HOW AND WHY DO STATES PROVIDE FOR CHILDREN?

COMPARING SOCIAL GRANTS FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Declaration

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Signature.. Signed by candidate ……. Date…19/02/2018………………………………….

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to the Chinyoka family, especially my mother, Marinda Chinyoka, and my late father, Themba Veryson Chinyoka.

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Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
BIDPA	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
CSG	Child Support Grant (South Africa)
CWR	Child Welfare Regime
GoB	Government of Botswana
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRN	Government of the Republic of Namibia
HGSFP	Home-Grown School Feeding Programme
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LIPWP	Labour Intensive Public Works Programme
MGECW	Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare
MLG	Ministry of Local Government
MLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Services
NSA	Namibia Statistics Agency
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
OVC	Orphaned and other Vulnerable Children
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SASSA	South Africa Social Security Agency
STPA	Short-Term Plan of Action
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency

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Map 1.1: Case study countries

Key:

- Yellow -study area
- 1;2;3;4: Case Studies

Abstract

This thesis explores variation in public policy with a focus on the provision of social grants (social cash transfers) for families with children. The thesis investigates how and why three middle-income countries (South Africa, Namibia and Botswana) and a low-income country (Zimbabwe) in Southern Africa provide for children in different ways. In-depth interviews and desktop research established that 'child welfare regimes' (CWRs) (a combination of programmes affecting the welfare of children, primarily cash transfers, feeding programmes, health and education fee waivers) are similar in providing some form of social grants, directly and/or indirectly to children or families with children. But there are significant variations between the CWRs. The CWRs primarily vary across two dimensions: first, the coverage of programmes; and secondly, their targeting, specifically whether they are targeted on poverty or on perceived 'family breakdown'. I present a taxonomy of CWRs with four distinct types: a pro-poor (poverty-targeted) CWR (as in South Africa), a familialist CWR (targeted on 'broken' families) (as in Botswana), a mixed (pro-poor-familial targeted) CWR (as in Namibia) and an agrarian (family-targeted) one (as in Zimbabwe). A pro-poor CWR is distinguished by high coverage and generous transfers. A familial CWR provides medium coverage with overall generosity but with parsimonious cash benefits. A mixed CWR has low coverage and modest generosity while an agrarian CWR has low coverage and ungenerous benefits. This taxonomy emphasises variation in targeting form, an important but underestimated dimension in identifying and explaining CWRs particularly in Southern Africa. In explaining the variation, the factors that were especially important include colonial antecedents, need or structural factors (particularly AIDS-related health shocks, demographic changes and family breakdown), international influence by international organisations, particularly UNICEF, the level of democracy but all these factors and the choice for a CWR reflect domestic politics (party politics and civil society organisations). These findings extend the Power Resource Theory beyond developed countries but also reveal new influential factors, within the theory, that have been overlooked but significant in explaining variation between CWRs.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The logic of comparison

1.1 Introduction

Many states in Southern Africa now provide one or more form of non-contributory social grants (social transfers) to children or families with children. This state social provision varies cross-nationally. Variation includes the design, coverage, scope and cost of social transfer schemes (ILO, 2017; 2014; Niño-Zarazúa *et al.,* 2012).

This thesis investigates variation between Child Welfare Regimes (CWRs) in Southern Africa. I use the term CWR to refer to the combination of programmes affecting the welfare of children directly (child-specific) or indirectly (child-oriented) — primarily cash transfer and feeding programmes, health and education fee waivers. A CWR envisaged here incorporates some general non-contributory welfare programmes that are usually meant to benefit the household as a whole (i.e. adults and children), (for example, farm input subsidies or subsidized housing) or even adults specifically (for example, old age pensions and disability grants). Though not explicitly oriented towards children, such schemes improve a household's ability to care for children (ILO, 2013). This definition encompasses the kinds of programmes elsewhere called 'child benefits' (Bradshaw, 2012), 'family allowances', 'child sensitive social protection' (social transfers that are sensitive to children's rights) (Roelen & Sabates-Wheeler, 2012; Department of International Development *et al.,* 2009) or 'social protection for children' (Handa *et al.,* 2011) i.e. a wide range of universal or targeted, conditional or unconditional, cash or in-kind social assistance (non-contributory) and social insurance (contributory) programmes that benefit children and families. In Southern Africa, however, CWRs (and associated proposed reforms and debates) revolve primarily around government-funded (i.e. public) unconditional, targeted, non-contributory social cash transfers.

This definition is different from the broader view of social protection as a set of universal or targeted public policies, programmes and systems put in place to help members of the society (as individuals or households) to cope with risk and vulnerabilities, particularly poverty (Barrientos,

2011:40-41; Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; 2009; Barrientos, Hulme, and Shepherd, 2005:11-13; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007; 2004:3-5; Devereux, 2001; Norton, Conway, and Foster, 2001:21-24).

Cash transfer programmes for children and families in the global South have continued during recent years, and in some countries, have even accelerated, whether in order to cushion the impact of the global crisis on children and families or with a more general objective of reducing poverty (ILO, 2014; Garcia & Moore, 2012; Slater, 2011). Two famous income transfer examples of child grant programmes in Latin America are Brazil's *Bolsa Familia* (which replaced *Bolsa Escola* in 2004) and Mexico's *Prospera (*previously *Oportunidades*) which were granted to poor households on the condition that children attend school (McCord, 2010; Soares, Ribas & Osório, 2010; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008).

Evidence suggests that social grants for families with children affect the wellbeing of children in various ways. Social grants not only tackle income poverty, they may also provide effective support for broader developmental objectives (Barrientos *et al.,* 2014). For example, social protection can be used to improve access to education and health, areas that are critically important for socio-economic development (Ellis, Devereux & White, 2009). These interventions alleviate child poverty (Pascall, 1997:220) and subsequent social vulnerability as a result of an increasing number of children living in a family environment aggravated by chronic poverty the region is experiencing (Barrientos *et al.,* 2013; Ellis, Devereux & White, 2009; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008). Other benefits include helping the poor and marginalized claim their rights and boosting investment in human capital of the poorest children. They also have the potential to break intergenerational poverty (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2011). Cash transfer benefits also include improvements in birth registration and reduced use of child labour (Holmes, 2009:1).

There has also been a remarkable increase in cash transfers to poor families with children in Southern Africa since the early 2000s. In some parts of Southern Africa social grants in the form of child support grants, child maintenance grants, foster care grants, orphan care grants, conditional and unconditional cash transfers were introduced to poor households to reduce

poverty and vulnerability (Seekings & Moore, 2013; Ellis, Devereux & White, 2009; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Devereux, 2006b). Using national child poverty lines, approximately 78% of all children lived in poverty in Zimbabwe in 2012 (ZIMSTAT, 2013), 63% of in South Africa in 2014 (Delany, Jehoma & Lake, 2016:34), 46% in Botswana in 2015 (World Bank, 2015:6) and 33% in Namibia in 2010 (NSA, 2012a:5). Regarding general poverty, World Development Indicators for August 2017 show that poverty rates (using the $1.90/day/person) in Southern Africa are highest in Zimbabwe with 72% followed by Zambia and Malawi with 61 and 51% respectively. Botswana has the lowest rate with 19%, South Africa has 23% and Namibia has 29% (World Bank, 2017). Figure 1.1 shows general poverty rates at national poverty lines as a percentage of the population in the four cases.

Figure 1.1: General poverty rates, 1990- 2015



Source: World Development Indicators

Comparable time series child poverty data were not available hence general poverty may be used as a proxy for child poverty. The available data, however, shows that in 2015 children constituted more than a third of the national population in all countries (see Table 1.1)

Table 1.1: Proportion of children, 2015

Country	National population (million)	Child population (million)	Proportion of child population (%)
Botswana	2.3	0.8	35
Namibia	2.5	0.96	38
South Africa	54	18.6	35
Zimbabwe	15.6	6.9	44

Source: United Nations Human Development Reports www.hdr.undp.org/en/data

Southern African countries are faced with overstretched traditional family and community support mechanisms, relatively high numbers of poor families with vulnerable children and high demand for social protection yet there are noticeable spotty policy and programme developments for the same. South Africa paid monthly child support grants for more than 12 million children by December 2017 (South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA), 2017), pays foster care grants for children who have been adopted formally, and has considered a dedicated orphan grant (Proudlock, 2011). Botswana, Namibia, Malawi and Zimbabwe have dedicated grants for orphaned and other vulnerable children (OVCs).[1] The World Bank and the ILO has encouraged countries to consider expanded social protection for children, possibly including conditional[2] cash transfers. There are, however, striking differences in the provision of social grants with some countries already having elaborate and comprehensive social protection systems (ILO, 2014). South Africa spends 3.5 to 4% of GDP on all the grants whilst Lesotho dedicates 1.4% of GDP (Niño-Zarazúa *et al.,* 2012:12).

The development and increasing attention to these social grants in some Southern African countries is grounded in international covenants such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children and the African Charter on the

[1] 'Vulnerable children' are children living in poverty with no reliable social safety networks on hand to depend upon in order to adequately manage the risk to which they are exposed.

[2] Conditional cash transfers are cash transfers that families living in poverty receive on a condition such as getting their children vaccinated and keeping them in school.

Rights and Welfare of the Child as well as some regional agreements such as the 2004 African Union Summit which noted the lack of social protection and called for its enhanced effectiveness and coverage; the 2006 signing of the Livingstone Accord where participant countries gave official recognition to social protection as a basic human right and encourages governments to come up with plans and budgets for their own national social protection plans; and the 2007 European Union and Africa Joint Strategic Partnership Agreement (UNICEF, 2008a). Even with international and regional agreements that seem to increase social grants recognition as a key strategy in reducing poverty, there is evidence that provision of these grants by some countries who signed the agreements vary cross-nationally.

This preliminary chapter sets out the logic of comparison, drawing theoretical lessons from the global North (i.e. the industrialized capitalist democracies including the United States and United Kingdom) and the global South or developing world (including Southern Africa).

1.2 How does state social provision differ?

How and why do some countries provide social grants differently from others? Regime types are less understood and researched in Southern Africa. To contribute to this growing field of CWRs, this thesis investigates the causes of variation in the design of cash transfers for families with children in four Southern African countries – South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

The overarching research question answered in this thesis is how and why three middle-income countries (South Africa, Namibia and Botswana) and a low-income country (Zimbabwe) in Southern Africa provide for children in different ways?

Specific questions:

- What are the distinctive characteristics of the child welfare regime in each country?
- How did the child welfare regime evolve over time in each country?
- Why did the child welfare regime evolve in this way?

The critical analysis of how social protection policy decisions are made in the four case studies in this thesis widens our understanding of public policy making in Southern Africa. The alternative explanations provided assist us in understanding the significance of assimilating child

poverty reduction and recognition of children's rights into the macroeconomic policy agendas geared towards equitable and sustainable development.

Scholars have been grappling with the question of how and why social provision differs since the 1980s (Kamerman & Kahn, 1981, Bradshaw, 2012). Hicks and Esping-Andersen (2005:510) ask, 'How do we explain the vast differences in the welfare states of today?' Kaufmann is equally concerned, 'How can one describe and explain the divergent historical development toward the welfare state in different countries?' (2013:28). Explanations of variation are inconclusive. This section reviews related literature on variation between CWRs from the global and Southern African perspectives. A large literature exists on variation in general welfare regimes. By contrast, there is limited literature specifically on variation between CWRs especially in developing countries. In view of this, the general literature on welfare regimes will be reviewed when it is directly or indirectly relevant to understanding CWRs specifically.

1.2.1 International literature perspective

Welfare states provide social protection to families with children in different ways. Child welfare regimes vary by overall expenditure, the generosity of the benefits, the form and extent of targeting, and whether the programmes are rooted in legislation (ILO, 2017; 2014; World Bank, 2017; 2015). Overall expenditure is the most easily measured of these. The ILO's *World Social Protection Report, 2014/15* (ILO 2014) asserts that countries in Africa, together with countries in Asia and the Pacific, spend a far smaller share of GDP on child benefits (about 0.2 per cent) than countries in Western Europe (about 0.4 per cent of GDP). The recent (2017) ILO report maintained that Africa and Asia spend less than 0.7% of GDP whereas Europe and Central Asia spend more than 2% of GDP on child benefits (ILO, 2017:18).

The World Bank Social Safety Nets report, *Closing the Gap: The state of social safety nets 2017*, shows that average spending on all social safety nets in Latin America and Caribbean has increased from 0.3% of GDP in 2000 to more than 1.5% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017:1). The Bank reports that developing countries spend an average of 1.6% of GDP but there are regional variations with Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and Caribbean are currently at the forefront of the social safety nets spending, with an average of 2.2%, 1.6%

and 1.5% of GDP, respectively. Middle East and North Africa and South Asia spend 1.0% and 0.8% respectively (World Bank, 2017:1). Most European countries offer generous benefits that are either universal or near universal, but there is considerable variation in the total volume (extensiveness) of transfers (Gauthier, 1996; Wennemo, 1992), targeting and generosity (Bradshaw, 2012; Daly & Clavero, 2002).

The World Bank argues that increased spending on social safety nets has resulted in increased coverage. Examples are Tanzania's Productive Safety Net programme that expanded from 2% of population in 2014 to 10% of population in 2016 and Senegal's National Cash Transfer Programme that expanded from 3% in 2013 to 16% of population in 2016 (World Bank, 2017:3). The ILO (2017:) specifically reports on coverage of social protection for children observing that globally 35% of children receive social protection benefits but the ILO is quick to note that there are 'significant regional disparities: while 87% of children in Europe and Central Asia and 66% in the Americas receive benefits, this is the case for only 28% of children in Asia and 16% in Africa'. In sub-Saharan Africa, the coverage rate for children is 13%, 'substantially lower than the world average of about 35%.' Coverage is higher in high income countries in Northern and Western Europe (above 95%), high in some high- and middle-income countries in Eastern and Southern Europe (above 85%) and Latin American countries (above 70% on average) but lower in Central America (29%). Coverage in Asia varies between 11% in Eastern Asia and 44% in Central Asia (ILO, 2017:16). The ILO concludes that some countries like Brazil and Mongolia are moving towards universal coverage but coverage in most countries remains limited. Thus, spending and coverage are important dimensions of variation in the provision of social protection for families with children.

Earlier research showed that provision for children varied in these dimensions (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Other scholars have argued that programme differences are either residual or institutionalised (marginal or comprehensive) (Sainsbury, 1991). The researchers seem not to agree on which dimensions are more important than other but authors select dimensions they deem especially important in constructing typologies. Building on this literature, this thesis shows that some of these dimensions are useful but argues that two dimensions – first, programmes' coverage (understood as proportion of children reached by social cash transfers,

generosity and legal status) and second, their targeting (i.e. whether programmes are poverty-targeted or targeted on the basis of family breakdown) – were especially important in distinguishing CWRs in Southern Africa (and possibly elsewhere also). Although spending is a widely measured dimension that could have been considered in this thesis, as shown later, it was disregarded because of the incompleteness of or absolute absence of spending data on child benefits in the case study countries except for South Africa. Most importantly, the universal-targeted (targeting) dimension emphasised in much of the literature (possibly because social democracy has been associated with universal programmes) was less important and inapplicable in Southern Africa since almost all the programmes are targeted in one way or another. What is very important, as discussed in Chapter 6, is variation related to targeting based on poverty or perceived family breakdown. This is an important dimension especially in identifying the different types of CWRs within the taxonomy (i.e. an empirical classification of four country cases) in this thesis.

Research has shown that social provision for children varies in terms of the programmes, known as 'child benefits' or 'child packages' and the level of the packages (Kamerman & Kahn, 1981; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Bradshaw, 2012; 2010; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Kamerman et al, 2010). Kamerman and Kahn's ground-breaking comparative research explores the differences between family benefits for working parents in the United States, France, Sweden, Germany and Hungary (Kamerman & Kahn, 1981. Most of these child benefits are employment-based. This study builds upon this literature to identify the programmes for families with children but focuses on non-contributory social transfers. The thesis further explores other dimensions of variation that have not been fully explored, particularly the differences on which categories of children gets what (targeting). The findings are critical in improving our ideas on regional and global perspectives on both variation and explaining variation between CWRs. It was also important to establish that the ways in which different direct and indirect social grants for families with children combine in each country is a crucial characteristic of variation that has not been fully explored in existing comparative welfare policy literature.

Esping-Andersen's seminal work on welfare regimes shows that state provision differs in terms of 'regime types' (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999). Welfare states are qualitatively different arrangements of institutions - state, market and the family - and distributive outcomes having

been shaped by different historical actors. Esping-Andersen argues that welfare regimes cannot be categorised on the basis of the single dimension of expenditure because regimes vary along multiple dimensions that are only weakly related to expenditure. Countries with very different regimes may end up spending much the same as each other (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26-28). Esping-Andersen clusters welfare states into three categories - social democratic (Nordic countries such as Sweden), conservative or corporatist (continental Europe such as Germany and France) and liberal states (Anglo-American like the United States and Canada) (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26-29). Citizenship based generous and universal income support for children meant to attain equality is provided in social democratic states. By contrast, conservative states provide encompassing and income-related child benefits emphasizing more on family support and negligible state provision. Liberal states provide mainly means tested transfers to poor families. The state plays a minimal role and the market is the primary provider for the employed breadwinners (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

A comparative review of Ireland, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK shows that policies and programmes for support for families with children vary in instruments including cash, provision of lone parents, childcare provision, reconciling work and family, children's rights and provision of care for the elderly (Daly & Clavero, 2002). Approaches used to support for families with children differed but fell into three categories: universal support (Sweden); support tied to father's employment (UK); and along family-types and financially and morally deserving families (Ireland). Generosity of support differs with some countries extending more generous benefits while others are 'laggards' with consistently low and selective (not universal) programmes. The degree of diversity of family support is the second variant where countries fit within the less to more diverse equation depending on the number of income programmes for families with children being offered. The nature of service provision is another disparity where state provision of service was either popular or unpopular for families or in general. This underdeveloped service provision could be a result of lack of relevant support service infrastructure culminating in few family services being provided to needy families.

1.2.2 A focus on Southern Africa

The regimes discussed thus far have been adapted in different settings to show variation in welfare provision. Seekings (2005) adapts Esping-Andersen's analytical framework in the

‘South’ but argues that it is inadequate as it neglects ‘ways in which states influence distribution through shaping the development or economic growth path’. Seekings offers an alternative typology of income support that distinguishes between agrarian, inegalitarian corporatist and redistributive regimes (Seekings, 2005:16). In 2012 Niño-Zarazúa *et al* sketched typologies of cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa that distinguished between the ‘Southern Africa’ and the ‘Middle Africa’ models. In this analysis social protection programmes in sub-Saharan Africa differ in structure and scope across countries (Niño-Zarazúa *et al.,* 2012:12). In the same year Garcia and Moore came up with almost similar distinctions that grouped cash transfer programmes into ‘middle-income’ (corresponding to the Southern Model) and the ‘low-income or fragile’ (similar to middle Africa model) considering the relationship between welfare provision and income level (following World Bank ranking). Many of these classifications resemble Esping-Andersen’s categories in one way or another. These regimes focus on general welfare but show how social provision in Southern Africa differs, pointing important dimensions including targeting, spending, and a review of the programmes in each country. This thesis builds upon these regimes to construct a taxonomy of CWRs and argue that the CWRs in the four case-studies constitute four distinct types. In two of these cases (Botswana and Zimbabwe), the character of the CWR conforms with the character of the general welfare regimes. In the two others (Namibia and South Africa), the CWR does not easily fit into the existing overall welfare regime.

The existing single or comparative studies on social cash transfers show the impact of different cash transfer programmes. In a recent 8-country comparative study of ‘the story of cash transfers’ for children, Davis and colleagues document ‘the accumulated evidence of the broad reaching impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa’ (Davis *et al.,* 2016:1). Handa’s latest contribution to social protection for children examines the impact of cash transfers on child nutrition (Groot *et al.,* 2017). In most of these studies, Handa and colleagues show programme impact in comparative perspective (see Handa et al, 2016; Handa *et al.,* 2015; Handa *et al.,* 2009). Handa *et al.,* (2011:31-67) assess ‘mechanisms for targeting poor and vulnerable children in selected ESA [East and Southern African] countries.’

Handa and others investigate *Social Protection for Africa’s Children* (Handa *et al.,*, 2011). The collection reviews the impact of social cash transfers on children in East and Southern Africa

(South Africa, Malawi and Ethiopia). The authors conclude that social protection is an important tool for child well-being. Their work in both Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (Handa *et al.,* 2006) make a compelling case for expansion of social protection for children. This literature sets out the key characteristics of programmes in different countries and regions, pointing to similarities and differences in coverage, legislation and value of transfers. This thesis builds upon and advances this literature to construct a taxonomy of CWRs in Southern Africa.

Some studies evaluate the impact of cash transfers in East and Southern Africa showing how different programmes impact child wellbeing including their education and nutrition (Kilburn *et al.,* 2017; Davis *et al.,* 2016; Handa *et al.,* 2016; Handa *et al.,* 2015; Handa *et al.,* 2011; Handa *et al.,* 2009). The focus in these studies is on making better policies, but scholars also review programmes existing in different countries showing the variation in programmes. The researchers, however, say little about design, or at least about the reasons why design varies. This thesis builds upon this literature, adopting the comparative methodology, to focus on the design of cash transfer and investigate explanations for the variation. While Handa and others primarily focus on direct cash transfers, this research expands the focus to examine the reforms of direct and indirect programmes that affect the wellbeing of children. This is a major contribution to the existing knowledge on CWRs that underscores the significance of considering both direct and indirect social cash transfers when designing child social protection programmes.

In South Africa, previous literature on social provision shows that there are child grants directly targeting children (Tshoose, 2016; Zembe-Mkabile, 2015; Wright *et al.,* 2015). Grants are primarily poverty-targeted as they are means tested to exclude the rich (Lund, 2008, Ferguson, 2007). Grants are targeted at different categories of children hence caregivers for children experiencing different conditions including disability and orphanhood receive grants specifically to help improve the quality of care (Mokomane, 2013).

Many studies focus on a single programme particularly the CSG in South Africa (e.g. Aguero *et al.,* 2006; Lund, 2008; Lund *et al.,* 2009; AIR, 2013; Budlender *et al.,* 2005). Francie Lund, a renowned South African academic and social policy specialist who played a critical role in South Africa's welfare reforms during the transition from apartheid to democratisation, has done considerable work on child social protection in South Africa Lund, 2011; 2008; Lund et al., 2009; Budlender and Lund, 2011; Case *et al.,* 2003). This work is important in helping us

understand the South African CWR better in terms of the introduction and reforms in social grants for families with children. For instance, Lund provides a detailed account of the post-apartheid social transfer programmes and the policy processes and the factors that led to the disbanding of the State Maintenance Grant and adoption of the CSG (Lund, 1993; 2008).

Lund and others also investigate the reach of the CSG in one province – KwaZulu-Natal - in South Africa and conclude that the grant reached 36% of eligible children (under the age of 7) in the selected district (Case *et al.,* 2003). But the focus on the CSG only (underplaying the role of other child grants in child well-being or how they were adopted and have transformed over time) and on South Africa (Lund, 2011; 2003; Lund *et al.,* 2009) without comparing it to other similar processes and grants in the region limits our view of CWRs in Southern Africa, Africa and globally. This thesis builds upon Lund's analysis of the CSG to include other child grants like the Care Dependency Grant and Foster Care Grant. The thesis also considers the conditions that could have led to introduction of these child grants, how they differ with almost similar programmes in other countries and what factors help us explain the differences. This is an important contribution that widens our understanding of CWRs both from a single-country and comparative perspective.

Building on this literature, the focus in this thesis is to identify the distinctive features of the South African CWR. I argue that South Africa originally had a primarily familial system (under apartheid), aimed at single mothers and their children, and orphans (albeit restricted to white, coloured and Indian people), but this was transformed into a distinctively pro-poor CWR through the Child Support Grant (CSG). Not only do child grants have a wider coverage but the expansive programmes for other population groups further increase the total coverage. Social grants are also legislated. My assessment of the value of benefits concurs with the existing literature showing that individual grant amounts fall below the Food Poverty Line, but I provide evidence that the combined value is generous.

Generally, Namibia's CWR (and broadly the general welfare regime) is one of the least researched in Southern Africa, possibly because Namibia has a small population and there have been few reforms of its CWR since programmes were introduced under South African rule. The limited existing literature usefully discusses the provision of Child Welfare Grants and to some limited extent the effect of indirect programmes on the child welfare regime (Chiripanhura &

Niño-Zarazúa, 2013; Levine, 2011; Subbarao, 2008; GRN, 2010; Barrientos *et al.,* 2010). The literature also characterises the Child Welfare Grants, describing programmes coverage and generosity. The literature shows the limited coverage of child grants specifically (Levine, 2011:45) and of the overall welfare regime (Devereux, 2001) without examining the proportion of children covered by the combined programmes (child grants and other indirect schemes). It pays little attention to generosity. Authors discuss targeting, showing that the child grants are categorically, targeted at specific groups of children, especially different categories of orphans.

This thesis builds upon and advances this literature to analyse the distinctive characteristics of the CWR arguing that individual grants coverage might be low compared to other middle-income countries but the combination of Child Welfare Grants with other indirect programmes modestly increase total coverage. I show that generosity is one of the key distinguishing features arguing that Namibia is the least generous country of the four cases. The literature identifies the CWR type in Namibia as orphan-targeted but I show that the CWR is mixed, encompassing both familial and poverty targeting aspects. I argue that Namibia is a variant of the South African system, but it was not transformed through a CSG when South Africa's CWR was reformed. Only recently have pro-poor grants been introduced, pushing Namibia in the mixed CWR direction.

In Botswana, as in much of Southern Africa, researchers extensively discuss the general welfare regime with limited or no focus on the CWR. The general welfare regime has been variously described as 'minimalist' (Good & Taylor, 2008), doing little, among other things, to promote 'access to social support' (Kaboyakgosi & Marata, 2012), or as conservative (Seekings, 2016a). It is more appropriate to identify the regime as conservative in view of the continued familialist characteristics, resistance to proposals for reforms, the central role played by the family with the state and the market playing minimum roles. The literature does not identify the CWR type in Botswana, particularly the combined effect of direct and indirect social transfers in defining the CWR's characteristics.

Scholars describe characteristics of social cash transfers in Botswana including coverage, benefits and targeting. Researchers generally agree that the general welfare regime is conservative with parsimonious benefits that are primarily in-kind (Ulriksen, 2017; Seleka *et al.,* 2007; Seekings, 2017; 2016a; Ntseane & Solo, 2007) but there is no consensus on coverage.

Seleka *et al.,* Ntseane and Solo and Ulriksen agree that coverage is low. Seekings argues that coverage is quite broad, especially taking into account feeding programmes. Ulriksen (2017:75) posits that, 'Social transfers are minimal and perceived by the political leadership as only supplementary support to those categorised as needy.' The disagreement depends on how scholars define social protection and how they define coverage. Other studies concur that transfers target the poorest or 'destitutes' (Seleka *et al.,* 2007, Ntseane & Solo, 2007). In her argument, Ulriksen asserts that the transfers are targeted at the needy families, what she terms 'income insecure families' (2017:76). She is correct to identify this target group in relation to the general welfare regime but this is not entirely correct in relation to key CWR programmes. As discussed later, the CWR transfers, particularly the Orphan Care Programme but also the school feeding programme, primarily target orphans (and all school going age children) without applying a means test. This research shows that the CWR also primarily provides familial in-kind benefits but they are relatively generous and coverage is high in comparison to other middle-income countries in Southern Africa.

In Zimbabwe, scholars do not explicitly describe the welfare regime as agrarian but their analyses of the characteristics of public policy in general suggest an agrarian regime (Moyo, 2013, Scoones, 2014). Researchers on social provision for families with children indicate that most programmes are familial but target the poorest families particularly in rural areas (Kaseke, 2011, Siampondo, 2015). The social protection system in Zimbabwe is agrarian because ZANU-PF governments (pre- and post-Government of National Unity) emphasised drought relief, land reform and farm input distribution (Munemo, 2012, Moyo, 2013) primarily targeted at poor peasant farmers. This approach, enduring since independence in 1980, is pro-agriculture. Zimbabwe experienced a partial shift from an agrarian regime to experiment with poverty-targeted cash transfers during the Government of National Unity (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016). During the Government of National Unity, ZANU-PF continued to run its agro-based social assistance, providing farm inputs to small farmers. Other researchers demonstrate that cash transfers target OVCs are mainly implemented by Non-Governmental Organisations (Crea *et al.,* 2013; Mushunje & Mafico, 2010), suggesting that the state delegated the role of social protection to non-state actors.

The literature on social transfers in Zimbabwe indicates the familial and agrarian aspects of social provision but it does not identify the type of CWR in Zimbabwe and little is known about the combined effect of the familial transfers on programmes' coverage and generosity. It is also not clear whether the CWR is similar or different to the general welfare regime or whether the factors that influenced the general regime are important in explaining CWR reforms. This thesis explores these gaps arguing that the CWR is agrarian. Key characteristics of the agrarian CWR regime are identified, showing the limited coverage, ungenerous transfers and promotion of familial provision through peasant farming.

This research builds upon and advances this existing knowledge to examine differences in key characteristics between the case studies and construct a taxonomy of CWRs in Southern Africa. This analysis demonstrates the heterogeneity of child social protection even in regions perceived to be 'similar' in their welfare provisions. Table 1.2 illustrates the variation in programmes coverage and generosity- the overall value of the transfers), distinguishing between programmes that directly and indirectly benefit families with children (the CWR).

Table 1.2: Differences in child and child-oriented social grants programmes

	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe
Programmes				
Direct programmes				
Cash transfers				
Child grants (direct cash to caregivers)	Child Support Grant; Foster Care Grant; Care Dependency Grant	Vulnerable Grant; Child Maintenance Grant; Special Maintenance Grant; Foster Care Grant	Orphan Care Programme	none
In-kind assistance				
School feeding programme	Nationwide but means tested	selected poor schools	universal	Present in selected districts and schools
School fee waivers	Most school; also poor students in fee-paying schools	Free up to high school	Needy students only	Selected OVCs in all schools
Health fee waivers	National-free primary health care	National-free primary health care	National-free primary health care	National but free to selected OVCs

Indirect programmes				
Old Age Pensions	√	√	√	×
Disability grants	√	√	×	×
Housing	√	×	×	×
Veteran grants	√	√	√	√
Farm inputs	√	×	√	√
Feeding programmes	√	√	√	√
	Total Coverage (proportion of children benefiting from all programmes)			
	95%	67%	85%	24%
	Generosity			
	generous	fairly generous	generous (with parsimonious cash benefits)	ungenerous

Source: Coverage data from country ministries responsible for grants

These programmes differ significantly in terms of targeting, an important dimension which has been overlooked in existing literature but explored in detain this thesis. All the four countries have social transfers for families with children but some programmes target families or children on the basis of both household structure (whether a family has no father, no mother, or does not have both mother and father) and poverty levels (extreme poor).

Variation in individual programmes targeting is represented in Figure 1.2 (the overall categories of CWRs is presented in Figure 1.3). Figure 1.2 shows programme reforms over time as indicated by the arrows. Zimbabwe and other low-income countries primarily target families but moved slightly towards poverty targeting through introducing Social Cash Transfers for poor and labour constrained households. Botswana has an orphan grant (categorically targeting children more on the basis of their perceived family breakdown than on poverty lines). Namibia differs from Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana since it has means tested child maintenance grants, possibly equally influenced by both household structure and the need to address poverty. Namibia recently introduced a poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant with striking differences to South Africa's poverty-targeted CSG. As argued in the Namibian case study (see Chapter 3),

Namibia imposes a strict means test for poor or vulnerable children than South Africa. The Vulnerable Grant is also largely covering urban areas unlike the CSG. In effect, the grant has a limited reach in comparison to the CSG. Finally, the CSG in South Africa is more of a poverty reduction strategy and is less directed towards addressing 'family breakdown' (also see attached *Appendix 1* Table 2 for scale and scope of these schemes).

Figure 1.2: Variation of child welfare regimes programmes in Southern Africa



Source: Author

Figure 1.2 only shows direct state social provision for children through various social grant programmes excluding the indirect programmes that benefit children. Such indirect programmes include housing (for example, Reconstruction and Development Programme houses in South Africa, Old Age Grants, food relief, public employment programmes). As discussed in Chapter 6, these indirect programmes significantly define the key characteristics of each CWR, particularly coverage. South Africa, for instance, has a more expansive CWR than Zimbabwe perhaps because other than the poverty-targeted CSG and other two programmes directly benefitting children (Care Dependency Grant and Foster Care Grant), children indirectly benefit from public works and social pensions.

The programmes shown in figure 1.2 and other child grants (see also *Appendix 1)* are extensively described (Handa, Devereux & Webb, 2011; Barrientos & Hulme, 2010; Barrientos & Hulme, 2009; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Devereux, 2006a; Schubert & Slater, 2006; Devereux, 2005:8-19). They are evaluated in many largely single-country case studies (Barrientos *et al.,* 2013; Kalusopa, Dicks & Osei-Boateng, 2012; Chopak *et al.,* 2012; Davis *et al.,* 2012; Ellis, 2012; Handa, Devereux & Webb, 2011; Proudlock, 2011; Miller, Tsoka & Reichert, 2011; Hagen-Zanker, Morgan & Meth, 2011; Bryant, 2009; Gandure, 2009; Holmes, 2009; Mirugi-Mukundi, 2009; Samson *et al.,* 2008; Devereux, 2005; Das, Do & Özler, 2005; Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). The literature establishes that countries provide similar and different cash transfer programmes that differ in spending, coverage, legislation, generosity and targeting (categories of children or families benefiting).

The dimensions discussed in this literature provided the basis on which the variation between the four case studies was investigated. Differences in programme coverage (scale), scope (varieties) and national social protection expenditure on child benefits as a percentage of GDP in the case studies were established (see Table 2 in Appendix 1). The differences indicate that South Africa and Botswana have more comprehensive programmes, Namibia has limited programmes and Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi have almost nothing (Table 2).

Based on the variation in programmes (figure 1.2, including other indirect programmes discussed later), a 2-dimensional taxonomy of CWRs in Southern Africa was constructed (see figure 1.3).



Figure 1.3: Taxonomy of child welfare regimes in Southern Africa

Source: Author

Figure 1.3 (building on Figure 1.2 that focuses on individual programmes) categorises the overall CWRs and show that the four case study countries form four different models of state provision. This taxonomy suggests that agrarian regimes (in the bottom-left 'quadrant'-Zimbabwe) provide little *direct* coverage for either poor or orphaned children, that Botswana is a case of a CWR that moved into the more familialist 'quadrant', South Africa moved into the more poverty-focused 'quadrant', and Namibia is a hybrid of the two (familial and poverty regime). A detailed analysis of these four regimes constitute Chapters 2-5, with particular focus on their distinctive characteristics, the evolution of the programmes and the possible explanations to their distinctiveness.

The CWRs evolved differently at different times. The historical evolution of the four CWRs demonstrate that despite the differences in the years of transition to democracy, the key moments of change became apparent in the 1990s (see Table 1.3). The four countries differ not only in terms of what reforms have been effected but also on what reforms have been rejected.

Table 1.3: Historical evolution of child welfare regimes, 1990-2017

Year	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe
1990s	SMG to CSG (1998)	Child Maintenance Grant / Special Maintenance Grant (1990)		
		Grants equalization (1990)		
		Adopting School Feeding Programme (1991)		
			Orphan Care Programme (1999)	
				Land redistribution (2000)
2000s				Basic Education Assistance Module (2001)
2002/3	Proposals & rejections of orphan targeting			
	Proposals & rejections of universal child grant (2002)		Destitute persons policy review (2002)	
	Alternative documents accepted (2008)		Vulnerable children targeted (2007)	
2008/9	CSG expansion to U18yr olds (2008)			Small farmer support (2008)
2009	Conditions rejected			Home Grown School Feeding Programme (2009)
+-2010		Proposal/ rejection poverty grant (2010)	Proposal/rejection of poverty grant (2010)	Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (2010)
			Food basket rationalisation (2010)	
2012		Free pry education Special Maintenance Grant introduced		
2013		Review of grants amount	Universal proposal/ rejection	
		Proposal/rejection of universal grant		
2014		Adoption of poverty targeting		
2016	Payments to orphan households	Free sec education		

Source: Author

1.3 Why does state social provision differ? Comparative theoretical perspectives

1.3.1 Industrialised capitalist democracies

Variation in social provision has been widely researched in the developed countries. This section first reviews the broad theories explaining variation in social provision. These theories do not directly explain child welfare regimes (CWRs) but they have been variously applied in the North to explain CWRs. The second part of the review will focus on the comparative cases of CWRs that have broadly applied the conventional theories.

Existing theories on explaining variation between states vary from the logic of industrialism-economic growth, power resources, state-centric approach (centrality of state bureaucracy and political elites in development of welfare policy formulation and programmes) to cultural influences which are well documented in literature (Aidukaite, 2009; Beblavý, 2008; Wood & Gough, 2006:1701; Gauthier, 2002:454-456; Myles & Quadagno, 2002).

The industrialism-economic growth approach as propounded by modernisation theorists (Wilensky, 1975; Cutright, 1965) argues that the origins, general development of the welfare state and cross-national social provision differences in post-industrial societies are economic. Contemporary welfare states are to be understood in terms of industrialization and economic growth where social spending is correlated with levels of economic growth (Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005). Strong economies produce strong welfare states (Pierson, 1996). This theory does not fully account for the differences between CWRs in either Europe or Southern Africa because it does not account for differences between countries with almost equal level of growth. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are all upper middle-income countries but there is substantial variation in social grants for children.

The 'logic of industrialism' lost centrality in comparative welfare state literature on the realization that even with the same level of economic growth, welfare provision among some post- industrialist states still varied (Rothstein, Samanni & Teorell, 2012; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Wilensky, 1975). Also, the size of social expenditure says little about the connection between social problems and their solutions (Kaufmann, 2013). These weaknesses gave rise to a counter approach - the Power Resource Theory (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi, 2001).

The Power Resource Theory argues that differences in size and coverage of welfare states in industrialised capitalist market economies is primarily a function of working class political mobilization (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983). According to this theory, welfare state development is a function of the historical strength of the political left, mediated by alliances with the middle classes. The Power Resources Theory, therefore, suggests that cross national variation is more an outcome of differences in power of actors or classes in influencing public policy than the level of economic growth (Pierson, 1996). Korpi argues that, 'because of differences in the ways that socio-economic class is related to types of power resources controlled by citizens as well as to patterns of life-course risks among individuals differently positioned within socioeconomic structures, welfare state development is likely to reflect class-related distributive conflict and partisan politics' (2006:68).

The Power Resource Theory posits that variation in welfare regimes reflects class differences over who benefits from welfare reforms. In the 1980s, Korpi (1983) suggested that welfare reforms are more likely to be promoted by the working class (represented in parties on the left) and opposed by high income groups. Later advocates of the theory in developed capitalist democracies argue that differences in class-coalitions or class power balances of different organised interests, including power relations between labour and capital or coalitions between classes such as the middle class and farmer organisations in promoting their interests, explain variation in welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). Coalition politics is central in explaining variation in redistribution between democracies in this literature (Iversen & Soskice, 2006; Iversen & Stephens, 2008). The Power Resource Theory, therefore, stresses that welfare state development is a function of the historical strength of the political left, mediated by alliances with the middle classes. An analysis of European welfare capitalism in the 21st century argues for a 'development of a new political economy of European welfare capitalism – a political economy grounded in the analysis of the past yet sensitive to the contingency of current trends, a political economy which shows the continued centrality of the welfare state to Europe's social, political and, above all, economic futures' (Hay & Wincott, 2012:1).

Power resource theorists focusing on the global North, therefore, emphasise the importance of political mobilization based on social class in explaining variation between welfare regimes. Constellations of political power and ideological influences reflected in variously pronounced legal entitlements of different social groups are more emphasized in this approach (Kaufmann, 2013:30). History also matters in explaining divergences under this theory as the correlation of 'working class mobilisation' and public policy seem period-sensitive (Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005:515-516). Accordingly, the welfare state is influenced by labour organizations, social movements and political parties to expand social programmes yet it may become less dependent on them with the advent of 'new politics' such as powerful groups surrounding the same social programmes that could support new political strategies (Pierson, 1996:144). Consequently, variation in social provision is caused by differences in the roles played by different actors. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) focused on three sectors: the welfare state, the market and the family. A fourth sector was added by subsequent critics: the volunteer sector or the community (Soma, Yamashita & Chan, 2011:11) which is also identified as non-governmental organisations (Seekings & Moore, 2013).

The Power Resource Theory, as applied in the global North (Korpi & Palme, 2003), rightly proclaims that 'a strong labour movement is responsible for expanding welfare programmes' (Rudra, 2015:468). By contrast, studies in developing regions, East Asia and Latin America specifically, show that labour unions tend to be decentralized, often compete with one another, adopt contrasting positions on social policy and represent more privileged labour groups and embrace welfare policies that benefit those groups at the cost of the poor (McGuire, 1999). Furthermore, labour movements oppose welfare retrenchment only in programmes that benefit the more privileged groups (López-Cariboni & Cao, 2015). The extent to which labour movements (or the middle class and farmer organisations) use their power resource to advocate for the expansion of cash transfers for families with children in Southern Africa is not immediately clear. Labour movements in Southern Africa, and much of Africa, tend to promote social insurance programmes with limited interest in non-contributory social assistance, hence they have a marginal effect on shaping social provision of cash transfers for families with children. Working class political mobilization, therefore, as argued later, hardly explains variation between the taxonomy of four child welfare regimes in this study. Variation between

the four child welfare regimes, as discussed later, reflects, consistent with previous research on welfare regimes in the global South, political economy i.e. the politics of social protection, a variant of the Power Resource Theory.

The evident question arising from this literature is how the Power Resource Theory might apply in semi-industrialised but still heavily agrarian societies such as Southern Africa, especially in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Power Resource Theory provides the theoretical framework on which this thesis is based. Theoretical ideas about partisan politics, coalitions and power balances of different interest groups embedded in this theory explain usefully the variation between child welfare regimes in this thesis. Different political actors, including political elites (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014), as discussed later, played fundamental roles in shaping distinct social protection trajectories assumed by the case study countries to form a taxonomy of four child welfare regimes.

Findings in this study, however, underplay working class political mobilization but assert the centrality of political power (politics), as contended by the Power Resource Theory, in explaining welfare regimes. Working class mobilization in Southern Africa, as shown later, is not responsible for the expansion and variation in child welfare regimes, as emphasised by the Power Resource Theory in the North. Differences between the global North and South abound in levels of industrialisation and the use of the power resource by labour and the left in supporting welfare expansion. Whereas the left and labour wield more political power in influencing social policy, particularly social insurance programmes, in the North, and modest power in industrialising regions such as Latin America and East Asia, working class political mobilization in support of social assistance appears inconsequential in Africa because Africa is largely semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian. Instead, coalition politics between a diversity of actors, overlooked in the North but underlined in other regions - East Asia, Latin America and Africa - as discussed later, including bureaucrats, individuals within government, domestic civil society organisations, United Nations agencies and international organisations (transnational actors) actively promoted distinct types of social provision for families with children apparent in Southern Africa.

While class-based research explains welfare reforms in Latin America (Dion, 2010) and Europe (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983), class analysis, as discussed later, appear less important in Africa, specifically Southern Africa, because societies in this region are heavily agrarian and semi-industrialised. Furthermore, business, middle class, farmer organisations, labour unions and social movements appear less organised in Africa and less interested in social assistance, especially in the four case studies in this thesis, hence these actors do not help us understand variation between child welfare regimes in study.

While the political economy approach, as espoused in the Power Resource Theory, remains valid in explaining variation in welfare state development in the global South, possibly by borrowing the political economy approach, previous research has cautioned against blindly using class analysis in developing countries 'as it is less straightforward to identify the traditional classes and related political parties than it is in the West (even ideological party labels may be misleading) (Sandbrook *et al*., 2007: 19). Other scholars have argued that in some developing countries, most notably in Africa, capitalism is mixed with pre-capitalist modes of production, and industrialisation has not developed as it did in the West. Therefore, class structures are very different – one can hardly speak of a proletariat, the middle class is often insignificant, and the elite is a rather heterogeneous group as sources of domination are not only related to economic resources, but also to positions in society (Thomson, 2004, Ulriksen, 2010:44). Ulriksen compares welfare expansion in Botswana and Mauritius and argues that 'A class analysis of developing countries may then turn out rather illusionary with the researcher identifying classes which either barely exist or with substantial different features than their Western counterparts' (2010:44).

Class analysis, however, might be extended to developing, especially more industrialising countries in East Asia and Latin America (Huber &Stephens, 2012; Rudra, 2008). Class analysis appears to apply in East Asia more clearly possibly because welfare institutions in affluent economies in East Asian countries resemble and were modelled on those found in Western welfare states (Walker & Wong, 2004:99). East Asia class structures, more similar to the West, appear to consist of political elites, capital (business), large class of workers, non-working poor and the middle class (Rudra, 2008). By contrast, the class structure in Latin America consists of

‘a significant class of large landlords, a large class of poor peasants and rural workers, a smaller urban working class, and a larger class of informal workers’ (Huber & Stephens, 2012:4). Similar classes, except for large landlords (in Latin America) or a distinctive middle-class (both in Asia and Latin America), are less clear in African countries, and less clearer in Southern Africa, because the region is semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian. Where such classes exist in Southern Africa, dominated by large peasantry, poor and unemployed groups, they appear to lack interest and political power to press for welfare reforms, specifically for families with children, because they are disorganised and, as Rudra (2015:468) argues, the poor face mobilisation problems ‘because of geographical diffusion, lack of access to information, and coordination challenges’.

Previous studies in Southern Africa, however, suggest that various groups of organised interests - economic elites (capitalists), political elites, middle classes (urban and rural), urban workers and rural labourers (such as agricultural workers) - exist and seek to influence welfare policy-making (Ulriksen, 2010:46). Consistent with previous research (Ulriksen, 2010), this study finds constellations of political power between various ‘interest groups’ or ‘individuals’ i.e. political elites, Civil Society Organisations, political parties, transnational actors and bureaucrats as important in reforms of social cash transfers for families with children. The political economy (a variant of the Power Resource Theory), therefore, is valid in understanding differences between child welfare regimes in semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian countries such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

A third explanation is the state-centred approach which emphasises institutional factors. Institutional theorists (Skocpol, 1995; Weir, Orloff & Skocpol, 1988; Skocpol, 1985) argue that post-1945 American social provision cannot be explained through the Power Resource Theory (Pierson, 1996:152). According to institutionalists, politics matters most as expansion of social programmes is generally a process of political credit claiming expected to contribute greatly to both state building projects and the popularity of reform-minded politicians (Pierson, 1996:144). In Africa,, unlike the USA, ‘politics has not been accorded a significant role in thinking and policy-making around social protection’ (Hickey, 2007).

The fourth and last school of thought explains variation in social provision in terms of cultural differences (van Oorschot, 2007; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Chamberlayne *et al.,* 1999). The theory posits that there is a relationship between culture and welfare policies and cultural differences exert determining influence on differences in the latter (Pfau-Effinger, 2005:6). Culture is more likely to affect welfare policy than some other areas of public policy because people tend to hold stronger normative beliefs about who should get (or who deserves) what and why.

This thesis assesses the relevance of these theories in Africa. The Power Resource Theory, as shown later, appears relevant in understanding variation between CWRs in Southern Africa. I further argue that the theory underestimates the role of other actors who were not important in the North but crucial in Africa. I show that international agencies and donors and domestic Civil Society Organisations matter. Overall, the socio-economic and political differences between the North and the South, as well as regional differences within the South i.e. Latin America, East Asia and Africa, make it difficult to apply the Power Resource Theory in Africa, specifically Southern Africa, without modifications. This thesis ultimately emphasises, consistent with previous research on general welfare regimes in the global South, the political economy of the welfare state, a variant of the Power Resource Theory, in explaining variation between child welfare regimes in Southern Africa.

The four theories have been tested in various comparative cases to explain variation between CWRs. Pedersen (1993) conducted a historical study of emergence of state policies towards families in France and Britain during the inter-war period of 1914-1945 to establish why the two countries took different trajectories. Pederson, who is a known critic of Esping-Andersen's underestimation of gender, argue that Britain developed along gendered lines, in that labour and social policies were premised on a normative vision in which men were presumed to be the principal breadwinners and dependence was considered a normal destiny for wives. By contrast, France followed family-type (parental policies seeking to equalize income across families regardless of parental occupation, marital status or class) welfare distributive policies.

Pedersen explains the 'different lines' between France and Britain to a number of related factors which largely show the significance of the power of social institutions. Pedersen further argues that views or attitudes about allowances were crucial. In France, parental logic (the role of

family) was supported across the political spectrum and popular within society as a whole whereas family allowances through the male breadwinner logic based on male wage earners in Britain was still a subordinate and contested part of the welfare system. The push for children's entitlements failed to win 'British public affection'. Unlike in Britain, French family policy principle of equalising living standards irrespective of social class and between the childless and those with children was widely understood and supported (Pedersen, 1993:415-416). Conclusively, France had a 'far more effective system of family allowance' for families with dependent children than Britain. Accordingly, variation in British and French family allowances is explained by differences in influence of political actors (feminist campaigners and pronatalists). Pederson concludes that the differences in the perceived gender roles explain the variation between British and French family policies. This study assessed the effect of gender in explaining variation in provision for children in the Southern African context and argues that it was not an important factor but the role of different political actors is relevant in Southern Africa. The campaign for the expansion of the CSG in South Africa partly shows the relevance of Pedersen's conclusions.

Gauthier (1998)'s study demonstrates the influential power of institutionalised politics in a historical comparative analysis of governments' family policies which were overtly meant to affect families in 22 countries (17 European countries, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States and Japan) from 1870s to the 1990s. Variations between these cases show country-specific differences in historical circumstances and or political regimes and ideologies (Gauthier, 1998). Yet it is argued that values, interests and political processes not considered here could have been important in explaining family policy formation (Glenn, 1997:730).

In their comparison of family policies in Ireland, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Daly and Clavero argue that the depth of absence or manifestation of moral debates regarding family support influences differences in state provisions. Countries having deeper pressure to support families are more likely to extend more support than others where the debate is either not initiated or is less vigorous. Lastly, differences in concerns and interests of influential actors in the policy making process may also lead to policy and programme discrepancies across countries (Daly & Clavero, 2002:40-42).

This thesis builds upon this literature to provide supporting evidence to the role of political factors in explaining variation. For instance, historically, at its independence in 1994 South Africa inherited a social welfare system that provided more for white families than blacks as far as the State Maintenance Grant was concerned and to redress such inequalities the grant which was politically transformed into the CSG was universalised (Lund, 1998). These developments can be contrasted to Zimbabwe's experiences which did not inherit any social programme specifically targeting children in 1980 (save for the old age pension scheme which favoured the white population that was abolished at independence) and did not introduce any such programme until 2011 when a marginal donor-funded pilot social cash transfer was introduced. In essence, differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe may not only be explained by variation in historical processes but the role of domestic politics.

Lack of reforms or lack of expansion of social provision for families with children also strongly reflect political elites' conservative arguments about welfare dependency i.e. households relying on government welfare benefits for a prolonged period of time. There is a long standing argument that welfare policies create dependency. Welfare dependency has historically been criticised by politicians of diverse views in the United States (Fraser & Gordon, 1994). Fraser and Gordon show that while liberals blame the poor less for their dependency, they are surely concerned about welfare dependency. Certain politicians believe that welfare dependency is normal for a child but abnormal for adults (Democratic Senator Daniel P. Moynihan quoted in Fraser & Gordon, 1994:309). Policy experts from major political parties, further argue Fraser and Gordon, broadly agree that welfare dependency undermines people's motivation to support themselves.

A gendered perspective of welfare dependency believing in the male breadwinner model of independent wage earners claims that poverty has a woman's face and women, especially unmarried poor women with children, depend on welfare because they did not participate in paid labour force (Fraser & Gordon, 1994:311; Kittay, 1998; Mink, 1998; Solinger, 1998). Reducing welfare dependency entails making women participate in the labour market. The United States federal welfare responsibilities were rolled back in the comprehensive 1996 reforms (and earlier reforms) that sought to reduce welfare benefits to poor families, in part, on the premises that a 'too generous welfare system' led 'women to shun work in favour of habitual idleness and

dependency' and that welfare 'undermined sexual and family morality' (Piven, 1998:67). Fraser and Gordon conclude that 'welfare dependency evokes the image of the welfare mother, often figured as a young, unmarried black woman…of uncontrolled sexuality (1994:311). Welfare dependency is, therefore, stigmatized and gendered and this was important in welfare reforms in the United States.

There is a large literature state social provision suggesting that certain political elites do not support the expansion of social transfers because it ostensibly fosters welfare dependency. As early as the mid-1980s, social policy scholars had started showing that concerns about welfare dependency are vital in shaping welfare policy development in developed capitalist democracies particularly the United States. Albeit with less effect on child poverty and welfare dependency, earlier United States child support enforcement policies, including the traditional approach to increase the employment of the mother and the collection of child support from absent fathers, were prompted by concerns about welfare dependency of poor female-headed households (Hu, 1999; Robins, 1986). Subsequent studies argued that United States policymakers battle with appropriate reforms of state social provision to avert intergenerational transmission of welfare dependency supposedly a consequence of rational choice, culture of poverty or child-care responsibilities (Harris, 1996; Kimenyi, 1991). These welfare dependency discourses and the ideology of workfare programmes might explain why the United States is curiously one of the First World countries without a universal child benefit (Bradshaw, 2012). Child welfare regimes in Southern Africa, as discussed later, were variously shaped by these welfare dependency discourses.

1.3.2 Global South and Southern Africa perspectives

Despite the focus on the core explanatory factor in the Power Resource theory in the North i.e. 'balance of domestic class power and party-political power' (Huber & Stephens, 2012:4), there is an extended discussion of the Power Resource Theory in the global South – Latin America, East Asia and Africa. Contemporary literature on welfare state variation argues that 'more recent stud[ies] of countries across the global South has been influenced most strongly by the power resources approach focused on the political economy' (Hickey *et al.*, 2018:5). Scholars attribute variation between social protection systems, focusing on differences in general welfare regimes, to political economy (revised Power Resource Theory) (Bangura, 2007; Brooks, 2015; Haggard

& Kaufman, 2008; Hickey *et al.,* 2018; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Kwon, 2004; Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Rudra, 2015; 2008; Ulriksen, 2017; 2012; Walker & Wong, 2004; Yang, 2017).

Haggard and Kaufman (2008) attribute cross-regional differences in pensions, education and health care (measures of development), between Latin America, East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, to political economy factors including dissimilarities in periods of critical realignments, the choice of development strategies and regime type. Critical realignments involve 'the composition of the political elite and in the political and legal status of labour and peasant organisations and mass political parties' (2008:45). Haggard and Kaufman further argue that between the 1980s and the early 2000s, electoral competition prompted new demands for social protection driven by 'political entrepreneurs and newly organised interests [who] pressed for the defense of existing social entitlements and the expansion of social insurance and services to previously excluded or undeserved groups' (2008:181). Comparably, Huber and Stephens (2012) investigate the link between partisan politics and redistribution in Latin America. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay are identified as welfare leaders, possibly because of strong left parties that propelled expansion of the welfare state in these countries. Huber and Stephens contend that the rise of left parties reduced poverty and inequality in Latin America and the variation between the countries is explained by differences in the strength of the left-party i.e. 'the strength of parties to the left of centre' (2012:240). Huber and Stephens assert that 'politics can make a big difference for the distribution of life chances'.

Dion (2010) employs a comparative historical analysis to investigate the politics of welfare provisions in Mexico in Latin America. In the 1940s when Mexico was primarily agrarian, the regime created welfare institutions that benefited a small number of industrial workers. In the 1990s, despite having complete control over labour, the dominant political party could not advance all pension and health insurance reforms favoured during this period. Dion employs the Power Resource Theory i.e. the role played by organised workers and cross-class coalitions (similar to the evolution of welfare states in the North) to explain these puzzles. More recent studies in Latin America argue that electoral competition and organised actors (business and social movements) explain the unexpected expansion of social policy and progressive tax reforms under right-wing governments (Fairfield & Garay, 2017). According to Fairfield and

Garay, focusing on Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, ‘electoral competition, business actors, and social movements play key roles in encouraging or discouraging redistributive initiatives’ (2017:7).

In East and South Asia, the political economy proved useful in understanding differences between welfare regimes, particularly general welfare regimes. In East Asia, the political economy has been used to explain differences between Indian states (Tillin *et al.,* 2015; Jenkins & Manor, 2017). The political economy explains post-economic crisis expansion of the welfare state in Korea (Kwon, 2004; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) or the small state in South Korea (Yang, 2007). Comparative studies of East and South Asia distinguish protective welfare states (India) and productive welfare states (South Korea) by differences between a political economy that ‘historically eschewed emphasis on international markets and ultimately focused government efforts on insulating domestic firms from international competition’ and one that prioritises ‘commodification, and evolved initially from systems that actively encouraged participation in export markets’ respectively (Rudra, 2008:86 & 87). Rudra’s application of political economy is not important for comparative welfare policies between regions i.e. East and South Asia only, but helps us understand the evolution of welfare provision within a country. Rudra argues, for example, that institutional factors – organisation of the political economy, the nature of policy interactions between government and labour and the fragmented character of labour organisations – explain the minimal change in India’s welfare regime despite globalisation-induced pressures (2008:120). Rudra further contends that institutional continuity in India can be traced to the protective welfare state that aggregates interests and structures access to the political arena, government-labour relationship that enables only selected labour groups to have privileged access to politicians and welfare benefits and fragmented labour movements that are neither able to encourage a transition to a more universalistic welfare state nor to block welfare retrenchment (2008:124-5). This thesis borrows this approach to trace the evolution of social provision within each country and to explain the differences between countries.

