STRAWSON'S CONCEPT OF A PERSON AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY

A thesis presented to the University of Cape Town
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Arts in Philosophy.

by

A.L. RICHTER

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Supervised by B.P.P. Keaney, Ph.D.
and A. Abramovitz, Ph.D.

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PART I

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this work I shall introduce Strawson's concept of a person and elucidate its ontological and epistemological aspects. I shall then examine criticisms of Strawson's work, and deal with Strawson's general approach, the origins and development of his work, and, finally, the implications of his concept of a person for psychology.

Strawson's essay on "Persons" first appeared in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume 11.[1.] This essay was then revised and became a chapter (ch. 3, pg. 87-116) in Strawson's book "Individuals".[2.] I shall be referring to this second work. It is important to see this chapter on persons as part of the book as a whole, therefore I shall deal with Strawson's overall aims, particularly in Chapter 4, though we will be limited to a close analysis of this chapter only.

Strawson calls his work in "Individuals" "descriptive metaphysics", which he says "... is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world".[3.] Thus, it is our conceptual structure (or conceptual scheme) that he is attempting to describe - no small task!

1. Ed. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958. pg. 330-353.
2. Lowe & Brydone, London, 1959, reprinted in paperback edition, Methuen, London, 1964, hereafter referred to as I.
3. I. pg. 9.

"Individuals" is divided into two parts. "The first part aims at establishing the central position which material bodies and persons occupy among particulars in general. It shows that, in our conceptual scheme as it is, particulars of these two categories are the basic or fundamental particulars, that the concepts of other types of particular must be seen as secondary in relation to the concepts of these." [1.] The second part of the book aims to "establish and explain the connection between the idea of a particular in general and that of an object of reference or logical subject". [2.]

The acceptance of the basicness of material bodies shall not be argued for here. What I am concerned with is the second basic particular - viz. persons. Persons, then, for Strawson, although having much in common with material bodies, constitute a type, or category, quite distinct from them. So we turn now to an examination of this concept.

1. I. pg. 11.
2. I. pg. 11-12.

CHAPTER II

PERSONS

Strawson begins with the point that "... one's states of consciousness, one's thoughts and sensations are ascribed to the very same thing to which these physical characteristics, this physical situation, is ascribed".[1] This gives rise to two questions: "Why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?" and "Why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc.?"[2]

In attempting to answer these two questions Strawson begins by examining the unique role which each person's body plays in experience. He shows us why everyone should have a very special regard for just one body; why it is unique and privileged. But the complex uniqueness of a person's body does not explain "... why I should have the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my thoughts and experience to anything".[3] That is, states of consciousness (thoughts etc.) are dependent on the body (necessary causality) but do not belong to the body. So, having the concept of the body does not explain the concept of the subject, and the concept of the person, at all.

Strawson then proceeds to assess two opposing theories that try to take account of the facts. What these two theories have in common is a belief that the concept of a subject (or person) is wrong or confused. Strawson's question: "why do we ascribe states of consciousness to the very same thing to which we ascribe physical characteristics, etc.?",

1. I. pg. 89.
2. I. pg. 90.
3. I. pg. 93.

is a question that does not arise in the first theory, for there is no common owner of both types of predicates. This is the Cartesian theory and it leaves us with Strawson's first question, viz., "why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?"

The second theory holds that: "... it is only a linguistic illusion that one ascribes one's states of consciousness at all, that there is any proper subject of these ascriptions, that states of consciousness belong to, or are states of, anything". [1.] This theory Strawson calls the No-ownership theory. It holds that the uniqueness of the body gives rise in us to the idea that one's experience can be ascribed to (possessed by) a particular thing; though in "reality" it is mistaken to ascribe states of consciousness to some thing.

Strawson criticizes these two theories (see Ch. 3 part 3) and concludes that they both fail to take account of all the facts. The no-ownership theory, although rightly showing that the role of the body is only a necessary and not sufficient explanation that one's states of consciousness are ascribed to something, still wrongly"... involves the denial that states of consciousness are anyone's". [2.]

The crucial fact that both theories do not recognize, according to Strawson, is this: "... that it is a necessary condition of ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself". [3.] It is important to emphasize here that one need not, but must be prepared to (i.e. it must be possible to) ascribe to others what one ascribes to oneself. Thus Strawson's point here is a logical point. (See his footnote on page 99.)

1. I. pg. 94.
2. I. pg. 98.
3. I. pg. 99.

The meaning of this is that, no matter whether the subject is oneself or another, the ascription (of states of consciousness) is used in just the same sense, i.e. the meaning is the same in both cases. Strawson says:

> "Of course the thought that this is so gives no trouble to the non-philosopher: the thought, for example, that 'in pain' means the same whether one says 'I am in pain' or 'He is in pain'. The dictionaries do not give two sets of meanings for every expression which describes a state of consciousness: a first-person meaning and a second-and-third person meaning. But to the philosopher this thought has given trouble. How could the sense be the same when the method of verification was so different in the two cases..."[1.]

(Strawson remarks that self-ascription might seem strange - for there is no method of verification in the case of oneself; there is no identifying. But this strangeness disappears when we remember that, primarily, we speak to others.) A point that is not stressed in Strawson's work is the reversibility of his axiom. Thus it is also a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness to others that one be prepared to ascribe them to oneself. So self- and other-ascriptions of P-predicates are interdependent.

Thus Strawson's 'crucial fact' perhaps explains how one ascribes states of consciousness to oneself, given that one can ascribe them to others. We must now inquire just how it is that we can ascribe states of consciousness to others. And it is here that we see the inadequacy of the Cartesian theory and the No-ownership theory. As Strawson briefly puts it: "One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one

1. I. pg. 99.

can identify other subjects of experience. And one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects of experience, possessors of states of consciousness".[1] And thus Strawson's initial questions are answered, since it is a necessary condition of ascribing states of consciousness at all that they be ascribed to the very same thing to which certain corporeal characteristics, etc. are ascribed, irrespective of whether they are self- or other-ascriptive.

And with these facts we are led to acknowledge the primitiveness and the primacy of the concept of a person. A person is a type of entity "... such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type".[2] So we see that states of consciousness cannot be ascribed at all unless they are ascribed to persons. One can ascribe states of consciousness to animals and material objects, but then clearly this is a metaphorical, anthropomorphic or animistic usage. With regard to animals Strawson says: "Any description we can give ... of their experience must be in terms of concepts derived from ours".[3] Strawson talks of "attenuated" ascriptions for the ascription of states of consciousness to anything that is not a person.

Strawson's concept of a person, then, has implications for the concept of a pure individual consciousness (the pure ego). Strawson says that this cannot exist, in the primary sense of existence, or, rather, it is not a primary concept, but is rather a secondary, non-primitive, derived concept - to be explained in terms of, or derived from, the concept of a person. Strawson shows the relevance of his analysis to

1. I. pg. 100.
2. I. pg. 102.
3. P.F. Strawson: "The Bounds of Sense", pg. 273.

the work of both Hume and Kant. Hume was seeking after this pure individual consciousness for the principle of unity, but his search was in vain for there is no principle of unity without a principle of differentiation. Kant accorded this pure consciousness a formal unity. But this unity accompanied all thought and therefore may as well have accompanied none, for it was empty. Kant simply neglected the empirical concept of a subject of experience. [1.]

Summarizing Strawson's view then:

> "... the word 'I' never refers to this, the pure subject. But this does not mean, as the no-ownership theorist must think, that 'I' in some cases does not refer at all. It refers; because I am a persom among others; and the predicates which would, per impossible, belong to the pure subject if it could be referred to, belong properly to the person to which 'I' does refer. The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not to be analyzed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima ... A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego might be a disembodied person, retaining the logical benefit of individuality from having been a person". [2.]

Strawson's definition of a person as a 'both-and' entity gives rise to a "rough division" in the types of predicates than can be ascribed to persons. The first type of predicate than can be ascribed to persons can also be ascribed to material bodies (which are also basic, primary particulars) - these are M-predicates. Examples are: 'weighs 10 stone',

1. See "The Bounds of Sense", Part III, (ii) Soul. pg. 163-174.
2. I. pg. 103.

'is in the room', etc. The second kind of predicates are the predicates that we ascribe to persons; for example, 'is smiling', 'is going for a walk', 'believes in God', 'is in pain', etc. - these are P-predicates. However, not every P-predicate can strictly be said to ascribe a state of consciousness. But what P-predicates may be said to have in common is that they always imply the possession of consciousness in that thing to which they are ascribed (though metaphorical use is possible).

Now there is no sense in talking of identifiable individuals of a special type that possesses both M- and P-predicates (i.e. persons) "... unless there is in principle some way of telling, with regard to any individual of that type, and any P-predicate, whether that individual possesses that P-predicate. And, in the case of at least some P-predicates, the ways of telling must constitute in some sense logically adequate kinds of criteria for the ascription of the P-predicate". [1.]

So one ascribes P-predicates to others, then, on the basis of observation of behaviour, and these behavioural criteria are not merely signs of the presence of what is meant by a P-predicate, but constitute criteria of a logically adequate kind. But this is only half the picture, since when one ascribes P-predicates to oneself one does not generally ascribe them on the basis of behaviour (though in some cases one might). M-predication, in contrast, is epistemologically simpler, since both self and other ascribing M-predicates rely on observation; i.e. there is only one general criterion for their application irrespective of person (first or third) or thing.

1. I. pg. 105.

So generally we use different criteria for ascribing P-predicates to oneself and to others (first and second-and-third person usage). And here we need to recognize the very special character of P-predicates; in the learning process neither is self-P-predicate ascription primary, nor is other-P-predicate ascription primary, - "Both these pictures are refusals to acknowledge the unique logical character of the predicates concerned".[1] As Strawson puts it:

> "... it is essential to the character of these predicates (i.e. P-predicates) that they have both first and third-person ascriptive uses, that they are both self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis of observation of the behaviour of the subject of them, and other-ascribable on the basis of behaviour criteria. To learn their use is to learn both aspects of their use. In order to have this type of concept, one must be both a self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such predicates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber. In order to understand this type of concept, one must acknowledge that there is a kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the basis of observation of the subject of the predicate and not on this basis, i.e. independently of the observation of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject".[2]

Now to refuse to accept this is to refuse to accept the structure of the language in which we talk about P-predicates. That is all right, Strawson remarks, for one can give up talking, but what is not acceptable "... is simultaneously to pretend to accept that structure and to refuse to accept it; i.e. to couch one's rejection in the language of that structure".[3]

1. I. pg. 108.
2. I. pg. 108.
3. I. pg. 109.

This implicit acceptance but explicit refusal to accept the structure of our language is characterized by the sceptic and the behaviourist. Both these philosophies are blind to either one aspect of P-predication - the self-ascriptive use, or the non-self-ascriptive or other-ascriptive use. What happens in either case is that one aspect is taken as self-sufficient, which we have seen to be false, and as a result the other aspect becomes highly problematical. Thus when the self-ascriptive aspect of P-predicates is taken as primary (or self-sufficient) we arrive at scepticism; and when the other-ascriptive aspect of P-predicates is taken as primary (or self-sufficient) we arrive at behaviourism. Either way a gap opens between the behavioural criteria and the actual state of consciousness (experience) and we are forced into two different meanings for each P-predicate - which is obviously false: "Rather, it is essential to the single kind of meaning that they (P-predicates) do have, that both ways of ascribing them should be perfectly in order". [1.] Thus in investigating the nature of P-predicates it is essential to keep in mind the structure of the language to which they belong. And the concept of a person is thus intimately connected with the structure of our language.

So Strawson's two initial questions are answered in admitting the primitiveness of the concept of a person - and with it, the unique character of P-predicates. But we can still ask what natural facts make it intelligible that we should have this concept of a person (besides the trivial answer that there simply are people in the world). Strawson tries to answer this by "... moving a certain class of P-predicates to a central position in the picture", [2.] viz. predicates involving action, predcates which involve intentionality; for example, 'going for a walk', 'writing a letter', etc. The point is that we see such movements (behaviour) in

1. I. pg. 110.
2. I. pg. 111.

others as actions and interpret them in terms of intentions. Thus "... we see others as self-ascribers, not on the basis of observation, of what we ascribe to them on this basis". [1] So the concept of agency is central, then, to the definition of the person and the ascription of P-predicates.

Strawson says that he is not attempting to solve the problem of other minds or justify our beliefs about other minds. A solution or justification he has argued is impossible. (Though he has shown, in a sense, that the problem of other minds and the mind-body problem are both pseudo-problems as traditionally stated.) What he suggests is "... that it is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature". [2] This suggestion brings Strawson close to the phenomenological approach in philosophy.

The last part of the chapter on "Persons" is concerned more with the philosophical implications of Strawson's theory. Briefly, having touched on the notion of a common human nature, Strawson goes on to deal with the concept of a community nature, the concept of a group mind. We do sometimes talk of groups of human beings in terms of their members thinking, feeling or acting 'as one'. But Strawson suggests that "... it is a condition for the existence of the concept of an individual person, that this should happen only sometimes". [3] Thus in our world the concept of an individual person is taken as a starting point - and a natural starting point.

1. I. pg. 111.
2. I. pg. 112.
3. I. pg. 114.

In the very last section of the chapter on "Persons" Strawson deals with the concept of a pure individual consciousness and its 'survival' after the death of a person. He has already shown that pure individual consciousness has no primary existence, being derived from the concept of a person (hence there being no traditional mind-body problem), but could have a "logically secondary existence". Thus although we can conceive of ourselves surviving after death, this disembodied existence has certain consequences, namely, that strict disembodied survival is strictly solitary and one could never know if there were other members of its class (solipsistic survival), and secondly, that "... in order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of himself as _dis_embodied, as a _former_ person".[1.] Strawson says that such a view of disembodied survival "... may well seem unattractive" and quips that it is for this reason, most probably, that the orthodox have insisted on the resurrection of the body.

1. I. pg. 116.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF STRAWSON'S CONCEPT OF A PERSON

Strawson's work, "Individuals", has been expounded and criticized by many philosophers. In this chapter I shall deal with just some of the specific criticisms of the chapter on Persons.

Of the criticisms of "Persons" many may seem at first to show fundamental differences, but this is by and large not so. A large proportion of the reviews of "Persons" grant much of what Strawson says to be true. Much disagreement, we shall see, turns out to be simply restatement.

Strawson's concept of a person has been challenged on many grounds, but the bulk of criticism has been concerned with his 'everyday' epistemology - viz. our knowledge of ourselves and other people. We have already seen how Strawson's concept of a Person steers a middle path between solipsism and behaviourism. He thus faces attack from defenders of both these poles. However the attack from the sceptical side has been the strongest, so I shall begin with it. These philosophers that attack from the sceptical point of view are not necessarily sceptics themselves - (we could call some of these people phenomenologists rather than sceptics) - for their emphasis is on the experiential (1st person) approach (or a total experiential approach) as opposed to the 'behaviourist' (third person) approach.

The sceptical disagreement (or rather, as we shall see, restatement) with Strawson concerns his use of behavioural criteria as being "logically adequate" for the ascription of P-predicates. Strawson himself admits that behaviour can be faked, but still maintains that this is reconcilable with

'x-behaviour provides logically adequate evidence for x-feeling'. Mundle, in "A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy", by over-emphasizing the possibility of faking, disagrees with Strawson, and on these grounds maintains that your evidence of my feeling x (e.g. pain) falls short of my certainty that I am x (in pain). Mundle, of course, is right in certain cases (the trivial cases of bluffing one's feelings, deliberately keeping back one's thoughts and feelings, etc.) but Strawson's point is that in our ordinary every day experience, observed evidence generally does give us certainty, in many cases, of the observed's feelings, etc.; we don't just believe that A is feeling x, we often really know it (an intuitive knowledge). And thus, observed evidence is a logically adequate <u>criterion</u>. It is <u>logically</u> adequate for it is in accordance with the structure of our language. This structure Strawson calls 'logico-linguistic'.[1] The point is that it is not logical in the strict formal sense. Also it is a <u>criterion</u> (logically adequate no doubt) rather than an all-weather proof.

Ayer, I think, is more subtle and realistic; he says: "Can we significantly divorce our thoughts and our emotions from their characteristic expressions in action or in speech? ... Human behaviour ... is itself expressive of these thoughts and feelings and purposes; and this is how we actually see it. From the outset we observe it <u>as</u> human behaviour with all that this implies".[2] This clearly has strong similarities with phenomenology (especially that of Merleau-Ponty). But Ayer nevertheless maintains that however natural this process may seem it remains at bottom a process of <u>interpretation</u>. This emphasis on interpretation, however inexplicit, forces a distinction between the sign and what it signifies;

1. See P.F. Strawson, "Logico-Linguistic Papers" and "Introduction to Logical Theory".
2. A.J. Ayer, "The Concept of a Person and Other Essays", pg. 97.

between the 'outer' and the 'inner'. In this light Ayer interprets what Strawson could mean by logically adequate criteria; he says: "So the reason why behavioural criteria can be said to be logically adequate is that even though they are not infallible (e.g. Faking - where 'inner' and 'outer' are clearly distinguishable) their overall success is logically guaranteed".[1.] So, Ayer continues: "... there is a difference between my believing that I am justified in accepting a given proposition and my really being so; and not only that, but a belief in a proposition may be justified without the proposition's being true".[2.]

It is the justification of this belief, for Ayer, that bars the sceptical approach to the problem of one's knowledge of other minds (for Strawson, other people). So Ayer fundamentally accepts Strawson's middle way, having only quibbled about Strawson's 'logically adequate criteria'. Ayer, however, ignores Strawson's 'ontological' ideas and his appeal to the structure of our language, both which affect his epistemological position.

Locke, in "Myself and Others" also fundamentally agrees with Strawson. He shows, rightly I think, that Strawson is concerned with identification (of particulars) and not verification, though Strawson himself does use the latter term which leads to some confusion. Locke says:

> "... and all that the point about identification amounts to is that we must be able to identify which conscious state and which person we are talking about. To move from these to the stronger claim that if we are to talk about conscious states at all we must be able to tell whether others do possess various conscious states, is to opt for a grossly implausible verificationism".[3.]

1. A.J. Ayer, op. cit., pg. 100. Brackets and emphasis are mine.
2. ibid., pg. 105.
3. D. Locke, "Myself and Others", pg. 147.

Locke thus maintains that if we are going to ascribe states of consciousness to others or ourselves it is certainly necessary to know what we are saying. But it is not necessary to know whether what we are saying is true or not. In this light Locke prefers to use the term "warranting-conditions" rather than Strawson's "logically adequate criteria".[1] Again, is this not restatement? Many philosophers are worried about this term - especially the adverb "logically" - cropping up in an essentially linguistic and behavioural setting. Again I must refer you to Strawson's "Introduction to Logical Theory" which we shall discuss in Chapter 5.

