

**A STUDY OF THE RHETORIC OF THE 2002
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ZIMBABWE**

By

JAIROS KANGIRA

**Thesis Presented for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the
Department of Social Anthropology, Centre for Rhetoric Studies,
University of Cape Town**

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

Supervisor: Distinguished Professor Philippe-Joseph Salazar

Cape Town: South Africa

August, 2005

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on rhetorical discourse of the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe. The thesis analyses the rhetoric used by the two major contenders of this controversial election - the incumbent president Robert Gabriel Mugabe, candidate of Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the challenger Morgan Tsvangirai, candidate of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The study first traces the origin of rhetoric, the art of persuasive communication, to ancient Greek and Roman traditions. Following Hanson (1997), the study treats Kenneth Burke's and Chaim Perelman's different rhetorical theories as complementary. The argument is that, although the two contemporary scholars offer different views on the nature and process of rhetoric, these views are two sides of the same coin as the ultimate goal is to convince people, to create a communion between the rhetor and the audience. The study shows that both parties used negative advertisements in the election campaign. This persuasive attack produced negative images of both candidates. The rhetoric induced political cynicism of the candidates in the minds of the voters. Mugabe used collective memory and nostalgia in four funeral speeches in order to persuade the voters to vote for him. As the chief interpreter of past events, he chose those events that presented him as the vanguard of the values of the liberation struggle. His rhetoric called on the voters to guard against forces of imperialism by voting him back to the presidency. Consistently, Mugabe centred his campaign rhetoric on the achievements of his government over 22 years since independence in 1980 and attacked his opponent as a sell-out, a puppet of Britain and the whites in the country. Mugabe's land rhetoric was popular with people in the rural and peri-urban areas whose lives depended on land. Tsvangirai's rhetoric focused on the need for a change of government. He attacked Mugabe and his government for mismanaging the affairs of the country, resulting in the economic and political meltdown in the country. Tsvangirai offered practical ways of delivering the country from its economic and political quagmire and end the suffering of the people. This study argues that Tsvangirai's rhetoric of change was so persuasive to voters that had the electoral process been free and fair, he could have easily won this election.

DEDICATION

To my young brother John Jonathan who passed away on 03.10.03 and was buried on 05.06.03 in my absence when I was in Cape Town, pursuing this PhD degree.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have assisted me in varying degrees to complete this thesis. I am heavily indebted to my supervisor and mentor, Distinguished Professor Philippe-Joseph Salazar, Director of the Centre of Rhetoric Studies, University of Cape Town. His wise counsel right from the proposal stage to the completion of this thesis helped me to keep focused on this study. He also generously lent me his valuable books and journals on rhetoric which made it easy for me to understand a plethora of issues in political campaign communication in particular and Rhetoric Studies in general. Many thanks also go to Nathalie Bucher of Cape Town for the support she gave me. The reading materials she prepared and posted to me in Zimbabwe made a huge contribution to the successful completion of this study. I must not forget Judy, who at one time acted as a courier of the study material between Nathalie and me. The list would not be complete if I do not mention Professor Martin Medhurst of Texas A & M University, USA. The many articles on political campaign communication in the fights for the US presidency in a number of campaigns helped me to approach the study of political campaign communication in Zimbabwe with a more critical mind. It was very kind of Prof Medhurst to respond to my e-mail seeking assistance in terms of journal articles. Thanks again to Prof Salazar for linking me with Prof Medhurst.

Locally, I would like to thank Ernest Mudzengi, the Information Officer of the National Constitutional Assembly, for the valuable information on the 2002 presidential election he gave me. To Susan Njani-Matetakufa of the Agence France Presse, I say thank you very much for your invaluable comments on parts of this study. And to Arnold Jonga, a colleague in the Department of Linguistics, I say thank you for the ZTV news tapes you lent me. I would also like to thank ZANU (PF) and MDC officials who helped me with campaign materials of their parties but preferred anonymity. Thank you also party supporters of the political divide for willingly giving me your views on the presidential election. This includes fellow lecturers at the University of Zimbabwe whose heated arguments on political and socio-economic matters affecting our beloved country today assisted my line of argument. I thank all civic organisations for organising those scintillating public lectures on the 2002 election. The arguments presented in these meetings were very helpful to me.

I extend my thanks to participants of the conference: *About An African Athens: Rhetoric and Democracy* held from 6 to 11 June 2004 at the Centre of Rhetoric Studies, University of Cape Town. The comments they gave to my paper (part of this thesis) helped me to shape my arguments. The papers given in this conference were so inspiring.

Last but not least, I thank my wife Noma and daughters Rumbiddzai, Kudzai and Yeukai for not complaining much because of my absence at home most of the time while I was working on this thesis in my office. I also appreciate the moral support from my parents, brothers and sister.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL BACKGROUND	1-25
CHAPTER 2: THE RHETORIC IN NEGATIVE ADVERTISING	26-54
CHAPTER 3: MUGABE’S FUNERAL ORATIONS: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND NOSTALGIA	55-88
CHAPTER 4: THE RHETORIC OF CHANGE	89-119
CHAPTER 5: MUGABE’S CAMPAIGN THEMES IN 37 RALLIES	120-133
CHAPTER 6: ELECTION RESULTS: TRIUMPH OVER IMPERIALISM OR DAYLIGHT ROBBERY	134-147
CHAPTER 7: SYNOPSIS OF DISCUSSIONS	148-153
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS	154-156
CHAPTER 9: POSTSCRIPT	157-159
REFERENCES:	160-165
APPENDICES:	
APPENDIX 1: MUGABE’S SPEECH-BURIAL OF GEZI	166-170
APPENDIX 2: MUGABE’S SPEECH-BURIAL OF MAHACHI	171-173
APPENDIX 3: MUGABE’S SPEECH-BURIAL OF HUNZVI	174-178
APPENDIX 4: MUGABE’S SPEECH-BURIAL OF NKALA	179-181
APPENDIX 5: COLTART’S NEW YEAR MESSAGE	182-185
APPENDIX 6: TSVANGIRAI’S SPEECH ON RESULTS	186-187
APPENDIX 7: MUGABE’S INAUGURATION SPEECH	188-192

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

This thesis is an analysis of the rhetoric of the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe¹. The main focus of the study is on the rhetoric used by the incumbent president, Robert Gabriel Mugabe who was the candidate of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and by the challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai, candidate of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The presidential election was held on March 9, 10 and 11 2002.

This campaign is of particular interest in the study of rhetoric since it generated a huge amount of political campaign communication whose goals were threefold: to reinforce the parties' already existing support, to persuade leaning voters to cross the divide and to convert new voters to support the parties (Shea 1996). The 2002 election campaign is also of much interest because, for the first time since the attainment of independence in 1980, and with Zimbabwe having been *de facto* a one-party state, a trend supported by the elections of 1985, 1990 and 1995, the sitting president could not take victory for granted when the MDC's strong showing in the 2000 parliamentary elections was considered. This time around, Mugabe, the 'easy' winner of the preceding four elections, was facing his strongest ever challenge from an opposition party presidential candidate, Tsvangirai. Predictably, the resultant election campaign was characterized by an

¹ Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, is a Southern African country which attained independence in 1980 following years of political agitation by African nationalist organizations and the subsequent armed struggle against the British settlers.

abundance of political rhetoric from the rival parties. Subsequently, and in consequence, both ZANU(PF) and the MDC embarked upon a vicious propaganda trail against each other, with ZANU(PF) making use of state-controlled media and the MDC being 'adopted' by the private and independent media.

It is the purpose of this thesis to analyse the campaign rhetoric from both parties, and show how it was meant to influence the electorate to vote for or against either party. What can be said from the onset is that this presidential election campaign exhibited a pattern that was characterized by serious polarization between the two major contending parties.

Generally and consistently, ZANU (PF) rhetoric insinuated that voting for Tsvangirai was similar to selling the country to Britain, the former colonizer². Similarly, the MDC's rhetoric increased distrust of Mugabe among the voters by pointing out that his bad governance was responsible for the political and economic meltdown in the country. These two hypotheses guide the analysis of political campaign communication the two candidates and their parties used in this election campaign.

1.1.1 Rhetoric and Rhetorical Theory

Rhetoric is defined for the purpose of this study as the art of persuasive communication in a given situation. In other words, rhetoric refers to the use of language in communicating a theme or an idea in an effort to convince an audience. Literature traces the origin of rhetoric as an art to the first century BC in

² The Herald, March 5 2002

ancient Greece. Rhetoric was then popularized by the Sophists or rhetoric teachers like Protagoras and Gorgias in the fifth century BC.

Ancient philosophers like Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle followed this period of the Sophists. These challenged the teachings of their predecessors and developed their own approaches to rhetoric. Plato observed that “the sophists cared not for the truth of an argument, but only how they might appear to win it” (www.preacahersfiles.com). Aristotle, Plato’s student, defined rhetoric as an “art of finding in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Garver 1998:307). To Aristotle, an argument must be won by the persuasive position of truth rather than the swaying of an audience through an emotional appeal. In addition, Aristotle described rhetoric as comprising three sources of persuasion, namely, *ethos* (the character of the speaker), *logos* (argumentation) and *pathos* (the emotions of the audience). Aristotle also divided rhetoric into three types which he called deliberative rhetoric (for political purposes), forensic rhetoric (used in legal situations) and epideictic rhetoric (for ceremonial occasions). Modern rhetoric uses these sources of persuasion and the three types of rhetoric.

The Romans later borrowed the art of rhetoric from the Greeks and great rhetoricians such as Cicero and Quintilian were produced. Cicero and Quintilian’s works were an extension of Aristotle’s work. Quintilian identified the following five aspects of rhetoric which we find in modern rhetoric:

Inventio (invention) is the process that leads to the development and refinement of an argument. Once an argument is developed, it is up to *dispositio* (disposition, or argument) to determine how it should be organized for greatest effects. Once the speech content is known and the structure is determined, the next steps involve *pronuntiatio* (language) and *elocutio* (delivery). Finally, *memoria*

(memory choice) comes to play as the speaker recalls each of the elements during the speech (www.preacahersfiles.com).

The Romans are credited with publicizing Greek philosophical and rhetorical works which might have remained unknown to the outside world.

Contemporary rhetorical theory has been influenced by the two different social rhetorics advanced by Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman. Perelman's rhetorical theory focuses on argumentation. He contends that "all argumentation aims at gaining the adherence of minds, and by the very fact, assumes the existence of an intellectual contact and that this contact of minds creates a community of minds."³ Inherent in this definition of rhetoric is the ability of the rhetor to use language as a vital tool to gain the audience's adherence to his thesis. Perelman's rhetoric advocates dialogue which affords reasonable compromises on conflicting views and thereby creating an environment for pluralism. It denies any one group absolute power. Further still, Perelman's stress on the audience implies that there must be close interaction between the rhetor and his audience. The linguistic system that is used in effective argumentation breaks the barrier between the rhetor and his audience so that the two enter into a communion

Burke defines rhetoric as "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols"⁴. The definition alludes to the one of the descriptions of language as an arbitrary system of symbols. According to Burke, rhetoric's major concern is "the Babel after the Fall". His treatment of rhetoric goes further than the intellectual contact

³ J. Hansons, 1997

⁴ Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 23

mentioned by Perelman. Burke's rhetoric takes into account exterior influences, thereby treating the human being in as a whole. For Burke, the rhetorical process centres between identification and division. He contends that the division of people results in identification and this in turn bonds people together as they attempt to unite that, which was separated, and in the process, new division (consubstantiation) arises and the process repeats itself like that. Burke says his theory is based on the fact that human beings appear to have a desire to overcome division as well as to create it at the same time. While Burke's and Perelman's rhetorical theories seem to be incompatible, they both advocate communion among people. Because of this and following Hanson (1997), this study treats Burke's view and Perelman's view on rhetoric as complementary.

1.1.2 Rhetorical Situation

In order to present a comprehensive analysis of the rhetoric Mugabe and Tsvangirai used in the election campaign in question, it is important to briefly reflect on the rhetorical situation in the country. According to Bitzer a rhetorical situation is

a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigency which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigency.⁵

The 2002 presidential elections were held with a backdrop of three major events in the country. First there was the rejection of a new constitution sponsored

⁵ Martin J. Medhurst (ed.), *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1996. p. 3.

by the government in a referendum in February 2000. The “YES” vote advocated by the government lost to the “NO” vote that was supported by the opposition party, the MDC, the National Constitution Assembly (NCA) and other civic organizations. The “NO” vote meant that the government could not engage in constitutional reform. Among other things, the government accused the NCA of having connived with MDC and western countries to bring down the gains of independence by campaigning against the adoption of the new constitution.

Chief among the reasons for urging the people to vote against the government sponsored constitution, the NCA raised the issue of the section on terms for the presidential post and the absolute powers the head of state was vested with. They argued that it was not different from ratifying dictatorship. The NCA also accused the government of having tried to hijack their initiative because they had lobbied for the replacement of the “outdated” Lancaster House Constitution with a home grown one. Although initially the government had kept a blind eye on the initiative, they were soon to realize that they could only do that at their own risk. They responded by appointing a Constitution Commission. This Commission was tasked to come up with a constitution in less than six months, a period critics felt was far too short. There were fears that the Commission would rubber-stamp a government document that already existed. Another dent on the credibility of the government-sponsored constitution was that the Commission consisted of people publicly known to be sympathizers of the ZANU (PF) government. The chairman of the Constitution Commission, president of the High Court, Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku, was hand-picked by President Mugabe. Thus

the MDC, the NCA and other civic groups campaigned vigorously against the proposed new constitution. When the “NO” vote won in the referendum, the MDC, the NCA and other civic societies celebrated the “victory”, dubbing it “the people have spoken”. Indeed, for the first time in twenty-two years, the people had spoken against a government initiative and the government that had hitherto enjoyed unquestioned support took this as a betrayal.

The government responded to the defeat in the referendum by sponsoring invasions of the white commercial farms by the war veterans of the liberation struggle and other ZANU (PF) sympathizers. This was the second major event. The farm invasions were described by the government as “peaceful demonstrations” by the landless black people, but in reality they were very violent, leaving behind them a trail of plunder and death. The ZANU (PF) terror campaign left at least 35 MDC supporters dead⁶ and the decline of the rule of law continued unabated. The white commercial farmers whose farms were occupied were paying for openly supporting the opposition MDC.

The third major event was the June 2000 parliamentary elections. The results of these elections were testimony that the ZANU (PF) government was losing popularity at an alarming rate taking into account that the MDC was only nine months old in June 2000. Out of the 120 contested parliamentary seats, ZANU-PF won 62 and the MDC garnered 57. ZANU, an ethnic party of the Chipinge enclave got only 1 seat. Despite the violence, torture and intimidation that accompanied the campaigns for this plebiscite, it was clear that the people of

⁶ Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, “Are they accountable? Examining alleged violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March” 2002, p.16.

Zimbabwe wanted a change of government. The MDC's remarkable performance in these elections shocked ZANU (PF). Judging from these results, it was evident that people craved for a change of government. It was clear that the MDC had a groundswell of supporters. ZANU (PF) sensed that if it did not employ some dirty tactics, the MDC would continue to attract more and more supporters.

The March 2002 presidential election campaign was arguably the noisiest and most crucial campaign ever held in post-independent Zimbabwe. This was because the ruling party ZANU (PF) faced the stiffest challenge from the MDC, the most vibrant opposition party to enter the political scene in Zimbabwe since the attainment of independence in 1980. These presidential elections were characterised by heavy polarisation between the two major parties. As stated in the introduction, the major contenders of these watershed elections were the incumbent president Robert Gabriel Mugabe of ZANU (PF) who had been the leader of the country for twenty-two years, and the challenger Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC.

During the presidential election campaign both parties produced so much rhetoric that there was no doubt that the parties considered rhetoric the lifeblood of the success of their candidates in the 'do-or-die' elections. This rhetoric was disseminated through various media in order to market their candidates to the electorate. According to Trent and Friedenber (2000), political election campaigns in general are communicative processes. The two scholars argue that it is this campaign communication or rhetorical discourse that is at the centre of presidential campaigns. Rhetorical discourse therefore forms an interface

between the goals of the candidate and the electorate, “just as it serves as the bridge between the dreams or hopes of the voter and the actions of the candidate” (Trent and FriedenberG (2000:17). In other words, presidential rhetoric in political campaigns helps the candidates to develop and maintain public support for themselves and their policies (Buchanan 1991; Joslyn 1990; McKelvery and Ordeshook 1984).

1.2 Brief review of literature

In addition to Burke’s and Perelman’s rhetorical theories, the study also adapts Goffman’s (1974) dramaturgical approach in analysing the rhetoric used in the 2002 presidential election campaign. This approach describes rhetorical communication using a theatrical metaphor. De Wet (1991:103) briefly explains Goffman’s approach as follows:

More specifically, Goffman explains impression management in terms of performers and teams in a theatre utilising front and back regions to foster an impression on an audience. He, after all, recognises that man is also a role player and manipulator of “props” (any object or furnishing that helps to convey desired impressions to recipients), costumes, gestures and words.

To add on to the image of the political stage that Goffman talks about, (De Wet (1991:96) says that “politicians rise to power mainly because they can talk persuasively to voters and political elites”. This statement implies that presidential candidates’ speeches and other forms of addresses they make have rhetorical power on the electorate.

The research on issues and images done by Stuckey and Antczak (1995) also shows that the issues at stake in presidential campaigns are communicated in words and images, that is verbally and non verbally. Their research is informed by Burke's (1969) "master tropes"⁷. In other words Stuckey and Antczak agree with Burke's assertion that since all language is tropic, it follows that it selectively defines reality. The significance of Stuckey and Antczak's work is that during political campaigns, it is the candidate who selectively defines reality of any issue or image using language which is tropic, and it is this reality that dominates that of the voters. Stuckey and Antczak observe that

[t]he tropic nature [of language] allows us to focus attention on the ways in which candidates seek to dominate and control the processes of defining issues and images in a national campaign to create the appearance of identification with, and thus representation of, the electorate (p.118).

It can be deduced from the above observation that the major aim of campaign rhetoric is to establish the authority of the candidate's perspective of issues or political reality on the voters. In cases where the candidate's rhetoric succeeds in doing so, voters begin to see the political world through the eyes of the candidate. For example, the electorate may be convinced by a challenger's rhetoric that the high rate of unemployment in the country is the result of bad economic policies of the incumbent president. In this case the candidate has defined the issue of unemployment in his political campaign communication. This definition of the issue is not the same as the one given by the incumbent candidate

⁷ Burke's "master tropes" are useful in political campaign communication as they help the voters to see one reality in terms of another. They are metaphor (perspective), metonymy (reduction), synecdoche (representation) and irony (dialectic). They explain the figurative nature of language.

who might define it as economic sabotage by those who control the means of production and his enemies. This is similar to what happened in the Zimbabwean situation. The opposition MDC attacked the ruling party ZANU (PF) for mismanaging the economy of the country while on the other hand ZANU (PF) held the MDC and its sympathizers responsible for the economic meltdown in the country. In ZANU (PF)'s campaign rhetoric, the MDC and its sympathizers were presented to the electorate as economic saboteurs. Issue definition is therefore crucial in political campaign communication as it helps in persuading voters to support the views of the candidate.

Gronbeck and Miller (1994:8) provide an interesting example of how an issue can be defined and used in presidential rhetoric when they argue that

[a] coal field is but compressed and solidified petroleum until political-nationalist values are attached to it in a dispute between France and Germany [for example] and it has no political significance until people contend for its energy-producing capabilities. A coal field is but a natural phenomenon until converted symbolically into a political value, i.e., until it is assigned human significance and made an object of collective worth.

The way the land issue was used in the presidential rhetoric of ZANU (PF) in Zimbabwe during the 2002 elections fits squarely in the argument put forward by Gronbeck and Miller in the above quotation. The land rhetoric was meant to have a hypnotic effect and therefore whet the black people's long-standing appetite for land. In his campaign rhetoric, Mugabe argued that he was reclaiming the land from the remnants of former white oppressors and giving it back to its rightful owners, the black majority. For the twenty-two years the land issue had not taken the prominence it did now, showing that Mugabe and his party

had redefined the issue using such metaphorical slogans as *Land for Economic Empowerment* and *Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land* (ZANU-PF Election Manifesto 2002). This 'fast-track' land redistribution exercise, which was chaotic in most cases, proved attractive to the electorate, particularly to the rural voters whose lives revolve around agricultural activities.

Spearheaded by the war veterans of the liberation struggle, the invasions of white commercial farms, dubbed *The Third Chimurenga*⁸, redefined the issue of land and the land rhetoric proved not to be mere rhetoric but something practical. This explains why Mugabe used the land issue as the opening salvo of his campaign. Attack rhetoric mounted by ZANU (PF) portrayed Tsvangirai as a protégé of the British who wanted to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle when voted into power. Mugabe and ZANU (PF) claimed that Tsvangirai would do this by giving back the land to the minority white commercial farmers whose farms had been compulsorily acquired by the government for resettlement without compensation. Part of ZANU (PF) land rhetoric reads:

Sellout opposition parties such as the white controlled movement for destruction of our country, the so-called MDC, are misleading the people claiming that the land question must be addressed outside and separate from the economy. As the revolutionary party that brought democracy to our country, we in ZANU (PF) know only too well that LAND IS THE ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMY IS LAND, hence our gallant Third Chimurenga. Our major challenge today is to make the economy work for all our people, especially those in the communal and resettlement areas by ensuring that land is given back to the people (p.17).

⁸ This is a Shona word which means revolution. The Third Chimurenga can be described as a revolution that was used by ZANU (PF) to compulsorily reclaim land from white commercial farmers and redistribute it to the black majority. The First Chimurenga (1896-7) was waged by the blacks against the white settlers while The Second Chimurenga (1965-1979) culminated in the attainment of independence in 1980 .

The above quotation is used here to emphasise the point of issue definition and to show that the land issue was at the core of ZANU (PF)'s campaign communication during the presidential election campaigns. What is interesting to note is that ZANU (PF) appeared to have found in land a panacea for the economic woes the country was facing at the time. The syllogism *Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land* was ZANU (PF)'s a magic formula or catchy phrase for economic transformation. This proved not to be so as most of the haphazardly resettled new farmers had neither the means nor ability to surpass the agricultural production of the commercial farmers whose farms had been compulsorily acquired. At the time of writing this thesis, three years after the so-called Third Chimurenga began, Zimbabwe's economy has not improved. Instead, the economic crisis in this country, once dubbed Africa's 'bread basket' and 'the Jewel of Africa', continues to drift towards the cataracts by the day with no signs for positive change in the near future. No wonder why this 'fast-track' land redistribution was heavily criticised by the opposition and most non-governmental organisations as a vote-buying gimmick that was used by the ruling party in order to remain in power.

On the land issue, the MDC argued that

... while much political rhetoric has been directed towards the land issue, there is no comprehensive national vision of how to address the land question, in terms of how land reform relates to development and macro-economic policies, the distribution of land values, entitlements and use in urban and rural areas, how to manage claims to land based on historical grounds, of men and women, of farm workers and of different productive sectors (MDC Manifesto 1999:21).

The MDC promised that it “[would] manage land redistribution through a transparent, technically sound process under a Land Commission that involves all interest groups” (p.22). The above quotations from ZANU (PF) and the MDC are further testimony that the definitions that candidates give to public policy issues form the basis of action that they promise to take if voted into power (Bennett 1993; Edelman 1977).

At the centre of MDC campaign rhetoric was the call for a change of presidential leadership and government. Calling for a change of government and its entire leadership is one of the seven strategies used by challengers in political campaign communication that Trent and Friedenber (2000:106) identify and describe. They are:

- attacking the record of the opponents
- taking the offensive position on issues
- calling for a change
- emphasising optimism for the future
- speaking to traditional values rather than calling for value changes
- appearing to represent the philosophical centre of the political party

and

- delegating personal attack or harsh attacks in an effort to control demagogic rhetoric

When we analyse the rhetoric of speeches and advertisements from the MDC during the campaign period of this study, we highlight that to a large extent the above strategies were made use of by the opposition, in varying degrees of course. For instance, Tsvangirai called for a change in leadership in order to “get the country moving again” and promised the electorate “...a better tomorrow - ...when justice [would] prevail, and when health, wealth, and happiness [would] be more than just vague illusions” (p.110).

This study demonstrates that the kind of rhetoric that was used by the opposition MDC leader was “a rhetoric of optimism” and not “a rhetoric of despair” (Trent and Trent 1974). It was a rhetoric of self-renewal or rejuvenation of national dreams and prosperity that were almost beyond people’s imagination under ZANU (PF) leadership. This type of rhetoric positioned Tsvangirai strategically as the only remaining beacon of hope amidst a sea of darkness and hopelessness. One is reminded of the rhetoric of optimism that is contained in Old Major’s political speech and in the song *Beasts of England* in George Orwell’s classic novel, *Animal Farm*⁹. Another good example of this rhetoric of optimism is found in Dr Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous speech titled “I Have a Dream”¹⁰. Through powerful images of hope and change he said in his speech:

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood. ... I have a dream that my four children will one day live in a nation where they will not

⁹ The book is a political satire that mocks the ideology of communism. At the beginning of the story, Old Major’s rhetoric incites the animals to oust Mr Jones, the owner of the farm. The song *Beasts of England* promises the animals “... joyful tidings of the golden future time”.

¹⁰ King Jr. delivered this speech on the steps of Lincoln Memorial to a quarter of a million Americans on 28 August 1963.

be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character (www.quoteland.com/library/speeches/dream.asp).

Dr King Jr.'s speech espoused a new American society that did not segregate its members on the colour lines of black and white. The speech electrified a quarter of a million people. The following comment sums up the essence of the speech:

The speech was structured like a classic tale of good triumphing over evil. Using Lincoln's words, King began with a discussion of the past: "Five score years." King then spoke of the present: "Now is the time." Then King ended with the future: "I have a dream."... Few could argue with King's imagery of little black boys and black girls joining hands with little white boys and white girls. Within two months of King's speech, Congress passed a new civil-rights bill into law (www.pbs.org/greatspeeches/timeline/).

Commenting on the strategy used in the same speech, Smith (1994:300) says that

[t]he genius of King's speech is that he argued for a fair treatment of all Americans, not solely African Americans, and that he did so not with the rhetoric of the black experience but with the rhetoric of the white middle class.

Since the aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the campaign communication of each of the two major contenders in the presidential election under study, the study shows that, by and large, the electorate, especially urban and peri-urban voters, found Tsvangirai's rhetoric of optimism quite appealing, hence the massive support his party garnered in these areas against all forms of political violence such as torture, murder and harassment perpetrated by ZANU (PF) supporters. Also, despite a lot of intimidation from ZANU (PF) supporters, thousands of people attended MDC rallies to hear Tsvangirai speech about change

and a better future. The MDC also got a lot of support from rural areas despite the fact that these had been declared 'no-go' areas for the MDC by ZANU (PF) supporters and militias during the election campaigns, and were generally strongholds of ZANU (PF). But had the MDC been allowed to campaign freely in these areas, there is no doubt it would have increased its support base in the rural areas.

Having looked at the rhetorical strategies of the challenger, it is imperative that we look at the strategies used by the incumbent. Again our source of the general strategies used by incumbents is Trent and Friedenber (2000). Only those strategies that are appropriate to the Zimbabwean situation are considered here. These are

- creating pseudo-events to attract and control media attention
- consulting or negotiating with world leaders
- manipulating economy or other important domestic issues
- appropriating [state] funds/grants [or loans]
- endorsements by party and other important leaders
- emphasising accomplishments
- creating and maintaining an "above the political trenches" posture
- depending on surrogates for campaign trail and
- interpreting and intensifying a foreign policy problem so that it

becomes an international crisis (p.90)

In the assessment of the rhetoric used by Mugabe and his party in the election campaigns, the above-mentioned strategies are investigated. In other

words, one of the objectives of the study is to examine to what extent Mugabe and ZANU (PF) used the incumbency strategies. For instance, it is not surprising to note there were many pseudo-events that were planned, planted or incited for the purpose of media attention (Brown 1983) by ZANU (PF) during the election campaign. ZANU (PF) used both the state controlled electronic and print media to manufacture news that either inflated the image of the incumbent or deflated the image of the challenger. In other words, there were many false events that were stage managed by the ruling party in order to manipulate the electorate into thinking that voting for the ZANU (PF) candidate was the wisest and patriotic thing and voting for MDC candidate was the most foolish and unpatriotic thing to do in these elections.

The newly created Department of Information and Publicity in the office of the President and Cabinet hyped or manufactured news that gave a positive image of the incumbent while the challenger was presented as a devil. The MDC leader was given such derogatory names as 'Tsvangison' and 'Boycott'. This name-calling strategy, as shall be seen in the coming chapters, was meant to belittle and trivialise Tsvangirai's political stature. Only ZANU (PF) campaign advertisements were flighted on the only state controlled television channel and aired through the four state controlled radio stations. No meaningful or positive coverage of MDC campaign rallies was done by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), which virtually turned the national broadcaster into a ZANU (PF) propaganda machinery. Neither did the state-controlled daily newspapers *The Herald* and *The Chronicle* and other publications from the same stable accept

campaign advertisements from the opposition MDC party. These papers published stories that dented the image of Tsvangirai and the MDC.

Throughout the election campaigns, the state media practised, among other forms of propaganda, propaganda by censorship. This means “the selective control of information to favour a particular viewpoint, and the deliberate doctoring of information in order to create an impression different from that originally intended” (Brown 1983:16). The MDC was painted as a sell-out organisation that was linked to Britain, the former colonial power that, in ZANU (PF) philosophy and rhetoric, had the intention of recolonising the country hence ZANU (PF)’s slogan “Zimbabwe Will Never Be A Colony Again”. The MDC leader was depicted as a dupe of the British by ZANU (PF)’s campaign rhetoric. This negative rhetoric was aimed at discrediting the opposition party ahead of the elections.

The Agenda-Setting Hypothesis (McCombs and Shaw 1972) of mass media explains why ZANU (PF) churned its propaganda through both the state-controlled electronic and print media. It also explains why the state-controlled media would not accept advertisements from the MDC. The ZBC would not allow the opposition leader a chance to address the electorate either through the radio or on television yet the incumbent had the privilege of using these media ad nauseam on a daily basis. The MDC used the privately owned newspapers for all their political campaign communication. Adverts and news reports that could not be published in the state controlled media were published in the privately owned newspapers such as *The Daily news*, *The Financial Gazette*, *The Standard* and

The Independent and monthly magazines such as *Moto* and *Parade*. It was in these newspapers and magazines that a positive image of the MDC presidential candidate was depicted. Most of these privately owned newspapers painted a negative image of Mugabe and ZANU (PF). They also used propaganda by censorship since they did not cover stories that portrayed a good picture of Mugabe and ZANU (PF). They carried stories that blamed Mugabe for bad governance and unchecked corruption that were bringing the economy of the country to its knees. There was no question that these papers were pro-Tsvangirai and the MDC although they did not publicly declare this, hiding behind the guise of freedom of the press and democracy. The incompatibility between state-controlled media on the one hand and the privately owned media on the other hand resulted in the polarization of the press in Zimbabwe.

There is no shred of doubt that the media played a significant role in image management of the two chief contenders in the 2002 presidential elections. According to McCombs and Shaw (1972:177), “the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues.” This is to say that the media are used in campaign communication to influence the way people view and discuss political issues. Mugabe and his party’ for example, put the issues of land and sovereignty high on the agenda in their campaigns while Tsvangirai and the MDC’s topmost issues were embodied in the call for ‘change’. Mass media agenda-setting assists candidates in trying to convince the voters on particular issues and in shaping voters’ opinions about them (McQuail 1987). He further notes that

[t]he hypothesis presupposes a process of influence from the priorities of political or other interest groups, to the news priorities of media, in which news values and audience interests play a strong part, and from there to opinions of the public (p.276).

A study carried out by Weaver et al. (1981) to examine the agenda-setting hypothesis of the 1976 American presidential election campaign revealed that the mass media play a vital role in shaping the candidates' images. They conclude that

[the] findings support the idea that media agenda-setting (at least newspaper agenda-setting) extends to candidate images as well as to issues and that media emphasis or de-emphasis of certain image attributes to voter evaluations of candidate (p.192).

In the same vein, Schenck-Hamlin et al. (2000:54) observe

[i]n campaign advertising, it is likely that campaign strategists purposefully use framing devices in political advertisements to influence the image of the candidate, the candidate's opponent, and the debate about public policy issues.

Candidate image is the sum of the perceived personal and professional characteristics of the candidate (Garramone 1986). Still on the role played by the media in the formation of presidential candidates' images, Graber (1972: 50-51) asserts that

[t]he mass media are significant in furnishing raw material for the formation of political images. Most people do not invent political images from thin air. Rather, they combine current political data supplied by the mass media with existing knowledge and attitudes and then weave these into a plausible and pleasing GESTALT.

What this suggests is that the meanings voters associate with a presidential campaign are not by chance (Jamieson 1992; Roberts 1995). These meanings are arrived at with the aid of the messages that come from the media.

Biocca (1991a:11) contends that “we can safely postulate that a relationship exists between the structure of the political ad and the psychological processes of the viewer” or the reader. Similarly, Jamieson (1992) metaphorically refers to voters as “pack rats” as they take bits and pieces of information from the media to create an overall impression of the candidate’s image. She notes that

[l]ike pack rats, voters gather bits and pieces of information and store them in a single place. Lost in the storage is a clear recall of where this or that ‘fact’ came from. Information obtained from news mixes with that from ads, for example (p.17).

According to Jamieson, both the news and advertisements about the candidates are important sources of information that voters use to form candidates’ images. This implies therefore that the image management policy of a political party must be clear as to what type of messages is disseminated to the electorate. In other words, campaign managers must work out or package the type of image they want to sell to the public before the information is released for public consumption. In their research on shaping a candidate’s image in the press, Richardson et al. (1994:90) state that

[i]f we are to understand how the public develops its images of presidential candidates, we must understand the process by which the images that candidates intend the public to receive get communicated to the public through the news media.

This explains why the news media in Zimbabwe carried different types of news items on the two candidates during the election campaigns. They were aimed at shaping the presidential candidates’ images in the minds of the voters.

After examining the semantic processing of campaign advertisements on the television in relation to candidate image, Biocca (1991b:27) states that

[v]iewed in cognitive terms, the struggle over the candidate's image is the struggle over the semantic processing of political commercials by voters. In the mind of the viewer the imagery of the political commercial is represented by networks of semantic nodes and markers radiating from a central concept, the candidate.

Biocca suggests that the voter has to work out the meaning of an advertisement and the mental image that the voter has is centred on the candidate. In other words the mental concept that the voter has about the candidate is the meaning of the advertisement, that is, the image the candidate wanted to communicate. To arrive at this image or meaning, the voter engages in a heuristic interpretation of the advertisement (Leech 1983).

This study shows that two major political parties in Zimbabwe during the 2002 presidential elections were aware of the influential role mass media play in forming the images of their candidates. As a result, the parties strove to have access to different types of media in order to reach every corner of the country. Regrettably and as earlier noted, the opposition party did not get a fair deal as far as the use of the national electronic media is concerned since they were barred from using them. In other words, the state media religiously performed the gate-keeping or propaganda function that allowed only ZANU (PF) campaign communication to be disseminated to the electorate. This selective or biased reporting was aimed at presenting the incumbent as the best candidate for the presidential election and to downplay the potential of the challenger.

