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The Democratic Impact of Traditional Cultural Values in Africa and Asia: The Cases of South Korea and South Africa

Introduction

Traditional cultural values have long been seen by scholars as a significant obstacle to political and economic development in the post colonial world, especially in Africa and Asia. Publics which prioritise things like the collective good of the family and community over procedure and individual rights, grant uncritical respect to authority and social hierarchy, and identify themselves primarily as members of sub-national kinship groups rather than modern nation-states, are said to be particularly inhospitable places for representative democracies and market economies to take root.

The theory of political culture argues that these traditional values result from long standing norms, orientations and values embedded in ethnic cultures and transmitted to succeeding generations through socialisation. They are expected to shape how individuals in those countries subsequently think, prefer and act, and thus have important influences on, among other things, a country's choice of economic and political regime (for example, Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1997; and Inglehart, 1988). Modernisation theorists accepted these premises and advocated policies that would bring about things like rapid urbanisation, industrialisation, increases in formal education, and growth of middle classes that would, among other things, either change individual values over the course of a lifetime, or produce new generations with less traditional and more modern outlooks on life, economics and politics.

Until recently, however, such theses have been hard to test in any systematic way because they require cross-national data about individual and collective value structures in the developing world. Beginning in the 1990s, however, cross-national survey projects have emerged that focus on the processes of political and economic reform in the developing world, including the Latinobarometro, the Afrobarometer, the New Europe Barometer, and, most recently, the East Asia Barometer. The findings of these surveys have enabled important cross-national comparisons within continents (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Dalton and Ong,

2004; Shin and Chu, 2005; Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).[1] While the Barometer projects have been working toward greater standardisation of question items, problems of data comparability and data availability have thus far precluded extensive cross-continental analysis (but see Rose, *et. al*, 2005).

In this paper, we take a tentative first step towards such broad-based comparison using data from one country from the East Asia Barometer (South Korea, 2003) and one from the Afrobarometer (South Africa, 2002) to address the following questions. To what degree have each of these projects developed reliable and valid measures of traditional values specific to their respective cultures? How widely are these values held across these mass publics? And to what extent do traditional values really preclude the development of public support for democracy?

To date, these questions have rarely been examined in a systematic manner using empirical data, and the results from a couple of recent studies that analyse Asian data find are mixed. We extend these analyses by, most obviously, drawing African data into the analysis, but also by pursuing different strategies for developing composite measures of both traditional values and attitudes to democracy. In addition, we also compare the impact of traditional values on attitudes to democracy with the effects of other theoretically derived factors such as institutional influences, performance evaluations, cognitive awareness, and social structure.

Comparing South Africa and South Korea?

To be frank, part of this study is motivated by the unique presence of African and Asian data available to the respective co-authors. But are South Africa and South Korea the best places to test arguments about traditional values and democracy? Both were once characterised by extensive agrarian production and traditional culture. Both were once occupied and colonised by foreign powers. But both went through relatively rapid transitions to at least partially industrialised economies in the mid 20th century, with South Africa enjoying rapid economic growth that was both state- and market-driven in the 1960s, and South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus both are now the most developed countries on their respective (mainland) continents. At the same time, both countries are widely seen as the most successful examples of "Third Wave" democratisation in Africa and Asia.

If modernisation theory is correct, their relatively advanced level of development would mean that citizens in both countries are less likely to possess traditional values than their less developed neighbours. Yet precisely

because these publics might be more evenly divided between traditional and modern value positions than their less developed neighbours, they might offer particularly useful places to test for the supposed differences between traditionalists and modernists in terms of attitudes about democracy.

Indeed, both countries seem to be experiencing similar problems with their new democracies. While both receive Freedom House ratings that enable them to be classified as "liberal democracies," neither can yet be characterised as consolidated (Im, 2004; Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Both societies exhibit heavily cleaved electoral systems in which deep social cleavages are manifested in politicised voting behaviour, by region in South Korea, and by race in South Africa. Both also have under-developed party systems. In South Korea's case, parties are personal vehicles of presidential candidates, while in South Africa, opposition parties have few resources and are unable to project themselves as credible national projects. Official corruption is a major issue in both countries, including right up to high executive offices (for example, the personal confidante and financier of South Africa's Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, is currently on trial for, among other things, arranging a bribe from a French arms manufacturer to Zuma). In 2002, South Korea ranked as the 40th most corrupt country, and South Africa as 36th, in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. And both countries have been characterised as "delegative democracies," with presidents who prefer to centralize as much decision-making authority as possible in the executive branch, while marginalising political parties and legislatures, in effect acting as though all power had been delegated to them through the election (Im, 2004; Croissant, 2004; Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

Conceptualising and Measuring Asian Values

In the Asian context, traditional values have usually been referred to as "Asian" values. Yet as Park and Shin (2004) point out, the religious diversity of Asia means that when most analysts speak about Asian values, they really mean Confucian values.

In contrast to Western culture, which sees society ultimately as an aggregation of rights-bearing individuals, traditional Asian value structures proceed from the premise of an organic society in which all individuals are inherently and fundamentally inter-connected (Marsella, De Vos and Hsu, 1985; Fiske, *et al.*, 1998). The interests of the group or community take primacy over those of the individual. More than rights, individuals first carry duties and obligations toward the family, elders and other social leaders and they are expected to respect social hierarchies. Individual behaviour ought to be guided by the

perceived virtues of maintaining harmonious relations with others, hard work, thrift and education. Leaders gain legitimacy by virtue of their position in the social hierarchy, rather than their individual qualities. In turn, paternalistic leaders (in both the family and the state) will look out for the best interests of society (Pye, 1985; Scalapino, 1989; Lau and Kuan, 1988; Yang, 1988; Rozman, 1991; Huntington, 1996; Dalton and Ong, 2004; Park and Shin, 2004).

Scholars have argued that such values may compete with or preclude the development of other values that are often seen to be necessary in a democratic society, such as individualism, tolerance of dissent, and interpersonal trust (Pye, 1985; Fukuyama, 1995). Or, more minimally, people who value such things may be less likely to prefer democracy as a political regime. Indeed, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew is only the latest Asian autocrat to rationalise authoritarian government with such cultural logic (Zakaria, 1994).