Locke sees that the truth underlying Strawson's argument from Persons (as well as from the argument from criteria and the argument against a private language) is that: "... if there is to be any way at all of teaching and explaining 'feels a pain' then there must be some publicly observable phenomena which provide some justification for saying that someone feels a pain".[2] So we have knowledge of other people's minds only insofar as our 'belief' in other minds is correct. It is possible to be mistaken in this belief. Locke's point is that we must accept what people say and do as evidence (criteria) for what goes on 'inside' if we are going to talk of an inside or a mind in the first place. This of course implicitly points to Strawson's appeal to the structure of our language.

Aune too [3] attacks Strawson's behavioural criteria - he claims that they are not of a logically adequate (sufficient) kind, but rather they are conceptually adequate (but that this does not support the metaphysics

1. D. Locke, op. cit., see pg. 152-153.
2. ibid., pg. 158.
3. B. Aune: "Feelings Moods and Introspection", Mind, vol. LXXII, 1963.

of private access); again a wariness about "logical" being applied to language and behaviour. Aune, too, seems to back up Strawson's point about the structure of our language, for he says that we have linguistic conventions such that if verbal responses do not agree with the rest of the observed behaviour then we are generally enjoined to say that the person is making a verbal slip, or is pretending (dissembling) etc. "Pretending", Wittgenstein has remarked: "is, of course, only a special case of someone's producing (say) expressions of pain when he is not in pain ... A child has much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can it be sincere)". [1.]

Hamlyn, in "The Theory of Knowledge", also attacks Strawson's claim that one need only be prepared to ascribe P-predicates to others - but actually need not - for a person may be perfectly prepared to do so but may claim that there are no others to whom this P-predicate can be ascribed. This sceptic, Hamlyn says, must be distinguished from Strawson's "true solipsist", "... who says that it is meaningless to talk of states of mind other than his own; for the logical principle invoked entails that it must make sense to ascribe them to other subjects than oneself, whether there actually are any". [2.]

Hamlyn too criticizes Strawson's concept of "logically adequate criteria" and calls it an "obscure notion". However, I think Hamlyn takes this concept out of Strawson's context; he says:

> "The truth is that we ascribe states of mind to others neither on the direct, noninductive basis implied by talk of logically adequate criteria nor on the basis of an analogy from our own case.

1. L. Wittgenstein: "Philosophical Investigations", pg. 228-229 e.
2. D.W. Hamlyn: "The Theory of Knowledge", pg. 238.

The former implies that the meaning of a given mental concept is to be given entirely in terms of certain forms of behaviour; the latter implies that it is given in terms of our own private experiences (in terms of our own case, as Wittgenstein puts it). The meaning of concepts of this kind certainly depends on inter-personal and public behavioural criteria; it presupposes characteristic and normal ways in which states of mind are expressed, and for this reason it is not open to any of us to doubt the possibility of other minds existing at all; such a doubt would be unintelligible". [1.]

And thus we see that Hamlyn as well as Ayer, Locke and Aune, although purporting to criticize, fundamentally agree with Strawson's epistemological position which shows the middle way between scepticism and behaviourism and shows the dependence (though often kept tacit) of the one on the other. So although we can replace the notion "logically adequate criteria" with some other notion, the point is that it will not affect Strawson's basic epistemological position.

Much less criticism of Strawson's work has been attempted from the behaviourist side. Coval, in "Scepticism and the First Person", tries to push Strawson to the limits of symmetry between first and third-person ascriptions. He says: "... self-ascriptive P-utterances are not a better ground for scepticism, nor more problematic, than are first-person M-utterances". [2.] He attempts to close the gap entirely between self and other ascriptions of P-predicates: "The availability of sufficiently

1. D.W. Hamlyn, op. cit., pg. 239.
2. S.C. Coval: "Scepticism and the First Person", pg. 101.

similar circumstances leaves P-discourse in as unproblematic a state as M-discourse, its necessary and usual contrast". [1] Strawson I think has successfully tried to break the basic asymmetry between first and third person (P-) ascriptions - (which has been the history of the philosophy of Mind, says Coval) but still maintains an 'asymmetry' in the application of criteria for the ascription of P-predicates, which Coval, I think, overlooks. For we simply do ascribe pain, for example, to others and ourselves on different criteria.

Thus, having reviewed criticism from both sides, in the 'epistemological' domain Strawson has had very little ground to shift.

Another of the main criticisms of Strawson's work centres around the ontological domain of the concept of a person. As Williams, in his review of "Individuals", says: "It is very hard, taking the book as a whole to resist the impression that this emphasis is in some way connected with the question of the reality or ontological status that is to be ascribed to various types of thing ..." [2] This view is actually supported by Strawson's own conclusion to his book "Individuals"; he says: "... so perhaps ... persons and material bodies are what primarily exist". [3] Williams questions the validity of Strawson's claim. Williams says: "Strawson never really produces an argument to show that basicness in identification is the only, or the chief, such criterion (of reality, primacy) ... This seems to be an incompleteness within the range of 'descriptive metaphysics'". [4]

1. S.C. Coval, op. cit. pg. 113.
2. B.A.O. Williams: "Mr Strawson on Individuals", Philosophy, vol. 36, 1961, pg. 321.
3. I. pg. 247.
4. B.A.O. Williams, op. cit., pg. 322. Brackets mine.

Mundle questions the whole ontological project: "Strawson's key principles for identifying particulars have implications concerning the temporal order in which we acquire concepts; but, I want to say, they have no ontological implications ... A Cartesian could concede that we cannot acquire the concept of an immaterial soul unless we have first acquired the concept of a person ... Do any ontological conclusions follow?" [1.] Urmson strangely prefers to admit the incoherence involved in maintaining that observation does not 'equal' experience, and yet both observation and experience separately provide sufficient conditions for the ascription of P-predicates, rather than claim primitiveness for the concept of a person. [2.]

In defense Danto compares persons to 'wavicles' (as in physics); he says: "It is instructive to note how close Strawson's concept is to the whole concept of a person in ordinary usage .. Polanyi, for instance .. would emphasize that this ordinary concept cannot, at present, be rendered comprehensible in scientific terms". [3.] This last aspect we shall deal with in relation to Psychology, but it is interesting here to compare Danto's view (and Polanyi's) to Harré and Secord, who although also generally agreeing with Strawson's and Hampshire's [4.] anthropomorphic concept of a person, see much value in its being formalized to some extent, and therefore of more use in a scientific concern (e.g. social psychology). We must keep in mind the point of formalization; as Ziff points out:

> "In consequence, in contrast with any natural language, a formal logic and formal languages in general appear to have the undeniable virtues of precision and clarity. But these virtues are purchased at a cost: the cost is the utter

1. C.W.K. Mundle: "A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy". pg. 147.
2. See J.O. Urmson: Note on "Individuals", Mind, vol. LXX, No. 278. pg. 258-264.
3. A.C. Danto: "Persons", in "The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy", vol. 6, pg. 113.
4. See S. Hampshire: "Thought and Action".

> inutility of the formal language as a language with which to communicate in the world in which we find ourselves".[1]

But with regard to formalization for example, in social psychology, the "virtues" of precision and clarity are not as great as in, say, physiology (compare for example, the concept of action and the concept of response in terms of formalizability) i.e. formalization is a matter of degree. The concept of a person I shall show, has certain limitations in regard to formalization, for it is inextricably tied to ordinary (natural) language usage; and being a 'holistic' concept it naturally defies precision. But this does not prevent the possibility of some degree of formalization where "person" is taken as a psychological or 'theoretical' term.

Our "ontic commitment"[2] to persons is I think, quite clear, but to show ontological priority is much more difficult. Although basically agreeing with Strawson about the ontological 'secondariness' of states of consciousness (mind), there are interesting defenses for the (primary) existence of disembodied individuals. One defense is given by Lewis in "The Elusive Mind". Lewis denies Strawson's initial starting point by saying that we do not ascribe states of consciousness and physical characteristics to the very same thing. He says: "I should ... wish to add that my real self is my mind, and that it is only in a derivative and secondary sense that my body is said to be myself at all ... my body is not something that I _am_, but something that I _have_, and here linguistic usage, if that were what we should appeal to, is on our side".[3] Lewis talks of an "elliptical" sense of ascription to the body. This appeal to linguistic usage is not, however, successful. We talk of _having_ a mind also. We talk of having and

1. P. Ziff: "Understanding Understanding", pg. 57.
2. see W.V.O. Quine: "Word and Object", Ch. 7, "Ontic Commitment". pg. 233-276.
3. H.D. Lewis: "The Elusive Mind", pg. 151.

being both a body and a mind; "being", when we associate the body or mind with the person - which we can only be, not have. In defense of Strawson, I think one phenomenological lesson must be learnt - viz., that we don't have bodies as we have tables - we must distinguish between a body (e.g. a corpse) and a lived body - which is in many cases, the body of a person. (This is related to Merleau-Ponty's idea of the "ambiguity" of the body. [1.])

Other attempts made to defend 'immaterial individuals' usually appeal to previous philosophers. For example, J. Moulder [2.] tries to defend 'Platonic Persons'. Zeno Vendler, in "Res Cogitans", tries to defend the Cartesian view. These philosophers, however, do not wholeheartedly accept Plato's or Descartes' view. Vendler, for example, puts forward an interesting theory that "Minds are individuated by the subjective perspective that marks a significant portion of one's thoughts ..." [3.] but continues: "... which perspective is a function of the spacio-temporal continuity of one's sentient body". [4.] One can certainly talk of person's having subjective perspectives - which bypasses discussion of minds being functions of bodies, etc. But disembodied existence (former subjective perspectives) for Vendler, seems about as unattractive as Strawson's view.

Another criticism of Strawson's work centres around his concept of a P-predicate. Williams shows that Strawson's discussion features 'states of consciousness'; and ascriptions of states of consciousness are only a sub-class of P-predicates. What is not made clear is the extent of P-predication. Harré and Secord interpret Strawson as saying that P-predicates can be applied only to entities that are conscious; this view they reject and prefer:

1. See M. Merleau-Ponty: "Phenomenology of Perception".
2. J. Moulder: "In Defence of Immaterial Persons". Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, No. 1, 1972, pg. 38-55.
3. Z. Vendler: "Res Cogitans", pg. 195.
4. ibid., pg. 195.

"... to think of a series of gradually stronger necessary conditions culminating in full self-consciousness and self-awareness, for calling a thing a person, rather than a total discontinuity between persons and non-persons. In this view, sufficiently advanced robots might be considered people for some purposes; even a talking chimpanzee might be similarly regarded". [1.]

They call this the 'weaker' thesis. They see person predication as forming a bodily-mental spectrum.

We have seen however that Strawson does admit of an attenuated usage of P-predicates (to animals, robots). Thus Williams' belief, also, that "A vast range of words which to persons ascribe actions can without any hesitation be applied to machines ..." [2.] can, I think, be incorporated in Strawson's theory. Even Ayer's argument (with a hypothetical example to show that a child who never encountered any other persons would not necessarily be prevented from ascribing P-predicates to himself if taught by a machine to describe his 'inner' states, etc..) would break down since the machine must be programmed (and manufactured) by a person - and thus the child could ascribe 'attentuated' P-predicates to the machine (who represents, as it were, other people).

No doubt the concept of attenuation is still rather unclear, but I would like to suggest that we could talk of degrees of attenuation; i.e. from more to less attenuation in going from rocks to chimps, or from simple to complex robots.

1. R. Harré and P.F. Secord: "The Explanation of Social Behaviour". pg. 7-8.
2. B.A.O. Williams, op. cit., pg. 330.

Strawson has already shown how central and important the concept of action is to the concept of a person. This is Hampshire's point too in "Thought and Action"; he says: "The deepest mistake in empiricist theories of perception, descending from Berkeley and Hume, has been the representation of human beings as passive observers receiving impressions from 'outside' of the mind, where the 'outside' includes their own bodies. In fact I find myself from the beginning able to act upon objects around me ..." [1.] Hampshire maintains that we exist not only as passive observers but also as active experimenters, and in full accordance with the Strawsonian position, shows that we could never be passive observers unless we were sometimes active experimenters, and vice versa - we could not be experimenters unless we were sometimes observers. Hampshire, perhaps better than Strawson, grasps the social import of being a person.

Langford, in "Human Action" says: "relations between persons ... are social relations that differ logically from relations between material things." [2.] Hamlyn also believes that there is a radical disparity between the types of relationship that a person can have - with other persons and with material objects. He maintains that with the latter the relationship is rather contingent. However: "This is far from true of the concept of a person, and a case can be made for the thesis that no proper understanding of the concept of a person can be had in independence of an understanding of the concept of a human relationship. If this is so, it is not surprising that a philosophical elucidation of knowledge of persons ... is a complex matter". [3.] The above is not so much a criticism of Strawson, as a point of elucidation and broadening of his work.

1. S. Hampshire: "Thought and Action", pg. 47.
2. G. Langford: "Human Action", pg. 67.
3. D.W. Hamlyn, op. cit., pg. 248.

Perhaps the most important elucidation here would be the ethical implications of the concept of a person; the ethical priority of persons over things - i.e. 'treat people as people, not things'. Versfeld, for example says: "I am trying to make the important suggestion that knowledge of persons is prior to knowledge of things, that we know things in terms of persons and not vice versa, and that any meaning which we find in nature is derivative from the meaning of persons". [1.] A Marxist analysis of the concept of a person (and the concept of a material object) would be interesting here, but, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this work. The ethical (and sociological and political) domain in general is also too large to enter into here.

In conclusion I think Strawson manages to withstand his numerous critics. His concept of a person remains substantial even though some of its tenets are weakened, while some are merely rephrased.

1. M. Versfeld: "Persons", pg. 17.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF STRAWSON'S INQUIRY

Strawson's work "Individuals" is an attempt to describe the structure of our thought - thus the term "descriptive metaphysics". It is important to note that Strawson wishes to describe and not to explain our conceptual scheme. This brings out the ties of his approach with the later Wittgenstein and the ordinary language analysts, and also with phenomenology.

Strawson, if classified at all, would be called a linguistic analyst, for he certainly approaches the 'problem' of the person <u>through</u> language. Some people would be surprised, however, at his being called a phenomenologist. Nevertheless, in "Individuals" I think he is very close to the phenomenological approach. Natanson describes the philosophical approach of Strawson (and Hampshire) as "... egological, descriptive, and in a sense ... phenomenological." [1] Ayer says of phenomenology: "Whatever phenomenologists may think they ought to be doing, what the best of them in fact do is to study concepts at work". [2]

Tugendhat, in "Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology", tries to define the subject matter of philosophy: "... its subject-matter seems to be our knowledge of the structure of all conscious experience, of the structure of understanding in general, not merely of linguistic understanding." [3] He maintains that some of the recent work like that of Strawson and Hampshire seems to lead in that very direction. Manser sees a danger in all this:

1. M. Natanson: "Literature Philosophy and the Social Sciences", pg. 41.
2. A.J. Ayer: "Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XXXIII, 1959, pg. 121.
3. E. Tugendhat: "Description as a Method of Philosophy" in: "Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology". Ed. W. Mays and S.C. Brown, pg. 261.

> "If one starts an investigation with a belief in some underlying scheme, then one is liable to distort the facts to make them fit, and it seems that this is what Strawson in fact does in "Individuals". I cannot here demonstrate this in detail, though in fairness to Strawson I must add that I do not think he intends 'descriptive metaphysics' to replace philosophy, but rather to constitute one section of it". [1.]

Descriptive metaphysics, though not trying to replace all philosophy, certainly does make a good starting point - what other starting points can Manser offer? Strawson, himself, shows concern for what metaphysics is: "So if metaphysics is the finding of reasons, good, bad or indifferent, for what we believe on instinct, then this has been metaphysics". [2.] Ayer in his Aristotelian Society Paper [3.] believes that any purely descriptive philosophy is unlikely to be of much interest unless it is in the service of some theory and has as its aim the elucidation of some philosophical problem. Strawson's work certainly has a theory behind it, and is in the service of many puzzles, e.g. the mind-body problem, the problem of other minds, etc. If one wanted to classify Strawson's theory it could be called a version of the Double-Aspect Theory. [4.]

Of the phenomenologists, I think Strawson is closest to Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's "embodied subject", and the "ambiguity" of the body, find their parallel in Strawson's "person", and the 'ambiguity' of the ascription of predicates of the body - for both M- and P-predicates are ascribable.

1. A. Manser: "Phenomenology as the Method of Philosophy" in: "Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology". Ed. Mays and Brown, pg. 277.
2. I. pg. 247.
3. See A.J. Ayer, op. cit., pg. 123-124.
4. See K. Campbell: "Body and Mind", pg. 114-115.

Merleau-Ponty also makes an interesting distinction between the phenomenal and the reflexive (or transcendental) field of our consciousness. This relates to Strawson's argument for the primacy of the person. Strawson tries to give a "rational account" for "... beliefs, and stubbornly held ones, of many people at a primitive level of reflection ..."; and later he says: "... for what we believe on instinct." [1.] These beliefs (or instinct) are part and parcel of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenal field, or pre-reflexive field (rather than primitive reflection). Merleau-Ponty's main thesis [2.] is to show the dependence of the reflexive, transcendental field on the phenomenal field.