Notably, in this literature, albeit the strong influence on social insurance programmes, the political power of labour and the left to influence social assistance (that is more expansive in the global South and the focus of this study) appears to reduce as we move down South within the

global South i.e. from Latin America, East Asia and Africa, respectively. Countries in the global South have not industrialised to similar levels hence the differences in working class mobilisation to pressure governments systematically to reform welfare policies to benefit the working class and the poor. Besides, the poor who should benefit from these reforms in industrialising democracies 'face tremendous mobilisation problems because of their geographical diffusion, lack of access to information, and coordination challenges' (Rudra, 2015: 468). As a result of differences in industrialisation and working class mobilisation, the political power of labour and the left to shape social assistance is more pronounced in capitalist democracies, less so in East Asia and Latin America and imperceptible in Africa.

Whilst working class mobilisation in support of expanding welfare programmes, especially social assistance programmes, appears limited in the global South, political power wielded by different political actors, however, does not disappear completely. Evidence suggests that the political power approach is relevant in the global South also but, whereas working class mobilization is problematic due to semi-industrialisation and prominence of agrarian societies in this same region, there is an emergency of new influential political actors shaping social provision. Global South researchers have emphasised the importance of domestic actors (Brooks, 2015), transnational actors (Hickey *et al*., 2018; Kwon, 2004; Lavers & Hickey, 2016) or domestic politics (Kwon, 2004; Ulriksen, 2017; 2012) in shaping social protection programmes, predominantly social cash transfers. Much of this literature, focusing on general welfare regimes, underlines global actors, such as the International Labour Organisation, as the 'primary and most consistent advocates of social protection' (Schmitt *et al*., 2015; also see Cichon, 2013; Rudra, 2015). Despite policy disagreements, overlapping and competing mandates between themselves (Deacon, 2013), and presenting as evangelical and self-righteous organisations fervently promoting cash transfers (Peck & Theodore, 2015), global actors such as the International Labour Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been influential in promoting the expansion of social protection at global level. The World Bank, for example, was instrumental in the reforms of conditional cash transfers in Mexico in the 1990s (Peck & Theodore, 2015). Huber and Stephens argue that 'transnational structures of power' were more important in shaping social policy in Latin America primarily because global actors i.e. the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, employed 'powerful negative (conditionality) and positive (loans) inducements at their disposal' to press for social policy reforms (2012:5).

This wide-ranging extension of political economy to comparative and individual country case studies in the global South, specifically in Southern Africa, nonetheless, primarily focuses on general welfare programmes and pays less attention to child welfare regimes. There is limited attention to the applicability of the political economy in understanding differences between child welfare regimes. This thesis extends the political economy to analysing child welfare regimes in Southern Africa from a comparative perspective. This study, as shown later, marshals a range of evidence to reinforce the centrality of political economy.

In the context of Southern Africa, except for South Africa, which also focuses on one programme, the Child Support Grant, there is limited literature specifically on variation between Child Welfare Regimes. This literature review draws from the available extensive general welfare regime literature and the limited, mostly single-case studies, on CWRs to comparatively investigate the politics of cash transfers for families with children in Southern Africa.

Midgley and Piachaud (2011) compiled a comparative volume on 'colonialism and welfare' showing that the current social policies in most Anglophone countries reflect British colonialism. An extensive body of literature on the politics of social protection, despite focusing on general welfare, argue that electoral competition, change of governments and domestic politics are important in reforms of cash transfers in Southern Africa (Seekings, 2017a; 2016a; Hamer, 2016a, Hamer & Seekings, 2017; Siachiwena, 2016; 2017). This thesis provides supporting evidence for the argument that different factors were more important in some countries than others leading to different CWRs.

Researchers have attributed the rise in Social Cash Transfers in Southern Africa to various factors. Harland argues that, 'This rise coincides with deep concern around entrenched food insecurity, the profound challenges brought about by HIV and AIDS, and persistent high levels of poverty and vulnerability' (2014:375). UNICEF (2008b) argues that cash transfers in East and Southern Africa may be determined by the magnitude of the need, the strength of national political commitment, donor interests and domestic economic and social conditions.

Scholars show the role of international donors and agencies in adoption and expansion of social transfers. International organisations including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and ILO supported social safety nets and have been pushing for poverty targeting in the 1990s and a developmentalist approach to poverty-reduction (pushed by the World Bank and then various donors including United Kingdom Department of International Development) in the 2000s. Other researchers argue that donors like the United Kingdom Department of International Development, European Union and UNICEF influenced social cash transfers through providing technically and financially especially in low-income countries like Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Niño-Zarazúa *et al.,* 2012). UNICEF, on the other hand, has promoted a social agenda focused on families, their breakdown, and what these mean for children and that resonated with African familialism. Some country cases demonstrate the limits and successes of these organisations and donors. Donors were important in setting the agenda social protection agenda in Uganda (Grebe, 2014). The United Kingdom Department of International Development influenced the introduction of cash transfers in Zambia but the finance minister resisted the expansion of the programme (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). UNICEF was important in the introduction of child grants for Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Lesotho and Kenya (Granvik, 2015; Handa *et al.,* 2012). This study builds upon this literature to analyse the role of these international organisations particularly UNICEF, an organisation mandated to champion children's rights. I argue that UNICEF was more important in Namibia, partially in Zimbabwe and less important in Botswana and South Africa. The next paragraphs review literature specific to the four case study countries in this thesis.

The variation between the four case studies could be a result of differences in the size of the economies. The size of the economies (comparative value of money), measured by the GDP per capita in United States Dollars based on Purchasing Power Parity (US$ PPP), also differ between the four case studies. It was hypothesised that countries with bigger economies had high economic resources and will have more expansive CWRs. Figure 1.4 shows variation in GDP per capita (US$ PPP) for the four case studies between 1990 and 2016. South Africa had the biggest economy between 1990 and 1996, followed by Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe respectively. Between 1997 and 2016, Botswana's GDP (US$ PPP) surpassed all the other three cases. South Africa's GDP remained second during this period. Botswana's coverage, however, continued

below South Africa, but above Namibia and Zimbabwe respectively. But it appears there is no relationship between the size of the economy and either social grants coverage and the type of CWR. The adoption of the four different CWRs could not be explained by variation in the size of the economy. As discussed in Chapter 6, the research findings suggest different important explanatory factors.

Figure 1.4: GDP per capita (US$ PPP)



Source: World Development Indicators, 1990-2016

Differences in the level of democracy[3] between the four case studies seem to matter. Figure 1.5 shows polity scores for the four case study countries between 1990 and 2017. Using the polity scale[4], a measure of democracy, Zimbabwe is an anocracy (part democracy and part dictatorship) while South Africa, Botswana and Namibia are all democracies. South Africa polity scores, however, are higher, followed by Botswana and Namibia respectively on the level of democracy.

[3] Based on an evaluation of states' elections for competitiveness and openness, the general nature of political participation and the extent of checks on executive authority (see https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polity_data_series).

[4] The polity scores range from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 corresponding to autocracies, -5 to 5 to anocracies and 6 to 10 to democracies (see https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polity_data_series).

As discussed later in Chapter 6, there appears to be a positive relationship between the level of democracy and social policy reforms related to social grants. In terms of programme coverage, the more democratic countries have more expansive coverage.

Figure 1.5: Democracy scores for case studies, 1990-2017



Source: Polity Annual Time Series, 1990-2017

In South Africa, the existing literature on child grants reforms has emphasised the importance of colonialism (and its successor, apartheid). At independence, the new ANC-led government inherited an extensive system of social grants, suggesting that path dependence might be significant. Two years before democratic rule in South Africa, Patel asserted that 'Both colonialism and apartheid shaped the evolution of the nature, form and content of social welfare policy in South Africa' (1992:34). Later, Patel assessed the effect of colonialism on the development of South Africa's welfare state including child grants (Patel, 2011).

Some authors argue that the reforms of the CSG, especially the expansion to reach all poor children under the age of 18 reflect a strong civil society and the role of individuals within government (Proudlock, 2011; Seekings, 2016c; 2017; Lund, 2008). Lund (2008) correctly show

that the civil society organised themselves and influenced important CSG reforms. The child support grants, which became the foundation of poverty reduction and equity in South Africa, were largely driven by domestic political processes and political elites (Niño-Zarazúa *et al.,* 2012:16).

Patel and colleagues' researches are useful in highlighting the role of colonial history in shaping the current social policies, the impact of child social protection programmes in South Africa (the CSG in this case) and the nexus between child social grants and gender relations. But these studies shed very little light on how South Africa's CWR is different from other CWRs in Southern Africa. Patel and colleagues do not even attempt to explain the factors that account for the wide coverage of the CSG in comparison to other child grants such as the Child Maintenance Grant in Namibia. Patel's studies are significant in showing the effect of the CSG on gender transformation examining whether gender was a factor in other countries in Southern Africa. While Patel *et al.,* (2013) show the benefits of the CSG on child well-being and women empowerment, they do not investigate whether gender was a determining factor in the adoption and expansion of the CSG as child sensitive social protection tool in South Africa and how this compares with similar child social grants in other developing countries. This was the departing point of this thesis.

This thesis analyses South Africa's CWR from a comparative perspective to establish that gender plays a marginal role in shaping CWRs in South Africa and between the four case studies. Patel argues that gender is crucial in the design of poverty reducing child grants, especially the CSG. When received by women caregivers, the CSG is more likely to empower women and enhance the well-being of children (Patel, 2012b; Patel & Hochfeld, 2011; Patel *et al.,* 2013). This is an important finding that challenges the existing explanations (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Pedersen, 1993) emphasising gender in explaining variation between CWRs.

This thesis builds upon previous research in South Africa to investigate why South Africa shifted from a familial to a pro-poor CWR through the introduction and later expansion of the CSG. The thesis provides evidence on the role of Civil Society Organisations, individuals within government and party politics (shifting ideologies within the ruling party) in the extraordinary expansion of child grants in South Africa. I argue that path dependence strongly shaped the

trajectory taken by South Africa post-apartheid. I further argue that Civil Society Organisations activism combines with the role of individuals explain both the reforms of individual grants (the CSG) and the reforms of the pro-poor CWR broadly. In comparing the most influential factors, the research underlines the importance of legislation guiding the provision of grants since the Civil Society Organisations had to rely on courts to urge the state to honour its constitutional mandate to provide social to all children.

In Namibia, there is limited literature on the fast-growing area of the politics of social protection. Authors have investigated the politics of proposals for a Basic Income Grant, showing the limited role of Civil Society Organisations that influenced the introduction but failed to successfully advocate for its expansion due to affordability concerns by government (Osterkamp, 2013; Haarmann, 2009; Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007). The push for the Basic Income Grant also shows the importance of individuals within Civil Society Organisations, especially Bishop Zephania Kameeta, then chair of the Basic Income Grant coalition.

Previous research on child welfare grants in Namibia argues that colonial history was important in the adoption of Child Welfare Grants after South African rule in 1994 (Ulriksen, 2013:45; Levine, 2011:39). There is, however, a limited interrogation of why there were limited reforms in Namibia in comparison to South Africa yet the two countries inherited similar grants at independence. While emphasising inheritance, the role of international pressure is underestimated. It is not clear from the existing literature why Child Welfare Grants were orphan targeted for such a long period and what factors were important during the transition to poverty targeting.

This thesis builds upon this literature to investigate why Namibia, a variant of South Africa, did not follow South Africa's lead in introducing a CSG, only expanding pro-poor provision later and more slowly. The findings concur that inheritance was important but l further argue that individuals within government, weak Civil Society Organisations and lack of electoral competition account for limited reforms that have promoted primarily targeting of broken families, modest coverage and relatively generous grants. Some individuals, Kameeta in particular, might have been important in pushing for the Basic Income Grant but played a limited role in the reforms of the mixed CWR. The lack of reforms, from independence up to 2012, strongly reflects the influence of Angula who was very powerful in cabinet and could have

influenced other political elites to reject proposals for expansion of Child Welfare Grants. Angula's departure from the powerful office of Prime Minister was followed by the appointment of Geingob. The major reforms of Child Welfare Grants happened during Geingob's time as Prime Minister up to his presidency in 2015. It is likely that Pohamba annointed Geingob as his successor because they were both reformists. It is further argued that the recent reforms - provision of general support to poor families with children - reflect the role of international pressure, particularly individuals in United Nations agencies (UNICEF) and international organisations (the ILO) but this role was constrained by party politics (the dominant one-party system and ambivalence to cash transfers by influential individuals [political elites] within government).

Comparatively, three factors mattered most in explaining the mixed CWR reforms - colonial history explains inheritance of South Africa-like Child Welfare Grants, UNICEF pressure accounts for the introduction of poverty targeting and domestic politics (SWAPO seeking to secure political legitimacy during the 2015 elections; supportive individuals within government especially Sioka, the minister responsible for child grants who, with support from UNICEF, became a strong advocate for the expansion of grants to poor children; and ambivalence by influential individuals within government, especially Angula).

There is limited literature explaining the CWR in Botswana. Researchers on the general welfare regime emphasise structural (AIDS, drought and the economy) factors (Dahl, 2014; Selolwane, 2012; Mupedziswa &Ntseane, 2012; Nthomang, 2007). Botswana recorded one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in Southern Africa since the 1990s (see Figure 1.6) leading to family breakdown (high mortality rate and increasing AIDS orphans). The AIDS shock necessitated the adoption of social transfers to help affected families.

Figure 1.6: HIV prevalence rates (15-49 yrs.), 1990-2016



Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 1990-2016 *These statistics are different from the ones reported by UNAIDS that uses pregnant mothers 15-49 as a proxy for national prevalence

Other scholars argue that ideology, domestic politics (political elites, electoral competition, politics of patronage) or cultural factors explain reforms of the conservative welfare regime (Seekings, 2017a:3; 2016a &b; Hamer, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017; 2011; Selolwane, 2012; Botlhomilwe & Sebudubudu, 2011). According to Ulriksen (2017), political elites limit redistribution and the poor receive minimum social transfers to buy their loyalty. Political elites' negative attitudes towards social welfare, in contrast with self-help and self-reliance, were also important (Makgala, 2013). Elites in Botswana revere work and rebuke overdependence on the state.

Building upon this literature to investigate the CWR regime in Botswana specifically, I investigate the politics of reforms of the CWR in Botswana to identify the factors that explain why Botswana has not shifted from a familial system, its distinctive characteristics and discussing the most important factors that explain the reforms in comparative perspectives. It is argued that structural, cultural, ideological and political factors broadly explain the fairly wide coverage and relatively generous and the enduring familial CWR. I further argue that in

comparison to the other three cases, structural factors (AIDS and the associated demographic changes), the ruling Botswana Democratic Party's conservative ideology and political factors (electoral competition and patronage) are the most important factors in the reforms of the familial CWR.

The literature on social transfers in Zimbabwe, like in many countries in Southern Africa, focuses on the general welfare regime (Seidenfeld *et al.,* 2016; Chikova, 2013; Chitambara, 2012; Kaseke, 2011; 1988; Mtetwa & Muchacha, 2013; Munemo, 2012; World Bank, 2014). The literature suggests that the agrarian regime reflects patronage politics by the ruling ZANU-PF and political competition from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Moyo, 2013, Scoones, 2014, Bratton, 2014). The limited literature pays little attention to other factors that were especially important in explaining the enduring agrarian regime. There is limited discussion of the CWR.

Building upon this literature, this study provides new evidence supporting that patronage and electoral competition are the most important factors in the reforms of the agrarian CWR. I argue that other factors - international pressure and structure/need (AIDS and the poor economy) - were consequential especially in reforms that happened during the Government of National Unity. The literature underestimates the role of individuals. Individuals within government, supported by international actors (UNICEF), were crucial in the adoption of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer that promoted poverty-targeting.

An important factor that has shaped state social provision of cash transfers to families with children in the global South is the notion of welfare dependency. Welfare dependency has had a lasting effect on welfare reforms in the global North, as discussed, but it is not inimitable to industrialised democracies. Case studies in Africa, including Southern Africa, illustrate that political elites' conservative arguments and attitudes about welfare dependency have also constrained the expansion of social cash transfers (Ferguson, 2015; Hickey *et al.,* 2018; Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014; Seekings, 2017a; 2016c). Findings from a research programme on 'Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms in Africa'[5] based at the University of

[5] Publications on 11 countries covered are available on http://www.idcppa.uct.ac.za/LIWPR . I was one of the researchers on this programme.

Cape Town in South Africa suggest that social protection (particularly social cash transfers) reforms have been introduced in some countries but not in others, in part, because of political elites' concerns about dependency (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016; Hamer & Seekings, 2017; Kabandula & Seekings, 2014; Seekings, 2017a; 2016c).

An almost similar research programme on 'The political economy of social protection expansion in Africa'[6] focusing on Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia by the University of Manchester (in the United Kingdom) based researchers demonstrates the effects of political elites fears on the expansion of cash transfer programmes to poor households (Hickey & Bukenya, 2016; Lavers, 2016a & b; Pruce & Hickey, 2017). The case studies show that social protection is more advanced in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Kenya in contrast with the slow progress in Uganda and Zambia but the expansion of cash transfers was underpinned by elite ideas about 'dependency and deservingness' in all cases. It is notable that the researchers at the University of Cape Town and the University of Manchester focus on the general welfare regimes notwithstanding that some beneficiary households have children. Building on this literature, this thesis focuses on child welfare regimes to provide new empirical evidence on the political impact of political elites' claims that social protection (welfare) causes dependency and that workfare programmes provide the remedy.

Previous literature, both in Southern Africa and globally, is important in forming the basis of my analysis of CWRs but it is insufficient in explaining variation between CWRs in Southern Africa. Related literatures reviewed show that there is limited focus on types of CWRs and the causes of variation between CWRs in Southern Africa are not immediately clear. This study builds upon this inconclusive literature to examine the variation between CWRs and construct a taxonomy of CWRs using four case studies. The thesis identifies the CWRs' key characteristics, the evolution of the programmes and suggests possible explanations to the variation. The empirical cases (Chapters 2-5) show that there are four regime types (each country representing a different CWR) that vary across two dimensions. As detailed in Chapter 6, I argue that different combinations of factors were important in the reforms of each regime. The factors include colonial antecedents, need or structural factors (particularly AIDS-related health shocks,

[6] see http://www.effective-states.org/the-political-economy-of-social-protection-expansion-in-africa/

demographic changes and family breakdown), international influence from international organisations, particularly UNICEF, domestic politics (party politics and civil society organisations) and the differences in the level of democracy.

1.4 Research methodology and design

The study is qualitative (Fossey *et al.,* 2002; Ambert *et al.,* 1995; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) using a comparative qualitative methodology (Hakim, 2000). The comparative approach allowed for 'detailed treatments of individual countries' (Kennett, 2004; Mabbett & Bolderson, 1999:10-22; Øyen, 1990). This thesis identifies and explains variation in social grant provision to families with children in four countries in Southern Africa using a comparative qualitative case study approach. Considering the analytical objectives of this study, a qualitative research approach was appropriate to describe social grants policy and programmes, noting the differences before suggesting some explanations. The research does not use quantitative analysis because only South Africa has publicly available data for social grants collected through General Household Surveys (GHS) that specifically ask whether households receive social grants especially since 2003. Household surveys contacted in Zimbabwe (Poverty, Income, Consumption and Expenditure Surveys [latest in 2013]; Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey [latest in 2015]), Botswana (Botswana AIDS Impact Survey [BAIS], the last wave was in 2013; Botswana Demographic Survey) and Namibia (Namibia Household Income & Expenditure Survey [latest in 2015/6]; Namibia Demographic and Health Survey, the latest was in 2013) either do not ask specific questions on social grants especially for families with children or ask the main source of income for the household.

1.4.1 Research design

In this research a multiple-case study design (De Vaus, 2001:226-229) is preferred to a two-[7] country case study or a large-*n* study. A large-*n* study, as discussed (see 1.4), was not possible because of absence of quantitative data and the need for insights into the political processes that led to specific reforms within each country, and the variation between the countries. A multiple-

[7] In a two case study design Zimbabwe can be compared to one country such as South Africa or Namibia or Botswana for purposes of drawing social grant policy lessons from that selected country as opposed to having all the four cases in the comparison. This would give Zimbabwe limited policy choices as it will only have one country to learn from.

case design enables a researcher to explore differences within and between cases (Yin, 2013). It was possible to explore differences in each case study and between the case studies i.e. Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, using the multiple-case design. These multiple cases enable comparison of both the 'holistic' (whole) and 'embedded' (various components) units (Yin, 2003:40; De Vaus, 2001:220) constituting differences in welfare provision among the countries. The use of a multiple-case design to draw comparisons allows the researcher to predict similar or contrasting results based on a theory (Yin, 2013). In this study, the researcher used theory to predict the cause of variation in child welfare regimes between the cases using a multiple-case design, allowing analysis of causes of variation within and across cases.

A single-case design would have represented 'the critical case [one unique case] in testing a well-formulated theory' (Yin, 2013:40) but the objective in this study is to compare child welfare regimes between cases. A multiple-case design is appropriate for examining similarities and differences between cases therefore it was deemed suitable to examine similarities and differences between child welfare regimes in four cases. A multiple-case design is richly descriptive and grounded in deep and varied sources of information (Hancock & Algozzine, 2016:16) hence it allowed the researcher to provide a rich comparative description of child welfare regimes based on various relevant data sources and to create robust and reliable evidence. The case study approach also allowed the researcher to tell a country-specific story to escape the problem of operationalising concepts in a uniform way across countries (usually by attaching numbers to them) (Mabbett & Bolderson, 1999:31-32).

The comparative methodology adopted was more useful in analysing the variation between the CWRs. Comparative literature has shown that 'comparative analyses make it possible to learn a great deal about one's own country by analysing it in contrast with other countries' (Greve, 1996:13). The comparative framework allowed the researcher to first understand the driving factors to the adoption of the different social grants and to investigate the most important factors explaining the models comparatively.

A desktop review was conducted to establish existing social grant programmes, policy frameworks, implementation mechanisms as well as document policy and programme reforms.

Data from the desktop analysis was used to document in detail the characteristics, evolution of cash transfers and establish the factors explaining the characteristics in Chapters 2 -5. The thesis is largely a comparative qualitative desk research but three of the four countries were visited for a minimum two months fieldwork involving 91 in-person interviews with key informants. The researcher obtained a list of key stakeholders involved in social grants policy-making processes and implementation from the responsible government ministry of each selected country. Non-random qualitative sampling - purposive sampling (on the basis of knowledge of social grants) - was used to determine the information-rich key informants.

To investigate the differences and the causes of CWRs, a combination of desk review of relevant documents (government and the media) and semi-structured interviews were deemed more helpful (than ethnographic methods like observations involving following policymakers like ministers) in understanding the politics of designing welfare policies. Table 1.4 shows the data collection methods, data sources as well as the type of data collected from the different sources.

Table 1.4: Data collection methods and sources

Method	Type of data	Data Required	Source consulted
Semi-structured in-depth interview **(Using Key Informant Interview Guide)**	Primary (raw data)	Policy environment related to social grants programmes: process: actors, roles, influence; programme objectives; verification of data from reviewed documents; factors that influenced social grants introduction and permitting/impeding scale up	Stakeholder/Key Informants/policy makers in social grant policy processes: Parliamentarians; Ministry of social development/ social services top officials; donor/NGOs officials funding/implementing social grants
Desktop review of literature	Primary and secondary	Current social grants programmes; legal and policy frameworks governing or affecting programmes; programme differences; social protection expenditure and beneficiary (coverage) statistics	Government/ ministerial publications (social policy legislation and policies); newspaper articles; programme reports; national budget statements; party election manifestos; parliamentary debates; UN agencies (ILO; IMF; World Bank- social protection cross-national data bases; UNICEF- Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS))

Source: Author

A desk review of existing social protection policies guiding social grant provision in different countries was conducted. The review considered other related documents such as child welfare

guidelines and national constitutions to have a country-specific as well as a regional understanding of the politics involved in social protection policy-making. The review aimed to understand how politics affect welfare reforms. Relevant programme documents reviewed include social protection policies and evaluation reports. The review assisted the researcher to gain knowledge on key characteristics, evolution and factors that could explain why social grants evolved in similar or different ways in the case-study countries.

To collect qualitative data on social policy-making in the four case studies, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with 91 purposively selected policy-making stakeholders in the three countries (see list of key informants in Appendix 6.1). I did not draw on interviews in South Africa because, unlike in the other three cases, it has considerable existing secondary literature. Country-specific stakeholders included ministers, parliamentarians or legislators, government ministries and department representatives such as the Department of Social Services or Social Development. Key informants were also from policy-planning organizations, government bureaucracies, state legislatures, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Policy experts from each organization with relevant knowledge and experience of social grants programmes in their countries were purposively selected.

Qualitative data were, in part, collected through participant observation. I attended three government-donor organised social protection policy meetings in Zimbabwe, a social policy dialogue and an international conference on social protection in Namibia, social policy position paper development in Botswana and two civil society organised child grants reform meetings in South Africa. Participation was important in understanding the politics of policy-making especially current policy discussions, including the different interest groups and their policy agendas, and discussions on the proposed policy options. Participant observer status enabled the researcher to engage in discussions with policy makers and allowed me to probe them in areas that needed further clarifications.

Data were captured through extensive note taking and recording. To avoid communication barriers through the different local languages spoken in the case study countries, all in-depth interviews were conducted in English. Given the sensitivity of the politics of policy-making, interviewees' preferences for recorded or unrecorded interviews were respected. The interviewees are identified by their real names except for those who chose anonymity. Only

notes were taken during interviews with participants who declined to be recorded. Recorded interviews were transcribed to facilitate content analysis of the statements of individual responses and to arrive at key messages after compressing the data according to the major themes emerging from the respondents' statements (Fossey *et al*., 2002).

The research was conducted in four purposively selected Anglophone countries - South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Social provision in all the countries is somehow similar but sufficiently different to merit explanation. The cases share substantial similar colonial settler histories, culture, predominantly Christian nations, all have or had peasant sectors and mineral-based economic development conditions. All the countries are parties to international conventions such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child especially Article 26 which guarantees the right to benefit from social security for every child. They also have national strategies and policies that incorporate an unconcealed focus on Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (OVCs). In these countries, various factors including unstable macroeconomic policy environments and inconsistent rates of economic growth contributed to the marginalisation of vulnerable and poor members of their societies including children. Almost similar experiences of natural disasters like droughts and HIV and AIDS have weakened family support systems. Support systems have already stretched thin by extreme poverty. All the case-study countries generally experience high child poverty rates. General poverty is also high across the case studies (see Figure 1.1 for general poverty rates).

Despite the similarities, there was enough variation to warrant explanation. Appendix 1.1 shows variation in social grants provision in six Southern African countries- Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Malawi and Zambia. These countries vary according to key characteristics including policy frameworks, (Table 1, Appendix 1.1) scale and scope (Table 2, Appendix 1.1). The scale and scope of social grants in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia is very similar with little variation hence one country, Zimbabwe, was selected. The selected four countries (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) have distinct CWRs, warranting an investigation into the key differences and possible explanations.

1.4.2 Study delimitation

Four case studies in this thesis are not representative of Africa because some (other) countries provide both social insurance and social assistance related child benefits. Most countries in

Francophone Africa historically considered employment-related family allowances since the 1930s (Cooper, 1996; SSA, 2017; 2005). Since 2005, the United States Social Security Administration (SSA) has reported in the *Social Security Programs Throughout the World* publications reported the prevalence of contributory social programmes for children in Francophone Africa. The administration reported that since 1931, the Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Environment and Sustainable Development in Mauritius provided an 'orphan's pension' to children if either of the deceased parents had paid contributions. (2005:118-122). Orphan's pension is part of the Work Injury social insurance programme. Similarly, Algeria, like Senegal since 1932, has been implementing a survivor's benefits programme for orphans in the absence of a surviving spouse to claim disability pension or old-age pension administered by the National Social Insurance Fund since 1949 (2005:27-31).

In addition, since 1941 Algeria has been administering employment-related family allowances. Cooper (1996) observes that France extended family allowances to all formally-employed workers in its colonies in 1952. In Senegal, for instance, a family received 4,800 francs 'for the birth of each of its first three children' (Cooper, 2006:318). In addition to social assistance programmes like the school feeding, educational assistance to vulnerable children and cash transfers in support of child nutrition programmes in Senegal (World Bank, 2013:27), contributory orphan's pensions and family allowances are provided in most of the other Francophone countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Tunisia and Morocco (SSA, 2005; 2017). In Benin, the contributory family allowance benefits include family allowances (monthly cash transfers) and school allowances (school fees) for children above the age of six (SSA, 2005:32-36). Therefore, Francophone Africa generally has a workerist model to child welfare provision which none of the four Anglophone cases in this thesis depict hence Francophone countries were not selected.

This thesis is broadly centred on the idea of child welfare and how states choose to address this with specific focus on social protection and public policy measures. Child protection policies and services 'provided to abused, neglected, or exploited children including early detection and response, policy enforcement and case management' (Adato & Bassett, 2008:169, also see Gilbert *et al.,* 2011; Hart *et al*., 2011:972) are very closely aligned with both child welfare regimes, and with specific groups such as Orphaned and other Vulnerable Children (OVCs) that

play centre stage in this study. The parallel and sometimes interrelated system of child protection is also an important part of child welfare that need investigation but is beyond the scope of this thesis for at least three reasons: (1) My thesis engages primarily with the comparative literature on welfare regimes, which focuses on cash transfer programmes and pays little attention to programmes such as child protection (2) Whilst there might be similarities in processes that shape child protection and child welfare regimes (such as civil society advocacy in South Africa or UNICEF pressure to universalise child grants across Southern Africa), the similarities or differences are not immediately clear and would require very substantial further research. It is also not clear how examining such processes may help in explaining differences in child welfare regimes. Similarities in processes shaping child welfare regimes and child protection policies may not lead to similarities or differences in the choice of social grants across countries. There is need to investigate the parallel and sometimes interrelated system of child protection that seems an important part of child welfare but that is beyond the scope of this thesis (3) An in-depth analysis of child protection would entail discussing the impact of social grants on child welfare related to child protection. The focus is not in evaluating the impact of social transfers e.g. on child poverty or child protection issues like child labour, violence, neglect or abuse (see Barrientos *et al*., 2014) but on explaining government choices for identified forms of social provision between countries.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is on how and why three middle-income countries (South Africa, Namibia and Botswana) and one low-income country (Zimbabwe) in Southern Africa provide for children in different ways.

Chapters 2 to 5 examine the CWRs in South Africa (Pro-poor CWR), Namibia (Mixed CWR), Botswana (Familial CWR) and Zimbabwe (Agrarian CWR). To facilitate the argument within each chapter and the overall thesis argument, l use a standard structure that examines the distinctive characteristics, the evolution of the regime and the key explanatory factors of the CWR characteristics in each chapter. Each of the three major sections of the case studies help us understand each CWR by providing answers to three specific questions in this thesis. The case

studies provide the basis for comparison - showing how and why the cases differ from each other – that is developed in a subsequent chapter.

Chapter 6 considers the overall pattern to variation between the four cases and locate the findings within a broader global perspective on CWRs. Evidence from desktop research and key informants reveal that CWRs between the cases vary on two dimensions: programmes coverage (proportion of children reached, programme legal status and generosity) and targeting form (whether poverty-targeted or family-breakdown targeted). The chapter identifies the most influential factors that explain the regime type in each country and comparatively. The factors identified include colonial inheritance, need or structural factors (health shocks, demographic changes and family breakdown), international influence by international organisations, particularly UNICEF, and domestic politics (party politics and civil society organisations). I argue that none of these factors individually explain the explicit models in each country. Rather, one combination of factors leads to one type of CWR and a different combination of factors leads to a different CWR. My findings extend the Power Resource Theory beyond developed countries but also reveal new influential factors within the theory that have been overlooked.

Appendix 1.1: Social Cash Transfers for Children in Southern Africa- Selected countries

Table 1: Strategic Framework

Strategy	Country					
	Namibia	**Botswana**	**South Africa**	**Malawi**	**Zimbabwe**	**Zambia**
National Social Protection Policy	None	-None -National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (2003) -National Policy on Needy& Vulnerable Families (Draft 2010)	-None -White Paper on Social Welfare (1997)	National Social Protection Policy (draft)	National Social Transfers Policy Framework (draft, 2011)	National Social Protection Policy (draft, 2013)
National CP Policy	None	None	None	None	None	National Child Policy (2006)
National OVC Policy/NAP for OVC	-National Policy on OVC (2004) -National Action Plan for OVC s in Namibia 2006-2010 (2007)	-National Policy on OVC (Draft 2010) -National OVC Guidelines (2008) -National M&E Framework for OVC (2008) -Short Term Plan of Action on Care of Orphans (STPA 1999-2003) -NPA for OVC 2010-2016 (2010)	-National Plan of Action for Children (1996) -The National Programme of Action: 2000 and Beyond (1999) -National Policy Framework for OVC (2005) -Policy Framework for Orphans and other Children Made Vulnerable by HIV &AIDS (2005) -NAP for OVC made Vulnerable by HIV &AIDS 2009-2012 (2009) - NPA for Children in South Africa 2012-2017 (draft)	-National Policy on Orphan Care (1996) -National Policy & OVC (2004) -NPA for OVC 2005-2009 (2005) -Guidelines for the Care , Protection & Support of OVC (2006)	-National Orphan Care Policy (1999) - NAP for OVC 2007-2010(2004) -NAP for OVC 2011-2015 (2011) -Zimbabwe National Strategy on Children in Difficult Circumstances (2001)	-NPA for OVC 2007-2011(2005) - NPA for OVC and Budget Recommendations for Year 1 (2005)

Table 2: Scale and Scope [8]

	Namibia	Botswana	South Africa	Malawi	Zimbabwe	Zambia
Social Grants	**Foster Parent Allowance**[9] **(MGECW):** N$200 (US$ 26 /month for the first foster child plus N$100 = US$ 13 per month for every additional foster child; 8808 children in 2005; Expenditure: N$19,616 million (US$2,315,938.61) **Maintenance grant:** S$ 26 per month for first child plus US$ 13 per month for every additional child; Coverage 2005: N$34707; Expenditure: 348 million in 2011/2012 (including maintenance and special maintenance); Maximum of 6 children in total **Special Maintenance Grant (Disability Grant for children) (SMG):** N$200/month ($ 26) **Place of Safety Allowance:** N$10/ child/ day (US$ 1.30/month)	-No social grant -National orphan care prog **food basket** [10]worth P261 (US$33) per month since 1999. Covering 92% of registered orphans in 2007	- **Child Support Grant** (CSG): pay R310/child/month (US$27) maximum 6 children up to the age of 18 to the carer of the child living in income poor households; reached 85% of eligible children by 2012; 3.5% of GDP; started 1998 **Care dependency Grant**: R1,140/ (US$98) month/child (2012) disabled children under 18; introduced 2009; 2010 expend- R1,356 million (US$116,595) **Foster Care Grant**: R740 (US$64) /month/child (2011) care of children who are placed by Court in foster care ages of 0-18 years; R4,362 million 2010 expenditure	**-Social cash transfer (pilot)** MK550 (US$9)/household/month; extra funds (bonus) paid to HH with children attending school; started 2006 Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot covers 9% of all households -7,480 children covered by April 2007	**-Harmonised Social Cash Transfers (Pilot)** 2011; $8/month/child cover 13 districts (10% of vulnerable HH)	- **Social cash transfer (pilot)** since 2004 cover 10% of incapacitated & destitute; benefits- $10/person /month+$2,50 for HH with children - **child grant** (2010) cover 3 districts (20000 HHs) as pilot; for under 5 children; US$ 11/month irrespective of HH size
School Feeding prog	Introduced 1991.270000 beneficiaries in 2012. N$55 million (US$4,733,219) 2012-2013 budget	Started 1966. Home Grown School Feeding Prog (1997) covering 16.6% of all pupils in 2009/10. Expenditure- 1.6%of GDP 2008/9	National School Nutrition prog (1993)	Started 1996 WFP funded	None	Home Grown School Feeding Prog (2011) covering 1million children in 39 districts

[8] http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home?p_lang=en

[9] http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.viewScheme?p_lang=en&p_scheme_id=1275&p_geoaid=516

[10] http://www.ilo.org/dyn/sesame/IFPSES.SocialDatabase

School fees prog	Free primary education (Education for All (EFA prog)	None	Free publicly compulsory basic education	Free primary school education	- Basic Education Assistance Module [11](BEAM) 2001; provide tuition, levy and examination fees assistance; cover 10.6% of eligible children 2006; 573 245 children (2009/10);$55/pri pupil/yr & $218/sec student/yr	-free basic education for all children
Social Protection exp on benefits for children % of GDP[12]	-	-	1.24	-	0.22	0.0
Gvt Spending on social protection % of GDP[13]	3.3	-	3.8	-	0.1	0.6

[11] http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.viewScheme?p_lang=en&p_scheme_id=1396&p_geoaid=716

[12] http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssiindic.viewMultiIndic?p_lang=en&p_indicator_code=E-4b&p_geoaid=716

[13] http://www.imf.org/ ; http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home?p_lang=en

CHAPTER 2

Pro-poor child welfare regimes: The case of South Africa, 1994-2017

2.1 Distinctive characteristics of South Africa's child welfare regime

South Africa originally had a primarily familial system (under apartheid), aimed at single mothers and their children, and orphans (albeit restricted to white, coloured and Indian people), but this was transformed into a distinctively pro-poor child welfare regime (CWR) through the Child Support Grant (CSG). Certain programmes partly continue to promote the familial component of the CWR. The Foster Care Grant, the second largest child-specific child grant in South Africa, for example, is not means tested and addresses a category of children defined by their family condition rather than the fact of their being poor. The Foster Care Grant, however, is used as a poverty alleviation grant for orphans living in kinship care to, in combination with targeted free schooling and free primary health care for children, promote a pro-poor child welfare regime.

South Africa's CWR is distinctive (compared to other middle and low-income countries in Southern Africa) in that the government spends more than 1% of GDP on child benefits, making it an outlier within Africa. Spending on child benefits is more compared to countries in North America, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean that spend an average of 0.7% of GDP (ILO, 2014:13). The social grants are more generous, near universal and legislated. Social grants are means tested but the means test serves to exclude the rich, with all poor households with children being eligible for the grants. The CSG, for instance, is the most expansive child grant in Africa, offering a model CWR to low and middle-income countries. Globally, in comparison with other general welfare programmes, the CSG is number five, after Di-Bao (China), Bantuan Landsung Sementara Masyrakat (BLSM) (Indonesia), IG National Old Age Pension Scheme (India) and BRIM (Malaysia) in the 'top five [unconditional] social safety programmes, by scale'[14] (World Bank, 2015:12). In South Africa, child grants

[14] In this comparison coverage is in absolute numbers, not proportion.

combine with other extensive indirect programmes to reach almost all children. There are about 18 million children and about 54 million children in South Africa (see Table 1.1). This chapter investigates why the CWR in South Africa shifted from a familial system to a pro-poor one through the CSG.

After the transition to democracy in 1994 ANC-led governments inherited social grants and expanded them massively. South Africa has three - Child Support Grant, Foster Care Grant and Care Dependency Grant - categorical cash transfers programmes for children (Guthrie, 2002:130; Barrientos & DeJong, 2004; Mturi *et al.,* 2012; Mokomane, 2013; Seekings & Moore, 2014:9). A 'foster care grant is for parents of foster children, a Care Dependency Grant for parents of a disabled child, and a child support grant paid to the primary caregiver for children' (Ferguson, 2007:77). In addition to child grants, the government implements targeted child-specific programmes including free or subsidised schooling, free health care and free school feeding.

Children indirectly benefit from social grants targeted at other groups of people but still end up in the same household. 'Aid is nominally targeted to individuals (based on age, disability, or parental status), but it is widely recognized that it ends up supporting not individuals, but rather large, multigenerational households' (Ferguson, 2007:78). Ardington and Lund (1995:558) corroborate that pensions 'are awarded to individuals but are to a large extent consumed by the household'. Such targeted programmes include the Old Age Grants, Disability Grants, Grant in Aid, National food relief Programme and Extended Public Works Programme. The expansion of the Old Age Grants coverage and benefits in the early 1990s (Devereux, 2007; Case, 2004; Case & Deaton, 1998) positively impacted on nutritious status for a third of African grandchildren living with pensions recipients, particularly granddaughters (Duflo, 2003; 2000). Children are the indirect 'beneficiaries' of intra-household redistribution of the Old Age Grant in South Africa (Bertrand *et al.,* 2003; Burns, Keswell & Leibbrandt, 2005; Seekings & Moore, 2014:10). Children may also benefit from the temporary Social Relief of Distress that is 'paid to certain vulnerable individuals' or households in poverty but in need of immediate assistance (Martin, 2010:29). Together, all these programmes expand the coverage of social grants for families with children more than in most African countries. Social grants beneficiaries increased from about 2

million in 1994 to more than 17 million in 2017[15] besides other social policies including housing, health care, school feeding schemes and public works benefits.

While the ANC government has generally promoted redistribution and conservatively objected defamilialisation perceived to undermine the family (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015:136), it has *defamilialised* (state displacing family provision) and *decommodified* (state displacing market provision) social provision for poor families with children to establish an exceptional CWR in Africa. From the late 1990s, the government tended to limit cash transfers through imposing strict eligibility criteria. Under pressure from the civil society, the ANC government transformed child social protection from a 'residual' welfare regime (for blacks) during apartheid and the early years of democracy (Luiz, 1995:591 & 592; Patel, 2011). The provision of child grants since 2009 when it was announced that child grants would be extended to all children to the age of 18 with relatively generous benefits demonstrate the CWR's inclination towards a social democratic approach (the means test notwithstanding). It is very generous to classify South Africa as social democratic because not all poor families with children receive social grants. The CSG, for instance, did not reach an estimated 18% of *eligible* children in 2016 perhaps due to low uptake by children under the age of one and children living in urban formal areas (SAHRC & UNICEF, 2016:6), and many children are not eligible because of the means test. The CSG and Care Dependency Grant (but not the Foster Care Grant) are means tested and not as generous as the apartheid era (but more generous than in other middle-income and low-income countries) reflecting liberalism (liberal regime characteristics) except that liberal regimes like the United States of America would usually target grants on the very poor, whereas the CSG is paid for most children. Nonetheless, when considering contributions of direct and indirect programmes, the CWR regime closely illustrates a social democratic regime.

Some scholars investigate the politics of South Africa's general social grant system (Lund, 1993; 2009; Seekings & Nattrass, 2015). Other scholars extensively describe the different child grants programmes (coverage, legislation and generosity) and targeting (categories of children targeted) (Goldblatt, 2005; Woolard & Leibbrandt, 2010; Lund, 2008; Patel, 2012b; Proudlock, 2011; Devereux, 2011; 2007; Seekings, 2016c; Zembe-Mkabile *et al.,* 2015; Wright *et al.,* 2015). Most

[15] http://www.sassa.gov.za/

of these scholars provide a detailed analysis of the child grants impacts and rightly applaud the CSG as an extraordinary scheme with the widest coverage in Africa. Alternative explanations to the reforms of child grants are proffered with a focus on the politics of reforming the CSG (Seekings, 2016c; Seekings & Nattrass, 2015; 2016; Proudlock, 2011; Devereux, 2011; Budlender *et al.,* 2008; RSA, 1997; Van der Berg, 1997). The extensive description of child grants, however, does not explicitly identify the type of CWR in South Africa. The literature also provides a limited account of the CWR's distinctiveness and is silent on the effects of other child grants (other than the CSG) and social grants for other population groups on the CWR's characteristics. The alternative explanations overlook the factors that were especially important in the pro-poor reforms of the CWR, not the CSG only.

This chapter discusses the distinctive characteristics, evolution and suggests explanations to the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa. Such an analysis widens our understanding of alternative explanations to South Africa's CWR exceptionalism. I show that South Africa's CWR is distinctively pro-poor (poverty-targeted) with outstanding programmes (near universal general social protection to poor families with children). Social grants for children, particularly the CSG, are internationally recognition for the outstanding wide coverage. As a result of the combination of child grants and other cash transfers targeted at other population groups but indirectly benefiting children, almost all children receive social cash transfers. I argue that colonial history explains path dependence but the pro-poor reforms since the late 1990s reflect domestic politics (a strong child sector civil society, supportive individuals within government and shifting political ideologies within the ruling party). In Chapter 6, I shall examine more fully how and why the CWR in South Africa is different from Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

2.1.1 Coverage

South Africa's CWR has comparatively the widest coverage. South Africa had a child population (i.e. under the age of 18) of 18,508,000 in 2014 (SSA, 2015a) and child grants reached 12,665,840 children (68% of all children) in February 2017 (SASSA, 2017). The CSG alone contributed 65% (out of the 68%). The National School Nutrition Programme covered about 9,5 million out of the 11,2 million school children in 2013 i.e. 85% of all school children and about 52% of all children (World Bank, 2015:114). Other programmes for poor households that

contribute indirectly to children's well-being include the Old Age Grants (reaching 3, 295,710 elderly men and women), the Disability Grant (paid to 1,067,402 disabled adults) (SASSA, 2017) and the Extended Public Works Programme, benefiting 350,068 people in 2013) (World Bank, 2015:114). Assuming (in the absence of disaggregated household survey data precisely on the proportion of children in all households receiving grants) that each grant represents a household and that average number of children per household is one, together, 51% of all children were reached indirectly. About 45% of all households reported receiving at least one grant in 2016 (SSA, 2016). By June 2017, 71% of all households that received grants had children (SSA, 2017), probably an underestimation because the number of children in households that received Disability Grant, Old Age Grants or War Veterans Grants is not reported.

Given that all social grants (child grants and those for other groups of people excluding in-kind benefits like school feeding) reached 17,191,121 people in February 2017, and that almost all poor households receive a social grant, it is likely that many children benefited from a grant either directly or indirectly. In other countries like Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia, unlike in South Africa, the coverage of the child welfare regimes is expanded by a combination of direct child grants and other social protection programmes. South Africa shares the same welfare regime characteristic (as the coverage is further expanded by other indirect programmes) but it is unusual in that direct child grants, particularly the CSG, are more expansive than in other cases.

South Africa, like Namibia but not Botswana and Zimbabwe, is one of the few countries in Africa where social cash transfers are based in legislation. The first social assistance laws were promulgated in 1921 (grants for children), 1928 (Old Age Grant), 1936 (blindness), 1946 (disability grant) and 1992 (all social security programmes) during apartheid. The post-apartheid South Africa constitution (section 27(1)(c)) provides everyone 'the right to have access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance' (RSA, 1996). The key legislation is the 2004 Social Assistance Act that provides for child and other grants. Other legislation including the Social Welfare Assistance Act (1994), Welfare Law Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1997, the Exemption of Parents from the Payment of School Fees Regulations (1998) and Children's Act, No. 38 of 2005 are key in

protecting children's right to social security. Social grants in South Africa are exceptional because they are legislated rights (Devereux, 2011).

In terms of generosity, the transfers are relatively generous relative to GDP per capita at $5,724 in 2015, the food poverty line and to other Southern African countries. South Africa uses three poverty lines: the Food Poverty Line below which people cannot purchase enough food; the Lower Bound Poverty Line below which people do not have enough money to purchase both adequate food items and non-food items, so they have to sacrifice food to pay for other non-food items; and the Upper Bound Poverty Line below which people are considered poor but generally 'able to purchase both food and non-food items' (SSA, 2015b: 2).

It is very likely that a poor household with children receives two social grants (either both child grants or a child grant and a social pension). In an average family of five people with two children and three adults, both children and one adult are likely to receive a grant, perhaps the CSG (R380 or US$30), and a high value social pension (R1, 510 or US$111), such as an Old Age Grant (or a disability grant). The combined transfer for such a household in December 2017 was US$31/person/month (using 2016 prices adjusted for purchasing power parity, PPP), higher than the national Food Poverty Line (US$26/person/month) but lower than the Lower Bound Poverty Line (US$39/person/month) and less than half the Upper Bound Poverty Line (US$60/person/month). The combined transfer translated to US$0.98/person/day which is slightly above half of the global poverty line of US$1.90/person/day.

Overall, the individual child grants are generous with the exception of the CSG (see Table 2.1). In December 2017, the CSG was US$30/person/month (or about US$1/person/day) that is above the national Food Poverty Line but below the Lower Bound Poverty Line and Upper Bound Poverty Line and the international poverty line of US$1.90/person/day. By contrast, the Foster Care Grant (at US$74/person/month or about US$2.50/person/day) and the Care Dependency Grant (at US$129/person/month or about US$4/person/day) were very generous relative to all the three national poverty lines and the international poverty line of US$1.90/person/day but lower than the international absolute poverty line of US$5.50/person/day.

Table 2.1: Transfer value of grants per person (adjusted for PPP), December 2017

Grant	Monthly (US$)	Daily (US$)
CSG	30	0.99
Foster Care Grant	74	2.44
Care Dependency /Old Age /Disability /War Veteran	129	4.01

Source: Statistics South Africa

These transfers exclude non-cash benefits including school feeding, free basic education and health care and other subsidized services (including housing, water and sanitation). South Africa's CWR is distinguished by government's provision of the 'social wage' – monetary and non-monetary poverty reduction mechanisms (SSA, 2014:8).

2.1.2 Poverty-targeting

Two major challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa are poverty and inequality (Tshoose, 2016; Langa, 2012). High levels of child poverty persisted since independence (see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Proportion of children living in poverty, 2003-2014



Source: Statistics South Africa * Data prior to 2003 was not accessed

Notably, the poverty lines (Upper Bound Poverty Line, Lower Bound Poverty Line and Food Poverty Line) used in South Africa are higher in comparison to the international Ultra Poverty Line and poverty lines in the other three cases. After transition to democracy in 1994, the government committed itself to 'elimination of poverty and establishment of a reasonable, and widely acceptable, distribution of outcome' (Tshoose, 2016:60). South Africa's CWR is distinguished by its provision of general support to poor households with children particularly through the CSG. Cash transfers for poor children are targeted at poor households regardless of household arrangements such as the rising number of orphans, street children as well as child-headed households (Case, Hosegood & Lund, 2005). The CSG, the most expansive in the country, was designed primarily to address poverty and malnutrition in low income households (Lund, 2008). The distinctive feature of the CSG, the largest social grant for children, is the concept of 'follow the child' meaning the benefit is supposedly paid to the caregiver irrespective of who the child live with. In Namibia, children must be living with caregivers other than their relatives to receive foster care grants, one parent to benefit from child maintenance grants or both parents to receive a Vulnerable Grant.

Until 2014, South Africa was the only Anglophone African country with a cash transfer programme specifically for children in poor households. In 2015, Namibia introduced a poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant which is largely urban biased (see Chapter 3). Poverty-targeting in South Africa is different from Botswana with familial benefits for OVCs and Namibia primarily targeting orphans. Poverty targeting is almost similar to Zimbabwe, but South Africa targets all poor individual caregivers while social cash transfers in Zimbabwe are limited to the very poorest families with children in certain geographical areas. Child poverty and not orphanhood, was central in the form of targeting in South Africa. Studies in the Southern African region have shown that orphanhood per se is not the major determinant of child well-being. Instead, household poverty for all children regardless of their orphan status is more important (Campbell *et al.,* 2008). Poverty targeting in South Africa, unlike the other cases, has been necessitated by the persistent high rate of unemployment, a chronic structural factor the country has grappled with since independence (Tshoose, 2016:66).

2.2 The evolution of South Africa's child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1994-2017

This section analyses the CWR evolution between 1994 and 2017, focusing on key moments of policy change and choice. I examine how reforms were effected and how these changes shaped the distinctive characteristics of the pro-poor CWR.

South Africa inherited a familial social protection system after apartheid with child grants paid to poor single mother caregivers but biased towards the white population. Nonetheless, ANC presidents since independence sought to continue deracialising social grants through expanding the welfare state to reduce inequality and promote a pro-poor CWR. Since 1994, the CWR evolved over three key moments disaggregated in line with the presidential terms of the ANC administrations. The first phase is between 1994-1999 during Nelson Mandela's leadership that was mostly concerned with elevating the historically disadvantaged children by deracialising welfare but opted to limit the expansion of child grants. Remarkable reforms including free and subsidised schooling, free health care and free school feeding were, however, implemented as part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme – ANC's economic and development imprint. The second phase is between 1999-2008 under Thabo Mbeki who was also conservative to the idea of universalising child social grants but partially acceded to civil society pressure. The last phase is the period since 2009 under Jacob Zuma who took a populist approach to social policy and expanded child grants to all children by raising the age-limit for the CSG to age 18. Unlike his predecessors, Zuma recognized the extra burden of care for families with orphans by paying their caregivers an additional amount. Despite being less conservative, Zuma's administration introduced social grants conditionalities that were turned down by the civil society. Kgalema Motlanthe's short presidency between 25 September 2008 and 9 May 2009 is not considered in this analysis as his term was very short with no major child grants reforms. At different key moments in the CWR's evolution, the reforms supported a poverty rather than orphan[16] or family targeted regime. Raising the age-limit and adjusting the means test expanded

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[16] The internationally accepted definition of orphans is children under the age of 18 years with one (single orphans) or both parents (double orphans) deceased. Orphanhood is defined differently in the four countries. South Africa restricts orphanhood to children whose mother (maternal orphans) or both parents (double orphans) have died. In Zimbabwe, orphans are broadly defined as children whose parents have died. Social orphans i.e. children with absent parents are excluded in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. Namibia adopts a broader definition to include single, double and social orphans. While Botswana recognises social orphans, it adopts a narrow orphan definition i.e. children who lost one single (unmarried) parent or two married parents and exclude single orphans (whose

child grants coverage significantly. The regime maintained inflation-indexed cash benefits that were relatively high, kept above the Food Poverty Line but generally low relative to the Lower Bound Poverty Line and Upper Bound Poverty Line. Given ANC's conservatism on expanding the welfare state, South Africa's exceptional CWR, like the general welfare regime, was 'unexpected' (Seekings, 2015: 13).

2.2.1 Democracy and the dismantling of discriminatory apartheid social grants legacy under Nelson Mandela presidency, 1994-1999

South Africa introduced a system of child grants in the first half of the twentieth century. The grants included family allowance, maintenance grant, introduced in 1937 and 1921 respectively, and foster care grant (Woolard, Harttgen & Klasen, 2011; Lund, 1993:9 & 11). Lund observes that these grants were 'problematic for recipients to get access to' (1993:12) because apartheid South Africa had an extensive welfare regime that largely provided for the white and not black South Africans (Nattrass & Seekings, 1997:457; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; Patel, 2011).

South Africa is a classic example of a CWR where major reforms happened after democracy. After independence in 1994, the ruling ANC had to overcome high poverty and redress the inequality (Ardington & Lund, 1995; Bhorat & Kanbur, 2006:12). The ANC sought to achieve equality, in part, through transforming the social welfare system (McGregor, 2014; Ferguson, 2007). Democratisation and political change in 1994 stimulated the growth of social assistance in South Africa, bringing hope that the new government would address the apartheid-era segregation (Barrientos *et al.,* 2013; Seekings, 2011). Mandela who had 'always condemned all forms of racism', 'always sought to create "a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa"' (Ojo-Ade, 1994: 523), focused on dismantling the legacy of apartheid by eliminating institutionalised racial provision of social grants. In the early years of democracy, the government did 'not provide a general system of relief for poor families because they [were] only paid in unique circumstances' (Luiz, 1995:588) yet 'more than half of the black population' was poor and poverty disproportionately high among women and children (Patel, 2011:71). Unemployment increased from 17% in 1995 to 24% 1999 (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2006:60). This

parents were married but one parent is deceased) and double orphans whose parents were not married. The variation in understanding of orphanhood has implications on targeting in each case.

contributed to high poverty levels among women and children especially in rural areas with limited access to the State Maintenance Grant.

The State Maintenance Grant was introduced during apartheid in the 1930s to support children and caregivers (specifically mothers) in white households (Lund, 2008: 15; 2009). The ANC inherited the State Maintenance Grant (together with Old Age Pensions and Disability Grantss) at independence and sought to redress the racial inequalities of the apartheid era by reforming the grant. In 1997, the Nelson Mandela led ANC government adopted the *White Paper for Social Welfare* that 'posited a new path for social welfare featuring a rights-based approach, equity in the distribution of resources and redress through increased access to social services and benefits to those who have been historically excluded' (Patel, 2012a:603-4). An important reform towards the achievement of this goal was the replacement of the State Maintenance Grant by the CSG in 1998 following a 1996 Lund committee on alternatives of abolishing the State Maintenance Grant. In addition to the transition from racially discriminatory benefits under apartheid towards 'racial parity' (Kruger, 1998; Lund, 2003; 2008: 15), the ANC government eliminated racialized access to the State Maintenance Grant through refocusing it from poor single parents to include other poor households with children

Nonetheless, the Lund Committee argued that equalizing the State Maintenance Grant was 'economically not possible' and 'socially inappropriate' (RSA, 1996:22; Lund, 2006) hence it was replaced by the CSG that fitted the new economy and other social protection demands (Budlender *et al.,* 2008:8). The Lund Committee recommended a small amount of R75 (US$5) per child for children up to nine years. Concerned with the age cut-off and small amount, the civil society, particularly the Black Sash, the Community Law Centre at the University of the Western Cape, the New Women's Movement, the Gender Advocacy Programme, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Cape Flats Development Association and the South Africa Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition lobbied the ANC party and government to raise the grant amount to R135 (US$10) and age limit to 12 years (Budlender, 2008:10). The CSG was finally introduced in 1998, targeted at children up to 7 years and offering a modest amount of R100/child/month (US$7). This design attracted divided views within government with some viewing it 'as a progressive first step', yet others labelled it 'a retrogressive step' or 'too small a step forward' (Proudlock, 2011:149). The CSG

was seen as ‘progressive’ because it was not as discriminatory as the State Maintenance Grant as it was expanded to all poor households regardless of race. It might have appeared ‘retrogressive’ perhaps because of the reduced benefits and age-limit.

