

NOW WASN'T THE TIME:

The ANC's 1994 Election Campaign in South Africa's Western Cape Province

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NOW IS THE TIME!

MANDELA FOR PRESIDENT



THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE!

FIVE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD VOTE ANC

You have heard what various parties say. On 27 April you be the judge. Here are the five important facts to remember:

ONLY THE ANC HAS:

1. A plan to build a better life for all

The ANC has a concrete and workable plan to build a better life for all. Together, we can make the plan work.

2. A track record of working with ordinary people for freedom

An ANC government will listen to ordinary people. We are firmly rooted among the people. We have stood by the ideals of equality and democracy even under the most difficult conditions.

3. A concrete plan to create jobs and provide free quality education

The ANC will create 2,5 million jobs within ten years through a public works programme. And many more opportunities through a growing economy. By

building houses, schools and clinics, we will get South Africa working. We will immediately introduce one education system and ten years of free quality education for all children.

4. A programme to bring about equality and respect for women

Under an ANC government, women will be given a voice. They will be respected and treated equally. At least one-third of our parliamentary candidates are women.

5. Concrete steps to bring peace and security to our land

The ANC will eliminate crime and violence. We will restructure the security forces and ensure that police work with communities. We will introduce strict gun control laws and promote political tolerance.

A BETTER LIFE FOR ALL!

A BETTER LIFE FOR ALL!

On 27 April, go out and make your mark to change your life for the better.
Your vote is your secret. It is your power. Use it.

The first ballot paper you will receive is for national government. The second one is for provincial government. For both levels of government you are right to want a democratic organisation that will create a better life for all.
That organisation is the ANC.

When you reach the polling booth, take your time. Look lower down in the ballot paper. You will see the ANC flag, spear and shield and Mandela's face.
Make your X in the empty box next to Mandela,
and you will have secured a better life for yourself
and your family.

First vote ... ANC



Second vote ... ANC



There is no other choice

Working together for jobs, peace and freedom!

Abstract

I have written this dissertation as an empirical study of the African National Congress' (ANC) 1994 election campaign in South Africa's Western Cape Province. Primarily, I address one overriding question: *what are the principal reasons for and ramifications of the ANC's inability to win control of the province?* I begin by exploring key factors concerning the history, demographics, electoral system and pre-campaign voter attitudes of the province that may have influenced how the party developed and implemented its strategy. I describe the evolution of the campaign, including strategic decisions made before and during its execution, and analyze the content of appeals to voters. I then assess the extent to which the above factors may have affected the campaign and examine the election results. I conclude by offering plausible implications of this case for future ANC campaigns in the Western Cape.

Dedication

To my sister Wendy, for making half a world away seem not so far after all... ;)

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Matt Eldridge
New Haven, Connecticut
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
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"Give us our own piece or we'll simply take it ourselves."

Political leaders bicker over how to share the new South Africa.

Introduction

April 23, 1994. The diminutive, coloured man in the impeccably tailored suit approached the microphone for the second time. A technical glitch had disabled the public address system for a few moments, but this had not rattled him. He confidently resumed his message to the thousand-strong gathering of ANC supporters who had come to this final pre-election rally in Mitchell's Plain, a predominantly coloured township near Cape Town. He was the Rev. Allan Boesak. He was the ANC's candidate for Western Cape premier in South Africa's first democratic elections. And he had a sermon of hope to deliver. It seemed that many had come not to listen to him but rather to see the popular ANC Secretary General, Cyril Ramaphosa, who would speak next. But you would not have known this by listening to Boesak. The makeshift stage was his platform to the world. His zealous voice boomed with assurance:

What you've been fighting for, what you've been working for, what you've been suffering for is coming true next Tuesday. What the ANC said 82 years ago will now come true next week. We will all be free next week! Mandela will be president next week! And the ANC will win in the Western Cape next week!¹

What Boesak failed to recognize, even on that sunny afternoon on the eve of the elections, was that his party would not win in the Western Cape. In fact, the African National Congress (ANC), despite its leading role in the liberation struggle, would lose by 53.3 to 33 percent to the very party that enacted apartheid, the National Party (NP).

The surprise of the ANC's loss to the NP goes beyond the mere vote totals. Widely regarded as the country's most liberal region, the Western Cape was one of only three

¹Allan Boesak, remarks at a NEHAWU rally, Mondale School, Portlands, Mitchell's Plain, April 23. All events cited in this dissertation took place in 1994 unless otherwise indicated.

of South Africa's nine new provinces in which the ANC did not sweep to a comfortable victory.² It marked what one campaign strategist described as the only "real contest" nationally, pitting the country's two largest parties against one another.³ Most important, the election outcome had hinged on a large proportion of apparently uncommitted, mostly so-called "coloured" voters.⁴ The coloured population had neither been the group most oppressed under apartheid nor the primary force behind the liberation movement. Yet it became the prize in a fierce competition between the "party of apartheid" and the "party of liberation."

Analyzing the ANC's campaign

I have written this dissertation to explore one overriding question: *what are the principal reasons for and ramifications of the ANC's inability to win control of the Western Cape?*

I outline below the structure of my chapters.

In Part I, I describe the general context in which the Western Cape elections would take place. Before turning to Chapter One, I would encourage the reader to refer to my research methodology (see Appendix I) -- in it, I detail six main research questions used

²The other two provinces in which the ANC failed to garner a comfortable victory were KwaZulu/Natal, in which it lost to the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the Northern Cape, in which it barely avoided a "hung parliament" -- see Andrew Reynolds, "The Results," *Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1994.

³Cameron Dugmore, interview, December 12, 1994. Note: Mr. Dugmore qualified this characterization by stating that the campaigns in KwaZulu/Natal, although hotly contested, were more like "barnstorming" than campaigning. In the Western Cape, the campaigns were more "traditional," involving debates over issues and a struggle for voters who had not yet decided for which party to vote.

⁴In this dissertation, I refer to various population groups using South African *racial* classifications. By "white," I mean South Africans who are of English, Afrikaner or other European descent; by "African," indigenous people such as Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho and Tsonga; by "Indian," those descending from ethnic groups in the Indian subcontinent; and by "coloured," those of either Khoi, San, Malay or other so-called "mixed race" descent. I do not employ these terms with respect to their "biological" definitions, but rather to the importance that such racial *identities* have assumed, particularly in the political context. Racial differentiation in the Western Cape both before and during apartheid left stark and profound social cleavages -- through segregated residential communities, schools, political representation, employment
Footnotes continue on next page.

to guide my empirical data collection and analysis. For ease of understanding, I also outline these questions here:

- How might the history, demographics and electoral system of the Western Cape have influenced ANC strategy, and how did they?
- What possible impact might knowledge of voters' political attitudes have had on ANC strategy, and what was the actual impact?
- What key strategic decisions did the ANC make and why?
- What were the internal political dynamics of these decisions at the provincial level?
- How did the ANC's national campaign priorities affect the development of the provincial strategy?
- What was the role of race in shaping ANC strategy, and how did the ANC address the "coloured question," given its commitment to nonracialism yet predominantly African membership?

In Chapters One and Two, I explore critical aspects of the pre-campaign environment in the Western Cape. I offer information with which, in my concluding chapters, I will propose answers to the first two of the research questions above. I examine key historical events, a socioeconomic profile of the electorate, the nature of the electoral system, pre-

policies and "influx control." These deepened and entrenched real cultural differences between racial groups.

campaign public opinion data, and the possible implications that all of these had for ANC campaign strategy.

Chapters Three through Five constitute Part II, in which I detail the evolution of the ANC's campaign. Relying mainly on qualitative data, I describe in Chapter Three the development of the party's objectives and strategy, and discuss in Chapter Four the main phases through which it implemented this approach. In Chapter Five, I utilize quantitative data to further characterize the ANC's efforts. Specifically, I analyze the content and delivery of campaign appeals in three areas -- speech themes, event locations and language.

Part III involves assessing the campaign and identifying its potential implications. In Chapter Six, I evaluate the ANC's strategy. I begin by using the information presented in Part II to address my research questions. I then explore the election results and explanations ANC leaders give for the party's performance.

Finally, in a postscript, I offer my own interpretation of the ANC's loss by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of its strategy, and proposing an alternative strategy that might have enabled the party to achieve a greater share of the vote. I address the following questions in particular:

- Why did many undecided coloured voters choose the NP?
- How appropriate was the ANC's strategy, given the nature of Western Cape society and the electoral system?
- Did the ANC "lose" the province or was it "unwinnable?"



In addition, I offer possible implications of this case for future party competition in the Western Cape.

Motivation

One may well ask what has compelled me to undertake this endeavor. On a personal level, many South Africans have asked me why, as an American, I would want to study in their country when there are many universities available in the United States. Such questions always surprised me since part of the answer seemed obvious. Only in South Africa in 1994 could I have had the chance to study South African politics firsthand *and* in the context of the country's first nonracial democratic elections. No classroom in the world could offer a comparable setting.

Also, I had written my undergraduate thesis on the difficult and often overwhelming subject of U.S. economic sanctions toward South Africa, and had worked on a voter education program in South Africa for the U.S. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Both of these experiences inspired me to return to the country and witness its historic transition from apartheid.

On an intellectual level, two motives stand out. First, I hope that my description and analysis of the ANC's campaign will prove useful to other researchers. Perhaps it will serve as a basis from which they might examine future Western Cape elections or ANC election strategies. Second, more broadly, I seek indirectly to supplement understandings of party electoral competition in societies with deep racial or ethnic divisions. I admit that my tentative findings from this case may vary in their applicability elsewhere. However, I hope that analysts may, at least, be able to draw upon my data to test hypotheses.



Following a wave of other parties being created in the run-up to the election, popular cartoon figures Madam & Eve launch their own party.

PART I:

Pre-Campaign Environment

CHAPTER ONE: History, Demographics and Electoral System

Key historical events, socioeconomic characteristics, type of electoral system and public opinion data all represent vital contextual information about the pre-campaign environment in the Western Cape. In this chapter, I explore the first three of these features in order to address an important hypothetical question:

- How might the history, demographics and electoral system of the Western Cape have influenced ANC strategy?

I begin by identifying historical events of the region that bore relevance to the 1994 elections. I then offer a demographic profile of the electorate, based on data such as income, home language and religion. I also address the question of coloured voters' alleged "cultural" or "class affinity" toward whites, which some analysts claim is why many coloured voters supported the NP over the ANC. Finally, I examine the electoral system and its origins, and suggest possible incentives it provided for parties campaigning in the province. As many scholars have argued, electoral "rules of the game" can often influence how parties campaign.

Critical historical events

Several aspects of the Western Cape's past stood to influence the ANC's campaign in 1994. Perhaps the most relevant trend in the province's contemporary history was a deepening social, cultural and economic divide between coloured and African people. Four interrelated events contributed to this phenomenon:

1. the growth of the coloured population into the single largest racial group, its oppression, and the application of "coloured preference" laws
2. the boom in the African population in the 1980s,
3. the adoption of apartheid "reforms" in 1983 that provided additional privileges to coloureds but denied them to Africans
4. the "rise and fall" of the United Democratic Front (UDF)⁵

The importing of slaves into the Cape Province, which was the only region to experience slavery,⁶ greatly influenced the development of the Western Cape coloured population. Unlike many other parts of Africa colonized by Europeans, the labor force was not based primarily on the indigenous population, although some Khoi and San worked on farms. As historian Nigel Worden explains, "Until the 1830s the main source of labour was slaves, imported from Central Africa, Madagascar, India and the East Indies."⁷ In 1834, when slavery was abolished in all British colonies, the import of slaves ceased. Large numbers of former slaves remained who had physical features generally darker than Europeans yet lighter than black Africans.

The descendants of these slaves as well as other people with lighter characteristics than black Africans -- including indigenous Khoi and San, and so-called "bi-racial" or "mixed race" children -- were typically categorized under apartheid as "coloured." Coloureds were further subdivided into the official race classifications of Cape Coloured, Malay,

⁵The third and fourth of these events bore relevance not only to the province but to the nation as well.

⁶Wilmot G. James and Mary Simons, eds., *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1989, p. i.

⁷Nigel Worden, "Adjusting to Emancipation: Freed Slaves and Farmers in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century South-Western Cape," in James, *The Angry Divide*, p. 31.

Griqua and Other Coloured.⁸ Collectively, they developed into the region's largest racial group with a unique identity. Although the existence of this identity is often disputed as a gross overgeneralization, and criticized as an artificial apartheid construction, some scholars argue that it has become a reality for many coloured people "if for no other reason than for decades of common oppression."⁹

By the turn of the twentieth century, over 60 percent of South Africa's coloured population lived in the Western Cape. In what some analysts have termed "divide and rule" tactics,¹⁰ successive governments designed and implemented policies in the region that granted certain privileges to coloureds but denied them to Africans. One initial advantage given to coloureds, but not to Africans, was enfranchisement. Coloureds had the right to vote since 1853 in the Cape Province, and actually helped the NP win elections in 1928. However, the process of coloured disenfranchisement began almost as soon as the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. It culminated in 1956 when the NP disenfranchised them completely, partly because they had swung their support to English parties.

Further coloured preference policies were adopted from 1904 to 1935 in an effort aimed at what historian Ian Goldin describes as deflecting growing political opposition based on an alliance of coloured and African people.¹¹ Evidence of growing politicization among coloureds could be seen in the emergence in 1902 of the first major coloured political group, the African Political Organisation (APO). The APO rapidly gained over 20,000 members, dwarfing the better-known ANC at least until the late 1940s. It failed,

⁸Robert Mattes, Hermann Giliomee and Wilmot James, "The Election in the Western Cape," paper written for inclusion as Chapter Five in R.W. Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., *Launching Democracy: South Africa's First Open Election, 1994*, New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming, p. 2.

⁹Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p. 2.

¹⁰Ian Goldin, *Making Race: The Politics and Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa*, London: Longman, 1987, p. xiii.

¹¹Goldin, *Making Race*, p. xiii.

however, to forge a lasting alliance between coloureds and Africans as some leaders of the white minority had feared, and it eventually faded from the political scene.¹²

From 1935 to 1948, strict controls were imposed on African residence and employment in the Western Cape.¹³ With the rise to power of the NP and its apartheid doctrine in 1948, the Coloured Labour Preference Policy was put into motion. This further limited "the employment and residence of Africans" and granted "preference to the employment of Coloured people in an area west of what became known as the Eiselen Line."¹⁴ From their conception to their general abandonment in the early 1980s, the coloured labor preference laws attracted many coloureds from other parts of South Africa to the Western Cape. Those who migrated came despite the imposition of the Group Areas Act, which limited in which communities they could live, and despite forced removals of one in six coloureds from "white" designated areas such as Cape Town's District Six.¹⁵

In the face of increasingly stringent influx control laws, Africans also flooded into the region in search of better economic conditions than those they faced in the impoverished, so-called black "homelands" or "bantustans." From the late 1970s, although many had lived in the region already, a surge of between 800,000 and 1 million Africans moved to existing townships, created new ones, and established "squatter camps" on sand flats due east of Cape Town.¹⁶ Coloureds who came to the Western Cape could often find some form of housing and employment, whereas many black Africans were forced by necessity to live in overcrowded squatter communities and compete for scarce menial labor jobs.

¹²J.S. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937*, Johannesburg, 1939, p. 257, as cited in Gavin Lewis, *Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African "Coloured" Politics*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1987, p. 1.

¹³Goldin, *Making Race*, p. xiv.

¹⁴Goldin, *Making Race*, p. xiv.

¹⁵Gerd Behrens, *The Other Two Houses: The First Five Years of the Houses of Representatives and Delegates*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1989, p. 238, as cited in Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p. 3.

¹⁶Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p.2.

the Western Cape ANC in particular was dominated by "Africanists" such as regional Secretary General Tony Yengeni.²⁵

Historical implications

These key events in Western Cape history seemed likely to affect the election campaigns of 1994. At least three main, possible ramifications can be identified. First, the preponderance of coloured voters meant that, quite obviously, their support would play an important role in the election outcome. Second, the African minority in the region represented the ANC's traditional support base. This raised the question of whether, and to what extent, the ANC's appeals to coloured voters would affect its support among Africans. Would appeals to both groups be mutually exclusive to a degree, and would this pose a perceived trade-off for ANC leaders?²⁶

Third, one might ask whether the absence of the UDF would limit the ANC's ability to win coloured votes. Seekings argues that it was probably easier for many coloured people to identify with the UDF through non-aligned civic organizations, than the ANC. In that way, they did not have to advocate a particular political agenda, like the ANC's, or participate in mass action if they felt uncomfortable doing so. He claims that even some general issues failed to galvanize the backing of many coloured UDF supporters. As an example, he cites a proposed, yet abandoned attempt in 1983-84 to hold anti-apartheid referenda among Indian and coloured voters.²⁷ Perhaps what hurt the ANC most was that, unlike the UDF, it did not represent a place for coloured people to be active in their

²⁵Tom Lodge, "The African National Congress and Its Allies," *Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, Andrew Reynolds, ed., Cape Town: David Philip, 1994, pp. 39-40. See Chapter Three below for a discussion of the term "Africanist."

²⁶See Chapter Three for a discussion of the debate on "nonracialism" versus "multiracialism" within the ANC.

²⁷Jeremy Seekings, comments to a postgraduate seminar on the ANC's 1994 campaign, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, September 21, 1995.

communities but remain non-aligned. In the elections they would be forced to choose between the ANC and NP, parties with images -- as I shall illustrate in Chapter Two -- as a "white" party and an "African" one, respectively.

Demographics

The disparate histories of racial groups in the Western Cape, particularly with regard to social segregation and economic opportunities, perpetuated complex and far-reaching divisions between them. Whites, who historically enjoyed the greatest level of socioeconomic opportunities in the Western Cape were far better off materially in early 1994 than the other two groups. Africans, who had experienced the most severe oppression, were the worst off. Coloureds, who had received certain advantages but had also been victims of discrimination, were somewhere in the middle.

Some scholars claim that coloured people have the most in common with whites, in terms of material conditions and culture. They argue that these similarities mark a kind of class or cultural "affinity" between the two groups, a sentiment that compelled coloured voters to choose the "white" NP over the "African" ANC. Do demographic data support the existence of such an affinity? It would be beyond the purview of this thesis to attempt to determine whether a cultural affinity exists between coloured and white Western Cape voters. Such an effort would probably require analysis of attitudinal data in addition to demographic information. In this section, I merely intend to review key demographic data and comment on the degree to which they may offer a foundation for claims of cultural affinity.

The issue of cultural affinity is difficult to address, partly because definitive demographic data are hard to obtain. Survey research and government census data both have

limitations, whether sampling errors and biases, or problematic methodologies employed under apartheid. Nevertheless, surveys can provide a general demographic profile of the Western Cape and, in turn, suggest the extent to which coloured demographic features resemble those of whites and Africans. I examine below eight demographic factors outlined by Mattes, Giliomee and James: residential location, type of dwelling, migration patterns, level of education, employment, income, religion and language.²⁸ These reveal considerable differences between all three major racial groups rather than a clear-cut parallel between coloureds and whites. Some similarities between coloureds and whites do exist, but in several cases coloureds have more in common with Africans. Tables 1-4 and Figures 1-4 below illustrate how the three groups compare in terms of the eight demographic factors.²⁹ I have adjusted table data in most cases for responses of "don't know," "other" or "would not say."

Residence

Figure 1 depicts differences among racial groups according to residential status. At first glance, it might appear that whites and coloureds live in similar kinds of areas. However, it is important to note that these data fail to reveal differences in the *quality* of housing, which arguably varies greatly between white and coloured neighborhoods. Most voters fall into the "urban" category, but one cannot deduce from these data whether the house of a coloured "urban" person more closely resembles that of a white or African "urban" person. Perhaps the most telling responses are from those who say they live in a "squatter" settlement -- Africans make up the overwhelming majority of these.

²⁸Mattes, Giliomee and James discuss these demographic factors in detail in "The Election in the Western Cape," p. 4, and the tables and figures I include below are borrowed directly from their paper. They derive their data from a February 1994 public opinion survey conducted for the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy by Market and Opinion Surveys. See Chapter Two for more information on this survey, also referred to as MPD/M&O.

²⁹The data for each figure have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

Table 1 provides some details about housing conditions. It suggests that most coloured and white voters live in "formal" houses. Most Africans do also, but nearly a third of them reside in shacks. As with the "urban" category of Figure 1, one cannot determine from this information the quality of one person's formal house compared to another. In other words, it is unclear whether formal houses of whites are of far greater economic value than those of coloureds, and whether coloureds' dwellings might actually be closer in worth to those of Africans. Thus, the utility of residential data for comparing the socioeconomic status of the three racial groups seems limited.

Figure 1: Residential Status




Table 1: Housing Situation

Type of Dwelling	White	African	Coloured	Total
Formal House	77	59	82	76
Flat (in building)	14	2	7	7
Flat (on property)	1	1	2	1
Townhouse	8	2	8	7
Shack	0	30	1	8
Hostel	0	6	0	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Education

Table 2 shows the level of education most recently attained by voters. Significantly, the category of coloured responses more closely matches those of Africans than whites. This is particularly evident in the middle four lines, including Standard 1-5, Standard 6-9, Matric and Diploma. On these lines, the gaps between coloureds and Africans are only 1, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The differences between coloureds and whites, on the other hand, are markedly wider: 14, 24, 15 and 13.³⁰ These education data appear to indicate a greater coloured-African similarity than a coloured-white one.

TABLE 2: Education

<u>Years of Education</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>
None	0	7	3
Sub A/Sub B	1	5	2
Standard 1-5	1	16	15
Standard 6-9	17	45	41
Matric	35	15	20
Diploma	29	10	16
Bachelors/Honours	14	2	2
Masters/Ph.D.	3	0	1
TOTAL	100	100	100

Income

Table 3 lists voters' monthly income levels in early 1994. Although over one-third of coloureds and nearly one-third of whites either would not say or were "uncertain," these data show the greatest similarities in income to be between coloureds and Africans. A sizable majority of coloureds and Africans fall into two of the lowest income levels,

³⁰Although these data seem to indicate similarities in education attained by coloureds and Africans, I acknowledge that a key difference between these groups may be found in the 1994 provincial matric pass rates: 97 percent for whites and 88 percent for coloureds, but only 51 percent for Africans. "Standard Ten Examination Results, 1994," *EduSource*, no. 8, April 1995.

R 1-999, and R 1,000-1,999. By contrast, while some whites also fall into these levels, more than twice as many of them have incomes between R 2,000 and R 6,000. One possible exception to this concerns those earning over R10,000 per month -- no Africans fall into this group. However, very few coloureds are in this bracket, only 2 percent, compared to nearly one white in ten.


TABLE 3: Monthly Income

<u>Joint Household Income</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Western Cape</u>
None	1	7	2	3
1-999	6	49	21	25
1,000-1,999	10	25	18	17
2,000-2,999	7	5	8	7
3,000-3,999	12	2	6	6
4,000-4,999	5	1	2	3
5,000-5,999	13	0	3	4
7,500-9,000	7	0	1	2
10,000-14,999	5	0	1	2
15,000-19,999	2	0	0	0
over 20,000	2	0	1	1
Won't Say/Uncertain	30	11	37	30
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Migration patterns

Figure 2 illustrates racial migration patterns or, in other words, where voters lived longest before the age of 18. Like Figure 1 and Table 1, it suggests a strong parallel between white and coloured people -- in fact, these two pies are nearly mirror images of each other. Africans, conversely, show a different pattern. Over one-third of Africans fall into a category that, perhaps unsurprisingly, virtually no coloured or white voters did: "African rural area." How does this information relate to the other categories of data presented here? One could argue that it illustrates the different *past* relocations of each group, or lack thereof, whereas the other data reveal their more *recent* socioeconomic conditions.

**Figure 2: Migration Patterns by Race
Area Lived in Longest Before Age 18**



Employment

Employment data, shown in Figure 3, do not seem to present a clear parallel between any two of the three groups. Whites have the highest employment levels, Africans the lowest, and coloureds fall in between. In some cases, coloureds appear marginally closer to whites but in others seem marginally closer to Africans. For example, the percentage of "full-time" coloured respondents is only 6 points higher than that of Africans, but 8 points below that of whites. "Unemployed" Africans are only 9 points more than coloureds, who are 18 points more than whites.


Religion

Information on religion, listed in Table 4, seems to indicate that coloureds have more in common with whites than with Africans. I have adjusted these data for responses of "would not say" or "don't know." The most significant sign of this is affiliation with the Dutch Reformed Church, which consists of 59 percent of whites and 35 percent of coloureds, but only 2 percent of Africans. In addition, affiliation with the next largest Christian denomination, Anglican, shows significant proportions of coloureds (32 percent) and whites (11 percent), notwithstanding a sizable share of Africans (23 percent). The data in Table 4 also suggest parallels between whites and Africans, particularly in Anglican, Catholic and Methodist affiliation. However, the key question may be with which group would *coloureds* most closely identify in terms of religion. The answer, according to these data, seems to be whites.

Table 4: Religion

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Total</u>
Anglican	11	23	32	26
Catholic	11	19	13	14
Dutch Reformed	59	2	35	35
Islam/Muslim	0	0	12	7
Methodist	19	56	8	18
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Figure 3: Employment³¹



³¹I have adjusted the data for these three charts to reflect the percentage of those providing answers other than "would not say" or "don't know."

Language


Figure 4 illustrates one of the most striking similarities between coloured and white respondents. Most coloureds and whites have either Afrikaans or English as their home language, whereas an overwhelming proportion of Africans speak Xhosa. These data, however, do not include second or third languages. It may be that Africans speak English as a second language in a proportion close to or even greater than that of coloureds.

Analysis: some evidence but no overwhelming affinity

The demographic features above do *not* suggest a clear-cut "class" and "cultural affinity" between whites and coloureds. Whites and coloureds do have similarities in many categories, such as housing, migration, religion and language. However, these parallels do not exist in other important categories, including education and income. In addition, data in other areas, such as employment, seem inconclusive. This seems to call into question the notion that there exists an overwhelming affinity between whites and coloureds that can be measured in terms of demographic data. If one exists, it may be based more on *perceptions* than actual socioeconomic *conditions*, a possibility I shall not attempt to explore here.

Interestingly, the very analysts from whom I borrow these demographic data reach a different conclusion. Mattes, Giliomee and James argue that a demographic basis exists for a cultural affinity between coloureds and whites. They contend, for example, that the housing and employment statistics, particularly with respect to the "housewife" category, show a great deal of socioeconomic similarity between whites and coloureds.

Figure 4: Language



Africans, on the other hand, are much less educated, live in worse housing conditions and have lower incomes. The coloured population also lacks any "cultural markers" of its own and instead shares much in common with the white population, especially in regard to language and religion.³²

As I argue above, however, the housing data appear to have limits and one should view with caution any conclusions drawn from them. In regard to employment, the "housewife" category seems minor in comparison to the larger share of respondents who fall into the full-time category. If anything, the full-time data appear to suggest a marginal closeness between coloureds and Africans, rather than between coloureds and whites. In addition, income and education data also seem to indicate a similarity between

³²Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," pp. 4-5.

coloureds and Africans. In terms of religious affiliation, I would agree that coloureds may have most in common with whites -- but it is important to note that the same data also suggest similarities between white and African voters.

Electoral system

Like the crucial historical events and key demographic data discussed above, the ground rules for contesting the election were an important part of the context in which the ANC's campaign would take place. Some would argue that they offered incentives that could shape the nature of party campaigning. Understanding these rules, and their origins, may shed light on the ANC's campaign strategy. Many scholars have theorized how electoral systems influence political systems and party competition in general. Several, such as Donald Horowitz³³, Arend Lijphart³⁴ and Andrew Reynolds,³⁵ have written on what kind of electoral system would be most appropriate for South Africa in 1994. Although their theories diverge on particular issues, they tend to agree on at least one basic premise: that different types of electoral systems present different types of campaign incentives for parties.

Origins

South Africa's electoral system for the 1994 elections grew out of negotiations between the country's major political parties. At the Kempton Park multiparty talks in the latter part of 1993, the issue of what type of electoral system would be most suitable for South Africa seemed to draw little discussion. A great deal of debate, on the other hand, did

³³Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991.

³⁴Arend Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa*, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985.

³⁵Andrew Reynolds, *Voting for a New South Africa*, Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1993.

arise over certain features of the electoral law, ranging from who could vote to what the ballots would look like. In addition, despite approval at the negotiations of the ANC's proposed single regional/national ballot method of voting, renewed controversy on this issue emerged shortly before the elections.

The negotiating parties deliberated only briefly at Kempton Park on selecting a type of electoral system.³⁶ Certainly, each party initially advocated the type of system it expected would offer it the greatest electoral advantage. Also, a technical committee at the talks, responsible for recommending an appropriate electoral system, sought the advice of a "wide range of experts" on a variety of options.³⁷ However, once the issue passed from technical committees to the task group level, it became largely a matter of whether parties would agree to the ANC's proposal (see below).³⁸ The National Party (NP), for example, seemed with few exceptions to have put little thought into the choice of voting system. One ranking NP official even termed this issue as merely a matter of "sometjies maak" -- Afrikaans for "making sums."³⁹

The ANC had adopted a position in October of 1990 calling for a 400-member national parliament elected by PR with two lists -- half the seats from the regions and half from

³⁶This does not necessarily reflect the extent to which both parties, and perhaps the ANC in particular, had intra-party debates outside of the formal negotiations on the choice of electoral system.

³⁷Bob Mattes, "The Road to Democracy: From 2 February 1990 to 27 April 1994," *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, Andrew Reynolds, ed., Cape Town: David Philip, 1994, p. 6.

³⁸Claire Robertson, "Contesting the Contest: Negotiating the Election Machinery," paper submitted to Ravan Press, 1994. Robertson describes some of the different levels at which issues were discussed in the negotiations. In reference to "task groups," in particular, she notes, "[they] were widely used at the talks, and were generally held to be useful not only because they allowed hard bargaining by small negotiating teams but also because they limited the power of technical committees by ensuring that negotiators were directly involved in thrashing out the details of planned laws. But they did not take precedence over bilaterals, as the task group on electoral legislation would discover when, toward the end of negotiations, its stance on a separate ballot for provincial elections was sacrificed in a bilateral trade-off between the ANC and DP" (p. 8).

³⁹Hermann Giliomee, "Trends of Past Show Likely Path to Future," *Cape Times*, January 27, 1994, as cited in Mattes, "The Road to Democracy," p. 8.

the national level.⁴⁰ This system, on which Kempton Park negotiators eventually reached consensus, offered the ANC several potential advantages. For example, the concept of voting for parties and their national leaders provided a measure of simplicity for non-literate⁴¹ voters, many of whom were believed to be ANC supporters. Negotiators on all sides seemed to agree, despite evidence to the contrary cited by critics, that such voters would only be able to understand and use the most basic voting procedures.⁴² It was argued that having to choose between possibly less well-known candidates on a smaller, constituency basis would be confusing for them. In addition, the ANC as a large party could exert control over the nomination of candidates and potentially ensure their loyalty in parliament.⁴³

Some criticized the ANC's proposal as a move to solidify its power, but a few key ANC negotiators claim it chose PR actually to a) lower its chances of winning a two-thirds majority⁴⁴ and b) lessen concerns that it sought to dominate the new government.⁴⁵ They argue that the final system agreed upon at Kempton Park was an "inclusive approach" designed to enable participation by small parties and minimize political conflict -- it provided a seat to any party that gained just 25 percent of the national vote.⁴⁶ In addition, as a gesture toward federalism, it included a senate as an upper house in parliament, consisting of ten senators from each of the provinces elected by their respective provincial parliaments.⁴⁷

⁴⁰Reynolds, *Voting for a New South Africa*, p. 41.

⁴¹The term "non-literate" was used frequently during the pre-election period rather than "illiterate," which was viewed as having demeaning connotations.

⁴²Robertson, p. 11.

⁴³Mattes, "The Road to Democracy," p. 7.

⁴⁴Parties had agreed that a two-thirds majority or "super majority" would be required for making changes to the interim constitution and approving the new one. Some feared that the ANC with a two-thirds majority in parliament could simply impose whatever kind of constitution it wanted.

⁴⁵Kader Asmal, interview, July 5, 1994.

⁴⁶Essop Pahad, interview, December 1993, as cited in Robertson, p. 11.

⁴⁷Martin Meredith, *South Africa's New Era: The 1994 Election*, London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1994, p. 97. Arguably, the inclusion of the Senate may have also been a gesture toward bicameralism, in order to lessen fears of rampant centralized majoritarianism.

PR should not be seen as merely a "gift" from the ANC to other parties, however. Avoiding a two-thirds majority, lessening fears of ANC domination, and making gestures toward federalism would serve a purpose for the ANC. They might, for example, discourage parties like the IFP from "opting out" of the Government of National Unity. They might also enable the ANC to avoid shouldering full blame for any problems left unresolved after the first five years following the election. In addition, this might help the ANC "sell" the new South Africa to foreign investors, by portraying the country as a fairly unified, and possibly stable, participatory democracy. After all, the ANC probably would need considerable funds to finance the various facets of its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).⁴⁸ In addition, the ANC conceivably could govern with as little as 51 percent in Parliament under PR, if it had a tightly organized and disciplined caucus.

Despite the accomplishments made at Kempton Park, not all issues were resolved at the conclusion of the talks in November 1993. Several questions continued to attract debate, some new and some re-emerging, up until just days before the elections. The issue of whether to use a "double ballot," one ballot for national parliament and another for the provincial one, emerged as one of the most contentious during the negotiations. Parties had agreed upon the ANC's proposed single ballot in November -- an accomplishment which Robertson credits to the ANC's skillful last-minute maneuvering⁴⁹ -- but the matter resurfaced only a few weeks before the elections.

⁴⁸This is not to argue, one way or the other, whether the ANC had the interests of the nation at heart in these proposals. I only wish to point out that, in the very least, a PR system seemed to serve the party's interests.

⁴⁹Robertson, p. 15.

The ANC had argued that a single ballot offered simplicity and would avoid confusing voters into believing they had a second choice of whom to vote for. In particular, the ANC feared that some African voters might be "fooled" into supporting the PAC on their second ballot. ANC research had suggested that a mistaken second preference vote on the provincial ballot could give the PAC up to 30 percent of the vote. Smaller, more regionally-based parties, on the other hand, expected that a double ballot would benefit them since voters might select the ANC nationally but favor a regional party for provincial representation. They defended the double ballot as more democratic, giving voters a greater degree of choice than a single ballot. Finally, in a last-minute effort to coax the Freedom Alliance into participating in the election, the ANC capitulated and the double ballot became part of the electoral law in March 1994.⁵⁰

At stake in the Western Cape were about 42 seats in the unicameral regional parliament. Before the election, the exact number of seats could only be an approximation since it would be determined by the proportion of provincial votes cast to votes cast nationwide -- no one knew precisely how many voters would turn out on election day. The parliament would hold responsibility for drafting a provincial constitution in accordance with the principles of the interim national constitution, and two-thirds approval would be required for its passage. As in every province, each party winning a minimum of ten percent of these seats would be able to name members to the regional cabinet, called the Executive Council. The composition of the Executive Council would include a premier and no more than ten other members.⁵¹

⁵⁰Robertson, p. 16.

