more Christ-like. That is, the individual can and inevitably will, commit sins against the normal, the natural and the will of the Creator God. But, only in extreme, self-determined circumstances, when the pressures of the world and the evil of it are anti-God, will the individual reach the state of sin wherein he is wholly and absolutely alienated from God. Particularized sins may violate and temporarily alienate the individual from God. But, as the Pauline and Johannine writings strive to make clear, individuals are able to set themselves free from sin and sins by acknowledging the role and the reality of Jesus Christ. This role and reality, they, as spokesmen of the NT Christian conception argue, has the purpose and the power to restore the created to his or her rightful relationship with the Creator God.

It has already been established that the OT has no main general word for sin in its Hebrew origins. In addition, the OT

conception did not differentiate between sin and sins as all sins were considered to cause sin. This situation of apparent confusion was perhaps due to the fact that in the OT conception, sin, guilt and punishment were not seen as separates. Rather, they were seen as contingent on the other as direct results of the individual's active estrangement from the Creator God, his acknowledgement of the estrangement, and feeling bad about it due to the dissonance between expectation and performance.

In the NT, Paul and John present and develop a different conception of the doctrine of sin to that of the OT. They use the word hamartia consistently when they are dealing with the question of sin. This Greek word denotes missing the mark. As such it connotes the OT notions of not living or acting according to the will of the Creator God. The essence of the Pauline teaching on sin, adduced from his extensive writings and thoughts on it, is that Jesus Christ alone redeems humankind from the power of sin. Paul argues men and women should therefore seek to be followers of Christ, who lived according to the will of God, rather than being sinners in repudiation of His example. Similarly John argues that those who oppose Christ commit sin. Therefore, John asserts, those who do not believe in Him, even those without overt opposition, also commit sin.

The basic Christian conception of sin thus appears to be,

in terms of these NT writers, that because of Christ, the state of sin is no longer an inevitability. Christians can commit sins without necessarily entering into finally and unredeemably into a state of sin[23] and the condition states of dissonance as sinners would engender.

Günther (1978) maintains that:

> "... the concept of sin embraces the gamut of human failure from the transgression of a single commandment to the ruin of one's whole existence."[24]

This is correct because, in the worldview of the OT and the NT, human failure is measureable in terms of standards determined by a paradigm of existence which asserts humans are created and accountable by and to a Creator God. In Günther's statement, differentiation between particular sins and a state of sin can be discerned. These are single commandment transgressions and the ruination of one's whole existence, respectively. This distinction is what Cook (1986) similarly classified as the conscious or accidental contravention of particular religious or moral precepts as against the willful turning away from God and or Christ.[25]

Thus the NT writers never tire of warning about particular sins and how these can compound into a total state of sin. Sin is as fundamental a fact of human existence for the writers of the Old and New Testaments as the fact of the Creation is for their worldview. For them sin is essentially human

rebelliousness and sins are inadequacies. As such they are inevitable elements in human nature. That Christ's role is one that deals with these elements points to the Christian fundamentals of redemption and forgiveness. These fundamentals give the NT part of its significance for the role it has played in effectively dealing with the problem of sin and sins and their subsequent feelings of dissonance and guilt in the lives of many individuals. It also distinguishes it from the atonement fundamental of Judaism although this fundamental is presumably similarly cognate with psychological discourse about mental health and well being. The specific role the NT plays in individual 'Christian' functioning needs further exploration in this regard.

This exploration is necessary because notions of sin, sins, redemption, forgiveness and others from this religion's world view enter and remain in individuals' minds as introjects. This psychological term introject neatly captures the way these notions are present but separated, basically unconscious, elements held in the mind. They nevertheless influence the individual at a psychological if not religious level. That is, many religious concepts are only partially integrated into the total experience of the individual. They often remain split-off, unintegrated, vicariously experienced, heard-about-entities, which remain in the mind purely as introjects.

This is perhaps due to the nature of the paradigm of the Christian religion.[26] It asserts that there is an inevitable gulf between the Creator God and the individual who will only know, through faith, certain things and only at certain levels. That is, as Kierkegaard argued, feelings remain primary dynamics in religious experience. Cognitive assurances are at best marginally achieved through leaps of faith.[27] This is not to disparage the faith networks of any believer's mind. The point is that feeling bad and feeling guilty, for example, can invariably be more real and living experiences than feeling absolutely sure about one's redemption and forgiveness.

Understanding how and why individuals feel anything at all about their performances and feelings in reference to a Creator God, whom others have argued has set the limits of and for human behaviour, means consideration must be given to exploring and explaining the Biblical conception of the inner environment of the individual conscience is perceived to be. This is to establish a little more accurately how and why individuals will or will not feel guilty or forgiven and have other feelings about 'sin.'

There is no overt voice of conscience or similar concept to it in terms of its present day formulation in the OT. This is because in the OT the problem of the individual's attitude towards him or herself was of far less significance

than that of attitudes toward God and others. In the LXX the Greek word for conscience, syneidesis, is used to indicate the prosecutor and judge function occurring within a person. Maurer (1978), however, points out that this is in Wisdom 17 : 11 where a bad conscience is spoken about in a purely ethical sense.[28] In the Hebrew OT the word leb is used only once to explain David's bothering conscience (I Samuel 24 : 5). The term conscience, in its more general psychological parlance was not a concept term familiar to the OT world. It entered into Biblical thought in NT times.

3.3

THE NEW TESTAMENT AND CONSCIENCE

In the NT the Greek noun syneidesis occurs some 30 times. In the Gospels it occurs only in John's account of the accusers of the woman taken in adultery. He writes that they were immobilized when "convicted by their own consciences" (John 8 : 9). Apart from three instances that it is used by Peter (I Peter 2 : 19, 3 : 16; and 3 : 21) and twice in Acts (Acts 23 : 1; 24 : 16), all usage is by Paul. It is apparent therefore that even if Paul did not actually introduce the word into Christian thought, as Pierce (1958) argues he did, Paul certainly used it to make plain its nature and role in the functioning of the Christian individual.[29]

In his book Conscience in the New Testament, Pierce[30] works from the conclusion that the word syneidesis refers to feeling the pain that is felt when something considered wrong was done. Pierce argues that as an everyday word during NT times it adequately represented the concept of consciousness within the individual which reviewed, and felt, the moral quality of actions. It referred to a specific element in human nature, and it was that which was concerned with the moral quality of one's own specific past acts and how these related to one's character as a whole. These resultant feelings invariably functioned as pain.

Pierce argues the conscience inflicted, felt and was the crippling and disabling pain. He uses Philo's description to show how all three aspects of conscience are a part of it as a whole entity within the individual. Philo's own words once again best explain:

> "... It is born with every soul and makes its abode with it, nor is it wont to admit therein anything that offends. Its property is ever to hate the evil and love the good. This same thing is at once accuser and judge. When once stirred up, as accuser lays charge, it makes accusation, it puts to shame: then again as judge it teaches, warns, counsels the soul to repent. If its suasions but prevail, joyfully it is reconciled. But if it cannot prevail, it gives not peace, but makes war. Never does it depart by day or by night, but it stabs as with a goad, and inflicts wounds that know no healing, until it snaps the thread of that soul's pitiful and accursed live.[31]

Clearly this description aptly captures the nature and effects

of conscience as it affects the individual's sense of well-being. It also points to the nature of the understanding of conscience that has filled lives and events throughout the history of the Christian religion if Pierce is correct in identifying this as the sense of the word that Paul employed.

Looking at Paul's use of the word conscience, Pierce shows how he needed to use it in a world that was affected by Greek constructs and a world that had individuals in it who demanded and needed a better understanding of their inner environments. They sought self-knowledge about the way that they functioned as humans, questioning their mode of existence, and belief systems. Thus it was that Paul, through his skills in communicating the Gospel message, identified and clarified the function of the conscience. He showed its role in the functioning of the individual, and how it can assist or thwart Christian living. In short, Paul showed how the conscience related to a sense of Christian well-being.

An examination of one of the times that Paul uses the word syneidesis as conscience illustrates this. In I Corinthians, 10, in dealing with the question of eating meats sacrificed to idols, Paul shows how conscience depends on knowledge to function properly and effectively. He argues that the conscience is only a part of the individual's moral faculty. It works in a basically negative way by functioning only

when something wrong has been done and it is known that wrong has been done.[32] Hence when the Christian's sense of individual well-being is subjected to doubts and the possibility of wrongdoing, Paul shows how the mechanism of conscience initiates and enables the individual to identify and ideally to deal appropriately with any internal feelings of dissonance.

From Paul's use of the word, it appears that he considered the conscience to be both the sense of pain and the instrument whereby the individual felt the pain when a religious law or precept was transgressed. It is therefore, that unit of moral consciousness which discerns the moral quality of actions, values and situations in terms of their will-of-God content. The conscience creates a sense of dissonance within the individual which has to be resolved if the individual is to experience and to achieve a sense of harmony and well-being.

Pierce usefully explains that the pain of a dissonating conscience can best be conceptualized as the guilt which is felt when shame and fear combine. This is apparent in the nature of nonlegalistic guilt which Pierce explains as being:

> "... internally effective whether it be externally declared or not, (and) is a phenomenon familiar to modern psychopathology. It is only too rightly called a disease and he who suffers from it can truly never be happy ...[33]

The unhappiness results from feelings of discomfort and dissonance related to feelings of culpability for wrong doing, which, activated in and by the conscience, causes feelings of guilt.

This condition appears to be particularly prevalent for individuals who accept and acknowledge a religion paradigm of creatureliness and obligation. For the Christian, the conscience is an especially important and active faculty of the individual. This is because, again as explained by Pierce, in the NT, "Conscience is the reaction of the whole man to his own wrong acts" and is "but one, the moral, of the reactions of the nature of man as delimited by creation."[34] As the sourcebook of the religion, the NT and its conception of the conscience formulates and maintains this conception of and for the individual and the functions of conscience. Consequently, the NT conceptions of guilt and conscience as indices of sin and sins marks a significant development in the history of ideas. This has shown the way that sin, sins and guilt are invariably contiguous as introjected feelings that affect the individual in his or her mental health functioning.

CONCLUSION

It is because the individual is considered to be a creature in this Biblical Christian conception of humankind that the possible consequences of the risk to err, against the Will of the Creator God, becomes an issue. That is, the notion of creatureliness establishes a particular ideal symbiosis with contraventions and obligations establishing particular conditions.

These conditions initiate the concepts of sin and sins which, although varying in parameters from OT to NT times, essentially refer to the creatures' defaults. The defaults in this overall paradigm are seen as involving consequence, and penalty marks their significance. Moreover, that the individual can experience dissonance in this regard, and can feel guilty about thoughts and actions, with reference to the ideals and expectations of faultlessness, marks the implications of the defaults.

The implications of the penalty of sin are threefold. It is alienation from the Creator and the possibility of progressive deterioration of character. It also profoundly affects the sense of well-being which has implications for mental health. Notions of sin, guilt and punishment are tied up with notions of the need therefore for wholeness, forgiveness and redemption to effect this state of mental health. Different answers to the manifestations of these needs have

been formulated by the OT, NT and psychology writers as they search for the ways and means to negate the consequences and the penalty of the sense of sin.

The Christian Biblical conception and norms of mental health thus affect the nature and effect of its fundamental conception of things. These function as introjects in the minds of those within and out of the orbit of the religion's influence. Based in the writings of the Scripture with the attendant implications of Scriptural Authority makes this Holy Writ about the status of the individual important in a great many lives, directly and indirectly.

