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**Commitment to Democracy in Mozambique: Performance Evaluations
and Cognition.**

Evidence from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer Survey Data

by

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of
the Degree of Master of Social Science in Political Studies, Democratic Governance
Programme

Department of Political Studies

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Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works of other people has been cited and referenced.

Signature

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Abstract

This study explores Mozambicans' commitment to democracy by testing and examining cognitive and performance evaluation factors, using Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey. It finds that Mozambicans are less committed to democracy than many other Africans but their levels of procedural understand of democracy are higher. My main findings are as follows: First, levels of information models are the main source of popular commitment to democracy. Second, both evaluations of economic and political performance matter for Mozambicans' commitment to democracy. Third, the effects of political performance matter more than economics. Fourth, people who have high levels of information (from news media use and formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors and obtain their information from relatively more independent sources (such as participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed democrats. Fifth, procedural understandings of democracy are positively relevant for individual commitment to democracy.

Dedication

To my parents

Cristina Figueira and António Ah Shenga

University of Cape Town

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Chapter 1

The Importance of Popular Commitment to Democracy in Mozambique

What we presently know about Africans' commitment to democracy comes from a cross-national survey based analysis of eleven Anglophone and one Francophone sub Saharan African countries. It finds that individual's cognitive awareness (including whether or not people understand democracy as a system of political procedures rather than economic outcomes, as well as how much interest in and information about politics they possess) is the principal source when tested simultaneously against competing explanations based on social structure, cultural values, institutional influences and performance evaluations (Mattes and Bratton, 2003; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). However, I examine popular commitment to democracy in the Lusophone African context of Mozambique.

Mozambique may alter the existing findings because of the particular legacies that it inherited from Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil war, especially its deleterious effects on formal education, news media and the availability of the independent, critical information necessary for democratic citizenship.

Independent Mozambique inherited very low levels of literacy from its period of Portuguese colonialism.¹ Colonialism granted only primary formal education to natives who could attend only Catholic Church schools, of which they were required to change their native name to a Portuguese one and convert to the Catholic religion in order to finish their qualifications. Only Europeans, Asians and a few *assimilated*² natives could attend secondary and high schools. After independence in 1975, the literacy rate

¹ After independence, due to Frelimo nationalization policy, most skilled Portuguese workers left the country leaving the public administration without qualified human capital. To keep government institutions functioning, the Frelimo government imported skilled workers from the Soviet Union. Students with some secondary school but without teacher training were drafted to become teachers.

² Assimilated were those natives that were socialized in western culture. Most of them were sons of white fathers and black mothers.

worsened as the country experienced 16 years of brutal civil war (1977-1992) which destroyed the schooling infrastructure.³ The literacy rate is now 46 percent.⁴

In addition, Mozambique also inherited a very weak mass media network from the colonial period: one radio station (*Rádio Moçambique*), and two daily and one weekly newspapers.⁵ Though the country now has relative media pluralism, few people have access to print or televised media. Very few newspapers are distributed outside of provincial capital cities leaving many towns, boroughs and rural area without any print media access. The public television created after the independence (1982) reached the country's second biggest city, Beira, only in 1994. It is now spread to provincial capital cities and few towns and boroughs, but no further. Rural areas do not have access to television. The lack of electricity also undermines internet access in these areas.

But it is also important to replicate earlier studies in Mozambique because of the legacies of Frelimo's communist style party-state system especially its control over society. To control the society, the party-state institutionalized at grass root levels a 'chief of ten households' (*chefe de dez casas*) beyond 'ward secretaries' (*Secretários de Bairros*) and dynamical groups (*grupos dinamizadores*). It also nationalized all public and private institutions and organizations, including barber and tailor shops.

Under the party-state system, the state secret police closely monitored Mozambicans who listened to news from foreign broadcasts, like BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), arguing that foreign influences would undermine the socialist project. Like in other

³ The existing school infrastructure was destroyed and all males 17 years and older had to do compulsory service in the army. By the end of 1980 the Renamo guerrillas controlled two-thirds of the country leaving the government confined to provincial capital cities. In these cities the few school vacancies were reserved only for successful students. Other students lost their vacancies in favor of young students or transferred to night schooling. The night schooling attempted to be more inclusive but it did not work due to constant electricity cut in many capital cities. Some cities went two to four months without electricity.

⁴ According to the Final Report on Household Survey published by the National Institute of Statistics, INE (2004), the average rate of illiteracy among adults nationwide is about 53.6%: it is higher in rural areas (65.7%) than in urban districts (30.3%) and more marked among women (68%) than men (37.7%). See also Mário and Nandja (2006). This household survey data is based on the period that the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 2002.

⁵ *Diário de Moçambique* and *Notíciais* are the two daily newspapers, and *Domingo* is the weekly.

communist countries, the circulation of information was controlled by party-state agencies.

The Frelimo one-party system favored pro-government trade unions and business organizations. Indeed, it created a confederation of labor unions – *Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos-Central Sindical* (OTM-CS), which are still today aligned with the state. Business organizations in Mozambique were also strongly dominated by the state. In fact,

“the bureaucratic elite which grew in the shadow of the Frelimo party-state are in the phase of re-conversion and installation into the world of business and the nascent national business class. For this, their main capital is precisely their link with Frelimo and its state. It is people in this stratum – including, for instance, the army officers from the army struggle – who have benefited most from the privatization of companies and services that were once under state control as well as bank credits granted with no expectation of repayment, or at nominal interest rates” (Pereira and Shenga, 2005:56).

On the other hand, church, or community development or self-help organizations were historically able to retain more independence from the state.

The Frelimo party-state system also shaped the range of influential persons that citizens could contact to obtain help or communicate their concerns or needs. Besides the usual array of Frelimo party officials and officials of government ministry, traditional rulers, local councilors and other community influential persons have also been aligned to the state. Traditional rulers were described in Decree Number 15/2000, of June 20 as a continuation of the state bureaucracy at grass roots and community levels and assigned the task of collecting taxes. Frelimo local councilors have dominated all municipalities since they won the 1998 local elections. Other community influential persons, like those who are relatively wealthier, are also the bureaucratic elite which grew up in the shadow of Frelimo one-party system and is in the phase of re-conversation and installation in world of business and the nascent business class (Pereira and Shenga, 2005). Thus, few officials or community leaders remain totally outside state control.

In this context, Mozambicans will not only tend to have low levels of information about politics, but they also should tend to get their information from state aligned sources. How much Mozambicans know about public affairs and politics as well as where they obtain their information is likely to shape how they understand democracy and their level of commitment to democracy. I distinguish between substantive understandings of democracy, which refer to what democracy does or its concrete outcomes, and procedural understandings, which emphasize the rules and procedures of democracy (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The former “prescribes a specific content to policy” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) such as improving living standards or alleviation of poverty, whereas the latter “is precisely about the struggle to determine those policies” (Diamond, 2005). How much Mozambicans know about politics and where they get that information may also shape the bases on which they support democracy – whether it is based on performance evaluations of political factors (like delivery of freedoms and political rights) or of economic factors (such as the availability of jobs opportunities and improvement of living standards). Thus, I am interested in exploring the extent to which individual levels and sources of information shape Mozambicans’ understandings of democracy as well as their commitment to democracy, and also the bases of their commitment to democracy by using public opinion data.

Hypotheses and Arguments

I expect that the few Mozambicans with high levels of political information and who get their information from relatively independent sources will be more likely to understand democracy procedurally and also will be more likely to be committed to democracy, and will be more likely to base their commitment to democracy on political performance rather than economic performance factors. In contrast, the majority who have low levels of information and who acquire it from state aligned sources will be more likely to understand democracy substantively and will be less likely to be committed to democracy.

The reasoning behind my expectations is as follows: “Education is a catalyst of social change; formal schooling informs people about the way things work in the world; and it increases awareness of public affairs” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:204). It is through education that individuals learn the rules of how the society functions and receive knowledge to play out their role. It also helps them to navigate more easily in other cognitive arenas (Bertrand and Valois, 1994). For instance, acquiring and processing information from newspapers requires a degree of formal education. Mass media exposure enhances “civic consciousness” (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002:vii); and “prompts policy discussion” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:219). Like education, media consumption is connected with cognitive skills.

On the other hand, obtaining information from state aligned sources is not conducive to positive attitudes toward democracy since the quality of democracy in Mozambique is being subverted and constrained by those very Frelimo officials or elites who administer the state. While political reforms have led to some former autocracies being reclassified as ‘liberal democracies’ or at least ‘electoral democracies’, Mozambique’s political regime is at best ‘ambiguous’ (see Diamond, 2002). Freedoms are limited and corruption is high (Transparency International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005). Electoral institutions, including the constitutional council, are infiltrated by and favor the dominant party, thus reducing the level of political competition. Due the adoption of a highly presidentialized system, the legislature cannot hold the executive accountable, with limited oversight and representation responsibilities. Thus, obtaining political information from the very state aligned sources that subvert democracy means, at best, that people fail to receive any positive message of the procedural elements of democracy and become less committed democrats. In addition, given the Marxist route of Frelimo, it is likely that they will transmit substantive views of democracy.

Relying on the information they have from their formal education and greater uses of private mass media as well as the use of more independent or critical sources of information, committed democrats compare the previous and current regimes in terms of

the delivery of political rather than economic goods. They perceive that the basket of political goods has improved while inequality has increased.

Indeed, though Mozambique has registered high levels of economic growth, since 1998, it has not been equally redistributed across the country. Macroeconomic improvements (like economic growth and controlled inflation) have not been reflected at the micro level (in terms of the improvements of individual living standards). On the other hand, Mozambicans now enjoy freedoms and political rights that were denied or limited under the old regime.

Why is Popular Commitment to Democracy Important?

Popular commitment to democracy (legitimation) is a multidimensional construct that combines the concepts of support for democracy and a broader rejection of authoritarian regimes. The popular legitimation of democracy is argued by many analysts to be the key to democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Diamond, 1999).

Linz and Stepan (1996) stress that consolidation occurs when all political actors come to regard democracy as “the only game in town”, in other words, this means “democracy is consolidated when citizens and leaders alike conclude that no alternative form of regime has any greater subjective validity or stronger objective claim to their allegiance” (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:447).

By examining and understanding post-communist societies, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) highlight that popular support is the foundation to maintaining a political regime. Without support no political regime can survive, maintain or consolidate (Diamond, 1999). Similarly, Gunther, Montero and Torcal point out that “support for democracy may serve as the bedrock of democratic stability and an important ingredient for the

functioning of a healthy democracy” (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004:1; Gunther, Montero and Puhle, 2004).

However, while Linz and Stepan (1996) measured commitment to democracy by ‘preference (support) for democracy against its alternatives’; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) measured it by ‘rejection of authoritarian regimes’. This study adopts both methods of measuring and explaining popular commitment to democracy, following Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) and Mattes and Shin (2005).

The Likely Sources of Popular Commitment to Democracy

Levels of information

This explanation assumes that the amount of political and civic information that people possess matters for their attitudes to democracy. People with high levels of information – based on access to formal education and, or exposure to news media - are expected to be more aware of public affairs and more supportive of democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). News media consumption is said to increase awareness of democracy, enhance a “civic consciousness” (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002), and “prompts policy discussion” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Exposure to mass media also becomes a decisive factor for democratisation by not only informing people about political events and public affairs, but also enabling them to become watchdogs of the democratic political process (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004:2-4).

However, this does not mean that citizens who lack education access and media exposure necessarily lack the information to form attitudes toward democracy. Individuals not only acquire information through formal education and news media, but can also learn from others, where individuals add their personal experiences to that of others (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Thus, acquiring information from alternative sources still matters for democratic consolidation.

People may acquire political information and developing interest in public affairs from their interpersonal social networks, through the ‘active discussion of politics with friends and neighbors, spouse and co-workers’ (Richardson and Beck, 2004). Discussion of politics with family members, co-workers, and friends was found to be more influential than media (e.g. newspapers) by Lazarsfeld and colleagues for two reasons: first, interpersonal networks have greater coverage and second, are based on high levels of trust among network members (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, 1954). I discuss this set of psychological orientations under the label of “cognitive engagement” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

Sources of Information

Some scholars argue that the specific informational environment in which people obtain their information has an important effect on political attitudes that can be conducive to democratic consolidation. Gunther, Montero and Torcal, for example, focus on the nature of information intermediation in a wide variety of democratic systems, and the implication of different patterns of intermediation for the nature of politics and the quality of democracy (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004). Gunther, Montero and Torcal (2004) distinguish between informational intermediaries that are ‘explicitly political’ from those that are ‘ostensibly apolitical and non-partisan’.

However, I distinguish mainly between sources of information that are state aligned from those that are relatively more independent. I argue that obtaining information from sources that are state controlled or state aligned has a different impact on attitudes to democracy compared to obtaining it from sources that are more independent or non-state aligned.

Nevertheless, the nature and extent of this impact from country to country depends on the degree to which ruling party and government officials are managing the state toward or

away from democratization. If they are in the process of subverting the quality of democracy, people who contact them or are member of their organizations are more likely to get information that is detrimental to democracy.⁶

Alternatively contacting influential persons that are far away from state control or are more independent is likely to create more positive attitudes to democracy. They are more likely to be critical about the conduct of government in office and more likely to demand shared power across state institutions, accountability, competition, rule of law, and easy access to participation in order to obtain their desired goals.

Performance evaluations

The performance evaluation explanation is based on a rational choice approach to individual political behavior. It assumes that political actors make rational decisions in situations of uncertainty. They “make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends (self-interests)” (Levi, 1997:27). Individuals evaluate the performance of officials, regimes, governments and institutions on the basis of practical tests of how that performance affects personal and collective self-interests (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

Improving democratic performance is widely cited as a prerequisite for democratic (legitimation) consolidation. However, researchers differ by the relative emphasis they place on the importance of economic and political performance factors (Evans and Whitefield, 1995).

⁶ Fung (2003) point out that associational life, for instance, can enhance democracy by fostering civic virtues and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance. However, Fung point out that this contribution depends on the nature of associations and also on the political context of a given society. Some forms of associations are better suited and advanced than others.

