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The Success and Failure of United Nations Multifunctional Peace Operations:

A Comparative Case Study of Conflict Transformation in Mozambique and Rwanda.

by

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Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Date

09.02.2005

Signature

Signed by candidate

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
Abstract

This study is about the ending of conflicts. It examines the United Nations (UN) capacities in Conflict Transformation activities through the deployment of multifunctional peace operations. It is a study of how the UN seeks to transform violent conflicts into the state of being non-violent conflicts. Thus, a study that examines the process of creating a self-sustaining peace (positive peace), and not only examining how to reduce the risk of resumption of violent conflict (negative peace). Herein, the study favours the concept *Conflict Transformation* as an extension of the term *Conflict Resolution*.

The multifunctional peace operations in Mozambique and Rwanda are chosen as case studies. The UN deploys the peace operations to implement the comprehensive negotiated settlements in these countries. The focal point is the means that the UN utilises, and not so much the consequences, to build a self-sustaining peace. The two case studies are analysed to generate knowledge of *when* the UN manages to build peace, and under *what* circumstances there are obstacles for conflict transformation. Hence, the study is about the effectiveness of UN multifunctional peace operations.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the UN's capacities the project is divided into four sections. First, build a theoretical framework through a discussion of the relevancy that different conflict theories (Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation) have for a theory of UN peace operations. Next, give an account for the evolution and typology of peace operations together with case examples. Third, seek an understanding of the different conflict specific situations in Mozambique and Rwanda. Finally, analyse the Conflict Transformation processes in the two countries by comparing the implementation of the sub-programmes of the mandates.

The study concludes that the UN capacity in Conflict Resolution activities is a dependent variable. In general, it demonstrates that peace is contingent on the conflict specific situation; support from the international community; sufficient resources; and the successful conclusion of each sub-programme. Finally, the study finds critical factors for success and failure in each sub-programme.



1.

Introduction

This project is concerned with the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN) multifunctional peace operations designed to assist in the ending of the Mozambican and Rwandan intra-state wars. The UN's Security Council authorised these peace operations to implement a range of tasks and thereby secure the transition from war to peace. Herein the UN seeks to get the warring parties to abide to their written commitments to peace. The UN seeks to address the root causes of conflicts and build the necessary political conditions for a sustainable and democratic peace. In all, secure the transition from war to peace.

Nonetheless, the end stories of the UN multifunctional peace operations contribute to a tangled image of UN's involvements in conflicts. Out of the eighteen UN multifunctional peace operations between 1988 and 2002, missions with an agenda for political-institution building, under one-third of the countries could be classified as electoral democracies.¹ Thus, what can the UN, in reality with all its constraints, do to prevent the recurrence of war? This life-or-death question for millions of people gives rise to the following research project having the effectiveness of UN multifunctional peace operations as the focal point.

¹ Here democracy refers "to the process whereby the rulers and procedures of citizenship are applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (coercive control), expanded to include persons not previously covered (ethnic minorities), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (state agencies)". (Melissa Labonte, "Dimensions of Postconflict Peace-building and Democratisation", *Global Governance* Vol. 9 No. 2 (April-June 2003): 261-72.) Countries considered with authoritarian regimes were Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo (Kinshasa), East Timor, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Tajikistan. Furthermore, as El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Namibia were electoral democracies, and only Croatia classified as a liberal Democracy. See Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation", and Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes", both in *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 13 No. 2 (April 2002): 21-50.

The project is to be seen within the study of peace operations that focus on the effectiveness of the peace operations as to the design and conduct. Central to this is which conditions contribute to effectiveness of multifunctional peace operations and under which conditions this concept fails. Mozambique and Rwanda are chosen as cases because a comparison between the two cases is well suited to contribute to an answer. First, the UN authorises a multifunctional peace operations to assist the peace process in both countries. Second, the outcomes of the UN interventions are entirely contrasting. Whilst the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) concludes effectively and has been seen as a success ten years down the line, the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) has been seen as a failure based on its catastrophic consequences.

The study is pursued through the framework of a comparative case study. In particular, the cases are chosen based on a most-similar system basis, which aims to explain the different outcomes of the UN interventions by comparing two similar cases. First, they are both exposed to an intra-state war in which the government fought an insurgency movement sponsored by an adjacent country. Second, the conflicts culminated in two comprehensive peace agreements with relative similarities. Moreover, the parties asked the UN to facilitate the implementation of the settlement.

Compared to quantitative studies, a two-case study has the opportunity to engage more deeply with each case rather than superficially handle many cases. Still, the study is not limited to one case only. An advantage of this is that a nuance understanding of Conflict Transformation and the UN comes into play by comparing two cases. However, the findings of this study cannot function as generalisations to other cases as the findings are highly contextualised. Any peace operation must be flexible and offer unique adopted means to suit the particular conflict.

The overall aim of this study is to identify how the UN executes Conflict Transformation customised to Mozambique and Rwanda. This will be analysed through the perspective of Conflict Transformation. Moreover, investigate through a literature study how the UN in these two cases attempts to end the conflicts, and develop a baseline conceptual framework to reflect upon the ability of the UN to transform conflicts.

These objectives lead to the research problem. Why did the two countries take such different paths after the deployment of the UN multifunctional peace operations? How does one

explain the relative success of the UN operation in Mozambique and its failure in Rwanda? Herein, the research problem is tasked to analyse under what circumstances does the UN accomplish its objectives of Conflict Transformation, i.e. what set of variables provide as necessary conditions for a successful multifunctional peace operation? More specific: *What are the critical success factors in Mozambique? What are the critical failure factors in Rwanda?*

The study aims to investigate and critically reflect upon the UN Conflict Transformation enterprise and the interventions in Mozambique and Rwanda. Their respective mandates and the following execution of them is the starting point for the evaluation to find the critical factors for effectiveness. In this case, as seen above, this will entail a study of the political dimension of the UN enterprise in particular. The study will not consider the economical and the social dimensions of the enterprise. Furthermore, the study will engage at the levels of the protagonists rather than emphasising the grass-roots level. Finally, the study analyses the means that the UN utilises in the ending of conflicts, and not so much the long-term consequences of the venture.

The study is structured in four different chapters. The below section gives an outline of each chapter, the main issues each will address, and the logical sequence of the chapters.

First, build an outline for a theoretical framework in which peace operations are understood. The objectives are to define the concepts pertinent to this study including the UN terminology. Moreover, discuss the relevancy that *Conflict Management*, *Conflict Resolution*, and *Conflict Transformation* as different conflict theories have for third party intervention and peace operations as such.

Second, give an account for the evolution, typology, and some empirical cases of UN peace operations. The purpose is to characterise the peace operations that differ in size and scope. The concept of the multifunctional peace operations is given a more thorough attention with a presentation of six specific operations. The critical factors determining the effectiveness are identified in each of these operations.

Third, compare the conflict specific situations in Mozambique and Rwanda in four different sections each answering one of the following questions: What are the causes of the conflicts? What are the natures of the conflicts? What leads to the peace agreements, and how are they negotiated? What leads to the UN involvement in the conflicts? The motive is to gain an understanding of the differences and similarities in the two conflicts.

Finally, assess the ONUMOZ operation and the UNAMIR operation to secure a self-sustaining peace in Mozambique and Rwanda. The chapter considers four sub-goals of the operations: *the political component, the military component, the police component, and the electoral component*. The aim is to identify the critical factors determining ONUMOZ's effectiveness, and UNAMIR's ineffectiveness.

2.

Theoretical Framework for Peace Operations: Conflict Approaches

This chapter seeks to marry the existing conflict theories to third party intervention and then build a theoretical framework for peace operations. The purpose of this is three-fold: (i) clear up the definitional wrangle that exists in the literature as to certain concepts; (ii) identify what the literature knows about the most effective ways to deal with conflict; and (iii) portray within which theoretical framework peace operations are understood, and the operations in Mozambique and Rwanda in particular.

The outline of this section is as follows: First, define important concepts. Second, discuss the relevancy of three different approaches for a theoretical foundation. Finally, present the theoretical framework.

2.1 Terminology: Key Terms

Before the discussion of the theoretical framework, it is necessary to define core concepts relevant in understanding peace operations. The section defines conflict, peace, and different strategies to approach conflicts, i.e. Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation.

2.1.1 Conflict and Violent Conflict

A conflict exists when there are perceived incompatible objectives between parties, and when these goals are pursued.² The situation arises out of demands on individuals to make unacceptable compromises. These are in some instances beyond human tolerance and

² Louis Kriesberg, "Social Conflict Theories and Conflict Resolution" *Peace and Change* Vol. 8 No. 2/3 (1982): 3.

capacity.³ The usage here applies to any political conflict whether the agents pursue it by peaceful or violent means. Political violence is one out of many symptoms of conflicts. Violent conflict indicates that one of the parties resort to the use of force to further its interests. More precise, a conflict causes the death of less than 1,000 people per annum due to organised and/or collective political violence (the death of more than 1,000 people is referred to as war).⁴ These definitions can be used to understand the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda.

On the other hand, conflicts have positive dimensions seeing them as a contributor to change and development beyond status quo. Hence, a conflict becomes negative when a society no longer can represent, manage, or resolve its interests in a productive manner as the conflicts can develop violent expressions.⁵ Thus, conflict is both inevitable and necessary, but at times destructive.

2.1.2 The Ends of Conflict: Negative Peace and Positive Peace

The research community has commonly conceptualised peace as the anti-thesis of war and political violence - 'the beating of swords into ploughshares'. It is a situation free from physical violence. This is in accordance with the classical views that understand peace as stability and order.⁶ However, Galtung's interpretation of peace has extended the understanding beyond this viewpoint. He differs between the concepts of *negative peace* and *positive peace*. In the former situation, there is absence of direct violence although structural and cultural hostility, repression (political) and exploitation (economical), still exist in the sense of an indirect violence. In *positive peace*, in contrast, justice is present and structural violence (repression and exploitation) is missing.⁷ Related to peace operations, the situation of

³ John Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 15.

⁴ Melvin Small and David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Berkeley Hills: Sage, 1982).

⁵ Adebayo Adedeji, "Comprehending African Conflicts", in *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: the Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*, ed. Adebayo Adedeji (London: Zed Books, 1999), 7.

⁶ Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Clausewitz all argue peace as order and stability. See Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 9.

⁷ Johan Galtung, "Violence and Peace", in *A Reader in Peace Studies*, eds. Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies, and Barbara Munske (Oxford, New York, Beijing, Frankfurt, São Paulo, Sydney, Tokyo, and Toronto:

negative peace is an instrument to reduce the risk of resumption to violent conflict. The aim is to prevent a relapse into overt violence. Positive peace, on the other hand, aims for the establishment of a self-sustaining peace, which prerequisites removal of the underlying causes of the conflict.⁸ This implies a two-fold exercise. First, secure conditions free from violence (the negative task). Second, consolidate a sustainable peace (the positive task).

2.1.3 Means to End Conflicts

As there are two different ends to peace, so are there different means to end conflicts. This study is found within the field of Conflict Resolution. It focuses on the means to settle disputes so that the needs and interests of the parties in a conflict are no longer frustrated.⁹ Here, the peace process is the overall project of ending conflicts in which *Conflict Management*, *Conflict Resolution*, and *Conflict Transformation* are different components at help. These are the concepts often used in the academia to study how conflicts end.

First, *Conflict Management*, or conflict regulation, represents one technique in dealing with conflicts and refers to the limitation, mitigation, and containment of violent conflict. It represents a form that positively regulates conflicts.¹⁰ Second, *Conflict Resolution* is a more comprehensive term that aims to address and resolve the deep-rooted causes of conflict. Third, *Conflict Transformation* aims to address the root causes, as with Conflict Resolution. Further, transform the negative structures, and importantly the social relationships and the situation that created conflict. Hence, Conflict Transformation denotes either a step beyond Conflict Resolution or a development of it.¹¹ In all, the staging from the first concept to the final follows a deepening of change in the causes of the conflict. The aim is to transform

Pergamon Press), 13. (Reprinted from "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969: 167-191).

⁸ Oliver Ramsbotham, "Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7 No. 1 (2000): 170-6; Miall et al., "Post-Settlement Peacebuilding", chapter seven of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* fifth edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 186-94.

⁹ Louis Kriesberg, "Conflict Resolution", in *Peace and World Security Studies*, ed. Michael T. Klare, sixth edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 176-7.

¹⁰ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, "Introduction", chapter one of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* fifth edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 21.

¹¹ Miall et al., "Introduction", 21.

violent conflicts into peaceful processes of economic, social, and political change, i.e. place conflict on a peaceful footing.

The above concepts are academic terms for how to conceptualise the ending of conflicts. However, it is useful to address the practitioners' concepts of the three strategies in Conflict Resolution, i.e. *peacekeeping*, *peacemaking*, and *peace-building*. They share respectively some commonalities with the concepts presented above, but are somehow different.

Whilst peacekeeping aims at reducing violence by having a military contingent in an interlocutory role, peacemaking refers to the making of peace through various mechanisms such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation so that conflicting protagonists with contradictory interests can be reconciled. Peace-building is the process addressing the practical implementation of peaceful social change through the means of socio-economic reconstruction and development.¹² These definitions share commonalities with the UN definitions of the same concepts that are presented below.

2. 2 United Nations Responds to Situations of Conflict: the Different Concepts

The United Nations Charter determines that among one of the main purposes for the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security.¹³ In his report *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), the Secretary-General at the time, Boutros-Ghali, identifies the following four different concepts as different actions to respond to conflicts: *preventive diplomacy*; *peacemaking*; *peacekeeping*; and *post-conflict peace-building*. The section below identifies how the UN defines these concepts. This will in turn help us to understand how the UN responds to conflicts. Furthermore, it clarifies and bridges the definitional wrangle at play in the literature regarding these concepts.

2.2.1 Preventive diplomacy

The report defines preventive diplomacy as the action to address tensions before they result in violent conflict or limit the spread when violent conflicts occur as by dealing with the underlying causes. There is a two-folded aim to stop violence and preserve peace. In so doing, the UN utilises different measures: build confidence between potential conflicting parties

¹² See Johan Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-building", in *Peace, War and Defence – Essays in Peace Research Vol. 2* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1975), 282-304.

¹³ United Nations, "Chapter I Purposes and Principles", in *The Charter of United Nations*, Article 1 [Available Online] <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (18.02.2004).

through personal contacts; deploy a fact-finding mission so that the preventive steps may be taken based on accurate knowledge; early warning system can identify whether a threat to peace exists; and preventive deployment of a UN mission could prevent a crisis to blossom.¹⁴ Such steps need to respect the sovereignty of the states and henceforth requires consent of the parties to intervene, and must be executed in accordance with the principle of neutrality.

2.2.2 Peacemaking

Peacemaking, the report suggests, seeks to bring antagonising parties together and lay the foundations for a dialogue so that an agreement can come into life. The aim is to appease conflicts whether it is to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts. In so doing, the UN has a comprehensive list of peaceful means that is in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter (see below in section 3.1.1). One such element that has shown effectiveness is mediation. Then parties in a conflict come together under UN auspices to settle the conflict through negotiations. However, as the report argues, the effectiveness of peacemaking measures depends on the political will of the parties to the conflict.¹⁵ In all, peacemaking implies that the UN will help create peace, remove obstacles to peace, and help facilitate agreements.¹⁶

2.2.3 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a deployment of a UN peace operation in the area of conflict that normally involves the following components: military, civilian, and police. As preventive deployment, the aim of peacekeeping is to halt violence and preserve peace. The concept implies the helping of implementing negotiated settlements.¹⁷ This has made the UN peacekeeping to take different roles in different conflicts, such as separating the protagonists and monitoring their conduct; implementation of comprehensive settlements; preventive deployment; and

¹⁴ Ibid.: paragraphs 23-32; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Beyond Peacekeeping", *New York Journal of International Law and Politics* Vol. 25 (1992-93): 119.

¹⁵ Ibid.: paragraphs 34-7.

¹⁶ United Nations, "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa". Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organisation, *General Assembly and Security Council Document A/52/871-S/1998/318*, 13 April 1998: paragraphs 18-20.

¹⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping", *Security Council Document S/24111*, 17 June 1992: paragraphs 46-50 [Available Online] <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>> [17. November 2003].

protecting humanitarian interests.¹⁸ Peacekeeping has been an effective enterprise that has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension.¹⁹

2.2.4 Post-Conflict Peace-Building

Post-conflict peace-building is the newest concept launched in *An Agenda for Peace*, which is “*action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict*”. The objective is to halt violence and preserve peace to better the security situation for ordinary people. The report suggests that both peacemaking and peacekeeping operations need to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures that will consolidate peace. Such actions may include disarming the parties, destruction of weapons, de-mining, repatriating refugees, advise security personnel, monitor elections, promoting human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting political participation.²⁰ Peace-building aims to work in cooperation with existing humanitarian or development activities.²¹ Post-conflict peace-building is the opposite of preventive action. Whilst the latter seeks to prevent crisis to happen, the former tries to avoid a crisis to reoccur.

2.2.5 Summing Up

The above section has given an account for the four different actions the UN identifies to respond to conflicts. The table below is summing up the main features of each concept whilst comparing them along the rationale of intervention, the aim, techniques, and the stage of intervention.

It is clear from the above presentation that these concepts merge into each other and cannot easily be separated. For example, it is difficult pinpoint peacekeeping evolves into the stage of peace-building as it is recognised that peace-building is no longer restricted to the post-

¹⁸ United Nations, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”: paragraphs 36-40.

¹⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping”: paragraphs 46-50.

²⁰ Ibid.: paragraphs 55-9; and Boutros-Ghali, “Beyond Peacekeeping”: 120-1.

²¹ United Nations, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”: paragraph 63.

conflict stage. Peace-building is later understood as actions also taken out before full blown violence has taken place.

Table 2.2.5: The main features of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building.