One of the major strategies that were used by both political parties during these election campaigns was that of personalised attacks on one's opponent. These attacks were prevalent in negative political advertisements that appeared

both in the print and electronic media. It has already been noted that as the ruling party, ZANU (PF) had the privilege of using both the print and the electronic media while the MDC relied only on the former.

It has also been found that negative advertising that is based on ‘vicious personal attacks’ is more likely to backfire than negative advertising based on issues (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991; Roddy and Garramone 1988). In other words what these scholars are saying is that negative messages backlash or backfire on their sponsor. This also supported by Roberts (1995:180-181) who asserts

direct attacks have the greatest potential for backlash, followed by the direct comparison. The implied comparison is found to be the least likely to create a backlash, because the format encourages viewers to generate their own arguments.

On the same issue, Gronbeck and Miller (1994:9) say

[t]he public’s responses generally are drawn between positive and negative poles: at times, they react with hope to portrayals of a new world, and at other times, with fear and pessimism to negative portrayals of opponents. ...Individuals do all this privately in small groups-more intriguingly today - publicly in the form of opinion polls.

This study offers support for these scholars’ findings and extends the understanding of negative advertisements and their interpretation in general.

1.3. Summary

A brief account of the origin of rhetoric from ancient Greece and Rome has been given. The rhetorical theories of Burke and Perelman have been

described and this study treats them as having a complementary role. The rhetorical situation or “exigency” prior to the 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe has been described. The ZANU-PF government lost in the referendum that it so desperately needed to make constitutional changes. This was followed by the invasion of commercial farm belonging to white farmers. The people’s quest for a change of government was shown in their overwhelming support for the MDC during the 2000 parliamentary elections despite the orgy of violence, torture and intimidation that were targeted at MDC supporters.

The works of scholars in rhetoric reviewed in this chapter show that in political campaigns in general, a candidate “[uses] the appropriate arguments to prove what [he] wants to claim” (Whateley 1963:39). These arguments may be based on facts and lies as in propaganda. Some works show that rhetorical discourse involves “adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas” (Bryant 1972:26). The role of attack rhetoric in election campaigns has been demonstrated by citing the scholars in rhetoric who have done some work in this area.

CHAPTER 2

THE RHETORIC IN NEGATIVE ADVERTISING

2.1 Defining Negative Advertising and Democracy

As a starting point, the terms “negative political advertising” or “negative political advertisement/s” and “democracy” are defined in order to situate the discussion. Gronbeck (1994:62) defines a negative political advertisement as “one that creates unattractive or undesirable images of one’s political opponents”. He further notes that the function of negative advertisements in political campaign communication

... is to destabilize the voter support for the other, either by increasing the undecideds (who presumably can be won by one’s own candidate) or ...even driving voters out of the electorate arena altogether in circumstances when one’s candidate might be helped by a lower turnout (p.77).

While this definition on its own would suffice for the purposes of this study, it is important to juxtapose it against perspectives of other scholars so as to provide a broader understanding of negative political campaign advertising.

One other way of describing negative political advertising is calling it mudslinging. Stewart (1975) as cited by Gronbeck (1994:62) says a mudslinger is a “person guilty of rumours, making insinuations, perpetuating, telling lies and calling names.” It is import to point out that not all the characteristics mentioned by Stewart may manifest themselves in a single negative political advertisement. The bottom line is that as long as an advert exhibits one or more of these features, its aim is to deflate the image of the opponent and is, therefore, negative. Mudslinging can also be described as the use of “smear tactics and political

CHAPTER 2

THE RHETORIC IN NEGATIVE ADVERTISING

2.1 Defining Negative Advertising and Democracy

As a starting point, the terms “negative political advertising” or “negative political advertisement/s” and “democracy” are defined in order to situate the discussion. Gronbeck (1994:62) defines a negative political advertisement as “one that creates unattractive or undesirable images of one’s political opponents”. He further notes that the function of negative advertisements in political campaign communication

... is to destabilize the voter support for the other, either by increasing the undecideds (who presumably can be won by one’s own candidate) or ...even driving voters out of the electorate arena altogether in circumstances when one’s candidate might be helped by a lower turnout (p.77).

While this definition on its own would suffice for the purposes of this study, it is important to juxtapose it against perspectives of other scholars so as to provide a broader understanding of negative political campaign advertising.

One other way of describing negative political advertising is calling it mudslinging. Stewart (1975) as cited by Gronbeck (1994:62) says a mudslinger is a “person guilty of rumours, making insinuations, perpetuating, telling lies and calling names.” It is important to point out that not all the characteristics mentioned by Stewart may manifest themselves in a single negative political advertisement. The bottom line is that as long as an advert exhibits one or more of these features, its aim is to deflate the image of the opponent and is, therefore, negative. Mudslinging can also be described as the use of “smear tactics and political

hatch” (Trent and Friedenbergr 2000) or “name-calling, direct personal attacks, man-on-the street, symbolic attacks ...to discredit the opponent ...most frequently delivered by surrogate speakers” (as mentioned in Gronbeck 1994:61). A surrogate speaker is often used to attack the opponent in a negative advertisement in order to avoid a backlash¹¹ or to take advantage of the surrogate’s ethos (Sheckels 2002). This sense of a negative political advertisement concurs with what Diamond and Bates (1984) call an “attack ad”. Benoit and Wells (1996) identify two aspects of political communication, that is “persuasive attack” and “persuasive defence”. They explain the two concepts as follows:

[p]ersuasive attack means messages that attempt to damage the image (reputation, face, identity) of a person, group, or organization (these attacks may address the character and/or the policies associated with that person, group, or organization). Persuasive defence on the other hand, attempts to repair an image after persuasive attack (p.20).

To a great extent the negative advertisements that are analysed in this study conform with the explanation of “persuasive attack” that Benoit and Williams give. The negative messages in the political advertisements attacked the images and parties of the two major presidential candidates under study.

On the same issue, Gronbeck (1994) identifies three basic types of negative political advertisements: the implicative advertisement, the comparative advertisement and the assault advertisement. He explains these by saying that “in implicative, comparative, and assault negative ads, we have three different foci: the implicative ad focuses on self, the assault, on other, and the comparative, on

¹¹ A backlash occurs when the negative political advertisements impact negatively on their sponsor rather than on the opponent. When this happens, the advertisement is self-defeating (Roberts 1995). See also Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1991) and Garramone (1988) for a detailed discussion on how negative advertisements can backfire.

both (p.69).” Accordingly, the analysis of the rhetorical structures of negative campaign advertisements in this study entails showing which types of advertisements each political party used and why they were used. It is the ‘assault advertisement’ that Gronbeck calls a true negative advertisement since it is completely centred on the opponent. This is the definition of negative advertisement that is used in the analyses of advertisements in this study. Some researches reveal that negative messages are rhetorically effective against the opponent if they are well managed (Kaid and Boydston 1987 and Merritt 1984).

Since the concepts “rhetoric” and “democracy” are almost inseparable, it is also imperative that a working definition of the term “democracy” be given. Defining democracy as a system of government for the people, with the people and by the people does not adequately and clearly give the features or tenets of this system of governing. In most cases politicians parrot this definition without actually understanding or practising the fundamentals of a democratic system or process. For the purposes of this study, I adopt the definition of democracy made in the deliberations of the International Panel on Democracy and Development (IPDD)¹². The panel defines democracy as

...a system whereby the whole society can participate, at every level, in the decision making process and keep control over it. Its foundation is the full observance of human rights, as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Pacts and Declaration of 1993. And the promotion of those rights and the respect of differences and freedom of speech and thought are indispensable preconditions for democracy. There can be no democracy without an independent judicial system and

¹² The IPDD was set by the UNESCO Director-General in 1998 to work out the principles of democracy and development. The panel, chaired by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, produced a verbatim record of the deliberations entitled *The Interaction between Democracy and Development* .

without institutions that guarantee freedom of expression and the existence of free media. The power to legislate must be exercised by representatives of the people who have been elected by the people. Laws must be implemented by legally responsible individuals, and the administrative apparatus must be accountable to the elected representatives. That is why a parliament that is truly representative of the people in all its diversity is indispensable for the democratic process. In this respect, the holding of free and fair elections by universal suffrage is a necessary, though not in itself sufficient, precondition for the existence of a democratic regime. ...democracy can be defined as a political system that is capable of correcting its own dysfunctions (Boutros-Ghali 2003: 7-8).

I find this to be a comprehensive definition as it lays down the fundamental principles for the execution of a democratic process. For instance, in a democratic society there is respect for other people as sovereign power lies with the people, there exists rule of law because there is a reliable and independent judicial system and individuals have the right "...to express their opinion [freely] within society to which they belong and [have] the right to be heard..."(ibid: 9). In addition, the political environment must be conducive to the free expression by civil society both locally and internationally, as the world is increasingly becoming a global village. A free press is also another precondition for democracy. There is a need to discuss negative advertising as a strategy for political influence with this definition of democracy in mind since it is apparent that during the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe, there were gross violations¹³ of some of the basic principles of democracy as the campaign was characterized by politically motivated violence which claimed the lives of many people, most of them supporters of the opposition MDC party (Feltoe

¹³ Some details of the human rights developments during this campaign period are contained in the March 2002 issue of the *Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin*, No.6.

2002)¹⁴. This political violence definitely infringed on the rights of the victims to express themselves freely and elect a candidate of their choice. The intimidation and harassment of voters that were characteristic of the campaign was a breach of the principles of a free and fair election campaign.

It should also be noted that the state-controlled television station and four radio stations did not allow political advertisements, whether positive or negative, from the MDC. The scenario was that the state-controlled media churned out negative propaganda campaign using advertisements and stories against the MDC. The following analysis made by the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)¹⁵ shows that the election campaign field was uneven:

ZBC carried a total of 402 election campaign stories in its news bulletins monitored between 1 December 2001 and 7 March 2002, the penultimate day of the election campaign. Of these, 339 of the bulletins (84%) favoured Zanu (PF)'s presidential candidate. Only 38 (9%) covered MDC activities, but virtually all of them were used to discredit the opposition party and its candidate. Radio Zimbabwe, ZBC's most popular station, carried a total of 275 campaign related stories. A total of 237 of them (86%) were promotional stories in favour of Zanu (PF), while 20 (7.3%) were all negative stories about the MDC. ...Out of a total of 14 hours 25 minutes that ZBC devoted to the presidential election campaign, Zanu (PF)'s candidate was granted a total of 13 hours and 34 minutes, or a little more than 94%. This compares to the national broadcaster's coverage of the MDC and its candidate, of just 31 minutes and 30 seconds, a paltry 4%. But even this was subverted by ZBC which used the time to attack, denigrate and discredit the MDC (MMPZ 14 March 2002).

¹⁴ See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *Are they accountable? Examining alleged violators and their violations – pre and post Presidential Election March 2002: A report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum*, December 2002

¹⁵ Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe is a Non-Governmental Organisation that analyses media issues independently in the country.

The above analysis of how the electronic media conducted their business during the 2002 presidential election campaign period is one example of the many violations of the tenets of democracy as given in the IPDD definition of democracy. The MDC presidential candidate could not use the national broadcaster to elaborate the policies of his party to the electorate. Neither could he use it for the purpose of persuasive defence, that is in trying to repair his damaged image.

2.2 Conspirator-traitor rhetoric

On 13 February 2002 ZTV produced a story from Australian Television alleging that Tsvangirai had plotted to assassinate Mugabe before the elections.¹⁶ According to a specialised edition of “Dateline”, a programme on the Australian Special Broadcasting Services (SBS), Tsvangirai had contracted Dickens and Madison, a Canadian Political and Public Relations Consultancy Company, to carry out the assassination of Mugabe. The documentary, entitled “Killing Mugabe - The Tsvangirai Conspiracy”, showed Tsvangirai discussing the alleged plot with executives of Dickens and Madison among them Ari Ben-Menashe, the head of the organisation who later ‘spilt the beans’, so to speak, to the Zimbabwean government. The MDC leader denied the assassination plot arguing that the MDC had approached Dickens and Madison to help them with a public relations thrust and sourcing of funds in North America and that “...this whole

¹⁶ The Sunday Mail, February 17 2002 gives the full text of Tsvangirai’s alleged conspiracy against Mugabe. See also The Daily News issues of 21, 22, 23 and 25 February 2002. The alleged plot received wide media coverage both locally and internationally.

thing was contrived to damage me politically and to eliminate me from the presidential race.”¹⁷

The state-controlled media argued that Tsvangirai had committed a treasonous crime and that it would not be easy for him to get away with it. The following comment from *The Herald* was characteristic of how the state-controlled media viewed the case: “He [Tsvangirai] will not wriggle out of this one with a mere denial because everything is on [video and] tape for all to see and hear¹⁸”. The use of the word “wriggle” and the expression “mere denial” suggest that it was not easy for Tsvangirai to get out of this case with a simple excuse. It seems the paper had already convicted him before trial.¹⁹ The purpose of referring briefly to the alleged conspiracy to assassinate Mugabe is to show how it was used in negative advertisements that portrayed Tsvangirai as an unscrupulous politician who would do anything to ascend to power, including the assassination of a sitting president.

The negative advertisements also portrayed the MDC as a terrorist organization. Although there were arguments channelled through the private press that the video had been externally edited or doctored, the fact that voters could see and hear Tsvangirai discussing the “plot” was detrimental to his image as a presidential candidate. In the circumstances, many viewers were likely to believe this conspiracy story word for word because of the power of television. Talking

¹⁷ *The Daily News*, February 22 200.

¹⁸ *The Herald*, February 19 2002

¹⁹ Tsvangirai was acquitted of this treason case by the High Court on 16 October 2004. In passing judgement, Judge President Justice Pardington Garwe’s main argument was that the meeting between Tsvangirai and Ben Menashe “could not have by any stretch of imagination discussed the assassination of the President” and that the witness was “a suspect witness whose evidence should be treated with caution” (*The Herald*, October 16 2004).

about the power of television, Shea (1996:208) says “because voters remember these images for ... a long period of time, paid political ads often are retained as independent news accounts - which is another reason why television is so powerful²⁰.”

In order to bolster the impression that Tsvangirai had actually plotted to kill Mugabe, ZTV repeatedly re-screened the old footage in which Tsvangirai addressed a rally in Harare in September 2001 where he said: “If you (Mugabe) don’t go peacefully, we will remove you violently”²¹. This was screened alongside the conspiracy video to buttress the impression that Tsvangirai advocated violence. The logic or enthymeme used here was meant to make the voters conclude that Tsvangirai was a violent man. The effectiveness of electronic media in its propaganda war against Tsvangirai lay in the fact that they did not accord him ample time to defend himself from the allegations levelled against him. According to the MMPZ,

ZTV devoted a total of 35 minutes 25 seconds to the assassination conspiracy in the news section of the five Newshour bulletins that featured the story between Wednesday (13/2/02) and Sunday [17/2/02]. ...The MDC official denial was afforded 15 seconds on ZTV (14/2/02 8pm). A further 55 seconds was given to footage of Tsvangirai addressing a rally in Chitungwiza (17/2/02) in which he again denied the allegations (MPPZ 2002:82).

Given these circumstances, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the use of the conspiracy video-tape in ZANU (PF)’s negative commercials had a

²⁰ See also Theodore F. Sheckles, “Negative Coherence And Antecedent Ethos In The Rhetoric Of Attack Advertising: A Case Study Of The Glendening VS. Sauerbrey” in *Campaign in Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, Vol.5, No.3, pp. 459-477

²¹ MMPZ, *Media Under Siege: Report on the media coverage of the 2002 Presidential and Mayoral elections in Zimbabwe*, p.82

negative rhetorical impact in the voters' minds as far as Tsvangirai's image was concerned. These negative advertisements were also aired on all the four state-controlled radio stations, reaching the voters in the remote rural areas and those without television sets in urban and peri-urban areas.

The targeting of audiences was important in this case on the part of ZANU (PF)'s electioneering machinery. According to Trent and Friedenbergr (2000) radio advertising is advantageous and much better than other types of advertising as it can be used to reach targeted audiences, even in remote areas. It is most likely that some people believed the conspiracy story word for word just because it came out on radio and television. Trent and Friedenbergr note that "[television] lends a sense of credibility to candidates and [also] allows for some degree of targeting" (Trent and Friedenbergr 2000:339). Other people, most of them probably MDC supporters, might have interpreted the alleged plot as a dirty tactic to smear campaign the MDC leader. It is highly possible that most people felt impatient with Tsvangirai for allowing himself to be trapped under surveillance cameras by Dickens and Madison. This feeling might have been because ZANU (PF)'s electronic advertisements portrayed Tsvangirai as a vulnerable political novice who lacked shrewdness and maturity, the prerequisite qualities of astute presidential candidates. The message the advertisements sent to the electorate was simply that Tsvangirai was unsuitable for the presidency.

Even the conspiracy advertisements that were flighted in the state-controlled newspapers attacked Tsvangirai's image as a presidential candidate. In one typical advertisement, ZANU (PF) asks the voters two rhetorical questions:

“WHAT WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? PLOTS TO KILL OR PLOTS TO TILL?”²² The punning or word play on the word “plots” displays a high degree of ingenuity of the staffers of the ZANU (PF)’s Information and Publicity department in designing the advertisement. The rhetorical captions have an epigrammatic appeal, as they are concise, memorable and rendering like aphorisms. The use of visuals in this advertisement is worth commenting on. The picture of a man holding a gun is in sharp contrast with the picture of a man holding a plough in the advertisement. The MDC leader was presented to the voter as a dangerous man who plotted to kill a president while the ZANU (PF) candidate was portrayed as a benevolent leader who provided people with plots to till. The rhetorical function of this advertisement lies in persuading the voters to vote for good and not for evil. In other words, the personal foci here are ‘Vote for Mugabe’ and ‘Vote against Tsvangirai’. The broadsheet advertisement refers to Tsvangirai’s assassination plot and the Land Redistribution Programme that Mugabe and his government embarked on in July 2000 (ZANU PF Election Manifesto 2002). While the violence that accompanied the Land Reform Programme must be strongly condemned, there was no question for the need for government to embark on a large-scale land reform exercise that would restore land to the indigenous people²³. While ZANU (PF)’s policy on the land question was clear and attractive to the black people, the MDC seemed wishy-washy on this issue. In a related advertisement ZANU (PF) argues that Tsvangirai has sold the land to the

²² The Herald, March 5 2002

²³Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, December 2002, *Are they accountable? Examining alleged violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March 2002*, p.16

British and racist Rhodesians and therefore people should not vote for him. This argument is clearly presented in the following advertisement:

Sliding from 6 points to 5 points and still going down...

WHERE HAS THE LAND GONE?

Zimbabwe Independent, January 18, 2002

MDC'S 6 Point Plan for a Better Future

PEACE- Fairness, Justice, Security, Law and Order

FOOD- Available and Affordable Prices

JOBS- New industries and Opportunities

LAND- Orderly, Equitable and Economically Sound

EDUCATION- Affordable Fees and Funding of Tertiary Education

HEALTH-Medication and Basic Health Care

Parade, February 2002

MDC'S 5 Point Plan for a Better Future

PEACE- Fairness, Justice, Security, Law and Order

FOOD- Available and Affordable Prices

JOBS- New industries and Opportunities

EDUCATION- Affordable Fees and Funding of Tertiary Education

HEALTH-Medication and Basic Health Care

(Picture of Tsvangirai receiving money from white farmers)

Why have they removed land from their 6 Point Plan?

BECAUSE TSVANGIRAI has already SOLD the LAND to the British and racist Rhodesians. Don't let them short change you again!

ON MARCH 9 AND 10 VOTE FOR THE PEOPLE: VOTE FOR MATURITY, EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM²⁴

The omission of the land issue by the MDC in the advertisement that appeared in the February 2002 issue of the *Parade* magazine was used in ZANU

²⁴ The Herald, February 1 2002

(PF) attack rhetoric as clear testimony that the MDC did not want to take land from the white commercial farmers. If voted into power, the rhetoric said, Tsvangirai would reverse the gains of the liberation struggle and the Third Chimurenga by returning the farms that had already been compulsorily acquired to the white farmers²⁵. This was equal to selling the country to the “British and racist Rhodesians.” In an attempt to convince the voters that Tsvangirai was indeed a sell-out, a picture of him with a group of white farmers²⁶ giving his party cheque donations was juxtaposed to the negative message in the advertisement. He was seen clapping hands, a gesture of expressing gratitude and appreciation. While the denotative meaning of this is that Tsvangirai was simply shown thanking the white farmers for donating money to his party, the connotative meaning was disastrous. He was depicted as accepting the white men’s money in exchange of the land that Mugabe had taken from them. This whole act was tantamount to selling the land to the white men - the advertisement exhorts the voters to believe. This is depictive rhetoric which Osborn (1986:79) defines as “strategic pictures, verbal and nonverbal visualizations, that linger in the collective memory of audiences as representative of their subjects when rhetoric has been successful.” Tsvangirai’s image in the picture functioned as a visual *topos* of a sell-out, a traitor - an unpatriotic Zimbabwean. This battered his image.

In order to understand the nature of the rhetoric of ZANU (PF)’s negative advertisements following the “Killing Mugabe-The Tsvangirai Conspiracy”

²⁵ For instance, Fidelis Mhashu, an MDC MP was quoted in the BBC’s Hard Talk Programme as saying the MDC would return the land that had been acquired by government to white farmers if voted into power.

²⁶ For the first time since 1980, the white populace became politically active, supporting the MDC openly, thus fuelling certain conclusions such as that they feared loss of land. The source of this picture was CNN which normally is anti-Mugabe .

documentary, it is necessary to view this with the 1988 presidential election campaign in America in mind. The focus is on George Bush (Republican) and Michael Dukakis (Democrat) as presidential candidates. In this election campaign, Bush used the Horton saga in a negative advertisement to attack Dukakis (Jamieson 1992; Diamond and Bates 1992; Iyengar 1991; Pratkanis and Aronson 1991). In short the advertisement told the story of William Horton, a convicted murderer who was sent to prison in Massachusetts. Horton committed rape and assault while he was on furlough from a prison when Dukakis was governor of Massachusetts.

The advertisement structured the information in such a way that made people infer it was Dukakis' responsibility that Horton committed the rape and assault crimes while on furlough, yet neither did Dukakis pardon Horton nor Horton kill. According to Jamieson (1992:24) Bush even commented that the Horton case "had come to symbolize, and represent – accurately, I believe – the misguided outlook of my opponent when it comes to crime." The Horton case was used to support the widely held opinion that Democrats are "soft on crime" (Jamieson 1992; Pratkanis and Aronson 1991).

So, this advertisement was aimed at making the voters form a bad image of Michael Dukakis since it attributed responsibility of the Horton case to him. It depicted Dukakis as a man who let out of prison prisoners charged with the crime of first-degree murder to go and commit other crimes. He was therefore not fit to vote for as president. The Horton saga makes an interesting analogy to the Tsvangirai alleged coup plot.

The “Killing Mugabe-The Tsvangirai Conspiracy” and the Horton cases to a large extent demonstrate that, as Jamieson puts it,

...in politics as in life, what is known is not necessarily what is believed, what is shown is not necessarily what is seen, and what is said is not necessarily what is heard. ...in [these cases] consultants exploited the psychological quirks that characterize humans (p.24)

The *topos* of a traitor is also found in the advertisement that equates Tsvangirai to the biblical Judas Iscariot who betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver.

The full text of the advertisement is as follows:

DON'T SELL YOUR COUNTRY, QUIT THE MDC AND RETURN TO THE PEOPLE

(Picture of Tsvangirai with a group of white farmers donating money to his party)

“This is how JUDAS ISCARIOT- the traitor of traitors- sold out.”

Some white people, the British Government and all traitors say:

“If the MDC had not been formed, the land would not have been returned to the people.” What they are saying is similar to what JUDAS ISCARIOT, the traitor of traitors said, “If I had not betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver he would not have died for you!”

DON'T BE A SELLOUT, RETURN TO THE PEOPLE

ON MARCH 9 AND 10 VOTE FOR THE PEOPLE: VOTE FOR MATURITY, EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM²⁷

The *logos* in the above advertisement is interesting. By referring to the betrayal of Jesus Christ by his disciple Judas Iscariot, the advertisement is appealing to people's emotions to hate Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai is again seen with

²⁷ The Herald, 5 March 2002

the same group of white farmers²⁸ donating money to his party as in the previous advertisement. Below the picture is the sentence “This is how JUDAS ISCARIOT - the traitor of traitors - sold out.” The *topos* of land is central to the argument being given to the voters. Tsvangirai’s picture with the white commercial farmers has since become a symbol of selling out in ZANU (PF)’s advertisements against the MDC leader. In one advertisement the same picture, appears with the Shona caption “Tsvangirai achitengesha nyika kumabhunu emumapurazi”²⁹ (Tsvangirai while selling the land/country to white farmers”).

In yet another negative advertisement Tsvangirai is presented as a tea-boy who is serving the Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Bliar³⁰ (sic) with tea (map of Zimbabwe put in a cup of tea). In the humorous cartoon Tsvangirai asks Bliar (sic) “Is this what you want to have on March 9 & 10, Baas?” and Blair answers “Yes, yes, my boy Morgan.” The connotation of this cartoon is Tsvangirai was a Blair stooge. The advertisement goes on to say that:

*TSVANGISON³¹ AND HIS SELLOUTS THINK ZIMBABWE IS
TEA
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR BIRTHRIGHT
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR HERITAGE
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR SOUL
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR COUNTRY
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR LAND
ZIMBABWE WILL NEVER BE A COLONY AGAIN*

²⁸ This is repeated use of the same picture found in the preceding advertisement.

²⁹ The Sunday Mail, February 10 2002. Note the deliberate wrong spelling of Blair’s name. It was used in ZANU (PF) campaign discourse to connote that Blair was a “liar” on many issues concerning Zimbabwe.

³⁰ The deliberate wrong spelling of Tony Blair statement is to present a negative image about him suggesting that he is a liar.

³¹ ZANU-PF coined the name Tsvangison after Tsvangirai had made reference to whites as “our cousins” at a rally, suggesting that he had anglicized himself.

the same group of white farmers²⁸ donating money to his party as in the previous advertisement. Below the picture is the sentence “This is how JUDAS ISCARIOT - the traitor of traitors - sold out.” The *topos* of land is central to the argument being given to the voters. Tsvangirai’s picture with the white commercial farmers has since become a symbol of selling out in ZANU (PF)’s advertisements against the MDC leader. In one advertisement the same picture, appears with the Shona caption “Tsvangirai achitengesa nyika kumabhunu emumapurazi”²⁹ (Tsvangirai while selling the land/country to white farmers”).

In yet another negative advertisement Tsvangirai is presented as a tea-boy who is serving the Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Bliar³⁰ (sic) with tea (map of Zimbabwe put in a cup of tea). In the humorous cartoon Tsvangirai asks Bliar (sic) “Is this what you want to have on March 9 & 10, Baas?” and Blair answers “Yes, yes, my boy Morgan.” The connotation of this cartoon is Tsvangirai was a Blair stooge. The advertisement goes on to say that:

*TSVANGISON³¹ AND HIS SELLOUTS THINK ZIMBABWE IS
TEA
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR BIRTHRIGHT
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR HERITAGE
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR SOUL
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR COUNTRY
DON'T LET HIM SELL YOUR LAND
ZIMBABWE WILL NEVER BE A COLONY AGAIN*

²⁸ This is repeated use of the same picture found in the preceding advertisement.

²⁹ The Sunday Mail, February 10 2002. Note the deliberate wrong spelling of Blair’s name. It was used in ZANU (PF) campaign discourse to connote that Blair was a “liar” on many issues concerning Zimbabwe.

³⁰ The deliberate wrong spelling of Tony Blair statement is to present a negative image about him suggesting that he is a liar.

³¹ ZANU-PF coined the name Tsvangison after Tsvangirai had made reference to whites as “our cousins” at a rally, suggesting that he had anglicized himself.

ON MARCH 9 AND 10 VOTE FOR THE PEOPLE: VOTE FOR MATURITY, EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM³²

Voters are warned not to let Tsvangirai sell their “birthright” “heritage”, “soul”, “country” and “land”. The use of repetition in this advertisement has a rhetorical impact on the voters as they are being given reasons for not voting for Tsvangirai. The repetition sounds formulaic and inherently demands adherence to the DON'TS. In addition, the DON'TS are compelling and were designed to have a hypnotic effect on the voters. The vow that ZIMBABWE WILL NEVER BE A COLONY AGAIN was meant to instil a sense of guilt or shame to whoever would want to vote for Tsvangirai, who wanted to sell the country to the British, the former colonizers. By using the derogatory, anglicized name “Tsvangison” the advertisement gave the impression that Tsvangirai had already sold his soul to the British and it followed that he would in turn sell the country to them if voted into the presidency. This advertisement is both satirical and sarcastic.

2.3 MDC's attack advertising

As stated earlier, both parties used negative advertising or the persuasive attack strategy in their campaigns. The MDC's campaign theme or *topos* was calling for change, one of the widely used challenger's strategies in political campaign communication (Trent and Friedenberg 2000). The issues that featured in the MDC's negative advertising included, among others, Mugabe's age, political violence, the land issue, unemployment, inflation and the general suffering of people due to the economic crisis in the country. Selected negative

³² The Herald, February 2 2002 .

advertises on these five topics are discussed in this section. It is important to note that these issues are interrelated and are discussed separately only for convenience.

On the issue of Mugabe's age, the MDC in one of its advertisements presented an impression that voting for Mugabe at the age of 78 was the same as voting for old thinking. The advertisement asked the rhetorical question "THE OLDEST PRESIDENT IN HISTORY?"³³ The narrative went on to say that if Mugabe was elected he would be the oldest man in history to be sworn in for a six-year presidential term. The message ends by saying, "This election is your chance to vote for new ideas instead of old thinking. It's your chance to vote the MDC and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai." A related negative advertisement suggested that if elected to the presidency at 78, Mugabe would be incompetent to run the affairs of government. It suggested other people would be doing the day-to-day business of governing the country. Mugabe's envisaged ineptitude is implied in the following rhetorical questions and narrative:

IF MUGABE WINS, WHO'LL REALLY BE RUNNING
ZIMBABWE?
EMERSON MUNANGAGWA? CHARLES UTETE?
PROFESSOR JONATHAN MOYO? GRACE MUGABE?

When you vote for a man of 78 for another term of office, your guess is as good as ours as to who will really be running the show. This election is to vote for a better future. It's your chance to vote MDC and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai.³⁴

³³ The Daily News, January 16 2002

³⁴ *ibid*

By suggesting that someone or other people would be running the show the advertisement attacked Mugabe's image as a potential candidate for the presidency. According to the above message, he was no longer worth voting for at this advanced age. The independent press peddled rumours about Mugabe's health, claiming that he was ailing. Consequently the MDC argued that "what Zimbabwe need[ed] [was] new blood, not spilled blood."³⁵ The mention of "spilled blood" brings us to the rhetoric of political violence.

Perhaps the most touching of all MDC's negative advertisements against ZANU (PF) was the one in which they published the victims of political violence and alleged that these were MDC supporters that were killed by ZANU (PF) supporters. The following message, quoted verbatim summarizes the purpose of the advertisement - to appeal to the emotions of the voters:

WE REMEMBER THEM, WE MOURN THEM, WE SALUTE THEM.

This is the roll of honour of some of the gallant sons and daughters of Zimbabwe who died in political violence. They were killed in cold blood by Zanu (PF) for daring to stand up for their rights and your rights to be free. This roll does not neglect the women who have been raped, the people who have been beaten up, their homes burnt. Throughout Zimbabwe, the spirit of democratic resistance is rising. We pay tribute to the proud spirit of the Zimbabwean people. They did not die in vain.³⁶

This message appealed to voters' emotions (*pathos*) in a number of ways. It was intended to portray a bad picture of ZANU (PF). The publication of the one hundred names of people who died in alleged political violence is a solemn matter in itself. One cannot help feeling sympathetic for these people and their families

³⁵ The Daily News, February 2 2002

³⁶ THE CHANGING TIMES Supplement publication, 3-10 March 2002

and relatives. The message used the endearing phrase “gallant sons and daughters”. This invoked the feeling of anger and hatred against those responsible for killing these people.

The epigram WE REMEMBER THEM, WE MOURN, WE SALUTE THEM told the reader straight away that what was contained in the message was something of a grave nature. The repetition in this saluting message is a rhetorical device that made the idea of the deaths of these victims ring or stick in the mind of the voter. By using the phrase “roll of honour” the reader was given a feeling that these people were killed doing an honourable thing, that of “daring to stand up for their rights and your [voters’] rights to be free.” The fact that the message said these heroes also died for the voters’ rights drew much more sympathy from the voters because they (the victims) were portrayed as being selfless – they were true Martyrs.

They were also portrayed as a new breed of heroes who were “killed in cold blood by ZANU (PF)” in an independent country fighting for democracy and human rights. The implication of the advertisement was that since these heroes were “killed by ZANU (PF)”, voters were not supposed to vote for its presidential candidate, Mugabe. In other words, the MDC, by using the deaths of its supporters in the negative advertisement, was saying that the political system was undemocratic and that Mugabe had condoned the mayhem in the country. This was used as a justification for the need for political change and the restoration of the rule of law under the MDC government.

The MDC also attacked ZANU (PF) for the high rate of unemployment. The voters were given the impression that it was due to the government's inefficiency that the country was experiencing the worst economic crisis ever, resulting in rampant unemployment. In order to appeal to the voters some of the advertisements were presented in Shona, one of the major indigenous languages spoken by the majority in Zimbabwe. One of the advertisements said: "KUTARISIRA KUZANU (PF) UCHIDA BASA KUGARIRA GUYO SEMBWA"³⁷ (It is pointless to expect ZANU (PF) to help with employment). The use of the Shona proverb in which a dog waits in vain for the whole day expecting its master to give it some peanut butter is quite telling. By using the proverb, the MDC painted a hopeless picture for the unemployed. Still on the same subject, another advertisement said: "NEZANU (PF) NYIKA YAZARA MAROVHA"³⁸ (ZANU PF has caused a lot of unemployment). In yet another advertisement the MDC urged people to desert ZANU (PF). It said "TIZA KUZANU (PF) UTIZE UROVHA"³⁹ (If you don't want unemployment, run away from ZANU PF). These negative advertisements were meant to entice the young voters who were facing hardships due to unemployment. The advertisements levelled the responsibility for unemployment on the ZANU (PF) government and Mugabe. Mugabe was therefore presented as being incapable of solving the unemployment problem.

The adverts implied that it was only the MDC and its leader Tsvangirai who would end the problem of unemployment if voted into power. In the wake of

³⁷ The Daily News, January 23 2002

³⁸ The Daily News, February 6 2002

³⁹ The Daily News, January 23 2002

company closures and the big numbers of unemployed youths, there is no doubt that the rhetoric on unemployment appealed to many urban voters. Coupled with unemployment was the general suffering that the MDC attributed to the bad governance of ZANU (PF) and Mugabe. The MDC messages like NEZANU (PF) INGA TAYAURA NHAI AMAI!⁴⁰ (ZANU PF has caused us a lot of suffering) and ZANU (PF) YAKAUNZA NHOKO DZEVIRONDA⁴¹ (ZANU PF has impoverished the people) were used to buttress the claim that all the suffering that the voters were experiencing was as a result of the mismanagement of the economy by ZANU (PF).

