

Embracing *New Accountability*: Consequences for strategies and implemented policies

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Declaration

I hereby certify that this thesis is entirely my own work, except where stated otherwise, and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

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Abstract

This thesis offers a contribution to current debates on the role of accountability in aid effectiveness¹, a concept which pervades development thought today. Through an exploration of the *new architecture of aid*², this research provides an account of how definitions and applications of accountability influence strategies, how these strategies are translated into policy on the ground and what the consequences are.

Using DFID as a case study, I approach this research in three stages. Firstly, I outline DFID's definitions and applications of accountability both nationally and internationally. Secondly, I describe DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies, with a specific focus on those strategies pursued in South Africa. And thirdly, I examine how these definitions and applications of accountability have influenced DFID implemented HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa and observe any consequences.

My methods included the development of an overview of the evolution of the concept of accountability, a review of UK foreign policy for aid, and documentary reviews of both DFID's definitions and applications of accountability and DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies and implemented policy in South Africa. My analysis of the influence of accountability on implemented policies in South Africa and the observed consequences was strengthened by in-depth interviews with purposively selected informants.

The meaning of accountability today is ambiguous. It can be attached to ideas about transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsibility, integrity, responsiveness, governance, corruption and fraud. It is easy to become confused when looking at accountability.

¹ DFID defines aid effectiveness as "a measure of quality of aid delivery and maximizing the impact of aid on poverty reduction and development" (DFID Annual Report 2007:353).

² This term emerged in the 1990s and established itself in the early years of the 21st century and is used by DFID in a number of its publications

New accountability relationships are a great deal more complex than domestic accountability relationships because of the absence of formal international structures and processes in place to implement this new (mutual) accountability. There is no existing specification of how donors and recipients are to successfully apply *mutual accountability* nor do they address the possibility that *mutual accountability* demands may conflict with domestic accountability demands.

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements	iv
List of Acronyms	viii
List of Acronyms	viii
List of Figures.....	xi
List of Tables	xii
List of Appendices.....	xiii
Chapter 1 - Introduction	1
Which strategies?.....	1
Why accountability?	2
Introduction to the case study.....	4
DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa.....	5
Overview of Chapters.....	7
Chapter 2 - Methodology.....	8
Summary.....	8
The Case Study.....	9
Historical Evolution of Accountability.....	9
Review of UK Foreign Policy for Aid.....	9
Key Informant Interviews.....	11
Limitations.....	15
Chapter 3 - An overview of the historical evolution of <i>accountability</i>	16
Summary.....	16
A broad definition of accountability.....	17
The origins and evolution of accountability	18
Complexities of new accountability	22
Chapter 4 – An overview of UK Foreign Policy for Aid	24
Foreign aid and the evolution of British policy for development.....	24
The new architecture of aid	32
DFID and the New architecture of aid.....	37
Chapter 5 – DFID and <i>Accountability</i>	39
Summary.....	39
Domestic accountability relationships.....	40
Building domestic accountability relationships in recipient countries generates more robust accountability relationships for DFID	45
New accountability: International accountability relationships	48
Conclusion.....	55
Chapter 6 – DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa	56
Summary.....	56
An overview of DFID's aid contribution	57
DFID's Strategic Response to HIV and AIDS	59
DFID's national programme in South Africa	66
Conclusions	69
Chapter 7 – Results and Discussion	70
Summary.....	70
Reputation.....	70

Ownership.....	71
Capacity building.....	71
Devolved responsibility.....	72
Circumstances in South Africa: A challenge for DFID.....	73
DFID's HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa.....	76
Consequences for policy.....	79
Chapter 9 - Conclusions	81
Bibliography	83
Appendices	91

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List of Acronyms

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
APF	Africa Partnership Forum
AU	African Union
CAP	Country Assistance Plan
CDC	Center for Disease Control and Prevention
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department For International Development
EC	European Commission
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
G8	Group of Eight
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
GPEX	Gross Public Expenditure on Development
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLSP	Health consultancy contracted by DFID
IACDI	Independent Advisory Committee on Development Impact
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IFF	International Finance Facility
LIC	Lower Income Country
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MIC	Middle Income Country
MP	Member of Parliament
MSP	Multi-sectoral Support Programme
NAO	National Audit Office
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OA	Official Aid
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODA	Overseas Development Agency
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
PSA	Public Service Agreement
SA	South Africa
SCS	Senior Civil Servant
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organisation

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Classical Policy Cycle.....	12
Figure 2. Resolution of the Development Assistance Group’s <i>Common Aid Effort</i>.....	26
Figure 3. Millennium Development Goals.....	31
Figure 4. A New Language of Aid.....	34
Figure 5. Mutual Accountability as Explained in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.....	53
Figure 6. DFID’s Medium Term Plan on Aid Effectiveness.....	54
Figure 7. DFID Aid Expenditure by Channel.....	57
Figure 8. Gross Bilateral ODA 2005/6.....	58
Figure 9. UK Government Main Targets for Tackling HIV/AIDS.....	59
Figure 10. DFID Multilateral Spend on Health 2005/6.....	61
Figure 11. DFID Policy on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights.....	64
Figure 12. DFID Policy on HIV Treatment and Care.....	65
Figure 13. Top Ten Recipients of Gross ODA/OA.....	66
Figure 14. An Example of HLSP Partners.....	68

List of Tables

Table 1. World Conferences Held in 1990s.....	30
Table 2. Domestic Accountability Relationships.....	43
Table 3. DFID's Financial Contributions to Key Multilateral Institutions.....	62

University of Cape Town

List of Appendices

Appendix A. Information Letter.....	91
Appendix B. Consent Form.....	93
Appendix C. Interview Guide.....	94

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

This thesis presents evidence how definitions and applications of accountability influence strategies, how these strategies are translated into policy on the ground and what the consequences are. Using DFID as a case study, I approach this research in three stages. Firstly, I outline DFID's definitions and applications of *accountability* both nationally and internationally. Secondly, I describe DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies, with a specific focus on those strategies pursued in South Africa. And thirdly, I examine how these definitions and applications of *accountability* have influenced DFID implemented HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa and observe any consequences.

Which strategies?

All organisations, implement strategies aligned to their mission, goals and objectives (Behn 2001). Strategies chosen by a government donor also depend on a number of political, economic and social factors, including the type and structure of the organisation, and the type and extent of resources available (Dye 2002). For instance, in the case of aid/development strategies, security-related concerns are important to the United States, home country business interests play a role in Japan, and former colonial ties influence Britain, France and Portuguese decisions (Behn 2001). These criteria influence why and how donors choose particular strategies and not others.

The new order "globalisation" has brought with it a shift in the focus of aid/development assistance (Plattner and Smolar 2000). In the 1990s Cold War strategies concerned with realpolitik diminished in favour of promoting and facilitating democracy. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked not only the end of the Cold War but also meant globalisation became both possible and desirable. Simultaneously national democratic values began to be applied on a global scale. This newfound sense of interconnectedness, influenced

thinking and a *new architecture of aid* also emerged which embodied “both fundamental reform in the way aid is delivered and a substantial increase in the volume of aid to the world’s poorest countries” (Birdsall and Williamson 2002). The *new architecture of aid* emphasises the importance of basic human rights, the reduction of poverty and is reflected in a new language of aid. The development agenda is dominated by terms concerned with aid effectiveness through partnership, coordination and harmonisation, conditionality, local country ownership and *accountability* (Riddell 2007). The doctrine of the *new architecture of aid* is that “individuals have rights, implies that governments and others have corresponding legal and moral obligations, and that they can be held to account for their actions to fulfil those responsibilities” (Eyben & Ferguson in Groves & Hinton 2004:163). As a result, a recipient country’s capacity to utilise aid effectively can influence donor strategies. *Accountability* has thus become a significant feature of many government donors’ strategies to tackle poverty and increase development.

Why accountability?

Accountability is necessary for any organisation to be effective. All organisations depend on a structure which articulates the tasks, responsibilities and the internal relationships of the people within it.

There are aspects to democracy which make *accountability* essential (Behn 2001). *Accountability* in a democracy provides legitimacy (Flinders 2001, Grant and Keohane 2005 Blair 2000, Newell and Bellour 2002, Bovens 2007, Schedler et al 1999). In a democracy, governments can only be elected by the people and must remain accountable to the people through parliament in order to remain legitimate. If a government (or any government department) does not act in accordance with its own democratic principles, delivering on promises and commitments in an accountable manner, it risks being sanctioned by its elected representatives, and ultimately by its citizens.

The *new architecture of aid* has emerged since the end of the Cold War. Democratisation and globalisation have influenced ideas about the provision of development

assistance/aid. Under this *new architecture of aid* it is not enough to simply spend honestly; donors must now also spend fairly and spend effectively. In order to do this, and to prove that this is being done, complex and dynamic relationships have developed between donors and taxpayers, between donors and their own governments, between donors and recipient governments and between donors and local populations. As a result a *new accountability* has emerged. Government donors have begun to respond to stakeholders other than their own citizens and acknowledge the need for a more inclusive understanding of *accountability* (Eyben & Ferguson in Groves and Hinton 2004). *New accountability* is *accountability* that extends beyond the borders of the nation-state.

New accountability in the era of globalisation and global democracy has complicated traditional state-centric understandings of *accountability*. States are now bound by rules and codes which extend beyond their boundaries. Government departments (including those responsible for distributing development assistance/aid) need to be seen to be legitimate not just to their own electorate but local governments and local populations. Included in *new accountability* is the conception and application of *mutual accountability* which emphasises the shared nature of development goals between two or more parties. Each party has a right or legitimate claim that the other is responsible for fulfilling or respecting, and each may be required to explain how they have discharged their responsibilities and be sanctioned if they fail to deliver (DFID 2005a). The application of these *accountability* relationships can profoundly influence the strategies pursued and what happens in practice.

Introduction to the case study

In this thesis I present evolving donor definitions and applications of *accountability*, consider how these shape strategies and explore the consequences of these on implemented policies/delivery, using the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) as a case study. DFID is a pertinent case for the following reasons.

Firstly, the United Kingdom (UK) is a major donor of overseas development assistance. Most recent figures show that the UK's Gross Public Expenditure on Development (GPEX) amounted to £6.027m in 2007/08 UK's Gross Public Expenditure on Development (GPEX) amounted to £6.027m in 2007/08 (DFID 2008). The DFID aid programme accounted for £5.2m (86 per cent) of this expenditure (DFID 2008) and DFID are expected to spend £7.9 billion by 2010/11 reaching the international aid target of 0.7 per cent of national income by 2013 (DFID 2008).

Secondly, DFID has a good reputation as a bilateral donor. In 2006, a Review of the Development Cooperation Policies and Programmes of the UK found that "the UK is currently seen by many aid practitioners and donors as one of the bilateral models for today's evolving world of development co-operation" (OECD 2006a:10). The report cites 'consistent clarity of vision', a 'clear legislative mandate', a lean and well managed delivery system, a well defined, unambiguous relationship with other departments, a unified government approach and coherent policy direction, and high calibre and highly motivated staff as some of the reasons DFID has been judged to have excelled as a government donor (OECD 2006a:10).

Thirdly, since its creation in 1997, DFID has adopted the principles of the *new architecture of aid*. This includes a mission-statement which promises to combat international poverty through rights-based approaches (Eyben and Ferguson 2004) as well as a commitment to make aid more effective through greater local ownership, better coordination and more inclusive *accountability*. DFID places heavy emphasis on the

importance of *accountability*, both nationally and internationally and has been influential in placing *accountability* high on the aid effectiveness agenda.

DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa

To examine the ways in which definitions and applications of *accountability* shapes donor strategies and to consider the consequences of these on policies I decided to focus on HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa. Through interviews with people who have experience in DFID's international response to HIV/AIDS across the policy cycle, I was able to gain in-depth knowledge of DFID's work and obtain specific examples of how applications of *accountability* have affected its HIV/AIDS policy work in South Africa.

The UK government has a long standing history with Africa initially through trade, including the slave trading, then colonisation and today through trade and aid policies. Africa is steeped in colonial history and many of the current problems across the continent are attributable to its largely British colonial past. Therefore the UK has some degree of responsibility to help these countries that they formerly ruled. To do this legitimately it must be accountable for what it does so that it is not seen as self interested (as was generally the case during colonialism and through much of the late 20th Century due to the Cold War).

In the last twenty years, development in sub Saharan Africa has been severely hampered by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. "Africa's condition of extreme poverty, conflict, weak institutional and physical infrastructure has provided an ideal environment for the spread of HIV/AIDS (Poku and Sandkjaer 2007:14). 22 million people out of the estimated 32.9 million round the world living with HIV/AIDS are living in Africa (UNAIDS 2007). As a result there is a heavy emphasis from government donors on prioritising a response to HIV/AIDS. The UK government, through DFID, is currently one of the largest donors for HIV/AIDS programmes across the world and the second biggest bilateral donor on HIV and AIDS - spending £466 909 000 in 2005/06 (DFID 2006a).

South Africa provides a critical case in which the consequences of the *new architecture of aid* can be explored in depth because it represents a challenge to the *new architecture of aid* and specifically to the principle of mutual *accountability*.

Despite having one of the strongest economies in Africa, South Africa has one of the largest AIDS epidemics in the world (UNAIDS 2008). Aid/foreign assistance to South Africa has long been tied up in its complex history and poor or inadequate response to HIV and AIDS:

South Africa's history has been bloody and exploitative, but there are important differences from other countries. Firstly, the system was based on racial discrimination and after 1948 this was institutionalised and legalised. Secondly, the past 20 years have been characterised by mobile populations and a breakdown in social structures. Thirdly South Africa has high levels of urbanisation and a large white minority. The AIDS epidemic reflects the history of this region (Barnett and Whiteside 2006: 147)

South Africa's relatively strong economic position means that it is not aid dependent (like other African countries that have been heavily affected by HIV/AIDS) and therefore has the power to reject the requirements of donor governments in favour of its own strategies. This is nowhere more apparent than in South Africa's response to HIV/AIDS which has long been at odds with internationally agreed responses to the epidemic. This creates a dilemma for donors. Due to South Africa's history and the AIDS epidemic, it is difficult for donors to completely withdraw aid.

Donors cannot withhold aid – “the sheer magnitude of human suffering – not to mention security, commercial concerns and historical ties – argues against walking away” (Pomerantz 2004:18). Donors need to retain sufficient influence on how the money is used to satisfy their own national *accountability* requirements and at the same time find ways of discharging their promise to the people they have committed to help. When relationships between donors and recipients break down, identifying alternative channels for providing assistance offers a solution - such as using Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or private consultancies. The irony is however, that in doing this aid often becomes less transparent and less accountable.

This thesis presents a comprehensive review of how *new accountability*'s defined and applied by DFID and the consequences both intended and unintended for HIV/AIDS policy implementation in South Africa.

Overview of Chapters

Chapter 2 describes my methodology used. Chapter 3 describes the historical evolution of *accountability*. *Accountability* is defined and a system for exploring *accountability* relationships is presented. Chapter 4 provides a review of the changing approach to international development and aid. This chapter provides some of the background necessary to understand how the *new architecture of aid* came into being bringing with it *new accountability*.

Chapters 5 and 6 both deal directly with DFID. Chapter 5 provides a description of how DFID both defines and applies *accountability*. In this chapter I establish to who DFID considers itself accountable and assess to what degree DFID is actually held to account. Chapter 6 explores DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa. I investigate the strategies in terms of how long they have been pursued, how much money has been spent and how many other resources have been provided.

In Chapter 7, I use the information gained from my interviews to identify the linkages between DFID's evolving definitions and applications of *accountability* (Chapter 5) with its on the ground HIV/AIDS policies (outlined in Chapter 6) .