Thus justifying our beliefs about other people is only necessary in the formal mode; in Merleau-Ponty's terms, in the reflexive field; for inter-subjectivity is given in the phenomenal field. Objective thought (i.e. reflexive consciousness) gives rise to solipsism, and to solve this problem we must "shed doubt upon objective thought" [3.] by returning to the phenomenal field. The backbone of this theory is found in Merleau-Ponty's earlier book "The structure of Behaviour". [4.] Ishiguro, I think rightly believes:

> "... that the primacy of the concept of the person, to which bodily and mental predicates are ascribable, is needed not merely to solve the 'other minds' problem, but in order to state it. However, it might be argued that the problem only arises when one doubts one's immediate intuitive awareness of other persons, and proceeds to look for a justification of how we come to

1. I. pg. 247.
2. In "Phenomenology of Perception".
3. M. Merleau-Ponty: "Phenomenology of Perception", pg. 350.
4. Where Merleau-Ponty shows, via the inadequacy of the classical behaviourist and the Gestalt school, that in psychology a dialectical approach rather than a mechanical or causal one must be taken.

know their existence. The question is then shifted from the plane of immediate intuitive awareness (i.e. from an ontological level) on to that of formal knowledge (i.e. a logical one). It is only on the latter level that a logical justification for the existence of others becomes necessary". [1]

Perhaps the only real, valid criticism of Strawson's work concerns the limitation of the application of his theory in "Individuals". Strawson talks of '<u>our</u>' conceptual scheme as if it had universal application, and seems to treat 'our' concepts of subject and predicate, person, and material object as belonging to the changeless central core of human thinking. Mundle, in his "Critique of Linguistic Philosophy", quotes Tsu-Lin Mei who shows that Strawson's scheme does not hold for Mandarin. Tsu-Lin Mei accuses Strawson of "linguistic imperialism" and says: "discredited is the school of ordinary usage, since one of its prominent representatives, himself a logician of note, is shown to be unaware of what his statements are about". [2] This is one variation of the Whorfian hypothesis. [3] The criticism is quite powerful, for it seems that, if Tsu-Lin Mei is right, we must just resign ourselves to accepting the limitations (relativity) of Strawson's 'descriptive metaphysics' - viz. that it applies to the ordinary world (and perhaps also the scientific world) of English-speaking and structurally similar language-speaking people. Here two points are important, firstly the fact that all human languages are 'translatable' defends Strawson's thesis; and secondly, Strawson's "modesty"; Toulmin, in "Human Understanding", shows that:

1. W. Mays: "Introduction" in "Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology". Ed. W. Mays and S.C. Brown, pg. 16. See also: H. Ishiguro: "A Person's Future and the Mind-Body Problem" in Mays and Brown (Ed.) pg. 163-178.
2. Tsu-Lin Mei: "Subject and Predicate, a grammatical preliminary". Philosophical Review, 1961, pg. 175. Quoted in C.W.K. Mundle: "A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy", pg. 126.
3. See B.L. Whorf: "Language Thought and Reality".

"Strawson's final conclusions are ... much more modest than those of Kant's position. The bounds of sense reflect the conditions of linguistic intelligibility, given human life and language as we know them. Conversely, given a non-human life and communication-system (or 'language') sufficiently unlike those we know, it becomes quite conceivable - even if only hypothetically, as a matter of science fiction - that there might be other, independent and non-overlapping 'realms of sense'. Within such an alternative realm, thinkers might understand each other perfectly well, even though our own attempts to make contact with them were all doomed to frustration. There would, accordingly, be nothing intrinsically 'non-rational' about their thought and language; their modes of talking and thinking, reasoning and acting would merely be 'rational' in ways different from, and incommensurable with, our own". [1.]

This second type of linguistic 'relativity' does not weaken Strawson's view that at least some of our everyday concepts: "... are the coping stones of our thinking; try to remove them, and our thought wholly collapses". [2.] This second type of linguistic 'relativity' seems superficially to give rise to 'comparative metaphysics' - but this of course becomes quite impossible if the "realms of sense" are non-overlapping at all. It is, rather, within our human language group, that we ought to look for alternatives to descriptive metaphysics; Toulmin, I think, points to one, viz., that of 'evolutionary metaphysics'; he says that a priori forms of rational thinking, universal deep structures, etc., are "... exceptions to our evolutionary account of the development of collective concept-use,(and),

1. S. Toulmin: "Human Understanding", vol. 1, pg. 427.
2. J. Passmore: "A Hundred Years of Philosophy", pg. 529.

we can bring these too within our scope ... (they) then represent - quite as much as those of (say) physics - the provisional end-products of cultural evolution". [1] In this light descriptive metaphysics is not incompatible with evolutionary metaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics may be quite valid for 'plateau' periods in our evolution.

Here we may pause to think about descriptive metaphysics and the concept of a thing or material object. Natural science in our century has certainly produced a tremendous revolution in our ways of thinking about matter. This science can be seen as the arch-enemy of descriptive metaphysics, being continuously revisionary. And yet the stability of certain natural language concepts (person, thing) ensures their unavoidability. I agree with Heisenberg who says: "We know that any understanding must be based finally upon the natural language because it is only there that we can be certain to touch reality, and hence we must be sceptical about any scepticism with regard to this natural language and its essential concepts". [2]

Before moving on to origins and development, and, later to the implications for Psychology of Strawson's concept of a person, having reviewed some of the criticisms, I maintain that Strawson fundamentally survives his critics. Two relevant criticisms, however, ought to be kept in mind; firstly, the possible need for fluidity in Strawson's concept of P-predication, i.e. degrees of P-predication (even degrees of attentuation), and, secondly, a possible relativity within descriptive metaphysics, within 'our' conceptual scheme, i.e. a challenge to some universal, changeless, human conceptual structure.

1. S. Toulmin, op. cit., pg. 477. First two brackets mine.
2. W. Heisenberg: "Philosophy and Physics", pg. 172.

CHAPTER V

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF STRAWSON'S "PERSONS"

In this chapter I would like to show, briefly, the line of thinking from which Strawson's work has developed, and show developments in the field of philosophical psychology after "Persons".

Searle, in his essay on Strawson in "The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy",[1.] says that "Individuals" employs Kantian methods to arrive at Aristotelian conclusions. So, to deal thoroughly with Strawson's foundations we ought to go right back to Aristotle. The trouble beginning with Aristotle is simply that the notion of behavioural science (or social or human science), as opposed to natural science, was not yet clearly formulated, and this distinction is, of course, crucial in respect to "persons". However Aristotle's notion of a person as a unity of mind and body, the former intrinsically independent of but extrinsically dependent upon the latter, is at the heart of what I call the philosophical paradigm of the person to which Strawson clearly belongs. Opposed to this philosophical view is the psychological paradigm where the mind is not intrinsically independent of the body. I shall show that it is this fundamental difference of paradigms that makes it difficult to relate Strawson's "person" to some of the psychological concepts of the person.

Strawson's debt to Kant is well recognized. This is clearly seen in Strawson's "The Bounds of Sense", an essay on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". Toulmin [2.] has already shown us developments of a Kantian theme in Strawson's

1. Vol. 8, pg. 28.
2. S. Toulmin: "Human Understanding", vol. 1, pg. 425-428.

work (see previous chapter). However Kant, like Aristotle, wrote well before what is called the natural/social science 'split'.

Thus having eliminated a glorious two thousand years of philosophy (!) we arrive at Wittgenstein, who, I think, is the most important influence on Strawson's philosophy of the person. Wittgenstein, like Strawson, can best be viewed in relation to Cartesianism (a very influential philosophy) and Behaviourism (the dominant school of psychology in many places at the time of Wittgenstein's writing). Descartes' philosophy is a dualistic philosophy with a 'dual' ontology - "res cogitans" and "res extensa". Behaviourism, finding "res cogitans" rather troublesome, confined its 'working ontology' to "res extensa", incorporating as much as it could of "res cogitans" into "res extensa". However, neither of these pictures is correct, as Wittgenstein pointed out. Cook expresses the point lucidly:

> "... the special status of human beings in the one case and their non-special status in the other, as marking out two different sorts of things composing a human being. This, of course, is the Cartesian account. Behaviourism, then, starting from this account, rejects the language games in which human beings have a special status. Unlike either of these, Wittgenstein rejects the first step, which escaped unnoticed: the redescription of a human being. We can now express this result as follows: these two types of language-games <u>taken together</u> mark off human beings from sticks and stones". [1.]

This clearly resembles Strawson's analysis of the person in terms of <u>both</u> P- and M-predication.

1. J.W. Cook: "Human Beings", Ch. 4 in "Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein". Ed. P. Winch, pg. 150.

Reinhardt has placed Wittgenstein and Strawson close together as regards their views on 'Other Minds'. He quotes Strawson:

> "If one is playing a game of cards, the distinctive markings of a certain card constitute a logically adequate criterion for calling it, say, the Queen of Hearts; but, in calling it this, in the context of the game, one is ascribing to it properties over and above the possession of these markings. The predicate gets its meaning from the whole structure of the game. So does the language in which we ascribe P-predicates. To say that the criteria on the strength of which we ascribe P-predicates to others are of a logically adequate kind for this ascription, is not to say that all there is to the ascriptive meaning of these predicates is these criteria. To say this is to forget that they are P-predicates, to forget the rest of the language-structure to which they belong". [1.]

To this Reinhardt says: "The suggestion here is that it is the entire system of P-predicates of which we gain a mastery in understanding what persons are". [2.] This concept of the <u>context</u> of an <u>entire system</u> in language brings Strawson close to Wittgenstein's insightful notion of a language-game and of a form of life. Reinhardt shows that the primacy of our vocabulary of action suggests that it is not chosen but rather constitutes our human nature. He says: "The responses we have and the related attitudes can only be understood by considering the language in which they express themselves, along with the ways of acting which, with the vocabulary, constitute

1. I. pg. 110.
2. L.R. Reinhardt: "Wittgenstein and Strawson on Other Minds", Ch. 5 in "Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein". Ed. P. Winch, pg. 157.

a form of life". [1] From the above I think it is safe to say that Strawson is a direct descendent of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind.

Ryle, the man in between (chronologically speaking) Wittgenstein and Strawson, moved away from Wittgenstein's insights back towards the behaviourist pole and it is, I think, Strawson who again rights this influential view (thus bringing Wittgenstein back into the picture). Ryle is described as a 'logical behaviourist', having abandoned the Cartesian 'myth' of the ghost in the machine for a behaviourist ("open access") account of other minds. [2]

Strawson does not refer to Ryle in his writings but, I think, by presenting a 'phenomenological' critique of Ryle's work, we will in fact be close to giving a Strawsonian critique. The critique I have in mind is that of Cowley's which is indebted to the Merleau-Pontian standpoint. Cowley says of Ryle: "Nor did he intend in his account of dispositions and propensities to give a causal account of human behaviour. But it seems to me that he has". [3] Cowley shows that Ryle's psychology in fact reduces all 'selves' to others (first persons to third persons), and reduces all others to objects; Ryle does not realize that objectivity is the correlate of subjectivity, and that the attempt to reduce the one to the other leads to confusion. [4] Using Merleau-Ponty to do the critical work for Strawson is, I think, quite significant; both these philosophers have clearly seen, and avoided, the trap of reducing subjectivity to objectivity (and vice versa). We have already shown in the previous chapter the connections between these two philosophers.

1. L.R. Reinhardt, op. cit., pg. 165.
2. See G. Ryle: "The Concept of Mind".
3. F. Cowley: "A Critique of British Empiricism", pg. 175.
4. See also Cowley's exposure of the Behaviourist fallacy, ibid. pg. 133, and the inadequacy of Ryle's account of consciousness, pg. 183.

The essence, then, of Strawson's position is his 'middle way'. It is interesting to compare his middle way to McMullin's "middle approach" which proposes middle views between Cartesian dualism and reductionism. McMullin says: "The advantage of these "intermediate" views is that they leave all the options open; as strategies of research, they suggest that every possibility has to be explored. They also imply the ultimate ontological unity of the universe". [1.] Thus Strawson's work (which is "intermediate") can be useful for strategies of research - and especially in psychology, as I shall show. Furthermore, McMullin's implication, of "the ultimate ontological unity of the universe", I think well describes one of the points for accepting Strawson's concept of a person.

What I wish to do now is, briefly, review some work by philosophers in the philosophy of psychology that has appeared contemporaneous with, and after, Strawson's "Individuals". This will serve as a contrast to modern psychology from the psychologist's perspective in the following chapter. In the distinction between philosophy (philosophical psychology) and psychology, I have in mind the distinction between logical and empirical issues. But even "logical" needs to be further subdivided into 'formal-logical' and 'logico-linguistic' (to use Strawson's own term). For philosophical psychology is not formal-logical but rather logico-linguistic in character. This latter term broadens the concept of logic by including in it statements which are not necessarily deductive, but concerned with the structure (or 'logic') of language. Thus it is still conceptual rather than empirical. So, then, we can make sense of the term 'logico-linguistic' (or informal logic) if we regard it as referring to ordinary (natural) language. [2.] Though not necessarily connected to "Persons", I think the works to be discussed are relevant to the philosophical foundations of

1. E. McMullin: "What Difference Does Mind Make", in: "Brain and Human Behaviour", Ed. A.G. Karczmar and J.C. Eccles, pg. 446.
2. See P.F. Strawson: "Introduction to Logical Theory", Ch. 8, pg. 211-232.

psychology in general. In using the term "philosophical psychology" I am referring to the 'English' variety, as opposed, for example, to the 'French' variety. For a picture of the latter, see Piaget [1.] even though his criticisms of this school can be strongly challenged.

We have already seen that, closest to Strawson is the work of Hampshire. [2.] He too, like Wittgenstein and Strawson, talks of the contextual (as opposed to class) nature of a term such as "Other" (as in "Other Minds"); [3.] and also talks of the middle way between logical behaviourism and Cartesian dualism. [4.]

I think it is realistic to point to the end of the "Philosophical Investigations" to show the starting point of the philosophical psychology that has emerged in the last twenty years. Wittgenstein says: "The confusion and barrenness of Psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings ... For in Psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion". [5.]

Follow-ups on Wittgenstein's judgement are witnessed, for example, in G.E.M. Anscombe's "Intention", Hamlyn's "Behaviour", and in a series of books called: "Studies in Philosophical Psychology", edited by R.F. Holland (including Meldon, Peters, etc.). "Anscombe ... takes it to be the distinguishing feature of an intentional act that the question 'Why?', asked in relation to it, can be a request for a reason, not for a cause". [6.]

1. J. Piaget: "Insights and Illusions of Philosophy". Ch. 4, pg. 122-164.
2. See S. Hampshire: "Thought and Action", and his collection of essays: "Freedom of Mind".
3. S. Hampshire: "The Analogy of Feeling", in: "Freedom of Mind".
4. S. Hampshire: "Feeling and Expression", in: "Freedom of Mind".
5. L. Wittgenstein: "Philosophical Investigations", Part II, XIV, pg. 232e.
6. J. Passmore: "A Hundred Years of Philosophy", pg. 514.

Hamlyn's argument in "Behaviour" [1] is similar; he shows that physiology can explain the motions of the body, using a causal model, but, cannot explain human behaviour or action. "I take it, then, that the point of Aristotle's distinction, or one of them, is to show that an activity is intelligible in itself - that is, does not necessarily require an explanation in terms of anything else - whilst a movement is not." [2] This reference to Aristotle is very much in keeping with Strawson's approach. Behaviour brings into being reasons, and so we have a distinction between causality and rationality; cause and reason. Hamlyn shows that words such as "behaviour", "activity" and "action", although having differences of usage between them, are basically of one particular type. However words such as "movement", "reaction", "reflex", and so on, constitute a very different type. Reasons, then, typify the first group, causes, the second group. "Behaviour (as opposed to "action") is often (especially in psychology) grouped with the second type; Hamlyn, however, has defined it with the first group.

Meldon continues on the same lines; he attempts to show that everyday explanations of actions which are given in terms of intentions, desires, interests, and so on, are incompatible with the causal model which we find in the natural sciences. He says: "this radical disparity (between these two modes of explanation ... accounts for the characteristic ambivalences and contradictions in current psychological discussions".[3]

The distinction between cause and reason clearly finds its place in Strawson's concept of a person. The person, we have seen, can have both M- and P-predicates ascribed to it. Now if an explanation in terms of a M-predicate ascription is given of a person we can always expect a causal

1. D.W. Hamlyn: "Behaviour". Philosophy, 28, 1953, pg. 132-145. reprinted in "The Philosophy of Mind", Ed. V.C. Chappell, pg. 60-73.
2. D.W. Hamlyn, in Chappell, pg. 62.
3. A.I. Meldon: "Free Action", pg. 200.

explanation. Whereas with a P-predicate ascription often a reason will suffice, though causes are also possible. Thus our ordinary language reveals a realm or "language-game" confined to persons (and metaphorical persons, i.e. attentuations) which is characterized uniquely by the ascription of reasons (P-predicates), though causes are not barred from it (M-predication as well).

Meldon epitomizes this approach and virtually arrives at Strawson's picture in his analysis: he says:

> "One may grant, in fact, that the development of the central nervous system goes hand-in-hand with the maturation of human beings as they acquire the varied skills which they exhibit in their seasoned and responsible thoughts and actions, that the latter is in some way dependent on the former. But none of this implies the forbidding picture painted by the epiphenomenalists in which the status of a person reduces to the vaporous after-effects of physiological processes. For even if we could do the decoding, we should still have the central nervous system of a person who reasons, justifies, decides, chooses ... Indeed, what our speculation implies is the requirement, for the thoughts and actions of such persons, of requisite states of the nervous system and this, far from reducing persons to hapless mechanisms, is only a more radical representation of the familiar view that persons are not disembodied spirits but persons who can be seen and touched and hurt, who use their arms, legs, etc. ... Indeed, the alleged conclusion that each of us is a helpless victim of the events transpiring in the central nervous system is simply a logical howler. 'Could have done', and 'could not have done',

> 'helpless', etc. - these are expressions employed not with respect to events occurring in the mechanism of the body, nor to mental events ... but to persons. We do not say that an itch or twitch, a feeling, thought or desire, however we understand these, is helpless. Neither do we say that the body is helpless in any sense in which we say this about a person. It is persons who are able or unable to do or refrain from doing; to think or refrain from thinking, etc. We need, in short, to recognize the necessary starting point for any elucidation of expressions of these sorts - persons who act, think, feel, in their commerce with the things about them and with each other. This is the language-game in which expressions like 'could have done', 'could not have done', 'helpless', etc., are employed". [1.]

Meldon, then, explicitly accepts Strawson's concept of a person as being basic, primary, and primitive, i.e. as ontologically 'prior' and indispensable.

A further extension of all this is found in Peters' book which shows the limitations of psychological theories of motivation. Peters believes that toleration will follow from the thesis that: "... the role of the Galileo of Psychology must be forever unoccupied ... It (psychology) has remained earthbound in mazes and Skinner-boxes because the highly general theories, which, it was hoped, would emerge, are logically impossible ..." [2.] Peters claims that psychology needs an Aristotle rather than a Galileo (and Strawson is Aristotelian!).

1. A.I. Meldon: "Free Action", pg. 212-213.
2. R.S. Peters: "The Concept of Motivation", pg. 156.

Other books in Philosophical psychology with similar approaches are Hamlyn's "The Psychology of Perception", Winch's "The Idea of a Social Science", C. Taylor's "The Explanation of Behaviour", which shows that psychology has failed to develop a non-teleological theory (Taylor also refers to Merleau-Ponty), and others.