As evidence to the claim that ZANU (PF) had brought hardships to the people, the MDC used two examples illustrating how the skyrocketing inflation had negatively affected the voters at the time. In the advertisement WHAT ZANU (PF) DID TO \$10, it was shown that in 1985, \$10 bought ten loaves of bread but the same amount bought only ten thin slices of bread in 2002⁴². In the other, it was shown that in 1985 \$100 bought a trolley of groceries but the same amount in 2002 bought a loaf of bread and one litre of fresh milk.⁴³ To make it worse, people were queuing (and are still queuing) for these and other basic commodities which were in short supply and very expensive, beyond the reach of most of the populace. The MDC used this depictive rhetoric to try and convince the voters that the ZANU (PF) presidential candidate was not worth to vote for in the election. This negative rhetoric against ZANU (PF) gave the impression that

⁴⁰ The Daily News, January 22 2002

⁴¹ The Daily News, February 7 2002

⁴² The Daily News, February 13 2002

⁴³ *ibid*

voting for the MDC presidential candidate was the only sensible thing to do in those times of economic hardships. It implied that a change of leadership and government was a necessity in order to stop the suffering of people brought about by the ZANU (PF) government.

The inflation issue and Mugabe's age were compared in a satirically rhetorical way in one of MDC's negative advertisements that said, THE ONLY THING THAT IS AS HIGH AS ZIMBABWE'S INFLATION IS MUGABE'S AGE⁴⁴. Ironically, this was an insult to all old people who still had the vote. On the other hand, ZANU (PF) argued that the suffering was being caused by the economic sanctions that had been imposed on the country by most Western countries which it claimed supported and sponsored the MDC. Also the ZANU (PF) government produced some advertisements that implied that white companies that were sympathetic to the MDC were hoarding food-stuffs, thereby creating artificial shortages.⁴⁵

The MDC rhetoric on the land issue denounced the manner in which ZANU (PF) handled the land reform programme. Tsvangirai was on record saying that ZANU (PF) was encouraging people to occupy farms haphazardly in order to gain political mileage ahead of the election. According to him, people were just mushrooming in the farms without order. Tsvangirai was quoted criticising Mugabe's land policy saying "Mugabe wants to turn us all into peasants..."⁴⁶ This was another unwitting insult against the peasants many of whom perhaps felt

⁴⁴ The Daily News, January 16 2002. According to THE CHANGING TIMES (March 2-10 2002) the hyper-inflation was 116%

⁴⁵ The Herald, February 1 2002

⁴⁶ ZTV February 4 2002, 8p.m. news bulletin

offended and withheld their votes. The MDC further attacked ZANU (PF) by suggesting that in the redistribution of land, only relatives and friends of ZANU (PF) stalwarts were benefiting⁴⁷. This meant that there was no transparency as ZANU (PF) cronies benefited more than the majority deserving cases. The MDC claimed that there was clear evidence that some of the big ZANU (PF) *chefs* had more than one farm each. The MDC also argued that the land belonged to the country as a whole and was not a monopoly of ZANU (PF) and that if the MDC had not been formed, land would not have been distributed to the people⁴⁸. This argument implied that ZANU (PF) no longer had a political agenda to sell to the electorate besides the land issue.

2.4 Synthesis

The negative advertisements rhetorically analysed in the above sections demonstrate that persuasive attack was a strategy that both political parties and their candidates used in the election campaign communication in 2002. Negative candidate theme advertising was used to present the images of the candidates running for the presidency as unfavourable as possible in the minds of the voters. Similarly negative issue advertisement attacked the candidates as far as the policies of their parties were concerned. The goal of both themes, which are inseparable in most cases, was to influence voters to form negative images of the candidates in each case and vote accordingly.

⁴⁷ The Daily News, January 30 2002

⁴⁸ The Daily News, March 8 2002

That this election campaign conveyed a sense of drama (De Wet 1991) with Mugabe and Tsvangirai as the chief actors cannot be doubted. ZANU (PF) campaign rhetoric portrayed Tsvangirai as a traitor and a protégé or stooge of British imperialists. The rhetoric suggested that if Tsvangirai was voted into power, he would give back the land that Mugabe had compulsorily acquired from the white commercial farmers back to them. This would be tantamount to reversing the gains of the liberation struggle since the land issue was one of the major causes of going to war against the British settlers in Zimbabwe.

By suggesting that Tsvangirai was a traitor or sell-out, ZANU (PF) negative rhetoric presented the MDC leader to the voters as being unpatriotic and therefore not worth to vote for. This unpatriotism was supported by the assertion that Tsvangirai had deserted the liberation struggle in the late 1970s (one that Tsvangirai does not deny). We see Tsvangirai's antecedent *ethos* being used to project him as a coward who could not bear the heat of the war. In contrast, Mugabe was presented as a true African statesman who stood boldly against local and international pressure and forged ahead with his controversial land reform programme that witnessed thousands of black families being settled in the farms that had hitherto belonged to white commercial farmers.

The rhetorical effectiveness of the land issue lay in the contrastive interpretations it induced in the minds of the voters. The contrast it suggested was that, while the patriotic Mugabe was taking the land from the white minority and giving it back to the black majority, Tsvangirai, the traitor, was contemplating selling it to the white people. A good example is found in the advertisement

WHAT WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? PLOTS TO KILL OR PLOTS TO TILL?
ZANU (PF) even appealed to the voters' sense of humour in one comic advertisement which showed Tsvangirai as a "tea-boy" serving the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, with tea in the form of the map of Zimbabwe with the word LAND inscribed on it.

The conspiracy story presented Tsvangirai as an evil man, a person who did not want to use constitutional means to get to the presidency. Killing a sitting president was something sinister and treasonous. This saga was used to demoralise Tsvangirai's voters and dampen their spirits. This was because if convicted, Tsvangirai faced either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment. In order to induce a highly negative view of Tsvangirai, the voters were given a daily "dosage" of the Tsvangirai conspiracy story from the state-controlled electronic and print media. The importance that was attached to this case by the state mass media was overwhelming. According to McCombs and Shaw (1972:177) "the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues."⁴⁹

In other words, the continuous reference to Tsvangirai's treason case in these media was designed to make the voters believe that Tsvangirai indeed had committed this crime and was therefore not suitable to vote for. The rhetorical effect of such an interpretation is supported by Schenck-Hamlin et al. (2000:57) who argue that "people apparently do not conduct a systematic and exhaustive search for all informational elements relevant to an issue as it is broached." In short the voters were to see Tsvangirai as "...a sick man with dangerous political

⁴⁹ See also David Weaver et al., *Media agenda-setting a presidential election*. New York: Praeger. (1981)

ambitions”⁵⁰. When Ben Menashe arrived in Zimbabwe to give evidence on the alleged plot to assassinate Mugabe, he described Tsvangirai as “a fool”⁵¹, adding that: “[h]e is not presidential material. It is a disgrace to have such a guy. He is a puppet but not a smart one because he did not need to come and plan the coup himself.”⁵² Mugabe also negatively described Tsvangirai, calling him “stupid...foolish [and] a goblin of Britain”⁵³ at one occasion.

We see the state press buttressing the idea that Tsvangirai was a dangerous puppet of the British colonialists whom voters were not supposed to vote for as president. It can be concluded that the media handled the whole conspiracy story in such a way that would short-circuit the reasoning of the voters. This is mainly because the alleged plot to assassinate Mugabe appealed to the emotions of fear (as the grainy audio-visual text made Tsvangirai appear threatening), anger and hatred for Tsvangirai.

The negative rhetorical power of ZANU (PF) advertisements was that Tsvangirai’s *ethos* was the central focus of their attack without any prevarication. Tsvangirai was negatively described as a front for Britain and some western countries which wanted to bring a regime change in Zimbabwe.

The MDC’s negative advertisements did not focus on Mugabe’s *ethos* with much strength. Where they mentioned Mugabe, they tended to concentrate on the alleged ineptitude due to his age. They suggested that Mugabe was too old

⁵⁰ The Herald, February 19 2002

⁵¹ The Herald, February 22 2002

⁵² The Herald, February 23 2002

⁵³ The Herald, March 2 2002. See also Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak, *The Battle of Issues and Images* (1995). They give a detailed analysis of how George Bush and Bill Clinton attacked each other in the 1992 general election campaign. This is similar to how Mugabe was attacking Tsvangirai’s character in the 2002 election campaign.

to rule the country and therefore should not be voted for. Most advertisements personified ZANU (PF) and their persuasive attack was not directed on Mugabe's *ethos*. We begin to see metaphor playing its part in this kind of rhetorical attack. ZANU (PF) is used to stand for Mugabe. In other words the MDC's negative advertising was indirectly saying Mugabe was responsible for all the problems that were negatively affecting the country. On the land issue, the MDC's negative advertisements lacked the punch that would convince voters that surely ZANU (PF) was doing an evil thing in taking the land from the whites and giving it to the landless black people. This is mainly because at the beginning the MDC treated Mugabe's action as an *ad hoc* issue, a gimmick to buy votes from the electorate.

While this assertion cannot be completely dismissed, the MDC failed to realise that in attacking ZANU (PF)'s land reform programme, they were invoking the wrath of the landless people, especially the war veterans and the rural people who saw the benefit of this programme. The MDC also failed to realise that the land issue was a sensitive issue that needed careful handling. In his address to the forty eighth ordinary session of the ZANU (PF) Central Committee meeting Mugabe declared that "the land issue remains the central national question claiming our energies and attention in order to secure its genuine and lasting resolution."⁵⁴ Although Tsvangirai said that he did not oppose the land reform programme, but was against "villagizing the whole country...killing the productive commercial sector that is supposed to produce for the country"⁵⁵, this did not appeal to voters as it was treated as being against the land reform

⁵⁴ Robert Gabriel Mugabe, *Inside The Third Chimurenga*, The Department of Information and Publicity, Office of the President and Cabinet, (2001) p.92.

⁵⁵ The Daily News, February 4 2002

programme. It appeared to advocate a return to the situation preceding the land reform and one that invariably favoured white farmers. Also, the seriousness and speed with which Mugabe intensified his land rhetoric and implementation weakened the MDC's negative rhetoric on this issue.

The MDC's negative rhetoric on issues like inflation and unemployment was meant to win the hearts of voters as it apportioned the blame for these to the alleged inefficiency and corruption in the ZANU (PF) government. Since the prices of basic commodities kept on rising literally on a daily basis, there is no doubt that this cost the ruling party a considerable numbers of votes. This was in the wake of food shortages in the country, shortages which the MDC attributed to the government's poor planning. With the rate of unemployment soaring to 70% during the campaign period, the MDC's attack on ZANU (PF) on this issue was rhetorically powerful as it was designed to appeal to the hundreds of thousands of the unemployed and their dependents, especially the youths and the retrenched workers who found themselves adrift because of company closures due to viability problems.

2.5 Overall Appraisal

The analysis of some of the negative advertisements that were used in the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe confirms what scholars in rhetoric generally agree, that negative rhetoric is a common strategy that is used in election campaign communication. The advertisements focused on both candidate theme and issue/policy theme. It has been demonstrated that in most

cases the two themes cannot be treated entirely separately as they are interwoven. This chapter suggests that ZANU (PF) negative rhetoric on the MDC's leader as far as the land issue was concerned had more impact on the voters mainly because the MDC did not clearly enunciate its land policy. The other reason was that ZANU (PF) had the advantage of using radio and television to attack Tsvangirai and the MDC. The MDC leader was not accorded the chance to either enunciate his party's policies or to refute the numerous and in most cases false allegations that were levelled against him using the state broadcaster. Instead, the "public" broadcaster served the interests of ZANU (PF) only, thereby violating one of the principles of democracy – that of freedom of expression. In the main, the MDC's negative rhetoric successfully created and intensified the anti-government mood that induced political cynicism of Mugabe in the voters.

The huge amount of negative advertising that characterized the 2002 presidential campaign indicates that both parties were convinced that negative advertisements would actually influence voters' minds and their choice of candidate. There is no doubt, therefore, that both parties regarded negative advertising or persuasive attack as the lifeblood of the 2002 presidential election campaign.

CHAPTER 3

MUGABE'S GRAVESIDE ORATIONS: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND NOSTALGIA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of four speeches delivered by President Robert Mugabe at the National Heroes' Acre during the burial of four national heroes between May and November 2001. The deceased were Border Gezi who died in a car accident and was buried on 2 May 2001, Moven Enock Mahachi who also died in a car accident and was buried on 29 May 2001, Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi whose death was due to a "natural cause" and was buried on 8 June 2001 and Cain Nkala who was laid to rest on 18 November 2001 after he was kidnapped from his Bulawayo home and murdered by unknown people, but whom ZANU (PF) alleged were members of the opposition party, the MDC. The other theory linked to this death by those in the opposition camp was that Nkala was abducted and murdered by people from his own political party, ZANU (PF), for his moderate approach to ZANU (PF)'s use of political violence. Mystery still shrouds Nkala's murder as the MDC activists who were arrested were acquitted by the courts after having been found not guilty to the murder charge.

Although this study claims that Mugabe uses deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric in all the four speeches – the three having a triangular relationship – it should be noted that they are not used in equal proportions. The speeches are largely epideictic as they eulogize the work of the deceased heroes the major aim being to inspire the audience to emulate them and thus remain loyal to the ruling party and vote for the party in the presidential election.

The discussion argues that by mentioning the ornate roles of the heroes in the shaping of the Zimbabwean society and by tracing the history of the liberation struggle, Mugabe was using collective memory and nostalgia as rhetorical tools to enhance and restore his political image ahead of the 2002 presidential election. In other words, Mugabe used rhetorical traditions to persuade mourners and the electorate in general to vote for him. It can be argued that Mugabe cunningly exploited the rhetorical context existing at that moment in such a manner that made the audience experience and understand his speeches the way he wanted them to do, that is, to sympathize with his political party ahead of the March 2002 presidential election.

In these speeches Mugabe uses a number of rhetorical devices which are meant to convince his immediate audience and the electorate at large to sympathize with the deceased, their families and the party, ZANU (PF). We see Mugabe revisiting the liberation struggle in these speeches and reminding people of the evils of settler colonialism and how people like the late heroes fought hard to improve the lives of the people who had been impoverished by the colonial system. By (re)constructing this collective memory and resorting to political nostalgia, Mugabe effectively appeals to people's emotions to hate everything associated with the former British colonizers and the vibrant opposition party, the MDC, which he accused of being sponsored by Britain to undermine Zimbabwe's sovereignty. The next section looks at the first speech.

3.2 Speech 1: Burial of Border Gezi – 2 My 2001⁵⁶

3.2.1 Analysis

The speech comprises seventeen paragraphs most of which are of more or less the same length. In the *exordium*, Mugabe uses his characteristic salutation. Here fourteen groups of people are mentioned according to protocol or hierarchy. He begins by paying tribute to his two closest lieutenants, Vice Presidents Simon Muzenda from the old ZANU (PF) and Joseph Msika from the defunct PF-ZAPU⁵⁷. By addressing these two leaders, the speaker is also addressing the two major ethnic groups, the Shona (80% of the population) represented by Muzenda, a Shona and the Ndebele (roughly 20% of the population), ironically represented by Msika, a Shona. This is meant to be a balancing act, but only fails to be so in reality when the Ndebele sector is represented by a Shona. The speaker moves on to the wives of his lieutenants, addressed in Shona as “Amai” (mother), a term that shows respect. By mentioning their wives, the speaker is adding honour to his two vices. The next powerful figure to be addressed is the Speaker of Parliament, Emmerson Munangagwa, strongly seen at that time as Mugabe’s apparent successor until recently when Mugabe chose a woman Vice President, Joyce Teurai Ropa Mujuru. Then comes the Acting Chief Justice, Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku who was the Chairman of the botched Constitutional Commission in 2000. Mugabe rewarded Chidyausiku with this high post after the then Chief Justice, Justice Anthony Gubbay was forced to resign before his term ended.

⁵⁶ See Appendix 1. Copies of all the four speeches were got from the New Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency (New Ziana), a government news body falls under the Ministry of Information and Publicity.

⁵⁷ PF-ZAPU, led by the late Joshua Nkomo, was swallowed by ZANU (PF) in the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987.

The hierarchy, in descending order, moves to Cabinet members, the honourable MPs present and the respectable Chiefs. It is important to note here that the Chiefs were accorded unprecedented respect in the last few years beginning from the year 2000. Mugabe's government had marginalized the Chiefs for two decades, but now they had all of a sudden found an important place in his campaign rhetoric. At one of his marathon rallies in 2002 Mugabe said:

We want our chiefs to have good homes. We want chiefs to have transport so that they don't wait for lifts when going about their business. Government has been able to reward them but not to the level we want because with their duties, they deserve a better reward. They should have secretaries and clerks to record proceedings. After presiding over an issue, it should be recorded.⁵⁸

These improvements on the homes of the chiefs were done in order to make them campaign for Mugabe in the election in their areas of jurisdiction. During the election period, chiefs and headmen were seen lining with their subjects, with notebooks that contained the names of the subjects. It was alleged that this was done to intimidate the subjects into voting for ZANU (PF).

After the chiefs Mugabe addresses Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, then the bereaved family, members of the deceased's religious sect, members of the party leadership and Government officials. He concludes the *exordium* by the generic Ladies and Gentlemen and Comrades and Friends. Thus the *exordium* places the audience in its different statuses and roles. Besides this function, the *exordium* has the effect of calling everyone to attention before the actual address begins. The President uses this style of introduction in all the

⁵⁸ The Herald, 22.02.02

speeches analysed in this chapter. There are however slight changes necessitated by the changing circumstances or contexts.

After the introductory remarks the speaker gets into his speech. In paragraph 2 Mugabe begins by telling his audience about the deceased's *ethos*. By saying that he "...did not have to look very far for the new Minister of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation" when he was forming his government in the year 2000, Mugabe implies that Gezi fitted well into the job. He justifies his appointment by describing Gezi as "a young man whose drive and commitment I had followed with keen interest as he worked alongside his colleagues in the Province to bring about political vibrancy, unity and national development." By saying that he, the President, the highest authority in land, had developed a "keen interest" in the deceased, Mugabe is building a strong case for Gezi to win the hearts of the audience. This gives the impression that Gezi must have been so outstanding in both character and deeds to attract the keen attention of the President. Indirectly, Mugabe is saying the audience should be like Gezi.

To draw the audience's *pathos*, Mugabe mentions that Gezi broadened development to reach the poor, rural folk who had been neglected by successive white governments. To further buttress Gezi's leadership qualities, reference is made to him as councillor, Member of Parliament for three constituencies and as Governor and Resident Minister of Mashonaland Central province. Gezi is also presented here as a fearless fighter who had to fight the negative attitudes the whites had in developing rural areas. At this time when there was acrimony towards whites because of the land issue, Gezi was presented as a prototypical

fighter of the Third Chimurenga and there is no doubt that this endeared him to the audience.

The third paragraph reinforces Gezi's leadership qualities. This time it was in the august house, Parliament, where he was ZANU (PF) Chief Whip and a member of a number of Standing Committees. His commitment to the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme was such that he wanted it implemented to the letter so that independence would be fully meaningful⁵⁹. This presents Gezi again as a patriotic comrade who was eager to see the majority landless people benefiting from the land reform programme.

In the fourth paragraph Mugabe appeals to the audience's *pathos* in his *narratio*. He tells the audience that the person they liked so much "is no longer with us." To show that Gezi was a man of the people, Mugabe uses Gezi's nickname, *Madzibaba* (an address title for a male follower of the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Faith Sect). The use of the Gezi's affectionate nickname is rhetorical here. It makes the heavy hearts of the mourners lighter and it draws them even closer to him in the light of the present sad circumstance.

The use of nicknames appears to be an effective strategy in rhetorical discourse. Salazar (2002) notes that the South African Constitutional Talk⁶⁰ team in 1996 showed in one of the comic strips (newspaper illustrations) President Mandela's hand signing his affectionate nickname "Madiba" and not "Nelson Mandela" on the draft constitution. Salazar argues that the rhetorical move lies in

⁵⁹ This was in line with Mugabe's vision as expressed in one of his speeches when he said: "In my countless addresses to you, I have emphasized that the national land question enjoys Siamese closeness to the question of our National Independence and Sovereignty." (Inside The Third Chimurenga, 2001: 92).

⁶⁰ Constitution Talk 11 of 1995. See Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa*, (2002:70).

the use of the President's *ethos*. The use of the nickname "Madzibaba" is similar to the "Madiba" sensation that grips most South Africans at the mention of former President Nelson Mandela.

By carefully using such words as "grief" and "sadness" and the phrases "dark day" and "harrowing moment", the speaker invites the sympathy of the audience. The speaker's choice of diction is excellent here. The audience is led logically to come to a conclusion that truly Gezi's young life was cut short in a tragic car accident. Further sympathy is solicited from the audience when it is reminded by the speaker here that Gezi was an "energetic and dynamic cadre" of the land based Third Chimurenga. Again Mugabe uses the deceased's *ethos* to show that "cruel" death has robbed them of their benefactor.

He supports this in paragraph 5 by explaining Gezi's intended journey to Masvingo, that is, to give \$1.6m (a huge sum of money at that time) to the disadvantaged members of the society, what he calls "the flotsam and jetsam of our society." We see in this an attempt to further draw sympathy from the crowd by describing the poor by the proverbial "flotsam and jetsam". The same strategy continues in paragraph 5 when he refers to some of the would-be beneficiaries of Gezi's visit to Masvingo present at the funeral saying that "grief fills their hearts, overcomes their tongues" and that they are "devastated" and "hapless" because Gezi lies in permanent stillness in the coffin. The last sentence in this paragraph is powerful as Mugabe blames fate for the death of Gezi: "That bundle of energy and dynamism, that booming voice, has now been stilled and silenced by the hand of a cruel, ineluctable fate." The language he uses here paints a picture of

something very good and desirable being brought to naught by circumstances beyond the control of human beings.

Mugabe's rancour and impatience with fate spills into paragraph 7 when he asks the rhetorical question: "Why should fate reserve so cruel a destiny for so young and promising a figure?" There is no answer to this question. Its rhetorical impact is that it is saying such a young man should not have died. This should be the message that goes to the audience. Again the issue of youth is addressed in this *interrogatio* or *rogatio*, giving the feeling that Gezi's death was premature. The rest in this paragraph is more or less a repetition of what has been said in paragraph 4.

In paragraph 8 we see Mugabe employing nostalgia. In tracing Gezi's life history, he refers to the unjust system of settler colonialism that neglected areas like Gezi's home area, Guruve, which were only remembered when native commissioners wanted to collect taxes from people. The settler governments never promoted meaningful developments in such areas mainly because they were not attractive and had harsh climatic conditions. The white settlers pushed the black majority to these areas that were infested with many diseases and other vagaries, forcing them to live from hand to mouth in the country of their birth. Mugabe argues that the black people were forced from fertile land to live in places like Guruve, Binga and Gokwe so that the white farmers, most of who had fought in the European wars, could be "pensioned off with our land." The *logos* in this paragraph is meant to show that it was wrong and unjust for the white men to take over land with good soils and climatic conditions from the black people, the

owners of the land. The argument is meant to make people hate the MDC as it was alleged to advance the interests of the white commercial farmers and all the whites in general.

Reference to the liberation struggle in paragraph 9 can be described in terms of nostalgia and collective memory. According to Mugabe, despite being backward and being denied development in all respects by the successive white regimes, “backwaters like Guruve” became the “bedrock of militant politics which were later to transform into armed insurrection against settler colonialism”. He also pays tribute to peasant families and militant youths (such as Gezi) living in marginal border areas with Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana for supporting the liberation struggle against colonialism. In paragraph 11 Mugabe implicitly appeals to the crowd’s support of his party by reference to Gezi being loyal and dependable as a *mujiba*⁶¹ from a tender age of thirteen. The essence of paragraph 10 is to appeal to people’s *pathos*. Mugabe talks of Gezi’s membership of the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Sect and addresses the followers in the crowd directly saying:

To them (the followers of the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Faith Sect) I say: We fail to comprehend the tragedy before us; our eyes are full of tears; our hearts grieve and weigh heavy; we know no sigh, we know no relief. We join you in deep sorrow for you have lost one of your own, one so dear.

He ends by mentioning God, saying that he had made his ruling, implying that no one had the power to reverse the “nightmare we endure today.” There is no doubt that by directly addressing the followers of this Sect, Mugabe was

⁶¹ Male war collaborator.

indirectly appealing for their support and votes in the forthcoming election. Furthermore, this Sect commands a very large membership in the country; therefore, by winning them to his side, Mugabe was sure of boosting his chances of winning the election.

The main point Mugabe brings out in paragraph 12 is that Gezi “turned-around the wheels of development” after his appointment as Governor and Resident Minister of Mashonaland Central province, thereby vindicating the President on the choice he had made. He supports this in paragraph 13 by describing how Gezi worked hard in the province, sometimes covering “enormous distances on foot or on bicycle in a bid to serve the people who had elected him.” He further cites Gezi’s resolute and courageous stance on the land reform programme in paragraph 14 by saying that he (Gezi) wanted to see action that empowered the black majority and not prevarication and corruption on the land issue. Refusing a “gift” of a tractor from a white commercial farmer so that government would not take his farm was enough testimony that Gezi was incorruptible. Still on the land issue, Mugabe says that Gezi’s wish was to see the completion of the programme by the middle of the year (2001). By saying “we dare not fail him”, Mugabe is using Gezi to solicit for support from the audience and to justify his presidency. In the same paragraph, Mugabe resorts to ‘othering’ discourse (Bucher 2003) when he says:

Let all those who have taken it upon themselves to oppose our land reform programmes do their worst, led by the Labour Government of Britain. Have no goodwill to expect from them.

The undertone of “those” and “them” is that there are people who are evil and there is an “us” side which is good. Here there is an indirect reference to the opposition MDC and its supporters as the “those”, the “traitors”. The audience is made to feel that it does not belong to this bad side, but to the “us” side, the ZANU (PF) party. We see the speaker here dichotomizing or polarizing the electorate along party lines, ZANU (PF) and the MDC. In the same paragraph, Mugabe whips the audience’s emotions by saying that it was through the “agony, blood and sacrifice” and not by “permission and generosity of colonialism” that the country won its freedom independence and sovereignty. A sharp contrast is made here of those who lost their lives fighting for the liberation of the country and those who thought freedom would come through negotiating with colonial masters.

The same ‘othering’ discourse continues in the next paragraph (15) with Mugabe reminding that land and sovereignty were more important than a job in a whiteman’s factory and the British penny. The speaker appeals to the audience’s support and patriotism by using *repetitio*: “Let those who think, ...think again”. He achieves this by haranguing people who wanted to compromise the country’s sovereignty by associating themselves with white men and Britain. Mugabe warns traitors that Zimbabwe is not for selling and he ends this paragraph by saying, “Cde Gezi knew this [that Zimbabwe in not for selling] perfectly well and, wherever he is, he urges and exhorts us on.” The speaker derives credibility from the audience by mentioning the deceased in this sentence.

Towards the end of the speech, in paragraphs 16 and 17, Mugabe employs the rhetorical device of *apostrophe*; he addresses the deceased, instead of the audience. He says:

To Cde Gezi I say: You have done your part; you have fought your struggle; staunchly defending your heritage, the people's needs and interests were always uppermost in your mind. May we take a cue from you.

This has the effect of calling for the attention of the audience to the purpose of the gathering. Everyone in the crowd should pay more attention to hear what the President is going to say when he says "To Cde Gezi I say ..." In paragraph 18 the rhetorical device of *apostrophe* continues as the speaker says: "Rest in peace Comrade, for your cause has not been in vain." He ends the speech with a powerful slogan, proclaiming land and power to the people in paragraph seventeen. This incantation has a hypnotic effect on the audience as it could be seen live on television making a standing ovation.

In this speech Mugabe uses Gezi as an epitome of a revolutionary hero whose loyalty to the party was unquestionable. He describes him as committed, energetic, dynamic, courageous, dependable, critical, hardworking and incorruptible. Gezi is also described as a promoter of unity (bridge-builder), a true revolutionary, a real man of the people, a genuine hero - having a tremendous personality and courageous leadership. These and other personal characteristics are used to present the deceased as an archetype of a party supporter with the aim of encouraging the audience to be like him in every respect. The speech is meant to inspire the audience in a particular way, the Gezi way. Any action against the

above characteristics will be a betrayal of Gezi, presented here as an embodiment of the values of ZANU (PF). In short, this epideictic speech was used to bolster Mugabe's campaign and his presidency.

3.3 Speech 2: Burial of Moven Enock Mahachi – 29 May 2001⁶²

3.3.1 Analysis

The speech begins with the characteristic *exordium* in which Mugabe calls everyone to attention by saying out their titles and/or names in paragraph 1. Without wasting time, the speaker states the theme or the main business of the day in paragraph 2, that is, “to bid farewell to yet another gallant and illustrious son of Zimbabwe, Moven Enock Mahachi”. He describes this moment as “sad and heart-rending”, similar to the occasion when people gathered again at the national shrine earlier to bury another hero, Border Gezi. We see Mugabe appealing to his audience's *pathos* by reminding them of Gezi's death before announcing that of Mahachi's at the beginning of the same sentence. The rhetorical impact of the first line is on the question of time. Mugabe's mention of “barely a month ago” is significant in that it shows that hardly had the people forgotten about Gezi's tragic death when they were faced with another equally saddening moment. They had now come to lay to rest yet another hero who had died after having been involved in a road traffic accident.

The mention of tender age of 16 when Mahachi joined the “service of the people” in paragraph 3 should be viewed under the backdrop of the controversial National Youth Service Plan introduced by the Government during

⁶² See Appendix 2

the campaign period. This plan produced militias which went about the country silencing those who did not support the ruling party. The national service phenomenon is contextualized and traced back historically and figureheads like Mahachi are identified with it so that the people do not view it as a completely new practice. Mahachi is presented in the rest of the paragraph as a people-oriented cadre who started fighting the colonial system that viewed blacks as “hewers of wood and drawers of water” at an early age.

The expression “hewers of wood and drawers of water” connotes a lowly group of people in constant, eternal and irredeemable shameful position of servitude to the White Master who is ruthless and who puts a glass ceiling to freedom and uses all the means necessary to keep the black man in this position. The speaker here effectively describes the stereotypical view the whites had about the blacks in colonial Rhodesia. This is to make the people see the whites in some bad light and applaud the role Mahachi played in fighting for the rights of the black people at an early age. Furthermore, the proverb, by its nature of being known by the people, would invoke memories of the heavy hatred the black man should have for the white man’s rule which the speaker aptly describes as “brutal” and “full-blooded wrath”. The major subject in paragraphs 4 and 5 is the land issue whose origin is traced here:

The situation [land ownership imbalance in favour of the white minority] was created in colonial times when blacks were forced off their ancestral lands. The land question was a major cause of the guerrilla war which led to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.⁶³

⁶³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/593522.stn> “Who owns the land?” (8.8.02)

According to Meredith (2002), the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 1 million blacks were allocated 29 million acres of land, 48 000 whites with only 11 000 on the land were given 48 million acres while an “area of 18 million acres of state land, which included forests and national parks, was left unassigned” (p.115). The land use imbalance in favour of the white minority is clear in the above figures. The same author cites the 1969 Land Tenure Act in which 45 million acres were allocated to whites and another 45 million acres to blacks with 6 million for national parks and game reserves. Meredith further observes that in this process,

thousands of Africans continued to be evicted from the white farming areas. Most evictions passed unnoticed. But one defiant stand taken by a chief in the eastern highlands caught international attention (p.116).

That defiant chief who took the Smith government to court was Chief Rekayi Tangwena. The fact that Mahachi fought hard together with the land dispossessed Chief Rekayi Tangwena in the 1970s gives him a political clout among the audience. The Tangwena people’s resistance against their removal from “the land of their forefathers” dovetails well with Mugabe’s land reform programme under the Third Chimurenga. This parallelism is meant to make the people see that there was nothing wrong in taking the land from the white people and giving it to the black landless majority. Despite the Tangwena people’s defeat by the white man, the much publicized resistance of these people influenced many people to go outside the country to take up arms against colonialism.

Another thing to note is that the violent removal of the Tangwena people is juxtaposed with the “spirit of their resistance.” The use of the word “spirit” is significant here as it forms a link with the legendary spirits of Nehanda and Kaguvi⁶⁴, the guiding spirits of the liberation struggle. The rhetorical impact of the prophecy of Nehanda in particular is that, if one alludes to it in a speech, the audience is literally translocated from its state of mind to a revolutionary one where the target of the action is the oppressor and sell-out, in the eyes of this speaker and his audience, Britain and Tsvangirai respectively.

Perhaps Mahachi’s greatest contribution to the liberation struggle is when he and Chief Tangwena assisted Mugabe and Edgar Tekere (then the secretary-general ZANU PF party) in their dramatic escape into Mozambique in April 1975. This was after the Central Committee had decided that Mugabe should go and lead the liberation struggle after the assassination of Herbert Chitepo. The rhetorical impact of this incident lies in the fact that Mahachi displayed unequalled courage and sacrifice in his life by assisting Mugabe and Tekere to cross the border into Mozambique. The mentioning of Mahachi’s arrest and consequent imprisonment by the Smith regime “for assisting in the

⁶⁴ “Kaguvu and Nehanda used their leadership to spearhead the first war of resistance (First Chimurenga) against European domination of the region. They instructed all the regional chiefs to arm and resist this domination in whatever way they could. It is during this resistance that some of the great Shona warriors emerged. Chief Mashayamombe who lived near Mhondoro, chiefs Gondo and Zhanda were also instrumental warriors during this time. They armed and spread around the nation. Regions like Makoni, Shangani, Chishawasha and Mazoe were hotbeds of struggle during Zimbabwe first war of liberation. Nehanda and Kaguvu were captured, tried and sentenced to death by hanging. They were hung on a hill near what is now the city of Harare in Zimbabwe. However, before she was hung, Nehanda promised the Europeans that her bones would rise to lead the second struggle against them” (Solomon Murungu and Zambuko Projects 2004).

recruitment of freedom fighters” buttresses the heroic role he played in the liberation struggle. The antithesis “shed ... tears of joy at the birth of the new Zimbabwe” has rhetorical influence in the minds of the people in the sense that it evokes both the memories of the days of the struggle and that momentous occasion when the black people finally got the opportunity to rule themselves in a free Zimbabwe.

In paragraphs 7 and 8 Mugabe comes back to his election campaign theme, the land reform programme. That the Fast Track Land Resettlement (sic) Programme had “delivered close to 3 million hectares of land back to its rightful owners” makes the audience see that the Government was resolute with the controversial programme that attracted a lot of criticism both locally and internationally. In paragraph 8 the speaker makes a biblical allusion when he says “Cde Mahachi was one you could rely upon to revive the spirits of doubting Thomases” when they prevaricated on the land question, doubting whether they could go ahead taking the land from the white farmers and giving it to the black people. In the Bible the story is told of Thomas who doubted that Jesus was alive and had arisen from the dead on the third day after his crucifixion as he had prophesied. Thomas went further to ask Jesus if he could touch the wounds in the hands where the nails had gone through. Mugabe uses this biblical allusion to mock those who doubted his hard-line stance on the land issue. It can be argued that the rhetorical impact of using the proverb “doubting Thomases” lies in that the listeners, most of whom are Christians, would not want to be identified with the biblical Thomas. In contrast to the “doubting Thomases”, Mahachi’s image is

boosted by the speaker when he is presented as a focused party cadre who “spoke passionately, eloquently and relentlessly about a land reform programme.”

