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Fear, Dislike and Hate: What Constitutes Xenophobia?

(An analysis of violence against foreigners in De Doorns,
South Africa November, 2009)

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*A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of Masters of Philosophy in Development Studies*

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2010

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

Acknowledgements

My research into xenophobia would not have been possible if it had not been for the men, women and children who were displaced to the Safety Sites in Cape Town and Gautang and who were always welcoming and willing to discuss their stories. They have been an inspiration to me.

The Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town, specifically Miranda Madikani and Lena Opfermann who facilitated the research, made all of this possible. And the wonderful people of De Doorns who were always helpful, welcoming and willing to share their stories and opinions with me, they are at the heart of this paper.

My supervisor, Ari Sitas, always willing to discuss my findings, provided fabulous insight into my work.

Finally, there is one individual who has been instrumental in everything I have learned working with NGOs in Cape Town. My co-researcher and co-author for the NGO report on De Doorns and chairperson of PAX South Africa, Anne-Marie Robb. She is not only an incredible woman, but a wonderful friend. Without her, none of this would have been possible.

To all these people I offer my utmost thanks, they have broadened my experiences and taught me much about what it is to live in South Africa as both citizens and foreigners. They have also shown me the incredible resilience of the human spirit. Thank you.

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Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of xenophobic violence in South Africa. By examining the root of the term 'xenophobia' it is possible to show how the term has evolved to mean something entirely different in the present day. De Doorns, a small farming town in the Western Cape of South Africa is used as a case study, showing how the xenophobic violence that occurred there in November 2009 arose and manifested. Through informal interviews, analyses of available local and regional statistical data a picture of the xenophobia in De Doorns emerges and is then examined in terms of the current theories on xenophobia. The resulting findings provide some new insight into xenophobia in South Africa and how it is evolving. Past assumptions that locate the root of xenophobic sentiment leading to xenophobic action in a 'hatred' of foreigners may be mistaken as xenophobia can (and does) occur in areas with low levels of prejudice towards foreigners. It does so because dissatisfaction with the government sometimes results in a new form of protest that is, to all appearances, xenophobia, but is not necessarily motivated by xenophobic intent. Rather an underlying xenophobic sentiment that exists throughout the nation has opened the door for poor South Africans to target foreign Africans a tool of protest in order to gain government attention. The whole concept of 'xenophobia' has evolved far beyond its roots to refer to actions that are taken against foreigners for the simple reason that they are foreign. As attacks on foreigners occur with increasing frequency in South Africa it is ever more important to gain a deep understanding of each individual outbreak in order to create a holistic and informed picture of South African xenophobia. This research suggests that some of the basic questions underlying research into xenophobia need to be questioned.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Research Question

I worked as a monitor during the response to the 2008 attacks, and while I gained an understanding of how the victims experienced xenophobia and how both government and civil society responded, there was very little understanding of what motivated the perpetrators and what exactly xenophobia in South Africa was. Since the outbreaks I have become increasingly interested in indentifying what South African xenophobia is and how it is evolving. In 2009, following the attacks in De Doorns in the Western Cape, I was again appointed as a monitor by a group of NGOs. The isolated nature of the small rural town provided a unique case study for examining xenophobic violence.

I wanted to understand the data gathered better, analyse it further, and contrast it with current literature to see where it would lead in terms of shedding light on xenophobic violence as it manifests in South Africa. My research seeks to gain greater understanding of South African xenophobia, how it is evolving and what it has become. By analysing the data collected as a monitor in De Doorns and using the current literature on xenophobia as a lense through which I examine the xenophobic violence, I aim to discover what motivated the perpetrators to attack foreign nationals and how this information can inform a South African understanding of xenophobia.

Motivation

With increasing media reports claiming a given situation is ‘not xenophobia’ I have frequently found myself wondering what definition they are using to rule it out. If statements can be made clearly identifying a situation as ‘not’ something then it follows that there must be an understanding of what that ‘something’ is. Yet an exact understanding of the connection between emotive xenophobia and violent action against foreigners remains elusive, though the same term is typically used for both.

The research I conducted in De Doorns only further confused matters. It fit with my understanding of xenophobia in that a group of individuals were targeted and forcefully evicted for the simple reason that they are foreign. But conversations with the community suggested that there was no hateful intent. If they bore the victims no ill will then how could it be xenophobia?

Crush & Ramachandran (2009) argue that greater understanding of the underlying motivations behind xenophobia is required if a coordinated response is to be achieved. With increasing instances of such violence in South Africa the need to develop a comprehensive understanding of what motivates perpetrators is ever growing.

I hope to build on the research conducted in the wake of the 2008 attacks. By providing an analysis of the De Doorns case, I seek to respond to Crush & Ramachandran’s (2009) call for “greater understanding of citizen attitudes to migrants, refugees and migration policy research which also uncovers the root causes of xenophobia and evaluates the effectiveness of interventions from the perspective of citizens and migrants”.¹

¹ Crush & Ramachandran, 2009, 71

Overview of Research

I analysed the current theories on xenophobia applying them to the South African context. By examining the most commonly used hypothesis I show how xenophobia poses a complex theoretical dilemma. The term has evolved beyond its original emotive definition to refer to violent action against foreigners, and highlighting this, I evaluate current understanding of xenophobia and what it means to be xenophobic. Xenophobia must then be considered in a South African context of protest culture which underpins mob violence.

Contextualizing De Doorns within the South African context required understanding of the historical factors that contribute to the current situation. South African communities cannot be examined without considering their apartheid past. With segregation an ever-present reality and continuing white economic domination, it was necessary to examine the present context within which the xenophobic violence erupted.

I then use the data I collected as a monitor. Through conversations and interviews with members from different groups of the De Doorns community I assess how xenophobia manifested in the small town. The motivations of the perpetrators are derived through these conversations and interviews and are informed by my observations during my research.

The events that occurred in November 2009 that led to over 2,500 Zimbabweans fleeing for their safety, their homes demolished, cannot be properly understood without analysing how the economic and political realities of the community influenced the violence. With seven key findings, I analyse the xenophobic violence in De Doorns and examine it in terms of current theory on xenophobia, specifically South African xenophobia. I further propose to add two new dimensions to current discussion. First, xenophobic violence in South Africa has become a tool of protest action, and the act of evicting foreigners is less an escalation of violence and more a new form of political protest. Second there is a mistaken assumption in most literature on xenophobia that presupposes the perpetrators dislike or hate the victims of violence. Much as a thief may not have any personal issue with the victim of his/her crime, so too did the perpetrators of violence in De Doorns bear no ill will towards the Zimbabweans they violently evicted through attacks on their personal property.

Limits of Research

I entered De Doorns as a researcher for an NGO, and both the information I learned and my interpretations of it are likely to have been affected by my position. The fact that I am a white female and, perhaps most importantly, foreign myself, further affects the data I obtained. I also found that with limited case studies into xenophobic violence in South Africa it is difficult to discern whether my findings suggest that De Doorns is a unique case, or an example of a wider phenomenon, though I suspect the latter to be true.

My work in the NGO sector, and specifically my work following the 2008 attacks has resulted in certain biases. I am loathe to state that violence against foreigners is not xenophobic, as I fear it will divorce it from the hate crime classification that I believe it rightly deserves. Though I endeavoured to remain cognisant of this bias, I know it impacts on both my analysis and my findings.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Analysis

In the wake of widespread xenophobic violence in South Africa a number of different terms and definitions have arisen to explain how xenophobic sentiment transforms into xenophobic action. Derived from the Greek words ‘xenos’ and ‘phobia’, the term literally refers to an irrational fear or dislike of strangers or those perceived as ‘foreign’². Contemporary authors tend to take one of three approaches to understanding what xenophobia means. The first is rooted in a belief that ‘we know it when we see it’ and the definition is considered implicit by virtue of using the term. In these cases the definition being referred to is likely the classical definition mentioned above. Another tendency is to redefine ‘xenophobia’. A joint discussion paper on International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia explains that “xenophobia describes attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity.”³ Crush & Ramachandran (2009) use the definition of ‘highly negative perceptions and practices that discriminate against non-citizen groups on the basis of their foreign origin or nationality.’⁴ They go on to state that it is ‘perpetuated through a dynamic public rhetoric that actively stigmatizes and vilifies some or all migrant groups by playing up the ‘threat’ posed by their presence and making them scapegoats for social problems.’⁵ In both these definitions the authors focus on discrimination as the foundation for xenophobia and hypothesis surrounding the root causes of xenophobia become central to an understanding of what xenophobic action is. The last approach is to reconceptualise xenophobia in terms of nationalism or ethnocentrism and offer an alternate term to describe the phenomena. Crush & Ramachandran (2009) reference “‘nativism,’ ethnocentrism, ‘xeno-racism,’ ‘ethno-exclusionism,’ ‘anti-immigrant prejudice,’ ‘the immigrant threat’ and ‘immigrant-phobia.’”⁶ Another notable term is ‘negrophobia.’⁷

Amidst various definitions and re-classifications, it is clear that the concept of ‘xenophobia’ is poorly defined. In a South African context violence against non-nationals by citizens is consistently linked to xenophobia. In this sense the term has evolved well beyond the classic definition, particularly as it is now being used to describe an action, rather than merely emotion. Yet what truly is xenophobia? The answer to this requires an understanding of the power dynamics in play, the roots of prejudice against foreigners and a discussion on how the term has evolved. This culminates in an analysis of protest culture, which is the avenue through which violence against foreigners is enacted.

Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and Xenophobia: Mann’s Dark Democracy

In the past century, the Holocaust and similar large-scale killings such as those that took place in Rwanda in 1994 and Cambodia in the 1970’s are commonly considered acts of ethnic cleansing or genocide. Xenophobia, as violent action, is now inextricably linked to such cases with one group attacking the ‘other’, and for reasons that are much the same as they all boil down to reasons or excuses for indentifying and vilifying the ‘other’. Mann’s (2005) analysis of ethnic cleansing and genocide helps

² Crush, 2009

³ ILO, IOM & OHCHR, 2001, 2

⁴ Crush & Ramachandran, 2009, 6

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Gqola, 2008

to explain how such hate crimes arise. However, by comparing South African xenophobia to his theories, the complexities of this particular type of violent action against 'others' come to light showing that though the base concept may be the same, the peculiarities of xenophobia make it unique.

Mann (2005) identifies three categories of perpetrators "(a) radical elites running party-states; (b) bands of militants forming violent paramilitaries; and (c) core constituencies providing mass though not majority popular support."⁸ He goes on to state "power is exercised in three distinct ways: top-down by elites, bottom-up by popular pressures, and coercively sideways by paramilitaries."⁹

To Mann (2005) ethnic cleansing involves a certain degree of power relations that are required for murderous (at the extreme level) actions to manifest. Yet, his argument does not hold for cases of xenophobia in South Africa. Firstly, the victims are not an ethnic group per say. Rather they are a macro-ethnicity defined by their social relation to South Africans. Secondly, by virtue of their political status, they are comparably weaker than the perpetrators. In this sense, the perpetrators have political sovereignty over the victims, and the victims could not (and are not) perceived as a threat to that sovereignty. Finally, the perpetrators as a collection of the poorest class, are themselves an out-group essentially seeking to cleanse themselves of a group who are further 'outliers' than they themselves. When ethnicity is introduced into the equation, the situation becomes more complex. Though the victims are from an amalgamation of different cultural backgrounds, both perpetrators and victims have descended from ancestors who migrated and settled throughout the continent thus numerous ties can be made to a collective ancestry.

Inequalities remain rampant within South Africa, however it is not that foreigners are perceived as having more, thus the perpetrators are being discriminated against in favour of the victim group, as the Rwandan genocide might be explained. Rather the perpetrators believe they are entitled to more than foreigners thus a discriminatory practice is perceived as *not* occurring.

Mann's (2005) power relations are equally skewed in the South African context. It is not bottom-up as the victims themselves are at the bottom, nor is it top-down since the perpetrators may be the masses but certainly are not the majority rule in terms of class. Furthermore it is not a sideways relationship as the two groups do not have equal political standing. When reported causes of xenophobic violence are taken into consideration, what appears is a situation where the masses feel they have been discriminated against by the state, and rather than rising up against the higher power, they have come down on a weaker group. All of this has occurred in a nation where the state remains strong, which Mann (2005) regards as unlikely to develop into a murderous cleansing, but nevertheless is manifesting with increasing cases of murder.

While discontent in South Africa does follow Mann's (2005) theories, the manifestation of this discontent appears as an anomaly to his ideas. The new class struggle over inequalities that has arisen out of racial segregation has taken a unique turn where perpetrators and victims do not follow traditional lines.

To reach an understanding, it is first necessary to examine common theories regarding the causes of 'xenophobia' that have been developed to explain xenophobic sentiment and are also used to show how such sentiment can result in violent action. These theories are examined in terms of a South African context, though many could be applied to xenophobic behaviour in other parts of the world. What becomes clear through this analysis is that the term 'xenophobia' is becoming increasingly vague. Furthermore, adapting this emotive term into an action is confusing its meaning.

⁸ Mann, 2005, 8

⁹ *ibid.*

Sociobiological Hypothesis

This theory strongly roots xenophobia in perceived difference. Sociobiological differences can be identified through hairstyle, accents, language, dress and physical appearance which all help to visually differentiate the 'other'.¹⁰ The phrase *amakwerekwere*, a derogatory term for foreigners designed to mimic their 'strange' speech, clearly points to sociobiological factors playing a role in xenophobic violence in South Africa where the term has become synonymous with non-national black Africans who remain the primary target of xenophobic attacks.

Harris (2008) argues that xenophobia is often targeted at specific ethnic groups, and the sociobiological theory helps to explain why foreigners are not always considered homogenous. In this sense foreigners are classified by their difference to the host population, rather than by their similarities as a group. Their linguistic, physical and behavioural differences categorize them as an 'other' in terms of relative difference to the host population group.

One possibility for explaining the sociobiological foundations for xenophobia is the increasing links between xenophobia and racism. The Durban Declaration, adopted at a World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, states "xenophobia ...constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism".¹¹ It is important to divide this 'modern' racism from classical understandings where race is broadly categorized into Black, White, Asian, Native etc. Discussing increasing instances of xenophobia in Europe, Sivanandan argues:

It is a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at western Europe's doors, the Europe that helped to displace them in the first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour-coded, directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is therefore passed off as xenophobia, a 'natural' fear of strangers. But in the way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism. It is racism in substance, but 'xeno' in form. It is a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is xeno-racism.¹²

Building on Sivanandan's theories, Gqola (2008), writing on the xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2008, argues that racism is now manifesting within blacks, against blacks, and the biological marker is phenotype. By differentiating the 'other' on the basis of pigmentation, the 'black-on-black' manifestation of xenophobia is perhaps more closely tied to the 'old' racism than Sivanandan has suggested. However Gqola (2008) is presupposing that the degree of colour identified through level of pigmentation is the *cause* of xenophobia rather than merely an identifier. This 'negrophobia', as Gqola (2008) labels it, would suggest that foreign Africans attacked in South Africa are targeted because they appear different, yet there is little evidence to support this assumption. As Sivanandan put it; "it is racism in substance, but 'xeno' in form".¹³ Race is utilized to identify the foreigner, but unlike the 'old racism' it is not the cause of either xenophobic sentiments or actions. They are not targeted because they are of a different race, but rather are targeted because they are foreign -identified, in part, by race.

The psychological foundations for the sociobiological hypothesis are predicated on the assumption that we are drawn to the familiar and balk from that which is perceived as strange. Waller (2002) argues that humans "have an innate, evolution-produced tendency to seek proximity to familiar faces because what is unfamiliar is probably dangerous and should be avoided... This universal human tendency is the foundation for the behavioural expressions of ethnocentrism and xenophobia".¹⁴ Ginsburg et. al (1994) provide a supporting example of Waller's theory by explaining that infants have a natural inclination to turn away from strangers indicating an innate xenophobic behaviour.

¹⁰ Harris, 2008

¹¹ Durban Declaration, 2001, 7

¹² Sivanandan in Fekete, 2001, 24

¹³ Sivanandan in Fekete, 2001, 24

¹⁴ Waller, 2002, 156

Though the theory that children are naturally frightened of that which they perceive as strange may be easily evidenced, there is no clear correlation between a 'fear' of the 'strange' and innate xenophobia. Crush & Ramachandran (2009) argue that presupposing an innate xenophobia leads to the conclusion that higher levels of migration would result in increased levels of xenophobia. Essentially, since fear develops upon confrontation, the greater the presence of that which is strange should lead to greater levels of fear thus xenophobia. However their research shows that there are many nations with few immigrants that still register high levels of xenophobia.