The impact of the notion of a conscience on the mental health of a Christian is therefore important to consider in the therapeutic situation. That the introduction of the term conscience may have created its function is a non-question. It's effects and implications appear to be, by their very nature, integral parts of being human. This is because it can be concluded that the primary function of the conscience is inherently a human faculty. As an internally held set of moral convictions derived from socio-religious precepts and teachings, it would appear that all persons sharing the same socio-religious paradigmatic conception of things would in effect have the similar functions of conscience as presented above in Chapter One and experience dissonance when drives, needs or goals conflict.

Accordingly, it is important to see the Biblical Conception as a major conception of the way individuals do live and feel they ought to live and this establishes a particular situation in which feelings of guilt are brought about. That it differs as a realm of discourse in the language it uses and the assumptions it holds about the individual, but shares with psychological discourse concerns for mental health and reducing dissonance, means that the two realms of discourse need to be correlated and developed into a more effective unifying discourse.

CHAPTER FOUR

A COMMON DISCOURSE FOR DEALING WITH THE DISSONANCE OF GUILT

Despite a shared interest in the human condition, confusion between methodology and terminology has meant psychology and religion appear to disagree.[1] Regretably this confusion has been responsible for aggravating mental ill health where this aggravation may well have been avoided.[2]

Both realms of discourse have tended to focus on the negative possibilities of the other. Consequently they have not always considered any usefulness the other may have. A comparison of Sigmund Freud's and Carl Jung's approaches verifies this. The former advocated that religion was symptomatic of neurosis whilst the latter advocated that religion played a vital role in the therapeutic process of integration.[3] Moreover, religionists denigrate psychology because it denies the actuality of many fundamental beliefs and practices of religion.

Pastoral Psychology attempts to reconsider the human condition and amalgamate its psychological and religious components.[4] This attempt and need for amalgamation is a Western phenomena. In Eastern traditions, religion and psychology never separated the way they have in the West.[5] Hence amalgamation is necessary only where such separation in thought and language has

occurred.

This chapter will consider how the realms of psychology and religion can, despite their inherent diversity in Western tradition, be amalgamated so they can be better understood and used by the other. This involves translating the sense and significance of their different approaches.

Accordingly, the chapter is in three parts. The first briefly explains what religion and psychology are and identifies points of translation they share in terms of mental health care. Second, their particular terms for dealing with the dissonance of guilt feelings will be presented with particular reference to the assumptions, procedures, and implications of confession and psychoanalysis with suggested re-definitions of some key words. The third part will suggest a new framework of approach for dealing with the dissonance of guilt feelings that refers to the discourses of psychology and religion.

4.1

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION: POINTS OF TRANSLATION

Psychology aims to systematically study and scientifically describe human behaviour.[6] It does so with particular focus on the human mind, and the ways in which the mind affects an individual's experience, and present condition. Psychology in this sense is basically biography. It aims to show how individual experience is determined by forces within and without the individual's inner life.

This aim of psychology is a vast enterprise. Different branches of psychology have developed specific concerns about certain aspects of the enterprise. One branch, the aspect this thesis refers to, seeks to account for and differentiate between biographies of mentally healthy and mentally unhealthy individuals. This is the psychology of psychopathology, or abnormal psychology.[7] It is primarily concerned with personality disorders, debilitating reactions of mental and emotional sickness, neuroses and psychoses.

The need for treatment of mental and emotional disorders has developed the psychological discipline of psychotherapy.[8] This discipline operates on the basis of inter-personal communication between psychotherapist and patient. The purpose of the communication is ostensively the patient's relief

from disorder. The psychotherapist, a trained psychologist in a particular method of psychotherapy, uses specialized theoretical and practical knowledge to enable the patient to express feelings, overcome inhibitions, identify and own weaknesses and acquire effective coping strategies so as to facilitate the patient's mental health.

The appelation of disorder to certain felt and exhibited thoughts and behaviours is contingent on the notion that there is an order to which the disorder contrasts.[9] The notion of order obviously effects the ways that individuals, as patients, psychotherapists or others, think about themselves and other people as they arrange and evaluate their thoughts and activities. Any conception of normality tends to become reified. It consequently becomes something to which individuals refer themselves and, in their evaluations, can come to view themselves or others as deviants.

Guilt feelings and other feelings of dissonance result when individuals recognise and acknowledge that they have been deviant and feel uncomfortable and responsible about it. These feelings can have positive or negative effects. In the former, the person takes appropriate action to allay and effectively dispense with the feelings. In the latter, appropriate action is not taken. Instead, the feelings become debilitating. They subsequently engender other and more serious effects in mental and emotional functioning.[10]

Here the task of the psychotherapist is evident. The therapist assists the patient with removing debilitating feelings and behaviour. These need to be replaced with appropriate means of functioning so that the patient will feel contented and experience no undue dissonance. This replacement is done within one of the two variations in the psychotherapeutic task. The first is that which the Freudian psychoanalytic method exemplifies.[11] It seeks the alteration of unconscious, deeply rooted faults in thoughts and behaviours. In this method, the patient's repressed, unconscious mental life is analyzed so that more effective coping strategies may replace the debilitating organization of the patient's personality which had been brought about by inappropriate defense mechanisms and repressed material.[12]

The second variation of psychotherapy deals more exclusively with the patient's conscious symptoms and problems. Techniques that give the patient reassurance, support and guidance are used. Any underlying, unconscious psychopathology is not directly dealt with. Instead, the therapist concentrates on the patient's cognizant strengths and weaknesses with the goal of building strengths and coping realistically with weaknesses. Rational-Emotive Therapy, Reality Therapy, Integrity Therapy and Transactional Analysis are methods exemplifying this approach.[13]

These latter methods of psychotherapy are more reparative

than reconstructive in purpose and method. They are different to the first variation in this respect. Prior to the development and growth of psychodynamic therapy, the functions of the reparative psychotherapist were administered by the clergy. That is, before developments in psychoanalysis and modern-day secularization, individual's generally sought and received counselling help from their priest, rabbi or minister. Clergymen, in their role as persons ordained for religious service, had functions of advising, guiding and counselling. Having this role meant they did the work of psychotherapists referring to their own religious convictions, not psychoanalytical theory.

The role religion and religionists still play in mental health is a complex issue to explain because defining religion is itself problematic and contentious.[14] Consequently there is much obscurity about what is and what is not religious. Nevertheless, major world religions and their adherents are identifiable as are their essential principles and features. The nature and implications of these principles influences the lifestyles of the adherents. Studies of religion, the psychology of religion and psychology in general attempt to account for these influences and their effects.[15]

The Biblical Christian conception of the psychology of the individual has been shown to have certain influences and effects (Chapter Three). That drives and goals involve the

generation of states of dissonance within the individual which can be debilitating, has also been indicated (Chapter One). It is important to recall that removal of dissonance is the goal of reparative and reconstructive psychotherapy. It therefore seems that psychology and religion have a common meeting ground in the issues pertaining to mental health and its permutations.

POINTS OF TRANSLATION

That psychology and religion share an interest in the procurement and maintenance of mental health suggests assessment of their assumptions and methodologies will indicate points where translation between their respective discourses could occur. Seven points of translation may be identified.

(1) MENTAL HEALTH CONSONANCE AND HARMONY

Both psychotherapy and religious discourses aim for individuals to attain and maintain a sense of well-being in their inner environment because the sense of well-being is viewed as necessary for appropriate, effective functioning. With a sense of well-being, the individual experiences and expresses no conflicting states of dissonance, either causing mildly debilitatory feelings, such as discontent and unhappiness, or severely debilitating feelings and convictions, such as self-worthlessness and personality disorders.[16] Thus, for

example, psychoanalysis aims to facilitate effective ego functioning whilst Christianity aims for life without sin.

(2) MODELS

In both discourses some notion of an ideal individual is advocated as the model to which others are compared and to which individuals compare themselves. In Christianity the model of Jesus Christ is propounded. Other religions explicitly or implicitly formulate their conception of the ideal individual.[17] For example, in Judaism the righteous individual is revered whilst in Hinduism it is the ascetic.[18]

In Freud's theory, the ideal individual would be one free from neurosis and be a person in which the id, ego and superego functioned harmoniously.[19] In psychotherapy generally the ideal is thus construed as the individual who is without debilitating disorders that would otherwise impede appropriate functioning and coping. Interestingly, the ideal is not formalized explicitly and no absolute is sought. This is evident in the discipline's attempt to define the abnormal.

Guidelines are offered and categories have been isolated. No absolute definition to encompass all individuals is seen as possible or desirable because of the varieties of individual experience and the dangers of proscriptive terminology. Nevertheless, working definitions and labels are, of necessity,

used. The DSM III (1984) is currently a common reference work in this regard.[20]

(3) THE INDIVIDUAL

In both psychology and religion the afflicted, troubled individual has to invest energy, effort, time and interest into the enterprise of attaining mental health. That is, the individual has to actively seek the goal that appears to be better than the condition of mental health, and to continue to make the effort to work towards fulfilling this goal of mental health. In Christianity this is explicitly an ongoing effort of living as a Christian despite contrary impulses, opportunities and attractions. In psychotherapeutic terms this can mean continuing to consult a therapist and to implement the advice given so that maladaptive behaviours are adjusted and the inevitable difficulties and challenges of life are appropriately responded to.

(4) HONEST VERBALIZATION

In confession and psychoanalysis the penitent or the patient has to verbalize innermost feelings and thoughts.[21] Honesty is essential. Any dishonesty obfuscates the issue and will not facilitate a resolution of the problematic present condition.

(5) THE LISTENER

The role of the spiritual or psyche guide is another common feature. That some are more adept and specially trained for dealing with certain aspects and maladies is evident in differing roles and functions of psychoanalyst and priest. Nevertheless, the person who listens to the afflicted individual basically has to establish and maintain suitable rapport if effective communication is to take place.

The psychotherapeutic concept and eventuality of transference and the trust necessary in the Christian confessional are essential components for communication in their respective processes. Such components are not automatic. They generally depend on the skills of the listener. Psychology has certainly assisted in refining and developing these skills.[22]

The psychologicalization of pastoral care has meant that many clergymen are trained for dealing with the more severe psycho-pathologies. Similarly, some psychotherapists are committed to particular religions. This means that in certain instances patients do receive a more holistic treatment from their listener. A few clergymen and therapists do the opposite. They refrain from using the other realm of discourse or disdain it openly. Thus, in some cases negative attitudes towards the other discourse, and what it represents, can be responsible for perpetuating problems that could otherwise

perhaps be better dealt with.

(6) DISSONANCE AND CONSCIENCE

The ways and the extent that feelings of dissonance and workings of the conscience are interrelated has been presented above (Chapter One). Their relationship does not imply that they are the same thing. A distinction needs to be made between them. This is because the conscience, although feeling the dissonance, is also the mechanism whereby the feelings of dissonance are evaluated and judged. Psychotherapy has tended to deny and neglect the additional aspect and function of the conscience. Consequently, the religious usefulness of the conscience in ensuring ethical obligations are met has not always been considered by psychotherapists with the result that the workings of the conscience are not always treated in psychotherapy.

