



Marange Diamonds Autopsy: Investigating the Anjin deal between Chinese capital and the political military elite of Zimbabwe, plus the distribution of rents

**Master of Philosophy in Development Policy and Practice (GPP5005W )**

**ABSTRACT:**

The study investigates the nature of deals between Chinese capital and the political-military elite in Zimbabwe, specifically exploring whether these interactions produce developmental outcomes or if they lean towards predatory practices. Using a case study of the Marange diamond fields, the Analytic Narratives and Process Tracing research methodology is applied to track the Anjin Limited deal in Marange from its inception till date. *What is the nature of the deal involving Chinese diamond mining capital and the political-military elite in Zimbabwe, and how are the rents distributed?* This paper argues that the Anjin deal is a high barrier arrangement that limits rents from flowing to local communities and national development. Access to this deal is only available to those with political connections and the political-military elite of Zimbabwe. The evidence supporting this argument is derived from the conspicuous absence of standard tender processes in the selection of Anjin. Further, it can be observed that due diligence processes are circumvented in favour of political connections and relationship with Zimbabwe's securocrats. Anjin's corporate strategy is seen to be extraction driven due to predatory engagement with political leadership. Consequently, the deal can be characterised as collusive and rent seeking, contributing very little to transformation, and the realisation of Zimbabwe's Vision 2030.

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## Acronyms

AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
ACR	African Consolidated Resources
AFDB	African Development Bank
AFECC	Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Co
AFZ	Airforce of Zimbabwe
ARDA	Agricultural Rural Development Authority (Transau)
ASM	Artisanal Mining
CCDT	Chiadzwa Community Development Trust
CIO	Central Intelligence Office
CMMR	Core Mining and Mineral Resources
CNRG	Centre for Natural Resource Governance
CRD	Centre for Research & Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSOT	Community Share Ownership Schemes or Trusts
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMA	Environmental Management Agency
EPO	Exclusive Prospecting Order
EU	European Union
GPA	Global Political Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
JOC	Joint Operations Command
JWP	Joint Work Plan
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEEA	Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITA	International Trade Administration
LAO	Limited Access Order
LEP	Look East Policy
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MMA	Mines and Minerals Act
MMCZ	Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PAC	Partnership Africa Canada
PCME	Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy
PCYIE	Parliament Committee on Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment
PLA	People's Liberation Army
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RDC	Rural District Council
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU – PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZCDC	Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZDI	Zimbabwe Defence Industry
ZEC	Zimbabwean Electoral Commission
ZELA	Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association
ZETDC	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Distribution Company
ZIMRA	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority
ZMDC	Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLWA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### Mining and Development

Mining has the potential to substantially contribute to economic and social empowerment, as well as reduce poverty. Numerous studies indicate that effective management and strategic investment of mineral resources can catalyse development and enhance the well-being of the populace (Bryan & Hoffman, 2007; Martin & Taylor, 2012; Acosta, 2013).

Several nations have successfully channelled revenues from the mining sector to support development objectives. Botswana, often lauded as a model for resource management, stands out for its partnership with the UK-based miner De Beers. Through revenue generated mainly from diamond mining, Botswana has financed collective goods, minimizing reliance on aid (O'Connell and Dolan, 2011). This example underscores the positive potential of the extractive industry to impact livelihoods not only in mining communities but also more broadly. It serves as a catalyst for human development through job creation, contributing to per capita income. Additionally, mining-generated revenue can be directed towards infrastructure development, public service delivery, and small and medium enterprise (SME) development, all aimed at improving overall livelihoods.

Nevertheless, the situation becomes more complex when foreign capital operates in exploitative ways, a recurring phenomenon in various African countries with resource wealth (Mailey, 2015). Additionally, capital investment in Africa is increasingly shifting towards the East, reflecting evolving geostrategic relationships in the "Looking East" policy trend. Notably, major emerging markets like China have significantly increased their investments in Africa's resource. Africa accounts for 75% of Chinese investment in foreign mining (Signe & Johnson, 2021). This prompts the question: Is Chinese capital contributing to development or engaging in predatory practices in Africa's extractive industry?

## Mining and Development in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's extractives industry is highly diversified with more than 60 different exploitable minerals, including gold, coal, platinum group metals (PGM), chrome, and diamonds (International Trade Administration [ITA], 2022). According to the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe, the country generated US\$5.6 billion in export earnings in 2022 compared to US\$5.1 billion in 2021. Additionally, the Minister of Mines, Winston Chitando (2017 – 2023) claimed that the extractives industry was projected to generate US\$12 billion in 2023 under the National Development Strategy (Mapuranga, 2023). In 2021, Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company [ZCDC] reported a net profit in diamond mining of \$60 million after it exceeded its production targets. As such, given the significant contributions of the mining sector to Gross Domestic Product (approximately 12%), the government has highlighted its key role in realising Zimbabwe's Vision 2030<sup>1</sup> (Muchato, 2022). It is regarded as critical to the country's stabilisation, economic recovery, and eventual growth (Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association [ZELA], 2023).

Amidst current Western sanctions on Zimbabwe, a new ray of optimism has emerged through the adoption of the "Look East" policy (Ojakorotu & Kamidza, 2018). This approach envisions collaboration with countries like China, aiming for mutually advantageous partnerships. Consequently, the landscape of mining capital in Zimbabwe has transitioned from Western sources to capital from the East<sup>2</sup> (and South<sup>3</sup>). The expectation is that this change in the composition of investment in the extractives industry will result in more significant mining benefits being retained within Zimbabwe, thereby advancing the goals of Vision 2030 (Tutic & Tombindo, 2016). However, the prevalence of closed deals between the political-military elite and foreign investors threatens this. There exists a rent-seeking process which requires scrutiny of its impact on national development and surrounding communities. In this regard, the Anjin Ltd deal in the Marange diamonds fields has been selected as the focal point of this study. The Marange diamond fields have over the years been associated with political-military control, raising complex issues involving governance, human rights and economic development. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to better understand the intricate interplay of the actors involved, their deals, and the profound implications for local and national

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<sup>1</sup> Vision 2030 emphasises improving the standard of life for the citizenry

<sup>2</sup> Comprises China, Russia, Iran and around 20 countries that support them

<sup>3</sup> Refers to developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America

development. Specifically, the study investigates the nature of the deal between Chinese capital and the political-military elite (Anjin), and whether it is developmental or predatory.

### Marange Diamonds: Background to the problem

Diamonds were discovered in Marange in 2006. Before this discovery, Kimberlitic Searches (a subsidiary of the De Beers Group) had been undertaking feasibility studies and prospecting Chiadzwa from 1992 to 2006. Overall, the area was underdeveloped and poor, and the community relied on subsistence agriculture.

In March 2006, De Beers ceased operations in Zimbabwe altogether. There were claims from those living in the Chiadzwa area that De Beers was in fact mining diamonds and smuggling them into South Africa (Nyamunda and Mukwambo, 2012). The government would later accuse De Beers of looting diamonds worth billions of US dollars (Guardian & Sun, 2012). Soon after, a UK based company African Consolidated Resources PLC (ACR) applied for and was awarded the rights for exploration and mining in Marange. In June of that year (2006), ACR announced that gem and industrial diamonds had been located in Chiadzwa. A 50/50 joint venture between the government via ZMDC and ACR was proposed. However, the Ministry of Mines rejected the proposal and forcibly removed ACR from its claims. The state claimed that the contract had been improperly given out (Munier, 2016). Although it is likely that this rejection had more to do with factional struggles within Zanu-PF and Mujuru<sup>4</sup> control of the company. ACR's title to the Marange deposit and their property was then awarded to the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC).

When the potential of diamond wealth in Marange became apparent, a diamond rush emerged where artisanal miners and informal syndicates flocked to the area. The rush attracted the attention and involvement of several international actors including Lebanese, Israeli, and Mozambican diamond traders as well as Russian interests. Because the Mineral and Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) was the only legal buyer of diamonds, the government encouraged artisanal mining. There is also speculation that the government allowed informal mining to secure votes for Zanu-PF in the upcoming 2008 general election. Removing the miners would have been antagonistic to voters in the rural areas which are Zanu-PF's

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<sup>4</sup> General Solomon Mujuru was formerly the head of the armed forces as well as the husband to Zimbabwe's First Vice President, Joyce Mujuru. He openly campaigned within Zanu-PF to replace Mugabe, whom many thought would not contest in the 2008 presidential elections.

stronghold (Munier, 2016). The Marange diamond fields quickly became a chaotic scene. Meagre payments (under the market price for diamonds) to the miners by MMCZ led to diamond smuggling particularly across the Mozambique border. The police were then sent there to stop illegal diamond mining however they instead allowed illegal trading to continue in exchange for kickbacks (Munier, 2016).

Following a devastating loss for Zanu-PF in the 2008 general election, the military were sent to Chiadzwa to restore law and order and clean up the “mess” that the police failed to address. During this time, Zimbabwe gained international attention for the human rights abuses that ensued following the militarisation of the Marange Diamond fields. Because of this, pressure mounted on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to classify Marange diamonds as “conflict” diamonds. Instead, a joint work plan was agreed upon between the KPCS and Zimbabwe, and operations were formalised through joint ventures with the ZMDC in 2009.

The following mining companies were in operation in Marange from 2009 to 2016:

Table 1 Mining Companies in Marange from 2009 – 2016


<b>Company</b>	<b>Local Investor</b>	<b>Foreign Investor &amp; Origin</b>
Anjin Investments (Pvt) Ltd	ZMDC; Matt Bronze	Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Co (China)
Diamond Mining Corporation (Pvt) Ltd	ZMDC	Foreign Partner undisclosed
Gye Nyame Resources (Pvt) Ltd	ZMDC; Zimbabwe Republic Police Trust; Dantor	Bill Minerals (Ghana)
Jinan (Pvt) Ltd	ZMDC	Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Co (China)
Kusena Diamonds	ZMDC	N/A
Marange Resources (Pvt) Ltd	ZMDC	N/A
Mdaba Diamonds (Pvt) Ltd	ZMDC & Grandwell Holdings	N/A

(Source : ZMDC Annual Report, 2012)

These stakeholders had the potential to invest capital, contribute to increased state revenues, and yield enduring advantages for local communities and the nation. To illustrate the substantial scale of these potential benefits, Louis (2021) highlights that they could significantly contribute to the revival of Zimbabwe's struggling economy and address the needs of nearly 75% of the population living below the poverty line. However, reports reveal three troubling outcomes. Firstly, the Centre for Research and Development [CRD] (2015) documented minimal remittances to the treasury, suggesting a potential diversion of the remaining revenues intended for the state. Secondly, concerning the Marange community, there were accounts of severe human rights violations by security agencies (CRD, 2015). Thirdly, there were indications of adverse social, environmental, and economic impacts on

neighbouring villages, with no compensation or intervention by the government (Maguwu, 2012; Muchadenyika, 2015). President Mugabe also claimed that approximately US\$15 billion in revenue from Marange diamonds remained unaccounted for since 2010, coinciding with the initiation of foreign capital operations (Al Jazeera, 2016). Fraud of such monumental proportions could not have taken place without the involvement and consequent collusion of the government given that they held a 50% in all diamond mining firms through ZMDC (Maguwu, n.d.). Following this announcement, the industry was again nationalised in 2016 through the formation of Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) which would be a merger of all companies operating in Marange. This nationalisation was short-lived because in 2020, the government once again gave concessions to Chinese and Russian capital in the diamond fields.

The timeline below visually shows the sequence of events in the Marange Diamond Fields:



### Institutional and Political Setup

The mining sector of Zimbabwe “is ripe for faster growth” however, this is in the context of relatively weak institutions where the political-military elite can use their discretion to expropriate property. As a result, investments in the extractives industry attract ex-post risks linked to opportunism and expropriation by the government.

Despite the political uncertainty there remains space for crafting deals as the basis of credible commitment for the protection of property rights (Nxele, 2023). Credible commitment establishes some stability in the interactions between the stakeholders (i.e. foreign investors and the political military elite of Zimbabwe) (Haber et al., 2003). Deals or elite bargains facilitate the allocation of rents, power and benefits within the coalition. Nxele (2023) further deconstructs deals by analysing the engagement between investors and political leadership and uncovers that deals can be predatory on one end, and developmental on the other. By predatory, Nxele (2023) refers to deals that are mainly extractive and speculative, deploying collusive tactics as strategies to manage expropriation. By developmental, Nxele (2023) refers to deals

that are driven by capital investment (productive rather than extractive), deploying embedded credible contracting to manage expropriation.

Rents are primarily distributed within the coalition as part of the deal so that the investment remains protected. In their analysis of the role of rent-seeking in economic development, Khan and Jomo argue that rent seeking processes can either produce productive rents, or predatory, extractive rents. In mining, rent-seeking is seen to be harmful and leading to poor economic growth, whereas the Asian experience of manufacturing intensive industrial sectors is evidence that rent-seeking can be essential to growth and efficiency (Doner and Ramsey, 2000). The conceptual framework chapter will add more detail and organise the political and institutional setup of Zimbabwe into a model that can be used to analyse the Anjin Marange case study.

In this context, the following subsection will capture this more formally in the research objectives.

### Research question, objectives, and hypothesis

The study aims to investigate elite bargains in the Marange fields from 2006 to 2020, focusing on the formation of Anjin. Anjin stands out due to its opaque operations and significant concessions in Marange (Partnership Canada, 2012). Additionally, Mugabe accused Anjin of looting nearly US\$15 billion in diamond wealth during the industry's nationalization in 2016. Lastly, the direct ownership by the Zimbabwean military adds importance to the Anjin deal.

Prior to the formalisation of diamond mining, the military were implicated in human rights violations in Marange which prompted an outcry from the international community. Following threats of withdrawal from the KPCS, Zimbabwe announced 50/50 joint ventures with ZMDC and investors. Three companies mining in Marange between 2009-2016 were particularly contentious due to their direct links to Zimbabwean security agencies. Kusena was linked to the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and Anjin and Jinan linked to the military.

Anjin and Jinan, representing Chinese investment, involve Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company (AFECC) with a 50% stake. Anjin's remaining stake belongs to Matt Bronze, a Zimbabwe Defence Industry (ZDI) shell company, with directors from the military and police. Anjin's formation appears geared towards securing off-budget financing for the military. This aligns with Zimbabwe's prebendalism, where the head of state grants resource access for loyalty and security (Tendi, 2013). This deal primarily benefits the military, sustaining Zanu-PF's political hegemony. As will be discussed in the following sections, when

the relationship between the ruling party and the military breaks down, political stability is threatened. Mugabe barring Anjin from Marange in 2016 can be interpreted as an attack on the military, which contributed to his removal from the presidency, paving the way for Mnangagwa who belongs to the military faction of Zanu-PF.