Approach	Preventive diplomacy	Peacemaking	Peacekeeping	Post-conflict peace-building
Rationale for intervention	Address tensions or limit the spread	Settle agreements	Keeping truce by holding parties apart	Strengthen and solidify peace
Aim	Halt violent conflict and preserve peace	Appease conflicts	Halt violent conflict and preserve peace	Create self-sustaining peace
Techniques	Confidence building; fact-finding; early warning system; and preventive deployment	Mediation; negotiation; arbitration; conciliation; judicial settlement; or other mechanisms to reach a peaceful settlement	Separating conflicting parties; implementation of comprehensive settlements; preventive deployment; and protecting humanitarian interests	Disarming; demobilisation; reforming the security sector; monitoring elections, promoting human rights; reforming or strengthening governmental institutions; and promoting political participation
Stage of intervention	Pre-violence	Escalation	De-escalation	Post-violence

The above presentation helps us to understand peace operations. At this stage, peace operations are UN deployed operations using preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, or post-settlement peace-building to maintain international peace and security. Peace operations refer to activities undertaken to preserve and restore peace before the outbreak of conflict, during conflict, and after a conflict has been negotiated an end. Moreover, peace operations combine the use of these different techniques.

It is important to mention here that this definition is hostage to older forms of peace operations that only executed peacekeeping. These operations would freeze the conflict with a peacekeeping force so that peacemaking could take place. Under this two-phase approach, peacekeeping and peacemaking occur before settlements and peace-building can take place after them.

2.3 Towards a Theoretical Framework: Discussion

With the above presentation, the discussion of the relevancy that the different conflict approaches have for third party intervention can commence. Conflict Management,

Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation are approaches at the heart of the discussion. In turn, this makes the backdrop for a theoretical framework for how conflicts best can end with the deployment of a peace operation. In so doing, the section appreciates attempts at theorising third party interventions that have been taken place since the 1990 onwards. Only then by conceptually addressing peace operation, as Weiss suggests, can an understanding of peace operations and attempts to improve the current enterprise of addressing conflicts realistically be expected.²² The rationale is thus to address the contested ideas of how to increase the effectiveness of peace operations.

The field of Conflict Resolution is a relatively new field with its start in the 1950s and 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, when the superpowers with their possession of nuclear weapons threatened human survival. Conflict Resolution as a defined specialised field came of age in the post-Cold War era. Within these years, however, the International Relations (IR) met the new arrival with scepticism as IR already had its own understanding of categories related to international conflict. Except from the threat of the nuclear weapons, Conflict Resolution evolved as a critique against Realism, which did not have, as claimed by Conflict Resolution, an effective way of dealing with conflicts. For the Realist, containment and control is the best to hope for as power is the main arbiter in international relations. Conflicts are inevitable and caused by an inherent aggressiveness or by the international system. To this, Conflict Resolution offers an alternative paradigm for dealing with conflicts, i.e. resolving them. Later, with the changing international climate after 1989, International Relations and Conflict Resolution approaches to conflicts started to merge as a richer cross-fertilisation of ideas began. Still, various voices criticise Conflict Resolution. Realists see the field as softheaded not focusing on power and coercion as the currency in international politics. Radical thinkers, such as neo-Marxists, argue that Conflict Resolution seek to reconcile different interests that should not be reconciled as there are forces of exploitation and oppression. A third critical voice claims Conflict Resolution as a Western enterprise that cannot be applied to other cultural settings.

2.3.1 Conflict Management: Conserving Status Quo

In pursuing peace operations, Conflict Management has been the traditional approach closely related to the concept of peacekeeping. Traditional diplomacy has operated within the

²² Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Options: Implementing an Agenda for Peace", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 16 No. 1 (1993): 59.

framework that defines a certain set of assumptions. Violent conflicts are herein seen as an inherent aspect of human existence caused by the competition of scarce resources. This makes resolution of conflicts unrealistic as they are in zero-sum situations. Hence, a compromise solution is unacceptable for the parties as much as a self-sustaining settlement is impossible. Therefore, the aims have been to reduce suffering and ameliorate the symptoms of the conflict by controlling the situation, and broker compromises through settlements. The approach ignores the aspects of positive peace and is satisfied by settling peace as absence of war. Settlements and cease-fires determine the success.²³ The role of a deployed peace operation in this model would be to execute the negative task, i.e. by coercive means, if necessary, to (re-) generate and ensure stability.²⁴

Diehl, Druckman, and Wall's study suggests that peace operations manage conflicts. Peace operations "reduce violence, increase stability, and enhance security" in the area of deployment.²⁵ All are elements that indicate that the conflicts are managed. It illustrates that Diehl et al. operates in a Conflict Management framework. However, Conflict Management can at best only hope for elimination, and at worst, hope for suppression of political violence. This is problematic as it becomes associated with status quo. In negotiation and mediation, the most powerful parties, as a function of the balance of political power, accrue the largest benefit.²⁶ As scholars suggest, peace operations are only a strategy to control agents so that violence can be reduced. It returns the belligerents to status quo ante without addressing the causes of violence.²⁷ Hence, Conflict Management only mitigates violent conflicts without seeking to transform the deep-rooted causes of the conflicts. Moreover, it is not an attempt to build new, stable, and sustainable structures, but to alleviate the symptoms of conflict. Hence, Conflict Management tends to seek settlements that consequently withhold the needed long-

²³ A.B. Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 1 No. 1 (1994): 8.

²⁴ Stephen Ryan, "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution", *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 2 No. 1 (1990): 56-60.

²⁵ Ryan, "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution": 51.

²⁶ Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice": 8.

²⁷ Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, 103, 112; "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding"; John W. Burton, *Violence Explained* (Manchester: Manchester University, 1997), 44, 75, 109, 150.

term sustainable solution of the conflict and rather cools the conflict to potentially boil over again at a later stage.²⁸

Consequently, the above discussion shows that Conflict Management offers little theoretical basis if the aim is to bring about positive peace

2.3.2 Conflict Resolution: “Re-solution” of Status Quo

The number of multifunctional peace operations deployed in the Post-Cold War era outdates the use of peace operations in a Conflict Management approach only. Recent operations have rejected the status quo ante, and the aim has been to construct a more just society less prone to violence. The positive task has been taken onboard exercised within the framework of Conflict Resolution. Hence, as Burton suggests, Conflict Resolution is more comprehensive and aims to address and resolve the deep-rooted causes of conflict. It marks a departure from the settlement approach.²⁹ Consequently, the conceptualisation shifts from peace operations as instruments for conflict control to approaches that contribute to more enduring resolutions of conflicts. Fetherston has made an interesting contribution in this manner. She suggests that the UN peace operations, as a third-party activity based on consent, is a form for Conflict Resolution, and hence could make the use of theoretical developments from that field.³⁰ Ball argues that the aim of Conflict Resolution is to stop the violence by reaching an agreement on key issues.³¹ The question is then how to reach an agreement.

Burton’s generic theory, the theory of basic human needs, is here relevant. He assumes that individuals have a set of basic human needs, such as identity, participation, and security. Social, political, or economical situations cause the deprivation, which in turn leads to conflict. Burton suggests furthermore that compromise is only feasible at the point when the

²⁸ See Raimo Vayrynen, *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolutions and Conflict Transformation* (London: Sage 1991).

²⁹ Burton.

³⁰ A.B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).

³¹ Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Re-building War Torn Societies”, in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester A Crocker, Fen O Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: U S Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 611.

basic human needs are pleased.³² Long-term frustration of these needs constitutes one precondition for and generates, in Azar's terminology, '*protracted social conflicts*' (PSC).³³

Moreover, at the outset of a conflict, individuals pursue an objective cause that along the process transforms to a subjective (mis-) perception. Alongside this follows a stereotyped reading of the "other" that worsens particularly at the violent stage. Consequently, the parties eschew from any constructive communication.³⁴ Hence, the peace operation needs to facilitate the necessary dialogue so that constructive interaction can proceed, i.e. in contrast to the coercive intervention by Conflict Management.³⁵ From this follows a re-perception of the issues involved in such a way that promote mutual understanding. This strategy, Fetherston asserts, aspires to generate a long-term solution of the conflict created and sustained by the parties themselves.³⁶ Moreover, the approach of Conflict Resolution holds that fundamental issues can be resolved as they portray non-zero sum situations. Win-win situations are obtainable.³⁷ The challenge is to convince the parties to perceive that they are in a positive-sum game.

The Conflict Resolution approach, as mentioned above, aims for the positive task. However, success becomes difficult to fulfil. Fetherston argues that the making of a positive just society

³² John Burton, "Human Needs Theory", chapter three of *Conflict: Resolution and Provention* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 36-41.

³³ Most current conflicts can be classified as PSCs. Hence, Azar identifies thereby the sources of conflicts to be predominantly within rather than between states. Azar suggests there to be additionally three sources of conflict. First, the 'communal content' as the identity group is at the core of the conflict problem with its relationship to the state. Second, 'governance and the state's role' can contribute to frustrate the identity group needs. Third, 'international linkages' refers to the political-economical relations of economic dependency within the international economic system. See Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990).

³⁴ Ronald J. Fisher and Loreleigh Keashley, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within Contingency if Third Party Intervention", *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 28 No. 1 (February 1991): 34.

³⁵ Ryan, "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution": 59.

³⁶ Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice": 8-10.

³⁷ Ryan, "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution": 56-60. This approach represents the problem-solving methodology to Conflict Resolution, which have been pursued by the 'scholars practitioners', e.g. Burton, Azar, Mitchell, de Reuck, and Banks. They see that there are chances of attaining self-sustaining settlements holding as a premise that the conflict is a shared problem that need a common solution.

is unlikely. She resettles the approach to favour a pro-active process towards the positive end.³⁸

The 'contingency model', as suggested by Fisher and Keashley, is an attempt of integrating peace operations to the theory of Conflict Resolution. The model executes a sequenced approach and favours the use of different techniques at different points in the conflict cycle. The model assumes that the effectiveness of intervention is dependent on the specific sequencing.³⁹ Within this perspective, peace operations are applied most often on the escalation or de-escalation stage.⁴⁰ Rather than being a Conflict Management approach, peace operations need to become a Conflict Resolution activity to achieve results beyond status quo.⁴¹

However, as do Conflict Management, so suffers the framework of Conflict Resolution problematical shortcomings. First, Conflict Resolution presents itself often as too formulaic, i.e. a specific solved outcome follows from a distinct recipe. The contingency model is one example. What is considered the right solution is rendered as discursive truth and represents a form of progressive linearity. Conflict Resolution assumes to know violent conflict to the extent that it has the power over it, and thus to solve the problem of it. Enlightenment, based on the knowledge of the cause and the solution, would rearrange the conflict.⁴² When the Conflict Resolution approach has been successful is has been applied on an ad-hoc basis favouring innovative and creative ideas than on a recipe or formula foundation.

Second, a problem with the Conflict Resolution framework is that it prescribes a solution within the same structures that made the conflict escalate into violence. As with Conflict

³⁸ Though success is difficult to foresee, Fetherston establishes a benchmark for positive peace that acts as a long-term ideal. This is based on some criteria for evaluation. First, the extent to which the parties to the conflict agree and accept the solution; second, the degree of the duration of a settlement; and third, the scale of change in the relationships between the agents before and after the settled dispute.³⁸ This implies that the end of Conflict Management is short-term and is only a preliminary requirement for success, whilst Conflict Resolution aims at establishing positive peace. See Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice": 9-10.

³⁹ Fisher et al., "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within Contingency if Third Party Intervention": 32-9; Ronald J. Fisher, "The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking", *Peace and Change* Vol. 18 No. 3 (July 1993): 253.

⁴⁰ The preventive deployment of a UN mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) is an exception of this rule.

⁴¹ Fetherston. "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice": 12-4.

⁴² A.B. Fetherston, "Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7 No. 1 (2000): 198-201.

Management, the framework of Conflict Resolution reinstates status quo. The latter aims beyond the controlling aspect of the former, but falls short and becomes another feature of the same system, as Fetherston suggests: “*which only seeks stability within the confines of that system, a system which already made the war possible*”.⁴³ These methodological approaches of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution are problematical, as Bendaña suggests, since they sustain the minimal levels of redistribution and representation.⁴⁴

Third, peace operations as a technique within Conflict Resolution tends to produce practices that coincide with past assumptions rather than practices that coincide with the needs of specific here and now situations. Past experiences develop present practice.⁴⁵

However, peace operations have neither fulfilled the aim of long-term solutions with a self-sustaining peace. The point to make is not to dismiss Conflict Resolution, but to reform the solution or open for transformation. Conflict Transformation offers an opportunity of rethinking third party interventions tied, again, to the idea of positive peace.⁴⁶ The ending of conflict is not the only goal as Conflict Transformation aims further to prevent the conflict of relapsing into violence.

2.3.3 Conflict Transformation: Transforming Status Quo

The peace operations deployed in the post-Cold War era have proved it difficult to separate peacekeeping from peace-building. The multifunctional peace operations have been an exercise in Conflict Transformation, or post-conflict peace-building, albeit under the title of peacekeeping. Herein, successful Conflict Transformation addresses the root causes in the same manner as the Conflict Resolution approach, but goes a step further by attempting to build a sustainable peace. Conflict Transformation tries to reverse the destructive processes that accompany violence. The concept of Conflict Transformation thus shifts away from the focus on warriors, with whom the two above techniques have been concerned, to the attitudes

⁴³ Ibid.: 196.

⁴⁴ Alejandro Bendaña, “Conflict Resolution: Empowerment and Disempowerment”, *Peace and Change* Vol. 21 No. 1 (1996): 69-70.

⁴⁵ Fetherston et al., “Overcoming Habitus in Conflict Management: UN Peacekeeping and War Zone Ethnography”: 102.

⁴⁶ Fetherston, “Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks”: 194-202.

and socio-economic circumstances of ordinary people.⁴⁷ The main objective of the process is structural change.⁴⁸ Several premises underlie Conflict Transformation. Peace requires social transformation, and peace encompasses many different issues, and Conflict Transformation is a process rather than a specific activity and must be seen as an outcome of this.

The relevancy of Conflict Transformation must be seen in the context of the peace-building literature. Here, Galtung's tradition is relevant. Burton follows this and identifies a two-folded model for peace-building. For Burton, Conflict Resolution offers short-term ends, as it is only a solution to the causes of the conflict. "Provention" offers rather a long-term perspective. It aims at addressing the root-causes of conflict in making those changes necessary for removing the structural difficulties, and promoting conditions that create cooperative relationships.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Ryan supplemented the discourse when he suggested the need for a change in the mutually negative conflict attitudes at grass roots level.⁵⁰

Lederach developed these ideas further and offers an 'integrated framework for peace-building' with the prime focus on the context of reconciliation. The approach defines peace-building as a process addressing the underlying structural, relational and cultural roots of conflict. It reflects the whole array of stages and approaches needed for the transformation of conflicts towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes.⁵¹ Hence, restoration and rebuilding of relationships are at the heart of his ideas. He aims for the 'sustainable transformation of societies' in a long-term perspective, and neither the management nor the re-solution. Transformation of these conflicts, PSCs, occurs along the process of changing relationships and creating social space to meet the end of peaceful relationships. Lederach

⁴⁷ Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, "From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-building in the New World Disorder", *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 20 No. 1 (1999): 15.

⁴⁸ Christopher Mitchell, "Beyond Resolution: What does Conflict Transformation actually Reform?", *Peace and Conflict Studies* Vol. 9 No. 1 (May 2002). [Available Online] <<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/CM83PCS.htm>> [14. March 2004].

⁴⁹ John Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 3.

⁵⁰ Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Aldershot and Hants: Dartmouth, 1995).

⁵¹ Jean Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 14.

suggests a bottom-up peace-building approach, but stresses at the same time the middle range leadership to be the key to sustain the process.⁵²

Thus, by linking the concept of Conflict Transformation to interventions the UN has a more realistic opportunity to accomplish positive peace. Compared to management and resolution, Conflict Transformation addresses a change in the context of the conflict that accompanies destructive violence. The aim is to transform the conflict into a non-violent mode. It allows a war or a violent conflict to end without the resolution of all the underlying sources. The central idea is that these unresolved dimensions are now operating in a new context, this within a new set of rules not allowing for political violence.

However, the ideas of Conflict Transformation are neither unproblematic as the two above approaches. The danger comes to play when the projects lack self-criticism.

2.3.4 Summing Up: Towards an End beyond Status Quo

Peace operations favouring a Conflict Management approach would most likely succeed to keep the peace between belligerents. However, the direct violence is often a symptom of the deeper conflicts, and management only would pacify the violence without solving the problem of structural violence. The Conflict Resolution approach contributes to solve the deeper underlying causes of conflict. Some of the multidimensional peace operations presented below illustrate this move away from applying management only. Peace operations have evolved to be a joint military and civilian project. Peace operations, as Last argues, apply defensive tactics that follow military doctrines, to control and prevent violence. The operations pursue offensive strategies to attack the sources of conflict to de-escalate tensions, and restore trust and confidence between communities when implementing peace agreements.⁵³ Hence, as Whitaker suggests, peace operations are a midwife at the birth of new strategy.⁵⁴ The UN has been involved in Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution. However, without transforming the socio-economic situation the end portraying social justice and sustainable positive peace cannot be accomplished.

⁵² Ibid., 27-52.

⁵³ David M Last, "Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques", *Armed Forces and Society* Vol. 22 No. 2 (Winter 1995): 202. 187-211.

⁵⁴ David Whitaker, *The United Nations in Action* (London: University College London Press, 1995), 204.

Furthermore, if there are problems of applying Conflict Management alone, it is problematic to apply Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation without effective management of violence. Continued violence feeds destructive processes that in turn undermine the process of transformation. Conflict management can address the direct violence, and thus create a room in which Conflict Resolution followed by Conflict Transformation can take place. Whilst the resolution techniques settle an agreement, the latter process seeks to reform the whole peace process into the stage of positive peace. Thus, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation share commonalities that, in turn set them aside from the Conflict Management approach. Table 2.3.5 below summarises the approaches' main characteristics.

Table 2.3.4: The main features of Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation.