This denial and neglect has occurred because psychotherapists have incorrectly equated the superego with the functions of the conscience. As the psychodynamic construct of socialization which does not explicitly consider religious dynamics, the superego needs to be seen as different in both role and function to the conscience. The former addresses conflicting feelings with a view to their particular implications. The latter does this too, but also evalutes the implications in terms of what they indicate about the whole person. It

thus feels and brings to consciousness the dissonance that the superego identifies.[23]

(7) SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Psychological and religious discourses are concerned with the individual's role as a social being. Despite the change in Christianity's emphasis on the individual's personal responsibility and accountability in the New Testament conception, in contrast to the more community emphasis of the Old Testament, the Christian has to live with others according to Christian community principles. Similarly, the social implications of psychopathologies primarily determine the gravity of the pathology in many instances. They are used as the measure against which the individual's functioning is compared.

These points of translation indicate that psychology and religion do share common methods and interests in the realm of mental health. They denote a larger common concern with adjustment and personal growth. However, they use differing terms and concepts for describing and achieving their aims. Closer examination of their conceptual vocabularies reveals that psychology and religion invariably refer to the notions of the other, albeit implicitly or indirectly. This suggests a basis for a common discourse that could be better articulated and more effectively used.

4.2

TERMS FOR A COMMON DISCOURSE

An examination of confession and psychoanalysis reveals that some terms and concepts in each have generic meaning for both. This is because both discourses originate and function in a Western paradigm. This paradigm allows the development of particular patterns of thought like Christianity and Depth Psychology. They both address the human condition within certain paradigmatic possiblities which necessarily share similar basic assumptions. Permutations of these assumptions result in apparently disparate approaches, such as psychoanalysis and confession, that nevertheless are essentially concerned with individuals and their present condition.

The approach of psychoanalysis as a method of treatment for mental ill health involves five permutated assumptions about the human condition derived in principle from Freud's theory.[24] These are used to evaluate the individual and what needs to be done about the present condition. The approach of the Christian Confessional as a method of ensuring spiritual, mental health involves three other permutated assumptions derived from the Biblical Christian concept of things.

The first assumption of psychoanalysis is that some mental processes are unconscious and operate outside the individual's

consciousness. The processes nevertheless play a significant part in the individual's psychic life and can affect behaviour. These processes can be responsible for neurotic, debilitating thoughts and behaviours which relates to the second assumption that thoughts and behaviours have psychological significance. This significance is seen as being due to their inevitable psychic determinants, including those at unconscious levels.

The third assumption is psychic determinants are responsible for determining behaviour. Once identified and understood, they invariably will explain behaviour because individuals function according to goal achievement which motivates behaviour. That motivation is geared towards the overall development of the individual is the fourth assumption. This development occurs as the individual accumulates and responds to experience and becomes an autonomous well-adjusted adult, who behaves and thinks appropriately.

The fifth assumption acknowledges that not all individuals become such a kind of adult. Deviations are systematically identified so they can be helped. Deviants are thus enabled to attain some measure of normality and order. In this regard the role of the psychotherapist is formulated. Their special training facilitates the patient's appropriate adjustment and personal growth. This adjustment and growth is achieved by restoring consonance and harmony to the inner environment, establishing a sense and an expression of well-being through

the chosen method of therapy.

The assumptions in the process of Christian Confession relate to the Biblical conception of the individual as a creature with specific obligations.[25] There are three basic assumptions. The first is that individuals are sinful creatures that need to be forgiven by the Creator God. The second is that as Creator, God alone can and will forgive sins if the sinner sincerely seeks this. The third is that Christ came to redeem sinners and His apostles and their successors can remit sins as He instructed them to.[26]

Confession works in Christianity in similar ways to psychoanalysis. Both involve an individual talking to another as a means for attaining relief from their troubling state of mind. In Christianity the troubling state involves the default of ethical obligations. Thus in Christian confession, the individual verbalizes the feelings, thoughts and actions they know are contraventions of God's Will. This is in response to the scriptural injunction found in James 5:16, which reiterates the advice given in Proverbs 28:13. These are 'Therefore confess your sins to one another ... that you may be healed' and 'He who conceals his transgressions will not prosper, but he who confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy,' respectively.

Roman Catholic Church confession consists of three phases.

These are contrition, confession and absolution. The three phases of the ritual of confession take the penitent out of the experience of dissonance to an acceptance of obligation and restoration of harmony. In the first phase individuals examine their consciences, vis-a-vis their ethical obligations and defaults which constitute sins. In the second phase, individuals, sincerely sorry for their sins, confess them, followed by a resolution to make amends by not sinning again. Finally, in the third phase, the Priest assigns a penance to be done in reparation, restitution or punishment for the sins. The process of confession, assignment of penance and absolution ends with the confessor reciting the Act of Contrition whilst the Priest gives Absolution (see Appendix C).

Confession is thus the admission individuals make to priests of sins committed with the purpose of receiving absolution for them from the priest. This procedure, correctly called the Sacrament of Penance, is sought when an individual has thought or behaved contrary to the Will of God. Confession of such contraventions is seen as necessary for receiving God's forgiveness. This is based on the scriptural injunction in I John 1 ff:

> '... the blood of Jesus cleanses us from all sin. If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just and will forgive our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say we have not sinned, we make him a liar and his word is not in us.'

This was a notion inherited from Judaism wherein the Day of Atonement is seen as an open confession of sins committed against others and God (Appendix D).[27] Jesus himself propounded the practice as exemplified in the Lord's Prayer (Luke 11:2ff). The practice of open confession was formalized by the Catholic Church in the 6th Century as a sacrament. Stott (1974) has argued that the sacrament is based on the doctrine of Catholic priesthood which arises out of and depends on Catholicism's views on absolution.[28] As Ludwig Ott (1970) states, priestly absolution "does not merely indicate forgiveness of sins, but also effects it."[29] This priestly effect means that priests are seen as having an integral role in actually forgiving sins on behalf of God by providing sinners with the means for obtaining His forgiveness.

Sin is thus viewed in a similar vein by psychotherapists and those who listen to Christian confessions. In religious discourse, sin is offence against God, a denial of His love and a choice to not fulfil obligations towards His expectations. It involves discord between the individual and God and between the individual and their community. In either situation, the discord initiates feelings of disharmony and dissonance in the individual who feels uncomfortable about their rebellion.

In psychological discourse such notions of sin can be equated with the subjective cognitions individuals hold about their

personal, social defaults and breaches of norms. These also initiate feelings of discord, affecting interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships. This equation means that although psychology disavows the religious connotations of the concept and term sin, it does address the feelings, process and implications that the word refers to within the parameters of the concept of dissonance.

This synonymity is because whether sin is construed as turning away from God or breaching social norms and feeling a sense of discord and culpability, the result in either case is due to egocentrism. As such, the state of sin or discord is a debilitating state of mind. It is due to consciousness of sins and social shortcomings corrupting and impairing the individual. These detrimentally affect social relationships, self-esteem and subsequent mental and emotional functioning.

Despite this contiguity in psychological and religious conceptions of sin, further extrapolations of similarities are not so easily discernible. This difficulty is evident when their views on the motivations, implications and justifications of sin are considered. The effects of Twentieth Century secularization and its precursor, the Protestant Reformation in the Sixteenth Century have been responsible for this.[30] The latter process undermined the Roman Catholic Church's position on the implications and nature of sin as well as

the role of the Priest in dealing with it. This undermining basically meant that individuals no longer went to Confession as a matter of course. They could choose not to go.

With the option of confessing of not, individuals were able to judge themselves and their sinfulness in a different way. Inevitably this resulted in strategies to lessen self-judgments of responsibility and culpability. That these strategies do not always totally negate reasons for feeling dissonance is evident in that feelings of guilt and dissonance continue. This continuation is due to the operations of the conscience and the superego, which, although susceptible to the counter measures of these strategies, nevertheless function in terms of their natures.

Six strategies to lessen self-judgements of responsibility and culpability can be identified.[31] Three are conducive to reducing dissonance and its possible detrimental effects, the other three can be seriously debilitating. The first in the former group is the strategy advocating the notion that sins are inevitable. The argument is that just as Adam was predestined to sin, so all people were. Sin is simply part of the human condition. Consequently, this view suggests, efforts to prevent sin or to seek forgiveness for them are wasted. It is best to simply accept them and get on with living.

The second strategy is the argument that sins need not be taken seriously because humans, created in the image of God, are not accountable. Individuals, in their assumed godlikeness thus believe they are permitted to do anything they please without fear of consequence. The third strategy argues that reasoning about sins is morbid and consequently corruptive and destructive in its effects on the individual. The argument is thus that individuals should instead simply seek to adopt more rational evaluatory procedures when considering their personal socio-religious defaults.

The first strategy that seeks to reduce responsibility and culpability, but invariably leads to more debilitating consequences is based on the notion that sin can be avoided. This idea can become a lifestyle that is neurotic and self-destroying. In it, all actions and thoughts become puritanically evaluated with all possibilities surveyed with incessant and unrealistic control. Threat of punishment forms another approach and has the effect of preventing sin being committed. However, because prevention in action does not necessarily include negation of concomitant thoughts and desires, individuals can experience discord and dissonance when actions are incongruent with feelings. Finally, the strategy of asserting one is without sin, or that sin is a meaningless concept, allows the individual to feel accountable to no-one. Although in some instances this may be a valid and mature assessment, it is oftentimes related

to sociopathic and psychopathic tendencies and disorders.[32]

Further comparison of confession and psychoanalysis reveals that despite differences, a convergence of interests, methods and purposes can be discerned. In both, the basic aim is to enable the individual to function optimally in their inner environment. In psychotherapeutic parlance, this environment is primarily the inner environment which includes the social environment impinged on to it by the ambient community. In the language of confession, the social community and the inner environment includes God and aspects of His Trinity as principal members.

Despite this difference of including or not including God, both aim at the basic restoration of the individual within so that optimal functioning is achieved. They also share certain other features to do this. One is that the confessional and the psychotherapy session follow and implement certain procedures. The Catholic confession, as the Sacrament of Penance, has a universal format. Psychotherapists do not have such a format. Nevertheless, they contain their efforts within certain ethical limitations. These ethical limitations constitute as ethical format which ensures patients' needs are inviolate.[33]

Both psychotherapists and clergymen view sin as something which makes people unhappy, discontented and in a state of

dissonance. This second agreement indicates that both consider sin as an integral component of the dissonance process. Psychology argues that the dissonance is a result of discordant compulsions. Religion argues it is due to wrong choices. These arguments confirm that both are concerned with the resultant dissonance. Hence, intentionality and its concomitant egocentrism, can be equated with conscious causes of dissonance and its evaluation as sin because both discourses see the (sinful) external act as result and cause. Consequently, sin and its egocentrism is considered by both to be a cause and a result of the individual's inability to cope appropriately with the demands and influences of the human condition.

While psychoanalysis is not intended to give a sense of forgiveness and confession is not intended to treat psychological disorders, both assist the individual towards feeling better about themselves. They do so by giving the individual a semblance of forgiveness and order through the implicit and indirect consequences of the therapy session or confession.

Psychoanalysis and confession have some substantial differences nevertheless. Firstly, psychoanalysis is not overtly concerned with the morality of the problem. It is concerned with the problem's propriety in terms of normality and the effects it has on the individual. The confessional and clergymen

are overtly concerned with religious morality, religiously defined norms of behaviour and ethical obligations.