The ANC was rather ‘conservative’ in reforming social transfers including the State Maintenance Grant, supporting family and market rather state provision. Mandela’s government was ‘workerist’ (promoting welfare through work) and against ‘handouts’. The Department of Social Welfare ‘accepted the need for social grants’ but at the same time wanted to link social grants to employment to avoid creating a dependency syndrome (Seekings, 2015:13-14). The ANC opted to continue the grant but like under apartheid, limited it to a certain group of children, this time not on race but age. The CSG amount was significantly lower than the generous State Maintenance Grant (Seekings, 2002:3) and it was only paid for the child excluding the parent or caregiver as the previous State Maintenance Grant. Discourses about welfare dependency in South Africa show that dependency is not unique to developed countries.

Furthermore, the ANC government’s development plans did not support a radical shift from the ‘discriminatory' provision of social welfare but rather the maintenance of the ‘status quo’. The Reconstruction and Development Programme, for example, emphasised poverty reduction through service provision in preference to welfare (Pelham, 2007). ‘A 1995 draft White Paper for Social Welfare was rebuked for paying too little attention to social grants and the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Framework marked another shift in approach, towards neoliberal economic growth and job creation with a diminished place for welfare and grants’ (Pelham, 2007:17). ANC’s ‘neo-liberal macro-economic policy meant that social spending had to be limited’ (Goldblatt, 2005:241), which did not mean a reduction but limiting the rate of increasing social spending i.e. slowing down the growth rate of social spending. Successive ANC governments, as discussed later, tended to limit social transfers for poor families with children but expanded transfers only under pressure from domestic civil society. Despite the age-limit, the CSG significantly expanded the coverage of child grants from about 22,000 in 1999 to 1.1 million in 2001 (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:70). ANC was, therefore, somehow conservative in reforming child social grants during Mandela presidency but later shifted towards ‘social democracy’, raising the CSG age limit to 18 years, paying out about 12 million child support grants at a massive cost of more than 1% of GDP.

Despite being conservative, the ANC-led government appeared programmatic. One of the most expansive programmes reformed under Mandela presidency is the National School Nutrition Programme. The programme provides a cooked meal on each school day of the year to learners in quintile 1-3 schools i.e. poor schools mainly in farm, rural and informal settlements, and has been rightly identified as 'the second largest state investment into alleviating the effects of child poverty, after the Child Support Grant' (Graham *et al*., 2015:7). Contrary to previous research asserting that the programme was introduced after the transition to democracy in 1994 (Leatt *et al*., 2005; van Stuijvenberg, 2005), the school feeding programme in South Africa has been in existence since the apartheid era. Although the programme is said to have 'originated from the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development in 1994 as a Presidential Project under the Department of Health' (RSA, 2013: vii), the first democratic government inherited the the School Feeding Scheme at independence but renamed it to, initially, Primary School Nutrition Programme, because it covered primary schools only, and later to National School Nutrition Programme in 2004. The programme was extended to needy secondary schools in 2009.

School feeding schemes were introduced as early as 1916, initially for poor white children in urban areas. South Africa had individual and community funded school feeding programmes as early as the late 1930s. The then ruling United Party officially introduced school feeding nationwide in 1943 for all primary learners regardless of their race. About one million children, half of them being black, benefited from the School Feeding Scheme between 1943 and 1944 (Kallaway, 1996). At its inception in 1943, the School Feeding Scheme was funded by government through provinces but the national Department of Social Welfare was responsible for administering the programme (RSA, 2013:11). Subsidies for natives (blacks) were, however, removed in 1945 when programme administration moved from Social Welfare to the Department of Education. Subsidies were reintroduced after 1948 during apartheid but the feeding scheme for natives received less funding and was eventually discontinued in 1957/8 (Kallaway, 1996:9). Kallaway asserts that charity organisations including private enterprises, donors and non-governmental organisations, however, continued to fund the scheme. Despite lack of government support for nationwide school feeding, the programme continued to exist with support from charity organisations.

After independence in 1994, president Mandela reconfigured feeding programmes, which already existed during apartheid, under the Integrated Nutrition Programme (Brits *et al*., 2017:214). Feeding programmes under the Integrated Nutrition Programme included the Primary School Nutrition Programme, community programmes and food parcels. The ANC made election promises to implement school feeding within 100 days after the 1994 election (RSA, 2013:11). The post-Apartheid ANC government has invested significantly in the National School Nutrition Programme. School feeding was funded R477.8 million between 1994 and 1996 as part of the Integrated Nutrition Programme (RSA, 2013:12) and funded about R6 billion[17] in 2016/7 financial year.

School feeding was implemented on a national scale at independence in 1994 as a poverty alleviation programme and an educational intervention. The school feeding programme, thus, together with poverty-targeted child grants and other child grants indirectly used for poverty alleviation such as the Foster Care Grant, promotes South Africa's pro-poor child welfare regime. The focus on poor children is expressed in the objective to 'enhance programmes for orphans and vulnerable children' (RSA, 2013:12). Although the programme aims to alleviate short-term hunger and address micro-nutrient deficiencies among school learners (van Stuijvenberg, 2005:213), school feeding targets learners in schools in poor socio-economic areas i.e. poorly resourced schools in poor communities (quintile 1-3 schools). School feeding complements other school-based pro-poor programmes because quintile 1-3 schools are also non-fee-paying schools. School feeding is, therefore, implemented as a poverty alleviation programme and an educational intervention (Leatt *et al.,* 2005:16). Targeting works in two ways: first, whole schools are selected for funding for the programme and secondly learners are selected by age, grade or some other criteria within the selected schools.

The programme is expansive, reaching about 9,5 million out of the 11,2 million children of school-going age in 2017, i.e. about 85% of learners.[18] It is the biggest school feeding programme in Africa. School feeding, however, is small in terms of value of transfer, cost and reach compared with the CSG. The average value of transfer for school feeding was R3

[17] National treasury budget, 2017

[18] http://www.childrencount.net/domain.php?id=6

(US$0.38)/child/day in 2013 (RSA, 2013), translating to about R60 (US$6)/child/month. By contrast, the CSG transfer value was approximately five times higher than school feeding at R300 (US$28)/child/month in 2013. Notably, school learners receive meals for a maximum of 195 school days per year and this negatively affects the average monthly transfer when compared to programmes that provide support for the whole year (such as the CSG).[19] Figure 2.2 compares cost of the National School Nutrition Programme and the CSG over time.

Figure 2.2: Cost of National School Nutrition Programme and CSG, 1998-2017



Source: Government of South Africa annual budgets

Figure 2.2 shows that the CSG costs much more than the school feeding programme, making it the most important child poverty alleviation strategy in South Africa. Whereas the cost of the CSG rose from about US$538 million in 2004/5 to more than US$4178 million in 2016/7, the school feeding costed about US$132 million and about US$493 million respectively. The ANC-

[19] A CSG value of US$185 and a school feeding programme value of US$75 is paid for 195 days. These values are calculated using the daily transfer of US$0.93 and US$0.38 for CSG and school feeding respectively.

led government, therefore, might be supporting the expansive school feeding programme because it is not expensive. It is curious, however, that the ANC supports a huge and expensive programme like the CSG. Even if we compare programme reach, the CSG still proves more important than the school feeding programme (see figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3: Reach of National School Nutrition Programme and CSG, 1998-2017



Source: Republic of South Africa departmental annual reports and financial budget

Figure 2.3 shows that the CSG reaches more children compared with the National School Nutrition Programme. CSG reach increased from 22000 children in 1998 to more than 12 million in 2017 while the National School Nutrition Programme benefitted about 5 million and 9,5 million children respectively. The big difference in reach between the two programmes for the period 1998-2004 is, in part, because the CSG was still new and beneficiaries were gradually enrolled on to the programme. From the cost and reach perspectives, while the National School Nutrition Programme is expansive relative to similar programmes in Africa, the CSG proves to be the most important child social protection scheme in post-apartheid South Africa. Continued budget support, by the ANC-led government, for both programmes, suggests political commitment for child poverty alleviation. Furthermore, the allocation of a big budget for the

CSG reflects the ANC's commitment to implement pro-poor social transfers for families with children.

Post-apartheid reforms, specifically coverage (reach) and targeting, of the school feeding programme, show strong political interests by the Mandela-led government to address child malnutrition and redress unequal access to education that characterised apartheid. Targeting and coverage reforms, therefore, became part of the ANC government's initial child social protection strategies to reduce child malnutrition and poverty for all children regardless of race and location. The primary concern of the ANC-led government was to 'eliminate the unacceptable rate of child death due to insufficient nutrition intake' (Graham *et al*., 2015:10), but it appears the school feeding programme was more than an educational, poverty and health intervention. What was the political motivation for president Mandela to reintroduce the programme as a 'Presidential Project'? Moreover, school feeding was later expanded to all learners in 2008 against recommendations to reduce it to fewer schools because of infrastructural gaps (Louw *et al.,* 2001; RSA, 2013:13; Saasa *et al*., 1997). While it is not clear whether the ANC used the school feeding programme as a tool to gain political support, it is likely that school feeding appealed to voters, particularly those in communities previously excluded from the programme i.e. people in farm areas, informal settlements and rural areas. From this perspective, the ANC had the political incentive to reform the school feeding programme after coming to power in 1994.

Children in public primary and secondary schools receive subsidised schooling or school fee exemptions. The South African Schools Act of 1996[20] allows for learners from poor families to be exempted from paying school fees. The Act requires the Minister of Basic Education to conduct a poverty ranking of schools. Schools are ranked between quintiles one and five, with quintile one being schools in a very poor area and quintile five being schools in a wealthier area. Schools in quintiles one to three are no-fee schools, and schools in quintiles four and five are fee-charging schools. Government wholly subsidises schools in quintiles one to three, and partially

[20] see South African Schools Act 84 of 1996
https://www.elrc.org.za/sites/default/files/documents/sa%20schools%20act.pdf

subsidises schools in quintiles four and five. No-fee schools were introduced in 2007 where the No-fee Schools policy abolishes school fees in the poorest 40% of schools nationally for learners from Grade R to Grade 9 (Leatt *et al.,* 2005:17). Both fee exemptions and free schooling are means-tested but they are automatically granted to orphans, learners in foster care and Child Support Grant beneficiaries.

After 1994 the ANC-led government removed user fees for primary health care as a means to improve access to health care for children living in poverty (Leatt *et al.*, 2005:19; Martin, 2010:82). User fees were initially removed for children under the age of six and for pregnant women and later extended to include free primary health care for everyone in the public sector. More recent reforms entailed expanding health fee waivers for secondary and tertiary care for children living with disabilities (Leatt *et al.,* 2005:19).

The provision of targeted school feeding, subsidised and free schooling and free primary health care complements child grants, particularly the poverty-targeted CSG, to create a set of pro-poor policies. These targeted programmes were developed alongside cash transfers (although through different processes, with less pressure from the civil society) after democratisation to support a pro-poor child welfare regime in South Africa.

2.2.2 ANC conservatism, civil society mobilisation, and social grants under Thabo Mbeki presidency, 1999-2008

The success of ANC government in replacing the State Maintenance Grant during Mandela presidency allowed the ANC to expand child grants to previously excluded poor black families with children. The ANC might have seen the introduction of the CSG as a big achievement but the civil society was concerned with the continued exclusion of many orphaned and poor children due to the strict means test. The civil society coalesced to propose significant reforms including the adoption of a universal Basic Income Grant or universalising the CSG that would ensure child grants reach all poor children. Mbeki's administration was not amenable to the proposals and eventually opted to partially raise the age limit and review the means test. As discussed later, the CWR largely became redistributive with strong social democratic characteristics despite the ruling party being conservative.

In 2002, the Alliance for Children's Entitlement to Social Security, amongst other civil society organisations, proposed 'a Basic Income Grant for all citizens' to effectively cover poor children not reached by the existing grants particularly the CSG (Rosa & Guthrie, 2002:4). The Basic Income Grant would reduce the coverage gaps within the social security system by providing social assistance to everyone i.e. it would extend social assistance to the 60% of the adult population living in poverty without receiving government assistance (Samson, 2002:76; Rosa & Guthrie, 2002:4). The Alliance for Children's Entitlement to Social Security also proposed a universal child grant by extending the CSG to all children under 18 years and removing the means test. Earlier, the Basic Income Grant idea had been raised at the Presidential Jobs Summit by the powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions in 1998, promoted by the Basic Income Grant Coalition in 2001 and resurfaced in the government's Taylor Committee recommendations to rationalize the social security system in 2002 (Ferguson, 2007:78; Makino, 2004; Meth, 2004; Seekings, 2002; Matisonn & Seekings, 2002; 2003; Samson, 2002). A Basic Income Grant would be a welcome income support to the increasing number of poor and unemployed people. The Basic Income Grant was to be a universal monthly modest payment of R100 (US$7) per person 'paid to the person primarily responsible for childcare' for children (Samson, 2002:76). The ANC was cautious in handling the proposal arguing that it was not affordable and would cause dependency (Meth, 2004:1). Simulations suggested a Basic Income Grant was affordable (Le Roux, 2002). Despite being endorsed by the civil society organisations, the political opposition and supported by influential ANC members, the Basic Income Grant was, 'emphatically rejected by the top leadership' (Ferguson, 2007:79).

The rejection of a Basic Income Grant continued the exclusion of children who were not covered by the existing grants. The excluded children included those living in poor households headed by the excluded 60% adult population already mentioned like 76% of children who lived without non-pensioners (Samson, 2002:71). The Basic Income Grant proposal unsuccessfully sought to introduce a citizen grant that would have benefited all children regardless of their caregivers' income. The rejection reveals the Mbeki-led ANC government's conservative characteristics. Mbeki himself was against a radical reform through introducing the Basic Income Grant but preferred a social assistance system that maintains such grants as the Old Age Grants and Disability grants and free public health care (Meth, 2004:2). As also shown by the rejection of an orphan grant, discussed later, the Basic Income Grant rejection illustrates ANC's unwillingness

to experiment with new social protection programmes. Still, the debates leading to the rejection were vital in influencing the government to instead consider the first age extension of the CSG in 2003. As Seekings observes, 'Hostility to a Basic Income Grant opened space for raising the CSG age limit as a compromise' (Seekings, 2016c:18).

Apart from the poverty-targeted CSG reforms and debates, the Foster Care Grant, the second largest child-specific cash transfer scheme in South Africa, was reformed significantly in 2002/3. The Foster Care Grant, inherited at independence, was initially part of the child protection system (in contrast with the CSG which was part of the government's poverty alleviation response) since it was given after court ordered foster care placements in cases where the government had removed children from their family environment due to abuse or neglect (Hall & Proudlock, 2011:1). The Foster Care Grant, thus, was used for child protection since it targeted children on the basis of their condition (abuse or neglect) rather than the fact of their being poor.

Between 1994 and 2002 the number of Foster Care Grants beneficiaries remained relatively stable at about 50,000 per year but a major policy change since 2003 led to a rapid expansion of over than 50,000 per year. Orphans were brought into the foster care system in 2003 when then Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya, announced that the Foster Care Grant would be made available to relatives who cared for orphaned children (Skweyiya 2002). Hall and Proudlock argue that the number of Foster Care Grants in 2003 (and subsequent years) increased rapidly after the minister's announcement and similar statements from other officials (2011:2). Hall and Proudlock further claim that since 2003, the Foster Care Grant 'has increasingly been used to provide financial services to orphan caregivers and has effectively been used as a poverty alleviation grant for orphans in kinship care.' The Foster Care Grant, possibly because of its higher value (nearly three times the CSG) has been used as a social protection rather than a child protection mechanism. The shift to a social protection scheme promoted South Africa's pro-poor child welfare regime.

In 2003 the ANC government also rejected proposals for an orphan grant. In the early 1990s and 2000s Southern Africa, and many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of orphans primarily due to HIV/AIDS. By July 2002 South Africa had 885,000 maternal orphans (i.e. children whose mothers had died), 73% as a result of AIDS (Giese *et al.,* 2003). HIV/AIDS prevalence remained one of the highest in the world at about

22% in 2003 (Bhorat & Kanbur, 2006:12) and continued to increase AIDS-related mortality. This orphan situation called for government immediate action. The big question facing the region in relation to child welfare was how states should respond to the orphan problem in the era of HIV/AIDS. Botswana introduced an Orphan Care Programme in 1999 and Namibia primarily focused its two major child welfare grants – the Foster Care Grant and Child Maintenance Grant - on double (both parents dead) and single (one parent dead) orphans respectively.

Given that orphans – defined as children 'under the age of 18 whose mother, father, or both biological parents have died' (Meintjies & Hall 2010: 102) - placed under foster care benefited from the Foster Care Grant, the debate was on whether to introduce an orphan grant (to benefit orphans living with relatives without being placed under foster care by a court order), similar to Botswana or Namibia or to reform the existing grants to accommodate all orphans. After replacing the State Maintenance Grant with the CSG in 1998, the government was reluctant to universalize child support grants on affordability basis. Without a universal CSG, the Department of Social Development, through the draft Children Bill (2002), proposed four orphan-targeted grants. An *Informal Kinship Care Grant* would cover South African children up to the age of 18 living in the care of their relatives without the intervention of the courts. A *Foster Care Grant* would be for children up to the age of 18 who are by legal definition 'in need of care' and placed by a court order in the care of unrelated foster parents. A *Court-ordered Kinship Care Grant* would target children up to the age of 18 who are by legal definition 'in need of care' and are placed by court order in the care of relatives. An *Adoption Grant* for caregivers adopting orphans 'with recommendations that this be equal in value to the Foster Care Grant' or 'Court-ordered Kinship Care Grant on the assumption that this would facilitate the permanent placement of children who require long-term caregivers because their biological parents are deceased or unable to provide care' (Giese *et al.,* 2003:12). These 'foster care' grants were meant to, as later revealed by the Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya, encourage 'relatives to take care of orphaned children under the foster care package' (Giese *et al.,* 2003:1).

Domestic civil society organisations collated arguments and supporting evidence against orphan-targeted grants. Various researches showed that although orphanhood increased vulnerability to child poverty, orphans did not require a 'special' grant as they proved not different or and in

some cases less poor than other vulnerable children. A government commissioned study conducted by the Children's Institute concluded that the majority of poverty related needs prioritised by orphans were shared by other children not experiencing orphanhood (Giese *et al.,* 2003). Other studies showed that the predicted impact of AIDS-related orphanhood, including that family will not cope, were overrated in South Africa and other parts of Africa (Foster, 2000; Bray, 2003). Using evidence from 'primary research, demographic projections and by costing a range of different social security scenarios' Meintjes *et al.,* (2003) argued that South Africa had a long history of poor children not living with biological parents and cared for by relatives. Black Sash commissioned its own a comparative study that projected a decline in the number of orphans by 2015. This meant government would reduce expenditure on orphans through foster care grants. Black Sash recommended that 'government had to increase substantially per capita spending on health and social welfare if it is to cater for the requirements of needy people... irrespective of HIV status' (Kallmann, 2003:55).

Given that many children lived in poverty, a universal child grant, possibly by extending the CSG to all children (and removing the means test that restricted children's access) would have been a more effective child social protection intervention. This research evidence convinced the government not to introduce orphan grants but to explore other more inclusive ways of increasing access to social grants. Government still continued to place orphans in foster care with relatives. The Foster Care Grant was, therefore, 'used to meet the social assistance (poverty-related) needs for orphaned children' (Hall, Skelton & Sibanda, 2016: 68). Civic organisations, as discussed later, used these studies to pressure the government to extend the CSG to all children and to advocate for additional grant payments for families caring for orphans.

Rather than introducing new grants – the Basic Income Grant and the orphan grant – the ANC opted to extend the age threshold of the CSG to 14 years in 2003. Assessments of the CSG indicated 'coverage' (number of beneficiaries) and 'benefit' (amount of money) gaps (ACESS, 2003a & b; Rosa & Guthrie, 2002). The CSG was strategically designed to exclude equally deserving children who fell outside the age limit, what Kidd, Gelders and Bailey-Athias (2017) term 'exclusion by design'. A total of 3,5 million children were excluded by 2002. The Alliance for Children's Entitlement to Social Security reported that the CSG was ineffective because of

‘the small benefit amount [R160/month by February 2003] and the limited age eligibility’ (ACESS, 2003a).

To improve the impact of the CSG, the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security recommended a universal child grant through the ‘Extension of the CSG to all children under 18 years’ (Rosa & Guthrie, 2002:4). The Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security argued that the age extension would be in line with the definition of a child as defined by the South African constitution and lobbied the ANC party at its 2002 Policy Conference and thereafter the government through the Minister of Social Development (Budlender, 2008:18). The government did not fully accept the proposals on ‘affordability’ grounds (Seekings, 2016c; 2017). Using research evidence, the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security, other civil society organizations and research institutes, including the Children’s Institute at the University of Cape Town, successfully advocated for the age extension from 6 to 14 years. This first raising of the age limit for the CSG expanded the coverage and increased the value of social grants for poor families with children. The age extension, as discussed, was a compromise between introducing a universal CSG or Basic Income Grant.

On the part of government, ‘improved public finances’ led President Thabo Mbeki’s administration to increase the CSG age limit (Seekings, 2016c:11) and allocate more budget on public spending (RSA, 2002; Patel, 2011:79). Consequently, more children were reached through the CSG, widening the overall coverage of cash benefits for families with children. The overall coverage increased from ‘2.6 million in 1994 to more than 10 million as of 2005’. ‘Much of the increase is due to the fact that the child support grant programme has been expanded several times to include children under 9 years of age in 2003, children under 11 years of age in 2004, and children under 14 years of age in 2005’ (Ferguson, 2007:77).

Age extension to 14 was implemented in three phases: the first phase-in of children under 9 years increased beneficiaries by 170% by 2003 (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:70), the second phase in 2004 included 10- and 11-year-olds, increasing beneficiaries by another 39% between 2003 and 2004, and the last phase in 2005 phased-in children up to 14 years increasing by 70%. As a result, the total number of beneficiaries increased from 4,273,056 in 2003 to more than 7 million in 2005 (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:70; 2012; ACESS, 2003a & b).

Nevertheless, the civil society was unsuccessful in convincing the government to increase the CSG amount. The government ironically argued it was not affordable yet it had increased the coverage by extending the age limit. Seekings (2016c) maintains that this paradox can be explained by the mediation role of politics on affordability. 'The expanded space resulted in policy reforms because, however, of political conditions, within the government, within the ANC and the ANC-led 'Alliance', in civil society and in the electorate.' (2016c:14). Seekings further argue that the ANC redefined 'affordability' to justify its position on expanding social grants. Thus, the unusual expansion of the CSG is a case of shifting discourses of affordability (Seekings, 2016c; 2017).

The 2007-08 period leading to Thabo Mbeki's resignation and his replacement by Zuma saw the civil society successfully push for fundamental reforms to access to child grants, especially the CSG. Three major reforms implemented by the Mbeki administration in 2008 include raising the CSG age limit to 15, adjusting the income threshold and allowing the temporary use of alternative identification documents. These reforms were consequential in increasing child grants coverage (reach). The reforms also meant increased household income support from government for newly enrolled families.

Raising the CSG age limit to children under 14 years in 2003 meant children between 15-18 years were still excluded. The civil society, particularly the Children's Institute and ACESS, continued to advocate for the extension of the CSG to all children less than 18 years through its CSG Extension Project (Rosa & Mpokotho, 2004). The project (involving various strategies of collecting access cases on the CSG through the Case Alert hotline) established by the Children's Institute and the Alliance for Children's Entitlement to Social Security between 2003-4 captured complains from caregivers, parents, Community Based Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and paralegal offices. This evidence showed that despite the age extension, many eligible children were not accessing the CSG. Under pressure from civil society, the Minister of Finance announced in his 2008 Budget an age extension to children less than 15 years starting in 2009. As discussed later, the extension was still exclusionary and did not deter the civil society from continuing to lobby for the extension to all children. Moreover, the civil society widened their advocacy for reforms to the general welfare regime indirectly impacting child well-being. Between 2006-08 government and civil society including Black Sash debated the reduction in

the age threshold for men from 65 to 60 years (to match the age limit for women) for the Old Age Grant. The age limit was subsequently equalized in 2008. Given that many pensioners in South Africa and generally in Africa are likely to care for children, the Mbeki-led government's move to equalize the Old Age Grant qualification meant increased reach for children in poor households. The number of children benefitting from the change in the age threshold for men might have been negligible since women (grandmothers) supported other dependents more than men (grandfathers).

Second, adjustment of the CSG income threshold expanded the coverage and cash benefits for poor families with children. For a decade, the income eligibility threshold - amount of money at which the household is eligible to apply for a grant - for the CSG remained unchanged yet the old age and disability grants 'automatically adjusted in line with increases in the grant amounts' (Budlender, 2008:16). Eligibility was based on monthly household income (R1,100 or US$162 for single caregivers and R2,200 or US$324 for a married couple), the type of household structure (single or married caregivers and with caregivers only able to apply for a maximum of six of children) and 'whether the child lived in a rural or urban area (R800 or US$76 and R1,100 or US$162 in urban and rural areas)' (Delany & Jehoma, 2016:61). The failure to adjust the CSG income threshold resulted in the exclusion of more than half a million children under 14 years of age in 2005 and approximately 700,000 children under 15 years in 2008 (Proudlock, 2011:158). The Department of Social Development responsible for social protection's own review of CSG means test in 2007 had concluded 'the eligibility income threshold had not accounted for price inflation between 1999 and 2008, meaning that an increasing number of poor families were being excluded from social assistance' (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:71). Many poor children were excluded because to qualify for the CSG by 2007, they had to be 50% poorer than when the grant was introduced in 1998 (Williams, 2007). The existing means test had discriminatory anomalies including different thresholds for urban and rural applicants and subjecting married couples (who had to support larger households) and single caregivers to a similar income threshold.

The Legal Resources Centre, in partnership with the Children's Institute, successfully compelled government to address the means test anomalies through litigation in August 2008. The revised eligibility rules increased income threshold by 10 and 20 times the value of the CSG for single

caregivers and married couples respectively. Similarly, the CSG income threshold was indexed on inflation. 'The Department of Social Development changed the Regulations of the Social Assistance Act, introducing a formula to provide for annual adjustments of the means test to keep pace with inflation' (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016: 71). The relaxation of the income threshold to determine the CSG eligibility meant 'many beneficiaries whose income had increased' between 1998 and 2008 became legally eligible. Department of Social Development, SASSA and the civil society widely publicized the change in eligibility rules allowing many families to apply for the grant. These reforms 'expanded the pool of eligible children from 7.8 million under the old, stricter means test to 9.5 million' (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016: 72).

Finally, the review of documents required to apply for the CSG increased poor children's access to the grant. Until mid-2008, the regulatory requirements for the application of the CSG included original identification documents like the child's birth certificate and the caregivers' national identification card. The original documents were to be submitted with police or commissioner of oaths certified copies. An application not meeting these requirements would not be approved. Many caregivers did not have these documents hence could not apply for the CSG. The requirement disqualified poor children in need of the grants, excluding about 20% of eligible children in 2007 (Hall & Proudlock, 2008). Through litigation, ACESS succeeded in pushing for the temporary acceptance and use of alternative identification documents by grant applicants without prescribed documents in June 2008. This meant more applicants previously excluded for lack of original documents could apply and start receiving the grants within a three-month grace period of obtaining the original documents. The 'alternative documents' statutory provision allowed 433,872 caregivers to apply for the CSG between 2008 and 2010 (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:72).

Although the progressive increase in the number of CSG beneficiaries was over time, the most dramatic increase was under Mbeki's presidency. CSG beneficiaries increased from 150,366 in 1999/2000 to 8,189,975 in 2007/8 before Zuma came into office. The real expansion of CSG beneficiaries happened earlier between 2003/4 and 2007/8 when the number of beneficiaries increased from 2,996,723 to 8,189,975 respectively. These reforms happened despite the

conservatism of the ANC-led government to reflect, as discussed, the influence of child-focused civil society organisations.

2.2.3 The 'left' and social grants reforms under Jacob Zuma presidency since 2009

Zuma emerged as ANC president, with support from COSATU and 'constituencies representing the poor' in late 2007 (Historical Materialism, 2008:168). Zuma's ascendency to ANC (and later South Africa) presidency, referred to as 'the Zuma tsunami', initially appeared to shift political power to the left wing within the ANC (Lodge, 2009). The left wing was critical of ANC's liberal policies, seemed more pro-poor and supported cash transfer policies (Leubolt, 2014:14). Perhaps frustrated by Mbeki's conservative policies (Ceruti, 2008), including social policies, Zuma assumed a different governance approach, co-opting the civil society unlike Mbeki his predecessor. The wide expansion of child grants to poor families during Zuma's presidency shows social provision leaning towards a social democratic state. But Zuma did not have a completely different ideology with Mbeki as he also believed that South Africa's economic policies should build a 'developmental state not a welfare state' (Lodge, 2009:32). Although Zuma has been described as scoring an 'own goal' because he is 'losing South Africa's 'War on Poverty'' (Maharaj, Desai & Bond, 2011), he has implemented substantial social cash transfer reforms for poor families with children. Under his presidency, access to child grants was significantly increased by raising the age limit of the CSG to 18 years and the child grants were extended to 'refugee children' previously excluded. His administration also put to rest the long-standing issue of support for orphaned children living with their relatives by agreeing to pay an additional amount to such households that led to the rejected proposal for an orphan grant already discussed. Despite proclaiming all these reformist credentials, Zuma attempted, without success, to return to Mandela and Mbeki's 'conservative' approach to social policy by conditioning child grants. Nonetheless, under civil society pressure, access to child grants improved, increasing coverage more than any of Zuma's predecessors.

The first remarkable pro-poor reform under Zuma's presidency is the age extension of the CSG grant to all children under the age of 18 in 2009. In 2008 the civil society welcomed the raising of the CSG age limit to 15 but continued to campaign for the CSG extension to all children. CASE conducted a study that demonstrated that the age-limit was still a barrier to access to the CSG (CASE, 2008). The Children's Institute, for example, argued that the reform did not protect

all children as it excluded some children from realizing their constitutional right to social security. The Children's Institute made its submission to the Department of Social Development proposing the extension of the CSG to children less than 18 years. The Children's Institute argued that excluding the 15-19-year-old children increases the chances of dropping out of school because of lack of fees, participation in harmful forms of labour or crime, compromising their education because of high chances of their engagement in activities to contribute to household income and excluded them from automatic grant-holder benefits like medical fee waivers. Access to the CSG would promote better health outcomes and improve access to services such as health facilities for the excluded children (Jamieson & Smith, 2008: 2-3).

Within ANC, economic and social policy debates including expansion of social grants persisted between the right and left wings. The ANC party's leadership shift to left wing in late 2007 may have increased the support for the extension of the grant in 2008 and 2009 (Proudlock, 2011). Proudlock further argues that civil society, particularly the Children's Institute, ACESS and Black Sash, took advantage of the power shift within the ANC to campaign for the extension of the CSG age limit and lobby ANC to honour its 2007 resolution to extend the CSG all children (2011:156). On the other hand, the power of ministries relative to each other was important. The Ministry of Social Development supported the expansion of child grants but faced resistance from other ministries especially the Ministry of Finance. 'There were clear disagreements within the state, with the Department of Social Development pushing for a raised age limit, against resistance from the Treasury and possibly other government departments also' (Seekings, 2016c:18). In October 2009, the ANC finally decided to raise the CSG age limit to 18 years.

Political pressure from the civil society led to the CSG's 'parametric' (changes in the benefit levels and eligibility conditions) and 'dramatic' reforms ('massive increase in the number of beneficiaries and a significant increase in real expenditure') (Seekings, 2017:14). These reforms significantly increased the CSG and overall coverage of the CWR. The CSG increased from 3,947,073 in 2003 to 8,832,675 in 2009. The rapid increase was a result of ACESS' education campaigns that informed and encouraged eligible households to apply for the CSG following the new age eligibility rules (ACESS, 2009). Together, child grants coverage more than doubled,

reaching 4,273,056 children in 2003 and 9,423,019 in 2009.[21] The total number of children receiving child grants 'had grown to more than 11.3 million children by 2012, and is now [2016] about to reach 12 million'. (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:70). As at end of February 2017, child grants reached 12,665,840 beneficiaries (SASSA, 2017).

Zuma's administration might have fulfilled children's right to social security through extending the CSG to all children (subject to their caregivers passing the means test) but did so conditionally. In 2009 the government imposed conditionalities on the CSG (Lund *et al.,* 2009). Following urgent submissions from the civil society, the conditions were 'softened' – the regulations remain but in the case of failure to comply the grant will not be discontinued (Hall, 2011). This means the 'soft' conditions will not affect the number of beneficiaries. Like most cash transfers in Latin America such as Brasil's *Bolsa Familia* or Mexico's *Oportunidades* (De la O, 2015; Handa & Davis, 2006.) the CSG would be conditional on 'nutrition, attendance at Early Childhood Development facilities, and school performance' (Lund *et al.,* 2009:73). To continue receiving the grant, caregivers/family should participate in livelihood activities and attend health workshops.

The low uptake of health and education in South Africa was rather a structural than individual problem which would not be addressed by the proposed CSG conditions (Budlender, 2008). The CSG already had costly and in some cases unconstitutional exclusionary measures (children excluded because of the age limit) on applicants. The CSG excluded some children from the poorest families (Barrientos & DeJong, 2006; Case *et al.,* 2005). Research evidence had illustrated that the CSG had achieved similar outcomes with conditional cash transfers like 'reducing child poverty, increasing school enrolment, improving children's health and nutritional outcomes', reducing incidence of child hunger and child labour (Hall & Wright 2010; Woolard & Leibbrandt 2010; Budlender *et al.,* 2008; Williams 2007; Coetzee 2010; Budlender & Woolard 2006; Agüero *et al.,* 2005; Case *et al.,* 2005). Generally South Africa has high school enrolments and attendance rates but the unconditional CSG already positively impacted on school attendance. Conditioning the CSG on school attendance, for example, would be 'a step in the wrong direction' (Lund, 2011) as this would perpetuate the exclusion of poor children.

[21] http://www.childrencount.org.za/social_grants.php

Conditionalities would potentially shift South Africa from its redistributive and inclusionary social policy approach. Rather than imposing conditionalities, government should improve on grants administration and provision (Lund *et al.,* 2009). Realising that imposing conditionalities was more regressive than progressive, the government kept the CSG unconditional. The government had similarly attempted to condition the CSG when it was introduced in 1998 and later in 2004 but civil society advocacy resulted in the conditions being dropped (Hall, 2011:4). Therefore, civil society mobilisation contributed to the making of South Africa a welfare state for children as it was for whites and not for blacks during apartheid.

Civil society campaign to extend child grants to all children extended to the fight for the right to social security for 'refugee children'. Until 2011, children in refugee families were not entitled to social security including child grants. Child grants were only available to permanent residents and citizens. Following legal action, in 2012 the government acceded to the demands and extended social grants to all documented refugee children (Delany & Jehoma, 2016:61). The reforms increased the number of children accessing child grants in South Africa.

The second major reform under Zuma's administration is the payment of additional grants for families with orphans in 2016. The debate to introduce orphan grants dating back to the early 2000s continued over the years. Although the number of orphans has gradually decreased, orphanhood remained a developmental challenge in South Africa (and many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) since the 1990s. Orphans rates increased from 16% in 2002 to 21% 2006 (Meintjes *et al.,* 2010: 43), remained constant up until 2008 (Meintjies & Hall 2010: 102) before declining to 16% in 2014 (GHS, 2015). Despite the high orphan rates, it did not mean that the living conditions of orphans were worse-off than other vulnerable children. Hence the situation of orphans did not require a new orphan-targeted grant (Ritcher & Desmond, 2008). Nevertheless, many orphans (and other children) live in 'households where their parents are absent' and are cared for by relatives (Hall & Wright, 2010). Another vulnerable group of children, though proportionally insignificant, lived in child-headed households (Meintjes *et al.,* 2010).

In response to proposals to introduce an orphan grant or pay additional amounts for the CSG to orphans and children in child-headed households, the government chose the latter in December 2015. The policy was effected through the Amendment to the Social Assistance Act in

November 2016 to 'allow the Ministers of Social Development and Finance to make these additional payments' in April 2017. The payments, the Minister of Social Development, Dlamini, indicated,[22] would increase the capacity of extended families that have the additional responsibility of caring for orphans. They will 'provide social assistance for poor children who are orphaned and living with family members and children living in child-headed households.' Dlamini's statement indicates that the government was more concerned with child poverty, and not orphanhood.

Poor orphans and children in child-headed households were already provided for through the Foster Care Grant. It would have been expected that the government would enroll them on the Foster Care Grant rather than increasing the value of the CSG to orphans. It is not clear why the government did not choose this policy option but is likely that affordability concerns might have been key considerations as in the case of universalising the CSG already discussed. In 2016, the Foster Care Grant amount (R890 or US$66) was more than double the CSG (R360 or US$26). What is clear is that 'neither a court process nor the associated heavy social work process for placement' was required (as in the Foster Care Grant) for the caregiver to receive the increased amounts, hence it was administratively easier for government to increase the value of the CSG than the Foster Care Grant to orphans. As Dlamini said, the new provisions allow the government to 'provide greater income support to all orphans and not only for those fortunate enough to access the foster care system.' More importantly, the choice might have been informed by the government's preference to maintain poverty-targeting as opposed to enrolling more orphans on grant that is not means tested.

2.3 Explaining South Africa's Child Welfare Regime

South Africa's CWR regime illustrates a form of path dependence. The social grants system was consolidated during apartheid (Seekings & Matisonn, 2012: 130; Lund,1993), and reformed after democratisation to reach out to previously excluded families with children. Nonetheless,

[22] Statement by the Minister of Social Development, Ms Bathabile Dlamini, during Amendment of Social Assistance Act media briefing in Parliament, Cape Town available on

http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/newsroom/222-minister-bathabile-dlamini-amendment-of-social-assistance-act

significant reforms were implemented since the late 1990s reflecting domestic politics (ideological shift within the ruling party, the influence of individuals, a supportive Minister of Social Development and strong civil society advocacy). In contrast with the lack of political mobilisation for social pensions reforms (Pelham, 2007:8), the child sector civil society was more organised and influential in advocating for child grants reforms. Unlike in other countries in Southern Africa including Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, strong civil society advocacy in South Africa partly explains the pro-poor reforms including the increase in age of eligibility, income thresholds, use of alternative identity documents and inflation indexed benefits.

2.3.1 'Structural' factors

South Africa, like most countries in Southern Africa, experienced high rates of HIV and AIDS that affected the household structure and weakened family capacity to provide social protection. High mortality rates left many children orphaned and vulnerable to the risk of poverty. AIDS increased orphans and subsequently the demand for social protection. It is not clear, however, if AIDS was a factor in the pro-poor reforms in South Africa in similar ways it shaped the familial CWR in Botswana. ANC-led government's response to orphanhood - enrolling orphans into existing grants without having to introduce orphan-targeted grants – show the focus on addressing the poverty needs rather than preserving the extended families that looked after these orphans like in Botswana. The Foster Care Grant was oversubscribed in the early 2000s because it became the primary source of income support for households caring for abandoned or orphaned children (Meintjies *et al.*, 2003). The resistance to was premised on the argument that social provision 'on the basis of orphanhood mistargets crucial resources, is inequitable, risks further overburdening the child protection system and is not a cost-efficient way of supporting all poor children' (Meintjies *et al.,* 2003). Hence poverty became the primary concern in the provision of child grants.

In South Africa, unemployment, underemployment and low wages have left many families to rely on the state for their livelihood. This has increased the number of social grants beneficiaries for poor families. Ferguson argues that 'the poor majority of black South Africans have in some ways become worse off since the end of apartheid. This is largely due to the massive shedding of jobs under the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy especially the low-skilled, low-tech jobs most often held by the poor' (2007:77-8). Unemployment rose over 35% at

times, averaged 25% between 2000 and 2016 (World Bank, 2016:2) declining from about 30% in 2010 using a broad definition of unemployment (Woolard, Harttgen & Klasen, 2011:358). A large population of the working poor earn low wages and qualify for the means tested child grants. Child grants (and social pensions) either become the primary source of income or significantly contribute to the low wages. The proportion of children who live in households where no adults are employed in either the formal or informal sector reduced from about 42% in 2003 to approximately 30% in 2014.[23] Unemployment is worsened because there is no peasant safety net in South Africa, unlike in Zimbabwe. Thus, while AIDS is the most challenging structural factor determining familial targeting in Botswana, unemployment is the most important factor that influenced poverty targeting in South Africa. The influence of unemployment in the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa has received limited attention in literature.

2.3.2 Ideological factors

ANC's approach to child social provision during Zuma's presidency broadly resemble Esping-Andersen's social democratic regime but also show conservative and liberal characteristics. The expansion of the CSG, for instance, has been subjected to ideological criticism with some political elites arguing that it will cause bad behaviour change like increasing teenage pregnancy, claims that have been refuted by empirical evidence (Devereux, 2013; Makiwane & Ujo, 2006). As the ANC efforts to establish a development state failed, the welfare state gained much support within the party. Despite a powerful conservative strand within the ANC, as in much of Africa, there is also a more progressive strand. The ANC did play a major role in writing the constitution that provided social security rights and the Minister of Social Development, Skweyiya, was a strong and effective advocate of expanded coverage. The state plays a central role in family provision with near universal and relatively generous child grants (compared to other countries in Southern Africa) that reach almost all children living in poor households. Most households receive both a child grant and either a disability or Old Age Grant.

Nonetheless, the wide coverage came at the backdrop of a ruling party that sought to minimise state provision and promoted social protection through the market. Almost all the child grants are

[23] http://www.childrencount.net/indicator.php?id=2&indicator=52

means tested and categorically targeted which is characteristic of a liberal regime. It is likely that had it not been of path dependence - the current legislative framework and programmes are traced back to the colonial period – the ANC might not have introduced and maintained such an exceptional expansive child grant system. Concerns about 'dependency', 'handouts' and 'affordability' within the ANC post-apartheid could have played differently in the social policy dialogue had ANC not inherited legislated child grants. The ANC could have followed other cases where social protection programmes were abolished and scrapped from the constitution at independence like Zimbabwe's Old Age Pensions in 1980. But the economic conditions in South Africa (particularly high poverty due to unemployment as opposed to Zimbabwe's agrarian regime providing employment through agriculture) urged the ANC to consider reforms focused on poverty reduction rather than abolishing altogether. Overall, the reforms of the pro-poor CWR are, in part, explained by the ideological shift within ANC but other factors, particularly the influence of individuals within ANC and CSOs discussed later, largely account for sustained poverty targeting.

2.3.3 Political factors

Path dependency is central to South Africa's extensive pro-poor CWR, especially the reforms under the Mandela-led government and not the recent reforms. Pre-apartheid South Africa institutionalised social provision for poor families with children, albeit on racial lines (Lund, 2009). In a clear case of path dependence, the ANC did not abolish but chose to continue the grants. Path dependence, therefore, is a strong factor explaining programmes inheritance. Social grants for children after 1994 are similar to those that existed during apartheid. The reforms of the SMG to the CSG, for example, are not a radical transformation from pre-democracy support for children. Other scholars have similarly argued that the current social grants reflect South Africa's colonial history (Patel, 2011:80).

Path dependence only explains part of the story of reforms of the pro-poor CWR. Other factors explain the significant reforms that happened since the late 1990s. After transition to democracy South Africa experienced multi-party democracy hence the pressure to reform the apartheid-era discriminatory social policies. The substantial child grants reforms were primarily to remove racial discrimination which excluded black mothers but provided for white South Africans. This observation is consistent with existing studies arguing that the reforms represent the desire to

achieve ‘racial parity’ (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015; 2016; Budlender *et al.,* 2008; RSA, 1997; Van der Berg, 1997).

In countries like Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, party competition between the ruling party and other parties and the power of donors and international agencies became significant political explanations to the distinctiveness of CWRs. These factors played a negligible role in shaping South Africa’s CWR. Due to the ruling ANC’s ‘electoral dominance’ which has translated into its dominance of the policy-making process since 1994 (De Jager, 2013:149), electoral competition between ANC and other parties has been dismissed as a key driver of welfare reforms in South Africa. The ANC ‘faces little immediate electoral incentive to expand the welfare system’. As a result, ‘welfare reform is not a major electoral issue’ (Seekings, 2008b:35).

Seekings’ claim might not be entirely correct to the pro-poor reforms of the CSG. Poverty targeting was, in part, influenced by structural factors, particularly unemployment, but the provision of grants to poor children could have been politically strategic. The urban and rural poor (caregivers who receive grants on behalf of children) in South Africa forms ANC’s political support base. The expansion and wider coverage of grants to the poor could have secured the ANC the poor voters’ support. On the other hand, poverty targeting excluded the rich who are less likely to vote for the ANC. There is no peasantry in South Africa (unlike in Zimbabwe) and the poor are the landless, the unemployed and those underemployed who form a large proportion of caregivers targeted by the child grants. Hence the expansion of social grants resonated with voters’ interests to help ANC gain political support. Other scholars have demonstrated that social transfers may be targeted on the poor to buy their loyalty (Ulriksen, 2017). Thus, the ANC could have used social grants to win elections (even in the absence of strong electoral competition).

Domestic politics - ‘factional’ divisions within the ANC, the power of civil society and the powers of ministries relative to each other are important in reforms of the CWR. The civil society and the Department of Social Development-induced reforms especially Skweyiya who served between 1999 and 2009 (Seekings, 2015:15; 2016:29) resulted in widening of grants coverage for poor families with children. Skweyiya was central in ‘recruiting paternalistic conservatives in support of a broadly social democratic position’ (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015:161). The key role played by Skweyiya shows the importance of individuals in policy

reforms. This observation supports existing studies (Seekings, 2016c; Proudlock, 2011; Lund, 2008) that emphasised the influential roles of individuals, particularly in the expansion of the CSG.

Party politics in the form of shifting party ideology triggered by succession politics within the ANC ushered major child grants reforms especially the last age extension of the CSG. The internal 'fighting' within the ANC saw president Jacob Zuma oust Thabo Mbeki (Lodge, 2009). In office, Zuma increased the CSG age eligibility to age 18 in 2009. Mbeki had cited fiscal constraints to reject proposals for a universal child grant and to defend his 'reluctance to raise the age-limit to 18 during the debate of 2005-08' (Seekings, 2016c:28). Hence, the shift of political power to the left resulted in 'a more populist and participatory faction of the party' that finally supported CSG extension (Proudlock, 2011:54).

Domestic civil society organisations is another important domestic politics factor that supported the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa. Previous research claims the absence of civil society pressure to reform the general welfare regime (Seekings, 2008b:35). This contrasts with a strong child sector civil society successfully lobbying for the expansion of child grants to all eligible children. The government had proposed gradual expansion of the CSG but that meant many poor families could not access the grants either because they were ineligible or lacked the requisite documentation (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016; Hagen-Zanker *et al.,* 2011).

ANC-led governments since independence have been 'conservative', introducing new forms of maintaining inequality including strict means testing, limiting access to grants discriminating against children (and adults for the Old Age Grants at some point) by age, imposing 'soft' conditionalities and hesitancy to introduce a citizen grant. Through litigation, the civil society advocacy urged ANC governments to implement substantial reforms that led to the implementation of near universal child grants. A strong civil society pressured, primarily through litigation, a seemingly conservative ANC government to expand poverty-reducing grants through increases access. Perhaps the pressure emanated from the belief that children count as deserving, even if poor adults are not. Literature has established the influence of domestic civil society,

arguing that it has driven welfare policy reforms in the face of resistance from powerful political elites (Devereux &White, 2010:55; Pelham, 2007; Devereux, 2013:22).

This chapter provides supporting evidence to previous literature on factors influencing child grants reforms broadly but further show the effect of the different factors identified in literature in shaping a pro-poor CWR. The rejection of an orphan grant (Ritcher & Desmond, 2008) and the recent introduction of additional amounts for families caring for orphans but receiving a CSG[24] indirectly point to the ANC's inclination towards poverty-targeted rather than 'family-breakdown' targeted grants. The analysis of how 'political, normative and ideological factors' defined the politics of affordability of the CSG (Seekings, 2017) brings to the fore the importance of these factors in reforms but sheds less light on how affordability contestations were important in promoting a distinct poverty-targeted CWR. Similarly, the analysis of path dependence (Patel, 2012) crucially points to historical factors that led to the adoption of specific forms of child support but reveals very little about the inheritance of means testing that continued to support poverty targeting. ANC did not only inherit the grants but also the means testing criteria. Also, the discussion of civil society (Proudlock, 2011) highlights the successes of Civil Society Organisations in pushing for reforms. Their failure to successfully advocate for a universal CSG, however, falls short of explaining how that could have been a result of the ruling party's ideological position to maintain a poverty-targeted CWR. This chapter has built on these arguments to show that the different factors were important in promoting an enduring pro-poor CWR.

In summary, South Africa depicts a distinct pro-poor CWR that transformed from a familial regime post-independence. The CWR is comparatively exceptional - legislated, expansive and primarily poverty-targeted. Unlike in the other three case studies, almost all children benefit from social grants. This is a result of the combined effect of direct and indirect programmes coverage. A large proportion of poor families with children benefits directly from the CSG and other child grants. The unique comprehensive CWR is widened by social pensions that provide enormous indirect support for children. The reforms of the pro-poor CWR from a familial regime

[24]http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/newsroom/222-minister-bathabile-dlamini-amendment-of-social-assistance-act

reflect not so much the historical or structural as to domestic political factors, especially the interplay of party politics and domestic civil society organisations.

CHAPTER 3

Mixed (familial-poverty) child welfare regimes: The case of Namibia, 1990-2017

3.1 Distinctive characteristics of Namibia's child welfare regime

Namibia's child welfare regime (CWR) transformed from familial to a distinctively mixed (pro-poor and familial) regime. Except for the Special Maintenance Grant whose eligibility is based on medical assessments, the other child grants directly target the poor because they are means tested. The Vulnerable Grant directly targets poor households with children but with both living parents. The Child Maintenance Grant is pro-poor as it targets households that are likely to be poor due to death or incarceration of one spouse who was either an Old Age Pension or disability grant beneficiary. The Child Maintenance Grant is also familial by targeting households with one absent parent (who is likely to be the male breadwinner). But the Child Maintenance Grant also covers many non-poor children since the means test threshold is linked to the applicant caregiver yet 'other household members may have other (better) sources of income' (ILO, 2014:115). The Foster Care Grant, on the other hand, largely targets on the basis of perceived family breakdown. The Foster Care Grant is primarily limited to double orphans. But the Foster Care Grant 'has an in-built poverty targeting element' as it targets households that are likely to be poorer due to over-representation of orphans and the number of children in such households (ILO, 2014:116). Many of the features of CWR in Namibia reflect the South African influence which is not surprising given that the Child Welfare Grants were built on apartheid-era foundations. But there have been significant reforms since independence which has shifted the CWR in a mixed regime direction different to the pro-poor CWR in South Africa. The post South African rule eligibility criteria for the Child Maintenance Grant and Foster Care Grant directly limit access to 'broken' families and indirectly target poor households while the Vulnerable Grant is designed to directly benefit poor families with children to support a mixed CWR that is distinct from CWRs in South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. This chapter investigates why Namibia, a variant of South Africa, did not follow South Africa's lead in introducing a CSG, only expanded pro-poor provision later and more slowly.

Namibia is an upper middle-income country with about one million children and a national population of 2.5 million (see Table 1.1). Namibia has enjoyed political stability since it became independent from South Africa in 1990. The country has experienced sustained period of strong growth, with an average annual rate of 6% per annum between 2010 and 2014 (World Bank, 2016) and a generally moderate economic growth of about 4% per year since independence. Nevertheless, Namibia still experiences many development challenges. Unemployment rate was 28% in 2014, down slightly from 30% in 2013 (NSA, 2015a:68). The country remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. The Gini coefficient was 0.57 in 2015/6 decreasing from 0.70 in 1993/4 (NSA, 2016a:12). Vision 2030, the country's national development framework, acknowledges the inequality and envisions a Namibia where 'Poverty is reduced to the minimum, the existing pattern of income-distribution is equitable and disparity is at the minimum' (NPC, 2004: 104). Relatively strong economic growth has not been sufficient to deal with poverty, inequality, and unemployment (World Bank, 2016). Child poverty, the proportion of children living in a poor household, is relatively high and has remained considerably above the general poverty rate. As shown in figure 3.1, in 2009/10 more than half (52%) of the poor were children and 34% of children lived in poverty. National poverty was at 29%. About 17% of children population aged 6 to 18 years never attended school (NSA, 2012b). In 2013, 14% of all children were orphans, 28% lived with neither parent, child mortality (deaths per 1,000 children surviving to their first birthday) was 16% and 24% were stunted. The national HIV prevalence was 17% (Ministry of Health and Social Services (MOHSS), 2014).

Figure 3.1: Child poverty in Namibia



Source: National Statistics Agency (2014; 2012); MoHSS (2003)

Since the 1990s 'Namibia became one of the few countries in Africa that has a well-established and long-functioning social grant system, though the quantity of such grants is still relatively low' (NSA, 2012a:16). Income support for families with children is extended (in)directly through a set of social cash transfer programmes. Children directly benefit, as discussed, from four Child Welfare Grants - Vulnerable Grant, Child Maintenance Grant, Foster Parent Grant and the Special Maintenance Grant (Levine *et al.*, 2011; NPC, 2012; NSA, 2015b:23). In addition, all children in public primary (since 2013) and secondary schools (since 2016) access free education and since 1991 almost all children in primary school benefit from the School Feeding Programme (see Annex 1).

Children also benefit indirectly from social pensions – Old Age Pension, Disability Pension and War Veterans' Subvention - paid to the elderly (60 years and above), disabled (above 16 years) and war veterans. The social pensions, though received by adults like grandparents, strengthen the mixed CWR since they provide income support for broken and poor families with children.

Grandparents contribute enormously to the safety net in Namibia by letting the entire family share their social pension in times of need (Subbarao, 2008). Child care by grandparents, particularly grandmothers, is a common phenomenon in African countries and more prevalent in Namibia. Grandmothers end up being the orphan caregivers as their own children die and maternal and paternal or double orphans are likely to end up in their hands when their parents die. UNICEF reported that grandparents 'care for around 40% of all orphans in the United Republic of Tanzania, 45% in Uganda, more than 50% in Kenya and about 60% in Namibia and Zimbabwe (2007:30). Although there is lack of beneficiary data, children with poor but able-bodied parents benefit from their parents' participation in food- or cash-for-works programmes that 'are usually implemented in times of covariant shocks like drought or floods' (Chiripanhura & Niño-Zarazúa, 2013:27). Approximately 21% of all children indirectly benefitted from social pensions in 2013 (ILO, 2014). In as much as coverage of the direct child benefits is low compared to neighbouring middle-income countries, South Africa and Botswana, these indirect benefits expanded, albeit modestly, coverage of the Child Welfare Grants. This chapter discusses the distinctive characteristics, evolution and suggest explanations to the reforms of the mixed CWR in Namibia. In Chapter 6, I shall examine more fully how and why Namibia's mixed CWR is different from South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

3.1.1 Coverage

Namibia's CWR is distinguished by low coverage. Coverage for the CWR considers two dimensions of child benefits: direct child grants and programmes and indirect social cash transfers a family receives. In 2009/10, 35% of all children directly and indirectly benefited from social grants (include Child Maintenance Grant, Foster Parent Grant, the Special Maintenance Grant, Disability Grant, Old Age Pensions and War veterans' grants but exclude the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSFP) and fee waivers) (NSA, 2012a:17). The number of children directly benefiting from child grants is relatively low but has been gradually increasing. Figure 3.2 shows that all direct child grants cover about 25% of all children in 2016, increasing from 20% in 2012. This excludes HGSFP beneficiaries in more than 1400 schools in certain poor

communities[25] and all children in public pre-primary, primary and secondary schools covered by the free education policy.



Source: MGECW

Children benefit indirectly from other social protection programmes. Given that 70% of all households in Namibia have at least one child (ILO, 2014:41; NSA, 2012c) it can be estimated that all recipients of social pensions and Veterans' subvention share their benefits with at least one child. Table 3.1 shows the proportion of children who likely benefited from social pensions in 2013. A total of 21% of all children benefit indirectly. The Old Age Pension contributes 15% while the disability and veterans' subvention each contribute about 3% to the total.

[25] http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp273493.pdf?_ga=1.199491566.1599468141.1475086145

Table 3.1: Proportion of children indirectly benefiting from other programmes, 2013

Programme	Recipients	Proportion of children %
Old Age Pension	143,007	14.9
Disability Grant	27,312	2.9
War Veterans' subvention	24,682	2.6
Food/cash for work	-	-

Source: ILO, 2014. * no statistics available for food for work programmes

Namibia is one of a few countries in Southern Africa with legislated social provision. According to the World Bank, child and family benefits programmes anchored in national legislation 'usually are more stable in terms of funding and institutional frameworks, guarantee coverage as a matter of right, and provide legal entitlements to eligible individuals and households' (World Bank, 2014:16). Article 95 of the constitution of Namibia promotes the 'Welfare of the People' through ensuring the 'enactment of legislation to ensure that the unemployed, the incapacitated, the indigent and the disadvantaged are accorded such social benefits and amenities as are determined by Parliament to be just and affordable with due regard to the resources of the State' (Article 95(g)). Sections 240-252 of the Children's Act (2015) provide for the payment of state grants to children caregivers.

Namibia's CWR benefits are very low both relative to the poverty lines and GDP per capita at US$4,947 in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). Namibia, like South Africa, uses three poverty lines: the Food Poverty Line; Lower Bound Poverty Line; and the Upper Bound Poverty Line. In December 2017, the Food Poverty Line was US$18, the Lower Bound Poverty Line was US$25 and US$33 for the Upper Bound Poverty Line (using the 2012 prices adjusted for purchasing power parity, PPP). The poverty lines, unlike in South Africa, are set at quite a low level to reflect the residual design of Namibia's CWR. Most poor children are likely to live in households that receive a child grant (N$250 or US$16) and either a monthly universal Old Age Pension or Disability Grant (N$1,100 or US$69). In December 2017, a five-person average household received a combined transfer of US$85, translating to US$17/person/month (or US$0.55/person/day) which is very ungenerous relative to all the three national poverty lines and the international poverty line of US$1.90/person/day.

