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**The Human Development Sequence in Sub-Saharan Africa:  
Botswana in Comparative Perspective**

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LKLROR001

**A Minor Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
the award of the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science**

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**COMPULSORY DECLARATION**

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES.....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>V</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>A Nation in Flux: Botswana's Development, 1966-2012</i> .....	1
<i>Political Attitudes in Botswana</i> .....	4
<i>Socioeconomic Development and Global Cultural Change</i> .....	7
<i>Research Questions</i> .....	11
<i>Relevance of Study</i> .....	12
<b>CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<i>Conceptual Framework</i> .....	13
Development and Value Change.....	14
Modes of Political Learning.....	16
<i>Argument</i> .....	17
<i>Research Design</i> .....	19
Self-Expression Values in Botswana .....	20
Botswana in Comparative Perspective.....	20
<i>Measurement</i> .....	21
Predictor Variables.....	23
<i>Conclusion</i> .....	26
<b>CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<i>Measuring Self-Expression Values in Botswana (2005)</i> .....	27
<i>Post-Materialist Values</i> .....	28
Subjective Wellbeing .....	30
Social Tolerance.....	33
Political Activism.....	34
Interpersonal Trust .....	36
<i>Results and Hypothesis Testing</i> .....	38
Hypothesis Testing.....	40
<i>Conclusion</i> .....	41
<b>CHAPTER 4: EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<i>Testing Predictor Variables</i> .....	43
Modernisation: Residential Location and Employment Sector.....	43
Human Development Sequence: Existential Security .....	44
Human Development Sequence: Economic Generation .....	45
Cognitive Learning: Education, Engagement, Awareness .....	47
Political Learning .....	48
<i>Predicting Value Preferences in Botswana</i> .....	49
Contrasting Explanatory Models.....	50
Socioeconomic Legacies and Value Formation .....	52
<i>Conclusion</i> .....	54
<b>CHAPTER 5: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS .....</b>	<b>56</b>
<i>Value Preferences in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> .....	56
Hypothesis Testing.....	57
<i>Value Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> .....	59
Micro-level Analysis .....	60
National-Level Analysis.....	63
<i>Conclusion</i> .....	65
<b>CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>67</b>

<i>Methodological Explanations</i> .....	68
<i>Substantive Explanations</i> .....	69
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>71</b>
<b>APPENDIX A</b> .....	<b>79</b>
<b>APPENDIX B</b> .....	<b>89</b>
<b>APPENDIX C</b> .....	<b>92</b>

University of Cape Town

## LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Table 1.1: The Process of Human Development .....	9
Figure 2.1: Socioeconomic Growth and Value Change.....	14
Figure 2.2: Political Development and Value Change.....	15
Table 2.1: Competing Models of Value Formation.....	17
Table 2.2: Operationalising Self-Expression Values .....	22
Table 2.3: Distribution of Economic Cohorts in Botswana (2005). .....	24
Table 2.4: Predictor Variables .....	25
Table 3.1: Afrobarometer Post-Materialist Values Measure (2008).....	28
Figure 3.1: Preference for Postmodern Values in Botswana (2005).....	29
Figure 3.2: Revised Post-Materialist Values Indicator (2005).....	30
Figure 3.3: Evaluations of Individuals' Living Conditions in Botswana (2005).....	31
Table 3.2: Evaluation of Living Conditions (2003).....	32
Figure 3.4: Support for Gender Equality in Botswana (2005).....	34
Figure 3.5: Political Agency in Botswana (2005).....	35
Figure 3.6: Interpersonal Trust in Botswana (2005).....	37
Table 3.3: Interpersonal Trust in Botswana (2005) .....	38
Figure 3.7: Self-Expressive Responses in Botswana (2005) .....	39
Figure 3.8: Distribution of Value Preferences in Botswana (2005).....	40
Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Value Preferences by Economic Cohort.....	46
Table 4.2: Post Hoc Results for Value Preferences by Economic Cohort .....	46
Table 4.3: Correlation with Self-Expression Values by Cohort Group .....	47
Table 4.4: Means and Standard Deviations of Value Preferences by Cognitive Autonomy .....	48
Table 4.5: Post Hoc Results for Value Preferences by Cognitive Autonomy.....	48
Table 4.6: OLS Regressions 1-5 .....	51
Figure 4.1: Contrasting Logics of Value Formation.....	53
Table 5.1: Value Preferences by Country (Afrobarometer Scale) .....	57
Table 5.2: Comparative Self-Expression Values Scores.....	59
Table 5.3: OLS Regressions 1-5 .....	61
Table 5.4: OLS Regression 6. ....	63
Table 5.5: Correlates of Self-Expressive Orientations.....	64
Table 5.6: OLS Regression 7 (Aggregated Afrobarometer Data).....	65
Figure A.1: Botswana's GNI per capita (current US Dollars, Atlas Method), 1966-2011.....	79
Figure A.2: Comparative Human Development Index (HDI), 1980-2011.....	79
Table A.1: Botswana's Employment and National Income Distribution by Economic Sector, 1985-2006. ....	80
Table A.2: Botswana's Population Characteristics, 1971-2001.....	80

Table A.3: Age-Specific Adult Literacy Rate (%), 2003.....	81
Figure A.3: Urban Population, 1960-2010.....	81
Table A.4: Voter Turnout in Botswana, 1965-2009. ....	81
Table A.5: Economic Status by Age, 2006.....	82
Table A.6: Societal Goals and Individuals' Values .....	82
Figure A.4: World Values Survey Global Cultural Map, 1999-2004. ....	82
Figure A.5: World Values Survey Global Cultural Map, 2005-2007.....	83
Figure A.6: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.....	83
Table A.7: Self-Expression Values in Medium-Development Countries .....	84
Table A.8: Value Preferences in Sub-Saharan Africa.....	84
Table A.9: Comparative Development Measures in Afrobarometer Countries.....	85
Table A.10: Scarcity v. 'Well being' Values.....	85
Table A.11: Measuring Cross-Dimensional Value Preferences.....	86
Table A.12: Correlates of Survival vs. Self-Expression Values.....	86
Table A.13: Materialist v. Post-Materialist Values Index.....	87
Table A.14: Emancipative Values Index.....	87
Table A.15: Global Value Preferences (WVS Wave 5).....	88

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## ABSTRACT

This study evaluates Botswana's prospects for democratic consolidation by investigating whether the country's unique post-colonial experience of steady economic growth and multiparty democracy has promoted the growth of emancipative, 'self-expression values.' Firstly, the study measures the levels of emancipative, 'self-expression' values in the country, which are associated with mature democracies, and tests four predictive models linking development to individual-level cultural change: modernisation theory, the Human Development Sequence, a cognitive hypothesis, and a political learning approach. Secondly, it replicates the analysis for the full regional dataset in order to investigate the extent to which Africans' values are shaped by collective experience.

In contrast to expectations based on aggregate socioeconomic indicators, the results indicate that Botswana is at a middling point on the survival/self-expression value spectrum and that citizens are not, on average, significantly more self-expressive than their regional counterparts. Further analysis indicates that cultural variation within the country was driven by differences in levels of both existential security and cognitive autonomy. Regional growth of self-expression values, conversely, was primarily shaped by individual cognitive forces, rather than generational or collective experiences.

Overall, the study's results indicate that the pace and state-driven nature of Botswana's post-colonial development has produced similar challenges to those faced by other Sub-Saharan African countries. Botswana's prospects for future democratic consolidation are therefore contingent not only on the continued growth of an educated, professional middle class, but also on the development of a vibrant private sector to decrease ordinary citizens' reliance on the state.

“We were taught, sometimes in a very positive way, to despise ourselves and our ways of life. We were made to believe that we had no past to speak of, no history to boast of. The past, so far as we were concerned, was just a blank and nothing more. Only the present mattered and we had very little control over it. It seemed we were in for a definite period of foreign tutelage, without any hope of our ever again becoming our own masters. The end result of all this was that our self-pride and our self-confidence were badly undermined.

It should now be our intention to try to retrieve what we can of our past. We should write our own history books to prove that we did have a past, and that it was a past that was just as worth writing and learning about as any other. We must do this for the simple reason that a nation without a past is a lost nation, and a people without a past is a people without a soul.”

- Sir Seretse Khama, speech of Chancellor at University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland graduation ceremony, 15 May 1970 (Source: *Botswana Daily News*, 19 May 1970, supplement).

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Botswana is widely regarded to be one of the world's most successful 'development states' following its transformation from a poor colonial outpost into a wealthy, peaceful democracy on a continent that remains better known for extreme poverty, brutal civil conflict and despotic leaders. Despite the country's extensive socioeconomic changes, much of the current research on democracy in Botswana focuses on the continuity of indigenous traditions in the contemporary political landscape. This study takes the contrasting approach and aims to measure the cultural impact of these shifts. Although analysts increasingly question Botswana's reputation as an African 'miracle,' the nation's development trajectory is undoubtedly unique due to the scale, pace, and endurance of this success. By focusing on ordinary citizens, rather than political institutions or elites, my analysis attempts to evaluate the extent to which Botswana's distinct post-colonial trajectory distinguishes Botswana (citizens of Botswana) from other Africans. In this chapter, I outline Botswana's transformation and the current understanding of its relationship with the national political culture, before summarising the global evidence linking sustained development to democratic consolidation and the theoretical framework with which I will approach my research questions.

### *A Nation in Flux: Botswana's Development, 1966-2012*

Much of the current interest in Botswana's development is due to the country's impressive record of political and economic stability. Botswana is Africa's oldest democracy and has enjoyed decades of uninterrupted multiparty democracy, with ten free and fair elections and a range of positive governance indicators and political freedoms.<sup>1</sup> Conventional wisdom attributes this concurrent economic and political progress to the 'exceptional'

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<sup>1</sup> Mauritius held its first elections under universal suffrage in 1959, but only gained independence in 1968. Botswana, on the other hand, held its founding elections in 1965 and gained independence the following year.

combination of visionary leadership with the natural advantages of a small, homogenous population and significant mineral deposits (e.g. Acemoglu *et al.*, 2001; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Samatar, 1999; and Sebudubudu & Molutsi, 2011). As the continent is generally abundant in resources and new empirical evidence disputes the longstanding perception of ethnic homogeneity, recent studies increasingly emphasise the role of good governance in sustaining the country's economic success (e.g. Robinson & Parsons, 2006). Prudent stewardship of the country's diamond resources fuelled Botswana's 'growth miracle,' which transformed the country from one of the poorest in the world into an upper-middle-income economy within the space of a single generation (**Figure A.1**).<sup>2</sup> As a result, living standards have steadily improved over time and national human development indicators are substantially higher than the regional average (**Figure A.2**). The Central Statistics Office (CSO) reports that most Botswana have access to fundamental services such as potable water (95%) and basic sanitation (80%), while 84% of the population lives within five kilometres of a public health facility (CSO & UNICEF, 2009: 4; CSO, 2007: 1).

The first major consequence of this development is the shift away from agriculture towards an increasingly industrialised and globalised economy. Although diamonds remain Botswana's primary export, government policies prioritise economic diversification and the national workforce is concentrated in the service sector (**Table A.1**). Secondly, Botswana has experienced a dramatic decline in the national fertility rate since independence, which has consequently reduced the proportion of the dependent population relative to the labour force (i.e. 'dependency ratio'; **Table A.2**). This is a common feature of modernising societies and was previously found to promote further economic development in South East Asia during the 1990s (Nair, 2010).

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<sup>2</sup> The World Bank currently classifies economies by their 2011 GNI per capita levels (Atlas method): 'low income,' \$1,025 or less; 'lower middle income,' \$1,026-\$4,035; 'upper middle income,' \$4,036-\$12,475; and 'high income,' at least \$12,476 (World Bank, 2012b). Botswana graduated to its current status in 1993.

Thirdly, there has been a sizeable change in women's roles in the family and wider community: Botswana women now represent almost half (48%) of the country's formal employment and younger generations of women are more literate than their male counterparts (**Table A.3**).<sup>3</sup> In general, Botswana performs well in terms of assuring equal educational attainment and economic opportunity, but continues to lag in women's health and political empowerment indicators (World Economic Forum, 2011). Fourthly, the proportion of urban residents has soared from 5% in 1966 to almost two-thirds (61%) of the national population in 2010 (**Figure A.3**). This shift has transformed the communities in which Botswana live from the traditional support systems of large extended families and small, rural communities towards progressively smaller households in large, urban areas.

Although all of these processes are common occurrences in modernising societies, the national government has warned of a growing identity crisis among young Botswana—blaming changes in traditional family and communal life, in addition to external influences from the international media (Ministry of Labour & Home Affairs, 1996).<sup>4</sup> This anxiety reflects the prevailing perception that 'modern' values are antithetical to Botswana's identity as a traditional, conservative society. Since independence, the country's political elites have sought to promote economic development and democratisation, while simultaneously honouring the country's past and preserving traditional Tswana morals (*cf.* opening quote: vi). This goal has become increasingly difficult to achieve, however, because of the tremendous pace of social transformation since the 1970s. Given these changes, theories of modernisation would predict that cultural change is both inevitable and irreversible. Furthermore, they

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<sup>3</sup> The Botswana Family Health Survey found that half (53%) of Botswana women practiced some form of birth control in 2007-2008 (CSO & UNICEF, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> The policy document also acknowledges the role of long-standing problems such as income inequality, disproportionate unemployment levels (**Table A.4**), and limited educational opportunities in precipitating crime and violence amongst the youth (MLHA, 1996: 7).

would argue that this change is desirable, as it would provide the requisite conditions for further political development and, ultimately, democratic consolidation.<sup>5</sup>

In particular, Ronald Inglehart's intergenerational value change thesis would predict that the type of rapid modernisation that Botswana has experienced would mean that successive generations of Botswana will progressively shift away from traditional, communal values towards those prioritising individualism and self-expression. My question, thus, is has Botswana's experience of steady economic growth and multiparty democracy in fact promoted the growth of these emancipative, 'self-expression values'?

### ***Political Attitudes in Botswana***

Despite the general interest in Botswana's unique development trajectory, this study appears to be the first empirical investigation of the relationship between socioeconomic growth and cultural change in the country. Due to the general lack of survey data in the country, the current understanding of the national political culture is based on extrapolations from small-scale empirical studies of citizenship norms (e.g. Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004) and descriptive statistics of attitudinal and behavioural data.<sup>6</sup> Historical accounts of Botswana's emergence as an independent state demonstrate that state-building efforts heavily involved local elites prior to independence—in contrast to most African nations (Robinson & Parsons, 2006). As Botswana's political development has primarily been a 'top-down' process ever since, empirical studies tend to concentrate on either institutionalisation or political elites (e.g. Molomo, 2005; Good, 2008; Sebudubudu & Molutsi, 2011).

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<sup>5</sup> Linz and Stepan (1996) defines a 'consolidated' democracy as "a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, 'the only game in town'" (15).

<sup>6</sup> Preece and Mosweunyane's evidence was collected between 2002 and 2003, and includes ninety-eight participants; of whom seven were political leaders while the rest were young Botswana. The study primarily recruited its respondents via civic associations, therefore its participants are likely unrepresentative of the general population (Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004).

Analysts agree that the country's conscious blend of indigenous and 'imported' political structures has resulted in its remarkable stability (e.g. Lekorwe *et al.*, 2001), but the country's development appears to be stagnating as a result. A comparative study of democracies in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) found that "compared to the recent progress made by other countries in the region, Botswana's democracy does not stand out as more progressive or comprehensively developed" overall, despite its longevity (Molutsi, 2005: 26). One of the areas of weaknesses identified in Molutsi (2005) is persistent voter apathy, which the author interprets as indication of weak public confidence in the democratic system (*cf.* Democracy Research Project, 2002; **Table A.4**). Maundeni (2005) argues that the preservation of automatic succession procedures from the pre-colonial era excludes ordinary Batswana from the decision-making process when selecting national leaders. This may explain why the country has generally failed to develop a participative political culture. In addition to weak electoral turnout, Molomo (2006) found that, on average, only 12% of citizens were active members of a civic organisation (including religious associations) in 2005. Furthermore, the country's youth demonstrate similar behavioural patterns to preceding generations—despite being more educated and familiar with civic duties, and growing up in an increasingly prosperous climate (Ntsabane, 2005). Ntsabane and Ntau (2000) attribute young Batswana's voter apathy to the perpetuation of traditional, 'authoritarian' norms in family life and schools.

These findings suggests that Botswana's post-independence experience has had limited, if any, impact on the country's political culture despite its on-going modernisation and globalisation. The existing attitudinal analyses consequently focus on continuity with the country's past and none have systematically related Batswana's beliefs to the country's more recent, *post-colonial* development.

According to Preece and Mosweunyane (2004), citizenship in the country is based on conservative communal norms, which focus on micro-level communities and are generally depoliticised. These values emphasise volunteerism, self-help and deference to community needs, and hold citizens subject to customary law and traditional authorities (Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004: 5). This suggests that Botswana's values are not significantly different from those of other Africans. In fact, scholars generally agree that African societies, although diverse, share a set of common cultural attributes due to the legacy of traditional norms and behaviours (Mattes & Shin, 2005).<sup>7</sup> Moreover, there is consensus that the defining feature of African culture is these societies' is an emphasis on communal needs over individualism, which is believed to impede the transition from deferent, colonial subjects to active citizenship (Mamdani, 1996; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000). The emphasis on communal values based on localised identities remains prevalent across much of the continent, as the traditional experience of life in small-scale, rural villages and patriarchal, hereditary leadership continues to be a reality for a large proportion of Africans (Ake, 1991).

Botswana's demographic indicators, however, clearly demonstrate that this experience is no longer applicable to a growing proportion of Botswana, which should therefore distinguish their political values from those of other Africans. The Afrobarometer surveys have, in fact, found that Botswana consistently exhibit amongst of the highest levels of support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, which suggests that the country's unique experience has had a significant cultural impact after all (Afrobarometer, 2009a). Lekorwe *et al.* (2001) found that there was a high level of trust in political institutions in Botswana and that the majority of respondents were aware of their civic rights and responsibilities. Overall, a strong majority of Botswana (76%) preferred democracy to alternative regimes and 79%

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<sup>7</sup> Etounga-Manguelle (2000: 75) proposes the following characteristics in his 'typology' of African culture: rigid, social hierarchy; weak controls over uncertainty; space and time perceived as a single entity; indivisible power and authority for political elites; avoidance of open conflict; inefficiency; irrationalism; and, above all, communal domination over the individual.

were either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied with its implementation in the country between 1999 and 2008 (Afrobarometer, 2009c). Further analysis of these attitudes consequently suggests that Botswana has the best prospects for democratic consolidation in the Afrobarometer’s sample of Sub-Saharan African countries (Afrobarometer, 2009b).<sup>8</sup>

In sum, a survey of the current literature indicates that no one has directly addressed the relationship between development and political culture in Botswana. Instead, most analyses focus on the role of institutions and elites in the country’s democratisation, while existing national analyses of public attitudes focus on cultural continuity, rather than change—yet regional evidence from the Afrobarometer surveys indicates that the country’s political culture is distinct from those in other African societies. Bratton *et al.* (2005) consequently argues that Botswana’s post-colonial trajectory has improved the likelihood that its democracy will consolidate. In the following section, I outline evidence from other societies that suggests that modernisation precipitates significant cultural changes that are associated with democratisation.

### ***Socioeconomic Development and Global Cultural Change***

Lipset (1959) found that industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth, formal education, and regime legitimacy were all strongly associated with effective and enduring democracies; subsequently arguing that successful democratisation requires these ‘social requisites.’ This study became the foundational text of modernisation theory, which posits that economic growth precipitates a series of technological (industrialisation), organisational (specialisation) and attitudinal (rationalisation) changes that collectively comprise the ‘modernisation’ process.<sup>9</sup> Modernisation theory became the leading paradigm in comparative politics in the

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<sup>8</sup> Botswana had the highest prospects for democratic consolidation in 1999/2000, with an aggregate score of 96 on the Afrobarometer’s ‘Prospects for the Consolidation of Democracy’ index. The country was followed by: Malawi (76); Zambia (74); Nigeria (72); Tanzania (70); Ghana (68); Uganda (52); Mali (50); South Africa (38); Namibia (32); Lesotho (12); and, lastly, Zimbabwe (6; Bratton *et al.*, 2005: 328, Table 13.2).

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Bell (1960) lists these changes as: Weberian bureaucratisation; the development of a welfare state; occupational specialisation; rising education levels; rising living standards, longevity and leisure time; greater

1950s and 1960s because it provided analysts with a single explanatory framework with which to assess both developed and emerging nations. Most emerging nations lacked the conditions identified in Lipset (1959), therefore social scientists questioned the prospects of democratisation in the Sub-Saharan Africa barring future economic and demographic transformation.

Despite its foundation in empirical evidence, modernisation theory was discredited due to its inability to predict outcomes in emerging nations in subsequent decades (*cf.* Huntington, 1965). Early studies (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Rustow, 1960) were based on data limited to the existing states of the time—giving established, Western nations a disproportionate influence on these findings. Modernisation theory consequently presumed that tradition and modernity are mutually exclusive, and that all societies would inevitably follow the path Great Britain established during the Industrial Revolution. The post-colonial era demonstrated that the modernisation process could be both an opportunity and a threat to political development—particularly in developing countries, whose rapid transformations forced governments to simultaneously lead development efforts while absorbing the process’ undesired effects (Bill & Hardgrave, 1981). Contemporary studies of the relationship between economic development and democracy have since evolved towards a focus on citizens’ commitment to democracy, rather the abandonment of traditional values, when examining political culture (Hagopian, 2000).