⁵¹Meredith, p. 99.

Incentives

The type of electoral system, and the use of separate national and provincial ballots, seemed to offer at least four main incentives for party campaigns. First, the major parties might be tempted to focus on urban areas, where the bulk of the provincial electorate lived. How could a party secure a majority in the legislature?⁵² Under a first-past-the-post constituency-based system, a party probably would have to win a plurality of the vote in a majority of constituencies. This might require a party to expend resources over a wide geographic area.⁵³ Under PR, however, a party simply had to win a majority of the provincial vote. It could target those places where most voters resided. Critically, the densest concentration of the Western Cape electorate was in the greater Cape Town area - main parties would possibly devote the bulk of their efforts there.

Second, the electoral system gave parties an opportunity to pool funds, workers and candidates from some areas to be used in other areas. After all, winning in particular voting districts was not necessarily as crucial as simply winning votes anywhere in the province. For example, the ANC could pull volunteers and candidates from communities of strong support, like Khayelitsha and Guguletu, to be used in places with weaker yet potential support, like Delft and Mitchell's Plain.⁵⁴

⁵²I assume that the main parties wanted to win as many seats as possible, or at least a majority in the legislature, and that they were unlikely to form coalitions for shared legislative control. This is a critical assumption here since parties' reluctance to form coalitions is not necessarily self-evident from the factors I have presented thusfar. See Chapter Two for public opinion data that the Western Cape elections would likely prove a two-party contest between the ANC and NP, with all other parties trailing far behind. See also Chapter Three: perceptions by ANC and NP leaders that their respective party stood a chance of winning, coupled with deep ideological and historical differences with other parties, may have made a coalition very unlikely.

⁵³This incentive is often cited by those arguing for retaining the U.S. Electoral College instead of shifting to a system of directly electing the President. The Electoral College generally makes it imperative for presidential candidates to spread at least some of their efforts across a broad geographic area, rather than simply focus on population centers.

⁵⁴This is not to argue that such pooling of resources could not also take place under a first-past-the-post, constituency-based electoral system. Rather, I only mean to suggest that PR may allow parties to pool resources more readily.

Third, the role of party leaders in campaign activities would be of potentially critical importance. As Hermann Giliomee argues, the electoral system "presidentialized" the campaigns.⁵⁵ The absence of constituency voting for individual candidates meant that voters would be faced with a choice on election day between parties, represented on the ballot by their respective national leaders.⁵⁶ Depending on the familiarity of voters with party candidates, many might base their vote -- at least partly -- on their perception of the party leader. The election might be, to some extent, a battle between presidential candidates. Thus, if the ANC made the Western Cape a priority nationally, then it would possibly schedule a significant number of appearances in the province by Nelson Mandela.⁵⁷

Fourth, the adoption of the double-ballot voting method also had possible implications for the ANC's campaign. Given the possibility that voters might mistake the provincial ballot for a second preference ballot, the ANC had an interest in educating voters or at least persuading them to support it on both ballots. Also, there was a chance that the ANC, with its widespread national appeal as a liberation movement, might lose provincial votes *because of its popularity*. Certain voters might vote ANC nationally but vote NP or IFP provincially in an attempt to avoid ANC domination at both levels of government. The ANC might see a need to address this issue in its appeals, and try to convince voters that it needed their support *especially in the Western Cape and KwaZulu/Natal*, where it faced close contests.

⁵⁵Giliomee, "Trends of the Past...", p. 6.

⁵⁶The ballots also included the name of the party and the party's symbol.

⁵⁷Mandela proved to be less popular than de Klerk in the Western Cape. See Chapter Two for pre-election public opinion data on party leader support.

In addition, Sisk maintains that the electoral system offered advantages for the ANC in particular. For example, it simplified the voting process by having voters choose parties instead of, for example, several candidates from a long list. African ANC supporters were presumed to have the least familiarity with voting, and thus the simpler the ballot, the less the incidence of "spoilage."⁵⁸

Possible impact on campaign

To recapitulate, the history, demographics and the electoral system of the Western Cape all represented important parts of the environment parties faced in the run-up to the April 1994 elections. It was possible that each of these factors would influence the ANC's campaign strategy.

The history of the region appeared to pose three potential effects. First, if the ANC wanted to control the provincial legislature, then it almost certainly needed to win a significant number of votes from the coloured majority. The ANC might direct a considerable share of its appeals toward coloured voters. Second, given that the African minority represented the bulk of the ANC's membership, conflicts within the party might arise over which of the two groups -- Africans or coloureds -- ought to be the principal target of the ANC's strategy. Third, the disbanding of the UDF might limit the interest of some coloured voters in supporting the ANC, or the ability of the ANC to take advantage of former UDF activists and structures in coloured areas.


Demographic data seem to suggest two main, possible influences on the ANC's campaign. Major socioeconomic gaps between all three main groups in the province

⁵⁸Timothy D. Sisk, *A New South African Social Contract?: Institutional Choice in a Divided Society*, Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, September 30, 1992, pp. 358-361.

meant that the party might have to appeal to each of them differently, if it desired their support. For example, issues that might resonate among African voters might not interest coloured voters to the same extent. Also, no overwhelming basis seemed to exist for an affinity among coloured people for whites. Perhaps coloureds were not as likely to support traditionally white parties such as the NP as some analysts had predicted, and the ANC might be able to attract some of their votes. Data on political attitudes of coloured voters toward the main parties might shed light on this possibility, and I explore that issue in the next chapter.

In addition, as noted above, the electoral system appeared to pose four plausible effects on the ANC's strategy. First, the party might focus on urban centers since it did not necessarily have to win votes across a broad geographic area. Second, for the same reason, the ANC might pool its resources and target them toward communities where it faced possible large net gains in support. Third, if the party made the Western Cape a national priority, then it might schedule a significant number of appearances in the province by Nelson Mandela. Finally, the use of the double ballot meant that the ANC had an interest in educating voters and persuading them to vote ANC on the provincial ballot.

I have not yet discussed one critical piece of the pre-election context in the Western Cape, however. Even if the ANC recognized historical and material differences between racial groups, and saw a need to focus on urban areas, how would it decide which voters to target principally and why? In Chapters Two and Three, I examine how various ANC leaders viewed the race for the Western Cape, and what critical strategic decisions they made on the basis of this understanding.



Some people panicked as the April 1994 elections approached, and began hoarding foodstuffs and other supplies.

✓ CHAPTER TWO: Voter Attitudes

In this chapter, I explore pre-campaign political views of the electorate in order to answer the following question:

- What impact might knowledge of voters' political attitudes have had on ANC strategy?

A range of public opinion polls took place in the Western Cape in the period before campaigning began. I draw upon the findings of several of them in an attempt to determine levels of party support, and examine the nature of this support. I begin by focusing on the extent to which voters identified with and favored parties, and characterize the support bases of the main parties in terms of key features such as race and economic status. I then explore how voters perceived parties with respect to key election issues.⁵⁹ I also suggest the degree to which the Western Cape electorate may have been "up for grabs" or available to the main parties and, finally, attempt to answer the question above.

Identification with and support for parties

Party identification proved generally low among most of the electorate. Although this limited its usefulness as a predictor of voting behavior, its significance remained: low

⁵⁹Scholars differ over what factors influence how voters vote, and the extent to which one should apply "Western" voting behavior theory to societies outside the West. I do not attempt to enter into these debates. However, I do discuss attitudes of the Western Cape electorate in terms of Western theory, particularly the "party identification" and "issue voting" models. For an overview of these theories, see Martin Harrop and William Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*, London: MacMillan, 1987. For party identification theory, see Angus Campbell, P. Converse, W.E. Miller & D.B. Stokes, *The American Voter*, New York: Wiley, 1960. For issue voting, see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper & Row, 1957. For a discussion of why Western theories seem to apply to South African voters, see Robert Mattes, *The Election Book: Reason and Judgment in South Africa's 1994 Election*, Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 1995.

identification with parties meant that voting intentions possibly were more changeable than if identification had been high. Most voters, particularly those in the majority coloured population, exhibited only weak if any allegiance to parties. Only African and white voters showed notable levels of party identification.⁶⁰

A series of polls in 1992 and early 1993 found that most voters supported the NP, at least among those who were not undecided. The NP consistently maintained support of between 43 and 61 percent of the electorate, compared to the ANC's 10 to 24 percent. Interestingly, there also seemed to be a wide gap in the popularity of party leaders.⁶¹ NP leader F.W. de Klerk found favor with between 54 and 68 percent, and ANC president Nelson Mandela garnered a meager 9 to 22 percent. Despite the NP's apparent edge, however, its lead over the ANC seemed to shorten over time. Figures 5 through 7 below illustrate how the overall gap in both leader and party support narrowed slightly from February 1992 to February 1993. Interestingly, de Klerk tended to gain higher ratings than his party, whereas Mandela received less than the ANC.

Beyond these early measurements of party support and party leader popularity, polls conducted in mid to late 1993 revealed another crucial feature of the electorate -- a considerable number of Western Cape voters did not yet know, or would not say, for which party they would vote.⁶² Figure 8 depicts three surveys' estimates of the size of

⁶⁰Source: Research Initiatives. See below for further information on the survey conducted by Research Initiatives in mid-1993.

⁶¹The extent to which party support was influenced by leader popularity, or vice versa, is a matter for debate. I note the data on leaders here at least to illustrate the strong apparent similarity to party support levels.

⁶²Different polls characterized these voters in different ways. Some had response categories of "don't know" and "undecided," whereas others used "uncertain" or "won't say." I do not attempt to equate these various categories with one another, as this would be methodologically problematic for many reasons. Rather, I lump them together under the umbrella of "undecided" in order to demonstrate broadly which voters did not, or refused to, indicate their party preference.

Figure 5: Support for Party Leaders, February 1992 to February 1993

Source: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)⁶³





Figure 6: Party Support, February 1992 to February 1993


Source: HSRC



⁶³As cited in Robert B. Mattes, "Appendix: Public Support for Parties and Leaders in South Africa: A Review of Poll Data," *The Impact of Public Opinion Polling on South Africa's Transition to Democracy: A Report to the "Investigation Into Research Methodology Project" of the Human Sciences Research Council*, unpublished report, 1995, p. 185. Mattes' report includes data from five HSRC polls, the samples of which are indicated as n=[sample size]: February 1992, n=2,000; April 1992, n=2,000; July 1992, n=2,000; September-October 1992, n=2,000; and February 1993, n=1,999. These polls are attributed hereafter to the HSRC, with the specific poll-date also listed. The data cited here include those respondents who declined to express an opinion.

Figure 7: Party and Leader Support, February 1992 to February 1993

Source: HSRC



this "undecided" bloc. Each suggests that it was significantly large, encompassing from about one-fifth to as much as one-third of the electorate.⁶⁴ Most undecided voters were also coloured. One poll put this number at a whopping 80 percent of coloured voters,⁶⁵ although another indicated that it was closer to 58 percent.⁶⁶ Either way, about three-fifths or four-fifths of coloureds appeared to have not yet decided which party to support, or would not tell. One could argue that this reflects the large lack of party identification among coloured voters, with those who identified little with a party being unlikely to know how they would vote.


⁶⁴Nearly all of the analysis of the mid-1993 Research Initiatives poll that I cite below is borrowed directly from Jeremy Seekings' contribution to an unpublished paper that he and I co-authored: "An Uphill Battle: Voter Attitudes and ANC Strategy in the Western Cape in the 1994 South African Elections," unpublished paper, April 1995. I am indebted to him for that assessment of those data. The comparative analysis of that poll and others, however, is mine alone.

⁶⁵See description of Research Initiatives survey below. Significantly, findings of this survey were not released publicly before the elections, and as Robert Mattes argues, it appears to have been commissioned by the ANC as internal strategic intelligence. Mattes identifies a compelling, rare coincidence between the sample size and date of the "ANC" poll described Lodge in "The African National Congress and Its Allies," and the "Matla Trust" survey referred to in an article by Susan Booysen of Research Initiatives. See Robert Mattes, *The Impact of Public Opinion Polling on South Africa's Transition to Democracy: A Report to the "Investigation into Research Methodology Project" of the Human Sciences Research Council*, unpublished report, 1995.

⁶⁶See description of Argus/MMR survey below. This poll does not explicitly estimate the percentage of undecided coloured voters in the Western Cape. It does, however, put the number of coloureds who were undecided at 33 percent. I use this number, with Independent Electoral Commission population figures of 56 percent coloured, 18 percent African and 25 percent white, to derive the estimate of 58 percent.

Figure 8: Percentage of Undecided Voters⁶⁷

Source: Research Initiatives/Marketing Media Research,⁶⁸ Argus/Marketing Media Research,⁶⁹ and Institute for Multi-Party Democracy/Market and Opinion Surveys⁷⁰



Surveys also suggested that the electoral contest would be a two-party race between the NP and ANC, with the Democratic Party (DP) trailing at a distant third place. Figure 9 illustrates three voting intention estimates. All of these polls showed the NP leading the ANC to varying degrees. What is perhaps most important about these estimates, though, is that only two parties appeared to have a real chance of winning control of the province.

⁶⁷This figure, and all others which list polling data from more than one source, should be viewed with caution. Given the methodological disparities between these polls, they do not necessarily lend themselves to direct comparisons with one another. For instance, some pose questions in different ways, which may lead to differences in how respondents answer. Thus, in this figure I do not attempt to use the data as a kind of "election meter" to illustrate how the percentage of undecided voters may have shifted over time from August 1993 to December 1993. Instead, I merely offer examples of surveys in mid to late 1993 which sought to measure how many voters were undecided. What is most relevant to this dissertation is that a significant proportion, between about one-fifth and one-third, of the Western Cape electorate fell into this category.


⁶⁸As cited in Eldridge and Seekings, "An Uphill Battle." This survey was conducted nationwide in July and August 1993, although the data cited here are from the Western Cape only. In the Western Cape, a total of 1,282 people were interviewed at home in the language of their choice -- including 382 Africans, 800 coloureds and 100 whites. See the appendix of "An Uphill Battle" for further details on the survey. This poll is referred to hereafter as Research Initiatives.

⁶⁹As cited in Mattes, "Appendix: Public Support," pp. 171-172. This poll took place during November 29 to December 29, 1994, and is referred to hereafter as Argus/MMR.

⁷⁰As cited in Mattes "Appendix: Public Support," p. 216. This poll occurred during November to December 1993 with a sample of 2,500 people in the Western Cape. The sample included 1,425 coloureds, 582 whites and 493 Africans. Results were weighted to reflect the population of the province. This poll is referred to hereafter as MPD/M&O.

Despite Cape Town's significance as a historical stronghold of DP support, the DP did not appear to be a serious contender for more than a small share of the vote.

Figure 9: Voting Intention in Early, Mid and Late 1993



These polls produced another significant finding -- there seemed to exist a strong correlation between race and voting intention. Most white and African voters, as suggested by party identification levels above, appeared to have already lined up behind the NP and ANC, respectively. Figure 10 shows how voters in each major racial category indicated their voting intention in mid-1993. Coloured voters seemed largely divided, although those who did indicate a preference chose the NP over the ANC by nearly three to one. The vast majority of Africans chose the ANC, with a small number opting for the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). Two to three out of four whites, on the other hand, preferred traditionally white parties, including the NP, DP and other right-wing groups. Figure 11 illustrates voting intentions among whites for these parties.

Comparing survey results from mid-1993 to those of late 1993 offers a consistent pattern of ANC and NP voting intention according to race. As in August 1993, two December 1993 polls suggest that the ANC's core constituency consisted primarily of African voters, and that the NP's support base comprised mostly white and coloured voters.

Figure 10: Voting Intention by Race, Mid-1993⁷¹

Source: Research Initiatives




Figure 12 shows the percentage of each racial group that preferred the ANC in each of these polls, and Figure 13 demonstrates this for the NP.

Beyond looking at voting intentions within the three major racial groups, examining voting intentions for each party according to race illustrates how significant these support levels are. Table 5 offers a breakdown of these data in mid-1993. One important feature of these results is that more of those favoring the NP were coloured than white.

⁷¹Totals do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Figure 11: White Voting Intentions for Traditionally White Parties (NP, DP, far right)⁷²





Figure 12: ANC Voting Intentions Among Each Racial Group



Even though most white voters intended to vote NP, there were many coloured voters who also shared this intention. This becomes even more apparent when comparing mid-1993 survey results to those of late 1993. Figure 14 juxtaposes two surveys' estimates of NP voting intentions by race, *as a proportion of eligible voters*. It indicates that the NP derived a third to more than three times as much of its backing from coloureds as compared to whites.

⁷²The "far right" parties included in these polls are as follows: Research Initiatives -- not specified; Argus/MMR -- Conservative Party (CP); MPD/M&O -- CP and Afrikaner Volksfront.

Figure 13: NP Voting Intentions Among Each Racial Group





Table 5: Voting Intention by Party, Mid-1993, According to Race

	<u>ANC</u>	<u>NP</u>	<u>DP</u>	<u>Far right-wing</u>	<u>PAC</u>	<u>IFP</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
African	65				100		
Coloured	27	60	60				88
White	8	40	40	100		100	12
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Figure 14: NP Voting Intention by Race, as a Percentage of the Total Electorate





Voting intentions did not correlate with race in all cases, however. Perhaps most important, a significant proportion of coloured voters did not favor the NP. More than one-quarter of coloured voters preferred the ANC to the NP in mid-1993 and, by late 1993, more than one-fifth continued to prefer the ANC.⁷³ This flew in the face of predictions that coloured voters would overwhelmingly support traditionally white parties such as the NP.

Class and race combined correlate more precisely to voting intention, than race or class alone. Although pre-election data on the relationship between occupational class and party preference are not available from any of the polls cited above,⁷⁴ data are available on voting intention according to level of education, which I argue is a reasonable proxy for class. For example, working-class voters typically have fewer years of formal education than middle-class voters. Voters with education levels up to and including standard 8, can be reasonably considered "lower class," and those with standard 9 or above can be thought of as "higher class."⁷⁵ These notions of class apply most appropriately within each racial category rather than across all of them -- i.e., higher-class whites can generally be considered more well-off than higher-class Africans.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, both the ANC and NP drew voting intentions in mid-1993 from voters all along the range of education levels. No clear relationship seems to exist between education and voting intention, although the NP has slightly less backing than the ANC among "lower class" (lower education) voters and marginally

⁷³Late 1993 poll source: Argus/MMR.

⁷⁴Post-election data are publicly available, however. See Robert Mattes, "Dispelling Myth of Racism in Coloured Vote," *OPINION POLL*, Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, vol. 1, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁵For nearly all white, most coloured, and many but not all African students, standard 8 in South Africa loosely represents the U.S. equivalent of grade 10, in which students are normally between 15 and 16 years old. Standard 9 is roughly grade 11, or ages 16 to 17. "Matric" is about grade 12, or ages 17 to 18. Post-matric education includes instruction at a post-secondary institution, such as at a technikon (technical college) or university.

more support in the "upper class" (higher education) category. Table 6 demonstrates voters' preferences for each party according to "class" or level of education attained. Note that columns do not add to 100 due to rounding.

Table 6: Voting Intention by Party, Mid-1993, According to "Class" (Education)

	<u>ANC</u>	<u>NP</u>	<u>Other Parties</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
std. 4 or less	19	13		23
std. 5-8	42	43	11	59
std. 9-10	23	23	33	12
post-matric	15	20	56	6
TOTAL	99	99	100	100




When combining class and race, however, and then comparing them to voting intention, an important relationship becomes clear. Among coloured voters, the NP garners the bulk of its voting intentions from those who are "lower class." The ANC, on the other hand, attracts backing from predominantly "higher class" coloureds. This does not mean that "lower class" coloured voters did not back the ANC at all, but rather that more of them intended to vote NP. Figure 15 illustrates this pattern.


There had seemed to be an enormous bloc of undecided coloured voters that might help the ANC close the gap with the NP. However, these data suggest that many undecideds actually had important economic and racial similarities with NP supporters. Most undecided voters were "lower class" coloureds, just like the majority of those who favored the NP. This might mean that undecideds would share many of the same political attitudes as NP supporters, and might also have the same voting intention on election day.


Figure 15: Voting Intentions by Race and Class, Mid-1993

Source: Research Initiatives



Each icon represents 1% of the total Western Cape electorate.

NP support is marked by 

ANC support is marked by 

A  indicates either 'undecided' voters or voters supporting a minor party.

Key election issues

Political violence, jobs and the economy emerged as the most pressing concerns of the Western Cape electorate as a whole. Respondents mentioned unemployment and crime as things that were going wrong in South Africa, and two-thirds of them said that "nothing" was going right. Altogether, NP supporters and undecided voters were the most worried about violence and crime.

Attitudes about violence, jobs and the economy generally favored the NP over the ANC. When asked which party had caused a lot of violence, only 6 percent of respondents named the NP, compared to 40 percent who named the ANC. Nearly one-third of coloured voters named the ANC a party which "cannot control its supporters." With respect to jobs and the economy, almost 50 percent of voters agreed that "an ANC government will mismanage the economy," and another 6 percent were uncertain. Undecided voters agreed with this statement by 2 to 1. Thus, undecideds perceived the ANC negatively with regard to two critical issues.

In addition, many coloured voters indicated that they viewed the ANC as unresponsive to their needs. Half of them agreed that "an ANC government will neglect the problems of coloureds, Indians and whites," and one-quarter named the ANC as a party of which they were afraid. Only about 20 percent identified the ANC as a party "with a place for people like me." With respect to the NP, some expressed criticism of its past performance. However, most viewed it more positively than the ANC in terms of the future. About 33 percent of coloureds agreed with the statement "the NP has ruined our economy and created unemployment," but about the same number disagreed. Only one in five agreed that, "The NP cannot be trusted to improve our lives." Half said that the NP was the most capable of dealing with their most pressing concern, compared to only

20 percent who named the ANC -- and undecided voters named the NP over the ANC by three to one.

An analysis of responses regarding most pressing concerns suggests a critical finding: most undecided voters had attitudes similar to those of NP supporters. Most viewed the ANC negatively, particularly with respect to jobs, violence and the economy. Many believed that the NP was more capable of addressing these problems. Thus, although they appeared to be undecided in terms of voting intention, their views of the parties with respect to key concerns showed them leaning away from the ANC.

Other factors

Mid-1993 survey data highlight several important aspects of the general mood among voters.⁷⁶ NP supporters tended to be pessimistic about the future, whereas ANC supporters were optimistic. About 80 percent of Africans expected that they would enjoy better living conditions, a greater degree of peace and more freedom. Two-thirds of white voters, on the other hand, anticipated worsening living conditions. Coloured voters seemed to be about 40 percent optimistic, 20 percent pessimistic and 40 percent unsure. Perhaps most important, undecided coloured voters appeared the least optimistic and most uncertain -- they had more in common with NP supporters than ANC supporters in this regard.

Undecided voters' perceptions of party leaders offered another indication that they tended to favor the NP. Overall, as Figure 16 illustrates, 42 percent of the electorate named de Klerk as the leader who would make the best president, whereas only 26 percent named Mandela. When examining undecided coloured voters, this disparity

⁷⁶Source: Research Initiatives. See Eldridge and Seekings, "An Uphill Battle," pp. 5-8.

widens. About 46 percent answered de Klerk, compared to a mere 6 percent for Mandela. Figure 17 depicts this gap.

Figure 16: Support for Party Leaders, Mid-1993

Source: Research Initiatives





Figure 17: Support for Party Leaders among Undecided Coloured Voters, mid-1993

Source: Research Initiatives



Further evidence of undecided voters' inclinations toward the NP can be found by examining answers to the question, "Do you trust and believe what X says?" As Tables 7 and 8 show, Mandela and Allan Boesak found wide support among African voters. On

the other hand, undecided coloured voters viewed them much less positively. About 18 percent trusted Mandela, but 28 percent said that they did not trust him. Although de Klerk garnered little trust among African voters, a majority of undecided coloureds trusted him.

Table 7: Do you trust and believe what X says? (Among Undecided Coloured Voters)

	F.W. de Klerk (%)	Nelson Mandela (%)	Allan Boesak (%)
<u>Undecided coloured voters</u>			
Yes	54	18	13
No	7	28	28
Not sure	36	49	39
Don't know him	3	5	20
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table 8: Do you trust and believe what X says? (Among African Voters)

	F.W. de Klerk (%)	Nelson Mandela (%)	Allan Boesak (%)
<u>African voters</u>			
Yes	5	98	87
No	74	1	3
Not sure	21	1	10
Don't know him	0	0	0
TOTAL	100	100	100

Implications for ANC strategy

Possible impact of knowledge of voter attitudes

The ANC at the start of the campaign period found itself faced with at least three compelling findings from survey research: 1) most polls showed the NP ahead of the ANC in terms of voting intentions and stated support, 2) there seemed to exist a large

bloc of undecided voters, but 3) many of these undecideds appeared to be already leaning toward the NP.⁷⁷

In the impending struggle for undecided voters, the NP had an important advantage. Most undecided voters had much in common with existing NP supporters. The majority of undecideds were lower class coloured voters, with an economic and racial background similar to that of the NP's core constituency. Most viewed the ANC as responsible for political violence, and feared that it would not manage the economy well or provide jobs for coloured people. They saw the NP as more able to protect social stability and limit violence. Many, like NP supporters, felt generally pessimistic about the future and distrusted ANC leaders.



The high number of undecided voters suggested, on its face, that both the ANC and NP had a chance of winning the Western Cape. However, the parallels in attitudes among undecideds and NP supporters meant that the NP stood a better chance of winning. Undecideds did not appear to be equally "available" to both parties. For the ANC to win, it seemed to face a daunting task -- to improve its image among undecided voters, particularly with respect to jobs, violence and the economy.

The primary implications of these findings for ANC strategy seemed to be twofold. First, the party might make the province a national priority, perhaps depending on other considerations at the national level. If ANC leaders perceived the party to be winning elsewhere, and if they concluded from public opinion data that they had a chance of winning the Western Cape, then they might decide to make a special effort here. Second,

⁷⁷I hasten to highlight the fact that I base these conclusions largely on Research Initiatives data which, as indicated above, seem to have represented internal ANC strategic intelligence not available to the public until after the elections. Those not involved in ANC campaign strategy probably did not have access to this information, except for other main parties which very likely commissioned their own studies. Thus, one may not necessarily have drawn conclusions like mine from the publicly available data alone. I also base

the ANC might focus its appeals almost exclusively on undecided coloured people, since they represented arguably the pivotal group of voters, and the party already enjoyed overwhelming support among Africans.

How did party leaders interpret these public opinion data, and to what extent did other factors influence their choice of strategy? In Chapter Three, I explore the decision making process out of which the ANC's approach emerged.

my findings on information from polling advisors to the ANC and party strategists, whose views I discuss in Chapter Three.



The NP, represented here by de Klerk, was accused of pandering to Western Cape voters' fears of the ANC as a communist, violent African party.

PART II:
Evolution of the Campaign

CHAPTER THREE: Strategic Choices, Competing Voices

In this chapter, I explore the *initial* campaign strategy adopted by the ANC in the Western Cape.⁷⁸ I begin by briefly outlining the general approach that national campaign organizers chose to use across the country. I then examine the internal dynamics of the ANC's provincial strategy formulation, with a look at the principal options under consideration. I also identify key developments that may have influenced the outcome. The information presented here and in Chapters Four and Five will enable me, in Chapter Six, to offer specific answers to my principal research questions -- in particular, the extent to which critical factors seem to have shaped ANC strategy before and during the campaign.⁷⁹

The national approach

The ANC developed a strategy on the national level that seemed designed to accomplish two broad goals: first, consolidating votes among the party's core support base of Africans and, second, winning new support in non-African areas. Ostensibly in order to meet these objectives, national strategists selected two campaign slogans. Initially, they would use "Now Is the Time," a theme on which they had relied for nearly a year.⁸⁰ It seemed to emphasize the "liberation" nature of the election in an effort to motivate African voters. As the campaign got underway, they would introduce "A Better Life for All," seeking to persuade voters -- particularly those who were either undecided or weak

⁷⁸This chapter and those that follow draw heavily on analysis that Jeremy Seekings and I have used in a series of papers: "An Uphill Battle;" "Mandela's Lost Province: The African National Congress and the Western Cape Electorate in the 1994 South African Elections," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 22 no. 4, Dec. 1996, pp. 517-540; and "Losing the Unwinnable Cape: The ANC's Campaign Strategy in 1994," unpublished paper, November 1995.

⁷⁹The initial strategy should not be confused conceptually with what I might call the ANC's "total" strategy, which includes the party's approach both before and during the campaign. I will evaluate this total strategy and relevant factors in Chapter Six.

⁸⁰Willie Hofmeyr, interview, June 24, 1994.

supporters of other parties -- that the ANC's plans would benefit all South Africans, not just Africans.⁸¹ Strategists agreed upon this dual approach, at no point taking for granted their chances of achieving a decisive win.⁸² In addition, the tone of the campaign would be constructive. As then provincial secretary Lerumo Kalako noted, "Overall, the ANC's national strategy was positive -- a better life for all, not harping on the past or criticizing the NP, just concentrating on what we could bring the people."⁸³

Internal provincial dynamics: debate over strategy

The ANC's leaders in the Western Cape agreed on the importance of employing provincially both strands of the national strategy. However, deep disagreement arose over how or where to strike a balance between them in terms of the distribution of campaign resources. Provincial leaders divided generally into two camps: "Africanists," who sought to prioritize a "liberation"-oriented campaign among African voters, and advocates of a "coloured focus" who favored targeting undecided coloured voters.⁸⁴ The province's demographic profile heightened the contrast between these two approaches. Africanists came from mainly African communities that comprised the bulk of the ANC's

⁸¹It is unclear why both slogans were not used from the outset, although this seems to indicate a shift in emphasis toward the inclusive, second theme, which may have been perceived as less threatening to voters outside of the ANC's core constituency.

⁸²According to Ketso Gordhan, ANC national election campaign coordinator, about 70 percent of the ANC's elections expenditures nationally were directed at consolidating support, and about 30 percent on winning new supporters; telephone interview, March 24, 1995.

⁸³Lerumo Kalako, interview, November 1, 1994. In addition, I use the words "positive" and "negative" when describing the general tone of campaigns. By positive, I mean emphasizing what a given party has to offer, or reasons why voters should choose that party. This can include, for example, a party's campaign platform, manifesto or other plans for action once in office. Conversely, I define negative as stressing unfavorable aspects of an opposing party, or reasons why voters should *not* support that party. For instance, this may involve attacks on the integrity of the opposing party's candidates, its past performance in office, or its proposed policies.

⁸⁴For a discussion of the historical development of these approaches within the Charterist or ANC-supporting movement, see Jeremy Seekings, "The United Democratic Front and the Struggle for Democracy," unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, forthcoming.

membership and leadership in the province, whereas some coloured focus advocates were from predominantly coloured or white areas with less support within the party.

Africanists within the Western Cape ANC argued that the party should initially concentrate on consolidating support among African voters in townships and squatter settlements. Only after it had shored up its core constituency of African voters, they argued, could the ANC move effectively and from a position of strength into coloured areas. This approach was based on four beliefs:

- the ANC's historical mission was the emancipation of the African majority, which had been more oppressed than any other racial group
- African voters comprised substantially more than 18 percent of the electorate; the ANC thus not only had an obligation to ensure that its support base voted, but would also benefit from it, since there were many more African ANC voters than generally thought
- the ANC had to counter not only the challenge of the PAC, but also the NP's attempts to secure African support in the province's huge shack settlements through the NP's alliance with prominent shack-lords⁸⁵
- a "multiracial"⁸⁶ strategy played into the hands of the NP by accentuating supposed racial differences, and it undermined the "nonracial" character of the ANC.⁸⁷

⁸⁵The NP included on its election list the shack-lords Johnson Ngxobongwana and Mali Hoza, whom the ANC derided as "notorious."

⁸⁶See below for a discussion of this term.

⁸⁷This paragraph is based on interviews with Tony Yengeni, February 13, 1995; Zou Kota, February 15, 1995; Dugmore, December; and Kalako.

With respect to the second of these beliefs, Africanists took issue with how the population figures had been derived. The ANC mainly relied on statistics from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), which had estimated African populations based on aerial photographs.⁸⁸ This method, Africanists argued, was fundamentally flawed because it only provided a crude approximation of how many people lived in African townships and squatter settlements. Most likely, the population density had been grossly underestimated. One could not determine the exact size of a particular household from the air, and the margin for error was undoubtedly far greater than DBSA analysts might admit. As one prominent African, Zou Kota, commented,

"Whatever population office there is has no idea how many people are living in the back of my house. People were coming to this region almost daily. ...A number of NGOs came up with statistics but some were using different methods. At the end of the day, none could give a good number. The last census attempt door-to-door was in 1984 or 1985."⁸⁹

Africanists did not disregard altogether the importance of winning coloureds' votes. On the contrary, although they favored placing primary emphasis on shoring up the votes of Africans, they argued that coloured support was also necessary. As former provincial secretary general Tony Yengeni put it, "we had to win over a substantial number of coloured voters to the ANC. ...For any party to win in this province, it must win a substantial number of coloureds in order to have an impact."⁹⁰

Coloured focus advocates countered that the ANC could only win through securing a considerable number of votes outside of its core constituency. They pointed to public

⁸⁸Garth Strachan, interview, August 17, 1994.

⁸⁹Kota interview.

⁹⁰Yengeni interview.

and internal ANC research that consistently showed that ANC support was very strong among African voters, but weak among coloured voters. They acknowledged that the support of African voters should not be taken for granted, but argued that three low-cost efforts would be most appropriate for African areas: 1) voter education, 2) mobilization to get voters to the polls and 3) publicizing aspects of the ANC's plans for jobs, houses and education. The ANC should concentrate most resources, they contended, on winning support from the large number of undecided, mostly coloured, voters. Campaign administrator, Garth Strachan remarked:

"We needed to project the ANC as an organization in which coloureds could find expression for their aspirations. We needed to project a coloured leadership. And we needed to project the changing culture of the ANC in the Western Cape, down to things like [using] Afrikaans in freedom songs."⁹¹

The ANC should seek to reassure coloureds on the key issues of jobs, housing, education and violence, and persuade them that the ANC would look out for their interests. It had to address coloureds' particular fears and concerns.⁹²

Coloured focus advocates also took issue with the claim of some Africanists that if the ANC did not concentrate sufficiently on African areas, it stood to lose votes to the PAC. They maintained that the PAC actually had only marginal backing and little potential for winning new support. The ANC only needed to get out the vote among Africans rather than keep them from shifting to the PAC. As campaign organizer Max Ozinsky commented,

⁹¹Strachan, August interview.

⁹²This account is based on interviews with Max Ozinsky, February 8, 1995; Garth Strachan, August interview and September 13, 1994; and Dugmore, December interview.