Finally, Chapter 8 presents my findings and offers my conclusions.

Chapter 2 - Methodology

Summary

In this chapter I describe my approach to assessing evidence about definitions and applications of *accountability*, in particular with respect to DFID. Firstly, I describe how the concept of *accountability* has evolved over time. Secondly, I identify when *new accountability* became important in aid through a review of UK foreign aid. Thirdly, I examine DFID's understandings of its *accountability* relationships. Fourthly, I look at the HIV/AIDS strategies pursued by DFID and identify some of the ways they have been implemented in South Africa. Finally, using my accumulated evidence and insights from interviews with a small purposively selected sample of informants I consider some of the consequences for *accountability*.

This is a qualitative piece of research which aims to establish some connections between definitions and applications of *accountability*, policies pursued and the consequences for *accountability*. Firstly, I will begin the chapter by discussing the case study methodology used in this piece of research. Secondly, I will describe my approach to creating the historical review of aid/development assistance policy and the development of the *new architecture of aid*. Thirdly, I will describe the document review that led to the development of my overview of DFID's understandings of *accountability*. Fourthly, I will illustrate the document review that describes DFID's response to HIV/AIDS with a focus on South Africa.

Finally, I illustrate the methodology employed in the empirical part of my research – key informant interviews. I explain how I chose my small group of informants, the development of my interview guide, and ethical considerations.

The Case Study

Case studies provide an insight into the context of phenomena and are frequently selected as a useful methodological approach in the field of sociology (Yin 2003). A case study is valuable in this exploratory piece of research because there is no developed theory or set of hypotheses, there are no readily accessible data and it would be difficult to observe these key factors across multiple cases. A case study therefore provides the opportunity to relate documentary evidence to the perspectives of informants involved at different points in the policy process and within the specific context of South Africa.

Historical Evolution of Accountability

In order to fully explain why understandings of *accountability* are important in examining donor strategies it was important to provide some historical context of development aid in general. My methodology included a review of the literature in this area beginning with key texts on the topic, followed by materials selected from their reference sections. In addition I searched the internet for relevant writing as well as browsing academic journal websites. I also obtained information from UK Parliamentary and Government of South Africa websites for supporting historical documents on the topic.

Review of UK Foreign Policy for Aid

I divided my document review into two sections, the first examining DFID's understandings of *accountability* through publications, its official line on *accountability*. The second section comprised a review of all of DFID's policy and strategy papers on HIV/AIDS, and in particular I looked for evidence of its strategies in South Africa. Both stages of the data collection involved an extensive review of information rich documents regarding UK Government policy, programme and strategy publications. Access to documentation in the public domain provided the majority of information, in part to test the transparency of DFID's reporting. These publications focus on DFID, but include other documentation where necessary.

The document review was conducted for the following reasons:

- To create a descriptive account of DFID's definitions and applications of *accountability* and its HIV/AIDS strategies.
- To gain a sense of the language of DFID. Does this language match the language of the *new architecture of aid*?
- To provide a backdrop against which to set the analysis of the interviews; and
- To serve as a context for the insights provided by my informants.

1. DFID's understandings of *accountability*

In discussing how DFID understands *accountability* (Chapter 3) I use a thematic approach, exploring how DFID understands *accountability* at both a domestic level (DFID to UK taxpayers and to the UK parliament) and an international level (DFID to the recipient government and to poor people in the recipient country). I use my conceptual framework to describe DFID's *accountability* relationships.

Guided by my *accountability* framework I read documents with the following questions in mind:

- Does DFID directly use the term *accountability* or is it implied?
- Does DFID define the term? If so, how?
- Who does DFID see itself as being accountable to? For what? Why? And how?
- Is DFID subject to all levels of *accountability* - Reporting? Answerability? Enforceability?

2. DFID's strategies for HIV/AIDS in South Africa

The second part of the document review, in which I examine DFID's strategies for HIV and AIDS (Chapter 4), focuses on the strategies it has pursued in South Africa. I outline what these strategies are (bilateral, multilateral, financial assistance, technical assistance etc.).

Guided by my literature review I read documents with the following questions in mind:

- How does DFID generally distribute aid? And more specifically aid for HIV/AIDS?
- What is DFID's strategic response to HIV/AIDS? What has it been doing in South Africa?
- What are DFID's priorities in the response to HIV/AIDS?
- What policies have been implemented by DFID in South Africa

Key Informant Interviews

The empirical phase of data collection comprised interviews conducted to explore the relationship between *accountability* and strategy. This phase involved semi-structured interviews over a six month period in the UK and South Africa with informants working within the policy cycle.

Other experts in the field who have knowledge of and or direct/indirect relationships with the donors were interviewed to provide supplementary information. All people interviewed had expertise of donor strategies for HIV/AIDS and insight into DFID.

Participant sampling and recruitment

Purposive sampling

My sample was small in scale and purposively selected on the basis of salient criteria. As my resources were limited I decided to use purposive sampling. With such a small sample I established criteria for selection. The key to this approach was to choose informants with expertise. I wanted people with:

- A) Specialised knowledge and experience in international development, and in particular Africa and HIV/AIDS.
- B) People with particular substantive knowledge in South Africa and its history.
- C) People located within the policy cycle.

Locating informants within the policy cycle became my key guide to selection. Respondents selected needed to have a current role which had to be in one of the four stages of the policy cycle. Of course, the fact that these people were also often experienced in other areas of the policy cycle added to the depth and range of their perceptions. The classic policy cycle is problem identification, agenda setting, implementation and evaluation (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Classical Policy Cycle

Steets (2004) was interested in accountability in terms of partnerships. In order to establish the right level of accountability depending on the political function of the partnership she adapted the classical policy cycle:

- Problem identification (knowledge-building and awareness raising)
- Policy formation (standard setting)
- Policy implementation (service provision and implementation)
- Policy evaluation (monitoring and feedback)

I selected people with expertise (both current and historical) in international responses to HIV/AIDS and *accountability* across the policy cycle. I decided to select informants who were currently working in a role in each of the four stages. To do this I created a basic profile for each potential informant to ensure that I got a good enough fit in terms of my criteria for selection.

Respondent 1 – Problem Identification (knowledge-building and awareness raising)

I looked for an academic or evidence-based practitioner expert in international development, Africa, and HIV/AIDS. The respondent selected is a South African with expertise in public health and in HIV/AIDS in particular. This respondent also has a history of experience within South Africa and in terms of HIV/AIDS internationally. They have a good understanding of policy and issues of delivery with previous experience of evaluation and of consultancy with policy makers.

Respondent 2 – Policy Formation (standard setting)

I aimed to find a Westminster politician if possible with an excellent understanding of political accountability and specifically of DFID as a government department and its policies. An interest in, and current involvement with Africa and HIV/AIDS were seen as an advantage. I was fortunate to get an MP as my respondent. This MP has membership of key parliamentary committees on international development and Africa including HIV/AIDS in Africa.

Respondent 3 – Implementation (service provision/implementation)

I wanted someone on the ground, working on implementation of HIV aids strategies in Southern Africa, preferably with previous experience at the problem identification or policy formulation stage within government or a major NGO. The respondent selected is currently working on HIV/AIDS delivery in Southern Africa and has previous experience both in a government department and an NGO working on problem identification and policy formulation in HIV/AIDS.

Respondent 4 - Policy Evaluation (monitoring and feedback)

I wanted someone who is currently involved in scrutinising government performance in terms of overseas aid - what is spent, how it is spent and whether it has an impact - an academic or a civil servant. Respondent selected is currently a civil servant but with both

academic and NGO experience of Africa and HIV/AIDS.

As *accountability* is such a complex concept and because I require information from individuals that have highly specialized roles, the sample was not designed to be representative. Instead, I purposively sought informants who, from the vantage of their particular positions, could provide information to augment and illustrate the documentary evidence I had collected.

Recruitment

Participants were recruited through a letter formally inviting them to take part in the study (see Appendix A). Before each interview, I reviewed the Consent Form with each participant and obtained written consent (see Appendix B).

Development of the interview guide

My interview guide was based on information gathered by applying the information I had gathered from my document reviews. I then added questions aimed at exploring questions raised by such information.

Interviews with key informants

The interviews were semi-structured using open-ended questions, a conversation with a purpose. They were conducted in person where possible and by telephone otherwise. Follow-up interviews were conducted when necessary either on the telephone or via email. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed where possible.

Interviews were conducted individually to provide personal accounts, explore issues in depth and detail and to gauge understandings of *accountability* at each stage of the policy process.

Ethical Considerations

Some sensitivities arose from conducting this piece of research, for example where DFID employees may have found some questions required information that they were not able to give. To encourage participation I made sure that I received permission to identify

participants when reporting on this study, but agreed not to attach names to particular ideas or quotes.

Limitations

For this piece of research to have been more reflective of donor organizations in general my research design would have compared many cases of donors so that there could be variance in understandings of *accountability*. As such it would have been possible to examine correlations between understandings of *accountability* and policy outcomes. Due to time and resource constraints this was not possible. Although informants' roles and identities are not revealed, nevertheless there was concern among all of them about confidentiality and to this extent their insights into how definitions and applications of *accountability* have shaped DFID strategies for HIV/AIDS in South Africa and consequences of these strategies were sometimes explicitly constrained. In particular, it was especially difficult to get informants to reveal any information about HLSP (the contractor DFID uses in South Africa). DFID Enquiries did not respond to emails or replied with information I had not asked for.

Chapter 3 - An overview of the historical evolution of accountability

Accountability is one of those golden concepts that no one can be against. It is increasingly used in political discourse and policy documents because it conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness. However, its evocative powers make it also a very elusive concept because it can mean many different things to different people (Bovens 2007:5)

Summary

This chapter explores the evolving meanings of *accountability* and interprets them within the context of international development aid. I show how a *new accountability* has emerged as domestic concepts of *accountability* are applied internationally and highlight the consequent complexities of doing this. Since *accountability* arises across a number of disciplines (Dubnick 2004) and is widely interpreted, my research refers to social science theory acquired from a variety of disciplines – linguistics, sociology, political science and management theory.

In this chapter I will establish a framework of accountability using established literature. It is important to note that this chapter is not a critique of the existing concepts of *accountability* but instead I am using the literature to outline a generally accepted framework. I will then apply this framework to DFID (Chapter 5) in order to establish how DFID understands *accountability* and how this in turn influences policy and strategies for HIV/AIDS in South Africa.

Firstly, I offer a broad definition of the concept of *accountability*. I then present a brief overview of the origins of *accountability* and how its meaning has evolved over time.

Thirdly, I focus on *accountability* in governance because of its pertinence to my thesis. I explain the processes of *accountability*. Finally, I describe how *new accountability* has emerged from the applications of domestic *accountability* internationally and highlight the complexities of this new *accountability*.

A broad definition of accountability

A relationship between an actor and a forum

As the opening quotation from Bovens suggests, *accountability* is a complex and elusive concept which can be interpreted in an extremely broad way (Behn 2001, Dubnick and Romzek 1993, Flinders,2001). That *accountability* is an amorphous concept is the one thing scholars agree upon. It is therefore essential to provide a baseline definition.

At its simplest *accountability* exists when there is a relationship between two entities (an actor and a forum) where one entity (the actor) agrees to carry out tasks or functions and agrees to explain and justify its conduct. The other entity (the forum) can then pose questions and pass judgement and the actor may face consequences.

The three levels of *accountability*

Three levels of *accountability* can be identified: reporting, answerability and enforceability; at the reporting level *accountability* is weakest and at the level of enforceability it is strongest. Reporting is when an individual or group of people (forum) who are affected by an action or decision can demand information about what has been done. Such information must include details about inputs, procedures and/or outcomes. Often the actor must also provide explanations and justifications, particularly in the case of failures or incidents. However, as the forum has no power to do anything with the information provided. Answerability - the second level of *accountability* is stronger as the forum, having been provided with the information, should then be able to scrutinise that information and receive an explanation and response for why such actions were taken. At this level of *accountability* the forum is able to test the legitimacy of the information given at the reporting stage. At the third level of *accountability* - enforceability - the forum has authority over the actor to pass judgement on their conduct and they must face the possibility of consequences (Keohane 2002, Bovens 2007). Enforceability is the strongest level of *accountability* as it provides the forum with the power to do something about the actions of the actor. The threat of facing the consequences can make people behave in a more accountable manner so enforceability

can act as a deterrent (Behn 2001). In order to be fully accountable, all three levels must be applied. Without enforceability, *accountability* can only be partial.

Processes of accountability

Accountability operates through vertical and horizontal processes. Vertical *accountability* provides the means by which citizens, mass media and civil society can demand legitimacy from their governments. Citizens impose *accountability* on their governments (Schacter, 2001). Citizens may act directly through the electoral process and through contact with Members of Parliament (MPs), by withholding compliance or protest. They may act indirectly through mass media and civil society. Citizens and civil society groups may also seek the support of their elected representatives to intervene on their behalf.

Horizontal *accountability* processes are created by the state in order to provide a check on its own abuses and inefficiencies. It is self-imposed *accountability* that operates within the state as a restraint primarily on executive power through other state institutions and independent bodies. Horizontal *accountability* may be exercised by the judiciary, executive and legislature as well as anti-corruption bodies, auditors general, electoral and human rights commissions and other ombudsmen (Newell and Bellour, 2002).

The origins and evolution of accountability

From bookkeeping to *accountability*

Accountability in the UK can be traced all the way back to William the Conqueror and the Domesday book when the king demanded that his citizens be held to account (Bovens 2007). *Accountability* then related directly to financial accounting and was relatively straightforward.

The origins of *accountability* as we see it today can be located in the liberal tradition of Locke, Montesquieu and the American Federalists. The democratisation of the US, marked by the adoption of the American Constitution in 1787, has been identified as a key event in shaping western conceptions of *accountability* (Dowdle 2006). With this

new constitution, elections provided the means by which citizens could hold the government to account. The real innovation in terms of *accountability* emerged from the separation of powers in the US which marked the beginning of horizontal *accountability*.

In the UK, where there is no formal constitution, the parliamentary system known as The Westminster Model shapes definitions and applications of *accountability*. Authority is granted to an executive, known as cabinet ministers, lead by the Prime Minister. The model is founded upon the assumption that ministers have both an individual and collective responsibility to Parliament. The House of Commons, the lower house of Parliament, comprises the peoples' elected representatives. Their designated role is to enact the legislation that establishes the fundamental principle of the rule of law. Under the Westminster model most legislation is initiated by the Executive and if agreed is passed by Parliament. In the UK Parliamentary *accountability* is weaker than the US because the executive and legislature are fused.

American notions of *accountability* influenced how *accountability* is applied in the UK at the end of the Second World War in 1945, when the United States helped to rebuild European states (Dowdle, 2006). By introducing their vision of *accountability* to Western Europe, bureaucratic regulation became increasingly embedded in both public international law and the legal and political environments of many countries including the UK.

Economic stagnation in both the USA and the UK in the 1970's caused an increased alarm about government performance, inefficient use of, and abuse of, power. Therefore, many institutions and organisations, including the US and UK governments adopted a more market-based approach to *accountability*. By providing monetary incentives they believed public resources would be more efficiently allocated and more responsibly used (Dowdle 2006). In the UK new governance architectures were invented that "replicated market-like forces of competition, by having different public departments, 'compete' in the development of effective regulation" (Dowdle 2006:6). This instance of broadening *accountability* is an example of how *accountability* has been expanded over time.