Some scholars, the so-called 'first generation', highlight the effectiveness of government delivery of socio-economic goods as the key to the sustainability of democracy (Przeworski, 1991, Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Pereira, Maraval & Przeworski, 1993; Przeworski et al., 1996), indicating that democratic regimes that do a better job handling the economy and improving people's living standards are more likely to endure (Przeworski et al., 1996). As such, the transition to democracy is a function of the degree to which economic experience departs from citizens expectations (Przeworski, 1991:184).

Elster (1993) argues that democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver goods in economic sphere (Elster, 1993: 268). In the same line of thinking, Ake (1996) argues that Africans view democracy in economic and instrumental terms. Contending that "Africans are seeking democracy as a matter of survival" he posits that "the democratic movement in Africa will emphasize concrete economic and social rights rather than abstract political rights; it will insist on the democratisation of economic opportunities, the social betterment of people, and a strong social welfare system" (Ake, 1996: 239-44).

On the other side, 'second generation' researchers emphasize "the ability of citizens to exercise basic political rights" (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:451) and "expectation(s) of public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism" (Diamond, 1997) as the prerequisite to the durability of democracy.

In fact, most empirical studies have found that popular support for democracy is largely based on political considerations rather than economic. As Diamond points out: "The most striking finding is the autonomy of the political", which overpowers "the country's level of socio economic development, the individual's socio economic status, and the regime's economic performance" (Diamond, 1999:162). Similarly, Rose, Mishler and Haepfer contend that public opinion about various political regimes is shaped more by guarantees of basic political rights than by a track record of material delivery" (Rose, Mishler and Haepfer, 1998:160). They find that while economic factors contribute to legitimation, politics matters more. Moreover, Evans and Whitefield (1995) also found

that both economic and political performance are important but the multiple effects suggests that the perceived political performance is of greater weight than is economic since it appears to have considerably stronger effects.

The Scope and Design of this Study

I test the effects of cognitive factors (levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement, and understandings of democracy) and performance evaluations on citizens' commitment to democracy. I use a micro-level analysis, and a cross-sectional design, which means "people of many ages, behaviours, and opinions are represented within the study population" (Lewis-Beck, Bryaman and Liao, 2004:299-230). In a cross-sectional design, the cases represented within the study population are measured at the same point of time (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995; de Vaus, 2001).

A cross-sectional design allows "observation of phenomena in more natural, realistic setting, increasing the size and representativeness of the population studied, and allowing the testing of hypotheses that do not lend themselves to experimental manipulation. The "cross-sectional design sacrifices internal validity of results for improving in external validity" (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:134).

I test my hypotheses against data collected through a public opinion sample survey. "If scientifically designed and administered in a culturally sensitive manner, sample surveys are a powerful tool" (Pereira, Davids and Mattes, 2002; Pereira et al., 2003) for revealing attitudes that are conducive to democracy. This study is based on survey data from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer. This survey interviewed a sample of 1400 Mozambicans that was a randomly selected representative sample of the adult Mozambican population between August and October 2002 in all 11 provinces of the Republic of Mozambique through personal interviews (see full details of the data in Appendix C).

Hypotheses' testing is conducted through multiple linear regression analysis. The assumption underlying multiple regression analysis is that the dependent and independent variables must be continuous. If the independent variables are not continuous they must be recoded as dichotomous 'dummy' variables. Multiple regression statistical techniques allow us to test simultaneously the effects of people's cognition (levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement, and understandings of democracy) and their performance evaluations on their commitment to democracy.

The Outline of this Study

In chapter 2, I consider the patterns of Mozambicans' understandings of and commitment to democracy. This chapter also tests the validity and reliability of the multidimensional constructs of commitment to democracy. While commitment to democracy is shallow in Mozambique, factor and reliability analyses confirm the validity and internal consistency of the items that measure the composite index labeled commitment to democracy. However, Mozambicans understand democracy as a set of procedures that 'allow everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions'.

In Chapter 3, I explain Mozambicans understandings of and commitment to democracy by testing the effects of levels and sources of information. I hypothesize that the few Mozambicans with high levels of information and acquire their information from relatively more independent sources will more likely to understand democracy procedurally as well as will be more likely to be committed to democracy, while the majority who have low levels of information and obtain their information from state aligned sources will more likely to understand democracy substantively and less likely to be committed democrats.

Generally speaking, the findings reveal optimism for this "informational" model even though some small deviations are found. The results reveals that people who have high levels of information and acquire their information from relatively more independent

sources are indeed more likely to understand democracy procedurally and are more likely to be committed to democracy than those who obtain their information from state aligned sources. However, by relying on informal sources of information, especially interpersonal discussion of politics, Mozambicans obtain some awareness of politics and form attitudes that matter for democratic consolidation. Also those who contact state aligned influential persons, particularly officials of government ministries still appear to be committed to democracy.

In chapter 4, I examine the basis of Mozambicans commitment to democracy testing the impact of cognitive factors (levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement, and understandings of democracy). The results reveal that popular commitment to democracy is a result of both positive economic and political performance evaluations but politics matter more than economics. The results reconfirm that people who have high levels of information and acquire their information from relatively more independent sources are more likely to be committed to democracy. However, people who discuss politics with friend or neighbors are also more likely to be committed to democracy. Procedural understandings of democracy appear to be a more important determinant of popular commitment to democracy compared to substantive understandings. The results also suggest that the process of being committed to democracy is collective learning experience through country institutional legacies.

In Chapter 5, I briefly restate the conclusions of the chapters, discuss the findings, and draw the theoretical and political implications of the findings and provide strategies to support the process of democratization of a young and new Mozambican democracy.

Chapter 2

Attitudes toward Democracy in Mozambique: Commitment to and Understandings of Democracy

The first step in analyzing survey data is to examine single variables – i.e. univariate analysis. This statistical technique shows how many survey respondents fall into the response categories of each of the variables (Denver, 1994). This chapter introduces and provides descriptive features of Mozambicans' understandings of democracy and their levels of commitment to democracy. What are the Mozambicans levels of commitment to democracy? How do Mozambicans regard, view or understand democracy: are they more likely to understand democracy procedurally or substantively?

2.1. Commitment to Democracy


Popular commitment to democracy (or legitimation) is a multidimensional construct that combines the constituent concepts of popular support for democracy and a broader rejection of authoritarian regimes. Committed democrats are those people who simultaneously support democracy (i.e. say 'democracy is preferable to any other kind of government') and strongly reject any type of authoritarian regimes, like one-party, military, and one-man rule (see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and Shin, 2005).

To describe the patterns of Mozambicans levels of commitment to democracy I examine first their levels of support for democracy and then their rejection of three forms of authoritarian regimes.

Support for democracy

Support for democracy is a popular preference for democratic political regime against its alternatives. People who support democracy say they prefer it to any other kind of government. Figure 2.1 summarizes the results of a 2002 random representative sample of 18 years and older Mozambican population. The results show a moderate level of popular support for democracy among Mozambicans. Just over one half (54 percent) respondents say that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

Figure 2.1: Support for democracy




Question: "Which of the following statements is closest to your opinion? A) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; B) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; and C) for someone like me it does not matter what form of government we have"

In comparison to results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 16 countries between 2002 and 2003,⁷ Mozambicans support for democracy is about 10 percentage points lower than the 16 country average (64 percent). Among 16 Afrobarometer countries in Round 2, Kenya present the highest (80 percent) level followed by Senegal (75 percent), Uganda (75 percent), Mali (71 percent), Zambia (70 percent), Nigeria (67 percent), Botswana (66 percent), Tanzania and Cape Verde (65 percent), Malawi (64 percent) and South Africa (57 percent). And then follows Mozambique and Namibia,

⁷ In Zimbabwe, the Round 2 Afrobarometer survey was implemented in 2004 due political instability.

both with 54 percent of popular support for democracy. The lowest level of popular support for democracy in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey comes from Zimbabwe (48 percent) and Lesotho (50 percent).

Figure 2.2: Support for democracy in 16 Afrobarometer countries



Rejection of authoritarian regimes


I also examine the patterns of rejection of other regimes that have been experimented within the African context, especially authoritarian ones. Rejection of authoritarian regimes refers to a popular disapproval of three types of authoritarian regimes, namely: one-party, one-man, and military rule. What are the levels of Mozambicans' rejection of those three forms of authoritarian regimes?

Figure 2.3 show the distributions of respondents in categories of rejections of the three forms of authoritarian regimes. The results show that just less than half (47 percent and 46 percent) of all respondents, respectively, reject one-party rule and one-man rule.

However, military government appears to be rejected at slightly higher levels. More than half (56 percent) of respondents strongly reject or reject military rule, suggesting that

after 16 years of experience of the long and destructive civil war Mozambicans are less likely to tolerate the army coming in to govern the country, than a reversal to one-party rule or 'strong man' rule.

Figure 2.3: Rejection of authoritarian regimes



Question: "There are many ways of governing a country. Would you reject or approve of the following alternatives? Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office (one-party rule); the army comes in to govern the country (military rule); and elections and the national assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything (one-man rule)".

These levels of rejection of authoritarian regimes in Mozambique are the lowest in Africa.⁸ While Mozambique and Namibia have the lowest proportions of disapproval of one-party, one-man and military rule, Zambia and Kenya have the highest levels. Zambians lead the way in rejecting military rule; Ugandans share the lead in rejecting one-man rule and Nigerians are most dismissive of one-party rule (see Figures 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3).

In general, the average proportions of these considerations in Africa indicate that large majorities of Africans reject the authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the average of disapproval of military rule is 78 percent among Africans, while of one-man and one-party rule is respectively 77 percent and 68 percent.

⁸ When I speak about Africa, means those 16 Afrobarometer countries.

This low level of popular commitment to democracy (e.g. support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian regimes) in Mozambique reflects low levels of elite commitment to democracy. While Mozambique's political elite agreed on the rules for competing for power, they have not yet agreed on ways to enforce limits on state authority. All electoral institutions, including the constitutional council, are controlled by the ruling party reducing the scope of political competition and participation. The entire state authority rest on the president who is both head of state and of government, and the parliament cannot hold the head of government accountable since the constitution allow him to delegate the premier whenever he wants.

Figure 2.4.1: Rejection of military rule in 16 Afrobarometer countries




Figure 2.4.2: Rejection of one-party rule in 16 Afrobarometer countries





Figure 2.4.3: Rejection of one-man rule in 16 Afrobarometer countries



Commitment to democracy composite index

Following previous studies of popular commitment to democracy in Africa (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and Shin, 2005), I have defined commitment to democracy as a popular preference of democracy against its alternatives and a broader

rejection of authoritarianism. However, to make sure that this construct is both valid and reliable I tested it statistically using factor and reliability analyses.⁹ Factor analysis confirms validity, and the reliability analysis confirms internal consistency, that Mozambicans' preference of democracy is strongly related to their rejection of three forms of authoritarian regimes. In other words, we can confidently say that committed democrats are those Mozambicans who say democracy is preferable to any other form of government, and who strongly reject one-party, military and one-man governments. A single unrotated factor was extracted with an eigenvalue greater than one (1.521) which explains 51 percent of the common variance. The index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) is (.65) acceptable. Thus, instead of using popular support for democracy and rejection of the three forms of authoritarian regimes as they were separate attitudes I employ its composite index in further analyses as my main dependent variable.

Table 2.1: Commitment to democracy (index)

	Factor loadings
Reject military rule	.709
Reject one-man rule	.776
Reject one-party rule	.593
Support for democracy	.252

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.521, and common variance of 51 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha =.65. Number of cases (n=1385).

2.2. Procedural versus Substantive Understandings of Democracy

Understandings of democracy refer to the ways that individual views or regard democracy. We distinguish between procedural and substantive understandings of democracy. Substantive understandings of democracy refer to what democracy does in terms of concrete outcomes. It "subscribes a specific content to policy" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005), like improvement of people living standards or alleviation of

⁹ It is to be seen here that committed democrats are only those who strongly reject authoritarian regime. Those who simply reject are partially committed democrats. As such, they are not coded with highest value to compute index of commitment to democracy.

poverty. Procedural understandings are “precisely about the struggle to determine those policies” (Diamond, 2005). They emphasize “political process for arriving at decisions” and “includes guarantees of civil rights and rules for elections, under which uncertain political outcomes arise from interplay of contending political forces” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:69). In short, it refers to what democracy is or ‘as an end in itself’ rather than what it does.


Is democracy understood procedurally or substantively in Mozambique? The measure used in this study differs from the one presented in Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005). While Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) measure understandings of democracy by an open-ended question: “What, if anything, does ‘democracy’ mean to you?” encouraging so respondents to answer in their own words, through a scale of 8 items: 4 procedural and 4 substantive, using Round 1 of the Afrobarometer data, I use Round 2 of the Afrobarometer one, which ask about this issue in a very different manner.¹⁰

Round 2 of the Afrobarometer ask a question that provides respondents with two statements: (1) ‘democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’; or (2) ‘democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs’.

The evidence in Table 2.5 shows that most (61 percent) Mozambicans understand democracy as a set of procedures for arriving at decisions (i.e. ‘democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’). Just under one-fifth (21 percent) of Mozambicans view it substantively (i.e. ‘democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs’). Yet while 32 percent of Frelimo identifies can understand democracy procedurally, 31 percent of independent citizens (those who identify with no political party) and even lower 23 percent of opposition identifies do so.

¹⁰ While my procedural measure only taps the aspect of ‘equal and free voice in making decisions’, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) procedural measure taps a range of liberal procedures of democracy.


Figure 2.5: Understandings of democracy



Question: "Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Statement A or statement B? Statement A: Democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions. Statement B: Democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone's basics needs".

When comparing to results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys in 16 countries, Mozambicans' procedural understanding of democracy is about 11 percentage points higher than the 16 country average (50 percent). While Cape Verdeans (69 percent) and Tanzanians (62 percent) lead the way in understanding democracy 'as a mean that allow everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions', Basotho (30 percent), Zimbabweans (30 percent), Malians (37 percent), Senegalese (37 percent), Batswana (39 percent) and even Ghaneans (44 percent) are less likely to do so (Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.6: Understandings of democracy in 16 Afrobarometer countries



That Mozambicans understand democracy as ‘an end in itself’ might reflect the role played by the enormous information network of voter education campaigns mainly in the 1994 founding elections involving “almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans” (de Maia, 1996). Though the aim of this campaign was “to mobilize the public, first to register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself” (de Maia, 1996:151), the voter education agents first had to explain the meaning of the concept of democracy, that is, what democracy is. This may also reflect the long history of conflict and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution. Supporting this, for instance, are countries that experienced long conflict’s periods and violence, like Nigeria, Namibia and Uganda, and are also quite higher procedural (see Figure 2.6).