"In African areas, the choice of the ANC was way ahead of the PAC. The PAC was concentrated only in Guguletu and wasn't really a factor. There were a few moments when this issue was raised but *the PAC was never viewed as a threat*. Remember that the PAC had been exposed by the ANC nationally. It was in the difficult position of its members expecting to boycott the election and of many people perceiving it as a terrorist organization. The choice on the ground was what the two parties had to offer -- the PAC usually said we agree with everything the ANC wants, and sometimes would just add a few things to the ANC's plan."⁹³

The multiplicity of issues involved in this debate rendered it difficult to clarify or resolve. It ranged across questions of strategy, of tactics, of principles, and of power within and over the Western Cape ANC. This meant, as senior campaign organizer Cameron Dugmore noted, "the debates were quite subtle and not necessarily neatly boxed into the two camps."⁹⁴ In general, Africanists seemed to understand the debate as a zero-sum contest over resources between African and coloured areas,⁹⁵ whereas coloured focus advocates often described it as a question of tactics. As Dugmore put it, the question was:

"how to talk about coloured people as 'coloured people;' the differences were in terms of what our emphasis should be. ...In some ways, the two approaches hit on similar issues but offered different choices on how to win undecided voters to the ANC -- no one didn't understand the need to target coloureds. We were debating on tactics."⁹⁶

The debate within the ANC over its strategy in the elections was far from novel. In some respects, it represented just the latest chapter in a long-running debate. For decades, the

⁹³Max Ozinsky, interview, June 14, 1995; emphasis added.

⁹⁴Dugmore, December interview.

⁹⁵Yengeni interview.

⁹⁶Dugmore, December interview.

Charterist movement adopted an eclectic approach to organization and strategy, hovering between "nonracial" and "multiracial" positions. The ANC and its allies were committed to a nonracial political settlement, in which South Africans would be enfranchised equally without regard to race. Since African people had been particularly oppressed and also constituted a majority of the population, nonracialism entailed the leadership and primary role of the "African masses." At the same time, however, the Charterist movement consistently sought to extend its support base through an appeal to coloured, Indian and white South Africans. It also repeatedly employed a multiracial approach to accommodate the perceived varied needs and interests of the different constituencies. The Congress Alliance in the 1950s was explicitly multiracial, and the UDF in the 1980s accommodated *de facto* multiracialism.⁹⁷



Debates in the Western Cape over multiracialism and nonracialism centered on the so-called "coloured question." Should Charterists organize among coloured people along nonracial lines, or within separate structures specifically for coloured people? The unbanning of the ANC in 1990 seemed to have resolved this question, with the nonracial ANC incorporating most Charterist organizations and activists. However, as I noted in Chapter Two, many coloured people in the pre-campaign period continued to regard the ANC as an organization for African people. This perception was probably furthered by the fact that the ANC's membership was overwhelmingly African, even in the Western Cape. Also, some coloured voters perceived party activists to be distant from the concerns of their communities. Dugmore outlined the difficulty this situation posed for the ANC:

"African branches usually had membership of about 1000 [each], but coloured areas had no more than 150-200 members. Credible and rooted branches needed to be put into place by 1993. The

⁹⁷Seekings, "The UDF and the Struggle for Democracy."

problem was that leadership in some coloured communities sometimes represented an activist clique more than civic or community-based people that had been used in the UDF.⁹⁸

In addition to general lack of support for the ANC among coloured voters, a number of prominent coloured ANC activists felt marginalized within the party. This led to some discussion in the early 1990s of reviving the UDF or some other organization tailored more explicitly to the needs and fears of coloured people in the province. Although the ANC decided against separate *organization* on the grounds that it would violate its nonracial character, the debate over *strategy* continued.⁹⁹

"Resolving" the debate: key steps

Three critical developments may have influenced the eventual outcome of the debate over strategy. First, the national leadership subtly manipulated provincial discussions of strategic options, making it difficult for Africanists to further their approach. Second, direct intervention by the national office and a change in provincial leadership enabled coloured focus advocates to gain control of top positions in the campaign structure. Finally, the inclusion of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in the campaign's governing political committee added pressure for concentrating efforts on winning coloured votes.

⁹⁸Cameron Dugmore, interview, June 14, 1994.

⁹⁹This and the previous paragraph are based on discussions with Strachan, August interview; and Paul Davids, interview, June 28, 1994. See also Max Ozinsky and Ebrahim Rasool, "Developing a Strategic Perspective for the Coloured Areas in the Western Cape," *African Communist*, second quarter, 1993; Mike Coetzee, "Coloured Workers: Joining COSATU, Voting NP?" *South African Labour Bulletin*, vol. 17, no. 2, March/April 1993. As late as 1993 there were rumors that the Coloured People's Congress or the UDF would be revived.

Manipulation of strategy discussions

The national leadership sought to shape deliberations of strategic choices. It went to considerable lengths to persuade the Western Cape ANC to adopt a strategy in line with national priorities. In particular, it wanted the provincial party to run a positive campaign devoted largely toward winning undecided coloured voters.

From mid-1992, if not earlier, the head office suspected that the ANC faced likely defeat in the Western Cape,¹⁰⁰ a view later reinforced by the party's own polling research. The national leadership concluded that the party must make a special effort to win support among coloured voters. Mandela himself had repeatedly urged the ANC to pay heed to the particular concerns of coloured voters. In late 1991, he controversially intervened in the Western Cape ANC in support of Allan Boesak's candidacy for the post of provincial ANC chairperson.¹⁰¹ In late 1993, the ANC's national elections organizers sought to intervene more subtly, structuring the process of strategic decision-making on their terms. They used the ANC's own opinion poll and focus group research both to inform and frame election strategy meetings, focusing organizers' minds on the composition and concerns of the ANC's target voters. National organizers gave provincial activists an opportunity to discuss possible strategies only *after* a presentation of the research results.¹⁰²

The national leadership was sufficiently concerned about the Western Cape that they flew the ANC's American advisers Stan Greenberg and Frank Greer to Cape Town in October 1993. Ostensibly, they hoped the Americans would add their professional authority to discussions of the ANC's polling data for the province. Greenberg, a pollster, and Greer,

¹⁰⁰Strachan, September interview.

¹⁰¹Dugmore, December interview.

¹⁰²This and the next paragraph are based on Seekings' observations of ANC workshops in late 1993.

a media strategist, had played central roles in Bill Clinton's successful 1992 presidential campaign in the U.S. Greenberg and the ANC's South African pollsters argued that the ANC had to direct its efforts toward increasing support among coloured voters. Although some provincial Africanists remained wary of the polling "experts," the strategic debate was recast. Henceforth, to challenge the strategic focus on coloured voters meant challenging the "evidence" presented by the ANC's own advisors and endorsed by the national leadership.

Provincial ANC leaders had initially intended, in terms of tone, to run a negative "liberation-oriented" campaign. The efforts of the national leadership, and especially the use of its American advisors, seemed to change the minds of many provincial strategists. As Strachan noted,

"Before [Greenberg] came, the ANC would have run a negative campaign focused on history and apartheid. Greenberg and Greer were instrumental in taking the ANC through a process which led to the conclusion that the negative approach wouldn't work. Focus groups all over the country showed that people wanted peace, wanted to forget the past, wanted to be reassured of a better life...."¹⁰³

Restructuring the provincial campaign

The national leadership intervened less subtly at the end of 1993, at about the same time a new provincial secretary general took office, in order to revamp the campaign's initial structure. At the outset of the debate around election strategy in 1993, Africanists maintained an apparently strong position in the Western Cape ANC. They included Tony Yengeni, the provincial general secretary, and Zou Kota, the initial election campaign

¹⁰³Strachan, September interview.

coordinator. They also enjoyed strong support from ANC branches, most of which were located in predominantly African areas. However, advocates of a coloured focus -- mostly white and coloured former UDF activists -- managed with the help of the national leadership to take control of the campaign structure and steer ANC strategy along their preferred lines.

The Africanists were marginalized in two ways. First, they lost positions of influence at the top of the campaign machinery. In November 1993, Yengeni was defeated in elections for the post of provincial secretary general by Lerumo Kalako, who was African but not as closely associated with the Africanist approach. The national leadership took this opportunity to move overall responsibility for the elections from Yengeni and Kota to the ANC's coloured provincial treasurer, Ebrahim Rasool, and administrative control to Garth Strachan, a white former exile. As one campaign official described the change,

"[The new campaign structure was] basically mandated by the head office -- by Popo Molefe, Ketso Gordhan, etc. The previous structure, run by Zou and Tony, was seen to be a real cock-up. It had failed to build any real strategy for winning coloureds' votes. The new structure...was designed in order to make inroads into coloured communities -- those areas were seen as crucial to winning the province or doing as well as possible."¹⁰⁴

Second, the introduction of specialized substructures further sidelined the Africanists. Under Rasool and Strachan, the campaign formed three separate area committees -- one each for African, coloured and white communities. Yengeni and Kota were put in control of the African Areas Committee which coordinated the campaign in African

¹⁰⁴Western Cape ANC leader who spoke on condition of anonymity, date of interview withheld to protect this person's identity.

townships and shack settlements, but retained little influence elsewhere. Neither participated in the "Command Centre" created during the second phase of the campaign to provide overall coordination. Opinions differ as to why they did not take part -- Strachan maintained that they had been invited to do so, but Yengeni claimed that he was not "included."¹⁰⁵ In either case, their new roles seemed to provide them with far less influence over campaign decisions than their former positions. Figure 18 illustrates the overall campaign structure.¹⁰⁶

The creation of three distinct area committees prompted a negative reaction from many ANC leaders and activists, particularly Africanists. As they had opposed a coloured focus strategy earlier, partly because they believed it would undermine the ANC's nonracial character, they now spoke out on similar grounds against separate "racial" committees. As Kalako put it:

"There was criticism of the campaign structures and apparently demarcating areas based on race -- coloured, African and white -- rather than across color lines. There was strong criticism, especially from townships, of this approach. It was argued that this strategy plays into the hands of the racists themselves."¹⁰⁷


However, despite this opposition to the committees, provincial campaign leaders did not dismantle them. The first half of the campaign got underway with the committees being put into place, and leading Africanists like Yengeni and Kota marginalized.

¹⁰⁵Strachan, telephone interview, March 24, 1995; Yengeni interview.

¹⁰⁶This paragraph is based on interviews with Yengeni; Kota; and Strachan, March 7, 1995. See also Richard Calland, *The Winds of Change? The ANC's Campaign in the Western Cape: An Assessment of the Principal Strategic Issues and Some Projections for the Future*, unpublished M.A. dissertation: Department of Political Studies, UCT, November 1994.

¹⁰⁷Kalako interview.

Figure 18: Campaign Structure



COSATU

A further development that aided the adoption of a coloured focus involved COSATU, the nation's largest labor federation. As part of the tripartite alliance standing for the elections under the ANC's banner, COSATU was particularly sensitive to the "coloured question" since many of its members in the province were coloured.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, although COSATU's leadership, officials and shop stewards overwhelmingly backed the ANC, a majority of rank-and-file members held more conservative, often pro-NP views.¹⁰⁹ When the ANC's national leadership intervened directly in late 1993 to restructure the provincial campaign, it made the campaign formally accountable not to the ANC alone but to the ANC-led alliance, including COSATU. This enabled the ANC to draw on the expertise and resources of the union, especially among the coloured working-class. In addition, it strengthened the position of coloured focus advocates relative to that of Africanists.

Outcome?

The debate over strategy never reached a definite conclusion, even though coloured focus advocates took control of positions in which they could significantly shape the distribution of resources. Opposition to a coloured focus remained and seemed to continue playing a role in campaign decision-making, albeit a diminished one. As one campaign organizer noted, "The debate was never fully resolved. It was always an issue throughout the campaign."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸The third partner in the alliance was the South African Communist Party (SACP).

¹⁰⁹Coetzee, "Coloured Workers", p. 47.

¹¹⁰Dugmore, December interview

In summary, the Western Cape ANC appeared to choose its initial strategy through a complex, often subtle tug-of-war between coloured focus proponents and Africanists -- an internal struggle that followed on the decades-old Charterist debate over nonracialism versus multiracialism. Several key developments seemed to influence the outcome of this intra-ANC debate. The national leadership laid the groundwork by shaping provincial discussions of strategy options, making it difficult for Africanists to promote their approach. Perhaps most important, with a change of provincial secretary general and the aid of sympathetic national leaders like Mandela, coloured focus advocates successfully secured key positions of power in the Western Cape campaign structure. With additional support from COSATU, they were able to set the campaign on an initial course designed principally to win the support of undecided coloured voters.

MADAM & EVE

BY S. FRANCIS, H. DUGMORE & RICO.

...AND, WITH THE ELECTION FAST APPROACHING, MANDELA, DE KLERK AND BUTHELEZI HAVE AGREED TO ANOTHER LAST RESORT EMERGENCY MEETING THIS WEEK...ALTHOUGH THE LOCATION OF THE SUMMIT IS A CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET.




DINGDONG!

QUICK, EVE--THEY'RE HERE! I'LL GET THE DOOR, YOU GET THE CHEESE DIP!!



GENTLEMEN. WELCOME TO THIS HISTORIC MEETING... UH, WHERE'S CHIEF BUTHELEZI?

DRIVING AROUND THE BLOCK. HE CAN'T DECIDE WHERE TO PARK.



NOW THAT EVERYONE'S HERE, I DON'T HAVE TO REMIND YOU THAT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA DEPENDS ON TONIGHT'S OUTCOME.

MOM... YOU MAY BEGIN.




OKAY--HERE WE GO. DELICES ARE WILD, JACKS OR BETTER TO OPEN! READ 'EM AND WEEP, GENTLEMEN.



HMMM.

HEH. HEH.

YES!



YOUR BET, MISTER MANDELA.

I'LL BET ONE CONSTITUTION REWRITE.



MISTER DE KLERK?

I'LL BET...A ONE WEEK LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY.



OVER TO YOU, CHIEF.

...I'LL SEE YOUR STATE OF EMERGENCY LIFT...AND RAISE YOU TWO ELECTION POSTPONEMENTS!

HE'S BLUFFING!



HEY! STOP LOOKING AT MY CARDS!

I AM NOT! LOUSY CHEAT!

MAYBE WE SHOULD'VE GONE WITH 'OLD MAID'!

Madam and Eve facilitate last-minute multiparty negotiations.

CHAPTER FOUR: Campaign Implementation

With top positions of its campaign structure dominated by advocates of a coloured focus, the Western Cape ANC began formally implementing campaign activities in December 1993. In this chapter, I explore the campaign's general phases from its start to late April 1994. I begin by examining the extent to which the Western Cape seemed to be a priority for both the NP and ANC, and outlining the broad strategy that the NP used in the province. I then detail the main characteristics of each phase of the ANC's campaign. I conclude by describing differences between the phases, and explaining why certain strategic and tactical changes seem to have been made.

Western Cape prioritized

The composition of the Western Cape electorate posed strategic challenges to both the NP and ANC. As I noted in Chapter One, only about 18 percent (just under 440,000) of the estimated 2.4 million voters in the province were African, and only 25 percent (about 600,000 voters) were white. About 56 percent (or about 1.3 million voters) were coloured.¹¹¹ Both the NP and ANC, therefore, had to extend their historical support bases if they wanted to win the election. To do so, each perceived the need to fashion a new image while minimizing any loss of existing support. The NP sought to appeal to coloured voters -- whom it had previously discriminated against -- without losing the support of white voters to the DP or far right-wing parties. The ANC similarly sought to

¹¹¹See also Chapter One. Indian voters accounted for just 1 percent of the electorate. The precise size and composition of the electorate remain unclear, since there were neither accurate census nor voter registration data. The total figure here is the estimate provided by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), cited in Reynolds, "The Results," p. 187. The estimated racial breakdown of the electorate is that used in the Research Initiatives survey (see Chapter Two), although they were for the expected boundaries of the Western Cape in late 1992 when only eight provinces were demarcated. Nonetheless, these figures are almost exactly the same as those provided by Reynolds on the basis of data from the IEC and others sources (see Reynolds, "The Results," p.201), and in other surveys. In only one other province, the Northern Cape, did African voters comprise less than two-thirds of the electorate.

win the support of coloured voters, but without losing the support of African voters to the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).¹¹²

Both the ANC's and NP's national campaigns prioritized the Western Cape, perhaps spurred on by uncertainty of the provincial election result and the desire to demonstrate their nonracial credentials. For its part, the ANC dedicated a disproportionate share of national spending toward the province. It spent about 20 percent on Western Cape activities, but for voters who comprised only around 10 percent of the country's electorate.¹¹³ Also, Mandela reportedly made more visits to the province than any other during the campaign period.¹¹⁴ Dugmore summed up the importance of the Western Cape election to the party:

"This place was the only one where a real campaign was fought. It was about personalities, images and policies. This was not the same anywhere else. Things were very different even in Natal, where the campaign was more like barnstorming. But here it was a real contest. We organized here and fought a bit of a battle. And the national office was very much aware that this was where the action was happening...."¹¹⁵

One might not have expected the ANC to place a priority on the Western Cape, given its likelihood of receiving a majority of votes nationally. Some have argued that the ANC did not intend at the national level to win more than two-thirds of the vote, which would have given it the power in Parliament to amend the constitution at will. Aiming for and confident of a majority of somewhere between 51 and 65 percent, the ANC might have

¹¹²As I noted in Chapter Three, opinions differ among ANC provincial campaign officials as to whether they ever regarded the PAC as a serious threat.

¹¹³Ketso Gordhan, telephone interview, February 15, 1995.

¹¹⁴Dugmore, June interview.

¹¹⁵Dugmore, December interview.

chosen, for example, not to spend resources at all rather than devote them toward a losing battle in the Western Cape.

Several plausible reasons, however, would help to explain why the national leadership prioritized the province. First, perhaps sufficient uncertainty existed in the minds of national strategists as to what the provincial outcome would be. They may have believed that the ANC could capture at least a small yet valuable share of undecided coloureds' votes. Second, they may have considered it important to be seen making an effort to win coloureds' votes. They might have believed that this would yield dividends for the party in future local and provincial elections, by showing coloureds that their votes were important. Third, national leaders may have considered a campaign for coloured voters as a means to demonstrate the ANC's nonracial, or at least not exclusively African, character. Fourth, as others have argued, the ANC actually may have sought to win as many votes as possible across the country, and saw the Western Cape as a key area in which to garner new support.

With respect to all of these possibilities, however, it is unclear whether the national leadership *initially* intended to prioritize the province. This may have occurred during the campaign as the result of other causes -- for example, a combination of effective lobbying by provincial leaders and sympathetic personalities at the head office such as Mandela.¹¹⁶

For the NP, the Western Cape seemed to offer one of its best chances for a provincial victory, though it also anticipated a strong performance in the Northern Cape. The party devoted particular resources toward the Western Cape, especially during the final month of the campaign. De Klerk himself made several high-profile appearances across the

¹¹⁶Dugmore, December interview.

province. He even completed his campaign roadshow with a rally at the Good Hope Centre in Cape Town, which was attended mainly by coloured voters.¹¹⁷

The NP's campaign

The NP, generally discounting the potential threat of other traditionally white parties to diminish its share of the white electorate, established a provincial strategy aimed mainly at attracting coloured voters' support. Key to this approach was the fact that, until the final weeks of the campaign, right-wing parties had opted to boycott the elections. By the time they entered the race, they seemed to pose little danger of stealing the NP's support among whites. Even the most favorable polls showed the far-right receiving only minimal, and declining backing. Figure 19 shows white support for far-right parties in four polls conducted from 1992 to early 1994. Figure 20 illustrates support for far-right parties as a proportion of the entire electorate in the Cape Province or Western Cape -- these data stem from seven surveys held from early 1992 to early 1994.¹¹⁸

The NP devised a principally negative, anti-ANC campaign centered on issues of primary concern to coloured voters, such as housing, education, violence and the economy. One popular slogan challenged voters to "Stop the Comrades, Vote NP," playing on perceptions of the ANC as a party of communists and thugs. A newspaper advertisement run early in the campaign proclaimed:

¹¹⁷Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," p. 64.

¹¹⁸These figures should be read with caution. They are not intended to show possible patterns of decline in far-right support over time, both among whites and the general electorate. I use them only to indicate that far-right support in the Western Cape -- or Cape Province before late 1993 -- seemed to be low.

Figure 19: Percentage of Whites Supporting Far-Right Parties¹¹⁹





Figure 20: Percentage of Support Provincially for Far-Right Parties¹²⁰



¹¹⁹The Argus/MMR polls listed only the CP as a far-right party, but the MPD/M&O surveys also included also the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF).

¹²⁰Far-right parties in the HSRC polls included the CP, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), and Herstigte Nasionale Partei (HNP). In the Markinor surveys, they included only the AVF and CP. The November 1993 Markinor survey, as cited in Mattes, "Appendix: Public Support," was conducted for the *Sunday Times* and had a national sample of 2,655 voters. This involved face-to-face or telephone interviews with 821 whites, 200 coloureds, 194 Indians, 1,440 Africans (all in personal interview, including 126 domestic workers, 102 hostel dwellers and 149 farmworkers). The Markinor surveys are hereafter referred to as Markinor.

"The ANC is bad news for the country. The NP builds schools; the ANC disrupts schooling. The NP builds houses; the ANC breaks houses down. The NP stands for peace and reconciliation; the ANC intimidates people. The NP builds hospitals; the ANC's supporters toyi-toyi in hospital corridors while people die inside."¹²¹

The NP's appeals may have also addressed the concerns of white voters, but the bulk of its Western Cape efforts focused on winning coloureds' support. Many have described its activities as a "*swart gevaar*" campaign -- one that played on coloured and white fears of the "black threat." Two particular incidents occurred during the NP's campaign that help to illustrate its general attacks on the "black" ANC. First, a group of African squatters took up residence in a new development of houses that the old government had built for coloureds. The NP responded with newspaper advertisements that warned: "The ANC is not yet part of the government and already its supporters are taking houses which belong to legitimate owners." "Your house is not safe," cautioned the NP, "under the ANC."¹²²

Second, the NP produced an illustrated pamphlet that seemed partly aimed at coloured youth in townships on the Cape Flats. It featured a discussion between a young man and his parents about whether they should vote NP. Their dialogue included the suggestion that under an ANC government one could expect to hear the slogan of, "Kill a coloured, kill a farmer."¹²³ The pamphlet -- commonly referred to as the NP's "comic book" -- also showed a coloured woman stopped from going to church by a group of African youths. She bemoans this harassment, noting that under the past NP government she could count on freedom of worship.¹²⁴ "The liberators have become

¹²¹*Die Burger*, February 21, 1994, p. 8, as cited in Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," p. 59.

¹²²Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," p. 62.

¹²³Meredith, *South Africa's New Era*, p. 177.

¹²⁴Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," pp. 64-65.

the killers," another character in the comic book argues, "they shout freedom and sow death." The IEC ruled that the NP had to recall all 80,000 copies of the comic book due to the inflammatory rhetoric it contained.¹²⁵

The NP also strived to sell itself as the "new NP," which had shed its apartheid past and was responsible for ushering in the "new South Africa." It portrayed the election to voters as a choice between it -- especially its leader, F.W. de Klerk -- and a violence-causing, communist-ridden ANC dedicated to Africanization. As Kriel alleged about the ANC in a debate with Boesak, "They have done nothing, except blame everybody else, to stem the killing."¹²⁶

The ANC's Campaign

The ANC, although its approach mainly prioritized winning coloured votes, effectively ran two campaigns in the Western Cape.¹²⁷ The continuous, often subtle tension over strategy and emphasis seemed to be resolved, in practice, by running these two campaigns separately. The most prominent and first of these was aimed at coloured voters, and waged through the press,¹²⁸ high-profile rallies, and later through door-to-door canvassing. It ultimately accounted for an estimated 65 percent of the provincial party's campaign expenditures,¹²⁹ and generally followed what coloured focus advocates had proposed in pre-campaign debates over strategy. As Strachan characterized it:

¹²⁵Meredith, *South Africa's New Era*, p. 177.

¹²⁶Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," p. 63.

¹²⁷A third campaign was aimed at white voters, but this was never a priority according to provincial officials.

¹²⁸Radio advertising was not allowed until the last few weeks of the campaign; television advertising was banned altogether.

¹²⁹Gordhan, February interview; Dugmore, December interview; and Strachan, interview, March 29, 1995.

"the coloured community strategy was totally different. It was based on saying there is a home for you in the ANC. We have a long history of struggle on behalf of coloureds. We tried to reassure them that an African government -- at the end of the day, that's what the ANC is -- wouldn't carry out political discrimination toward coloureds with respect to jobs, affirmative action, schools, and the very important question of violence. Coloureds saw violence as directed at them."¹³⁰

The second campaign was aimed at African residents of the province's townships, shack settlements and farms. It was conducted primarily through mobilization and organization at the local level, with little use of the press or of rallies. In comparison with the main campaign toward coloured voters, these efforts received far fewer funds from the provincial party and occurred on a much more limited scale. As Kalako put it, "There was virtually nothing done in African areas -- we were carrying African areas with ease. There were very few meetings, rallies and door-to-door canvassing. The great part of our resources went to coloured areas."¹³¹ These two campaigns had separate coordinating structures: the Command Centre -- which took over from an initial Elections Coordinating Committee during phase two -- and the *de facto* independent African Areas Committee, respectively.¹³²

In contrast to the NP's largely negative, aggressive appeals, the ANC used a positive tone from the outset. Its campaign for coloured people's votes in the Western Cape unfolded in three broad phases. First, the ANC concentrated on presenting its "Plan," based around proposals in its draft Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In early March, it shifted to a more aggressive approach, contrasting the ANC with the NP and even attacking the NP directly. It also began to publicize endorsements of the ANC by

¹³⁰Strachan, August interview.

¹³¹Kalako interview.

¹³²I have been unable to gather much information on the ANC's campaign in African areas, partly due to my methodological focus on the party's activities in coloured communities, but also due to the apparent use of fewer materials than the campaign for coloured voters.

prominent community leaders. In the last weeks of the campaign, in April, the ANC stepped up the intensity of its attacks on the NP, while advertising further endorsements and offering optimistic messages about the future.

Phase One: "Our Plan"

The Western Cape ANC linked its first phase to the national-level approach, which had been developed in a set of strategy meetings in mid-to-late 1993. Taking to heart the advice of Greenberg and Greer, the national headquarters had decided to implement a largely positive campaign that addressed the party's ability to tackle real "issues." Greenberg noted that, "You have an electorate that's serious. South Africans are not just voting to affirm history, they're voting for a direction and a set of policies." Greer added:

"South Africans so clearly want the elections to be about their lives. I believe the NP will seek to divert attention to other subjects -- like how many communists [are] on the list. And our challenge, the ANC's challenge, is to keep the election on the issues."¹³³

The two American consultants proposed a campaign that included some methods used on the Clinton campaign. For example, in December 1993, the ANC campaign got underway with a succession of "people's forums" -- community events reminiscent of the "town meetings" Clinton had popularized. These stage-managed affairs were intended to give voters an opportunity to voice their concerns to the party, or at least to demonstrate that the ANC was offering voters this chance. One advertisement urged voters to attend, saying:

¹³³Mark Gevisser, "Clinton's Men on the ANC Campaign Trail," *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, February 25 to March 3, 1994, p. 10.

"Join us at a People's Forum in the Western Cape. Give us your views on jobs, affirmative action, crime, security, language and culture. Tell us where you stand. Because, above all, the ANC stands for you."

Most forums in the Western Cape sought to involve coloured voters in particular. For instance, in one given week, just one out of a dozen forums took place in an African neighborhood.¹³⁴

From mid-January to late February 1994, following a considerable lull in activity over the December holidays, the ANC stepped up its efforts. It introduced a series of newspaper advertisements, entitled "Our Plan," to publicize its stands on pressing issues. Most ads contained considerable amounts of text, extensively outlining the RDP's main components. Greenberg noted, "Even if you don't read or can't read the details, you get the message: the ANC has a plan; it's serious."¹³⁵ The ads' headlines highlighted key facets of the RDP:

"WHY TEN YEARS FREE QUALITY EDUCATION MAKES SENSE"

"2. PUTTING A STOP TO CRIME AND VIOLENCE"

"3. MAKING EDUCATION FREE AND EQUAL TO ALL"

"4. BUILDING HOUSES AND IMPROVING SERVICES"

"5. IMPROVING THE LIVES OF WOMEN"

"2,5 MILLION JOBS AND FREE EDUCATION"¹³⁶

¹³⁴*Argus*, December 2, 1993.

¹³⁵Gevisser, "Clinton's Men."

¹³⁶Examples of each of these ads can be found in the following: *Argus*, February 24, p. 21; *South*, February 18-22, p. 7; *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, February 25 to March 3, pp. 12-13; *Sunday Times*, February 27, pp. 8-9; *Sunday Times*, March 6, p. 9; *Sunday Times*, March 13, pp. 10-11.

Speakers at ANC rallies and public meetings focused attention on these central aspects of the RDP. At a rally on February 13 in the mainly coloured Cape Town suburb of Retreat, Mandela spearheaded this trend. He promised that the party would construct a million houses over the next five years and create 2.5 million jobs in ten years. Other speakers followed Mandela's lead, such as candidate and unionist Salie Manie who echoed these points at smaller rallies and events during this phase.¹³⁷ Some, like candidate Tony Ruiters, consistently made reference to the "five pillars" of the plan, almost as if reciting a mantra.¹³⁸

Speakers also sought to address specific concerns of coloured voters, though the campaign primarily emphasized the broad features of the RDP during this stage. At the Retreat rally, for instance, Mandela attempted to dispel rumors that the party would seize coloureds' homes and reallocate them to Africans. He added that the ANC would also not favor the hiring Africans over coloureds through affirmative action. Rather, affirmative action would benefit all who had been oppressed under apartheid.¹³⁹ These remarks may have been a defensive reaction to provocative NP allegations, or based on survey research that showed these concerns to be widespread among coloureds, or both.

The provincial party made efforts through newspaper ads to show how "Our Plan" would affect the Western Cape. Ostensibly, as an attempt to show that the ANC did not only reflect the interests of Africans, it publicized its list of candidates -- the largest group of whom were coloured, by 20 out of 42. By contrast, the list included only 18 Africans. Given that the vast majority of provincial party *members* were African, the number of coloured *candidates* was disproportionately high.¹⁴⁰ The party's final candidate list on

¹³⁷See, for example, Manie's remarks at the CRIC Centre in Athlone, Cape Town on March 9.

¹³⁸Tony Ruiters, remarks at Cape Town Central ANC Branch public meeting, April 10.

¹³⁹Nelson Mandela, speech at Allenby Sports Field, Retreat, Cape Town, February 13.

¹⁴⁰See Appendix G: Advertised List of Candidates for Provincial Assembly.

election day had an even larger gap between the numbers of coloured and African candidates, by 21 to 15.¹⁴¹

In many ads, the ANC pledged to develop housing¹⁴² and employment¹⁴³ in the province, and promised a sufficient budget for education.¹⁴⁴ It also attempted to respond to the unlawful takeover of houses by African squatters. As one advertisement proclaimed:

"On Friday the 18th of February, an attempt was made to occupy houses in Delft. (To make matters worse, some people have been on the waiting list for these homes for more than 10 years.) Why didn't the police do anything to protect the interests of the rightful owners? And why did the National Party government fail to fulfill its obligation to the community? Only the ANC intervened. For, as Nelson Mandela said at a rally in Retreat recently, 'I want to give you my assurance and that of the ANC that your homes will be safe under an ANC government.' In fact, safeguarding your personal property is one of the most important points in the ANC's plan for the Western Cape. A plan which stands for Coloured people, African people, Indians and Whites. And a better life for all."¹⁴⁵

In terms of its other activities, the party created only a small number of leaflets for the Western Cape in phase one, and its posters mainly served to publicize events and meetings.¹⁴⁶ The reasons for this generally low level of activity are unclear, but may reflect a desire by provincial leaders to avoid "peaking" too early, or the organizational inability of the campaign to conduct more efforts sooner, or perhaps both.

¹⁴¹See Appendix H: Final List of Candidates for Provincial Assembly.

¹⁴²*Weekend Argus*, March 5-6, 1994, p. 11.

¹⁴³*Southeaster*, March 25-29, 1994, p. 5.

¹⁴⁴*Southeaster*, March 25-29, 1994, p. 8.

¹⁴⁵*Weekend Argus*, February 26/27, 1994, p. 18.

¹⁴⁶In January and February combined, the Western Cape ANC only produced 19,700 posters and 77,000 pamphlets. See Appendix D for details.

Near the end of February, at about the same time the ANC's national-level, "Our Plan" advertising blitz got fully underway, many of the party's Western Cape campaign leaders began to question the utility of this strategy. It seemed that the NP campaign's negative tone had altered the nature of the contest. Many local branch activists, with support from some provincial leaders, urged campaign headquarters to retaliate in kind. As Strachan described the situation: "There was great pressure in the Western Cape for a component of our campaign to be strongly negative."¹⁴⁷

There was a need to fight fire with fire, some claimed. "It was important to respond to these [NP] attacks," argued Kota. "At the end of the day, we would have been sending the wrong signal to say just ignore the past." Rudi Dicks, a coloured organizer at the ANC's branch in the predominantly coloured area of Grassy Park, expressed his frustration this way:

"We had to deal with fears -- people always threw those things in our faces. There were some of the most rude and racist comments. Coloureds are the most racist people you can get. This racism came not from the Boere¹⁴⁸ but my own people. People would say the ANC is only for Africans, it will take away my jobs and houses, and our kids will be raped. ...we had to adapt our whole approach [to counter these claims]."¹⁴⁹

Simultaneously, survey research indicated that the party's efforts were not attracting as many votes as leaders had hoped. According to Strachan, "The problem for us here was that nationally the ANC was way ahead, but in the Western Cape we were way behind. ...the NP was running a dirty campaign, so there was a sense that we had to do

¹⁴⁷Strachan, March 7 interview.

¹⁴⁸Afrikaners.

¹⁴⁹Rudi Dicks, interview, June 17, 1994.

something."¹⁵⁰ Partly in desperation, campaign leaders opted to adopt a more negative style, targeting the NP. Some of them later argued that they had not believed this new tack would boost ANC support by much -- internal focus group studies¹⁵¹ had suggested that undecideds wanted to look forward instead of backward at past injustices. Rather, they expected that attacking the NP would motivate grassroots activists. As Strachan noted, "The negative campaign appealed not because it would work but because it would galvanize activists. ...there was also a measure of sensing we had nothing to lose -- we had tried a positive campaign and it hadn't seemed to work."¹⁵²

Phase Two: A.C.E.

The Western Cape campaign shifted its strategy in early March to one referred to as "Attack, Contrast and Endorsement (ACE)."¹⁵³ ACE consisted of mounting anti-NP attacks, highlighting contrasts between the RDP and the NP's proposals,¹⁵⁴ and publicizing endorsements of the ANC by prominent community leaders. Although the "contrast" element followed a strategy move at the national level, provincial leaders emphasized the "attack" component, directing aggressive assaults on the NP. According to one provincial official, the national leadership reacted "badly" to the province's adoption of a negative approach.¹⁵⁵ However, having already granted the Western Cape campaign a degree of autonomy, national leaders might have been reluctant to intervene on this issue.

¹⁵⁰Strachan, March 7 interview.

¹⁵¹Melanie Verwoerd, interview, June 27, 1994; Strachan, September interview.

¹⁵²Strachan, September interview.

¹⁵³This label was used by Strachan at an ANC sub-regional organizers' briefing in Guguletu, March 3, 1994.