Domestic accountability for all

The end of the Cold War marked an important moment in the evolution of the concept of *accountability* as the rapid spread of democratisation led to the expansion of domestic *accountability* to an increasing number of countries. Democracy, it was believed, had triumphed and *accountability* was seen as one of the most important instruments of democracy. (Newell and Bellour 2002). Domestic *accountability* became a cornerstone of good governance, thus, legitimising public power. It provides a means by which elected representatives and other officials must justify their actions (Newell & Bellour 2002, Wenar 2006).

No longer restricted by the Cold War strategies concerned with *realpolitik*, donors began exhorting domestic *accountability* as a measure of good governance to recipient countries.

New accountability

At the same time, countries began to globalise “marked by a proliferation of political settings beyond domestic boundaries (Cohen and Sabel 2004:763). This involved increasing global rule-making and standard setting as well as the application of domestically formulated *accountability* mechanisms internationally: a *new accountability* emerged (Sabel and Cohen 2004). Notions of domestic *accountability* were both adopted by countries as a means of ensuring good governance in Central Europe, Asia and Africa and by donors as criteria, and thus a test of continued aid.

Both the advance of technical and economic growth at the end of the cold war facilitated a rapid proliferation of globalised networks of bilateral and multi-lateral relationships and with it new forms of regional global governance. Global politics have played a significant role in changing the way we think about *accountability*.

States and other organisations exert effects over great distances; peoples' lives can be fundamentally changed, or ended, as a result of decisions made only days or moments earlier, thousands of miles away (Keohane 2002:10).

New forms of both multilateral and multinational politics have blurred the boundaries of *accountability* in terms of who is accountable, to whom, for what, how and why. In a world where “transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, and where powerful states make decisions not just for their peoples but for others as well, the questions of who should be accountable to whom, and on what basis, do not easily resolve themselves. Overlapping spheres of influence, interference and interest create dilemmas at the centre of democratic thought” (Held and Mephram, 2007:56).

The *new architecture of aid* has changed the relationship between rich and poor countries. A new language has emerged where countries, no longer categorised as ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’, are now referred to as ‘development partners’. This expression of partnership has been accompanied by new-found shared responsibilities and mutual *accountability*. *Mutual accountability* requires common goals and purposes:

Making donors more accountable to recipients could encourage them to improve their aid practices, and more leadership by recipients in the aid relationship itself could promote better country ownership (De Renzio and Mulley 2006)

Although it is clear why the concept of *mutual accountability* has emerged, very little consideration has been given to how this might be applied. Theoretically, donors and recipients are united in their objectives to reduce poverty and human suffering and this makes it possible for ‘partners’ to form *mutual accountability* relationships. In practice donors and recipients do not always agree on policy and both must meet their own domestic *accountability* if they are to remain legitimate in the eyes of their people and their parliaments.

Complexities of new accountability

It is clear that *accountability* today is expansive. Commentators have drawn attention to the difficulties in defining *accountability* today. The problem lies in the fact that the concept of domestic *accountability* has simply been applied internationally with no consideration for the fact that there is no global democracy. Grant and Keohane provide a succinct explanation of the difficulties of applying *accountability* to global politics:

If governance above the level of the nation-state is to be legitimate in a democratic era, mechanisms for appropriate *accountability* need to be institutionalised. Yet these mechanisms cannot simply replicate, on a larger scale, the familiar procedures and practices of democratic states (2005:29).

Mutual accountability relationships are particularly complex, largely because there is an obvious power imbalance between donor and recipients. Donors determine both the quantity and quality of aid/development assistance. They monitor recipient performance. Recipients, however, have little influence and few mechanisms for monitoring the donors (De Renzio and Mulley 2006).

Donors and recipients often differ greatly on the specific strategies that should be employed to meet shared objectives:

Many times, donors interpret this as a problem of political will. In turn, this begets a suspicion that there really isn't a common purpose (Pomerantz 2004:24.)

The recipient government is left with the impression that donors do not understand the realities on the ground, and even more damaging, that donors don't trust them (Pomerantz 2004:24). There is no direct feedback loop that allows recipients to influence strategy formulation in donor countries (De Renzio and Mulley 2006).

Mutual accountability is complicated further by the fact that both donors and recipients are not just accountable to each other. Donors and recipients are bound by multiple accountabilities to their own people and their own governments. In upholding

accountability to its own people and its own government a donor may not fulfil its commitment to the recipient or vice versa.

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Chapter 4 – An overview of UK Foreign Policy for Aid

In this chapter I provide an overview of British Official Development Assistance (ODA) and UK aid policy as well as the new architecture for aid. I pay particular attention to the context in which the approach to aid to Africa has changed during the last century and explore how global changes (as well as changes in the UK government system) have shaped the UK's approach to development assistance.

Foreign aid and the evolution of British policy for development

Colonial - 1947

The British aid programme, particularly to Africa, is “rooted in colonial history” (Barder 2005:1). In colonial times the British government opposed the provision of aid to the colonies, arguing that the local administrations should be responsible for their running costs. Aid was generally only given in times of emergencies (Barder 2005). The only aid – as the word is used today – for health, education and general services to the poor was provided by voluntary organisations, particularly religious groups (Riddell 2007). Only in 1929 did British government begin to address the issue of non-administrative aid under the Colonial Act. It was not aimed primarily at improving the lives of the local inhabitants but at increasing trade through economic development.

Discontent in the colonies and imperial decline between 1935 and 1938 led to increased funding through the Colonial and Development Welfare Act of 1940. This “extended the purposes of the Colonial Development Act to include the welfare of the colonies” (Barder 2005:4). The end of the Second World War in 1945 brought in a Labour government which believed that it was essential to develop the colonies. With the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945, the government attempted to expand agricultural production through research stations, extension programs, promotion of technology, and conservation. According to Barder (2005) this increased aid over ten years to £120

million (about \$6.5 billion in 2007 prices). In 1947 Britain's first aid programmes were established through the Overseas Resources Act which was the first time that aid aimed to help the local people rather than just benefiting Britain (Barder 2005).

The 1950s and 1960s

In January 1949 US President Harry Truman launched a global appeal to help the poor in his inaugural address:

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people (Truman 1949).

Riddell agrees that “the last few years of the 1940s are usually sited as the time when the modern era of aid giving is said to have begun” (2007:24). Truman was the first political leader to outline why and how governments should help poor countries. He encouraged other countries to make the same commitments. America was already giving aid to Europe in the form of The Marshall Plan of 1948 where US\$13 billion was pledged by the US to Europe - a figure worth US\$85 billion in today's prices (Riddell 2007).

The Marshall Plan was not development aid as such but its success inspired optimism that capital and technical assistance could transform economies quickly elsewhere such as Africa (Barder 2005). The post war boom spread to less developed countries and it was widely assumed that they would ‘modernise’. Prospects for growth and development seemed largely unproblematic. Early development assistance was mainly technical cooperation. In Britain the government began to provide budgetary grants, technical assistance grants and concessionary loans to Commonwealth and some non Commonwealth countries. (Barder 2005).

Figure 2. Resolution of the Development Assistance Group's Common Aid Effort

- **Conscious of the aspirations of the less-developed countries to achieve improving standards of life for their peoples;**
- **Convinced of the need to help the less-developed countries help themselves by increasing economic, financial and technical assistance and by adapting this assistance to the requirements of the recipient countries;**
- **Agree to recommend to Members that they should make it their common objective to secure an expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made available to the less developed countries and to improve their effectiveness;**
- **Agree that assistance provided on an assured and continuing basis would make the greatest contribution to sound economic growth in the less-developed countries;**
- **Agree that, while private and public finance extended on commercial terms is valuable and should be encouraged, the needs of some of the less-developed countries at the present time are such that the common aid effort should provide for expanded assistance in the form of grants or loans on favourable terms, including long maturities where this is justified in order to prevent the burden of external debt from becoming too heavy;**

A significant policy shift occurred in 1960 following a speech by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan known as “The Winds of Change” speech. This speech signalled Britain’s intention to decolonise its African territories and encourage African self-government, but it also affected Britain’s relationship with Apartheid South Africa:

The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept this fact, and our national policies must take account of it. (Wilson 1960).

The “Winds of Change” speech referred to the Cold War which was to become a major influence on aid-giving from the West to Africa in coming decades. From then on aid became an important inducement by the superpowers and their allies to keep the governments of the newly emerging nation states on their side and lure others into their camp. Under these circumstances development became a propaganda tool that both capitalist and communist camps used to prove their systems were better.

In 1960 the OEEC which was to become the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the following year with the inclusion of the USA and Canada, formed a forum called the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Collectively, they agreed the Common Aid Effort ().

Throughout the 1960s, Britain supported aid as a common good and because it encouraged trade (Barder 2005). In 1964 the government created a Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) separate from the Foreign Office and headed by a cabinet minister so that its aims would not be confused with British foreign interests (Barder 2005).

Despite these high ideals, there was no significant increase in aid spending and, from 1967, the ODM was no longer represented in Cabinet although it remained a separate government department.

At the end of the 1960's the post-war boom faltered in many Northern countries and pessimism towards overseas development grew. (King and McGrath 2004). This produced two responses from the World Bank. According to Riddell, "both presented an approach to development based on the notion that to tackle poverty it was insufficient merely to try and raise growth rates... to try to stimulate structural and institutional changes would – eventually and mostly indirectly – lead to a reduction in poverty" (2007:31-32).

A Commission on International Development set up in 1969 and led by former Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, set out to tackle the increasing complexity of aid and the growing concern that it was proving ineffective. Although the Commission acknowledged that donors had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the recipient was serious about development, it also argued that the donor-recipient partnership must be driven by recipient governments if it was to be effective:

Developing countries cannot reach for ambitious goals unless they know that serious programs will find external support. They are entitled to ask what commitments aid-givers are ready to make

and how these commitments will be lived up to. Performance is not a one way street (Commission on International Development 1969:17).

The Commission for International Development argued against uniform policies and targets and suggested that the only universal target for the South should be an average GNP growth of 6% per annum (1969:124).

The 1970s and 1980s

A significant shift in the aid discourse occurred at the beginning of the 1970s with the appointment of Robert McNamara, a former Secretary of State for Defense, to lead the World Bank. Under McNamara the World Bank came to the forefront of the 'War Against Poverty'. McNamara believed that poverty could be tackled and eradicated if basic infrastructure was put in place (King and McGrath 2004, Riddell 2007).

The impact of this thinking on aid-giving was quite dramatic, and neither aid-giving nor the discourse about aid for development were to be the same again. To the present day, donors have successively swung between the extreme views that development aid is best deployed to assist poor people, or that it is best deployed in accelerating and helping to shape the process of wealth creation, contributing to poverty alleviation more indirectly (Riddell 2007:32).

In Britain in 1970, a Conservative government incorporated the ODM into the Foreign Office and called it the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) overseen by a Minister of State in the Foreign Office. (Barder 2005). Four years later a Labour government revived it and appointed a cabinet minister to run it. A more fundamental change in British foreign and aid policies came in 1975 when a White Paper on aid, *The Changing Emphasis on British Aid Policies: More help for the poorest* (Ministry for Overseas Development 1975), adopted the 'basic needs' approach.

"Donors focused their aid far more on particular sectors and sub-sectors of aid-recipient economies and gave far greater prominence to aid provided in the form of discrete projects – on education, health and water – aimed at reaching down to and helping poor people directly"
(Riddell 2007:32).

In 1975 the Labour government removed the Minister of Overseas Development from the Cabinet although the department remained technically separate from the Foreign Office. In 1979 the Conservatives under Mrs Thatcher cut overseas aid and put the renamed

Overseas Development Administration back under Foreign Office control as a tool of a “Britain first” foreign policy. “The result was a significant expansion of the Aid and Trade Provision, and a number of bilateral aid projects designed to support British businesses including steel mills, Leyland buses, Hawker-Siddeley aircraft, and Westland helicopters.” (Barder 2005:9).

The following year (1980) the Independent Commission on International Development issued a report called North-South: A Programme for Survival, known as the Brandt Report. Updated as *The Common Crisis* in 1983, the report focused on international interdependence and asserted that the rich must assist the poor and disadvantaged or lose out if they did not. The first Brandt report (like Pearson) called for the doubling of Overseas Development Assistance by 1985 in order to reach the target of 0.7% of GNP to be given in aid by rich countries. It proposed that 1% should be achieved by 1990 (Riddell 2007:35).

The Brandt reports ignored, and then dismissed a new ideological orthodoxy that was spreading in the USA, one that would impact greatly on the South, particularly Africa. Neo-liberal ideology argued that countries in the South largely had themselves to blame for their development failure. To make them more globally competitive it was proposed that their economies must undergo radical restructuring (Hanlon 1991).

The Brandt reports were ignored by the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the 1980s. Their policies were characterised by the neoliberal agenda which were imposed uniformly any country that needed aid. Tightly conditional structural adjustment loans and a little grant aid, it was believed, would achieve economic development (Riddell 2007). These policies known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), were designed to encourage developing countries to follow market oriented strategies. State control was weakened, currencies floated, state enterprises sold off, economies opened up to investment. (Thomas in Baylis and Smith 1997). The effect in Africa was devastating and did not reverse overall; African economic decline (Riddell 2007).

1990s and 2000s

In 1989 the Cold War unexpectedly ended with the collapse of Communism. This had two effects on Africa. America and Western Europe concentrated on restructuring former communist states in Eastern Europe. Africa was largely ignored. The western recipe for Africa was multi party democracy and structural adjustment towards a free market system. British aid was cut and old Cold War allies, many of them dictators, were abandoned. A few were overthrown. Others organised elections which they won. This at least created space for a new debate about aid.

The end of the Cold War opened a unique political opportunity at the international level to take a fresh look at the nature and functioning of the aid system, and to re-orient it from a system based mostly on geo-strategic interests to one with a greater focus on the reduction of global poverty levels (De Renzio and Mulley 2006:1).

Human rights assumed a central position in the discourse surrounding international development (Gready and Ensor 2005). Development assistance was increasingly seen as a right and developed countries increasingly demanded good governance and the democratisation of developing countries as a condition for assistance (Jonsson 2005).

Another fundamental shift in aid was brought about by the establishment of targets. King and McGrath refer to the 1990s as the “decade of the world conference” (2004:23). Table 1 shows the 10 world conferences that took place throughout the 1990s.

Year	Conference	Year	Conference
1990	Education	1995	Social Development
1990	Children	1995	Women
1992	Environment	1996	Human Settlements
1993	Human Rights	1996	Food Security
1994	Population	1997	Climate Change

Table 1. World Conferences held in 1990s

These conferences greatly impacted on the 1996 Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and its development strategy *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation* (OECD 1996). This strategy document is considered to be the

basis of for the new approach to aid effectiveness. De Renzio and Mulley provide a succinct summary of the strategy:

Shaping the 21st Century outlined a clear shift in the aid paradigm, based on a change in the conception and language of aid... In order to enhance the role and effectiveness of development assistance, it was necessary to focus on building more effective partnerships between donors and recipients, with joint responsibilities and mutual commitments. In particular, donors should focus their efforts on low-income countries, rely on locally-owned development strategies and support government programmes as much as possible, avoiding project proliferation and shifting to programme-based approaches. Recipient governments, on their side, should create effective coordination mechanisms for managing development assistance, and improve their systems for managing public resources and monitoring development outcomes (De Renzio and Mulley 2006: 4)

Shaping the 21st Century was followed by the creation of the International Development Targets (IDTs). A *new architecture of aid* came to dominate the approaches of many donors to development aid (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003). The IDTs focused on poverty, education, gender equality, mortality and the environment. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) has built its strategy around these targets. Later formulated as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), they were officially adopted at the United Nations General Assembly at the Millennium Summit (Figure 3). There are eight goals and 21 targets all to be achieved by 2015.