Cash benefits for child-specific grants are the lowest compared to other neighbouring middle-income countries, specifically Botswana and South Africa. The modest cash benefits of the Child Welfare Grants are, in part, a result of the supposedly indirect benefits children receive from the country's broader social protection system. Most needy children are cared for by the elderly and the political elites within SWAPO believe that an increase and expansion of benefits for the elderly (which are universal) will have a 'trickle-down effect' on children in such households.

3.1.2 Targeting 'broken' families

Notwithstanding that Namibia has four child-specific grants supposedly for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs), up to 2014 the grants largely targeted 'broken' families - one or no parent families due to death caused by war or AIDS or absent fathers (unknown or incarcerated) - rather than poverty-targeted. Broken families had either single orphans (maternal or paternal), double orphans (lost both parents) or 'social' orphans (children with absent parents or the parents' status is unknown). Orphans increased from about 7% in 2000 to approximately 10% of all children in 2013 but the number of children living with either parent was high at about 58% in 2013, decreasing from 60% in 2000 (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Distribution of orphans by parent status, 2000-2013

Parent survival status	2000	2013
Both M[other] and F[ather] alive and present	26.4	24.8
M present, F deceased	3.9	4.6
M present, F alive but absent	29.3	27.8
M deceased, F deceased	1.1	1.9
M deceased, F alive but absent	2	2.7
M deceased, F present	0.4	0.5
M alive but absent, F deceased	3.7	3.7
M alive but absent, F alive but absent	26.4	28.3
M alive but absent, F present	3.6	3.7
Orphans as % all children	7.4	9.7

Source: NSA (2003:12) & NSA (2014a:22).

Namibia's living arrangements were consequential in the design of the child grants that focused on 'broken' families. The eligibility criteria prioritised orphans defined as 'a child aged 0-17

years whose maternal mother or paternal father or both are dead' (NSA, 2015b:22; GNR, 2004) to exclude equally or more needy poor, non-orphaned vulnerable children. A vulnerable child in Namibia refers to a child with a high probability of experiencing a welfare loss above a socially accepted norm, and as well as a lack of appropriate risk management instruments in place which may result in risky/uncertain events on the part of the child (NSA, 2015b:22). This contrasts with the international definition that defines a vulnerable child as a child below the age of 18 and: (i) has lost one or both parents, or (ii) has a chronically ill parent (regardless of whether the parent lives in the same household as the child), or (iii) lives in a household where in the past 12 months at least one adult died and was sick for 3 of the 12 months before he/she died, or (iv) lives in a household where at least one adult was seriously ill for at least 3 months in the past 12 months (UNICEF, UNAIDS, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2005). Up to 2013, OVCs in Namibia meant orphans. Therefore, the CWR was primarily familial from independence until 2013.

Without general support for poor households with children, the system of child grants was inequitable as well as badly targeted and did little to ensure the future of Namibia's vulnerable children and the country's growth prospects (ILO, 2014). Research in Southern Africa has shown that household poverty rather than orphanhood is a more important negative determinant of child well-being (Campbell *et al*., 2008). Despite the evidence that not all households with orphans were vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity (MGECW & WFP, 2007), there was a marginal difference in incidence, depth and severity of poverty between orphaned and non-orphaned children and that a high number (82%) of poor children were non-orphans (MGECW, 2010:151), the eligibility criteria for the main child grants – Child Maintenance Grant and Foster Care Grant – were 'strongly focused on the orphan status (single or double orphans) of the beneficiaries' (MGECW, 2010:150). Orphan statistics in Namibia show that orphanhood was a major problem as in other countries in the region. Orphanhood was, however, less important than 'broken' families in determining child grants targeting.

Concerns about children in 'broken' families rather than orphans per se (as in Botswana, see Chapter 4) were important in cabinet's decision to focus more on orphans than other groups of vulnerable children. France Kaudinge, SWAPO Director of Administration, pointed out that SWAPO leaders, including Nahas Angula, Prime Minister (2005-2012) and Minister of Defence

(2012-2015) and Nangolo Mbumba particularly as Personal Secretary to SWAPO President Sam Nujoma (1990-1993) and Finance Minister (1996-2003), believed in poverty reduction through employment creation hence viewed extending government support to children with both surviving parents as assuming the parents' responsibility.[26] In principle, the Child Maintenance Grant was designed to benefit poor children irrespective of status of their parents but in practice it is for single orphans with one parent for whatever reason such as those incarcerated for more than six months, is absent or dead. Angula said at independence the government was more concerned with 'children of war' (children who lost their parents during the colonial period) and that led to the narrow focus on orphans whose caregivers received Child Maintenance Grant if they were single or Foster Care Grant to double orphans.[27]

The adoption of a Vulnerable Grant in 2014 shifted targeting from orphan to poverty targeting but it was not a complete change as the old grants continued to target orphans. Overall, child provision assumed a mixed (familial-poverty) CWR with the introduction of a poverty-targeted grant. The shift, as discussed later, reflect international influence combined with domestic politics (party politics with the ruling SWAPO).

3.2 The evolution of Namibia's child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1990-2017

From independence in 1990 to 2017, the CWR in Namibia went through three key moments of change and choice. Under President Sam Nujoma (1990-2005), the SWAPO-led government inherited Child Welfare Grants introduced during the colonial period when Namibia was under South African rule. Before independence, the grants were paid to poor single mothers but the grants amount depended on race. At independence, President Nujoma's government equalised the grants amounts across all races as well as targeting 'broken' families to assume a familial trajectory. The second phase is between 2005 and 2014 under President Hifikepunye Pohamba. Familialism persisted in the first part of Pohamba's administration but later shifted to include poverty targeting to form a mixed CWR. The last phase is since 2014 under President Hage Geingob who has not presided over major reforms except for the adoption of free secondary

[26] Separate interviews with France Kaudinge, SWAPO Director of Administration, 21 July 2015 and Nahas Angula.

[27] Interview with Nahas Angula.

education which was already at an advanced stage of implementation when he came to power. Hage, therefore, has maintained the mixed CWR.

3.2.1 Social grants reforms under President Sam Nujoma, 1990-2005

The SWAPO-led government, like ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, inherited Child Welfare Grants introduced before independence (Namibia was subsumed under South African between 1915 and 1990). The new Sam Nujoma administration did not abolish the grants like the ANC in 1994 but expanded them to primarily cover a small category of 'broken' families that was barely above 1% by 2003. The lack of general support to poor families with children and limited Child Welfare Grants access to 'broken' families supported a familial CWR (later changed to mixed regime). By contrast, South Africa moved in a different direction at independence. When the ANC came to power in 1994 it inherited similar grants but progressively expanded them to most poor children to adopt a pro-poor CWR (see Chapter 2). Hence, Namibia inherited the same apartheid social protection system of social grants with South Africa at independence. Nevertheless, child grants in South Africa have remarkably reformed in terms of targeting poor children, the number of beneficiaries and generosity (see Chapter 2) whilst in Namibia they comparatively remained modest, limited to 'broken families and ungenerous.

The variation between Namibia and South Africa after democracy is, in part, due to differences in the political dynamics each of the new government had to redress. The ANC-led government in South Africa had to deracialise the grants that primarily benefited the white population (see Chapter 2). By contrast, in colonial Namibia (under South African rule) grants were also targeted at lone poor mothers but for all races. The value of grants also depended on race. Thus, the SWAPO-led government had to redress variation in benefits while the ANC-led government had to make reforms that would achieve racial parity.

At independence in 1990, President Nujoma's administration equalized the amount of Child Welfare Grants for all children regardless of their race, fairly expanded support for families with children particularly orphans and not the broader group of vulnerable children. Before independence, few children benefitted from the Child Maintenance Grant if they were poor or received Foster Care Grants if they were double orphans because the grants were urban biased yet large proportion of these children resided in the rural areas. Yet grants were distributed on racial grounds similar to apartheid South Africa hence the amount varied by race: N$382

(US$24) for whites, N$135 (US$9) coloureds and N$55 (US$3) blacks. The amounts also applied to other grants including the Old Age Pension and Disability Grants. In 1990, Namibia inherited a dual economy characterized by interrelated challenges of low economic growth, a high rate of poverty, inequitable distribution of wealth and income, and high unemployment (ILO, 2014). So, households, especially those with children, suffered from exceptionally high-income inequalities and poverty levels compared to other medium human development countries and interventions were needed to reduce inequality, extreme poverty and vulnerability (NPC, 2012; GRN & UNICEF, 2013). Equalizing child grants clearly became a central component of the national response.

Albert Biwa, Acting Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare (MoPESW), said when Namibia got independence from South Africa in 1990, all the grants – child and other grants – were equalized to N$135 (US$9), an amount previously set for coloureds and not the highest amount that was received by whites because it was not affordable as more beneficiaries were enrolled.[28]

Child Welfare Grants amounts increased sporadically if at all. Since independence, the amount of all child grants changed three times only, from N$135 (US$9) in 1990 to N$200 (US$13) in 2000 and N$250 (US$16) in 2013. As a result, the real value of grants declined due to inflation and children could not maintain their standard of living and fall back in poverty in-between the increments. The consequence of not raising the value of child grants in line with inflation (as was the case with the Old Age Pension) is that the real value of the Child Maintenance Grant and Foster Care Grant has eroded by 39% between 1996 and 2009 and by 23% between 1999 and 2009 (Levine *et al.,* 2009). Comparably, the increments for the universal Old Age Pension and the Disability Grant were equal to child grants up to 2000 but thereafter increased bi-annually to reach N$1000 (US$63) by 2015. The regular increase for the Old Age Pension were, perhaps, because most elderly people care for children, especially orphans who lost their parents during the war or to HIV/AIDS.[29]

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[28] Interview with Albert Biwa, in Windhoek, 21 July 2015.

[29] Interview with Albert Biwa

The low reforms of value of child benefits could be explained by low electoral competition and partial change of government. Since independence the war of liberation party, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has been in power to keep a same one-party rule. Unlike in Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe was president from 1980 to 2017, three SWAPO presidents have changed power since independence: Sam Nujoma (1990-2005), Hifikepunye Pohamba (2005-2015) and Hage Geingob (since 2015). SWAPO has been winning all the presidential and parliamentary elections emphatically with the largest percentage poll in 2015 when Geingob polled 87% of the vote. Sam Nujoma was elected as president without elections in 1990, won with about 76% 1994 and about 77% in 1999. Pohamba won about 76% in 2004 and 2009 respectively. Unlike in Zimbabwe where electoral competition between ZANU PF and the Movement for Democratic Change formations led to substantial social policy reforms between 2009 and 2013 (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016) or in Zambia when the Patriotic Front led by Michael Sata took over from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy from 2011 (Siachiwena, 2016), SWAPO has been under no pressure from the political opposition to reform welfare policies.

When Pohamba came to power child grants were N$200 (US$13) and they almost remained so throughout his presidency only to change to N$250 (US$16) in 2013, just before the 2014 elections and his exit in March 2015. Ivin Lombardt, Executive Director, Namibian Non-Government Organisation Forum, said while Pohamba was hailed for pushing for increased spending on education and housing, he seemed ambivalent about social spending on child social protection. Lombardt noted that Pohamba, like his predecessor Sam Nujoma did not favour cash transfers.[30] Surprisingly it was during his tenure, almost at the end of his second term in office between 2010 and 2014, when discussions about the universal child grant started and his government was at the point of adopting the grant when elections were held in 2014 and the negotiations between cabinet and MGECW supported by UNICEF had to be revamped with the new government which is still reviewing the proposals.

[30] Interview with Ivin Lombardt.

The stagnation of grants amount was also partly due to the prioritization of expanding the grants coverage over amounts. When the grants were split into different ministries in 2002 i.e. child welfare grants placed under the MGECW (then Ministry of Women Affairs) and Old Age Pensions and Disability Grant in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, bureaucrats in MGECW debated on whether to bid for increasing the number of beneficiaries or benefits and settled for enrolling more beneficiaries. Albert Biwa, then Grants Coordinator in the Ministry of Health and Child Care, said, 'The ministry [MGECW] did not really push for increasing the benefits. The major drive was in registering beneficiaries rather than increasing the amount of the grants since there were few children [9600] benefiting when they took over.'[31] Helena Andjamba, Director: Child Welfare Services in MGECW concurred:

> Our major concern as a ministry was not to increase the amount of benefits for those already receiving the grants. There were many children who needed the grants but were excluded. We did not fight for money to increase the amount so much although it was part of our proposal. We fought for money to increase the number of children benefiting and not the amount. We knew we could not get both. So, we put the amount issue aside for the meantime.[32]

The near absence of review of the amount was thus, the result a conscious choice to expand coverage over generosity although there were concerns over affordability. Biwa indicated that, 'From the finance side it was the lack of fiscal space to increase the grants. We had to increase but also keep the bill manageable not to fall in the same trap as what happened in Greece (expanded benefits but now could not sustain the bill).'[33] Affordability was more of a political than a fiscal one. More often than not, political elites shift their definition of affordability to suit their political ends (Seekings, 2017b). Slater (2011:257) concurs, 'Affordability is not only about cost but also about political choice.' On the other hand since independence it became SWAPO policy to increase grants that they deemed more important in reducing poverty especially the Old Age Pension. The SWAPO government was more supportive of the Old Age Pension and made a

[31] Interview with Albert Biwa.

[32] Interview with Helena Andjamba, 15 July 2015, Windhoek.

[33] Interview with Albert Biwa.

decision not to increase both child grants and the Old Age Pension at the same time. As a result, the government have tried to keep the Old Age Pension to at least US$2/day and have made consistent inflationary adjustments. The Old Age Pension increased from N$135 (US$9) in 1990, N$1000 (US$63) by 2015[34] and N$1,100 (US$69) in 2016.

Ideological underpinnings within SWAPO were important in policy decisions to increase social pensions rather than child grants. Although child grants in Namibia target OVCs, in practice they were for orphans and provided to 'single caregivers' (surviving spouses, a single parent looking after children when the husband is saving a jail term or a father (not mother) receiving an Old Age Pension). The general belief in Cabinet appears to have been that the elderly were more responsible than the 'single parents' hence government favoured increasing the Old Age Pension than child grants. Biwa stated that the 'grandmothers are the mothers' so government prioritized them knowing they will share the benefits with their grandchildren.[35]

Also, the amount of child grants was maintained at N$200 (US$13) for more than a decade - 2000 to 2012 – as the SWAPO cabinet decided in 2002 to increase all the other grants (Old Age Pension, Disability Grants and Veterans grants) except for child grants on the perception that caregivers were abusing child grants. Nahas Angula who was influential in the decision was against cash transfers as he believed caregivers receiving 'child grants were either abusing grants through converting them for their own use or had too much cash from child and their own grants'. Angula started lobbying the Cabinet to 'be cautious' with giving cash transfers during his time as Minister of Higher Education from 1995 to 2005, supposed that cash encouraged welfare dependency and believed government should only give cash to the most vulnerable people such as orphans and the elderly. Prime Minister Angula successfully convinced cabinet to limit cash transfers to needy families by only adjusting grants for the elderly.[36] The result was an increase of Old Age Pension, Disability Grants and Veterans grants from N$200 (US$13) in 2000 to N$550 (US$35) in 2012 while child grants remained at N$200 (US$13). Angula himself,

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[34] Interview with Helena Andjamba.

[35] Interview with Albert Biwa.

[36] Interview with Gerson Uaripi Tjihenuna, former Under Secretary: Policy Analysis & Coordination in Cabinet,14 July 2015, Khomasdal, Windhoek.

who supported self-help income generating projects or public works said, 'the government was giving too much cash for nothing. It was not necessary to increase child grants and pensions [Old Age Pension, Disability Grants and Veterans grants] because they end up in the same household. That is why those looking for the children will abuse the grants, they buy alcohol or use the money on themselves because they will have a lot of cash'.[37] Angula represented political elites in Namibia and Africa, as in the United States or other developed countries, who are likely to oppose the expansion of social protection programmes to the poor because their own moral arguments about welfare dependency.

It is true that the grants may end up in the same household but only 18% of all children and 22% of poor children were in households where there is a person receiving a pension (NSA, 2012a:16). Also, there is no corroborative evidence to suggest that recipients abused grants. Iben Nashandi also believed beneficiaries abuse cash transfers. Nashandi supported the parsimonious benefits noting that, 'children already have free basic education and will have free secondary education starting in 2016. They are benefiting from the school feeding programme and fee waivers at health facilities'. Research has shown that poor people do not spend cash transfers on 'temptation' goods such as beer, cigarettes and drugs. Evans and Popova (2016) use 19 studies from across the globe, Africa, Latin America and Asia included, to examine poor people cash transfer spending on 'temptation goods' (cigarettes and alcohol) and conclude that consumption of 'temptation goods' actual reduces after cash transfers. Evans and Popova argue that the reduction is because conditional cash transfers are earmarked for health and education, for example, and unconditional cash transfers motivate recipients to redirect cash they would use on alcohol to other things.

In 1991 the Nujoma administration adopted a Home-Grown School Feeding Programme in pre-primary and primary schools. HGSFP was introduced by the World Food Programme (WFP) in collaboration with the Ministry of Education in 1991 and the government took over in 1996 (ILO, 2014:98; MoE, 2012). HGSFP increased the coverage of child social transfers, increasing to 330,000 children in 2016[38] from 91,177 children in 1997 (Subbarao, 1998). The nutritional

[37] Interview with Nahas Angula.

[38] http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp273493.pdf?_ga=1.199491566.1599468141.1475086145

programme serves a mid-morning meal and supported 35% of all children (330,000 children) in 2016. Home Grown School Feeding Programme was initially designed to benefit Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs) in schools in poor communities. In practice, it is extended to all children wishing to partake the food in beneficiary schools. The focus on OVCs shows SWAPO's ideological preferences to provide social protection to the indigent. The support for a minimalist welfare state within SWAPO was also demonstrated when the Nujoma government reintroduced School Development Funds in 2001. Thus, while South Africa's CWR transformed to a pro-poor regime through the CSG in the late 1990s, the CWR in Namibia took a familial trajectory at independence and remained so during Nujoma's presidency.

3.2.2 Social grants reforms under President Hifikepunye Pohamba, 2005-2014

Reforms during the second phase, 2005 to 2014, under president Pohamba, fall into two parts. The first part is between 2005 and 2011 almost corresponding to Pohamba's first term of presidency. Initially, Pohamba, like Nujoma after grants equalisation, did not institute any significant reforms but maintained a familial CWR that continued to be minimalist by targeting a small category of 'broken' families. Pohamba seemed not different from Nujoma i.e. he was conservative (familial) and he continued with School Development Funds. During this part SWAPO continued to face a weak opposition, passive Civil Society Organisations and limited international pressure. Pohamba was reelected in 2009 with a landslide victory of about 77% of the vote (like in his first election in 2004) without literally implementing any child grants reforms. His could have drawn his political support from SWAPO's general support as a liberation movement that liberated Namibia from South African rule.

The second part of this phase is between 2012 to 2015, a period of substantial reforms that entailed the introduction of new grants and, most importantly, the shift from primarily family targeted to a mix with poverty targeting to create a mixed CWR. The one party (SWAPO) dominance persisted during so the pressure to reform did not come from competitive elections like in Botswana and Zimbabwe (see Chapters 4 and 5) or organised Civil Society Organisations like in South Africa but it was both internal (within government and SWAPO) and external lobbying (from international organizations and agencies especially UNICEF supported by the ILO.

During this second part, political elites formed into two categories. The first group comprised influential leaders who were ambivalent about cash transfers but supported minimal state provision hence they did not abolish but continued the grants without major reforms. Cabinet members including the president Pohamba, Angula and Mbumba constitute this group. Nujoma, as former president, was said to continue to be very influential in policy-making even in his retirement.[39] The second category consisted of less influential advocates of reform. This group included the minister responsible for child grants and bureaucrats within this ministry especially the two directors and the permanent secretary. This group believed in the expansion of Child Welfare Grants to fulfill the rights of women and children in line with the ministry's mandate yet were cautious in their approach to convince cabinet to endorse their proposals. This category was fully aware of the first group of politicians who were likely to resist their proposals hence they preferred proposing one reform at a time. During the second part of Pohamba's presidency Sioka and team collaborated with UNICEF at a time SWAPO was seeking reelection in 2014. These political dynamics led SWAPO to embrace the civil society and international organisations to introduce the Special Maintenance Grant, adopt free education, review grants amounts, adopt the poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant and legislate Child Welfare Grants. The result was a mixed CWR born out of the continued family-focused and poverty-targeted grants.

During Pohamba's first term as president, bureaucrats continued to be cautious with proposing 'outrageous' reforms.[40] Bureaucrats and the minister responsible for Child Welfare Grants, Sioka, realised the need to increase the grants amounts and expand coverage to other poor children and excluded orphans as reported by the World Food Programme funded outreach (registration) exercise conducted in 2006/7. Sioka was not convinced that Pohamba would warm to her proposals. Instead, the ministry focused 'on registering more orphans, at least to enrol more children than increase the money for a few children'.[41]

The first part of Pohamba's presidency was characterised by failed reforms as his government rejected UNICEF proposals to abolish primary School Development Funds. In 2007 UNICEF

[39] Interview with France Kaudinge

[40] Interview with Helena Andjamba.

[41] Interview with Helena Andjamba

had proposed the abolition School Development Funds to improve access and enrolment as part of 'mitigating the multiple impacts of HIV and AIDS on children's right to education' (UNICEF, 2007:3). The proposal, drafted by Khin-Sandi Lwin, a UNICEF representative who had worked in the country for seven years, noted School Development Fund as 'a major barrier for access and retention for both primary and secondary school' (UNICEF, 2007:1). Cabinet turned down the proposal on the basis of affordability and the perceived responsibility of the family to provide for children. Although Nangolo Mbumba, Minister of Education (2005-2010), who supported work-based programmes to support poor families, made the submissions to Cabinet, he was himself against free education. Mbumba was one among Cabinet members who believed that parents should contribute to their children's education,[42] suggesting that political elites within SWAPO supported a minimalist welfare state. The rejections saw the continued exclusion of poor children but sustained familialism that resonated with political elites within SWAPO.

The second part of Pohamba's presidency (2012-2015) is characterised by significant reforms that transformed the CWR from a familial to a mixed regime. In May 2012 the Pohamba administration adopted Special Maintenance Grants paid to caregivers of children under 16 years who are diagnosed as temporarily or permanently disabled including children with HIV/AIDS and or blind (Levine *et al*., 2011:44). The grant provided income relief for caregivers of disabled children who barely had time to leave them and engage in economic activities such as looking for employment or petty buying and selling, activities that require them to be away from home and the disabled child(ren). In many cases, the caregivers had other children to provide for yet they had very limited income support.[43] The government intervened to reduce this burden of care.

Moreover, the increasing number of households headed by disabled children was becoming worrisome, at 306 in 2011 from 205 in 2001 and 10 in 1991 (NSA, 2016:51). While Namibia, like South Africa, had an adult disability grant for 'people with temporary or permanent disability, including the blind' to support 'disability prevention and rehabilitation' (Chiripanhura & Niño-Zarazúa, 2013:18), there was no similar support for children living with disabilities.

[42] Interview with G.U Tjihenuna.

[43] Interview with Helena Andjamba.

Civil society, particularly the National Federation of People with Disabilities in Namibia, proposed a grant for children with disabilities which government approved.[44] Pohamba's openness to civil society shown by his embracing of the National Federation of People with Disabilities in Namibia marked the beginning of his willingness to work with Civil Society Organisations and other agencies. As shown later, the reforms that changed the CWR from a familial to a mixed regime entailed close engagement between these agencies and Pohamba's government. The Special Maintenance Grant's parsimonious benefits, like all the other child grants, amounted to N$250 (US$16) per month per child in 2016 up from N$200 (US$13) in 2012. In Namibia, only a third of people living with disabilities receive disability grants (NSA, 2016:7). The Special Maintenance Grant benefitted 4972 children in 2015 from 4018 in 2012.

After adopting the Special Maintenance Grant, Pohamba continued to be a reformist who became sensitive to children's rights to education, leading his government to abolish School Development Funds to adopt free primary education in 2012/3 (MoE, 2011). Pohamba had continued with School Development Funds during his first term of presidency. A total of 458,933 children (48% of all children)[45] benefited from the new policy. The provision of free primary education fulfilled the constitutional provisions of free and compulsory primary education (Iipinge & Likando, 2013:137).

Three factors were significant in cabinet decision to implement the free primary education policy. UNICEF had proposed the removal of School Development Funds in 2007 to help achieve Millenium Development Goal two (UNICEF, 2007). The education minister then, Nangolo Mbumba, and Prime Minister Angula, both known advocates of poverty reduction through employment creation, were against free education hence the UNICEF proposal was rejected.[46] But Abraham Iyambo's, Minister of Education, Arts and Culture (2010-2013), dedication to education reforms in Namibia was influential. As Minister of Education, Iyambo, who was also 'a member of both the Central Committee and Political Bureau of SWAPO Party

[44] Interview with Helena Andjamba.

[45] The Namibian, 09 January 2013, http://www.namibian.com.na/103971/archive-read/No-school-fees-for-primaries-THE-Ministry-of

[46] Interview with G.U. Tjihenuna.

and the Chairperson of his Party 'Think Tank'[47] had urged the SWAPO cabinet to respect the constitution through adoption of free education. Iyambo's personal interest in free education earned him the nickname 'Doctor Book' (one who loves education) by his Deputy Minister, David Namwandi.[48] Mourning his untimely death in February 2013, Namibia Non-Governmental Organizations Forum's chairperson, Henry Platt, remembered Iyambo as 'one of our strongest and most dedicated allies in the pursuit of free and accessible quality education for all' (*New Era*, 5 February 2013).[49] Because of his interest in free education, Iyambo supported UNICEF proposal and presented it to cabinet.[50]

Although the government had rejected UNICEF proposals to abolish School Development Funds in 2007, pressure to introduce free education from United Nations agencies was central in cabinet decision in 2012. In 2011 the Ministry of Education (with Iyambo as minister) in partnership with UNICEF and UNESCO commissioned two studies to analyze the gaps in quality and equity in education and document the context of free primary education in Namibia. The first study found that 'the inequitable distribution of wealth and income mirrors inequalities in education with the poorest children the most disadvantaged' (UNICEF, 2011:2). The second study concurred but also concluded that School Development Funds contribution by parents did not only perpetuate educational inequalities but were inconsistent with the constitution hence recommended the removal of School Development Funds (Ministry of Education, 2011:16). The Legal Assistance Centre, a Civil Society Organisation at the University of Namibia, had also argued that School Development Funds were unconstitutional and government should consider abolishing them (Hubbard, 2011). The findings became the talking points during discussions for free primary education at the National Education Conference in 2011. The conference recommended for the introduction of free primary education to resolve the inequality. Based on

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[47] http://www.moe.gov.na/news_article.php?type=pressrelease&id=102&title=Ministry%20Mourns%20the%20Death%20of%20Dr.Iyambo .

[48] http://www.moe.gov.na/news_article.php?type=pressrelease&id=102&title=Ministry%20Mourns%20the%20Death%20of%20Dr.Iyambo

[49] http://www.namibia-botschaft.de/index.php/regierungs-mitteilungen/450-nation-mourns-dr-iyambo .

[50] Interview with Gerson Uaripi Tjihenuna.

the study findings and conference deliberations, cabinet was convinced that elimination of School Development Funds was necessary and approved the recommendations in 2012 and Namibia had free primary education from January 2013. Benson Katjirijova, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance Youth League Secretary-General and shadow Minister of Education indicated that UNICEF was the force behind the adoption of free education.[51] The cabinet decision reflects both the role of individuals and United Nations agencies in social policy reforms. Finally, Elma Dienda, a Member of Parliament and Secretary General, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance political party, pointed out that SWAPO had already started preparing for the 2014 elections so these reforms, including the later introduction of the Vulnerable Grant in 2014, 'were part of the campaign strategy.'[52]

SWAPO proved to be a programmatic party when the Pohamba administration surprisingly instituted the first upward review of child grants amounts in a decade in 2013. Child grants amounts were adjusted to N$250 (US$16) in 2013 from N$200 (US$13) in 2000, consequently increasing the value of the grant but below the absolute poverty line of N$283.47 (US$18). Levine *et al*. (2009:154) reported that 'the real value of the Child Maintenance Grant and Foster Care Grant has eroded by 39% between 1996 and 2009 and by 23% between 1999 and 2009.' MGECW, supported by UNICEF, had recommended the upward review of all child grants to N$300 (US$19) in 2010 following a UNICEF funded grants assessment study that revealed their ineffectiveness in poverty reduction (MGECW, 2010). Child grants, as reported in this assessment, were last adjusted in 2000, were orphan-oriented and should be expanded to all the excluded category of vulnerable children other than orphans to improve grant effectiveness. In 2013 a cabinet decision was made to increase all the grants to N$250 (US$16) but the first payments were to be made in the 2014, starting August 2014.[53]

Two factors were imperative in the successful upward review of grants amounts. First, Angula who had 'blocked' the reviews had left the influential position of Prime Minister in 2012 and had less influence in his new portfolio as Minister of Defense (December 2012 to March 2015).

[51] Interview with Benson Katjirijova, 9 July 2015, Windhoek.

[52] Interview with Elma Dienda, 16 July 2015, Windhoek.

[53] Interview with Helena Andjamba.

Moreover, Hage Geingob who replaced him as Prime Minister was not ambivalent about cash transfers as Angula. The Minister of MGECW, Sioka relaunched the review proposals in 2013, 'was successfully supported by Geingob' and the amounts were adjusted upwards. Second, the review reflects partisanship. 'The adjustments were timely for SWAPO as the amounts were paid in 2014 just before the elections.'[54]

A major reform that resulted in the creation of a mixed CWR was the adoption of the Vulnerable Grant before the 2014 elections. Earlier in 2010/11 UNICEF, in collaboration with the MGECW, commissioned a grants effectiveness study that recommended 'a means tested grant for all poor and vulnerable children' (MGECW, 2010:52). The Pohamba administration rejected the recommendations to continue with low coverage and ungenerous benefits targeted at 'broken' families. The proposed grant would increase coverage of vulnerable children as it would benefit all poor children in kinship care who at the time were eligible for the Foster Care Grant that restricted enrolment as it required court order placements. The study concluded that the current Foster Care Grant and Child Maintenance Grant schemes excluded a large number of vulnerable children under the care of impoverished parents. About 95% of Foster Care Grant applicants were extended family members ineligible for the Child Maintenance Grant (NPC, 2012). The proposal resonated with the MGECW's focus to increase the coverage of the two main child welfare grants- the Foster Care Grant and Child Maintenance Grant (MGECW, 2010:153). Having closely worked with the Doreen Sioka, MGECW minister, Petra Hoelscher, former UNICEF Namibia Social Policy Specialist, said:

> The minister favoured universal over means tested child welfare grants because of the large number of vulnerable children beyond those falling under the very narrow definition of poverty, the ease of administration and time freed up for social workers to provide family support, the greater accessibility for the most vulnerable children and the expected benefits for children's well-being and development.[55]

[54] Interview with Elma Dienda.

[55] Interview with Petra Hoelscher, 3 September 2015, Cape Town, South Africa.

Minister Sioka submitted the proposal to Cabinet in 2011 and it was disapproved on affordability grounds. Angula said, 'We [government] did not have the money to start such a big programme for all children. Where will the money come from?' Affordability was not the only reason for the rejection. Ideologically, political elites within SWAPO believed that social cash transfers should only be orphan-focused and parents should work for the welfare of their children. Angula said, 'Primarily we should be giving the grants to orphans only and that is what we are doing, but those children whose parents are still there should take responsibility. We will do our best to support the parents. Those parents failing to take care of their children can get licenses for fishing and we have grants for that.'[56]

Although the UNICEF recommendations for a means tested child grant were not implemented, the study, as we shall see, kept the proposals for a poverty grant on the reform agenda until the introduction of the Vulnerable Grant in 2014. Hoelscher said, 'The 2010 UNICEF/MGCEW study started to raise awareness on child poverty in Namibia and the potential of using child welfare grants as a mechanism to reduce child poverty and improve children's well-being, including their nutrition, health and education'.[57] Despite the rejection, the government acknowledged in the Namibia National Development Plan Four (2012/3 to 2016/7), that 'poverty-stricken children that are not classified as orphans are not covered by current social grant schemes.' The government planned to 'Expand the social protection system to cover children in all poor households' (NPC, 2012:18) through introducing a poverty-targeted Kinship Grant (NPC, 2012:67). The Plan outlined two possible child grant reform options: a universal child grant (Kinship Grant) for every child in Namibia or a means tested child grant with a more generous means test set at the same level as the war veteran subventions which would cover some 80% of all children.

When the UNICEF proposal was rejected, in 2013 the ILO advocated for a universal child grant which the government also rejected. Following a heightened Basic Income Grant Coalition (supported by UNDP) push for a Basic Income Grant that would have paid all citizens a monthly cash grant of N$100 (US$6) up until pensionable age, at which point citizens become eligible for

[56] Interview with Nahas Angula.

[57] Interview with Petra Hoelscher.

the existing universal State Old Age Pension (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007:4), the Parliament of Namibia in 2013 requested for a review of social protection programmes in the country to determine social protection priorities.[58] The ILO and UNICEF, in collaboration with Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, contracted Oxford Policy Management Limited international consultants (supported by national consultants Haimbodi Ya Nambinga and Immaculate Mogotsi) who were more likely to maintain international agencies' social protection reform agenda on national dialogue to establish a comprehensive national social protection floor including a universal child grant.

The assessment revealed coverage and benefit gaps as well as less impact on household welfare. ILO reported corroborative evidence with UNICEF studies that although the country had put in place child grants, the current system did not provide for general support for poor households and children' (ILO, 2014:137). Moreover, the benefits were inadequate to keep children out of poverty and address multi-dimensional poverty. Existing child grants reduced child poverty by 1.4% only (NSA, 2012a). In view of these gaps the ILO proposed a universal Child Grant that would provide 'basic income support' for all children from 2015. The universal child grant would reduce child poverty from 34% to 9% and income inequality (Gini coefficient) from 0.60 to 0.52. The Child Grant proposal was among other social protection reforms including a universal Old Age Pension, Maternity Grant, Disability Grant, Attendant Allowance, Employment Safety Net Programme together at a cost of 3.2% of GDP (ILO, 2014:141). The universal child grants would be gradually introduced to children 0-17 years and replaces the child and special maintenance grants in phases. It would provide a monthly transfer of N$250 (US$16) similar to the current amounts and was anticipated to cover 'about 70% of all households' countrywide and reach more than '70% of all social assistance beneficiaries at full scale' (ILO, 2014:143).

The ILO proposal was rejected on more of political than economic considerations by the SWAPO-led government. First, despite the Namibian tax-benefit microsimulation model evidence that Namibia could afford a universal child grant (Wright *et al*., 2014), the Ministry of Finance argued that such a grant was not affordable. Iben Nashandi, Permanent Secretary,

[58] Interview with Albert Biwa.

Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare (2015-), Deputy Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Finance, 2012 to 2015, said that a universal child grant was not sustainable because 'we [Namibia] have few resources to spread over many children including those who do not need them'. Nashandi maintained that expanding the child grants was beyond 'what the economy can support.' [59] Angula supported the affordability narrative, 'It's not affordable to give social grants to all children. Means testing should stay.'[60]

Second, UNICEF advocacy was strongly weakened by the departure of its influential representative, Hoelscher, who had championed the child grant reform agenda. The lobbying and advocacy for child welfare grants reforms intensified during her time from 2010 as UNICEF Social Policy Specialist but slowed when she was redeployed in 2013. Andjamba stated that Hoelscher's redeployment affected the universal child grant negotiations as she had established personal relations with the ministers and 'we [MGECW] spoke to the Cabinet through her since she knew we supported a universal grant. Since she left UNICEF's influential power had decreased and we are also affected.'[61]

Despite the rejection, the ILO and UNICEF proposals kept the poverty-targeted child grant on the reform agenda but the outgoing Pohamba administration seemed supportive to the proposal to introduce a universal child grant. Pohamba's Cabinet had already instructed UNICEF and MGECW to explore funding options for the implementation of a universal child grant. UNICEF funded a study that assessed the funding options and recommended that Namibia would fund the universal grant through taxes and levies from financial transactions, electronic funds transfers, national revenue turnover, financial sector and solidarity tax (Mwinga, 2014).

In the midst of these negotiations and instead of adopting the ILO proposed universal child grant, Pohamba introduced a mean-tested Vulnerable Grant similar to the UNICEF proposed poverty child grant. The collaborative lobbying efforts of UNICEF and ILO and individuals within the

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[59] Interview with Iben Nashandi, 24 July 2015, Windhoek.

[60] Interview with Nahas Angula.

[61] Interview with Helena Andjamba.

MGECW were crucial in the introduction of the Vulnerable Grant. The Vulnerable Grant rapidly expanded the Child Welfare Grant total coverage, almost doubling to 25% in 2016 from 15% in 2013. To be eligible for the grant, both parents must be surviving but their income should fall below a set income threshold, set at a total monthly household income of less than N$1000 (US$63).

Two events occasioned the introduction of the grant. A UNICEF-arranged study tour was crucial in lobbying for political support for the programme. Granvik (2015:3) asserts that among other 'weapons', 'international agencies (such as UNICEF, the ILO and World Bank) and donor organizations (such as the British Department for International Development) persuade national policy-makers through 'fly[ing] politicians and officials to international workshops and arrange study tours to other countries to learn from their experiences'. In Namibia, international donors and agencies pushed the government through the MGECW. In 2013 UNICEF organized a learning visit to South Africa, led by MGECW Permanent Secretary and included government representatives from the MGECW, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and National Statistics Agency to learn about planning, administration and monitoring of social grants and South Africa's targeting decisions. The visit was important in prompting the policy-makers to critically review how they could address child poverty through the child grant system. Based on their knowledge of South Africa's experience, the government decided to introduce the Vulnerable Grant along the lines of South Africa's CSG as a preferred child poverty reduction option to the universal Basic Income Grant. A decision was also made to keep all the other 'complementary' grants (Child Maintenance Grant, Foster Care Grant and Special Maintenance Grant) to benefit children requiring special care (orphans, children living with disability).[62]

The adoption of the Vulnerable Grant can be viewed as a rare successful story of policy transfer in Southern Africa, at least for child grants. 'Countries strategically respond to policies adopted by other countries, emulate policies that turned out successful abroad or react to external pressure to adopt a particular policy' (Obinger *et al*., 2013: 112). South Africa has led Southern Africa and Africa in child grants provision but most of its neighbours have not followed its

[62] Interview with Petra Hoelscher.

footsteps. Even the introduction of Lesotho Child Grant programme in 2010 is not a case of policy diffusion as the programme was initially donor driven and later embraced by the political elite (Granvik, 2015).

Elections also played an important role. The poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant could have been used by the ruling SWAPO party for patronage purposes considering that it was announced at a political rally in 2013 by the SWAPO presidential candidate Geingob[63] and introduced in 2014, an election year. This was clientelistic (Stokes *et al*., 2013) as the grant was a political tool to secure political support, especially from poor urban voters.

On the other hand, at the time of introducing the grant the SWAPO administration was under pressure from civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations and international donors to introduce both a Basic Income Grant and a universal child grant as the flagship poverty reduction schemes. Although there were concerns regarding the form of child grant the government could adopt, the Vulnerable Grant was favoured grant than the Basic Income Grant among the SWAPO leadership[64] hence introducing the Vulnerable Grant was a 'scape goat' from this pressure as well as a way to gain political support from the large numbers of the rural and urban poor and unemployed parents who were not receiving any of the existing grants.[65] In Botswana, the Botswana Democratic Party under President Ian Khama reformed the Destitute Persons programme to include previously excluded vulnerable children in the period leading to the 2014 elections (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the age-reforms of the CSG in South Africa particularly in 2009 were partly influenced by the ANC's strategy to avoid introducing a Basic Income Grant (see Chapter 2).

3.2.3 Social grants reforms under President Hage Geingob, since 2014

The third and final phase is end of 2014 to 2017 during the Geingob presidency. In November 2014 Geingob polled the highest votes in the history of presidential elections in Namibia,

[63] Interview with Elma Dienda.

[64] Interview with Nahas Angula.

[65] Interview with Elma Dienda

winning overwhelmingly with 87% of the vote but he has not implemented reforms of his own. Instead, he completed universalising free education, a project that started under Pohamba. Without major reforms, Geingob has maintained the mixed CWR.

In the 2014 elections SWAPO did not only face a fragmented opposition but the perceived reformist credentials of SWAPO's presidential candidate, Geingob, could have secured SWAPO a large support of the electorate. Geingob seemed in support of the Basic Income Grant Coalition's proposal for a Basic Income Grant in Namibia during his time as Vice President and the electorate was very expectant that it will be easy for him to introduce the grant as the president. It appears Geingob almost was determined to fulfill this expectation when he formed a new ministry dedicated to poverty reduction and appointed the former chair of the Basic Income Grant Coalition, Bishop Kameeta, as the minister. Unfortunately, the Basic Income Grant idea, hence the voters' expectations, has not materialised. Therefore, in the 2014 elections voters could have rewarded SWAPO by voting for Geingob overwhelmingly anticipating that he will also meet their social protection interests. The result is the continuation of a one-party dominance system and an enduring mixed CWR that is more familial than poverty-targeted.

In January 2016, the Geingob-led government abolished the (School Development Funds for all secondary school children in public schools. Free secondary education benefits 182 945[66] children (19% of all children) at a cost of N$50million (US$31,498,150) for the 2016/7 academic year (*New Era*, 10 November 2015).[67] As discussed, Namibia introduced free primary education in 2012/3. In 2016, free education reached 641,878 children (67% of all children).

Free secondary education was a fulfilment of the election promises made by SWAPO in 2014. The 2014 election manifesto stated that 'In 2013, the SWAPO Party Government abolished the requirement for parents and guardians to pay for school development funds. The same arrangement will be expanded to the secondary school phase, starting in the 2016 academic

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[66] 2012 enrolments http://www.moe.gov.na/emis.php . Calculating percentage beneficiaries for primary and secondary using this figure is likely to underestimate coverage as more secondary school children could have enrolled between 2012 and 2016.

[67] https://www.newera.com.na/2015/11/10/free-secondary-education-2016-hanse-himarwa/

year.'[68] *The Namibian* newspaper, 24 March 2014, reported that the announcement was made by then President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, in the run-up to the 2014 elections. Addressing a SWAPO star rally for 2014 elections in Katima Mulilo, Mbumba, SWAPO Party Secretary General, had already indicated that 'we have introduced free primary education and we have even extended that to secondary level' (*New Era*, 13 October 2014).[69] Hence, although free education for secondary schools was finally introduced under Geingob's presidency, it was Pohamba's legacy as pre-primary and primary fee waivers were introduced and preparations for the adoption of free secondary education started during his presidency.

Overall, the enduring minimalist welfare regime in Namibia has transformed from primarily targeting 'broken' families (familial) under President Nujoma to include poverty targeting and create a mixed CWR under President Pohamba. President Geingob has maintained the mixed regime. Until such a time when the Vulnerable Grant is significantly reformed to remove the urban bias to resemble the CSG in South Africa, the CWR in Namibia remains mixed despite being a variant of the South Africa system.

3.3 Explaining the distinctive characteristics of Namibia's child welfare regime

The distinctiveness of Namibia's mixed CWR (the result of the evolution discussed in section 3.2) is a result of structural, ideological and political factors. The increasing number of orphans and other vulnerable children (OVCs), mostly due to HIV/AIDS, and increasing household poverty caused by drought and high unemployment resulted in a change of targeting form (from 'broken' families to poverty-targeted) and modest expansion of coverage of social cash transfers for families with children. SWAPO's conservative ideology, its focus on the indigent and preferences for poverty reduction through employment (in farms and formal employment) support a mixed CWR with low coverage and ungenerous. Politically, the electoral dominance of SWAPO, coupled with a weak opposition and civil society enabled the SWAPO governments to reject proposals for universal cash transfers. Despite the failure to convince government to adopt universal programmes, international agencies and donor advocacy efforts urged government to

[68] SWAPO 2014 election manifesto, p6.

[69] https://www.newera.com.na/2014/10/13/swapo-wont-backpedal-development-mbumba/ .

consider the primacy of poverty rather than household composition in designing child poverty reduction strategies. International agencies, particularly UNICEF and the ILO were important in advocating for the provision of child grants as entitlements. This resulted in legislated provision, the introduction of a near- universal poverty-targeted child grant and universal free primary and secondary education that led to increased but still low benefits and coverage.

3.3.1 'Structural' factors

The increasing number of OVCs, instigated by structural factors like the environment, unemployment and demographic changes, contributed to a shift from orphan to poverty-targeted direct income support for families with children. AIDS, surprisingly, was not an important factor despite its effects on household structure. Unlike in Botswana where AIDS necessitated the reforms of the familial CWR, AIDS had limited influence on the reforms of the mixed CWR in Namibia. Other structural factors were important.

Unemployment urged the government to reform child grants through the introduction of a poverty-targeted vulnerable child grant as opposed to other child grants targeting 'broken' families only. The Vulnerable Grant changed the targeting form, increased coverage and value of income support for families with children. Unemployment increased the number of vulnerable children who were not covered by the existing child grants and at the same time their parents lacked the economic means to provide for them. High unemployment has been of major concern in Namibia and has left many families with children vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity. President Pohamba singled out 'the lack of employment opportunities available in the country' as the biggest challenge caused by 'inadequate and volatile economic growth' Namibia has experienced as of 2012 (NPC, 2012: vii). Although unemployment has generally decreased over the years, it remains relatively high (see figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3: National unemployment rate, 2004-2014



Source: Namibia National Statistics Agency

Nationally, highest unemployment was 51% in 2008, reduced to 37% in 2011 and 28% in 2014 (NSA, 2014b; World Bank, 2016). The drop in 2010 was likely caused by the end Targeted Intervention Programme for Employment and Economic Growth employment programmes that provided employment especially to youth and retrenchments due to closure of industries (ILO, 2010). Unemployment among youth remains the highest at about 40%. Moreover, as a primary sector economy, the 2008/9 global economic crisis affected the export industry of Namibia. The crisis contributed to the waning demand for Namibia's products leading to closure of industries and job losses through retrenchment (ILO, 2010:7).

In terms of environmental factors, drought induced vulnerability triggered the government to expand the welfare state through introduction of temporary public works programmes and school feeding programmes. Namibia is located between the Namib and Kalahari deserts and most parts of the country constitute some of the most arid landscapes south of the Sahara. As a result, the country receives the least rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa (MoHSS & ICF, 2014:1). At the same time, 'seventy percent of the population in Namibia relies on agriculture for their livelihoods but due to droughts that weakened the agrarian economy many small-scale farmers especially in the

rural areas have been left without employment' (World Bank, 2016). Over 90% of Namibia is arid/desert or drought-prone (Subbarao, 1998:7; Chiripanhura and Niño-Zarazúa, 2013) and the government has initiated food/cash for work programmes in response. President Pohamba declared the 2012/3 agricultural season an emergency due to drought that reduced crop production by 48% and as part of food security the state sought to strengthen and expand 'safety net programmes such as the school feeding programme, food-for-work and cash-for-work programmes'. In other countries in Southern Africa and other regions, the recurrent problem of drought-driven food insecurity urged countries to develop and expand social welfare policies that indirectly benefit children.

The 2012/3 drought was instrumental in government's decision to introduce the Vulnerable Grant for children from poor families. Helena Andjamba said, 'Many children especially with both parents unemployed were left exposed by the drought as many parents could not afford a meal or pay school fees for their children in secondary school.' The failure of poor parents (both husband and wife living with their children) to provide for their families in cases of drought and floods as was experienced in 2011 became ministers Doreen Sioka and later Rosalia Nghidinwa's rallying point in arguing for a grant that covers poor children regardless of the survival status of their parents.[70]

3.3.2 Ideological factors

The earlier adoption of a familial and later shift to poverty targeting to form a mixed CWR with low coverage and ungenerous benefits reflect SWAPO party's conservative ideology, individual beliefs and influence among politicians and bureaucrats within SWAPO and government. SWAPO leadership believes poor but able-bodied people should work for their upkeep and social assistance should target those who cannot work such as the elderly and children hence child welfare grants have remained targeted (not universal) with low benefits and coverage. Most of the influential political leaders in SWAPO, Nujoma, Pohamba, Geingob and Angula, hail from northern Namibia known for its agricultural economy and they all were involved in subsistence farming in their early life. They are against 'handouts' as they believe people should

[70] Interview with Helena Andjamba.

work for their income security through employment- formal or self-employment in the form of farming or income generating activities. Nujoma himself comes from the North and worked for his well-being in the farms (Nujoma, 2001) and assumes the poor should follow the same approach to social protection. To promote work-based welfare, the MGECW has a poverty reduction programme that provides funds for women and men to embark on Income Generating Activities in order to promote self-employment among the urban and rural poor communities. The funding opportunities ideologically encourage families to participate in their own economic development rather than rely on government child grants. Child grants are, therefore, regarded as an incentive for economic emancipation especially for unemployed caregivers.

Pohamba shared Nujoma's ideology having grown up in the north where people used to make life through farming in the fields and argues that people (other than children, the elderly and disabled who cannot work) should not receive cash for doing nothing but should look for employment and if they do not get it they should work in the fields. Yet the SWAPO leadership is detached from the reality that the government is performing poorly in employment creation, the land is no longer productive, people lack farming inputs and most rural areas are constantly hit by drought.[71] The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in Namibia reported that 64% of extremely poor households owned land (CBS, 2006:91) and households that report 'subsistence farming' as their main source of income reduced from 35% in 1993/4 to 23% in 2009/10 (CBS,1996; NSA, 2012).

Targeted programmes with low coverage and benefits are partly explained by Nujoma's beliefs which became SWAPO's ideology and are fostered on succeeding presidents and other important policy makers in government. France Kaudinge, SWAPO Director of Administration, pointed that SWAPO believes 'the less fortunate should not be condemned and excluded from benefiting from Namibia's resources since they are all Namibians. The focus on those who cannot support themselves especially the disabled, the elderly and children has been informed by this view, our party view which becomes government policy.[72] As espoused in its 2009 election manifesto, SWAPO regards social grants (cash transfers) as social safety nets that should address 'the plight

[71] Interview with Elma Dienda

[72] Interview with France Kaudinge, 21 July 2015.

of vulnerable groups of our society, especially orphans and vulnerable children, senior citizens, war veterans and people with disability'.[73] The 2014 election manifesto promised ' continued support to the vulnerable groups within the society through the improvement of safety nets and other social support services.'[74] Tom Alweendo, Director General of Namibia National Planning Commission showed his support for targeted than universal programmes when he said 'poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and … can be addressed through … targeted programmes and projects according to peculiarities of particular area of interest' (GRN, 2012:7).

Individual philosophies (presidents, ministers and representatives of United Nations agencies) played significant roles in Child Welfare Grants (failed)reforms. Most of the reforms occurred during Pohamba's presidency (2005-2015). Other than his reluctance to review the amount of child grants for fear of abuse by caregivers,[75] Pohamba was more supportive of the expansion of Child Welfare Grants. Sam Nujoma had equalized the grants amounts across races but only focused on orphans and excluding other vulnerable children. Nujoma did not make an attempt to provide general income support for poor families with children. Nujoma adopted a pauperist approach (see Seekings, 2008 for details of this approach) to social provision as he believed that social protection should only target the indigent hence he was anti universal benefits.[76] Accordingly, Nujoma was the first president to reject the Basic Income Grant and review child grants amounts only three times in his 15 years presidency.

Pohamba was different as he was more open to reform the CWR. For his part, Pohamba introduced a disability grant for children less than 16 years, free primary education and made preparations for the adoption of free secondary education, adopted a poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant and legalized the administration of child grants through the Children's Act. When he left presidency in 2015 his government was at the verge of adopting a universal child grant which UNICEF representative, Hoelscher, had advocated for in collaboration with equally enthusiastic

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[73] 2009 SWAPO election manifesto, p20.

[74] 2014 SWAPO election manifesto, p21.

[75] Interview with Gerson Uaripi Tjihenuna, 14 July 2015, Khomasdal, Windhoek.

[76] Interview with Claudia Haarman and Dirk Haarman, Basic Income Grant Coalition Secretariat, 13 July 2015, Klein, Windhoek.

Ministers of MGECW, Sioka, and Rosalia Nghidinwa (2012-2015). The reforms resulted in poverty than orphan targeted grants, expanded coverage and a regime guided through a legal framework. Pohamba became conformist when he reintroduced school development funds in 2006, first rejected proposals to fee waivers in 2007 but later yielded to pressure to abolish primary school fees from his minister of education, Nickey Iyambo, in 2013, rejected proposals for a universal Kinship Grant in 2012 and a universal Child Grant in 2013. The result was a CWR that maintained a benefit gap (low value relative to the poverty line) as Pohamba did little to change the value of the grants.

Rejections of universal programmes, particularly the child grant and Basic Income Grant, and irregular review of child grants amounts which led to low coverage and benefits, are also attributed to the continued influence of Nujoma on policy-making despite that he left government as president in 2005 and left active politics as SWAPO president in 2007. Nujoma who was honoured by Namibian parliament and his party as 'Leader of the Namibian Revolution', 'Founding Father of the Namibian Nation' and 'National Chairman of SWAPO' is still influential in policy decisions as he attends meetings of two governing bodies of SWAPO - the Central Committee and Politburo – and sits in SWAPO Party Elders Committee. Nujoma still plays the important advisory role both to SWAPO party and presidents.[77]

The continued parsimonious benefits and coverage are partly due to SWAPO's ideology. SWAPO 'could be considered as a party with trends towards neo-liberalism and social democracy with some diehards supporting democratic socialism and Marxism' (Toetemeyer, 2007:3). Yet its approach to social protection show high degrees of conservatism. The conservative SWAPO governments rejected proposals for a universal child grants. Political elites are ambivalent about providing social cash transfers 'to too many children'. The same conservatism applies to the general welfare regime in Namibia where SWAPO governments have also rejected proposals to adopt a universal Basic Income Grant. The Basic Income Grant was part of the proposals of the Namibian Tax Consortium in 2002 to achieve equitable distribution of resources. Basic Income Grants were to be paid to all Namibian citizens at a monthly cash grant of N$100 (about US$14), as a citizen's right, up until pensionable age, at

[77] Interview with France Kaudinge, 21 July 2015.

which point citizens become eligible for the existing universal State Old Age Pension of N$370 (about US$53). Despite efforts by the Basic Income Grant Coalition[78] to convince the government to adopt Basic Income Grant, the SWAPO administration under Nujoma, Pohamba and now Geingob rejected the proposals, maintaining the inequality the programme sought to address. Angula's preference for employment creation, worry about dependency and skepticism about 'handouts' are reflected in his beliefs: 'I would rather have the Basic Income Grant money used in skills development to empower people not to be dependent on government. I want people to be empowered not just to be given. I believe in the Chinese saying that give somebody a rod not fish.'[79] As a result of the rejection of the Basic Income Grant and a universal child grant but with the introduction of the Vulnerable Grant, Namibia's CWR continue to differ with the country's general welfare regime that does not provide general support to poor people.

3.3.3 Political factors

Individuals within government, combined with intra-party politics, were important in the reforms of the mixed CWR. The 'stagnation' in reforms between 1994 and 2012 broadly reflect SWAPO's conservative ideology prioritising the preservation of 'broken' families but primarily show Angula' s influence before and as Prime Minister. Angula was a very influential individual within SWAPO having saved as minister in different portfolios since independence in 1990. Angula, like many political elites within SWAPO, was anti-cash transfers arguing that they are 'handouts' causing 'dependence.'

Angula has always harbered presidential ambitions since the 2004 congress and he used his influential position on social policy, rejecting proposals for reforms. Angula's lost the fight for SWAPO presidency to Pohamba in 2004. In office Pohamba replaced Angula by Geingob but was reassigned to the defence ministry. Angula was still hopeful to land the presidency but

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[78] On April 27th 2005, the Basic Income Grant coalition was officially launched in Windhoek and the Council of Churches, the National Union of Namibian Workers, the National NGO Forum, the Namibian Network of AIDS Service Organisations, the Legal Assistance Centre, and the Labour, Resource and Research Institute. See Claudia Haarmann and Dirk Haarmann (eds). 2005. The Basic Income Grant in Namibia Resource Book. Windhoek: ELCR. http://www.cdhaarmann.com/Publications/BIG_Resource_Book.pdf . See also Claudia Haarmann and Dirk Haarmann. 2007.From Survival to Decent Employment: Basic Income Security in Namibia. *Basic Income Studies, (2) 1*.

[79] Interview with Nahas Angula.

Pohamba anointed Geingob his predecessor when he appointed him deputy in 2012, forcing Angula to resign from active politics.

Geingob was different from Angula. It is unclear why Geingob finally landed the presidency ahead of Angula but it is likely that Pohamba and Angula did not agree much in terms of social and other party policies. As discussed, Pohamba was pro-reforms in contrast with the conservative Angula. Geingob's influence on social policy as Prime Minister is also unclear but most of the reforms happened during his time as Prime Minister into his presidency - from 2012 when he became Prime Minister to 2014/15 when he became President - suggesting that he was a reformist like his anointer but in contrast with Angula. The change of prime minister in Namibia was important in similar ways the change of presidents in South Africa affected reforms when a populist Zuma succeeded Mbeki.

Lack of political competition between SWAPO and other political parties to reform social policy has resulted in low coverage and parsimonious cash benefits but international pressure led to a shift from orphan to poverty-targeted and a CWR guided by legislation. Since independence Namibia has remained a 'dominant party state' (Toetemeyer, 2007). SWAPO has been comfortably winning both presidential and national assembly elections since independence in 1990 (see figure 3.4) giving it the political power to control political policy and decision-making process in Namibia. SWAPO's electoral dominance has become 'a near-permanent feature of the post-apartheid political landscape' (Du Pisani, 2013:133).