He is further described in paragraph 9 as a “conscientious”, “trusted”, “sincere” and “loyal” member of ZANU (PF) making it possible for the President to appoint him to various ministerial posts which “he served with diligence and distinction” since 1980.

In paragraph 10 Mugabe uses Mahachi in trying to justify Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) conflict. This involvement was a grey area in the eyes of the voting public who saw no immediate gains from entering into such a war while the country was reeling under the worst ever economic crisis. Mugabe was largely seen as a father who leaves his children crying for food while he went to feed the children who have their own father and problems next door. Economic analysts argued that the budget spent on the DRC virtually made it an appendage of Zimbabwe⁶⁵. There were unconfirmed rumours that Mugabe and some government officials were benefiting from diamonds from the DRC and this was a smudge on his political image ahead of the presidential election. To cleanse himself before the electorate Mugabe claims that the international world had

sought to demonise Zimbabwe and her soldiers for upholding internationally recognized principles in defence of the Congo, while condoning acts of aggression, genocide and gross looting of Congolese resources by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

⁶⁵ It was estimated that Zimbabwe spent about US 1million dollars per day in the DRC after deploying about 11 000 soldiers in that country.

As Minister of Defence, the deceased is praised here for the role the Zimbabwean army played in the “fight for the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the DRC. In paragraph 11 Mugabe makes maximum use of Mahachi’s character to portray the ethics guiding ZANU (PF). He says, “we shall miss his honesty, his reasoned contributions to debates and his great commitment to his country.” He also alludes to how people will miss Mahachi’s “hearty, almost shrill, but joyful laughter”. These are general sentiments passed and felt at an ordinary funeral setting in the Zimbabwean African setting. Mugabe aptly portrays himself as the president of the people by expressing his condolences first to the bereaved family, his immediate audience and the nation as a whole. In his concluding remarks he addresses the deceased, calling him “son of the soil”, a catchy phrase which originated in the days of early nationalism and now used to mean a patriotic Zimbabwean, especially a supporter or sympathizer of ZANU (PF). The term “son of the soil” also evokes memories of the land reform programme in the minds of the audience. The speaker ends his eulogy by saying “go well gallant fighter” and translates this into the two national indigenous languages, Shona and Ndebele.

The essence of this speech is that, just like the previous one, it affords Mugabe a chance to look back and use historical events involving the deceased to spruce his own image and that of his party, thereby drumming up support ahead of the election. By tracing Mahachi’s glorious contribution to the struggle for liberation and his patriotic service to the nation after independence, Mugabe is persuading his audience to rally behind him and his party during the election. The

events involving Mahachi are so carefully chosen and enunciated by the speaker that the audience is most likely to suspend reason and get persuaded to act according to the whims of the speaker. In other words, reasoning is short-circuited in such circumstances. The rhetorical effect of the speech is that it literally hypnotizes the audience in such a way that they begin to idolize the deceased as its hero. The powerful manner in which Mugabe delivers his speech, in most cases appealing to the emotions of the audience by reference to the evils of colonialism – the “callous and barbaric nature of colonialism”- involuntarily makes the audience to sympathize with his case.

3.4. Speech 3: Burial of Chenjerai Hunzvi – 8 June 2001⁶⁶

3.4.1 Analysis

This is the longest speech with 22 paragraphs. In this speech Mugabe resorts much to the history of the country. This is to be seen as part of nostalgia and collective memory being used as rhetorical tools.

After the characteristic opening of his speech, Mugabe moves on quickly to appeal to the *pathos* of his audience by mentioning that no sooner had they buried Mahachi – “barely a week ago” – and Gezi, “four weeks before then”, than they were back again to bury “yet another Son of the Soil”, Hunzvi. The tone set in this paragraph grips the hearts of the audience. The speaker further develops this sombre mood by lamenting that “fate has been most unkind to us, hitting us where it hurts most at a time when our land based Third Chimurenga is at its most critical historical juncture.” The President pays tribute to the roles played by the

⁶⁶ See Appendix 3

dead heroes during the controversial land reform programme arguing that the best tribute the people could pay for these immediate heroes and others who died before them was to “give land back to the people of Zimbabwe.” This would be the greatest honour for Hunzvi whose whole life, it is claimed, was spent fighting for the people of Zimbabwe. Reference to the land reform programme at the outset sets the tone of the speech.

Mugabe then traces Hunzvi’s political history beginning with his activism in 1965, the year the then Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith made his “illegal declaration of independence (UDI).” By going back to the details of Harold Wilson’s visit just before Smith’s UDI in 1965, Mugabe’s point is that the British Government was not sincere in its efforts to restrain Smith from his evil act and “the British people and their Government would never contemplate abandoning their white kith and kin in favour of the African cause.” Mugabe says that similarly today, Prime Minister Tony Blair will not abandon his “white kith and kin whose forefathers colonized our country, butchered our people and stole their land.” He further questions in paragraph 18: “Why then are we expected to send our own army to shoot people [occupying white men’s farms]?” He vows that “we could not, and we will never, set war veterans in the army against fellow war veterans and landless peasants peacefully demonstrating for their usurped birth rights.” Mugabe uses colonial history in his rhetoric and this logically vindicates his sanctioning of the war veterans to invade white commercial farms. He fuses racist undertones in his speech in such a way that absolves him and his party of any wrong doing in taking the land from the white commercial farmers.

From paragraph 9 to paragraph 10 Mugabe narrates Hunzvi's involvement in the struggle for liberation during which he was arrested and detained by the colonial regime at various holding centres in the country. His post independence contribution is chronicled in paragraphs 11 and 12 where it is claimed he fought hard for the welfare of war veterans, ex-detainees, war collaborators and peasants and workers. Hunzvi's biggest role is mentioned in paragraph 12 when the speaker says after the rejection of the draft constitution in 2000, Hunzvi, without instruction from the party of Government, "led the war veterans and the landless to demonstrate on white owned commercial farms countrywide." Hunzvi's Machiavellian tactics on the land issue were clear, for example when he declared publicly that "we are fighting an economic war for the liberation of our country"⁶⁷ and that "no one can stop the revolution we have started."⁶⁸ He is also quoted as having given Zimbabwe's white farmers two options regarding their land: "Hand over the land we leave them or stay and see what land we leave them."⁶⁹ This type of rhetoric ignited the fire for the so called Third Chimurenga with Hunzvi becoming a hero of the synchronized invasions of white farmers' land.

It becomes apparent from this part of the speech that the white commercial farmers were paying a prize for actively supporting the "No" vote in the 2000 referendum that squashed the government's plan to introduce new constitution. Mugabe describes the rejection of the new constitution as "the British sponsored rejection of the democratic draft constitution which held the British responsible

⁶⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/69995/stm>

⁶⁸ *ibid*

⁶⁹ *ibid*

for funding a land reform programme in Zimbabwe.” The speaker goes on to talk so passionately about the “land-based Third Chimurenga” using statistics to justify that land should be taken from the white farmers, some who boast of having “little Englands” and others having vast expanses of land, “almost the size of Belgium”, all this at the expense of the landless majority. The irony of it is that, according to the speaker, “80 percent of the cotton and over 70 percent of maize is produced by these same black farmers.” All this is meant to whip up the audience’s feelings of hatred for the white community and those who oppose the ZANU (PF) and the Government ahead of the election. In other words by citing these figures the President is saying the black people can do without the production from the white commercial farms. His rhetoric justifies his stance on the land reform programme. Indirectly he is saying “we can do without the white farmers”, but time has proved him wrong as vast expanses of land given to the black people, most of who are not farmers, lie idle at the time of writing this thesis.

The speaker also condemns the negative coverage of the land reform programme by the international media, especially CNN, BBC, Sky TV and SABC in which war veterans were described as “axe wielding warriors” against the vulnerable white farmers. He castigates the call for the rule of law by the international community arguing that “the rule of law is presented as one that protects the minority’s privileges, which are subsidized from expropriated African ancestral land and other resources.”

The speaker also questions the kind of the spirit of reconciliation which favours only the interests of the white people. He also castigates Britain for failing to fulfil the pledge it made on the land question at the 1979 Lancaster House Conference that paved the way for Zimbabwe's independence.

By mention figures of "5 million hectares" and 105 000 families on close to 3 million hectares of land", Mugabe is giving credence to the Fast Track Resettlement Programme among the audience. Here and elsewhere in this chapter the speaker uses rhetorical statistics⁷⁰ to show that his controversial land reform programme is for the benefit of the landless back people. He adds that the greatest tribute for the deceased, a pivotal player in land based Third Chimurenga, was now "to intensify the [election] campaign which will even make victory more certain."

The speaker adopts his characteristic ending of funeral speeches, that of using *apostrophe*. This sums up the "good" things the deceased has done for the party, the country and the people during his lifetime. The usual farewell is used in English, Shona and Ndebele.

One interesting thing to note is that this speech is given against the backdrop of Hunzvi's scandalous exigencies involving the looting of the War Victims' Compensation Fund⁷¹ which were fresh in the minds of the audience. As a medical assessor of war veterans who would benefit from the fund, Hunzvi had falsified many claims, including that of his own father who got an award but had

⁷⁰ Philippe-Joseph Salazar (2002:104-107) uses the term rhetorical statistics when he contrasts the 1996 census in South Africa and the counting of people in the apartheid era in that country which saw people as "discrete units". In contrast, Census 1996 tried to show the nation's "true colours", alluding to the metaphorical a "rainbow nation". His argument is that "a nation is not a population".

⁷¹ Martin Meredith, p.134-5

not fought the war. The speaker does not mention Hunzvi's dark side in his eulogy, keeping to the Shona proverb, *wafa wanaka* (the deceased is saintly). This is in line with the Shona culture never to say the bad things of the deceased. With regard to the looting of the War Veterans' Compensation Fund, many people, including prominent government officials are said to falsify claims and benefited from the fund illegally.

3.5 Speech 4: Burial of Cain Nkala – 18 November 2001⁷²

3.5.1 Analysis

The *exordium* is similar to the ones used in prior speeches. Here Mugabe mentions twelve groups of people, with the exception of "Our respectable Chiefs" and "ZANU (PF) Party Leadership".

Right from paragraph 2 where the main speech begins, we see Mugabe appealing to the audience's emotions. He begins by describing Nkala as "a dedicated, consistent and patriotic son of the soil" before telling the crowd that he was "abducted, tortured and murdered by terrorists." The words "abducted", "tortured" and "terrorists" paint a gloomy picture in the minds of the audience. The speaker wants the audience to feel the "indescribable pain of losing Nkala" as he himself does or purports to do. He achieves this by introducing the term "terrorist/terrorists" which features twice in the paragraph.

This rhetoric of terror continues into paragraph 3 where the speaker concludes without presenting concrete evidence that Nkala was "kidnapped, tortured and strangled with a shoelace to death by MDC activists and officials."

⁷² See Appendix 4

The use of a shoelace in the murder has a chilling effect in the audience as they imagine how painful it should have been when Nkala was being murdered. The use of “brutal death” in this paragraph and “brutal murder” in paragraph 4 invokes fear in the audience. This is effective as the audience is bound to fear and hate the perpetrators of this cold-blooded murder. Mugabe begins this paragraph by telling the audience that Nkala’s murder was a result of a well planned bloody offensive launched by both internal and external forces. Although there is no tangible evidence for the claim of these internal and external forces having committed the crime, this illusion is effective as it creates a sense insecurity in the audience.

To support his argument about terrorism, Mugabe concludes that the perpetrators of this heinous crime were supported by funds provided by the local white commercial farmers, political parties in Britain and the British Government of Tony Blair. He further alleges that there are terrorist forces of destruction in the MDC who destroy the minds of the youths by giving them “donor trinkets, drink and drugs” to fight against ZANU (PF) and “the gains of our hard won independence and sovereignty.”⁷³ He continues labelling the members of the main opposition party as “the MDC terrorists”.

This name-calling is logically supported by the allegation that they are sponsored by former Rhodesian whites and the British with the aim destroying “our free and united Zimbabwe.” He concludes that the killings of Nkala and Limukani Lupahla are testimony of the attempt by the MDC and its allies to

⁷³ Note the antithesis in MDC youths and ZANU (PF) youths as exemplified by Gezi, Mahachi and Hunzvi. The MDC youths are presented as violent and unpatriotic as opposed to the ZANU PF cadres who are patriotic.

reverse the gains of the struggle against colonialism. In this light, Nkala is declared a Martyr, a true hero of the people. By describing Nkala as a Martyr, Mugabe's purpose is to appeal to the audience's *pathos* so that they see him as a principled party cadre who died because of his belief in the sovereignty of the country. Nkala is presented as a sacrificial victim of the audience's cause; therefore they must hold him in the highest regard.

The attack on the MDC intensifies in paragraphs 6 and 7. More sympathy is drawn from the audience by mentioning that another ZANU (PF) youth member been murdered in a similar fashion. The speaker refers to unauthenticated media reports saying that the MDC had terrorist training camps on some commercial farms, outside our borders and even overseas..."

In paragraph 7 Mugabe employs antithesis to prove his case that the MDC was deceiving the people. He sarcastically says the MDC was clamouring for "democracy, the rule of law and human rights during the day as a cover for perpetrating political violence during the night." The irony that the antithesis invokes in the audience makes the audience see the MDC as a deceitful and insincere political party. The speaker begins the paragraph by warning that ZANU (PF) and the Government will not tolerate such terrorist provocation and violence in the country and ends by saying that the murder had proved to the whole world the "brutal circumstances surrounding the death of Cde Nkala." It is ironical that at this period, when the Zimbabwean Government's rating on the abuse of human rights was at its lowest ebb, the MDC would be described as having committed "violence and crimes against humanity." It is apparent

reverse the gains of the struggle against colonialism. In this light, Nkala is declared a Martyr, a true hero of the people. By describing Nkala as a Martyr, Mugabe's purpose is to appeal to the audience's *pathos* so that they see him as a principled party cadre who died because of his belief in the sovereignty of the country. Nkala is presented as a sacrificial victim of the audience's cause; therefore they must hold him in the highest regard.

The attack on the MDC intensifies in paragraphs 6 and 7. More sympathy is drawn from the audience by mentioning that another ZANU (PF) youth member been murdered in a similar fashion. The speaker refers to unauthenticated media reports saying that the MDC had terrorist training camps on some commercial farms, outside our borders and even overseas..."

In paragraph 7 Mugabe employs antithesis to prove his case that the MDC was deceiving the people. He sarcastically says the MDC was clamouring for "democracy, the rule of law and human rights during the day as a cover for perpetrating political violence during the night." The irony that the antithesis invokes in the audience makes the audience see the MDC as a deceitful and insincere political party. The speaker begins the paragraph by warning that ZANU (PF) and the Government will not tolerate such terrorist provocation and violence in the country and ends by saying that the murder had proved to the whole world the "brutal circumstances surrounding the death of Cde Nkala." It is ironical that at this period, when the Zimbabwean Government's rating on the abuse of human rights was at its lowest ebb, the MDC would be described as having committed "violence and crimes against humanity." It is apparent

therefore that this was smear campaign against the MDC whose members were in a majority of cases on the receiving end of the violence sponsored by Mugabe's party and government.

In contrast to the "MDC terrorism", the first two sentences of paragraph 8 presents the ZANU (PF) Government as a promoter of peace, stability and unity in the country. The speaker gives the audience the impression that ZANU (PF) fights for their rights while the MDC is a party composed of criminal elements and rebels who are being used for reversing the gains of the people by external forces. This is an allusion to the allegation that the MDC is a front of Britain and its western allies. By referring to the economic rights of the people, Mugabe is implicitly referring to the land reform programme. His argument here, which is to appeal to his audience, is that by giving them the land, this would be addressing their economic rights, hence the empty slogan or campaign theme tag, LAND IS THE ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMY IS LAND, which Raftopoulos (2004:17) aptly describes as a "simplistic party slogan which has been translated into politics of exclusion, racial essentialism and violence."

Paragraph 9 mainly concentrates on Nkala's *ethos* and the various roles he played after the attainment of independence in 1980. He is described as being committed, patriotic, diligent, consistent, disciplined, honest, humble, revolutionary and religious. The superfluous use of adjectives to describe Nkala is to present him as a perfect party cadre who is worth emulating. It is also to draw the audience's *pathos* in the sense that they would sympathise with him and dislike the opposition party as it was alleged that its members had killed him.

The land issue takes centre stage in paragraphs 10 and 11. By euphemistically referring to the farm occupations as “land demonstrations”, Mugabe wants to play down the controversy surrounding his land reform programme. He says Nkala played a pivotal role in these land demonstrations. He further justifies his land reform programme by describing it as “a people-driven cry for social justice”. This gives the impression that Nkala’s murderers were against the wishes of the people because they murdered someone who was championing their cause. The speaker again appeals to the audience’s emotions when he mentions in paragraph 14 that even when Nkala was facing death at the hands of his abductors “at that harrowing moment”⁷⁴, he prayed for them and vowed that the land issues “would find a final and just solution” against all odds. The speaker is extolling Nkala’s courage and heroism displayed at such a difficult time when it appeared apparent that he was about to be murdered. Indirectly, the speaker is appealing to the audience to show such courage and heroism by supporting his party and voting for it in the forthcoming elections. Paragraphs 15 and 16 address Nkala’s widow, children and War Veterans and the Youth. Mugabe extends his “heartfelt Condolences” to these groups of people. He ends the speech by addressing the deceased, saying in Ndebele (Nkala’s native language): “*hamba kahle qhawe lethu!*” (go well our hero). Ndebele is used first here to identify with the Ndebele-speaking section of ZANU (PF) supporters.

⁷⁴ This term is also used in the first speech, referring to the agonising time the mourners had at the time of Border Gezi’s death. Here it refers to the traumatic time Nkala had at the hands of his abductors, torturers and murders. In both cases it refers to the pain people suffered but it seems to more appropriately describe the latter incident.

In this speech Mugabe paints a gloomy picture that his Government is under threat from really imagined terrorists in the MDC and from external forces. The aim is to demonise the MDC by accusing some of its members and officials of abducting, torturing and murdering Nkala and referring to it as a terrorist organization bent on furthering the interests of foreign western powers. He achieves this by using the word “terrorist” interchangeably as a noun and an adjective thirteen times as follows:

- “tortured and murdered by *terrorists*”;
- “deplorable *terrorist* circumstances under which he met his death;”
- “wider and carefully planned *terrorist* plot by internal and external enemy forces”;
- “these sponsored *terrorist* forces of destruction in the MDC”;
- “cannon fodder in *terrorist* fights ... against ZANU (PF)”;
- “target of the MDC *terrorists*”;
- “abducted, tortured and murdered ... by the same *terrorists*”;
- “MDC *terrorist* training camps on some commercial farms, outside our borders and even overseas”;
- “kidnapping and assault of ZANU (PF) members by MDC *terrorists*”;
- “*terrorist* provocation and build-up of violence;”
- “in the typical fashion of *terrorist* groups”;
- “time for this deceit is now up for the MDC *terrorists*”;
- “evil machinations and *terrorist* actions”.

The redundant reference to the MDC as a terrorist organisation has a rhetorical effect in favour of the speaker. It instils a sense of insecurity⁷⁵ in the audience and thus increases their faith in the speaker who is the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of the country. If the audience wants to be protected from the impending terrorism, then it should logically rally behind the speaker and his party. The phrase "... abducted, tortured and murdered..." in paragraphs 2, 6, 7 and 14 collocates with the word "terrorist", and this strengthens the rhetorical impact as of the smear campaign against the MDC by the speaker.

4.5 Overall Appraisal

Mugabe's funeral speeches that have been analyzed above may be described as funeral diplomacy. In other words, the funeral speeches are not mere chains of condolences to the bereaved families and the nation. These speeches are a type of diplomacy in which Mugabe took advantage of the funeral set-up to peddle a political motive, that is, to appeal to the people's support in order to win the impending presidential election. The speeches are systematically intertwined praises of the deceased and bashing of the main opposition party, the MDC, which offered the Mugabe's ruling party the most formidable challenge since independence. In other words, the sum rhetoric in these speeches is not simply a matter of "*inaugurer chrysanthemes* – to lay wreaths, verbal wreaths"⁷⁶ on the

⁷⁵ See also Bush's speeches on "war on terrorism" in Brigitte Mral "*We are a peaceful nation*" – *War Rhetoric after September 11*. SEMA 2004.

⁷⁶ Philippe-Joseph Salazar, *An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa*, 2002, p. 32

deceased comrades, but to use these opportune moments to whip up support for his political party ahead of the dicey presidential election.

By extolling the virtues of his comrades-in-arms and by painting colourful pictures of the roles they played during and after the liberation struggle, Mugabe intends to win the hearts of the electorate. Mugabe recreates collective memory of the liberation struggle in such a way that suits his exploits. In so doing, he selects those incidents that glorify his political party and draws the attention of the audience to the evils of colonialism and neo-colonialism. In other words, the rhetoric in these speeches invokes the memory of the hardships the black people experienced during the colonial regimes. The negative image of colonialism is clearly enunciated in all the speeches. The speeches are well crafted to suspend the reasoning of the listener in such a way that what is left is to hate the white man and all that is associated with him, and all the people who forge alliances with him, to the maximum. In some cases the speeches were so inflammatory that they triggered violence against the “enemies of the state.”

We see Mugabe, himself an astute revolutionary and a firebrand leader of the Second Chimurenga, using collective memory and political nostalgia⁷⁷ to prop and enhance his tattered political image in the face of stiff threat and challenge from Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition MDC party. In this regard Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles (2000) come to the conclusion that

[b]ecause collective memory is limited in its representation of the past, it easily succumbs to presidential manipulation and

⁷⁷ Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles provide an interesting analysis of how US President Bill Clinton used collective memory and political nostalgia in 1988 in their paper entitled “Collective Memory, Political Nostalgia and the Rhetorical Presidency: Billy Clinton’s Commemoration of the March on Washington, August 28, 1998”, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol.86, No.4, November 2000, pp 417-447

exploitation and is smoothly transformed into political nostalgia. Political nostalgia is the limited, distorted narrative of the past-in-memory that argumentatively resurrects and glorifies bygone times and is communicated to achieve an emotional response in the service of a political or electoral goal⁷⁸

It is therefore needless to question the existence of these two powerful tools in Mugabe's rhetorical repertoire at this crucial moment of his political career. In these speeches, Mugabe is the sole interpreter of collective memory regarding the liberation struggle. As the powerful chief interpreter of events, there is no doubt that the speaker chooses only those memories that are to his advantage in the campaign period. There is also a likelihood that he distorts information here and there in order to build a positive image of himself in the eyes of the voters. Since he holds the monopoly in all the four speeches, he is at liberty to construct the past history in a way that presents ZANU (PF) as the only party the electorate could vote for in the election. The speaker glorifies the characters and deeds of the deceased heroes and exhorts the audience to follow their example. The characters and the deeds of the deceased are presented as the yardstick of patriotism and any deviation from the values and principles held by these heroes should be shunned and considered as a betrayal of the nation, a sin that would attract the label of terrorism. The deceased are presented as the "Saints" of the liberation struggle and post-independence era despite the fact that some had publicly known cases of corruption, for example Hunzvi. One can argue here that collective memory and nostalgia as rhetorical tools allow the speaker to present half-truths about events since, as the chief interpreter of events, he has the

⁷⁸ Ibid, p.420

prerogative of choosing which events to focus on and which ones to play down. The speaker of course chooses those events that will boost his political image and that of his political party.

It can be concluded that the sum of Mugabe's rhetoric is Sophistic rhetoric as it exudes or attempts to present wisdom or knowledge of what is wrong and right. The four funerals are opportune moments in which the President finds it appropriate to seek believability and credence in the electorate in his election campaign ahead of a crucial election.

CHAPTER 4

THE RHETORIC OF CHANGE

4.1 Introduction

The year 1999 will go down the annals of Zimbabwean history as a year in which the general populace of Zimbabwe from all walks of life came together to form a people's movement whose major aim was to bring a change of government in the country. The birth of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under its charismatic leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, gave the people of Zimbabwe high hopes for a new democratic government after the country had been (mis)managed by ZANU (PF) for the 22 years at the time of the 2002 presidential election. The mood of change gripped a society that had been hitherto forced to believe that it was only Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) who were mandated to rule the country *ad infinitum*. It is the purpose of this chapter to trace the rhetoric of change and attempt to show its impact during the campaign of the 2002 presidential election campaign. In other words, the chapter tries to illuminate the persuasive nature of the rhetoric of change as presented by the MDC and its presidential candidate, Tsvangirai. It is argued that the rhetoric of change centred on the campaign theme of change. Voters were persuaded to believe that by voting the MDC candidate to the presidency, they were actually "completing the change"⁷⁹. It is also shown in this chapter that Tsvangirai's rhetoric espoused the principles of a democratic electoral process and the observance of human rights.

⁷⁹ A catchy phrase used in MDC's campaign material.

4.2 The Birth of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)

Perhaps before going into the gist of this chapter, it is important to give a brief explanation of how the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) started. The MDC was officially formed in September 1999. The roots of the party can be traced to its mother labour body, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which organised an all embracing crucial conference, the National Working People's Convention, held in Harare from 26 to 28 February in 1999. This high powered convention had strong representatives from all walks of life – labour leaders, non-governmental organisations, academics, lawyers, church and women's organizations drawn from both rural and urban areas.

It is important to note that all the stakeholders to the Convention agreed on the fact that the country needed a strong opposition party. They were all convinced that the country needed an alternative voice. It is not surprising therefore that when reading the final document produced at the convention, one can easily pick the rhetoric of change contained therein. Among other issues, the Convention singled out the disempowerment of the people; the breakdown of the rule of law mainly due to state-sponsored political violence, the Government's inability to manage the economy, resulting in high costs of basic commodities, the deterioration of public services, lack of progress in resolving the land hunger in rural areas, the absence of a people oriented constitution, widespread corruption in Government, regionalism, racism, gender discrimination and the general abuse of human rights.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Movement for Democratic Change, May 1999, www.samara.co.zw/zctu/background.htm . . p.1 (14.03.05)

Consequently, the Convention made wide ranging recommendations on the way forward in the above areas including the following: health delivery, education, housing, media freedom and, above all, multiparty democracy. It was also noted that changes in these and other areas that were affecting people's lives would not be realised "without a strong, democratic and popularly driven and organised movement of the people"⁸¹. Ultimately, that movement came to be known as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its leaders confirmed that they were forming a political party in May, the official launching of the party coming in September 1999. For the purpose of clarity, it is important to cite the MDC's objectives as they were listed at the beginning. The objectives of the party thus ran as follows:

- to unite organizations of working people, as currently set out in the Working People's Agenda and Declaration.
- work to ensure that there is a government which makes decisions on national policies that are in the interests of the people who are the source of sovereignty.
- to ensure the conditions for and form the base/foundation upon which a political party can be built that is able to contest the 2000 elections.
- to create, mandate and own the political party formed and to monitor its performance in relation to the aims of working people.

⁸¹ *ibid*, p.3.

- to build nation integration so that all Zimbabweans together without barriers of race, colour, tribe, ethnicity, status, political or religious affiliation.
- to embark on voter education for change.
- to democratize all political processes in the country.

A short comment of these objectives will suffice here. The objectives enunciated clearly to the voters that here was a democratic party in which they would participate freely and help change the status quo in the leadership of the country. The objectives formed the core of what the MDC stood for as a new party that was introducing an alternative voice in the political arena that had been dominated by the ruling ZANU (PF) party since 1980.

At the launch, the MDC party adopted the theme “The past we shall inherit, the future we shall remake.” The promise of hope for a better future was carried in the phrase “the future we shall make”. The fact that a strong coalition of civic groups had united to form a united front in the form of the MDC had a rhetorical impact on the voters since it was evident that everyone with progressive thinking was rallying behind the new party. It gave a natural feeling of being left out of the phenomenon of change if one did not support the new party.

The rhetoric of change was clearly expressed in the powerful slogan *Chinja maitiro* (Shona) and *Guqula izenzo* (Ndebele) (“Change the way of doing things”) that the MDC adopted. The instant popularity that the party’s slogan had with the people and its applicability in every sphere of life showed that its

inventors had done their homework thoroughly. The irresistible rhetoric of calling for change was loud and clear in this slogan. It had the direct impact of telling the incumbent President and his Government to change their bad ways of ruling the country. The MDC was calling for “...political change so as to ensure that the interests of working people, the unemployed and the rural people [were] advanced.”⁸²

The fact that the MDC found enthusiastic reception in the Zimbabwean body politic is clear testimony of the impact of the rhetoric of change right from the beginning. It was also clear that although there had been some opposition political parties before, such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD), the MDC was in all intents and purposes, a true opposition party, a real people’s movement championing the cause of the people in their hour of need for a change in governance. A brief look at the MDC presidential election manifesto shows that the rhetoric of change was at work throughout the campaign period.

4.3 The 2002 election manifesto

The 2002 manifesto was presented differently from what most political parties would do and appeared like an abridged version of a larger document. The policy briefs were set within what the MDC named “Presidential Election 2002 – Completing the Change: MDC information pack”. Included in the pack were profiles of the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, and his vice, Gibson Sibanda. It also contained the party’s own assessment of the electoral environment up to a

⁸² *ibid*, p.3-4

month before the polls were due to be held, examining it *visa-vis* the Southern African Development Committee (SADC) electoral standards and various other laws pertaining to the conduct of elections.

The actual manifesto was a nine-paged section headlined *Policy Briefs*. All of the five policy briefs covering peace, the economy, land, health and education, were prefaced by the party's election candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai. The two to three lines *exordiums* summarized each of the party's key policies on national issues. The *exordiums* satisfied the recommended structures of an introduction in classical rhetoric.

4.3.1 Peace and national building

In his preamble to this section, Tsvangirai said:

The top priority of an MDC government will be to restore law and order, guarantee the peace and safety of all Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation and ensure the beginning of a process of national healing that would contribute to economic recovery.⁸³

The MDC deliberately opened its manifesto with this very sensitive subject of the rule of law because at the time scores of people had been wounded in attacks or even killed in clashes with pro-government supporters and war veterans. While its ultimate goal was change in the economic and political sphere, it was saying there was no way people could talk about economic change or recovery without law and order. This was after the violent 2000 farm invasions combined with electoral campaign that saw violence continue unabated across the country

⁸³ MDC manifesto, 2002, p. 13

Accusing the state of sponsoring the violence through the training of ruling party youth militias, and the police of encouraging the violence by “selective application” of the law, the MDC promised change if it got into power.

The promise read:

Upon assumption of office, the MDC commits itself to restoring law and order. We will ensure that Zimbabweans from all shreds of political opinion can unit and co-exist with each other in an environment of peace. This issue has become a top priority of an MDC government because it is the basis upon which our economic stabilization and recovery plan rests.⁸⁴

The use of “all shreds of political opinion” is metaphoric in that it tries to appeal to all strata of people regardless of their political orientation or affiliation. All the people would be guaranteed involvement in all the change the party was advocating for, and that no one would be sidelined.

As will be noticed in sections to follow, the MDC’s manifesto rested entirely on the underlying principle and belief of change for the better, especially on the economic and political fronts. Even on the sections dealing with peace and national healing, the MDC said the issue was its top priority “because it is the basis upon which our economic stabilization and recovery plan rests”⁸⁵. In an environment of hyperinflation, high unemployment and grinding poverty levels, MDC’s policies sounded attractive and therefore had the possibility of luring votes, even in the absence of concrete programmes.

When the manifesto said the MDC “has no desire to travel the path of retribution”, it was making use of historical allusion by indirectly making reference to the violence experienced since 1999 when the MDC came into play,

⁸⁴ *ibid*, p.13

⁸⁵ *ibid*, p. 13

posing the most serious challenge to the ruling ZANU (PF) party. This statement assumes that readers of the manifesto were already aware of the political problems in the country. The spirit of reconciliation for the sake of developing a nation torn apart on party lines was further emphasized in the following statement:

If all of us are to succeed in turning Zimbabwe's economy around, it is imperative that our focus is not diverted to side issues, which do not assist the starving and jobless masses. Forgiveness and national healing is therefore a must for every patriotic Zimbabwean.⁸⁶

Reference to the "starving and jobless masses" had the rhetorical impact on the voters (most of them jobless and actually starving) who would consider the MDC as the party to vote for as it showed that it has concern for them.

4.3.2 Economic Policy

As with the other policy issues, the economic policy was pre-ambled by a summary from the party's presidential candidate and leader Tsvangirai, but it handled this important issue differently from others. It has a section on background, then the party's response and is wound by a summary. Even the space allocated to the subject shows the importance the party placed on economic issues. The preamble reads:

Job creation and price reduction are at the heart of the MDC's economic agenda. We have an economic recovery and stabilization plan that has been formulated according to the needs and aspirations of ordinary Zimbabweans. It aims to end the vicious cycle (sic) of poverty and job insecurity that inflicts a significant

⁸⁶ *ibid*, p.13

proportion of Zimbabweans and ensure that the people of this country are never exposed to the threat of mass starvation.⁸⁷

In the manifesto, the MDC accused the government of presiding over the decline of the country's economy through mismanagement and incompetence. It promised to turn around the economic slump by introducing people centred and driven development policies.

To emphasize the desperate need for change the MDC's manifesto highlighted that after two decades of ZANU (PF)'s rule, Zimbabweans are as poor as they were some 30 years earlier, adding corruption and economic manipulation for "political purposes"⁸⁸ had taken root. It also painted a gloomy picture by saying unemployment had grown five times, with at least more than a quarter of a million jobs lost in the preceding year. It stated that industrial production was lower than it was towards the end of colonial rule or just before ZANU (PF) came into power in 1980. By reminding people that their plight had been worsened by Mugabe's government, the rhetoric in the manifesto was that people should dump the ZANU (PF) candidate and vote for the change of government in the form of the MDC candidate.

While the common expression 'vicious circle' which means "a continuous situation in which one problem or need leads to another and the new problem makes the first problem worse"⁸⁹, the MDC used 'vicious cycle'. Whether the use of 'cycle' was a typographical error or was deliberate is not entirely clear. Taking

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p. 14

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁹ Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary, p. 1326

a cycle as “a series of events that are regularly repeated in the same order”⁹⁰, we note that the meanings are not completely at variance, except that the former is more detailed than the latter. But the rhetorical message remains the same - the call for change. The MDC is trying to graphically illustrate that recycling ZANU (PF) into power means the people will remain in a vicious circle that will not deliver them from their quagmire. They, thus, should take action and vote for the MDC.

The term “mass starvation” is very graphical and it conjures up horrific *stories and atrocious images of emaciated people dropping dead in the streets or skeleton-like children scavenging fly-infested rubbish dumps in search of food.* This has become a reality in Zimbabwe today. These ghastly images of masses of suffering people (caused by the ZANU PF government) are evoked in the conscious reader’s mind by the hyperbolic language used in the manifesto. This kind of language drives the voters to want to seek change through the ballot box.