Figure 3 Millennium Development Goals

- 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
 - 2) Achieve universal primary education
 - 3) Promote gender equality and empower women
 - 4) Reduce child mortality
 - 5) Improve maternal health
 - 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
 - 7) Ensure environmental sustainability
 - 8) Develop a global partnership for development
- (Source: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>)

The MDGs provide international development objectives that focus on poverty, debt relief and fairer international trade rules. They set targets against which donor agencies can set their own goals and measure their effectiveness. They provide a “means for developing countries and their development partners to work together: (Ban Ki-Moon 2007:3)

The MDGs were followed by further commitments from donor governments. The Monterrey Consensus, agreed in 2002, saw pledges by donor governments to increase aid and debt relief to the poorest countries (Monterrey Consensus 2002). In 2003 the Rome Declaration the donors agreed to harmonise aid and stressed the importance of *accountability* (Rome Declaration 2003). And later they expressed support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), a strategic framework for Africa which echoed the global development agenda (King and McGrath 2004). The G8 made Africa its focus at a series of meetings; Kananaskis in 2002, Evian in 2003 and Gleneagles in 2004 when the UK established a Commission for Africa to report on new ideas for development and to highlight the need for further increases in aid and debt relief (Commission for Africa 2005). The report, published in 2005, demanded that 'top priority must be given to scaling up services needed to deal with the catastrophe of HIV and AIDS' (2005:186). Aid donors also signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Efficiency which made *mutual accountability* a key component. This new approach can be seen as the *new architecture of aid*.

The new architecture of aid

A rights-based approach

Traditionally, aid was provided within the framework of meeting 'needs'. Today increasingly, development is viewed and approached through the vision of human rights (Riddell 2007:6).

The *new architecture of aid* is founded on a rights-based approach; "the idea that all people are citizens with rights, rather than passive beneficiaries of aid" (Eyben and Ferguson 2004:163) It was acknowledged that "managing aid spending was only one (and arguably not the most important) part of development policy, and that the new department had a legitimate voice in the formulation of government policy in other areas (e.g. trade, conflict and foreign relations) for which other government departments had primary responsibility" (Barder 2005: 14). According to Eyben and Ferguson "One of the issues highlighted by a rights approach is that of *accountability*. The idea that individuals

have rights implies that governments and others have corresponding legal and moral obligations, and that they can be held to account for their actions to fulfil those responsibilities. In particular, the emphasis on equality in rights-based approaches highlights the importance of *accountability* to the poorest” (Eyben & Ferguson in Groves & Hinton 2004:163).

The *new architecture of aid* calls for developing a global partnership for development and *accountability* of institutions was one of the three conceptual pillars of the Social Development Strategy of the World Bank (World Bank 2004).

Poverty as the root cause of the problem

Poverty is now seen as the root cause of all problems in the developing world (Riddell 2007) and its abolition is the main objective of all donor governments (Christiansen and Rogerson 2005). In order to achieve this, much of the development discourse emphasises the need to embrace globalisation and market forces whilst supporting efforts aimed at poverty reduction. Donors generally perceive macroeconomic stability, growth, good governance and social inclusion as the key factors in reducing poverty. Aid effectiveness is seen as central to poverty reduction.

Aid effectiveness as the solution

The most important component of the *new architecture of aid* “has been the growing recognition that the impact and effectiveness of aid is crucially dependent upon political structures and processes of the country to which it is given, and that weak clientelistic states, in particular, provide a particularly difficult environment for aid to be effective” (Riddell 2007:7).

A new language of aid




Figure 4 A new language of aid (Source: De Renzio and Mulley 2006:4)

From donors and recipients to Partner countries

Instead of using the terms “donors and recipients”, governments now call themselves ‘partners’. This suggests a new, more equal relationship where both sides work together to drive forward successful and sustainable development and achieve the MDGs. Partnership is intended to create a sense of ‘shared’ responsibilities and to foster mutual *accountability*, a concept that first surfaced in the Millennium Summit Declaration in 2000 and remained high on the agenda in the Monterrey Consensus and in the Johannesburg, Rome and Paris Declarations.

From donor-led to Country-led strategies

Traditionally they dictated policy but donor governments are now committed to aligning their programmes to the development plans and strategies of recipient countries (Riddell 2007). Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PSRPs) are drawn up to demonstrate sound economic management and good socio-political governance. In theory they are produced by the recipient countries in consultation with interest groups such as civil society organisations (CSOs). In practice, many are said to be driven by the donors perhaps because PSRPs must meet the donors’ own *accountability* requirements. Donors provide recipients with “capacity building” and “technical assistance” to ensure their own requirements are met. Donors also promise greater harmonisation and coordination but

these are difficult for recipients to enforce since recipients are but one (weak) government while donors are many and much more powerful.

South Africa, classified as a middle income country (MIC), does not qualify for aid under the PSRPs but donors still expect to support the development strategies of South Africa and others in that category. Donors continue to support MICs because economics alone does not adequately reflect the need of a country. Some MICs have a very unequal distribution of wealth and consequently the poorer majority often do not have adequate healthcare, education access to other resources outlined in the MDGs. South Africa has the largest number of people infected with HIV in the world and therefore walking away on the grounds that macro-economically it is middle income is not an option.

In many countries, both MICs and Lower Income Countries (LICs) if donors do not like what the recipient government is doing they channel aid away from the government and give it to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and civil society organizations (Held and Mephram 2007). These bodies then apply pressure on the government to bring about change.

From conditionality to ownership

Aid has always come with strings attached. “All aid donors, both official and non-governmental, have an obligation to ensure that the funds they provide are used for the purpose intended, and that they are utilised as efficiently and effectively as possible. Conditionality has been one means to try and ensure this happens” (Riddell 2007:235). Traditionally donors stated explicitly how their aid should be used. If these requirements were not met, donors withheld or withdrew that aid (Riddell 2007). Now, most donors believe that by enabling recipient countries to design their own strategies, based upon the MDGs, aid will be more effective (Birdsall, Williamson and Deese 2002). So they encourage recipient governments to draw up their own development plans. Conditionality still exists, but donors have broadened the focus from the SAP’s macroeconomic conditions, to include political and institutional change, as well as social and environmental policy.

From Project aid to Programme Assistance, technical assistance and capacity building

In the past donors tended to prefer project aid which enables them to support “predefined discrete projects that they can describe to their taxpayers’ representatives and claim credits for with the public of the recipient country. This is especially true of bilateral donors, who have been the largest providers of aid to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)s and sub-Saharan African countries in the past two decades” (Birdsall, Williamson and Deese 2002:69). Recently however, donors have favoured programme assistance over projects. Programme aid can be either a sectorwide approach (SWAp) or direct budget support. A SWAp involves donor support for a specific sector such as health or education. Budget support is used to increase funding overall, usually channelled through ministries of finance (general budget support) or through specific sectors (sector budget support) (Riddell 2007). Budget support is provided to countries which donors believe have good governance practice.

Greater emphasis on harmonisation and coordination has led to more partnership budget support. According to Riddell this is where the “funds provided constitute a ‘partnership’ with the recipient government involving dialogue concerning the overall thrust of expenditure and the provision of technical assistance. Meanwhile in the wider context there is greater harmonisation and alignment of policies and practices”. (2007:199). Technical assistance (TA), the provision of know-how in the form of personnel, training, research and associated costs (Hanlon 1991) is popular with donors as they can ensure that the resources they provide are implemented successfully. TA is often accompanied by capacity building, now commonly known as capacity development (Riddell 2007). Capacity development is “the process by which individuals, groups and organisations, institutions and countries, enhance and organise their systems, resources and knowledge; all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives” (OECD 2006b:).

From fragmentation to Coordination

The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) demonstrated donors’ commitment to coordinating the provision of aid to make it more effective. A more harmonised approach

from donors makes it easier for recipient governments to absorb funds and spend them effectively. They can then report to one source rather than many. The emphasis is on sharing objectives and responsibilities for outcomes. Greater coordination encourages mutual *accountability*.

From 'Upward' to 'Downward' *Accountability*

Donors may have distanced themselves from conditionality but they need to find other ways to ensure that funds they provide are used for the purpose intended, efficiently and effectively. Recipient governments are expected to improve *accountability* to their citizens (OECD 2007). Donors too are accountable to their own domestic requirements but now also wish to be accountable to the recipient governments and to the people they help. This is 'downward' *accountability*. Many donors have said they wish to operate this under an internationally agreed human rights framework.

DFID and the New Architecture of Aid

In 1997 UK aid and development policy was transformed by the establishment of the Department for International Development (DFID) which was launched by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, with the commitment to 'work through international forums and bilateral relationships to spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy' (The Guardian 12/05/1997).

Robin Cook emphasised the ethical dimension of foreign policy and declared that the Labour government would put human rights at its heart (Groves and Hinton 2004, Held and Mepham 2007). Clare Short accepted the position of Secretary of State for International Development on condition that she was given a seat in Cabinet and that she was responsible for development policy as a whole, not just aid (Barder 2005).

Today DFID is responsible for bilateral aid and the funding of multilateral development institutions, as well as working with the Treasury to guarantee consistency in aid and development policies across all UK government ministries (Riddell 2007, Barder 2005).

Poverty reduction is at the heart of aid and development policy and progressed measured by targets. Enhancing the quality and effectiveness of aid are DFID's ambition.

The 1997 White Paper, *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century* (DFID 1997) prioritised the elimination of poverty and the achievement of sustainable development particularly in Africa. The aid budget has tripled over the decade and 90% of those resources are now focused in the poorest countries (Held and Mephram 2007). The UK has also led international efforts to write off debt of the poorest, most indebted countries. It has used the UK's Presidency of the European Union and the G8 in 2005 to raise the profile of Africa (Held and Mephram 2007). In 2006 an OECD report held up DFID as a model of bilateral development cooperation with a unified government approach and coherent policy direction (OECD 2006a).

The establishment of DFID transformed UK foreign aid policy. Its political status has been increased and DFID is represented in Cabinet. There has been a significant upsurge in the UK foreign aid budget and its aims and objectives have been clearly laid out in White Papers as well as in law.

Chapter 5 – DFID and *Accountability*

Summary

This chapter provides documentary evidence of how *accountability* is both defined and applied by DFID. I use publications and official information to look at DFID's organisational structure, its position within the UK government, and its international commitments. Based on the historical evolution of *accountability* outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter explores DFID's thoughts about its own *accountability* relationships both domestic and international.

For a democratic government to ensure legitimacy it must be accountable to its own people and to independent legally enshrined institutions. It is clear from my conceptual framework that locating DFID's *accountability* relationships within a domestic setting is fairly straightforward. *Accountability* structures are long established, well defined and supported by effective mechanisms. The UK parliament, as a democracy, accepts *accountability* as a key instrument of legitimacy³. DFID, as part of government, is held to account by parliament, citizens and institutions made up of the judiciary, auditors, inspectors, controllers and professional peers. These institutions and structure have been in place for a long time and are therefore easy to identify and understand. *Accountability* was at the fore of the Labour Party's Manifesto when it came to power in 1997 and quickly began applying the concept across all government departments.

'*Accountability*' is not only seen by the western democracies as a key instrument of legitimacy in their own countries. All countries which aspire to the principles of democracy must apply *accountability* with their nations. Who better to expound this vision than the donors? Furthermore, the concept of domestic *accountability* has been expanded to an international level, where donors and recipients are encouraged to form

³ *Accountability* was a key message in President Barack Obama's campaign, is expounded by the UK government.

accountability relationships with each other. Applying a domestic concept internationally, however, presents a major challenge, as the structures which support *accountability* relationships at a domestic level are absent at an international one.

Domestic accountability relationships

As I explained in my conceptual framework, *accountability* at a domestic level is relatively unproblematic. Firstly, like almost any large organisation DFID has a hierarchical structure of *accountability*. Secondly, citizens hold their governments to account through elections and thirdly, there is usually a principal-agent relationship between the government department and parliament. Parliament has the power to demand *accountability* from any government department through legal and political structures created to sustain democracy.

A hierarchical *accountability* relationship

Organisations, like DFID, operate hierarchically⁴. The Minister in charge of the department has a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions of the department including its executive agencies. DFID is represented in the Cabinet by its Secretary of State for International Development. The Minister appoints Under Secretaries to assist him/her. In 2007/8 DFID expanded its ministerial team from one Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to three. The four ministers agree to share the responsibility and to be held to account by Parliament.

Under the ministers a senior civil servant is appointed as head of the department. Known as the Permanent Secretary this role is to carry out the requirements of the Secretary of State. The Permanent Secretary is also accountable to Parliament for the management and organisation of the department. The Permanent Secretary is also the principal accounting officer with a direct responsibility to parliament for his department's expenditure. As accounting officer, he or she can object to a ministerial political decision if it is deemed to be outside the law.

⁴ For a detailed organogram of DFID - <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/organogram.pdf>

In DFID the Permanent Secretary is assisted by four Director-Generals. The first Director-General is responsible for Country Programmes, the second for International matters, including Europe and donor relations, international finance and development effectiveness, and the United Nations (UN), conflict and humanitarian issues. The third Director-General is responsible for policy and research and the fourth for corporate performance.

Each government department is managed by a board which carries out the strategic framework established by the minister. In DFID the management board comprises the Permanent Secretary, the four directors-general and two non-executive directors⁵. It is collectively responsible for delivering the Public Service Agreement (PSA) on International Poverty Reduction and its fundamental purpose is to make DFID more effective (DFID 2008). This means ensuring that DFID's financial resources and staff are allocated and managed effectively. Within DFID the Management Board has a collective responsibility for delivery. Directors are individually accountable for the objectives and targets and delegate responsibility to the teams in their department.

The management board is supported by five standing committees: the Development Committee; the Audit Committee (chaired by the two non-executive directors); the Investment Committee; the Human Resources Strategy Committee; and the Senior Civil Service (SCS) Committee. The committees ensure that DFID operates as effectively and efficiently as possible.

⁵ The two non-executive directors (one private sector, one senior civil servant from outside DFID) provide an external perspective on DFID's work, while understanding DFID's mode of functioning as an organisation

Vertical Accountability: To citizens, mass media and civil society

It is widely accepted that through the UK political system, DFID, as an executive department is accountable to taxpayers in the UK and parliament. This political system is founded on and follows the Westminster model. DFID, as part of government, is horizontally accountable to parliament and the judiciary and vertically accountable to the electorate.

Horizontal Accountability: To the judiciary and Parliament

As an executive department, DFID is held accountable horizontally to the judiciary and Parliament. Criteria embodied in legislation provide specific directives for a department to follow and provides legal authority for a department's expenditure.

The 2002 International Development Act replaced the 1980 Overseas and Development and Cooperation Act. The purpose of this act is to provide the legal authority for most of DFID's expenditure. This act sets out the ways in which money can be spent. Two main conditions are outlined in this act. The first condition states that "any development assistance must be provided for the purpose of furthering sustainable development or improving welfare" and the second that "DFID must be satisfied that the assistance will be likely to contribute to the reduction of poverty" (DFID 2002). The International Development Act was followed by the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Law in 2006. This requires the Secretary of State for International Development to report annually on various areas, including expenditure on international aid, progress towards the UN target of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) for ODA by 2014, and the effectiveness and transparency of aid.

Horizontal *accountability* can be delivered by Parliament. Parliament is able to scrutinise a department such as DFID through mechanisms which include the National Audit Office, select committees, parliamentary questions, and all party parliamentary groups

(see Table 2). Each *accountability* mechanism operates to different stages of *accountability*.