Studying the Anjin deal is crucial as military control of diamond resources is seen to significantly influence Zimbabwe's political stability. The exploration will delve into the parties of the deal, and distributional consequences. The study will be guided by the following research question:

*What is the nature of the deals involving Chinese diamond mining capital and the political-military elite in Zimbabwe, and how are the rents distributed?*

The research objectives flowing from the question include the following:

1. To explore the nature of the deals between the political-military elite and the Chinese capital.
2. To trace the distributional outcomes of rents generated from mining activity associated with the deals
3. To contribute to the frontier debate about the nature of deals between Africa and the East. Specifically, is Chinese capital in the extractives industry transformative or destructive to Zimbabwe?

To answer the research question, the Analytic Narratives and Process Tracing research methodology will be applied in chapter 4 to track the Anjin Limited deal in Marange from 2009 to 2020. The rest of the paper will be organised as follows: In chapter 2, a literature review will be conducted using empirical studies on the behaviour of Chinese capital in Africa and Zimbabwe, the allocation of mining rights in Zimbabwe and the Resource Curse thesis. Next the paper will develop a conceptual framework in chapter 3 which synthesises the work of Pritchett, Sen and Werker (2018), Levy (2014), Nxele (2023), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Khan and Jomo (2000), Auty (2007) and North et al. (2013). It is an empirically adoptable framework for the subsequent chapters (5 and 6) which will study the deal between Chinese investors and the political-military elite of Zimbabwe, and distributional consequences. Finally, the paper will conclude with recommendations for a way forward in Zimbabwe.

## Chapter 2: Background, Overview & Literature

The Zimbabwean extractives industry holds potential for structural transformation, offering avenues for enhanced infrastructure, economic diversification, job creation, and sustainable development. However, it faces challenges, notably a deficit in transparency and accountability in deals between mining capital and the political-military elite. This hinders efficient resource allocation. Additionally, the sector grapples with governance shortcomings, undermining its capacity to drive economic development and ensure equitable distribution of mineral resources to the populace. As such, this research is vital for comprehending the dynamics of these deals and shedding light on resource allocation mechanisms. This chapter will provide an overview on the role of China in Africa, the allocation of property rights in Zimbabwe as well as review literature on the resource curse framework.

### Chinese capital in Africa

China implemented various development projects in Africa such as the railway line built from Tanzania to Zambia between 1970 and 1976. In addition, Beijing supported several national liberation movements in Africa during this time. These include Angola, Algeria, the DRC, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (Jurencyk, 2020). However, the early 2000s marked a significant turning point in Africa's engagement with the East, particularly with countries like China and India. China has been a significant player in Africa, particularly in the mining sector, over the past few decades. Chinese companies (private and public), often in partnership with state-owned enterprises of the hosting country, heavily invest in various mining projects across the continent. China has a need for natural resources to support its growing economy hence its interest in Africa, which is rich in mineral resources. To sustain its rapid economic growth and industrialisation, China requires a secure and steady supply of critical raw minerals such as copper, iron ore and cobalt (Ayodele and Sotola, 2014; Taylor, 2007; Matti, 2010). Lastly, the interest in African mineral resources is strategic as it relates to the Belt and Road Initiative<sup>5</sup> (McBride, Berman and Chatzky, 2023). Overall, this strategy of resource acquisition is referred to as “resource diplomacy” or “resource-for-infrastructure deals”.

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<sup>5</sup> The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to enhance global connectivity through infrastructure development. It is widely perceived as an effort to grow China's economic and political power.

To illustrate, China holds a significant stake in Angola's natural resource sector, notably in oil. The China-Angola Strategic Partnership, established in 2010, involves China financing infrastructure projects in exchange for access to Angola's oil reserves. Wolf (2016) assesses this relationship, concluding that Chinese investment has positively impacted manufacturing development and contributed to Angola's domestic-market formation and overall economic development. Habiyaemnye (2016) further states that China's resource diplomacy strategy has enabled African countries, including Angola, to diversify their economies. The emergence of the African "Lion economies", spurred by China's infrastructure investments, is noted. Additionally, China-Angola cooperation has fostered socio-economic development through investment in healthcare, education, public works, social communication, and transport according to Kiala (2010).

However, contrasting views reject these findings. Studies by Vargas Murgui (2018), Begu et al. (2018), and Hess and Aidoo (2015) argue that Chinese investment has not significantly contributed to socio-economic development in Angola and has inadequately addressed local needs. Begu et al. (2018) highlight self-enrichment by political elites and the reinforcement of undemocratic operations in the Angolan regime. Allegations against former President Dos Santos include transparent looting, diverting oil revenue and investment gains to his family and inner circle, with embezzled funds reaching up to US\$6 billion annually (Copper, 2016). Meanwhile local communities in Angola remain in poverty, with minimal participation in oil sales profits (Hess and Naidoo, 2015). The impact of Sino relations in Angola is intricate - the winners and losers in these deals evolve over time and long-term consequences are not immediately clear.

### Chinese capital in Zimbabwe

China and Zimbabwe established diplomatic relations in 1980, with ties strengthening notably in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Facing Western sanctions in the early 2000s due to concerns about human rights violations, electoral irregularities, and the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme<sup>6</sup>, Zimbabwe adopted a "Look East" policy in 2003 (Tombindo and Tukic, 2016).

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<sup>6</sup> In the late 1990s, early 2000s, Mugabe implemented a land reform programme where commercial farms were expropriated from white farmers without compensation and redistributed to the military elite and Mugabe cronies and loyalists.

Sino-Zimbabwe relations encompass diplomatic and economic support, trade, technical cooperation, socio-cultural ties, and close military connections (Tombindo and Tukic, 2016). China, a key partner for Zimbabwe, has invested in agriculture, energy, mining, and infrastructure. Under China's Belt and Road Initiative, notable projects have been funded such as the Kariba South Hydro Power Station expansion and the rehabilitation of the Hwange Thermal Power Station which are major electricity generation facilities in Zimbabwe (Tombindo and Tukic, 2016). Other infrastructural developments include the expansion of the Victoria Falls International Airport – to capacitate the airport to accommodate larger aircrafts and boost tourism to Victoria Falls (Pirie, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2017).

Zimbabwe was poised to lead in the African extractives industry due to its competitive mineral resources, infrastructure, and skilled workforce in the early 2000s yet faced economic crisis repercussions (Hogwe and Banda, 2017). Therefore, foreign investments notably from China, played a crucial role in the sector's recovery. Since then, China has become the leading investor and main consumer of Zimbabwe's natural resources. However these arrangements in Zimbabwe's mining sector are often perceived as unbalanced, exploitative and a means to strengthen the “corrupt” Zanu-PF government.

Perceptions of China's behaviour in Zimbabwe are complex and multifaceted influenced by various factors. Proponents of Sino-Zimbabwe relations emphasise job creation, economic development, and infrastructural developments. Building roads, hospitals and schools is a visible part of investments by the Chinese. Additionally, companies such as Huawei have been working with the government in information technology and telecommunications development (Mapaure, 2014). While the Zimbabwean government has praised its ties with China, it can be observed that very little trickles down to the populace. In fact, local Zimbabweans perceive China as bringing no benefit to the economy nor improving their livelihood, only to themselves and the government (Tombindo and Tukic, 2016). Emerging bodies of evidence portray Chinese investment as unethical, unsustainable, and lacking regulatory oversight where legal and social standards are concerned (Mapaure, 2014; Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018). Overall, academic interest is growing in understanding the behaviour of Chinese investment in Africa and whether it has a transformative or predatory effect. Therefore, this study aims to explore the role of China in the Zimbabwean extractives sector.

## Allocation of mining rights in Zimbabwe and revenue distribution

### Contract Negotiation and Access to Information

Mining rights in Zimbabwe are governed by the Mines and Minerals Act (MMA), outlining six titles: Exclusive Prospecting Orders (EPO), special grants for exploration, claims, mining leases, special grants for coal and energy minerals, and special mining leases. In some situations (such as within the Marange diamond fields), the state may enter into a shareholding agreement with private investors. The issuance of these titles, managed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and occasionally the President, involves applications to the Mining Affairs Board.

The extractives industry of Zimbabwe often faces scrutiny for issues related to transparency, accountability and adherence to legislation and international standards such as the KPCS. Despite provisions in the MMA and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the extractives industry (particularly the Marange diamond fields) remains shrouded in secrecy. The selection of investors is often not transparent and tender procedures are seldom followed. The State and investors often claim confidentiality to justify inadequate access to information and contract non-disclosure (ZELA, 2011). This also insulates the government from public inquiries and investigations into their operations and decision-making. Instead what can be observed is the prevalence of elite deals which are barriers to economic and political opportunities through the manipulation of institutions (Harvey, 2019)

### Rights of Private Landowners and Communal residents

The Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) mandates compensation for private landowners affected by mining activities. Private landowners denied access to their land have the right to claim compensation. For communal residents on communal land, the Rural District Council (RDC) acts as the landowner. The compensation payment is then made to the District Development Fund and is to be used for development projects within mining communities (ZELA, 2011).

The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) of 2008 aimed at empowering indigenous Zimbabweans, initially requiring foreign companies to cede 51% of shares. Revised in 2018, the Act now encourages voluntary partnerships and joint ventures, allowing businesses to contribute 10% of shares to Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs). CSOTs are meant to represent local interests in mining activities and ensure benefit sharing. Funds and

resources received through the trusts can then be channelled towards infrastructural developments, the provision of social amenities, healthcare, and other community projects (ZELA, 2011). The RDCs play a significant role in overseeing and managing the CSOT.

Despite the legal frameworks in place, concerns arise due to inadequate reinvestment by RDCs, raising issues of corruption and mismanagement (ZELA, 2011). What often results is local populations not participating in the mining sector, nor deriving any economic benefits and their economic, social, environmental and cultural rights not being realised.

#### Mining Revenue Distribution:

Mining revenue is sourced from royalties, corporate tax, Value Added Tax, and exploration fees. Royalties, the primary revenue stream, should ideally contribute to the Consolidated Revenue Fund held by the Treasury. However, tax concessions for community development initiatives and challenges like transfer pricing and tax evasion through re-invoicing narrow the tax net, reducing inflows into the Treasury (ZELA, 2011; Kaseke et al., 2015).

The government also directly participates in mining by holding shares/equity in mining companies through ZMDC. This is the investment vehicle of the government in the mining sector with a role to develop the industry and establish operations with investors. The revenue earned by ZMDC is supposed to contribute to economic and socio-economic development through payments to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The ZMDC Incorporation Act states that investments should be for the national interest and ultimately uplift the lives of Zimbabwean people. Despite these provisions, the mining sector reflects poverty, mismanagement, and corruption from mining pits to government offices and company executives (Kaseke et al., 2015).

#### Resource Curse Framework – resource abundance and poor economic growth

The central argument of the theory is that the presence of mineral resources in low and middle-income countries is often linked to diminished economic growth, a deterioration in democratic processes and unfavourable development outcomes (Auty, 1993). As a result, rather than being blessings they end up being curses. Empirical research indicates that developing countries abundant in resources tend to underperform both socially and economically when compared to mineral-poor peers (Nankani, 1980; Doro & Kufakurinani, 2018). According to Hawkins

(2009), this is because political leadership, foreign investors and other stakeholders divert resource wealth for personal gain, therefore neglecting economic growth and development.

The conventional perspective suggests that natural resources can stimulate economic development (Auty, 1993) and critics of the paradox of plenty framework will often cite countries like Botswana, Chile and Malaysia as examples of this. Nevertheless, a majority of empirical data from low and middle-income countries demonstrates contrasting results (Doro & Kufakurinani, 2018; Nankani, 1980). As such, the resource curse framework has been the prevailing explanation for these disparities within the perspectives of think tanks, policy-makers, and advocates for community development.

Studies on the extractives industry have drawn on this framework because it explains the causal mechanism between resource abundance and how it translates into distributional outcomes (at the local level and nationally). They focus on issues such as the allocation of rights and mineral resources for development purposes, conflicts between companies and communities, environmental impacts of mining etc. (McMahon & Remy, 2001; Bridge, 2004; Linde, Matti & Jagers, 2012). However, this often results in a short circuit or a premature move to outcomes without an in-depth understanding of what is happening behind the scenes. There is a missing focus on the characteristics of rentiers involved and the bargains that influence distributional outcomes. As such, this research is going “behind the scenes”, tracing a specific deal (Anjin Limited in Marange) and unpacking it from start to finish before arriving at the outcomes. This approach will explain the formation, function, process, and impact of the Anjin agreement in the quest for rents and power.

## Chapter 3: The Nature of Deals

This chapter lays the foundation for the study and provides a conceptual framework for understanding the topic at hand. It synthesises the work of Pritchett, Sen and Werker (2018), Levy (2014), Nxele (2023), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Khan and Jomo (2000), Auty (2007) and North et al. (2013). Following Pritchett, Sen and Werker (2018), the framework has three core variables: institutions, political settlements and rent space. It also has an intermediary variable, the deals space. Finally, instead of examining growth episodes as an outcome variable, this study's framework departs from Pritchett et al. by examining rent distribution.

Institutions provide a framework within which human beings interact. They establish relationships within a society (North, 1990). The inclusion of political settlements is to understand the context within a country as it relates to institutions and competition in the polity. This ultimately determines the pathway to investment and development. The rent space is essential for efficiency and growth. It is the reason for interactions taking place where they will either be growth promoting or growth retarding (Khan and Jomo, 2000). The deal space is linked to credible commitment given unpredictable and informal institutions. Deals establish predictability for investors and secure property rights (Nxele, 2023). Lastly, it is necessary to include the rent distribution variable as deals often result in different development trajectories – either the pathway of growth and transformation or that of stagnation (Nxele, 2023).