Of all these books I think we can take Peters' book "The Concept of Motivation" as a paradigmatic case with special regard to psychology. Batson, [1] in reference to Peters, shows that the 'why' question asks for a sufficient rather than an exhaustive explanation. Peters notes a legitimate use for causal explanation but shows that this is quite restricted. In fact the whole point of "The Concept of Motivation" is to show how misguided psychological theories of motivation are which attempt to put forward one type of explanation only as sufficient to answer all types of 'why' questions. Batson then quotes a crucial passage from Peters: "The point of looking closely at ordinary usage, if one is a psychologist, is that it often provides a clue to distinctions which it is theoretically important to take account of. We know so much about human beings, and our knowledge is incorporated implicitly in our language." [2] Building on this idea, which clearly shows the importance of linguistic philosophy, Batson attempts to provide a conceptual framework. He shows that there are at least three levels of explanation which are used in psychology, as well as mixtures of these three. These levels are the physical descriptive, the behavioural, and the theoretical. Batson enlarges rather clearly on this:

1. See C.D. Batson: "Linguistic Analysis and Psychological Explanations of the Mental", Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 2, No. 1, 1972.
2. R.S. Peters, op. cit., pg. 50; reproduced in Batson, op. cit., pg. 53.

The philosophical foundations of the above passage should be perfectly clear. This integrated approach of Batson's is, I think, very close to Harré and Secord's approach in "The Explanation of Social Behaviour" - but this we shall deal with later.

So far I have looked at some of the developments of linguistic analysis in philosophical psychology, keeping in mind Strawson's concept of a Person. Although the connections between Strawson's work and other theorists are not always clear, I hope that they will come out in the following section. So now we turn to Psychology.

PART II

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Strawson has not written explicitly about the field of psychology; I hope to give a 'Strawsonian critique' of the philosophical foundations of modern psychology. Thus what follows are only possible implications of Strawson's theory, rather than valid deductions from his theory.

The major part of this section will be essentially a philosophical appraisal of psychology (using Strawson's work, wherever possible, as a tool for criticism and measurement). In the last chapter I shall try to present Strawson's work in a more positive light - by trying to show the use his concept of a person can have for psychology.

Looking at modern psychology is more than just looking; it is straining, focusing, refocusing, putting on one pair of spectacles, then another. I shall review the main approaches, schools or subsets of psychology - behaviourism (and the neo-varieties), phenomenology, some cognitive theory, the existentialist and humanistic approaches, the developmental approach, and the psychoanalytic approach. I shall leave out some approaches, for example, systems theory and mathematical psychology, as they are too distant from Strawson's theory.

But before entering into the different approaches let me say something about psychology as a whole. At one end of the spectrum psychology has been called an "incoherent" science [1.] revealing methodologically "processed" knowledge, rather than real discoveries, which results from "ameaningful thinking". Another view is that psychology, on the whole, is not a science. But I think it is realistic to accept that psychology, in parts at least (e.g. sensory psychology) is scientific. Rather than call psychology incoherent I prefer to call it pluralistic or heterogenous. Deese says: "Psychology is a patchwork alliance of very different intellectual enterprises. Indeed, psychological problems are so varied that it is a question as to whether there _is_ such a thing as a single discipline of psychology". [2.] But this variety does not necessarily negate the adjectives "scientific" and "coherent". One further characteristic of psychology is that it is a parasitic discipline which no doubt is partly a function of its variety of subject matter; historically psychology has always been parasitic and perhaps may always remain that way. [3.] Thus having referred to the uncertainty and crisis over the nature of psychology as a whole, let us enter into the particular approaches.

1. See S. Koch: "Psychology cannot be a Coherent Science". Psychology Today, Sept., 1969.
2. J. Deese: "Psychology as Science and Art", pg. 74.
3. See R.S. Peters and C.A. Mace: "Psychology" in "The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy", Ed. P. Edwards, vol. 7, pg. 26.

CHAPTER II

BEHAVIOURISM

In the light of the first part of this thesis I shall begin with the approach of behaviourism - behaviourism being the dominant school of psychology today (in the English-speaking world). Strawson has already shown us the middle way (epistemologically) between scepticism and behaviourism. To begin, let us look at a book edited by T.W. Wann entitled: "Behaviorism and Phenomenology : Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology". Koch, in his paper "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary" refers to the historical development of behaviourism which involved classical behaviourism, neo-behaviourism and even neo-neo-behaviourism. The main figure of classical behaviourism was Watson who advocated objectivism - "bury subjective subject matter". Here already a distinction between metaphysical behaviourism and methodological behaviourism [1] is crucial. Watson adopted the former which does not have much philosophical support - Strawson has already shown us the contradictions in this view. Its weakness is akin to that of extreme reductionism which is problematical in the face of the 'givenness' of consciousness and awareness which I will not argue for now. Reductionism, itself, can be divided into methodological and metaphysical extreme reductionism. [2]

Methodological behaviourism, as opposed to metaphysical behaviourism was adopted by the neo-behaviourists. This asserts that behaviour, rather than mental states, is the primary datum of psychology. As Kendler and

1. See G. Bergmann. "The Contribution of John B. Watson". Psychological Review, 1956, 63, pg. 265-276.
2. See M.B. Turner: "Philosophy and the Science of Behavior", pg. 309-310.

Spence put it: "The methodological disagreement between the phenomenologist and the neobehaviourist, then, is that while the former tends to regard self-report as having a high degree of correspondence with private experience and thus acts as though these experiences were raw data, the neobehaviourist makes no further assumptions and gives verbal reports no special status". [1.] The 'liberalism' of the neobehaviourists is seen in regard to the incorporation of phenomenological data - for while some ignore such data, others use phenomenal reports as a source of theoretical hypotheses; another alternative is to develop a theoretical structure to represent conscious experience. [2.]

Koch sees a pattern in the development of the behaviourist school - a pattern that leads him to reject it strongly, perhaps a bit too strongly:

> "To me it suggests the story of the gradual attenuation of a position that was never seriously tenable, never consistent, based on thin and shifting rationales, and adopted more to serve needs for comfort and security than a passion for knowledge. Does this story of attenuation, attrition, and compromise "refute" behaviourist epistemology? Here I can only revert to my earlier observation that in certain connections "refutation" is an (unsystematically) ambiguous notion. I think that our story begins to suggest the unfruitfulness of the position, its restrictive effects on problematic curiosity, its scholastic character, perhaps most of all its basic ludicrousness ..." [3.]

1. H.H. Kendler and J.T. Spence: "Tenets of Neobehaviorism" in "Essays in Neobehaviorism", pg. 35.
2. ibid., see pg. 35-36.
3. S. Koch: "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary", in "Behaviorism and Phenomenology". Ed. Wann, pg. 20.

Koch also provides reasons for behaviourism's "evaporating methodological support" - these involve general changes in the philosophy of science and newer conceptions of definition and meaning. [1]

Methodological behaviourism, however, if seen as a development away from its 'metaphysical' ancestry rather than as a weakening of an earlier position, has strong defences. Kendler and Spence claim that: "... the epistemological decisions of the neobehaviorists cannot be understood if limited to their philosophical implications. In fact one can argue, as I shall, that their epistemological decisions have been more an outgrowth of pragmatic than of philosophical considerations". [2] They thus maintain that:

> "... the methodological assumptions of neobehaviorism acknowledge personal observations as the foundation of scientific knowledge. The nature of man and the world make it easier to achieve intersubjective agreement with a physicalistic language with public definitions than through a phenomenalistic language with private criteria; for these reasons, physicalistic terms are to be preferred, but phenomenalistic ones need not be barred assuming that satisfactory intersubjective reliability can be reached. The choice of a physicalistic language, then, neither denies the existence of conscious experience nor bars it from scientific investigation". [3]

This quotation certainly marks an increase in tolerance from the early days within the behaviourist camp.

1. S. Koch, op. cit., see pg. 21-30.
2. H.H. Kendler and J.T. Spence, op. cit., pg. 12.
3. ibid., pg. 15-16.

I think the work of J.G. Taylor best exemplifies Kendler and Spence's last point. Taylor works within a neobehaviourist paradigm, but attempts nevertheless to tackle the problems of consciousness, his thesis being that consciousness (perception in particular) is a function of behaviour. Rather than deny the phenomenal order he clearly states: "There is thus no ground whatsoever for the notion that the sensory order or phenomenal world is an entirely fallacious and unreliable guide to knowledge of the physical order. It is, on the contrary, the final court of appeal, and without it scientific knowledge of any kind would be absolutely impossible". [1.] Taylor accepts the distinction between public and private events, and concludes from this that even though the act of knowing is a private event and only the person within which it takes place can report this event, what is known is <u>public</u>. Taylor's point, then is that there is no essential difference between the two types of knowledge - that embodied in sense data and that derived from scientific investigation; and furthermore, that these private events do thus present a legitimate subject for scientific inquiry. [2.]

Taylor's work in "The Behavioural Basis of Perception" does counter the countless criticisms of the limitations of behaviourism. His work is still in its infancy, for there are great differences between simple perceptions and the 'higher' types of consciousness, but the direction that he has taken offers much promise. It is important to notice here a 'softening' to phenomenology in the behaviourist camp. Taylor's theoretical writings, do, I believe, have points in common with Strawson. Taylor, in analyzing psychology before the advent of behaviourism, shows that it rested on two incorrect axioms:

1. J.G. Taylor: "The Behavioural Basis of Perception", pg. 344.
2. See J.G. Taylor, op. cit., pg. 352-353.

"The first of these propositions, which dates back at least as far as Plato, is that the actions of a conscious organism are governed by mind. We may call it the mind-over-body (or m-o-b) axiom. The second proposition is of more recent origin, and it is concerned with the source of conscious experience. In the middle of the 17th century Descartes had formulated his famous theory of two substances, res extensa and res cogitans, or matter and mind, which had no properties in common and yet could interact with one another". 1.

Strawson, I think, would agree with Taylor's point that these two axioms are incorrect, for his concept of a person contradicts both. It is interesting to note, however, that Taylor makes no use of the concept of a person - a holistic concept - he stops short at consciousness, which is a consequence of behaviour; he thus deals with a 'formalized' person, i.e. a 'behaving organism'.

In appraising behaviourism we have seen how important it is to distinguish the methodological from the metaphysical. Strawson's work is undoubtedly metaphysical in nature and can therefore carry very little weight on methodological matters. I can accept the legitimacy of behaviourism on the methodological level i.e. neobehaviourism, and tend to agree with Price:

"First let me say that I have no objections at all to the behaviourist method. There is no reason why there should not be a branch of scientific inquiry which confines itself strictly to investigating the publicly observable behaviour of human beings and animals. And it has turned out in practice that there is a surprisingly large

1. J.G. Taylor: "The Role of Axioms in Psychological Theory". Bull. British Psychological Society, 21, 1968, pg. 222.

> field of empirical facts which can be profitably studied in this way, especially facts about the behaviour of animals. There is a science which might be called behaviouristics, or the science of behaviour, though one may well doubt whether this science should be called psychology. It seems rather to be only one part of psychology, namely that part which can be studied by methods approximating to those used in the physical sciences". [1]

This quotation raises the much debated question of the actual field of psychology; i.e. its definition, and furthermore, it raises the thorny question of the status of psychology, or subsets of psychology, as a science - which in turn, of course, brings up the even thornier question about the definition of "science". These problems we shall return to again, and again.

I doubt whether any behaviourists would equate behaviourism with psychology, but the tendency is to argue that behaviourism is the only scientific approach to psychology - other alternatives being scientifically inadequate. Skinner, for example, maintains that if psychology is the science of the mind or mental life, then it must defend a special methodology which it has so far failed to do. Whereas if psychology is the science of the behaviour of organisms then it becomes part of the natural sciences which has tested and highly successful methods. Thus for Skinner the basic issue is not whether the world is make up of one or two stuffs, "but rather the dimensions of the things studied by psychology and the methods relevant to them". [2]

1. H.H. Price: "Some Objections to Behaviorism", in: "Dimensions of Mind". Ed. S. Hook, pg. 79.
2. B.F. Skinner: "Behaviorism at Fifty", in: "Behaviorism and Phenomenology". Ed. Wann, pg. 79.

Skinner, then, does not deny the experiential realm but simply maintains that: "The problem of privacy may be approached in a fresh direction by starting with behaviour rather than with immediate experience". [1] However, Skinner calls himself a "radical" behaviourist for he finds no use in calling anything "mental". His position is one of certainty that reports about 'internal states' are not at all adequate; (though 'certainty' is surely an internal state!?). What is at stake here is the vocabulary that we employ; in psychology, as opposed to 'everyday life', Skinner argues dogmatically for a physicalist vocabulary. In Strawson's terms, this attempt is quite untenable for, in effect, it reduces all P-predicates to M-predicates, and thus, in the process, we lose the concept of a person. All behaviourism seems to exhibit this lack of a concept of a person. Skinner, and other behaviourists, have to defend themselves with the objection that psychology is 'radically' different from everyday life (the Strawsonian world) and thus like physics (or the natural sciences) is entitled to its own terminology and <u>ontology</u> (viz. a physicalist one). This exhibits the belief in a <u>unity</u> of the sciences (both natural and social). This unity found in many of the behaviourists, is that of reductionism (psychology reduced to natural science). Another type of unity of science that is witnessed is the unity of method; an example is Popper's hypothetico-deductive methodology, which characterizes any science. This view is held by some behaviourists, but certainly not by all - Skinner, for example, might opt for a unity of method in the sciences - but this would certainly not be along the lines of hypothetico-deduction.

Unity in method seems all well in principle, but takes much strain in practice. The social sciences (and psychology included) face problems which are unique and not encountered in the natural sciences. This does

1. B.F. Skinner: "Behaviorism at Fifty", in: "Behaviorism and Phenomenology". Ed. Wann, pg. 84.

not ensure, but certainly points to, the possibility of new methodologies. The other type of unity, viz. that in terms of reductionism, is perhaps the most ambitious. In principle, at least, it seems quite in order for the social sciences to be reduced to the most elementary science. Our ordinary 'lived' world presents us with a 'unity' - where people form part of the natural order; but, as yet in the history of science, it seems ludicrous to align the social sciences with the natural sciences, for our explanation of people's actions cannot totally undergo a reduction. Psychology, we must remember, is still at a 'pre-Galilean' stage, arguing about the choice of concepts it makes. And arguments that it must necessarily remain at a 'pre-Galilean' stage have also been put forward. [1.]

But back to Skinner; an anti-reductionist case has been put forward by W.F. Day. Day attempts to show similarities (and differences) between Skinner and Wittgenstein. One point of similarity among others [2.] is that both are against reductionism; Day says: "For Skinner, facts are little more than what we observe to be the case, and they are generally to be explained by relating them to other facts, not by reconstructing them out of more primary sense-data, as in phenomenalism". [3.] This type of reduction is different however from the above type (viz. that of a reductive vocabulary). Day shows that Skinner's position with respect to reductionism is, like Wittgenstein's position, very different from conventional ones. His position is only properly understood "... with the context of his system as a whole. As with Wittgenstein, the treatment turns about the analysis of verbal behaviour, or of the functions of words, and particularly about issues involved when we talk about our own private experience". [4.]

1. See R.S. Peters above Part 1, Ch. 5, pg. 40.
2. Others being: Antipathy to logical positivism, anti-dualism, the impossibility of a purely private language, nature of meaning, anti-mentalism and the behavioural nature of language.
3. W.F. Day: "On certain similarities between the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the operationism of B.F. Skinner". Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1969, 12, pg. 489-506.
4. ibid., pg. 492.

Having compared Skinner to Wittgenstein, I shall quite expectedly compare Skinner to Strawson - Skinner's analysis of verbal behaviour "is properly understood only within the context of his system as a whole" - this involves the verbal community: Strawson asks us to keep the whole structure of our language in mind when analysing P-predication. Strawson's essential axiom "... viz. that it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself",[1.] certainly presupposes Skinner's "verbal community" - and Skinner's verbal community, in turn, ought to be characterized by this Strawsonian principle.

Thus, focusing on behaviourism with Strawsonian spectacles there is no argument with methodological behaviourism as a scientific inquiry, i.e. as a pragmatic strategy. But there is a case with metaphysical behaviourism, however, as I have already referred to in "Persons"; this behaviourism is epistemologically incomplete (the interdependence of first and third person P-predication), and ontologically unsound, as it reduces persons to things, or rather, does not accept the category of a person as distinct from a thing.

Strawson, we must remember, is concerned with the structures that make our ordinary language possible; i.e. what conceptual scheme our language is built on. Strawson's work shows that our conceptual scheme is not exhausted by a behavioural account, and, furthermore, as innumerable critics have pointed out, the behavioural account necessarily involves the non-behavioural, or 'experiential' account.

1. I. pg. 99.

Other philosophers (of Psychology) look at ordinary language to see what markings, distinctions, etc. it holds, and have analysed the 'mental' language of intentions, motives, etc. This approach ties up with Strawson's approach, since analysing ordinary language usage does lead in many cases to conceptual structure. Strawson thus gives us a groundwork for philosophical psychology; he gives us an epistemological structure within which philosophical psychologists have developed. An example is the analysis (linguistic, if you like) of cause and reason - which fits into the M- and P-predications of Strawson's "Persons". Strawson, then, presents us with a subject-object epistemology as being essential for a holistic approach to psychology. Behaviourism, lacking this epistemology, is therefore not holistic and thus cannot and should not try to monopolize psychology.

To conclude our inquiry on Behaviourism, it seems to me that philosophically-minded methodological behaviourists are quite able to meet many of the philosophical criticisms fired at them; "But in so doing they seem to purchase impregnability at the expense of those very features of the behaviourist outlook that attracted theorists to the position in the first place." [1.] A very important point to note, then, is the conceptual evolution of the behaviourist outlook. This evolution is rather revolutionary for it brings into doubt the continuity of the school from the early to the neo-neo-behaviourist varieties.

1. A.S. Kaufman: "Behaviorism" in "The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy", Ed. P. Edwards, vol. 1, pg. 271.

CHAPTER III

PHENOMENOLOGY

Wann's alternative base for modern psychology is phenomenology. Phenomenology is far less overbearing in its claims about the field of psychology than behaviourism. Unlike many behaviourists who conceive of behaviourism alone as being scientific psychology, phenomenologists often even withhold the right to call their work (phenomenological psychology) a science. MacLeod epitomizes this for he regards psychology as a propaedeutic to science. His concern is to show that to develop a science of psychology one must first begin with the phenomenal world before transcending it. He discusses the various ways of doing this.