Strangeness and familiarity are two sides of a spectrum, and with increasing contact, what is strange can indeed become familiar. Crush (2009) cites Gordon Allport's theories on diminishing prejudice through contact which requires four conditions necessary to promote understanding; equality between groups, groups working together to reach a common goal, inter-group coordination as opposed to competition and support from authorities and policy that outlines interaction. Pettigrew & Tropp (2005) further build on Allport's theories, showing that "greater levels of intergroup contact are typically associated with lower levels of prejudice".¹⁵ What is notable about their study is that Allport's required foundations for positive contact were found to be non-essential. Though ninety-five percent of this study reported reduced levels of prejudice, only nineteen percent actually incorporated Allport's requirements.¹⁶ This finding suggests that *general* contact between groups will result in decreased prejudice.

The evidence provided by these studies clearly shows that 'strangeness' is a fluid concept. By rooting the sociobiological hypothesis in these psychological foundations it follows that xenophobia may be overcome by familiarizing individuals classified as 'xenophobic' with that which they perceive as 'strange'. The South African cases of xenophobic action clearly contradict this hypothesis. Xenophobic violence is most commonly reported in communities where foreigners have been residing alongside the South African perpetrators for years. This indicates one of three possible explanations: foreigners have remained isolated from South Africans while living alongside them; South African informal settlements where xenophobic violence most frequently occur are anomalies to Pettigrew & Tropp's (2005) research; or the psychological foundations proposed by the sociobiological hypothesis do not apply in the South African context.

Though it is possible that foreign African's have remained isolated from South Africans despite their proximity, this explanation may not be entirely accurate. Morris (1998) argues that South Africans and foreign Africans have lived alongside one another for years. Prior to 1990 there were few accounts of discrimination towards foreign Africans by the local black population. Immigrants integrated into South African communities often taking South African spouses and many able to speak at least one of the local languages.¹⁷ This evidence suggests that many immigrants assimilated to the local culture.

It also seems unlikely that the South African cases are anomalies to Pettigrew & Tropp's (2005) research. With countless instances of xenophobic violence across the nation, an underlying ethnic or cultural factor would have to exist to explain so many instances. The isolation hypothesis helps to support this possibility by explaining a uniquely South African phenomenon that may have resulted in a cultural preclusion to xenophobia.

Isolation Hypothesis

It is virtually impossible to divorce a history of apartheid from any analysis on contemporary South African society. Only fifteen years into democracy, South Africa is still experiencing growing pains.

¹⁵ Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005, 267

¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷ Morris, 1998

The isolation hypothesis has been adopted to explain previous instances of xenophobic violence in South Africa resulting from imposed seclusion from the international community during apartheid.¹⁸ Morris (1998) argues that Southern Africa was isolated from the rest of the continent and the wider international community, and the end of the apartheid brought about a sudden shift in both the number and the ethnicity of immigrants entering the country post-1994. After years of isolation, South Africans came into contact with the unknown 'other' which allowed space for hostility to develop.¹⁹

The international seclusion that Morris (1998) regards as setting the foundations for recent xenophobic sentiments is insufficient for explaining xenophobic violence perpetrated on Africans from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) whose states are located within the Southern African bubble that the rest of the world was isolated from. A second tier to the isolation hypothesis helps to explain why Southern Africans have been targeted. The institutionalised racism and policies of segregation instituted during the apartheid era have also affected South African's ability to tolerate both 'difference' between South Africans and Africans from Southern Africa and 'difference' between South Africans.²⁰ Cejas characterizes the apartheid project "as the production of racial and national identities, prompting the "foreignization" of a great proportion of its population".²¹

Under the apartheid, the conditions that determined 'alien' status were racial, reinforced by South Africa's immigration legislation.²² The racial differences explained by the sociobiological hypothesis were reinforced by the policies of the Apartheid government. In this sense, South Africa institutionalized notions of 'difference' and 'other' categorized by racial identity.

The 'phobia' in Xenophobia

Harris (2002) quotes Hobsbawm's analysis of xenophobia in Europe arguing that "the strength of this xenophobia is the fear of the unknown...".²³ She goes on to explain that though the isolation hypothesis may explain why foreigners have been classified as an 'unknown' 'other', the theory does not explain why the 'unknown' "produces anxiety and why this automatically results in aggression".²⁴ The assumption being made is that xenophobia is the result of anxiety or fear, that there is a psychological diagnosis that can be automatically applied.

Phobias and anxiety are psychological disorders that are frequently connected to attacks on foreigners in both definition and explanation, however the reported causes of xenophobic violence in South Africa suggest that this connection may be tenuous at best.

Ullmann and Krasner (1975) described phobia as an intense, excessive, irrational, and unrealistic emotion characterized by the avoidance of an object or situation or event which an individual recognizes to be harmless. When approaching the phobic object, the individual responds with feelings of dread, discomfort, inhibited motor reaction, apprehension and a feeling of imminent catastrophe...These manifestations indicate that phobic reaction is a powerful unconscious process that an individual cannot voluntarily resist or control. Psychosocial factors like academic education, intelligence, socioeconomic class, parental upbringing, religiosity, fashionable lifestyle, bravery or will power, cannot mediate or stop the reactions.²⁵

Applying the term 'phobia' to groups of individuals equates to diagnosing entire sections of the population with a psychological disorder. Furthermore, the research provided by Pettigrew and Tropp

¹⁸ Harris, 2002

¹⁹ Morris, 1998

²⁰ *ibid.*

²¹ Cejas, 2007

²² *ibid.*

²³ Harris, 2002, 173

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Omoluabi, 2008

(2005) suggests that xenophobia may be overcome, a direct contradiction to the psychological definition of a 'phobia'.

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th Edition, 2003) defines 'anxiety' as:

an abnormal and overwhelming sense of apprehension and fear often marked by physiological signs (as sweating, tension, and increased pulse), by doubt concerning the reality and nature of the threat, and by self-doubt about one's capacity to cope with it.

Much like the definition of 'phobia' the term 'anxiety' comes across as an extreme label to be placed on large groups of individuals. Though their actions may indicate discrimination, prejudice, and arguably dislike, there is a distinct lack of evidence to explain the leap in logic required for labelling a group motivated by phobia or anxiety.

Scapegoat Hypothesis

More and more research is showing a correlation between xenophobia and access to resources. The scapegoat hypothesis provides an explanation of xenophobic violence that is based on more rational fears than both the sociobiological and isolation hypotheses. One of the most commonly cited causes of xenophobic violence in South Africa is competition over scarce resources and the perception that foreigners are responsible for high crime rates. Frustration over crime rates and service delivery is then misdirected onto foreign Africans living in impoverished communities making them scapegoats for social ills.²⁶

Tshitereke (1999) ties scapegoating in South Africa to the shift from apartheid to democracy. During the apartheid regime there was a distinct divide between people's value expectations (what they believed they were entitled to) and their value capabilities (that which they believed they were capable of obtaining).²⁷ With the shift in government, those who had been most disadvantaged during the apartheid era developed high value expectations that they perceived themselves as capable of obtaining.²⁸ Much of the new legislation and policies reaffirmed these expectations, for example making promises to build one million houses per year and instituting affirmative action policy. Failure to meet these expectations has resulted in a perceived increase in deprivation relative to the increase in value expectations that remain outside of the majority of South Africans ability to achieve. Thus this 'relative deprivation' has led the poorest populations of South Africa being more aware of their deprivation than ever before.²⁹

The affirmations "they steal our jobs, they steal our wives, they take our houses" have become increasingly common, placing the blame for relative deprivation upon the feet of immigrants.³⁰ A statement by previous Home Affairs Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi highlights the depth at which this scapegoat mentality has become ingrained in South Africans; "With unemployment running at above 34% and millions of illegals making a living in South Africa, it can be postulated that if all the illegal aliens were removed, the unemployment problem would come to an end".³¹

Crush (2009) argues that "scapegoats are invariably weaker, vulnerable, minority groups... as non-citizens who may already be marginalized because of their status, migrants make easy scapegoats and victims".³² The sociobiological and isolation hypotheses help to explain how foreign Africans have

²⁶ Harris, 2002; Crush, 2009

²⁷ Tshitereke, 1999

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ *ibid.*

³² Crush & Ramachandran, 2009, 42-43

become easy scapegoats and victims by virtue of their difference. This is then reinforced by legislation that categorizes access to services based on residency status. By adding the relative deprivation theory, it becomes almost understandable how 'xenophobia' has arisen in the 'New' South Africa. Believing that the new democracy would bring about a massive change for the marginalized poor and faced with the realization that this change has failed to materialize, the poorest South Africans have looked for an explanation. The influx in migration that accompanied the shift to a democratic state, and the increase of foreign African populations in the poorest informal settlements made a convenient scapegoat.

Public Rhetoric

Although it is an over exaggeration that all illegal immigrants are involved in syndicated crime, the incidence of serious criminal activities amongst them is obvious. For one, few South Africans would dare to walk the streets of Hillbrow in Johannesburg. The risk of their personal safety is just too great and it is known that a fair majority of residents in that neighbourhood are now of foreign origin. What is more, the illegal entry and sojourn in South Africa is prohibited by law and therefore an offence similar to all other crimes. Turning a blind eye to this dimension of law enforcement solely because foreigners are involved, would make a mockery of the criminal justice system. (Billy Matsetha, South Africa Home Affairs Director-General in a presentation to Parliament March, 2000).³³

Cejas (2007) argues that a socially and culturally constructed discourse is a requisite component of xenophobia in order to entrench and normalize concepts of the 'other'. As the quote from the former Home Affairs Minister above illustrates, South Africa is no stranger to public statements that reinforce xenophobic beliefs and assist in legitimizing foreigners as scapegoats for social problems. Both politicians and the media have contributed to this rhetoric using terms such as 'aliens' and 'illegals' and referring to the influx in migrants as 'flooding' and 'pouring' across the border. This rhetoric has little basis in reality. The 2001 census estimated that in a nation of 44 million people, only 150,000 were foreign born. A more likely estimate places the population of immigrants at 1 million, comprising a mere 2% of the countries residents.³⁴ Meanwhile in cities like Toronto, Canada where xenophobic sentiment is comparatively low, 40% of the population is foreign born. Despite the statistical data, popular belief still supports a notion of 'foreign invasion' into South Africa.

Both government representatives and the media have built and maintained a public discourse that is xenophobic in nature.³⁵ Foreigners are blamed for increasing crime rates, for taking jobs and many are criminalized as news reports often suggest high volumes of 'illegals' are entering the country. With mass deportations, increasing reports of police brutality, and a public rhetoric that criminalizes foreigners, prejudice against immigrants is becoming normalized. And though most comments do not specify the ethnicity of 'illegals', it is understood that these so-called 'aliens' are of African origin.

Labelling and Symbolic Interactionism

Labelling theory states that deviant behaviour is socially constructed; a criminal becomes 'criminal' because their act is identified as such by society. Thus foreigners are 'criminals' if they failed to obtain the documentation the state requires them to have, not merely because they are 'foreign'. Though popular discourse has reached a point that many are likely to blur the line between 'foreign' and 'illegal', criminality is not conferred by 'foreignness' alone. By consistently associating foreigners with crime, a rift in conceptions of deviance has occurred. African foreigners are often presumed 'illegal' until proven otherwise. To much of the masses, the mere presence of the foreigners in South Africa is equated with deviance by virtue of a perceived non-entitlement to services. This perception applies a 'deviant' label to foreigners when they utilize these services. With no clear understanding of what rights apply to immigrants, the application of criminality has become confused. Thus common phrases

³³ Cejas, 2007, 476

³⁴ Landau, 2005

³⁵ Crush J., 2008

used to rationalise community action against foreigners have taken on a distinct criminality; “they steal our jobs, they steal our wives.” These phrases certainly portray deviance, however there is technically no law against foreigners marrying South Africans, or for those with the proper documentation obtaining jobs. Furthermore, an employer hiring an undocumented immigrant is the one breaking the law, the immigrant’s ‘criminality’ is only reflected in their failure to obtain legal status.

Fine (1977) identifies three distinct discourses within Becker’s theory of labelling; “ (i) theory about the causation of deviance; (ii) a theory about the identification of deviance; (iii) a theory about the nature or constitution of deviance”.³⁶ In the first case, labelling is considered a cause of deviance and becomes self-fulfilling.³⁷ The second theory arose out of mistaken identification, that the wrong individual was identified as ‘deviant’.³⁸ Becker states that the theory created “a four cell property space by combining two dichotomous variables, the commission or non-commission of a given act, and the definition of that act as deviant or not”.³⁹ Thus deviance is a “violation of social rules or norms”.⁴⁰ The third theory is the entire basis for labelling theory, that deviance is a consequence of socially constructed norms rather than a quality of the person who ‘commits’ deviant action.⁴¹

While the concept of ‘illegals’ can be explained by labelling theory, xenophobia falls slightly outside the scope. It is a label increasingly applied to groups of individuals committing what is both morally and legally considered a deviant act, yet the term itself does not confer deviance, rather perpetrators that are charged with a crime are usually charged with ‘public violence’ or other standard ‘deviant’ labels.

“Symbolic interactionism is a subjectivist sociology that makes the point of view of the actor and his or her “definition of the situation” the central feature of the analysis of collective action”.⁴² Meaning is conferred on an object or person by the way in which people act towards it.⁴³ Using the example of marriage, Lal (1995) shows how meaning can change as a result of behaviour. Traditional conceptions of the family involved a man and woman entering into marriage, while same sex marriages are now becoming normalized in numerous states, thus the very conception of marriage has changed. Applying this theory to xenophobia helps to explain how the label ‘xenophobia’ has been adapted and altered in colloquial discourse in South Africa. The term is now widely applied to a specific type of behaviour that does not always fall in line with traditional understandings of what xenophobia is. The concept has become subjective, and the label it once applied no longer carries the same meaning. Rather than a term to define an emotional state, common perception of xenophobia is that it refers to actions against foreigners. This is most likely a result of the 2008 xenophobic crisis which received wide press coverage and, though there had been quite a bit of discussion surrounding increasing xenophobia in South Africa prior to the attacks, they were the first instance of its wide spread usage. The media, reports by organisations and, to some extent, political figures, all consistently referred to the violence as ‘xenophobia’. Consequently a rather large and vocal group adapted the meaning of the term.

Xenophobia is a label now synonymous with violent action against foreigners, rather than an emotion that explains the motivation behind violent action. It is a fine difference, but significant nonetheless. For this reason, explaining ‘xenophobia’ in South Africa has become much more complex as it is simple to get lost between the act and the feeling. The ‘act’ is a hate crime akin to cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide, though it embodies some peculiar differences in the South African context. The ‘feeling’ is a psychological phobia that results from a culmination of factors. However, the issue

³⁶ Fine, 1977, 166

³⁷ Fine, 1977

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ Becker in Fine, 1977, 169

⁴⁰ Fine, 1977, 169

⁴¹ Fine, 1977

⁴² Lal, 1995

⁴³ *ibid.*

with most academic accounts is that authors frequently fail to differentiate between the two. In the most simplistic terms, the feeling does not necessarily precipitate the act.

The label is thus applied in a haphazard fashion. Academics and organisations often label individuals as ‘xenophobic’ and negative behaviour towards non-nationals as ‘xenophobia’, but common local discourse attributes ‘xenophobia’ to a specific action that is not always considered negative, certainly not deviant, and is clearly understood. With a widespread xenophobic consciousness,⁴⁴ xenophobia (in terms of the feeling) has become normalized within South Africa. Thus labelling xenophobia as ‘deviant’ in terms of actions outside of the norm, would be incorrect, though xenophobic violence is a form of pre-existing deviant labels. Furthermore, through a process of symbolic interaction, the term now also refers to the act, which at present also remains outside the scope of ‘deviance’.

Though most discussions on labelling theory point to the creation and escalation of deviance through the application of a deviant label, xenophobia is proving to be a case where the absence of the label is legitimising the act. If it can now be agreed that ‘xenophobia’ refers to violent actions against foreigners whether on the person or their property, by neglecting to label said acts as ‘deviant’, an understanding is developing that regards such actions as acceptable.