The manifesto highlighted the issues that had become common, but made comparisons in an attempt to illustrate that people could do better and that change was inevitable. The page containing unemployment figures was juxtaposed with the one on MDC’s promise to create a million jobs within two years. However, the proposed plan did not state how it would fund “the mass housing schemes and rural infrastructure projects”⁹¹ and how it proposed would create the million jobs. Such claims are described by Hugh Rank as basic election claims he summarizes

⁹⁰ *ibid*, p. 290

⁹¹ MDC Manifesto 200, p. 15

as follows: “I am competent and trustworthy; from me, you will get more good and less bad”⁹².

The claims match up to Aristotle’s concept of *ethos*, the desired image of the politician as the sincere and benevolent expert. All the promises made in the manifesto were attempts to convince the electorate to vote for Tsvangirai.

It has already been stated that the MDC’s rhetoric is that of hopes, dreams and improvement. This is well captured in the first line of its summary on the economic policy document which reads “Zimbabwe has the potential to become a fast growing and more equitable society if it has the right form and practice of government”⁹³.

4.3.3 Land Policy

While the MDC has been criticized by its opponents of not having a clear land policy, it however listed land as its third policy issue for the 2002 election campaign, highlighting the need for it to be attended to in a businesslike fashion rather than for political mileage. In a preface to the policy document, Tsvangirai says:

Land reform in Zimbabwe is an unfinished national agenda. Our goal is to resettle people in a way that the resettled people produce lots of food to fight poverty and starvation.⁹⁴

The party pledged to source funds that would adequately assist the newly resettled farmers. The MDC government would also give the new farmers title deeds which they would use as collateral in securing loans from banks. There was

⁹² Rank, H: Political rhetoric – How to analyse election rhetoric, weber.berkeley.edu/users/grank/political/elections%20/images_and_issues.htm

⁹³ MDC Manifesto 2002, p.16

⁹⁴ *ibid*, p.17

also need to develop the infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, dams and schools in the resettlement areas. These were promises expected by new farmers and the MDC hoped to woo votes through the pledges.

It was careful not to ruffle feathers when it said “those Zimbabweans who have been properly allocated land will remain settled on their pieces of land” after it was accused by its opponents of planning to evict all resettled blacks and return whites to their land. But it qualified the statement by saying those “properly” given land. Here the MDC was also trying to not to lose ballots by being seen to be threatening newly resettled farmers with eviction.

The MDC also stressed that land reforms should be directly linked to economic development, not to score political mileage. The MDC also tried to counter propaganda from their rivals by dropping a line that literally means their opponents were lying about their achievements:

Although the government claims that hundreds of thousands of families have been resettled under the fast track land policy, we have found evidence of 30,000 families having been resettled in conditions of heightened poverty.⁹⁵

Describing conditions of resettled farmers as “heightened poverty”, suggests that the government programme was not improving the living standards of its people, and therefore was not worthy to vote for. Again the aim was to discredit the government by belittling the efforts of the land reform programme.

4.3.4. Education policy

⁹⁵ *ibid*, p. 18

The MDC education policy, while appearing to be skeletal, touched on the most basic of issues ranging from standards of education at all levels to reviewing the status of the teaching profession and conditions of service for teachers. The education policy summary below promised better access to quality education from nursery school to tertiary institutions than what is on the ground.

At the heart of our vision for education is the need to ensure that every Zimbabwean has access to high quality education. The MDC will ensure a future for every child by reforming and investing substantial funds and resources into the education system.⁹⁶

Promising improved standards of education, was a positive move that was meant to attract support especially in an environment where standards of education had been falling due to under-funding and lack of resources.

4.3.5 Health policy

The people of Zimbabwe deserve a fully staffed and adequately funded health service that can support and deliver the health needs of all Zimbabweans.⁹⁷

The above opening statement by Tsvangirai was again building a self-image that he could do better for the average person, for the poor that have been neglected in terms of their health needs. If people “deserve” better, it follows that what they are getting is a raw deal and they are capable of doing something about it. “The people of Zimbabwe deserve” is a rhetorically very effective use of language to get people to seek change for better, in this case by voting the MDC into power. The statement suggests that it is the people’s right to get better health services and not a privilege. In the wake of the total collapse of the health delivery

⁹⁶ *ibid*, p. 19

⁹⁷ *ibid*, p. 21

system in the country, anyone who promised improvement in this regard was sure to get support from the suffering people.

While the policy is generally addressing the health sector, it starts off with a section of HIV/AIDS, a pandemic that has affected literally every family in Zimbabwe. The MDC promised to “commit substantial investment to policy solutions aimed at tackling this pandemic”⁹⁸. Giving HIV/AIDS a priority is a clever technique aimed at capturing voters’ empathy. Many families had been drained of all their resources in a bid to look after the HIV/AIDS affected and infected. So anyone who promised to fund for the AIDS treatment and care, and support for the orphans, would obviously win the hearts of the majority of people. Other health policies are separately treated in the manifesto, showing that HIV/AIDS was prioritised for obvious change-seeking reasons.

4.4 Brief Profile of Morgan Tsvangirai: MDC President⁹⁹

Morgan Tsvangirai was born in 1952 in Gutu communal lands, in Masvingo province. He is the first in a family of nine children. His father was a bricklayer. Morgan attended Munyira Primary School and went to Silveira and Gokomere for secondary education.

In order to help his parents to support the family, he had to look for employment immediately after completing his “O” level of education. Consequently, he found himself working at Mutare Clothing firm at the age of 20.

It was here that he was initiated into trade unionism just as an ordinary member of

⁹⁸ *ibid*, 21

⁹⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/startcontent>: 15.10.04. See also “Tsvangirai – ‘a skilled and charismatic administrator’ by Lance Guma, an article in The Zimbabwean newspaper, 18.03.05, p.22.

the local textile union. He later moved to Bindura where he had got a job as a plant operator at Trojan Nickel Mine. He later rose to the position of a plant foreman. While working at Trojan Nickel Mine, Tsvangirai was elected the branch chairman of the Associated Mine Workers' Union. His vision and commitment to the well being of the worker saw him being propelled to the executive of the National Mine Workers Union.

In 1988 Tsvangirai became Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Little did he know that a decade later, this workers' union would collaborate with other organizations yearning for democracy and form a formidable opposition party he was going to lead. Because of Tsvangirai's humble background and the basic education he possesses, he has been often haughtily described by Mugabe as an ignoramus. Mugabe boasts of a chain of degrees, both earned and honorary. The highest qualification Tsvangirai possesses is an Executive Leaders In Development Diploma which he obtained from Harvard University's John F Kennedy School of Government in June 2001. This prestigious diploma for executive global leaders covers such topics as leadership, managing political and economic reforms, managing transition, economic development, financial management and globalisation.

However, Tsvangirai's role in mobilizing the people against the government shows that although he may lack the high education that Mugabe has, he possesses good leadership qualities. This is in light of the role he played in steering the ZCTU more and more on a political course in the 1990s as the

economy of the country declined and workers' living standards hit the bottom level.

In particular, Tsvangirai organized successful nationwide strikes that brought the whole country to a standstill. At one time Mugabe's government attempted to raise funds to pay the pensions of war veterans by raising income tax, a move that proved unpopular with the people and the ZCTU. The ZCTU-organised nationwide strike forced the government to stop implementing the income tax. As a result of this ZCTU's success in making the government reverse its decision, Tsvangirai was attacked by allegedly angry war veterans who attempted to throw him out the window of his office in the 10th floor. His attackers used a metal bar and only left when his secretary screamed. The success of this strike led to stayaways in December 1997 and early 1998. The government was forced to cancel the implementation of two taxes.

As already noted in the preceding section, the ZCTU assisted in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999 with Tsvangirai taking the post of President and his former boss, Gibson Sibanda becoming his deputy. It is therefore correct to conclude that the catalyst for Tsvangirai's transformation into a powerful politician was his career in the trade unions.

In February 2000, a few months after the formation of the MDC, the young party campaigned vigorously against the government-sponsored referendum on constitutional reform, which among other things, sought to take the white men's farms without compensation. The "Yes" vote supported by the

government lost. Mugabe's and his government viewed this loss as the biggest political set-back since independence.

The favourable results of the referendum gave buoyancy to the MDC. It was evident that the new party was an acceptable phenomenon in the politics of Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai became the people's beacon of hope, a hope for true democracy and an end to a *de facto* one party state rule and tyranny.

Using the campaign theme of change, the MDC nearly squared up with the ruling party in the June 2000 parliamentary elections when it garnered 57 seats against ZANU (PF)'s 62 seats. No opposition party had made such a remarkable showing in Zimbabwe since independence - what more in the wake of horrendous acts of violence that left more than 100 MDC supporters dead. Some analysts have contended that if the Zimbabwean political field was level, the MDC could have easily won the 2000 parliamentary election with a wide margin. This view is credible taking into account that the MDC challenged 37 seats that were won by ZANU (PF) in court.

It was a clear case that all the disparate groups that were strongly opposed to Mugabe and the ZANU (PF) government were now rallying behind Tsvangirai who appeared to be their saviour in the time of need. Tsvangirai's popularity continued to grow despite the fact that the state propaganda machinery relentlessly attacked him as a puppet of Britain, a sell-out who had never taken part in the liberation struggle against the British settlers. The pro-government public media took advantage of the fact the white farmers openly supported, campaigned for and financed the MDC.

Tsvangirai has not travelled a smooth road to the political powerhouse that he is today. In 1989 Mugabe's government imprisoned him for six weeks on trumped up charges of being an apartheid-ruled South Africa's spy. In 2000 he was charged with treason for saying at a rally in September that year that if Mugabe did not go peacefully, the MDC would remove him violently. This charge was later dropped by the government as the courts found it unconstitutional. In defence Tsvangirai said he never meant removing Mugabe by physical violence but that he meant Mugabe would be removed by popular discontent. In 2002 Tsvangirai was charged with high treason for allegedly having sought the services of a Canadian political consultancy company, Madison and Dickens to assassinate Mugabe ahead of the 2002 presidential election. He was found not guilty by the High Court on 15 October 2004. Despite all this and other forms of harassment from the government, Tsvangirai has remained steadfast and principled in his call for democratic change of government in Zimbabwe:

We remain committed and focused to completing the change we set on to achieve some three years ago. This change should speed up economic recovery for the good of us all. It should also witness the birth of a new era where basic liberties are recognized and the dignity inherent in every human being is upheld and respected.¹⁰⁰

Probably the most apt summary of Tsvangirai's character was given by David Coltart¹⁰¹, MDC Member of Parliament for Bulawayo South, as a new year's message at the beginning of 2002. The message was published in a number of independent papers in Zimbabwe. Coltart described Tsvangirai as the *coup de grace* in the 2002 presidential election. The use of the phrase *coup de grace*

¹⁰⁰ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/startcontent> See Appendix 5.

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

provides an impression that Tsvangirai was the best candidate in the election, one who was ready to make an easy, final stroke as the victor in the elections. This description is followed by three sentences that give a vivid and positive picture of Tsvangirai:

Getting to know him has been a sheer pleasure. He is a man of great intellect, integrity, courage, compassion and humour. In fact I firmly believe that in Mr Tsvangirai we have truly a great leader who will become a statesman of world renown. I have consistently impressed by (sic.) his wisdom in tackling issues and by his commitment to a vision of a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic Zimbabwe¹⁰².

Coltart goes on to give some reasons why he has so much admiration for his leader. Tsvangirai phoned to convey a congratulatory message to Coltart at the birth of their child, a clear testimony that “[h]e does not have an ounce of racist blood in his veins”¹⁰³. Coltart says that Tsvangirai restored his courage and determination when he (Coltart) received death threats because of his political activities. Tsvangirai is said to have resolutely and fairly dealt with an issue of indiscipline involving some younger members of the MDC whose squabbles were bringing the party into disrepute. Even when Tsvangirai “was ambushed twice last year, he remained absolutely calm and focused”¹⁰⁴. By saying that Tsvangirai “is truly a great leader and Zimbabwe will be blessed to have him as President”¹⁰⁵, Coltart was appealing to the electorate to vote for Tsvangirai. He paints an attractive picture of Tsvangirai that the electorate was most likely going to be persuaded to vote for him.

¹⁰² *ibid*

¹⁰³ *ibid*

¹⁰⁴ *ibid*

¹⁰⁵ *ibid*

Through observation and talking to people from all walks of life, the researcher found that MP Coltart's comments about MDC President were shared by many people, both in the rural and urban areas. Tsvanirai was the darling of the electorate mainly because of the change rhetoric that characterized him and his party.

In conclusion, it can be noted here that it was trade unionism than anything else that catapulted Morgan Tsvangirai to the high position of a formidable and effectual opposition leader Zimbabwe has ever seen since 1980. Tsvangirai's entry onto the Zimbabwean political scene has been traced to social movements such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) of which he was Secretary General and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) of which he was the founding chairperson. Besides being a self-made person, Tsvangirai can also be described as a solid administrator, competent thinker, charismatic leader, democratic team player, a social democratic and an eloquent speaker. At 52 years old in 2002, Tsvangirai stood a better chance in the eyes of the people as he was comparatively much younger than his nemesis, Mugabe, who was 78 years old. Thus the 'age rhetoric' favoured him more than it did Mugabe. His charismatic character transcended over ethnic and racial groups and people felt he would be a better President than Mugabe.

4.5 Overview Tsvangirai's speeches at rallies

Tsvangirai held about nine presidential campaign rallies, but because he spoke off-the-cuff, the researcher did not find records of his speeches. The only

available source of portions of his speeches, are stories carried by the media. And even these did not carry the nine speeches because not all of his rallies were accessible to the media due to the hostile political environment at the time which confined most scribes to urban areas. Thus, because of the non-availability of the parts of the speeches verbatim, the analysis will mainly be limited to the subjects raised, and where they are available, to the direct discourse used to propound the issues.

According to an international newspaper report, Tsvangirai's kick-started his 2002 presidential campaign at Sakubva Stadium in Zimbabwe's eastern border town of Mutare. In his wide-ranging address, Tsvangirai told prospective voters that "the country would be making a choice between a bleak future and bright prospects when it goes to the polls on March 9-10"¹⁰⁶

Asking would-be voters to choose between a bleak future and bright prospects is what Hugh Rank describes as "progressive rhetoric". Rank describes progressive rhetoric as the rhetoric of

reformers, liberals who want to change or fix up parts of the existing system....and replace it with a better one. Progressive Rhetoric is the rhetoric of the Have-nots who seek to change the 'bad' (relief) and to get the 'good' (acquisition)¹⁰⁷

In the case of the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai fits the above description perfectly. His rhetoric fits this description well too. He enters the political arena as a redeemer, as someone who has to

¹⁰⁶ Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be ousted, Feb 4, 2002

¹⁰⁷<http://webserve.govst.edu/users/grank/political/Elections%20/progressive.htm>

correct a big wrong doing. His rhetoric seems to contain the panacea to the problems that bedevilled and still haunt Zimbabwe. Coming back to his maiden campaign speech in Mutare, Tsvangirai told his supporters and the electorate at large:

We are in a mess because of Mugabe. The economy has been crippled; we have no friends internationally because Mugabe has chosen policies to isolate us from the rest of the world.¹⁰⁸

The above citation confirms Rank's description of progressive rhetoric, that is, "the rhetoric of the opposition, the protesters and the pickets, the people who are not in power".¹⁰⁹

Tsvangirai's campaign rhetoric can also be described rhetoric of "dissatisfaction, discontent, and anger for not having the 'good', but it is also the rhetoric of hopes, dreams, change, progress and improvement"¹¹⁰. On progressive rhetoric Rank further notes that:

[t]argeted to their own supporters, progressive rhetoric often suggests fears of stasis (of being stopped, stalled, thwarted), either suddenly (banned, controlled) or slowly (exhausted, burned out).¹¹¹

This comes out clearly in Tsvangirai's speech when, making reference to the political violence in which the MDC claims more than 100 of its supporters were killed at the hands of furling party supporters. He says:

¹⁰⁸ Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined Zimbabwe's Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be ousted, Feb 4, 2002

¹⁰⁹ Rank, H: Political Rhetoric <http://webserve.govst.edu/users/grank/political/Elections%20/progressive.htm>

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹ *ibid.*

I know there are those among us clamouring for revenge. I want to tell you that we cannot afford that. When we come to power we will pursue a policy of reconciliation because that is the only way to build a country. Our present programme is to get rid of ZANU (PF) and after that we form a government of national unity. We ask you to brave ZANU (PF)'s campaign of violence.¹¹²

By asking his supporters to brave the ZANU (PF) campaign of violence in itself indicates fears for its efforts to rebuild the country being thwarted by reaction from the incumbent if at all the MDC wins the elections. It is at the Mutare rally that Tsvangirai tells the electorate to turn out in large numbers to dislodge the ZANU (PF) Government on election days. He says:

[t]he election is going to be won or lost on the basis of turnout. We must all go and vote, because at the end of the day, let not the future generations accuse us of being negligent and allowing a dictator to destroy the country in our faces.¹¹³

By openly calling Mugabe a “dictator” at a rally, Tsvangirai is endearing himself with his supporters as no one would dare call Mugabe by that term without fear of arrest or reprisal. This presents him as a dauntless fighter for the general people’s cause.

Referring to threats by the military that it would not accept an opposition victory government, Tsvangirai tries to separate the military from politics and indirectly alluding to them as professionals, saying:

[w]e have no doubt that the army has professional integrity to respect the constitution and to respect the will of the people¹¹⁴.

¹¹² Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined ‘Zimbabwe’s Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be ousted, Feb 4, 2002. www.namibian.co.,na/2002/February/africa/023F6A43E.htm

¹¹³ Thousands rally to support Tsvangirai, The Times (UK), 4 February 2002

¹¹⁴ Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined ‘Zimbabwe’s Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be ousted, Feb 4, 2002. www.namibian.co.,na/2002/February/africa/023F6A43E.htm

Indeed this is diplomatic way of telling the military that they will be expected to honour the outcome of the polls. It is a pragmatic technique that attempts to solicit cooperation from to the military.

But at another rally in Harare, Tsvangirai openly tells the security agents to draw a line between ZANU (PF) and government business. He says:

[t]he police and other security agents ... should know that they are working for the country not for Mugabe. They have nothing to be afraid of if they are part of national institutions, but we do not need those who believe they work for ZANU (PF). We will deal with you in the most effective way. If you cannot salute your commander-in-chief, you will have made yourself redundant. *Ko tingazviite sei?* (There is nothing we can do).¹¹⁵

Here Tsvangirai issues a dangerous and confrontational warning, in sharp contrast to his earlier diplomatic handling of the issue of defence chiefs who had openly announced that they would not recognize a President without liberation war credentials. Perhaps sometimes it was necessary for him to call a spade a spade by showing his decisiveness as a strong leader. The argument is that he needed to flex his muscles and show the military that there were rules to follow which were laid down in the constitution. One can say that he was trying to shade off intimidation by the military.

On the topical land question, Tsvangirai stresses in his speeches that the land reform programme has been chaotically executed. His argument was that there was need for “a land reform programme that benefits the whole country, that recognizes that farming is a commercial venture and not just about pieces of land

¹¹⁵ '50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally' – Daily News March 4, 2002

for peasants”¹¹⁶. This is an implicit, if not hyperbolic suggestion that the land programme has all been to do with parcelling of portions of small land for subsistence farming only.

Following his manifesto Tsvangirai, at his campaign rallies, promised not only to deal with the economic malaise affecting the country, but also compensate victims of political violence since the 2000 election campaign.

At a rally in Bulawayo Tsvangirai pledged to compensate victims of political violence from 2000 onwards¹¹⁷. *The Daily News* reported that Tsvangirai had said an MDC government would establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with issues arising from political violence that had left over 100 opposition supporters dead and that Tsvangirai “pledged to compensate all victims of political violence if elected into power.”¹¹⁸ *The Financial Gazette* echoed the same promise later in that week when it reported that “Tsvangirai ... said his government would pay reparations to those who lost relatives and properties because of state-sanctioned violence.”¹¹⁹

On this subject Tsvangirai capitalizes on the sensitive emotions of people, picking on the historical aspect of political violence. He is pointing at the government’s wrongs and at the same time trying to build a self-image of the defender of the rights of the poor, the weak and the downtrodden.

¹¹⁶ Nampa-Reuters in a story in the Namibian headlined ‘Zimbabwe’s Tsvangirai says Mugabe must be ousted, Feb 4, 2002. www.namibian.co.na/2002/February/africa/023F6A43E.htm

¹¹⁷ See also David Harold-Barry, *Zimbabwe: The Future is the Past*, 2004 p.212-223.and Ragnar Waldahl, *Politics and Persuasion: Media coverage of Zimbabwe’s 2000 election*, 2004, p.87-104

¹¹⁸ ‘MDC pledge to compensate victims of violence’ *Daily News* March 3, 2002

¹¹⁹ ‘Tsvangirai to compensate victims of violence’ *Financial Gazette*, March 7,2002

At the same rally at White City Stadium, according *The Sunday Mail*, Tsvangirai pledged to address the land reform exercise, but castigated the way his opponent had handled it. He is quoted by *The Sunday Mail* as having said:

I want to assure you, we believe in land reforms. There is need for communal land re-organisation ... but look at what ZANU (PF) has done.¹²⁰

Tsvangirai reiterated his position on the land issue at another rally a day after. *The Daily News* quoted him saying:

[w]e will deal with land redistribution in a transparent, lawful and equitable manner, not just dumping people like ZANU (PF) is doing. We need jobs through the opening up of new industries among other issues.¹²¹

He is basically echoing his party's manifesto which says land reforms should ensure production of adequate food to fight poverty and starvation. Poverty, hunger and unemployment were the collocates at the time especially after the shortages of food that were squarely blamed by critics on the Mugabe's fast-track land redistribution programme. The three are still affecting millions of Zimbabweans today.

With the food shortages at hand, Tsvangirai took the opportunity of his campaign rallies to openly criticize some of Mugabe's policies, in particular his turning to the Libyans for aid after the West shunned him over his Government's human rights record and other disagreements with the Bretton Woods institutions.

"*Ko vanhu vanodya mafuta here?*(Do people eat fuel?) You cannot feed the people on fuel. That is impossible"¹²², sarcastically commented Tsvangirai on

¹²⁰ 'Tsvangirai makes U-turn'- Sunday Mail, March 3, 2002

¹²¹ '50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally' – The Daily News March 4, 2002

¹²² 'Tsvangirai makes U-turn' – The Sunday Mail March 3, 2002

a deal Mugabe struck with Libya to supply fuel. Fuel shortages had almost brought the country on its knees at that time. These and other shortages continue to dog the country as I write this thesis.

But politics of the stomach and that of mobility cannot be separated. The opposition leader on that statement can be described to have resorted to cheap propaganda just to appease the huge crowds around him, yet it was not a necessary comparison. Both food and fuel are necessary for any modern country to run. What the opposition leader should have probably said was how his government would change the status quo to ensure that fuel supplies would never be disrupted in future. He also made use of a rhetorical question when he posed a question in the Shona language whether people were going to feed on fuel. In one of his main speeches, delivered at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield the weekend before polling, Tsvangirai used various forms of tactics to persuade the audience by using what is informally known as ‘pep talk’. This has the aim of stirring up discontent with and resentment against the authorities in power.

We are meeting today not because of Mugabe’s generosity, but because our people want change. We are going into the elections under protest because the electoral process is not free and fair. If Mugabe tries to rig the election he will be an illegitimate president because our people know that change is now irreversible. I urge all of you to go out in large numbers and vote to avoid rigging, to determine the country’s future. So many people have been killed, houses burnt and we should not betray them by voting for ZANU (PF). We have to end this lawlessness in the country in order to create jobs, open up new industries and fight against HIV/AIDS as a nation.¹²³

He energized his support base by making the supporters aware of the fact that they were going into elections not because Mugabe wanted to be seen to be

¹²³ ‘50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally’ – Daily News March 4, 2002

practicing democracy, but because “people want change”. By stating that he was running for the election even if the conditions were not very conducive, he was trying to emphasize the need for change. Tsvangirai was also appealing to the people’s emotions by saying the election was not going to be free and fair. He therefore urged for a sense of responsibility by calling for a collective action, urging “all of you to go out in large numbers and vote ... to determine the country’s future”. Here he impressed on the voters that winning the election was a question of numbers. They had to turn up in large numbers in order to deter ZANU (PF) from rigging the elections.

By making reference again to victims of political violence, Tsvangirai was intensifying the issue through repetition. He knew it was an emotional issue that would appeal even to those not directly affected especially when he said: “so many people have been killed, houses burnt and we should not betray them by voting for ZANU (PF). We have to end this lawlessness in the country”. Feelings of anger against the establishment could easily be stimulated among some receptive listeners. Employment creation, resuscitation of the economy and the battle against HIV/AIDS remained the focus of his speeches and were repeated over and over.

Following on his reference to political violence and his pledge to set a truth and reconciliation body to compensate victims of politically motivated violence, Tsvangirai promised to deal with the perpetrators of the violence. The language used appears to be contradictory to the purposes of setting up a reconciliation commission, alluded to earlier on. He was quoted saying:

[w]e will deal with these militias who assault people old enough to be their parents in the name of ZANU (PF). Mugabe should disband those militias. The people of Zimbabwe liberated themselves and Mugabe should stop misrepresenting history.¹²⁴

This kind of language would appeal to the people who had been affected by political violence that characterized the campaign period and was partly blamed on ZANU (PF)'s militias¹²⁵. The ZANU (PF)'s militias, infamously called "Green Bombers", a name deriving from their dark green uniform, were unleashed on the electorate to harass or even kill people who were opposed to ZANU (PF). So when Tsvangirai openly condemned the evil deeds of the militias and said "Mugabe should disband those militias", this had a rhetorical impact on the voters as he presented himself as having the welfare of the people at heart. The people would view him as a peace loving leader unlike Mugabe who set the notorious militias on them, to "assault people old enough to be their fathers in the name of ZANU (PF)." In the African culture, it is a taboo for a son to assault his father. Tsvangirai made use of this cultural symbolism in his speech so that the audience would view Mugabe as going against the norms and values of society by using young men (militias) to beat up and harass the people, including hapless old men and women. Tsvangirai also plays down the big role Mugabe played in liberating the country when he says "[t]he people of Zimbabwe liberated themselves and Mugabe should stop misrepresenting history.'

4.6 Overall Appraisal

¹²⁴ 50,000 attend Tsvangirai rally, Daily News, March 4, 2002

¹²⁵ These were ZANU (PF)'s National Youth Service graduates that were involved in acts of violence against known and perceived supporters of the MDC.

When now viewed in retrospect, it is not difficult to trace the “surfacing” (Trent and Friedenbergr 2000) of Tsvangirai as a strong contender of the 2002 presidential election, widely viewed as “an unfair contest” (Feltoe 2002). While it is logical to say that as soon as Tsvangirai became the President of the MDC, he was obviously going to be its presidential candidate in the presidential election, his vision for change and a better life for the people of Zimbabwe can be traced earlier to his trade unionism days, especially when he was the Secretary General of the ZCTU. It can therefore be argued that Tsvangira’s rhetoric of change did not just start instantaneously, but that it was a cumulative process that was only intensified during the campaign period under study. This is why this chapter has gone into some brief background of Tsvangirai life and his rhetoric of change. Trent and Friedenbergr (2000:25 say that although it is difficult to trace the first stage, “surfacing begins with candidates’ initial efforts to create an interest and image themselves as candidates and extends through a variety of public rhetorical transactions” before the actual campaign. This chapter has traced how Tsvangirai positioned himself in the leadership position of the MDC. With his party adopting the slogan *Chinja Maitiro* (Change your ways of doing things), we can see the rhetoric of change, that Tsvangirai together with his colleagues had began, being buttressed and taken to a higher level.

Although the state machinery and ZANU (PF) militias declared rural areas no-go-areas for the Tsvangirai, he took the campaign theme of change to major cities, altogether addressing a paltry nine rallies compared to Mugabe’s thirty-seven. Despite all the constraints the MDC leader faced to reach his avalanche of

supporters both in the rural and urban areas, the rhetoric of change spread to these areas like a bushfire. There was nothing appealing as the MDC's thematic slogan *Chinja Maitiro* (Change your ways of doing things). The slogan offered a "cognitive shortcut" (Shea 1996) to the voters that when voting time came, they were going to vote for a change of government. Tsvangirai's speeches were persuasive in the sense that they promised the voters a new democratic dispensation if he got to power. In the eyes of the people, he was a beacon of new hope, their hopes and patience having been trampled upon by the ZANU (PF) government for 22 years. Such messages like "As President I Will Respect You", "As President I Will Listen to You" and "As President I Will Protect You", which accompanied most of Tsvangirai's campaign adverts, had a positive rhetorical impact on the voters. The voters were also given responsibility to "Help Bring About a Better Life" by voting Tsvangirai to the presidency.

It can be thus concluded that Tsvangirai used the challenger's strategies as suggested by Trent and Friedenberga (2000) in his campaign for the presidency. The rhetorical impact these strategies had on the voters was great judging by the popularity he commanded and still commands among the voters.

core of the incumbent's campaign style (Trent and Friedenbergr 2000). Top on the achievements the Manifesto highlighted were land to the people, peace and stability, education, health, mining, tourism, justice, legal and parliamentary affairs, local government, and economic liberalization.

The thematic tag LAND FOR ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT ran through the Manifesto, giving the persuasive appeal that by getting land from the white commercial farmers, the economy of the country would improve. It is important to note that the Manifesto played down the fact that at the country was and is still reeling under the worst economic slump by describing the economic hardships as "temporary but pressing setbacks of our economy"¹²⁶. To date, some five years later as I write, the economy continues to nosedive; the "temporary setbacks" have become permanent, so to speak, with no signs of changing for the better in sight.

The Manifesto treated voting for ZANU (PF)'s candidate as a collective responsibility in order to defend the country's sovereignty which, in Mugabe's rhetoric, was in danger from the British who wanted to recolonise it, hence his vow that Zimbabwe will never be a colony again. Right from the onset, the ZANU (PF) Manifesto 2002 makes use of the rhetorical strategy of collective responsibility so that voters would identify with the party. The following phrases rhetorically implied that the voters had a responsibility of ensuring that the country belonged to them collectively and they should guard against its sovereignty: "our party", "our gallant sons and daughters", "our economy", "our

¹²⁶ ZAUN (PF) Manifesto 2002, p.2.

nation", "our country", "our independence", "our sovereignty", "our 22nd anniversary of independence", "22 years of our liberation" and "our national independence". Also "together with you" is used at the beginning to give the impression that whatever ZANU (PF) did and stood for, it was the will of the people. This had the rhetorical impact of giving the voters a duty to vote for ZANU (PF) which was presented as caring and responsible. In order to entice more voters to vote for ZANU (PF), the Manifesto gave reasons why the majority would vote for the party. Among these reasons included the claims that it was only ZANU (PF) that understood that "Land is the Economy" and that the "Economy is Land" and that it was only ZANU (PF) that could formulate a policy from this into something practical and real. Saying that it was only ZANU (PF) that understood that the "Economy is the Land" was not only in itself confusing but meaningless. Such cryptic rhetoric would make the message obscure, leaving many questions unanswered.

The Manifesto also claimed that there was no alternative to ZANU (PF) implying that the other parties, including the MDC were of no consequence. The emphasis on the liberation struggle was also appealing as it suggested that it suggested that it was only ZANU (PF) that had liberated the country. There were also promises for economic growth, social justice through redistribution of wealth and equity, democracy, peace, stability and rule of law and national autonomy in the domestic and foreign policy. The Manifesto exhorted people to vote for ZANU (PF) because:

- ... the wishes of the people are sovereign.

- ... the people died for the land.
 - ... the economic power of the people is based on the land.
 - ... the Third Chimurenga is about giving land back to the people. Land is our heritage.
 - ... ours is a Government of the people by the people for the people.
- (p.69)

5.1 Analysis

Mugabe's campaign strategy mainly targeted the rural electorate which constitutes the greater percentage of the country's population. The rural population has also been the stronghold of the ruling party support for the past years. However, there seemed to be some manipulation of some kind when it came to the presidential election campaign. Mugabe has been acclaimed as one of the most eloquent and best president orators in Africa. Some analysts have described him as a shrewd manipulator of rhetoric. To some Mugabe has become a legend and a hero of all time. His speeches were a plethora of veiled threats, promises and assurances to look into the wrongs of the past especially for the Matebeleland electorate in the wake of the Matebeleland massacres of the 1980s as well as allegations of deliberate forestalled regional development. Some folks in other rural areas, especially in Midlands, Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland provinces, were indoctrinated with a myth that Mugabe was their super hero and a saviour from hunger and starvation. Accused by their urban counterparts of being gullible, the rural folk undoubtedly fell prey to Mugabe's powerful manipulation of words, intimidation and violence allegedly perpetrated by the militias and the war veterans.

The 2000 parliamentary elections helped Mugabe to foresee the possible outcome of the presidential results. Judging by the results of this parliamentary

election there was need for the ruling party president to concentrate on massive campaign in the rural areas where most of his support was.

Mugabe criss-crossed the country in a private helicopter and addressed a total of 37 rallies. On the land reform programme Mugabe told voters there was no backtracking. He supported his controversial land reform programme by attacking the white commercial farmers who owned huge tracts of land. Of notable importance were the Oppenheimer's estates especially in Matebeland. He supported the farm occupations by the war veterans when he said, "War veterans were saying white farmers have no right to that land. We can show them where Britain is. Blair can take them."¹²⁷ More farms had to be taken from white farmers and given to the people. By saying, "if there are some who have not been allocated farms, we will acquire more farms and resettle them"¹²⁸, Mugabe was building high hopes in the people. This appealed to the rural folk who were dispossessed of their ancestral land by the British settlers. He reiterated his attack on the MDC saying that if people voted Tsvangirai into the presidency, Tsvangirai would return all the land to the whites.

Contrastively, Mugabe presented himself as a fighter for the common good of the people by declaring that he would not go back on the land reform programme. At another rally he said:

The British say Mugabe is a madman, they say I am grabbing their land and the whites are supposed to be saints. That's laughable. Blair can do anything and go anywhere and say what he wants but I will die clinging on to my land. This is what we fought for.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ The Herald, 20.02.02

¹²⁸ The Herald, 22.02.02

¹²⁹ *ibid*

Mugabe blamed the problems between Zimbabwe and Britain on the failure of Blair's labour government to honour the country's colonial obligations as contained in the 1978 Lancaster House Agreement that paved the way for the independence of Zimbabwe. He further argued that the British Government was renegeing on the land question in order to keep its descendants on the land that was not theirs in the first place, reasoning that how could a minority own huge tracts of land at the expense of its rightful owners, the black majority.

Mugabe also told voters that he was prepared to withstand EU sanctions. He asked them a rhetorical question "What will we be wanting in Europe?"¹³⁰, and contemptuously described Britain as an "obnoxious island". The implication of this is that Zimbabwe was self sufficient and that there was no need to worry about the sanctions imposed by the EU. He gave the impression that sanctions were therefore meaningless. This was mere rhetoric as the country continued to plunge into the worst economic crisis mainly as a result of being isolated by the international community. It is interesting to note that at another rally Mugabe seemed to feel the effects of sanctions when he said: "Sanctions will only harden our stance [on the land]. They only serve to show that the white man is evil."¹³¹ My argument is that, if sanctions were meaningless, as Mugabe alluded to earlier, why then would they (sanctions) make him and his government harden their stance, presumably on the land question? If sanctions are meaningless, why the look East rhetoric now?