Summary of Findings

In this chapter, I examined the patterns of Mozambicans’ understandings of and support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian regimes. I also tested the validity and reliability of the construct of commitment to democracy, which is a multidimensional version that combines the concepts of support for democracy and rejection of one-party, military, and one-man authoritarian rule.

The results revealed that the levels of Mozambicans’ commitment to democracy are not deep. Just a simple majority (54 percent) of Mozambicans support democracy and less than half strongly reject or reject one-man (46 percent) and one-party rule (47 percent). Just over half (56 percent) of them strongly reject or reject military rule. Compared to other African countries these levels of popular commitment to democracy in Mozambique are relatively low.

Factor and reliability analyses of attitudes toward popular support for democracy and rejection of the three forms of authoritarian regimes found that those concepts represent a larger valid and reliable single multi dimension labeled commitment to democracy. It confirms that committed democrats are those Mozambicans who prefer democracy against its alternatives and strongly reject the three forms of authoritarian regimes.

Conversely to their levels of commitment to democracy, Mozambicans' procedural understanding of democracy is relatively high. We observed that most (61 percent) Mozambicans understand democracy procedurally, meaning that 'democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions'. I suggested that this may reflect the role played by the enormous information network in voter education campaigns in the founding multiparty elections in explaining the positive meaning of the concept of democracy. This also may reflect the long history of conflict and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution.

Instead of simply describing the features of these attitudes toward Mozambicans understandings of and commitment to democracy I am also interested in explaining them. This is the goal of the chapters that follow where I will test and examine the effects of levels and sources of information considerations on Mozambicans understandings of and commitment to democracy.

Chapter 3

The Effects of Levels and Sources of Information on Mozambicans' Understandings of and Commitment to Democracy

In this chapter, I begin by examining features of Mozambicans' levels and sources of information. I then statistically model two attitudes to democracy -- understandings of and commitment to democracy -- by testing and examining the effects of levels and sources of information factors against each other. I argue that if government officials are in the process of subverting the quality of democracy, as in Mozambique, then those people who contact them, or are affiliated in their organizations, or who identify with their political party, will be less likely to possess positive attitudes to democracy because the information that they acquire from those intermediaries will be more likely to be detrimental to, or help to breakdown, democracy.

Alternatively people who contact relatively more independent influential persons, identify with opposition parties or who are independent of parties influence or become a member of relatively more independent organizations, will be more likely to understand democracy procedurally rather than substantively and be committed to democracy. The messages that pass through these information intermediaries will be more supportive of democratic consolidation because these organizations will be more likely to demand greater political freedom, accountability, clean and decent government, rule of law and constitutionalism, and respect for democratic procedures.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 examines data on levels of information (formal education and news media use) and cognitive engagement (interpersonal discussion of politics and interest in public affairs). It then explores their bivariate connections with popular understandings of and commitment to democracy, as a first test of the hypotheses.

Section 3.2 examines the data on sources of information. I examine first *state aligned sources of information*, such as identification with the ruling party, contacting officials, local councilors, traditional rulers and other community influential persons, like someone who is relatively wealthier, and membership in trade unions and professional associations. Second, I then examine *independent sources of information*, such as membership in religious and community development groups, contacting religious leaders, participation in collective action and identification with opposition parties. I then explore their bivariate relationships with those two popular attitudes to democracy.

Finally, section 3.3 tests and examines the joint impacts of levels and sources of information, and cognitive engagement factors on public understandings of and commitment to democracy, using multivariate analyses. The last Section then summarizes the chapter findings.

3.1. Levels of Information

Formal education


In Chapter 1, I outlined several aspects of Mozambique's history (namely the Portuguese colonial experience and the 16 years of civil war) that have conspired to leave the country in a very bad situation with regard to formal education.

Since then international donors, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have been supporting the reconstruction of the country's schooling infrastructure, arguing that formal education was essential for the sustainability of democracy and the economy. The country's political parties have also emphasized formal education in their electoral manifestos as key instruments to preserve national unity and establish democracy (Golias, 1996).

After exactly one decade of peace, the 2002 Afrobarometer survey asked Mozambicans: "What is the highest level of education you have completed?"

Figure 3.1 shows distributions of levels of adult formal education.¹¹ Four in ten (42 percent) of all adult Mozambicans that we interviewed lacked formal education. Among those who have some schooling (57 percent), most (40 percent) have only completed primary school. Very small proportions have completed secondary (14 percent) and post-secondary (3 percent) education.

Figure 3.1: Levels of formal education




Question: "What is the highest level of education you have completed?"

In comparison to results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys in 16 countries, Mozambicans' access to formal education is about 23 percentage points lower than the 16 country average (80 percent). Mozambicans possesses some of the lowest levels of formal education in the sub Sahara African continent, but the levels of formal education of Malians (42 percent) and Senegalese (31 percent) are much worse.

¹¹ The 'no schooling' figure combines the absence of formal education with informal education, including Koran schooling; 'post-secondary education' combines post-secondary qualification with other than university, some university, university completed, and post-graduation. 'Primary education' combines some years of primary and completed primary education; and secondary education also combines some years of secondary and completed secondary education.

Figure 3.2: Levels of formal education in 16 Afrobarometer countries



To what extent does formal education contribute to understanding democracy procedurally and commitment to democracy in Mozambique?

If high levels of information considerations enhance democracy, as argued in chapter 1, then the few Mozambicans with higher levels of formal education should be more likely to understand democracy procedurally, and be committed democrats. As a first test of this hypothesis I analyze the bivariate correlations between information considerations and attitudes to democracy.¹²

The data shows that formal education has a statistically insignificant effect on procedural understandings of democracy (Pearson's $r=.046$), suggesting that people with formal education are equally likely to see democracy as a set of procedures or substantive outcomes. However, there is very strong relationship between formal education and commitment to democracy (Person's $r=.312^{**}$), meaning those with access to formal

¹² The full results of the bivariate correlations are attached in Appendix E, but a brief summary will help to guide the reader. The Appendix E presents Pearson's correlation coefficients and asteristic (*) is the respective measure of fit. Two asteristics means that the correlation is significant at the .01 level ($p < .01$), whereas one asteristic suggests that correlation is significant at the .05 level ($p < .05$).

education are more likely to be committed democrats compared to those with no formal education.

Mass media consumption

Since Mozambique embraced multi-party politics in 1994, the winds of change have increased mass media pluralism to the extent that the country now enjoys several private or independent daily and weekly newspapers, FM radio stations, and to a lesser extent television stations. Data from the state Information Office (*Gabinete de Informação – GABINFO*) collected by Macuane (2006) show significant increases of radio and television stations registrations in the late 1990s with the entrance of independent televisions (including RTK (now TVK), *Miramar* Television, Portuguese Radio-Television for (Lusophone) Africa (*RTPAfrica*), *Soico* Television (*STV*), and 9TV). It should be noted that all these television stations also have their own radio stations.

With regard to print media, the Information Office registered 178 publications (Macuane, 2006:135) in 2005. Among them, 42 have significant levels of circulation, including the state owned daily newspapers *Diário de Moçambique* and *Notícias*, and the weekly newspaper *Domingo* and monthly magazine *Tempo*. It also includes the private or independent newspapers, such as internet or fax diaries *Mediafax*, *Vertical*, *Correio da Manhã*, *Imparcial*, *Diário de Notícias*, *Canal de Moçambique*, etc; and the weekly *Savana*, *Zambeze*, *Demos*, *Embondeiro*, *O País*, etc.

But how many people have access to, or use this newly diversified range of media news outlets? In order to answer this, Afrobarometer asked Mozambicans: “How often do you get news from radio, television, and newspapers?”


An overwhelming majority (76 percent) of respondents said that they get news from radio on a regular basis,¹³ with more than half (58 percent) getting news ‘everyday’ (Figure

¹³ Regular use is defined as receiving it everyday or a few times a week.

3.2). These findings are consistent with Juarez de Maia who pointed out that the broadcasts of Radio Mozambique and the activities of the Mass Communication Institute (ICS) cover between 70 to 80 percent of the country (de Maia, 1996:155).

However, only two in ten Mozambicans get news from television (26 percent) or newspapers (20 percent), on a regular basis.

Figure 3.3: Media consumption




Question: "How often do you get news from radio, newspaper, and television?"

Breaking down these data by residential location, we find that Maputo city residents are much more likely to obtain news from television, newspapers and radio than all other provinces. In addition, urban residents are more likely to get news from television, newspapers and also radio than rural ones. Urban and rural respondents differ in 29 percent points in getting news from newspapers, 45 percent points in getting news from television, and 17 percent points in getting news from radio, on a regular basis (see Appendix F). This suggests that while radiobroadcasts are to some extent spread across the entire country, television and newspapers are more concentrated in Maputo capital city leaving two-thirds of the country, which is rural, and to lesser extent some provinces without access to these sources of cognitive awareness. This situation also reflects the fact that most of Mozambicans live below the poverty line, so they may not be able to afford television, newspapers or even radio.

When compared to the rest of the Afrobarometer Round 2 survey, Mozambicans' levels of regular use to news from radio lag behind 15 percentage points to the 16 Afrobarometer country average (91 percent), and a regular use of television and newspaper news, respectively, is 24 percentage and 33 percentage points below the 16 Afrobarometer country average (55 percent and 56 percent).

Figure 3.4: Average of media consumption in 16 Afrobarometer countries



Instead of treating these variables (getting news from radio, television, and newspapers) as if they were separate behaviors, I construct a larger composite index and use them in bivariate and multivariate analyses of attitudes to democracy as one single dimension, which I label *media consumption*. Factor and reliability analyses confirm that the responses of getting news from radio, television and newspapers provide a valid and reliable representation of that dimension.¹⁴

Testing the correlation between consuming news media and attitudes to democracy, the evidence shows first as with formal education that news media consumption is not connected with understandings of democracy (Pearson's $r = -.008$), an unexpected finding.


¹⁴ A single unrotated factor was extracted with eigenvalue greater than one (1.659), 66 percent of common explained variance and reliable at .73, number of case (n=1999). The full details of these and other factor and reliability analyses in this study are described in Appendix B.

However, they also show that there is a very strong relationship between news media use and public commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r = .346^{**}$).

Cognitive engagement

Regardless of whether Mozambicans have access to formal education or make use of news media, I look at other alternative sources where people can acquire information necessary for democratic citizenship. Are Mozambicans interested in public affairs and do they actively discuss politics?

Figure 3.5: Interest in Public Affairs




Question: "How interested are you in public affairs?"

The evidence in Figure 3.5 demonstrates that most Mozambicans are interested in public affairs, though relatively few discuss politics with friends or neighbors. More than two-thirds (72 percent) of Mozambicans say they are interested in public affairs, with 35 percent saying very interested. Almost three in ten (28 percent) Mozambicans responded that they were not interested in public affairs.

Compared to other Africans, Figure 3.6 shows that Mozambicans' levels of interest in public affairs (72 percent) are about the same as the Zambians (72 percent), South


Africans (73 percent) and Zimbabweans (73 percent). These levels fall slightly below the Afrobarometer country average (80 percent). While Basothos (92 percent), Ugandans (86 percent) and Batswana (84 percent), and to some extent other Africans are more likely to be interested in public affairs, Malawians are less likely to do so (38 percent).

Figure 3.6: Interest in public affairs in 16 Afrobarometer countries



Beyond formal education and news media use, relevant political information passes also through other alternative social contexts, such as interpersonal discussion of politics. Yet while 72 percent say they are interested in public affairs, just 40 percent say they discussed politics with friends or neighbors in the previous twelve months. While 59 percent say never discussed politics, two in ten (23 percent) say they 'would do it if had a chance' (Figure 3.7).


Figure 3.7: Discussion of politics with friends or neighbors



Question: "Please tell whether you personally have discussed politics with friends or neighbors during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance?"

In comparison to rest of the results from Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 16 countries, Mozambicans lag well behind the 16-country average (61 percent), in terms of interpersonal discussion of politics. Mozambicans are less likely to engage in interpersonal discussion than other Africans. While Nigerians (75 percent) are more likely to discuss politics with friends or neighbors, Senegalese are more likely to engage in interpersonal discussion 'often' (32 percent).

Figure 3.8: Interpersonal discussion of politics in 16 Afrobarometer countries



To what extent is cognitive engagement (discussion of politics and interest in public affairs) associated with democracy?¹⁵ From bivariate correlations, I confirm that both interest in public affairs (Pearson's $r=.078^{**}$) and interpersonal discussion of politics (Pearson's $r=.056^*$) are connected to how people understand democracy. At this stage, I observe that Mozambicans who discuss politics and interest in public affairs are more likely to understand democracy procedurally. I find that Mozambicans who discuss politics (Person's $r=.263^{**}$) and those who are interested in public affairs (Person's $r=.080^{**}$) are also more likely to be committed to democracy.

3.2. Sources of Information

Beyond how much information and interest people possess, I also want to know about the sources of their information and their impacts on attitudes to democracy. As explained in chapter 1, I distinguish between *state aligned sources of information* (including membership in state aligned organizations and identification with the governing party. It also includes contacting state aligned influential persons or leaders) and *independent sources of information* (including membership in relatively more independent groups, participation in collective action, as well as contacting relatively more independent leaders, and identification with opposition parties).

¹⁵ There is insufficient internal consistency between these two variables to combine them in a single construct, labeled cognitive engagement. In fact, variables measuring interest in public affairs and interpersonal discussion of politics correlate with each other at $r=.28^{**}$ with reliability Alpha = .43 (n=1382)


Contacting state aligned versus more independent influential persons

Since the 1990 democratic constitutional provision, Mozambican citizens may take the initiative to contact influential persons or leaders for help to solve a problem or to voice their views. Thus, Afrobarometer asked Mozambicans: 'During the past year, how often have you contacted religious leaders, traditional rulers, officials of government ministries, local councilors and other community influential persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views?'

