Performing the Self: Making/Remaking White Male Identities in Post-Apartheid South Africa

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signed by candidate

Signature: signature removed Date: 6/11/04

Contents

Materialisations

Note: The materialisations for this dissertation were created as part of the process of research in a dialectical way, and were created in parallel with the reading and literature review, the one informing the other. They are an integral part of the academic work in that they are both informed by and informative of the research journey, inasmuch as the creation of the materialisations allowed me to perform my investigation into both the personal experience as well as the academic perspectives thereon. The inclusion of materialisations as part of the dissertation is a departure from the customary academic expression, yet in this context is the most lucid way I can find of expressing some of the intricacies of the topic.

Figures

Note: The figures that form part of Materialisation 7 reflect in a graphic way on my personal expression in the context of the modified body, and are dialectical in their interaction with the theoretical element of the dissertation. They images selected are of course subject to interpretations, and I include them as records of my physical transformation, which I comment on from the perspective certain of many readings rather than a critical reading of the images themselves.

Introduction

I start this dissertation with a quote that resonates with me, as a reflection of how I feel about my identity as a white male African undertaking a dissertation the study of which is my very sense of self:

> The self is an instrument of inquiry. In the end we have no other. To understand the childhood origins of an intellectual passion is to understand the possibilities and limitations of that instrument, the better to see what other instruments one needs to know the world.[1]

I usually write of my life with equanimity and poise, making light of my circumstances, berating myself for my deep, dark feelings. I have a sense, from looking at my peers and through my own experience that, in post-apartheid South Africa, the challenges that apartheid has left the country in terms of the need to redress the inequalities of the past has not substantially affected the opportunities of white men, who remain privileged, respected, and employed. White men are arguably still more likely to understand the dominant ideologies of race and culture, since these ideologies are written in their language, made in their image and custom-fitted to their bodies[2]. Yet there is a nagging sense that they are not unproblematically custom-made. I ask whether perhaps I have been custom-made to fit the ideologies, rather than the other way around, and that perhaps I should recognise that the power and privilege which appears to be my birth-right is less like a fur-lined mantle tailored for my pleasure, and more like a suit of armour made to measure for the 'perfect', 'normal' white man (or, I ask myself, is it the average drone?) and that prevents my growth beyond its confines. Perhaps this suit of armour is the very thing that prevents me from reaching a sense of humanity and connectedness with all people, irrespective of their cultural, racial, or gendered orientation, from performing a role that falls outside of the boundaries of 'the norm'.

I feel restricted by the identity I am forced to perform, and I feel a sense of anger and loss in the face of my privilege. I am angry despite my privilege, and even because of my privilege. Yet the anger and loss is not about fearing deprivation of my livelihood in favour of people who deserve to obtain positions and social standing previously the sole preserve of white men. I feel removed from the people around me who go about their business, work and play. I feel in some sense deprived of my humanity through my whiteness and my maleness. There is on the surface no real reason for me to feel so lonely in my identity. I have a loving, albeit difficult family with whom I have a strong yet trying relationship, I have a devoted life-partner who puts up with no

[1] Hochschild, AR- The commercialisation of intimate life- notes from home and work (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2003) p6

[2] There is a range of work done, from a postcolonialist and feminist perspective, on the damage done by patriarchy and the colonialist/imperialist enterprise, to which I will refer in detail later

end of strife from me, yet continues to support and love me, I have friends, an excellent education, a sustainable if somewhat unstable income, a lovely home, and a means of transport. I ask myself why I feel this loss, deprivation and guilt? In the search for a sense of understanding, I have put together a selection of writings and images which form the materialisations of this dissertation, and which dialectically both inform and are informed by the theoretical portion thereof by expressing some of the events and feelings that have impacted on my development as a white man, and how I have coped with and expressed these in a very material way, by means of modifying my body.

In the search for some indication as to the origins of these feelings, I look to myself and my identity. I ask myself 'who am I?' I was born with a penis, which makes me a man. I was born with a pink skin, which makes me white. I suppose it does, in the sense that this is the identity for which performance I was groomed. Yet I do not feel white, and I do not feel male, in that I do not understand what these terms mean in any real sense. I do not understand why these terms, held so dear to most other white men with whom I have spoken, and disparaged by so many 'non-white', 'non-men', should define who I am. I reject the sense of obligation that I feel associated with my whiteness and maleness, and the sense of personal guilt for inequalities and wrongs perpetrated by the system created by others who look as I do, yet did so without asking me whether I wanted to be a part of that system, or perform those prescribed roles. I reject the sense of restriction I feel as to what I may legitimately enjoy.

I do not believe that I am unusual in my feelings of anger, frustration, guilt and yearning. South Africa's history was for the first 350 years of its official existence largely written, if not created, by white men, who, although they may ultimately have had a choice in how they conducted themselves, I suggest have never had an unfettered freedom in defining their own identities outside of the parameters of the power systems they created. I suggest that white men have in some ways been the victims of the same systems that the patriarchal, colonial system forced on both willing and unwilling women and black people, a system that is "a principle of organisation composed of sheer mythos, sociopolitical authority, the hegemony and empowerment of an idea about order and control that is not itself a biological reality"[3]. And I have the sense that white men as individuals should have the opportunity of escaping this double-bind, of being allowed the voice to express their humanity, while not presuming to speak for anybody else but themselves, and certainly not presuming to speak from a position of power. As Payne notes, Norman O Browne "suggests that patriarchy is only one of two patterns of male organisation, the other being fraternity"[4].

[3] Payne, D in 'Autobiology' Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing (Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, London, New Delhi, 1996) p63
[4] Payne, D in 'Autobiology' Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing ibid p63

It is this environment of expectations in which I get the sense that white men adopt that I attempt to problematise in this dissertation, and further to explore possible routes of egress for all individuals, particularly white male South Africans.

Problematic

The problematic with which I deal in this dissertation is the question of the performance and stability of white male identity and the possibility of egress from the roles and expectations levelled at white men by the patriarchal society in which they live, and by the white men themselves in their maintenance of this system of privilege.

In this dissertation I approach questions of the placement of the self. I seek to find a route to reposition myself as a white male, but, as opposed to claiming a position for whiteness and maleness at the margin, and reclaiming that margin as much postcolonialist, feminist and queer writing has done, I seek rather to find academic support for the destabilisation of the very notion of centre and periphery. This is a difficult path, but during the course of the research I have discovered that I am not alone in my perspectives, and that there is a growing body of work that works within these parameters[5]. I do not look for an unoccupied space for white men, free of context or history. Rather I try to find a route to an expansion of the space which white men occupy so that they (we) may perform ourselves in freer ways, and allowing me to explore the questions of identity that I experience both academically as well as personally.

Discussion of whiteness and maleness are well-traversed paths in the humanities, although most often for the past few decades from the perspective of the effects of patriarchy by feminist and postcolonialist writers. The feminist movements highlighted the role of women in patriarchy, working with renewed force from the middle of the twentieth century by such eminent theorists as Simone de Beauvoir[6]. These movements are of course not without dispute in their own ranks, and as Butler notes,

> ...the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category[7].

Similarly, the theorists of the postcolony, such as Edward Said, write about the placement of the racialised "Other" as being outside of the patriarchal systems, and again the concept of

[5] notably through such theorists as Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990) with her theories of performativity, and Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990) with his ideas of hybridity, neither of whom attempt to claim ownership of a non-important periphery, but rather seek to reposition the margin as being a valid space to occupy in order to grow and develop.

[6] de Beauvoir, S The Second Sex (trans HM Parshley, 1972, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1949)

[7] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990) pp7

postcolonialism is by no means stable[8]. Both feminism and postcolonialism are written in contradistinction to patriarchy, which in turn has been written by and in the frames of reference of whiteness and maleness, which are correctly identified as the home of negative power relations that have burdened the Western world with patriarchy, imperialism and colonialism; ideologies and perspectives that have in many ways brought our society to its knees, and which have subjugated billions of people to the dehumanising machine of 'progress' and 'development', always in the terms of the white and male western paradigm, with very little space for any other point of view, spaces opened up by such theorists as Said and De Beauvoir[9].

The history of whiteness and maleness is that of power relations, privileging the white male voice and marginalising others', often associated with a violence, physical, psychological and emotional[10]. Much academic work has been done, through the lenses of postmodernism, postcolonialism, gender studies and queer theory, on deconstructing the systems and methodologies of the colonialist, imperialist enterprise. This work has slowly prized open the box and shown the instability of the authority of the white male voice, and has opened up spaces for women, black people, gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people to express themselves on their own terms, albeit perhaps in many ways in the terms created by patriarchy. As Threadgold notes, "What we have is a world constructed in and through discourse, meaning and representation, and the people in that world are constructed in the same way"[11].

As a gay man, I have taken personal power from these voices, for in many respects I count myself amongst those newly liberated voices. Yet it is not in the capacity of disenfranchised gay man that I speak in this dissertation. It is rather in the voice of a male human being with a white skin. For there is a conundrum that besets my whiteness and maleness. How can I break from the restraints and restrictions of that very thing which supposedly defines who I am, my

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[8] Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979); Anthony R. Guneratne of the Department of English Language and Literature, National University of Singapore notes in Part One of "Virtual Spaces of Postcoloniality: Rushdie, Ondaatje, Naipaul, Bakhtin and the Others," taken from http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/poldiscourse/guneratne1.html: "When," an Indian friend of mine (with a progressive cast of mind and a firm conviction in the idea of technological advancement) asked in exasperation, "does the state of postcoloniality end?" Questions of the same order have been plaguing literary scholars for a while, and a number of profound thinkers and theorists have done their best to abolish the term "postcolonial" altogether. In articles first published in 1994 in the journal Social Text, both Ella Shohat and Anne McClintock point out that "postcolonialism" never really existed except as a designation of convenience, and that it is no more, in essence, than colonialism attached to a "post-" (and straining at its tether to reassert its modes of thought).

[9] ibid

[10] M'barek Rouwane (Hassan II University -Ain Chok, Casablanca, Morocco) "Colonialist Discourse: "Postcolonial" Violent Realities and Practices" in http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/poldiscourse/casablanca/rouwane1.html
"Colonialist discourse (in the colonial as well as the so-called postcolonial situation), as it is disseminated in many European modes of thought and knowledge about the Other, has been functioning within intricate, violent structures and acts of domination, whose psychological effects-the negative aspects of so-called hybridity- such as shocks, traumas, and scars are left in and felt by today's (ex)colonisers and (ex)colonised. There are ample instances and examples of this kind of violent contact. The problem has been and is still being made more complex with the continuing perpetuation of imperialist aggression, which is justified by a more complex ideological system of what I call imperialist culture, rather than cultural imperialism. The ideological role of imperialist culture has been the lumping together of the Other's different ways of life with underdevelopment, violence, and terrorism, just as in the past non-European modes of life and violent barbarism were lumped together."

[11] Threadgold, T *'Introduction'* in Threadgold, T & Cranny-Francis, A (eds) Feminine, Masculine and Representation (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, London, Boston, Wellington, 1990) pp3

whiteness and my maleness, without falling foul of the very challenge that is legitimately levelled at the white male voice? The call in post-apartheid South Africa appears to be for the white male voice to be silent, so that the non-white, non-male voice can be heard. And it is a valid call. Yet that call does not reconstruct a space in which my humanity can find a voice, a humanity that is not defined in terms of the colour of my skin or my gender.

I suggest that the arguments and calls in the fields of postmodernist, postcolonialist and feminist writings for the validating power of the voice of the 'Other' also hold the seeds of validation of the voice of all individuals, including those of the white male. Crafting certain of these arguments in the spirit underlying their enunciation allows us to look at whiteness and maleness as narratives that entail a joint venture of reading and writing on the part of both white men and others. It is aspects of this project that I undertake in this dissertation. There are similar projects undertaken, albeit in different for a, for example by South African artists such as Peet Pienaar and Steven Cohen, who create installations to challenge, amongst other things, masculinity[12]. Robert Hanke notes,

> The relationship between masculinity and the media, which first came into focus in the 1970s and gained increased scholarly attention in the late 1980s, has continued to generate work that theorizes, interprets and evaluates masculinity with/in the media. In the five years since Fejes (1992) completed his review of empirical mass communication research on masculinity, there has been a growing stream of books and articles within media studies that has shifted critical attention from what Fejes calls "masculinity as fact" to the facticity of masculinity. This work focuses on masculinity as it is represented and defined in various media, genres, texts, or icons and the relationship between these sites and gender, the gender order, other cultural differences, identity and identification, the subject, experience, and reality in late capitalism. As has often been observed, the theoretico-political clusters of feminist and gay and lesbian studies has given particular impetus to the exploration of masculinity as a dominant cultural identity and invisible norm. At the same time, particular projects continue to be in dialogue with other theoretical work that has opened up mediated masculinities to new questions.[13]

I look to the fields of study of postmodernist literature, feminist and postcolonialist academic literature, to determine ways in which the white male identity can be rewritten (or reperformed) to make it 'unwhite', and 'unmale', and allow all people to determine their own sense of self, irrespective of their biologies. Looking at whiteness and maleness as narratives written by generations of people of all kinds allows us to conceptualise the rewriting of identity by the individual. Looking at power in the Foucaultian sense of relations rather than imperialist domination, we can look at the movement of the white male voice from the authoritatively authorial to the discursively interrelational[14]. Looking at both gender and race as performative, as is argued by Judith Butler, we can see that no individual is inherently bound to either their

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[12] Peet Pienaar is a Cape Town-based artist who planned an exhibition of his own circumcision in the Metropolitan Art Gallery in Cape Town, while Stephen Cohen is a Johannesburg-based performance artist who, amongst other things, challenges gender-stereotypes by appearing in extravagant feminine attire.

[13] in "Theorizing Masculinity With/In the Media" *Communication Theory* 8(2), 183-203, May 1998

[14] Foucault, M The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980), also The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure- (Pantheon, New York, 1985) and the Archeology of Knowledge ((trans AM Sheridan-Smith) Tavistock, London, 1972)

gender or their race, and therefore can choose from a range of gendered positions, or no position at all[15]. Looking at race as being constructed, we can refute the primacy of whiteness as an absolute[16]. Finally, looking at the body as the home of the both the individual, perhaps ungendered, unracialised spirit, we can, by incorporating the postmodernist perspectives on corporeality, conceive of a world without bodies, or with mutative bodies, or simply with free spirits, that allow individuals to break free from the restraints of their biological inheritance and create their own individual identities[17].

In the South African context I find compelling the arguments and perspectives of postcolonialist theorists such as Said, Bhabha and Fanon, as well as postmodernists such as Foucault, Baudrillard and Derrida, and contemporary feminist writers such as Game and Butler[18]. It is some of these writers that I will be calling on to work with the idea of identity as narrative text that can be both read and written.

There remains the valid question of how can I, indeed how dare I, as a white man, identify with the intimate struggles of black people and women, and use the power of their words and ideas to support what could be seen as the re-introduction of the primacy of the white male voice? How can I call on Fanon, whose sense of self is so bound with his sense of blackness in a white world[19]? How can I call on de Beauvoir, whose sense of struggle was with her woman-ness in patriarchy[20]? The answer is two-fold. I have not first-hand experienced the struggle to speak of the person in a woman's or a black person's body, yet I identify with the struggle of the individual to speak of their individualism in a way that reflects their personal circumstances, not restrained by the norms and authority of their environment, in my case that of the white male. Secondly, I take my position in this dissertation as a starting-point as well as a conclusion: that whiteness and maleness are both performative constructs, which performance serves to restrict my ability to better understand myself as human being. I find myself in a difficult position, in that I am encouraged to place myself in the box of whiteness and maleness in order to argue my way out of it. The way out of this double-bind is to adopt the materialist position to rely on the premise that I need not be bound by my whiteness and maleness in order to determine my own sense of self, and to write my own narrative that does not presume to write those of any other person, white or black, male or female.

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[15] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990)
[16] Particularly looking at Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979) and Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990)
[17] see particularly Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003)
[18] Said, E Orientalism ibid; Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration ibid; Fanon, F Black Skin White Masks ibid; Foucault, M The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, ibid, The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure; ibid and the Archeology of Knowledge ibid; Baudrillard, J- Fatal Strategies ibid; Derrida, J Writing and Difference (trans Alan Bass) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978); Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology ibid; Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- ibid
[19] Fanon, F Black Skin White Masks (Grove Press, New York, 1967)
[20] De Beauvoir, S: The Second Sex transl by HM Parshley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972)

In chapter 1, I place the dissertation within the disciplinary parameters of sociology, in particular medical sociology. I choose the latter particularly because of the attention placed by the discipline on the hiatus of the lived body as sociological agent, when traditionally sociology has avoided or underutilised the idea of the individual as inhabiting a material body. I refer primarily to Turner and Game, who speak specifically of the benefits of adopting a more materialist conception of the lived human body as a valuable perspective in sociology[21]. I then look to the self as authorial position, looking to Probyn for the validity of the approach[22]. Looking to anthropology and the methodologies of auto-ethnography, I call on Hochschild's views on incorporating the self to view the expression of my personal interaction with whiteness and maleness that I incorporate into the materialisations that form part of the dissertation[23]. I further suggest that "Undisciplined Theory", as suggested by Genosko, may perhaps be an appropriate approach to an interdisciplinary study of whiteness and maleness such as the present one, which almost by definition does not fall within the parameters of the existing disciplines and methodologies whose formulations are indeed an aspect of the concern of categorisation of the performance of whiteness and maleness[24].

I follow this with Materialisation 1, which reflects on my birth and early childhood, as I remember it through the lens of a 32-year old nominally white male, and during which I was inculcated into the performance of my identity.

I then look to narrative as a legitimate way of looking at personal identity, looking particularly to Hinchman and Hinchman, who suggest that this is a valid and worthwhile approach, and calling on Game who advocates a more narrative approach to sociology. I call on Bhabha for his approach to nation as narration, and follow with Cixous' feminist perspectives on the subject[25].

Materialisation 2, which follows, is a screenplay I have written for a 15-minute short film that traverses the issues faced by two characters who face their own sense of racialised and gendered identities, and which is connected to elements of the preceding chapter by materialising the idea of identity as a narrative text.

Chapter 2 looks to the question of power, from a postmodernist perspective. I speak particularly of Foucault's ideas of the systemic rather than hierarchical nature of power, in the context of

[21] Turner, BS- Regulating Bodies- Essays in Medical Sociology (Routledge, London and New York, 1992); Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991)
[22] Probyn, E- Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (Routledge, London, New York, 1993)
[23] Hochschild, AR- The commercialisation of intimate life- notes from home and work (university of california press, berkeley, los angeles, london, 2003)
[24] Genosko, G Undisciplined Theory (Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1998)
[25] Hinchman, LP & Hinchman, SK (eds)- Memory, Identity, Community- The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997); Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991); Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990); Cixous, H 'Difficult Joys' in Wilcox, H, McWatters, K, Thompson, A, Williams, LR The Body and the Text- helene Cixous, Reading and Teaching (St martin's Press, New York, 1990) especially pp14

discourse, and looking to a range of contemporary theorists' views in this respect, particularly Foucault's ideas of discursive creation[26].

Materialisation 3 again reflects on my childhood experiences, connecting to the ideas of discursive creation and power in the context of the discursive creation of my childhood.

I then look to concepts of power and the self in the context of knowledge, language and social discipline, looking to Game's understanding of psychoanalytic theory, particularly that of Lacan and Freud, together with Hegelian conceptions of knowledge and institutional power[27].

Materialisation 4 is my reflections on how I myself have perpetuated the power structures and rules that I learned as a young child in the years before adulthood.

In Chapter 3, I look to the stability of western conceptions of space, time and memory, speaking particularly of Game's conceptions thereof, in the context of Bergson's theories of multiplicity, as compared with non-western ideas of space and time as being mutable, and therefore unstable[28]

I follow with reflections on my adult life as Materialisation 5, which connects to the idea of space and time in that this materialisation does not rely to the same extent on the exigencies of time and memory as those of my youth and childhood due to the relative recent nature of my memories.

In chapter 4, I turn to the dissertation's prime theorist, Judith Butler, for an exploration of the inherent instability of both gender and sex as categories, followed by discussion on the unstable nature of race as category, using Bhabha and Said as primary theorists[29].

This I follow with the script rationale for the screenplay by way of Materialisation 6.

Chapter 5 again looks to Butler for the ways in which identity can be destabilised, together with the postmodernist views on the body as locus of destabilisation of identity[30]. I looking to such theorists as Kristeva, as she reads Lacan, Foucault and Bloom as he looks to psychoanalytic theories to review race and ethnicity in South Africa[31].

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[26] especially those of Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991) and Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994) particularly McGowen, R "Power and Humanity, or Foucault among the Historians", ibid

[27] Lacan and Freud as discussed in Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology ibid; Hegel as discussed by Kolb, D the Critique of Pure Modernity- Hegel, Heidegger, and After (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986); Instiitiutional Power as discussed by the theorists in Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994)

[28] looking particularly at Castoriadis, (DA Curtis, ed & trans) World in Fragments- Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1986)

[29] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- ibid; Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration ibid; Said, E Orientalism ibid

[30] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, ibid

[31] Kristeva, J Desire in Language: a Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art ((Roudiez, L, ed) NY, Columbia University Press, 1980); Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, ibid & Foucault, ed (trans Richard McDougall) Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite ibid; Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa ibid

I turn to Springer who looks at the postmodern body as locus of challenge, in terms of the absent body in cyberspace, as well as the sexed/gendered and racialised body of the cyborg[32]. I also look to Golding, especially as he looks to Nietsche and Baudrillard's understanding of the body, as well as theories on the transgendered body for possibilities of change and destabilisation of whiteness and maleness[33].

I conclude with the possibility inherent in the white male of performing other ways of being, looking to Pitts in Materialisation 7 as she discusses the modified body[34].

This dissertation is in some ways difficult to theorise, partially because it is so personal a work, based inherently on my individual journey, and therefore perhaps not applicable to all whiteness and all maleness, and partially, particularly looking at whiteness, because

> this property of whiteness, to be everything and nothing is the source of its representational power… The colourless muticolouredness of whiteness secures white power by making it hard, especially for white people and their media, to 'see' whiteness. This of course makes it hard to analyse[35].

Perhaps it is also difficult because, as Herman Melville so aptly put it,

> …as in essence whiteness is not so much a colour as the visible absence of colour, and at the same time the concrete of all colours: it is for these reasons that there is such a dumb blankness, full of meaning in a wide landscape of snows- colourless, all colour of atheism from which we shrink?[36]

Which gives me hope because perhaps what we should do is, rather than theorise what whiteness and maleness "is", theorise what it "isn't", and what it "could be". Which in turn implies that the performance that I suggest which is whiteness and maleness has unlimited possibilities and potentials.

[32] Springer, C- Electronic Eros, Bodies and Desire in the Post-Industrial Age (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1996)
[33] Golding, S (author, editor)- The Eight Technologies of Otherness (Routledge, London, New York, 1997)Baudrillard, J- Fatal Strategies- (Paris: Semiotext(e)/Pluto, 1983, 1990)
[34] Pitts, VL"Subversive Bodies, Invented Selves" In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003)
[35] Richard Dyer, 'White', Screen, vol 29, no 4 (1988), 45 – 46, quoted in "The white issue" by Vron Ware in Golding, S The eight technologies of otherness ibid
[36] Herman Melville (Moby Dick, 1851 (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1986) 295-6, quoted in "The white issue" by Vron Ware in Golding, S The eight technologies of otherness ibid

Chapter One - Disciplines, Methodologies and Discourses

When starting out on this dissertation, I was sure that I wanted to study race and gender from my personal perspective. I approached the topic from various disciplines, and spoke to a number of lecturers in various departments, looking to Anthroplogy, Sociology and Media Studies as possible starting points. It became clear that these departments did not quite fit with the tenor of the study. It was when I approached the Centre for African Studies that I realised that the interdisciplinary focus is the most appropriate, since the core of the topic is, to my mind, by its very nature interdisciplinary.

I was in the fortunate position of not inherently being bound to a single discipline, since I have a somewhat broad, humanities-based academic history, the majors in my undergraduate degree being English and Law, followed by a LLB. I was at a disadvantage in that I found it difficult to place my study firmly in a discipline, which obviously makes the enterprise somewhat unstable. I looked to the most logical starting-point for a study on the human being in its social context, being sociology, but with the understanding that this discipline does not necessarily sufficiently encompass the humanities-based subtleties and nuances of the route that I have followed. I have therefore adopted a 'melange' of disciplinary and methodological influences which I feel best suits the nature and scope of the topic.

The dissertation is structured in two main parts: the theoretical debate, backed up by materialisations made up of a screenplay and personal reminiscences as primary research. The primary theoretical portion is based on sociology, particularly medical sociology as it pertains to the human body, together with elements of social anthropology as starting-points. The methodology of the primary research is that of auto-ethnography and auto-biography in the form of personal reminiscences, together with a creative element in the form of the screenplay. Although I argue that there is merit in reading human experience as narrative, and I incorporate the filmic narrative of a screenplay, the methodologies of the argument are not directly those of media studies, although these do influence the reading of my personal life and those of the characters of the screenplay. I rely on what has become known as "undisciplined theory" to support the interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation.

Disciplinary Departure-Points

Throughout the dissertation I work between and amongst the established methodologies, concepts and disciplines of the social sciences. Yet the core of the work draws parallels between narrative theories of the humanities and whiteness and maleness, drawing on the relationships between the disciplines and the fields of study of feminist, postcolonialist, and queer studies, and working within the parameters of African Studies. The dissertation by no means falls squarely within the boundaries of a single discipline, and is an inter/multi-disciplinary work in the realm of the humanities.

I start with sociology, which speaks of the ways in which people interact with each other in society, and which treats the autonomous agent as the base-line of the discipline. Sociology is the study of the social world in which we live as conscious agents, and has traditionally been described as

> "'the science of society'", wherein scientists "meant that sociology was concerned with carrying out research into the causes of social phenomena such as crime, unemployment, stratification, and so on. Once causes had been established, then control and reform became possible. Sociology promised to provide a basis for both social control and reform"[37].

At the same time this traditional positivist formulation of sociology has been argued to be

> "partial- it is always taken from a particular site. Theories…do not arise out of the data, but on the contrary, our theories determine what we select to examine in the first place and the range of possible explanations available to us. For example, theories that suggest that a woman's role is natural (biologically determined) limit the questions that we can ask about women and the range of possible answers to these questions."[38]

Traditional sociological formulations are further premised on "the distinction between the social sciences and the humanities [which] assumes a distinction between social reality and representation."[39] They are based on a pre-existing social 'reality' which is observed, described and dealt with appropriately in a scientific way. It is of course dangerous to look at sociology, or indeed any discipline, as a unified or totalising entity. Without traversing the breadth of the different sociological approaches and schools, it is important to call attention to the "founding fathers" of sociology, Marx and Weber, and to a lesser extent Durkheim, whose work and following is a "sociology that speaks for sociology [and] claims to be radical and theoretical"[40]. This sociology has in many respects evaded the focus on the experiential and the lived, central to which is the idea of agency, the very foundations of the discipline[41].

[37] Abbott, P & Wallace, C An Introduction to Sociology- Feminist Perspectives (Routledge, London & New York, 1990) pp3
[38] ibid, pp3
[39] Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991), pp4
[40] Ibid p21
[41] as argue Game, ibid and Turner, ibid

Lately, sociologists have questioned the benefits of looking at the discipline in this way, ie in looking to the conception of 'agency' as the abstract, uncritical, given departure-point. Anne Game, for example, argues that

> "[w]hen sociologists speak of agency they usually refer to the agency of 'oppressed groups'- the working class, women and so on. But what I want to propose here is that the agency in question is *their* agency, the status of sociological knowledge. By focussing on the agency of the oppressed, critical reflection on the desire for agency is evaded. Giddens's emphasis on consciousness hints at this desire, for consciousness is above all about the knowing subject."[42]

It is this knowing subject as sociologist that certain sociologists are investigating, looking at the possibility that deconstructive strategies be used for the social sciences, and not just the humanities, thereby reinventing the "real-representation distinction, albeit reformulated as a context-text distinction"[43].

Looking at sociological knowledge in this way, we are able to understand the discipline as a mode of discursive production of the agent, and indeed therefore, at the performances of white men in some ways as the product of the sociological imagination.

I turn to the specific area of medical sociology as a disciplinary starting-point of this dissertation, looking at body-based biological distinctions between men and women, black and white. And I find it instructive to look to the narrative of the body as a point of departure, taking the perspective that the body is a site (and indeed a sight) of discursive manufacture of identity.

As Turner says:

> "The idea of the body as representation, and in particular as a representation of the fundamental features of society, is not a recent development. Anthropologists, especially through the influence of Mary Douglas, have studied the body as a narrative of social processes and social structures. However, in contemporary social theory, as a consequence of the growing interest in 'deconstructionism' in the work of Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, it is fashionable to regard the body as text, or as the effect of a discourse. The body is socially constructed through discourses- medical, moral, artistic, commercial. These ideas have a number of consequences. They problematize 'the body' and make any essentialist notion of the body as a living organism, which could be studied through the neutral gaze of science, difficult to sustain. Social constructionism- the view that the body is fabricated by scientific discourses in medicine- calls into question the claims of expert knowledge. These deconstructive, critical readings of the body- for which I have great sympathy- are normally regarded as 'antihumanist', because they challenge the modernist understanding of knowledge, subjectivity and the subject-object relationship. The Text replaces the knowing, conscious Author; knowledge is an effect of textuality not subjective comprehension.... The problem which dominates *Regulating Bodies* is ... to acknowledge how our perspectives on the body are the product of social constructions, and to retain an appreciation for the phenomenological nature of the lived body"[44]

He goes on to note that "[t]he absence of the body from social theory is not an unimportant or insignificant lacuna. The absent body implies and poses major problems for the formulation of a sociological perspective on the human agent, agency and human embodiment. If we adopt the idea of sociology as the scientific study of action, then we require a social theory of the body,

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[42] Game ibid, pp6
[43] Ibid pp4
[44] Turner, BS- Regulating Bodies- Essays in Medical Sociology (Routledge, London and New York, 1992) Author's preface- p8

because human agency and human interaction involve far more than mere knowlegeability, intentionality and consciousness."[45] He calls attention to the questions raised in sociology on what counts as an 'agent', and need to "avoid the conventional conflation of people with parts by being more clear about the difference between social system analysis and social analysis"[46], arguing that if collective action is about social entities such as class and state, then perhaps the question of the body is relevant, but if the concern is people at the social rather than the system level, then sociology should not avoid the issue of the body. He takes Weber's claim seriously that "sociology is the interpretive understanding of social action, and that this social action is undertaken by embodied social beings" [47], as well as "the problem of the gesture in G.H.Mead's attempt to formulate an understanding of the situated and interactive character of the 'I' and the 'me'"[48], using the example of Mead's discussion of the importance of hand gestures pertaining to the central nervous system and the origins of creative thinking as typically neglected in discussions of the origins of symbolic interactionist analyses of the self[49].

Traditional sociological discourses have focussed insufficiently on the question of the lived body in its experience of life, preferring to see the social agent as in a way somehow disembodied and pre-existing the corporeality of its holder. The methodologies developed to support the discipline have also traditionally been insufficiently developed to enable a nuanced incorporation of the agent doing the living in his/her body. As Turner notes, this is particularly important in advanced industrial societies, where "we can detect a transformation, because the body in the late twentieth century is no longer the productive body. Whereas most social scientists are concerned to understand leisure as a mechanism of body production in consumer society, it seems to me that the body is being increasingly experienced, discussed and represented as a limit and as a brake on growth."[50]

As Turner explains, the analytical frameworks for the social sciences have specified foundationalist vs anti-foundationalist conceptions of the body[51]. The former seek to understand the body as a lived experience, to understand embodiment, to see how biology impacts on everyday life and human population macro organization, how historical social demographics have impacted on human history, and to investigate the relations between organic systems, cultural frameworks and social processes. The latter conceive of the body as a discourse on social relations, as a system of symbols, a metaphor for social structures, a social construction of power and knowledge in society, or perceive the body as an effect of social discourse. The parallel questions in sociology surround the debate between social constructionists and anti-

[45] Ibid P35
[46] ibid P35 quoting (Archer 1988)
[47] ibid P35 (Weber 1978)
[48] ibid P35
[49] ibid P35
[50] ibid p11/12
[51] ibid p48

constructionists. Those who oppose the concept of the social construction of reality believe that the body is independent to the discourse which represent it, while the other camp focus on the social construction by discursive practices of the body. This results in a grand debate as to whether these epistemological orientations to the body are compatible or mutually exclusive.

It is within these paradigms that I write this dissertation. Although I agree that the lived body is not sufficiently focussed on in sociological discourses, I advocate the position that the body and identity are social constructs. And furthermore, notwithstanding the focus of this dissertation on the identity of the individual, it is important, when looking on a macro-scale, to look at the contention concerning the consciousness of death not through violence, but through secret cancers, viruses and strokes, as Turner puts it, that

> "... medical and demographic developments, therefore, lend weight to the need for a new concept of modern societies as somatic. We might define the somatic society as a social system in which the body, as simultaneously constraint and resistance, is the principle field of political and cultural activity. The body is the dominant means by which the tensions and crises of society are thematized; the body provides the stuff of our ideological reflections on the nature of our unpredictable time.... The somatic society is thus crucially, perhaps critically, structured around regulating bodies."[52]

Looking to the micro-scale, he notes that

> "... Merleau-Ponty argues that perception is always undertaken from a particular place or perspective. It is not possible to talk about human perception of the world without a theory of embodiment as the 'perspective' from which observation occurs. Our perception of everyday reality depends on a lived body, because, for example, we move around a room in terms of sight, touch and smell, but even our 'higher' perceptions can never escape the legacy of our (primordial) embodiment."[53]

Of course, the body has indeed been studied from outside the Cartesian framework, in which there is a sharp division between the body and the mind, yet these starting-points are arguably insufficient. Turner notes that this underdevelopment can be found in the (primarily German) tradition of philosophical anthropology rooted in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, whose approach to the nature of human existence was the principal influence behind the philosophical anthropology tradition of analysis, less commonly referred to as 'phenomenological anthropology'. Turner narrows this frameworkto include influential writers like Arnold Gehlen, Helmuth Plessner, F.J.J Buytendijk, A Blok, A Portmann and J Von Uexkull. Looking to a broader framework, he links the idea of philosophical anthropology to the work of Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger.[54]

Max Weber's conception of personality and action is an important concept in the context of this dissertation: "Action is human behaviour 'when and to the extent that the agent or agents see it as subjectively *meaningful*' and action is 'social', the meaning, which is 'intended by the agent or

[52] Ibid p42/3
[53] Ibid p42/3
[54] ibid p38

agents involves a relation to *another* person's behaviour[55]" Turner notes that Weber's building blocks for sociological theory appear to attack any reification of sociological terms, where the latter defined sociology as a science which attempts to interpret the meaning of the actions of individuals in social relationships. For Weber, sociology excludes an event, external behaviour towards material objects, internal behaviour such as solitary prayer, but that certain types of social action are within its purview, such as:

1. Rational action, in terms of selecting a means appropriate to a given end (*zweckrational)* or
2. Rational action in attempting to achieve some absolute value (*wertrational), or*
3. Effective action: 'the result of current emotional impulses and states of feeling'
4. Traditional behaviour, which involves 'the expression of a settled custom'[56]

This has certain Implications with respect to the sociology of the body. It is difficult to sustain the distinction between reactive behaviour like a set of of 'natural events', internal behaviour and meaningful social action. We have to question what Weber means by 'individual human beings', as well as how agents recognise other agents. Being a competent social agent requires memory, but memory is social, and the body is crucial here in that without a body neither action nor memory are possible. Weber's analysis ignores this element, giving privlege to rational action (especially means-end rationality).

Turner reviews Social-Construction Theory, which he notes is strongly influenced by Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann in terms of working out a systematic theoretical bridge between the voluntaristic theory of action and the biological foundations of the human organism as a set of constraints.

Berger held that humans don't have a fixed set of instincts, the satisfaction of which is attached to a limited range of objects, nor do they have a species-specific environment. They do however have cultural and social constraints

> "In the absence of a species-specific reality, human societies are involved in the endless tasks of social construction of social orders, the production of social legitimation and the maintenance of 'plausibility' structures. Against the infinite possibilities of social construction, human beings are faced by the threat of chaos, de-legitimization and consequently homelessness" [57]

In this conception, there are three moments as concepts for the social: externalization, objectification and internalization. Humans make their social reality, which shapes human experience of reality, which is in turn an objective structure that determines social agents. Berger, however, reworks Marxist reification as alienation in an interesting way, arguing that "only when the frailty of social relations can be experienced as an external, objective and reliable fact [can] humans have the confidence in the security and validity of the world. The

[55] *Economy and Society,* (Runciman 1978:7), quoted in Turner, BS- ibid pp78
[56] Turner, BS- ibid pp78, quoting (Runciman 1978 28-9)
[57] Turner, BS- Regulating Bodies- Essays in Medical Sociology (Routledge, London and New York, 1992) p82

satisfaction of the problem of theodicy requires the alienation of human beings"[58] Turner argues that the problem with Berger is that he conflated and confused certainty with meaning, precluding the possibility of the autonomy of the agent. For Berger "man *is* a body.... On the other hand, man *has* a body. That is, man experiences himself as an entity that is not identical with his body, but that, on the contrary, has that body at it's disposal'[59] But Berger is not concerned with everyday reality, in that the body does not play a large part in his ideas of identity, and did not try to integrate the ideas of intentionality, phenomenology of the body and the social dynamics of identity.

Two more modern versions of structuration theory are those of Giddens and Bourdieu. As discussed by Tuner, Giddens defended the idea of the knowledgeability of the social actor, referring to practical and discursive consciousness[60]. He tries to avoid the static dualism of agency and structure, insisting rather that we should look at how in everyday life the social structures which make all action possible are reproduced in the performance of those actions. His approach is to take sociology as an interpretative approach to action, while moving beyond the traditional dualities of action- structure, objective-subjective, materialist-idealist.

Turner argues that Giddens' account of structure depends on a vague idea of 'rule' which excludes the idea of structure as a constraint.[61] He also looks at a duality of structure which looks at interaction which doesn't overcome dualism. More importantly, Giddens fails to make serious reference to the body.

Bourdieu's sociology incorporates, in a general role, the body which is important to his ideas of physical capital, occasionally subsumed under the broader category of cultural capital. But the body as a social product is produced in a space by sport, leisure and consumerism, and as Turner argues, is the consequence of (class) practices and is an essential element of the reproduction of class inequalities. "[In Bourdieu] [w]e can thus see society as an organisation of fields which are the sites of individual and collective struggle over the production and consumption of cultural goods"[62]

[58] Turner, BS- Ibid p82
[59] Berger and Luckmann 1966:48
[60] Turner, BS- Ibid p82
[61] Turner, ibid P89
[62] Turner, ibid P89

Methodological Approaches

When approaching this dissertation I was faced with certain concerns pertaining to methodologies. It soon became clear that the social-sciences methodologies of sociology are inappropriate for this dissertation, since traditional sociological methodologies allow little leeway in the academic being at the same time writer and subject, particularly since the dissertation largely concerns the lived human body as locus of personal identity. I was forced to look farther afield, to the arenas of Anthroplology and Media Studies for method, and I have found that auto-ethnography, together with scriptwriting are the best means of conveying the sense of whiteness and maleness at my disposal, methodologies hybridised with the literature review that forms the main focus of the dissertation.

