THE DIVINE AGENT

IN INTERTESTAMENTAL JUDAISM

the origins of the concept in the Hebrew tradition
and its application in the figures of
the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch
and the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria

A dissertation submitted by
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Abstract

THE DIVINE AGENT IN INTERTESTAMENTAL JUDAISM

M.A. Dissertation submitted by

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Many New Testament scholars have recently come to understand aspects of Christology in terms of the rabbinic legal concept of agency. Whereas Rengstorf attempted to understand apostleship in terms of the rabbinic agency concept (1964, first published 1933), works such as those of Borgen (1983, first published 1968), and Buehner (1977) attempt to explain the Johannine Jesus in such terms, following on Eduard Schweizer's "Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Hintergrund der "Sendungsformel" Gal.4:4f; Roem.8:3f; John 3:16f; I John 4:9", published in the Zeitschrift fuer die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft in 1966. The aim of this dissertation is to locate the roots of the concept of Divine Agency at the heart of the Hebrew tradition, rather than in later rabbinic abstractions, and to examine the development of the tradition from ancient times to the period contemporary with Jesus of Nazareth. Two figures, in works reflecting some of the diversity of Intertestamental Judaism and dating from the first decade of the Christian Church, have been selected for assessment as Divine Agents. These are the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch and the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria.

While the rabbinic and other legal abstractions are not a valid ideal model for understanding Divine Agency, they are nevertheless useful in that they articulate concepts more concisely than is the case elsewhere. A brief treatment of the legal material is therefore included. This is followed by a survey of the development of the Hebrew religious tradition, with particular attention to the concept of the Divine Council assembled round the Throne of God. It is in the context of this tradition that messianic and other ideal figures emerged, and therefore in this context that the origins of the Divine Agency Concept are sought. The Agency idea is found to be well-attested in the Hebrew tradition, particularly during the post-Exilic period.

The "Son of Man" is identified as the supreme heavenly being, God's Agent and vicegerent. Both the figure of the "Son of Man" and his functions are rooted in the Hebrew tradition, and are fully explicable in terms of that tradition.

The "Logos" is also rooted in the Hebrew tradition, but is a more complex figure, having originated as a concept rather than as a being. The "Logos" appears in Philo's writings both as a conceptualisation of aspects of the Divine Essence, and as the supreme heavenly being. In the latter form, the "Logos" is God's Agent and vicegerent, with functions rooted in the Hebrew tradition. As a divine manifestation, the "Logos" is not a being, and therefore

cannot be described as an Agent, but has functions rooted in the Hebrew tradition, and fully explicable in terms of that tradition.

Both the "Son of Man" and the "Logos" emerge from the Jewish tradition, even if not without outside influences. Their functions too are derived from that tradition, and are explicable in terms of that tradition. Rabbinic legal abstractions are therefore unnecessary in order to explain the functions of Divine Agents in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own work, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Religious Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, in the University of Cape Town. No part of this dissertation has been submitted in any form to any other University, for the purpose of obtaining any academic qualification.

Signed by candidate

NICHOLAS HUGH TAYLOR

15 January 1987

CONTENTS

Preface

Divine Agency has in recent years become a category in terms of which New Testament scholars have sought to understand and interpret Christology. They have tended to abstract the concept of agency from the Mishnah and later rabbinic writings, rather than from the Hebrew tradition, most particularly the Old Testament and Intertestamental writings. The aim of this dissertation is to rectify this flaw in scholarship, by seeking to locate the concept of Divine Agency at the heart of the Hebrew tradition, and to examine the development of the tradition from ancient times to the period contemporary with Jesus of Nazareth. Two figures, in works reflecting some of the diversity of Intertestamental Judaism and dating from the first decade of the Christian Church, have been selected for assessment as Divine Agents. These are the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch and the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria.

My sincere thanks are due to my parents for their unfailing encouragement and support. Without their self-sacrificing dedication to my upbringing and education, none of the work I have accomplished would have been possible. Thanks too to the other members of my family who have contributed significantly to my studies, most particularly to my uncle, who provided the computer upon which this dissertation was produced, and in whose home this final draft was completed.

As this dissertation comes at the end of six very rewarding years at the University of Cape Town, it seems appropriate to thank all the staff of the Department of Religious Studies and also my colleagues and friends, especially during my years as a post-graduate student, for their guidance, teaching and fellowship. Thanks especially to my supervisor, Dr Chuck Wanamaker, and also to Dr Bill Domeris and Mrs Shaan Ellinghouse, for their helpfulness beyond the call of duty. Particular thanks are due to my colleague and friend Richard Wortley, who has very kindly undertaken the photocopying and binding of this work in Cape Town, in my absence overseas as I begin doctoral research at the University of Durham.

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INTRODUCTION

Many New Testament scholars have recently come to understand aspects of Christology in terms of the rabbinic legal concept of agency. Whereas Rengstorf attempted to understand apostleship in terms of the rabbinic agency concept (1964, first published 1933), works such as those of Borgen (1983, first published 1968), and Buehner (1977) attempt to explain the Johannine Jesus in such terms, following on Eduard Schweizer's "Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Hintergrund der "Sendungsformel" Gal.4:4f; Roem.8:3f; John 3:16f; I John 4:9", published in the Zeitschrift fuer die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft in 1966. If Jesus' relationship to God is understood as that of an agent to his principal, then the ontological issues cease to be crucial to his christological status and soteriological role.

Borgen and Rengstorf particularly, have erred in abstracting the concept of agency from the Mishnah and later rabbinic writings, rather than from the conceptions of messianic figures earlier in the Hebrew tradition. Whereas the Jewish tradition has been searched meticulously for evidence of messianic expectations or lack thereof, scholarship has sought to understand the role of such a figure in terms of later legal abstractions. Buehner has rectified this to a limited extent, in looking at the Targums and other Intertestamental writings, as well as some Old Testament texts, but generally not the texts in which the messianic

figures and their precursors appear.

The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the Divine Agency concept has its roots at the heart of the Hebrew religious tradition, just as do the messianic and other figures whose roles are interpreted in terms of that Agency concept. The ideal figures cannot be separated from their functions, and the functions are to be explained in terms of the roles of the figures and their precursors in the Hebrew tradition. If the Divine Agency concept cannot be found where the messianic and other figures appear in the Old Testament and Intertestamental writings, then the concept cannot validly be introduced on the basis of later legal abstractions to explain the roles of those figures.

Two figures from Intertestamental Judaism will studied in order to demonstrate the thesis that the Agency concept, like the figures to which the concept is applied, is rooted in the Hebrew religious experience. They are the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch and the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria. Both figures are crucial to New Testament Christology, and occur in writings which, it will be argued below, date from the first decade of the Christian Church (c. 40 CE). A further criterion for the selection of these particular figures is the desire to consider as wide a spectrum of Intertestamental Jewish thought as possible. The Similitudes of Enoch represent Palestinian Apocalyptic Judaism, while Philo represents Hellenistic Wisdom Judaism. While a polarity between Palestinian and

Diaspora, Hebrew and Greek, Apocalyptic and Wisdom, should not be emphasised to the exclusion of the unity in the heritage of the Jewish experience which bound together the diversity of Intertestamental Judaism, it is nevertheless desirable to consider the issue in the light of the diversity as well as the unity.

While the functions of messianic figures in the Jewish tradition cannot validly be explained in terms of the Mishnaic and later rabbinic legal abstractions, the legal texts are nevertheless useful in that they articulate concepts more coherently and precicely than other writings. Part I of this dissertation will therefore examine the legal concept of agency in the Graeco-Roman world. The Greek and Roman systems will all briefly be considered, and their agency concepts discussed. More detailed attention will be given to agency in the Jewish tradition, and to the various hypotheses as to the origins of the concept.

Ideal and redeemer figures, particularly those of a metaphysical or supernatural nature, can be understood only in the context of the religious tradition in which they are conceived. The Throne-Theophany, in its various forms, is the most significant experience of direct contact with God in the Jewish tradition. The development of the Throne-Theophany tradition, from its roots in the ancient Near Eastern religious milieu, through the Hebrew prophetic Theophanies, to the apocalyptic visions and the mysticism of the Wisdom tradition, to Merkabah mysticism,

will be considered in Part II of this dissertation. Particular attention will be given to the concept of agency in the tradition, and especially the role of Divine Agents.

Parts III and IV of this dissertation will discuss the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch, and the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, respectively. Each part will, so far as is possible on the basis of the data available, locate the figure under discussion in the context of the tradition, and locate the literature in its religious, philosophical, social and historical context. The identity and the role of the "Son of Man" and of the "Logos" will be discussed, with particular attention to the applicability to these figures of the designation "Divine Agent".

It is hoped that this study will enable the Divine Agency concept to be applied more fully and more accurately, not only to Jesus of Nazareth in the New Testament, but also to the various messianic and other ideal and redeemer figures, heavenly and earthly, who proliferate in the Intertestamental writings. Such studies should locate the figures under discussion in the context of the Jewish religious tradition, and not attempt to explain their functions in terms of later legal abstractions.

PART I

THE CONTEMPORARY CONCEPT OF AGENCY

A. The Law of Agency in the Graeco-Roman World

A brief discussion of the legal meaning of agency in the Graeco-Roman world during the Intertestamental period, is a useful beginning to this study, as it enables terminological clarity, and a broader understanding of contemporary legal thinking on the subject. It is in the law that abstract ideas are most clearly quantified, and therefore in legal concepts that the most precise meanings are to be found. The dominant legal system, especially during the latter part of this period, was the Roman, but the various Greek systems continued to function, especially in commerce, as did other national legal systems, such as the Jewish, within their own areas.

"An agent is one who sets up legal relations between his principal and a third party, himself acquiring no right and incurring no liability" (Buckland, 1939, p301). The agent is the representative of his principal, and acts either on the instructions of his principal, or at his own discretion on behalf of his principal, and in accordance with the powers delegated to him.

Agents played a significant role in Greek commercial and legal affairs, and the legal systems of the various Greek states recognized and provided for this. Agents, slave or free, operated as the legal and commercial representatives

of their principals, particularly in the absence of the latter, but also when the principal was legally prohibited, as an alien or a slave, from acting on his own behalf, in court or in the market place (Jones, 1956, p224). As well as slaves and sons, and other subordinate members of the household, bankers were frequently engaged as agents in financial matters (Jones, 1956, p225). Of particular significance is the role of the banker as the agent of a slave in negotiating the purchase of his or her freedom (Jones, 1956, p282). It is clear, therefore, that in Greek law an agent was not merely a messenger; he was empowered to conclude agreements and to make and enforce decisions.

Roman law was more restrictive, particularly in the realm of private law, in its provisions for agency, and, while not entirely consistent, generally recognized as agents or "procuratores" only dependent persons, and not independent agents. "The underlying idea was that a person could make use of another person dependent on him to perform juristic acts for and on behalf of him in much the same way as a human being uses his limbs" (Kaser, 1965, p57). This did not necessarily mean that the agent was not given powers of discretion, but, as a person, he was a subordinate member of the household of his principal. The legal consequences of the actions of a duly authorised agent, in the course of his commission, bound his principal, who accrued all benefits and liabilities resulting from the action of the agent (Kaser, 1965, p58). The agent acted "merely as a conduit pipe" (Buckland & McNair, 1952, p217)

between his principal and the other party.

Theoretically, the role allowed to agents in negotiating contracts, was severely limited. In principle, no contract could be entered by a representative (Buckland & McNair, 1952, p219). An agent could act as an intermediary or "nuntius", but the terms of the contract were to be negotiated by the parties themselves (Buckland & McNair, p220). This limited the role of an agent, at least officially, to conveying messages between the parties to the negotiation process.

In Roman-occupied Egypt, Greek and Egyptian legal principles operated beside the Roman. Greek norms tended to predominate in commercial matters, and the right to enter a contract through a proxy was recognized (Taubenschlag, 1944, p233). Despite non-recognition in Roman law, indirect representation was legally valid in Egypt (Taubenschlag, 1944, p235). The principal could therefore act through his agent, or, if he so wished, he had the option of commissioning his agent to act autonomously on his behalf. Agents could therefore exercise wide discretionary powers in Egypt, and play a prominent role in civic and commercial life.

This discussion highlights two distinctions which are crucial to understanding agency. The first is the distinction between an agent and a messenger; whereas the former is empowered to act on behalf of his principal in completing legal transactions, the latter is merely

despatched to convey messages between two principles who reserve to themselves all decision-making power. A further distinction is that between dependent and independent agents; whereas the former are subordinate members of their principals' households, the latter are independent persons commissioned for the purpose of completing particular transactions. These distinctions must be constantly borne in mind when divine agency is considered.

B. Agency in Jewish Law

In the Hebrew tradition, the concept of agency originated in the cult (Falk, 1964, p106). The head of a clan offered sacrifices on behalf of his entire clan, and later the Aaronite priesthood functioned on behalf of all Israel, and of individuals offering sacrifices in the Temple.

The concept of agency developed both religious and secular applications. In a community in which theology and law were inextricably intertwined, if not identical, it was inevitable that the juridical principles and their implications would be fully explored with no conscious distinction between sacred and profane. The results of the Tannaitic debates came to be recorded in the Mishnah, which was finally codified by the end of the second century CE, but preserves more ancient traditions, rather than creating new ones. A survey of Mishnaic statements on agency is crucial to understanding the concept during the Intertestamental period, as it is in the Mishnah that the

principles are most clearly articulated.

Jewish law presumed that the agent was functioning in obedience to his or her principal (Qiddushin 2.4). For the purposes of the legal transaction, the principal transferred all rights and property involved to the agent. The latter, however, remained answerable to the principal for his or her actions.

Only an adult might appoint an agent, and the actions of an agent not duly commissioned, or appointed by a minor, are legally invalid (Gittin 6.3). An agent could be employed, inter alia, to negotiate a betrothal (Qiddushin 2.1). Should both the agent and the principal enter a marriage contract concerning the same person, viz. the principal, the contract entered first would be valid, and the second void; should it be impossible to determine which was first, both would be invalid unless the parties reach an agreement (Qiddushin 4.9).

Should an agent misappropriate Temple funds, and thereby commit sacrilege, his or her principal would be liable, if the offence was committed in the course of carrying out the commission (Melah 6.1). However, should the agent commit sacrilege without completing the task, he or she would be responsible personally. Deaf-mutes, imbeciles and minors were exempt from this responsibility, and their principals would be liable in case of sacrilege (Melah 6.1f).

An agent might not lay hands on the animal to be sacrificed as a sin-offering, even if the offering was being made on behalf of a group of people (Menahot 9.8f). The one offering the sacrifice was required to lay hands on the animal himself, and, if the offering was made by a group, all would be required to lay hands on the animal. While, in regular worship, a priest in the Temple, or Agent of the Congregation in the synagogue, could function as agent on behalf of the nation; each person was responsible for his or her own sins, and for making the required sin-offering.

The Mishnah includes two references to the Agent of the Congregation, שלי"ח צבור. This title was accorded the precentor in the synagogue, who assumed the role previously occupied by the priesthood, as mediator between the nation and God. The Agent of the Congregation was obliged to say the daily Tephillah (Rosh Hashanah 4.9). Whereas, for an ordinary member of the congregation, it would be regarded a bad omen only for himself should he fall into error, having said the Tephillah; should the Agent fall into error, having said the Tephillah, it would be regarded a bad omen for the entire congregation (Berakot 5.5). The principle behind this is that "a man's agent is like to himself" (Berakot 5.5).

The fundamental principle of agency is that the agent is like the one who sends him. "He represents in his own person the person and rights of [his principal]" (Rengstorf, 1964, p415). This is reiterated frequently in

the rabbinic literature (eg Berakot 5.5, Qiddushin 42b, 43a). The authority and the function of the agent are derived from the sender or principal, irrespective of the personal status of the agent (Borgen, 1983, p122). Rabbinic judicial mysticism went so far as to state that the agent is identical to his or her sender (eg Qiddushin 43a) (Borgen, 1983, p123).

The term שליח denotes not only the agent appointed by a human being to act on his or her behalf, but is also used of persons designated by God to perform specific functions. The term is applied to Moses, Elijah, Elisha, Ezekiel and to the priests of the Temple offering sacrifices (Barrett, 1978, p89). This does not make שליח an essentially religious concept, however. "The term [שליח] is legal rather than religious, and if the שליח has religious significance this is not because he is a שליח but because he is entrusted with a religious task" (Rengstorf, 1964, p415).

There are limitations to the applicability of the term שליח. Particularly in its religious application, שליח is used only within the bounds of Judaism, and is never used of missionaries (Rengstorf, 1964, p418). It is also significant that rabbis are nowhere described as שלוחים (Rengstorf, 1964, p418). There is a certain amount of scholarly controversy as to whether prophets were regarded as agents or not. Rengstorf asserts that prophets were messengers, but not agents, as they were not in communication with God (1964, p420). Those prophets who

are designated Divine Agents, are so called not on account of their prophecy, but on account of the miracles they performed (1964, p419). Buehner convincingly demonstrates that Rengstorf's idea that prophets were not in communication with God is without foundation except in twentieth century modernist thought, and is quite contrary to the self-understanding of the Hebrew prophets (1977, p274). As Rengstorf does not explain how prophets could be messengers, but not agents, if they were not in communication with God, this point hardly requires refutation. Buehner points out that that the roles of both שליח (agent) and מלאך (messenger/angel) are founded on union with God (1977, p329). Further, the concepts of שליח and מלאך are equated in the Targums of I Chr.14:15, Isa.44:26 and Hag.1:13 (1977, pp281f). Buehner cites further conceptual and literal identifications between שליח and מלאך, many of which are explicit references to prophets, and concludes not only that the to concepts are identified, but also that the term שליח is applicable to the prophets (1977, p282).

The Divine Agent belongs to a particular category of agency. The Agent of God is not necessarily divine, but acts on behalf of God, and can for convenience therefore be described as a Divine Agent. Both heavenly and human beings, particularly prophets, were regarded as Divine Agents. The next stage in this study is to trace the development of the concept of Divine Agency in the context of the Throne-Theophany tradition. It is in the session of the Divine Council around the Throne of God that both

angels and prophets were conceived to receive their commissions, and it is therefore in the context of the development of this tradition that the roots of the concept of Divine Agency are to be sought.

PART II

THE ROOTS OF THE AGENCY CONCEPT IN THE HEBREW TRADITION PARTICULARLY DIVINE AGENCY AS FOUND IN THE THRONE-THEOPHANY TRADITION AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS IN PROPHECY, APOCALYPTIC AND WISDOM

The concept of the Divine Council meeting around the Throne of God is fundamental to understanding ancient Hebrew thought. In particular, the development of Hebrew religion from polytheism, through monolatry and henotheism to monotheism, can most clearly be seen in the development of the concept of the Divine Council. It is also crucial to later developments in the religious tradition, particularly the phenomena of Apocalyptic, Wisdom and Merkabah mysticism. Furthermore, the Theophany of the Throne of God with the Council gathered round, is in ancient Hebrew religion the most direct form of communication between God and man. It is therefore in the Council and Throne-Theophany tradition that the roots of the concept of Divine Agency are to be sought.

Polytheism was universal in the ancient Near East, and the interactions of the gods in the pantheon are integral to the mythology. The idea of the gods forming a council, however informal, is attested in much of the ancient literature. The Akkadian creation myth "Enuma Elis" (c 2000 BCE) provides a particularly graphic account of the deliberations and activities of the council of the gods! Closer to ancient Israel, the Ugaritic mythology, which

may well be dependent upon "Enuma Elis" (Coogan, 1978, pp75f), includes in the Ba`al myth several episodes of divine activity, some in council. As will become clear below, particularly in Part III, these texts are of considerable importance in understanding the roots of crucial aspects of Hebrew thought.

Two parallel and integrally related processes took place in the evolution of the Council and Throne-Theophany tradition. Over the course of centuries from the emergence of Ancient Israel to the post-Exilic period, Yahweh's fellow-members in the pantheon came either to be identified with, or subordinated to, him. By the time of the Exile (VI BCE), the subordinate deities had come to be regarded as fully subject to Yahweh and no longer gods. Accompanying and following their loss in status, the heavenly beings acquired distinct identities and functions, delegated to them by Yahweh. It is these functions, and those of human beings admitted to the Council, that require examination as roots of the Divine Agency concept.

In the Biblical Tradition, the members of the Council are described in a variety of ways, which reflect their demotion from the status of full members of a pantheon. They are referred to as בני אלים (Ps.29:1;89:7), אלהים (Ps.82:1), בני האלהים (Gen.6:2,4(J); Job 1:6;2:1), בני עליון (Ps.82:6), כול אלהים (Ps.97:7), and קדושים (Deut.33:2f; Job 5:1). It is noteworthy that, in a number of instances, the members of the Council are described as gods,

reflecting the polytheistic religious milieu from which the Hebrew religion emerged. The pantheon concept is preserved in the Biblical literature, but in each case the gods are gathered under Yahweh's presidency. It is also noteworthy that the concept of divine sonship is prominent in the terminology, as a means of avoiding polytheistic overtones.

According to Cross (1973, pp60-71), the name Yahweh originated as an epithet of 'El, the chief of the Canaanite pantheon. יהוה is the hiphil imperfect of היה, to create. יהוה צבאות translates "he (who) creates the heavenly armies". The name of Yahweh is therefore integrally connected to his position in the Council, as creator of the heavenly hosts; a conception derived from the Canaanite cult of 'El.

In the earlier Hebrew traditions, the קדושים are rarely mentioned, except in the company of Yahweh. They constitute his retinue, and do not function independently (eg Ps.89:6-8). As well as surrounding Yahweh in the assembly, the holy ones, described as הכוכבים, stars (cf Job 38:7; Ps.148:3), accompany him to war (eg Jud.5:20(E)). As well as the stars, the sun and moon also form part of the Council (Ps.148:3). The Council forms a heavenly army, as the term צבאות indicates. The heavenly hosts accompany Yahweh to war; the marshalling of the Israelite army being an earthly reflection. This idea is attested in Josh.10:11(J), Jud.5:20(E), II Kings 6:17(E);7:6(E), Isa.13:3ff;40:26, Joel 3:11,14ff et al

(cf. 1QM).

Although the Biblical tradition regards the heavenly beings as divine, the Deuteronomic tradition nevertheless explicitly forbids their worship (Deut.4:19;17:3). This prohibition is referred to frequently in the Deuteronomistic History. According to Deut.32:8 (LXX), Yahweh assigned land and nations to specific angels. In the original Hebrew version of this text, the word rendered ἀγγέλων in the LXX was probably בנ"י. The Deuteronomistic conception of the division of the earth and its people among the heavenly beings, traditionally seventy in number, with Israel reserved to Yahweh himself, is derived from the ancient Near Eastern belief that the various nations and their lands belonged to particular gods. In the belief that events on earth were a reflection of events in heaven, relations between the nations were considered to be dependent upon the relationship between their gods, and events between the nations were a reflection of events between their gods.