The results in Figure 3.4 show that "Mozambicans are not necessarily in the habit of using official channels to redress grievances or address public problems" (Pereira et al., 2003). They are more likely to take their problems or voice their views to religious leaders, traditional rulers, and to some extent other community influential persons rather than to address them to officials related to state, especially officials of government ministries and local councilors.

Four in ten (35 percent) and three in ten (34 percent), respectively, say they had contacted a traditional ruler or religious leader, while only 13 percent and 9 percent, respectively, had contacted a local councilor or government ministry official. The proportion of contacting other community influential persons falls in between the former and the latter (19 percent).

Figure 3.9: Contacting state aligned versus more independent influential person




Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views?

I interpret these variances in contact with leaders by the distances that separate respondents from the specific persons. Officials of government ministries are far away from the majority of ordinary Mozambicans, based at the central level, whereas traditional rulers are located at the community and grass root levels. Religious leaders are also very accessible at community levels.

As same as other Africans, Mozambicans are still far away from enjoying the democratic virtues of political participation through contacting influential persons to advance their desired needs. Mozambicans' levels of contacting influential persons are under half and about the same as the 16-country averages. However, in terms of contacting religious leaders, Mozambicans (34 percent) lag relatively behind the Afrobarometer country average (47 percent).

Figure 3.10: Contacting in 16 Afrobarometer countries (average)



As I argued earlier in chapter 1, officials of government ministries, traditional rulers, local councilors and other community influential persons are state aligned,¹⁶ while

¹⁶ I tried to construct an index for contact state aligned influential persons but I did not find their internal consistency though they are valid. In reality, one unrotated factor was extracted with Eigenvalue greater

religious leaders are relatively more independent. What are the effects of contacting these different types of leaders on attitudes to democracy?

If state aligned influential persons subvert and constrain democratic procedures and the quality of democracy, Mozambicans who contact them should be less likely to receive positive signals about democracy. The same logic is applied to membership in state aligned organizations as well as identification with the ruling party.

As an initial test of these hypotheses, the bivariate correlation results show that contacting local councilors is not connected with either understandings of democracy (Pearson's $r=.016$) or commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r=.002$). There is also no relationship between contacting other community influential persons and understandings of democracy (Pearson's $r=-.028$) and commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r=.010$). Contacting traditional rulers have also statistically insignificant effect on people understandings of democracy (Pearson's $r=-.018$) and has a significant negative effect on commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r=-.111^{**}$), indicating confirmation that Mozambicans who contact traditional rulers are less likely to be committed to democracy.

Public understandings of democracy are also not associated with contacting government officials (Pearson's $r=.017$) or religious leaders (Pearson's $r=-.002$). However, there is relationship between contacting government officials or religious leaders and commitment to democracy. Those who contacted government officials (Pearson's $r=.132^{**}$) or to lesser extent religious leaders (Pearson's $r=.072^{**}$) are more likely to be committed democrats.

than one (1.099) which explain 45.349 percent of common variance but is not reliable. Reliability (Alpha) $=.59$. Factor loadings: traditional ruler (.595), some other influential persons (.566), local councilors (.490), and officials of government ministries (.429).


Identification with the ruling party versus with opposition parties

As usual, the ruling party tends to be more conservative while the political opposition tends to be more liberal. For instance, as a Democrat candidate, Bill Clinton campaigned democrat (liberal), but governed conservative. As such, political parties may transmit liberal or conservative values or information to those people who belong or identify to them. Do Mozambicans identify with political parties? And to what extent does their partisanship affect their followers' particular views about democracy? Afrobarometer asked Mozambicans: 'Do you feel close to any political party? If yes, which party?'

The results in Figure 3.11 suggest that most (58 percent) Mozambicans identify with the ruling party Frelimo. Three in ten (35 percent) respondents are independent not identifying with any political party. Just 6 percent identify with opposition parties, including Renamo, Pimo, PCN, Sol and others.

As usual, identification with the ruling party reflects a state aligned source of information while identification with the political opposition represents a relatively more independent source of information.

Figure 3.11: Party Identification



Question: "Do you feel close to any political party? If yes, which party?"

Analyzing the effects of identification with the ruling party and political opposition, the results show that there is no relationship between partisan identification and understandings of democracy.¹⁷ Nonetheless, partisan identification matter for popular commitment to democracy. People who identify with opposition parties (Pearson's $r=.107^{**}$) and to lesser extent identify with the ruling party (Pearson's $r=.067^*$) are more likely to be committed to democracy than those who do not feel close to any party.

Membership in state aligned versus in independent groups

Moving to other informational environments where people may obtain information about public affairs, I examine associational life *in state aligned organizations*, especially trade unions or farm associations and professional or business associations, and *in relatively more independent organizations*, particularly religious groups and community development or self help associations.

Associational life is a key element of the process of democratization, “creating not only private goods for those who belong to them, but also public goods for the entire society by developing organizational and advocacy skills, creating a form to discussing public affairs and acting as watchdog over elected leaders” (Pereira et al., 2003:8).


With the exception of membership in religious groups, I observe that “Mozambicans have not yet appeared to have taken advantage of the freedom of association to create or join civic associations in large numbers” (Pereira et al., 2003). While close to two-thirds (66 percent) belong to a religious group, with four in ten (44 percent) saying that they are an official leader or an active member, only two in ten (18 percent) are members of a trade union or farm association, and just one in ten (10 percent) are a member of a

¹⁷ The Pearson's correlation between identification with the ruling party and understandings of democracy is .032 while between identification with opposition parties and understandings of democracy is -.002.

professional or business association, and a community development or self help organization (see Figure 3.12).

Does group membership in state aligned or relatively more independent organizations affects attitudes to democracy in Mozambique?¹⁸

Figure 3.12: Membership in state aligned versus more independent groups



Question: Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member?

The results show first that membership in state aligned organizations tends to make people to see democracy not procedurally. Affiliations in state aligned or farm associations (Pearson's $r = -.070^{**}$) and in professional or business organizations (Pearson's $r = -.060^{*}$) have statistically significant correlations, but are negatively associated with procedural understandings of democracy, as expected. Turning to popular commitment to democracy, the results show that while membership in professional or

¹⁸ I tried to combine and group statistically these attitudes to form larger constructs but there is no internal consistency between them. Indeed, variables measuring membership in trade unions or farm associations and in professional or business organizations correlate with each other at $r = .279^{**}$ with reliability Alpha = .4299 (n=1396). Variables measuring membership in religious group and community or self help organizations correlate to each other at $r = .113^{**}$ with reliability Alpha = .1778 (n=1396).

business organizations are not connected with commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r=.012$), membership in trade unions or farm associations is statistically significant and negatively associated with commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r=-.065^*$), confirming that those who belong to trade unions or farm associations are less likely to be committed to democracy.

Second, they show that membership in relatively more independent organizations is not associated with understandings of democracy. The impacts of affiliation in religious groups (Pearson's $r=.041$) and in community development or self help associations (Pearson's $r=-.015$) on understandings of democracy are statistically insignificant. And membership in community development or self help associations is also not related to commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r=.003$). However, people who belong to religious groups are more likely to be committed democrats (Pearson's $r=.067^*$).


Political participation in collective action

Political participation refers to “legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly or indirectly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and the actions they take” (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). The underlying assumption is that people behave pragmatically, that is they take political actions and choose channels of representation on the basis of what works best.

Voting is a well known form of political participation, however, there are other forms of participation apart from voting, such as campaigning and contacting (see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:261-65). While voting is directly related to express partisan preferences during election periods, these other forms of political participation occur before and between elections. In this study, I consider the patterns of forms of political participation in legal activities through various forms of collective action like attending a community meeting, attending a demonstration or protest march, and getting together with others to raise an issue.

When asked whether Mozambicans had attended a community meeting, got together with others to raise an issue, or attended a demonstration or protest march during the past year, six in ten (64 percent) said that they had attended a community meeting, three in ten (26 percent) had got together with others to raise an issue, and two in ten (15 percent) had attended a demonstration or protest march (Figure 3.13).

Figure 3.13: Political participation in collective action



Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had a chance?

I combined the answer to these questions about political participation in a larger valid and reliable single dimension labeled collective action.¹⁹ This reflects a common set of efforts that citizens undertake to organize themselves to influence political officials.

I use this larger construct, that is, collective action instead of the separate behaviors in the bivariate and multivariate analyses. The bivariate results show that collective action and understandings of democracy are not at all correlated (Pearson's $r=.047$), but Mozambicans who participate in collective action are more likely to be committed democrats (Pearson's $r=.184^{**}$).

¹⁹ (See full details in Appendix B of how the composite index of those attitudes was constructed using factor and reliability analyses).

3.3. Multivariate Effects

I have now summarized the various levels and sources of information that Mozambicans use, and the bivariate associations of these and attitudes to democracy. However, I now want to examine the simultaneous impact of all these taken together. By employing bivariate analysis we observed that interpersonal discussion of politics, formal education, media consumption and collective action, for instance, were associated with commitment to democracy. But this could not tell us which one matters more than the others. Thus, I test all information factors so far considered in this chapter against each other in a multivariate analysis on attitudes to democracy.

Table 3.1 presents a multiple linear regression model that separately tests the impacts of levels and sources of information on two attitudes to democracy, understandings of democracy and commitment to democracy. The first and second column under each dependent variable contains the standardized regression coefficients (Beta). The levels of significance are in parentheses. I have highlighted all effects that are statistically significant, which indicates that the null hypothesis (which states that there is no relationship between the two variables) can be rejected.

The negative or positive sign in each coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Non-significant effects means that the two variables are not at all connected. In the last rows I present the sample size (n) and the total explained variance (Adjusted R Square) of the model on each dependent variable.

The evidence shows that Mozambicans who identify with political opposition and with the ruling party, belong to religious groups, and who are interested in public affairs are more likely to understand democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’, with the effect of partisan identification with political opposition weighting more. On other hand, those who have access to news media, belong to trade unions or farm associations are less likely to understand

democracy procedurally. In other words, they are more likely to understand democracy substantively (e.g. ‘democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs’). However, the overall ‘informational’ model has only limited power, explaining only 2 percent of the total variance in understandings of democracy.

Table 3.1: The effects of levels and sources of information and cognitive engagement on attitudes to democracy (multivariate linear regression)

	Procedural understandings of democracy	Commitment to democracy
(Constant)	(.000)	(.047)
Levels of information		
Media usage	-.082(.018)	.198(.000)
Formal education	.043(.223)	.127(.000)
Cognitive engagement		
Interpersonal discussion of politics	.031(.377)	.116(.000)
Interest in public affairs	.063(.031)	-.031(.250)
Independent sources of information		
Membership in religious groups	.056(.049)	.055 (.036)
Membership in community development associations	-.007(.827)	.014 (.632)
Contacting religious leaders	-.016(.630)	.074 (.017)
Collective action	.021(.538)	.073(.017)
Identification with opposition parties	.157(.015)	.105(.073)
State aligned sources of information		
Membership in trade unions	-.068(.024)	-.052 (.060)
Membership in business groups	-.053(.091)	-.018 (.538)
Contacting local councilors	.006(.852)	-.025(.381)
Contacting officials of government ministries	.023(.457)	.065(.023)
Contacting traditional rulers	-.012(.728)	-.102 (.001)
Contacting other community influentials	-.020(.529)	-.008(.769)
Identification with the ruling party	.156(.015)	.048(.413)
N	1400	1400
Adjusted R Square	.015	.183

Note: The table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant impacts are highlighted in bold.

With respect to sources of information, the effects of identification with opposition parties, membership in religious groups and in trade unions or farm associations are consistent with my hypothesis, since their effects are statistically significant and with right sign. The effects of participation in collective action, membership in business

organizations, and contacting traditional rulers and other community influential persons are also consistent with my hypothesis since their effects have right sign but are statistically insignificant. Inconsistent with my hypothesis is the effect of identification with the ruling party among those effects that are statistically significant and with opposite sign, while inconsistent among those effects that have opposite sign but are statistically insignificant are the effect of membership in community development associations and contacting religious leaders, local councilors and government officials.

Turning to the second column, the results show that popular commitment to democracy in Mozambique is propelled by news media use, access to formal education, interpersonal discussion of politics, contacting religious leaders and officials of government ministries, and membership in religious groups. However, the consumption of news media has the greatest impact. On the other hand, contacting traditional rulers detracts from commitment to democracy.

Informational factors are able to account for more variance in commitment to democracy than understandings of democracy. Overall, this informational model accounts for roughly 18 percent of total explained variance in commitment to democracy.

With regard to sources of information, the impacts of membership in religious groups, contacting religious leaders and traditional rulers and participation in collective action are consistent with my hypothesis, since their impacts have right sign and are statistically significant. The impact of membership in community development organizations, business groups and trade unions, contacting local councilors and other community influential persons, and identification with the opposition parties are also consistent with my propositions, but their impacts are statistically insignificant. While the effect of contacting government officials is inconsistent with my hypothesis, since its effect has opposite sign and is statistically significant, the effect of identification with the ruling party is inconsistent but its impact is statistically insignificant.

Summary of Findings

I summarize the abovementioned findings as follows. I found, as unexpected, that there is no positive relationship between news media consumption and procedural understanding of democracy. On other hand, partisan identification with the ruling party and interest in public affairs appeared to be connected to procedural understanding of democracy, as also unexpected finding. I did not find any explanation for this. I cannot confidently say, for instance, that the negative effect of news media use on procedural understanding of democracy reflects the fact that most of the country bigger media are state aligned because on the other side, we observed that media consumption contribute positively on commitment to democracy. Maybe this specific aspect needs to be captured by qualitative analysis. The same I say with respect to the positive effect of identification with Frelimo party.

As expected, it was confirmed that Mozambicans who identify with opposition parties and belong to relatively more independent groups, such as religious groups, are more likely to understand democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’.

With respect to commitment to democracy, as unexpected, we observed that contacting officials of government ministries was connected with popular commitment to democracy. Explanation to this may also be captured via qualitative analysis. On other hand, as expected finding, it was confirmed that people with high levels of information (from news media use and access to formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors, and who obtain their information from relatively more independent sources (like contacting religious leaders, participate in collective actions or belong to religious groups) are more likely to be committed democrats than respondents who obtain their information from sources that subvert the quality of democracy, that is aligned to the Mozambican state (such as contacting traditional rulers). Those who contact traditional rulers are less likely to be committed to democracy, as expected.