¹³⁰ The Herald 22.02.02

¹³¹ The Herald, 20.02.02

Mugabe promised to give enough food to voters saying that no one would die because of the drought that had affected most areas. Contrary to this promise on food distribution the MDC and NGOs alleged that food aid was used by Mugabe to gain political mileage during the campaigns. Only people holding ZANU (PF) cards were reported to be eligible for the allocation of food. The researcher witnessed a similar case in Hatcliffe township in Harare where only people carrying ZANU (PF) cards were allowed to buy maize meal from a shop whose owner was a well known ZANU (PF) supporter. It was also common that maize and mealie-meal were distributed at most ZANU (PF) rallies, a practice that was condemned as vote buying by the opposition.

Another technique Mugabe used in his campaign was to lure traditional chiefs to support ZANU (PF). In his rhetoric he promised to improve the welfare of traditional chiefs. The Government was going to electrify their homes and provide them with vehicles, clerks and secretaries to make their work easier. Their salaries and perks were increased to at Z\$18 000 per month, a lot of money at that time. It was said this was to restore the dignity of the chiefs which had been eroded by the colonial regimes and yet in actual fact chiefs were to pay back by literally ensuring that all their subjects would vote for Mugabe in the election. For sure the chiefs lined voters according to their villages with the village head ensuring that everyone voted for Mugabe. Mugabe castigated Tsvangirai in his addresses alleging that he and the MDC were bent on reversing the gains of the country's revolution. People should not therefore vote for Tsvangirai.

Employing his sense of humour Mugabe attacked Tsvangirai's personality. At one rally Mugabe joked about his age (78) saying that he was capable of physically knocking down Tsvangirai (49) if they were given a boxing ring. He said, "This fist is 78 years old and has 78 horsepower that could send Mr Tsvangirai to the ground if we were to get the ring." By injecting humour into his speech Mugabe's purpose was to retain his audience's interest and to appear credible as a contender in this election. By making the crowd laugh, he was increasing their attentiveness to his speech, hopefully to remain so until the end of his speech.

Mugabe also gave the impression that Tsvangirai was not a patriotic and committed leader. Mugabe sarcastically reasoned at one rally:

I will be surprised if you voted for Tsvangison, someone who ran away from school, only to run away from war in Mozambique, how do you know he will not run away from the presidency?¹³²

The humour that is logically presented in this statement is compelling. Mugabe's analysis of Tsvangirai's character instilled a sense of insecurity in the voters should they vote for Tsvangirai. They were also made to feel more secure with the incumbent who seemed to imply that they were sensible people who would not vote for Tsvangirai. By saying, "I will be surprised if you voted for Tsvangirai", Mugabe was foregrounding credit to the people before he told them Tsvangirai's weakness of always abandoning tasks unaccomplished. Mugabe was indirectly telling the people that they were wise choosers or voters who would not vote for a deserter like Tsvangirai. The voters were likely to feel honoured that

¹³² The Herald, 14..02.02

the speaker regarded them as reasonable people who would not vote for some who had the alleged weakness of leaving tasks not completed. Mugabe used his good sense of humour in most of his attacks against Tsvangirai and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.

Mugabe also added in his addresses that Tsvangirai was a puppet of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. At another rally in Matebeland North questioned what the MDC really stood for:

Look at MDC. Who are they? What is it they want to do with the country? Who is Tsvangirai? He is the white man's puppet. He is not himself. He has lost his African essence, his humanity. He has turned himself into a tool of the British.¹³³

Note the effective use of questions and the repetition of the pronoun “he” in the answers to the question “Who is Tsvangirai?” All this is meant to paint Tsvangirai as a stooge of the British. The researcher found that Mugabe’s rhetoric about Tsvangirai wanting to give back land to the white people was so effective mostly in rural areas that even today the rural folk do not trust people from urban areas, the strongholds of the MDC.

Mugabe’s attack of Tsvangirai by describing him in Shona as *chimbwasungata chemunhu*¹³⁴ (a true puppet of the British) was meant to make him appear to be a real enemy of the people, a person who was selling his country to the British. A few days before the election Mugabe intensified his demonisation of the MDC when he referred to the MDC as a party of crooks and criminals:

¹³³ The Herald, 21.02.02

¹³⁴ The Herald, 14.02.02

We want to see if the Movement of Dead Crooks and Criminals [MDC] will rise from the dead. If their spirit has the capacity to rise, we will deal with them as well. After the election, we will not write 'Rest in Peace but Rest in *Gehena* (hell)¹³⁵.

Mugabe was calling to the people to condemn the MDC to hell by voting him into the presidency. At the same rally, Mugabe's wife Grace added to her husband vitriolic attack on the MDC by telling the people that "You cannot vote for the MDC because you will be ruled by dogs and cats."¹³⁶ The rhetorical impact of the phrase "dogs and cats" lies in the metaphorical sense in which it is used, having been formed from the letters "D" and "C" of the acronym MDC. This follows after Mugabe had said the MDC was the "Movement of Dead Crooks", vowing that they would never rule Zimbabwe. Mugabe was consistent with his recurrent rhetoric, in which he was quoted during one of his addresses saying:

Let the MDC side with the Europeans and the British, but we will conquer them together. I am firmly asserting to you that there will never come a day when the MDC will rule this country. Never, ever¹³⁷.

Mugabe's utterance is often compared with Ian Smith's "The Africans will never rule this country. Not in a thousand years. Never, ever."¹³⁸ This comparison is always viewed in bad taste taking into account that one day Mugabe shall leave office and if the electoral field is level, the MDC will certainly rule the country.

¹³⁵ Media Under Siege, MMPZ, p.128

¹³⁶ *ibid*, p.129

¹³⁷ Dieter, B. Scholz, 2004 "Robert Mugabe: revolutionary or rebel?" in Harold-Barry, D. (ed.) (2004). *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future: Harare: Weaver Press.* p.29

¹³⁸ *Ibid*. Ian Smith is the former prime Minister of Rhodesia. In 1965 he declared what became infamously known as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

In Matebeleland Mugabe's campaign rhetoric centred on the Unity Accord that the late Dr Joshua Nkomo and he signed in 1987 which brought the major antagonistic parties under the umbrella ZANU (PF). He reiterated the importance of unity in nation building by proclaiming:

Unity, unity and more unity. That's the way we build the party and nation. That's the way we have known each other and that's the way it would be. We will all say Zimbabwe first. We say *sisonke*. (We are together)¹³⁹.

He reminded people in Matebeland that Dr Joshua Nkomo stood for unity and the sovereignty of the country. The people were therefore to vote for ZANU (PF) for it was championing the principles of Dr Nkomo and other fallen heroes.

Mugabe took a swipe at the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, Pius Ncube for allegedly "frustrating Government efforts to upgrade Lupane Mission Hospital"¹⁴⁰. Archbishop Ncube, who recently won the 2005 Buns Humanitarian Award¹⁴¹, Scotland's equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize, has consistently criticized Mugabe's policies and squarely blamed him for the suffering that Zimbabweans are experiencing.

Mugabe threatened to ban the ZCTU alleging that it had failed to champion the cause of the workers by aligning itself with the MDC. He promised workers that the government would assist them to take over the companies that had closed down due to what he termed sabotage. In reality most of the companies were closing due to viability problems in a hyper-inflation environment. He threatened all whites who did not support him by declaring that

¹³⁹ The Herald, 21.02.02

¹⁴⁰ The Herald 22.02.02

¹⁴¹ The Zimbabwean, 20-26 May 2005

“his government would expel all whites whose conduct reflected a reluctance to live under black rule after March [2002)”¹⁴² and urged “farm workers to report any farmer who mistreated them or whose behaviour belittled his administration.”¹⁴³ This was meant to instil fear and a sense of insecurity in the white people and to appeal to the farm workers’ vote.

On the question of violence during the campaign, Mugabe insisted that the MDC was responsible for the unrest. Carefully choosing his words, Mugabe told his supporters at a rally:

We don't condone violence, but I'm not saying you should fold your hands if you are provoked. We want peaceful elections, but...you cannot be attacked in your own homes... You must defend yourselves and your families, but we should not go around assaulting people.”¹⁴⁴

Reading between the lines, we can see that Mugabe did not completely condemn violence. In fact it has been concluded that his party sponsored violence and this can be supported by the amount of violent rhetoric that characterized the ZANU (PF) Congress held in Victoria Falls in December 2001. Elliot Manyika, the national political commissar was quoted by *The Sunday Mail* saying: “Our machinery is sharp. MDC, here we come. We are going to crush you,”¹⁴⁵ and Mugabe did not mince his words, describing the 2002 campaign as war:”*Hazvisiri zvekutamba izvi. Yava nguva yehondo*”¹⁴⁶ (There is no kidding now. It’s time for war). Such kind of language, used in some metaphorical sense,

¹⁴² Financial Gazettee, 21.02.02. Still on the question of violence, G. Feltoe (2004:198) quotes Mugabe saying: “There have been very few cases of violence, but if the [white] farmers start to be angry and start to be violent, the of course they will get that medicine delivered to them. And it will be very, very, very severe.’

¹⁴³ *ibid*

¹⁴⁴ The Herald, 18.02.02

¹⁴⁵ MMPZ, Media Under Siege, p.122

¹⁴⁶ *ibid*

was dangerous as party supporters later took it literally and went about assaulting and even killing supporters and sympathizers of the opposition MDC. The war rhetoric that Mugabe used was reckless as Zimbabwe was not in a war situation. Neither was the country in a state of emergency. The war rhetoric fanned violence that was perpetrated by Mugabe's supporters. The perpetrators of this orgy of violence saw nothing wrong in intimidating and even killing the supporters and sympathizers of the MDC since Mugabe had declared war against those who opposed him and his party. On the same issue Feltoe (2001:82) notes:

ZANU (PF) has used massive intimidation all around to try to force people to vote for President Mugabe. People have been rounded up and forced to attend indoctrination sessions at which suspected MDC members are denounced and beaten.

5.3 Overall Appraisal

This chapter has shown that Mugabe set the tone for his election campaign by attacking the MDC, Britain and minority white people in the country. Mugabe's rhetoric presented the MDC leader, his main rivalry in the election, as having no agenda of his own but of furthering Tony Blair's agenda of reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. Mugabe made it abundantly clear in his speeches that the country was in a state of war with the British over the land issue and vowed that he would continue giving back the land to its rightful owners. It can be said that Mugabe's land rhetoric had a lot of impact on the voters as he used land issue shrewdly in an emotive way. To the land hungry black voters, Mugabe was their Black Moses as he said everyone who wanted land was going to get it. People never questioned the feasibility of this mammoth task as they saw

other people invading white commercial farms at will without being stopped by government. The violence rhetoric that came from ZANU (PF) party leaders incited more violence as people, mostly ZANU (PF) supporters, took the law into their hands. The white farmers were threatened with expulsion as they opposed the land reform programme, calling it the “land grab” programme.

We see Mugabe entering the campaign with the anti-British card which he plays tactfully by painting a picture in the minds of the voters that Britain wanted to take back the country through the MDC leader, Tsvangirai. With the memories of the suffering experienced by the people during the years of the liberation struggle being fresh, especially in the minds of the elderly in the rural areas where the war was largely fought, Mugabe’s war rhetoric fell on fertile ears.

CHAPTER 6
ELECTION RESULTS: TRIUMPH OVER IMPERIALISM OR
DAYLIGHT ROBBERY?

6.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the voting days and the announcement of election results. It also briefly analyses Tsvangirai's rejection of the results and Mugabe's speech on the occasion of his inauguration as the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The inauguration speech is the only major speech Mugabe gave after the announcement of the results of the election. It is important to note that while ZANU (PF) and its supporters hailed the results of the election as a triumph over imperialism, the MDC leader described them as daylight robbery.

6.2 Voting days

March 9 and 10 were the initial voting days but the period was extended by one day due to hundreds of thousands of voters who had not cast their vote by 7 p.m. on the last day of voting. Even with the extension of the voting period to 11 March, hundreds of thousands of voters were disenfranchised in most urban areas, the strongholds of the MDC. The hullabaloo associated with the election campaign seemingly came to an end during the voting days. It was relatively peaceful without major reports of violence as had been the order of the day during the campaign period.

The extension of the voting period to the afternoon of 11 March came as a result of what has been described as a strategy that ZANU (PF) used to rig this election. There were fewer polling stations in urban areas, the strongholds of the MDC whereas there were more stations in the rural areas, the strongholds of ZANU (PF). In Harare for instance there was tripartite voting, voting for the president, the mayor and councillors. This meant the voter spent more time in the booth. Voters had also to vote in their constituencies and these had been changed during delimitation and most voters had no knowledge of this.

The end result was that hundreds of thousands urban dwellers people were not able to cast their vote in this crucial election. I was only able to vote after queuing for ten painful hours while it took me about ten minutes to vote in the 2005 parliamentary elections, just about the same time I spent in the 2000 election. Some people I interviewed in Harare took between two and three days to cast their precious votes while others completely failed to do so. Voting days were characterized by anger and frustration among the voters in urban areas as it became clearer and clearer that the voting process had been designed to deny them their right to vote for the president of their choice.

6.3 Announcement of Results

The announcement of results was done constituency by constituency. In a lead story *Mugabe leads in poll*, *The Herald* (11.04.02) said of the 5.6 million voters, 3.4 million were rural voters while 2.2 million were urban voters. The paper's prediction of the poll results was:

Zanu (PF) has more support in the rural areas while the MDC has its stronghold in urban areas and going by the figures released yesterday, indications are that the ruling party will retain the presidency.¹⁴⁷

The final results confirmed the above prediction. Mugabe got 1 685 212 votes (56.2%) while Tsvangirai had 1 262 401 votes (42%). Therefore Mugabe had won another sixth year term as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. The immediate reaction was that ZANU (PF) readily accepted the results describing Mugabe's win as a triumph over imperialism. The ZANU (PF) Information and Publicity Secretary, Dr Nathan Shamuyarira commented:

The results of the Zimbabwe presidential election that have been announced are a personal triumph and a historic victory for the President and first secretary of ZANU (PF) and for the nation as a whole¹⁴⁸.

On the other hand, the MDC rejected the results saying the election had not been free and fair, and therefore did not reflect the will of the people of Zimbabwe. This view was supported by a number of independent observers including the Commonwealth Observer Group which concluded that "...the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for an expression of the will by the elector"¹⁴⁹, adding that "the violence and intimidation created a climate of fear and suspicion"¹⁵⁰.

6.4 Election results "daylight robbery" -Tsvangirai

¹⁴⁷ The Herald, 11.03.02

¹⁴⁸ People have triumphed over imperialism, The Herald, March 14, 2002

¹⁴⁹ Commonwealth, UN blast as not free and fair, The Daily News, 15 March 2002

¹⁵⁰ *ibid*

Tsvangirai rejected the outcome of the 2002 polls immediately after the results were announced. At a news conference Tsvangirai, in a brooding mood, declared that:

[t]he MDC is firmly of the view that the results for the Zimbabwe presidential election results ... do not reflect the true will of the people of Zimbabwe and are consequently illegitimate in the eyes of the people. We therefore do not accept them.¹⁵¹

Tsvangirai condemned the whole electoral process saying: “We foresaw electoral fraud but not daylight robbery because that is what it is.”¹⁵² In this statement, Tsvangirai used what in rhetoric is referred to as *kairos*, the “art of using the right word [or words] at the right time” (Mral 2005). In other words Tsvangirai’s argument was that the election had been “stolen” by ZANU (PF). The MDC leader further argued that the election result was a political issue and not a legal issue. This had come after realizing that continuing going to court would actually give Mugabe legitimacy. But it was surprising to see Tsvangirai going to court to challenge Mugabe’s election victory. Henceforth, Tsvangirai’s rhetoric attacked Mugabe as an illegitimate President.

Tsvangirai’s statements reflect bitterness expected of a defeated person particularly where one was confident of victory. The use of “robbery” and “the biggest electoral fraud in history” suggest criminal offences probably requiring legal recourse. He described Mugabe as a thief, a robber of votes, of democracy. Thieves and robbers should eventually meet their fate which is conviction and sentencing. This shows that even in defeat, Tsvangirai was still hopeful and suggesting that change would come and that Mugabe will one day leave office.

¹⁵¹ Tsvangirai rejects Mugabe victory: Financial Gazette,

¹⁵² Electoral results illegitimate, The Herald, March 14, 2002

The hope and defiance is amply demonstrated in Tsvangirai's speech, delivered some two weeks after the elections results were officially published, where he still held hope for change. Tsvangirai said before the polls were held he was concerned "that if the elections were not handled properly, there would be a serious fall-out in the country and throughout southern Africa". The tone of a "wounded lion" is clear in the following paragraph:

Despite the shadows of war and terrorism, I called for a fair and free election. Zimbabwe's people did not get one. Instead they got terrorism...ZANU (PF)'s terrorism was conducted by rogue elements among the veterans of Zimbabwe's war of independence two decades ago as well as by government militiamen and youths, all of whom were actively aided by the police.¹⁵³

While the term "terrorism" simply refers to the systematic use of violence and intimidation to achieve some goal, to the layperson it sounds quite strong and synonymous with international terrorists of the likes of Osama bin Laden. Tsvangirai made effective use of the term to paint Mugabe and his supporters as responsible for the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe, especially those who held different views from the ruling party's. After the images of the September 11, 2001 in the US, no peace loving Zimbabweans would think twice about having a terrorist for a head of state. Tsvangirai also talked about war, yet Zimbabwe was not in a state of war. The term political violence could have been used to describe the situation that prevailed in Zimbabwe at that time.

Tsvangirai went on to vindicate his party's position that the presidential election was not free and fair by saying:

This intimidation and violence meant that my party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), could not reach the electorate in

¹⁵³ Project Syndicate, March 2002 < <http://100megsfree4.com/zimcountdown/morgan.html>

large parts of the countryside. In addition, the government of President Mugabe effectively disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of urban voters, particularly in the capital Harare and in the city of Chitungwiza. Because of an inadequate number of polling stations, I believe that in Harare and Chitungwiza alone more than 360,000 people stood in a queue to vote but never got the opportunity to cast their ballot.¹⁵⁴

In the paragraph above, Tsvangirai was trying to explain to his supporters and sympathisers why he failed to make it. He did not say how he reached the estimate of 360,000 people denied the chance to vote in Harare and Chitungwiza, but the figure is quite close to 400,000, the number of votes by which he lost to Mugabe in the election. Here he was still stressing that change was possible and was quite near. What this did to the electorate was to boost their determination that one day change would be achieved; the impression was that change was not too far after all. But his analysis of the alleged vote rigging painted a gloomy picture of the way the presidential campaign and election were conducted. This is clear in the following paragraph:

My concerns about the legitimacy of the election results are further raised by interference by Mugabe's militia, whose members prevented the MDC from posting polling agents in 52 polling stations. By the end of the voting, the MDC had no observers at six out of 10 rural stations. This effectively meant that Mugabe's supporters could have their way at these stations. We are compiling a comprehensive list of the polling stations where ZANU-PF supporters had solitary control. In our investigations so far, a pattern has emerged even at this stage – these polling stations recorded the highest numbers of voters for Mugabe.¹⁵⁵

Tsvangirai supported his allegations of vote robbery and persuaded his supporters and sympathizers to believe that had the voting field been plain, they would have easily won the election. He therefore reasons that

¹⁵⁴ *ibid*

¹⁵⁵ Project Syndicate, March 2002 < <http://100megsfree4.com/zimcountdown/morgan.html>

[i]n light of all the evidence, I cannot accept the presidential election results in which Mugabe, the sitting president, was declared a winner this month with 56 percent of the three million votes tallied. The official results do not reflect the true will of the people of Zimbabwe and are illegitimate in the eyes of the people. Zimbabwe's people have been cheated of their right to freely and democratically elect a president of their choice...I am saddened because Mugabe's regime remains intent on defying the people's will.¹⁵⁶

Stressing to people that they had been “cheated of their right” strengthened their resolve to seek change. So Tsvangirai rejected the poll results telling the electorate to wake up and realize that the leader in power was not legitimate. This created mistrust between the elected president and the people. We see Tsvangirai centring on the question of illegitimacy of Mugabe's presidency.

Tsvangirai then went onto an image seeking campaign, portraying himself as the “loyal servant” who was being victimized through arrests on treason allegations and who may even face death. By feeling pity for himself that he might be killed for seeking democratic change, Tsvangirai presented himself as a Martyr. To buttress the concept of martyrdom, he urged his supporters to keep up the spirit of fighting for change should he become a sacrificial victim. He declared that change was inevitable. The passage below shows that Tsvangirai used *pathos* mainly in order to draw sympathy from the electorate and also from the international community:

Whatever may happen, I as the people's loyal servant, am with them all the way. The government may want to arrest me. Indeed I was arrested for treason even before elections. At worst they may even wish to kill me. But the government will never destroy the spirit of the people to reclaim their rights and power. The power to

¹⁵⁶ *ibid*

achieve democratic change is in our hands. We may fear in the days ahead, but we must never let despair overwhelm us. The tide of political change is irreversible but we must be prepared to pay a high price for our freedom.¹⁵⁷

He reiterated the sense of martyrdom but changed the strategy to give prominence to the electorate, referred to as “heroes” in the next part of his address. In the pragmatics principle of politeness, when one plays down his role and gives prominence to the other, it is termed minimizing praise of self and maximizing praise of others. Doing so has the rhetorical impact of winning the hearts of the other who feels honoured enough by the speaker. Tsvangirai, consciously or unconsciously, used the rhetorical strategy of *delectare*, that is, “capturing the public’s attention by pleasing them and building a rapport” (Mral 2005) between them and him.

In this section of Tsvangirai’s address he called himself “the messenger” so as to appeal to the sympathy of both “Mugabe and his cronies”, the electorate and the international community. The message to the Government seems to be “I am only a messenger, don’t do me any harm” and to the electorate and the international community, it appears to be “Please do something to protect the people’s innocent messenger.” Having briefly referred to himself, he went on to extol the virtues of the “heroes who waited hours and hours to vote, heroes who refused to be turned away”¹⁵⁸ during the flawed election. He said these were the voiceless ordinary Zimbabweans whose voices must have been heard. They had together with him travelled an arduous road to try and achieve democratic change in the country.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*

¹⁵⁸ Project Syndicate, March 2002 < <http://100megsfree4.com/zimcountdown/morgan.html>

Tsvangirai also referred to the enthusiasm of his supporters despite their suffering by saying “[r]arely in the history of mankind have a people faced such brutality while retaining such gracious exuberance”¹⁵⁹. He said he was confident that no matter what happened to him, the people would carry on the struggle for democratic change until it was victorious. Tsvangirai seemed not to be deterred by the loss, but tried to encourage his supporters and sympathizers to soldier on as democratic change was inevitable. In his mind he had no doubt that

[t]he people of Zimbabwe want constitutional change, legal change, legitimate change, and they are going to obtain it in spite of all these obstacles.¹⁶⁰

As if to find solace for his loss, Tsvangirai referred to the misconduct of elections in many African states where there have been gross irregularities, fraud and cheating. He bemoaned the lack of transparency and sincerity in the manner in which elections were conducted and vowed that “Zimbabwe’s struggle is not over. My people are in their hour of greatest need. I pledge not to abandon them.”¹⁶¹

Here, Tsvangirai tried to draw consolation from the fact that electoral fraud was not only typical of Zimbabwe, but is commonplace in Africa. Despite the trend, Tsvangirai was saying the struggle continues. He wound up his speech with a promise not to abandon his people.

He built his image around issues claiming such virtues about himself as trustworthy and being available for the struggle to unseat Mugabe and his government.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid*

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

¹⁶¹ *ibid*

Tsvangirai was persuading the electorate to try him for change by intensifying the threats that Mugabe and his party posed to the people through name-calling such as terrorists and electoral fraudsters. He then tried to create a bond with the threatened electorate by pledging his loyalty and emphasizing to the voters that change was in their hands and that he was their messenger and was prepared to be their Martyr. Throughout the speech, Tsvangirai was pinning on the *pathos* of his immediate supporters and the outside world. He presents himself as the sacrificial lamb, ready to die for the people but at the same time the undertone of appealing to the people's sympathy for him could be detected.

6.5 Elections a triumph over imperialism: Mugabe

On 17 March 2002 Mugabe was sworn in as President at State House. In his speech he touched on a wide range of issues. After saluting his guests by calling out their designations in paragraph 1, in paragraph 2 Mugabe said that the nation and he were in a moment and mood of pride and joy respectively because the nation had produced this day by voting him into power. Mugabe said that the national joy and personal pride were "tempered with a sense of humility." He also thanked those people who voted for him and those who voted for Tsvangirai, saying, "both dimensions [lent] their weight to a true democratic process" (paragraph 2). The phrase "democratic process" was used three times, "democratic practice" once and "democratic society" also once. There was a deliberate choice of these phrases in order to give credit to the election that was heavily criticized as being flawed and the whole electoral process undemocratic.

By thanking both groups of voters, those who voted for him and those who voted for his opponent, the speaker was attempting to tone down his vicious rhetoric against the opposition leader and his supporters, the people he had castigated in the election campaign for allegedly furthering imperialism. It is therefore ironical that in paragraph 3 Mugabe embraced all Zimbabweans, regardless of their political affiliations by saying, “Well done Zimbabweans! *Makorokoto!*¹⁶² *Amhlope!*¹⁶³ We have done a blow to imperialism!” He sounded reconciliatory. To him and his party, the election victory was a triumph over imperialism. In the next paragraph (4), he attempted to play down his victory by saying both the ruling party and the opposition “have ... something to rejoice about as well as something to mourn about.” The ruling party was celebrating winning the presidential election but it was mourning losing the mayoral and council elections in Harare. Similarly, the opposition had won the mayoral and council elections in Harare and lost the presidential election.

Mugabe begged for unity by reminding his audience of the National Anthem and the “multi-coloured flag”. These are the two symbols of nationhood and by referring to them at this moment in his speech, he seemed to be saying his new government accepted every Zimbabwean, regardless of their colour, creed or political affiliations.

He further reasoned that “our energies and capabilities are surely better spent on constructive people-oriented tasks and programmes rather than plotting the downfall of each other.” However, the harassment of the officials of the MDC

¹⁶² Shona word for “Congratulations!”

¹⁶³ Ndebele word for “Congratulations!”

that followed after Mugabe inauguration proved that he was not sincere talking about love, national unity and the spirit of brotherhood. This speech can be described as a public relations exercise in front of national and international guests. Still, talking about “excitement”, “jubilation” and “exhilaration” gave the impression that the election results were accepted by all and sundry, which was not the case.

In paragraph 6 Mugabe said the land reform programme was to “proceed with great speed and strength.” This must be viewed as a promise of reward to the people who had supported him and voted for him in the election. He also talked about the need to address problems in the manufacturing, mining and infrastructure sectors, adding that all the details of the strategies for economic growth were contained in the Millennium Economic Recovery programme. The much talked about economic programme has completely failed to deliver, leaving commentators concluding that it was mere rhetoric. Towards the end of the speech Mugabe said the reason for “Zimbabwe or Mugabe-bashing” by Britain and its allies was “our land reform initiative and its impact on the affairs of the white community” (paragraph 13).

He also emphasized that his winning the election was a triumph over imperialism as he alleged that “Britain and its white allies have blatantly sought to ensure that this last presidential election be won by their protégé and not by me and ZANU (PF)” (paragraph 14). He therefore paid tribute to the people of Zimbabwe for saying loudly “No! No! Never! Never again shall Zimbabwe be a colony. I thank them (voters) for their resolute anti-imperialist stand!” (paragraph

14). The speaker also thanked African and non African countries for their support and solidarity and appealed to “their support in the future as imperialist manoeuvres against Zimbabwe persist.” It is my argument that Mugabe attempted to use this speech as a redemption tool in the presence of his fellow countrymen and international guests after an election that he knew was strongly criticized as not being free and fair.

6.6 Overall Appraisal

Tsvangirai’s refusal speech seems to contain credible reasons why he described the outcome of the presidential results as daylight robbery and illegitimate. He acquitted himself honourably in attempting to convince his supporters and sympathizers that the election was not free and fair. For sure there had been many serious irregularities in the whole electoral process, irregularities that favoured the incumbency. In this regard the leader of the Commonwealth Observer Group, former Nigerian military leader, General Abdulsalam Abubakar noted that:

It is our view that the ruling party used its incumbency to exploit State resources for the benefit of its electoral campaign. This was compounded by the government’s near monopoly of the broadcast media.”¹⁶⁴

The rhetoric in Tsvangirai’s speech solicited for sympathy from the people of Zimbabwe and the international community. Indirectly, Tsvangirai’s rhetoric appealed for action to be taken on Mugabe whom he said had been illegitimately declared the victor of the presidential election. The arguments provided in this

¹⁶⁴ Commonwealth, UN blast election as not free and fair, The Daily News March 15, 2002.

study do to large extent support Tsvangirai's stance that the results of the election were illegitimate.

On the other hand, Mugabe hailed the election results as a victory over imperialism. His argument was that Britain and its allies had wanted their puppet, Tsvangirai, to win the election so that their interests, especially the land, would be safeguarded. Like in almost all of his campaign speeches, he strongly made it clear that it was his land reform programme that had caused the standoff between Zimbabwe and Britain and its allies.

In answering the question which is the heading of this chapter, from a rhetorical point of view, the 2002 presidential election was not free and fair. We cannot talk of a democratic process having taken place in a campaign period in which there was no freedom of expression in the opposition camp. We cannot talk of a democratic process in an environment where there was a general breakdown of the rule of law and a repression of dissenting voices.

CHAPTER 7

SYNOPSIS OF DISCUSSIONS

This study sets out to analyse the rhetorical strategies that Mugabe and Tsvangirai and their parties used to persuade the voters to vote for them in the fiercely contested 2002 presidential election. The running hypothesis has been: “... the business of politics is to convince others, and to this end rhetoric is called.”¹⁶⁵

The two candidates entered the race knowing that it was a do-or-die election considering that ZANU (PF) and the MDC had almost come out neck and neck in the 2000 parliamentary election, despite the allegations of massive rigging by the government. Worse still for Mugabe, he had suffered a stunning defeat when the government sponsored referendum on the change of the constitution had lost before the 2000 election in February the same year. Since every signpost indicated a clean win for Tsvangirai in the presidential election, it was imperative for Mugabe and his party to mount the strongest and dirtiest campaign ever to stop the winds of change in order for Mugabe to retain the presidency. Similarly, Tsvangirai and the MDC needed to vigorously campaign in order to maintain the successes they had scored and to keep the spirit of change burning in the hearts of the voters until they completed the change by winning the presidency. Thus the election campaign period was dramaturgical with Mugabe and Tsvangirai as the

¹⁶⁵Philippe-Joseph Salazar, The Joint Sitting of Parliament, 15 April 2003. A Rhetorical View of the Reparations Debate in E . Doxtader.and C.Vicencio. (eds.) (2004) *To Repair the Irreparable: Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa*, p.45

main characters and the voters as the audience who had to be persuaded to support either of the two actors.

Consistently throughout his campaign, Mugabe attacked Tsvangirai as a puppet of Britain and its allies. Having embarked on a chaotic land reform programme that benefited the black voters, Mugabe's campaign rhetoric had impact on the people, as the programme was practical. The land reform programme was not "mere rhetoric or empty content" (Mral 2005), but a reality to the people, a dream come true to the land hungry black people. So when Mugabe told people that Tsvangirai wanted to return the land back to the white farmers after winning the election, this had a negative impact on Tsvangirai's image as a suitable presidential candidate. Tsvangirai was presented as a presidential candidate who wanted to further the interests of the minority white people in Zimbabwe, a leader who did not care about his fellow black people who had been oppressed by the same white people before independence. The fact that the white people in Zimbabwe openly supported Tsvangirai and the MDC gave credit to Mugabe's thesis that Tsvangirai was a puppet of Britain and the whites in Zimbabwe.

Tsvangirai was therefore branded a sell-out, a "Judas Iscariot", who even had plotted to assassinate Mugabe before the presidential election. He was presented as a murderer and the MDC as a terrorist organization. The documentary "Killing Mugabe-The Tsvangirai Conspiracy" was used by Mugabe's propaganda machinery to prove to the electorate that Tsvangirai was a terrorist. Mugabe advanced the terrorism theory in his funeral speech at the burial

of ZANU (PF) war veteran leader Nkala who had been kidnapped from his home and murdered. As it turned out later, the MDC supporters who had been arrested were found to have nothing to do with the murder of Nkala, but the damage had already been done on the reputation of the party. The MDC was directly attacked in Mugabe's rhetoric as a terrorist organization. Mugabe insinuated in his speeches that the people and the country were in danger of the MDC terrorists and that they needed to vote him into power in order not to lose their country.

Mugabe's funeral speeches have been described as funeral diplomacy in which he extolled the values and characters of the dead in order to appeal to the *pathos* of the voters. The rhetoric in these speeches brought back the memories of the suffering of the black people during the colonial regimes. Using collective memory and nostalgia as rhetorical tools, and himself as the chief interpreter of past events, it can reasonably be argued that Mugabe chose those events that gave his party and him a sense of heroism in the liberation struggle. This had the impact of presenting himself and ZANU (PF) in a positive manner to the voters. Mugabe presented himself as the liberator of the country and as the defender of the sovereignty of the country. The maxim "Zimbabwe will never be a colony again" encapsulates Mugabe's sovereignty rhetoric.

He also presented himself throughout his campaign rallies as a champion of the black majority as he had taken the land from the white minority and given it back to its rightful owners. The war veterans of the liberation and the militias were used to bolster Mugabe's land and patriotism rhetoric and in most cases their activities went into excesses.

While it has been generally acknowledged that most of the prime land in Zimbabwe had been in the hands of the minority white people, and that there was definitely need to redress the situation in favour of the black majority, the methods used by Mugabe's government in doing so have been heavily criticized. But Mugabe maintained that he was at war with Britain which he accused of sponsoring the MDC to effect a regime change in Zimbabwe. War has far reaching consequences and mentioning that the country was at war again gave the nation a sense of insecurity. People look to strong leaders who make decisive decisions in times of war. Voters might have been influenced by the war rhetoric to vote for Mugabe thinking that voting him into power would prevent Britain from taking over the country through Tsvangirai. Many people who were interviewed in my rural home area said they actually voted for Mugabe because they did not want Britain to recolonise them. This is why Mugabe described his winning the election as a triumph over imperialism. Mugabe so eloquently enunciated his recurring rhetorical themes of land reform, neo-colonialism and war against Britain and terrorism that most people, especially in the rural areas, believed that surely he was the only one who could defend them from impending danger. Talking about war, the horrors of the war of liberation were still fresh in the minds of the voters, especially the elderly ones. Instinctively, and quite reasonably so, they would not want a repeat of war like the one that had ravaged them and the country in the mid to late 1970s.

Tsvangirai and the MDC's campaign rhetoric centred on Mugabe's age, political violence, the land issue, the mismanagement of the economy, corruption,

inflation and the general suffering of the voters. The MDC's campaign adverts appealed to the voters to vote for new ideas instead of old thinking, arguing that voting for someone who was 78 years old was unwise. Tsvangirai said the country was in mess because of Mugabe. Mugabe's government had crippled the economy and the country had been isolated internationally because of Mugabe's bad policies. He accused Mugabe and his government of the high levels of unemployment.