Figure 3.4: SWAPO share of vote, 1994-2014



Source: Electoral Commission of Namibia *The share of vote for other parties was not included because there are many opposition parties sharing the outstanding vote after SWAPO.

SWAPO is opposed by ‘some small, mostly ethnic based political parties’ that are weak hence ‘there is no political counterweight of any relevance’ (Toetemeyer, 2007:2). SWAPO, whose political support thrives on ethnic voting particularly by the Oshiwambo-speaking tribe (Du Pisani, 2013:133), owes its dominance to ‘lack of challenge than to its own strength’ (Diescho, 1996:15). Du Pisani (2013) further argues that SWAPO’s dominance of electoral politics is the absence of ‘any credible prospective challengers in sight’. But with regard to child social protection, SWAPO made programmatic efforts through adopting social transfers for all caregivers with school going age (free primary and secondary education and the Vulnerable Grant) and unemployed or employed but poor parents who were struggling to provide for their children. These programmes typified SWAPO’s programmatic child social protection. SWAPO’s programmatic cash transfers for families with children resonated with the new constituency of unemployed caregivers. The urban-biased Vulnerable Grant appears to have appealed to the unemployed and the working urban poor and might have increased SWAPO’s urban political support base effectively. Du Pisani (2013:141) posits that SWAPO’s ‘ability to spend large

amounts of public money on targeted social investment programmes' has won the Party support. Du Pisani argues the introduction of a N$19 billion (US$11,969,297,110) Targeted Intervention Programme for Employment and Economic Growth (TIPEEG) job creation project that appealed to unemployed Namibians given the 50% unemployment rate as one such programmes. It has become common for incumbents to gain political support by introducing cash transfer programmes that meet the needs of their constituencies. President Ian Khama and his Botswana Democratic Party were partly voted back into power in 2014 as their constituencies rewarded Khama's programmatic efforts to redress high unemployment by rebranding the public works programme, *Ipelegeng* (Hamer, 2016a). *Bolsa Familia* contributed to the incumbency of President Lula in Brazil's 2006 elections (Zucco, 2008). Progressa beneficiaries were more likely to vote for the incumbent in Mexico (De la O (2013). Consequently, cash transfers 'enable ruling parties to build the political support critical in order to secure incumbency' (Sandberg & Tally, 2015:505). Since SWAPO implemented programmes that were more likely to generate political support from the working poor and unemployed, both in urban and rural areas, its dominancy and the expansion of cash transfers for children through such programmes are explained by 'programmatic mobilization', where programmes foster the 'incumbency effect' (as in the case of Mexico's Presidential elections in 2000) than clientelism (De la O, 2013).

Nevertheless, the weak opposition (due to leader competition and ethnic differences) has not been sufficiently strong to push SWAPO to expand the existing grants, review the benefits regularly and introduce universal child grants that would widen the coverage. Comparatively, although the opposition in Botswana is fairly strong and has challenged the Botswana Democratic Party to reform social policy, in both countries the opposition has failed to push the ruling parties to widely expand cash transfers. A weak opposition combines with a weak civil society. Despite the establishment of Namibian Non-Governmental Organisation Forum, the umbrella board for civil society in Namibia in 2007, civil society advocacy efforts are not well coordinated. Ivin Lombardt, Namibian Non-Governmental Organisation Forum Director, Mahongora Kavihuha, Secretary-General, Trade Unions Congress of Namibia and John Muniaro, Secretary-General, National Union of Namibian Workers[80] bemoaned the lack of space

[80] Interviews with Mahongora Kavihuha, 12 July 2015, Khomasdal; Ivin Lombardt, 24 July 2015, Windhoek and John Muniaro, 23 July 2015, Katutura, Windhoek.

for social dialogue by the ruling SWAPO but agreed that due to civil society fragmentation, none of their organizations had advocated for the reform of child grants. A weak civil society means the SWAPO government lacks the necessary pressure from such organizations (as in South Africa) to implement social policy reforms hence child grants benefits and coverage have remained low and not universal.

International pressure to reform child grants from donor and United Nations agencies urged the government to shift from orphan to poverty-targeted grants. Hoelscher, UNICEF Social Policy Specialist, working closely with a supportive minister, Sioka, Mbombo (Acting Permanent Secretary) and bureaucrats such as Andjamba (Director: Child Welfare Services) successfully advocated for the inclusion of cash grants on the agenda. From 2007 UNICEF started to fund studies to urge the government to expand the child social protection system through reforming the child grants (UNICEF, 2007; MGECW, 2010; NSA, 2012b; Mwinga, 2014; Wright *et al.,* 2014; GRN, 2015a & b). Up-to-date evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, on the current situation of children in poverty and the role of the social protection system has led to broad-based support for an expansion of child welfare grants. The National Development Plan Four, for example, outlined two possible child grant reform options: a universal child grant (Kinship Grant) for every child in Namibia or a means tested child grant with a more generous means test set at the same level as the war veteran subventions which would cover some 80% of all children. UNICEF created a strong evidence base and advocacy for the expansion of child welfare grants to all poor and vulnerable children particularly between 2010 and 2014. Technical support to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare (MGECW) and the National Planning Commission on a qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the current social protection system in addressing child poverty in Namibia created ownership of the child poverty agenda in the two key ministries involved in poverty reduction (MGECW, 2010). UNICEF collaboration with the National Statistics Agency led to the publication of the first child poverty report for Namibia, including an assessment of the impact of Child Welfare Grants on poverty rates and a simulation and basic costing of alternative policy options (means tested or universal Child Welfare Grant) (NSA, 2012a). UNICEF successfully advocated for the inclusion of child poverty and the expansion of the child welfare grant system in the Fourth National Development Plan (NDP 4) (NSA, 2012b). Presenting for the first-time evidence on child poverty and the

potential role of child welfare grants in reducing high child poverty rates led to a shift in public debate away from Orphans and Vulnerable Children – which in Namibia means mostly orphans – to a broader look on child poverty and other vulnerabilities. Subsequently, child poverty was recognized as national problem that needs to be tackled and government partners acknowledged the targeting of Child Welfare Grant towards orphans leaves the majority of poor and/or vulnerable children without support. Furthermore, UNICEF provided technical support to the Ministry of Finance to develop a tax-benefit microsimulation system (Namibian tax-benefit microsimulation model) that allows the assessment of the impacts of the social grant system and personal taxation on poverty, household expenditure, and income inequality as well as modelling and costing of alternative policy options, including an increase of social grants, changes in eligibility and new policies (Wright *et al.,* 2014). This gives Ministry of Finance the possibility to generate themselves the evidence for the efficacy of an expanded child welfare grant system and its required resources.

The World Food Programme also contributed to grants coverage in 2006/7 through financial support to register more beneficiaries but the assistance was part of a short-term food aid project. When the project ended in 2007, there was no traction in efforts to expand the grants through enrolling more children on the programme by government. The pressure to introduce a universal child grant did not result in the desired policy outcome but urged the SWAPO administration to reconsider the inclusion of vulnerable children through a Vulnerable Grant. In effect, the welfare state expanded, albeit modest. But the introduction of this grant is more likely going to curtail UNICEF push for a universal child grant. Iben Nashandi, Deputy Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Finance (2012-2015) and Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare from 2015 said 'I am not a proponent of any type of universal social assistance.' Nashandi's view contradicted the beliefs of his minister, Bishop Kameeta. Nashandi, an economist, believed a universal child grant would perpetuate inequality as it 'lifts both poor and rich children from poverty without closing the poverty gap.' Nashandi was correct but he underestimated the reality that a universal grant would close the poverty gap.

On the other hand, competing interests (with the same reform agenda) between United Nations agencies and international donors in advocating for different policy options led to stagnation in child grants reforms, resulting in continued grants that do not cover all deserving children. While

UNICEF (Mwinga, 2014) and the ILO (ILO, 2014) are advocating for universal child grants, the World Bank and UNDP are pushing for the Basic Income Grant. Monalisa Mbakumua Zatjirua, Acting Social Policy Specialist, Programme Officer- Child and Social Protection at UNICEF Namibia indicated that UNICEF is not against Basic Income Grant as it would still be a universal programme benefiting all children, but the 'delays in approval of the Basic Income Grant proposals were worrisome and another form of a universal grant in the form of a child grant was necessary'.[81] The simultaneous proposal of two universal policy instruments to address poverty partly explain the delay in Cabinet decision as it debates whether to adopt one or both programmes.[82] Herbert Jauch, former Basic Income Grant Coalition Chairperson and current Education Coordinator at Metal and Allied Namibian Workers Union saw proposals of a universal child grant as 'confusing the recipient government' as it might have distracted considerations for the Basic Income Grant which was proposed earlier than the child grant.[83]

Expansion of child grants as part of general support for poor children through the Vulnerable Grant is a delayed but successful case of policy transfer (Obinger *et al*., 2013; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; 1996; Marsh & Sharman, 2009). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:5) view policy transfer as political actions where 'knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system. Obinger *et al.,* (2013:112) argue that countries 'emulate policies that turned out successful abroad or react to external pressure to adopt a particular policy'. The success of the CSG in the neighbouring South Africa where Namibian officials from the ministry responsible for Child Welfare Grants visited had a positive effect on the ideological shift from orphan to poverty-targeted child social protection. Learning from and emulating the South African model of child provision were critical in the modest expansion of Namibia's mixed regime. In summary, the failure to follow South Africa's lead in introducing a CSG and the later slow expansion of pro-poor provision in Namibia reflects both domestic politics and transnational actors.

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[81] Interview with Monalisa Mbakumua Zatjirua, 20 July 2015, UN House, Klein Windhoek, Namibia.

[82] Interview with Albert Biwa.

[83] Interview with Herbert Jauch, 16 July 2015, Windhoek West.

Appendix 3.1: Existing child-focused social grants in Namibia

Programme	State Maintenance Grant	Foster Parent Grant	Special Maintenance Grant	Vulnerable Grant
Target group	Orphaned children	Orphaned children	Children living with disabilities	Children from poor households
Eligibility criteria	Child under 18 who has lost one (single parents) or two (married couples) biological or adoptive parents. Not means tested.	Enrolment at government school	Presenting at clinics: Children <6 years Pregnant women	Due to disabilities or chronic ill health, incapable of sustainable economic activity, has insufficient assets and income sources (<4 LSU or gets <P120/month single,<P150/month with dependants) or incapable of sustainable economic activity, unreliable and limited sources of income due to old age, disability, terminal illness. Permanent: completely dependent, not suitable for rehabilitation. Temporary: suffered disasters, family crises etc., expected to exit.
Targeting mechanism	Categorical + community: referral by Village/Ward Social Welfare Committee, VDC or other leaders or concerned individuals for registration by local authority. Orphan or caregiver may also apply directly	Categorical	Categorical	Proxy means testing +community: referral by Village/Ward Social Welfare Committee, VDC or other leaders or concerned individuals. People may al o apply directly to these committees or to S&CD
Coverage	National	National	National	National but still disproportionately accessed by caregivers in urban and peri-urban areas.
Value of transfer	N$250	N$250	N$250	N$250 (US$30)
Retargeting frequency	annually	n/a	n/a	annually
Graduation criteria	Reach 18th birthday	Reach 18th birthday	Reach 17th birthday and start on Disability Grant	Reach 18th birthday

CHAPTER 4

Familial child welfare regimes: The case of Botswana, 1966-2017

4.1 Distinctive characteristics of Botswana's child welfare regime

Botswana's child welfare regime (CWR) is idiosyncratic within Southern Africa because it has not shifted from familial provision. Whilst South Africa had a largely familial system prior to 1998 that transformed to a pro-poor CWR and Namibia resisted but later shifted to a mixed regime, the familial system in Botswana has endured since independence in 1966. The CWR is largely familial (targeted at families and not individuals) and not poverty-targeted, conforming to Esping-Andersen's conservative welfare regime, falls within the 'Southern Africa' and 'middle-income' models emphasizing categorical and in-kind transfers. Direct cash transfers have low coverage but total coverage is expansive. The familial primarily in-kind benefits are generous per household but ungenerous per person relative to the national and international poverty lines. Social grants provision, like in Zimbabwe and not in South Africa and Namibia, is not legislated.

Botswana, a Southern African landlocked country with 800,000 children and a small national population of 2.3 million (see Table 1.1), is regarded as 'one of Africa's veritable economic and human development success stories' transitioning 'from Least Developed Country at independence in 1966 to Middle Income Country' in three decades mainly 'through the successful exploitation of its mineral wealth.'[84] The discovery of diamonds and other minerals provided the resources used to transform social security through redistributive measures to promote social justice. The country's social protection system has been described as a miracle of Africa (Ulriksen, 2011:199; 2010:12). The successful introduction and extension of unconditional, categorical and universal (at least within some categories) social transfers made the country an African model (RHVP, 2011:17).

Botswana has been made substantial progress in reducing poverty. 'The percentage of people living below the poverty datum line steadily declined from 47% in 1993 to 30% in 2002,' 23% in

[84] UNDP http://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/countryinfo.html accessed 30 March 2016.

2009 and 19% in 2015 (GoB & UNDP, 2010). Despite the decrease in poverty and having a 'comprehensive regime of social safety nets with relatively high coverage', albeit with parsimonious benefits (Seekings, 2016*a*), the country still experiences high rates of poverty, as well as rising inequality. Child poverty was at 33% in 2002 (CSO, 2002). Eight percent of children in Botswana lived in households where a household member was critically ill in 2008 (BAIS III, 2008), 32% of children were stunted in 2013 and 11% of children were out of primary school in the same year (Statistics Botswana, 2013:6; UNICEF, 2013; World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:10). The situation of orphans is exacerbated by high unemployment rate for their caregivers, 'Thirty-one percent of orphans lived in a household where there was no one gainfully employed in 2008, down from 55% in 2001' (MLG, 2008; CSO, 2002).

Newly-elected president Ian Khama summarized the challenges facing Botswana in his 2009 inauguration address to the National Assembly, 'unemployment, poverty, crime, HIV and AIDS, shortage of shelter, declining social values, environmental degradation and global competition ….'[85] In the same address Khama outline the government's response, 'we have put in place a number of policies, programmes and projects, measures and initiatives to tackle most if not all of them.'

Children in Botswana are supported by a number of programmes: those for orphans; vulnerable children- 'needy children' and 'needy students' (provided under the programme for destitutes). Children also benefit from government school feeding programmes, initiated in the mid-1960s and taken over by the Government from the World Food Programme in 1997 (Seekings 2016a & b), operated at primary and secondary levels, and in some cases from their parents' registration as destitute persons. There are special provisions for the children of remote area dwellers (under the Remote Area Development Programme). Generally, these programmes, especially indirect schemes, have a high coverage, offer in-kind child benefits that are relatively generous and family-based but without statutory provision.

The expansive but thrifty safety nets persisted in successive Botswana Democratic Party governments. This was not surprising as president Ian Khama, the current and fourth president of

[85] National Assembly, 0830 hours http://www.botswana.emb-japan.go.jp/downloads/khama-inaugurationspeech.doc accessed 31 March 2016.

the country since independence, like the preceding three presidents, is a known passionate conservative.[86] In his 2009 inauguration address to the National Assembly President Ian Khama mentioned that, 'A change of [political] leadership does not mean radical changes in the way we have been setting out our objectives as agreed upon by the ruling party and government for this nation. Our party has a manifesto that I signed on to and the government has a national development plan that I am also a party to.'[87] It is no surprise that he has presided over a conservative government in favour of a market-based approach to poverty reduction in the country through a poverty unit situated in his office. The promotion of workfare and minimal social welfare could have been to reduce family overdependence on the state and, argues Makgala (2013), to rekindle self-help and self-reliance ethos that had been eroding. I argue that a combination of structural (AIDS challenges and social factors such as family dynamics), political (party competition between the ruling Botswana Democratic Party and other parties), cultural and ideological (national culture and the Botswana Democratic Party's conservative ideology) influences shaped the CWR. The Botswana Democratic Party promoted a unique but segmented array of social protection programmes that preserved the family, a strong characteristic of a familial CWR. This chapter discusses the distinctive characteristics, evolution and suggest explanations to the reforms of the familial CWR in Botswana. In Chapter 6, I shall examine more fully how and why the familial CWR in Botswana is different from South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

4.1.1 Coverage

Assessments of social assistance programmes in Botswana indicated that safety nets coverage is low (see Table 4.1).

[86] Office of the President details his biography on http://www.gov.bw/en/ministries--authorities/ministries/state-president/office-of-the-president/about-the-office-of-the-president/

[87] Inauguration address by H.E. Lieutenant General S.K.I. Khama President of the Republic of Botswana, Tuesday 1st April 2008, National Assembly, 0830 hours.

Table 4.1: Programme coverage and spending

Programme	Budget (Pula-millions)		Share of GDP		No. of beneficiaries (thousands)		% national population		% of child population
	2009/10	2012/13	2009/10	2012/13	2009/10	2012/13	2009/10	2012/13	2013
Direct coverage									
Orphans	**47**	**301**	**-**	**0.2**	**48,119**	**40,030**	**2.6**	**1.9**	**4.6**
Primary School Feeding Programme	**208**	**275**	**-**	**0.2**	**301,970**	**268,761**	**16,6**	**12.8**	**31.3**
Secondary School Feeding Programme	**172**	**210**	**-**	**0.2**	**165,097**	**161,929**	**9.1**	**7.7**	**18.8**
Total direct coverage									**54.7***
Indirect coverage									
Community Home Based Care	160	38	-	0.0	3,702	3,434 (6868)	0.2	0.2	-
Vulnerable Group Feeding	216	166	-	0.1	230,985	383,392 (192000)	12.7	18.3	30
Destitute Persons	207	241	-	0.2	40,865	30,518 (67000)	2.2	1.5	7.8
Old Age Pension	256	279	-	0.2	91,446	93,639 (187278)	4.8	4.5	22
World War Veterans	15	-	-	-	2,940 (5880)	-	0.2	-	1
RADP	49	-	-	-	43,070 (86140)	-	2.4	-	10
Ipelegeng	260	409	-	2.6	19,431	55,000 (110,000)	1.1	0.3	13
Total indirect coverage									83**
Total coverage									85

Source: Adapted from World Bank & BIDPA (2013:x); Turner *et al.,* (2010a: xi). * total does not add up to 100% and it is an overestimation because there is duplicate counting of children who benefit from more than one programme. Even if we assume that all orphans attend school to avoid double counting, the proportion is 49.3%. This is misleading because this represents coverage for one programme ** overestimation due to double counting of children covered by more than one programme *** total does not add to 100% because of duplication

There are, however, conflicting evaluations primarily because of the variation in programmes research teams focus on. Seleka *et al.* assessed 11 social safety net programmes (see Table 4.1) and concluded that they reached less than 10% of the population and covered 19% of poor households (2007:28). Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP), a regional programme that "supported improvements in policy and programme approaches to hunger and vulnerability in southern Africa with particular emphasis on the role of social protection," assessed ten programmes (excluding the Community Home Based Care programme which Seleka *et al.,* included) and concluded that 'Together these reach approximately 900,000 people or half of the total population, although 700,000 of these are beneficiaries of the universal school feeding programmes or vulnerable group feeding. Of the remaining seven programmes, none reaches more than 5% of the population,' (2011:2). RHVP's assessment is misleading as its conclusion is based on the wider coverage of the School Feeding Programme only.

The World Bank & BIDPA (2013) and Turner *et al* (2010b) reached the same 5% conclusion but included scholarships, transfers to NGOs and poverty eradication initiative that were excluded by Seleka *et al*. and RHVP. The World Bank (2015) shows that, 'Almost 72% of the population lives in a household with at least one member who benefits from a social-protection programme.'

Turner *et al.,* (2010b:4) argued that 'despite fears of a national trend towards dependency', social assistance has a very low coverage compared to the number of people who should be covered. This is not entirely true of Botswana's CWR. Children benefit directly from the Orphan Care Programme (reaching about 5% of all children in 2013), fee waivers, and School Feeding Programme and most children (about 85% in 2013) benefit indirectly from family benefits i.e. from general welfare programmes including the Community Home Based Care, Old Age Pensions, World War Veterans and *Ipelegeng* (see Table 1.1). The Department of Social Protection in the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) has made progress towards children's well-being through the provision of social safety nets and social services in education, health and housing.

Previous researchers based their arguments on coverage by establishing the number of children covered as a percentage of total population. This is useful in understanding the general coverage of social protection programmes but sheds very little light on the number of children benefiting as a percentage of all children. This chapter argues that despite the coverage gaps, Botswana's

CWR's coverage may be considered low compared to South Africa (another middle-income country) but has extensive coverage particularly in comparison to Namibia and Zimbabwe. Children averaged 43% of the population between 2007 and 2013 (MLG, 2008:38; Statistics Botswana, 2014:6) and, as discussed, approximately 85% of all children benefited from social safety nets in 2013. The percentage of children who benefitted was calculated using 40,030 children benefitting under Orphan Care Programme, 430,690 primary and secondary school feeding (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:x), 67,000 vulnerable children under Destitute Persons Programme (MLG, 2008:41) and 192,000 children under Vulnerable Group Feeding (estimating that half of the 383,392 beneficiaries in 2013 were children). The estimated reach excludes 15,524 Remote Area Dweller children assuming they are counted under the school feeding programme if they attend school (an underestimation because not all Remote Area Dwellers children are of school going age). Using these estimates, if we assume that all orphans attend school and count them under the School Feeding Programme also, the percentage of children covered drops to 72% of all children. Child focused programmes, especially the School Feeding Programme (see Table 4.1), are very extensive.

Seekings asserts that Botswana 'had an extensive but parsimonious, 'conservative' welfare state, focused on economic growth and social stability but protecting most of its citizens against extreme poverty' and precisely discerns, 'By 2010, most children and many adults received free food rations, and one in ten people received individual cash transfers, often on behalf of their entire households,' (2016b:1-2). These coverage estimates differ because they take into account different programmes. As already discussed, Seleka *et al.,* (2007:10-12) assessed only selected 11 programmes and the other studies took into account a wider range of programmes (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:x; Turner *et al*., 2010a:x; RHVP, 2011:7-12). The CWR covers almost all children taking into account school and other feeding programmes which have very modest benefits, many children when considering indirect benefits through familial programmes, but only some children taking into account only child-focused programmes such as the Orphan Care Programme. Only the narrowly child-focused programmes are generous, however; the other programmes provide very modest benefits.

Geographical coverage of child and family benefits show Botswana has remarkably made great strides in achieving redistributive justice. While the geographical distribution of social protection

programmes is expected to follow that of the overall population to increase access to the most needy, there is remarkable inconsistence between the two in many Southern African Development Community countries. According to Mupedziswa and Ntseane (2012), 'the geographical coverage of social protection beneficiaries broadly follows that of the overall population (76% rural) and of poverty (91% rural).' In 2011 over 80% of 10 social protection programmes beneficiaries were "rural residents, exceeding the national population percentage" and 'nine out of ten beneficiaries of poverty-targeted programmes were in rural areas' (RHVP, 2011). The registration of need children and students under the destitute programme was also skewed towards rural areas. About 98% of the 2008/9 destitute registrations were in rural communities where the larger proportion of the poor live as opposed to the higher standard of living in the towns (Turner *et al.,* 2010a). Overall, coverage of in-kind benefits that are family targeted is high to support a familial CWR.

With regard to legal status of programmes, Botswana, unlike South Africa, Mauritius or Namibia, does not have statutory provisions for social assistance. Social assistance is governed by administrative fiat, not legislation. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) developed a number of policy instruments and guidelines including the Short-Term Plan of Action (STPA) on Care of Orphans in Botswana, 1999-2001(1999), Revised National Policy on Destitute Persons, 2002 (2002), Revised National Rural Development Policy (2002), National Guidelines on the Care of Orphans and Vulnerable Children (2008), Botswana National Plan of Action on Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2010-2016 (2010) that replaced STPA and a draft National Policy on Orphans and Vulnerable in Botswana (2013). Turner *et al.,* (2010b) observe that Botswana has an abundance of policy yet 'none is directly supported by law'. Seekings refers to Botswana's inheritance at independence as 'an ad hoc system of destitute relief, without any statutory poor law' (2016a:18). Even so, the policies highlight the 'importance accorded to social protection in the national polity' (RHVP, 2011:5). Contrary to Namibia with the provision of Child Welfare Grants enshrined in the Children Act of 2015, Botswana's Children's Act of 2009, the only legal instrument that provides a legal and institutional 'framework for the protection and care of children,' is silent on social protection for children. This is not surprising as bureaucrats and politicians alike were well aware of the policy implications of having statutory provision of social protection that once enshrined in such instruments, government will

be obliged to provide it. A government official indicated the government was reluctant to legislate social assistance because, 'Even if when we can't fund it, we are stuck with it.'[88]
Eligibility for child support is based on need (through proxy means testing) for vulnerable children (needy students, needy students and children in need of care) targeted under the Destitute Persons Programme and children requiring supplementary nutrition covered by Vulnerable Group Feeding programme. Child benefits were universalized in some categories. The Orphan Care Programme, designed to respond to need of orphans, was open to all families with orphans who applied and all children attending government primary and secondary schools benefited from the School Feeding Programme.

In terms of generosity of benefits, Botswana uses two national poverty lines: the Food Poverty Line i.e. 'the minimum food expenditure necessary for the household to maintain good caloric requirements'; and the Poverty Datum Line i.e. the 'cost of a basket of goods and services [food, clothing, personal items, household goods and services, and shelter] deemed to be necessary and adequate to meet basic needs for household members' (World Bank, 2015:26). In 2013 the average value was P685 ($82), equivalent to 92% of the Food Poverty Line (World Bank, 2015:143). In December 2017, using the 2016 prices (converted to US$ and adjusted for purchasing power parity, PPP), the Food Poverty Line was US$67/household/month and the Poverty Datum Line was US$86/household/month. A poor household with an orphan was presumably eligible for the Orphan Care Programme (between P500-P850 or US$49-US$83) and an *Ipelegeng* opportunity (P480+food P100 or US$47 + US$10). The total cash value would be US$143/household/month translating to US$28/person/month or US$0.90/person/day in an average five-person household, a very ungenerous amount that is far below the two poverty lines, the international extreme poverty line of US$1.90/person/day and ungenerous compared with other middle-income countries including South Africa.

In December 2017, the Orphan Care Programme transfers were US$0.90/person/day (US$28/person/month) which is ungenerous relative to the international poverty line of US$1.90/person/day. Overall, the Orphan Care Programme cash value was parsimonious relative to GDP per capita (US$7,315 in 2013) and the Food Poverty Line (US$67/person per month).

[88] Interview with Olebile Gaborone interview, Permanent Secretary-Poverty Eradication, Office of President, 27 October 2015.

The overall benefits are, however, generous relative to the Food Poverty Line taking into account what a poor household was likely to receive in total. The World Bank rated major social assistance programmes in Botswana as 'generous'. For instance, the Destitute Persons programme that directly and indirectly benefits many children contributed '77% of the poorest household food consumption' and the benefits were equivalent 'to 94% of Statistics Botswana's BCWIS's Poverty Datum Line for 2009/10 (P680/month or US$67)' (World Bank, 2013:49). Therefore, the CWR offers high value benefits relative to the Food Poverty Line per household in contrast with the parsimonious general welfare regime (Seekings, 2017:3; Seekings, 2016b:22; Ulriksen, 2017).

4.1.2 Familial-targeting

A key distinguishing feature of Botswana's social safety net system (both general and CWR) is its familialist focus. This focus is applied to both child and family benefits. Unlike South Africa, Lesotho and Namibia that have child grants for individual children, social protection programmes in Botswana target the family. For programmes that target groups such as orphans and destitute persons, their families become 'automatic' beneficiaries as the family receive a family-based food basket/coupon determined by family size. Sharing scarce resources, including food, in times of need has been a cultural practice of Batswana. AIDS weakened the nuclear and the extended family (Nthomang, 2007:193), rendering the traditional family support system inadequate to provide for orphans. Dahl argues that many Batswana, including political elites, the church and ordinary people, admit that kinship care for orphans (tied to the Batswana culture of family provision) can no longer adequately address the 'demographic devastation' caused by AIDS (2009:24). The government's provision of family-based food baskets reflects the political elite's ideas about reinventing the family and the promotion of the kinship culture in addressing the AIDS challenge. Social policy, hence, is rooted in the cultural aspects of kinship (Durham, 2007; 2005).

The government did not only promote familial provision by targeting the family but also by not providing transfers to some families assuming that the family will take the responsibility. The government has been conservative in providing for orphans placed under foster care of non-kin. Under the pilot Foster Care Programme (Dahl, 2009:33), the government withdrew the food basket on the pretext that the carers would abuse the programme by fostering children for the

purposes of accessing the basket and not to provide care. It is surprising that the government initiated a programme but could not avail the resources (food or cash) to sustain it and assumed absolute family responsibility. Such a romanticised view of the family partly explains the persistent familial orientation of all the programmes. The view may also account for the failure of the proposed foster care system which could not be implemented beyond piloting.

4.2 The evolution of Botswana's child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1966-2017

Between 1966-2017 Botswana's CWR went through four phases of reforms without shifting from the familial system. The first phase is between 1966 and the mid-1990s, traversing from Sir Seretse Khama (1966 to 1980) to Masire's presidency when the ruling Botswana Democratic Party enjoyed political security as a result of weak political opposition. The Botswana Democratic Party, therefore, lacked the incentive to reform social grants, limiting state provision to drought-related food aid.

The second phase is between the mid-1990s to 2002 when the ruling Botswana Democratic Party under Masire's presidency faced competitive elections that threatened its political security hence urged the ruling party to institute social grants reforms to secure the waning electoral base. During this period, the Botswana Democratic Party had to regain its lost electoral support in preparation for the 2004 election in which Masire sought reelection and had to address the devastating impact of structural challenges, especially AIDS-related health and demographic shocks.

The Botswana Democratic Party's political insecurity persisted into the third phase between 2007 and 2009 but this time Mogae had to strengthen the party against the strong opposition and prepare for the incoming president Ian Khama. The period was again characterised by structural challenges but in a different form - high unemployment combined with the AIDS crisis to increase family vulnerability to poverty and family breakdown. In response, Mogae expanded the food basket to the new category of vulnerable children and made the *Ipelegeng* public works programme permanent.

The last phase is between 2010 and 2015 characterised by political complacence by the Khama-led Botswana Democratic Party after winning the 2009 elections. The Botswana Democratic

Party regained its political security by winning the 2009 elections. The result was a series of failed reforms as the government rejected proposals for new poverty-targeted grants on the one hand and an enduring familial CWR providing familial benefit. Khama he rebranded the *Ipelegeng* to secure his reelection in the 2014 elections but the complacence costed the Botswana Democratic Party electoral support hence won the 2014 tightly contested election by a small margin and without winning a majority vote (Hamer, 2016a, Seekings & Hamer, 2017). Across the four phases, the Botswana Democratic Party maintained its conservative ideological orientation, promoting familial social provision, distributing primarily in-kind benefits to the neediest families with children and rejecting proposals to shift to poverty targeting.

4.2.1 Social grants provision under a politically secure Botswana Democratic Party, 1966-1994

Botswana's ruling Botswana Democratic Party faced a weak opposition from independence up to 1994 (Hamer, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017) hence lacked the political incentive to reform the child social provision. Figure 4.1 shows Botswana Democratic Party's electoral dominance, winning the majority vote despite declining from about 80% in the first election in 1965 to about 57% in 1994.

Figure 4.1: Political parties' share of vote, 1965-2014



Source: Botswana Independent Electoral Commission *By 2014 elections, Botswana National Front had merged with Botswana Movement for Democracy in 2010 to form Umbrella for Democratic Change.

This period of political security is characterised by a conservative minimal CWR and limited defamiliarisation with the government intervening with donor-assisted drought-related food aid and public works programmes that promoted workfare (Seekings, 2017; 2016a; Munemo, 2012). Children benefitted mostly indirectly from general welfare except for feeding programmes in schools and at home when their families qualified for the WFP-funded Vulnerable Group Feeding.

Minimal state intervention in family provision, representing the foundations of a conservative CWR, can be traced to the pre-independence era when the colonial government initiated these school and community nutritional programmes in response to incessant droughts. Unlike in South Africa or Namibia where the colonial government provided cash transfers to poor families with children (see Chapters 2 and 3), Botswana had no permanent support for poor children. Familialism continued in independent Botswana during this era of Botswana Democratic Party's political security. Destitute children were primarily provided by the family (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2011) except for the 1980 destitute policy that targeted adult destitute persons and indirectly benefited children. The orphan problem existed during this period (MLG, 2007) but the family and community provided a safety net to orphans with limited government support.

4.2.2 Social grants reforms under a politically insecure Botswana Democratic Party, mid-1990s- 2002

Researchers have argued that up to the 1990s the Botswana Democratic Party led government played a residual social provision role on the assumption that families could support themselves through rural activities or supported by other community members (Mugabe in Ulriksen, 2017:84-5). This assessment is partially correct but it underestimates the lack of political competition that characterised this period. The 1994 competitive elections caused electoral discomfort to President Masire and his ruling Botswana Democratic Party (see figure 4.1). The Botswana Democratic Party's political insecurity from the mid-1990s to 2002 urged the Botswana Democratic Party-led government to make significant social transfer reforms including the introduction of the previously neglected Old Age Pension, an Orphan Care Programme and

reviewing of the destitute policy to cover 'destitute children'. The reforms, as discussed later, supported familial provision reflecting Botswana Democratic Party's conservative ideology.

The Botswana Democratic Party's first major reaction to the opposition electoral threat in 1994 was the Masire-led government's unceremonious introduction of the Old Age Pension in 1996. South Africa and Namibia (under South African rule), had Old Age Pensions for the elderly pre-independence but Botswana did not inherit or introduce the scheme until 1996. According to Ulriksen (2017: 83) the motion to introduce an Old Age Pension was moved in 1988. Such a delay could have been a result of the perceived prospects of self-reliance for survival by retired workers (Ulriksen, 2017:84) and the weak political opposition. Ulriksen further attributes the pension's introduction to electoral competition – the Botswana Democratic Party experienced the strongest opposition in the 1994 elections so the pension was a political tool to maintain rural support (*ibid*). The pensions were 'conservative' in that they were limited to destitute adults aged 65 or older despite the retirement age of 60.

There is no clear evidence to suggest that the design of the pensions considered poor children in the targeted 'destitute' families but it is likely that demographic changes (age) and the possible burden of the elderly (the destitute persons) caring for children might have been important considerations. In other words, the pensions were familial. Evidence suggests that pensions for elderly and disabled people have a distributional aspect as, 'they are awarded to individuals but are to a large extent consumed by the household' (Ardington & Lund, 1995:558). In Lesotho, the design and introduction of pensions in 2004 deliberately sought to benefit pensioners and OVCs (Pelham, 2007). In Namibia (see Chapter 3), the political elite supported inflation indexed increment of the Old Age Pension amount in contrast with child grants because of the perceived trickle-down effect of the Old Age Pension. It is likely that when the Old Age Pension was introduced in 1996 the government was cognisant of its possible indirect impact to the orphan problem. Moreover, the government's concern for orphans was shown in 1996 with the inaugural distribution of the Orphan Care Basket.

The second remarkable reform after the 1994 competitive elections and the devastating effects of the AIDS pandemic was the Orphan Care Basket initiative that began in 1996 under president Masire and became a fully-fledged Orphan Care Programme in 1999 during Mogae's presidency. Botswana 'has one of the world's highest HIV/AIDS burdens that have had 'human welfare,

fiscal and governance impacts.'[89] There were 350,000 people living with HIV in 2003 (37% prevalence rate) (UNAIDS & WHO, 2005). Despite the prevalence rate falling to 22% by 2013, Botswana still had the third highest HIV prevalence rate in the world (after Lesotho and Swaziland) and the pandemic had left many disintegrated families (UNAIDS, 2014: A8-A9). In comparison to its Southern African neighbours - South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe - also affected by the advent of HIV and AIDS in the 1990s, Botswana was one of the hardest hit with high AIDS-related deaths triggering an unprecedented increase in 'AIDS' orphans. A total of 110,000 and 120,000 children lost their parents to AIDS in 2003 and 2005 respectively (CSO, 2005; UNCEF, 2005). An estimated 77% of registered orphans and 16% of all children in 2007 were AIDS orphans (Hu, 2011:63; CSO, 2009:55). Many Batswana children grew up 'as double orphans, in single parent families or even in child-headed households' (UNICEF, 2012:17).

Stegling corroborates that the effects of HIV at household level included the "growing number of orphaned and vulnerable children and the increasing number of patients that are taken care of at home" (2004:234). Festus Mogae, President of Botswana from 1998 to 2008, viewed HIV/AIDS as "the biggest problem facing post-colonial Botswana" as it became an economic and security threat to the nation (Kaboyakgosi & Mpule, 2008:302). Kanki and Marlink show President Mogae's acknowledgement of the AIDS problem in Botswana and his commitment to fighting the epidemic. Mogae 'decried the possible extinction of the Batswana' and declared a 'war' against AIDS. In his words: '*Ntwa e bolotse'* (The war has started) (2009:4).

HIV/AIDS threatened to destroy the human capital and government efforts to combat the disease had economic and human cost (Masire, 2006: x). One of its major social impact was the reduction of life expectancy from 65 to 35 years in 2005 (Kallings, 2008:238). UNICEF reported the devastating impacts of AIDS in Botswana:

> HIV/AIDS touches every aspect of life in Botswana. It continues to undermine the enormous advances this democratic country has made by aggravating poverty, increasing child mortality, weakening families, compromising productivity, and decimating the working age population. At home, families live with the effects of HIV/AIDS first hand as they try to cope with income loss due to illness, the trauma of

[89] *UNAIDS Botswana country profile*

> losing loved ones, the costs of caring for the sick, the burden of looking after orphaned relatives, and the overall physical, emotional and financial drain that the disease engenders (UNICEF, 2004:12).

The country mounted a strong HIV/AIDS intervention, providing more than 70% of all HIV spending, reaching universal access to HIV treatment by the end of 2011 and halving new HIV infections for infants between 2009 and 2012 thereby making important progress towards achieving an AIDS-free (GoB & UNDP, 2010) but 'its capacity to sustain the response is being stretched to the limit.'[90] Mupedziswa & Ntseane argue that 'the pandemic threatened the socio-economic fabric of Botswana society, with breadwinners succumbing to the virus in large numbers, in the process leaving behind thousands of orphans and vulnerable children requiring assistance' (2012:60).

After facing its major political competition in 1994, and in response to the increasing need (HIV related demographic and social changes) the Botswana Democratic Party-led government started providing an Orphan Food Basket to families with orphans without establishing a proper orphan care policy (Dahl, 2014; 2009). Dahl (2009:29) argues that the basket was an 'incentive to keep orphans connected to their kin and culture'. The food basket ensured that orphans 'are not abandoned or neglected' (Dahl, 2016:290). In 1997 the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) commissioned a situation analysis of orphans that reported an increasing number of orphans as result of AIDS-related deaths than other causes (MLG, 1998). Some scholars argue that orphan estimates were an underestimation resulting from AIDS-related stigma underreporting (Ntseane & Solo, 2007:93; BFTU, 2007). The analysis identified orphans as a particular vulnerable group that needed immediate government intervention. In this report, the government acknowledged that family coping mechanisms such as reliance on the traditional extended family were severely stressed. The provision of basic social welfare services and material support to 'needy' children including orphans by government and other stakeholders was also overstretched.[91] Ministry of

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[90] UNDP website http://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/countryinfo.html accessed 30 March 2016.

[91] All social protection programmes covered less than 10% of poor households by 2007 (Seleka *et al.,* 2007: 28)

Local Government (1999) reported “Orphans had no access to basic needs such as food, clothing, toiletry and shelter” as a result of household poverty.

In response to this orphan problem, the Ministry of Local Government (through its Social Welfare Division, now Department of Social Protection) adopted, in 1999, a *Short-Term Plan of Action (STPA) on Care of Orphans in Botswana (*replaced by the *Botswana National Plan of Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, 2010-2016* in 2010) that provided for the introduction of the Orphan care Programme the same year. 1999 was a turning point in the social policy history in Botswana as STPA was the first and only policy directly targeting children since independence.

The STPA’s main objective was “to respond to the immediate needs of orphans i.e. food, clothing, education, shelter, protection and care.” In keeping with the Botswana Democratic Party government’s approach in delivering services to the need, STPA emphasised that the government will support ‘community based responses to the orphan problem’ (MLG, 1999), suggesting promotion of the familial and community approaches that existed before the AIDS era. Although the Orphan Care Programme’s ultimate goal was to remove orphans from poverty trap (Ntseane & Solo, 2007:93), its immediate aim was to ‘offset the burden of [families/kin] taking on additional mouths to feed’ (Dahl, 2009:29). Hence, the Orphan Care Programme promoted kin-based orphan care.

The Orphan Care Programme is regarded as a social allowance hence it is not means tested. All families with orphans under 18 years were eligible for the programme. An orphan is narrowly defined as “a child below 18 years who has lost one (single parents)[92] or two (married couples, whether married in civil or traditional marriages) biological or adoptive parents.” STPA further defines ‘social orphans’ as “children who are abandoned or dumped or whose parents cannot be traced.” This definition excluded children living with single parents such as the mother only but with ‘absent fathers’ (see Table 4.2).

[92] This definition only refers to children who had a single parent and lost that parent through death and excludes children who had two parents (unmarried) and lost one parent through death.

Table 4.2: Distribution of orphans by status of parent, 2001 & 2008

Parent survival status	2001	2008
Both M[other] and F[ather] alive and present	23	28.7
M present, F deceased	6.1	9.3
M present, F alive but absent	35	15.7
M deceased, F deceased	1.6	3
M deceased, F alive but absent	2.6	6.4
M deceased, F present	0.5	3.9
M alive but absent, F deceased	1.6	10.2
M alive but absent, F alive but absent	22	28.8
M alive but absent, F present	3	0.9
Orphans as % all children	15.2	16.2

Source: CSO (2001:52) & CSO (2009:110).

The orphan definition contrasts with other definitions within Botswana and internationally. The Botswana Central Statistics Office (now Statistics Botswana) defined orphans as children under 18 years who have lost one or both parents or whose parents' survival status is unknown (see Table 4.2) while the UNICEF/UNAIDS/USAID (2002) state that 'an orphan is a child below the age of 18 years who has lost one or both parents,' adopted by Botswana's neighbours, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The narrow definition of orphans excludes children falling in the 'orphan' category according to international definition. For instance, 'single' orphans (either maternal or paternal) are not recognized in Botswana. To compel absent fathers to provide for their children, 'Deserted children born out of wedlock were excluded from the definition of an eligible orphan, and therefore excluded from benefits under STPA unless there was clear proof that the child's father had indeed died' (MLG, 2006:4). As a result of this disparity orphan rates were estimated at 7% and 17% using the Botswana and the international definition in 2008 (MLG, 2008).

The value of the food basket remained unchanged at P216,00 (US$21) per orphan irrespective of geographical location of their home from 1999 until 2009. In 2010, the value increased and ranged between P500,00 (US$41) and P650,00 (US$76) depending on geographic location (urban, peri-urban or rural). The amount was supposed to be 'adjusted for inflation at the beginning of each financial year but it has not been reviewed since 2010 due to affordability concerns, to allow more children to be enrolled on other programmes, particularly the increasing

children in need of care (vulnerable children)'[93] and 'direct more financial resources towards income generating projects for families with children to increase their chances of self-reliance.'[94]

The Orphan Care Programme earned political support as it maintained the 'safety net' typology which the ruling Botswana Democratic Party favoured. Based on the 1998 rapid assessment of the situation of orphans in the country conducted by the Ministry of Health and international donors (USAID and UNICEF) which revealed the escalating numbers of orphans as a result of AIDS-related deaths, then president Festus Mogae, soon after taking over from Quett Masire in April of that year, declared the situation of orphans as a national disaster.[95] Orphanhood was henceforth viewed as an emergency compelling government to act swiftly by introducing the Orphan Care Programme. The STPA was initiated prior to the change of president, but the introduction of the Orphan Care Programme was under Mogae suggesting that Masire appears to have underestimated the devastating effects of AIDS on the family which his successor took seriously.

The introduction of Orphan Care Programme offering in-kind benefits can be viewed as some form of 'path dependency' (Pierson, 2000). Informed by the destitute programme which was already giving out monthly benefits as food parcels with a small cash component of P81 (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2012; Ntseane & Solo, 2007; Seleka *et al.*, 2007), it was administratively easy and cost effective to extend the same benefits (in-kind) to children in need using the same distribution structures already established.

Donors were also influential on the Orphan Care Programme targeting up to 2012 but the narrow orphan focus resonated with the Botswana Democratic Party's minimalist ideology. Although the government-President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (USAID/PEPFAR) funding partnership was that of government supported partnership, contrary to lower income countries like Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia, the pressure was unusual in an upper middle-income

[93] Interview with Nguvauva.

[94] Interview with Olebile Gaborone.

[95] Interview with Tebogo B Seleka, Executive Director, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), 29 October 2015.

country. The pressure to target orphans is attributed to the fact that Orphan Care Programme was funded by USAID under the PEPFAR programme through the National AIDS Coordinating Agency until 2013. There was not much political will until the 2010s when Government only took over in 2014 when it started funding Orphan Care Programme from ministerial budget.[96] As part of financing HIV/AIDS programmes such as the Community Home Based Care Programme, USAID scheme (initiated in 1995 by government and donors) also financed the food basket for orphans as part of mitigation strategy since a larger percentage of the orphans were 'AIDS' orphans. Ansell views the 'singular focus on AIDS orphans as a 'funding magnet'. The funding of AIDS orphans programmes through PEPFAR is not unique to Botswana. Ansell observes, "PEPFAR sets aside 10% of its programme funding to address the needs of orphans and vulnerable children and claims to have supported more than 5 million of them" by 2014 (2016:168).' PEPFAR has been funding OVCs programmes in almost all countries in Southern Africa between 2004 and 2017.[97] The PEPFAR-funded OVCs programmes included 'food and nutrition, shelter and care, legal protection, health care, psychosocial support, education, and economic strengthening of families' and households' (Bryant *et al*., 2012:1509). In Botswana, donors did not contradict but rather supported the government's narrow targeting of AIDS orphans.

Global pressures also influenced the shape of the Orphan Care Programme. Botswana is party to the "Code on Social Security in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)" that was formulated in 2004 and signed by all member states in 2008. Article 1 of the code distinguishes between social assistance and social allowances. Social allowances[98] are defined as "universal payments made to 'persons in designated categories' to include children, the disabled and the elderly. They are financed from government revenue and are not mean-tested." Persons falling within the designated category receive social allowances regardless of their economic position. Put differently, though having the same funding modalities, social assistance is cash or in-kind assistance provided to persons lacking the "means to support themselves or their

[96] Interview with Papadi Nguvauva.

[97] https://www.pepfar.gov/countries/cop/2007/index.htm.

[98] Kerapeletswe (2008) also uses the same classification of social safety nets in Botswana (Kessy and Tostensen (eds) 2008 p.83-116).

dependents" and it is means tested. This type of government intervention is meant to 'alleviate poverty' through 'provision of minimum income support' (SADC CODE, 2008:1). Based on this distinction, a matrix of child-focused programmes under each class and the guiding policy/Act for Botswana is drawn as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Botswana Social Protection Matrix

Classification	Type of social safety net	Policy instrument/Act
Social allowance schemes	Orphan Care Programme	• Short Term Plan of Action for Care of Orphans in Botswana • National Guidelines on the Care of Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2008 • Botswana National Plan of Action on Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2010-2016
	Vulnerable Group Feeding	• National Health policy (1995,2011)
	School Feeding Programme	• National Policy on Education
Social assistance schemes	Destitute programme	• Revised National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002)
	Needy students	• National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002)
	Needy children	• National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002)
	Remote Area Dweller Programme	• National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002) • Remote Area Development Policy

Adapted from Ntseane and Solo (2007:27).

Table 3.4 indicates that the core social transfer for children in Botswana, Orphan Care Programme, falls under social allowances which are 'universal' and 'not means tested'. The slow reforms of programme shown in the matrix are partly explained by Botswana's adoption of these classifications and definitions. Although the Code is not legally binding, using the SADC Code, there is no doubt that Botswana conformed to the regionally agreed standards of social provision and the government has viewed the current provisions as internationally acceptable and adequate.[99]

Although the Orphan Care Programme was a programmatic response to AIDS and the associated social and demographic changes, its implementation was conservative and shows aspects of patronage. It was conservative because orphans were supported within a family, indirectly promoting the extended family (familial). Although some rich families that cared for orphans

[99] Interview with Mr Olebile M. Gaborone, Permanent Secretary-Poverty Eradication, Office of President.

might have benefited from the Orphan Care Programme, because it was not means tested, many orphans joined their extended families in the rural areas when their parents died and most of the caregivers were likely to be elderly and poor (Dahl, 2014). These poor caregivers' livelihoods depended on the food baskets and were, like other poor beneficiaries of food aid (Ulriksen, 2017), Botswana Democratic Party loyalists. Overall, Mogae seem to have intensified his response to AIDS but the response (introduction of the Orphan Care Programme) actually intensified his election campaign for the 1999 elections. Without specifying the strategies to be taken, Mogae underscored that, 'The Botswana Democratic Party will continue to pursue new strategies to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS and arrest the spread of the virus.'[100]

The last social transfer reforms during Masire's presidency was the revision of the Destitute Policy in 2002 to expand coverage of 'destitute' children in destitute families. Like the Orphan Care Programme, Masire initiated the review during the run up to the 2004 elections where he was seeking reelection. Masire was re-elected, perhaps because the expanded coverage of 'destitute families' became popular among the poor, especially the urban poor who were previously excluded from other social assistance programmes and the old destitute criteria.

The review entailed redefining child destitution to cater for children previously not covered by any other programme and introducing a new Head Start Programme targeted at vulnerable children (needy students and needy children). The Destitute Persons Programme, guided by the *National Destitute Policy,* was formally introduced in 1980 to respond "to the gradual erosion of the traditional safety net." Although it covers other people in need, the programme was "intended to serve the few who have absolutely no other sources of support" (MLG, 2002). 'Destitutes' had been assisted prior to 1980, but on an ad hoc basis (Seekings, 2016a:18). The policy was revised to the *Revised National Policy on Destitute Persons* in 2002 and was being reviewed to be a *National Policy on Needy and Vulnerable Families* as of October 2016. The 2002 revision was reportedly motivated by six considerations: (1) "changes in the circumstances of poor people in Botswana since the original policy was introduced in 1980" (2) "the 1980 policy assumed that registered destitute persons consumed rations on their own. Experience has shown that almost

[100] Botswana Democratic Party 1999 Election Manifesto, p1.

without exception, destitute persons in fact share their rations with their immediate dependents" (3) "in the old policy document, a person was only eligible to be assessed as 'destitute' if he or she did not own any assets. Subsequently, more accurate analysis has shown that it is indeed possible for a household to own just a few assets, for example, up to a maximum of four livestock units, and still be very poor" (4) "poor households require a small amount of cash, to meet their non-food requirements. The need to introduce other forms of assistance such as a small amount of cash to instill a sense of being and confidence on the beneficiaries" was identified (5) "government had introduced other social benefit programmes such as Rural Area Dweller Programme and it was found necessary to review the 1980 policy to prevent 'double dipping' but this excluded the Old Age Pension since eligibility was not means tested" (6) "the need to emphasize the rehabilitation component was found to be critical" (MLG, 2002:3). Thus, the revision was necessitated by the 'changing social conditions' (Ulriksen, 2017:82).

The monthly benefits include a food coupon (similar to the Orphan Care Programme) valued between P450 and P550 (US$44 and US$54) by October 2002 depending on locality (higher in remote areas with usually high food prices) and family size or the number of dependent children and a cash allowance pegged at P70 (US$7) since October 2002. The amount of the food basket is doubled 'for families of five or more members' (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:24). The cash component is meant to cater for other non-food individual needs, bestow dignity and pride on destitute persons (MLG 2002:7).

The 2002 policy provides for the support of three categories of destitute children i.e. 'minor children', 'needy children' and 'needy students'. The policy redefined a destitute child as "a child under the age of 18 who is need of care and may not be catered for under the Orphan Care Programme, or has parent(s) who are terminally ill and are incapable of caring for the child, or has been abandoned and is in need of care". "Child in need of care" is "a child who has been abandoned or is without visible means of support; has no parent or guardian or has a parent or guardian who does not or is unfit to exercise proper control over the child; engages in any form of street trading, unless he has been deputed by his parents to help in the distribution of merchandise of a family concern; is in the custody of a person who has been convicted of committing upon or in connection with a child any offence referred to in part IV of the act; or frequents the company of an immoral or violent person, or is otherwise living in circumstances

calculated to cause or conduce his seduction, corruption, or prostitution," (see Botswana Children's Act, 2009 Section 14). "Children in need of care' therefore refers to 'orphans, abused, abandoned, and neglected children" (Maundeni, 2009). Children under 18 years also qualified as destitute persons if they lived under 'difficult circumstances'. Such categorization shows the government has always done something but not 'too much' for its poor citizens. Consequently, the support has provided useful social safety nets for families with children but has remained fragmented (Seleka *et al.,* 2007) and modest.

In both the original and revised versions the policy objective of ensuring "government provides minimum assistance to the genuine destitute persons to ensure their good health and welfare' and to alleviate poverty" (MLG, 2002) did not change. The policy states that the government will provide 'destitute persons with a reasonable level of benefits' that will motivate them to use their efforts to escape poverty trap and not 'serve as a disincentive to such persons making an effort to obtain a sustainable livelihood'. The extent of government assistance is to 'allow some latitude before the disincentive level is reached'. For destitute children under 18 years this meant furthering their education 'to the best of their ability' (MLG, 2002:10). By defining these responsibilities and obligations of persons receiving government assistance the Botswana Democratic Party government emphasizes that social provision for the indigent should be temporary of last resort. Support should also be only for people who are 'genuinely' destitute. Poor people should turn first to other means of work, family or community support and only in the event that these institutions fail to meet their basic needs, i.e. they are 'genuinely' destitute, will government intervene. The clause 'It is the responsibility of the eligible persons to make most out of the rehabilitation opportunities that are provided by government' (*ibid*) reminds beneficiaries that government can only assist to a certain level (provision of basic needs and rehabilitation programmes) beyond which the poor should endeavor to work for their well-being. Batswana seem to share the credence that 'there is dignity in working' as opposed to receiving social assistance. 'Parents or caregivers must work for their children. They should not just expect to receive social assistance from government. We are guided by *botho,* values that guide our behaviour to respect and assist each other in time of need'.[101] Another interviewee said, "They are our children. We must see that they are provided and not the government. We always

[101] Interview with Angelinah Montshiwa, BONELA Programme Manager, 7 October 2015.

have ways of helping each other in our communities not to start by running to the government."[102] Similar sentiments were echoed in other interviews with government officials.[103]

This philosophy of providing minimal assistance but 'enough' to empower the poor to work for their welfare has largely informed the design and implementation of child social protection programmes in Botswana. Poor families with vulnerable children (destitute children) are subjected to a means test before they are certified as eligible candidates for the destitute programme and those who qualify are usually registered on a temporary basis except for the chronically sick or disabled. Similarly, the Orphan Care Programme is limited to a narrowly defined category of orphans that excludes single (one parent surviving) orphans such as those living with their mother but the father is deceased accounting for about 6% and 9% of all children in 2001 and 2008 assuming that the parent present will be able to provide for the child(ren).

The revised policy emphasized beneficiary graduation upon rehabilitation despite that the 'majority of those enrolled on such programmes are "old, sometimes frail persons with low educational levels and few skills" (Ntseane & Solo 2007:92). Rehabilitation was meant to promote self-reliance but the number of able-bodied persons on the Destitute Persons Programme increased to 'alarming rates' (8,785 in 2008) raising government concerns about dependency. For this reason, two thirds of this category had been moved to government workfare *Ipelegeng*[104] programme by 2010 (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:25). This transfer cemented the Botswana Democratic Party government's view that family and child support should first and foremost be sought from work, a notion dating back to Seretse Khama's emphasis on 'self-help' – working in subsistence farming, or for the community or state through a public works programme - captured in Botswana's first full National Development Plan in 1968 (Seekings, 2016b:15). The preference for workfare programmes in contrast with social assistance in

[102] Interview with Olobile Gaborone.

[103] Separate interviews with Olobile Gaborone; P Nguvauva and Gomotsanang Manne.

[104] Setswana word for 'people must carry themselves on their own backs'.

Botswana suggests the universality of welfare dependency discourses in shaping public policy in developing and developed countries.

To protect the increasing number of needy students, the revised Destitute Policy provided for a *Head Start Programme*. The programme's near cash benefits are similar to the Orphan Care Programme but it is the adult destitute person who is registered and receives cash and a family food coupon. Under this programme, '*needy students'* are defined as, "needy children' who are at school or in vocational training or tertiary education." These include destitutes under 18 who are not cared for by other programmes, but "are mainly children in the households of registered destitute persons." The level of support for *needy students* depends on whether the child is at pre-school, primary, community junior secondary, senior secondary school or vocational training and tertiary institutions. Benefits offered are similar to the Orphan Care Programme. In recognition of difficult circumstances under which needy students study, they are considered for repeating at school to allow them to improve their grades (MLG, 2002). "Sponsorships and scholarships for students in tertiary education as part of this programme accounted for 1.4 % of GDP - 45% of total social assistance spending" and the same percentage of the population in 2012/13 (World Bank, 2013: x). This budget is huge and incomparable to any of the other social grants for children. The Bank asserts that these programmes are "likely to be regressive, benefiting mostly rich and upper-middle income students," and while they promote skills development, "Their use results in a private benefit, with fewer positive externalities than in primary or secondary education." Such high expenditure show government commitment "to ensure that every child gets access to education, including tertiary" with the ultimate goal of breaking intergenerational poverty and invest in human capital development through "ensuring that children attain the highest level of education, so that they can compete in the labour market," (*ibid*: xiv).