Chapter 4

The Basis of Mozambicans' Commitment to Democracy

Improving democratic performance has been cited by many scholars as key to its consolidation. However, these scholars differ in the relative emphases they place on the nature of the performance. 'First generation' scholars emphasized economic performance factors, arguing that democratic regimes will be more likely to endure if they produce and broadly distribute improvements in living standards (Przeworski, 1991; Pereira, Maraval and Przeworski, 1993; Przeworski et al., 1996). In the African context, Claude Ake argued that "the democratic movement in Africa will emphasize concrete economic and social rights rather than abstract political rights" since "Africans are seeking democracy as a matter of survival" (Ake, 1996:239-44).

On the other hand, 'second generation' researchers focused on the role of political performance factors (Evan and Whitefield, 1995; Diamond, 1997; Rose, Mishler and Haepfer, 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001), suggesting that "public assessments of democracy do not only involve the handling of the economy. How democratic governments meet expectations for public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism may be no less important, or even more so" (Diamond, 1997:20). In fact, Evans and Whitefield have observed that "although both political and economic factors are found to be significant, multivariate analysis indicate that political experience is of greater weight than is economic" (Evans and Whitefield, 1995). Similarly, Rose, Mishler and Haepfer (1998) found that whereas economic factors do contribute for legitimation, politics matter more.

Beyond the impact of levels and sources of information I ask whether people base their commitment to democracy on economic or political performance evaluations. I also ask whether the impact of levels and sources of information remains once we consider effects of performance evaluations and understandings of democracy.

In this chapter, I examine first the patterns of political and economic evaluations of political leaders and regimes performance in Mozambique. Second, I test and examine their bivariate effects on popular commitment to democracy. I then explore Mozambicans' commitment to democracy by testing and examining the effects of political and economic performance evaluations controlling for cognition (levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement and understandings of democracy), employing multivariate regression analysis.

4.1. Economic Factors

The Afrobarometer measured evaluations of economic performance with questions asking people how well Mozambican government managed the economy, kept prices stable, created jobs, and narrowed gaps between rich and poor, whether the process of economic reform has resulted in greater availability of goods, jobs opportunities, or raised people standards of living. It also asked people for their present, relative, retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national economy and personal living conditions.

Government handling economy


Since the advent of Mozambique's World Bank and International Monetary Fund supported structural adjustment programme in 1987 and 1990,²⁰ the country has begun collecting the gains of market reform mainly through increased external investment,²¹ hitting double digits (12) of economic growth in 1998. Over the same period, the country has also been adopting policies to control inflation. However, though the annual

²⁰ In 1987 the structural adjustment programme was known as Economic Recovery Programme (*Programa de Restituição Económica – PRE*), and in 1990 it introduced its social component and so-called Social and Economic Recovery Programme (*Programa de Reabilitação Económica e Social - PRES*) (Castel-Branco, 1996).

²¹ Mozal – Mozambique smelter aluminum has been cited as the engine for higher economic growth (Pereira et al., 2003).

Economic and Social Plan (*Plano Económico e Social*) has targeted holding inflation to single digit, it has never succeeded in doing so. Objective economic performance assessments of “experts”, such as the Bertelsmann index describe Mozambique as a ‘market-based democracy with deficiencies’ with economic management described as ‘successful with weaknesses’.²² But are these macro-economic gains (as referred by GDP growth) reflected at the micro-level in terms of improvement of people’s living standards? Assuming that “citizens opinions are ultimately what matter most in terms of the feasibility of the democratic project” (Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005), I test economic performance using public opinion perceptions.

Figure 4.1: Government handling economy



Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?"

Less than half (46 percent) of Mozambicans⁷ said that the government is managing the economy well. And two-thirds said that government was handling job creation (68 percent) and keeping prices stable (71 percent) badly. In addition, six in ten (59 percent) voted government performance narrowing gaps between rich and poor as bad (Figure 4.1).

²² The Bertelsmann Transformation Status and Management Indexes for 2006: The status Index result represents the mean value of political and economic transformations. The management index evaluates managements by political decisions makers while taking into consideration the level of difficulty. www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de

These separate attitudes toward government handling of economic matters represent a valid and reliable single dimension,²³ which is used in further analyses.


Testing the relationship between evaluations of government handling of the economy and public commitment to democracy I find that this economic factor does not contribute positively to Mozambicans' commitment to democracy. In fact, there is a statistically significant and strongly negative effect between evaluations of government handling of the economy and popular commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r = -.227^{**}$). At this stage, it appears that the more positive Mozambicans evaluation of the government economic performance the less they are committed to democracy.

Evaluations of economic reform

In order to test public evaluations of the effects of the larger economic reform process, the Afrobarometer asked people whether their standard of living, the availability of goods, and jobs opportunities were better or worse than a few years before. We observe in Figure 4.2 that the proportion of respondents saying that the availability of jobs opportunities is worse or much worse is far higher (59 percent) than for their living standards (29 percent) or the availability of goods (21 percent).

²³ Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor with eigenvalue greater than one (1.714) which explains 56 percent of the common variance. Reliability analysis Cronbach's Alpha index is high (.7317) and acceptable. Number of cases (n=1400) (for full details of factor and reliability analyses see Appendix B).

Figure 4.2: Evaluations of economic reform



Question: "Tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they use to be, or about the same?"

These economic performance evaluation attitudes can be combined in a valid and reliable representation of a single dimension labeled delivery of economic welfare, which can be used in bivariate and multivariate analyses, instead of using those separate attitudes.²⁴

When correlated with popular commitment to democracy we find that evaluations of economic reform have significant and positive effects (Pearson's $r = .125^{**}$), suggesting that economic factors, especially experiences of economic reform matters for democratic legitimacy.

Economic evaluations

The Afrobarometer also asked people to evaluate the national economy and personal living conditions. Generally speaking, Mozambicans' evaluations of the national economy are more positive than of their personal living conditions.

²⁴ A single unrotated factor was extracted with eigenvalue greater than one (1.396), which explains 60.731 percent of the common variance, and it is sufficiently reliable (.6657). Number of cases ($n=1,395$).

Prospective economic evaluations show that more than half (54 percent) Mozambicans expect that the national economic condition will improve over the next twelve months while just under half (47 percent) expect that their living conditions will be good in twelve months time. However, this is not a really big difference.

With respect to retrospective economic evaluations, just under half (46 percent) think that the country economic condition improved over the past twelve months ago; on other hand, just four in ten (38 percent) said their personal living conditions improved over the past twelve months.

Regarding present economic evaluations, 50 percent and 37 percent, respectively, vote the present national economic condition and personal living conditions as good.

Table 4.1: Economic evaluations

	Good/better
Retrospective economic evaluations[^]	
National economic conditions	46
Personal living conditions	38
Prospective economic evaluations^{^^}	
National economic conditions	54
Personal living conditions	47
Present economic evaluations^{^^^}	
National economic conditions	50
Personal living conditions	37
Relative economic evaluations^{^^^^}	
Country econ. conditions vs. other neighbor countries	35
Personal living conditions vs. other Mozambicans	31

[^] Question: “Looking back, 1) how do you rate the economic condition in this country, and 2) your living conditions, compared to twelve months ago?”

^{^^} Question: Looking ahead, do you expect 1) the economic conditions in this country, and 2) your living conditions, in twelve months time to be better or worse?”

^{^^^} Question: “In general, how would you describe 1) the present economic condition of this country, and 2) your own present living conditions?”

^{^^^^} Question: “In general how do you rate 1) the economic condition in this country compared to those in neighboring countries and 2) your living conditions compared to of other Mozambicans?”

Finally, with regard to relative economic evaluations, Mozambicans are more likely to see greater positive economic conditions in other countries (compared to Mozambique) or other ethnic groups (compared to their own). Indeed, just 35 percent and 31 percent perceive that the country economic condition compared to those in neighboring countries and personal living conditions compared to those of other Mozambicans are good, respectively.

Each group of these economic evaluations was combined in a specific valid and reliable construct, which is used in bivariate and multivariate analyses.²⁵ What are the effects of these economic evaluations? Do they contribute to public commitment to democracy?

Among the above mentioned factors, only present economic evaluations of government performance (Pearson's $r = -.106^{**}$) and relative economic evaluations (Pearson's $r = -.111^{**}$) have statistically significant effects, but their effects are negative. These signify that Mozambicans who are satisfied with current national and personal economic conditions as well as those who think that they are better than others are less likely to support democracy and reject authoritarian rule. The lack of statistical significance in prospective (Pearson's $r = .036$) and retrospective (Pearson's $r = .053$) economic evaluations indicates that they are not related to popular commitment to democracy in Mozambican context.

4.2. Political Factors

The Afrobarometer measured political performance evaluations by asking people about a range of factors, including performance of political incumbents (the president, the

²⁵ Variables measuring the present country economic condition and personal living conditions correlate with each other at $r = .469^{**}$ with a reliability of $\text{Alpha} = .64$ ($n = 1393$). Variables measuring the country economic condition and personal living conditions compared to others correlate to each other at $r = .45^{**}$ with a reliability $\text{Alpha} = .62$ ($n = 1395$). Variables measuring retrospective country economic condition and personal living conditions correlate to each other at $r = .511^{**}$ with a reliability $\text{Alpha} = .665$ ($n = 1386$). Variables measuring prospective country economic condition and personal living conditions correlate each other at $r = .59^{**}$ with a reliability $\text{Alpha} = .74$ ($n = 1396$).


member of parliament and the local mayor), levels of official corruption, and whether the current regime is delivering more political rights (including freedom to say what you think, to join any political organization you want, from false arrest when you are innocent, to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, the ability of ordinary people to influence what government does, and safety from crime or violence) than the previous one-party regime.

Delivery of political rights

After centuries of colonial domination, the movement that liberated Mozambique in 1975 established a system of government that did not deliver liberties even though they were broadly promised. The Frelimo communist party-state system in Mozambique was repressive and coercive. Comparing the current multiparty regime with the former, how do Mozambicans evaluate the delivery of political rights by the current multiparty regime compared to the former Frelimo communist party-state regime?

The data indicate that Mozambicans say that the delivery of political rights is better or much better in the democratic government than the old one-party regime. Overwhelming majorities of 78 percent, 77 percent and 76 percent respectively say that the freedom to say what you think, choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, and to join any political organization are better or much better under the current regime than the old one. In addition, five in ten also felt that the ability of ordinary people to influence government (54 percent) and the freedom from false arrest (55 percent) is better or much better. However, just under half (41 percent) felt that safety from crime or violence is better or much better in the multiparty regime compared to the former Frelimo communist party-state system (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Delivery of political rights



Question: "Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be or about the same?"

I constructed a valid and reliable dimension of the delivery of political rights by creating composite index of the items just reviewed,²⁶ with the exception of safety from crime or violence.

When these political factors are tested in bivariate model, safety from crime or violence has a statistically significant but negative effect on public commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r = -.202^{**}$). On the other hand, the larger construct delivery of political rights is not only statistically significant but also positively correlated to popular attitudes to democracy (Pearson's $r = .185^{**}$): the more Mozambicans perceive that the basket of political rights is improving, the more likely they come to become committed to democracy. However, the evidence suggests that Mozambicans do not see their own personal safety as part of that same basket. In fact, it even suggests that those who feel safer now than under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of democracy.

²⁶ A single unrotated factor was extracted with eigenvalue greater than one (2.296) and common explained variance of 56 percent and reliable at .796. Number of case (n=1400).

Perceived official corruption

Corruption has become a highly visible issue in Mozambique involving alleged “untouchables” of governing party elite related to the murder of investigative journalist in 2000 and a senior official of the Central Bank in 2001, both investigating corruption cases. While for the first case Mozambicans saw on television a live trial of an “untouchable,”²⁷ the trial for the second case had not yet occurred. In addition, the police together with guards from the justice sector are responsible for releasing many criminals especially the assassin of investigative journalist in 2000 from the maximum security prison.

Besides that, corruption penetrates many other civil services. Corruption among teachers and school administrators is perpetrated by people seeking favors or obtaining a place at school or to pass exams, while amongst border officials it involves attempts to import and export goods, especially alcohol.

Expert opinion, in the form of the Transparency International, locates Mozambique as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2006; Mediafax of November 15, 2006). Similarly, the World Bank corruption score for 2005 is low (31),²⁸ suggesting high levels of corruption.


The Afrobarometer question on corruption defines it as a situation “where those in government and the civil service take money or gifts from the people and use it for themselves, or expect people to pay extra money or a gift to do their job” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Subjective perceptions from the Afrobarometer survey data reveal that corruption is seen as highest among border officials (34 percent), the police (33 percent), and teachers and school administrators (25 percent), (see Figure 4.4).

²⁷ One of the killers implicated the son of the former President, Joaquim Chissano, as the one who asked and paid them to execute the journalist.

²⁸ The World Bank score on corruption range on scale of 1 to 100, where close to 100 means less corrupt. www.worldbank.org

Mozambicans perceive that the president and officials in his office are less corrupt (13 percent).

Figure 4.4: Perceived official corruption



Question: "How many of the following do you think are involved in corruption?"

Similar to other factors used in this study, attitudes toward corruption were combined in one single valid and reliable dimension, which is labeled perceived official corruption.²⁹


Perceptions of official corruption (Pearson's $r = .158^{**}$) are positively and moderately strongly connected to Mozambicans' commitment to democracy, indicating that citizens who perceive high levels of corruption among government officials and civil servants are more likely to be committed to democracy. While political corruption might be expected to increase disgust and disillusionment with democracy, the data suggest just the opposite: that the lack of transparency, of ethics or clean and decent government leads Mozambicans to demand democratic procedures.

²⁹ Factor and reliability analyses offer a valid and reliable single dimension (see results in the attached Appendix B).

Performance of political incumbents

Beyond asking people to compare the previous and current regimes, attitudes toward democracy may also be based on evaluations of current political incumbents (Norris, 1999:17-21). Among political incumbents I include in my analysis the president, the members of parliament and the local mayor. When evaluating their performance, Mozambican public opinion reveals strong optimism. Eight in ten (80 percent) Mozambicans approved or strongly approved the performance of the president over the previous twelve months, six in ten (63 percent) approved or strongly approved the way that the members of the parliament performed their jobs, while exactly half (50 percent) said the same thing about their local mayor.