Auto-Ethnography

It is precisely because of the lack of convincing closure around embodiment in sociology that I call on the methodologies of anthropology in this dissertation, more particularly an anthropology of the body, as developed through the work of Mary Douglas, Marcel Mauss and Robert Hertz to name but a few[63]. The anthropological focus on the symbolic significance of the body and on the use of the body in the determination of identity in sacrifice, mortification, and scarification in rites of passage are particularly important in looking at the identity in the context of the performance of whiteness and maleness.

In order to avoid the pitfalls of a totalising approach to society that befalls many sociologists in the discussion of their 'agents', I choose an element of auto-ethnography to incorporate into the dissertation. Yet this is not an unproblematic choice. The distance by definition created between the ethnographer, auto- or otherwise, and the subject of discussion is problematic in its implicit authorial stance. The ethnographer cannot hope impartially and independently to capture the 'truth' of his/her subject. There is always an element of the ethnographer's subjectivity implicit in the descriptions of the subject. As Mark Neumann remarks of ethnography[64]:

> "As a form of institutional and scientific investigation, ethnographic reports privileged the "neutral" voice of the writer over the authority of subjective and personal experience. Yet, elements of fascination, adventure, romance, and desire leak through, suggesting how ethnographic discourse functions as location for addressing issues of identity, place, and uncertainty in modern life".

More particularly, auto-ethnography serves to explain the essence of things in ways that cannot be captured by an externalised, 'impartial' (and always to some extent authorial) voice. David Payne, in his essay "Autobiology", says it extremely well:

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[63] See "Collecting Ourselves at the End of the Century" in Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing (Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, London, New Delhi, 1996)
[64] "Collecting Ourselves at the End of the Century" in Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing (Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, London, New Delhi, 1996) p172 et seq, p 176

> The ideas and stories of this essay are concerned with the location of the body in the productions of our discourse. Our various discourses of power and control do in fact *locate* (author's italics) the body within symbolic, mythic worlds that *dislocate* the body and its ownership from the self. The consequences of this phenomenon are a central concern of contemporary feminist, ideological, and ethical research... the personal narrative attempts to write from the site of my body- where it was, what it was doing, what was done to it. The theoretical text is also a story, but one told through my intellectual exploration of the themes and ideological critiques of contemporary scholarship. Even so, this theory also renarrates the site of my body in an ideological universe. [65]

It was with this in mind that I took a second look at my starting-point, and reconsidered the appropriateness of a social sciences-based approach to a dissertation which is almost by definition a humanities-based enterprise- it is after all about reading and writing the poetry of personal identity and its performance, rather than facts and statistics about the make-up of a social group[66]. So I move from sociology, and into language and media studies, which inform my approach much more directly.

The Writer as Reader, the Reader as Writer

Looking at identity from the perspective of the humanities, rather than the social sciences, we are able to look at identity in the context of reading and writing, rather than social habits and structures. In doing so, it becomes apparent that it is in some ways impossible to extract the roles of reader and writer from each other. The reader becomes writer, and the writer becomes reader. In my choice of incorporating a screenplay, I must approach the question of how I, as script-writer, should read my own writing, as well as the subject-matter on which it is based, and critically approach both my script and the academic portion of the work, and how the two inform each other. It is equally important to be able to contextualise the creative materialisations, so that the dissertation maintains a sense of internal integrity. Hence my choice of auto-ethnography by means of the reminiscences in the materialisations that I incorporate.

In so doing, and at the same time reflecting on the body as both text/discourse and the mechanism of action of the embodied agent/author, I incorporate some of the narratives that form part of my own story, and that do not remain where they are told, squarely and comfortably within the bounds of a single discipline. My undergraduate major being English, I am schooled in the essential perspectives of the humanities, through literary discourses, through symbolism and analogy, and it is the style of writing that 'feels' right for this subject (the topic of whiteness and maleness), and for this subject (this particular white male).

In the context of the social sciences, this personal narrative is somewhat unusual, and in the traditional academe, frowned upon, from the perspective that it is 'unscientific' to discuss the world from any position other than that of the objective, disconnected, unemotional

[65] ibid, p49 et seq

[66] as I will discuss later with particular reference to Butler's performativity theories in Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990) and Bhabha's ideas of hybridity in Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990)

practitioner[67]. Broadening my methodologies to incorporate a humanities-based influence allows me the space to 'interview' myself and better to understand my circumstances, my world, my life. So I choose auto-ethnography, in a way that, Bhabha notes:

> "the ethnographic demands that the observer himself is a part of his observation and this requires that the field of knowledge- the total social fact- must be appropriated from the outside like a thing, but like a thing which comprises within itself the subjective understanding of the indigenous. The transposition of this process into the language of the outsider's grasp- this entry into the area of the symbolic of representation/signification- then makes the social fact 'three-dimensional'. For ethnography demands that the subject has to split itself into object and subject in the process of identifying its field of knowledge; the ethnographic object is constituted 'by dint of the subject's capacity for indefinite self-objectification (without ever abolishing itself as subject) for projecting outside itself ever-diminishing fragments of itself'.[68]

It is further important that I employ means that will do more than simply record the society I see around me, for I am after all an integral part of that society. I prefer rather to follow a more pro-active approach to cultural studies, one that is more in line with Lawrence Grossberg's definition:

> "Cultural Studies is concerned with describing and intervening in the way discourses are produced within, inserted into, and operate in the relations between people's everyday lives and the structures of the social formation so as to reproduce, resist and transform the existing structures of power "[69]

Some may think of this enterprise as rather tricky, which it is. However, given the personal rather than academic motivation for my undertaking the project in the first place, I can find no alternative. I find Hochschild's view in this respect compelling:

> "some colleagues I respect consider it risky to link a personal journey to an intellectual interest, because doing so reveals a personal 'bias'. If by 'bias' we mean a 'mental leaning or inclination'- which is one definition *Webster's New World Dictionary* suggests- then yes, it does. The self is an instrument of inquiry. In the end we have no other. To understand the childhood origins of an intellectual passion is to understand the possibilities and limitations of that instrument, the better to see what other instruments one needs to know the world. But such subjectivity- what, it turns out, *drives* us- does more than just that. It shapes what we expect and wish, and so it shapes how the world surprises us. So, our subjectivity, with the wealth of comparisons it implants in us, transforms us into tourists of ourselves, visitors of the odd sights of everyday life. It removes the dull sense that anything at all is obvious. Every social scientist has his or her subjectivity: the question is how we use it." [70]

Max Weber, in his essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy", speaks of the "hair-line which separates science from faith" [71]. Hochschild follows Weber, saying that we correctly rely on values to decide what we must understand and to which purposes we should put them. Between these, Weber speaks of a value-neutral middle stage of "finding the truth", where he saw values as the source of bias. Hochschild rather sees the problems of childhood as creating a quest backlighting our findings, requiring us to continually question our values. I agree with

[67] discussed in Probyn, E Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (Routledge, London and New York, 1993
[68] Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990), pp301
[69] (1988a:22) quoted in Probyn, E Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (Routledge, London and New York, 1993 (p2)
[70] AR- The commercialisation of intimate life- notes from home and work (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2003) p6
[71] Weber, 1963, p416 quoted in Hochschild, AR- ibid p6

Hochschild in that it is difficult to see how we can "find this truth" (of course here I mean one of many "truths" that hold for me in a variety of circumstances) without guidance from these very values.

The Self as Authorial Position

In including personal perspectives into an academic piece leads to the question of how far do I place myself from the arguments I propose? Do I acknowledge my personal motivations and put them to one side, or, risking something in the process, do I continue to take my personal perspectives as valid and validating, rather than putting them to the rigorous testing of 'scientific proof' and taking an 'objective standard' as the benchmark alone?

I approach the question of whether this dissertation is a legitimate piece of academic writing, or simply proselytising. I am compelled to stand both inside and outside the work, in order to ensure that my arguments and positions hold water, given my personal interest in the perspectives of the work which ultimately allows me the freedom to extricate myself from the restrictive identities and roles of whiteness and maleness. I stand inside with my personal motivations and outside in challenging more traditional formulations of academia using legitimating references of established academics whose lead I follow, academics such as Butler, Foucault, Game, Baudrillard and Bhabha, and who are forming a growing field of study, particularly that of the body into which I fit[72].

The dissertation seeks to link into some kind of response to the question of 'what is self'. Methodologically, however, it is of course necessary to look at the authorial voice that I adopt here, both as script-writer and academic writer, autobiographer, artist, before we even get to the metaphysical questions of "what is white and male or its performance?".

I follow Probyn's position, as she talks about the use of experience in theory, that there is a centrality of imagination in the project[73]. She describes 'self', and I paraphrase here, as a 'limit-attitude', where we work at the very edges and ends of ourselves to envision change, thereby being able to break into other realms of possibility. She refers to the Althusserian idea of a problematic as being a relation to the presence of problems and concepts. In other words, a problematic is 'a conjunctural question', not 'a universal or immutable configuration' (Probyn's terminology). She suggests that there are three analytic possibilities for experience. Either experience speaks to the composition of social formation, or it can be overwhelming and work to conceal the connections between the different structures, or alternatively the critic's own

[72] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- ibid; Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, ibid; Foucault, M- The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure-ibid; Foucault, ed (trans Richard McDougall) Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite ibid; Foucault, M (trans AM Sheridan-Smith) the Archeology of Knowledge ibid; Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology ibid; Baudrillard, J- Fatal Strategies- (Paris: Semiotext(e)/Pluto, 1983, 1990)Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration ibid

[73] Probyn, E Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (Routlegde, London and New York, 1993, p6

experience can impel analysis of his/her differentiated relations to levels of social formation. All of these inform this piece.

Probyn argues around the question of placement of the centre, Freud's "unheimlich" vs "heimlich", making the unknown known, saying that 'reality' can successfully be grounded in the epistemological self as a bridge to ontology[74]. Here there is similarity between problems of academic reading (and translating) of the 'other' (black, female, gay etc) and reading anyone who is not me- along the argument that we can never understand any other person, since everyone is translating personal experience in what they perceive to be common language. In the context of ethnography, Probyn refers to Rabinow's postulation of 'otherness' as the necessary result of different historicised perspectives, a position which therefore allows two sets of 'otherness' only partially articulable.

With reference to materialising locations she speaks of 'images and selves', emotion vs science, and of Deleuze who argues that we need to think in terms of the double which is never a projection of the interior but an interiorisation of the outside[75]. In this way, we perhaps avoid the question of justification of the self as author. Foucault takes this idea further, albeit in a different direction, when he, in reading Kant, advocates asking where we are now in this space and time, as against Descartes asking who we are as everywhere, anywhere at any moment[76].

The dissertation makes use of three main writing positions: postcolonialist, postmodernist and feminist, which are juxtaposed and intertwined within the different sections, and read with each other by way of reflection on concerns of the stability of white male identity, together with the autobiographical, screenwriting and bodyart materialisations.

I wrote a screenplay for a short film as part of the materialisations of this dissertation because of the nature of the filmic process, and how that links in to the topic under review. The dissertation sets out how personal identity can and should be read as narrative, where individuals have the ability to write their own sense of self. Yet this ability is not unbounded. As I will show, all of our identities are written and performed according to our circumstances, our environments and our perspectives, as they are by ourselves and the choices we make[77]. In this respect the creation of identity is a narrative one, much the same as the filmic process is used by film-makers to collaborative manipulate audience perspectives. As Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis note, "...point-of-view is one of the most important means of structuring narrative discourse and one

[74] Probyn, E Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p6 "chapter three- Moving Selves and Stationery Others- Ethnography's Ontological Dilemma"
[75] ibid, chapter 4; ibid p 88- Deleuze (1986: 105)
[76] Ibid, Chapter 5- "Technologising the Self- Foucault and le Souci du Soi", P108
[77] see particularly my explorations of Judith Butler and Anne Game, Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990) & Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991)

of the most powerful mechanisms for audience manipulation"[78]. Film also arguably engages with the unconscious more than any other medium, to the extent that "...film's images and sounds are not meaningful without the (unconscious) work of the spectator, and it is in this sense that every film is a construction of its viewer" [79]. It is for this reason that I choose film as the medium that reflects both the possibilities and the challenges to the character creation that is available both to the actors in a film and people (notably in the context of this dissertation the white male) in 'real life'.

Undisciplined Theory

This dissertation is a melange of discourses and traditions, borrowing from some of the epistemological and ontological understanding of whiteness and maleness from other disciplines, or no disciplines at all. I like to think that I am in some ways adding to the melting pot of 'Undisciplined theory', which "understands its position in the between as an occasion to theorise ambivalence" [80]. Genosko posits 'Ambivalence' as of use to the undisciplined theorist only in the sense that its theorisation is a creative response to 'being in the between'. It is not a resolution, but a way of occupying distress and making it liveable. Theory, he says, as placed in the realms of specific disciplines, is set up as the sign-posts of mental activity, and "hangs in the axes of disciplinary differentiation which structure it, signifying, within a given discipline, a recognizable concept, practice, text, name or group, and in the between, it relies upon the disciplines that surround it and other few-and-far-betweens."[81] Yet theory is inherently unstable, and this instability is celebrated within each discipline. There is no absolute truth in any discipline. The academy thrives on disagreement and differing viewpoints, and in recent years the concept of interdisciplinarity has gained ground, having become

> "...subject to a widespread institutional orthodoxization that transforms the between into a discipline in its own right., with its own codes, specialists, and graduates, who may have little or no interest in theory... In such cases, theory becomes relatively stable. In other cases, theory, with its new modifiers, becomes a specialisation admitted- on the basis of friendly gestures that may not entail a full welcome- into traditional disciplinary practices and bureaucracies."[82]

He goes on to say that theory diverts itself through its "fundamental ambivalence, which it must feel and think", spreading instability "through ambivalence, with and against the disciplines, and the lip-service currently paid to interdisciplinarity". He claims Baudrillardian ambivalence as being dangerous, while Pasolini's ambivalence as being beyond discipline and the disciplines. His view of emotional ambivalence is similar to that of Freud which recognised as primordial and a fundamental feature of human relations, underlying the great chain of guilt. He says that

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[78] Stam, R, Burgoyne, Flitterman-Lewis, S New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics- Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and Beyond Routledge, London & New York, 1992) p84
[79] Stam, R, Burgoyne, Flitterman-Lewis, S ibid p139
[60] Genosko, G Undisciplined Theory (Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1998)
[61] ibid pp2
[62] ibid

when internalised, ambivalence gives rise to discontent, which seems to be eternal.[83] He thinks of ambivalence as a dangerous and positive force, as a guilt-machine "tending toward accommodation in the individual", with a little anxiety thrown in. The former he sees as radically anti-disciplinary, and the latter as "anxious about such aggression and experiences guilt at the thought of undisciplined behaviour". He notes that

> "The task of theory in the between is to think through the problematic of ambivalence in relation to discipline and the challenge of becoming undisciplined, as well as the consequences of moving towards indisciplinary pursuits, theoretical and otherwise, perhaps even becoming extravagant"[84]

I like to think that this dissertation, in its approaching multi-/inter-/un-disciplined theory and form, in some ways starts me on the road to becoming an "undisciplined theorist" who "'should be', to paraphrase Roland Barthes, 'that uninhibited person who shows his/her behind to the Disciplinary Father', [but] can neither dismiss nor pretend to destroy him. S/he needs to manoeuvre with subtlety, fill him/herself with unexpected moments, and never relinquish laughter....Undisciplined theorists are not starting another war. They spread instability, discomfort, hope and mistrust, and cultivate ambivalence. This is the condition of theory between and beside the disciplines"[85].

[83] ibid pp5
[84] ibid
[85] ibid, p10, ref Barthes, (1975:53)

I now turn to Materialisation 1, written in the form of an auto-ethnographic and auto-biographical reflection on my beginnings.

As I have noted, this dissertation was written partly as an academic exploration of whiteness and maleness, and partly as an exploration of my personal journey as a white male. During the beginning stages of my study I embarked on a writing expedition as a means to recollect aspects of my growth and development, to inform the elements that have informed my identity. This materialisation, together with materialisations 3, 4, 5 and 7, are the results of this journey.

In the materialisations I wanted to express elements of the unremarkable as well as the remarkable about my past, in a way that implies the intricacy of influences that make us who we are, and particularly the subtle expectations and norms that have signposted my development as a white man. I wrote the materialisations as a means of grappling with the theoretical aspects of the topic, as well as a reflection of the theories with which I was grappling, in a dialectical way. I have used the materialisations as a means of self-exploration, and self-reflection, and indeed as a reflection of my performance in the face of the various performances from which to choose in order to play the roles of whiteness and maleness

I have called Materialisation 1 "False Beginnings" because I have the sense that had I been subject to different norms and standards, I would not have developed with my particular brand of dysfunction or, on the other hand, my particular strengths. Although I of course remember nothing of my birth, in this materialisation I recount certain information of my circumstances which I came to understand in later years, and which must have impacted on my new-born sense of self. I understand, through regression therapy, that my adoption and the ways in which I have been brought up by my adopted family, has informed the performance of my identity in that it underlies a sense of dislocation and 'outsideness' that I have always felt. As I learned more about my biological heritage, I came to understand more about what has been omitted from my developing sense of identity, how I have become a particular white male, rather than any other kind. I realise that if it weren't for my adoption, I would in many ways be a very different person.

Materialisation 1: Reminiscences of a White Male- False Beginnings

I was born Michael James Sheard, on the second of August 1972, to a young unwed woman whose parents came to South Africa from the UK in the fifties, and who was already parenting a sixteen month old son. Within six weeks of my birth I was adopted by Mr and Mrs TJ Theo, who renamed me Lincoln John Theo, the official name on my birth certificate since 1973.

I have always known that I am adopted, but only found out at the age of twenty-nine that I had a previous name, an identity other than that which to I have become accustomed. It intrigues me that, had circumstances been different, I would now have had a different public identity, a different name, a different identity number. I would have been a different person. I would have thought about myself in a very different way. I would have had no affinity for the peculiar spelling and sound-formation of the world 'Lincoln', and I would never have associated my name with the image of a small black cat being picked up by the scruff of its neck, as I did for many years in my childhood. This classic case of Saussure's semiotic understanding of the arbitrary nature of language, the dissonance between signifier and signified in denotation and connotation, is certainly a very real concept in my life[86]. I have a very tenuous hold on my own 'signification'.

Similarly amazing to me is that somewhere out there I have an older brother. I have never met him, I do not know if he is even alive. I often wonder what life would have been like with a brother rather than a sister, or a brother and a sister, or no siblings at all. I could not imagine not having had a sister, who has shared with me untold moments of weeping and laughter, frustration and joy, and as many secrets as we both have. Yet I could have had a brother, and who is to say that I would not have been a different person for it? Who is to say that I would not have thought about the world in vastly different ways if I had had the opportunity of sharing 'little boy things' with him rather than 'older brother/younger sister' things with Cathy. Who is to say that I would still be gay, still be academically inclined, creative, temperamental, moody, opinionated, gentle, and all the other things that I believe I am, not to mention all the things I don't believe, but am told that I am? My family has been an integral part of my journey, in ways that are not apparent, and that I would not be who I am if it were not for their influence.

I know very little about my biological mother, the only information coming from a childrens services report drafted at my birth. I believe on a subconscious level I have always felt betrayed and rejected, although I have always consciously been aware of my (adopted) mother's love. (I want to call her my adopted mother for clarity, but that does not ring true- she is my mother, and any other label would fail to indicate the nature and extent of the bond that she and I have). She always provided everything I needed, and much of what I wanted, albeit strictly according to her paradigm of what was necessary and approved of. Her thoughtfulness and giving nature I cannot fault. In fact it is this giving that has created me in many of the ways I am now, borne of my mother's morbid fear of losing me, the one thing that brought her sanity when she was afraid of never being able to have the children she so desperately wanted but could not bear herself.

I similarly know very little about my biological father, save that his surname was apparently Brink, and that his father owned a panelbeating firm. Although he purportedly spoke English as a first-language, his surname leads me to think that his ancestry was Afrikaans. Which in turn makes me partly biologically Afrikaans. Which in turn may

[86] Saussure de, F Course in General Linguistics Eds C Bally and A Sechehaye (NY, McGraw Hill, 1966)

mean that I have 'black' blood in me, given that many earlier generations of white South Africans were the subjects of the 'dreaded plague' of 'miscegenation'. Many so-called white South Africans' lineages are sprinkled with 'non-white' genes, amongst which legend holds our own in some quarters esteemed Maria Van Riebeeck, wife of the infamous Jan, who was allegedly 'oriental' from the Dutch East Indies and although referred to as 'Dutch', was of Malaysian or Indonesian. Given such tests for race during apartheid as the infamous 'pencil test', although never proved, to gauge ethnic origin, my blood could run black a lot nearer than three hundred years ago. Who knows, maybe my great great grandmother was a Dutch slave from the Orient, or perhaps my great-grandmother was a 'coloured'. Of course there has been much hysteria about this subject, comment on which is excellently documented by Saul Dubow[87].

Which all makes my biological identity as white very tenuous and contentious.

I have come to understand one of my most basic drives: fear. Fear of being deserted, fear of love being taken away, fear of confirmation of the veracity of my feelings of unworthiness, fear of insufficient money, support, and worth. I am learning to manage my pathology, I am learning how to manage what Fanon has termed the 'abandonment neurotic' drive within me:

> "Oh, those tears of a child who had no one to wipe them. … He will never forget that he was apprenticed so young to loneliness…. A cloistered existence in which I learned too soon to meditate and to reflect. A solitary life that in the end was profoundly moved by trifles- it has made me hypersensitive within myself, incapable of externalising my joys or my sorrows, so that I reject everything that I love and I turn my back in spite of myself on everything that attracts me."[88]

As Fanon describes:

> "What is going on here?… I do not want to be loved… Because once, very long ago, I attempted an object relation and I was *abandoned.* I have never forgiven my mother. … I will make someone else suffer, and desertion by me will be the direct expression of my need for revenge. That… is called "putting oneself to the proof in order to prove something."… I adopt a defensive position."[89]

And so, I embarked on a traumatic, yet so far rewarding life, in the company of other small 'white boys', all over the country.

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[87] Saul Dubow, in Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa (p188) makes mention of "the metaphor of blood manag[ing] to explain the coloured both as the result of racial mixture and also as the conveyor of a hidden taint which is apt to re-emerge from dormancy at any moment in future generations". Dubow refers to historian Leo Fouche (ed *Het Dagboek van Adam Tas 1705-1706* (London, 1914, pp xxiii-xxiv) who used this perspective to explain the 'dissolute and extravagant behaviour' of Willem Adriaan van der Stel, Governer of the Cape, whose Goanese grandmother, Monica Da Costa, was 'coloured', and therefore, due to 'throwback', Willem's character 'was not without its more admirable features, but he lacked balance and self-control, and the moral sense seems to have been entirely wanting' (C Dover *Half-Caste*, London, 1937)

[88] Fanon, F Black Skin White Masks (Grove Press, New York, 1967) p76/77, quoting Jean Veneuse, as discussed by Germaine Guex, *La Nevrose d'abandon*

[89] Fanon, F Black Skin White Masks (Grove Press, New York, 1967) p76/77, quoting Jean Veneuse, as discussed by Germaine Guex, *La Nevrose d'abandon*

Identity as Narrative

In the context of this dissertation, whose focus is on the performance of gender and race, and the potential for 'reperformance' implicit therein, as I will explore later, it is useful to approach and express personal identity as a narrative, as both a methodology and as a means of understanding the substantive make-up thereof, from a humanities- rather than a social-sciences approach.

Identity, Textuality and the Social Sciences

As already discussed above, sociology traditionally adopts an approach that almost by definition precludes interdisciplinary study, which often crosses the boundaries between the social sciences and the humanities. Sociologists have tended to be somewhat suspicious of textual approaches to the world in which we live, to be read in a variety of different ways, preferring the more 'scientific' approaches of observation and causal explanation.

> Sociology, as it is currently defined, is indeed incompatible with intellectual traditions informed by structural linguistics and psychoanalysis. It is a discipline that claims to know the whole of society, the extra-textual real, and deals in abstractions, the 'aim' of which are the combination of welfare and reform (helping others) and total change in the future.[90]

Anne Game advocates a view that diverges from this definition of sociology, and indeed of the social sciences, arguing that concerns such as desire, memory and time, and the body should be incorporated into the discipline in order to approach "the immediate, the lived of everyday life and experience, and with transformations in the now"[91]. She uses contemporary French theory, which allows her to "develop a materialist semiotics, that is, an understanding of meaning processes as both temporal and embodied,... break[ing] with distinctions between representations and the real, text and context, theory and practice. Furthermore, the deconstructive 'concept' of writing as transformation provides the opportunity to reformulate the question of social change." As she goes on to say, "Reading a text is a writing practice, and in this lies the opportunity of a rewriting of texts of the culture, in the now. A deconstructive strategy is a positive strategy of transformation: undoing is simultaneously an unmaking and a making, a process without end" [92]

It is with this in mind that I start the argument that allows the deconstruction of the 'text' of whiteness and maleness in this dissertation, a process that is followed by the possibility of the reconstruction of these identities into something more open and inclusive. It is with this in mind that I look to the creative spark, as opposed to biologically-based corporeality, as a starting-point for enunciating the boundaries of identity, and more particularly, white, male identity.

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[90] Game, A- Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991, pp ix)
[91] ibid, pp ix
[92] ibid, pp x

The Performance of Identity as Narrative Form

Reading human identity, and therefore the performance of whiteness and maleness, as a narrative is not a new enterprise. Greek mythology is tells cautionery tales of the human experience. The rationalist, Enlightenment approaches to knowledge, despite their reverence for the classics, have for the last few hundred years muted the cries to look at human experience from anything but a scientific perspective. Reading human experience as narrative, as opposed to from the perspective of the purely rationalist social sciences, is an enterprise that is gaining ground in contemporary interdisciplinary studies, on the basis that "...there has been a disenchantment with theories, especially in psychology, that portray the self as a mere "point" acted upon by external forces. Narrative, by contrast, emphasises the active, self-shaping quality of human thought, the power of stories to create and refashion personal identity"[93]. Indeed, "[n]arrative seems to offer a way out of the reification that the "mechanistic" models of human behaviour may unwittingly impose"[94]

As Hinchman and Hinchman argue, "narrative appears to reaffirm the plurality of stories that different cultures and subcultures may tell about themselves... Storytelling becomes for its supporters an act of resistance against the dominant "Cartesian" paradigm of rationality"[95].

It is to narrative that we turn when we want to find out about how thinhgs are. We look to novels, films, poetry, to add the 'real' sense of what human experience means. We look to narrative to enrich our lives, to go beyond the structural dynamics of the human experience, to add flavour to our world, and yet we are reticent to look at our own identities as narrative. We are happy to look at human lives as physical 'points' which are described by narrative, but are generally not comfortable looking at those lives *as* narratives themselves.

Yet, the elements that inform identity form an inextricable part of narrative, elements that are

> "...forms of discourse that place events in a sequential order with a clear beginning, middle and end.... [A] narrative is not just a list, nor is it even a series of case-studies or vignettes.... the sequence must add up to something: the units so ordered must have an intrinsic, meaningful connection to one another.... [M]ost narrativists do distinguish between theories and narratives, and some (eg Philip Abbott) explore the productive tensions between the two. They usually conceive of theories as attempts to capture and elaborate some timeless, essential reality "behind" the world of human events, whereas narratives undertake the more modest task of organising and rendering meaningful the experiences of the narrator in that world"[96]

This hermeneutic perspective on the human sciences is underlain by the Derridean view that "there are no lost origins, no natural guideposts, no determinate meanings- only the infinite play

[93] Mancuso and Sarbin 1986:241-42
[94] Introduction, Hinchman, LP & Hinchman, SK (eds)- Memory, Identity, Community- The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997) pp xiv-xv
[95] ibid, introduction, pp xv
[96] ibid, pp xv

of signifiers in texts"[97]. It reflects the view that meaning is rendered in, through and by texts, and that the readings themselves are informed and indeed created by texts. Yet how do we read a text and not fall into the trap of circularity by interpreting a text in terms of what we presume its constituent parts to be made, and vice versa, which in turn disallows an 'authoritative', 'decisive' or 'definitive' reading of that text? Derrida's argument is here instructive- since, he argues, everything is a text, and all interpretation is commentary upon commentary, let the text speak to us, and avoid the trap of looking for 'truth', 'knowledge' and 'reality' in the text, which both Derrida and Nietsche see as a dangerous myth. For them, presence, or self-identity, are defined in terms of what is absent, rather than what is absolute.

If we are to look at personal identity as narrative, it is informative to look at national identities, which indeed constitute personal identities, as narrative. Nation-states seek to set themselves up as separate entities from one another, entities which have individual 'national' characteristics, and 'ethnic' flavours. Manuel Castells argues, in the context of Africa,

> the relationships between ethnicity, society, the state and the economy are too complex to be reducible to 'tribal conflicts'... If ethnicity matters, the ethnic differences that are at the forefront of Africa's political scene today are politically constructed, rather than culturally rooted. From contrasting theoretical perspectives, Africanists as different as Bayart, Davidson, Lemarchand, and Adekanye, among others, converge toward a similar conclusion.[98]

He argues that in colonised spaces, delimited according to arbitrary geographical carving by the colonising poweres, ethnic identity was in many ways created in the terms of the colonisers view of the world, a state of affairs that has contined into the postcolonial era through economic disempowerment. In this respect, it is the nation that has been narrated into existence, and continues to narrate itself. As Homi Bhabha argues that "[t]he people turn *pagan* in that disseminatory act of social narrative that Lyotard defines, against the Platonic tradition, as the privileged pole of the *narrated,* 'where the one doing the speaking speaks from the place of the referent. As narrator she is narrated as well. And in a way she is already told, and what she herself is *telling* will not undo that somewhere else she is *told*.' This narrative inversion or circulation- which is in the spirit of my splitting of the people- makes untenable any supremacist, or nationalist claims to cultural mastery, for the position of narrative control is neither monocular or monologic.[99] Bhabha refutes the very idea that there can ever be a national identity, made up of a homogeneous group of people who think alike, for not all people are alike, and if they are to organise themselves into such a homogeneity, they must by definition lose aspects of their individual identities.

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[97] Hollinger, R Postmodernism and the Social Sciences- A Thematic Approach (Sage, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, 1994), pp96

[98] Castells, M End of Millennium (Blackwell, Mass and Oxford, 1998), pp105

[99] Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990), pp301, quoting J-F Lyotard and J-L Thebaud, *Just Gaming*, trans Wlad Godzich (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p41

The connection between identity and narrative needs arguably to be explored within the parameters of the similarities in make-up of each. The central feature of narrative is, as noted above, that it is a collection of events which 'add up to something', and that form a beginning, middle and end. On the surface we understand personal identity to be the way in which individuals associate themselves with others, sharing points of view and experiences, and project these in public space under an umbrella of a (or many) identities, in other words perform the narrative. The question is in what ways the specific defining elements of narrative, and their self-evident corollaries, are associable with those of personal identity. If we can differentiate between both narratives and identities respectively, each of which has to have a specific beginning and end to be identifiable, then to what extent are identity and narrative similar in form and substance? More particularly, how does the idea of individual identity conform to the necessary internal coherency of narratives and narrative performance? In order to come to terms with some of these issues, I have set out what makes sense to me as some aspects of the questions that impact on narrative and identity performance as follows:

1. differentiability between individual narratives and identities
    a. standing alone: How do both narratives and identity performance stand alone in both substance and form, and are they mutually exclusive from others, based on the premise that:
        i. Narratives are differentiable in terms of genres, which sometimes overlap, or do not contain absolute recipes for success.
        ii. Basic social identities (black, white, male, female) are differentiable from each other, often based on physical appearance. People who do not appear to conform to a specific social identity become something else in the public imagination. For example, a woman with a penis is not necessarily understood to be a woman, but rather a 'transgendered person', an 'hermaphrodite', or a 'she-male', while a black man with white skin can be seen as 'albino', or 'pigmentally-challenged', and may not be accepted as entirely 'black'.
    b. start and end: How do the extremities of both narrative and identity performance interact in terms of their start and end, and how do we approach where where one ends and another begins, based on the starting-point that:
        i. Individual narratives need a beginning and end, in order to be internally coherent.
        ii. Different personal identities can apply to individuals, even if their boundaries are not necessarily clearly articulable. When does a Portuguese Mozambiquan stop being Portuguese and start being African?
    c. corporeal reality: How does the role of the presence of corporeal human entities in the formation and maintenance of both identity and narrative play out, based on,
        i. the role of one or many 'realities'. In narrative the 'imagined' takes precedence, although the narrative must perforce be 'true to life', in order to successfully encourage audience 'suspension of disbelief'.

ii. This role of selectivity/choice in the reflection. Not all elements of a genre are necessarily incorporated into a specific narrative. Similarly, in order to collate the multitude of personalities, realities and perspectives into an identity, many important aspects of personhood are left out.

2. event and action: How do events which take place, either physically, emotionally or psychologically, inform the creation of both the performance of identity and narrative? The 'shopping list' of actions/attributes interplays in order to qualify for the identity of both narrative and personal identity. In other words:
    a. the role of predictability in terms of content or order of events or actions.
    b. the role of articulability of events or actions.
    c. the interplay between events or actions, as connected to the overarching sets of norms associated with a pre-existing narrative genre or generic identity.
3. space and time: How do space and time impact on the creation of both narrative and identity?
    a. Events in narrative take place in the intellectual/emotional space of the medium. Events/actions informing the creation of human identity take place in physical, metaphorical, (ie the mind of the society), and even metaphysical spaces, which allow the conception, delineation and perpetuation of identity as a human attribute.
    b. The concept of time in the existence and durability of a narrative and identity are important in that neither can exist without some form of time element.
4. context: How does the role of context and viewer/reader/audience perspective apply?
    a. As discussed in this paper, the reader/viewer of a narrative is in some ways as much its writer as its consumer.
    b. Similarly, the individual's identity is open to influence in determination depending on the context. For example, the Portuguese Mozambiquan can be seen as Portuguese in the context of his European Union citizenship, but African in the context of his support for the Mozambiquan football team. Is he Portuguese or African? Similarly, the 'maleness' has value in certain contexts, but not in others. The beer commercial on South African television which runs to the soundtrack of "Oh, it's good to be a man…", quickly denotes the things men are 'allowed' to appreciate, amongst which are cars, beautiful women, good food without the worrying of putting on weight. These men are carefree, independent and self-confident, all of which are valuable attributes to people trying to fall within the paradigm of 'real man'. It also slyly excludes from the domain of "real man" those who are not, or do not want to be those things, amongst which are women, men who enjoy fashion, beauty, gardening, interior design, or any of the other things that men in the real world actually do enjoy. These people are by implication not as valuable, according to the commercial.

In the context of this dissertation, we need merely to recognise that there is a range of habits and perspectives that individuals adopt and perpetuate in order for the existence of groupings of people according to the performance of their identities. This in general principle correlates with the idea that there are certain binding elements of narrative which allow us to differentiate between different narratives

For the purposes of the dissertation, in the case of both narrative and identity, it does not matter *how* these habits or expression of perspectives take place, or whether they actually take place

at all. All that matters is that there is an amorphous and omnipresent expectation that they apply to people with certain physical and/or psychological characteristics. To quote Hinchman & Hinchman again: "...the story of an individual life usually plays off on one or more historically and socially transmitted narratives, which serve as prototypes for the elaboration of personal identity. Narrative theory is always implicitly a theory of how communities are formed and maintained, and how individuals are drafted into available social roles."[100]

Narrative is about interrelations between people, how people do things and how they interrelate. So is identity, which is fundamentally about the interplay and power relations between people and groups of people. Identity is about who is better than whom, who gets included, and who gets left out.

If we are not to look at identity as tieing people down into national or personal identities, then we must acknowledge that whiteness and maleness can validly be seen as narrative and performance. Whiteness and maleness are particularly about who has the power, who interrelates in what way with whom, and who is allowed to do what. And although I write this dissertation from a white male, and therefore nominally in principle privileged, position, I do so in ther spirit of destroying ethnocentrism and self-referentiality, and to work towards the Derridean idea of *Difference*[101].

And so we look at a twofold experience of narration. The author is the narrator of the story, whether the academic treatise or the narrative of the screenplay, novel, poem or other narrative. As Cixous notes, though, "What about the authors of the author, the real authors of the author? They belong to two different species- one, of course the real biological parents, who immediately become imaginary, who are immediately transfigured' the others are texts, other writers, other books..."[102] We, as cognitively aware beings, are both the authors and the authored, both of our own lives as well as the world around us. So we must maintain a dual sense of self-awareness, of the stories that we tell, and the stories that we are, the latter which are both those of our own and others' making. And as Cixous goes on to note, "...the personality of the writer is composed of a large family of living and dead persons, sometimes with the majority of that family composed of 'women', sometimes composed of men."[103] Which preempts my discussion here in that as both the authors and theauthored, in many ways we are both male and female, since we can only be what our authors make us, composed of what they believe themselves to and others to be.

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[100] Ibid, pp xxiii
[101] See Derrida, J, Writing and Difference (trans Bass, A) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978)
[102] Cixous, H 'Difficult Joys' in Wilcox, H, McWatters, K, Thompson, A, Williams, LR The Body and the Text- helene Cixous, Reading and Teaching (St martin's Press, New York, 1990) pp14
[103] ibid pp 17

There is value in looking to ourselves as the product of our own authorship, and looking to our own bodies as the words on the page, the image on the screen. If we can do this, perhaps we will be more able to conceive of the power that we have, both as individuals and as society, to mould both ourselves and our environment. For, as Cixous warns:

> "Beware of the writer (male or female). The beginning of the history of the writer is not motherhood. Writers begin as sons, male or female, but later they become mothers when they come to think about what writing is. When you start writing usually, you don't think in those terms because you are so nervous. The craft is so difficult to master that you only think in terms of the language, of the page, of the sentence. You don't think of the ethics of writing. Later, when you start thinking in terms of the ethics of writing and reading, then you may become a mother whether you are a man or a woman. (But in our time it's mostly women who are driven by experience to think ethically.) And then you know that you are going to give birth to all kinds of persons and effects of identification. Whether you like it or not. You will be echoed, imitated (or rejected), overrated (or underrated), given undue importance- for, after all, as Thomas Bernhard once wrote, what is so mysterious in artists? We listen to them more attentively, and eventually, the day comes (may it come) when we readers realise we have stuffed them full with our hopes, illusions, and our own ideal greatness.
>
> Let us not forget the mysterious, grave, humorous cycle, where we readers are authors of the writers, we writers are both engendering and engendered... *à suivre.*"[104]

There is also value in looking at white men as their own authors/performers in a similar way to how we look at Dracula as being representative of our society. "His face was a strong- a very strong- aquiline, with high bridge of the thin nose and peculiarly arched nostrils; with a lofty domed forehead, and hair growing scantily round the temples, but profusely elsewhere. His eyebrows were very massive, almost meeting over the nose, and with bushy hair that seemed to curl in its own profusion. The mouth, so far as I could see it under the heavy moustache, was fixed and rather cruel-looking, with puculiarly sharp white teeth; these protruded over the lips, whose remarkable ruddiness showed astonishing vitality in a man of his years. For the rest, his ears were pale and at the top extremely pointed; the chin was broad and strong, and the cheeks firm though thin. The general effect was one of extraordinary pallor."[105]

The analogy between Dracula and the white man is in some ways useful. Like Dracula, the white man is bound to the identity of monster that he himself created and is at the same time foisted on him, born into a circular tragedy from which it seems impossible to escape. Both are immortal in their apparent omnipotence: the white man being nominally in control over the 'Other', the black and the female through the power of patriarchy and colonialism which were created to empower him and disempower all others, rendering them voiceless[106].