The government revised the destitute policy together with *National Policy for Rural Development* in 2002 to cater for socially and economically marginalized families with children living in remote areas covered by the *Remote Area Dweller programme*. The Remote Area Dwellers Programme beneficiaries are not means tested (Tesliuc *et al.*, 2013:38); eligibility is open to all children living in selected remote areas and belonging to the previously disadvantaged Basarwa ethnic group. Like in other programmes, children from such disadvantaged families receive material benefits such as food, toiletry, bedding, transportation

and other educational expenses. Again, the food basket under the Orphan Care Programme applies to children these families. Government assistance to these children is both a safety net and investment in human capital as it is meant "to enable school going children to participate in the education system and allow them to compete effectively in the job market and graduate from the remote area dweller programme support" (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013).

The policy reforms initiated by president Mogae show his pragmatism on the one hand and his alignment to partisan politics on the other. The social programmes he introduced and the reviews of existing policies instituted promoted inclusivity but simultaneously supported his political ambitions especially through using the programmes to campaign against the competitive political opposition and seek reelection. The reforms reflected the Botswana Democratic Party's familial ideological orientation, promoting family targeted primarily in-kind benefits limited to the neediest families.

4.2.3 Botswana Democratic Party's political insecurity, (un)employment and vulnerability induced social transfer reforms, 2007-9

The Botswana Democratic Party continued to face a strong political opposition in the 1999 and 2004 elections. Although the Umbrella for Democratic Change's share of the vote declined from about 38% to about 26% in the 1999 and 2004, the united party continued to cause electoral discomfort to the Botswana Democratic Party. During 2007/9, the Botswana Democratic Party's political insecurity persevered yet the government faced another structural challenge –high unemployment leading to increased vulnerable families with children. Like many other countries globally, Botswana experienced the effects of the 2008 Great Recession much earlier. The Botswana Democratic Party responded by expanding the food basket to OVCs and made the public works programme a permanent scheme. These 'pro-poor' reforms were politically strategic since they were instituted before the 2009 elections and might have helped the Botswana Democratic Party to expand its political support base into the urban areas. The reforms were conservative in that the programmes remained familial and targeted at 'destitute' families.

In 2007 the Department of Social Services (DSS) expanded the coverage of the Destitute Persons Programme to households designated as households with OVCs - previously excluded poor families with parents/caregivers who were unable to meet their children's needs because they

were not gainfully employed or were chronically ill. Orphan caregiving households (already receiving or eligible for Orphan Care Programme) with vulnerable children were also targeted.[105] Caregiver/parent employment status became important in the designation of OVCs households.

Recognizing the increasing number of OVCs, government had spearheaded social transfer provision specifically to orphans through STPA without a major focus on vulnerable children. The exclusion of vulnerable children during the formulation of STPA was as a result of the plan being "largely guided by a rapid assessment of orphans" without considering 'the distribution and magnitude of problems facing orphans (not to mention other vulnerable children)' (MLG, 2006:6). A 2005 MLG-UNICEF supported evaluation concluded that, 'STPA has managed to reach virtually all eligible orphans with food packages' that 'helped to protect not only the nutritional status of the orphans, but also other children in orphan caregiving households, and even caregivers' (MLG, 2006: xv). The evaluation established that 'orphan' food was shared among family members suggesting that the Orphan Care Programme basket was already a 'family basket' although the government did not initially see it as such. While acknowledging that the 'move from an orphan to an OVC orientation' was already underway as some vulnerable children in destitute families were supported under the Destitute Persons Programme, the evaluation recommended a 'move from an orphan focus to an OVC focus' (*ibid*: xvii).

Based on these recommendations, the MLG, supported by USAID/PEPFAR, commissioned a National Situation Analysis on OVCs in mid-2007. Prior to this analysis, the Destitute Policy had defined vulnerable children other than orphans as: "street children; child labourers; children who were sexually, physically or emotionally exploited, neglected or abused; children with disabilities; and remote area dweller children from minority groups" accounting for 9% (67,900) of all children in 2008, doubling from 33,380 in 2003 (MLG, 2008:41). By contrast, MLG broadly defined vulnerable children as children "below the age of 18 years who live in an abusive environment; live in a poverty-stricken family and cannot access basic services; heads a household; lives with a sick parent(s)/guardian; is infected with HIV; lives outside family care" (MLG, 2008: viii). But MLG only adopted two measurable criteria that restricted vulnerable

[105] In 2007, and up to 2010, Orphan Care Programme food basket was for individual orphans only. The basket was rationalised in 2010.

children to children 'below 18 years living in a household where there was no person who was gainfully employed' (constituting 31%) or 'where there was a person who was critically ill for at least three months' (constituting 4%) (2008:10) to estimate the prevalence of this category of children. Similar to the STPA evaluation that observed that, "the rapid rise in the number of orphans has coincided with a rise in the number of vulnerable children, including children in households caring for orphans, but also other households" (MLG, 2006:8), nearly 31% of children were identified as vulnerable (and about 17% as orphans using international orphan definition) as they lived in poverty, child-headed households or struggled to grow up in families prone to internal conflicts, alcoholism, abuse and poor parenting skills. Almost all OVCs lived with family relatives but 'most of the relatives were unemployed (about 58%), widowed, grandmothers with a low education and low income.' Furthermore, '90% of the households were female-headed,' up from 68% of orphan caregiving households in 2001 (MLG, 2008:29). An increasing number of unemployed youths were living in poor families and cared for by the elderly (43% of heads of households surveyed were grandmothers) highlighting 'that the burden of care is falling on the most aged and frail, the grandmother'

The OVC situation prompted the MLG through the Social and Community Development departments at council level to start registering 'vulnerable children' who were not benefiting from any other social assistance programmes under the Destitute Persons Programme. Three categories of vulnerable children - needy students, needy children and children in need of care[106] – defined as a 'person below the age of 18 years who is in any situation or circumstance which is or is likely to adversely affect the child's physical, emotional, psychological or general well-being, which prevents the enjoyment of his or her rights, and who is in need of protection" were identified.[107] The number of registered vulnerable children benefiting and receiving similar

[106] Needy students refer to children from destitute families who attend school whilst needy children refer to children from the same families either of below school-going age or out-of-school.

[107] "A child in need of protection" refers to "a vulnerable child under the age of 18 years and includes a child who is temporarily or permanently deprived of parental care and support; or who is temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment and care; or heads or lives in a child headed household; or displays behaviour which cannot be managed by the parent, guardian or other person; or suffers from physical/mental disability or any form of chronic illness; or is involved in work which is harmful to his or her emotional, physical. Psychological, social or educational development or well-being; or suffers/lives in abusive circumstances; or lives in

support as orphans has been increasing. The number increased from 25 483 in 2008 to 29 033 and a peak of 34 633 in 2009 and 2010 respectively. By October 2015 the number had decreased to 33 681 as more children exited the programme compared to entrants. Entrants were few due to the shortage of social workers who were overwhelmed by other duties other than assessing referred children.

The unemployment statistics show that the structural challenges facing the family, particularly the urban households had extended from AIDS to unemployment. Hamer summarised the economic situation, 'In 2008, the country's real GDP contracted by 6% and jobs in the mining sector fell by almost 10%. Nearly one out of five Batswana lived below the poverty datum line and the unemployment rate was 18%, though this rate was no doubt much higher among the youth and in rural areas' (2016a:12). Unemployment related child vulnerability especially deepening poverty necessitated the targeting of vulnerable children. The expansion could have been part of the Botswana Democratic Party's strategy to generate support by correcting the 'insufficiently inclusive growth' that had reduced its electoral support (Hamer, 2016a:9). These reforms indicate a slight but not clear shift to poverty targeting reflected in the means test (chronically ill or unemployed guardians) but provision remained familial in that the programme targeted no individual children but families with vulnerable children. Botswana Democratic Party always made programmatic responses to the social protection needs of the poor families (see reforms of the destitute policy and institutionalisation of drought relief, for example) as the 'poor constituency' formed its strong support base.

Despite the augmented reach to a wider range of 'vulnerable' children, many children continued to be excluded from the deserving category because the government remained anxious about both 'dependency' and 'affordability'. The Botswana Democratic Party administration expected that the situation of vulnerable children would improve and the registered numbers decrease once their parents or caregivers were empowered through poverty eradication programmes such as *Ipelegeng* and other government funded income generating activities. With that view, against all evidence reported by social workers on the deteriorating situation of vulnerable children, the

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circumstances calculated to be cause or conduce to the child's seduction, prostitution or corruption; or is in contact or conflict with the law."

ongoing increase in the number of vulnerable children was considered temporary and did not warrant a stand-alone long-term policy intervention.[108]

Donors played a significant role in advocating for the expansion of support to other vulnerable children other than orphans. Both the 2006 STPA evaluation and the 2008 Situation Analysis on OVCs were primarily funded by UNICEF Botswana and USAID/PEPFAR respectively. Through the evaluation, UNICEF, an international United Nations agency advocating for universal coverage of child social protection globally, successfully lobbied for a paradigm shift among policy makers from focusing on orphans to include other vulnerable categories. Together with USAID, UNICEF stimulated political will and government financial support to have expanded support for OVCs as government agreed that expanding the programme to other vulnerable children was a virtuous way of addressing the OVC problem. Government recognised the expansion as a way to strengthen the disintegrating family structure struggling to provide for children. For USAID, political and financial buy-in of the expansion was important as it was part of its exit strategy. At the time of the expansion the Orphan Care Programme was principally funded by USAID. USAID's strategy was first to have government enrol vulnerable children on the tax-funded Destitute Persons Programme and later allow government to take over Orphan Care Programme. While the government immediately adopted the expansion recommendations, it only took over Orphan Care Programme funding in 2013.[109]

The USAID-funded Situation Analysis on OVCs became "a precursor to the development of a National Policy on Orphans and Vulnerable Children" that would guide the expanded provision of essential services to vulnerable children. The draft policy is destined to provide an overarching framework to support and guide delivery of 'comprehensive, inclusive, "age appropriate, integrated and quality responses to all vulnerable children" contrasting previous OVC responses which tended to both separately focus on orphans and other groups of vulnerable children and not well guided, coordinated or monitored (MLG, 2013). The policy, like Zimbabwe's Harmonised Social Cash Transfer, promotes a family care approach to the care and support of OVCs (MLG, 2013:6). The strategic emphasis of the policy on social protection is

[108] Interview with Olebile Gaborone.

[109] Interview with a government official who preferred anonymity.

"targeted interventions and services provided on the basis of assessed needs and vulnerability", presenting both "government's intention to promote and protect the rights" of Botswana's most vulnerable children and its minimalist approach to social provision for families with children. The proposed policy has gone through two drafts (2009 and 2013) but still awaiting Cabinet review, perhaps, because the government would rather support OVCs caregivers through employment and self-employment initiatives to strategically limit the number of vulnerable children on government support.

Another unemployment-related reform instituted by the Botswana Democratic Party government is the rebranding of the Labour Intensive Public Works Programme (LIPWP), introduced in 1978 to 2007. LIPWP was a temporary programme implemented as a form of drought relief to provide income support to poor families particularly in the rural communities (Ulriksen, 2017). Although it does not directly target children, it is likely that some children were reached indirectly as children tend to be overrepresented in poor families. The programme, starting with in-kind and later cash payments, provided 'subsistence level' benefits of about P10 (about US$1) per day (Ntseane & Solo, 2007). LIPWP became popular to the rural poor and secured political support for the Botswana Democratic Party (Ulriksen, 2017; Molutsi, 1989).

The LIPWP (now *Ipelegeng*) was made permanent in 2008, still targeting the poorest but no longer drought-related and expanded to urban areas (GoB, 2009), perhaps to curb urban unemployment. Despite dependency concerns about *Ipelegeng*, institutionalising it was the Botswana Democratic Party's political decision to continue soliciting rural political support and to win urban voters.

Most poor people ended up depending on the programme for their livelihoods. The total number of people employed increased from about 100,000 in 1992/3 to about 180,000 in 2007 (Ulriksen, 2017:80). *Ipelegeng* is said to benefit over 200,000 a year but because people are employed on rotational basis, this might be an overestimate. Ulriksen (2017) proposes counting monthly as opposed to annual beneficiaries. This might have reduced the participants to about 55,000 in 2012/3 (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:x), representing about 3% of the population. It is not clear how many children indirectly benefited from the *Ipelegeng* but an average household has two children in Botswana. Hence, children double the number of participants might have been indirectly reached through *Ipelegeng* in 2012/3.

Both the rebranding of *Ipelegeng* and the expanded coverage of OVCs could have helped the ruling party to be reelected in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. Rebranding *Ipelegeng* was crucial in securing Botswana Democratic Party electoral support in the highly competitive 2014 elections (Hamer, 2016a). Literature on conditional cash transfers has shown that voters reward presidents and ruling parties who provide cash transfers (De la O, 2015; 2013; Zucco, 2008; Zucco & Power, 2013; Hunter & Power, 2007). The provision of unconditional cash transfers in Southern Africa also secured incumbent presidents political support to win elections (Hamer, 2016a; Seekings & Hamer, 2017; Siachiwena, 2017; 2016).

4.2.4 Social transfer (failed)reforms during the Botswana Democratic Party's return to political security, 2010-15

The Botswana Democratic Party's share of vote declined from about 68% during the first election in1965 to about 52% in 2004. But in 2009, the share increased to about 54% while the strongest opposition, the Umbrella for Democratic Change, polled about 22% (declining from about 26% in 2004). The slight increase in the Botswana Democratic Party's share of vote, showing increased electoral support in 2009, could have fostered complacence within the party. The Botswana Democratic Party had no incentive to make substantial social grants reforms in contrast with the pressure experienced after the 1994 elections. A weak electoral threat usually contributes to resistance to reforms by incumbent parties like South Africa (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015). The result of Botswana Democratic Party's complacence was a period of 'no reforms' and rejections of proposal for new cash transfer programmes. The complacence might have costed the ruling party in the 2014 elections which it won but with less than half of the share of vote.

Between 2010 and 2013, the only successful change that might have been driven by the Botswana Democratic Party's familial ideology (hence conservative) is the rationalisation of the Orphan Care Programme food basket in 2010. Until 2010 each orphan registered under the Orphan Care Programme would receive his or her food ration. A household with three orphans would receive the same number of food baskets. Rationalisation implied that a 'family' food basket was provided based on the number of household members'. The basket, therefore, depended on family size rather than eligible individuals, suggesting a shift from individual to family focus. The food basket per each benefiting household was calculated based on family size

and age of household members. Using this formula, 'one orphan plus two-family members are entitled to one food basket; one orphan plus three or four family members receive one additional food basket and; one extra food basket will be allocated for every two additional household members.'[110]

Rationalisation had earlier been applied to the revised destitute programme where upon recognizing that destitute people shared their food rations with other household members, government assistance to a destitute household became proportional to the size of the family[111] in line with the *family care approach*. This familialist approach was compelled by government's concern about reported wastage of surplus food especially in houses with many orphans but received 'more than enough', increase in abuse (reselling) of food basket and financial sustainability of the programme. There was need to 'rationalize and redistribute' rations from recipient families perceived to be abusing food to other needy groups. Government was also aware of the increasing number of OVCs in Botswana but had no stand-alone programme for vulnerable children as they were covered under the destitute programme. Realizing that many of the households with orphans, and already receiving a food basket, included also other 'vulnerable' children, government rationalized the food basket to allow both orphans and vulnerable children to benefit from the basket without having to introduce a transfer specific to vulnerable children.

Rationalisation also implied a reduction in 'destitute' families as Orphan Care Programme beneficiary households would not qualify for government support under the Destitute Persons Programme.[112] Consequently, it was effective in ensuring poor families access basic needs but created another problem. For families that were not considered under the destitute programme but had rationalized food baskets (because they had orphans), vulnerable children in such households were at risk of falling into destitution or remaining destitute. While 'orphan

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[110] Interview with Gomotsanang Manne.

[111] After rationalisation, additional food ration packages were given as follows: one destitute person plus two dependants were entitled to "one food basket; one destitute person plus three or four dependants were entitled to one additional food component ration package; one extra food ration was allocated for every two additional dependants."

[112] Interview with government official who preferred anonymity.

households' benefited from the food component, vulnerable children in the same households fell short of school fees and other education related assistance only available to orphans and needy students or children. This exclusion error was a deliberate mechanism, on the part of government, to reduce the number of poor families depending on government provision. A government official indicated that, 'It is working for us'. Rather than introducing an unconditional child grant targeting all children less than 18 years living in poor families, the government opted to rationalize the Orphan Care Programme food basket and that complemented by the already rationalized food basket for destitute persons, more poor people were already receiving government support.

Rationalisation of the food basket could have been Botswana Democratic Party's strategy to reject an international organisations and donor proposed 'Child Support Grant' similar to South Africa's CSG (Turner *et al*., 2011; Turner *et al*., 2010b:98). In 2009/10 government, through Department of Social Services in the Ministry of Local Government, supported by UNICEF and the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme, commissioned a countrywide situation analysis and development of a framework for social protection led by a team of international and national social protection experts.[113] The international consultants were led by Frank Ellis, a UK-based social protection specialist whose earlier work in Southern Africa in 2008 (Ellis, 2012) and elsewhere is against targeted cash transfers. The local consultants were Dolly Ntseane, an academic, seasoned researcher and consultant in social policy and social work, based at the University of Botswana, and Tebogo Seleka, the Executive Director of Botswana's leading independent development policy think tank with a history of poverty reduction strategies. The team identified emerging social protection needs for children and wrote a Social Development Policy Framework for Botswana (see reports 1 and 2).

The purpose of the CSG 'would be to curb the hunger, malnutrition, social exclusion and other forms of deprivation to which many children are vulnerable, especially in poorer families and most seriously in their pre-school years, with potentially lifelong consequences.' Like in South Africa, the CSG 'would involve payment of a regular monthly cash grant, (adjusted annually for inflation), to the primary caregivers of children' (Turner *et al*., 2011:97) and was costed at 1.2%

[113] The team comprised of Frank Ellis, Nicholas Freeland, Stephen Turner and Philip White and two nationals, Dolly Ntseane and Tebogo Seleka.

of GDP (similar to South Africa) in 2010 (but with the anticipated cost dropping to 0.7% by 2020 as GDP grew and poverty declined) (GoB, 2010). Anticipated to make a broader-based assault on poverty and "substantially limit the costs of providing emergency relief in the event of shocks and disasters such as drought" (Turner *et al*., 2011:100), the proposed CSG could be introduced incrementally, beginning with the youngest age group (for example, 0-6 years) and gradually extending it to all those under 18 years. The CSG initial transfer would be set at "P100 per month (with subsequent annual consumer price index linking)" and means tested "through specifying an appropriate index-linked upper earnings limit for the primary carer and spouse, and/or targeting it to poorer parts of the country, in order to concentrate benefits on the most needy" (Turner *et al*, 2010a:13). The rationale for the grant was its potential to combat the "vulnerability and inequality that is offered by the patchwork of existing social assistance measures" (*ibid*: 11).

Despite support from bureaucrats in the Department of Social Protection who thought the CSG 'would reduce the administrative burden of screening deserving children as well as reduce workload for overburdened social workers',[114] the Botswana Democratic Party government rejected the CSG proposal. Instead, it rationalised the food basket to ensure all needy families accessed food. The cabinet argued against the CSG, 'not every child requires government assistance and universalism will cause dependency and laziness which is against government policy that is encouraging graduation and self-reliance through participation in government funded poverty eradication self-help programmes.'[115]

This view seemed to be shared among political elites within the Botswana Democratic Party. President Ian Khama had reminded "the nation at large that …we need to rekindle our spirit of self-reliance" in his 2009 inauguration address to the National Assembly. Makgala (2013) argues that ethos of self-reliance and self-help have been part of the Batswana tradition but were being eroded and replaced by overdependence on the state. Khama's speech seemed determined to preserve this ethos. Continuing with the current safety nets reduces over reliance on government support at the expense of *boipelego* (Setswana word for self-reliance). The rejection also reflects

[114] Interview with P Nguvauva.

[115] Interview with Olebile Gaborone.

government's view of the poor, that it should only support those that are poor and not able to support themselves and their families through labour. Contrary to evidence from "Mexico's PROGRESA programme and South Africa's CSG" ascertaining that cash transfers "actually reduced dependency by making it possible for recipients to look for and find paid employment" (Turner *et al.,* 2010b:71; Surender *et al.,* 2010) the Botswana government perceived that introducing the CSG would mean even the 'working poor' families will benefit if their income fall below the set eligibility threshold and would discourage people from working for their families.[116] UNICEF, RHVP and other partners had taken the opportunity to build evidence for the development of "A Social Development Policy Framework for Botswana" to put the CSG on the political agenda but lacked political support from the conservative Botswana Democratic Party government that preferred to continue addressing poverty through economic growth rather than introducing a more inclusive child grant.

Despite the political elite's resistance to reform social transfers, international agencies continued to make proposals that seemed to support the Botswana Democratic Party's preference but they were rejected. In 2013 the World Bank collaborated with BIDPA to assess Botswana's social protection system focusing on social assistance programmes to inform the country's "future social protection and labour strategy and help achieve the goals of Vision 2016" (explained later) encompassing lifting "84,000 families (336,000 people) from absolute poverty by 2016" (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:3). Even with the existing safety nets a large number of families were still living in absolute poverty, the Bank argued. The Bank also observed that these programmes were a significant draw on government's budget at a time "revenues from mining are projected to decline" hence the need to "increase the cost effectiveness of existing programmes." This could be achieved through "a better weaving of the safety net through the introduction of a last resort, poverty-targeted programme," a Family Support Grant. Such a programme would eradicate poverty in a budget neutral way as it will be funded from 0.4-0.6% of GDP redirected from sponsorships and scholarships programmes that accounted for 1.4% of GDP in 2012/3.

The proposed Family Support Grant would offer 'a benefit of P85 (US$6) per capita per month (equivalent to P340 [US$30] for an average family of four) to cover all families living in

[116] Interview with Olebile Gaborone.

absolute poverty[117] that were not reached by the existing programmes in 2013.' The grant was set to be implemented gradually where its design was to be developed in 2013, 'piloting in 2014 and the full roll out by end of 2015.' Three options for the Family Support Grant introduction were recommended: the first two options suggested 'replacing existing Destitute Persons and Orphan Care programmes with the Family Support Grant that would continue to cover poor and lower-middle income families taking care of either orphans or have destitute persons' while a 'complimentary Family Support Grant' was a third option. The last alternative entailed offering 'P85 (US$8)/capita/month to all families identified by the proxy-means test as the 24% poorest, but only to family members who are not covered by other individual, more generous programmes.' Beneficiaries of Destitute Persons, Orphan Care, Old Age Pensions or *Ipelegeng* programmes will be excluded in the third option. Depending on option taken, the first alternative would be budget neutral while options two and three would cost 0.2 or 0.35% of GDP respectively. The grant was meant to target families in *absolute poverty only*, beneficiary households would be selected through *proxy-means test*, receive *cash* benefits and expected to adhere to *conditions* as government would only provide cash to "poor families contingent on them investing in human capital such as keeping their children in school or regularly taking them to health centres."

Although the Family Support Grant was to be a family-based poverty-targeted programme, resonating with the Botswana Democratic Party government's preferences, the proposed implementation mechanisms contrasted Botswana Democratic Party's preferred social assistance design. The Botswana Democratic Party favoured programmes that targeted the indigent and provide a safety net as opposed to a poverty-targeted grant. Poverty reduction, as envisioned in *Vision 2016* and other strategic documents, should be achieved through economic growth facilitating market-based interventions. The targeting form, proxy means test, had already been rejected in 2007 when BIDPA suggested it for selected safety nets such as the Orphan Care Programme (Seleka *et al.,* 2007). At that time, and in 2013, government was more inclined to categorical targeting that seemed more appealing to the electorate, an indirect use of social protection for patronage purposes. As discussed, cash benefits were only introduced in 2002 as a

[117] In 2013, absolute poverty line was P170 (US$20) per capita per month and the total poverty line was P220 (US$26) per capita per month (Wold Bank, 2013).

small component of the in-kind assistance for adult destitute persons only but government mistrusted beneficiaries on their abuse of such benefits. So, the World Bank's proposal of a cash grant was met with obvious resistance.

A conditional Family Support Grant also did not appeal to the Botswana Democratic Party administration as, historically, government did not impose conditions on social allowances. Moreover, if introduced, the grant was considered more 'permanent' than most of the safety nets, save for the Old Age Pension and was likely to promote rather than discourage dependency hence contrasting the principle of 'self-reliance' envisioned in the 'national manifesto'- *Vision 2016*. As the World Bank anticipated, the Botswana Democratic Party seemed to find it 'politically difficult' to replace existing programmes (options 1 and 2) and concerned about financial sustainability (option 3) of endorsing the Family Ssupport Grant. Olobile Gaborone, Permanent Secretary in the Office of President and Head of the Poverty Eradication Unit distanced himself and government from the Family Support Grant, 'They [donors] are just talking about it and courting us [government] to pilot it but I don't see that happening. We are not part of it at the moment'.[118]

Researchers have attributed rejections of proposals for expansion to 'anxiety about dependence and preference of workfare programmes (Seekings, 2017:11). This might be true in relation to the general welfare programmes like the Family Support Grant and not child grants. The rejection of proposals for new primarily cash transfer programmes that are poverty-targeted also reflects the Botswana Democratic Party's conservative ideology (familial), electoral dominance (albeit declining), declining electoral competition, weak civil society and inadequate international pressure.

The evolution of Botswana's CWR shows strong conservative characteristics, remaining familial despite proposals to reform it. Although near-cash social assistance was expanded to almost all children through familial provisions, the reforms demonstrate an enduring familial regime. In Botswana, children have a *de facto* right to social protection, programmes have a wider coverage but with a perceptible 'benefit gap' (low value child support) and, with the rejection of a poverty-focused CSG, remained in-kind.

[118] Interview with Olebile Gaborone.

4.3. Explaining Botswana's child welfare regime

The distinctive features of the child welfare regime – the result of the evolution discussed above, including the rejection of proposals to introduce a Child Support Grant – are the result of structural, political, cultural and ideological reasons. This mix of factors sustained the regime's characteristics despite proposals to reform it. It supported a CWR that remained familial (rather than poverty-targeted), continued with in-kind support and wide coverage but still governed by administrative fiat, not legislation.

4.3.1 'Structural' factors

AIDS-related demographic and social changes combined with unemployment to urge the ruling party to institute social transfer reforms. Since the diagnosis of HIV in Botswana in 1985, the country maintained high prevalence rates. AIDS hindered socio-economic development, increased infant and adult mortality and poverty rates as some working age adults were too sick to work (BIDPA, 2000). The number of orphans increased dramatically. Concern over AIDS orphans prompted the government to prepare and adopt a National AIDS Policy (1998) to reduce "the impact of HIV/AIDS on society" through, among other activities, 'provisions for orphans', reviewing the Destitute Policy 'to make special provision for children orphaned due to AIDS' and "to make provision for distressed children of parents infected with HIV as well as those sick with AIDS" (MLG, 2006:3). The following year the STPA was formulated and the Orphan Care Programme was initiated to provide orphans with in-kind benefits to cover their immediate basic needs.

Environmentally, Botswana has always been prone to drought hence the extensive coverage of social protection programmes. It became government policy to provide for the need during drought and non-drought years (Seekings, 2016a). According to Seekings (2016b:2) 'drought shaped how the Botswana Democratic Party leadership understood not only poverty, but more broadly the roles of state, market and kin in meeting people's basic needs in the new Botswana.' The poor became the responsibility of the community or themselves through labour, writes Seekings. For a 'population dependent largely on subsistence production', Botswana's 'harsh, drought-prone physical environment' (Selolwane, 2012:2) limited subsistence farming to further expose the rural poor to increasing poverty. 'About 70% of rural households still depend in part

on agriculture for their livelihoods, which are based on low and erratic rainfall, poor soil, limited inputs, and rain-fed systems of low productivity' (World Bank, 2013:15-6). An increase in population also increased demand for income support. Government responded through expansive food aid. In effect, drought relief expanded the child welfare regime as more children in drought-affected families benefited from government food aid other than conventional programmes such as the Orphan Care Programme.

Botswana has experienced high rates of unemployment from the 1970s subsequently increasing the number of poor families requiring government support. Unemployment increased from 18% in 2010 to 20% in 2014 (GoB & UNDP, 2014). In 2014 Afrobarometer reported that unemployment was considered the most important problem by 58% of the respondents[119]. The temporary or short-term problem of deagrarianisation during drought became a long-term problem of unemployed adults who were unable to support themselves on the land or through the labour market. Hamer (2016a) shows how the government responded in part through making its workfare (*Ipelegeng*) programme permanent, rather than short-term responses to drought. *Ipelegeng* benefited more children indirectly, hence extending coverage of the child welfare regime.

The 2008-9 recession resulted in an increase of people living in poverty due to job loses particularly in mining. In response, the government opted to provide a dual regime of social protection: "relatively good protection for the categories of the employed and low protection for the categories of the unemployed, poor and the rural citizens" (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2012). Low protection (parsimonious benefits and covering most but not all the poor) strategically discouraged dependency on state.

Besides, like other countries in the Southern African region, the country has experienced rapid social changes that resulted in increasing destitute families, weakened poor families with OVCs mostly female and elderly headed in the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. Such family dynamics increased children's vulnerability to multiple deprivations and government opted to provide basic essentials in the form of family-based in-kind food benefits and education assistance to a large number of children in such families. The 'familial safety nets' provision conforms to

[119] http://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/botswana-0

Esping-Andersen's conservative regime type that is 'committed to the preservation of traditional familyhood' at a time 'when the family's capacity to service its members is exhausted' (Esping-Andersen, 1990:27). Thus, structural factors, especially AIDS and unemployment, became important in shaping familial provision of social transfers in Botswana. Despite the changes in policies including shifting from orphan to OVC focus, the objective to help the family did not changed hence provision remained familialistic.

4.3.2 Cultural factors

Familialism in Botswana's CWR was, in part, promoted by the national culture. The reforms of the Orphan Care Programme from targeting individual orphans to a family targeted food basket, the rationalisation of the food basket to consider all family members and the expansion of the food basket to other vulnerable children by targeting their families reflect the government's efforts to preserve the Batswana culture of sharing and keeping the family ties. In the culture and tradition of Batswana, before independence in 1966, poverty and destitution were addressed through informal social protection arrangements encompassing family and kinship. As such, public policy was 'premised on the idea – prevalent across most of Africa – that 'traditional' social arrangements addressed poverty in rural areas (Seekings, 2016b:4). The traditional (informal) measures were grounded on the notion of *botho (*also *ubuntu, vumunhu, vhuthu or humanism* in other countries*),* a concept linked to cooperation and working together and "compels individuals and families to care for the needy out of a moral obligation," (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2011). On the basis of *botho*, Batswana believe "those who are privileged at one point may become vulnerable at another point, hence the need to support relatives, neighbours and community members." As a result, the family provided needed support and care to *motlhoki* (destitute) (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2011). But such social protection initiatives have been daunted by the HIV and AIDS pandemic that weakened traditional support systems and family ties in the country since 1985 (Kessy & Tostensen, 2008:112). The provision of modest family-based social assistance since 2002 for the Destitute Persons Programme and 2010 for the Orphan Care Programme became government strategies to promote the *botho* spirit of sharing among family members as well as strengthen the family's capacity to provide. The strong emphasis on family stimulated family food coupons offered through the various programmes. The 'near-

universal insistence on keeping orphans within the homes of their extended families, out of respect for Tswana traditional practice' (Dahl, 2009:23-4) could have supported the familial CWR in Botswana.

Apart from prioritizing employment-based welfare, the Botswana Democratic Party governments partly appreciated these traditional systems to the extent that it did not extend the formal interventions to all the needy children, on the basis that the family would provide. As long as a child has an immediate family, the responsibility of providing for that child primarily rests with parents even if they are poor. If government decides to assist such poor families the assistance should not be mistaken for an entitlement.[120] This view, which appears to be shared among the political elites, partly explains government's earlier focus on orphans more than other vulnerable children, the lack of legislative framework for the provision of social transfers and the family-based in-kind support. Despite the apparent weakening of the family, children still largely rely on assistance from family and kin. State assistance is, therefore, restricted to those who need it most, particularly orphans, vulnerable or destitute children based in rural and remote areas. The role of the state is to come up with mechanisms that empower the family to be able to provide for its members.[121]

Since the advent of AIDS Botswana has gone through rapid socio-economic, cultural and political changes. The United Nations Development Programme reported in its Human Development Report that, "the extended family can no longer cope with both the quality and quantity of care required by children in need of care" (UNDP, 2000).While government has acknowledged that these traditional institutions have transformed and have been weakened (MLG, 1999), policy makers still believe family and kin must be able to provide with very minimum government support.[122] The support, extended partly through "a social safety net for those who find themselves in poverty for any reason" (GoB, 1997:10), contributes to building a "compassionate, just and caring nation" as expressed in *Vision 2016*. Vision 2016, Botswana's

[120] This view is shared by many high-ranking government officials interviewed in the ministries of finance, local government and Office of President.

[121] Interview with Olebile Gaborone. Also see Poverty Eradication Strategy, 2003.

[122] *Ibid*.

seven-pillar[123] long-term development strategy, envisioned "national socio-economic progress" for all Batswana through inclusive growth. The Vision, guided by the principles of development, democracy and self-reliance, underscored the need for self-reliance promoted through citizen empowerment programmes designed to graduate people from social safety nets. Since 1996 when *Vision 2016* was initiated, there has been a change from a 'welfarist' approach to emphasis on economic growth as a means of poverty reduction. Kerapeletswe argues that Botswana has been 'too welfarist' in its approach to poverty reduction and this has created 'perpetual dependence' on government which, she concludes, is retrogressive as it has yielded limited success in poverty reduction (2008:112). Consequently, child benefits have remained parsimonious yet the family is expected to remain 'strong'. The frailty of such high expectations from family and kin on the basis of government's employment and 'self-employment' based solutions to improving the welfare of the marginalized is that the impact of many of the 'empowerment' programmes housed in the Poverty Eradication Unit in the Office of President are still to be realized. For the political opposition, the programmes have not done much than keeping people busy and earning the ruling party more political support than strengthening and enabling the family to provide for children.[124]

4.3.3 Ideological factors

Botswana's CWR strongly reflects the Botswana Democratic Party government's benign conservatism since taking power in 1966. Despite the evidence suggesting that poverty-targeted grants were more likely to reduce child and household poverty, the Botswana Democratic Party rejected the CSG and Family Support Grant proposals. Botswana Democratic Party administration's strategic plans prioritised market-based poverty reduction (through labour), with the state providing a safety net largely through in-kind assistance to the "very poor and vulnerable groups in society" (Seleka *el al*, 2007:2). The Revised Destitute Persons Policy (2002) stated that the government's position on assisting poor people was to "confront the larger

[123] The pillars are: An Educated, Informed Nation; A Prosperous, Productive and Innovative Nation; A Compassionate and Caring Nation; A Safe and Secure Nation; An Open, Democratic and Accountable Nation; A Moral and Tolerant Nation and; A United and Proud Nation.

[124] Interview with Duma Boko, President of Umbrella for Democratic Change and Opposition Leader in Parliament, 28 October 2015.

issue of providing programmes and opportunities which will enable persons to help themselves and not call upon government subsidies" (Kessy & Arne, 2008:109). Similarly, the Remote Area Development programme was "targeted at the poorest member of remote communities, not on those community members who do have the means for their own sustenance" (MLG, 2009:8). Vision 2016 (Tesliuc *et al.,* 2013), Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003) and National Development plans all promote the need to grow the economy and self-reliance with minimum state support.

These policies reflect the norms of policy-making political elites within the ruling party. Botswana Democratic Party's preference for self-help contradicts with universal cash transfers or the provision of general support for poor families with children proposed by international agencies and donors hence they were rejected. 'The Botswana Democratic Party celebrated rural life, self-help and community, weaving these into a conservative ideology of social justice that decried excessive inequality and legitimated targeted interventions' (Seekings, 2016a:3). The political ideology has perpetuated familial in-kind transfers that survived the change in national political leadership that preferred modest food rations to cash, perhaps on the assumption that children will be supported by their working parents or caregivers.

The paltry and inconsistent increments of the food baskets for the Orphan Care Programme and Destitute Persons programme reflect the Botswana Democratic Party government's attitude towards social grants: that they make people lazy. The attitude is consistent with popular discourse of 'Batswana people as having an appallingly lax work ethic' (Makgala, 2013:46). The attitude is reflected in the parsimonious benefits especially of individual grants. When the Old Age Pension was introduced in 1996, the government was very cautious to make the payment 'enough to meet reasonable needs' but 'did not want it to be so large that people would stop doing useful things' (Masire, 2004:234). Later presidents, Mogae in 2006 (Makgala, 2013:56) and Khama in 2009 called Batswana to revive the spirit of self-reliance. Earlier in the 1999, the Botswana Democratic Party had underscored in its election manifesto, 'Let us collectively create a life of self- reliance as opposed to a dependency syndrome' *'Mokodua go tsosiwa o o*

itsosang'.'[125] The elite in Botswana were '*opposed* to cash transfers' because 'there is too much welfare' with little impact but 'creating dependency and laziness'.[126]

4.3.4 Political factors

Botswana did not experience significant CWR reforms during the period of Botswana Democratic Party's political security (discussed in 4.2.1). Political security promoted limited familial provision. The conservative Botswana Democratic Party has been democratically elected (winning comfortably) and ruled Botswana since independence in 1966. Botswana Democratic Party's election victories have been largely due to its 'impressive record of development and economic growth' (Hamer, 2016a:2). Party competition between Botswana Democratic Party and other parties mainly the Umbrella for Democratic Change and Botswana Congress Party in the 1990s caused the Botswana Democratic Party to lose its electoral base especially in the urban areas. The competition resulted in the Botswana Democratic Party's political insecurity that urged it to make substantial social transfer reforms. Electoral competition from opposition parties, some branding themselves as 'social democrats' changed the political landscape in the recent past. Support for Botswana Democratic Party started waning after Seretse Khama's death in 1980 and continued declining in the 1990s (see Figure 4.1). "The 1994 election gave the opposition Botswana National Front 37% of the vote and since then, 'elections in Botswana have continued to be characterized by this heightened political competition" (*ibid*: 24)'. Seekings corroborates, 'electoral competition particularly in the mid-1990s provided immediate political impetus for the expansion of public policy (2016b:24).' Both the ruling Botswana Democratic Party and opposition Botswana Congress Party 1999 election manifestos advocated for Orphan Care Programme reforms but with different details. The Botswana Democratic Party promised an AIDS orphans only programme while the Botswana Congress Party would introduce 'an orphan policy' extended to both AIDS and non-AIDS orphans'. After 1994 elections, the Botswana Democratic Party introduced the Orphan Care Programme for all (AIDS and non-AIDS) orphans, pushed by the opposition's advocacy for such a programme (Hamer, 2016a:6-7).

[125] Botswana Democratic Party 1999 election manifesto, p1.

[126] Interview with Keitseope Nthomang, Professor and Head of Department of Social Work department at University of Botswana, 27 October 2015.

Botswana Democratic Party has leveraged on the split in the opposition vote (Mokopakgosi & Molomo, 2004) to maintain its electoral dominance and conservative social policy ideology.

Earlier, before the 1994 the Umbrella for Democratic Change had promised to expand social security (Ulriksen, 2017). After the first major competitive elections in 1994, the Botswana Democratic Party sought to regain its political support by engaging in programmatic social policy reforms. Political competition urged the Botswana Democratic Party to introduce programmes it was initially reluctant to introduce. The conservative reforms (as the expansion was limited to 'destitute persons' and with less generous benefits), include the introduction of the Old Age Pension in 1996 and the Orphan Care Programme in 1999 (introduced during an election year).

Before the 2014 elections the Botswana Democratic Party had always presented itself as pro-poor, and poor, rural voters were the bedrock of its electoral support. But from 1994 (see Figure 4.1) the opposition has gained more support especially from the unemployed and working urban poor. Electoral competition, like structural changes - AIDS and later unemployment, urged the Botswana Democratic Party to revise the details of its pro-poor branding. The result was shifting its focus on orphans to other categories of vulnerable children in 2007/8 to gain electoral support in the 2009 elections.

In its 1994, and later 2009 election manifesto, the opposition Botswana National Front did not only criticise the Botswana Democratic Party's failure to reform social protection to address increasing unemployment, poverty and collapsed agriculture[127] but promised to 'provide social welfare for the most needy' as a constitutional right through a 'comprehensive social security legislation'. While the Botswana Democratic Party continued emphasizing cash-for-work and other Public Employment Programmes, in 2009 elections Botswana National Front labelled itself 'a party of the masses, especially for the poor, the working class and sections of the middle class'[128] and repeated the same 1994 social security promises to challenge the ruling party's failed efforts to expand social security. Botswana National Front's election promises prompted

[127] Botswana National Front 1994 Election Manifesto, page 2.

[128] Botswana National Front 1994 Election Manifesto, page 7.

the ruling Botswana Democratic Party to enroll vulnerable children (other than orphans) on the Destitute Persons programme.

Nevertheless, the political opposition has not been sufficiently strong to push the ruling Botswana Democratic Party to transform the safety nets. Weak opposition might explain the Botswana Democratic Party's rejection of poverty-targeted grants (Family Support Grant and CSG) and the enduring familial CWR. The Botswana Congress Party and Umbrella for Democratic Change supported proposals for a poverty-targeted CSG and believe Botswana Democratic Party's resistance to embrace such research evidence is political as it anticipate resentment and loss of political support particularly from the rural people constituting a larger percentage of the electorate and beneficiaries of social transfers. The Botswana Democratic Party politicians have a tendency of influencing the registration of some rich people on social assistance and it's easier to manipulate categorical than means tested schemes or universal programmes. Categorical targeted schemes have been retained for selected categories of families with children as they are not discriminatory and maintain social harmony among communities.[129] Thus, the rejection of opposition and donor supported cash transfer programmes show both a weak opposition and failed international pressure.

Weak donor and international influence in Botswana, unlike in Namibia, account for the rejection of proposals for poverty-targeted grants and the continued familial system. International agencies - UNICEF, USAID and to a lesser extent the World Bank - actively participated through financial, technical and logistical support in the various government commissioned studies and development of strategic policy documents but could not convince the government to shift to either mixed (as in Namibia) or pro-poor provision (as in South Africa). The UNICEF contracted group of international experts[130] (as discussed in section 4.2.4, also see Turner *et al.,*

[129] Separate interviews with Duma Boko, Dithapelo Keorapetse (Phikwe Botswana Congress Party Member of Parliament) on 23 October 2015 and Kesitegile Gobotswang (Botswana Congress Party Vice President) on 12 October 2015.

[130] Stephen Devereux, Frank Ellis, Nicholas Freeland, Janet Seeley, Stephen Turner, Philip White including two Batswana, Dolly Ntseane and Tebogo B. Seleka.

2011) recommended 'A child support grant for Botswana?'[131] The Botswana Democratic Party rejected the proposals, showing its ideological preferences to familial in-kind support and political elites' ambivalence with cash transfers. Overall the policies, developed in partnership with the Department of Social Protection, were important advocacy instruments used to lobby government to move from orphan to OVC focus but the ultimate goal of introduction of poverty-targeted grants has not been achieved.

Uncoordinated and competing policy positions between donors and international agencies partly explain their failure to convince government to shift to poverty targeting. International donors up to 2013 had conflicting views about whether to continue targeting orphans only or expand to other vulnerable children. UNICEF advocated for universalism (all children) in contrast with USAID/PEPFAR which funded the Orphan Care Programme up to that year and was pro-orphan targeting until government takes full control of the programme. In disagreement from a child rights perspective, UNICEF was pushing for the inclusion of vulnerable children on the Orphan Care Programme hence the proposal for a CSG (Turner *et al.,* 2010b). The two donors only concurred in 2014 when government finally took over the Orphan Care Programme, a time both played more technical than financial roles. From that year they both became enthusiastic about universal benefits inclusive of vulnerable children, an idea government is still considering.[132] Meanwhile, the World Bank showed no support for the CSG but advocated for a different intervention, the Family Support Grant. On the other hand, civil society organizations led by the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions proved very passive in these discussions as most of them were inactive, lacked coordination, lacked knowledge on child social protection and were preoccupied with labour-related issues.[133] The absence of shared policy options and competition to propose different but complementary social protection instruments among donors weakened their power to push the Botswana Democratic Party to adopt a poverty-targeted CSG that would have expanded child social protection coverage. Similarly, the simultaneous proposals for a

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[131] The consultants present a costed analysis of introducing a child support grant in Botswana in their second report. See 'A Social Development Policy Framework for Botswana Phase II: Framework and Strategy 26 May, 2010'.

[132] Interview with government official who preferred anonymity.

[133] Interview with Thusang Butale, Secretary-General, BFTU on 15 October, 2015 in Gaborone.

universal poverty-targeted child grant and a Basic Income Grant by donors and civil society in Namibia has delayed adoption of either grant as the SWAPO government is court in between adopting one or both (see Chapter 3).

The earlier restriction and the later expansion of the food basket to orphans and 'destitute' children also reflect some elements of patronage by the ruling party. Most orphan caregivers were poor elderly people (Dahl, 2014:626). These poor people, as argued by other scholars with reference to general welfare regime programmes (Ulriksen, 2017) constituted the Botswana Democratic Party's political support base. Thus, the orphan basket, like the 'destitute basket' for vulnerable children and drought-induced food aid, is a very popular programme among the rural poor and has promoted the familial CWR. In 2015, the poor and vulnerable were overrepresented in rural areas in Botswana (World Bank, 2015). This may explain the party's dominance and the outright rejection of international agencies and donors' proposals for poverty-targeted cash transfers.

In summary, the reforms of the CWR in Botswana were programmatic in some ways since the government effectively responded to the effects of structural factors (health and demographic shocks). The limitation of the transfers initially to orphans and later to other vulnerable children, and the resistance to provide general support for families with children like in South Africa and more recently in Namibia reflects forms of patronage and ideology. Most post 1994 election reforms were driven by electoral competition but the form of benefits (in-kind transfers), familial targeting and relative generosity of (in-kind) transfers reflect the Botswana Democratic Party's conservative ideology.

Appendix 4.1: Existing child-focused social grants

Programme	Orphan Care	School feeding	Vulnerable group feeding	Destitute Persons (include Vulnerable children i.e. Children in need of care, Needy students & Needy children)
Target group	Orphaned children	School age children	Adults and pre-school children needing supplementary feeding	Poor and destitute individuals unable to work
Eligibility criteria	Child under 18 who has lost one (single parents) or two (married couples) biological or adoptive parents. Not means tested.	Enrolment at government school	Presenting at clinics: Children <6 years Pregnant women	Due to disabilities or chronic ill health, incapable of sustainable economic activity, has insufficient assets and income sources (<4 LSU or gets <P120/month single,<P150/month with dependants) or incapable of sustainable economic activity, unreliable and limited sources of income due to old age, disability, terminal illness. Permanent: completely dependent, not suitable for rehabilitation. Temporary: suffered disasters, family crises etc., expected to exit.
Targeting mechanism	Categorical + community: referral by Village/Ward Social Welfare Committee, VDC or other leaders or concerned individuals for registration by local authority. Orphan or caregiver may also apply directly	Categorical	Categorical	Proxy means testing +community: referral by Village/Ward Social Welfare Committee, VDC or other leaders or concerned individuals. People may al o apply directly to these committees or to S&CD
Type of transfer	Food; school fees, uniform and other education costs; clothing	Food	Food	Food & cash
Other benefits	Counselling and psychosocial support by local authority social workers	None	None	Shelter; Funeral expenses ;School fees and associated expenses for children of destitute families, plus psycho-social support, mentoring, career guidance

Source: adapted from A Social Development Policy Framework for Botswana: Phase I: Situation Analysis, GoB (May,2010).

CHAPTER 5

Agrarian child welfare regimes: The case of Zimbabwe, 1980–2017

5.1 Distinctive characteristics of Zimbabwe's child welfare regime

The child welfare regime (CWR) in Zimbabwe is distinctive because it is an agrarian social protection system, primarily targeting the poorest families; the low coverage and low benefits of direct cash transfers; and the relatively wide coverage of non-cash benefits. An agrarian CWR is promoted by supporting family provision through farming. The government distributes land and free farm inputs to peasant farmers to enhance family capacity to provide for their members including children. The absence of social pensions including old-age and disability grants in Zimbabwe — programmes that in neighbouring South Africa provide massive indirect support for children — contributes significantly to the low coverage of social cash transfers. The government of Zimbabwe strategically aims to reduce child poverty through reducing household poverty; hence, social cash transfers are family - rather than child-specific. Zimbabwe introduced cash transfers later than most other countries in Southern Africa because its poverty-reduction strategy was largely agrarian. Consequently, Zimbabwe is regarded as a laggard in terms of cash transfers in the region, but previous studies of social cash transfers in Zimbabwe often overlooked the non-cash components (Mtetwa & Muchacha, 2013; Seidenfeld *et al.,* 2016; Siampondo, 2015), which were considered in detail in this chapter.

The distinguishing characteristics of Zimbabwe's CWR are largely the result of the partisan preferences of the ZANU-PF administration. Political insecurity affected the form of the interventions (programmatic versus discretionary) more than the fact of the interventions themselves. ZANU-PF promotes in-kind social transfers in the form of farm inputs and food aid that favour its political ends. In-kind benefits are more easily used for clientelistic purposes than cash transfers, especially when donors are putting in place measures to stop the political manipulation of cash transfers. ZANU-PF found a winning policy formula in land reform and food aid. The CWR resembles Zimbabwe's general welfare regime, which, both pre- and post-Government of National Unity, was classically agrarian, focused notionally on land reform, an

idealized understanding of agrarian society, and emergency relief in times of drought, not on the 'modern' panoply of cash transfers.

Zimbabwe has a child population of 6.9 million and a national population of 15.6 million (see Table 1.1). This chapter examines the provision of social cash transfers to poor families with children in Zimbabwe in the context of changing political regimes. Zimbabwe's CWR consists of direct benefits, including school feeding programmes and school and medical fee waivers. Indirect social transfers that target poor households with children include cash transfers through the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer and Public Assistance programmes. Non-cash components include food aid, particularly during drought years, and agricultural farm inputs support. The CWR is distinctive in that, like welfare in general in the country, it is highly targeted at the poorest families with children, classically agrarian, and focused notionally on land reform, an idealized understanding of agrarian society, and emergency relief in times of drought, not on the 'modern' panoply of cash transfers.

Since 2000, Zimbabwe has been under some pressure to provide more fully for its children. Zimbabwe might have adopted the child-oriented cash transfer programmes or subsidies associated with one or other of the 'models' developed by its richer neighbours to the south (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia) or models favoured, and promoted energetically, by the World Bank, UNICEF, and other external agencies. Zimbabwean governments did implement modest reforms, especially under the Government of National Unity between 2009 and 2013. But ZANU-PF, which governed alone before 2009 and after 2013, and shared power in between, resisted cash transfer programmes, favouring instead programmes that provided (generally modest) benefits in kind to families, rather than for the care of individual children, and that (except during periods of drought and drought recovery) were highly targeted at the very poor.

In some of these respects Zimbabwe's welfare regime during this period was similar to Botswana's, but there were crucial differences even between these two cases. Zimbabwe had neither a dedicated child grant nor old-age pension, whereas Botswana had universal cash transfers for orphans and the elderly. Botswana's welfare regime was also familial, but its feeding and public employment programmes had much wider coverage than Zimbabwe's. The

reason for these differences lay in the Zimbabwean government's preference for an agrarian welfare regime — that is, one that addressed risks of poverty primarily through agricultural production. Zimbabwe's constitution revealingly imposes a duty on citizens to produce for themselves, whilst imposing vague obligations on the state to provide for the destitute. Whereas South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia were essentially post-agrarian societies, Zimbabwe retained a plausible agrarian option. This meant that the models provided by its regional neighbours were deemed less appropriate, and even the models advocated by international agencies were considered less important than programmes to support peasant agriculture.

The policy models favoured by ZANU-PF were not cash transfer programmes but farm input subsidy programmes. These were particularly appealing to ZANU-PF when it faced severe electoral challenges from the urban-based political opposition. The only major cash transfer programme that has been implemented — the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer — was introduced under the Government of National Unity. Although the post-2013 ZANU-PF government has not abolished it, it did rein it in, and has invested instead in small farmer support. An economic and fiscal crisis has constrained the scope for expensive interventions, but ZANU-PF's ambivalence towards cash transfer programmes represents political choices informed by the nature of Zimbabwean society and politics. The expansion and contraction of the child welfare regime in Zimbabwe, at different moments of policy change, as discussed later, was characteristic of the ZANU-PF led government and the unpredictability of the reforms had everything to do with party politics and not funding.

Whilst it is the post-agrarian societies that provide most or all of the models for cash transfer programmes, Zimbabwe (together with Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique) is different in that the agrarian society has survived: these are (outside of drought years) non-arid environments, with strong peasant sectors, in stark contrast to South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia. Moyo (2011a, 2011b, 2013:26) describes Zimbabwe as 'a largely agrarian society'. In Zimbabwe, agriculture provides livelihoods to 80% of the population, accounts for 23% of formal employment, and contributes about 18% to GDP and approximately 33% of foreign

earnings.[134] Zimbabwe's CWR does not fit easily into either Esping -Andersen's 'three worlds of welfare capitalism' (Esping-Andersen, 1990) nor typologies of CWRs in the North (Bradshaw, 2012; Daly & Clavero, 2002). It fits better Seekings' classification of social provision in the global South. Seekings distinguishes between *agrarian* regimes that promote kinship support and strengthen 'peasant agriculture through shaping access to land … products markets … and production systems' with a primary objective to reduce poverty, and *pauperist* regimes that target 'deserving categories of very poor people through highly targeted non-contributory social assistance (Seekings, 2012:18). In Zimbabwe, as in most of Africa until the late 20th century, states (at best) tried to build the capacity of families to produce more and be more self -reliant: 'The families were and are the main sources of support for the African poor, as much for the young unemployed of modern cities as for the orphans of the past' (Iliffe, 1987:7). Until recently, social assistance in Zimbabwe remained steeped in the tradition of the Poor Laws, targeted at the poorest of the poor (Kaseke, 2011). This chapter discusses the distinctive characteristics, evolution and suggest explanations to the reforms of the agrarian CWR in Zimbabwe. In Chapter 6, I shall examine more fully how and why CWR in Zimbabwe is different from South Africa, Namibia and Botswana.

5.1.1 Coverage

Social cash transfer coverage in Zimbabwe is low: transfers reach at most 24% of all children; on average, any given programme covers only 6% of all children. Even Zimbabwe's flagship cash transfer programme, the Harmonized Cash Transfer Programme, reached less than 1% of children (in 25,598 households) in August 2016, down from about 2% (in 55,509 households) in February 2016. Coverage is lower than most other countries in Southern Africa, including its neighbours South Africa (95%), Botswana (85%), and Namibia (67%).

Though, donor-supported in-kind benefits through food aid for poor children have been benefiting more children, reaching about half of all children in 2008 - an increase from 26% in 2006, emphasizing the ruling ZANU-PF party's efforts to combat child poverty through the

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[134] http://www.moa.gov.zw/index.php/2-uncategorised/8-welcome-to-our-ministry.

agrarian route. The Agricultural Input Pack Support Programme has the highest coverage of the in-kind benefits programmes at 24% of all children.

In terms of programmes' legal status, social protection is a vague right under the constitution, but is not enshrined in legislation. Article 30 of the 2013 constitution provides for social welfare and requires the state to 'provide social security and social care to those who are in need'. Article 19(1) of the constitution requires the state to adopt policies and measures 'to ensure that in matters relating to children, the best interests of the children concerned are paramount'. The state first and foremost protects children by protecting the family, i.e. by providing care and assistance to caregivers (Article 25(a)). In terms of food security, the state must 'secure the establishment of adequate food reserves', but Section 15(a) of the constitution provides that it is the duty of people (families) 'to grow and store adequate food'; hence the strategic emphasis on social protection through agriculture, as will be shown later. The constitution (Article 27(1)(a)) also compels the state to provide 'free and compulsory basic education for children'.

Nevertheless, the Social Welfare Assistance Act [Chapter 17:06] of 1988 (amended in 2001) legislates the provision of Public Assistance (PA) to persons in need and their dependants (including any child of the applicant or beneficiary, a step-child, legally adopted child, or child born posthumously who is under 18 years of age). This is a very narrow definition of dependant, as it does not include extended kin such as grandchildren. With the exception of PA, the various programmes are not written into law. There is no legislation comparable with the Social Assistance Act in South Africa, for example.

In terms of generosity of benefits, Zimbabwe's CWR is characterized by low-value income support relative to the poverty line and GDP per capita (US$885 in 2015 — World Bank 2016). Cash transfers fall below both the Food Poverty Line — consumption expenditure necessary to ensure that an individual can (if all expenditure is devoted to food) consume a food basket representing 2,100 calories at US$30/person/month, or US$151 for an average of five persons per household in July 2016 — and the Total Consumption Poverty Line — the poverty level below which individuals are unable to purchase both non-food and food items, at US$96/person/month or US$480 for an average of five persons per household in July 2016

(ZIMSTAT, 2016b:2;5). The Harmonised Social Cash Transfer offers US$10–25/month/family depending on family size, an amount below the Food Poverty Line and much less than the Total Consumption Poverty Line in 2016.[135] Thus, the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer benefits translate to US$0.16/person/day (or US$5/person/month), an amount far much less than the international absolute poverty line of US$1.90/person/day.