He also attacked Mugabe and ZANU (PF) for unleashing the militias on the people. The politically motivated violence had left more than 100 of the MDC supporters dead, killed in cold blood by ZANU (PF) supporters. The situation was so bad that Tsvangirai could not hold campaign rallies in areas that had been declared no-go areas by ZANU (PF) militias and supporters who went about beating and torturing supporters of the MDC.

On the land question Tsvangirai said he was never against people being given the land, but said this had to be done according to the law and in an orderly fashion so as not to cripple production. He was against the idea of people taking the law into their hands and just "sprout everywhere like mushrooms". Tsvangirai's argument was that the way Mugabe had handled the land reform programme was wrong as it assumed that everyone was a good farmer. His fears have been proven true in recent years as production from the farms that were given to the so-called new farmers has failed to meet the demands of the nation. Most of these 'farmers' have neither the means nor the equipment to use in making those farms productive. As I write this thesis tracts of lands that used to

be green with summer and winter crops are lying ideal because the white farmers who used to use the land productively were chased from those farms. However, the MDC did not seem to have a clear land reform policy that would be as attractive to the people as the ZANU (PF)'s. Tsvangirai was often at task to clearly state his party's land policy amidst reports that one of his officials appeared on BBC saying if the MDC won the election, the land that had been taken from the white people would be given back to them. It has been amply demonstrated in this study that Tsvangirai's recurring theme throughout the election campaign was to bring change in every sphere of life if elected to the presidency.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the political discourse in the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe has shown that rhetoric was an indispensable tool that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai used in order to persuade the electorate to vote for them. The importance that both candidates and their parties placed on this election resulted in the serious polarisation of the electorate on party lines. The linguistic attires the presidential candidates dressed themselves in were meant to convince the voters about their suitability for their candidatures to the presidency.

Mugabe's campaign rhetoric focused on attacking Tsvangirai as a puppet of Britain, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair for what Mugabe called meddling in the political affairs of his country and the white minority in Zimbabwe for openly supporting the MDC. At one point at a summit in South Africa, Mugabe told Blair in the face he should keep his Britain while he kept his Zimbabwe.

Mugabe's propaganda machinery painted a picture that the MDC was a terrorist organisation bent on destabilising the country. It has also been shown that Mugabe's rhetoric painted a picture that he was at war with Britain over the land controversial reform programme. The land rhetoric appealed to the landless black people who saw a chance of empowering themselves by supporting Mugabe and get a piece of land free of charge. By saying that he was at war with Britain and by branding Tsvangirai as a murderer in his rhetoric Mugabe aimed to instil fear and confusion in the voters and to portray himself as the only leader who would

defend them and the country. His emotive appeal for patriotism and the safeguarding of the country's sovereignty made him a hero. Mugabe bolstered this by recounting the role liberation war heroes had played in the liberation struggle. The war rhetoric therefore appealed to the rural people and Mugabe appeared the leader who could deliver them from such a situation, just as he had done in 1980. In short, Mugabe's rhetoric presented Tsvangirai as a villain to the electorate. In contrast Mugabe presented himself as a hero of the people and a defender of their rights, especially their right to land, their "birthright".

On the other hand, Tsvangirai rode on the wave of the need for change and democracy in his campaign. People needed a change of government generally after having been disappointed by ZANU (PF) government for 22 years. The people had partially "tasted" the change in the referendum and the parliamentary elections of 2000. Tsvangirai attacked Mugabe's policies and held him and his government responsible for the suffering the people were experiencing. His rhetoric of change of government through the ballot box was so persuasive that, had there been fair play, Tsvangirai could have won the presidential election by a wide margin. It is generally believed Tsvangirai won the election, but the electoral process was heavily manipulated to give advantage to Mugabe. This thesis is supported by the fact that hundreds of thousands of voters were disenfranchised in major towns and cities, the strongholds of MDC by reducing the number of polling stations in these areas and increasing polling stations in the rural areas where ZANU (PF) has its strongest following. Also Tsvangirai and his party

officials could not campaign in the rural areas and other towns because of ZANU (PF) militants who declared the areas no-go areas for the MDC.

This study concludes that the conditions for a free and fair electioneering were non-existent; hence the election itself was not free and fair. The violent campaign against supporters and officials of the MDC during the campaign period is another factor that makes this study conclude that the electoral process was in favour of the incumbent President. Voters were therefore not free to express their electoral choices for fear of victimization by the ruling party which had all the state machinery at its disposal. Tsvangirai's public sphere and that of his officials and supporters kept on shrinking as the ruling party used state apparatus to curtail the free expression of opinions as far as the election was concerned. Mugabe's use of rhetorical dictatorship impinged on the individual rights of assembly and freedom of speech of the supporters and would-be supporters of the MDC. Mugabe's rhetoric fanned intolerance and coercion. On the contrary Tsvangirai's rhetoric espoused pluralism and with it democracy, freedom of expression, respect for human rights, social justice, sound economic policies, peace and equality for all Zimbabweans. It can also be concluded that Mugabe's rhetoric largely echoed the old politics of the war of liberation while Tsvangirai's rhetoric epitomised the new politics of democracy and civil rights.

CHAPTER 9

POSTSCRIPT

Three elections have been held in Zimbabwe over a period of five years and these elections have had their controversies. If one was writing a movie script on these elections, one might have simply used these titles: Election Zimbabwe 2000: Part 1, Election Zimbabwe 2002: Part 2 and Election Zimbabwe 2005: Part 3. The scriptwriter would be justified to add either the word ‘circus’ or ‘farce’ in the titles as they elections were a mockery of the principles and practice of democracy.

Although the aim of this study was to concentrate only on the rhetoric of the 2002 presidential election campaign, it necessary to make brief remarks on the rhetoric of the 2005 parliamentary election campaign in Zimbabwe. The rhetoric that ZANU (PF) and the MDC used throughout the campaign period was characteristic of that of the 2002 presidential election campaign. ZANU (PF) dubbed the 2005 parliamentary election an “Anti-Blair Election” while the MDC still had hope of changing the government with “A New Zimbabwe - A New Beginning ” campaign theme. It was not surprising therefore that both ZANU (PF) and the MDC were revitalizing and invigorating their campaign themes of 2002, with some adjustments here and there of course. While ZANU (PF) rhetoric emphasized the alleged political interference from Britain and the United States of America in Zimbabwe’s politics and the ‘success’ of the land reform programme, the MDC’s rallying call was still on change and good governance, with specific policies and issues as discussed in previous chapters.

The rhetorical situation of the 2005 parliamentary election was slightly different from that of the 2002 presidential election as it allowed the opposition MDC some reasonable public sphere. This was because the Zimbabwean government was forced to abide by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. Unlike in the previous elections, for example, the MDC got access to the state-controlled media although its leaders complained that this was not adequate, an observation made in the preliminary statement of the SADC Observer Mission (SOEM) led by South Africa's Deputy President (then an MP), Phumuzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. It can be said that the government allowed cosmetic changes so that it would appear as if it was complying with the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Democratic Elections.

In addition to the "Anti-Blair Election" rhetoric, ZANU (PF) introduced another issue that was very appealing to women voters – that of introducing a woman Vice President in the name of former liberation struggle fighter, Joyce Teurai Ropa Mujuru. Mujuru, herself an eloquent speaker, gave ZANU (PF) a refreshing outlook to the voters who had been overdosed with the ideas of the old guard. Thus gender rhetoric spread throughout the country with some people commenting, *regai vakadzi vambotongawo* (Let women also rule the country). It is not an understatement to say that the elevation of Mujuru to the Presidium in December 2004 earned ZANU (PF) votes in this election. This was despite the divisions Mujuru's appointment caused within ZANU (PF) itself.

Another observation is that although the level of political violence in the 2005 election campaign dropped significantly as compared with the violence in the 2000 and 2002 elections, the electoral process did not guarantee a free and fair election. The implementation of a democratic process was again abortive as there were still many fundamentals of democracy that were not upheld. ZANU (PF) won 78 seats, the MDC 41 seats and one seat went to an independent, Professor Jonathan Moyo who had fallen from grace from ZANU (PF). ZANU (PF) hailed these results, but the MDC cried foul again, pointing out the massive electoral fraud by the government. The MDC and the progressive world accused the government of using food as a political tool, inflating the voters roll, manipulating the actual counting of votes and of not generally complying with the SADC Guidelines. There had also been some gerrymandering of constituencies that had given ZANU (PF) unfair advantage over the MDC.

In conclusion, although the campaign themes of both ZANU (PF) and the MDC of the three elections remained more or less the same in the 2005 election as they were in previous elections, there is need to study the recent campaign in depth. Such a research would concentrate more on gender rhetoric, an element which was not the main focus of this study. There is a lot of interesting material on gender rhetoric in Zimbabwe's political discourse that can be exploited by scholars in rhetoric.

References

- Bennet, W.L. (1993). *Thought and character: The rhetoric of democratic education*. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press.
- Benoit, W. L. and Wells, W.T. (1996) *Candidates in Conflict: Persuasive Attack and Defense in the 1992 Presidential Debates*. Alabama: University of Alabama Press.
- Biocca, F. (1991a). Some limitations of earlier 'symbolic' approaches to political communication. In Frank Biocca, (ed.), *Television and political advertising: Signs, codes and images*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 2, pp. 11-16.
- Biocca, F. (1991b). Viewers' mental models of political messages: Toward a theory of semantic processing of television. In Frank Biocca, (ed.), *Television and political advertising, Psychological processes*. Hillsdale, N.J.:Erlbaum. 1, pp. 27-89.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (2003) *The Interaction between Democracy and Development*. Paris: Unesco.
- Brown, H.A.C. (1983). *Techniques of persuasion. From propaganda to brainwashing*. Harmondworth: Penguin.
- Bryant, D.C. (1972). Rhetoric: Function and its Scope. In D. Ehninger, (ed.), *Contemporary Rhetoric*. Glenview,IL: Scott Foresman. pp. 15-37
- Buchanan, B. (1991). *Electing a president: The Markle Commission research on campaign '88*. Austin: University of Texas Press
- Bucher, N. (2003) "Understanding the Power of Rhetoric: The case of Robert Gabriel Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe". Unpublished Honours Thesis, University of Cape Town.
- Burke, K. (1969). *A rhetoric of motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press
- De Wet, J.C. (1991). *The Art of persuasive communication*. (2nd edition). Cape Town: Juta.
- Diamond, E. and Bates, S. (1984) *The spot: The rise of political advertising on television* (3rd edition). Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Doxtader, E. and Villa-Vicencio, C. (eds.) (2004) *To Repair the Irreparable: Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Edelman, M. (1977). *Political language. Words that succeed and policies that fail*. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Faber, R.J. et al. (1993). Negative political advertising and voting intent: The role of involvement and alternative information sources. *Journal of Advertising* 22(4), pp. 67-76.
- Felton, G. (2004). The onslaught against democracy and rule of law in

- Zimbabwe in 200. In Harold-Barry, D. (ed.) *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future: Harare: Weaver Press*. pp. 193-222.
- Feltoe, G. (2002). An unfair contest: the Presidential elections in Zimbabwe. In *Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin*, Issue No. 6. Harare: CrabApple Productions. pp. 81-94.
- Garramone, G.M. (1986). Candidate image formation: The role of information processing. In Lynda Lee Kaid, Dan Nimmo, and Keith Sanders, (eds.), *New Perspectives on political advertising*. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press. pp. 235-47.
- Garver, E.(1998) *Rhetoric. Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Vol. 8*. London:Routledge
- Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame analysis*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Graber, D. A. (1972). Personal qualities in presidential images: The contribution of the press. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16, pp. 46-76.
- Gronbeck, B.E. (1994). Negative Political Ads and American Self Images. In Arthur H. Miller and Bruce E. Gronbeck, (eds.), *Presidential Campaigns and American Self Images*. Oxford: Westview Press. pp. 60-81.
- Gronbeck, B.E. and Miller, A.H. (1994). The Study of Presidential Campaigning: Yesterday's Campaigns and Today's Issues. In Arthur H. Miller and Bruce E. Gronbeck, (eds.), *Presidential Campaigns and American Self Images*. Oxford: Westview Press. pp. 3-11.
- Hanson, J. (1997) "Sociality in the Rhetorics of Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman: Toward a Convergence of Their Theories". Paper presented at the National Communication Association Conference, Chicago, November 1997.
- Harold-Barry, D. (ed.).(2004). *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Hart, R.P. (2000). *Campaign Talk: Why Elections are good for us*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hill, R.P. (1989). An exploration of voter responses to political advertising. *Journal of Advertising* 18(4), pp. 14-22.
- Hornby, A.S. (1989) *Advanced Learner's Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*. Chicago: University Press of Chicago.
- Jamieson, K.H. (1992). *Dirty politics: Deception, distraction and democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson-Cartee, K. and Copeland, G.A. (1991). *Negative political advertising: Coming of Age*. Hillsdale, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Joslyn, R.A. (1990). Election campaigns as occasions for civic education.

- In David L. Sawnsen and Dan Nimmo, (eds.), *New directions in political communication. A resource book*. Newbury Park: Sage. pp. 86-122.
- Kaid, L.L. and Boydston, J. (1997). An experimental study the effectiveness of negative political advertisements. *Communication Quarterly*, 35, pp. 193-201.
- Leech, G.N. (1993) *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.
- McCombs, M.E. and Shaw, D.L. (1972) The Agenda Setting Function of the Press. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36, pp. 176-87.
- McCombs, M.E. (1994). News influence on our pictures of the world. In J. Byrant and D. Zillman, (eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research*. Hillsdale. N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum. p. 1-16.
- McKelvey, R.D. and Ordeshook, P.C. (1984). Rational expectations in elections. *Public Choice*, 44, pp. 61-102.
- McQuail, D. (1987). *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*. (2nd edition). London: Sage Publications.
- Medhurst, M.J. (1996). *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*. Texas A&M: Texas A & M University Press.
- Meredith, M. (2002). *Robert Mugabe: Power, Plunder and Tyranny in Zimbabwe*. Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers (Pvt) Ltd.
- Merritt, S. (1984). Negative political advertising: Some empirical findings. *Journal of Advertising* 13(3), pp. 27-38.
- Moyo, J. N. (1992) *Voting for Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.
- Mral, B. (2004) "We are a peaceful nation" – War rhetoric after September 11, Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA).
- Mugabe, R.G. (2001) *Inside The Third Chimurenga*. Harare: The Department of Information and Publicity, Office of the President and Cabinet.
- Orwell, G. (1945) *Animal Farm*. London: Penguin Books.
- Osborn, M. (1986) Rhetorical depiction. In H.W. Simmons and A.A. Aghazian (eds.), *Form, genre, and the study of political discourse*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, pp.79-107.
- Parry-Giles, S. J. and Parry-Giles, T. (2000) Collective Memory, Political Nostalgia and the Rhetorical Presidency: Bill Clinton's Commemoration of the March on Washington, August 28, 1998. *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (86)4, pp. 417-437.
- Perelman, C. (1980) *Justice, Law and Argument*. London: D. Riedel Publishing Company.
- Perelman, C. (1963) *The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argumentation*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Pratkanis, A.R. and Aronson, E. (1991). *Age of propaganda: The everyday use and abuse of persuasion*. New York: Freeman.

- Raftopoulos, B. (2004). Current politics in Zimbabwe: confronting the crisis in Harold-Barry, D. (ed.) *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future: Harare: Weaver Press.* pp. 1-18
- Ranger, T. (ed.) (2003) *The Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe: Volume Two.* Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.
- Richardson, G. et al. (1994). Shaping a Candidate's Image in the Press. In Arthur H. Miller and Bruce E. Gronbeck, (eds.), *Presidential Campaigns and American Self Images.* Oxford: Westview Press. pp. 89-108.
- Roberts, M.S. (1995). Political Advertising. In Kathleen E. Kendall, (ed.), *Presidential Campaign Discourse: Strategic Communication Problems.* New York: State University of New York Press. pp. 179-198.
- Roddy, B. and Garramone, G. (1988) Appeals and strategies of negative political advertising. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 32(4), pp. 415-427.
- Salazar, Ph. -J. (2002) *An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa.* Mahwah/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.
- Salazar, Ph.- J. (2004) The Joint Sitting of Parliament, 15 April 2003. A Rhetorical View of the Reparations Debate in E . Doxtader and C. Villa-Vicencio. (eds.) *To Repair the Irreparable: Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa.* Cape Town: David Philip. pp. 44-65
- Shea, D.M. (1996). *Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management.* Westport: Praeger
- Sheckels, T.F. (2002). Narrative Coherence and antecedent Ethos In The Rhetoric Of Attack Advertising: A Case Study Of Glendening VS. Saurerbrey Campaign in *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 5(3), pp. 459-477.
- Schenck-Hamlin, W.J. et al. (2000). The influence of Negative Advertising Frames on Political Cynicism on Political Accountability. *Human Communication Research* (26)1, pp. 53-74.
- Scholz, D.B. (2004) Robert Mugabe: revolutionary or rebel? In Harold-Barry, D. (ed.) *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future: Harare: Weaver Press.* pp. 2-30.
- Smith, C.A. (1995). The Struggle for Interpretive Dominance. In Kathleen E. Kendall, *Presidential Campaign Discourse: Strategic Communication Problems.* New York: State University of New York Press. pp. 293-303.
- Smith, C.A. (1994). The jeremiadic logic of Bill Clinton's policy speeches in Stephen A. Smith, (ed.), *Bill Clinton on stump state and stage: The rhetorical road to the White House.* Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. pp. 73-100.

Moto Magazine
Parade Magazine

Manifestos

MDC Manifesto (1999)

MDC Manifesto (2002)

ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto (2002)

Reports

Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, (2002). *Media under Siege: A report on the media coverage of the 2002 Presidential and Mayoral elections in Zimbabwe*, Harare: MMPZ.

Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, (December 2002). Are they accountable? Examining alleged violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March 2002.

Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, (September 2001). *Enforcing the rule of law in Zimbabwe*.

APPENDIX 1

SPEECH 1: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G.

MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE

BORDER GEZI: NATIONAL HEROES' ACRE – 2 MAY 2001

Vice Presidents Simon V. Muzenda and Joseph Musika
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika;
Speaker of Parliament, Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa;
Acting Chief Judge, Justice Godfery Chidyausiku;
Honourable Ministers;
Honourable Members of Parliament here present;
Our Respectable Chiefs;
Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps;
The Bereaved Gezi Family;
Representatives of the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Movement;
Zanu (PF) Party leadership here present;
Government officials;
Ladies and Gentlemen;
Comrades and Friends.

When after our general election in June last year [2000], I set about composing my Government through ministerial appointments, I did not have to look very far for my new Minister of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation. I very easily settled on a burly and bearded young man from Mashonaland Central, a young man whose drive and commitment I had followed with keen interest as he worked alongside his colleagues in the Province to bring about political vibrancy, unity and national development. He had served as a councillor for Mvurwi where he had come face to face with white racial obduracy, as he tried to embrace rural areas neglected by successive colonial governments in spite of the fact that this is where the majority of the people lived. He had served as Member of Parliament for Centenary, Muzarabani and lately Bindura, and had risen to become the Governor and Resident Minister of Mashonaland Central Province.

At national level in Parliament, he had been appointed Chief Whip and had served on various Standing Committees of the august House. When we embarked on an accelerated land reform programme, he had proved dependable and critical to its implementation. Often, he would get overcome with emotion and castigate Ministers he saw as developing cold feet over the land issue. For him this was a fundamental question which had to be resolved once and for all, in order to give content to our hard-won Independence.

It is with extreme grief and sadness that I rise this dark day to announce that this young man, ever energetic and dynamic cadre, affectionately known as Madzibaba, is no longer with us, having been cut down in a tragic accident last Saturday morning, while on his way to Masvingo on a national assignment. This is a harrowing moment for me personally and for most Zimbabweans who today mourn the loss of one so committed, a true revolutionary, a real man of the people, indeed a genuine hero of our land-based Third Chimurenga.

Cde Border Gezi set out early Saturday morning from Bindura to catch a fixture in Masvingo where he was scheduled to disburse \$1,6m to a number of deserving beneficiaries of the self-help projects in that Province. This would have been another of the numerous trips which in sum, had taken him to every corner of the country; had brought him in close contact with the flotsam and jetsam of our society, and had kindled so much hope and self-belief in hitherto depressed communities as they struggled to overcome unemployment through community-based self-help initiatives. Not surprisingly, Mucheke Hall, his scheduled rendezvous with this stratum of our society, was abuzz with excitement, full of anticipation, knowing that hope was surely coming their way that very morning in the person of their beloved Minister, Cde Border Gezi.

Sadly, as fate would have it, he would not make it to Mucheke. He would not meet, in fact never meet again, at least on this side of earth, with those he hoped to help and who eagerly awaited his arrival. Some of these we have with us here and the grief fills their hearts, overcomes their tongues. They are devastated, and haplessly do no more than watch the coffin encasing Cde Border in permanent stillness. That bundle of energy and dynamism, that booming voice, has now been stilled and silenced by the hand of a cruel, ineluctable fate.

Some 200km along the Harare – Masvingo road, near Mvuma, his vehicle went into that dramatic accident the details of which have been provided by the police. He and his driver were the victims, but fortunately his aide was the survivor.

Why should fate reserve so cruel a destiny for so young and promising a figure? He was only 37, the only surviving child, father of six, and in the tenth month as Minister of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation. He was full of ideas, most of them at various stages of implementation, ideas set to change our countryside, and with it, the lives of many of our rural people currently faced with acute unemployment. All that is now a dream which only partially came true.

We have lost a great life lived simply; a life and figure of vigour and compelling affection. Hailing from a very humble background and averagely educated, he represented a generation of rural youths, born in the early sixties under conditions of settler colonialism; a generation that grew up exposed to a brutal conflict inflicted on the black majority of this country by white settlers. Guruve, where Cde Border Gezi was born the only child survivor in his family, in

many ways typified the objective conditions for communal Africans under settler colonialism. Situated in the Muzarabani area, on the margins of what then was called Rhodesia, Guruve was thought cursed by the gods, given its very harsh climate and a landscape which offered no readily known riches or attractions to settlers. It fell outside the attractive wealthy heartland; outside the settler scheme of things, and only periodically remembered by successive native commissioners on tax collection chores. Occasionally and alongside Binga and Gokwe, it would present itself as dumping ground for Rhodesia's black supernumeraries who would have been forcibly uprooted from heartland areas and displaced to make way for privileged white farmers, many of them veterans of European wars coming here to be pensioned off with our land. Like most marginal areas, Guruve had no real roads, very few poor schools, very few clinics, no safe water points and was yearly afflicted by all sorts of maladies, including malaria, typhoid and dysentery. The African families and their cattle stood between the tsetse fly and European farmer. The sun scorched and the rains were erratic, making harvests both meagre and uncertain. Survival for our people, Cde Gezi's family included, was from hand to mouth.

Ironically, it was in the backwaters like Guruve where nothing was supposed to happen, that the great germ of the struggle for liberation took deep root, sprouted and matured. Their contiguity to independent African states like Mozambique and Zambia, coupled with swelling community bitterness to colonial neglect, made places like Guruve the bedrock of militant politics which were later to transform into armed insurrection against settler colonialism. These marginalized places along our border with Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana gave us the first generation of fighters of the armed liberation struggle, a militant youth movement and loyal peasant families on whose strength, support and commitment settler colonialism would be defeated.

To understand and to pay tribute to the late departed is to recognize the social situation that yielded a personality of his calibre and courage. Cde Gezi emerged from such an environment which threw him into the fray and cauldron of the struggle. By 1977, at the tender age of 13, he was already in struggle distinguishing himself as a loyal and dependable militant, a *mujiba* amongst *mujibas* and *chimbwidos*.

His spiritual calling also prompted him to become a youthful member of the Johanne Masowe Apostolic Sect. Many of his fellow worshippers are with us today to bid him farewell. To them I say: We fail to comprehend the tragedy before us; our eyes are full of tears, our hearts grieve and weigh heavy; we know no sigh, we know no relief. We join you in deep sorrow for you have lost one of your own, one so dear. On our part, we have lost a leader you raised, and so generously gave and offered to us in the political leadership. We readily welcomed him, seeing in his youthful age and tremendous personality enormous energies and qualities to propel our revolution through many years of leadership ahead which his youthful life promised. We certainly hoped to work with him

much longer, and never at any moment were we prepared for the nightmare we endure today. But God's will has had it otherwise.

I have already alluded to the fact that Mashonaland Central was among those of our provinces with very depressed areas. It faced many developmental challenges at Independence, made worse by its leading role in the liberation struggle which left it scarred by the war. When in 1996 I decided to appoint Cde Gezi as Governor and Resident Minister of Mashonaland Central, I looked to a quick turn-around of the development of the Province. I indeed soon felt vindicated for in a matter of months, the wheels of development turned fast, pushed by a united Province now focused on agreed targets of development. This was no mean achievement for a province which only a few years back had been riven by serious dissention as its leadership wrangled. Gezi was a bridge-builder and promoter of unity on the strength of which he mobilized for development.

He used his elevation to the Central Committee at the 1989 People's Congress, his subsequent election to Parliament as MP for Centenary in the 1990 general election, and his elevation to the Provincial Chairman of the Party, to deepen the roots of unity in order to bring about broad based development in the Province. Often, he would cover enormous distances on foot or on bicycle in a bid to serve the people who had elected him. He made sure civil servants he coordinated at the provincial level gave a day's honest work. A new breed of a hardworking and grassroots-based politician had arrived and the politics of the country would never be the same again. He steeped his politics and leadership in self-help projects through community action and empowerment, politics that made membership to the Party synonymous with gainful self-employment and participatory development. Significantly, Cde Gezi has lost his life trying to further such an initiative on a national basis!

Perhaps the one area in which Cde Gezi showed the most courageous leadership was our land reform programme. Often, we were hard put to restrain him in Central Committee meetings as he accused some members of equivocating on agrarian reforms. For instance, he could not understand certain delisting decisions taken by lead ministries in the face of rampant landlessness. White commercial farmers, he would charge, were compromising ministers and civil servants. Indeed, he was the man most appropriate to make such a charge, having himself been unsuccessfully tempted with a tractor by a white commercial farmer who hoped such a "gift" would save his farm.

His wish was to see the land reform programme through the middle of this year. We dare not fail him. Our temporarily resettled people are close to finishing this year's harvest and our machinery should speedily move in to put them on newly opened permanent resettlement areas so that they can start preparations for the next season immediately. Let all those who have taken it upon themselves to oppose our land reform programmes do their worst, led by the Labour Government of Britain. Have no goodwill to expect from them. But let them

please leave us alone! Neither our history nor that of any colonized people provides any salutary lessons from imperialism. We have come this far in our struggle for freedom, independence and sovereignty not by permission or generosity of colonialism, but through agony, blood and sacrifice.

Let those who think a job in the whiteman's factory is worth the price of the landlessness of the vast majority of our people please, think again! Let those who think the British penny is worthier than our sovereignty, think again! This country is not for selling and traitors are bound to fail and perish as the people's will inevitably triumph (sic). Cde Border Gezi knew this perfectly well and, wherever he is, he urges and exhorts us on.

To Cde Gezi I say: You have done your part; you have fought for your struggle; staunchly defending your right and heritage. The people's needs and interests were always uppermost in your mind. May we all take a cue from you.

Rest in perfect peace Comrade, for your cause has not been in vain.

Land to the People!

Power to the People!

Long live free and independent sovereign Zimbabwe!

Aluta Continua.

I thank you.

APPENDIX 2

SPEECH 2: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G.

MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE

MOVEN ENOCK MAHACHI NATIONAL: HEROES' ACRE – 29 MAY

2001

Vice Presidents Simon V. Muzenda and Joseph Msika,
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika
Speaker of Parliament. Cde Emmerson Munangagwa,
Acting Chief Judge, Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku,
Honourable Ministers,
Honourable Members of Parliament here present,
Our respectable Chiefs,
Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
Members of the Mahachi family,
ZANU (PF) Party Leadership here present,
War Veterans,
Government officials, Ladies and friends.

Barely a month after we congregated here to lay to rest Cde Border Gezi, we meet again under similarly sad and heart-rending circumstances to bid farewell to yet another gallant and illustrious son of Zimbabwe, Moven Enock Mahachi. As we all now know, three days ago, Cde Mahachi died on his way to hospital after a road traffic accident in Nyanga. It was at the tender age of 16 that Cde Mahachi first showed a readiness and an ability to be in the service of his people. Starting at Cold Comfort Farm where, together with Cde Didymus Mutasa, he preached and practiced the ideals of self-reliance and unity of purpose through co-operative farming, Cde Mahachi was over the years to prove his mettle as a selfless, dedicated and unwavering cadre. At Cold Comfort Farm, where he rose to the position of vice chairman, he came into contact with the beginnings of the desire by blacks to reassert themselves, in seeking their political rights and resisting their economic disempowerment. In many ways, therefore, Cold Comfort Farm became synonymous with the embryonic but unstoppable yearning to fight the colonial exploitative stereotype that saw blacks as purely 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'.

In the 1970s, and with the experience of the power of united action, Cde Mahachi found himself at the helm of the Nyafaro Development Company, which fought against the forced removal of the Tangwena people from the land of their birth to the rocky and barren areas. Together with the late Chief Rekayi Tangwena and Cde Didymus Mutasa, Moven became the new frontier of resisting the callous and barbaric nature of colonialism. Although the Tangwena people were

eventually overcome and violently removed from the Gaeresi Ranch, the land of their forefathers, the spirit of their resistance and the strength and sincerity of their cause was to prove inspirational to the entire liberation struggle. Indeed, it was the flame and anvil which shaped and gave courage to many other young cadres who were leaving the country for the liberation struggle.

Fired up by the increasingly brutal character of the Smith regime, Cde Mahachi together with Chief Tangwena became trusted couriers and bridges for many young cadres who had decided to cross into Mozambique, take up arms and pay the ultimate price for the liberation of their land. For Cde Mahachi, then as now, the fight for the land, our dear land, was the most consuming. There could be no greater sacrifice. Indeed, it was through Mahachi's and Tangwena's brave and courageous support that I and Edgar Tekere were assisted in crossing into Mozambique in April 1975, after the Zanu Central Committee had decided that I should go and lead the liberation struggle, following the sad death of Cde Herbert Chitepo.

Later in the same year, 1975, Cde Mahachi was to meet the full-blooded wrath of the Smith regime, which sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment for assisting in the recruitment of the freedom fighters. His release in 1979 came at the dawn of a new Zimbabwe. The release enabled him to attend the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference. A few months later, he was to shed, together with many of us, tears of joy at the birth of the new Zimbabwe.

In June last year, Government began to fulfil its longstanding promises on the land through the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme which has, so far, delivered close to 3 million hectares of land back to its rightful owners. The programme has succeeded in the face of innumerable and often hostile obstacles, personified in the main by unwarranted British sponsored campaign. Cde Mahachi was heartened by the resoluteness shown by the Party and Government in addressing this longstanding colonial problem. Sadly, he has not been able to see the conclusion of his exercise, which we all know was so dear to his heart.

Often times, when others prevaricated and seemed unsure of the meaning of our land reform programme, Cde Mahachi was one you could rely upon to revive the spirits of the doubting Thomases. He spoke passionately, eloquently and relentlessly about the land reform programme that would prove, once and for all, to the whole world, the capacity of black Zimbabweans to make full productive use of their land.

At the Party level, Cde Mahachi was a conscientious, trusted and sincere worker. He served the Party loyally in a number of portfolios including, more notable as Secretary for the Commissariat and most recently as Secretary for Transport and Welfare. It was during his tenure as the National Commissar that the Party became seized with the restructuring exercise meant to enable ZANU (PF) to respond more vigorously to present-day challenges. In his new role, he

had begun to organize the Party's transport system in preparation for work leading up to the presidential election. Nothing could illustrate his being close to the people better than his successive re-election as Member of Parliament. It is instructive that he met his fate when he was coming from a provincial co-ordinating meeting in Mutare. Because of his exceptional qualities, I was able to appoint him to various ministerial positions over the twenty-one years of our Independence, and in every case he served with diligence and distinction.

In his last assignment as Minister of Defence, Cde Mahachi was able also to make a mark on the international front through his gallant work in our fight for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo following its invasion by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Under his guidance, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, in combination with Allied Forces, successfully resisted the aggression visited upon the Congo and thus gallantly upheld the dignity of that country as a sovereign nation. Together with his counterparts in Namibia, Angola and the DRC he was instrumental in the realization and implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement. Over the last two years he also witnessed the duplicity of the international world, which has sought to demonise Zimbabwe and her soldiers for upholding internationally recognized principles in defence of the Congo, while condoning acts of aggression, genocide and gross looting of the Congolese resources by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

With Moven's sad departure, ZANU (PF) has lost a very constant guiding and stabilizing hand; while in Government we shall miss his honesty, his reasoned contributions to debates and his great commitment to his country. Many times over, we shall also certainly miss that hearty, almost shrill, but jovial laughter. The full impact of our loss is perhaps underlined by the sad fact that none of us can ever be Comrade Moven Enock Mahachi. While we vainly try to come to terms with this tragic and enervating loss, our spirits can at least find solace and comfort in the happy knowledge that we were able to serve with one so tried and tested, a truly rare revolutionary nationalist right up to the end.

To his family, to the many people gathered here today and many others in various parts of our country, I wish, once again, to express heartfelt condolences over this cruel and irreparable loss that even time cannot heal.

Moven, it is with a heavy heart that we now say to you go well son of the soil; go well gallant fighter.

Famba zvakakanaka gamba redu.

Hamba Kahle qhawe lethu!

I thank you.

APPENDIX 3

SPEECH 3: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G. MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE CHENJERAI HUNZVI: NATIONAL HEROES' ACRE – 8 JUNE 2001

Vice Presidents, Simon Muzenda and Joseph Msika
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika,
Speaker of Parliament, Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa,
Acting Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku'
Honourable Ministers,
Honourable Members of Parliament here present
Our respectable Chiefs,
Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
The Bereaved Hunzvi Family,
ZANU (PF) Party Leadership here present,
Government officials
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Comrades and Friends.

Barely a week ago, we gathered in heart rending circumstances to bid farewell to our dear departed Comrade Moven Mahachi. Four weeks before then, the cruel hand of fate had brought us here to pay our last respects to another gallant son of Zimbabwe, Cde Border Gezi. Today we are once again congregated in equally sad circumstances to bid farewell to yet another Son of the Soil, Cde Chenjerai Hunzvi, who died on Monday this week at Parirenyatwa Hospital of malaria.

Fate has been most unkind to us, hitting us where it hurts the most at the time when our land-based Third Chimurenga is at its most critical historical juncture. And yet these harsh reversals should never deter us but should, instead, propel us to fight even harder to intensify the campaign and ensure that the sacrifices of our fallen heroes are not in vain. These heroes lived a life dedicated to ensuring that Zimbabweans regain their ownership of their land as an undisputed matter of social justice. They died in the middle of the Third Chimurenga, which we must see to the victorious finish. Our greatest tribute to them and many others who died before them some of who lie here and many others who lie in unmarked graves within and outside our borders, would be to give land back to the people of Zimbabwe.

We are today bidding farewell to Chenjerai Hunzvi, a man who spent his entire life fighting to ensure that the people of Zimbabwe regain their political and economic birth rights.

