



A DISCURSIVE HISTORICAL APPROACH (DHA) TO UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S LEADERSHIP ASPIRATIONS IN AFRICA: STATE EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MANDELA AND MBEKI

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Masters of Social Science in International Relations

University of Cape Town

Faculty of the Humanities

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2018

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I dedicate this thesis to Jesus Christ, my God, Lord and personal saviour. Without His strength, guidance and provision I would have never been able to complete this thesis.

A special thanks to my parents, my two elder brothers, Ntokozo and Pilela, and my sister-in-law, Buhle, for the tremendous love and support throughout my years at the University of Cape Town. I further dedicate this thesis to my wonderful and bright young nephew, Nzulu.

Tremendous gratitude goes to Dr Lauren Paremoer who encouraged me to pursue my honours degree and, to my honours research supervisor, Dr Karen Smith, who introduced me to alternative approaches in International Relations which eventually led me to develop a deep interest in discourse analysis.

Lastly, to my thesis supervisor, Prof John Akokpari. Thank you for your tremendous efforts, the good laughs which kept me going from time to time and for taking great interest in my research.

Siseko Maposa
Cape Town, February 2018

ABSTRACT

Since the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the state has maintained a “South African Africa destiny” which sees itself as a modernizing and civilizing force in, and the rightful leaders of Africa. What has also been evident, throughout various political leaderships, has been a strong presence of South African exceptionalism which forms a core characteristic of its’ national identity (Vale & Maseko, 2002; Mamdani, 1998; Breckenridge, 2004). Leadership foreign policy dispositions and state exceptionalism have persisted through the democratization of the state, forming a core component of post-apartheid state identity and foreign policy in Africa. But how can one understand the relationship between South African exceptionalism and its’ continued leadership dispositions in the region? By employing a Discursive Historical Approach (DHA), the thesis investigates the influence of South African exceptionalism on its’ foreign policy in Africa under the presidencies of Mandela (1994-1999) and Mbeki (1999-2008). Analysis will identify the discursive origins of South African exceptionalism, assess discursive diachronic changes and (re)productions within the post-apartheid state before drawing upon theoretical in-sight to investigate the impact of state exceptionalism on South African foreign policy in Africa.

The thesis finds that firstly, the origins of South African exceptionalism can be discursively traced back to the pronouncements by British political leaders in the South African Union of 1910. Initially, South Africa was argued to be exceptional because of its’ geography and in the manner it exercised colonial governance over its’ African subjects. Secondly, several post-apartheid discourses of exceptionalism are identified, traced back to the workmanship of new right-intellectuals of the 1990s and their ideas of a multicultural new South Africa. Post-apartheid discourses of exceptionalism relate to: 1) the South African miracle, 2) South Africa: the rainbow people of God, 3) South Africa: the cradle of mankind and 4) South Africa: the gateway to Africa. These discourses construct a South African identity possessing the inter-subjective view that the states’ politics, economy and society are more advanced than that of its’ neighbouring nations. Lastly, the paper finds that South African exceptionalism must be understood as 1) a discursive construction of South African identity, 2) a role-creator articulating South Africa as leaders and teachers in the region and 3) a framework articulating the nations’ model of political and economic organization as something worth exporting elsewhere. At often times, this influences the states’ actions in Africa by creating a leadership-orientated foreign policy demeanour.

KEYWORDS: South African Foreign Policy, South African Exceptionalism, South African State Identity, African Foreign Policy, Discourse Analysis.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DHA	Discursive Historical Analysis
DIRCO	the Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DTI	the Department of Trade and Industry
G8	the Global Eight
GEAR	the Employment and Redistribution policy
IDC	the Industrial Development Cooperation
MONUC	the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEPAD	the New Economic Partnership and Development Initiative
NP	National Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAP	the Pan African Parliament
RDP	the Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	the South African Development Community
UN	United Nations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	3
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	4
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	7
IMPORTANT CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS	10
THE DISCOURSE HISTORICAL APPROACH	11
METHODOLOGY	11
PROBLEM STATEMENT	12
ANALYSIS	12
RESEARCH QUESTIONS	13
CHAPTER II: DISCOURSES OF SOUTH AFRICA PAST AND PRESENT:THE (RE) PRODUCTION OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM DISCOURSES AND IDENTITY	14
2.1 SOUTH AFRICA "PAST": THE PRODUCTION OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM DISCOURSES AND IDENTITY	14
1950: NATIONAL PARTY AND RE-PRODUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM	16
2.2 THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: THE REARTICULATION OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM DISCOURSES AND IDENTITY	19
THE RIGHT INTELLECTUALS OF THE 1990'S: A MULTICULTURAL NEW SOUTH AFRICA	20
THE VOCABULARY OF NEW SOUTH AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM	22
THE "SOUTH AFRICAN MIRACLE" AS A DISCOURSE OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM	22
SOUTH AFRICA THE RAINBOW PEOPLE OF GOD: AN EXCEPTIONALISM OF DIVERSITY	25
SOUTH AFRICA: THE CRADLE OF HUMANKIND & GATEWAY OF AFRICA	26
THE RISING SUN ANALOGY AND FARANANI SPIRIT OF THE NATION	27
CONCLUSION	28

CHAPTER III: STATE EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY	30
3.1 DISCOURSES OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY INFLUENCE IN AFRICA	30
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING POST 1994: THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER	30
MANDELA’S FOREIGN POLICY PAPER (1993)	31
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: “DEVELOPING AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY”	33
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 1998 “WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS”	37
MANDELA CONCLUSION PRELIMINARY FINDINGS	39
3.2 THE OPERATIONS OF DISCOURSE OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY INFLUENCE IN AFRICA UNDER MBEKI (1999-2009)	40
THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE	42
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE STRATEGIC PLAN 2003-2008	43
STRATEGIC PLAN OF 2009-2011 AND THE AFRICAN AGENDA	47
CONCLUSION	50
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS	52
REFERENCES	55

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Since the creation of the South African Union in 1910 exceptionalism has remained central to the states' identity (Mamdani, 1999; Lazarus, 2004). State exceptionalism refers to the belief that a state differs qualitatively from other nations, because of its' unique origins, national credo, historical evolution, and distinctive political and religious institutions (Koh, 2005:225). In more contemporary times, as the state evolved through the 1970s, "South African commentators and leaders tended always to regard the country as *sui generis*, special, unique and somehow able to evade the pressures experienced by the rest of Africa" (Lazarus, 2004). South African exceptionalism persisted through the democratic transition of 1994, forming a central part of post-apartheid state identity and taking root in governance, scholarship and popular imagination (Vale & Maseko, 2002; Czada, 2002). As a core element of state identity, discourses of South African exceptionalism must be investigated in an attempt to understand their foreign policy influence, particularly with regard to the states' foreign policy in Africa.

Regionally, South Africa has maintained a leadership foreign policy disposition (Masters et al., 2015). Conventional wisdom assumes that South African leadership aspirations developed only after its' democratic transition, however, the state has articulated itself as a leader of Africa since the Union of South Africa in 1910 and throw-out the 1940s under the notion of "South African Africa destiny". "The notion that South African presence should feature in African affairs has been a constant thread in the rhetoric of successive South African leaders, irrespective of color or ideological hue" (Vale & Maseko: 2002: 274). Whether for historical or structural reasons, Africa has been a central feature of South African foreign policy since a time predating democracy (Moore, 2014:371). After the transition, regional leadership aspirations persisted throughout the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki. South African foreign policy attempted to utilize its' social, economic and political posture, *vis-à-vis* other states, to lead the region into a "better future" (Moore, 2014:371). But what can account for the historical persistence of leadership dispositions in South African foreign policy in Africa, and more importantly, what is the influence of South African exceptionalism on its' African foreign policy?

Interest in the influence of state exceptionalism on foreign policymaking has grown over the past decade. For example, studying Nordic exceptionalism, Browning concludes that "Nordic discourses of exceptionalism influences its' foreign policy by positioning Nord states as bridge-builders trying to

teach people how to build a proper security community based on a firm Nordic belief in internationalist-solidarity (Browning, 2007). Corkin, on the other hand, establishes a good relatedness between the formulation of Chinese exceptionalism, which construct unique images of its' domestic environment contributing to its' rising soft power capacity, which is utilized to establish bilateral agreements in Africa and the rest of Asia (Corkin, 2014). Within the foreign policy literature of recent years, discourse analysis has emerged as a useful analytical approach to understanding the nexus between state exceptionalism, as a discursive construction of state identity, and foreign policy. In this context, discourse analysis attempts to understand the construction, justification and destruction of state identity discourses and investigates subsequent foreign policy impact. As such, a context-specific variant of discourse analysis, such as Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA), can be valuable in understanding the relationship between South African exceptionalism and the persistence of its' leadership aspirations in Africa.

The analytical basis of this thesis rests on the assumption that discourses matter in two important ways. Firstly, they construct reality and describe social phenomenon, one important social phenomenon being that of state identity and secondly, discourses enable and dis-enable particular state actions. By employing a DHA approach, the thesis investigates the influence of South African discourses of exceptionalism, as a core construction of state identity, and the states' foreign policy in Africa under the presidencies of Mandela (1994-1999) and Mbeki (1999-2008). Analysis will identify the discursive origins of South African exceptionalism, assess the discursive diachronic changes and (re)productions within the post-apartheid state before drawing upon theoretical insight to investigate the impact of exceptionalism on the states' foreign policy in Africa.

The thesis finds that firstly, the origins of South African exceptionalism can be discursively traced back to early pronouncements by British political leaders in the South African Union of 1910. Initially, South Africa was argued to be exceptional because of its' geography and in the manner it exercised colonial governance over its' African subjects. Secondly, several post-apartheid discourses of exceptionalism are identified, traced back to the workmanship of new right-intellectuals of the 1990s and their ideas of a multicultural new South Africa. Post-apartheid discourses of exceptionalism relate to: 1) the South African miracle, 2) South Africa: the rainbow people of God, 3) South Africa: the cradle of mankind and 4) South Africa: the gateway to Africa. These discourses construct a South African identity possessing the inter-subjective view that the states' politics, economy and society are more advanced than that of its' neighboring nations. Lastly, the paper finds that South African exceptionalism must be understood as 1) a discursive construction of South African identity, 2) a role creator articulating South Africa as leaders and teachers in the region and

3) a framework articulating the states' model of political and economic organization as something worth exporting elsewhere. At often times, this influences the states' actions in Africa by creating a leadership-orientated foreign policy demeanour.

The thesis will be divided in the following manner:

CHAPTER II (DISCOURSES OF SOUTH AFRICA PAST AND PRESENT: THE (RE) PRODUCTION OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM DISCOURSES AND IDENTITY): After a brief presentation of important definitions and concepts, chapter II investigates the origins of South African exceptionalism before assessing post-apartheid reproductions of the discourse. Several post-apartheid state exceptionalism discourses are noted. These relate to the South African miracle transition, the rainbow nation, South Africa: the cradle of humankind and gateway to Africa. Each discourse is assessed using discursive analytical tools before brief policy influences are noted.

CHAPTER III (EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY): The chapter investigates the influence of South African exceptionalism on its' foreign policy in Africa under the precedencies of Mandela and Mbeki. Key foreign policy documents shall be assessed in each presidency. In this section, the thesis attempts to understand how state exceptionalism discourses cultivate a leadership-orientated foreign policy in the region.

CHAPTER IV (CONCLUSION): The chapter presents research findings. Noteworthy reflections will be made with regards to the relationship between South African state exceptionalism and foreign policy in Africa.

CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Before the thesis proceeds, several important concepts and definitions must be presented. These will contribute to the analytical framework of use.

- 1) The thesis defines “discourse” to mean a statement, or a set of statements, providing representation of a social phenomenon (Hall, 1998:72). Der Derain’s argument that “discourses construct rather than reflect reality” is highly appreciated (Der Derain, 1989:4).
- 2) Power is understood in a genealogical manner, as having the capacity to produce representations of phenomena when channeled by various social actors. As such, social actors, in particular prominent actors such as presidents, politicians and elites, create discourses through the channeling of power by means of a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic mechanisms such as speeches, text, reports and manifestos (Howarth, 2000:5). Discourses contribute to the restoration or decay, legitimization or de-legitimization, revitalization or damage of social practice and/or action (Wodak, 2006). In other words, discourses are enabling and disabling in that they have the power to open space for certain courses of actions while closing off others. It is also appreciated that discourses emerge, re-emerge and are produced and reproduced throughout time (Howarth, 2000:10).
- 3) In this thesis, foreign policy is understood as generated from within the state. Foreign Policy is not immune from state identity, values, ideas and initiatives (Hill, 2003:222). Instead, “the relationship between domestic and foreign is linked by the influence of domestic culture, values and identity. (Hill, 2003:227; Thomson & Hickey, 2007: 132). In this research particular interest is placed upon national discourses which influence foreign policy (Corkin, 2014). As such, discourses which construct state identity are understood to have influence in foreign policy making as national discourses and narratives are extended to form international policy.
- 4) State exceptionalism is defined as a states’ belief that it differs qualitatively from other nations, because of its’ unique origins, national credo, historical evolution, and distinctive political and religious institutions (Koh, 2005:225). Exceptionalism can form a core component of a states’ identity, generating inter-subjective role perceptions in the international arena.