In addition to these cash transfers, poor families with children receive non-cash transfers. It is difficult to ascertain the monetary value of non-cash benefits given that some transfers are not regular (e.g. monthly), while others are just one-off grants, such as agricultural inputs. Nonetheless, a limited number of orphans and vulnerable children enjoy fee waivers for education, through the Basic Education Assistance Module, and for intermediate and tertiary health services, via Assisted Medical Treatment Orders. Orphans and vulnerable children also benefit from in-kind transfers through school and Seasonal Targeted Assistance programmes, the Health and Nutrition Safety Net, and the Agricultural Input Pack Support Scheme. The inadequacy of both cash and non-cash social transfers, together with low coverage, partly accounts for the fact that 78% of all children live in poverty (below the Total Consumption Poverty Line) in Zimbabwe (in 2016). Inadequate social transfers also contribute to general household poverty. The percentage of people below the Total Consumption Poverty Line remained at 61% between 1995 and 1999, rose to 75% in 2000, and remained at that level until 2003 before increasing to 80% in 2013, though it fell to 72% in 2016.[136]

5.1.2 Familialist targeting

Zimbabwe's CWR is located in the general agrarian regime; hence, social transfers are familialist — largely targeting the family. The government focuses on peasants and family, and kin are central to social provision. Seekings (2010: 27) describes such regimes as agrarian. Unlike most countries in Southern Africa, which have adopted child grants paid to caregivers of children, Zimbabwe has not introduced a child-specific cash grant. In his presentation at the National Social Protection Policy Consultative Workshop, Togarepi Chinake, Director of the Department

[135] http://www.zimdat.zimstat.co.zw/zimdat/libraries/aspx/dataview.aspx

[136] http://www.zimdat.zimstat.co.zw/zimdat/libraries/aspx/dataview.aspx

of Child Welfare and Probation Services in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, said that social transfers in Zimbabwe aim to first address household poverty by increasing household consumption of goods and services and indirectly to reduce child poverty.[137]

As in Botswana, where there are familial safety nets, poor families with children in Zimbabwe receive family-based cash and in-kind benefits. But Zimbabwe is familial in a wider sense than Botswana. Botswana also targets families, in contrast with South Africa and Namibia, which provide grants for individual caregivers (often causing discord within families, as patriarchal relations are undermined). Botswana also provides for families in the event that a child is orphaned (as, in effect, do South Africa and Namibia). Zimbabwe does not even do this, or at least not directly. The presumption in Zimbabwe is that the extended family, in an agrarian society, will take care of children, even orphaned children.

5.2 The evolution of Zimbabwe's child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1980–2017

State provision for poor families with children has gone through four key moments of change and choice between 1980 and 2017. The reforms happened as the ruling ZANU-PF's political security waxed and waned. In the first phase, between 1980 and the late 1990s, when the ruling ZANU-PF was politically secure—with no strong opposition—the government continued to provide for the indigent on the basis of poor laws, particularly through Public Assistance, land redistribution, and food aid.

In the second phase, between 2000 and 2008, after the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change opposition party in 1999, ZANU-PF became insecure and sought to consolidate its political power. ZANU-PF strengthened its land reform programme in 2000 and responded to the deepening economic crisis, largely due to its own economic mismanagement, by introducing Basic Education Assistance Module for OVCs in 2001. The government responded to recurrent droughts by partnering with United Nations agencies and donors to provide expansive food aid programmes as well as promoting temporary public works programmes as part of drought relief in 2002 (and subsequent drought years). During the period leading to the 2009 election,

[137] The author attended the workshop at the Fairmile Hotel in Gweru on 4 November 2015.

Zimbabwe's economic crisis worsened, state capacity to provide for the poor weakened, and poverty escalated. In an attempt to foster self-reliance, ZANU-PF introduced a presidential farm input scheme for subsistence farmers, particularly in rural areas, in 2008.

In the third phase, between 2009 and mid-2013, during the Government of National Unity between ZANU-PF and Movement for Democratic Change formations, Zimbabwe introduced its highly poverty-targeted cash transfer programme, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, in 2010/2011 — largely influenced by donors.

In the post-Government of National Unity phase, from mid-2013 to the present (2017), the new ZANU-PF government reverted to its ambivalence towards cash transfers, significantly downscaling the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer in preference to Command Agriculture, providing inputs to support smallholder farmers, most of whom had benefited from the land redistribution programme. Command Agriculture complemented the existing presidential input scheme. These reforms sustained the familial agrarian regime, largely offering non-cash benefits (food aid during drought and farm inputs), and modestly increased the coverage of social cash transfers (most of which continued to have no statutory basis).

5.2.1 Social cash transfers under a politically secure ZANU-PF, 1980–1999

After independence in 1980, the ZANU-PF led government, like most post-colonial governments in Southern Africa, continued with the provision of public assistance to the indigent. ZANU-PF's political security until the 2000s resulted in the party enjoying the comfort of majority support. After independence in 1980, ZANU-PF dominated the political space including social policy making. Dorman (2016:2) argues that in independent Zimbabwe, the 'process of politically driven nation- and state-building institutionalized ZANU (PF)'s control of the political sphere and monopoly on political representation.' Without electoral competition, ZANU-PF governments felt no need to expand social programmes. At independence, the ZANU-PF government had inherited an old-age pension scheme similar to South Africa's, but limited to white citizens, and a means tested and parsimonious public assistance system along the lines of colonial Poor Laws. Before independence, Public Assistance had been limited to the aged, blind, and sick (Kaseke, 1988). The new Zimbabwean government chose to abolish the pensions, rather

than extend them to all Zimbabwean citizens. Continuing concerns over indigent families caring for children meant that the Public Assistance survived; it was even expanded to cover all destitute citizens and their dependants, where destitution was 'due to old age, unemployment, sickness, disability, or death or desertion of a breadwinner' (Kanyenze *et al.,* 2011:380), but was limited to destitute individuals 'who are unable to get assistance from their families' (Kaseke, 1988:6). Child-headed households were also targeted by Public Assistance, since they were considered destitute families. Children benefit indirectly from Public Assistance as 'dependants of indigent persons' (Kaseke, 2003:35).[138] The adoption of Public Assistance at independence demonstrates the importance of colonial history in shaping social policy in Zimbabwe, as in much of Anglophone Africa. Poor funding, low coverage and ungenerous benefits of the programme post-independence reflect ZANU-PF's political manipulation of the programme to keep the poor in poverty and buy their loyalty.

Public Assistance has low coverage and small benefits because of poor funding, and often irregular and unpredictable payments. The number of beneficiaries declined from 69,308 in 1994 to 20,562 in 1998 (Munro, 2003:14). As of 2014, beneficiary households received parsimonious monthly benefits of US$20/household irrespective of household size. The benefits represent 20% of the Total Consumption Poverty Line for a single-member household and 4% of the Total Consumption Poverty Line for a family of five (World Bank, 2014:11). Public Assistance includes Assisted Medical Treatment Orders for orphans and vulnerable children. Assisted Medical Treatment Orders are 'fee waivers/vouchers issued to indigent persons to facilitate access to intermediate and tertiary health services, such as a provincial or national hospital or other specialist facility' (Kanyenze *et al.,* 2011:386). In 2011, Assisted Medical Treatment Orders benefited 25,000 individuals (inclusive of children)—up from 9,625 in 2008 (Chikova, 2013:2; Chitambara, 2012:16).

Besides Public Assistance, a key programme introduced post-independence but heightened in the 2000 when ZANU-PF faced competitive elections is land redistribution to peasant farmers. Seekings' (2005:16) analysis of 'Southern states' that 'promote income security through access

[138] The programme is still running in all the 45 districts where the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer has not been rolled out, although the plan is that the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer will replace it (see Section 3.3).

to land' and where 'land reform programmes, and ensuing government support for small farmers, can provide poor families with the opportunity to produce for either their own consumption or for the market' aptly describes and distinguishes Zimbabwe's CWR. The ruling ZANU-PF party has sought to fight poverty through land redistribution since independence in 1980. At independence, a white minority continued to exploit 'varsity' land — individual farms averaging 2,000 ha — for large-scale commercial farming at the expense of the peasantry. Between 1980 and 1999, 'Zimbabwe pursued a market-based land reform programme' that did not result in the large-scale transfer of previously white-owned land to peasants (Moyo, 2013:201). Since 2000, ZANU-PF has redistributed previously white-owned land to small-farm families largely of rural origin and black commercial farmers' (Bratton, 2014:76; Moyo, 2013:42; Scoones *et al.,* 2011a; 2011b).

Through land reform, ZANU-PF emphasized social protection through agriculture, promoting family provision. Section 15(a) of the constitution provides that it is the duty of people (families) 'to grow and store adequate food' (GoZ, 2013:25). Post-independence land reforms that earned president Mugabe popularity within Zimbabwe and internationally (Mamdani, 2008) broadened 'access to land and promot[ed] peasant productivity' (Moyo, 2013:30) as well as improving beneficiaries' living standards (Hanlon, 2013; Scoones *et al.,* 2011a; 2011b). Low agricultural productivity has compelled ZANU-PF governments to rely heavily on food aid, largely from the United Nations World Food Programme, with less consideration for direct cash transfers for poor families with children.

Despite falling aggregate agricultural production after the fast-track land reform of the 2000s, for some small farmers, production and living standards have improved, particularly in the countryside, where some formerly very poor people are now more food secure. Although land reform is said to have largely benefited President Mugabe's cronies (Bond, 2005; Moyo, 2013:37; Robertson, 2011; Scoone,s 2014:102), the government largely supports agriculture as the primary poverty reduction strategy.

During the period of ZANU-PF's political security, the party secured its rural political base by massive drought relief through food aid especially during drought years. Since 1982, Zimbabwe

has experienced successive droughts, which have threatened agricultural productivity. Munemo (2012) writes that in the 1980s and 1990s President Mugabe was quick to respond to drought through 'expansive relief programmes' including employment creation programmes. These programmes earned Mugabe international recognition. Political insecurity subsequently weakened Mugabe's commitment to such programmes, and by the mid-1990s, he had 'progressively moved [away] from offering the broad programmes of relief' (Munemo, 2012:88). Political crisis in the late 1990s led him to revive food aid programmes as he 'politicized' relief in order to consolidate his power. As Munemo (2012:88) explains: 'Mugabe's adoption of drought relief programmes reflected his own political strength or weakness, shifting as his standing changed'. When Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party 'faced insecure political environment […] they responded to droughts by adopting food aid programmes for adults'; when they were more secure, 'drought-relief programmes for adults shifted away from free food aid to cost-effective programmes that avoided dependency and limited waste, such as food for work' Munemo (2012:88). As discussed later, ZANU-PF continued to rely on emergency food aid in drought years when its political insecurity intensified in the 2000s.

5.2.2 Social cash transfers under a politically insecure ZANU-PF, 2000–2008

The rise of an effective political opposition — the Movement for Democratic Change—caused considerable political discomfort to ZANU-PF (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008). The labour-led MDC was the first opposition party to challenge ZANU-PF's domination of post-colonial politics in Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2000; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004). The rise of the Movement for Democratic Change was in part a response to ZANU-PF's policy reforms. The deteriorating economy meant that ZANU-PF had had to remove subsidies on basic social services (including education and health) as well as food under the 1991 Framework of Economic Reform Programme, drawn up as part of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, with technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Britz & Tshuma, 2013:174). This had contributed to an increase in poverty from 40% in 1990/91 to 63% in 1995/96 (CSO, 1998). Faced not only with rising poverty but also with a new and energetic political opposition, ZANU-PF began to consider new reforms.

In an attempt to win its declining political support especially by the rural poor, the ZANU-PF led

government resuscitated school fee waivers to OVCs through the Basic Education Assistance Module. Although the constitution requires the government to provide free basic education, ZANU-PF has not honoured such provisions but instead offered school fee waivers to a few OVCs. In 1995, the government had introduced a Social Dimensions of Adjustment programme to mitigate the effects of structural adjustment on vulnerable groups, including children (Mhone, 1995; Mutasa, 2015). As part of this programme, the government had introduced waivers of school and examination fees, particularly for poor urban households (Kanyenze *et al.,* 2011:381). These fee waivers had been discontinued in 1998, despite the continued increase in child poverty, due to HIV/AIDS and drought-induced low agricultural productivity as well as structural adjustment.

In 2001, the government and donors resuscitated the defunct fee waivers through the Basic Education Assistance Module. OVCs constituted 27% of the 3.6 million or so pupils in school too poor to pay school fees and levies (MLSS, 2012a). The Basic Education Assistance Module was one of government's largest pro-poor poverty alleviation strategies, aimed at reducing school dropouts and 'reach out to children who have never been to school due to economic hardships' (Mutasa, 2015:155). With a pool of donor funds managed by UNICEF for primary students and government funding for secondary students, the programme maintained coverage of about 80% of needy children until 2006, but declining donor funding and government allocations in the face of increasing demand reduced the Basic Education Assistance Module coverage from 2007. Over the years, the Basic Education Assistance Module received more funding than other cash transfers (see Figure 5.1) but less than non-cash transfers (farm inputs), partly to honour the right to free education enshrined in Article 27(1)(a) of the constitution and to eliminate 'the risk of impairment of one's capacity to earn income through lack of basic education' (Chikova, 2013:2). By 2008, the Basic Education Assistance Module was dysfunctional, without any government disbursements. As discussed later, donors collaborated with the Movement for Democratic Change-led Ministry of Education to resuscitate the Basic Education Assistance Module under the Government of National Unity.

Figure 5.1: BEAM funding compared to other social cash transfers, 2011-2016



Source: Ministry of Finance

ZANU-PF also sought to regain its lost political support by providing drought relief through public works and feeding programmes that primarily targeted the rural populace. Since the 2001/02 drought, ZANU-PF has sought to consolidate its waning political power by offering relief programmes, including Community Feeding, Vulnerable Group Feeding, the School Feeding Programme, and public works programmes in rural areas. Recurrent drought (due to increasingly erratic rainfall patterns), a series of poor harvests, high unemployment, restructuring of the agriculture sector, and high HIV/AIDS prevalence—about 15%, the fifth highest in the world—have all contributed to increasing levels of vulnerability and acute food insecurity since 2000. Drought necessitated large-scale humanitarian food relief operations in the country (WFP 2016a, 2016b).

Community Feeding (and the Health and Nutrition Safety Net) for children under five years of age reached 200,000 women and children in 2012/13 (World Bank, 2014:8). Beneficiary households received monthly cash transfers of US$8/person/month or in-kind food rations. Cash was limited to selected areas with better market supplies. This assistance was only for the lean season, usually November to March.

The Vulnerable Group Feeding programme, which largely distributes in-kind benefits, has been one of the programmes with the highest coverage among poor families with children. The Vulnerable Group Feeding programme reached 27% of all children in 2006 and 42% in 2008 as the economic crisis deepened and drought continued to hit hard. By 2009, almost half of Zimbabwe's population depended on international food aid (Bratton, 2014:85). Although food aid was at times perceived as creating a dependency syndrome and was publicly downplayed by the ZANU-PF government, particularly between 2006 and 2008, the government's incapacity to provide food aid forced it to accept food donations (WFP, 2012:16).

The School Feeding Programme, also initiated and funded by the WFP in 2002 to respond to the 2001/02 drought, provides one meal to school-going pupils in selected schools in poor communities. Until 2008, the School Feeding Programme (like the Vulnerable Group Feeding programme) remained solely a donor-funded 'emergency' programme under the ZANU-PF administration. As will be shown later, the Government of National Unity transformed the School Feeding Programme into a permanent nutritional intervention.

In this period, the government also supported insecure rural households through public works programmes. In 2002, in partnership with the World Food Programme, it started implementing temporary programmes for the duration of the drought and recovery period. Non-Governmental Organizations, funded by the World Bank, World Food Programme, United States Agency for International Development , and the United Kingdom Department for International Development, now also implement short public works in selected districts. The government's Drought Relief Public Works Programme (also the Food-Cash for Assets/Community Works Programme or Food Mitigation Programme) targets food-insecure labour-endowed and labour-constrained households in geographically selected food-insecure districts (MLSS, 2010). To be eligible, the able-bodied should 'participate in community projects for a 15-day working month', while labour-constrained households receive free food (Chikova, 2013:3; Kanyenze *et al.,* 2011:388). Public works programmes offer parsimonious benefits (US$20/month per household in cash or in-kind food rations of one 50 kg bag of maize meal per family per month) for a 15-day working month (Kanyenze *et al.,* 2011:388).

Children in participating households benefit from public works indirectly. Kanyenze *et al.,* (2011) assert that cash benefits allow beneficiaries to buy inputs or food or to pay school fees for their children. Participating adults (caregivers) prioritize and invest their wages in the human capital development of children. The World Bank reported that the 2011/12 public works project, the Productive Community Works programme, benefited 5,580 labour-endowed people, who devoted more than half of their wages to children' s education, using the rest to buy food and grain (World Bank, 2014:14). Together, public works programmes covered approximately 7% of all children in 2016.

In 2008, ZANU-PF employed the politics of patronage by introducing an Agricultural Input Pack Support Programme that supported its agrarian CWR and secured political support in the rural areas. In the early 1980s, the ZANU-PF government had encouraged peasant production through land redistribution, improved marketing, and credit lines. Basking in the glory of its election victories, ZANU-PF had abandoned these schemes in the 1990s. In the period leading to the 2009 election, President Mugabe established the presidential Agricultural Input Pack Support Programme in support of the agrarian welfare regime. The programme revitalized agriculture following the collapse of financial schemes for farmers since the land reform programme in the 2000s. The programme had wide coverage, second only to food aid. It promoted self-reliance and discouraged donor and government dependency. Mugabe said that the programme 'empower[s] our farmers for greater crop production'.[139] Moses Moyo, ZANU-PF Umguza District Coordinator, said that the programme teaches people 'not to depend on donors but to be self-reliant so that we work on the land so that we feed our families'.[140]

The Input Scheme now receives a higher budget allocation than any other social programme and largely covers households that benefited from the land reform programme from 2000.[141] The input package, valued at about US$127 per family, consists of 50 kg of compound D fertilizer,

[139] Speech by President Robert Mugabe at the opening of the First Session of Zimbabwe's Seventh Parliament on 26 August 2008.

[140] Chronicle newspaper, 17 January 2012. Available at: http://www.chronicle.co.zw/presidential-input-scheme-rolls- into-ntabazinduna/ (accessed 9 March 2017).

[141] http://www.herald.co.zw/zim-asset-in-line-with-sdgs/

50 kg of topdressing ammonium nitrate fertilizer, 50 kg of lime, and, depending on rainfall patterns, either 10 kg of maize seed or 10 kg of millet or sorghum seed. Most children indirectly benefit from the scheme. Approximately half (49%) of all children benefited from the input scheme in 2014/15. This decreased to about a quarter (24%) in 2016/17, but it is still the social programme with the highest national coverage. Given that 900,000 households are considered poor in Zimbabwe (MPSLSW 2016: 32; ZIMSTAT 2013), the input scheme covered all poor households in 2013/14 and 2014/15 but coverage fell to about 89% in 2016/17.

The Input Scheme, which is supposedly a government programme, has remained discretionary, with no clear selection criteria. It is usually implemented by the president's office in collaboration with ZANU-PF councillors and traditional leaders including chiefs,[142] and at times with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Public Service and Social Welfare (MPSLSW), which is responsible for family and child welfare, is not involved in the implementation of the programme. Heal Zimbabwe, a Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation in Zimbabwe, reported the exclusion of known Movement for Democratic Change supporters and the partisan inclusion of ZANU-PF party loyalists. Individuals believed to have refused 'assisted voting'—where voters are coerced to feign illiteracy and choose ZANU-PF election agents to write voting preferences on ballot papers on their behalf — during elections are accused of supporting the political opposition and are denied the inputs.[143] At some distribution points, Movement for Democratic Change supporters are allegedly asked to surrender party membership cards and regalia in order to receive the inputs.[144]

Thus, ZANU-PF preferred food aid and land reform to direct cash, favouring programmes that largely benefit the rural population, from whom ZANU-PF mainly draws its support (Britz & Tshuma, 2013:173). Indeed, food aid intensified ZANU-PF's patronage. During the 2000–2008 economic crisis, for example, 'Agricultural inputs and maize intended for food relief were sold by [ZANU-PF] party functionaries or were awarded to card-carrying acolytes of ZANU-PF,

[142] http://www.herald.co.zw/zim-asset-in-line-with-sdgs/

[143] http://thezimbabwean.co/2013/11/the-presidential-input-scheme-should/

[144] https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/10/25/bigwigs-hijack-inputs-distribution/

while these supplies were withheld from persons suspected of opposition sympathies' (Bratton, 2014:86).

5.2.3 Social cash transfers under the Government of National Unity, 2009–2013

Before the Government of National Unity was formed, in 2009, Zimbabwe had experienced a decade of socioeconomic meltdown and political instability, and weak and deteriorating social services and safety nets. As has been seen, government policies had been impromptu, inconsistent, and unpredictable. The new government crafted sound economic policies and immediately implemented them to restore macro-economic stability and put the economy on a path to recovery. Nevertheless, the economy remained fragile, and constrained public revenues meant low levels of public investment in the social sectors and the persistence of poverty (GoZ, 2013:74).

Despite these financial constraints, the Government of National Unity made progress in social policy reforms that helped households with children better manage risks such as child poverty. The Government of National Unity resuscitated the defunct Basic Education Assistance Module programme to provide fee waivers to the increasing number of OVCs, and the Movement for Democratic Change-led Social Services Ministry introduced cash transfers the ZANU-PF government had not considered up to 2008. A key reform that partially shifted family provision from primarily an agrarian regime to a poverty- targeted cash based CWR was the adoption and expansion of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme.

The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme, which targeted poor households, not children per se, was introduced in 2010/11— later than most of Zimbabwe's neighbours in Southern Africa — amidst strong pressure from international donors and agencies. The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme modestly expanded the coverage of social cash transfers, increased the value families received, and partially shifted Zimbabwe's child social protection mechanisms from non-cash to cash transfers. The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme provided benefits of between US$10 and US$25 per month, depending on household size. In districts where Public Assistance still existed, this was transformed into a more programmatic cash transfer intervention by transferring the monthly allowance paid under Public Assistance into the

Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme. The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme targeted 10% of households in each district, an enormous increase over Public Assistance. Still, many very poor households were still excluded (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016: 20).

Eligible households were identified through a targeting census conducted by ZIMSTAT (the national statistical agency) to avoid 'complications of community targeting and mitigate the potential for community politics' (Seidenfeld *et al.,* 2016:232)—i.e. partisan or government abuse of cash transfers. Eligible households had to be 'food poor' (i.e. living below the Food Poverty Line and unable to meet urgent, basic needs) and 'labour constrained' (have high dependency due to age, disability, or chronic sickness) (MLSS, 2012b:12–13). These households were targeted because they contained all the vulnerable groups, including OVCs, that urgently required social protection. At the time of the design of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme, 78% of households in Zimbabwe were living below the Total Consumption Poverty Line and more than half (55%) below the Food Poverty Line. About 20% of food-poor households were also labour-constrained, with approximately 750,000 children. As a child-sensitive programme (Roelen & Sabates-Wheeler, 2012), the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Phase 1, targeting 10 districts, showed that most (85%) of the targeted 10% households had children (85%). Forty-two percent of the beneficiary children were orphans (MLSS, 2012b: 8–9).

Targeting was also a result of the convergence of donor interests and the priorities of Movement for Democratic Change ministers within the Government of National Unity on the provision of social protection to mitigate poverty and deprivation. In 2009, the Movement for Democratic Change Finance Minister, Tendai Biti, had identified 'the elderly, orphans and child-headed families as well as the physically handicapped' as 'specially targeted vulnerable groups' requiring immediate social protection (GoZ, 2009:26). These groups constituted about 10% of all households in Zimbabwe in 2009 (Schubert, 2010c:62).

The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was partly based on 'lessons learned from the past and ongoing cash transfer programmes implemented by Government and Non-State-Actors' (Schubert, 2011a:6). Barrientos (2007:9) asserts that 'deficiencies of anti-poverty programmes

implemented in the past provide a strong motivation for considering potential alternatives'. Instead of targeting the individual, for example, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer targeted the household on the basis that non-state cash transfers had not benefited the most vulnerable and were least likely to address the causes of poverty.

The familial design of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer also reflects the policy transfer promoted by international donors, led by UNICEF. Before introducing the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer in Zimbabwe, UNICEF, in consultation with a renowned German cash transfer expert, Bernd Schubert, and his Team Consult, had trialled a familial model targeted at poor and labour-constrained households in Zambia (Siachiwena, 2016) and Malawi (Hamer, 2016b).

The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was test run in one district (Goromonzi) in late 2010 and was set to expand through a phased approach (due to human and financial capacity limitations in the ministries of Social Services and Finance). By late 2011, under the first 'scale-up' phase, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer had reached 10 districts to benefit 19,827 households. By the end of the Government of National Unity, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer had reached 16 districts, benefiting 39,004 households.

Nonetheless, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was introduced in a complex political context (two wards, for example, did not initially wish to distribute cash, as some political leaders claimed they had not been involved in the targeting process). To mitigate the risk of political manipulation, an independent targeting process and methodology were defined in the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Operational Manual. Donor visibility was low to minimize any political challenges in the first phase but improved in the second phase, when donors adopted a targeting strategy that minimized inclusion and exclusion errors by monitoring the exclusion error rate and limiting the number of households benefiting from the programme during the first phase of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (Department of International Development, 2012:5).

One particular individual within government played an important part in the introduction of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. Sydney Mhishi, then Acting Principal Director of the

Department of Social Services (DSS) in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MLSS; later MPSLSW), became the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer champion. Schubert describes Mhishi's contribution as an 'important buy-in' by an influential bureaucrat who had the power and responsibility to sell the cash transfer programme to the government.[145] Mhishi had a long interest in social protection[146] and was quick to buy into Schubert's idea of cash transfers. But Mhishi found it difficult to convince the government, which had several bureaucrats and politicians sceptical of cash transfers and viewed them as 'hand-outs' with the potential to create a dependency syndrome. For example, Lancaster Museka, then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, appointed by the president, did not initially support the idea of cash transfers and preferred to continue with the Public Assistance programme.[147] By contrast, the Movement for Democratic Change's Paurina Mpariwa, then a minister in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, was in favour of the initiative, recognizing that transfers were a feasible way of assisting the poor, especially children and the elderly burdened with providing for themselves and OVCs under their care, in an economically challenging environment. Grounding his recommendations on positive evidence of cash transfers in the region, Schubert's UNICEF-commissioned study on *Child-Sensitive Social Protection in Zimbabwe* (2010c), and the transfer plan, Mhishi was able to convince the government[148] to approve a pilot programme.[149] The interplay of donor influence, supportive bureaucrats, and Government National Unity's open-door policy to technical ideas, coupled with improved donor relations, shaped the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer in this period. On the other hand, arguments about dependency between ZANU-PF political elites show the lasting impact of the welfare dependency discourses in shaping welfare reforms in Zimbabwe and Africa at large beyond the United States and other industrialised democracies (Fraser and Gordon, 1994;

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[145] Interview with Bernd Schubert, UNICEF Consultant, 28 January 2015.

[146] Interview with Sydney Mhishi, Acting Principal Director for the Department of Social Services in the MLSS, 4 December 2014.

[147] Interview with Sydney Mhishi, 4 December 2014.

[148] It seems that Mhishi reported to ZANU-PF political structures as well as following the normal policy-making process.

[149] Interview with Sydney Mhishi, 4 December 2014.

Solinger, 1998).

In sum, four factors influenced the introduction and success of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer during the Government National Unity, namely the dollarization of the economy, market liberalization, donor enthusiasm for cash transfers, and supportive political leadership. The Ministry of Labour and Social Services was under the Movement for Democratic Change portfolio and its development partners (mainly donors and civil society) worked together to reform the Public Assistance programme as the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer.[150] In a 2015 essay, Tendai Biti described the bad donor relations the Government National Unity inherited:

> At the inception of the Government National Unity, the Zimbabwean government had no relationship with international financial institutions. The IMF had suspended Zimbabwe's voting rights in 2003, the African Development Bank had closed its office in Harare, and the World Bank maintained a skeletal presence. Zimbabwe had started defaulting on its debt obligations in 1999, and accumulated arrears prevented any further borrowing from IFIs and Western donors. It meant no access to concessional finance or to international capital markets (Biti, 2015).

Thus, while political fragmentation may pose difficulties for scaling up programmes (Barrientos, 2007: 9), the Zimbabwean case demonstrates how that can be an opportunity for programme introduction and expansion.

5.2.4 Social cash transfer reforms post-Government of National Unity, 2013–2017

Zimbabwe held 'harmonized' (i.e. simultaneous parliamentary and presidential) elections in July 2013. Mugabe was re-elected president, and ZANU-PF won a parliamentary majority, which it had not had for the preceding four years. Initially, the government seemed to intend to pursue the Government National Unity's expansion plans. It rolled out the School Feeding Programme and modestly expanded the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme. For the first time, the

[150] Interview with Amarakoon Bandara, UNDP Economic Advisor, 13 November 2015.

ZANU-PF-led government showed a rhetorical interest in cash transfers. The new government's economic blueprint, Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-economic Transformation, mentions cash transfers as part of its poverty-reduction strategy.

Although ZANU-PF did not abolish the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer after winning the 2013 election, it reverted to emphasizing its agrarian components. Since mid-2013, donor pressure has been ineffective in urging the scaling-up of direct cash transfers in the face of conservatism, tight budget constraints, and the prioritization of other programmes, as well as a preoccupation with political issues. Consequently, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer has been significantly downscaled. Instead, an agricultural input programme, Command Agriculture, was introduced in 2016. This has modestly expanded the coverage of non-cash social transfers, but inputs are largely distributed on partisan lines, benefiting ZANU-PF and excluding suspected opposition supporters.

Another reform that began during the Government National Unity but implemented by the post Government National Unity ZANU-PF led government is the institutionalisation of nutrition in schools that entailed taking full ownership of the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSFP). Between 2002 and 2008, the World Food Programme had solely funded the School Feeding Programme as part of its emergency response to food insecurity in Zimbabwe. In 2009, the Government National Unity took over the School Feeding Programme and made it a 'permanent' programme—at least in poverty-stricken communities—but the Government National Unity's efforts to expand the School Feeding Programme to all public primary schools were curtailed by a lack of funding and a proper model that would ensure sustainability.

By the end of the Government National Unity, in mid-2013, plans to embark on a study tour to Brazil by the Movement for Democratic Change-led Ministries of Finance, Education, Health, and Social Services were at an advanced stage. In December 2013, the World Food Programme funded a study visit under the auspices of the Brazil Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, a World Food Programme /Government of Brazil initiative that helps countries to expand their food and nutritional security interventions, including school meal programmes, so as to improve the food security of children. The inter-ministerial team on this trip included Primary and

Secondary Education Minister Lazarus Dokora and other officials from the ministries of education, agriculture, finance, health, and social welfare. Based on the Brazilian model of school feeding, where the government provides a budget that is decentralized to allow school feeding committees to take the lead in local food procurement, the Ministry of Education transformed the School Feeding Programme into a Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSFP), which was launched in May 2014. Although the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme was designed to be fully government-funded and -implemented, it is currently co-funded by the government and donors. In 2016, the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme benefited approximately 10% of all students.

A major reform that supported the agrarian CWR post- Government National Unity was the stalling and downscaling of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. Since mid-2013, ZANU-PF has continued with the Government National Unity -introduced cash transfers that it had avoided introducing before 2009. As will be discussed, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer has been downscaled drastically, reducing the coverage of the major cash transfer programme for poor families with OVCs. Downscaling has also reduced the amount of cash families with children receive.

A change of governments has been associated with interest in and expansion of cash transfer programmes in some Southern African countries. Former Malawian President Joyce Banda expressed rhetorical interest in cash transfers, though without expanding the Social Cash Transfer programme, when she took over from Bingu Mutharika in 2012 (Hamer, 2016b). In Ghana, not only did the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty programme survive a change of government in 2008, but the incoming party expanded the programme's coverage and increased the 'proportion of government resources' allocated to Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (Ragno *et al.,* 2016:149). The new government in Zambia, under the presidency of Michael Sata from 2011 until 2014, took over financial responsibility from international donors and expanded Zambia' s Social Cash Transfer programme to more than double the number of beneficiary households and districts (Siachiwena, 2016). Zimbabwe is an unusual case in that, in practice, the Mugabe administration retrenched some of its welfare programmes, including the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer.

Between November 2013 and February 2014, the government seemed to be intending to pursue the Government National Unity's Harmonized Social Cash Transfer expansion plans. The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was rolled out in four new districts, bringing the total number to 20 out of the total of 65 districts. In the rest of 2014, and during 2015 and 2016, the programme was not expanded to any new districts, and between February and August 2016, Harmonized Social Cash Transfer beneficiaries did not receive transfers. Donor funding that was supposed to end with the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Phase 2 in September 2015 had been extended to February 2016 but dried up. Then, in August 2016, partly on account of the enduring economic crisis, Harmonized Social Cash Transfer districts were reduced from 20 to 9, cutting the number of beneficiaries by more than half (25,598). As part of the 'transition', beneficiaries in the discontinued districts received a one-off double payment in September/October 2016. That was the end of the 'expansion plan'. These developments show that the sustainability of cash transfer programmes is doubtful when governments fail to implement plans to graduate from donor funding.

Six main factors explain the delayed expansion and downscaling of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. First, the Government National Unity, through fiscal funding to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, had agreed to match donor funds 50/50 (AIR, 2014a: 4), but it did not honour this commitment, leaving donors to contribute over 80% of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer budget since its inception. Second, despite bureaucrats within the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and Ministry of Finance being supportive of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, pushing the ZANU-PF administration to prioritize social cash transfers, ZANU-PF ministers (first Nicholas Goche, succeeding Paurina Mpariwa, and currently Prisca Mupfumira) and Members of Parliament generally had a negative attitude towards the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. Goche said 'Our party has no problem when donors give poor people money but we have a problem with donors when they want us to give our people money. What people need is food, which they should grow, so why not give them food and not money?'[151] Third, donors lacked trust in the new government to handle the finances of the

[151] Interview with Nicholas Goche, 27 July 2016.

Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme equitably. Fourth, donors and government had conflicting social protection priorities. Whilst donors were pushing for Harmonized Social Cash Transfer expansion, the government was more concerned about how to fund Basic Education Assistance Module following the withdrawal of the European Union and the United Kingdom Department of International Development, who were funding Basic Education Assistance Module beneficiaries in primary schools. Also, as has been seen, the government preferred farm subsidies to direct cash transfers, giving the Agricultural Input Scheme more budget support. Fifth, the government lacked fiscal space for social spending due to the deepening economic crisis. Finally, post- Government National Unity, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer and other social protection programmes were affected by a lack of consistent political and bureaucratic leadership in the MPSLSW. Nicholas Goche and Tongai Muzenda, who were appointed as Minister and Deputy, respectively, within the new ZANU-PF government in September 2013, were expelled from the government in December 2014 on allegations of supporting a faction led by Vice-President Mujuru that was plotting to oust Mugabe. They were replaced by Prisca Mupfumira (in December 2014) and Tapiwanashe Matangaidze (in September 2015), respectively.

The last pro-agrarian CWR reform implemented by the ruling party after winning the 2013 elections and possibly to secure political support by both the political elites and the small farmers is the empowerment of farmers through Command Agriculture. Despite downscaling the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer on 'affordability' grounds in the face of increasing food insecurity (ZIMSTAT, 2015:14; 2016), the ZANU-PF administration rolled out a US$500 million[152] small-scale farmer input support scheme, Command Agriculture, in 2015. The Command Agriculture programme sought to achieve household and national food security through enhanced maize production. Command Agriculture beneficiaries are expected to produce approximately 91% of Zimbabwe's maize requirement (equivalent to 2 million tonnes). To be eligible for the inputs, farmers should commit a quarter of a hectare to the programme[153] and have 'irrigation infrastructure [and] potential irrigable areas, and be maize producers on dry

[152] The Herald newspaper, 15 August 2016: http://www.herald.co.zw/500m-command-agric-scheme-begins/

[153] http://www.moa.gov.zw/index.php/component/content/article/13-latest-news/7-latest-news

land (large and small scale farmers)'.[154] Justin Mupamhanga, Deputy Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet, said that farmers on the programme would receive 'production inputs like fertilisers, seed and agrochemicals' in addition to irrigation and mechanized equipment.[155] The Command Agriculture aimed to support 20,000 households, and 19,608 households[156] had been reached by November 2016 (MoAM, 2016).

The Command Agriculture programme ostensibly promotes family reliance rather than government or donor dependency. Together with the agricultural input package already discussed, Command Agriculture is therefore aligned to the ruling party's agrarian approach to social protection for the poor and poor families with children. Emmerson Mnangagwa, Vice-President, underscored that the Command Agriculture would 'stimulate the agro-industry and create employment' and potentially 'generate income and improve livelihoods of all people.'[157] But Command Agriculture, like the presidential input scheme, provides ZANU-PF with an opportunity to reward those who voted it back to power in the 2013 election and 'prepare' them for the upcoming election in 2018, since the inputs are distributed on a patronage basis. The Command Agriculture is exclusionary and largely benefits ZANU-PF supporters, as the target group, small-scale farmers, constitutes the majority of beneficiaries of the land reform programme aligned to the ruling ZANU-PF party (Moyo, 2013; Scoones, 2014).

5.3 Explaining the distinctive characteristics of Zimbabwe's child welfare regime

The distinguishing characteristics of Zimbabwe's CWR are a result of a combination of structural, ideological, and political factors. Structural factors including HIV/AIDS, drought, economic downturn, and unemployment heightened household and child poverty and increased the number of OVCs. These changes prompted the government to modestly expand child social protection by introducing School and Vulnerable Group Feeding programmes, school and

[154] The Herald, 16 August 2016: http://www.herald.co.zw/command-agric-takes-course/

[155] The Herald, 12 August 2016: http://www.herald.co.zw/500m-command-agric-scheme-begins/

[156] http://www.moa.gov.zw/index.php/component/content/article/13-latest-news/7-latest-news

[157] The Herald, 25 August 2016: http://www.herald.co.zw/vp-mnangagwa-calls-for-unity-on-command-agric/

hospital fee waivers, and direct cash transfers to children in poor and labour-constrained households. In drought years, the government partnered with United Nation agencies to provide social transfers to poor families with children, the bulk of which were in-kind. The ruling ZANU-PF party's preference for an agrarian route to poverty reduction was consequential in sustaining the familial provision of primarily non-cash social transfers pre- and post-Government of National Unity. Pressure to shift from in-kind to cash transfers from international donors and agencies during the Government of National Unity led to a change in the form of benefits from largely non-cash to cash transfers. The 2009 election also ushered in a shift to cash when the Movement for Democratic Change joined ZANU-PF in government, but winning the 2013 election gave ZANU-PF the power to reduce direct cash in favour of non-cash transfers, and shift the focus back from transfers to the poor to support for small farmers.

5.3.1 'Structural' factors

The effects of structural factors (AIDS, drought) were exacerbated by the government's economic mismanagement, creating the need for policies that would mitigate the effects of poverty. More than half of all children (3.5 million) and almost all children (5,148,000) lived in poverty in 2010 and 2012, respectively (Schubert, 2010c:23; ZIMSTAT, 2012). Orphan rates decreased but remained high at 22% in 1994 and 15% in 2015 (CSO, 1995:12; ZIMSTAT 2016a: 29). In 2014, Zimbabwe had the largest absolute number of orphans (Kavak, 2014:8). A high HIV/AIDS-related death rate weakened family support and increased the number of OVCs requiring state support. At the height of the 2000–2008 economic crisis, 'national HIV prevalence exceeded 30%, making Zimbabwe one of Africa's hardest-hit countries' (Bratton, 2014:85). In 2015, Zimbabwe had the fifth-highest prevalence (about 15%) in Sub-Saharan Africa after Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa.[158] The revitalization of Basic Education Assistance Module in 2001, for example, was prompted by the increase in children orphaned and made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS. Reduced numbers of caregivers, as well as weakened and inadequate extended family structures to provide a family safety net, combined with poverty to increase OVCs. During drought years, particularly in 1982/83, 1991, 2002, and 2004, the government partnered with international donors to provide feeding schemes for

[158] http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/zimbabwe/

drought-affected families. On the other hand, financial crises — especially that of 2000–2008, which 'ended up in a full-blown economic crisis' (Bratton, 2014:84) — increased household vulnerability to poverty.

Zimbabwe, a low-income country, is the poorest (the other three are middle-income countries) of the four cases in this study and it was expected that political elites interviewed would voice affordability concerns. None of the interviewees mentioned affordability as one of the factors for not expanding cash transfers. Surprisingly, it is the middle-income countries where governments expressed concerns about the affordability of cash transfers (Seekings, 2016c and Chapter 3). Moreso, government's failure to disburse funds for the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer, despite the rhetorical commitments, but at the same time increasing the farm input scheme budget does not only reflect preference for agriculture. It also suggests that funding was more of a political than a fiscal issue.

5.3.2 Political factors

Political factors including patronage politics, electoral competition, the limited power of international agencies and donors, and the proselytising of individuals within the government were consequential in promoting the enduring agrarian CWR, the modest expansion of coverage and shift from in-kind benefits in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF's agrarian approach to social protection largely explains the familial provision of primarily non-cash transfers in the form of food aid and agricultural inputs and the low coverage of cash transfers to poor households with children. As discussed, Zimbabwe's CWR is located in an agrarian general welfare regime supporting families through the provision primarily of in-kind benefits rather than direct cash transfers. ZANU -PF's emphasis on poverty reduction through land redistribution and agricultural inputs support for the peasant farmers (poor households) who make up a large proportion of the population has led to continued familial targeting. Nevertheless, agricultural support (land and farm inputs), ZANU-PF's preferred form of social protection, has been discretionary, clientelistic, and exclusionary. Despite the government's (and non-state actors') drought relief programmes for the most drought-stricken households, cash transfers still have low coverage of poor households with children. Drought relief, and not cash transfers which are currently donor-

funded and monitored, is favoured as it is much easier for ZANU-PF to patronise it. As discussed later, ZANU-PF turned to partisanship politics when threatened by a strong political opposition.

Electoral competition between the ruling ZANU-PF and the MDC urged ZANU-PF to reform the agrarian CWR. Between 1980 and 2000 ZANU-PF was politically secure and was under no pressure to make substantial social policy reforms. During this period the poorest families received public assistance (through the Public Assistance programme) but public works and drought relief programmes were also effectively implemented. These programmes, and the role in liberating Zimbabwe which the electorate is usually reminded of during election campaigns, could explain the support ZANU-PF enjoyed. In the comfort of this political insecurity, ZANU-PF discontinued fee waivers in 1998. Since the 2000 elections, ZANU-PF has been politically insecure as it faced strong opposition from the Movement for Democratic Change. ZANU-PF needed to regain its rural voters and strategically embarked on pro-agrarian reforms that reflect partisan politics. The reforms, resonating well with the rural poor who constituted the largest proportion of ZANU-PF's support base, include land redistribution since 2000, the reintroduction of fee waivers (Basic Education Assistance Module) in 2001, massive drought-related food aid since 2001 and the roll out of the agricultural input scheme to small rural farmers in the period leading to the widely contested 2008 elections (Britz & Tshuma, 2013:189). For the first time in independent Zimbabwe the opposition won more parliamentary seats and the presidential vote (but not enough to win the election outright) (Bratton, 2014; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008) in the 2008 elections.

In government, Movement for Democratic Change -led social services ministries (education, health, social services) opened doors for donors, who were enthusiastic about cash transfers. The participation of the Movement for Democratic Change in government led to significant policy reforms, including the introduction of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, which provided direct cash transfers to families with children, the establishment of health and education funds, which expanded the coverage of Basic Education Assistance Module and Assisted Medical Treatment Orders, and the inaugural joint (government and donors) funding of the School Feeding Programme and its later institutionalisation that saw the programme reaching more

children in poverty-stricken communities. On the other hand, ZANU-PF reconstituted itself during the Government of National Unity (Bratton, 2014). While budgets for other social protection programmes reduced, possibly responding to the poor economy, government support for the agricultural input scheme did not change much. In fact, the budget continued to increase in the period leading to the 2013 elections and after (see figure 5.1). Presidential Input Schemes, land redistribution and food aid continued in the rural areas. These programmes could have helped ZANU-PF to secure enough political support, leading to the 'crushing defeat' of the Movement for Democratic Change in the 2013 election (Bratton, 2014).

After winning the 2013 elections, ZANU-PF instituted reforms that continued to support an agrarian CWR. As if to clear off the Movement for Democratic Change's foot prints in the Government of National Unity, almost similar to the repeal of Obamacare (medical insurance introduced by Democrat and former United States President, Barack Obama) by President Trump (a Republican) in the United States,[159] ZANU-PF downscaled the only major cash transfer programme, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. Some scholars have claimed that ZANU-PF returned to political power but 'had little to offer other than an unchecked return to economic folly, elite corruption, and the bitter politics of exclusion' (Bratton 2014:2). This might be true particularly in the urban areas where the urban electorate is hard hit by the rising unemployment and poverty levels. Bratton seem to underestimate the pro-agrarian reforms ZANU-PF has undertaken after the elections. Command Agriculture, introduced in 2015, in addition to the food aid and farm inputs to the rural people, seem to be a political tool to secure votes by the small farmers (rural poor) and political elites targeted by these programmes. Based on these agriculture-based reforms, it is likely that ZANU-PF will continue to win elections, including the forthcoming 2018 harmonised elections. ZANU-PF's electoral dominance, and the subsequent endurance of the agrarian regime, might also be aided by the weakening opposition that is failing to provide a formidable alternative.

International agencies and donors played a central role in partially shifting from primarily agrarian regime providing in-kind benefits to cash transfers. International donors, through

[159] https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/19/obamacare-repeal-tax-bill-trump-243912

UNICEF, piloted and expanded the coverage of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer from 1 to 20 districts. UNICEF successfully advocated child-sensitive social protection in the form of a cash transfer programme (the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer) that deliberately targeted food-poor and labour-constrained families with OVCs. Moreover, the revitalization of the defunct Basic Education Assistance Module programme by donors in 2009 expanded the coverage of social cash transfers. On the other hand, the wider coverage of food aid for poor households has been made possible by World Food Programme funding. The World Bank's assessment of the 2005–2009 economic crisis period was that 'Donors have played a major role in financing social expenditures even prior to the economic crisis, and increasingly after that' (World Bank, 2011:9). Where donor funding was withdrawn, as with Basic Education Assistance Module funding for primary school pupils since 2014, or partially discontinued, as in the case of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer since February 2016, social transfers coverage reduced drastically.

Despite these modest reforms, donor pressure was inadequate to convince the government to transit from a primarily minimalist agrarian regime to a pro-poor CWR that provides general support for families with children. The United Kingdom Department for International Development pushed for free primary education through withdrawing Basic Education Assistance Module funding without success. The UNICEF-driven Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was almost abolished in 2013 and has not expanded. All these retrenchments contrast with increased government support for poor rural farmers reflecting partisan politics.

Finally, certain individuals within government played significant roles in the establishment and reform of social cash transfer programmes. Sydney Mhishi in particular strongly advocated cash transfers within government. At the establishment of the Government of National Unity in 2009, donors were still sceptical about funding social protection through government and it was critical to have individuals in government that they could trust in reforming social policy. Although Mhishi was a ZANU-PF-appointed bureaucrat, he became the trusted individual donors needed. Mhishi also worked closely with Movement for Democratic Change ministers — Paurina Mpariwa in the MLSS, Henry Madzorera in the Ministry of Health, and David Coltart in the Ministry of Education — to gain donor confidence. As a result, the flagship cash transfer

programme, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, was introduced, marking a shift from food to cash transfers as well as expanding the coverage of transfers. Mhishi's support for the expansion of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was constrained by ZANU-PF's preference for agro-based rather than cash-based poverty reduction mechanisms. Overall, the agrarian CWR has endured despite internal (within government by individuals like Mhishi and from the political opposition) and external (from donors and international agencies) pressures to reform it to reflect the influence of patronage politics.

CHAPTER 6

Comparing and explaining child welfare regimes in Southern Africa

6.1 Key differences and similarities in child and child-oriented social cash transfers

This chapter considers the overall pattern to variation between the four case studies detailed in Chapters 2-5. The chapter examines how and why child welfare regimes (CWRs) in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are different. Despite the similarities documented in the previous chapters and summarised in this chapter, there are striking differences in some key characteristics. To understand how social grants for families with children vary (answering research question 2), in the next section I contrast the variation in the social cash transfer schemes between the four cases. In the following section I step back and consider the explanatory factors to this variation (answering research question 3), locating these findings in the broader comparative welfare regimes literature. I explore some gaps in the current study that suggest opportunities for further research before drawing certain conclusions. The overall discussion advances the comparative welfare regime methodology in a different geographical context compared with the usual focus on industrialised democracies. It also suggests a focus on an underestimated but important dimension, the targeting form.

The discussion in Chapters 2-5 shows that all the four cases started off as familial and residual, with public provision focused on orphans or children living in poor, single-mother households. None of them followed the French model of family allowances, nor the Nordic model of direct public provision through public childcare. South Africa has diverged from this model dramatically over the last 20 years. Namibia has been slow to follow South Africa's lead, and Botswana has stuck with its familial model, while Zimbabwe has an enduring agrarian and familial child welfare regime (CWR) similar to that of Botswana. The crucial variation – as measured by coverage and targeting form dimensions – has occurred over the past 20 years, as all four cases have diverged to a greater or lesser extent. Divergence in programmes coverage (the proportion of children reached by direct and indirect schemes, programmes' legal status and generosity) and their targeting form (whether programmes are targeted in terms of poverty or on the basis of perceived family breakdown) has led to a 2-dimensional taxonomy of four distinct CWRs.

6.1.1 Coverage

The four case studies are similar in that they all have non-contributory cash transfers and in-kind programmes aimed at children; but there are significant cross-national variations too. The CWRs differ in two major dimensions: coverage and targeting form. One major similarity is the provision of some form of social grant to families with children in all cases. The grants directly or indirectly benefit children. Except for Zimbabwe, the other three cases have direct child grants. All the countries implement varied programmes that indirectly benefit children. War veteran grants are provided in all cases, but vary in amounts. Three of the four countries provide Old Age Pensions, the exception being Zimbabwe, where the post-independence government abolished the system for whites, coloureds and Indians. Disability grants are offered in South Africa and Namibia, but not in Botswana and Zimbabwe. South Africa stands out as the only country with housing programmes. Community feeding programmes are implemented in all cases, but on different scales (more pronounced in Zimbabwe and Botswana than in Namibia and South Africa). A combination of these direct and indirect grants, however, varies in important programme aspects including coverage and generosity.

Coverage (the proportion of children directly and indirectly reached by social grants, whether programmes are legislated or provided via administrative fiat; and generosity) comparisons are summarised in Table 6.1. Legal status, as discussed later, seems to have minimal effect on the type of CWR. Direct coverage excludes in-kind benefits children may receive including school feeding, community feeding, health and school fee waivers. Table 6.1 compares direct and indirect reach of social grants in the four cases. South Africa has the highest direct reach with 68% possibly because of the expanded CSG. Namibia is second reaching 25% of all children. This is less than half the reach in South Africa but higher than in Botswana covering a paltry 5% and Zimbabwe without direct cash transfers at 0%. There are significant variations in indirect coverage too. Botswana covers 85% of all children, the highest reach between the cases. This is expected because children benefit more from in-kind than direct cash transfers in Botswana. South Africa is second, covering 51% of all children, Zimbabwe is third, reaching 24% of all children and Namibia is last, reaching out to 21% of all children.

Table 6.1: Comparison of programme coverage

Regime type	Coverage		Total coverage
	Direct	Indirect	
Pro-poor (South Africa)	High (68%)	High (51%)	high
Familial (Botswana)	Low (5%)	High (85%)	medium
Mixed (Namibia)	Low (25%)	Low (21%)	low
Agrarian (Zimbabwe)	0%	Low (24%)	low

Source: Ministries responsible for social grants

Table 6.1 shows that the pro-poor CWR in South Africa has high total coverage because it benefits many poor children. Whilst it is possible to have pro-poor targeting and low coverage (the World Bank promotes that only very poor families should receive benefits), South Africa is unusual in that its means test is used primarily to exclude the rich, not to limit the benefits to the extremely poor. Hence, South African social grants are quasi-universal. A familial CWR in Botswana has medium coverage because it covers some families and excludes others. Coverage is low in both mixed and agrarian CWRs in Namibia and Zimbabwe, respectively, because they tend to exclude many poor children but reach out to a smaller number of OVCs. The categories of children covered in these regimes tend to represent smaller proportions of children. In Namibia, for example, although most orphans benefit, they are very few in number.

It is surprising that Namibia has low total coverage in contrast with medium coverage in Botswana. It was expected that coverage would be higher in Namibia, in comparison with Botswana, because of the mixed regime encompassing pro-poor grants. Namibia's low total coverage is possibly because Namibia's primary target were broken families, with small numbers of orphans, until the recent introduction of the poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant, which still has very limited coverage.

Generally, low-to-no coverage by child-specific grants is notable across countries, except for South Africa. Zimbabwe does not provide a direct cash transfer to children, hence the 0% direct

coverage (see Table 6.1). In Botswana and Namibia, unlike South Africa, the wide coverage of social cash transfers is not so much about the direct child grants programmes as the indirect benefits from the broad social protection system. While South Africa shares the same CWR characteristic (since coverage is further expanded by other indirect programmes) it is unusual in that direct child grants, particularly the CSG, are more expansive than those in other cases.

Coverage of child grants shown, in Table 6.1, contrasts with coverage of general welfare regimes in the case studies. Available data, that is not updated for all the cases and may not represent current coverage, suggests that Botswana has the highest coverage, followed by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, respectively (see Figure 6.1). Thus, the general coverage of social cash transfers (defined as percentage of population participating in cash transfers and last-resort programmes, noncontributory social pensions, and other cash transfer programmes including child, family and orphan) may not be truly representative of child welfare regimes between the case studies.

Figure 6.1: Coverage of social safety nets, 2008-2013



Source: World Development Indicators (coverage of social safety net programmes variable), 2008-2013

A second important dimension is the generosity of social grants i.e. the combined amount of cash and in-kind social cash transfers a child receives from the government relative to national and international poverty lines. The value of transfers analysed in this section, however, excludes in-

kind benefits. Table 6.2 shows that the four countries have different poverty lines. With the exception of Botswana, the other three countries set their Food Poverty Line and Upper Bound Poverty Lines below the international extreme poverty line of US$1.90/person/day and the international absolute poverty line for upper middle income countries of US$5.50/person/day. Setting these poverty lines low at national level, as shown later, has a bearing on the generosity of benefits provided.

Table 6.2: Differences in poverty lines (US$/person/day)

Poverty line	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Globally
Food Poverty Line/extreme poverty line	0.84	0.58	2.16	0.97	1.90
Lower Bound Poverty Line	1.26	0.81	-	-	-
Upper Bound Poverty Line /Poverty Datum Line/Total Consumption Poverty Line	1.94	1.06	2.77	3.1	5.50*

Source: SSA, ZIMSTAT, NSA & Statistics Botswana * World Bank upper middle income poverty line.

Using the December 2017 cash transfer values (converted to US$ and adjusted to purchasing power parity, PPP)[160], all four countries provided ungenerous benefits relative to the global poverty line (extreme/absolute poverty line) of US$1.90 or less/person/day. Figure 6.2 shows that South Africa provides a combined transfer of US$0.98/person/day (or US$31/person/month): higher than all the other cases but lower than the global poverty line of US$1.90. Botswana provides US$0.90/person/day (US$28/person/month). Namibia transfers US$0.55/person/day (or US$17/person/month), much less when compared with South Africa and Botswana, but higher than Zimbabwe with its lowest transfer of US$0.16/person/day (or US$5/person/month).

[160] The nominal value of the estimated total value received by a child in local currency was converted to real value using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for each country (2016 prices for South Africa and Botswana, and 2012 prices for Namibia and Zimbabwe when the nominal and real values were the same). The real value was then converted into US$, using the December 2017 exchange rate to obtain the actual transfer value in US$.

Figure 6.2: Value of monthly transfers (US$/child/day)



Source: Author calculations using estimated value of transfer per child per month

The value of transfers relative to these national poverty lines varies across the four cases. South Africa transfers US$31/person/month, which is generous relative to the Food Poverty Line (US$26/person/month) but ungenerous relative to the Lower Bound Poverty Line (US$39/person/month) and Upper Bound Poverty Line (US$60/person/month). Botswana transfers US$28/person/month, which is ungenerous relative to the Food Poverty Line (US$67/person/month) and the Poverty Datum Line (US$86/person/month). Namibia provides US$17/person/month which is very ungenerous relative to all the three national poverty lines: Food Poverty Line (US$18); Lower Bound Poverty Line (US$25); Upper Bound Poverty Line (US$33). Zimbabwe is the least generous country providing US$5/person/month relative to the Food Poverty Line (US$30/person/month) and the Total Consumption Poverty Line (US$90/person/month). Overall, the transfers are ungenerous relative to national poverty lines.

There is limited comparative literature on the generosity of CWRs in Southern Africa. The existing literature compares general welfare provision between South Africa and Botswana and other countries (not necessarily included in this study) - excluding Zimbabwe and Namibia (Seekings, 2016c:4). Seekings concludes that South Africa provides more generous welfare, while Botswana is less generous. The comparison of generosity of CWRs in these two countries

concurs with these findings. This study, however, provides evidence that the CWR in Botswana is not as parsimonious as the general welfare regime, as argued by other scholars (Ulriksen, 2017:85; Seekings, 2017b:8; 2016a:2).

The last aspect of coverage is variation in legal status of programmes. Child grants in South Africa and Namibia are an entitlement, in contrast with those of Botswana and Zimbabwe. South Africa stands out because, unlike the other three cases, pre- and post-independence social grants have been based in legislation. Despite a similar colonial history to that of South Africa, Namibia was very slow to legislate social grants for children. Namibia became independent in 1990, but child welfare grants were legislated through the Children's Act only in 2015. It is possible that colonial inheritance combined with an active and strong civil society could have promoted the legislation of child grants in South Africa, in contrast with the situation in Namibia, with its relatively weak civil society. Legal status of programmes relates to claims families with children in South Africa and Namibia can make to government, unlike the situation in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Legislated provision has, however, been important in South Africa compared with the other cases, since civil society and government have relied on legislation to expand social grants to the poor (Tshoose, 2016).