### Rent Space

Khan and Jomo (2000) define rents as income in excess of the minimum amount a firm would have accepted if presented with alternative options. They arise through both legal and illegal means, including bribery, coercion, lobbying, or advertising. Consequently, rent-seeking intersects with other processes such as patron-client exchanges and corruption in Khan and Jomo's (2000) framework. Examining Asian case studies, the authors reveal that although rents are sometimes detrimental in developing countries, they may also be essential for efficiency and growth. The Asian experience demonstrates a coexistence of substantial rent-seeking and high growth. Doner and Ramsey (2000) contend that clientelism and rent-seeking in Thailand resulted in socially valuable rents, enriching the economy through competition in the industrial sector and rapid growth. This example challenges the notion that the absence of rent-seeking

leads to successful developmental outcomes. It contradicts observations in underperforming African economies where rent-seeking is identified as a primary cause of poor economic growth. In the Anjin case, the role of rents is crucial as they form the basis of the deal.

## Political Settlements

Political settlement analysis plays an influential role in development, peace, and conflict studies. According to Khan (1995), it is an inherited balance of power and “the combination of power<sup>7</sup> and institutions that are mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability” (Khan, 2010). The purpose of the political settlement is to address the fundamental governance challenge of restraining violence. There are two dimensions of power which emerge due to differing relationships between the rulers and the ruled (Levy, 2014). The first is the distribution of horizontal power which refers to whether power is concentrated in one dominant party or political leader, or competitive and dispersed across several political groups. The second dimension refers to vertical power which is the distribution of power between elites and non-elites (Khan, 2010). A weaker concentration of horizontal power in a country translates to a more competitive settlement. Where vertical power is concerned, a weaker concentration signals greater strength to non-elites and an empowered civil society that can resist corrupt or politically illegitimate institutional arrangements (Khan, 2010). This variable captures the political context of Zimbabwe which ultimately determines the interactions between investors and political actors in the Anjin deal.

## Institutions

North (1990) defines these as the “rules of the game” that constrains the actions of actors which can be individuals or organisations. Based on this premise, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) argue that inclusive political institutions (rule of law and citizen participation) and inclusive economic institutions (secure property rights, law and order, free market entry etc) are fundamental for broad-based economic growth. The authors further argue that the power relations in place determine which economic institutions will emerge. As such, institutions are politically determined and they in turn determine economic performance and resource distribution that is compatible with the prevalent power relations (Pritchett, Sen & Werker,

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
<sup>7</sup> How long a particular organization can hold out in actual or potential conflicts against other organisations or the state.

2018). An implication of this theory is that the most powerful political elites are incentivised to maintain the economic institutions that yield the greatest distribution of resources to them and political institutions that give them power (Pritchett, Sen & Werker, 2018).

### A Development Typology

Levy (2014) combines political settlement analysis and institutions to develop a typology that distinguishes between two dimensions of governance - dominant and competitive polities – and two dimensions of institutions – rule of law and personalised deal-making:

Figure 1: A Development Typology



(Source: Levy, 2014)

Using the above framework, Zimbabwe can be categorised as Dominant discretionary. The Zanu-PF leadership (with the backing of the military) has successfully consolidated its hold on power. Dominant-power politics exists in Zimbabwe whereby there is a real political space and even contestation by members of the opposition. However, Zanu-PF has dominated the political system and there appears to be no prospect of power changing hands (Carothers, 1998). Further, institutions are weak resulting in personalised rule. They do not function independently but instead are under the grip of presidential and military control – weaponised to punish dissent and weakly applied as a law enforcement mechanism against corruption.

Due to Zimbabwe’s political and institutional setup, investors often lack the confidence that positive development outcomes could emerge from their capital. As such, to mitigate the

“resource curse” hazards that arise when natural resource investments are made where domestic governance is weak, various unusual institutional arrangements are often made (Levy, 2014). Earlier literature such as Barma et al. (2012) has focused on de jure rules and formal institutions as the determinants of growth. However, this does not account for the fact that in developing countries, there exists a gap between the official de jure laws and regulations and what actually happens on the ground (de facto) (Pritchett, Sen and Werker, 2018). Consequently, deal making is necessary for credible commitment.

### Power Politics and Limited Access Orders

Power politics (often referred to as *realpolitik*) was coined by Von Treitschke (1897) and emphasises the pursuit of national interests and power by state leaders over moral, ethical, or ideological considerations. National interests include economic, military, security and geopolitical objectives and power is viewed as a critical tool to achieve them. The term Machiavellian is often used to describe the strategies and tactics employed in this regard – the use of manipulation, cunning and pragmatism to achieve political objectives (Ramsey, 2000). In the struggle for power, political protagonists employ three essential power resources : coercion, persuasion and/or incentives. That is domination established by violence to compel submission, the use of reasoned arguments to persuade one to acquiesce, and lastly rewarding obedience by offering material inducements (Bratton, 2014).

The concept of power politics can be applied to the Zimbabwean political space where leaders (particularly from the ruling party) are seen to be motivated by self-interest, maintaining dominance over rivals, and resisting independent constraints embodied in the rule of law. Because the democratic constitution and other legal codes are worth a little more than the paper they are written on, it is the informal and arbitrary practices of power that determine political outcomes in Zimbabwe (Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008). In a quest to attain desired political ends and ensure permanence in power, the ruling party does not hesitate to unleash instruments within the power politics arsenal which include political intimidation, economic exclusion, covert operations, manipulation of the law, and physical violence (Bratton, 2014). To this end, military strength and selective distribution of economic resources such as the Marange diamonds are the main sources of authority. Zimbabwean autocrats rely heavily on repression and therefore need to strengthen the hand of the armed forces (Bratton, 2014). The ruling party’s reliance on the security establishment was first developed during the liberation

struggles. The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) – a guerrilla force- was at the heart of ZANU and negotiated the establishment of a black majority government (Mitsi, Nyakudya and Barnes, 2009; Towriss, 2013). Both President Mugabe and President Mnangagwa understood the importance of military colleagues and reinforcing their loyalty through providing self-enrichment opportunities. Because of this, armed forces (namely the Joint Operations Command) receive special treatment to maintain their loyalty and they are able to claim a majority share in political decisions and economic bounty (Bratton, 2014). Economic institutions in Zimbabwe are such that income and assets are removed from society and transferred to the political class and those who keep them in power – the military elites (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). As Kasipo (2018) and Towriss (2013) point out, illicit flows from the economy are the pillar of the patronage system that ensures Zanu-PF’s hegemony within the political field and most importantly, the support the military provides to the regime.

This bargaining between political actors, security agents and economic actors takes place in the context of a Limited Access Order (LAO). North et al. (2013) define this as “economic and political arrangements that discourage the use of violence by limiting access to an organisation to the elite in order to create and maintain rents” (North et al.,2013). By manipulating institutions, elites limit access to economic and political opportunities to consolidate their own wealth and power (Harvey, 2019). As such, the system of LAOs not only permits rent seeking, but mandates it. The cooperation and stability of the coalition is tied to achieving the balance between economic power and political power, and the rent creation process (Nxele, 2023). The military elites exert hegemonic influence through various channels within the stakeholder map to control economic activity for their own benefit, to deter violence and to maintain ZANU-PF’s dominant position within the political sphere.

### The Deals Space

Deals are the intermediary variable and transmission mechanism between institutions and political settlements, and the distribution of rents. Investments are pricey and often irreversible especially in the extractives industry. As such, they pose the risk of opportunism (Levy, 2014). Ex ante, government and political leaders are strongly incentivised to coalesce support for an investment to get operations underway. However, ex post, a strong incentive to renege on their commitments and capture the benefits of the investment emerges. The treatment of Kimberlitic Searches, African Consolidated Resources and Anjin Limited in Marange are examples of this.

What resulted was sunken investments, them being forcibly removed from the diamond fields by the government and the decision being upheld by the judiciary which is meant to provide checks and balances.

In this regard, the first challenge is to provide investors with the necessary credible commitment to attract capital. Haber et al (2003) describe this as a mechanism to ensure that governments and institutions uphold commitments, build trust, and establish stability in their interactions with stakeholders including investors and international partners. The standard prescription for credible commitment is that institutions such as an impartial judiciary would protect property rights, enforce written contracts, and mediate disputes between investors and the state. But if the judicial system and other institutions are weak, there must be alternatives to address the challenge of credibility risk and inhibit shirking. This alternative is referred to as deals or elite bargains. Pritchett, Sen and Werker (2018) define this as agreements (formal or informal) among key stakeholders within a country that are reached to allocate resources (rents), power and benefits among various groups, particularly economic and political elites.


It is clear to see that there is a role for such personalised and informal relationships between private investors, political leaders, and military where institutions and politics are personalised. Further, rents are then primarily distributed within the coalition as part of the deal so that the investment remains protected. Practically, this looks like kickbacks to government officials, security agents and other political leaders.

### Corporate Political Level Deals

Nxele (2023) provides a useful framework to analyse how foreign investors engage with the political elite. It can be used to investigate whether the Anjin deal between the Chinese investors and the political elite (ruling party and security agents) is transformative or predatory. In this study, transformation is the realisation of Zimbabwe's Vision 2030. Contrastingly, predatory deals are collusive and rent-seeking in nature, contributing very little to investment and transformation.

The typology below is adapted from Nxele (2023):

Figure 2: Corporate Strategies and Engagement with Political Leadership



(Source: Adapted from Nxele, 2023)

Figure 2 illustrates the strategies of foreign mining investors as well as the expected outcomes. Investors can be extraction driven which means that they engage in economic institutions that extract wealth from the society at large to benefit a smaller subset (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). What often emerges as a result are collusive deals and predatory engagement with political leadership. Predatory deals are personalised for rent-seeking purposes rather than the imperative of investment (Nxele, 2023). Alternatively, investors can be investment driven and engage in inclusive economic institutions that foster economic activity, productivity, growth and prosperity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). As such, engagement with political power will be transformative.

Nxele (2023) refers to the third route as legalism which focuses on regulatory compliance. Along this route, investors are only concerned with de jure institutions to keep predation and expropriation at bay. In summary, predatory capital behaves collusively which often results in the abuse of resources, little to no investment and poor transformation outcomes. Transformative capital establishes good deals that promote investment and durable transformation.

## Rent distribution


The distribution of rents is the outcome of the nature of deals (intermediary variable) and also a function of institutions and the political settlement (core variables). Elite bargains lead to different outcomes that either foster growth and development, or hinder it leading to stagnation. Auty's Rent Cycling Theory (2007) examines rent distribution by emphasising the interplay between government incentives, agreements, and the resulting economic structure. The fundamental premise of this theory posits that the extent or size of rents will influence political incentives, either steering an economy towards or away from its optimal development trajectory (Auty, 2010). Lower rents create an incentive for public good provision as they are directed through markets rather than patronage mechanisms, fostering a virtuous economic cycle. Conversely, higher rents encourage economic and political actors to engage in rent capture and personal enrichment, diminishing broad-based wealth creation. Rents are then cycled through patronage networks instead of market mechanisms, perpetuating a negative economic cycle (Auty, 2010). Formally, “(1) high rent diverts government incentives from wealth creation into patronage cycling that distorts the economy, retards institution building, depresses investment efficiency and causes a growth collapse; (2) recovery from a collapse is protracted due to the inertia of rent cycling; and (3) the negative effects of high rent are amplified when rent is concentrated on governments (as with mining)” (Auty, 2007).

The Anjin Marange case closely mirrors the Rent-Cycling Theory where high rents in diamond mining are observed to be incentivising security and political agents into rent capture and self-enrichment rather than broad-based wealth creation. As per the framework, what emerges is looting, corruption, poor remittances to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and negative local level outcomes.

Rents also ensure the stability of an institutional arrangement and deal. As North et al. (2013) put it, the evolution of policy in the deals space is the outcome of rent distribution. To illustrate, diamond mining rights in Zimbabwe have evolved significantly since the first find in 2006 : DeBeers >> ACR >> ZMDC >> Joint Ventures >> Nationalisation (ZCDC) >> Joint Ventures >> Private Investors. The common denominator observed with each policy change is contention regarding rent distribution, particularly in the elite coalition. For instance, in 2016, Mugabe exercised a credible threat by nationalising the diamond mining industry following

inadequate revenue flowing into government coffers particularly from Anjin. This evolution of diamond mining rights in Zimbabwe will be analysed in greater detail in the empirical section. All the above can be synthesised into the conceptual framework below in Figure 3 to underpin this study:

Figure 3: The Nature of Deals Conceptual Framework



(Source: Adapted from Pritchett, Sen and Werker, 2018 and Nxele, 2023)

This chapter outlined a conceptual framework that shows possible paths to rent distribution in the diamond mining sector given the interactions between other variables such as political settlements, institutions, the rent space and deals. This framework will be placed within a methodology as outlined in the following chapter. Further, it is an empirically adoptable framework for studying the relationship between the Anjin deal and rent distribution in the Marange diamond fields.

## Chapter 4: Methodology

In research, the conventional approach is to begin with a theory to be tested by the study. However, this paper proposes an iterative approach which moves between the literature, theory, and empirical observations. The Analytic Narratives Research Methodology and the Process Tracing Method inform this approach.

### The Analytic Narratives Research Methodology

The Analytic Narratives Research Methodology is particularly useful in studying political and economic institutions, governance, and development issues (Bates et al., 1998; Levi, 2002). This method combines narrative storytelling with analytical and empirical techniques to analyse and explain complex political and social phenomena. To start off, a puzzle or problem is selected and then a model is built to explain the puzzle using a unique case study (Levi and Weingast, 2016). The methodology involves four key “steps” as follows:

***First: Extracting from the narratives.*** The researcher tells the story as a detailed and textured account. This involves explaining the key players, their preferences, the key decision points, and the institutions in a sequenced account.

***Second: Build the model:*** The researcher creates a model or generates a theory of the sequence of interactions, including predicted outcomes.

***Third: Evaluate and Modify the theory:*** The evidence may contradict the model, highlight overlooked features of the data, or predict new relationships entirely. If the case does not confirm expectations as outlined by the theory, then the researcher reformulates the model to think about the problem or puzzle in a different way.

***Fourth: Postdiction:*** The researcher explains or interprets the case and outcomes based on theoretical framework and causal explanations developed. Overall, the theory should help the researcher make sense of the historical events and give understanding on why they unfolded the way they did.

Overall, this approach is useful in evaluating causal mechanisms when analysing a specific case study. The iterative process allows us to test the theory and ultimately isolate the one which best explains the case. Further, the Analytic Narratives Methodology is versatile and balances the depth of historical analysis with the rigor of political and economic theory.