Table 2 Domestic Accountability Relationships				
Accountability mechanism	Description	Stages of <i>Accountability</i>		
		Reporting	Answerability	Enforceability
The National Audit Office (NAO)	Audits the accounts of all central government departments and agencies, as well as a wide range of other public bodies.	DFID is required to provide information.	Audits on economy, efficiency and effectiveness.	Reports to Public Accounts Committee who then take necessary action.
Public Accounts Committee	A select committee of the House of Commons.	DFID is required to provide information. Information is also provided by NAO.	Scrutinises accounts.	Can pass judgements; suggest changes which are then implemented by Parliament.
International Development Select Committee	A select committee of the House of Commons and the House of Lords	Calls the minister or another senior civil servant to report. Ministers cannot be forced to attend but unheard of them not to. Individuals can be compelled.	Scrutinises DFID's policies and programmes. Examines expenditure, administration and policy for DFID and its associated bodies.	Makes recommendations about how DFID can improve practices, strategies, and programmes. Reports findings to Parliament who can make any necessary changes.
Parliamentary Questions	Can be asked in the House of Commons, House of Lords or at Prime Minister's Questions. May be oral or written.	Compel the Minister or senior civil servant to provide evidence.	Scrutinise and demand explanations from the minister or senior civil servant on the work, policy decisions and actions of their department.	Parliament can take action if necessary.
All Party Groups	Informal cross-party groups that are run by and for Members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.	Invite individuals and organisations to come and give evidence on selected topics.	Do not have the power to demand answers.	Produce reports which are normally presented to select committees. No formal power to enforce any change.

DFID has its own Evaluation Department which aims to increase *accountability* to parliament and the public:

Evaluation strengthens DFID's accountability by documenting the allocation, use and results of its development assistance and by calling those responsible for policy and implementation to account for performance. It is recognised that DFID is part of a collective effort, which makes attribution of performance difficult. Evaluation can help to clarify where accountability rests and to confirm achievement. DFID's evaluation studies strengthen its accountability not only to the British Parliament, but also to the government and public in partner countries, and inform other development partners. (DFID 2005c:8).

One way DFID in which tries to achieve this is by focusing on transparency and opening up space and participation and capacity building (DFID 2006a). This involves work on the supply side of *accountability*, to improve the availability and accessibility of information on public expenditure and to open up public expenditure processes; and to work on the demand side, to build the capacity of civil society organisations to engage with public expenditure processes and to facilitate that participation at national, sub-national or sector levels (DFID 2006a:i).

In the last year a new Independent Advisory Committee on Development Impact (IACDI) has been established to help DFID evaluate the impact of UK aid and advise DFID on the overall strategy, approach and priorities being adopted in its evaluation work. According to DFID “the role of the committee will be to assure the independence of the evaluation function in DFID and the use of evaluation results to enhance delivery and impact of UK development assistance”⁶. The Chair of IACDI prepares an annual report to the Secretary of State. The aim of the IACDI is to use domestic lines of *accountability* to enforce lines of international *accountability* such as the commitments made in The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

⁶ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/evaluation.asp>

Individual accountability

Ministers and civil servants are also held to account as individuals. Ministers are held to account individually through The Ministerial Code⁷. This formalises their *accountability* relationship with Parliament. The four main ways in which a minister is individually accountable are to inform and explain; to apologise; to take action; and to resign. Civil servants are held to account by the Civil Service Code⁸:

The Civil Service Code sets out the framework within which all civil servants work, and the core values and standards they are expected to uphold. It forms part of the terms and conditions of employment of every civil servant (Civil Service Code 2006).

Employees at DFID are also held to account by the Blue Book: Essential Guide to Rules and Tools (2006b). The Blue Book sets out the core information about how to do things in DFID. It explains the rules governing key corporate activities including programme management, finance, people management, security, IT and propriety.

Building domestic accountability relationships in recipient countries generates more robust accountability relationships for DFID

Donor governments, including DFID, consider domestic *accountability* in recipient governments essential for the provision of effective aid. Donors like DFID place great importance on “improved *accountability* relationships between a partner developing country and its own citizens” (Rome Declaration 2003). Making recipient governments accountable to their own populations and parliamentary structures provides legitimacy and should make governments less corrupt. Greater domestic *accountability* within developing countries therefore provides donors with better assurances on the use of their funds (OECD 2003:46). The more assured donors are about the use of their funds, the more robust their own domestic *accountability* relationships become. The established view is that donors should support national systems in recipient countries so that governments can be accountable to their own citizens rather than to the conditions of

⁷ For more information on The Ministerial Code see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/propriety_and_ethics/assets/ministerial_code_current.pdf

⁸ For more information on The Civil Service Code see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/propriety_and_ethics/civil_service/civil_service_code.aspx

donor agencies:

The way aid is delivered can create an unnecessary burden on partner countries, under efforts to build partner country capacity and weaken partner government leadership and its accountability to its own people (OECD 2003:16).

However, in order to support domestic *accountability* donors must align their strategies with those of the recipient government. There is a “need for DAC donors to focus their assistance...in a way that strengthens local structures of *accountability*” (World Bank 2008:104).

DFID is committed to “helping to build states that work for the poor” (DFID 2006c:8). As part of this, DFID wants to promote *accountability* in recipient countries. DFID defines *accountability* as “the ability of citizens, civil society and the private sector to scrutinise public institutions and governments and hold them to account” (DFID 2006c:22). According to DFID, domestic *accountability* means “being answerable for what is done” through mechanisms which include:

- Offering citizens the opportunities to check the laws and decisions made by government, parliament or assemblies.
- Encouraging a free media and the freedom of faith and association.
- Respecting human rights and making sure the ‘rule of law’ is upheld, for example by an independent judiciary.
- Providing regular opportunities to change leaders in peaceful ways.

Source: DFID 2006c:22.

DFID claims that building domestic *accountability* structures in recipient countries will ensure that aid is delivered more effectively because there will be greater guarantees the money is being spent correctly:

Where accountability is good, audit institutions and parliamentary committees scrutinise the way government bodies spend their money and what they achieve. Courts help prevent abuse of office. And beyond the formal structures of the state, civil society organisations give citizens power, help poor people get their voices heard, and demand more from politicians and government (DFID White Paper 2006c:22).

DFID is eager to facilitate the progress of sound domestic *accountability* relationships across the developing world, particularly in those countries that receive aid from DFID. At the same time, DFID is opposed to conditionality⁹. Instead DFID contends it is more effective to encourage domestic *accountability* relationships which will in turn bring about better governance and consequently greater legitimacy.

In 2007 DFID established the Governance and Transparency Fund which aims to strengthen governance by supporting public demands for *accountability*. The Fund is worth £100 million over five years, and supports activities based in developing countries, working through a variety of local partnerships and networks. It is designed to support civil society, a free media, parliamentarians and trade unions – those working to improve transparency and enable more effective *accountability* mechanisms between citizens and the state (DFID 2007:16). Alongside this DFID is committed to helping recipient governments to build capability and authority to get things done in a manner which reflects the principles of good governance (DFID 2007).

Strong domestic *accountability* relationships for both donors and recipients are considered to be crucial to providing more effective aid. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasises the importance of “enhancing donors’ and partner countries’ respective *accountability* to their citizens and parliaments for their development policies, strategies and performance” (Paris Declaration 2005:1).

Domestic *accountability* provides the foundation for the *accountability* principle of effective aid. Yet donors assert that it is also important to apply the principle of *accountability* beyond national boundaries:

We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability — the accountability of States to their citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the present generation to future generations. (Annan 2005: 7)

⁹ For more information see DFID publication *Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality* (2005).

New accountability: International accountability relationships

The *new architecture of aid* is founded on principles of universality, justice, equity, democracy, participation, transparency, *accountability* and inclusion. Commitments to these principles, under the *new architecture of aid*, to improve aid effectiveness, have encouraged the development of *new accountability* relationships which extend beyond the nation-state. *New accountability* has come to represent better donor practice, greater transparency, increased trust and more harmonious relationships between donors and their partners. *New accountability* relationships are a great deal more complex than domestic *accountability* relationships because of the absence of formal international structures and processes in place to implement *accountability*. I therefore looked for evidence of DFID's evolving definitions and applications of international *accountability*.

International *accountability* relationships includes recipients being held to account by donors (this has always been the case with aid money), of donors accounting to other donors, and, most recently, of *mutual accountability* (donors and recipients holding each other to account).

Recipients accountable to donors

Evidently, donors hold recipients to account at all times merely because they hold the purse strings. It is unlikely a donor will allocate funds to a country whose policies it opposes and it is clear that when aid is provided some account of how it is spent will be necessary. Certainly, a donor like DFID would rather use a recipient country's own *accountability* relationships as a means of assurance. Where it is judged that a recipient government is not fulfilling its domestic *accountability* obligations money can, and often will be, withdrawn or redirected (enforceability). As DFID, explains:

Where the government is simply not committed to helping its citizens, we will still use our aid to help poor people and to promote long term improvements in governance. But we will do this by working outside the government, and with international agencies like the UN and civil society organizations...Where circumstances deteriorate – or improve – the UK will re-assess governance, our partners' commitment to the three principles and, where necessary, change the way we provide aid (DFID 2006c:24).

In order to avoid placing heavy conditionality on recipient governments DFID offers support to civil society to encourage the demand side of good governance, monitoring

and *accountability* through the empowerment of citizens and non state actors (DFID 2006a).

Donors accountable to donors

It is now agreed by donors that they themselves must be held internationally accountable too. DFID's 2006 White Paper specifically calls for change in the international system to provide "greater *accountability* for developing countries" (2006c:11) and to "monitor and hold donors to account on their international commitments" (2006c:11). The OECD conducts Peer Reviews to monitor the commitments made by donors. Donors examine each others' policies and efforts approximately once every four years. The Peer Review is prepared by a team, comprised of representatives of the Secretariat working with officials from two DAC members who are designated as examiners. The country under review provides a memorandum setting out the main developments in its policies and programmes. Then the Secretariat and the examiners interview officials, parliamentarians, as well as civil society and NGO representatives of the donor country to obtain a first-hand insight into current issues surrounding the development co-operation efforts of the member concerned. Field visits assess how members are implementing the major DAC policies, principles and concerns, and review operations in recipient countries, particularly with regard to poverty reduction, sustainability, gender equality and other aspects of participatory development, and local aid co-ordination. There is reporting and answerability but no enforceability.

Donors accountable to recipients (*Mutual Accountability*)

The concept of *mutual accountability* has gained an ever increasing position as one of the pillars of international cooperation for development in the past four years, starting with the Millennium Summit Declarations, followed by the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg, Rome and Paris Declarations. It stems from the recognition that the world shares a common objective as far as development and well-being for all is concerned and that the policies of both the developed countries and the developing countries are crucial for realising that objective (Discussion Paper for the Abuja meeting of 9 and 10 April 2005).

The preferred term for *accountability* between donors and recipient governments or partners is *mutual accountability*. There is a growing consensus that overseas development assistance (ODA) can only work if ‘partners’ (donors and recipients) are mutually accountable.

DFID has shown its commitment to *mutual accountability* by signing a number of international agreements initiated at the Millennium Summit Declaration, followed by the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg, Rome and Paris Declarations. The following agreements, declarations and reviews address the importance of *mutual accountability* and endeavour to explain what this means, none of them address directly how *mutual accountability* should be implemented and the consequences of doing this.

The Cotonou Agreement 2000

The Cotonou Agreement regulates aid and trade issues between the EU and ACP countries in a ‘compact’ which emphasises equality, ownership, mutual obligations and dialogue. Ensuring “transparent and accountable” management and governance are important elements of this agreement (Cotonou Agreement 2000).

The Cotonou Agreement was signed by all the then 15 members of the European Union (EU) and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in 2000 and came into force in 2002. The aim of the agreement is to reduce and finally eradicate poverty while simultaneously encouraging sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy. It is founded upon four fundamental principles:

- Equality of the partners and ownership of development strategies – This essentially encourages recipient ‘led’ and recipient ‘owned’ development and economic strategies.
- Participation – The purpose of participation is to encourage actors other than the main governments to play a role in the economic development of these countries. Civil society, the private sector and local and regional governments are also encouraged to take part.

- Dialogue and mutual obligations – All signatories have assumed mutual obligation and will continue to pursue these through dialogue and cooperation. This includes monitoring and evaluation.
- Differentiation and Regionalisation – Cooperation agreements will be decided according to each partner's level of development, needs, performance and long-term development strategy. The main focus will be regionalisation and special treatment shall be given to the least developed countries.

Source: Cotonou Agreement 2000:9

This agreement allows African states some representation when it comes to decisions when it comes to decisions about how European aid is allocated. The agreement applies the reporting and answerability stages of *accountability* to its framework. Donors and recipients are contractually obliged to share information and assess each others' performance. Enforcement, however, remains asymmetric.

Global Monitoring Reports 2002

In 2002, the World Bank and the IMF, in cooperation with the DAC, UNDP and others, developed a monitoring framework to track donor commitments. Annually produced Global Monitoring Reports (GMRs) chart progress on key development issues and are meant to hold developing countries and their donors mutually accountable for their performance. Global Monitoring focuses on how well countries are implementing the policies and actions for achieving the MDGs and related development outcomes. It is a framework for *accountability* in global development policy.

In 2006 the World Bank's Global Monitoring Report underlined the importance of *accountability*, and in particular the principle of mutual *accountability*:

Donors and the international financial institutions must increase aid flows, improve aid quality, and better align their support with country strategies and systems. Donors also need to open up their markets to the developing world. Developing countries, for their part, must commit to sound development strategies and stronger systems of governance to ensure that resources will be effectively used World Bank GMR 2006:1).

In 2007 the report called for a strengthening of monitoring and *accountability* frameworks and in 2008 the report noted a lack of effective *accountability* mechanisms was still an issue.

The 2008 Global Monitoring Report concluded:

Greater attention needs to be focused on the quality of education and health investments—and to the governance and accountability of public programs—if they are to meet MDG objectives (2008:87).

While the Global Monitoring Reports provide some useful information and analysis for donors and recipients, they lack any specific targets or enforcement mechanism. There is reporting and some measure of answerability, but there is no enforcement mechanism.

Africa Partnership Forum 2003

The Africa Partnership Forum (APF) was established in 2003 as a way of providing a more inclusive partnership between the G8 and Africa through NEPAD. It aimed to serve as a mechanism for discussing and monitoring policies and strategies and observe progress on mutual *accountability*. The forum focuses on focuses on strategic, political and socio-economic issues related to African development and the implementation of NEPAD programmes in the context of achieving the MDGs. In conjunction with the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the DAC, the forum monitors commitments made against outcomes to produce a Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness. This is one of the first successful mechanisms of international *accountability* for implementing reporting and answerability. But as yet, the forum lacks the power of enforceability.

UN Secretary General's In Larger Freedom 2005

In 2005 the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called for reform of the United Nations in a major report called *In Larger Freedom*. The report, supported by DFID, refers directly to the importance of *accountability*:

In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society, the private sector and international institutions to advancing a vision of larger freedom, we must ensure that all involved assume their responsibilities to turn good words into good deeds. We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability — the accountability of States to their citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the present generation to future generations. Where there is accountability we will progress; where there is none we will underperform. The business of the summit to be held in September 2005 must be to ensure that, from now on, promises made are promises kept. (Annan 2005:7)

In Larger Freedom also emphasises that aid relationships based on 'mutual respect and *accountability*' is a requirement. Kofi Annan's report calls for donor agencies to deliver aid that is "linked to the local needs identified in countries' national strategies and to the

achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), not to the interests of suppliers in donor countries” (2005:17).

