EXPLORING POLITICAL INTOLERANCE IN A POST-APARTHEID GENERATION OF SOUTH AFRICANS: THE ROLE OF INTERGROUP THREAT AND NEGATIVE INTERGROUP EMOTION

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature:_____ Date:_____

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ABSTRACT

Background and aim: There are several variables that are associated with the development of political intolerance in society. This study uses the intergroup emotions theory as a framework to investigate whether intergroup threat (more specifically perceived racial threat) and negative intergroup emotions precipitate political intolerance in a well educated, post-apartheid generation of South Africans. It also examines whether outgroup appraisals (perceptions of outgroup strength) and degree of ingroup identification have a role to play in this hypothesised relationship. This study extends Gibson and Gouws' (2003) work on threat and intolerance as well as Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz and Wyer's (1991) work on the influence of emotion on people's tolerance judgements.

Method: Participants were randomly assigned to two experimental groups. The independent variable, racial threat, was manipulated such that one group experienced more threat (increased threat group) than the other group (reduced threat group). Following this, the effect of this manipulation on the rest of the study variables was examined using questionnaires that were completed by the participants. The increased threat group comprised 68 participants and the reduced threat group, 55. All these were South African, psychology students from the University of Cape Town (UCT) and were of different racial groups. Before the main study commenced, pilot studies were used to select and develop experimental stimuli for the manipulation of racial threat as well as to develop and refine scales for the different study variables. The pilot sample comprised 164 students from UCT. Thus the entire study sample comprised 287 participants

Results and conclusion: In line with the hypotheses of the study, t-tests revealed that the increased threat group expressed significantly more anger, t (121) = 4.98, p <.01, d=.91; fear, t (121) = 4.14, p < .01, d = .75; and political intolerance, t (121) = 1.74, p = .04, d= .32 than the reduced threat group. No significant differences were found regarding outgroup appraisal

and racial identification. Similarly, linear regression analyses indicated that perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance, R^2 = .05, F (1, 121) = 6.83, p = .01 and that this relationship is mediated by negative intergroup emotion. Outgroup appraisal and racial identification did not significantly influence this relationship. These findings strongly suggest that perceived racial threat and negative intergroup emotions are potent triggers of political intolerance.

Key words: intergroup threat; intergroup emotion theory; negative emotions; outgroup appraisal; ingroup identification; political intolerance.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The world that we live in today is rife with intergroup intolerance and the current upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East is a testament to this fact. In December 2010, civilian protests broke out in Tunisia and quickly spread across the Arabic region to over ten nations including Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Iran, Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Bowen, 2011; Cutler, 2011). The protestors in most of these countries have called for the incumbent authorities to step down from government in a bid for economic, social and political change. In most cases, the uprisings have been met with both violent and non-violent repression by the ruling regimes. In Libya for instance, Colonel Muamar Gadaffi's security forces opened fire on unarmed civilians, while in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, a number of people have been killed by government forces during the protests. Some of the less aggressive forms of repression reported are the banning of media houses and civilian protests. Artists and intellectuals who speak out against the authorities have also been targeted, harassed and arrested by government officials in some countries (Weaver, 2011).

This conflict in the Middle East and North Africa and the repressive response of the authorities has again brought the vital issue of political intolerance to the fore. It is a stark reminder of the importance of fostering political tolerance in society for the sake of peace and stability. However, for this to be achieved, it is important to understand the mechanisms that lead to the breakdown of tolerance and the precipitation of intolerance. This is the main purpose of this thesis.

INTERGROUP INTOLERANCE

Political intolerance falls under the wider umbrella of intergroup intolerance which includes other forms like racial, ethnic and religious intolerance. Intergroup intolerance occurs when individuals from different social groups refuse to "bear with" each other due to the fact that the "other" belongs to a disliked group (Gibson, 1989). This dislike may be premised on different factors for example ethnicity, race, religion, nationality and differing ideologies (Gibson, 2006). The detested groups and their members are denied the opportunity to express themselves and their views in society and at the extreme end of intolerance, their right to exist as part of the society may also be challenged (Wenzel, Mummendy, & Waldzus, 2007).

Since time immemorial, intergroup intolerance has plagued various populations, frequently resulting in adverse conditions in communities. Ethnic intolerance for instance,

has been associated with the inhumane treatment and massacre of millions of people in a large number of contexts over the years. In Germany, it led to the ruthless killing of a vast number of Jewish people and the establishment of the appalling Nazi concentration camps during the Holocaust from early 1933 to mid 1945 (Petrie, 2000). In Rwanda, years of ethnic intolerance between the Hutu and Tutsi communities culminated in the 1994 genocide where approximately 800,000 people were killed in a period of 100 days (BBC, 2011; Mamdani, 2001; McKenzie, 2008). Religious intolerance is another form that has pervaded a number of countries including Nigeria, Northern Ireland, India and Iraq just to name a few. In some cases, it has precipitated fatal conflict between different religious groups and resulted in the destruction of property, and the propagation of instability in society (Aliyu, 2009; Fox, 2004).

It is clear from the discussion above that intergroup intolerance is not confined to particular regions or nations but is an issue that has permeated a vast number of countries in various developmental stages across the globe (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). More importantly, the examples above accentuate the fact that if intergroup intolerance remains unchecked, it can escalate into the unprecedented destruction of lives and property and the general breakdown of society. There is therefore an immense need for intergroup tolerance in our world today.

This need has become even more urgent as societies have become increasingly heterogeneous. These days, it is not unusual to find people from different social, political, religious and ethnic groups living side by side in towns and cities. This co-existence in some cases may provide ample opportunity for dissent based on differences and competition between groups (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Thus, Stephan and colleagues are not far from the mark in claiming that "...in practice relations between groups are far more likely to be antagonistic than complementary" (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009, p.43). In light of all this, it is not surprising that intergroup intolerance has gained mounting prominence in the academic and research spheres. In the same vein, political intolerance has garnered much interest in the political, social and academic world.

THE CONSTRUCT OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

Political tolerance purports that alternative voices in society should be given room for expression without fear of rebuttal or repression. In the words of Gibson (1989, p.19), "Political tolerance refers to the willingness of citizens to support the extension of rights of citizenship to all members of the polity — that is to allow political freedoms to those who are

politically different." Thus, political *intolerance* is propagated when particular groups in society and/ or their members are denied basic political rights; for example, the right to express themselves publicly and the right to assemble. It is in direct opposition to diversity as it claims that individuals must be, think, or act in a specific way in order to be given expression (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Shamir, 1991).

The construct of political intolerance encompasses both attitudes and behaviours ranging from non-confrontational to more confrontational forms of intolerance towards outgroups (Gibson, 2005). Some examples of less confrontational forms are — not allowing particular books to be kept in libraries because of the views that they put forward, denying qualified individuals work opportunities because of their political affiliation, and not allowing particular individuals to speak at meetings because of their stance (Gibson & Bingham, 1982). The more confrontational forms include (amongst many others) verbal and physical aggression towards the rival group, and the destruction of their property.

Extensive research has been conducted around factors that influence the development of political intolerance. However, most of this research has been carried out in first world nations such as the U.S.A (e.g. Gibson, 1989; Gibson, 2008; and Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004), and Russia (Gibson, 2002). Although some research has been conducted in developing countries such as South Africa (e.g. Gibson & Gouws, 2001 and Gibson & Gouws, 2003) it is not extensive. There is therefore still a need for more research in this particular context for a number of different reasons as will be seen below.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

South Africa is a nation whose history is riddled with high levels of political intolerance (Mare, 2000). During apartheid rule (1948-1994), the incumbent government made the division of the different racial groups the norm rather than the exception. They legalised the separation of races making this the official position of their reign (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Gibson, 2006). As a result, some of the racial groups in South Africa were denied full political rights, for example the right to vote (Valji, 2004). Even after the demise of the apartheid regime, political intolerance continued to be part and parcel of South African society. In 1995 for example, the province of KwaZulu-Natal experienced high levels of violence between individuals of different political parties resulting in the death of over one hundred people per week. In addition, no go zones were demarcated for particular political parties (Gibson & Gouws, 2003).

More recently, political intolerance was witnessed during the period leading up to the 2009 general elections. For instance, rallies were disrupted and posters of political candidates were destroyed by members of opposing parties. On a number of occasions, intolerance escalated into violent clashes between members of different parties sometimes resulting in death. Conflict was observed between various parties including the African National Congress (ANC), Congress of the People (COPE) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Members of smaller political parties also claimed that they were victimised because of their political affiliation (Du Preez, 2009).

Whilst South Africa is similar to a number of other contexts in terms of its widespread political intolerance, it is unique in a number of other respects. To begin with, as a lingering result of apartheid, divisions between different groups at present still run deep. It is true that segregation was officially abolished with the advent of majority rule and that over the years, various policies have been put in place to encourage integration. Nevertheless, informal segregation still persists to this day (Durrheim & Dixon, 2004). The threat and realism of one's political enemies may therefore be heightened in this polarised context (Gibson & Gouws, 2001).

In addition, political groupings in South Africa are to a large extent associated with race, ethnicity and class (Mare, 2000). These different social groups play a significant and influential role in the South African political sphere with race being one of the major key players. Apartheid rule meant that political parties were established within the framework of racial separatism. Hence parties were used as vehicles to push forward the agenda of the different racial groups and politics in South Africa became deeply racialised or based on one's ethnicity. Different political parties came to be associated with particular racial or ethnic groups (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). Although these political-racial divides are no longer as strong or as evident today, they are still present in society. Thus, "one cannot write about South African politics without writing about race" (Gibson & Gouws, 2003, p. 35). Correspondingly, it is not plausible to explore the issue of political intolerance in South Africa without exploring the issue of race (this study considers this in its design as will be seen later).

It is apparent then, that the South African context is indeed distinctive and as is well known, the context of a study is very important. This is because it may influence the participants in different ways and thus influence the findings of the study. It is dangerous to assume that all individuals around the globe respond in the same ways to similar stimuli in different contexts. Therefore, though studies have previously been conducted around the

development of political intolerance in countries outside South Africa, it is important to investigate what the findings in this context will be (Gibson & Gouws, 2001).

As mentioned earlier, some research around political intolerance and its antecedents has been conducted in South Africa. Most of these studies analysed data that was collected just before or soon after the abolishment of apartheid (1992- 2001) (e.g. Gibson & Gouws, 2003 and Gibson, 2006). Thus, the participants were drawn from a generation of South Africans who grew up under apartheid rule. During this period, the political had a direct effect on the personal, as the lack of political power led to the social and economic marginalisation of particular ethnic groups. The impetus to be politically active and intolerant of rival parties was therefore probably much higher than it is at present (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). Now, due to the advent of majority rule, there is a younger generation of South Africans who have grown up under very different political, social and economic circumstances. They have experienced a very different South Africa from the preceding generation. In light of this, it is pertinent to explore political intolerance in this younger generation of South Africans. In doing so, this thesis recognises the significant influence of the geographical context and specific time period (post-apartheid) on individuals.

Some of the factors that have been put forward as possible precursors to political intolerance are perceived intergroup threat and negative affect (emotion) (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Shamir, 1991). Hence this study examines the role of perceived intergroup threat and negative intergroup emotion in the development of political intolerance within a new generation of South Africans. Due to the fact that race and politics in South Africa are highly intertwined (Mare, 2000), the kind of intergroup threat that will be employed in this investigation is perceived threat to one's racial group. Thus, this thesis aims to answer the question, "Is perceived racial threat associated with particular emotions that may trigger the development of political intolerance in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans?" The Intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) will be used as the theoretical framework for the exploration of this question and will be discussed in more detail in the second chapter of this thesis.

ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

This thesis is presented in six chapters. The current chapter introduced the construct of political intolerance, provided the context of the study, and outlined the general purpose and significance of the study.

Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the literature regarding intergroup threat, intergroup emotion and political intolerance. It will also present the theoretical underpinnings of this study in detail. The specific aims and hypotheses of the thesis will be presented at the end of this chapter.

Chapter 3 will discuss a number of pilot studies that were used to develop and refine the materials (stimuli and scales) used in this study. It will therefore outline how the various materials were developed or selected. Chapter 4 will present the method of the main study including the design, sample, sampling strategy, procedure, materials, data analysis methods and ethical considerations.

Chapter 5 will present the results of the study, and Chapter 6 will discuss the implications of these results, the limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of empirical research around variables associated with political intolerance namely: intergroup threat, intergroup emotion, outgroup appraisal, and ingroup identification. The review begins by looking at the role of perceived intergroup threat in the preponderance of negative attitudes, action tendencies, and behaviour towards outgroups. Next, it presents the Intergroup emotions theory as the theoretical framework for this study, arguing that it provides a comprehensive explanation for how intergroup threat, intergroup emotion and the other aforementioned variables interact with each other in the development of political intolerance. This review therefore articulates the rationale underlying the hypotheses of the study which are presented at the end of the chapter.

PERCEIVED INTERGROUP THREAT AND POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

When individuals interact with each other in everyday life, they form social groups based on a diverse range of attributes such as gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, and religious affiliation. Individuals identify with and see themselves as part of particular groups, known as their ingroups. There are also other groups with which people do not identify. These "othered" groups are referred to as outgroups (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Gaertner et al., 2000). If a particular group believes that one of their outgroups poses some kind of danger to them, intergroup threat may arise. Thus intergroup threat is experienced "when one group's actions, beliefs or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group" (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006, p.336).

There are various kinds of intergroup threat that have been put forward by theorists. The intergroup threat theory (formerly termed integrated threat theory) postulates that there are two dominant types, namely *realistic* and *symbolic* threat (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Realistic threat encompasses anything that poses a challenge to the power of the ingroup, the amount of resources available to them as well as their physical well-being. If this challenge is posed towards the group's values, beliefs, morals and general way of life, it is known as *symbolic threat* (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). Some of the other kinds of intergroup threat proposed by various theorists are *cultural* (Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004), *group esteem* (Branscombe & Wann, 1994), and *distinctiveness* threat (Riek et al., 2006). Cultural threat is quite similar to symbolic threat in that it encompasses anything that challenges the general way of life (culture) of the ingroup

(Zarate et al., 2004). Group esteem threat on the other hand, refers to anything that threatens the worth or "self-esteem" of the group (Branscombe & Wann, 1994) while distinctiveness threat refers to anything that threatens the uniqueness of the ingroup (Riek et al., 2006).

Although various studies document different kinds of intergroup threat, the effect of all these on attitudes towards outgroups is similar. Overall, perceived intergroup threat has been found to elicit negative attitudes towards outgroups. Riek and his colleagues (2006) conducted a meta-analysis on 95 samples investigating the relationship between intergroup threat and negative outgroup attitudes. Five different kinds of threat were examined and each of them was found to be significantly related to negative outgroup attitudes.

Both correlational and experimental studies support the conclusion that perceived intergroup threat has a negative impact on intergroup relations. A correlational study conducted in Israel, found that realistic threat was a significant predictor of the prejudicial attitudes of native Israelis towards Russian immigrants (Bizman & Yinon, 2001).

Cultural threat has also been associated with the adoption of negative attitudes towards outgroups. Zarate and colleagues (2004) found that when cultural intergroup differences were prominent, prejudicial attitudes towards outgroups were more prevalent. However, when groups perceived their outgroup to be culturally similar to them, prejudicial attitudes were less evident.

Likewise, an experimental study investigating group esteem threat, found that it was related to outgroup derogation for individuals with high national identification. The participants in this study —who were American—were divided into two groups depending on their level of national identification. High identifiers were put in one group while low identifiers were put in another group. Each identification group was then split into two conditions: the no threat condition and the identity threatening condition (resulting in four separate groups). In the no threat condition, participants watched a six minute video clip of a boxing match in which a boxer of their nationality defeated a Russian boxer. In the identity threatening condition, participants also watched a short video clip of a boxing match, however at the end, the Russian boxer defeated the American one and this defeat was assumed to be a threat to their group esteem. The results of this experiment indicated that "the threat manipulation did not influence the amount of derogation observed among subjects who were low in identification with America". However, "For those high in identification...the amount of Russian derogation was significantly higher in the threat condition than in the no threat condition" (Branscombe & Wann, 1994, p. 648).

Perceived intergroup threat is not only a significant predictor of negative attitudes but also impacts the action tendencies of ingroups towards outgroups. An action tendency can be defined as one's "readiness to engage or disengage from interaction with some goal object in some particular fashion" (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989, p. 213). Thus, action tendencies indicate how individuals are likely to behave in specific circumstances, and are frequently related to their actual behaviour (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009). An empirical study examining the relationship between perceived threat and attitudes towards affirmative action found that both realistic and symbolic threats were associated with opposition to affirmative action. The greater the perceived threat posed by this public policy to the ingroup, the greater the opposition was to the policy (Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006). Perceived threat in this case did not only influence the adoption of negative attitudes towards the outgroup but also influenced the way in which ingroup members were likely to behave (oppose or support affirmative action) —that is their action tendencies.

Perceived intergroup threat has also been associated with the actual behaviour of group members. A study investigating the responses that people have towards gay people found that symbolic threat influenced the behaviour of the participants towards these individuals. On average, participants (who were all heterosexual) were more likely to sit farther away from the gay individuals in the context of symbolic threat. However, in the non-threatening situation, participants kept closer proximity to them (Bromgard & Stephan, 2006).

As aforementioned in the introductory chapter, political intolerance occurs when certain political groups and/or their members are denied the opportunity to express themselves and their views in society (Halperin et al., 2009). Political intolerance is therefore not merely a negative attitude that is held by individuals or groups of individuals, but also involves an action tendency, as it indicates how politically intolerant groups and their members are likely to behave towards disliked groups. Furthermore, it is often used to denote actual negative behaviour towards these outgroups. Political intolerance is therefore "multidimensional" (Gibson & Bingham, 1982, p. 604). Seeing that perceived intergroup threat has been found to be a good predictor of negative attitudes, action tendencies and behaviour, it is plausible that it may also be a predictor of the negative attitudes, action tendencies and behaviour comprised within political intolerance. Surprisingly, not many social psychologists have conducted research testing the link between perceived intergroup threat and political intolerance within the South African context where political intolerance is

so rampant. Relatively few studies investigating this relationship within this context were found (e.g. Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Gibson, 2006).

One of the studies conducted in South Africa found that perceived threat to people's view of the "ideal" South African society (*socio-tropic threat)* was associated with political intolerance. The more participants felt that certain disliked groups threatened their "ideal society", the more intolerant they were of these groups (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). An earlier study investigated the influence of the facts and information given to people (about civil liberties disputes) on their tolerance judgements. The findings indicated that pre-existing threat perceptions of South Africans had more of an influence on their tolerance judgements than the facts or information presented in the actual dispute or situation (Gibson & Gouws, 2001). Thus, these studies revealed that perceived intergroup threat was a significant predictor of political intolerance in the South African context at the time. Empirical research suggests that it does not work in isolation and that other significant factors, such as emotion, play an important role (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2003).