In "Figuring The Vampire: death, desire and the image", Carolyn Brown speaks of the myth of the inability of vampires to be seen in mirrors as the absence of the image or self in reflection, which can be read as the mingling of the self with the image[107]. She speaks of the vampire's

[104] ibid pp 29
[105] Dennis Wheatley Library of the Occult: Bram Stoker, Dracula (Sphere Books Ltd, London, 1974, p27)
[106] Said, E- Orientalism - 1978
[107] Golding, S The eight technologies of otherness (Routledge: New York, London, 1997), p118 et seq

body as a 'mutating metaphor for the mobility of shape, substance and desire'. She speaks of the connection between homosexual identity and the vampire in death, and of the 'other' and death. All of these are discourses that Bram Stoker himself perhaps did not intend, and perhaps could not have foreseen.

We look for identifications in the media that we consume, whether it be film, television, theatre, literature. We look for ways in which we can see ourselves and those around us in the characters we encounter. In so doing, we attribute characteristics to them, and thereby write them ourselves. It seems natural therefore that we acknowledge that we ourselves are in equal measure written by the characters that we encounter as viewers/readers not just of media, but of the world around us, and that we have an element of choice in what we do with the characters that we are always becoming.

So I turn to Materialisation 2, the Screenplay "the Clock". This work came to me in a flash of inspiration while sitting with Noeleen Murray, my supervisor.

I had been grappling with how to reflect some my perspectives of the challenges of whiteness and maleness in a way that was a little more un-selfconscious than the personal reminiscences I had been preparing, some of which I was beginning to feel were too personal to be incorporated into the dissertation. Early this year my last remaining grandparent, my grandfather, died at the age of ninety-three. He had been living in an old-age home in Johannesburg for some ten years, and had outlived all three of his wives. I was dealing with elements of guilt at not having visited him for a long time, and not having connected with him for even longer, exacerbated by my sister having come from the USA to visit him last year, when I could not even see fit to do so from Cape Town. The last time I saw him was in about 1992, when he thought that I was my cousin's boyfriend.

These low-level feelings had been mulling around inside me, and I was thinking about how his life had been, as a working-class white man, and how different both his and my sense of self would have been had the environments in which we were brought up had been different. As I sat in Noeleen's office, I saw a book on her desk that for some reason brought the date 1939 clearly to mind, together with an image of the mantle-clock that my grandfather had always had on his dresser, for as long as I can remember. This clock, I suddenly realised, was a very strong metaphor for my grandfather's life. He had been given the clock as a golden handshake on his retirement for service to the company for which he had worked for a long time, and I realised in a very real sense how the passage of time, together with our own memories, are such important elements of the development of our identities. I realised that the philosophical theories about time and memory which I discuss below have a very real impact on how we develop a sense of continuity of life, without which we would not be able to conceive of ourselves as coherent, homogeneous and rational beings with the capacity to move forward in our lives, and how this sense of continuity, of right and wrong, impacts on the expectations that we level against others and ourselves, disallowing us from reviewing who we believe we are.[108]

It also became clear to me that the narrative aspect of who we are is fundamental to the development both of who we have become, and who we are constantly becoming[109]. It is with this in mind that I decided to write a film screenplay, film being one of my passions, and being appropriate to the question of social and historical context, especially the African context, which is not based on a homogeneous and single-minded audience[110].

[108] especially those of Bergson and Freud as discussed by Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991)
[109] see the discussion of narrative above
[110] see the discussion on African Cinema in Bartlet, O African Cinemas- Decolonising the Gaze (trans Turner, C) (Zed Books, London & New York, 2000) p232 et seq

The Clock

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (MORNING)
TOM, a white man (70), sits on his bed in his room at the old-age home, surrounded by his few belongings. The room is sterile and institutional with a standard metal-framed single bed and a metal bedside table on which sit a range of medicine bottles, miscellaneous personal belongings and an old photo album. The only personal piece of furniture in the room is a large grandfather clock that overpowers the room in size and the sound of its 'tick-tock'.

A fly buzzes and the clock tick-tock's, then sounds a single chime, which reverberates strongly.

DONG

TOM looks up at the clock, then confusedly at his hands. He stands up, then sits down again, as if he can't remember what he was about to do. He stares at the clock, frowning, as if trying to remember something.

CUT: AUDITORIUM INT (1939)
TOM, as a small boy (5) sits on a bench in a crowded auditorium, swinging his legs and craning his neck to look between the heads of the people in front of him. He is sitting next to his mother, a middle-class, white woman, (30) dressed in 1930's style clothing. A General in the colonial army stands on the podium and ceremonially unveils the grandfather clock for TOM's grandfather, (65) dressed in a colonial army uniform.

GENERAL

Major Robertson, on your retirement, for your long and dedicated service to honour and glory of the Empire.

The clock strikes loudly in the auditorium. The audience applauds, and TOM's mother turns and smiles at TOM

AUDITORIUM EXT. (MID-AFTERNOON- 1939)
TOM's mother leads TOM by the hand out of the auditorium, talking to him. The guests are white and styled in late 1930's clothing. A newspaper seller holds up a newspaper with the headline "War Declared against Germany!"

TOM's MOTHER

Aren't you proud of your Grandpa, Tom? Maybe one day you'll walk in his footsteps.

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (THE SAME MORNING)
A nurse, DORIS, (45) a coloured woman, walks into the room. She is brisk and professional. TOM ignores her, fumbling as he picks up a book from the side-table and pages through it. He is trying to hide that he is feeling disoriented. DORIS puts a tray of food down on the bedside table as she speaks to TOM.

DORIS

Môre Mnr Robertson, how are you feeling today?

TOM looks at DORIS. He seems a little confused.

TOM

I seem to have mislaid my tool kit. I can't fix the radio without it. Maybe Helen knows where it is. Where is she with my coffee?

DORIS

Now Mnr Robertson, your tool box isn't here. (beat) And you know your wife passed away two years ago. But Michael will be here later for a visit.

DORIS picks up the photo album on the side-table, and puts it on TOM's lap

DORIS

There you go. Look through this, maybe you'll remember.

TOM looks through the album, page by page, and then puts it down, picking up a sausage from the plate. He stares at the grandfather clock, which is tick-tocking loudly, for some time, lost in thought.

BUTCHER SHOP INT (1949)

TOM (15) stands behind the counter of a late 1940's style butcher shop, chopping meat with a cleaver, talking to a man with a heavy Afrikaans accent.

CUSTOMER

It's about time the Nats came into government. That Brit-lover Smuts… His relaxing of influx control was turning Jo'burg into a location - just to allow cheap labour for the war… What sort of world are we leaving for our kids?

TOM (nodding in agreement)

Ja Meneer. Next thing you know, there'll be one of them serving you here! And the way they live is disgusting… (grimacing)

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (EVENING)

MICHAEL (25), very effeminate, walks in and puts a bunch of blue flowers in a vase on the dresser.

MICHAEL

Hello Grandpa. How are you feeling today? I've brought you some flowers.

TOM gets up unsteadily from the bed, leaving the album on the sidetable. He seems pleased to see MICHAEL, whose arrival seems to bring TOM back to the present. TOM shakes MICHAEL's hand.

TOM

Michael, my boy. How are you doing?

MICHAEL looks at TOM, smiling nervously. He glances at DORIS, who smiles at MICHAEL and walks out of the room. MICHAEL looks back to TOM, handing him two small screwdrivers.

MICHAEL

I'm fine Grandpa. How are you doing today? Doris tells me you've been looking for your tools. I brought you a few screwdrivers so you can fix your radio.

TOM looks less dazed as he takes the screwdrivers. He puts them on the side table.

TOM

So, my boy, how are you? How is school? … What sports are you playing? … Do you have a young lady in your life?

MICHAEL squirms nervously at the last question.

MICHAEL

Grandpa, I'm 25, I'm not at school any more. (beat) And I've never liked sport.

MICHAEL walks to the window and looks out, then turns and looks at TOM, chewing a finger nail.

MICHAEL

Grandpa, I have something important to tell you.

(pause)

Grandpa. You know I've always been different to other boys. I've always felt there's something wrong with me, something missing.

(takes deep breath)

Grandpa, I've been seeing a psychiatrist, and I've realised that I feel like I'm in the wrong body, that I should be a woman.

TOM picks up a nail clipper from the side-table, opens it and starts to clean under his nails. He does not look at Michael.

MICHAEL

There's no easy way to tell you this…

(pause)

I'm having gender reassignment. I'm having a sex change.

(pause)

It's the only way I'll be happy…

(pause)

You've always accepted me. But I have to be honest with myself, and with the people I love …

TOM continues to look at his nail clippings, which drops into the waste paper basket. He picks up the radio from the side table and twiddles with the dials. He picks up a screwdriver and undoes the back of the radio. His hands are shaking.

MICHAEL sits for a while, then gets up awkwardly.

MICHAEL

I'll be back tomorrow, Grandpa, if you want to talk about this

MICHAEL walks out. TOM continues to tinker with the radio, not looking up at MICHAEL.

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (MORNING)
DORIS enters with a tray of food, which she puts on the side-table.

DORIS

Môre Mnr Robertson. Breakfast!

TOM, sitting beside the window, is tinkering with the workings of the radio, which has been taken to pieces, with the screwdriver. He is angry, and pokes the radio viciously.

TOM (to himself)

A radio and a clock aren't the same. Different workings. Can't tell the time on a radio, can't listen to a clock. What makes people think they can start monkeying about with things, why not leave them the way they were designed?

He ignores DORIS and the food and grunts angrily.

TOM (to himself)

Damn radio! Nothing ever works the way it's supposed to! How can I listen to the news if everything breaks…

DORIS

What's wrong, Mnr Robertson?

TOM

(still turned away from her, coldly)

Mind your own business.

DORIS stiffens.

DORIS

Now, now. No need to be *onbeskof*.

TOM stops poking at the radio, and looks at his hands, which are shaking. DORIS manoeuvres TOM to the bed. TOM grudgingly allows himself to be moved, still ignoring DORIS and the food, his shaking hands upturned in his lap.

BEACH (1959- MIDDAY)

TOM (25) in a late 1950's styled bathing suit plays with his daughter (3) in the sand. The sea is the same colour blue as the flowers MICHAEL put in the vase. They are building sandcastles. A sign on the beach says "Europeans only". The old-fashioned radio (the same as the one TOM tinkers with in the previous scene) plays in the background

"bleep-bleep-bleep-bleep Today is January the 1st, 1959. the time is 1pm, and the news is read by…"

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (MIDDAY)

TOM is sitting alone on the bed, in the same position as when DORIS was feeding him, hands upturned in his lap. He is facing the grandfather clock, and rocking back and forth slightly, lost in thought. DORIS is standing beside the bed, measuring out medicine.

TOM (rambling)

Ongodelikheid. That's what the old people said. Unchristian. We were always a Christian family. Church of England. Cleanliness is next to Godliness. Family…

DORIS stops what she is doing and looks down at TOM, irritated

DORIS (under her breath)

I don't know why you're complaining. I didn't even know my *ouma*. Nor my *pa*- he ran off *God weet waar*. And *Ma*, living on the streets in Sea Point.

DORIS gives TOM his medication and walks out, turning at the doorway and looking at TOM, shaking her head

DORIS

Still, you have so little now …

TOM watches DORIS leave. We are unsure whether he heard her or not.

MIDDLE CLASS LIVING ROOM INT (1969)

TOM (35) listens to the radio (the same one as previously). The announcer notes "and the first words spoken on the moon: "One small step for man, one giant leap for mankind".

TOM

(speaking over his shoulder)

You know, we could have the technology here to enter the space race, if the coons weren't causing so many problems. Who wants to invest here with so much trouble? We look after them well, they have homes, jobs, what would they be if we weren't here for them?

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (EVENING)

MICHAEL knocks and stands in the doorway, looking very nervous, and smiling at TOM, who is standing next to the grandfather clock. TOM ignores MICHAEL, who gets tears in his eyes

MICHAEL

Grandpa….

TOM ignores MICHAEL and taps the clock

TOM

And now the clock stops. Wonder when it's my turn..?

TOM turns and looks at the photo of Michael on the side table

HOSPITAL INT (1979)

TOM (45) in late 70's clothing stands next to the bed of his daughter, cooing at a new-born baby he is holding wrapped in a blue blanket.

TOM

He is so handsome. Who's Grandpa's little man then? You are going to grow up to be big and strong, just like me, aren't you, Michael!

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (MORNING)

TOM opens the front of the grandfather clock, takes reading glasses from his shirt pocket and pokes at the clock's workings with one of the screwdrivers. He opens a small panel in the back of the clock and finds an envelope, which he turns over, surprised.

TOM

Mrs Robertson. From Maria Appolis. Hmmm?

TOM takes out a photograph of a 'coloured' woman in a maid's uniform holding a white baby, taken in the 1930's. The woman in her uniform resembles DORIS. He takes out a piece of paper from the envelope.

TOM

My birth certificate! "Mother: Maria Appolis, (beat) father: unknown, (beat) race… 'coloured'. Oh my God!

TOM unfolds the other piece of paper with shaking hands, reading aloud to himself:

TOM

"Dear Missus. I went to my family in De Doorns to have my baby. I can't take little Tom home to Cape Town- my husband will kill me- Tom is not his boy, he is Mnr Robertson's. Please *vergewe* me, as I pray God will. Please look after Tom, you are a good person. I am sorry. Maria."

TOM sits on the bed, with the papers crumpled in his hands and the photo on his lap. TOM is crying quietly.

DORIS walks in with some medicine, and sees TOM crying. He immediately stands up and walks to the window, to hide his red eyes, throwing the crumpled papers into the waste paper bin to hide them.

DORIS puts the medicine down on the side table, and walks out quietly.

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (MIDDAY)

TOM is not in the room. DORIS walks in and starts to arrange the room. She takes the crumpled papers out of the waste paper basket, smoothes them, and reads them aloud

DORIS

These look *amptelik*.

(pause)

O hemel…

OLD-AGE-HOME ROOM INT. (AFTERNOON)

MICHAEL walks in, wearing a skirt, blouse and make-up, looking more comfortable in his skin. He is holding a yellow rose, which he puts down on the side table. He takes the wilted blue flowers out of the vase and throws them in the waste paper basket, replacing them with the rose. He is nervous, but takes a deep breath, sits next to TOM, and puts his arm around TOM's shoulder. Tom allows MICHAEL's hand to rest there.

DORIS walks in with a tray of food and smiles as she sees TOM and MICHAEL. She puts the tray down and puts her hand on TOM's other shoulder.

DORIS

Oom, are you ready for your lunch?

Chapter Two- Power

Power and Discourse

Game argues that Foucault, like Freud, took 'the subject' as the object of analysis, and that "both their approaches run directly counter to any individualism. It is the recognition of the particularity of any object, be it an individual or anything else, that calls for analysis rather than 'theory'." [111] It is this precept that I find attractive in looking at the performance of identity. Many structuralist theorists prefer to look at such phenomena as social identity from the perspective of generalities and theories rather than the particular. I suppose I count myself a postmodernist in my approach from the particular to the general. Foucault may not have had the exigencies of South African society in mind, and he certainly did argue against "tak[ing] as a whole the rationalization of society or of culture"[112], but rather to analyze specific rationalities in a range of fields with 'reference to a fundamental experience'. I would argue that it is exactly this kind of 'specific rationality' that informs the creation of whiteness and maleness as performances, and negates the options for alternative modes of existence for white men.

In "the Subject and Power", Foucault works with the idea that the subject is integrally linked, and is indeed a consequence of, the relation between power and knowledge[113]. He bases his ideas on the existence of three differentiable concepts: that of the human being, the subject position, and the individual. Game explains the difference:

> The subject is a social or discursive effect; power does not work negatively over and against an already free subject (the 'individual' of liberal discourse): rather it is productive of the subject. Furthermore, power operates in and through the body: its productive effects are bodily... Foucault begins 'the Subject and Power' by stating that the goal of his work has not been 'to analyze the phenomenon of power', but rather 'to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects[114].

Working with this idea, he looks at three 'modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects'[115], the discourses of life, labour and language. All of these discourses are pertinent in the context of the performances of whiteness and maleness, since it is precisely these discourses which have created these body-based identities. Following Foucault's historical development of these disourses, and the shifts in power from the disciplinary (external) systems of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the modern (internal)

[111] Game, A- pp 57
[112] Foucault 1982 p210-211
[113] 1982
[114] Game, A pp 40 - 41
[115] Foucault, 1982: 208

regulatory power whereby individuals police themselves, whiteness and maleness can be seen as the consequence of self-regulatory membership of the society in which the subject resides[116].

McGowen argues that traditionally:

> "...we find power portrayed as violent and repressive, coercive and destructive. It seeks to control and repress. And in the modern world it has found its fullest and most negative form in the increasingly centralised power of the state."[117]

Foucault does not deny this, but he looks at it in a different way. His conception is that power is in fact productive, rather than merely repressive. He says that "the interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition, far from being the essential forms of power, are only its limits, power in its frustrated or extreme forms"[118]. He looks at power as being the basis on which social control is based, but he sees social control as the interplay between subjects that form flows of power between people and between dominant and subordinate groups of people. "For Foucault the central question is always: what permits some things to be said and not others. By this he does not simply mean what preconceptions shape our knowledge, but what existing power arrangements constitute the conditions under which something can be said."[119] He further looks at power as the means by which people are able to see reality, since it is the paradigm in which people identify themselves and others' positions.

In accordance with Foucault's conception of power as a system rather than a one-way relation of excess between the 'empowered' and the 'disempowered', in the South African context one can argue that there is a constant tension between the dominant culture of whiteness and maleness, and the subordinate cultures of blackness and femaleness. And again using Foucault's formulation, these dominant and subordinate cultures have needed each other in order to survive, in order to create and identify both themselves and others. If there were no subordinates, the dominant would not exist, and vice versa. It is a symbiotic relationship, from which it seems impossible to escape, and Foucault does not seem to see the benefit of trying to do so. He does however see the benefits of revisiting the questions of power relations in order to reevaluate the nexus of control as being at play on a micro level rather than on a macro-level, a "cluster of relations"[120].

The importance of looking at power in this way, especially in the context of whiteness and maleness, is that instead of implying a passive object against which power is levelled, it speaks of an active, self-regulating subject who determines his or her own identity and therefore struggle. It does away with the old conceptions of a system that works against impassive

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[116] Foucault, 1982: 208
[117] McGowen, R "Power and Humanity, or Foucault among the Historians" in Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault-Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994), pp 94
[118] L Kritzman (ed) Politics, Philosophy, Culture (New York, Routledge, 1988) pp 118
[119] McGowen, pp 97
[120] Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p199

individuals, who then need to revolt against an external enemy, but rather creates the conception of a system that is self-perpetuating precisely because all elements of that system are in unconscious collusion as to who holds, and who is denied, power (in its repressive formulation). This of course does not negate that the society, the definition of which must in this context include the state, does perpetuate these power relations. This society is under an obligation (in South Africa both Constitutional/governmental as well as ethical) to work towards the reversal of these relations inasmuch as they do not allow equal distribution of resources and disallow the individual from achieving success and happiness[121]. This obligation certainly comes from a moral/human rights perspective of the aims and goals of civil society, either from positivist or naturalist conceptions of jurisprudence[122]. But it derives equally from a sense of the need, as can be read from Foucault's understanding of the nature of society and power in that society, to maintain an understanding of self and other. However, this conception of Foucault's understanding of power as the force sanctioned by the state or other loci of authority is not what we are talking about here. Here we are talking more about the sense of self derived from relations, Foucault would express this as power relations, between individuals.

Simply put, Foucault's compelling conception of power is one that sets up power relations in terms of a system, neither necessarily beneficent nor malevolent, which is self-sustaining because the system in fact creates individuals by being at the same time totalising and individualising[123]. The system is totalising in that it is aimed at creating a homogeneity, or rather treating subjects as if they are homogeneous, and in so doing creating the fallacy of their homogeneity. All subjects are formally created equal, and therefore are all seen to be the same.

By implication the members of society are created as being either normal or abnormal judged according to an amorphous but definite set of norms. Normal people are those who appear to be part of the homogeneous mass, while abnormal people are those who sit outside that sphere. In Hegelian terms, "a whole or unity requires a negation of otherness in a quest for self-sameness"[124]. Although Foucault spent much time talking of these ideas in the context of the insane and the criminal, the ideas are arguably equally applicable to the concepts of whiteness/blackness, and maleness/femaleness in the South African context. During colonialism and apartheid fictions of maleness and femaleness, and equally blackness and whiteness evolved from pre-existing western rationalist, positivist, Cartesian power relations to effect control over its subjects, both black and white, male and female. As the ideas were refined, the ideas of 'colouredness' and 'indianness' were superimposed on the model, taken to

[121] see Corder, H (ed) Essays on Law and Social Practice in South Africa (Juta, Cape Town, Wetton, Johannesburg, 1988) especially Corder, H and Davis, D "Law and Social Practice", pp1 et seq and Harris, JW Legal Philosophies (Butterworths, London, 1980) esp chapter 18 "Sociological Jurisprudence" pp232-244

[122] see Corder, H (ed) ibid especially Corder, H and Davis, D "Law and Social Practice", pp1 et seq and Harris, JW ibid esp chapter 18 "Sociological Jurisprudence" pp232-244

[123] Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p199

[124] Game, pp 44

their logical (or rather highly illogical) conclusion during Apartheid[125]. Now that apartheid is over, we are left with a legacy of this differentiation that is still not only the property of the state, but the preconceptions of the citizens.

In this way the power wielded is as much totalising as it is individualising. Following Foucault, this implies that in the process of creating a homogeneous society, the individuals who inhabit the society are by definition also created, since a homogeneous group that forms society is a necessary precondition to the existence of individuals, and in the same breath, the existence of individuals is a precondition to the existence of a society[126]. In our context this means that people are (or perform the roles of) black, white, male, female, etc, according to definitions which are all set up in opposition to each other. These definitions are created by the society, which, although it no longer controls people from above in the form of law in the same way as previously now that apartheid is no longer statuted, it continues to do by integrating individuals into a predetermined space. And since there is no space for people who do not wish to identify themselves as one of those groups, they are left with no alternative identity to adopt.

However, implicit in this very conception of power and control are the seeds of alternatives. In Foucault's conception, in order for power to be effective, both the empowered and the disempowered need to be conceptualised as individuals with free will. Classically the conceptions of the disenfranchised, slaves, women, the black "Other" are implicitly still given the option of having free will, but are precluded from acting upon it due to the power relations which impose roles and restrictions, either explicit or implicit, on them.

This in turn surely creates the implicit option of adopting variations of those roles and identity performances, which in turn allows for the possibility of refusing them, even though there is perhaps no possibility of ignoring them. It makes sense to me that there is, in this construction, the possibility of questioning the order of relations, which means looking internally into the nature of subjectivity, with the possibility of thereby destabilising the received roles, identities and power relations.

This is not necessarily a possibility to Foucault, who, in his later work "questioned the liberal vision of the autonomous individual, past or present, able by personal choice to make his or her own way in the world. He constantly pointed to the priority over the free, thinking individual, the Cartesian *cogito*, of what were widely called 'structures' of thought and practice- the 'epistemes' or overriding, holistic mental paradigms of *The Order of Things*, the 'discourses' of much of his

[125] see Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa (Ashgate, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, 1998) and Dubow, S Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) for cogent discussions contextualising power, racism and apartheid

[126] Game, pp 44

later *oeuvre.*[127] He saw that the institutions and systems created around human existence were nothing more than an extension of administrative authority. However, there are other theorists who argue very cogently that there is a way out of this predicament, some of whom I mention here.

Of particular interest to us in the context of whiteness and maleness as performance is Foucault's work on discourse analysis, which, as Freundlieb argues are "neither lucid nor uncontroversial"[128]. Freundlieb indeed argues that the concept of the formation of discourse is indeed a theoretical fiction. He argues that Foucault collates a domain of objects within a largely structuralist framework, which Freundlieb holds is unworkable, and that Foucault's theories on discourse imply an "untenable ontology" and leads to a "self-destructive relativism"[129]. Despite certain theorists' objections to Foucault's formulations, his argument is interesting in its statement of discourse in the form of the question: "how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?". This of course is not the same as the structuralist conceptions of discourse as being framed by the question of "according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made?"[130] The importance of this is that Foucault was attempting to set up a project that "claims to be a '*pure description of discursive events'* so as to make possible an entirely new way of setting up and grouping discursive unities, independent of all the old and in Foucault's view only seemingly self-evident unities such as the book and the *oeuvre".*[131]

Foucault sought to redefine the constitution and unity of discourses by reviewing more traditional formulations of relations. Firstly he looks at the idea that the formation of discourse may be held together by a common set of objects of reference. He prefers to look at the formation of discourse as "the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time"[132].

The second hypothesis is that there is a sense in which the 'rules' and 'system' that govern a heterogeneous body of statements, but are not purely discursive. They do not 'constitute' the discourse, but rather 'make possible' statements and practices that characterise a discourse[133].

The third hypothesis that Foucault reviews is that a discourse may be held together by a system of permanent and coherent concepts. He argues rather that "one might discover a discursive

[127] Jones, C and Porter, R "Introduction" in Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994), p1
[128] Freundlieb, D "Foucault's Theory of Discourse and Human Agency" in Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) ibid, pp 153
[129] ibid pp 154
[130] quoted in Freundlieb, D ibid, pp 156
[131] ibid, pp156 (italics are Foucault's emphasis)
[132] ibid pp 157
[133] ibid pp 159

unity if one sought it not in the coherence of concepts, but in their simultaneous or successive emergence, in the distance that separates them and even in their incompatibility"[134].

The fourth that he approaches is that of the "identity and persistence of themes". Foucault looks at the "dispersion of the points of choice that the discourse leaves free", and the way a discourse defines 'a field of strategic possibilities'[135].

Foucault defines a discursive formation as :

> "Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a *discursive formation*." [136]

He goes on to say:

> "the conditions to which elements of this division [ie the discursive formation] (objects, modes of statement, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the *rules of formation*. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance) in a given discursive division."[137]

Foucault's concepts of discourse can be linked to the questions of power and identity in the following way. Firstly, it makes sense that they can be linked to the modification of traditional models of identity definition, and the review of the scope of the discourses that define identity in public space (from an historical view, in other words, which discourses have defined identity in which specific ways). Secondly, they can open up a route to the re-evaluation of discursive practices that can delineate identity definition in the future, and can open up conceptions of how people can identify their own sense of self. These two linkages can go directly to the way in which we look at both power relations at play in the formation of gendered and racialised identity, especially that of white men in South Africa.

It makes sense to me that the former be articulable in terms of the scope of empowerment granted to groups previously conceived of as 'disempowered', a label that succeeds in maintaining a hold on the 'disempowered' by constructing a glass ceiling above which the 'disempowered' may not rise into a Jungian conception of individuation[138]. With Foucault's formulation of power, it is clear that the 'disempowered' are only disempowered due to their choice of placement in the systems of power relation, and that this disempowerment, as a mutable, systemic idea, can be reversed and reworked so that the 'disempowered' are no longer bound by the strictures of the 'top-down' formulation of power- they have the choice to accept or reject their placement.

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[134] ibid pp 162
[135] ibid pp 162
[136] ibid pp 162
[137] ibid pp 163
[138] see for example Jung, CG, (Jaffe, ed, Winston, R&C, trans) Memories, Dreams, Reflections Collins, 1983

It further makes sense that the second be articulable in terms of understanding the discourses that frame and create the empowered and disempowered. In the 'old' formulation of discursive power, such framing is entirely within the purview of the 'empowered' 'classes' (not to be mistaken for the Marxist conception of class). With Foucault's formulation of discursive production, it is clear that there is a two-way interaction between the subjects and the objects of discourse. Using this formulation, we can arguably extrapolate Freundlieb's explanation of Foucault above to postulate that the disempowered are as able to formulate themselves and their environment discursively as the 'empowered'[139].

It must be stated here that the latter was not something that Foucalt necessarily thought even possible.

This is not to say that the process of redefinition of discursive power relations in order to re-place the disempowered is an easy or simple process, or even that it can be done in practicality at all. It simply implies that, whereas other formulations of power and discourse speak of the absolute impossibility of social groups to re-evaluate themselves and their place and future due to the preponderance of (top-down) power held by the 'empowered', it is conceptually possible for the disempowered to re-evaluate their position, and reposition themselves, using Foucault's formulation[140].

It does also not imply that this re-evaluation, repositioning and discursive production can necessarily be applied to whole 'groups' of people (here I do not infer the Marxist conception of 'class'), but rather that it *may*, in concept, be possible for individual people to revisit their positions with a view to enabling and 'empowering' themselves[141].

It further does not set out to specify who should be seen as the 'disempowered' and who 'empowered'. Since there are a multitude of layers and connections of discursive production, even as applied to one 'group' at any given time, such a change and 'revolution' would almost by definition not be possible, since the numbers of discursive influences on any person at any time are multiple, and not the same as those on any other given person. This also does not imply that whole groups of 'disempowered', such as women, black people, gays and lesbians etc, can summarily decide that the discourses that produce them will no longer do so. However it does possibly open a window of opportunity to individuals to understand the power and discursive influences on their own self-definition, and therefore to enable them to make personal choices within the paradigm of those influences that can shift the power relations in their lives[142].

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[139] Freundlieb, ibid pp 154-163
[140] see Freundlieb's arguments above
[141] I have not found any indication in my research that Foucault specifically discounted this type of conception, although he may not have envisaged his theories being used in this way. I have also not found similar arguments being applied to contemporary theories of whiteness and maleness, although they may exist.
[142] See note [141] above, which applies here too

The power relations that apply to the performance of whiteness and maleness are those that, in the non-Foucaultian sense of power, entrench the white male in a never-ending, forever-spiralling control of both himself and his environment, which environment includes women, black people and other disempowered people. This, extrapolated to a systemic level, means that Western governance and economic power will remain under control of the white male, or at least the white male paradigm, as the creator of the patriarchal hierarchy, until such time as that system falls (according to the Marxist perspective, by revolution)[143].

According to the Foucaultian perspective of power and discursive formulation, it is the system that creates the people who inhabit it, which people include individual white men. If we are to take Foucault's ideas to the next level in the South African context, there is a distinction between individual white men and the patriarchal systems that maintain white male privilege. Since all subjects in the system comprise both 'empowered' and 'disempowered' entities, individuals of any kind can in principle change their role in the power relations, and are not forced to identify themselves as 'flag (or pall)-bearers', and can revise their sense of self, and thereby derive wider and different pleasures from their individual lives.

At this point I turn to Materialisation 3, which is a continuation of Materialisation 1, and reflects my reminiscences of early childhood, and perhaps indicates some of the ways in which my performance of whiteness and maleness have been moulded by my circumstances.

I label this materialisation "Inscriptive Procedures" because it is during the formative years that we are primarily determined and defined both psychologically and socially. As Elisabeth Gross notes,

> "Inscriptive Procedures marking the body and producing it as sexually determinant and coded are active in transforming the anatomo-physiological structure of the body as socially located *morphology*. Body-morphologies are the results of the *social meaning* of the body... Morphological differences between sexed bodies imply *both* a traced, 'biological' difference which is transcribed by discursive, textual representations, *and* corporeal significations. It implies a productive, *changeable*, non-fixed biological substratum mapped by social, political and familial grid of practices and meanings. The morphological dimension is a function of socialisation and apprenticeship, and produces as its consequences a subject, soul, personality or inner depth.... Masculinity and femininity are not simply social categories as it were externally or arbitrarily imposed on the subject's sex. Masculine and feminine are necessarily related to the structure of the lived experience and the meaning of *bodies*. ... Gender is an effect of the body's social morphology. What is mapped onto the body is not unaffected by the body onto which it is projected."[144]

My inscriptive procedures were largely written about my performance as a white male, some of which I record below. I was apparently given some very mixed messages, albeit in the form of regulated rigid gendered and racialised roles to follow and perform.

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[143] See note [141] above, which applies here too

[144] Elizabeth Gross, in "Inscriptions and body-maps: representations and the corporeal" in Feminine, Masculine and Representation Threadgold, T & Cranny-Francis, A (eds), (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990), pp62-74

Materialisation 3: Reminiscences- Making the Child

or "Inscriptive Procedures"

Cross-Dressing Four-Year Olds

One of my first memories is of nursery school in Johannesburg. At four years old I was ever the gregarious Leo, loving being the centre of attention. One particular dress-up day at school, when we would all dive into the clothes in the dress-up box, I remember a frisson of pleasure as I put on a dress and high heels and carrying a handbag, paraded with my friends up and down, playing on the swings and jungle-gym. Later, at home, I walked into the kitchen where my mom was ironing while listening to the radio. I started telling her of my day at school, of the clothes I dressed up in. She put the iron down and looked down at me with a horrified look on her face, saying "Lincoln, little boys don't dress up in little girls' clothes. What are they teaching you at that school? I will have a talk to your father this evening. We're taking you out of that place!" More clearly than the memory of that horrified look is the knot in my stomach, which as I write this comes back and repeats on me again as I feel that despair settling in on me once more. I feel the flush to my cheeks as I realise I've done something wrong. I suppose it must look like guilt, but it's actually the realisation that there is a rule that I don't know about that I've been caught out in, a law that I've broken. I cried and apologised and promised I wouldn't do it again, and berated myself in the way that four-year-olds do for not being normal, and learned another rule that cannot be broken, another to add to the growing list.

It is interesting how time changes our perceptions of events. My mother has since told me that the school phoned her to tell her that I was dressing up in girls' clothes, and they were worried about me. Why they were worried, I still don't know.

But I did not transgress that particular boundary again, at least not for another twenty years. I do have a number of skirts now, that I wear proudly, to feel them brush against my legs in a way that men are not supposed to enjoy, and to challenge that particular feeling of helpless wrongdoing.

Lion of Africa or 'Swart Gevaar'

I was five years old. I can't remember much of that time, save that I had a black cat named Felix, who was more canine that feline, and who would run around the garden with me. I also remember Limon, the gardener, a gentle man from Malawi, who returned from his annual holiday to visit his family bringing a small carved lion for me. I loved that lion, which to my young eyes was of the finest ivory rather than light wood. I felt warm and safe with Limon as he handed me the carving with his big, rough, calloused hands. A few years later, my father was working for an oil company on contract in Malawi. He stayed for weeks on end in Lilongwe, sometimes bringing me small gifts on his return from site, one of which was a carved Malawian elephant, which he placed in the study next to two larger elephants with bone tusks that he had bought to represent himself and my mother. Each time I see them on the mantle-piece I get a warm feeling tinged with an image of beautiful exoticism filled with friendly people that is difficult to reconcile with my father's description at the time of Malawi as a dirty, decrepit place filled with not very intelligent and lazy black people.

One night at about this time a commotion woke me up in the middle of the night. My father, in his pyjamas, firmly holding onto a large stick that he kept beside his bed for

defence in the event of a break-in, went outside to chase the drunk people causing the commotion. I was not allowed out with him, and I doubt my pacifist father was violent, but the event is lodged in my mind as one of a looming sense of danger, which seemed to have something to do with black people, and which did not sit quite right with Limon's gentleness and warmth.

It was the precepts of that simmered in the sub-consciousness of well-meaning people like my parents, who were complicit in making "*...the black man... the symbol of evil*", with all the western associations of blackness. As Fanon so aptly puts it,

> The torturer is the black man, Satan is black, one talks of shadows, when one is dirty one is black- whether one is thinking of physical dirtiness or of moral dirtiness. It would be astonishing, if the trouble were taken to bring them all together, to see the vast number of expressions that make the black man the equivalent of sin.... Blackness, darkness, shadow, shades, night, the labyrinths of the earth, abysmal depths, blacken someone's reputation; and, on the other side, the bright look of innocence, the white dove of peace, magical, heavenly light...[145]

I now understand that this was around the time of the 1976 Soweto riots, and my parents, like many white South Africans of their generation and background were concerned.

Within a year, my father had relocated us to Reading, England.

Boys don't cry

I awoke one evening at about six years old wanting a drink of water. In my half-asleep state walked stumbled towards what I thought was the bathroom, but fell off the bed, banging my head into one of the wardrobes on either side and cutting it open. My hysterical mother and resolute father immediately rushed me to the local hospital, where I received six stitches. To this day my parents are amazed at the brave way I faced the ordeal of getting those stitches at the age of six, not needing to have orderlies hold me down while the doctor attended to me. The sense I have of the ordeal was not that I was being brave, but that 'boys don't cry' and that in order to be in control of what was going on I had to ignore the shock and pain and do what was necessary. It of course didn't hurt that I was getting much love and respect from all around me, and was not disappointing my parents by being a cry-baby!

Black friends, tin plates and toilets

When I was six years old, we moved to a big old house in Greenside East, Johannesburg, built in the thirties, with a huge oak tree and an old tiled swimming pool in front, where I celebrated my seventh birthday party with a big green cake (an appropriate colour for a little boy!) constructed in the shape of a train. I was never very interested in trains, and I did wonder why she had chosen one. I suppose little boys were supposed to like trains!

The domestic worker lived in the 'servants quarters' behind the kitchen, a place I was not supposed to go. Her son, whose name I either never knew or have forgotten was about my age and came to stay with her for a while. He was not allowed in the house, and of course did not attend my birthday party. One day I poked my head out the back door and saw him playing in the yard. I remember the smell- lifebouy soap- that I could not decide whether I liked or not. I sat on the back step and watched him watching me, smiling shyly. I smiled back. I ventured out and sat with him on the concrete under the windy-dry, looking at each other with no way of communicating verbally since neither of us could speak the other's language. I had this vague feeling that there was something I

[145] Fanon, F Black Skin White Masks (Grove Press, New York, 1967), pp188-189

should be doing to make him feel comfortable, which was combined with an uncomfortable feeling that I shouldn't be there.