¹⁵⁴The ANC also claimed that the NP had "no plan."

¹⁵⁵Senior provincial ANC campaign official, who made this comment on condition of anonymity.


Significantly, the provincial campaign altered its decision-making structure during this phase.¹⁵⁶ Initially, the "Elections Co-ordinating Committee" -- which consisted of the heads of each task group -- had served as the central forum for operational decisions. However, day-to-day operations did not always require the involvement of the heads of such task groups as finance, security or fundraising. For this reason and possibly others, the campaign leadership decided to reformulate operations coordination into a "Command Centre" of essential task group heads, augmented by two canvassing coordinators and other ANC leaders. The Command Centre met about three to four times a week, usually around 10:00 at night.¹⁵⁷ One effect of this restructuring was to consolidate the control of coloured focus advocates on the overall direction of the campaign. Given the non-participation of Africanists like Yengeni and Kota in the Command Centre, as I noted in Chapter Three, this move also further isolated those favoring an Africanist approach.

The new Command Centre quickly set about responding in kind to the NP's negative attacks. Provincial campaign appeals during this phase clearly illustrate an increase in aggressive, anti-NP rhetoric. One offensive targeted Hernus Kriel, the NP's candidate for provincial premier. Kriel seemed to represent a weak spot for the NP, who downplayed his candidacy in favor of highlighting de Klerk. Reportedly, Kriel never once shared a public platform with de Klerk during the entire campaign period.¹⁵⁸ One public opinion poll conducted from March 12 to 16 suggests that the electorate perceived both Kriel and Boesak unfavorably. Figure 21 illustrates voters' responses to the question, "Do you think that x will make a good prime minister?" Although Boesak pulled nearly twice as many positive responses, both candidates garnered about the same net approval rating, with Boesak at -38 and Kriel at -36.

¹⁵⁶See Chapter Three for a diagram of the campaign structure.

¹⁵⁷Ozinsky, February interview.

¹⁵⁸Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p. 22.

Figure 21: Support for Western Cape Party LeadersSource: South African Broadcasting Corporation/Markinor¹⁵⁹

The ANC instigated widespread, persistent attacks on Kriel. Often at least one speaker at public meetings and rallies would target him.¹⁶⁰ Pamphlets served as another means of targeting Kriel. One featured his photograph under the headline, "A Vote for the NP Is a Vote for Fear," and suggested that he had approved of torturing prisoners. It also sought to highlight the RDP in contrast to the NP's alleged lack of a plan, stating on the reverse side: "The NP has no plan." It outlined the RDP's points for addressing homelessness, joblessness, crime, violence and education (see Figure 22 below). Altogether, the ANC printed three quarters of a million various pamphlets in March, including this one -- a total that represented ten times the volume produced in January and February combined.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹Mattes, "Appendix: Public Support," p. 248. This poll, hereafter referred to as SABC, was conducted by Markinor from March 12-16, 1994; n=400 (198 coloured, 102 African, 100 white), reweighted to reflect a population of 54% coloured, 17% African and 28% white; most white and coloured respondents were interviewed over the phone, but personal interviews were done with those without phones in correct proportion; all African interviews were done in person.

¹⁶⁰For example, Kader Asmal at a meeting at the Ghousia Manzil Centre, Rylands, March 5.

¹⁶¹Information from Allie's Press. See Appendix D for full details and also Figure 26 below.

Figure 22: ANC Leaflet: "A Vote for the NP Is a Vote for Fear"

A VOTE FOR THE NP IS A VOTE FOR FEAR.



"It's amazing how quickly people talk after 3 days in solitary confinement."

Fennis Kriel, Minister of Law and Order and NP candidate for Premier of the Western Cape, as quoted in the Sunday Times, 5 March 1994.

The NP has no plan

The NP has no plan for the future and, if they win this region, will be unable to attract investment in the Western Cape.

All the NP can offer us is the shame of the past.

There's no difference between the leaders of the 'new' National Party and the old one. Except for a few leaders who have little or no support in the communities they claim to serve. Among their supporters are the corrupt and violent 'witdoek' leaders.

◀ *If you vote for the NP, you vote for a man who supports Section 29, a law that has no place in a civilized society.*

The NP wants you to use your vote as a vote against the ANC. They are asking you to vote with your fears, instead of your dreams.

They would like you to be scared of democracy, scared of the very system of government all the world's most successful countries are based on.

By doing this, the NP hopes to deny South Africa a government that represents all the people - in favour of a government that represents only a few of them.

The NP have had their chance

In the 46 years that the National Party has ruled South Africa, the NP has torn our country apart, divided our people, destroyed our economy and made most people second class citizens in the country of their birth.

Although the NP admits they've made a 'mistake', they take no responsibility for the lives they've destroyed under apartheid - or the billions of rands they've wasted on their useless policies.

Vote ANC and send a clear message to the NP: We reject oppression.



Vote ANC for a better life for all.

Let's work together for jobs, peace and freedom.

Issued by ANC Western Cape, P.O. Box 13123, Sir Lowry Rd. 7900

Another leaflet printed and distributed during this period also targeted Kriel, alleging that he knew about "Third Force" activities.¹⁶² It lists on one side "the facts" about Third Force activities and includes photographs of three major players involved: Basie Smit, Themba Khoza and Krappies Engelbrecht. A box in the lower half with the heading "Kriel's Terror in the Boland" describes an incident in the Western Cape town of Saron. According to the ANC, Kriel ordered an illegal search of a transitional local "management" committee office. "KRIEL MUST GO!" in boldface runs the length of the leaflet's bottom margin. On the reverse side, under the words "STOP THIS!!" a photo of Kriel lies superimposed on a shot of Inkatha soldiers carrying weapons. The text below it claims that Kriel, as Minister of Law and Order, either "knew this was happening and didn't care - or he didn't know and wasn't doing his job." It ends: "ONLY AN ANC GOVERNMENT CAN STOP THE VIOLENCE!" (See Figure 23 below.)

The shift to a negative campaign occurred in tandem with an increase in door-to-door canvassing, particularly in coloured communities. One advantage to canvassing over other avenues of communication had to do with its direct, personal impact. It allowed the party to contact voters who might not be reached as effectively through rallies, for example, which were largely speeches to the converted. As provincial canvassing coordinator Johnny Issel noted:


"[it became] apparent that in order to change their minds we need to get in direct contact with voters to inform them about the ANC. ...It also became apparent that through mass activities we weren't reaching those whose support we needed. For example, mass rallies weren't effective instruments to challenge prejudices and inform people about us."¹⁶³

¹⁶²The term "third force" is used to describe elements in the apartheid government that illegally supplied arms and military training to Inkatha members.


Figure 23: ANC Leaflet: "Kriel Must Go"

THE 3RD FORCE


The facts. . .



**Deputy Commisioner of Police,
Lieutenant-General Basie Smit**
Trained and armed Inkatha members. Helped plan train violence. Ordered the manufacture of home-made guns.



IFP Transvaal leader, Themba Khoza:
In charge of a gun-running network between the SAP and Inkatha members. Also supplied guns to hostel-dwellers and train killers.



Head of Counter Intelligence, General Krappies Engelbrecht:
Organised the training of IFP members in the use of hand weapons and grenades. Responsible for hit-squads and the planning violence in trains and hostels.

Kriel's Terror in the Boland

Saron is a small town in the Boland which has suffered under apartheid. In January a democratic election was held to elect a new management committee.

Housing Minister Morkel refused to accept the result of this democratic election. After negotiations the new and old committees agreed to work together. Still the NP would not accept this.

On Friday, the police stormed the management committee building. They had no search warrants. They gave no warning and fired guns at unarmed people. One person died in the attack.

The police orders came from the very top. Hernus Kriel is the Minister of Law and Order. We say Kriel must stop harrasing his opponents.

KRIEL MUST GO!

Published by ANC Western Cape 228 Victoria Rd, Woodstock. Printed by Allie Printing 531 2142

Initial attempts to implement canvassing operations in phase one had run into difficulties at the branch level, where recruitment of canvassers had stalled as a result of funding delays and limited training.¹⁶⁴

In March, the campaign leaders opted to create a centrally coordinated "task team," which included 120 canvassers and a minimum of 11 vehicles. The main impetus for establishing the team, according to senior campaign official Willie Hofmeyr, was to compensate for lack of activity in target areas: "The feeling was that we weren't delivering enough canvassing at the local level. It was important to put together a big group [of canvassers] to have a significant impact in certain areas and an inspirational spin-off on other members."¹⁶⁵ Not unlike UDF "blitzes" conducted in the 1980s, the task team delivered pamphlets door to door and, occasionally with ANC candidates, spoke with voters in person.

The team carried out its activities almost exclusively in predominantly coloured communities, such as Delft, Grassy Park, Kraaifontein, Lentegur, Macassar, Mannenberg, Mitchell's Plain and Retreat. Canvassing coordinators targeted these areas because they were believed to include large numbers of undecided voters but insufficient local ANC structures to reach them.¹⁶⁶ Campaign leaders perceived important distinctions between these areas in terms of support for the ANC, though it is unclear how they based decisions on these distinctions. As Dugmore described these differences:

"The most difficult to reach were the more traditional, working-class coloureds in Lentegur, Mannenberg and Grassy Park. It was more difficult to organize there than in

¹⁶⁴Ozinsky, February interview.

¹⁶⁵Hofmeyr interview.

¹⁶⁶Interviews with ANC organizers who spoke on condition of anonymity, dates withheld to protect identities; and with Issel, February 7, 1995.

Blue Downs or Delft. We focused on both areas, though perhaps we should have concentrated on one or the other."¹⁶⁷

Endorsements emerged as a regular feature of rallies and, increasingly, newspaper advertisements during this phase. Typically, these included statements of support for the ANC by popular local or provincial figures, and were intended to demonstrate the party's backing among respected individuals. In coloured areas, another important goal of endorsements was to show coloured voters that the ANC represented a home for them and their community leaders. Endorsers at rallies would share the stage with party speakers and candidates, and often would be invited to stand and be recognized by the audience.¹⁶⁸

Phase Three: Endgame

An ANC conference formally launching the RDP took place on March 26, marking the beginning of this phase nationally. Ironically, although the RDP remained a prominent feature in the party's appeals, other themes -- particularly aggressive ones -- took on a significant share of emphasis. The party stepped up its anti-NP rhetoric, and also employed further community leader endorsements and optimistic appeals about the future under an ANC government. In addition, this phase witnessed a tremendous surge in leaflet production and distribution.

The provincial ANC ran a final series of newspaper advertisements that held the "new" NP responsible for apartheid injustices. COSATU independently sponsored several

¹⁶⁷Dugmore, June interview.

¹⁶⁸For example: ANC rally at Stellenbosch Town Hall, Stellenbosch, April 12; and ANC rally at Hewatt College, Athlone, March 27.

especially pointed ads, in defiance of national campaign leaders' wishes¹⁶⁹ and despite having maintained a low public profile during the first two phases of the campaign. One such ad appeared on April 17, picturing a woman languishing over the coffin of a boy whom the South African Police had allegedly murdered in 1985. The headline exclaimed, "This is the Reality of 46 Years of National Party Rule. Don't Let Them Stain Your Hands with the Blood of Our Children." (See Figure 24 below.) Immediately after this ad appeared, much to the ire of those who had designed the ad, the woman featured pointed out to the press that she was actually an NP supporter.¹⁷⁰

Another COSATU ad depicted rows of white crosses laid out like a cemetery against a black background. The names of prominent anti-apartheid activists who had been killed appeared underneath each cross, as well as the dates they had died. "Now on April 27 where are you going to put your cross?" asked the ad. "Stop the National Party. Vote ANC."¹⁷¹ (See Figure 25 below.)

The party accelerated its canvassing drives during this phase and supplemented them with a massive increase in leaflet production. During the month of April alone, the provincial ANC commissioned the printing of 3 million pamphlets, about four times as many as in March. It also produced 84,000 posters. Figures 26 and 27 illustrate the production of leaflets and posters during the course of the entire campaign, and show clearly how these volumes peaked toward the end.¹⁷² These suggest that the negative campaign fought through leaflets included not just part of all leaflets produced, but rather the overwhelming proportion.

¹⁶⁹Strachan, September interview.

¹⁷⁰*Cape Times*, April 15, p. 4; *Argus*, April 20, p. 4.

¹⁷¹*Argus*, April 22; *Weekend Argus* and *Cape Times*, April 23; *Sunday Times*, Metro section, April 24.

¹⁷²See also Appendix D.

Figure 24: ANC Advertisement: "Don't Let Them Stain Your Hands..."

ADVERTISEMENT

THIS IS THE REALITY OF 46 YEARS OF NATIONAL PARTY RULE



*Michael Miranda (11), Shaun Magmoed (16) and Jonathan Klaasen (18) were
killed by the South African Police in Thornton Road, Athlone in October 1985.*

DON'T LET THEM STAIN YOUR HANDS WITH THE BLOOD OF OUR CHILDREN.

Now it is time for us to use our vote to make sure the National Party will never again be allowed to do to our children what they have done to us and those who have gone before us.

© 1985 ANC

Figure 25: ANC Advertisement: "Where Are You Going to Put Your Cross?"

SUNDAY TIMES CAPE METRO, 24 April 1988 15

ADVERTISEMENT

 <p>Steve Biko King Williams Town died: 12.9.1977</p>	 <p>Yvette Otto (16) Elsies River died 6.7.1989</p>	 <p>Shaun Magmoed (16) Athlone died 15.10.1985</p>
 <p>Johannes Spocter (12) Jansenville died 1986</p>	 <p>Dr Neil Aggett Cape Town died 5.2.1982</p>	 <p>Matthew Goniwe Craddock died 27.6.1985</p>

NOW, ON APRIL 27
WHERE ARE YOU GOING
TO PUT YOUR CROSS?

Stop the National Party.
Vote ANC



Figure 26: ANC Leaflet Production Per Week

Source: Allie's Press





Figure 27: ANC Poster Production Per Week

Source: Allie's Press



The majority of leaflets attacked the NP in a similar vein to newspaper advertisements. One warns, "Beware of Kriel's 'new' NP!" featuring a hand-drawn caricature of Kriel, handling the reigns of three ferocious, salivating dogs. Each dog wears a collar with the name of a "notorious" figure -- two of these were African shack-lords and NP candidates whom the ANC claimed to be responsible for violence in Cape Town's squatter communities. Shacks burn on the horizon and R 50 bills fall out of Kriel's pocket. "Will you be safe in their hands?" continues the ad, playing off an NP campaign slogan by tying the NP instead of the ANC to violence and destruction. The party produced over three-quarters of a million copies of this pamphlet (see Figure 28 below).

In addition to increased canvassing, the ANC and COSATU organized a number of "court forums" during this phase.¹⁷³ Court forums generally involved visits by a group of candidates and volunteers to the courtyards of apartment blocks. As ANC national list candidate Melanie Verwoerd described a typical court forum:


"We would go into working class areas in the Cape Flats to high-rise flats centered around a courtyard. Our cars would go through the courtyard with a sound system on the back of a bakkie [truck], and we would start playing music. Then we would have our political message. This was dangerous because there were hostile areas. The security risks were high. There were often a lot of gangsters around and some [of our] people were hit with rocks. We later moved to using more open areas like playgrounds or out on a *veld*.¹⁷⁴ A lot of us did two to three court forums a night starting at 5pm and then would go to a public meeting around 8pm."¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³Dugmore, June interview.

¹⁷⁴Afrikaans for "field."

¹⁷⁵Verwoerd interview.

Figure 28: ANC Leaflet: "Beware Kriel's 'New' NP"



- These two are warlord leaders of the 'witdoeke' vigilantes.
- The witdoeke destroyed thousands of homes in KTC and Crossroads in attacks that left 30 000 Capetonians homeless.
- There have been many court cases to stop their attacks, intimidation and people's courts.
- They work with **Prince Gcobinga**, a military agent, being investigated for gun-running to the Western Cape.

Kriel's Minister of Tourism, Shan Jumana
*Chopped up and killed his 15 year old girlfriend
 and was convicted for murder.*

Who can forget Abe Williams?

- He destroyed Coloured Education.
- He caused bitter conflict with teachers.
- He tricked Saldanha tenants into paying high rents for krotte.

Will you be safe in their hands?

The anti-NP offensive reached new heights at rallies. Speakers at one rally in Cape Town's city hall condemned the NP for its "racist," "*swart gevaar*" campaign, standing under a banner of "Save the Cape from NP Racism!"¹⁷⁶

The ANC's endorsement efforts also increased, including figures such as the well-known educationist Franklin Sonn, who was appointed after the elections as ambassador to the United States. The campaign leadership chose to step up its use of endorsements, it seemed, out of concern that the party had not successfully convinced coloured voters it would not champion Africans' interests over theirs. As the Cape Town Southern Suburbs coordinator, Paul Davids, put it:

"The problem was that, on one hand, it was hard to explain how affirmative action didn't mean a replacement of coloureds' jobs by Africans. The ANC was seen as a black organization with a black leadership. We had the problem of saying we were an organization for everybody -- that's why people like Franklin Sonn, Allan Boesak and Dullah Omar became key near the end."¹⁷⁷

One endorsement by Sonn features a somber, bespectacled portrait. His face and upper torso take up most of the space, and a lengthy quotation fills the upper right corner:

"I call on all God-fearing, decent, principled people to join me in saving the Western Cape from disaster. ...The National Party has a strategy for this region. It's called racism. It is a deliberate strategy aimed at creating fear and racial conflict. It is a strategy that could destroy all our hopes of living together in peace in the Western Cape."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶Comments by Boesak, Franklin Sonn, Jan van Eck, and Charles Villa-Vincenzo at Cape Town City Hall, April 8. For another example, see Boesak's remarks at a rally at the Baxter Theatre, University of Cape Town, April 19.

¹⁷⁷Davids interview.

¹⁷⁸*Weekend Argus*, March 26-27, pp. 17 and 19; *Southeaster*, April 8-12, p. 5; *Weekend Argus*, April 2-3, p. 13; *Weekend Argus*, April 23-24, p. 21.

Along the bottom border of the ad, just below the ANC logo, are the words that have been the hallmark of nearly all ANC advertisements, leaflets and other printed materials: "A better life for all. Working together for jobs, peace and freedom." (See Figure 29 below.)

Taking the lead from the national campaign, the provincial ANC also publicized its positive vision of the future in an attempt to reassure uncertain voters. Mandela and Boesak featured in a set of advertisements that included their "personal" appeals to the electorate, urging voters to choose freedom and "A Better Life for All."¹⁷⁹ "Dear friends," states Boesak in the text of one ad, "Our hour has almost come. On Wednesday 27 April we will reach the goal which the ANC has struggled to achieve for over eighty years." One page of this two-page spread shows Boesak from the waist up, beckoning the reader with his hands outstretched, mouth slightly open as if speaking (see Figure 30 below). His lengthy statement fills the entire opposing page, and concludes:

"I know many of our people are afraid and uncertain. Any period of transition brings anxiety. But, together with our trust in God, we must take up this challenge to shape a future we can all share. We have worked hard to bring about the opportunity for fundamental change. Now we must direct that change. I call on all who love our region to vote for the ANC on the 27th of April."¹⁸⁰

Summary

Throughout these three phases, the Western Cape ANC essentially ran two campaigns, as noted above: a marginal one aimed at consolidating African support and another, more

¹⁷⁹*Cape Times*, April 27, p. 8; *Sunday Times*, April 17, p. 11; *Weekend Argus*, April 23-24, p. 23.

¹⁸⁰*Sunday Times*, Metro section, April 24, pp. 6-7.

Figure 29: ANC Advertisement: Sonn endorsement

"I call on all God-fearing, decent, principled people to join me in saving the Western Cape from disaster."

Franklin Sonn, Rector of the Peninsula Technikon and SABC Board Member


"I have decided to give all my time and energies to helping win the Western Cape for the ANC. I will do this whatever it costs me or my future.

The National Party has a strategy for this region. It's called racism. It is a deliberate strategy aimed at creating fear and racial conflict. It is a strategy that could destroy all our hopes of living together in peace in the Western Cape.

We must end apartheid and we must bury it forever on April 27th.

I call on all God-fearing, decent, principled people to join me in saving this region from the disaster of a Kriel-led National Party government. I call on you to come out in public support for an ANC government in the Western Cape."

Franklin Sonn



A better life for all. Working together for jobs, peace and freedom.



*"Dear Friends
 Our hour has almost come.
 On Wednesday 27 April we will reach the goal which the
 ANC has struggled to achieve for over eighty years."*

"The ease of freedom has been very high. Over the years, many have died at the hands of the National Party government. Many more have spent years of their lives in apartheid's jails. Many have been exiled, far from their homes and their families. Mothers have wept bitterly over their children. Fathers have suffered humiliations and indignities. Children have gone to bed at night, hungry and cold.

Over the years, you and I have struggled together to change South Africa. To rid our people of oppression, to bring about justice, to establish a non-racial democracy. Many times we have faced this danger and the fear you together, born to prison together, suffered together.

Let us remember this when we go to vote next week. And let us remember the sacrifices that have been made for the sake of this beautiful country of ours.

Our vote is the most precious thing we have. Because it is our power to change our lives; our power to shape the future of this region for ourselves and our children.

The ANC plan is a plan for all the people of this country, all the people of this region. It is not a plan for White people, or for African people, Coloured people or Indian people. It is a plan that respects and honours the right of every individual in this region to ordinary human rights and dignity.

It is a realistic and reasonable plan that promises itself to a better life for all our people. To the provision of decent affordable homes. To the creation of an economy in which there will be jobs for all. To ten years of free education for our children.

These are our ambitions or reasonable demands. They are the ordinary demands to which every human being has a God-given right.

I've nearly half a century we have been living under a system that has been condemned by the world as an outrage, a criminal and inhuman regime that has brought this country to its knees. The UN has called it a crime against humanity. The churches have declared it a sin of luxury and blasphemy.

I don't have to remind you of how the National Party threw you out of your homes in District Six and in Crossroads. I don't have to tell you about the

money you have paid in taxes, simply to find it has been spent on corruption and mismanagement. I don't need to tell you about the bat squads and the dirty tricks.

The so-called 'new' National Party has fought a better and more election campaign - a campaign that threatens the unity and peace for which we in the Western Cape have worked so hard and continue to long for. A campaign that seeks to set Coloured against African, African against Coloured. A campaign based on lies, fear and arson.

Now is the time for all of us to bury the old apartheid and the new apartheid. Now is the time for us all to join hands and work together for a better life for all the people of this region.

We owe it to those who came before us, those who have struggled long and hard for this day. And we owe it to those to come, to our children, our grandchildren and our great-grandchildren.

Friends, we have come a long way together. We cannot afford the disaster of a National Party government in the Western Cape with Kriel as its Premier. When we go to the polls, let us vote for a Western Cape that will never ever again see the evils of apartheid and racism.

I know many of our people are afraid and uncertain. Any period of transition brings uncertainty. But, together with our trust in God, we must take up this challenge to shape a future we can all share. We have worked hard to bring about the opportunity for fundamental change. Now we must direct that change.

I call on all who love our region to vote for the ANC on the 27th of April.

You are committed voters to the people of the Western Cape.

God bless you all."

Allan Boesak

ALLAN BOESAK
 PREMIER CANDIDATE, WESTERN CAPE.



A better life for all. Working together for jobs, peace and freedom

Figure 30: ANC Advertisement: Boesak final message


significant one designed to win undecided coloureds' votes. The latter campaign received the overwhelming share of attention and resources, and represented the party's primary thrust by a ratio of approximately two to one. The party's provincial focus on Africans and undecideds respectively was, therefore, about the opposite of what it was nationally.¹⁸¹

The ANC's initial and largely positive appeals, many of which were targeted generally toward undecided coloured voters, shifted about midway through the campaign. By the end of the first phase, campaign leaders had begun to question the effectiveness of a purely positive strategy. In the face of growing NP attacks and local activists' exhortations to fight fire with fire, the ANC adopted a more aggressive tack in phase two. The party moved to a combined positive-negative approach, which highlighted reasons why coloured voters in particular should support the ANC. It attempted to persuade the coloureds not only to vote *for* the ANC, but to vote *against* the NP. Rather than only offering voters details of the RDP and how it would apply to the Western Cape, the party ultimately sought to hold the NP responsible for apartheid injustices and coloureds' socioeconomic plight.

As the campaign continued, the ANC's anti-NP assaults, and production and delivery of materials increased tremendously.¹⁸² With growing emphasis, the party attempted to convince voters that supporting the NP constituted a vote for racism. Backing the ANC, on the other hand, would ensure a "Better Life for All." The party delivered its concluding appeals in an upbeat, visionary manner, encouraging voters to look forward to better times ahead under an ANC government.

¹⁸¹Gordhan interview; and Strachan, March 7 interview.

¹⁸²This dramatic rise in production and activity occurred despite the national headquarters' denial of the provincial campaign's request for an increase in allocated funds for the third phase. The campaign's leadership had wanted to launch an even more remarkable, final assault against the NP -- this may have included a greater boost in materials production, canvassing and event scheduling than what actually took place; interview with Western Cape ANC leader who spoke on condition of anonymity, date of interview withheld to protect this person's identity.



Some voters questioned the extent to which the NP had really changed.

CHAPTER FIVE: Content Analysis

I have attempted in the previous chapter to characterize the three general phases and key activities of the ANC's Western Cape campaign. I sought to substantiate my descriptions of the campaign's evolution with largely *qualitative* information -- for example, by highlighting examples of various ANC newspaper advertisements, leaflets and other election materials, and by citing interviews with various ANC officials.¹⁸³ In this chapter, I seek to augment my depiction of the party's efforts with *quantitative* data. I examine the content and delivery of certain ANC campaign appeals -- not only what messages were conveyed, but how and where.

In particular, I focus on three sets of data: themes in speeches, event locations, and language used in posters and leaflets. With respect to the first of these, I identify "dominant" themes, "strong" themes, and possible patterns in the use of these themes over time. Second, I review the locations for which the party's rallies and public meetings were scheduled, and from this information attempt to draw conclusions about how the party targeted racial groups. Finally, I turn to leaflet and poster production, and examine the party's use of the three main languages in the province: English, Afrikaans and Xhosa.

Themes in speeches

During the campaign period, I observed a total of 63 speeches given by ANC candidates, officials and endorsers. In Appendix I, I briefly describe the methodology used to record these observations. Appendix F details the methodology I employ in this chapter to

¹⁸³One main exception to my reliance on qualitative information in Chapter Four was the citation of ANC poster and leaflet production data.

analyze the content of these observations. Before outlining my findings, I believe it is important to note two important qualifications.

Qualifications

First, as I indicate in Appendix I, the speeches which I observed do not represent by any means a comprehensive set of all campaign speeches. One could venture to say that they are perhaps a representative sample, but this is difficult to determine. It is unclear, after all, exactly how many events were held or speeches given and, therefore, what proportion mine constitute of that total. In any case, the events I observed seem to comprise only a small number of total scheduled events. Thus, any conclusions about the ANC's campaign speeches in general drawn from my data must be considered as *tentative*.

Second, very few speeches occurred in the initial weeks of the campaign and, largely as a result of this, I observed only a handful of speeches during that period. Since I am now analyzing speech themes by week, those that were used in early weeks may appear in the tables below to have greater significance than they may deserve. For example, I witnessed two speeches during the week ending February 19, and the dominant theme for both was the RDP. Thus, even though the RDP constituted the dominant theme for all speeches observed during that week, it is important to keep in mind that only two speeches were studied.

Findings

As I note in Appendix F, I have categorized themes in two main ways: "dominant" and "strong/weak/absent." My principal findings concern 1) what the main "dominant" and

"strong" themes were, and 2) how they varied in incidence over time. With respect to dominant themes, I have identified the top five of these as follows:

- education
- fears of the ANC and Africans
- the NP
- racism
- the RDP

As Appendix F indicates, these five dominant themes occurred far more frequently than any others. Tables 9 and 10 show how these themes recurred in speeches during the course of the campaign. The use of three of these dominant themes -- the RDP, the NP and racism -- seems to parallel shifts in the campaign's phases. Near the beginning of the campaign, the RDP featured as the most common dominant theme. It is used throughout, but drops as April approaches. The NP emerges as a dominant theme in early March, at about the same time the ANC launched its second phase, and increases in frequency through to the end. Racism arises in April, as the ANC sought to further intensify its anti-NP attacks. Figure 31 illustrates how these three dominant themes appeared to be the most dominant.


Table 9: Weekly Incidence of Five Top "Dominant" Themes

Theme	19-Feb	26-Feb	5-Mar	12-Mar	19-Mar	26-Mar	2-Apr	9-Apr	16-Apr	24-Apr	Total
education	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	1	1	6
fears	0	0	2	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	6
NP	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	5	9	20
racism	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	6	14
RDP	2	0	4	1	1	1	1	0	3	6	19

Table 10: Incidence of Five Top "Dominant" Themes, as a Proportion of Total "Dominant" Themes per Week¹⁸⁴

Theme	19-Feb	26-Feb	5-Mar	12-Mar	19-Mar	26-Mar	2-Apr	9-Apr	16-Apr	24-Apr
education	0%	0%	0%	25%	43%	0%	0%	0%	8%	6%
fears	0%	0%	29%	0%	0%	25%	50%	0%	8%	0%
NP	0%	0%	14%	0%	14%	25%	25%	50%	42%	50%
racism	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	50%	75%	25%	33%
RDP	100%	0%	57%	25%	14%	25%	25%	0%	25%	33%

Figure 31: Incidence of Five Top "Dominant" Themes, as a Proportion of Total Speeches



One limitation of examining only dominant themes, as I have defined them, is that they did not necessarily have to be the *overwhelmingly* dominant theme in a particular speech. They only had to be either the *most* dominant, on balance, or one of the two most dominant. In many cases, those themes I classified as dominant had only slightly greater emphasis than other strong themes. Thus, looking at leading strong themes can complement the conclusions I have reached about dominant ones.

¹⁸⁴Note that some speeches had more than one dominant theme and, thus, row totals add up to more than 100 percent. See Appendix F methodology.

Six strong themes appear to have garnered the greatest emphasis during the campaign:

- education
- NP
- racism
- RDP
- peace, violence or crime
- houses

It is immediately apparent that nearly all of the top strong themes were also the main dominant themes. There are only three exceptions. First, fears of the ANC seems to be a less frequent strong theme than these six. Despite the fact it was one of the leading dominant themes, it does not appear among these principal strong ones. In other words, it received a great deal of emphasis in speeches, but only for a relatively short period of time. These six themes, on the other hand, occurred with frequency throughout the campaign. Second, both peace and houses now seem to have greater significance than if I had only examined dominant themes, among which they did not feature at all.

Several noteworthy patterns emerge when looking at the incidence of these strong themes over the course of the campaign, as Tables 11 and 12 outline. The NP emerges in early March, as it did as a dominant theme, peaks in early April, and remains prominent until the end. Racism features in late February, appears occasionally in March, and then maintains a sizable presence throughout April. The RDP is very strong during the whole campaign, with its highest peaks in the very beginning (though there were few speeches at that time, as noted above) and mid-March. Education and houses seem most significant in February and March, dropping in April, ostensibly because there tended to be greater emphasis placed on RDP details early on. In Figure 32, we can see that the

three leading strong themes -- the NP, racism and the RDP -- are the same three that led among dominant themes.

Table 11: Weekly Incidence of Six Top "Strong" Themes

Theme	19-Feb	26-Feb	5-Mar	12-Mar	19-Mar	26-Mar	2-Apr	9-Apr	16-Apr	24-Apr	Total
education	1	0	2	2	4	1	1	0	1	2	14
NP	0	0	4	0	2	2	3	3	6	11	31
racism	1	0	1	0	2	0	2	4	6	8	24
RDP	2	0	3	3	3	2	2	0	3	10	28
peace	1	0	3	1	0	1	3	0	2	2	13
houses	2	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	2	3	12


Table 12: Incidence of Six Top "Strong" Themes, as a Proportion of Total Speeches per Week

Theme	19-Feb	26-Feb	5-Mar	12-Mar	19-Mar	26-Mar	2-Apr	9-Apr	16-Apr	24-Apr
education	50%	0%	29%	50%	57%	25%	25%	0%	8%	11%
NP	0%	0%	57%	0%	29%	50%	75%	75%	50%	61%
racism	50%	0%	14%	0%	29%	0%	50%	100%	50%	44%
RDP	100%	0%	43%	75%	43%	50%	50%	0%	25%	56%
peace	50%	0%	43%	25%	0%	25%	75%	0%	17%	11%
houses	100%	0%	43%	25%	0%	25%	0%	0%	17%	17%

Location of events

Scheduled event locations lend themselves to more definite conclusions than the speech theme data, mainly because I have a comprehensive list of them. Appendix C details these events, including intended speakers. However, as I note in the methodology of that appendix, even these findings have important limits. For example, the provincial party did not necessarily schedule all of these events. It is unclear how many may have been organized by local branches, perhaps in conjunction with the provincial office. Thus, using only scheduling information, one cannot with certainty say that provincial leaders sought to hold a particular number or proportion of events in predominantly coloured

Figure 32: Incidence of Six Top "Strong" Themes, as a Proportion of Total Speeches



areas. What is clear is how many events were scheduled and where they were intended to take place. Also, whether or not scheduling was most influenced by provincial campaign headquarters, it is interesting that at least some branches may have independently reached similar conclusions as to what areas should be prioritized.

Two key patterns emerge from these data. First, the vast majority of events were scheduled for the last phase of the campaign, as Figure 33 illustrates. This number peaked in April, especially in the final week. A slight dip in scheduling occurred in late March and early April -- interestingly, this resembles a dip that took place in poster and leaflet production (see Figures 26 and 27 in Chapter Four). The reasons for this lapse are unclear, but may be linked to the shift from phase two to three, the formal launch of the RDP on March 26, or both.

Second, the overwhelming bulk of events were scheduled to take place in coloured areas throughout the campaign. This emphasis increases dramatically over time, as Figure 34 and Table 13 demonstrate. By the end of April, the proportion of events to be held in

coloured areas far outshadows those elsewhere. African areas received the next largest number of total scheduled events, as Figure 35 shows, and white areas come in far behind.

Figure 33: Total Scheduled Events: Late February to Late April




Table 13: Scheduled Events by Location, Late February to Late April

<u>Week Ending</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Coloured/ African</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>all</u>	<u>?</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
26-Feb	7	2	4	4	2	0	19
5-Mar	14	2	5	3	0	0	24
12-Mar	14	5	12	2	4	0	37
19-Mar	18	5	10	0	4	0	37
26-Mar	9	0	3	1	4	0	17
2-Apr	32	8	9	3	6	2	60
9-Apr	28	8	4	2	2	2	46
16-Apr	41	3	6	2	9	0	61
23/4-Apr	65	8	8	5	9	1	96
TOTAL:	228	41	61	22	40	5	397

Figure 34: Scheduled Events by Location, Late February to Late April





Figure 35: Percentage of Total Scheduled Events by Location



Language in posters and leaflets

This set of data proved the most straightforward to analyze. After compiling a comprehensive list of poster and leaflet production in the province, and comparing this to the ANC's record of posters and leaflets received from the national office (see Appendix D), patterns of language use became clear. I draw three primary conclusions:

- 1) English overwhelmingly marked the language of choice in both leaflets and posters
- 2) the prevalence of English varies little from provincial-level production to national-level delivery, although the province used slightly more Afrikaans than the national office
- 3) the gap between use of English and other languages -- Afrikaans came in a distant second -- increased sharply over time.