Sentiment vs. Action

There are some undeniable truths about the manifestation of ‘xenophobic’ sentiments in violent actions. *Doing* ‘xenophobia’ is a hate crime. The American Psychological Association defines hate crimes as “violent acts against people, property, or organisations because of the group to which they belong or identify with”.⁴⁵ This definition is then further elaborated on in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination which defines hate activities as “all of those which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of one colour or ethnic origin, which justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination”.⁴⁶ In this sense, xenophobic action is certainly a hate crime.

There is a very real divide between xenophobic sentiment and xenophobic action. Applying the same underlying psychological motivators to xenophobic violence may not always be appropriate, even though it is widely acceptable to use the same terminology. In South Africa the *act* of xenophobia refers more to a xeno-cleansing. This could be motivated by traditional understandings of xenophobia, but it could also be motivated by a variety of other causes. Zondi (2008) in a discussion regarding public displays of discontent throughout Africa states, “in many cases as in Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria and more recently Cote d’Ivoire and South Africa, the violence was meted out against African immigrants. This was not primarily xenophobic in nature but only in form”.⁴⁷ Also concerned with broadly categorizing xenophobic violence as motivated by a hatred of foreigners, Zondi (2008) argues that though hate may be an instigator, it is highly unlikely that it is the overriding emotion, as the definition of xenophobia would suggest.

Defining and redefining this term in order to allow it to fit with a given situation may be counterproductive. Crush’s (2008) research clearly shows that xenophobia is rampant throughout South Africa. This xenophobic sentiment is exacerbated by a public rhetoric that demonizes African foreigners as ‘illegal’, ‘criminal’, ‘insurgents’ and ‘drug dealers.’ However, the correlation between such sentiment and xenophobic action may not be as clear-cut as common discourse suggests.

This undercurrent of xenophobia that has resulted in a discourse that publicly devalues and dehumanises foreign Africans has set the foundations for current outbreaks of xenophobic violence

⁴⁴ Crush, 2008

⁴⁵ American Psychological Association (APA) quoted in Harris, 2004

⁴⁶ Article 4 quoted in Harris, 2004

⁴⁷ Zondi, 2008, 32

though there are other contributing factors that lead to violent action. In the future it may be necessary to rename 'xenophobia' however at this point doing so runs the risk of divorcing recent violent actions from their hate crime classification. The term 'xenophobia' has become fluid, and when applied to violent action it refers to a victim group that is defined by perceived citizenship status. For the purpose of this paper, in lieu of a more appropriate term I will continue to use the now widely applied and accepted phrase of xenophobia. But this should only be considered a colloquial terming, rather than a reference to an academic, psychological *xenophobia*.

Protest Culture

It would be negligent to discuss xenophobia in South Africa without examining the persisting protest culture. Xenophobic violence is often linked to violent protests and the necklacing in Alexandra in 2008 indicates visual similarities to the political protests of the struggle years. Protesting in South Africa has been common for at least the last half century. Buur (2009) traces protests back to the 1808 slave rebellion in the Cape and sporadic protests followed, steadily increasing over the course of the 20th Century. The 'struggle years' in South Africa saw a rise in protests fighting off the oppression of the apartheid regime. Soweto school children famously mobilized against the apartheid educational system in the 1970's.⁴⁸ By the 1980's toyi-toying, a protest dance that mimics militarized movement, had become commonplace and songs of protest were sung by South African's located across the globe.⁴⁹ It cannot be disputed that protests played a pivotal role in the end of the apartheid state. Yet curiously these protests shifted in form, from peaceful to violent in the 1980's, which Buur (2009) attributes to the state response to the 1976 school children's protest in Soweto mentioned above, when unarmed protestors were 'mowed down'.

Violent protests were not unique to the end of the 20th Century. Buur (2009) writes an account of a protest against European oppression in 1952 East London. The protest occurred in Duncan Village township and angry 'location' dwellers sought out Europeans as well as 'European infrastructure' to torture, kill and demolish.⁵⁰ The 'crowd-turned-mob' attacked Europeans indiscriminately, including a Nun who had provided medical care to the residents of the township for twelve years.⁵¹ They beat, stabbed, burned and subsequently ate this woman, and though some had expressed concern over attacking a woman who had aided them, they were forced to flee from the frenzy of the mob. Though this evidence shows that violent protests took place prior to the 1980's, this decade saw a marked rise in their occurrence. They were characterized by "militarized youths [who] monitored and enforced boycotts through various forms of intimidation, including petrol-bomb attacks on 'enemy' homes, 'necklacing'⁵², beating, stabbing, shooting and sexual assault".⁵³

Protests and democracy go hand in hand. The 'power of the people' (democracy) is virtually synonymous with 'people's power' (a term frequently employed for protesting, notably the 'people's power revolution' in the Philippines in 1986). Societies and people throughout the globe, and throughout history, have risen up against tyranny and oppression, thus it could be argued that an element of protest is part of all cultures and South Africa's historical context with a history of apartheid and culture of violence has created unique characteristics of protest.

⁴⁸ Klandermans, 1997

⁴⁹ Twala, 2006

⁵⁰ Buur, 2009

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² Necklacing, or burning somebody alive by placing a fuel-soaked car-tyre around their body and lighting it, is widely associated with 'people's justice'. It became (in)famous when Winnie Mandela publicly stated at a rally: 'We are going to rule this country with our tyres and match-boxes.'

⁵³ Buur, 2009, 34

“There is no doubt that violence is socially sanctioned in South Africa”.⁵⁴ Regimes used violence to enforce power while the masses utilized it to affect political change.⁵⁵ In the 1980’s and 1990’s social scientists started to label South Africa as having a ‘culture of violence’ and a violent culture of protest has persisted in the ‘new’ South Africa.

The apartheid, enforced by the police, led to frequent abuses of human rights. In the aftermath of the fallen government, amnesties granted to abusers have resulted in lingering impunity amongst South Africans as well as continuing mistrust for the police.⁵⁶ Crime, particularly violent crime, is endemic to South Africa and is compounded by rampant poverty, unemployment and persisting inequalities as the benefits of economic citizenship have failed to trickle down to those most in need.⁵⁷ A National Survey by Market Research conducted in 1997 showed that one in five black Africans stated that it was sometimes right for a vigilante group to physically harm a suspected criminal.⁵⁸ Buur (2009) links current vigilantism to the violent searches and ‘arrests’ of the apartheid era. Thus the acts of the state prior to 1994 not only opened the door to violence, but legitimized it as a means for achieving goals. Utilizing violence to quell protests only encouraged violence to be used in response. What was true of the past appears to be true of the present. The failure of police to fight crime has resulted in communities seeking to preserve their own safety. In the model set for them by the police and the apartheid state, they use violence to achieve this.

Protesting, Violence and Foreigners

There is a protest culture in South Africa, much as there remains a culture of violence. Not only do present day protests frequently take violent turns, the violence itself often has a ritualized aspect. Necklacing is still employed, as is stoning. Furthermore, the image of black South African’s toyi-toying is part of history, but part of the present as well. Where a shift has occurred is in the targets of violence.

The protest in 1952 East London, mentioned above, focused on the ‘European oppressors’ yet modern day protests are increasingly focusing on the ‘foreigner’ who cannot be labelled oppressive. The cause for this shift in focus and the link between xenophobia and protests is the crux of this debate.

Most literature on protests in present day South Africa is focused at vigilantism and service delivery protests. Xenophobia can be linked to both. Harris (2001) shows the shift in conceptions of vigilantism pre-1994 and post-1994. Pre-1994 vigilantism referred to violent actions that were considered political. In post-apartheid South Africa, vigilantism is tied to law and the justice system.⁵⁹ Individuals perceive vigilante action as outside of the law, though it is not necessarily deemed criminal or wrong.⁶⁰ Harris (2001) states “the criminal justice system is a contested area that is not always accepted as a positive”.⁶¹ Thus vigilantism has become disassociated with politics and is now regarded as “crime-fighting”. The focus of vigilantism on ‘criminals’ ties into xenophobia when the rhetoric that labels immigrants as ‘illegal’ or ‘criminal’ is taken into consideration. By likening foreigners to ‘criminals’ immigrants can be targeted in the drive to rid South Africa of continuing crime. A lack of faith in the justice system as a whole has driven communities to take justice in their own hands and the targets of this ‘justice’ are often foreign.

⁵⁴ Rauch, 1991

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ Hamber, 1999

⁵⁷ Harris, 2006

⁵⁸ Hamber, 1999

⁵⁹ Harris, 2001

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ Harris, 2001, 15

Likewise, service delivery protests often end up targeting foreigners. A report on service delivery protests by the Research Unit, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) states that one of the reasons protests become violent is xenophobia.⁶² “Xenophobia, coupled with fierce competition for jobs and resources by South Africans, have often made foreigners targets of violence”.⁶³ Maharaj (2009) explains that often, when migrants settle in areas such as informal settlements, there is a resulting struggle over the appropriation of space. When rights and associated struggles are commonly exercised in these contested spaces, migrants enter into pre-existing local conflicts and the ensuing tensions are not limited to economic factors but encompass symbolic local beliefs as well.⁶⁴ The pre-existing protest culture, and increasing relative deprivation have placed immigrants in an incredibly volatile space. Competition for resources and discontent are incredibly high amongst South Africans, and the prospects of sharing the meagre fruits of democracy with immigrants perceived as non-entitled has resulted in them being targeted as part of the failure of government to deliver services.

The failure to track migration both into and within South Africa is also a contributing factor. With limited information on where migrants go, population statistics are often markedly different than reality, thus the amount of services being delivered fall far behind demand.

The current outbreaks of xenophobia can be tied to one of these two forms of protest. The murder or rape of a South African attributed to a foreigner sometimes results in community mobilization against all foreigners within the area,⁶⁵ ⁶⁶while protests over service delivery and failure to ensure economic opportunities have also resulted in xenophobic outbreaks.⁶⁷

The link between protests and attacks on foreigners cannot be disputed. However, is this xenophobia? Most ‘inquires’ claim it is not. Yet this may be more of an issue surrounding definition and labelling of ‘xenophobia’ than common understanding. The scapegoat hypothesis could be applied in both instances. Though a foreigner may have committed a crime, the response by the community to attack all foreigners suggests a level of xenophobia. Likewise attributing the lack of employment opportunities and limited services to foreigners is equally an example of scapegoating. But is this a fear or a dislike of foreigners? Why are they being targeted in protest action? They are not oppressing South Africans. Though public discourse has suggested they are present in massive numbers, they do not comprise such a large percentage of the population as to be the cause of limited resources. It is unlikely South Africans believe that with the removal of foreigners services will miraculously appear. So, why foreigners?

What my findings suggest is that the devaluing and dehumanization of immigrants has allowed them to become a tool for protest action. By targeting black African foreigners, communities are taking a stance on the lack of service delivery and endemic crime. It is organised, it is calculated, and it is not necessarily motivated by traditional understandings of xenophobia, though common discourse labels it as such; but a widespread xenophobic consciousness is the door through which such action has entered.

In a discussion on 18th Century food riots in England, Thompson (1971) states:

⁶² The Research Unit, Parliament of RSA, 2009

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Maharaj, 2009

⁶⁵ The example of the displacement of one hundred Zimbabweans from the Westenburg township is a case of just such violence, which resulted from Zimbabweans being blamed for a spate of crime that resulted in the death of a local South African (Rampedi, 2009, 10)

⁶⁶ Another case is the displacement of foreigners from Imazamo Yethu informal settlement⁶⁶ after a Malawian man was accused of raping a toddler (Meyer, 2009, 3)

⁶⁷ foreign owned shops were targeted for looting, burglary and burning in Mpumalanga in July 2009 during service delivery protests (Tau, 2009, 2) and the xenophobic displacement in De Doorns has also been attributed to lack of service delivery and persisting unemployment.

The men and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the community... The food riot in eighteenth-century England was a highly-complex form of direct popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives.⁶⁸

This is the root of South African xenophobia that has taken shape amidst a culture of protest. It is a process through which South Africans defend their entitlement in light of the perceived non-entitlement of immigrants. Much like the food riot in 18th Century England, these protests are forms of “direct popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives”.⁶⁹

They are xenophobia, in the sense of what the term has evolved to become in the new South Africa. They are xenophobia because a xenophobic consciousness propels them. They are xenophobia because they are predicated on the supposition that black Africans from the rest of Africa are not only less entitled, but less human and displacing them, attacking them, stealing their property and destroying their homes is not perceived as criminal but rather acceptable.

The danger lies in the tendency to state that such action is not xenophobia. Police claim that the instance in Imazamo Yethu informal settlement was not xenophobia as residents were responding to a ‘crime’, but they responded by running out all foreigners *after* suspects had been taken into custody.⁷⁰ Such action is not common crime, but hate crime, and it is being rationalized by police and government in order to avoid the terming xenophobia. Yet it is xenophobia and linking it to other forms of deviance does not make it less so. Victims targeted because they are foreign are victims of hate crime and stating that it is just another example of ongoing crime in South Africa masks the reality. Some cases of crime on foreigners are inevitably examples of ‘common crime’, though it is likely perceived as xenophobia by the victim, but when all foreigners in a given area are targeted, when the shops being looted are foreign owned and local owned are spared, it is not ‘common crime.’ Such action should not be ignored or masked as it can lead to ethnic cleansing or genocide even if the power relations and ethnic rivalry propelling the action is different.

⁶⁸ Thompson, 1971

⁶⁹ *ibid.*

⁷⁰ Meyer, 2009

Chapter 3

Methodology

Xenophobia is shaped by a combination of political, economic, social and cultural variables that are unique to a given location. For this reason, xenophobia manifests differently in each place it occurs. When xenophobic tendencies result in violent action, it is necessary to understand the root causes of xenophobia and why they led to violence. The case of the xenophobic displacement in De Doorns, South Africa in November 2009 provided a unique opportunity to assess xenophobic violence in the South African context due to the small size and rural location of the town. Remotely located, De Doorns allowed for inclusive field research that encompassed the diverse variety of community members residing there.

In order to gain an understanding of the root causes of xenophobia in De Doorns, it was necessary to research reports and statistical data that pertains to the area in conjunction with interviews. These interviews, using both qualitative and quantitative techniques, were focused on obtaining both subjective and objective data from individuals who reside in the De Doorns community in order to gain an understanding of their lived experience of xenophobia and how it had developed into a violent displacement.

Preparatory Research and Statistical Data

During the initial two weeks of the response a group of monitors from the NGO sector were tasked with drafting and filing reports on the situation as it unfolded. These reports, combined with articles from local newspapers, were used as tools to identify the basic role players and inform methodology.

Jack (2001) explains that existing schema can affect a researcher's ability to listen to a narrator. A researcher is always in danger of applying pre-conceived notions to narratives when they may not be appropriate. In order to ensure that outside perspectives did not subjectively cloud the collection of data when interviewing individuals, it was decided not to delve too deeply into the statistical data and analysis on De Doorns prior to field research in order to ensure outside perceptions did not hinder listening capacity.

Following the field research a number of sources were utilized to collect statistical data. Integrated development plans, census results, in conjunction with municipal and provincial reports were used to inform the analysis. This quantitative technique reveals little about the lived realities and cannot allow for a rich interpretive description of data gathered.⁷¹ Analysis of facts and statistics does not allow for an understanding of why or how the xenophobic displacement took place. It is useful for informing qualitative data that is better suited for showing the lived reality.

Field Research

Following the May 2008 xenophobic attacks I had been appointed an independent monitor for an Oxfam funded project to assess the South African Government's response to the displacement. In my capacity as a monitor I drafted and compiled reports on the displacement. A 'stakeholder' meeting was created towards the end of 2008 that consisted of a group of NGOs. My attendance at these meetings as well as my experience with the 2008 crisis led to my role as a monitor in De Doorns on behalf of

⁷¹ Grudens-Schuck, 2004

this same group of NGOs. The methodology I employed for this research was informed by my experiences following the crisis in 2008.

I was sent to De Doorns as part of a two-person team to conduct an analysis into the xenophobic displacement that had taken place in late November. This research was a follow up to the preliminary monitoring that had been conducted in the initial two weeks. Using the data that had been collected, and paired with one of the researchers that had been present in the initial monitoring, a list of potential interviewees was drafted.