THE DISCOURSE HISTORICAL APPROACH (DHA)

It is important to note that there is no single way to conduct a discourse analysis. Nevertheless, a discourse approach must be grounded in theory and discipline (Howarth, 2000:10). The DHA approach is located within the Critical Discourse discipline. Wodak identifies four variants of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Wodak, 2006). Firstly, there is the British CDA approach used by scholars such as Kress, Fowler, Fairclough and Van Lauwer, which borrows from the Foucauldian tradition of discourse analysis. Secondly, the Dutch CDA, which bases itself on a rich cognitive-orientation. Thirdly, the German CDA purported by Maas, Jäger and Link which draws heavily (much more than the British CDA) on Foucauldian tradition and the genealogy of power/knowledge and finally, the Vienna School approach utilizes a sociological lens to critical discourse analysis.

The DHA approach was first utilized to trace in detail the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotype image, of *Fiendbild*, as it emerged in public discourses in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim (Wodak et al., 1990). Since then, several noticeable works have emerged. For example, Kovacs, Wodak and Muntigle utilize a DHA approach to study racist discrimination against immigrants from Romania, the discourse about nation and national identity in Austria and policy-making within the European Union (Kovas & Wodak, 2003; Wodak et al., 1999; Muntigle et al., 2000; Wodak & VanDijk, 2000). These studies were concerned with analyzing the relationship between the discursive construction of national sameness and /or difference and its' influence on policymaking. The DHA is useful as it traces the historical production of discourses, effectively identifying discursive diachronic changes and their effects on structures and substructures of society (Wodak, 2006). Furthermore, it allows analysis to unravel the historical-context in which a discourse emerges from, providing a richer understanding to social phenomena and the subject of inquiry.

METHODOLOGY

Several methodological prescriptions are utilized in the thesis:

- 1) Linguistic texts are prioritized. These relate to speeches, pronouncements, interviews, books and manifestos which contribute to a particular discourse. Furthermore, the historical environment in which a discourse emerges/re-emerges is highly appreciated (Howarth, 2000:10).
- 2) Discursive tools of "intertextuality", indicating a relationship between two texts and "interdiscursivity", indicating an aspect of discourse which relates to another, will be utilized to examine data, develop discursive understandings, identify diachronic changes of discourses and highlight key findings. The approach furthermore draws upon insights of discursive

strategy construction, justification and destruction to examine the creation, persistence and damage of discourses (Wodak, 2006).

- 3) The paper investigates the domestic discursive construction of South African exceptionalism, as core to its state identity, before assessing how these discourses influence the states' foreign policy making in the region.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The persistence of South African leadership-orientated foreign policy in Africa.

In attempting to understand the continued leadership aspirations of the state, some studies have asserted that South Africa's soft power capabilities, noticeably its' strong economy, allow it to initiate a leadership inspired foreign policy in Africa. However, in the wake of the states' recent economic woes, coupled with the increased economic growth of other regional states, these arguments fail to explain why state leadership aspirations persist. Other studies have looked at the role of ideas particularly in post-apartheid South Africa and how this has strengthened the states' soft power capacity. According to this argument the decline of South African soft power, a well-articulated phenomenon which started in the Mbeki era, would have diminish its' leadership aspirations. However, given the states' interaction with the African Union (AU) and SADC, South Africa still attempts to use its' soft power capacity to lead these multilateral institutions and the region. Evidently, South Africa still articulates itself as playing a key role of norm builder and promoter of principles through these multilateral institutions (Lansberg, 2007:211). Even more striking is the presence of South African leadership aspirations in Africa predating the states' democratization in 1994 and thought-out various administrations holding different political convictions (Vale & Maseko, 2002). Seemingly, a more thorough explanation of the persistence of South African leadership aspirations in Africa, which takes the historical evolution of the state to account, must be presented.

ANALYSIS

The thesis looks at the domestic level sources of South African foreign policy. Through a discursive-historical approach (DHA) it examines South African exceptionalism, as a discursive construct of state identity, and assesses how this has influenced its' foreign policy making in Africa under the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki. Considering more recent studies concerning state exceptionalism and foreign policy impact, analysis shall investigate the assumption that state exceptionalism produces leadership aspirations in the region.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In light of the analytical framework and problem statement, the thesis asks how has South African exceptionalism, as a discursive construction of state identity, influenced its' foreign policymaking in the region under the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki? Several more concise research questions shall direct analysis:

- 1) Where and when did state exceptionalism emerge as a core component of South African state identity?
- 2) How has South African exceptionalism been reproduced in the post-apartheid era?
- 3) How has South African exceptionalism generated continued leadership dispositions in post-apartheid South Africa under the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki?

These questions will guide the papers research. As new data and evidence is found more specific questions will be asked and examined.

CHAPTER II:
DISCOURSES OF SOUTH AFRICA PAST AND PRESENT: THE (RE)
PRODUCTION OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM DISCOURSES AND
IDENTITY

The section investigates the discursive emergence of South African exceptionalism, its' multiple discursive reproductions under different administrations of the state and subsequent foreign policy impact. In each section, the paper oscillates between the domestic discourses of state identity and South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. What will be investigated are patterns of (dis)convergence and (dis)coherence between discourses of state exceptionalism and foreign policy in Africa. At the core of the analysis is the assumption that state exceptionalism creates a leadership-orientated foreign policy.

2.1 SOUTH AFRICA "PAST": THE PRODUCTION OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM DISCOURSES AND IDENTITY

The idea of this section is not to provide a detailed analysis of the historical construction and development of South African exceptionalism, space does not allow me to, but rather to present some historical significant events which contribute towards the discourse of South African exceptionalism. This is necessary in order to understand the discourses diachronic change as it reproduced itself in the new South Africa. Discursively, the construction of South African exceptionalism can be traced back to the 1910s after at the establishment of the Union of South Africa. The South Africa Act passed by the British Parliament in 1909 merged the self-governing British colonies of the Cape, Natal, Orange River and the Transvaal into the Union of South Africa which was a dominion within the British Commonwealth. Initial rationalities of South African national credo as being distinct and, more importantly, above the norm in relation to the region were made by the British pact of 1910, which included political leaders, intellectuals and public commentators. At the helm of the British political pact was Lord Milner, the Governor of the Cape Colony who became a central actor in the creation of the Union of South Africa. Lord Milner articulated South Africa's statecraft and geography as unique to that of the rest of the continent. As he noted in 1902, "South Africa is a self-governing white community, supported by a well-treated and justly-governed black labour force from Cape Town to the Zambezi" (Harvey, 2016:34).

The South African Union, established by foreign legislation, was understood to have created an artificial British-modelled state in Southern Africa. Textually, “well-treated” and “justly-governed” described the role of a modern state within society. British South Africa was argued to be exceptional in the manner in which it exercised a form of control over its’ African subjects and because of its’ modern statecraft (Breckenridge, 2004). Modernity associated South Africa to the West and fasted western virtues of rationality, reason, enlightenment, development and progress to state identity (Hall, 1998). A number of reasons were used to justify South African modernity and its’ state exceptionalism. These related to “the extent, character and expense of the war of conquest between 1899 and 1902, the political and financial power of the finance houses that controlled the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, the flows of imperial finance and speculative capital that followed the British conquest of the Transvaal and the intense cooperation between the mining houses and the new state in the decades after 1902” (Breckenridge, 2004). These discourses of exceptionalism argued that the states’ governance system and statecraft was unlike any of its’ colonial peers, and more importantly, dramatically unlike its’ African neighbors.

Exceptionalism became a way to understand South African existence, its’ people and nature. Above governance and statecraft, the government of the time articulated South African land as staggeringly unique and distinct to land in the rest of Africa - in essence South African land was British terra. Geography became a key factor in constructing an epistemology of difference between South Africa and the rest of the continent (Vale & Maseko, 2002). The discourse on South African land argued that the British ownership and governance of South Africa had initiated a profound process of civilizing the southernmost point of Africa, which tied the states’ geography and space to the grander project of modernity. In essence, the British had placed South Africa in “good hope” through the creation of the political union and thus South Africa could, and most certainly needed to, cultivate the modernization of an entire backward continent.

By the early 1920s, the exceptionality of the states’ governance system and geography generated continental leadership aspirations. But these leadership aspirations could only be formally embarked upon after the creation of the Balfour Declaration of 1926. As a significant political document, the Balfour Declaration granted South Africa independent foreign policy decision-making competencies and equal and autonomous status under the new Commonwealth (Siko, 2014:16). General Jan Smuts, Afrikaner raised, Cambridge educated and later Prime Minister of South Africa, emerged as the captain of South Africa’s battle for autonomous status. Although Smuts only became Prime Minister of the state in 1938, in the Hertzog era he was influential in reinforcing state exceptionalism on the one hand, but more importantly using this construction of state identity to craft a “South

African Africa destiny". "From his Cambridge education and his work with Rhodes, Smuts acquired a preoccupation with the duty of spreading civilisation, whilst from his Afrikaner upbringing and his association with leaders such as Kruger, he inherited a love of the South African land and a sense of an Afrikaans heritage in Southern Africa" (Getz, 1997:20). In a 1942 speech titled "plans for a better world" Smuts proclaimed:

"If we [South African's] wish to take our rightful place as leader in Pan-African development and in the shaping of future policies and events in this vast continent, we must face the realities and the facts of the present and seize the opportunities which these offer. All Africa maybe our proper market if we will but have the vision, and far-sighted policy will be necessary if that is to be realized" (Smuts, 1942:250).

"Our [South African's] rightful place as leaders" is a strategy of discursive justification indicative of an inter-subjectivity which argues that leading Africa is an intrinsic aspect of South Africa's identity and a central component of its' destiny in Africa. Furthermore, the discourse argued that the country was in a unique position, as a modern economically advanced state in Africa, possessing majestic lands with tremendous mineral reserves, to lead Africa into the modern world (Becker, 2010:135). In this view, Africa was not destined for the imperialism of the British, but that of South Africa- in better terms a "South African imperialism" (Smuts, 1940; Getz, 1997). South African imperialism reinforced the themes of modernization and leadership as core to states' foreign policy in the region. Inter-discursively, South African imperialism associated the state with western imperialistic concepts of conquest and exploration whilst owning the project of imperialism as a purely African expression and undertaking. The hubris of South African imperialism was based on a historical self-hood of being, one which articulated the state as an exceptional nation in Africa. By the late 1940s, state exceptionalism became a lens to understand South Africa's position in Africa, as the head and not the tail, and solidified as national consciousness generating expansionism as South Africa aspired to extend its' territories into South-West Africa and Namibia (Getz, 1997:20).

1950: NATIONAL PARTY AND REPRODUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

In 1950, the National Party won power and immediately initiated racial segregationist policies known as apartheid. The history of apartheid is well documented and will not be reinstated here (Nattrass, 1991; Nattrass, 2014). What remains important for this thesis is how apartheid discourses appropriated South African exceptionalism to benefit the National Party's domestic and regional interests. Domestically, state exceptionalism was used to justify the need for a system which could mitigate the "special issues" which the state faced. When faced with mounting pressures both regionally and internationally for the abolishment of apartheid policies in the 1970's, drawing from

rationalities of South African uniqueness, the government responded by articulating the history of South Africa as tremendously uncommon, exceedingly rare and staggeringly extraordinary. Here, the rationalities of exceptionalism exceeded the boundaries of policy and became inter-subjective schema to understand the states' successes and on-going dilemmas. If South Africa was a special state then its' problems, tensions and contradictions were articulated as special too. Addressing an audience in Pretoria, Verwoerd's 1966 speech emphatically emphasized this claim:

"What is the heritage of White South Africa joint together by the very nature of the task set before them at this very time? Through this Unity (British and the Government) co-operating in solving its' special problems of race relations so totally different from problems anywhere else in the world" (Verwoerd, 1966).

Textually, "special problems" related to racial hostility within the state between the white minority (who were the capital-owning class) and the black majority (who were the landless proletariat). Importantly, Verwoerd's speech reinforced the notion of South African difference. The discursive phase "so totally different from anywhere else in the world" embellished the fact of South African distinctiveness, uniqueness and dynamism in comparison to the rest of the continent. For the government, special problems needed special solutions, hence apartheid policies were necessary. The totality of apartheid's justification is made known by the Prime Minister, Mr PW Botha, in 1989. As Botha stated, "I believe South Africa is a unique country, there is no other country in the world who has the same problems as South Africa and that is why we must start a unique system" (Botha, 1989). The state believed that its' "unique system of apartheid" would effectively manage its' "special problems" of race relations. However, apartheid was not only seen as a unique system but an expression and extension of the states' identity— an identity based around the concept of "good-colony". Inter-discursively, good-colony aligned to Milner's understanding of the noble manner in which the modern state of South Africa managed its' complex environment and African subjects. The notion of South Africa as a good-colony was based on the multi-nation thesis of South African identity. Kepler best explains this view:

"In this view, put forward by Afrikaner nationalists, South Africa is construed as a multinational state composed of between ten and twelve nations each with its' own culture and entitled to self-determination. African people were comprised of eight to ten primordial 'ethnic' groups all of whom apparently sought 'nation' status in separate 'nation-states'. 'Coloureds' and 'Indians', however, whilst forming distinct 'ethnic' groups were not 'nations'. White people (mainly the Afrikaans and English 'ethnic' groups) were regarded as a single 'nation': "the white nation of South Africa" (Kepler, 1999:47).