But, as noted above, these arguments – both that these societies exhibit the traditional values described, and that they have a negative impact on democratisation – have rarely been put to systematic empirical test. Two initial probes have turned up mixed results. Using data from the 1995-1998 and 2000-2002 World Values Surveys in seven East Asian countries (South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore), Dalton and Ong (2004) developed indices of authority orientations toward the family and other elements of society.[2] They found wide variation in overall agreement with some items amongst these seven countries. They also found that aggregate agreement with some orientations in Asia were no different from those for four "control" Pacific-rim western democracies (the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Most importantly, they found extremely weak and often insignificant relationships within each country between respondents' authority orientations and their positions on a "democratic regime index."[3] Indeed, they found generally stronger, though at best modest, relationships amongst the western countries.

The second attempt comes from an analysis of South Korean data generated by the East Asia Barometer, a project that sees one of its main goals as "examin[ing] the extent to which traditional values inherited by East Asian societies constrain the acquisition of democratic values and shape the patterns of civic attitudes" (Chu, 2003). Park and Shin (2004) lay out what they regard to be four important dimensions of Asian social values (social hierarchy, social harmony, group primacy and anti-pluralism) and three dimensions of Asian political values (family-state, moral state, anti-adversarial politics[4]). They then identify two question items that they believe tap each item and form a construct measure of each. Correlating each value construct with separate indices of Democratic Support[5] and Authoritarian Rejection,[6] they found weak relationships between both social and political values and Democratic Support,

but modest relationships between some social values and all political values and Authoritarian Rejection. When taken together, these social and political values explained less than 2 percent of the variance in Democratic Support, but 11 percent of the variance in Authoritarian Rejection.

Taking note of Park and Shin's conceptual framework of seven separate social and political values, we wanted to test whether it was possible to develop a smaller, more parsimonious number of broader value dimensions. And since ordinary respondents often hear different things when asked a set of questions than what might have been intended by the survey designer, we also tested whether popular responses to these items actually fell into the patterns anticipated by the Park and Shin framework.

Using Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis, we find that it is possible to build broader constructs of social values. Rather than the seven two-item value constructs employed by Park and Shin, we identify four broad value indices that we interpret as measuring: 1) Respect for Authority; 2) Accommodation / Communalism; 3) Emphasis on Social Harmony; and 4) Respect for Family / Elders. In addition, four other individual items in the East Asia Barometer that tap potentially important aspects of traditional values fail to correlate sufficiently with any of the four indices, or with each other, and thus are retained as single-item indicators. On their face, we interpret these to measure: 1) Patriarchy; 2) Fatalism; 3) Educational Elitism; and 4) Interpersonal Trust (the traditional response would actually be distrust).

While the eight question items displayed in Table 1, part 1.1, obtain sufficiently similar patterns of responses to allow us to treat them as a measure of a single underlying value dimension that we interpret as Respect for Authority, the item results also demonstrate that the average (median) South Korean "disagrees" with all but one item. The only exception is on the issue of whether leaders with majority support should disregard the views of the minority, a question on which South Koreans are evenly divided (50 percent agree, 50 percent disagree). In general, between 20 and 40 percent "agree" with the traditionalist position, and at most 5 percent "strongly agree." Thus, even *if* it was once accurate to characterise South Koreans as acquiescent to political authority, it is no longer so.

Table 1: Traditional Asian Values (South Korea)

1.1 Respect for Authority (Index)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing	Mean (0-4)	Std. Deviation	Factor Loading
The most important things for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore established procedure (q145)	25	52	22	1	<1	0.98	0.72	.636
The government should maintain ownership of major state-owned enterprises (q140)	15	45	36	4	0	1.30	0.77	.513
The national government should have more authority over local decisions than it does now (q141)	19	54	24	3	0	1.11	0.74	.510
When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is OK for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation (q125)	27	50	22	1	0	0.97	0.73	.475
When judges decide important cases, they should accept the views of the executive branch (q136)	22	47	29	2	0	1.11	0.77	.436
As long as a political leader enjoys majority support, he should implement his own agenda and disregard the view of the minority (q148)	11	39	46	4	<1	1.44	0.74	.402
If a political leader really believes in his position, he should refuse to compromise regardless of how many people disagree (q146)	18	50	28	3	<1	1.17	0.75	.393
If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things (q137).	12	42	41	5	<1	1.40	0.75	.330

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.77) which explains 31.5 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .68) is acceptable (n=1493).

1.2 Deference / Accommodation (Index)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing	Mean (0-4)	Std. Deviation	Factor Loading
For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second (q69)	5	25	55	15	<1	1.80	0.74	.571
A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him (q68)	6	32	53	8	<1	1.63	0.73	.535
When one has a conflict with a neighbour, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person (q66)	5	23	55	16	<1	1.82	0.76	.528
If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything (q138)	7	30	47	16	<1	1.72	0.82S	.453

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.82) which explains 45.4 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .60) is acceptable (n=1491).

1.3 Emphasis on Social Harmony (Index)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing	Mean (0-4)	Std. Deviation	Factor Loading
If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic (q139)	13	40	42		<1	1.40	0.78	.517
The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society (q134)	15	45	36	6	<1	1.29	0.76	.458
Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize into lots of groups (q135)	15	50	32	4	<1	1.23	0.74	.417
Government leaders are like the head of a family, we should follow all their decisions (q133)	13	40	42	3	<1	1.40	0.78	.413
For the sake of the national community / society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice his personal interests (q143)	8	37	49	6	<1	1.53	0.74	.369

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.76) which explains 35.3 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .54) is below normal minimal criteria for acceptability (n=1496).