Highly segregated by race, the De Doorns community can be divided into distinct groups; black South Africans residing in informal settlements, coloureds, white farmers, Zimbabweans, as well as other non-national groups who have settled in the area –all of whose different viewpoints on the situation were considered invaluable for painting a holistic picture of the xenophobic attacks. In order to inform the subjective information that was the goal of interviews with community residents, a number of ‘professional’ interviews were also conducted. These were focused on individuals who either worked in the community or with the disaster response to the xenophobic displacement.

Participant Observation

The three day, ethnographic fieldwork was an exercise in participant observation. Through intensive interaction with and observation of the local community it was possible to indentify additional dimensions to the crisis that could deepen understandings and analysis of what had occurred that lead to the events of the crisis.

Interviews

Jack (1991) argues that oral interviews structured by the narrator as opposed to the researcher allow for more subjective information to emerge. The goal of the researcher is to immerse ones-self in an interview and try to envision the story from the narrators point of view all the while endeavouring not to appropriate the narrative into a pre-existing schema.⁷² By adopting an informal interview style, structured by the narrator, the interview becomes more akin to a conversation. In conversations a certain level of comfort can be attained that leads to more in-depth interviews allowing subjective feelings regarding complex situations to emerge. As Faulkner (2004) argues, the research method selected should enable the respondents to have a voice in describing their own realities. By abandoning the more typical structured interview, unforeseen topics emerged. By remaining open minded to these developments, the research was able to take new directions that may have been missed by previous accounts.

Selection of Interviewees and Interview Structure

Targeted participants were identified in broad categories. The primary role players had been identified in media and NGO reports, and it was decided to interview representatives from each group of Zimbabweans, farmers, government, NGOs and the local community residing in the informal settlements. I was aware that differences in language, culture, gender, race and class could cause barriers to my communication and understanding which required me to ensure a high level of sensitivity. In order to ensure participants remained comfortable and did not feel as if they were being interrogated and desiring to increase the potential for building trust, I selected an informal interview style which I believe is instrumental in reducing the power differential between interviewer and interviewee. The variety of distinct cultures that remain segregated within De Doorns, and the added role players involved in the displacement required different techniques for data collection that will be explained below in terms of the methodology employed.

⁷² Anderson, 1991

Group Interview

The De Doorns Safety Site is an enclosed area under the authority of Disaster Management as well as a Zimbabwean committee of elected representatives. Wanting to respect the authority of this committee it was necessary to meet the community representatives and request permission to collect data upon entering the site. As elected representatives, they were considered a priority for interviewing. Due to the large number of committee members a group interview was deemed appropriate for gathering information. By putting questions forward to the group as a whole, conversations amongst representatives were sparked. In this format, as an interviewer, my role was limited and I became an observer participant to the conversation, sometimes asking pointed questions but allowing the dialog to develop amongst the group.

Participant Observation Conversations and Domino Interviews

In field research it is not always possible to identify interviewees in advance. In order to ensure representatives of all aspects of the community were interviewed, participant observation was employed. Through observing community life in De Doorns it was possible to identify key community members and elicit conversations. These interviews followed a very informal design in that little preparation was possible due to the incidental nature of identifying possible respondents. Through these conversations other possible respondents were identified leading to a domino interview process.

Ten interviews were conducted in this manner. Locations were identified as high traffic or likely to provide respondents knowledgeable on certain aspects of community life that required further elaboration. From these interviews others developed allowing a picture of community life to emerge in a short period of time.

'Professionals'

A number of interviews were conducted with 'professionals' representing organisations that took a more typical, structured approach. Since these individuals were working at the time of their interviews and were representing organisations, it was deemed necessary to form questions prior to the interview. With a greater need for quantitative data, this approach was considered more appropriate in the environment the conversations took place within.

The differences in methodology that were employed during fieldwork is best described in terms of the type of response that was being elicited. More subjective information in terms of feelings and emotions was considered essential for representatives from both the informal settlements and Zimbabwean communities. The four 'professional' interviews, on the other hand, were focused on collecting more detailed and directed data.

Limits and Advantages of the Method Chosen

The informal, qualitative interviews allowed elements to arise that may not have been discovered if a more formal interview style had been adopted. I believe it was this style of interviewing that allowed my primary findings to surface. However, a qualitative analysis often leads to conjecture. With only five days in De Doorns to gather data, there was not enough time or man-power to conduct a detailed statistical analysis of certain elements. For example, the accusation that Zimbabweans receive below the minimum wage could have been investigated in detail by gaining access to payment records from all the farmers rather than one. Furthermore, the limited time required discession on which community members to focus on and which information to gather. The choices made were focused at gathering the most accurate information regarding xenophobia, though it is entirely possible that some of the community members who were left out could have provided useful and further insight. Of particular note is the lack of in depth data on women's experiences in De Doorns. Though females were interviewed, the focus was on xenophobia rather than their lived experiences in De Doorns. With greater time and resources I would have liked to examine women's issues in greater depth to see if any new information would arise.

Barriers to Research

One of the most obvious barriers was language. English is not the mother tongue for most residents of De Doorns. The white and coloured population primarily speak Afrikaans while the local population in the informal settlements speak Xhosa as well as a number of other dialects. The Zimbabweans were primarily native Shona speakers, and though most have some English language skills, not all do. Thus the number of potential interviewees was limited by language ability. Without the ability to speak in an interviewees native language there is also much higher likelihood of misunderstanding.

Interviews are, first and foremost, conversations that are underpinned by a power relation between interviewer and interviewee. This power dynamic was an even greater consideration in De Doorns where historical racial inequalities persist and are a contributing factor to the recent violence. As a white, female, foreign, researcher working alongside a white, female South African researcher, this power structure was all the more important to consider. Therefore our race, gender, class and educational status impacted the on the data collected. For this reason it was decided to interview individuals in settings where they were most comfortable, and to downplay as much as possible the common aspects of an interview that can exacerbate power dimensions achieved primarily by allowing the narrator to direct the interview process. It is not possible to eliminate the racial barriers to the research and the historical race, class and gender relations between narrator and researcher most likely influenced the interviews obtained.

The power dynamic between researcher and respondent is inherent in any research. As a younger female researcher some of this dynamic may have been ameliorated. However, it is possible that both my youth and gender influenced the responses obtained, particularly within South Africa's patriarchal society. By having group interviews and conducting conversations in causal environments it was hoped to reduce the inherent power dynamic. However the nature of these interviews introduced added barriers that arise from public conversations.

Field research conducted in a situation with fluctuating circumstances such as De Doorns does not allow for many controlled variables. Interviews arising out of participant observation did not always result in ideal interviewing circumstances. In many instances there were other individuals listening to the interviews, which could easily affect the content of the dialog provided. In one particular instance the circumstances allowed for an individual to be answering questions in front of a large group. By observing the body language, silences, and expressions from both the interviewee and those present during the interview, it was possible to deepen the understanding of the data being gathered. In this case the result was beneficial but it cannot be ignored that the presence of an audience can greatly affect an interviewee's responses.

My role as an NGO monitor cannot be divided from my research. In this capacity I gained access to areas and individuals that may have been out of reach to an academic researcher, however, there were added obstacles as well. NGOs are often perceived in a similar way to government departments, each one considered a division of a wider body. When an NGO enters into adversarial relationships with individuals or organisations, often the result is to mistrust *all* NGOs. This had occurred in De Doorns. A report on abusive labour conditions had recently been released by a small NGO that led to farmers being wary of anyone entering on behalf of such organisations⁷³. Additionally, the advocacy organisation operating in De Doorns had developed adversarial relations with the government representatives running the Safety Site that led those in charge of access to be suspicious of NGOs that were not operating on government contract. In order to deal with the many negative assumptions, and to ensure that we were able to conduct interviews with the many different groups living within the

⁷³ Investigations for this report are currently ongoing as collaboration between ActionAid and Women on Farms.

community, it was necessary to ensure we were not seen to have any bias or affiliation with one group over another.

Ethical Considerations

As the research was conducted on behalf of an NGO and prior to the decision to use it for my dissertation, the ethical clearance system was not traditional. As an NGO researcher I was bound by the Code of Conduct of the NGO I was working for (see Appendix A), upon entering the Safety Site, I was further bound by the Code of Conduct drafted by the stakeholder group (see Appendix B). The information I gathered was also subject to the ethical considerations agreed upon prior to our research by the research team. It was decided to record interviews where consent was obtained, and that all respondents would remain anonymous. Though many individuals stated that they did not mind if their names were used, I opted to maintain their anonymity. When recordings were not possible (either because a respondent chose not to be recorded or the interview location was not optimal for recording) notes were taken and again, anonymity was maintained. For the purpose of referencing, the interviewees have been labelled by their status in the community (eg. farmer, informal leader, etc.). In order to use the data gathered for this, separate report, I obtained a letter of clearance from PAX South Africa, the NGO I was working with (see Appendix C).

Lacking a background in counselling, there is always a concern that trauma may be exacerbated when interviewing individuals following a traumatic event. I always endeavoured to remain respectful and watch the tone and body language in any conversation to gauge whether the interviewee was becoming uncomfortable with the questions. Furthermore, both I and the researcher I was working alongside offered contact details to each interviewee and ensured we had the numbers for the trauma centre on hand. In at least one instance a trauma narrative did develop, though it was one of inherited trauma due to the racial discrimination of the past. Without qualifications for such discussions it is not possible to delve into these experiences in the same manner a counsellor would and I opted to listen empathetically and not push when such instances occurred.

Chapter 4

Context

The events of November 2009 need to be placed within the context of De Doorns. A small agricultural town that continues to experience the lingering affects of colonialism and apartheid in the form of racial segregation and preferential hiring continues to maintain an inherited behaviour of 'othering'. The population has rapidly expanded over the past decade, with an increase in internal migration into the area and an influx in Zimbabwean immigrants due to the high employment demand in seasonal months. With a swiftly growing population, resources have failed to meet demand and dissatisfaction with service delivery is high. This is then compounded by corruption and a weak elected government. It is only by understanding the contextual background of the region and the community that resides within it that the xenophobic actions taken in November 2009 can be properly understood.

Segregation, Racism and Apartheid

De Kaap was founded by the Dutch East India Company in 1652, later to become Cape Town.⁷⁴ With slave importation and resulting intermixed couplings, two population groups emerged, the lighter-skinned 'Afrikaner,' and the darker skinned 'Coloured'.⁷⁵ With the discovery of rare minerals, industrialization was sparked, and migrant labour was imported from the rest of Africa to assist in the process. Soon the white minority started to feel the appeal of a small movement that advocated segregation.

In 1948 the National Party was elected into government and instituted the, now infamous, apartheid. Afrikaans for 'apartness' the policies of apartheid were rooted in segregation ensuring all cultures remained separate and thus the masses kept weak.⁷⁶ A minority bourgeoisie was attempting to ensure a rise of the proletariat was never realized. Much of the legislation from both before and during this period served to isolate and oppress the majority of individuals living in South Africa. The Group Areas Act was utilized to ensure delineated areas became and remained ethnically homogenous. In Cape Town alone, at least 200,000 individuals were forcibly removed from a population of approximately 1 million.⁷⁷ The Pass Laws regulated movements of different ethnic groups and a number of other policies were implemented that restricted access to land based on racial heritage. An official freezing on family housing in the Western Cape in 1966 resulted in no black housing being built for a period of 10 years.⁷⁸ And, declaring Transkei 'independent' in 1976 and Ciskei in 1981 resulted in at least half of the black population of Cape Town, a majority of which were Xhosa-speaking, being declared 'foreigners' and thus 'illegal'.⁷⁹

The institutionalized racism from this era has had lasting effects on all South Africans. However, two specific policies stand out as having a particular influence over the culture and experiences of farm workers in the Western Cape today.

⁷⁴ Western, 2002

⁷⁵ *ibid.*

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁸ Bishop, 1983

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

The 'Dop' System

The Dop System that was in place for 300 years in the Western Cape encouraged alcoholism amongst farm workers. Traditionally paid in tobacco, bread and wine, the system “institutionalised alcohol as a condition of service”.⁸⁰ This system, which became a particular feature of South African agriculture, originated in the Cape Colony and was “an important element of social control exercised over indigenous peoples of the region”.⁸¹ Other industries in South Africa pursued prohibition policies contrary to the ‘dop’ System that persisted in the Western Cape in light of the heavy sway of wine farmers.⁸² Allowing farmers to utilize excess product in order to reduce labour costs, the system is partially responsible for the stationary rural labour force in the region.⁸³ In 1961 an amendment to the Liquor Act outlawed payment with alcohol yet did not stop farmers from dispensing wine as a ‘gift’ resulting in continuation of the practice.⁸⁴ London (2009) states that “anecdotal reports suggest [the system’s] informal and sometimes formal use remains widespread”.⁸⁵ Alcoholism became entrenched in the culture of the poorest South Africans living and working on farms in the Western Cape and consumption rates have been shown to be twice that of farm workers urban counterparts.⁸⁶ The associated health issues are also a persisting concern and McKinstry (2005) claims that fetal alcohol syndrome is endemic to the region. The ‘dop’ System bred an ‘alcohol culture’ and dependence on alcohol is unlikely to subside with its eradication.

Coloured Labour Preference

In order to protect the interests of the majority Coloured population in the region, the Coloured Labour Preference Area Policy (CLPAP) was enacted.⁸⁷ Employers seeking to hire black labourers (historically labelled ‘African’) were required to obtain a “coloured labour clearance certificate” from the Department of Manpower in order to show that a suitable ‘coloured’ person could not be found to fill the position.⁸⁸ The CLPAP policy effectively promoted the underemployment of an entire ethnic group within the Western Cape, though black labourers had been part of the Western Cape’s agricultural workforce since the first half of the 19th Century.⁸⁹

The Agricultural Sector

De Doorns is a successful agricultural town located in the mountains of the Cape Winelands. The primary crop is table grapes that are exported to the international market. Over the past decade the market has grown exponentially and the number of grapes being produced almost doubled in a period of just eight years.

Represented by the Hex River Valley Table Grapes Growers Association, a powerful body in the region, the Farmers are under increasing global pressures. Subject to international market forces and technical standards, the global retail practices ‘are known to squeeze local suppliers on price, set tough technical standards and demand greater flexibility under just-in-time production schedules and more uncertain and volatile trading conditions’.⁹⁰ The farmers are thus coerced to cut costs, the most expensive of which are production and packaging –those that incorporate labour.⁹¹ Due to supermarket

⁸⁰ McKinstry, 2005, 1098

⁸¹ London, 1999, 1409

⁸² London, 1999

⁸³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

⁸⁵ London, 2009, 1409

⁸⁶ London, 2009

⁸⁷ Bishop, 1983

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Wijeratna, 2005, 3

⁹¹ WCDM, 2007, 14

trends, farmers have been required to reduce the size of their permanent workforce instead relying on less costly seasonal, contract and migrant labour.⁹²

In 2005 ActionAid, together with South African advocacy group Women on Farms, released a study called Rotten Fruit that highlights many of the issues faced by farm owners and labourers. As low prices and tougher standards are forced on local fruit farmers, working conditions decrease. The report finds that workers are subject to poverty wages -sometimes below the minimum wage, they are often exposed to harmful pesticides, and as a result of limited income and farmers increasingly relying on only seasonal labour, they are often unable to sustain their livelihoods.

Agricultural work in South Africa is steeped in traditions and is described as a century old 'lifestyle' that has continued for generations with little shift in practise and relationships. The permanent workers on the farms have predominantly been 'coloured' and this practice continues today. The continued categorization of labour by race is reflective of a society that remains deeply divided and strongly affected by the traditions of the past. Amidst deep-rooted alcoholism, a history of exploitation and oppression as well as legitimized preferential hiring practices, black farm labourers are at a serious disadvantage.

Working and living in De Doorns

With a historical backdrop of segregation and exploitation, and with increasing global pressures to cut costs, farm labourers are suffering. Due to the racially based preferential hiring system, black South Africans experience the brunt of both historical and present policies that have led to continued exploitation.

Labour Brokers

The increasing casualisation of farm workers, referring to "non-standard and non-permanent employment relations such as temporary work, fixed term contracts, seasonal work and outsourcing or subcontractors"⁹³ has led to a rise in informal labour contractors. With an increasing need to rely on temporary, seasonal workers in place of a permanent work force, individuals have taken on responsibility for organising labourers and contracting them out for employment. Known as 'labour brokers' these individuals are the source of much debate between government parties. In October 2009, Labour Minister Membathisi Mdladlana "reiterated his determination to stamp out abusive workplace tendencies attributed to labour brokers".⁹⁴ Amid extensive evidence of exploitative practices and labour brokers breaching workers rights, Mdladlana has stated his intention to root out "this form of human trafficking from all sectors of the economy".⁹⁵ On the one side, the ANC seeks to ban labour brokers altogether, and this position is supported by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). On the other, the DA is promoting regulation of labour broking, which would formalize the system, though the vast majority of brokers do not support any change at all.