INTERGROUP EMOTIONS THEORY

The Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) is one of the theories that has dominated research concerning the role of emotion in triggering particular action tendencies and behaviour towards outgroups. It was used as the theoretical framework for this study to investigate the role of intergroup emotion in the development of political intolerance within the context of intergroup threat. This theory was selected because it offers a comprehensive explanation of how intergroup threat and emotion may interact in the development of political intolerance as will be seen below. IET is largely based on the self-categorisation theory (SCT) (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Turner, 1987) and appraisal theories of emotion (Fridja, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989).

Self categorisation theory (SCT)

Individuals situate themselves in various social groups in diverse contexts at different times, and this positioning gives them a social identity. When a particular social identity is made salient, people classify themselves into groups pertaining to this specific identity; that is self-categorisation (Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). Thus, if nationality is made salient, people will categorise themselves according to the country they belong to. When individuals self-categorise, they begin to see themselves as similar to the other members of their ingroup. Moreover, the differences between them and

outgroup members become accentuated (Voci, 2006). Consequently, "self is viewed as an exemplar of the group rather than as a unique individual" (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2003, p.112). This process is known as *depersonalisation* (Devos et al., 2003).

Emotion theorists have extended SCT to include emotions. Thus, they propose that depersonalisation leads the individuals within a group to converge towards their ingroup's emotions (Moons, Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2009). IET therefore contends that when a particular social identity is salient, the emotions that members of the ingroup experience will converge, leading to the propagation of socially shared emotion within the ingroup known as intergroup emotion (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2003). In addition, because social identity informs one's personal identity, what is important to the group will become important to the individual even if it does not personally affect them. Hence, IET proposes that individuals may have an emotional reaction when something affects their ingroup even if they are not personally affected (Giner-Sorolla, Mackie, & Smith, 2007).

Moons and colleagues (2009) carried out a study on American university students. The participants were asked to report the extent to which they felt certain emotions as individuals and as Americans. The participants were then given "fake" emotion stereotypes that described how Americans in general supposedly feel. After this, participants reported their emotions as individuals and as Americans again. When American social identity was made salient, the participants shifted their emotion towards what they believed their ingroup felt, that is toward the American emotion stereotypes. However, when thinking of themselves as individuals, there was no convergence of emotion even after they had been exposed to the stereotypes. A study conducted at Indiana University also found that when the participants' identity as students was made salient, the emotions that they expressed were similar. However, when they reported their emotions as individuals this convergence of emotion was no longer evident (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

Intergroup Emotions Theory goes a step further by proposing that the type of intergroup emotion experienced by the ingroup is largely dependent on appraisals of events, groups or entities that confront the ingroup, as will be seen below.

Appraisal theories of emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion address emotion at the individual level and maintain that when people are confronted by an event or entity, they cognitively evaluate and interpret it in terms of whether it will harm or benefit them (Frijda et al., 1989). These evaluations and interpretations trigger distinct emotional reactions, which are associated with specific action

tendencies and behaviours (Devos et al., 2003). IET applies appraisal theories of emotion to social groups. It claims that when social groups are challenged by outgroups, they appraise them in terms of whether they will benefit or harm the ingroup. These outgroup appraisals trigger specific emotional reactions (both within the ingroup and towards the outgroup) which are associated with specific action tendencies (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Some studies have found that when the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, the emotion that ingroup members are likely to experience is fear (Frijda et al., 1989; Halperin et al., 2009). However if the outgroup is appraised as weaker than the ingroup, the emotion that the ingroup members are likely to experience is anger (Mackie et al., 2000).

Three negative emotions— anger, fear (or anxiety) and hate are associated with the development of political intolerance (Devos et al., 2003; Halperin et al., 2009; Mackie et al., 2000). Negative emotions typically arise as a result of a perceived unpleasant change in one's environment. This change disrupts the individual's balance and prompts them to respond in a way that will restore this balance to normal. Thus, negative emotions "are related to the willingness to create some kind of change in the environment. Yet negative emotions differ from each other in the specific kind of change they endorse" (Halperin et al., 2009, p. 96). For instance, fear is more likely to prompt avoidant action tendencies in ingroup members, (Frijda et al., 1989; Halperin et al., 2009) while anger is likely to trigger more confrontational tendencies. However, it is important to note that anger is only associated with confrontational tendencies in some but not all cases (Mackie et al., 2000). "The aggressive action tendencies associated with anger are only one out of a group of alternative solutions" (Halperin et al., 2009, p. 97).

Hate may be more potent than anger when it comes to aggressive action tendencies. This is because anger is triggered by the deeds of outgroups, therefore the action tendencies elicited may not necessarily be geared towards harming the outgroup but rather towards correcting their actions. Hate on the other hand is triggered by the repeated perceived "evil" actions of the outgroup towards the ingroup and these actions eventually come to be seen as inherent attributes of the outgroup. Consequently, hatred is directed towards the outgroup, and not towards their actions as may be the case with anger, resulting in more aggressive action tendencies towards the outgroup (Halperin et al., 2009).

Although many empirical studies have found that the various negative emotions are distinct in terms of their influence on peoples' action tendencies, it is important to note that a significant amount of research has found that this is *not* true of all cases. That is, negative

emotions are not always distinct from each other, and may sometimes exert similar effects on action tendencies (Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006 as cited in Petersen, 2010). For example, a study investigating factors that influence people's opinion on immigration policy found that anxiety and anger (in this sample) were related to each other as they loaded onto a common factor. The two emotions also had a similar effect on the participants' action tendencies when analysed separately. As a result, anger and anxiety were combined into one scale for this specific study (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008).

The construct of political intolerance encompasses both avoidant and aggressive action tendencies and behaviours. For instance, intolerant individuals may avoid opponents and their views by denying them particular political rights such as the right to campaign in their community. On the other hand they may confront them by disrupting their political rallies. Thus, outgroup appraisals of strength or weakness could both theoretically lead to action tendencies that are part and parcel of political intolerance. Conversely, there is a line of reasoning that suggests otherwise— that it is only when outgroups are perceived as stronger than the ingroup that people may become intolerant towards them. This is because the strength of the outgroup makes them even more dangerous and threatening to the ingroup. In contrast, threat posed by weak outgroups would be less potent and the ingroup members may be more inclined to be tolerant of these groups.

In their study on sociotropic threat and political intolerance, Gibson and Gouws (2003) found that when outgroup power was analysed as a threat variable, it was positively associated with tolerance. Thus when disliked outgroups were perceived as powerful, tolerance towards them increased. They suggested that people may tolerate strong enemies because it poses too much of a danger to express intolerance towards them. In line with this, it is possible that if the outgroup is perceived as more powerful, this may lead to the adoption of avoidant action tendencies that are not necessarily intolerant but protective in nature.

In contrast, when Gibson and Gouws (2003) investigated the influence of outgroup power as a separate variable from threat, the effect of this variable proved to be different. They tested whether perceived outgroup power would have a "conditional effect on the relationship between perceived threat and intolerance" (Gibson & Gouws, 2003, p.69) and found that it did not. Hence they concluded that "the power of a group has little to do with the level of tolerance expressed toward it" (Gibson & Gouws, 2003, p.69).

Strength of ingroup identification is another variable that may impact the intergroup emotions experienced by ingroups.

The role of ingroup identification

How strongly individuals identify with their social group influences the quality (type) and intensity of emotion experienced by the ingroup (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007); strong identification increases negative emotions towards outgroups and increases positive emotions towards ingroups (Mackie et al., 2009). A study on male, English soccer fans found that the strength of identification that they felt towards their soccer team predicted the kind of emotion that they experienced. After losing a match, low identifiers experienced more sadness than anger while high identifiers experienced more anger than sadness. Those who experienced anger were more likely to confront fans of the rival soccer team, while those who experienced sadness were more likely to avoid fans of the rival soccer team. Strength of ingroup identification therefore influenced the quality or type of intergroup emotion that the soccer fans experienced as well as the associated action tendencies (Crisp et al., 2007).

Another study investigating the role of intergroup emotion in bullying amongst children found that children who identified more strongly with their respective social group (bully group or victim group) experienced the socially shared emotion of their ingroup more intensely (Jones, Manstead, & Livingstone, 2009). This same study also brought out the fact that strength of ingroup identification influences the extent to which individuals adhere to the norms of their group. "Strong identification is associated with strong norm adherence" (Jones et al., 2009, p.855).

Strength of ingroup identification has also been found to influence the extent to which individuals categorise themselves into social groups. Thus, how prototypical of the ingroup individuals perceive themselves to be is influenced by how highly they identify with the ingroup. As a result, identification influences the extent to which appraisals made are group rather than individual based (Mackie et al., 2009).

In addition, strength of ingroup identification influences the degree of emotional convergence within an ingroup when social identity is made salient. Empirical research has found that the more individuals identify with their ingroup, the more their emotion becomes similar (Mackie et al., 2009).

CONCLUSION

Intergroup emotions theory is supported by a large amount of empirical research. It also provides a comprehensive explanation of how intergroup threat and emotion may lead to the development of political intolerance. When individuals who have engaged in self-categorisation are faced with a situation that endangers their social group, they may be more

inclined to interpret this threat as harmful even when it is not necessarily harmful to themselves as individuals. They may also experience negative emotions towards the source of threat and as a result become more inclined to express intolerance towards this source (Smith et al., 2007). Thus, it is possible that political intolerance may be a form of group and self preservation arising from a base of intergroup emotion precipitated by intergroup threat. In line with this, empirical research has found that different kinds of perceived threat elicit distinct emotions in individuals and groups. Threats to ones physical well-being for instance have been found to elicit fear and anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Furthermore, emotion has been associated with the development of political intolerance in some contexts (Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, & Wyer, 1991).

The study of political intolerance in relation to emotion is therefore not completely new. Kuklinski and colleagues (1991) evaluated whether people's tolerance judgements are influenced more by rational thought or affective responses to disliked outgroups. The participants in this study were divided into three experimental groups. The first group was asked to use their emotions to judge the actions of a disliked outgroup (affect group). The second group was asked to use rational thought in their judgements (consequence group), and the final group was not given any instruction on how to make their judgements about the outgroup (no instruction group). The political tolerance judgements of the affect group were found to be more similar to the no instruction group than the consequence group. Hence they concluded that people's tolerance judgements are influenced more by emotion than by rational thought.

A more recent study investigated the role of extrinsic anxiety "in how and when people rely on predispositions and when they rely on [new information] in making political tolerance judgements" (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005, p. 949). In the context of high extrinsic anxiety, participants who had a strong predisposition of being tolerant were more tolerant towards outgroups than those who had no tolerance predisposition. However, when provided with new persuasive information, in the context of high anxiety, participants with strong tolerance predispositions were more willing to let go of their predispositions and rely on the new information received. They were therefore more prone to expressing intolerance when faced with new persuasive information in the context of high anxiety.

Contrary to these findings, a study conducted in South Africa found that when individuals were presented with new information concerning civil liberties disputes, they relied more on their predispositions of threat in society than on the new information given to

them about the dispute when making political tolerance judgements (Gibson & Gouws, 2001). In this case predispositions had more of an influence on tolerance than contemporary information, while in Marcus et al.'s (2005) study the opposite was found to be true. Gibson and Gouws (2001) propose that this is the case because the South African context is very different to the contexts in which many of these studies have been conducted, such as the USA. "It is the South African context— the immediacy and realism of the threat posed by one's political enemies—that is more influential, not the elements of the situation itself" (Gibson & Gouws, 2001, p.1069). They suggest that in the United States, the threat and realism of one's political enemies are less than in South Africa and thus people may be inclined to rely more on persuasive arguments arising out of civil liberties disputes rather than on their predispositions. The difference between these two studies accentuates the importance of the context of a study as highlighted in the first chapter of this thesis.

SPECIFIC AIMS AND HYPOTHESES

Aims

The overall aim of this study was to investigate whether perceived racial threat and negative intergroup emotion play a role in the development of political intolerance in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans. With this in mind, three study objectives were formulated:

1. to find an experimental stimulus that would effectively elicit perceived racial threat in the participants.
2. to develop and refine a questionnaire measuring the different variables, that is perceived racial threat, intergroup emotion, outgroup appraisal, political intolerance, and racial identification.
3. to investigate the hypothesised relationships between these variables.

Hypotheses

This study tested the following hypotheses:

1. Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative intergroup emotions of hate, anger and fear.
2. Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance.
3. Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance.
4. Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance.

5. The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of intergroup emotion expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, participants will experience more fear than anger and hate. However, when the outgroup is appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more hate and anger than fear.
6. The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of threat experienced by the participants and thus influence the intensity of intergroup emotions experienced and the amount of political intolerance expressed by them.

CHAPTER 3: PILOT STUDIES

This study was conducted in two phases: a pilot phase, followed by the main study. The main study was a randomised experiment which tested the research hypotheses. Therefore, experimental stimuli were required for each condition as well as scales for the measurement of all the study variables. In light of this, four pilot studies were used to: (a) select appropriate experimental stimuli, and (b) develop scales for the main study. This chapter discusses these studies and describes how the various materials were selected or developed. It also presents the psychometric properties of the developed scales. The method of the main study is discussed in Chapter 4.

PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS

Data from 164 participants was analysed during the four studies of the pilot phase with each one involving different numbers of participants. All of these were students at the University of Cape Town (UCT) and were assumed to be proficient in English as this is the official language of instruction at UCT. The first pilot study consisted of 36 participants; the second one, 116; the third, 10; and the final study, 2. The entire pilot sample included 44 male (27%) and 120 female (73%) participants. The majority of these were White (55%), followed by Coloured (24%), Black (22%) and Asian (1%) individuals. The age range was 17 to 54 years with a mean age of 20 (only three participants were above 30).

DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the main purpose of this thesis was to investigate whether perceived racial threat (IV) precipitates negative emotions and political intolerance (DV). However, before this could be done, it was imperative to find or develop experimental stimuli that would effectively manipulate the independent variable.

During the pilot phase, two experimental stimuli—a video clip and a written piece/ blog — were tested. Both stimuli revolved around Julius Malema (a famous South African political figure) and were assessed to see if they would elicit racial threat in the participants, and if so, which would be more effective (that is, which would elicit more threat). The threat stimuli focused on Malema because he and his key supporters were the target outgroup in this study. Malema is the current president of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), the youth wing of the incumbent ruling party. He is well known in the South African context for the controversial, inflammatory statements that he has made in the recent past, targeting different

individuals and social groups (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009). He was therefore probably known to most of the participants and served as a good potential candidate for eliciting threat in them. Furthermore, because he is quite controversial, people may feel more comfortable with expressing intolerance towards him and his supporters.

Video Experimental Stimulus

This stimulus was a two minute video clip of Malema giving a press conference. In this clip, a BBC journalist asks a question that angers Malema who responds with insults and threats, some personal and others racial in nature. For example Malema shouts: "This is a building of a revolutionary party, and you know nothing of the revolution. So here you behave or else you jump...This is not a newsroom this, it's a revolutionary house and you don't come here with that tendency. Don't come here with that white tendency...if you've got a tendency of undermining blacks even where you work, you're in the wrong place. And you can go out...you're a small boy, you can't do anything...GO OUT! Bastard! You bloody agent" (Tsele, 2010). After this tirade the journalist leaves the room as Malema orders security guards to throw him out. The video clip was aired on the local news and was sourced from the internet. It was therefore readily available and easily accessible in the public domain.

Blog Experimental Stimulus

The second stimulus was a written piece which was supposedly from an authoritative political blog about Julius Malema. In actual fact, it was a piece written by the researcher that incorporated a number of threatening statements Malema has made over the past few years. For example, "We are prepared to die for Zuma. Not only that, we are prepared to take up arms and kill for Zuma" (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009, p. 32). (Zuma was the presidential candidate for the ANC at the time). The piece also highlighted some of the controversial things that Malema has done and emphasised the power that he holds as ANC Youth League president. The material for this stimulus was largely drawn from Du Preez and Rossouw's (2009) book, *The World According to Julius Malema* as well as newspaper articles and the internet (to see the blog, refer to Questionnaire 1 in Appendix A).

Although Malema is well known (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009), it was assumed that some people may not know who he is. Therefore, a short biography of him was included in the pilot study questionnaire with the rest of the materials. It informed the participants of who he is, what he does and how he came into power and ensured that all the participants had

enough information about him to adequately respond to the questionnaire. Once the experimental stimuli and biography were developed, construction of the scales commenced.

SCALE DEVELOPMENT

Five scales were required to measure the variables in this study. These were:

- the political intolerance scale- main DV;
- the perceived racial threat scale- main IV;
- the intergroup emotion scale;
- the outgroup appraisal scale; and
- the racial identification scale.

The development process of these scales is discussed below.

Development of the Political Intolerance Scale

The conceptualization of political intolerance and subsequent item generation were based on the findings of a qualitative pilot study and extant conceptual and empirical literature on this construct. There are two general approaches that are used to measure political intolerance in empirical research. The first measures intolerance towards a specific outgroup, for example a study in Russia examined intolerance towards communists and Fascists (Gibson, 1998). The second approach does not focus on a specific outgroup but allows participants to select their least liked group from a list of alternatives (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). Participants' tolerance towards this group is then assessed.

These two approaches have been used to develop several political tolerance scales which have helped to provide a better understanding of the construct. However, none of these were appropriate for the particular context of this study. Scales which adopted the specific outgroup approach frequently had content which was tailored to the specific context of the study. For example, a study investigating intolerance towards Arab Americans and Muslims in the USA was conducted soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Therefore, the intolerance scale contained items such as: (a) Muslims should not be allowed to purchase or own guns, (b) Muslims should have their phones tapped by government, and (c) Muslims should be subject to more thorough searches in airports (Skitka, et al., 2004, p.749).

Scales which adopt the least liked approach are more applicable to the context of this study, as they usually assess general features of political intolerance such as, whether the outgroup should be allowed to hold demonstrations (Gibson, 2006). However, most of these scales assess blatant forms of intolerance, for example, whether outgroups should exist as

political groups and whether members of outgroups should be allowed to stand as candidates for elected positions (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). This blatant form of intolerance has largely been assumed to be a phenomenon associated with conservative, less educated groups of people of low socio-economic status (Renfro et al., 2006; Sullivan et al., 1990 as cited in Shamir, 1991). As is the case with most university students in South Africa, the sample of this study is more educated than the general population and also over-represents the middle/ upper income groups. In addition, this sample was recruited from an institution that espouses liberal political values and allows a wide range of political groups to operate student organisations. It is thus a milieu in which political tolerance would be expected to be the norm (UCT values, 2001). In light of this, it was imperative to develop a scale that also assesses subtle forms of political intolerance.