If good-colony articulated the state at the time, the discourse on "Big Orania" articulated the historical evolution of white South Africa from an Afrikaner perspective, a South Africa built in

isolation, onwards towards a modern state of being. It was a hallmark apartheid discourse which appropriated the states' historically constructed identity of exceptionalism to benefit the domestic and international interests of the National Party. Big Orania said that South Africa could fix its' own, and Africa's, problems of development and cultivate tremendous economic growth and industrialization (Lazarus, 2004:611). The National Party believed that the key national strength of an "autonomous industrial economy" as explained through the Big Orania could be used to benefit a backward and struggling Africa.

Certainly, the domestic events of the time and the exceptional discourses of identity became a source of the states' foreign policy in Africa. "South Africa's foreign policy during the premierships of DF Malan (1946-54) and JG Strijdom (1945-58) were characterized by attempts to maintain close ties with the West and establish South Africa as a major player in a rapidly decolonizing Africa, all the while showing voters that Pretoria would not be cowed by external pressure" (Siko, 2014:17). This position was formalized in Prime Minister B.J. Vorster's outward movement pro-Africa foreign policy launched in 1966. The latter administrations, facing a much more disgruntled international audience, attempted to utilize the unique strengths of South Africa to fashion its' foreign policy in Africa. The state argued that South Africa had a formidable independent economy and could benefit Africa in the development of an independent, "de-westernized" economy. During Botha's era, for example, South Africa saw itself as a key player in the project of decolonizing Africa. "Although Botha expressed concern about the rapidity of African decolonization, he was clear that he did not begrudge African states choosing independence and emphasized the civilizing potential of South Africa regarding technological and economic cooperation with Africa (Siko, 2014:19). Of-course, extending South Africa's economic influence in Africa was a strategy in accessing regional markets to benefit domestic interests (Moore, 2014:372). To this end, South Africa embarked on various regional initiatives such as the Conciliation of South African States (CONSAS) in an attempt to tie African economies to that of South Africa, however, this eventually never materialized as several neighboring states refused to sign to the agreement.

The National Party argued that the exceptionality of the South African nation, being one where minorities lived together with minorities based on a common understanding in the importance of the division and self-determination, could prove significant in a rapidly decolonizing and "self-determined" Africa. This was reinforced by the discourse of Big Orania which understood the evolution of the white South African state as something accomplished in isolation through the pure ingenuousness of the white minority nation in South Africa. By the late 1980s, as a consequence of

the states' national credo of exceptionalism, South Africa's foreign policy took on the role and vision of a modernizing and civilizing force in Africa.

Under colonial and apartheid rule South Africa detached itself from the rest of Africa (Matsinhe, 2011: 301). The manner in which South African governance, statecraft and land was articulated by its' early political leaders of the 1910s, South African history as unique, and the concepts of good-colony and Big Orania by the National Party are some of the central pre-democratic discourses which produced and reproduced South African exceptionalism as a core element of its' state identity. State identities should not be understood as fixed or pre-given but as constantly negotiated and thus open to change and transformation (Browning, 2007:29). "Identities are negotiated in interactions with others and reflect in different narratives. Such narratives, however, constantly need retelling and need to be endorsed and accepted by the relevant audience if an identity or set of identities is to hang together" (Browning, 2007:29). What is furthermore witnessed is the leadership-orientated posture of South Africa predating its' democratization. The presence of state exceptionalism seems to have generated the states' leadership impulses in the region, albeit the specific substantive arguments for leadership appear to differ from one administration to another. Milner's unique state in Africa, Smuts' use of "South African imperialism" and the National Party's articulation of South Africa as a modernizing and civilizing force in Africa became central to the states' African foreign policy and the way it imagined its' regional role. This role, "South Africa's African destiny", said that the state was the rightful leaders of the region politically, economically and socially based on its' unique origins, national credo, historical evolution, geography, geology, economy and domestic institutions.

2.2 THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: THE REARTICULATION OF STATE EXCEPTIONALISM DISCOURSES AND IDENTITY

From the analysis above the thesis has demonstrated that, dating back to the political union of South Africa and through-out apartheid, South African state identity contained elements of exceptionalism. The substance of state exceptionalism, however, transformed according to the particular historical context of the time. In every significant historical event (the political Union of South Africa or the rise of the NP) dominant social actors were awarded the opportunity to reproduce state exceptionalism. As apartheid ran into crisis in the late 1980s and domestic and international pressures for its' abolishment grew, the decline in confidence of the old South Africa marked the rebirth of the state. The emerging state would be known locally and internationally as the new South Africa. Importantly, as previous state identity discourses were destroyed, new discourses were created to describe the emerging state. As a significant moment, the decline of apartheid and its' multiple epistemologies

opened up space for dominant social actors of the state, both in the old and new regime, to negotiate identity narratives and state discourses of the new South Africa. However, “if stories and narratives are retold, the re-is of decisive importance; each new invention happens in the margin of the already-written” (Brink, 1999:22). New South Africa would be spoken of within the perimeters of state exceptionalism.

THE RIGHT INTELLECTUALS OF THE 1990’S: A MULTICULTURAL NEW SOUTH AFRICA

When approaching the construction of post-apartheid South Africa one can trace discourses which attempt to construct an exceptional state identity back to the workmanship of new right intellectuals of the 1990s (Kepler, 1997). At the helm of the new right movement was Mr FW De Klerk, the then president of South Africa. Through their discourse on new South Africa, De Klerk and the new right intellectual community of the time extended the narrative of state exceptionalism, *albeit*, appropriated it through the four-nations thesis of South Africa- a supposition which articulated the states’ emerging social and political organization within the boundaries of a unique multiculturalism. As Kepler explains:

“The four-nation’s thesis represents the classic liberal position. In this view, the four population registration groups, black, white, Coloured and Indian are 'races' which ought to coexist in "multi-racial harmony" within a single nation. This perspective does not regard the different 'races' as extant or potential nations in themselves” but envisaged South African state identity on the tenants of multiculturalism, inclusion and diversity” (Kepler, 1997).

The four-nations argued for the exceptional capacity of South Africa to synchronize divergent perspectives and form a unique social order of peaceful coexistence and an amicable and congenial social-life. It articulated the post-1994 common South African as someone who found virtue in non-racialism, non-violence and the multicultural basis of national identity. Marais captures the jest of the four-nation’s identity when stating:

“Instead of revolution, negotiation; instead of uncompromising transformation, compromising concessions; instead of a violent struggle for seizure of power, negotiation over the distribution of power; instead of sweeping aside the old order and all who had implemented it, dismantling the old order jointly with old architects; instead of radical exclusion of the old to benefit the new, inclusion of both old and new in a newly created social framework” (Marais, 2001: 11).

The four-nation’s discourse supported the moral and social exceptionalism of new South Africa and would become a schema to understand the peaceful political transition of 1994- a transition which

would be understood internationally as a miracle. In February 1990, President De Klerk presented the fundamental tenets of new South Africa in a speech delivered to the parliament of South Africa:

“There is the growing realization by an increasing number of South Africans that only a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population is able to ensure lasting peace..... The aim is a totally new, a just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavor - constitutional, social and economic. I wish to ask all who identify yourselves with the broad aim of a new South Africa, and that is the overwhelming majority; Let us put petty politics aside when we discuss the future during this session, Help us build a broad consensus about the fundamentals of a new, realistic and democratic dispensation. Let us work together on a plan that will rid our country of suspicion and steer it away from domination and radicalism of any kind” (De Klerk, 1990).

De Klerk’s use of the term “South Africans”, although its’ meaning is undefined here, evokes the inclusivity of a national group identity and appeals to a concomitant sense of patriotism within the nation, a truly remarkable achievement given the political tensions of the time. The manner which De Klerk describes the majority of the nation’s populace, as people who stand for peace, associates the states’ group identity to moral exceptional conduct. The discursive attitude argued that despite the nation’s tremendous violent history, the emerging new South Africa was a state of diversity, a state where different races had agreed to mold the social order according to the principles of non-racialism, non-violence, diversity, consent and negotiation. This identity discourse of new South Africa not only articulated the social organization of the state, but the political and economic too. At a much more comprehensive level, new right intellectual’s identity discourse heavily influenced the placement of new South African in the region. The discourse described the state as a rational peace-maker, possessing universal interests of long-lasting peace and liberty through negotiated-settlements of political conflicts. As De Klerk put it, “South Africans understood that violence served the interests of nobody whilst negotiation promoted the path to well-being” (De Klerk, 1990). Consequently, it will be witnessed later on that rationality and negotiated settlement of special problems are enterprises of the state forming a central component of South Africa’s peace diplomacy in the region.

In summary, the emerging new South Africa became known as the nation of multiculturalism. As a significant moment, new South Africa aligned to the immediate rationalities of multiculturalism as developed by the new right intellectuals and the incoming elite powers, and the distant rationalities of state exceptionalism tracing back to Milner’s 1910. Exceptionalism manifested itself through the four-nation’s thesis which articulated the emerging new nation as a phenomenally non-racial, non-violent and peace loving state. This would not only shape internal politics but the manner in which

South Africa defined its' foreign policy in the region- a foreign policy of peace, democracy, consent and the negotiated settlement of political conflict.

A NEW VOCABULARY FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA

The idea of a multicultural new South Africa was supported by a new vocabulary to describe the emerging social order - a vocabulary that spoke of nationhood, unity and racial harmony. Democracy, accountability, negotiated consent, rationality and modernity described the new social order emerging in South Africa. As democracy dawned, the incoming government considered it important to extend the vocabulary of new South Africa to the international arena. By that time, Mandela had emerged as a global icon and had embarked on various international travels in a tremendous attempt to market new South Africa to the world. For example, on the 5th of May 1993 Mandela delivered an important speech at the British parliament. The speech attempted to construct new South Africa on polar opposite terms to that of the old and, more importantly, in images associated with prized western virtues and ideals:

“Our country and people are striving to create a social order, as well as establish the institutions, that will ensure that we, too, resolve the natural conflict of interests, ideas, and instincts among ourselves through a peaceful contest rather than through the pursuit of policies whose success is measured by the success of terror.... As South Africans, we too, believe that we should, together, transform our continent into one that is governed according to democratic system, respect for human rights, reduction of military expenditure, and resolution of disputes by peaceful means” (Mandela, 1993).

Mandela's constant repetition of the word “too” is interesting in the sense that it figuratively associates South Africa's credo and credence to that of traditional western beliefs of modernity. After the 1994 elections, positive attempts were further made to award South Africans a new language for speaking about the country (Verdoolaege, 2008:157). The new vocabulary operated as a discourse of confirming multicultural new South Africa and of justifying its' exceptional and unique character. Such discourses argued that the state and emerging social order were politically, economically and socially distinct from the rest of Africa, and in its' distinctiveness, more advanced, developed, and modern. In the post-apartheid era, South African exceptionalism is reproduced through three important discourses: 1) the South African miracle 2) South Africa: The rainbow people of God and 3) South Africa: the cradle of humankind and gateway of Africa. Several supporting discursive mechanisms were used, such as the “rising sun analogy”, “the faranani energy of the nation” and “Madiba magic”, to reinforce post-apartheid discourses of South African exceptionalism. The following section looks at these discourses in detail and evaluates how they contributed to South African exceptionalism and impact the states' foreign policy in Africa.

THE “SOUTH AFRICA MIRACLE” AS A DISCOURSE OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

The discourse of South African miracle was firstly constructed in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Of course, “the pursuit of reconciliation had a long history in South Africa, being a key-component of the ideology of Albert Luthuli, South Africa’s first Noble Peace Prize winner in 1961, and in the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s driven by several members of the Christian community in their resistance to apartheid” (Verdoolaege, 2008:156). The TRC was established by the Mandela government as a commission which gave amnesty to perpetrators for political atrocities. It became a profound event for articulating new South Africa. On the one hand, the very nature of the event justified state identity rationalities of negotiation, settlement and the pursuit of reconciliation. On the other hand, the commission was effective in bringing the violent past of the state to the forefront of national consciousness, thwarting that past with the optimism of new South Africa and beaming this new image of the state to millions of South Africans through live television all around the country. This opened up space for dominant social actors to condemn the impurities of the past whilst discursively constructing the virtues of the new South Africa. The TRC was very political in the sense that it was an area for constructing and reinforcing images of new South Africa, whilst destroying the images of old country. At the head, and heart, of the TRC project was Desmond Tutu, a quiet, nobleman, considered to be the states’ spiritual leader. Desmond Tutu’s forward in the TRC report best captured South African exceptionalism as manifested through the discourse of “South African miracle”:

“Ours is a remarkable country. Let us celebrate our diversity, our differences. God wants us as we are. South Africa wants and needs the Afrikaner, the English, the coloured, the Indian, the black. We are sisters and brothers in one family; God’s family, the human family” (Tutu, 1996).