1.4 Respect for Family / Elders (Index)

	Strongly Disagree	*Disagree*	*Agree*	*Strongly Agree*	*Missing*	*Mean (0-4)*	*Std. Deviation*	*Factor Loading*
Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask (q64)	14	38	40	8	<1	1.41	0.83	.615
If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute (q71)	11	44	39	5	<1	1.38	0.76	.497
When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives (q65)	27	46	23	3	<1	1.02	0.79	.428

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.52) which explains 50.8 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .54) is below normal minimal criteria for acceptability (n=1494).

1.5 Individual Items

		Strongly Disagree	*Disagree*	*Agree*	*Strongly Agree*	*Missing*
Patriarchy	A man will lose face if he works under a female supervisor (q70)	25	49	23	4	<1
Fatalism	Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate (q67)	26	45	25	4	<1
Educational Elitism	People with little or no education should have as much or now say in politics as highly educated people (q132)	19	54	21	7	<1

		One Cannot Be Too Careful	*Most People Can Be Trusted*	*Missing data*
Interpersonal Trust	Generally speaking, would you say that "Most people can be trusted" or "you can't be too careful in dealing with them"? (q24)	61	39	<1

And the average South Korean disagrees with most statements relating to political and individual steps to maintain societal harmony that come at the expense of the individual, and with a series of statements about traditional respect for family and elders. Majorities also reject the individual (non-indexed) statements that men lose face by working for women (Patriarchy), that wealth and poverty are determined by fate (Fatalism), and that the better educated should have more say politically (Educational Elitism). Only on the scale measuring Accommodation / Communalism do we find that the median South Korean respondent "agrees" that people should acquiesce to others socially, though healthy minorities disagree.

Conceptualising and Measuring African Values

Four developments are widely seen as formative and dominant influences on the values that characterise African cultures. First, until relatively recently, Africans have traditionally lived in small-scale villages. Second, again, until relatively recently, Africans have governed themselves through a usually patriarchal system of largely hereditary, unelected traditional leaders that, at the same time, reputedly featured significant amounts of inclusive participation in village council discussions. Third, political rule was rarely exercised on the scale of the modern state, often extending only to the boundaries of the village, and beyond that only indirectly in loose confederation with other villages sharing tribal, clan or linguistic similarities. Fourth, Africa's modern political topography often bears little resemblance to the continent's ethnic or tribal makeup as colonial mapmakers divided and recombined Africa's homogenous agrarian and herding communities into heterogeneous national societies.

The small scale nature of village life has meant that Africans, like Asians, begin from the premise of a society in which all people are interconnected in some way. And, again echoing Asian traditional values, Africans tend to emphasise the communal good over individual destiny as communicated through the concept of *ubuntu*, which is interpreted to mean "I am human only through others" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubuntu). The relatively recent and often still limited influences of industrialisation and the modern nation-state have led many to conclude that Africans continue to identify themselves according to where they live or the kinship group to which they belong, rather than by what they do or the broader polity in which they have been incorporated by colonial mapmakers. And such kinship identities have been broadly seen to be so strong as to resist post-independence leaders' attempts to construct new overarching identities.

These values are seen to conflict with the values necessary for a democratic society in several ways. First, the emphasis on communal good means that producing just outcomes, even if it requires the use of violence, may be valued more than procedure and rule of law. Second, the emphasis on the communal good and the history of traditional rule is said to lead people to think and act as clients dependant on patrimonial relations, and later on neo-patrimonial "big men," to provide for their welfare (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) or as passive, deferential subjects of external forces rather than as agents, or democratic citizens, with some degree of control over their lives or the wider polity (Chazan, 1993; Mamdani, 1996; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000). Third, the patriarchal nature of many African polities means that women are often seen as inferior and unequal. Fourth, the emphasis on consensus may breed intolerance of dissent (Owusu, 1992). Fifth, people with strong group-based identities may be more likely to develop antipathies to "others" and less likely to accept a democracy that necessarily includes competing groups (Gibson and Gouws, 2003). And last, because democracy presumes at least some prior agreement on the identity of the political community that is to govern itself (Rustow, 1970), the lack of national identity may deny young democracies of necessary "political glue," turning every element of political contestation into a zero-sum, group-based conflict (Connor, 1987; Horowitz, 1985).

Table 2: Traditional African Values (South Africa)

2.1 Communitarian Values (Index)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing	Mean (0-3)	Std. Deviation	Factor Loading
Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so. [1] (q67)	51	34	1	4	(5)	0.68	.822	.575
If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would find a way to take revenge yourself. [2] (q75)	44	45	7	5	(5)	0.73	.785	.542
A married man has a right to beat his wife and children if they misbehave. [3] (q74)	65	27	5	4	(5)	0.47	.747	.518
In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause. [4] (q76)	37	46	11	6	(12)	0.85	.827	.464
Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community. [5] (q69)	51	35	10	4	(9)	0.47	.747	.372
It is better to have wealthy people as leaders because they can help provide for the community. [6] (q68)	37	44	12	7	(7)	0.90	.876	.344
In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority. [7] (q65)	36	38	20	6	(9)	0.96	.889	.282

These questions were posed as the choice between two statements. The "communitarian" statement is shown in the table, while the contrasting statements are shown below.

Thus, the responses recorded in the table as "Disagree" and "Strongly disagree" were actually those who agreed or strongly agreed with the opposing statements below.

[1] In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.

[2] If you were the victim of a violent crime you would turn for help to the police.

[3] No-one has the right to use physical violence against anyone else.

[4] The use of violence is never justified in South African politics.

[5] Since everyone is equal under the law, leaders should not favour their own family or group.

[6] It is better to have ordinary people as leaders because they understand our needs

[7] As citizens, we should be more active in questioning they actions of our leaders.

Factor Analysis extracted two rotated factors, the first (Eigenvalue = 2.12) explains 30.3 percent of the common variance.

Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .62) is acceptable (n=1722).

2.2 Personal National Identity (Index)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither/ Don't Know	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing Values	Mean	Std. Deviation	Factor Loading
You would want your children to think of themselves as South African	2	3	8	45	43	(1)	3.23	.863	.904
It makes you proud to be called a South African	2	4	6	48	40	(1)	3.22	.845	.882
Being South African is a very important part of how you see yourself.	2	4	11	44	40	(1)	3.17	.867	.852

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.53) which explains 85.7 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .92) is very high (n=2019).