As a first step to gathering information for the development of this scale, a qualitative pilot study was conducted. This study collected students' views on political intolerance. Thirty six respondents were given a short questionnaire sporting two open-ended items: "In your opinion what is political intolerance?" and "Please write down some examples of political intolerance to illustrate your answer to question 1." Emergent findings and extant literature (Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Gibson, 1998; Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Halperin et al., 2009) were then used to generate dimensions of political tolerance which in turn informed the specific items of the scale. These dimensions were: (a) allowing all groups the right to speak or express themselves, (b) allowing all groups to stand for political positions or serve in high positions of government, and (c) allowing all groups to assemble and/or demonstrate.

The generated pool of intolerance items focused on Julius Malema and his key supporters. To reduce acquiescent response bias some of the items were positively worded while others were negatively worded. In addition, they were presented in a particular order to ensure that the negatively and positively worded items were mixed within the scale. This order also ensured that the more emotive items appeared in the middle or at the end of the scale (Rattray & Jones, 2007). Some examples of the generated items are:

- Politicians like Julius Malema should not be allowed to publicly criticise my party and its leaders.
- Politicians like Malema should be allowed to make speeches in my community, even if their speeches contradict the values of my community.
- Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to hold political rallies in any communities they wish, including mine.

- Julius Malema and his key supporters should be allowed to do door-to-door campaigns in my community.
- Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to stand as candidates for the Presidency of South Africa. (See section F of questionnaire 1 in Appendix A for the rest of the intolerance items).

The developed scale covered both blatant and subtle forms of political intolerance and contained 24 items. Discussion of the items with a social psychologist with extensive experience in scale construction, led to the modification of some of the items in terms of their content, relevance and clarity of wording, thereby improving their validity (Rattray & Jones, 2007). Each item was presented on a 7-point scale ranging from *strongly agree* (1) to *strongly disagree* (7).

Development of the Racial Threat Scale

The perceived racial threat scale was designed to measure the level of perceived racial threat amongst participants. In doing so, it also acted as a manipulation check: by measuring the level of threat amongst the participants in the various experimental conditions, it was possible to determine whether the different experimental stimuli had the effect that they were supposed to have.

Items for this scale were based on the definition that perceived racial threat is when one racial group believes that another racial group poses a danger to their general well-being and goal attainment (Riek et al., 2006). There are a number of existing intergroup threat scales of high validity and reliability (Dixon et al., 2010; Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Halperin et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 1999). However, many of these scales are tailored to the specific contexts of their studies. For example, in a study assessing threat perceptions in Israel, participants were asked to report to what extent the outgroup: (a) endangers Israel's security, (b) Israeli democracy, and (c) Israel's Jewish character (Halperin et al., 2009). In light of this, it was essential to develop a racial threat scale that was tailored to the context of this study, especially with regards to the target outgroup. Published scales and extant literature were used to generate several dimensions of the racial threat construct and these informed the development of the racial threat items. The dimensions included perceived threat to:

- the physical well-being of one's ethnic group;
- the power of one's ethnic group;
- the amount of resources available to one's ethnic group; and

- the values and culture of one's ethnic group.

The generated threat items were positively and negatively worded to minimise acquiescent response bias. They were also presented in a particular order to ensure that the positively and negatively worded items were mixed within the scale and that the more emotive items appeared in the middle or towards the end of the scale (Rattray & Jones, 2007). The content and wording of the items were evaluated by the expert and the items were modified accordingly. Those which did not adequately reflect the racial threat construct were removed at this stage and those which had unclear or inappropriate wording were re-worded. This helped to improve the validity of the items (De Vaus, 2002).

Some examples of the preliminary racial threat items are:

- Julius Malema and his key supporters only want to empower certain groups in South Africa.
- Julius Malema and his key supporters respect the property and ownership rights of all ethnic groups in South Africa.
- As a leader, Julius Malema genuinely tries to address the needs and issues of all ethnic groups including mine. (For the full racial threat scale, refer to Section C of Questionnaire 1 in Appendix A).

Each item was presented on a 7-point scale ranging from *strongly agree* (1) to *strongly disagree* (7). The final draft of this scale contained 10 items.

Development of the Intergroup Emotion scale

The items in this scale were drawn from existing intergroup emotion scales (Halperin et al., 2009; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). The purpose of this scale was to measure participants' degree of affect towards the target outgroup. Hence they were asked to report the extent to which they feel particular emotions when they think about Malema, his key supporters and their behaviour. An example is, "To what extent do you feel anxious when you think about Julius Malema, his key supporters and their behaviour?" The participants selected one out of seven possible responses ranging from *not at all* (1) to *extremely* (7) for each item. The scale consisted of four sub-scales which contained a number of items that reflected the overarching emotions of fear, anger, hate or happiness.

- Fear subscale: anxious, afraid, worried, and uneasy.
- Anger subscale: irritated, furious, displeased and angry.
- Hate subscale: hostile, disgusted and hateful.

- Happiness subscale: happy, proud, calm, and joyful.

The items were evaluated by the expert to ensure that the content was valid, relevant and clearly worded (De Vaus, 2002). (For the whole scale, see Section D of Questionnaire 1 in Appendix A).

Development of the Outgroup Appraisal Scale

The purpose of this scale was to measure participants' perceptions of how strong the target outgroup is as compared to their ingroup. Thus, it assessed whether participants perceived the target outgroup as stronger or weaker than their ingroup. There are a number of existing outgroup appraisal scales of high validity and reliability (Mackie et al., 2000). However, many of these scales are tailored to the specific contexts of their studies and are thus not applicable to the context of this study. A study by Mackie and colleagues (2000, p. 604), for instance, assessed individuals' perceptions of outgroup support using items that revolved around arguments presented by the outgroup. Some of these are: (a) which group has more persuasive arguments, (b) which group has more coherent arguments? and (c) which group has more relevant arguments?

Extant literature and published measures were used to generate dimensions of the outgroup appraisal construct (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie et al., 2009). These included perceptions about:

- how much influence the outgroup has;
- the amount resources available to the outgroup as compared to the ingroup; and
- how much collective support the outgroup has in society.

These dimensions were then used as a framework for the construction of the appraisal items. These were evaluated by the expert, whose feedback was used to improve their content and clarity of wording. The preliminary measure comprised five questions to which participants responded either: "Malema's faction in the ANCYL" or "My preferred political group."

1. Who has more influence over government decisions?
2. Who has more support for their views from the South African public?
3. Who has more access to financial resources?
4. Who has more positive coverage in the media?
5. Who has more power overall within the current SA (South African) political context?

Development of the Ingroup (racial) Identification Scale

This measure was designed to assess how strongly individuals identify with their racial group and was based on the Identification with a Psychological Group (IDPG) Scale developed by Mael and Tetrick (1992 as cited in Greene, 2004). The IDPG has been found to be applicable to a diverse range of social groups and was therefore deemed to be a suitable model for the items in this study (Greene, 2004). It also has high internal consistency with a Cronbach's alpha of .85. Some of the items from the IDPG scale were reworded to make them appropriate for the context of this study and a few other items measuring degree of affect towards one's ingroup were added to the identification scale. (See Appendix B for the IDPG scale).

After discussion of the items with the expert, ambiguous items were modified with regards to their wording and content to make them clearer and to improve their validity (Rattray & Jones, 2007). The preliminary racial identification scale was made up of 9 items including:

- I'm very interested in what others think about my ethnic group.
- When I talk about my ethnic group, I usually say "we rather than "they."
- Being a member of this ethnic group is an important part of who I am.

(See Section G in Questionnaire 1 of Appendix A for the full racial identification scale).

DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL STUDY MATERIALS

Once all the scales were developed, additional measures which were required for the study—the self-categorisation prime, support gauge and demographics— were developed. These are briefly outlined below.

Self-categorisation prime

This item was designed to trigger self-categorisation in the participants of the study. The respondents were asked "What ethnic group do you belong to?" This kind of question is effective in making particular social identities salient and has been found to lead to self-categorisation in a number of studies (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Ray, et al., 2008).

Support Gauge

This item was designed to assess each participant's level of support for the target outgroup. Participants were asked, "On a scale of 1-10, indicate your level of support for

Julius Malema as a political leader." The lower end of the scale '1' indicted *no support* while the higher end of the scale '10' indicated *very strong support*.

Demographics

Participants were asked to provide demographic information about their age, sex, and nationality.

GROUP COMPARISONS PILOT STUDY

Once all the preliminary materials were developed, they were combined in a preliminary questionnaire which was tested in the group comparisons pilot study. The materials were presented in the following order:

1. Self categorisation prime.
2. Support gauge.
3. Racial threat stimuli (video or blog)
4. Perceived racial threat scale.
5. Intergroup emotion scale.
6. Outgroup appraisal Scale.
7. Racial identification scale.
8. Demographics.

A sample similar to that of the main study (psychology undergraduates) was used because "as far as possible, pretesting should be conducted with people who resemble those to whom the questionnaire will finally be given" (De Vaus, 2002, p. 117). This study had a number of aims:

1. to test whether the video and blog stimuli would elicit racial threat in the pilot participants;
2. to test which of these stimuli was more effective in eliciting threat in participants; and
3. to refine the various scales in the preliminary questionnaire in terms of wording, content and reliability.

This study was a randomised experiment with four experimental groups. Three of these were used to test whether the blog and video stimuli increased racial threat in participants. The first group was exposed to the blog (blog group), the second group watched the video clip (video group) and the third group was a control group in which participants were not exposed to any threat stimuli. These groups allowed us to test whether there was a significant

difference in the amount of threat elicited by the blog and the video clip and if these amounts were significantly higher than "normal" (level of threat in the control group).

In addition, it was thought that perhaps the racial threat measure could in itself potentially elicit racial threat in participants (even when they were not exposed to any threat stimuli) and thus confound the political intolerance results. To test this, a second control group was used in this study. Like the first control, this group was not exposed to any threat stimuli. In addition, the racial threat scale was not included in their preliminary questionnaire.

Over 150 participants were recruited for this study. However, incomplete questionnaires and respondents with high levels of support for Malema were excluded leaving a final total of 116 participants. Of this sample 22% were male and 78% were female. The majority were White participants (61%), followed by Coloured (22%), Black (15%) and Asian (2%) participants. The age range was 17 to 54 years with a mean age of 20 (only three participants were above 30). High supporters (scoring 5 or above on the support gauge) were excluded because it was assumed that they would be less likely to express intolerance towards Malema (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups:

1. Blog group: read the blog and then completed the questionnaire.
2. Video group: watched the video clip and then completed the questionnaire.
3. Control Group 1: not exposed to any of the threat stimuli and only completed the questionnaire.
4. Control Group 2: not exposed to any threat stimuli and the racial threat scale was not included in their preliminary questionnaire.

Results of the Group Comparisons Pilot Study

The collected data was cleaned and entered into a statistics program (STATISTICA). Following this, principal axis factor analysis (with varimax normalized rotation), inter-item reliability analysis and item analysis were used to investigate whether the scales contained any weak items. These procedures were selected as a number of theorists have proposed that they are some of the best methods to use for refining measures (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). In addition, they have been used in a number of studies to develop highly reliable and valid scales in different populations (Renfro et al., 2006).

Principal axis factor analysis is not a widely used method for scale development. A large amount of literature on best practices for scale development indicates that principal components analysis (PCA) is the more popular method but is not necessarily the best one to

use (Costello & Osborne, 2005). PCA is thought to be less appropriate than factor analysis for scale development because it "does not attempt to model the structure of correlations among the original variables" (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum,& Strahan, 1999, p.275). Furthermore, "under certain conditions, PCA may overestimate factor loadings and result in erroneous decisions about the number of factors or items to retain" (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006, p. 819). It also does not make a distinction between the shared variance and unique variance of the variables. Thus the components that are yielded by this kind of analysis are not actually underlying variables (Fabrigar et al., 1999).

The goal of the scale refinement process in this study was to detect underlying factors in the data and to determine which items were related to them. It was therefore more appropriate to use one of the factor analysis methods rather than PCA. A large amount of literature suggests that if data is normally distributed, maximum likelihood factor analysis is the best method to use. However, if data is not normally distributed, then principal axis factor analysis is best (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). A considerable amount of the pilot study data was non-normal. For example, the distribution of several racial threat items was skewed. Thus principal axis factor analysis was the method of choice.

Several criteria were used to identify weak items. In the inter-item reliability analyses three criteria were used: items with low inter-item correlations (below .3), items with low item-total correlations (below .3), and items which if deleted, would result in an increase in the Cronbach's alphas of the scales (Costello & Osborne, 2005).

In the factor analyses, weak items were highlighted by low loadings (below .3) onto the relevant factors. In addition, items which did not load onto any factors or which loaded highly onto more than one factor were also regarded as weak items (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Finally in the item analyses, any items which had particular response options that were selected by a majority of the participants were deemed to be weak items, as this suggested that they had poor discriminatory power (Rattray & Jones, 2007). Qualitative analysis of the items was also used to determine whether there was duplication of items within the scale.

Perceived racial threat scale refinement results

Inter-item reliability analysis on the racial threat measure revealed that the scale had high internal consistency. The Cronbach's alpha was .87, all the items had item-total correlations above .3 and most of the inter-item correlations were above .3. However, this analysis indicated that two items (C2 and C4) were possibly weak items as the Cronbach's alpha of the scale would increase if any of them was deleted (See Table 1).

The scale's 10 items (C1 to C10) were submitted to a principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation. This revealed that one factor was dominant, as it was the only factor with an eigen value higher than 1 (4.67) and explained 46.72% of the variance in items. Examination of the scree test revealed that there was a second factor that was quite strong. Although it had an eigen value less than 1 (.81), it accounted for 8.09% of the variance in items. In light of this, both one factor and two factor extractions were conducted. The two factor solution revealed that all the items with the exception of three (C1, C4 and C5) loaded above .3 onto the first factor. Item C1 and C5 loaded highly onto the second factor while item C4 did not load onto any of the factors. This suggested that these may be weak items. More importantly, the two factor solution indicated that a one factor solution may be more appropriate as the two factor solution resulted in a large number of cross loadings. When one factor was extracted, all the items loaded above .3 onto it. However, item C2 and C4 had markedly lower loadings than the rest of the items (see Table 1).

Item analysis revealed that three items (C1, C5 and C6) had poor discriminatory power as many participants gave the same response to these items. The distribution curves of these items were negatively skewed.

In general, the various analyses revealed that five of the items— C1, C2, C4, C5 and C6— in this scale were not very strong. Due to their poor discriminatory power, items C1, C5 and C6 were removed from the scale. However, item C2 and C4 were kept as part of the scale because they tapped into aspects of perceived racial threat that none of the other items did. Item C4 was the only blatant measure of threat and Item C2 was the only one that revolved around the threat of aggression towards one's ethnic group:

- C4: Politicians like Malema pose a threat to my ethnic group in South Africa.
- C2: Julius Malema and his key supporters instigate conflict between the different ethnic groups.

In addition, these items had moderate relationships with the other items and were therefore not extremely weak items. The final scale had a high Cronbach's alpha of .89 and contained seven items.

Table 1

Racial Threat Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses

Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability		Single-factor loading	Rotated loadings from two-factor solution	
			Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted		1	2
C1[a]	5.54	1.26	.61	.86	**.66**	.13	**.90**
C2	5.14	1.55	.39	.88	**.42**	**.49**	.09
C3	5.81	1.09	.65	.86	**.72**	**.41**	**.61**
C4	4.47	1.54	.35	.88	**.37**	.27	.24
C5[a]	5.39	1.32	.65	.86	**.68**	.28	**.72**
C6[a]	5.88	1.15	.63	.86	**.67**	**.61**	**.32**
C7	5.36	1.16	.81	.85	**.87**	**.64**	**.57**
C8	5.74	1.22	.62	.86	**.68**	**.72**	.23
C9	5.63	1.16	.79	.85	**.83**	**.87**	**.31**
C10	5.24	1.18	.64	.86	**.71**	**.50**	**.49**

Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface.

[a] Item not selected for final seven-item scale.

Intergroup emotion scale refinement results

Inter-item reliability analysis indicated that the Intergroup emotion scale had high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.77). All the items with the exception of two (proud and overjoyed) had item-total correlations above .3, indicating relatedness between most of the items. This analysis also revealed that if any of the happiness items were deleted, the Cronbach's alpha of the scale would improve (see Table 2). It was assumed that because happiness is a positive emotion, while the other three are negative emotions, the happiness items were less related to the rest of the items in the scale (Brader et al., 2008).

Although it had been predicted that this scale would have four distinct sub-scales (fear, anger, hate and happiness), a principal axis factor analysis indicated that there were three and not four dominant factors amongst the items. The first had an eigen value of 5.76 and accounted for 38.43% of the variance in items. The second had an eigen value of 1.33 and accounted for 8.89% of the variance, while the third had an eigen value of 1.02 and accounted for 6.78% of the variance. (These were the only factors with eigen values higher than one). The fear items loaded onto the first factor, the happiness items (with the exception of the item 'calm') loaded onto the second and the anger and hate items loaded onto the third factor. Indeed, empirical research has found that in some cases, negative emotions like anger and hate are not distinct from each other (Brader et al., 2008).

This analysis flagged the items calm, irritated and displeased as weak items. 'Irritated' and 'displeased' had similar loadings on more than one factor while the item 'calm' loaded onto the fear factor rather than the happy factor (See Table 2). Consequently, the item 'calm' was removed from happiness sub-scale. On consultation with the expert, the item 'displeased' was replaced by the item 'outraged' as it was a better reflection of the overarching emotion of anger. Irritated remained as part of the anger scale. The anger and hate items were not combined into one sub-scale at this stage, but remained as distinct sub-scales because another round of scale refinement was going to be conducted using the main study data. This therefore provided the opportunity for further investigating whether the anger and hate items should be combined into one sub-scale. All the four sub-scales were of high internal consistency and the final scale comprised 14 items (see Table 5).

Table 2

Intergroup Emotion Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses

Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability		Rotated loadings from three-factor solution		
			Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted	1	2	3
Anxious	4.69	1.51	.62	.73	**.83**	.08	.26
Irritated	5.80	1.21	.56	.74	**.45**	**.42**	.39
Hostile	4.28	1.48	.65	.73	.39	.14	**.57**
Happy	1.88	0.94	-.52	.81	-.20	**-.55**	**-.44**
Worried	5.19	1.58	.57	.74	.72	.15	.26
Furious	4.44	1.77	.68	.72	.26	.04	**.77**
Disgust	4.98	1.66	.61	.73	.19	.21	**.69**
Proud	1.63	1.14	-.25	.79	-.11	**-.77**	-.11
Uneasy	5.10	1.40	.59	.74	**.53**	.29	.37
Displeased	5.33	1.60	.42	.75	.20	.36	**.40**
Hatred	3.33	1.71	.56	.74	.22	.00	**.65**
Calm[a]	2.85	1.35	-.37	.81	**-.51**	-.15	-.07
Afraid	4.07	1.61	.54	.74	**.70**	.02	.23
Angry	4.69	1.51	.58	.74	.14	.25	**.69**
Overjoyed	1.40	0.78	-.15	.78	-.06	**-.76**	-.05

Note. Factor loadings >.4 are in boldface.