The miracle transition argued that South Africa was remarkable as it had emerged as a democratic state, amidst tremendous political conflict, with a progressive democratic society who shared mutual understandings of multiculturalism, anti-racism and non-violence. The term “miracle” articulated the political transition as an extraordinary event manifesting divine intervention in human affairs. The South African miracle was reinforced by the rhetoric of “Madiba Magic”-a tangible if unquantifiable mystique surrounding the figure of Nelson Mandela (Vale & Taylor, 1999:630). New South Africa took on a talismanic character through the discourse of the South African miracle. It articulated the nature of the social and political order of new South Africa- one which, despite tremendous pressures exerted to it, always found negotiation, consent and working together, captured in the

term Ubuntu, as central in the social organization of the state and the virtues of its' people. As Tutu noted "a person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs to a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished" (Tutu, 1996). The notions of unity and respect, accompanied with the discourses of South African miracle and reconciliation, described a rather exceptional moral character of new South Africa (Verdoolaege, 2008:158). A discourse analysis of South African miracle suggests it reinforced rationalities of new right intellectuals and their construction of new South Africa. Importantly, the South African miracle was a discourse of justification. It justified the non-violent, non-racist and democratic foundations of South African existence. Non-violence goes beyond the non-existence of violence and depicts the nations' selfhood as holding the position that violence is irrational and immoral. The non-violent aspect of South African identity argues that the people of South Africa are indeed lovers of peace in every regard. Non-violent justification discourses were found both in Mandela's and Mbeki's precedencies. As Mbeki stated after the 1999 elections:

"As they did in 1994' and 1999, these masses have confirmed that all they had been saying throughout the generations was - give peace a chance. If all of us stand tall today, as all of us surely do, it is only because we are borne aloft by the firm hands of the ordinary people of this our country who, through the generations, have said all they want is peace, progress and liberty" (Mbeki, 2002).

Here, peace is inherently attributed to the generations of peoples composing South Africa. Mbeki ties peace to the "true wishes" of South Africans and articulates a complex whereby South African behaviour is directed by peace. Miracle transition and reconciliation discourses of the state fared well in constructing a reality of non-violence and non-racism in South Africa. It must be recalled however that discourses do not only function as systems of knowledge in which one draws meaning from but as forming differences and the other. The discourse of non-violence and non-racism, central to South African miracle, positioned the state as a new hope in a continent which had been plagued by the most horrific ethnic and tribal conflicts. It will be seen that this component of South African miracle became essential in justifying Mandela's Universalist foreign policy of democratizing the region. If South Africa had skilfully done it, it needed to be at the head of teaching other states how to do so too.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE RAINBOW PEOPLE OF GOD, AN EXCEPTIONALISM OF UNITY IN DIVERSITY

The miracle transition discourse was reinforced by another important discourse known as the rainbow nation. The phrase "South Africans, the rainbow people of God" became a strong identifier

of the new nation” (Verdoolaege, 2008:161). A phenomenal contributor to rainbow nation discourse was Mbeki, both during his time as deputy and president of South Africa. In his presidential inauguration speech on the 16th of June 1999 Mbeki stated that, “as South Africans, whatever the difficulties, we are moving forward in the effort to combine ourselves into one nation of many colours, many cultures and diverse origins” (Mbeki, 2002). Mbeki’s discourse argued that all South African’s had accepted the fate of a land which belonged to everyone who lived in it, both black and white. The togetherness of the nation and united effort in crafting a better future for all who lived in it, embedded in the notion of rainbow nation, was utilized to explain the lack of violence in South Africa as compared to other ethnically diverse countries in the region. As Mbeki argued,

“Why you haven’t had eruption from the beginning was that South Africans, both black and white, had accepted the fact that they we all South Africans. There’s no one who’s saying because you are white you are half South African or not quite South African” (Mbeki, 2002:193).

Inter-discursively, the discourse of rainbow nation aligned to early 1970 academic arguments that decolonization in South Africa would not lead to the barbarism, classism and ethnic chauvinism witnessed in the rest of Africa but an “all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people” (Lazarus, 2004:611). More closely, Mbeki’s pronouncements indicated that all South Africans had accepted rainbowism which argued for an exceptional South Africa epitomizing unity in diversity. Even when asked of the potential of South Africa following the same ethnic-based violence as Zimbabwe, Mbeki emphatically, if not agitatedly, claimed that “there was no likelihood that any of this [ethnic tensions] would happen in South Africa” (Mbeki, 2002:193). Rainbowism acted as a discursive strategy of embellishing the non-violent, anti-racist and reconciled character of South African identity. It gave the state a tenacity that it had thoroughly mitigated ethnic tensions and, more importantly, could teach the rest of conflict-ridden Africa how to do so too. As such, rainbow nation discourse awarded the state a great degree of societal and moral excellence vis-à-vis other states in the region who either had went through a tremendous phase of ethnic-based violence or who were still going through such at the time.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE CRADLE OF HUMANKIND & GATEWAY OF AFRICA

The discourses of South African miracle and rainbow nation constructed a non-violent, non-racial, democratic, diversity and peace-based state identity of the new South Africa. What these discourses failed to do however was effectively articulate what the state could do for the region. At the time, South Africa's potential contribution to the region was a highly contested debate (Masters et al, 2015). In this context, South Africa was to be articulated as both "the cradle of mankind", with everything good and noble thing springing forth from it, and "the gateway of Africa"- a hope for economic development in Africa. Micro-discourses, such as the Mbeki's "rising sun analogy" and "faranani spirit of the nation", helped cultivate these discourses and contributed to a positive role South Africa could play for the region. South Africa as the cradle of mankind was formally articulated by Mbeki at the launch of Freedom Park in 2002. Mbeki stated that:

"What we are doing this morning is to launch a narration of the totality of the South African story. The story begins at the beginning! It is a story of the beginning of life in Barberton some 3,6 billion years ago, in a single cellular organism, later evolving into multi-cellular life forms like animals and humans... Together with East Timor (a Southeast Asian nation occupying half the island of Timor), South Africa had in abundance fossil evidence that indicated that ours is the land from where humanity first emerged" (Mbeki, 2002:177).

Inter-discursively, whilst the discourse was fairly new it build on distant legacies which articulated the geography of South Africa as exceptional, such witnessed during the Milner administration. Fossil evidence and the great deposits of mineral resources in South Africa were argued to be something "geology and divine natural selection" had conceived (Mbeki, 2002:179). Several other reasons were presented to reinforce the cradle of mankind discourse. As Rubidge notes "South Africa is the single country in the world which has the oldest evidence of life on Earth, the oldest multicellular animals, the most primitive land-living plants, the most distant ancestors of dinosaurs, the most complete record of the more than 80 million year ancestry of mammals and a remarkable record of human origins and of human achievements through the last four million years" (Rubidge, 2003:1). In recognition of this, the South African Government identified Palaeontology and Palaeoanthropology as one of five key research themes in its' National Research and Development Strategy of July 2002. Essentially, for the state leaders of the time geography and geology boldly asserted that South Africa was the cradle of mankind (Mbeki, 2002:180).

The discourse of cradle of humankind was important as it not only defined and located the country in history, but also placed its on-going process of rebirth in a regional context. It argued that a force would come from the furthest tip of Africa that would change the course of history for the whole continent. The articulation of South Africa as the cradle of mankind was imported in justifying and

contributing towards rationalities which viewed the state as the gateway of Africa. The discourse of South Africa as the gateway of Africa was justified through 1) “the rising sun-analogy” and 2) what Mbeki called the “Faranani spirit” of the nation- a hyperphysical, intangible and un-measurable force unique to South Africa which had been used for its’ own renewal and could be used to contribute towards the rebirth of Africa.

THE RISING-SUN ANALOGY AND FARANANI SPIRIT OF THE NATION

Throughout the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki there was the constant use of a rising-sun analogy and related notions of a forthcoming dawn to articulate what the states’ political transition meant for the rest of the continent. As Mbeki stated, “at the dawn of new -life, our practical actions must ensure that non can challenge us when we say- we are a nation at work to build a better life for all” (Mbeki, 2002). The rising-sun analogy argued that the good which had started in South Africa, i.e. political democracy, economic development and social harmony, was destined to engulf and positively influence the whole continent. This is a classical characteristic which exceptionalism identity produces. As Carr notes, exceptionalism based foreign policy argues at first that what is best for the world is best for his country, and then reverses the argument to read what is best for his country is best for the world (Carr, 1964: 75–76). The rising sun was indicative of a constructed understanding that South Africa could positively contribute to Africa as an enlightened civilizing and modernizing force. Under this construct, the renewal of South Africa could only mean the renewal of the continent.

Mbeki held much of this rhetoric throughout his presidency. For example, on the 15th of November 2001, Mbeki retold Tanure Ojaide’s Kwanza poem at the ITU Telecom African Youth Forum. Outside the symbolism of quoting such a poem at the event, Mbeki’s speech was laced with pronouncements reinforcing South African brilliance. As Mbeki stated, “those who mocked our naked hands for lack of industry will be ashamed of their ignorance of our palmistry, those who jeered at our play-punctured war-songs will join us in the proud anthem of survival” (Mbeki, 2002). Textually, the repetition of “those” is important in constructing the image of “another”, which is articulated as ignorant, unaware and old. New South Africa however is articulated as a dynamic emerging state, optimistically aware of its’ location and role in Africa as an instrument of hope. Mbeki would go on to urge African leaders to appreciate the uniqueness of a “moment in history” - a moment which had the potential of bringing a “radiance of a cheerful dawn” for Africa (Mbeki, 2002: 166).

The rising sun analogy was effective in linking the emerging new South Africa to a broader continental significance. This was not accomplished for the vain sake of symbolism, however, but to effectively open a pathway for South Africa to further its' interests in Africa. Beyond the rising sun analogy was the discursive construction of a unique spirit of South Africa known as the faranani spirit of the nation. The faranani spirit evoked sentiments of South African renewal and energy, of a unique hyperphysical element of the state and its' people, which not only was used in the creation of the new South Africa but could prove tremendously valuable in the development of the continent. Rationalities of a unique energy and force articulating South African identity can be found in many of Mandela speeches. As Mandela stated in his 1994 presidential inaugural speech, "each time one of us touches the soil of this land, we feel a sense of personal renewal. The national mood changes as the seasons change" (Mandela, 1994). The spiritual and hyperphysical energy of South Africa, an exceptional attribute of the states' character, certainly inspired Mbeki and his policies. In an address at the opening of Parliament, National Assembly on the 25th of June 1999 Mbeki stated:

"The government therefore commits itself to work in a close partnership with all our people, inspired by the call - Faranani! - to ensure that we draw on the energy and genius of the nation to give birth to something that will surely be new, good and beautiful... To ensure that we transform the possibility into reality, we will have to nurture the spirit amongst our people which made it possible for many to describe the transition of 1994 as a miracle- the same spirit which, in many respects, turned this year's election campaign into a festival in celebration of democracy" (Mbeki, 2002).

Faranani (which means unity or togetherness in Venda) said that the nation of South Africa had a unique collected energy which enabled it to constantly develop something new, dynamic and good. It will be witnessed that drawing on this energy, brilliance and acumen, the faranani positioned South Africa as a country that could propel Africa towards modernity.

CONCLUSION

The notion of new South Africa argued for a unique South African social and political trajectory that differed from the conventional African colonial and post-colonial experience (Greffrath, 2016:161). Even the South African intellectual community became enticed by exceptionalism thinking. As Klotz notes, "South Africa is characterized as exceptional, be it for its' history of draconian racial segregation, as Basil Davidson suggested, or its' distinctive patters of settlement, as James Belich claimed" (Klotz, 2013: 230). Its' people, "living in some isolation at the tip of a continent with which they do not interact much with others, are prone to both parochialism and South African exceptionalism. They are not only slow to accept that other countries have lessons for them and tend to believe that they are special, different, and even the people of the miracle" (Johnson, 2015).

Importantly, South African exceptionalism functioned as a core discursive construction of state identity. The section identified the discourses of miracle transition, rainbow nation, South Africa: the cradle of humankind and South Africa: the gateway to Africa as important discursive reproductions of South African exceptionalism in the new South Africa. Furthermore, micro-discourses such as the “rising-sun analogy” and “faranani energy of the nation” were employed upon as discursive justifications of South African exceptionalism.

The chapter further identified the 1990s as a watershed moment for new South Africa. The era witnessed an immense discursive thrust to articulate the emerging state on the grounds of multiculturalism. The legacy of the new right Intellectuals still influences South Africa’s foreign policy in the region. Both Mandela and Mbeki employed discourses of exceptionalism during speeches to not only articulate the emerging identity of new South Africa, but also its’ model of politics, economy and society. The moral and ideological sources of new South Africa’s exceptionalism lie in its’ political transformation captured in the discourses of miracle transition, its’ multicultural society captured in the discourse of rainbowism and its’ historical significance and potential valuable contribution to Africa captured in its’ cradle and gateway of Africa discourses, rising-sun analogy and faranani spirit of the nation. These discourses defining national identity, credo, history and character must be understood as important influences in the production of the states’ foreign policy in Africa.