The Biblical tradition tends to identify Mount Sion as the סוד, the meeting place of the Council, attributing features of other ancient Near Eastern meeting places to the holy mountain of Jerusalem, and particularly to the Temple. This can be seen particularly in the accounts of the prophetic visions in Isa.6 and Zech.3, and in the later Hebrew literature, such as I En.26. In traditions prior to or opposing that of Jerusalem, the Council is conceived to meet in the Tent of Meeting, אהל מועד, of

the JE tradition. The divine assembly met in the tent, the predecessor of the Temple, which was later conceived to be the meeting place of Moses and Yahweh (Ex.33:7-11(E); Num.11:24f(J)).

In the Priestly tradition, the Council is active in creation (Gen.1(P)). This is particularly apparent in Gen.1:26, where the divine assembly addresses itself in the first person plural. Specific creative acts are not assigned to specific members of the Council, as eg. in "Enuma Elis", but it can be assumed that the Priestly editor understood the heavenly beings to be working under Yahweh's direction.

The Council is the scene of judgement. In Ps.82, Yahweh judges the heavenly beings for their failure to carry out their responsibilities. They were instructed to uphold justice and defend the weak, but had failed to do so, for which they would "die like men" (Ps.82:7). This illustrates the accountability of the lesser heavenly beings to Yahweh. This accountability is crucial to the concept of agency, and indicates the degree of responsibility which Divine Agents were believed to hold.

In communicating and enforcing the decrees of the Council, the activities of the messenger / angel, מלאך, and of the prophet, נביא, one who is called, are both described by the verb [שלח], send (eg. Gen.24:7; Ex.33:2; Isa.6:8; Ezek.3:6; Zech.7:12). Both are messengers of the Council, despatched by Yahweh. While the angel is a heavenly being,

and as such a (presumably eternal) member of the Council, the prophet is admitted to the Council in his inaugural vision; the most graphically described being that in Isa.6. Being part of the Council and its deliberations, is the test of the authenticity of the prophet's vocation, and accordingly of his message (Jer.23:18; cf. 14:11-16). The authority of the prophet rests on his having stood in the Council, having heard there the message, דבר יהוה, the word of the Lord, and having been sent to proclaim it. This experience is characteristic of pre-exilic prophecy; but, of the post-Exilic prophets, Deutero-Isaiah alone experienced a theophany Yahweh and his Council in the traditional form (Kingsbury, 1964, p179). No equivalent to the Israelite conception of prophecy is attested elsewhere in the ancient Near East (Mullen, 1980, p218). Both prophet and angel depend for their authenticity on being duly commissioned Divine Agents, sent to proclaim the messages and/or execute the decisions of Yahweh and the Divine Council.

The three most explicitly described prophetic visions are those of Micaiah (I Kings 22), Isaiah (Isa.6) and Ezekiel (Ezek.1/10). These theophanies have the same format, and several features in common. Yahweh is enthroned as king and surrounded by heavenly creatures. In Micaiah's vision they are described as צבא השמים, in Isaiah's as סרפים, and in Ezekiel's as כרובים. In each vision, the prophet sees Yahweh and hears him speak. It is particularly noteworthy that, in Isaiah's vision, Yahweh speaks in the first person plural, speaking for the Council as a body

(Isa.6:8; cf Gen.1:26). All three visions take place at the time of the enthronement festival of Yahweh, which formed part of the new year ritual (Kingsbury, 1964, p282).

The less fully documented prophetic experiences also fit the pattern of the visions of Micaiah, Isaiah and Ezekiel. The last of the five visions of Amos fits this format (Amos 9). Jeremiah relates the words of Yahweh heard during such a vision at the new year festival (Jer.26). Jeremiah further asserts that the false prophets have not stood in the divine Council, and have not seen Yahweh or heard his words (23:18). Isa.40 records the words of Yahweh spoken in Council, and includes Deutero-Isaiah's commissioning (40:6).

Post-exilic developments in the concept of the divine Council are unparallelled elsewhere in Canaanite religion (Mullen, 1980, p274). Yahweh becomes increasingly transcendent, and accordingly less active in the Council, delegating to lesser beings those functions which previously were reserved to him. This development is attested as early as Zech.3:1-7, where Joshua appears before the angel of God, מלאך יהוה, who presides in the assembly, and not before Yahweh himself. The direct encounter of the pre-exilic prophets with Yahweh is replaced by the encounter with an intermediary (Kingsbury, 1964, p179). The fact that a subordinate being could be depicted on the Throne of God and presiding in the Council, indicates the degree to which agents could be

appointed to function on God's behalf. Another significant development is that members of the Council acquire individual identities and specific functions. This development is particularly true of השטן, the accuser or adversary. The Satan is a member of the Council with specific functions, and, while he becomes increasingly sinister (cf Job 1f), he is not yet the personification of evil; a development found in the Intertestamental writings. While the Satan came to be regarded as a rebel against, and enemy of, God, he, like other subordinate heavenly beings, was originally a duly commissioned Divine Agent, whose functions were delegated by God.

The connection between Canaanite mythology and Hebrew tradition is illustrated in the vision of Dan.7, which is derived from the Canaanite conception of the meeting of the Council. The Ancient of Days, עתיק יומין, is the equivalent of 'El, the father of years in the Ugaritic pantheon. The one like a son of man is the equivalent of Ba`al, the storm god of Canaan, who is subservient to 'El, and appears before him in the Council. This connection is crucial to understanding issues regarding the "Son of Man" in later Jewish literature and the gospels, as will become clear in Part III.

The apocalyptic literature is characterised by the activity of angels. Michael and Gabriel emerge in Daniel, the former as the patron angel of Israel (12:1). This further illustrates the delegation of previous prerogatives of Yahweh to angels. Whereas in Deut.32:9

Israel had come directly under the care and jurisdiction of Yahweh, in the post-Exilic and Intertestamental periods, Michael came to be the guardian of Israel in some traditions, while in others, Israel remained directly under Yahweh's jurisdiction (eg Ecclus.17:17; Jub.15:31). The gentile nations continued to have their own heavenly patrons, no longer regarded as gods (Jub.15:31f; cf. I En.89:10ff) .

It is particularly in I Enoch and Jubilees that the angelology becomes complex and detailed. Classes and functions of angels are distinguished, and archangels become a distinct category, varying in names and numbers, but consistently including Michael and Gabriel (I En.9:1f, 20:1-8, 40:6ff). The superior classes of angels are involved in waiting upon God and mediating between God and man, and it is they who acquire personal names. Their functions and jurisdictions, delegated by God, are spelled out, inter alia, in I En.20:2-8. The lesser angels are those identified with the natural elements (Jub.2:2).

In the apocalyptic literature, where the plenary Divine Council is replaced by the mediation of individual angels, the revelation of the message of God which is to be proclaimed by the prophet is replaced by the revelation of cosmic secrets to the mystical recipient. Whereas previously the human functionary was admitted to the Council, the cosmic secrets came to be revealed by an angelic intermediary. This process is parallel to that reflected in Zechariah's vision where God's transcendence

is such that he is no longer present in the assembly of the Council. Even if the apocalyptic visionary is guided on a heavenly journey, he is not admitted, except as a spectator, to the proceedings of the Council. The function of the visionary becomes little more than to take note of and record what he sees and hears. The agency function is fulfilled by the heavenly revealer rather than by the terrestrial receiver.

The post-Exilic and Intertestamental literature also contains strong reactions against the thought that cosmic secrets can be revealed to a human recipient. In the Wisdom tradition, mysticism was not so much a matter of passive receipt of revelations as one of active intellectual pursuit of the divine mystery. Even where the theophanic vision is part of the religious experience of the community, the validity of revelations of heavenly secrets during such mystical experiences is denied. Job 38-41, a storm Theophany, is a case in point, where God is described as demonstrating the limits of human knowledge, and the consequent incompetence of Job to make the statements he made which question divine justice. The Testament of Job (36:8-38:8) and the book of Ecclesiasticus (3:18-25) deny the validity of knowledge revealed in apocalyptic visions, on the ground that cosmic knowledge is beyond human powers of comprehension. Where the mysticism is an intellectual exercise directed towards "a timeless apprehension of the transcendent through a unifying vision that gives bliss or security and normally accrues on a course of self-mastery and contemplation"

(Winston, 1981, p21), there is naturally less scope for the operation of Divine Agents than in the prophetic and apocalyptic traditions which are grounded in history, and where the initiative rests with the revealer rather than the recipient.

Wisdom mysticism is a mental exercise whereby the individual transcends time and space, in order to attain union with the divine emanations. This process became increasingly complex as more and more divine emanations were introduced, which mediated between God and the visionary. God and the Throne-chariot became increasingly remote until they were ultimately separated by ten Sephirot, the ten emanations through which the Divine is manifested in Merkabah mysticism. It is personifications of these emanations, as well as angels and outstanding human functionaries, usually identified with heavenly beings or concepts, to which Divine Agency functions were attributed in Wisdom thought. This phenomenon, as exemplified in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, will be examined in Part IV.

The concept of Divine Agency has been shown to be firmly rooted in the Hebrew religious tradition, and, in particular, in its mystical tradition, central to which is the vision of the Divine Council gathered about the Throne of God. The role of Divine Agent was played by both heavenly and human beings subject to God and members of the Divine Council. The remaining parts of this dissertation will be concerned with two specific figures

in Intertestamental Judaism, whose role as Divine Agents will come under discussion. Part III will deal with the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch as an example of Palestinian Apocalyptic Judaism. Part IV will deal with the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, representing the Hellenistic Jewish Wisdom tradition.

PART III

THE "SON OF MAN" IN THE SIMILITUDES OF ENOCH

The "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch, is a highly controversial figure in contemporary scholarship. Before examining the role of the "Son of Man" as a Divine Agent, it is therefore necessary to locate the figure in its literary-traditional and socio-historical context, giving due attention to a number of the contemporary issues.

Firstly, the meaning of the term "Son of Man" will be discussed, and the development of the "Son of Man" tradition traced, from its roots in ancient Near Eastern mythology, through the biblical tradition, to the Similitudes of Enoch. Secondly, the figure of Enoch in the Israelite tradition will be discussed, with particular attention to the Intertestamental period. A discussion of the role of the "Son of Man" as a Divine Agent in the Similitudes will then be possible.

A. The "Son of Man" in the Ancient Near Eastern and Hebrew Tradition

1. The Meaning of the Term "Son of Man"

The crucial issue regarding the term "Son of Man" is whether or not it is a title, or, perhaps more accurately, in which cases it is a title, and in which it is not. In the Old Testament, בן אדם is generally a variant form of אדם and simply means "a human being". Its most common use is as a form of address (eg. Ezek.2:1), and as a poetic variation of אדם (eg. Ps.8:4). According to Colpe, the Aramaic בר נשא is a figure of speech, which refers to a particular individual from among a group of men, while בן אנוש is an expression approximating the English man/kind (1972, p424). According to Fitzmyer, however, בר נשא is a late Aramaic development, and is not attested before 200 CE at the earliest (1979, p62). Any semantic distinction between בר נשא and בר אנש could therefore have developed only during that period.

Vermes, claiming scholarly consensus, asserts that בר אנש was in common use as a substitute for the indefinite pronoun, and was also used as a circumlocution for the first person pronoun, at the time the gospels were written (1967, p315). Fitzmyer challenges this assertion, and points out that the Targumic text Vermes cites in support of his argument on the second point (Cairo TgB Gen.4:14), is a late Aramaic writing, dating from after 200 CE (1979,

p58). Furthermore, there is no evidence that בר אנש was used as a circumlocution for the first person pronoun before the writing of the New Testament documents (Fitzmyer, 1979, p59).

The differences of opinion between Vermes and Fitzmyer are serious, and reflect the uncertainty that is inevitable in any field of scholarship required to base its findings on evidence as sparse, and as dubious, as is the case with the present issue. What is certain, however, is that Fitzmyer is methodologically more sound, as Vermes tends to ignore or disregard the dating of the documents he cites to support his arguments. In the absence of any conclusive evidence, therefore, a provisional acceptance of Fitzmyer's arguments seems appropriate.

Fitzmyer regards "the son of man" as primarily a generic statement, and distinguishes the generic use from the indefinite. Conclusive evidence of circumlocutional use is not attested until the late Aramaic period (1979, p58). Therefore, where there is no indication of an overriding theological connotation applied by the author to the term "son of man", it is to be understood in the generic or indefinite sense.

2. The Ancient Near Eastern Background to the "Son of Man" Concept

J. Theisohn has compiled a fairly concise, and relatively recent, summary of the various hypotheses which attempt to explain the emergence of the figure of the heavenly "Son of Man" in the Hebrew tradition (1975, p4). These theories fall into two basic categories: those which posit purely Jewish origins for the concept, none of which has proved tenable in the scholarly debate; and those which posit non-Jewish sources for the idea. Few of the latter have won acceptance in scholarship either, but a number do merit attention, and will be considered. Mowinckel's "Urmenschmythoshypothese" will be considered first. Then the Marduk myth, favoured most recently by Hooker, and, more particularly, the Ba`al myth, favoured by Cross, Mullen and Collins, will be discussed as possible sources of the "Son of Man" idea in the Hebrew tradition.

(a) Mowinckel's "Urmenschhypothese"

Mowinckel suggests that the "Son of Man" concept originated in the ancient Near Eastern myth of the Primordial Man, "Anthropos" (1959, p422), not to be confused with the first created man (1959, p423).

"Anthropos" is a divine, heavenly being, the son of the supreme god (Mowinckel, 1959, p427). The "Son of Man" is a divine, heavenly being (I En.46 et al.), and "may have been called "Son of the Most High God"" (Mowinckel, 1959,

p429). The latter contention is substantiated only by reference to the synoptic gospels, and is therefore inherently suspect, both on account of the date, and of the problems associated with the "Son of Man" issue in the gospels.

The Primordial Man is called by such names as "Man", "One like a man", etc. (Mowinckel, 1959, p427). The "Son of Man" is addressed and referred to in these terms, and is the prototype of humanity (Mowinckel, 1959, p430). This assertion is not substantiated by reference to any text.

The cosmos comes into existence through the Primordial Man (Mowinckel, 1959, p427). "The Son of Man ... seems [to be] ... in some way connected with creation" (Mowinckel, 1959, p430). The wording of this assertion illustrates its own inconclusive nature. Furthermore, Mowinckel fails to demonstrate conclusively the preexistence of the "Son of Man".

Anthropos is "often thought of" as king of paradise (Mowinckel, 1959, p428). The "Son of Man" is "in some way connected with the conception of paradise", sometimes as king (Mowinckel, 1959, p430). Dominion is undoubtedly an attribute of the "Son of Man", but this is not in itself sufficient to connect the "Son of Man" and Anthropos.

Anthropos is the primordial soul, the source of life, and the ideal pattern and prototype of humanity (Mowinckel, 1959, p428). The "Son of Man" is the ideal pattern of

mankind, and, in the Similitudes of Enoch, the prototype of the righteous elect (Mowinckel, 1959, p430). This connection is somewhat tenuous, as the prototype of a select group within a generic whole cannot function in the same way as the prototype of the whole. This can therefore not be considered conclusive evidence of any link between the two concepts.

Anthropos is the primordial sage, the source of all understanding and the possessor of secrets (Mowinckel, 1959, p428). The "most characteristic qualities" of the "Son of Man" are wisdom and understanding (Mowinckel, 1959, p430).

The destiny of Anthropos is the type of the destiny of mankind (Mowinckel, 1959, p428). The "Son of Man" is instrumental in creating the destiny of mankind (Mowinckel, 1959, p430). These ideas may be similar, but there is no clear connection between them. Furthermore, the active role of the "Son of Man" is not paralleled in Anthropos.

Anthropos is "sometimes" created for conflict with evil, and is accordingly a redeemer figure (Mowinckel, 1959, p428). The "Son of Man" is integrally connected to a dualistic conception of the universe, to conflict with evil, and to the redemption of the righteous (Mowinckel, 1959, p430). The concept of conflict with evil, both in the primordial era, and in creation, is too universal for this criterion to determine any connection between

Anthropos and the "Son of Man".

The ideal man and redeemer, Anthropos, is incarnated in the godly (Mowinckel, 1959, p428). The "Son of Man" is identified with the souls of the departed righteous, or rather they with him (Mowinckel, 1959, p430). The identification of the godly with their heavenly, eschatological counterpart, is undoubtedly a feature of Jewish apocalyptic thought. This identification cannot be equated with incarnation, however, and therefore does not provide an unambiguous link between the two figures.

The Primordial Man is integrally related to changes of era. In linear time-systems, such as the Iranian and Israelite, this would apply to the eschaton (Mowinckel, 1959, p429). The "Son of Man" is an eschatological figure, integrally involved in the inauguration of a new age.

The Primordial Man reveals himself on the clouds (Mowinckel, 1959, p329). The "Son of Man" comes on the clouds of heaven in the Similitudes of Enoch, and in the Christian gospels and post-Christian apocalypses (Mowinckel, 1959, p431). In Daniel, however, the figure is כבר אנש, one like a son of man, and not the "Son of Man". Nevertheless, Daniel is integral to the development of the "Son of Man" idea, as will become clear in the discussion below, and there may well be a connection here.

The Primordial Man is sometimes connected with resurrection (Mowinckel, 1959, p429). In the Similitudes

of Enoch, the Christian gospels, and the post-Christian apocalypses, the "Son of Man" "seems to have had some connexion" with the resurrection of the dead (Mowinckel, 1959, p431). It is arguable that here Mowinckel under-states his own case, and misses an opportunity to demonstrate a clear link between the two figures.

While some of his arguments are tenuous, Mowinckel nevertheless posits some possible points of contact between the "Son of Man" concept in Jewish apocalyptic and the mythological heritage of the ancient Near East. Mowinckel's hypothesis is fundamentally flawed, however, in that he assumes that all texts refer to the same "Son of Man" figure, and he accordingly conflates all the textual evidence into a single tradition, without giving due consideration to the development of the concept, and virtually ignores the possibility of diversity in the tradition. He further assumes that Jesus of Nazareth, as portrayed in the New Testament, accurately represents the Jewish concept of the "Son of Man". Nevertheless, while not in itself adequate to explain the emergence of the "Son of Man" concept, especially in that it does not account for the judgement motif prominent in the Similitudes of Enoch and in the Christian gospels, the "Urmenschmythoshypothese" is nevertheless a potentially valuable model for understanding the "Son of Man" concept in apocalyptic Judaism.

(b) The Ba`al and Marduk Myth Hypotheses

The Ba`al myth hypothesis of the origins of the "Son of Man" idea has won the widest acceptance in recent scholarship. While it does not account for the emergence of the terminology of the "Son of Man", it is the most satisfactory explanation of the mythical context in which the "Son of Man" figure appears.

The most complete presentation of this theory, is that of ET Mullen, who cites several significant parallels between the vision of Dan.7 and Canaanite mythology.

The Ancient of Days, עתיק יומין, clearly a circumlocution for God in Dan.7, is the equivalent of 'El, the father of years, 'abu shanima , in Ugaritic mythology (Mullen, 1980, p160). The anthropomorphic description of the Ancient of Days as an elderly, bearded man, is very similar to descriptions of 'El in the Ugaritic texts (eg. Coogan, 1978, pp38,95). Not only is fire a common feature in Canaanite and Hebrew theophanies, but the descriptions of the throne of 'El in the Ba`al myth (Coogan, 1978, p99f; cf. pp86,92) and of the throne of the Ancient of Days in Dan.7, are closely related (Mullen, 1980, p160).

The one like a son of man, כבר אנש, coming with the clouds of heaven, is parallel to Ba`al in Ugaritic mythology, and the scene in Dan.7 is based upon the storm theophany of Ba`al in Canaanite thought (Mullen, 1980, p161). The relationship between the one like a son of man and the

Ancient of Days, corresponds directly with that of Ba`al and ʻEl in the myth; in both cases, the former is subordinate to the latter (Mullen, 1980, p161). As the one like a son of man appears before the Ancient of Days, so Ba`al appears before ʻEl to receive dominion over the earth (Mullen, 1980, p162).

Mullen is not the only proponent of the Ba`al myth hypothesis. As well as the earlier scholars, Emerson and Rost, recent scholarship has tended to favour this theory. Colpe, like Mullen, compares Daniel's vision with the Ugaritic Ras Shamra texts, and draws parallels between the fourth beast and Itn the chaos dragon (alternatively Yamm the sea monster); between the one like a son of man and Ba`al the storm god who overcomes Itn, Yamm, Ashtar and Mot in the various traditions; and between the Ancient of Days and ʻEl the father of years (1972, p415). Colpe believes that the symbolism used in Daniel's vision was probably absorbed into the Israelite tradition prior to Daniel (1972, p418).

Collins also prefers the Ba`al myth hypothesis. He notes that, in the Israelite tradition, it is traditionally Yahweh who rides the clouds, but the rider of the clouds in the myth is subordinate to the Ancient of Days (1984, p81). This shift implies the inclusion of another divine figure in the vision, or at least in the myth that lies behind it.

A major discrepancy between the Ba`al myth and the vision

of Daniel, is that, whereas in the former Ba`al overcomes the beast, in the latter it is Yahweh who conquers. This demonstrates the redaction which takes place with the incorporation of older traditions. Monotheist sensitivities play a role in this, but it is also the divergent purposes of the various contributors to the tradition, which results in such ammendments. The imagery of the myth is retained, but applied to different circumstances, and to represent a new situation.

The Ba`al myth clearly has common origins with the Hebrew Throne-Theophany tradition. Not only is the imagery of the theophany similar, but the idea of a Divine Council is also present. This indicates convincingly that the the underlying conceptions of the universe in the Ugaritic myth are part of the common heritage of the ancient Near East, including Israel.