[a] Item not selected for final fourteen-item scale.

Political Intolerance scale refinement results

Inter-item reliability analysis on the political intolerance items indicated that the scale had high internal consistency with a Cronbach's alpha of .94. All the items except F15 had item-total correlations above .3 (see Table 3). In addition, if any items were deleted from the

scale (with the exception of F7, F15 and F24) this would result in a decrease in the alpha of the scale.

Exploratory factor analysis with principal axis extraction of factors with eigen values of greater than one revealed a two factor solution. The first factor had an eigen value of 8.65 and accounted for 36.02% of the variance in items. The second had an eigen value of 1.26 and accounted for 5.24% of the variance. Although there were two factors with eigen values higher than 1, only one of these was dominant. Most of the items (with the exception of F15, F22 and F23) loaded above .3 onto the first factor. In addition, most items which loaded onto both factors, loaded more highly onto the first factor (see Table 3). This therefore suggested that a one factor solution was more appropriate. A one factor solution revealed a strong relatedness between the items, as they all (with the exception of F15) loaded above .3 onto this factor. Both the factor and inter-item reliability analyses flagged item F15 as a weak item. However, it was kept in the scale because it was one of the only two items that measured political intolerance in terms of aggression towards the target outgroup. In addition, since a second round of scale refinement was going to be conducted in the main study, there was another opportunity to test whether it was truly weak or if this was an effect of using this particular sample; if found to be weak it would be removed from the scale.

Item analysis revealed that some of the items—F4, F12, F17, F18 and F20— had poor discriminatory power. These were removed, leaving 19 items in the scale. Due to the fact that the scale was still quite long, a qualitative analysis of the remaining items was conducted and items which were duplicated were removed from the scale. For example item F13 was removed from the scale because it was highly similar to item F3.

- F13: The government should be able to prohibit the expression of beliefs and values that it feels are offensive to its citizens.
- F3: The government should have the right to silence politicians like Julius Malema who say very controversial things.

In the same vein, items F7, F8 and F16 were also removed, leaving a final scale of 15 items with high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .92).

Table 3

Political Intolerance Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses

Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability		Single factor loading	Rotated loadings from two-factor solution	
			Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted		1	2
F1	4.48	1.74	.68	.93	**.67**	**.69**	.12
F2	4.30	1.55	.69	.93	**.63**	**.57**	.25
F3	4.64	1.83	.71	.93	**.71**	**.66**	.26
F4[a]	2.92	1.22	.50	.93	**.48**	**.44**	.19
F5	4.89	1.43	.70	.93	**.67**	**.63**	.24
F6	3.86	1.54	.72	.93	**.69**	**.72**	.12
F7[a]	3.16	1.65	.45	.94	**.41**	**.53**	-.12
F8[a]	4.47	1.47	.78	.93	**.73**	**.64**	**.35**
F9	3.86	1.32	.81	.93	**.84**	**.81**	.26
F10	4.24	1.34	.65	.93	**.58**	**.41**	**.46**
F11	3.92	1.49	.75	.93	**.68**	**.73**	.08
F12[a]	3.08	1.31	.44	.93	**.46**	**.38**	.26
F13[a]	4.28	1.55	.57	.93	**.56**	**.50**	.25
F14	5.18	1.71	.62	.93	**.62**	**.42**	**.57**
F15	4.22	1.33	.05	.94	.04	-.03	.15
F16[a]	4.68	1.24	.63	.93	**.62**	**.51**	**.38**
F17[a]	3.73	1.19	.63	.93	**.65**	**.58**	.29
F18[a]	5.00	1.40	.73	.93	**.74**	**.66**	**.34**
F19	4.22	1.29	.59	.93	**.60**	**.53**	.29
F20[a]	4.34	1.76	.67	.93	**.67**	**.67**	.16
F21	2.85	1.18	.42	.93	**.34**	**.36**	.04
F22	4.64	1.35	.54	.93	**.51**	.19	**.77**
F23	5.53	1.27	.47	.93	**.48**	.17	**.74**
F24	4.14	1.45	.38	.94	**.43**	**.30**	**.35**

Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface.

[a] Item not selected for final fifteen-item scale.

Racial Identification scale refinement results

Inter-item reliability analysis revealed that the racial identification scale had high internal consistency. The Cronbach's alpha was .83 and all the items had item- total correlations above .3. In addition, if any item was deleted, it would result in a drop in the Cronbach's alpha of the scale (see Table 4). Principal axis factor analysis indicated that there was one dominant factor with an eigen value higher than 1. This factor accounted for 40.02% of the variance and all the items loaded above .35 onto it. This suggested a strong relatedness between all the items in the scale. Item analysis revealed that one of the items (G7) had poor

discriminatory power. Therefore, this item was removed from the scale leaving a final scale of eight items with high internal consistency (see Table 5).

Table 4

Racial Identification Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses

Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability		Single-factor loading	Rotated loadings from two-factor solution	
			Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted		1	2
G1	4.99	1.16	.31	.83	**.35**	.27	.26
G2	5.03	1.21	.42	.82	**.45**	.28	**.33**
G3	4.52	1.49	.48	.82	**.49**	.14	**.62**
G4	5.16	1.32	.69	.79	**.78**	**.56**	**.53**
G5	4.36	1.43	.75	.78	**.80**	**.39**	**.81**
G6	5.31	1.03	.70	.79	**.83**	**.88**	.29
G7[a]	5.38	0.93	.65	.80	**.77**	**.87**	.23
G8	4.14	1.09	.53	.80	**.55**	**.35**	**.39**
G9	3.95	1.25	.35	.83	**.37**	.13	**.36**

Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface.

[a] Item not selected for final seven-item scale.

Table 5

Summary of Scale Psychometric Properties

Scale	Cronbach's alphas		Average inter-item correlation of refined scales	Number of preliminary items	Number of items in refined scales
	Preliminary scales	Refined scales			
1. Perceived racial threat	.87	.89	.54	10	7
2. Intergroup emotion	.77	.77	*.15	15	14
• Fear	.85	.85	.58	4	4
• Anger	.76	.76	.50	4	4
• Hate	.73	.73	.50	3	3
• Happiness	.66	.74	.51	4	3
3. Political intolerance	.93	.92	.41	24	15
4. Racial identification	.82	.83	.42	9	8

*The average inter-item correlation for the intergroup emotion scale was low due to the fact that this scale was composed of four subscales tapping into different kinds of emotion. Inter-item reliability analyses on each of these subscales indicated that they had high internal consistency as can be seen in the table.

Group comparison tests results

Once the scales were refined, a one way ANOVA was conducted on the racial threat scale scores as delivered by the refined scales. Therefore racial threat was the dependent variable while the independent variable was the group that participants belonged to (blog, video or control group). This analysis indicated that there was a significant effect, F (2, 83) = 7.83, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$. A Tukey's HSD test revealed that the blog group (M =6.09, SD = 0.71) had significantly higher threat levels than the video group (M =5.41, SD = 1.07) and Control Group 1 (M = 5.29, SD =0.74). There was no significant difference between the video group and Control Group 1. These results suggested that the blog was the better stimulus to use in the main study. (Control Group 2 was not included in this analysis because it did not have a racial threat measure).

The results also showed that even though the participants in Control Group 1 were not exposed to any threat stimuli, they still experienced a considerable amount of threat. Their threat levels were not significantly different from those of the video participants. In addition, a one way ANOVA on political intolerance indicated that there was no significant difference between the groups, F (3, 112) = 0.95, p = .42. Thus, the amount of political intolerance expressed by all four groups was quite similar, despite the fact that some groups had been exposed to threat stimuli and others hadn't. This hinted that it would probably be more effective to use a different kind of control group in the main study, one which would reduce racial threat in control group members. It was hoped that this would push the threat levels of the experimental and control group in the main study farther apart and in doing so, make the effect of the different threat levels on political intolerance clear. In light of this, the search for an additional stimulus that would reduce racial threat in the control group began.

Although it had been predicted that the video clip would increase racial threat in the participants, this did not seem to be the case. As mentioned above, there was no significant difference between the video and control group. During the data collection process, it was noticed that many of the participants seemed to find the video clip amusing. Some even laughed aloud as they watched the clip. It is possible then that the participants' levels of threat were reduced by humour. Indeed, empirical research has found that humour does reduce anxiety and threat (Ford, Ferguson, Brooks, & Hagadone, 2004). To test whether this was true for the video group, a qualitative study was conducted on participants' views on the video clip.

VIDEO PILOT STUDY

In this study, 10 participants were recruited to watch the video clip of Julius Malema. After this, they were given a short questionnaire with three items to complete. The first item was, "What opinion does the video give you of Malema?" the second was "After watching this video, in what ways do you see Malema?" and the third was "On a scale of 1-10, how do you rate this particular video in the aspect of "Funniness?"

Many of the respondents reported that the video showed Malema to be authoritative, racist and rude. However, they also said that it showed him to be a joker, unfocused and foolish. Even though most of the participants saw Malema in a negative light after watching the clip, they still found it amusing. On a scale of 1 to 10, six participants rated the video above 4 on funniness. Only three participants did not find the video funny at all. These results therefore supported the notion that humour counteracted some of the threat elicited by the video clip in the group comparisons study, thereby leading to reduced perceived threat in the video group. In light of this, the idea that humour could be used to suppress threat in the control group of the main study was formulated and a new humorous stimulus was sourced.

This stimulus was a cartoon strip about Malema (Francis & Rico, 2008). It painted a comical version of Malema who does silly things that injure his political career and was distinct to the blog in that it did not portray Malema as a powerful political figure. Rather, it portrayed him as someone who should not be taken too seriously (see Questionnaire 2 in Appendix A for the cartoon strip). The stimulus was piloted on two participants to test whether it was actually funny.

CARTOON PILOT STUDY

The participants in this study were given the cartoon strip to read. They were then asked a few short questions about it. Both participants seemed to find the stimulus amusing as they laughed aloud when they read it. They also reported that the strip portrayed Malema as a "joke" or "a clown" and not much of a threat. The results therefore indicated that the cartoon strip would be an effective stimulus to use for the control group in the main study as it was humorous and would therefore probably reduce racial threat in this group (Ford et al., 2004).

PILOT SUMMARY

The piloting process led to the selection of two threat stimuli for the main study: the blog for the increased threat group and the cartoon strip for the reduced threat group. It also ensured that valid and reliable measures were developed for the study variables. That is: (a)

the perceived racial threat scale, (b) the intergroup emotion scale, (c) the outgroup appraisal scale, (d) the racial identification scale, and (d) the political intolerance scale. Additional materials required for the main study— the Malema biography, self-categorisation prime and support gauge— were also developed during this process. The next chapter presents the method of the main study.

CHAPTER 4: METHOD - MAIN STUDY

This chapter presents the method of the main study, which includes a description of the design, participants, sampling strategy, procedure and data analysis methods used. Ethical issues pertaining to this study are discussed at the end of the chapter.

DESIGN

The main study was a randomised experiment (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) in which participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: the increased threat or reduced threat group. The increased threat group was exposed to the blog stimulus while the reduced threat group was exposed to the cartoon stimulus. This design was employed with the objective of isolating the effect of the independent variable (perceived racial threat) on the dependent variables (intergroup emotion and political intolerance) (Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004). In addition, this design allowed for the exploration of multiple relationships between all the different variables using correlation and regression analyses. Thus, it provided a way to establish cause and effect as well as build a model predicting political intolerance.

Perceived racial threat was the main independent variable with two levels: increased threat and reduced threat. Negative intergroup emotion was investigated both as a dependent variable in hypothesis one and mediator variable in hypothesis four. The influence of outgroup appraisal as an independent variable was explored in hypothesis five (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), while racial identification was employed as the independent variable in the examination of hypothesis six. Political intolerance was the focal dependent variable in this study (see Chapter 2 for all the hypotheses).

PARTICIPANTS

The target population, all psychology undergraduates at UCT, was selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was assumed that most of this population would meet the "post-apartheid generation" criterion of the study, which was the case. The mean age of this sample was 20 years, with a range of 17 to 38 (only four participants were above 30 and most were below 23). Secondly, students are readily accessible, and provided a large population to sample from.

Data was collected from 198 individuals. However, the final sample consisted of 123 participants as a reasonable amount of data was excluded for various reasons. Firstly,

participants with large amounts of missing data were excluded from analysis. Secondly, because the stimuli used to elicit racial threat in this experiment revolved around a black political figure (Julius Malema), it was assumed that black participants would experience little or no racial threat. Therefore their data was excluded. Thirdly, similar to the group comparisons pilot study, strong supporters of Malema were excluded (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). In addition, data from non-South Africans was excluded to ensure that the views collected were those of South Africans. Finally, data from participants in the reduced threat group who did not find the cartoon strip humorous was excluded. This was because humour was the tool that was supposed to reduce racial threat in this group. Thus, if some participants did not find the cartoon funny, it may have meant that their threat levels would still be high, and this may have confounded the results of the study.

Although the number of participants in the final sample was not as large as hoped, it still proved to be adequate. A number of statisticians have proposed that a sample of at least 10 participants per variable is adequate for credible statistical analysis to be conducted (Lunenburg & Irby, 2008). In this sample there were at least 15 participants per variable and over 100 participants in total. This sample size was satisfactory even for statistical analyses that are quite sensitive to outliers and sample size such as linear regression (Tredoux, 2002).

There were 68 participants in the increased threat group and 55 in the reduced threat group. Of these, 30 were male (24%) and 93 were female (76%). Eighty participants (65%) were White, 30 (24%) were Coloured, 10 (8%) were Indian and 3 (2%) were of Chinese descent. Although it would have been beneficial to have equal numbers of participants in each sex and racial grouping, time constraints prevented this imbalance from being corrected once it was discovered. More importantly, the distribution in the sample was a reflection of the UCT psychology undergraduate population which has more female and white students.

Convenience sampling was used in the selection of participants (Lunenburg & Irby, 2008). An advertisement was posted on the relevant website and announcements were made during some of the lectures. Students were asked to volunteer for the study by signing up on the website which directed them to sign up for specific study time slots.

MATERIALS

The piloting process (Chapter 3) resulted in the selection of two experimental stimuli (the blog and cartoon strip) and the development of several scales. These materials were combined into a questionnaire titled “Thoughts on Malema questionnaire” (TMQ) and two

versions of this questionnaire were created; one for the increased threat group and the other for the reduced threat group. Both of these contained:

1. the self-categorisation prime;
2. the biography on Julius Malema;
3. a threat stimulus (blog or cartoon) - the IV;
4. the racial threat scale;
5. the intergroup emotion scale;
6. the outgroup appraisal scale;
7. the political intolerance scale; and
8. the racial identification scale.

The two versions of the TMQ were highly similar with the exception of a few features. Apart from the threat stimuli (blog vs. cartoon) being different, the biographies on Julius Malema were also slightly different. The one in the increased threat TMQ emphasised the fact that Malema is powerful and influential throughout South Africa and should therefore be taken seriously. The biography in the reduced threat TMQ also portrayed Malema as powerful; however, it claimed that the extent of his power and influence was limited. It also brought out the fact that Malema is not above reprimand or discipline. Thus, the biography in the increased threat TMQ was written to sound more threatening while the one in the reduced threat TMQ was written to sound less threatening. In addition, filler items were added to the racial threat measure in the reduced threat TMQ but not to the increased threat one. (See Appendix A for both versions of the TMQ).

PROCEDURE

Data for the main study was collected over a period of three weeks in February 2011. Participants signed up for specific half hour time slots. Before the participants arrived for the study, the two versions of the TMQ were arranged in random order. An online randomization tool known as *research randomizer* was used for this purpose (Research randomizer, 1997). The research randomizer was used to generate 10 sets of random numbers. Each set had only two numbers in it — 1 and 2— in random order (See Table 6).

Table 6

Order of Random Numbers

Set number	Number order	Set number	Number order
1	2, 1	6	2, 1
2	1, 2	7	1, 2
3	2, 1	8	2, 1
4	1, 2	9	1, 2
5	2, 1	10	1, 2

These different sets were compiled into one list of twenty numbers (beginning with the first set) as follows: 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2. The number '1' was allocated to the blog TMQ and the number '2' was allocated to the cartoon TMQ. The questionnaires were then arranged in groups of twenty in the same order as the random list of numbers. For example, the first four questionnaires were in the following order: cartoon TMQ, blog TMQ, blog TMQ, and cartoon TMQ, which was according to the first four numbers of the list (2, 1, 1, and 2). When participants arrived for the study, they were given the questionnaires in this order. Thus the random order of the questionnaires ensured that the participants were randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions.

Before the participants began the study, they were given informed consent forms to read and sign. This form explained the general purpose of the study. It also informed them that they were free to terminate the study at any point and assured them of confidentiality (see Appendix C for the informed consent form). Not all the details of the study were divulged at this point as this could have potentially affected the validity of the results as a result of social desirability bias (De Vaus, 2002).

The questionnaires contained standardised instructions guiding the participants through each section. On completion of the TMQ, participants handed them in and were free to leave at their leisure. Thus the response rate was 100%. After this, they were emailed a debriefing form explaining the purpose, aims and theory surrounding the study in detail (see Appendix C for the debriefing form).Once data collection was complete, the data was coded and entered into STATISTICA in preparation for analysis.

DATA ANALYSIS METHODS USED IN THE MAIN STUDY

Although all the preliminary scales were refined in the pilot phase, they were refined further using the main study data. Principal axis factor analysis (with varimax normalized rotation) and inter-item reliability analysis were employed for this purpose and ensured that the scales were of high internal consistency. These results are presented in Chapter 5.

Independent groups t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to determine whether there were significant differences between the increased threat and reduced threat groups with regards to the study variables. They were selected because they are some of the most powerful methods to use for this purpose. T-tests were used for normal data while Mann Whitney-U tests were used for non-normal data (Miles & Banyard, 2007).

Simple regression and multiple regression were used to explore the relationships between the various variables in the main study. They provided both the strength and direction of the relationships between these variables and also clarified how much of the variance in the dependent variables could be attributed to the independent variables. These methods also allowed for a model predicting intolerance to be developed (Tredoux, 2002).

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Different measures were put in place to ensure that this study was conducted in an ethical manner and that participants faced minimal risk (De Vaus, 2002). The UCT code for research with human subjects was adhered to. Thus, as mentioned earlier, informed consent forms were used to ensure that participation was voluntary. In addition, participants were allowed to ask questions in the process of and after they completed the questionnaire. The use of a debriefing form also ensured that they were fully informed about the study and that they remained with their dignity intact after the study (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).