### Process Tracing

Similar to the Analytic Narratives approach is Process Tracing (George and Bennett, 2005; Collier, 2011). It will be used as a complement to strengthen the agility of the causal narrative nature of this study. The method seeks to identify the causal chain between explanatory variable(s) and the outcome of the dependent variables (George & Bennett, 2005). Process tracing focuses on how events or situations unfold over time i.e. taking snapshots at critical junctures and observing change or sequence. It allows one to work backwards from an observed outcome, using empirical records to ultimately uncover the chain of events that explain the case.

Overall, the iterative process of the methodology blurs the distinction between deduction and induction, and moves away from the conventional notion of hypothesis testing (Levi and Weingast, 2016). Reformulation rather than falsification is the dominant response to disconfirmation. There is consistent movement between the literature, theory, and empirical observations, with modifications being made in light of case materials. This ultimately results in a match between the theory and empirical observations (Levi and Weingast, 2016). In this regard, the paper first characterises the nature of investments and then argues the following:

***These high barrier arrangements between foreign capital and the political military elite result in negative distributional consequences by limiting rents from flowing to local communities and the economy.***

High barrier arrangements refer to barriers to entry arising from elites limiting access to economic and political opportunities by manipulating institutions to consolidate their own power and wealth (Harvey, 2019). This can also be simply referred to as deals. “Foreign capital” in this instance specifically refers to Chinese investment . “Local communities” refers to those that are most affected by or whose geographical location is in close proximity to the extractive activities (Muchadenyika, 2015).

The study will follow a qualitative approach as this will allow a dynamic view and detailed analysis of what is happening in the Anjin Marange case. It will attribute a deeper and nuanced understanding of the observed processes, events, and patterns as well as how they have unfolded over time. A case study design is adopted as it enables in-depth analysis of the unique features surrounding the Anjin and Marange diamond story. It is useful when analysing complex and unique cases where statistical analysis and experimental designs would otherwise not be suitable. Further, case studies develop, refine, or challenge existing theories, and could lead to the formulation of new theories based on empirical evidence. This is seen in the preceding chapter where the observations from the Anjin case are organised into a conceptual framework.

### Data and data collection

Due to the controversy and politics surrounding Marange diamonds, there is a lack of Zimbabwean-authored academic research on elite deals. Consequently, this study relies on data from external entities such as The Sentry, Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, The Daily Maverick, along with legislation, interviews, documentaries, and other academic journal articles that delve into these deals. Additionally, due to the contentious nature of Marange diamonds, access to Marange communities is restricted. Nevertheless, there is valuable secondary data and literature provided by organizations with established connections to the communities of interest, including ActionAid International Zimbabwe, ZELA, Centre for Research and Development, Oxfam and Centre for Natural Resource Governance.

### Ethical considerations

This research draws on documents, records and data that are all publicly available and does not involve human participants.<sup>8</sup>

### Potential limitations of study

Despite the many advantages of the case study design, there are limitations which include potential bias. This is particularly the case when the researcher shapes their findings on their preconceived notions or perspectives. However, this is eliminated through proper application

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<sup>8</sup> Ethics clearance process completed

of the methodology which enhances reliability, validity, and objectivity of the study. The purpose of the research is to trace the Anjin Marange deal detailing how it works. The data collection and analysis to achieve this is done iteratively. Therefore, the data speaks for itself throughout the research process, rather than confirming pre-existing ideas. Another limitation is limited generalisability because findings from a specific case may not be generalised easily to other contexts or populations. This limited capacity in generalisation is also considered the Achilles' heel of Analytic Narratives as each narrative accounts for a particular puzzle in a specific context with a theory and model tailored to that situation (Levi and Weingast, 2016).

## Chapter 5: Empirical Case Study

### What happened leading up to Anjin being awarded a mining license in Marange?

#### Diamond Rush and Political Context (2006 – 2007)

One of the world's largest alluvial diamond deposits was discovered in Marange in 2006 (Towriss, 2013). While this find generated significant interest and movement, Kimberlitic Searches (a subsidiary of the De Beers Group) had been undertaking feasibility studies and prospecting in the region from 1993 – 2006. During this time, the company illegally extended its Exclusive Prospecting Order (EPO) beyond 1999 to 2006. Additionally, De Beers was mining and not exploring. It is alleged that the company looted over 100 000 tonnes of diamonds worth billions of dollars (Guardian & Sun, 2012). Magawu (n.d.) further argues that the government was fully aware of what was happening at this time yet chose to turn a blind eye. De Beers' EPO for the Marange Area was set to expire in March 2006. Leading up to this, Members of Parliament began to push for an investigation into the activities that were taking place in the diamond fields. In response, De Beers notified the government that it would not be extending its EPO for undisclosed reasons (Ndlovu, 2018).

Thereafter, the scramble for the Marange diamonds fell onto new entrants tied to political elites. African Consolidated Resources PLC (ACR) – a UK based company – applied for and was awarded the rights for exploration and mining in Marange. After announcing the discovery of gem and industrial diamonds in Marange, ACR proposed a 50/50 joint venture to the government via ZMDC. This was rejected by the Ministry of Mines citing irregularities in their application and ACR was forcibly removed from the claims. ACR's title to the Marange deposit and property were awarded to ZMDC. The politics surrounding ACR forced removal from Marange is worth noting because it is linked to two major factions within Zanu-PF that emerged after independence in 1980. One led by former vice president, Joyce Mujuru and her husband, former general Solomon Mujuru. The other major faction was led by current president (former Minister of Defence), Emmerson Mnangagwa (Munier, 2016) and aligned with the Joint Operations Command (JOC). The terms JOC, political military elite, and securocrats will be used interchangeably throughout this paper to refer to high ranking security agents within the military, the CIO and ZRP.

At the time in question, the JOC comprised of the following members:

- Emmerson Mnangagwa (Chair of JOC)
- General Constantine Chiwenga (Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces; current Vice President and Minister of Health and Child Welfare)
- Lieutenant General Phillip Sibanda (Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army)
- Air Marshal Perence Shiri (Commander of the Air Force of Zimbabwe and RG Mugabe's cousin)
- Commissioner Augustine Chihuri (Zimbabwe Republic Police)
- Major General (Ret) Paradzai Zimondi (Head of the Zimbabwe prison service)
- Happyton Bonyongwe (Director-General of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO))
- Gideon Gono (Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe)

The JOC are the ultimate decision-making power in Zimbabwe and the supreme instrument in coordinating state security (Heywood, 2021). They are considered the “high priests of Zimbabwean politics and the final arbiters of tough decisions” (Martin and Taylor, 2010). Their direct involvement in Marange, as will be seen in later sections of this paper, points to their ability to exert hegemonic influence within the stakeholder map to control economic activity for their own benefit.

In an interview conducted by Martin and Taylor (2010) with an ACR representative in 2010, it was uncovered that Solomon Mujuru was a shareholder in the company. Although ACR says his shareholding was no more than 3% - or 240 000-pounds sterling - this is widely rejected (Martin and Taylor, 2010; Munier, 2016). The River Ranch diamond mine which is located near the South African border, was the largest in Zimbabwe before the discovery of diamonds in Marange and it was mined by ACR (Munier, 2016). River Ranch is also colloquially known as “Mujuru's mine” where paperwork listed him down as a director of River Ranch Limited. With this in mind, it could be suggested that ACR (which was linked to Mujuru) was removed from Marange due to factional struggles within Zanu-PF and in order for the JOC to monopolise the country's diamond resources.

Playing out simultaneously was the diamond rush of artisanal miners (ASM) to the region. During this time, Zimbabwe was facing significant economic woes. In the political space, tensions between the ruling Zanu-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were mounting. Investor confidence had reduced drastically in response to the land grabs, governance issues and human rights abuses became prevalent at that time. All these factors contributed to economic depression in Zimbabwe (Chimonyo, Mungure and Scott, 2017). It is against this backdrop that the government seemingly turned a blind eye to the rush of artisanal diamond miners while other ZANU-PF officials even went as far as to encourage this haphazard activity. This was all believed to be politically motivated and to gain support from the public (Gandu, 2007; Thornycroft, 2006; Chimonyo, Mungure and Scott, 2017).

During this dispensation, tensions in Zanu-PF escalated due to factional struggles for internal succession<sup>9</sup> and control of the Marange diamond field. ACR legally challenged its removal from the area. The High Court ruled to uphold the EPO agreement with the government and proceed with mining operations. Despite the ruling, it appears that members of the JOC teamed up to bar the Mujuru faction from the fields with the favour of the central state.

#### Operation Chikorokoza Chapera (Operation end to illegal mining activities) (2007 – 2008)

An estimated 35000 people were informally mining in the region by December of 2006 (Global Witness, 2017). At that time, the MMCZ was the only legal diamond buyer and trader. However, illegal miners reneged on this leading to large volumes of diamonds being smuggled out of the country (Mobbs, 2009). To deal with the issue of ASM, 600 security agencies were deployed to the Marange diamond fields to restore law and order. This was known as Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. During this time, various deals were in place and different interests often struggled against each other and co-existed. What ensued was a network of economic and political interests which consisted of government officials, security agents (low-level to high ranking officials), state-mining operators, artisanal miners and black market traders (Saunders, 2014).

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<sup>9</sup> General Mujuru wanted his wife, the joint Vice President Joyce Mujuru to succeed Robert Mugabe instead of then Defence Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa

Security agents who were responsible for enforcing the law in the diamond fields were alleged to have been working with illegal miners by granting access to secured zones in exchange for bribes and commissions. Syndicates were formed which comprised two to five security agents and approximately 30 miners (Saunders, 2014). According to a cable on Wikileaks, US Ambassador James McGee wrote to Washington in 2008 that high-ranking government officials and political military elites were also generating millions of dollars by hiring panners to extract diamonds on their behalf. McGee met with Andrew Cranswick, the chief executive of ACR, who implicated regime members and elites including Grace Mugabe (first lady at that time) and JOC members in illegal diamond mining (McGee, 2008).

Zimbabwe's state institutions demonstrated a lack of harmonisation, leading to conflicting regulations and announcements (Saunders, 2014). The Senate's casual approach to the Chiadzwa situation clashed with the central state's intent to end Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM). The Precious Stones Amendment Bill, criminalising illicit diamond mining, was passed in September 2007. However, impending 2008 harmonised elections postponed its full enforcement (Nyamunda and Mukwambo, 2012). To formalise Marange operations, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) was expedited in parliament in 2007 and signed by President Mugabe before the March 2008 elections. The IEEA aimed to increase indigenous Zimbabwean participation in company ownership and management, mandating 51% ownership by indigenous people or the government across sectors like banking, mining, and strategic industries. The legislative change, coupled with the push for ZMDC to take control, seemed intentional, facilitating politically-connected private firms and securocrats to mine the region.

#### Operation Hakudzokwe (Operation no return) and Political environment (2008)

In the 2008 harmonised elections, Zanu-PF faced a setback when opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai secured 48 percent of the votes compared to Mugabe's 43 percent (Mail & Guardian, 2012). The absence of a 50 percent plus one majority led to a run-off, marked by widespread violence orchestrated by war veterans and Zanu-PF militia under security agencies' directives. The Chiadzwa diamonds funded these violent activities, providing a lifeline to a regime on the verge of collapse. The run-off election, won by Mugabe with 90 percent of the vote, faced international condemnation, leading to calls for a power-sharing agreement.

Christopher Mushowe, Zanu-PF's parliamentary candidate for the Mutare West constituency (where Marange is located), promoted ASM during his campaign espousing the notions of indigenisation and black empowerment all in a bid to consolidate political support (Nyamunda and Mukwambo, 2012). Following his electoral loss, Mugabe appointed him Governor of Manicaland Province. A source claims that after his appointment, Mushowe chaired a meeting with the JOC where he expressed bitterness at the low voter turnout and his election loss. He claimed that the Chiadzwa people did not uphold their end of the bargain by not voting for Zanu-PF and threatened to crush them (Alternative Information and Development Centre [AIDC], 2016; McGee, 2008).

Also noteworthy during this time is the growing discontentment across Zimbabwe due to the poor economic situation. This severely affected various stakeholders including the military which scaled down in strength from nearly 40000 to 26000 due to under-remuneration (Smith, 2008). In response, soldiers rioted in the city centre of Harare in November. This discontentment among the military posed itself as a threat to the Mugabe regime because a close relationship exists between security agencies and Zanu-PF to maintain the party's hegemony in Zimbabwean politics.

Lastly, Zimbabwe's membership in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was in jeopardy given the smuggling rings in Marange and illegal digging which were a clear breach of the KPCS requirements. It is against this backdrop and within this political context that Operation Hakudzokwi was launched in late 2008. A JOC meeting took place and it was concluded that the army would be sent to Chiadzwa. The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Airforce of Zimbabwe (AFZ) were deployed to Marange and given full control of the diamond fields to rectify "ZRP's failures". However, when the military took over the Marange diamond fields, the operation of illegal syndicates continued to their benefit. During this dispensation the objectives of party patronage, elite accumulation, and securing Zanu-PF's hegemony in the political sphere converged. Further, the prominent role that security agencies play in Zimbabwean politics was apparent. At a time when Zanu-PF's popularity had dwindled and their hegemonic status in the political space challenged due the GPA, the party relied on the security agents to sustain its dominance. In turn, the military and securocrats were given full access to the Marange Diamond fields.

Government of National Unity, international pressure, the KPCS and formalisation of mining operations (2009)

Under the Government of National Unity (GNU), Mugabe retained the presidency, and Tsvangirai was the Prime Minister (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010). Zanu-PF maintained control of crucial ministries like Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Defence, and International Security, while the opposition oversaw less politically sensitive areas such as Education and Health. However, Tendai Biti from the opposition became the influential Minister of Finance, setting the stage for financial struggles among loyalists to Mugabe and Zanu-PF, particularly security agencies (Global Witness, 2012a).

In January 2009, the European Union (EU) tightened sanctions on Zimbabwe's leadership, placing ZMDC under embargo due to concerns about illicit diamond trade supporting Zanu-PF and repressive actions (Partnership Africa Canada [PAC], 2009). The EU condemned violence by security agencies in Marange, leading to a prohibition on mineral and precious stone trade between Zimbabwe and the EU for undermining democracy and human rights (Centre for Natural Resource Governance [CNRG], 2013).