At the 2005 World Summit there was a call for substantial strengthening of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as the forum where aid issues should be discussed and coordinated. Unfortunately, although this UN-based initiative was supported by the Secretary General, no specific targets were ever established and therefore no mechanisms were built.

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2006

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness focuses on improving the quality of aid through a series of reciprocal and agreed commitments and targets. Signed by 110 donors and partner countries in 2005, the Paris Declaration positioned *mutual accountability* at the heart of international cooperation. In signing this, DFID agreed to “mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments and more broadly their development partnership” (OECD 2005:45).

Figure 5. *Mutual accountability as explained in The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*

Mutual accountability– Donors and partners are accountable for development results

47. A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance *mutual accountability* and transparency in the use of development resources. This also helps strengthen public support for national policies and development assistance.

48. Partner countries commit to:

Strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets. Reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving in a broad range of development practices when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies.

49. Donors commit to:

Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislature and citizens.

50. Partner countries and donors commit to:

Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mechanisms mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments.

DFID affirms its commitment to the Paris Declaration definition of *mutual accountability* in its 2006 Annual Report. It has also published a response to the Paris Declaration, DFID’s Medium Term Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness: Our Response to the Paris

Declaration (2006d). In this publication DFID agrees to work with government and other donor partners in order to “develop a *mutual accountability* mechanism which will assess progress on improving aid effectiveness and provide joint support to strengthen governments’ capacity to manage aid effectively” (DFID 2006d:8).

Furthermore, DFID commits to work with others, and use its resources to influence and to push for change in the international system. Included in these changes are greater *accountability* to developing countries and a request for the OECD to monitor and hold donors to account on their development commitments:

“Donors are rarely held to account for their performance nor are their commitments monitored. There is emerging evidence that independent reviews of donor performance and agreed frameworks for monitoring performance can encourage substantial changes in donor behaviour. We therefore need to increase the development and use of robust systems for reporting effectiveness at country level. This will include partner country monitoring of performance, peer reviews and internal performance and monitoring systems (DFID 2006d:17).”

Figure 6. DFID’s Medium Term Plan on Aid Effectiveness

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

Strengthening Mutual *accountability*

46. Encourage greater use of *mutual accountability* frameworks. We support the introduction on new processes to strengthen mutual *accountability*. In particular we will encourage country led processes for monitoring progress against indicators and targets agreed at Paris. We will encourage independent monitoring of donor/partner country performance and learn from emerging practice in countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Vietnam.

47. We will continue to support regional and international mechanisms for *mutual accountability* and encourage the use of in-country generated information and build their capacity to put in place follow up action.

48. We will contribute to global monitoring and evaluation of performance through the DAC. We will do this both through self reporting and through the development of a monitoring system to review progress against Paris commitments to feed into reviews of the Paris Declaration in 2008 and 2010.

Source: DFID’s medium term action plan on aid effectiveness: Our response to the Paris Declaration 2006:29 London: DFID

The Paris Declaration states specific comprehensive commitments for both donors and recipients which include specific targets that both must achieve. This is however, largely still rhetorical as there are no mechanisms to enforce sanctions on those who do not meet the targets.

The Three Ones

As well as internationally agreed commitments to improving aid in general such as The Rome Declaration and the Paris Declaration, the UK (amongst others) have also agreed to a set of commitments with a specific HIV/AIDS focus. In order to improve the international response to HIV and AIDS, the UK have agreed to the Three Ones principles, a UNAIDS initiative aimed at achieving in each country: one agreed HIV and AIDS Action Framework, one national AIDS Coordinating Authority and one agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system. The Three Ones mandate stresses the importance of ensuring *accountability* in the response to HIV and AIDS in terms of policy implementation, partner inclusion, and programme outcomes (UNAIDS 2004).

As with every internationally agreed target, the stages of reporting and answerability do, to varying degrees, exist. Yet again, enforceability is lacking.

Conclusion

DFID is very clearly held to account domestically. There are clear processes which facilitate this. Internationally, DFID is less accountable. This is because the level of enforceability is absent in all international agreements on mutual *accountability*. Donors and recipients are, by their very nature, asymmetrical and this means that enabling a recipient country to apply full *accountability* to a donor is not possible. Despite a lack of enforceability, reporting and answerability mechanisms are being applied by both partners. This partial *accountability* relationship is a significant step in the right direction as these commitments show donors are willing to be more responsive to recipients, and allows recipient an opportunity to evaluate the donors.

Chapter 6 – DFID’s HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa

Tackling HIV/AIDS is a top DFID priority (DFID 2007:32b)

Summary

In this chapter I describe DFID’s strategic response to HIV and AIDS and outline what has been done in South Africa.

DFID had an early vision to respond to HIV and AIDS. In 1999 the UK signed up to the International Conference on Population and Development target to “achieve a 25% reduction in HIV infection rates among 15-24 year olds in worst affected countries by 2005 and globally by 2010”. This was followed in 2000 by the Millennium Summit which adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one of which aims to have “halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS” (Millennium Development Goals). In 2001, DFID published a Target Strategy Paper: Better Health for Poor People which identified HIV/AIDS as one of four key responses needed to improve the health of the poorest. This was followed by DFID’s Call for Action, a paper published in 2003, which called for a stronger, more coordinated response to the HIV/AIDS crisis (DFID 2003). Out of these publications came DFID’s *Taking Action: The UK’s Strategy for Tackling HIV and AIDS in the Developing World* (2004). This is the strategy paper which I will focus on in this chapter.

An overview of DFID's aid contribution

All DFID official development assistance (ODA) in developing countries, including HIV/AIDS expenditure, can be generally classified as bilateral, multilateral or administrative costs. DFID also channels funding through research organisations and civil society. According to DFID, bilateral aid is provided either for use in a specific country and directed to the government or organisations carrying out an aid function in that country or to institutions, normally in Britain, working in fields related to international development (DFID 2007b:353). Multilateral aid is channelled via international agencies. DFID does not have direct control over the use and final destination of these funds. DFID administrative costs cover the total cost of delivering all DFID's programmes¹⁰.




Figure 7. DFID Aid Expenditure by Channel 2006/7

Source: DFID Statistics on International Development 2007

As Figure 7 illustrates, over half of DFID's expenditure is channelled through bilateral aid. Africa is the main recipient of bilateral ODA from DFID. In 2005/6, 52.5% of the US\$8,894 million total was allocated for Africa (OECD 2007b).

¹⁰ They include UK based and local staff, consultants, travel, rents and communications – anything that does not provide a direct developmental benefit. Other administrative costs cover the overseas costs of staff in agreed diplomatic posts concerned with full time aid administration and other elements of FCO and CDC administration costs which are related to aid delivery (DFID 2008).




Figure 8. Gross Bilateral ODA 2005/6 average

Source: OECD-DAC (<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/53/40039127.gif>)

DFID's programming objectives are outlined in The Public Service Agreement (PSA) which runs over a three year period. The overall aim of PSAs is the elimination of poverty in particular through achievement by 2015 of the Millennium Development Goals. The Public Service Agreement provides a set of targets for DFID's work, as required by the White Paper, *Public Services for the Future: Modernisation, Reform, Accountability* (UK Treasury 1998). The current PSA is for 2005-2008 and is based around one aim, six objectives and six targets. These cover the work of the Africa Division, Asia Division, Europe, Middle East and Americas Division, International Division, Policy Division and a crosscutting Value for Money target. Sixteen key African countries and 9 key Asian countries are made the focus of the PSA. In 2002/3 the 16 key African countries received 88% of total DFID spend in sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Included in the aim of the current PSA is a commitment to combating HIV/AIDS and Objective 1, Target 1, outlines a specific commitment to reducing HIV in South Africa (one of the 16 PSA target countries until 2008) (DFID 2004c).

DFID has prioritised an HIV/AIDS response. "26% of the UK's overall bilateral assistance to Africa is spent on AIDS and sexual and reproductive health work" (DFID 2004a: 19).

DFID's Strategic Response to HIV and AIDS

DFID's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been three-fold: reflecting the importance of tackling the epidemic in its high level targets; developing a strategic framework for the department to work within; and revamping its organisation to better reflect current thinking on the most effective approaches to tackling HIV/AIDS" (Barnett). The UK government's (and particularly DFID's) priorities for how this money will be spent and what it aims to achieve are outlined in *Taking Action: The UK's Strategy for Tackling HIV and AIDS in the Developing World* (2004a). DFID is responsible for the implementation of the UK's strategy for HIV and AIDS. Written by DFID and published in 2004, *Taking Action* was the result of DFID's Call for Action, a paper published a year earlier, which called for a stronger, more coordinated response to the HIV/AIDS crisis (DFID 2003). To emphasise how important HIV and AIDS issues are to the UK government as a whole, the forward is written by then Prime Minister, Tony Blair. The main foci of the strategy are to make a financial commitment to increase spending to over £1.5 billion over the following three year period (2005-2008), a commitment to placing women, young people, children and orphans, and a commitment to support governments to improve treatment, care and prevention (DFID 2004a:iii). Through internal business plans, working with countries and multilateral partners, DFID allocate resources to country programmes, multilateral institutions, research bodies and civil society.

DFID's objectives for tackling HIV and AIDS are outlined in seven main targets (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. UK Government main targets for tackling HIV and AIDS

- 1) 25% fewer young people infected with HIV by 2005 and globally by 2010
- 2) Increased access to sexual and reproductive health services for women and girls by 2005
- 3) 3 million people, including 2 million in Africa, receiving treatment by the end of 2005, at least half whom should be women and children
- 4) National plans in place to meet the needs of orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV and AIDS by 2005
- 5) Rapid implementation of the Three Ones, linking donor help to national priorities
- 6) Increased global investment in HIV and AIDS research, addressing the needs of the poor, women and children
- 7) On track to slow the progress of HIV and AIDS by 2015

Source: DFID *Taking Action* Report 2004:1

DFID acknowledges that these targets are extremely ambitious and unlikely to be met. Indeed, the 2005 targets were not met. However, it stresses that having targets is still important for stressing ambitions and goals (DFID 2004a).

Taking Action emphasises four approaches to improving the response to HIV and AIDS should be improved. These are an increased financial contribution, an improved international response, better national programmes and a long term strategy.

Strategy 1: An increased financial contribution

Taking Action outlines the UK's commitment to increasing financial contributions both multilaterally and bilaterally. The spending target set by *Taking Action* is £1.5 billion during 2005/6 to 2007/8. Over a three year period, the UK government commit to double funding to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), and over a four year period provide £36 million to UNAIDS in support of its global leadership. In that same four year period the government pledged £80 million to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) for HIV prevention, sexual and reproductive health work with women. Bilaterally, DFID are the second largest donor for HIV and AIDS (after the US). Through DFID, at least £150 million was granted for programmes to meet the needs of orphans and other children made vulnerable by HIV and AIDS.

DFID's bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan Africa rose to £1,107m in 2006/07 from £1,097m in 2005/06 (0.9 per cent). Assistance to Asia decreased over this period from £943m to £881m (-6.5 per cent). In 2006/07 £274m of bilateral assistance was channelled through UK Civil Society Organisations. Major recipients included the British Red Cross, VSO and Oxfam (DFID 2008).

DFID's total multilateral programme accounted for £2,126m in 2006/07 from £1,725m in 2005/06 a rise of 23 per cent. In 2006/7 43 per cent of DFID's contributions were multilateral. The European Commission's development programme received the largest amount of DFID multilateral assistance (£964m), followed by the World Bank (£592m)

and the United Nations (£308m) (DFID 2008). “The European Commission (EC) is the world’s third largest development aid donor, has a critical role to play. The UK Government provides around 19% of the total EC budget. A key focus of the UK strategy will be to work with the EC to ensure that its work on AIDS until and beyond 2006 is focused in the best way possible” (DFID 2004a:33).




Figure 10. DFID Multilateral Spend on Health 2005/06
Source: DFID 2007c

It is difficult to obtain exact figures on what DFID has spent specifically on HIV/AIDS to date as they are often included in other areas, particularly health. £320m was committed for HIV and AIDS and Sexual Reproductive Health in 2003-04 (DFID 2005c). The health sector received the highest share of DFID bilateral expenditure in 2006/7 with £490 million (Annual report 2007).

Strategy 2: An improved international response

DFID’s pledge to an improve the international response to HIV and AIDS has already been demonstrated through its commitment to internationally agreed targets for HIV and AIDS, in particular the MDGs, the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) agenda as well as UNAIDS Three Ones principles.

As well as increasing multilateral contributions, this strategy involves DFID working with a number of multilaterals¹¹ to ensure that all countries have access to funds and support in the fight against HIV/AIDS (Table 3.). Part of this commitment to an improved international response is to work with multilaterals to increase access to essential medicines in developing countries, including for the treatment of HIV and AIDS and opportunistic infections.

Table 3. DFID's financial contributions to key multilateral institutions

	2004	2005	2006	2007
UNDP		140		
UNICEF			100.9	
UNFPA		36.4	23.1	
UNAIDS		21.7	15.6	
WHO	135.3			
WB			493	
EC		934		
Asian Dev't Bank			31.7	
African Dev't Bank			57.2	
GFATM			100	

The UK has agreed to the Three Ones principles, a UNAIDS initiative aimed at achieving one agreed HIV and AIDS Action Framework, one national AIDS Coordinating Authority and one agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system in each country. *Taking Action* also outlines DFID's desire to create a 'Fourth One'. This is to ensure that there is donor harmonisation at country level. This is to be achieved through the provision of a single pooled funding mechanism, to channel all bilateral and multilateral support, and reduce the burden on national governments (*Taking Action* 2004:36).

¹¹ Multilateral organisations include EC, GFATM, UNAIDS and its cosponsors, World Bank, UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA

The UK's strategy also includes securing an agreement for an International Finance Facility and a promise to use their presidency of both the G8 and the EU to put AIDS at the forefront of their Africa-focused agenda.

Strategy 3: Better national programmes

The UK government has committed DFID to strengthening national AIDS responses led by the affected countries themselves. These obligations were reaffirmed when the UK agreed to the Three Ones Principles in 2004. In this strategy DFID asserts that successful national programmes need to be comprehensive, long-term and must include prevention, treatment and care. They must meet the needs of the most vulnerable. *Taking Action* stresses the importance of education in HIV prevention, capacity-building in the health sector, as well as providing support to civil society and the private sector:

Civil society, groups of people with HIV and AIDS, other community groups, NGOs, the medical and scientific community, faith-based organisations, business and the media all have important roles to play in creating a demand for better leadership and holding governments more accountable (DFID 2004a:28).

In order to ensure national programmes are effective, DFID creates Country Assistance Plans (CAPs) for all countries where it provides development assistance programmes of more than £20 million. These papers, are produced in consultation with governments, business, civil society and others both within the country concerned and in the UK. They outline the ways in which DFID proposes to achieve international development targets in the country in question. CAPs are normally intended to cover a three to four year period. Not all spending is centrally determined. Many projects are agreed at the country level to reflect local circumstances.

In order to drive successful national plans the UK government strategy makes it clear that it is necessary to have a supportive environment:

Leadership outside government – from faith-based organisations, people with HIV and AIDS, civil society, women and the private sector – is also key (DFID 2004a:50).

Furthermore, DFID emphasises the significance of providing a multifaceted response to HIV and AIDS. According to DFID any response to HIV and AIDS should go beyond health addressing the broader causes and effects. AIDS prevention is therefore a major focus of any programme:

AIDS impacts on education, social structure, cultures and economies and therefore effective HIV prevention therefore requires strong community engagement, social change and good communication to support individual choices (DFID 2004a:43).