Figure 4.5: Performance of political incumbents



Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

Factor and reliability analyses show that these three attitudes represent a valid and reliable single dimension,³⁰ labeled performance of political incumbents. Do attitudes toward performance of political leaders enhance public commitment to democracy? The evidence shows that performance of political incumbents is not associated with commitment to democracy (Pearson's $r=.049$), as its effect is not statistically significant.

³⁰ See results attached in the attached appendix B.

4.3. Multiple Effects

All the potential influences on popular commitment to democracy so far considered in the past chapters were included in a multivariate linear regression analysis. Model 1 in Table 4.2 reflects the effects of economic performance evaluations factors on popular commitment to democracy, while Model 2 represents the models of political evaluations.

Analyzing these two models we observe both economic (.109) and political (.110) models account for roughly equal levels of explained variance in commitment to democracy. However, political models account for slightly more variance than economic ones.

Model 3 shows the joint effects of economic and political evaluations factors on popular commitment to democracy. The results show that, with the exception of prospective economic evaluations, all economic and political indicators contribute significantly to commitment to democracy. Government handling economy, delivery of political rights, perceived official corruption, safety from crime or violence and evaluations of economic reform have greater impact on commitment to democracy than present, relative and retrospective economic evaluations and performance of political incumbents. However, the impacts of government handling economy, safety from crime or violence and present and relative economic evaluations are negative.

These findings suggests the following: Mozambicans who think their government is handling the economy well are less likely to be committed to democracy, while those who perceive an improved delivery of political rights (including freedom to say what they think, to join any political organization, to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, freedom from false arrest, and the ability to influence government) are more likely to be committed to democracy.

Mozambicans who perceive improvements in safety from crime or violence under the current multiparty system are less likely to be committed democrats. As argued earlier, this suggests that Mozambicans do not see their own personal safety as part of that same basket. In fact, it even suggests that those who feel safer now than under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of democracy. Those who perceive official corruption are more likely to be committed democrats in Mozambique. They demand decent and clean government, transparency and ethics in governance as well as respect for democratic procedures.

While Mozambicans who perceive economic reform, performance of political incumbents and retrospective economic evaluations positively are much likely to develop democratic commitments, those who perceive that their present and relative economic conditions improved are less likely to be committed democrats.

Overall, to what extent are public orientations to democracy formed by economic and political performance evaluations? The Adjusted R Square shows that economic and political factors explain 18 percent of the variation in commitment to democracy. This suggests an important impact with virtually no difference in the explanatory impact of political versus economic factors.

Model 4 drops the indicators which are statistically insignificant in order to estimate a more accurate Adjusted R Square and develop a more parsimonious model (Kerry, Hall and Kozub, 2003). The results show that with the exception of retrospective and relative economic evaluations, all economic and political considerations maintain the same ranking order and sign. Relative economic evaluations which ranked ahead retrospective economic evaluations under the previous Model 3, now rank behind retrospective economic evaluations under Model 4. When dropped off statistically insignificant effect (prospective economic evaluations) from the analysis, Model 4 account for 17 percent of explained variance in commitment to democracy.

Table 4.2: The effects of performance evaluations on commitment to democracy (multivariate linear regression)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4		
				(significant effects)	Adjusted R Square (block)	Cumulative Adjusted R Square
(Constant)	(.352)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)		
Economic evaluations						
Evaluations of economic reform	.199(.000)		.136 (.000)	.141 (.000)		
Government handling economy	-.260 (.000)		-.219 (.000)	-.216 (.000)		
Present economic evaluations	-.105 (.000)		-.083 (.003)	-.077 (.006)		
Relative economic evaluations	-.103 (.001)		-.085 (.004)	-.080 (.006)		
Retrospective econ. evaluations	.094 (.002)		.085 (.004)	.101 (.000)		
Prospective econ. evaluations	.065 (.034)		.047 (.111)	-		
					.106	.106
Political evaluations						
Delivery of political rights		.220 (.000)	.179 (.000)	.182 (.000)		
Perceived official corruption		.153 (.000)	.144 (.000)	.146 (.000)		
Perform. of political incumbents		.039 (.137)	.052 (.047)	.054 (.038)		
Safety from crime or violence		-.231 (.000)	-.161 (.000)	-.159 (.000)		
					.110	.174
N	1400	1400	1400	1400		
Adjusted R Square	.109	.110	.175	.174		

Note: Table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant effects are highlighted in bold.

To finalize, I find that economic and political performance evaluation considerations do matter to the development of individual democratic commitments. In contrast to the great bulk of the public opinion literature, I find no evidence for the primacy of the political: in Mozambique both politics and economics contribute equally to democratic commitment.

Do the impacts of economic and political performance evaluations remain even after we take cognitive influences into consideration in the analysis? This is the question that I answer in the section that follows.

Adding cognitive factors

Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.3 show the effect of adding cognitive considerations (levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement and understandings of democracy) to our multivariate account of commitment to democracy. While Model 1 shows the effects of all cognitive and performance evaluation indicators, Model 2 drops all statistically insignificant indicators to obtain a more accurate estimate of Adjusted R Square and a more parsimonious model.

The evidence shows that even after accounting for economic and political performance evaluations, we continue to observe that Mozambicans with high levels of information (from news media use and access to formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors, and who obtain their information from relatively more independent sources (like participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed to democracy than those who obtain their information from state aligned sources (particularly contacting traditional rulers) (Model 1 in Table 4.3). However, those Mozambicans who are interested in public affairs are less likely to be committed democrats.

Table 4.3: The effects of performance evaluations and cognition on commitment to democracy (multivariate linear regression)

	Model 1		Model 2	
			Sig. effects	Adj. R ² (block) Adj. R ² (Cumulative)
(Constant)	(.265)			
Economic evaluations				
Evaluations of economic reform	.098 (.000)	.110 (.000)		
Government handling economy	-.209 (.000)	-.219 (.000)		
Present economic evaluations	-.033 (.241)	-		
Relative economic evaluations	-.039 (.179)	-		
Retrospective econ. evaluations	.057 (.055)	-		
Prospective economic evaluations	.017 (.582)	-		
			.086	.085
Political evaluations				
Delivery of political rights	.115 (.000)	.122 (.000)		
Perceived official corruption	.094 (.000)	.081 (.001)		
Perform. of political incumbents	.015 (.585)	-		
Safety from crime or violence	-.068 (.013)	-.086 (.001)		
			.111	.156
Levels of information				
Media usage	.168 (.000)	.173 (.000)		
Formal education	.068 (.031)	.088 (.000)		
			.138	.226
Cognitive engagement				
Interpersonal discussion of politics	.093 (.003)	.103 (.001)		
Interest in public affairs	-.054 (.040)	-.050 (.044)		
			.067	.241
Independent sources of information				
Membership in religious groups	.020 (.442)	-		
Memb. in community. devel. assoc.	.022 (.434)	-		
Contacting religious leaders	.065 (.031)	.071 (.010)		
Collective action	.075 (.012)	.066 (.020)		
Identification w/ opposition parties	.081 (.153)	-		
			.035	.244
State aligned sources of information				
Membership in trade unions	-.039 (.147)	-		
Membership in business groups	.002 (.956)	-		
Contacting local councilors	-.039 (.147)	-		
Contacting government officials	.049 (.089)	-		
Contacting traditional ruler	-.094 (.004)	-.093 (.001)		
Cont. other community influentials	-.001 (.962)	-		
Identification with the ruling party	.004 (.434)	-		
			.012	.249
Procedural unders. of democracy	.073 (.004)	.079 (.001)		
			.015	.255
Adjusted R Square	.257	.255		

Note: Table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant effects are highlighted in bold (n=1400).

Lastly the evidence shows that understanding democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone an equal and free voice in making decisions’ or ‘as an end in itself’ matter positively for popular commitment to democracy, compared to seeing it ‘as a mean to other ends’, like socio-economic development. In fact, the more people understand, view or regard democracy procedurally, the more they become committed to democracy.

Taken together, political and economic performance evaluations and cognitive factors explain 26 percent of variance in public commitment to democracy. This explained variance drops very little when statistically insignificant effects are removed in Model 2. In fact, most of the statistically significant effects increase when irrelevant effects are removed from the analysis. Government handling economy ranks ahead all other indicators, suggesting the greatest impact. Media use ranks behind government handling economy followed by delivery of political rights, evaluations of economic reform and interpersonal discussion of politics. Contacting traditional rulers, ranks behind interpersonal discussion of politics followed by formal education, safety from crime, perceived official corruption, procedural understandings of democracy, contacting religious leaders, participation in collective action and interest in public affairs.

To what extent does each theoretical family explain public commitment to democracy? Weighting the explanatory power of each model in the analysis, the results suggest that Mozambicans’ commitment to democracy is principally explained by levels of information from news media use and formal education, followed by political performance evaluations (delivery of political rights, official corruption and safety from crime). I now find moderate consistency with the literature that although economic performance factors contribute to the legitimacy of democracy, political performance factors matter more. While economic performance and cognitive engagement factors explain commitment to democracy moderately, obtaining information from state aligned

and relatively more independent sources and understandings of democracy have weaker, though significant, effects (see middle column of Model 2 in Table 4.3).

Summary of Findings

In this chapter I first hypothesized that popular commitment to democracy is based on evaluations of political rather than economic performance, and second that Mozambicans who have high levels of information and obtain their information from relatively more independent sources are more likely to be committed to democracy. Third, I proposed that people who understand democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’ are also more likely to be committed democrats.

I find that economic and political performance evaluation considerations do matter to development of democratic commitments but political factors matter more when tested simultaneously against competing explanations based on economic performance evaluations, cognitive engagement, independent versus state aligned sources of information and understandings of democracy. Government handling of the economy has the greatest significant impact on support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian regimes, but it is negative. However, delivery of political rights contributes significantly and is positively associated with commitment to democracy. It ranks behind only government handling of the economy. I also find that safety from crime, perception of official corruption, evaluations of economic reform, retrospective, relative and present economic evaluations as well as performance of political incumbents are relevant for commitment to democracy, but safety from crime, and relative and present economic conditions have negative impacts.

Adding cognitive considerations, I reconfirm that Mozambicans who have high levels of information (like news media use and access to formal education) and obtain their information from relatively more independent, critical sources (such as participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed to

democracy than those who obtain their information from sources that subvert and constrain democratic procedures and the quality of democracy (like contacting traditional rulers). However, while those Mozambicans who discuss politics are also more likely to be committed to democracy, those who are interested in public affairs are less likely to do so. Nevertheless, contacting government officials is relevant and associated with commitment to democracy positively, as unexpected.

In addition, I also confirm, as expected, that people who understand democracy as a set of procedures that 'allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions' are more likely to be committed to democracy than those who view, regard or understand democracy 'as a means to other ends' like alleviation of poverty, improvement of people standard of living or socio-economic development.

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Chapter 5

Conclusions

I conclude this dissertation summarizing the features of two attitudes toward democracy: understandings of and commitment to democracy (e.g. support for democracy and rejection of one-party, military and one-man rule) and the main findings, discussing the study findings, drawing theoretical and political implications of the findings as well as pointing some strategies of social change. My findings are based on a micro-level analysis of a cross-sectional design randomly selected representative sample survey of 1400 adult Mozambican population from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer, collected through personal interview in August and October 2002.

My main findings are as follows. First, levels of information models are the main source of popular commitment to democracy when taken into account simultaneously competing explanations based on economic and political performance evaluations, cognitive engagement, independent versus state aligned sources of information and understandings of democracy models. Second, both evaluations of economic and political performance matter for Mozambicans' commitment to democracy. Third, the effects of political performance matter more than economics. Fourth, people who have high levels of information (from news media use and formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors and obtain their information from more independent sources (such as participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed democrats. Fifth, procedural understandings of democracy are positively relevant for individual commitment to democracy.

**Popular understandings of and commitment to democracy:
Mozambicans in comparative perspective**

This study makes clear that ordinary Mozambicans are less committed to democracy than many other Africans from 16 Afrobarometer countries observed between 2002 and 2004. We observed moderate levels of support for democracy (54 percent) and rejection of military rule (56 percent), and weak rejection of one-party (46 percent) and one-man rule (47 percent). These low levels of mass public commitment to democracy reflect low levels of elite commitments to democracy. While the Mozambican political elite agree on the rules for competing for power they do not yet enforce limits on state authority.

All electoral institutions, including the constitutional council judiciary, are controlled by the ruling party reducing the scope of political competition and participation. The entire state authority rests on the president who is both head of state and of government, and the parliament cannot hold the head of government accountable since the constitution allows him to appoint or fire the premier whenever he wants. The political implications of these low levels of commitment to democracy at both the elite and mass levels means that democracy will be less likely to survive and consolidate (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1997; Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Diamond, 1999) in Mozambique.

Nevertheless, the data suggests that Mozambicans understand democracy procedurally - e.g. as a set of procedures that 'allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions' (61 percent). The concept of democracy described by Mozambicans is both liberal and participatory, however this measure only taps the single aspect of 'free and equal voice in making decisions' but not a full range of liberal procedures, meaning that further analysis need to includes more comprehensive measures of liberal procedures (including civil liberties and political rights, equality and justice, popular participation, peace and unity). It should be seen, however, that popular understandings of democracy in liberal and procedural terms is by itself not sufficient to qualify the country regime as a 'liberal democracy'. As classified by Diamond (2002), Mozambique is at his best an 'ambiguous' regime. As we saw, legitimacy is shallow and institutions are weak.

Democratic procedures are frequently subverted, civil liberties abused, and elections in some cases are fraudulent and result in violence, especially the 1999 national and 2005 local elections in Montepuez and Mocímboa da Praia.

In comparison to the rest of the 16 Afrobarometer countries, Mozambicans' procedural understandings of democracy rank ahead Southern African countries and in sub Sahara African countries, rank behind Cape Verdeans and Tanzanians. These relatively high levels of procedural understandings of democracy may reflect the role played by an enormous information network of voter education campaigns mainly in the 1994 founding elections involving "almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans" (de Maia, 1996). This campaign was "to mobilize the public, first to register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself" (de Maia, 1996:151), but voter education agents first had to explain the meaning of the concept of democracy. These relatively high levels of procedural understandings of democracy may also reflect the long history of conflict and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution.