We sat together for quite some time, toying with sticks from the jacaranda tree that hung over the wall between our back yard and the neighbour's garden. I was just starting to feel that maybe there wasn't anything wrong with being here, when my mother came to the kitchen door and called me in. There was a funny look on her face, somewhere between displeasure at an unpleasant smell and disapproval at me for doing something that I knew I shouldn't be doing. Guiltily I smiled at the boy and followed my mother into the laundry. She said something along the lines of "I don't want you playing in the back yard with that boy. He's not the same as you, he's not very clean and you never know , he might have worms or something." I was not quite sure whether this was true of him in particular, or black people in general. Needless to say, he was the first and last black child I never had the opportunity of playing with.

When I was young, it never struck me as strange that there should always be a single pale green tin plate and cup neatly packed under the sink. Every evening while cooking and dishing up dinner for the family, my mother would ask me to please call the domestic worker to bring her plate (the lady in question was always called 'the maid') so my mother could dish up for her.

Every evening the 'maid' would dutifully reach under the sink and bring out the tin plate and mug to receive her ration. I always knew that my mother did not approve of the domestic worker using our china mugs and plates, but I never really questioned why this was so. I could not ask, for fear that my mother would think that I did not share her 'innate' sense of what was proper, but I always felt awkward about it.

I had a nagging feeling that this separation must mean that the domestic worker must be somewhat dirty, a feeling that did not fit with her room being always clean. There was something warm and non-judgmental about her room when she was there with her radio on. Unfortunately I was generally too wrapped up in trying not to offend the lady in question to actually ask her what she thought.

In later years, once I had started thinking about these things more clearly, I was similarly perplexed about why the domestic worker was not allowed to use the inside toilets. I know my parents had issues with curly black hair!

It has taken me some time to understand the context of the country in which I learned how to perform my whiteness and maleness, and the historical legacy of racism and sexism that inculcated my sense of self, a sense of self that I have continued to fight, both in terms of my perceptions of who others are or should be, as well as my idea of my own performance, in an attempt to undermine my inheritance

Power and the Self- Knowledge, Language and Social Discipline

According to Foucault's perspective on power and discourse, the postmodernist methods of internal, as opposed to external, regulation work by means of surveillance. As Game observes

> "[t]hese powers are exercised through the body of the individual: 'certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals'; individuals are not points of application of power, but 'vehicles of power'. Panopticism is a form of power that has not disappeared. However there has been a shift to the gaze: the subject takes him- or herself as the object of the gaze, exercising surveillance over self."[146]

As Game argues the methodology of psychoanalytic theory is important in the context of the particular (and therefore, I argue, personal identity in both public and private space)[147]. Lacan is of interest in the context of self-identification, and therefore if identity-creation. Reading his work of course brings us back to the importance of meaning and language in the conception of identity, which further links to identity as narrative. In his essay 'The Mirror Stage' he looks at the connection between sight and identity, where he connects the imaginary, with its principal meaning of resemblance, with the self. Game argues that the mirror stage is about the instability of the self, which is neither centred nor originary of the 'I'. The inner body is fragmented and made up of many different parts, while the outer, the piece that is seen, is both unitary and unified. As she says

> "identification with the imago is thus constitutive of the fantasy of identity", thus creating the illusion of a coherent autonomous subject, which is created by identifying with an other's perception of it. In other words, the constitution of the 'I' comes from the mirror of itself from the position of the other, which is in fact a misrecognition. Further than this, this mirror stage "...represents a prototypical example of the generation of the "I" which is in some sense always other".[148]

This of course links in with Foucault's conception of surveillance.

Freud's split between the conscious and the unconscious is also of note here, since knowledge is traditionally seen as an element of consciousness. Game notes that theorists concerned with the subject emphasise the split between the two, which by definition defy the idea of a unified subject, as "systems in a dynamic relation of tension, and bearing the traces of each other. Consciousness can be understood as the moment of the desire to know, the desire for identity and wholeness, and the unconscious as that which undoes identity... the former is dependent on repressions, which are its very undoing.[149] It can be argued that the conscious representation of self is belied by the unconscious drives which motivate us, and which are therefore are by definition the undoing of what our ego represents to ourselves and projects in public space.

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[146] Ibid p 42
[147] Game, pp 56-57
[148] Kerby, AP, 'the Language of the Self' inHinchman, LP & Hinchman, SK (eds)- Memory, Identity, Community- The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997) pp 134
[149] Game, pp 48-49

A different but equally apposite, if not unproblematic, perspective is that of Sartre, who

> "... claims that bad faith is the refusal to recognise the self as both facticity and transcendence. Three basic negative attitudes toward the self are possible:
>
> 1. the individual may regard himself as pure transcendence, as forever beyond his 'situation', as neither part nor responsible for choices he has made, since he is, as it were, beyond choosing... Such an individual sees himself not as possessing a *situated* freedom, but as having a ghostly, dislocated freedom that glides through the world untouched and untouching. This posture is one of extreme alienation, like that which characterizes Kierkegaard's 'aesthetic sphere'.
> 2. One may choose to deny one's transcendence completely, viewing oneself as a thing and one's value as determinate consequences of this objective existence. Sartre describes this as the 'spirit of seriousness' (*l'esprit de seriieux*) in which one regards all values and the very meaning of the world as constituted prior to and independently of one's own existence.
> 3. A third sort of bad faith consists in treating oneself as an *other* instead of treating oneself as one's self. This pattern of bad faith is distinct from, though parallel to, the second pattern. To treat oneself as an other is to deny transcendence and turn one's self not into a thing, but into pure facticity. This pattern occurs through being-with-others and is the most fundamental of the three"[150]

Power and Knowledge

Hegelian conceptions of power and knowledge are particularly powerful in the reading of identity as a master-slave dialectic (which we note is again a narrative rendition of self), and which dialectic revolves around questions of desire. Hegelian thought assumes that self-consciousness needs a relation to other self-consciousness in order to exist, and to identify with itself for a unified independence, and knowledge. Hegel looks at knowledge in terms of desire rather than in the unified Cartesian model of intellectual activity alone. This implies an integral existence of the body in knowledge, and Hegel looks at mind and body not as different entities, but rather as different moments of self in the emergence of self-consciousness from lower states of consciousness.

> "For Hegel nothing is immediate, in thought or in actuality. Thought and its relation to reality must be thought of in terms of the motion of the absolute form: universality (the logic), particularity (the logical categories spread out in otherness in nature), individuality (the logical categories as forming self-aware individuals, spirit).[151]"

For Hegel, nothing is a fully independent reality, and everything is interlinked. He refuses the dichotomies of internal mind and external reality, rather

> "elevating our awareness of our own existence to an awareness of our full necessary conditions and context. ...For Hegel we are involved in a whole we can come to recognize; we cannot get outside. We do not claim the existence of spirit; we discover it as we become aware of the full context within which we exist. Becoming aware of that context is not an empirical investigation but an awareness of the conditions of possibility for our thought. And it is part of the motion of spirit that we should discover it." [152]

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[150] Golomb, J In Search of Authenticity- From Kierkegaard to Camus (Routledge, London and New York, 1995) pp153
[151] Kolb, D the Critique of Pure Modernity- Hegel, Heidegger, and After (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986) pp86
[152] Ibid pp86

The importance of Hegel in this context is the similarity between his ideas and those of Foucault in their implicit connection between power and knowledge. For both, the empowered and the disempowered are trapped in the body as a means of obtaining knowledge. Hegel however sees this as a negative productivity of the subject, while Foucault does not see this as a necessity. Foucault does not go beyond human-based systems to the concept and connection of a transcendental reality, which is problematic. There is room for me in Hegel's attempts at transcending those systems. There is merit in readjusting social systems in light of such concepts broached by Hegel, despite his militaristic and positivistic leanings. His ideas of the synthesis of "the Being" and "the Unbeing" as "the Becoming" are worth working with[153]. In extrapolating this idea, and working with Foucault's conceptions of system-based power, we can work with the possibilities of overcoming our bodily-based identities and reaching a truer sense of self that transcends the facile representations of physicality[154].

Language and Self

Foucault describes the formation of discourse through speech and language, although not in the same terms as Derrida or any of the other linguists. He is not interested in a statement's objective validity, nor the reasoning processes behind statements, but rather in the positions the statement provide for subjects. As he says:

> "the subject for the statement should not be regarded as identical with the author of the formulation- either in substance, or in function. He is not in fact the cause, origin, or starting-point of the phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a sentence... If a position, a sentence, a group of signs can be called 'statement', it is not therefore because, one day, someone happened to speak them or put them in some concrete form of writing; it is because the position of subject can be assigned. To describe a formulation *qua* statement does not consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he says (or wanted to say, or said without wanting to); but in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it".[155]

In the context of this thesis, it is of importance that subjects, in other words individuals, find themselves within a discourse, and therefore implicitly within a power relation, by means of the language and statements that they use.

It is indeed language that feeds our sense of selves, and further feeds others' sense of who we are (or at least who we present ourselves to be, or even who others project us to be). It is knowledge or awareness of one's place in the world that leads to our being able to express thoughts about ourselves or others. As Kerby notes:

> "...the self is not a thing in the metaphysical sense of being a substance, residing beneath experience. It is rather, as CS Pierce has claimed (against Descartes), a being of semiosis, a sign or symbol functioning within a given semiotic field, the broad field of self-referring utterances. And like all signs this one is also external, spoken, implying that it requires recognition by another

[153] see the argument in Kolb, ibid
[154] as per my discussion above relating to Power as systemic rather than hierarchical
[155] Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994), pp173

> person from a similar linguistic tradition and background- even if this other is oneself, for we are both tellers and listeners."[156]

There is a wealth of semiotically-based descriptions of how sense is made of the world, many of which reside in the realm of postmodernism, and many of which seek to undermine the rationalist discourses of traditional social sciences. And there are certainly benefits to these, the nature of which are beyond the scope of this paper. But there are equally strong arguments that "discourse should be motivated by strategic interests and should thus frame its discussions in terms of pragmatic questions about the local effectiveness of particular types of argument"[157]. Describing Contingency Theory (the argument that all linguistically articulated norms devolve into private contingencies) as "precluding any *public* description of the world", Cole says that "such a description is presupposed by any critical or cultural theory which seeks to move beyond self-interest to a consideration of the political and social determinants of identity.... [C]ommunicative processes constitute a public space which makes possible the articulation of an intersubjective world"[158]. He quotes Donald Davidson's argument that the 'I' defined in relation to its own contingency has no access to such an articulation:

> "If I were bolted to the earth I would have no way of determining the distance from me of many objects...Not being bolted down, I am free to triangulate. Our sense of objectivity is the consequence of another sort of triangulation, one that requires two creatures. Each interacts with an object, but what gives each the concept of the way things are objectively is the base-line formed between the creatures by language. The fact that they share a concept of truth alone makes sense of the claim that they have beliefs, that they are able to assign objects a place in the world"[159]

Institutional Power

In Chapter 3 of Part II of *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault looks at the formation of objects, in which he identifies three areas where power applies itself[160]. He speaks of 'Surfaces of emergence', in psychopathological discourse, as the family, the immediate social group, work, religious community, art and penalty, while 'Authorities of delimitation' include medicine, law, religious authority and literary art and criticism. 'Grids of specification' comprise mental illnesses, and encompass the soul, the body, the life and history of individuals, and the interplay of neuropsychological correlations[161]. Although Foucault was specifically referring to the formation of psychopathological concepts, they are equally valid for the relations that form individual identities, especially since Foucault refused to look at the specific intentionality of the members of institutions in those arenas of study, which intentionality would delimit the reach of the concepts, institutions and constructions of his discursive work. In this respect we are again

[156] Kerby, AP, 'the Language of the Self' inHinchman, LP & Hinchman, SK (eds)- Memory, Identity, Community- The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997) pp 133
[157] Cole, SE 'Evading the Subject: the Poverty of Contingency Theory' in Simons, HW & Billig, M (ed) After Postmodernism- Reconstructing Ideology Critique (Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1994), pp 39
[158] ibid
[159] Davidson, D, 1982:327, quoted in Cole, SE 'Evading the Subject: the Poverty of Contingency Theory' in Simons, HW & Billig, M (ed) ibid pp54
[160] Foucault, M (trans AM Sheridan-Smith) the Archeology of Knowledge (Tavistock, London, 1972)
[161] Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994), pp163 et seq

talking of the arrangements of discourses in the creation of objects. the value of this approach lies in being able to see the unintended consequences of the structural organisation of social institutions in the development of human objects. As Foucault states at the end of the chapter, "a discursive analysis of the formation of objects is neither about language or words nor about things, but about 'the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse'. These objects must be related 'to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance'. A discourse 'is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language (*langue*), the extrication of a lexicon and an experience'"[162].

These ideas of the identification of self are linked to conceptions of knowledge in that without knowledge there can be no surveillance, no recognition of other and therefore no (mis)recognition or (mis)conception of self as a unified subject[163].

It is of necessity a function of the institutions of society that knowledge be used as a double-edged sword, both an empowering mechanism, and therefore a function of the development of identity, as well as a means of destruction of identity. The institutions that we have governing knowledge are those set up largely according to the tenets of Cartesian conceptions of reality and self as a unified being. And traditionally the models employed are those of the pursuit of 'truth'. However, the flipside of the 'pursuit of truth' is that the very truth being sought is indeed created in the process. As Zito states: "Institutional structures such as universities are ways of ordering collective discourse, of making it safe by defusing intrinsic possibilities."[164] Foucault had some very different ideas on the the 'will to truth':

> "Something designated as *truth* is claimed to have an essential, absolute existence and by searching is held to be attainable: indeed, some aspects of it are supposedly already attained. One cannot challenge the ideological monopolizations of social reality and be allowed to function successfully in this society.[165]"

Although Zito is speaking about structures and semiotics in the social sciences, the argument is similarly apt for concerns over the creation and maintenance of identity, which is, after all moulded by the institutions driven and maintained at least in part by the academe, as it traditionally stood, and continues largely to function.

Clearly the institutions of society, of which academia is but one, have traditionally supported the Cartesian methodologies, and to a large extent still do in the sciences and somewhat less, but still notably, in the social sciences. A large part of the postmodern enterprise has been driven by what Baudrillard describes as the 'loss of faith in the grand meta-narratives', and as such is an

[162] Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) pp165
[163] in the context of whiteness and maleness, the 'mis' is my parenthesis
[164] Zito, GV Systems of Discourse- Structures and Semiotics in the Social Sciences (Westport, London, Greenwood Press, 1984) pp 91
[165] ibid, quoted pp91

important method of deconstructing these hierarchies in the definition of knowledge, desire and therefore the identification of self. And the modern academe is much more intent on taking account of a 'de-Cartesianised' role in the development of knowledge and education[166].

From a national perspective, Foucault argues that each state is in constant competition with other countries and nations to the extent that "each state has nothing before it other than an indefinite future of struggles. Politics has now to deal with an irreducible multiplicity of states struggling and competing in a limited history… the state is its own finality."[167]

Power and Regulation in South Africa

In the South African context, we can read the regulation and the gaze of which Foucault speaks, as derived from the whole spectrum of social institutions, from the state through academia, to the family, and indeed the individual[168]. And all arguably by means of the Foucauldian conception of surveillance. It is precisely this surveillance that reached its pinnacle in the apartheid era, regulating not only the 'black Other', but also the 'white self' of the ruling class. The white male, who so deftly created an outward-looking sense of self, and a judgemental sense of who belongs within the laager, equally successfully regulated himself so that he may remain part of the laager, but may not go beyond its boundaries, for fear of losing his esteemed position. This mentality was not reserved for the ruling Afrikaans classes of the apartheid era, but equally to the colonial period, in which the Dutch, and then the British, exercised their governing roles. Initially this can be argued to have been done in an externally regulatory manner, with the colonial government overtly acting as the militarily regulatory arm of the 'motherland', resulting in a scenario which perpetuated a

> "white militarism [the background to which] is well-documented. Many books produced from both sides of the apartheid divide portray an army of uncompromising force capable of inflicting the worst cruelty upon its enemy. Establishing this force has necessitated the assertion of male dominance. This militarism is built upon already-inculcated values: the values expounded in schools during Youth Preparedness and Cadets"[169]

This militarism resulted in a situation where

> "In South Africa, white youths journey through institutions- state-run and family-sanctioned- where supposedly 'normal' standards are set in accordance with so-called traditional values….
>
> Within schools themselves minor cults of heroism were nurtured…. the achievers were young people who expounded the values promoted by the school. He who is handsome shoots well. He who is handsome stands for the fatherland. People viewed the military uniform as an icon of desirable male sexuality. In this way the white school's system bred the worst kind of patriarchy; and it is here that one finds the origins of white South African male sexuality"[170]

[166] this is apparent by the legitimacy that postmodernist theorists such as Foucault have in the humanities
[167] Foucault, M Technologies of the Self (Gutman, H et al (ed)) (London, Tavistock, 1988) p 151-4
[168] See Frankel, P, Pines, N & Swilling, M (eds) State, Resistance and Change in South Africa (Southern Book Publishers, Kent, NSW, Johannesburg, 1988) for a discussion on the political changes that took place in South Africa from 1976 to the late 1980's, as an example of regulation
[169] "The Arista Sisters- September 1984", in Gevisser, M & Cameron, E Defiant Desire- Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa (Sigma Press, Pretoria, 1994), pp 210
[170] "ibid pp 210

The scientific and academic community, which upheld these conceptions, were intent on proving the inferiority of black people, and therefore by implication the superiority of white men. As Dubow argues:

> "Initially, expressions of interest in 'primitive mentality' focussed on the issue of whether blacks thought in fundamentally different forms from whites... [V]iews rested on evolutionist assumptions and tended to concieve of Africans as 'children'- a potent metaphor... capable of sustaining evolutionist as well as relativist conceptions, depending in part on whether the 'racial childhood' of 'primitives' was held to be a temporary or permanent state, and also whether the state of 'childhood' was conceived of in cultural or biological terms... [T]he mental testing movement objectified those whom it observed, sustaining the notion of the existence of essential differences between 'us' and 'them', and reinforcing the view that moral and political issues could be settled on the basis of impartial, scientific science. One might plausibly speak of a discourse of psychological domination in which power was conferred upon those specialists who claimed to posses singular knowledge of the 'native mind'.... In general terms it legitimised the right of whites to make decisions for and on behalf of Africans." [171].

This argument would follow that as the colonial enterprise started to look increasingly unstable, and the colonised peoples started integrating into the system, the regulatory element of subject-creation, and thereby of objectification, became much more subtle[172]. Instances of 'self-determination', such as the coloured Griqua grant of an nominally independent protectorate, under Adam Kok, in the Eastern Cape, were surface indications that the system was starting to allow a concept of autonomy to its subjects, at least politically[173]. In the early 20th century the surface integration went so far as to allow black people to vote, at least in the Cape Colony, although only on restrictive terms[174]. The non-racial franchise was not included in Union of South Africa in 1910, and later in 1936, removed completely from the Cape[175]. In later years, when apartheid took hold, and all black representation was abolished in favour of apartheid legislation, Afrikaner Nationalism can arguably be seen as an example of the reaction against just that surveillance that Foucault talks about, occasioned by the British in its colonial government, which created a set of hierarchies based on English cultural norms against which the Afrikaans community revolted. Using this perspective, this can be seen as the surveillance that created the British (male) subject being replaced by a similar surveillance that created the (Afrikaans) male subject. And of course, since these methods of internal regulation are so

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[171] Dubow, pp243 - 245

[172] see Boulle, L, Harris, B, Hoexter, C Constitutional and Administrative Law (Juta, Cape Town, Wetton, Johannesburg, 1989) pp118 "The constitution [of 1853 of the Cape Colony] provided for a Parliament consisting of the Governor and a bicameral legislature. The latter was made up of an upper house (the Legislative Council) and a lower house (the House of Assembly). Both houses were elected on a non-racial, males-only franchise with a low voting qualification..."

[173] See David Johnson's discussion, elaborated later, on the Griqua "The First Rainbow Nation? The Griqua in Post-Apartheid South Africa' in Poddar, P (ed) Translating Nations (Aarhus University Press, Denmark, Oxford, Connecticutt, 2000) pp 115 et seq

[174] Boulle et al, pp118, "Any voter could stand for election to the lower house, but a person wishing to stand for election to the Legislative Council had to be at least 30 years of age and had to own unburdened immovable property worth at least £2000"

[175] Boulle, L, et al ibid, pp124 et seq, and pp134, re discussion of the Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936, which removed black voters from the general voters role, replacing them on a separate voters' role for the purpose of electing three white members to the House of Assembly and four white members to the Senate.
See also Odendaal, A Vukani Bantu!: the Beginnings of Black protest politics in South Africa to 1912 (1984), quoted in Boulle et al, pp124 n17 for a detailed account of attempts by black politicians to prevent the enactment of the Union constitution

omnipresent and diaphanous, the pre-existing English identity have remained, maintaining hold over the economic and social centres of society[176].

The effect of this system are well-documented, and as Bloom notes:

> "the reality, threat and phantasy of social violence in South Africa has created much individual trauma, either directly or vicariously. A major and disabling consequence of the traumata of apartheid is *learned-helplessness*... defined as a condition 'characterised by an expectation that bad events will occur and that there is nothing [in reality] one can do to prevent their occurrence. [It] results in passivity, cognitive deficits and other symptoms that resemble depression' ..." [177]

It is arguable that post-apartheid, the same concept of surveillance is being marshalled by the system to identify South Africans of all races and genders (although perhaps not sexual orientations) as being in opposition to all non-South Africans (especially those of African origin). To go further, and more particularly of interest in terms of this dissertation, the subject-creation of all social groups, and all individuals, remains, and is instituted by means of this surveillance. It is precisely because men, women, black , white, gay, straight, seek to identify themselves as such that the power relations between them apply[178]. And the flip-side of this is that if people chose not to identify themselves as specifically 'white', 'black', 'male', 'female', or to perform the roles of these categories, the power relations and discursive formulations would no longer apply, and the power dynamic (in the Foucaultian sense) would swing in another direction, potentially leaving more scope for self-fulfillment in the hands of individuals.

[176] Although I have not read particular discussions making this connection between Foucault and whiteness and maleness in South Africa, it seems to me to be the logical connection, based on such work as Gevisser, M & Cameron, E who note in the context of white male development that *"In South Africa, white youths journey through institutions- state-run and family-sanctioned- where supposedly 'normal' standards are set in accordance with so-called traditional values....*

Within schools themselves minor cults of heroism were nurtured.... the achievers were young people who expounded the values promoted by the school. He who is handsome shoots well. He who is handsome stands for the fatherland. People viewed the military uniform as an icon of desirable male sexuality. In this way the white school's system bred the worst kind of patriarchy; and it is here that one finds the origins of white South African male sexuality" The Arista Sisters- September 1984", in, E Defiant Desire- Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa (Sigma Press, Pretoria, 1994), pp 210

Similarly, I look to such arguments as Mercer, K, and Julien, I, 'Race, sexual politics and black masculinity: a dossier', in R Chapman & J Rutherford (eds), Male Order. Unwrapping Masculinity (London, 1988), p106, quoted in Bleys, RC the Geography of Perversion- Male-to-Male Sexual Behaviour outside the West and the Ethnographic Imagination 1750-1918 (Cassell, London & NY, 1996), p1 "Historically, the European construction of sexuality coincides with the epoch of imperialism and the two inter-connect"[176]

[177] Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa 1998, p130 quoting Rosenhan and Seligman, 1984

[178] Although I have not read particular discussions in this respect, this too seems to me to be the logical connection

I turn to Materialisation 4, which is part 3 of my auto-ethnographical work, and is again reflections of my youth, but this time reflecting my burgeoning sense of self-definition in society, and the beginnings of my refusal to conform to the stereotypes laid out for me.

I connect this materialisation to the concerns of power and regulation by means of the sense I have in my own life of conformity being imposed on me in subtle ways both from outside, in the form of my parents, school and peers, and from the inside by means of my sense of wanting to 'fit in' and 'do the right thing' to be accepted, in other words, to perform the 'right' role of white male. There was a constant tug-of-war in my emotions between desperately wanting to feel as though I was a part of society on the one hand, and wanting to stand apart and be singular and individual on the other. This struggle continues to this day.

I preface this piece by saying that even though I was beginning to question the norms that were commonplace in my youth, I was caught between wanting to 'fit in' and wanting to determine my own future. In my teens I was by no means the arch-rebel, nor was I distinctly different in many ways from my peers, in that I largely strove for what they sought, and set my sense of self on definitions that were common to most young men in my circle. Yet the seeds of change were germinating.

Materialisation 4: Reminiscences- the Child Learns to Perform

Boys toys

We often visited my maternal aunt. I counted my cousin Lindsay, who is two years older than I, as one of my best friends. We lived in Johannesburg's Northern Suburbs, and never ventured south except for sunday lunches, at christmas, birthdays and on holidays, when Lindsay and I would play together for hours.

It was always a foregone conclusion in my family that I would go to university (as opposed to trade school or technikon), and that I would follow a 'profession' such as law, accounting, medicine or architecture. With this in mind, I was never given presents that were not educational. I admit that I was a spoiled child, and often my father would buy toys such as lego, playmobil or matchbox cars (a large trunk of which I still have), or my mother would buy a book for me. Of course I was only bought Franklin W Dixon's *Hardy Boys*, Alfred Hitchcock's *Three Investigators* and Willard Price novels, rather than Nancy Drew, which were understood to be "sissy" literature. I read a couple of my childhood books again lately, and it is blindingly apparent that were inherently premised on racial superiority and sexism, which I simply accepted as right and normal.

I remember being perfectly happy with this state of affairs, until on one visit to my aunt I found my female cousins playing with their barbie dolls. I was torn between wanting to dress these dolls up and do their hair, and my feelings of propriety: I could not be caught playing with girls' toys! I soon gave in to my urges though, and, after making sure that my parents were comfortably ensconced in conversation, I suggested that we play under the bed, because that would be a great 'house' for the dolls (and more importantly, it would be more discrete there). I completely lost myself in the moment, only coming back to the reality of the rules when my mother called from the doorway "what are you doing under the bed?" I panicked. I knew that if she found me playing with dolls I would be in for the high jump. I would relive that awful feeling of being some abnormal creature from the deep. I had the presence of mind to reply nonchalantly "oh, nothing, just fixing some of the toys" It seemed to do the trick, and my mother walked off. A little later my aunt came in and actually saw me putting a dress on a doll. I had to ask her to please not tell my mother. She gave me a puzzled look and walked away. On reflection, I'm not sure whether she was wondering what fear of God my mother had put in me for playing 'girls games', or if she was thinking the same as my mother would have.

That Christmas we went to the same aunt for Christmas lunch. It was a large affair, with a marquee pitched in the garden and all of the extended family and many friends in attendance. Every family brought a small gift that was placed into a large christmas bag and distributed amongst the children. I chose the biggest package that I could find, hoping that what was in it would be better than a small package. It was a green plastic army helmet with plastic plant camouflage on top, covered with a camouflage net - I was horrified! I ripped off the net and camouflage and half-heartedly wore the helmet until someone kindly pointed out that the net was supposed to stay on. How was I to know that the net and fake foliage were supposed to be there? I had never been exposed to army paraphernalia. The implication to me was clearly 'what kind of boy doesn't know that?' To my father's credit, when he saw my very red face and that I was about to burst into tears, he let me know in no uncertain terms that it was a silly gift, and that we should not be glorifying war.

White boys' clothing

For as long as I can remember, I have been fighting my parents over what I wear and how I present myself. My childhood was however fraught with constant feelings of invasion at being told how to comport myself, what to wear, how to behave like a 'good, normal boy'.

It was with this process of pleasing my mother in mind that I one day donned the new navy blue blazer with brass buttons acquired from the local school outfitters, not for school, but for 'formal occasions'. My grandfather was visiting, and I thought this was a great opportunity to please both him and my mother. I paraded through the lounge wearing the blazer as I had seen male models do on television fashion shows. My mother had that horrified look on her face that I remember from the 'cross-dressing' debacle. As she walked out of the room she said fiercely to me that I must not walk around like that, and that boys don't walk like sissies, or girls. Another lesson in propriety.

Needless to say, the same injunction was ever-present in respect to ear-rings, which were the sole preserve of girls. By the age of twelve, once I had reached high school where many of the older boys had had their ears pierced and were successfully hiding the holes with bits of fishing line that protruded from their lobes like mini-antennae, my yearning to have one had reached astronomical proportions. But this was one of those many things that I could do when I was grown up and had left my mother's admonitions of hell-fire and brimstone behind, so I told myself. I could at least wait until I was sixteen! But the need was too great, and one night I surreptitiously crept to the sewing room and got a needle, which, once back in my bedroom, I sterilised in the flame of a candle. I held a piece of ice to my left lobe (it had to be the left lobe- a pierced right ear was the label of a homosexual, God forbid, while both ears pierced meant drug addiction!), and with minimal pain I pushed the needle through leaving a single drop of blood peeping over the shiny metal. I replaced the metal with a piece of plastic. And so started a life of changing my body. But that is another story!

I'm not sure how I did it, but at the age of about fifteen I managed to convince my father to buy me a pair of "k" takkies (the highly objectional vernacular term for what we would now call 'high-tops'). In the mid-eighties hip-hop and breakdancing were 'in', and I desperately wanted to be a part of that free, alive, tactile and acrobatic scene. I already had a skate-board, which was my means of escape from the dullness and prescription of home, allowing me to venture into forbidden areas. I also wanted the clothes that went with the ideal of freedom that I saw other kids my age wearing. I found the shoes at Levinson's, a shop in the 'Indian' area of Durban that sold all the coolest clothes. I have never wanted anything quite as much either before or since. When I finally got them, after many months of bargaining, cajoling and convincing that wearing such shoes that 'blacks' wore was not such a bad thing, I finally managed to get the money from my father. I was in seventh heaven!

One of the most impactful events pertaining to my identity as a 'white' boy in Durban was one Saturday while walking down a pavement with my mother. An old man, who looked a little out of his depth in the city, was slowly walking towards us. I was enthralled. He was wearing a threadbare suit and carrying a knobkierrie, and was wearing large wooden plugs in his stretched earlobes. I had never seen such a thing before and I was amazed. I spent a good week thinking about that man, and how upstanding and proud he looked. And the white men I saw around me, men hopelessly caught in the trap of (western) 'normality', suddenly looked so artificial.

Sporty white boys

Sport was always beyond me. I never got the point of chasing a ball around a field, or running around a track endlessly. I half-heartedly learned to play tennis at school, but never felt able to throw or catch a ball.

In junior school I would sit next to the school fields at breaks feeling very lonely as I watched the boys on the fields playing 'stingers', a game involving throwing a tennis ball aimed to maim the unwary. I was convinced that I would make a complete fool of myself by failing to catch the ball, and an even bigger fool by 'throwing like a girl'.

The one game I did enjoy, but was rarely allowed to play, was skipping with the girls in the quadrangles. Either the passing boys would make comments at my playing with the girls, or some of the girls would talk to each other as though I was not there, or the enemy. So I spent many years in 'gender-neutral' space, like the library, where I could avoid my feelings of physical inability and at the same time talk to the girls, or better yet, just read.

At fifteen years old I did everything in my power to show both my parents and school-mates that I was a 'real man'. I joined the school rugby team and found myself as the scrawniest prop in the history of the game. I was so determined to prove that I was not gay or a 'sissy' that I made sure that I progressed to the under 16a team. I know this impressed my father, who in his youth was on his school and university first teams, and I knew that the 'real men' at my school respected me for acting as tough and manly as any of them, an act supported by my perpetually having a girlfriend by my side.

All post-pubertal boys are perverts

Along came puberty, that dreaded time when a young person's life is turned upside down and nothing is as it should be. Between the ages of about ten and eighteen I, like all young people, spent most of my time desperately trying to be cool, within the parameters of my parents' views of appropriateness, while at the same time feeling that there was something fundamentally wrong with me for not being 'normal' enough, 'cool' enough, 'sporty' enough, or 'clever' enough.

One of the most traumatic elements of my puberty was dealing with my sexual orientation. Actually, I did not deal with it at all until I reached university, but homosexuality was a constant threat to my emotional well-being. I was completely driven by my sexual urges and at the same time severely traumatised by my feelings of guilt, fear of being caught out, fear of how terrible a person I was.

Little did I know that one day I might find myself being the kind of person that Dolmance describes in the most natural way:

> ... Would it then be possible that Nature, having thuswise assimilated them into women, could be irritated by what they have of women's tastes? Is it not evident that this is a category of men different from the other, a class Nature has created in order diminish or minimise propagation, whose overgreat extent would infallibly be prejudicial to her?...[179]

[179] "Philosophy in the Bedroom- The Marquis de Sade" transl by Richard Seaver & Austryn Wainhouse, in Goldberg, J (ed) Reclaiming Sodom (Routledge, New York & London, 1994), pp 213

Chapter Three- Space, Time and Memory

Space, Time/ Duration, Memory and the Stability of Identity

Without space, time and memory there can be no identity, which by definition inheres in an entity that occupies space and time. And human identity, whether self- or other-imposed, whether in private or public space, requires memory in order for a collection of actions, concepts, etc to constellate into a separate entity.

Game argues that embodied meaning is inherently connected to time[180]. She argues that transformation and writing the body are based on the positive desire that incorporates a movement towards the 'other'. She points out that the Hegel-Lacan oppositions in the structure of desire immediacy-mediation, subject-object, internal-external are based on spatialisation and specularisation. Looking to Bergson's conceptions of multiplicity and duration in support, she posits that "duration consist[s] of a movement and permeation of elements mak[ing] the presence of any single element impossible."[181] For Bergson, memory is very important in this process: "'Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present: it is impregnated with memory images"[182]. This is linked to Derrida's idea that the movement of relations between elements undermines ideas of causality, totality and an end. Game argues that Bergson's conceptions of multiplicity entail dissociating any object's ways of meaning, and that simultaneity is possible. She looks at the conceptions of time, and follows Bergson's argument that the problems of philosophy are largely that it sees time spatially, rather than temporally, as abstract, linear and homogeneous. Bergson argues that we should place ourselves in time, rather than outside of it, and live it, whereby we would be able to live time in multiplicity, ie not in an exclusively linear mode[183]. If we continue to think of time as spatially oriented, we are bound to look at it in terms of discrete elements, meaning that as we move through time we can only occupy one unit 'at a time', so to speak. However the concept of movement of a body between one moment and the next involves duration, which is inimical to space. A body in movement is occupying duration (ie time), rather than space. The mathematician only deals with frozen instants in space, which has nothing to do with time. This

[180] **Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991), pp90 et seq**
[181] **ibid pp91**
[182] (Bergson 1950b [1986] 170), quoted in Game, ibid, pp91
[183] (Bergson 1950b [1986] 170), quoted in Game, ibid, pp91

implies that we cannot 'be' the same as we were yesterday, since we are always 'becoming', we are always occupying time rather than space[184].

Game goes on to discuss conceptions of memory and time, looking again to Bergson who adopts a

> "method of intuition- placing oneself in the movement of life. We cannot get pastness out of the present by putting together likenesses from a present image. Memory and perception are qualitatively different. The present is sensori-motor, the materiality of existence, and is unique for each moment of duration. As memory materialises in the body, in movement, it ceases to be pure memory; it is lived in the present. It has moved from virtual, in the depths of the past, to actual, capable of provoking movements."[185]

He goes on to develop the idea that there is actually no present, there is a constant meeting of the past and the future. In other words, the present is not 'a presence'. It is rather the connection by means of memory of the past and the future, a duration. This returns us to the problem of spatialising time. Memory cannot be the collection of images, which are in themselves immobile snapshots of a place, a point in time. Duration is therefore indivisible and irreducible, and thereby original, which fits with the Derridean conception of the present, whose elements are in relation to some other thing, retaining the signature of the past element which is dually nullified by the future element[186].

Bergson nonetheless sees time as continuous, which does not quite fit with his idea of it being heterogeneous and multiple[187]. Game points out that Merleau-Ponty disagrees with Bergson's view of time in terms of continuity, which amounts to a denial of time altogether. He argues that continuity, as a phenomenon of time, involves moments eliding into each other, while not being distinguishable, failing which time would not exist[188].

Post-enlightenment rationalist Western thought conceives of time as linear, and we are able to think of time as such because of our memory of prior thoughts and actions, and of prior interractions with the world around us that are no longer taking place. This of course implies that there is a beginning, middle and end to every idea associated with human action. We see time as being space-bound, as starting on the left and finishing on the right, and we picture time as being finite and discontinuous. As Wallman notes,

> "The time-map reader [can] play conceptual games with Ego's position on it. It is common, for example, to 'place' children left of centre, therefore with a long future, and the old correspondingly far right with a relatively short one. This reflects the biochronology, but it is not clear whether Ego's sense of his/her own position on that timescale matches the observer's, even without cross-cultural complications, or whether Ego experiences him/herself on *that* timescale at all. (The anthropological 'Ego' and the seeing 'I' are different kinds of being)"[189].

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[184] (Bergson 1950b [1986] 170), quoted in Game, ibid, **pp90 et seq**
[185] Game, ibid pp97, quoting Bergson 1950b: 174-9
[186] Game, ibid pp98
[187] Game, ibid pp99
[188] Game, ibid pp99
[189] Wallman, S (ed) Contemporary Futures- Perspectives from Social Anthropology (Routledge, London and New York, 1992) pp12

This in turn allows us to conceive of identity as bounded and unitary, whereas the idea of separate perspectives of being introduced by anthropological perspectives implies that there is by definition an asynchronous conception of identity, one held by 'others' and one held by the 'self', neither of which are necessarily 'true', or alternatively both of which are 'true', depending on whether one is taking as a given an absolute personal identity with which to compare[190].

The concept of time and an enduring sense of self are bound up with ideas of the future and aspiration. We hope to 'become' something (by implication something 'different' to what we 'are') in line with this asynchronous sense of both time and identity that inhere. In opposition with this idea is that of an "*enduring present* [that] relates to any matter which has to do with the *continuity of existence*"[191].

It would seem obvious that space, time and identity are integrally linked, in fact inseparable. But let us make sure that we are talking about the same conceptions of space and of identity. Castoriadis argues that

> "[I]t would be wrong... to equate space (full space, actual space, as distinct from abstract space) with identity and difference, repetition, determinacy- in brief, with the ensemblistic-identitary (ensidic), and time with alteration, creation/destruction only. There is poietic space, space unfolding with and through the emergence of forms. And there is identitary time, ensidic time embedded in poietic or imaginary time."[192]

This is not self-explanatory, and Castoriadis goes into much detail on the subject. For our purposes we should bear in mind that physical space is not the only space that we as individuals or as groups of humans occupy. We also occupy the mythic spaces of all the things we could be, should be, want to be. We occupy the spaces of leisure, of work, of love, of sincerity, of posturing. What Castoriadis implies is that all these spaces change and mould us as we develop. It is not enough to take a positivistic perspective on who we are by looking at the physical spaces we inhabit.