2.3 Inclusive National Identity (Index)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither/ Don't Know	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing Values	Mean	Std. Deviation	Factor Loading
It is <u>desirable</u> to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country.	2	4	13	45	37	(1)	3.11	.893	.849
It is <u>possible</u> to create such a united South African nation	3	5	14	45	33	(1)	3.02	.954	.646
People should realise we are South Africans first, and stop thinking of themselves in terms of the group they belong to	2	5	11	44	38	(1)	3.10	.932	.656

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.12) which explains 70.7 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .79) is high (n=2019).

2.4 Individual Items

		Traditional	Modern	Missing
Traditional Identities	Besides being a _____, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?	41	59	(2)

Question introduced with: "We have spoken to many South Africans and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, religion or gender and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer."

Responses are coded as "traditional" if respondents express racial, ethnic, religious, regional or age identities. Responses are coded as "modern" if they cite occupation, class, country, political party, or individual identities.

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing
Social Harmony	We should avoid large differences between the rich and the poor because they create jealousy and conflict [1] (q63)	12	26	33	29	(12)
Paternalism	People are like children, the government should take care of them like a parent [2] (q70)	14	24	26	21	914)
Dependency	The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people [3] (q61)	23	30	25	22	(7)
Consensualism	In order to make decision in our community, we should talk until everybody agrees [4] (q64)	20	30	29	21	(10)
Educational Elitism	Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders [5] (q66)	39	41	12	9	(15)
Community Interest	Each person should put the well being of the community ahead of their own interests [6] (q62)	22	42	26	11	(7)

These questions were posed as the choice between two statements. The statement of traditional values is shown in the table, while the contrasting statements are shown below. Thus, the responses recorded in the table as "Disagree" and "Strongly disagree" were actually those who agreed or strongly agreed with the opposing statements below.

[1] It is alright to have large differences of wealth because those who work hard deserve to be rewarded.

[2] Government is an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the government.

[3] People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life.

[4] Since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion within our community

[5] All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election

[6] Everybody should be able to be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals

We identified a range of question items from the Round 2 South Africa Afrobarometer questionnaire that appear to tap orientations to the role of authority, responsibility for providing welfare, community versus individual interest, violence, interpersonal trust, social identity, national identity and gender. Because such cultural values are reputed to be embedded in traditional society and passed down from generation to generation, we excluded white Afrikaans and English speaking respondents from our analysis. However, along with respondents who speak African languages we decided to include Coloured respondents (who either trace their roots to the Khoi-Khoi and San tribes of southern Africa or to the traditional societies of 17th and 18th century Indonesia and Malaysia) and Indian respondents (who trace their lineage to the 19th century traditional societies of South Central Asia).

We find that South Africans' responses to a large number of these items cohere sufficiently to create one general index of what we interpret to measure Communitarian Values (which combines measures of the role of women, violence, clientelism and authority). We also find that South Africans' answers to a set of items on national identity fall into two distinct, though related, coherent patterns. We interpret the first to measure a sense of Personal National Identity and the second to measure a sense of an Inclusive National Identity (in the African context, the opposite end of both these indices would constitute the purportedly traditional value, but we can think of no concise term adequate to characterise the opposite of both of these concepts). Seven other items either fail to correlate with any of these indices sufficiently or amongst each other, but are retained as potential single item indicators. On their face, we interpret them as measures of: 1) Traditional Social Identities; 2) Social Harmony; 3) Paternalism; 4) Subject Reliance on the State; 5) Consensualism; 6) Educational Elitism; and 7) Community Interest.

If Koreans tend to "disagree" with much of what are said to be core Asian values, the average black (African, Coloured and Indian) South African "disagrees" with all, and "strongly disagrees" with several items on the Communitarian scale. Black South Africans also exhibit extremely high levels of both Personal and Inclusive National Identity. There are a few items, however, on which most South Africans adopt a more classically traditionalist viewpoint. The median respondent "agrees" that it is important to minimise inequalities in wealth in order to avoid jealousy and conflict, that government should take care of people like a parent, and that debate should be extended to induce consensus rather than accepting differences of opinion. Yet the average respondent disagrees with putting the community interest ahead of the individual interest and does not think that government should bear the main responsibility for providing welfare.

Linking Cultural Values and Popular Demand for Democracy

While the comparative study of popular attitudes to democracy has taken significant strides over the past decade, important debates about what to measure and how to measure it still exemplify the discipline, albeit implicitly. One tradition has focused on measuring the degree to which people hold a range of democratic values (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). A separate tradition has concentrated on measuring popular support for democracy, but has disagreed on the appropriate indicators. In the World Values Survey, popular support for democracy is measured by agreement or disagreement with a series of positive and negative statements about democracy. Other have chosen to force respondents to make choices between democracy and its alternatives (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Lagos, 2001) or to ask people about a series of non-democratic regimes with which they may have some experience (Rose, *et al.*, 1998). Yet others prefer to eschew the word "democracy" altogether, but rather assess people's attitudes by asking whether they agree or disagree with statements about a range of democratic processes identified by the scholar as essential to democracy (Gibson, 1996).

In this paper, we adopt a different approach. Following Bratton, *et al.*'s (2004) demand and supply model of democratic consolidation, we measure two separate sets of democratic attitudes. The first is premised on Linz and Stepan's (1996) view of democratic consolidation as legitimation, that is, when democracy comes to be viewed as "the only game in town." We measure this with a scale that combines Richard Rose's measures of rejection of authoritarianism with the Linz and Stepan item on preference for democracy against its alternatives. We premise our measures of the second set of attitudes on the institutional view of democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1996; Hadenius, 2001; Grindle, 2000, Fukuyama, 2005). But rather than using expert assessments of institutional delivery, we ask respondents whether they think their political institutions are actually delivering democracy. Fortunately, the East Asia and Afrobarometer surveys contain nearly identical items that allow us to construct almost identical dependent variables (the measures of demand for democracy are identical, but there are some differences in the measurement of supply).