Approach	Conflict Management	Conflict Resolution	Conflict Transformation
Aim	Reduce violence and contain the conflict	Resolve the conflict	Place the conflict on peaceful footing
Nature of the conflict	Zero-sum game	Positive-sum game	Positive-sum game
Role of the third party	Coercive and control the situation	Non-coercive; facilitate a process of problem solving	Non/coercive; facilitate a change in the destructive structures
Focus	Violence; interposition	Issues and interests	Structural context; changes in relationship
Level of intervention	Field	Official efforts and elites	All levels, including grass roots.
Relation to status quo	Conserving status quo	Re-solving status quo	Transforming status quo
Outcome	Limit violence; negative peace	Short term: prevent relapse into violence	Long-term: Self-sustaining peace; positive peace

In all, whilst Conflict Management is a necessary precondition for Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, the two latter approaches are required to meet the end of positive peace that management of violence cannot. Moreover, a successful accomplishment of peacemaking and peace-building, as the UN defines them, requires peacekeeping – and vice versa. The assumption suggests that the intervention strategy of peace operations would use the favourable components of each approach as they complement each other.

2.4 Conclusion

The rationale of this chapter grew out of the lack of a theoretical underpinning with respect to UN peace operations. In the presentation, important concepts in relation to peace operations have been identified and defined to bridge the definitional wrangle. Then, the chapter set out

to undertake the comprehensive task to build a theoretical framework for third-party intervention and peace operations as such. A discussion of the relevancies that three conflict theories have for a theoretical foundation for peace operations followed. With the premise of establishing positive peace, the exercise found that Conflict Transformation enjoys the best starting point. The approach includes actions to build systems to contain conflicts, and transform the structures that nurture conflict. It offers the best prospective to help societies to reach the state of non-violence. However, the discussion showed further that applying Conflict Transformation alone would work against its purpose. An accumulated approach that considers Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation is healthier. The aim is to take the advantage of the strengths in the three approaches to exercise the positive task in the process of ending conflicts, i.e. aim to reduce the risk of resumption of violent conflict and the establishment of a self-sustaining peace – place conflict on a peaceful footing. In all, this makes up the context in which peace operations are understood in this study, and especially the UN interventions in Mozambique and Rwanda.

3.

United Nations' Peace Operations: Evolution, Typology, and Cases

The aim of this section is to give an account for the evolution of the UN peace operations, from those of classical peace operations to those of multifunctional peace operations. Moreover, give an account for these various different categories of peace operations. An empirical example illustrates each peace operation concept. The concept of multidimensional peace operation is given most thoroughly attention. Finally, six different multifunctional peace operations are examined.

The purpose of this is to demonstrate that peace operations range in both size and scope, but that some share commonalities more than others do. Further, describe the crucial differences between multifunctional peace operations on the one hand, and other categories of peace operations on the other hand. Finally, identify the critical factors determining either success or failure for a set of multifunctional peace operations. In all, prepare for an understanding of the discussion of UN missions in Mozambique and Rwanda.

3.1 The Problem of the Charter

To understand how the UN peace operations have evolved it is necessary to examine Chapter VI ('Pacific Settlement of Disputes') and VII ('Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression') of the UN Charter.

3.1.1 Chapter VI

Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for non-coercive means to accomplish the end of peace and security. Article 34 gives the Security Council authority to investigate any situation

of “*international friction*”, and article 36 designates it to recommend “*appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment*” such as mediation or arbitration acts.⁵⁵ The use of these measures would violate the sovereignty of the state intervened. Therefore, if the UN shall intervene legally consent from one of the parties is needed.⁵⁶ Chapter VI has proven to be an important instrument for the Security Council⁵⁷, and has made it the most compatible organ for the maintenance of peace and security.

3.1.2 Chapter VII

In contrast, Chapter VII of the UN Charter prescribes coercive means. It places national military resources at the disposal for the Security Council once it has fulfilled its task to identify any act of aggression or threat to international peace.⁵⁸ The Chapter makes the Council responsible for determining when a situation requires collective security action.⁵⁹ The blueprint suggests that a Military Staff Committee composed of representatives from the P5 would coordinate UN operations. However, this chapter has proven problematic given the reliance on consensus and cooperation in international relations. The tension throughout the Cold War caused by the global bipolarity was a major indicator of an international system that worked opposite. Given the ideological lenses of the two sides, the objective identification of an aggressor in any crisis was not possible, nor would military staff representing the P5 act as a unified command.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ United Nations, “Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, in *The Charter of the United Nations*, Article 34 and 36.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*; “Chapter I Purposes and Principles”, Article 2.

⁵⁷ The Security Council is the core organ to address the maintenance of international peace and security acting on behalf of the UN members. Fifteen member states compose the Council of which five is permanent (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the US, P5), and the rest changes every [...] between the remaining ten members. The Security Council’s decision needs nine votes on procedural matters, whilst resolutions on other matters need fourteen votes (countries to a dispute cannot vote). See United Nations, “Chapter V ‘The Security Council’”, of the Charter of the United Nations.

⁵⁸ The underlying aim of this ambiguous international security project was a reaction to the failure of its predecessor, the League of Nations, to preserve peace. The League failed to hinder the Italian fascist regime in occupying Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and subsequently fell short to uphold its force in international relations. (Norrie Macqueen, “The History, Politics and Law of United Nations Engagement with Africa”, in *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (Edinburgh: Parson Education Limited, 2002), 3-4.)

⁵⁹ United Nations, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”, in *The Charter of the United Nations*, Article 39.

⁶⁰ Macqueen, “The History, Politics and Law of United Nations Engagement with Africa”, 5.

3.1.3 “Chapter-Six-and-a-Half”

This context gave rise to peace operations as the third set of measure that the UN could use to fulfil its aim of preserving a security role in the Cold War. Despite the fact that the Charter does not explicitly provide for peace operations, later references to peace operations have been known as grounded in “Chapter-Six-and-a-Half”. They are poised between the non-coercive means of Chapter VI and the enforcement actions dealt with in Chapter VII.⁶¹ Hence, there are some arguments that the Security Council has an implied ability to create a peace operation. The Security Council authorises the peace operations in furtherance of peaceful settlement under Article 36, or pursuant to the acceptance of provisional matters called from under Article 40.⁶² Peace operations constitute something more than the recommendations provided for in Chapter VI with its military presence, and peace operations are not pure military enforcement as envisaged under Chapter VII.⁶³ Moreover, the Security Council has been deploying operations closer to Chapter VII in order to enforce provisional measures.⁶⁴ However, the “Uniting for Peace Resolution”⁶⁵ provides the General Assembly on a legal basis to authorise a peace operation. The Assembly utilised this to mandate the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I).

In addition, the Charter provides the Secretary-General with relatively diminutive authority, though the various holders of the post have developed an impressive set of powers to be used in peaceful settlement of disputes and other situations. The office holders perform the

⁶¹ Carolyn M Stephenson, “New Approaches to International Peacemaking in the Post-Cold War Period” in *Peace and World Security Studies*, ed. Michael T Klare, sixth edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 21-2. 14-27; N. D. White, “The Legal Parameters of Peacekeeping: Constitutional Issues”, in *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 227-8.

⁶² United Nations, “Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Article 36; “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”, Article 40.

⁶³ The United Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) illustrates a peace operation that combines non-coercive and coercive elements. The Security Council mandated the mission with both a civilian component along the line of “*appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment*” and a smaller military element to keep the peace between the Kingdom of Morocco and Frente Polisario. See William J. Durch, “Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in Western Sahara”, *International Security* Vol. 17 No. 4 (Spring 1993): 150-71.

⁶⁴ Nigel D. White, “The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues”, *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 3 No. 4 (Winter 1996): 51-2. Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda are all examples of where the UN has taken action close to Chapter VII in enforcing provisional measures, but still not enforcement as envisaged under the full-blown sense of Article 42.

⁶⁵ United Nations, “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, General Assembly Resolution 377/V (3. November 1950).

executive task of the assignments defined by the various UN organs.⁶⁶ The only autonomous power implies that the Secretary-General would bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that the General reads as threatening international peace and security.⁶⁷ Later the office holder's assignments have developed to be the executive commander of some peace operation forces within the framework of the Security Council's mandate.⁶⁸

3.1.4 Summing Up

The UN can use three sets of measures to maintain international peace and security. Two of these, Chapter VI and Chapter VII, have explicit provisions in the UN Charter. The third, Peace operations as seen by "Chapter-Six-and-a-Half" is in some way anchored in the Charter, despite the lack of a stated provision. The UN peace operations are between the peaceful recommendations and military enforcement. The section below renders how the peace operations have changed over time.

3.2 The Peace Operations Evolve: A Brief History

The peace operations have evolved through different phases. These phases have alternated between periods of rapid growth and periods of inactivity. In a review of the literature on the case-by-case assessment of the history of peace operations, seven different phases come to eye⁶⁹: the Nascent Period, 1946-56; the Assertive Period, 1956-67; the Dormant Period, 1967-73; the Resurgent Period, 1973-78; the Maintenance Period, 1978-85; the Expansion Period, 1988-93; and the Contraction Period, 1993 onwards. They are not dealt with extensively here, and only a short account for the developments is given.

⁶⁶ United Nations "Chapter XV The Secretariat", in *The Charter of the United Nations*, Article 98. These tasks may range from sending a fact-finding mission, to offering his good offices, to the organising and emplacement of peacekeeping force.

⁶⁷ United Nations "Chapter XV The Secretariat", Article 99. A classic example on the use of this power was when the then Secretary-General Hammerskjöld brought the situation of the Congo to the attention of the Security Council in 1960.

⁶⁸ This applies to the traditional peacekeeping forces (see below for definition) and the missions to Namibia and Cambodia. On the other hand, a state or a group of state commanded the operations in Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti both politically and military under a Security Council mandate. (White, "The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues": 55-6.)

⁶⁹ H. Wiseman, "The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis", in *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (UNITAR, 1987), 264-99; Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 16; Dennis C. Jett, "A Brief History of Peacekeeping", chapter two of *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 31-4.

A significant increase in peace operations occurs in the Assertive and the Dormant period, mainly in response to the conflict in the Middle East. Tensions between the superpowers end these periods and are followed by eras in which the Security Council confines peace operations to the continuation of ongoing missions.⁷⁰ From the deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in 1948 and onwards to the end of the 1980s, the Security Council mandates thirteen peace operations with the aim to support peacemaking efforts.⁷¹

The change in international relations since the end of 1980s with the conclusion of the ideological confrontation paved the way for negotiated settlements to end proxy Cold War conflicts and intra-state wars in developing countries. Moreover, it made it possible for the Security Council to deploy an increased number of peace operations. The UN peace operations commence to help ending of intra-state wars in contrast to the previous peace operations. These new circumstances require new forms of action and include far more variables. These operations are known as *multifunctional peace operations*.⁷² However, many of these operations fail due to over ambiguity, and the current period commences. There has been little new activity and a decline in number, size, and scope of existing missions. These operations have been given Chapter VII engagement and thus contribute to the blurring of a clear conceptual distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁷³

3.3 Typology: Different Peace Operation Concepts

Peace operations have so far been presented as one category. However, the many peace operations that the Security Council has mandated vary significantly. Boutros-Ghali suggests “*peacekeeping has to be invented every day*”, and “*there are as many types of peacekeeping as there are types of conflict*”.⁷⁴ The following section introduces a categorisation based on

⁷⁰ Jett, 23-30.

⁷¹ Murrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping”, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Vol. 69 No. 3 (July 1993): 457; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, “Second Generation Multinational Operations”, *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 15 No. 3 (1992): 114-5.

⁷² William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s”, in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 3-4, 23; Mackinlay et al., “Second Generation Multinational Operations”: 116-7.

⁷³ Jett, 31-4.

⁷⁴ United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation”, UN GAOR, 48th Session, Supp. No. 1, A/48/1 (1993): 59.

different peace operation concepts, i.e. *the classical peace operation, the preventive deployed peace operation, the humanitarian peace operation, and the multifunctional peace operation*. The aim is to identify the crucial differences and gain a more comprehensive understanding of UN peace operations and multifunctional peace operations in particular.

3.3.1 The Classical Peace Operation

The concept of the classical peace operation refers to those peace operations deployed with the purpose to end violent inter-state disputes by supporting peacemaking efforts. Hence, deploy operations after the belligerent parties have agreed to a cease-fire that might not be self-sustaining.⁷⁵ The traditional tasks have been interposing between belligerents, monitoring cease-fires, and observing frontier lines.⁷⁶ Thus, the classical peace operation has been exercising Conflict Management. The operation has in general been based on three key principles: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the classical peace operation has, except from the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC), been employed to deal with inter-state wars.

UNTSO is regarded as the first UN peace operation. The Security Council mandated the operation in 1948 to supervise the truce that came out of the first Arab-Israeli war. It was an unarmed military deployment encompassing the classical grouping.⁷⁸ The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, 2000-) is another example of classical peace operation although it was deployed as late as in 2000. The objective of the deployment was to present an interposition between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two sovereign state members of the UN, supervise their troop withdrawals on the Horn of Africa and the redeployment of national forces, as well as determine the borderline between the countries. The Security Council

⁷⁵ Stephen Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7 No. 1 (2000): 34; Norman Bowen, "The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping", *International Journal on World Peace* Vol. 14 No. 2 (June 1997): 4.

⁷⁶ Mark Malan, "A Concise Conceptual History of UN Peace Operations", *African Security Review* Vol. 6 No. 1 (1997): 18.

⁷⁷ Maurice Mamika, "The Rules of the Game: the Three Guiding Legal Principles of Peacekeeping", *Peacekeeping and International Relations* Vol. 25 No. 1 (January/February 1996). Peace operations differ from conventional combat operations in a number of ways. For a comparison see Sandra Cummer, "The Challenges Faced by the Military to Peacekeeping Missions", *Peacekeeping and International Relations* Vol. 27 No. 1 (January/February 1998): 13-17.

⁷⁸ United Nations, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 17-20.

mandated a total force of 4,200 military personnel (later extended to 5,600) that would position itself in the Temporary Security Zone setting up a buffer between the two countries.⁷⁹ UNMEE shared therefore some similar characteristics with United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF, November 1956-June 1967), widely regarded as the classical model of UN peace operation following the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.⁸⁰ The UNMEE has managed to successfully keep the peace, through the approach of Conflict Management, between the two countries. The belligerents have shown willingness to cooperate, though some difficulties remained regarding the borderline.⁸¹

3.3.2 The Preventive Deployed Peace Operation

The purpose of preventive deployment of UN troops is to hinder that a conflict escalates into violence by increasing the political price that would have to be paid by the potential aggressor.⁸² Moreover, prevent the threatening spill over effect from an adjacent state. Another function is early warning. This happens on the request of one of the parties and is deployed on its territory only. The peace operation then takes the interposition role by controlling the buffer zones.⁸³ Hence, the Security Council deploys the peace operation before the armed conflict has broken out.

The UN first, and up till now only, preventive deployment has been the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). UNPREDEP is an extension of, until February

⁷⁹ United Nations, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea", *Security Council Document S/2000/785*, 9 August 2000.

⁸⁰ For details on UNEF see United Nations, "United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 35-55. In 1958 Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General at the time, drew from the military and political experience of UNEF I and produced the 'Summary Study', which proposed a number of operational benchmarks: Freedom of movement for the missioners within the operational zone; the UN shall not compete with the authority of the hosting state; the mission must not interfere with the domestic politics; military contingents could only be requested on a voluntarily basis; and, the principle of 'middle power peace operation'. See United Nations, A/3943, 9 October 1958.

⁸¹ Norrie Macqueen, "Reconstructing and Defining the Post-Col War State: The Horn of Africa", in *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (Edinburg: Parson Education Limited, 2002), 229-31; United Nations, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea", *Security Council Document S/2003/1186*, 19 December 2003: paragraphs 33-7.

⁸² Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles": 34.

⁸³ Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping": 456-7; Mackinlay et al., "Second Generation Multinational Operations": 117; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and A.B. Fetherston "UNPROFOR", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7 No. 1 (2000).

1996 when it became an independent mission, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that had been deployed in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Macedonia in February 1992.⁸⁴ The aim of UNPREDEP was to stop the spreading of the succession wars on the Balkans into Macedonia. A military component monitored the border with both Albania and the Republic of Yugoslavia, which co-functioned together with civilian elements to reconcile political and ethnical groups.⁸⁵ In all, the 1,000 military troops together with the 50 military observers, 26 police monitors, and the 168 personnel managed to accomplish UNPREDEP's objective of preventing the violent conflicts on the Balkans to spread into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and furthermore contributed to peace and stability in the Southern Balkans.⁸⁶

3.3.3 The Humanitarian Peace Operation

The humanitarian peace operation is characterised by executing humanitarian relief supply with a war-fighting dimension. This operation takes pre-emptive military action if they feel threatened. The purpose is to ensure that humanitarian deliveries can resume.⁸⁷ These operations are hence provided for more in Chapter VII of the Charter than Chapter VI, and thus contribute to the blurring of the distinction between peace operations and coercive action.⁸⁸ These operations have been deployed at the stage when violence escalates.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the Security Council mandates such interventions when the UN no longer finds the cooperation needed in order for the organisation to succeed.⁹⁰ Hence, the humanitarian

⁸⁴ The objective of UNPROFOR was to create those necessary conditions of peace and security so that a solution to the Yugoslav crisis could be negotiated. For details see United Nations, "United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), February 1992-March 1995", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 513-41.

⁸⁵ Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles": 35.

⁸⁶ United Nations, "United Nations Operations in the Former Yugoslavia after March 1995", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 564-6.

⁸⁷ Harry Summers, "Peace Operations", chapter eight of *The New World Strategy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 165-7; Mackinlay et al., "Second Generation Multinational Operations": 117.

⁸⁸ Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping", in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 302.

⁸⁹ Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles": 34; Bowen, "The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping": 4-7.

⁹⁰ Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping": 458.

peace operation does not respect the non-intervention norm in the same manner, as does the classical peace operation. Moreover, the concept executes a limited version of Conflict Management.