Simultaneously, the Kimberley Process (KP) faced pressure to address human rights abuses in Marange. In 2009, a KP delegation visited Marange, recommending immediate demilitarisation and suspension of Zimbabwe from rough diamond exports until Marange production was regulated. The army refused to vacate the diamond fields despite a pledge for their withdrawal (Mail & Guardian, 2009). In fact, the ZDF consolidated their presence through regular rotations in the diamond fields – a policy designed to maintain their loyalty to Zanu-PF by giving them access to Zimbabwe's mineral wealth (HRW, 2009a). Despite the overwhelming evidence of smuggling and human rights abuses in the Marange diamond fields, the KP refused to suspend Zimbabwe. Instead, a Joint Work Plan (JWP) proposed by the Zimbabwean government<sup>10</sup> was adopted with the purpose of identifying and engaging potential investors (Wise, 2009). Obert Mpofu soon announced two joint ventures with Grandwell Holdings, and Core Mining and Mineral Resources. However, later revelations exposed these choices as suboptimal due to a lack of mining experience and links to smuggling activities (Towriss, 2013). Further, Zimbabwe's tender laws were contravened and the ZMDC circumvented in the selection process. When questioned by the Portfolio Committee on Mines

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<sup>10</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/133851.pdf>

and Energy [PCME] in 2013, Mpfu refused to disclose who had picked these joint venture partners and instead alluded that the process was conducted by an unknown person or body (Towriss, 2013). There is also no documented role played by MDC in the selection of investment partners and the drawing up of contracts (Maguwu, 2013).

### Anjin Investments granted concessions in Marange (2009 – 2016)

Anjin Investments (PVT) Ltd was another joint venture formed in December 2009 under the JWP. It had rights to mine 5 concession blocks in Marange, making it the biggest miner (Chikane and Bockstael, 2011). This was corroborated by Munyaradzi Machacha, the director of Anjin, who claimed that it was the largest diamond mining company (Chronicle, 2011). However, in May 2012, Finance Minister Biti stated that Anjin had not made any remittances to the Treasury since it began operations. He voiced deep concerns of diamond revenues being used as off-budget financing for a parallel government (Mphambela, 2012).

Table 1 Ownership structure of Anjin Ltd

Player	Role
Shelton W Kativhu	Director of Matt Bronze
Pennelope Rujeko	Director of Matt Bronze
Prudentius Kativhu	Director of Glass Finish
Tinashe Kunze	Director of Glass Finish
General Charles Tarumbwa	Judge Advocate General at the Ministry of Defence
Peng Zheng	Director of Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (Group) Co LTD (AFECC)
Martin Rushwaya	Former secretary in the Ministry of Defence
Oliver Chibage	Retired ZRP commissioner
Munyaradzi Machacha	Zanu – PF director of publications
Romeo Daniel Mutsvunguma	Retired Colonel

(Source: *Global Witness, 2012b*)

A 2012 ZMDC report reveals that AFECC owns 50 percent of Anjin, while ZMDC and the “Government of Zimbabwe” own 10 percent and 40 percent respectively. AFECC is a Chinese construction company that built the National Defence College of Zimbabwe. This was financed through a US\$98 million loan from the Chinese Exim Bank (Mashinga, 2011). Revenues generated by Anjin formed part of the loan repayment (Financial Gazette, 2011). It is widely believed that Anjin is in fact owned and controlled by the Ministry Defence and that it was set up to “legitimately” provide financing to Zimbabwean security agencies (Guma, 2012). A Compliance Verification Report of Anjin by the KP shows that the company is a 50/50 joint

venture between AFECC and Matt Bronze, which is contrary to the ZMDC report (Chikane and Bockstael, 2011). The Global Witness (2012b) uncovers that this is representative of the 40 percent allotted to the “Government of Zimbabwe”.

The Zimbabwean company registry states that Matt Bronze was formed on the 24<sup>th</sup> December 2009 and listed as its directors are Penelope Rujeko and Shelton W Kativhu – individuals with no public profile in the extractives industry (Global Witness, 2012a). According to the Zimbabwe Independent (2012), Matt Bronze was formed by ZMDC and the ZDF via a shell company called Glass Finish (PVT) Ltd in a shareholding ratio of 20:80 respectively. The directors of Glass Finish are Tinashe Kunze and Prudentius Kativhu, who when tracked down by the Independent were shocked to learn about their connection to Glass Finish, Matt Bronze and thus, Anjin Ltd (Zaba and Marima, 2012). Kunze explained that the pair ran Prudent Financial Services until 2009 which specialised in selling shelf companies. He also stated that they had sold those shelf companies to Brigadier General Charles Tarumbwa in 2009 (Zaba and Marima, 2012). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) identified General Tarumbwa as Judge Advocate General at the Ministry of Defence. Further, he is listed as the sole Zimbabwean Director on Anjin’s company records and the rest are Chinese nationals. Pheng Zheng (representing AFECC) and Mr Tarumbwa (representing Matt Bronze) signed the agreement which established Anjin in 2009 (Global Witness, 2012b).

The company’s Zimbabwean executive board membership also points to military and police control of Anjin. The board includes Martin Rushwaya (former secretary in the Ministry of Defence), Oliver Chibage (retired ZRP commissioner) and Romeo Daniel Mutsvunguma (retired colonel) (Mail & Guardian, 2013). According to eyewitness accounts given to the Human Rights Watch (2008), Romeo Mutsvunguma shot and fatally wounded Tabeth Marume in Marange during Operation Hakudzokwi.

At the occasion when Anjin executives were granted a mining licence, they met with President Mugabe and Mnangagwa pictured below:

Figure 1 Anjin Executives, President Mugabe and Defence Minister Hon. ED Mnangagwa



(Global Witness, 2012b)

Therefore, it is plausible that Mnangagwa who was the Defence Minister at that time and the front-runner to succeed Mugabe, granted Anjin the Marange concessions (Global Witness, 2012b). MDC Parliamentarian, Hon Settlement Chikwinya, alleged that Mnangagwa had indeed given Anjin its concessions when he was acting Mines Minister while Obert Mpofo was away (Makombe, 2017). When Global Witness reached out to Anjin for a comment, the company said that the concessions were issued by the Ministry of Mines and granted by President Mugabe by legal procedures (Global Witness, 2012b). However, military ownership of Anjin was verified by the deputy minister of mines Gift Chimankire during a parliamentary enquiry in June 2012 (Jamasmie, 2012).

Matt Bronze being a front company for the ZDF, military and police points to the fact that security agencies are securing off-budget financing through diamonds. This is problematic because it undermines democracy, and civilian and parliamentary oversight. These institutions

acting with few checks and balances are further incentivised to maintain these rent seeking structures. MDC taking over the Ministry of Finance set the stage for off-budget funding for partisan security agents that were loyal to the Mugabe regime (Global Witness, 2012b). The political military's direct control of Anjin undercuts the democratic processes in place in Zimbabwe. It ultimately enables Zimbabwe's security agents to set and finance their own agenda without oversight or scrutiny from elected officials.

#### Rents distributed to military and China

Historically, military expenditure was the second largest item on the national budget however after spending cuts by Biti it became the fifth largest allocation (Moyo, 2012). Data from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) shows that the government received US\$41 million in 2011 from Marange diamond sales of approximately US\$230 million. This was against the projected US\$600 million in diamond sales for that year and the assumption that a diamond carat was worth US\$1300 (Moyo, 2012). The 2012 diamond export figures surged to approximately US\$565 million however, only US\$41 million was received by the government in dividends and taxes (CRD, 2015). As a result, Minister Biti announced a budget of US\$3.4 billion - a cut from US\$4 billion - and stated that additional expenditure would only take place if US\$600 million from diamond revenues was remitted to the treasury (Global Witness, 2012b).

The security forces perceived this as a threat to their financial interests, status, and power. The Defence Secretary at that time condemned the budget cuts and stated that the military – who perceive themselves as custodians of Zimbabwe – were being reduced to mere tribesmen (Towriss, 2013). The Marange diamond fields therefore provided an opportunity for off-budget financing of arms and other military equipment. During their investigations in Marange, the Daily Mail claimed that “one of Mugabe’s most senior intelligence chiefs” confirmed that a government-to-government deal existed between China and Zimbabwe, where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would supply military hardware in exchange for rough diamonds (Malone, 2010). The construction of a 2-kilometre runway in Chiadzwa with a fully operational control tower was an indication that large volumes of diamonds were indeed being exported to China. This is further corroborated by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control accusing Anjin of smuggling 3.7 million carats of diamonds to China to which Anjin argued were government sanctioned (Nyaungwa, 2016). By May 2012 only US\$30.4 million had been received by the Treasury from diamond companies. Anjin had remitted nothing since it began operating in

Marange (Moyo, 2012). The military benefitted by receiving military hardware at a time when their budget allocation had been drastically cut. Further, AFECC built the National Defence College of Zimbabwe which was financed by a US\$98 million loan from the Chinese Exim Bank (Mashinga, 2011). The loan would be paid off by the Marange diamonds and revenues generated through Anjin (Financial Gazette, 2011). China in turn would receive millions of carats of diamonds to satiate its expanding appetite for industrial diamonds and those of gem quality for jewellery manufacture.

### Rents to Mugabe: 2013 Presidential Elections

Zanu-PF had an overwhelming victory during the 2013 harmonised elections. Mugabe secured 61% of votes while Tsvangirai received 33%. Zanu-PF also increased parliamentary seats from 99 to 159, while MDC-T's saw a decrease to 49 seats (Raftopoulos, Kanyenze and Sithole, 2021). Mugabe described his victory as “God’s choice” and referred to his presidency as a “divine task”. However, what would soon emerge is the secret to his election success.

The Centre for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG) conducted research in 2013 to investigate the source of Zanu-PF election funds. According to CIO documents obtained by the research team, the electoral success was achieved through financial support of \$1 billion in diamonds, income from two diamond companies, as well as direct intervention by the Chinese Communist Party (CNRG, 2021). Anjin was one of the companies that funded Mugabe’s re-election effort through diamond revenues. In the documents, retired army colonel and head of the Zimbabwean Defence Industries (ZDI) Tshinga Dube was to secure resources from Anjin to undertake “Special Projects” leading up to the election (Sharife, 2013). The documents reveal that overall US\$800 million came from Anjin Ltd and Mbada Diamonds (CNRG, 2021). The funds and diamonds would be used to fulfil the following strategy to secure votes:

- Recording fewer than ten legitimate voters on “specific days following direct instructions from Nikuv<sup>11</sup>” and the Party;
- Inflating voter numbers on the electoral roll before and during elections to counter unfavourable voting outcomes;

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<sup>11</sup> Nikuv International Projects is an Israeli company that specializes in large technology projects including registries and passports

- Conducting parallel registration and mobilization in hostile constituencies in collaboration with the Registrar's Office and Chung Huwao- an official of the Chinese Communist Party;
- Impeding registration within the 18-35 age group while excessively registering voters aged 35-90;
- Utilizing housing programs to "re-orient beneficiaries" and include them on the voter roll;
- Intentionally causing congestion in the registration process of the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) by deploying "security personnel and trusted associates to delay the process as advised by Nikuv<sup>12</sup>."

(Source: Sharife, 2013)

As such, the CIO documents implicate Anjin Ltd in interfering with Zimbabwean political processes, including elections, in favour of the ruling party – ZANU(PF).

#### Rents to Emmerson Mnangagwa

The Lacoste faction within Zanu-PF refers to those who are aligned with Emmerson Mnangagwa. It mainly consists of liberation leaders and has been historically close to the ZDF. Mnangagwa's close ties with the military predates the liberation struggle where he served as a guerrilla commander and coordinated military efforts. This relationship has continued post-independence and plays a significant role in his political career (to be discussed in the following section). Mnangagwa's relationship with the military can also be understood through prebendalism. Through the distribution of state resources to the military and fellow securocrats, Mnangagwa has secured their support politically.

The majority shareholder of Anjin is Brigadier-General Tarumbwa, a senior law officer in the Ministry of Defense. Then Minister of Defense Emmerson Mnangagwa played an instrumental role in securing Anjin's mining license (Mambondiyani, 2021). He is a top member of the military elite with very close ties to China and Anjin. During this dispensation, he was a regular VIP visitor to the Anjin site along with General Chiwenga (PAC, 2012). In a bombshell

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<sup>12</sup> Eddie Cross – MP for MDC – revealed that security sources informed him that Nikuv was working on the voters roll at the Defence House. This is the headquarters of the ZDF. Cross has repeatedly proven to be well-informed and reliable on security matters (Sole, 2013).

interview, former Zanu-PF Secretary for Administration, Didymus Mutasa, confirmed that Mnangagwa had indeed been dealing directly with the Marange diamonds through his involvement in the military and Anjin. Mutasa (2015) stated that “those who benefitted from diamonds in Chiadzwa are (VP Emmerson) Mnangagwa and others from the army including a company called Anjin ”.

In a United Nations Security Council (2002) report, Mnangagwa was implicated, among other officials and military figures, for looting diamonds and other mineral resources from the war-ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Further, he has been linked to an underground gold mining syndicate (Mutasa, 2015). As such, it comes as no surprise that he plays a key role in the Anjin Marange deal, receiving a significant share of the rents.

#### Rents to Obert Mpofu

Senior government officials closely linked to diamond extraction amassed great riches overnight. An example of this is Obert Mpofu who was the Mines and Mining Development Minister between 2009 and 2013 when mining activities were commercialised (The Citizen, 2016). While the President’s office was the ultimate authority over mineral resources, Mpofu was theoretically the gatekeeper and chief custodian of Marange. However, in practice, he often deferred those responsibilities to the JOC (PAC, 2012). Prior to his appointment in the mines ministry, Mpofu was a businessman with a modest profile. In his new role, his portfolio boasted high-value investments in banking, transport, tourism, mining, media and ranching. He is referred to as the half owner of the resort town of Victoria given his substantial investments in real estate and touring companies, and the King of Matabeleland (PAC, 2012)

#### Anjin de-licensed and barred from Marange, factional struggles in Zanu-PF and military coup (2016 - 2018)

President Mugabe announced the nationalisation of the diamond mining industry in 2016 due to US\$15 billion in revenue that could not be accounted for. The former president is on record condemning the mining companies in Marange for “swindling and smuggling” the wealth of Zimbabwe (Zulu, 2016). Anjin in particular was de-licensed and barred from further mining activities in Marange. The company unsuccessfully appealed its eviction in the High Court,

Supreme Court and Constitutional Court<sup>13</sup>. ZCDC was set up by the government as a merger of Kusena Diamonds, Marange Resources, Gye Nyame, Diamond Mining Company and DTZ-OZGEO (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre [BHRRC], 2021). This action was framed as a step towards increasing transparency and accountability within the diamond industry in response to mounting concerns regarding the insufficient revenues generated.