Secondly, confession is concerned with willful, conscious misdeeds and thoughts that are deemed contrary to Christian standards. Psychotherapeutic psychoanalysis is concerned with unknown, unconscious motivations and how and why these have affected consciousness. These different concerns mean that there are fundamental differences in the way that the patient or penitent is approached. The former is invariably deemed less culpable and accountable than the latter.

Nevertheless, the confessional dyad's religious framework distinguishes it from the therapist-patient situation only in so far as religious issues can be distinguished from psychological issues. Both involve openness, honesty and letting someone else know exactly what is being felt and experienced. They use different assumptions, however, and refer to different conceptions to effect this open disclosure.

Psychoanalysts subscribing to Freud's assumptions about personality functioning, base their approach to effecting restoration on certain concepts of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. This approach thus includes the general psychodynamic conception of personality functioning, its implications of unconscious motivation and ego defense mechanisms. These psychodynamic constructs determine the particular mode of therapy called psychoanalysis.

This mode of therapy is an analytic one and depends on insight to obtain material and be effective because patients invariably do not fully understand something about themselves. The psychoanalyst has to find out what this is and why it is debilitative. Accordingly, in psychoanalysis, the psychotherapist interprets the individual's motivations to reveal the deeper roots of any psychological or emotional problem. Insights, by the therapists or the patient, achieved through such interpretation and revelation, are presumed to assist the movement of psychic material from inaccessible and unconscious levels to conscious levels.[34] Through this consciousness raising, the unconscious is made conscious. This invariably relieves individuals from their inner dissonance that had debilitating cognitive and psychodynamic causes and effects.

In doing so, psychoanalysis fulfils some of the functions of religion. It gives the individual reasons for living, a sense of purpose, belonging and meaning and does so by answering existential crises in an appropriate way. That is, just as religious faith works to restore and maintain mental health by giving meaning and purpose to life, so psychological terminology operates to give the troubled individual a sense of mental health.

Making psychology more cognizant of the role that religions ought to and can fulfil in effecting mental health in a

secularized world has been sanctioned by several writers.[34] They all basically argue for psychological discourse to be cognizant of religion's contributions and implications so that the positive role it can play in personal mental health can be facilitated and maintained.

The complementary process of psychologicalizing religious discourse also needs to take place. Here the scientific knowledge of psychology can usefully benefit effectiveness of expression and appropriateness of treatment. To effect these processes of translation, words from each discourse need be explored and explained with reference to the other so that, where possible, words are used and understood correctly. Otherwise, they will continue to be used and understood imprecisely and obscurely with implications and influence for mental health care obfuscated and confused.

The table below presents some of the words that invariably function as obfuscated introjects in the minds of therapist, patient and others. The alternative definitions are suggested as a means for bringing about some clarity. This redefinition is not to propose that the theoretical or doctrinal implications of the original words be totally disregarded. This reformulation attempts to translate the unclear into a more functional framework, so that re-theologizing and psychologizing pastoral care and mental care is done in a way that ensures effective care and cure of those experiencing dissonance.

CURRENT WORD	SUGGESTED UNDERSTANDING (NEW TRANSLATION)	IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST
Confession	The process of talking through, with total honesty, feelings, ideas, and memories that constitute everything that makes the person feel the way they do at the present time and is causing dissonance and discomfort.	To facilitate honesty to use the insights of the confessional procedure so to account for the presenting problem and identify and initiate a means of treatment for their resolution.
Conscience	The regulative mechanism censoring the individual's thoughts and actions from within by identifying, constituting and feeling the pain and discomfort felt when norms are breached, obligations not met and expectations unfulfilled.	To differentiate the effects of the conscience from the effects of an overscrupulous superego so that the necessary stringency of moral behaviour is maintained and that the religious dynamics of the mechanism ensure harmony, consonnance and ethical behaviour.
Dissonance	Feelings of discomfort, often leading to feelings of guilt initiated by remorse and regret, brought about by contrary cognitions. This occurs when beliefs are incongruent with actions or when beliefs conflict with other beliefs, held by the same individual.	To distinguish between psychodynamic dissonance and cognitive dissonance so that causes and effects can be established and dealt with effectively.
Feeling Guilty	Broadly speaking, being ill-at-ease with one's self and within one's self due to feelings of regret and remorse about actions and thoughts, contrary to the expected, normal or beneficial. These are due to feelings of dissonance which can lead to constructive or destructive responses.	To establish the cause and level of feelings of guilt and to restore consonnance through the negation of the dissonance by the most effective strategies. This involves primarily raising to cognitive consciousness the reasons and extent of the feelings so that the patient can co-author the healing process.
Psychotherapy	Therapy of psychic difficulties and problems using certain theoretical methodologies and conceptions of the causes and means of resolving such debilitating entities. Involves a therapist and the talking through of difficulties with consciousness raising, mutual rapport and understanding facilitating the patient's restoration with the guidance and expertize of the listener-therapist.	To be cognizant of the totality of individuals and their needs for inner environment consonance and harmony and that the history of the cure of souls indicates the necessary cognizance of religious dimensions in and for the psychotherapeutic task.

Redemption	The realization that restitution has been brought about and that sinful actions have been negated appropriately. That Christianity advocates Christ as the Redeemer nevertheless still requires Christians to redeem themselves by living according to Christian principles. This is synonymous with the reasoning and results of Salvation and Healing through forgiveness.	To facilitate self-redemption through constructive action to repair damaged relationships with God, others and aspects of the self so that the individual is released from feelings of disequilibrium.
Religion	A particular traditional, shared set of beliefs about life and living that shape experience and life-styles and thereby function to give individuals a sense of belonging and meaning and a means of explaining existence.	To establish exactly what individuals believe about themselves and their worlds and how this is integrated or responded to so that the networks of cause and effect can be identified and intervention, correction, and assessment can be accurate and effective.
Salvation Healing	These two words need to be seen as synonymous as both refer to the condition of well-being brought about within the individual when he feels restored, forgiven or mentally healthy. That is, both words refer to the same condition of wholeness wherein there is no feelings of inappropriate or debilitating dissonance.	To align notions of salvation to well-being by recognizing and developing the religious dimensions of the health of the whole person. This thus involves their spiritual needs and dynamics as well as physical, mental and emotional.
Sin	The condition of feeling alienated from God because of some default and breach of expectation. It involves feelings of sadness, discomfort and self-worthlessness because the individual acknowledges his deviation that makes him unacceptable according to the standards of God. These standards relate to and are formulated in an ethical code of behaviour. Specific contraventions are thus sins.	To differentiate between sin and feelings of sinfulness attached to specific sins. The rational element in both situations needs to be analysed so that constructive restitution can be brought about. In addition, sin, as that which refers to feelings of disloyalty to human expectations, needs to be seen as debilitating as religiously determined 'sin'.
Superego	The psychodynamic construct of the centre of internalized socio-religious values which evaluates the ego's management of the id and initiates psychic conflict and tension when it perceives mismanagement.	To remember this is a theoretical construct that is different to the related theoretical construct of the conscience. The superego identifies mismanagement and initiates tension and conflict. The conscience does this as well as feeling the resultant discomfort and does so in relation to specific issues. Thus there are different kinds of conscience but only one superego.

The usefulness of this vocabulary is of course contingent on the psychotherapists' and clergymen's acceptance of the new translations. Because of what has emerged from the examination of the two realms of discourse in this thesis, it would appear that such acceptance is a logical and reasonable response. This kind of response is appropriate because, as has been shown, the differences in the two realms of discourse of psychology and religion have been exaggerated at the expense of their similarities in mental health concerns. The new translations are therefore suggested as viable understandings of concepts from each realm which better explains how everyday mental health concerns can more effectively be broached, by clergyman or psychotherapist.

Ruth Barnhouse (1983) has drawn some useful conclusions that confirm this.[35] She works from the proposal for a 'practical theology' by John Deschner (1981). This theology of action is proposed as a more adequate theology. In the words of Dorothy Sayers (1949), "the interpretation and control of the problems of everyday life" could be more effectively managed by such a theology. Deschner's categories of working, fellowship and service, the three components of the life of a congregation, are interrelated. They are thus connected to the four problem areas Barnhouse identifies as the basics of everyday life. These are leisure, work, sex and friendship.

These problem areas are all grounds for dissonance, when actions or thoughts to do with them contravene the expected at personal and socio-religious levels. The psychotherapist or clergyman has to deal with the debilitative results of such dissonance. The Church, in principle, provides support systems to alleviate and control the possibility of such dissonance within its congregational care of the needs of leisure, work, sex and friendship, when individuals accept what the Church expected with regard to these basics of every-day life. When acceptance does not occur or causes dissonance through sin or guilt, the individual can resort to the psycho-therapist or priest for help in resolving their dissonance.

Psychoanalysis and the Sacrament of Penance may differ but nevertheless have some similarities in approaching dissonance. Both aim to restore the individual to an emotionally and mentally healthy disposition wherein the sin or egocentricism that causes problems is redirected or eliminated. This restoration is seen as necessary because both consider psychopathology, or inner discord of such problems, as responsible for hampering the individual's integrity. Both accordingly aim to relieve the individual from debilitating thoughts and behaviours.

Both psychoanalysis and confession can and should therefore work in a combined effort to facilitate the individual's consonance in the spiritual and psychological spheres. This combination would enable individuals to respond to their total environments appropriately and effectively. That the one includes God and the other does not, is not necessarily a problem. It depends on how religion, God and mental health are defined.

The reason the two discourses are not complementary and working together is due to their differing assumptions, presuppositions and conceptions of individual functioning. The fact that they are both inevitably dealing with the same issues and implications in mental health suggests that their theoretical constructs could usefully be aligned in a reformulation of terms and concepts relating to mental health. The dissonance of guilt seems to provide an ideal means for doing this task of translation.[36]

4.3

THE NEW FRAMEWORK

Releasing the patient from debilitating feelings of dissonance and restoring the individual to a state of mental health are two tasks for psychotherapists and Christian counsellors. That they both have these tasks and have the same goal means

that what they have in common needs to be identified and developed. Areas of disagreement or opposition can thereby be reduced or negated.

Two steps need to be taken to expedite this process of unification. Firstly, an exhaustive case history of the patient's religious background and predelictions ought to be accumulated. (A modified assessment outline is presented in Appendix E.) Secondly, psychotherapists and religious counsellors need to be adequately trained in the psychological principles of religion. They also need to know more about the basic assumptions of the different religions and the implications of these.[37]

From this information and this knowledge, the patient's world view, self-concept and expectations can be more comprehensively and accurately assessed. Inferences about the patient's thoughts and behaviours can be reviewed more meaningfully. By establishing the role religion plays in the life of the individual, psychotherapists will thus not dismiss religious considerations as irrelevant. In addition, instead of concentrating on religion's possible negative effects, they can also come to respect its possible positive effects.

The positive effects of religion for mental health are important considerations.[38] They are evident in several of the Christian Church's functions and activities. For example,

the confession of sins serves as a means for reducing dissonance, resolving tension and moral conflict. It does so by restoring consonance and harmony through absolution. In a similar way the Church's symbolism may be a source of restorative attributes for the unconscious mind. Carl Jung's notion of the collective unconscious suggests that in this way the Church's fatherly, motherly, protective, positive qualities may be a source of calm for the troubled person.