Likewise, it is foolhardy to try to tie us down to linear time only. At any given moment we can occupy a multitude of times, none or all of which coincide with the years, months, days, hours, minutes and seconds that allow us to move from being young to old. We live in the past, the present, the future, the past conditional, the present perfect, the future imperfect, and all the concatenations of time both 'real' and 'imaginary'. On the one hand we live in 'real' time, going about our daily business and working amongst other people also going about their business. But time is a personal thing- it means something different to each of us at all times: sometimes it is long and drawn-out, other times it is quick and easy, and never is it exactly the same to every person. Castoriadis posits two fundamental categories to use in working with time: difference

[190] extrapolated from Wallman, Ibid
[191] ibid pp15
[192] Castoriadis, (DA Curtis, ed & trans) World in Fragments- Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1986) pp396

and otherness, both of which by definition entail space, and make up time as encompassing space. It is in space where forms emerge and are created, and where simultaneously the constituent parts of forms are created and exist. He talks of time as "creation and destruction- that means that time is being in its substantive determinations"[193]. He talks of multiplicity as difference, which means "that the plurality of particular beings is brought into one by the laws which produce, deduce, etc., beings from each other. ... qualities are reduced to quantities and different quantities give different (reducible) qualities. This is both Hegel and the dominant, reductionist trend in the positive sciences."[194]. The implication is that in order for a being to be, it (he/she) has to 'be' in multiplicity, ie in different forms together in a unity. This means that there can be no stability of identity in a human being, that human beings change and are mutable with time, both 'real' and "ensidic" (ie emotional time)

More particularly to the questions of gendered (and by implication racialised) identity, Butler asks

> "[t]o what extent is 'identity' a normative ideal rather than a descriptive feature of experience?... Inasmuch as "identity" is assured through the stabilizing concepts of sex, gender and sexuality, the very notion of "the person" is called into question by the cultural emergence of those "incoherent" or "discontinuous" gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined."[195]

This argument is equally valid for racialised identity, in which the corpus is defined in terms of its colour, 'cultural background' or 'nationality'. Race is by definition unstable, as I shall argue later, as is evidenced by the fallacious definitions of South Africans during Apartheid as being 'black', 'white', 'coloured', or 'indian', with 'racial' groups such as Chinese and Japanese being virtually invisible except inasmuch as they could be artificially incorporated into the pre-existing definitions, as 'white' and 'black' respectively. Hence the question of 'person' is called into question by 'mixed race' questions such as those of the Griqua, who, as I shall discuss later, have been calling for UN sanctioned 'first-people' status on the basis of their indigenous heritage, as discussed by David Johnson[196].

As I shall argue, it is the continuity over time of the gendered and racialised performances that allow us to identify, both internally and in others, the roles that we are supposed to play. These roles are identified by our spatially identifying performative roles based on past experiences, and placing ourselves in the parameters of those roles and projecting them into the future, onto our future selves, and closing the gap around the 'self-identical being' that we are encouraged to believe that we are. It is precisely the people who for whatever reason refuse to perform

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[193] ibid pp399
[194] ibid pp399
[195] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990), pp 23
[196] The First Rainbow Nation? The Griqua in Post-Apartheid South Africa' in Poddar, P (ed) Translating Nations (Aarhus University Press, Denmark, Oxford, Connecticutt, 2000) pp 115 et seq

those roles that unhinge the conception of stable identity, and indeed who open the door to a destabilisation of those roles and the identities they reflect.

In 'The Death of the Future', David Lowenthal argues that we are living in a time of the disappointment with the unfulfilled or fulfilled but less than spectacular promises of technology, which has resulted in "doubts that saving miracles will continue to unfold, disbelief that technological progress will make people happy... The collapse of inflated expectations and loss of faith in progress induce despondency, impotence, and *apres moi le deluge* escapism..."[197] He however looks to a largely positive personal future, with the image of life as a career, with a focus on bigger, better middle-class social and materialist expectations[198]. It is however precisely these expectations that box us into personal identities in conformity with the roles set out for us.

Non-Western Models of Time

However, linear thought and linear time are not the only options available to use as the environment in which our own identity can exist. Turning to anthropological discourses on non-western perspectives on time, we note that "In 'traditional' societies, governed, according to definition, by the natural rounds of sun, moon and season, the dominant model is cyclical and, because it is cyclical, continuous: any point in the round is potentially (also) its beginning or end. The fact that cycles like these are still experienced in 'non-traditional' societies, is geared (again by definition) to industrial imperatives, suggests that different shapes of time (can) pertain to different contexts in the same culture."[199]

As Jean L Briggs argues, against the initial question of whether the Inuit are 'future oriented', that these people do indeed organise action linearly, thinking forward and backwards in time[200]. However it appears that the Inuit broaden their perspective on time by reworking linear conceptions of temporal orientation: "present orientation in the case of material objects, past and/or future orientation where the recycling of souls is concerned, and both future and present orientation in the cases of adoption and gender change". All of this disallows a simple comparison between Western linear thought or any other particular temporal orientation as a fundamental organising principle of Inuit society, and hence another option for us to consider.

C Bawa Yamba speaks of the predominantly Hausa West African Muslim pilgrims living in Sudan whose future is important insofar as it allows them to identify themselves as pilgrims, and as Hausa, even though they are to all intents and purposes naturalised Sudanese who have set

[197] Lowenthal, pp 30 in Wallman, S (ed), ibid
[198] Wallman, S (ed) ibid pp23 et seq
[199] Wallman, S (ed) ibid pp11
[200] "Lines, cycles and transformations: temporal perspectives on Inuit action" in Wallman, S (ed) ibid pp83 et seq

up home and have been living in Sudan for generations[201]. The argument is that "if the past makes us what we are, it is the notion of the *future* that transforms us into what we are to become."[202]

From a somewhat more esoteric perspective, Roy Wagner speaks of the 'Holographic World View' of the Barok people of New Ireland[203]. He speaks the view in New Guinea that it is impossible to understand the 'other', and that any attempt to do so results in the anthropologist understanding more about his/her own culture than that of the subject culture.

> "Because a conceptual holography is a perfect scale model of all the mistakes to be made in figuring out what it may be, we cannot really know, or prove to ourselves, how things or indeed people "work", and are thrown back on our own resources. Hence we do not *learn* a "culture" or its reprojection within the "given" or natural world of fact, or even learn about them, so much as we *teach ourselves to them*."[204]

This argument is as valid in the context of the identity of the individual as in the context of anthropology.

The Certainty of Whiteness and Maleness in Space and Time

In interacting with the concepts of gender and race (read whiteness and maleness), we project as much of our own sense of self onto people around us, in terms of seeing their sense of performance of gender and race, as we absorb of them. In this respect, time and memory as substantive of identity are merely snapshots of our own projections of what we (and the world around us) should be, and the gendered and racialised identities that we expect of ourselves and others, rather than a true reflection of any 'real' identities. Purely from the perspective of time, I am therefore not necessarily white or male, since those identities are simply the projections of my past experiences as I perform them now. They are also simply reflections of the projections of the people around me, as are their identities merely reflections of my projections onto them.

If we can disrupt space, we can disrupt time, and we can disrupt our own sense of self. We are only constant, and identifiable, if we occupy both space and time, space in order to be able to move through time, and time in order to make our spacial sense of self continue. But, as Doreen Massey says

> "the map is not space. And the spacial is not representation... time is a priveleged dimension, space is a lack of temporality.... Temporality must be conceived as the exact opposite of space. The 'spatialisation' of an event consists of eliminating its temporality ... A strategy assumes a space that can be circumscribed as *proper* (propre)... Political, economic and scientific rationality has been constructed on this strategic model... "The 'proper' is a victory of space over time' ... Any view of space implies a view of time. If space is a slice through time, then history is

[201] 'Going there and getting there: the future as a legitimating charter for life in the present' in Wallman, S (ed) ibid pp 109 et seq
[202] C Bawa Yamba in Wallman, S (ed) ibidpp 109
[203] Wagner, R An Anthropology of the Subject- Holographic Worldview in new Guinea and its Meaning and Significance for the World of Anthropology (University of California Press, Berkeley, LA, London, 2001)
[204] ibid, pp xiii

> impossible. This kind of space implies a homogeneous linear progression, a time dimension which is 'infintiely divisible, so that spatial reality may be chopped up into instantaneous slices of immobility,,, which are then strung together again with the 'time-line'. Louis Althusser said much the same thing about Hegel's "coupes d'essence". Space as the binary opposite of time makes history no more than a sequence of snapshots[205]

Which makes anything possible…

[205] Golding, S (ed) The eight technologies of otherness (Routledge: New York, London, 1997) Doreen Massey 'Spacial Disruptions' p218 et seq, referring to Laclau, (1990, 41), Ho, (1993, 171) and de Certeau, (1984, xix)

I turn to Materialisation 5, in effect part 4 of my auto-ethnography, which reflects some of my adult understanding of the ways in which I was brought up, and the influences that have helped to shape me. I choose these adult reflections particularly in connection with the preceding chapter to underscore the sense of discontinuous time I feel when looking at who I am now, together with the sense of movement that has brought me here. I perform my identity in a very different way now to the way I did as a young man struggling with his identity, but at the same time there are linkages that follow my sense of self.

Materialisation 5: Reminiscences- Adult Reflections

I led a sheltered youth, and had a very strong sense from both my parents and the society in which I lived as to who was appropriate as playmates. This definition excluded those children whose parents were not upper-middle class white english-speaking professionals. The clear messages I received were that anyone else was 'different' and not good enough, or at the very least different, 'not like us' and with no common interests. The list was endless: Afrikaners, Portuguese, Jews, Lebanese, Indians, Coloureds, Blacks. There was never any direct aggressive hostility in our house, but we were left with no misunderstanding of our place in the world. There was at the same time a strange double-standard, in that much more credence was given to Americans or Europeans of African origin, such as Ella Fitzgerald, Eartha Kitt, and other well-known African-American singers who formed a strong part of my early childhood. These people were not, however, categorised as 'black', but rather as 'black american', which made them worth identifying as 'people' rather than 'them'.

There was no mention that my paternal grandfather was a (greasy?) Greek Cypriot or of my paternal grandmother being purebred Afrikaans. My grandmother refused to acknowledge her own (possibly Jewish) maiden name of Leff, and also refused to speak Afrikaans, choosing rather to speak in "the Queen's English". Rather sheepish mention was made of my mother's Jewish heritage, her grandfather's surname being Haskins.

My parents never advocated being overtly discriminatory against 'other cultures', but it was, and still is, anathema to them to be personally involved with any of them- God forbid I should have met a nice Jewish or Indian girl! As it turns out, I have met a number of nice boys, of all varieties, and my sister is now involved with a Siq man!

I had by the age of eighteen successfully internalised most, if not all, of the prejudices and expectations that my parents held dear to them, although somewhat diluted by certain of my teachers who taught me about the virtues of rational rather than emotionally-driven thought, while still maintaining a connection to the 'heart' of the matter, and to the emotional responses that people have in their circumstances.

At the age of sixteen, I for the first time started to 'see' other people. And I do not mean this only figuratively. Of course other people, black and white, male and female, of all socio-economic levels, had always surrounded me. But, when I first went to a multi-racial private school in standard nine, I had the opportunity of meeting and getting to know black, coloured, indian and chinese classmates, and I started in a meaningful sense to identify people as individuals, rather than as members of a group. I also started to realise that I may, just may, be homosexual myself (although it would be another two years before I acted on that fear). Even though I had for a number of years felt uneasy about how (white) people around me dealt with each other and other (black) people, I had never realised what the problem was.

My parents

The messages I learned from my parents and environment were very confusing. On the one hand my parents had strongly 'liberal' political views, which meant that they were against apartheid, and believed in equal economic opportunities for all South Africans. My parents were horrified at the injustices perpetrated on our population, and were strongly against violence. They thought it scandalous that black people were forcibly removed from their homes, denied decent education and work, and their lives devastated. But at the same time they believed that black people were in some way inferior to us,

since their culture, although 'naively charming', was not as well-developed as ours. They also believed that, largely as a result of this lack of education, black people were not ready for the vote, even in the late eighties. My parents would never ill-treat anyone, and were vociferous in their opposition to apartheid. They were at the same time afraid of the lid blowing off the boiling pot that was South Africa. In 1976 they emigrated to the UK, only to return to a better standard of living, in 1986 they applied for residency in the USA and Canada, both of which applications were eventually granted in 1997.

Their racism was publicly denied, but subsumed under their classism, which they believed was defensible. It was never voiced as such, but I grew up with a feeling that if black people could 'become like us', then 'they' would be equal citizens, but until such time, 'they' needed help. There was always a 'them' and 'us' mentality which held sway. There was always a very strong sense of what was right, who should inhabit which boxes, and who should or should not consort with whom. There was no understanding in my life that those boxes may be arbitrarily defined, and that even if we do choose to place ourselves within them, they are mutable and not as concrete as they make themselves out to be.

Yet my parents never meant anybody any harm. They were, and are, well-meaning, loving parents, trying to forge a way for themselves and their family in trying times. They were afraid, of violence, of economic loss and of social deprivation.

They emigrated to the USA in 1997 and do not plan to return. I still argue with them, differing vastly from their relatively conservative political views, but my father, whose intellect and ability to deal with change with equanimity I have always respected, has acknowledged to me that he was extremely prejudiced, without his being aware of it.

He would never return to South Africa now, and I get the sharp sense that he feels betrayed by this country. He tells me that he feels that he has more in common with Americans than with South Africans, the white, english-speaking 3% of whom he only identifies with. He feels betrayed by the British, whose aim was only to rape Africa, and not to give anything back, always thinking of England as 'home', and inculcating a sense of inferiority into all colonial subjects, whatever their 'race'. He feels betrayed by 'Afrikaners', who pushed Afrikaner Nationalism at the expense of all others, including him, a feeling he backs up with a sense of bitterness at not being able to progress above a 'glass ceiling' in his career as engineer and manager in the oil industry. And now he feels betrayed by the 'black government' who, albeit understandably to his mind, have to right the inequalities of the past, but at the expense of him and his family. It is interesting that he nevertheless bears no grudge against black South Africans, whom he feels have the right to determine their own future. But he feels excluded from the process.

My Sister

Cathy is the only person who understands what it was like to live in our extremely loving and supportive yet emotionally trying home. On the one hand we were never left wanting for anything. Yet on the other hand the environment was extremely emotionally taxing, fraught with pitfalls of blame for disobedience, disloyalty, lack of appreciation of all that was done for us, and the list goes on.

Cathy is now a US citizen studying medicine in New Jersey and in a mere seven years has become substantially Americanised. She has all but lost her South African accent, speaking with a full-blown East-Coast twang, to the extent that people she meets no longer ask her where she is from, much to her chagrin freeing her from opportunities of professing to be an 'African-American'!

Like me, Cathy finds it difficult to reconcile the views on race and culture that we both grew up with, often being overly aware of her skin-colour, even in the USA, where the discrepacies between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' are less apparent.

Interestingly, she has now surrounded herself predominantly with friends of Indian origin, first generation Americans whose parents are from Mumbai, New Delhi, Goa, who, although on the surface are well-adjusted Americans, have an uneasy relationship with their country of origin. They still feel somewhat like outsiders since they have difficulty reconciling their parents' religion and cultural norms which are at times at odds with their own Westernised view of the world. Cathy has commented to me that she appreciates her friends' perspective, which is wider than that of most more entrenched Americans she has met. She feels that her friends are more aware that the planet is a lot larger than American culture would have its citizens believe, and that there are a multitude of paradigms from which to choose.

Me

In 1991 I started university full of anticipation of exciting possibilities. I quickly learned that there is a whole world of different perspectives, paradigms and perspectives from which to choose, to revel and luxuriate in.

After thirteen years of consciously deconstructing the premises on which my young life was build in respect to race, gender and culture I still feel angry and frustrated. I am seething with anger that the spurious ideas of racism and sexism were inculcated into me, that fear was my standard operating procedure for so long, and still haunts me daily. I resent that I was never allowed to enjoy the company of people who speak a different first language to me, of people who look different to me, of people who have different physical anatomies to me. More than that, I resent that I was never allowed to be what I wanted to be. I was never allowed to identify with the millions of my fellow South Africans, nor to feel my femininity, my African cultural identity. How could the system deprive me of something so central to human life- a choice as to who I want to be? How could the system encourage my parents to be the unwitting perpetrators of the violence of segregation against me? How could the system have been allowed to exist whereby I was disallowed so many years of loving other people, loving the female because I identify with her, loving Africa because I am of its soil, and of its people?

Would my life not be more valuable to me if I were not to feel shoehorned into the various roles predetermined for me by virtue of my white male identity? Would I not be free to experience my life with less self-judgement and more love if I had more freedom to express myself without the expectations of race and gender hindering me?

Now that I face these questions I face a deeper one: how is it possible for white men to deal with the restrinctions of their identity, to allow them to move to a place that is not based on restriction? Is it possible to really face ones constitution, destabilise it and move on to something more? Or are we white men stuck with our identities with no hope of reprieve? Can we destabilise the racially and sexually defined standards, thereby creating the space for alternative perspectives on the world? Do these things allow me a personal space in which to celebrate the simple joy of being a human being rather than a white male?

Chapter Four- Race and Gender

Sex/Gender and Male Identity

Feminism, Femaleness and Power

Feminist theory comes in many forms. "There are Marxist feminists, postmodern feminists, liberal feminists, radical lesbian feminists, and African-American feminists who attack white feminists for being racist and elitist."[206] Arguably one of the central points of reference of feminist thought is that society, its institutions and discourses are created in the image of, and using the discourses of, the male of the species, and that people, whether they have a penis or a vagina (or both, or neither) are encouraged to define themselves in relation to a predetermined set of male norms and based on male expectations, and to perform accordingly. As Game argues: "Deconstructive feminists make the claim that the power of philosophical discourse is dependent on the negation or repression of the feminine. Their deconstructive strategy consists in demonstrating how these repressions operate to effect the pretence to self-identity in knowledge."[207] This point is satisfying to a certain extent, since most societies, historically with very few exceptions, are traditionally patriarchal in nature, and have been so since recorded history began, with few exceptions. Traditionally the view is that since society is patriarchal, women and other disempowered peoples should fight to attain the equality and independence that is denied them. "... [T]he radical feminist version is to put women where men now are; ... to replace the patriarchal power with the power of women. [yet this is s]tructurally the same story [as the current system of roles]."[208] Again, this argument is compelling inasmuch as it suggests the implicit right of all people to be deemed equal. The challenge, according to this paradigm of fundamental equality, is to ensure that all people are given the same opportunities, educational and material resources, and be allowed to occupy equally valuable social spaces.

However these positions are somewhat lacking in that they assume the validity of simply reversing the structures, or at the very least, working with the same paradigms and structures to achieve change. They do not challenge the very existence of the assumed patriarchal structures themselves. As Game says, "What we learn from Hegel is that reversal changes nothing of the structure"[209]. They further presume a fundamental difference between people. They presume that men are one animal, and women are another, and that these definitions are mutually

[206] Hollinger, R Postmodernism and the Social Sciences- A Thematic Approach (Sage, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, 1994) pp139
[207] Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991), pp77
[208] Ibid pp77
[209] Ibid pp77

exclusive. This simple following of the binary Cartesian paradigm does not go far enough in achieving the equality based on similarity, since it is based on qualitive difference, even though premised on quantitative equation. The argument that women are equal to men, and therefore by implication cannot 'be' (or as we shall see, 'perform as') men, and vice versa, serves to restrain the equality process. The fundamental principle of separation is maintained at all levels of society, from government through the media to the family.

Looking at power in a more Foucauldian sense, we understand that individuals, thereby stripped of their inherent identities, are in fact free to occupy any mark on the wheel of power, and to manipulate their own power as individuals, rather than as men, women, black, white, gay, or straight[210].

To better understand power and gender, it is worthwhile looking at Hegel's Master/slave dialectic as seen through the eyes of Benjamin, who argues that, although the dialectic does represent masculine/feminine, it can be seen as the starting-point for looking at the fantasy of erotic domination in contemporary Western Culture[211].

> "Combining Hegel, de Beauvoir, Bataille and object relations psychoanalysis, [Benjamin] provides an account of a splitting of masculine and feminine, two poles in a unity; and an attempted resolution through relations of erotic domination. The 'ideal' for her would be the two sides of the split existing within each subject, in a relation of tension. This would constitute desire without inequality, and a resolution between the contradiction betweeen independence and recognition."[212].

This goes beyond the reversal of the power duality of male/female, master/slave, and "we are left with two subjects that combine characteristics of masculine and feminine; while the oppositional definition of these, autonomy vs nurturant and so on, remains."[213]

De Beauvoir, in reading the Master/slave dialectic, argues that "man is in the position of master, the looker, in transcendence; woman is in the position of slave, the looked at, in immanence. In Sartre, there is a struggle for the position of subject; in de Beauvoir, there is no struggle between the sexes, woman having given up the ideal of transcendence and being complicit in their objectification" [214]. De Beauvoir has been accused of failing to question transcendence as a human goal, thereby failing to question the benefit thereof as a goal for women, and taking transcendence as her reference point[215]. Game further notes that de Beauvoir does not see the masculine in the Sartrean understanding of transcendence, as opposed to the feminine immanence, and Game approaches the concerns by noting that the Hegelian Master/Slave

[210] Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980); Foucault, M- The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure- (Pantheon, New York, 1985)
[211] Benjamin, J "master and Slave: the Fantasy of Erotic Domination", in Snitow, A, Stansell, C, and Thompson, S (eds) Desire: the Politics of Sexuality (London, Virago, 1984), quoted in Game, Ibid, pp77 et seq
[212] Game, pp77
[213] Game, ibid pp77
[214] Game, ibid pp77
[215] Game, ibid pp77

dialectic does not necessarily neatly map the masculine/feminine relation, and that the feminist pinning down of the relation might be overstating the case[216].

De Beauvoir looks at the dialectic through the lens of existentialist *mauvaise foi* .

> "Every subject asserts itself concretely as a transcendent being through chosen projects, and realises its freedom only by continually surpassing itself towards other freedoms...Every individual concerned to justify his/her existence experiences that existence as an indefinite need to transcend him/herself"[217]

This perspective, on the not necessarily valid premise that transcendence is truly the male prerogative, supports the argument that de Beauvoir is indeed hearkening after an absolutely male privilege, rather than deconstructing the principle.

In both Cixous' and Irigaray's positions on the masculine/feminine dialectic, "the body is central to the question of different ways of meaning. Female sexuality, the repressed of western culture, presents a disturbance to the order of discourse."[218] These theorists talk in their work not of a difference between the absolute other, but rather more of Derrida's *difference*, ie not based on an identity with the same, but the reference to elements in a chain.

It is clear that Cixous sees the need of the feminine to reclaim her space, her power, and write herself:

> "A feminine text cannot be more than subversive...She must write herself because, when the time comes for her liberation, it is the invention of a new, insurgent writing that will allow her to put the breaks and indispensible changes into effect in her history.... To write- the act that will 'realise' the uncensored relationship of woman to her sexuality, to her woman-being giving her back access to her own forces; that will return her goods, her pleasures, her organs, her vast bodily territories kept under seal... Write yourself: your body must make itself heard. Then the huge resources of the unconscious will burst out. Finally the inexhaustible feminine Imaginary is going to be deployed."[219]

She is clear though that the idea of feminine writing, or the use of 'feminine' or 'masculine' is misused, and that the idea should not be set up in terms of binary opposites, but rather as "a deciphering libidinal femininity which can be read in a writing produced by a male or a female."[220] In this sense, she talks of a sense of 'feminine-ness' that transcends body-bound sex or gender.

This in turn is closely connected to multiplicity in French feminist writing. Irigaray notes female autoeroticism as a disruption of the masculine perspective, since it does away with the presence/absence and subject/object dichotomies[221]. Of note is not specifically feminine

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[216] Game, ibid pp77
[217] de Beauvoir, S: The Second Sex transl by HM Parshley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972) pp 28-9;I,31
[218] Game pp83-84
[219] Helene Cixous, *The Newly Born Woman*, translated by Betsy Wing (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p7, quoted in Cornell, S 'Helene Cixous and les Etudes Feminines', in Wilcox, H, McWatters, K, Thompson, A, Williams, LR The Body and the Text- Helene Cixous, Reading and Teaching (St martin's Press, New York, 1990) pp 35
[220] Verena Andernatt Conley, *Helene Cixous: Writing the Feminine* (Lincoln, Nebraska and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984) p129 quoted in Cornell, S 'Helene Cixous and les Etudes Feminines', in Wilcox, H, McWatters, K, Thompson, A, Williams, LR The Body and the Text- helene Cixous, Reading and Teaching (St martin's Press, New York, 1990) pp36
[221] discussed in Game pp83-84

autoeroticism in itself, but rather the connection between the body and the power of the gaze. According to these writers, the male gaze objectifies and subordinates the feminine, and the feminine focus on the own body, the own self as both erotic subject and object. If read in terms of *difference*, this enables the stability of the top-down, masculine ownership to be destabilised and undone by means of an interplay between references, rather than a holding and ownership of the feminine 'other'. The importance of touch rather than sight is that removal of the element of vision from eroticism means that the masculine power- the eye which (be)holds- is disempowered, and the person has the opportunity to *feel* the other, while at the same time feeling the self. It is impossible to 'see' the other and the self from an 'objective' perspective, since our eyes are embedded in our own sense of self, in our own bodies. When we see we therefore define ourselves in terms of the 'other', that person we are seeing. But it is possible to feel both ourselves and others at the same time, since the sense of touch is referential, not oppositional. In this respect, the I/you dichotomy is diminished.

These ideas of bodily disruption are not peculiar to feminist thought. Barthes, for example, speaks of "'subjectivity' making 'structure hysterical': a bodily disruption of the order; the 'energy' of 'infinite Displacement"[222].

Brown speaks of the paradox of postmodern identity, which has opened spaces of articulation of marginal voices (notably gay voices, female voices), and speaks at the same time of questioning the idea of a unified subject which takes away any claim of self-knowledge, authenticity and the margins from which the people occupying them are permitted to speak beyond their bodies[223].

> "In the two-sex model that still rules late twentieth century thinking, a woman's difference from men, and her supposed inferiority to them, is explained by reducing her to her body, specifically, her sexual organs, which are considered to be the opposite of men's. Women's genitals are described as hidden, internal and inert, as opposed to what is described as the forceful and aggressive male penis. Women are thus associated with the interior spaces of the body, with the hidden, fluid, and fluctuating internal systems. (In the one-sex model, Laqueur shows, both men's and women's bodies were understood to be fluid-filled vessels). Men in the two-sex model, on the other hand, are associated with dry solidity and with hard physical strength."[224]

Braidotti argues that there is a parting of the ways between elements of postmodernism as it intersects with feminism, at least in the form of Foucault and Irigaray: "Foucault elaborates a new ethics that remains within the confines of sexual sameness, whereas Irigaray is arguing for sexual otherness as a strategy allowing for the assertion of feminine subjectivity"[225]. She argues that Foucault's historical approach is tantamount to

> "a critical anatomy of phallocentric structures in discourse; the practice of 'ethical virility' in fact also lays the foundation of the philosophical game as such, ... it provides the basic parameters of

[222] Barthes (1986:43) quoted in Game pp89
[223] ibid
[224] Springer, C- Electronic Eros, Bodies and Desire in the Post-Industrial Age (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1996), p102
[225] ibid, pp38

> the political truth, as submitted to the authority of the *logos*. Moreover, the phallo-logocentric economy ... also reveals the male homosexual bond which constitutes the basis of the social contract as well as the discursive practices which society adopts for itself: it is a world for and by men"[226]

She goes on to describe Irigaray's enterprise as encompassing "the double urge to express the radical novelty of a feminine corporeal reality which has never been adequately represented and also not to interrupt the dialogue with the masters of Western philosophy."[227] Irigaray believes that the difference between the sexes is apparent and indeed constitutes human reality. She argues that the relationship to 'other', especially the 'Other that is the Divine being' is coalesced in the sexual other[228].

Braidotti argues that Foucault reflects a politics of sameness through his unapologetic discussions of the classical Greek and Roman ethics, the use of pleasure and subjectivity, and his question of how we can move beyond the historical nature of our modern condition, where no morals are possible, since we are condemned to work our own lives in terms of our history[229]. She also argues that Irigaray's redefinition of the tenets of personal relationships based on sexual difference, although being about the same question of 'where to from here?', comes from a fundamentally different place, and is going in a better direction, where "it may well be that sexual difference as a movement of thought will open the door to the recognition of multiple differences which spell the death of the One and Only logic of phallo-logocentrism.[230]"

Feminist Arguments and Maleness

These arguments however do not go far enough in undoing the male gaze, and in identifying the male gaze with the man. Neither Foucault, with what can be seen as a fatalistic perspective on what we have to work with and on how we go about working with it, nor Irigaray, with her focus on differentness, even if that differentness is based on a reworking of hierarchically-defined duality to a Derridean *difference,* see a way of undoing the paradigms of power and gender identity[231]. Foucault seems to be unable and unwilling to go beyond deconstruction, while Irigaray seems unwilling to work outside of the heterosexual, body-based paradigm of gender.

They also do not go far enough in dealing with the implications for 'the masculine' and what a new space for men should incorporate, or what the performances of maleness should entail. Weberian conceptions of rationality, whether 'instrumental' or 'means/end' rationality, 'juridical' rationality, or 'cognitive' or 'scientific' rationality are to my mind discredited due to their

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[226] ibid, pp42
[227] ibid, pp43
[228] see also Welton, D (ed) The Body (Blackwell, Malden, Oxford, 1999) pp361 et seq for a review of Irigaray by Tina Chanter 'Beyond Sex and Gender: On Luce Irigaray's *This Sex'*
[229] Braidotti, R 'The problematic of 'the feminine' in contemporary French philosophy: Foucault and Irigaray' in Threadgold, T & Cranny-Francis, A (eds) Feminine, Masculine and Representation (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, London, Boston, Wellington, 1990) pp 36 et seq
[230] Braidotti, R ibid
[231] Braidotti, R ibid

impersonality, their tendency to abstract relationships and the separation of rational subjects from objects, which result in a virtual Nietschean nihilism in the sense that they turn in on themselves and are self-destructive[232]. They further place the masculine and the male in a predetermined role and performance. But the alternatives put forward by much of feminist thought does not successfully postulate an alternative for the male, in a post-patriarchal society, or indeed for the male in this patriarchal system.

Undoing Sex and Gender

The most attractive argument for undoing the binds of gender are those put forward by Judith Butler, in her groundbreaking work entitled "Gender Trouble- Feminism and the Subversion of Identity", which forms the core of my position in this dissertation[233].

Her argument begins with the question of whether feminist politics is inherently and integrally connected with women as 'subject'.

> At stake is not whether it still makes sense, strategically or transitionally, to refer to woman in order to make representational claims on her behalf. The feminist 'we' is always and only a phantasmatic construction, one that has its purposes, but which denies the internal complexity and indeterminacy of the term and constitutes itself only through the exclusion of some part of the constituency that it simultaneously seeks to represent.... The radical instability of the category sets into question the *foundational* restrictions on feminist political theorising and opens up other configurations, not only of genders and bodies, but of politics itself.[234]

She argues that foundationalist thinking posits that an identity must already be in place for political interests to be enunciated and action to be taken. She looks critically at the construction of feminism and questions the universality and unity of the feminist subject that she argues underpins the feminist enterprise, arguing that this unity and universality is undermined by the

> "...representational discourse in which it functions... the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes"[235].

She argues that the action taken by the subject is in fact constitutive of the subject, and that the question of agency is premised on the prior existence of a wholly constituted agent. In reality, though, the agent is constructed by acting as such. She argues that this kind of agency incorrectly presumes:

> (a) "the agency can only be established through recourse to a prediscursive "I", even if that "I" is found in the midst of a discursive convergence, and

[232] Poole, R, 'Modernity, rationality and 'the masculine'' in Threadgold, T & Cranny-Francis, A (eds) Feminine, Masculine and Representation (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, London, Boston, Wellington, 1990) pp49-50
[233] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990)
[234] ibid pp181
[235] ibid pp7

(b) that to be *constituted* by discourse is to be *determined* by discourse, where determination forecloses the possibility of agency"[236].

In the context of gender, this means that both sex and gender are constructions. It is a well-trodden path that gender is a construction, and feminists have legitimately stated that gendered hierarchies have been created and maintained by a patriarchal structure in order to maintain the privilege associated with the position of the powerful. Butler argues that "whatever biologically intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally constructed: hence, gender is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex."[237] Therefore there is no rule that says that female gender must adhere to a female body, and vice versa.

Going back to de Beauvoir's construction of identity, Butler argues that the "I" that 'does its gender' and 'becomes its gender' is 'nevertheless …never fully identifiable with its gender'[238]. She posits that the ordinary use of language actually supports a strategy of domination, by framing the 'I' against the 'Other' as binary opposites, and as entities that support the structures of a gendered hierarchy and 'normative heterosexuality' by means of repetition that at the same time hides and enforces its rules.

Looking to Irigaray, Butler argues that notwithstanding the domination of language over the subject, the female sex is neither a 'lack', nor an 'Other' that defines the subject in its masculine 'immanence' and negatively. The female subject is therfore a subject by virtue of not being one. She refers to Wittig's call for the destruction of "sex" in order for women to assume the status of universal subject[239]. She refers further to Foucault's discussion of sex and sexuality as a reversal of the traditional formulations of both sex and gender: "In opposition to [the] false construction of "sex" as both univocal and causal, Foucault engages a reverse-discourse which treats "sex" as an *effect* rather than an origin. In the place of "sex" as the original and continuous cause and signification of bodily pleasures, he proposes "sexuality" as an open and complex historical system of discourse and power that produces the misnomer of "sex" as part of the strategy to conceal and, hence, to perpetuate power relations"[240]

Since gender is intimately connected to sexuality, the argument holds that both gender and sex are constructions borne of power relations enforced by language and the systems of Cartesian rationality that demarcate the 'being' of each individual, and further are performances.

[236] ibid pp182
[237] ibid pp10
[238] ibid pp182
[239] ibid pp27
[240] ibid pp121

Sex as Stable Category

The literature on gender, sex and sexuality is broad, and, as Evans notes, "[t]he now given distinction between biological sex (male, female), learned and negotiated gender (masculine, feminine) and sexual orientation and expression, has enabled considerable refinement of psychological and sociological analyses of the social construction of gender variety and sexualities."[241] He goes on to quote Stoller, "'If sex and gender were in direct relationship, if masculinity and femininity were simply a result of one's sex- ie of biological factors- then the differentiation would be pedantic'"[242]. Evans goes into the psychological theory on gender identity creation at some length, referencing theorists such as Caldwell and Benjamin[243]. He discusses the difference between transvestism (cross-dressing) and trans-sexualism (I prefer the term 'transgender', since I maintain that sex is in itself also fundamentally an indeterminate category) and refers to 'gender dysphoria' and the concerns of clinicians about the validity or otherwise of altering the body as a means of obtaining the body of a 'true' 'other sex'[244].

The clinical and psychological categories of and approaches to gender transformation are largely beyond the scope of this dissertation, since we are here more interested in the social implications to the definition of white male, and the sociological perspectives of 'sex' as category.

Foucault's review of the case of the nineteenth century hermaphrodite/intersexed person Herculine Barbin is a compelling look at the validity of 'sex' as a category[245]. He argues that

> "the univocal construct of "sex" (one is one's sex and, therefore, not the other) is
>
> (a) produced in the service of the social regulation and control of sexuality and
>
> (b) conceals and artificially unifies a variety of disparate and unrelated sexual functions and then
>
> (c) postures within discourse as a *cause*, and interior essence which both produces and renders intelligible all manner of sensation, pleasure, and desire as sex-specific.
>
> In other words, bodily pleasures are not merely causally reducible to this ostensibly sex-specific essence, but they become readily interpretable as manifestations of the signs of "sex""[246].

He looks at 'sexuality' as the discourse that produces 'sex' as a strategy of concealing and perpetuating power relations, rather than at sex as the originator of physical pleasure that is expressed through sexuality. With this in mind he looks at the creation of sex and sexual difference as physical identity as a result of discursive modes of production, as opposed to the feminist discourses which take the binary opposites of sex as the starting-point. He sees sex as constructed, and regulative. His discussion on the intersexed body is illustrative of how the

[241] Evans, DT Sexual Citizenship- the Material Construction of Sexualities (London & New York, Routledge, 1993), pp177
[242] Stoller 1979:109, quoted in Evans, ibid
[243] Caldwell (1949) and Benjamin (1966) in Evans, ibid
[244] Evans, DT Sexual Citizenship- the Material Construction of Sexualities (London & New York, Routledge, 1993), pp177 et seq
[245] Foucault, Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century Hermaphrodite, trans Richard McDongall (New York: Colophon, 1980)
[246] Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980) p154

power relations work (or fail to work) within the sex divide. The intersexed body renders the sense of identity so closely tied to sex as unintelligible, successfully undermining and subverting the category sex, and thereby subverting the unidirectional power relations that created the category of sex in the first place. This in turn reveals a primary sexual multiplicity that is the underlying human nature. The journals of Herculine, although they do not show the untramelled joy of a person unregulated by the strictures of sex or gender (far from it, they reflect the pain of a displaced person), do indicate the person outside of convention, and therefore inherently beyond the power matrices of society, which nevertheless attempts to enforce the existing set of rules on him/her by forcing him/her to change from one sex to the other[247].

Butler argues that

> "Herculine's pleasures and desires are in no way the bucolic innocence that thrives and proliferates prior to the imposition of a juridical law. Neither does s/he fall outside the signifying economy of masculinity. S/he is "outside" the law, but the law maintains this "ouside" within itself. In effect, s/he embodies the law, not as an entitled subject, but as an enacted testimony to the law's uncanny capacity to produce only those rebellions that it can guarantee will- out of fidelity- defeat themselves and those subjects who, utterly subjected, have no choice but to reiterate the law of their genesis"[248]

Taking the concept a step further, we can readily argue that, since both sex and gender are indeed performative, and the intersexed person does, to a greater or lesser extent, and not unproblematically, challenge the relations of power and the received standards of both sex and gender, the 'choice' involved in trans-vestite and trans-sexual identities is as much of a challenge to the self-same power and sex relations. Speaking of the radical gay politics of the late 1960's and early 1970's, David Evans reflects

> "In reaction to 'Gay men who would not attempt to destroy their male privilege, their sexism' ... other men adopted political drag, 'the ultimate rejection of the male role in society'..., by wearing clothes that society permits only women to wear... Such 'queens [men who wear make-up and dresses] are rejected by society because they destroy the myth about men'"[249]

He goes on to argue that

> "the medicalised 'gross aberrations of masculinity and femininity' (Stoller 1979: 109), transvestism and trans-sexualism, which dominate medical, legal and commonsense discourses of cross-gendered behaviours, or 'gender-dysphoria'... are, despite their elaborately 'deviant' performance props, seriously committed to narrowly idealised conventional gender standards"[250].