Despite the fact that Afrikaans is the home language for the greatest proportion of the Western Cape electorate (see Chapter One), the ANC chose at both provincial and national levels to produce and distribute most posters and leaflets in English. It is unclear why this occurred. ANC leaders may have perceived the need to avoid using Afrikaans, wary of its negative stigma among many ANC supporters. After all, it represents for many of them the language of apartheid and of their oppression, and many resent having been forced to learn it in school. Alternatively, leaders may have decided that English posters and leaflets would be the most transferable, since English was the most commonly understood language among the three main racial groups in the province. Perhaps they figured that at least some voters in Afrikaans-speaking or

Xhosa-speaking areas would be able to translate for others without too much difficulty. Leaflets were often distributed door-to-door by canvassers who ostensibly understood at least their basic content.

Figure 36 illustrates the production of posters in the Western Cape, posters received from the national office, and the sum of each, by week and according to language used. Figure 37 shows this information for leaflets. In both of these figures, production and receipt of materials skyrockets in the final phase of the campaign. Also, the gap between English and other languages used widens greatly.

Figure 38 depicts what proportion of total posters and leaflets were done in each language. The lowest percentage of leaflets made in English was 79 percent (produced provincially), and 80 percent for posters (received from national office).

Findings

This content analysis of ANC speech themes, event locations, and language in posters and leaflets reveals several compelling patterns. The emphasis of ANC speeches seemed to shift by late February or early March -- from RDP-related themes to a set of themes including the RDP, but also the NP and racism. The party also seemed to schedule the greatest proportion of its events in predominantly coloured areas. Finally, it almost exclusively used English in the production of posters and leaflets for the Western Cape, despite the fact that Afrikaans is the most widely spoken language. I have sought to offer plausible explanations for all of these patterns.

Perhaps most important, these quantitative data tend generally to support the description of the campaign that I provided in Chapter Four. The ANC changed course midway into

the campaign and also began to target coloured voters primarily. However, to my surprise, the fact that the party conveyed a huge proportion of its appeals in English was not apparent from the interviews, observations and other qualitative information I gathered. My methodological focus on materials and events that were likely to be in English may have minimized my insight into how much -- or, indeed, how little -- the party had campaigned in other languages.

In light of the Western Cape's history, demographics, electoral system and voter attitudes, what do this chapter's quantitative data and the qualitative information of Chapters Three and Four suggest about those factors that may have shaped ANC strategy the most? I address these issues and more in Chapter Six.

Figure 36: Posters Produced or Received Weekly, by Language




Figure 37: Leaflets Produced or Received Weekly, by Language





Figure 38: Total Posters and Leaflets Produced and Received Proportionally by Language





The NP's Hernus Kriel demonstrates a heavy-handed approach to the ANC's Allan Boesak.

PART III:
Post-Campaign Assessment

CHAPTER SIX: Conclusions

The ANC's loss in the Western Cape came as a shock to more than a few party members and even some leaders, as the results slowly trickled in after the April 26-28 elections. To many, the party of liberation had lost to the party of oppression. The most progressively-minded region had voted into power the architects of apartheid. The coloured population somehow had been tricked into supporting the party that had once stolen the vote away from them, kicked them out of their homes and called them inferior. Disappointed by the ANC's performance, many directed blame toward the campaign. They asked what went wrong, and why? But does the fact that the party did not win a majority, or even a plurality, of the vote necessarily mean that something went wrong? The answer would seem to depend on how one views the ANC's pre-election prospects and whether, due to serious mistakes, it fell short of them by election day.

In this chapter, I re-examine the party's strategy. I begin by revisiting my central research questions and suggesting the extent to which contextual factors may have influenced the campaign. I then explore the election results and outline relevant voting patterns. Finally, I also describe how many ANC officials reacted to and interpreted the outcome.

Influence of contextual factors

In the Introduction, I listed six main research questions in order to guide my study of the ANC's campaign. I proposed several contextual factors that might have affected the party's strategy: the history, demographics, electoral system, knowledge of voter attitudes, internal political dynamics at the provincial level, national priorities and the issue of race. Many of these factors are closely interlinked, making it difficult to distinguish the impact of one from another. In Chapters One and Two, I suggested

how the first four factors might have been expected to influence the campaign. Given the evidence of the party's actual efforts presented in Part II, I now seek to offer a plausible explanation for how all of the factors may have shaped the ANC's approach.

History and race

In Chapter One, I suggested that key developments in the history of the Western Cape might have the following effects on the ANC's campaign:

- at least some focus on coloureds, the province's single largest racial group
- intraparty divisions over whether to prioritize African voters, the party's core constituency
- difficulty garnering coloured support, given the disbanding of the UDF

It seems that at least the first two of these effects manifested themselves in ANC strategy. Both tied in directly to the issue of race. First, the growth of the coloured population into the region's majority, especially given coloureds' particular oppression and relative advantages under apartheid, did appear to play a critical role in party strategy. The election contest found the two major parties, whose support bases consisted primarily of Africans or whites, focusing their appeals toward coloured voters. As Yengeni noted, no party could hope to win the province without winning a large share of coloureds' support. Both national and provincial ANC leaders recognized that appealing to coloured people would be important.

Second, long-standing debates within the party over race -- whether framed in terms of nonracialism versus multiracialism, or the "coloured question" -- seemed to arise as a central issue if not *the* central issue for strategists. As this matter had sparked internal divisions in the days of the UDF, it also proved problematic for the ANC in the run-up to the 1994 elections. Should the party appeal to coloured people as

"coloureds?" Would this be tantamount to abandoning principles of nonracialism? Dugmore and others claim that disputes around this question concerned tactics and semantics, and that no one was arguing that the ANC ought not to seek coloureds' support. However, the issue of what *proportion* of emphasis to place on coloured versus African voters was a *strategic* consideration, not tactical. Its resolution stood to have, and indeed appeared to have, far-reaching implications for how the party would design its appeals and devote its resources.

As for the third possible effect regarding the disbanding of the UDF, the data I have gathered do not seem to indicate one way or the other whether that development may have alienated coloured voters. If anything, Seekings' analysis suggests that the UDF is something of a red herring in explaining why coloureds did not vote ANC. Despite perceptions of widely-supported UDF-organized mass action in the 1980s, little evidence exists that the UDF actually enjoyed broad backing among coloured people. Thus, the movement's collapse in the late 1980s, and the decision of the ANC not to revive it in the run-up to the 1994 elections, may have had but a marginal impact on coloured support for the ANC.¹⁸⁵

Demographics

The demographic divisions of the electorate were tightly connected to historical and racial issues. In Chapter One, I identified two possible effects that demographics might have on the campaign:

¹⁸⁵Jeremy Seekings, seminar comments, September 1995.

- different appeals for different racial groups
- some appeals directed toward coloured voters given the lack of a demographic basis for an overwhelming “affinity” with whites, though this might depend on whether public opinion data suggest they would consider voting ANC

Evidence seems to bear out the first of these effects. Each of the three main racial groups had such a different socioeconomic status that parties faced difficulty appealing to them all at once. It was suspected that the same messages and themes might not resonate among such diverse segments of the electorate. The national ANC seemed initially to favor a liberation-oriented approach using its theme "Now is the Time!" As noted in Chapter Four, however, this soon shifted to the more broadly-focused "A Better Life for All." This would seem to indicate a change in emphasis from Africans to voters in general. The provincial ANC appeared to go a step further midway through the campaign, by organizing three distinct racial area committees and also directing many appeals specifically toward coloured voters. As for the second possible effect, I explore it below in relation to knowledge of voter attitudes.

Electoral system

The four potential incentives of the PR system and double ballot outlined in Chapter One all seemed to have some effect on the ANC's campaign. These included the following:

- urban focus
- pooling of resources
- emphasis on presidential candidate
- priority on voter education in general and with respect to double ballot

First, the ANC appeared to perceive focusing on urban areas as advantageous, as I had assumed in my methodology. The list of scheduled events in Appendix C seems to illustrate that the vast bulk of the party's events were intended to be held in the greater Cape Town area.

Second, the similar advantage for a party to pool its resources and channel them toward target areas appeared to be important to provincial leaders. As Southern Suburbs organizer Paul Davids suggests in Chapter Four, however, many ANC branches did not fully understand or accept the goal of winning votes provincially before locally.

Third, national ANC strategists may have believed the contest to have a "presidential" nature, by which many voters would vote for a party's leader more than the party itself. As I noted in Chapter Four, the ANC prioritized the Western Cape nationally, and this correlated with a disproportionately large number of Mandela appearances relative to the size of the provincial electorate.¹⁸⁶

Finally, voter education seemed to have significance to strategists, in light of the fact that nearly all ANC supporters had never voted and that the potentially confusing double ballot would be used. They designed a specific arm of the campaign structure to address this need (see organizational diagram in Chapter Three), and many speakers went out of their way to explain the double ballot, particularly during the last weeks of the campaign.

¹⁸⁶See Chapter Four.

Public opinion and intraparty dynamics

The confluence of three factors -- knowledge of voter attitudes, internal political dynamics at the provincial level, and national priorities -- seemed to play an especially critical role in shaping Western Cape strategy. In Chapter Two, I outlined two possible effects that knowledge of voter attitudes might have:

- prioritization of the Western Cape nationally, given closeness of the race
- primary focus on undecided coloured voters, since the vast majority of Africans already showed strong support for the ANC

My evidence strongly suggests that these effects took place. With respect to national priorities, the ANC dedicated a disproportionate share of both Mandela appearances and finances to the Western Cape, as noted in Chapter Four. Interviews indicate that these decisions stemmed partly from the perception, based on polling results, that the party faced a tight contest. Also, public opinion data seemed to provide a basis for national intervention in favor of a coloured focus strategy. Polling advisors Greenberg and Greer had argued that the ANC faced little threat from the PAC, had a strong hold on African votes, and stood to make gains in coloured communities. Ostensibly taking this interpretation to heart, national leaders manipulated provincial strategy discussions around presentations of survey research, and restructured the provincial campaign management to place coloured focus advocates in top positions.

These factors appear to have influenced the campaign in at least two other interrelated ways as well. First, public opinion data played a central role in intraparty dynamics at the provincial level. Coloured focus advocates relied heavily on these findings to bolster their arguments, whereas Africanists disputed their accuracy. Second, it seemed that the provincial campaign could not make strategic decisions without taking into consideration how the national office might react, and what the possible

repercussions of such reactions might be. For example, national leaders' preference for a positive tone may have compelled the provincial ANC not to introduce negative appeals until halfway through the campaign. In addition, near the beginning of the third phase, national leaders opposed a further negative shift and denied the province's requested increase in allotted funds.¹⁸⁷ Provincial officials indicate that this decision was influenced by secret ANC survey research conducted during the campaign. Findings had suggested that the party was winning less coloured support than hoped, and stood to make only marginal gains during the final four weeks.¹⁸⁸

Strategic choices and why

Each of the above factors appears to have influenced the ANC's Western Cape strategy as discussed. However, I have not yet explicitly listed what the main strategic decisions were both before and during the campaign. Based on the evidence I presented in Parts I and II, I outline below what six of these choices and their immediate causes seem to have been:

- 1) **Structural change.** In late 1993, the national office overhauled the organizational structure of the provincial campaign and placed coloured focus advocates in positions of control. It had perceived the old leadership to be inadequate and using the wrong approach.

- 2) **Initially positive.** The provincial campaign chose to use positive appeals initially. This seemed to result partly from the fact that the national office had chosen a positive tone for the national campaign, and preferred the Western Cape's approach to be consistent with this.

¹⁸⁷See end of Chapter Four.

¹⁸⁸Western Cape ANC leader who spoke on condition of anonymity, date of interview withheld to protect this person's identity.

- 3) **Coloured focus.** Coloured voters were made the province's primary target group. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, this did not appear to be a formal decision, but rather the de facto sum of choices concerning resource allocation. It would seem that these choices were shaped by the views of coloured focus advocates who dominated management positions.
- 4) **Negative shift.** Halfway through the campaign, the provincial headquarters shifted to a more negative tone and increased the use of appeals tailored to coloured voters in particular. This choice seems to have resulted from growing grassroots pressure to counter the NP's aggressive approach and desperation that the NP was winning the battle for undecided coloureds.
- 5) **Increased volume.** During the course of the campaign, the party steadily raised the volume of its appeals both in terms of event scheduling and materials production. This peaked almost exponentially during the final phase. It is unclear why this occurred. It may, for example, represent a culmination of decisions which were not necessarily intentional. It may mark increased organizational and production capacity, or it may reflect the conscious objective of a strong finish. Perhaps it is a combination of all of these.
- 6) **Additional funding denied.** Near the beginning of the third phase, the national headquarters denied the provincial campaign's request for an increase in allotted funds. As noted above, national leaders seem to have concluded from secret opinion data that the party's support would only rise marginally by election day, at best. An increase in funding now would make little difference in the outcome.

The results

In order to determine what impact the ANC's strategy might have had on the party's performance at the ballot box, it is important to examine the election results. By the time the IEC announced the final ballot returns in early May 1994, the NP had secured an unmistakable triumph in the Western Cape. It received 53.3 percent of the vote, whereas the ANC garnered only about two-thirds as much, at 33 percent. The two-party race anticipated by pre-campaign polls proved to be the case, with smaller parties acquiring a total of less than 14 percent altogether.¹⁸⁹

In August 1993, nearly one-third of the electorate had appeared to be undecided, as I noted in Chapter Two. The Western Cape had the highest proportion of undecided voters in the country, compared to only 18 percent nationally. By election day, however, most undecided voters appeared to have made up their minds, at least to vote rather than to abstain. Only 13 percent of Western Cape voters stayed away from the ballot box -- a proportion roughly equal to the national average.

Table 14 compares the findings of the August 1993 Research Initiatives survey to the April 1994 election results. The election results by themselves, noted in the middle column, do not indicate how many voters abstained. The "adjusted" column, on the other hand, represents voters' choices as percentages of the total electorate -- it includes eligible voters who chose not to vote as "undecided/not vote." Thus, the "adjusted" column offers a useful comparison to the August 1993 poll results.

¹⁸⁹As voters had two votes, and there was some vote-splitting, the distribution of Western Cape votes for the national Constituent Assembly was somewhat different. For example, the DP fared better on the provincial than the national ballot.

Table 14: Party Support in August 1993 Compared to April 1994Source: Research Initiatives; IEC.¹⁹⁰

	August 1993 poll (%)	April 1994 election (%)	April 1994 election, adjusted (%)
ANC	26	33	29
NP	30	53.3	46
DP	5	6.6	6
far right-wing	4	2.1	2
other	3	5	4
undecided/not vote	32		13
TOTAL	100	100	100

From August 1993 to April 1994, not only did the number of apparent undecideds plummet, but there seemed to be a dramatic jump in NP support by 16 percentage points or over 50 percent.¹⁹¹ By contrast, the ANC only received an increase of 3 points or about 12 percent. Other parties fared worse than the ANC. Although the DP's support rose by 32 percent, it gained only 1.6 points. Far right-wing parties actually lost over half of their support, leaving them with only 2.1 percent of the vote. By all indications, undecided voters had flocked en masse to the NP.¹⁹² Figure 39 illustrates the percentage increase or decrease of each party's support compared to its August 1993 level. Figure 40 shows the net gain or loss of support as a percentage of votes cast/respondents.

¹⁹⁰Table 14 should be read with caution, as opinion polls and actual elections measure different things -- in this case, the former attempts to gauge voting intention whereas the latter illustrates voter choice. The proportion of "undecided/would not vote" voters in the actual election is based on the IEC's estimate of turnout, which was itself calculated by comparing the actual number of voters with the expected number, based on population estimates. This figure is only an approximation. The IEC estimate and the election results are from Reynolds, "The Results," pp. 187 and 204. Note also that the category of "far right wing" consisted of the Conservative Party, AWB, AVU and AVF in the 1993 poll, but included only the Freedom Front in the actual election. For details of these parties' activities during the campaign period, see Johan van Rooyen, "The White Right," Andrew Reynolds, ed., *Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1994.

¹⁹¹Note that the precise magnitude of this shift hinges upon estimates of how many eligible voters opted not to vote in April 1994.

¹⁹²A second, much less important factor was the conversion of some voters who had previously opted for one or other of the minor parties -- particularly the IFP, which attracted the support of some white voters in the 1993 poll but almost no support in the actual elections.

Figure 39: Change in Party Support as a Percentage of Party Support





Figure 40: Change in Party Support as a Percentage of Votes Cast/Respondents



As noted in Chapter Two, most undecided voters happened to be coloured. By ostensibly winning support from most undecideds, the NP also received the lion's share of the coloured vote. Figure 41 shows the proportion of votes received by the ANC and NP according to race. It is estimated that just under 60 percent of all

coloured voters cast their votes for the NP, compared to 20 percent for the ANC and 15 to 20 percent who did not vote at all. At least two out of three of the NP's votes came from coloured voters. Figure 42 compares the proportion of the coloured electorate that voted NP to that which voted ANC. Figure 41 is based solely on votes cast, whereas Figure 42 takes estimated abstentions into account.

Figure 41: ANC and NP Western Cape Election Results by Race

Source: Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape."






Figure 42: Approximate Proportion of Coloureds' Votes Cast for NP and ANC



Despite the ANC's overall defeat, the results had perhaps two encouraging signs for the party. First, African voters chose the ANC overwhelmingly, which suggests that the party may have effectively mobilized its widespread support in African areas. In the very least, the ANC did not lose many, if any, African votes on election day either to other parties like the PAC or to abstentions. Second, the ANC also sustained its pre-election backing among coloured voters -- according to one estimate, over 40 percent of those voters who chose the ANC were coloured.¹⁹³ Figure 43 denotes what percentage of the NP's and ANC's support came from coloured voters.

Figure 43: ANC and NP Western Cape Coloured Support Bases
(Percentage of Each Party's Votes That Came from Coloured People)



¹⁹³Robert Mattes, comments made to a postgraduate seminar on the ANC's 1994 Western Cape election campaign, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, September 21, 1995. This estimate was based on the results of a post-election survey commissioned by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa.

ANC Reactions to and Interpretations of the Results

Reactions

Before examining ANC leaders' explanations of the results, it is interesting to note how officials at various levels in the party reacted to the outcome. Initial responses to the ANC's performance were mixed. Leaders' assessments tended to correlate with their respective decision-making level within the party. I have gathered data on the views of those at the following three levels: candidates and local activists, provincial strategists, and national coordinators.

Many candidates and local activists had confidently predicted an ANC win during the campaign, even privately. As Davids admits, "We believed we would win. We didn't believe we would lose until it really happened."¹⁹⁴ Like Boesak at that sunny afternoon rally in Mitchell's Plain just before the election,¹⁹⁵ some believed that an ANC victory was an historical inevitability -- the imminent culmination of the liberation struggle. Despite the warning flags of survey research and other evidence, many refused to accept the possibility of defeat. They believed that, even in the worst case, the outcome would result in a tie with the NP or a hung parliament.¹⁹⁶ Some claim that the campaign leadership downplayed or obscured the ANC's likely loss. As Melanie Verwoerd noted:

"People running the campaign knew [before the elections that we were losing] but they hid it from us. ... We had to phone in results to them and were surprised at their reaction -- it was so

¹⁹⁴Davids interview.

¹⁹⁵See Introduction.

¹⁹⁶I spoke to a range of candidates and activists, such as the following: Verwoerd; Davids; Naledi Pandor, interview, July 5, 1994; Dicks; Yvonne Witbooi, interview, June 13, 1994; and one organizer who spoke on condition of anonymity, date withheld to protect this person's identity.

matter-of-fact. That was because they knew. I thought it would be at least a close battle, with us getting about 50 percent or having a hung parliament."¹⁹⁷

Leading Africanists in the provincial ANC admit being taken by surprise. As Yengeni put it, "We believed the reports from activists that we were doing well. Only after the elections did we discover that we had not done so well."¹⁹⁸ Other Africanist leaders question the accuracy and validity of the results, particularly in rural farming areas and in certain African townships. Kota pointed out:

"I have concern about whether [the election] was free and fair in rural and farming areas where the ANC didn't have the resources to monitor the NP. It got many votes in rural areas where farmers were NP members. This is a big question.... There may be some discrepancies in the Mitchell's Plain district, where [Khayelitsha] was, because it was raining, ballots weren't delivered on time, there were delays and problems securing [voting] stations. Some boxes were taken by police where we couldn't monitor them. So, there are many questions. I'm not saying we could've won the Western Cape, but we could've done better if we could've kept track of every single ballot."¹⁹⁹

Some coloured focus advocates, on the other hand, insist that although they had *hoped* the party would do better, internal polls persuaded them to *expect* a loss. The issue for them was not if, but by how much, the NP would defeat the ANC.²⁰⁰

Party officials at the national level seemed the least surprised. Before the campaign period, some had been so certain of an ANC loss in the Western Cape that they had

¹⁹⁷Verwoerd interview.

¹⁹⁸Yengeni interview.

¹⁹⁹Kota interview.

²⁰⁰This paragraph is based on discussions with ANC leaders both at the time of the election and later.

floated the idea of actually writing off the 1994 provincial election and running a campaign with the 1999 election in mind.²⁰¹

Explanations

(1) 53

Like reactions to the election outcome, explanations of the results also varied. In post-election interviews, ANC leaders tended to put a positive spin on what had proved for many to be an intensely shocking and disappointing tally. They argue that the ANC faced a tough contest from the outset, and that although it performed worse than they had hoped, it actually did better than they had expected. They claim that internal ANC survey research showed the party to be well behind the NP before the campaign period, and that these data demonstrate just how far the ANC closed that gap during the campaign. According to Strachan:

"We knew we were in trouble and that we were going to lose. [ANC polling advisor Stan] Greenberg spent two weeks here and was adamant that there was no way we could win. I spoke with him afterwards and he said he was surprised we got as much support as we did. We achieved a measure of success -- 33 and a third of the vote. ...The best-case scenario suggested by our polls was 28 percent."²⁰²

Organizational problems

Leaders offer a spectrum of reasons for why the ANC did not capture a larger slice of the electoral pie, and these generally fit into three categories. The first group of explanations -- by far the largest and most complicated -- involves organizational

²⁰¹This option was mentioned by Strachan, September interview; the 1999 option might have had the advantage of allowing activists to put all their efforts into winning the more easily available votes, especially in African areas, since these counted at the national level; resources would not be wasted in an expectedly arduous attempt to make inroads into coloured communities.

²⁰²Strachan, August interview.

problems. For example, some hint that the persistent Africanist-coloured focus debate hindered the development of an effective, unified approach. Some claim that certain top political leaders, such as Boesak, were unwilling to leave day-to-day operations under the control of campaign managers, and that this interference limited their administrative autonomy and effectiveness.²⁰³

Other leaders argue that the party spent too much energy and resources on mass activities such as large rallies rather than personal contact with voters. They claim that a greater emphasis should have been placed on canvassing, which was perceived to have the greatest impact on undecided voters.²⁰⁴ Still others pinpoint Boesak's largely negative image among many coloured voters, and maintain privately that another, less controversial premier candidate ought to have been chosen. Pandor touched on Boesak's reputation, yet expressed reservations that his candidacy could be blamed for the party's loss: "Another question is how Allan Boesak was perceived by the public. There seems to be a negative perception of him but public support was high on the campaign trail. So, I don't know who holds the negative view but I'm aware it may be a factor."²⁰⁵

One foreign consultant to the campaign offers a scathing, in-depth criticism of the organizational structure of campaign headquarters, arguing that it was insufficiently understood both by those outside and inside, needlessly cumbersome, and lacking in strong, centralized leadership.²⁰⁶ Many organizers at the ANC's Community House headquarters in Cape Town's suburb of Salt River seemed to have, at best, a rudimentary knowledge of decision-making structures, and many branch heads appeared simply baffled, often operating on the basis of known contacts rather than

²⁰³Strachan, September interview.

²⁰⁴Kalako interview; Issel, June interview; Ozinsky, June interview.

²⁰⁵Pandor interview.

²⁰⁶See Calland, *The Winds of Change?*

formal procedures.²⁰⁷ The relationship between the three area committees and campaign management remained vague throughout the campaign, with the white and coloured committees essentially ceasing to function by phase three. In addition, the Command Centre, despite its ostensibly centralized decision-making function, often operated on the basis of consensus and thereby wasted valuable time and energy.

Political environment

The second group of reasons concerns the political environment of the province. For instance, some argue that the ANC lacked an ally in the Western Cape media, particularly among newspapers, which were generally perceived to be either pro-DP or pro-NP. Many simply concede that the NP had run a highly organized, though racist and inflammatory, campaign.²⁰⁸ Dugmore elaborated on the media factor:

"We also must use the media better [in the next elections]. In the Western Cape from 1993 to 1994 we were basically cut off from communication that could have made a real difference. We were faced with a hostile SABC, despite the more objective composition of its board. The perceptions of the ANC we wanted to avoid were shown in *Die Burger*, the *Cape Times*, and the *Argus*. As much as we tried to show ourselves with nonracial leadership and messages, we couldn't get the message across!"²⁰⁹

Racism

A third category has to do with voter prejudices based on race. Leaders refer to the allegedly widespread racism of coloured voters toward Africans. They claim that such attitudes made it difficult for the ANC to convince coloureds that it was not an

²⁰⁷It took me until early 1995 to piece together a diagram of the general campaign structure.

²⁰⁸Pandor interview.

²⁰⁹Dugmore, June interview.

exclusively "African" party, and that coloureds ought to disregard the NP's doomsday predictions of African "domination" under an ANC government.²¹⁰ As Issel put it:

"Coloureds chose to opt for white safety. It was easy [for the NP] to say that de Klerk was different [from leaders of the "old" NP]. ...We had a rally with Mandela in Elsie's River in September 1993 and I lived there to organize it. I saw that people didn't support the ANC and didn't show up at the rally. They were scared of ANC people. They saw us as violent, unable to contain the violence and responsible for it."²¹¹

Many analysts outside the party echo the explanations given by ANC strategists for its performance. Some elaborate on factors such as Boesak's negative reputation among many coloured voters,²¹² the NP's "top-notch organization" and an effectively run *swart gevaar*²¹³ campaign,²¹⁴ and the ANC's inability to "get away from old perceptions of the unity of the oppressed" and use sophisticated strategies to target specific areas.²¹⁵

Summary

The initial design and continued evolution of the ANC's campaign strategy seems to have been influenced by a range of contextual factors: the Western Cape's history, demographics, electoral system, the party's knowledge of voter attitudes, internal political dynamics at the provincial level, national priorities and the issue of race. These factors correlate with several principal strategic decisions, including early changes in campaign structure, an initially positive tone, a focus on coloured voters, a

²¹⁰See comments by Dicks and others in Chapter Four.

²¹¹Issel, June interview.

²¹²Vuyo Bavuma, "Cape ANC searches for winning leader," *Argus*, September 9, 1994.


²¹³Afrikaans for "black threat."

²¹⁴"How West was won -- organisation and huge coloured vote," *Argus*, May 3, 1994.

²¹⁵Bob Mattes, as cited in Richard Calland, "ANC Must Heed Lessons of W. Cape Poll Loss," *Argus*, September 9, 1994.

negative shift in tone halfway through the campaign, a steadily increasing volume of appeals and a denial of additional funding from the national headquarters.

When the elections eventually took place, results show that the NP far outperformed the ANC at the ballot box. Perhaps most important, voting patterns suggest that the NP's victory stemmed from winning over a greater share of undecided coloured voters than the ANC. Many provincial ANC leaders, disappointed though perhaps not shocked by the outcome, attribute the party's loss to organizational problems, the political environment and racism. In the Postscript which follows, I speculate on whether an alternative strategy might have been more appropriate for the ANC in 1994, and what implications its campaign and the election results may have for future strategies in the Western Cape.



An observer comments on successful NP campaign strategies in the Western Cape, including "Rooi Gevaar" (red/communist threat) and "Swart Gevaar" (black threat).

POSTSCRIPT: Alternative Strategy and Implications

An Alternative Strategy

One must be very careful when assessing an event in retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight and the luxury of proposing alternatives which cannot be tested. What I seek to accomplish in this section is to offer what might be called "informed speculation." I fully recognize that definitive conclusions about "what might have been, if only..." are very problematic. I analyze strengths and weaknesses of the ANC's strategy, and suggest the possible impact that an alternative strategy might have had on the election outcome. In particular, I attempt to answer three questions:

- Did the ANC "lose" the province or was it "unwinnable?"
- How appropriate was the ANC's strategy, given the nature of Western Cape society and the electoral system?
- Why did many undecided coloured voters choose the NP?

All of the explanations of the ANC's performance noted above tend to overlook what I believe is a central question: whether the party lost the election through a faulty campaign, or whether from the beginning it did not stand a reasonable chance of winning. The ANC's three main interpretations of the outcome -- organizational difficulties, the political environment, and racism -- all hinge upon what I view as essentially tangential, albeit important, issues. It is unclear to me how a more effective campaign organization, an ally in the provincial media, and less prejudice among coloured voters toward Africans would have *significantly* improved the ANC's electoral performance. The party's very strategy seems to

me to be the main problem it had in 1994, as I shall explain. I would answer yes to both sides of the question above: the ANC probably could have done slightly better by running a different campaign, *and* it stood very little chance of victory in the Western Cape.

Strengths and weaknesses of the ANC's strategy

The ANC's provincial election campaign had both strengths and weaknesses in terms of the attitudes and beliefs of the electorate. It seems to have been entirely appropriate with regard to African voters, among whom the ANC enjoyed overwhelming support from the outset of the campaign. One challenge facing the ANC was therefore ensuring a high turnout among Africans, which the ANC sought to do through its grass-roots organization in townships and shack settlements. The party appears to have succeeded in this, both in the Western Cape and elsewhere in the country.

Among coloured voters, however -- and especially among the large number of undecided coloured voters -- the ANC's strategy had its limits. The ANC maintained significant support among coloured voters, but made few inroads into the initially undecided bloc of them. To the ANC's credit, its big budget, media-oriented strategy rightly targeted undecided coloureds. Its focus on issues was also appropriate, since these voters seemed essentially to be "issue-voters" with weak or no allegiances to any of the competing parties. There were problems, though, with both the *form* of the ANC's campaigning and its precise *content*.

Undecided coloured voters clearly felt distanced, perhaps even alienated from the ANC, as I discussed in Chapter Two. Few saw it as a party for people like them. The ANC sought to transform its image by promoting coloured leaders at the provincial and national levels, and through the People's Forums and rallies in coloured residential areas. However, the

weaknesses of the ANC's branch-level organization in many coloured areas meant that the ANC always remained something "out there." The NP, by contrast, could utilize locally-based electioneering structures which coloured NP activists brought to it from their days in the old, pre-1994 Tricameral Parliament, before they joined the NP.

Perhaps more important, the content of the ANC's campaigning seems to have been self-limiting. The ANC rightly diagnosed that most undecided voters harbored deeply-rooted concerns about the ANC, linking it to changes that were seen as directly or indirectly prejudicial to them -- i.e., to issues such as violence, and discrimination against the coloured working class with regard to housing and jobs. The main thrust of the ANC's election campaign comprised attempts to address such concerns directly. During the crucial first months of 1994, the ANC concentrated on its "plan," emphasizing that it had detailed policy positions on the issues worrying the voters. This was a strategy designed at the national level with potential swing voters in mind: convince them that the ANC could run a responsible government, it was reasoned, and they'll vote for the ANC. However, although the strategy was conceived with the right voters in mind, the message appears not to have been tailored effectively.

The content of the "Our Plan" campaign was perhaps too academic and too broadly nonracial, notwithstanding efforts to reassure and appeal to coloured voters in particular, in advertisements and at rallies. The constraints on ANC support in the Western Cape did not appear to be simply due to fears of ANC incompetence. Rather, they seemed to stem from the perceived association of the ANC with violence and its perceived neglect of the particular interests of coloured people, especially working-class coloured voters. "Our Plan" detailed the ANC's proposals for building houses and providing jobs, for example. However, coloured voters might have asked "So what? How would it help us if an ANC government gave these to African and not coloured families?" The strategy may have edged support

upwards very slightly, but arguably failed to challenge deep-rooted perceptions about the ANC. To do the latter would require, I suspect, much longer than the four months of the election campaign.

Like the ANC, the NP ran an issue-focused campaign in the Western Cape. Unlike the ANC, however, the NP's campaign was aggressively negative from the outset. NP advertising pointed to issues such as violence, housing and employment, with the message that an ANC government would be bad for undecided, coloured voters on these very issues. The ANC and NP concurred on the agenda for the election in the Western Cape, but it was the NP which apparently succeeded in setting the terms by which the core issues were understood by voters. The election was thus defined primarily in terms of the ANC's weaknesses.

A possible alternative

The ANC's principal mistake, with hindsight, may have been not taking the fight to the NP from the outset, contesting the very issue framework in which the provincial election was fought. The ANC might have adopted a two-pronged strategy, combining an emphasis on the ANC's positive attributes with a hard-hitting attack on the NP. The second prong could have combined criticism of the performance of the "new" NP since 1990, including its failure to address issues such as crime, housing, and unemployment, together with a more pointed questioning of whether the "new" NP was really so "new" after all. The ANC could have appropriated and inverted the NP's own slogan, proclaiming "NP destroys, ANC builds." Advertising could have pointed to NP-built houses falling down, NP-commanded police failing to control crime, and other aspects of the NP's performance in office.

Undecided voters may not have been persuaded that the ANC's history was unblemished, but they might have been dissuaded from voting for the NP. The NP itself recognized that many

of its supporters were somewhat ambivalent about voting at all, leading party organizers to worry about how to motivate them.²¹⁶ Some voters may even have been persuaded to vote for a flawed ANC rather than a flawed NP. In other words, the ANC might have cast the election in terms of the NP's weaknesses rather than its own. The Western Cape ANC belatedly recognized this, adopting a more aggressive tact halfway through the campaign period. However, this shift seems to have come too late, and the ANC may have only succeeded in limiting the scale of its defeat.

The ANC's national and provincial leadership had initially seemed to lean toward a negative campaign, focusing on the NP's responsibility for apartheid. They appeared to decide against this after consultations with Greenberg and other advisors, who drew on secret polling evidence to suggest that a campaign focused on apartheid would alienate many voters, especially the undecided voters whom the ANC sought to recruit. As Greenberg put it, "an unrelentingly negative campaign might backfire and put the ANC out of sync with the mood of the country."²¹⁷ The proposed, overwhelmingly positive campaign may have proven a wise strategy in other provinces, but among undecided coloured voters in the Western Cape it seems to have been less appropriate.²¹⁸ I would argue that a negative campaign focused not on the NP and apartheid but on the "new" NP's performance since 1990 would have been more "in sync" with the targeted Western Cape voters.