Overall, this study was of minimal risk to the participants. It was a study "in which the likelihood and extent of harm to the subjects is perceived to be no greater than that typically experienced in everyday life" (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008, p.68). Although the study employed stimuli to elicit racial threat in the participants, it is unlikely that these will have serious or lasting negative effects on them. The stimuli were sourced from various mediums in the public domain such as the internet, newspapers and books and were therefore not foreign or new to them. Furthermore, in signing the informed consent forms, the participants were made aware of the fact that they could terminate the study at any moment they chose. Thus if they felt uncomfortable or distressed they were free to leave. Unsurprisingly, none of them did.

SUMMARY

This chapter presented an overview of the main study method. Firstly, it outlined the design of the study, followed by a description of the participants and sampling strategy employed. After this, a synopsis of the materials used for data collection was provided, followed by a description of the procedure and data analysis methods employed. Finally this chapter clarified the fact that high ethical standards were adhered to during this study. The next chapter presents the results of the main study data analysis.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

Statistical analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses of this study. This chapter presents the results of these analyses. However, before this is done, the data coding process will be outlined, followed by a synopsis of the data cleaning and entry process. After this, the results of the main study scale refinement process will be presented, followed by the results of the group comparison tests. These will be presented in an effort to show that perceived racial threat precipitated negative emotion and political intolerance in this study. Finally, the results of the linear regression analyses will be discussed with the aim of describing how the different study variables interact and lead to the development of political intolerance. The hypotheses of the study were as follows:

1. Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative intergroup emotions of hate, anger and fear.
2. Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance.
3. Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance.
4. Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance.
5. The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of intergroup emotion expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, participants will experience more fear than anger and hate. However, when the outgroup is appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more hate and anger than fear.
6. The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of threat experienced by the participants and thus influence the intensity of intergroup emotions experienced and the amount of political intolerance expressed by them.

DATA CODING

After data collection was complete, two unused questionnaires (blog and cartoon TMQs) were used as codebooks. Specific codes were allocated to each response of each item in these questionnaires. These were then used to code the participants' questionnaires appropriately.

All the measures (with the exception of outgroup appraisal), were 7 point Likert scales with a minimum score of '1' and a maximum score of '7'. One indicated low levels of the relevant variables, while seven indicated high levels of the same. For example, a score of

one on any item in the racial threat measure indicated low perceived racial threat with regards to this specific item. In contrast, a score of seven revealed high levels of the same.

The negatively worded items were reverse coded so that their scores would be in line with those of the positively worded ones. Following this, the data was entered into MICROSOFT EXCEL 2007 and STATISTICA and the scales were refined using the same methods employed in the pilot studies. Scales scores were then generated by summing up participants' item scores. For instance, the political intolerance scale scores were obtained by summing each participant's intolerance item scores.

The outgroup appraisal scale was coded differently to the rest as it was a categorical scale. Participants were asked a set of five questions which gauged the participants' perceptions of which group was more powerful— Malema's faction in the ANCYL or their preferred political group. Thus, there were only two response options for each item and participants were required to select one. One response, *my preferred political group,* was given the code '0', while the other response, *Malema's faction in the ANCYL,* was given the code '1'. Hence participants were either given a score of 0 or 1 for each item, depending on which response they selected. Scale scores were obtained by summing up the five item scores. The minimum scale score was '0' while the maximum was '5'. Scale scores between zero and two indicated that the participants appraised their preferred political group as stronger than outgroup and scores between three and five indicated that they perceived the outgroup as stronger. After the data was coded, the data cleaning process commenced.

DATA CLEANING PROCESS

All the questionnaires collected during the study were reviewed with the aim of identifying and removing the unusable ones from the final data pool. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Black participants, non-South Africans and strong supporters of Malema were excluded from the final data pool. (Strong supporters were those who scored '5' and above on the support gauge item). In addition, questionnaires of participants in the reduced threat group, who did not find the cartoon strip funny, were also excluded. Finally questionnaires of participants with large amounts of missing data (for instance whole scales missing), were deemed unusable. Those which had small amounts of missing data (fewer than three items missing) were not removed from the data pool. Instead, values were imputed for the missing items as the missing data was classified as missing completely at random (MCAR). This is because the probability of it missing seemed unrelated to the values of any

of the other variables in this study. Data is MCAR when "the probability that an observation (X_i) is missing is unrelated to the value of X_i or to the value of any other variables" (Howell, 2009, p.2). Data imputation was the method of choice because it prevented more questionnaires from being excluded from the final data pool which would have reduced the power of the study (De Vaus, 2002).

There are various techniques that statisticians use to impute values for missing items. Some of these are mean substitution, hot deck imputation, regression substitution, maximum likelihood method, approximate Bayesian bootstrap method, and multiple imputation (Howell, 2009; Shadish et al., 2002). Although mean substitution is not necessarily the best technique to use, it was employed in this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, many authors who are not in favour of using mean substitution say this with reference to the *sample mean*. It is true that using the sample mean to fill in missing values may lead to a reduction in variance and an underestimation of standard error (Howell, 2009). Howell (p. 16) contends that this method "adds no new information [as] the overall mean, with or without replacing missing data, will be the same." However, in this study the sample mean was *not* used to impute missing values. Instead, the missing values were replaced by participants' mean scale scores (the average of the rest of the items that were part of the same scale as the missing item). This therefore had less of an effect on the variance within the sample and also, to a certain extent, added new information to the data pool as it still captured the variance that each individual added to the sample.

More importantly, each individual with missing data only had one item missing in their questionnaire. Thus out of a large number of items, data was only imputed for one item, for each participant with missing data. It is unlikely that this would greatly alter their results. According to Shadish and his colleagues (2002, p. 339), "when both total and differential attrition are low (less than 10%) and the effect size is high, these [attrition] analyses will rarely change the qualitative conclusion about whether a treatment works compared with analyses that do not take attrition into account." The attrition in this study was very low (less than 10%) as is shown below.

- *Increased threat group:* 5 participants out of 68 (7.35%) had one missing item.
- *Reduced threat group:* 1 participant out of 55 (1.81%) had one missing item.
- In total, only 6 participants out of a sample of 123 had missing data (1 item per participant), which was only 4.88% of the sample.

Thus, it was concluded that using the participants' mean scale scores to fill in missing data would *not* greatly alter the results of the group as whole. After the data was cleaned, the main study scale refinement process began.

MAIN STUDY SCALE REFINEMENT RESULTS

The results of the refinement process indicated yet again that all the scales had high internal consistency.

Perceived Racial Threat Scale Refinement Results

Inter-item reliability analysis on the racial threat measure (C1-C7) revealed that the scale had high internal consistency. Cronbach's alpha was .79, all the items had item-total correlations above .4 and most of the inter-item correlations were above .3 (see Table 7).

Principal axis factor analysis indicated that a one factor solution was the most comprehensible. This factor was the only one with an eigen value higher than one (2.64) and accounted for 37.69% of the variance in items. In addition, all the items loaded above .45 onto it and the communalities for all the items (with the exception of two) were above .35 (see Appendix D for communalities). Both analyses did not flag any items as weak, thus all seven items were kept as part of the final scale. The means of all the items indicated that threat amongst the participants was quite high. On a scale of 1-7, all the items had a mean of above 5 (see Table 7).

Table 7

Racial Threat Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses

Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability		Single-factor loading	Rotated loadings from two-factor solution	
			Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted		1	2
C1	6.39	0.90	.51	.77	**.59**	.23	**.73**
C2	5.79	1.33	.61	.74	**.69**	**.67**	.27
C3	6.18	1.02	.55	.76	**.64**	**.30**	**.69**
C4	5.99	1.12	.59	.75	**.66**	**.75**	.16
C5	6.29	0.95	.61	.75	**.69**	**.57**	**.39**
C6	5.87	1.12	.40	.78	**.46**	**.43**	.19
C7	5.02	1.55	.45	.79	**.51**	**.43**	.27

Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface.

Intergroup Emotion Scale Refinement Results

Factor analysis on the intergroup emotion scale yielded similar results to the pilot studies. That is, the anger and hate items loaded onto one factor, indicating that they were tapping into the same underlying construct. In addition, the fear and happiness items loaded onto separate factors. The anger/ hate factor had an eigen value of 5.53 and accounted for 36.84% of the variance in items. The fear factor had an eigen value of 1.13 and accounted for 7.51% of the variance, while the happiness factor had an eigen value of 0.67 and accounted for 4.46% of the variance in items. Although the happiness factor had an eigen value lower than one, it was kept as a separate factor because a three-factor solution was more comprehensible than a two-factor one. When two factors were extracted, the happiness items loaded onto the same factor as the anger and hate items (see Table 8). Furthermore, the communalities of a two-factor solution and a three-factor solution indicated that the three-factor solution was a better fit to the data (see Appendix D). The item "uneasy" loaded above .3 onto two factors. However, it loaded more highly onto the second factor with the other fear items (anxious, worried and afraid) and was therefore kept as part of this factor (see Table 8). In light of this, the anger and hate items were combined into one sub-scale (the anger sub-scale), while happiness and fear remained as separate sub-scales.

Table 8

Factor loadings for Intergroup Emotion Scale

Item	Rotated loadings from three-factor solution			Rotated loadings from two-factor solution	
	1	2	3	1	2
Anxious	.22	**.69**	.08	.20	**.71**
Irritated	**.52**	.24	.14	**.53**	.26
Hostile	**.61**	.24	.06	**.59**	.25
Happy	-.28	-.05	**-.44**	**-.39**	.-09
Worried	.20	**.83**	.12	.21	**.83**
Furious	**.83**	.26	.19	**.83**	.28
Disgusted	**.61**	.13	.14	**.62**	.14
Proud	-.14	-.07	**-.39**	-.26	-.11
Uneasy	**.37**	**.50**	.24	**.41**	**.52**
Outraged	**.75**	.22	.21	**.77**	.24
Hateful	**.78**	.19	.20	**.79**	.22
Afraid	.14	**.59**	.04	.13	**.59**
Angry	**.73**	.18	.27	**.78**	.20
Joyful	-.04	-.09	**-.67**	-.24	-.15

Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface.

Inter-item reliability analysis on the separate emotion sub-scales indicated that the anger and fear sub-scales were of high internal consistency. Anger had a Cronbach's alpha of .89, and fear had a Cronbach's alpha of .79. The item-total correlations for the anger items were quite high, ranging from .56 to .83. Thus all the items in this sub-scale seemed to be highly related to each other. This analysis supported the results of the Factor analysis in that it indicated that the anger and hate items should be combined in one scale. The fear items all had item-total correlations above .3. In addition, the analysis revealed that if any of these items were removed from the fear sub-scale, the Cronbach's alpha would decrease (see Table 9). This suggested that all the items should be retained in the final fear sub-scale.

The happiness sub-scale did not have high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .47) indicating that it may not be a very reliable scale and should therefore be used with caution in the investigation of the hypotheses.

Table 9

Emotion Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability Analysis

Sub-scale	Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability	
				Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted
Anger	Angry	4.83	1.52	.76	.87
	Irritated	5.89	1.28	.56	.89
	Hostile	4.37	1.66	.61	.89
	Furious	4.55	1.78	.83	.86
	Disgusted	5.47	1.64	.61	.89
	Outraged	4.90	1.54	.76	.87
	Hateful	3.50	1.69	.78	.87
Fear	Anxious	4.76	1.49	.61	.73
	Worried	5.36	1.39	.75	.66
	Uneasy	5.22	1.36	.52	.77
	Afraid	4.43	1.54	.52	.78
Happiness	Happy	1.62	0.93	.30	.48
	Proud	1.19	0.47	.29	.41
	Joyful	1.30	0.59	.37	.27

Political Intolerance Scale Refinement Results

Inter-item reliability analysis on the political intolerance items (F1-F15) indicated that the scale had high internal consistency with a Cronbach's alpha of .85. All the items, except F10 and F12, had item-total correlations above .3. In addition, if any items were deleted from the scale (with the exception of F10 and F12) this would result in a decrease in the alpha of the scale (see Table 10).

Principal axis factor analysis indicated that a one factor solution was most comprehensible. This factor had an eigen value of 4.73 and accounted for 31.53 % of the variance in items. It was the only factor with an eigen value greater than one. In addition, this solution resulted in fewer cross-loadings than a two factor solution (see Table 10). This analysis revealed a strong relatedness between the items, as they all (with the exception of F10 and F12) loaded above .3 onto this factor. Most of the communalities were moderate (above .3) indicating that the items were sharing some variance. Items F10 and F12 had very low communalities (below .1) indicating that they did not have much in common with the other variables (see Appendix D for communalities). Item F15 also had a low communality (.2) and its loading was markedly lower than loadings of the other items (see Table 10).

Therefore both analyses indicated that the political intolerance scale had three weak items. Two of these items— F10 and F12—were very weak while the third (F15) was moderately weak. F10 and F12 had extremely low item-total correlations and did not load onto any factor (see Table 10). They were also the same items that had been identified as weak during the pilot scale refinement process. That is, items that tapped into aggressive political intolerance. In light of this, items F10 and F12 were removed from the scale. The moderately weak item (F15) had an acceptable item to scale correlation (above .3) and loaded moderately onto the political intolerance factor (see Table 10). However, when compared to the rest of the items in the scale, this item was weaker. The other items had higher item to scale correlations and loaded more highly onto the political tolerance factor. The inter-item reliability analysis also indicated that if this item was deleted from the scale, the Cronbach's alpha would not change. This therefore suggested that item F15 did not add much to the political intolerance scale. For this reason, it was also removed from the scale, resulting in a final scale of high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha= .87), with 12 items.

Table 10

Political Intolerance Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses

Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability		Single factor loading	Rotated loadings from two-factor solution	
			Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted		1	2
F1	5.28	1.93	.58	.83	**.61**	**.60**	.12
F2	5.59	1.83	.57	.83	**.63**	**.58**	.23
F3	5.65	1.39	.59	.83	**.64**	**.60**	.20
F4	4.17	1.94	.69	.83	**.72**	**.81**	-.16
F5	4.85	1.61	.40	.84	**.44**	**.42**	.09
F6	5.00	1.82	.61	.83	**.64**	**.66**	.03
F7	4.08	1.84	.62	.83	**.69**	**.74**	-.07
F8	3.95	1.86	.62	.83	**.68**	**.74**	-.08
F9	5.92	1.69	.53	.84	**.58**	**.49**	**.39**
F10[a]	4.66	1.53	.002	.86	.00	.01	-.05
F11	5.09	1.49	.52	.84	**.59**	**.57**	.15
F12[a]	2.48	1.35	-.02	.86	.02	.01	-.10
F13	5.28	1.47	.49	.84	**.53**	**.41**	**.63**
F14	5.88	1.42	.56	.84	**.61**	**.49**	**.63**
F15[a]	4.37	1.78	.34	.85	**.37**	**.33**	.20

Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface.

[a] Item not selected for final twelve-item scale.

Racial Identification Scale Refinement Results

Inter-item reliability analysis on the racial identification items (G1-G8) revealed that the scale had high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha of .82). All the items, with the exception of G1, had item- total correlations above .3. In addition, if any item, with the exception of G1, was deleted, it would result in a drop in the Cronbach's alpha of the scale (see Table 11).

Principal axis factor analysis indicated that there was one dominant factor with an eigen value higher than 1. This factor accounted for 39.04% of the variance and all the items (with the exception of G1) loaded above .38 onto it. In addition, most of the communalities were above .38 suggesting a strong relatedness between all the items (see Appendix D). Both analyses flagged item G1 as a weak item. In light of this, it was removed from the scale resulting in a final scale of seven items with high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha= .83).

Table 11

Racial Identification Item Descriptives and Results from Reliability and Factor Analyses

Item	Mean	*SD*	Reliability		Single-factor loading	Rotated loadings from two-factor solution	
			Item-total correlation	Alpha if deleted		1	2
G1[a]	5.11	1.30	.26	.83	.27	.08	**.42**
G2	5.09	1.48	.37	.82	**.39**	.16	**.53**
G3	4.67	1.65	.58	.79	**.64**	**.52**	**.38**
G4	5.28	1.53	.70	.78	**.79**	**.67**	**.41**
G5	4.42	1.66	.70	.78	**.79**	**.63**	**.48**
G6	5.63	1.36	.49	.81	**.56**	**.59**	.12
G7	4.43	1.59	.65	.79	**.72**	**.72**	.21
G8	3.97	1.69	.57	.79	**.64**	**.68**	.12

Note. Factor loadings >.3 are in boldface.

[a] Item not selected for final seven-item scale.

Table 12 presents a summary of the psychometric properties of the preliminary and refined scales

Table 12

Psychometric Properties of the Final Scales

Scale	Cronbach's alphas		Average inter-item correlation of refined scales	Number of preliminary items	Number of items in the final scales
	Preliminary scales	Refined scales			
1. Perceived racial threat	.79	.79	.37	7	7
2. Intergroup emotion	.84	.84	*.19	14	14
• Fear	.79	.79	.49	4	4
• Anger	.89	.89	.56	4	7
• Happiness	.47	.47	.27	3	3
3. Political intolerance	.84	.87	.36	15	12
4. Racial identification	.82	.83	.37	8	7

*The average inter-item correlation for the intergroup emotion scale was low due to the fact that this scale was composed of four subscales tapping into different kinds of emotion.

GROUP COMPARISON TESTS RESULTS

The purpose of the group comparison tests was to investigate whether there were significant differences between the increased threat (blog) group and the reduced threat (cartoon) group with regard to the independent and dependent variables of the study: perceived racial threat, intergroup emotion, outgroup appraisal, racial identification, and political intolerance. Mann-Whitney U tests were used for non-normal data while t-tests were used for normally distributed data (Miles & Banyard, 2007).

As will be seen below, the results of the group comparison tests indicated that there were significant differences between the two groups with regard to perceived racial threat, negative emotion and political intolerance. The increased threat group had significantly higher levels of racial threat, negative intergroup emotion (anger and fear) and political intolerance than the reduced threat group. The tests also revealed that there were no significant differences between the two groups regarding outgroup appraisal and strength of racial identification.

Perceived Racial Threat

Statistical analyses indicated that the racial threat data was negatively skewed in the increased threat group but normally distributed in the reduced threat group (See Figure 1). This suggested that the increased threat stimulus (i.e. the blog) was effective, as it seemed to push all the blog group participants' levels of threat towards the higher end of the scale. T-tests require that data in each group should be normally distributed. However, as the data in one of the groups was skewed, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that the blog group participants would on average experience higher levels of threat than the cartoon group participants.

The Mann-Whitney U test does *not* compare the means of groups as the t-test does, instead, it compares the average ranks of groups. To obtain the average rank, all the scale scores are ordered from the minimum to the maximum score. These scores are then assigned specific ranks in ascending order. For example, if the minimum score is 5, it is given the rank '1' and if the next score is 6, it is given the rank '2' and so on. Once this is done, the ranks of the scores in the separate groups are summed and divided by the number of participants in the group (Miles & Banyard, 2007).