There are a number of issues that are raised as a result of this informal system. The broker acts as a 'middle man' between employer and employee which opens up employees to further exploitation as the working relationship becomes ambiguous. When a labour broker enters the equation, the exact type of employment falls into question.

There are a number of different types of employees in South Africa; independent contractor, temporary employee, temporary employment services (TES), fixed-term contractor, and employee:⁹⁶

⁹² Wijeratna, 2005

⁹³ WFP & CRLS, 2009, 13

⁹⁴ Mail & Guardian, 2009

⁹⁵ Mail & Guardian, 2009

⁹⁶ WFP & CRLS, 2009

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are self-employed and run their own business, they are thus responsible for paying into the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and Workmen's Compensation.⁹⁷

TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES are usually provided by a third party, but can be hired directly by an employer while a TES is an organisation that provides temporary labour.⁹⁸ In cases of temporary employment where a third party is involved the work contract exists between employer and the third party while a temporary contract is in place between third party and employee rather than a contract directly between employer and worker.⁹⁹

A **FIXED-TERM CONTRACTOR** is hired by an employer for a set amount of time and such contracts can only be renewed once, after which a full employment contract must be provided.¹⁰⁰

EMPLOYEES have a clear-cut relationship with their employer who is responsible for paying into UIF and workman's compensation.

It has been argued that due to the provisions in the Labour Relations Act, the labour broker is a third-party employer and thus the worker is under the employee of the broker and not the farmer.¹⁰¹ This system then releases farmers of their obligations towards workers by shifting said obligations onto the broker.

As the system is unregulated, there are currently a variety of ways in which labour brokers secure payment. Some have a pre-agreed rate with the farmer and are paid a set amount for each worker provided. Others may obtain a percentage of the income earned, or a piece-rate on the amount of work conducted. Since some labour brokers require that wages are paid to them for distribution, the door is left open for corrupt brokers to take more money from their workers. Though the farmer may have paid their labourer the legislated amount, the worker receives below minimum wage. Thus the system is often implicated in allegations of farmers paying below the minimum wage which is currently set in the Western Cape at R57 per day.

Though there is much evidence to support the fact that the current system is rife with corruption, it must be remembered that labour brokers are generally former farm workers who live alongside the labourers they hire. They also provide a necessary service to the farmers who are increasingly relying on seasonal work. Furthermore, evidence that some are corrupt does not suggest that all are.

Even so, with so many allegations it is likely that brokers are further exploiting many farm workers. Since many farmers only hire through brokers, labourers are required to work within this informal system. As seasonal employees, farm labourers work a maximum of seven months of the year. On R57 per day, working five days a week for the entire season, a seasonal worker would be taking in an average of R665 per month. In 2004 the poverty index for South Africa was set at R1,290 per month assuming a household size of four.¹⁰² Six years since this index was calculated it is safe to say that assuming two workers and two dependants, the households of seasonal workers are living at or below the poverty line. In such a precarious position workers are forced to take work where they can, and when the brokers they use are corrupt, their situation is made worse.

⁹⁷ WFP & CRLS, 2009

⁹⁸ *ibid.*

⁹⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

¹⁰² Schwabe, 2004

Service Delivery and Housing

With such low incomes, seasonal farm labourers' only options for housing are to live on farms when allowed, or the reconstruction and development program (RDP) housing subsidized by the state. The housing situation for permanent labourers is also poor.

Traditionally farm workers would reside on the farms with their families and the percentage of workers provided with housing was heavily weighted towards the coloured population.¹⁰³ Due to the CLPAP the permanent workforce on farms has traditionally been coloured. Migrant black population groups were usually housed in hostels as opposed to the farm housing reserved for permanent workers.¹⁰⁴ This issue was only first addressed in the 1990s and has resulted in skewed housing backlogs. Though labourers continue to be housed on farms, the decrease in the permanent work force combined with new legislation has reduced the number of individuals and families that have access to such housing.

The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 was designed to right some of the wrongs that were the legacy of the Apartheid Regime. Forced evictions were common, and the new South African government took a rights-based approach to land tenure. Section 8 of the Act states that farm workers who had resided on a farm for over 20 years, those over the age of 60, those who have resided on land belonging to the owner of the property for 10 years and those who are employees or former employees and can no longer provide labour as a result of injury, illness or disability have a non-transferable right to remain on the land indefinitely. Though this legislation was designed to ensure rights, some farmers state that they have since decreased the number of workers that are able to live on the farm. In one man's words "what if they go work for someone else and I still have to support them?"¹⁰⁵

With the farmers under added stress to meet international standards and compete in a globalized market, combined with concern over legislation that regulates housing provision on their private land, the traditional housing system is crumbling. This places added pressure on a government that has already proved less than capable of meeting the state subsidized housing demand. In rural areas where infrastructure is limited and the municipalities less resourced than in more urban regions, issues surrounding service provision are exacerbated.

Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Housing

RDP housing is the government subsidised housing for the lowest income group. Applicants must prove they meet the mandated requirements; provide proof of citizenship or permanent residency; provide verification of a household income less than R3,500 per month; be over the age of 21; be married, live with a partner or single with dependants; and provide proof of never owning property in South Africa.¹⁰⁶ Once an application has been filed and approved, a plot of land is allocated. The household may build a shack on this land, with enough space left in front for the formal RDP structure.

The Housing Amendment Act Number 4 of 2001 in section 10A outlines the process and restrictions for vacating and selling RDP Housing. A house may not be sold or alienated for a period of eight years, if vacated prior, the property shall revert back to municipal ownership and no remuneration shall be paid to the person vacating the property.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, section 10B states that an individual's successors or creditors seeking to sell or alienate subsidised housing are obligated to first offer the house to the relevant provincial department for the price of the subsidy originally received. In regards to this Act, alienation of a house includes letting and renovations to the property and house. Thus

¹⁰³ Schwabe, 2004

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Farmer, Personal Communication, December 11, 2009

¹⁰⁶ Housing Code of South Africa

¹⁰⁷ Act No. 4 of 2001, Section 10A

RDP houses may only be sold or leased out by the title deed holder after a period of eight years, and the purchaser or successor cannot sell or lease the house without first offering to sell it back to the relevant government department at the original price.

Technically only households who have been approved for RDP houses and allotted a plot have any legal right to be residing in government delineated informal settlements that have been marked for such housing schemes. Service provision is limited to these settlements, thus access to water, sanitation, refuse removal and electricity requires approval for subsidised housing. Any shacks built without approval, rooms or structures leased out by an individual who has resided in RDP housing for less than eight years, or persons that have purchased said housing from an individual who had not owned the dwelling for a period of at least eight years is residing on that land illegally. For those awaiting approval, or those who do not fulfil the outlined requirements, housing options are scarce. This is a particular concern for migrants who must be in the country on a valid work or refugee permit for a period of five years in order to qualify for the requisite permanent residence qualifications.

Under the government subsidized housing program, 21,011 houses were built in the district between 1994 and 2003, in Breede Valley alone, 1,568 houses were provided during the same time period with a housing backlog of 10,000.¹⁰⁸ In a panel discussion on the 2005 IDP, it was estimated that the current housing backlog would take 21 years to meet, not accounting for future population growth.¹⁰⁹

Other Services Delivered

As of 2007 the water and sanitation backlogs were 7,691 in Breede Valley with an estimated growth rate of 3%. At present, two of the informal settlements in De Doorns remain without formal access to electricity. Bathing facilities are provided in the form of a tap and residents use their own basins for washing themselves as well as clothing. There is no hot water, and the housing infrastructure is weak. With migrant labour comprising a large percentage of the seasonal workforce, the population fluctuations would be high and there is no indication of whether the current population number is inclusive or exclusive of migrant workers. Added pressure is put on resources during the employment season, and the unemployment rates in the off-season increase drastically. The most recent Integrated Development Plan (IDP) cites De Doorns as having one of the highest unemployment rates in the district.¹¹⁰

Protesting in De Doorns

“In South Africa if you want to be listened to, you have to take to the streets. It’s how we do things”¹¹¹

As the government has failed to deliver on promises of education, jobs and decreasing inequalities that were expected to provide a new and ‘better’ life, service delivery protests of communities have re-emerged, reminiscent of past anti apartheid street demonstrations.¹¹²

An ANC News Brief of 21 February 1998 confirms that violent protests have been taking place in De Doorns for at least the past decade. It is reported that “Police fired rubber bullets after angry pupils and teachers stoned motorists on the N1 highway and rampaged through the small Boland town of De Doorns near Worcester”.¹¹³ According to the report, even though the pupils and the teachers of Van Cunsten High School were granted permission to march and follow a predetermined route through town, they failed to do this. Rather they, “broke the window of a motor vehicle and when police tried to stop them, they were stoned. One policeman was struck in the face and received medical

¹⁰⁸ CWDM, 2007, 27

¹⁰⁹ DPLG, 2005

¹¹⁰ CWDM, 2007, 18

¹¹¹ Community Leader, Personal Communication, December 11, 2009

¹¹² Buur, 2009, 30

¹¹³ ANC News brief, February, 21, 2009

attention”.¹¹⁴ With stones barricading the N1 and protestors throwing rocks at passing motorists, the police closed the N1 and “fired rubber bullets to disperse the crowd.”¹¹⁵

On November 17th 2008 the death of a community member, Freddie Louw, occurred during police intervention with rubber bullets. Nine others were injured during the protest “when residents blocked the road with burning tyres and hurled stones at police and vehicles”.¹¹⁶ 4000 residents of the De Doorns community were protesting over service delivery and lack of assistance following floods.¹¹⁷ Allegedly “the municipality focused only on people living on the river banks. They were given food parcels. But we were also flooded. The government did not help us”.¹¹⁸ Residents vowed to continue protesting with community leader Themba Mbali saying that they were demanding “electricity, sanitation and housing”.¹¹⁹ Other concerns raised were the municipal housing list and diversion of municipal funding to Worcester. The community utilized a tradition of protest in order to highlight their belief that these concerns needed the attention of government.

The informal settlements around De Doorns have only arisen over the last decade, and in that time there has been numerous violent protests. Stoning and utilizing rubber bullets are common occurrences that speak both to a tradition of violent protests and to persisting inequalities and rampant poverty.

Zimbabweans in De Doorns

While South Africans have been growing increasingly angry at their quality of life, the socio-political state of their Zimbabwean neighbour has been steadily worsening. Human Rights Watch reported that as of 2007, 83% of the population of Zimbabwe were living below the poverty line, and the unemployment rate was 80%.¹²⁰ By 2008 the country was starving. There were significant food shortages and the government believed that the many aid agencies offering assistance were working for the opposition party so they barred them from Zimbabwe.¹²¹ Inflation rates stand at 100,000% and 50% of health care positions are vacant.¹²² In just under 30 years the life expectancy of women has dropped by 22, at 56 in 1978 to 34 in 2006.¹²³ Political persecution, a starving economy and famine have led hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans to cross the boarder into South Africa in search of economic opportunity, political asylum, and humanitarian aid among other reasons. The variety of motivations for seeking refuge require equally varied legal frameworks for coping with the influx in migration and Polzer (2008) argues that legislation such as the Refugee Act, Immigration act and the Disaster Management Act have been applied without adaptation or coherence in dealing with the ‘Zimbabwean problem’.¹²⁴

In 2001, a Zimbabwean family moved to De Doorns in search of work, the following account describes how that family came to be in De Doorns, and how their numbers multiplied¹²⁵ as a result:

A Zimbabwean woman, faced with increasing economic crisis in Zimbabwe, informed her husband of a place in South Africa where she had worked informally selling goods as a girl. At

¹¹⁴ ANC News brief, February, 21, 2009

¹¹⁵ *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Lewis, 2008

¹¹⁷ Kamaldien, 2008

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Prince, 2008

¹²⁰ Human Rights Watch, 2008, 6

¹²¹ *ibid.*

¹²² *ibid.*

¹²³ *ibid.*

¹²⁴ Polzer, 2008, 7

¹²⁵ Zimbabwean Woman, Personal Communication, December 12, 2009

that time De Doorns had been a small agricultural area where there was plenty of migrant work during seasonal months. Leaving their children behind the couple, accompanied by the woman's sister, jumped the border and travelled to De Doorns. They arrived March 23rd, 2001. On the second day, her husband found work. The third day found her and her sister sitting outside Shoprite, with no food, and no accommodation, they wondered what they were to do, when a man drove up on his way to the pharmacy. He asked them if they sought employment, then he provided them with drink and food.

Soon after starting work, the woman informed the farmer that her children were still in Zimbabwe and that conditions were bad. He provided her with money to travel to Zimbabwe and bring her children back. "So I go to Zimbabwe and I take my children. I take even my relatives like my brothers. I come with them, ten of them at one time and I ask [the farmer] to give them work, and he did. We start like that, we come one-one-one-one and it was going on, bigger and bigger."

Over the next nine years many more Zimbabweans came to De Doorns, connected one way or another to someone who came before. A system has developed where resident Zimbabweans assist new arrivals. They find work and lodging and earn money to send back home where economic crisis persists.

*DHA and HDA*¹²⁶

With Zimbabweans arriving in increasing numbers and a continuing labour shortage, farmers found themselves faced with problems of immigrant status. Some individuals from the farming community would assist newly immigrated Zimbabweans by driving them to the Nyanga Refugee Reception Office, however lines there were notoriously long and there were copious allegations of corruption and bribery amongst guards and individuals waiting in line. When a woman who had assisted some Zimbabweans was threatened with arrest for aiding 'illegals' to gain the proper documentation, some representatives of the HDA went to petition the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) for a small office to be opened in De Doorns that would provide seasonal workers with the required paper work. Thus a 'satellite Refugee Reception Office' was opened.

Specific data on this office is surprisingly difficult to come by. It is widely known to have existed, but the exact dates of opening and closing remain elusive. Furthermore there have been countless allegations that the office was only to be utilized by Zimbabweans. I have been unable to either confirm or deny this information, however the fact that there remains a remotely large population of Zimbabweans in De Doorns and incredibly small populations of immigrants from the rest of Africa suggests that there might be some truth to this rumour.

With the situation in Nyanga growing worse all the time, it did not take long for news of the office in De Doorns to spread. There are only five refugee reception offices in South Africa and comparatively high numbers of applicants for refugee status. Thus it is unsurprising that applicants descended on De Doorns in high numbers, camping out in the hopes of obtaining what remains elusive refugee status.

As per the agreement between DHA and HDA, the office could be closed at any time. With many potential refugees arriving in the town and with pressure from a group of Labour Brokers to shut the office, the HDA contacted DHA and requested its closure.

However the damage was done. News of employment opportunity in De Doorns had spread throughout Zimbabwe, and the refugee reception office located in town only encouraged greater numbers to come and seek employment. In the area, the Asylum Seeker permit is affectionately known

¹²⁶ Farming Representative, Personal Communication, January 22, 2010

as a 'work permit' and somewhere between 2,500 and 3,000 Zimbabweans have migrated to De Doorns over a period of nine years.

Access to Services and Zimbabweans

A common complaint is that foreigners obtain access to RDP houses though they have no legal right to do so. Furthermore, community representatives will often claim that foreigners have no right to live in informal settlements at all. As the review of the process for obtaining RDP houses, selling and leasing them above shows, the belief that foreigners are not entitled is predicated on fact. In order to obtain permanent residency, migrants must be in the country on a work or refugee permit for a period of five years. Without the requisite permanent residency, they are unable to apply for RDP housing. With very few RDP houses having been provided in De Doorns, those with the legal right to lease out or sell their house are few. Since the vast majority of Zimbabweans reside in the informal settlements, mostly within the delineated RDP areas, it is safe to state that the majority are residing there illegally (as are many South Africans).