Perhaps the principal obstacle to the ANC running a negative, issue-focused campaign in the Western Cape, even as part of a two-pronged strategy, was that this would have been "out of sync" with the ANC's campaign nationally. As some provincial officials recognized at the time, the ANC's choice of strategy in the Western Cape ostensibly reflected not just its

²¹⁶See Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," p.54.

²¹⁷Quoted in Gevisser, "Clinton's Men."

²¹⁸The case for a negative campaign is argued strongly by Calland, *The Winds of Change?* I note that Calland does not distinguish between different types of negative campaigns, in particular between a campaign focused on 1994 issues and one on the historical topic of apartheid.

appraisal of the electorate but also the organizational dynamics of the ANC, i.e., the relationships between provincial and national leaders and among provincial leaders themselves. First, the ANC's national campaign leadership seems to have had considerable influence, especially in late 1993 and the beginning of 1994. It had been advised to avoid a negative campaign nationally, and appears to have believed that the ANC was not equipped to run a dramatically different campaign in the Western Cape than elsewhere.

Second, the provincial ANC leaders were in an arguably poor position to challenge or defy the national leadership. The advocates of a coloured focus had drawn heavily on the support of the ANC's head office during the process of choosing which voters to prioritize in the Western Cape. They may have been very reluctant to turn around and tell the national leadership that they were going to run a very different provincial campaign. These provincial leaders seem to have been organizationally vulnerable, given the predominance of African branches in the province, and were perhaps unlikely to defy key mentors or supporters. Moreover, none of the national or provincial ANC leaders had experience in running election campaigns, and may have understandably tended toward caution rather than boldness.

Possible effects of alternative strategy

If the provincial ANC had been able to overcome differences with the national office and actually implement the kind of alternative strategy I outline above, I believe that this approach might have had two main effects: 1) a significant proportion of the initially undecided voters may have remained undecided in April 1994, abstained from voting, and thus lowered the turnout in the election, and 2) a small proportion of them might have decided to vote for the ANC. The best possible scenario, given surveys of undecided voters' feelings about the parties and issues involved (see Chapter Two), might have been one in

which the NP emerged as the largest party in a hung provincial legislature. The NP might have won only about 48 percent of the vote compared to about 38 percent for the ANC. Even in this best-case scenario, therefore, the ANC probably would not have won the election in the Western Cape -- it only could have avoided losing it so badly.

The election results also could have been far worse, of course. The ANC's strategy was successful in two important respects, as noted above. First, it ensured a high turnout among African voters, who made up over half of the ANC's support base. Second, it attracted a substantial minority of coloured voters to the ANC, so that almost half of the ANC's votes came from them. Had the ANC failed to campaign for coloured votes, then its defeat would almost certainly have been even more crushing.

Implications of 1995 local elections?

Is the Western Cape unwinnable for the ANC? ANC leaders have been greatly encouraged by the ANC's performance in the local government elections held on November 1, 1995 outside of metropolitan Cape Town. The ANC actually won more votes overall than the NP in predominantly coloured wards. However, the ANC should not overrate its performance. It enjoyed relatively stronger support in the small towns that were contested in November than in either greater Cape Town or the farming districts where there were no elections. The ANC's share of the vote in the small towns certainly seemed to rise between April 1994 and November 1995, but not by a huge amount. The greatest change was the collapse of the NP's vote. Most of the NP's 1994 voters did not vote at all. Many of those that did, voted for locally-based civic groupings rather than either the ANC or the NP directly.

The lesson of the 1995 local elections may be that a locally-oriented campaign with local candidates (i.e., local coloured candidates in coloured areas) works to the ANC's advantage.

Orienting the campaign towards the specific concerns of coloured voters may have meant that the ANC no longer seemed to be an alien, African party "out there." This kind of campaign may have pacified the fears of some potential NP voters. In the short run many such voters seem to have simply stayed away from the polls, perhaps viewing the major parties with indifference.²¹⁹

In both the 1994 and 1995 elections, ANC and NP campaigns seem to have influenced the turnout and the parties' shares of the vote in the Western Cape. This may have been primarily because a high proportion of the electorate did not have strong attachments to any of the major parties. Whether these voters voted and who they voted for appeared to depend largely on how they understood the elections, and that may have been deeply shaped by the emphasis, form and content of the major parties' campaigns. In 1994 the NP arguably succeeded in defining the election to its advantage. In the small towns of the Western Cape, in late 1995, the ANC seems to have been more successful.

Implications

What implications do the ANC's chosen strategy and the election results have for future ANC campaigns in the Western Cape? Perhaps of greatest relevance will be the conclusions that provincial ANC leaders draw from the campaign. I offer four possible scenarios and then identify evidence that suggests which of them may be most likely:

Scenario A

Leaders infer from the election results that the ANC lost because it failed to place sufficient emphasis on its African support base. They assume that coloureds were not as undecided as

²¹⁹Seekings, "What Swing? A Closer Look at the 1995 Local Government Election Results in the Non-

pollsters led them to believe, and that the ANC lost in 1994 because it failed to recognize the extent to which coloureds' perceived "affinity" with whites would shape their votes. The ANC wasted too much time and resources on winning coloureds' support. The most effective approach for the 1999 provincial elections will be to place top priority on consolidating the party's core constituency of African voters. Despite these leaders' support for the ANC's nonracial philosophy, they would have the party "go racial" in the Western Cape -- not necessarily because going racial works in an objective sense, but rather because they believe it will work.

Scenario B

Leaders reach the opposite conclusion as in Scenario A -- coloureds are not permanently aligned toward the NP, and whatever "affinity" they may have with whites does not overshadow other factors. In fact, surveys suggest that levels of party identification remain low even after the election, despite some hardening of allegiances. Leaders interpret these findings to mean that many coloureds can be won over to the ANC if it adopts a more appropriate campaign strategy, one which targets coloured voters from the very start. Perhaps most important, coloureds make up nearly half of the party's 1994 vote totals. Given the consistently high support for the ANC among Africans, coloureds thus represent the most crucial constituency in the province.

Scenario C

Leaders are split in their interpretations of the results and conclusions about race as a motivating factor. Some decide, as in Scenario A, that the party needs an "Africans first" approach. Others conclude, as in Scenario B, that a coloured focus will be critical in 1999.

This difference in opinion exacerbates existing rifts between Africanists and coloured focus advocates. Battles over resources hinder leaders' ability to compromise with each other, and the party approaches the next elections without a unified, cohesive strategy. Divisions harden and prospects for improving the party's share of the provincial vote appear dim. This conflict lays the groundwork for future intraparty tensions and heightens the possibility of the ANC eventually "going racial" in the Western Cape.

Scenario D

The same situation unfolds as in Scenario C, except that leaders conclude that their differences of opinion may threaten the ANC's chances of electoral success in 1999. They agree to compromise on strategy, and ultimately develop an approach that directs efforts toward both African and coloured voters. The commitment of factions to work together for common goals lowers the chances of the party going racial, at least in the short term.

Evidence for scenarios

Several post-election events provide limited evidence relevant to these scenarios, though none of it appears conclusive. As noted above, tensions seem to exist between provincial ANC factions along the lines that divided campaign strategy options for 1994. Two occurrences seem to support this: a walkout by coloured leaders in the ANC Youth League, and the almost exclusively African composition of the REC and criticism of it by coloured focus advocates. On the other hand, some ANC leaders seem encouraged by the party's performance in rural coloured wards in the November 1995 local elections.²²⁰ They appear

²²⁰Comments made by Cameron Dugmore and Max Ozinsky at a joint University of Cape Town, University of the Western Cape, and Stellenbosch University seminar on the local elections, hosted by the UCT Department of Political Studies at the UCT Centre for African Studies, November 1995.

to believe that the ANC may have a reasonable chance at winning some coloured votes away from the NP and/or capturing a larger share of the vote in 1999. They do not seem to have written off either the importance of maintaining the party's perhaps tenuous hold on existing coloured support, or the possibility of increasing that support.

I would suggest, tentatively, that this evidence supports Scenarios C and D over A and B. Neither Africanists nor coloured focus advocates appear to have taken over the direction of the provincial party to the exclusion of the other side, though Africanists seem to dominate current decision-making structures. Tensions exist but so too do areas for compromise and cooperation.

Conclusion

A different strategy may have given the ANC a better electoral performance. One that targeted undecided coloured voters from the campaign's outset, offering reasons to vote *for* the ANC and *against* the NP, might have proved the most appropriate approach. The 1995 local election results suggest that at least some coloured voters who previously backed the NP were willing to vote ANC, and the party's campaign may have played a role in this conversion.

I doubt that the ANC could have won a majority or plurality of the Western Cape vote in 1994, particularly given the limited four-month campaign period and deep-seeded attitudes among coloured voters which seemingly predisposed them against the ANC. As one provincial strategist paraphrased Greenberg, "In the Western Cape we would have needed a miracle to win. And miracles are few and far between."²²¹ Nevertheless, had

²²¹Strachan, September interview.

the ANC adopted the kind of alternative strategy outlined above, I believe it might have done marginally better.

The implications that the ANC's 1994 campaign strategy and election results have for future campaigns in the Western Cape may hinge largely on party leaders' assessments of that strategy and those results. I suspect that Africanists and coloured focus advocates will remain the provincial party's two predominant factions, at least in the short term, and it is unclear whether this will result in a more cooperative or more divisive intraparty dynamic as the 1999 elections approach. In any case, the ANC's ability to formulate and communicate compelling messages to coloured voters appears critical to either maintaining or increasing the party's overall support in the province.



Will ethnic divisions plague South Africa's new democracy in the future as they did in the run-up to the April 1994 elections? The IFP's Buthelezi is shown here as responsible for recklessly threatening the country's political transition.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: List of Interviews

<u>NAME</u>	<u>CAMPAIGN ROLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Zou Kota	provincial ANC pre-campaign Elections Coordinator; coordinator of African areas committee; national candidate	February 15, 1995
Ketso Gordhan	national ANC campaign coordinator	February 15, 1995; March 24, 1995
Tony Yengeni	immediate past provincial ANC secretary general; coordinator of African areas committee; national candidate	February 13, 1995
Lerumo Kalako	provincial ANC secretary general; national candidate	November 1, 1994
Garth Strachan	provincial ANC Campaign Administrator	September 13, 1994; August 17, 1994; March 7, 1995; March 24, 1995; March 29, 1995
Kader Asmal	national candidate	July 5, 1994
Naledi Pandor	national candidate	July 5, 1994
Paul Davids	ANC Cape Town Southern Suburbs Sub-regional Organizer	June 28, 1994
Melanie Verwoerd	national candidate	June 27, 1994
Rudi Dicks	ANC Grassy Park Branch Organizer	June 17, 1994
Willie Hofmeyr	provincial ANC coordinator of Special Events; coordinator of white areas committee; national candidate	June 17, 1994
Cameron Dugmore	provincial ANC head of Voter Education, Organisation, Training and Transport (VOTT); provincial candidate	June 14, 1994; December 12, 1994
Max Ozinsky	provincial ANC VOTT canvassing co-coordinator	June 14, 1994; February 8, 1995
Johnny Issel	provincial ANC VOTT canvassing co-coordinator; provincial candidate	June 13, 1994; February 7, 1995
Yvonne Witbooi	ANC Grabouw Branch organizer	June 13, 1994

Note: From June 1994, persistent attempts were made to interview the following ANC officials who played important roles in designing, influencing and/or implementing the campaign -- Allan Boesak, Trevor Manuel, Bulelani Ngcuka and Franklin Sonn. These individuals unfortunately were consistently unavailable for comment.

APPENDIX B: List of Campaign Events Observed

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SPEAKER/EVENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOTEBOOK</u>
31-Jan	aft.	MPD Field Reports	Leslie Bldg., UCT	1
10-Feb	aft.	news of police raid ANC	ANC Retreat Branch	1
13-Feb	15:30	Mandela	Retreat Sports Field	1
16-Feb	12:00	ANC voter ed workshop	Zolani Twshp., Ashton	1.5
17-Feb	12:30	Manie, Golding, Hofmeyr	Cape Town Civic	1.5
23-Feb	eve.	Sub-Regional Organizers Meeting	Ottery	1.5
25-Feb	12:00	Mbeki	Jameson Hall, UCT	2
27-Feb	13:30	Mbeki, Manuel, Rasool	Athlone Civic	2
28-Feb	20:00	van Eck, Pandor, Manuel	Claremont Civic	2
5-Mar	14:00	Asmal, Ngcuka, Naidoo	Rylands	3
6-Mar	12:30	Delft canvassing blitz (not)	Delft	3
6-Mar	14:00	Manuel, M. Verwoerd	Macassar Civic	3
6-Mar	20:00	Sachs, Naidoo, M. Verwoerd	Sea Point Civic	3
8-Mar	13:00	Sisulu -- CT women's march	Parliament, Cape Town	4
8-Mar	19:00	Sisulu -- women's league rally	Good Hope Ctr.	4
9-Mar	14:10	Ozinsky interview	Community House, Salt River	4
9-Mar	aft.	Manie, Noel Daniels, Benjamin	CRIC, Athlone	4
10-Mar	10:00	Strachen, Issel: organizers' mtg.	Guguletu	4
11-Mar	12:30	Holomisa	NSLT, UCT	4
15-Mar	19:30	Pandor, Benjamin	Mowbray Town Hall	5
16-Mar	08:00	multiparty debate: Gabru	Garlandale H.S., Athlone	5
16-Mar	20:00	Nissen, Omar, Essop	All Saints Hall, Woodstock	5
17-Mar	13:00	Naidoo	Great Hall, UWC	6
17-Mar	19:00	canvassing blitz	Grassy Park ANC	5
20-Mar	17:25	Mandela	Kleinvele	6
22-Mar	13:10	Boesak	Central Methodist, CT	6
22-Mar	16:00	Manuel, Manie, Davies	CT Civic	6
26-Mar	15:00	Manuel, van Eck, Boesak, Ramaphosa	Eastridge, Mitchells Plain	7
27-Mar	11:30	Ramaphosa	Baxter Theatre, Rondebosch	7
27-Mar	15:00	Ramaphosa, Sonn	Hewatt Coll., Athlone	7
28-Mar	14:15	MPD press conference	The Town House Hotel, CT	7
2-Apr	15:30	Mandela	Good Hope Ctr.	8
5-Apr	12:00	Asmal, Boesak	Woodstock Holiday Inn	8
7-Apr	20:20	multiparty debate: Bloch	Marks Synagogue Ctr., Sea Pt.	8
8-Apr	13:00	Boesak, Sonn, van Eck, Villa-Vincenzo	CT City Hall	8
9-Apr	17:00	Slovo	UCT Med School	8
10-Apr	14:50	Naidoo (not)	Goodwood Showgrounds	8
10-Apr	20:20	Ruiters, van Eck, Pandor	CT Central ANC	8
11-Apr	20:00	Hofmeyr -- Black Sash debate	Rondebosch Cong. Church	9
12-Apr	13:00	Nkonki, Yengeni	Jameson Plaza, UCT	9
12-Apr	19:30	W. Verwoerd, Sonn, Manuel, Niehaus	Stellenbosch Town Hall	9
13-Apr	19:30	Carolus, Sonn	Sinton Alexander Sch., Athl.	9
14-Apr	20:15	Bradenkamp residence -- TV debate	Grassy Park	10
17-Apr	15:30	Mandela, Boesak	Athlone Stadium	10
18-Apr	09:30	Manuel	Dock Rd. Theatre, CT Waterfront	10
19-Apr	20:00	Boesak, Carolus	Baxter Theatre, Rondebosch	11
20-Apr	20:20	Manuel, Pandor, Davies	Van Niekerk Hall, Table View	11
21-Apr	12:50	Boesak-Bester debate	Great Hall, UWC	11
22-Apr	12:55	Boesak, Bloch	NSLT, UCT	11
23-Apr	15:45	Ramaphosa, Boesak, Manie	Mondale Sch., Mitchells Plain	12
24-Apr	13:30	Mbeki, Boesak	Hout Bay Harbour Festival	12

APPENDIX C: List of Campaign Events Scheduled

<u>date</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>event type</u>	<u>speakers</u>	<u>area</u>
Tuesday, February 22	Cape Town Central Branch	meeting	Bridgette Mbandla	all
Thursday, February 24	Nondzwakazi Church Hall, NY1, Guguletu	ANC Section 1 Guguletu Branch	Tony Yengeni, Bulelani Ngcuka	African (A)
	Elsies River Civic Centre, Halt Rd.	sports meeting	Cheryl Roberts, Jannie Momberg, Ngconde Balfour, Derrick Whiteboy, Cameron Dugmore	coloured (C)
	Electric City/Blue Downs	people's forum	Johnny de Lange, Imam Solomons	C
	Bishop Lavis Civic Centre	public meeting	Hilda Ndude, Jan van Eck	C
Friday, February 25	Bredasdorp Landbou Ko-Operasie	Farmers' Union seminar: van Eck speaking on ANC agricultural policy	van Eck	white (W)
	Jameson Hall, UCT	rally	Mbeki	all
	NICRO offices, Hoboken Bldg., Krufkall Ave., Bellville	meeting with white pensioners and poor	Mbeki	W
	I&J Factory, Woodstock	candidate visit	Mbeki	C
	UWC Festival, UWC stadium	brief appearance	Mbeki	C/A
	Kenilworth Racecourse	fundraising function	Mbeki, Trevor Manuel	W
	Cape Evangelical Bible Institute, 424 Klipfontein Rd., Surrey Estate	discussion on the future under new government	Chris Nissen	C
Saturday, February 26	Mitchell's Plain Town Centre	walkabout and short address	Mbeki	C
	Mbekweni, Paarl	canvassing blitz	Mbeki	A
	Guguletu	visit to mentally handicapped children	Mbeki	A
	NICRO office, Mitchell's Plain	meeting with social workers and community organizations	Mbeki	C
	Luckhoff High School Hall, Idas Valley, Stellenbosch	people's forum	Mbeki, Nissen, Ebrahim Rasool	C/A
	Club Ubuntu, Guguletu	social function with Unity Zone community leaders	Mbeki	A
	Town Hall, Stellenbosch	local government discussions with Stellenbosch municipality	Mbeki, Rasool, Manie	W

Sunday, February 27	St. Giles, Klipfontein Rd., Rondebosch	visit to disabled people	Mbeki	W
	Guguletu Section 2 Civic	meeting with African pensioners	Mbeki	A
	UWC S1 Lecture Theatre	Northern Suburbs community leaders' meeting	Mbeki	C
	Primrose Park, Madrassa, Surrey Estate	people's forum	Manuel	C
	Railton Community Hall, Swellendam	public meeting	t.b.a.	C
	Trek Garage, Khayelitsha	ANC Sol Plaatjies Branch people's forum	Omar	A
	ANC Office, Fairways	public meeting	Melanie Verwoerd, Essa Moosa	C
	Regent Road, Sea Point	opening for exhibition of black art	Albie Sachs, Omar Bradsha	W
	Mandalay Primary School	people's forum	Asmal, Phumzile Ngcuka, Tony Ruiters, Lerumo Kalako, Rhoda Joemat, Enver Daniels, Tasneem Essop	C
Monday, February 28	Claremont Civic Centre	rally	Manuel, Pandor, van Eck	W
Tuesday, March 1	Langa	people's forum	t.b.a.	A
Thursday, March 3	open field opposite Maitland abbatoir	COSATU workers' rally	Yengeni, Manie, Dullah Omar and Nomtsikeleli Mgayia	C
	Bellville South Civic Centre	COSATU workers' rally	Asmal, Danny Olifant, Leonard Ramatlakane	C
	Site 5 School, Kommetjie	ANC Two Oceans Branch launch	Yengeni, A. Young	A
	Ida's Valley	Stellenbosch public meeting	t.b.a.	C/A
	Strand Town Hall	ANC Helderberg Zone public meeting	Imam Solomons, Melanie Verwoerd, Pandor	C/A
	Klaver Community Hall	ANC Klaver public meeting	Noel Williams	C
Friday, March 4	Athlone Civic Centre	education forum	Cheryl Carolus, Pandor, Mavis Makeleni	C
	Nonzwakazi Church Hall, Guguletu	International Women's Day prayer	n/a	A
Saturday, March 5	open field opposite Silver Stream Hotel, Atlantis	COSATU workers' rally	Jay Naidoo, Baleka Kgotisile, Boesak, Manie, Oliphant, M. Verwoerd	C
	Ghousia Manzil Centre, Athlone	rally	Naidoo [ed: and Asmal]	C
	Roman Catholic Hall, Dooringbaai	ANC Dooringbaai public meeting	Omar, Makeleni, Sue van der Merwe	C
	St. Helena Bay	ANC St. Helena Bay mass meeting	t.b.a.	C

	Victoria West	Victoria West people's forum	t.b.a.	C
Sunday, March 6	Holomisa Village, Khayelitsha	ANC Bantu Holomisa Branch Rally	Lizo Nkonki, Bulelani Ngcuka, Enver Daniels	A
	Rosemead Primary School, Delft	Delft manifesto canvassing blitz	Boesak [ed: did not show, blitz went ahead without him]	C
	Oscar Mpetha High School, Nyanga	candidate visit to preschool	Kgotisile	A
	Bernard Fuller Hall, UCT Medical School	ANC health policy forum with private sector doctors and representatives	Naidoo, Carolus, Omar	all
	Macassar Civic Hall	public meeting	Naidoo, Trevor Manuel, Jan van Eck, Kota, Pandor, M. Verwoerd	C
	The Music Cafe, Observatory	Observatory/Mowbray International Women's Day celebration	Jean Benjamin, Lynne Brown, Beattie Hofmeyr	all
	Sea Point Civic Centre	domestic workers' forum	Naidoo, Kgotisile	A
	Minor Hall, Sea Point Civic Centre	Sea Point ANC rally	Naidoo, Kgotisile, M. Verwoerd, Albie Sachs	W
Monday, March 7	Jameson Hall, UCT	UCT ANC Student Forum rally	t.b.a.	all
	Parliament	women's march to Parliament by all ANC Alliance female candidates	Boesak [ed: he did not show]	all
	Westridge Civic Centre, Mitchell's Plain	COSATU women's rally	Naidoo, Boesak, Carolus	C
Wednesday, March 9	UWC	UWC Education Policy Unit seminar	Omar	C/A
	Lentegeur Civic Hall, Mitchell's Plain	ANC Mitchell's Plain Sub-Region mass meeting	Ebrahim Rasool	C
Thursday, March 10	Cloeteville	ANC Stellenbosch public meeting	t.b.a.	C/A
	Bishop Lavis Civic Centre	ANC Bishop Lavis public meeting	Manuel, Rashieda Abdullah, Gertrude Fester	C
	Moreesberg Community Hall	ANC Moreesberg public meeting	t.b.a.	C
Friday, March 11	Lusaka Community Hall and KTC Hall, Guguletu (?)	people's forums	Winnie Mandela, Holomisa	A
	Black City/Boys Town/Buntubakhe, Black City	people's forum	W. Mandela	A
	UWC	public meeting	Holomisa	C/A
	Village 2 grounds, Browns Farm	people's forum	Holomisa	C/A
	Holomisa Village, Khayelitsha	people's forum	W. Mandela	A
	Hanover Park shopping centre	candidate blitz	Asmal, Ngcuka, Manie, M. Verwoerd	C

	Mbekweni Community Hall	public meeting	W. Mandela	A
	Hermanus Community Hall	public meeting	Holomisa	C/A
Saturday, March 12	SACTWU Hall, Salt River	COSATU Regional Conference	Boesak	C
	Club Ubuntu, Guguletu	breakfast	W. Mandela, Holomisa	A
	Athlone	candidate shopping centre walkabout	W. Mandela	C
	Bloekombos	rally	W. Mandela	C
	Site 5, soccer ground, Noordhoek	people's forum and walkabout	Holomisa	A
	Mitchell's Plain	candidate walkabout	Holomisa	C
	3B Alfred Ct., St. Johns Rd., Sea Point	ANC City Branch office launch	Sachs	W
	Langa Stadium	rally	W. Mandela	A
	Mfuleni Community Hall	rally	Holomisa	A
	Goedverwacht Church Hall, Picketburg	ANC Picketburg public meeting	M. Verwoerd, Williams	C
	Electric City Primary School, Blue Downs	Electric City, Blue Downs mass rally	Boesak	C
	Maitland Cemetery	wreath laying ceremony for Ashley Kriel and Anthony Fransch	W. Mandela, Holomisa	C
	Section 7, Guguletu	wreath laying ceremony at graves of "fallen comrades"	W. Mandela, Holomisa	A
Sunday, March 13	Nolungile Primary School, Site C, Khayelitsha	people's forum	W. Mandela, Holomisa	A
	primary school, Ngxobongwana	people's forum	W. Mandela, Holomisa	A
	NY 116 Stadium, Guguletu	township church gathering	n/a	A
	Crossroads Hall, Crossroads	people's forum	W. Mandela, Holomisa	A
	Wolseley Civic Centre	ANC Wolseley public meeting	Boesak, M. Verwoerd	C
	Kensington/Fatreton Community Hall	ANC Kensington people's forum	Manuel, van Eck, Fester, van der Merwe	C
	Ottery Civic Centre	ANC Southern Suburbs people's forum	n/a	C
	Mfuleni	ANC Mfuleni public meeting	t.b.a.	A
Monday, March 14	Bonteheuwel Civic Centre, Mitchell's Plain	debate on women's issues	t.b.a.	C
	Athlone Technical College	Athlone Tech forum on affirmative action	t.b.a.	C

	Melkhoutfontein Community Hall	Melkhoutfontein public meeting	t.b.a.	C/A
Tuesday, March 15	Paarl Community Hall	ANC Paarl Election Launch	Manuel	C/A
	Mowbray Town Hall	ANC Mowbray/Observatory information meeting	Benjamin, Pandor, Shepard Mdladlana [ed: last speaker did not show]	all
Wednesday, March 16	Garlandale High School, Athlone	multi-party debate on education	Daniels	C
	opposite Rainbow Industrial area	COSATU workers' forum	n/a	C
	Landsdowne Civic Centre	people's forum	Solomons	C
Thursday, March 17	Genadendal Public Works Project	candidate visit	Naidoo	C
	Caledon Square Police Station to Clifton 4th Beach, Cape Town	Albie Sachs freedom run to commemorate release from prison 30 years ago	Sachs, Ngconde Balfour, Cheryl Roberts, Duncan Crowie, Brickwa Stanley, Leon Beech	all
	Recife (block of flats?), Hanover Park	court forum	Naidoo	C
	Phillipi	public meeting	Steve Tshwete, Nofulele Creche, Joe Modise	C/A
	Scottsdene Club House, Kraaifontein	sports forum	Tshwete, C. Roberts, Crowie	C
	Malmesbury Civic Centre, Westbank	COSATU workers' forum	Manuel	C
	Strand Town Hall	rally	Boesak	C/A
	Strandfontein Civic Centre	public meeting	Omar, Virginia Engels, Nomantaya Haganga	C
	Cloetesville, Stellenbosch	rally	Boesak	C/A
Friday, March 18	Scottsdene Secondary School, Kraaifontein	teachers' forum	Fester	C
	Langa High School	public meeting	Tshwete	A
	Club Ubuntu, Guguletu	Mnandi Clothes launch	Boesak	A
	Langa Community Hall, Washington St.	meeting	Boesak	A
	Eyona Centre, NY1, Guguletu	candidate mans information tables	Boesak	A
	SAMWU Hall, Beverly St., Athlone	sports forum	Tshwete	C
Saturday, March 19	UWC Lecture Theatre DL2	Social Audit Academics Conference	Manuel	all
	Nyanga bus terminus, NY3	launch of ANC Big Better Life [street rubbish] Clean-Up campaign	Boesak, Mbandla	A
	Westfleur Council Offices, Mandela Square, Atlantis	COSATU workers' rally	Yengeni	C

	Ocean View sports field	ANC Ocean View Branch launch rally and soccer match (local team vs. regional candidates)	van Eck, Manie, M. Verwoerd	C
	Cape Town Civic Centre	National Ministers' Fellowship Forum	Boesak	all
	Wallacedene sports stadium, Kraaifontein	public meeting	Yengeni, Amos Lengisi	C
Sunday, March 20	Green Point Stadium, Cape Town	Lion's Club children's sports day	Nelson Mandela	all
	Perrivale Primary School, Grassy Park	rally	Mandela	C
	Greens Football Field, Mannenberg	Mannenberg Peace Event	Mandela	C
	Kleinvlei sports stadium	Peace Rally	Mandela	C
Monday, March 21	Langa Comprehensive School, Zone 27	Langa Sharpeville Commemorative Rally	Mbandla	A
	Khayelitsha soccer stadium	meeting	Lulu Johnson (president ANCYL)	A
	Diazville Civic Centre, Saldanha	Sharpeville Day Rally	?	C
Tuesday, March 22	Central Methodist Church, Green Market Square, Cape Town	public meeting	Boesak	all
Wednesday, March 23	Cape Town Civic Centre	forum on ANC economic policy	Boesak, Manuel, Ruiters, Davies, P. Ngcuka, Manie	all
	Durbanville Town Hall	public meeting: "The Future for Farmers and Farmworkers under the ANC"	Doug [Johnny?] de Lange	C
	SACS High School, Newlands	teachers' and parents' meeting	Boesak	W
	Schotschekloof Civic Centre (Bo-Kaap), Cape Town	Cape Town Central Branch meeting	Manie, Omar, P. Ngcuka	C
Friday, March 25	Hanover Park bus terminus	canvassing blitz	Cyril Ramaphosa	C
	Berg River Hall, Wellington	rally	Ramaphosa	C
Saturday, March 26	Goodwood Showgrounds	opens RDP conference	Ramaphosa	all
	Crossroads	rally	Ramaphosa	A
	Eastridge, Mitchell's Plain	rally	Ramaphosa	C
Sunday, March 27	Baxter Theatre, UCT	Sunday tea with white community	Ramaphosa	W
	Eikendal Sports Ground, Kraaifontein	rally	Ramaphosa	C
	Hewatt College, Athlone	rally	Ramaphosa, Carolus, Sonn	C

	UWC Great Hall	Mayibuye Centre opening	Ramaphosa	all
Monday, March 28	Nonzwakazi Church, Guguletu	memorial service for prisoners	Chris Nissen, Kalako	A
	Sanlam head office, Voortrekker Rd.	Sanlam workers' rally	van Eck	C
	Ceres Town Hall	Ceres teachers' forum	Abdullah	C/A
	Bellville	candidate visit to numerous sites	Boesak	C
	Bellville South Senior Secondary	Bellville peoples' forum	Engel	C
	Matilda and Mabel Courts, Mannenberg	Mannenberg peoples' forum	t.b.a.	C
	Christchurch Hall, Constantia	public meeting	Manuel	W
	Maitland Town Hall	Kensington peoples' forum on affirmative action	Essop, Johnny de Lange	C
Tuesday, March 29	NW coast	candidate tour	Boesak	C
	Guguletu Comprehensive School, Guguletu	students' rally	Kalako	A
	South Peninsular High School	panel debate on education	n/a	C
	Langa High School, Langa	Langa students' rally	Yengeni, Nkonki	A
	Masiyile Secondary School, Khayelitsha	Khayelitsha students' rally	n/a	A
	UCT plaza	UCT students' meeting	Ngcuka	all
	Atlantic Underwater Club, Bay Rd.	Underwater Club meeting on the future of sea resources	n/a	?
	Knysna	Knysna public meeting	Janie Momberg	C/A
Wednesday, March 30	2A Robert Leslie Bldg., UCT	religion forum	Barney Pityana, Fahrid Essack	all
	Langa	Langa traders' meeting	Omar, Kalako	A
	?	tourism in the '90s	Carolus, Asmal	?
	Macassar Civic Hall	public meeting	Rasool	C
	Laingville Civic Centre, St. Helena Bay	public meeting	Kalako, Engel, Hananga	C
	Bellville Civic Centre, Bellville	public debate	?	C
	Community Hall, Vredendal	farmworkers rally	Liz Abrahams	C
	Grassy Park	people's forum	?	C
	Riversdale Town Hall	public meeting	Bloch	C
	CPA Hall, Chapel St., Woodstock	information meeting	Essop, Gasan Solomons	C
Thursday, March 31	Woodstock Holiday Inn	press conference	Boesak, Sonn	all
	67 Capricorn Way, Ocean View	coffee with community leaders	Boesak	C

	Porter Boys Reform School, Tokai	candidate visit	Boesak	W
	Kalk Bay Harbor	meeting and lunch with local fishermen	Boesak	C
	Cafta squatter settlement, Steenberg	candidate walkabout	Boesak	C
	Lavender Hill	candidate walkabout	Boesak	C
	Jaffers Motors, Grassy Park	tea with business and community leaders	Boesak	C
	Ottery Cemetery, Phillipi	funeral for ANC member Pat Harrison	Boesak	C/A
	St. Georges Cathedral, Cape Town	Easter service	Boesak	all
	Redby Methodist Church Hall	public meeting	Boesak, Pandor, Fester, B. Ngcuka	C
	G.H. Starke Centre, 2 Greenturf Rd., Hanover Park	multi-party debate	Reg September	C
	UWC	march to Bellville police station, demand for free political activity in Natal	Yengeni	C/A
	UCT, New Science Lecture Theatre	meeting on free political activity	?	all
	Westridge Civic Centre, Mitchell's Plain	end of term rap powerjam (rap concert)		C
	Town Hall, Franschoek	mass meeting	Kalako, M. Verwoerd, Johnny Arendse, Nomatyala Hangana	C/A
	Spurwing Drive, Electric City	people's forum: housing crisis	Yengeni, Ramotsamai	A
	Valhalla Park Civic Centre	people's forum: social security and education	Bloch, MacGregor, Lynn Brown	C
Saturday, April 2	Mbekweni Stadium, Paarl	SADTU member funeral service	September, Ben Tengimfene	A
	Vanguard Hall, Genadendal	ANC funeral service	Virginia Engels	C
	South West Coast	rally	Mandla Gxanya	C
	ANC office, Keerom St., Robertson	candidate walkabout and short address	Boesak	C/A
	Klipheuwel	rally	Kalako	C
	Cororbrick	rally	?	C
	MacGregor Rugby Field, MacGregor	meeting and address to farm workers	Boesak	C
	Nquebele Primary School, Nquebele Township	candidate visit	Boesak	A
	Good Hope Centre, Cape Town	Muslim commemoration of arrival of Sheikh Yusuf	Mandela	C
	Barnard Hall, Ashton	candidate visit and canvassing	Boesak	C/A