He refers to such theorists as Kirk and Heath who show male transvestites's feminine self as a form of 'escape' from the pressures of being masculine, and as the chosen alter-ego as being as far removed from the male model as possible, "explaining or excusing the chosen often

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[247] Foucault, Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century Hermaphrodite, trans Richard McDongall (New York: Colophon, 1980)
[248] Butler, ibid p135
[249] Evans, DT Sexual Citizenship- the Material Construction of Sexualities (London & New York, Routledge, 1993) p174
[250] ibid p176

stereotypical cross-gendered personae, suggesting uncritical mimicry and satire rather than emulation."[251]

There is certainly room for the position that the system, ever-maleable in terms of the Foucaultian sense of self-regulating power, has accommodated the 'new' identities of 'transvestite' and 'transsexual', rather than unlacing the constructs of male and female. There is further room for the argument that the system has put people who choose to challenge the gendered roles and sex stereotypes by means of their bodies, into the box 'deviant'. As Evans notes,

> "Urban and Billings explain the emergence of the transsexual medical condition quite explicitly as a discursive reflection and development of 'late capitalist logics of reification and commodification'. They argue that, with little or no prior knowledge, transsexual medicine by the late 1960's was extolling the benefits of sex role reassignment through books, articles, lecture tours as well as through non-medical journals and newspapers.... Thus 'the legitimation, rationalisation and commodification of sex-change operations have produced an identity category- transsexual- for a diverse group of sexual deviants and victims of severe gender role distress'"[252]

Yet this is indeed a relatively new phenomenon. Laqueur argues the distinction between male and female as being essentially political and primarily based on rhetoric rather than biology regarding sexual difference and sexual desire. As he eloquently puts it,

> "It is about a body whose fluids- blood, semen, milk, and the various excrements- are fungible in that they turn into one another and whose processes- digestion and generation, menstruation and other bleeding- are not so easily distinguished or so easily assignable to one sex or another as they become after the eighteenth century."[253]

Before this time, it was the one-sexed body that predominated, and, he argues, it indeed continues to live on, where the "womanliness of woman" struggles against the "anarchic assertors of the manliness of woman" despite the dominant insistence that there are indeed two genders[254]. This is an arresting argument, and one that requires more investigation, for, if there is indeed one gender, despite protestations to the contrary, then the concerns of feminists, the personal trials and tribulations of transgendered and transsexual people (the former understood to be people who find themselves somewhere 'between' the sexes, and the latter 'in the wrong sexed body'), not to mention the masculine posturing of men, are for nought. If there is no real difference between genders and sexes other than biology, which is not absolute, what are we fighting about? Why are we concerned about gender at all, what is there to concern us- we are all one in any case...

Yet we are still faced with Laqueur's "problematic, unstable female body that is either a version of or wholly different from a generally unproblematic, stable, male body."[255] Which means that

[251] ibid p182 refering to Kirk and Heath (1984), and Cohen et al (1978:81)
[252] ibid p199 referring to Urban and Billings (1982:277)
[253] ibid p19-20
[254] ibid p21
[255] ibid p22

as a society, we are still at the mercy of a precept of the feminine body being somehow 'less than'. We need to pay attention to understanding the body as human, rather than either male or female.

Sex and Gender Performativity

Butler's argument is a complex intervention into the givens of western philosophical understanding of both sex and gender, which unequivocally opens the door to destabilisation of gendered identity (and by implication all identity based on supposedly 'stable' biological 'reality') This door is opened with the argument that both gender *and* sex are roles that are performative in nature, and are constructs that we as individuals adopt in order to make our way in the world.

It is this argument, on which I will elaborate later, that concerns us in the context of power. For power (in its traditional, non-Foucauldian, macro-, super-imposed formulation) is only important insofar as it imposes its will on people, and forces them into a space that they would otherwise not occupy, and that they do not wish to have imposed upon them.

Using this argument we can find our way out of the maze of identity politics and into a space of real opportunity for all people which does not simply reverse the power relations that beleaguer the development of a society in principle based on equality and human dignity.

Race, Ethnicity, Nationality and Whiteness

as I've noted before, the concern with being able to delineate the concerns of whiteness are that "this property of whiteness, to be everything and nothing is the source of its representational power... The colourless muticolouredness of whiteness secures white power by making it hard, especially for white people and their media, to 'see' whiteness. This of course makes it hardto analyse"[256] It is for this reason that this section is predominantly framed in terms of the ideas surrounding blackness, and the effects that this has on whiteness.

I refer to theorists such as Fanon for two reasons. Firstly, on an emotional level, I identify with his feelings of subjugation and struggle, even though I intend no substantive parallel between the struggle of black people to self-actualisation and that of white men. Secondly, Fanon's work resonates a truth factor that applies to South African society.

[256] Richard Dyer, 'White', Screen, vol 29, no 4 (1988), 45 – 46, quoted in "The white issue" by Vron Ware in Golding, S The eight technologies of otherness (Routledge: New York, London, 1997)

Blackness in a White World

Fanon looks in his work at the place of the black person in the face of white privilege, remarking that "...it is not I who make a meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing, waiting for me."[257]. He speaks from the perspective of the Martiniquan whose sense of self is derived from his blackness, looking at the phenomenon of assimilation of his compatriots from Martinique into 'white' culture, not so much at how white society subjects black society, but more at how black people themselves limit their options to the not viable and the not possible. His argument is that either black people attempt to assimilate into white society, and attract the opprobrium of their fellow (black) Martiniquans, or they reject the society that still subjugates their identity and remain cast-outs. Fanon believes that the former is the main modus operandi[258].

The use of language is one of the ways in which this interraction occurs:

> "In every country of the world there are climbers, "the ones who forget who they are," and in contrast to them, "the ones who remember where they came from." The Antilles Negro who goes home from France expresses himself in dialect if he wants to make it plain that nothing has changed."[259]

Fanon speaks of his compatriots who speak the French of "the motherland", meaning France, if they want to make their friends at home feel that they have assimilated into the 'better' French culture. It is this type of perspective that Fanon shows to be signatory of the internalised "Otherness" of black people, a feeling of self-consciousness and self-devaluation not experienced by whites, a sense of "crushing objecthood"[260] "As long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through others."[261] Fanon speaks of Hegel's 'being for others', but he claims that "every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society" [262], since black people must not only be black, but be black in relation to whiteness, whiteness that hates blackness, not reasonably, but just because it is blackness, because it is the "Other".

> "Man is human to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another man in order to be recognized by him. As long as he has not been effectively recognized by the other, that other will remain the theme of his actions." [263]

Fanon recognises the Hegelian need for recognition of the other in order to "win the certainty of oneself", and to "burgeon into the universal consciousness of self", which is "in quest of absoluteness", needing "recognition as a primal value without reference to life, as a

[257] Fanon, F Black Skin White Masks (Grove Press, New York, 1967) pp134
[258] ibid
[259] ibid pp37
[260] ibid pp109
[261] ibid pp109
[262] ibid pp109
[263] ibid pp217

transformation of subjective certainty (*Gewissheit*) into objective truth (*Wahrheit*)"[264] Fanon asks to be recognised as subject without struggle, rather than as object with struggle, as Fanon claims happened with the end of slavery as a decree by whites to elevate black people to the status of human, as opposed to black people rising up and taking their due.

He takes cognisance of the essence of what it means, in his circumstances, for a black man to live in a colonial (and arguably postcolonial) reality, borne of constant striving towards European culture. Interestingly he fails to recognise the extent to which white people are also the 'victims' (in a very different sense to that appropriate to people subjected to colonialism and tyranny) of a slavery of the human spirit. As Bloom argues, referring to Fanon's analysis of the emotional content of colonialism as being "closely related to the content of apartheid", "the culture of apartheid has been at the most primitive level of development because hate rather than love or concern has become institutionalised …", creating a "social system that was intended to destroy individuality. The extent to which it succeeded- for whites as for blacks- has yet to be evaluated"[265].

Using the argument of Foucault's conception of power relations, the white identity is incarcerated in the cage of 'Master', while the black one at the same time emerges from the slavery of Western disdain[266]. We need to move past the definitions that encircle and enshrine us, to a recognition of the past, without a necessary projection into the future.

As Cheyette says, writing of Fanon's approach to anti-semitism, he also writes a tension between "a particularist anti-colonial nationalism, and more universalist or transnational theories of racial oppression"[267], erroneously identifying jews with white oppressors, which is a problematic perspective on the shared experience of the oppressed and the universalisation drive of post-colonialist writers such as Edward Said[268]. Although 'white' culture is arguably based on imperialism, the individuals who do not adhere to the tenets of such imperialism are almost by definition 'tarred with the same brush', to ironically coin a problematic phrase.

Said has been critical of "'cults like post-modernism, discourse analysis, New Historicism, deconstruction, neo-pragmatism", since they afford their adherents "an astonishing sense of weightlessness with regard to the gravity of history'"[269]. There is validity in this proposition. There is a solemnity that we owe to the power imposed on people by the imperialist colonialist enterprise, the effects which we are increasingly feeling as time passes, with the increasing

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[264] ibid pp217
[265] Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa (Ashgate, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, 1998), pp121 referring to Per, (1992)
[266] see my arguments re Foucault above in chapter 2
[267] Cheyette, B 'White Skin, Black Masks' in Pearson, KA, Parry, B & Squires, J (eds) Cultural Readings of Imperialism- Edward Said and the Gravity of History (St Martin's Press, New York, 1997), pp115
[268] Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979)
[269] Pearson, KA, Parry, B & Squires, J (eds) Cultural Readings of Imperialism- Edward Said and the Gravity of History (St Martin's Press, New York, 1997), Introduction, pp8

poverty of the 'have nots', combined with the increasing wealth of the 'haves', which statistically are represented by black and white, western and non-western nations respectively. However, there is validity in using the positions put forward particularly by post-modernist theorists such as Foucault in order to rework the paradigms of the future. Whereas theorists like Foucault were hesitant to look forward in any utopian way, actively denouncing the utopian dream in their sense of the ways of the world, there is a way in which the premises of the post-modernist conceptions of refusing to take the accepted paradigms of the world at face value can be used to define a future that undoes the paradigms of the imperialist, colonialist mentality with which we are burdened.

Said's endorsement of universalism in order to "move beyond the easy certainties provided by our background, language, nationality', in pursuit of establishing and upholding 'a single standard' concerning 'freedom and justice'"[270] (as distinguished from a universal norm of human behaviour) is important, and should form part of an integration of the language of the oppressed into the language of the oppressor into a universal vocabulary. However, we should steer clear, as Said has urged, of a universalism that entrenches the eurocentric privilege by means of the privileging of nationalist ideologies.

Nationalism and White South African Identity

It is informative, in the context of nationalism, to look at the formation of identity as at least in part produced by the advent of the nation-state as separate conceptual space, and therefore as being created by the need for homogeneous citizenship working towards a common goal. This argument, Viswanathan argues, should be looked at in conjunction with the role of religious belief, not as religious authority, but "the aspirations, understandings, expectations, needs and goals that constitute the self-definitions of people, the very content of which is denied or suppressed in the construction of social identity" [271]

In the South African context, it is perhaps to a lesser extent true that religious difference, as traditionally constructed, is constitutive of cultural difference, since South Africa is predominantly a christian country. Nevertheless the aspirations of its citizens to live a 'christian' life, for the white population particularly informed by Calvinist perspectives on race and culture, that has been instructive in the development of the self-identity of white men. As Bloom notes

> "In a nominally deeply Christian nation, what amounted to an essentially anti-Christian ideology demanded an endless and exhausting intellectual and emotional effort of its supporters- active or passive- to rationalise it as a morally valid and socially realistic view of society. The 'victims' were thereby turned into perpetrators, because apartheid generated a neurotic attempt to undo the

[270] ibid pp9
[271] 'Secular Criticism and the Politics of Religious Dissent' in Pearson, KA, Parry, B & Squires, J (eds) ibid pp 151-172 pp159

guilt-producing problems that it had itself generated by ever more elaborate rationalisations. In this way, severe depersonalisation also occurred in the adherents of apartheid"[272]

As compelling is the role of nationalist politics, asserting a sense of hegemony, that has secured a secluded self-identity for white men, through "a deeply entrenched authoritarianism that permeates South Africa's social and political relationships. Leaders are seen as 'fathers', and their followers see themselves in the main as disappointed children"[273]. The issue of racism is no longer, or indeed perhaps never has been, as simple as a one-way power relation aimed at retaining the privilege of a hegemonous white population,

> "...racism participates in something much more universal than one usually in fact wants to admit. Racism is an offspring, or a particularly acute and exacerbated avatar- I would even be tempted to say a monstrous specification- of what, empirically, is an almost universal trait of human societies. What is at issue is an apparent incapacity to constitute oneself as oneself without excluding the other, and this is coupled with an apparent inability to exclude others without devaluing them and, ultimately, hating them"[274].

The legacy which we have is arguably based on "a continuing sense that the relationships between empowered and powerless are still locked into anti-freedom contradictory ideals (ie attitudes and fantasies about power and the self)"[275], based on a militarism that permeates the culture.

Bloom argues that

> "the depersonalisation brought about by apartheid has five main features:
>
> 1. the grief, depression, and suppressed anger brought about by learned-helplessness and imposed low self-esteem.
> 2. Economic, political and social arrangements severely discouraged individuals from working with others and loving and relating to them spontaneously. Many relationships were severely and narrowly stereotyped, and only the brave and committed evade stereotyping...
> 3. Apartheid was based on an irrational... system of ideas which as they were obsessively elaborated, became more and more distant from the reality of how a fragmented and turbulent society could survive in the long run.....
> 4. Apartheid was collectively and individually unstable, because it deprived most of the people of any meaningful control over their own lives... Those with power needed more and more power and authority to reassure themselves that externally the control would last, and internally that they were justified morally...
> 5. Apartheid had considerable power to create victims The obsessively detailed prescriptions of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour and feelings, allowed few assurances that one could behave correctly and gave no encouragement to a sense of authenticity and autonomy...What is too little acknowledged is the intensely guilt-provoking ambivalence of the feelings of many controllers themselves."[276]

This control entailed a policing of the home community on a variety of fronts, one element of which was, and arguably remains sexuality, as an example of policing of the self, the scope of

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[272] Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa (Ashgate, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, 1998), pp132
[273] ibid pp122
[274] Castoriadis, C (DA Curtis, ed & trans) World in Fragments- Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1986), pp23
[275] Bloom, ibid, p123
[276] Bloom, ibid, pp131-13

which falls outside of the purview of this dissertation, save to remark that, as Mercer and Julien note, "[h]istorically, the European construction of sexuality coincides with the epoch of imperialism and the two inter-connect"[277] This policing is well illustrated by the control of both indigenous and 'European' homosexuality, which, as Bleys remarks "..., often perceived as a 'foreign import' from either Europe or the Arab world, thus assumes a signifying position within early post-colonial rhetoric. Its idealism accordingly is rightly understood as a reaction against the perennial 'perversification' of the colonial subject"[278] Indeed, again following Foucault's formulations, it is cogently argued that the policing in fact creates the body and the self: "It is disciplinary power, through the surveillance and subsequent objectification of the body, which actually serves to fabricate the body in the first place"[279]

It is informative that we are now supposedly living the 'rainbow dream', still based on a problematic nationalist perspective, of who we should be. As Bloom notes, "Identity through the newly-found notion of 'culture' is one more negative and restricting definition of identity."[280]

Time will tell whether this inclusion of all 'races' excludes other 'nationalities' in self-definition, particularly for men. If the range of popularly-reported and –supported xenophobia is indicative of the way we are moving, the nationalist mentality that South Africans are better, or more deserving of self-respect or material wealth because of what 'we' have been through, appears to be developing, notwithstanding the criticisms levelled against 'identity' as being socio-historically redundant, even more than philosophically unstable.

Anthropological Identity Definition

Anthropologists have argued between the ideas of the creation of identity and ethnicity is being 'primordial' or 'instrumental'. "Primordialism, in its most extreme form, presents social identity as immutable and cultures as fixed texts. Social groups are said to exist in themselves, as social objects **a priori**. Ethnicity is then understood as a manifested essence, a 'cultural thing'"[281] Looking more particularly at the postcolonialist perspectives, there is value in the argument that "colonial regimes and their successor states invented, promoted, and exploited 'tribal' differences and traditions"[282], and that the very existence of race and ethnicity are dubious at best. These arguments lead us to believe that, if (black) ethnicity is a fiction, then surely (white) ethnicity is as much a fiction, also based on the essentialist approaches to culture and context.

[277] Mercer, K, and Julien, I, 'Race, sexual politics and black masculinity: a dossier', in R Chapman & J Rutherford (eds), *Male Order. Unwrapping Masculinity* (London, 1988), p106, quoted in Bleys, RC the Geography of Perversion- Male-to-Male Sexual Behaviour outside the West and the Ethnographic Imagination 1750-1918 (Cassell, London & NY, 1996), p1

[278] Bleys, RC the Geography of Perversion- Male-to-Male Sexual Behaviour outside the West and the Ethnographic Imagination 1750-1918 (Cassell, London & NY, 1996), pp9

[279] Armstrong, D "Bodies of Knowledge/Knowledge of Bodies" in Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994), 23

[280] Bloom, L ibid pp 99, speaking of Nigerian identity

[281] Sverker Finnstrom, Dept of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University Working Papers in Cultural Anthropology no 7, 1997, referring to Comaroff 1987; 1995; Eriksen 1993:55; Schoenbrun 1993:47, as well as Amselle 1993:21,

[282] Comaroff 1995:246

The idea of a bounded cultural identity, related to Weberian 'status groups', is arguably a basis for nationalism, both those of hegemonous first-world 'nations', which are indeed largely based either on ancient tribal identity (in Western Europe) or a eurocentric national fiction of hegemony (as in the case of North America), as well as third-world 'nations' which are predominantly constituted by the cultures coralled by the national boundaries demarcated by the colonial powers.

Multiculturalism

Theories of multiculturalism, which deal with difference while trying to approach change in a proactive way, are instructive of a way out of the morass of self-defeating, circular self-definitive identites. Postcolonialism, on the other hand, "is to a great extent perceived to be defined by its specific historical legacies in a retroactive way"[283]. Sneja Gunew argues that the concept of multi-culturalism is used in different ways in different spaces: in Canada, the USA and Britain, it is connected with ideas of racialised difference, while in Australia this has not been given sufficient recognition[284]. Gunew argues that the term is used for the actions of the state in terms of law, education, sociology and immigration, and has been used in different ways. 'Ethnicity', while nominally marking cultural groupings, has often been used to demarcate racialised identity in covert ways, and has been used to identify 'blackness' as opposed to the dominant 'whiteness' of the state[285]. This sliding scale of blackness is interesting to note, and Gunew uses the example of Italians and Greeks in Australia, and Ukranians in Canada as falling within these parameters, as being 'black' at certain pouints in history, and for certain purposes, but not for others[286]. The community is defined as representative of cultural difference, and the rigidification of traditions in terms of both a static identity (associated with the purported 'ancientness', and therefore non-modernity of 'traditional' societies) and the 'backwardness' of the adherents to 'tradition' has in many societies supported the expansion and prolongation of the colonialist and imperialist imperatives of the governing social group (usually white)[287].

The Line between Black and White

The sliding scale of distinction between black and white, 'Us' and 'Other', indicates the fluidity of the definitions of who people are, relative to others. A case in point in the South African context is how 'blackness' is related to 'indian-ness' or 'coloured-ness', depending on the uses to which it is put. During apartheid, the government, with its dedication to separation of 'racial' types, insisted on the cultural differences between (black) Africans, who were subdivided into 'tribal'

[283] Gunew, S "postcolonialism and Multiculturalism: Between Race and Ethnicity" (University of British Columbia, Canada), http://www.english.ubc.ca/~sgunew/race.htm ibid, pp1
[284] ibid
[285] ibid
[286] ibid
[287] ibid

identities, and the coloured and Indian populations, while members of these populations often, but far from absolutely identified a common 'blackness' in their exclusion from white privilege[288]. This tension continues today, with the affirmative action laws being construed widely to include 'previously disadvantaged people', but almost by definition excluding certain whites who were economically underprivileged during apartheid, and further perhaps applying lower standards to blacks than to whites[289].

A further interesting example of the indistinct boundary between 'ethnicites' is that of the Griqua, who, David Johnson notes as having dubious "First-Nation" status as defined by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, to which the Griqua applied in 1995 for recognition[290]. In terms of such recognition, the Griqua would have a strong case to approach the South African national government for restitution of land rights based on violation of treaties predating 1913, as well as for formal recognition of a distinct Griqua people and representation in the House of Traditional Leaders. However there is a dispute as to whether the Griqua, as purportedly the offspring of Europeans and indigenous people, or alternatively predominantly indigenous, qualify as indigenous. The Griqua version of their identity establishment differs from that envisaged by the South African Constitution, the latter which sets out to reconcile, in a forward-looking way, the elements of the country as 'a nation', rather than focussing on the oppression of colonialism and apartheid. The challenge is to deal with the postcolonial perspectives as legitimate grounds for recompense, based not as much on the active oppression of the colonisers, but in a way that both reflects the self-identification of the Griqua as well as the 'national imperatives' such as those imposed by the commercial state and the competing challenges of individual groups who seek self-determination. Johnson suggests that we look firstly "away from the kinds of essentialist pre-occupations facing...earlier historians, and focus instead on the 'historically defined discursive systems' constituting ... national identity"[291]. He suggests that we look to the role of 'collusion' in the sense that Fanon describes the 'native' intellectual as 'throw[ing] himself greedily upon Western culture', giving 'proof that he has assimilated the culture of the occupying culture'[292]. Or alternatively what Homi Bhabha describes as "how colonial subjects practise a 'sly civility' and 'subversive mimicry' as forms of defensive warfare. As Bhabha explains, extending Fanon, 'beyond the psychic choice... :turn

[288] See Boulle, L, Harris, B, Hoexter, C Constitutional and Administrative Law (Juta, Cape Town, Wetton, Johannesburg, 1989) pp101, who note, speaking about pre-1994 South Africa "the group formation in South Africa has, to a greater extent than in other plural societies, been artificially imposed and maintained, ... managed and manipulated by the state which has defined groups and classified people in terms of race, colour and ethnicity"

[289] see the argument in this regard in the early 1990's in Caldwell, D South Africa: The New Revolution Free Market Foundation Books, Johannesburg, 1989) p28 et seq

[290] Johnson, D 'The First Rainbow Nation? The Griqua in Post-Apartheid South Africa' in Poddar, P (ed) Translating Nations (Aarhus University Press, Denmark, Oxford, Connecticutt, 2000) pp 115 et seq

[291] Johnson, D 'The First Rainbow Nation? The Griqua in Post-Apartheid South Africa' in Poddar, P (ed) Translating Nations (Aarhus University Press, Denmark, Oxford, Connecticutt, 2000) pp 122

[292] Fanon, F The Wretched of the Earth, trans Constance Farrington (1961, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) 176, 178, quoted in Johnson, D The First Rainbow Nation? The Griqua in Post-Apartheid South Africa' in Poddar, P (ed) Translating Nations (Aarhus University Press, Denmark, Oxford, Connecticutt, 2000) pp 122

white or disappear"... [t]here is the more ambivalent, third choice: camouflage, mimicry, black skins white masks'[293].

It is clear that, although race is not a determinant of who people are, or should be, racism and its deleterious effects both on the colonised as well as the colonising and imperialist mind, are far-reaching. These effects are truly heinous in the depth of reach, succeeding in convincing the 'Other' of his/her inferiority, both 'culturally' as well as personally, and impressing on the colonising mind that he (for the colonising mind is most often not a she) is superior and separate.

Hybridity

Yet there is a third option, one that is most compelling, and which looks past the givens of skin-colour and 'ethnicity', as they are used as means to subjugate or entrap. Such an approach to national identity in post-colonialist theory and politics is perhaps 'hybridity', which many theorists believe is, within the context of nationalist politics, appropriate for the successful incorporation of ethnic groups in an inter-dependent way. As Bhabha defines it, 'hybridity' is

> "the construction of cultural authority within conditions of political antagonism or inequity. Strategies of hybridization reveal an estranging movement in the "authoritative", even authoritarian inscription of the sign"[294].

The arguments on which analyses in the name of hybridity rely are based on the boundaries they seek to deconstruct, and it would be informative to look at the kind of theorising of Butler[295], reflected in the section on gender/maleness, to read whiteness as a form of performativity that can do way with the idea of both racial and cultural identity.

Yet it is the ideas of multicultural critical theory that opens the door to looking at both the local and the international, not in a single voice, as Said would have us critique, but with a linkage between the specific and the general, between the nation as between nations, and the national and cultural identities as constitutive of the individual[296].

Looking more narrowly into the field of post-colonial discourse from the perspective not of 'who am I?', but 'what do I do?', we need to ask, 'who has the voice?'. Although post-colonialist theorists agree in broad strokes that the 'subaltern' has a lesser or greater voice, it is always, it is argued, a voice in contradistinction with the colonial/imperialist voice that for centuries has taken precedence[297]. It is arguable whether there is indeed a 'post'-colonial voice to be had,

[293] Homi Bhabha, 'Siugns taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817', Europe and its Others, ed Francis Barker et al, vol 1 (Colchester: U of Essex, 1984) 103, quoted in Johnson, D The First Rainbow Nation? The Griqua in Post-Apartheid South Africa' in Poddar, P (ed) Translating Nations (Aarhus University Press, Denmark, Oxford, Connecticutt, 2000) pp 122
[294] Bhabha, 'Culture's In Between' Artforum (September) (1993167-214:212)
[295] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990)
[296] see Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979)
[297] see such theorists as Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990), Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979)

since the paradigms were written in the voice and with the language of the coloniser. From Fanon to Said, the focus in postcolonial discourse has been to deconstruct the dominant paradigms, and to find a voice for the disenfranchised that speaks not only of the larger experience of the colonised, but to allow a space for the smaller experiences in that text, with cultural and linguistic differences between groups of people from Shanghai to Nova Scotia needing to be taken into account[298]. The postcolonialist discourses are arguably uncomfortable with deconstructing the very concept of difference, while at the same time expressing that difference in terms of the smallest common denominator- the individual human being, since that might lead us back to where we are- back to the lion's den of patriarchy.

Homi Bhabha, in the essay "Dissemination, Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation", looks at the margins of national culture to see that the margins of national culture now do not simply refer to the subaltern in the colony, but speak of the migrant in the metropolis[299]. He takes the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised of his earlier work, and reworks the paradigm to reflect on the migrant as the subaltern

> "address[ing] the logic of political affiliation and the structures of ideological negotiation that is exercised in the margins of national culture. It is an attempt to understand the encounters of both colonialism and postcolonialism as both continuous and discontinuous with the overall project of modernity"[300]

It is this reworking of the tenets of postcolonialist thought that allows us the space to revise the prior, more simplistic determinations of who we are and what we are doing. We must use these conceptions to revise the space of the white male in the South African, and indeed the international, context so that this white male can have the space to determine his own place in the world, rather than having to remain bound to the old stereotypes that defined him in the first place, but that he ultimately, if we are to see his identity as performative, can shed, and remake himself by means of the primary mode of differentiation between him and other people- his body.

It is hybridity that holds the promise of a space for white men that is neither centre nor periphery, yet perhaps allows for whiteness and maleness, within its historical and social context, to re-perform itself in ways as yet unthought of.

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[298] Fanon, F Black Skin White Masks (Grove Press, New York, 1967), Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979)
[299] in Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990) pp 291-322
[300] Papastergiadis, N 'Ambivalence in Cultural theory: Reading Homi Bhabha's *Dissemi-Nation*' in Hawley, JC (ed) Critical Studies- Writing the Nation: Self and Country in Post-Colonial Imagination (Rodopi BV, Amsterdam, Atlanta, 1996) pp176 - 193 at p176

I now turn to Materialisation 6, the script rationale for the screenplay "The Clock". As I mentioned in the preface to the screenplay itself, the idea for writing a film script came to me as part of my personal journey of exploration into my whiteness and maleness. The characters and the setting are informed by my circumstances, and my background. The character of the grandfather is loosely based on my image of my own grandfather, although he never faced the issues with which Tom grapples. The character of Michael is loosely based on my own experiences and my questions pertaining to my gendered identity, although I have not chosen to adopt a female identity. The struggle that Michael has with 'coming out' to his family is similar to my coming out as gay to my parents.

The connection that I make between my academic reading and the screenplay, and the motivations that are situated in Materialisation 6, are largely those of the struggles of individuals who do not find themselves squarely in the socially defined identities prescribed for them, and in this respect, I draw implicit parallels between my characters and contemporary writers. I call on the sense of the writers of the postcolony and whose sense of self they feel is dissonant with the narratives prescribed for them by both the colonialist enterprise and the legacy thereof, which places the black person in the position of the "other" [301]. I also call on the writers of deconstructive feminism, who similarly feel separated from their bodies in their attempt to fulfil some utopian role of the female[302]. More pertinently, I call on my own sense of dislocation as white male, feeling neither archetypally white nor male, in the development of the screenplay's characters.

[301] for example Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979) and Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990) as they look to nationhood and personal identity,

[302] such as De Beauvoir, S: The Second Sex transl by HM Parshley (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972) and Irigaray, as discussed in Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991)

Materialisation 6: Script Rationale- "The Clock"

This script came to me while thinking about the core element of a filmic story that would reflect some of the issues facing white South African men, whose challenge lies in part in coming to terms with the possibility that their identities are not as static and immutable as they are taught to believe.

The title "the Clock", comes from the central motif in the film, the clock. The war to me reflects a turning point in South African history, both politically and socially, as a point at which the country, at least partially separated from the colonial era, had a choice as to which path to follow. It chose apartheid, which further entrenched white privilege, and in so doing, entrenched the identity of whiteness as an absolute.

The image of the clock reflects the concept of time in the durability of identity. As Springer notes,

"[i]n the seventeenth century Descartes and Leibnitz, among others, used the clock metaphor to explain the workings of the natural world… Human bodies, too, operate according to mechanical principles in the Cartesian system, as Descartes explains in his sixth meditation: "A clock, composed of wheels and counterweights, is no less exactly obeying the laws of nature when it is badly made and does not mark the time correctly than when it completely fulfills the intention of its maker; so also the human body may be considered as a machine, so built and composed of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood, and skin that even if there were no mind in it, it would not cease to move in all the ways that it does at present when it is not moved under the direction of the will, nor consequently with the aid of the mind (Descartes, *Discourse*, 138). What separates human beings from animals and machines, according to Descartes, is the human's nonmechanical mind, which is animated by the soul and capable of speech and reason"[303]

This for me is the core of both the dissertation as well as the screenplay. If we can cease to look at the human body as separated from spirit, we can start to undo the immutable and static nature of whiteness and maleness.

I have tried to create an emotionally engaging narrative concept, driven by the theories of whiteness and maleness set out in this dissertation, and based primarily on the binary codes of static/mutable identity, age/youth, male/female, black/white. As discussed in the Methodologies section, the reason for writing a screenplay is primarily the collaborative nature of the medium, reflecting the collaborative nature of the creation of identity.

The story centres arount a white, middle-class grandfather, (Tom) who grapples with his static 'old-school' ideas of racial and gendered identity. His beloved grandson (Michael) reveals that he is undergoing gender reassignment, soon after which the grandfather realises that his biological mother was really coloured, both of which challenges his preconceptions about the place of people in his world. The theme of anger and resentment, combined with love and family, is guided by the character of Doris, the caregiver in Tom's old-age home.

The audience is given an insight into Tom's background through specific cuts which show pieces of Tom's life. These cuts are juxtaposed with the linear progression of the narrative, and serve to underscore both Tom's history, as well as the a certain sense of

[303] Springer, C- Electronic Eros, Bodies and Desire in the Post-Industrial Age (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1996) P38

disconnection that he experiences both through his advancing age, as well as his failing memory and connection to the present.

The cuts also refer to the collective past of Tom's generation, which contextualises his personal struggle in his cultural and social environment.

Character Development

- Tom.

The persona of the grandfather is traditionally often peripheral to the storyline, in that in many narratives the grandfather figure is often represented as the wise elder who performs the role of 'mentor' to the protagonist[304]. In this story the grandfather is the protagonist struggling with the past meaning of his life. I have subverted this traditional structure as a cautionary tale to the audience, and as a means of underscoring the tension between traditional modes of understanding time and life. Most protagonists are young, and can apply the lessons learned in the narrative in their future life, while Tom, being near the end of his life, has the (unfulfilled) opportunity of revising his own past life in order to find appropriate meaning therein.

Tom, through his failing memory, struggles to place himself in the memories of past and experience of present. This struggle reflects the tension between our belief that our identities are static, and the possibility of changing who we believe ourselves to be, simply through realligning our understanding of the meaning of our lives. Tom is losing his memory, and with it, he is losing his sense of identity.

He is faced with challenges to his ideas of gender. Michael's 'reality' is that he/she is not male, and Tom is forced to face the mutable nature of gender. At the end, the audience is left unsure whether Tom is reconciled with the validity of Michael's choice, or whether Tom simply chooses to overlook the choice in order to retain the relationship with his grandson. Although there is no solution, the resolution for Tom is that he is loved, and is with family, and that his conceptions of race and gender are not important, or at least surmountable.

Tom also struggles with the concept of race. Throughout most of the narrative he believes in the immutability of racial distinctions, and works on the unconscious premise that 'people of colour' are inferior. He has not spent much time pondering race politics, and simply accepts the apartheid policies of segregation based on irreconcilable differences between the races. It does not cross his mind, as a white man, that the idea of race may be a construct in and of itself. His racism is very subtle, and carried across not in racial pejoratives aimed at 'non-white' people, but rather in the implicit sense of superiority and exclusion that he displays towards Doris. He would not call himself a racist, but has clearly fed into the apartheid machine. The major explosion of the film is Tom's realisation that, although he has lived a life as a white man, he is biologically 'coloured', and has thus lived a lie. It is this fundamental denial of his life that could lead to his salvation and acceptance of all human beings being fundamentally equal. This solution is not explicitly set out in the narrative, the resolution being that Tom has the informed choice as to how to conduct his dealings with people. The time-juxtapositions between Tom's past and the present reflects that it is no longer as important, in post-apartheid South Africa, that Michael challenges the nature of gender, or that Tom is not the 'race' he has always believed, since these categorisations have become more fluid than they were during the apartheid years.

[304] see Vogler, C The Writer's Journey- Mythic Structure for Storytellers and Screenwriters (Pan Books, London, 1998)

Tom's character develops from being unconsciously racist and sexist at the beginning, to being more aware of the emotional concerns of race and gender through his realisation that both sex and race are not as stable as he had believed. He is faced with the choice of holding to his immature, racist, sexist and dualist understanding of the world, and thereby losing Michael and rejecting Doris, or he can allow the flow of change to envelop him. It is left unclear which choice he makes, but he has the option, of which he was not previously aware. He can, if he chooses, accept a metaphorical home in which he is loved, and in which he can love the people who mean the most to him, namely Doris and Michael.

- Michael

Michael, as the antagonist, is not a malign force in the narrative, in that his intentions are not to destroy the protagonist[305]. He is rather a tool that the protagonist uses to reach individuation through successfully traversing the challenges of being able to undo the stability of race and gender. Michael is a child of the millenium, who, although undergoing a traumatic change in his life in the form of his transgendered nature, is able to make the transition from male to female with the requisite courage and self-possession. His most traumatic task, as part of his own process of individuation, is to face both Michale himself, externalised in the person of his grandfather, as well as Tom himself, whom he respects and loves and whose opinion he cherishes. Although he challenges the status quo, and therefore fulfills the role of antagonist, his motivation is to work through his own process in order to reach truth and honesty, both internally and externally, and to right what he perceives as a fundamental wrong in his own life, keeping a secret from his grandfather.

Michael is at first afraid of facing censure. Yet he faces his demons and plucks up the courage to deal with the consequences of his choices. He is ultimately able to stand in his own power and remain true to himself in the face of possible rejection by his grandfather.

Michael's character turns the traditional role of mentor around, since he is the youngest of the characters, and succeeds, albeit unwittingly, in leading Tom through his own path to individuation, by example if not by design. In so doing, Michael also undergoes a process of individuation.

Michael's hermaphroditic identity represents the unity of opposites.

"Psychologically, it must not be overlooked that the concept of hermaphroditism represents a formula (which, like most mythic formulas, is only an approximation) of 'totality', of the 'integration of opposites'. In other words, it expresses in sexual- and hence very obvious- terms the essential idea that all pairs of opposites are integrated into Oneness"[306]

It is this integration that stands in opposition to Tom's unitariness, and is at the resolution of the film the model that Tom adopts to reach his peace.

- Doris

Doris stands as a mentor to Tom as protagonist, and fulfills the role of foil for Tom's facing his own (coloured) identity. She is also a materialisation of the mother who gave him up (Maria), and could conceivably be biologicaly related to Tom, as his niece, although this possibility is not explicitly noted.

[305] again, see Vogler, C ibid for a discussion of the roles of the antagonist in film narrative
[306] Cirlot, JE A Dictionary of Symbols (Redwood Books, Trowbridge, Wiltshire, 1962) pp 145-6

She starts by being brisk and aggressive. She masks her anger and resentment with professionalism as a caregiver. Initially this self-definition is brought down to the focus on preservation of the patient's physical being: Doris is intent on making sure that Tom has the right medication and is fed, and has clean bedding.

Subconsciously she has chosen nursing to fulfill her emotional, maternal needs, a path that is initially undermined by her feelings of anger at the social inequalities forced on her by race-based hierarchies. As the film progresses she feels her emotional attachment to Tom strengthen, and starts to look out for his emotional as well as his physical needs.

She progresses through the film from seeing emotional attachment as being a weakness, and inappropriate to demonstrate to the 'enemy', being privileged white people, but she turns at the end, in a subtle way giving warmly and lovingly, thereby feeding both the soul of her charge, as well as her own soul. She recognises her own needs for family in caring for Tom, and eventually recognises her role as surrogate family-member.

Poetic Amplification

- (model construct) clock

The clock is the central metaphor for the passage of time in the film, and all the facets of human nature that are time-bound.

It symbolises Tom's character development in that the clock is situated in the present, but is bound to the past. Although the hands continue to turn and therefore to mark the passage of time, they always return to the same spot they occupied twelve hours before, representing both Tom's static movement throughout his life, and the potential cyclical nature of human experience. The clock's revolutions represent the cycle from birth to death, as well as the issues of belonging and individuation which challenge everyone, generation by generation.

For Tom the halt of time reflects three things.

1. The stopped clock reflects the challenge to the inexorable passage of time. The link with Tom's shocking revelation that his grandson is undergoing a gender reassignment means that the comfortable yet predictable relationships predicted and encouraged by the society in which Tom lives are not subject to the stable and secure passage of time, and can be disrupted arbitrarily.

2. Tom's trying to fix both the radio and the clock is an attempt to return the status quo. This attempt is thwarted by the revelation that Tom himself is not who he thought he was. The resolution of this challenge is that the clock is not fixed, and that linear time is forever interrupted. However, instead of this being a negative, it is a positive in that the expectations that come with the linear progression of time are no longer of importance. Tom no longer needs the link with his heritage (the clock being a symbol of his colonial, military grandfather), and he no longer needs the stability of regulated time, because he has worked through fear-based attachment to rationality.