Bratton, *et al.* (2004) argue that young democracies become consolidated – meaning there is little or no chance of breakdown or regression (Schedler, 2001) – when relatively high proportions of citizens continue, over several different measurements, to both demand democracy and to feel that their new political

institutions are actually delivering it. To what extent do South Koreans and South Africans demand democracy, and do they feel that it is being supplied by their regime?

Between eight and nine out of every ten South Koreans disagree or strongly disagree with proposals to replace their current system of multiparty elections with presidential dictatorship, military rule or one party rule. These figures have held steady since at least 1997. Yet just 49 percent say that "democracy is always preferable" to an authoritarian regime, which represents a new low point, down considerably from the 70 percent who said so in 1996.

Figure 1: Demand for Democracy over Time, South Korea

To measure South Koreans' perceptions of the institutional supply of democracy, the 2003 East Asia Barometer presented respondents with a 10 point scale, with endpoints of complete dictatorship (1) and complete democracy (10), and asked them to place South Korea according to its current level of democracy. When asked in this way, 82 percent placed South Korea as more democratic than undemocratic (a score of 6 or above), and 20 percent rated it as highly democratic (between 8 and 10). In the other question that makes up the Supply Index, 60 percent said they were satisfied with the way democracy was currently working in South Korea, though just 1 percent said they were "very satisfied."

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Figure 2: Supply of Democracy over Time, South Korea

In 2002, between 90 and 75 percent of black South Africans rejected various authoritarian alternatives to multiparty elections, and 59 percent said that democracy was preferable to any other system of government. One half (50 percent) told interviewers that South Africa was either a "full democracy" or a "democracy with minor problems," and just 46 percent said that they were "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the way democracy was working in the country.

Figure 3: Demand for Democracy over Time, South Africa

Legend:
— ▲ — Democracy Preferable
— ◇ — Reject Strong Man Rule
— ■ — Reject Military Rule
— ○ — Reject 1 Party Rule
— + — Reject Return to Apartheid
— ● — Reject All 3 + Prefer Democracy

Figure 4: Supply of Democracy over Time, South Africa

Legend:
— ▲ — Satisfied With Way Democracy Works
— ◆ — Full Democracy / Minor Problems
— ■ — Election Free & Fair / Minor Problems

Table 3: Attitudes Toward Democracy, South Korea

Commitment to Democracy (Index)

	Agree or Strongly Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Mean (0-2)	Std. Deviation	Factor Loadings
We should get rid of parliament and have a strong leader decide things	16	44	41	1.12	0.71	.632
The military should come into govern the country	13	46	41	1.27	0.68	.621
No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power	10	41	49	1.38	0.66	.586
	Doesn't Matter What Kind of Govt. We Have	Authoritarian Govt. Can Be Preferable	Democracy Always Preferable			
Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?	17	33	49	1.32	0.75	.277

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = .1.85) which explains 46.3 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .59) is just below the normal minimal level of acceptability (n=15000).

Supply of Democracy (Construct)

		1 to 3	4 to 5	6 to 7	8 to 10	Missing	Mean (0-3)	Std. Deviation
Extent of Democracy	Where would you place our country under the present government?	2	17	62	20	0	2.00	.654
		Not At All Satisfied	Not Very Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Missing	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction With Democracy	On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country?	2	36	60	1	1	1.62	.544

The items measuring extent of democracy and satisfaction with democracy are correlated at (Pearson's r = .255). The reliability coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha = .401) is below the normal minimum for a two item construct of supply of democracy (n=1490).

Table 4: Attitudes Toward Democracy, South Africa

Commitment to Democracy (Index)

	Approve or Strongly Approve	*Disapprove*	*Strongly Disapprove*	*Mean (0-2)*	*Std. Deviation*	*Factor Loadings*
Elections and the National Assembly are abolished so the president can decide everything	27	36	36	1.09	.793	.755
The army comes in to govern the country	25	34	41	1.16	.797	.677
Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office	34	38	28	0.93	.783	.520
	Doesn't Matter What Kind of Govt. We Have	*Non-Democratic Govt. Can Be Preferable*	*Democracy Preferable*			
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?	26	15	59	1.32	.864	.243

Factor Analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.93) which explains 48.2 percent of the common variance.
Index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .62) is acceptable (n=2039).

Supply of Democracy (Construct)

		Not A Democracy	Major problems, But Still A Democracy	Don't Know	Minor Problems, But Still A Democracy	Full Democracy	Missing	Mean (0-4)	Std. Deviation
Extent of Democracy	In your opinion, how much of a democracy is ____ (your country) today?	8	37	6	36	14	(4)	2.12	1.256

		Not At All Satisfied	Not Very Satisfied	Don't Know	Fairly Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Missing	Mean	Std. Deviation
Satisfaction With Democracy	Generally, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in ____?	22	26	6	35	11	(<1)	1.88	1.39

The items measuring extent of democracy and satisfaction with democracy are sufficiently correlated (Pearson's r = .39) and reliable (Cronbach's Alpha = .56) to warrant the creation of a two-item average construct of supply of democracy (n=1966).

If traditional values constitute the obstacle to democratisation in the developing world as portrayed in the arguments reviewed earlier, traditionalists in both Asia and Africa should be *less likely* to *demand democracy* than other respondents. Yet traditionalists should also be *more likely* to *feel that their political institutions are supplying democracy.* This may seem counterintuitive at first; why would someone who does not prefer democracy be more likely to think they are receiving it? We argue that in democratising contexts, like Korea and South Africa, if traditionalists really are passive, acquiescent followers, they will be more likely to consider that their governments – which call themselves democratic – are indeed delivering democracy and less likely to think critically about the content of regime performance.