However, it is more plausible that this move was a result of factional struggles within Zanu-PF. Intra-party fighting within Zanu-PF for succession after Mugabe often played itself out in the Marange Diamond fields as each faction wanted to control diamond resources (The Zimbabwean, 2010). To illustrate, Canadile was believed to also have been linked to Solomon Mujuru while Mbada Diamonds was linked to Mnangagwa and the Mugabes (Towriss, 2013). In November 2010, Canadile officials were arrested for “fraudulently obtaining a mining license by misrepresenting the company’s capacity to fund operations” (British Broadcasting Company [BBC], 2010). Those arrested included Tichaona Muhonde, Ashton Ndlovu and Mark Tsomondo, individuals all linked to Mujuru (Towriss, 2013). The arrests are alleged to have been politically motivated and a move to outflank Mujuru by detaining Canadile officials (The Zimbabwean, 2010). Following the Wikileaks of 2008 and 2009, Mugabe became suspicious of the Mujuru faction. According to Ray (2009), Joyce Mujuru said that the old guard of Zanu-PF was giving way to “young blood” such as herself. Therefore, following a large election victory in 2013, Mugabe fired Mujuru as Vice-President and government officials associated with her office. Mnangagwa, aligned with Mugabe and with significant participation from General Chiwenga, military intelligence machinery and resources secured through Anjin, orchestrated the removal of Joyce Mujuru – putting to rest factional rivalry between the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions that spanned since the 1990s (Raftopoulos, 2017). Mnangagwa would then take her place and be strongly positioned to succeed Mugabe (Munier, 2016).

However, the G40 faction which consisted of young politicians such as Jonathan Moyo (Minister of Education), Saviour Kasukwere (Local Government Minister) and First Lady Grace Mugabe soon emerged within the party. Grace Mugabe became a cabinet minister in 2014 (the head of the Zanu-PF Women’s League) and the desire for her ascension to presidency

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<sup>13</sup> High Court Case Number : HC 2183/16 Supreme Court Case Number: SC 39/20 Constitutional Court Case Number: CCZ 6/18/11

over Mnangagwa became apparent. The rivalry between Mnangagwa's Lacoste faction and G40 openly played out on social media where the former was accused by Jonathan Moyo of looting USD\$15 billion in diamond revenues through Anjin (Moretti, 2017). In March 2016, Mugabe shut down Anjin and Jinan for "looting and robbing Zimbabwe of its wealth". The shutting down of Anjin can be linked to the succession fight between the two factions. As discussed above, Anjin provided off-budget funding to the JOC and ZDF of which Mnangagwa presided. Further it is reported to have provided substantial funding to the Lacoste faction in its presidential bid for 2018.

As such, shutting down Anjin was an attempt to hinder Mnangagwa's road to the Presidency in favour of G40 members (Gagare and Moyo, 2016). Following this, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) publicly withdrew its support for Mugabe as the 2018 presidential candidate and instead rallied behind Mnangagwa as the heir of Zanu-PF (Moretti, 2017). They openly expressed their stance that they will not permit someone who did not participate in the liberation struggle to assume leadership (referring to Grace Mugabe). Mugabe responded by dismissing eight ZNLWVA officials from the party for "undermining the authority of the president" (News24, 2016).

There are also claims from sources close to Mugabe that Anjin's eviction was in retaliation to the military's plan to overthrow him from the presidency (Matimairé, 2021). This is plausible, given that after the military coup which led to Mugabe's expulsion from the presidency and Zanu-PF, top army officials were given powerful government positions under Mnangagwa's leadership and Anjin was re-enlisted.

### China's role in the coup d'état

The notion that China influences regime change in Africa gained traction in the wake of the Zimbabwean coup d'état which saw the removal of Mugabe from the presidency.

The preceding sub-section clearly demonstrates the strong connection China has with the ZDF which also happens to be the stronghold of Mnangagwa's Lacoste faction. China has supplied a range of military hardware as well as provided funding for the construction of the National Defence College. In return, revenues from the Marange diamond mines have been diverted to China through Anjin (Banerjee and Rich, 2017).

The Marange diamond fields became a focal point of China's growing concerns about Mugabe's indigenization policy, mandating 51 percent local ownership of foreign businesses – a move that would impact numerous Chinese enterprises in Zimbabwe (Tisdall,2017). Their concerns were actualised when the government nationalised the diamond industry and integrated all companies operating in Marange into the state-owned Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) in 2015 (Banerjee and Rich, 2017). The move was met with opposition from the CCP. It also strained Sino-Zimbabwe relations and resulted in Beijing withholding support for their “long-time friend and ally” Mugabe during the 2017 coup.

Mugabe ultimately determined his fate by yielding to Grace's influence, as she aimed to take over the presidency. Under her guidance, Mugabe initiated a purge of potential contenders for the presidential role. Among those targeted was Emmerson Mnangagwa, who Grace viewed as her main rival. At a political rally, Grace Mugabe said "a snake is better dealt with by crushing the head. I will personally make sure Mnangagwa is dealt with, even if everyone else in the party is scared. I will not be intimidated" (Raftopoulos, 2017). Further, Grace warned of a coup orchestrated by Mnangagwa and the Lacoste Faction (BBC, 2017).

On November 6, the Information Minister Simon Khaya Moyo announced Mnangagwa's dismissal stating displays of “disloyalty, disrespect, deceitfulness and unreliability” which no longer aligned with his official duties (Dzirutwe, 2017). It is alleged that Mnangagwa sought refuge in China following his removal from the vice presidency. General Chiwenga also undertook an official trip to China from November 8 to 10. On this visit, Chiwenga met with Li Zuocheng from China's Central Military Commission<sup>14</sup> and China's Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan (Banerjee and Rich, 2017). Shortly after his return Harare would descend into political turmoil. The military, under General Chiwenga's leadership, would take control, leading to the house arrest of President Robert Mugabe and his eventual removal from power (Westcott and George, 2017). Mnangagwa would then assume the Presidency and bestow the military with significant roles in the government. General Chiwenga was appointed as Vice President and later as the Minister of Health and Child Welfare. Major General Sibusiso SB Moyo assumed the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs while Air Marshall Perence Shiri was designated as the Lands Minister. Retired Major General Engelbert Rugeje took on the

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<sup>14</sup> A body which oversees defence and security policymaking within the Communist Party

role of National Political Commissar within the party. Mnangagwa also extended gestures to the military through promotions and acknowledgments in civilian capacities.

While China denied any involvement in the coup, it did not categorically reject any prior knowledge of the Harare coup. Further, and more noteworthy is its lack of condemnation regarding the apparent removal of Mugabe from the presidency.

### National Diamond Policy, new joint ventures and Anjin comes back to Marange (2018 – present)

In December 2018, Cabinet approved the Zimbabwe National Diamond Policy which is meant to regulate and promote accountability in the diamond mining sector. The policy only allows for ZCDC, Murowa Diamonds and two other government-approved companies to undertake diamond exploration and mining in Zimbabwe (BHRRC, 2018). A key feature of the policy is that ZCDC has 46 percent shareholding, the local Community Trust is allocated 5 % which may be waived by the government and the rest is allocated to the foreign investor (Diamond World News Service [Diamond World], 2018).

Vast Resources is a British multi-resource operation trading stocks on the London Stock Exchange. It was formerly known as African Consolidated Resources (the same company removed from Marange in 2006). In September 2018, Vast Resources formed a joint venture with Chiadzwa Mineral Resources LTD (CMR) – designated to represent the interests of the Chiadzwa community in the concession. This led to the formation of Katanga Mining LTD (Katanga). The arrangement ensures that the local communities are beneficial recipients of profits generated through mining activities. Additionally, Vast Resources also pledged to foster forward linkages through promoting local jewellery manufacture (NewzWire, 2018). A further joint venture agreement between ZCDC and Katanga has been in the pipeline since 2019 and is yet to be officially signed despite efforts to do so (Vast Resources PLC, n.d.). Based on the framework by Nxele (2023), Vast Resources is seen to engage in transformative corporate-political deals that lead to investment driven and inclusive rent distribution. Yet it appears that the company was left out when concessions were granted to Russian company Alrosa, Anjin, ZCDC and RioZim under the new diamond policy. In December 2019, Alrosa Zimbabwe edged out Vast Resources under unclear circumstances. It is a joint venture between Alrosa (a Russian company) and ZCDC with a shareholding ratio of 70:30 respectively (Diamond World, 2019). Anjin went back to Marange in March 2019 also under very unclear circumstances. The

company ownership remains a 50/50 joint venture between AFECC and Matt Bronze (Matimaire, 2021). As illustrated in other parts of this paper, the JOC and military have established themselves as crucial factors in maintaining the dominance of the ruling party and, in turn, reap several rewards. Their ongoing involvement in the Marange diamond fields serves as evidence of this mutually beneficial relationship. Moreover, the resurgence of Anjin suggests that this dynamic may remain unchanged.

#### Rents distribution:

President Mnangagwa accused the mining companies that were previously in Marange of externalising foreign currency and failing to repatriate export proceeds. This included Anjin which was accused of externalising money to China through the payment of goods not received in Zimbabwe (The Standard, 2021). However despite this, the most lucrative concessions which were previously being mined by ZCDC were given to Anjin (Matimaire, 2021). In February 2022, the Chamber of Mines produced its annual commodity outlook report. It said that ZCDC had generated 89 percent of the 4.2 million carats extracted in 2021 and 10 percent was produced by RZM Murowa. Curiously, Anjin was not mentioned in production figures and instead the report referred to the company expecting to produce 12 million carats by 2025 (Chamber of Mines, 2022). By the end of 2021, Anjin had been operating in the most lucrative concessions in Marange for more than a year yet had not made significant diamond production according to official records.

Notably, in 2016, General Chiwenga emphasized that the military is a significant stakeholder in the country, underscoring the notion that individuals with a background in the liberation struggle hold more importance as stakeholders than those in official leadership roles (Ndawana, 2020). The reinstatement of Anjin serves as evidence supporting this claim. While officially documented as resuming operations in Marange through a joint venture with ZCDC, this representation is misleading, aiming to obfuscate the true beneficiaries of the Marange concessions currently held by Anjin and intentionally concealing the military's shareholding (Gagare and Moyo, 2016). It is apparent that securocrats persist as key shareholders and beneficiaries of the diamond wealth by strategically positioning themselves within and around joint ventures. There is a discernible shift in the military's commercial influence in Zimbabwe. The ZDF has transitioned from strictly military enterprises to significant ventures like diamond mining, acquired through legal and illicit concessions in the Marange region (Gagare and Moyo, 2016).

## 6 Analysis of Anjin using Conceptual Framework (Discussion)

This chapter will use the conceptual framework adapted from Pritchett, Sen and Werker (2018) and Nxele (2023) to analyse the Anjin deal and rent distribution in the Marange diamond fields.

### 6.1 Political Settlement Analysis of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's political history can be categorised into 4 key periods : Pre-Independence (1970 – 1980), post-Independence (1980 – 2000), The Indigenisation and Unity era (2000 – 2016) and Mnangagwa's Zimbabwe (2017 – date). The Anjin deal began in the Indigenisation and Unity era and has continued into the current dispensation under President Mnangagwa.

Drawing on Levy's (2014) typology, a hybrid political settlement existed in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2016. De jure, the Zimbabwean political field was personalised and competitive however, in practice, the nation did not undergo a genuine transition. Zanu-PF experienced devastating losses in the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections. However, the requirement of a 50% plus one majority for an outright presidential victory led to the need for a run-off election. This was preceded by violence and brutality which ultimately led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) under the supervision of SADC. A Government of National Unity was formed between 2009 and 2013 (Makombe, 2017).

Mugabe refused to step down from the presidency and Zanu-PF retained its grip on key levers of power including intelligence services, the judiciary and defence. Tsvangirai became the Prime Minister and MDC was given charge over healthcare, finance and education (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010). It is therefore clear to see that although political competition was evident, power remained firmly consolidated within the Zanu-PF camp. Mugabe's regime frequently resorted to violence and coercion to assert dominance over the political landscape. This resulted in an authoritarian and heavily militarised rule (Raftopoulos, Kanyenze and Sithole, 2021).

Under the leadership of Mnangagwa (2017 to date), a hybrid political settlement remains which is economically and politically exclusionary. De jure, Zimbabwe is characterised as personalised and competitive however de facto, the nation has further plunged into autocratic rule. Hybrid institutions also exist because while there is high organisational complexity embedded in the legislation, institutions are personalised (Levy, 2014). The law is used by Zanu-PF to suppress political dissent and control the citizenry (Maverick Citizen, 2021).

Traditional democratic institutions hold little sway in shaping political outcomes, with informal power dynamics taking precedence.

An example of the abuse of state institutions is the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) (2021) passed by the National Assembly which includes increasing the retirement age and eliminating the public interview process for judges, removal of the presidential running mate clause and increasing the number of cabinet ministers selected from outside Parliament. This move is criticised by civil society because it consolidates excessive power in the hands of the president, potentially leading to a dictatorial regime (Matanda, 2022).

## 6.2 The Deal Space and Anjin's engagement with leadership

Informal and personalised relationships between investors (economic actors) and political leadership are captured in the deals space. While de jure policies and formal rules are considered institutional determinants of economic growth, this is not the case in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. Given the country's political settlement, there is a gap between de jure laws and what actually happens. As such, the rules of the game almost have no predictive power (Pritchett, Sen and Werker, 2018). In this regard, Zimbabwean investors need the necessary credible commitment to ensure the government does not shirk on its commitments. Therefore, deals between investors, political leadership and the military are reached to allocate resources, power and benefits.

Using Pritchett and Werker's (2012) typology, the Anjin deal can be characterised as a closed deal because it is only available to those with political connections and the political-military elite of Zimbabwe.

The Mines and Minerals Act details the process to obtain mining rights in Zimbabwe. It can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Submission of a detailed application to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development
- 2) Due Diligence on applicants conducted by the Ministry to assess their technical, financial, and operational capabilities
- 3) Environmental Impact Assessment to assess the potential environmental and social impact of the mining activities proposed
- 4) Evaluation of application by the Ministry

- 5) Recommendation to the Mining Affairs Board
- 6) Lastly the granting of mining rights by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines

However, the selection of Anjin was not transparent and the normal tender processes were not followed, and excluded ZMDC in the decision making process. Due diligence processes detailed above were circumvented in favour of political connections and relationships with Zimbabwe's securocrats.