The intervention in Somalia in December 1992 represents a humanitarian peace operation deployed with forceful means. The Security Council legitimised the Operation Restoring Hope⁹¹ with the objective of creating a secure environment and ensuring humanitarian deliveries to the Somali people as the warlords had hindered both local and international organisations from distributing food supplies to the starving population.⁹² There was a clear division of labour between the US and the UN. The former was to undertake the military role and create the needed secure environment for the latter to continue its work.⁹³ The US would only open supply routes by using its military means provided for in Chapter VII.⁹⁴ Hence, the 28,000 American troops together with 17,000 international troops would not consider themselves with rebuilding the collapsed Somali state.⁹⁵ Altogether, with its end in May 1993, the Operation Restoring Hope had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁹⁶ Although violence continued, it is said that the intervention saved about 90,000 people.⁹⁷

⁹¹ The UN refers to this operation as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).

⁹² Summers, "Peace Operations", 164.

⁹³ United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II (UNOSOM I and II), in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 295.

⁹⁴ Elgin Clemons, "No Peace to Keep: Six and Three Quarters Peacekeepers", *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* Vol. 26 No. 1 (Fall 1993): 135-9.

⁹⁵ William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-building' in Somalia", in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 320-1.

⁹⁶ United Nations, "United Nations in Somalia I and II", 296.

⁹⁷ When Operation Restoring Hope did not succeed in creating a secure environment, the Secretary-General therefore recommended to the Security Council to set up a new UN mission (United Nations Operation in Somalia II, UNOSOM II), under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the mandate and armament necessary to enforce secure conditions for humanitarian operations. However, neither UNOSOM II managed to create a secure environment and suffered casualties that later had an impact on the willingness for countries to do peace operations on the African continent. See Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-building' in Somalia".

3.3.4 The Multifunctional Peace Operation

The multifunctional peace operations refer to those operations where the aim has been to implement a negotiated settlement.⁹⁸ In general, the peace processes started with a cease-fire determined by comprehensive peace agreements. UN troops are deployed in the affected areas with the consent of the involved parties after the negotiation of the settlement has taken place.⁹⁹ More specific, the objective is to help the belligerent parties to transform the violent conflict into state of being non-violent towards political reconciliation, democratic consolidation, and reconstruction.¹⁰⁰ Compared to the other categories of peace operations, multifunctional peace operations represent a changing role for the UN in the move toward a prominent role for the organisation as an agent for democratic transitions, i.e. the UN seeks to address the root causes of conflicts and build the necessary political conditions for a sustainable and democratic peace. Hence, the UN has involved itself in processes of Conflict Transformation.

In order to accomplish the objective, the various multifunctional peace operations have utilised a wide range of functions. These new peace operations monitor cease-fires. In addition, the multifunctional peace operations have been executing functions that employed both civilian and political elements.¹⁰¹ The list of tasks is long: cantonment and demobilisation of troops; the destruction of and the formation and training of new armed forces; monitoring existing police forces and forming new ones; supervising (or controlling) administrations; verifying respect for human rights; observing, and/or conducting elections; undertaking information campaigns to explain the settlement, the opportunities it represents and the role of the UN.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Mark Malan, "Peacekeeping in the New Millennium: Towards 'Fourth Generation' Peace Operations", *African Security Review* Vol. 7 No. 3 (1998). [Available online] <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No3/Malan.html> (23.04.2004).

⁹⁹ Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles": 39.

¹⁰⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, United Nations (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 5.

¹⁰¹ Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s", 3-4.

¹⁰² Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping": 457.

The multifunctional peace operations vary both in breadth and in depth.¹⁰³ The differences follow naturally from the fact that these peace operations have been mandated to implement peace agreements, which in turn have been influenced by the parties of the conflicts, if not most extensively. Hence, the negotiated settlements set the agenda for the mandate that the Security Council authorises. The breadth of peace operations refers to the many different functions that UN has executed, and in what spheres the operation is involved to resolve the conflict. The depth refers to the degree of involvement and addresses the extent to which the UN is engaged.¹⁰⁴ The presentation below reduces the number of functions to a set of components - the military, the civilian, the police, and the humanitarian component:

1. The military functions:
 - Monitor cease-fire.
 - Cantonment, disarmament, and demobilisation of troops.
 - Monitor withdrawal of foreign troops.
 - Creation of new national armed forces.
2. The civilian functions:
 - Charing political commissions.
 - Supervising or controlling governmental administration.
 - Observing, supervising, or conducting elections.
3. The police functions:
 - Monitor performance of the local police.
 - Reorganisation of a new police force.
4. The humanitarian functions:
 - Alleviate of human distress.
 - Verify respect for human rights.
 - Clearance of mines.

The depth needs more explanation, as it opens for different concepts with slightly different content. Traditionally the UN has had four different levels of responsibility. First, the UN *monitors* when the mandate speaks of an observing role without authority to influence directly the agents involved. Second, *supervision* refers to the mandate where the UN can request, but not order, the agents to change their behaviour. Third, *control* implies that the UN has direct line of control over the agents. Finally, *conduct* means authority to perform certain tasks

¹⁰³ Steven R. Ratner, "Setting the Scene: The Conceptual Underpinnings of the new Peacekeeping", chapter two in *The UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 41.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 41-3.

directly. Each concept accumulates the authority of the previous concept, and define *conduct* as the most authoritative concept.¹⁰⁵

3.3.5 Summing Up

The section above distinguishes between the UN peace operations. The operations vary both with respect to objectives and functions. They also vary in the use of Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation. It is only the concept of the multifunctional peace operation that bring on board Conflict Transformation. The concept of the multifunctional peace operation proves to be the most comprehensive. The table below summarises and compares the different concepts.

Table 3.3.5: The main features of the different peace operations.

Type	Classical	Preventive deployed	Humanitarian	Multifunctional
Objective	Keep peace and open for peacemaking	Prevent conflict escalation	Humanitarian relief supply	Strengthen and solidify peace
Function	Military	Military	Military; humanitarian	Military; civilian; police; humanitarian
Means to end conflict	Conflict management	Conflict management	Conflict management	Combines the use of all the three approaches
Stage of intervention	De-escalation	Pre-violence	Escalation	Post-violence
UN term	Peacekeeping	Preventive deployment; peacekeeping	Peacekeeping/enforcement	Peacekeeping; post-conflict peace-building
Outcome	Negative peace	Negative peace	Negative peace	Positive peace

3.4 Different Multifunctional Peace Operations

The effectiveness of UN multifunctional peace operations vary. This section seeks to address the UN's tangle image in the Conflict Transformation enterprise. The aim is to gain an understanding of the pattern of success and failure. The section below focuses on some of the main multifunctional operations that the Security Council deploys in the beginning of the 1990s. The different cases of Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Namibia, Mozambique, and

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Rwanda are chosen. Here, the UN sought to transform the violent conflicts into being non-violent. They are chosen on the basis that they were exposed to multifunctional peace operations in an attempt to finalise the violent conflicts. Moreover, while some represent successes, other signifies failures. This helps us on the way to find the crucial critical factors for success or failure in the six multifunctional peace operations.

The section follows a distinct pattern by presenting the different functions as provided for in their mandates. Then they are analysed whether their success or failure can be explained from the different actions of peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace-building. However, the conflict specific situation is likewise appreciated.

3.4.1 Namibia

United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG, April 1989-March 1990) in Namibia was the first multifunctional peace operation the UN deployed, and constituted an evolutionary step beyond the classical UN peace operations. UNTAG was to implement the Settlement Proposal of 1978 between South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) and the South African Government ending the quarter century long fight. The prime objective was to ensure that free and fair elections could be held leading to an independent Namibia.

UNTAG had three different components. First, the military unit with a personnel consisting of 4,500, monitored the cease-fire, cantonment of troops, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, the 2,000 civilians were mandated to accomplish the transition to independence by creating the political structures for fairness in the elections. Third, the 1,500 police sought to monitor the performance of the police.¹⁰⁶

In all, the UNTAG withdrew in March 1990, and is regarded a success story with the free and fair elections in 1989 and the withdrawal of South African Defence Forces (SADF) as the dominant indicators for the triumph. The Namibian success story must be seen in relation to two aspects of the conflict specific situation. First, with the deployment of UNAVEM I¹⁰⁷ one of the conflicts in Angola came to a solution.¹⁰⁸ The UNAVEM I had been deployed to

¹⁰⁶ United Nations, "United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 229.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (January 1989-May 1991).

¹⁰⁸ The US had brokered settlements between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in April 1989. Besides the reduction of Cuban troops, the accords also provided for the closure of the African National Congress'

monitor the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. South Africa had perceived Cuban presence a threat to its interests. Next, the fact that UNTAG dealt with a case of decolonisation and not parties in an intra-state war, made it additionally easier.

3.4.2 Cambodia

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, March 1992-September 1993) aimed to implement the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (Paris Agreement 1991) that was designed to end the conflict between four parties¹⁰⁹ and establish a legitimate government with international assistance. The conflict had barked off during the years of French colonialism, accumulated through Pol Pot's regime (1975-79) and continued as a battle for controlling the government in 1980s. The peace accords gave UNTAC extensively power to solve any problems that had implications for the implementation.¹¹⁰

UNTAC's mandate was also threefold. First, the military unit of 15,547 troops and 893 military observers sought to supervise, monitor, and verify the cease-fire. Next, the 5,979 civilians (1,149 internationals and 4,830 local staff) executed a broad range of tasks, such as controlling the civil administration, a human rights component, organise and execute free and fair elections, repatriation, and rehabilitation. Third, UNTAC with a police force of 3,500 supervised and controlled the police component.¹¹¹ The scale and complexity of UNTAC's mandate marked for real a departure away from classical peace operation.

Through short-term lenses, UNTAC's eighteen months deployment accomplished numerous achievements and the Security Council judged it a success that managed to hold free and fair

(ANC) camps by Angola, the granting of independence of Namibia, and the withdrawal of SADF from the territory, and the withdrawal of assistance to the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

¹⁰⁹ The belligerents in the Cambodia conflict are the Phnom Penh government, the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the Khmer People's People Liberation Front (KPNLF), the Party of Democratic Campuchea (PDK, also known as the Khmer Rouge), and the State of Cambodia (SOC).

¹¹⁰ James A. Schear, "Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace", in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 172-4. Although the Peace Accords gave the UN extensively amount of power that encouraged the use of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council did not employ UNTAC with such a power.

¹¹¹ United Nations, "United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 456-8.

elections in Cambodia, as well as set foundations for a peaceful society.¹¹² However, the peace process was far from being admirable. The critical factor rests in the peacekeeping and peace-building process. UNTAC manages to play down the damaging role by PDK, but cannot handle SOC negative play with its use of violence and terror. In all, it obscures the peace-building process, e.g. to demobilise the armies and control the SOC civil service.¹¹³ SOC's electoral turnout in 1993 was low, and consequently forces UNTAC to negotiate them a larger role in a power-sharing.¹¹⁴ Later, the operation loses its credibility when the loser, SOC, in the 1997 elections ousted the winner, FUNCINPEC.

3.4.3 El Salvador

The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL, July 1991-April 1995) aimed to end the twelve-year long civil war between the government and an insurgent movement (the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional, FMLN). It was deployed to implement the Mexico City Agreement between the belligerents in which the UN had played a central role to design.

The mandate gave ONUSAL a wide range of responsibilities. The military element, as classical peacekeeping, separated forces and verified the cease-fire. Further, the 368 military observers sought to ensure cantonment, demobilisation, and redeployment. Second, the human rights division, staffed by 30 international civil servants, were mandated to verify human rights violations. Third, the police components, consisting of 631 police, monitored and supervised the newly established Salvadorian police force. An electoral division, consisting of 36 core observers (the number increased to 900 during the elections) observed the voter registration, and elections for presidency and parliament.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Ibid., 481. However, as Ratner argues, the UNTAC had problems of establishing a peaceful society for elections as the operations mismanaged the process of demobilisation and cantonment, nor did it exercise the degree of control and supervision of competing regimes in order to ensure a neutral political environment. See Ratner, "Part III: The Cambodia Experience", in *The UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 190.

¹¹³ Micheal Doyle, "Peacebuilding in Cambodia: Legitimacy and Power", in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, eds. Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karen Wermester (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 99-102.

¹¹⁴ Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", 26-36.

¹¹⁵ United Nations, "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 429-31.

The Security Council judged the process to be meeting the ends of a democratic and peaceful nation in El Salvador.¹¹⁶ The impact of ONUSAL stands as a critical factor for success. The UN had helped to negotiate the settlement, and without its presence would likely have made peacemaking more difficult. ONUSAL managed to keep the peace in El Salvador, subsequently contained the conflict, and made progress in other fields of the mandate possible, e.g. a thorough demobilisation process. Moreover, by supervising the implementation, ONUSAL assisted the parties to adhere to the settlement's terms and ensure that they lived up to their commitments.¹¹⁷ In sum, third party intervention was crucial in El Salvador.

3.4.4 Mozambique

United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, December 1992-December 1994) was deployed to implement the Rome Agreement between the conflicting parties in Mozambique that had ended over a decade of warfare.

The mandate included four different elements. First, the military contingent of 6,625 personnel sought to monitor and verify the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, the political division was responsible for the political guidance of the peace process, and chair in the political commission. Next, the electoral division with 148 international electoral officers (2,300 electoral observers during the election) monitored and supervised the voter registration as well as they sought to observe the elections for the presidency and the parliament. Fourth, a small number of international staff coordinated the humanitarian component that would serve as an instrument for reconciliation, and assist the return of displaced people. Although the Security Council did not give a mandate for a police force, the ONUMOZ consisted of 1,144 civilian police to observe the performance of the police in Mozambique.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ United Nations, "Resolution 991 (1995)", *Security Council Document 991*, 28 April 1995.

¹¹⁷ Fen O. Hampson, "The Pursuit of Human Rights: The United Nations in El Salvador", in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 95-6.

¹¹⁸ United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 323-5.

ONUMOZ is widely regarded as a success story of UN multidimensional peace operations with the execution of the elections internationally acclaimed fairness. However, problems remain to fulfil the military mandate.¹¹⁹

The critical factors for success in Mozambique rest in conflict specific factors, as well as in the peacemaking and the Conflict Transformation process. Conflict specific factors such as the leadership styles of the local agents, lack of internal resources, and the pressure and commitment from external forces contribute towards success.¹²⁰ The central participants in the conflict were included in the peacemaking process, and those challenging the peace process were dealt with constructively.¹²¹ The comprehensive Conflict Transformation process contributed also to success, and will be discussed more in detail later.

3.4.5 Angola

In Angola, the United Nations Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II, May 1991-February 1995) aimed at building a sustainable and democratic peace by implementing the peace agreement between the MPLA and the UNITA of 1991. As the other multidimensional peace operations, UNAVEM II's mandate included different components. The unarmed 364 military officers sought to monitor and verify the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and the total withdrawal of foreign troops.¹²² The police unit consisting of 89 police monitored the neutrality of the police. The political unit (54 international civilian staff and 41 local civilian staff) sought to supervise elections for parliament and presidency.¹²³ However, UNAVEM II

¹¹⁹ For details see Ibid., 336-8; and Pamela L. Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation: The United Nations Operation in Mozambique", in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 301-4.

¹²⁰ Dennis C. Jett, "Similar Histories: Different Outcomes", chapter four of *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 61-6.

¹²¹ Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 2 (Fall 1997): 40-3. 5-53

¹²² UNAVEM I had been established in the beginning of 1989 to monitor the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops that had supported the MPLA regime since independence.

¹²³ United Nations, "United Nations Verification Mission I, II, III", *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 239-40.

failed to bring about a long lasting peace as UNITA lost the first-round presidential election. The fear of losing the next round made the UNITA to take up arms.¹²⁴

New talks between the belligerents eventuated in a new peace agreement that UNAVEM III sought to execute through five main features. First, the political unit offered good offices and mediation. Next, the military component (336 military observers and 6,576 troops) monitored the cease-fire, supervised, verified, and controlled cantonment and demobilisation. Third, the police division with 226 police officers monitored and verified the neutrality of the Angolan police. Four, a component assisted in humanitarian activities linked to the peace process. Finally, the electoral component sought to verify and monitor the entire electoral process for the second round of presidential elections.¹²⁵ However, UNAVEM II was not able to fulfil its civilian mandate as did its successor, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).¹²⁶

Specific conflict dynamics contribute to explain the outcome of a UN intervention. The local leadership promoting disunity, the wealth of internal resources functioning as an incentive for continuation of warfare, and the lack of international attention and support are all critical factors making up the failure in Angola.¹²⁷ With respect to Conflict Transformation, the fact that demobilisation before the elections in the UNAVEMII years did not occur, made it easier for UNITA to continue fighting.

3.4.6 Rwanda

In Rwanda, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I, October 1993-April 1994) was requested to implement the Arusha Accord of 1993. As in the other cases, the mandate spoke for a multidimensional peace operation. The prime objective was to create a secure environment for the installation and subsequent operation of the transitional

¹²⁴ Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Verification Mission II", in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 403.

¹²⁵ United Nations, "United Nations Verification Mission I, II, III", 256.

¹²⁶ Yvonne C. Lodico, "A Peace that Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola", in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 124-6. Norrie Macqueen, "Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola", *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 36 No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

¹²⁷ Jett, 61-6.

government. First, the military division consisting of 2,548 military personnel sought to monitor and verify the cease-fire, supervise an integration of the two armies, and monitor the overall security situation until national elections. Second, the civilian component sought to supervise elections for presidency and parliament. Third, the 60 civilian police monitors sought to monitor and verify the performance of the Rwandan police force.¹²⁸ Finally, the operation would assist in coordination of humanitarian assistance activities.

Unable to deploy its force in a timely manner, efforts to implement the agreement collapsed in April 1994 when Hutu extremists orchestrated a mass slaughter of Tutsi civilians and Hutu moderates.¹²⁹ The critical failure in Rwanda is to be found in the peacemaking process. CDR, a faction within the MRDN representing the Hutu extremists, was left out of the Arusha peace making process, and not dealt with constructively. CDR refused any compromise with RPF, challenged president Habyarimana, and acted as a spoiler that sought to destroy the whole peace process.¹³⁰ Finally, the International Community demonstrates unwillingness.