3. The clock, which stands for memory and the stability of identity over time, reflects Tom's struggle with his loss of memory. The clock not being fixed is a symbol of Tom's no longer needing to be attached to logical, sequential time. He eventually accepts his aging, safe in the loving care of his 'family', Michael and Doris.

- Blue flowers/yellow rose

The bunch of blue flowers that Michael gives to Tom represent of the hermaphroditic undertone of the story, as well as the concepts of unity of masculine and feminine (ie the unity of Tom's rationalist/colonialist mentality with the emotional development that he undergoes).

The petals of the blue flowers fall off, indicating the emotional development of the characters. At the point where the clock stops, practically all of the petals have fallen from the bunch. Michael replaces these flowers at the fulfillment with a single yellow rose in full bloom, symbolising golden achievement and completion, and the successful transition of the characters from masculinist rationality to *conjunctio*.

Tom at first rejects the ideal of unity, reflected by the shedding of the petals. At the end the possibility of Tom shedding his own identity in favour the fulfillment represented by the yellow rose is possible.

Michael, in introducing the blue flowers, introduces the image of union of male and female. As he faces the challenge of dealing with his grandfather's opprobrium the beauty of these flowers changes, with the petals falling off and dying. His successful achievement of dealing with adversity is, like his grandfather's, represented by the yellow/gold rose of completion.

For Doris the blue flowers also represent the possible conjunctio of her masculinist/rationalist side (her brisk professionalism in dealing primarily with the physical ailments of her patient). She too undergoes a resolution, in the combination of traditional medically-oriented nursing with a more care-based approach, which too is reflected in the yellow/gold rose of completion.

The Cuts:

The flashback scenes of Tom's life contextualise Tom's life and character, and the society in which he grew up and lived. They show that he has adopted the identity of conservative white male, and it is clear that any other identity would have been extremely difficult to adopt, given the social pressure he was under to conform.

- Cut 1: 1939: the auditorium and the military presentation underscores the rationalist society that influences Tom. The military theme also represents Tom's internal singular control over himself throughout his life, as he is honed into an identity of white male. The clock of course is the physical representation both of his grandfather and of his identity, which he has carried with him for 65 years.

- Cut 2: 1949: the chopping meat scene represents the cutting of Tom's character by the colonial/pre-apartheid society in which he grew up. It equally symbolises the cutting up of this identity as the story progresses. It is important that Tom is the one doing the chopping of the meat (read as his character), since he always has the option of changing his make-up, ie of carving a new identity for himself. He in fact always has had this choice, but it is only when he is liberated from the linearity of his mind, by means of his failing memory and the challenges of unstable race and gender, that he can reach full individuation.

- Cut 3: 1959: the beach shows the unreal beauty of the apartheid landscape, both physical and emotional, with the sea, as being next to, but not part of the landscape, as connected to the colour of he blue floweres which represent the hermaphroditic, and potentially emotionally whole element of connection between male and female. The radio

again links to the power of sound as impacting on the definition of identity, while the sandcastles represent the false security of apartheid which has now fallen like a sandcastle, built to resemble a building designed to withstand an onslaught, but actually subject to the same forces as all other elements of the beach, and easily washed away by the sea.

- Tom sitting in his living room, again with the radio, reflects the misconceptions of the apartheid mentality which believed it could reach great heights by undermining and ignoring all South Africans. It also represents Tom's being caught up in the racist mindset. It further connects with Doris' family reality of a broken home, which shows the fabrication of reality for the white population, while the black population suffers

- Cut 4: 1979: This section captures Michael's birth. He is appreciated not for what he is, but for what Tom expects him to become. This is a precursor to Tom's own (unspoken) realisation that he could not live up to his own grandfather's expectations of him as a man. The blue of the blanket is important, since it labels the otherwise genderless baby as male, and it also links through to Michael's bringing Tom the bunch of blue flowers. It is also notable that this cut is the last image of the past, reflecting that the repetition of the old ways of looking at gender (and race) stop with the birth of Michael.

Chapter Five- Disturbing the Economies of Race and Gender

Subverting Gender

Judith Butler, after cogently arguing the performative nature of both sex and gender, refers to ways in which acts of the body can be used to subvert the norms of gendered and sexualised identity performance[307]. She looks at Julia Kristeva's theory of the semiotic dimension of language, which she claims "at first appears to engage Lacanian premises only to expose their limits and to offer a specifically feminine locus of subversion of the paternal law within language"[308] . According to Butler, Kristeva challenges the Lacanian premise that the paternal law governs all linguistic signification (Lacan's "the Symbolic"), and looks at the primary relationship with the maternal body not as something that is by definition repressed, but rather that is used to create the 'semiotic' dimension of language. This for Kristeva is a constant subversion within the Symbolic, expressing the 'libidinal multiplicity' within the terms of culture, on "the stability and reproduction of precisely the paternal law that she seeks to displace... conced[ing] that the semiotic is invariably subordinate to the Symbolic, that it assumes its specificity within the terms of a hierarchy immune to challenge."[309] Butler takes issue with the both Kristeva's and Lacan's premise that the primary relationship to the maternal body is a viable construct, or even that it is knowable, since it can be argued that the relationship predates the expression in language that is the basis of both theorists' views. Butler further takes issue with Kristeva's claim that the "libidinal course of subversion cannot be maintained within the terms of culture, that its sustained presence within culture leads to psychosis and to the breakdown of cultural life itself"[310], which means that Kristeva at the same time affirms and denies the liberatory ideal of the semiotic. Kristeva's argument, according to Butler, looks at the status of the feminine/maternal body as prediscursive, rather than the effect of culture, and therefore that Kristeva is doing no more than temporarily disrupting the paternal law, rather than refuting its existence, and indeed reinstates this paternal law at the semiotic level. Kristeva "accepts the assumption that culture is equivalent to the Symbolic, that the Symbolic is fully subsumed under the "Law of the Father", and that the only modes of nonpsychotic activity are those which participate in the Symbolic to some extent. Her strategic task, then, is neither to replace the Symbolic with the semiotic nor to establish the semiotic as a rival cultural possibility, but rather to validate those experiences within the Symbolic that permit a manifestation of the borders which divide the Symbolic from the semiotic"[311] Kristeva sees poetry and maternity as

[307] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990), pp101 et seq
[308] ibid p101
[309] ibid p102
[310] ibid p102
[311] ibid p108-9

privileged practices in culture, which is itself within the purview of the father. This poetry represents "an instinctual heterogeneity that subsequently exposes the repressed ground of the Symbolic, challeng[ing] the mastery of the univocal signifier, and diffus[ing] the autonomy of the subject who posits their necessary ground"[312] In essence, Butler argues that "tactical subversions and displacements of the law challenge its self-grounding presumption. But once again, Kristeva does not seriously challenge the structuralist assumption that the prohibitive paternal law is foundational to culture itself."[313]

When looking at Kristeva's views on subversion, the prior question, according to Butler, is, if the forms of subversion are present in language and culture, and already defined as Symbolic, how do we know that they indeed have a Pre-Symbolic, independent existence? We can't look to poetry to rationalise the existence of the drives, since poetry is itself expressed in terms of the paternal language. Similarly, to conceive of a causal link between the drives and language is to presuppose that the drives pre-exist the language, while using the language to justify that pre-existence. Again a circular argument premised on the lack of 'proof' of the preexisting drives apart and asifde from language, which only attests to the effects of the drives, rather than their ontological existence.It is in turn therefore logical that either the drives and the expression thereof are created at the same time, or that the expression pre-dates the drives. Kristeva relies on an instinctual understanding of these drives. But how can we know that this instinctual understanding is not a construction of the language itself?

Butler argues that "the figuration of the maternal body and the teleology of its instincts as a self-identical and insistent metaphysical principle- an archaism of a collective, sex-specific biological constitution- bases itself on a univocal conception of the female sex. And this sex, conceived as both origin and causality, poses as a principle of pure generativity."[314]

Butler calls on Foucault's conception of sex as causal of the structure and meaning of desire: "the notion of 'sex' made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifier and as a universal signified"[315] Foucault, like Butler, sees sex as a construct predated by discourse and power, which attract bodily functions and forms into collectives which are only formulated in those collectives for the purposes of the discursive power uses to which they are put. Butler calls on this conception to take a different look at Kristeva, and argues that, following the Foucaultian view, "the discursive production of the

[312] ibid p109
[313] ibid p109
[314] ibid p116
[315] Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980) p154, quoted in Butler, p117

maternal body as prediscursive is a tactic in the self-amplification and concealment of those specific power relations by which the trope of the maternal body is produced. In these terms, the maternal body would no longer be understood as the hidden ground of all signification, the tacit cause of all culture. It would be understood, rather, as an effect or consequence of a system of sexuality in which the female body is required to assume maternity as the essence of its self and the law of its desire"[316]

Again looking to the Foucaultian conception of power, Butler critiques Kristeva's ideas of subversion as being unable to conceptualise the paternal law as being constitutive of desires, rather than simply prohibiting them[317].

Undoing Ethnicity and Race in South Africa

Leonard Bloom argues cogently in the South African context that ethnicity and identity-formation is an attempt to defend the self against vulnerability and inferiority, hidden by aggressive and assertive social behaviour[318]. He uses psychoanalytic theories of aspects of narcissism to make this argument, which he bases on the Freudian primary and secondary stages of the development of narcissism, starting in infancy where the person's world is small and the only interest he/she has is in him/herself. According to Freud, original libidinal love becomes love of the ego and the bodily self, which is where arises secondary narcissism. Adult narcissism is the stage where early responses to the trauma of childhood are not dealt with effectively, and the adult narcissist is unable to recognise that he/she is his/her own creation, and is beset by feelings of paranoia, being threatened, and the individual has relationships bound by his/her fantasies of domination[319].

Bloom asserts that "it is arguable that most socio-cultural analyses of ethnicity go back to fears of change, of sociocultural absorption, and above all, of the perceived loss of power.... Change, collectively and individually, is emotionally unsettling because changing relationships inevitably arouses early, more primitive feelings and challenges the controls and defence-mechanisms that were formerly stable"[320]. He goes on to argue that "'Ethnic' and national identities are invented, maintained and lived by people who have their idiosyncratic, unconscious and conscious motives for this obsession"[321] He argues that individuals make decisions, rather than groups, who are indeed not deprived of their capacity to contribute their uniqueness to society, or the ability to live on individual and group levels.

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[316] Butler, p118
[317] Butler, p118
[318] Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa (Ashgate, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, 1998), p103 et seq
[319] ibid p108-9
[320] ibid p108-9
[321] ibid p110

He makes reference to Fanon's understanding of identity as a colonised person moving out of a colonial society. Fanon used the terms 'internalisation', objectification and epidermalisation'[322] . The first terms refers to a person's struggle to make the connection between sociohistorical reality and personal reality, and that the internal reality we create in some respects protects us from life's struggles. Objectification, on the other hand, is the struggle to use ones own abilities to reflect reality as a less painful emotional reality. Epidermalisation, as Fanon uses it, refers to the transformation of economic inferiority into subjective feelings of inferiority. Bloom argues that much of the politics surrounding 'ethnic' identity are based on the fears of continuing powerlessness. He notes that "the fostered and enforced delusion that South Africans are only, mainly, or exclusively Zulu, Afrikaner, so-called 'Coloured', even children, women or men, persists almost unopposed as we limp into the newish South Africa."[323]

Bloom works with the psychoanalytic idea that children develop identities rather than being born with them: "Sometimes haltingly and painfully, we acquire fragments of identity that we may, or we may not, succeed in combining by adulthood into a more-or-less cohesive and coherent whole that is emotionally satisfying and serviceable for providing us with a (for ourselves) functional sense of continuity."[324] He defines 'emotionally satisfying' as feelings of self-esteem, a sense of competence that we are relatively free to control our lives, and a sense of security that our identities will not be removed from us. The development of identity is a choice, whereas an enforced identity, such as

> "[i]mposed ethnicity and nationalism forces individuals to disown possible fragments of identity... Children do not grow up into ethnic identity: they respond with varied emotions to adults who are significant in their lives, and adults respond to them. Adults offer affiliative and friendly, or hostile and distant relationships and fragments of identity. Children absorbe these fragments and relationships, interpret and transform them into feelings and attitudes about themselves and other people..."[325].

According to Bloom, in South Africa "Two myths persist... One myth is that 'we' are the only nation, ethnic group, religion, that has the answers to South Africa's problems; and the other is that 'we' are a complete, integral and distinct entity"[326]. He likens this to the narcissist patient, who will be unable to deal with his/her affliction unless he/she must accept other people's existence, and further, their existence as individuals[327].

Taking this further, we can look back to Judith Butler's compelling argument that both gender and sex are performative in nature[328]. Her thesis, based on the premise that sex is biologically-bound and is indeed constructed by the power relations that govern gender, can, I suggest, be

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[322] Fanon, F Black Skin, White Masks 1986, p10-11
[323] Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa (Ashgate, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, 1998), p113
[324] ibid p114
[325] ibid p115-116
[326] ibid p118
[327] ibid p118
[328] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990)

expounded to look at race and ethnicity, on the basis that both race and ethnicity can also be seen as biologically-determined and described, and are equally prescriptive as identity. Both race and gender are equally, using the same Foucaultian argument of power, arguably determined by the power relations of colonialism and nationalism, can be seen to be created by the power distinctions between the colonisers and the colonised during the colonial period, and between the (economically and socio-politically) empowered and the disempowered in the context of nationalist politics. Using the same argument, therefore, since race and ethnicity are performative in nature, they are subject to the same kinds of semiotic and symbolic subversions[329].

Performing the Self

The Postmodern 'Utopian' Mechanical Body and the Absent Body

In the postmodernist view of the world, it is increasingly difficult to "perform the self", given that, as Springer notes, the

> "postmodern consumer society is an all-encompassing marketplace of products; everything has been commodified, and it surrounds us with advertising, packaged images, and ever-changing fashions in clothes, music and "life-styles". Images and sounds bombard postmodern humans and create a phantasmagoria of idealised human bodies. The endless depictions of human bodies have in effect replaced actual human bodies in the public imagination, and it can thus be argued, as do postmodern cultural critics Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, that the human body is already obsolete. They ask, "why the concern over the body today if not to emphasize the fact that the (natural) body in the postmodern condition has *already* disappeared, and what we experience as the body is only a fantastic simulacra of body rhetorics?" The physical body, argue the Krokers, has become obscured by the body rhetorics of advertising, economics, politics, psychoanalysis, science, and sports. Not just the physical body but also the discursive body has disappeared into what the Krokers call "panic bodies: an inscribed surface onto which are projcted all the grisly symptoms of our culture burnout" Panic bodies, in the Krokers' description, are "incited less by the languages of accumulation than fascinating, because catastrophic, signs of self-[extermination], self-liquidation, and self-cancellation." According to the Krokers, bodies have become expendable... as the economy collapses and the culture implodes."[330]

I quote the above in extensively, because its content and tone reflects a sense of the cataclysm that faces the postmodern body. And I feel it appropriate to jump from the traumas visited on our society by the imperialist colonialist enterprise, where the male, female, black, white body is implanted into our consciousness as a given, an absolute, to the postmodernist view, where the body is done away with completely, and replaced by the cult of technology, to the extent that our own bodies are nullified by the utopian ideals of the 'meatless' society, where eros can become excited at its own annihilation: "[f]rom Baudrillard to *Mondo 2000*, those who adulate

[329] see the arguments followed in Butler, ibid
[330] Springer, C- Electronic Eros, Bodies and Desire in the Post-Industrial Age (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1996) p40, quoting Kroker and Kroker *Body Invaders: Panic sex in America* (New York, St Martin's 1987, 22)

technology's penetration of the human body and mind can lose sight of how the attempt to become a technological object leads inevitably to extinction"[331]

Springer looks at fictional representations of cyborgs, part human and part machine, either organic, made up of a pre-existing human body with mechanical or electronic implants or prostheses, or non-organic, with no form, but a human mind held on computer software[332]. The cyborg is often represented as the the ultimate of what we want to be as humans, seen from an Enlightenment frame of reference, where mind takes precedence over body[333]. He argues that popular culture reflects our cultural conflicts about sexuality and gender roles in the way cyborgs are represented, claiming that "[a]lthough technology has been radically transformed over the course of the twentieth century, from massive industrial machines to tiny microelectronic circuitry, representations of cyborgs often cling to an anachronistic concept of the invincible armored man of steel", fulfilling a metaphorical function of staving off technological and cultural "feminization"[334]. He opines that phallic industrial imagery coexists with other imagery celebrating the electronic technology's miniaturization and internalization, resulting in "a popular culture arena where cultural debates over sexuality and gender are played out in both literal and metaphoric guise" [335]. He notes that the imagery alternates between exploring alternative types of sexuality and gender roles and conventional stereotypes from the past, arguing that

> "The idea of the cyborg is simultaneously a culmination of Descartes' separation of reason from emotion and a supercession of that opposition. At the same time that the cyborg represents the triumph of intellect, it also signifies obsolescence for human beings and the dawn of the posthuman, post-Enlightenment age. In other words, the cyborg appears to rest on a dichotomy between mind and body, but it actually supersedes the dichotomy and makes it anachronistic in a new vision of fusion and symbiosis with electronic technology"[336]

Body Representation as Imposed Vision

Some theorists, such as Susan Griffin, according to Springer, maintain that we have for centuries been treating the body as obsolete, following the he Judeo-Christian ethic that categorises bodily knowledge as evil, and we have followed the dangerous illusion that "spirit is excluded from matter", resulting in our hardly having begun to discover our bodies, "since we have long been stifled and constrained by authoritarian strictures.", to the extent that we have allowed world leaders to treat human bodies as expendable during wartime[337]. She continues

> "Inscriptive Procedures marking the body and producing it as sexually determinant and coded are active in transforming the anatomo-physiological structure of the body as socially located *morphology*. Body-morphologies are the results of the *social meaning* of the body... Morphological differences between sexed bodies imply *both* a traced, 'biological' difference which is transcribed by discursive, textual representations, *and* corporeal significations. It implies a

[331] ibid p7
[332] Springer, C- Electronic Eros, Bodies and Desire in the Post-Industrial Age (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1996) p40,
[333] ibid p10
[334] ibid p10
[335] ibid p10
[336] ibid P19
[337] ibid P25

> productive, *changeable*, non-fixed biological substratum mapped by social, political and familial grid of practices and meanings. The morphological dimension is a function of socialisation and apprenticeship, and produces as its consequences a subject, soul, personality or inner depth.... Masculinity and femininity are not simply social categories as it were externally or arbitrarily imposed on the subject's sex. Masculine and feminine are necessarily related to the structure of the lived experience and the meaning of *bodies*. ... Gender is an effect of the body's social morphology. What is mapped onto the body is not unaffected by the body onto which it is projected."[338]

And our gendered, not to mention 'ethnicised' bodies, are far from neutrally represented in this arena of the 'perfect' human being. Philosopher Sandra Harding holds that gender ideologies are an intgral part of scientific enquiry, informing and shaping scientists' viewpoints and the direction of experimentation, as well as public reaction[339]. She points out conversely, that scientific representations of the feminine body themselves partly constitute wider social discourses "that are informed and shaped in their turn by economic, class and racial ideologies"[340] She suggests that it is not necessarily beneficial to look only at whether scientists are sexist, but rather at how science has fulfilled the functions of representations of bigger cultural meanings, which are "not value neutral but often uphold dominant patriarchal views."[341]

And it is up to us to evaluate our perspectives on these utopian renditions of the 'neutral' world that we are fed, which are often based on the norms and standards of the 'white, male' sense of self, in order to enable us to write our own sense of self, as individuals rather than as racialised or gendered identities. We need to look critically at Deleuze's conception of the double which is never a projection of the interior but an interiorisation of the outside[342]

Performing/Reperforming the Body and the Self- the Philosophy of Being

Golding in his editing of apparently unconnected ideas by unconnected writers, postulates eight technologies of otherness, which is for me instructive on informing our journey out of the quagmire of binary oppositions and delimited personal identities into a field of satisfaction based on personal fulfillment in the present[343].

He looks at Curiosity, Noise, and Cruelty, amongst other things. He works with the idea of not being grounded in the Hegelian binary oppositions, which do not allow a valid space for identity as 'not-being', as varieties of negation: a dialectical version of the negation rather than a teleological version, the latter which introduces assumptions around morality, politics and change, what is referred to as an 'asystematic systematising of negation', in which

[338] Elizabeth Gross, in "Inscriptions and body-maps: representations and the corporeal" in Feminine, Masculine and Representation Threadgold, T & Cranny-Francis, A (eds), (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990), pp62-74
[339] (*Whose Science? Whose Knowledge* Ithaca, NY, Cornell Univ Press, 1991, 37) quoted in Springer, C- ibid P 47
[340] ibid P 47
[341] ibid P 47
[342] Probyn, E Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (Routledge, London and New York, 1993), p 88- reference to Deleuze (1986: 105)
[343] The eight technologies of otherness (Routledge: New York, London, 1997)

indeterminate excess supplies meaning (ie 'the determinacy of the not') grounding every truth-game.[344]

The book works with the concept of time as 'A time of forgetting, a space to remember', in which the 'the a-moral interregnum' enables us to create the imaginary as if real, where curiosity is the only alternative as a space to move in[345].

Cruelty can be a well of creativity, following Nietsche's paradoxical self-presentation wherein he embodies in himself a passage beyond nihilism to what he calls humanity, which entails a usage of self involving exposure of/to a dimension of existence that is properly 'useless'[346]. Sovereignty, for Nietsche is not about self-production and self-possession in a totalising form, but assumes a sense of cruelty towards the self and is therefore constantly disappropriating. This disappropriation is necessary in the making of a sovereign subject who has achieved the right to a future and the right to affirm itself. The subject is capable of forgetting, and thus can enjoy a healthy present untroubled by the past. This subject can therefore also enjoy a self-determined future. According to Nietsche, the history of asceticism, which is grounded in cruelty, enables this development. Nietsche's 'bad conscience' can be looked at as the well of creativity and self-creation[347]. For Nietsche, the 'Master Race' idea is bad conscience turned outward, creating a system that moulds the conquered, while incorporating race as the fighting dominator is bad conscience turned inward, where the instinct for freedom is repressed, which results in the inhibited will turning upon itself. The womb of creative expression, and indeed all creative being (ie the bad bringing to life beauty- we need to know what ugliness is to know beauty) can therefore be seen as coming from cruelty. While discussing Heine's 'divine malice', he says: "I estimate the value of men... according to the necessity by which they cannot conceive of the god apart from the satyr' followed by 'the great poet dips *only* from his own reality- up to the point where afterward he cannot endure his work any longer"[348]

As we have found with Foucault, there is the space of opening new forms of political relation rather than working within defined structures, which, if incorporated with Nietschean cruelty, can be a fount of creativity of the self[349]. The body itself can be seen as a site for this deconstruction and recreation of self, and, if avoiding the pitfalls of the Descartean binaries, can be truly creative rather than reactionary to the old structures.

[344] 'Taking up the void' , ibid p13 et seq
[345] ibid p 17 et seq
[346] ibid p 84 et seq, refering to Nietsche: Ecce Homo
[347] ibid p90 et seq, referring to Ecce Homo
[348] Nietsche: Ecce Homo, p245-6
[349] see variously Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980); Foucault, M- The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure- (Pantheon, New York, 1985); Foucault, ed (trans Richard McDougall) Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite (Colophon Press, NY, 1980); Foucault, M (trans AM Sheridan-Smith) the Archeology of Knowledge (Tavistock, London, 1972)

The transgendered, androgynous body (as opposed to the intersexed, hermaphrodite body) is at the same time monstrous, inasmuch as it is transgressive and mutating, 'other', and creative in its 'undetermined possibilities and conceptions. It unhinges the mythological natural body, which relies on nature vs culture, the natural body which can be seen as 'pure state', impervious to culture. In this body we have the opportunity of returning to the traditional reverence for the unitariness of the androgyne, the wholeness of being one and many all together. In the Middle Ages, intersex people were assigned their sex by their father or grandfather, but could change that definition before they were at the marriagable age without falling foul of sodomy laws. The Native American berdache, androgynous and revered, had with special social role as shaman in a hundred and fifty North American societies, and the ayurvedic medical literature in India reflects the phenomena of the revered Hijra from 600bc to 100 ad.[350] We have the option of moving away from gender and sex definition based on chromosomal, gonadal, or hormonal sex, internal reproductive organs, external genitalia, or secondary sex characteristics such as voice pitch and facial and body hair. We no longer need to define ourselves in terms of our ability to reproduce, since we can now do so technologically.

As Doreen Massey notes,

> "Gender identity, like all subjectivity, is unstable. Gender must be constantly re-established socially through performance of gender-codes and roles and anchored by language and the body's forms. If the body does not suit ones self-determined gender identity/stories then technological intervention can redesign the body to approximate more authentically to the gender expression of the subjective identity experienced. Gender is a social, psychic, political category which is not ffixed in or guaranteed by nature. Biology is ideological. What we often take as natural sex or gender is always culturally constructed. Sexual anatomy as an empirical, common-sense evaluation has only a contingent, arbitrary relation to gender reality."[351]

We can look at our bodies as sites of change. We can recognise the hermaphroditic drives of bodybuilders, who aim for a triangle shape for both male and female, both 'genders' wanting large breasts and small waists. We can deconstruct the image of 'The Pinup' as the site of pleasure only in his/her objectification for the viewer, and re-view the person as a being subject taking his/her own space, taking pleasure in his/her own body, being active in his/her passive representation taking cognisance of the view that "The explicit body is the symbolic body too, resonating beyond the theoretical structure of binary polarity that orders critical enquiry, political agency and discursive mobility into manifestations of hegemonic or subversive significance"[352]

We can begin to look at the body as artwork, rather than as productive alone, and at the same time distinguish eros and art. Perhaps all bodies can start to become more of an aesthetic phenomenon, looking further than simply the excessive bodies of athletes or bodybuilders as creative. Perhaps we can appreciate the body that is all that it can be, and look past the

[350] Golding, S ibid Zachary I Nataf 'Skin-Flicks'
[351] Golding, S ibid Doreen Massey 'Spacial Disruptions' p218 et seq
[352] Freuh, J- Monster/Beauty (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2001) p100

"'infamies' which are misunderstandings based primarily on cultural terror of gender breakdown; their persistence is a sign that people do not register weights, diet, cosmetic surgery or drugs as artists tools"[353]

Taking the erotic as art, it is not just the sexual act that performs a reconstructive role, rather

> "[the Erotic] may include sexual desire and physical acts. Most important, it encompasses relations whose potency, unpredictability and usefulness proceed from and create the capacity for individuals' intellectual, emotional and spiritual transformation, which may activate social transformation"[354]

Baudrillard, in "Fatal Strategies" conceives of fashion as immoral (as opposed to beauty, which implies a moral distinction between beautiful and ugly)[355]. He asserts that today we look for the extreme, intensification, at fashion as the ecstacy of the beautiful, which he claims is the pure and empty form of an aesthetic spinning about itself[356]. He speaks of the body becoming more body in the context of obesity, of postmodernism as excess, not sublimation, which leads people to excess, whereby "an excrescent system of interpretation develops with no relation to its objects... Tentacular, protuberant, excrescent, hyperbolic, this is the fate of inertia in a saturated world. To deny its own end through hyperfinality" [357]. He speaks of cancer as part of the process of the death of history, with perhaps a new reference-point in personal meaning. "The transpolitical is the transparency and obscenity of all structures in a destructured universe, of change in a dehistoricised universe, of information of a universe emptied of event, of space in the promiscuity of networks, of the social in the masses, of the political in terror, of the body in obesity and genetic cloning"[358] he speaks of obesity as "conformity by excess of conformity, not of a protective layer of fat or a neurotic one of depression- a method of disappearanceof the body- bloated with undeliverable information"[359]. He speaks of an end to all this as "maybe revolt, not political as it once was, but genetic uncontrollable vitality and undisciplined proliferation- the body rebelling against the commandments of DNA, its 'objective' definition"[360]. He speaks of our destiny as not being to exist and survive, but to appear and disappear[361].

Perhaps the changed body, whether un- or multi-gendered, un- or multi-ethnicised, fashioned and refashioned, built or decimated, obese or super-thin, is the making appear and disappear of ourselves as individuals in this world of excess. Perhaps we need to make our symbols in the only things we have to ourselves- our bodies, thereby making meaning of life in the post rationalist view of existence, where, "[f]rom post-essentialist perspectives, the historic and

[353] ibid p119
[354] ibid p175
[355] Baudrillard, J- Fatal Strategies- (Paris: Semiotext(e)/Pluto, 1983, 1990)
[356] ibid
[357] ibid
[358] ibid
[359] ibid
[360] ibid
[361] ibid P174 et seq

geographic diversity of bodies and body practices point not only to the body's shaping by and through cultural practices, but also to *the impossibility of a natural model of the body*"[362].

Looking to the modified body, perhaps we can take a page from the book of the body modified as found in what Pitts refers to as "the body art movement" of the 1990's[363]. She speaks of the problematic of the reading of the modified body as being alternately "socially problematised, depicted as forms of "self-mutilation" engaged in by youth, women, and gays and lesbians, amongst others", and, on the other hand, "as challenges to the naturalised status of Western body norms, and as forms of self-fashioning and self-narration in postmodern culture"[364]. She notes that the increased visibility of body practices has played a role in the increasing theorisation of the body, which is now not seen as fixed or perfect, or as subordinate to the self[365]

Perhaps we should be looking at what William Haver, in the context of queer research, speaks of as "the pragmatic poietics of identification, the model of education as consciousness-raising", and of Britzman's view of "queer pedagogy [a]s about risking the self through the proliferation of multiple, rather than plural, identifications, rather than identites. Not that anyone might be queer, but that something queer might happen to anyone"[366]. Again referring to Britzman, he suggests what we could read as a cation, or a liberation, depending on our perspective,

> "a technique or a peisis which does not make the world familiar or comfortable for the student or reader but which defamiliarises, or makes strange, queer or even cruel what we had thought to be a world. The 'student' or reader approaches the impossibility of saying anything at all, or the possibility of being able to say far too much- either an uncontainable loquacity in an exhaustion of predication, or silence: in any case, the impossibility of maintaining the co-ordinates, categories, or protocols according to which the world has heretofore held to be (at least ideally) comprehensible."[367]

Perhaps the writing of the possibility of a space is more important than actually finding it, perhaps the simple writing of our bodies, whether physically or metaphorically, is the most important, not because of what we write, but simply because we write. Perhaps we should recognise that our individual identies are already made up by what we do with our bodies and what is imposed on our bodies. In that performance lies the key to our own liberation, a liberation that can be made up of our making conscious the drives and forces at play on us, and choosing which performances we adopt.

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[362]Pitts, VL"Subversive Bodies, Invented Selves" In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003),p 29

[363] Pitts, VL ibid p23 et seq

[364] Pitts, VL ibid p23

[365] Pitts, VL ibid p29, where she notes that "writers like Bryan S Turner, Mike Featherstone, and Alberto Melucci collectively attribute this to a number of factors", including "the increasing role of leisure in late modern capitaliust economies; the shift of social movement activity from class struggle into identity politics and sexuality; the erosion of traditional authority over bodies and sexuality (such as that of the church); medical advances that have resulted in increased technological intervention and longevity; and public controversies over bodily isues such as AIDS, pollution, health care access, and alternative medicine"

[366] Golding, S (ed) The eight technologies of otherness (Routledge: New York, London, 1997), Haver, W 'Queer Research', p288-291

[367] Golding, S (ed) ibid

It is with this impossibility in tieing down what our own lives and bodies could or do mean that I turn to Materialisation 7. I end the dissertation with an 'exhibition' of myself, in order to finish my trajectory from the general to the specific, from 'deduction' (moving from the general to the particular) rather than 'induction' (moving from the particular to the general), the latter which is the trend of academic treatises. I seek in this dissertation in some ways to work against what the social sciences tend to do, which is to generalize from specific circumstances, and rather to specify what I feel can only be true to me in my search to develop my experience of performance of whiteness and maleness into a performance that fits my specific circumstances. I began this dissertation working with certain theories on postmodernism, feminism and postcolonialism, all of which seek to challenge the patriarchal, colonialist enterprise which has tried to situate and lock off the identities of its subjects[368]. I have worked towards some element of theory on how, if the identities of white men can indeed be seen as performance, I can find my way to an alternative performance. I realize that I have indeed found that way, which is in in my modified body. I also realize that this way is not the way that is appropriate for all white men, or indeed all people, yet it is the way that works for me, if not unproblematically. In this respect I see myself as an adherent of "liberal postmodernism, which depicts body projects as willful acts of self-narration", and even more, looking to Butler, that my body is the home of "body projects or "speech acts" [which] are not necessarily willful, conscious, or chosen, but are rather practiced as *imperatives* influenced by powerful norms"[369]. Those norms are the ones that attempt to inculcate me into some sort of archetypal whiteness and maleness, neither which are even to my mind articulable, but omnipresent.

I include in this Materialisation a sense of the groups into which I of necessity include myself, in an attempt to find the pre-written performances that best reflect what goes on inside myself.

[368] particularly looking at Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980); Foucault, M- The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure- (Pantheon, New York, 1985); Foucault, ed (trans Richard McDougall) Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite (Colophon Press, NY, 1980); Foucault, M (trans AM Sheridan-Smith) the Archeology of Knowledge (Tavistock, London, 1972), Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991), Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990), Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979), Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990) and Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa (Ashgate, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, 1998)

[369] Pitts, VL"Subversive Bodies, Invented Selves" In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003),p 46/7

Materialisation 7: The Modified Body- Performing in the Theatre of the Body

This dissertation would not be complete without a visual representation of me, and of the context of the modified body in which I find myself. Although I set out to modify my own body in order to 'be different', I of course have placed myself, my body and my life in the context of what Victoria Pitts describes as "The Cultural Politics of Body Modification"[370], where "the body is revealed as a space of important social significance. Body practices… show how the body figures prominently in our notions of self and community, in our cultural politics, and in social control and power relations"[371]

The Context

In contextualising my experience of the modified body, I turn to a quotation from Lukas Zpira, well-known body modifier, who notes:

> La nature évolue, le tout est de rester en harmonie avec elle et d'essayer de comprendre si nous sommes, tel prométhé des demi-dieux participant à une des grandes révolutions de ce monde, ou de simples pantins, infime rouage d'une obscure et monstrueuse mécanique céleste….[372]

As social phenomena, postmodern body art is argued by Pitts to "facilitate self-expression and fulfill identity needs within a widening set of cultural and technological options"[373]. She notes that these accounts redirect the focus from problematically viewing the natural body as an ideal in self-mutilation discourse, and that they have further demonstrated the relativity of contemporary body projects such as tattoos, piercings, and scars, which can be seen to have lot in common with more conventional body practices[374].

She is however concerned that using this paradigm, postmodern bodies are perhaps seen as being more free to be transformed, and therefore unmarked and unlimited by the powerful categories of gender, class and race, and not historically located in time and place. I agree, with the proviso that my personal experience of body modification has been, both consciously and unconsciously at least in some way to destabilise exactly those categories, if not unproblematically, and if not necessarily in the minds of the adherents of the self-mutilation discourse. As Pitts notes,

> When bodies are understood as social and political- as inscribed by and lived within power relations- anomalous body modifications do not appear as inherently unnatural or pathological, but they also don't illustrate that individuals can freely or limitlessly shape their own bodies and identities. Rather, body projects suggest how individuals and groups negotiate the relationships between identity, culture and their own bodies.[375]

[370] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003)
[371] Pitts, VL ibid p3
[372] Lukas Szpira, LE KØR RITUEL, http://www.body-art.net. 2000 The rough translation: "Nature evolves, the job is to stay in harmony with her and to try to understand if we are either Prometheus of the demi-gods taking part in one of the great revolutions of this world, or simply puppets, the lowest cogs of an obscure and monstrous mechanical universe…"
[373] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003), p33/4
[374] Pitts, VL Ibid
[375] Pitts, VL Ibid p35

Modern Primitives

Some people choose so-called "tribal" tattoos, based largely on the tattoos understood to be worn in indigenous societies as marks of social standing or decoration.

The word "tattoo" itself is of "tribal" origin, believed to be derived from the Tahitian word "ta-tu", which is thought to be an onomatopoeic derivation of the 'tap-tap' sound of traditional tattoo implements[376]. Traditional artists pound the ink into the skin, using a set of sharp implements[377]. The modern methods of using a tattoo gun are a western invention, and in some ways arguably detract from the 'rite-of-passage' element of being tattooed, especially since the modern methods make the procedure less painful and take less time[378].

The choice of "primitive" iconography is interesting, since the representation of the 'other' in the choice of "indigenous" markings by predominantly white 'modern primitives' is by no means unproblematic. As Pitts notes

> ... in Western and Colonial representations, indigenous bodies have been exoticised and fetishized to draw symbolic boundaries between "us" and "Others". Bodily differences, including culturally spcific body modifications as well as bodily colours, textures, and shapes have been unconsciously viewed as well as purposively framed as expressions of some deep ontological difference between Westerners and those constructed as "exotic ethnics", to use Rosemary Garland Thompson's term.[379]

She goes on to note the nineteenth century ethnological exhibits such as that of Sara Baartman, which "created a public theatre for the discursive production of the "primitive" as exceptional and anomalous"[380], as well as, at the same time as the non-western body was being valorised as exciting and inspirational for American and Euro-American artists, writers, travellers, expatriots, and scholars. The Modern Primitive movement, which "invert hierarchies of ethnicity by valorasing the "primitive" as politically, culturally, and spiritually superior" remains problematic in its nostalgia for what has been argued as an inauthentic superficiality and narcissism.[381] It has even been argued that the deployment of the "exotic" serves to rehabilitate the tattoo from its working-class associations[382]. The other side of these arguments is that the 'movement' is a political statement, expressing cultural dissent. The uneasiness of the political standpoint is the charge that it is an exercise of western privilege, a valid claim that is only partially addressed in my circumstances by my choice of combining "tribal" with "old-school" tattoos that represent the western working-class history of the art-form[383], and again partially addressed by the "subversive subcultural performance" that is body modification, where ""modern" and "primitive" signs are represented together, but the distinguishing differences are preserved, "strategically reconstituted in a war of position"", and where "the neotribal body might testify to the permeability of the Western subject's boundaries, challenging the efficacy and necessity of fixed identities" [384].