The Anjin deal could be characterised as an ordered one between 2010 to 2016. This means that once it was negotiated, officials and relevant parties to the deal honoured it and delivered on their obligations. For instance, Anjin bankrolled Zimbabwe's \$98 million loan from the EximBank to build the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence which would "safeguard Zimbabwe's sovereignty and territorial integrity" (PAC, 2012). AFECC built the college and repayment of the debt was through diamonds and revenues from Anjin. Additionally, it is alleged that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would supply military hardware in exchange for rough diamonds (Malone, 2010). Further, the revenue generated from the diamonds also provided funding to the Mugabe 2013 campaign which secured a landslide election victory. Other parties to the deal such as Mnangagwa and Mpofo would benefit too. Therefore, each party to the deal honoured their obligations and it remained secure as long as they continued to do so.

However, in 2016, the deal evolved, remaining closed but this time disordered. President Mugabe would no longer deliver on his end of the bargain. He barred Anjin from the Marange diamond fields, nationalised the industry and forced the remaining companies to be merged to form ZCDC. According to Pritchett and Werker (2012), disordered deals arise when it is no longer in the short term interests of the political elite to honour them. It was no longer in Mugabe's interest to continue to prop up the military and thus the Lacoste faction by allowing Anjin to continue operating in Marange. Mnangagwa (Lacoste faction) had been propped up to succeed Mugabe in the presidency and diamond revenues generated by Anjin would have provided much needed funding for a 2018 election campaign. However, it was no longer in Mugabe's interest for this to be the case. Instead, he sided with the G40 faction and hoped that his wife, Grace, would succeed him. As such, shutting down Anjin was an attempt to hinder Mnangagwa's road to the Presidency in favour of G40 members.

After the 2017 coup and in the Mnangagwa dispensation, Anjin was reinstated and the deal was once again ordered. While the full scope of rent distribution to the different parties of this deal is unknown, it is clear that the political military still benefit greatly from it as they remain shareholders of Anjin through Matt Bronze. In return, Mnangagwa has the much needed support and loyalty of the military that put him and will keep him in power.

Using Nxele's (2023) framework, Anjin is seen to be extraction driven, engaging with political leadership in a predatory manner. Overall, the deal is collusive and rent-seeking in nature, contributing very little to investment and transformation. Anjin has not provided any statistics nor declared revenues generated. It is equally unknown where and to whom it sells its diamonds too (CNRG, 2021). However, what is evident is the lack of rents flowing to surrounding communities and into national development. The Anjin deal could have been instrumental in the realisation of Zimbabwe's Vision 2030 and gone a long way in boosting the ailing economy, however, the outcomes discussed in the following subsection show otherwise. Ultimately, the deal has been personalised for rent-seeking purposes rather than the imperative of investment (Nxele, 2023).

### 6.3 Impacts of Anjin Mining Operations

Anjin's operations are reported to have resulted in negative social, economic, and environmental impacts in mining communities, with no recompense or government intervention.

#### Social Impacts

##### *Community displacement and relocation*

Between 2010 and 2011, approximately 1300 families were displaced and relocated to Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA) Transau in Odzi<sup>15</sup>. Anjin formulated a relocation programme and discussed it with key stakeholders prior. They pledged an investment of US\$100 million which would be used in the following areas: water and sanitation, education, healthcare services, residential homesteads, transport infrastructure, agriculture, job creation and food security (Chikane and Bockstael, 2011). In addition, each household was to be fully compensated based on the valuation of the properties left behind in Marange (New Zimbabwe, 2022). Majority of the Chiadzwa community accepted this proposition and were willing to relocate to ARDA Transau. However, post-displacement stories of those living in the community uncover a different narrative.

##### *Impact on welfare and livelihoods*

Relocated families face various challenges such as inadequate pastures, food insecurity and loss of livelihood. According to the Marange and ARDA Transau Protocol, families were allocated 0.5 hectares of land. This is inadequate to sustain farming activities and livestock production for those displaced (Natural Justice, 2014). Contrary to the agreed upon relocation programme, no alternative livelihoods have been provided nor have jobs been created. During an interview with Act Ubumbano (n.d.), a displaced woman expressed that herself and the community have been robbed of their land and livelihood sources. She lamented the untold suffering being experienced due to a lack of livelihood projects to generate income for resettled families.

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<sup>15</sup> This is a state-owned farm that was converted to a residential area for people who were forcibly relocated due to diamond mining in Chiadzwa.

Anjin promised to hire semi-skilled workers in the diamond fields. The company also said that they would provide financial and technical assistance for projects such as pig and poultry operations. Further, as per the Memorandum of Understanding, Anjin was to provide households with food hampers on a quarterly basis. This would consist of 20 kgs of sugar, 20 litres of cooking oil, 200 kgs maize meal, 20 kgs of kapenta fish, 20 kgs of sugar beans, 12 bars of soap and a carton of candles. However, Anjin has not honoured any of its promises. Relocated families were only given food hampers once in January 2012 at an event that was officiated by Emmerson Mnangagwa (New Zimbabwe, 2022). Unemployment at ARDA Transau is approximately 95% and as a result, women and young girls have resorted to sex work to earn a living (Act Ubumbano, n.d.). With that comes several health challenges including unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions (often leading to death) and a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the community (Muchadenyika, 2015).

#### *Access to clean water*

Water is supplied by the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) through a spigot for communal use however, most families are unable to afford it. Easily accessible water sources such as rivers, wells and boreholes are located long distances away from Arda Transau. A study by Matasva (2022) uncovers that households are without water for up to four months. Section 77(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) affords every citizen the right to water as such, the situation of the displaced communities is a violation of that. Further it presents health hazards and exposes communities to the risk of contracting waterborne diseases such as typhoid and cholera.

#### *Impacts on education*

A company called Chirasike constructed a primary school which Anjin relocatees share. It consists of four classroom blocks which are meant to accommodate 1900 pupils. Therefore, due to capacity constraints, most students attend their lessons in makeshift classrooms (Figure 3). In 2022, statistics from the provincial offices of the Ministry of Education (Primary and Secondary) revealed that there were 440 dropout cases from the three schools in Arda Transau – Wellington and Chirasike primary schools and Transau Secondary School. Approximately 60 percent of the dropout cases are attributed to the secondary school and 45 percent of the overall dropouts to female students (Matimaire, 2022a). These statistics are a result of poverty

and early child marriages as school going girls have become dependent on elderly men to look after them and their families.

Figure 3 Makeshift classroom



(Source: Majavu, 2022)

### *The housing situation*

Anjin built four-roomed match-box homes for relocatees without considering their family size. To illustrate, William Kaiboni Kambeni previously had more than ten houses in Marange to accommodate his 14 wives, 80 children and 20 grandchildren. Upon relocation, he was given a seven-bedroomed house to share with his family, which is not only impractical but violates his traditional beliefs (CRD, 2013). During an interview conducted by Africa Report (2021), another villager reminisced over his 16 hectare property in Chiadzwa that could accommodate him, his children and their families. However, following relocation to ARDA Transau, the family is forced to share a four-bedroomed home which violates Shona culture that prohibits sharing a house with daughters-in-law.

According to Matimaire (2022b), Anjin used its own contractors and inspectors to build homes, effectively removing all checks and balances. Further, the resettlement exercise was done in great haste so that the procedural mandatory safety inspections were not carried out. Moses Mujaji, the Zanu-PF councillor for Ward 3 encompassing Arda Transau, revealed that majority

of the houses are substandard and dangerous to live in (Matimaire, 2022b). As shown in figure 4 below, the houses are on the brink of collapse with gaping holes visible on them.

Figure 4 House built by Anjin in Arda Transau



(Source: Majavu, 2022)

### Economic Impacts

Prior to the adoption of the 2018 National Diamond Policy, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act required Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOT) to be set up which are entitled to 10% shareholding for developing mining communities. These funds could have been used to invest in livelihood projects in Arda Transau to economically empower the relocatees. Mining companies pledged a contribution of 10% of mining revenues to the Zimunya Marange CSOT however, only \$400 000 of the expected \$50 million was received from Marange Resources and Mbada Diamonds. Despite operating the largest concessions, Anjin told the Parliament Committee on Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (PCYIE) in 2016 that it did not have sufficient funds to contribute to the scheme. Due to gross mismanagement of the trust, the funds eventually ran out in 2021 leading to its collapse and further plunging displaced villagers into abject poverty (Fairplanet, 2022)..

## Environmental Impacts

The mining activities of Anjin are responsible for large scale environmental destruction. The Environmental Management Act requires that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be conducted prior to mining activities (Chapter 20:27). Further, mining companies are to outline measures to mitigate the environmental risks and implement EIA recommendations. However, Anjin has failed to comply with these requirements and produce an EIA.

In 2012, an investigation was conducted by ZELA<sup>16</sup> on the impact of Anjin's operations on the water quality in the Save River. Dangerously high levels of bacterial contamination mainly of faecal origin were found in the water which exposed villagers to waterborne diseases such as typhoid and cholera. High concentrations of fluoride - which increase the risk of skeletal<sup>17</sup> and dental<sup>18</sup> fluorosis - were discovered in the water. The study also uncovered high levels of nickel, chromium and iron. This posed a risk of contracting cancer to villagers due to nickel and chromium being potentially carcinogenic agents (ZELA, 2012). Total solids and water turbidity were found to be in excess of the environmental limits. As a result, water could not be used for irrigation of crops or as potable water. It also had negative consequences on the biodiversity of Save River and therefore livelihoods of those who relied on subsistence fishing (ZELA, 2012).

## Livelihoods of Chiadzwa communities today

Chiadzwa communities have not been welcoming towards the Chinese miners, vowing to continue fighting against the human rights violations they perpetrated between 2009 and 2016. In October 2021, Headman Robert Chiadzwa, the Chiadzwa Community Development Trust (CCDT) chairperson Newman Chiadzwa and 26 other villagers were arrested for staging a protest against Anjin after it was reinstated. This was in response to Anjin holding a traditional beer ceremony without the Chiadzwa family's knowledge and blessing – a cultural violation (BHRCC, 2021). Another point of contention is the fact that the Chiadzwa community has not yet received a 20 percent portion from diamond revenues which was promised to them by Mnangagwa during a re-engagement meeting (BHRCC, 2021). Since Anjin's return, villagers

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<sup>16</sup> A common law trust with the mandate to promote environmental justice in Zimbabwe.

<sup>17</sup> A metabolic bone disease resulting from chronic ingestion of large amounts of fluoride over time

<sup>18</sup> Changes in the appearance of tooth enamel caused by excessive ingestion of fluoride

continue to demand their socio-economic and cultural rights, as well as for the company to address their long-standing grievances.

Several years after their displacement by Anjin mining operations, negative consequences persist in Chiadzwa communities. When investigating post-displacement livelihoods, Gukurume and Tambindo (2021) uncovered that villagers still protest living at Arda Transau farm due to a lack of meaningful development in their communities and exclusion from diamond wealth. Chiadzwa people initially moved due to populist promises which largely remained unfulfilled. Compensation packages have not been paid in full (less than half in some cases), villagers have no access to basic services and amenities such as clean water, unemployment continues to increase and poverty is rife (Gukurume and Tambindo, 2021). A villager shared that he had previously worked in Mutare city and retired to his rural home in Chiadzwa where he built a 4-bedroomed house, drilled a borehole, started a fruit plantation and established a small business. He lamented losing everything after relocation to Arda Transau, stating that “they stole my pension and left me hopeless” (Gukurume and Tambindo, 2021). At the annual Kimberley Process Intersessional meeting, the CNRG (2023) rightly pointed out that the battle for human rights and dignity in Marange is far from over. What remains the biggest concern is abject poverty in a land that has an annual production of over 4 million carats (CNRG, 2023). The June 2006 diamond discovery was meant to transform the lives of the surrounding communities and the nation at large, however diamond wealth has not contributed to poverty reduction in Marange. The lack of will from Anjin and political leadership has left the Arda Transau situation unaddressed and the lives of villagers marked by destitution, suffering and extreme poverty.

## Implications for the broader Zimbabwean economy

### *The debt crisis*

Zimbabwe has been struggling with a longstanding and severe debt crisis. The situation is as a result of both domestic and external factors that have contributed to its economic challenges. Zimbabwe has accumulated debt amounting to nearly US\$18 billion – made up of US\$13 billion in external debt and US\$5 billion in domestic debt (Chikowore, 2023). Additionally, Zimbabwe has struggled to service its debt obligations therefore most of what it owes is arrears on repayments and penalties for defaulting. Overall, the debt situation is closely linked to the

broader economic challenges the country faces and constrains its ability to fund essential projects for sustainable development.

As the president of the African Development Bank (AFDB) (2023) stated, “Zimbabwe cannot run up the hill of economic recovery carrying a backpack of debt on its back”. The Mnangagwa regime rightly pointed out that Zimbabwe can service its external debt by ensuring high productivity in all sectors of the economy (Chikowore, 2023). This also includes the extractives industry which contributes 12% to Gross Domestic Product (ITA, 2022). The Chamber of Mines reported that diamond firms produced a total output of 4.2 million carats in 2021, with ZCDC contributing 89% and Murowa diamonds contributing 10%. This would mean that Anjin only produced 1% of total output, despite operating the most productive concessions (African Mining Market, 2022).

While Anjin cannot be blamed for the debt crisis that Zimbabwe faces, transparent governance and responsible management of the company has the potential to harness substantial diamond wealth which could contribute to addressing Zimbabwe’s debt crisis. For instance, instead of US\$15 billion worth of diamonds being looted, a significant portion of Anjin’s revenues could have been allocated for the repayment of outstanding debts. Its revenues can also be used in negotiations for favourable debt restructuring agreements with creditors. Further, diamond exports can be channelled towards building and/or replenishing Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange reserves thus strengthening the country’s ability to manage debts and stabilise the currency.

### *Infrastructure*

The condition of infrastructure in Zimbabwe has faced various challenges. According to the AFDB (2023), these infrastructural challenges hurt the region because Zimbabwe lies at the heart of Southern Africa. Several regional infrastructure development initiatives, such as railways, roads, and power transmission lines, have been halted due to the necessity of passing through the country. The prevailing conditions in Zimbabwe also undermine the advancement of the continental free trade agenda. It is in this regard that diamond revenues from Anjin could be allocated toward infrastructure development, including roads, energy, and water supply. Unfortunately, this is not the case due to corruption and looting allegations.