One notable example of these updated versions of modernisation theory is Inglehart’s intergenerational value thesis, which reconceptualises modernisation as *two* distinct processes: industrialisation and post-industrialisation. According to Inglehart’s thesis, as an economy shifts away from agriculture towards the industrial sector (i.e. ‘industrialisation’), citizens shift from an emphasis on traditional (religious) to rational-legal (government)

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availability of mass media; the decline of landed elites in favour of the urban bourgeoisie; urbanisation; increasing emphasis on the nuclear, rather than extended, family; and women’s entry into the work force (cited in Norris, 2002: 22).

sources of authority. Furthermore, the shift away from an industrial economy towards the service sector (‘post-industrialisation’) leads to a second cultural shift towards an emphasis of individual self-expression over *all* forms of authority (Inglehart, 1999; **Table A.6**). Societal value change therefore occurs gradually as successive generations grow up under increasingly secure material conditions.

The Human Development Sequence (HDS) theory expands the intergenerational value change thesis to include institutional change by arguing that socioeconomic growth is linked to democratic consolidation via the growth of emancipative, ‘post-modern’ values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). The theory therefore combines socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional change within a single explanatory model under the overarching concept of ‘human development.’ This concept is founded on Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s revolutionary reconceptualisation of ‘development’ as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999: 3). As **Table 1.1** (below) demonstrates, these emancipative, ‘self-expression values’ provide the *motive* to exercise individual autonomy, while economic growth provides the *means* and democracy the *institutional framework* with which to do so (Welzel *et al.*, 2003).

**Table 1.1: The Process of Human Development**

<b>Human Development</b>			
	<b>Socioeconomic Dimension</b>	<b>Cultural Dimension</b>	<b>Institutional Dimension</b>
<b>Process</b>	Modernisation	Value change	Democratisation
<b>Component</b>	Socioeconomic resources	Self-expression values	Civil and political liberties
<b>Contribution</b>	Enhancing people’s <i>capabilities</i> to act according to their choices	Increasing people’s <i>priority</i> to act according to their choices	Broadening people’s <i>entitlements</i> to act according to their choices
<i>Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 3).</i>			

The HDS theory is corroborated by cross-national evidence from the World Values Survey (WVS), which suggests that that socioeconomic growth tends to result in robust intergenerational differences in citizens’ political values—depending on each country’s development level (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994; *cf.* **Figures A.4** and **A.5**). Citizens in

prosperous, post-industrial societies appear to have largely shifted away from communal ('survival') values towards an emphasis on individualism and self-expression, while this transformation occurs more slowly (if at all) in low-income countries (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b). As a result, there is a growing cultural gap between countries of differing development levels, which is strongly correlated with the global variation across several democratic indicators (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). The WVS data consequently suggests that socioeconomic development creates an attitudinal environment conducive to the establishment and stability of liberal democracy.

Both the HDS and modernisation theories would predict that Botswana's socioeconomic growth is leading to a cultural shift towards emancipative, post-modern values. However, the HDS would emphasise citizens' levels of *subjective* existential security over modernisation theory's focus on objective indicators such as urbanisation, professionalisation, industrialisation and service sector employment.

A third interpretation of the link between socioeconomic growth and pro-democratic culture privileges the role of formal education in democratisation. Democracy research has consistently corroborated Lipset's finding that there is a positive association between an educated population and democratisation (Diamond, 2001). However, Blais (2007) highlights the need to distinguish between the cognitive and cultural effects of formal education: schooling may increase political comprehension, rather than promote pro-democratic attitudes. Despite this caveat, evidence from established democracies suggests that citizens with tertiary education are more likely to support 'engaged' citizenship norms, which encompass a broader range of political engagement than traditional 'citizen duty' norms and are comparable to Inglehart's concept of 'self-expression values' (Dalton, 2009).<sup>10</sup> Given

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<sup>10</sup> Dalton (2009) contrasted citizenship norms in: Australia; Austria; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany (East and West); Great Britain; Ireland; Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; and Switzerland.

Batswana's rising education levels since independence, this theory would also predict that the country's political culture is shifting towards an emphasis on emancipative citizenship norms.

The final explanation that I will address shifts away from socioeconomic legacies altogether towards the political realm. In contrast to global trends, Afrobarometer evidence suggests that individual-level variables and post-colonial *political*, rather than not economic, paths shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy (Bratton *et al.*, 2005). These findings suggest that political attitudes on the continent are the result of 'learning' about democracy via a combination of cognitive and experiential factors—not the result of structural factors or traditional values (Mattes and Bratton, 2007). Given Botswana's stable post-independence political development, this argument would predict that the country should be experiencing a shift towards pro-democratic, emancipative values as citizens become increasingly socialised by the living in a relatively effective and well-functioning democracy.

### ***Research Questions***

Firstly, do socioeconomic differences have a significant effect on citizens' political values? This question addresses the *uneven* nature of the country's economic development, as poverty and inequality remain significant challenges despite overall growth. Secondly, do Botswana's values form based on individual or collective, generational experience? This question addresses the *pace* of economic development, which has led to divergences in individual experience. Thirdly, does formal education have a significant effect on Botswana's political values? This addresses one of the major *consequences* of Botswana's development. Fourthly, has Botswana's sustained experience of electoral democracy had a significant impact on its political culture? This question addresses the extent to which direct experience of multiparty democracy is further conducive to consolidation—thereby establishing a virtuous circle of political development.

### ***Relevance of Study***

Botswana's economic development has led to a range of socioeconomic changes; including rising levels of material security and a generation of youth that is better educated and connected to international influences than its predecessors. Furthermore, the nation's political development has resulted in an enduring multiparty democracy. Botswana consequently presents a compelling case for the study of the link between previous development and current political culture. The scale and longevity of the country's socioeconomic success, coupled with its decades of stable multiparty democracy, would appear to provide unique conditions for the growth of democratic values in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite these factors, the WVS dataset includes a limited number of African cases and has never included Botswana.

This thesis will attempt to use African survey data to measure and analyse the formation of 'self-expression values' in both Botswana and seventeen other Sub-Saharan African countries. By doing so, the study will test whether Botswana are significantly different from other Africans, given the nation's comparative success and prior evidence that it was the most likely to achieve democratic consolidation. Do Botswana vary internally, and in contrast to other Africans, in ways that would be predicted by its past four decades of economic and political progress? If I find that there is indeed evidence, this may suggest a path for other countries in the region. Furthermore, extending my analysis to the cross-national level allows me to test whether self-expression values are primarily influenced by individual characteristics (i.e. perceived security and cognition), or collective experiences (overall national development). Lastly, although the HDS theory is based on compelling cross-national and longitudinal evidence, this study is the first to specifically test its applicability in the region.

## CHAPTER 2

### METHODOLOGY

Following decades of diamond-fuelled growth, Botswana is virtually unrecognisable from the poor, agricultural and illiterate society of 1966. Rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and globalisation have transformed the communities in which Botswana live, while democratisation has transformed them from colonial subjects to legal citizens. The breadth and pace of these changes make Botswana a unique setting for the study of human development, yet relatively little is known about the cultural impact of the country's development trajectory. It is therefore unclear whether the country's political culture is shifting towards the emphasis on individual freedom and self-expression that is associated with advanced, post-industrial democracies. This chapter outlines how I adapt the Human Development Sequence (HDS) theory's concepts and measures to the available data from the Afrobarometer, in order to investigate whether Botswana lives up to its reputation as an 'exceptional' African democracy.

#### *Conceptual Framework*

Maslow (1943) posits that all human action is determined by a hierarchy of five basic, universal motivations—of which physical survival is the most primal (**Figure A.4**).<sup>11</sup> As a result, people only allocate their resources to higher-order, psychological needs once they meet their physiological and safety needs. The HDS theory reorganises Maslow's hierarchy into a value spectrum with two diametrically opposed clusters of preferences on either end: the first ('survival values') emphasises extrinsic, physical priorities, while the second ('self-expression values') prioritises intrinsic, psychological motivations (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 138). If this theory applies in Botswana, I should find that: socioeconomic factors, rather than political, explain how Botswana's value preferences form; existential security is a

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
<sup>11</sup> The author defines the ultimate motivation, 'self-actualisation,' as "the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming" (Maslow, 1943: 383).

better predictor of self-expression values than cognition and living in a ‘modern’ or democratic environment; and that citizens’ values form via generational learning.

*Development and Value Change*

The HDS theory predicts that self-expression values form via a logic of ‘economic socialisation.’ Firstly, the scarcity hypothesis posits that an individual’s cultural priorities depend on his or her sense of existential security (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 97). Under insecure conditions, physical survival takes priority and individuals prioritise survival values. Under secure conditions, however, people prioritise self-expressive values because they have fewer external constraints to their choices (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 138).<sup>12</sup> The socialisation hypothesis further argues that cultural values are largely formed prior to adulthood. As a result, prolonged periods of economic growth lead to a societal shift from survival to self-expression values, while long-term economic reversals lead to the opposite, via generational replacement (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 97-99). Generations that grow up under high levels of subjective material security should therefore be more likely to hold self-expression values.

**Figure 2.1: Socioeconomic Growth and Value Change**




The first alternative explanation, a theory of ‘cognitive learning’, asserts that emancipative attitudes are primarily determined by an individual’s *abilities*—particularly the

<sup>12</sup> The study will therefore alternately refer to self-expression values as ‘emancipative’ norms due to this association with human autonomy.

ability to form independent beliefs and evaluations (i.e. ‘cognitive autonomy’). This emphasis on cognition disputes the HDS’ emphasis on experiential factors, arguing instead that citizens who have tertiary education are significantly more likely to hold self-expressive value preferences than the rest of the population due to their greater cognitive autonomy. Opinion data from established democracies indicates that higher education is a more significant indicator of ‘engaged citizenship norms,’ than traditional, duty-based forms of citizenship (Dalton, 2009). Individuals who have high levels of cognitive autonomy should therefore be more likely to hold self-expression values.

The third possible explanation, modernisation theory, asserts that economic development leads to key ‘social requisites’ of successful democratisation: industrialisation, wealth, urbanisation, and education (Lipset, 1959). As an economy shifts away from the agrarian sector, citizens tend to move to urban environments and work in specialised occupations—leading to an urban, professional middle-class. As both the HDS and cognitive theories incorporate wealth and education, I will address the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation under the banner of ‘modernisation.’ Moreover, I emphasise the role of working in the service industry in forming these values due to the argument that self-expression values are predominant in *post-industrial* society (Inglehart, 1997). One should find that urban and professional, ‘white collar’ environments are conducive to forming self-expression values.

**Figure 2.2: Political Development and Value Change**



As **Figure 2.2** (above) indicates, the final explanation shifts away from socioeconomic legacies and asserts direct experience of multiparty democracy forms self-expression values via political socialisation. This theory therefore agrees with the HDS’

assertion that experiential factors shape individuals' values, but disputes the assumption that the causal direction in human development is from economic (modernisation) to cultural (survival to self-expression values), and ultimately, political (democratisation) change. Lindberg (2006), for example, found that electoral experience—even when flawed—made a positive impact on 'human freedom' and democratic attitudes in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, Bratton *et al.* (2005) found that countries who experienced more years under multiparty democracy than autocratic regimes in the post-colonial era had the most pro-democratic citizens. Individuals living in a multiparty democracy should therefore be more likely to embrace emancipative values.

### *Modes of Political Learning*

As the previous section demonstrates, the relationship between development and value formation is multi-causal and the conceptual framework indicates that my analysis also needs to address the *mode* in which values form. The HDS theory is based on Inglehart's intergenerational value change thesis, which predicts that aggregate cultural transformation occurs gradually via intergenerational population replacement; therefore *generations* who grow up during long periods of scarce conditions prioritise survival values, while those who do so under prosperity emphasise self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). On the other hand, the cognitive learning theory clearly implies that values are formed on an *individual* basis as the process depends on each citizen's respective cognition. Furthermore, modernisation theory's logic would predict that *individuals* who live in urban environments and work in 'white-collar' occupations are significantly different from those who do not.

The final argument (political learning) is more ambiguous, however, and it is unclear whether political socialisation occurs on a generational or *collective* (i.e. national) basis. The first possibility is that the political learning model captures a process of political socialisation: generations who grow up in a multiparty democracy are more likely to be self-

expressive because of their familiarity with democratic institutions and procedures. The second possibility is that self-expression values are the result of citizens' environment and thus that all citizens within that environment form similar values. Individuals who grew up in autocratic regimes but spent their adulthoods in a democracy would therefore be as likely to embrace emancipative norms as younger citizens—as long as they had experienced an equal number of total years under multiparty democracy. Evidence from the Afrobarometer, for example, demonstrates that Africans' attitudes towards democracy are shaped by their knowledge and experience of democracy well into adulthood (Bratton *et al.*, 2005).

**Table 2.1: Competing Models of Value Formation.**

Model	Predictor Variables	Hypothesis
Modernisation Theory	'Modern' Environment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employment in services</li> <li>• Urban residential location</li> </ul>	Living and working in a 'modern' social environment promotes self-expression values.
Human Development Sequence (HDS)	Existential Security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic Security</li> <li>• Physical Security</li> <li>• Job Security</li> <li>• Age Cohort</li> </ul>	Growing up in more prosperous conditions promotes self-expression values.
Cognitive Learning	Cognitive Autonomy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formal Education</li> <li>• Interest in Politics</li> <li>• Discusses Politics</li> </ul>	High levels of cognition promote self-expression values.
Political Learning	Age cohort. Democratic Experience: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Experience (years).</li> <li>• Liberal Democracy (FH score).</li> </ul>	Growing up/living in a multiparty democracy promotes self-expression values.

### **Argument**

Botswana is an industrialising society and is therefore unlikely to have a similar level of self-expression values as established, post-industrial democracies. It is difficult, however, to predict where the country is on Inglehart's survival/self-expression values scale because of the complex relationship between socioeconomic development and cultural values. A comparison of medium development nations surveyed in the fourth and fifth WVS waves demonstrates that there was a wide range in scores from the most (El Salvador) to least (Moldova) self-expressive society (**Table A.7**). Furthermore, there is no immediate, clear relationship between these countries' values and their 2011 Human Development Index

(HDI) and national income (GNI per capita) levels.<sup>13</sup> Contrary to Inglehart and Welzel's 2005 prediction, this study expects to find that, on average, Batswana hold modest levels of self-expression values.<sup>14</sup> While Botswana's human development levels are not significantly higher than those South Africa and Guatemala, and are lower than the Philippines', the country has had a long history of democratic stability—in addition to its socioeconomic success. Furthermore, I expect to find that there is systematic variation in citizens' values based on the aforementioned conceptual framework.

Firstly, I expect to find significant cultural differences between individual Batswana of varying socioeconomic backgrounds due to the country's persistent income inequality: more secure citizens emphasise self-expression values, while less secure citizens prioritise survival values. Moreover, I expect to find modest generational differences in value preferences because of the country's developmental pace. Although younger Batswana live in considerably more secure conditions than their predecessors, older citizens presumably continue to transmit their own (survival) values, which would moderate the economic boom's cultural impact. My second hypothesis is consequently that the youngest generation of Batswana are significantly more self-expressive than the rest of the population.

Third, I expect to find a positive relation between citizens' cognitive autonomy and emancipative priorities in Botswana, but anticipate that existential security will make a greater impact on these values. Although the national government has heavily invested in education since independence, the public primary and secondary education system has been heavily criticised for failing to promote pro-democratic norms due to its traditional,

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<sup>13</sup> It is appropriate to compare the two waves and to use 2011 indicators because aggregate values change very gradually (*cf.* socialisation hypothesis).

<sup>14</sup> The authors' model predicted that Botswana would have had a score of -0.20 on the survival/self-expression values scale, based on its economic indicators (GNP/capita, percentage of tertiary sector employment and number of years under communist rule) and location in Sub-Saharan Africa (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a: 191).

authoritarian nature, while access to tertiary education remains restricted by structural barriers (Ntsabane, 2005).<sup>15</sup>

My fourth hypothesis is that individuals who live in urban environments are more likely to hold self-expressive preferences than their rural counterparts. My fifth is that there is a positive correlation between working in a white-collar occupation and self-expression values. Finally, **Table A.8** indicates that the highest score recorded so far in Sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria's 2000 score (0.28), but I expect to find that a higher proportion of Botswana hold emancipative values than in other Sub-Saharan African countries. Botswana's objective measures indicate that the country has outpaced its regional counterparts in almost all the predictor variables in my analysis (**Table A.9**). Furthermore, longitudinal opinion data indicate that Botswana have gradually deepened their support for democracy and remains the closest country to achieving democratic consolidation (Afrobarometer, 2009a).<sup>16</sup>

### ***Research Design***

As Botswana is not included in the WVS, this thesis will test these hypotheses by employing public opinion data from the Afrobarometer study. The Afrobarometer is a cross-national survey of public attitudes in twenty Sub-Saharan African countries (as of Round 4), which asks questions and measures concepts that parallel most of the relevant concepts and variables employed in the HDS—thereby allowing for comparison across the two datasets. At present, the survey is the only source of recent, nationally representative data on public opinion in Botswana and has measured aggregate opinion over time in four rounds (1999-2008). Given the socialisation hypothesis, the Afrobarometer's timeframe is too short to capture cultural change over longitudinal analysis, thus a cross-sectional design is more

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<sup>15</sup> Secondary education is divided into junior (3 years) and senior (2 years) level; there are 207 junior schools, but only 28 senior schools, in the country (Ministry of Education, 2010).

<sup>16</sup> In 2008, 65% of respondents supported democracy and rejected all three autocratic alternative regimes, while 80% believed the country was a democracy and were at least 'fairly satisfied' with the regime (Afrobarometer, 2009c: 2).

appropriate. This study will employ data from Round Three (2005/2006), which best fits the conceptualisation and operationalisation of self-expression values.

### *Self-Expression Values in Botswana*

For its national analysis, this thesis' population is voting-age Botswana (citizens of at least eighteen years old), represented by a sample of 1,200 respondents; I therefore employ micro-level analysis (individual respondent) to test my hypotheses. In Chapter Three, I attempt to measure levels of self-expression values in Botswana as of 2005 by creating a proxy based on the Afrobarometer questionnaire. Moreover, I test my index's construct validity via reliability testing (Cronbach's alpha) and factor analysis techniques (maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation) on the overall population. Although this study tests the HDS model, a confirmatory factor analysis was not conducted because the analysis employs a different dataset from Inglehart's original analysis. By doing so, I address critiques of Inglehart's conceptualisation and operationalisation of self-expression values (e.g. Davis & Davenport, 1999; Haller, 2002; Seligson, 2002). In Chapter Four, I then employ various tests to test how self-expression values form in Botswana: firstly, I use bivariate correlation and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test each predictor variable separately; then, I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to evaluate the hypotheses simultaneously.

### *Botswana in Comparative Perspective*

The study's cross-national analysis employs a total sample of 25,395 voting-age respondents to represent the citizens of the eighteen countries included in the 2005 round.<sup>17</sup> I therefore place Botswana in comparative context in Chapter Five by contrasting its aggregate score (computed as the arithmetic mean on the outcome variable's scale) to those for the rest

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<sup>17</sup> Frequencies were conducted on the weighted sample of 21,600 respondents (1,200 per country), while the explanatory analysis was conducted on the unweighted sample. Due to inconsistencies within the questionnaires, two countries (Cape Verde and Zimbabwe) were excluded from the explanatory analysis, thus reducing the unweighted sample's size to 22,093 respondents.

of the Afrobarometer sample. In the first regression models, I employ micro-level analysis to evaluate how individual citizens' values formed. Afterwards, I aggregate my findings to the national level (i.e.  $N=17$ ) to further test my hypotheses using objective data.<sup>18</sup> By placing Botswana in the regional context and thus extending beyond a single-country study, I test the extent to which my index is equivalent to Inglehart's original self-expression values measure and evaluate whether the country is an outlier.

### *Measurement*

My outcome variable is the concept of 'self-expression values,' which represents "a syndrome of mass attitudes that tap a common underlying dimension that incorporates an emphasis on freedom, tolerance of diversity, and political participation, at both the individual and aggregate levels" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003: 64). Inglehart's operationalisation captures both poles of this value dimension and has gradually evolved from using numerous variables in Inglehart (1997; **Table A.10**) to only five survey items in Inglehart & Welzel (2005b; **Table A.11**). Self-expression values therefore reflect five cultural characteristics, or 'indicators': post-materialist values; high levels of subjective wellbeing; social tolerance; political activism; and high interpersonal trust. Survival values, on the other hand, represent the opposite characteristics. My analysis exclusively employs Round 3 of the Afrobarometer due to the need to incorporate all five indicators of self-expression values and inconsistencies in survey items between each of the four rounds. Of the four questionnaires, only Round 2 and Round 3 incorporate measures of social tolerance; however, the former does not measure interpersonal trust. **Table 2.2** (next page) demonstrates how I approximated each of the five indicators of self-expression values, using both Inglehart's index and the list of correlates found in WVS data (**Table A.12**).

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<sup>18</sup> Cape Verde was included in the aggregate-level analysis.