Xenophobia

The situation in De Doorns is dire, poverty is rife and there is little evidence of any change in the immediate future. With so few resources, and being required to share them with those perceived (ill or not) to be non-entitled, the problem has been exacerbated. This is compounded by farmers who are believed to favour Zimbabwean labour over local black labour. The growing xenophobic culture that demonizes the foreigner and marks them as less human has mingled with a continuing protest culture. By forcefully evicting foreigners, the locals can remove competition for resources while obtaining the much desired attention of government in order to put forward their demands. Since the victims of these evictions are 'less human', such violence can (and does) happen with ease.

Chapter 5

Events

The following list of events is an amalgamation of different accounts from the community of De Doorns. Most accounts of the xenophobic violence start with the displacement of 68 Zimbabweans on November 14th, 2009, however accounts from the community suggest that a collection of events led up to the displacements that occurred both on the 14th and the 17th of November.

An Early Case of Xenophobia

This account is a culmination of reports from periodicals, internet blogs, informal settlement residents in De Doorns, Zimbabwean residents, farmers plus various other representatives. What follows are the most commonly agreed aspects of an event that occurred on February 22nd, 2009.

Known as a 'lovers quarrel', a relationship between a young South African man and young Zimbabwean woman ended when the woman fell in love with a Zimbabwean man. The jilted lover, in his rage, attacked the Zimbabwean, who ran and sought refuge. He escaped into a shack inhabited by other Zimbabweans only to hear a crowd gather outside. The Shack was surrounded and a flame lit. While the shack burned, residents of the settlement stood around it, stoning those who tried to escape. Seven people burned to death, four men, and three women. During the course of the ensuing investigation, the police ruled out 'xenophobia' as a motivator, though many town residents disagree with this finding. A single man was arrested and charged with seven counts of murder.

Hweshe (2009) reports that in the follow-up to these murders, the police raided the informal settlements surrounding De Doorns and 367 foreigners were taken to the nearby police station. This occurred at 2:00am on March 4th, 2009. Police officials claimed the foreigners were not in custody but rather were there awaiting assistance from the Department of Home Affairs.¹²⁷ However, those who were rounded up still lacked proper documentation and thus are considered 'illegal' under South African Law. A week later, at the time of Hweshe's report, the individuals remained in cells without any information regarding their future.

Community members reporting on this expressed concern over the 'brutality' of the raid, and its timing. Interestingly, even those who have been linked to the xenophobic attacks in November have stated that they believe what the police did was wrong. Many individuals believe that the raid was a result of the investigation into the murder of the seven Zimbabweans, and that they responded to the discovery that many Zimbabweans were sharing small shacks and overcrowding the area. Many were forced to flee into the mountains while the 367 were detained.

Service Delivery Problems

In the months preceding November, moves were made to provide Stofland with electricity. Allegations have been made that as far back as September, community residents were informing Eskom of where to place electricity and telling them to avoid the homes of Zimbabweans where they were planning on "doing xenophobia".¹²⁸ During the survey conducted by the electricity company it became apparent that a number of South African residents in Stofland had built their home outside of the delineated RDP area. The township is located alongside a riverbed, and in response to overcrowding, some families had located their shacks on the riverbed itself. The vulnerability to flooding led electrical

¹²⁷ Hweshe, 2009

¹²⁸ Zimbabwean Resident, Personal Communication, December 11, 2009

providers to deny service to those homes. In interviews with community leaders, some expressed that there was a need to “make room” in the main Stofland area so these South African ‘brothers and sisters’ could move their homes to areas where electricity would be provided.¹²⁹

Other Early Warning Signs

Throughout the interview process, consistent mention was made of meetings discussing xenophobic action. Though accounts vary on the substance and timing of these meetings it is clear that a number took place. The most frequent accusations were against the Ward 2 councilman who allegedly called the community together for a meeting where he discussed ‘doing xenophobia’ successfully inciting the local population to act. Many community members stated that they believed this was a political ploy to strengthen his position within the community that had faltered as new, informal leadership rose up in his place. According to representatives of the informal leadership group, the councilman in question had called for a physically violent attack with which the informal leadership disagreed. They spoke to the community and stated that the Zimbabweans were to remain unharmed.¹³⁰ In light of how the attacks played out with no harm coming to the community, there is likely to be some truth to these accusations.

Though it is not possible to verify the extent of the meetings that took place prior to the outbreak of violence, from the number of community members stating that they knew of the attacks prior to the outbreak suggest significant warning. Some individuals even stated that they went to the police stating that a xenophobic attack was imminent. By all appearances nothing was done to prepare for the violence.

The Attacks

On Saturday, November 14th, 2009 at 2:00am 68 Zimbabweans were forcibly ‘evicted’ from the Ekuphumleni settlement in De Doorns. The following Tuesday the violence intensified and a crowd approximately 400 strong moved through the ward 2 area resulting in the displacement of approximately 2,500-3,000 Zimbabweans from the settlements of Ekuphumleni, Stofland and Hasie Square.

The violence on November 17th began around 6:00am, and the local police department called for assistance from the Public Order Police. Residents present during the attacks have claimed that the De Doorns police stood on the bridge watching the violence unfold and it was not until the Paarl Public Order Police arrived that action was taken to quell the crowd. Rubber bullets were fired and at least one local female was injured. There were some allegations that women were raped during the attacks, however none of these have been verified. The Zimbabweans were forced to flee to the local police station and their homes were dismantled by the crowd.

The Response

Over the next 24 hours the displaced were moved to the local sports field in the centre of town and some were picked up and taken to farms. Some community residents (notably a group of Afrikaans women, many wives of farmers) got together to make food to distribute to the displaced. A full safety site was soon erected with the UNHCR donating tents and a ‘stakeholders’ forum was set up to organise humanitarian assistance. A code of conduct was drafted by this group that comprised representatives from government departments, UN agencies as well as some national NGOs. The South African Red Cross took charge of collecting and distributing donations and became the government contracted food provider. The local clinic set up a health desk and the Department of Social Development located a desk near the entrance and took charge of caring for the children and providing mental health counselling. By most accounts the response was swift and efficient. There

¹²⁹ Community Leader #2, Personal Communication, January 22, 2010

¹³⁰ *ibid.*

were few complaints regarding the services provided and coordination appeared to be well organized. Weekly meetings were organised, and Disaster Management appointed a Site Manager. A heavy focus was placed on reintegration in the hopes of resolving the crisis quickly. On November 20th 24 people were arrested on charges of public violence in connection with the xenophobic attacks which further angered the local community who claimed that they had not committed any crime.

In the weeks following the displacement it became clear that a resolution may take time. Efforts towards reintegration diminished as the holiday season approached, and for the duration of the season most aid providers pulled back on their work with both the community and the displaced. The primary organisations involved in reintegration and advising (government and the UNHCR) expressed concerns that the displaced would become too comfortable with services provided and refuse to reintegrate. Such a situation had occurred in the aftermath of the 2008 attacks and a year and a half later a few hundred remain displaced in Cape Town. A policy of cutting services quickly to diminish the possibility of dependency developing was taken in the hopes of dissuading Zimbabweans from becoming complacent with their position.

At present approximately 1,600 Zimbabweans remain displaced in the Safety Site and still more are staying with local farmers, or have left the area. The majority maintain steady employment at the nearby farms and desire reintegration though they feel it is still too soon. The community demands to keep out the Zimbabweans have not shifted and it appears as if reintegration is still a long way off.

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Chapter Six

Findings

My research in De Doorns resulted in seven key findings. Some of these findings support previous research into xenophobia in South Africa, while other provide new insight into what propels such violence and the underlying emotions that allow it. The following is a brief outline of these findings.

Parallel Government

There are two levels of leadership in Ward 2 of De Doorns, one formal and the other informal. In response to increasing frustration with locally elected government the community has turned to a group of individuals for leadership. Responding to decreasing support and with elections looming in 2011, the councilman of Ward 2 has been widely accused of inciting xenophobic violence in the hopes of regaining political control. However, the response has resulted in building the power of informal leadership even further. The six men and women who have arisen as leaders became the 'committee' which meets and discusses the xenophobic violence and possible solutions. They worked with the community to free the men and women arrested for the violence and support for them is clearly evident through conversations with community members and observed behaviour towards them.

Incited as a means for regaining support, the displacement has been sustained for the purposes of achieving the goals of the informal leaders. With a spotlight placed on the small town, the informal leadership was provided with a microphone they could use to contact and pressure government in order to improve services and ensure the issues that led to frequent violent protests in the past would finally be examined.

Much as findings from research into the 2008 attacks has shown that micro-politics often played a key role¹³¹, my findings suggest that the same is true of De Doorns. The community has developed a distorted democracy that is predicated in a micro-nationalistic perception of rights based citizenship. The community has the right to decide who has access, and the right to revoke said access whenever they see fit. This right was invoked to expel the Zimbabweans who, as non-citizens were denied this 'democratic' role granted to South African community members.

Less a culture of impunity, the actions of the community are perceived as just and morally acceptably by virtue of popular support. Democracy is perceived to exist in two separate spheres, the national achieved in the 1994 election, and the micro-local that is not necessarily subverted by the national. Rather than waiting for an election to vote out an unsupported elected official, the community as a group of citizens living within a particular area is perceived as having the right to replace leadership at any time simply by shifting support. So long as no understood criminal act is committed, the behaviour of the community is perceived as just and morally acceptable. This logic has been applied in the case of the xenophobic displacement and there is a high level of confusion surrounding the apprehension of suspects in the violence that occurred in November. Since no physical harm was done, and the community asserted its right to revoke access, there is a wide belief that no crime was committed.

Much as micro-politics were identified as playing a key role in the 2008 attacks¹³², political concerns had a significant impact on those of 2009. Allegedly incited for the purpose of building political support,

¹³¹ Misago et. al. 2009

¹³² *ibid.*

and sustained for achieving political ends, the Zimbabweans in De Doorns are casualties of a distorted democracy that has developed and strengthened in the townships of South Africa.

Preferential labour

Driven to De Doorns by economic plight, Zimbabweans are a Darwinian example of preferred labour. Willing to work hard and long hours, they have exhibited a great amount of loyalty and reliability that the farmers have taken advantage of. With a need to send money back to dependants in Zimbabwe and living in what is perceived as temporary conditions until economic stability is achieved in their home nation, Zimbabweans have arisen as a new pool of labour.

With a background of coloured labour preference, preferential hiring has been a traditional process in the agricultural sector. Identified as strong labourers, the Zimbabweans have infiltrated this system and risen above the local black workers. With the support of the farmers, employment in the work season is plentiful.

Migration Influx

With work readily available and an ever present need to find sources of income, Zimbabweans have entered De Doorns in increasing numbers. A system has developed and as rumours spread throughout Zimbabwe that there is work to be found, resulting in an increase in immigration, settled Zimbabweans in De Doorns assist new arrivals. All linking back to the first arrivals, a web of communication is ever growing and rooted in a continuing need for seasonal migrant labour.

A Mistaken Perception of Working for Less

With ever increasing numbers, a growing support base and preferential hiring, the Zimbabwean culture of De Doorns has led to a mistaken perception that they work for less. Cramped into small living spaces, every effort is made to maximise earnings for the purpose of sending money home. The temporary nature of their residence in South Africa has led to Zimbabweans being willing to live in incredibly poor conditions. Sending a large percentage of their earnings back to Zimbabwe, they are successfully living on less than the South African farm workers. Since their labour is preferred over the work of local black Africans, a mistaken assumption has developed that they are working for less, when, in reality, they are only living on less.

Illegally Obtaining Housing

The illegal purchasing and leasing of RDP houses in De Doorns is a growing concern. South Africans in the community have found a means of making money by obtaining state subsidized houses and selling or leasing them to Zimbabweans. This practice has provided Zimbabweans with dwellings in state serviced areas which has limited availability for South Africans. Due to a survey by Eskom to determine where electrical lines will be placed, it came to light that a number of South African shacks have been built on a flood plain where essential services (notably electricity) cannot be provided. Since South Africans are believed to have a superior right to these services, and it is known that RDP houses cannot (generally) be sold to foreigners, the community chose to remove them in order to make space for the individuals currently residing in unserviceable areas.

The information available surrounding RDP housing is convoluted and many academics have chosen to focus on the constitution as a means for discerning whether or not foreigners have a right to access these services. It is often stated that limiting RDP houses to South Africans is unconstitutional, however, the law is clear. Foreigners are able to access state subsidized housing so long as they fit the requirements outlined for South Africans and they have permanent residency. Since these services are limited for South Africans as well, the argument that states it is unconstitutional to deny them to foreigners follows that it is unconstitutional to limit them for South Africans too. Subsidized housing throughout the globe has limitations in order to ensure it is feasible for the government to provide such housing for those in need. Without the constitutional argument, it is necessary to determine that most

foreigners (those who do not have permanent residency) do not have any legal right to reside in areas delineated for RDP housing. Likewise, South Africans do not have the right to sell or lease these dwellings. In this sense, the community's complaint surrounding procurement of property in RDP areas has the law behind it.

Protest Action

labour issues are commonly cited as the instigator of xenophobic violence, yet the community places a much higher focus on problems surrounding service delivery than they do labour. The action taken not only visually resembled protest action, but it was a new form of protest. By forcefully evicting foreigners the community successfully gained the attention of government and provided themselves with a platform from which they could voice concerns that had previously gone unheeded.

Absence of Dislike

Perhaps the most substantial of my findings was the absence of hate or dislike. There is an underlying assumption that xenophobia is predicated on a hatred or dislike of foreigners. That in order to attack them, whether physically or attacking their property, an element of dislike must exist. But the case of De Doorns showed a much different reality. Amidst a widespread xenophobic consciousness that paints foreigners as less than human, attacks on their belongings were deemed morally acceptable. Yet there was no evidence that the community bore Zimbabweans any ill will. Complaints regarding the illegal sale of property were directed at the municipality and local South Africans for breaking the law by selling these homes, rather than at the Zimbabweans for purchasing said dwellings. Concern over the preferential hiring of Zimbabweans was focused on their willingness to do work locals were not and to work longer hours rather than making derogatory comments about them. In general there was an absence of any negative comments directed at Zimbabweans, who made comparatively more negative statements about the locals. Throughout my conversations with community members, the negativity was directed at the black locals and government with almost no evidence of disliking Zimbabweans. With an absence of hate or dislike the current concept, at very least the current definition of xenophobia comes in to question.

It is my contention that this finding is not unique. That if more research was done into communities in South Africa that experience xenophobic violence, particularly those with high percentages of foreigners over a significant time period, a similar finding would result. Violence against foreigners does not require dislike, and 'xenophobia' in terms of action taken against foreigners, does not always necessitate an underlying strong xenophobic sentiment. Such action is becoming a new tool of protest that is more closely linked to political motivation than emotional. In order to cope with, and hopefully prevent, future attacks this needs to be better understood.

Again, this is not to say that the action taken against foreigners was not xenophobia, nor to say that it was not a hate crime. It was. The underlying xenophobia is mild but present. It does not always result in hate, but it allows this distorted democracy that creates rights based citizenship to develop that paves the way for xenophobic action. Since the action is directed at foreigners alone and simply for the reason that they are foreign, it is xenophobia, and it most certainly is a hate crime, albeit one without hate driven motivation.

Chapter 7

Discussion

The hypothesis on the root causes of xenophobia do not all fit in the case of De Doorns, nor do they adequately explain why violence broke out in the small farming community. By examining the xenophobia in De Doorns in terms of the theoretical understandings, it is possible to see where theory and practice divide. Understanding xenophobia within South Africa requires more in depth research into the variety of causes and motivations that lead to violence against foreigners. Only with better understanding can a comprehensive response and future mitigation methods be reached.

The sociobiological hypothesis centres around physical differences as a motivator for xenophobia. In De Doorns, unlike the violence in 2008, the darkness of skin was never mentioned and the visual aspects of the sociobiological hypothesis appeared to have no bearing. Yet the case of De Doorns sheds some new light on the theories put forward by Waller as well as those by Pettigrew & Tropp (2005). At the outset of my research it became apparent that there was a lack of derogatory comments directed at Zimbabweans. In 2008, Zondi argued that it was unlikely hate was the overriding motivator behind the 2008 violence, and De Doorns helps to prove this theory, though the vast majority of research into xenophobic violence appears to assume that there is an underlying motivation of hate or dislike.

Though Waller (2002) and Pettigrew & Tropp (2005) may appear to contradict each other, my findings suggest that there is an element of truth to both. Fear can indeed develop upon contact with the 'strange' as Waller (2002) contends, however he is mistaken to assume that this 'fear' transforms into xenophobia and is thus sustained. Rather, as Pettigrew & Tropp (2005) argue, through repeated contact, this 'fear' (which can, and has transformed into prejudice) can be reduced.