Finally, I square these high levels of procedural understandings of democracy with lower levels of actual commitment to democracy by the limited range that the measure of procedural understandings of democracy taps, using Round 2 Afrobarometer survey. If I was able to include a full or range of liberal procedures in the measure of understandings of democracy, I think that the procedural understandings of democracy would fall to the levels of actual commitment to democracy.

Discussion

Casting lights on the influences of levels of information, legitimacy of democracy is significantly and positively propelled by high levels of news media use and of formal education. "Formal education is a catalyst of social change" (Bratton, Mattes and

Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) and news media use prompt policy discussion and enhance “civic consciousness” (Hyden, 2002).

Reflecting the influences of ‘first generation’ scholars (Przeworski, 1991; Pereira, Maraval and Przeworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Przeworski et al., 1996), the study of consolidation of democracy has been dominated by accounts based on the necessity of the democratic regime, and of incumbents and governments to produce positive economic performance. In contrast, weighing the explanatory power of performance models, I find that political performance matters more than economic explanations, and come next after levels of information in the ranking order of explaining political legitimacy. In addition, while economic performance of the government matters, the direction of this impact is negative. On other hand, positive performance in delivery of political rights contributes significantly and positively to democratic commitment. This confirms the ‘second generation’ researchers (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Diamond, 1997; Rose, Mishler and Haepfer, 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001) who have focused on the role of political performance factors, suggesting that “how democratic governments meet expectations for public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism may be no less important, or even more so” (Diamond, 1997).

Safety from crime or violence, official corruption, evaluations of economic reform, retrospective, relative and present economic evaluations and performance of political incumbents also contribute significantly to support for democracy. However, the impacts of safety from crime, and present and relative economic evaluations are negative. The effects of present and relative economic evaluations reconfirm that producing positive economic reform is not a requirement of democratic consolidation. Inconsistent with this theory is the positive effect of evaluations of economic reform and retrospective economic evaluations, which support to lesser extent ‘first generation’ scholars (Przeworski, 1991; Pereira, Maraval and Przeworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Przeworski et al., 1996). The negative effect of the relative safety from crime is inconsistent to my hypothesis, suggesting that ordinary Mozambican citizens do not see their own personal safety as part of that same basket. In fact, it even suggests that those

who feel safer now than under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of democracy.

With respect to the relevance of official corruption, official corruption is to be significantly and negatively related to democracy, because official corruption creates public disgust and disillusionment (Diamond, 1997; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). The effect of official corruption in Mozambique appears to be significantly and positively associated with support for democracy, because political corruption makes people to demand clean and decent government, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and good governance.

The positive stimulus of interpersonal discussion of politics on mass public commitment to democracy is due to the fact that these networks are based on trust and have great coverage (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944). This suggests that individuals not only acquire information through news media or formal education but can also learn from others, where they add their personal experiences to that of others (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Thus, this also means that acquiring information from alternative informal sources also matters for democratic consolidation beyond obtaining information by being taught and, or from formal sources.

Considering the impacts of sources of information, positive attitudes to democracy -- procedural understandings of and commitment to democracy -- are more likely to be transmitted from relatively more independent or non-state controlled sources of information, because the state and or ruling party (i.e. Frelimo) subvert the quality of democracy and democratic procedures.

Conventional views of African politics strongly suggest that Africans support democracy largely on the basis of substantive understandings of democracy (Ake, 1993). However, although 'what democracy does', "its concrete outcomes" or "a specific content to policy" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) are more tangible aspects of democracy, in contrast, I found that "the struggle to determine those policies" (Diamond,

2005) or democratic rules or procedures are what matters positively to building and consolidating democracy.

To finalize, the process of being committed to democracy in Mozambique is shaped by the larger legacies of Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil war, especially its deleterious effects on formal education and news media. Frelimo's communist style party-state system legacy, especially its control over the society means that many Mozambicans obtain their information from sources that subvert democratic procedures. It is from these legacies that Mozambicans collectively learn about democracy or become committed to democracy depending on how democracy performs.³¹

Yet the legitimacy' process is also shaped by the legacies played by an enormous information network of voter education campaigns in the 1994 founding elections involving "almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans" (de Maia, 1996) in explaining them the meaning of the concept of democracy as well as the long history of conflicts that were key to see or understand democracy procedurally. However, this type of conclusions may be more salient when tested and captured in cross-national (comparative) perspective (see Gunther, R. and Mughan, A. 2000).

³¹ The notion of "collective" learning point to historical periods effects that impart a set of common lessons across all people in a country regardless of age or generation (Barner-Barry and Orenwein, 1985). The dramatic vents of political transitions, such as the total breakdown of the institutions and value structure of the *ancien regime*, or the founding election of a new regime, might provide such effects, creating re-socialization across all people and a society-wide transfer of regime loyalties (Bermeo, 1992; Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004; Gunther Montero and Torcal, 2004). As such, the macro-level crystallization of mass public attitudes in a new democracy may resemble the types of micro-level attitude change that occur in early adulthood in stable regimes (Jennings, 1989; Gibson and Gouws, 2003). See Mattes and Bratton, 2003.

Strategies to support the process of democratization

Transposing my findings to policy and practice I raise some strategies to support the process of democratization in Mozambique.

To practitioners, such as members of parliament, political parties, and leaders of interest groups and movements, I emphasize the need “to enforce limits on state authority, no matter which party or faction may control the state at a given time” (Diamond, 1997). This is necessary to deep “democratic structures to make them more liberal, accessible, accountable, and representative; and strengthening the formal institutions of democracy, including parties, legislatures, and the judicial system” (Diamond, 1997).

Thus, the Mozambique’ highly presidentialized system of government should be converted to parliamentary system to make the government more accountable to the legislature. The judiciary should be more independent and autonomous “to enforce the law equally toward everyone, including those in government” (O’Donnell, 2005). The electoral institutions, including the Constitutional Council should be more independent, impartial or not controlled or dominated by the ruling party to improve the scope of political competition and of participation. Any government tentative of strategy of development without making first these political reforms will be a fallacy.

Voter education campaigns explaining the meaning of the concept of democracy, which may be a reflection of high levels of procedural understandings of democracy in Mozambique, should not stop after an election. However, because strategies of development must be emphasized in association with the study findings rather than a reflection, procedural understandings of democracy should be taught at school or introduced into school curricula, since formal education appeared to be positively related to democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allow a free and equal voice in making decisions.’

In this way, the strategies of development to increase levels of actual commitment to democracy must come from its significant and positive predictors rather than a possible reflection, such as an agreement to enforce limits on state authority.³² In this way, to increase the levels of actual commitment to democracy it is important to increase levels of information, especially by broadening access to formal education and independent news media. However, training programs and capacity building or civic education campaign at schools curricula and mass media about democratic citizenship and procedures, and rules to empower ordinary citizens on democratic issues are also relevant. This cognitive strategy should also be extended to non-state aligned or relatively more independent organizations and religious leaders, since they matter positively in development of democratic commitments.

To ordinary Mozambicans, they should engage more in interpersonal discussion of politics and participate more in collective action in order to build greater democratic legitimacy. Overall, in terms of cognition, I point that the strategy of democratic development should be based on positive and significant impacts of how much Mozambicans know and where they obtain their information, but understand democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allow everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’ also matter positively.

Since people support democracy because they think that democracy work better than any other form of government worldwide experienced, Mozambican democratic governments should improve their political performance in delivering political rights (including freedom to say what you think, to join any political organization, from false arrest, to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, and the ability of ordinary people to influence government). But also economic reform should address problems of inequalities instead of just producing relatively strong economic growth and debt

³² Enforcing limits on state authority may contribute to the legitimacy of democracy in Mozambique, but because this study does not address and find that we cannot emphasize that enforcing limits on state authority is a strategy of development to improve levels of actual commitment to democracy. The strategies of development must come from study findings. However, it could be interesting in further studies to probe the impact of this aspect on levels of commitment to democracy.

alleviation that are not being reflected at micro-levels (in terms of improvement of people standard of living or alleviation of poverty).

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Appendix A

Operationalization of the Variables

Commitment to democracy is measured by support (preference) for democracy and rejections of three forms of authoritarian regimes: one-party, military, and one-man rule.

a) *Support for democracy* is measured by question: “which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?” A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; and C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have’.

b) *Rejection of authoritarian regimes* is measured by: “There are many ways of govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? A. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office; C. The army comes in to govern the country; and D. Elections and the Assembly of the Republic are abolished so that the President can decide everything. Those who prefer democracy and strongly disapprove authoritarian regimes are deemed to be committed democrats.

Procedural versus substantive understandings of democracy is measured by: “Which of the following statement is close to your view? Statement A or statement B. Statement A: Democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions”. Statement B: Democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs”. Respondents who say statement A are deemed to understanding democracy procedurally – i.e. as an end in itself/what democracy is.

Formal education is measured by: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”

Media exposure is measured by: “How often do you get news from television, radio, newspapers?”

Interest in public affairs is measured by: “How interested are you in public affairs?”

Interpersonal discussion of politics is measured by “How often do you discuss politics with friends or neighbors?”

Contacted influential persons is measured by: “During the past year, how often have you contacted a political party official, an official of government ministry, a local councilor, a traditional ruler, a religious leader, other influential person for help to solve a problem or to give them your view?”

Affiliation in associations or group membership is measured by: “I am going to read you a list of voluntary organizations. For each tell me whether you are official member, an active member, or not a member? A religious group (e.g. church or mosque), a trade union, a professional or business association, and a community development or self-help association.

Party identification is measured by: “Do you feel close to any particular political party? (If yes), which party is that?”

Political participation in collective action is measured by: “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you personally, have done any of these things during past year. (If not), would do this if you had a chance? Attended a community meeting; getting together with others to raise an issue; and attended a demonstration or protest march”.

Performance evaluations

Political factors

Delivery of political rights is measured by: “Comparing the democratic regime and the previous party-state system, please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be or about the same: a) freedom to say what you think, b) freedom to join any political party you want, c) freedom from being arrested when you are innocent, d) freedom to choose who vote for without feeling pressured, e) the ability of ordinary people to influence what government does.

Perceived official corruption is measured by: “How many of the following do you think are involved in corruption: a) The president and officials in his office, b) elected leaders, c) government officials, d) the police, e) border officials, f) teachers and school administrators and g) judges and magistrates.

Performance of political incumbents is measured by: “do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following person has performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard about them to say?” a) The president, b) members of parliament, and c) the local mayor.

Safety from crime or violence is measured by: “Comparing the democratic regime and the previous party-state system, please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be or about the same: safety from crime or violence”.

Economic factors

Evaluations of economic reform is measured by: “Tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they use to be, or about the same: a) the availability of goods, b) people standard of living, c) the availability of job opportunities?”.

Government handling economy is measured by: “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: a) managing the economy, b) keeping prices stable, c) creating jobs and d) narrowing gaps between rich and poor?”

Relative economic evaluations

How would you rate a) the economic conditions in this country compared to those in neighboring countries, and b) your living conditions compared to those other Mozambicans?

Present economic evaluations

How would you rate the following a) present economic condition of this country, and b) your present living conditions?

Retrospective economic evaluations

How would you rate the following compared to twelve months ago a) the economic condition of this country, and b) your living conditions?

Prospective economic evaluations

How do you expect the following to be better or worse a) economic conditions in this country in twelve months time, and b) your living conditions in twelve months time?

Appendix B

Multi Item Composite Indices

This dissertation employs three types of indicators: single item, two-item constructs, and a set or cluster of items represented in a single composite index, which I call multi index. Single item reflects one survey question; two-item constructs represent two survey questions; and multi index reflects at least three survey questions. How do I construct two item constructs and multi indices?

Two-item constructs are constructed by employing reliability analysis (Alpha) and Pearson's correlation. The two-items must be reliable at least at .50 and correlate to each other.

Multi indices are constructed by employing factor and reliability analyses. While factor analyses test the validity of the index being constructed; reliability analysis tests its internal consistency. The acceptability of these analyses depend on certain statistical rules: In factor analysis, the single items by which we pretend to construct a composite index must generate one factor and an eigenvalue greater than 1; while reliability analysis acceptability require a value greater than or equal to .60.

My factor and reliability analyses are based on Maximum Likelihood extraction method, and Direct Oblimin rotation. The strengths of combination of Maximum Likelihood extraction with Direct Oblimin rotation is "guaranteeing that if a factor solution can be found, it will also be found via all other methods" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:355). Factor and reliability analyses reflect valid responses, including don't know. Missing data, refusals to answer and cases where a question was not applicable are excluded, not only from the calculation of factor and reliability analyses, but from the entire analyses. Below is presented full results of factor and reliability analysis.

Commitment to democracy index

	Factor loadings
Reject Military rule	.709
Reject One-man rule	.776
Reject One-party rule	.593
Support for democracy	.252

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.521, and common variance of 51 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha =.65. Number of cases (n=1385).

Perceived official corruption Index

	Factor loadings
The president and officials in his office	.770
Elected leaders	.842
Government officials	.881
Police	.704
Judges and magistrates	.677
Border officials	.652
Teachers and schools administrators	.638

Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =3.86, and common variance of 61.83 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.895, number of cases (n=1393).

Delivery of Political Rights Index

	Factor loadings
Freedom to join any political organization that you want	.780
Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured	.741
Freedom to say what you think	.728
The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does	.571
Freedom from being arrested when you are innocent	.533

Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =2.296, and common variance of 56.241 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.79.6, number of cases (n=1400).

Evaluations of economic reform index

	Factor loadings
People's standard of living	.921
The availability of goods	.594
The availability of job opportunities	.442

Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.396, and common variance of 60.7 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.666, number of cases (n=1395).

Government handling economy index

	Factor loadings
Keeping prices stable	.766
Creating jobs	.744
Narrowing gaps between rich and poor	.609
Managing the economy	.450

Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.714, and common variance of 56 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.73, number of cases (n=1400).

Media Exposure Index

	Factor loadings
Newspaper	.886
Television	.855
Radio	.380

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.659 and common variance of 65.994 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.73, number of cases (n=1399).