**Table 2.2: Operationalising Self-Expression Values**

Indicator	WVS Items	Afrobarometer Survey Items
Post-Materialist Values (Index)	Prioritises post-materialist goals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life.</li> <li>- As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders.</li> <li>- We should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves of it.</li> <li>- The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.</li> <li>- People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views are.</li> </ul>
Subjective Wellbeing (Index)	Describes self as happy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In general, how would you describe:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Your own present living conditions.</li> <li>• Your living conditions twelve months ago.</li> <li>• Your living conditions in twelve months.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Social Tolerance (Construct)	Agrees that homosexuality is justifiable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men.</li> <li>- Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.</li> </ul>
Political Activism (Index)	Has or would sign a petition.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: <i>Get together with others to raise an issue.</i></li> <li>- During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A local government councillor.</li> <li>• A parliamentarian.</li> <li>• A government ministry official.</li> <li>• A political party leader.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Interpersonal Trust (Construct)	Is not wary of trusting people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?</li> <li>- How much do you trust each of the following groups of people: Batswana from other ethnic groups.</li> </ul>

*Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005)*

As none of my five indicators corresponds exactly with the equivalent item on the WVS questionnaire, it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of my results and one can make limited comparisons between my results and those from the WVS. Furthermore, Inglehart's index was computed via exploratory factor analysis on nation-level data from the first four rounds of the WVS and presents scores on a continuous ratio scale using standardised scores (*cf.* Inglehart & Welzel, 2005c: 12). My index, on the other hand, is an additive, continuous ratio scale comprising five aggregate measures to represent the same indicators—each of

which was computed, in turn, as an additive index or construct. All five indicators were weighted equally and the original scale was replicated to allow for comparison across both datasets: a score of -2.0 represents fully survivalist responses, while 2.0 represents fully self-expressive responses, and 0.0 represents an equal number of responses in both sets (*cf.* **Appendix B**).

Despite these methodological constraints, if the *concept* of self-expression values is as coherent Inglehart asserts, employing analogous Afrobarometer items to measure each indicator should create a fairly valid and reliable overall proxy of self-expression values.

#### *Predictor Variables*

Firstly, I grouped respondents by their class (as measured by occupation) and their residential location (urban or rural) to test the modernisation argument.

Secondly, I created a measure of ‘existential security’ to test the scarcity hypothesis. Although technically a *subjective* measure, Inglehart *et al.* measure this concept in terms of aggregate and individual income levels for comparison across and within societies, respectively. This study, conversely, argues that the concept refers to the extent to which physical survival is assured (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 23), and that it therefore needs to be broadened in the African context—as income does not necessarily guarantee physical survival in the developing world due to the threat of violence. I created an original, multi-item index to capture three dimensions of material security: economic (access to basic goods and services), physical (lack of victimisation), and employment status. Each was aggregated as an *average* measure of each concept.

In order to test the socialisation hypothesis, it is necessary to make some reference to *past* levels of existential security. As the WVS is not a panel study, the HDS employs birth cohorts to approximate shared experiences: “one’s subjective sense of security not only reflects one’s own personal security but is influenced by the general sense of security that

prevails in one’s social context” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 98). I categorised respondents according to their age during four key periods in Botswana’s economic development for my analysis in Chapter Four (**Table 2.3**, below). In the cross-national analysis in Chapter Five, however, I divided respondents into six groups covering ten years each—except for the oldest cohort, which includes citizens over the age of 68 years. This operationalisation therefore does not directly capture the cross-national variation in economic development trajectories.

**Table 2.3: Distribution of Economic Cohorts in Botswana (2005).**<sup>19</sup>

Development Stage	Key Event	Birth Year	Age (years)	<i>n</i>	%
Traditional	Colonial economy, largely based on subsistence agriculture.	1954 or earlier	51 or older	236	19.9
Pre-Take-off	<b>1968:</b> Debswana established.	1955-1965	40-50	195	16.4
‘Take-Off’	<b>1980:</b> Botswana enters lower-middle-income status (by today’s standards).	1966-1979	26-39	422	35.6
Drive to Maturity	<b>1993:</b> Botswana enters upper-middle-income status.	1980 onwards	18-25	334	28.1

*N*=1,187 (Excludes respondents who could or would not provide their exact age).

To test the cognitive hypothesis, I created three average measures of cognitive autonomy to capture the effect of cognitive skills (presumably acquired during schooling), engagement (discussion and interest in politics), and access to political information (media consumption). Although most of the existing research links tertiary education to pro-democratic attitudes, the proportion of citizens with higher education is relatively low, hence the incorporation of the other two measures—based on Bratton *et al.*’s (2005) methodology.

The final predictor variables are employed to test the ‘political learning’ model. In Chapter Four, I regroup respondents into *political* cohorts depending on whether they turned sixteen years old before or after the country’s democratic transition in 1966. This is replicated across the rest of the dataset in Chapter Five, according to each country’s respective transition year, in addition to two national-level variables. Furthermore, I incorporate two, national-level indicators. The first, ‘multiparty experience,’ measure represents the total number of years each country had experienced under multiparty rule since its most recent

<sup>19</sup> The development stage categories are based on Rostow’s ‘take-off’ model (Rostow, 1960).

transition in 2005 or 2006, depending on the year in which its survey took place. The second, ‘democratic rights,’ provides a proxy for democratic quality by comparing countries’ levels of political and civil rights employing Freedom House scores. A reversed, additive index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores was employed—recoded from a minimum score of 0 (7 on both original Freedom House dimensions) to a maximum of 12 (1 on both).

**Table 2.4: Predictor Variables**

<b>Concept</b>		<b>Survey Item (Afrobarometer)</b>
<b>Class</b> <sup>20</sup>	Item	What is your main occupation? (If unemployed, retired, or disabled, what was your last main occupation?)
<b>Urban/Rural Location</b>	Item	Do you come from a rural or urban area? (Answered by interviewer.)
<b>Economic Security</b>	Index	Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enough food to eat?</li> <li>• Enough clean water for home use?</li> <li>• Medicines or medical treatment?</li> <li>• Enough fuel to cook your food?</li> </ul> A cash income?
<b>Physical Security</b>	Index	Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feared crime in your own home?</li> <li>• Had something stolen from your house?</li> </ul> Been physically attacked?
<b>Job Security</b>	Item	Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?
<b>Economic Cohort</b> <sup>21</sup>	Item	Calculated by age.
<b>Formal Education</b>	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?
<b>Cognitive Engagement</b>	Construct	When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters? How interested would you say you are in public affairs?
<b>Media Consumption</b>	Index	How often do you get news from the following sources: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Radio.</li> <li>• Television.</li> <li>• Newspaper.</li> </ul>
<b>Political Cohort</b> <sup>22</sup>	Item	Calculated by age.
<b>Multiparty Experience</b>	Item	Years elapsed since most recent multiparty transition.
<b>Liberal Democracy</b>	Item	Reverse, additive Freedom House score.

*Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 Codebook, Freedom House (2006).*

<sup>20</sup> ‘White-collar workers’ include: commercial farmer, clerical worker, businessperson, professional worker, supervisor/forman, teacher, government worker, retail worker, student, politician, priest/imam, NGO employee. ‘Blue-collar workers:’ rest of the respondents (excludes housewives and unemployed, retired, and disabled respondents).

<sup>21</sup> The cross-national analysis divides respondents into six groups: 18-27 years, 28-37 years, 38-47 years, 48-57 years, 58-67 years, and those over the age of 68. The analysis excluded respondents who did not know their age and who reported being over the age of 114 because of the latter’s unlikeliness.

<sup>22</sup> Although both Economic and Political Cohorts are calculated by age, the latter divides respondents into two groups: those who turned sixteen either prior to or after 1966. Consequently, it captures a different sample from simply dividing the Economic Cohorts into two groups.

## ***Conclusion***

This chapter outlined how this thesis conceptualised and measured the levels of self-expression values in Botswana in order to evaluate the extent to which the HDS theory explains how cultural values form in both the country and the region. In order to confirm the scarcity hypothesis, there should be a *positive* correlation between socioeconomic legacies and self-expression values. Moreover, existential security and self-expression values must be the strongest predictor of these values in the overall model. If neither holds true, Botswana may be a disconfirming case in the post-materialism thesis. If only the former holds true and cognitive learning has a more significant effect on values, this may have important policy implications for the role of tertiary and civic education in developing democracy in Africa.

In order to confirm the socialisation hypothesis, one should find both significant cohort differences in values priorities and a *negative* association between self-expression values and age (i.e. younger generations hold higher levels). Finding that neither assumption holds may indicate that socioeconomic growth occurred too recently or was not distributed widely enough to affect the current generation of youth, rather than disconfirming the theory. This effect must remain in the overall model to disprove the alternative modes of value formation (i.e. individual and life-time learning).

## CHAPTER 3

### DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Phillip Converse's seminal work on political attitudes defines a belief 'system' as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (Converse, 1964: 207). Converse warns that while most scholars presume that belief systems' constraints are universal, there are "important and predictable differences in ideational worlds" between elites and the general masses, which complicate the appropriate measurement and representation of these systems (Converse, 1964: 206). The HDS theory, on the other hand, assumes that cultural beliefs are shaped by universal motivations and therefore depend solely on environmental conditions. Inglehart's measurement of post-modern values has evolved as the available WVS data expanded over time and into a growing number of societies with developing economies.<sup>23</sup> In this chapter, I adapt Inglehart's five-item self-expression values index to the Afrobarometer survey data in order to test the hypothesis that Botswana held moderately self-expressive values in 2005.

#### *Measuring Self-Expression Values in Botswana (2005)*

Self-expression values constitute a set of predictable norms and preferences shaped by "the most fundamental external constraint on human choice": existential security (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 138).<sup>24</sup> As Inglehart's thesis focuses on the transformation from survival to self-expressive values, however, his scale captures these concepts as two poles on a single continuum. Inglehart computes his survival/self-expression values index by aggregating results from the first four rounds of the World Values Survey conducting an exploratory factor analysis on the survey items that measure both dimensions of cross-cultural variation

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<sup>23</sup> Inglehart and Welzel (2010) states that the most recent incarnation measures survival/self-expression values with a *twelve*-item additive index, which appears to be recoded from -2.0 to 3.0, but the article does not specify the constituent items (564, footnote 10).

<sup>24</sup> As previously stated, this refers to a *subjective* sense of security, thus representing a 'psychological' constraint: "*experienced* as a logically constrained cluster of ideas" (Converse, 1964: 211).

(i.e. traditional/secular-rational values and survival/self-expression values; *cf.* **Table A.11**).<sup>25</sup>

On the other hand, I explicitly concentrated on the latter dimension and thus created an additive index of seventeen items intended to represent conceptually equivalent measures of the second set of survey items. I categorised responses as self-expressive, survivalist, and—wherever possible—neutral, in order to represent a value *spectrum* (*cf.* **Appendix B**).

### ***Post-Materialist Values***

The first indicator of self-expression values, ‘post-materialist values,’ represents the relative desirability of various societal goals, which gradually change over time as generations of citizens that grew up in an increasingly prosperous environment emerge (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005b: 23). The HDS measures these values with the four-item Post-Materialist Values Index, which categorises respondents as ‘materialist,’ ‘mixed,’ or ‘post-materialist’ depending on their selection of *two* national priorities out of four possible choices.<sup>26</sup> A very similar measure was introduced in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, which found a strong majority of respondents (75%) in Botswana chose a response in both categories (i.e. ‘mixed’ orientation), while only 7% of respondents chose both post-materialist responses and 18% chose both materialist responses (**Table 3.1**, below).

**Table 3.1: Afrobarometer Post-Materialist Values Measure (2008)**

<b>If you had to choose, which one of the following things is:</b>	<b>Most important? (%)</b>	<b>Next most important? (%)</b>
Maintaining order in the nation.	8.1	15.6
Giving people more say in government decisions.*	15.8	30.8
Protecting people’s right to live freely.*	10.8	32.2
Improving economic conditions for the poor.	65.3	21.4
* I interpret this response as post-materialist.		
<i>Source: Afrobarometer 2008 survey.</i>		


Unfortunately, these items were not included in the data under consideration in this study (Round 3); I consequently employ a five-item additive index that categorises

<sup>25</sup> The analysis specified that two factors be extracted: the first five items represent the traditional/secular-rational value dimension, while the second set represents the survival/self-expression dimension (*cf.* Inglehart & Welzel, 2005c: 8-12 for the detailed methodology).

<sup>26</sup> WVS questions: “For a nation, it is not always possible to obtain everything one might wish...Several different goals are listed. If you had to choose among them, which one seems most desirable to you?” “And which would be the next most important?” Responses: Maintaining order in the nation (1). Giving the people more say in important political decisions (0). Fighting rising prices (1). Protecting freedom of speech (0).

respondents according to their choice between two statements in each survey item. According to this scale, self-expressive citizens: support individualist over communitarian norms; are willing to question their leaders' decisions; and they support freedom of association, press, and speech. Survivalist value preferences, on the other hand, represent the opposite views. Unlike the Round 4 question, these five items capture respondents' attitudes towards rational-legal authority (i.e. 'the government'). As a result, the index likely captures the broader notion of 'post-modern' values, rather than post-materialist values (cf. Inglehart, 1997: 108). This is acceptable, however, as both reflect a choice of societal norms that corresponds to greater individual autonomy and self-expression.

**Figure 3.1: Preference for Postmodern Values in Botswana (2005)**



Overall, respondents reported strong support (71%) for the five measures of post-modern values, which suggests that Botswana have already largely shifted towards an emphasis on individual autonomy (Figure 3.1, above).<sup>27</sup> However, only half of the respondents agreed that 'People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life,' which indicates fairly robust support for communitarian norms.<sup>28</sup> This finding may therefore be related to the African Development Bank's (AfDB) warnings that


<sup>27</sup> All index figures report the proportion of respondents with positive scores (i.e. >0) on the scale.

<sup>28</sup> The WVS found that the opposing view, 'The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people,' is strongly correlated to *survival* values ( $r=.68$ ) on Inglehart's scale (Table A.11).

both the private sector and society at large are overly reliant on government services (AfDB, 2009). Alternatively, it may indicate that this response captures *libertarian*, rather than individualist, ideals.

This is a first indication of the difficulty of pairing Inglehart’s indicators to their equivalent Afrobarometer survey items. In order to confirm the scale’s validity, I conducted a factor analysis on the five items that indicated that both the ‘Individual’ and ‘Critical Citizenship’ items failed to load on the post-materialist values indicator. As reliability analysis further indicated that removing both items would increase the scale’s reliability, I converted the indicator as a three-item index (*cf.* **Appendix C** for all frequencies). This increased the average support for post-materialist values to 76% (**Figure 3.2**, below).

**Figure 3.2: Revised Post-Materialist Values Indicator (2005)**




### *Subjective Wellbeing*

The second indicator of self-expression values is a high level of ‘subjective wellbeing,’ which Inglehart asserts is the primary goal of postmodern societies (**Table A.6**). According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 139-140), there is an intrinsic and universal relationship between life satisfaction and individual autonomy. Inglehart measures this concept by calculating the respondents’ average evaluations of their personal happiness on a scale from 1 (‘very happy’) to 4 (‘not at all happy’) in the WVS survey. As the

Afrobarometer does not measure happiness, I substituted respondents' evaluations of their *individual* living conditions (i.e. egocentric measure) for happiness because of its strong correlation with Inglehart's survival/self-expression values index in the WVS data.<sup>29</sup> I constructed an average scale of three items regarding respondents' evaluation of their: present living conditions; perception of these conditions relative to the past; and expectations for the future. These three measures of respondents' present, past, and future wellbeing capture a single, reliable concept of 'subjective wellbeing' (Eigenvalues=1.106, total variance explained=35.2%, Cronbach's Alpha = .62).

**Figure 3.3: Evaluations of Individuals' Living Conditions in Botswana (2005)**



In contrast to Botswana's strong economic record and performance at the time, just 30% of respondents reported positive evaluations on this scale in the 2005 survey (**Figure 3.3**, above). Only a fifth of respondents evaluated their living conditions as 'fairly good' or 'very good' and the same proportion reported that these conditions had improved from the previous year, while 44% expected an improvement in 2006. Although the scale is not directly equivalent to a measure of happiness, further analysis indicates that these evaluations

<sup>29</sup> WVS data indicates that 'dissatisfaction with the financial situation of one's household' is highly correlated ( $r=.83$ ) with survival values (**Table A.11**).

are based on relatively stable benchmarks and are consistent with other surveys' findings on Botswana's levels of happiness.

Firstly, longitudinal analysis demonstrates that these evaluations have remained fairly steady over time: on average, 22% of respondents reported 'fairly good' or 'very good' present conditions, 29% reported that their conditions had improved, and 51% were optimistic about the future (**Appendix C**). Secondly, when asked to specify how they would evaluate their living conditions on a scale from 0 ('poor') to 10 ('rich') in 2003, respondents gave relatively low average evaluations of their financial circumstances (**Table 3.2**, below). On average, Botswana provide negative evaluations of their present wealth and indicated that they did not consider themselves to be significantly better off than their parents. They did, however, expect their children to attain higher levels than themselves, which echoes the pattern revealed in the subjective wellbeing scale index: low evaluations of the present in both absolute and relative terms, but optimism for the future. Lastly, Helliwell *et al.* (2012: 31) further corroborate my results: the study found that Botswana's average life evaluations were below 5 on the Cantril scale (i.e. 'struggling').<sup>30</sup>

**Table 3.2: Evaluation of Living Conditions (2003)**

On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are "poor" people and 10 are "rich" people:	Mean	Median
Which number would you give yourself today?	3.47	4
Which number would you give your parents ten years ago?	3.26	3
Which number do you expect your children to attain in the future?	7.19	8

*Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 (2003).*

This pessimistic outlook is therefore likely an indication of Botswana's high levels of income inequality and structural unemployment, rather than measurement issues. While the country's aggregate economic measures are undoubtedly impressive, Sentsho (2003) asserts that mineral-based economies like Botswana's are often susceptible to poverty and inequality because the capital-intensive sector's revenues tend to disincentivise economic diversification ('Dutch Disease') and hire relatively few workers. At present, the economy is highly reliant

<sup>30</sup> The Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale asks individuals to rank where they believe they stand on a 'ladder' from 0 (worst) to 10 (best), based on their individual life aspirations.

on the public sector and the wealthiest quintile of households in Botswana earned 71% of the total national income in 2003 (CSO, 2011: 1-9). Structural unemployment is another major concern—particularly for the country’s youth: 29% of Botswana aged 15-29 were unemployed in 2006 (**Table A.5**).

### *Social Tolerance*

The third indicator of self-expression values is high ‘social tolerance,’ which Inglehart measures in terms of respondents’ acceptance of homosexuality on a scale from one (disapproval) to ten (acceptance).<sup>31</sup> According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 143), declining existential threats lead to a corresponding rise in humanism in advanced industrial societies and thus greater support for individual freedom and human rights for ‘out-groups’—including people of other races, nationalities and sexual orientation. I employ a two-item construct of support for gender equality: the first item measures support for equal rights, while the second support for equal opportunity for political office. Validity testing indicates that the two items are not highly correlated ( $r = .42$ ), but are fairly reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .59).


Overall, three-quarters of respondents supported this measure of social tolerance (**Figure 3.4**, next page): 68% of respondents agreed that ‘Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men,’ which indicates strong support for this dimension of self-expression values. The WVS found the alternative response, ‘Men make better political leaders than women,’ to be highly correlated ( $r=.86$ ) with survival values (**Table A.12**). Although a lower proportion (68%) of respondents indicated that ‘In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do,’ one could argue that this result may be due to the fact that the alternative statement (‘Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so’) is open to

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<sup>31</sup> WVS survey item: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card: Homosexuality.” Responses form a scale from 1 to 10, where larger numbers represent a higher degree of acceptance.

interpretation: traditional customs and gender parity are not necessarily mutually-exclusive concepts.

**Figure 3.4: Support for Gender Equality in Botswana (2005)**



Given the long-standing effort to promote gender equality in Botswana since independence, it appears unlikely that this measure is an accurate proxy for tolerance for homosexuality given that Botswana is a conservative country in which same-sex sexual activity is a criminal offence. According to Ditshwanelo (2007), the 2002 legal decision upholding sodomy laws stated that individuals' rights to privacy, association and freedom of expression were overridden by the need to support 'public morality.' At present, however, the Afrobarometer does not provide an alternative measure of social tolerance that is more equivalent to the original item.


#### *Political Activism*

The fourth indicator of self-expression values is a high level of 'political activism,' which Inglehart measures as an individual's *willingness* to sign a petition—rather than traditional forms of civic engagement, such as voting or party activism.<sup>32</sup> The Afrobarometer does not include the WVS survey item and it is difficult to find an equivalent measure that reflects this relatively passive mode of voicing one's protest. According to Inglehart (1999),

<sup>32</sup> WVS survey responses: Have or would sign a petition (0); Abstention and would not (1).

citizenship in post-industrial societies is marked by an increasing emphasis on individualism over all forms of authority. I therefore created an index that combines respondents' willingness to 'Get together with others to raise an issue' with four measures of political contact to gauge each respondent's level of *individual* agency.