The results of the test were in the expected direction and significant. The blog group (average rank = 74.93) experienced significantly more threat than the cartoon group (average rank= 46.01), U= 990.5, z = 4.47, $p < .01$.



Figure 1. Distribution of racial threat scores in the blog and cartoon groups.

Intergroup Emotion

Anger

The anger data was normally distributed in both experimental groups (see Figure 2). Therefore, a t-test was conducted to evaluate whether the blog group experienced more anger than the cartoon group. Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was not significant, $F(1,121) = 1.35$, $p = .50$. Therefore, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was upheld. A one tailed t-test indicated that the blog group experienced significantly more anger (M = 36.75, SD = 7.46) than the cartoon group (M = 29.50, SD = 8.66), t (121) = 4.98, p <.01, d=.91.



Figure 2. Distribution of anger scores in the blog and cartoon groups.

Fear

The distribution graphs indicated that the data within each group was normally distributed (see Figure 3). Therefore, a t-test was conducted to investigate whether there was a significant difference between the fear levels of the blog and cartoon groups. It was hypothesised that the blog participants would experience more fear than the cartoon participants. Levene's statistic was not significant, F (1, 121) = 1.03, p = .75, thus the assumption of homogeneity of variance was upheld. The results indicated that the blog group expressed significantly more fear (M= 21.19, SD = 4.28) than the cartoon group (M =18, SD= 4.22), t (121) = 4.14, p < .01, d = .75.



Figure 3. Distribution of fear scores in the blog and cartoon groups.

Happiness

The data for both groups was positively skewed (see Figure 4). Therefore, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to determine whether the blog group participants would, on average, experience less happiness than the cartoon group participants. The results indicated that the blog group (average rank = 51.49) expressed significantly less happiness than the cartoon group (average rank = 75), U=1155, z = -3.63, p < .01.



Figure 4. Distribution of happiness scores in the blog and cartoon groups.

Outgroup Appraisal

The outgroup appraisal data was highly skewed (see Figure 5). This indicated that participants in both groups generally viewed the outgroup (Malema's faction in the ANC Youth League) as stronger than their preferred political group.

A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that there was no significant difference between the blog group (average rank = 62.31) and the cartoon group (average rank = 61.62) with regard to outgroup appraisal, $U = 1849$, $z = 0.11$, $p = .92$.



Figure 5. Distribution of outgroup appraisal scores in the blog and cartoon groups.

Racial (Ethnic) Identification

The racial identification data was normally distributed in each group (see Figure 6). Therefore, a two-tailed t-test was conducted to investigate whether there was a difference between the blog and cartoon groups in terms of racial identification. Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was not significant, F (1, 121) = 1.07, p = .94, indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was upheld. The results showed that the blog group's average level of racial identification (M = 33.41, SD =7.93) was highly similar to that of the cartoon group (M = 33.62, SD = 7.67). There was no significant difference between the two groups, t (121) = 0.15, p < .88.



Figure 6. Distribution of racial identification scores in the blog and cartoon groups.

Political Intolerance

The intolerance data was normally distributed within both groups (See Figure 7). Therefore, a one-tailed t-test was conducted to evaluate whether the blog group expressed higher levels of intolerance than the cartoon group. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was upheld as Levene's statistic was not found to be significant, F (1, 121) = 0.06, p = .81. The test revealed that the blog group expressed significantly more intolerance (M = 62.60, SD = 13.71) than the cartoon group (M = 58.43, SD = 12.57), t (121) = 1.74, p = .04, d= .32.



Figure 7. Distribution of political intolerance scores in the blog and cartoon groups.

Group Comparison Summary

The results of the group comparison tests unequivocally support most of the hypotheses of the study. The group that experienced significantly more racial threat (blog group), also expressed much more anger and fear and less happiness than the group that experienced less racial threat (cartoon group). Furthermore, this increased threat group also expressed significantly more political intolerance towards the outgroup than the reduced threat group.

Racial identification and outgroup appraisal did not seem to influence the levels of political intolerance in the groups as both groups had similar levels of the two variables. Both groups appraised Malema and his supporters as stronger than their political ingroup.

The group comparison analyses therefore suggest that perceived racial threat may indeed precipitate negative emotion (anger and fear) and political intolerance. Table 13 provides a summary of the group comparison results.

Table 13

Summary Results of Group Comparison Tests

Variable	U statistic	Average rank		*t* value	Mean		*p*
		blog group	cartoon group		blog group	cartoon group	
1. Racial threat	990.50	74.93	46.01				.001
2. Anger				4.98	36.75	29.50	.001
3. Fear				4.14	21.19	18	.001
4. Happiness	1155	51.49	75				.001
5. Outgroup appraisal	1849	62.31	61.62				.92
6. Racial identification				0.15	33.41	33.62	.88
7. Political intolerance				1.74	62.60	58.43	.04

LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL PREDICTING POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

Intergroup emotions theory suggests that apart from the main variables (intergroup threat and intergroup emotion), outgroup appraisal and ingroup identification also have a role to play in the action tendencies adopted by individuals. In order to investigate how these different variables may interact in the development of political intolerance, a preliminary model predicting political intolerance was formulated using IET (see Figure 8). Linear regression analyses were then conducted to test this model, as well as to further investigate the hypotheses of the study. The results of these analyses are presented in this section.



Figure 8. Preliminary Model Predicting Political Intolerance

Hypothesis 1: Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative intergroup emotions of hate, anger and fear

During scale refinement, the anger and hate emotion items loaded highly onto the same factor and were therefore combined into one sub-scale, namely the anger scale. The group comparison tests done earlier supported the first hypothesis, as they found that racial threat was positively associated with negative intergroup emotion. To further investigate this hypothesis, simple regression analyses with racial threat as the independent variable and the intergroup emotions as the dependent variables were conducted on the whole sample.

The analyses revealed that racial threat had a significant positive association with the negative intergroup emotions. As racial threat increased amongst the participants, anger and fear also increased, while happiness decreased. Thus, the statistical analyses supported the hypothesis that perceived racial threat is positively associated with negative intergroup emotion. The regression results indicated that racial threat accounted for 10% of the variance in anger, 9% of the variance in fear and 26% of the variance in happiness (see Table 14).

Table 14

Racial Threat and Intergroup Emotion Regression Results

Intergroup emotion	*M*	*SD*	β	*t value*	R^2	*F* (1, 121)	*p*<
Anger	33.51	8.77	.32	3.66	.10	13.41	.001
Fear	19.76	4.52	.29	3.41	.09	11.64	.001
Happiness	4.11	1.44	-.51	-6.45	.26	41.56	.001

Hypothesis 2: Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance

The group comparison test results presented earlier supported this second hypothesis as the participants in the increased threat group expressed significantly more political intolerance than those in the reduced threat group. To test this hypothesis further, a simple regression analysis was conducted with racial threat as the predictor variable and political intolerance as the outcome variable. Racial threat was found to be a significant predictor of political intolerance in this sample, $\beta = .23$, t (122)= 2.61, p =.01. It also accounted for 5.3% of the variance in political intolerance, $R^2 = .05$, F (1, 121) = 6.83, p = .01.

Hypothesis 3: Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance

As mentioned earlier, group comparison tests found that the increased threat group expressed significantly more negative emotion (anger and fear) than the reduced threat group. This same group also expressed significantly more political intolerance than the reduced threat group. Thus the group that experienced more negative intergroup emotion also expressed significantly more political intolerance. These tests therefore suggested that the negative intergroup emotions were likely to be positively associated with political intolerance in the whole sample. To investigate this, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with anger, fear and happiness as the predictor variables and political intolerance as the outcome variable.

Multiple regression analysis

All the variables (anger, fear, political intolerance) with the exception of happiness were found to be normally distributed. Although happiness was positively skewed, the distribution of the residuals was found to be generally normal with only one outlier. This outlier was less than 1% of the total number of cases included in the regression analysis and was therefore not excluded (Tredoux, 2002). The relationships between all the emotions and political intolerance were linear. Thus the assumptions for multiple regression were upheld.

The correlations in Table 15 show that anger and fear had positive correlations with political intolerance while happiness had a negative correlation with political intolerance. Anger and fear, as well as anger and happiness were moderately related. This indicated that multicollinearity (of the independent variables) was possibly an issue to take into account for this regression.

Table 15

Correlations between the Intergroup Emotions and Political Intolerance

Variable	Anger	Fear	Happiness	Political intolerance
Anger	—	.52***	-.39***	.25**
Fear		—	-.25**	.25**
Happiness			—	-.25**

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The regression analysis revealed that the intergroup emotions significantly predicted political intolerance, $R^2 = .11$, F (3, 119) = 4.66, $p < 0.01$ and accounted for approximately 11% of the

variance in this variable. However, the coefficients of each emotion were not significant (see Table 16). This suggested that the emotions were sharing a large amount of variance and so when they were put into the regression together, they stopped being significant predictors on their own.

The partial correlations also indicated that the different emotions shared a fair amount of variance. Fear and anger had zero-order correlations of .25 with political intolerance, while happiness had a zero-order correlation of -.25 with the same variable. However, the partial correlation values were smaller. For example, anger had a partial correlation of .09 indicating that it was sharing quite a bit of variance with fear and happiness. Happiness seemed to be the variable that shared least variance with the other two variables as it had the largest partial correlation with political intolerance (-.16) and also had the largest tolerance value (.84). Anger on the other hand, seemed to be the variable least tolerant to the influence of the other independent variables (tolerance= .66) (see table 16). The zero-order inter-correlations seen earlier also indicated that anger was quite highly related to fear (r =.52) and moderately to happiness (r = -.39).

Table 16

Coefficients and Correlations of the Intergroup Emotions

Emotion	*b*	Std error	Beta	*t* value	*p*	Zero order correlation	Partial correlation	Tolerance
Anger	0.162	.16	.11	0.99	.32	.25	.09	.66
Fear	0.450	.29	.15	1.51	.14	.25	.14	.73
Happiness	-1.528	.87	-.17	-1.75	.08	-.25	-.16	.84

Previous empirical research revealed that this overlap between anger and fear was not unique to this study. This literature suggests that negative emotions like anger and fear are not always distinct from each other (Brader, Valentino & Suhay, 2008). In light of this and the problems arising from multicollinearity, anger and fear were combined into one new variable, namely ‘negative intergroup emotion’. Multiple regression was then conducted on political intolerance with negative intergroup emotion and happiness as the independent variables.

The distribution of the residuals was generally normal with two outliers which accounted for less than 2% of the total number of cases included in the regression analysis. They were therefore not excluded (Tredoux, 2002). The relationships between all the

independent variables and political intolerance were linear. Thus the assumptions for multiple regression were upheld.

The overall model was found to be significant, R^2 = .10, F (2, 120) = 6.99, p = .001, and accounted for approximately 10% of the variance in political intolerance. Thus the amount of variance accounted for by this new model (negative intergroup emotion and happiness) was quite similar to the previous model. The tolerance of each variable also increased to .86. The coefficient of negative intergroup emotion was found to be significant, however the coefficient of happiness was not found to be significant (see Table 17).

Table 17

Coefficients and Correlations of negative intergroup emotion and happiness

Emotion	*b*	Std error	Beta	*t* value	*p*	Zero order correlation	Partial correlation	Tolerance
Negative emotion	1.018	.42	.23	2.44	.02	.29	.22	.86
Happiness	-1.486	.85	-.16	-1.73	.09	-.25	-.16	.86

Consequently, happiness was removed from the model and a simple regression was conducted on political intolerance with negative intergroup emotion as the predictor variable. This variable was found to be a significant predictor, R= .29, R^2= .08, F (1, 121) = 10.81, p=0.001 and accounted for 8.2% of the variance in political intolerance. Therefore, the regression analyses supported hypothesis three as they indicated that negative intergroup emotion was positively related to political intolerance.

Hypothesis 4: Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance

The regression analyses presented so far revealed that perceived racial threat was a significant predictor of negative intergroup emotion. They also found that both racial threat and negative emotion were significant predictors of political intolerance. The use of threat stimuli in the experimental groups indicated that threat probably preceded negative intergroup emotion amongst the participants. Thus, it was important to investigate whether negative intergroup emotion mediated the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance (see Figure 9).

The first step of the mediation analysis was to determine whether racial threat was significantly related to political intolerance. This was confirmed in the investigation of

hypothesis two, R =.23, R^2 = .05, b = .57, F (1, 121) = 6.83, p =.01. Therefore, the next step of mediation analysis was done. The purpose of this step was to investigate whether racial threat was a significant predictor of negative intergroup emotion. A simple regression analysis with racial threat as the independent variable and negative intergroup emotion as the dependent variable was conducted, and racial threat was found to be a significant predictor of negative intergroup emotion, R = .35, R^2 = .12, b = .19, F (1, 121) = 17.09, p <.01.

Next, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with racial threat and negative intergroup emotion predicting political intolerance. The overall model was significant, R^2= .10, F (2,120) = 6.77, p < .01. However, the slope coefficient for racial threat ceased to be significant when negative intergroup emotion was added into the model (b= .37, p = .11). The b value also reduced in size from .57 to .37. These results indicated that negative intergroup emotion mediated the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance. A Sobel test confirmed this to be true, test statistic = 2.16, SE = 0.09, p = .03. Thus, these results supported the fourth hypothesis of this study.



Figure 9. Mediation Model

Hypothesis 5: The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of intergroup emotion expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, participants will experience more fear than anger. However, when the outgroup is appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more hate and anger than fear

To test this hypothesis, simple regression analyses were conducted with outgroup appraisal as the independent variable and the different intergroup emotions—fear and anger (including hate)— as the dependent variables.

The results of the analysis revealed that outgroup appraisal did not have a significant relationship with any of the negative intergroup emotions. Furthermore, the correlations between outgroup appraisal and the different emotions were all quite low indicating that there was almost no relationship between outgroup appraisal and the different emotions (see Table 18).

Outgroup appraisal had a positive relationship with anger (Table 18). However, if the hypothesis had proven to be true, outgroup appraisal should have had a negative relationship with anger. This is because empirical research (Mackie et al., 2000) suggests that if the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, this leads to less anger and hate and more fear. Therefore, in this study it seemed that the kind of outgroup appraisal made by the participants did not seem to influence the kind of emotion that they expressed.

Although outgroup appraisal did not have a significant relationship with any of the negative intergroup emotions, its relationship with political intolerance approached significance, $R = .17$, $R^2 = .03$, $F(1, 121) = 3.79$, $p = .054$. This relationship however, was weak.

Table 18

Results of Outgroup appraisal regression analyses

Variable	*M*	*SD*	*r*	*t value*	R^2	$F(1, 122)$	*p*
Fear	19.76	4.52	.01	.12	.00	0.02	.91
Anger	33.51	8.77	.04	-.47	.00	0.22	.64
Political Intolerance	60.74	13.33	.17	1.947	.03	3.79	.054

Hypothesis 6: The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of threat experienced by the participants and thus influence the intensity of intergroup emotions experienced and the amount of political intolerance expressed by them.

Firstly, a simple regression analysis was done with racial identification as the predictor variable and racial threat as the outcome variable. The variables were found to be reasonably symmetrical and the assumption of linearity was upheld. The residuals were found to be normally distributed with only two outliers present in the sample.

The relationship between strength of racial identification and perceived racial threat was very weak, infact almost negligible ($r = .02$). In addition, the regression analysis indicated that strength of racial identification was *not* a significant predictor of racial threat in

this sample (see Table 19). The standard deviation of racial threat (5.41) was quite close to the standard error of estimate (5.43), indicating that the regression equation derived from this analysis would not be adequate. Therefore, these results suggested that the participants' strength of racial identification did not exert a significant influence on the amount of racial threat that they experienced.

In contrast, a simple regression analysis with racial identification as the independent variable and negative intergroup emotion as the dependent variable indicated that racial identification was significantly related to negative intergroup emotion. However, counter intuitively another simple regression analysis revealed that it was *not* significantly related to political intolerance (see Table 19).

Table 19

Results of Racial Identification Regression analyses

Variable	*M*	*SD*	β	*t value*	R^2	*F*(1, 122)	*P*
Racial threat	41.54	5.41	.02	.24	.00	0.06	.81
Negative emotion	13.89	2.97	.29	3.29	.08	10.86	.00
Political Intolerance	60.74	13.33	.16	1.74	.02	3.03	.08

Overall, these regression results offered mixed support for hypothesis 6. To begin with, strength of racial identification did *not* influence the amount of perceived racial threat that participants experienced. Thus, the first part of hypothesis 6 was not supported. Nevertheless, racial identification still influenced the quantity of negative intergroup emotion that participants expressed. The relationship between racial identification and negative intergroup emotion was positive and significant, suggesting that the more participants identified with their racial group, the more intensely they felt negative emotion. Surprisingly, racial identification did not seem to exert much influence on political intolerance.

Summary Regression Results

The regression analyses revealed a number of things. Firstly, that perceived racial threat is a significant predictor of political intolerance and that this relationship is mediated by negative intergroup emotion. Secondly, that outgroup appraisal did *not* significantly influence the kind of intergroup emotion expressed and finally, that strength of racial

identification did *not* influence the level of racial threat experienced by the participants or the amount of political intolerance they expressed. This led to the development of a refined model predicting political intolerance (see Figure 10).



Figure 10. Refined Regression Model Predicting Political Intolerance

SUMMARY

The findings of this study strongly suggest that perceived racial threat precipitates negative intergroup emotion and political intolerance in individuals. The group comparison results indicated that the group that perceived more threat from the outgroup, expressed significantly more negative emotion and political intolerance towards them, than the group with reduced threat levels. These results were supported by the linear regression analyses which found that perceived racial threat was a good predictor of negative emotion and political intolerance in the whole sample. In addition, these analyses revealed that negative intergroup emotion mediated the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance.

The variables outgroup appraisal and strength of racial identification did not exert an influence on the relationship between racial threat, negative intergroup emotion and political intolerance. However racial identification seemed to have some influence on negative intergroup emotion. The next chapter of this study presents a discussion of these findings.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated whether intergroup threat (perceived racial threat) and negative intergroup emotion would lead to the development of political intolerance in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans. It also investigated whether outgroup appraisals and degree of ingroup (racial) identification influence the relationship between racial threat, negative intergroup emotion and political intolerance. The intergroup emotions theory (IET) was used as a framework to generate the following hypotheses:

1. Perceived racial threat is positively associated with the negative intergroup emotions of hate, anger and fear.
2. Perceived racial threat is positively related to political intolerance.
3. Negative intergroup emotion is positively related to political intolerance.
4. Negative intergroup emotion mediates the relationship between perceived racial threat and political intolerance.
5. The kind of outgroup appraisal made will influence the kind of intergroup emotion expressed. When the outgroup is appraised as stronger than the ingroup, participants will experience more fear than anger and hate. However, when the outgroup is appraised as weaker than the ingroup, participants will experience more hate and anger than fear.
6. The strength of ingroup (racial) identification will influence the level of threat experienced by the participants and thus the intensity of intergroup emotions experienced by the participants and the amount of political intolerance expressed.