DFID focuses on those who may not have the power to make individual choices, in particular the UK's strategy for tackling HIV and AIDS in the developing world involves tackling violence against women, supporting children orphaned and other young people made vulnerable by AIDS (DFID 2004a:5). In order to achieve this DFID works to ensure that these issues are part of national government strategies that provide care and treatment programmes for parents in order to reduce and delay orphaning.

In its efforts to support better national programmes DFID implements policy on sexual and reproductive health through country governments and partners in four main ways: improved policies, better access to services, fewer barriers and more information (Figure 11).

Figure 11. DFID Policy on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

- Advocate internationally and nationally for policies, plans and resources that address people's rights to sexual and reproductive health, and continue to address controversial issues such as safe abortion and harmful and coercive practices.
- Improve access to comprehensive services that are responsive to the rights and needs of poor people and other vulnerable groups.
- Address social, cultural and economic barriers, using a rights-based approach, and tackle factors outside the health sector.
- Support research, monitoring and evaluation and apply knowledge and lessons learnt in policy and planning.

Source: DFID 2004a:45

DFID does not directly provide treatment and care programmes because it considers supporting stand alone programmes undermines national responses. The UK's strategy allows DFID to support initiatives that persuade national governments to both set and own plans (Figure 12). It does this at both a regional and in country level.

Figure 12. DFID Policy on HIV Treatment and Care

- Involve all sectors of government and society
- Are pro-poor, equitable and gender- and child-focused
- Involve individuals and communities affected by HIV in decision making
- Help to strengthen the systems that deliver health services, and support prevention and impact-mitigation efforts
- Promote alignment at the country level, and harmonisation at the international level (the Three Ones)
- Are informed by evidence, and consistent with broader developmental objectives.

Source: DFID 2004a:45

Taking Action encourages DFID to use both financial support and advice to governments so that they can build successful responses to HIV and AIDS.

Strategy 4: A long term response

In order to ensure that aid is both long term and predictable, the UK strategy proposes that the International Finance Facility (IFF) be expanded to channel funds for treatment and research. A major component of the UK's long term strategy is research.

DFID's strategy strongly supports increased support for research and development into microbicides, treatments and new technologies. The UK government pledges to:

increase the share of its bilateral resources dedicated to poverty reduction budget support where conditions are appropriate...to enable governments to take long term responsibility for their AIDS responses (DFID 2004a:58).

The UK's strategy assures DFID's commitment to a long term approach to funding, yet funding cycles only cover a three to five year period. DFID accepts this and offers reassurances of more sustainable funding as a solution to this problem.

DFID's national programme in South Africa

Despite being classified as Middle Income, South Africa continues to receive significant amounts of donor funding. This is largely due to the country's high prevalence of HIV.

"In some middle-income countries, such as South Africa, AIDS has already reached epidemic proportions. This has significant consequences for the wider region. We are equally concerned about prevalence in countries where the state is weak or has failed" (DFID 2004a:31). Since 1997 DFID has given £122,217,241 projects in South Africa which have an HIV/AIDS element. DFID has committed R493 million to South Africa for the period 2002-2008 (Harinder 2003).

Until 2006 South Africa was one of the top 20 recipient countries of UK net bilateral ODA, receiving £48 in 2004 and £39m in 2005 (DFID 2007c). In 2006 six of the top 10 recipients of gross ODA/OA were African including South Africa.

Top Ten Recipients of Gross ODA/OA (USD million)	
1 India	419
2 Bangladesh	287
3 Tanzania	265
4 Iraq	228
5 Ghana	200
6 Zambia	174
7 Congo. Dem. Rep.	162
8 Afghanistan	151
9 Malawi	115
10 South Africa	112

Figure 13. Top Ten Recipients of Gross ODA/OA (USD millions)

Source: OECD-DAC Peer Review of the UK 2006

In South Africa funding for HIV and AIDS is split between National and Provincial Government, Civil Society, UNAIDS SA and the Private Sector to improve capacity and support the implementation of national AIDS strategies. Three main areas of focus are prevention, care, and reducing the overall social and economic impact of HIV and AIDS. Prevention includes, for example, supporting the South African government's free condom programme, promoting behaviour change and helping to improve the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases.

Obtaining information about what policies DFID actually implements in South Africa was particularly difficult. This is supported by an evaluation of *Taking Action* which concluded:

The absence of a monitoring framework with clear indicators in Taking Action makes it difficult to assess rigorously the extent to which the distribution of current UK-supported HIV and AIDS activities reflect priorities in the strategy. Obtaining disaggregated information on how DFID funds are spent on HIV and AIDS is difficult, because of the instruments used for funding, e.g. sectoral and budget support, and because current systems do not track this information (DFID 2006f).

I was however, able to establish that DFID operates three programmes in support of those who are HIV positive in South Africa, They are:

- A £30 million, four-year multi-sectoral framework programme on HIV/AIDS which works with partners in national and provincial governments, civil society and the private sector to strengthen the South African response to HIV/AIDS. – HLSP.
- A commitment of £13 million over five years to the South African multimedia NGO called 'Soul City' for its HIV/AIDS prevention work and to support its expansion into a further eight countries in the region. – 2008 £14m over 4 years.
- £20 million over three years to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for their work with orphans and vulnerable children in east and southern Africa, South Africa is one beneficiary of this grant.

There are obviously other policies that DFID implements in South Africa as its recorded spend for HIV/AIDS is much higher in official documentation (DFID 2007b). However, I was unable to access any specific information about DFID's exact spend. It is not possible to isolate what exactly happens to DFID's funds for UNICEF but information about the multi-sectoral programmes and Soul City are outlined below.

Multisectoral Support Programme (MSP)

DFID has focused support on comprehensive multi-sector national responses to provide HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care services along with impact mitigation.

Depending on the context, a range of approaches has been used, including support to strengthen government and civil society responses and direct service delivery via UN and civil society agencies (DFID 2007b: 327).

DFID supports a multi-sectoral HIV and AIDS support programme which is implemented on its behalf by HLSP, a health consultancy. The MSP was started in 2004 (HLSP has been running this since October 2007) with the aim of employing the international community to improve the response to HIV and AIDS in South Africa:

The MSP is designed to assist partners so that they can develop, implement, monitor and evaluate their HIV/AIDS plans as well as strengthening the relationship between national and provincial government departments (<http://www.hlsp.org/>)

In keeping with the South Africa Government's National AIDS Plan, the MSP's target areas are as follows:

- Prevention of HIV and AIDS through civil society and public sector programmes.
- HIV and AIDS treatment, care and support.
- Strengthening key components of the South African health system and structures including Monitoring and Evaluation Operations Research.
- Strengthening policy dialogue on human rights and the legal environments for vulnerable groups.

HLSP has partnerships with government departments, in provinces and across sectors. Service providers, comprised of private consulting firms, civil society organisations (CSOs) and research institutions are employed to implement projects. Figure 14 provides examples of some of these partners¹².

Figure 14. An example of some of HLSP's partners

National government departments	Provincial governments	Civil Society service providers	Private sector
Health	Eastern Cape	Anglican Church of South Africa	G&B Consulting Ltd
Social Development	KwaZulu Natal	Treatment Action Campaign	Denovo Communications
Defence	Limpopo		Akena Research, Evaluation and Consulting Ltd
	Mpumalanga		

¹² For a full list of partners and project implementers - <http://www.hlsp.org/>

It is interesting to note that HLSP do not make available information on all 170 projects, and it does not reveal any information about how much is spent on individual projects.

Soul City

DFID has worked to develop a 'toolkit' aimed at strengthening the capacity of community-based organisations to provide care to HIV and AIDS sufferers. One way DFID does this is through its support of 'edutainment', designed to address a variety of health and social issues. DFID provides funds to the 'Soul City' project and its child friendly project, 'Soul Buddyz'. These projects advocate "social change in individuals and communities through edutainment – the integration of social issues (prioritised through research findings) into popular and high-quality entertainment"

(<http://www.soulcity.org.za/programmes/the-soul-buddyz-series/soul-buddyz-series>).

DFID has supported Soul City for the past 13 years and has just this year committed a further £14 million to Soul City and Soul Buddyz over the next four years.

Conclusions

By end December 2008 DFID will have spent approximately £30million in support of the South Africa's response to HIV and AIDS. It is impossible to gain access to information about DFID's specific spending for HIV/AIDS. Its new programme on AIDS in South Africa is currently in design stage but DFID says it expects to spend £26m over 5 years.

Chapter 7 – Results and Discussion

Summary

Based on a combination of the evidence presented in Chapter 6 and my interviews with informants, purposively selected for their positions in the policy cycle (see Chapter 2), I argue that there is sufficiently persuasive evidence to suggest four key findings about the consequences of DFID's embrace of the new language of aid and the *new accountability* for its work in the case of South Africa. Firstly DFID has an excellent reputation because it undertakes to apply the principles of the *new architecture of aid* – they talk the talk. Secondly, circumstances in South Africa present a challenge to DFID's application of these principles. Thirdly, as a result of circumstances DFID has had to modify its response in South Africa – they can't quite walk the walk of the *new architecture of aid*. Finally, these responses have had consequences for DFID's *accountability* relationships both with the South African government (mutual *accountability*) and within its own country (domestic *accountability*).

Reputation

Firstly, DFID has an excellent reputation and is well respected for adopting sound principles. DFID's outstanding reputation amongst the aid community is affirmed by my informants who acknowledge that DFID is widely accepted as a model donor. Informants' sense there is an expectation that DFID will "do the right thing" (R2).

There is a strong value system in DFID. DFID's core values apply right across the system. DFID's staff have integrity. There is a clear hierarchy of goals (R3)

Much of this respect derives from DFID's adoption of the language of the *new architecture of aid* and its application of this language when dealing with its South African partners. DFID has played a leading role in both promoting the principles of the *new architecture of aid* and implementing them in practice. DFID's applies the principle of ownership, directs aid towards capacity building and devolves responsibilities to staff in country so that they can have a more flexible response on the ground.

Ownership

From the evidence presented in Chapter 6 it is clear that DFID recognises that an effective response to HIV and AIDS will only be successful if countries develop and commit to strong nationally developed and led plans (DFID 2004). Consequently, DFID works with recipient countries to develop nationally owned strategies. The application of this principle means that DFID is recognised as paying due respect to the host country, and really attempts to get local buy-in. According to one informant, DFID is “a good donor, concerned with local buy in and consultation” (R4).

DFID consults with governments, business, civil society and others in recipient countries to provide aid that reflects local circumstances:

DFID would not agree a programme that was not negotiated with a partner country. Consultation is vital. One thing partners so highly appreciate about DFID is that they respond to the needs of the country. DFID supports national plans which allows for a better response (R1)

DFID follows country-led approaches to development as part of its support for the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to ensure that programmes do not undermine national responses to HIV and AIDS. DFID stresses the importance of working in partnership with mutual goals and accountabilities.

Capacity building

DFID’s concentration on facilitating capacity building is seen as a way to follow the lead from the host country. Building capacity is critical to making aid more effective and absorbing larger amounts of aid, since it is at the heart of the closely interrelated strands of achieving the MDGs and realising the principles of the *new architecture of aid*. The need for supporting sustainable capacity development is identified by DFID as crucial. DFID works to provide high level technical assistance to countries affected by HIV and AIDS. Informants described their approval of DFID’s approach to supporting recipient countries. For example, one informant noted:

Strengthening government and capacity is a core of what DFID does. DFID works directly on technical assistance, evidence based policy making and governance. DFID works to build a strong policy-making environment (R3)

Budget support is also perceived as a good aid instrument because it supports nationally-led strategies (one of the principles of the *new architecture of aid* and a precondition of *mutual accountability* relationships). According to one respondent:

DFID would rather give budget support and make sure a government has a good national strategy in place. DFID see budget support as a long term sustainable way of funding much more so than others (R4)

This sentiment is echoed by other respondents who agree that “this helps build secure relationships with partners” (R2) and “allows for a better response” (R3).

Devolved responsibility

DFID’s devolved approach to decision making in-country is seen as a core strength. The autonomy afforded to country teams has enabled DFID to adopt a flexible approach to HIV/AIDS programming and many decisions are made by country teams without having to seek permission from superiors. Such flexibility allows DFID to be highly responsive which is crucial in countries affected by HIV and AIDS because epidemics create new issues all the time. Devolution also allows DFID to be more innovative; it can invest in up-to-the-minute ways of responding to the epidemic. Respondents praised DFID for its flexible approach:

The flexibility of DFID is highly appreciated by partners because it is better able to deal with unforeseen needs (R3).

Giving aid in this way is, in theory an excellent approach and one which on the face of it seems fairly unproblematic – provided the circumstances in the recipient country allow. In a country like South Africa, the circumstances are such that applying the principles of the *new architecture of aid* becomes more complex.

Circumstances in South Africa: A challenge for DFID

Applying the rhetoric of the principles of the *new architecture of aid* to practice has been problematic in a country like South Africa.

A Middle Income Country

South Africa is classified as a middle income country (MIC) and therefore is not eligible for the same funding as if it were a lower income country (LIC). Since its classification as a MIC, DFID has withdrawn South Africa from its list of target countries (under the PSA) and it no longer receives significant amounts of aid. DFID's approach to MICs is to focus on improving the effectiveness of the international system in achieving the MDGs in MICs worldwide (DFID 2004b).

A controversial response to HIV/AIDS

As stated in the first part of this chapter, a country's own priorities are at the heart of country-led approaches. There is, however, a risk that countries may fail to prioritise HIV and AIDS. This has certainly been the case in South Africa. Until recently, South Africa's response to HIV and AIDS has placed DFID in a difficult position. This has included years of inaction, misinformation and denial within the South African government, in particular former President Thabo Mbeki and the Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang.

South Africa has a per capita income similar to Botswana and Brazil and so should have been more capable of dealing with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, the government in South Africa was slow to respond to HIV/AIDS and since the epidemic began, the government has been criticised for its failure to take effective actions against AIDS. The lack of a comprehensive and coordinated response by the government and NGOs has been exacerbated by Mbeki's controversial stance. Despite a court ruling in July 2002 that required the government to provide antiretrovirals for infected children the government has been slow in meeting these obligations. The South African government consistently resisted calls to introduce an AIDS treatment programme until August 2003,

when the cabinet finally agreed to consider it. Brazil has had a health policy with universal access to HAART since 1996 (Nattrass 2004).

Insufficient capacity

International and internal pressure, as well as the political imperative of the 2004 election compelled the government to act more decisively. In November 2003 the government approved a \$1.7 billion Comprehensive Nation Plan on HIV/AIDS Care, Management and Treatment (ARVs) to more than 1.4 million South Africans by 2008. However, since the launch of the initiative, little progress has been made. In June 2004, only 20,000 people had access to ARV treatment out of 750,000 people in need (Nattrass 2006). Access to ARVs has been very uneven across the country as provinces face different challenges, including insufficient human resources, lack of training and healthcare workers, lack of treatment literacy, delays in the procurement of the drugs and the need for specialised equipment.

These capacity issues present DFID with a dilemma. Working under the principles of the *new architecture of aid* means that DFID has to promote ownership and support country-led responses to HIV and AIDS. At the same time DFID is compelled to fulfil its own objectives and must also meet its own national *accountability* needs. In South Africa, the potential for meaningful *mutual accountability* relationships with donors has been compromised by the government's controversial response to the epidemic.

DFID can only have a relationship of constructive *mutual accountability* with a recipient that identifies with the principles of the *new architecture of aid*. A foundation of good governance, legitimacy and *accountability* nationally is necessary for a *mutual accountability* relationship:

Where DFID has a relationship with a government, its primary expectation would be that there is good governance. The 2006 White Paper had an emphasis on good governance. In countries that are not well governed DFID will not work with the executive (R2).