However, with the deterioration of the Church's significance, especially with regard to the nature and implication of contravening the expectations of God, individuals have conceived and conceded failure in other terms. In other words, sin and sins, in the Christian conception of things, have become almost meaningless concepts. Many people, remaining cognizant of their Christian ethos and ethical obligations, have nevertheless devalued and de-emphasized the Church's role as a means for dealing with dissonance. The salvation the Church offers is thus seen as distinct from the healing available from secular, psychotherapeutic means for failure to meet one's own expectations and live appropriately.[39]

Barnhouse has pointed out that salvation and healing are actually etymologically contiguous.[40] Their current dichotomy in thought and language is, she argues, the result of the separation between religion and medicine in the West. This incorrect dichotomy verifies the need for a recombining of

psychological and religious resources in effecting the salvation and health synonymous with consonance. This recombination is necessary because, as human individuals are whole units with different aspects, so different focuses on the human being need to be cognizant of each other's conceptions. Thus, psychology and religion, complex entities of knowledge in their own spheres, should not be negated in condescension to the other. Rather they should refine and clarify their findings with reference to the other.

Thus confession and restitution, as useful and effective psychotherapeutic means, need to be understood and examined in these terms by psychotherapists and clergymen. This cross-reference is necessary because in psychoanalysis the patient is inevitably also confessing. But, invariably, there is a danger that appropriate restitution is not realized. This failure can mean that the patient never feels totally healed because the dimension of religious salvation has not been touched. Clearly the religious component of each human individual has to be identified, assessed and catered for.

CONCLUSION

The points of translation in which the endeavours of psychotherapists and religionists meet indicates that in dealing with the dissonance of guilt they could usefully refer to and integrate some of the formulations of the other. Both have developed substantial systems of discourse which usefully address specific aspects of the human condition. Consequently, an amalgamation of their separate systems should therefore result in a more comprehensive and effective approach to two of the principal aspects of the human condition, namely its religious and psychological dimensions.

That the procedures and results of confession and psychoanalysis share similarities confirms that such an amalgamated dialogue could facilitate the alleviation of unnecessary psychological or religious dissonance. The dissonance could be resolved by more accurate comprehension of the one by the other as patient or penitent, therapist or clergyman were enabled to more directly articulate and identify the areas of dissonance inherent in each.

The table of alternative new definitions of relevant terms and concepts from both discourses for use in such a new bridging discourse, thus consists and results from conclusions found in the development of this thesis. They are particularly concerned with the dissonance of guilt feelings. These find-

ings accordingly verify and emphasize the ubiquitous importance of these fundamental feelings in the human condition. How these feelings of guilt need to and can be dealt with effectively involves looking at the dissonance not only in terms of its psychological consequences, but also at religious causes and implications. Only these methods will ensure that the whole person's present condition is adequately assessed in the psychotherapeutic process and specific questioning in this regard by the therapist will facilitate this.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Individuals have experienced the agonies of the dissonance of guilt since the beginning of human self-awareness. Adam, David and Job are individuals who paradigmatically suffer from it in Biblical religious discourse that is thousands of years old. More modern writers, Shakespeare, Dickens and Dostoevsky for example, have proliferated the literary world and vicarious experience with many other guilty characters. Philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and others interested in understanding the human condition have similarly formulated ideas, albeit more explicitly, about the meaning and implications of the individual who feels guilty. Clearly, the dissonance of guilt is a fairly ubiquitous feature of human experience.

This thesis has accordingly attempted to clarify the centrality of guilt feelings to the human condition, and its religious ramifications for mental health in order that counselling discourse can be re-construed. Reconstrual has been necessary because psychotherapy is historically linked with and consequently influenced by Freud's revolt against religion and his views of religiously induced guilt as misdirected and wasteful fears. Basically, Freud was hostile to religion and consequently neglected to consider its possible positive

effects by concentrating his efforts only on its negative possibilities. Contemporary Christian Pastoral Counsellors, and psychologists interested in Eastern psycho-philosophies, have worked to redress this situation of disparate and conflicting discourse about what can and should be done about mental health.

Reviews in Contemporary Psychology (1986 31 (2) pp 85-88) on two recent books, Working With Religious Issues in Therapy (R.J. Lovinger (1984)) and Psychotherapy of the Religious Patient (M.H. Spero (Id) (1985)) by Allen E. Bergin and Hirsch Lazaar Silverman, indicate that the task of re-aligning the relationship between psychotherapeutic and religious factors is at a significant stage which marks the beginning of a new era in the psychotherapeutic task of mental health care of the whole individual. This thesis has been an attempt to assist in this re-alignment.

Accordingly, in terms of what this thesis has established in an attempt to continue the dialogue, the following conclusions are proposed in support of the need to unite the resources of psychology and of religion to more effectively deal with the totality of the human condition.

(1) Mental health, assessment, religion and the ideal

Mental health is an assessment of the condition of the inner environment of an individual. Religion not only assesses

this condition but also affects the assessment. This is because systems of religion formulate particular conceptions of ideal behaviour, to differentiate between appropriate and inappropriate, normal and abnormal. Accordingly, individuals are assessed with reference to the conception of the ideal, appropriate and normal and these conceptions are invariably meta-theoretical constructs which identify socio- and psychopathologies as ascribed to by psychologists.

(2) The consciousness of guilt feelings

Guilt feelings are conscious elements of the condition of feeling guilty with the dissonance experienced being the consciousness of such effects. That is, the dissonance of guilt is dissonance that occurs primarily because cognitions conflict. The reasons and implications of their conflict initiates feelings of regret and remorse. These generate guilt feelings because individuals feel lessened as human beings as they reflect upon who they are in self-awareness and self-evaluation.

(3) The unconscious effects of dissonance

Unconscious forms and levels of dissonance, as construed in psychodynamic conflict in Freud's theory, means troubling repressed conscioussness in the unconscious, that prove debilitating, need to be brought to consciousness. At this level of awareness, the role of the psychoanalytic psycotherapist is operative so that consonance can be restored. Psychosomatic

and accident-proneness as results of repressed unconscious guilt feelings are interesting speculations but further research needs to be undertaken to establish the extent of any relationship between the unconscious and such results.

(4) Guilt feelings, dissonance and punishment

Guilt feelings are the result of dissonance. As such they are part of the self-punishment the individual experiences and exercises in lieu of punishment that may or may not be expected as the result of the reasons for feeling guilty. These expectations occur when wrongdoing is seen to lead to punitive consequences from other outside sources. That is, dissonance is the primary area of such consciousness and affect. The guilt feelings are secondary. They may become debilitating in addition to the negative effects the dissonance can have on the individual's optimal functioning. Hence, there can be dissonance with no concomitant feelings of guilt, but rarely are guilt feelings explicable when there are no immediate conscious elements of dissonance.

(5) The debilitating effects of the dissonance of guilt

Dissonance and guilt are debilitating because of the negative effects they have on the individual's identity and personality functioning. They undermine and threaten the individual's sense of integrity and wholeness with confusion, discord and instability in the inner environment. This state of affairs can initiate lowered self-esteem, and can produce

an individual not only at war within but also at war with others when feelings of personal meaning and belonging are in doubt. Clearly psychology and religion have a role to play in replacing debilitating doubts and a sense of security and meaning.

(6) Psychology, religion and individual biographical goals

The present condition of the individual and what led to it is the concern of psychology. As such, psychology is essentially biography. Religion is similarly interested in biography but in addition seeks to understand and cater for the ultimate objectives of the individual. That is, religion asks, and propounds to answer, questions about the totality of the individual in the totality of his or her environment and is also concerned about ultimate goals rather than only survival and present condition. This concern is because, for religion, survival means maximising all possible goals and defining these goals. Consequently, for religion, goals are more important than survival as they give meaning and inspiration to the need for survival.

(7) The need to resolve and absolve

The need to resolve feelings of dissonance and absolve concomitant feelings of guilt in the conscience is related to the quest for a harmonious self-identity. This is because it is important to know and accept who one really is. Other-

wise, anomie and alienation, products of the dissonance of guilt, occur when feelings of guilt isolate individuals from others. Potentials for self-improvement are enfeebled when religion and psychology do not jointly share in the task of enabling the individual to ask and to answer the question 'Who am I?' satisfactorily.

(8) Goals and guilt

There are no goals without guilt. This suggests that by getting rid of goals and paradigms of socio-religious reality that propound goal-seeking and goal-oriented behaviours, the problem of the dissonance of guilt could be eradicated. However, it would appear that humankind is inevitably vulnerable to feeling culpable and feeling guilty about it. This inevitability occurs because each individual is ultimately able to make choices, evaluate their decisions and feel guilty about them and their outcomes if this is deemed appropriate by the individual.

(9) Goals and God(s)

Similarly there is an argument that if the concept of God was removed from human consciousness, guilt could be eradicated. However, the concept of God can be construed to include concepts of normalcy, expected and appropriate. So, whether these concepts are centralized as ideals originating in God, as in the Judaeo-Christian Biblical tradition, or in nature, others, ideal selfhood or in any other paradigmatic model

for behaviour, it appears that the dissonance of guilt is inevitably a possibility in human experience. Individuals invariably compare themselves to the paradigmatic model, evaluate their situation in terms of it, and consequently feel dissonance about the difference between the model and themselves if there are any grounds for discrepancies and conflicts.

(10) The economic dynamic in the dissonance of guilt

The economic dynamic evident in the wrongdoing-guilt-restitution nexus interestingly echoes Christian notions of redemption and psychoanalytic notions of rehabilitation. These notions indicate again the inevitable process and presence of guilt feelings as integrants of human experience because when wrongdoing, deviance or impropriety occur, it needs to be made right through some sort of compensation in order that the dissonance of the guilt feelings do not become debilitative.

(11) Value orientations and dissonating cognitions

The individual's value orientations are closely connected to feelings of guilt and to interpretations of such feelings. Naturally a value orientation and its concomitant ethical obligations are evident in certain religious conceptions and their realization in the conscience. These realizations are most closely related to, and expressive of, an awareness of guilt feelings because values are the very tissue of the dissonating cognitions as they differ and conflict. Without

values and their differing proportioning of worth, cognitions would differ and conflict in negligible ways.

(12) Dealing with the past affects the present

Articulation of inner environment feelings by the patient is as important as his or her acceptance of the role of the listener as a means for attaining mental health. It is accordingly important to acknowledge the usefulness of others in general for the sharing of secrets and the admission of transgressions. This sharing and admission ensures that freedom of expression achieves freedom from the debilitating dissonance caused from fear of punishment, or fear of being found out, because of the nature of the secreted transgressions. Past errors and disappointments need to be dealt with consciously and positively in the present. Doing so ensures that the present is not held hostage by the past, and life is lived to its optimal benefits in a socially, and psychologically, healthy inner environment shared with others enjoying similar well-being.

(13) Dealing with dissonance

Psychologically, the dissonance of guilt is dealt with by the individual through repression, projection, compensation, rationalization, self-justification and other cognitive strategies to establish inner harmony and consonance. Christianity suggests that individuals deal with the dissonance of guilt with self-examination, confession through repentance, and

requesting absolution and restitution through forgiveness. Both realms of discourse use these different concepts and terms and yet are seeking the same goal and almost using similar means. Clearly more explicitly shared concepts and terms would usefully advantage them both to bring about feelings of restitution in psychotherapy and more cognitive consonance in confession. Such results would be in distinction to the situation that often occurs when individuals never quite achieve these results in any sort of allied formulation and never feel 'restored' or 'forgiven'.