> "The first, of course, is by building a metaphysics which says something about the non-phenomenal world. Every scientist is a metaphysician, whether or not he likes to admit it, at least to the extent that he asserts the existence of something which he does not fully understand but which he is determined to investigate. The transcendent reality may be a world of material things, a world of ideas, a world of values, or a world of spirits ... The phenomenological approach in psychology is likely to lead us into psychophysics, into psychophysiology, into social psychology, perhaps even - and I suggest this with great diffidence - into a sophisticated behaviourism. One has often asked whether phenomenology can be reconciled with Freudian psychoanalysis ... Certainly, however, the phenomenological approach has yielded rich rewards in psycho-diagnosis and psychotherapy." [1]

1. R.B. MacLeod: "Phenomenology: A Challenge to Experimental Psychology" in "Behaviorism and Phenomenology", Ed. Wann, pg. 54-55.

A striking point here is the 'amiable' nature of phenomenology - it does not attempt to replace or reduce any of the other approaches in psychology.

Phenomenology rests strongly on the notion of the 'phenomenal level' of existence - the level that behaviourism always avoids or overlooks. Merleau-Ponty refers to Husserl's first instruction to phenomenology, i.e. to a descriptive phenomenology, which involves a return to the "things themselves". This, he shows, is from the beginning a rejection of science. Merleau-Ponty brilliantly indicates how we can never shut ourselves up within the realm of science for we cannot conceive of ourselves as nothing but a determined piece of the world. His point is that every bit of our knowledge of the world, including scientific knowledge, is derived from a particular point of view.

> "The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression ... Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of the world's, are always both naive and at the same time dishonest, because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms itself round me and begins to exist for me. To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always <u>speaks</u>, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and

derivative sign-language, as in geography in relation
to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand
what a forest, a prairie or a river is." [1]

Such eloquence requires no comment.

There is therefore a unique relationship between phenomenology and psychology (and science); furthermore, phenomenology is indispensible in the study of science [2] (particularly in the social sciences). The phenomenologist, then, is not as concerned with the status of psychology as a science as the behaviourist is. Quoting MacLeod again: "Today ... I do not find myself worried about psychology's status as a science; there are too many problems which strain our present methods and too many inviting phenomena for which we have not discovered an adequate language". [3]

As for the problems which phenomenology has dealt with, MacLeod offers three experimental areas where psychological phenomenology has shown its relevance - one is phenomenal constancy, another is the phenomenology of the other person, and a third is the phenomenology of communication. This second problem area greatly concerns us. MacLeod is interested in empirically studying the "other self". He notes that we are constantly confronted with things and events that are phenomenologically not part of ourselves, i.e. they are objective. But of these things only some we call persons. Phenomenology is concerned with studying things left as they are; similarly with people - to study them their phenomenal worlds must be left intact. MacLeod thinks we are justified in speaking of the phenomenal world of the other person. He remarks: "Reconstructing the world of the other person involves an opening of the self to the other self. This is

1. M. Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology of Perception", Preface, pg. viii-ix.
2. See "Phenomenology", ed. J.J. Kockelmans, esp. Part III, Ch. VI., "Summary and Conclusion".
3. R.B. MacLeod, op. cit., pg. 72.

where empathy as an enriched and disciplined form of perception can be so important ..." [1] "Reconstructing" is perhaps a misleading term, for our experience necessarily presents us with other people - and hence their "phenomenal world" ("solitude" is a contextual term). In Strawson's terms, "empathy" can now be seen as central to third-person P-predication.

MacLeod talks of the many problems in psychology that "strain our present methods". Since psychology has different and more complex problems than those of the natural sciences, the question of posing new methodologies arises. Its subject matter is the person - an active agent who, like the psychologist studying him, also construes and interprets the situations he is in. Spiegelberg [2] shows that phenomenology is not afraid of complexity and variety for it has turned against the tide in science of reducing phenomena to their indispensible minimum. Thus he maintains that phenomenology has encouraged and actively participated in the exploration of neglected and overlooked phenomena.

Methodologically, then, phenomenology has challenged the behaviourist paradigm of inquiry, and particularly in regard to verification; on this Spiegelberg comments:

> "By widening the possibilities of verification, phenomenology makes it possible to test such hypotheses in new and enriching ways ... While the theory of phenomenological verification is still very much in need of clarification and development, it may at least be suggested that the phenomenological liberalization of epistemology opens up new opportunities for scientific verification". [3]

1. R.B. MacLeod, op. cit., pg. 65.
2. See H. Spiegelberg, "Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry".
3. ibid., pg. 363.

Thus epistemology, both 'everyday' and scientific, gains much depth and freedom from the phenomenological enterprise.

I think Phenomenology is best assessed in relation to behaviourism. Epistemologically, by remaining open-ended, it seems more acceptable than behaviourism in general. I have already shown the close connections between Strawson's work on "persons" and the phenomenological approach (see part I, chapter 4); epistemologically, phenomenology often does the work for Strawson, and ontologically, although often using terms such as self, mind, etc., phenomenology is often in consonance with Strawson's "person". Both Strawson and the phenomenologists attack the Cartesian approach to the study of man; both refer to a 'pre-reflexive' "unity"; in phenomenology's terms as "being-in-the-world", "embodied subjectivity" etc., and in Strawson's term "Person" - and related to it, P-predication.

In conclusion, I think phenomenology greatly serves to keep behaviourist philosophy in check: "Neither behaviourism nor phenomenology have any justified claims to epistemic priority. Both psychologies, like science in general, must do without anchors or firm foundations at any point. All knowing is highly presumptive, involving presumptions, not directly or logically justifiable". [1.] But logically, phenomenology's epistemological position, although not prior to behaviourism's, in a sense incorporates it (in the better phenomenologies) and is certainly broader and more acceptable at an everyday level of knowing.

But accepting phenomenology's virtues we must always keep in mind that although it can rightly criticize behaviourist philosophy, it cannot and should not keep behaviourist psychology, i.e. experimentation and

1. D.T. Campbell: "A Phenomenology of the Other One", in "Human Action", Ed. T. Mischel, pg. 66.

empirical studies, in check. Thus phenomenology can criticize the paradigm of psychology from without but should not criticize the work that goes on within the behaviourist paradigm using criteria or 'expectations' from the phenomenological paradigm.

CHAPTER IV

A COGNITIVE APPROACH - KELLY'S CONSTRUCT THEORY

Having investigated the schools of behaviourism and phenomenology I will now look at other approaches, systems or theories in psychology which are no doubt behaviourist or phenomenological or both to some extent, but nevertheless still distinct. Let us begin with the cognitive approach. Cognitive psychology is, as expected, full of behaviourist (especially in connection with learning theory) and phenomenological labels. But rather than deal with the empirical findings on pattern recognition, memory, etc., I would like, briefly, to evaluate Kelly's Personal Construct theory which can be classified as a 'cognitive' theory. I have chosen Kelly's approach firstly for he has a particularly clear and unified theory, and secondly, and more important, because he, unlike so many other psychologists, makes explicit use of the concept of the person.

For Kelly, "person" is the primary term; he defines it as: "This term is used to indicate the substance with which we are primarily concerned. Our first consideration is the individual person rather than any part of the person, any group of persons, or any particular process manifested in the person's behaviour".[1] Kelly's concern with the person as such is, I think, very close to Strawson's view - the concept of a person as logically irreducible and primitive; the primary concept from which any part of the person, group of persons, or processes involved in the behaviour of the person, is derived. Kelly's theory revolves around one central or fundamental postulate: "A person's processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events".[2]

1. G.A. Kelly, "The Psychology of Personal Constructs", pg. 47.
2. ibid., pg, 46.

It is not altogether necessary to go into Kelly's theory of personal constructs in detail to appraise the philosophical foundations of his theory.

Basically, Kelly takes a specific model of man, viz. man-the-scientist as the paradigm for investigation. Man-the-scientist is the anticipator of events, the predictor, the controller. This view although it has its weaknesses, presents a rather positive contrast to man-the-machine, man-the-behaving organism, or man-the-animal models of man. Kelly's theory, although a formal theory in its own right, was devised for clinical applications; and thus the aim of personal construct theory is concerned with liberation through understanding. Thus the ambiguity of the scientist (man-the-scientist) is cleared up - understanding and explanation are the goals, not prediction and control. Thus prediction is not an aim but a means of putting our understanding to the test. And control, in any full sense of the word, is not the aim of the theory, but if taken as such could be dangerous. [1]

But back to our concept of the person. It seems to me that Kelly's concept of a person is too individuated or isolated, and too 'mentalized'. By 'individuated' I mean the societal aspects are greatly overlooked; i.e., the effectsof society on the person and his constructions are not sufficiently taken into account. The (I think artificial) separation of person and society overlooks the immense and extremely complex interplay between the two. The social nature of science itself must be recognized, and hence the same for man-the-scientist. By 'mentalized' I mean not involved enough with the body, with action, with human behaviour. The relationship between constructs and behaviour is surely very intimate and

1. For a concise summary of Kelly's work see D. Bannister and F. Fransella: "Inquiring Man".

complex. It is interesting to compare Kelly's approach to that of Vendler,[1.] for Vendler's "subjective perspectives" are remarkably close to Kelly's "constructs". I think that an understanding of Kelly's work becomes clearer when it is realized that basically he is in the philosophical paradigm (Aristotelian) of a person as opposed to the psychological paradigm, even though he is predominantly a psychologist. Yet his philosophy lacks the 'phenomenological' insights of the person as being through and through both corporeal and societal.

Perhaps Kelly's emphasis on the individual 'mental' person is reasonable since his theory is a cognitive theory; Kelly even talks of an "intellectual model".[2.] These criticisms then, may be more appropriate of cognitive psychology than of Kelly's theory in particular. They are essentially 'Strawsonian' criticisms; viz. that one person implies other persons, which in turn, implies a society. Bannister says that one gets the notion of other persons by analogy with oneself, one assumes a comparability of subjective experience. This argument by analogy we have already criticized.[3.] The Strawsonian critique of Kelly's over-emphasized 'mental' person is of course quite evident in the fact that behaviour is a logically adequate criterion for the ascription of states of consciousness (constructs) to other persons.

I think Kelly is on the right ontological track with the concept of a person, though this linguistic similarity has some conceptual shortcomings. Basically I think that his concept is too one-sided or not holistic enough. However, the fact that Kelly's theory is clinically orientated and is essentially a cognitive theory is to some extent justificatory.

1. See Part I, Chapter 3, pg. 22.
2. See Kelly, op. cit., pg. 130.
3. See the quotation from Hamlyn above, Part I, Chapter 3, pg. 17-18.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHOANALYSIS

I shall now focus on psychoanalysis, whose philosophical foundations reveal a rather unique model of man. It should be noted that Freud started work in neuro-physiology and there are strong signs to show that neuro-physiological explanation provided a model which influenced Freud's shaping of the concept of unconscious mental activity. Thus, although in his later works Freud abandoned the neuro-physiological model, he still saw the mind as a piece of machinery, and with this goes the 'causal' language and the notion of determinism. Following Brown [1.] four postulates underlie Freud's psychoanalytic theory; they are: psychic determinism, the role of the unconscious, the goal-directed nature of behaviour, and the developmental or historical approach.

Of these four basic postulates I think the role of the unconscious is the most revolutionary - and it is this that gives Freud's theory originality; psychic determinism, the goal-directed nature of behaviour, and the developmental or historical approach, are (separately) among the basic postulates of many other radically different theories in psychology. The concept of the unconscious is then central in Freud's theory; it is not unlike Kant's "ding-an-sich", which is directly inaccessible by definition. But this defines it negatively, and Freud is more positive; the centrality of the unconscious is shown for it is the area of primary process. Furthermore, there is that which is unconscious but has not been repressed (although everything repressed is unconscious). Also, the unconscious is responsible for the direct causal effect of the infant on

1. J.A.C. Brown: "Freud and the Post-Freudians". Ch. 1, "Basic Concepts of Psychoanalysis", pg. 1-16.

the adult. Thus the unconscious is omnipresent and exerts a continual causal influence upon conscious thought and behaviour. 'Structural' approaches to the unconscious have been developed recently. Lacan's work, which attempts to show that: "the structure of the unconscious is the structure of language" [1] should be interesting to compare with the work of linguistic philosophers,but is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Freud's main metapsychological or philosophical task then, I think, is to justify his concept of the unconscious. The justification runs along the lines that it can account for behaviour which cannot be accounted for in conscious intention. Dreams and neuroses are examples of expressions of this type of behaviour. However this is only justification in the weak sense. Explanations in terms of unconscious wishes etc. are certainly appropriate (but perhaps <u>only</u> appropriate) to cases where there is some kind of lapse, or to cases where it is inappropriate to ask what the point of the performance might be, or when people simply give hopelessly unconvincing reasons for their behaviour. But we have already seen the much stronger thesis of Freud's, viz. that of all conscious behaviour being unconsciously determined. However, there is a difference (perhaps radical) between explanation in terms of conscious and unconscious processes.

Peters interprets Freud in terms of the weaker thesis: "His claim was not that his theory could explain most human actions but that it could explain phenomena for which either no explanation had been forthcoming or only crude physiological explanations had been attempted". [2] It is this weaker thesis that I will be later concerned with. Thus, according to

1. J. Miel: "Jacques Lacan and the Structure of the Unconscious" in: "Structuralism". Ed. J. Ehrmann, pg. 98.
2. R.S. Peters: "The Concept of Motivation", pg. 55.

Peters, Freud's contribution to psychology shows us that neither the rule - following purposive model of man (i.e. man-the-conscious-being) nor the mechanical model of man are adequate for conceptualizing his revolutionary insights. Philosophically, this puts Freud in historical perspective. He is, it seems, a Cartesian, but unlike the cartesian picture of the mind as self-conscious, rational intellect, Freud introduces the unconscious and makes it the more dominant and determining part of the 'mind'.

In relation to other theories of human behaviour Freud stands half-way between two attempts to correct the Cartesian theory. The first attempt we could call the behaviourist attempt - viz. to reduce "res cogitans" to "res extensa" - thus the explanation of 'mental' states and processes are explained (reduced) in terms of physical states and processes. The other attempt admires Descartes' autonomy of mind so much that it denies any dependence on the physical; the existentialists come to mind here, especially Sartre. Sartre is quick to see the implications of Freud's unconscious; he says: "The profound contradiction in all psychoanalysis is that it presents <u>at the same time</u> a bond of causality and a bond of understanding between the phenomena that it studies. These two types of relationship are incompatible". [1.] Causality and understanding are certainly different, but why "contradictory"? Surely behaviour can have both causes and reasons, or, to put it another way, reasons can have causes. Sartre says: "For our part, we do not reject the findings of psychoanalysis when they are obtained by the understanding. We limit ourselves to the denial that there is any value or intelligibility in its underlying theory of psychic causality". [2.] I think that explanation in terms of the unconscious is not causal (or not predominantly causal) in character, but,

1. J-P. Sartre: "Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions", pg. 54.
2. ibid., pg. 54.

I disagree with Sartre, for some sort of causal account of 'unconscious' behaviour seems in principle quite legitimate.

It seems to me that Freud introduces a third contender to the cause-reason controversy, viz. motive. A person's behaviour can be caused (and I think that in a sense all behaviour is caused); a person's behaviour can have reasons - this occurs with rational conscious action; and finally a person's behaviour can be motivated - this occurs with emotional behaviour, sometimes conscious and other times unconscious. Perhaps the split between conscious and unconscious is not discrete but continuous - i.e. not a split but a spectrum. In this light motivated behaviour can at one end (the conscious end) be explained in terms of motives or 'emotional' reasons, whereas at the other end (the unconscious end) the behaviour can be explained in terms of unconscious motives - we don't like to talk of "unconscious" reasons. So, unconscious explanation is half-way between causal explanation and reason or rational explanation, and yet distinct from both.

But the term "half-way" is, I think, not quite true for there is still a stronger cleavage to reasons than to causes. This I will try to explain with the Strawsonian model. Strawson's person can be analysed, we have already seen, by examining the language we use to describe him, viz. P- and M-predication. I would argue that ascriptive statements that refer to unconsciously motivated behaviour will still involve P-predicates (rather than M-predicates). Thus if one accepts that unconscious motives (e.g. X did Y because of an Oedipus-complex, because of projection, regression etc. in such-and-such circumstances, etc.) involve P-predication, this has important consequences for P-predication - viz., that the person has <u>both</u> states of consciousness <u>and</u> states of unconsciousness - and thus to be

consistent, to ascribe states of unconsciousness to oneself one must be prepared to ascribe them to others and vice versa. Furthermore, behaviour (including verbal behaviour)[1] must be a "logically adequate criterion" for the ascription of states of unconsciousness.

Thus the philosophical implications of Freud's work in regard to Strawson's concept of a person goes a long way to showing that a person's 'mental' states form a spectrum from conscious to unconscious. We have already seen in the philosophical criticisms of Strawson's theory an argument for a 'bodily-mental' spectrum, i.e. a spectrum of M- and P-predication, [2] however this above-mentioned spectrum is found within P-predication itself.

In the above I have turned the tables on Strawson, and, rather than give a Strawsonian critique of Freud, I have found it more profitable to give a Freudian critique of Strawson so as to point to the adjustments that are required in Strawson's theory. This I think surely points out the greatness of Freud's work, for here we have a psychological theory which (however weak in parts) is able to provide new philosophical insight. But now to turn the tables once again, a critique of Freud and psycho-analysis. Firstly, Freud's ontology; criticism of Freud's stronger thesis is needed, viz. that all behaviour is unconsciously determined. The unconscious, says MacIntyre, [3] is presented by Freud no longer as an adjective or adverb, but as a noun. This firstly commits the Cartesian 'fallacy' - the belief in a mind as a thing like the body, and secondly undermines or usurps man's conscious activity. Strawson's argument against the Cartesian picture we have already dealt with. As for the iceberg theory of the 'mind' (which points to the predominance of the unconscious), it is firstly untestable

1. See J. Miel on J. Lacan above.
2. See Harré and Secord's criticism, Part I, Ch. 3, pg. 23, and also their "The Explanation of Social Behaviour", pg. 109-113.
3. See A.C. MacIntyre: "The Unconscious" - a short but excellent book.

and I think, simply goes against the facts of our conscious existence. Furthermore, if an omnipresent unconscious causation is exerted upon conscious life, then in clinical practice there is definitely a sense in which the non-neurotic is more deluded than the neurotic. This paradoxical position can only be averted by resorting back to rationality; Freud said: "Where id was, there ego shall be". MacIntyre in fact points at the clash between the two languages in Freud - the language of rationality and responsibility, and the language of determinism. He further maintains that Freud promoted, though he tried to conceal this, a moral ideal, of which rationality was central; and of course the conscious, rather than the unconscious, mind is associated with rationality and responsibility.