Importantly, state exceptionalism must be understood as enabling/disabling particular state actions whilst locating the state in time and space in relation to other nations. Exceptionalism discourses not only formed a way of articulating new South Africa, but functioned as systems of knowledge to draw insight from at a policy-making level. This correlates with recent studies suggesting that discourses of exceptionalism form a linguistic framework which policy makers draw from in the construction and development of foreign policy (Holsti, 2010:383). For example, studying American exceptionalism and foreign policy impact, Widmaier shows how exceptionalism ideational constructs offered by Harry S. Truman in 1948 and George W. Bush in his first term conditioned their policy choices, set the foreign policy agenda, and ultimately became constraints on their ability to choose among policy options (Widmaier, 2007). Holsti finds that belief in American exceptionalism provides the framework for discourse in US foreign policy making (Holsti, 2010:383). The next section develops from these themes and findings through a closer inquiry of state exceptionalism and foreign policy in the region under the precedencies of Mandela and Mbeki.

CHAPTER III:

EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 DISCOURSES OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY INFLUENCE IN AFRICA UNDER MANDELA (1994-1999)

In this chapter, the thesis looks at three important foreign policy documents 1) Mandela's 1993 foreign policy document, 2) the African National Congress's (ANC) 1997 Developing a strategic perspective on South African Foreign Policy and 3) South Africa's 1998 paper titled; "White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions". These texts will be discursively analysed to unravel rationalities of South African exceptionalism. Discursive tools of inter-discursivity, inter-textuality, discursive construction, justification and destruction will be utilized to study data. Before the thesis proceeds, however, an important discussion of South Africa's foreign policy making structure will be presented to justify the papers focus on the presidency, the ANC and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING POST 1994: THE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER

"As new South Africa emerged the state was faced with the tremendous task of transforming apartheid institutions to fit the democratic model of governance in a manner that would allow it to pursue a diplomacy of active internationalism in a changed post-cold war global order" (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk; 2002). The incoming government was faced with the difficult task of transforming the public service sector to represent the demographics of the country whilst ensuring that those who were employed by the apartheid government still could effectively serve the country. Within the structures of the then Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (later changed to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation/DIRCO) the dialects of transformation, preservation and inclusivity became a great source of tension and disdain (Le Pere, 2014:37). Furthermore, with democracy came a proliferation of domestic actors in public, private and civil society sectors interested in South African foreign policy. As such, South African foreign policy was crafted in a complex environment of negotiation and contestation, with old central foreign policy actors (the president, the state and its' departments) attempting to secure much foreign policy making

competencies and powers (Masters, 2012). The challenges of coordination and transformation influenced the tone of South Africa foreign policymaking.

As the state attempted to transform its' structure, foreign policymaking power became centralized in the Presidency, ANC and the DFA (Lansberg, 2012:4). At the helm of foreign policymaking was, and still is, the president who shaped the perceptions of South African foreign policy. The president of South Africa plays a key role in foreign policymaking as a result of the powers the constitution awards him/her (Constitution of South Africa, 1997; Masters, 2012:24). The president performs the function of both head of state and head of the national executive. This means that both symbolic and executive authority is vested in the president. Furthermore, the president is awarded powers to "receive and recognize foreign diplomatic and consular representatives, appoint ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, diplomatic and consular representatives and develop and implement national policy, including the states' foreign policy" (Constitution of South Africa, 1997). As such, a dominant, if not the major, actor in foreign policymaking is the national leader or, on occasion, his chosen delegate if the leader is disinterested in the external realm (Siko, 2014:7, Hudson, 2007:4).

Another important actor in South African foreign policy is the ANC. The ANC emerged as the majority winning party out of the 1994 elections. Because of its' tremendous electoral power, the ANC heavily influences the foreign policy of the state. Within the ANC, the National Executive Council (NEC) has a great amount of clout in shaping the foreign policy agenda of the party, and by default, the state. Furthermore, post-1994 many ANC officials took up prominent roles in the DFA. These included ANC cadres such as Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Aziz Pahad who took up prominent positions at the department. Evidently, there is close proximity between DFA and Luthuli House (Masters et al, 2015). These dominant social actors (the president, the ANC and DFA) are highly influential in shaping South Africa's regional foreign policy. As such, the paper prioritizes these actors and attempts to examine their use of South African exceptionalism in the states' foreign policy approach in the region. The first section deals with South African exceptionalism and its' foreign policy influence from 1994 to 1999 (Mandela-era) and the second from 1999 to 2008 (Mbeki-era).

MANDELA'S FOREIGN POLICY PAPER (1993)

With a national credo and identity of exceptionalism, new South Africa became important not only for South Africans but also for the region. The states' historical emergence was articulated as tremendously unique and its' future was seen through the optics of optimism, anticipation and enthusiasm. For the globe, South Africa became a powerful hope in the extension of universalism

and democracy in Africa. For the region, South Africa represented the end of colonial domination and a belief in the start of a better, more prosperous future. For South African foreign policy, the emergence of new South Africa marked a significant moment enabling the state to finally move towards accomplishing its' historically developed African destiny as modernizers and civilizers in the region.

Towards the end of apartheid, Mandela and the ANC saw it fit to articulate new South Africa's foreign policy in the region. In 1993, Mandela, under the direction of the ANC, drafted a post-democratic vision of South Africa's foreign policy. "Eager to change its' identity within and beyond Africa, efforts to rehabilitate South Africa's reputation would largely reflect Nelson Mandela's six pillars of foreign policy" (Grant & Hamilton, 2017:13). Mandela's famous foreign policy paper of 1993 became pivotal in articulating the doctrine of post-1994 South African foreign policy in Africa. In the spirit of rearticulating South Africa's role in the region, Mandela justified the states' leadership role through the "energies" and capabilities of the state and the positive impact these could have in Africa. As Mandela noted, "South Africa cannot escape its' African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its' various parts" (Mandela, 1993). Mandela's use of a "South Africa African destiny" and devotion to the African continent indicates the irrevocable need for new South Africa's influence in the region. Mandela justifies South Africa's leadership in Africa through its' emerging democratization which, as we have witnessed, was articulated as an exceptional feature of new South Africa. The democratization of South Africa was considered the beginning of continental cooperation, agreement and consolidation. As Mandela further articulated, "a democratic South Africa will bring to an end an important chapter in Africa's efforts to achieve unity and closer cooperation" (Mandela, 1993).

Inter-discursively, there is great resemblance between Mandela's assumption of South Africa's African destiny and those which emerged during the time the state transitioned to republicanism in 1961. At that time, the emerging republic of South Africa was articulated as not just a domestic political event, but as spearheading the civilization of wider Africa. Evidently, "South Africa's future has always been tied to that of Africa and the states' perception of what that future will look like – and therefore Africa's outlook – supplies the contours of its' African foreign policy" (Grant & Hamilton, 2017:17). Even during South Africa's most contentious period on the continent under apartheid, Africa was a focal point in South Africa's identity as leader of the continent and beneficiary of such leadership (Grant & Hamilton, 2017:17). Narratively, South African state identity articulates significant domestic political events as potentially compelling continental achievements.

South African exceptionalism constructs an inter-subjective view where the situation of South Africa determines that of the continent. Mandela emulates this thought-out the document by utilizing the phenomenon of South Africa's miracle transition, a central feature of the emerging state and its' character of exceptionalism, as signifying a greater continental move towards democracy and economic development. Here, it is assumed that South Africa's miracle transition into democracy is not only an element of its' exceptionality but furthermore as the coming together of Africa and justification of the state's leadership in that process. As Mandela notes, "We [South Africa] are prepared, too, to shoulder our share of the responsibility for the whole southern African region, not in the spirit of paternalism or dominance but mutual cooperation and respect" (Mandela, 1993).

Mandela's foreign policy holds an inter-subjective understanding which suggests that South Africa has important and formidable continental responsibilities and obligations it ought to meet. Mandela sees South Africa as the legitimate state, because of extraordinary historical evolution and skilfully crafted negotiated settlement, to articulate the manner in which state cooperation in Africa will proceed, by providing the tone, language and vocabulary of African cooperation. Of-course, the basis of African cooperation correlates with the hubris of the states' exceptionalism discourses of negotiation, agreement, respect, dialogue and consent. These virtues not only form a core construct of state identity in the new South Africa, but are extended to the region via the states' foreign policy. From Mandela's pre-democratic take on South Africa's foreign policy we can certainly see rationalities of South African exceptionalism being used to construct a leadership foreign policy in the region. The hallmark discourse of exceptionalism utilized is South Africa's miracle transition to democracy, which comes with the images of peace, negotiation and cooperation- epitomes of a modern-rational state. It awards the state a certain political posture above the norm vis-à-vis other African states, which Mandela uses to reproduce a state African destiny for the new South Africa. This destiny sees the state as leading the drive towards the democratization of Africa, the establishment of transparent open governments and the rule of law (Mandela, 1993). It also creates essentialism around South Africa's democracy by positioning it as a significant political event which will lead to greater continental cooperation and solidarity.

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: 1997 DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Because of the great degree of foreign policy-making power vested in the president, once Mandela took up office in 1994 much of his 1993 pronouncements began to reflect the states' foreign policy. They also heavily shaped the ruling party's understanding of South African foreign policy in Africa. To this end, an important ANC document articulating the principles of South African foreign policy was

the 1997 document titled “Developing a strategic perspective on South African Foreign Policy”. Building from the foreign policy paper adopted at the 1994 national conference, the ANC’s 1997 strategic perspective articulated the future of South African foreign policy along the lines of peace, democracy and liberty. The document however can be read as a consolidated policy revealing the sentiments of not only the NEC of the ANC, but the president and DFA whom were important contributors. At a much more comprehensive level, three years had passed since the 1994 foreign policy approach, and as such the strategic perspective read as a critical reflection of new South Africa’s foreign policy. At the heart of the strategic perspective remained discourses of state exceptionalism which are used to generate South Africa’s regional role. As the opening paragraph noted, “we [South Africa] need to become an increasingly active participant in regional organisations recognising that acting multilaterally almost always involves negotiations and compromise” (ANC, 1997:172). A central characteristic of exceptionalism inspired foreign policy is the understanding that prized national values can and ought to be reproduced in the international arena (Holsti, 2010). Rationalities of negotiation and compromise, all encapsulated in national discourses of miracle transition, reconciliation and rainbow nation, are reproduced in the ANC’s articulation of South Africa’s role in important multinational organizations of the region. The strategic perspective would go on and built from discourses articulating South Africa as the gateway to Africa to further embellish the tremendous value a prosperous and growing South Africa could bring to the region. Increased South African influence is understood as the impetus for the resurgence, rejuvenation and vitalization of the region. As the document notes:

“A South Africa that is thriving and experiencing growth and developing in a Southern Africa on a continent that is experiencing poverty and underdevelopment will increase the problem of illegal entry into the country, drug trafficking and many other related aspects. It is therefore important to ensure that South Africa is deeply involved in the revival, economic growth and development of Southern Africa and the continent as a whole” (ANC, 1997:170).

A constant theme witnessed in South African foreign policy, dating back to the political union of the state, is the articulation of Africa in the terms of backwardness and underdeveloped, whilst South Africa as forward and developed (Masters et al, 2015). The discursive device is essential in the lexicon which justifies and provides essentialism around increased South African influence in Africa. What is even more striking is the direct use of “revival discourse”, attached to broader national level rationalities of the rising-sun analogy, in the construction of South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. The ANC was convinced that “South Africa [had] an important role to play in the economic and political revival of the continent” (ANC, 1997:178). From the ANC’s viewpoint, South Africa’s role of reviving Africa would be provided through the states’ increased leadership of important multilateral

institutions. As the strategic perspective stated “South Africa needs to lead a campaign to transform and empower the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its’ organs so that it is able to play an effective role in the implementation of an agenda for an African renewal” (ANC, 1997:182).

The ANC placed African renewal, influenced by South African renewal, as the main aim of South Africa’s foreign policy in the region. It was understood by the ANC as necessity that South Africa heads a campaign to transform the OAU, at the time the most important regional multilateral institution with the mandate of ensuring the prevention of conflict, increased continental security, the eradication of poverty and creating socio-economic development. The term “needs”, describing South African leadership as not just desirable but of great necessity, must be seen within the light of an inter-subjective viewpoint which understands South Africa as an eminent, if not the only eminent, state in the region. In leading multilateral organizations, however, the ANC believed that the state needed to ensure that foreign policy not only reflected the interests of the continent but also forwarded state interests too. The ANC was aware of South African prestige but cautioned against the states’ continental image being understood as assurance that it would easily accomplish its’ foreign policy objectives in the international domain. As the strategic perspective noted:

“South Africa’s geo-strategic location and relatively high-profile, given the international image of both our country and the President are no guarantee for entry into the international area on our own terms.... South Africa’s stature on the continent and the world, it is not always possible to act in a way that satisfies the expectations of other countries, particularly the African continent” (ANC, 1997:173).