(14) Guilt feelings are ultimately personal and unavoidable

The various sources of guilt feelings, from parents, children, lovers and relationships with them, from institutional dynamics such as schools and churches, from values attached to sex, money, death, careers, possessions and education, as well as everyday guilt-inducing events such as littering, breaking diet or not paying busfare, all centre eventually on the inner experience and feelings of the individual. When these are experienced as dissonant feelings of guilt, they need to be resolved if the individual is not to be debilitated.

(15) Religion and psychotherapists

Religious values and beliefs need to be taken seriously as potentially positive integrants for adjustment and personal growth. The stigmas associated with religiosity in psychotherapeutic literature and by psychotherapists needs to be

more rigorously disputed. Religious values and beliefs are, by their natures, very personal issues. Psychotherapists need therefore to cautiously but effectively enter the domain of a patient's religion so that the nature and implications of the patient's religious beliefs, experiences and predelictions can be identified and assessed.

(16) Effective mental health care in shared psychological and religious discourse

A more holistic perspective of what psychotherapeutic services could and should be doing needs to advocate and adhere to the realization that mental health involves and includes the spiritual-religious dimension of human experience. Disparities in religious and psychological discourse need to be rigorously re-examined in order that the two realms might better co-operate in creating a shared discourse for effective mental health care in which the body, mind and soul of the individual are all equally considered.

These conclusions all relate to the importance of language of areas of expertise about the human condition being better understood and used by the people who refer to it. That

is, experts, as therapists or clergymen, or the laity, as patients or others, need to be able to communicate theories and feelings proficiently so that the care and cure of problems in the human condition are not impeded by theoretical abstractions rendered useless in jargon. To this end, the redefinitions presented in this thesis, resulting from the examination of two principal realms of religious and psychological discourse, hopefully assist in making two useful paradigmatic statements about the human condition, namely Freud's theory and Biblical Christianity, more manageable points of reference for effective mental health care.

Much could be said about what this thesis is not. Clearly other points of reference in other systems of religion and psychological theory could have been used. Similarly, the two paradigmatic statements of Freud and Christianity that were selected could have been examined more rigorously and in different ways. These alternative approaches would however have detracted from the intentions of this thesis, which were to examine the dissonance of guilt feelings, and establish how religion could assist psychotherapists to deal with them, by translating between the realms of religious and psychological discourse to indicate how these realms share in the task of mental health care.

The dissonance of guilt feelings, as a major factor in human experience, and hence in psychopathology, is of course a

socio-religiously determined phenomena. That is, the dissonance of guilt feelings result in individuals who live in certain types of societies which cause individuals to be especially introspective, egocentric, self-evaluating and goal-oriented. Such self-interestedness inevitably focuses on the individual's concerns far more on his or her own performance and status, in terms of the values, norms and goals that are impinged onto the consciousness of the individual by the society, than may otherwise happen in other societies.

The suggestion that the dissonance of guilt feelings are the particular result of particular societies and their religious constructs, relates to earlier conclusions about the role of God(s) and goals in the human condition. Clearly, further research into the cause, processes and results of socio-religious dynamics in human experience is necessary to establish, more accurately, the situation in this regard. Similarly, further empirical research into the nature, causes, implications and ubiquity of the dissonance of guilt feelings would further serve to verify the claims of this thesis.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX A

LEWIS, H.B. TABLE OF SUMMARY OF WORKING CONCEPT OF SHAME AND GUILT

	SHAME	GUILT
Stimulus	1. Disappointment, defeat or moral transgression	1. Moral transgression
	2. Deficiency of self	2. Event, act, thing for which self is responsible
	3. Involuntary, self unable	3. Voluntary, self able
	4. Encounters with "other" or within the self	4. Within the self
Extent of libidinal component	1. Specific connection to sex	1. Connection to aggression
Conscious content	1. Painful emotion	1. Affect may or may not be present
	2. Autonomic reactions	2. Autonomic reactions less likely
	3. Connections to past feeling	3. Fewer connections to past feelings
	4. Many variants of shame feeling	4. Guilt feeling is monotonic
	5. Fewer variations of cognitive content (the self)	5. More variations of content-things in the world
	6. Identity thoughts	6. No identity thoughts
Position of self in field	1. Self passive	1. Self active
	2. Self focal in awareness	2. Self not focal in awareness
	3. Multiple functions of self at the same time	3. Self intact, functioning silently
	4. Vicarious experience of "other's" view of self	4. Pity, concern for "other's" suffering
Nature and discharge of	1. Humiliated fury	1. Righteous indignation
	2. Discharge blocked by guilt and/or love of "other" discharge on self	2. Discharge on self and "other"
Characteristic defences	1. Denial	1. Isolation of affect
	2. Repression of ideas	2. Rationalization
	3. Affirmation of the self	3. Reaction formation: good deeds or thoughts
	4. Affect disorder: depression	4. Thought disorder: obsession and paranoia

(in Izard, C.E. (1979) see note 44, Chapter One)

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY TABLE OF ID, EGO AND SUPEREGO

	LEVEL OF CSNESS	AGENCY	ENERGY	PROCESSES	DEVELOPED FROM	ENVIRONMENT	& REPRESSION	& GUILT	BASICALLY
ID	unconscious	instinctual agent	from instincts	pleasure principle reflex actions primary process	instinctual needs	internal	is what is repressed	not conscious - may cause conscious/ behaviour effects	biological aspect
EGO	conscious and unconscious	mediating, regulating, executive agent	from id's psychic energies	reality principle secondary process	need to interact realisticly with external world	external & internal	is the repressing force - <u>and</u> ensures resistance	here that levels of guilt are felt/dealt with - & where the condition of feeling guilt 'felt'	psychological aspect
SUPEREGO	primarily unconscious	critical agent	from id's psychic energies + ego force derivative	conscience ego ideal personal-experience 'conscience'	need to behave & think in socially approved manner	internal & external	powers the ego's repressing forces	from an (over-scrupulous) superego i.e., 'causes' the guilt	socio-religious aspect

APPENDIX C

PROCEDURE IN THE CONFESSIONAL

ACT OF CONTRITION

(by the penitent)

O my God, I am heartily sorry for having offended Thee, and I detest all my sins, because I dread the loss of heaven and the pains of hell but most of all because they offend thee, my God, Who art all good and deserving of my love. I firmly resolve, with the help of Thy grace, to confess my sins, to do penance, and to amend my life.

Amen.

FORM OF THE ABSOLUTION*

(said by the priest to the penitent)

May Our Lord Jesus Christ absolve thee, and I, by His authority, absolve thee from every bond of excommunication and interdict, according to my power and your need. Therefore, I absolve thee from thy sins, in the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

Amen.

*This is or used to be said in Latin.

Belgum, D. (1970) Guilt: Where Psychology and Theology Meet, p 69.

APPENDIX D

DAY OF ATONEMENT STATEMENT

May it therefore be thy will, O Lord our God and God of our fathers, to forgive us all our sins, to pardon us all our iniquities, and to grant us atonement for all our transgressions.

For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee under compulsion or of freewill,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by hardening of the heart;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee unwittingly,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee with utterance of the lips;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by unchastity,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee openly and secretly;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee knowlingly and deceitfully,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in speech;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by wronging a neighbour,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in the meditation of the heart;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by association with impurity,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by confession of the lips;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by despising parents and teachers,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in presumption and in error;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by violence,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by violence,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by the profanation of thy Name;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by impurity of the lips,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by foolish speech;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by the evil inclination,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee wittingly or unwittingly.

And for all these; O God of forgiveness, forgive us, pardon us, grant us atonement.
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by denying and lying,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by bribery;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by scoffing,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by evil speech;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in business,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in eating and drinking;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by usury and increase,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by an arrogant mien;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by the utterances of our lips,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by a wanton glance,
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee with haughty eyes,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee with obdurate brow.
And for all these, O God of forgiveness, forgive us, pardon us, grant us atonement.
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by breaking off the yoke.
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by contentiousness;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by ensnaring our neighbour,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by envy;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by levity,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by being stiff-necked;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by running to do evil,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by talebearing;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by a vain oath,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by causeless hatred;
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by a breach of trust,
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by terror of the heart.
And for all these, O God of forgiveness, forgive us, pardon, grant us atonement.
And for the sins for which we owe a burnt offering;
And for the sins for which we owe a sin-offering;
And for the sins for which we owe an offering according to our ability;

And for the sins for which we owe a trespass-offering for certain guilt and a trespass-offering for doubtful guilt;
And for the sins for which we deserve corporal chastisement;
And for the sins for which we deserve the punishment of forty stripes;
And for the sins for which we deserve death by the hand of God;
And for the sins for which we deserve the punishment of excision, and of being childless;
And for all these, O God of forgiveness, forgive us, pardon us, grant us atonement.
And for the sins for which we deserve the four kinds of death inflicted by the Court of Law: stoning, burning, beheading and strangling.

For the breach of positive commands, and for the breach of negative commands, whether an action be involved or not; both for the sins that are known unto us and those that are unknown to us. Those that are known unto us we have already avowed before thee, and we have made acknowledgement of them unto thee: and those that are unknown to us, lo, they are revealed and known unto thee, according to the word which has been said: The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but the revealed things belong unto us, and unto our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this Law.

from Routledge and Kegan Paul (1st ed.) 1955 Service of the Synagogue: A New Edition of The Festival Prayers with an English Translation in Prose and Verse.

APPENDIX E

A REVISED ASSESSMENT OUTLINE

The questions of the format presented below are suggested as part of the procedure for use by therapists in obtaining information about the patient's presenting problems. This format specifically seeks to obtain religious information to ensure a more holistic assessment of the patient.

ASSESSMENT OUTLINE:

What were the reasons/circumstances of the referral?

an account of how the condition eventuated and how the patient came to be seeking therapy.

What is the presenting problem?

an account of the present condition of the patient.

What is the history of the problem?

including here details of the patient's life events, family history., attempts to cope with the problems, attitudes towards the problem, where pertinent.

What is the personal history of the patient?

A fuller account of the individual clarifying and expanding on information already mentioned in detailing the history of the problem; here religious influences and predelictions need to be identified and assessed.

What is the history of the patient's family?

A full account of family members, significant others, the home, the religious background, assessing family functioning, noting particular details pertinent to the patient's problem and situation.

What is the basic personality of the patient?

Developmental features, looking at education, psychosexual maturation, social functioning, activities and habits, personality traits, attitudes and values, predominant moods and expression. This should explicitly refer to any religious influences and expressions.

N O T E S

and

R E F E R E N C E S

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1 The environment meaning all that is the 'world out there' and not the individual per se. It includes others, objects, events, values, attitudes, systems of thought, tradition, society, etc. and not what is the individual and his/her inner environment of thought and feeling.

2. Drives are what, at a meta theoretical level, has the status of theoretical explanatory devices which may or may not exist as bodily processes (eg. hunger as opposed to survival).

3. Freud, S. (1983) New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. London: Penguin, p 113.
(Note: hereafter this text will be referred to as NILOP only, with page number.) Also, for desires in ethical discourse, see Chidester, D. (1987). Patterns of Action: Religion and Ethics in a Comparative Perspective. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Press.

4. Freud, S. NILOP, p 106.

5. Miller, N.E. (1944) Experimental Studies of Conflict. In J.McV. Hunt (ed) Personality and the behaviour disorders. New York: Ronald Press.