Participation in collective action index

	Factor loadings
Got together with others to raise an issue	.813
Attended a demonstration or protest march	.563
Attended a community meeting	.490

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.218 and common variance of 58.65 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.6307, number of cases (n=1400).

Performance of political incumbents' index

	Factor loadings
The president	.681
The speaker of the parliament	.818
The mayor	.366

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.267 and common variance of 58.5 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.618, number of cases (n=1391).

Appendix C

Round 2 Afrobarometer Survey

The Afrobarometer³³ is an “independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in sub-Saharan Africa” (Bratton et al, 2004). It is dedicated to three main objectives:

- to produce scientifically reliable data on public opinion in Africa;
- to strengthen capacity for survey research in African institutions; and
- to broadly disseminate and apply survey results.

By employing surveys based on personal interviews in local languages with a randomly selected representative sample of the national population, the Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 16 sub-Saharan African countries: Cape Verde, Mozambique, Kenya, Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, South Africa, Mali, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Nigeria between 2002 and 2003. However, due political instability, Round 2 Afrobarometer survey was conducted later in 2004 in Zimbabwe. “Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries are systematically compared and trends are tracked over time” (Bratton et al, 2004). In Mozambique, the Round 2 was implemented in August and October 2002.

Methodology

The Afrobarometer through its partner in Mozambique – the Service of Public Opinion and Democracy of the Centre of Population Studies at the Eduardo Mondlane University - surveyed a nationally representative, multi-stage, area stratified cluster sample of 1400 Mozambican citizens, 18 years and older. The sample was designed by the National

³³ For more information about Afrobarometer survey see www.afrobarometer.org

Institute of Statistics. At confidence level of 95 percent, a sample of this size allows a confidence interval, or margin of error, of plus or minus 2.5 percentage points. This means that, had we interviewed every Mozambicans, the results would differ from those of this survey by no more than 2.5 percentage points, nineteen times out of twenty.

Interviews were conducted at 115 sites distributed across all three regions (North, South and Central), all provinces, and across rural and urban areas within each provinces. An average of 12 interviews per site was conducted. In order to make sure that women's voice were fully reflected, every second interview had to be with a female respondent. An equal number of interviews were conducted across ten provinces, plus Maputo City. Then, based on the 1997 Census, all the interviews were weighted to reflect each province and urban differences proportionally with Maputo city treated as a separate province.

Interviews were conducted in Portuguese (the official language) and in four other national languages (Changana, Sena, Ndau and Macua). The research instrument was a questionnaire containing structured and semi-structured items administered face-to face to respondents by teams of trained interviewers. To adapt the questionnaire to local conditions, all items were pre-tested in trial interviews in urban and rural areas. The original Portuguese version was translated into all relevant home languages and all interviews were administered in the language of the respondent's choice.

Potential obstacles

Several potential obstacles presented themselves to Afrobarometer interviewers during the course of this survey. First of all, we found that Mozambicans still need to get used to the notion that fieldworkers and researchers can represent independent organizations and universities. Even though we went to great lengths to tell people in the sample households that we represented the Afrobarometer and Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) only, 56 percent of respondents still told us – when asked at the end of the

interview – that they thought that we had been sent by “the government,” another 3 percent said “Frelimo,” and 1 percent said “the president.” Only 5 percent said “UEM.” At the same time, we should note that there is no evidence that this perception affected the responses. To check this, we looked at responses to three politically sensitive questions: 1) What parties did support?; 2) Did they approve of the performance of the president?; and 3) Did they approve of the performance of the national assembly? We find that those respondents who thought we were from official sources (government, Frelimo the president) were no more likely to tell us they supported Frelimo, or to tell us that they approved of the performance of the president or the national assembly, than were respondents who thought we were sent by independent sources.

Second, continuous natural disasters and poverty have made rural citizens suspicious of researchers’ motives. In a few instances, respondents refused to be interviewed, arguing that “since they become target group of many researchers, their situation has never improved and they were exhausted with questioning”. Interviewers also observed that many local people assumed that the households in which we interviewed were selected to provide them things like furniture, food or blankets. There was also a view that the respondents selected for interviews were relatives or contacts of the local authorities. This situation caused some jealousies, especially in rural communities. Each time, interviewers took time to explain to people the purpose of the project and that no would received any material benefit from participating. Finally, in some rural areas where traditional influences are still strong, the absence of male heads of households denied some women the chance to participate in interviews since they could not obtain their husband’s permission (Pereira et al., 2003:2-4).

Profile of Sample (weighted data)

Sample size	1400		%
	%	Home language	
Gender		Portuguese	3
Male	50	Emakhuwa	25
Female	50	Cisena	10
		Cindau	5
Median age	35yr	Xichangana	23
		xinyanja	4
Location		Gitonga	4
Rural	49	Citswa	5
Urban	51	Chinyungue	3
		13 others below 2.8 percent each	16
Provinces		Income (in Meticais)³⁴	
Niassa	8	Less than 900	75
Cabo Delgado	8	Up to 1000	14
Nampula	9	1001 – 2000	7
Zambézia	9	2001 – 4000	3
Tete	9	4001 – 6000	1
Manica	9	Over 6000	1
Sofala	9		
Inhambane	9	Religion	
Gaza	9	None	14
Maputo (province)	9	Islam	18
Maputo (city)	12	Catholic	32
		Protestant (mainstream)	9
Education		Protestant (evangelical)	16
No formal schooling	30	African independent	6
Informal schooling only	11	Traditional religion	3
Primary school (some or complete)	40	Agnostic	<1
Secondary school (some or complete)	14	Atheist	<1
Post-secondary education	3	Others	1

Source: Pereira et al., (2003) Updated in June 28, 2006.

³⁴ Mozambique's currency.

Appendix D

Variable Recodes

All the transformation or recodes done in this dissertation reflect valid responses, including don't know. Missing data, refusals to answer and cases where a question was not applicable are excluded from the calculation of any result employing basic or advanced statistical technique in this study.

Support for democracy

Original format

3 = democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

2 = in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.

1 = for someone like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have.

9 = don't know.

Recoded format

2 = democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

1 = in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.

0 = for someone like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have.

0 = don't know.

Rejection of one-party, military, and one-man rule

Original format

- 1 = strongly disapprove
- 2 = disapprove
- 3 = neither disapprove nor approve
- 4 = approve
- 5 = strongly approve
- 9 = don't know

Recoded format

- 2 = strongly disapprove
- 1 = disapprove
- 0 = neither disapprove nor approve
- 0 = approve
- 0 = strongly approve
- 0 = don't know

Procedural versus substantive understandings of democracy

Original format

- 1 = Agree very strongly with A
- 2 = agree with A
- 3 = agree with B
- 4 = agree very strongly with B
- 5 = agree with neither
- 9 = don't know

Recoded format

- 5 = Agree very strongly with A
- 4 = agree with A
- 2 = agree with B
- 1 = agree very strongly with B
- 3 = agree with neither
- 3 = don't know

Formal education

Original format

00 = no formal schooling
01 = informal schooling (including Koran schooling)
02 = some primary schooling
03 = primary school completed
04 = some secondary school/high school
05 = vocational/technical training
06 = post secondary qualifications, other than university
07 = some university
08 = university completed
09 = post graduate
99 = don't know

Recoded format

0 = no formal schooling
0 = informal schooling (including Koran schooling)
1 = some primary schooling
1 = primary school completed
2 = some secondary school/high school
2 = vocational/technical training
3 = post secondary qualifications, other than university
3 = some university
3 = university completed
3 = post graduate
0 = don't know

Getting news from radio, newspapers, and television

Original format

4 = everyday
3 = a few times a week
2 = a few times a month
1 = less than once a month
0 = never
9 = don't know

Recoded format

4 = everyday
3 = a few times a week
2 = a few times a month
1 = less than once a month
0 = never
0 = don't know

Interest in public affairs

Original format

0 = not interested

1 = somewhat interested

2 = very interested

9 = don't know

Recoded format

0 = not interested

1 = somewhat interested

2 = very interested

0 = don't know

Interpersonal discussion of politics

Original format

4 = yes, often

3 = yes, many times

2 = yes, once or twice

1 = no, but would do that if had the chance

0 = no, would never do this

9 = don't know

Recorded format

3 = yes, often

2 = yes, many times

1 = yes, once or twice

0 = no, but would do that if had the chance

0 = no, would never do this

0 = don't know

Participation in collective action

Original format

4 = yes, often

3 = yes, many times

2 = yes, once or twice

1 = no, but would do that if had the chance

0 = no, would never do this

9 = don't know

Recoded format

3 = yes, often

2 = yes, many times

1 = yes, once or twice

0 = no, but would do that if had the chance

0 = no, would never do this

0 = don't know

Group membership

Original format

- 3 = official leader
- 2 = active member
- 1 = inactive member
- 0 = not a member
- 9 = don't know

Recoded format

- 2 = official leader
- 2 = active member
- 1 = inactive member
- 0 = not a member
- 0 = don't know

Contacting influential persons

Original format

- 0 = never
- 1 = only once
- 2 = a few times
- 3 = often
- 9 = don't know

Recoded format

- 0 = never
- 1 = only once
- 2 = a few times
- 3 = often
- 0 = don't know

Evaluations of economic reform

Original format

- 1 = much worse
- 2 = worse
- 3 = about the same
- 4 = better
- 5 = much better
- 9 = don't know

Recoded format

- 1 = much worse
- 2 = worse
- 3 = about the same
- 4 = better
- 5 = much better
- 3 = don't know

Delivery of political rights

Original format

1 = much worse
2 = worse
3 = same
4 = better
5 = much better
9 = don't know

Recoded format

1 = much worse
2 = worse
3 = same
4 = better
5 = much better
3 = don't know

Perceived official corruption

Original format

0 = none
1 = some of them
2 = most of them
3 = all of them
9 = don't know

Recoded format

0 = none
1 = some of them
2 = most of them
3 = all of them
0 = don't know

Performance of political incumbents

Original format

1 = strongly disapprove
2 = disapprove
3 = approve
4 = strongly approve
9 = don't know

Recoded format

1 = strongly disapprove
2 = disapprove
4 = approve
5 = strongly approve
3 = don't know

Government handling economy

Original format

- 1 = very badly
- 2 = fairly badly
- 3 = fairly well
- 4 = very well
- 9 = don't know

Recoded format

- 1 = very badly
- 2 = fairly badly
- 4 = fairly well
- 5 = very well
- 3 = don't know

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Appendix E

Bivariate Correlations

Levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement, performance evaluations and attitudes to democracy (Bivariate Pearson's Correlations)

	Procedural understanding of democracy	Commitment to democracy
Levels of information		
Formal education	.046	.312**
Media consumption	-.008	.346**
Cognitive engagement		
Interpersonal discussion of politics	.056*	.263**
Interest in public affairs	.078**	.080**
Sources of information		
Contacting local councilors	-.016	.002
Contacting officials of government ministries	.017	.132**
Contacting religious leaders	-.002	.072**
Contacting traditional rulers	-.018	-.111**
Contacting other community influential persons	-.028	.010
Identification with the governing party	.032	-.080**
Identification with political opposition	-.002	.107**
Membership in religious groups	.041	.067*
Membership in trade unions or farm associations	-.070**	-.065*
Membership in professional or business associations	-.063*	.012
Membership in community development or self help associations	-.015	.003
Collective actions	.047	.184**
Performance evaluations		
Evaluations of economic reform		.125**
Delivery of political rights		.185**
Perception of official corruption		.158**
Government handling economy		-.227**
Performance of political leaders		.049
Safety from crime or violence		-.202**
Present economic evaluations		-.106**
Relative economic evaluations		-.111**
Retrospective economic evaluations		.053
Prospective economic evaluations		.036

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

Appendix F

Contingency Tables

Media usage by urban-rural divide and province

Getting news from radio by Urban/Rural divide

	Residential location		Total
	Urban	Rural	
Never	8	22	15
Less than once a month	3	4	3
A few times a month	6	8	7
A few times a week	18	17	18
Every day	66	50	58
Total	100	100	100

Getting news from television by Urban/Rural divide

	Residential location		Total
	Urban	Rural	
Never	44	94	68
Less than once a month	3	1	2
A few times a month	4	2	3
A few times a week	13	2	7
Every day	36	2	19
Total	100	100	100

Getting news from newspapers by Urban/Rural divide

	Residential location		Total
	Urban	Rural	
Never	46	91	68
Less than once a month	9	2	6
A few times a month	11	3	7
A few times a week	15	3	9
Every day	19	2	11
Total	100	100	100

Getting news from radio by Province

	Province											Total
	Niassa	Cabo Delgado	Nampula	Zambézia	Tete	Manica	Sofala	Inhambane	Gaza	Maputo (Prov.)	Maputo (City)	
Never	31	7	23	23	3	14	6	26	24	17	1	15
Less than once a month	1	1	8	2	7	3	3	3	1	6	1	3
A few times a month	6	5	5	7	10	9	4	10	7	12	3	7
A few times a week	6	26	13	11	20	16	27	28	17	19	14	18
Every day	56	62	51	58	60	58	60	33	52	47	81	58
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Getting news from television by Province

	Province											Total
	Niassa	Cabo Delgado	Nampula	Zambézia	Tete	Manica	Sofala	Inhambane	Gaza	Maputo (Prov.)	Maputo (City)	
Never	85	84	95	86	82	81	63	75	79	75	5	68
Less than once a month	1	-	-		2		3	2	1	4	7	2
A few times a month		1		1	4	4	3	2	5	3	5	3
A few times a week	4	7	3	3	8	4	9	8	6	9	14	7
Every day	10	7	2	11	5	11	22	13	9	9	68	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Getting news from newspapers by Province

	Province											Total
	Niassa	Cabo Delgado	Nampula	Zambézia	Tete	Manica	Sofala	Inhambane	Gaza	Maputo (Prov.)	Maputo (City)	
Never	82	82	91	83	71	79	60	76	86	77	12	68
Less than once a month	2		1	2	8	3	5	5	3	5	18	6
A few times a month	3	7	4	3	8	3	7	4	4	6	16	7
A few times a week	3	7	2	4	12	9	18	4	1	7	22	9
Every day	11	4	3	8	2	6	10	11	7	5	32	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

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