Freud's concept of the unconscious brings with it great epistemological problems - problems of verification and problems of explanation, since the unconscious is not a directly observed entity. Verification (or, rather, testability) of statements involving the unconscious have three main difficulties; the first centres on the concept of resistance. Failure to acknowledge the correctness of an interpretation may be due <u>either</u> to the patient's resistence <u>or</u> due simply to the fact that the interpretation was wrong. Secondly, the concept of ambivalence creates a difficulty (i.e. for example the inter-changeability of love and hate). And the third difficulty evolves from Freud's idea of overdetermination, viz. that there are always more than sufficient causes of a neurosis, and thus the fact that a particular explanation did not produce a remedy never means that the explanation was incorrect, but rather, that it was incomplete. From the above I think we are strongly influenced to believe that clinical experience could never logically provide adequate verification (or falsification) for Freudian theory as a whole. This fact leads me to believe in a degree of autonomy of psychotherapy as distinct from psychoanalysis or

psychoanalytic theory. However with changes in terminology, many of Freud's hypotheses can be tested (and hence verified or falsified to some degree) without recourse to his theory. Another viewpoint is to take non-verifiability (or falsifiability) positively, as N.O. Brown (as we shall see), and Merleau-Ponty do. Merleau-Ponty says:

> "Freud's contribution is not to have revealed quite another reality beneath appearances, but that the analysis of given behaviour always discovers several layers of signification, each with its own truth, and that the plurality of possible interpretations is the discursive expression of a mixed life in which every choice always has several meanings it being impossible to say which of them is the only true one". [1.]

This is in keeping with the "ambiguity" that pervades Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.

As for the explanatory nature of Freud's unconscious, we must decide whether the unconscious is to be classed with, for example, the electron or with ether. Freud certainly has a legitimate concept of unconscious mental activity - but does he use this to describe rather than explain behaviour? Many philosophers [2.] think that Freud has not given an explanation, but rather has given what Wittgenstein called a "wonderful representation" of the facts. Instead of explaining a dream for example, Freud is said to describe, decipher or decode it. Thus the unconscious functions as a classificatory label, a category into which parts of a person's life can be fitted. On the other hand, Freud's unconscious is certainly more than merely descriptive, even though its predictive power is rather 'low'.

1. M. Merleau-Ponty: "Themes from the Lectures at the College de France, 1952-1960", pg. 50.
2. MacIntyre, for example; op. cit.

Surely Freud's theory is both descriptive and explanatory? 'But why quibble about words?' you may ask; what is behind this descriptive/ explanatory dichotomy?

I think the question of whether psychoanalysis is a science is in question here. And since 'explanation' is one of the strongest criteria in classifying some theory scientific, to accept the unconscious as being an explanatory concept, to some extent, shows markings of a 'scientific' theory. Of course here the issue revolves around the view we take of science. Brown, for instance, shows a positive value in being unscientific, or, rather, non-scientific, though, no doubt, maintaining a particular view of science:

> "... the basic structure of Freud's thought is committed to dialectics, because it is committed to a vision of mental life as basically an arena of conflict; and his finest insights (for example, that when the patient denies something, he affirms it) are incurably 'dialectical'. Hence the attempt to make psychoanalysis out to be 'scientific' (in the positivist sense) is not only vain but destructive. Empirical verification, the positivist test of science, can apply only to that which is fully in consciousness; but psychoanalysis is a mode of contacting the unconscious under conditions of general repression, when the unconscious remains in some sense repressed. To put the matter another way, the 'poetry' in Freud's thought cannot be purged away, or rather such an expurgation is exactly what is accomplished in 'scientific' textbooks of psychology; but Freud's writings remain unexpurgatable". [1]

1. N.O. Brown: "Life Against Death", pg. 279.

Another problem of the 'scientific' nature of psychoanalysis concerns the reference area of the theory - a problem common to all general theories of psychology. In other words, can any psychological theory (and for that matter, any overall theory of a human or social kind) be scientific? MacIntyre proclaims that no doubt a general explanation of what human beings are and do is in some sense possible, for neurophysiology will some day give us a full account which itself will be reducible to chemical and physical explanations. But then he asks whether this will be what we are looking for. He believes that still nothing of the specifically human will be accounted for - for this a different account, that of the novelist or the artist rather than the scientist, will be needed.[1.] This view puts the person above science or confines (and defines) science to the 'natural' sciences which is limited to the material world to which persons belong, but not exhaustively. This type of belief brings us into the next approach in psychology that I wish to examine, viz. the existentialist-humanist approach.

1. See A.C. MacIntyre: "The Unconscious", pg. 97-98.

CHAPTER VI

EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM

We should talk of the existentialist-humanist 'paradigm' for there are many different, and sometimes conflicting, approaches within it. Firstly, existentialism is predominantly the outgrowth of European thought, whereas humanistic psychology is an American product. Furthermore, existentialism is an autonomous inquiry, whereas humanistic psychology (the so-called "Third Force") is closely allied to existentialism. It is also important to notice that existential-humanism has no clear boundaries to its thought. It has clear overlaps with other approaches, especially phenomenology (many of the existentialists and humanistic psychologists being phenomenologists - e.g. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Rogers, Giorgi, etc.); thus many of these psychologists are really philosophers. It is also closely linked to psychoanalysis and neo-Freudianism (the 'ego'-centred variety).[1.] And like psychoanalysis (and even Kelly's cognitive theory) it has strong ties with the therapeutic, practical, clinical world; i.e. with psychology as therapy rather than theory.

A good description of the confusion of existentialist (and humanist) therapy in America is given by May. He says that the writings on existential psychology and psychotherapy seem to be a "Tower of Babel" for there is a great confusion of tongues.[1.] Some say that existential psychology is Adlerian, others that it is Jungian, and others that it is all in Freud. Some identify it with Zen Buddhism and other anti-intellectual trends, others with super-intellectual philosophy (especially of the German variety).

1. For example see: "Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy", ed. H.M. Ruitenbeek.
2. See R. May: "Dangers in the Relation of Existentialism to Psychotherapy", in "Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy", ed. H.M. Ruitenbeek.

May maintains that most of these spokesmen seem unaware of their contradictions, namely that if existential psychology and psychiatry is one of these things it cannot be any of the others. The existentialist wing seem to write off psychology as a science - the person is simply beyond scientific inquiry. The humanistic psychologists have, I think, a similar belief, but different intentions - they simply (or not so simply) change the definition of science to include their field.

Existentialism is perhaps best known through the work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, however men like Binswanger, Boss, Buitendijk, etc., are more actively involved in existential psychology and existential psychotherapy. Because of space I will limit myself to only one theorist - Ludwig Binswanger. As Freud's psychoanalysis was an attempt to show that man had instincts, Binswanger goes on to show that man also has a 'spirit'. Binswanger's Daseinanalyse is strongly influenced by the philosophy of Kant and Heidegger. Central to his work is the concept of the Existential A Priori: "they are the universals or forms that stand to the experience of each human being in the same manner that the Kantian categories of the understanding stand to the objects that we know."[1] Yet they are broader than the Kantian categories for these are just one mode of Being-in-the-World among others - viz., the mode of objective knowledge.

For the sake of continuity with the previous chapter I shall deal with Binswanger's 'critique' of Freud's unconscious. This involves two new concepts, that of the horizon and that of thrownness. Both terms I think significantly alter our conception of the unconscious. Basic to the concept of the horizon is the indeterminacy of an object or a meaning. For Binswanger the relation between the present and the past experience

1. L. Binswanger: "Being-in-the-World", transl. with introduction by J. Needleman, pg. 27.

of an individual is not determined by that very past (as in Freud's case) but rather by the horizon within which that individual experiences both the present and the past. Thus: "Existential psychoanalysis is not looking for the causes or basic drives as psychoanalysis does. It looks for that in the individual which makes it possible that these causes and basic drives have the efficacy that Freudian psychoanalysis ascertains them as having".[1] Binswanger's concept of thrownness is also a strong conceptual tool especially in healing Freud's 'psychic' splits of past and present, and ego and id. For Binswanger the unconscious is only one manifestation of the Dasein - viz., that of thrownness. Binswanger emphasizes that thrownness is an a priori constitutive element of the Dasein; i.e. it is constitutive of the self to a degree - hence we see the unity of the Dasein. Thus thrownness and freedom are found together interdependently in the Dasein.

Although Binswanger's language is rather distant from that of Strawson's, I do think there are points of contact. Parallels can certainly be drawn between the a priori and holistic Dasein of Binswanger and Strawson's person, and between the concept of thrownness and Strawson's M-predication. The existentialists in general seem most aware of the given (a priori) unity of the person containing within it a distinct mystery, a uniqueness. In Strawson's (linguistic) terms this is the ability to ascribe both M- and P-predicates to man, and it finds counterparts in almost every existentialist writer, often with new, interesting and insightful terminology. We have already witnessed Binswanger's case. Sartre formulates it most extremely in his "pour-soi" and "en-soi" terminology.[2] One further example is that of Ricoeur who speaks of the voluntary and the involuntary.[3] Central to his philosophy is the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary -

1. L. Binswanger, op. cit., pg. 138.
2. See J-P. Sartre: "Being and Nothingness".
3. See P. Ricoeur: "Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary".

the "primacy of conciliation over paradox". [1] Ricoeur's freedom is a willing freedom (the voluntary), and, as important, it is an incarnate freedom. He talks of the "central primitive fact of incarnation" [2] which is also fully in agreement with Strawson's concept of a person. Existentialism thus greatly amplifies and enriches Strawson's very clear but simple ontology.

As for the humanists perhaps Rogers is a good example to choose. Typically he shows a breadth of influences - viz. phenomenology, existentialism, self-theory, etc. He says: "We need no longer live in an inhibited science of psychology", [3] and calls for "... a more inclusive and a more profound science". [4] He refers to three ways of knowing, objective, subjective and interpersonal, and shows the relatedness of them all. [5] He is thus optimistic about "... a newer philosophy of science which will not be fearful of finding room for the person - both the observer and the observed - in his subjective as well as his objective mode. It will carry within it a view of man as a subjectively free, choosing, responsible, architect of self". [6] So optimism and science are side by side in humanistic psychology.

The Articles of Association of the American Association for Humanistic Psychology define its role as follows:

> "Humanistic psychology is primarily an orientation towards the whole of psychology rather than a distinct area or school.

1. P. Ricoeur, op. cit., pg. xviii (transl. introd.)
2. ibid., pg. 87. (See also Merleau-Ponty: "Phenomenology of Perception")
3. C.R. Rogers: "Toward a Science of the Person", in: "Behaviorism and Phenomenology", ed. Wann, pg. 120.
4. ibid., pg. 118.
5. ibid., see pg. 110-118.
6. ibid., pg. 131.

It stands for respect for the worth of persons, respect for differences of approach, open-mindedness as to acceptable methods, and interest in the exploration of new aspects of human behaviour. As a 'third force' in contemporary psychology it is concerned with topics having little place in existing theories and systems: e.g. love, creativity, self, growth, organism, basic need-gratification, self-actualization, higher values, being, becoming, spontaneity, play, humour, affection, naturalness, warmth, ego-transcendence, objectivity, autonomy, responsibility, meaning, fair-play, transcendental experience, peak experience, courage, and other related concepts. (This approach finds expression in the writings of such persons as Allport, Angyal, Asch, Buhler, Fromm, Goldstein, Horney, Maslow, Moustakas, Rogers, Wertheimer, and in certain of the writings of Jung, Adler, and the psychoanalytic ego-psychologists, existential and phenomenological psychologists)". [1.]

More specifically some of the aims of Humanistic psychology are:-

1. a human orientated science,
2. a view of man that is fruitful and enriching to his life.
3. to fight depersonalization and the man-as-object influence - thus a fight for dignity.
4. to explain the 75-90% of man's potential which today is largely latent. [2.]

1. F.T. Severin (ed.): "Humanistic Viewpoints in Psychology", Introduction, pg. xv-xvi.
2. See J.F.T. Bugental: "The Challenge that is Man", in: "Challenges of Humanistic Psychology". ed. J.F.T. Bugental, pg. 5-11.

If one asks 'why still science?', one can surely reply 'and why not?' We must realize that it is not so important what we call this inquiry (or any inquiry, for that matter) as what our inquiry is concerned with, and discovers. Maslow, for example, cries out for the desacrilization of science.[1.] The other points (2, 3 and 4) clearly exhibit the ethical and political nature of psychology, pointing out how important human interest is (or should be) in psychology and the social sciences.

In the same line Giorgi lists the three presuppositions of psychology as a human science:

1. Fidelity to the phenomenon of man as a person.

2. Special concern for uniquely human phenomena.

3. The primacy of relationships.[2.]

Giorgi's presuppositions are very Strawsonian in character, for Giorgi is concerned with the model of man-the-person, and with those phenomena which are unique to the person, and what makes each person unique - which corresponds to the 'realm' of P-predication, in Strawson's terms. And furthermore, by referring to the "primacy of relationships" Giorgi points to the 'intersubjective' (or objective-subjective) foundation of Strawson's theory.[3.]

Thus from a Strawsonian point of view, I think the existentialist-humanist 'paradigm' is most aware 'ontologically', of the subject matter of psychology. It shows concern with the whole person, i.e. the person's unity, and his uniqueness. Thus descriptively it is in line with Strawson's concept of a person. However it is not limited to description for it is deeply concerned with the 'normative' or prescriptive field, i.e. with what

1. See A.H. Maslow: "The Psychology of Science", esp. ch. 14.
2. See A. Giorgi, "Psychology as a Human Science", pg. 184-187.
3. See Hamlyn's thesis quoted above, Part I, Ch. 3, pg. 24.

man should be and what values he should cherish. This is witnessed in its concern for man's dignity and for a view of man that is 'enriching' to his life. This concern with the 'normative' field implies that ethics is central to psychology;[1.] and also, obviously, that the person is an ethical concept.

This concern with the richness of life is, however, in conflict with a particular view of science. Rudner says:

> "...the mistake (about science) ... consists in assuming that it is the function of science to reproduce "reality" and concluding that science is defective from the fact that it accomplishes no such thing. Basically, this error rests on a confusion between a description and what is described. Albert Einstein once remarked that it is not the function of science 'to give the taste of the soup'".[2.]

This is called the reproductive fallacy of science and is applied to the social sciences as well.

I think the existentialist-humanists can quite legitimately search for the richness of human life and focus on the ethical, religious and political realm, but this constitutes no valid criticism of other approaches which choose precision as an alternative aim (e.g. the behaviourists). Whether this search can be termed 'scientific' is another matter, for the 'reproductive' fallacy must be seriously taken account of. Strawson makes no claims as to the relation between his concept of a person and the nature and workings of science, both natural and social.

1. See, for example, A.R. Louch: "Explanation and Human Action".
2. R.S. Rudner: "Philosophy of Social Science", pg. 69.

So here we enter into the realm of alternatives. I think they boil down to treating the concept of a person as either an informal (common-sense, everyday) or a formal concept. The existentialists and the humanists both employ the informal concept; the former, then, generally disregard their work as being scientific, though some, especially those phenomenologically inclined, see it as a preface to scientific work; the latter reconcile this informal concept of a person with the 'scientific' label. We shall return to formalization later.

CHAPTER VII

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

As with Existentialism-humanism, developmental psychology is better conceived as a paradigm than as an approach. It is concerned with the history and growth of the person but contains many different perspectives. One way, for example, of characterizing these perspectives is in terms of functional and structural approaches.

One of the main criticisms of the philosophical psychologists is that they tend to see the adult person as 'given', thereby overlooking the importance of the development of the person from the baby to the adult. Alternatively, many see this development as irrelevant to our understanding of the mature adult. In this section I intend examining the relevance of developmental accounts to the philosophical foundations of psychology in general and to the concept of the person in particular.

I shall begin with the most influential theory of development today, viz. Piaget's "genetic epistemology" which clearly exhibits the structural approach. Piaget maintains that:

> "By its analysis of the most elementary stages, genetic epistemology has been able to show that the initial forms of knowledge differ from the higher forms to a much greater extent than has been believed, and that consequently the construction of the latter has had to follow a much longer, more difficult and more unpredictable path than one would have imagined. The genetic methodology thus lends support to constructivist conceptions..." [1]

1. J. Piaget: "The Principles of Genetic Psychology", pg. 93.

The theory of Piaget's as such, and the complex interplay between the philosophical and psychological elements of the theory are much in debate. [1]

For a brief view of this debate I shall begin with Hamlyn who believes that the philosophical and psychological (or empirical) issues are unfortunately muddled up together, for philosophical questions cannot be answered by appealing to empirical evidence, or vice versa. He says:

> "On this I can at present only be dogmatic ... If I am right, however, my answer to the question, "What relevance has genetic epistemology in the more orthodox sense?", must be that in a certain sense genetic epistemology presupposes a traditional epistemological position. If it has implications for epistemology, it is in that sense and for that reason, and not because of its status as a psychological theory". [2]

The traditional epistemological position (and philosophical tradition) which Hamlyn refers to is the Kantian one. Toulmin exhibits Piaget's variation on a Kantian theme. Piaget might have started with a Kantian training, but the developments of the disciplines of history and anthropology could not be ignored. Toulmin compares Piaget's 'Kantian' psychology to Max Planck's 'Kantian' theoretical physics.

> "For both Planck and Piaget, complete rational coherence was no longer an all-or-nothing affair, but rather an ideal to which men approached by successive approximations ... In Piaget's hands, the Kantian scheme thus becomes an ideal or final system towards which all rational thought develops as its inescapable and unique destination." [3]

1. See "Cognitive Development and Epistemology". ed. T. Mischel.
2. D.W. Hamlyn: "Epistemology and Conceptual Development", in Mischel, pg. 19.
3. S. Toulmin: "Human Understanding", pg. 423.

Hamlyn, in appraising Piaget's theory, says: "... I am still inclined to think that a theory that rests directly upon both empirical and philosophocial considerations must have a degree of incoherence". [1] It is this 'separatist' notion which is at the bottom of the controversy. Toulmin, unlike Hamlyn, welcomes this mixture. He believes that the mixing of conceptual and empirical issues is to some extent unavoidable. And this mixing is <u>not</u> unnatural <u>nor</u> confusing. Thus for Toulmin a philosophical critique of developmental psychology performs a necessary preface to understanding (Piaget's) empirical findings. So philosophical defects in Piaget's conceptual work will certainly damage his psychological account; but: "we shall arrive at a better "theory of cognition" - or, to use the traditional phrase, at better "principles of human understanding" - only in the light of <u>both</u> better conceptual analysis <u>and</u> better empirical information". [2]

The trend among philosophers is, I think, to accept Toulmin's account; but our concern is with the psychologist and it is even more important that <u>psychologists</u> themselves examine this 'open' approach. Flavell [3] exemplifies this attitude; he is interested in the possible contributions that philosophy might make to developmental psychology. He sees the work of the cognitive-developmental psychologists as describing and theorizing about the ontogenetic history of the adult mind. However this requires some idea of what conceptual processes and structures eventually get developed. One further contribution that Flavell thinks philosophers can make, is conceptual analyses of the processes and structures of development itself, in contrast to the products of that development. Some philosophers, virtually abandoning philosophy, look almost entirely to psychology, believing that the future of epistemology is in the hands of the advances to come in psychology.