3.4.7 Summing Up

The above section was tasked with presenting six different multifunctional peace operations. The mandate, the outcome, and the critical factors for the outcome were considered. It demonstrated that the various cases share similarities in the mandate. The peace operations were all deployed to execute multifunctional tasks and Conflict Transformation as such. For a comparison of these mandates, see table 3.4.7 below. The table shows that there is no clear-cut blueprint model of a multidimensional peace operation. The various peace operations differ as to the functions whether it is the military, civilian, or the police functions. However, the table shows that the military functions vary to a lesser extent, whereas the civilian and police functions vary more significantly. The short exercise that identifies factors for effectiveness demonstrate that these aspects are both to be found in peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building, and in the conflict specific situations.

¹²⁸ United Nations, "United Nations Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda (UNOMOR); United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 343-45.

¹²⁹ J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda", in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 399.

¹³⁰ Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes": 20-6.

Table 3.4.7: The different functions of the multifunctional peace operations

Functions	Military functions			Political functions					Police functions	
	Cease-fire	Cantonment and demobilisation	Withdrawal of foreign troops	Political Commission	Governmental administration	Voter-registration	Elections		Performance	Creation of new force
							Directly	Indirectly		
UNTAG	Monitor and verify		Monitor and verify	Member	Supervise	Control		Control	Monitor and verify	Monitor and verify
UNTAC	Monitor, verify, and supervise	Monitor and verify	Verify	Member	Control	Conduct		Conduct	Monitor and verify, supervision and control	
ONUSAL	Verify	Monitor	Monitor and verify	Member		Observe	Observe		Monitor and supervise	Supervise
ONUMOZ	Monitor and verify	Monitor and verify	Monitor and verify	Member		Monitor and verify	Monitor and verify		Monitor and verify	
UNAVEMII	Monitor and verify	Monitor and verify	Verify	Guest		Supervise, monitor, and verify	Monitor and verify		Monitor	
UNAVEMIII	Monitor	Supervise, control, and verify		Member	Monitor and verify	Supervise, monitor, and verify	Monitor and verify		Monitor and verify	Monitor and verify
UNAMIR	Monitor and verify	Supervise					Supervise and monitor		Monitor and verify	Supervise

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the UN peace operations on a descriptively level. The discussion of the problem of the Charter demonstrates that despite explicit provision in the UN Charter peace operations are anchored in “Chapter-Six-and-a-Half”. A short reference to the history of UN peace operations was made. It shows that the objective of peace operations have evolved from Conflict Management to Conflict Transformation. After the Cold War, the UN has more intensively involved itself in conflicts by authorising mission with a comprehensive mandate.

Based on the various different UN peace operations, a typology of four different concepts was made. Each of these ideal types was presented with special attention given to the multifunctional peace operation. An empirical example illustrated each peace operation concept. Then, six multifunctional peace operations were shortly discussed with respect to their mandate, outcome, and the critical factors determining the effectiveness. The exercise found that not only do the many concepts of peace operations vary in breadth and depth, but the multifunctional peace operations also are different in nature.

Thus, with this background on both a theoretical and a descriptive level, it makes sense to devote the rest of this project to the two UN interventions in Mozambique and Rwanda.

4.

Understanding the Conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda

This chapter compares the Mozambican and Rwandan conflict specific situations. This is important as some of the critical factors determining the outcome of the UN intervention are to be found inherent in the conflicts. The chapter also briefly renders the peacemaking processes and how the UN got involved in the two countries. The purpose is to demonstrate that success and failure cannot be explained without a reference to the conflict specific situation. Different conflict situations are potential for different outcomes of multifunctional peace operations regardless of intervention strategy. Furthermore, the section functions as a background to understand the two conflicts.

The chapter is divided in four comparative sections each answering one of the following questions: What were the causes of the conflicts? What were the natures of the conflicts? What led to the peace agreements? What led to the UN involvement in the conflicts?

4.1 The Conflicts Emerge: the Roots

This section considers the roots of the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda. The purpose is to gain an understanding of the most important causes of the conflicts, and that these sources need to be addressed if resolutions of the conflicts should be found. Thus, it is necessary to consider the contemporary history of the two countries.

4.1.1 Mozambique: Synthesis of Internal and External Explanations

Frelimo, launched in 1962, heads the successful national liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism.¹³¹ By the time of independence in 1975, Frelimo enjoys sole realistic ambitions of governing Mozambique and represents a formidably military and ideologically unity. Frelimo is subsequently transferred the authority after a short transitional period. This occurs without elections.¹³² The colonial power's poor policies on infrastructure and education leave an independent country with a fracture and fragile national identity. Frelimo had developed a socialist agenda during the struggle, and two years into independence, the organisation adopts the Marxist-Leninist ideology prescribing the wholesale transformation of the Mozambican society.¹³³ This attracts support from the USSR both financially and military.¹³⁴ Consequently, Maputo's supports liberation movements and opposes the white minority regimes in Southern Africa.

As a result, Renamo comes into play in 1976. The Rhodesian Intelligent Service establishes Renamo to de-stabilise Mozambique and hinder Maputo's support for the Zimbabwean insurgent movements.¹³⁵ At the outset, Renamo assists the Rhodesian security forces in intelligence gathering. The terror movement consists mainly of former Frelimo commanders alienated by the Maputo government with no clear political objective. The numerical strength

¹³¹ In April 1974, a group of Portuguese junior officers dissatisfied with their country's colonial policies, including their counter-insurgency wars in the three African colonies (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique), leads a military coup that topples the Portuguese fascist regime at the time. A Portuguese Socialist leader, Soares, holds talks with Frelimo that end in the Lusaka Agreement paving the way for Mozambican independence. See Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 115-21.

¹³² Throughout the years of independence, a series of sections grow out of Frelimo, following splits on issuers such as elitism, ideology, and the ethnic composition of its leadership. For further details, see Alex Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique* (University of York, York: Centre for Southern African Studies, 1991), 5-10.

¹³³ In the first four years of independence, Frelimo receives arms to the value of \$180 million. (Robert D. Grey, "The Soviet Presence in Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 22 No. 3 (September 1984): 520).

¹³⁴ Mark Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors in the Transformation of Frelimo", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31 No. 2 (1993): 307-8. 309-337; Chris Alden, "Political Violence in Mozambique: Past, Present and Future", 40-2.

¹³⁵ The Maputo Government supports, in particular, the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and gives its military wing, ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army), a launching pad for its offensives in the rural areas of Rhodesia.

is about thousand members.¹³⁶ In 1980, with the nominal black majority rule and the change from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, Apartheid South Africa adopts Renamo. The new patron substantially increases the military support. Amplified operational units follow with a range of terror campaigns aiming for political and economical, as well as civilian targets within Mozambique.¹³⁷ Consequently, Renamo earns the nickname the 'Khmer Rouge of Africa'. The emergence and evolution of the insurgence movement is thus located within the broader context of Southern African political and security dynamics. However, as the war progresses, Renamo develops a distinct Mozambican identity particularly towards the central and northern regions.¹³⁸ Renamo claims an anti-communist agenda aiming for political and economical liberation in Mozambique.¹³⁹

In this, there are three sources of the Mozambican conflict: (i) the decolonisation process; (ii) subversive actions initiated from adjacent countries; and (iii) policy mistakes on behalf of Frelimo as the government. The balance between these sources changes as the time goes by. At first, it is the legacy from the decolonisation process when Frelimo is handed power without elections, together with the intervention from Rhodesia and South Africa that fuel the conflict. Later, Frelimo's policy mistakes nurture disappointments that Renamo exploits.

4.1.2 Rwanda: Revolutionary Governance

In Rwanda, Belgian colonisers arriving after the Second World War take notice of the already existing social differentiation between Hutus and Tutsis.¹⁴⁰ They exploit and solidify it,

¹³⁶ The Rhodesian Intelligence services recruited disgruntled settlers who fled Mozambique, black Mozambique soldiers loyal to the Portuguese army, expelled members of Frelimo, and, Frelimo soldiers who had been sanctioned and imprisoned for crimes committed after independence. (Abiodun Alao, *Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa* (London and New York: British Academic Press, 1994), 46.)

¹³⁷ Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 15-31. Steven Metz, "The Mozambique National Resistance and South African Foreign Policy", *African Affairs* Vol. 85 No. 341 (October 1986): 492-6.

¹³⁸ Glenda Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo", *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 28 No. 4 (1990): 605-7; Alao, *Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa*, 48-9.

¹³⁹ In this respect, the fact that the organisation changes its name is not without significance. Until 1982, or so, it was usually referred to as MNR (English abbreviation for Mozambique National Resistance). Later, it adopts Renamo that can be seen as an attempt of Mozambican itself. More likely, however, is this directed from Pretoria to give Renamo its own identity so that the links between the patron and the client become more blurred. (Tom Young, "The MRN/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics", *African Affairs* Vol. 89 No. 557 (October 1990): 501-2.)

¹⁴⁰ It is difficult to distinguish between individuals in Rwanda as the differences in physical stature have been exaggerated, and it is rarely possible to objectively distinguish between individuals belonging to the Twa,

following the system of the colonial game by 'divide and rule'. Herein, the Tutsi group is favoured.¹⁴¹ The Belgians continue to support the Tutsi group until the mid 1950s when the Tutsis start to see themselves not only superior the Hutus but also equal the Belgians. By the time of decolonisation in 1962, the Belgians favour the Hutu group that wins the elections and represents the first independent republican government in Rwanda. Onwards, the Hutu Administration, led by Kayibanda, follows the same rule of discrimination. The identification cards that had previously guaranteed the Tutsi privilege serve now against them in education or employment.¹⁴² The regime answers oppositional ideas with repression, and violence with counter violence.

In this, there is a rapid change of social and political structures. However, this social-revolutionary process, taking place from 1959-64, is incomplete as there is a lack of transformation in the race relations between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Instead, a tense relationship between the two groups is merging, and Hutu and Tutsi appear as political identities locked in a zero-sum political game.¹⁴³

General Habyarimana stages a *coup d'état* in 1973 and turns Rwanda into a single-party state under the MRND two years later. At the outset, the discrimination of the Tutsis seems to find an end as he "redefines" the Tutsis as indigenous people.¹⁴⁴ Later, however, the Tutsis see

Hutu, or Tutsi group. They all speak the same language, sharing the same culture and religion, and living relatively in the same places. Two factors, however, have made identification easier, i.e. (i) knowledge of ancestry, and (ii) the possession of an identification card that specifies by law which group an individual belongs to. Since 1926, the latter has played a role in the Rwandan society and politics. Those with ten cows or more were classified as Tutsis, less than ten cows made a Hutu, and even less cows than a Hutu made a Twa. (Alex de Waal, "Genocide in Rwanda", *Anthropology Today* Vol. 10 No. 3 (June 1994): 1-2.

¹⁴¹ Catherine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

¹⁴² Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1998).

¹⁴³ Zwelethu Jolobe, '*The Social-Revolutionary Process as a Cause of Genocide in Rwanda*': *A Critical Interpretation on the Causes of Rwanda's 1994 Genocide* (Master's thesis submitted at University of Cape Town, 2003), 64-75.

¹⁴⁴ Throughout the post-independent Rwanda the Hamitic hypothesis plays a central in the Rwandan society. The hypothesis relies on anthropological theory, proposed by John Hanning Speke in 1863, saying that central Africa had been introduced to a taller and sharper-featured group, the Tutsis. This groups is considered to be a Caucasoid tribe of Ethiopian origin. The group is descended from the biblical King David, and thus a superior race to the native groups. It superiority belonged to the years before independence. After, the idea is reversed and used to discriminate the Tutsis based on xenophobia. See Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families Stories from Rwanda*, second edition (London: Pan Macmillan, 2000), 50-3.

themselves again excluded based on ethnicity. Rwanda, through Hutu eyes, is regarded a stable and peaceful society, though control is an obsession for the regime that executes extensively non-democratic means to sustain its position. Consequently, many Tutsis flee into exile. By the late 1980s, the Tutsi community in the neighbouring countries has expanded to 600,000.

Thus, the intra-state conflict in Rwanda that starts in October 1990 is an expression of the political conflict between Tutsi rebels and the Hutu led government. Through the history, authoritarian rule has generated Hutu and Tutsi as 'political identities'. These identities have in turn changed with the changing history of the Rwandan state. History of the state has made the bipolar identities, and fuelled the conflict.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the unfinished social-revolutionary process following the decolonisation triggers a second revolutionary crisis that is the intra-state conflict.¹⁴⁶

RPF launches itself in December 1987 advocating democracy, citizenship, and national unity.¹⁴⁷ In October 1990, when its armed wing, Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), enters Rwanda it represents the Tutsi exiles that have waited 30 years to stage an offensive against the Hutu led government.¹⁴⁸ In this, Uganda supports RPF as a liberation movement that aims to overthrow the Hutu nationalist government. The balance of power wants it however otherwise. Rwandan Government Forces (RGF), with support from Belgium, France, and Zaire, stops RPF only 30 kilometres north of Kigali.¹⁴⁹ A cease-fire follows an international mediation in June 1992. Further international pressure for political liberalisation makes

¹⁴⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 60-75.

¹⁴⁶ For details see Jolobe, 76-115.

¹⁴⁷ RPF has until then existed under the acronym Ranu (Rwandan Alliance for Nation Unity) with the aim of establishing a socialist republic in Rwanda. With change in name, the radical agenda withers away. From October 1990 until July 1994, RPA grows from 5,000 to 25,000 troops.

¹⁴⁸ Wm. Cyrus Reed, "Exile, Reform and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 34 No. 3 (September 1996): 484-90.

¹⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Arming Rwanda: the Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War*, (New York : Human Rights Watch, 1994), 23-4. Belgium and France send respectively 535 and 300 troops argued ostensibly to protect their nationals, whilst the thousand Zairian troops are deployed in direct combat with RPF. Later Belgia and Zaire withdraw their troops, the former due to domestic pressure, and the latter has been accused of looting and stealing more than executing effective military actions. France stays both physically and as a guarantor for military equipment and financial liability. RGF increases its number of troops from 5,200 to 30,000 from October 1992 until June 1992.

Habyarimana form a power-sharing arrangement with four opposition parties in June 1992 without RPF representation. The arrangement turns out to be nominal as Habyarimana continues his strong authority. CDR¹⁵⁰, a conservative Hutu party, shares a position in this new government that pursues for extreme ideas. The parties use the truce as a window period to upgrade its arsenal and resume to even heavier fighting in February 1993. Following requests from Uganda, who wants to clean herself from accusations of supporting RPF, and the Kigali government with strong support from France, the Security Council authorises the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMOR) to verify that no military goods are floating from Uganda to Rwanda.

4.1.3 Summing Up

The above section has been tasked to give an account of the causes of the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda. It is apparent from the above that the situation is different in the two countries. What is the nature of the essential differences? First, in Mozambique a combination of the flawed Portuguese decolonisation, interventions from Mozambique's white minority regimes, and Frelimo's failure in the course of policy actions cause the conflict. By contrast, the creation of the 'political identities' through the two social-revolutionary processes triggers the fighting in Rwanda. Second, the differences in the causes of the conflicts have implications for the understanding of the participants. Whilst Renamo from the outset is a terror movement and a puppet of Pretoria, RPF is a liberation movement. Compared to Renamo, RPF is a more independent movement that is inspired by, and shares experience from, Museveni's power conquest in Uganda. This leads to the third difference that is seen in the miscellaneous agendas Renamo and RPF pursue. As a terror movement, Renamo, at least in the beginning, seeks only to destabilise the Frelimo regime. In contrast, the RPF stages Rwanda to overthrow the Hutu nationalist government. In short, the causes of the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda are different that have different implications on the agents.

4.2 Conflict Dynamics: the Structure and the Participants

The compositions of the conflicts are complex as they float into different levels. The section below differentiates between three dimensions, i.e. the internal, regional, and international components, regarding their nature and extent. The purpose of this section is to give an

¹⁵⁰ The acronym of CDR comes from its French name "Coalition pour la Défense République".

overview of the conflict dynamics in order to understand the structure of the conflicts and their participants.

4.2.1 Mozambique: a Strong Regional Dimension

The internal dimension of the conflict in Mozambique consists of the perceived incompatible goals between Frelimo and Renamo. Frelimo claims to hold the legitimate right to exercise the central authority. Renamo's objective, at least on the paper at the stage of peacemaking, is political and economical liberation.

At the regional level, Frelimo confronts the white minority regimes in the region, first primarily towards Rhodesia, and later Apartheid South Africa. They perceive that the eventual success of a black majority-ruled government in Mozambique would have a domino effect on South Africa and Rhodesia. Moreover, Pretoria senses the fall of white minority regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, together with the war in Namibia, as a strategy initiated from Moscow, i.e. the 'total onslaught', and is countered with the 'total strategy'.¹⁵¹ Hence, Renamo's patrons use its client extensively to destabilise their neighbour.

The international dimension articulates a light involvement by the Cold War's major agents, the Soviet Union and the US. The Soviet Union supports Frelimo both as a liberation movement and as a post-independence government, but its commitment is never as extensive as for MPLA in Angola, and Maputo could enhance an independent foreign policy.¹⁵² The Soviet Union rejects the Mozambican application for Comecon in 1981, and Maputo subsequently gradually distances itself from Moscow by flirting with the West. Washington does not feel flattered. The Reagan Administration keeps Renamo on an arm length distance. When Renamo is accused of perpetuating a massacre in July 1987, the Administration disassociates from the organisation, as do other Western governments. Thus, Mozambique never really became a battlefield for the Cold War superpowers.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Rob Davies and Dan O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: an Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978", *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 11 No. 2 (April 1985):

¹⁵² Richard Weitz, "Continuities in Soviet Foreign Policy: the Case of Mozambique", *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 11 No. 1 (January-March 1992): 85. However, it must be noted that besides the Derg Regime in Ethiopia, the level of support to Frelimo, measured in arms assistance, reflects USSR's second largest commitment in the region next to MPLA. See Marx Webber, "Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Final Phase", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 30 No. 1 (March 1992):11-2.