**Figure 3.5: Political Agency in Botswana (2005)**



Traditional forms of democratic engagement have been consistently low in Botswana: the country's voting-age population (VAP) turnout, for example, has averaged at 37% for all ten elections (International IDEA, 2012). My analysis indicates that non-traditional measures of political agency are also very low: only 3% of respondents had contacted all four types of leaders and were willing to raise an issue with others (**Figure 3.5**, above).<sup>33</sup> Although almost all the respondents reported that they were at least willing to raise an issue with other citizens, only 57% of respondents had actually done so. Furthermore, on average, less than a fifth of respondents had contacted any political actor within the previous year. The highest proportion of contact (26%) was with respondents' local councillors—with whom one should theoretically have the most contact. Of those who did contact a leader, however, only 3% gave view on a 'political issue,' while 39% did so regarding a 'public or community

<sup>33</sup> Factor analysis indicated that the first item loaded very weakly onto the dimension, but I chose to keep all five items due to the relatively high index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .67).

problem,' and over half (54%) did so to discuss a 'personal problem,' which indicates that *political* activism is even lower than the overall figure of 31%.

Molomo (2006) posits that Botswana's non-participative political culture is due to remnants on the society's traditional system of government via the *kgotla* (formal council of leaders and advisors), but the vast majority (85%) of respondents had never contacted a traditional leader. As this figure is comparable to the numbers of those who contacted parliamentarians, government officials and party representatives, the results indicate that Botswana's reticence to voice their political views may be due to institutional, rather than cultural, constraints. This lack of direct contact, coupled with the lack of regular polling, may explain why government policies and actions are often misaligned with public opinion. For example, the National Assembly passed a 2008 bill proposing significant restrictions to the private media without much debate, despite the strong public support for press freedom demonstrated in **Figure 3.1**.


#### *Interpersonal Trust*

My final indicator of self-expression values is a high level of generalised interpersonal trust (also known as 'bridging' or 'social' trust), which refers to trust in people outside of an individual's circle of acquaintances. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 141), individuals that grow up in secure existential conditions are more socially autonomous as they do not feel that they have to rely on in-group identities and relationships to ensure their physical survival. Ties between these citizens are consequently intrinsically shaped, rather than imposed by the constraint of existential threats, and the country's social capital consequently transforms from bonding to bridging trust as this social autonomy grows. Inglehart's self-expression values index employs the standard trust question, a well-

established item that is widely used in the literature on social capital around the world that operationalises trust as a binary measure.<sup>34</sup>

Molomo (2006) previously found low levels of social capital, measured in terms of membership in voluntary civic associations and trust in political institutions and politicians within the same survey sample, but did not examine the interpersonal dimension. As there is considerable debate regarding how to measure this concept, this thesis employs the standard trust question in conjunction with respondents' trust in Batswana from other ethnic groups.<sup>35</sup> According to my construct, interpersonal trust is very low in Botswana: an average of only 21% of Batswana demonstrated high levels of trust, despite the country's relative ethnic homogeneity and peaceful, democratic experience (**Figure 3.6**, below). The proportion of Batswana who reported that they generally trusted 'most people' (6%) is, in fact, amongst the lowest in the world.<sup>36</sup>

**Figure 3.6: Interpersonal Trust in Botswana (2005)**



<sup>34</sup> WVS survey item: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Responses: (1) Most people can be trusted (i.e. 'trust'). (2) Need to be very careful (i.e. 'distrust').

<sup>35</sup> The two items are very weakly correlated (Pearson's  $r=.12$ ) and unreliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.17), but I chose to keep both because the significant drop in the Standardised Trust Question between Rounds 1 and 3 calls its reliability into question.

<sup>36</sup> The only countries with lower scores in the most recent (fifth) wave of the WVS were: Turkey (4.9%), Rwanda (4.9%) and Trinidad and Tobago (3.8%).

According to Guido *et al.* (2010) the standard trust question's results are dependent on how individual respondents interpret the question, as the latter option may be an indication of cautiousness, rather than mistrust *per se*. Furthermore, it is unclear why the proportion of those who agreed that 'Most people can be trusted' declined by eight points between the 1999 and 2005 Afrobarometer surveys. As **Table 3.4** (below) demonstrates, however, trust clearly declines as one moves beyond respondents' immediate circle of acquaintances, which implies that in-group social identities remain important in Botswana. This result indicates that Botswana is likely to lean further towards survival values than I originally anticipated, given the centrality of this dimension in self-expression values.

**Table 3.3: Interpersonal Trust in Botswana (2005)**


<i>How much do you trust each of the following types of people?</i>	<b>A lot</b>	<b>Somewhat</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Trust Type</b>
Your relatives	37.8	17.9	55.7	Bonding
Your neighbours	21.3	19.7	41.0	Bonding
People from your ethnic group	19.7	20.2	39.9	Bonding
Batswana of other ethnic groups	14.9	20.2	35.1	Bridging
<i>N</i> =1,169				

### ***Results and Hypothesis Testing***

Inglehart conceptualises and measures self-expression values as the *synthesis* of post-materialist values with high levels of subjective wellbeing, social tolerance, political activism and interpersonal trust. **Figure 3.7** (next page), however, indicates that the majority of respondents supported post-materialist values (76%) and gender equity (75%), while significantly lower proportions reported high levels of subjective wellbeing (31%), political activism (31%) and interpersonal trust (21%). On average, a slight majority (53%) of responses were self-expressive, but this figure drops to 47% once the five aggregate measures are weighted equally across the fifteen survey items. Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 138) defines self-expression values as "reflect[ing] a synthesis of interpersonal trust, tolerance and political activism," which suggests that these are the belief system's central elements;

average support for the three sub-dimensions was even lower (42%) than across all five aggregate indicators.

**Figure 3.7: Self-Expressive Responses in Botswana (2005)**




Factor analysis of the five aggregate scales with maximum likelihood extraction and oblique rotation (direct oblimin) and reliability testing confirms that these value dimensions do not form a coherent, reliable measure of respondents' value preferences. I conducted a second exploratory factor analysis on the fifteen constituent survey items, which confirms that they create *five* factors that correspond to each of the aggregate indicators (**Appendix C**). The fifteen items cumulatively explain 44% of the variance in respondents' value preferences and create a fairly reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha=.46). The items provide more explanatory power on individual-level data than Inglehart's index, which explains 13% of individual-level variation and a quarter of cross-national variation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 51). Although Inglehart's scale is considerably more parsimonious, its relatively low explanatory power at both levels suggests that my scale's validity problems may be related to Inglehart's original conceptualisation and operationalisation. I conduct further validity testing in Chapter Five to investigate how well the fifteen items explain cross-national variation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

## Hypothesis Testing

As previously mentioned, this thesis is restricted by the methodological difficulties of attempting to replicate Inglehart's body of work employing a survey that was not specifically designed to capture the survival/self-expression value index. My results indicate that the fifteen items I employed provide a reasonable approximation of this cultural dimension given these methodological restrictions. I coded additive index to replicate Inglehart's scale from -2.0 (fully survivalist) to 2.0 (fully self-expressive), with 0.0 indicating a neutral position (i.e. an equal number of responses on both ends of the value spectrum). As **Figure 3.8** (next page) demonstrates, value preferences were distributed fairly normally in Botswana (skewness=-0.22, kurtosis=-0.02), but the survivalist end of the value spectrum extended further than the self-expressive pole: the minimum score was -1.73, while the maximum was 1.32 on the scale. The standard deviation was relatively high, however, as the majority of individual respondents' scores were within 0.50 points of the mean.

**Figure 3.8: Distribution of Value Preferences in Botswana (2005)**



Inglehart typically presents national-level self-expression values in terms of a society's arithmetic mean score on his survival/self-expression values scale. Although Botswana has never been included in the WVS, Inglehart and Welzel (2005a) predicted that the country would have had a mean score of -0.20 in 2005, given its income and location in Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on the country's much-lauded socioeconomic and political experience, however, my first hypothesis was that Botswana would hold moderate levels of self-expression values. My analysis confirms that the country's average scores were on the self-expressive end of the value spectrum, but they were further towards the neutral position that I anticipated: the mean score was 0.01 and the median score 0.03. Based on existing WVS data, Inglehart and Welzel's predictive model had a mean prediction error of 0.34 for the fourth WVS wave, which was significantly lower than that based on a randomised model (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a: 188).<sup>37</sup> My analysis indicates that my overall scale had a standard error of just 0.01, however, which indicates that my result is representative of the true mean value.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

Assuming that my indicators of self-expressive value preferences are at least roughly equivalent to those employed in the World Values Survey, this chapter has provided an initial descriptive analysis of self-expression values in the country. On average, Botswana were evenly divided between survivalists and self-expressive values on my scale in 2005. Reported subjective wellbeing, interpersonal trust and political activism were all low; furthermore, it is likely that the findings would have leaned further towards the survivalist pole if I had employed the original value orientations and tolerance measures. It therefore appears that my

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<sup>37</sup> The model is based on the following formula: Survival/Self-Expression Values in 2005 = -0.349 + 1.03 x Cultural Zone factor - 0.019 x years under communist rule + 0.032 x GNI/capita, 2000 (in thousands) + 0.008 x percentage employed in service sector, 2000 (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a: 191)

<sup>38</sup> The individual indicators' standard errors were: Post-Materialist Values (0.04), Subjective Wellbeing (0.02), Social Tolerance (0.04), Political Activism (0.03), and Interpersonal Trust (0.03).

hypothesis was incorrect, but citizens' preferences varied widely from the most (1.32) to least (-1.73) self-expressive respondents on my scale. Moreover, the standard deviation indicates that two-thirds of the respondents fell within 0.5 points on either side of the mean (0.01). The following chapter contrasts the four theories of value formation in order to attempt to explain this variation in Batswana's values.

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## CHAPTER 4

### EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS

My analysis in the previous chapter demonstrates that Botswana's democratic culture is not as self-expressive as one might expect given the country's dramatic socioeconomic growth and political stability. On average, Botswana held a relatively middling position on the survival/self-expression value spectrum in 2005, though there was a large variation in respondents' overall preferences ( $M=0.01$ ,  $SD=0.50$ ). This result suggests that traditional beliefs continue to shape citizens' contemporary political attitudes. Modernisation theory assumes that traditional structures, norms and behaviours inevitably give way to their modern forms as countries develop, but WVS data indicates that traditional, national heritages continue to shape the path along which societies modernise (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b). I therefore evaluate the extent to which emancipative values are shaped by Botswana's post-colonial transformation—as opposed to cultural continuity—in this chapter.

#### *Testing Predictor Variables*

In this section, I test the effect of the predictor variables within the modernisation, HDS, cognitive and political learning hypotheses to measure the extent to which each variable explains how self-expression values form in Botswana. My fifteen-item self-expression values index is the outcome variable in all the analyses and I conducted one-tailed tests, wherever appropriate, to reflect the fact that my hypotheses are directional.

#### *Modernisation: Residential Location and Employment Sector*

Modernisation theory implies that there are clear technological, organisational, and cultural distinctions between societies of differing levels of industrialisation. Traditional economies are agrarian; the population lives in small, rural communities and is primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture. Once an economy industrialises, however, the country becomes increasingly urbanised and people become employed in jobs that require

progressively higher levels of occupational specialisation. I grouped respondents by their residential location and occupation in order to test for cultural differences. If the modernisation argument is correct, living in an urban area and/or working in a white-collar or managerial job should be conducive to forming self-expression values. I conducted two independent samples t-tests, which indicated that neither predictor variable had a significant effect on value preferences.

As expected, on average, respondents living in urban areas of Botswana held moderate levels of self-expression values ( $M=0.04$ ,  $SE=0.02$ ), while those in rural areas leaned slightly towards survivalist values ( $M=-0.01$ ,  $SE=0.02$ ). This difference was not significant ( $t(1144)=-1.61$ ,  $p>.05$ ). The cultural difference was even slighter between respondents working in professional or managerial occupations and those in 'blue collar' jobs: both groups held moderately self-expressive values and there was no significant difference ( $t(1073)=-1.20$ ,  $p>.05$ ).<sup>39</sup> The effect sizes of both variables were very small ( $r>.01$ ).

#### *Human Development Sequence: Existential Security*

Inglehart's interpretation of Maslowian logic predicts that individuals living in prosperous (i.e. 'secure') conditions are more likely to prioritise self-expressive value priorities, while those living in scarce ('insecure') conditions are more likely to emphasise survivalist values. Based on this assumption (stripped of the socialisation hypothesis), one would expect to find a positive, linear relationship between material conditions and self-expression values in Botswana. I conceptualise 'existential security' as the cumulative effect of economic, employment and physical security. Exploratory factor analysis and reliability testing indicated, however, that this proposed scale of existential security does not capture a coherent concept (**Appendix C**). I therefore conducted separate bivariate correlations for

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<sup>39</sup> White collar workers: mean=0.06, SE=0.03. Blue-collar workers: mean=0.02, SE=0.02.

each of the three security dimensions and that only two were significantly related to my self-expression values scale: economic and employment security.

The strongest relationship was between economic security (measured as access to basic goods) and emancipative values ( $r=.25, p<.001$ ). Respondents' job security also had a positive, but more modest, effect on forming emancipative values ( $r=.14, p<.001$ ).<sup>40</sup> Respondents who reported lower levels of material deprivation and those in a more stable working environment were therefore more likely to hold self-expression values. These results, coupled with the finding that respondents' levels of physical security had no statistically significant relationship with value preferences, appear to confirm the hypothesis that meeting the most basic level of human needs (i.e. physiological) provides a conducive environment for self-expression values to form. However, the HDS asserts that the scarcity hypothesis does not function in isolation from the socialisation hypothesis, which may explain the fairly weak correlation between material conditions and value preferences. Prosperous individuals are more likely to prioritise self-expressive concerns, but some of them hold survivalist values—presumably because they grew up under insecure conditions.

#### *Human Development Sequence: Economic Generation*

The socialisation hypothesis predicts that cultural values are formed prior to adulthood and that developing societies become progressively self-expressive via intergenerational replacement. Based on this assumption, each successive age cohort should grow up in a more prosperous environment than its predecessors and therefore lean further towards emancipative priorities. Botswana has experienced massive economic growth since independence and therefore one would presume that citizens of varying age cohorts have had substantially different formative experiences. This study grouped respondents by their age in

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<sup>40</sup> This variable was measured as an ordinal scale, ranking respondents from the most secure (employed full-time), to the least (unemployed and looking for work).

2005 (cf. **Table 2.3**) and a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that value preferences differed significantly across these cohorts,  $F(3, 1130)=5.06, p<.01$ .

**Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Value Preferences by Economic Cohort**

<b>Economic Cohort</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
Traditional	220	19.4	-0.10	0.59	-1.73	1.18
Pre Take-Off	188	16.6	-0.00	0.48	-1.69	1.32
Take-Off	406	35.8	0.04	0.47	-1.64	1.25
Drive to Maturity	320	28.2	0.06	0.46	-1.33	1.07
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,134</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>-1.73</b>	<b>1.32</b>

However, the cohort effect was relatively small ( $\eta^2=.11$ ) and I also find a similarly weak correlation between age and value preferences ( $\tau=-.072, p<.001$ ).<sup>41</sup> As expected, mean scores were progressively higher from the oldest (born 1906-1955) to youngest (born 1980-1987) cohorts, but there was a wide variation in scores within each cohort (**Table 4.1**, above). Although the two youngest cohorts both had positive mean scores, the ‘Drive to Maturity’ cohort surprisingly had the *lowest* maximum score on the scale, which suggests that there were a number of outliers within all four groups that skewed these results. This consequently appears to confirm Ntsabane’s (2005) argument that socialisation agents within families and schools have failed to socialise Batswana youth into a pro-democratic culture because parents and teachers continue to hold traditional, non-democratic norms.

**Table 4.2: Post Hoc Results for Value Preferences by Economic Cohort**

<b>Economic Cohort</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Subset for alpha = 0.05</b>	
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
Traditional	220	-0.10	
Pre Take-Off	188	-0.00	-0.00
Take-Off	406		0.04
Drive to Maturity	320		0.06
<b>N=1,134</b>			

As **Table 4.2** (above) demonstrates, Tukey B *post hoc* procedure appears to confirm the socialisation hypothesis’ assertion that there is a time lag between socioeconomic growth and cultural change. Rather than forming four distinct subsets, the ‘Pre-Take-Off’ cohort (respondents born 1956-1965) straddles the two subsets dividing young and old respondents.

<sup>41</sup> Kendall’s tau ( $\tau$ ) was employed due to the large number of ‘tied ranks’ in the distribution (i.e. number of respondents with the same age).

As previously stated, however, the socialisation hypothesis posits that value preferences are determined by an individual’s formative conditions, thus implying an interaction between existential security and age. I therefore recalculated the correlation between my measures of existential security and the self-expression values index within these cohort clusters—dividing respondents by whether they were born prior to 1966 (i.e. Traditional and Pre Take-off cohorts), or afterwards (Take-Off and Drive to Maturity). The results (**Table 4.3**, below) confirm that there was no substantial intergenerational difference.

**Table 4.3: Correlation with Self-Expression Values by Cohort Group**

	Traditional/Pre Take-Off	Take-Off/Drive to Maturity	Total Sample
Economic Security	.24	.23	.25
Job Security	.16	.14	.14
<i>N</i>	431	756	1,187

*Cognitive Learning: Education, Engagement, Awareness*

The cognitive hypothesis asserts that the increasing level of formal education brought on by economic growth is an *agent* of cultural change because it promotes the formation of independent beliefs and critical evaluations associated with emancipative values (*cf.* Inglehart, 1999). The HDS model, on the other hand, asserts that education is a *marker* of wider (i.e. socioeconomic) privilege: “A high level of education is an indicator that an individual grew up with a sufficiently high level of existential security to take survival for granted – and therefore gives top priority to autonomy, individual choice, and self-expression” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 37). Existing studies all emphasise the role of *tertiary* education, however, in forming pro-democratic values—indicating a non-linear relationship between cognitive development and cultural preferences. I therefore grouped respondents according to their levels of cognitive autonomy, which was measured as the cumulative effect of formal education, cognitive engagement (interest in and discussion of politics), and political awareness (media consumption).

**Table 4.4: Means and Standard Deviations of Value Preferences by Cognitive Autonomy**

Cognitive Autonomy	<i>n</i>	%	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Low	175	15.5	-0.18	0.54	-1.73	0.96
Moderate	491	43.6	-0.03	0.46	-1.41	1.15
High	411	36.5	0.12	0.48	-1.69	1.20
Very High	49	4.4	0.26	0.52	-0.85	1.32
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,126</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>-1.73</b>	<b>1.32</b>

A one-way ANOVA indicated that cognitive development had a significant, positive effect on respondents' value preferences,  $F(3, 1122)=21.2$ ,  $p<0.001$ ; this difference represents a medium-sized effect ( $r=.23$ ). Tukey B *post hoc* procedure found that respondents with either 'high' or 'very high' levels of cognitive autonomy were significantly different from the rest of the sample, which suggests that the cognitive model is at least complementary to the HDS (Table 4.5, below). Interestingly, the bottom two groups were also significantly different from one another, which indicates that greater engagement and awareness supplements low formal education levels when forming self-expressive value preferences. As my cognitive autonomy measure is a continuous scale, I calculated its correlation with my self-expression values scale to contrast its explanatory power to the scarcity hypothesis. Cognitive autonomy has a fairly weak, positive correlation with self-expression values ( $r=.26$ ), which was similar to the relationship between these norms and existential security ( $r=.25$ ), but larger than the effect of job security ( $r=.14$ ) and economic cohort ( $r=.11$ ).

**Table 4.5: Post Hoc Results for Value Preferences by Cognitive Autonomy**

Cognitive Autonomy	<i>N</i>	Subset for alpha = 0.05		
		1	2	3
Low	175	-0.18		
Moderate	491		-0.03	
High	411			0.12
Very High	49			0.26
<i>N</i> =1,126				

### *Political Learning*

Political learning assumes that direct experience of democracy provides an environment conducive to self-expression values because citizens are socialised into pro-

democratic attitudes via institutions etc. As this is an environmental explanation, I therefore categorised respondents according to whether they turned sixteen years old prior to or after Botswana's founding elections in 1965, rather than based on behavioural measures. An independent samples t-test indicates that respondents socialised during the colonial era prioritised survival values ( $M=-0.13$ ,  $SE=0.05$ ) on my self-expression scale, while those socialised under multiparty rule leaned slightly towards self-expressive values ( $M=0.04$ ,  $SE=0.02$ ). This difference was significant ( $t(209) = .001$ ,  $p < .001$ ); however, its effect was very slight ( $r < .001$ ).

### ***Predicting Value Preferences in Botswana***

The previous analysis provides tentative support for all four theories: existential security, cognitive development and democratic experience all had a positive effect on forming self-expression values in 2005, while age had the opposite effect. This section evaluates the four theories within a single explanatory model via a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. As its name implies, OLS regression assumes a linear relationship between the outcome variable and all predictor variables. Unstandardised Beta coefficients ('B') indicate the strength, direction and statistical significance of each variable's unique contribution to predicting the outcome variable (self-expression values). Standardised Beta coefficients ('b'), on the other hand, provide each explanatory variable's *relative* contribution to predicting value preferences.<sup>42</sup> Substantively, this indicates the extent to which each predictor variable explains the variation in respondents' value preferences above and beyond all the other variables in the model. A positive coefficient therefore indicates an effect on self-expression values, while a negative coefficient indicates an effect on forming survival values.

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<sup>42</sup> In this analysis, a positive coefficient indicates an effect on self-expression values, while a negative coefficient indicates an effect on forming survival values.