The reference to South Africa’s high profile and international image is indicative of a high presence of national self-worth. Significantly, this is important in constructing a foreign policy based on exceptionalism (Holsti, 2010). “It is crucial that a country which hopes to model a foreign policy based on national narratives and discourses of exceptionalism construct an image of great national self-worth, the kind that can persuade other states to cooperate with its’ foreign policy” (Holsti, 2010). The ANC do this by articulating South Africa in the terms of high prestige, stature and prominence. This prestige found its’ basis in concepts of peace and reconciliation emulated by state exceptionalism discourses of miracle transition and rainbow nation. The ANC was also aware of the expectations of Africa for South Africa and the limits on the state’s agency in the continent. The discourse of miracle transition to democracy in 1994 produced great expectations on the part of the international community that the country would actively engage in conflict resolution efforts in the continent (Nibishaka, 2011:1). Mandela’s understanding of South Africa’s essential role in the region and the world as a responsible global citizen, catalyst for African development, peacemaker and leader further reinforced regional and international expectations. These foreign policy roles were

encouraged by exceptionalism discourses in post-apartheid South Africa. Indeed, the ANC did not disagree with the notion of a “South African Africa destiny” and the articulation of the state as the leaders of the region. Instead, the party remained skeptical of the idea that South Africa would totally relinquish its’ national interests for the continent ones.

The ANC was weary of utilizing a large degree of national assets for peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Instead, the government pushed for demilitarization and the transformation of South African forces to minimal peacekeeping units as it was believed this would produce savings which could be redirected into social development (Barber, 2005:1079). During its first years in office, the South African Government, led by the ANC and the alliance partners the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), was heavily focused on its’ pressing domestic agenda, especially poverty reduction and the transformation of the economy (Nibishaka, 2011:1). What the ANC attempted to do was contain unfettered expectations and direct government action towards pressing national prerogatives, all at the same time retaining South Africa’s leadership role in the region. In essence, ANC’s caution was based on national socio-economic pressures and not a direct rejection of South Africa’s leadership role in Africa. Instead, the ANC understood that South African influence in Africa was highly desired and essential. The ANC contributed to South Africa’s leadership aspirations in the region by detailing South Africa as a state which would empower regional organizations such as the OAU (ANC, 1997:182). As the strategic perspective noted, “South Africa must make an effective contribution in Africa. This leadership entails empowering the continent to act for itself and its’ interests” (ANC, 1997:174). Far from challenging the notion of South African leadership then, the ANC certainly approved of an Africa of greater South African influence.

The ANC’s strategic perspective of 1997 holds an appreciation of national self-worth and notes the tremendous value which South African leadership can award the region. Exceptionalism discourses of the state are not only the base of inter-subjective role creations but furthermore seem to form a framework to understand and articulate South Africa’s foreign policy in the region (Browning, 2007; Holsti, 2010). There is also a great degree of model-mimicking which is a central feature of exceptionalism-inspired foreign policy and sees the state’s social, political and economic organization, including its’ institutions, as something worth exporting to the rest of the continent (Holsti, 2010). National renewal embedded in the rising sun analogy is used to fashion “African renewal” and the national credo of negotiation, consent, peace and agreement, encapsulated in the discourses of miracle transition, rainbowism and reconciliation was calibrated to produce a regional foreign policy of multilateralism with heavy South African influence. Whilst skeptical of South Africa

acting devoid of national interests, the ANC agreed with the notion of the state's African destiny, one which articulated the state as leaders, empowers and teachers in Africa.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 1998 "WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS"

Mandela and the ANC emulated exceptionalism-based foreign policy. Another key contributor was the DFA. In 1998, South Africa was seen, by itself and internationally, as continental mediators. By 1998, the state had already attempted to fulfill its' role as African peace-keepers. South Africa commenced its' peace-keeping contributions in 1998 with the deployment of personnel in Lesotho in what it claimed was a Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention. The state was furthermore in discussion with the United Nations (UN) concerning sending its' troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which culminated to the countries first UN deployment which came in 1999 through the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (Lotze, 2015). South Africa espoused greater participation in African politics, guided by the assumption that regional stability was important for the fulfillment of national interests (Malan, 1997). In this context, the DFA drafted the white paper on South African Participation in International Peace missions, describing the nature of contemporary peace missions in Africa and providing clear and concise inter-departmental policy guidelines on South African participation in such missions" (DFA, 1998:5).

Key contributors to the white paper were the Minister of Defence, the president and senior military advisors. Other state departments were active contributors to the document such as the Department of Police, a select committee established by the Department of Safety and Security and South Africa's permanent missions to the UN (DFA, 1998:30-34). At the heart of the documents policy making approach is the use of history, South Africa's domestic experience and discourses of exceptionalism to fashion a foreign policy position in international peace missions. As the document notes in its introduction:

"Since the advent of democracy in 1994, domestic and international expectations have steadily grown regarding South Africa's role as a responsible and respected member of the international community. These expectations have included a hope that South Africa will play a leading role in international peace missions" (DFA, 1998:3).

South Africa's miracle transition into democracy is seen as the initiation of the state into its' role as a responsible nation at the head of African peace missions. Ever more important is the so-called "growing international expectations" of South Africa's peace leading role in the region. One must be

critical of this rationale however. Evidently, as articulated in the previous section, since 1994 South Africa had been arguing that its' democracy was regionally significant and marked a rising-sun in the politics and economic affairs of Africa. As Mandela articulated in his first speech as President of the country, "Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a society of which all humanity will be proud" (Mandela, 1994). Noticeably, expectations are based on a self-articulated expression articulating the significance of South African democracy for the region. This is a classical feature of states' that hold an identity of exceptionalism (Browning, 2007:3; Holsti, 2010). Inter-subjective roles are constructed to easily transport the states' model of politics and economy into the region. The document emulated this in every regard:

"Experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels us to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts. South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history" (DFA, 1998:19).

South Africa holds the view that its' miracle transition necessitated it to participate in regional peace missions. Miracle transition discourse develops rationalities that South Africa's case is not only unique but furthermore an organic and genuine endeavor. The repetition of the term "its' own", to describe South Africa's conflict-resolution techniques, attempts to articulate the states' approach to conflict resolution as a genuine and unique outgrowth of its' national character. This national character is wrapped up with the hubris of exceptionalism, progress and development. As such, "South Africa's approach to conflict resolution became strongly informed by its own history and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts" (Malan, 1999:1). At a far more comprehensive level, South Africa attempts to export its' model of conflict resolution to the region. As indicated above, this is a classical undertaking of state that holds an identity of exceptionalism. Peaceful negotiation, an exceptional character of South Africa's democratic transition, presents itself as a national resource which the state offers the international community in an attempt to create peace in Africa. This is reinforced by claims that the state has "civilians with a diverse range of skills and experience appropriate to peace processes, professional and experienced police officers and well-trained and disciplined military elements" (DFA, 1998:34).

CONCLUSION AND PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Mandela's era of foreign policy develops several preliminary findings relating to the manner in which South African exceptionalism influences its' foreign policy. Firstly, the centralization of foreign policy-making power becomes an important network of dispersion which transfers domestic level state identity discourses into South African foreign policy. The president, the ANC and the DFA, all intricately intertwined, underpin the capacity of state-level exceptionalism discourses to reproduce themselves in state foreign policy.

Secondly, South Africa held the inter-subjective position that it had tremendous responsibilities in the region. Leader, teacher and a state which can empower are essential identity and role perceptions of South Africa in the region. Inter-discursively, this aligned to the history of South Africa's African destiny dating back to the 1920s under the government of Smuts. Importantly, "one cannot be a model, teacher, or instigator with a low view of national self-worth" (Holsti, 2010:398). Discourses of South African exceptionalism produce a great deal of national self-worth and pride which underpins a leadership inspired foreign policy in the region. A common feature of foreign policy based on exceptionalism is the articulation of the states' meaningful destiny, responsibility, obligation, and mission as saving entire societies suffering from some evil, exploitation, or fallen status. (Browning, 2007; Holsti, 2010:384). Foreign policy based on state exceptionalism tends to define national priorities in terms of subordinating self-interest to a larger, assumed universal good (Holsti, 2010:384). This qualitatively correlates with the use of a unique South African discursive strategy of justification, one which initially defines the continent as backward and South Africa in polar opposite terms before noting the positive contribution the state can make in the continent as leaders. It confirms the assumption that state exceptionalism tends to produce inter-subjective rationalities which sees the states' influence as essential for the politics, economy and society of the region it is located in (Browning, 2007:3; Holsti, 2010).

Lastly, there appears to be a dominant rationality in South African foreign policy which articulates its' domestic model of politics, economy and society as something which can and ought to be extended and implemented in the region. Importantly, state exceptionalism tends to produce the convictions that domestic political and economic values are superior than those of the region and subsequently regional model's need to be transformed according to the hubris of state exceptionalism claims (Browning, 2007:3). Through discourses on miracle transition, reconciliation and rainbow nation, South Africa's model of political, economic and social organization is articulated in terms of peace, consent, negotiation and compromise. The analysis indicated that all three documents utilized negotiation and compromise as important foreign policy levers in the region. In essence,

South Africa's efforts to help resolve conflicts is underpinned by the constitutive norms of protecting vulnerable populations, promoting human security, and encouraging negotiated resolution of disputes (Grant & Hamilton, 2017:18). Extending South Africa's model to the rest of the region entailed propelling democracy well into Africa.

The next chapter builds from these findings. For the sake of clarity, four findings are presented with regards to the influence of state exceptionalism on foreign policy 1) state exceptionalism discourses provide foreign policymakers with a framework for understanding and articulating the states' role in Africa, 2) state exceptionalism discourses produce an inter-subjective role perception of leadership in the region, 3) state exceptionalism usually results in foreign policy which "mimics" the states' domestic model of political-economy when constructing a regional one and 4) state exceptionalism discourses act as action legitimization and justifications for the state. The findings are used as analytical points to examine Mbeki's policy. Beyond this, analysis will further attempt to investigate other influences of state exceptionalism on foreign policy.

3.2 DISCOURSES OF SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY INFLUENCE IN AFRICA UNDER MBEKI (1999-2009)

South Africa's foreign policy under Mandela heavily prioritized the Southern African region by attempting to forge important diplomatic ties with neighbouring states. This policy was pursued in an attempt to rid the state of continental estrangement and comprehensively extend South Africa's presence into the region. It was not until 1999, under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki, that South Africa extensively sought to fulfill its' role as leaders in Africa. The transformation of national economic policy had a lot to do with the change in foreign policy approach. In 1996, South Africa moved away from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which placed a heavy emphasis on Southern Africa, and adopted the Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR). This placed Africa beyond Southern Africa into greater focus (Schoeman, 2007:96). The increased prioritization of the whole continental of Africa was furthermore encouraged by expanding South African business interests and international expectations which argued that South Africa needed to play a more responsible peacekeeping role in the continent and not in Southern Africa alone. Under Mbeki, South Africa's foreign policy was based on the vision and the dream of renewal- in more specific terms African renewal. This, of course, was inspired by the rising sun of new South Africa. Mbeki's African renaissance represented a progressive effort to not only transform Africa and save it from its misery, but also to calibrate the new South Africa to the status of the saviour of Africa (Masters et al, 2015).

With regards to South Africa's foreign policymaking structure, Mbeki's presidency has been understood to have centralized foreign policy making to a great extent (Siko, 2014). However, this may be an over-simplistic, if not incorrect, assessment of Mbeki's influence on South Africa's foreign policymaking environment. Whilst Mbeki became a dominant figure in the control of the affairs of foreign policy, his leadership style importantly remained inclusive, with policy being open to re-articulation, argument and input from several different actors at multiple spheres of society (Siko, 2014). Under the Mbeki presidency, there was the forging of closer ties between important foreign policy actors, whilst, to an extent, the neglect of actors considered as less important. The presidency, ANC and DFA increasingly interacted with each other which enabled the maintenance of an artery dispersing similar types of knowledge regarding South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. There was certainly a greater harmony between these foreign policy actors with regards to South Africa's continental role as leaders, modernizers and teachers of the region. As stated above, the presidency and DFA had long envisaged South Africa as the rightful leaders of the region. Whilst reluctant at first, the ANC's 2004 newsletter captured the totality of its' understanding of South Africa's role in Africa under Mbeki:

"Considering South Africa's position of relative strength on the continent, the country [South Africa] has a responsibility to play a leadership role in Africa's socio-economic development agenda in terms of developing policy, correctly channelling resources, supporting implementation and directing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) processes, as well as to play a role in international arena in negotiating a new partnership paradigm and ending Africa's marginalisation in the global community" (ANC, 2004).

If there was any doubt, by the time Mbeki took over the party was aware of the self-worth and exceptionalism of South Africa and understood this to be legitimate claims to the states' leadership in the region. Exceptionalism discourses provided a useful framework for policymakers to understand the countries position in Africa, and the states' potential valuable contribution to African security and economic development. In the section below, the thesis attempts to understand Mbeki's African renaissance through the lens of South African exceptionalism. Two central foreign policy documents will be discursively analyzed. These are the Foreign Policy Strategic Plan of 2003-2005 and Foreign Policy Strategic Action Plan of 2008-2011. Analysis prioritized South Africa's articulation of its' role in the Africa Agenda. Building from the findings in the previous section, the thesis examines the operations of South African exceptionalism in its' African foreign policy.

THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE

A central pillar of Mbeki's foreign policy between 2003 and 2005 was the concept of "Africa Renaissance" developed in his 1997 speech titled "African Renaissance and a workable dream". Inter-textually, African Renaissance borrowed from Pixely ka Seme's 1906 speech on "the regeneration of Africa" (Masters et al, 2015). Speaking to African investors and leaders of the SADC, the then Deputy President Mbeki predicated the "rebirth of Africa in the 21st century" (Mbeki, 2002). However, Mbeki's expressions could only take full effect when he became President in 1999. Around the same time, Africa was beginning to be understood as the new telos of progress for global capitalism and a promising financial capital investment destination. The discourse of "Africa Rising" references Africa's strong economic performance, technological improvements and democratization in the early 2000s (Chitonge, 2014). It was understood that Africa was on an upward trajectory towards modernity and South Africa had an important role to play in this process.

Within this context the definition of African renaissance meant different things for different people (Mbeki, 2000). The African renaissance fashioned an optimistic outlook with regards to Africa's political and economic future. Although it contained many other nuances, Mbeki's African Renaissance discourse drew heavily upon dominant domestic phrases and narratives of new South Africa, such as the rising sun analogy and the faranani spirit of the nation, to form its ideological nucleus. At a much more comprehensive level, African renaissance justified the states' inter-subjective position as leaders in Africa. Whilst the discourse said that Africa needed to boost its' collective security through policy reform, the building of effective security structures and tremendous economic development through effective investment policies and fiscal management, and whilst it brought to the forefront issues of global inequality and the structural underdevelopment of Africa, at its' heart the Africa renaissance articulated South Africa as a key player, and leader, in the rejuvenation of Africa (Masters et al, 2015:99-104). As Mbeki once stated "in the African continent, South Africa remains a major player" (Mbeki, 2002).

Mbeki's use of African renaissance supported the historical narratives of South Africa's role in Africa. The concept of renaissance, as articulated by Mbeki, embellished the need for South African influence in the region. As Mbeki noted, "a renaissance is a period of spiritual liberation which frees the creative energies of a society. It is therefore a period of great optimism" (Mbeki, 2002: 81). National discourse, such as the faranani spirit of the nation, had long articulated the country as possessing productive energies which could benefit the continent tremendously. Inter-discursively, renaissance reinforced the potential contribution that the state could have in freeing and generating

energies for continental progress. At a much more comprehensive level, the African renaissance appropriated “South Africa’s African destiny” by attempting to create a regional ideology which could not only benefit African economic development but also extend South Africa’s influence in Africa. As Vale & Maseko note “the African Renaissance sought to maximize South Africa’s foreign policy options in Africa, which included other important foreign policy objectives like the continental support for the country’s search for a seat on the United Nations Security Council” (Vale & Maseko, 2002:272).

THE FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIC PLAN OF 2003-2008

By 2002, Mbeki had settled in the presidency and became more directly influential in foreign policymaking. The 2003-2008 Strategic Plan became a pivotal document in defining South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. A discursive analysis of the strategic plan reveals that it draws from the concept of African Renaissance and discourses of South African exceptionalism to form South Africa’s foreign policy posture in Africa. By the time of the strategic plan’s drafting, South Africa had actively attempted to lead Africa, both politically and economically. South Africa led the development of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) and was the first chair of the AU in 2002/2003. Furthermore, the country hosted the NEPAD secretariat and the Pan African Parliament (PAP), expanded its’ bilateral and joint commissions with African states such as Morocco and increased its’ involvement in peace mission regionally. Additionally, South Africa provided the core force for peacekeeping efforts in Burundi during the transfer of the mission’s responsibilities from the AU to the United Nations (UN). Economically, the government began to formalize its’ technical and financial assistance to Africa through the establishment of the African Renaissance Fund in 2000 (Siridopolos, 2008:110). South Africa had tremendously increased its’ economic leadership in the region. Between 1993 and 2003, the states’ trade with the rest of the continent saw a 328% increase (Schoeman, 2007:99). “South African business, encouraged by government, in retail, banking, telecommunications, hotels, tourist, mining and other infrastructure industries, increasingly moved deeper into the continent” (Schoeman, 2007:99). This reflected the states’ efforts to become a “pioneering hegemon” in the African continent (Schoeman, 2007: 96-98). In this manner, the strategic plan was developed within the context of a South Africa that had already begun to actively pursue its’ historically constructed role of leadership in Africa.

Key contributors to the strategic plan were the President, The Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ms Nkosazana-DlaminiZuma, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mr Aziz Pahad and the Director-General for the Department of Foreign Affairs (DDG): Mr Abdul Minty. The first section of the

strategic plan was written by Ms Dlamini-Zuma who outlined the principles of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. Importantly, a strong influence of South Africa's foreign policy approach in Africa is history- to be more specific the states' national history and credo of a unique struggle, peace, negotiation and forgiveness. This became important in shaping the states' approach in Africa. In the opening stanza of the strategic plan Nkosazana-Dlamini Zuma emphatically stated that:

"Our [South Africa's] collective experiences as South Africans have placed us in a unique position to understand and empathize with the challenges facing humanity.....Our struggles and tribulations, our challenges and traumas and our own history demands that we make meaning full contributions for the creation of a better world for all"(DFA: 2003:7).

The exceptionalism of South African history, articulated as unique and special, is utilized as a source of foreign policy. The history of South Africa is used as an important justifier for the states' future actions which entails teaching humanity. This is a core characteristic of exceptionalism-inspired foreign policy (Holsti, 2010). By virtue of its' exceptional history South Africa is placed in a unique position to comprehend and effectively deal with challenges facing humanity. In this manner, South Africa's history is attached to a greater regional purpose. Dlamini-Zuma's pronouncements seem to suggest that there was a reason why South Africa went through a history of struggle, tribulation and turmoil- that reason being to emerge out of history as the destined and rightful state to teach and lead the continent in peace and create a better life for all. Because of its' exceptional history, South Africa understands its' post-apartheid image as an important global agent of change. As the strategic plan further noted, "we [South Africa] must become a positive global influence and an agent of progressive change" (DFA, 2003:7).

By 2003, state exceptionalism discourses provided a framework to understand and shape South Africa's role in Africa. Foreign policy minister Ms Dlamini-Zuma was openly expressing that South Africa had both a responsibility and an obligation to contribute to the continents' renewal in building peace and prosperity (DFA, 2003). The confidence of this claim, embedded with renewal, and peace discourses of state identity, is indicative of a strong inter-subjectivity which understands South Africa as an important actor in Africa's rejuvenation. The strategic document further indicated that:

"South Africa's transition indicated that peaceful change through dialogue and reconciliation is possible. Hence, we have participated in the peace processes of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Great Lakes Region, Comores, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Zimbabwe" (DFA: 2001:7).

Textually, there is the direct use of South Africa's political transition to construct a peace-based leadership approach in Africa. Miracle transition, by its' argued uniqueness and containing rationalities of South African peace, negotiation, respect and consent, is utilized as a discursive justifier for South Africa's peaceful foreign policy in Africa. Furthermore, there is a direct extension of South Africa's democratic model into its' peace-based approach in Africa, a classic characteristic of foreign policy influenced by state exceptionalism (Browning, 2007). Where South Africa's inter-subjective leadership role is made more evident is in the section titled "challenges to foreign policy" written by Deputy Minister, Mr Aziz Pahad:

"South Africa also has a leading role to play in dealing with global issues, such as terrorism, trans-frontier crime, good governance, human rights, democracy, peacekeeping and peace-building, disarmament and arms control. Likewise in the economic arena, South Africa has to play a role in resolving issues of interest to the South" (DFA, 2003:10).

Beyond its' leadership articulation, the state understands its' actions as transcending national interests for universal goods, a central feature of exceptionalism-inspired foreign policy (Holsti, 2010). The proclamation that South Africa would play a leading role in dealing with global issues and play as bridge-builders in managing conflict of interest issues in the South is indicative of a national interest articulated in universalist terms. Where South Africa's African destiny is ever more expressed is through its' articulation of foreign policy challenges, which only read as obstacles which stand in the way of it fulfilling its' role as continental leaders. As Pahad notes:

"The real challenge for South African foreign policy is to be able to play an effective role, and the role that is expected of us, in dealing with the vast plethora of international issues that engage us and the international community at large" (DFA, 2003:10).

South Africa's regional role perception is understood in terms of teachers, leaders, modernizers and enablers which creates tremendous essentialism around South African influence in Africa. Here, the single most prominent challenge to the states' foreign policy is "obstacles" which stand in its way from achieving its' African destiny as effective players of influence in the politics and economy of Africa. Inter-discursively, Pahad's argument seems to be very similar to Smuts understanding of challenges to South African imperialism in the late 1930's. A common thread between both discourses is South Africa's inter-subjective role perception of continental leadership, a consequence of state exceptionalism discourses, and the articulation of obstacles, noted as foreign policy challenges, which impede the state from achieving its' African destiny.

Under Mbeki, multilateralism became a huge policy option in mitigating foreign policy challenges. However, South Africa's use of multilateralism should not be seen as a tactic of diminishing or deflecting its' leadership aspiration in the region, instead it forms a central part in creating an Africa which South Africa can exert much more influence over (Masters et al, 2015). Multilateralism is utilized to realize South Africa's African destiny and mitigate the "real challenge" of impeding obstacles as previously noted. "South Africa adopted the tactic of pushing for multilateral mechanisms so that once these institutions were established it would become easier for the state to act in its' preferred way" (Lansberg, 2007:196). The reasons given by the DFA for South Africa's membership in the AU, for example, holds true to the argument that the state's use of multilateralism is to exert greater influence in Africa. As the strategic plan noted, "AU membership, aside from the intrinsic political, security and economic benefits it brings, enhances our ability to exert influence on a wider international arena" (DFA, 2003:7). Multinational institutions, such as the AU, are utilized as organizations which can extend South Africa's influence into the region, an influence which is understood as essential and necessary for Africa. This, of course, is a tactic to extend the rationalities of domestic politics and economy into the regional. Importantly, foreign policy influenced by exceptionalism results in a tremendous push to transfer the domestic institutions and values of the state holding an identity of exceptionalism into the region (Holsti, 2010). South Africa's involvement in NEPAD is a clear example of this.

NEPAD was created through the efforts of Mbeki and several other important African leaders of the time which included Olusegun Obasanjo, Abdoulaye Wade, Meles Zenawi, Muammar Gaddafi and Abdelaziz Bouteflika. "These state leaders coordinated their efforts to challenge western states at the Global 8 (G8) to treat Africa as a zone of human beings" (Masters et al, 2015:100). Eventually, this led to the G8 outreach initiative and the tabling of a common development vision for Africa which crystallized as the programme NEPAD. From rather early on, however, it was clear that South Africa was the main contributor to NEPAD and thus heavily influenced its' functional and substantive policy. The operational logic of NEPAD was based on rationalities which grew out of South African exceptionalism discourses such as miracle transition, negotiation, reconciliation and the necessity for democratic peace. NEPAD followed the claim that "without peace there would be no development and without development there would be no peace on the continent" (Schoeman, 2007:96). This tremendously mimicked the model the South African political economy since 1994. Above the extension of South Africa's development model into the region, what remains striking is the states' confidence in achieving its' African destiny through multilateral agreements. As Pahad noted in 2003:

“The cornerstone of our foreign policy will be to end conflicts peacefully, to achieve a new world order that is more equitable and people-centered and to create conditions for sustainable development. This demands that we strengthen and not weaken multilateralism” (Pahad, 2003).

Importantly, a state containing exceptionalism-inspired foreign policy does not tend to be hostile to international organizations but rather develops a multilateralism which tends to be very pragmatic (Luck, 2003). “Under Mbeki, pragmatic-multilateralism became a tremendous policy option in dealing with multilateral institutions in the region” (Williams, 2006).

The strategic plan of 2003-2008 actively draws upon the discourse of South Africa’s exceptional history and miracle transition to form a role perception in Africa. The state articulated domestic values as universal goods which could and ought to be implemented in the rest of Africa. Furthermore, obstacles to South African foreign policy can be read as obstacles to the full realization of its’ historical African destiny as leaders. Membership in international organizations was used to overcome these foreign policy obstacles and challenges. Other state role perceptions include “African teachers” and “effective players”. Importantly, the strategic plan utilized South African exceptionalism discourses as justifications for the states’ actions in the continent. Here, the states’ history of struggle and peaceful transition operated as discursive justifications for South Africa’s peace efforts in the continent. Furthermore, there was a strong mimicking of South Africa’s domestic model in its normative ambitions for Africa which is a central characteristic of state exceptionalism-inspired foreign policy. Here, multilateralism through important regional institutions such as the AU and NEPAD was used to extend the states’ influence into Africa.