The isolation hypothesis can then be linked to Waller's (2002) theory. Historical isolation resulted in a heightened perception of strangeness. Foreigners from neighbouring Zimbabwe were thus perceived as strange and feared. This is evident in the way in which crèches (care facilities for children while mothers work on the farms) are divided. Zimbabwean children and South African children are cared for in separate facilities. Though adults work together, their children remain separate. When asked why this occurs, the response was that there was concern over diseases.¹³³ Zimbabweans further elaborated stating that they were concerned their children would learn the negative traits they perceived as South African; laziness and alcoholism.¹³⁴ While the South Africans are concerned with Zimbabwean 'diseases', Zimbabweans are concerned over the negative stereotypes they have developed towards South Africans. In this sense, an 'us' and 'them' mentality has been sustained, arguably derived from isolationism and rooted in Waller's (2002) theory. But maintaining segregation does not necessarily indicate prejudice, particularly in a community where racial segregation has persisted in the years following the end of apartheid.

In terms of South African xenophobia, the scapegoat hypothesis is the most commonly identified cause. It presupposes that South Africans misdirect their discontent at foreigners. Yet De Doorns shows that it to may be mistaken in assuming their discontent is misdirected. The scapegoat hypothesis

¹³³ Farmer, Personal Communication, December 11, 2009

¹³⁴ Group of Zimbabweans, Personal Communication December 10, 2009

is generally focused on issues surrounding high crime rates and dissatisfaction with service delivery, and discussions with the informal leadership in De Doorns placed a heavy focus on issues surrounding service delivery and access to resources. The conditions of the township have not improved enough over the last decade and the community has become increasingly disenfranchised with local government. There have been increasing incidents of violent protests and they have failed to yield results. In 1994 one hundred and twenty-seven RDP houses were built in De Doorns and nothing since. The growing dissatisfaction with lower levels of government has resulted in the community seeking out higher levels in the hopes of instigating change.

In 2009 Misago et. al. combined crime and service delivery, arguing that one element of crime was the perceived legality of property ownership. The illegality of foreigners obtaining RDP housing was the single area where Zimbabweans were directly linked to crime and service delivery, and local community leaders were very clear about who they believed was at fault for this criminal behaviour; the municipality and their fellow community members.

Now the problem is that the Municipality is not monitoring the situation and if they had, there would not have been places that were hired or sold to the foreigners. The foreigners are on land that the locals sold to them and the thing is that you cannot sell land that does not belong to you. It belongs to the Municipality and you cannot sell until you have the title deed. Now the thing is that you are not buying the land – you are buying the materials to build the shack – so you cannot sell the land. So, the municipality did not monitor.¹³⁵

Foreigners, in this case Zimbabweans, would enter De Doorns and often they would find a house for sale. When a purchase agreement had been found, they would go to the police station and the sale of the property would be witnessed. The process appeared legitimate, however in many cases, it was not. The seller never had the right to sell the property and the dwelling was purchased illegally.

The issue surrounding the legality of obtaining RDP housing has become confused within De Doorns and some elected officials and the police are clearly mistaken regarding the purchase of these dwellings. A number of individuals interviewed stated that the process foreigners used for obtaining houses was legal. In an interview with an elected city official it was stated that the Zimbabweans have legally purchased these homes as the police witnessed the sale of them. If an elected official is unaware of the laws surrounding housing subsidies, it is entirely possible that the police are equally naive. By lending an appearance of legitimacy, the sale of these houses has become commonplace and an increasing problem.

If the community is directing their anger at fellow community members for illegally selling RDP houses and the government for being complicit in this action, then their problems over crime and service delivery cannot be labelled 'misdirected' at foreigners. In this area, the scapegoat hypothesis fails to stand up though it does play a role in discontent derived from labour concerns.

It was initially argued that farmers were paying Zimbabweans below the minimum wage. Since foreigners were willing to work for less they had better access to employment. Through interviews with farmers it became clear that the certification process required for exporting table grapes ensures that farmers comply with labour regulations. Though there is undoubtedly room for some corrupt farmers, the majority would not be paying less than minimum wage. Later the blame was placed on labour brokers. In much the same fashion as the accusations against the farmers, paying Zimbabweans less made their labour more desirable as labour brokers could make more money off of them. But this too does not seem entirely accurate as the Zimbabweans interviewed all claimed that they were not working for less. Furthermore, one farmer stated that many Zimbabweans refuse to go through labour brokers because they believe them to be corrupt.¹³⁶ Even allowing for the possibility that these

¹³⁵ Community Leader, Personal Communication, December 11, 2009

¹³⁶ Farmer, Personal Communication, December 11, 2009

accusations are true for some, the statements from both the Zimbabweans and the farmers suggest that there is little ground for claiming that Zimbabweans as a whole, or even a majority, are receiving less than locals. An alternate theory arises by examining the typical behaviour of Zimbabwean farm workers in De Doorns.

Every Zimbabwean I asked stated that they intended to return home and their stay in South Africa was temporary. While they live in De Doorns they work to save money and send it home. Of the 2,500 (approximate) Zimbabwean residents in the employment season, only 600 live in De Doorns year round, and in a Safety Site of 1,600, there were only seven children of school going age.¹³⁷ The vast majority of Zimbabwean children are infants and toddlers who are still too young to be separated from their mothers suggesting that many older children remain in Zimbabwe. Maintaining ties to their mother country the needs of Zimbabweans in De Doorns are quite different than the local population. Living in South Africa temporarily means there is limited drive to become involved in political life. Basic survival is all that is required, as well as employment to ensure responsibilities are met back in Zimbabwe. During a group interview with a number of Zimbabwean men, the daily savings and expenditures were explained.¹³⁸ If a couple each earn the minimum wage of R300 per week (rounded up), R500 is put aside for dependants back in Zimbabwe. The remaining R100 is then broken down to pay for food and accommodation. To supplement this income some buy goods at bulk stores in Johannesburg and bring them back to sell to the locals. For the time they are in De Doorns the sole objective is to earn money to send back home. To achieve this costs are cut wherever possible. Migrant Zimbabweans live on an abstemious diet of pap and a type of rape (wild spinach) that grows wild amongst the grape vines they work on, which saves costs on food. Other means of cutting costs involve living in cramped conditions and having very little in the way of material positions.

All the measures taken to reduce costs have resulted in Zimbabweans living in squalor, which may well have led to the mistaken impression that they earn less when in actual fact, over 80% of their earnings are being sent back to Zimbabwe. In this case, the behaviour of Zimbabweans has led to a mistaken impression that allows them to bear the blame for farmers preferential hiring. When asked why farmers prefer to hire Zimbabweans, the response is that South Africans are 'lazy', 'dishonest' and 'uncommitted'. They further explain that the local community only wants to work one or two days a week and the rest want to live off government grants that are often squandered on booze.¹³⁹ On being challenged that Zimbabweans perform work better, the response was: "They are not better workers – but they are loyal, never absent from work, they work on Saturdays and overtime. I do not need to ask them –they ask me".¹⁴⁰ The stereotypes put forward by the farmers paint poor South African blacks as lazy, stupid, alcoholic and criminal and these beliefs are entrenched in a racist discourse that maintains and sustains the conditions that will continue to exacerbate xenophobia.

A number of theorists have discussed a persisting culture of impunity that gives rise to xenophobic violence. When twenty-four individuals were arrested on charges of 'public violence' for the attacks, the community was outraged. They firmly believed that there were no grounds for criminal charges. This in itself could be considered to speak to a culture of impunity, however the comments from the community suggest otherwise. They argued that there was no physical harm done to the Zimbabweans thus there was no criminal act. It is likely that the statements not to harm the foreigners during the attacks were made for the specific reason of ensuring there was no appearance of criminal intent. With an absence of physical harm, the forced eviction was perceived in a much different light by the community than by media and other 'outsiders'. There exists a belief that the community has the right to choose who lives amongst them and who does not. A form of 'localism' has arisen and they believe

¹³⁷ Group of Zimbabweans, Personal Communication, December 10, 2009

¹³⁸ *ibid.*

¹³⁹ Farmer, Personal Communication, December 11, 2009

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*

they are perfectly within their rights to evict members of the community if a majority agrees. This distorted democracy has legitimized xenophobic action.

In an article published in the *Star*, PASSOP Co-ordinator Braam Hanekom¹⁴¹ stated “we have further accounts that local level politicians actively participated in the planning and execution of these attacks in a desperate attempt to regain popularity”.¹⁴² In response to claims that a particular councilman had been involved, the police laid charges.¹⁴³

Discussion over the involvement of a local politician in organizing the xenophobic attacks was common throughout community groups in De Doorns. Even government officials indicated that they were aware of the issue, in one particular case, the official stated that there was some concern over the councilman’s involvement as the district had an ANC majority by a single vote.¹⁴⁴ If the councilman were to be charged and convicted, the DA could obtain majority-voting rights until the next election.¹⁴⁵ With such a small majority margin, the De Doorns case proves to be a perfect example of Misago et. al.’s theories on micro-politics and their role in xenophobia.

Communities in South Africa often have parallel leadership. If the community loses faith in their elected representative, informal leadership frequently rise in their place. In a study conducted following the xenophobic violence in 2008, Misago et. al. (2009) found that micro-politics played a significant role. Specifically, areas with parallel levels of government (one elected and one informal) had higher levels of xenophobia. In areas where there was a strong leadership, the violence was sometimes stemmed.¹⁴⁶ Many reports have suggested that there was an absence of leadership in De Doorns, however, my findings showed a very different reality. Through interviews with the community a group non-elected of individuals appeared as leaders. The community supported them and the power of their leadership was evident in behaviour towards them. Further communication with one of the informal leaders confirmed their support when the young man informed us that during a visit from government officials conducting research into service delivery on behalf of Parliament, the representatives met with the informal leadership, not seeking an audience with the elected councilman of Ward 2.¹⁴⁷

The general consensus of the community is that the councilman representing Ward 2 was concerned over his support for the 2011 election. In an effort to regain support he took advantage of the influx in the Zimbabwean population, the tendency of farmers to hire them, and the high unemployment rates. Inciting the community to commit xenophobic violence, this man called for them to ‘kill’ the Zimbabweans. An alternate account of the meetings held prior to the outbreak of xenophobia is provided in a report published in late 2009. The meetings were held on the 13th and 16th of November and were attended by local authorities including the Mayor.¹⁴⁸ According to this report the councilman, whom the community believes incited the attacks, attempted to stop them by informing the community that such action was illegal.¹⁴⁹ Misago (2009) contends that the fact that the attacks occurred after these meetings suggests that the community perceived local government to sanction them.¹⁵⁰ Amidst many allegations with no formal evidence, it is difficult to discern the truth behind the violence. With so

¹⁴¹ PASSOP is a local NGO that advocates for Zimbabweans. It is the single NGO that has maintained a presence in De Doorns since the outset of the Attacks in November.

¹⁴² Gosling, 2009

¹⁴³ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Disaster Management Representative, Personal Communication, December 12, 2009

¹⁴⁵ The majority voting rights would be guaranteed if the charges on the initially accused councilman led to further charges being filed on two other ANC councilmen who were also implicated.

¹⁴⁶ Misago et. al. 2009

¹⁴⁷ Community Leader # 2, Personal Communication, January 22, 2010

¹⁴⁸ Misago, 2009

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*

many claiming the involvement of the councilman it is difficult to overlook these accusations, especially since they come from a variety of community members each from different groups (farmers, Zimbabweans as well as the local black population). Add to this the fact that the councilman's authority within the community was in jeopardy, and it appears a very similar scenario to those discussed by Misago et. al in their research on the 2008 attacks.

The meeting that took place where xenophobia was initially incited was focused on labour issues. For this reason it is understandable that such a heavy focus has been placed on labour by responding organisations and researchers. However the community raises very different issues when talking about the attacks and their problems. Labour concerns were far outweighed by concerns over service delivery. And discussions with the informal leadership all suggested that the xenophobia provided a platform for them to voice their concerns to government and the media.

The outbreak of xenophobia and subsequent response only further entrenched the informal leadership. They complied with the attacks, and their relationship with the councilman in question only degraded after the attacks had taken place when their leadership position was solidified by their placement on the 'committee'. Six individuals were 'selected' (their word) by the community to form a committee representing them in the wake of the violence. Their presence at meetings has lended further legitimacy to their position as leaders. At present this committee is "standing at the front of the community".¹⁵¹ Though their recognized position is that of committee members, they have stated that they are the informal leadership and they speak on the communities behalf.¹⁵² Discussions with these individuals paint a clear divide between the informal leadership and elected officials with statements such as "The Mayor's councillors" and "His [the councilman's] Mayor" rather than 'our Mayor' and 'our councillors'.¹⁵³ What may have been a weakening local government prior to the attacks is now perceived as completely separate from the community.

A Parliamentary Committee visited the area in January 2010 and met with the informal leadership failing to contact the elected official for the area they were visiting.¹⁵⁴ This action further legitimized the informal leadership while simultaneously delegitimizing the role of the elected official. The violence served to strengthen the informal leadership and provide them with a spotlight from which they could voice their concerns. As such, the focus of the communities concerns has shifted away from the Zimbabweans and onto 'more pressing issues' of service delivery. Most of these 'issues' have very little to do with Zimbabweans, and it was clearly stated by one leader that their displacement is being maintained as a political tool to ensure action on the part of the government.¹⁵⁵

The xenophobia may have been incited because of labour issues, but it was carried out and maintained because of service delivery. Increasing frustration with the lack of service delivery to the area has become the most commonly cited problem in the months following the violence and is clearly one of the many reasons that the action was supported by the community.

Protest Culture

It was frequently stated that the Zimbabweans refused to partake in community protests, which inhibited a traditional means of affecting change. Since the Zimbabweans would continue to go to work on days when protests took place, the effect of the protest was diminished. In a community with frequent service delivery protests, and with very little change, frustrations have grown. Every community member interviewed mentioned service delivery as an issue, however, they did not comment on Zimbabweans reducing their ability to obtain services. The focus was entirely on the

¹⁵¹ Community Leader # 2, Personal Communication, January 22, 2010

¹⁵² *ibid.*

¹⁵³ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*

government for failing to meet demand. The xenophobic violence was visually reminiscent of past protest, effectively displacing Zimbabweans through a traditional method of affecting change that had been inhibited by their presence. Furthermore, the action was, in part, a new form of protest designed to ensure that services would be provided to South Africans in need.

After protests in the past, promises would be made to appease an angered community and they were never realized, so trust in municipal government waned significantly with repeated failure to follow through. The Zimbabweans, unfortunately, got caught in the middle. A community who used to blockade the N1 as a sign of protest, found a new avenue –forceful eviction of foreigners. It was designed to get government’s attention, and it worked. They were organized, and careful. The community was warned not to physically harm the foreigners, just to force them out and take down their homes.¹⁵⁶ Though the actions they took appear to be an escalation of violence, the perception of the community suggests that they felt they had the right to do so by virtue of a perceived rights based citizenship and the actions they took were not morally wrong. In this sense they did not believe that they were acting in a deviant manner and the form of this protest was not much different, in their minds, than the protests of the past.

On the one hand it was a protest against Zimbabweans for not participating in protest action, and on the other it was a more typical service delivery protest designed to ensure South Africans received promised resources. The attacks occurred soon after Eskom stated that they would not provide electricity to the shacks located on the flood plain. These shacks belonged to South Africans, and the response of the community was to remove Zimbabweans to make room for South African dwellings in the areas where services could be delivered. There was also some mention of the municipality claiming that there were shacks built in the area of which they had no knowledge, and services would not be provided as a result of the added dwellings.¹⁵⁷ Again, the informal leadership was clear about who was to blame, but the presence of the Zimbabweans had reduced the available resources and they took action though it appears they did so bearing no ill will.

Perhaps because of the wide media coverage of the 2008 attacks or maybe simply because an elected official suggested it, xenophobic action was taken, in part, as a means of gaining government’s attention. Not local government with whom the Ward 2 community members have very little trust, but higher levels of government. The unfortunate truth is that, in this sense, the xenophobia ‘worked’. It placed a spotlight on De Doorns and high level officials descended on a previously isolated and remote little town.