South Africa's response to HIV and AIDS has certainly affected this *mutual accountability* relationship. Furthermore, informants expressed an additional concern

about the structures that are designed to facilitate better relationships in the region as a whole. One respondent notes:

DFID are responsive to SADC. SADC is dysfunctional, weak and with little capacity. Until SADC becomes a functional institutional structure it is very difficult to sustain a useful relationship. The alternative is to build up civil society (R3)

South Africa's controversial response to HIV and AIDS is not the only reason a donor like DFID finds it difficult to follow the principles of the *new architecture of aid* in practice. A constant precondition for aid success is the ability of a government to absorb the aid it is given and to spend it effectively. Despite all macroeconomic data for South Africa indicating that the country has the capacity to use aid efficiently this has not been the case. In October 2005 the South African Press Association reported that the then Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang had told parliament that the national budget of health would have to roll over R67.2 million that it had not spent on budgeted HIV/AIDS projects in the 2004/5 financial year.

The limitations of the South African government to absorb aid are identified by one respondent:

There is no health sector pot, no mechanism for South Africa to have money delivered directly to the government (R1)

South Africa's lamentable response to HIV/AIDS and its inability to spend aid effectively has created an uncomfortable relationship with the donors. This has challenged DFID's approach. It has been unable to establish *mutual accountability* relationships with the South African government.

DFID's HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa

Clearly, because South Africa is a middle income country, certain means of providing aid are not open to DFID which they would be if South Africa was a developing country. This combined with the fact that South Africa does not have the capacity to deal with large amounts of aid for HIV and AIDS and its controversial response to the epidemic have impacted on the way DFID provides aid to South Africa.

As outlined in Chapter 6, aid for HIV and AIDS in South Africa provided by DFID is not provided directly in partnership with the recipient government. Instead, DFID delivers aid through multilateral organisations, the private sector and civil society.

Multi-lateral organisations

In South Africa, DFID provides multi-lateral aid to UNICEF to implement South Africa's National Action Plan for children affected by AIDS. Funding multi-laterally in this way has consequences for both *mutual accountability* and domestic *accountability*. *Mutual accountability* can only exist between recipient governments and donor governments and therefore by providing funding in this way DFID does not have a *mutual accountability* relationship with the South African government. Furthermore, DFID's domestic *accountability* relationship is weakened because although donors do receive guarantees from multi-laterals and donors are represented in multi-lateral organisations, multi-laterals do not have domestic *accountability* relationships with donor governments.

Informants did not raise any specific concerns related to *accountability* as a result of DFID's support of UNICEF in South Africa. They did however, observe obstacles to *accountability* that had emerged from funding other multi-laterals:

DFID has problems with the Global Fund being bad¹³ so it has to fund bilaterally when it would like to give multilaterally. Don't forget, DFID is still accountable to the taxpayer (R4).

¹³When asked what was meant by bad the respondent referred to a corruption scandal involving money from the GF

Some noted that multilateral institutions impede *accountability* to recipient countries rather than improving *accountability* relationships. One informant stated:

The problem with the Global Fund is accountability becomes much more complex – accountability to so many stakeholders means that the donors squeeze out the recipients. In theory the GF is very progressive. In reality the GF does not have a direct mechanism for intervening (R3).

The weakness of the Global Fund's *accountability* mechanisms was also stressed by another informant:

Global Fund's CCM's (Country Coordinating Mechanisms) cannot be construed as accountability mechanisms because there isn't a global accountability structure – there is no mechanism for intervening (R1)

Therefore, funding multilaterally does present challenges to DFID's *accountability* relationships as there are other contributors whose perspectives have to be accommodated and ultimately *accountability* has to rely on the effectiveness of the control mechanisms of the IGOs themselves.

Private sector consultants

DFID also provides aid for HIV/AIDS through a multi-sectoral support programme (MSP) contracted out to HLSP, a private health consultancy. An informant revealed that DFID uses this approach because it does not have the capacity to deliver this aid directly:

The MSP involves around 170 contracts with service providers, all of whom had to be managed. This is not something that DFID would be able to do - so HLSP is the managing agency for the MSP (R1)

Funding through an intermediary with such a high number of contracts surely contradicts the Three Ones Principles. It certainly has consequences for DFID's *accountability* relationships. Firstly, in using HLSP, DFID's domestic *accountability* relationships are compromised (as happens when using any intermediary). Secondly, the South African government's domestic *accountability* is weakened as it has to operate programmes in accordance with the terms and conditions laid out by the contractor. Finally, this form of providing aid inhibits a *mutual accountability* relationship between DFID and the South African government.

It is noteworthy that, considering the strategic and monetary value of the relationship between DFID and HLSP and the fact that many senior HLSP staff formerly worked for

DFID, information about HLSP was very sparse. Nowhere on its website does DFID mention its partnership with HLSP and it is only given one sentence in the Annual Review. While HLSP staff are quite open about their relationship with DFID, DFID staff are markedly reticent about the role of HLSP.

Civil society

DFID supports Soul City, an organisation which helps educate people about HIV/AIDS through entertainment. Provision of aid to civil society has earned DFID a great deal of acclaim, not surprisingly especially amongst civil society. DFID asserts that civil society has an important role to play in creating a demand for better leadership and holding governments accountable. It therefore encourages civil society to raise awareness, stimulate debate and disseminate information.

Support of civil society is recognised by the respondents as a key strategy by DFID. One such informant contended that “building up civil society is a valuable way of empowering people” (R3). Another maintained that reinforcing civil society is an “excellent way of facilitating development” (R1).

Respondents generally express approval that DFID try to work with civil society where possible. As one respondent notes:

Any donor needs to respect that people on the ground will very often have better ideas about how to spend the money. There are so many examples of seriously bad aid caused by foreign donors deciding what's best without understanding local practices. DFID try to consult with all civil society organisations (R2).

Funding civil society, although undertaken to improve aid and bolster domestic *accountability* in recipient countries, can have unintended consequences. Donors run the risk of distorting *accountability* relationships so that organisations become shaped by the aims of the donors (Eyben and Ferguson 2004). This is supported by evidence from one informant:

The problem is that recipients need to speak up. Recipients in South Africa don't feel able to tell donors what they want because the power dynamic is so intense. It is really difficult to get the recipients to stand up to donors (R3).

Furthermore, this approach to funding does not create or support a *mutual accountability* relationship between DFID and the South African government.

Consequences for policy

None of the above approaches to funding support *mutual accountability* relationships and, in some circumstances these approaches weaken both donor and recipient domestic *accountability* relationships. Furthermore, DFID's devolved approach to funding also has consequences for *accountability*, although one informant argued that this was countered by better aid:

Theoretically, yes, this does mean that there is less accountability but the benefits outweigh this – allow a better response. DFID doesn't have preordained actions. It is often the case that the things DFID does that are the most flexible are also the most valuable. If you follow a predetermined agenda you cannot meet the needs of the country (R3)

Accountability, particularly *mutual accountability* is considered to be a requirement for more effective aid. Although the rhetoric has been adopted by almost all major donors, the case of DFID shows that there are some real challenges to applying *mutual accountability* in practice. Not least because *mutual accountability* relationships can contradict the objectives of DFID. One informant noted:

Theoretically DFID is signed up to mutual accountability but there is a real tension between delivering UK objectives and doing what recipients want (R4)

Furthermore, the universal objectives set by donors are often in stark contrast to the principals of the *new architecture of aid*. For instance, one informant described how recipient countries can only own strategies so long as they fit with the MDGs:

DFID says it promotes ownership - that it wants to get behind national policies for HIV/AIDS but they are signed up to the MDGs and use them as the foundation of their work. The MDGs are ideals pushed by donor countries. How can one goal be suitable for all recipients? (R4)

Another informant highlighted the apparent contradiction between internationally agreed HIV/AIDS strategies:

There is a contradiction of ideals in DFID. The MDG's that DFID set their targets by are pushed by donor countries. How is this nationally led? In endorsing the Three Ones in 2005 donors had to respect that countries had control of their own strategies. But independently of DFID, ActionAid campaigned for universal access to treatment. This was supported by other international NGOs and was completely out of line with the Three Ones. Tony Blair and Gordon Brown then endorsed this focus on treatment within a set timeframe without any referral to the AIDS Policy Team at DFID. They did this solely as a result of pressure from activists. This undermines the ability of countries like South Africa to take control of their own HIV/AIDS programmes (R1)

In trying to meet their own requirements for domestic *accountability*, and at the same time provide aid outside of government, *mutual accountability* relationships are compromised. However, *mutual accountability* relationships are not possible in countries where the policies of the donors and the recipients are at odds with each other. This has significant implications for the implementation of the principles of the *new architecture of aid*.

Chapter 9 - Conclusions

It is evident that tensions exist between following the principles of the *new architecture of aid* and implementing policy on the ground, and that these have clear consequences for *accountability*.

The meaning of *accountability* is ambiguous. The word has been variously defined in terms of transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsibility, integrity, responsiveness, governance, corruption and fraud. While the principles of the *new architecture of aid* are widely apparent in the strategic thinking and policies of DFID, it is more difficult to find evidence of *new accountability* relationships on the ground. In South Africa, where there are explicit policy differences between the national government and DFID, it seems that while DFID *talks the talk* of mutual *accountability*, it encounters problems in *walking the walk*.

Although the particular circumstances of South Africa and HIV/AIDS policy demonstrate just how difficult *mutual accountability*—the hallmark of the *new architecture of aid*—is to realise, similar problems are likely to occur in other settings too. *New accountability* relationships are a great deal more complex than domestic *accountability* relationships because of the absence of formal international structures and processes which are necessary for implementing this new (mutual) *accountability*. There is no existing specification of how donors and recipients are to successfully apply *mutual accountability* nor do they address the possibility that *mutual accountability* demands conflict with domestic *accountability* demands.

As such, *mutual accountability* is currently an ideal. The absence of both a global public and global structure to support *accountability* mechanisms means it is impossible to implement *mutual accountability*. That leaves two possible outcomes for *mutual*

accountability in the future: I have two suggestions for what this might mean for mutual accountability:

1. The structures to support *mutual accountability* will develop in the future.
2. The concept of *mutual accountability* between donors and recipients is fatally flawed. This is because donors will always have more power than recipients. In the words of Humpty Dumpty:

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master – that's all."

(Carroll 1871:365)

University of Cape Town

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Appendices

Appendix A – Information Letter

26 March 2008

Dear.....,

I am an MPhil Candidate at the University of Cape Town in the Department of Sociology. I am working under the supervision of Professor Robert Mattes on the following study which is being conducted as part of my MPhil requirements.

This research project is exploring definitions and applications of *accountability* and the consequences for this on implemented policy. I am using DFID as a case study and am specifically looking at what they do in South Africa.

The purpose of this letter is to request your cooperation as a voluntary participant in this study.

What is the study about?

This project will use perspectives in the field of political science to inform an investigation of DFID and its *accountability* relationships.

The aim of this study is to provide a greater understanding of *accountability* relationships and the consequences for implemented HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa. This research project will explore whether the way an organisation understands *accountability* has consequence for the policies they pursue.

It is important to stress that this thesis does not in any way attempt to assess the quality of the donor. This is not an assessment of DFID. This piece of research is being undertaken to provide a deeper understanding of *accountability* and to explore the relationship between *accountability* and donor strategy.

How will this study be conducted?

My methodological approach involves a review of UK foreign policy for aid, including research of the key texts, followed by further exploration in their reference sections. I have also searched the internet extensively for relevant articles and reports and took advice from people in the field of HIV/AIDS, aid and Africa. I drew on the UK government's websites for much of the documentation.

Interviews are being conducted to further investigate definitions and applications of *accountability* as well as donor strategies, specifically within DFID. They are designed to provide a more detailed understanding of *accountability* and how it affects policy.

Who is being approached to participate in this study?

Approximately five participants are being sought based on their insight into donors (particularly DFID and HIV/AIDS strategies, both past and present). I am seeking people from across the policy-cycle who have expertise in this field.

What would you have to do as a participant?

Participants would have to take part in a one-on-one interview in person (by telephone if necessary) at a time that is convenient. The interview may be tape-recorded and later transcribed. The interview will focus on your thoughts about the relationship between *accountability* and DFID's strategies (particularly for HIV/AIDS).

You will be asked permission to be acknowledged in the study, but your name will not be specifically attached to particular ideas or quotes. Only my supervisor (Professor Robert Mattes) and I will have access to the primary data. Any part of the interview that you would like to remain confidential will be maintained as such.

You will be free to raise questions or concerns throughout the study and may withdraw at any time should you so choose.

Thank you for your consideration. Please contact me at isabelladowden@gmail.com or at +44 (0) 7980 869 656 for further discussion.

Yours sincerely

Isabella Dowden

Appendix B - Consent Form

I, _____, agree to take part in a qualitative study on the donor definitions and applications of *accountability* and the policies they pursue. This study is being conducted as part of Isabella Dowden's MPhil requirements through the University of Cape Town Political Science department.

I understand that, as a participant in the study, I will be interviewed by Isabella Dowden either in person or by telephone. I understand that the interview may be tape recorded and transcribed. I understand that participating in the study will involve answering questions about:

Foreign Aid
HIV/AIDS policies, programmes and strategies
DFID
Africa (particularly South Africa)
Accountability

I understand that the interview will take about 60 minutes and will occur at a time that is convenient for me.

I understand that I will not be identified in the study. Rather, relevant information will be provided to give context to ideas, such as identifying that a particular perspective was raised by someone who works in the HIV/AIDS field.

I understand that I am under no obligation to agree to participate in the interview. I understand that I can refuse to answer any questions I choose, and that I can stop the interview at any time or withdraw from the study. I understand that if there is any part of the interview I wish to remain confidential, my request will be honoured.

I understand that Isabella Dowden and her supervisor (Professor Robert Mattes) are the only people who will have access to the primary data from the interview. I understand that at the end of the study, the data, including audio tapes and transcripts will be destroyed. I understand that Isabella Dowden will be seeking to publish the results of this research.

I understand what this study involves and I agree to participate. I have been given a copy of this consent form for my own records.

Signature

Date

Appendix C – Interview Guide

Interview Guide

General

- 1) Do you have a relationship with DFID?
- 2) How would you describe this relationship?
- 3) How do you understand the term *accountability*?
- 4) How do you think DFID understands *accountability*?
Prompts - Reporting? Answerability? Enforceability?
- 5) Who do you think DFID sees itself as being accountable to? To parliament? Within DFID? To recipient countries?
- 6) DFID are encouraging recipient countries to be more accountable? How do you think they can do this?
- 7) DFID have signed up to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In this the term *mutual accountability* is used – how would you define *mutual accountability*?
- 8) How does *mutual accountability* work for recipient governments?
- 9) Do you think DFID's understanding of *accountability* differs from other donors? If so how?

HIV/AIDS – South Africa

- 10) How has your work related to the UK's international responses to the global pandemic?
- 11) How important do you think *accountability* is in determining DFID's (HIV/AIDS) strategies?
- 12) To what extent do you think *accountability* influences DFID's HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa/Southern Africa? In what ways?
- 13) In what ways does DFID practice *mutual accountability* in its HIV/AIDS strategies in South/Southern Africa?
- 14) What do you think about DFID's move from an in-country approach in South Africa to a regional approach for Southern Africa (especially in terms of HIV/AIDS and *accountability*)?
- 15) If the UK did not support *mutual accountability* do you think that they would follow different strategies?
- 16) Are there any HIV/AIDS strategies DFID doesn't pursue because of the way it understands *accountability*? What are they?
- 17) Is there anything else you think I should know?