Similar to the Ba`al myth in many ways, but reflecting a somewhat different religious system, is the myth of Marduk and Tiamat, preserved in "Enuma Elis". Hooker compares Yahweh's victory over the fourth beast in Daniel 7 with Marduk's over Tiamat, and notes that, in Daniel, the victory over the beast is reserved to Yahweh (1967, p20). Certain adaptations of the tradition are therefore required for the thesis that the Marduk myth is the source of the "Son of Man" tradition. Whereas Ea and the other gods cede dominion to Marduk in return for destroying Tiamat; Yahweh kills the beast, and then delegates rule over the world to the one like a son of man. Israel's

monotheistic sensitivities do not account adequately for these alterations to the myth; nor do the different circumstances, as the mythological framework is quite different. Therefore, while it is possible that it provided some material for the conflict aspect of the "Son of Man" idea, it is unlikely that the Marduk myth was the major source of the "Son of Man" tradition. Coogan's hypothesis, however, that the Ba`al myth is dependant upon "Enuma Elis" (1978, pp75-77), is plausible; in which case "Enuma Elis" would have been an indirect source of the tradition behind Dan.7.

The Ba`al myth is undoubtedly that which accounts most adequately for the mythological framework of the "Son of Man" tradition. In a constantly interacting religious milieu such as that of the ancient Near East, it would be totally unreasonable to expect any idea to be dependent on a single source. Furthermore, inter-cultural contact is one of the major catalysts in the development of thought. Therefore, those aspects of the "Son of Man" idea not accounted for in the Ba`al myth can reasonably be sought in other ancient Near Eastern traditions. The origins of the term "Son of Man", for example, are to be found in the myth of the Primordial Man, and in the exegetical tradition which developed from the visions of Ezekiel and Daniel, rather than in the Ba`al myth. Non-Israelite sources, whether previously incorporated into the Israelite tradition or not, are necessary to account for the development of the "Son of Man" idea. It is highly likely that the Ba`al myth was known in ancient Israel;

and the creation myths in Genesis demonstrate the common origins of Israelite and other ancient Near Eastern creation mythology, which includes the concept of the Primordial Man. There is therefore no reason to doubt that these myths lie behind the "Son of Man" concept that emerged in post-exilic Judaism.

3. The Israelite Background to the "Son of Man" Idea

The term "Son of Man" occurs in a number of places in the exilic and post-exilic literature. The simile "like a man" or "like a son of man" is also crucial to understanding the emergence of the "Son of Man" concept. A number of exilic and post-exilic texts where these terms occur, will now be considered.

(a) Ezekiel

The first vision of Ezekiel can be dated, on the basis of 1:1-2, to c. 593 BCE (Von Rad, 1968, p189). This vision belongs to the tradition of the theophanic experience of the Israelite prophets. The most primitive documented form of this vision is that of Micaiah in I Kings 22:19-22, which dates from the ninth or eighth century BCE (Black, 1976, p58). The inaugural vision of Isaiah in Isa.6:1-13, which dates from c. 745 BCE (Von Rad, 1968, p119), represents a somewhat more developed form of the prophetic Throne-Theophany. Not only are the descriptions and symbolism more detailed and explicit, but the portrayal of God tends slightly more towards anthropomorphism. The vision of Ezekiel represents considerable further development in the tradition from the form of Isaiah's vision.

The depiction of God in Ezekiel's vision is explicitly anthropomorphic, and Kim suggests that this is an inversion of the P tradition that man is created in the

image of God (Gen.1:26). In Ezek.1:26, there is portrayed above the throne דמות כמראה אדם lit. "a likeness as the appearance of a man". This clearly refers to God. The word דמות implies similitude (BDB, 1976, p198). The figure above the throne is therefore not a man, but one whose appearance resembles that of a man. While this text does not adequately account for the emergence of the idea, especially as the anthropomorphic depiction of God is an explicit simile, it is an example of the use of anthropomorphic symbolism in speculation about heavenly beings, and, on this account, may provide part of the background to the "Son of Man" concept in Judaism.

In the same vision, Ezekiel is addressed from above the throne by God as בן אדם (2:1,3 etc.). Here, the term is a circumlocution for אדם and simply means "man". Ezekiel, the recipient of the theophanic vision, is addressed as "son of man", according to Hooker, in order to emphasise the contrast between God and man (1967, p31). Ezekiel is not the "Son of Man"; בן אדם is applied to him strictly in its literalist sense. This sense of the term recurs elsewhere in the apocalyptic literature, eg. in Dan.8:17, and in a number of places in the Similitudes of Enoch, in the Targums (Vermes, 1976, pp315f), and possibly in the Christian gospels. While the possibility that this usage in apocalyptic literature led to the application of the term to an eschatological figure cannot be denied, such a development would imply considerable confusion in the process. This usage may explain partly the application of the term, but it cannot explain the development of the

"Son of Man" idea.

Ezekiel was undoubtedly significant in the development of Jewish apocalypticism. His symbolism and language are emulated in later, more developed, apocalyptic literature. The possibility therefore cannot be excluded, that his anthropomorphic simile, and his use of בן אדם, contributed to the development of the "Son of Man" idea in apocalyptic Judaism.

(b) Psalm 8

The dating of the Psalms is inherently problematic. Although attributed to David, and included in a corpus within the Psalter which is associated with the J tradition, allusions to the creation myth in Gen.1, indicate that Psalm 8 is more closely associated with the P tradition, and dates from the Persian period.

The term בן אדם occurs in v.4 (MT v.5). While clearly originally a poetic variant for אדם, this term came to be interpreted in the sense of the eschatological "Son of Man". Whereas, in the Hebrew Bible, the son of man is created by Yahweh to be a little lower than the heavenly beings, the <u>'elohiym</u> , in the Targums, this text is reinterpreted, to state that the "Son of Man" is created to be a little lower than God (Mowinckel, 1959, p374). This development demonstrates the freedom of interpretation and reinterpretation that was part of the Jewish exegetical tradition.

While it is unlikely that Ps.8:4 was a major factor in the development of the "Son of Man" tradition, its interpretation in the Targums demonstrates that it could be understood in the light of that tradition, within the parameters of established Jewish exegetical norms. Therefore, the possibility cannot be excluded, that the interpretation of this text contributed to the development of the "Son of Man" concept in post-exilic Judaism (cf. Heb.2:5-8).

(c) Daniel

The book of Daniel dates from c. 165 BCE, and it is commonly supposed that Dan.7:13 is the earliest occurence of the "Son of Man" in Jewish literature. While this is clearly not the case, as will be shown below, this text remains one of the most crucial in the development of the "Son of Man" idea. This text is also important on account of the presence of the agency idea implicit in 7:14.

It has been seen above that this vision appears to be related to, if not ultimately derived from, the Canaanite Ba`al myth. This is not the only source of tradition behind the vision, however. The Throne-Theophany of the Ancient of Days, עתיק יומין, belongs to the theophanic tradition of Hebrew prophecy. The anthropomorphic portrayal of God, the Ancient of Days, is more explicit than in the more ancient theophanic visions, including that of Ezekiel. Whereas in Ezek.1:26 God is described as

resembling a man in appearance, in Dan.7:9 this simile is implied, and particular features of the appearance of the Ancient of Days are described.

The one explicitly described as resembling a man in this text is not God, but another figure, one כבר אנש, "like a son of man", coming with the clouds of heaven (Dan.7:13). As in the case of the anthropomorphic description of God in Ezek.1:26, the simile implies that the being described is not a human being, but merely resembles one in appearance. This does not answer the question as to who this man-like being is, however, and scholars have debated the identity of the one like a son of man, without reaching any consensus.

Mowinckel identifies the one like a son of man with Israel (1959, p350). This corporate being represents the people of God, who are to be given worldwide dominion. Once God has destroyed their enemies, he will delegate rule over the world to his people (Mowinckel, 1959, p352). Muilenburg also opts for corporate representation. He fails to note the simile, and identifies the "Son of Man" with the saints of the Most High of Dan.7:25 (1960, p199). Russell notes the simile, and interprets the figure symbolically, identifying the one like a son of man with the saints, the triumphant people of God in the eschatological kingdom (1971, pp325f).

Black identifies the one like a man as a "second divinity" (1976, p61). While the vision of Daniel lies in the

tradition of Isa.6 and Ezek.1, the introduction of the second divinity is a significant departure from that tradition. This second divinity inherits the anthropomorphism from the Ancient of Days, the first divinity in the vision (Black, 1976, p60). The second divinity represents the saints of the Most High, the purified and redeemed Israel (Black, 1976, p61). Presumably, the Ancient of Days is to be identified with the Most High, and the second divinity remains subordinate to this figure. Black's thesis, therefore, differs with those of Mowinckel, Muilenburg and Russell, essentially in that it implies that the man-like figure is divine in his own right.

Casey asserts that the one like a son of man is neither a human nor a heavenly being, but a purely symbolic being, with no identity or existence outside the vision (1979, pp27,29). Casey notes that the dominion delegated to the one like a man in Dan.7:14, is delegated to the saints in v.27 (1979, p24). The one like a son of man corresponds to the saints of the most high, and is symbolic of them in v.14. Casey's interpretation of the text differs from that of the other scholars cited, in that he denies the existence of the being described, and reduces the figure to the realm of symbol. The one like a son of man is "a pure symbol, with no experiences at all, other than the symbolic ones in vss.13-14" (1979, p39). While contemporary thought would undoubtedly be inclined to agree with Casey in this regard, it is highly questionable whether the author and his original readers, to whose

existential situation the vision relates, would have confined the existence of the one like a son of man, and all that figure represented, to the text. Casey's assertion is thoroughly anachronistic, and does not adequately take into account the religious and intellectual milieu in which the text under discussion was written.

Collins follows to the logical conclusion the corporate identity of the one like a son of man as the representative of the saints of the Most High. If the one like a son of man is the corporate representative of the eschatological community of Israel, he must be the heavenly counterpart of Israel, Michael (Collins, 1984, p82). The one like a son of man is not merely the corporate representation of the saints; he is their heavenly counterpart. Casey's objection to this identification (1979, p32) rests upon his highly questionable thesis concerning the composition of Daniel. He asserts that the Aramaic section of Daniel was written by a different author to the Hebrew sections (1979, p7), and that Dan.2-7 is a compositional unit, and that Dan.7 therefore has no connection with Dan.8-12 (1979, p9), which he dates to a later period. Casey fails to explain how a later redactor could have combined literature in two languages into one book. It is highly unlikely that anyone other than the original author would have done this. The most plausible explanation for the discrepancy in languages is that the Aramaic section was intended for popular consumption while the more esoteric sections were

written in Hebrew to be read only by the learned. The basis of Casey's objection to the identification of the one like a son of man as the heavenly counterpart of the saints, would appear therefore to be invalid. In the parallel visions to Dan.7 in Dan.8-12, Michael fulfils the role played by the one like a son of man in Dan.7 as the heavenly counterpart of Israel. In Dan.12:1ff, Michael arises and inaugurates the eschatological judgement, which will bring delivery to Israel and condemnation to her enemies.

That the one like a son of man in some way represents the saints of the Most High, the faithful of Israel, seems to be beyond doubt. It is the nature of this being, and the form of representation, that is in question. The plausibility of Black's hypothesis of a second divinity, depends on what he means by "divinity", which he fails to stipulate. There can be little question of a second god, in any form, in apocalyptic Judaism with its particularist tendency. However, if by "divinity", Black means a heavenly being who is not of the created order, then his thesis has some plausibility. It is most likely, however, that the one like a man is a created heavenly being, subordinate to Yahweh, the Ancient of Days. There is no reason to believe that the visionary did not envisage more than symbolic existence for this figure, who is like, but is not, a human being. There is therefore no reason to deny that the one like a son of man is a heavenly being.

It is almost certain that the one like a son of man in

Dan.7:13 is a heavenly being, the representative of the holy ones. While it is not possible to be as certain as to the particular identification of the heavenly being, there is no reason to dispute that he is Michael, the heavenly counterpart of the faithful of Israel (cf. Dan.12:1). If this identification is to be denied, one would have to hypothesise another being, who would be the heavenly counterpart of the particular community within Israel, in which Daniel was written. There is possible precedent for this idea in the Melkisedeq fragment found at Qumran (11QMelk). The state of this text, however, is such that it can not be used to substantiate an hypothesis of this nature.

The most likely identity of the one like a son of man in Dan.7:13, is Michael, the heavenly patron of Israel. Whoever this being is, he receives from the Ancient of Days eternal sovereign power (7:14). The one like a son of man is therefore a Divine Agent, to whom God has delegated specific powers. As the heavenly counterpart of the elect community, this being has been given the patronage over that community. If he is Michael, as seems probable, then he has assumed this function which had earlier been reserved to Yahweh (cf. Deut.32:9). He is therefore Yahweh's Agent in the patronage of his chosen people.

Dan.7 is of vital importance to the development of the "Son of Man" idea in the Hebrew tradition. Not only does it provide a major link in the development of the mythological background, but the reference to one like a

son of man in the context of the myth cannot have failed to contribute to the development of the term "Son of Man".

While other texts are crucial to the development of the "Son of Man" idea, Dan.7 is without question in a pivotal position in the development of the tradition, without which the development of the "Son of Man" figure in Jewish apocalyptic cannot be understood.

B. The Enoch Tradition and Literature

1. The Figure of Enoch

Enoch, or Hanok, enters the biblical tradition in Gen.5:18-24 (P). This text, which clearly presupposes a more complete myth, ends with the words לקחאתו אלהים, "God (or "heavenly beings") took him". While it is not possible to be certain to what extent the myth presupposed in the biblical text was already entrenched in the oral tradition of Israel, or came to form part of it; there can be little doubt that the tradition was expanded, and this text became a source of later speculation, which grew into a vast tradition, which included the literature attributed to Enoch. From the speculative assumption that God took Enoch in order to reveal esoteric secrets to him, developed the Enoch tradition and literature (Nickelsburg, 1981, p46).

There are several possible prototypes to Enoch in Mesopotamian mythology. In the Sumerian myth, Enmeduranki of Sippar is the seventh king, as Enoch is the seventh from Adam in the P tradition. Enmeduranki was a diviner and receiver of revelations. Utuabzu, the seventh sage and contemporary of Enmeduranki, was taken up into heaven. In the Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic, Utnapishtim was taken by God, and received immortality. While no single Mesopotamian prototype of Enoch can be isolated, it is clear that the Enoch figure belongs to the ancient Near

Eastern mythological milieu.

Collins suggests that the Enoch tradition developed in the context of ancient Near Eastern "competitive historiography" (1984, p35), which could perhaps be more appropriately termed "competitive metahistoriography". The various nations asserted the greater antiquity and wisdom of their patriarchs and sages, Enoch being one of the figures so developed in the Israelite tradition. Collins locates this activity in the eastern Diaspora (1984, p36), although the traditions came to be incorporated into Palestinian Judaism.

During the Second Temple Period, Enoch was conceived primarily as the recipient and teacher of divine knowledge, and also as the scribe, the inventor of writing and of the calendar (Stone, 1984, p395). As well as in the literature attributed to him, Enoch appears in Ecclus.44:16, 1QGenApoc.2:2, Jub.4:16-23 and TestAbr.B.19, and quite possibly also in other literature no longer extant. He appears also in the (probably) Samaritan document, Ps.Eupolemus, quoted by Eusebius in his Ecclesiastical History (ch.17), and in the Christian Letter to the Hebrews 11:5-6.

2. The Enoch Literature

The extant Enoch Literature is preserved in three corpora: I (Ethiopic) Enoch; II (Slavonic) Enoch; and III (Hebrew) Enoch.

I Enoch is a composite document, extant as a unit only in Ge'ez Ethiopic, although fragments of individual components have been found in other languages, most significantly the Aramaic fragments from Qumran. I En.1-36, the Book of Watchers, dates from the middle of the second century BCE, or earlier (Collins, 1984, p36). I En.37-71, the Book of Similitudes, as the document of primary interest to this study, will be discussed below in greater detail. The Astronomical Book, I En.72-82, dates from c 200 BCE, or earlier. The Book of Dreams, I En.83-90, which includes the Animal Apocalypse, dates from the Maccabaean Revolt, c 160 BCE. The Epistle of Enoch, I En.91-108, which includes the Apocalypse of Weeks, dates from the same period. There can be little doubt that these documents were originally written in a Semitic language, and the Qumran find could indicate that this was Aramaic rather than Hebrew. The early Enoch literature seems to have been motivated by concern at the results of Hellenism, both in the religious sphere, with the erosion of traditions, and in the social sphere, with the aggravation of class distinctions (Collins, 1984, p63). Separatist tendencies, which asserted the prior authority of Enoch over against Moses and the Law, may also have been a factor, but not to the extent that the community in

which the documents were written could not promote the cause of the Maccabees (Collins, 1984, p63).

II Enoch is extant only in Slavonic, although it was originally written in Greek. It is preserved in two recensions, the shorter of which is closer to the original (Collins, 1984, p195). This work dates from the first century CE (Russell, 1979, p40), although it undoubtedly contains older traditions.

III Enoch is extant in the Hebrew original. This work dates from considerably later than the other documents, having been written during the fifth or sixth century, and, while significant in that it explicitly identifies Enoch with Metatron, cannot be considered a part of the Intertestamental literature.

The Enoch literature belongs to the apocalyptic tradition of Intertestamental Judaism. Theosophy and cosmogony accompany the revelations of divine secrets, and the accounts of heavenly journeys; though not in the more systematic manner of the Wisdom tradition. The mysticism of the Enoch tradition is overtly apocalyptic, and there is no hint of doubt that divine knowledge and cosmic secrets can be revealed to a human recipient. Such a recipient, however, must be one of exceptional holiness. The Throne-Chariot of God is the seat of judgement, rather than the object of mystical ascent, as in the Wisdom tradition and rabbinic Judaism. Nevertheless, the Throne-Theophany is central to the mysticism and

spirituality of the Enoch tradition.

3. The Similitudes of Enoch

(a) Date and Origin of the Similitudes

The Book of the Similtudes of Enoch is one of the most controversial documents in the Pseudepigrapha. Extant only in Ethiopic as chapters 37-71 of I Enoch, this document is a translation from a Semitic original whose origins are disputed by the various scholars.

While Milik asserts that the Similitudes are a Christian document, dating from c. 270 CE, other scholars are agreed that the book is of Jewish authorship. Sjoeberg has demonstrated convincingly that there is no basis of argument for Christian authorship (1946, p6), and little ground for believing there to be Christian interpolations in the text. "Wir haben ein Buch vor uns, dessen Inhalt sich vollstaendig aus juedischen Voraussetzungen erklaeren laesst und keine spezifisch Christlichen Zuegen aufweist" (Sjoeberg, 1946, p23).

While Charles dates the Similitudes to c. 100 BCE, contemporary scholarly consensus dates the work to the first century CE (Charlesworth, 1975, p322). More precise dating is problematic, as historical allusions are few and uncertain.

Sjoeberg points out that there is no hope expressed in the

future restoration of the Jerusalem Temple, and asserts that the work must therefore date from before 70 CE. Suter notes that IV Ezra and II Baruch, the Jewish apocalypses which post-date the fall of Jerusalem, are obsessed with that event, while the Similitudes do not even relate to it (1979, p29). It is therefore most improbable that the Similitudes were written after the destruction of Jerusalem. Unless it can be shown that any community within Judaism was oblivious to the fall of Jerusalem, this argument must be regarded as almost conclusive. The destruction of Jerusalem was a cataclysmic event, to which any Jewish apocalypse, or other writing, would have had to relate.

The Parthian invasion related in I En.56:5-8 has been used by many scholars to date the Similitudes. Sjoeberg identifies the invasion as that which took place in 40-38 BCE, and accordingly dates the Similitudes to that period (1946, p38). Josephus' account of this invasion, however, records that Jews volunteered to join the Parthian forces in order to oust Herod (Antiq.XIV.13.3); a policy of hailing the new invader as liberator from the old oppressor, followed consistently by the Jews of the Intertestamental period. The account in I En.56, on the other hand, is hostile to the Parthians. It seems most unlikely, therefore, that the invasion alluded to in the Similitudes is that of 40-38 BCE, or any other during a time of foreign occupation of Palestine.

The same reference to a Parthian invasion asserts that

"the city of my righteous ones" will be an obstacle to the Parthian advance (I En.56:7). There can be little doubt that this city is Jerusalem, and this text is often understood to imply that the walls of Jerusalem were still standing at the time the Similitudes were written. This view assumes that this text is an explicit historical allusion, which Suter (1979, p12) and Collins (1984, p143) refute, preferring to interpret it as an apocalyptic motif. Suter regards it as unlikely, however, that this apocalyptic motif would have been used after the fall of Jerusalem (1979, p29). Whatever the merits of their argument, the historical allusion is problematic, as the "Parthians" could well be a concealed reference to the Romans or other invaders (cf. Rev.13). It is therefore not possible to identify the invader with any certainty, still less the particular invasion.

Knibb argues that the absence of the Similitudes from the Qumran collection indicates that this work dates from after the destruction of the community in 68 CE (1979, p358). This presupposes that the Qumran library housed a comprehensive collection of Jewish literature, which was clearly not the case. No copy of the biblical Book of Esther has been found at Qumran; nor were all the apocrypha and pseudepigrapha which are known to predate the destruction of Qumran in its library. The absence of a particular document from Qumran, is therefore not a valid criterion for determining a late date for that document.

Knibb argues further that the "Son of Man" sayings in the

Similitudes fit best into the situation at the end of the first century CE (1979, p358). The information necessary to make such a statement is not available at this stage in the debate, however. The similarities between the "Son of Man" sayings in the Similitudes and those in IV Ezra and II Baruch, do not necessarily imply that the works are contemporary, as Knibb asserts (1979, p359). Knibb fails to produce the evidence he requires to date the Similitudes of Enoch to the last quarter of the first century CE. Suter's argument, likewise, that the "Son of Man" sayings in the Similitudes are more primitive than those in the gospels, and therefore must predate them (1979, p13), assumes that the concept developed in an identical pattern in the various traditions within Judaism. This view cannot be substantiated.

Suter locates the Similitudes within the context of the development of Merkabah mysticism (1979, p24). He cites the distinction between heaven and the heaven of heavens in I En.71:5-7, and concludes that the Similitudes must predate the emergence of the concept of seven heavens in Merkabah mysticism during the first century CE. He accordingly dates the Similitudes to early in that century (1979, p25). Dating the Similitudes according to the evidence of chapter 71 is problematic, as this chapter is an appendix which may have been added later. Black has argued that this appendix reflects an earlier stratum in the Enoch tradition than the rest of the Similitudes (1976, p70). If this is correct, then the Similitudes cannot be dated to the first century on this basis.

However, dating literature on the basis of a particular idea, is hazardous, as the same concept is not necessarily accepted as readily or developed as rapidly in every context.