### *Contrasting Explanatory Models*

The first four regression models test the effect of the predictive variables addressed earlier in this chapter, while the fifth tests whether traditional norms continue to shape citizens' cultural values above and beyond all of the socioeconomic and political changes Botswana has experienced since independence. I included this hypothesis in the explanatory model in order to improve upon these explanations given the available literature on Botswana, which generally characterises Botswana's democracy in terms of *continuity* with pre-colonial institutions, behaviours, and norms. The national government's self-conscious preservation of these traditional structures and value may have therefore slowed the pace of cultural transformation, in spite of the country's rapid modernisation and globalisation. I employed respondents' attachment to traditional (ethnic) over modern (national) social identities, attitudes towards clientelism, and whether they supported the current practice of the vice-president's automatic succession to the presidency when incumbents step down.<sup>43</sup>

Firstly, I compared each hypothesis' block adjusted  $R^2$  to evaluate its overall ability to predict self-expression values—in isolation from the competing explanations. **Table 4.6** (next page) demonstrates that the HDS and cognitive learning explained the most variance in respondents' value preferences in 2005: respondents' economic and job security, coupled with their cohort, explained 7.3% of the variance; furthermore, their levels of formal education, cognitive engagement and media consumption, on the other hand, explained 6.7%. On the other hand, political learning and traditional norms each explained just over 1%, while modernisation variables only explained 0.1%—even in the absence of other variables.

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<sup>43</sup> I include the latter because it is a notable example of traditional norms of 'hereditary' political power preserved in Botswana's contemporary democracy (*cf.* Maundeni, 2005; Good, 2008). The process occurred in 1998, when Sir Ketumile Masire retired, and in 2008, when his former vice president, Festus Mogae, retired.

**Table 4.6: OLS Regressions 1-5**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> (block)	
	B	b	B	b	B	b	B	b	B	b		
(Constant)	.002 (.021)		-.441 (.061)		-.545 (.068)		-.551 (.072)		-.478 (.075)			
<b>Modernisation</b>											<b>.001</b>	
Urban	.037 (.030)	.038	-.039 (.031)	-.039	-.085 (.036)	-.088**	-.087 (.032)	-.088**	-.093 (.032)	-.094**		
‘White-Collar’	.034 (.034)	.030	-.042 (.035)	-.037	-.085 (.036)	-.076*	-.085 (.036)	-.076*	-.078 (.035)	-.071*		
<b>Human Development Sequence</b>											<b>.073</b>	
Access to Basic Goods/Services			.127 (.019)	.210***	.109 (.020)	.179***	.109 (.020)	.178***	.114 (.020)	.185***		
Employment Status			.053 (.013)	.130***	.031 (.013)	.077*	.031 (.013)	.076*	.030 (.013)	.074*		
Economic Cohort			.028 (.014)	.053	-.018 (.017)	-.038	-.021 (.020)	-.045	-.015 (.015)	-.033		
<b>Cognitive Learning</b>											<b>.067</b>	
Formal Education					.066 (.024)	.116**	.066 (.024)	.116**	.065 (.024)	.114**		
Cognitive Engagement					.054 (.022)	.078*	.053 (.022)	.078*	.055 (.022)	.081*		
Media Consumption					.051 (.016)	.126**	.051 (.016)	.126**	.042 (.016)	.104**		
<b>Political Learning</b>											<b>.014</b>	
Post-Transition Generation							.015 (.058)	.010	-.010 (.058)	-.007		
<b>Traditional Norms</b>											<b>.012</b>	
Traditional Identity									-.162 (.046)	-.105**		
Supports Clientelism									-.019 (.044)	-.013		
Supports Auto. VP Succession									-.082 (.030)	-.082**		
<b>Total Variance Explained (<i>R</i><sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>.003</b>		<b>.068</b>		<b>.105</b>		<b>.105</b>		<b>.120</b>			
<b>Total Adjusted <i>R</i><sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.001</b>		<b>.063</b>		<b>.098</b>		<b>.097</b>		<b>.109</b>			
N=1,010.		Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index.										* <i>p</i> <.05, ** <i>p</i> <.01, *** <i>p</i> <.001

Each regression model's total adjusted  $R^2$  takes the number of variables into account when calculating the total variance explained; therefore it indicates which model best represents how Batswana's values formed in 2005. A rise in the adjusted  $R^2$  indicates that the additional variables improved the regression model's explanatory power; conversely, a fall means that the additional variables did not do so above the effect of random chance and removing them would consequently improve the model's parsimony. Overall, the final model best predicts how value preferences formed, as it explained 11% of the total cultural variation. This result confirms that respondents' attachment to traditional continues to shape their political orientations, particularly as the model made a unique contribution of 1.2% to the overall explanatory power. As the model's adjusted  $R^2$  was also 1.2% in the absence of any other variable, it appears to have no conceptual overlap with any of the other models.

Model 5 indicates that respondents who reported attachment to traditional identities and support for automatic leadership succession were more likely to emphasise survival values ( $b=-1.05$  and  $b=-.082$ , respectively), while support for clientelism had no significant cultural effect. The political generation variable, on the other hand, had no significant, unique effect on self-expression values and its inclusion reduced the third model's explanatory power. This result consequently suggests that it explains 1.4% of the variance when assessed individually because it is driven by another, overarching explanation. I will therefore shift my focus to the effect of socioeconomic legacies on cultural values.


#### *Socioeconomic Legacies and Value Formation*

The first regression model demonstrates that the modernisation variables explained only 0.1% of the variance in self-expression values and that, on average, a respondent living in a rural community and holding a 'blue-collar' position held a neutral position on the survival/self-expression values spectrum (Constant=.002). Only when the cognitive variables were added in Model 3 did this change: respondents living in an urban environment and those

who had a professional occupation were more likely to prioritise survival values ( $b=-.088$  and  $b=-.076$ , respectively). Although this result refutes the modernisation argument, the effect was maintained when the political and traditionalism measures were added in the subsequent regression models. It is therefore difficult to interpret in the overall context of socioeconomic explanations, as urbanisation and industrialisation should both be complementary to rising existential security and education levels.

Prior to evaluating the HDS and cognitive hypotheses, it is important to note that both acknowledge the role of environmental *and* cognitive factors in shaping cultural beliefs but differ in their emphases (**Figure 4.1**, below). The HDS' environmental logic posits that existential conditions (scarcity hypothesis) prior to adulthood (socialisation hypothesis) determine one's value preferences. Emancipative values are therefore effectively formed by the experience of growing up in a secure environment (i.e. *past* conditions). Dalton (2009), on the other hand, found that higher education was strongly associated with both forms of citizenship—particularly engaged citizenship—but that there was a *negative* relationship between respondents' income and engaged citizenship norms. The cognitive logic therefore suggests that emancipative value priorities are shaped by cognitive autonomy. This implies that increasing one's cognitive abilities, engagement and awareness affects value preferences—presumably at any age. This section will therefore address the relative effect of each model's predictor variables on forming self-expression values.

**Figure 4.1: Contrasting Logics of Value Formation**



As a result of this conceptual overlap, there is considerable multicollinearity between the HDS and cognitive hypotheses: each accounts for 7.3% and 6.7% of the variance in self-expression values when analysed in isolation, but the final regression model only explains 11% of the total variance in respondents' beliefs. Comparing each individual variable indicates that all three cognitive factors had a significant effect on cultural values, while only two of the HDS measures did so. Economic cohort consistently failed to make a significant contribution to the regression models, thereby disconfirming the socialisation. Both measures of existential security and all three of cognitive autonomy had a positive effect on self-expression values, which confirms both the scarcity and cognitive hypotheses. Of the five variables, respondents' economic security was consistently the best predictor of value preferences ( $b=.185$  in Model 5), followed by formal education ( $b=.114$ ); furthermore, both political awareness ( $b=.104$ ) and cognitive engagement ( $b=.081$ ) had a greater effect than respondents' employment status ( $b=.074$ ).

### ***Conclusion***

My explanatory analysis provides evidence that corroborates the scarcity and cognitive hypotheses, but indicates that there was no generational effect on Botswana's values—whether conceptualised in terms of economic or political cohorts. Furthermore, it indicated that urbanisation and industrialisation only impacted value preferences in combination with other factors. These results indicate that Botswana's socioeconomic development has had a substantial cultural effect, largely driven by rising economic and cognitive autonomy. The OLS regression models confirm that there is substantial conceptual overlap between the HDS and cognitive explanations' ability to predict Botswana's value preferences, but it is unclear whether educational attainment's effect on democratic values is largely a reflection of privilege, rather than cognition (Inglehart & Wezel, 2005b: 37).

Overall, the HDS' predictor variables cumulatively explain more of the variation in Batswana's values than the cognitive measures, but the generational mode of learning was disconfirmed. Instead, learning occurred on an individual basis, as per the scarcity and cognitive hypotheses. This indicates that Batswana living in secure environments and with greater levels of cognitive autonomy are more likely to be self-expressive citizens—regardless of their age. The subsequent chapter tests whether Batswana's values have formed on a collective basis as well by contrasting these norms to those of other Africans.

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## CHAPTER 5

### CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

Scholars generally agree that Sub-Saharan African societies, although unquestionably diverse, share a fundamental set of common values shaped by the legacies of traditional communal life and colonial rule. Despite Botswana's record of sustained economic growth and democratic stability, my previous analyses indicated that Botswana were fairly evenly divided between self-expressive and survivalist priorities. Furthermore, socioeconomic and cognitive factors had the most significant effect on forming self-expression values, while respondents who reported an attachment to traditional norms were more likely, on average, to emphasise survival values. These findings corroborate cross-national WVS evidence, which indicates that African citizens are less likely to hold self-expression values than their socioeconomic indicators would otherwise predict (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b).<sup>44</sup> Given Botswana's unique development trajectory, however, this chapter addresses whether the country is an outlier in the region—not only in terms of the society's aggregate score, but also in terms of how individual citizens' values form.

#### *Value Preferences in Sub-Saharan Africa*

My descriptive analysis indicated that Botswana had a mean score of 0.01 on my fifteen-item survival/self-expression values scale, which would have made it the highest score amongst the African countries in the fifth wave of the WVS (2005-2008) and tied for twenty-fourth position globally, with Thailand (**Table A.15**). As a limited number of African countries have been included in the WVS, however, the following section further tests my hypothesis by comparing Botswana to other Africans on the same, fifteen-item scale (*cf.*

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<sup>44</sup> The nine 'cultural deviation factors' were: English-Speaking (.58); Protestant Europe (.54); Catholic Europe (.05); Latin America (0.03); South Asia (-.29); Sub-Saharan Africa (-.45); Confucian (-.49); Orthodox (-.50); and Islamic (-.71; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 74, Table 2.5).

**Appendix C** for frequencies and results of validity testing).<sup>45</sup> According to my analysis, Afrobarometer Round 3 respondents were slightly survivalist ( $M=-0.026$ ), but there was a fairly large variation in value preferences from the least (-1.92) to most (1.89) self-expressive respondents (**Table 5.1**, below).

**Table 5.1: Value Preferences by Country (Afrobarometer Scale)**

Rank	Country	N	Mean	SD	Std. Error	Min.	Max.
1	Mozambique	911	0.188	0.5	0.0165	-1.59	1.71
2	Madagascar	996	0.141	0.46	0.0146	-1.47	1.37
3	Senegal	1,051	0.134	0.53	0.0164	-1.38	1.61
4	South Africa	1,047	0.125	0.53	0.0163	-1.81	1.82
5	Ghana	1,069	0.061	0.52	0.0158	-1.57	1.73
6	Uganda	1,172	0.054	0.54	0.0157	-1.67	1.89
7	Tanzania	963	0.023	0.45	0.0145	-1.33	1.42
8	Namibia	1,106	0.021	0.51	0.0154	-1.72	1.53
<b>9</b>	<b>Botswana</b>	<b>1,146</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.0146</b>	<b>-1.73</b>	<b>1.32</b>
10	Kenya	1,095	-0.014	0.52	0.0157	-1.61	1.47
11	Zambia	1,117	-0.027	0.53	0.0158	-1.92	1.75
12	Benin	1,071	-0.106	0.47	0.0143	-1.67	1.34
13	Cape Verde	947	-0.11	0.42	0.0137	-1.52	1.71
14	Zimbabwe	1,168	-0.143	0.33	0.0097	-1.34	0.62
15	Nigeria	1,141	-0.145	0.52	0.0153	-1.73	1.52
16	Mali	1,145	-0.217	0.62	0.0182	-1.8	1.51
17	Lesotho	1,136	-0.226	0.59	0.0174	-1.92	1.71
18	Malawi	1,137	-0.226	0.52	0.0154	-1.72	1.57
<b>Total Sample</b>		<b>19,418</b>	<b>-0.025</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.0153</b>	<b>-1.92</b>	<b>1.89</b>

### *Hypothesis Testing*

Contrary to my expectations, Botswana's responses were not significantly more self-expressive than other Africans across the five aggregate indicators, despite Botswana's comparative wealth, political stability, and ethno-linguistic homogeneity. Overall, Botswana's aggregate score was in the middle of the distribution of Afrobarometer countries. Surprisingly, Mozambique, Madagascar and Senegal occupied the top three positions, thereby also outscoring South Africa (fourth) and Namibia (seventh)—whose socioeconomic, education and democratic indicators were comparable to Botswana's in 2005 (**Table A.9**).

<sup>45</sup> Due to inconsistencies in the Cape Verdean and Zimbabwean questionnaires, I computed Cape Verde's score by using the standard trust question as the single indicator of interpersonal trust, while I substituted missing values with the Afrobarometer mean score wherever a question was missed in Zimbabwe. Although the latter method is generally discouraged, Zimbabwe was one of only eight countries in both surveys, which necessitated its inclusion in this analysis.

Mozambique had the lowest HDI score (.285) in the dataset and amongst the lowest proportions of service sector employment (16%), while just over half (55%) of the population over fifteen years old was literate. Furthermore, the country is not only a newer democracy, but lags behind other countries that transitioned in the early-to-mid 1990s in terms of democratic rights. Mozambique's score on my self-expression values index ( $M=0.188$ ,  $SE=0.02$ ) is consequently difficult to interpret, as it may be indication that these countries are outliers in both the HDS and cognitive models or, alternatively, highlight underlying problems in my scale's conceptualisation or operationalisation.

In order to test whether my scale captures an analogous concept to Inglehart's index (i.e. 'self-expression values'), I plotted my results with the most recent available WVS scores in the eight countries that participated in both studies: Ghana (2007); Mali (2007); Nigeria (2000); South Africa (2007); Tanzania (2001); Uganda (2007); Zambia (2007); and Zimbabwe (2001).<sup>46</sup> As **Table 5.2** (next page) demonstrates, my scale came closest to the WVS results in Mali (my score was 0.13 points below the WVS figure) and Tanzania (0.17 points above), while my findings were substantially different in Zimbabwe (1.22 higher). The latter result is probably due to my use of means substitution in six items across all three essential indicators of self-expression values (tolerance, activism and trust) in Zimbabwe. As Chapter Three explained, my scale's overall overestimation of 0.19 points (excluding Zimbabwe) is probably due to the differences in how the two scales measure value orientations and social tolerance. Despite these methodological inconsistencies, the fifteen items in my survival/self-expression values index cumulatively explained 34% of the total variance, which is higher than Inglehart's scale in the WVS. Although this figure is lower than their explanatory power in Botswana (44%), fourteen of the fifteen variables loaded onto the five resulting factors, while only twelve did so in Botswana (**Appendix C**).

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<sup>46</sup> Grouping WVS waves is appropriate because the socialisation hypothesis posits that cultural change is very gradual (*cf.* **Table A.6** for Nigeria and South Africa's scores across time).

**Table 5.2: Comparative Self-Expression Values Scores**

Country	Afrobarometer SEV Index	WVS SEV Index	Difference
Ghana	0.06	-0.29	0.35
Mali	-0.21	-0.08	-0.13
Nigeria	-0.14	0.28	-0.42
South Africa	0.13	-0.10	0.23
Tanzania	0.02	-0.15	0.17
Uganda	0.08	-0.50	0.58
Zambia	-0.03	-0.62	0.59
Zimbabwe	-0.14	-1.36	1.22
<b>Average</b>	<b>-0.03</b>	<b>-0.35</b>	<b>0.32</b>

### *Value Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa*

My findings in the previous section disconfirm my hypothesis that Botswana would have the highest proportion of self-expressive citizens. The country had neither the highest percentage of self-expressive responses across the five aggregate indicators, nor the highest mean score on my index; value formation is clearly more complicated than I had initially assumed. In order to determine whether Botswana's value structure is largely the result of unique, internal factors or due to a shared, African cultural heritage, the following section will evaluate how self-expression values form in Sub-Saharan Africa. The five explanatory models have varying interpretations of the mode in which self-expression values form. Cognitive learning assumes that *individual* characteristics (cognition) determine these preferences; conversely, the 'traditional norms' and political learning hypotheses assume that values form as the result of *collective* learning. The HDS asserts that self-expression values result from the combined effect of individual (scarcity hypothesis) and societal (socialisation hypothesis) existential security.

In the first analysis, I test how individual Africans' values form via OLS regressions on micro-level data from sixteen of the eighteen countries; I compare the effects of the five explanatory models, before controlling for national-level effects.<sup>47</sup> In the second analysis, I

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<sup>47</sup> I conducted the analysis on unweighted data and excluded Cape Verde and Zimbabwe because of the differences in how I calculated the dependent variable in both nations.

employ aggregate data from seventeen nations to corroborate my findings and further assess the extent to which societal-level factors influence these values.<sup>48</sup>

### *Micro-level Analysis*

The first five OLS regressions replicate the analysis in the previous chapter; they therefore employ the same variables wherever possible. The ‘traditional norms’ model only includes two items, however, as the question regarding support for automatic succession is not applicable outside the context of Botswana’s democracy. Furthermore, given the wide variety in economic legacies, the HDS model includes a general, ‘age cohort’ variable that divides citizens into six groups by their ages in terms of decades. The ‘post-transition’ cohort, on the other hand, replicates the methodology used in the national-level analysis: I divided respondents into two groups, based on whether they turned sixteen prior to or during each nation’s most recent transition to multiparty democracy. This simplifies the political trajectories of most African countries, as many experienced multiple regime types after gaining independence (*cf.* Bratton *et al*, 2005).

Comparing the hypotheses’ block adjusted  $R^2$  demonstrates that cognitive factors accounted for the most variance (6%) by a substantial margin; the HDS explained 2% of the cultural variation, which reverses the order in Botswana (**Table 5.3**, next page). Political learning had a smaller effect than it had in Botswana, which suggests that the differences between Africans socialised during multiparty democracy are not as different from those socialised under autocratic rule as is the case in Botswana. Multiparty rule is relatively new in most of the Afrobarometer countries and presumably most citizens have not had enough direct experience of democracy. The five models cumulatively explained 8% of the total cultural variation and the political learning hypothesis made no unique contribution to the overall model, which suggests that socioeconomic factors shape cultural norms in the region.

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<sup>48</sup> The analysis excludes Zimbabwe.

**Table 5.3: OLS Regressions 1-5**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> (block)
	B	b	B	b	B	b	B	b	B	b	
(Constant)	-.038 (.006)		-.137 (.019)		-.297 (.020)		-.313 (.021)		-.279 (.075)		
<b>Modernisation</b>											<b>.009</b>
Urban	.019 (.009)	.017*	-.011 (.009)	-.010	-.068 (.009)	-.061***	-.067 (.009)	-.061***	-.070 (.009)	-.063***	
‘White-Collar’	.106 (.009)	.092***	.093 (.009)	-.081***	.015 (.010)	.013	-.016 (.010)	.014	.018 (.010)	.016	
<b>Human Development Sequence</b>											<b>.022</b>
Access to Basic Goods/Services			.064 (.005)	.112***	.043 (.005)	.075***	.044 (.005)	.076***	.042 (.005)	.073***	
Employment Status			.023 (.004)	.048***	.014 (.004)	.030***	.012 (.004)	.026**	.012 (.004)	.026**	
Age Cohort			-.021 (.003)	-.056***	-.029 (.003)	-.075***	-.023 (.004)	-.060***	-.020 (.004)	-.053***	
<b>Cognitive Learning</b>											<b>.055</b>
Formal Education					.068 (.006)	.116***	.066 (.006)	.113***	.062 (.006)	.106***	
Cognitive Engagement					.077 (.005)	.120***	.077 (.022)	.119***	.073 (.005)	.113***	
Media Consumption					.046 (.004)	.103***	.032 (.011)	.105***	.048 (.004)	.107***	
<b>Political Learning</b>											<b>.001</b>
Post-Transition Generation							-.032 (.011)	-.028**	-.041 (.011)	-.036***	
<b>Traditional Norms</b>											<b>.012</b>
Traditional Identity									-.123 (.011)	-.084***	
Supports Clientelism									-.037 (.009)	-.030***	
<b>Total Variance Explained (<i>R</i><sup>2</sup>)</b>	<b>.010</b>		<b>.028</b>		<b>.068</b>		<b>.069</b>		<b>.078</b>		
<b>Total Adjusted <i>R</i><sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.009</b>		<b>.027</b>		<b>.068</b>		<b>.068</b>		<b>.078</b>		
<i>N</i> =16,056. Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index. * <i>p</i> <.05, ** <i>p</i> <.01, *** <i>p</i> <.001											

The values for the total variance explained and adjusted  $R^2$  are equal in OLS Regression 5, which indicates that the model is parsimonious; in fact, all of the variables in the final model had a significant effect on value preferences except respondents' occupation. As expected, greater existential security and cognitive autonomy are conducive to self-expression values, while attachment to traditional norms has a significant effect on forming survival values. Contrary to the HDS' assumptions, younger generations of Africans were generally slightly more survivalist than the oldest respondents ( $b=-.053$ ), furthermore, being socialised in the post-transition era had the same effect ( $b=-.036$ ). Overall, the cognitive model's predictor variables had the most unique contribution to the model: cognitive engagement had the greatest effect ( $b=.113$ ) on respondents' values, followed by media consumption ( $b=.107$ ) and formal education ( $b=.106$ ). Economic security, on the other hand, had a smaller effect ( $b=.073$ ) than attachment to traditional social identities ( $b=-.084$ )—in contrast to its leading role in shaping Botswana's values.