6.1.2 Targeting form

A second important variable is the targeting form (who gets what grant, where and why). Similarities or differences between cases are determined by the policy objective to address family breakdown and/or poverty. The extent to which the state prioritises each of the two dimensions determines the policy trajectory taken. Prioritisation also determines the category of children targeted by specific programmes. Namibia, for instance, has a Vulnerable Grant that is almost similar to the CSG in South Africa (both are poverty-targeted), but it is urban-biased. In other words, both family breakdown and targeting are considered in designing social grants for families with children in all four cases, but the varying significance placed on either or both factors results in the four different trajectories (models).

The categories of children targeted by different programmes vary between case studies (see Table 1.1). Regarding child grants (direct programmes providing direct coverage), South Africa

and Namibia provide similar direct grants that target specific categories of children, although there are remarkable differences. Both the CSG and the Vulnerable Grant in South Africa and Namibia are poverty-targeted, but the CSG is near-universal while the Vulnerable Grant is urban-biased. Also, different eligibility criteria are applied. The Vulnerable Grant was designed to benefit poor children of unemployed but living parents (both mother and father), whereas all poor children country-wide are eligible for the CSG, irrespective of the status (living or dead) of their parents or guardians. Botswana is different, since the major 'child grant' (the Orphan Care Programme) targets all orphans nationwide without any means test. This observation disputes existing claims that only 'needy' (income insecure) families are targeted (Ulriksen, 2017). Zimbabwe's only cash transfer programme, the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer, is different from the other three cases in that a small proportion of families with OVCs is eligible in geographically-targeted poorest districts.

All four cases implement school feeding programmes, but there are significant targeting differences. Both South Africa and Botswana implement school feeding programmes nationwide, but it is means tested in South Africa, although in practice all children in participating schools have access to it. South Africa's school feeding programme is the most expansive of the four cases, the largest in Africa[161] followed by Egypt, and the fourth globally (after India, Brazil and China), reaching about 9,5 million children in 2015 (World Bank, 2015:13). By contrast, only children in certain schools in poor communities in Namibia and Zimbabwe benefit. School feeding also covers primary schools only in Namibia. In Zimbabwe, the programme is limited to certain districts, and to certain schools within those districts. This might explain the low coverage in both countries when compared with the other two cases.

School fee waivers are also provided differently. Namibia is a unique case, providing universal free primary and secondary education. Whereas most schools in South Africa are non-fee paying, and exemptions for poor students in fee-paying schools are implemented, Botswana and Zimbabwe are different: basic and secondary education is not free. Children from affluent families pay school fees. Fees are waived for all orphans, with certain needy children receiving

[161] In this sentence coverage is measured in absolute numbers but as a proportion of all children elsewhere in the thesis.

exemptions. In this latter point, Zimbabwe is an exception: waivers are limited to selected OVCs only, through the Basic Education Assistance Module.

Zimbabwe lags behind the other three countries with the absence of indirect social grants including old age pensions and disability grants. These grants provide massive indirect support for children in South Africa and Namibia, and widen coverage significantly. In addition, while the other three cases provide universal free primary health care, Zimbabwe provides targeted health care fee waivers to a few OVCs, specifically orphans who live in government or private residential care.

Community or vulnerable group-feeding programmes that indirectly benefit children are implemented in both Zimbabwe and Botswana. Both countries have outstanding extensive drought relief programmes, sometimes reaching out to more than half of the population. The programme is seasonal and usually donor-funded (mostly through the World Food Programme), but has become institutionalised as an integral part of both welfare states, unlike the situation in South Africa and Namibia. Such food supports the agrarian regime in Zimbabwe, where massive relief is provided in times of crop failure.

In view of this variation in targeting, South Africa, as discussed, depicts a pro-poor CWR. Namibia places almost equal importance to family breakdown and poverty in assuming a mixed regime. A conservative Botswana prioritises maintenance of the family structure. Lastly, Zimbabwe has not reformed from an agrarian CWR: it has an enduring agrarian society unmatched to any of the other three cases since pre-independence. It would appear that the government relies on families to provide for children (and other members) through subsistence farming with minimal state support. Changes in either family structure or poverty rates have not motivated the state to move in the direction of Botswana, South Africa or Namibia.

The taxonomy constructed in this study confirms the importance of two dimensions as discussed in literature (Davis *et al.,* 2016; Handa *et al.,* 2015; Handa *et al.,* 2012; Handa *et al.,* 2011; ILO, 2017; World Bank, 2015; 2017). But I further emphasise the significance of targeting form in distinguishing regime types that have been underestimated in existing child welfare regime typologies both in Southern Africa and globally (Handa *et al.,* 2011; Bradshaw, 2012,2010; Kamerman, Phipps & Ben-Arieh, 2010; Daly & Clavero, 2002; Seekings & Moore, 2013) and

general regimes (Noyoo, 2017; Garcia & Moore, 2012:48; Niño-Zarazúa *et al.,* 2010; Seekings, 2005:16; Esping-Andersen, 1990).

6.2 Explaining the variation in child welfare regimes in Southern Africa

This section focuses on an explanation of the variation between the four child welfare regimes via investigation of the determinants of social grants policy choices in comparative perspective. Key factors, found to explain cross-national variation adequately, reflect, strongly, the interplay of need or 'structural' (AIDS or other medical challenges, social [such as family breakdown], demographic changes) factors, colonial antecedents, international influence (the power of donors and international agencies) and domestic politics (party politics [competition between ruling party and other parties, party ideology, the role of individual champions within the ruling party or state or civil society, the powers of ministries relative to each other] and the power of domestic Civil Society Organisations). These findings, consistent with previous studies primarily focusing on general welfare regimes in Latin America, East and South Asia and Africa (Hickey *et al*., 2018; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Rudra, 2015; Yang, 2017) extend the Power Resource Theory beyond developed countries, but also reveal new influential factors (within the theory) that have been overlooked. This is important in widening our understanding of the causes of variation in public policy related to social protection in the global South and the world at large. Literature shows the importance of these factors in the African context, particularly the fairly-researched general welfare regime types (Ulriksen, 2017). This section builds on this literature to argue that one combination of factors has led to one type of regime, and a different combination has led to a different type of child welfare regime. The various combinations of factors explain the child welfare regime model explicit in each country.

None of the causal links of industrial-economic growth (Wilensky, 1975), power resources (Esping-Andersen, 1990), state-centric (Skocpol, 1995) and cultural (van Oorschot, 2007) theories to variants of social policy in post-industrial states, the conventional comparative welfare state literature in the global North and South, fully accounts for the various CWRs in the different countries in Southern Africa and Africa at large. The causal influence of the logic of industrial-economic growth theory (Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005) as advanced by modernisation theorists (Wilensky, 1975; Cutright, 1965) is weak in explaining variation

between upper middle-income countries: South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. Similarly, cultural explanations proffered by cultural theorists (van Oorschot, 2007; Chamberlayne *et al.,* 1999) do not fully explain variation between the four cases with almost similar cultures. Policy convergences would be expected between the case studies, as they share cultural experiences, especially the idea of sharing resources among family members and between poor and rich members of the community: the *ubuntu* concept (as known in South Africa) and its *botho* equivalent practised in Botswana (see Chapter 4), or *unhu* in Zimbabwe. All these theories underestimate the role of HIV and AIDS in determining policy decisions in Southern Africa. The four cases have AIDS-related high OVCs populations. Families with children, in Botswana, for instance, experience structural poverty as a result of the death of breadwinners caused by HIV and AIDS. In Botswana HIV has also weakened traditional support systems, forcing the government to intervene with family and child-focused social assistance schemes (Leite, 2014). The North, Europe, for example, has not experienced HIV to same extremes as Southern Africa, especially Botswana, hence there is very little or no literature referring to AIDS and social policy in the North, whereas this is the starting point for Botswana and much of Africa. These theories on welfare regimes do not explain adequately the variation between case studies because Southern Africa presents with specific social, economic and political experiences never experienced in the North, namely, colonial antecedents, AIDS orphans, and international pressure (global developmentalism).

Different sets of factors (Table 6.3) explain why the four identified CWRs vary (or are similar) across two dimensions: ‘coverage’ and ‘targeting form’. No one factor accounts for a CWR type instead a combination of factors leads to one type of CWR and a different combination leads to another. Table 6.3 summarises the most influential factors.

Table 6.3: Key explanatory factors to child welfare regimes

Country	Most influential factors	Regime type
South Africa	• Colonial antecedents (path dependency) • Domestic politics - strong domestic child sector CSOs; role of individuals (minister of social development) • Structural factors - unemployment	Pro-poor
Namibia	• Colonial antecedents (inherited from South African rule) • Domestic politics – one-party dominant system (lack of electoral competition); political elites/individuals within government (not) embracing proposals for reforms • International influence (UNICEF-supported poverty targeting)	Mixed (familial-poverty)
Botswana	• Colonial antecedents - poor relief • Structural factors (AIDS shock - changed family social dynamics) • Domestic politics - party ideology (conservative); electoral competition since 1994)	Familial
Zimbabwe	• Colonial antecedents – Public Assistance programme • Domestic politics - patronage politics (ruling party supported land reform and free agricultural inputs for rural farmers/voters); electoral competition since 2000	Agrarian

Source: Author

6.2.1 'Structural' factors

Identified structural factors have predicted the need for social grants in each of the four countries, to which the governments have responded variously. Since need has permeated all cases, it is not surprising that all four countries have social grants for families with children. Also, the fact that all four are concerned with addressing the effects of social change, primarily family breakdown and poverty whether at household or individual/child level, in some ways sheds light on their similarities.

Need determined the choice of the CWR in some cases while not in others. Also, different aspects of structural factors influenced reforms which varied between the countries, leading to different CWRs. AIDS provided a similar shock (AIDS orphans, high mortality of parents or

caregivers) in all four cases. AIDS was more important in reforms of the familial CWR in Botswana. The government of Botswana responded to the changes in family structure due to AIDS by extending its provision initially to orphans and their families (not orphans only), and later to other vulnerable children to support a familial CWR. AIDS became a political and valience issue in that the electorate expected the government to respond effectively. It is likely that poor families with children were affected most by the AIDS pandemic. The Botswana Democratic Party did not disappoint this poor constituency. It rolled out a nationwide response including specific provisions for orphans. This should have appealed to both rural and urban voters. This might explain the Botswana Democratic Party's electoral dominance, albeit the declining share of electoral vote and the enduring familial CWR. These findings are consistent with existing literature on the effect of the AIDS crisis on general social policy in Botswana and not in comparison with other countries in Southern Africa (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2012; Selolwane, 2012:127; Nthomang, 2007). Other scholars have also demonstrated the influence of AIDS in other countries both in Southern Africa and other regions (Handa *et al.,* 2015; Handa *et al.,* 2012; Granvik, 2015; Garcia & Moore, 2012:37; Webb, 2011; World Bank, 2009; Pelham, 2007; Budlender, Proudlock & Jamieson, 2008; Devereux *et al.,* 2005) without comparing their findings with Botswana. This study has examined the AIDS effect in Botswana, and three other countries, to argue that structural factors (especially AIDS) have combined with party ideology and electoral competition to explain familial reforms. In Botswana, the impetus to reform the CWR was driven by structural shocks, but timing and targeting (familial) reflect electoral competition and the Botswana Democratic Party's political ideology.

It is not clear whether AIDS was a factor in the pro-poor reforms to the CWR in South Africa. There seems to be no evidence to suggest that the Lund Commission's recommendations to reform the CSG were influenced by the AIDS shock. What is clear is that other structural factors were more crucial in South Africa, especially unemployment (Gumata & Ndou, 2017; Altman *et al.,* 2014; Yu, 2013a &b; Mlatsheni & Leibbrandt, 2011; Nattrass, 2002; Nattrass & Seekings, 2001). Existing literature on the politics of child grants in South Africa underestimates the effect of unemployment in the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa, possibly because children fall within the target group of economically inactive people (Tshoose, 2016:80). Poverty targeting in South Africa was primarily influenced by the need to address the devastating effects

of unemployment-related poverty. Thus, while Botswana focused on the AIDS crisis, South Africa grappled with unemployment. Even though these two cases chose different social policies to address the variant forms of structural factors (AIDS that caused family breakdown in Botswana, and unemployment as a result of poverty in South Africa), the targeting choice in both countries reflect other political influences, especially the need to secure political support and re-election by the respective ruling parties. While the ANC government was targeting poor families directly, possibly to gain electoral support from the poor caregivers (recipients of the grants) (as already discussed), the Botswana Democratic Party also used familial grants to secure votes from poor rural families targeted for the food baskets.

Similarly, AIDS might not have been a major factor in the enduring agrarian CWR in Zimbabwe. There was no deliberate targeting of AIDS-affected households for land reform, agricultural input schemes, food aid or the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme, as these programmes targeted poor families and were implemented along patronage lines. Also, there seems to be less motivation for government to reform the agrarian regime on the basis that families will provide for their children and other members through subsistence agriculture. On the other hand, structural factors such as family breakdown partly explain the mixed (primarily the familial component) CWR in Namibia that targeted 'broken' families but shed less insight on the adoption of poverty-targeting. Poverty-targeting in Namibia, as discussed later, reflects the influence of international organisations and agencies more than structural factors.

6.2.2 Colonial antecedents

Historical factors consider whether a country inherits social grants during transition to democracy and whether the new government institutes major reforms to the CWR. Studies have argued, correctly, that most of the social grants in these four Anglophone African cases are a legacy of the British colonial system (Surrender, 2013; Patel; 2011; Kaseke, 2011; Levine *et al.,* 2011; Seekings, 2017; Selolwane, 2012). Other scholars argue that colonial heritage is important in explaining adoption of social security programmes outside countries in the OECD-world (Schmitt, 2015). Although these researches have a bias towards general welfare regimes, inheritance is also an important factor in explaining similarities between the CWRs investigated in this study. Social grants, in all four cases, can be traced to colonial policies that targeted

families with children. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the four countries inherited one or another form of social grant at the time of independence. Most of the programmes inherited had an in-built poverty-targeting mechanism which did not target poor children explicitly. South Africa's inherited a State Maintenance Grant, Namibia inherited South Africa's system of grants, and Zimbabwe inherited a Public Assistance programme from the British at independence in 1980, to assist children in difficult circumstances. Botswana did not inherit any child grants at independence in 1966 but the destitute policy provided public assistance (poor relief) to families with children.

It is true that South Africa has a much longer and broader history of cash transfer programmes, while Botswana favoured in kind benefits but colonial history does not tell us much about why child support has diverged since the 1990s. History sheds no light on why Zimbabwe's new ZANU-PF government in 1980 abolished Old Age Pensions that had indirectly provided massive support to families with children in the other three countries. The past shared between the three might explain similarities (all having some kind of social grant for families with children), but not the differences that have emerged in the recent past. Pre-occupation with poverty-targeting is relatively recent, probably not dating as far back as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-supported Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and to United Nations-led Millennium Development Goals that sought to promote poverty-focused governments in developing countries in the late 1990s and 2000. The variation between the CWRs precedes these developments, as differences became apparent after the early 1990s when most countries in Southern Africa experienced unprecedented HIV prevalence rates and transitioned to democracy. Existing literature on the effect of colonial history overlooks this. As discussed later, other - factors especially domestic politics - seem more important.

6.2.3 International pressure (global developmentalism)

Despite UNICEF's 'global' presence, Namibia is the only case in the present study where international pressure (through UNICEF influence) became an important factor. UNICEF, represented by Hoelscher, significantly influenced the shift from familial to pro-poor targeting. This success, however, reflects other factors, notably domestic politics which will be discussed later. The case of Namibia provides new evidence regarding the effect of international agencies.

These findings support previous political economy research in Southern Africa, as well as Africa, at large, that demonstrates the influence of international organisations on OVC cash transfers (Wanyama & McCord, 2017; von Gliszczynski & Leisering, 2016; von Gliszczynski, 2015; Granvik, 2015). Other scholars have also shown the influence, in some cases negative, on general welfare regime cash transfers (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016; Grebe & Mubiru, 2014; Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Hickey *et al*., 2009; Devereux, 2010; Pruce & Hickey, 2017). Despite limited success in the other three cases, overlooked in existing theories (Beland, Morgan & Howard, 2015; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Wilesky, 1975; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Skocpol, 1995; van Oorschot, 2007), international organisations and agencies, in this case UNICEF, remain important in explaining variation between CWRs in Southern Africa. UNICEF influence portrays international organisations not only as donors but also purveyors of social protection ideas. Case studies in this thesis, consistent with political economy literature in the global South, extend Esping-Andersen's Power Resource Theory that emphasises the influence of political actors in shaping regime types but show the political power of actors previously overlooked in the North.

There is limited evidence to suggest that UNICEF was an important factor in reforming the pro-poor CWR in South Africa. In Botswana it was UNICEF that was influential in putting social protection for families with children on the agenda, and policy documents tended to incline towards donor preferences. For example, UNICEF was particularly instrumental in lobbying for a separate department of social protection which the Botswana government introduced in 2014. But the Botswana Democratic Party rejected proposals for a CSG-like child grant (Ellis *et al.,* 2011). This technical influence does not explain the reforms of the familial CWR, as it did not lead to actual reforms of the programmes. Similarly, the introduction and expansion of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer in Zimbabwe were UNICEF-driven. Despite UNICEF's financial and technical support, the ruling ZANU-PF party has not adopted the programme and has not expanded it. Even the successful introduction of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer itself was not as much about donor influence as it was about domestic politics (the open door policy of the Movement for Democratic Change-led ministry of social welfare) (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016). The impetus to introduce social transfers might come from donors (Devereux & White, 2010), in this case the UNICEF-funded Harmonised Social Cash Transfer, but the

motivation for expansion rests with political elites. The Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme case partially supports the view that donors use 'funding modalities to support the extension of social protection' (Barrientos *et al.,* 2010:5), but government failure to implement the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer nationwide disputes the claim. The failure reflects domestic politics (patronage).

Overall, limited success in other three cases in this thesis illustrates the limits of United Nations agencies and international donors in influencing reforms in the different CWRs. These findings concur with other studies that have demonstrated the significance or limitations of these organisations in social policy reforms but with a focus on general welfare regimes (Grebe, 2014, Hickey *et al.,* 2009; Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). The findings support the argument that the limited coverage of cash transfers reflects politics, specifically political elites' reluctance to accept social protection policies, as well as international organisations' failure to advocate successfully for adoption and expansion of cash transfers (Hickey, 2008; Hickey *et al.,* 2009; Cliffe, 2006).

These findings demonstrate that international organisations and United Nations agencies, like UNICEF, are political actors central in shaping child welfare regimes. The influence of these organisations and agencies is underestimated in the Western application of the Power Resource Theory in explaining variation in welfare regimes. Proponents of the Power Resource Theory do not even make reference to the influence of international organisations such as the World Bank (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999; Korpi, 1983). By contrast, this study, focusing on Southern Africa, identifies an influential group of political actors underestimated within the Power Resource Theory, as applied in industrialised capitalist democracies, but important in Africa.

6.2.4 Domestic politics

Factors discussed, thus far, have been important in explaining the variation between the CWRs, but they reflect domestic politics, especially party politics (party ideology, partisanship, electoral/political competition, change of governments and individuals within government). Two key aspects of domestic politics - party politics and the influence of domestic Civil Society

Organisations – were more important. Domestic politics, as discussed later, constrained the influence of international organisations. Political elites rejected proposals for reforms in all countries, except for Namibia, and partially in Zimbabwe. UNICEF's success in Namibia, too, reflects domestic politics. The electoral incentive for political elites, within SWAPO, to support the introduction of a poverty-targeted grant, as proposed by UNICEF, was the grant's potential to appeal to urban voters ahead of the 2015 elections.

These findings confirm the role of politics as espoused in the Power Resource Theory. The Power Resource Theory argues that the extent to which political elites 'incorporated or excluded organisations and political parties representing urban labour and the rural poor' in different contexts help explain divergences in welfare regimes (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008: 2). In other words, political elites use their power resource to shape policy. Political elites, as will be discussed later, were key in shaping child social provision in Southern Africa. The four distinct child welfare regimes in this study reflect the different policy choices undertaken by political elites.

6.2.4.1 Party politics

In all four cases, party politics combine with other factors to influence familial, pro-poor, mixed and agrarian reforms. In South Africa, as in all the other cases except for Zimbabwe, path dependence primarily explains inheritance of CWR programmes in 1994 but reveals very little about recent reforms, especially since 1998. Other factors have become more important. First, researchers agree that a strong child sector civil society was influential in advocating for reforms. Second, individuals mattered the most in CSG reforms (Seekings, 2016c). But the claimed success of Civil Society Organisations and individuals is not independent of the influence of party politics in final policy decisions to effect pro-poor reforms. Domestic politics, in the form of party politics, appear to be a more important factor.

Civil Society Organisations in South Africa utilised an opportunity presented by the power shift from the right to the left wing within the ANC (Proudlock, 2011) to campaign for the expansion of the CSG. Inspite of this, influence of Civil Society Organisations is limited to advocacy alone. Only the ANC could make the final policy decisions. The new populist Zuma dispensation that needed to be politically different from that of the Mbeki government was strategic in accepting

Civil Society Organisations' recommendations, as it was a way of 'rebranding' the party. Most importantly, Seekings (2016c) correctly claims that Skweyiya was an important individual, although Seekings does not relate this individual to the party he represented. As a minister, Skweyiya was a political appointee who represented his party, the ANC. In African politics ministers rarely act outside cabinet. The electorate would not only recognise him as an individual but would identify him with the ruling party. The CSG reforms associated with Skweyiya might have contributed to identification of the ANC with the grants than it had previously, possibly explaining the ANC's electoral dominance in the 2004 elections (ANC winning about 70% share of the vote) and subsequent elections, albeit declining.

Political ideology is another component of party politics that became important, especially in explaining the reforms in the familial CWR in Botswana. Although not as conservative as countries in continental Europe that rely on male breadwinners (Esping-Andersen, 1990), Botswana has had an enduring familial CWR, arguably dating back to independence. Successive Botswana Democratic Party presidents have resisted international pressure to shift to poverty-targeting and expand social transfers. This argument concurs with Ulriksen's (2017) claim that the ruling Botswana Democratic Party deliberately provides minimal transfers as a strategy to buy political support from the poor. Electoral competition, as discussed, compelled the Botswana Democratic Party to reconsider its ideology and rebrand itself by reforming *Ipelegeng* (Hamer, 2016a). Despite these changes, the CWR remained familialistic in reflecting the Botswana Democratic Party's ideology. None of the reforms in the other three cases is as strongly attributed to ideological factors as it is in Botswana.

Previous studies attribute the conservative general welfare regime in Botswana to structural (particularly drought and economic) and political (ideological and electoral competition) factors (Seekings, 2017:3; 2016a &b; Hamer, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017; 2011; Selolwane, 2012). Some scholars emphasise the importance of individual factors such as drought, politics, culture or interests of political elites (Seekings, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017; 2010; 2011; Mpedziswa & Ntseane, 2011). These factors, as discussed, explain the CWR partially. Ulriksen's (2017) contention that the Botswana Democratic Party has remained minimalist to secure political support from the rural poor, for instance, helps to explain why there is no general support for poor families with children. In her analysis of the re-branded *Ipelegeng*, Ulriksen, however, makes little reference to

the Botswana Democratic Party's programmatic reforms as a possible tool to win urban voters, since the programme has been extended to urban areas. Furthermore, reforms ensured indirect support for children in new participating families in urban areas. Previous studies have also underestimated some aspects of structural factors, specifically AIDS and the resultant social change, that explain best the reforms of the CWR in Botswana. This study emphasises the 'AIDS effect' on welfare reforms in Botswana. Individual factors may explain the general welfare regime but do so inadequately for the CWR. Instead, the combined three important factors, as already discussed, appear to explain the reforms of the familial CWR sufficiently. Comparatively, a combination of these factors is less useful in explaining the other three cases.

Patronage politics, rather than party ideology, largely explain the enduring agrarian CWR in Zimbabwe in contrast with the other cases. The ruling ZANU-PF engaged in land and farm input redistribution to support farming, especially subsistence agriculture for the rural population that forms its main political support base. Unlike SWAPO in Namibia which has always been confident of winning elections, ZANU-PF has used patronage, when under threat of losing elections to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, since the 2000s. In other words, as discussed later, reforms in the agrarian CWR have been consequential in thwarting political competition. Patronage may explain both ZANU-PF's continuing stay in power and the sustenance of the agrarian regime. Other scholars have attributed the enduring general agrarian welfare regime in Zimbabwe to the politics of patronage (Moyo, 2013; Scoones, 2014), without assessing its effect on the CWR in Zimbabwe and other countries. Comparatively, this study argues that partisan politics (combined with political competition) have been more influential in Zimbabwe, while not as strong in the other three CWRs.

Electoral competition (combined with structural factors) was another important factor in the reforms of the familial CWR in Botswana. Structural factors - health shocks in the form of AIDS - were an important factor, but the option to introduce an Orphan Care Programme targeted at AIDS-affected families also reflects elements of domestic politics in the form of electoral competition. Preceding the adoption of the Short-Term Plan of Action which ushered in the Orphan Care Programme, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party had faced its first strong election challenge in the 1994 elections. To regain waning political support lost to the opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change since 1994, the Botswana Democratic Party had to rebrand

itself through programmatic reforms, including the *Ipelegeng* public works programme (Hamer, 2016a), and expanding the 'destitute' benefits to vulnerable children other than orphans. Earlier, the Botswana Democratic Party had introduced an Old Age Pension in 1996 to secure political support from the rural poor (Ulriksen, 2017). Despite electoral competition, the continued familial regime reflects the Botswana Democratic Party's dominance, conservative ideology, a weak civil society and weak international influence. Electoral competition is predominant in explaining the reforms of the familial CWR, both for direct and indirect programmes that affect children's wellbeing.

Electoral competition (combined with patronage) is also of prime consideration in the reforms of the agrarian CWR in Zimbabwe. The ruling ZANU-PF, as with the Botswana Democratic Party in Botswana, faced strong opposition that threatened its dominance. The MDC gained much of the urban vote but also made significant progress in securing rural support in the 2000 elections. ZANU-PF, in response, sought to gain its rural support base through the land reform programme that resonated well with the poor rural voters, mainly the peasant farmers. It is likely that ZANU-PF used land reform as a political tool to consolidate political power and justify its dominance. Land reform, as discussed, would indirectly support families in providing for themselves. Children would benefit indirectly from both land and farm inputs distributed to households, possibly explaining the absence of cash transfer programmes which might target children, as in the other three cases. It appears that electoral competition intensified in the early 1990s and early 2000s in Botswana and Zimbabwe (1994 in Botswana and 2000 in Zimbabwe), urging the incumbent and dominant parties to employ substantial welfare policy reforms to secure political legitimacy. Thus, electoral competition (and patronage) was consequential in reforms of the agrarian CWR, in the same way that it was with the general agrarian welfare regime. This analysis of the CWR provides new evidence supporting the description and explanations of Zimbabwean welfare policies as agrarian and enduring, as well as explanations to ZANU-PF's dominance (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016; Britz & Tshuma, 2013; Moyo, 2013; Scoones, 2014).

By contrast, electoral competition had little influence in the reforms of the CWRs in the remaining two cases. In Namibia, for example, SWAPO might have introduced the Vulnerable Grant to gain political support from urban voters, but had no strong competition from the weak

opposition. This illustrates that ruling parties do not only make reforms when threatened to lose elections, but also merely to win elections even in the absence of strong opposition.

Individuals within government and civil society matter (whether for or against reforms) in explaining variation between the CWRs. In South Africa, the Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya, presided over the expansion of the CSG as he believed in its importance in reducing poverty (Seekings, 2016c:14). The former Namibian Prime Minister, Angula, belittled the importance of social protection to all families with children and did not support the expansion of Child Welfare Grants. Angula became an obstacle to the Child Welfare Grants reforms in Namibia's mixed CWR. In contrast with the ambivalence expressed by influential political elites like Angula, the role played by Hoelscher, a civil society/UN agency representative, was important in the major reforms in Namibia's mixed CWR. Hoelscher pushed substantially for poverty targeting, an important aspect of the mixed regime. In Zimbabwe, the influence of Mhishi was remarkable in the partial shift from being primarily an agrarian CWR to embracing the new wave of cash transfers during the Government of National Unity (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016). Individuals, therefore, made differences in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, but not in Botswana. The individuals' influence, however, was constrained by domestic political factors, particularly party politics.

6.2.4.2 Domestic Civil Society Organisations

The reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa are largely a 'product of domestic civil society activism' (Devereux & White, 2010:69) by comparison with the other three cases. South Africa is unique in that the Civil Society Organisations, especially the child sector Civil Society Organisations, have been well coordinated and particularly active in the policy-making process. Civil Society Organisations that criticised an orphan grant, effectively fighting narrow targeting, and pushed for the age and means test reforms of the CSG, include the Black Sash, Child Support Advocacy Group, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Alliance of Children's Entitlement to Social Security (ACESS) and the Children's Institute at the University of Cape Town. When the ANC-led government was concerned about 'affordability' at the time of designing the CSG, the Civil Society Organisations criticised and denounced the Lund Committee's recommendations as neo-liberal, and 'demanded substantial increases in public

spending' (Seekings, 2016c:6; 9). Findings in this study confirm earlier emphasis on the importance of Civil Society Organisations in child welfare reforms in South Africa (Lund, 2008; Proudlock, 2011; Seekings, 2016c). This study further shows that, as discussed, Civil Society Organisations' power to advocate successfully for pro-poor reforms also reflects domestic politics.

Furthermore, the analysis of Civil Society Organisations in existing literature in South Africa underestimates the support of external actors to these advocacy efforts, especially the role of UNICEF. UNICEF formed powerful alliances with domestic Civil Society Organisations to press for reforms. UNICEF might not have been particularly visible in South Africa, but its role (financial and technical) is recognised in the reports written by the Civil Society Organisations. The Children's Institute, for example, acknowledges financial support from UNICEF in most of its reports. Many studies that built evidence to resist the introduction of an orphan grant bear the UNICEF imprint. This demonstrates UNICEF's 'invisible' participation in advocating for pro-poor reforms, promoting the rights discourse and universalism. It is difficult to establish UNICEF's financial investment in these studies, but the number of publications suggests huge funding. Such funding might have been consequential in strengthening the more coordinated Civil Society Organisations in South Africa in ways that are not matched in other cases.

While the Power Resource Theory emphasised alliances between classes such as farmer organisations and the working class (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 2006), this study, consistent with previous researches (but focused on general welfare regimes in the global South), establishes the alliance between global and domestic actors. In Namibia, UNICEF representatives worked closely with bureaucrats while domestic Civil Society Organisations in South Africa appear to forge alliances with UNICEF. The poor and unemployed and peasants form large groups in Southern Africa but they appear to lack political power to influence policies in all four countries in this study. Instead, donors and domestic Civil Society Organisations appear to press for expansion of social cash transfers that also promote their poverty alleviation agenda. This is an important observation that shows challenges of applying the Power Resource Theory outside the global North. The observation also reveals the existence of important political actors underestimated in the North. Researchers need to pay particular attention to the role of these global actors to understand better differences in child social policies in the global South.

The power of Civil Society Organisations in South Africa, when compared with other cases, may also reflect additional factors. It is likely that, based on their professional background, key people involved in policy-making process, specifically the Lund Committee which advised the ANC on reforming the CSG, appreciated ideas and evidence from actors other than government. Seekings (2016c:5) reveals that 'academic and Non-Government Organisations experts' comprised the Lund Committee. These experts 'broadly concurred on the importance of public expenditure in providing a foundation for the alleviation of poverty', and hence were likely to support the Civil Society Organisations. Such a strong mix of Civil Society Organisations and 'government advisers' is non-existent in any of the other three countries. Furthermore, personal relationships between some Civil Society Organisations members and the powerful minister Skweyiya might have helped strengthen Civil Society Organisations' advocacy. Skweyiya was from Simon's Town in the Western Cape, the province that housed the key child sector Civil Society Organisations (IDASA, the Children's Institute, CASE and Black Sash). Although he had lived in exile for several decades before returning to South Africa in the early 1990s, he helped to set the Centre for Development Studies at the University of the Western Cape, where he would have had the opportunity to forge relationships with researchers and academics such as Deborah Budlender and Francie Lund. Although Skweyiya's ties with key figures in these organisations are not clear, it is likely that he could have 'collaborated' with these Civil Society Organisations leaders to press for the CSG reforms.

The other three cases are in sharp contrast with Civil Society Organisations in South Africa. Civil Society Organisations in these three countries are weak, and hence have next to no influence on CWRs reforms. There is no active child sector Civil Society Organisations as in South Africa, and the media and the church are silent on issues of social protection for children. In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF controls the media and civil society, dismissing the later as 'foreign-funded' (Dorman, 2016:2). Dorman argues that 'organized social groups, such as Non-Governmental Organisations, trade unions and churches' in Zimbabwe were important in pushing ZANU-PF to make economic and political reforms (2016:8), but these groups were ineffective in the reforms of the agrarian CWR. In Botswana, Trade Unions such as the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions write position papers on social policy without articulating child welfare issues. Literature suggests that, up to the 1990s, Botswana lacked powerful interest groups, hence the limited challenge to government social policies (Holm, Molutsi & Somalekae,

1996). According to Nthomang (Bangura, 2007), 'Botswana's unions are very weak and are not affiliated to any of the political parties. In addition, the government has prevented public sector employees from joining or forming unions.' This weak civil society, combined with the 'unorganised poor' (Selolwane, 2012:200), specifically the rural poor, appears to have persisted to the present.

Similarly, Civil Society Organisations in Namibia and Zimbabwe are silent and 'toothless' in advocating and lobbying for reforms of social grants including those for families with children. Namibia's umbrella civil society board, Namibia Non-Governmental Organisations Forum, has not been active since the 1990s due to lack of coordination and funds; and started to reconstitute itself only in 2015 when it initially received government and donor funding. When it reconstituted, its focus was on work-related social insurance programmes with very little push for social assistance, and none for social grants for children. In Zimbabwe, the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations represents the interests of civil society, but its influence is minimised by the political situation in the country where policy-making is dominated by the ruling ZANU-PF party, i.e. for the Government of National Unity period (2009-2013) when relations between the state and civil society were better, and allowed the voice of non-state actors. In effect, child grant reforms are less pronounced in any of the cases other than in South Africa. The Power Resource Theory does not mention domestic civil society organisations as important actors but the new insight in this study is that Civil Society Organisations are central in the politics of social protection reforms in the global South including in certain country case studies, as discussed, in this thesis.

Overall, domestic politics seem to be a cross-cutting factor that has influenced reforms in all of the CWRs. International organisations' power to influence CWR reforms, assuredly, were constrained by domestic politics. Proposals to reform the familial CWR in Botswana through the introduction of poverty-targeted grants did not succeed. Unlike in Namibia, where political elites embraced the poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant, in Botswana the World Bank's proposed Family Support Grant or Basic Income Grant and the UNICEF proposed 'Child Support Grant' were rejected by the conservative ruling Botswana Democratic Party. UNICEF, by funding most of the studies that were used by Civil Society Organisation to advocate for the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa, partially influenced child grants, although with limited success.

The ANC resisted the proposal for the universal CSG, preferring to expand access of the poverty-targeted CSG. Similarly, international pressure from UNICEF and other United Nations agencies and international organisations was insufficient to influence reforms of the agrarian regime in Zimbabwe. Despite UNICEF's funding of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme, the government of Zimbabwe did not expand the programme to support the proposed shift from an agrarian to a pro-poor CWR, which would have provided cash transfers to poor households in all districts. This failure provides further evidence to confirm the general observation in welfare policy literature (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016; Hickey *et al.,* 2009) that international organisations have failed to persuade some political elites to expand cash transfers. Ultimately, the choice for a CWR reflects more political than other influences.

The role of political elites in shaping policy in this study is consistent with the Power Resource Theory's emphasises that political elites would support reforms if they promote their interests. In this thesis child focused civil society organizations promoted reforms because they promoted the social protection interests of their constituency i.e. children's social protection rights. Similarly, political elites like politicians co-opted civil society organisations in policy-making, for example, in the case of South Africa during Zuma presidency when child reforms promoted their leftist ideology. In cases where political elites' interests diverged with those of United Nations agencies reforms did not happen. UNICEF's advocacy for a CSG-like child grant in Botswana or UNICEF's push for the adoption of cash transfers as the primary poverty reduction tool in Zimbabwe are good examples. The strength of this thesis is in underscoring the political elites-United Nations or international agencies power relations underestimated in the Western application of the Power Resource Theory.

6.2.5 Level of democracy

Another important factor which could contribute to explaining differences in coverage between the CWRs is the level of democracy. There appears to be a positive relationship between coverage and the level of democracy. South Africa, as discussed, has the highest level of democracy, Botswana is second, Namibia is third, and Zimbabwe is not even classified as a democracy but an anocracy. These democracy levels correspond to expansiveness of the CWRs. The highest percentage of children covered is in South Africa, followed by Botswana and

Namibia. The lowest number of children covered is in Zimbabwe. Of the four cases, countries with high levels of democracy are likely to have more redistributive CWRs. Research into the relationship between level of democracy and types of welfare regimes in Southern Africa is scarce. This analysis sheds light on one aspect (programmes coverage) of variation between CWRs and the level of democracy, taking into account other underlying factors, notably domestic politics.

6.3 Further research

This thesis aims to promote our thinking about characterising and explaining CWRs in the global South, particularly in Southern Africa. The researcher believes this to be the first scholarly attempt to document CWRs in the Southern African region, and possibly in Africa at large. A taxonomy of CWRs was constructed using four cases only. This thesis is, therefore, not exhaustive as it does not examine adequately the variance that could exist in different countries in West, East and North Africa; neither does the study consider all countries in Southern Africa. Further research would be likely to reveal new explanations due to the differences in political, religious, economic, historic and social experiences. Such comparisons have been beyond the scope of this research due to financial and time constraints. A more comprehensive study would require extensive time, financial and human resources beyond this thesis and the capacity of the researcher.

Furthermore, this study revealed that some CWRs in Francophone Africa had adopted a 'workerist' CWR model resembling those in France (and other industrialised democracies). Such a model is different from the CWRs discussed in this study, focusing on Anglophone Africa. It is anticipated that there is further substantial variation between CWRs within Francophone Africa alone. An opportunity exists to investigate whether explanations discussed in this thesis account fully for the variation between CWRs within Francophone Africa, and between Francophone Africa and Anglophone Africa. It is likely that CWRs in Francophone Africa might require a new set of explanations as a result of historical, political, socio-economic and cultural differences from those of Anglophone Africa.

Qualitative data collected through in-person interviews with purposively selected policy-makers helped the researcher to gain insight into valuable historical and current social policy reforms. The combination of in-depth interviews and document analysis provided adequate data for meaningful analysis in this thesis. Without time constraints, and notwithstanding the negligible value of full researcher participation in policy-making processes, including engagement in anthropological data collection instruments such as participant observation, comparative CWR research could benefit from such epistemology.

6.4 Conclusions

This thesis explored comparative variation between Child Welfare Regimes and the possible causes of variation in Southern Africa. In developing an alternative empirical operationalisation of child welfare regimes variation, the study concludes that states provide social grants for families with children in different ways. The major finding is that CWRs in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe all started as familial and minimalist, with state provision focused on orphans or children living in poor, single-mother households. But, since the 1990s, state provision has diverged across two dimensions: coverage (proportion of children reached, legal status and generosity of benefits) and targeting form. Targeting varies across two aspects: whether social grants are poverty-targeted or targeted on the basis of 'family breakdown'. In view of these two dimensions, a taxonomy of four distinct CWRs was constructed: a pro-poor in South Africa, a familial in Botswana, a mixed (familial-poverty) in Namibia, and an agrarian in Zimbabwe.

Building upon theories of welfare state development, this thesis argues that the different ways in which domestic politics respond to international pressure, structural factors and colonial antecedents largely account for the four different trajectories the countries assumed. Findings in this study suggest that the political economy narrative proves amazingly influential in making sense of differences between child welfare regimes. The overall argument advanced is that different combinations of factors explain the model in each country and the variation between them but that politics is a crucial determinant of the choice for a regime type. Ruling parties do not reform CWRs only when they are threatened to lose elections, but implement reforms to win elections even in the absence of strong political competition. The desire to secure political support by incumbent parties appear to be the primary driver of reforms across all the cases

under study, hence ruling parties in Southern Africa, as in Latin America (De la O, 2015; 2013), opt to introduce or reform cash transfer programmes in ways that favour the incumbent. Winning elections and political legitimacy are generally factors which motivate incumbent parties to reform social transfers for families with children, despite the lack of strong electoral competition, with or without structural challenges, international or Civil Society Organisations pressure. The South African and Namibian cases demonstrate the absence of electoral pressure, although reforms occurred. Comparatively, reforms in Botswana and Zimbabwe were responses to political competition. In both periods of political insecurity and security, reforms happened in all four cases because the incumbents needed to secure votes.

Various political actors (Civil Society Organisations, international agencies and donors, political elites, individuals) played different roles in shaping CWRs. Theoretically, therefore, the analysis in this thesis falls broadly within the Power Resource Theory. Power Resource Theory predominates in the global North where these actors were overlooked, leading to the conclusion that existing theoretical explanations to the causes of variation in CWRs do not account adequately for variation in provision of social grants for families with children in Southern Africa. This thesis has advanced the Power Resource Theory to Southern Africa, but identified new and important (although overlooked alternative) explanations within this theory. Whereas the Power Resource Theory emphasised the power resource of interest groups particularly linked to political mobilisation (Esping-Andersen, 1990), this thesis emphasised the power resource of a different set of interest groups, including domestic Civil Society Organisations, international organisations and agencies and bureaucrats. The power of certain ministries, such as Ministries of Finance relative to other ministries, was also important in this study although underestimated in the application of the Power Resource Theory in the West.

The Power Resource Theory emphasised coalitions between different actors i.e. political elites, the middle class, labour movements, social movements and farmer organisations, in welfare state expansion. Power coalitions are apparent in case studies in this thesis, albeit different actors because of the non-contributory nature of social protection. Except for political elites, actors identified by the Power Resource Theory in the global North, including some of actors identified in East Asia (Rudra, 2008) or Latin America (Huber & Stephens, 2012), were less important in welfare reforms related to social cash transfers for families with children in Southern Africa.

Instead, different actors – transnational actors (specifically UNICEF and ILO), domestic Civil Society Organisations, individuals within governments or Non-Governmental Organisations, the power of ministries relative to each other - are important, as discussed, in this study. Bureaucrats, for example, such as Sioka and directors in the Ministry of Gender and Child Welfare in Namibia, coalesced with UNICEF (representing United Nations agencies) or the ILO (representing international organizations) to advocate successfully for a poverty-targeted grant. While confirming broadly the relevance of coalitions espoused in the Power Resource Theory, as applied in Western cases, this thesis advances the theory to identify new actors - international organisations and United Nations agencies - that promote, actively, child social protection reforms in the global South. These findings are consistent with previous research that emphasise the importance of such actors in explaining variation between general welfare regimes (Brooks, 2015; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Hickey *et al*., 2018; Niño-Zarazúa *et al.,* 2012; Uriksen, 2010) and individual country welfare reforms of child grants (Seekings, 2017b).

This thesis is an attempt to answer the question faced by social policy comparativists (How and why social provision for families with children vary?) to make three important contributions to the fast-growing literature that examines the politics of cash transfers in Southern Africa and elsewhere. First, theoretically, the thesis has extended the Power Resource Theory to semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian societies. Findings in this study suggest that the Power Resource Theory remains valid in explaining variation between child welfare regimes beyond capitalist democracies in the North and more industrialising regions i.e. Latin America and East and South Asia in the global South. The different combinations of explanatory factors that appear central in the empirical cases provide new evidence and support existing theoretical explanations to variation in public policy. The study brings new perspectives by analysing how and why social provision varies for families with children which tend to be under-theorised.

Second, the study has generated new empirical evidence, providing detailed analysis of the political economy of evolution of child welfare regimes within and across four countries in Southern Africa, an under-researched region as far as child welfare regimes are concerned. The importance of political economy in understanding differences in child welfare reforms underscored in this investigation is consistent with previous researches that, however, focused on general welfare regimes. The focus on child welfare gives new perspectives on social provision

for families with children in the four case study countries. The study has shown that the choice of programmes, form of targeting and the reach of social transfers, within and across countries, is not determined by one factor but a combination of considerations. Furthermore, while governments appear to provide social cash transfers for families with children primarily to reduce child poverty, the policy decision on which category of children gets what form of social assistance (form of targeting) is not solely an outcome of the need to address child poverty. Other factors, specifically the perceived breakdown of families, are significant considerations. Ultimately, the reach (coverage) and targeting form of social cash transfers are outcomes of complex political processes in each country, hence the variation in child welfare regimes. The shift from familial targeting to poverty-targeting in all countries, albeit slow in some countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana perhaps because of weak political interests in favour of broad-based and generous child welfare policies, suggests the possibility of adoption of pro-poor child welfare regimes in future.

Third, this thesis appears to be the first major attempt to construct a taxonomy of child welfare regimes in Southern Africa. Despite the existence of substantial research on CWRs focusing on the global North, the taxonomy constructed in this study is important in widening our knowledge of the less understood field of regime types in Southern Africa. The four regime types identified in the taxonomy constructed present comparative social policy researchers with an opportunity for further interrogation into CWRs in Southern Africa and elsewhere. This is an important contribution to existing knowledge on empirical classification and alternative explanations to the constructed taxonomy from a Southern African perspective. The study has suggested two dimensions i.e. coverage and targeting form that are vital in constructing a taxonomy of child welfare regimes. The thesis has challenged previous research on taxonomies of CWRs to set up a future comparative research agenda in the global South. Given that the thesis used only four case studies to explore new possible determinants of CWRs variation, the extent to which the possible causes of variation analysed in this study may account for cross-national differences in the rest of Africa remains unknown. The potential value of this four-case comparative study is that the cases represent distinct regime types that could be found elsewhere; in other words if more African countries were to be considered, they would fit into these four regime types.

In addition, this thesis advances the comparative methodology that predominates the global North and primarily extended to general welfare regime researches in the global South. Despite extensive comparative social policy studies in the North and an increasingly new focus on general welfare regimes in the global South, comparative studies of child welfare regimes from a Southern Africa perspective remain sparse. This study is important in filling the limited comparative research gap in the fast-growing field of child social protection as well as contributing to the growing literature on comparative political economy of social cash transfers in industrialising societies.

Findings in this study have some theoretical implications to the broader understanding of differences in welfare states. The Power Resource Theory underscores the importance of political institutions as simple arenas for conflict among social classes or as useful political tools for the parties involved in this struggle. Political institutions, in this regard, lack independent explanatory power to explain variation in welfare states (Korpi, 2001). Findings in this research support this claim to show that political institutions, such as government ministries or domestic Civil Society Organisations, impact on, but hardly explain independently, the expansion of social provision for families with children. The power of ministries of finance relative to ministries responsible for social grants, as discussed, has an enduring effect on targeting and the reach of social cash transfers. The power of finance ministries is, however, constrained by political elites, for example. Findings in this study, thus, agree that political institutions are important and support earlier assertions (Korpi, 2001) that institutional factors lack independent power to explain differences in welfare regimes. None of the individual actors (within the Power Resource Theory) or individual factors could explain variation between the CWRs in this study, yet one combination of factors leads to one type of regime and a different combination of factors leads to a different CWR.

Whereas the Power Resource Theory affirms the importance of strong labour movements in welfare expansion in the global North (Korpi, 2001; Korpi & Palme, 2003), there seems to be no strong labour movements, such as trade unions, that advocate for the expansion of social assistance, particularly social cash transfers, in Southern Africa. This study accentuates that political institutions such as labour movements have limited power to promote the expansion of social grants for families with children in Southern Africa. Trade unions exist, for example,

Congress of South African Trade Unions in South Africa, Botswana Federation of Trade Union in Botswana, Zimbabwe Congress of trade Unions in Zimbabwe and the National Union of Namibian Workers in Namibia, but they primarily represent work-related social insurance programmes with limited interest in social cash transfers. This study does not rebut the Power Resources Theory but complements it by affirming, as in previous studies on general welfare regimes in the global South (Brooks, 2015; Hickey *et al*., 2018), that other political actors i.e. Civil Society Organisations (e.g. Black Sash in South Africa) and transnational actors (e.g. UNICEF in Namibia), rather than labour movements, are more important in shaping social policy in Africa. This study finds strong evidence to suggest that the effect of these political actors is mediated by domestic politics. Findings in this study, thus, advance the Power Resources Theory, as applied to general welfare regimes in the global South, but further challenge the theory's relevance in explaining variation in child welfare regimes in Southern Africa, specifically. Without disputing the Power Resources Theory, this research downplays the role of labour movements in the expansion of social grants for families with children. Instead, this thesis, provides new evidence to the limits of labour movements in influencing welfare reforms in the developing world, consistent with previous research (Rudra, 2015), while emphasising the explanatory power of domestic politics.

Previous researches in the global North assert the importance of the Power Resource Theory in understanding differences in welfare state development. The researches underscore the significance of working class mobilization in expansion of welfare programmes (Huber & Stephens, 2001). The Power Resource Theory, as discussed, emphasises the 'distributional struggles between competing interest groups', with a focus on 'the political power wielded by the major classes and the ensuing class conflicts and compromises characteristic of capitalist democracies' (Hickey *et al.*, 2018:5). The political power approach has been applied in the global South to understand differences in expansion of general welfare regimes, with limited focus on child welfare regimes. This thesis assesses the relevance of the Power Resource Theory in explaining variation between child welfare regimes in Southern Africa. Variation between child welfare regimes in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe does not reflect working class mobilisation but is traced to the historical and contemporary differences in political economy i.e. a variant of the Power Resources Theory. The emphasis on political economy in this study is consistent with previous general welfare regime studies in the global

South, specifically in East Asia, Latin America and Africa (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Hickey *et al.,* 2018; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Rudra, 2015). Findings in this thesis, therefore, contribute to the theoretical understanding of welfare regimes by extending the political economy to research on child welfare regimes in Southern Africa from a comparative perspective. The Power Resource Theory, however, cannot be applied to Africa without modifications because much of Africa is semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian. Ultimately, this thesis accentuates the relevance of political economy in explaining variation in reach and targeting form between child welfare regimes.

Appendix 6.1: List of Key informants

	Name	Institution	Designation
		BOTSWANA	
1	Olebile M Gaborone	Office of the President	Permanent Secretary Poverty Eradication
2	Dr Ernest N Makwaje	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning	Director Macroeconomic Policy
3	Gomotsanang Nchadi Manne	Mininstry of Local Government- Department of Social Protection	OVC Coordinator- Legislation and Policy Officer
4	Papadi Evelyn Nguvauva	Min of Local Government- Department of Social Protection	Commissioner of Social Benefits
5	Angelinah Montshiwa	Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS	Programmes Manager
6	Felistus Motimedi	Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS	Programmes Manager
7	Mpho Sebako	Ark and Mark Trust	Programme Officer
8	Tsepiso Sekopo	Ark and Mark Trust	Programme Officer
9	Paul SS Shumba	Independent	Former Advisor to President ; Consultant and Former Senior Management & Implementation Specialist and Team Leader, NACA
10	Dr Kesitegile Gobotswang	Botswana Congress Party	Vice President
11	Boyse Otlhomile	SOS Children's Villages	Programme Director
12	Dithapelo Keorapetse	Botswana Congress Party	Member of Parliament, Phikwe
13	Duma Gideon Boko	Social Democratic Botswana National Front & Umbrella for Democratic Change	President
14	Ndaba Goalathe	Umbrella for Democratic Change	Deputy President
15	Moeti Mohwasa	Umbrella for Democratic Change	spokesperson
16	Thusang Butale	Botswana Federation of Trade Unions	Secretary General

17	Dr Tebogo Bruce Sekela	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis	Executive director
18	Kaboyakgosi, Gape	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis	Senior Researcher
19	Prof Keitseope Nthomang	UB Social Work Department	HoD Social Work Department
20	Prof Rodreck Mupedziswa	UB Social Work Department	Senior Lecturer
ZIMBABWE			
21	Paurina Mpariwa	Parliament/ Movement for Democratic Change	Former Minister of Labour and Social Services
22	Lucia Matibenga	Parliament/ Movement for Democratic Change	Former Minister of Public Service
23	Ngoni Masoka	Government	A/Chief of Policy, Planning &PVO Administration MPSLSW
24	Togarepi Chinake	Government	Director Social Services (Family and Child Welfare) MPSLSW
25	Joyce Jiri	Government	Acting Deputy Director Vulnerable Groups Families & Social Protection Services MPSLSW
26	Agnes Mutowo	Government	Acting Deputy Director BEAM MPSLSW
27	Pamhidzayi Berejena Mhongera	Ministry of Labour and Social Services	Technical Advisor: Social Cash Transfers MPSLSW
28	Lovemore T Dumba	Ministry of Labour and Social Services	National NAP Coordinator MPSLSW
29	Laxon Chinhego	Government	A/Deputy Director of Policy, Planning & PVO Administration MPSLSW
30	David Coltart	Movement for Democratic Change	Former Minister of Education
31	Dr. Henry Madzorera	Movement for Democratic Change	Former Minister of Health
32	Gwati Gwati	Government	Policy Planning & Donor Cordination Officer MoHCC

33	Tendai Biti	Ministry of Labour and Social Services	Former Minister of Finance
34	Victor Makovere	Action Aid International	PRP Project Officer
35	Angeline Matereke	Save the Children	Technical Manager-Child Rights Governance
36	Leon Muwoni	UNICEF	Child Protection Specialist
37	Dr. Chrystelle Tsafack	UNICEF	Social Policy Specialist
38	Sam Coope	United Kingdom Department of International Development	Social Development Advisor
39	Herbert Matsikwa	World Food Programme	Programmes Manager
40	Sherita Manyika	World Food Programme	Programme Assistant
41	Constance Oka	Food and Agriculture Organisation	Livelihoods Officer
42	Ruth Wutete	World Bank	Public Information Assistant
43	Adonis Faifi	HelpAge Zimbabwe	Programs Manager
44	Dr. Cephas Zinhumwe	National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations	Chief Executive Officer
45	Leonard Mandishara	National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations	Programmes Director
46	Albert Jaure	World Vision International (Zimbabwe)	ADP Area Manager-Harare
47	Dr. Billy Mukamuri	Centre for Applied Social Sciences	Director
48	Prof Edwell Kaseke	Impact Research International	UNICEF Consultant
49	James Matiza	National Social Security Agency	Chief Executive Officer
50	Dr. Bernd Schubert	UNICEF	UNICEF Consultant
51	Dr. Prosper Chitambara	Labour & Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe	Development Economist
52	Naome Chakanya	Labour & Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe	Economist
53	Chido Mutambara	Mercy Corps	Programme M &E Coordinator
54	Richard Nyamanhindi	Mercy Corps	Programme Manager

55	Ophilia Zava	Government	Deputy Director, Infant Education
56	Amarakoon Bandara	UNDP	Economic Advisor
57	Charles Chingosho	Government	Director community Development MWGCD
58	Violet Mushandinga	Government	Programme Officer Vulnerable Groups
59	James Chawarika	Government	Senior Programme Administrator MWGCD
60	Sydney Mhishi	Government	Principal Director MPSLSW
61	Adolphus Chinomwe	ILO	Senior Programme Officer
62	Prof Sudhanshu Handa	UNICEF	UNICEF Consultant
63	Noma Nkomani	Deloitte	Managing Assistant
		NAMIBIA	
64	Helena Andjamba	MGECW	Director, Child Welfare Services
65	Iben Nashandi	Government	PS min of poverty; former deputy PS MoFinance
66	Evia Scihepo	Lifeline/Childline	Programme Manager
67	Nahas Angula	SWAPO	Former prime minister
68	France Kaudinge	SWAPO	Director of Admin
69	Melanie Tjituka Tjikusere	SWAPO	National Youth Council Committee member
70	Eric Luff	SWAPO	Special Advisor to the Presidents
71	Albert Biwa	Government	Acting Permanent Secretary MoPESW
72	Elma Dienda	DTA	Secretary general, MP
73	Benson Katjirijova	DTA	Youth League Secretary-General
74	Monalisa Mbakumua	UNICEF	Prog officer-Child & Social

	Zatjirua		Protection
75	Julia Shipena	Red Cross	OVC Programme Manager
76	Fabian S Mubiana	UNDP	National Poverty Reduction Advisor &M&E Focal Point Learning Manager
77	Mahongora Kavihuha	Trade Union Congress of Namibia	Secretary General
78	Dr. Michael Akuupa	Labour Resource and Research Institute	Director
79	Laura Cronje	Church Alliance for Orphans	Director
80	Herbert Jauch	Co-author of Basic Income Grant Reports/ Metal & Allied Namibian Workers Union	Labour Specialist/ Education Coordinator
81	Ivin Lombardt	Namibian Association of Non-Governmental Organisations Forum	Director
82	Toni Hancox	Legal Assistance Centre	Director
83	Dirk Haarman	Basic Income Grant Coalition	Basic Income Grant Secretariat
84	Agnes Mukubonda	Government	Programme Manager, School Feeding Programme, Min of Educ, Arts &Culture
85	John Muniaro	Trade Union	Secretary General NUNW
86	Letisia Alfeus	INGO	Programme Manager UNFPA
87	Gerson Uaripi Tjihenuna	Academic	former Cabinet Under Secretary: Policy Analysis & Coordination
88	Heiner Naumann	NGO	Resident representative
89	Dr Blessing Chiripanhura	UNAM	Researcher/Lecturer
90	Petra Hoelscher	UNICEF	former Chief of Social Policy (2010-4)
91	Brigitte Nshimyimana	MGECW	Chief Social Worker/ M&E

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