6. Definitions of what mental health is and what it is not abound. For the purposes of this thesis it is taken to refer to an ideal of functioning as a person that accords to norms and values of a particular sub-

paradigm within a paradigm of reality which is Religion. That is, in the final analysis, each Religion determines what is and what is not mentally healthy.

7. See Note 1, Chapter Two, and for dissonance, the implicit information in Freud's theory of the neurotic conflict and psychodynamic conflict.

8. Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston Illinois: Ron Petersen.

9. For Jung's views on Guilt, see Brooke, R. (1985) Jung and the Phenomenology of Guilt. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 30, pp 165-184.

10. Differentiation between external (Shame) functions of conscience and internal (Guilt) functions of conscience have been theorized in the so-called Shame and Guilt Cultures of the East and West respectively. The work of Ruth Benedict (1946) in The Chrysanthymum and the Sword. Houghton Mifflin is a primary source. (This thesis has recently been disputed - see Epstein, A.L. (1984) The Experience of Shame in Melanesia. Occasional Paper No. 40, Royal Anthropological Institute, London.)

11. For an extensive phenomenological study on conscience, the work of Parker, M. (1985) is invaluable. The title of this (unpublished) Masters Thesis is A Phenomenological Analysis of the Psychological Manifestations of Ontic Conscience as derived from Heidegger's Ontological Conception of that phenomenon. (Rhodes University, Grahamstown)

12. See note 6 above.

13. Pierce, C.A. (1958) Conscience in the New Testament. London: SCM Press, p 115.

14. MacQuarrie, J. (1970) "The Struggle of Conscience for Authentic Selfhood" in Conscience, C. Ellis Nelson (ed) (1973) New York: Newman Press, pp 155-166, usefully considers this with reference to issues in Ethics. (Hereafter references from this edited text will be noted uncer Conscience.)

15. Tillich, P. (1955) "The Nature of a Liberating Conscience" in Conscience, pp 62-71, argues how these demands are allied to a fundamental need for morality in the human condition.

16. Buber, M., (1965) 'Guilt and Guilt Feelings' in Conscience, p 235.

17. Fromm, E. (1958) Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, differentiated in a similar way between Authoritarian and Humanitarian forms of conscience. The former debilitates with fears of punishment whilst the latter serves to ensure productivity and rationality.

18. op cit Note 13 above.

19. Ibid, pp 21 ff.

20. These two books provide further information in this regard:

Button, E. (1985) Personal Construct Theory and Mental Health, London: Croom Helm, presents an up to date and comprehensive review of the theory and practice of this approach and how it can deal with the consequences of the conscience.

Butler, J. (1964) Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and a Dissertation Upon the Nature of Virtue. London: G. Bell & Sons. This gives a comprehensive exposition of the nature of man, and the normative nature of the demands and functions of the conscience.

21. Heller, A. (1979) A Theory of Feelings. The Netherlands: Van Gorcum presents an alternative point of view to this in the form of a Marxist anthropology of feelings.

22. Issues related to temptation and its implications are another vast topic altogether. Basically they are related to issues in Christian Religion with temptation seen as incitement to sin and consequent behaviours contrary to the obligations of the religion.

23. Coleman, J.C. (7th ed) (1984) Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life. New York: Scott Foresman, is a most useful source book for further details of cases in this regard.

24. Wright, D. (1983) The Psychology of Moral Behaviour. Great Britain: Penguin.

25. See Chapter Four for other strategies of reparation.

26. See Greenspan, P.S. (1983) Moral Dilemmas and Guilt in Philosophical Studies, 43, pp 117-125, for an interesting consideration of this in terms of the novel Sophie's Choice by William Styron (1980).

27. In Conscience (op cit) pp 11-20 - Guilt Ethics and Religion.

28. See differentiation in Chapter Three.

29. For detailed description of phenomenology of authenticity versus inauthenticity see Parker, M.A. (op cit Note 11), pp 16-26 and pp 33-41.

30. An article by Rev. Edward C. Sellner, OSC, usefully looks at a case history in this regard and suggests a strategy for Pastoral Counselling to deal with such a situation. The article is entitled The Question of Guilt in the Search for Identity: A Case-Study, in Journal of Pastoral Counselling, 10 (1975), pp 42-55.

31. The Psychology Today Questionnaire - Isn't It Right - An Enquiry into Everyday Ethics (June 1981) and the consequent reported findings (November 1981) produce some startling results in this regard.

32. Wright, D. op cit (Note 24 above).

33. Useful books in this regard are:

    (1) Brighton, C.C. (1959) History of Western Morals.

(2) Frankena, W.K. (1963) Ethics.

(3) Hospers, J. (1961) Human Conduct.

34. The 10 Commandments of the Law of Moses (Exodus 20) and the New Commandment of Jesus (John 13:34) are examples of this.

35. Chidester, D. op cit Note 3 above.

36. Ibid, p 111.

37. Thoules, R. (1971) An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion. London: Cambridge University Press.

38. Ibid, p 39.

39. Ibid.

40. Nietzsche, F. (1969) On the Genealogy of Morals (transl. Kaufman, W. and Hollingdale, R.J.). New York: Random House.

41. Chidester, ibid, p 212.

42. Ibid, p 246.

43. The nature, issues and implications of this situation are interestingly developed in an article Existential Neurosis by Maddi, S.R. (1967) in Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 4, pp 311-325,

and in a book Existential Guilt by Morano, D.V. (1973). Assen: Van Gorcum.

44. Rorty, A.I. (Ed) (1980) Explaining Emotions, London: UCP, is a very useful source book for understanding human emotions and theories of them, as is
Izard, C.E. (Ed) (1979) Emotions in Personality and Psychopathology. New York: Plenum Press.

45. See Lewis, H.B. article Shame in Depression and Hysteria in Izard (op cit 29 above) and
Hesselgrave, D.J. (1983) Missionary Elenctics and Guilt and Shame in Missiology: An International Review, 11, pp 461-483.

46. Ausubel, D.P. (1955) Relationships Between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process. Psychological Review, 62 (5).
Lewis, HB. (1979) op cit above Note 45.
Benedict, R. (1946) op cit above Note 10.
Piers, G. & Singer, M. (1971) Shame and Guilt. New York: Norton.
Thrane, G. (1979) Shame in Journal of Theory of Social Behaviour, 9 (2), pp 139-166.
Shinn, R.L. (1976) The Baffling Mix of Confusion and Guilt. Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 31, Winter, pp 126-136.

47. Ausubel op cit, p 379.

48. Ibid, p 382.

49. Ibid, p 383.

50. Ibid, p 385.

51. This is also the assumption of this thesis.

52. The work of Donald Mosher in the research of guilt feelings is an outstanding contribution in documenting and quantifying the nature and range of these discrepancies and the feelings they involve. A full listing of Mosher's work can be found in Izard op cit, pp 124-129. (Note 45 above.)

53. Lewis op cit, Note 46 above.

54. This relates to theories of Locus of Control as researched and posited by Rotter, J.B. (1966) and interestingly re-examined by Lawrence Breen and Terry Prociuk (1976) looking at Internal-External Locus of Control and Guilt in Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32 (2), p 301-302,

55. Chidester, D. op cit, pp 209-210.

56. Ibid, p 210.

57. Averill, J.R. (1976) Emotion and Anxiety: Determinants in Rorty, A.I. (1980) Explaining Emotions, Berkeley: University of California Press.

58. Buber, M. (1965) "Guilt and Guilt Feelings" in Conscience, C. Ellis

Nelson (ed) (1973) New York: Newman Press, pp 224-237.

59. A useful reference on this from another point of view is:
Brooke, R. (1985) Jung and the Phenomenology of Guilt. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 30, 165-184.

60. Chidester, op cit, p 251.

61. See Bean, P. (Ed) (1983) Mental Illness: Changes and Trends, New York: Wiley, for full coverage of this.

62. McNeill, J.T. (1977) A History of the Cure of Souls. New York: Harper & Row.

63. Ibid, Preface, p vii.

64. Ibid, p 321.

65. Ibid, p 300.

66. See Table Chapter Four.

NOTES

CHAPTER TWO

1. The following are useful texts for further information and for considering the implications of Freud's theory.
   (a) Stevenson, L. (Ed) (1981) Seven Theories of Human Nature. London: OUP, pp 165-192.
   (b) KÜng, H. (1979) Freud and the Problem of God. New Haven: Yale University Press.
   (c) Homans, P. (1970) Theology after Freud: An Interpretative Inquiry. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

2. Wollheim, R. (1983) Freud. Glasgow: Collins, p 9.

3. Jones, E. (1966) The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud. London: Penguin.

4. NILOP, pp 102-104.

5. As implicit in Wollheim's book. Op cit.

6. NILOP, p 88 ff.

7. Footnote in NILOP, pp 88 f.

8. See Chapter Two. The Theory of the Mind. Wollheim op cit, p 42 f, and in Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).

9. NILOP, pp 105-107.

10. op cit, p 176.

11. The term id-organism refers to their seemingly inextricable interrelationship that means the organism is the id as the id is the organism at its basic levels of functioning.

12. From Complete Works Vol XIX, p 23; NILOP, p 108 and Wollheim, p 108, respectively.

13. NILOP, pp 108 and 122-124 gives further details on this issue.

14. NILOP, p 108.

15. NILOP, p 110.

16. Wollheim op cit, p 189.

17. NILOP, p 107.

18. Wollheim op cit, p 176.

19. Freud, Lecture XIX, p 17.

20. Freud also uses terms such as introjection and identification to explain

this process (see NILOP, p 95).

21. See Pierce, C.A. (1955) op cit. (Note 13, Chapter One above.)

22. See Conscience. (Note 14, Chapter One.)

23. NILOP, p 96.

24. NILOP, p 92.

25. Wollheim. op cit. p 204.

26. NILOP, p 98.

27. Ibid.

28. Wollheim. op cit. p 196 ff.

29. Ibid.

28. Wollheim. op cit. p 196 ff.

29. Ibid, p 105.

30. See Freud, Lecture 32, Anxiety and Instinctual Life, NILOP, pp 113 ff.

31. Psychic Topology versus Psychic Energetics - in NILOP op cit Note 30

and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).

32. NILOP op cit p 129 footnote.

33. NILOP op cit p 129.

NOTES

CHAPTER THREE

1. The principle reference works used for this were:
   (1) Brown, C. (Ed) (1978) The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology. Exeter: Paternoster Press.
   (2) Thomas, R.L. (Ed) (1981) New American Standard Concordance of The Bible. Hebrew-Aramaic and Greek Dictionaries. Nashville: Holman.
   (3) von Allmen, J.J. (Ed) (1958) Vocabulary of the Bible. London: Lutterworth.

2. All Bible references in this thesis are from the Revised Standard Version (1971).

3. Wolff, H.W. (1981) Anthropology of the Old Testament, Philadelphia: Fortress provides some useful ideas and information in this regard.

4. An extensive phenomenological study of this can be found in Brooke, R. (1983) An Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Being-Guilty. (Unpublished) MA Dissertation: University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
   Brooke, R. (1985) op cit (Note 9, Chapter One);
   Sexton, R.O. & Maddock, R.C. (1978) The Adam and Eve Syndrome in Journal of Religion and Health, 17 (3), pp 163-168,
   and Narramore, B. (1974) 'Guilt: Its Universal Hidden Presence in the Journal of Psychology and Theology, 2 pp 105-115,

offer interesting expositions of this seminal story.