The results unequivocally supported the first four hypotheses. To begin with, the experiment revealed that perceived racial threat precipitated negative emotion and political intolerance amongst the participants. In addition, linear regression analyses on the whole sample indicated that this same variable was a strong predictor of political intolerance and that this relationship was mediated by negative intergroup emotion. In contrast, the findings did not support the fifth hypothesis and offered mixed support for the sixth one. The type of outgroup appraisal made by participants did not influence the kind of intergroup emotion that they expressed. In addition, participants' strength of racial identification did not influence the amount of threat that they experienced or the amount of political intolerance they expressed. It however influenced the intensity of emotions that they felt. These findings illuminate several points which will be discussed in this chapter. To be exact:

1. That intergroup threat (racial threat) and negative intergroup emotion are potent triggers of political intolerance.
2. That racial threat and negative emotion may be more influential than outgroup appraisal and racial identification in the development of intolerance.
3. That political intolerance is not a phenomenon that is confined to less educated groups of people of low socio-economic status.
4. That political intolerance in South Africa is not a feature of the past as it is still alive in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans.
5. That race at present still influences people's political tolerance judgements in South Africa.
6. That intergroup emotions theory is viable and offers a comprehensive explanation of how intergroup threat can lead to the development of political intolerance.

RACIAL THREAT AND NEGATIVE EMOTION AS POTENT TRIGGERS OF INTOLERANCE

Several empirical studies document the fact that intergroup threat is a strong predictor of political intolerance (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Gibson, 2006). However, a majority of these are correlational studies and therefore "do not provide strong evidence for causality between the surveyed constructs" (Halperin et al., 2009, p.117). This study is insightful in that it isolates the effect of perceived racial threat on negative intergroup emotion and political intolerance and in doing so, reveals that intergroup threat is not only a good predictor of intolerance, but also a potent trigger of the same. It also demonstrates that intergroup threat works in conjunction with negative intergroup emotion. To be precise, threat triggers negative emotions which in turn elicit political intolerance (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Marcus et al., 2005).

This is consistent with the findings of Halperin, Canetti-Nisim and Hirsch-Hoefler's (2009) study which demonstrated that perceived threat amongst Israelis was associated with the development of political intolerance and that this relationship was fully mediated by hatred. When a direct path between perceived threat and intolerance was tested, it was not found to be significant. Thus they suggested that, "perceived threat...has only an indirect effect on political intolerance, through hatred" (Halperin et al., 2009, p.112). It is important to note that in their study, hatred, anger and fear were found to be distinct emotions with distinct relationships with political intolerance. Hatred had a direct relationship with it, however, anger and fear did not. Their relationships with intolerance were mediated by hatred. For

example, it was suggested that intolerance is more likely to occur when anger evolves into hatred. In contrast, the current study did *not* find anger and hate to be distinct emotions. Fear however was distinct. Although this goes against the findings of the aforementioned study, it is consistent with those of numerous other studies and is a reflection of the presently unresolved debate about the distinction of emotions within literature (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006 as cited in Petersen, 2010).

Overall, negative emotion was found to be a potent antecedent of political intolerance. Thus, Kuklinski and his colleagues (1991) were not far from the mark in claiming that people's tolerance judgements are influenced more by emotion than rational thought. The notion of intergroup threat and negative emotion as potent triggers of political intolerance is further supported by the fact that they were stronger predictors of intolerance than outgroup appraisal and racial identification, as will be seen below.

OUTGROUP APPRAISAL AND POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

Outgroup appraisals literature contends that when outgroups are appraised as stronger than the ingroup, this propagates fear within ingroup members. On the other hand when outgroups are appraised as weaker than the ingroup, this results in anger (Frijda et al., 1989). In addition, it was proposed that both anger and fear may lead to action tendencies (avoidant and confrontational) that are part and parcel of political intolerance thus suggesting that both kinds of appraisals could indirectly lead to political intolerance. The results of this study did not support these predictions. Although the target outgroup was appraised as stronger than the ingroup by most participants, this did not result in more fear and less anger amongst them. Infact, there was almost no relationship between the outgroup appraisals that they made and the kind of emotions that they expressed. In addition, there was no significant relationship between outgroup appraisal and political intolerance.

It is difficult to ascertain why this was the case. However, one possible explanation could be that perceived racial threat is so powerful that it neutralises the influence of outgroup appraisals on emotion making it insignificant. Thus, when outgroup appraisals are made within the context of high threat, individuals responses may be determined more by the threat than their appraisals of the outgroup. In support of this, Gibson and Gouws' (2003) study investigating political intolerance in South Africa found that when the perception of outgroup power was analysed as a separate variable from threat, it did not have an influence on political intolerance. However, when it was analysed as one of the threat variables, it was positively associated with political intolerance. Hence they concluded that "the power of a

group has little to do with the level of tolerance expressed towards it" (Gibson & Gouws, 2003, p.69). Although plausible, this conclusion has not yet been verified by empirical research. This therefore highlights the need for further investigation into outgroup appraisals in relation to political intolerance.

RACIAL (INGROUP) IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL INTOLERANCE

Racial identification is another variable that was expected to influence negative intergroup emotion and political intolerance in this study. It was proposed that high identifiers would experience more racial threat and therefore more intense negative emotion and political intolerance; while low identifiers would experience less racial threat and therefore less intense negative emotion and political intolerance (Crisp et al., 2007). The results of this study offered mixed support for this hypothesis. To begin with, racial identification was not related to the amount of racial threat perceived by participants. It was also not a strong predictor of political intolerance. Nevertheless, it still managed to influence the quantity or intensity of negative emotion felt by individuals. Thus, it seemed to have an independent influence on negative emotion that was distinct to the influence of racial threat on negative emotion.

A large amount of empirical research corroborates the finding that strength of ingroup identification influences the quantity of intergroup emotion experienced by individuals (Crisp et al., 2007). However, the fact that this same variable was *not* significantly related to political intolerance in this sample, contradicts the findings of several studies that demonstrate that ingroup identification is related to the negative attitudes and action tendencies adopted towards outgroups (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Jones et al., 2009). It is possible then that there was another variable that influenced the relationship between racial identification, negative emotion and political intolerance in this sample; one that inhibits high identifiers who experience intense negative emotion, from expressing high levels of political intolerance; a variable such as group norms (Jones et al., 2007).

Group norms can be defined as "the attitudes and behaviours that are typical of a given group, and which differentiate it from other groups" (Jones et al., 2007, p. 855). Social scientists have found that how highly individuals identify with their social groups has a bearing on the extent to which they stick to their group norms. High identifiers are more likely to adhere to group norms than low identifiers. In addition, when a particular social identity is salient, individuals are more likely to conform to their social group's norms (Jones et al., 2007). In the present study, ethnic/racial identity was made salient. Therefore, if

participants believed that tolerance was one of the norms of their racial group, it is possible that those with high identification may have adhered to this group norm, even when they experienced strong negative emotions towards the outgroup. This would explain why racial identification was associated with negative emotions but not political intolerance in this sample. Although plausible, this idea cannot be verified at present as the examination of group norms was beyond the scope of this study. It however, underscores the need for further research into this variable and its possible relationship with racial identification and political intolerance in this context.

POLITICAL INTOLERANCE: NOT JUST AN ISSUE FOR "PARTICULAR" GROUPS

Apart from asserting that intergroup threat and negative intergroup emotion are triggers of intolerance, the results of this study also demonstrate that political intolerance is not a phenomenon that is confined to "particular" groups of people. A large amount of empirical research purports that political intolerance is more prevalent amongst conservative, less educated groups of people, of low socio-economic status (Renfro et al., 2006; Sullivan et al., 1990 as cited in Shamir 1991). In light of this, the sample used in this study was one which would normally be regarded as less prone to expressing political intolerance. However, the results of this study indicate otherwise.

Perceived racial threat and negative emotions were still able to trigger political intolerance in this sample, thereby reiterating the fact that these two factors are powerful antecedents of political intolerance. This may explain why political intolerance is still very rampant in South African society today (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). As long as intergroup threat and negative emotions are salient in society, it is likely that intolerance will continue to be part and parcel of the relational dynamics between social groups.

The use of a post-apartheid sample also elucidated the fact that race is still an influential factor in South African society today. Threat to participants' racial groups, greatly influenced the response that they had towards the outgroup. This therefore re-affirms the claim that it is not plausible to explore the issue of political intolerance in South Africa without exploring the issue of race and also re-emphasizes Gibson and Gouws' (2003, p.35) statement, that "one cannot write about South African politics without writing about race."

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Although the discussion so far has emphasised the potency of intergroup threat and negative emotions, it's important to note that these factors may not always translate into political intolerance. It is imperative to explore factors that could prevent intergroup threat and negative emotions from leading to political intolerance in the South African context (protective factors). In other words, factors that promote tolerance in society. Some of the viable factors put forward by literature are group norms and political sophistication (Halperin et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2007). As mentioned earlier, group norms may prevent individuals who experience strong negative emotion from becoming politically intolerant. Thus it would be important to investigate whether they have an influence on intolerance in this context.

Political sophistication can be defined as the amount of information that people have regarding political issues and events in their society. A study found that people's level of political sophistication influences their tolerance judgements. In the context of high negative emotion, individuals who are high in political sophistication are less likely to express intolerance than individuals who have low levels of political sophistication. Thus political knowledge may to a certain extent inhibit negative emotion from translating into intolerance (Halperin et al., 2009). It would be important to explore whether this is true of the South African context.

Finally, the findings of this study indicate that it would also be useful to explore whether positive emotion can inhibit threat from translating into intolerance. Participants who were exposed to the humorous stimulus in this study, expressed significantly less threat and less intolerance.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Although interesting, the current findings should be treated with some caution due to particular limitations of the study. Firstly, a specific sample (UCT students) was employed in the investigation of the research hypotheses. This sample may not be representative of the whole post-apartheid generation of South Africans. Thus it may be difficult to generalise the results of this study to all South Africans who are part of this generation. However, it is important to note that this sample was employed because it allowed us to investigate whether intergroup threat and negative emotions are as powerful as they have been proposed to be in the development of political intolerance. Therefore, it was deliberately selected for a particular purpose. Another limitation of this study is that, a considerable amount of data was excluded for various reasons, outlined in the results chapter. This could therefore have led to

bias within the findings. However, as has been seen, the results of this study are largely in line with previous empirical research, and this therefore reiterates their validity and reliability.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the findings of this thesis support IET. Although not all the hypotheses generated from this theory were supported, the major variables postulated to influence action tendencies of ingroups towards outgroup— self-categorisation, intergroup threat, and negative emotion— exerted a significant influence on political intolerance. Therefore IET offers a plausible and comprehensive explanation of how intergroup threat can translate into political intolerance.

This thesis also drew a number of additional conclusions: (a) that racial threat and negative emotions are potent predictors of political intolerance, (b) that these two variables may be more powerful than outgroup appraisal and racial identification in the development of political intolerance, (c) that political intolerance is not a phenomenon that is confined to less educated groups of people of low socio-economic status, and (d) that race at present still influences people's political tolerance judgements in South Africa.

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APPENDIX A: Thoughts on Malema Questionnaires (TMQ)

THOUGHTS ON MALEMA QUESTIONNAIRE 1

Researcher: Melina Ojiambo
Email: melina.ojiambo@uct.ac.za

INSTRUCTIONS: This is a study of the political attitudes of different individuals in South Africa. Please try to be as honest as possible when answering the questions, as this will help us to better understand students' attitudes towards political issues.

Please fill in all the questions in the questionnaire to the best of your ability. Thank you for your help in advance ☺

SECTION A

1. What ethnic group do you belong to? (for example, Black Xhosa, White-English, White Afrikaans, Indian, etc.) .....

The following provides some information about Julius Malema. Please read it carefully.

JULIUS MALEMA

Julius Malema was born on 3rd March 1981 into a township in Seshego, Limpopo. He was brought up by his mother Flora and his grandmother Sarah.

From a young age, Malema displayed his ability to lead. At the age of 14, he became the leader of the ANC Youth league (ANCYL) in his hometown. At 16 he was elected as chairman of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in Limpopo. He then became the national president of COSAS four years later.

In 2008, Malema was elected as president of the ANC youth league at their national conference. He has been credited with playing a major role in the 2009 ANC election campaign which saw President Zuma come into power. Malema is very influential amongst the black youth of South Africa and it has been said that he, like Nelson Mandela may one day rise through the ranks of the ANC to become the president of South Africa.

Malema currently aged 29 lives in Sandton, a suburb in Johannesburg and works from his office at Luthuli house, the headquarters of the ANC.

The following is the text of a blog posting on the news and discussion site, AfricaOpinion.com. The blog was posted by Ghanaian contributor Michael Appiah on 08-07-2010. Please read the blog carefully and answer the questions that follow.

Thursday, 8TH July 2010

News from the South

In my last postings I have been talking about my recent 3 month trip to South Africa. I am going to end with a final, rather strange political story that has important lessons.

One evening when I was in Port Elizabeth, I switched on the TV and there on the news was the current ANC Youth League president Julius Malema. I watched in astonishment as Malema threw a BBC journalist out of a press conference. For those of you who didn't see the video clip that did the rounds on YouTube: the journalist had asked him whether he [Julius Malema] lives in Sandton, a wealthy suburb in Johannesburg. In response, Malema said the following to the journalist:

"Here you behave or else you jump, don't come here with that tendency, don't come here with that white tendency...if you've got a tendency of undermining blacks even where you work, you're in the wrong place."

Malema then proceeded to insult, shout and swear at the journalist calling him a "bastard" and "bloody agent".

As I watched all this, I wondered to myself, how did South Africa get here? How could such a public figure and leader openly express such prejudiced views in a nation that is fighting to achieve reconciliation, tolerance and peace between different groups of people? Who *is* this Malema?

As you know, I always dig for detail. I made some enquiries and here's what I found out.

Malema's name was first launched into the public eye in June 2008 by his shocking public declaration "We are prepared to die for Zuma. Not only that, we are prepared to take up arms and kill for Zuma." This said in a nation that has witnessed much bloodshed over the years due to political violence, one can only but take what Malema said seriously. Not too long after this declaration, Malema's radical nature was witnessed yet again when he led students at the University of Johannesburg in the song "shoot the boere [farmers] they are rapists." Even after the song was outlawed, Malema defiantly sang it in Zimbabwe, a day after the murder of the former AWB leader Eugene Terreblanche.

Malema has made no move to hide his prejudiced views and has verbally attacked different individuals and groups over the past few years. He refers to the leader of the Democratic Alliance (official opposition party), Helen Zille, as "that racist girl" even though she is 30 years older than him. When challenged by the DA youth leaders to a public debate in 2009, Malema responded by saying "I only debate with serious political youth formations. Not a group of the racist Helen Zille's garden boys." He referred to the black individuals in the DA as "garden boys who smile at the madam."

In another instance, during Jacob Zuma's rape trial, Malema attacked the Sonke gender, justice advocacy group for taking him to the equality court for making a sexist statement against Zuma's accuser. He responded by saying:

"The black faces you see in front (with reference to the Sonke group)- those are not real faces, they represent the whites who are opposed to African leadership. The imperialists and the whites who are still representing the past are using this organisation."

Thus implying that no black person can or should oppose Zuma.

Malema has become well known in South Africa for his controversial statements. Another example is, If you arrest him [Zuma], he will lead us from prison. We are not afraid to be led by a president in orange clothes."

When Zuma was charged with corruption, Malema exclaimed, "but what is wrong with the president of the country being in and out of court?"

Despite all the controversy surrounding Malema and his actions, the ANC leadership has rarely reprimanded him for his behaviour. In most cases, they have let him go with a mere slap on the wrist. Perhaps this is because he has managed to garner a large following for the ANC. In fact, Malema has to a large extent been credited with aiding Zuma in gaining his victory as president of the ANC. Malema and his colleagues like to remind the ANC leadership that they, the youth league delivered most of the votes to the ANC during the 2009 election, making sure that the ANC ended up with a 65.9% of the total vote.

Now for the really worrying part. Despite all the controversy surrounding him, Malema has apparently continued to grow in influence and power over the years. Within the ANC and ANC youth league, it has been said that those who do not love Malema, fear him or tolerate him because he serves their purposes and most make sure that they stay on his right side.

How does Malema sustain his power? There are plenty of allegations of "tenderpreneurship" as they call it in SA, with Malema amassing great wealth through his political power in his home province. Perhaps he uses his wealth to buy influence. Perhaps it's a combination of charisma and bully tactics.

But perhaps Malema is onto something, giving a voice to the millions of black South Africans who feel cheated and frustrated by the promise of multiracial democracy and economic improvement. The black economic empowerment programme has gone awry, creating a few bling millionaires but leaving the frustrated majority behind. In light of this, I can see how Malema's populist rhetoric appeals to the masses. And with numbers behind him, he could be unstoppable. If it is indeed true that the ANC youth league is the breeding ground for future leaders, then it is highly possible that Julius Malema may become part of the ANC leadership and perhaps even President of the country in future.

If this is so, I think that South Africans need to ask themselves: Is this the future they want? Is this the kind of leadership that South Africa needs?

POSTED BY MICHAEL APPIAH AT 9:56 AM, 78 COMMENTS

SECTION B

1. According to this blog author, which attributes describe Julius Malema? (*Tick all the relevant ones)*
    a. friendly
    b. open to questioning
    c. peaceful
    d. racist
    e. powerful
    f. democratic
    g. power-hungry
    h. wise
    i. irresponsible
    j. statesman-like
    k. discriminatory
    l. impulsive

2. To what extent do you agree with the blog author's view of Julius Malema? (*tick the appropriate block)*

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

3. On a scale of 1-10, indicate your level of support for Julius Malema as a political leader. *(circle a number from 1 to 10, where 1=No support, 10 =very strong support)*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
no support very strong support

SECTION C

The following statements relate to Julius Malema and his key supporters within the ANC youth league. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement/question by circling/ ticking your preferred answer.