At an early age of 19 years, Cde Hunzvi experienced the racist brutality of the Smith regime when he was arrested in October 1965, just before the illegal unilateral declaration of independence, for leading demonstrations against then British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, during his visit to Rhodesia.

Wilson had come to Rhodesia ostensibly to give political pressure on Ian Smith not to declare UDI. A group of nationalist leaders, including myself and the late Vice president Cde Nkomo were police-led from detention camps to meet this man, who had been projected as one so interested in our cause for equal rights and so as one who was to tell Smith that if he proceeded to declare UDI, his regime would encounter the wrath of the Queen's imperial might.

We were to discover that it was a monumental charade, an ill-fated public relations exercise, devoid of any real care for the plight of the black majority in this country. Harold Wilson made it clear to us then that, as the unfolding of history has testified, the British people and their Government would never contemplate abandoning their white kith and kin in favour of the African cause.

These statements, coming from none other than a British Labour Prime Minister were all that Smith and his ilk needed to hear in order to know that they could unilaterally declare a manifestly unconstitutional independence without fear of any consequences from the Queen's government. As if history is repeating itself, today another British Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has made it clear in many ways reminiscent of Harold Wilson's assurance that the Queen's Government will not abandon its white kith and kin whose forefathers colonized our country, butchered our people and stole their land.

The young Hunzvi realised in 1965, as he did in 2000, that it would take None But Ourselves to liberate our country from the colonial settler regime and its consequences.

Cde Hunzvi's nationalistic involvement in the liberation struggle saw him incarcerated, detained and restricted at various infamous holding centres around Zimbabwe such as Gonakudzingwa, Wha Wha, Enkeldorn Police Station and Salisbury Police Station. Yet the harassment by the Smith regime could not deter him as he rose to become ZAPU's chief representative in Poland during the liberation struggle.

In post independent Zimbabwe, Cde Hunzvi could have been comfortable with the affluence that often goes with the professional status of medical doctors, but his selfless commitment and dedication to seeing Zimbabweans regain ownership of their land led him to toil and suffer together with fellow war veterans in their quest for total liberation. He fought tirelessly for the welfare of war veterans, ex-detainees and war collaborators in as much he did for the peasants and workers deserted and abandoned by an opportunistic would-be trade union leadership now in bed with employers. His inspiring leadership of the war

veterans came at a time when some people were beginning to waver, perceiving war veterans as objects of contempt and ridicule as they relegated the land from the top of national priorities.

Following the British sponsored rejection of the democratic draft constitution which held the British government responsible for funding a land reform programme in Zimbabwe, Cde Hunzvi, without a cue from the leadership of the Party, ZANU (PF), or Government, courageously led war veterans and the landless to demonstrate on white owned commercial farms countrywide. Their simple message was that the ultimate purpose of the liberation struggle must be fulfilled and that the ownership of land must be returned to its rightful owners. This act of unparalleled and principled heroism saw the beginnings of the Third Chimurenga.

It is this land-based Third Chimurenga that has become the target of a vicious British-sponsored local and international media and diplomatic campaign that seeks to preserve the immoral and inequitable land system in Zimbabwe where a mere one percent of the population owns over 70 percent of the best land in the country. Worse still, of the land owned by the white farmers, only 30% is utilized with the rest lying idle or used for cosmetic purposes. Indeed, there are many cases of white commercial farmers boasting of little Englands in Zimbabwe and some having farms almost the size of Belgium.

Instead of seeing Cde Hunzvi, war veterans and the landless majority as victims of and indeed solutions to the land problem, some sections of the international community, led by Britain, portray them as invaders of the white man's land, squatters, land grabbers, marauding thugs and rapists whose only interest is to loot the white man's property with no regard to the rule of law. No wonder why the most common images on CNN, BBC, Sky TV and even SABC portray war veterans as axe wielding warriors ready to strike at "vulnerable God-fearing white families living peacefully on their farms." Invariably, the white farmer is projected as the paragon of justice and the one responsible for the country's success story in agriculture and the survival of our economy. The fact that 80 percent of the cotton and over 70 percent of maize is produced by these same black farmers, is conveniently forgotten as is the fact that these black farmers can do more and better for the economy if given access to fertile land currently lying idle in the hands of an extreme selfish racial minority.

Through various British mouthpieces, Government has been explicitly directed to remove the war veterans from commercial farms or consequently face British hostility, isolation and sanctions. We have been repeatedly informed that if we do not oblige, worse things would be done as we would have failed to uphold the rule of law and preserve the sanctity of the white man's property.

Reconciliation is now supposed to mean final acceptance, by the African, of the social, class and economic structures and property relations put in place by

illegal colonial regimes, in the most scandalous robbery in history. The hand of reconciliation is now understood to be the five finger hand salute of the policeman who stops you at the gate of the property stolen from your ancestors, and asks you to turn round and go back to the arid patch where the colonial predator threw our clan. The only variation is when the same hand becomes a slap in the face of the African labourer who must till his own land for the benefit of robbers from across the seas.

The rule of law is presented as one that protects the minority privileges, which are subsidized from the expropriated African ancestral land and other resources.

Law abiding Africans are those who will not challenge the immorality and illegality of their deprivation, but will happily retreat to their arid patch of land after their useful life, in the judgement of enterprising settler, expires. Our response to these British-sponsored machinations is very clear and unequivocal. We have reminded the British, not only of their failure to honour their pledge at the Lancaster House Conference but also of Harold Wilson's open testimony to us that the British would never set their army on their Rhodesian kith and kin, a testimony that is now being repeated by Tony Blair as he resists the land acquisition and reform programme in protection of his kith and kin. Why then are we expected to send our own army to shoot our own people? We could not, and we will never, set war veterans in the army against fellow war veterans and landless peasants peacefully demonstrating for their usurped birth rights.

While we have made it clear that we would not shoot our own people demonstrating on the farms, we nevertheless have indicated that under the fast track resettlement programme Government would acquire at least 5 million hectares on which to resettle landless Zimbabweans and we would, as we are doing, acquire this land in terms of our Constitution, laws and policies all of which are very clear, notwithstanding endless attempts to misrepresent and misinterpret our rule of law. War veterans on ungazetted farms would be removed on to acquired farms. The Fast Track Resettlement Programme, which began in July last year, is now at an advanced and irreversible stage having settled 105 000 families, on close to 3 million hectares of land. More families are set to be resettled before the onset of the rains. Cde Hunzvi was a pivotal player in our realizing these targets.

Regrettably, his death came at a time when victory of the on going land-based Third Chimurenga was now in sight. There can be no greater tribute and honour to pay him today than that to intensify the campaign which will make victory even more certain. His untimely departure should never be an opportunity for those who want to see division within the ranks of the war veterans to proceed with their machinations. Nor should it be an opportunity for those who want to intimidate our people or to render them despondent by defiling our culture and celebrating untimely death of our heroes. Instead, the war veterans and indeed all

of us, must emerge from this tragedy more united and resolute in ensuring that Cde Hunzvi's cause is fulfilled and that the noble values of our liberation struggle are upheld.

To you Cde Hunzvi I say: You have done your part, you have fought your struggle and fought it gallantly; staunchly defending your birth right and your revolutionary heritage. The people's needs and interests were always uppermost in your mind. You indeed deserve the halo of a national hero.

Go well gallant son-of-the soil!
Famba zvakakanaka Gamba redu!
Hamba kahle qhawe lethu!

APPENDIX 4

SPEECH 4: ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT R. G. MUGABE ON THE OCCASION OF THE BURIAL OF THE LATE CDE CAIN NKALA: NATIONAL HEROES' ACRE – 18 NOVEMBER 2001

Honourable Vice Presidents, Comrades Simon Muzenda and Joseph Msika
Amai Muzenda and Amai Msika,
Speaker of House, Comrade Emmerson Mnangagwa,
Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku'
Honourable Ministers, Members of the Nkala family,
The Acting Chairman of the War Veterans' Association, Comrade Patrick Nyaruwata,
War Veterans, Former Detainees and Restricttees,
Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Comrades and Friends.

We are gathered here today to pay our last respects to and bury yet another dedicated, consistent and patriotic son of the soil, Cde Cain Nkala, who was abducted, tortured and murdered by terrorists on November 5, 2001. The indescribable pain of losing Cain, just four days before he was to turn forty-three years old, is accentuated and heightened by the deplorable terrorist circumstances under which he met his death.

While the commendable Police investigations are still in progress, what has already emerged, beyond any shadow of doubt, is that Cde Nkala's brutal death was not a simple criminal case of abduction and murder. Yes, he was kidnapped, tortured and strangled with a shoelace by MDC activists and officials. But there was more to it than this.

Comrade Nkala's brutal murder was a bloody outcome of an orchestrated, much wider and carefully planned terrorist plot by internal and external enemy forces. With plenty of funding from some commercial farmers and organizations like the Westminster Foundation, which gets its dirty money from the British Labour Party, the Conservative and Liberal Parties and the Government of Tony Blair, these sponsored terrorist forces of destruction in the MDC are corrupting and ruining the youth at colleges and elsewhere by showering them with donor trinkets, drink and drugs in order to use them as cannon fodder in terrorist fights not just against ZANU (PF), but principally against the gains of our hard won independence and sovereignty. Make no mistake about it, the target of the MDC terrorists and their Rhodesian and British sponsors was, and still is, our free and united Zimbabwe. These are the circumstances in which Cain Nkala, Limukani

Lupahla, and other victims have died. It is in this special national and heroic sense that Cde Nkala is indeed a Martyr, a true hero of the people.

Let it be remembered that Cde Nkala was abducted, tortured and murdered on November 5, 2001 by the same terrorists who, on October 29, 2001 in Lupane, similarly kidnapped, tortured, killed and burnt the body of Limukani Lupahla, a youth member of ZANU (PF). Apart from widespread media reports of MDC terrorist training camps on some commercial farms, outside our borders and even overseas, there have been numerous and growing cases across the country of kidnapping and assault of ZANU (PF) members by MDC terrorists, some of whom want to be counted among legislators.

Against this backdrop let nobody entertain the foolish notion that ZANU (PF) and Government will brook this kind of terrorist provocation and build-up of violence in our country. The MDC perpetrators of political violence and crimes against humanity and their international sponsors should know that their days are numbered. Everybody now knows that, in the typical fashion of terrorist groups, the MDC invokes democracy, the rule of law and human rights during the day as a cover for perpetrating political violence, kidnapping, torture and murder during the night. The time for this deceit is now up, for the MDC terrorists as the whole world has been given a rude awakening by the brutal circumstances surrounding the death of Cde Nkala.

The ZANU (PF) Government prides itself on its endeavours to achieve peace, stability, and the unity of our country. We are particularly proud of the unity of purpose that has bound our people together and strengthened them to press for their economic rights. In this regard, the ZANU (PF) Government will not allow rebels and MDC criminal elements who have neither minds nor policies of their own, and who are clearly willing agents of some external forces fighting to ruin the gains of the people of Zimbabwe.

After Independence, Comrade Nkala joined the Zimbabwe National Army, where his keen sense of national service and commitment to patriotic duty served him well until the time of his demobilization in 1983. Four years later, Cain was among the comrades who established the Bulawayo chapter of the War Veterans' Association. Once again, his diligence and consistency saw him rise through the ranks to the position of Bulawayo Provincial Chairman of the War Veterans Association in 1998. In all his assignments, Cain showed discipline, honesty, humility and a disarming revolutionary disposition. His religious instruction and beliefs completed the fine specimen of the patriot that he was.

It is not surprising, therefore, to note that above everything else, Cde Nkala was motivated by a twin sense of duty and fairness. As Chairman of the Bulawayo War Veterans' Province, he played an exemplary and pivotal leadership role when the land demonstrations of the Third Chimurenga gathered momentum in the Matebeland North and South provinces. Cde Nkala did not

require persuasion to realize that the land demonstrations were a people-driven cry for social justice that needed urgent action from the Party and the Government. He clearly understood and preached the one message that ZANU (PF) has always preached – that the source of livelihood in Zimbabwe is the land and that, without it, our people are doomed to vagaries of permanent squalor and injustice.

Because of the limited availability of land for resettlement around Bulawayo, Cain looked to Matabeleland North and South where he sought to ensure that the Government's successful Fast Track Land Acquisition and Resettlement programme assumed the appropriate level of urgency for Bulawayo residents.

Further evidence of Cde Nkala's devotion is the tremendous development that has taken place at the Bulawayo Provincial Heroes' Acre, the provincial War Veterans office and the formation of the War Veterans Widows Association for Bulawayo Province that he spearheaded.

It is in recognition of this short but rich life given to national service, along with the circumstances of his death, that Cde Nkala has been declared a national hero and a true Martyr of the people's struggle for full sovereignty.

It is not instructive that even as he was about to meet his fate, Cde Nkala could still pray for his torturers and murderers, and that even at that harrowing moment, he could fearlessly and heroically declare that the land question would find a final and just resolution, whatever the evil machinations and terrorist actions his abductors and tormentors were resorting to.

As we lay Cde Nkala to rest, I wish, once again, on behalf of the Government, ruling Party, ZANU (PF), and in my capacity as Patron of the Zimbabwe National War Veterans' Association, to extend my heartfelt condolences to Cain's dear wife, Sikhumbuzo, his five children, the entire Nkala family, the War Veterans and the Youth.

I would like to assure the Nkala family that we deeply share their sad loss and that we will never forget that Cain paid the ultimate price because of his total commitment to the realization of the Land Reform Programme and the unity of the people of Zimbabwe. The War Veterans and the Youth of our country must derive greater strength and inspiration from Cain's relentless and unyielding service to the country.

I say to Cain, *hamba kahle qhawe lethu!* We who remain behind will carry on the challenge you, our Martyr, have left for us.

I thank you.

APPENDIX 5:

A NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE FROM DAVID COLTART MP (ZIMBABWE), MDC (MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE)

LEGAL AFFAIRS

THE CANDIDATE

The people being ready is one thing; having a decent candidate to vote for is another thing entirely. Which leads me to the coup de grace in the form of Morgan Tsvangirai. Whilst I have known MDC President Tsvangirai since 1992 I have only got to know him well since being invited by him to join the MDC in 1999. Getting to know him has been a sheer pleasure. He is a man of great intellect, integrity, courage, compassion and humour. In fact I firmly believe that in Mr. Tsvangirai we have a truly great leader who will become a statesman of world renown. I have consistently been impressed by his wisdom in tackling tricky issues and by his commitment to a vision of a non-racist, non-sexist, democratic Zimbabwe.

It is hard to convey why I have so much admiration for Tsvangirai. A few random examples of his character may help. When our child Bethany was born in September Tsvangirai took time off his hectic schedule to phone me to say "makorokoto" (Shona for congratulations). When I was concerned in November by the death threats I had received a meeting with him restored my equilibrium. When some of our younger members went over the top in campaigning for positions last year in Harare, bringing the MDC into disrepute, Tsvangirai dealt with the issue quickly, resolutely but fairly and put the party back on track. When he was ambushed twice last year he remained absolutely calm and focused. He does not have an ounce of racist blood in veins. He is truly a great leader and Zimbabwe will be blessed to have him as President.

Some sceptics may argue that my own experience is all very well but Tsvangirai is not known by the Zimbabwean people and we may well end up like the Zambians, lumped with a President very few people want. After all the people of Zambia were also ready for change. Over 80% of those eligible to vote turned out to vote in the recently held Parliamentary and presidential elections. Over 70% of those who voted, voted against the so-called ruling party candidate, Levy Mwanawasa. The will of the people was denied however because, despite all the opposition's claims of rigging, even on the Zambian government's own figures Mwanawasa won with only 28,7% of the vote. The dreaded "Kenya syndrome", namely the inability of the opposition to coalesce around a single candidate, did in the Zambian people. The "Kenya syndrome" is more likely to occur in countries where ethnicity is a major factor or where the opposition is unable to produce a single candidate who stands head and shoulders above the rest of the opposition candidates. The latter problem is

exacerbated when a good opposition candidate does not have the backing of a strong party behind him or her.

Fortunately Zimbabwe does not suffer from any of these blights. Ethnicity will not be a factor in our elections as far as the MDC is concerned. The MDC team of President Tsvangirai and Vice President Sibanda attracts support countrywide and in both urban and rural settings. Ndebele people have thronged President Tsvangirai's meetings in Matabeleland in 2001 and Shona people have done the same for Vice President Sibanda in meetings held recently in, for example, Zaka in Masvingo. If anyone will have a problem attracting support from specific ethnic groups it will be Mugabe whose chickens are coming home to roost. Mugabe will battle to attract support in regions he has alienated such as Matabeleland, Masvingo and Manicaland. Indeed Mugabe was the MDC best candidate ZANU (PF) could have offered because he is so intensely disliked by various ethnic groups throughout the country. We were absolutely delighted that the ZANU (PF) Congress decided to stick with the soon-to-be-78 year old Mugabe. The problem for ZANU (PF) is compounded in Matabeleland in that his only possible Ndebele Vice President running mates, Msika or John Nkomo, did not even dare to contest seats in Matabeleland in the 2000 elections cognisant of their inability to win. Both are deeply unpopular in Matabeleland in stark contrast to Vice President Gibson Sibanda who won his seat with a majority of over 80%.

What then of the prospect of multiple candidates from other parties as happened in Zambia? In the 2000 elections ZANU (PF) secured 48% of the vote, the MDC 46% and the balance went to a variety of small opposition parties, the main one being ZANU Ndonga which secured the only other opposition seat of Chipinge South. There are only three other political parties of any consequence namely, the UANC led by Bishop Muzorewa, ZAPU and the Liberty Party (both regional parties based in Bulawayo). All three attracted minimal votes and many of their candidates lost their deposits in the 2000 elections. ZANU (PF) has been desperately trying to promote candidates from these parties and it has been intriguing to see how, for example, the government controlled Chronicle newspaper in Bulawayo has been promoting the fortunes of Paul Siwela, the Secretary General of ZAPU who appears to have desires to contest the Presidential election. His plans to contest were dealt a bit of a blow when the ZAPU Central Committee recently decided that it would not field a candidate in the election. Since that decision was taken the Chronicle has done its utmost to discredit Agrippa Madlela, the ZAPU President who, one would have thought, would be ZAPU's logical candidate, but who believes that ZAPU should not contest the election.

The same tactic is being employed, with similar lack of success, to get Wilson Khumbula MP to stand as ZANU Ndonga's Presidential candidate. Khumbula until recently was the President of ZANU Ndonga. He has been suspended from the party and there are strong indications that ZANU Ndonga will not want to field a candidate. So despite ZANU (PF)'s best efforts to split the opposition vote by assisting the campaigns of a multiplicity of opposition candidates

they will not succeed. If anything President Tsvangirai will pick up votes from the supporters of these small parties, especially from the largest of them all, ZANU Ndonga. In sum this will in essence be a two horse race. In any event our electoral laws are different to Zambia in that in Zimbabwe the winning candidate has to win a majority of votes cast and if a majority is not achieved in the first ballot then the two top candidates have to contest a second ballot against each other. So at the end of the day this will be a straight contest between Tsvangirai and Mugabe.

Another important reason why the opposition vote will not be split sufficiently to usher Mugabe back into power by default is because in MDC President Tsvangirai Zimbabwe has got a charismatic candidate the opposition and civil society can coalesce around. Having been a highly successful Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) prior to his election as President of the MDC, Tsvangirai has a very high and positive profile that transcends the ethnic, class, racial and gender divide. My personal experience of Tsvangirai is shared by hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans countrywide. In a word he is Presidential and it is not hard for Zimbabweans to conceive that he would be a good President. Even if other opposition candidates do stand none will have the presence or profile of Tsvangirai.

But it is the backing of an effective party that is the most compelling reason why our election will be different to the Zambian election. The MDC since its formation in September 1999 has been subjected to a literal baptism of fire at the hands of ZANU (PF) and its surrogate police force and CIO. We have now had over 90 of our supporters murdered by ZANU (PF) thugs; virtually every single MDC MP has been either detained, or assaulted, or had his or her house searched, or received death threats. The MDC has been subjected to the most bizarre selective application of the law. Charges have been fabricated against MDC leaders and prosecuted vigorously whereas ZANU (PF) leaders who openly advocate murder are not even arrested. The electronic media is brazenly the mouthpiece of ZANU (PF). And so it goes on. But the reality is that, despite all of this harassment (in fact perhaps because of the harassment) the MDC is now stronger than it was in June 2000. Not only do we now have elected structures countrywide but also we now have the capacity and ability to govern.

Unlike ZANU (PF) which is trapped in its one-track mind of its disastrous "fast track land programme" the MDC has developed comprehensive policies to turn Zimbabwe around. President Tsvangirai has spent the last six months progressively unveiling the MDC's economic, health, education and labour policies (to mention a few). All these policies have been formulated in consultation with experts from the relevant sectors of Zimbabwean society and have been hailed by serious commentators within Zimbabwe. The MDC has unveiled a three-year recovery plan that President Tsvangirai will start to implement as soon as he has been inaugurated in April.

But the MDC is more than just a body with good structures and policies -

most importantly it has spirit! I have just had the pleasure of attending the MDC's Annual Conference that was held in Gweru on the 22nd December. I have three words to describe the Conference: joyous, hilarious and constructive! There was absolute (and heartfelt) agreement that Morgan Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda shall comprise our Presidential team unlike the deep divisions within the ZANU (PF) camp regarding Mugabe's candidacy. Most of the meeting was devoted to debating and agreeing on key policy issues such as tackling the economy, dealing effectively with the Aids pandemic and restoring the rule of law unlike the ZANU (PF) Congress which only seemed to discuss Mugabe's declaration of war on the Zimbabwean people. In stark contrast to the tone of the ZANU (PF) meeting prayer and a recommitment to the principle of non-violence marked the MDC Conference. As a white Zimbabwean I felt profoundly privileged to be part of the proceedings of a movement that is non-racist and has a vision for not only a new democratic Zimbabwe but also a new beginning for Africa. I feel excited about the prospect of serving under Morgan Tsvangirai's Presidency.

The views expressed in this letter (are attributed to David Coltart - MDC Legal Affairs, Zimbabwe, and) do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change).

APPENDIX 6

TSVANGIRAI'S SPEECH ON THE 2002 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

RESULTS

Before Zimbabwe's presidential election earlier this month, I believed that if the elections were not handled properly, there would be a serious fallout in the country and throughout southern Africa. Despite the shadows of war and terrorism, I called for a fair and free election. Zimbabwe's people did not get one. Instead, they got terrorism.

In the two years that led up to the presidential vote the people of Zimbabwe were subjected to severe intimidation, harassment and fear, all of which was carried out as part of a broader programme of state-sponsored terrorism by Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANUPF).

ZANU PF's terrorism was conducted by rogue elements among the veterans of Zimbabwe's war of independence two decades ago as well as by government militiamen and youths, all of whom were actively aided by the police.

This intimidation and violence meant that my party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), could not reach the electorate in large parts of the countryside. In addition, the government of President Mugabe effectively disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of urban voters, particularly in the capital Harare and in the city of Chitungwiza. Because of an inadequate number of polling stations, I believe that in Harare and Chitungwiza alone more than 360 000 people stood in a queue to vote but never got the opportunity to cast their ballot.

My concerns about the legitimacy of the election results are further raised by interference by Mugabe's militia, whose members prevented the MDC from posting polling agents in 52 percent of rural polling stations. By the end of the voting, the MDC had no observers at six out of 10 rural stations. This effectively meant that Mugabe's supporters could have their way at these stations. We are compiling a comprehensive list of the polling stations where ZANU PF supporters had solitary control.

In our investigations so far, a pattern has emerged even at this early stage — these polling stations recorded the highest number of voters for Mugabe. In light of all the evidence, I cannot accept the presidential election results in which Mugabe, the sitting president, was declared a winner this month with 56 percent of the three million votes tallied. The official results do not reflect the true will of the people of Zimbabwe and are illegitimate in the eyes of the people.

Zimbabwe's people have been cheated of their right to freely and democratically elect a president of their choice. The contest over the election results is a political issue that must be resolved politically. Food and fuel are in short supply, jobs are vanishing and inflation is running at more than 100 percent. The people of Zimbabwe deserve a celebration for their courage and determination. We may yet get one.

As I write, I am saddened because Mugabe's regime remains intent on defying the people's will. Whatever may happen, I as the people's loyal servant am with them all the way. The government may want to arrest me. Indeed, I was arrested for treason even before the election. At worst, they may even wish to kill me. But the government will never destroy the spirit of the people to reclaim their rights and power. The power to achieve democratic change is in our hands. We may have moments of fear in the days ahead, but we must never let despair overwhelm us. The tide of political change is irreversible but we must be prepared to pay a high price for our freedom.

Mugabe and his cronies are afraid of the people and we have heard they may do anything to kill the messenger. If they do, I only ask that the people of Zimbabwe remain strong and carry on the work that we began together. Among ordinary Zimbabweans walk heroes — heroes who waited hours and hours to vote, heroes who refused to be turned away. These are the heroes of the new Zimbabwe whose voices must be heard around the world. Together, we travelled a very harsh road to achieve democratic change in my country. Rarely in the history of humankind have a people faced such brutality while retaining such gracious exuberance.

I realise that the people of Zimbabwe are impatient. I understand why. But they must wait peacefully for the political process to unfold. They will not let this election stand but neither will they succumb to Mugabe's provocative traps and resort to violence.

The people of Zimbabwe want constitutional change, legal change, legitimate change, and they are going to obtain it in spite of all the obstacles. In this, we know we are not alone. We know that throughout Africa, the will of the electorate has been thwarted. It appears that in the majority of African states, whenever you have elections, you have irregularities, fraud, cheating. There is always a crisis of elections in Africa. There is, sad to say, a lack of sincerity on the part of governments across this continent when the time comes to give people the right to choose.

But those who wish otherwise can take hope. Zimbabwe's struggle is not over. We have time to tally the lessons of our experience for Africa, and the world. My people are in their hour of greatest need. I pledge not to abandon them.

Credit to Project Syndicate, March 2002

APPENDIX 7

SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT, COMRADE R. G. MUGABE, ON THE OCCASION OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE PRESIDENT, STATE HOUSE, HARARE, SUNDAY, 17TH MARCH, 2002.

Master of ceremonies, Your Excellencies Heads of State here present, Honourable Vice Presidents of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Comrades Simon Mzenda and Joseph Msika, Mai Mzenda na Mai Msika, Mama Mafuyana, Former Heads of State, The Speaker of Parliament, Comrade Emmerson Munangagwa, The Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, Honourable Godfrey Chidyausiku and Amai Chidyausiku, and members of the Judiciary, distinguished Representatives of Heads of State and Government from fraternal countries within our region and beyond, Traditional Chiefs, Honourable Ministers and Members of Parliament, Service Chiefs, Heads of Religious Denominations present here today, Representatives of Sectoral Organisations and Professionals, Your Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps, All Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades and Friends.

I come before you in a moment and mood of national pride and personal joy tempered with a sense of humility. It is a moment of national pride because the nation, through those registered and able to vote, has made its unfettered decision that in turn has produced this day. Personal joy, yes, because in a closely fought campaign, a large majority of our people has returned my party and me into the leadership of our free and sovereign country.

With humility, I wish to thank all those who voted for me and my Party as well as those others who decided to exercise their voting in a different way, both dimensions indeed lending their weight to a truly democratic process. In their different political affiliations and espousing their preferences, our people turned out in their thousands, indeed millions, braving the elements of weather as they stood patiently awaiting their turn to cast their votes. Such was the evidence, if anywhere needed, of the maturity of our democratic practice and level of discipline prevailing in our society.

How can anyone feel restrained, least of all the winner of this day, in chanting with an exuberant voice, "Well done, Zimbabweans! Makorokoto! Amhlope! We have dealt a blow to imperialism!"

This is indeed a moment for all of winners, losers and us to celebrate the multi-faceted phenomenon of the victory of our democratic process. Where the ruling Party won the Presidential election, it became a loser to the Mayoral and

Council elections, in all Harare. On the other hand, where the opposition won the Mayoral and Council elections, it became a loser of the Presidential election. Both sides have something to rejoice about as well as something to mourn about. But these mingled joys and aches aside, the greatest winner, you will agree, was our democratic process.

As Zimbabweans, this moment of national pride is one that bids us further to come together, and as in unison we chant our National Anthem and raise high our multi-coloured flag of glory, work jointly and collectively to reconstruct our economy in order to transform our society. Our energies and capabilities are surely spent on constructive people oriented tasks and programmes than on planning and plotting the downfall of each other. The serious espousal of the ideal of national unity and the spirit of brotherhood will inject correct doses of love and fervour into our relationships hitherto sounded by hostility and anguish.

The current and urgent demand of our country is for a renewed faith and vigour, faith in ourselves and vigour in our efforts. Our country beckons us to join hands in a formidable unity of purpose as we vigorously engage in our various national endeavours.

The excitement, jubilation and exhilaration, as well as the anxieties of the last several weeks will soon recede into history, and yet our tasks will continue in their various shapes and focuses to address the current and future economic problems that persistently confront our nation. We have no choice but to strive to sustain and enhance the lives of our people in order to give meaning to the shape and content of our democratic society. Indeed, the general review of our socio-economic programmes has now to receive immediate attention.

The Land Reform programme must proceed with greater speed and strength, so the losses and drawbacks of the current drought-ridden season can be overcome and replaced by rich harvests and farmers' earnings in the coming agricultural season, given better weather patterns than at present. In the process deliberate emphasis will have to be given to the production of critical crops such as maize, tobacco, cotton, soya beans, sugar and others, at both peasant and large scale levels. For now, however, Government will continue to exert maximum efforts into securing adequate maize supplies, to ensure the adequacy of food for the people.

The manufacturing sector has to be immediately addressed in order to revive all those factories, which have shut down or are on the verge of doing so. Greater emphasis than before will be placed on the informal sector in order to adequately revamp it as a vital contributor to the Gross Domestic Product. The mining sector will similarly be given such serious attention as will enable it to sustain productivity at higher levels than at present so the volume of foreign earnings can be boosted.

The development of the infrastructure sector, which encompasses dam construction, rural electrification, road and rail construction will of necessity have to be intensified, as indeed will the construction and rehabilitation of our airports, large and small.

Then there is our sector of tourism which is a significant contributor to our capacity to earn foreign exchange, and which we must continue to enhance both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Beyond these and other measures directed towards the current food emergency situation, Government has worked out a comprehensive economic recovery strategy whose components integrally addresses the issues of economic empowerment and indigenisation; restoration of confidence in management of the economy; and formulation of appropriate, consensus based responses to the problems of reduced foreign currency inflows, inflation, high prices, debt management and low investment activity in the economy.

The details of the strategies and other solutions to the challenges cited above are either already enshrined in our Millennium Economic Recovery programme or will shortly be presented to the nation following necessary consultations. However, the current severe foreign currency crunch requires that we immediately provide further stimulus to national export performance including that of the general agricultural and horticultural sectors; promote beneficiation for high value exports; encourage both local and direct investment in the economy and market our country more professionally, innovatively and effectively to boost tourism.

On inflation, which has had a devastating effect on the standard living of our people, we are determined that fiscal policy shall focus on strict control of government expenditures, especially recurrent or consumption expenditure. However, Government must and will invest in productive, employment generating activities, including infrastructure. In particular we plan, as already stated, to increase production in agriculture which, among other things, will have a tampering effect on inflation through increase in aggregate supply.

Economic empowerment is a vital part of our economic policies. We intend to further enhance this thrust by way of initiatives that aim to produce an overarching legal framework on economic empowerment; create an enabling environment for employee ownership and management buy-out schemes as may be mutually agreed; strengthen the capacity of micro- finance institutions to deliver loans to the informal and micro-enterprises sector; increase funding for the land reform programme; give preferential treatment to indigenous businesses on Government tenders, whilst ensuring efficiency and value for money; and use the budget as a central tool for economic empowerment, where a significant amount of resources would be set aside for such empowerment.

I should, however, wish at this stage to state that in tackling these problems we shall be moving with speed and in a time-framed and result-oriented manner. We cannot afford the luxury of dilatoriness and bureaucratic sloth and indecisiveness.

The day is gone and gone for good when the business of the people could be half-done, postponed inordinately or even recklessly and irresponsibly set aside. Government has no purpose at all unless that purpose speaks in words and deeds to the needs and aspirations of the people.

This economy must grow, not contract. Growth will be restored as investment by, above all, Zimbabweans themselves, is deliberately and systematically embarked upon in all sectors, but principally in agriculture. Land reform is not merely an exercise in rectifying a monstrous colonial injustice, vital though and necessary this has been. The resettlement programme is also an opportunity to unleash the spirit of self reliance and creativity of our people; to foster the economic empowerment of our people; to increase agricultural production and therewith to expand the domestic economic base and foreign market access; to create and enhance employment creation; and to assure national food security on a permanent and reliable basis.

In addition, and in complementary fashion, we have set out to evolve an integrated rural development strategy that covers provision of enhanced agricultural extension services; infrastructural rehabilitation and development; rural electrification; and the development of largely agro-based small and medium enterprises around the country.

Other programmes directed, for example, to improving social delivery will be announced in due course. This will include improved approaches in our fight against the HIV-AIDS pandemic that has so ravaged our society in recent years.

Beyond our borders, our country has in recent years attracted a good deal of international attention, most of which has been extremely negative and quite hostile. Indeed it could even be said, colloquially, that Zimbabwe or Mugabe-bashing has become an obsessive compulsion in certain circles abroad. The reason for this is obvious: our land reform initiative and its impact on the affairs of the white community and certain foreign interests in our country have inspired that attention and the hostility from the former colonial power Britain and its allies. It is greatly to be regretted that we live in an age where racial and socio-economic injustices still prevail after centuries of their callous and systematic perpetration against many of our African communities.

In most of our colonised countries, the oppressed, suppressed and repressed people had no option but to organise themselves in order to fight these injustices both politically and militarily. It was these liberation struggles that gave birth to their freedom and independence as they regained their sovereign right to determine their destiny. In 1980, as we celebrated the advent of our independence,

here, we least expected that twenty years down the line we would, once again, have to wage another struggle for the defence of that sovereign Independence against our former colonial power seeking in a determined way to diminish it so as to regulate our policies and our lives, including the choice of our rulers.

Ladies and gentlemen, comrades and friends, you certainly have now been able to see how Britain and its white allies have blatantly sought to ensure that this last presidential election be won by their protégé and not by ZANU (PF) and me. But thanks to the people of Zimbabwe for loudly saying “No! No! Never! Never again will Zimbabwe be a colony”. I thank them for their resolute anti-imperialist stand!

Finally, I want to thank our brotherly African and non-African countries for their full solidarity and enduring support. It is indeed against that background that I want to welcome all our guests, especially the Heads of State and Government from outside Zimbabwe for being here with us today as we celebrate our victory over colonialism. May I mention, however, that we will continue to need your support in the future as imperialist manoeuvres against Zimbabwe persist.

Thus as we now move to face up to the two daunting tasks, on the one hand, that of our socio-economic recovery and stabilisation, and, on the other, that of nation building, we humbly call upon you, our friends and allies, to remain steadfast behind us. Simunye!

To all of you here, may this historic occasion be to you as much a source of joy and aspiration as it is to me. I thank you all for being with us and for sharing this day with me, my wife and family, Party and Government colleagues.

I thank you.