**Table 5.4** (next page) controls for the countries other than Botswana in order to contrast their respective citizens' values with Botswana by employing dummy variables, which recodes respondents from that nation as 1 and the rest of the dataset as 0. The model's intercept (i.e. 'Constant') therefore indicates that a Botswana with all the attributes expected to result in survival values would have a score of -0.28 on my self-expression values index. After accounting for my measures of socioeconomic, political and traditional cultural legacies, Mozambican ( $b=.100$ ), Madagascan ( $b=.075$ ), Senegalese ( $b=.065$ ), Ugandan ( $b=-.062$ ), Ghanaian ( $b=.033$ ) and South African ( $b=.031$ ) citizens were significantly more likely to hold self-expression values. These six countries had the highest mean scores on my index, but their overall rankings are different from this order of cultural distinctiveness; the result indicates that South Africans are not as different from Botswana as one would expect given

the society's overall values. As previously noted, the two countries have similar socioeconomic indicators and, as neighbours, share a degree of cultural tradition.

**Table 5.4: OLS Regression 6.**

	<b>B</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup> (block)</b>
(Constant)	-.279	.028		
<b>Modernisation</b>				<b>.009</b>
Urban	-.076	.009	-.069***	
'White-Collar'	.033	.010	.029**	
<b>Human Development Sequence</b>				<b>.022</b>
Economic Security	.043	.005	.075***	
Employment Status	.006	.004	.013	
Age Cohort	-.023	.004	-.060***	
<b>Cognitive Learning</b>				<b>.055</b>
Formal Education	.064	.006	.110***	
Cognitive Engagement	.072	.005	.111***	
Media Consumption	.046	.004	.102***	
<b>Political Learning</b>				<b>.001</b>
Post-Transition Generation	-.033	.012	-.029**	
<b>Traditional Norms</b>				<b>.012</b>
Traditional Identity	-.087	.011	-.059***	
Supports Clientelism	-.045	.009	-.037***	
<b>Country</b>				<b>.056</b>
Benin	-.017	.027	-.007	
Ghana	.077	.026	.033**	
Kenya	-.031	.026	-.014	
Lesotho	-.175	.028	-.067***	
Madagascar	.167	.026	.075***	
Malawi	-.141	.026	-.062***	
Mali	-.115	.027	-.048***	
Mozambique	.271	.028	.100***	
Namibia	-.029	.027	-.011	
Nigeria	-.124	.025	-.072***	
Senegal	.166	.027	.065***	
South Africa	.057	.024	.031*	
Tanzania	.047	.026	.020	
Uganda	.102	.025	.062***	
Zambia	-.011	.027	-.004	
<b>Variance Explained (R<sup>2</sup>)</b>			<b>.122</b>	
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>			<b>.120</b>	
N=16,056    Outcome Variable = Self-Expression Values Index				*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

### *National-Level Analysis*

Inglehart's body of literature generally aggregates data to the societal level as well, which has drawn criticism that this methodology creates an 'ecological fallacy' because it uses individual-level, survey data to form a macro-level theory regarding global cultural change (*cf.* Seligson, 2002). However, Inglehart and Welzel (2003) counters that aggregating data cancels out random measurement error, thus providing more valid results, and demonstrates that the WVS' micro-level findings were largely replicated after aggregation.

My final analysis contrasts Afrobarometer nations according to their aggregate indicators to corroborate my findings in **Tables 5.3** and **5.4**. To test the modernisation argument, I employed each nation’s urban population and service sector employment as a proportion of total population and employment, respectively. I employed both human development (HDI) and national income (GNI per capita) to test the HDS, while each country’s literacy rate and mean years of schooling for adults over the age of 25 represented cognitive factors. Finally, I employed Freedom House scores and the number of years elapsed since each country’s most recent democratic transition to evaluate political learning.

**Table 5.5: Correlates of Self-Expressive Orientations<sup>49</sup>**

	PMV	Wellbeing	Tolerance	Activism	Trust	SEV Index
<b>Modernisation</b>						
Urban Population	<b>.463</b>	<b>.298</b>	<b>.268</b>	<b>-.539</b>	<b>-.362</b>	.184
Service Employment	.110	<b>.374</b>	.110	<b>-.423</b>	<b>-.255</b>	.024
<b>HDS</b>						
HDI	<b>.384</b>	<b>.309</b>	<b>.253</b>	-.160	<b>-.443</b>	.222
GNI per capita	<b>.331</b>	<b>.251</b>	.161	-.247	<b>-.298</b>	.190
<b>Cognitive Hypothesis</b>						
Years Schooling	<b>.309</b>	.059	.095	.085	<b>-.311</b>	.181
Literacy Rate	<b>.316</b>	.017	.097	<b>.354</b>	<b>-.522</b>	.066
<b>Political Learning</b>						
Multiparty Experience	.161	.012	-.037	-.188	.038	.064
Freedom House	<b>.313</b>	.044	.145	<b>-.401</b>	<b>-.218</b>	-.008
<i>N</i> =17.	Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index.					

Firstly, I conducted a series of bivariate correlations to test the relationship between each predictor variable and both my self-expression values scale and its cultural sub-dimensions (**Table 5.5**, above). My analysis demonstrates that the explanatory models had the predicted, positive association with post-materialist values, subjective wellbeing, and tolerance, but were (surprisingly) negatively correlated with political activism and interpersonal trust. Perhaps as a result of these mixed results, the correlations between these objective measures and the overall index were weak; however, all but the Freedom House variable had the expected, positive effect. Of the eight measures, countries’ HDI levels had

<sup>49</sup> Values are bivariate Pearson’s correlation coefficients (*r*); significance statistics are not reported due to the small sample size (*N*=17). Cohen (1977) suggests the following guidelines for evaluating effect sizes: .20 is a small effect, .50 is moderate, and .80 large. Correlations of .80 are rare in the social sciences; therefore this table highlights the magnitude and direction of coefficients (*r*>.250).

the strongest effect on self-expression values ( $r=.222$ ), followed by GNI per capita ( $r=.190$ ), urbanisation ( $r=.184$ ), and the average years of formal education within each society ( $r=.181$ ). These findings therefore corroborate my previous finding that socioeconomic factors have the most significant effect on Africans' value preferences.

Finally, I conducted a regression model to evaluate which of these variables explained the cross-national variation in self-expression values. Model 7 indicates that countries' human development levels were the most powerful predictor of the society's score on my self-expression values index by a substantial margin—accounting for just under 5% of the total variance in value preferences (**Table 5.6**, below). This contradicts the individual-level analysis, but corroborates global WVS evidence; thus indicating that further investigation is required into the link between development and aggregate culture in the region. The result that the mean years of schooling in a country had a negative effect on self-expression values is particularly surprising given the results on the individual level.

**Table 5.6: OLS Regression 7 (Aggregated Afrobarometer Data)<sup>50</sup>**

	<b>B</b>	<b>b</b>
(Constant)	-.530	
<b>Modernisation</b>		
Urban Population	.008	<b>.818</b>
Service Employment	-.008	<b>-1.026</b>
<b>HDS</b>		
HDI	2.832	<b>2.089</b>
GNI per capita	.000	.155
<b>Cognitive Hypothesis</b>		
Years Schooling	-.094	<b>-1.539</b>
Literacy Rate	.001	.163
<b>Political Learning</b>		
Multiparty Experience	-.005	<b>-.336</b>
Freedom House	-.032	<b>-.488</b>
<b>Total Variance Explained (<math>R^2</math>)</b>		<b>.432</b>
<i>N</i> =17.	Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index.	

### **Conclusion**

This chapter employed my fifteen-item self-expression values index to make a series of comparisons between: individual Africans; my measure and Inglehart's survival/self-

<sup>50</sup> I do not report significance figures due to the small sample size ( $N=17$ ); the table highlights the magnitude and direction of coefficients ( $b>.250$ ).

expression values index; various theories of cultural change; and, finally, between Botswana and other Africans. According to my scale, Afrobarometer countries form a relatively coherent cultural zone: the range in national scores was 0.4 points, which is smaller than that found in the fifth WVS wave (1.64 points; **Table A.6**). Secondly, my analysis further indicates that my fifteen-item self-expression values index overestimates the proportion of emancipative values relative to Inglehart's scale: on average, my results were 0.19 points higher than the WVS' findings in Afrobarometer countries. Thirdly, both the HDS and cognitive hypotheses explain large proportions of the total variance in individual Africans' value preferences, but cognitive autonomy had a larger effect. National level cultural variation, conversely, was driven by human development levels, which had the expected (positive) impact on forming self-expression values. Surprisingly, countries' average education levels had a fairly strong, negative effect on self-expression values.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

In this study, I presented a dual-level approach to the investigation into development and democratic culture in Botswana using statistical analysis of survey data from the third round of the Afrobarometer study (2005/2006). Firstly, I measured the levels of emancipative, ‘self-expression’ values in the country and tested four predictive models linking development to individual-level cultural change: modernisation theory, the Human Development Sequence, cognitive learning, and political learning. Secondly, I replicated the analysis for the full Afrobarometer dataset in order to investigate the extent to which Africans’ values are shaped by collective experience. In contrast to my expectations, however, my results indicate that Botswana is at a middling point on the survival/self-expression value spectrum and is not, on average, more self-expressive than the region.

After adapting Ronald Inglehart’s survival/self-expression values index for operationalisation within existing Afrobarometer data, my results demonstrated that Botswana were fairly evenly divided between support for communal, ‘survival’ values and emancipative, ‘self-expression’ values. Statistical analysis indicated that there was substantial cultural variation within the country, which was largely driven by micro-level differences in existential security and cognition—although being socialised under multiparty rule also had a modest impact on forming self-expression values. The analysis further demonstrated that traditional, communal values continue to shape Botswana’s attitudes, which may explain why the societal mean score is lower on my survival/self-expression values scale than I had anticipated. Further analysis at the cross-national level indicated that the national political culture is not significantly different from those in other African countries—even when controlling for the effect of traditional norms. This surprising result may be the result of

conceptual or methodological issues within my study, but may, alternatively, be indicative of substantive issues.

### ***Methodological Explanations***

Firstly, my findings may be the result of employing micro-level data to draw conclusions about Botswana's *national* political culture (*cf.* Seligson, 2002). However, the macro-level link between socioeconomic development and cultural change has been confirmed at the micro-level in the WVS dataset (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). Moreover, one would expect that indications of societal-level cultural change occur only once a nation achieves a certain threshold on the level of individual citizens; therefore the result may indicate that the country has not yet reached this level, rather than a methodological shortcoming.

Secondly, my results may be an indication that my fifteen-item self-expression values index is not an accurate representation of Inglehart's survival/self-expression values index using Afrobarometer survey items. Inglehart and Welzel (2010) more recently states that his index has been modified into a twelve-item additive scale; future studies could therefore employ this newer measure to investigate whether my unexpected results were due to measurement problems. Alternatively, one could systematically compare my results to those in the WVS dataset for countries included in both surveys. My first recommendation would therefore be that the WVS includes Botswana in future waves to make the current database more representative of the variation in Africans nations' socioeconomic development trajectories. At present, Mauritius is not included in the dataset either—despite being the other notable case of successful political development on the continent. I would also suggest that the Afrobarometer survey continue to include its items on national priorities and reintroduce measures of social tolerance in order to allow for the inclusion of more cases—and ultimately, longitudinal research design.

Thirdly, structural equation modelling (SEM) would more accurately reflect the socialisation hypothesis' argument that *past* socioeconomic conditions influence *current* values than my present methodology. Furthermore, the technique would allow further investigation into the interaction between predictor variables in order to test whether cognitive autonomy drives value change, or is a reflection of environmental factors. Future research employing this technique would therefore allow for policy recommendations, as its results would indicate the extent to which civic education programmes could supplement raising overall development levels in promoting the country's democratic consolidation. Comparing educated and middle-class citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa would be particularly significant as it would provide greater insight into the interaction between existential security and cognitive autonomy.

### ***Substantive Explanations***

Alternatively, my findings may be an indication that Botswana's society is not as different from those of other African countries as the aggregate picture suggests on the level of *individual citizens*. As previously mentioned, Botswana's idiosyncratic developmental path is notable not only for its comparative success in the region, but also for diverging from the pattern established by Western, post-industrial societies. Rather than progressing first from an agrarian to industrial and only then to a service-oriented economy, as in most industrialised countries, the country appears to have bypassed the industrialisation process and the majority of the workforce is employed in the service sector and the industrial sector remains weak (with the exclusion of the diamond industry). This reality is largely due to South Africa's position as the dominant industrial economy within Southern African region and the inability of smaller countries, like Botswana, to compete—despite continued efforts.

The predominance of service sector employment is a key indicator of the *post-industrialisation* process, however, this is concentrated in Botswana's public sector and

progress towards economic diversification remains slow. This lack of a developed private sector is vastly different from the situation in mature, developed economies and the narrow scope of employment opportunities for an increasingly educated citizenry is likely to have important implications for the growth of self-expression values in Botswana. National levels of poverty and structural unemployment are another major similarity to other African economies—particularly their implication for young citizens. The current generation of Botswana youth faces an increasingly precarious future due to the state's retreat from the dominant economic role it has traditionally played and it is unclear whether future generations of Botswana will necessarily live in a more secure environment than their predecessors given the lack of a vibrant private sector to offset this change. Despite objective data clearly indicating that Botswana are living in better material conditions than their predecessors, my findings demonstrate that this has not translated into greater levels of perceived material security—even prior to the current global economic climate (*cf.* **Figure 3.3** and **Table 3.2**).

In sum, my results disputes long-held assumptions about Botswana's regional singularity, while highlighting major cultural divergences from the country's traditional, pre-independence past. My analysis consequently indicates that Botswana is likely to become increasingly self-expressive as long as the country continues to develop an educated, professional middle class into future generations. It is crucial, however, that policy efforts are directed towards attaining both existential and cognitive security independently from government efforts—both the HDS and cognitive theories highlight the importance of individual *autonomy* in forming emancipative, self-expression values. It is therefore unlikely that the country will reach the levels of these cultural norms associated with democratic consolidation until the state plays a smaller role in Botswana's daily lives.

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
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
## APPENDIX A

**Figure A.1: Botswana's GNI per capita (current US Dollars, Atlas Method), 1966-2011.**



Source: World Bank (2012a)

**Figure A.2: Comparative Human Development Index (HDI), 1980-2011.**



Source: United Nations Development Programme (2012)

**Table A.1: Botswana's Employment and National Income Distribution by Economic Sector, 1985-2006.**

	1985	1990	1996	2000	2005	2010
<b>% of Total GDP</b>						
Agriculture	6.4	4.9	4.0	2.7	1.8	2.9
Industry	61.2	61.0	53.2	52.6	50.6	45.3
Services	32.4	34.1	42.8	44.7	47.6	51.9
<b>% of Total Employment</b>						
Agriculture	57.9	-	15.6	19.7	29.9	-
Industry	10.6	-	25.6	20.9	15.2	-
Services	31.4	-	58.6	58.1	54.7	-
<i>NB: Employment statistics were not available for 1990 and 2010.</i>						
<i>Source: World Bank (2012)</i>						

**Table A.2: Botswana's Population Characteristics, 1971-2001.**


	1971	1981	1991	2001
<b>Enumerated Population</b>	<b>574,094</b>	<b>941,027</b>	<b>1,326,796</b>	<b>1,680,863</b>
Male	262,121	443,104	634,400	813,583
Female	311,973	497,923	692,396	867,280
Non-Batswana	10,861	15,677	29,557	60,716
<b>Botswana Nationals Abroad</b>	<b>45,735</b>	<b>42,069</b>	<b>38,606</b>	<b>28,210</b>
Male (000's)	36,7	32,6	27,9	16,8
Female (000's)	9,1	9,4	10,7	11,4
<b>Population Distribution (%)</b>				
0-4	17.6	18.8	14.6	11.6
5-14	29.9	28.8	28.6	25
15-64	46.9	47.6	51.8	58.2
15-49	39.4	40.8	45.5	52.0
65+	5.6	5.1	4.9	5
Percentage of Females aged 15-49 (out of total females)	42.8	42.9	46.5	52.4
Dependency Ratio (per 100)	113	110	93	71.5
Child-woman Ratio (per 1000)	759	819	602	430.1
Sex Ratio (Males per 100 Females)	84	89	92	93.8
Percentage Urban	9	17.7	45.7	54.2
Population Density (per km)	1	1.6	2.3	2.9
Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000)	45.3	47.7	39.3	28.9
Crude Death Rate (per 1,000)	13.7	13.9	11.5	12.4
Natural Rate of Increase (% per annum)	3.1	3.4	2.7	1.7
General Fertility Rate (per 1,000 women aged 15-49)	189	210	161	106.9
Mean age at childbearing	30.5	30.6	30	30.3
Total Fertility Rate (births per woman)	6.5	6.6	4.2	3.27
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births)	97	71	48	56
Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000)	56	35	16	19
Under 5 Mortality (per 1,000)	152	105	63	74
<b>Life Expectancy at Birth (years)</b>	<b>55.5</b>	<b>56.5</b>	<b>65.3</b>	<b>55.6</b>
Males	52.5	52.3	63.3	52.0
Females	58.6	59.7	67.1	57.4
<b>Mean Age (years)</b>	<b>23.4</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24.8</b>
Males	22.6	22.0	22.4	24.2
Females	24.1	23.4	23.5	25.3
<b>Median Age (Years)</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>20.1</b>
Males	13.5	15.0	16.0	19.4
Females	16.7	16.5	17.4	20.8
<b>Population Growth Rate</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>2.4</b>
<i>Source: Central Statistics Office (2003).</i>				

**Table A.3: Age-Specific Adult Literacy Rate (%), 2003.**

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
15-19	92.5	94.9	93.7
20-24	91.6	96.4	94.2
25-29	89.3	95.4	92.6
30-34	85.9	88.4	87.3
35-39	79.1	84.3	82.1
40-44	68.9	72.8	71.1
45-49	64.3	63.8	64.0
50-54	59.6	53.5	56.3
55-59	54.2	48.7	51.0
60-64	36.5	34.8	35.5
65+	36.3	26.8	30.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>80.4</b>	<b>81.8</b>	<b>81.2</b>

*Source: Central Statistics Office (2005:77)*

**Figure A.3: Urban Population, 1960-2010.**



*Source: World Bank (2012)*

**Table A.4: Voter Turnout in Botswana, 1965-2009.**

Year	Population	Voting Age Population (VAP)	Registration	Registration by VAP (%)	Total Vote	Turnout Vote/Reg. (%)	VAP Turnout (%)
1965	520,000	202,800	188,950	93.17	140,858	75.55	69.42
1969	570,000	205,200	140,428	68.43	76,858	54.73	37.46
1974	660,000	244,200	205,050	83.97	64,011	31.22	26.21
1979	783,873	290,033	230,231	79.38	134,496	58.42	46.37
1984	1,051,000	420,400	293,571	69.83	227,756	77.58	54.18
1989	1,245,000	522,900	367,069	70.20	250,487	68.24	47.90
1994	1,443,000	634,920	370,173	58.30	283,375	76.55	44.63
1999	1,592,528	844,338	459,662	54.44	354,466	77.11	41.98
2004	1,561,973	957,540	552,849	57.74	421,272	76.2	44.00
2009	1,990,876	892,339	723,617	81.09	555,078	76.71	62.20

*Source: International IDEA (2012)*

**Table A.5: Economic Status by Age, 2006.**

Age Group	Employed	Unemployed	Economically Active	Unemployment Rate (%)
15-19	29,577	10,749	40,326	26.7
20-24	68,360	36,663	105,023	34.9
25-29	83,111	24,801	107,912	23.0
30-34	77,214	13,256	90,470	14.7
35-39	64,544	9,670	74,215	13.0
40-44	51,910	7,023	58,933	11.9
45-49	46,637	5,194	51,832	10.0
50-54	34,954	3,341	38,296	8.7
55-59	23,404	1,517	24,920	6.1
60-64	14,459	859	15,318	5.6
65+	32,148	923	33,071	2.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>539,150</b>	<b>114,042</b>	<b>653,191</b>	<b>17.5</b>


Source: Central Statistics Office (2011: 83), taken from the Labour Force Survey 2005/2006.