1. As a leader, Julius Malema genuinely tries to address the needs and issues of all ethnic groups including mine.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

2. Julius Malema and his key supporters instigate conflict between the different ethnic groups in society.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	Neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

3. I trust Julius Malema and his key supporters to acknowledge and respect equally the values, views and beliefs of all groups in society.

strongly agree	Agree	slightly agree	Neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

4. Julius Malema and his key supporters only want to empower certain groups in South Africa.

strongly agree	Agree	slightly agree	Neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

5. Julius Malema is racially prejudiced.

strongly agree	Agree	slightly agree	Neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

6. Julius Malema and his key supporters respect the property and ownership rights of all ethnic groups in South Africa.

strongly agree	Agree	slightly agree	Neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

7. Julius Malema and his key supporters pose a threat to my ethnic group in South Africa.

strongly agree	Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

SECTION D

As a member of your ethnic group, to what extent do you feel the following emotions when you think about Julius Malema, his key supporters and their behaviour? *(Please indicate the intensity of your emotion by circling your level of each emotion felt on a scale of 1-7.)*

anxious

1) not at all anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely anxious

irritated

2) not at all irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely irritated

hostile

3) not at all hostile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely hostile

happy

4) not at all happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely happy

worried

5) not at all worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely worried

furious

6) not at all furious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely furious

disgusted

7) not at all disgusted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely disgusted

proud

8) not at all proud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely proud

uneasy

9) not at all uneasy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely uneasy

outraged

10) not at all outraged 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely outraged

hateful

11) not at all hateful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely hateful

calm

12) not at all calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely calm

afraid

13) not at all afraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely afraid

angry

14) not at all angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely angry

joyful

15) not at all joyous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely joyous

If you are a <u>supporter</u> of Julius Malema and his faction within the ANCYL, skip the following section (Section E) and go straight to Section F.
If you support a non-Malema faction within the ANCYL, or if you support a different (i.e. non-ANC) political organisation altogether, then please answer Section E first.

SECTION E

The following items ask you to compare the Malema-led faction within the ANC Youth League, with the political group / party that you support. For each question choose one group by making a tick in one block, either Malema's group or your preferred group.

	Malema's faction in the ANCYL	My preferred political group / party
1. Who has more influence over government decisions?		
2. Who has more support for their views from the SA public?		
3. Who has more access to financial resources?		
4. Who has more positive coverage in the media?		
5. Who has more power, overall, within the current SA political context?		

SECTION F

The following questions ask about your personal opinion regarding the political activities of Julius Malema and his supporters within the ANC Youth League. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement/question by circling/ ticking your preferred answer.

1. Julius Malema and his key supporters should be allowed door to door campaigns in my community.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

2. The government should have the right to "gag" Malema (i.e. stop him from making statements to the media and the public) if he continues expressing extreme views.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

3. Malema and his supporters should **not** be allowed to hold rallies in particular areas if there is a possibility that conflict could erupt.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

4. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to make speeches in my community, even if their speeches contradict the values of my community.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

5. The media should deliberately give moderate politicians more space to air their views, and give less space to politicians like Julius Malema.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

6. Julius Malema and his key supporters should **not** be allowed to publicly criticise my party and its leaders.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

7. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to hold political rallies in any communities they wish, including mine.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

8. Malema and his key supporters should only be allowed to speak in places where they are welcome.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

9. Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to stand as candidates for the presidency of South Africa.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

10. I feel sympathetic towards members of my party who sometimes act aggressively towards the Malema faction within the ANC Youth League.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

11. Julius Malema should **not** be allowed to bring external supporters into my community for a political rally.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

12. If members of my party attacked supporters of Julius Malema, I would want those members of my party to be firmly disciplined.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

13. I believe in political tolerance for socially responsible parties, but politicians like Julius Malema do **not** deserve to be tolerated.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

14. Politicians like Julius Malema should **not** be allowed to be voted into high positions in government.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

15. Malema and his supporters should be allowed to buy advertising space in the media to promote their views.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

SECTION G

The following questions ask you how you feel about being a member of your ethnic group. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement.

1. I'm very interested in what others think about my ethnic group.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

2. When I talk about my ethnic group, I usually say "we" rather than "they."

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

3. When I hear someone who is not from my ethnic group criticize my ethnic group, I feel personally criticized.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

4. Being a member of this ethnic group is an important part of who I am.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

5. When someone praises my ethnic group it feels like a personal compliment.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

6. I feel proud to be a member of my ethnic group.

very agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

7. My views are in line with those of my ethnic group.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

8. I act like other members of my ethnic group to a great extent.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

SECTION H: Demographics

1. Gender:
    a. Male
    b. Female

2. Age.....
3. Are you a South African citizen?
    a. Yes
    b. No

THOUGHTS ON MALEMA QUESTIONAIRE 2

Researcher: Melina Ojiambo
Email: melina.ojiambo@uct.ac.za

INSTRUCTIONS: This is a study of the political attitudes of different individuals in South Africa. Please try to be as honest as possible when answering the questions, as this will help us to better understand students' attitudes towards political issues.

Please fill in all the questions in the questionnaire to the best of your ability. Thank you for your help in advance ☺

SECTION A

1. What ethnic group do you belong to? (for example, Black Xhosa, White English, White Afrikaans, Indian etc.) .....

The following provides some information about Julius Malema. Please read it carefully.

JULIUS MALEMA

Julius Malema was born on 3rd March 1981 into a township in Seshego, Limpopo. He was brought up by his mother Flora and his grandmother Sarah.

Malema has been involved in politics from a young age. At the age of 14, he became the leader of the ANC Youth league (ANCYL) in his hometown. At 16 he was elected as chairman of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in Limpopo. He then became the national president of COSAS four years later.

In 2008, Malema was elected as president of the ANC Youth League at their national conference. He has been credited with playing a major role in the 2009 ANC election campaign which saw Jacob Zuma come into power as ANC President. Malema wields significant political power in his home province of Limpopo, and also has the support of the (currently dominant) faction within the ANC Youth League. He is a controversial figure who has been reprimanded by the ANC leadership for ill discipline and contradicting the official party line. He has also run afoul of the media for making inflammatory statements, and for his personal accumulation of wealth.

Julius Malema currently lives in Sandton, a suburb in Johannesburg, and works from his office at Luthuli house, the headquarters of the ANC.

Please read the Madam & Eve cartoon strip below and answer the questions that follow overleaf.



SECTION B

1. The *Madam & Eve* cartoon you just read asks us to imagine Julius Malema as James Bond. Why do you think the cartoonists chose Bond?

.....

.....

.....

2. In the opening frame, the TV newsreader says "...political analysts now believe ANC youth league leader Julius Malema might be a liability to the ANC...and an asset to C.O.P.E." (C.O.P.E is a opposition party which started as a break-away from the ANC.) What does the cartoon mean by "liability to the ANC" and "asset to C.O.P.E"

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

3. On a scale of 1-7, how do you rate this particular cartoon on the following aspects.

funny

1) not at all funny 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely funny

insulting

2) not at all insulting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely insulting

fair

3) not at all fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely fair

clever

4) not at all clever 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely clever

4. Any other comments?

.....
.....
.....

4. To what extent do you agree with the cartoonists' view of Julius Malema?

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

5. On a scale of 1-10, indicate your level of support for Julius Malema as a political leader. *(circle a number from 1 to 10, where 1=no support, 10 =very strong support)*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

no support very strong support

SECTION C

The following statements relate to Julius Malema and his key supporters within the ANC youth league. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement/question by circling/ ticking your preferred answer.

1. Having colourful characters like Malema on the scene, makes politics more interesting for the average person.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

2. As a leader, Julius Malema genuinely try to address the needs and issues of all ethnic groups including mine.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

3. Julius Malema and his key supporters instigate conflict between the different ethnic groups in society.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

4. It's hard to take "Juju" Malema seriously.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

5. I trust Julius Malema and his key supporters to acknowledge and respect equally the values, views and beliefs of all groups in society.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

6. Julius Malema and his key supporters only want to empower certain groups in South Africa.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

7. Ultimately, Julius Malema will bring about his own downfall.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

8. Julius Malema is racially prejudiced.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

9. The media have the right to make jokes about Malema when he says foolish or outrageous things.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

10. Julius Malema and his key supporters respect the property and ownership rights of all ethnic groups in South Africa.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

11. Malema's public blunders are sometimes quite amusing.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

12. Julius Malema and his key supporters pose a threat to my ethnic group in South Africa.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

SECTION D

As a member of your ethnic group, to what extent do you feel the following emotions when you think about Julius Malema, his key supporters and their behaviour? *(Please indicate the intensity of your emotion by circling your level of each emotion felt on a scale of 1-7.)*

anxious

1. not at all anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely anxious

irritated

2. not at all irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely irritated

hostile

3. not at all hostile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely hostile

happy

4. not at all happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely happy

worried

5. not at all worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely worried

furious

6. not at all furious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely furious

amused

7. not at all amused 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely amused

disgusted

8. not at all disgusted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely disgusted

proud

9. not at all proud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely proud

uneasy

10. not at all uneasy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely uneasy

outraged

11. not at all outraged 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely outraged

hateful

12. not at all hateful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely hateful

calm

13. not at all calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely calm

afraid

14. not at all afraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely afraid

angry

15. not at all angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely angry

joyful

16. not at all joyous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely joyous

If you are a <u>supporter</u> of Julius Malema and his faction within the ANCYL, skip the following section (Section E) and go straight to Section F.

If you support a non-Malema faction within the ANCYL, or if you support a different (i.e. non-ANC) political organisation altogether, then please answer Section E first.

SECTION E

The following items ask you to compare the Malema-led faction within the ANC Youth League, with the political group / party that you support. For each question choose one group by making a tick in one block, either Malema's group or your preferred group.

	Malema's faction in the ANCYL	My preferred political group / party
1. Who has more influence over government decisions?		
2. Who has more support for their views from the SA public?		
3. Who has more access to financial resources?		
4. Who has more positive coverage in the media?		
5. Who has more power, overall, within the current SA political context?		

SECTION F

The following questions ask about your personal opinion regarding the political activities of Julius Malema and his supporters within the ANC Youth League. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement/question by circling/ ticking your preferred answer.

1. Julius Malema and his key supporters should be allowed door to door campaigns in my community.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

2. The government should have the right to "gag" Malema (i.e. stop him from making statements to the media and the public) if he continues expressing extreme views.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

3. Malema and his supporters should **not** be allowed to hold rallies in particular areas if there is a possibility that conflict could erupt.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

4. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to make speeches in my community, even if their speeches contradict the values of my community.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

5. The media should deliberately give moderate politicians more space to air their views, and give less space to politicians like Julius Malema.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

6. Julius Malema and his key supporters should **not** be allowed to publicly criticise my party and its leaders.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

7. Politicians like Malema should be allowed to hold political rallies in any communities they wish, including mine.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

8. Malema and his key supporters should only be allowed to speak in places where they are welcome.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

9. Politicians like Julius Malema should be allowed to stand as candidates for the presidency of South Africa.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

10. I feel sympathetic towards members of my party who sometimes act aggressively towards the Malema faction within the ANC Youth League.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

11. Julius Malema should **not** be allowed to bring external supporters into my community for a political rally.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

12. If members of my party attacked supporters of Julius Malema, I would want those members of my party to be firmly disciplined.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

13. I believe in political tolerance for socially responsible parties, but politicians like Julius Malema do **not** deserve to be tolerated.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

14. Politicians like Julius Malema should **not** be allowed to be voted into high positions in government.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

15. Malema and his supporters should be allowed to buy advertising space in the media to promote their views.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

SECTION G

The following questions ask you how you feel about being a member of your ethnic group. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement.

1. I'm very interested in what others think about my ethnic group.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

2. When I talk about my ethnic group, I usually say "we" rather than "they."

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

3. When I hear someone who is not from my ethnic group criticize my ethnic group, I feel personally criticized.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

4. Being a member of this ethnic group is an important part of who I am.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

5. When someone praises my ethnic group it feels like a personal compliment.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

6. I feel proud to be a member of my ethnic group.

very agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

7. My views are in line with those of my ethnic group.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

8. I act like other members of my ethnic group to a great extent.

strongly agree	agree	slightly agree	neutral	slightly disagree	disagree	strongly disagree

SECTION H: Demographics

4. Gender:
    a. Male
    b. Female

5. Age.....

6. Are you a South African citizen?
    a. Yes
    b. No

APPENDIX B

Identification with a Psychological Group Scale (IDPG)

(Mael & Tetrick, 1992 as cited in Greene, 2004, p.141)

Items in the scale refer to the participants' preferred political party

1. When someone criticizes this group, it feels like a personal insult.
2. I don't act like the typical person of this group (reversed).
3. I'm very interested in what others think about this group.
4. The limitations associated with this group apply to me also
5. When I talk about this group, I usually say "we" rather than "they."
6. I have a number of qualities typical of members of this group
7. If a story in the media criticized this group, I would feel embarrassed.
8. When someone praises this group, it feels like a personal compliment.
9. I act like a person of this group to a great extent.

APPENDIX C

Informed Consent Form

A survey of University Students' political attitudes

The purpose of this study is to examine the political attitudes of University students. Participation in this study will help us learn more about the political attitudes of South Africans in general.

A questionnaire will be given to you to complete. This should take approximately 10-15 minutes in total. You will then be free to leave at your own leisure. The questionnaire will be anonymous meaning that your identity will be kept confidential.

It is important to note that participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will not involve any penalties. You are free to stop participating in the research at any time without incurring any penalties or punishments. Before you agree to either participate or not participate in this study, I will answer any questions that you may have.

For further questions or comments regarding this study please feel free to contact me

Email: menamfuts@yahoo.com
Phone number: 076 934 8913

STUDENT NUMBER:

SIGNATURE:

Thank you for your participation

"Thoughts on Malema" Debriefing Form

The study that you took part in aims to understand some of the factors that could lead to political intolerance in society. Political intolerance occurs when certain groups or individuals in society are denied their basic political rights, for example the right to assemble and the right to speak publicly. They are therefore refused the right to express their views in society. Political intolerance is quite common in the South African context. In the 2009 general election for example, political intolerance occurred between different political parties to such a great extent that some areas were declared "no go zones." Thus some parties were refused the right to campaign in particular areas. Political intolerance also led to violence between different political parties and rival parties disrupted each other's political rallies. These are examples of extreme, blatant and confrontational forms of political intolerance, however, there are also more subtle, less confrontational forms of political intolerance. Some examples of these are not allowing particular books to be kept in libraries because of the views that they put forward, or denying qualified individuals work opportunities because of their political affiliation.

Political intolerance prevents groups in society from living together in harmony and in many cases may even lead to the breakdown of peace and stability. There is therefore a need to promote tolerance within the South African society for the sake of peace, stability and harmony between different groups. Therefore, it is important to investigate what factors or mechanisms may lead to the breakdown of tolerance and the development of intolerance. It is for this reason that this study examines the influence that perceived intergroup threat and negative emotions may have on the development of political intolerance in the South African context.

Intergroup threat arises when one group in society challenges or endangers another group's goals or well being. Previous research has found that intergroup threat is linked to the development of political intolerance. Therefore, when one group feels threatened by another group, they are more likely to be intolerant of the group that threatens them (Gibson & Gouws, 2003). Researchers have also found that when one group threatens another, this is linked to negative emotions (like anger and fear) arising in the threatened group. Negative emotions have also been found to be related to the development of political intolerance. Research done around the influence of intergroup threat and negative emotions on political intolerance has mostly been done in contexts outside the South African context. It is therefore important to see whether intergroup threat and negative emotions are also related to political intolerance within this context and in a post-apartheid generation of South Africans. The intergroup emotions theory was used to explore this topic (see references below, for more information).

As a participant in this study, you were assigned to one of two groups. One group read a blog about Julius Malema, while the other group read a cartoon strip about him. The blog was meant to cause participants in the blog group to feel some threat from Malema (increased threat group). While the cartoon was meant to reduce any threat that participants may feel from him (reduced threat group). With this information in mind, this study proposed a number of things. That:

1. The participants in the increased threat group will experience more intergroup threat and thus express more intense negative emotions and more political intolerance, than the participants in the reduced threat group.
2. The kind of emotion expressed will be influenced by whether the participants believe that Malema and his key supporters have more or less support than their own group.

3. How strongly individuals identify with their ethnic group will influence the intensity of emotion that they experience as well as the level of political intolerance that they express.

The questionnaire you completed measured different things— how strongly you identify with your ethnic/ racial group, how threatened you feel by the Malema and his key supporters, your emotional response to threat and your level of tolerance/intolerance towards Malema and his key supporters.

The results of this study indicated that the threat group participants expressed more intense negative emotion and political intolerance than the reduced threat group participants. Although most participants viewed Malema and his supporters as stronger than their preferred political group, this did not influence their emotional response towards him and his supporters. In addition, how strongly people identified with their ethnic group did not seem to influence the relationship between intergroup threat, negative emotion and political intolerance. Thus it was concluded that intergroup threat and negative emotion (anger, and fear) are potent triggers of political intolerance. In a nut shell, the more threatened people feel, the more negative emotion they express, and the more intolerant they become of the source of threat.

Thank you very much for your input, please do not hesitate to ask any questions you may have.

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Yours sincerely,

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APPENDIX D- SCALE REFINEMENT ADDITIONAL RESULTS

Table D1

Perceived Racial Threat Scale Communalities

Item	From 1 factor	Multiple R- Square
C1	.35	.39
C2	.48	.41
C3	.40	.41
C4	.44	.39
C5	.49	.39
C6	.21	.19
C7	.26	.23

Table D2

Intergroup Emotion Scale Communalities from Three factors

Item	From 1 factor	From 2 factors	From 3 factors	Multiple R-square
Anxious	.05	.53	.54	.55
Irritated	.27	.33	.35	.44
Hostile	.38	.44	.44	.48
Happy	.08	.08	.08	.30
Worried	.04	.73	.73	.61
Furious	.68	.75	.75	.73
Disgusted	.37	.39	.39	.45
Proud	.02	.03	.03	.19
Uneasy	.14	.39	.39	.47
Outraged	.57	.62	.66	.64
Hateful	.61	.65	.69	.69
Afraid	.02	.37	.37	.39
Angry	.53	.57	.64	.62
Joyful	.00	.01	.46	.20

Table D3

Intergroup Emotion Scale Communalities from Two factors

Item	From 1 factor	From 2 factors	Multiple R-square
Anxious	.04	.54	.55
Irritated	.28	.34	.44
Hostile	.34	.41	.48
Happy	.16	.17	.30
Worried	.04	.73	.61
Furious	.69	.78	.73
Disgusted	.38	.41	.45
Proud	.07	.08	.18
Uneasy	.17	.45	.47
Outraged	.59	.65	.64
Hateful	.64	.69	.69
Afraid	.02	.36	.39
Angry	.61	.65	.62
Joyful	.06	.08	.20

Table D4

Political Intolerance Scale Communalities

Item	From 1 factor	Multiple R-square
F1	.38	.38
F2	.39	.44
F3	.41	.45
F4	.52	.61
F5	.19	.27
F6	.41	.44
F7	.47	.57
F8	.46	.53
F9	.34	.38
F10	.00	.07
F11	.35	.42
F12	.00	.08
F13	.29	.48
F14	.37	.51
F15	.14	.20

Table D5

Racial Identification Scale Communalities

Item	From 1 factor	Multiple R-square
G1	.07	.12
G2	.15	.19
G3	.41	.42
G4	.62	.59
G5	.62	.59
G6	.31	.39
G7	.53	.51
G8	.40	.45