### *Service Delivery*

The predatory engagement of Anjin with political leadership also has indirect yet detrimental effects on public institutions such as the healthcare system in Zimbabwe. To illustrate, the biggest hospital in Zimbabwe only has one maternity theatre which was built in 1977 by the Smith regime. It costs approximately US\$37000 to build one maternity theatre (The Herald, 2021). One million of the US\$15 billion Mugabe declared stolen by Anjin could have built 27 maternity theatres in Zimbabwe to facilitate safe deliveries and ensure maternal health. Instead, pregnancy and childbirth related complications remain leading causes of death among Zimbabwean women of reproductive age. Investing in human capital contributes significantly to long-term economic sustainability and social well-being. This could be achieved using diamond wealth to fund social development programmes such as education, healthcare, and poverty alleviation. Instead, the industry is plagued by corruption which ultimately prevents service delivery to Zimbabweans.

Overall Zimbabwe has faced a range of challenges across various sectors and the discussion above is not exhaustive. The mining sector has great potential and is regarded as critical to Zimbabwe's economic recovery, stabilization, and eventual growth. However, issues to do with governance, transparent regulatory frameworks and corruption hinder this potential. Zimbabwe has instead turned to rentier politics to secure political support and for self-enrichment purposes at the expense of sustainable development and transformation. The extractives industry is rife with corruption which exists by the patronage of those at the very top. This ultimately diminishes the country's capacity to build critical infrastructure and support the growing needs of the population as well address urgent economic challenges (Transparency International, 2023). Contrarily, several countries have successfully used proceeds from the extractive industries for national development purposes. For instance, although mineral dependence in Botswana has conferred a central role in the economy to the government, they have constrained rent seeking, instead converting diamond rent into human capital and economic infrastructure (Auty, 2007). The political elite have broader and more stable coalitions. Therefore, rather than turning to rentier politics, they have channelled resources towards rapid mineral-driven growth (Poteete, 2009).

## China in Zimbabwe

Under the colonial government of Ian Smith, Zimbabwean institutions were extractive in nature, consolidated for the whites and exclusionary to the black majority. Land seizures from the black majority is an example of a central policy which existed during the time. This was done under the Land Apportionment Act through the imposition of hut taxes. It forced the black majority away from their ancestral lands and into cheap labour in the colonial economy.

At Independence in 1980, Mugabe delivered a speech of conciliation and inclusion, vowing to uphold fundamental rights and freedoms espoused in the Constitution such as property rights (Leith, 2019). He was regarded as a hero who stood up to Western Imperialism and neo-colonialism however that perception would change during his presidency. This research is of the opinion that China's involvement in Zimbabwe following Mugabe's Look East Policy is contrary to the promises made at Independence. In fact, it fosters neo-colonialism by allowing the same extractive institutions of the Smith regime to persist.

Supporters of Sino-Zimbabwe relations rightly emphasise the visible part of investments by the Chinese such as infrastructure development. For instance, China funded the rehabilitation of the Harare-Chirundu highway which is a key transportation route in Zimbabwe. The result of this investment is improved connectivity, better trade facilitation and transport efficiency. However, rarely do the financial benefits of such investments trickle down to the grassroots level. Further, infrastructural projects in Zimbabwe such as the building of bridges and roads are often breeding ground for corruption and predatory deals that line the pockets of the elite. Therefore, Chinese investments in more essential infrastructure such as public healthcare and education would benefit the populace in a more tangible way.

The extractives industry is a key part of Zimbabwe's economy but due to capacity constraints, foreign investment is necessary for its potential to be fully realised. Since the adoption of the LEP, China has become the leading investor in Zimbabwe's mining sector. However, most evidence points to it behaving in a predatory way, leading to negative local level outcomes. As seen in this research, the activities of Anjin resulted in gross human rights violations and the displacement of people from their ancestral lands with no alternative sources of livelihood provided. The beneficiaries of the Marange Diamonds are the political military elite and the Chinese, not the citizenry.

A significant driver of Zimbabwe's LEP is China's principles of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. This means that it pays little attention to the negative externalities arising from its investments (Condon, 2012). The promotion of good governance, human rights and transparency is absent from its development rhetoric. As such, Chinese deals often expose and exploit the weaknesses of African governments, encouraging corruption and wasteful decision making (Hanauer and Morris, 2014). In conclusion, while appreciating the intricacy of Sino-Zimbabwe relations, this paper is of the opinion that Chinese capital is predatory and perpetuates a neo-colonial relationship. China has proven to be a rogue donor particularly in Zimbabwe's extractive industry. Its capital in the mining sector is often detrimental to the lives of those in surrounding communities and yields very little financial flows towards national development.

The statement below by a community member in Marange perfectly captures this:

*"We thought everything was going to be awesome. We thought our lives were going to be better. What we hoped for was that the money from the diamonds was going to benefit us the locals first then the whole country. We expected to see Zimbabwe growing. That the future would be bright. What happened was totally the opposite. I feel that all our hopes have been shattered and I feel so cross about our land being mined without us benefitting anything".*

(Global Witness, 2017)

## Conclusion

This research set out to study the nature of the deals involving Chinese diamond mining capital and the political-military elite, exemplified in the Anjin case in Zimbabwe. The inquiry extended to examining rent distribution and contributing insights to the broader discourse on the East's role in African contexts, specifically delving into Chinese capital behaviour within Zimbabwe's mining sector. The significance of this research lies in its behind-the-scenes exploration of the Marange diamond fields, shedding light on often overlooked aspects of participating rentiers and their influence on distributional outcomes.

The Anjin case study brought to light a collusive arrangement between Chinese investors and the Joint Operations Command (JOC), culminating in adverse developmental consequences for surrounding communities and insufficient financial contributions to national development. Three critical aspects of the Anjin deal were uncovered: Firstly, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation's (ZMDC) insufficient capacity necessitates foreign investment, especially from China, to drive productivity in the extractives industry. However, the political landscape in Zimbabwe complicates engagements between investors and leaders, prompting the need for deals to safeguard property rights and secure investments. The Anjin deal, within this context, becomes imperative for ensuring credible commitment to Chinese investors, particularly in a political settlement where institutions are weak and captured.

Secondly, intra-party conflicts within Zanu-PF manifest in Marange, where control over diamond resources translates into political leverage. It enables the expulsion of undesirables and secures military support and election funding. Anjin is populated by high-ranking security officials aligned with political leadership. Their presence in the diamond fields ensures the perpetuation of their faction in power while maintaining Zanu-PF's dominant position in Zimbabwean politics. In this regard, the research underscores that securocrats emerge as key shareholders and beneficiaries of diamond wealth - a dynamic that may remain unchanged.

The research further suggests that Anjin has adopted an extraction driven approach and engages with political leadership in a predatory manner. Consequently, Marange diamonds are a “curse” to local communities, resulting in negative social, economic, and environmental impacts without adequate recompense or government intervention.

Lastly, the study evaluates China's role in Zimbabwe, particularly in the extractives industry through resources for infrastructure deals. While Chinese investment has demonstrated developmental impact in infrastructure projects amid Zimbabwe's economic crisis, their involvement in the extractives sector is exploitative, strengthening corrupt governance. Sino-Zimbabwe relations are indeed complex, varying on the project nature, sector specificity, the execution of the arrangement and diverse stakeholder perceptions. Notwithstanding this complexity, the Anjin case study suggests that Chinese capital has exhibited predatory behaviour in the Marange diamond fields. Further, the paper concludes that Sino-Zimbabwe relations perpetuate a neo-colonial relationship by maintaining the same extractive institutions that existed under the colonial regime.

Zimbabwe's multifaceted economic challenges, coupled with governance failures, corruption, and opaque deal-making practices, hinder the extractives industry's potential contribution to economic recovery and growth. Rather than channelling diamond wealth toward Vision 2030, the Anjin case epitomizes rentier politics, the prioritisation of political hegemony and self-enrichment. In this scenario, the political-military elite, Chinese investors, and politically connected entities emerge as winners, while surrounding communities and the broader citizenry emerge as the losers of the Anjin deal. In conclusion, this research corroborates the argument that the high-barrier arrangements between Chinese capital and the political-military elite have led to negative distributional consequences, restricting rents from reaching local communities and the broader economy.

## Recommendations

### Deal negotiations

As Levy (2014) put it, at the heart of a “working with the grain” approach to development is recognition that all good things do not come together. While the dominant political trajectory is discomfiting, Levy’s approach encourages possibilities and alternative interventions that respond to governance ambiguities. With this in mind and given the political context of Zimbabwe, credible commitment through deal making will likely remain a permanent feature in the decision-making process of investment.

Therefore, negotiating good deals is key to move Zimbabwe forward. Negotiating better deals with China or any other foreign partner in the extractives industry involves a strategic approach that considers Zimbabwe's economic interests, legal frameworks, and the principles of transparency and sustainability. Below are some recommendations in that regard:

- **Capacity Building** of Zimbabwean negotiators and government officials involved in mining sector negotiations through training in legal aspects, negotiation skills and technical knowledge related to the industry.
- **Public Participation** of relevant stakeholders in the deal negotiation process. This ensures a more inclusive decision-making process and that local community interests are considered.
- **Diversify Partnerships** to avoid over-reliance on a single partner and increase negotiation leverage. Engagement with several foreign partners also creates a competitive environment.
- **Negotiate for Local Content** in order for the project to benefit surrounding communities and contribute to economic development. This can be done through lobbying for skills transfer and local employment in the extractives industry.
- **Negotiate Fair Revenue Sharing** between Zimbabwe and foreign investors
- **Seek Technical Assistance** from external experts and international organisations to support Zimbabwean negotiators to ensure that negotiations take place on a level playing field.

## Demilitarisation of Diamond Industry

The consequences of the findings of this research reach beyond the Marange diamond fields and into the very heart of Zimbabwean national politics. Why are security agencies allowed to exploit the country's most precious and promising resources without consequences? This is because of the close relationship between security agencies and the ruling party. Under challenging political and economic circumstances, Zanu-PF is reliant on the security instruments and natural resources are used to secure their loyalty. The case of the Marange diamonds is just another example of Zimbabwean security agencies looting resources and emerging as their major beneficiaries.

There is no simple or single solution to the problem of political violence and the role of the security sector in Zimbabwe. Ending more than a century of politicisation of the military and the militarisation of Zimbabwe's political economy will take time. Further, addressing the militarization of the Marange diamond fields requires a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach. Below are some recommendations:

- Demilitarization Strategy for the Marange diamond fields which may involve a phased withdrawal of military personnel, replacing them with civilian security forces, and establishing a framework for maintaining law and order without military involvement.
- Alternative Livelihoods for military personnel such as education and vocational training. Further, investing in community development initiatives that seek to address the root causes of militarisation of the diamond fields. This could be through improvements in education, infrastructure and healthcare to ultimately reduce over-reliance on diamond revenues.
- Engagement with regional bodies and organisations to address the militarization issue. This has the potential to contribute to a coordinated approach and discourage cross-border involvement of military forces such as the case when the Zimbabwean army was involved in the DRC diamond industry .

Ultimately, a holistic and collaborative effort which involves government institutions, civil society, the military, and the regional and international community is needed to address the issue.

## The role of civil society

### Community Agency and Involvement

Facilitating community dialogues is essential to foster citizen engagement in public policy matters and the governance of natural resources. This process serves to empower communities, enabling them to collectively address challenges arising from diamond mining. Collaborating with civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs, including CNRG and ZELA, provides communities with the means to communicate concerns to relevant government stakeholders. A cohesive and well-structured approach is vital for effectively addressing the adverse impacts of diamond mining. Social movements such as the Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation founded in 1998 had the power to transform low-income housing delivery. Therefore, with the backing of CSOs, mining communities can establish strategic and well-organised movements to mitigate the negative consequences of mining activities.

### Non-Governmental Organisations

CSOs and NGOs have played a pivotal role in shedding light on the detrimental effects of the extractive industry. They have raised awareness about environmental, social, cultural, and economic rights in mining communities, exerting pressure on the government to take action. Given the democratic deficit in Zimbabwe due to authoritarian rule, vertical accountability is limited. The work of CSOs serves as a mechanism for horizontal accountability through the influential power of adverse publicity and the potential for reputational damage.

### Media Freedom and Whistle blower Protection

An independent and investigative media is crucial to uncovering corrupt practices and informing the public. As such, media freedom should be safeguarded and journalists who investigate issues related to the extractives industry protected. Further, robust whistle blower mechanisms should be implemented such as establishing channels for confidential and anonymous reporting. Individuals with information about corruption, malpractices and human rights abuses in the extractives industry should be encouraged to come forward without fear of retaliation.

***Independent Audits and Monitoring*** of Marange diamond mining operations through reputable firms/entities who will assess and report on the financial sustainability, environmental and social impacts of mining activities. Mildred Chiri, the Auditor General of

Zimbabwe, is renowned for her efforts in exposing corruption by conducting audits on government finances and operations. In her 2021 Report, she brought attention to various issues, including substandard procurement practices, inadequate accountability for diamond stocks by ZCDC, and non-compliance with tender rules in diamond sales. These concerns not only signal governance deficiencies in Marange but also point to the potential existence of Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs). Media outlets often highlight these findings, contributing to increased public awareness of financial mismanagement and corruption within the government. This heightened public scrutiny has the potential to exert pressure on authorities to address the identified issues.

### The role of the international community

- ***International Partnerships*** with organisations and development partners for capacity building and the sharing of best practices. Collaborating with international partners can provide the much needed technical assistance to implement effective governance mechanisms. For instance, Partnership Africa Canada has spearheaded initiatives to strengthen natural resource governance in Africa for long-term, sustainable development.
- ***Regional and International Pressure*** on the government to adhere to best practices in diamond mining and influence positive changes in governance. For example, the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) serves as a valuable framework for overseeing and addressing potential negative impacts on human rights and the environment within mining operations. This includes both the direct and indirect components of the global value chain. Given the frequent trade of Marange Diamonds in Antwerp, buyers are likely to face heightened due diligence obligations. Consequently, the regulatory standards set by this directive will extend beyond EU borders, impacting African mineral producers engaged in business, either directly or indirectly, with companies having a substantial presence in the EU.
- ***The Kimberley Process [KP]*** should broaden its definition of “conflict diamonds” to include diamonds that enable human rights violations, finance corruption, unfairly displace communities and destroy fragile ecosystems. Further, the KP should foster independent and local oversight of Zimbabwe’s diamond industry through coordination with Civil Society Organisations [CSOs].

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