¹⁵³ Chris Alden and Mark Simpson, "Mozambique: a Delicate Peace", *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 31 No 1 (1993): 110-3.

Table 4.2.1: The structure and the participants in the Mozambican conflict

Agent	Represents	Supported by	Claim	Conflict with
Frelimo	The Mozambican Government.	The USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe (from 1980, Zimbabwean freedomfighters prior independence).	Legitimate right to exercise the central authority, and defend its sovereignty.	Renamo, Rhodesia (1976-80), South Africa (1980-88).
Renamo	Rhodesia (1976-80), South Africa (1980-88). Later, the rural population of Mozambique (central and northern region).	Rhodesia (1976-80), South Africa (1980-88), Malawi, Kenya Groups in Portugal, West Germany, and the US.	Official: Political and economic liberalisation Unofficial: Maximise material – opportunistic.	Frelimo.

4.2.2 Rwanda: a Strong Internal Dimension

The internal dimension of the Rwandan conflict portrays three main cleavages: (i) the conflict within the Habyarimana regime; (ii) the opposition towards the Habyarimana regime within Rwanda¹⁵⁴; and of prime focus here, (iii) the perceived incompatible goals between MRND and RPF because both parties want to control the governmental power. The latter wants to overthrow the former.

The regional dimension of the conflict in Rwanda does not evolve into the same intensity as in Mozambique. Uganda has supported and nurtured RPF since 1987 as President Museveni entered Kampala with the help from Tutsi exiles one year earlier.¹⁵⁵ With a Ugandan presence, Kenyan scepticism of Kampala and Mobutu's need for French support extend the Rwandan conflict into regional relationships.¹⁵⁶

At the international level, France becomes involved in Rwanda. The French has incorporated the former Belgium colonies into its sphere of influence. France supports MRND as a

¹⁵⁴ The internal cleavage draws on general dissatisfaction with the regime along an ethnic cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi, and regional or other cleavages within the Hutu society.

¹⁵⁵ The current president in Rwanda, Kagame, was Museveni's head of military intelligence in the National Resistance Army (NRA), which is the military wing of the National Resistant Movement (NRM). Many of RPA's troops deserted from NRA and took along military supplies.

¹⁵⁶ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Uganda's Domestic and Regional Security since the 1970s", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 31 No. 2 (June 1993): 242-8; Reed, "Exile, Reform and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front", 484-6.

Francophone force, and opposes RPF with its Anglophone background. Paris perceives RPF as a function of the 'Anglo-Saxon' conspiracy in which Uganda also plays a role to invade the Francophone sphere.¹⁵⁷ France sends not only weapons but also a small contingent of troops to help Habyarimana repel RPF.¹⁵⁸ Rwanda is even further away from the Cold War confrontation than Mozambique, and the transformation in international relations has no direct effect on the backing of either side.¹⁵⁹

Table 4.2.2: The structure and the participants in the Rwandan conflict

Agent	Represents	Supported by	Claim	Conflict with
MRND	The Hutu group, mainly from the northern region.	France, Kenya, Zaire, Belgium (until 1993).	Social revolution, legitimate right to exercise the central authority, and defend its sovereignty.	RPF.
RPF	The Tutsi exiles, especially the Ugandan community.	Uganda, Belgium (from 1993).	Liberate Rwanda with the following values: national unity, restoration of citizenship, and democracy.	MRND, CDR.

4.2.3 Summing Up

Considering the internal dimension, the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda have violent expressions illustrating two examples of intra-state wars. Both governments are fighting insurgents that start their attacks from an adjacent state, and later consolidate their positions within their homeland. Nonetheless, there are major differences between Renamo and RPF. On the regional level, it seems that Mozambique is subjected to a stronger involvement from the neighbouring countries than the involvement of Uganda in Rwanda. In comparison, the South African involvement in Mozambique is more explicit than Uganda's role in Rwanda. Finally, even though the superpowers do not involve themselves heavily in the Mozambican conflict, their absence is clearer in Rwanda where France plays the central role on the

¹⁵⁷ Asteris C. Huliaras, "The 'anglosaxon conspiracy': French perceptions of the Great Lakes crisis", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 36 No. 4 (December 1998): 597-600.

¹⁵⁸ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 99-109.

¹⁵⁹ Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking", *The Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (March 1998): 198.

international level. Thus, the dynamics of the two conflicts share both similarities and dissimilarities.

4.3 The Peacemaking Process: Negotiating Comprehensive Settlements

The section below considers the process leading to the negotiated settlements in Mozambique and Rwanda. Herein, it is crucial to consider the balance of power between the belligerents when the peacemaking processes start. The aim is to understand how the conflicts are addressed before the UN is asked to implement the settlements.

4.3.1 Mozambique: the General Peace Agreement

The international and regional dimension of the conflict has changed substantially by the time Frelimo and Renamo are ready to negotiate. Pretoria's support of war has withered away¹⁶⁰, the Soviet Union has turned inwards and demonstrates eagerness to solve regional conflicts, and the US appears more peaceful as the Cold War confrontation seems to settle.¹⁶¹ The belligerents had been dependent on foreign donors during the fighting, and when this stops, the parties face economic exhaustion.¹⁶² Simultaneously, they face a mutually hurting stalemate, as either side contemplate neither victory nor defeat.¹⁶³ The violence continues on a horrific level and is of increasingly pure destruction. The conflict is ripe for resolution.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Until 1984, when the Maputo is unable to deal with the 'total strategy' and signs the Nkomati-agreement with Pretoria, the South African Defence Force (SADF) provides logistical support for Renamo. Pretoria continues to fuel its client and only culminates in an official full stop after the Songo meeting between the presidents of Mozambique and South Africa in 1988 (though some dissident forces within SADF continue to support for Renamo).

¹⁶¹ Alden et al., "Mozambique: a Delicate Peace": 113; Marina Ottaway, "Mozambique: From Symbolic Socialism to Symbolic Reform", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 26 No. 2 (January 1988): 217-21.

¹⁶² The economic situation is an important feature to the Mozambican context. It is in stark contrast to other intra-state wars in Africa. For the parties in Mozambique fighting was not a clear means to enrichment, and thus an incentive for the continuation warfare as seen in Angola, Liberia, or Sierra Leone. Mozambique's wealth is more potential than actual, and less immediate portable compared to that in the above countries. Mozambique's immediate economic prospects centre on the provision of port and transport facilities to its neighbours, on agriculture, and tourism. All of these require stability, long-term development, and prudent management.

¹⁶³ According to Zartman, a "mutually hurting stalemate defines the moments as ripe for resolution: both sides are locked in a situation from which they cannot escalate the conflict with their available means at an acceptable cost". See I. William Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil War*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995, 8.

¹⁶⁴ For a theoretical underpinning of this argument see I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

The parties seem to undergo a change of heart. Frelimo had abandoned its radical policy, created a new constitution, and called for multi-party elections.¹⁶⁵ The *raison d'être* for Renamo to continue the war swept thus away.

Peace talks between the Mozambican parties, marked by both mutual distrust and desire to end the war, start in 1988 and pick up the pace in the two first years of the 1990s under auspices of the Catholic Church in Rome.¹⁶⁶ Before this there had been initiatives towards peacemaking in the form of a pre-negotiation phase. The Nkomati Accord represents the first sign, but it fails and the war resumes.¹⁶⁷ At the Songo meeting in 1988, Chissano and Botha sign an agreement in which South Africa pledges to assist in repairing a water dam, and which in turn would provide South Africa with 8% of its energy requirements. Pretoria, in need of energy supplies, insists Renamo to stay away from this project, and even supports Maputo with military supplies to guard the installation. In parallel to these processes, from 1984 onwards the Mozambican churches, the Catholic and the Protestant, undertake initiatives that promote dialogue.¹⁶⁸

However, it is not until 1988 that contact with Renamo is made, that commitments towards resolution take place, and that Frelimo and Renamo are willing to negotiate towards an end of the war.¹⁶⁹ In July 1989, the government makes provisions for dialogue. It circulates a twelve-point document demanding Renamo to abandon terrorism and violence, it offers the rebels

¹⁶⁵ Joseph Hanlo, *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots* (London, Blomington, and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 60-5.

¹⁶⁶ It was two representatives from a Catholic organisation associated with the Vatican, the Sant' Egidio Community, together with the Italian government and Bishop Jaime Gonçalves that mediates the talks. This results in a cease-fire for six months in December 1990 to a limited area in which the Zimbabwean troops would confine and Renamo not attack. For an account of the role that that the Sant' Egidio Community plays, see Andrea Bartoli, "Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio", in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson and Pamela Aal, second edition (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 247-71.

¹⁶⁷ This is an agreement between Maputo and Pretoria. Renamo is left out of the discussion, because Frelimo makes the analysis that from an agreement with the patron follows the end of the client's existence basis. See John S. Saul, "On War and Peace in Africa: The Mozambican Case", chapter four in *Millennial Africa: Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy*, John S. Saul (Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press, 2001), 115; Baptista Lundin and Da Costa Gaspar, "Mozambique: Making Peace – The Roots of the Conflict and the Way Forward", in *Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation*, eds. Eric Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Claremont: New Africa Books, 2003), 314-5. For details of the Nkomati text see *Accord of Nkomati* [Available online] <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/moz1.pdf> [18.05.2004].

¹⁶⁸ Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 28.

¹⁶⁹ Now Chissano has succeeded Machel, whom had died in a plane crash in 1986.

amnesty, as well as promises of reintegration into society.¹⁷⁰ In response, Renamo rejects Frelimo's demands and would only renounce violence under certain conditions, such as to be acknowledged as a political force in Mozambique; accept to draw up a new constitution jointly with Renamo; withdrawal of foreign troops; and commitment to reconciliation.¹⁷¹

Then, President Chissano prepares for a negotiated outcome. Later, Frelimo creates a new constitution, and calls for multi-party elections. Thus, Renamo's objective to continue warfare sweeps away and the organisation faces instead incentives to find a political solution. Dhlakamo, Renamo's leader, makes organisational changes and transforms the insurgency from a terror movement to that of a politico-military organisation.¹⁷² Moreover, Renamo's leadership changes the dressing from military uniform to that of negotiation costume. On the part of Frelimo, peace is a necessity to become a trading partner with the West. Later, the drought in the beginning of the 1990s pressure Renamo towards working for peace, as it no longer could sustain itself in the rural areas.¹⁷³ In addition, external pressure helps towards negotiations. The first direct talks between officials from Frelimo and Renamo take place in July 1990 in Rome. The process eventuates in the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in October 1992.

Based on Cameron Hume's account for the peacemaking process between Frelimo and Renamo it is possible to differentiate between five phases: (i) starting a dialogue; (ii) identification of the vital issues; (iii) political questions; (iv) discussion about humanitarian issues; and (v) discussion about military issues.¹⁷⁴ The section below briefly renders the developments made in each of these phases.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁰ See "Twelve Principles for Peace of the Mozambican Government" <<http://www.c-r.org/accord/moz/accord3/nairobi.shtml>> (18.05.2004).

¹⁷¹ See "Sixteen Point Declaration of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo)" <<http://www.c-r.org/accord/moz/accord3/nairobi.shtml>> (18.05.2004).

¹⁷² Alden et al.: 113-6.

¹⁷³ Saul, 116-7.

¹⁷⁴ Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: the Role of Mediation and Good Offices* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994).

¹⁷⁵ The following is drawn from Alden et al.: 118-22, United Nations, *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-95* (New York: Department of Public Information United Nations, 1996), 14-22; Hume, 25-139; Saul: 117-29; Andrea Bartoli, "Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio", in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O.

In the first phase (October 1988-December 1990), no substantial agreement is met, but is still significant to the broader resolution perspective. A direct dialogue between Frelimo and Renamo commences and they commit themselves to a peaceful future.¹⁷⁶ Representatives from the Kenyan, Malawian, and Zimbabwean governments facilitate, and later Sant'Egidio takes over the role. External pressure, especially from the US and South Africa, persuades Renamo to continue the talks and acknowledge Frelimo as the partner in peace. A partial cease-fire is reached.¹⁷⁷ Zimbabwe ought to withdraw its troops from the Beira and Limpopo corridor, whilst Renamo would not launch attack in these trade routes.

In the next phase (January 1990-October 1991), the two parties identify the central issues and reach an agreement upon the procedure to be followed. A systematic step-by-step approach is chosen that prescribes that an agreement is signed on a particular issue before the discussion of any new issues. Mutual distrust leads to a deadlock, but still the parties agree to an agenda specifying six areas requiring agreement: the law on political parties, the electoral system, military issues, guarantees, a cease-fire, and a donors conference. Furthermore, the parties endorse mutual recognition that opens for further discussions.

Nonetheless, it is not until the third phase (October 1991-March 1992) that serious negotiation concerning a real resolution of the conflict takes place in Rome. The parties agree upon electoral procedure and the holding of free and fair elections. The President would be elected based on a simple majority for a term of five years. The 250 parliamentarians are to be elected for equally five years based on proportional representation. At the same time, violence continues in Mozambique. Renamo has taken an upper hand and is tempted to have confidence in further warfare. Convinced by the US, the USSR, and Italy, Renamo agrees to continue by political means and signs a cease-fire. In return, Frelimo promises not to unilaterally introduce any new laws.¹⁷⁸

Hampson, and Pamela Aal. Second Edition (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 257-71.

¹⁷⁶ See "Joint Communique of 10 July" <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/moz5.pdf>> (18.05.2004).

¹⁷⁷ The truce is agreed upon 9 November 1990, see "Agreement on a Partial Ceasefire" <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/moz6.pdf>> (18.05.2004).

¹⁷⁸ The Maputo government had upset Renamo by unilaterally introduced the new constitution.

The fourth phase (March-August 1992) is characterised by the discussion of humanitarian issues and the start of the military issues.¹⁷⁹ A severe drought has tremendous impact on the humanitarian situation not only in Mozambique, but also in neighbouring countries. Consequently, the parties find no support for continuation of the war, and rather encounter international and regional pressure to negotiate an end. The “observer governments”, France, Portugal, the UK, and the US, enter the stage together with the United Nations (UN). It is under these circumstances that Dhlakama and Chissano meet for the first time, ratify the progress, and set a final date as a target for finalising the peace accord. They agree that UN would play a role in the peace assistance.

In the final phase (August-October 1992), an agreement on military issues is made. Among the central issues are the demobilisation on both sides, the creation of a new national armed force, and reform in the police and in the security service. The GPA is signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. However, the document is flawed, much remaining to be spelled out in practice.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, the conflict has only found a solution on the paper, and the GPA needs to be materialised. To do so, the parties agree that the UN would supervise its implementation. They share the fear that without help from a third party, the comprehensive peace process might be set back and violence would resume.

The conclusion is a comprehensive negotiated settlement consisting of six areas: the law of political parties, the electoral system, military issues, guarantees, a cease-fire, and a donor conference.

4.3.2 Rwanda: the Arusha Peace Agreement

The internal dimension of the conflict in Rwanda changes and makes negotiations possible. First, the newly included parties in Habyarimana’s government are at some point closer to the RPF than its coalition partner. Sections within the multi-party government, despite that CDR opposes, because it sees it as a betrayal of the Hutu cause, are willing to talk and make negotiations possible between the Rwandan government and RPF. Second, the two waves of RPF military invention, the first conventional warfare and the second guerrilla tactics, has proven RPF a threatening force and subsequently gives it increased bargaining power vis-à-

¹⁷⁹ See “Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance” <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/moz3.pdf>> (18.05.2004).

¹⁸⁰ For details of the text see “General Peace Agreement for Mozambique”, <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/moz4.pdf>> (18.05.2004).

vis the Kigali government. It enabled the RPF to shift from rebels to a legitimate participant in the domestic political process.¹⁸¹ RPF has an ascendancy over the nationalist Hutu government. Further military raids would raise international scepticism, and a political solution through negotiations could enhance RPF's cause.

Moreover, the Kigali government is challenged in economical terms. The war had disrupted the agricultural situation as well as the import corridor to Mombasa leading to a food crisis. The military expenditure had risen from 15% in 1990 of the GNP to 70% three years later.

From June 1992, Tanzanian officials facilitate the peacemaking process between RPF and the Kigali government under international auspices.¹⁸² There had been different stages, a pre-negotiation phase, in the peacemaking process leading up to the formal talks. In February 1991, Habyarimana offered amnesty and cease-fire as he joined talks with Museveni under the leadership of the Tanzanian government. In June, the OAU holds a mini-summit that opens for the first official talks between the Rwandan government and RPF.¹⁸³ However, neither of the sides demonstrates willingness to reach a settlement as they both are confident that they could gain an upper hand militarily. Then in March 1992 Habyarimana gives his words for political liberalisation after international pressure. RPF enables to attain a position as a legitimate participant in the domestic political process. In essence, this leads to preparatory talks three months later, and the stage was set for official negotiations in July 1992.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ The ethnic arithmetic figures had not been in favour of RPF, and the movement had consequently to reaffirm itself as a national movement. Gradually it established its national credentials through internal discipline and good governance in the areas of its control. The international community, the OAU and the US, acknowledged this officially. (Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking": 201-2.)

¹⁸² The Organisation of African Unity, the UN, Belgium, France, Germany, Nigeria, and the US participated.

¹⁸³ For an overview of the role that the OAU plays in the peacemaking process see Amare Tekle, "The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution", in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, eds. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 111-29.

¹⁸⁴ Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking": 200-2.

The Arusha Peace Agreement is negotiated through six phases: (i) cease fire; (ii) rule of law; (iii) power-sharing; (iv) granting of power to the transitional institutions; (v) composition of the transitional institutions; and (vi) refugees and security.¹⁸⁵

In the first phase (12-14 July 1992), the parties agree to call for a cease fire. The parties also agree to set up a joint political military commission (JPMC). The JPMC would be composed of five representatives from the Rwandese government and five representatives from RPF. The commission would be tasked to ensure the implementation of the cease fire and the peace agreement including the conclusion of the negotiations. The opposition politicians dominate the government negotiation delegation.