1. Hamlyn, op. cit., in Mischel, pg. 23.
2. S. Toulmin, "The Concept of Stages in Psychological Development", in Mischel, pg. 55.
3. See J.H. Flavell, in Mischel.

See, for example, Quine's paper: "Epistemology Naturalized". [1] But Quine here refers to <u>scientific</u> epistemology which can be distinguished from Strawson's 'everyday' epistemology.

Another approach to developmental psychology, and in particular, cognitive development, is that of Malcolm's, and others, who generally consider cognitive structures and processes to be myths. Malcolm believes that both philosophers and psychologists are not quite clear of what they mean when they speak of cognitive structures and cognitive processes. He elucidates:

> "Imagine an eccentric who smiles at and says "Hi, John", to every tenth person he passes; and who has never seen this John before. Given those facts, his smile and utterance on this occasion would not be an expression of recognition. On the other hand it is easy to imagine a situation in which such a smile and greeting would be an expression of recognition. Thus, it is the facts, the circumstances surrounding that behaviour, that give it the property of expressing recognition. This property is not due to something that goes on inside. It seems to me that if this point were understood by philosophers and psychologists, they would no longer have a motive for constructing theories and models for recognition, memory, thinking, problem solving, understanding, and other "cognitive processes". [2]

Malcolm applies this very same argument to the field of language and language-acquisition. He says:

1. In "The Psychology of Knowing", Ed. J.R. Royce and W.W. Rozeboom, Ch. 2, pg. 9-23.
2. N. Malcolm: "The Myth of Cognitive Processes and Structures", in Mischel. pg. 387.

> "What is wrong is the assumption that either the languagelike behaviour or the subsequent mastery of language must be under the control of underlying systems or structures, schemes or schemas, processes or principles, plans or isomorphic models. Our understanding of human cognitive powers is not advanced by replacing the stimulus-response mythology with a mythology of inner guidance systems". [1.]

Compare this with Nagel who says: "... fortunately, we don't need to know how to digest food, for we do it in the right way automatically. Language-learning may be similar ... We simply arrive at a command of language after a certain period of exposure ..." [2.] Nevertheless, this does not prevent an inquiry into this 'automatic' acquisition, just as a scientific study of digestion is quite in order.

I think Malcolm's arguments exhibit an inadequacy in regard to explanation. He overlooks the fact that explanation can have many levels. Perhaps Malcolm confuses explanation with complete explanation. This is Dodwell's view. He believes that Malcolm is simply unwilling to grant any validity to any specific level of explanation or investigation of human behaviour. He agrees with Malcolm that appeals to memory, for example, cannot yield a complete explanation of remembering, but why, he asks, should this fact invalidate the types of investigation and the construction of models that psychologists spend their efforts on. Malcolm, then, wrongly wants to restrict psychologists to investigating simple empirical relationships. If this were the case, which empirical relationships would be investigated, and who would choose them? - surely not philosophers.

1. N. Malcolm, op. cit., pg. 392.
2. T. Nagel: "Linguistics and Epistemology" in "Language and Philosophy", Ed. S. Hook, pg. 182.

Dodwell maintains: "It is a fact of life that scientific explanations are not coextensive with common-sense ones, and scientists are in the best position to decide what is, and what is not, worthy of investigation and scientific explanation". [1.] Many thinkers, Dodwell included, believe that scientific theories in psychology are often valued mainly because they cannot be reduced to common-sense. That there are scientific theories in psychology, then, is open to debate - one which centres around the question of 'how common is common-sense'?

Louch is of the opinion that psychology can either be reduced to physiology or to common-sense (or both) - he plays a variation on Malcolm's theme; he says:

> "Explanation of human action still resides, for all the efforts of psychologists, in the ad hoc pronouncements which we make with confidence about the notices and intentions, desires and anxieties, the anticipated pleasures and the felt pains which account for this or that human action. It is possible to imagine the laborious analysis of behaviour into measurable units serving as the structure and the evidence for physiological hypothesis. But psychology as a science with its own explanatory laws, falls in a no-man's land between physiology and the ad hoc deliverances of every-day life". [2.]

But here we need to ask, 'even granting that this is true, is this a necessary or a contingent fact?'; i.e. how necessary is it that psychology never transcends 'common-sense'?

1. P.C. Dodwell: "Is a Theory of Conceptual Development Necessary?", in Mischel, pg. 383.
2. A.R. Louch: "Explanation and Human Action", pg. 38.

But such far-reaching questions which we will return to later have taken us off our initial inquiry - viz., developmental psychology. Having discussed the philosophical implications of developmental psychology in general, I would like to enter into the development of the concept of a person - and question whether a developmental account will in any way cast light on Strawson's concept of a person.

Piaget maintains that the young child at first cannot distinguish between internal and external data:

> "On the question of sensorimotor action, J.M. Baldwin long ago demonstrated that the young child does not exhibit any consciousness of self, nor of a fixed boundary between data given internally and those given externally; and that this 'adualism' continues up to the time when the construction of the self becomes possible in correspondence and in opposition with that of others. We have ourselves observed that the primitive universe of the child does not include permanent objects until this interest in others as persons appears, the first object considered as permanent being such persons. These results have been verified in detail by Th. Gouin-Décarie ..." [1]

This in fact validates Hampshire's view that for any language to be possible (which necessarily involves identification) it must be possible at least to distinguish persons from one another - and to distinguish persons is to distinguish objects (which persons, among other things, are) from sense data. It further 'validates' Hampshire's point that we <u>must</u> talk of reality as consisting of <u>permanent</u> or persistent things, for otherwise we could not use

1. J. Piaget: "The Principles of Genetic Psychology", pg. 20.

language to identify things (both persons and objects). Strawson's point about the self involving other selves ("in correspondence and in opposition with that of others") is also 'validated'.

Piaget continues: "In short, the co-ordination of the subject's actions, inseparable as it is from the spacio-temporal and causal co-ordinates which he attributes to reality, is the origin both of the differentiations between this subject and objects and of the decentring process on the level of physical acts..." [1.] This clearly ties up with the ideas of both Strawson and Hampshire and the central role of action for the person. As Strawson says: "First, I think a beginning can be made by moving a certain class of P-predicates to a central position in the picture. They are predicates, roughly, which involve doing something ..." [2.] So here we have an 'account' by two philosophers (and, further, linguistic philosophers) which does not clash with the developmental account of Piaget. Perhaps then we see the 'teleological' aspect of developmental psychology as being fundamental; i.e. to give an acount of the adult person we must in a sense begin with him.

Piaget's account involves the development of concepts and structures (e.g. reversibility). However we have already asked just how relevant the whole theory of genetic epistemology (i.e. the epistemological tradition) is to these empirical questions. It is thus interesting to see that Merleau-Ponty gives a similar account of the development of the concept of a person without any recourse to Piaget's schemas. He too shows that there is a first phase in which we find an anonymous collectivity, that is, an undifferentiated group life. Next occurs the distinction of individuals. This occurs by objectifying one's own body and constituting the other in his or her difference. Merleau-Ponty continues more specifically:

1. J. Piaget, op. cit., pg. 22.
2. I. pg. 111.

"The I arises when the child understands that every _you_ that is addressed to him is for him an I; that is, that there must be a consciousness of the reciprocity of points of view in order that the word I may be used ... Use of the pronoun I comes still later than use of the proper name, at least as it is understood in its full meaning, i.e. in its relative meaning. The pronoun I has its full meaning only when the child uses it not as an individual sign to designate his own person ... but when he understands that each person he sees can in turn say I and that each person is an I for himself and a _you_ for others. It is when he understands that even though others call him _you_ he can nonetheless say I, that the pronoun I is acquired in all its significance... At around three years the child ... stops confusing himself with the situation or the role in which he may find himself engaged. He adopts a proper perspective or viewpoint of his own - or rather he understands that, whatever the diversity of situations or roles, he is _someone_ above and beyond these different situations and roles". [1.]

Merleau-Ponty's account, being close to Piaget's, also shows much consonance with Strawson's concept of a person, especially in the epistemological domain. Strawson's 'necessary axiom' [2.] is 'verified' in the most basic case here; for the ascription of the concept of a "person" to oneself necessarily implies preparedness to ascribe the concept "person" to another, and vice versa.

1. M. Merleau-Ponty: "The Primacy of Perception", pg. 150-152.
2. "viz. that it is a necessary condition of ascribing states of consciousness ... to oneself ... that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself." I. pg. 99.

Thus I think developmental psychology (the Piagetian and Merleau-Pontian variety) adds support to the philosophical (conceptual, or even metaphysical) standpoint; and a good philosophical account of the person (viz. Strawson's and Hampshire's) provides the "terminus ad quem" of developmental psychology. Though the empirical and conceptual accounts are not directly dependent on one another, I think to divorce them is artificial (just as theory and observation are virtually inseparable in practice), and thus taken together they broaden and enhance our knowledge, as Toulmin has clearly pointed out.

CHAPTER VIII

AN OVERVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY

In this chapter I hope to summarize the issues arising out of the previous chapters. Firstly we must ask what does Strawson's concept of a person offer psychology? We have seen that the person implies a "wholeness", i.e. both M- and P-predication must be incorporated; a person is "... a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable ..."; [1] and, further, both M- and P-predication must be taken fully. The person is, then, a thing among other things in the world, but he is not only this, he is also an agent in the world; the body is not only in space, but also "inhabits" and "haunts" space [2] (i.e. the 'lived' body - viz. the person).

Furthermore the person implies a unity. The point is that this unity is "given" (in the phenomenological sense) for we experience people fully, as people, and not as being divided into minds and bodies (this division is only made 'artificially' - or on the 'reflexive' plane). Thus the person is subject to explanations on the causal sphere as well as the sphere of reasons (and, again, this division is a result of reflection). The person, then is certainly to some extent liable to be given a causal account of his actions - though, of course, this is often a highly inadequate account.

But to the extent that a causal account of behaviour or action is applicable to the person, so both behaviourism and physiology, as a partial

1. I. pg. 102.
2. See M. Merleau-Ponty: "The Primacy of Perception", pg. 5.

study of the person, are in order. What we have, then, in varying degrees in both cases is a formalization of the concept of a person (the person is construed as an organism, or a responding mechanism, etc.). But this formalization obviously has its effects on our concept of 'unity' of the person.

So the unity of the person cannot be approached without taking into account the informal usage of the concept of a person (and here we have a pointer to Polanyi's "tacit" knowledge). [1.] This informal (phenomenological) aspect of the person was taken into account to some extent by the phenomenologists, existentialists, and humanists. Of course this wholeness and unity of the person is "basic" and "primitive", and therefore poses problems for the scientific (and even non-scientific) study of the person. The possibility of reflexiveness and self-reference alone put the person into a unique realm, for a scientific study of the person must be done by none other than persons. Otero makes the distinction between "total" psychology and scientific psychology (which is never total) and tries to show that the former is little more than an expression of goodwill. He says:

> "The goal of a "total" psychology is to capture the unique, non-recurring features of each individual human experience: what "from within" appears as an unobjectifiable act, a fleeting instant of "concrete temporality". The very subject-matter of psychology would be by definition incapable of becoming an object for science; and hardly an object for philosophy either ... In the end, this type of psychology would not even allow its own inclusion in discourse, except through metaphor, given the supposedly ineffable nature of its subject-matter. Poetry and silence would be the only two means for its adequate expression". [2.]

1. See M. Polanyi: "The Tacit Dimension".
2. M.H. Otero: "Philosophical Problems of Scientific Psychology", in "Contemporary Philosophy", ed. R. Klibansky, vol. III, pg. 223.

Thus we see limits to "totality", in the ontological sense, in psychology. More specifically this is a result of the limitation of formalizability and, related to this, the inexhaustability of the 'informal' person.

Epistemologically, I have emphasized that Strawson's concept of a person shows the necessity of both subjective and objective approaches in conjunction for a true account of the person. This calls for a 'dialectic'; I shall try to show in the next chapter a 'dialectical' development whereby both the subjectiveand objective approaches, and the informal and formal approaches, to the concept of a person are taken into account so as to deal with the 'unity' and 'wholeness' of the person more satisfactorily.

But to return to the essential question of the nature of the inquiry on man; what is the relationship between science and the person? One of the 'shortcomings' of Strawson's work in "Individuals" is that he has not said anything explicit about the relationship between his concept of a person and science,and between his concept of a person and ethics. Metaphysics - descriptive or otherwise - cannot avoid the clutches of either science or ethics. In a nutshell, Strawson remains silent on the topical issue of the social sciences.

There are, I think, two broad approaches to psychology (in relation to the notion of science). One is an 'optimistic' and positivistic (in a broad sense) approach which aligns psychology with scientific inquiry, so that even though it may recognize certain shortcomings in the scientific approach, it still advocates psychology as a science. This approach finds (varying degrees of) hope in psychology as a developing study, and in the possibility of exciting empirical findings.

The other broad approach - more pessimistic (or perhaps realistic) - focuses on psychology as it is now and pronounces it pre-scientific; this being in some ways similar to T. Kuhn's conception of psychology as being "pre-paradigmatic". The judgement inherent in this pronouncement varies between contingency and necessity. Let us begin with this latter approach. Louch, for example, begins with the concept of action which we have seen is central to the concept of a person; he says: "The concept of action itself, I hope to show, is in a broad sense a moral concept". [1.] Enlarging on this he shows that the behavioural sciences have become established, and experts in these disciplines play professional roles in political and social strategies. Louch however maintains that even though the professional and scientific rearing of children, treatment of the mentally ill, and designing of policies, to give his examples, are greatly desired, "the observations pertinent to these areas are piecemeal, the conclusions tentative, and dependent on a moral point of view". [2.]

That psychology's observations are "piecemeal" is certainly some stumbling-block (this criticism is Popper's also); that its conclusions are tentative is, I think, Louch's stumbling-block, for such is the nature of all science - and this is a positive aspect, for with "tentativeness" comes criticism and 'openness'. That psychology is dependent on a moral point of view is perhaps the most interesting critique; for when we move from the natural sciences to the social sciences we see the intrusion of 'human interest' which is moral and political; when a social scientist expresses his work in concepts his concepts necessarily (?) are, to some extent, reflections of his culture, i.e. projections of human interests (sociologically this is a Marxist critique). It is interesting that Hampshire, a philosopher so close to Strawson in so many ways, should say:

1. A.R. Louch: "Explanation and Human Action", pg. vii.
2. ibid, pg. 5.

"I hoped ... to bring moral argument nearer to the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of mind nearer to moral argument". [1] For the philosophy of mind should certainly affect psychology.

Louch elaborates a further thesis, viz. that: "Psychology's successes are essentially successes in the mechanics of control, and not in the explanation of normal human action". [2] Explanation rather than control is, I agree, the central criterion for science; and control as an end is a clear proof of a moral point of view. Louch is prepared to call psychology (and the social sciences) a science, but makes it clear that then it does not have the same meaning as natural science - for it is rather an "engineering" science. He believes that we are always ready to bow down to anything that is labelled 'scientific', and confronted with scientific method we often adopt a view of human action that is inconsistent with the picture presented to us as responsible moral agents. He says:

> "I call this attitude scientific because it is urged upon us in the name of the success and progress of science and the ameliorating effect it has on human life. But I should rather call it an engineering attitude, for its more natural affinities are with those practical disciplines whose object is not to understand nature so much as to bend it to our purposes. We think, especially once we are imbued with positivist metaphysics, of physics as the most obvious instance of an enterprise designed and eminently suited to control nature. Yet the major advances of physics have been reflective in nature. The major aim has been to sort out the facts, not to exercise control over them. The scientific attitude evinced by behavioural scientists, conscious or not, is not like this; it is rather the engineer's attitude ..." [3]

1. S. Hampshire: "Thought and Action", pg. 9.
2. A.R. Louch, op. cit., pg. 36.
3. ibid., pg. 238.

Thus science and the success in applying its results (i.e. technology) must be clearly distinguished. I think Louch correctly shows that the two are very often confused especially in the behavioural sciences.

Another example of this broad attitude is given by Andreski who titled his latest book "Social Sciences as Sorcery"; he says: "I argue on the pages which follow that much of what passes as scientific study of human behaviour boils down to an equivalent of sorcery, but fortunately there are other things as well". [1.] So, notwithstanding the possibility of true social science, Andreski presents a scathing attack on what presently passes as social science. He concludes his book as follows:

> "Instead of entertaining visions of a final victory of reason over magic and ignorance, we have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the norms and ideals which permit the advancement of knowledge have to be defended in every generation against new enemies, who reappear like the heads of the Hydra as soon as others are decapitated, and who employ ever-new labels, catchwords and slogans to play on the perennial weaknesses of mankind ... The pioneers of rationalism inveighed against the traditional dogmas, ridiculed popular superstitions, campaigned against priests and sorcerers, and castigated them for fostering and preying upon the ignorance of the masses - hoping that a final victory of science would banish for ever the evils of unreason and organized deception. Little did they suspect that a Trojan Horse would appear in the camp of enlightenment, full of streamlined sorcerers clad in the latest paraphernalia of science." [2.]

The core of Andreski's book is an enumeration of the "latest paraphernalia".

1. S. Andreski: "Social Sciences as Sorcery", pg. 10.
2. ibid., pg. 237-238.

On the other side (though there is no clearcut line between) - that which claims that psychology can be scientific (and more broadly, that the social sciences are really scientific) - we still find many different views. Most of these theorists, although claiming validity for psychology (and other social sciences) as being scientific, have important reservations to make. We have already seen some peculiar differences between the social and the natural sciences. Now we must ask whether these peculiarities alter the status of the social sciences - viz. from science to ideology. Ryan points out an interesting fact here, namely what Kuhn's work[1.] on the philosophy of science has achieved: "We have been assuming that if the social scientist can emulate the practice of the natural scientist sufficiently closely, he will produce social science rather than class ideology. But what Kuhn has done is to undermine this assumption by assimilating the status of the natural sciences to that of ideology". [2.]