5. Further details in support of this can be found in the following:
Jacobs, L. (1964) Principles of the Jewish Faith. London: Valentine Mitchell & Co.
Blaum, J.L. (1966) Modern Varieties of Judaism. New York: Watts & Co.

6. An analysis of the implications of Christ being a model of comparison can be found in Paloutzian, R.F. (1975) in an article The Role of Emotional Feelings: A Social Psychological Perspective and Case Study in the Journal of Psychology and Theology (3) Spring, pp 90-93.

7. This has lead to differentiation between sins of omission and commision, original sin, mortal sin, venial sin and the so-called Seven Deadly Sins of pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy and sloth.

8. op cit. Sexton & Maddock, Note 4 above.

9. Narramore, B. (1974) op cit, Note 4, pp 107-108, identifies several of the consequences of the Fall.

10. Further useful reading on the issues pertinent to the story of Job can be found in:
Jones, E. (1966) The Triumph of Job. London: SCM Press.
Swaith, N. (1968) The Book of Job: Its Origin and Purpose. London: SCM Press.

11. Further analysis and exploration of this can be gleaned from Ricoeur, P. (1969) The Symbolism of Evil. Boston: Beacon.

12. An interesting consideration of this in terms of African factors can be found in Hebga, M. (1983) Reconciliation and African Culture in African Ecclesial Review 25, pp 347-355.

13. G. Pidoux in von Allmen (Note 1 above).

14. Quell, GL (1951) Sin in the Old Testament in Sin (Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's Theologisches Wörtenbuch Zum Neuen Testament). London: Adam & Charles Black, p 5 ff.
(Note: References from this text hereafter denoted under Sin.)

15. Examples include the consequences of Adam eating the apple, David holding the census and Moses' lack of faith.

16. Quell ibid, p 5.

17. Ibid, p 21.

18. Günther, W. (1978) in Brown, C. (op cit Note 1 above, p 574).

19. Bertram, G. in Sin, pp 33 ff.

20. The notion of the Old Testament as the quarry of resources for the New Testament is admirably presented in Hanson, A.T. (1983) The Living

Utterances of God. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, and in van Ruler, A.A. (1970) The Christian Church and the New Testament. Michigan: Erdmans.

21. Fuller analysis of the world and contents of the New Testament can be gleaned from the following:
Bruce, F.F. (1969) New Testament History. London: Oliphants.
Dunn, J.D.G. (1981) Unity and Diversity in the New Testament. London: SCM Press.
Robinson, J.M. and Koestler, H. (1979) Trajectories Through Early Christianity. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

22. Menninger, K. (1973) Whatever Became of Sin? London: Hodder & Stoughton, looks at the state of the concept-term sin today.

23. Matthew 9:10 ff; Mark 2:5 ff.

24. Günther, W. op cit (Note 18), p 573.

25. Cook, J.T. (1985) (unpublished Masters thesis) A Critical Analysis of the Assumptions, Aims and Methods in Seward Hiltner's Approach to Pastoral Counselling in the Light of the Major Christian Traditions of Pastoral Care. (Religious Studies, University of Cape Town), p 40.

26. Another alternative paradigm is explored and explained by Segundo, J.L. (1980) Evolution and Guilt. Great Britain: Gill & MacMillan.

27. This is the concept-term used by Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard to explain the active leap of imagination from reason to faith by believers. See Kierkegaard, S. (1954) The Sickness Unto Death (trans. Lowrie, W.) New York: Doubleday.

28. Maurer, C. in TDNT, VII 908 (op cit Note 1 above).

29. Pierce, C.A. op cit Note 13, Chapter One, pp 84 ff.

30. Ibid and op cit.

31. In Pierce op cit, p 46.

32. Slote, M.A. (1977) Morality and Ignorance in The Journal of Philosophy, 74 (12), pp 745-767.

33. op cit, p 112.

34. op cit, p 113.

NOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

1. See Loomis, E.A. (1963) entry on Religion and Psychiatry in Deutsch, A. and Fishman, H. (Eds) Encyclopaedia of Mental Health. New York: Watts & Co., pp 1747-1748.

2. For a fuller discussion of the medical models, the meaning of madness and the hierarchy of disorder, see Wing, J.K. (1978) Reasoning About Madness. London: OUP.

3. See Lecture 35, The Question of a Weltanschauung, (NILOP, pp 193-219), for Freud's views and Fordham, F. (1981) An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, London: Penguin (pp 69-83) for Jung.

4. Snoeck, A. (1961) Confession and Pastoral Psychology. Westminster, Maryland: Newman.
   Bower, R.K. (Ed) (1974) Integrity Therapy: Biblical and Psychological Perspectives for Christian Counsellors. USA: Publishers Services.
   Cook, J. (1986) (op cit Note 25, Chapter 3).
   Gerkin, C.V. (1984) The Living Human Document. Nashville: Abingdon Press.
   Wuellner, W.H. and Leslie, R.C. (1984) The Surprising Gospel. Nashville: Abingdon Press.
   (all have useful further information in this regard)

5. An interesting perspective and commentary can be found in Avens, R. (1980) Imagination is Reality. Texas: Spring Publications.

6. Definitions of Psychology are as varied as the schools of thought within and without the discipline. Any definition is a product of the definer's world view and this needs to be borne in mind. This definition is an attempt to be as simple and as objective as possible.

7. Again, Coleman, J.C. (1984) (op cit Note 23, Chapter One), is a useful text for an overview of this area.

8. See Van den Berg, J.H. (1971) What is Psychotherapy? in Journal of the Institute of Man. Duquesne University, Vol II (3), pp 321-370.

9. This refers to the issues of order/disorder normality/abnormality. Again texts on Abnormal Psychology generally have pertinent comments in this regard which indicate their approach to the question of definition and implication of differences.

10. These are the effects of dissonance as mentioned in earlier chapters.

11. See Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J.B. (1983) The Language of Psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press.

12. See Freud, S. (1914) "Remembering, Repeating and Working Through" (in Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1973).

13. For further details see

Kovel, J. (1977) A Complete Guide to Therapy, Great Britain: Penguin, or

Darley, J.M., Glucksberg, S. & Kinchla, R.A. (1986) Psychology (Third Edition). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Chapter 18, pp 601-634.

14. For working definition of this thesis please refer to entry in table on page 130 of this chapter.

15. For further details see:

Allport, G.W. (1960) The Individual and His Religion. New York: Mac-Millan.

Thoules, R.L. (1971) op cit Note 37, Chapter One.

Brown, L.B. (ed) (1985) Advances in the Psychology of Religion. Oxford: Pergamon.

Brown, L.B. (ed) (1973) Psychology and Religion. London: Penguin.

16. The quest for acceptability and the intense longing for consonance and harmony is interestingly explored in an article by LeRoy Aden (1984) Pastoral Counselling and Self-Justification in Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 3 (4), pp 23-28.

17. Radhakrishnan, I. & Raju, P.T. (eds) (1966) The Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosphy. London: George Allen & Unwin usefully looks at Greek, Jewish, Chinese, Indian, Christian, Islamic and Marxist thinking on this issue.

18. The question of Jewish guilt and anxiety is cogently presented in Spero, M.H. (1977) "Anxiety and Religious Growth: A Talmudic Perspective" in Journal of Religion and Mental Health, 16 (1), pp 52-57.

19. See Fenichel, O. (1971) The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

20. See DSM III - Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd edition) (1980). American Psychiatric Association: Washington DC.

21. An authoritative and exhaustive study on the contemporary Jewish penitent personality can be found in Spero, M.H. (1980) "The Contemporary Penitent Personality: Diagnostic Treatment and Ethical Considerations with a Particular Type of Religious Patient" in Journal of Psychology and Judaism, 4 (3), pp 131-197.

22. See Malcolm, J. (1981) Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession. Great Britain: Picador.

23. For differentiation between superego and conscience the following two articles in Nelson, C.E. (1973) Conscience: Theological and Psychological Perspectives, New York: Newman, are most useful:
Conscience and Superego: A Key Distinction by Glaser, J.W. (1971), pp 167-188, and
Superego and Conscience by Zilboorg, G. (1955), pp 210-223.

24. See Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J.B. (op cit Note 11 above) and Klebanow, S. (1981) Changing Concepts in Psychoanalysis. New York: Gardner Press.

25. At its simplest, confession involves acceptance of failure or wrongdoing and a willingness to admit this to another.

26. See McConahay, J.B. & Hough, J.C. Jr. (1973) "Love and Guilt Oriented Dimensions of Christian Belief" in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 12, pp 53-64.

27. Day of Atonement statement: see Appendix E.

28. Stott, J.R.W. (1974) Confess Your Sins. Waco Texas: Word Books.

29. See Ott, L. in Stott (1974), p 276, in Barnhouse, R. (1974) op cit Note 38 below.

30. Berger, P. (1969) The Social Reality of Religion, London: Faber, also the following from Belgum, D. (1970) op cit. In Article XXV of the Augsburg Confession (1530) in The Book of Concord, Martin Luther (1483-1546) argues that Christian faith is necessary to ensure absolution from sins. This is because he reckoned absolution was invalid and meaningless without faith. He states:

"Confession has not been abolished in our churches, for it is not customary to administer the body of Christ except to those who have previously been examined and absolved. The people are very diligently taught

concerning faith in connection with absolution, a matter about which there has been profound silence before this time ... confession is retained among us on account of the great benefit of absolution and because it is otherwise useful to conscience." (Belgum, p 79)

John Calvin (1509-1564) another principle Reformation theologian, opposed the meaningless ritual of private compulsory confession. He argued confession ought only be sought and undertaken by individuals who required it. It was not to be an automatic sacrament taken by all. He writes:

"... confession ... ought to be free so as not to be required of all, but to be commended only to those who know that they have need of it. Then, that those who use it according to their need neither be forced by any rule nor be induced by any trick to recount all their sins ..." (Belgum, p 81)

31. These appear to be the results of the rational scientific approach to knowledge and living according to secularized world views.

32. See Ehrlich, M.P. (1977) Self-Acceptance and Meditation in Journal of Pastoral Counselling, 11, pp 37-41.

33. Steere, J.A. (1984) Ethics in Clinical Psychology. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

34. See Wittenberg, L. (1950) Psychoanalytic Insight and Relationships. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

35. Formats used by clinicians, psychotherapists, analysts etc. need to more overtly include religious factors in initial assessment/examination/ formats. A survey on formats in use in Cape Town area indicates this is not currently done.

36. See Jampolsky, G.G. (1985) Goodbye to Guilt, New York: Bantam, and Narramore, B. (1974) four articles:-
Guilt: Where Theology and Psychology Meet;
Guilt: Its Universal Hidden Presence;
Guilt: Christian Motivation or Neurotic Masochism? and
Guilt: Three Models of Therapy in Journal of Psychology and Theology, Vol 2, pp 18-25; 104-115; 182-189 and 260-265.

37. See Resnick, G. (1982) (unpublished thesis) Religion as an Influencing Factor in Psychiatric Illness. University of Cape Town.

38. e.g. Jung (op cit Note 3 above).
Mowrer, O.H. (1967) Morality and Mental Health. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
Adler, A. (1924) The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology. London: Collins.
Menninger, K. op cit Note 22, Chapter 3.

39. Barnhouse, R.T. (1983) "The Theology of Pastoral Care: A Progress Report" in Anglican Theological Review, 65, pp 397-411.

40. ibid p 397.

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