Mearns asserts that the longer recension of the Testament of Abraham, which probably dates from the first century CE, includes an implied polemic against the conception of Enoch as the eschatological judge, as he is portrayed in I En.71 (1979, p363). In TestAbr(B).11, Abel is seated on the throne of judgement, while Enoch, the scribe of righteousness, prosecutes. Michael explains somewhat emphatically to Abraham that "it is not Enoch's business to give sentence" (11:7). The shorter, and earlier, A recension does not include this implied polemic; Adam is the judge, and Enoch is not mentioned. On the basis of his assessment of the B recension of the Testament of Abraham, Mearns posits a date for the Similitudes during the years c. 40-50 CE (1979, p364,369). However, it is not possible to be certain whether or not, in the Semitic original of I En.71:14, Enoch is the eschatological judge, or whether the text is at least open to that interpretation. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the placing of Abel on the throne of judgement in TestAbr.11 implies any polemic against I Enoch. Although Enoch is somewhat forcibly subordinated to Abel, which could be attributable simply to Abel's greater antiquity; Therefore, while there may be some substance to this argument of Mearns, there can be no certainty.

Suter suggests that the circumstances which gave rise to the Similitudes, were those of c. 40 CE, when Caligula attempted to enforce emperor-worship on the Jews (1979, pp30f). This accounts for the antipathy towards the secular powers, particularly Kings, and may also account for the hostility to the "Parthian" invasion. Resistance to the proposed erection of the emperor's image in the Temple was considerable. Jerusalem, the city of the righteous, would have been a real obstacle to Caligula's plans, so much so that the governor of Syria hesitated to carry out the emperor's orders. It therefore seems plausible to identify the "Parthian" invasion in I En.56:5ff with Caligula's scheme to erect his statue in the Jerusalem Temple, by force if necessary. Jerusalem would resist this at all costs. The author of the Similitudes predicts that the issue would be resolved by the enemies of Israel fighting among themselves.

It seems, therefore, that the most plausible date for the Similitudes of Enoch, is at the time of Caligula's attempt to impose emperor-worship in Jerusalem. Had Caligula not died before the governor of Syria finally prepared to mobilise his army; there would have been attrition in Judaea. This dating satisfies most of the pointers the various scholars have gleaned from the text. It predates the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple. The "Parthian" invasion is one to which most Jews were hostile. It is earlier than, or contemporary with, the Testament of Abraham. The Similitudes would have been of no interest to the Qumran community, which had repudiated

the Jerusalem Temple. For the purposes of this study, therefore, the Similitudes of Enoch will be dated to c 40 CE.

I Enoch was translated into Ethiopic, either from the Semitic original or from a Greek translation thereof, between the years c. 350-650 CE (Isaac, 1983, p8). While the Aramaic fragments of the other four books found at Qumran, tend to favour Aramaic as the orignal of those parts of I Enoch, the Similitudes are extant in no language other than Ethiopic. There is no consensus or certainty among scholars as to the original language of the Similitudes. While Collins favours Aramaic (1984, p143), and Mowinckel Hebrew (1959, p356), the majority of scholars prefer not to speculate as to which was the original language. It is not necessary for the purposes of this study to attempt to decide this issue, and the question will therefore be left open.

(b) The Composition of the Similitudes of Enoch

In terms of the typology of apocalypses formulated by Collins and his associates, the Similitudes are a Type IIb apocalypse; one which relates an otherworldly journey, and expounds a cosmic or political eschatology (Collins, 1979, p23).

The Similitudes of Enoch belong to the tradition of the theophanic visions of the Israelite prophets, and represent a crucial stage in the transformation of that

tradition, through the apocalyptic visions, to Merkabah mysticism. This transformation begins with Ezekiel's vision (Black, 1976, p59), and continues through the Jewish apocalyptic literature, until, in the Similitudes, the crucial elements of Merkabah mysticism, apocalyptic visions, theosophy and cosmogony, are all present (Scholem, 1955, p43). The seven-heaven concept has not yet emerged, and the Throne of God is the seat of judgement rather than an object of mystical ascent. The heavenly ascent, and the songs of the angels, however, are present.

The Similitudes of Enoch can be divided into the following sections :

I En.37 : Introduction

I En.38-44 : First Parable : The Ascent of Enoch

I En.45-57 : Second Parable : Judgement

I En.58-69 : Third Parable : Salvation and Judgement

I En.70-71 : Epilogue : The Assumption of Enoch

Suter argues that I En.38-69 was the original book of Similitudes (1979, p132). I En.37; parts of 65-68; 70; and a number of interpolations, form a second stratum, which, Suter suggests, was that which introduced the name of Enoch to the document (1979, p132). I En.71 would presumably represent the final stage in the composition of the Similitudes.

Black divides the third parable into three parts: the third parable (I En.58-59); a section incorporated from the "Book of Noah" (I En.60-67) and the Revelation of

Michael (I En.68-69). Suter regards the hypothetical "Book of Noah", supposedly incorporated into I Enoch, as too diverse to have originated from one source (1979, p32). Furthermore, the Noachic fragments in I Enoch deal with fallen angels, while the "Book of Noah" alluded to in Jub.10:13f and Jub.21:10 deals with medicine and healing, and with the offering of sacrifices. The Book of Noah mentioned in Jubilees therefore appears to belong to a different literary genre to the Noachic fragments in I Enoch. Suter asserts therefore that no "Book of Noah" was incorporated into the Similitudes (1979, p154). He posits, as an alternative, that the older traditions incorporated into the Similitudes, are a midrash on Isa.24:17-23 in I En.54:1-56:4 and I En.64:1-68:1; and a midrash on Gen.6:1-4 in I En.69:2-12 (1979, p37).

I En.70-71 forms a double appendix to the Similitudes. While Sjoeberg insists that the two chapters formed one tradition (1959, pp159-162), Black asserts that I En.71 represents an older tradition subsequently appended to the Similitudes (1976, p70). Collins notes that, while repetition is characteristic of apocalypses, it is rare in their narrative frameworks (1980, p123). He suggests that I En.71 was appended to the Similitudes to identify the "Son of Man" as Enoch, in reaction against the appropriation of that title for Jesus by the early Church (1980, p126; 1984, p153).

It seems therefore that the Similitudes were composed in three stages. The first was the apocalyptic visions; the

second their narrative framework, which introduced the association with Enoch, and the inclusion of a number of midrashic passages; the third stage being the addition of the appendix in I En.71.

C. The Figure of the "Son of Man"

1. Traditions behind the "Son of Man" Figure

The origins, both within and without the biblical tradition, of the "Son of Man" idea, have been considered above. The ancient Near Eastern concept of the Divine Council, and particularly its development in Ezek.1 and Dan.7, were shown to be vitally important in the development of the "Son of Man" concept. Another possible biblical source for this idea, as interpreted in the Similitudes, is the servant songs of Deutero-Isaiah.

Jeremias notes that the עבד יהוה is called בחירי, my chosen (one) in Isa.42:1, and צדיק, the righteous (one) in Isa.53:11 (1967, p687). He notes further that these texts are both interpreted messianically in the Targums, where the term עבדי משיחא is applied (1967, p681). עבד is also applied to the Davidic Messiah in Ezek.34:23f and Ezek.37:24f, and in the Targums of those texts (Jeremias, 1967, pp681f). The servant of Yahweh was therefore closely identified with the Davidic Messiah in the Jewish tradition by the time the Targums were written.

Russell notes that, not only is the servant identified with the Messiah in the Targums, but the Targum on Isa.53 transfers the sufferings endured by the servant in the Hebrew text, to the enemies of Israel, whom the servant is to overcome (1971, p335). The conception of vicarious

suffering, prominent in the Hebrew text of Isa.53, is absent from the Targum (Russell, 1971, p335). This reinterpretation of the role of the servant, is potentially crucial to understanding the "Son of Man" in relation to the servant of Yahweh.

Jeremias cites a number of apparent allusions to the servant songs of Deutero-Isaiah in the Similitudes (1967, p687). In I En.48:4, the "Son of Man" is described as "the light of the nations", in apparent allusion to Isa.42:6 and Isa.49:6. In I En.48:6, the "Son of Man" is described as "hidden before God", in apparent allusion to Isa.49:2. In I En.46:4; 55:4 and 62:1-3, the homage of the secular rulers, and the power of the "Son of Man" over them, is described, in apparent allusion to Isa.49:7 and 52:15. While these allusions are plausible, Jeremias' assertion that the reference to the "Son of Man" having been named before creation is an allusion to Isa.49:1 (1967, p687), is somewhat less plausible, as there is no mention of creation in the Isaiah text. Nevertheless, there is a plausible link between the servant of Yahweh in Deutero-Isaiah and the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch.

Nickelsburg cites parallels between Isa.52-53, and I En.62-63, which indicate that the "Elect One" (who will be seen below to be identical with the "Son of Man") in the latter is modelled on the servant in the former (1972, p71). He posits that, between the writing of Deutero-Isaiah and the Antiochan persecution, Isa.52-53

had come to be interpreted as describing the pending exaltation of the persecuted, and judgement on the persecutors (1972, p81). He suggests further, that the traditions of Isa.13-14 and Isa.52-53, came to be conflated (1972, p82). In I En.62-63, which preserve a more primitive form of the tradition than Dan.12 (Nickelsburg, 1972, p78), and elsewhere in the Similitudes, Dan.7 is the source of imagery for the description of the eschatological judge, while the Isaiah tradition provides the account of the the judgement scene and process (Nickelsburg, 1972, p86).

Despite Sjoeberg's dissension (1946, pp127ff), it seems probable that, in addition to the tradition of the Divine Council, the servant songs of Deutero-Isaiah influenced the development of the figure of the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch. This is important for the present study, as the role of the servant as a Divine Agent reinforces the agency motif brought into the tradition from other sources.

2. "Son of Man" as a Title

Before proceeding to examination of the role of the "Son of Man" as a Divine Agent, it is necessary to decide whether or not the expression "Son of Man" is a title. The problems in deciding this issue are exacerbated by the fact that the original Semitic text is no longer extant. Therefore, only a provisional solution to the issue, on the basis of the Ethiopic translation, is possible.

The Ethiopic text of I Enoch uses three expressions which are conventionally rendered "Son of Man" in English. Each merits brief consideration.

ወልደ ሰብእ walda sab'e . "Sohn des Menschen" (Sjoeberg, 1946, p42). As in Hebrew or Aramaic, the Ethiopic term is to be understood with "Man" conveying no implications of gender. According to Colpe (1972, p424) and Knibb (1978, p38), walda sab'e is the equivalent to the Aramaic בר נשא.

ወለደ ብእሲ walda be'esi . "Sohn des Mannes" (Sjoeberg, 1946, p42). In this expression, "Man" is to be understood as conveying masculine connotations. Knibb equates walda be'esi with the Aramaic ברא דגבוא (1978, p38). The expression ወለደ ነፍሰት , "Sohn des Weibes", "Son of Woman" also occurs, but, according to Sjoeberg, only in error where walda be'esi is the correct rendition (1946, pp9,42).

ወለደ እጓለ እመሕያው walda 'equala 'emaheyaw . "Sohn des Menschgeborenen" (Sjoeberg, 1946, p42). This expression translates "Son of the One born of Man"; "Man" conveying no connotations of gender. Colpe equates walda 'equala 'emaheyw with the Aramaic בר אנש and the Hebrew בן אדם (1972, p424), and Knibb with the Aramaic בוא דבר נשא (1978, p38).

Casey refutes the equation of particular Ethiopic expressions with particular Semitic originals, and asserts

that all three Ethiopic terms are translations of בן אדם or בר אנשא (1979, p102). While it cannot be assumed that these three Ethiopic terms directly reflect three Aramaic or Hebrew terms, especially in the light of Fitzmyer's research into the attestation of בר (נש)א considered above (1979, p62), the use of three synonymous terms to designate the same eschatological figure, implies that, for the translator, if not for the author, "Son of Man" was not a formal title. However, the analogy of the English terms king, monarch and sovereign, illustrates that, even if not translating a formal title, the expressions rendered "Son of Man" can nevertheless refer unambiguously to a specific being. This is clearly the case in the Similitudes of Enoch, where the expression "Son of Man" clearly describes the appearance of a particular heavenly being (Colpe, 1972, p423). The expressions are furthermore meaningless outside the apocalyptic context of the text (Sjoeberg, 1946, p59).

As it is not possible to be certain as to the terminology used in the Semitic original of I Enoch, the issue as to whether "Son of Man" is a title cannot therefore be resolved simply on the basis of the terminology of the Ethiopic translation.

"Son of Man" is almost invariably prefaced by some form of pronoun in the Similitudes. Walda sab'e is prefaced by zeku , that (I En.46:2; 48:2) and zentu , this (I En.46:4). Walda be'esi occurs on its own (I En.62:5) and prefaced by we'etu , the third person personal pronoun (I

En.69:29(twice); 71:14). Walda ʾequala ʾemaheyaw occurs on its own (I En.62:7; 69:27), with zeku (I En.62:9,14; 63:11) and with weʾetu (I En.69:27; 70:11; 71:17). Some scholars, such as Nickelsburg (1981, p215), regard the use of pronouns as qualification, and therefore assert that "Son of Man" is not a title. This is not necessarily the case, as the demonstrative pronoun could equally indicate that "Son of Man" is, in fact, a title. The use of the pronoun could emphasise that reference is being made to the "Son of Man", and not merely to a son of man. Casey notes that, while the demonstrative pronoun is used on twelve occasions in conjuction with "Son of Man", it is never used in conjunction with "Elect One" (1979, p100). This does not prove that "Son of Man" was not a title, however; it merely shows that "Elect One" was a less ambiguous phrase.

A further consideration is that there is no definite article in Ethiopic, and the demonstrative pronouns may replace the Greek definite article. While Casey objects that this would only be possible if the Ethiopic was translated from Greek (1979, p101), he fails to prove that the pronouns could not have been used to translate the Hebrew or Aramaic definite article. As there is no certainty as to the language from which the Ethiopic was translated, there can be no certainty as to the significance of the demonstrative pronouns and other qualifiers, irrespective of whether Casey is correct in his assertion. The pronouns cannot therefore be used to resolve whether or not "Son of Man" is a title in the

Similitudes.

Collins notes that the "Son of Man" figure is introduced as "one with the appearance of a man" (I En.46:1), in clear allusion to Dan.7:13 (1980, p112). Thereafter, the "Son of Man" figure is referred to as "that Son of Man" (Collins, 1980, p112). Although Nickelsburg is correct in pointing out that heavenly beings are frequently referred to simply as men in Daniel (1981, p215), in the Similitudes the phrase "Son of Man" is applied to a particular heavenly being, previously identified. While the term is also applied in the literal sense (eg. I En.60:10), the context usually makes the distinction between technical and non-technical use abundantly clear.

The issue as to whether "Son of Man" can be considered a title or not, depends largely on how rigidly the definition of "title" is applied. While the term is used in what is clearly the literal sense, it is also applied consistently and unambiguously to a particular figure. While this does not imply that the term was a previously recognized title, it nevertheless came to function as a title, even if not in a set form, in the Similitudes. In the absence of the original text of I Enoch, it is not possible to be more certain than this.

3. The Identity of the "Son of Man"

"Son of Man" is not the only designation given to a particularly eminent heavenly being in the Similitudes of Enoch. Other titles used are heruy , "Elect One", sadq , "Righteous One" and mesih , "Anointed One" (Messiah). That these titles or descriptions all apply to a single figure, will now be demonstrated. Firstly, "Son of Man", "Elect One" and "Righteous One" will be shown to be equivalent in each parable. It will then be shown that messiahship is also the property of this heavenly being. An attempt to reach a more specific identity of the "Son of Man" will then be made.

(a) The First Parable

The "Son of Man" is not mentioned in the first parable. The "Elect One", however, is mentioned in association with the elect community, who are identified with the community of the righteous in I En.39:6 and I En.40:5. The "Righteous One" is mentioned in association with the righteous, who are identified with the elect in the prologue to the parable (I En.38:2). That the righteous and the elect communities are identical, is explicitly stated. There can therefore be no doubt that the "Righteous One" and the "Elect One" are the same being. This being is second to the "Lord of Spirits" in I En.40:3-7, but is otherwise not described. The "Lord of Spirits" is clearly God. The "Righteous" and "Elect One",

whose sole function in this parable is to appear in the presence of God, is in some sense second to God. While no delegated powers or function are attributed to him, the "Righteous" and "Elect One" is nevertheless at least potentially a Divine Agent of comparable stature to the one like a son of man in Dan.7, and Michael in Dan.12 (in all probability the same being, as was demonstrated above), the heavenly counterpart, and therefore ruler, of the earthly elect.

(b) The Second Parable

In I En.45:3-5, the "Elect One" is portrayed as judge on the Throne of glory. In I En.46:1f, two figures are described. The first is the "one to whom belongs the time before time", and the second is "one whose countenance had the appearance of a man". The allusion to Dan.7 is clear. The former being is God, and the latter a particularly eminent heavenly being. This latter being is identified as the "Son of Man who has righteousness", who has been chosen by the Lord of Spirits to execute judgement on the kings and mighty (I En.46:3f), a function that is reserved to the Ancient of Days in Dan.7. "That Son of Man" was named before God, and hidden, before the creation of the world (I En.68:2ff). According to Isaac's translation, "that Son of Man" became the "Elect One" (1983, p35). However, Knibb translates the statement: "... he was chosen ..." (1978, p134). If Isaac's translation is correct, then the identification of "that Son of Man" as the "Elect One" is quite explicit. If Knibb's translation

is correct, the identification is not explicit, but the two figures are nevertheless implicitly identified in that they both function as the executors of God's final judgement. In I En.49:2, the "Elect One" stands before the Throne of glory, exercising eternal dominion. In I En.51:3, the same figure is seated on the Throne of God, as the revealer of the secrets of wisdom. In I En.53:6, the "Righteous One" and the "Elect One" are explicitly identified as one figure, who is to bring salvation to the faithful, described as "the house of [the Lord of Spirit's] congregation". The three titles clearly belong to the same being. Where they are not explicitly identified, they carry out identical functions. The "Son of Man", the "Righteous" and "Elect One", is the revealer of the secrets of wisdom, and the eschatological judge who brings salvation to the faithful and damnation to the kings and mighty. Any subordinate being who sits on the Throne of God, does so either as an usurper or as the delegated Agent of God. Clearly, the "Son of Man" is no usurper. The agency function only implicit in the first parable, is explicit in the second. Not only does the "Son of Man" occupy the Throne, but he exercises powers delegated by God.

(c) The Third Parable

The "Elect One" brings salvation to the faithful, apparently in the form of resurrection, and judges the works of the heavenly beings, in I En.61. In I En.62:2-7, the "Elect One" is identified as the "Son of Man" who had

been hidden. Once the "Son of Man" is established in power, evil will disappear from the earth (I En.69:26-29). Judgement and rule are the functions of the "Elect One", the "Son of Man". As in the second parable, the "Son of Man" exercises powers and functions delegated by God to his Agent.

It is clear that "Son of Man", "Righteous One" and "Elect One", are all titles or descriptions of the same eschatological figure, where they occur in all three parables. The Divine Agency of the "Son of Man", implicit in the first parable, is explicit in te second and third.

(d) "Son of Man" and "Messiah"

It has been noted above that a number of biblical texts which seem to have influenced the Similitudes, had come to be interpreted messianically by the time of the writing of the Targums. It is therefore necessary to relate the "Son of Man" figure to the "Messiah" figure in the Similitudes.

The kings and mighty are to be judged by the "Son of Man" for denying the "Lord of Spirits" and his "Messiah" (I En.48:10). The narrative in the preceding verses of the pericope attributes actions to the "Son of Man" which leave no place for another "messianic" being, and in which no such being is attributed a role. It is therefore clear that "Son of Man" and "Messiah" are one and the same being. In I En.52:4, the angel accompanying Enoch attributes all the events which Enoch had witnessed to the

authority of the "Messiah", whom he implicitly identifies with the "Elect One" in I En.52:6. The "Son of Man" is therefore identified with the "Messiah".

Describing the "Son of Man" as the "Messiah", the "Anointed One", does not imply that the "Son of Man" is the Davidic Messiah. David and the Davidic conception of messiahship are mentioned in neither pericope; nor is there allusion to the Aaronite conception of the Messiah. It is highly questionable whether, in the context of as cataclysmic an eschatology as that of the Similitudes of Enoch, and in the presence of a heavenly being as dominant as the "Son of Man", there is room for as purely temporal a figure as the Davidic Messiah. It would appear that messiahship in the military and political sense of the Davidic tradition is totally inadequate to an eschatology which is as universal and as cataclysmic as that envisaged by the author of the Similitudes. The intervention of heavenly powers in terrestrial affairs is essential to such an eschatology. The heavenly beings are no longer merely the counterpart of humanity, and earth is no longer a reflection of heaven. Messiahship is totally assumed by the heavenly patron of the faithful, the "Son of Man", who intervenes directly to bring about the eschaton on earth.

(e) Is a more specific Identification of the "Son of Man" possible?

The "Son of Man" has been identified as a heavenly being of particular eminence in the celestial hierarchy, also known as the "Elect One" and as the "Righteous One", and who has assumed the role of messiahship. But can a more specific identification be made? In particular, can the "Son of Man" be identified with Enoch?

The "Son of Man" is described as "one whose countenance had the appearance of a man" (I En.46:1). As in the anthropomorphism in Ezek.1:26, and in the case of the "one like a son of man" in Dan.7:13, from which this tradition derives, the being is human in appearance only. In Ezek.1, the one like a man is God; in Dan.7, the one like a son of man is a heavenly being, in all probability Michael. The "Son of Man" in the Similitudes is clearly not God, but a heavenly being, second only to God and superior to the archangels, including Michael (eg. I En.40:3ff).

The "Son of Man" is more exalted than Michael, the patron of Israel. Collins posits that he is the patron of an exclusive sect within Judaism, the community in which the Similitudes were written: "While the Son of Man is conceived of as a real being, he symbolises the destiny of the righteous community both in its present hiddenness and future manifestation" (1984, p150). It is questionable, however, whether the "Son of Man" who is the light of the nations (I En.48:4), can be understood as the patron of an

exclusivistic sect. While unquestionably the heavenly champion of the persecuted righteous, as that group is conceived in the Similitudes, the role of the "Son of Man" extends beyond the elite group. He became the "Elect One" in order that all nations might worship the Lord of Spirits (I En.48:6). His role is the establishment of God's kingdom on earth, and the purging of evil, and the ending of oppression (I En.49:2) which is the prerequisite to this. It is, by virtue of this function that the "Son of Man" is second only to God in power, in eminence and in authority. The "Son of Man" can be the heavenly patron of an elect group, therefore, only if that group sees itself as being in some way instrumental in the redemption of all humanity.