The next phase (August 1992) evolves naturally from the first. The rule of law is on the agenda. The agreement states that no one should be above the rule of law, it advocates the separation of powers, condemns ethnic discrimination and states that the return of Rwanda's refugees was their "inalienable right". RPF challenges Habyarimana's position as president, but finally agrees that he would be the transitional president.

The parties can easily conclude on this matter as they leave out the issues of controversy such as the composition of the transitional government.

The third phase (7-8 September 1992) sees the parties discussing power-sharing, unification, and political cooperation without any conclusion. One of the main reasons to the failure is that Habyarimana's men negotiated without a mandate.

In the fourth phase (6-12 October 1992), the parties determine that a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) would function as a transitional government for 22 months. The end of the transitional phase would be marked by elections to determine the new government. The parties settle that the power of the president would diminish in favour of having a strong parliament. The Transitional National Assembly (TNA) would be granted substantial power, e.g. elect the heads of the Supreme Court. However, the Protocol does not resolve the issue of the distribution over seats in the transitional institutions.

In the fifth phase (25 November 1992 – 10 January 1993), the parties reach an agreement over the precise composition in the BBTG and the TNA. The MRND secures for itself the crucial

¹⁸⁵ The following is taken from Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process": 131-53; Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking": 202-7.

positions of the president and minister of defence, but fails in its bid to have the CDR included in government.¹⁸⁶ Nonetheless, when the Protocol is signed the Habyarimana's regime is marginalised, and the conclusion is victorious for the RPF.

The final round (23 February – 4 August 1993) deals with two sets of issues: refugees and security. The first is settled quickly. The security question proves more difficult as it involves the composition of a neutral military force, integration of the armed forces, and the composition of the army command structure. Herein, the two latter components raise most concern as they would determine the new military dispensation. After many rounds, the parties agree that the command level is to be split 50-50, and the forces are to be drawn 60-40 in favour of the government. The government delegation brings the putative agreement to Habyarimana who rejects its content. It took heavy influence by the Tanzanian, French, and American teams to convince the two sides of the agreement.

The Arusha Accords are now completed and are signed on 4 August 1993. This is a comprehensive agreement in which the following issues are agreed upon: the establishment of the rule of law and a culture of human rights, power-sharing in all public institutions, the transitional arrangements that would lead to elections, repatriation of refugees, the resettlement of internally displaced persons, and the integration of the armies.¹⁸⁷

4.3.3 Summing Up

Both the Mozambican and the Rwandan conflict changed in nature by the time the parties were willing to negotiate that made peacemaking possible. In Mozambique, changes at the regional and international level dried up the external support together with economic exhaustion and military stalemate paved the way for negotiations. Internal changes in Rwanda, combined with international pressure, led to the Arusha peace talks. The two conflicts are at a different stage when peacemaking starts. Whilst the Mozambican parties face a hurting stalemate, it is not a stalemate in Rwanda. The balance of power is as such that RPF has an upper hand in conflict, and could possibly have overthrown the nationalist Hutu led Kigali government. Nonetheless, the outcome of the two negotiations processes is two

¹⁸⁶ Both France and Tanzania support the idea of including the CDR in the BBTG. They argue that it would be easier to control the extremist voices within the government compared to having them outside.

¹⁸⁷ For details of the text see *The Arusha Accords: Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front* [Available online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

comprehensive settlements. Now the agreements need to be materialised. The UN would play a central role in this process.

4.4 Initiatives towards UN Involvement: Two Multifunctional Peace Operations

The outcomes of the peacemaking processes are two comprehensive settlements. These agreements need to be put into practice. Parties on both sides in each conflict agree that the UN would play a central role in this process. This section aims to answer the question of what led to the UN involvement in the conflicts, and examines the two multifunctional peace operations' mandates as authorised by the Security Council. Herein, the purpose is to examine how the UN analyses the two conflicts and the resolution of them. Moreover, define the qualitative nature of the two mandates, and build an understanding of the two interventions that serves as a backdrop for the following chapters.

4.4.1 Mozambique: ONUMOZ

The UN involvement in Mozambique grows directly out of the peace agreement. Frelimo and Renamo sign a document on Fundamental Principles on 18 October 1991, which calls for the UN to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement. The UN had been an official observer throughout the negotiations. The GPA comes into effect on 15 October 1992 when the Mozambican National Assembly ratifies it.¹⁸⁸ Two months later, on 16 December 1992, the Security Council authorises the deployment of ONUMOZ by its resolution 782 after being recommended by the Secretary-General.¹⁸⁹ The Security Council, in accordance with the GPA, mandates ONUMOZ with four distinct, but interdependent objectives, i.e. military, political, electoral, and humanitarian. Thus, by recalling the balance of power, the UN deploys a peace operation to implement a settlement agreed to by two parties in a hurting stalemate.

The UN intervenes to end fourteen years of civil war in Mozambique by establishing ONUMOZ. The purpose of the operation is to assist in the implementation of the GPA by monitoring and verifying the process, and establish the necessary conditions for the holding of elections. The mandate includes four different elements. First, the military contingent of 6,625

¹⁸⁸ Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation: the UN in Mozambique", 281.

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique*, Security Council Document S/24892, 3 December 1992: paragraph 3; United Nations, "Resolution 792 (1992)", *Security Council Document* 792, 1992.

personnel would monitor and verify the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, the withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as integration of the armed forces. Second, the political division would be responsible of the political guidance of the peace process, and chair in the political commission. Next, the electoral division with 148 international electoral officers (2,300 electoral observers during the election) would monitor and supervise the voter registration as well as observe the elections for the presidency and the parliament. Four, a small number of international staff would coordinate the humanitarian component that would serve as an instrument for reconciliation, and assist the return of displaced people. Although the Security Council does not give a mandate for a police force, the ONUMOZ consisted of 1,144 civilian police to observe the performance of the police in Mozambique.¹⁹⁰ It is a comprehensive mandate with various sub-goals that taken together would serve to end the Mozambican conflict. It is clear that the UN commit itself to fulfil tasks that go beyond classical peace operation.

4.4.2 Rwanda: UNAMIR

Habyarimana and the chairperson of RPF signed the comprehensive peace accord 4th of August 1993 in Arusha. Two months earlier, the Kigali government and the RPF had asked the UN to deploy a peace operation by the time that the negotiations had ended. This was included in the Accord.¹⁹¹ Before the signing, the UN had sent a 'goodwill mission' to the region and adopted a resolution calling for comprehensive negotiations.¹⁹² Following the signing of the agreement, the Security Council approves the establishment of UNAMIR. It would be a two-year operation planned in four phases.¹⁹³ The UNAMIR operation is tasked to implement an agreement between two parties that share an imbalance of power. The RPF is the strongest part.

¹⁹⁰ United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)", in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 323-5.

¹⁹¹ United Nations, *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance for Rwanda*, Security Council Document S/25951,

¹⁹² United Nations, "Resolution 812 (1993)", Security Council Document 812, 12 March 1993.

¹⁹³ The end of phase one would be marked by the instalment of the transitional government; phase two would involve the demobilisation of armed forces and the integration of a new national army; phase three would include the establishment of a new demilitarised zone and the integration of police force; the final phase would cover supervision of the final stages leading to the elections. See United Nations, *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance for Rwanda*, Security Council Document S/26488, 24 September 1993.

Hence, the UN intervenes to end three years of fighting, and thirty years of institutionalised discrimination with the deployment of the UNAMIR operation. The purpose of the operation is to assist in implementing the Arusha Accord. The prime objective is to create a secure environment for the installation and subsequent operation of the transitional institutions in the transitional phase, which would end by the holding of elections after 22-months. Its tasks are manifold, but fall in under the following interdependent components: military, civilian, police, and humanitarian. First, the military division consisting of 2,548 military personnel would monitor and verify the cease-fire, supervise an integration of the two armies, and monitor the security situation in Kigali until national elections. Second, the civilian component would supervise elections for presidency and parliament. Third, the 60 civilian police observers would monitor and verify the performance of the Rwandan police force.¹⁹⁴ Finally, the operation would assist in coordination of humanitarian assistance activities. Although many UN officials perceive that UNAMIR would be a “success story”, the mandate is limited by political and economical considerations and explains the low number of UN personnel.

4.4.3 Summing Up

The origins of the UN involvement in the two conflicts are relative similar. The UN is not directly involved at the stage of peacemaking. Rather, the UN becomes drawn in at the stage of peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building. Moreover, the UN shows its interest to solve the conflicts by sending a reconnaissance mission to each country; the parties invite the UN to supervise the implementation of the settlements; and, the Security Council authorises multifunctional peace operations, i.e. ONUMOZ and UNAMIR. Herein, remember the differences in the balance of power between the parties in each conflict. When ONUMOZ arrives, it does so to solve a conflict that has reached a hurting stalemate. UNAMIR, on the other hand, is deployed to end a conflict in which one of the parties has a stronger hold. Whilst the UN succeeds to read the conflict in Mozambique, the organisation proves illiterate with respect to the Rwandan conflict.

Furthermore, it is apparent from the above presentation that ONUMOZ’s and UNAMIR’s mandate are both comprehensive and design multifunctional peace operations. The mandates

¹⁹⁴ United Nations, “United Nations Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda (UNOMOR); United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)”, in *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 343-45.

speak of distinct, but interlocking, sets of objectives. However, the nature of this scope varies between ONUMOZ and UNAMIR. In general, when it comes to the number of UN personnel deployed it is larger for ONUMOZ than for UNAMIR. There are more human resources within the ONUMOZ operation to ensure the implementation of the mandate. A comparison of the mandates follows. First, the military components share similarities in that they would execute comparable tasks, but that the nature of involvement is deeper for ONUMOZ than for UNAMIR. Second, whilst ONUMOZ does have a clear political role, it is not explicitly defined in UNAMIR's mandate. ONUMOZ political leadership would lead the political commission for guidance of the peace process. The parties themselves in Rwanda would care for this function only to be accompanied with support from the Secretary-General's good offices. UNAMIR's role would be to provide a stabilising presence that would facilitate implementation of the Arusha Accord, whilst ONUMOZ would conduct some of the implementation. Third, the electoral components share similarities. Both are designed to assist in the electoral process marking the end of the implementation phase, and the end of the transition from war to peace. Fourth, whilst ONUMOZ's mandate does not provide for a police component, UNAMIR does. However, ONUMOZ would include this later that also is substantially bigger than UNAMIR's component. Finally, both peace operations are designed with a humanitarian component that would coordinate humanitarian assistance. In short, comparing the degree of involvement, the UN participation in Mozambique is heavier than in Rwanda.

4.5 Conclusion

Aimed at providing an overview of the conflict specific situations in Mozambique and Rwanda, four different questions regarding the causes, the nature, the resolution of the conflicts and the UN intervention were considered in this chapter. The following recalls the outline of the nature of the essential differences.

First, the causes of the Mozambican conflict start with the flawed decolonisation process, then to be stimulated by the intervention by the adjacent white minority regimes, and later by policy mistakes on behalf of Frelimo. In contrast, in Rwanda the incomplete social-revolutionary process immediately after independence leads to the second social-revolutionary process that is the intra-state war in the 1990s. Whilst Renamo as a terror movement wants to destabilise the Frelimo regime, RPF as a liberation movement aims to depose the Hutu led nationalist government in Kigali. In short, there is a difference in what keeps the conflict going.

Second, the differences in the causes of the conflicts have implications for the conflict dynamics. At the domestic level, there is perceived incompatible goals both between Frelimo and Renamo, and between the Habyarimana regime and RPF. The regional dimension of the Mozambican conflict is more transparent than the Rwandan conflict. Pretoria determines Renamo's agenda more than Kampala does for RPF. Instead, NRM inspires RPF to take similar actions. Museveni's approach demonstrates a good recipe to gain political control. Neither of the conflicts attracts the superpowers of the Cold War, but they are more involved in Mozambique than in Rwanda. France plays a role at the international level in the latter.

Third, changes in the conflict specific situation pave the way for the peacemaking processes. However, there is a crucial difference in the balance of power in the two cases. Whilst the Mozambican parties reach a hurting stalemate, this is not the case in Rwanda. RPF gains superiority that could have forced the Habyarimana regime to step down. The outcome of the peacemaking processes is nevertheless two comprehensive negotiated settlements aimed to prescribe new political dispensations.

Finally, the process of involving the UN share similarities both compared to each other, but also to the typical way of resolving conflicts after the Cold War, i.e. to ask the UN to monitor, verify, or supervise the implementation of the settlements. The Security Council then authorises multifunctional peace operations, as distinct from other peace operations, to accomplish the separate, but interconnected, tasks. Thus, the UN deploys two peace operations of relative similar scope to solve conflicts that differ in nature.

This outline of the conflicts in the two cases functions as a backdrop for the further examination of how the UN seeks to end the conflicts.

5.

Assessing Conflict Transformation in Mozambique and Rwanda

This chapter assesses the UN interventions to secure a self-sustaining peace in Mozambique and Rwanda and then place the conflicts on a peaceful footing. The effectiveness is analysed by the ability of the multifunctional peace operations to accomplish their sub-goals. The chapter considers four sub-goals that prove importance for a successful conclusion of the peace processes: political leadership of the peace process, demilitarisation, reform of the security sector, and post-conflict elections.

The chapter considers the sub-goals in separate sections. Each section follows the same outline that compares ONUMOZ and UNAMIR in two parts: (i) the sub-goal as conceived in the peace agreements and as mandated by the Security Council; and (ii) the record of implementation. The sub-goals are considered in the following order: the political component, the military component, the police component, and the electoral component. Each section starts with a discussion that seeks to explain why the particular sub-goal has a relevancy for Conflict Transformation.

5.1 The Political Guidance of the Peace Operations

This section emphasises the political component of the two multifunctional peace operations to facilitate Conflict Transformation. Central to this is to assess whether ONUMOZ and UNAMIR proves effective to take the leadership of the peace processes in the two countries. This must be seen in relation to the mandate given from the peace agreements and the authorisation from the Security Council. The section compares the role of a political component as prescribed in the two peace-agreements, in the UN mandates, and the processes of implementation.

The political component of a multifunctional peace operation seeks to lead the political process from violent conflict to a self-sustaining peace. The component governs how the peace operation is exercised, and functions as catalyst for change and the guarantor for peace. Herein, the political component can take a strong lead and establish a channel in which tensions can be addressed and obstacles overcome. To guide the peace process successfully, political guidance needs to entail three components. First, the leadership of the component needs to be composed of people who are committed to Conflict Transformation. Second, to secure political guidance the political component must be designed a mandate that prescribes them with good working conditions and the right goals. Third, it needs to include the right institutional framework. The aim is to reconcile differences and find solutions to urgent problems on the path to positive peace. Thus, political guidance has a relevancy for Conflict Transformation.

5.1.1 Political Guidance in the Peace Agreements and the Mandates: Political Commission and Transitional Arrangement

The following sub-section considers the political component in the peace agreements and the mandates.

5.1.1.1 Mozambique: Political Commission

In Mozambique, Protocol V of the GPA considers detailed guarantees for the transitional period between the cease-fires and the holding of the elections. In this phase, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) is assigned the important role to oversee the entire peace process. The CSC would be empowered to replace the government in any matters related to the implementation of the Rome agreement. Representatives of the Mozambican parties, the UN, the OAU, and countries to be agreed upon would compose the Commission. The UN would chair the CSC.¹⁹⁵ The following six subsidiary commissions would assist the CSC in specific aspects of the GPA:

¹⁹⁵ "Protocol I Basic Principles", in *The General Peace Agreement for Mozambique* [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/moz4.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

Table 5.1.1.1: The Six Subsidiary Commissions to Assist the CSC196

Commission	Task
The Cease-Fire Commission (CFC)	Plan, verify, and monitor the cessation of the armed conflict, including the demobilisation process.
The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM)	Supervise the establishment of FADM.
The Reintegration Commission (CORE)	Monitor, verify, and conduct the economic and social reintegration of demobilised soldiers.
The National Election Commission (CNE)	Conduct the electoral process.
The National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL)	Monitor and verify the performance of the police.
The National Commission for State Affairs (CNA)	Conduct the relationship between areas held by the government and Renamo.

The public administration in Mozambique would seek to ensure the maintenance of peace and the creation of the necessary climate for the holding of free and fair elections. The GPA denies a power-sharing arrangement. Instead, Frelimo and Renamo would separately govern the territories they claimed at the signing of the peace agreement. Both parties would respect the other's governance without interference.¹⁹⁷ The CSC would function as a bridge between the two administrations. The Commission would seek to settle disputes between the Mozambican parties. It would also seek to reconcile any differences in the interpretation of the GPA. Finally, the CSC has a coordinating role for the subsidiary commissions to be established to deal with the demilitarisation of the conflict.¹⁹⁸

ONUMOZ's mandate is clearly influenced by the GPA. The mandate says that the Special Representative would be responsible for the political guidance of the peace process. The chairmanship of the CSC would be a central part of this role. The key responsibility is to create an environment in which the election process and its outcome would be accredited international fairness. The Commission would seek to settle any disputes that would be brought to the surface, and urge compliance upon the parties. However, an important notice is that the SRSG is not authorised to compel the parties to implement the GPA completely.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ "Protocol V Guarantees" in The General Peace Agreement for Mozambique [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/moz4.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

¹⁹⁷ The GPA tasks the parties to reintegrate the areas under a single administration. See *ibid*.

¹⁹⁸ "Protocol V Guarantees".

¹⁹⁹ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ". *Security Council Document S/24892*, 3 December 1992: paragraph 18.

5.1.1.2 Rwanda: Transitional Institutions

The protocol on power sharing defines the transitional arrangement in Rwanda. A Multi-Party Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) would govern Rwanda during its 22 month-long transition. These institutions would come into life thirty-seven days after the signing of the agreement. Until then, Habyarimana's government would retain power. The 1991 constitution and the Arusha Peace Agreement would form "indissolubly" the Fundamental Law, and in cases of conflict, the latter would be superior.²⁰⁰ The rationale for the BBTG is similar to that of the CSC. The BBTG is the media in which to address problems arising during the implementation.