Ryan, however, dispells much of Kuhn's ideas and opts for the existence of 'facts', i.e. "objectivity", however difficult this is to achieve in social science: "It may well be almost impossibly difficult for social scientists to remain objective and not to allow their hopes and fears to colour their beliefs; but there is a world of difference between setting out to do something very difficult, and setting out to do something which makes no sense. It is the argument of this book that social science is difficult". [3.] This understanding yet positive approach is perhaps most needed today.

Scriven writes particularly on psychology and his reservations for psychology-the-science are most interesting. Scriven believes that psychology's weaknesses have nothing to do with its "alleged youth". He does not deny the possibility of great discoveries forthcoming in psychology, but says:

1. See T.S. Kuhn: "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions".
2. A. Ryan: "The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, pg. 233.
3. ibid., pg. 240-241.

"I wish only to claim that a certain kind of fundamental discovery - the kind that unified astronomy and mechanics (the law of gravitation) or the kind that retransformed the whole of physics (relativity being one example and quantum theory another) - is wholly impossible in psychology".[1] This reminds us of Peters ("The Concept of Motivation") when he states that the role of the Galileo in psychology must remain forever unoccupied.[2]

Scriven gives three reasons why "radical developments" are impossible in psychology. Firstly, Scriven believes that psychology is greatly constrained by the realm of common-sense. Secondly, Scriven believes that psychology's territory is constantly being usurped by other sciences - viz. biochemistry, biology, genetics, physiology, etc. And thirdly, many of psychology's problems cannot be solved with precision because of the inaccessability of many of the variables needed, and thus: "... many problems of unconditional prediction in psychology are simply unsolvable".[3] In comparison with the natural sciences, Scriven is able to maintain that: "The good fortune of classical physics and the misfortune of psychology lie to a large extent in the kind of prediction problems which they inherit".[4] Thus for Scriven psychology is limited by common sense, by other sciences (i.e. by reduction) and often by the inaccessability of crucial variables.

Scriven's restraining arguments have been attacked. Otero, for example, has this to say: "According to Scriven, then, psychology is in danger of losing its substance to common sense and to related disciplines. However, his assertion merely indicates a constraint; it in no way proves the impossibility of any fundamental discovery, since, on the contrary, reduction itself only becomes possible as a result of a fundamental discovery".[5]

1. M. Scriven: "Views of Human Nature", in: "Behaviorism and Phenomenology". Ed. Wann, pg. 166.
2. See above, Part I, Ch. 5, pg. 40.
3. M. Scriven, ibid., pg. 170.
4. ibid., pg. 172.
5. M.H. Otero, op. cit., pg. 227.

And as regards Scriven's third point, Otero shows that the Galilean advance in the natural sciences: "... rested precisely on the choice of issues sufficiently schematic in themselves to admit of abstract treatment ..." [1.] rather than the complicated treatment that Scriven calls for in psychology. Thus for Otero, psychology may well be 'pre-Galilean' - but this is a <u>contingent</u> fact for him.

But besides Scriven's pessimism over psychology's advancement, he does present some useful ideas for psychology. His most useful proposal is, I think, eclecticism in psychology. Firstly, he talks of the compatibility between behaviourism and phenomenology. But more important, he suggests the possibility of different approaches in different areas in psychology:

> "The physicist interested in cryogenics (low-temperature physics) should, by and large, act as a determinist, and he does. But his colleague, interested in particle interaction, should not and does not ... People think of physics in a monolithic way if they are outside it. Within physics determinism has its role just as indeterminism does. In psychology we can reasonably argue that the area of sensation will best be handled within the framework of a careful phenomenology, that of scheduled motor learning by a careful behaviourism, and so on." [2.]

This touches on the question of coherence in psychology. We have already accepted the pluralistic nature of psychology. But Feyerabend takes this pluralism further - urging for alternative approaches and theories <u>within</u> each field of psychology; i.e. he prescribes an infra-eclecticism. [3.] In connection with this Feyerabend puts forward an "anarchistic epistemology". [4.]

1. M.H. Otero, op. cit., pg. 227.
2. M. Scriven, op. cit., pg. 177.
3. See P.K. Feyerabend: "How to be a Good Empiricist - A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological", in: "Readings in the Philosophy of Science". Ed. B.A. Brody.
4. See P.K. Feyerabend: "Against Method" Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 4.

Winch's ideas [1] about the nature of social science give us a further example of reservations about the adjective "scientific". Winch tries to show that the notion of a human society brings with it a set of concepts (or a conceptual scheme) which is logically incompatible with explanations given in the natural sciences (i.e. causal explanations). Briefly, let me quote Cohen who gives Winch's ideas in terms of five arguments and then provides five counter-arguments:

> "1. social phenomena are ideational; but it does not follow from this that all social conduct is affected by any kind of idea; nor does it follow that all social phenomena are ideational to the same extent.
>
> 2. The explanation of social conduct consists not only in the elucidation of meaning but also, necessarily, in the analysis of causal connexions.
>
> 3. Decision-making, and other aspects of social conduct, rule out determinism, but do not entirely rule out causation.
>
> 4. Statistics do, of course, have to be interpreted; but the interpretations can often be subjected to statistical tests themselves.
>
> 5. The social sciences may owe a great deal to philosophy; and sociology, in particular, may be inseparable from it; but much of sociology has not only benefited from the method of science but could benefit from a great deal more of it." [2]

1. See P. Winch: "The Idea of a Social Science".
2. P. Cohen, in the discussion of E. Gellner's "The New Idealism" in: "Problems in the Philosophy of Science". Ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, pg. 409.

Points 2 and 3, I think, quite rightly bring out the possibility (and necessity) of causal explanation in the social sciences (and in psychology). We can certainly give causal accounts of the person; in regard to explanation all 'M-predicative' events could be 'exhausted' causally, and all 'P-predicative' events could be explained causally to some extent, though, we have already seen, not exhaustively. But there also exists the exciting possibility that in the future of science (i.e. with post-quantum revolutions ...) causal explanations could come to a full account of the 'mental' level (i.e. 'P-predicative' events) for our concept of 'causality' could well shift or broaden, just as occurred when we moved from the pre-Newtonian to the Newtonian 'paradigm'. But just how or why these paradigms (i.e. conceptual schemes, or concepts of rationality) 'shift' is (at least at present and surely for much of the future) beyond science; that is, they are parascientific or metascientific questions of the highest order.

Summarizing, then, Strawson's concept of a person is a philosophical concept and an informal concept. Psychology, being a diverse discipline, employs different concepts of a person in its various fields and theories, yet in some it lacks this concept altogether. These concepts vary in degrees of formalization. For example, the existential psychologists use an informal concept of a person, whereas Kelly's Construct theory formalizes, to some extent, the concept of a person. Behaviourism, in general, does not employ this concept, being a rather formalized psychological approach. So we see that Strawson's concept of a person, being philosophical, is a <u>meta-scientific</u> concept. The extent of its formalizability, which is a function of precision and scientific applicability, is thus rather small. Psychology as a discipline can (for convenience) be divided into theories or into fields.

Strawson's concept of a person, then, is relevant to theories which are relatively unformalized: e.g. existentialist and humanist theories; and to fields or areas that are sufficiently holistic and do not call for too much formalization. I think such a field is social psychology.

CHAPTER IX

STRAWSON'S "PERSON" IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

If psychology is at the pre-Galilean stage, as many critics have already pointed out, then psychology is at that crucial state of choosing the correct set of concepts with which to manage its reference area. In this light I think Strawson's concept of a person is of great use in psychology, and especially in social psychology.

Harré and Secord's work,[1.] which I will be following, provides an excellent case of the use that Strawson's concept of a person (and Hampshire's also) has. At the outset, Harré and Secord maintain that:

> "In our view, an adequate social psychology can be developed only as a co-operative enterprise between psychologists, philosophers and sociologists. No one of these groups seems able to be successful alone. Psychologists have often been concerned with too narrow a conception of social action, and have been severely handicapped by conceptual naivete ..." [2.]

Here we see an eclecticism at the 'macro-' stage, and, also, implicit belief in the 'heterogenous' (rather than 'incoherent') nature of psychology, for we are concerned with <u>social</u> psychology as opposed to other areas of psychology. In terms of levels the field of social psychology is at the top of the psychology ladder and therefore has the personality (individual) and physiological levels below it. The implication of this is that in terms of inclusiveness social psychology is at the positive extreme.

1. R. Harré and P.F. Secord: "The Explanation of Social Behaviour" (see also their new journal: "Journal for the Theory of Social behaviour" which began in April, 1971).
2. ibid., pg. 2.

Harré and Secord develop what they call the "anthropomorphic" model of man which advocates: "... the treating of people for scientific purposes as if they were human beings. This model is rooted in contemporary ideas about the nature of a person, ideas that stem from the way that concept functions in the grammar of our language and in the system of our commonest thoughts". [1.] These "contemporary ideas" refer to the work of Strawson and Hampshire among others, and indicate the linguistic aspect of their philosophies. The acceptance of this model has important consequences, for it regards personal reports as being crucial in psychological study. Thus what people actually say is taken seriously and is seen as really reporting data which are relevant to explaining behaviour. Traditionally it has been argued that statements are merely signs of a state of mind. Harré and Secord show, on the contrary, that at least some self-reports themselves constitute that state of mind. Furthermore: "It is through reports of feelings, plans, intentions, beliefs, reasons and so on that the meanings of social behaviour and the rules underlying social acts can be discovered". [2.] The Strawsonian character of the above passage is quite evident. And further, a harmony with the phenomenological approach is evident. For the Behaviourist appraisal of the status of 'self-reports' (especially Taylor's view) see above, Part II, Ch. 2.

Following Hampshire Harré and Secord suggest that the central condition for being a person is that the individual be aware of what he is doing. Thus he must be capable of saying what he was up to. This condition does leave room for deception in ascribing mental predicates (or rather P-predicates), and furthermore does not require full attention (what Harré and Secord call "attention in the second order of monitoring"). Like Strawson they maintain that in order to have the concept of oneself as a

1. Harré and Secord, op. cit., pg. 6.
2. ibid., pg. 7.

person others should be able to recognize one as a person. So unless we see that others see us as persons we cannot see ourselves as such. It must therefore be possible for one person to know that another person is aware of what he is doing. And thus we see the incorporation of Strawson's epistemological position.

Given this theoretical platform, Harré and Secord attempt a remedy for social psychology; this is their outline:

> "1. Human beings must be treated as agents acting according to rule, and it must be realized that it is unscientific to treat them as anything else.
>
> 2. Social behaviour must be conceived of as actions mediated by meanings, not responses caused by stimuli.
>
> 3. The theory of movements, physiology, must be clearly separated from psychology, the theory of actions.
>
> 4. It must be clearly appreciated that most human social behaviour cannot be made intelligible under the mechanistic, causal paradigm.
>
> 5. Reasons can be used to explain actions, and not all reasons can be treated as causes in the mechanistic sense, though in some special cases causes may be cited as reasons.
>
> 6. Lay explanations of behaviour provide the best model for psychological theory, and properly considered they can be seen to be actually more in accordance with the actual methodology of real natural science than is the positivist methodology which provided the old models of science which psychologists have copied." [1]

1. R. Harré and P.F. Secord, op. cit., pg. 29.

We have encountered the above points in many places before. Point six is, I think, the most assertive for it attaches great importance to common sense ("critical common sense") in social psychology; this is a result of the influence of linguistic philosophy. But the fact that this approach is more in accordance with the actual methodology of the natural sciences, is certainly open to discussion. I cannot deal with it however for it obviously involves going into an elucidation of the intricate methodology of the natural sciences.

More precisely, and in Kuhnian terms, Harré and Secord's remedy involves an attempt to 'shift' from one paradigm (the Old one) to another paradigm (their New one). [1.] This New paradigm revolves around the concepts of ordinary language. As Harré and Secord put it: "Social psychologists should turn more of their attention to life situations, but they need a technique to do this. Ordinary language concepts are the <u>only</u> concepts we have for describing <u>action</u>-meaningful behaviour. The use of ordinary language allows for explanation of behaviour in terms of the actor's point of view". [2.] Some theorists would reply that because these are the only concepts we have for describing 'action', it does not stop them from developing new ones - this reflects the view that science must transcend the level of common sense to be worthwhile science. On this view, everyday concepts, like Wittgenstein's ladder, must be thrown away after we have 'climbed' them; these concepts being only 'the scaffolding to a building'. [3.] Thus I think Harré and Secord's comment must not be taken dogmatically, hence preventing further theorizing (viz. 'super-paradigmatic' theorizing), but we certainly should accept their point when interpreted as: ordinary language concepts are a very good place to start working in.

1. See R. Harré and P.F. Secord, op. cit., pg. 19-22.
2. ibid., pg. 10.
3. See J. Passmore: "A hundred Years of Philosophy", pg. 529.

We still need to decide on the clear demarcations of explanation of human behaviour in terms of ordinary language concepts. Harré and Secord express themselves concisely on this point:

> "Having a power or liability is being in such a state that one is likely to behave in a particular way. The ascription of powers may be characterized according to the following formula:
>
> If C_1, C_2, C_3 ... Cn, then B is virtue of N.
>
> C represents a set of conditions forming an open disjuction, B represents the ensuing behaviour, and N represents the nature and state of the individual, in virtue of which he is capable of doing B should any of the conditions C_1 ... Cn obtain. The C and B elements taken together we call the D-component of the powers ascription. Both the D-component and the N-component <u>can</u> be expressed entirely in ordinary language terms. Sometimes, however, they relate readily to ordinary language or become a part thereof. Psychological terms may form a part of the C- or N- components, but can be a part of the B-component only if consonant with the logic of ordinary language. Physiological terms form a separate scientific vocabulary and may enter into the C-component or the N-component, but <u>not</u> the B-component. This is what distinguishes psychological from ordinary medicine. Thus, physiological conditions and N-states and processes pertaining to schizophrenia may be specified, but schizophrenic <u>behaviour</u> may only be described in ordinary terms and certain related psychological terms". [1]

1. R. Harré and P.F. Secord, op. cit., pg. 18.

Thus what is beginning to emerge is a theory with different levels. We have a physiological level, but to identify physiological entities always depends upon independently identifying psychological phenomena and so cannot be substituted for them. We also have a psychological level (which involves theoretical and conceptual terms), and finally a level, or realm, of ordinary language terms. These terms have limited usage for they do not characterize the individual in all settings or levels. But they are particularly useful in those contexts where man interacts socially with his fellows.

Thus the person as a whole is characterized by all three levels. [1.] A very similar picture is given by Batson; [2.] he too refers to three levels (physical-descriptive, behavioural and theoretical) and shows that no explanation at one level alone is sufficient - all three are needed for a full account of the person. I have characterized this 'multi-level' approach earlier as being "dialectical" - for it combines objective (physiological) with subjective (ordinary language usage reports) approaches, and adds a theoretical dimension to it (viz. the psychological level). This reminds one of similarities with Popper's "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject" [3.] where three 'worlds' or levels are developed. The third 'world' being the theoretical, scientific world. This would correspond with Harré and Secord's psychological level, only the similarity is greatly weakened by the restraints that Harré and Secord put on this level (viz. the necessary harmony with ordinary language concepts).

One further aspect of this 'dialectical' characterization of Harré and Secord's approach is the combination of the informal and formal aspects of

1. See J.K.C. Jones: "Logical Reduction and Social Psychology". Journal for the theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 3, No. 1, 1973, pg. 3-21.
2. See Part I, Ch. 5, pg. 41-42.
3. Reprinted in: "Objective Knowledge", pg. 106-152.

the person. Strawson's concept of a person is no doubt an informal concept (which centres around ordinary language usage), but the possibility for formalization is evident in this new approach. [1.] Formalization obviously takes place at the physico-descriptive, physiological level, but the possibility of another formalization could take place at the psychological (theoretical) level. This formalization, however, will not be as strict as the physiological one, for we have seen it has restraints imposed upon it; in a sense, it would be a compromise between formal and informal, i.e. a synthesis in the true sense of the word.

With our new approach we must expect a new methodology. Harré and Secord devote a chapter of their book to research strategies in the behavioural sciences which involve some new methodological directions. To illustrate one of the new methods:

"Method Exploiting and Exploring Ordinary Language

Example Person Concepts

(a) (i) Most studies have provided participants with a language and terminology.

(ii) The 'experiments' have not usually involved real interaction with real people.

(b) The analysis of free interview accounts of other people can be done, and has already produced very illuminating results." [2.]

The new methodology, then, certainly involves the collaboration of philosophers, for much of the work to be done is conceptual and linguistic in character.

1. For the point about formalization - see Ziff above, Part I, Ch. 3, pg. 20-21.
2. R. Harré and P.F. Secord, op. cit., pg. 293; see Ch. 14, pg. 293-318.

So basically Harré and Secord have tried to establish the conceptual foundations for understanding the nature of human society. That is, they have tried to establish a new social psychology. Their central axiom is that a human community is essentially linguistic: "It is the web of language that makes for 'psychic continuity' between people". [1.] All this, I think, is intimately linked to Strawson's concept of a person, for the person necessarily implies a social aspect, and furthermore, both the person and society (or community) necessarily imply the "web of language" or, at least, some symbolic interaction.

It is, I believe, this 'trilogy' of the concept of the person, the community (or society) and language which underlies social psychology. And here a broad view of Strawson's philosophy, covering each aspect of the trilogy, is of great value. Thus Strawson's work on the person, his work on language, viz. his theory of communication-intention,[2.] and his ideas about philosophical logic [3.] become highly relevant, and I think are all interdependent. I shall first spell out his theory of communication-intention; since the person is predominantly a social being his language must necessarily be communicative, and since the person is uniquely describable in terms of P-predication the idea of consciousness must be present or at least implied - hence the person and his language must be "intentional". Thus Strawson's communication-intention theory of language presupposes the person and society. As for Strawson's work on philosophical logic, it could also be referred to as social logic for it aims at uncovering the structures of human society which, we have seen, are to a large extent linguistic in character. Thus the theory of philosophical logic (as opposed to formal logic) presupposes the person, society, and language which are all interwoven with great complexity.

1. R. Harré and P.F. Secord, op. cit., pg. 123.
2. See P.F. Strawson: "Meaning and Truth", in: "Logico-Linguistic Papers", Ch. 9, pg. 170-189.
3. See P.F. Strawson: "Introduction to Logical Theory", esp. Ch. 8.

In conclusion I think Strawson's central concept of a person, together with other related aspects of his pioneering philosophy (viz. language and philosophical logic), should become firmly entrenched in the conceptual foundations of social psychology in the time to come.

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