It is recorded in I En.48:2f, that the "Son of Man" was named in the presence of the Lord of Spirits before the creation of the heavenly luminaries, and in I En.62:7 that he was concealed from the beginning. The glory of the "Elect One" is described as eternal in I En.49:2. It is disputed in scholarly circles whether or not these verses imply that the "Son of Man" is a preexistent being. Casey, who identifies the "Son of Man" with Enoch, asserts that Enoch was pre-existent "like other righteous people" (1979, p106). Hooker asserts, however, that the "Son of Man" is part of the eternal purpose of God, but not necessarily preexistent (1967, p43). Why a being who does not yet exist, needs to be hidden, or how a non-existent being can be hidden, is a not explained. It seems most plausible that the "Son of Man", and other heavenly

of Man", but he goes to be with that "Son of Man" (1959, p441ff).

Both translation and explanation are disputed. Knibb renders the verse: "You are the Son of Man who was born to righteousness ..." (1978, p166). If Isaac is correct, then Enoch is the son of man in the sense that Ezekiel is the son of man in Ezek.2:1; he is the human visionary admitted into the Divine Council. If Knibb's translation is correct, however, then Enoch is the eschatological "Son of Man", whom he has seen in his visions.

Sjoeberg asserts that the two concluding chapters of the Similitudes represent one tradition, the latter chapter explicitly spelling out what the former implies (1946, pp159-162). The historical Enoch is an incarnation of the "Son of Man" (Sjoeberg, 1946, p169). According to Colpe, Enoch is not an incarnation of the "Son of Man", nor is he mystically identified with that being, but he is instituted into the office and function of the eschatological "Son of Man" in I En.71 (1972, pp426ff). According to Russell, similarly, a human being is exalted to the position of eschatological "Son of Man" in I En.71 (1971, p349).

Hooker regards I En.71 as the logical conclusion and climax of the Similitudes. During the course of the parables, the "Elect One" and the "Son of Man" have been identified, and, in the conclusion, the identity of that being is revealed (1967, p41f). Collins asserts that,

while the identification of Enoch as the "Son of Man" is made only in I En.71; this identification is not a radical departure from the rest of the Similitudes, and could have been read out of the text by means of contemporary exegetical methods (1980, p124; 1984, pp152f). He asserts that this identification can not alter the nature of the "Son of Man" as a heavenly being (1980, p123). Collins suggests that the explicit identification (in terms of his interpretation of the text) of Enoch and the "Son of Man" is made by the redactor who appended I En.71, in reaction against Christian appropriation of that title for Jesus (1980, p126; 1984, p153).

The explicit identification of the "Son of Man" as Enoch, may be made in I En.71:14. Scholars differ as to the meaning of the Ethiopic text, and the original is lost. There can therefore be no absolute certainty as to the correct understanding of I En.71:14. If the identification is not made, then Enoch is addressed as human being, a son of man. If, however, the identification is made, then it is made only in the appendix. If this is the case, then I En.71 represents a development in the tradition, approximating that represented by II and III Enoch. If I En.71 represents an older tradition, that tradition has been modified if Enoch is the "Son of Man".

Whether or not the "Son of Man" is identified with Enoch, is in some ways a secondary issue for the purposes of this study, as the role of the "Son of Man" as a Divine Agent is only marginally affected. What is of consequence,

though, is the possibility that a human being, albeit one of great antiquity and sanctity in the Hebrew tradition, could be conceived to be exalted to a position in the heavenly hierarchy second only to that of God, and even to be seated on the Throne of God. If this study were to be carried further to the Christian gospels, particularly John, then the possibility that a heavenly being, second only to God in te Divine Council, could be incarnated in a human being, with the role of a Divine Agent, would be of great consequence. It is well to bear these considerations in mind as we proceed to analyse the role of the "Son of Man" in greater detail.

D. The Role of the "Son of Man"

This study has given considerable attention to the tradition behind the "Son of Man" figure in the Similitudes of Enoch. The earliest attestation of a comparable figure in the Hebrew tradition is the one like a son of man in Dan.7. While the title "Son of Man" is not yet present, only one Aramaic letter need be dropped from the Danielic expression to produce the form of the title. Many other attributes of the "Son of Man" are present in Daniel, including that of Divine Agency.

The "Son of Man" is, if anything, a more eminent being than the one like a man, in that he functions as eschatological judge, a function reserved to the Ancient of Days in Dan.7. He is also more eminent than Michael (I En.40:3), the heavenly patron of Israel, who in all probability is the one like a man in Dan.7. Nevertheless, the dependence of the Similitudes of Enoch on Dan.7 is clear. A fuller examination of the role of the "Son of Man" in the light of this and other strands in the Hebrew tradition, with particular attention to the Divine Agency function, is now necessary.

Whereas in the first parable the "Son of Man" has no active function, in the second his role as a Divine Agent becomes explicit. In I En.45:3, the "Elect One" is portrayed on the Throne of glory, the Throne of God, exercising eschatological judgement. While the judgement

role had previously been reserved to Yahweh, as in Dan.7, it is now delegated to a subordinate heavenly being. The presidency of subordinate beings in the Divine Council is not altogether unprecedented in the Hebrew tradition, however. In the vision in Zech.3, Joshua appears before the angel of God presiding in the Council. While the role of the presiding angel is not judgement, and it is not stated whether or not the angel is seated on the Throne of God, there is nevertheless the conception of a heavenly being presiding over the Divine Council attested in the early post-Exilic period. The "Son of Man", here described as the "Elect One", is seated on the Throne, which implies that he is acting on behalf of the one whose Throne it is, and in the power of that person. As eschatological judge, the "Son of Man" is a Divine Agent, who acts on behalf of, and in the power of, God.

In I En.46:3, the "Son of Man", who surpasses all in righteousness, is the one chosen by the "Lord of Spirits" to reveal the hidden secrets. The function of revelation by a heavenly being is a distinctive aspect of apocalypses. The "Son of Man", however, is clearly more than a guide on a heavenly journey or a heavenly messenger to a human visionary. The act of revelation in which the "Son of Man" is a Divine Agent, is clearly an eschatological one, qualitatively distinct from the revelations imparted during the course of history by other heavenly beings. Nevertheless both belong to the Hebrew tradition of revelation in the course of theophanic visions; a tradition which has its roots in the Israelite

prophetic Throne-Theophany experience. Prophet and apocalyptic visionary receive their messages in the course of their theophanic visions, and the eschatological revelation of hidden secrets by the "Son of Man" is the climax of these visionary experiences.

In I En.46:4ff, the "Son of Man" is designated as the one who will bring about divine intervention in the world, overturning the prevailing order, and wreaking vengeance on the rulers who do not worship or acknowledge God. This eschatological function of the "Son of Man" supercedes any role that could be attributed to a Davidic Messiah. The "Son of Man" is Divine Agent in judgement and retribution. His role is derived both from the figure of one like a son of man in Dan.7, and from the exegetical traditions which had developed from the servant songs of Deutero-Isaiah in Isa.49:7 and 52:15. Both the one like a man and the <u>'ebed Yahweh</u> are Divine Agents, although the role of the latter has been reinterpreted to conform with that of the former.

In I En.48:5, the "Son of Man" is portrayed receiving from "all who dwell upon the dry ground" homage and worship as God's vicegerent. Those who worship the "Son of Man" also praise the name of the "Lord of Spirits". The "Son of Man" receives this praise as God's representative. This verse is clearly dependent on the tradition of Dan.7, but represents some development in the tradition. In Dan.7:14 it is said of the one like a man: לה יפלחון. [פלח] can mean either to reverence or worship, or it can mean to serve (BDB, 1976, p1108). The same verb is applied to the saints

of the Most High in the interpretation of Daniel's vision in Dan.7:27. The one like a man is not mentioned in the interpretation, and the verb applied to him in the vision is applied to the community he represents in the interpretation. [פלח] is probably to be understood in the sense of to serve in both verses, but in the course of exegesis יפלחון would have come to be understood in the sense of to worship, as it is when that tradition is applied in I En.48:5. The "Son of Man" receives the worship of the nations, but he does so as God's Agent and Vicegerent.

In I En.48:8-10, the destruction of the condemned is described. They are damned for denying the "Lord of Spirits" and his "Messiah". The "Messiah" is clearly the "Son of Man", God's Agent in the eschatological judgement in the preceding verses. It is in I En.48:10 that the fundamental principle of agency is most explicitly applied. "A man's agent is like to himself" (Mishnah Berakot 5.5). So God's Agent, the "Son of Man", when carrying out his commission, is like God himself. Therefore an offence against the "Son of Man" is an offence against God, and refusal to recognize the authority of the "Son of Man" is to defy the authority of God.

In I En.49:2-4, the "Elect One" stands before the "Lord of Spirits" and exercises judgement of things that are secret. Although he does not occupy the Throne of God as in I En.45:3, the "Son of Man" is nevertheless God's Agent

in this role. He has been chosen, and therefore appointed, by God for this task, and functions on God's authority.

In I En.51:3, the "Elect One" is designated the one who, at the eschaton, seated on a throne, will reveal the secrets of wisdom. He has been appointed and glorified for this purpose by the "Lord of Spirits". The "Son of Man" is enthroned, but apparently on a throne of his own, and not on the Throne of God. This would seem to reflect a development in the tradition of Dan.7:9, where an undisclosed number of thrones are set, one of which is subsequently occupied by the Ancient of Days. While the one like a son of man is not described as being enthroned in Dan.7, he is given glory, dominion and a kingdom in Dan.7:14. It would have been logical to suppose that he would have been installed on one of the other thrones, which seems to be the application of the tradition in I En.51:3. While he occupies a throne other than the Throne of God, the "Son of Man" nevertheless remains a Divine Agent. He occupies the throne not in his own right, but because God has appointed him for the function which he executes from the throne.

In I En.55:4, the "Elect One" is described as the one who, seated on the Throne of God, will judge the hosts of evil in the name of the "Lord of Spirits". The agency role of the "Son of Man" is here quite explicit. It is God's Throne that he occupies, and in God's name that he executes judgement. Whereas the status of the "Son of Man" as a Divine Agent is implicit in I En.45:3, it is made

explicit in I En.55:4 with the statement that he judges in the name of the "Lord of Spirits".

In the third parable, the "Lord of Spirits" sets the "Elect One" on his Throne, to execute judgement on the holy ones in heaven (I En.61:8). He is to judge their deeds according to the word of God. The "Son of Man" is commissioned and empowered by God to execute judgement not only on terrestrial beings as in the second parable, but also on heavenly beings. Whereas in Ps.82 God judges and condemns the heavenly beings for their misdeeds, in this verse the "Son of Man" judges the deeds of the heavenly beings, after which they combine with the earthly holy ones in the praise of God. Two developments in the tradition since the writing of Ps.82 are noticable. The emergence of dualism in the Hebrew tradition has excluded the heavenly beings who previously came under judgement from the Divine Council, and placed them in an opposing camp to that of God. This results in exoneration at the time of judgement for those who remain. The greater transcendence of God has led to the delegation of the judgement role, not only of earthly beings, but also of heavenly beings, to God's Agent, the "Son of Man".

The judgement scene in I En.62-63, according to Nickelsburg, represents a tradition older than the rest of the Similitudes (1972, p78). Nevertheless the figure of the "Son of Man" is comparable to that elsewhere in the Similitudes. He sits on his own throne of glory (I En.62:5). In I En.62:9, the "Son of Man" is the object of

the unsuccessful entreaties of the kings and mighty, whom he has stripped of their power, and is about to despatch to their destruction. The judgement process, while delegated to the "Son of Man", appears to be supervised by God (I En.62:10), for the apparent reason that the "Son of Man" might be too inclined to mercy. At the conclusion of the eschatological events, the righteous and chosen ones will live with the "Son of Man" for ever (I En.62:14). This confirms the role of the "Son of Man" as the heavenly patron of the righteous and chosen ones, and therefore his identification with the "Righteous One" and the "Elect One". An eternal, and not merely an eschatological, role for the "Son of Man" is also indicated. This scene is clearly dependent upon Dan.7, and the exegetical traditions which arose from the vision of Daniel. Nickelsburg has argued convincingly that a conflation of the traditions of Isa.13-14 and Isa.52-53 has provided the raw material for the judgement scene and process in this pericope, while Dan.7:13ff is the source of the imagery in which the eschatological judge is described (1972, pp81-86). As patron of the righteous elect, the "Son of Man" is accorded a function previously reserved to God in the tradition (eg. Deut.32:9). Judgement too is a delegated function, although the "Son of Man" occupies his own throne, and not the Throne of God.

In I En.69:27, the "Son of Man" sits on his throne, and the function of judgement is given to him, so that he can purge evil from the earth. Once he has taken his place, all evil will be destroyed, and the word of the "Son of

Man" will "be strong" before the "Lord of Spirits" (I En.69:29). This indicates that the "Son of Man" will remain a prominent figure in the Divine Council after having completed his eschatological functions as God's Agent. Whereas in Dan.7:14 the one like a son of man is given an everlasting kingdom, he indications of I En.69:29 are that the "Son of Man" is expected to return power to God after having completed his eschatological commission, but to remain active in the Divine Council.

PART IV

THE "LOGOS" IN THE WRITINGS OF PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

The figure of the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria is in many ways a more complex one than that of the "Son of Man" in the Similitudes of Enoch. Not only is Philo himself a highly enigmatic figure, but his cultural and intellectual milieu gives his writings a more diverse background. The "Logos" concept has roots not only in the ancient Near Eastern and Hebrew traditions, but also in the Greek, Egyptian and Persian traditions which formed the philosophical and religious milieu of Alexandria.

As Philo wrote in Greek, it seems preferable to begin with the Greek background to the "Logos" concept, so that the term is studied first in the language in which it was expressed. Then parallels in the other religious traditions of the ancient world will be sought. Attention will also be given to Philo and his writings, before the "Logos" is studied, and its role as a Divine Agent assessed.

Not all issues related to the figure of the "Logos" in Philo's writings can be discussed in this study, as space does not allow. One important issue in particular, the highly problematic relationship between the "Logos" figure and the "Sophia" figure, cannot be discussed in full.

Rather, it will be discussed in the context of particular texts in which the problem arises. This will both facilitate greater accuracy and diminish the occurrence of unhelpful and misleading generalizations.

A. The Religious and Philosophical Background to the "Logos" Figure

The "Logos" clearly belongs to the Wisdom tradition of Hellenistic Judaism, and must be studied in that context. But its roots are far from clear. "The difficulty with which we are confronted in a search for the mythological background of the figure of Wisdom [and, accordingly, for the figure of the "Logos"] or for the religious conceptions of non-Israelite origin which gave rise to Wisdom [and "Logos"] does not spring from a paucity of similar ideas and speculations among the peoples with whom Israel had contact but rather from a wealth of similar ideas" (Rankin, 1954, p231). The problem, therefore, is not to find possible sources for the "Logos" conception, but to determine the most plausible source(s) for that idea.

1. The Greek Background, and the Meaning of the Term "Logos"

Λογος is a Greek word; its meaning must therefore be sought in the Greek tradition. Only once its Greek meaning is established, can the appropriation and application of the term in Judaism be studied.

The noun Λογος is derived from the verb λεγω, to speak. The root λεγ - means to gather and arrange (Boman, 1960, p67). The original meaning of Λογος was gathering or gleaning, but the term acquired the figurative connotation of counting, reckoning and explaining (Kleinknecht, 1967, p77). The concept of thought is therefore at least as much a part of the meaning of Λογος as is that of speech. The litteral meanings acquired by the term Λογος can be divided into two categories. The first is the means by which a thought is expressed; and the second, the thought which is given expression. It is the second of these which is important for this study. According to Boman, this is the more ancient, as Λογος originally had nothing to do with speech, but rather with "the ordered and reasonable content" of what was spoken (1960, p67). It was from this meaning that the philosophical concept was to develop. "Logos means primarily the formulation and expression of thought in speech, but from this it took on a variety of associated meanings" (Goodenough, 1962, p103).

The philosophical significance of the term Λογος emerged during the second half of the fifth century BCE, when it

came to be regarded as synonymous with νους , and to acquire the sense of reason, mind, thought and spirit (Kleinknecht, 1967, p78). Heraclitus was the first of the Greek philosophers to expand upon the concept of the "Logos". According to him, the "Logos" constitutes the being of the Cosmos, and of the individual person (Kleinknecht, 1967, p81). The "Logos" is the source of order in the constantly changing universe. The "Logos" is the connecting principle between man and the world, between man and man, and between man and God (Kleinknecht, 1967, p81). Later expansion of Heraclitus' philosophy, led to the conception of the "Logos" as the connecting principle between the world below and the world above (Kleinknecht, 1967, p81).

Significant developments in the concept of the "Logos", took place with the Stoic philosophers. Diogenes defined the "Logos" as "the ordered and teleologically orientated nature of the world" (Kleinknecht, 1967, p84). The "Logos" is equated with Zeus in the hymn of Cleanthes (Kleinknecht, 1967, p84). Zeno introduced the concept of λογος σπερματικος, the organic power which fashions nature (Kleinknecht, 1967, p85). Further Stoic innovations which were founded on the "Logos" concept, were λογος ὀρθος , the cosmic law which gives men the power of knowledge and of moral action (Kleinknecht, 1967, p85). To the pantheistic Stoics, the "Logos" was the mind both of the universe, and of God.

To the neo-Platonists, the "Logos" was the power which

gives life and form to all in the world (Kleinknecht, 1967, p85). This clearly reflects Stoic, rather than pure Platonic, influences.

The mystery cults introduced the concept of ἱερος λογος, which includes sacred history, doctrine and revelation (Kleinknecht, 1967, p86). The Hermetics equated the "Logos" with Hermes, but without any connotations of incarnation (Kleinknecht, 1967, p87). Further speculations, under Egyptian influence, led to the idea of the "Logos" as the son of Hermes, the εἰκων θεου, while man was conceived to be created in the image of the "Logos" (Kleinknecht, 1967, p88).

This review of the Greek background to the "Logos" figure in the writings of Philo, however brief, has highlighted several conceptions and phrases which will prove crucial to the study of the Philonic material. Nevertheless, due account must also be taken of the ancient Near Eastern and Jewish background to the Philonic "Logos".

2. The Ancient Near Eastern Background to the "Logos"

Λογος occurs in the Septuagint most frequently as the translation of דבר, word. This is not to be limited by contemporary English connotations of "word", however, as will become clear below when the relevant texts are studied. דבר is crucial to understanding the "Logos" concept, and its ancient Near Eastern antecedents must therefore be established.

(a) Egypt

In Egyptian thought, the divine word was regarded as the source of the power of creating and sustaining, "the ever-active, fluid or ethereal divine substance proceeding out of the mouth of the divinity" (Boman, 1960, p59). Creation by word is central to many versions of the Egyptian creation myth. In the Memphite myth, Ptah created, and imparted life to, the gods, through Atum, by thought and word. Ptah conceived the gods in his heart, and created them with his tongue. In the Heliopolitan myth, Atum spewed Shu and Tefnut from his mouth, after self-fertilization. In this version, the sexual aspect of creation is emphasised, though not to the exclusion of the verbal. The Hermopolitan myth, like the Memphite, understands creation as being effected by word. Atum, rather than Ptah, is the creator god. The Thebian myth contains elements of creation both by word of command, and by physical activity on the part of Re, the creator god. Creation by word of command is therefore a major element in Egyptian creation mythology, being present in all the known versions of the myth.

Ma`at, the Egyptian deity of regularity and order, is looked upon as a source for both the "Logos" and "Sophia" conceptions in Judaism. Ma`at, personified as a goddess, is the deification of justice, righteousness, truth and order. She is the guiding principle of the gods, the one closest to, and the daughter of, Re, the sun god, and, in

the Thebian tradition, the creator. Identified with Tefnut, Ma`at is the daughter of Atum in other versions of the myth. She communicates the ethical demands of the gods to men, and is the guiding principle of the kings. While Rankin is hesitant in according Ma`at a significant role in the development of Jewish wisdom (1954, p234), other scholars, such as Mack (1973, pp34ff), regard Ma`at as a significant component of the tradition behind the "Sophia"/"Logos" figure in Jewish wisdom.

The syncretism between Egyptian and Greek religion during the Hellenistic era, is another possible source of symbols and ideas for the Jewish Wisdom tradition. Rankin asserts that Isis is the closest equivalent to the Jewish "Sophia" figure; and that the Isis-Sophia figure is interchangeable with the Hermes-Logos figure (1954, p235). Plutarch, in "De Iside" (53ff), records a version of the Osiris-Isis myth in which the original Egyptian myth is overlaid with Greek concepts and terms. Osiris is identified with the "Logos", Isis is the "female principle in nature, the recipient of all coming into being", and Horus is the "Cosmic Logos", the "world principle". According to Mack, Isis possesses those attributes which Ma`at lacks, and also comes to acquire the functions of Ma`at during later stages in the development of Egyptian mythology (1973, p38f). The corollary is that the fusion of Isis and Ma`at in Graeco-Egyptian thought provided a valuable source for the conception of the personification of "Sophia" and "Logos" in the Jewish Wisdom tradition.

While providing no complete prototype for the Jewish "Sophia" or "Logos" figures, Egyptian and Hellenistic-Egyptian mythology provided many of the ideas which the Jewish Wisdom tradition may have adopted.

(b) Mesopotamia

While Boman asserts that there is no evidence for any conception of creation being brought about by the spoken word (1960, p60), Rankin cites the Babylonian creation myth "Enuma Elis" as a possible source for Hebrew thought regarding the divine word. Mummu, the counsellor of the creator god Apsu, is a deification of the "principle of formation" in this myth (Rankin, 1954, p231). Mummu is derived from the root riqmu , word (Rankin, 1954, p231). Mummu is a possible source for the "Logos" idea in Jewish Wisdom, though not a complete prototype of the Philonic "Logos".