	Zolani Civic Centre, Zolani (near Robertson)	candidate visit	Boesak	A
	Worcester Stadium, Worcester	rally and music festival	Asmal, Daniels, Gasant Solomons, Hanganya, van Eck, Sonto	C/A
	Bonnivale Civic Centre, Bonnivale	rally	Boesak	C
Sunday, April 3	Robertson Rugby Stadium, Robertson	public meeting	?	C/A
	Bonnivale Community Hall, Bonnivale	church service	Boesak	C
	Montague	peace rally	Boesak	C
Monday, April 4	Turfhall Park, Athlone	Athlone festival	?	C
	Malmesbury	farm workers people's forum	Christmas Tinto, Amos Lengesi	C
	Eislen Park Civic Centre, van Huysten Ave., Eislen	candidate motorcade	Boesak	C
	Worcester	candidate visit to various church bazaars	Boesak	C/A
	Shoprite Centre, Eerste River	Blue Downs ANC Easter festival	Sonn	C
	Laingsburg School Hall, Laingsburg	rally	Boesak	C
Tuesday, April 5	Holiday Inn, Woodstock	launch of "Sekunjalo" cassette for taxi members	Boesak, Pretorius, Asmal, Solomons	all
	Scottsdene Senior Secondary School, Petunia St., Scottsdene	public meeting	W. Verwoerd	C
	UWC	teachers' forum	Benjamin	C/A
	Goeie Hoop Primary School, Bellville	people's forum	Russel MacGregor	C
Wednesday, April 6	Bonteheuwel Civic Centre	Muslim forum	Manie	C
	Stellenbosch High, Jamestown, Stellenbosch	public meeting	W. Verwoerd, Rob Davis	C/A
	Touws River Community Hall	public meeting	?	C
	Athlone Scout Centre, Hazendal, Athlone North	people's forum	?	C
Thursday, April 7	Lentegeur	candidate motorcade	Boesak	C
	Lentegeur radio station	candidate visit	Boesak	C
	Guguletu Civic Hall	Chris Hani Week rally	?	A
	Windmill Res., Bredasdorp	forum	W. Verwoerd	C

	Lutheran Centre, Felix St., Bellville	people's forum	Vincent Diba, Jean Benjamin	C
	Happy Valley informal settlement, Phillipi	mini rally	Boesak	C/A
	Leaf College Hall, Rondebosch	panel discussion	Asmal, Pandor	W
	corner of Jacaranda and Hibiscus Roads, Lentegour	mini public meeting	Boesak	C
	Marks Synagogue, Sea Point	multi-party debate on elections	Graham Bloch	W
Friday, April 8	Lighthouse Christian Centre	multi-party panel discussion	Sonn, Ngcuka, Asmal	?
	Piesang Valley Civic Centre, Plettenberg Bay	rally	Manuel, Momberg, Nissen, Nomatyala Hanganga	C/A
	Graafwater Primary School	rally	Boesak	C
Saturday, April 9	Grabouw	peoples' forum	Leonard Ramatlakane	C/A
	Grootbrakrivier sports field	rally	Manuel, Momberg	C
	Boland sub-regional office	sports forum	Cheryl Roberts	?
	Wallacedean Sports Stadium, Kraaifontein	rally	Slovo	C
	Chris Hani Fields, Kwangaba, Mossel Bay	Hani memorial rally	Manuel, Momberg	A
	Uluntu Centre	early childhood education forum	Nobom Sonto, Rose Sonto, Omar	A
	Vanguard Hall, Genadendal	farm workers' forum	Christmas Tinto	C
	St. Mary's Hall, Calvinia	roadshow	Danny Oliphant, Sorhub Oosthizen	C
	Wallecedean Sports Field, Kraaifontein	Hani mass rally	Yengeni	C
	Mandalay Primary School	peoples' forum	Manie	C
	Mannenbergs/Guguletu	march from police station to shopping centre	Slovo, ANCYL	C/A
	Civic Hall, Vredendal	rally	Boesak	C
	Oudendal Sports Grounds, Prince Albert	peoples' forum	Russel MacGregor, Gertrude Fester	C
	Marconi Beam informal settlement	rally with joint squatter areas damaged by fire	Slovo	A
	Heidelberg Civic Centre	public meeting	W. Verwoerd	C
	UCT Medical Faculty Lecture Theatre	health care in the '90s panel	Slovo	all

	Onverwaagt Restaurant, Wellington	peoples' forum	Kalako, Joey Cupido	C
Sunday, April 10	NGK, Vredenburg	church service	Boesak	C
	Louterwater, Langkoof	Hani Day rally	?	C
	open field by ANC office, Koornhof St., New Crossroads	Hani memorial service	Slovo	A
	Goodwood Showgrounds, Goodwood	SACTWU Conference	Naidoo	all
	Guguletu Stadium NY 49	Hani memorial rally	Slovo	A
	Vanguard Community Centre	forum	Yengeni, Ngcuka, Abdullah, Freddie Bosman	C
	Ceres Town Hall	Hani memorial meeting	Essa Moosa, Liz Abrahams, Terry Lester	C/A
	Albow Brass Hall, Gardens, Cape Town	Cape Town Central meeting	Pandor, van Eck, Ruiters	all
Monday, April 11	Antoniesbos	rally	Boesak	C
	Umfeleni Old Age Centre	public meeting	Boesak	A
	Bellville South Stadium	SAMWU Workers' Rally	Manie	C
	Blue Downs: Stratford, Brentwood Park, Rosedale and Kleinvei	candidate walkabout	Boesak	C
	Blue Downs	candidate motorcade	Boesak	C
	ISM Events Centre (Cape Town?)	Sapics Industrial Forum	Manuel	all
	Lourensford Hall, Lourensford	rally	Amos Lengesi	C
	Tuscanny Glen Primary School, Blue Downs	public meeting	Boesak	C
	Pniel Congregational Church, Pniel	peoples' forum	Sonn, M. Verwoerd, Davies	C
	Deyseldorp Civic Ctr., Deyseldorp	public meeting	Manuel, Momberg	C
	Congregational Church, Rondebosch	Black Sash debate	Hofmeyr	W
Tuesday, April 12	Vanguard Hall, Genadendal	teachers' forum	?	C
	Mandalay Shopping Complex	Eskom victory report	Manie	C
	Voorburg Senior Secondary School, Delft	peoples' forum	M. Verwoerd	C

	Freedom Hall, Mfeleni	peoples' forum	?	A
	Town Hall, Stellenbosch	mass meeting	Niehaus, Sonn, Manuel, W. Verwoerd	C/A
	Rietbrom	public meeting	Manuel, Momberg	C
	Civic Centre, Ocean View	peoples' forum	?	C
	Civic Centre, Grassy Park	endorsement rally	Omar and over 25 community leaders	C
	Main Town Hall, Woodstock	public meeting	?	C
	Plaaslike Geen, Malmesbury	public meeting	?	C
Wednesday, April 13	Methodist Church, Buitenkant St., Cape Town	press conference by 60 Christian leaders concerning forthcoming elections	Boesak	all
	Bredasdorp	candidate roadshow begins	Boesak	C
	Leslie Bldg., Lecture Theatre 2A, UCT	UCT meeting on "The Land Question"	Sonn, Indie Mfeketu, Bloch	all
	Gansbaai	candidate visit	Boesak	C
	Stanford	candidate visit	Boesak	C
	Kylanie, Crossroads	Bindu Bakhe public meeting	?	A
	Gordans Rd. Playground, Kalk Bay	Two Oceans court forum	Enver Daniels	C
	Rugby Stadium, Hawston	rally	Boesak	C
	Bellville South Civic Centre	public meeting	Carolus, W. Verwoerd, Manie	C
	Industrial Psychology Bldg., Univ. of Stellenbosch	election symposium	Asmal	all
	Square Hill Civic Centre, Retreat	forum	Sonn	C
	Alex Sinton School, Athlone	people's forum	Sonn, Carolus	C
	Bethany Full Gospel Church, Lansdowne Rd., Claremont	public meeting	Daniels	W
	Lansdowne Civic Centre, Church St.	people's forum	Carolus, Sonn	C
	St. Bartholomew's Hall, Walmer Estate	women's rights debate	Fester	C
	Caledon	public meeting	Boesak	C
Thursday, April 14	Koeberg Power Station	Eskom Koeberg workers' rally	Daniels	C
	UCT Plaza	SASCO Open Air Forum and Walkabout	Sonn	all
	Leslie Bldg., Rm. 3A, UCT	UCT cultural debate: "The Role of Art in the New SA"	Omar Badsha	all
	B.J. Vorster Bldg., Univ. of Stellenbosch	public meeting	?	all

	Rylands High School, Rylands, Mitchell's Plain	Thornhill teachers' forum	Daniels, Randall van der Heever	C
	Gerald Wright Hall, Grabouw	people's forum	van der Heever	C/A
	Rocklands Civic Centre, Mitchell's Plain	public meeting	?	C
	Redhill squatter camp, Simon's Town	people's forum	?	A
	Windmill Restaurant, Bredasdorp	Overberg sports forum	?	C
	Civic Centre, Civic Way, Matroosfontein	mass rally	?	C
Friday, April 15	Bellville South CTPA, Kasselsvlei Rd.	meeting	Boesak	C
	Coloured Affairs Regional Office, 107 Voortrekker Rd., Omnia Bldg., Bellville	meeting	Boesak	C
	Lutheran Centre, Felix Street, Bellville	senior citizens' tea party	Reggie and Hettie September	C
	Matroosfontein Old Age Home	meeting	Boesak	C
	Uitsig Civic Hall	meeting	Boesak	C
	Bishop Lavis Police Office	meeting with police officers	Boesak	C
Monday, April 18	Imizamo Yethu, Hout Bay	court forum	?	A
	Bantu Hall, Washington St., Langa	people's forum	Hilda Ndude	A
	St. Margaret's Hall (location?)	Cederberg farm workers meeting	?	C
	Groot Constantia Estate, Constantia	meeting	Abrahams, Daniels	C
	Everite Hostels (location?)	Everite workers' forum	?	C
	Grootdrakenstein	Backsberg Farm meeting	B. Ngcuka, de Lange	C
	Pacalsdorp Town Hall, George	public meeting	?	C
	Darling Town Hall	public meeting	Sonn	C
	Portuguese Club, Milnerton	Portuguese community public meeting	Manuel	W
	Sarepta Civic Centre, Reitvlei Rd., Kuilsriver	Election Hype rally	Tshwete, Manuel	C
Tuesday, April 19	Cafta Old People's Home	candidate visit	Boesak	C
	House of Representatives office, Wynberg	meeting	Boesak	C

	Wynberg taxi rank	candidate walkabout	Boesak	C/A
	Parkwood	candidate motorcade	Boesak	C
	Heathfield	meeting	Boesak	C
	Baxter Hall, UCT	rally	Boesak, Carolus	C
	Westridge High School, Mitchell's Plain	panel debate	Yusuf Gabru, Daniels	C
	New Orleans Secondary School, Paarl	Berg Valley teachers' forum	Sonn	C
	Belhar; Kraaifontein	canvassing blitz	Lulu Johnson	C
	3B Leslie Bldg., UCT	women's issues rally	Miranda Xuhayse	all
	B.J. Vorster Bldg., Univ. of Stellenbosch	public forum	Fester, Xoliswa Sibeko	all
	Bellville Civic Centre	mass meeting	Manuel	C
	802 City Centre, 71 Loop St., Cape Town	NADEL panel	Daniels	all
	Swellendam	mass meeting	?	C
	Gordon's Playground, Kalk Bay	Two Oceans court forum: provincial government	Gabru	C
	Matroosfontein Civic Centre	public meeting	Sonn	C
	FAWU Centre, NY1 Guguletu	public meeting	Tshwete	A
	Rylands High School, Mitchell's Plain	Gatesville tenants' forum	Omar	C
	Bergriver Senior Secondary School, Wellington	youth discussion: religion and the ANC	Imam Solomons, Nissen	C
	Alabama Hall, Ladismith	public meeting	?	C
	Fairways/Parkwood office	mass meeting	?	C
	Piketburg Civic Centre	public meeting	?	C
	St. George's Church, Cape Town	election forum debate	?	all
	Windmill Res., Bredasdorp	forum	Yengeni	C
	Pinelands Town Hall	public meeting	Manuel, Barney Pityana	W
	Paarl Town Hall	public meeting for the white community	de Lange, Bloch	C/A
	Macassar Civic Centre	people's forum	Pandor	C
	Morningstar Civic Centre, Durbanville	public meeting	W. Verwoerd, Sonn	C
	Cravenby Civic Centre	mass rally	Brian Bunting, Sue van der Merwe	C
	22 Venus Way, Ocean View	house meeting	Teressa Solomon	C
	Woodstock Town Hall	public meeting	Manuel, Rasool	C
Wednesday, April 20	Readers' Digest House, Athlone	meeting	Boesak	C

	2A Leslie Bldg., UCT	meeting on economic policy	Manuel	all
	Good Hope Centre, Cape Town	Teachers Against Racism rally	Boesak, Sonn, Shepher Madladla, Vivian Carelse, Carolus	all
	Kalkstenfontein	canvassing blitz	Boesak	C
	Surrey Estate	canvassing blitz	Boesak	C
	Heideveld	canvassing blitz	Boesak	C
	Leibrant van Niekerk Hall, Table View	public meeting	Manuel, Pandor, Davies	W
	Good Hope Centre, Cape Town	NUMSA nurses' rally	Manuel	C
	Cape Town Civic Centre	WCYF meeting	?	C
	Excelsior Hall (location?)	farmworkers' rally	?	C
	Everite Hostels (location?)	Everite Workers' forum	?	C
	Philani Clinic, Unathi	Buntubakhe general meeting	?	A
	Marcus Gavey Square (location?)	Rastafarian meeting	?	?
	Garlandale High School, Athlone	debate	?	C
	Pegasus Centre (BABS), Aster St., Kewtown (Athlone)	Athlone mini rally	?	C
	Huegenot College Hall, Wellington	public meeting	B. Ngcuka, Niehaus	C
	Hanover Park Civic Centre	rally	Boesak	C
	Riversdale Town Hall	rally	Omar, Yengeni	C
	Fish Hoek Civic Centre	public meeting	Momberg, Asmal, M. Verwoerd	W
	Veldrif Community Hall	meeting	Sonn	C
	Community Hall, Paarl East	meeting	Boesak	C/A
Thursday, April 21	Beaufort West	teachers' rally	Sonn	C/A
	SACS Circle, Bellville South	Nylon Spinners workers	?	C
	Laingsburg		Sonn	C
	Good Hope College	panel discussion	?	all
	Vanguard Hall, Genadendal	teachers' forum	?	C
	NG Church Hall, Prins Albert	rally	?	C
	Concordia Winkelsaal & Civic	Hornlee rally	?	C
	Hall, Kyamandi	people's forum	?	A

	Community Hall, Cruiser Rd., Strandfontein	public meeting	Manuel	C
	D.F. Malan Hall, Stellenbosch	premiers' debate	Boesak	all
	Uitsig	mass rally	?	C
Friday, April 22	Excelsior I Secondary School, Belhar	joint schools' meeting	Sonn, Shepherd Mdlalana, Boesak	C
	Sohnge College, Worcester	teachers and civil servants rally	Sonn	C/A
	Jameson Hall, UCT	UCT ANC Forum rally	Boesak	all
	Arthur's Seat Hotel, Sea Point	seminar on affordable housing and the role of the building industry	Hilda Ndude, Basil Davidson, Thozamile Botha, Sam Montsi, Boesak	W
	Athlone	candidate walkabout	Sonn and others	C
Saturday, April 23	NGK, Kraaifontein	funeral for Matthew Marshall	Boesak, Kalako	C
	Eerste River	funeral for Mrs. Arendse	Boesak, Kalako	C
	Tygervalley Shopping Centre	information table	Boesak	C
	near library, Piketburg	people's forum	Sonn	C
	New Horizon Sports Ground, Plettenberg Bay	rally	Barbara Masekela	C/A
	Macassar Secondary School	rally	Ramaphosa	C
	Vredendal	rally	Manuel	C
	Hornlee Stadium, Knysna	rally	Masekela	C/A
	Mondale School, Portlands, Mitchell's Plain	NEHAWU civil servants rally	Ramaphosa, Boesak	C
	Belhar Secondary School	rally	Sonn	C
	SACTWU Hall, Salt River	SACTWU rally	Boesak	C
Sunday, April 24	Hout Bay Harbour	festival	Mbeki, Boesak, Manuel	C/A
	Mbekweni (location?)	memorial for Tambo	Masekela, Boesak	A
	Blue Downs/Eerste River	burial of apartheid procession and rally	Boesak, Manuel	C
	NY2 Guguletu	ministers' fraternal interdenominational elections service	Mbeki	A
	Samaj Centre, Gatesville	48 Hours to Freedom rally	Mbeki, Boesak	C
	Bishop Lavis Sports Ground	rally	Sonn, Mbeki, Boesak	C
	UWC	Women's League festival	Nomatyala Hagana	A

Methodology for Appendix C

I label "areas" according to the predominant "racial" group living in the general proximity where the event occurred. Classifying a location along these lines can be problematic. For example, in towns that are largely coloured, there may be a sizable African township nearby toward which the event might also have been targeted. Many from the township may have traveled to the coloured "area" to attend the event. Contextual detail of this sort is difficult to derive from a simple list of *scheduled* events. Thus, I have attempted to classify them using the following, admittedly imperfect yet perhaps sufficient, approach:

I use six categories: C for mainly coloured communities, C/A for largely coloured areas with Africans living in close proximity, A for predominantly African communities, W for mainly white areas, "all" for locations at which an event would be expected to draw a mix of all three groups, and "?" for areas I did not know how to classify. Although some events in predominantly coloured rural areas might have attracted some whites -- thus necessitating a C/W category -- I assume that whites would have attended in far fewer numbers than coloured people.

Also, I differentiate between C and C/A in most locations based on whether the given area had a "Black Local Authority" (BLA) according to the 1983 Tricameral System. This criterion was used in the November 1995 local elections law for allocating proportionally elected seats according to race. My assumption here is that although an event may have taken place in a largely coloured area, many Africans living nearby probably attended. The locations which had a BLA include the following: Ashton, Beaufort West, Ceres, George, Hermanus, Ikapa (including Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga), Khayelitsha, Somerset West, Mossel Bay, Oudtshoorn, Paarl, Robertson, Stellenbosch, Strand and Worcester. Obviously, I consider the Ikapa townships and Khayelitsha as African areas, rather than C/A.

In these two ways, I have attempted to determine as closely as possible those "racial" groups toward which scheduled events were targeted. The conclusions that can be drawn from this information may be limited, but also may be useful. I have listed several cautions and possible constraints in Chapter Six.

APPENDIX D (1-3): ANC Poster and Leaflet Production

(includes provincial production and materials received from national office)

1. African National Congress Posters and Leaflets							
Produced by Allie's Press During the 1994 Election Campaign							
Western Cape Province							
DATE	POSTERS	LEAFLETS	DESCRIPTION				
24-Jan	300	0	Ash Belford				
26-Jan	300	3,000	people's forum				
26-Jan	5,000	0	Never Again...				
26-Jan	1,500	50,000	election rally - Athlone			Posters	Leaflets
26-Jan	400	0	Wynberg election launch				
28-Jan	300	0	Wynberg			TOTAL JAN:	7,800 53,000
7-Feb	8,000	0	Mandela's Pledge to the Cape				
7-Feb	300	10,000	Heideveld				
10-Feb	400	0	Retreat				
10-Feb	300	4,000	Bishop Lavis				
10-Feb	300	0	Observatory/Mowbray				
23-Feb	300	0	Write Off Debt...				
24-Feb	500	10,000	Saldhana Bay				
24-Feb	300	0	people's forum				
24-Feb	300	0	Ida's Valley/Stellenbosch			Posters	Leaflets
24-Feb	300	0	Guguletu				
24-Feb	900	0	Strand, N. Pine, Piesangstown			TOTAL FEB:	11,900 24,000
1-Mar	800	0	Mitchell's Plain				
1-Mar	500	0	Sea Point				
1-Mar	300	0	Macassar				
1-Mar	300	4,000	Bishop Lavis				
4-Mar	5,000	20,000	Adelaide Tambo/Women's League/Atlantis				
4-Mar	800	0	Women's League				
4-Mar	300	0	Cloetesville				
4-Mar	500	0	Carl Niehaus				
4-Mar	1,800	40,000	Jay Naidoo				
8-Mar	5,000	0	Better Life for All/Winnie Mandela				
8-Mar	5,000	0	Bantu Holomisa				
8-Mar	200	0	Melanie and Willem Verwoerd				
8-Mar	0	10,000	Western Cape				
8-Mar	300	0	VOTT: Manuel, van Eck; Omar, Manuel				
9-Mar	300	0	Wolsley				
9-Mar	150	10,000	Electric City				
9-Mar	100	0	Woodstock				
10-Mar	300	0	Better Life for All				
11-Mar	200	0	Mowbray				
11-Mar	350	0	Lansdowne				
11-Mar	200	0	Strandfontein				
11-Mar	200	0	Strand				

11-Mar	200	5,000	Atlantis					
13-Mar	0	15,000	Strand					
13-Mar	0	20,000	Eid message					
16-Mar	1,500	0	Ocean View					
16-Mar	500	0	Cape Town Central					
17-Mar	2,000	0	ANC Youth League rally					
17-Mar	300	0	Sharpeville commemoration					
17-Mar	300	0	Dennemere					
17-Mar	1,000	0	Mandela - Ferste River					
17-Mar	0	30,000	Athlone					
18-Mar	300	0	Montana					
18-Mar	300	0	Garlandale					
19-Mar	300	0	Heideveld					
19-Mar	250	0	Wellington					
19-Mar	2,000	1,000	Mannenberg					
23-Mar	1,500	0	Ramaphosa speaks...					
23-Mar	0	80,000	Stop the Third Force (Xhosa)					
23-Mar	0	120,000	Stop the Third Force (Afrikaans)					
23-Mar	600	0	morning tea with Cyril Ramaphosa - Rondebosch					
23-Mar	500	0	Luxurama Theatre					
23-Mar	0	50,000	We Will Stop the Violence					
23-Mar	300	0	Constantia					
23-Mar	2,000	0	Kirstenbosch Peace Festival					
23-Mar	800	0	Cyril Ramaphosa - Crossroads					
23-Mar	1,500	30,000	Cyril Ramaphosa - Eastridge, Mitchell's Plain					
23-Mar	2,000	0	Grabouw					
23-Mar	500	0	Wellington					
23-Mar	300	0	Tulbaugh					
23-Mar	5,000	50,000	Peace rally - Elsie's River					
24-Mar	500	8,000	Cyril Ramaphosa - Kraaifontein					
24-Mar	0	60,000	ANC students					
24-Mar	200	0	Maitland Town Hall					
24-Mar	5,000	0	voter education					
24-Mar	5,000	0	repeat - voter education					
24-Mar	0	50,000	Mandela/Boesak					
24-Mar	30,000	0	voter ID					
24-Mar	0	10,000	Portlands, Mitchell's Plain					
24-Mar	0	1,000	Constantia					
24-Mar	0	2,000	Marion Institute					
28-Mar	0	8,000	Thornhill (Athlone)					
29-Mar	300	5,000	Montana					
29-Mar	0	30,000	ANC Tertiary...					
30-Mar	2,000	0	Women's League					
30-Mar	100	2,500	Mitchell's Plain					
31-Mar	200	1,000	Stellenbosch H.S. - people's forum				Posters	Leaflets
31-Mar	0	10,000	Norma - W. League (Xhosa)					
31-Mar	0	100,000	Norma - W. League (English)			TOTAL MAR:	89,850	772,500
1-Apr	300	20,000	Franklin Sonn					
4-Apr	0	10,000	Thornhill (Athlone)					

5-Apr	2,000	22,000	Youth League				
5-Apr	350	0	Cape Town Central				
6-Apr	2,000	0	Chris Hani commemoration				
6-Apr	5,000	0	Joe Slovo speaks - Hani commemoration				
6-Apr	500	125,000	Beware Kriel's New NP (English)				
6-Apr	500	0	Save the Cape from Racism				
6-Apr	1,000	0	Women's League - forum				
6-Apr	0	10,000	Stellenbosch				
7-Apr	200	5,000	repeat - Save the Cape from Racism				
7-Apr	2,000	100,000	repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP (Afrikaans)				
7-Apr	0	75,000	repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP (Xhosa)				
7-Apr	300	0	Meet the ANC: Sonn, Carolus				
7-Apr	1,000	5,000	Sohnge College, Worcester				
7-Apr	0	50,000	repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP (Xhosa)				
7-Apr	0	50,000	repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP (Afrikaans)				
7-Apr	0	100,000	repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP (English)				
7-Apr	0	5,000	Women's League				
7-Apr	0	6,000	Call of Islam				
7-Apr	0	4,000	women's forum				
8-Apr	400	10,000	Stellenbosch: Verwoerd, Manuel, Niehaus, Sonn				
8-Apr	200	2,000	Pniel				
9-Apr	300	0	Grassy Park				
9-Apr	300	5,000	mini-fest				
10-Apr	200	3,000	Bellville: Renetia Bernard				
11-Apr	15,000	200,000	Mandela festival (English)				
11-Apr	4,000	150,000	Olympics Off!				
11-Apr	1,000	10,000	Swellendam (Xhosa)				
11-Apr	0	20,000	Swellendam (Afrikaans)				
11-Apr	0	250,000	repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP				
11-Apr	0	10,000	Paarl				
13-Apr	800	3,000	Claremont: Jan van Eck				
13-Apr	400	0	Table View				
13-Apr	0	50,000	repeat: Mandela festival (Xhosa)				
13-Apr	3,000	150,000	Athlone: Mandela speaks				
13-Apr	300	0	Two Oceans				
13-Apr	1,500	0	Blue Downs				
13-Apr	300	0	Durbanville				
13-Apr	500	0	Tous River				
13-Apr	3,000	0	Come Hear Nelson Mandela Speak				
13-Apr	0	-40,000	Hanover Park				
13-Apr	0	260,000	Kriel's Cape Boerestaat				
13-Apr	0	150,000	Kriel's Cape Boerestaat				
13-Apr	0	100,000	Kriel's Cape Boerestaat				
13-Apr	0	10,000	Paarl: Boesak				
14-Apr	0	5,000	Kuils River: Manuel, Niehaus, Tshwete				
15-Apr	300	0	Paarl: Boesak				
15-Apr	200	0	Pinelands				
15-Apr	1,000	0	Hanover Park				
15-Apr	200	0	Paarl				

15-Apr	300	0	Worcester					
15-Apr	500	0	Steve Tshwete					
15-Apr	300	0	Kuils River					
15-Apr	300	0	Eitsig					
15-Apr	300	0	Ravensmead					
15-Apr	300	0	Kuils River					
18-Apr	600	0	Rocklands					
18-Apr	300	0	Strandfontein					
18-Apr	300	0	Paarl					
18-Apr	300	0	Thornhill (Athlone)					
18-Apr	300	0	Heathfield					
18-Apr	0	250,000	A Call from the Heart (English)					
18-Apr	0	100,000	A Call from the Heart (Xhosa)					
18-Apr	0	150,000	A Call from the Heart (Afrikaans)					
18-Apr	0	15,000	Rocklands					
18-Apr	0	10,000	Mrs. Shapiro					
19-Apr	300	0	Grassy Park					
19-Apr	200	0	University of the Western Cape					
19-Apr	2,000	0	Strand					
19-Apr	300	0	Borland					
19-Apr	5,000	0	Hout Bay					
19-Apr	1,200	0	Athlone					
19-Apr	0	20,000	Multeno					
19-Apr	0	15,000	voting station					
19-Apr	0	5,000	Belhar					
19-Apr	0	40,000	Blue Downs					
21-Apr	20,000	0	Mandela: Vote ANC					
21-Apr	3,000	35,000	Northern Suburbs					
21-Apr	0	30,000	Hout Bay					
21-Apr	0	3,000	Wynberg					
21-Apr	0	5,000	Macassar					
21-Apr	0	150,000	ANC Calling Special Votes					
21-Apr	0	8,000	Paarl				Posters	Leaflets
21-Apr	0	10,000	Worcester					
21-Apr	0	150,000	Mandela speaks			TOTAL APR:	83,850	3,011,000
TOTAL:	193,400	3,860,500						

NOTE: The data above is not entirely comprehensive, but is based on all records available from Allie's Press. It also does not include posters or leaflets paid for in cash by individual ANC branches. Allie's Press estimates that few leaflets and no more than 5,000 posters were produced on that basis.

2. African National Congress Campaign Materials

Received from the National Office During the 1994 Election Campaign

Western Cape Province

Compiled by Quentin Joseph, ANC, April 1995

Prepared by Matt Eldridge, April 20, 1995

Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town

Sorted chronologically

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ITEM TYPE</u>	<u>VOLUME</u>	<u>LANGUAGE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
31-Jan	badge	30,000	English	"Mandela for President" ***
16-Feb	manifesto	3,500	English	ANC manifesto*
16-Feb	manifesto	14,000	Afrikaans	ANC manifesto*
16-Feb	manifesto	24,000	Xhosa	ANC manifesto*
16-Feb	small flag	8,000	n a	ANC flag w logo in centre**
16-Feb	badge	8,000	English	"Mandela for President" ***
17-Feb	manifesto	72,000	Afrikaans	ANC manifesto*
3-Mar	poster	3,500	English	"Vote ANC for Women's Rights"
3-Mar	sticker	10,000	English	"Mandela for President"
3-Mar	manifesto	18,000	Xhosa	ANC manifesto*
7-Mar	sticker	120,000	English	"Mandela for President"
7-Mar	pamphlet	10,000	English	women's forums
7-Mar	pamphlet	32,000	Afrikaans	women's forums
7-Mar	pamphlet	5,000	Xhosa	women's forums
7-Mar	pamphlet	10,000	Sotho	women's forums
7-Mar	manifesto	5,000	Afrikaans	ANC manifesto*
9-Mar	manifesto	1,000	Afrikaans	ANC manifesto*
9-Mar	small flag	6,000	n a	ANC flag w logo in centre**
10-Mar	poster	20,000	English	"Jobs, Jobs, Jobs"
11-Mar	manifesto	6,000	English	ANC manifesto*
11-Mar	small flag	8,000	n a	ANC flag w logo in centre**
11-Mar	badge	16,000	English	"Mandela for President" ***
14-Mar	poster	10,000	Afrikaans	"Jobs, Jobs, Jobs"
14-Mar	sticker	70,000	English	"Mandela for President"
16-Mar	poster	25,000	English	ANC for youth
16-Mar	visor	92,000	n a	ANC ballot stripe on visor
16-Mar	"Zabalazo" booklet	1,000	English	for dignitaries, not for distribution
17-Mar	visor	8,000	n a	ANC ballot stripe on visor
18-Mar	small flag	50,000	n a	ANC flag w logo in centre**
18-Mar	badge	10,000	English	"Mandela for President" ***
21-Mar	poster	10,000	English	"Vote ANC for Peace"
21-Mar	poster	10,000	Afrikaans	"Vote ANC for Peace"
21-Mar	poster	10,000	Xhosa	"Vote ANC for Peace"
21-Mar	manifesto	500	English	ANC manifesto*
21-Mar	manifesto	3,000	Afrikaans	ANC manifesto*
23-Mar	poster	12,000	English	"Vote ANC for Free Education"
24-Mar	small flag	20,000	n a	ANC flag w logo in centre**
25-Mar	small flag	34,000	n a	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**
26-Mar	poster	20,000	Afrikaans	"Mandela for President"
26-Mar	poster	24,000	English	"Vote ANC" w/ Mandela's face
28-Mar	pamphlet	25,000	English	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"
28-Mar	pamphlet	29,800	English	future of youth

28-Mar sample ballot	660,000	Eng./Afks.	provincial ballot
29-Mar pamphlet	35,000	English	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"
29-Mar sample ballot	375,000	Eng./Afks.	national ballot
29-Mar sample ballot	40,000	Eng./Afks.	provincial ballot
30-Mar poster	16,000	English	"Vote ANC" w/ Mandela's face
31-Mar pamphlet	14,000	English	"Vote ANC for Peace"
1-Apr sticker	70,000	English	Mandela and children
1-Apr banner	70	English	ANC ballot stripe
1-Apr banner	145	English	Mandela and children
1-Apr billboard	21	unknown	metropolitan Cape Town (9), rural areas (10)
1-Apr badge	5,000	English	Mandela and children
5-Apr poster	7,500	Xhosa	"Mandela for President"
5-Apr sticker	20,000	English	"Mandela for President"
5-Apr pamphlet	445,000	Afrikaans	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"
5-Apr manifesto	20,350	English	ANC manifesto*
7-Apr poster	26,225	English	"Mandela for President"
8-Apr pamphlet	140,000	English	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"
8-Apr pamphlet	54,000	Xhosa	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"
8-Apr banner	16	English	ANC ballot stripe
8-Apr banner	10	Xhosa	ANC ballot stripe
8-Apr banner	48	Afrikaans	ANC ballot stripe
8-Apr poster	35,000	English	Chris Hani commemoration
8-Apr poster	8,000	English	Oliver Tambo commemoration
11-Apr poster	4,500	Afrikaans	"Mandela for President"
11-Apr poster	8,000	English	"Mandela for President"
11-Apr poster	3,000	Xhosa	"Mandela for President"
12-Apr pamphlet	210,000	Afrikaans	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"
12-Apr small flag	100,000	n a	ANC flag w. logo in centre**
12-Apr poster	6,000	English	Oliver Tambo commemoration
13-Apr poster	2,000	English	"Mandela for President"
13-Apr sticker	100,000	English	"I'm Voting ANC"
13-Apr manifesto	6,600	English	ANC manifesto*
14-Apr ballot sticker	165,000	Eng./Xhosa	ANC ballot strip, incl. logo, name, mark
15-Apr poster	68,000	English	Mandela and children
15-Apr sticker	20,000	English	Mandela and children
15-Apr sample ballot	220,000	Eng./Afks.	national ballot
15-Apr small flag	20,000	n a	ANC flag w. logo in centre**
19-Apr ballot sticker	800,000	Eng./Xhosa	ANC ballot strip, incl. logo, name, mark
24-Apr ballot sticker	800,000	Eng./Xhosa	ANC ballot strip, incl. logo, name, mark

* This is the figure that Western Cape ANC records show were delivered. A provincial ANC source says that the national office disputed this figure, claiming to have sent a greater number.