As a first test of these hypotheses, we examine the bivariate correlations between the various multi-item and single-item indicators of traditional values (which differ for the two countries) and the measures of demand for and supply of democracy (which are nearly identical for both) that we have constructed from the South Korean and South African responses. The results suggest potentially strong evidence for the traditional values thesis, especially in South Korea. They show that South Koreans who respect authority, feel that they would lose face working under a woman, and respect family and elders, are in fact much *less* likely to demand democracy. In addition, those who believe that wealth and success are determined by fate, who emphasise social harmony, and who do not trust other citizens are also less likely to demand democracy, though to a lesser extent. However, those who value deference and accommodation to others do not differ from others in any significant way in their preference for democracy.

Table 5: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy I (Bivariate Correlations), South Korea

	Demand for Democracy	*Supply of Democracy*
Respect for Authority	-.314***	.149***
Chauvinism	-.224***	.035
Respect for Family and Elders	-.198***	. 114***
Fatalism	-.161***	.063*
Emphasise Societal Harmony	-.160***	.128***
Educational Elitism	-.126***	.023
Interpersonal Trust	.086***	.118***
Deference / Accommodation	.013	.061*

Alternatively, traditionalist South Koreans are, as predicted, *more* likely be believe they are being supplied with democracy, though the impact is more modest and less consistent. Those who value respect for authority and for family and elders, and those who value societal harmony, are more likely to feel that their institutions are delivering democracy than other South Koreans.

Table 6: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy II (OLS), South Korea

	Demand for Democracy	*Supply of Democracy*
Respect for Authority	-.346***	.121***
Chauvinism		
Respect for Family and Elders	-.185****	
Fatalism	-.101**	
Emphasise Societal Harmony		.093***
Educational Elitism	-.144***	
Interpersonal Trust	.104***	.097***
Deference / Accommodation	.079***	
Adjusted R^2	.231	.041
N	1481	1489

Standardised Regression Coefficients (Beta)
Variables with p> .05 dropped from final model

Thus, we find at least initial support for both of our hypotheses. Traditionalists are less likely to want democracy, yet they are simultaneously less likely to exercise their critical faculties on the performance of the political regime, perhaps due to their desire to respect authority and not rock the societal boat. When we regress our two dependent variables on this battery of traditional cultural values, they account for a substantial 23 percent of the variance in South Koreans' demand for democracy, but just 4 percent of the variance in perceived supply.

The South African results are consistent with the South Korean findings with respect to demand for Democracy, though the magnitudes of the associations are lower. Black South Africans who hold traditional communitarian values (value patriarchy, see themselves as clients, and want to retain a resort to violence), think only the educated should vote, and have a weak sense of South African national identity are indeed less likely to demand democracy.

Table 7: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy I (Bivariate Correlations), South Africa

	Demand for Democracy	*Supply of Democracy*
Communitarian Values	-.312***	-.108***
Educational Elitism	-.150***	-.080**
Inclusive National Identity	.187***	.212***
Personal National Identity	.195***	.233***
Paternalism	-.075**	.001
Dependency	-.007	-.023
Consensualism	-.052*	.067**
Traditional Social Identities	.029	-.036
Societal Harmony	.050*	-.042
Community Interest	-.023	.078***

Bivariate Correlations (Pairwise Deletion of Missing Values)
Black Respondents Only

Table 8: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy II (OLS), South Africa

	Demand for Democracy	*Supply of Democracy*
Communitarian Values	-.284***	-.077**
Educational Elitism	-.096***	
Inclusive National Identity		.166***
Personal National Identity		.087*
Paternalism	-.080***	
Dependency		
Consensualism		
Traditional Social Identity		
Societal Harmony		-.060*
Community Interest		.074**
Adjusted R^2	.111	.070
N	1249	1274

Standardised Regression Coefficients (Beta)
All variables p> .05 excluded
Black Respondents Only

However, the impact on the perceived supply of democracy differs quite sharply from South Korea. In South Africa, those who possess strong personal and inclusive national identities (which in Africa is seen as the modernist position) are more likely to think they are being supplied with democracy. And those who score

highly on our communitarianism scale are *more* critical of the supply of democracy, not less. Only those who value consensual decision-making and elevate the community interest over the individual are more likely to say they are living in a democracy, though the impact is quite limited. Taken together, cultural factors account for approximately 11 percent of the variance in South Africans' demand for democracy, and 7 percent of the perceived supply.

Cultural Values Versus Other Competing Theoretical Explanations of Attitudes to Democracy

Thus far, we have assessed the direct links between traditional cultural values and key attitudes to democracy in both countries. What remains to be tested, however, is whether these links remain once we take into account a range of other respondent evaluations and characteristics. In other words, are the impacts of traditional values we have reviewed above independent of other factors, or will they diminish and even disappear once we test the simultaneous impact of other theoretical families of factors?

Following the theoretical framework of competing explanations of public attitudes laid out in Bratton, *et al.* (2004), we have identified a wide range of conceptually similar items in the East Asia and Afrobarometer questionnaires and grouped them according to whether they measured: 1) Performance Evaluations of the government's record in delivering economic and political goods; 2) Institutional Influences such as identifying with a political party or membership in a civil society organisation; 3) Cognitive Awareness of politics such as news media use or political interest and discussion; or finally 4) one's position in the Social Structure, such as rural or urban residence, income or occupation. We then tested whether the statistical explanatory power of cultural values remained stable, or was reduced once we brought indicators of these other competing theoretical families into the equation.

Table 9: Demand for Democracy[1], Explanatory Factors Compared[2], South Korea

	r	b	S.E.	Beta	Adj. R² (block)	Adj. R² (cumul.)
Constant		1..609	.102			
Cultural Values					.232	.232
Respect for Authority	-.401	-.361	.027	-.319***		
Respect for Family / Elders	-.253	-.111	.020	-.133***		
Educational Elitism	-.143	-.074	.013	-.126***		
Patriarchy	-.254	-.052	.014	-.086***		
Interpersonal Trust	.093	.069	.022	.071**		
Performance Evaluations					.101	.282
Trusts Representative Institutions	-.197	-.104	.020	-.127***		
Democracy Able To Solve Problems	.210	.129	.124	.123***		
Increased Freedoms Under Democracy	.099	.087	.019	.104***		
Perceives Corruption in Government	-.072	-.056	.019	-.071**		
Personal Experience With Corruption	-.117	-.057	.019	-.066**		
Cognitive Awareness					.032	.292
Feels Able to Participate in Politics	-.105	-.049	.014	-.075***		
Feels Able to Understand Politics	.140	.039	.014	.065***		
Persuaded Others During Campaign	.041	.079	.029	.062***		
Institutional Influences						
Trusts Civil Society Organisations	.059	.083	.021	.094***	.002	.300
Full Model			.394			.300

** p =/<.01   *** p=/<.001

N = 1,476

1. The dependent variable is the *index of commitment to democracy* (an average score composed of expressed support for democracy plus rejection of military, one-party, and one-man rule).
2. Ordinary least squares regression estimates.