(c) Persia

The "Amesha Spentas", the six "bounteous immortals" (Zaehner, 1961, p45) around Ahura Mazda in Zoroastrian mysticism, are of considerable significance in the development of the Jewish Wisdom tradition. In concept they are similar to the Hebrew Divine Council, and their hierarchy and the abstract qualities they represent are strikingly similar to the Sephirot of rabbinic mysticism. Ahura Mazda and the "Amesha Spentas" can be depicted thus:

Ahura Mazda
(The Wise Lord)

Spenta Mainyu
(Holy Spirit)

(1) Vohu Manu (2) Asha Vahista
(Good Thought/Mind/Disposition) (Perfect Righteousness/Truth/ Right Law)

(3) Khshathra Vairya
(The Kingdom of God/Good Royalty)

(4) Spenta Armaiti
(Pious Modesty/Rightmindedness/Devotion)

(5) Haurvatat (6) Ameretat
(Perfection/Wholeness/Health) (Immortality)

Ahura Mazda and Spenta Mainyu were originally distinct, but came to be identified later in the development of Zoroastrianism (Zaehner, 1961, p45). In the "Gathas", a portion of the "Avesta" which dates from the time of Zarathustra, Ahura Mazda is described as the father of Spenta Mainyu, and also of Vohu Manu and Asha Vahista. Creation by an act of the will constitutes the fatherhood of Ahura Mazda (Zaehner, 1961, p45). Spenta Mainyu, Vohu Manu and Asha Vahista are the closest to, and are understood to be, hypostases of Ahura Mazda (Zaehner, 1961, p45). Vohu Manu, according to the "Yashna", is the intermediary of Ahura Mazda in creation (31:11; 47:3), and also the mediator and content of the eschatological consummation of earthly history (45:5,8; 46:7; 48:8). Vohu Manu is also the content of all religious and moral life (Yashna 34:2). Asha Vahista is the law and the fire of justice, and the source of all good (Yashna 43:12), and, according to Rankin (1954, p250), is the closest of the Amesha Spentas to the Jewish Wisdom concept. Khshatha

Vaiyra is an attribute of Ahura Mazda, but one which can be usurped by the forces of evil under Angra Mainyu (Zaehner, 1961, p46). Spenta Armaiti is the attitude of man towards God, but, like the other bountiful immortals, has no existence independent of Ahura Mazda (Zaehner, 1961, pp45f). Haurvetat and Ameretat, while attributes of Ahura Mazda, are his gifts bestowed on mankind (Zaehner, 1961, p46).

While Rankin has isolated Asha Vahista as the closest prototype of the Jewish Wisdom figure, and it undoubtedly manifests many of the qualities associated with the "Sophia" and "Logos" figures in Judaism, so do other of the Amesha Spentas, most notably Vohu Manu. It seems therefore preferable not to isolate individual members of this group as prototypes of the Jewish concepts. Rather, the Amesha Spentas as a whole, are to be regarded as a source which contributed to the rise of the Jewish Wisdom tradition, and to the concepts which were evolved in that tradition.

Several analogous concepts which may well have contributed with varying degrees of significance to the Jewish Wisdom tradition, as represented by Philo of Alexandria. None, however, provides a complete prototype, or an adequate explanation, of the origins of, the Jewish "Sophia"/"Logos" figure. This was not to be expected, and the diverse contributions to the Jewish tradition, and developments in that tradition itself, are all to be recognized for their part in the emergence of the "Logos"

figure in Hellenistic Judaism.

3. The Biblical Background to the "Logos" Concept

The Old Testament background to the "Logos" concept can be divided into two categories: the concept of דבר יהוה, the word of the Lord, and the development of the Hebrew Wisdom tradition.

(a) The "Word of God" in the Old Testament

There are 394 occurences of דבר denoting the "word" of God in the Old Testament (BDB, 1976, p182). The "word" of the Lord in Hebrew thought, like the Greek λογος, is not to be limited in its meaning to contemporary English usage. Unlike the Greek word, דבר יהוה connotes a dynamic force rather than the expression of a thought (Boman, 1960, p58), the cosmic power of the creator, of whose divine will the verbal utterance is the declaration (Eichrodt, 1967, p71). The words spoken are the verbal accompaniment to the force which brings the statement made to its fruition; the source of the words is also the source of the power which brings those words to their fulfillment. The "word" of the Lord, as well as imparting a message from God, effects the realisation of that message.

According to Boman, a distinction needs to be drawn between the "word", דבר, and the "voice", קול, of God (1960, p60). Whereas "word" signifies the power of the utterances of God, and their consequent actions, "voice" denotes a more pantheistic understanding of divine action in nature. Whereas the "voice" of God operates somewhat

arbitrarily in the forces of nature, the "word" of God is "always the function of a conscious and moral personality" (Boman, 1960, p60).

Prophecy is the most important manifestation of the "word" of the Lord in the Old Testament, according to Dunn accounting for 90% of its occurrences (1980, p217). In both the Deuteronomistic History and the books of the major and minor prophets, the "word" of the Lord is constantly cited as the authority for the prophets' utterances. Prophetic speeches are frequently prefaced: ויהי דבר יה' אל ...., And the "word" of the Lord came to .... (I Sam.15:10; II Sam.7:4; Isa.38:4 (late VIII BCE); Jer.1:4 (late VII BCE); Ezek.3:16 (593 BCE) etc.). Similar formulae including the words דבר יהוה\אלהים\אל, are used likewise to designate the beginning of prophetic orations (II Sam.24:11; I Kings 12:22; Jer.25:3; Mic.1:1 (late VIII BCE) etc.). Other prophetic oracles are prefaced in a less technical manner, in which it is intimated that God has spoken the words which the prophet utters (Isa.14:24; Jer.6:22; Amos 2:1 (mid VIII BCE); Mic.4:6 etc). The "word" of God is the revealed source, as well as the divine authority, for the statements of the Israelite prophets. It is also the content or the message of the prophetic orations (Isa.2:1; 9:8 (MT 9:7)).

During the post-Exilic period, the "word" of God came to be understood in a manner less closely tied to the concept of speech, and more as an emanation from God which could be sent. This development is crucial as the verb [שלח] is

that from which the noun שלית, agent, is derived. In Isa.55:11, which dates from early in the post-Exilic period, the "word" of the Lord goes forth from the mouth of God, and does not return until it has accomplished that which it has been sent to do. The "word" is an emanation from, rather than of, God, as it acts independently in accomplishing its purpose. The "word" is not hypostatised as a being, however. It is compared with inanimate objects, rain and snow, and not with heavenly or human beings. While due regard must be given to the poetic nature of the text, the fact that the "word" is a sufficiently distinct conception to be described as being sent, is not to be overlooked. Nevertheless this text represents an important development in the tradition, not only in the concept of the "word", but also in the introduction of the verb [שלח].

Ps.107 dates from somewhat later in the post-Exilic period, as v3 refers not only to a wide dispersion of the Jewish people, but also to their repatriation. This psalm may well be dependent upon Deutero-Isaiah. Ps.107:20 portrays a similar conception of the "word" of Yahweh to that in Isa.55:11: .... וישלח דברו. Here the "word" is a distinct entity, sent to heal those who cry to God in their distress. As in Isa.55:11, the verb [שלח] is used. As in the Deutero-Isaiah text, the "word" is not hypostatised, but has a clear identity and a definite function, which it is sent by God to fulfill.

Ps.33:6-9 introduces the concept of the creative "word of

God": .... דברו יהוה שמים נעשו . The heavens and the heavenly beings are created by the breath of the mouth of God. The creation of the earth and earthly beings is not mentioned, but it is probable that they are conceived to have been created in the same way in the tradition behind this verse (cf. Gen.2:7 (J)). The Egyptian creation myth seems to be reflected in this psalm, as creation is conceived to be by emission from the mouth of God, or at least its poetic expression is based on that understanding of creation.

The P creation myth in Gen.1, which in its present form dates from c 550 BCE, represents some development in the tradition from Ps.33:6. The Hebrew understanding of the "word" of God is combined with the idea of creation from the mouth of God. The "word" is the cosmic power of the creator (Eichrodt, 1967, p71), effective in bringing about creation. The spoken commands of God bring about creation. In the case of the creation of light, and of the world, and of the created beings, God speaks on his own (Gen.1:3,6,9,11 etc). However, in the case of the creation of man, God speaks to and for the Divine Council (Gen.1:26), and follows up his command with creative action (Gen.1:27). There is development in the tradition in that nowhere is it intimated that any created object is emitted from the mouth of God. Rather, the spoken utterance of God results in creation taking place.

דבר יהוה came increasingly to be identified with the written law, as is demonstrated by Num.15:31 (P), where

the "word" and the commandment of God are identified. This development is a product of the Exilic and post-Exilic shift in emphasis from the cult to the law, from sacrificial ritual to reading, interpreting and observing the Torah. This understanding of the Mosaic Law as the "word" of God is perhaps the root of the traditional rabbinic understanding that the scribes were the successors to the prophets as the interpreters of divine law. Whereas the prophets had declared the divine law and will in terms of the "word" which had been revealed to them in their visions and other experiences, the identification of the written law with the divine "word" enabled the scribes to become the interpreters of the divine law in the place of the prophets.

While the Targums do not form a part of the religious and literary heritage of Philo, they nevertheless reflect developments in contemporary Judaism, which are not necessarily confined to Palestine, and may therefore be useful to understanding aspects of Hellenistic Judaism. Several Targumic texts introduce the "word", מימרא, of God where it does not appear in the Hebrew Bible. Whereas in the MT of Exod.19:7 Yahweh dictates his commands to Moses, in the Targum of that text the "Word" of God commands Moses to address the elders. Similarly, in the MT of Deut.33:13, the hand of God lays the foundation of the earth, while in the Targum it is by his "Word" that God establishes the earth. There is a clear tendency for the insertion of the "Word" of God into the texts, to avoid both reference to direct contact between God and man, and

also anthropomorphic depiction of God. This reflects the contemporary religious trend which enhanced the perception of the transcendence of God, as is reflected in the development of Jewish mysticism during the period. Intermediaries, such as heavenly beings, were construed to fill the vacuum created by the increased transcendence of God, of which the "Word" is one of the most significant. This development, which has its origins long before the Targums were written, is very important in the emergence of the concept of Divine Agency.

(b) The Background of the "Logos" in the Jewish Wisdom Tradition

The Jewish Wisdom tradition is of crucial importance to understanding the origins of the "Logos" concept. The figure of "Wisdom" is an enigmatic one, and its relationship to the "word" of God problematic, not least in Philo's writings. A further conception, רוח, the "Breath" or "Spirit" of God, closely related to the divine "word", must also be considered. Careful, if brief, discussion of texts in the Jewish Wisdom tradition is therefore required.

The dating of Job, and of its constituent parts, is highly problematic, and certainty is impossible. Oesterley and Robinson suggest that the dialogues date from the fifth or fourth century BCE (1953, p175), and greater precision cannot be attained. In Job 26:13, the "Breath" of God is instrumental in the creation of the heavens, an idea which

reflects Ps.33:6. Job 33:4 seems to reflect the J creation narrative in Gen.2:7, and possibly also the tradition behind Ps.33:6, if the two traditions are distinct. Here the "Breath" of God is responsible for the creation and invigoration of man. This same "Breath" or "Spirit" is the vital force by which Job lives (Job 27:3).

The hymn to "Wisdom" in Job 28 is generally regarded as later than the dialogues, but cannot be precisely dated. "Wisdom" is not personified as in many of the later writings, but is a quality identified with fear of the Lord, and the abandonment of evil ways (Job 28:28). "Wisdom" is more valuable than the most precious minerals for which men search the earth. "Wisdom" is the exclusive possession of those who fear God.

The personified figure of "Wisdom" appears in Prov.1:20-9:18. This section of Proverbs reflects considerable development in the tradition, and therefore probably dates from as late as the third century BCE, where it is located by, inter alia, Oesterley and Robinson (1953, p207). In Prov.3:19, "Wisdom" is the instrument of Yahweh in creation. The construction of the verse is similar to that in Job 26:13 where the "Breath" of God is instrumental, and in Psalm 33:6 where the "word" of God is instrumental. There is, however, no indication as to how "Wisdom" is conceived to function as God's creative instrument. In Prov.8:22-31, חכמה describes herself as the preexistent companion of God, the first of created beings. "Wisdom" was present at the creation of the world, as a

master craftsman at the side of God. No independent creative role is ascribed to "Wisdom", but she does have a distinct identity. According to Rankin, this conception of "Wisdom" is dependent upon the Amesha Spentas, particularly Asha Vahista (1954, p252).

The concept of divine "Wisdom" was developed considerably in the Apocrypha. In Ecclesiasticus, dating from c 180 BCE (Russell, 1960, p81; Von Rad, 1972, p240), "Wisdom" is decribed as speaking ἐν ἐκκλησια ὑψιστου , in the assembly of the Most High (Ecclus.24:2), the Divine Council. "Wisdom" is identified, albeit figuratively, as a heavenly being, a member of the Council around the Throne of God. This identification is heightened by her profession to have come from the mouth of the Most High (Ecclus.24:3). This statement echoes Ps.33:6, where the heavens are made by the breath of God, and the holy ones by the word of his mouth. "Wisdom" seems therefore to be identified in this text both with the "word" and the "Breath" of God, and also as one of the holy ones.

"Wisdom" is the inheritance of Israel, and is manifested in the Book of the Covenant, the Law of Moses (Ecclus.24:23). This is analogous to the identification of the "word" of God with the divine law in Num.15:31 (P).

A further apocryphal writing which may be part of the tradition behind Philo's conception of the "Logos", is the Wisdom of Solomon. Oesterley and Robinson divide the work into two parts, dating the first to the first half of the

first century CE, and the second part a century earlier (1953, p153). Russell dates Wisdom of Solomon as a whole to the early first century BCE (1960, p80). Winston suggests the period 30 BCE - 50 CE as the most likely time of writing, and, while insisting on the impossibility of certainty, prefers the years 37-41 CE as the most plausible (1979, p59). If this dating is correct, then it is more likely that Wisdom of Solomon would have been influenced by Philo, than been part of the heritage from which Philo developed his "Logos" concept. The two works certainly have common roots in Egyptian Judaism, and in the Hebrew tradition (Winston, 1979, pp59ff).

Wisdom of Solomon 9:1-2, is a particularly significant text, in that both "Logos" and "Sophia" are attributed a role in creation:

ὁ ποιήσας τα παντα ἐν λογῳ σου
και τῃ σοφια σου κατεσκευασας ἀνθρωπον

Two understandings of this text are possible. The first is that God created the world and all created beings, with the exception of man, by word of command. Man, however, is created separately by God, in his wisdom, to rule the created order. This interpretation would reflect the theology of the P tradition, as contained in the creation narrative in Gen.1. While the rest of creation comes into being at the command of God, man is made by God. Two categories of creation are implied in such an interpretation.

The second possible understanding of the text is that

"Logos" and "Sophia" are synonymous, and that both concepts represent the creative activity of God. It is therefore probable that "Logos" and "Sophia" are identified in this text, as the instrument of God. This understanding of the text would link it to Ecclus.24:2f, where "word" and "Breath" are identified, and ascribed a creative function.

It is not necessary for the purposes of this study to decide which interpretation of Wisd.Sol.9:1-2 is correct; literary factors do favour the latter, however. In view of the uncertainty as to the dating of Wisdom of Solomon, no conclusions can be drawn as to the relationship between this work and Philo.

In Wisd.Sol.9:17, "Wisdom" and the "Holy Spirit" (or "Breath of God") appear to be identified. They undoubtedly perform the same function in transmitting and revealing the divine will. This text is also significant in that the "Spirit" is described as being sent. This implies an independent existence, or at least identity, such as that ascribed to the "word" of God in Ps.107:20.

The "Logos" appears in Wisd.Sol.18:14-16 as the warrior who metes out divine wrath on earth. The "Logos" comes from heaven, from the throne of God, to carry out his function. This text is clearly a reflection on the episode of the destruction of the firstborn of Egypt (Exod.12:29ff (J)). The function performed by Yahweh in the J tradition comes to be performed by the "Logos" in Wisdom of Solomon.

This development is typical of the post-Exilic period, when the conception of divine transcendence was heightened, so that functions previously ascribed to God came to be performed by lesser beings. The activity of God in this text has come to be understood as the activity of the divine "Word". As the "Logos" originates from the Throne of God, it is probably to be understood as a manifestation or instrument of God, rather than as a Divine Agent. Nevertheless it has a distinct identity and function, and represents an important development in the tradition. The "Logos" is mentioned with no reference to "Wisdom", which suggests that a "Logos" concept had been developed by the time of writing, which could be understood independently of the figure of "Wisdom". The text presupposes that the identity and significance of the "Logos" was known in the community in which Wisdom of Solomon was written.

Two strands of development in the Hebrew tradition behind the Philonic "Logos" have been isolated. These are the "word" of God, particularly as manifested in the prophetic messages, and the Wisdom tradition in both Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism. The "word" of the Lord uttered by the Hebrew prophets came to be understood as an emanation from the mouth of God, and to be described as being sent. This development enabled the concept of the "word" to be linked to creation, and led to its acquiring an independent identity and functions. However, the idea of the "word" as a Divine Agent is not fully developed in the Old Testament. Although the Targums come closer to this

conception, it is not clear that the Agency idea is articulated there. The Wisdom tradition ascribed many of the attributes of the "word" of God in the earlier literature to the figure of "Wisdom", and in some texts these two concepts, and that of the "Breath" of God, are, at least implicitly, identified. The hypostatic figure of "Wisdom" is developed, and identified, figuratively if not literally, as a heavenly being, a member of the Divine Council. "Wisdom" develops distinct functions as well as identity, but te Divine Agency idea is never more than latent.

While the "Logos" figure in Philo's writings is not fully developed in the biblical tradition, there nevertheless is present in the tradition considerable the material from which the "Logos" concept could be further developed within the parameters of contemporary exegetical norms.

B. Philo of Alexandria and his Writings

1. Philo Judaeus

Philo is one of the most enigmatic figures in Intertestamental Judaism. As in the case of Josephus, the preservation of Philo's writings was due to the efforts of Christians, and not of Jews. Later Judaism may have disowned Philo, but this does not imply that he did not stand well within the parameters of what was considered orthodox Judaism in his time.

Philo's life is generally dated from c 20-10 BCE to c 40-50 CE; there is no need for greater precision at present, so this tentative dating can be accepted. Philo was a contemporary of such figures in Palestinian Judaism as Hillel and Shammai, and an older contemporary of Gamaliel and Jesus of Nazareth. In the gentile world, Philo's contemporaries include the philosopher Seneca. Perhaps most significantly, Philo lived in the first generation of the Christian Church, although there is no evidence that he had any knowledge of Christianity (Sandmel, 1979, p3).

Philo was a Jew of Alexandria, a cosmopolitan centre in the Roman Empire, where the Jewish community formed a substantial proportion of the population. The Jewish community in Alexandria were the only non-Greeks to make any significant original contribution to Hellenistic philosophy (Wolfson, 1968, p4). This Alexandrian Jewish

philosophical school began with the production of the Septuagint, and Philo was the last, and probably the greatest, of its philosophers.

Philo came from an influential and prosperous family, many of whose members, including his own brother and his nephew, held high civic office. Little is known of Philo's life, except that he headed a delegation of Jews of Alexandria to Emperor Caius in c 40 CE, to protest the emperor's claim to divinity, and the treatment received by the Alexandrian Jewry at the hands of imperial officials. Goodenough believes that Philo, as a young man, was a member of the Therapeutae, an ascetic Jewish sect living in the Egyptian desert (1962, p32).

Philo was a Greek-speaking Jew of the Diaspora, who received a Greek education, and was versed in the various Greek philosophical schools, particularly the Pythagorean, Platonic and neo-Platonic, and Stoic traditions (Borgen, 1984, p254ff). Philo was therefore a thoroughly hellenized Jew, who lived in a hellenistic city, and came from a family whose members were prominent in civic life. Philo was no Jew of the ghetto; he was fully a part of the society in which he lived.

Philo was a Jew who thought, spoke and wrote in Greek. His Bible was the Septuagint, and it is questionable whether, scholar as he was, Philo was literate in Hebrew. While there is scholarly consensus that Philo's knowledge of Hebrew was weak, if it existed at all (Goodenough, 1962,

p9), scholars are divided on the issue. Siegfried, Wolfson and Hanson among others believe that Philo was conversant in Hebrew. Heinemann, Stein, Nikiprowetzky and Sandmel, on the other hand, believe Philo had no knowledge of Hebrew (Borgen, 1984, p257). The question is one which cannot be resolved on the basis of the evidence available, and must be regarded as inconclusive. Two factors require consideration, however. Philo's belief in the divine inspiration of the Septuagint would have eliminated any need for reference or recourse to the Hebrew original (Chadwick, 1967, p157). His use of the Septuagint, therefore, does not necessarily imply that Philo had no knowledge of Hebrew. Origen, a gentile Christian from Alexandria two centuries after Philo, was able to attain sufficient knowledge of Hebrew to compile the Hexapla. This could indicate that the Hebrew language was never entirely lost by the Alexandrian Jewry, even if it ceased to be their mother tongue, and the Hebrew Bible was superceded by the Septuagint as their Scripture. It therefore seems reasonable to assume, until the contrary can be proven, that Philo had at least a basic knowledge of Hebrew, although Greek was his mother tongue.

The issue of Philo's knowledge of Hebrew is important not only on account of which Scripture text/s he would have known, but also because his knowledge of contemporary Palestinian Jewish thought would have been contingent upon some knowledge of Hebrew and Aramaic. According to Sandmel, there is no conclusive evidence that Philo was familiar with contemporary Palestinian Jewish thought

(1979, pp132ff). Wolfson asserts that Alexandrian Jewry were in constant communication with the Jews of Palestine (1968, p5), and Philo is known to have made a pilgrimage to the Temple in Jerusalem at least once (De Providentia 64). This indicates that the Temple remained the focal point of his religion, and that he would have had the opportunity of an encounter with Palestinian Jewish scholars. It needs also to be realised that Philo lived in the Hellenistic world, and expressed himself in terms of Hellenistic thought and concepts. Palestinian ideas would not have been familiar to his Gentile, or even most of his Jewish, readers. Furthermore, Palestian conceptions and modes of thought would not necessarily have been relevant to Philo's intentions in his writings. The absence from Philo's writings of overt evidence of Palestinian Jewish influences therefore does not necessarily indicate that he was ignorant of the work of Hebrew- and Aramaic-speaking Jews.

The transcendence of the Greek philosophers over Olympian idolatry in favour of implicit monotheism, and their high ethical standards, enabled Jews such as Philo to identify with them, and to speak their language, to such an extent that Yahweh could be identified with the god of the Greek philosophers (Wolfson, 1968, p17ff). Philo's philosophy is "a highly Stoicized form of Platonism, streaked with Neopythagorean concerns" (Winston, 1981, p3). Philo stands firmly in the Middle Platonic tradition, which provides the concepts with which he articulates his theology.