** This number does not include flags that were delivered before the period covered by these records.

*** This amount does not include badges that were delivered before the period covered by these records.

	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Total Posters:	0	0	160,500	168,225	328,725
Total Pamphlets Manifestos:	0	113,500	194,300	875,950	1,183,750
Total Stickers Badges:	30,000	8,000	226,000	1,910,000	2,174,000
Total Other:	0	8,000	1,294,000	410,310	1,712,310
TOTAL ITEMS:	30,000	129,500	1,874,800	3,364,485	5,398,785

3. African National Congress Campaign Materials

Received from the National Office During the 1994 Election Campaign

Western Cape Province

Compiled by Quentin Joseph, ANC, April 1995

Prepared by Matthew Eldridge, April 20, 1995

Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town

Sorted according to language

<u>LANGUAGE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>ITEM TYPE</u>	<u>VOLUME</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>		
Afrikaans	16-Feb	manifesto	14,000	ANC manifesto*		
Afrikaans	17-Feb	manifesto	72,000	ANC manifesto*	Feb:	86,000
Afrikaans	7-Mar	pamphlet	32,000	women's forums		
Afrikaans	7-Mar	manifesto	5,000	ANC manifesto*		
Afrikaans	9-Mar	manifesto	1,000	ANC manifesto*		
Afrikaans	14-Mar	poster	10,000	"Jobs, Jobs, Jobs"		
Afrikaans	21-Mar	poster	10,000	"Vote ANC for Peace"		
Afrikaans	21-Mar	manifesto	3,000	ANC manifesto*		
Afrikaans	26-Mar	poster	20,000	"Mandela for President"	Mar:	81,000
Afrikaans	5-Apr	pamphlet	445,000	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"		
Afrikaans	8-Apr	banner	48	ANC ballot stripe		
Afrikaans	11-Apr	poster	4,500	"Mandela for President"		
Afrikaans	12-Apr	pamphlet	210,000	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"	Apr:	659,548
Eng./Afks.	28-Mar	sample ballot	660,000	provincial ballot		
Eng./Afks.	29-Mar	sample ballot	375,000	national ballot		
Eng./Afks.	29-Mar	sample ballot	40,000	provincial ballot	Mar:	1,075,000
Eng./Afks.	15-Apr	sample ballot	220,000	national ballot	Apr:	220,000
Eng./Xhosa	14-Apr	ballot sticker	165,000	ANC ballot strip, incl. logo, name, mark		
Eng./Xhosa	19-Apr	ballot sticker	800,000	ANC ballot strip, incl. logo, name, mark		
Eng./Xhosa	24-Apr	ballot sticker	800,000	ANC ballot strip, incl. logo,	Apr:	1,765,000
English	31-Jan	badge	30,000	"Mandela for President" ***	Jan:	30,000
English	16-Feb	manifesto	3,500	ANC manifesto*		
English	16-Feb	badge	8,000	"Mandela for President" ***	Feb:	11,500
English	3-Mar	poster	3,500	"Vote ANC for Women's Rights"		
English	3-Mar	sticker	10,000	"Mandela for President"		
English	7-Mar	sticker	120,000	"Mandela for President"		
English	7-Mar	pamphlet	10,000	women's forums		
English	10-Mar	poster	20,000	"Jobs, Jobs, Jobs"		
English	11-Mar	manifesto	6,000	ANC manifesto*		
English	11-Mar	badge	16,000	"Mandela for President" ***		
English	14-Mar	sticker	70,000	"Mandela for President"		
English	16-Mar	poster	25,000	ANC for youth		
English	16-Mar	"Zabalazo" booklet	1,000	for dignitaries, not for distribution		
English	18-Mar	badge	10,000	"Mandela for President" ***		
English	21-Mar	poster	10,000	"Vote ANC for Peace"		
English	21-Mar	manifesto	500	ANC manifesto*		
English	23-Mar	poster	12,000	"Vote ANC for Free Education"		
English	26-Mar	poster	24,000	"Vote ANC" w/ Mandela's face		
English	28-Mar	pamphlet	25,000	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"		
English	28-Mar	pamphlet	29,800	future of youth		
English	29-Mar	pamphlet	35,000	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"		
English	30-Mar	poster	16,000	"Vote ANC" w/ Mandela's face		
English	31-Mar	pamphlet	14,000	"Vote ANC for Peace"	Mar:	457,800
English	1-Apr	sticker	70,000	Mandela and children		

English	1-Apr	banner	70	ANC ballot stripe		
English	1-Apr	banner	145	Mandela and children		
English	1-Apr	badge	5,000	Mandela and children		
English	5-Apr	sticker	20,000	"Mandela for President"		
English	5-Apr	manifesto	20,350	ANC manifesto*		
English	7-Apr	poster	26,225	"Mandela for President"		
English	8-Apr	pamphlet	140,000	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"		
English	8-Apr	banner	16	ANC ballot stripe		
English	8-Apr	poster	35,000	Chris Hani commemoration		
English	8-Apr	poster	8,000	Oliver Tambo commemoration		
English	11-Apr	poster	8,000	"Mandela for President"		
English	12-Apr	poster	6,000	Oliver Tambo commemoration		
English	13-Apr	poster	2,000	"Mandela for President"		
English	13-Apr	sticker	100,000	"I'm Voting ANC"		
English	13-Apr	manifesto	6,600	ANC manifesto*		
English	15-Apr	poster	68,000	Mandela and children		
English	15-Apr	sticker	20,000	Mandela and children	Apr:	535,406
n/a	16-Feb	small flag	8,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**	Feb:	8,000
n/a	9-Mar	small flag	6,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**		
n/a	11-Mar	small flag	8,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**		
n/a	16-Mar	visor	92,000	ANC ballot stripe on visor		
n/a	17-Mar	visor	8,000	ANC ballot stripe on visor		
n/a	18-Mar	small flag	50,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**		
n/a	24-Mar	small flag	20,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**		
n/a	25-Mar	small flag	34,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**	Mar:	218,000
n/a	12-Apr	small flag	100,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**		
n/a	15-Apr	small flag	20,000	ANC flag w/ logo in centre**	Apr:	120,000
Sotho	7-Mar	pamphlet	10,000	women's forums	Mar:	10,000
unknown	1-Apr	billboard	21	metropolitan Cape Town (9).	Apr:	21
Xhosa	16-Feb	manifesto	24,000	ANC manifesto*	Feb:	24,000
Xhosa	3-Mar	manifesto	18,000	ANC manifesto*		
Xhosa	7-Mar	pamphlet	5,000	women's forums		
Xhosa	21-Mar	poster	10,000	"Vote ANC for Peace"	Mar:	33,000
Xhosa	5-Apr	poster	7,500	"Mandela for President"		
Xhosa	8-Apr	pamphlet	54,000	"Five Reasons to Vote ANC"		
Xhosa	8-Apr	banner	10	ANC ballot stripe		
Xhosa	11-Apr	poster	3,000	"Mandela for President"	Apr:	64,510

* This is the figure that Western Cape ANC records show were delivered. A provincial ANC source says that the national office disputed this figure, claiming to have sent a greater number.

** This number does not include flags that were delivered before the period covered by these records.

*** This amount does not include badges that were delivered before the period covered by these records.

	<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Total English:	30,000	11,500	457,800	535,406	1,034,706
Total English/Afrikaans:	0	0	1,075,000	220,000	1,295,000
Total Afrikaans:	0	86,000	81,000	659,548	826,548
Total English/Xhosa:	0	0	0	1,765,000	1,765,000
Total Xhosa:	0	24,000	33,000	64,510	121,510
Total Sotho:	0	0	10,000	0	10,000
Total not applicable (n/a):	0	8,000	218,000	120,000	346,000
Total unknown:	0	0	0	21	21
TOTAL ITEMS:	30,000	129,500	1,874,800	3,364,485	5,398,785

APPENDIX E: Newspaper Advertising Data

List of Western Cape ANC Campaign Advertisements Collected

date	publication	page	header	description
February 18	<i>Argus</i>	8	Should Anyone Walk Away from the Elections? You Be the Judge.	list of 6 ANC election law proposals
February 18-22	<i>South</i>	7	Our Plan: 2. Putting a Stop to Crime and Violence.	statement w/ 5 highlighted points
February 23	<i>Argus</i>	7	Just How Fair Is <u>the</u> Cape?	Mbeki photo, msg. announcing his arrival to investigate issues in WC
February 24	<i>Argus</i>	21	Our Plan: Why Ten Years Free Quality Education Makes Sense.	Mandela looking through hole in (school?) wall
February 24	<i>Argus</i>	14	These Are the People Who Will Bring Jobs, Peace and Housing to the Western...	ANC candidate lists, Boesak photo, map, msg.
February 25-March 3	<i>Weekly Mail and Guardian</i>	12-13	Our Plan: 3. Making Education Free and Equal for All.	2-page spread, pencil w/ nails bent back, statement
February 26-27	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	18	The ANC Stands for the Protection of All People's Property. Which Is Why We're...	statement on Delft illegal squatter occupation
February 26-27	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	7	How Will the ANC Preserve the Proud Tradition of the Muslim Community?	note of Mbeki Muslim people's forum, statement
February 27	<i>Sunday Times</i>	8-9	Our Plan: 4. Building Houses and Improving Services	2-page spread, bricks in fresh mortar, statement
March 1990	<i>Cosmopolitan</i>	208	I Have Prayed. I Have Laughed. I Have Sung. And I Have Cried. But Until Now..	2-page spread, 1 w/ quote, other w/ profile of woman
March 4-8	<i>Southeaster</i>	8	(same as above)	
March 5-6	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	11	We Can't Live in Peace and Have Dignity If We're All Living in the Same House.	"crowded" bold white letters on black background

date	publication	page	header	description
March 6	<i>Sunday Times</i>	n/a	Our Plan: 5. Improving the Lives of Women.	2-page spread, bucket & mop w/ mikes, statement
March 20	<i>Sunday Times</i>	30-31	This year, the NP is spending 3 times more on each White pupil than on each...	group of young black students writing on floor
March 20	<i>Sunday Nation</i>	16-17	(same as above)	
March 23	<i>Cape Times</i>	7	The National Party Government Is Said to Run Guns and Hit Squads. Don't Let...	photos of Kriel and de Klerk
March 25-26	<i>Southeaster</i>	5	495 000 people in the Western Cape don't have jobs because of the NP.	"unemployment" line
March 25-29	<i>Southeaster</i>	8	The NP spends 3 times more on educating White pupils than Coloured, African...	group of young children staring out broken windows
March 26-27	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	19	Ten years of free, quality education for every child is exactly what this country...	Archie Vergotine endorsement
March 26-27	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	17	I call on all God-fearing, decent, principled people to join me in saving...	Franklin Sonn endorsement
April 2-3	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	11	(same as above)	
April 2-3	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	13	The ANC has a workable plan for the half a million unemployed people in the...	Ngconde Balfour endorsement
April 3	<i>Sunday Nation</i>	9	What the NP Is Doing... What the ANC Will Do.	NP column 3 photos, ANC column jobs, ed., peace
April 4	<i>Southern Suburbs Tattler</i>	4	Join Us and Vote ANC	pictures of 20 endorsers
April 8-12	<i>Southeaster (South)</i>	5	Only the ANC has the broad support to realise the proud vision of Sheik Yusuf...	Achmat Davids full-page endorsement
April 10	<i>Sunday Nation</i>	9	It Takes a Brave Person to Fight. But a True Hero to Make Peace.	Hani speaking at microphone
April 10	<i>Rapport, Metro</i>	5	(same as above but in Afrikaans)	
April 15	<i>Cape Times</i>	4	(same as above)	
April 15	<i>Cape Times</i>	5	(same as above)	
April 17	<i>Sunday Times, Metro</i>	8	This Is the Reality of 46 Years of National Party Rule...	woman standing over casket

date	publication	page	header	description
April 17	<i>Sunday Times, Metro</i>	7	Apartheid's Men Still Want to Run the Cape. Now Is the Time for You to Stop...	mugshots of Kriel + 4
April 17	<i>Sunday Times, Metro</i>	n/a	(same as above)	
April 17	<i>Sunday Times</i>	11	After April 27 there will be something more important than an ANC government	2-page spread: Mandela photo opposite statement
April 17	<i>Sunday Nation</i>	16-17	(same as above)	
April 17	<i>Rapport, Metro</i>	5	(same as above but in Afrikaans)	
April 22	<i>Argus</i>	n/a	(same as above)	
April 23-24	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	32-33	Racism...a dirty word for a dirty attitude and dirty tricks. On April 27 YOU in...	Trojan Horse photo of SAP shooting
April 23-24	<i>Weekend Argus, Special</i>	7	(same as above)	
April 23-24	<i>Cape Times</i>	n/a	(same as above)	
April 23-24	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	17	The Whole World Wants to See a Change. Vote ANC	single bold white statement on black, short msg. below
April 23-24	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	21	We add our voices to the people who trust the ANC to build a better life for all in...	detailed list of endorsements by "sectors"
April 23-24	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	19	Unite the People of the Cape. Vote ANC	bold white letters on black background
April 23-24	<i>Weekend Argus</i>	23	For the people of the Western Cape, there is only one choice.	Boesak portrait
April 24	<i>Sunday Times, Metro</i>	15	Now, on April 27 Where Are <u>You</u> Going to Put Your Cross? Stop the National...	6 crosses w/ names of dead, e.g. Biko (COSATU)
April 24	<i>Sunday Times</i>	24	Working Together with the People, the ANC Has Won the Right for All South...	truncated ballot w/ x in space next to ANC
April 24	<i>Sunday Nation</i>	3	(same as above)	
April 24	<i>Rapport, Metro</i>	3	(same as above but in Afrikaans)	
April 24	<i>Sunday Times</i>	28	KwaZulu/Natal Deserves the ANC Plan	2-columns comparing IFP/NP deeds to ANC plan

date	publication	page	header	description
April 24	<i>Sunday Times, Metro</i>	17	For 46 Years the National Party took away everything, except our dignity. Don't...	Black text on white background
April 24	<i>Rapport, Metro</i>	13	(same as above but in Afrikaans)	
April 24	<i>Sunday Times, Metro</i>	6-7	Dear Friends Our hour has almost come...	2-page spread: Boesak portrait opposite letter
April 24	<i>Rapport, Metro</i>	8-9	(same as above but in Afrikaans)	
April 27	<i>Cape Times</i>	9	The NP Has No Plan. But It Does Have a Record of Failure. The ANC Has a Plan...	2 columns: NP "failures", ANC plan item-to-item
April 27	<i>Cape Times</i>	8	Let us vote in such overwhelming numbers that we show everyone how...	Mandela portrait, quote, statement
n/a	<i>n/a</i>	n/a	Look Through the Chaos to Find Hope.	dot matrix pattern puzzle
n/a	<i>n/a</i>	n/a	Our Plan: 2,5 Million Jobs and Free Education	multiracial group photo of kids, people of diff. "jobs"
n/a	<i>n/a</i>	n/a	Why We're Going to Vote for the Regional ANC [in Afrikaans]	white on black header, statement, endorsements

APPENDIX F: Data on Themes of Campaign Speeches

Note: themes are coded as absent (0), weak (1) or strong (2). Includes only data on top 13 "strong" themes, and not Q&A periods.

Completed: December 1995

date	location	speaker	dom. theme	education	peace, crime,	fears of ANC, Africans	racism	equality, inclusive, nonracial	unempl., jobs	houses	plan/RDP	NP	de Klerk	Mandela	Kriel	morality, religion
13-Feb	Retreat	Mandela	RDP	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0
17-Feb	CT Civic	Manie	RDP	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0
25-Feb	UCT	Mbeki	IFP	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
27-Feb	Athlone	Mbeki	relig.	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	2
28-Feb	Claremont	Manuel	RDP	2	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0
28-Feb	Claremont	Pandor	women	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
28-Feb	Claremont	van Lek	fears	1	2	2	2	1	0	2	0	2	1	0	1	1
5-Mar	Rylands	Naidoo	fears/RDP	2	1	2	0	0	1	2	2	2	0	1	1	0
5-Mar	Rylands	Ngcuka	NP/RDP	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	0
5-Mar	Rylands	Asmal	RDP	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	2
6-Mar	Sea Point	M. Verwoerd	women	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	0
9-Mar	Athlone	Manie	RDP	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0
9-Mar	Athlone	Benjamin	education	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
11-Mar	UCT	Hlolomisa	Bop	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	1	0
15-Mar	Mowbray	Benjamin	education	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
15-Mar	Mowbray	Pandor	education	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
16-Mar	Athlone	Gabru	education	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
16-Mar	Woodstock	Nissen	RDP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
16-Mar	Woodstock	Omar	nonracialism	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
16-Mar	Woodstock	Essop	NP	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	2	0
17-Mar	UWC	Naidoo	motivate religion	2	0	0	0	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0
22-Mar	Cape Town	Bocsak	religion	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
22-Mar	CT Civic	Manuel	investment	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
26-Mar	M. Plain	Manuel	NP	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	2	0	1	0
26-Mar	M. Plain	Ramaphosa	RDP/fears	1	1	2	1	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
27-Mar	R'bosch	Ramaphosa	racism/fears	0	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	0	0
27-Mar	Athlone	Sonn	NP/fears	2	2	2	0	0	2	1	0	2	2	1	2	2
27-Mar	Athlone	Ramaphosa	RDP/racism	0	2	0	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	0
2-Apr	CT Good Hope	Hope/Mandela	religion/Isiar	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
8-Apr	CT City Hall	Villa-Vincer	racism	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	2

APPENDIX G: Advertised List of Candidates for Provincial Parliament†

<u>rank</u>	<u>name</u>	<u>race</u>	<u>sector</u>
1.	Allan Boesak	coloured	church
2.	Cameron Dugmore	white	activist
3.	Vincent Diba	African	activist
4.	Lerumo Kalako	African	activist
5.	Johnny Issel	coloured	activist
6.	Ms. Hilda Ndude	African	local government
7.	Chris Nissen	coloured	church
8.	Ebrahim Rasool	coloured	muslim
9.	Ms. Tasneem Essop	coloured	COSATU
10.	Leonard Ramatlakane	African	COSATU
11.	Ms. Nomaindla Mfeketho	African	civic
12.	Russel McGregor	coloured	COSATU
13.	Rose Sonto	African	civic
14.	Ms. Lynne Brown	coloured	education
15.	Tony Ruiters	coloured	COSATU
16.	Yusuf Gabru	coloured	education
17.	Garth Strachan	white	SACP
18.	Joe Cupido	coloured	health
19.	Ms. Rampi Ramotsamai	African	civic/women
20.	Ms. Nontsikilelo Mgayiya	African	civic/women
21.	Ms. Virginia Engel	coloured	development
22.	Enver Daniels	coloured	activist/law
23.	Ms. Theresa Solomon	coloured	activist
24.	Ms. Rashieda Abdullah	coloured	muslim
25.	Noel Williams	coloured	rural
26.	Lanval Reid	coloured	rural
27.	Sorub Oosthuizen	coloured	rural/union
28.	Ms. Rhoda Joemat	coloured	education
29.	Stan Nyongwana	African	youth
30.	Lizo Ngqunwana	African	Umkhonto we Sizwe
31.	Mcebisi Skwatsha	African	youth
32.	Ms. Connie September	coloured	COSATU
33.	Arthur Jacobs	coloured	civic
34.	Dhesigen Naidoo	Indian	COSATU
35.	Ms. Xoliswa Sibeko	African	women
36.	Mbulelo Grootboom	African	rural
37.	Ben Tengimfene	African	sports
38.	Lizo Kapa	African	civic
39.	Ms. Zora Mehlomakulu	African	civic
40.	Mandla Gxanyana	African	COSATU
41.	Neville Naidoo	Indian	youth
42.	Ms. Nobom Sonto	African	women

†Only the information contained in the first two columns was advertised by the ANC -- see the *Argus*, February 24, 1994, p. 14. Data for the "race" and "sector" columns were provided by Strachan. The list includes 20 coloureds, 18 Africans, 2 whites and 2 Indians, and 14 women and 38 men. Please note that this list differs slightly from the final list submitted to the IEC (see Appendix H).

APPENDIX H: Final List of Candidates for Provincial Parliament‡

<u>rank</u>	<u>name</u>	<u>race</u>	<u>sector</u>
1.	Allan Boesak	coloured	church
2.	Cameron Dugmore	white	activist
3.	Vincent Diba	African	activist
4.	Lerumo Kalako	African	activist
5.	Johnny Issel	coloured	activist
6.	Ms. Hilda Ndude	African	local government
7.	Chris Nissen	coloured	church
8.	Ebrahim Rasool	coloured	muslim
9.	Ms. Tasneem Essop	coloured	COSATU
10.	Leonard Ramatlakane	African	COSATU
11. *	Ms. Lynne Brown	coloured	education
12.	Russel McGregor	coloured	COSATU
13.	Rose Sonto	African	civic
14. *	Ms. Rampi Ramotsamai	African	civic/women
15.	Tony Ruiters	coloured	COSATU
16.	Yusuf Gabru	coloured	education
17.	Garth Strachan	white	SACP
18.	Joe Cupido	coloured	health
19. *	Ms. Nontsikilelo Mgayiya	African	civic/women
20. *	Ms. Virginia Engel	coloured	development
21. *	Ms. Theresa Solomon	coloured	activist
22.	Enver Daniels	coloured	activist/law
23. *	Ms. Rashieda Abdullah	coloured	muslim
24. *	Ms. Rhoda Joemat	coloured	education
25.	Noel Williams	coloured	rural
26.	Lanval Reid	coloured	rural
27.	Sorub Oosthuizen	coloured	rural/union
28. *	Ms. Connie September	coloured	COSATU
29.	Stan Nyongwana	African	youth
30.	Lizo Ngqunwana	African	Umkhonto we Sizwe
31.	Mcebisi Skwatsha	African	youth
32. *	Ms. Xoliswa Sibeko	African	women
33.	Arthur Jacobs	coloured	civic
34.	Dhesigen Naidoo	Indian	COSATU
35. *	Ms. Nobom Sonto	African	women
36.	Mbulelo Grootboom	African	rural
37.	Ben Tengimfene	African	sports
38. *	Ms. Vivien Taylor	coloured	?
39. *	Mandla Gxanyana	African	COSATU
40. *	Neville Naidoo	Indian	youth
41. *	Ms. Florence de Villiers	white	?

‡Source: "Notice 294 of 1994, Independent Electoral Commission, Publication of Lists of Candidates," *Government Gazette*, Pretoria: Government Printer, vol. 345, no. 15618, March 31, 1994. The list includes: 21 coloureds, 15 Africans, 3 whites, and 2 Indians, and 14 women and 37 men. A * indicates where changes were made to the list of provincial candidates advertised in February 1994.

APPENDIX I: Methodology

In this appendix, I outline my methodology for examining the principal reasons for and ramifications of the ANC's defeat in the Western Cape. I begin by exploring six research questions and explain why I have chosen them. In light of these questions, I then detail my approach for gathering and assessing empirical data. I note the types of evidence I sought to collect, and how I collected them, measured them, and determined their validity and reliability.

Research questions

I derive my first two research questions from the assumption that the ANC's campaign may have been influenced by contextual factors such as the history of the province, socioeconomic similarities or differences between ethnic groups, the electoral system and voters' political attitudes. I attempt to examine the possible role of these factors by posing the following questions:

1. How might the history, demographics and electoral system of the Western Cape have influenced ANC strategy, and how did they?
2. What impact might knowledge of voters' political attitudes have had on ANC strategy, and what was the actual impact?

I also assume that the ANC's key strategic decisions may be discernible, and that additional contextual factors such as intraparty dynamics and the issue of ethnicity may have affected these decisions. My four remaining research questions thus include the following:

3. What primary strategic decisions did the ANC make and why?
4. What were the internal dynamics of these decisions at the provincial level?
5. How did the ANC's national campaign priorities affect the development of its provincial strategy?
6. What was the role of ethnicity in shaping ANC strategy, and how did the ANC address the "coloured question," given its commitment to nonracialism yet predominantly African membership?

Types of evidence to be collected

Based on my research questions above, I decided to collect three main categories of evidence. First, expert analyses of key historical events and trends, important demographic features, and the origins and nature of the electoral system would help me to answer question number one. Since I had no great knowledge of any of these subjects, I would have to rely on conclusions of other scholars and information they cite. Second, with regard to question two, survey research findings might indicate what the crucial political attitudes among the electorate were.

The third category of evidence would apply to all of the questions. Two particular kinds of information would be useful: a) perspectives of individuals inside the campaign and b) available evidence of campaign appeals to voters. Perspectives might offer insight on what the strategic decisions were, how they were made and what factors were involved. Evidence of appeals might reflect the party's strategic decisions, and indicate the extent to

which the perspectives could be substantiated by observable data. It seemed to me that crucial features of these appeals would include the following:

- method of delivery, whether through speeches, posters, leaflets or newspaper advertisements⁵⁰
- volume
- location
- themes

Data collection

Secondary sources

Secondary research enabled me to locate evidence in the first two categories above. Writings by experts on Western Cape history and the development of the electoral system provided essential information and analyses. I found useful data and observations on Western Cape demographics in a chapter written by Robert Mattes, Hermann Giliomee and Wilmot James. Also, a report prepared by Mattes for the Human Sciences Research Council on the political impact of opinion polls in South Africa's 1994 elections offered particularly helpful analysis, and data from a wide range of surveys.⁵¹

Interviews

Primary research -- conducting interviews, observing events, gathering materials and compiling other data -- provided evidence in the third category. I chose to pursue

⁵⁰Parties had agreed to ban political advertising on television throughout the campaign, and to permit radio advertising only during the final weeks before the election.

⁵¹See footnotes in Chapters One and Two for more information on these sources.

interviews with individuals at three different levels of the campaign: provincial managers, party candidates and grassroots organizers. See Appendix A for a list of the interviews I conducted. I reasoned that those who ran the campaign might give me invaluable input on strategic decisions in which they may have participated personally. Candidates and local organizers, on the other hand, might share how they perceived strategic decisions as “insiders” who generally operated outside of campaign headquarters. How their views compared to those of provincial managers might tell me something about intraparty decision making and the flow of information, either from the campaign leadership downwards, or from the grassroots toward the top.

Observing events, gathering materials

Attending rallies and collecting materials proved the most complex and time-consuming of my research efforts. I chose to focus on several mostly coloured and some white areas near Cape Town in which at least some speeches and materials were likely to be in English. These included the communities of Athlone, Bellville, Cape Town, Claremont, Grassy Park, Hout Bay, Mitchell's Plain, Mowbray, Retreat, Rondebosch, Sea Point, Steenberg, Table View and Woodstock. I also gathered evidence in a few Afrikaans-speaking, largely coloured communities, including Delft, Grabouw, Kleinvlei and Macassar, and in the Xhosa-speaking, almost exclusively African township of Guguletu.

I chose these target areas based on the following assumptions:

- given that the electoral system was a form of proportional representation, parties might concentrate on the most highly populated areas -- I anticipated that the ANC would direct most of its appeals toward communities in the Cape Town metropolitan area

- since polls suggested that up to one-third of the electorate was undecided and most undecideds were coloured, a) the ANC might focus efforts on coloured areas near Cape Town and b) by observing activities and gathering data in those communities, I might be able to obtain a useful sample of the party's efforts provincially⁵²
- observing and collecting most information in English would maximize my efficiency and the breadth of information I could gather -- after all, I did not speak Afrikaans or Xhosa, the other two main languages in the Western Cape, and having data translated into English would pose time and financial costs
- observing at least a few events and collecting some materials in Afrikaans and Xhosa would give me an idea, with the help of translation, of whether these appeals were roughly similar to those the party was using in English

Following on these assumptions, I decided to make observations in and gather materials from targeted areas in four particular ways:

1. attend and take handwritten notes at as many ANC rallies and events as possible
2. compile public statements and documents issued by the campaign

⁵²I later found support for this assumption from my interviews. ANC officials identified most of the coloured communities I had chosen as the ANC's primary target areas, and indicated that the bulk of the party's efforts took place there. See Chapters Four and Five.

3. gather samples of canvassing materials and posters
4. collect campaign advertisements from major Western Cape newspapers

See appendices for lists of rallies and events both observed (Appendix B) and scheduled (Appendix C), and newspaper advertising data (Appendix E).

Compiling other data

I sought to obtain other data from the ANC and relevant contractors on its event scheduling, provincial newspaper advertising, leaflet and poster production, and receipt of materials from the party's national campaign headquarters. I compiled weekly lists of scheduled campaign events. The ANC's advertising agency in the province, Hunt Lascaris, gave me information on which national newspaper ads were run in the Western Cape, when and in which publications.

To complement these data, Prof. Eve Bertelsen of UCT's English Department allowed me to copy her nearly comprehensive collection of ANC newspaper ads. Her contribution greatly supplemented my own, limited compilation of ads from the *Argus*, *Cape Times*, and *Weekly Mail and Guardian*.

The ANC produced all of its provincial leaflets and posters through one printing company, Allie's Press. This firm provided me nearly complete records of what kind of items were created, how many, when and, in some cases, for which geographic area (see Appendix D). Also, the provincial ANC received many materials from the national office -- the party kept a record of these and allowed me access to it.

Data measurement

I decided to weigh my primary research data in two separate categories: qualitative and quantitative. With respect to qualitative data such as notes from speeches or interviews, I broadly sought to identify main points and themes, and make generalizations about them. In regard to quantitative information, I attempted to measure ANC campaign appeals through a detailed content analysis of speech themes, event locations, and language use in posters and leaflets. (See Appendix F for a matrix of themes used in observed speeches, and a description of the methodology used to prepare it).

Validity and Reliability

Representativeness and bias

The wide range of data, materials, observations and interviews included in my research offers critical information for answering the research questions outlined above.

Admittedly, much of my evidence reflects an urban bias. The fact that I gathered the vast majority of my data in the greater Cape Town area means that I excluded rural communities, with the exception of Grabouw, and other large towns such as Hermanus, Worcester or Atlantis. Nevertheless, the ANC's records and my interviews with campaign leaders suggest that the bulk of the party's resources were devoted to the areas which I covered. Thus, despite my focus on urban data collection, I believe that my evidence may be largely representative of campaign efforts throughout the province.

With regard to my collection of newspaper advertisements, the ANC and its advertising agency were only able to provide me comprehensive data on those *national* ads which appeared in the Western Cape. Hunt Lascaris and its parent company in Johannesburg,

Eurospace Africa, refused -- allegedly due to staffing constraints -- to give me any information on the particular ads placed by the *provincial* ANC campaign. My collection of ads includes many of the provincial ones, but I do not necessarily have a representative sample or know in which publications they appeared. In addition, my provincial ANC leaflet and poster production data from Allie's Press are, for the most part, comprehensive. Allie's Press, however, admits that its records omitted a few orders placed by the provincial campaign office and others by individual ANC branches.

I believe that my interviews with senior campaign officials have given me a useful range of perspectives on provincial-level decision making. Interview subjects included many, though not all, key players in the campaign leadership. Some did not make themselves available for comment, despite persistent attempts over a period of several months -- e.g., Allan Boesak, Bulelani Ngcuka and Trevor Manuel. In any case, while the views reflected in my interviews do not represent a complete spectrum, they perhaps mark a generally representative one. I would add that my decision to interview only a few candidates and branch-level organizers means that I cannot necessarily draw sweeping conclusions from their comments. Rather, their viewpoints may only suggest what those of other individuals at their levels of the campaign might be.

The fact that I held my interviews after the elections means that the comments of those interviewed must be considered carefully. Interview subjects' perceptions of campaign decisions and events might have shifted in the period since they took place -- recollections of details may have become less clear, and interpretations may have changed based upon subsequent input. Subjects also may have tempered their comments to me for fear of divulging secrets useful to political opponents. In addition, the ANC's loss in the region, among a host of other factors, may have further influenced their remarks. For example, they may have wished to put a certain, political "spin" on the

election outcome. These concerns do not eliminate the usefulness of the interviews, they merely caution one from viewing these statements uncritically.

It is important to note that, even though many of my data are largely representative of the ANC's efforts provincially, one should be cautious about drawing conclusions from it. The existence of correlations, of course, does not necessarily imply a causal link. Take speeches by candidates at rallies and events, for example. What if I show that, in my sample of observed remarks, candidates consistently mentioned affirmative action more than any other issue? This does not necessarily mean that the party -- the Western Cape ANC -- held affirmative action to be *the most important issue*. This kind of sweeping conclusion would depend on a host of factors, such as the extent to which the campaign leadership briefed candidates on what issues to highlight, the degree to which candidates abided by leaders' guidance, and whether this varied from area to area, or time to time. It would be perhaps more reasonable to conclude, in this case, that affirmative action was *an important issue* to the ANC and that its prominence in candidates' remarks probably reflects this. I qualify my analysis of speech themes further in Chapter Five.

Validity

My assumptions may be subject to falsification. For instance, I chose to focus on coloured areas based on the assumption that the ANC would be doing the same. If someone were able to show that, despite campaign leaders' stated intentions and my strong evidence of this focus, a) there actually were a significant number of events and resources devoted to African areas, and b) most of these events and resources were not documented or widely publicized outside of these areas, then my conclusions about this focus would be seriously weakened. The ANC could be said to have run two *major* campaigns, each having *significant* emphasis but different levels of profile. My

interviews with ANC leaders who were responsible for efforts in these areas suggest that this was not the case, but if it were then it would at least partly falsify my analysis.

This reasoning holds true for my urban bias and language focus assumptions as well. For example, if one could demonstrate that a) significant, unreported efforts took place in rural areas that relied on local resources, and b) these represented a significant part of the campaign even though provincial leaders were not aware of them or would not say, then my assumption about an urban focus would be partly incorrect. Or, if campaign appeals in Xhosa-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking areas actually differed greatly from those in English-speaking ones, then my findings based mainly on English appeals would not be nearly as representative as I assume.

APPENDIX J: Selected Political Cartoons


Sources



Cartoons appearing in body of dissertation:

Page xii: *Cape Times*, February 24.
Page 6: *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, March 11-17.
Page 34: *Cape Times*, April 22.
Page 53: *Cape Times*, April 13.
Page 71: *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, April 15-21.
Page 104: *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, February 11-17.
Page 120: *Cape Times*, March 31.
Page 142: *Cape Times*, April 15.
Page 155: *Weekend Argus*, April 2-3.

Cartoons in this appendix (in order of appearance):



n/a
Weekly Mail and Guardian, April 15-21.
Cape Times, March 10.
Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 11-17.
Cape Times, March 15.
Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 25-30.
Cape Times, February 22.
Weekly Mail and Guardian, February 25 to March 3.
Cape Times, April 19.
Weekend Argus, April 16-17.
Cape Times, April 28.
Cape Times, March 8. (Madam & Eve series)
Cape Times, March 18.
Cape Times, March 17.
Cape Times, March 14.
Cape Times, March 15.
Cape Times, March 10.
Cape Times, March 11.
Cape Times, March 21.
Cape Times, March 22.
Cape Times, March 29.
Cape Times, March 30.
Cape Times, March 31.
Cape Times, March 25.
Cape Times, April 4.
Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 31 to April 7.
Weekly Mail and Guardian, April 22-28.
Cape Times, April 18.
Cape Times, April 14.
Cape Times, April 12.
Cape Times, April 28.






MADAM & EVE



BY S. FRANCIS, H. DUGMORE & RICO



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




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Madam and Eve

By Francis, Dugmore and Schacherl




It's time to clean house.

The **MADAM & EVE** PARTY


Whatever you want , we promise to get it.

Gwen Anderson Eve Sisulu






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
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"Pick your polling station . . . That queue's for the Good Hope Seminary, that one's for the Civic Centre, that one's for Salt River Market Hall and that one's for the Good Hope Centre."

OKAY NOW! FOR TWO MINUTES ...
AS AGREED... HOLD HANDS!






"No ... wait ... look ... it's me!"



"And now an entrant from South Africa, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who has refused to compete against anybody else and is showing his form in his own solo event — skating on thin ice."



ZAPIRO © 2-94 with a nod to Ted Geoghegan




That grand old leader of the Volk.
 He had three thousand men.
 He marched them into the land of Bop.....




..... And marched them out again.

ZAPIRO 1973

**THE FIRST LITTLE PIG
 HAD A HOUSE OF STRAW**



**THE SECOND LITTLE PIG
 HAD A HOUSE OF STICKS**



**BUT THE THIRD LITTLE PIG
 HAD A HOUSE OF ILLICIT
 SEMI-AUTOMATIC WEAPONS,
 COURTESY THE S.A.P.**



ZAPIRO © 1973