**Table A.6: Societal Goals and Individuals' Values**

	Traditional Society	Modern Society	Postmodern Society
<i>Core Societal Goal</i>	Survival in a steady-state economy.	Maximise economic growth.	Maximise subjective well-being
<i>Individual Values</i>	Traditional religious and communal norms.	Secular-rational and survival values.	Self-expression values.
<i>Authority System</i>	Traditional authority.	Rational-legal authority.	De-emphasis of both legal and religious authority.

Source: Adapted from Inglehart (1997: 76; Table 3.1) and Inglehart (1999).

**Figure A.4: World Values Survey Global Cultural Map, 1999-2004.**



Source: World Values Survey (2012)



**Table A.7: Self-Expression Values in Medium-Development Countries**

Country	World Values Survey		Human Development (2011)		National Income (2011)	
	Wave	Surv/Self. Values	HDI Rank	HDI	GNI per capita	Income Group
El Salvador	4	.53	105	.674	3,480	Lower-Middle
Thailand	5	.01	103	.682	4,420	Upper-Middle
South Africa	5	-.10	123	.619	6,960	Upper-Middle
Philippines	4	-.11	112	.644	2,210	Lower-Middle
Guatemala	4	-.17	131	.574	2,870	Lower-Middle
<b>Botswana</b>	<b>Prediction</b>	<b>-.20</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>.633</b>	<b>7,480</b>	<b>Upper-Middle</b>
India	5	-.21	134	.547	1,410	Lower-Middle
Vietnam	5	-.26	128	.510	1,260	Lower-Middle
Ghana	5	-0.29	135	.547	1,410	Lower-Middle
Egypt	4	-.54	113	.644	2,600	Lower-Middle
Algeria	4	-.74	96	.698	4,470	Upper-Middle
Indonesia	5	-.80	124	.617	2,940	Lower-Middle
Kyrgyzstan	4	-.91	126	.615	920	Low
Morocco	5	-1.04	130	.582	2,970	Lower-Middle
Jordan	4	-1.05	95	.698	4,380	Upper-Middle
China	5	-1.16	101	.687	4,930	Upper-Middle
Moldova	5	-1.28	111	.649	1,980	Lower-Middle

NB: All countries were classified as 'Medium Development' by the UNDP in 2011.

Sources: Inglehart & Welzel (2005a), UNDP (2011), World Bank (2012), and World Values Survey (2011).

**Table A.8: Value Preferences in Sub-Saharan Africa.**

Country	Year	Mean Score
Burkina Faso	2007	-0.49
Ethiopia	2007	-0.36
Ghana	2007	-0.29
Mali	2007	-0.08
Nigeria	1990	-0.68
	1995	-0.68
	2000	0.28
Rwanda	2007	-0.62
South Africa	1990	-0.46
	1996	-0.46
	2001	-0.10
	2007	-0.10
Tanzania	2001	-0.15
Uganda	2001	-0.50
Zambia	2007	-0.62
Zimbabwe	2001	-1.36

Source: World Values Survey (2011)

**Table A.9: Comparative Development Measures in Afrobarometer Countries**

Country	HDI	GNI per capita	Employed in Services (%)	Urban Pop. (%)	Literacy Rate	Multiparty Transition	Freedom House
Benin	.409	570	46.2	40.0	41.7	1990	10
Botswana	<b>.601</b>	<b>5,070</b>	54.7	57.3	84.1	<b>1966</b>	10
Cape Verde	.543	2,080	n/a	57.4	84.8	1991	12
Ghana	.484	460	29.1	47.8	66.6	1992	11
Kenya	.467	520	32.2	20.7	87	1992	8
Lesotho	.417	840	18.3	23.3	89.7	1993	9
Madagascar	.465	300	15.8	28.5	64.5	1993	8
Malawi	.351	220	n/a	17.3	73.7	1994	6
Mali	.319	390	28.3	30.5	26.2	1992	10
Mozambique	.285	300	16.1	34.5	55.1	1994	7
Namibia	.593	3,300	55.1	35.1	88.5	1989	10
Nigeria	.429	630	41.1	46.2	60.8	1999	6
Senegal	.432	800	36.1	41.6	49.7	1978	9
South Africa	.599	4,850	<b>66.6</b>	59.3	88.7	1994	11
Tanzania	.420	380	19.2	24.2	72.9	1990	7
Uganda	.401	300	23.2	12.5	71.4	2005	5
Zambia	.394	500	20.6	35.0	70.9	1991	6
Zimbabwe	.345	440	15.3	35.9	<b>91.9</b>	2000	1

NB: Freedom House score is a reversed additive index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties that has been recoded so that the worst score (7 on both) is a 0 and the best score (1 on both) is a 12.

Sources: World Bank (2012), UNDP (2012), and Freedom House (2012).<sup>51</sup>

**Table A.10: Scarcity v. 'Well being' Values.**

Scarcity Values	'Well-being' Values
Not happy	Life satisfaction
Woman needs children	Post-materialist values (scale)
Reject out groups (scale)	Affect balance (scale)
State/employee management	In good health
Child needs both parents	Homosexuals ok
Technology	Friends important
Respect parents	Trust people
Hard work	Leisure important
State responsible	Imagination
Money	Women's movement
Trust science	Tolerance
Jobs to own nationality	Equality
Good and evil are clear	Have free choice
Respect authority	

Source: Inglehart (1997: 82, Fig 3.2)

<sup>51</sup> Note: HDI, GNI per capita, urban population and Freedom House scores are all for 2005. Adult literacy rates (at least fifteen years old) for 2009, except Mozambique (2006), Uganda (2006) and South Africa (2007). GNI per capita is in current (i.e. 2012) US dollars. Proportion of services employment is for the closest available figure to 2005.

**Table A.11: Measuring Cross-Dimensional Value Preferences.**

<i>Traditional values emphasise the following (Secular-Rational values emphasise the opposite):</i>	Agg.	Indiv.
God is very important.	.91	.70
It is more important to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination (Autonomy Index).	.88	.61
Abortion is never justifiable.	.82	.61
Strong sense of national pride.	.81	.60
Favours more respect for authority	.73	.51
<i>Survival values emphasise the following (Self-expression emphasise the opposite):</i>	Agg.	Indiv.
Priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life (4-item Materialist/PMV Index).	.87	.59
Describes self as not very happy.	.81	.59
Homosexuality is never justifiable.	.77	.58
Has not and would not sign a petition.	.74	.54
Wary of trusting people.	.46	.44

*NB:* Factor loadings based on the first four waves of the WVS.  
*Source:* Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 49-51).

**Table A.12: Correlates of Survival vs. Self-Expression Values.**

<b>Survival values emphasize the following (opposite of self-expression values)</b>	<b><i>r</i></b>
Men make better political leaders than women.	.86
Respondent is dissatisfied with financial situation of his or her household.	.83
A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled.	.83
Respondent rejects foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbours.	.81
Respondent favours more emphasis on the development of technology.	.78
Respondent has not recycled things to protect the environment.	.78
Respondent has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the environment	.75
When seeking a job, a good income and a safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with the people you like.	.74
Respondent is relatively favourable to state ownership of business and industry.	.74
A child needs a home with both a mother and a father to grow up happily.	.73
Respondent does not describe own health as very good.	.73
One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behaviour.	.71
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.	.69
Prostitution is never justifiable.	.69
Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.	.68
Respondent does not have much free choice or control over his or her life.	.67
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.	.67
Respondent does not favour less emphasis on money and material possessions.	.66
Respondent rejects people with criminal records as neighbours.	.65
Respondent rejects heavy drinkers as neighbours.	.65
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child.	.64
Imagination is <i>not</i> one of the most important things to teach a child.	.62
Tolerance and respect for others are <i>not</i> the most important things to teach a child.	.62
Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity.	.60
Leisure is not very important in life.	.60
Friends are not very important in life.	.58
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections would be a good form of government.	.56
Respondent has not and would not take part in a boycott.	.56
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.	.55
Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government.	.45
Respondent opposes sending economic aid to poorer countries.	.42

*Source:* Inglehart & Welzel (2005b: 55-56)

**Table A.13: Materialist v. Post-Materialist Values Index.**

<b>For a nation, it is not always possible to obtain everything one might wish....</b>	
Set One	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintaining order in the nation.</li> <li>• Giving the people more say in important political decisions.*</li> <li>• Fighting rising prices.</li> <li>• Protecting freedom of speech.*</li> </ul>
Set Two	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintaining a high level of economic growth.</li> <li>• Making sure this country has strong defence forces.</li> <li>• Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done in their jobs and in their communities.*</li> <li>• Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.*</li> </ul>
Set Three	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A stable economy.</li> <li>• Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.*</li> <li>• Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.*</li> <li>• The fight against crime.</li> </ul>

NB: \*Post-materialist response. Set One constitutes the Four-Item Index.

Source: *Davis and Davenport (1999:650-651)*

**Table A.14: Emancipative Values Index.**

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Factor Loading</b>
Equality over Patriarchy:	.76
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agree that a woman can live by herself.</li> <li>• Disagree that men make better political leaders.</li> <li>• Disagree that education is more important for boys.</li> <li>• Disagree that men have more right to a job.</li> </ul>	
Tolerance over Conformity:	.72
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agree that abortion can be justified.</li> <li>• Agree that homosexuality is justified.</li> <li>• Agree that divorce is justified.</li> </ul>	
Autonomy over Authority:	.63
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Autonomy chosen as a goal to teach.</li> <li>• Imagination chosen as a goal to teach.</li> <li>• Obedience not chosen as a goal to teach.</li> <li>• Faith not chosen as a goal to teach.</li> </ul>	
Expression over Security:	.54
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Priority to giving people more say in government over order and stable prices.</li> <li>• Priority to giving people more say in local affairs over strong defence and fighting crime.</li> <li>• Priority to protecting freedom of speech over order and stable prices.</li> </ul>	

Source: *Welzel and Inglehart (2009: 130)*

**Table A.15: Global Value Preferences (WVS Wave 5).**

Rank	Country	Surv/Self Values
1	Sweden	2.35 <sup>52</sup>
2	Norway	2.17
3	Canada	1.91
4	Switzerland	1.90
5	New Zealand	1.86
6	United States of America	1.76
7	Australia	1.75
8	Britain	1.68
9	Andorra	1.62
10	France	1.13
11	Finland	1.12
12	Mexico	1.03
13	Uruguay	0.99
14	West Germany	0.74
15	Brazil	0.61
16	Colombia	0.60
17	Italy	0.60
18	Spain	0.54
19	Argentina	0.38
20	Slovenia	0.36
21	East Germany	0.26
22	Cyprus	0.13
23	Malaysia	0.09
24	Thailand	0.01
25	Chile	0.00
26	Japan	-0.05
27	Mali	-0.08
28	South Africa	-0.10
29	Poland	-0.14
30	India	-0.21
31	Trinidad	-0.26
32	Vietnam	-0.26
33	Ghana	-0.29
34	Turkey	-0.33
35	Ethiopia	-0.36
36	Burkina Faso	-0.49
37	Rwanda	-0.62
38	Serbia	-0.62
39	Zambia	-0.62
40	Indonesia	-0.80
41	Ukraine	-0.83
42	Hong Kong	-0.98
43	Bulgaria	-1.01
44	Morocco	-1.04
45	China	-1.16
46	Taiwan	-1.18
47	Moldova	-1.28
48	South Korea	-1.37
49	Russia	-1.42
50	Romania	-1.55
51	Iraq	-1.68

*Source: World Values Survey (2011).*

<sup>52</sup> Inglehart and Welzel (2010: 564, footnote 10) states that the survival/self-expression index is now an additive index of twelve items and reconfigures the scale from -2.0 to 3.0, but does not explain these changes.

## APPENDIX B

### SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES INDEX FORMATION

Variable	Afrobarometer Survey Item	Afrobarometer Coding		Thesis Coding	
<b>Indicator 1: Value Orientation</b>					
Individualism	<b>Q19</b> A: People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life. B: The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people.	Agree very strongly with A	1	Individualist	1.5
		Agree with A	2	Individualist	1.5
		Agree with B	3	Communitarian	-1.5
		Agree very strongly with B	4	Communitarian	-1.5
		Agree with neither	5	Neutral	0
		Don't know	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
		Critical citizenship	<b>Q20</b> A: As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. B: In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority.	Agree very strongly with A	1
Agree with A	2			Critical	1.5
Agree with B	3			Uncritical	-1.5
Agree very strongly with B	4			Uncritical	-1.5
Agree with neither	5			Neutral	0
Don't know	9			Missing data	999
Refused to answer	998			Missing data	999
Missing data	-1			Missing data	999
Associational autonomy	<b>Q25</b> A: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. B: We should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves of it.			Agree very strongly with A	1
		Agree with A	2	Anti	-1.5
		Agree with B	3	Pro	1.5
		Agree very strongly with B	4	Pro	1.5
		Agree with neither	5	Neutral	0
		Don't know	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
		Press freedom	<b>Q26</b> A: Government should close newspapers that print false stories or misinformation. B: The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.	Agree very strongly with A	1
Agree with A	2			Anti	-1.5
Agree with B	3			Pro	1.5
Agree very strongly with B	4			Pro	1.5
Agree with neither	5			Neutral	0
Don't know	9			Missing data	999
Refused to answer	998			Missing data	999
Missing data	-1			Missing data	999
Freedom of expression	<b>Q27</b> A: Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority. B: People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.			Agree very strongly with A	1
		Agree with A	2	Anti	-1.5
		Agree with B	3	Pro	1.5
		Agree very strongly with B	4	Pro	1.5
		Agree with neither	5	Neutral	0
		Don't know	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
		<b>Indicator 2: Subjective Wellbeing</b>			
Present wellbeing.	<b>Q4B</b> In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?	Very bad	1	Very low	-2
		Fairly bad	2	Low	-1
		Neither good nor bad	3	Neutral	0
		Fairly good	4	High	1
		Very good	5	Very high	2
		Don't know	9	Neutral	0
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
		Past wellbeing.	<b>Q5</b> Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Your living conditions?	Much worse	1
Worse	2			Low	-1
Same	3			Neutral	0
Better	4			High	1
Much better	5			Very high	2
Don't know	9			Neutral	0
Refused to answer	998			Missing data	999

		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
Expected wellbeing.	<b>Q6B</b> Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your living conditions in twelve months' time?	Much worse	1	Very low	-2
		Worse	2	Low	-1
		Same	3	Neutral	0
		Better	4	High	1
		Much better	5	Very high	2
		Don't know	9	Neutral	0
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
Overall subjective wellbeing.	Average of present, past and expected wellbeing.				
<b>Indicator 3: Social Tolerance</b>					
Equal rights for women.	<b>Q23</b> A: In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do. B: Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.	Agree very strongly with A	1	Pro	1.5
		Agree with A	2	Pro	1.5
		Agree with B	3	Anti	-1.5
		Agree very strongly with B	4	Anti	-1.5
		Agree with neither	5	Neutral	0
		Don't know	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
Equal opportunity for women.	<b>Q24</b> A: Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men. B: Men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women.	Agree very strongly with A	1	Pro	1.5
		Agree with A	2	Pro	1.5
		Agree with B	3	Anti	-1.5
		Agree very strongly with B	4	Anti	-1.5
		Agree with neither	5	Neutral	0
		Don't know	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
<b>Indicator 4: Political Activism</b>					
Protest potential.	<b>Q31B</b> Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: <i>Got together with others to raise an issue?</i>	Yes, often.	4	Activist	1.5
		Yes, several times.	3	Activist	1.5
		Yes, once or twice.	2	Activist	1.5
		No, would if had the chance.	1	Potential Activ.	1.5
		No, would never do this.	0	Non-Activist	-1.5
		Don't know.	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
Contact local government councillor.	<b>Q32A</b> During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: <i>A local government councillor?</i>	Often.	3	Activist	1.5
		A few times.	2	Activist	1.5
		Only once.	1	Activist	1.5
		Never.	0	Non-Activist	-1.5
		Don't know.	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data	-1	Missing data	999
		Contact MP.	<b>Q32B</b> During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: <i>A Parliamentarian?</i>	Often.	3
A few times.	2			Activist	1.5
Only once.	1			Activist	1.5
Never.	0			Non-Activist	-1.5
Don't know.	9			Missing data	999
Refused to answer	998			Missing data	999
Missing data	-1			Missing data	999
Contact ministry official.	<b>Q32C</b> During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: <i>An official of a government ministry?</i>			Often.	3
		A few times.	2	Activist	1.5
		Only once.	1	Activist	1.5
		Never.	0	Non-Activist	-1.5
		Don't know.	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer.	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data.	-1	Missing data	999
		Contact party official.	<b>Q32D</b> During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them	Often.	3
A few times.	2			Activist	1.5
Only once.	1			Activist	1.5
Never.	0			Non-Activist	-1.5

	your views: <i>A political party official?</i>	Don't know.	9	Missing data	999
		Refused to answer.	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data.	-1	Missing data	999
<b>Indicator 5: Interpersonal Trust</b>					
Standard trust question.	<b>Q83</b> Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?	You must be very careful.	0	Low	-1.5
		Most people can be trusted	1	High	1.5
		Don't know.	9	Neutral	0
		Refused to answer.	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data.	-1	Missing data	999
Trust in 'non co-ethnics'.	<b>Q84D</b> How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Batswana from other ethnic groups?	Not at all.	0	Very Low	-2
		Just a little.	1	Low	-1
		I trust them somewhat.	2	Moderate	1
		I trust them a lot.	3	High	2
		Don't know.	9	Neutral	0
		Refused to answer.	998	Missing data	999
		Missing data.	-1	Missing data	999
		<b>Self-Expression Values</b>			
SEV Index <sup>53</sup>	Additive scale – all five indicators weighted equally from -2.0 to 2.0.				

<sup>53</sup> The initial Self-Expression Values (SEV) Index is an additive scale of all seventeen measures, with each indicator weighted equally and coded from -2.0 (survivalist) to 2.0 (self-expressive). The revised 12-item SEV Index excluded the measures for Individualism, Critical Citizenship, Protest Potential and both measures of Interpersonal Trust following exploratory factor analysis (*cf.* Chapter 3).

## APPENDIX C

### SECTION 1: BOTSWANA

#### *Self-Expression Value Preferences*

Value Orientation	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Missing	Factor Loadings
Individualism	49.6	7.8	42.4	(.3)	.05
Critical citizenship	77.3	2.6	19.7	(.5)	.20
Freedom of association	70.8	2.5	25.1	(1.7)	.60
Freedom of the press	70.9	3.0	24.7	(1.4)	.65
Freedom of expression	82.2	1.3	15.5	(1.0)	.48

*N*=1,153

Factor analysis was specified to extract a single factor (Eigenvalues=1.06), which explains 21.1% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.47) is fairly low and indicated that both the Individualism and Critical citizenship items should be dropped.

Value Orientation (revised)	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Missing	Factor Loadings
Freedom of association	70.8	2.5	25.1	(1.7)	.62
Freedom of the press	70.9	3.0	24.7	(1.4)	.65
Freedom of expression	82.2	1.3	15.5	(1.0)	.47

*N*=1,159

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.02), which explains 33.9% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.60) is acceptable for an index of value orientations.

Subjective Wellbeing	Very High	High	Neutral	Low	Very Low	Missing	Factor Loadings
Present wellbeing	1.6	18.3	18.9	36.8	24.4	(0)	.59
Past wellbeing	3.7	23.9	41.1	21.8	9.5	(0)	.56
Expected wellbeing	9.5	34.4	30.6	15.8	9.8	(0)	.63

*N*=1,200.

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.06), which explains 35.3% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.62) is acceptable for an index of subjective wellbeing.

Social Tolerance	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Missing
Equal rights for both sexes	67.3	2.7	29.4	(.6)
Equal political opportunity	82.6	1.5	15.3	(.6)

*N*=1,188.

The two items are correlated (Pearson's  $r=.42$ ) and reliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.59) enough to warrant an average construct of social tolerance.

Political Activism	Activist	Non-Activist	Missing	Factor Loadings
Raise an issue with others	90.5	8.9	(.6)	.24
Contact local councillor	25.9	74.1	(0)	.62
Contact Member of Parliament	11.6	88.4	(0)	.64
Contact ministry official	13.3	86.6	(.1)	.57
Contact political party official	11.8	88.3	(0)	.68

*N*=1,192

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=2.24), which explains 32.5% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.67) is acceptable for an index of political activism.

<b>Interpersonal Trust</b>	<b>Very High</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Very Low</b>	<b>Missing</b>
Generalised trust	-	5.9	0.5	93.6	-	(0)
Trust in non-coethnics	14.9	33.1	1.8	20.2	30.0	(0)
<i>N</i> =1,200.						

The two items are very weakly correlated (Pearson's  $r=.12$ ) and unreliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.17), thus calling into question whether one can use an average construct of the two. I chose to keep both, however, as there was a significant drop in the Standardised Trust Question between R1 and R3.