According to Winston, Philo's work to reconcile his philosophy with his faith, his thoughts with his heritage, began late in his life (1981, p4). If this is so, then Philo's exegetical and philosophical defence of the primacy of Moses, the Mosaic Law and Judaism, over Greek philosophy, so that Plato is depicted as a disciple of Moses, can be understood, at least partly, as a reaction to the conditions which gave rise to his participation in the delegation from the Jews of Alexandria to Emperor Caius in c 40 CE. The increasing hostility of the Alexandrians, and of the imperial officials, to the Jewish community, would have placed Philo and the Jews in general, on the defensive, intellectually as well as politically. The preceding situation of harmony, mutual respect and cooperation between Jew and Gentile in Alexandria would not have induced a sense of contradiction, hostility or incompatability between Judaism and Hellenism, and would not have created the need for an aggressive defence of the historical and theological primacy of Judaism against Hellenism.

Philo's method of allegorical exegesis, is similar to that of the Cynic and Stoic philosophers (Winston, 1981, p4), which had previously been applied to the writings of Homer (Chadwick, 1967, p138). This method Philo combined with the Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean anachronism, which enabled his defence of the primacy of Judaism. His presentation of Judaism as "resembling an esoteric and slightly exotic philosophical tradition of pre-Platonic origin was skilful apologetic to the contemporary

Hellenistic world" (Chadwick, 1967, p141).

Philo was a mystic as well as a philosopher. The vision of the Throne of God was central to his spirituality, in which the goal was mystical union with God. As will become apparent below, this union with God was to be realised by union with the "Logos", as God himself is unapproachable to humans. The "Logos" serves as God's mediator with humanity. "God requires a second, metaphysically inferior aspect of himself to face towards the lower world" (Chadwick, 1967, p145). The angels, frequently referred to as "logoi", are emanations from God, who reconcile divine transcendence and immanence, and so mediate between God and creation. Philo's mysticism, while experientially different to that of Apocalyptic Judaism, was nevertheless founded upon the same mythological presuppositions, and was as deeply rooted in the Hebrew tradition of the Divine Council gathered about the Throne of God.

In Wisdom mysticism, of which Philo is a representative, the emphasis is not on divine revelations of cosmic secrets to human recipients. Rather, Wisdom mysticism consists in the individual quest for union with God. Men of different intellectual and spiritual calibre are accordingly able to apprehend God more or less fully; God reveals only as much of himself as the human soul is able to perceive (Winston, 1981, p28). The ultimate form of mystical union, however, is when the soul gazes upon the "Logos".

Philo's mystical construction of the Light-Stream, by which God mediates himself to creation, is similar to, but not identical with, the Sephirot of Palestinian rabbinic mysticism. This mystical reconstruction is based upon the Ark of the Covenant; the parts of the Ark being transformed into the seven powers (Goodenough, 1935, p24):

"BEING"
το ὀν
(the divine)

==========

The "Logos"
ὁ λογος
(the voice from the cloud)

Creative power
δυναμις ποιητικη
(cherub)

Royal Power
δυναμις βασιλικη
(cherub)

Power of Mercy
δυναμις ἱλεως
(the mercy seat)

Law-making Power
δυναμις νομοθετικη
(tablets of Law)

World of Forms
κοσμος νοητος
(the box)

While Philo and Palestinian Judaism share fundamentally the same concept of God as absolute and transcendent, there are nevertheless definite differences. The allegorical and exegetical techniques which lie behind the various mystical experiences differ, particularly in that Philo attaches no importance to the numerical values of the Hebrew letters. The eschatology which Palestinian Judaism inherited from Apocalyptic, is absent in Philo's writings. The angelologies of the two traditions, are also somewhat diverse, as Philo is dependent upon the Platonic

concept of "daemones" rather than on the apocalyptic understanding of the role and identity of the angels (Winston, 1981, p323).

Philo's mysticism belongs to the Wisdom tradition of Hellenistic Judaism. It is conditioned by the language and philosophy in terms of which Philo thought, and is therefore different in many ways to the mysticism, apocalyptic and rabbinic, of Hebew- and Aramaic-speaking Judaism. Nevertheless, while the Throne-Chariot of God is less prominent in Philo's writings, his mysticism belongs to the same tradition as all other contemporary Jewish mysticism, which has its foundations in the Throne-Theophany tradition of ancient Israel.

As Philo's mysticism is founded on different philosophical premises and different spiritual goals to that of Palestinian Judaism, although the mythological foundations are the same tradition, his understanding of communication between God and humanity is somewhat different. The form of mediation between the transcendent God and the created order is therefore different, and therefore the concept of Divine Agency is somewhat modified, as will become clear in the discussion below.

2. Philo's Writings

The literary works of Philo belong to three groups. These are: The Exposition of the Law of Moses; Allegorical Interpretations of Scripture; and miscellaneous Thematic

Works. As the texts requiring discussion for the purposes of this study fall in the first two categories, no discussion of the Thematic Works is necessary here.

(a) The Exposition of the Law of Moses

This group of writings can in turn be divided into three parts. "De Opificio Mundi" deals with the creation of the world. "De Abrahamo", "De Iosepho", and the extinct works on Isaac and Jacob, deal with the history of the Hebrews and the Covenant. "De Decalogo", "De Specialibus Legibus", "De Virtutibus" and "De Praemiis et Poenis" deal with legislative matters. "De Vita Mosis" is a companion to this group of writings, and is presupposed in them (Goodenough, 1962, p35).

The Expository Books and "Mosis" are addressed to benevolent Gentiles, and are an apology for Judaism. The biblical texts are paraphrased and expanded in a manner comparable with that in such works as "Jubilees", the "Genesis Apocryphon" and the "Biblical Antiquities" of Pseudo-Philo (Borgen, 1984, p234).

"Mosis" is an apology for Judaism, in which Moses is portrayed as the ideal king, high priest and prophet. The qualities and attributes of the sage of the Stoics, the divine man of the Pythagoreans, and the saviour of the mystery cults, are combined in Moses. The divine calling of Moses and the Jews to worship God, observe the Law and serve the whole world is expounded. A new era is forecast

in which all nations will observe the Mosaic Law (Goodenough, 1962, p33).

"Opificio" is an exposition of Gen.1-3, dealing with the creation of the world; in which the Biblical text is understood in terms of Hellenistic cosmology and metaphysics (Goodenough, 1962, p35). Borgen notes affinities between "Opificio" and Plato's "Timaeus", particularly the conception of the world of forms, and also with Stoic thought, such as the conception of the world as a city (1984, p236). According to Philo, Greek philosophy has its roots in the Mosaic Law; Greek philosophical ideas are therefore Jewish in essence.

"Abrahamo" is the first and only surviving of three works on the patriarchs. It is an exposition of Gen.4-26, articulating and interpreting the history of humanity from Enos to Abraham. The life of Abraham is archetypical of the Mosaic Law.

"Iosepho" is an exposition of Gen.37-50, but begins with a summary of Philo's interpretation of the lives of the patriarchs. In this work, Philo reflects on conditions in contemporary Alexandria, and emphasises that the ideal ruler of Egypt was Joseph, a Jew.

In "Decalogo", Philo demonstrates that the Decalogue constitutes the basic principles on which all laws are based. This is illustrated more fully in "Specialibus Legibus", a systematic review of the Mosaic Law in four

volumes.

In "Virtutibus", Philo demonstrates the harmony that exists between the Mosaic Law and the higher forms of Greek Ethics. "Praemiis" is a summary of the points made in Philo's collection of legal expositions.

(b) Allegorical Interpretations

Three groups of writings fall into this category. "Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin" and "Quaestiones et Solutiones in Exodum", extant only in Armenian, with a few Greek fragments, are works of catechetical instruction, where the Biblical texts are discussed verse by verse. While Goodenough argues that this corpus originally covered the entire Penteteuch, and can be regarded as Philo's magnum opus (1962, p49), Borgen regards the Armenian text as complete, as Eusebius knew only the extant version, and no Greek fragments remain of any other part of the corpus (1984, p242). While the question cannot be conclusively resolved, there is no apparent reason why Philo would have discontinued his exposition at the end of Exodus, except in the case of the intervention of death. It seems most likely, therefore, either that Philo's work was cut short by his death, or that the corpus originally included expositions of the entire Penteteuch. As these works are of a catechetical nature, they would have been of no interest to Gentiles, who were responsible for the preservation of the entire Philonic corpus. Philo's catechetical works may therefore have perished in the

original Greek, where his other writings, which were addressed to Gentiles, and accordingly were of wider interest, were preserved.

The second group of writings in the Allegorical Interpretations is also addressed to Jews, but is directed at a higher intellectual level than the catechetical works. The allegorical method of interpretation is used in these works "to deduce ... principles to fortify the Jews of Alexandria in their religious and moral life" (Borgen, 1984, p243). Allegorical method allows the literal meaning of the text to be superceded by speculative discussion, of a mystical, metaphysical, ethical, psychological or political nature, around the text (Goodenough, 1962, p47).

The major work in this group of writings, is "Legum Allegoriae", preserved in three volumes. Gen.2 and 3 are expounded according to Philo's allegorical method. Three groups of treatises follow upon "Legum Allegoriae". The first consists of "De Cherubim", "De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini", "Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Solet", "De Posteritate Caini", "De Gigantibus" and "Quod Deus Immutabilis Sit"; the second of "De Agricultura", "De Plantatione", "De Ebrietate" and "De Sobrietate"; and the third of "De Confusione Linguarum", "De Migratione Abrahami", "Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres", "De Congressu Quaerendae Eruditionis Gratia", "De Fuga et Inventione" and "De Mutatione Nominum". According to Goodenough, at least nine further works are missing from this collection (1962, p46).

"Cherubim" is an exposition of Gen.3:24 and 4:1, interpreting Cain's life, activities and descent after the murder of Abel. "Sacrificiis" an exposition of Gen.4:2-4, dealing with the sacrifices offered by Cain and Abel. "Quod Deterius" is a study in the combat between opposing principles in several situations in Genesis. "Posteritate" covers the Biblical material between the murder of Abel and the flood (Gen.4-5). "Gigantibus" is an exposition of Gen.6:1-4, dealing particularly with the words of God in v.3. "Quod Deus" is an exposition of Gen.6:4-12, dealing with the consequences of Philo's interpretation of the preceding verses in "Quod Deus".

"Agricultura", "Plantatione", "Ebrietate" and "Sobrietate" are a series of expositions of Gen.9:20-29. These works deal with Noah's post-deluvian activities.

"Confusione" is an exposition of Gen.11:1-9, interpreting the events surrounding the building of the Tower of Babel. "Migratione" is a treatise on Gen.12:1-6, expounding the meaning of Abraham's departure from his ancestral home to the promised land. "Quis Rerum" is an exposition of Gen.15:2-18, dealing both with Abraham's relationship with God, and with the issue of his inheritance of the land. "Congressu" is an exposition of Gen.16:1-6, interpreting allegorically Abraham's relationships with Sarah and Hagar. "Fuga" follows upon "Congressu", covering Gen.16:6-12. The theme is flight, and Hagar's departure from Sarah, and also Jacob's flights to and from Laban,

are expounded. "Mutatione" expounds Gen.17:1-5 and 15-22, interpreting the significance of the changes of name ordered by God for Abraham and Sarah.

The third group of writings in the Allegorical Interpretations, are the books entitled "De Somniis". The first of these is no longer extant (Borgen, 1984, p245). The second expounds the significance of the dreams of Jacob at Bethel (Gen.28) and at Haran (Gen.31). The third book deals with the dreams of Joseph, both those he experienced (Gen.37), and those of others which he interpreted (Gen.40-41).

C. The Figure of the "Logos" in Philo's Writings

The "Logos" appears both in Philo's expository works, and in his allegorical writings. It is best discussed in terms of these literary categories. But first a brief summary of the complex diversity of traditions behind the "Logos" concept is helpful.

1. The Sources of the "Logos" Tradition in Philo's Writings

Several possible contributors to the tradition which gave rise to the "Logos" concept were considered above. While no single source for the idea can be isolated, some certainty is possible as to the variety of ideas and beliefs upon which the "Logos" concept was developed.

The ancient Near Eastern understanding of the divine "word" as effective in bringing about action, is particularly important to the development of the "Logos" idea in Judaism. The prophetic speeches were regarded as manifestations of the "word" of God. The extension of this concept with its association with creation, and its further development in the Jewish Wisdom tradition, where it is associated if not identified with the figures of "Wisdom" and the "Breath" of God, with the incorporation of Iranian and Greek ideas, added significantly to the understanding of the "Word" of God. The articulation in Greek of the tradition which developed, accompanied by the introduction of the term λογος, together with the

philosophical connotations which accompanied the word, and other Greek ideas, particularly Platonic, Pythagorean and Stoical, completed the tradition which lies behind the Philonic concept of the "Logos". How Philo used his heritage, and the degree to which he was an original thinker, cannot be established conclusively, as there is insufficient Hellenistic Jewish literature of the period which can be precisely dated. What is clear is that the Jewish tradition already contained the basic concepts with which Philo worked.

2. The "Logos" in the Legal Expositions

Philo's Legal Expositions are an apology for Judaism directed at a Gentile readership, and are accordingly not esoteric in their philosophy or their mysticism. The role of the "Logos" in these writings can therefore be dealt with relatively briefly.

The "Logos" is never systematically defined in Philo's writings; nor is a definitive "Logos"-doctrine ever articulated. Sometimes the "Logos" appears as an independent entity; at other times it is an attribute or manifestation of God. At times the "Logos" belongs to the created order; at others it is an instrument or agent of the Uncreated. The ontology and function of the "Logos" are not always consistent. Nevertheless, it is possible to locate the "Logos" in the hierarchy of being, and to describe some of its qualities, before examining its functions.

The "Logos" is second only to God in the hierarchy of being, in the Legal Expositions. The "Logos" is the eldest of all existing or created beings, τον ἀνωτατω λογον (Spec.Leg. III:207). This accords with the status of "Wisdom" in Prov.8:22. As a created being, the "Logos" has an identity and existence of its own, which is important if it is to be described as a Divine Agent.

The "Logos" is the instrument of God in creation, and the archetype of created beings. The shadow of God casts an image on, and is the pattern of, created beings, so that they are made after the image of God, an idea derived from Gen.1:27. The immortal human soul is made after the image of God, the "Logos", through whom the Universe was made. Not only is the "Logos" a creative instrument in God's hand, but also the archetype of subsequent creatures, the image of God through whom the universe was framed (Spec.Leg. I:81). Here the "Logos" does not have independent delegated functions, but is an instrument of God. While the association of the "word" of God with creation is well-established in the Jewish tradition, the mode of creation, and the function of the "Logos", are unprecedented.

Man is made after the image of God, the "Logos" being the image of God, man the image of the "Logos" (Opif. 25). Man is made, not patterned on any created object, but on the "Logos" (Opif. 139). While physically allied to the material world, man is mentally allied to the "Logos",

having been created a copy or fragment of the "Logos" (Opif. 146; Praem. 163). Here the "Logos" is an attribute of God, and not a created being. The function of the "Logos" is to mediate the Divine Image, but, as a Divine Emanation, the "Logos" cannot be described as a Divine Agent. The "Logos" is the archetype upon which the human being, soul and body, is modelled (Opif. 138f). This relationship with the "Logos" is the greatest gift bestowed by God the merciful saviour (Praem. 163).

Creation, portrayed as a city, begins with the divine plan, κοσμος νοητος , the universe of ideas, which exists only in the mind of the architect. The "Logos" is the location of the universe of ideas (Opif. 20), and, accordingly the mind of God. The universe of ideas can even be identified with the "Logos" (Opif. 24). As the mind of God, the "Logos" is an aspect of the Deity, and not an independent functionary, and therefore not a "Divine Agent".

The "Logos" is identified with the Decalogue, which is a summary of the entire divine Law as found in Scripture (Decal. 154). The Decalogue is described as ten "Logoi", ten manifestations of the "Logos" (Decal. 32, 154, 176; Spec.Leg. I:1). The identification of the written law with the "word" of God has its origins in the P tradition, as expressed in Num.15:31.

The "Logos" appears, as the messenger of God, to Abraham (Abrah. 71) and to Sarah (Abrah. 206), fulfilling the role

attributed to God himself in the Genesis narratives. The heightened perception of the transcendence of God necessitates the role of intermediaries for communication between God and man. This text is important in that the "Logos" is identified as an angel, a heavenly messenger of God and member of the Divine Council. The "Logos" therefore has an existence and identity of its own, and a function delegated by God. The Divine Agency concept is therefore present in this text.

In the Legal Expositions, the "Logos" is most prominent for its role in creation. The "Logos" is the plan and archetype of the created order, and particularly of humanity. The "Logos" is identified with the Law of God, particularly the Decalogue. The "Logos" also fulfills roles attributed to God in Scripture, a tendency noted above in the Targums. The "Logos" is in most texts an attribute or emanation of God, rather than a created being. The "Logos" is a created instrument of God in "Spec.Leg" I.81, with no delegated functions. In "Abraham." 71 and 216, hopwever, the "Logos" is a mediating angel of God, a Divine Agent.

3. The "Logos" in the Allegorical Interpretations

The Allegorical Interpretations were written for an educated Jewish readership, and are consequently more complex in their mysticism and philosophy than the Legal Expositions. The "Logos" is accordingly a much more complex figure, requiring more detailed treatment than in the case of the Legal Expositions. For convenience the material will be dealt with categories according to criteria of particular interest.

(a) God, "Logos", and "Sophia"

The "Logos" is second only to God in the hierarchy of being, except in instances where the "Sophia", the spouse of God, takes the second place, in which cases the "Logos", as son of God, is relegated to third in the hierarchy.

The "Sophia" is the Garden of Eden, and the "Logos" the river, generic virtue, that flows from Eden, and divides into four particular virtues (Leg.All. I:63ff). The "Logos" descends from the fountain of the "Sophia", Eden, like a river to water the garden which is the souls of virtuous (Somn. II:241f). The "Logos" is the fountain of the "Sophia", from which man can draw in order to gain eternal life (Fuga 97). In these allegories, the "Sophia" is the spouse of God, and accordingly second in the hierarchy of being. "Wisdom", where personified in the Hebrew tradition, is portrayed as female, in possible

dependence on the Egyptian figures of Ma'at and Isis. "Wisdom" is also portrayed as an intimate companion of God (eg. Prov.8:30; Wisd.Sol.8:3). Philo's portrayal of "Sophia" as the spouse of God is therefore fully in continuity with his Jewish heritage. The "Logos" is next to "Sophia" in the hierarchy. The sonship idea is the logical conclusion of the development in which divine attributes became personified as subordinate beings. The heavenly beings, with which the divine "word" and other concepts came to be identified, are called sons of God in a wide variety of Old Testament texts (eg. Gen.6:2(J); Ps.82:6; Job 1:6). While the "Logos" is frequently described as the son of God by Philo, texts in which the "Logos" is third in the hierarchy behind "Sophia" are less frequent than those in which the "Logos" is second only to God.

The Primal Existence, γενικωτατον , is God, and next to God is the "Logos" (Leg.All. II:86), God being the fountain of the "Logos" (Q.Deter. 82; Post.Cain. 69). The "Logos" is second to God, and, though of the created order, is the first and greatest of all created beings (Leg.All. III:175). The "Logos" is the eldest of all existing or created things, του πρεσβυτερου των ὀντων (Q.Deter. 118); ὁ λογος πρεσβυτερος (Migr.Abr. 6); τον ἀνωτατω λογον (Spec.Leg. III:207); πρωτογονος (Conf.Ling. 146); πρωτογονου υἱον (Agr. 51).

The "Logos" is the first-born of God, and is the ruler of the angels, των ἀγγελων πρεσβυτατον (Conf.Ling. 146), and is

high above the cherubim, the chief of all intellectually percieved beings (Fuga 101). As well as being the oldest and most honoured of all created beings, the "Logos" has the prerogative of standing between creature and Creator, and therefore of being the channel of communication between mortality and immortality (Q.Rer. 205). The "Logos" is placed nearest to God, and is the one through whom God directs the rule of the universe (Fuga 101). The "Logos" shares the immutability of God (Somn. II:237), a characteristic which is shared to a lesser degree by the sage and the man of gradual progress. The "Logos" is identified as the chief of the heavenly beings in the Divine Council. "Wisdom" is similarly conceived in Ecclus.24:2, and is described as the first of all created beings, inter alia, in Prov.8:22. The "Logos", as a created being with the function of mediating between God and humanity, is a Divine Agent. This role of the "Logos" is the result of the heightened perception of divine transcendence in post-Exilic Judaism.

"Logos" and "Sophia" share many attributes in the Allegorical Interpretations. Both are called the firstborn of God, the "Logos" in the texts already cited; the "Sophia" in "Fuga" 51 and "Ebrietate" 31. This is attributable to both concepts originating in the same milieu, of Hellenistic Jewish Wisdom speculation (Mack, 1973, p143), and also to the attribution of similar functions to both concepts earlier in the tradition. The "Sophia", as a feminine concept, has the role of wife (Cher. 49), or alternatively, daughter (Q.Gen. 97; Fuga

50-52), of God. The "Logos", as a masculine concept, is attributed divine sonship. According to Wolfson, "Wisdom ... is only another word for Logos, and it is used in all the senses of the term Logos" (1968, p258). The two are effectively identified, in continuity with the Jewish Wisdom tradition.

(b) The "Logos" as a Divine Manifestation

The "Logos" is almost always conceived as second only to God in the hierarchy of being, and usually as the first and greatest of the created order. However, the "Logos" is also conceived as an attribute or manifestation of God.

The "Logos" is the name of God, the one by whom, in accordance with Deut.6:13, oaths are sworn. The "Logos" stands in the place of God, and bears witness to God. As it is unfitting for mortals to swear by God, as they are incapable of possessing knowledge of the nature of God, it is sufficient that they swear by the "Logos", the name of God (Leg.All. III:207f). The transcendence of God requires mediation between God and humanity. This function is performed by the "Logos", in this text as an attribute, the name of God.

The "Logos" is described as the shadow of God, σκια θεου (Leg.All. III:96). The "Logos" is the instrument of God in creation, and the archetype of created beings. The shadow of God casts an image on, and is the pattern of, created beings, so that they are made after the image of God; an

idea founded on Gen.1:27. When God had completed the work of creation, He imprinted the universe with his image and an ideal form, the "Logos" (Somn. II:45).

The "Logos" as a divine manifestation, has no existence or identity distinct from God. "God requires a second, metaphysically inferior aspect of himself to face towards the lower world" (Chadwick, 1967, p145). This form of the "Logos" has no independent existence, and cannot therefore be described as a Divine Agent. Rather, "the Logos is what is knowable of God, the Logos is God insofar as he may be apprehended and experienced" (Dunn, 1980, p226).