How the Zimbabweans became a tool of protest is rooted in an underlying xenophobia. When talking with a local black man in town, upon discovery that I too am foreign, he stated that they would not have done to me what they did to the Zimbabweans as I am “more of a person”.¹⁵⁸ Likewise, in another interview with a community leader, a similar statement was made. Discussing the hiring practices of farmers, the informal community leader stated “they replace the real people with Zimbabweans”.¹⁵⁹ This ‘dehumanization’ of foreigners allowed for them to be treated as less than human. With a persisting xenophobic rhetoric in South Africa, it is no surprise that there is an underlying xenophobia, albeit one with no associated fear, anxiety, anger or hate directed towards them.

Beyond the two statements mentioned above that indicate a dehumanization of foreigners, the only derogatory comments made towards Zimbabweans that I witnessed were yelled publically at the Safety Site by passing farm labourers on their way to work. Individual discussions yielded no such distaste. Though it is possible that the community members interviewed happened to be amongst the few that

¹⁵⁶ Community Leader # 2, Personal Communication, January 22, 2010

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Community Member, Personal Communication, December 21, 2010

¹⁵⁹ Community Leader, Personal Communication, 11 December 2009

are not xenophobic, a number of those arrested for the violence were amongst the individuals interviewed. Furthermore, it is equally possible that yelling xenophobic statements was politically designed to show government officials that tensions remained high.

The implications of low levels of xenophobia combined with frequent violent protests lead to the conclusion that the xenophobia in De Doorns was a new form of protest. It was not a protest against foreigners, but one directed at government over problems associated with government's perceived failure to provide needed resources. Foreigners were targeted in part because they made an easy target, part because there is an underlying xenophobia that paints them as less than human and part because there is a persisting distorted democracy that empowers micro-nationalism within individual communities. With violent protests frequently occurring in South African townships, violent action during them has been disconnected from its deviant and criminal label. Thus it has become less an issue of a perceived impunity and more a mistaken understanding of the right of the community to grant and restrict access. Action taken on behalf of the community and with majority support is then perceived as legitimate, much in the same way that theories argue deviance is conferred, the logic of the community confers innocence by virtue of a majority believing it so.

Other Identified Causes

A report by Misago (2009) on the xenophobia in De Doorns highlights three commonly identified causes;

- Local farmers' preference of foreign workers because they are seen as being cheap labour;
- labour brokers importing people from Zimbabwe; and
- The presence of a Home Affairs satellite office that attracted foreigners to the area.

Though all three of these points were brought up, they can be misleading when not put in the proper context. That the local farmers prefer to hire Zimbabweans is not in dispute, rather the reasoning behind it. The assumption is that farmers prefer to hire them because they are cheaper, while the farmers themselves provide different reasons for their choice. They perceive Zimbabweans as more loyal and reliable than their South African counterparts and as such, are a preferred source of labour. The issue of labour brokers being brought in from Zimbabwe is likely a misunderstanding based around a particular individual playing numerous roles, and though the presence of the Home Affairs satellite office may have further attracted foreigners to the area and contributed to their increase, it certainly was not the only cause nor the primary one.

The Zimbabweans that have come to De Doorns are not all related, do not come from the same background and they are not from the same areas of Zimbabwe. In a sense, there is very little to connect them beyond nationality. However, they all entered De Doorns because word had reached them that there was work to be found. Upon entering the small town they sought out a woman who was known for helping Zimbabweans settle.¹⁶⁰ Thus immigration into the area has become a complex web of communication all linking back to one individual.

As Crush & Ramachandran (2009) argued, migration patterns need to be better understood in order to develop a comprehensive approach to xenophobia. The discovery that the migration into De Doorns links back to a single individual provides useful insight into migration patterns. It has also led to the mistaken perception that labour brokers are importing Zimbabwean workers. There is one woman who connects the Zimbabweans residing in De Doorns a 'Mama Zimbabwe' of sorts who assists the newly immigrated. Residing permanently in De Doorns, this woman has built a life for herself and her initial role as farm worker has evolved into a position as a labour broker. Though it is possible that some brokers are encouraging more labourers to enter in order to meet the labour demand, it is

¹⁶⁰ Group of Zimbabweans, Personal Communication, December 10, 2009

perhaps more likely that the facts have been misconstrued. Since this particular woman holds numerous roles in the community, it is entirely possible that these roles have become confused. Rather than many labour brokers bringing in workers from Zimbabwe, a single woman has continued her role as 'welcoming committee' for new Zimbabweans, and word continues to spread of work in De Doorns, the source of which ties back to the same woman. The situation can be likened to the game of 'broken telephone' where a story is repeated from one individual and passed to the next in order to show how the facts change in the process of being repeated. In this instance a story of many labour brokers importing Zimbabweans may simply be a case of a single woman, who happens to be a labour broker, assisting the newly immigrated and being considered the source of the 'rumour' spreading through Zimbabwean that there is work to be found in De Doorns.

Conclusion

The concept of xenophobia in South Africa has evolved into two ideas, the first is an academic understanding predicated on a psychological definition of the term while the second is the increasingly common usage of the term to refer to violent action taken against foreigners. While there is undoubtedly an undercurrent of the first that leads to the second, the most basic underlying assumption, that the hate crime of xenophobia is rooted in a 'hatred' of foreigners, may not always be present. Through repeated contact, prejudice may be reduced, following Pettigrew & Tropp's (2005) theories of familiarization. This stands in direct contradiction with Waller's premise that fear of the strange is evoked through contact. Crush's (2008) findings that the majority of his sampling indicated high levels of xenophobia and had little contact with foreigners helps to support this claim. What the findings in De Doorns indicate is that reducing xenophobia may not be as simple as reducing prejudice. Even when familiarization occurs and levels of dislike are decreased, xenophobic action can occur. This is not simply because there is an underlying xenophobia that dehumanizes foreign Africans, but is also linked to a distorted democracy and perception of rights based citizenship that paints foreigners as non-entitled. Through this distorted democracy informal leadership is allowed to arise through popular support in the absence of an election, and these leaderships are not merely supported by the community, but are legitimized by government representatives as well –as the case of De Doorns clearly shows.

If xenophobic violence is to be stemmed in the future, a greater focus needs to be placed on ensuring democracy prevails in South Africa. Trust in local government needs to be maintained or restored, and service delivery issues must be addressed. Furthermore, the obligations of democracy need to be better understood. South Africa is clearly experiencing the growing pains of a new democracy, and these, in part, have led to the xenophobic violence that continues to manifest throughout the nation. Much more research needs to be conducted on outbreaks of xenophobia in order to better understand how to respond and, hopefully, mitigate them. Warning mechanisms remain elusive, and though it has often been shown that the outbreak of violence was forewarned, there appear to be no means for prevention.

Furthermore, the response to xenophobic outbreaks needs to be carefully planned. There is a need to ensure that the response does not perpetuate the crisis further. By lending legitimacy to the informal leadership, the response to the crisis in De Doorns only further entrenched a parallel leadership that has been shown to lead to xenophobic violence in the past. Providing a spotlight on community concerns could serve to encourage further 'xenophobic protests' that result in displacement as a means of obtaining attention from government.

Like any man-made disaster, xenophobic violence is an incredibly complex issue and needs to be better understood if mitigation techniques are to be found. Empty promises have had a devastating effect, and the brunt of this is now being felt by foreigners. Government must address the issues of trust that have arisen as a result of the response to repeated displeasure over service delivery. At this point, honesty and communication are key in developing transparency. Only with change on behalf of all stakeholders can future outbreaks be avoided, and without it there is a very real concern that xenophobia in South Africa could develop into xenocide.

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Appendix A

COMMITMENT TO PAX South Africa's CODE OF CONDUCT

Working on behalf of PAX South Africa I commit myself to:

1. Treat all refugees and other persons of concern fairly, and with respect and dignity.

I will always seek to understand the difficult experiences that refugees and other persons of concern have faced and survived, as well as the disadvantaged position in which they – particularly on the basis of gender, age or disability – may find themselves in relation to those who hold power or influence over aspects of their lives.

I will always seek to care for and protect the rights of children, and act in a manner that ensures that their best interests shall be the paramount consideration.

As my job involves direct work with refugees or other persons of concern, I will meet with them regularly, in order to fully understand their experiences and needs, and to explain the role of PAX South Africa and the scope of its work as well as my role within the organization.

I will keep myself informed about PAX South Africa's policies, objectives and activities and about refugee concerns, and will do my utmost to support the organization's protection and assistance work.

2. Ensure that my personal and professional conduct is, and is seen to be, of the highest standard.

I will demonstrate integrity, truthfulness, dedication and honesty in my actions. I will be patient, respectful and courteous to all persons with whom I deal in an official capacity, including refugees and other persons of concern, representatives of operational and implementing partners, governments and donors.

3. Perform my official duties and conduct my private affairs in a manner that avoids conflicts of interest. My actions will be free of any consideration of personal gain, and I will resist any undue political pressure in decision-making. I will neither seek nor accept instructions regarding the performance of my duties from any government.

I will not accept supplementary payments or subsidies from a government, or participate in certain political activities such as standing for or holding public office.

4. Contribute to building a harmonious working relationships based on team spirit, mutual respect and understanding. I will show respect to all colleagues, regardless of status or position, and will allow all colleagues the opportunity to have their views heard, and to contribute from their knowledge and experience to team efforts. I will communicate openly and share relevant information (subject to confidentiality requirements) with other

colleagues, and will endeavor to respond in a timely manner to queries.

I will respect my colleagues' privacy, and avoid misinformation. I will seek to resolve differences and solve problems when they arise. I will contribute to building constructive dialogue, guided by mutual respect and an open, positive approach, between management and staff representatives.

5. Promote the safety, health and welfare of all colleagues as a necessary condition for effective and consistent performance.

I will remain aware of and comply with all instructions designed to protect my health, welfare and safety. If I have doubts regarding an instruction that I consider threatening to my safety or the safety of other persons, I will bring this immediately to the attention of my supervisor. In the event I have no supervisor I will act to preserve my own safety and well-being and inform the other members of PAX South Africa about the situation.

6. Safeguard and make responsible use of the information and resources to which I have access by reason of my affiliation with PAX South Africa

I will exercise due care in all matters of official business, and not divulge any information deemed confidential about refugees, colleagues and other work-related matters. I will protect, manage and utilise PAX South Africa's human, financial and material resources efficiently and effectively, bearing in mind that these resources have been placed at PAX South Africa's disposal for the benefit of refugees and other persons of concern.

7. Prevent, oppose and combat all exploitation and abuse of refugees and other persons of concern.

I undertake not to abuse the power and influence that I have by virtue of my position over the lives and well-being of refugees and other persons of concern. I will never request any service or favour from refugees or other persons of concern in return for protection or assistance. I will never engage in any exploitative relationships— sexual, emotional, financial or employment-related— with refugees or other persons of concern.

Should I find myself in such a relationship with a beneficiary that I consider non-exploitative and consensual, I will report this to my coordinator, or other members of PAX South Africa for appropriate guidance in the knowledge that this matter will be treated with due discretion.

I will act responsibly when hiring or otherwise engaging refugees or other persons of concern for private services. I will report in writing on the nature and conditions of this employment to my supervisor.

8. Refrain from any involvement in criminal or unethical activities, activities that contravene human rights, or activities that compromise the image and interests of PAX South Africa.

I will neither support nor take part in any form of illegal, exploitative or abusive activities, including, for example, child labour, and trafficking of human beings and commodities. I

am aware that I am expected not to engage in sexual activities with any person under the age of 18.

9. Refrain from any form of harassment, discrimination, physical or verbal abuse, intimidation or favouritism in the workplace.

I will not engage in or tolerate any form of harassment in the workplace, including sexual harassment and abuse of power. I will not solicit favours, loans or gifts, nor will I accept unsolicited ones that are of more than token value.

University of Cape Town

Appendix B

Code of Conduct

To be observed by all Role-Players (Government & NGOs) in delivering support to the IDPs of De Doorns

Owing to social conflict a group of Zimbabweans has been internally displaced by irate residents from the local community of De Doorns from 14 November 2009. They have subsequently been accommodated in tents on a local sports field. A Crisis Committee under the chairmanship of the local municipality has been established where various organizations have representation. One sub-committee is responsible to provide in the humanitarian and basic needs of the IDPs and site management, another sub-committee is also working on possible reintegration back to the same community from where they were ousted.

The Crisis Committee has a daily report-back meeting at 10.00 in the local library.

As various interest groups and role-players expressed a desire to assist, it should be noted that each organization is different in terms of their vision; mission; ethos; mandate; and have their own peculiar constituency.

This code of conduct sees to align the different role-players to a particular objective and task, i.e. to provide humanitarian assistance, as well as to work towards possible reintegration of the IDPs. In the process we need to have regard and respect for each other and abide to certain principles and behaviour as outlined below.

A. Agreed Principles:

1. Respect for each organization involved with this crisis, although there might be some disagreement with each other's mandate;
2. Respect for and compliance to the Constitution of South Africa, as well as legislation and regulations of the country;
3. Respect for International Convention and Prescripts as accepted by South Africa;
4. Respect for the work and institutions of the Crisis Committee;
5. Respect for human life, regardless whether national or foreign;
6. Acceptance of the principle of international economic migration;
7. Acceptance of the dignity of human life, especially for the poor and vulnerable;
8. Acceptance of the principle of social harmony and integration;
9. Professionalism;
10. Accountability;
11. Team work and team spirit in an effort to find lasting solutions to this crisis;
12. Honesty and Integrity in dealing with each other;
13. Confidentiality as far as it is possible in assisting IDPs;
14. Responsible handling of the media
15. No incitement of any affected group in this conflict (including role-players);
16. Patience with each other;
17. No organization in better than the other, or the sole spokesman on behalf of any group affected by this conflict.

B. Agreed Conduct:

1. Acceptance of the above set of principles;
2. Everyone entering the safety site must first report to the command centre;
3. All NGOs must be registered at the command centre and report to the Social Development helpdesk, also seated in the command centre;
4. All NGOs and Donors must also report to the Social Development helpdesk, and donations declared;
5. No Cash donations will be accepted, however financial contributions can be deposited into the Red Cross Society bank account;
6. Other donations will be given to Red Cross who will sort and distribute donations;
7. Acknowledgement and “thank you” letters will also be issued to donors;
8. Red Cross Society is the only NGO who will act as service provider in collaboration with the Department of Social Development to distribute food and other humanitarian support;
9. An ECD Playgroup for pre-school children is in operation and convened by the Department of Social Development;
10. Psycho-social support (eg. De-briefing; trauma counselling; etc.) is also provided and convened by the Department of Social Development;
11. All Role-players are welcome to make suggestions for improvement, but must realize that it remains suggestions until it is accepted for implementation;
12. NGOs will meet from time to time at the school opposite the safety site in an effort to streamline activities – notice of such meetings will be given at least two days in advance, and convened by the Department of Social Development;
13. Meeting protocol must be observed, and no one organization will be allowed to dominate or disrupt meetings;
14. Minutes will be distributed as soon as possible;
15. UNHCR is taking responsibility for proper registration of all IDPs;
16. The roles of the UNHCR and Human Rights Commission are acknowledged and accepted in ensuring international standards are adhered to;
17. The role and authority of Site Management is acknowledged and accepted in ensuring that all matters of safety; security; basic needs; access control; water; sanitation; health and electricity services are attended to.

C. Disciplinary Action

1. Should any organization or individual representing an organization be in breach of this code of conduct, a written warning will be issued and also presented to the Crisis Committee;
2. The Crisis Committee will make a determination to have a separate hearing as soon as possible;
3. Penalties could include warnings, as well as complete exclusion of the defaulting organization from the safety site, as well as the Crisis Committee.

D. Endorsement of this Code of Conduct

1. This Code of Conduct will be tabled to the Crisis Committee and endorsed after consultation by the committee;

2. Once the Crisis Committee has endorsed the Code of Conduct, it is assumed that all role-players that are registered with the Crisis Committee accept the terms of the Code of Conduct;
3. The Code of Conduct will be signed by the Chair Person of the Crisis Committee.

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Appendix C



PAX South Africa

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To Whom it May Concern:

I, representing PAX South Africa, give consent for Alexandra (Ali) Davis to use the data collected as a monitor on behalf of PAX for her Master's research at UCT. I request that all sources remain confidential as per our agreement with the individuals interviewed.

Sincerely

Anne-Marie Robb, Chairperson

University of Cape Town