Table 10: Supply of Democracy[1], Explanatory Factors Compared[2], South Korea

	r	*b*	*S.E.*	*Beta*	*Adj. R^2 (block)*	*Adj. R^2 (cumul.)*
Constant						
Performance Evaluations					.185	.185
Satisfaction With Govt Performance	.328	.259	.030	.217***		
Perceives Corruption in Government	-.286	-.250	.033	-.189***		
Perceives Freedom of Speech and Association	.183	.114	.024	.120***		
Increased Freedoms Under Democracy	.197	.101	.035	.073**		
Government Enforces Law Fairly	-.102	.091	.034	-.063***		
Cultural Values					.025	.203
Emphasises Social Harmony	.143	.143	.042	.082***		
Fatalism	.078	.079	.023	.081***		
Institutional Influences					.018	.211
Contacts Formal Leaders	-.136	-.385	.093	-.096***		
Social Structure					.011	.215
Lives in Urban Area	-.108	-.079	.027	-.070***		
Full Model				.696		.215

** $p =/<.01$ *** $p=/<.001$

N = 1,481

1. The dependent variable is the *index of supply of democracy* (an average score composed of perceived extent of democracy plus satisfaction with democracy).

2. Ordinary least squares regression estimates.

First of all, we find that adding these families of variables into the equation allows us to construct relatively powerful models of democratic attitudes in both countries. It should be noted that we estimated these models conservatively: by excluding all variables that were not significantly related to the dependent variables (at $p \leq .01$), we chose parsimony over a high R^2 figure. We can account for 30 percent of the variance in demand, and 22 percent in the perceived supply in South Korea, and 27 percent of demand and 30 percent of perceived supply in South Africa. However, a full discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings is beyond the scope of this paper. What we are currently interested in is what happens to the impact of cultural values once we test other theories of attitudes toward democracy beyond that of political culture.

Table 11: Demand for Democracy[1], Explanatory Factors Compared[2,] South Africa

	r	b	S.E.	Beta	Adj. R² (block)	Adj. R² (cumul.)
Constant						
Performance Evaluations					.131	.131
Increased Freedom Under Democracy	.328	.135	.023	.211***		
Perceives Corruption in Government	.063	.136	.023	.175***		
State Is Able To Enforce Law	.283	..048	.013	.113***		
Ease of Access To State	.188	.060	.020	.094**		
Cultural Values					.106	.220
Communitarianism	-.347	-.187	.036	-.173***		
Educational Elitism	-.190	-.058	.016	-.111***		
Cognitive Awareness					.069	.232
Cognitive Engagement	.233	.059	.017	.105***		
Social Structure					.016	.268
Urban	.171	.166	.030	.166***		
Ill Health	-.110	-.065	.018	-.101***		
Full Model			.426			.268

** p =/<.01   *** p=/<.001
N = 908
1. The dependent variable is the *index of commitment to democracy* (an average score composed of expressed support for democracy plus rejection of military, one-party, and one-man rule).
2. Ordinary least squares regression estimates.

As we saw in Table 6, the entire package of traditional values by themselves explained 23 percent of the variance in demand for democracy in South Korea; adding in the other sets of variables simultaneously allows us to explain 30 percent. Yet the unique contribution of cultural values within the final model remains at exactly 23 percent. Thus, cultural values comprise the most important part of a model of demand for democracy in South Korea, and the single largest impact comes from the Respect for Authority variable (Beta =-.319). This also suggests that any additional explanatory contribution of Performance Evaluations, Cognitive Awareness, and Institutional Influences is independent of the impact of culture in South Korea. Second, the impact of traditional values remains consistently negative. Those South Koreans who hold the traditionalist position on measures of respect for authority, respect for family and elders, educational elitism, patriarchy and interpersonal (dis)trust are less likely to say democracy is preferable, or to strongly reject authoritarian alternatives.

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Also in Table 6, we saw that while traditional values played a much smaller role in shaping how South Koreans evaluated the institutional supply of democracy, the direction of the impact was still positive.

Examining the full model of supply, we can now see that the impact of culture has been reduced substantially (from 4 percent by itself, to 2.5 percent). Performance evaluations are a much more powerful determinant of whether Koreans think they are living in a democracy and whether they are satisfied with the way democracy works. However, the direction of the impact of values, as small as it is, remains positive. Those Koreans who value societal harmony and have a fatalist view of success and failure in life, are more likely to think their institutions are supplying democracy. This confirms our suspicion that traditionalists (all other things being equal) are less likely to apply a critical lens in evaluating government and regime performance than modernists.

The impact of traditional values among black South Africans also remains an important predictor of demand for democracy, even after we control for the impact of a range of other factors like cognition, social structure, institutional membership and performance satisfaction. Performance evaluations are the most important predictor of demand for democracy, but cultural values add approximately 9 additional percentage points to the power of the model. And the direction of the impact is as predicted. Those who hold communitarian values are less likely to prefer democracy or reject authoritarian alternatives.

Finally, while Table 8 suggested that traditional values, on their own, could account for 7 percent of the variance in the perceived supply of democracy, that impact is almost totally taken over by the effect of performance evaluations. While we can account for 30 percent of the variance in perceptions of democratic supply among black South Africans, cultural values account for less than one percent. But, against our expectations, the direction of the impact, while very small, is negative. In other words, those black South Africans who hold traditional values are not only less likely to demand democracy, but they are also less likely to think they are getting it.