(c) The Role of the "Logos" in Creation

The "Logos" is the instrument with which God makes heaven, the prototype of the mind, and earth, the prototype of sense perception (Leg.All. I:21). God is the pattern of the "Logos", and the "Logos" the pattern of created beings (Leg.All. III:96).

The "Logos" is the house of God. Just as the human mind has speech for its dwelling, so God, who is the mind of the universe, has the "Logos" for his dwelling (Migr.Abr. 4). The house of God is invisible, and can be fully perceived only by the soul (Migr.Abr. 5). The same "Logos" who is the house of God, is the one who holds eldership and precedence in the created order (Migr.Abr. 6); a position held by "Wisdom" in Prov.8:20. The house of God, the universe of ideas, is the plan or the prototype of the

material universe.

God is the cause of the universe, the architect who creates it out of his own goodness. The "Logos" is the instrument through which the universe is formed of the four elements (Cher. 127), universal being being divided into water, fire, earth and air (Q.Rer. 140). God's use of the "Logos" as his instrument, ensures the perfection of creation (Migr.Abr. 6; Fuga 12). While living beings are incomplete at their conception, and need to grow, they are essentially perfect in that the imprint of the "Logos" ensures their qualitative immutability (Fuga 13). Man is created indirectly in the image of God; the "Logos" being the image of God, man the image of the "Logos". Man is therefore made after, rather than in, the image of God, in terms of Philo's exegesis of Gen.1:27 (Q.Rer. 231). The "Logos" is the instrument of God, with no independent functions, and is therefore not a Divine Agent in this conception of creation. Not only is the "Logos" the instrument with which God creates, but also the image of Himself which he imprints upon the completed work of creation (De Somn. II:45).

The "Logos" is active not only in creation, but also in the continuing ordering of the universe. As well as functioning, by virtue of seniority and prestige, to separate creation from the creator, and mediating between the two spheres (Q.Rer. 205), the "Logos" has a particular role in the ordering of nature and history. The "Logos" with distinct identity and existence, and delegated

functions, is God's Agent in the ordering of the world, and in mediating between the created and the Uncreated.

The "Logos" supports the world as a prop, maintaining it in its correct position. As the bond of the universe which ensures the course of nature, the "Logos" separates the elements so that they cannot destroy each other (Plant. 8-10). The vestments of the "Logos", personified as the high priest, are the four elements which constitute the world (Fuga 108-110).

The "Logos" is portrayed with a role in creation, an idea attested in the Hebrew tradition in Ps.33:6 and Gen.1 as well as in the Wisdom tradition. The "Logos" is at times conceived as an attribute or manifestation of God, and at other times as a primordial or first created being. Only in the latter case can the "Logos" be described as a Divine Agent.

(d) The "Logos" as a Mediator between Creator and Creation

God is ontologically distinct from creation, and therefore requires mediators, of whom the "Logos" is the chief, to relate to creation. This idea is identical to that in Palestinian Judaism where the heightened perception of the transcendence of God requires the activity of intermediaries between God and man. Philo's conception is expressed in a different language, and in terms of a different philosophy, but is fundamentally the same as Palestinian Jewish belief.

God rules the universe through the "Logos" (Cher. 28), his viceroy, who upholds and sustains creation (Somn. I:241). God has set the "Logos", his first-born son, over the universe as his viceroy, so leading his flock in accordance with the principles of righteousness and law (Agric. 51). The "Logos" is the ruler of all, the bestower of good and evil (Cher. 36). The "Logos" rules the universe as God's Agent and Vicegerent.

The "Logos" represents God and can be given the title "God", not by virtue of inherent divinity, but by virtue of standing in the place of God. It is not of the nature of God to be spoken of, but to exist. God accordingly has no proper name as such, except where a name is attributed out of linguistic necessity (Somn. I:228ff). The "Logos" is the one whom mortals are able to perceive, and with whom they communicate, and is accordingly the one addressed as "God". The "Logos" is a created being, God's Agent, who enables creation to communicate with its creator.

The "Logos" is the image of God, εἰκων θεου , the chief of intellectually perceivable beings, and stands next to God, the truly existent One (Fuga 101). Just as the parhelion is to the sun, so is the "Logos" the image of God. The "Logos" is not God, but is often thought to be (Somn. I:239). It is expected that the learned should strive to see God, the Existent One. Should they be unable to achieve this, they should seek his image the "Logos"

(Conf.Ling. 97), who stands next to God, and can more readily be perceived. Those who have not yet reached the level where they can become sons of God, can become sons of the "Logos", the invisible and first created image of God (Conf.Ling. 147).

The "Logos", as archangel, or chief messenger of God, has the unique function of standing on the border between creation and the Creator, and is the means of communication between the created order and the Uncreated (Conf.Ling 146). The "Logos" pleads with God on behalf of man, and is God's representative to his subject people (Q.Rer. 205). Accordingly, the "Logos" is often looked upon as God, although merely the image and angel of God (Somn. I:239). The "Logos", as God's Agent, stands in the place of God in his dealings with creation. The "Logos" is the chief member of the Divine Council, a position analogous to that of "Wisdom" in Ecclus.24:2.

By virtue of man's having been made in the image of the archetype, the "Logos" of God the first cause, the human body was created erect so that the eyes could be directed to heaven, and man apprehend that which he cannot see (Plant. 20). By means of the "Logos", God draws the perfect man from terrestrial matters to Himself (Sacr. 8). The "Logos" leads and accompanies those who yearn to enter the presence of God (Somn. I:71).

The "Logos" is the guide and ruler of all (Cher. 36), leading God's flock according to what is right and lawful

(Agric. 51; Mutat.Nom. 114). With some, the "Logos" deals as king, with some as teacher, and with some as counsellor (Somn. I:191). The "Logos" is chosen as guide and patron by the wise (Migr.Abr. 67). For as long as they fall short of perfection, they have the "Logos" for their leader (Migr.Abr 174).

The function of the "Logos" as mediator between God and creation is to relate God, who is absolutely transcendent, to creation, which cannot otherwise reach God. The "Logos" is God's Agent in this mediatory and viceregal function.

(e) The "Logos", the Torah and the Law

The "Logos" is frequently identified with Scripture. Bible is Moses' name for the "Logos" (Leg.All. I:19). The "Logos" is identified either with Scripture generally, or, more frequently, in the context of a reference to a specific text. With one exception, these texts are all from the Pentateuch; the exception being in Ebr. 143, in which the "Logos" is indentified with Scripture in the context of a quotation of I Sam.1:11. Other instances of the identification of the "Logos" with Scripture occur in Leg.All. II:105; III:8, 11, 36, 110, 162, 217; Sacr. 76; Sobr. 68; Migr.Abr. 85; Q.Rer. 95; Congr. 85f; Fuga 196; Somn. I;77f, 81, 206, 214, 245; II;23, 272. The "Logos" is identified with the Law of God (Migr.Abr. 130). The "Logos" is the interpreter and prophet of God (Q.Deus 138). The identification of the "word" of God with the written law originates in the Priestly writings, most

particularly Num.15:31.

(f) The "Logos" Manifest as a Human Agent of God

Philo identifies a number of particularly eminent figures, of whom Moses is the chief, with the "Logos". Moses is the most important figure in Hellenistic Jewish apologetics (Meeks, 1977, p45), not least in Philo's writings. Moses is particularly exalted in "Mosis" I.157f. He is the "Logos" as leader of the exodus (Leg.All. III:43), as lawgiver (Migr.Abr. 23), and as prophet (Congr. 170). Moses the "Logos" and high priest pours out the blood, half into mixing bowls, and half onto the altar; the blood poured out on the altar being an offering to God; that poured into the bowls enabling the human senses to become pure and rational (Q.Rerum 182ff).

The "Logos" is identified with the priest whose prophetic function it is to discern hidden truth with the all-penetrating eye of God, and to execute judgement accordingly (Cher. 17). The "Logos" is identified with the high priest (Migr.Abr. 102), who lives among the sacred teachings, but can enter the Holy of Holies only once a year (Gigant. 52; cf Lev.16:2,34). The high priest is not a man, but the "Logos", whose father is God and whose mother is the "Sophia". The high priest is incorruptible because his parents are incorruptible; it is only when the "Logos" withdraws from his soul that the high priest becomes corruptible. The "Logos" as high priest is vested in the world, the four elements being his garments. The

rule of the "Logos" as high priest, king and judge, is perpetual (Fuga 108-118). In the Temple of God, which is the universe, the "Logos" is high priest; in the second Temple, the reasoning soul, the priest is a man, the outward and visible image of the "Logos", whose vestments are a replica of heaven (Somn. I:215).

The "Logos" is identified with Aaron, whom Moses, the man of all wisdom, called to his assistance as a spokesman and interpreter (Migr.Abr. 76-79). Together with Hor, Light, Aaron the "Logos" supports the arms of Moses, showing that the wise are upheld by the "Logos" and the Light of Truth (cf Exod.17:8-15). When Aaron dies, by which is meant, when he attains perfection, he ascends Mount Hor, as Truth is the ultimate goal of the "Logos" (Leg.All. III:45; cf Num.20:25). Aaron the "Logos" begs Moses, the beloved of God, to heal Miriam (Leg.All. I:76; cf Num.12).

The "Logos" is identified with Phinehas, who earned the prize of peace as the reward for his zeal to obliterate vice (Conf.Ling. 57; cf Num.25), and also with Melkisedeq, the priest of the Most High, and only, God (Leg.All. III:82; cf Gen.14:18).

Eminent human beings who function as God's Agents, are identified with the "Logos".This applies particularly to Moses and Aaron. Priestly functions are attributed to all these, which indicates the regard in which Philo held the Jewish cult, and his allegiance to his Jewish heritage. His identification of the "Logos" with human beings,

however, is without precedent in the Hebrew tradition.

(g) Plural Manifestations of the "Logos"

The "Logos" does not always appear in the singular. Particularly, when identified with that which is plural in Scripture, the "Logos" appears in plural form, as "Logoi". The wise man encounters "Logoi" in his quest for God, the ruler of the universe (Post.Cain. 18). "Logoi" are "heavenly principles ... embodied in the laws and precepts given to the Jews through Moses" (Borgen, 1984, p273). While God bestows the principal gifts, the "Logoi" and angels bestow secondary gifts which cure illnesses (Leg.All. III:177). The "Logoi" are the physicians of the soul to the virtuous, and heal their infirmities (Somn. I:69). The two angels who visited Lot to warn him of the impending destruction of Sodom, are identified as "Logoi" (Conf.Ling. 27f; Fuga 144). The angels who ascended and descended the ladder Jacob saw in his dream at Bethel (Gen.28:12), are identified as "Logoi"; they separate the universe from mortality, and show that which is worthy of attention; the "Logoi" also display compassion and companionship (Somn. I:146f). The identification of the "Logoi" with the heavenly beings in the Divine Council locates Philo well within his Jewish heritage. The "Logoi" are manifestations of the "Logos" who mediate between the Throne of God and the created world as God's Agents with their various functions.

The identification of the "Logos" with human beings is to

be understood in the light of the plural manifestation of the "Logos" as "Logoi". In terms of Philo's mysticism and philosophy, only the most advanced in learning and spirituality, can apprehend the "Logos" as a whole. Others can apprehend only parts of the "Logos", as it divides lower down on the mystical ladder. These divisions of the "Logos" into lesser beings, powers and emanations, constitute the "Logoi", which can take form in identifiable individual manifestations, including human beings who are Agents of God.

4. The Identity of the "Logos"

The "Logos" is a somewhat ambiguous figure in the writings of Philo. While an emanation and manifestation of God; the "Logos" is also described as a created being. This ambiguity is best understood in terms of Philonic mysticism, where God is manifested in creation through the "Logos"; which divides into lesser manifestations in the powers. While the "Logos" as a whole has no identity apart from God, its lower manifestations, the "Logoi", are identifiable. The activity of God, and of Agents of God operating in the created order, is identified as the activity of the "Logos". The human and heavenly Agents of God can therefore be regarded as manifestations of the "Logos", as the "Logos" incorporates all its lower manifestations.

The "Logos" is the firstborn son, the image of God, the archetype of creation and the Law of God. The "Logos"

rules creation, and is the only channel of communication between God and man. In its lower forms, the "Logos" is manifested in both heavenly and human Agents of God. The "Logos" is the immanent aspect of God; that which is perceptible to human apprehension.

D. The Role of the "Logos"

The figure of the "Logos" in Philo's writings is not ontologically or functionally consistent. Whereas it is described as an emanation of God, it is also described as the first created being. In some texts, the "Logos" is described as an instrument in God's hand, and in others is an Agent of God with independent, delegated functions. This ambiguity makes the description of the "Logos" as a Divine Agent a complex issue. The label can be applied only with qualification and reservation. This does not prevent our demonstrating the origins of the functions of the "Logos" at the heart of the Hebrew tradition, however.

The role of the "Logos" is most satisfactorily assessed interms of Philo's mysticism. The "Logos" as a whole is the ultimate vision in Philo's mysticism; one which can be attained only by those advanced in spirituality and intellect. Those of less spiritual and intellectual advancement, can reach only to visions of the lower manifestations of the "Logos", where it is disseminated into the various powers and "Logoi". The "Logoi" can be incarnated or manifested in the material world as human Agents of God.

The "Logos" in its highest form is an emanation of the divine essence, and has no identity or existence apart from God. The designation Divine Agent is therefore not applicable, as the "Logos" does not act independently of God. Rather than an Agent, the "Logos" is an instrument of

God, and is designated ὄργανον in Cher. 125-127. The concept of ὄργανον does not imply the delegation of power or of function (Wolfson, 1968, p269). The "Logos" as a divine emanation, is the instrument, rather than the Agent of God. As instrument, the "Logos" has no independent function or power, but is merely an extension of the divine essence and activity. As well as the function and power of the "Logos", his essence also emanates from God.

The "Logos" is also a part of the created order, and therefore has an identity and existence distinct from God. This manifestation of the "Logos", can accurately be described as a Divine Agent. While the power and function of the "Logos" are delegated by God, the "Logos" has an essence which is separate from the divine essence. This is particularly true when the "Logos" is identified with human functionaries, such as Moses, who are clearly distinct from the divine essence. Human Agents derive their authority from God, who delegates to them their functions. They are nevertheless not divine in essence, and can be considered Divine Agents.

The "Logos" as an emanation of the divine essence, cannot be regarded as a Divine Agent, as it has no existence or identity apart from God. It is an instrument rather than an Agent. Manifestations of the "Logos" in the created order, however, have an existence and identity distinct from God, and can be considered Agents of God.

The functions of the "Logos" are rooted in the Hebrew

tradition, particularly, though not exclusively, in the Wisdom tradition. The figure of the "Logos" can be understood in continuity with the Jewish tradition. While the antecedents to the "Logos" are not conceived to be ontologically distinct from God, they are so portrayed figuratively. Philo's heritage therefore allows for reinterpretation of the "Logos" as a created being, with delegated viceregal functions. The role of the "Logos" as a Divine Agent, therefore, is in full continuity with the Jewish tradition. The Agency function therefore does not require explanation in terms of rabbinic law.

Philo's identification of the "Logos" with major figures in the Hebrew tradition is his major innovation. Human beings admitted to the Divine Council, such as prophets, were commissioned as Divine Agents in the Hebrew tradition, and the messages delivered by the prophets were described as the "word" of God. Those whom Philo identified with the "Logos" are all figures attributed intimacy with God in the Hebrew tradition, and would have shared the vision only the prophets describe. The development whereby the "word" became hypostasised in the tradition, and its identification with human, or for that matter the heavenly, bearer of the message, rather than with the message itself, cannot be unrelated. Nor is it unrelated to the identification of the "Logos" as the chief of the heavenly beings, and the consequent identification of the heavenly beings as "Logoi". Philo's innovation is therefore essentially in continuity with the Hebrew tradition. The functions of the human Agents of

God, even if not identical to their particular roles in the Old Testament, are rooted in the Hebrew tradition, and do not require explanation in terms of the rabbinic legal prescriptions.

Whether or not the "Logos" in the writings of Philo, can be regarded as a Divine Agent, depends on its ontological status and its functions in the various texts. While the highest manifestation is not an identifiable entity, and therefore not an Agent, the lower manifestations are of the created order, and therefore can be described as Divine Agents where their functions are delegated by God. While Philo is indubitably under Hellenistic influence, and expresses himself in the language of Greek philosophy, his "Logos" figure is essentially in continuity with his Jewish heritage in both essence and function. Where the "Logos" is a Divine Agent, this too is rooted in the Hebrew tradition, even if only fully realised in Philo's works.

Conclusions

We have been concerned with the figure of the "Logos" in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, and in particular in assessing whether or not the "Logos" can be considered a Divine Agent. Our aim has been to show that in both concept and function the "Logos" figure is rooted in the Hebrew tradition.

The "Logos" figure is the product of the conflation of several strands of tradition. The Old Testament concept of the "word" of God, and the Jewish figure of "Wisdom", which is all but identified with the "Word" and the "Breath" of God, are the two most important, but by no means the only, predecessors to the Philonic "Logos" concept.

The "Logos" is, in concept and function, essentially identical to the Jewish "Wisdom" figure. The functions of the "Logos" in Philo include those of "Wisdom" in Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, and the later Wisdom of Solomon whose relationship to Philo is uncertain. Earlier developments discernible in the tradition are continued by Philo, who in places conceives the "Logos" to be a created being and Divine Agent. Philo applies more literally that which is expressed figuratively in the earlier phases of the tradition. The Philonic "Logos" figure is therefore firmly rooted in the Jewish tradition.

The "Logos" is an ambivalent figure in Philo's writings,

in some texts an extension of the divine essence, in others a created being and Agent of God. The "Logos" is not always manifested as a single being, but is often disseminated as "Logoi" who are often identified as angels, and on occasion as human beings of particular eminence and sanctity.

When a created being with functions delegated by God, the "Logos" is a Divine Agent, God's vicegerent and the chief of the created heavenly beings, with a variety of functions, chiefly concerned with mediation between God and creation. Both as a Divine Agent, and as a less independent instrument of God, the functions of the "Logos" are derived from its antecedents in the Hebrew tradition, and are fully explicable in terms of that tradition. Rabbinic legal concepts of agency are not required to explain the functions of the "Logos".

CONCLUSION

THE DIVINE AGENT IN INTERTESTAMENTAL JUDAISM

The aim of this dissertation has been to locate the origins of concept of Divine Agency in the Jewish religious tradition, together with the figures to which the designation may be applied. This thesis has been posed as an alternative to those which explain Divine Agency in terms of the rabbinic legal concept of agency.

The rabbinic thesis of Rengstorf and Borgen is unsatisfactory because it is based on later Jewish writings, some later even than the Mishnah. While these texts undoubtedly preserve older traditions, it is nevertheless methodologically unsound to explain a concept apart from the context and tradition within which it developed. The Agency concept, if it is to be applicable to Jewish messianic figures, must be rooted in the religious tradition in which those figures appear.

The Throne-Theophany and its developments in apocalyptic visions and mystical ascents, is the chief form of direct communication between God and man in the Hebrew religious tradition. The Divine Council gathered about the Throne of God is fundamental to the development of the Jewish religion. It is in the context of this tradition that ideal and messianic redeemer figures emerged in Jewish thought, and therefore in this context that the roots of the Divine Agency concept are to be sought. The heightened

perception of the transcendence of God in Exilic and post-Exilic Judaism required intermediary functionaries, such as heavenly beings who were earlier regarded as gods, to conduct the affairs of the Divine Council, particularly God's dealings with mankind. These beings are widely attributed Divine Agency powers and functions in the Hebrew tradition.

Two figures in Intertestamental Jewish thought were selected for study in order to demonstrate the thesis posed. The development of each figure was traced from its origins in ancient Near Eastern mythology, through the Old Testament and Apocrypha to the writings in which they appear during the period contemporary with the emergence of the Christian Church, giving due consideration to other sources outside this tradition.

The "Son of Man" appears as the supreme heavenly being in the Similitudes of Enoch, which were dated to c. 40 CE. The figure of the "Son of Man" has its most probable origins in the Ugaritic myth of Ba`al. This myth is reinterpreted in the apocalyptic vision in Dan.7. Ba`al becomes "one like a son of man", a heavenly being who can in all probability be identified with Michael. The one like a son of man is a Divine Agent and God's vicegerent. This function, when attributed to the "Son of Man", is expanded to include eschatological judgement and the revelation of secrets, representing further delegation of divine powers. The Divine Agency role of the "Son of Man" is rooted in the tradition at least as far back as Dan.7

when the myth was reinterpreted in a monotheistic sense. The Divine Agency role of the "Son of Man" emerges, like the figure himself, in the Hebrew tradition, and does not require explanation in terms of the rabbinic law of agency.

The Philonic "Logos" is a more complex figure in both identity and function. Its ontological status is ambivalent, and its functions inconsistent. The "Logos" concept has its origins principally in the Jewish "Wisdom" figure, which is identified before Philo with the earlier Hebrew concepts of the "word" of God and the "Breath" or "Spirit" of God. The "Logos" therfore originates in the tradition as a conceptualisation of certain aspects of the Divine Essence, and not as a being with an identity and functions of its own. The process whereby "Wisdom" came to be hypostasised and identified as a companion of God and member of the Divine Council, began as early as Proverbs. "Wisdom" is described figuratively as such a being frequently in the tradition before Philo. The Philonic "Logos" is depicted both as an emanation of the Divine Essence, in continuity with the Wisdom tradition, and as the supreme heavenly being, thus completing the development begun several centuries previously. Where the "Logos" is a distinct being, and has functions delegated by God, it is a Divine Agent. The functions of the "Logos" both as the supreme heavenly being and as a manifestation of God, are those of "Wisdom" in the Jewish tradition, and also incorporate the functions of angels, priests and prophets, and most particularly of Moses, who are

identified as manifestations of the "Logos". The functions of the "Logos" chiefly concern mediation between God and man. These functions are well-attested in the Hebrew tradition, particularly in the Wisdom tradition, and do not require explanation in terms of rabbinic legal abstractions. The designation Divine Agent is not applicable to the "Logos" and its precursors before Philo, as it is not until Philo that the "Logos" is conceived as a being. The functions become Agency functions when the "Logos" becomes a being who can function as an agent, and specifically as a Divine Agent.

While the thesis has been demonstrated with only two sample figures from Intertestamental Judaism, it was shown that the Divine Agency concept is well-attested much earlier in the Hebrew religious tradition, and is applied to heavenly beings at least from the time of the Exile. Divine Agency emerges with the figures who come to fulfil the role of Divine Agents. Explanation of Divine Agency in terms of rabbinic law is therefore not only methodologically unsound, but quite unnecessary.

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