[376] Fellowes, CH The Tattoo Book (The Pyne Press, Princeton, 1971) p6 " The Tahitian pronunciation is actually *tatau*, meaning literally "the results of tapping", taken from the root *ta*, "to strike, beat, or tap; to tattoo."
[377] Wroblewski, C Skin Shows IV (Virgin Books, London, 1995), p 5 ""Tattoo". From the Tahitian, tatau- meaning "tomark". Possibly onomatopoeiac, referring to the beating of two wooden sticks- one to indent the skin and inject the pigment, the other to apply direction and force."
[378] Fellowes, CH The Tattoo Book (The Pyne Press, Princeton, 1971)
[379] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003), p120.
[380] ibid
[381] ibid, p126 et seq
[382] ibid
[383] see Fellowes, CH The Tattoo Book (The Pyne Press, Princeton, 1971) p1 to 10 for a brief history of the practice in the west
[384] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003), p133

"Gender Bending"

In this dissertation I use the terms "transgendered" to refer to the body that lies somewhere between male and female, as a matter of choice[385]. This term is opposed to the "intersexed", or "hermaphrodite" body as referring to the body that is born of indeterminate sex. As Butler notes, questions of the "culturally constructed body" should be premised with questions about ""the body" as a construct of suspect generality when it is figured as passive and prior to discourse"[386].

The Modern Primitives movement does not generally, however, or necessarily address the concerns of gender and sex stereotyping in the way that the transgendered, androgynous body does, except inasmuch as it can refer to "a fluid gender identity, a marginality with respect to conventional Western culture, and an alternative, more empowered sense of embodiment", reflecting "the popular view in modern primitivism that indigenous cultures are more open to gender differences"[387].

The transsexual body is monstrous, transgressive and mutating, and allows its 'owner' to perform his/her life in a vastly different way from that which is prescribed for the body of his/her birth[388]. This transgression can be seen in a particularly sexual way, which is a strong space for transgressive behaviour, as it sits outside of the approved social spaces of family, work and recreation. And in the context of gendered roles, "transsexual surgery… has already challenged the fixity of nature-based sex and revealed the ways in which femininity and masculinity are scripts that can be learned"[389]. Transgederism, on the other hand, "more radically disturbs the taken-for-grantedness of the dominant sex/gender formula. Transgenderism implies that gender does not automatically flow from biological sex, and so unfixes the meanings of biological difference"[390].

It is the surgically altered body in this respect that perhaps holds the possibilities for un-gendered and un-racialised personal identities. Artists such as Orlan who use cosmetic surgery to explore "the meaning of femininity, appearance, technology, and the body in relation to her subjectivity", further destabilise the meanings of the body, particularly the gendered body, in western discourse, and I like to count myself as one of those artists/soldiers[391].

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[385] taken from http://home.zonnet.nl/manjamooy/inleiding%20scriptie.htm "Transgenders zijn personen met een genderidentiteit tussen mannelijk en vrouwelijk in. Het merendeel van de transgenders wenst geen geslachtsaanpassende behandeling te ondergaan. Sommige van hen willen slechts een deel van de behandeling doorlopen. Dit wordt echter in principe door het genderteam afgewezen". While De term interseksueel staat voor 'mensen met een niet te duiden geslachtsorgaan' (NRC handelsblad 10-11 mei 2003). Bij deze mensen is het bij de geboorte vaak niet mogelijk duidelijk de sekse te bepalen. De term interseksualiteit wordt vaak verward met de term hermafroditisme. Hermafroditisme kan worden uitgelegd aan de hand van de bipotentialiteit van de geslachtelijke differentiatie. Op basis van de genetische codering XX of XY ontwikkelt het menselijk lichaam zich in verschillende stadia tot vrouw dan wel man. De spontane ontwikkeling van het organisme is om zich als vrouw te differentiëren, voor de ontwikkeling in mannelijke richting zijn extra factoren noodzakelijk (Gooren 1990: 10-14). Bij een hermafrodiet persoon ontwikkelt een deel van de organen zich vrouwelijk, en een deel van de organen zich mannelijk. Transseksuelen zijn duidelijk te onderscheiden van hermafrodieten omdat bij hen de geslachtsorganen en de inwendige geslachtsklieren tot het zelfde geslacht ontwikkeld zijn. Bij een lichamelijk onderzoek kan bij hen dan ook geen afwijking worden vastgesteld. Recentelijk is er een theorie ontwikkeld die stelt dat ook de hersenen een geslachtelijke differentiatie ondergaan (Chung in Volkskrant 11 januari 2003, Zhou e.a. 1995). Na de geboorte ontwikkelt de hypothalamus zich vrouwelijk of mannelijk. Bij transseksuelen heeft zich volgens deze theorie een vergelijkbare stoornis voorgedaan als bij hermafrodieten: bij MV's is het lichaam als man ontwikkeld maar hebben de hersenen een vrouwelijke kern. De hypothalamus bij VM's heeft een differentiatie zoals een man die als man geboren is. Omdat deze ontwikkeling pas in het 3e of 4e levensjaar plaatsvindt, is het niet duidelijk of deze differentiatie een biologische of psychische oorzaak heeft (Gooren in tot op het bot, AT5 juni 2002). Een andere variant van de theorie is dat de hypothalamus bij transseksuelen na inname van de hormonen verandert" I apologise for the Dutch

[386] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990) p164

[387] Pitts, ibid, p134

[388] Golding, S (author, editor)- The Eight Technologies of Otherness (Routledge, London, New York, 1997) Zachary I Nataf 'Skin-Flicks'

[389] Pitts, ibid, p158

[390] Pitts, ibid, p158

[391] see Pitts, ibid, p164 et seq for a full exploration of Orlan's work

Figure 1

Figure 2



So I turn to my own body, and refer to Figures 1 and 2, which give a sense of 'before' and 'after' (or rather more accurately, 'before' and 'during', since my project continues).

Figure 1 is a photograph of me at six years old, and was taken as the first official photograph in my 'professional' career in academia, in grade 1, by the school photographer at Parkview Primary School, the school that my father had attended some twenty-nine years prior to that. I look at this photograph and see some of the sense of fear that benighted me even at that age, yet which perhaps remains unnoticed by the casual viewer who might see nothing more than an adorable little boy. Yet the canvas of this photograph, the canvas of my body that has become my life, remains untouched, new, unwritten and unperformed. Or does it? My reading of it is that Figure 1, as a 'studio portrait', is a staging which supports the performance of the 'good white boy', who is placed centre of the frame with a non-specific blue background. The whiteness of the the clothing, the ubiquitous white shirt of the South African school uniform, reflects to me the whiteness of the aspirations imparted to all children in the schools of our country during the 1970's and 1980's, and the blue the aspirational cleanness of a society that was looking to cleanse the land of the 'Other'.

Figure 2 is a photograph of me at thirty-one years of age, taken by my life partner Jason Venter some twenty-five years later. The latter reflects to me a much-changed person, on the outside, with a different haircut, tattoos and piercings, and facial hair, which belie a sense of fear and bewilderment that I have carried with me through the years. The photograph, in its tighness of shot, and the downward angle of the lens, seems to imply the scrutiny under which I feel placed as both a 'white man' and as a 'rebel', neither of which versions are necessarily welcome or reflect the variety of meanings associated with my life. The photograph is not staged, as is figure 1, but is rather a moment captured by a loved one that disallows me, as the photographic subject, from being able to compose myself, and 'perform' any of the roles for which I have been groomed, either 'dutiful son', or 'rebel without a cause'. I get the sense that I am simply captured in a moment of perplexity that accurately reflects much of my surprise and bewilderment at the identity I am 'supposed' to have.

I chose these two photographs to be juxtaposed against each other to reflect a dual sense of performance. The first I see as the performance of the 'dutiful son', so clear in figure 1, which shows me to be as yet largely unaware, at least consciously, that there are a range of rules and regulations that I was supposed to follow in order to be validated as a white male, and thereby as a human being. In the figure 2, I get a sense of performance of the 'rebel-boy', which is to me simply a layer of 'stage-paint' on me as a performer who feels like a human being of indeterminate race and gender, and who reflects some degree of surprise at the position in which I am placed.

My Experience

Over the last few years I have looked into my personal motivations in my modifications, so that I may better understand my journey, my drives, and my sense of self. This dissertation goes some way in expressing the context and intellectual challenges facing me in my 'training' as a white man, and I acknowledge that my modifications are at least in part an attempt to 'perform' my own life in a way that does not conform to the stereotypes of whiteness and maleness, and in a way that allows me some sort of ownership over my performance as human being.

My drives run deeper than a political statement. They are in some way an attempt to undo and rewrite the very strong influence of the internalised feelings of abandonment and lack hard-wired into me. I now understand through therapy that these feelings are largely based on my adoption, combined with my parents' over-protectiveness and judgmental attitude to the world in my formative years. I also understand that these feelings are not peculiar to me, and that we all have pathologies with we must deal in order to reach happiness and fulfilment. One of my modes of coming to terms with my place in the world as individual is that found in the pain and transformation of my body.

As an experienced body modification practitioner, Lukas Zpira speaks of the process of body modification, advocating that

> ...le rituel doit être une expérience personnelle, non une démonstration, quelqu'un qui cherche à se réaliser et non à prouver quelque chose...Comme un phœnix qui renaît de ses cendres...[392]

For me, the process of modifying my body has always indeed been cathartic, and either a reflection or a precursor to change and development in my life more broadly. Indeed, each individual modification represents, in a very physical sense, an influence or a motivation in my life, ranging from the flowers tattooed on my right arm each of which represents somebody I love, to my breast implants, which represent my search for a more feminine, intuitive way of living. I try to represent my body, both to myself and to the world, in a way that employs "tactics such as symbolic inversions, or performative practices that invert, contradict, or present alternatives to dominant cultural codes".[393]

The responses I get range from utter disbelief, through being blatantly ignored, through not being noticed at all, to admiration. The single connecting element between most responses seems to be a sense of confusion. Some people are not sure as to whether they should comment at all, others seem to want to pull me in to some 'fraternity' (or more often these days 'sorority') based on some or other alliance based on some 'tribe' to which they perceive me to belong. Others are nervous of making eye contact with me, and seem surprised when I speak with an educated, white South African accent that does not sit comfortably with my 'alternative' representation. Indeed my experience is that my body is indeed, like many other 'anomalous bodies', a site of the Foucauldian reading of "subversive to the extent that it resists discipline. Such a body defies normativity in its appearance, practice, or stylisation, and fails to situate itself easily in dominant categories and roles"[394].

I enjoy all of those responses, since I have the opportunity of gaining insight into nuances of society and personalities to which I would not otherwise be privy. I count myself fortunate for this chance.

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[392] Lukas Szpira, LE KØR RITUEL, http://www.body-art.net. 2000 Rough translation: "...the ritual must be a personal experience, not a demonstration, someone who seeks to realise and not to prove something, like a phoenix who is reborn from the ashes..."
[393] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003), p42
[394] Pitts, VL Ibid p41

Figure 3

Figure 4

Tattoos

Figures 3 and 4 depict my tattoo work, some of which has been added to by the time of publication of this dissertation. Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the elements of my front view, while figure 4 represents my back. The photographs were taken by a colleague of mine, Lisha Donnelly, while I was working at a film production company in Cape Town, Maximum Films, and I have collated them into a collage which represents a certain element of the collage effect of the modifications themselves- each modification is another element that adds to the mosaic of my life in that each represents a different aspect thereof.

My tattoo work is an ongoing project, which will, in all likelihood, only finish when I run out of uncovered skin (although I do not intend having my face 'inked'). I have chosen styles that resonate with my developing sense of self, and have chosen what are termed in the tattoo culture 'tribal', 'oriental' and 'old-school', in other words, both western and non-western 'styles' of modification[395]. These choices are important, since their histories represent to me, although, as I have discussed above, not unproblematically from an ethnological perspective, a confluence of cultures and view-points, incorporating me into a larger framework of world culture. As Pitts notes:

> ...indigenous body rituals that create scars, cuts, tattoos, welts, hollows, rims and stretched, reshaped and inlaid surfaces can mark the body to indicate social position. In contrast, the modern Western body is understood not as a collective product of inscription, but as a personal projection of the self. Bodies then become understood as exteriorising an "inward depth". As Lingis has it, such an exteriorisation of the self is, for Westerners, largely understood to involve volition, thoughts, processes and sensations that use the body to "signify something, to aim at something, to tend toward something[396].

The choice of both modifying my body permanently, as well as the specific styles of modification, represent to me an indelible integration with the larger, non-western history of the world, as well as with the people I meet every day. Each tattoo reflects an important turning point in my life, and marks, as a kind of "Blood Sacrifice" my journey and my life[397].

The flowers in their 'frames' on my right arm each represent a loved one, and the whole sleeve reminds me to look out of my 'windows' at the beauty that surrounds me. The nine stars on my right hand represent wholeness (three times three being a symbol of perfection) and the importance of looking to the stars for inspiration. The 'tribal' left arm represents the four primal elements of fire (the sun on my shoulder), air (the wind on my back and chest), water (the waves on my upper arm) and earth (the boxes on my forearm), together with 'roots' on my left hand, symbolically reminding me to pay attention to the power inherent in the world around me. The birds and flowers on my neck are for freedom and flight, personal possibilities that are always there to be taken. The explosion on my neck comes from the back of my head, and reminds me of the power of my own intellect in dealing with my life. The celtic/pictish cow on my right side is for the maternal instinct in me that allows me to nurture myself when I need to,

[395] The term "tribal" refers to an aesthetic understood to be found amongst indigenous peoples of the world and generally displays black work in varying degrees of symbolic patterning, while "old-school" refers to the designs which refer to European historical representations, usually more 'realistic' in nature, pictorially depicting elements of Euro-American culture. The term "Oriental" usually refers to the Japanese style of tattooing which Sturtevant (Fellowes, CH The Tattoo Book (The Pyne Press, Princeton, 1971), pp9) describes as "the most technically accomplished of any. Very elaborate designs in many colours often covered the whole body except for the head and neck"

[396] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003) p31

[397] Wroblewski, C Skin Shows IV (Virgin Books, London, 1995) notes, p16 "the tattoo artist exchanges ink for blood in order to appease the loas. Spirit possession as a form of telepresence. The loa comes in from the astral plane in cyberspace and rides the body which calls them. The tattooed glyph is a homing signal. Reverse the moment... When you die, your tattoo is meant to flash from positive to negative. It acts as a beacon to guide you back to your ancestral homeland"

while the Native American wolf on my left is about being wily and astute when I need to negotiate the dangers of life. The ladies on my legs represent the beauty of femininity. They are to be juxtaposed with men on my inner calves to represent their masculine counterparts. I am planning a pair of Marquesian shorts to represent the power of action, and a sacred heart on my stomach for the power of love, and on my back a stylised penis to represent the joy of sexuality.

Dr Paul S Taçon reflects, in a way that accurately represents many of my personal motivations and understanding of my modifications:

> For many people, the more time, dedication, pain and toil put into their adornment, the more they feel empowered. In group settings, this is often associated with some sort of initiation, and initiation always involves sacrifice and confrontation. For individuals, the pain and endurance of some forms of body art mimic those of group initiation, giving highs worth repeating. For others, their body is a life's work, a piece of performance art that is continually being refined and added to. In extremes, this leads to every part of the body being tattooed, from head to foot. Or it may lead to an eclectic composition of ink, steel, scar tissue, animal products, clothing and precious stones set on a sculpted human form that continually changes with the application of paints, dyes and hair-pieces. For many people, their body is their art, as well as an expression of a history of personal and group experience.[398]

[398] Australia Museum Body Art (Outback Print, NSW, Australia, 2000) pp12

Figure 5

Breast Implants

In May 2004 I underwent breast augmentation surgery, during which two 500cc silicone breast prostheses were implanted in my chest to give my chest a more 'feminine' shape.

The results of this surgery are reflected in figure 5. The photographs were taken by me in a mirror, meaning that my 'true shape' is a mirror image of those depicted in figure 5. This photographic constitution was intended to 'reflect' both some sense of my view of my own body shape as a mirro image of that seen by other people, as well as to 'reflect' the sense of gender that we perform, which can be seen as a distortion of the image that others see.

As I argue in this dissertation, gender (and race) can in many respects be seen as reflected from the world around us, rather than necessarily derived from our internal sense of self, which needs no gender or sex to have validity.

My aim in undergoing the surgery was both political and personal. I am intent on destabilising maleness as an absolute, dualist conception, and on undermining the "sexed surface of the body", which Butler refers to as emerging as "the necessary sign of the natural(ized) identity and desire"[399]. I was and remain politically committed to representing the power of the un/multi-gendered body as transgendered, androgynous, monstrous, transgressive and mutating, 'other', and creative in its "undetermined possibilities and conceptions"[400]. I remain politically focussed on "unhinging the mythological natural body, which relies on nature vs culture, the natural body which can be seen as 'pure state', impervious to culture", taking the "opportunity of returning to the traditional reverence for the unitariness of the androgyne, the wholeness of being one and many all together..."[401].

Looking beyond the political, I do not count myself as 'trans-sexual', in the way that Butler describes as having "...a radical discontinuity between sexual pleasures and bodily parts"[402]. She notes that

> Very often what is wanted in terms of pleasure requires an imaginary participation in body parts, either appendages or orifices, that one might not actually possess, or, similarly, pleasure may require imagining an exaggerated or diminished set of parts.[403]

Although I do in some sense identify with Butler in this regard, I do not intend to undergo full gender reassignment. Yet I count myself as 'transgendered' in the sense that I aim in some way to transcend the gendered norms imposed on us[404].

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[399] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990) pp91

[400] Zachary I Nataf 'Skin-Flicks' in Golding, S (author, editor)- The Eight Technologies of Otherness (Routledge, London, New York, 1997)

[401] Zachary I Nataf 'Skin-Flicks' ibid

[402] Butler, ibid, pp90

[403] Butler, ibid, pp90

[404] see http://home.zonnet.nl/manjamooy/inleiding%20scriptie.htm, which describes transgendered people as those who have a gender identity 'between male and female'
("Transgenders zijn personen met een genderidentiteit tussen mannelijk en vrouwelijk in. Het merendeel van de transgenders wenst geen geslachtsaanpassende behandeling te ondergaan. Sommige van hen willen slechts een deel van de behandeling doorlopen Dit wordt echter in principe door het genderteam afgewezen". While De term interseksueel staat voor 'mensen met een niet te duiden geslachtsorgaan' (NRC handelsblad 10-11 mei 2003). Bij deze mensen is het bij de geboorte vaak niet mogelijk duidelijk de sekse te bepalen. De term interseksualiteit wordt vaak verward met de term hermafroditisme. Hermafroditisme kan worden uitgelegd aan de hand van de bipotentialiteit van de geslachtelijke differentiatie. Op basis van de genetische codering XX of XY ontwikkelt het menselijk lichaam zich in verschillende stadia tot vrouw dan wel man. De spontane ontwikkeling van het organisme is om zich als vrouw te differentiëren, voor de ontwikkeling in mannelijke richting zijn extra factoren noodzakelijk (Gooren 1990: 10-14). Bij een hermafrodiet persoon ontwikkelt een deel van de organen zich vrouwelijk, en een deel van de organen zich mannelijk. Transseksuelen zijn duidelijk te onderscheiden van hermafrodieten omdat bij hen de geslachtsorganen en de inwendige geslachtsklieren tot het zelfde geslacht ontwikkeld zijn. Bij een lichamelijk onderzoek kan bij hen dan ook geen afwijking worden vastgesteld. Recentelijk is er een theorie ontwikkeld die stelt dat ook de hersenen een geslachtelijke differentiatie ondergaan (Chung in Volkskrant 11 januari 2003, Zhou e.a. 1995). Na de geboorte ontwikkelt de hypothalamus zich vrouwelijk of mannelijk. Bij

Rather than following the well-trodden route of maintaining a singular gendered identity, I became aware that my sexuality, my own sense of gender was not adequately reflected by the body that I inhabited, and, after much soul-searching, l chose to fly in the face of social norms, and modify my body to better reflect that sense of multiplicity which I feel is more appropriate ot my sense of self, given the relative instability of space, time and memory to which I refer in chapter 3, in the context of Bergson's theories of multiplicity, as compared with non-western ideas of space and time as being mutable, and therefore unstable[405].

The process of finding a surgeon to undertake the operation was arduous. I approached a number of surgeons, and spent much in consulting fees, only to be told that the surgeons in question would not feel comfortable implanting 'female' prostheses into a 'male chest'. I approached the Grootte Schuur Hospital plastic surgery department, only to be told in no uncertain terms that there was absolutely no way that I, as a 'non-transsexual' patient, would be able to undergo the operation there. I finally managed to convince Dr R (whose name I withhold to protect his anonymity) that, since the operation is not irreversible, it could do no harm for him to take it on. I understand that Dr R referred the matter to a conference of international surgeons, which he attended to obtain some perspective on how to undertake the operation, since he had never performed the procedure before. I am unclear as to whether he discussed the 'ethics' of performing such a procedure, but the sense that I get is that he did. I was aware, through the tone and content of my conversations with the cosmetic surgeons, of my disturbing the processes of medical science, especially those of plastic surgery which in many ways derives its sense of self from the norms of beauty current in modern Western society, in the way that Freuh describes:

> "The explicit body is the symbolic body too, resonating beyond the theoretical structure of binary polarity that orders critical enquiry, political agency and discursive mobility into manifestations of hegemonic or subversive significance"[406].

Body artists such as Orlan undertake this kind of subversion, and arguably acknowledge the multiplicities involved in such a project as plastic surgery, which on the one hand can be argued to be a challenge to the aesthetic norms of Western society, but on the other can also be argued to be self-serving in its dismissal of ordinary women's (and men's) suffering in relation to cosmetic surgery[407].

My circumstances are rather different, yet similar in that even though I feel that I am undermining my performance as white male by the surgery, I could legitimately also be argued to be undermining the very real concerns of 'transsexual' people whose rights to change from one gender to another should, as some may argue, be left untrammeled[408]. My response to such a position is that I do not seek to deny individuals the right to alter their bodies to reflect the 'other sex' which they feel is most appropriate for them, rather I

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transseksuelen heeft zich volgens deze theorie een vergelijkbare stoornis voorgedaan als bij hermafrodieten: bij MV's is het lichaam als man ontwikkeld maar hebben de hersenen een vrouwelijke kern. De hypothalamus bij VM's heeft een differentiatie zoals een man die als man geboren is. Omdat deze ontwikkeling pas in het 3e of 4e levensjaar plaatsvindt, is het niet duidelijk of deze differentiatie een biologische of psychische oorzaak heeft (Gooren in tot op het bot, AT5 juni 2002). Een andere variant van de theorie is dat de hypothalamus bij transseksuelen na inname van de hormonen verandert" I apologise for the Dutch)

[405] looking particularly at Castoriadis, (DA Curtis, ed & trans) World in Fragments- Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1986)

[406] Freuh, J- Monster/Beauty (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2001) p100

[407] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003) pp165

[408] I have not read specific arguments in the literature to this effect, but I have spoken to a number of gender activists whose positions are perhaps more conservative in their 'wishlist' of social changes, seeking merely to allow transsexual people the right to alter their biology according to a more dualist paradigm.

seek to assist in the process of undermining the question of identity so that they may be more free to make the choices that are right for their specific circumstances.

So too do similar arguments hold water, pertaining to my intrusion as a man into the female experience by summarily adopting the right of women to enjoy their own particular form, and perhaps even glorifying body alterations, which "even deviant ones, [are] instances of the patriarchal mistreatment of women's bodies"[409]. But like Orlan, I prefer to see my modification as "highlighting gender as a powerful social category, …acknowled[ing], rather than den[ying], the relevance of power on the body. At the s", ame time, she asserts the possibility of individual choice to navigate through history's imperatives and move the body beyond them"[410].

[409] Pitts, VL ibid pp53, speaking of radical feminists such as Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon|
[410] Pitts, VL ibid pp167

Figure 6

"Mutable Zen"

I acknowledge the unclear arena of meanings of the modified/anomalous body as being both "threatening to the social order without subversive intentions, [while] rebellious body projects may involve subversive intentions and still have ambiguous, contradictory, and even reactionary effects"[411]. And I approach my own projects, both those that involve the modified body as wellas those that do not, as one of the means at my disposal to achive a sense of internal peace, which is after all, the right of every person, notwithstanding the gendered, racialised, class and other social power relations at play. I approach my projects with what I call "mutable zen"

The photographs of figure 6, taken by Cape Town-based photographer Julian Goldswain, represent a sense of peace to which I aspire. They were taken as a project to form part of the photographer's portfolio, and were shot in the Cape Town harbour, inside a rusted metal hull of a boat being worked on in dry dock. The styling and choice of wardrobe for the photographs were chosen by the photographer and myself, and resulted in a set of images that reflect an aspirational sense of how I like to see myself, in a way that combines a feeling of 'edginess' as well as of centredness in a balanced way.

The images, with their almost industrial setting, represent a challenging, rough and textured space that I occupy, in which I am free to explore the interstices of the world, and in which I am not bounded by expectations of my placement in society, wther real or imaginary.

The combination of the softness and lack of aggression of my stances and the roughness of the industrial environment, with the sky above, holds in it the promise of my being able to look both inside myself and to my environment for inspiration and a way forward.

[411] Pitts, VL ibid pp46

Conclusion

My personal motivations for undertaking this dissertation were to better understand how I can extricate myself from the restrictive and disempowering role of white male, while at the same time not proposing to re-establish the white male voice as primary, and not to request special treatment for subjugation to a patriarchal and imperialist system that has caused untold pain and trauma to millions of black people and women.

I advocate neither patriarchy nor Eurocentrism. I rather seek to open up the spaces of whiteness and maleness, in order to allow my own performance of these identities to expand into areas not usually occupied, and to explore my own identity and its future performances in different ways. I question whether I, trained into rigidly defined roles of whiteness and maleness, am by definition caught up in these rigid performances, which are simply too chokingly restrictive to bear, whether I can avoid them completely, or challenge their meanings and implications.

I find myself, at the age of thirty-plus, in the invidious position of nominally being a white man, yet feeling that I too have been systematically denied access to other ways of enjoying my life, ways that transcend race, gender and class. I feel that I have been bound to perform an identity that does not reflect the variety of experiences that I have the potential to enjoy, and have been denied the right to express my life in the way that fits with my internal dialogues. My white male paradigm is one which automatically places me in the role of performing the role of writer and controller, without any reference to how other people view me as an individual, without any reference to how the world is making me as a human being, or the choices I have in making myself, abstracted from yet connected to my physical form.

And so I look for life narratives for my own such as those that Wagner describes, in the context of the holographic world view of New Guinea, as a view of the world as a place that speaks to us and writes us as much as we speak to or write it, narratives that allow us to determine, in conjunction with the world around us, some sense of our selves as whole human beings[412].

I look for spaces in which to perform myself that are neither a colonisation of the periphery by yet another authorial (white, male) voice, nor a justification of the validity of the margins as worthwhile. Rather, I look for spaces which open the context of my whiteness and maleness to possibilities that I am trained to exclude for myself in the rigid performance of whiteness, and the static performance of maleness.

[412] Wagner, R An Anthropology of the Subject- Holographic Worldview in new Guinea and its Meaning and Significance for the World of Anthropology (University of California Press, Berkeley, LA, London, 2001)

It is in such writers as Butler and Bhabha, whose theories of performativity and hybridity open the periphery to occupation by all people, and whose ideas allow me to triangulate my own experience of being with those of the female and black experience that perhaps opens these spaces for me[413]. Although I run the risk of legitimate criticism in associating the white male voice with these positionings, I find that they express and acknowledge the inherently unstable nature of identity, and allow me to reposition and resituate myself beyond the binaries of "centre" and "periphery". These paradigms allow me to raise questions about, and allow exploration of, who I am, and who I may become by 'performing' more varied, 'hybrid' roles that work with my own particular circumstances.

The argument I follow in this dissertation is that, by looking at power in a Foucaultian sense, we are able to understand that the power influences are not necessarily only imposed by the empowered on the disempowered, but are equally imposed on the so-called 'empowered' by themselves[414]. In looking at discourse as creative, we have the power to understand that we are part of the creative process itself, in fact as a narrative, the performance of which both we and our circumstances write[415]. The nature of personal identity as not necessarily bound by time and space, and both gender/sex, as well as race, can indeed be seen as unstable and performative[416]. Once we accept the possibilities that these identities are performative, we can find ways to actively undermine them, and in so doing, create, or acknowledge the creation of, identities that do not fall squarely within the parameters of the existing categories of race and gender[417]. In so doing, I suggest that we can incorporate into our lives alternatives to enrich our experience and move beyond the restrictive roles prescribed for us.

I explore the dialectic of experience and theory by exploring the disciplines and the postmodernist, feminist and postcolonialist fields of study and interconnecting the materialisations which express my experience of race and gender in the context of whiteness and maleness. I do this by way of exploring how I may find contextualised spaces to explore and to broaden my own experience of life, not as a white male, but as a human being. If we

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[413] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990), Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990)

[414] My arguments in this regard are based on Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980); Foucault, M- The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure- (Pantheon, New York, 1985); Foucault, M (trans AM Sheridan-Smith) the Archeology of Knowledge (Tavistock, London, 1972); Foucault, ed (trans Richard McDougall) Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite (Colophon Press, NY, 1980)

[415] see particularly Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991)

[416] particularly following the argument of Butler, JP ibid

[417] in this respect I look particularly to the idea of the modified body as a means of destabilizing gendered and racialised identity, relying largely on Springer, C- Electronic Eros, Bodies and Desire in the Post-Industrial Age (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1996), Golding, S (author, editor)- The Eight Technologies of Otherness (Routledge, London, New York, 1997), Baudrillard, J- Fatal Strategies- (Paris: Semiotext(e)/Pluto, 1983, 1990) Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003)

follow an inter- or multi-disciplinary route in this respect we may perhaps be able to follow an "Undisciplined" mode of looking at our lives that has value[418].

In Chapter 1, I start the dissertation from the disciplinary parameters of sociology, in particular medical sociology, referring to Turner and Game, who speak specifically of the benefits of adopting a more materialist conception of the lived human body as a valuable perspective in sociology, which has traditionally preferred to ignore the lived body as sociological agent[419]. Challenging the traditional disciplinary formulations through theorists such as Probyn who supports using the self as authorial position, and Hochschild who advocates incorporating the self through the anthropological methodologies of auto-ethnography[420], allows us to move beyond static methodologies of the social sciences into an "Undisciplined Theory", as suggested by Genosko, which may be informative to an interdisciplinary study of whiteness and maleness such as the present. Such an approach, which moves beyond traditional academic disciplines to inter- and multi-disciplinarity and into the fields of study, in the context of this dissertation, of postmodernism, postcolonialism and feminism, incorporates methodologies which perhaps more closely relate to social circumstances[421]. It is these methodologies of "the between" which I incorporate into the materialisations that form part of the dissertation.

If we look to parallels between identity development, both personal and national, we can understand ourselves as narrative creations with open-ended resolutions, and we can integrate the values of narrative as mode of living and self-identification[422]. Looking at personal identity as narrative allows us to look at the human experience in ways that go further than the rationalist social sciences have for long advocated. It allows us to incorporate the varied aspects of human experience that do not necessarily fall within the parameters of strict scientific explanation. Looking at human identity as being in some respects self-determined narrative, more than simply being described by narrative, allows us to look further than the explanatory role than narrative ordinarily reflects, and to incorporate a sense of possibility and variety that is precluded by the positivist perspectives of the traditionally formulated social sciences, allowing individuals to choose their performances inherent in that narrative[423].

[418] Genosko, G Undisciplined Theory (Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1998)
[419] Turner, BS- Regulating Bodies- Essays in Medical Sociology (Routledge, London and New York, 1992), Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991)
[420] Probyn, E- Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (Routledge, London, New York, 1993); Hochschild, AR- The commercialisation of intimate life- notes from home and work (university of california press, berkeley, los angeles, london, 2003)
[421] Genosko, G Undisciplined Theory (Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1998)
[422] Hinchman, LP & Hinchman, SK (eds)- Memory, Identity, Community- The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997); Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991); Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990); Cixous, H 'Difficult Joys' in Wilcox, H, McWatters, K, Thompson, A, Williams, LR The Body and the Text- Helene Cixous, Reading and Teaching (St martin's Press, New York, 1990) pp14
[423] see particularly Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991); Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990)

Chapter 2 looks to the issues of power from a postmodernist perspective, and relies on Foucault's ideas of the systemic rather than hierarchical nature of power, in the context of discourse, and speaks to a range of contemporary theorists' views in this respect, particularly those reviewing Foucault's ideas of discursive creation[424].

I look to concepts of power and the self in the context of knowledge, language and social discipline, recognising that any self-definition that is to go beyond those determined by race and gender are informed and influenced by context, but are not necessarily defined by them. I look to Game's understanding of psychoanalytic theory, particularly that of Lacan and Freud[425], as well as Hegelian conceptions of knowledge and institutional power[426]. Looking at power and discourse through the eyes of the postmodernist enterprise in this way, with the help of such theorists as Foucault, allows us to review the top-down perspectives of the imposing of power on an unsuspecting and disempowered populace, and to look at power in its discursive and creative formulation[427]. This in turn allows us to concede that the 'disempowered' as well as the 'empowered' are part of a discursive system that creates identities as well as regulating the flow of power. With this in mind we are then able to extrapolate our argument by agreeing that individuals within the power systems are not necessarily precluded from revisioning their own positions within those systems, and therefore by implication that men and women, black and white people are not absolutely bound by their positions within these systems.

If we take the creative discursive nature of power relations as our grounding point, we are then able to look at the instability of the self as unitary and stable entity, on the basis that the self is in turn created by a multitude of influences, and is indeed written by both the self as well as the environment. Such writing of the self is not unitary in that there are many facets to the process of writing, and, from the perspective of semiotics, there are equally many ways of reading the self, depending on the positioning of the author as well as the authored[428].

In Chapter 3, I look at the stability of western conceptions of space, time and memory, speaking particularly of Game's conceptions of Bergson's theories of multiplicity, as compared with non-

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[424] especially those of Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991) and Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994) particularly McGowen, R "Power and Humanity, or Foucault among the Historians", ibid

[425] Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991)

[426] as discussed by Kolb, D the Critique of Pure Modernity- Hegel, Heidegger, and After (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986) as discussed by the theorists in Jones, C & Porter, R (eds) Reassessing Foucault- Power, Medicine and the Body (London & New York, Routledge, 1994)

[427] My arguments in this regard are based on Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980); Foucault, M- The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure- (Pantheon, New York, 1985); Foucault, M (trans AM Sheridan-Smith) the Archeology of Knowledge (Tavistock, London, 1972); Foucault, ed (trans Richard McDougall) Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite (Colophon Press, NY, 1980)

[428] particularly looking at Saussure's conception of semiotic meaning, Saussure de, F Course in General Linguistics Eds C Bally and A Sechehaye (NY, McGraw Hill, 1966)

western ideas of space and time as being mutable, and therefore unstable[429]. Using these arguments as grounding the perspective that there can be no inherent continuity, we are able to deconstruct the stability of identity in terms of space and time, acknowledging that identity is conceptually bound by both, and therefore liberated from the necessity of obtaining to the individual in perpetuity.

Chapter 4 speaks of Judith Butler's exploration of the inherent instability of both gender and sex as categories, a position which allows us to unpack the determinacy of all gender and sex narratives and performances[430]. If we use a similar principle, basing it on Bhabha's ideas of 'hybridity', to refer to race, we are able to recognise that race as category is inherently unstable[431]. In this way, we can deconstruct the ideas of both the gendered and racialised self, and to look at the self as performative in terms of the formulation of sex (not only gender), as well as hybridised in terms of the narrated elements of nation and ethnicised self. These identities therefore do not necessarily have to be adopted, or not in the formulation that we have come to expect.

Chapter 5 again looks to Butler for the ways in which identity can actively be destabilised, primarily by means of capitalising on the inherent instability of the body, together with the postmodernist views on the body as locus of destabilisation of identity[432]. Kristeva's readings of Lacan, Foucault and Bloom's understanding of psychoanalytic theories to review race and ethnicity in South Africa allow us to recognise the historical context of South Africans, which inform the definition of personal identity, and prevent us from believing that individuals are absolutely free from their context in their self-definition[433].

The postmodern body can be seen as locus of challenge, in terms of the absent body in cyberspace, as well as the sexed/gendered and racialised body of the cyborg[434]. We can combine this with Nietsche's ideas of the creative element of identity as defined by the absent rather than the absolute, which further opens the door to our determining a space in the margins which is at the same time not marginal, and which acknowledges a mobility of identity and experience. Baudrillard's understanding of the body, together with theories on the transgendered body, open possibilities of change and destabilisation of whiteness and

[429] Game, A Undoing the Social- Towards a Deconstructive Sociology (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, 1991), comparing with Castoriadis, (DA Curtis, ed & trans) World in Fragments- Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1986)
[430] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990)
[431] Bhabha, HK (ed)- Nation and Narration (Routledge, London & New York, 1990), Said, E Orientalism (Vintage, New York, 1979)
[432] Butler, JP- Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity- (New York, Routledge, 1990)
[433] Kristeva, J Desire in Language: a Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art ((Roudiez, L, ed) NY, Columbia University Press, 1980); Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980) & Foucault, ed (trans Richard McDougall) Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite (Colophon Press, NY, 1980); Bloom, L Identity and Ethnic Relations in Africa (Ashgate, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, 1998)
[434] Springer, C- Electronic Eros, Bodies and Desire in the Post-Industrial Age (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1996)

maleness[435]. In this respect, there is inherent in all people, including the white male, the possibility of performing other ways of being through the body, particularly the modified body. It is these kinds of performances which we see through the experience of the modified body[436].

Once we have acknowledged that self-identity, which include the elements of gender and race/ethnicity, is inherently unstable, we can look at ways in which these identities can actively be destabilised, either by action or perspective, in order to allow a broader scope for individuals to identify themselves and thereby achieve greater self-fulfilment and, in the Jungian sense, individuation[437].

It is these ideas of destabilisation and redefinition of space which I have followed both academically and in my own "Body Story"[438], in my very physical modifications, as a means of both finding and creating a sense of the "hybrid performance" whose potential we all hold in our very skins[439]. It is this process of logic that holds possibilities for both the future generations of South Africans, as well as myself, as nominally a white man, and which perhaps enables us to activate freedom from constraint that potentially holds us back, to acknowledge a mobility of space while still recognising our context.

I close with a quotation which reflects how I feel about being a modified African of indeterminate gender or sex, living in the country that makes my heart sing:

"Africans are the same
whereever we are, she says to me
matter-of-factly
I look at her and smile
And ask
like a good researcher should
How So?
I can't explain, she says
with a voice that sounds
like the rush of many rivers
It is the way we all are
The way we move
The way we think"[440]

[435] Golding, S (author, editor)- The Eight Technologies of Otherness (Routledge, London, New York, 1997); Baudrillard, J- Fatal Strategies- (Paris: Semiotext(e)/Pluto, 1983, 1990)
[436] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003)
[437] see for example Jung, CG, (Jaffe, ed, Winston, R&C, trans) Memories, Dreams, Reflections Collins, 1983
[438] Pitts, VL In the Flesh- the Cultural Politics of Body Modification (Palgrave McMillan, New York, Hampshire, 2003), acknowledgements
[439] in the sense identified by both Butler, ibid and Bhabha, ibid
[440] Austin, DA, "Kaleidoscope- The Same and Different" in Ellis, C & Bochner, AP (eds) Composing Ethnography- Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing (Altamira Press, Walnut Creek, London, New Delhi, 1996) pp 207-208

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