### *Self-Expressive Value Preferences in Botswana (1999-2008)*

<b>Survey Item</b>	<b>Percentage</b>				
	<b>1999</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>Avg.</b>
People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life.	48.1	47.9	49.5	-	48.5
As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders.	-	62.1	77.2	66.5	68.6
We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.	-	-	70.8	62.4	66.6
The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.	-	-	70.9	79.8	75.4
People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.	-	-	82.2	86.3	84.3
Present living conditions are at least 'fairly good.'	-	25.2	19.9	20.6	21.9
Present living conditions have improved from 12 months ago.	-	28.8	27.6	31.3	29.2
Expects improved living conditions in 12 months.	-	51.8	43.8	57.5	51.0
In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.	-	77.7	67.4	-	72.6
Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.	-	-	82.6	-	82.6
Has or would get together with others to raise an issue.	71.8	86.5	90.5	94.7	85.9
Contacted local government councillor in past year.	-	24.1	25.9	35.3	28.4
Contacted Member of Parliament in past year.	-	14.3	11.6	21.7	15.9
Contacted official of a government agency in past year.	-	17.8	13.4	13.3	14.8
Contacted political party official in past year.	-	16.3	11.8	-	14.1
Most people can be trusted.	13.9	-	5.9	-	9.9
Trusts Batswana from other ethnic groups.*	-	-	35.1	35.2	35.2

\*NB: in R4 this was phrased as trust "other Batswana."

## Factor Analysis of the 15-Item Self-Expression Values Scale (Botswana)

Survey Item	Rotated Factor Loadings				
	1	2	3	4	5
We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.	.048	-.038	-.021	-.038	<b>.632</b>
The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.	.047	.010	.038	-.087	<b>.640</b>
People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.	.103	.077	-.006	-.076	<b>.471</b>
Present living conditions are at least 'fairly good.'	.297	.072	<b>.825</b>	.070	.012
Present living conditions have improved from 12 months ago.	<b>.995</b>	.089	<b>.431</b>	-.089	.129
Expects improved living conditions in 12 months.	<b>.728</b>	.102	<b>.877</b>	.021	.068
In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.	.067	<b>.437</b>	.129	.023	-.036
Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.	-.022	<b>.992</b>	.077	.092	-.046
Has or would get together with others to raise an issue.	-.013	.122	.063	.248	-.110
Has contacted local government councillor in past year.	-.093	-.099	-.025	<b>.610</b>	-.060
Has contacted Member of Parliament in past year.	-.069	-.039	.106	<b>.640</b>	-.092
Has contacted official of a government agency in past year.	-.075	-.077	.061	<b>.564</b>	-.058
Has contacted political party official in past year.	-.045	-.034	.080	<b>.670</b>	-.104
Most people can be trusted.	-.009	-.083	.013	.038	-.044
Trusts Batswana from other ethnic groups.	-.040	.050	.041	.144	-.003
<b>Eigenvalues</b>	<b>1.65</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>1.67</b>	<b>1.10</b>
<b>Proportion of Total Variance Explained</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>6.7</b>

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Direct Oblimin (oblique) with Kaiser Normalization.

## Predictor Variables

Economic Security	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	None	Missing	Factor Loadings
Access: Enough Food	52.2	15.5	19.7	10.0	2.5	(0.0)	.62
Access: Clean Water	63.3	14.4	11.9	8.1	2.3	(0.0)	.63
Access: Medical Care	62.4	16.6	14.0	5.6	1.4	(0.0)	.61
Access: Cooking Fuel	56.7	18.5	15.6	7.5	1.7	(0.0)	.71
Access: Cash Income	38.9	16.5	17.5	10.9	16.2	(0.0)	.54

N=1,179

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.94), which explains 38.7% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .75) is acceptable for an index of economic security.

Physical Security	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	None	Missing	Factor Loadings
No Fear of Crime	64.5	18.0	9.3	4.2	4.0	(0.0)	.61
No Theft	69.3	20.2	7.5	2.4	0.6	(0.0)	.83
No Physical Assault	85.7	10.5	2.4	1.1	0.3	(0.0)	.44

N=1,194

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.25), which explains 41.5% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .63) is acceptable for an index of physical security.

<b>Existential Security</b>	<b>Very High</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>None</b>	<b>Missing</b>	<b>Factor Loadings</b>
Economic Security	54.8	16.3	15.7	8.4	4.8	(1.8)	.17
Physical Security	73.2	16.2	6.4	2.6	1.6	(0.5)	.99
Employment Security	n/a	20.9	5.3	23.7	50.2	(0.1)	.17

*N*=1,172

Factor analysis was specified to extract a single factor (Eigenvalue = 1.06), which explains 35.3% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .21), however, is not acceptable for an index of existential security.

<b>Cognitive Engagement</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Very Low</b>	<b>Missing</b>
Political Interest	44.6	29.5	14.9	11.0	(0.0)
Political Discussion	n/a	23.0	39.0	38.0	(0.0)

*N*=1,185

The two items are correlated (Pearson's  $r=.31$ ) and reliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.46) enough to warrant an average construct of cognitive engagement.

<b>Media Consumption</b>	<b>Very High</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Very Low</b>	<b>Missing</b>	<b>Factor Loading</b>
Radio news	44.0	32.0	7.1	2.8	14.0	(0.0)	.53
Television news	27.0	16.0	8.3	3.9	44.8	(0.0)	.74
Newspaper news	22.8	25.7	13.8	4.9	32.9	(0.1)	.72

*N*=1,198

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.34), which explains 44.8% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .70) is acceptable for an index of media consumption.

<b>Cognitive Autonomy</b>	<b>Very High</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Very Low</b>	<b>Missing</b>	<b>Factor Loading</b>
Formal Education	-	9.5	45.0	28.2	17.0	(0.3)	.60
Cognitive Engagement	-	22.3	26.3	27.0	24.5	(1.3)	.36
Media Consumption	31.3	24.6	9.7	3.9	30.6	(0.2)	.89

*N*=1,179

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.29), which explains 42.9% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.77) is acceptable for a second-order index of cognitive development.

<b>Political Learning</b>	<b>Pre-Transition</b>	<b>Post-Transition</b>	<b>Missing</b>
Political Cohort	15.6	84.4	(0.0)

*N*=1,200

<b>Traditional Norms</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Missing</b>	<b>Factor Loading</b>
More/Only Attached to Ethnic Identity	12.1	87.9	(0.4)	.326
Supports Clientelism	13.2	86.8	(0.1)	.181
Supports Automatic VP Succession	41.8	58.2	(2.1)	-.044

*N*=1,169

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=.141), which explains 4.69% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.018) is not acceptable for an index.

## SECTION 2: AFROBAROMETER

### *Self-Expression Value Preferences*<sup>54</sup>

Value Orientation	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Missing	Factor Loadings
Individualism	47.9	3.5	48.7	(6.4)	-.05
Critical citizenship	68.4	2.0	29.6	(7.1)	-.06
Freedom of association	62.7	3.4	33.9	(4.3)	.58
Freedom of the press	57.2	3.7	39.1	(4.7)	.50
Freedom of expression	73.8	2.0	24.2	(3.4)	.48

N=18,542

Factor analysis was specified to extract one factor (Eigenvalues=.811), which explained 16.2% of the common variance. As in the national analysis, index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.33) was fairly low.

Value Orientation (revised)	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Missing	Factor Loadings
Freedom of association	62.7	3.4	33.9	(4.3)	.59
Freedom of the press	57.2	3.7	39.1	(4.7)	.52
Freedom of expression	73.8	2.0	24.2	(3.4)	.49

N=19,888

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=.852), which explains 28.4% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.54) is acceptable for an index of value orientations.

Subjective Wellbeing	Very High	High	Neutral	Low	Very Low	Missing	Factor Loadings
Present wellbeing	3.4	22.8	22.1	27.7	24.0	(0.0)	.66
Past wellbeing	4.2	28.1	3.04	25.2	12.2	(0.1)	.60
Expected wellbeing	11.2	38.2	29.7	11.1	9.7	(0.0)	.58

N=21,570

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.13), which explains 37.7% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.64) is acceptable for an index of subjective wellbeing.

Social Tolerance	Pro	Neutral	Anti	Missing
Equal rights for both sexes	71.0	1.6	27.4	(6.2)
Equal political opportunity	75.7	1.2	23.1	(1.0)

N=20,168

The two items are correlated (Pearson's  $r=.48$ ) and reliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.64) enough to warrant an average construct of social tolerance.

Political Activism	Activist	Non-Activist	Missing	Factor Loadings
Raise an issue with others	84.9	15.1	(4.7)	.29
Contact local councillor	25.3	74.7	(4.7)	.56
Contact Member of Parliament	1.5	89.5	(4.7)	.64
Contact ministry official	11.3	88.7	(4.7)	.63
Contact political party official	15.1	2.1	81.5	.66

N=19,960


Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.65), which explains 32.7% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.68) is acceptable for an index of political activism.

<sup>54</sup> All frequencies are reported on weighted data. Each country's data was weighted to a total of 1,200 respondents.

<b>Interpersonal Trust</b>	<b>Very High</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Very Low</b>	<b>Missing</b>
Generalised trust	-	15.7	2.1	81.5	-	(4.3)
Trust in non-coethnics	15.7	26.4	1.8	34.9	21.2	(9.1)
<i>N</i> =19,154						

The two items are fairly weakly correlated (Pearson's  $r=.24$ ) and unreliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.38), thus calling into question whether one can use an average construct of the two. As with the national analysis, I chose to keep both because the Standard Trust Question was used in the WVS.

### *Comparative Value Preferences, 2005/2006*



*Self-Expressive Preferences by Country (%), 2005/2006.*

Survey Item	Afrobarometer Country (%) <sup>55</sup>																		
	BN	BW	CV	GH	KE	LS	MG	MA	ML	MZ	NA	NG	SN	ZA	TZ	UG	ZM	ZW	All
<b>Post-Modern Values</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>65</b>
Support: Freedom of Association	70	72	82	69	54	72	80	42	57	54	54	51	73	64	26	59	66	85	63
Support: Freedom of Press	36	72	67	59	53	63	57	51	42	74	53	62	40	65	35	57	64	79	57
Support: Freedom of Speech	74	83	80	81	77	83	81	70	60	60	64	73	74	76	47	74	82	88	74
<b>High Subjective Wellbeing</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>36</b>
Present conditions are at least 'fairly good.'	10	20	16	26	33	16	25	17	16	35	43	46	33	47	22	35	36	7	26
Living conditions improved from 12 months ago.	25	27	29	28	32	22	30	40	30	36	49	42	47	36	31	36	56	16	32
Expects improved conditions in 12 months.	37	44	85	48	48	25	66	35	65	46	60	69	69	59	36	51	40	9	50
<b>Tolerant</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>73</b>
Support: Gender Equality	79	68	80	82	69	41	79	57	55	83	79	64	57	84	89	68	76	-	71
Support: Equal Opportunity for Office	85	83	82	84	81	51	83	81	62	84	67	59	72	81	81	79	71	67	76
<b>Political Activist</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>29</b>
Has/would get together with others to raise issue.	88	91	89	89	93	32	31	34	64	91	73	77	80	75	87	94	90	82	85
Contact: Local government councilor.	21	26	16	14	35	28	18	18	30	9	17	19	25	23	29	62	20	-	24
Contact: Member of Parliament.	6	12	9	16	16	16	5	12	9	8	9	8	11	5	17	13	12	-	11
Contact: Government official.	4	13	9	13	18	23	1	9	4	15	16	11	11	6	17	14	10	-	11
Contact: Political party official.	8	12	16	22	14	23	7	14	17	22	15	16	19	14	19	10	15	-	15
<b>Interpersonal Trust</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>16</b>
Most people can be trusted.	27	6	3	15	10	17	33	7	23	22	27	12	26	15	12	17	10	-	17
Trusts [nationality] from other ethnic groups.	30	35	-	42	31	37	33	55	54	55	40	30	72	36	67	41	34	43	17
<b>SELF-EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES<sup>56</sup></b>	<b>44</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>46</b>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005/2006)

<sup>55</sup> Country names: BN=Benin, BW=Botswana, CV=Cape Verde, GH=Ghana, KE=Kenya, LS=Lesotho, MG=Madagascar, MA=Malawi, ML=Mali, MZ=Mozambique, NA=Namibia, NG=Nigeria, SN=Senegal, ZA=South Africa, TZ=Tanzania, UG=Uganda, ZM=Zambia, and ZW=Zimbabwe.

<sup>56</sup> Calculated as an average of the five aggregate indicators, to reflect that each has equal weighting.

### Factor Analysis of the 15-Item Self-Expression Values Scale (Afrobarometer)

Survey Item	Rotated Factor Loadings				
	1	2	3	4	5
We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.	.006	.026	-.029	<b>.578</b>	-.068
The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.	.046	-.018	.024	<b>.502</b>	-.100
People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.	.025	-.047	-.014	<b>.476</b>	-.117
Present living conditions are at least 'fairly good.'	.011	-.083	<b>.648</b>	-.014	.074
Present living conditions have improved from 12 months ago.	.034	-.042	<b>.569</b>	-.024	.065
Expects improved living conditions in 12 months.	.008	-.047	<b>.539</b>	.017	.043
In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.	.024	<b>-.575</b>	.100	.020	-.004
Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.	.034	<b>-.826</b>	.025	.009	.005
Has or would get together with others to raise an issue.	.294	-.067	-.001	.068	.001
Has contacted local government councillor in past year.	<b>.555</b>	.006	.010	.018	.046
Has contacted Member of Parliament in past year.	<b>.643</b>	-.020	.009	-.014	.056
Has contacted official of a government agency in past year.	<b>.639</b>	.000	.045	-.005	.043
Has contacted political party official in past year.	<b>.660</b>	-.009	.032	.026	.067
Most people can be trusted.	-.002	.026	.062	-.064	<b>.686</b>
Trusts Batswana from other ethnic groups.	.060	-.015	.046	-.107	<b>.360</b>
<b>Eigenvalues</b>	<b>1.48</b>	<b>1.22</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>0.58</b>
<b>Proportion of Total Variance Explained</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>3.8</b>
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.					
Rotation Method: Direct Oblimin (oblique) with Kaiser Normalization.					

### Cross-national Comparison of Self-Expression Values Index Scores<sup>57</sup>

Country	N	Mean	SD	Std. Error	Min.	Max.
Benin	1,071	-.106	.47	.0143	-1.67	1.34
Botswana	1,146	.010	.50	.0146	-1.73	1.32
Cape Verde	947	-.110	.42	.0137	-1.52	1.71
Ghana	1,069	.061	.52	.0158	-1.57	1.73
Kenya	1,095	-.014	.52	.0157	-1.61	1.47
Lesotho	1,136	-.226	.59	.0174	-1.92	1.71
Madagascar	996	.141	.46	.0146	-1.47	1.37
Malawi	1,137	-.226	.52	.0154	-1.72	1.57
Mali	1,145	-.217	.62	.0182	-1.8	1.51
Mozambique	911	.188	.50	.0165	-1.59	1.71
Namibia	1,106	.021	.51	.0154	-1.72	1.53
Nigeria	1,141	-.145	.52	.0153	-1.73	1.52
Senegal	1,051	.134	.53	.0164	-1.38	1.61
South Africa	1,047	.125	.53	.0163	-1.81	1.82
Tanzania	963	.023	.45	.0145	-1.33	1.42
Uganda	1,172	.054	.54	.0157	-1.67	1.89
Zambia	1,117	-.027	.53	.0158	-1.92	1.75
Zimbabwe	1,168	-.143	.33	.0097	-1.34	0.62
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,418</b>	<b>-.025</b>	<b>.50</b>	<b>.0153</b>	<b>-1.92</b>	<b>1.89</b>

<sup>57</sup> Cape Verde score was calculated using the 'Standard Trust Question' to represent interpersonal trust. Zimbabwe score was calculated by employing the Afrobarometer mean for all survey items excluded from the country's questionnaire.

## Predictor Variables

Economic Security	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	None	Missing	Factor Loadings
Access: Enough Food	46.5	15.5	19.8	13.5	4.7	(0.2)	.65
Access: Clean Water	50.7	12.0	15.8	12.5	8.9	(0.2)	.56
Access: Medical Care	42.1	15.4	21.2	14.5	6.8	(0.5)	.73
Access: Cooking Fuel	56.3	14.2	15.7	9.1	4.7	(0.5)	.57
Access: Cash Income	20.0	12.5	24.7	26.6	16.1	(0.6)	.66

N=21,236

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=2.02), which explains 40.5% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.77) is acceptable for an index of economic security.

Physical Security	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	None	Missing	Factor Loadings
No Fear of Crime	65.6	13.4	10.8	5.8	4.5	(5.8)	.51
No Theft	70.5	18.4	7.1	3.2	0.8	(5.7)	.73
No Physical Assault	87.7	8.1	2.4	1.2	0.6	(5.7)	.52

N=20,311

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.06), which explains 35.5% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.57) is acceptable for a second-order index.

Existential Security	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	None	Missing	Factor Loading
Economic Security	43.1	13.9	19.4	15.2	8.2	(0.0)	.99
Physical Security	74.6	13.3	6.8	3.4	2.0	(0.1)	.13
Employment Security	-	21.8	12.9	35.0	30.3	(0.3)	.18

N=19,913

Factor analysis was specified to extract one factor (Eigenvalue=1.05), which explains 34.8% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.23) is not acceptable for a second-order index of existential security.

Cognitive Engagement	High	Moderate	Low	Very Low	Missing
Political Interest	38.1	29.2	17.3	15.4	(1.2)
Political Discussion	-	23.2	45.5	31.3	(1.2)

N=21,140

The two items are correlated (Pearson's  $r=.47$ ) and reliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.61) enough to warrant an average construct of cognitive engagement.

Media Consumption	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	Very Low	Missing	Factor Loading
Radio news	56.0	21.8	7.3	4.0	11.0	(0.2)	.44
Television news	26.4	12.6	7.3	6.8	46.8	(0.7)	.80
Newspaper news	10.2	12.7	10.6	9.7	56.9	(1.4)	.67

N=21,261

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.27), which explains 42.2% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.66) is acceptable for an index of media consumption.

Cognitive Autonomy	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	Very Low	Missing	Factor Loading
Formal Education	-	8.7	32.7	37.3	21.3	(0.4)	.53
Cognitive Engagement	-	19.0	26.2	27.0	23.4	(0.0)	.17
Media Consumption	30.9	15.7	8.4	6.8	38.2	(0.2)	.79

N=21,409

Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=0.93), which explains 30.1% of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha=.46) is acceptable for a second-order index of cognitive development.

<b>Political Learning</b>	<b>Pre-Transition</b>	<b>Post-Transition</b>	<b>Missing</b>
Political Cohort	61.9	38.1	(0.0)
<i>N</i> =21,596			

<b>Traditional Norms</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Missing</b>
More/Only Attached to Ethnic Identity	13.7	86.3	(1.1)
Supports Clientelism	27.0	73.0	(7.0)
<i>N</i> =20,092			

The two items are very weakly correlated (Pearson's  $r=.03$ ) and are not reliable (Cronbach's Alpha=.06) enough to warrant an average construct of traditional norms.

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*Predictor Variables by Country, 2005/2006.*

Survey Item	Afrobarometer Country (%) <sup>58</sup>																		
	BN	BW	CV	GH	KE	LS	MG	MA	ML	MZ	NA	NG	SN	ZA	TZ	UG	ZM	ZW	All
<b>'White-Collar' Occupation</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Urban residential location</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Economic Security</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>57</b>
Access: Enough Food	65	68	83	79	63	63	45	40	66	53	68	66	61	77	62	57	64	36	62
Access: Clean Water	50	78	71	73	61	57	78	60	66	52	72	61	59	76	47	62	52	55	63
Access: Medical Care	55	79	72	71	53	51	62	51	63	47	69	64	42	73	58	45	56	25	58
Access: Cooking Fuel	73	75	72	83	67	67	72	63	70	65	76	63	55	79	81	66	71	70	70
Access: Cash Income	20	55	49	44	24	28	24	18	32	20	42	48	19	65	29	19	28	20	32
<b>Physical Security</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>86</b>	-	<b>88</b>
No Fear of Crime	77	83	81	82	61	67	77	90	88	82	83	84	87	69	78	80	73	-	79
No Theft	87	89	95	89	86	93	93	93	92	89	84	90	76	90	92	85	88	-	89
No Physical Assault	98	96	98	94	92	99	98	99	100	95	90	93	92	95	98	94	98	-	96
<b>Currently Employed</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>At least Secondary Education</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>Cognitive Engagement</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>45</b>
At least 'somewhat' interested in politics	62	74	51	72	67	82	50	75	69	69	78	60	72	62	82	74	56	57	67
Discusses politics frequently	22	23	18	30	24	20	12	23	21	26	19	21	37	19	39	29	15	20	23
<b>Media Consumption</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>47</b>
Radio news at least a few times/week	78	76	72	85	86	53	63	79	81	70	94	81	88	91	78	83	81	59	78
Television news at least a few times/week	25	43	66	46	36	11	27	11	47	25	53	59	67	79	19	9	40	37	39
Newspaper at least a few times/week	5	48	14	20	32	9	12	15	6	14	48	27	23	54	22	16	24	20	23
<b>Post-Transition Cohort</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Traditional Norms</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>34</b>
Feels more/only attached to ethnic ID	42	49	34	51	46	51	31	49	45	48	49	40	54	40	60	51	35	39	45
Leaders obliged to help own community.	37	13	51	32	18	14	25	8	38	41	31	40	18	22	17	32	28	-	27

*Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005/2006)*

<sup>58</sup> Country names: BN=Benin, BW=Botswana, CV=Cape Verde, GH=Ghana, KE=Kenya, LS=Lesotho, MG=Madagascar, MA=Malawi, ML=Mali, MZ=Mozambique, NA=Namibia, NG=Nigeria, SN=Senegal, ZA=South Africa, TZ=Tanzania, UG=Uganda, ZM=Zambia, and ZW=Zimbabwe.