STRATEGIC PLAN OF ACTION 2008-2011 AND THE AFRICAN AGENDA

By 2008, state exceptionalism had normalized within South African foreign policymaking forming a framework for policy-makers to understand and articulate South Africa’s role and foreign policy in Africa. South African foreign policy found its’ policy competencies on the claims that it was the very character of South Africa’s history that placed the state firmly as champions of democracy, good governance, human rights, development, peace and justice in Africa (Smith & Van der Westhuizen, 2012:34). In this zeitgeist, President Mbeki delivered his State of the Nation Address of 2007, which transformed the broad vision of African Renaissance into a progressive policy known as the African Agenda. The African Agenda became an extension of domestic interests, rationalities, narratives and discourses into continental foreign policy. The agenda, and more broadly the African renaissance, became the flagship of South African foreign policy in Africa (Moore, 2014:373). The states’ goals for the African continent were the resolution of conflict and the building of an environment in which

socio-economic development could take place. The government's view was that socio-economic development could not take place without peace and stability, as these constituted the necessary conditions for sustainable socio-economic development (DFA, 2008). The impact of the African agenda was felt in two important regards.

Firstly, the African agenda understood continental Africa and its' people in the terms of lack, incompleteness and deficiency, which included "the inadequacy of democracy, the deficiency of governance, the lack of peace, and an incomplete detachment with a past assumed to be one of savagery and barbarism" (Masters et al, 2015:100). Building from these perceptions of Africa, South Africa's foreign policy attempted to "modernize" and "enlighten" Africa through political and economic development programmes whilst simultaneously changing negative global perceptions of Africa. The African agenda, in the latter, aimed to put Africa on the global state, arguing that structural inequalities embedded in the global capitalist structure impeded African development efforts. The agenda also argued for the need of a tremendous transformation of the global political economy to enable development in third world countries. Lastly, through the African agenda, South Africa positioned itself as a special middle ranked power, a pivotal state and exemplary in Africa and the rest of the developing world (Lansberg & Kondlo, 2015). Under African agenda, the state understood its' own future as inextricably linked to that of the African continent- a future of greater South African influence (Lansberg & Kondlo, 2015:2).

The African agenda found formal foreign policy expression in the Strategic Plan of 2008-2011. The strategic plan of action was created at a time when the state had already extended its' influence, globally and in Africa, and both politically and economically. "Under President Mbeki, South Africa established itself as an important interlocutor for Africa in global fora, a strong advocate of South-South solidarity and reform of the out-dated global governance architecture, and a leader in the reconstruction of Africa's institutional architecture" (Sidiropoulos, 2008:109). In the political sphere, in 2006 South Africa secured a two-year seat in the UN Security Council and continued its' peace efforts in Africa. Furthermore, by 2007, the state had opened over 40 diplomatic missions in Africa (Schoeman, 2007:98). In the DRC, South Africa was extensively involved in institutional and human resource capacity building. Economically, various South African departments, such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) had increased in spheres of influence in Africa by providing support for trade through multiple offices build in different African countries, and the Industrial Development Cooperation (IDC) provided investment funding for African development projects (Schoeman, 2007:100). Essentially, the constructed role of South Africa as important player in Africa was not merely a symbolic policy but took on tremendous policy life in the region.

Key contributors to the strategic action plan were the President, the Foreign Affairs Minister: Ms Dlamini-Zuma, the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Ms Sue Van Der Merwe & Mr Aziz Pahad and the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs: Dr Ayanda Ntsabula. The strategic plan emulates the central findings of this paper. Textually, the use of a new linguistic phrase to articulate South Africa's role in the Africa and more broadly the global South is noted. In the opening stanza of the plan, Minister Dlamini-Zuma employs the phrase "sister-peoples and sister countries" repetitively to name the nations which South Africa's foreign policy is directed towards. As Dlamini Zuma notes:

"In this context we will indeed endeavor to strengthen bilateral relations with our sister countries in the continent by extending the number of our diplomatic missions from the current 46 missions in 43 countries.....In this regard, we certainly and furthermore will pursue the mandate given to us by SADC to assist the sister peoples of Zimbabwe to find a speedy resolution to their political and economic challenges moving from the understanding that only the people of Zimbabwe acting with the support of the region can find a resolution to their challenges" (DFA, 2008:3).

The phrase, "sister-people", is loaded in the sense that it describes a distinct perception of South Africa's role in the region - that being of Big-Brother. The brother status is not for novelties sake however. Given African culture and traditional rationalities, big-brother evokes the role perceptions of responsibility, authority, leadership and ownership (Ndulo, 1998). Importantly, Mbeki had always understood new South Africa as possessing the character of being custodians, curators and defenders. As Mbeki articulated, "because we (South Africans) are one another's keepers, we surely must be haunted by the humiliating suffering which continues to afflict millions of our people" (Mbeki, 2002).

What is important about this discourse is that it extends to the states' foreign policy in Africa by positioning the state as the "brothers-keepers/big brothers" of the region. Big brother further confirms Mandela's confidence in a South Africa which had tremendous continental responsibilities it had to meet. Whilst the phrase big brother acts as a role creator, the strategic plan further attempted to extend the political-economic model of South Africa into the region. The opening forward of the document articulates the vision of Africa in identical terms to the hubris of discourses of exceptionalism. South Africa's vision of Africa reads more like South Africa's vision for itself:

"Our vision is an African continent, which is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable.....Moving from the premise that South Africa cannot prosper in isolation from its sister countries particularly in the neighborhood, we certainly will pursue all efforts aimed at regional economic integration under SADC" (Strategic Plan, 2008).

CONCLUSION

In the previous section, the thesis identified several important discourses of exceptionalism detailing new South Africa. An important conclusion was that state exceptionalism discourses function as pivotal constructions of state identity. These locate the state in time and space vis-à-vis other states. Importantly, discourses of exceptionalism form systems of knowledge for which to draw insights from during the policy-making process. In this section several noteworthy findings are presented below.

Firstly, South African exceptionalism acts as a constructed identity which becomes a tool of inter-subjectivity generating specific roles for the state in the region. South African exceptionalism creates a South African Africa destiny which articulates the state as leaders, teachers, modernizers and civilizers. In the Mandela and Mbeki era, South Africa articulated its' role in Africa in these terms.

Mandela's presidency was successful in constructing South African responsibilities in the region. It was noted that as early as 1993, Mandela and the ANC had associated the new South Africa with major regional responsibilities of extending democracy and economic development. The discourse of miracle transition was important in extending and justifying Mandela's universalist foreign policy in Africa. In Mbeki's era, several leadership role perceptions are presented as an outgrowth of state exceptionalism discourses. For example, analysis found that the Foreign Affairs Minister, Dlamini-Zuma, articulated the state as "teachers" in the region through the unique position which the nation's history had put it in. Pahad articulated South Africa as a major "global player" in mitigating international issues such as terrorism, international crime, global warming and underdevelopment. Mbeki also understood South Africa as a major player in the region with regards to the eradication of poverty and the generation of economic development and growth. Even the DFA emphasized this inter-subjectivity by articulating South Africa as a positive influence and an agent of change in the region. At many times, exceptionalism discourses were used to justify leadership foreign policy. Theory reveals that state exceptionalism identities generate inter-subjective leadership role for the state possessing an identity of exceptionalism. This seems to be the case with regards to South African exceptionalism and its' influence on foreign policy in Africa.

Lastly, South African exceptionalism has articulated the states' model of political and economic organization as progress, unique, dynamic and significant. State exceptionalism has been noted to generate national models which are understood as worthy of replicating elsewhere in the region (Holsti, 2010). As Browning finds, for example, that the 'idea' of the Nordic model has been presented as progressive and something that can and ought to be copied and implemented

elsewhere (Browning, 2007). In the South African instance, this means the extension of peace, negotiations, democracy, multiculturalism and capitalist development (epitomes of the South African model), through a leadership foreign policy approach, deeper into Africa.

CHAPTER IV:

CONCLUSION: SOUTH AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

The belief that South Africa has a national credo, history and character tremendously unique and staggeringly special is a commonly held conviction within national scholarship, policy and popular imagination. A national identity of exceptionalism must be understood as an important influence in the policy-making environment, particularly in foreign policy-making where nation states fight for positions of power in the international arena. Through national narratives and discourses state leaders constantly attempt to brand the state to enable particular foreign policy actions whilst disabling other states from acting in certain ways. In South Africa, there remains a tremendous need for studies which investigate the impact of state exceptionalism on foreign policymaking. Furthermore, there is a need for research which investigates the impact of state exceptionalism, national narratives and state discourses on foreign policy implementation and evaluation. In this thesis, discourse analysis proved valuable in understanding the construction of state identity and its' foreign policy influence. By approaching the continued persistence of South African leadership aspirations in Africa through a DHA approach several important conclusions are made:

Firstly, the discursive construction of South African exceptionalism can be traced back to the political union of the state in 1910. For the dominant British political leaders of the time, the understanding that South Africa was unique was essential in the construction of national identity. At the helm of the British pact was Lord Milner who, in great efforts, justified South African exceptionalism through a number discourses which articulated the formation of South Africa, its' governance system, land and society as special and unique in the African region. Initial justifications of exceptionalism were based on South Africa's modern-statecraft, the manner the state exercised a form of colonial rule over its' African subjects and the states' unique geographical placement. What remained important for state identity construction was the articulation of South Africa on terms associated with western modernity, bounding the state to western virtues of rationalism, enlightenment, development and progress. South Africa became a place of ore, wonder and prestige in Africa.

Secondly, with regards to the states' foreign policy, the Belfour declaration of 1926 must be noted as a significant event as it awarded South Africa formal foreign policymaking competencies separate from Britain enabling it to embark on its leadership foreign policy in the region. The thesis found that

the discourse of South African imperialism, primarily articulated by General Jan Smuts, was essential in the development of a “South African Africa destiny”, one which understood the states’ influence in the region as essential for modernizing a backward Africa. The understanding of South Africa as modern, further emulated through the 1950s by the national narrative of “Big Orania” and “South Africa the good-colony” discourse during the National Party’s’ governance, was central in the articulation of the states’ role as modernizers and a civilizing force in Africa. As such, discourses of state exceptionalism operate as important sources of state identity. In the region, state exceptionalism creates an epistemology of difference which articulates South Africa as above the norm, vis-à-vis other states, with regards to its’ politics, economics and social organization. In South African foreign policy, regional states are commonly understood in terms of lack, need and backwardness (Masters et al, 2015). As such, discourses of state exceptionalism influence state identity construction, inevitably positioning South Africa, and its’ influence in the region, as valuable for the modernization and development of Africa.

Thirdly, post-apartheid discourses of South African exceptionalism were appropriated by new right intellectuals of the 1990s, primarily led by the President FW De Klerk, and their ideals of a “new South Africa”. New South Africa was articulated in terms of multiculturalism based on a four-nation’s thesis of South Africa. The multicultural identity of the state meant that new South Africa was to be understood in terms of peace, negotiation and lovers of diversity. South African exceptionalism discourses from 1994 onwards followed this multicultural identity construction of new South Africa. State exceptionalism manifested in the discourses of “miracle transition, rainbow nation, South Africa: the cradle of humankind and gateway of Africa”. Importantly, South Africa’s political transition remains very important in the construction of its’ foreign policy in Africa. Essentially, “South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy cannot be understood outside an explanation of its’ post-apartheid political transition. Its’ actors, the ideas they express, the interests they represent and the institutions they craft are all crucially influenced and impacted upon by the democratic transition and how it has evolved” (Abib, 2009:143).

Fourthly, discourses of state exceptionalism must be understood as important regional role-creators. Post-apartheid discourses defined a South Africa in the terms of civilizers, modernizers, teachers, empowers of the region, peace-makers, brothers-keepers and catalysts for African development. Exceptionalism creates inter-subjective rationalities which understand the state as having undeniable responsibilities and noble expectations it ought to fulfill in the region (Holsti, 2010). South African foreign policy under Mandela held the inter-subjective understanding suggesting that the state had important and formidable continental responsibilities and obligations it ought to fulfill

in Africa. This entailed spreading peace, democracy and good governance (Mandela, 1994). Under Mbeki, South Africa understood itself as regional teachers, empowering regional states by taking headship of the African renaissance and agenda. These regional projects stemmed from a huge conviction in the national energy, spirit and credo of South Africa emulated through its post-apartheid discourses of exceptionalism. National characteristics and specificities were argued to have proved valuable in national renewal and as such could prove valuable in Africa's renewal too.

Even more striking, discourses of South African exceptionalism are important in articulating South Africa's model of political, economic and social organization as first something of tremendous national self-worth, and secondly as something which can and ought to be transported into the politics, economics and social organization of the region. Here, South African national interests are articulated as universal goods (Holsti, 2010). The extension of democracy and liberal economics, certainly in the states' interests of national development and security, were articulated as important for African peace and development and became central to South Africa's policy in Africa under Mandela and Mbeki. However, extending South Africa's model into the region needed important methods of justification. The thesis noted the specific use of a discursive logic which attempted to justify the states' leadership in the region. The logic runs as follows:

- 1) Articulate the region in the terms of lack and need.
- 2) Articulate South Africa in terms of having and completeness.
- 3) Note the positive potential contribution of increased South African influence in the region.
- 4) Embark on leadership foreign policy which extends South Africa's influence in the region.

Evidently, there is a close relatedness between South African exceptionalism and the states' leadership aspirations in Africa. Discourses of South African exceptionalism produce a great deal of national self-worth, articulating the nations' model of politics and economics as something which ought to be extended into the region. This, subsequently, underpins and encourages a leadership inspired-foreign policy in Africa.

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