Table 12: Supply of Democracy[1], Explanatory Factors Compared[2,] South Africa

	R	b	S.E.	Beta	Adj. R^2 (block)	Adj. R^2 (cumul.)
Constant						
Performance Evaluations					.290	.290
Approval of Incumbent Performance	.416	.237	.026	.211***		
Quality of Life Improved Under Democracy	.388	.206	.032	.149***		
Approves of Govt Policy Performance In Basic Services	.341	.142	.023	.135***		
Approves of Govt Policy Performance In Macro Economy	.375	.173	.032	.128***		
Quality of Governance Improved Under Democracy	.315	.132	.029	.100***		
Ease of Access to State	.264	.123	.031	.085***		
Cultural Values					.005	.286
Community Interest	.078	.063	.024	-.053**		
Social Structure					.013	.303
Coloured	.016	.198	.067	.060**		
Ill Health	-.084	-.077	.028	-.055**		
Full Model						.303

** p =/<.01   *** p=/<.001

N = 1792

1. The dependent variable is the *index of supply of democracy* (an average score composed of perceived extent of democracy plus satisfaction with democracy).

2. Ordinary least squares regression estimates.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have demonstrated that traditional cultural values do shape popular attitudes to democracy in Asia and Africa, even in relatively modernised settings like South Africa. However, it is important to remember that the descriptive statistics reviewed in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrated clearly that traditionalists are minorities within both societies. However, those minorities, other things being equal, are substantially less likely both to prefer democracy to its alternatives, and to reject non-democratic alternatives to their current regimes.

We end with two final considerations. First, the findings we have just reported stand in contrast to initial probes in Asia (Dalton and Ong, 2004) and Africa (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). We also found a much stronger

impact than initial investigations in South Korea (Park and Shin, 2004). What explains this? Part of this may be methodological. As for South Africa, Bratton, *et al*. (2004) reported findings from a pooled data set of Afrobarometer Round 1 surveys in 12 countries. South Africa could have been quite different from the other 11 countries if the model had been tested by country. At the same time, the present results are based on Round 2 of the Afrobarometer whose questionnaire may have contained an improved set of measures of values compared to those available from Round 1. In the case of South Korea, part of the reason may be that the East Asia Barometer designers did a much better job of anticipating and measuring Asia-specific value structures than could have been achieved by the global World Values Survey data on which Dalton and Ong (2004) based their analysis. Another fact could be that the Barometer measures of attitudes to democracy, particularly the indicators of demand, do a much better job of discriminating between democrats and non-democrats than the World Values Survey indicators, which tend to yield overly optimistic assessments of global support for democracy (see, for example, Inglehart, 2003).

Second, we have found a much stronger impact of cultural values in South Korea than South Africa. Why? A first reason might be located in the diverging history of the respective countries, both in the short and the long term. In terms of recent history, it might be that public support for democracy in South Korea was initially based on a Churchillian assessment that it was better than the old dictatorship in delivering key political goods like freedom and rights. But because the dictatorship had been able to deliver other desired public goods like economic growth and social order, the *ancien regime* was never fully discredited in the public mind (Chu, 2003a). Thus, as the new regime has struggled to root out corruption or deal with the Asian economic crisis, basic values have become the prime line of distinction between democrats and non-democrats, rather than positive relative assessments of democracy compared to its predecessor. In South Africa, however, the *apartheid* regime still serves to legitimate the new regime, if only through its thoroughly negative memory.

In terms of deep history, because the experience of colonialism was far more prolonged and intense in Africa than in Asia, traditional values may have remained more intact and retain a more meaningful connection with one's views toward modern representative democracy in South Korea. And while we certainly disagree with romantic celebrations of the democratic nature of pre-colonial traditional rule in Africa, we do agree that traditional African politics featured important elements of democratic participation that may make African traditionalists more open to modern democracy than their Asian counterparts.

But a second reason may have to do with methodology. From our attempts to create meaningful, reliable and valid multi-item indicators of these values, it is evident that the East Asia Barometer offers better measures than the Afrobarometer. However, we feel the broader contribution of our findings is the demonstration that cultural values do matter for the things in which the Asia and Afrobarometers are ultimately interested, and that both projects need to develop better composite measures of cultural values, traditional or otherwise.

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Endnotes

[1] The World Values Study provides extensive data from standardised questions on national publics around the world, including many developing societies. However, this strength may also be one of its drawbacks. A questionnaire originally developed in North American and Western European contexts may not provide local scholars with the necessary data to examine the existence of value structures derived from specific cultures.

[2] Family authority orientations were measured by the following items:
  Respect parents
  Parents duty
  Make parents proud
The societal authority orientations were measured by the following items:
  Teach obedience
  Work to instructions
  Respect authority

[3] The Democratic Regime Index consisted of the following items:
  Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (Fairly Bad / Very Bad)
  Having experts, not government, make decision according to what they think is best for the country (Fairly Bad / Very Bad)
  Having the army rule (Fairly Bad / Very Bad)
  Having a democratic political system (Fairly Good / Very Good)

[4] The "family-state" concept suggests that to Asians there is an analogy between the family and the state, while the "moral state" concept suggests that they see the state as endowed with moral authority. "Anti-adversarial politics" refers to a perceived Asian aversion to conflict and adversarial opposition.

[5] The three items measuring Democratic Support are:
  Here is a scale: 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. To what extent would you want the country to be democratic now?
  Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our country. If "1" means that democracy is completely unsuitable for South Korea today and "10" means that is completely suitable, where would you place our country today?
  Which of the following comes closest to your own opinion.?
    - Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government
    - Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.
    - For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non democratic regime.

[6] The three items measuring Rejection of Authoritarianism are:
  As you know, there are some people in our country who would like to change the way in which our country is governed. We would like to know whether you think of their views. For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?
  We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things
  The military should come in to govern the country
  We should get rid of parliament and elections and have the experts decide everything.

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