The Security Council mandates UNAMIR to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali from deployment until the holding of elections. The Arusha Accord makes no provisions for a political commission. The BBTG would care for this function. Thus, it is left for the parties themselves to create an environment that could lead to elections. UNAMIR does not have a clear political role. Nonetheless, a SRSG would be assigned the political leadership of UNAMIR.²⁰¹

5.2.1.3 Summing Up

The above section has been aimed to compare the provisions for a political component in the two peace agreements and the mandates. The exercise finds that the two peace agreements in Mozambique and Rwanda portray different transitional arrangements, and define different roles for the UN peace operations as the guarantor for peace and Conflict Transformation. The fundamental difference between the two cases is found in the nature of the role the UN would play with respect to the transitional authority. In Mozambique, both the agreement and the mandate make provisions for a political commission, an administrative authority, to supervise the implementation. In Rwanda, neither the Arusha Agreement nor the mandate provides UNAMIR's political component to take a lead in a political commission. Instead, the role of UNAMIR would be to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Whilst the

²⁰⁰ "Protocol on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front", *The Arusha Agreement* [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

²⁰¹ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda, requesting establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the integration of UNOMOR into UNAMIR", *Security Council Document S/26488*, 24 September 1993: paragraph 66.

belligerents in Mozambique agree to control separate areas, the Rwandan parties would govern together in the BBTG. Finally, the already existing law would prevail in Mozambique, whereas the peace agreement together with the 1991 constitution would be the law to obey to in Rwanda.

5.1.2 Implementing the Political Components

The following section aims to examine ONUMOZ's and UNAMIR's record of implementation with respect to the political components.

5.1.2.1 Mozambique: Surmounting the Differences

The political component of ONUMOZ provides leadership to the implementation of the GPA. The political component does so in two ways: first, through active mediation and diplomacy; and second, through the chairs of the commissions set up under the GPA structure. After the lengthy war, the overarching aim confronting ONUMOZ is a political issue. The political component of ONUMOZ has to foster a new spirit of trust between Frelimo and Renamo. Only under these circumstances can the peace accord be materialised. The section below examines the two interlinked leadership mechanisms.

The Secretary-General expedites Aldo Ajello as his Special Representative in Mozambique. He arrives in Mozambique mid October 1992 with military observers and works to set up the apparatus for the forthcoming implementation. However, it would take six months after the resolution mandating the operation before the force comes up to its full strength. There are a number of reasons for this. The UN member states express concerns about the costs. Moreover, with the deployments in Cambodia, Somalia, and Former Yugoslavia, the UN has already deployed a number of operations around the globe. Most worryingly, UNAVEM II remains in place in Angola after the collapse of the peace process there. The project in Angola is very similar to that now proposed for Mozambique.²⁰² The financial concern becomes a recurring issue in the Security Council only to be solved well into 1993.

The SRSG and his team encounter several tests that have forced the UN elsewhere to withdraw. However, in Mozambique Ajello plays a leading role executing his political skills to contrive the indifferences through flurry diplomatic activity and mediation. The first test comes at the outset. Renamo refuses to relocate its headquarter from Gorongosa (central

²⁰² Macqueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960*, 157.

Mozambique) to Maputo. In his right, Dhlakama argues that he neither has the resources nor the guaranteed safety to do so. He approaches the government to provide logistical support, but Frelimo claims the lack of the sufficient means. These setbacks make it impossible to set up the monitoring and verification machinery that the GPA prescribes. Ajello reconciles the differences when he facilitates a meeting between the parties. It proves decisive and eventuates in the first assembly for the CSC taking place in the beginning of November 1992.²⁰³

A timely intervention by Ajello is also instrumental to resolve two ceasefire violations. The first comes in June 1993 when Renamo detains 27 people alleged of poaching in its controlled area. Frelimo owns responsibility for the second when the government claims four villages considered rightfully under its control.²⁰⁴ In this, the SRSB takes advantage of the CFC and solves the problems.

A third test comes when the Security Council considers the report on progress of the implementation after six months. ONUMOZ informs the Security Council that the timetable is unrealistic and needs to be reviewed.²⁰⁵ The Secretary-General arrives in Maputo and states that unless the impasse is broken withdrawal of ONUMOZ would follow.²⁰⁶ The parties express commitment and settle outstanding issues.²⁰⁷ Then, the Security Council authorises a renewal of the mandate first for six months and then in May 1994 until November the same year.²⁰⁸

²⁰³ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, 24.

²⁰⁴ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/26385*, 30 August 1993: paragraph 10; Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Few Cease-Fire Violations", in *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 4 (June 1993): 4.

²⁰⁵ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General in ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/26034*, 30 June 1993: paragraphs 21-3.

²⁰⁶ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/26666*, 1 November 1993: paragraphs 45-51.

²⁰⁷ The assembly and demobilisation of both parties' troops; disarmament of militias; the composition of the NEC; the system and timetable for the new electoral law; and new arrangements are devised for the leadership of the Commission of Administration and the National Police Affairs and Information.

²⁰⁸ United Nations, "Resolution 882 (1993)", *Security Council Document S/RES/882*, 5 November 1993; "Resolution 916 (1994)", *Security Council Document S/RES/916*, 5 May 1994.

Herein, the manoeuvres Ajello takes in relation to Dhlakama are essential. Ajello, according to himself, succeeds to convince Dhlakama of three important things: that (i) Renamo stands a better chance as a political party; (ii) the international community is willing to assist Renamo's transformation if clear commitment to the peace and the elections are held; and (iii) that the presence of UN is a guarantor for free and fair elections.²⁰⁹ Thus, Ajello succeeds to ensure Dhlakama's commitment to the peace process by applying carrots and sticks.

In addition, the political component carries its leadership through the various commissions. Moreover, the close affiliation between the SRSG and the international community, the member states of the CSC in particular, represents another cornerstone to stir the peace process. Frelimo and Renamo delegations along with representatives from Italy, Britain, Portugal, the US and the OAU make up the Commission. The CSC enjoys the overall responsibility for the implementation of the GPA. It is the vehicle to drive the peace process forward. Later, Ajello argues that the composition of the CSC makes it possible to coordinate the process and act in real time to avoid exploration of differences.²¹⁰ Moreover, as Boutros-Ghali argues:

As provided in the General Peace Agreement, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) became the key mechanism for sustaining both the momentum and the involvement of the international community. The United Nations chairmanship of the CSC and the other commissions charged with implementing the accords greatly facilitated rapid, objective problem-solving. Whenever difficulties were encountered, the CSC was able to convene negotiations that succeeded in persuading the parties to adhere to their commitments. This form of collective oversight, involving the two parties, the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and ambassadors of Mozambique's donor countries allowed for flexible management and for adjustments to the time-table when such recourse became unavoidable.²¹¹

However, observers are critical to the role of the countries represented in the CSC. These comments come from different angels. Saul conceptualises the process as an "*institutionalising of the Westernisation*".²¹² He is critical to the gradual expanding role that

²⁰⁹ Aldo Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement", in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, eds. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 625-8.

²¹⁰ Moisés Venâncio, "Can Peace-Keeping be Said to have Worked in Mozambique? (Bye Bye ONUMOZ)", in *War and Peace in Mozambique*, eds. Stephen Chan and Moises Vênâncio (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 99-100.

²¹¹ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 67.

²¹² Saul, "On War and Peace in Africa: The Mozambican Case", 131.

the Western powers take during the negotiations, and the more intense position in the implementation process.²¹³ As an extension of this critique, Hanlon concludes that ONUMOZ accomplishes the Post-Cold War goals of the US rather than the more balanced directives from the UN.²¹⁴ They are both negative to the strong lead that the West take.

On the other hand, it is worthwhile to refer to Ajello. He admits that he decided only to act after regular consultation with the ambassadors of the major powers and to act on their authority rather than that of the headquarters in New York.²¹⁵ Moreover, the then US ambassador to Mozambique Dennis Jett supports Ajello. The Ambassador states that the western authorities “*dogged the process daily, participating in virtually every decision made affecting the Mozambican transition*”.²¹⁶

Thus, there are reasons to be sceptical of the role that the Western countries play although the Secretary-General defines their role to be crucial for a peaceful conclusion of the Mozambican conflict.²¹⁷ The “Core Group” of ambassadors plays an important role as a source of strategic coordination among bilateral actors and means by which SRSB can bolster authority.²¹⁸

Despite these institutional arrangements and the susceptibility of both parties to international pressure, the peace process starts to lose impetus in March 1993. Again, Renamo alleges logistical and financial complaints. Consequently, Dhlakama withdraws his organisation from Maputo and paralyses the work of the commissions. At the same time, the process of

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Joseph Hanlon, *African Agenda* Vol. 1 No. 5 (1995): 15-6.

²¹⁵ Aldo Ajello, “Introductory Statement”, in *International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)*, ed. Winrich Kühne. Organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (New York Office) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Ebenhausen (Germany) New York (March 27 1995): 12.

²¹⁶ Dennis Jett, “Lessons Unlearned - Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere”, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (1995) <<http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm>> (20.April 2004).

²¹⁷ For an emphasised argument, in general terms, on this point see Roland Paris, “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28 No. 4 (2002): 637-56.

²¹⁸ Bruce D. Jones, “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination”, in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Civil Wars*, eds, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 99-100.

demilitarisation stalls as well as discussions on the electoral law (see below sections).²¹⁹ Renamo insists that without financial assistance there can be no democracy.²²⁰ Ajello understands the game and identifies the currency needed for the process to get on track again; pressure from the UN and the international community together with the availability of US\$ 17,5 million is the solution for Renamo to retake office in Maputo. Aware of this situation, Ajello argues that the international community has to pay the prize despite its 'political incorrectness'.²²¹ Furthermore, the international community acknowledges that Renamo as a viable political force in the peace process is needed for a successful conclusion.²²² The Trust Fund would help Renamo to transform into a political party as much as the the Renamo officials could sustain themselves in a civilian life. Assistance is also provided to socialise Renamo into a democratic tradition, and to make its legitimacy contingent upon accomplishing its commitment to peace.²²³ In short, ONUMOZ's political leadership manages to address the spoiler problem effectively.

In this, the UN and a few committed individuals representing the international community demonstrate clear sensitivity to the political reality in the Mozambican peace process in two different ways. First, the Trust Fund provides substantial financial support for Renamo to translate from an insurgency to that of a political party. The Fund provides Renamo to exercise an electoral campaign, as well as it makes Dhlakama capable to reward and assist Renamo's leadership in adjusting to a new civilian costume. Second, the Security Council authorises an extension of the mandate that proves its sensitivity to the context. However, certain conditions have to be met, most importantly a commitment by the parties to continue. In short, by ensuring the political guidance through diplomacy and mediation together with chairing the CSC the political component of ONUMOZ proves effective.

²¹⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, 28-9.

²²⁰ Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?*, 146.

²²¹ "Mozambique: Funding for Peace", *Africa Confidential* Vol. 34 No. 10 (May 14, 1993): 4.

²²² Carrie Manning, "Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as Political Party", *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 24 No. 1 (March 1998): 161-90.

²²³ Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes": 40-3.

5.1.2.2 Rwanda: the Politics of Genocide

The situation in Rwanda is different. UNAMIR struggles to take the influential lead. With the absence of a political commission such as the CSC, the Special Representative, Booh-Booh, is contingent on mediation and diplomacy only to stir the peace process. UNAMIR is not provided to play the central role with respect to a transitional authority. This is despite that the Arusha Accords plea for a strong third party to function as a guarantor for the implementation. Instead, much is left for the Rwandan parties themselves to secure a peaceful outcome. It represents a challenge. The belligerents previously fighting each other are now supposed to reconcile. The spoilers in Rwanda are not susceptible to financial resources. Instead, they pursue an extremist almost ideological agenda of ethnic cleansing that must be seen in relation to the zero-sum nature of conflict. In short, it represents a formidable challenge to defeat.

In Rwanda, the parties use the time of the UN deployment to obstruct the process by subjecting every issue for discussion. Thus, either UNAMIR or forces within the Rwandan political system manage to accomplish the mandate given from the Arusha Accord. In particular, problems arise concerning the installation of the transitional institutions that challenges the existence of the UN presence in Rwanda. To give explanations to the failure of UNAMIR it is necessary to examine these challenges.

When the Security Council endorses the plan of the reconnaissance mission led by General Dallaire in October 1993, it is already twenty-one days after the BBTG should have been inaugurated. The mandate explicitly assumes cooperation as insurance for further UN deployment.²²⁴ Boutros-Ghali asks his old friend and Cameroon's former Foreign Minister, Jaques-Roger Booh-Booh to serve as his Special Representative in Rwanda. Until his arrival, the Force Commander, General Dallaire, functions as the SRSG. As UN member countries have been demonstrating reluctance to deploy peace operations, so are they sceptical towards UNAMIR.

The first test occurs even before UNAMIR comes operational in December 1993. Assassination of the first democratically elected president in the neighbouring Burundi, the Hutu Melchior Ndadaye, in October affects the peace process in Rwanda seriously.²²⁵

²²⁴ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26488*: paragraphs 21-30.

²²⁵ Although the Hutus are the majority group in Burundi, as in Rwanda, the Burundian Tutsi Elite rules the country in the post-independent era. Following a range of political reforms, the Tutsi regime opens for power

Prospects for power sharing sweep away and fuel the Hutu hardliners to feel threatened by the Tutsis.²²⁶ At the same time, UNAMIR notes that a “*well-armed and reportedly ruthless group*” tries to disrupt the peace process.²²⁷ Nonetheless, the SRSG wins assurance from the Kigali government and RPF that they will cooperate and install the transitional government by the end of December.²²⁸ UNAMIR escorts RPF civilian leaders to Kigali that is the first move to establish the BBTG.²²⁹ The Secretary-General reports of no cease-fire violations, but identifies the potential danger after the Burundian crisis. However, he states that a reduction of the UNAMIR contingent would have a negative effect.²³⁰ The Security Council supports his argument.²³¹

The splints in the opposition parties occur that cause a stalemate in the process of installing the BBTG. This is the second test for UNAMIR. According to Jones, the fragmentation is a part of a three-pronged strategy processed by extremist forces. First, a process of *demonisation* substantially increases propaganda against the Tutsis and the RPF; second, the process of *mobilisation* sees the establishment of an armed opposition to the RPF, especially by the *interahamwe* militia; and third, the *polarisation* attracts the political centre to take refuge in either of the wings.²³² Consequently, the emergence of fractions plays havoc with the math used in the distribution of seats at Arusha.²³³ Habyarimana, on the rejections of RPF, demands positions for the CDR in the TNA. Although Habyarimana is sworn in as interim

sharing and Government of National Unity. However, elements within the Tutsi dominated army want it otherwise and launch a military coup. The assassination follows that triggers acts of genocide. Between 50,000 and 100,000 people are killed. Mainly Hutus are attacked. Moreover, the ensuing instability drives almost 400,000 Burundians into Rwanda.

²²⁶ Alison Des Forges, “*Leave None to Tell the Story*”: *Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, Washington, London, and Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 134-40.

²²⁷ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26927*, 30 December 1993: paragraph 18.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*: paragraphs 4-6.

²²⁹ Six hundred RPF troops are also transported to Kigali to offer protection to their civilian leaders.

²³⁰ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26927*: paragraph 30.

²³¹ United Nations, “Resolution 893 (1994)”, *Security Council Document S/RES/893*, 6 January 1994.

²³² Bruce D. Jones, “UN Peacekeeping and the Collapse of Arusha: Implementation Efforts” chapter five in *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 32-41, 111-3.

²³³ For details of the proposed composition of the BBTG see “Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government”, in *The Arusha Accords*.

president 5 January 1994, the peace process stalls as the remaining transitional institutions are yet to be installed.²³⁴

In this, Booh-Booh demonstrates lack of strength. Observers have critically assessed Booh-Booh's bearing. Central in this critique is the argument that the SRSG downplays the magnitude of the information Dallaire provides him with. Consequently, DPKO is fed with different information from two sources in the same operation. Moreover, that Booh-Booh is biased to the Government and opts for RPF to accept CDR as a member in the BBTG.²³⁵ General Dallaire raises a critical voice as well.²³⁶ On the other hand, Prunier argues that the SRSG does his best to avoid being partial. In his argument, he shows that Booh-Booh takes issues with both sides.²³⁷

Already as a leader of the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, General Dallaire made conclusions that a strong force of some 5,000 men is necessary to address the situation in Rwanda, and makes him later claim that this force could have staved off the genocide. Nonetheless, General Dallaire as the Force Commander could have addressed the situation differently. It is possibly to think of another scenario. The Force Commander could have approached the extremist spoilers in Rwanda with deterrence. In some ways, the spoilers need to be managed in the same way as they threaten the peace process. However, this is problematic for UNAMIR. The credibility of such threats would have been questioned by UNAMIR's few and light weighted resources. Moreover, the operation could have encountered a situation where it clashed with the spoilers and thus damaged its own interests of being neutral. However, Ajello illustrates that being partial sometimes helps the overall process. The point to make is that General Dallaire's humanitarian face functions to be too soft in the meeting with the spoilers. Moreover, to help this cause, the Security Council could have provided him with Chapter VII provisions.

²³⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-96* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 31-5.

²³⁵ Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, 93-4; Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": *Genocide in Rwanda*, 173.

²³⁶ See Lieutenant-General Dallaire, *Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 118-9, 149.

²³⁷ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 204.

Moreover, the UNAMIR operation, according to Stedman, fails to strategically address the spoiler problem. As the political leadership of the UNAMIR operation applies the threat of withdrawal as primarily strategy it fails to punish the CDR as the total spoiler. When this is said, UNAMIR fails to facilitate a unified international approach to manage the spoiler problem. Moreover, UNAMIR targets Habyarmina as the main spoiler when CDR demonstrates to be the real problem.²³⁸ However, management of the CDR as the total spoiler might have avoided the tragic outcome in April 1994. In this, military threats might have been the only language CDR would have understood.

UNAMIR encounters, however, not only a spoiler problem. Another set of problems are in the provisions as defined in the Arusha Accords. The armed forces are not included in the peace agreement. This signifies that parts of the conflict are not resolved, and can thus neither be transformed. The peace agreement is naïve. It does not include the powerful people, i.e. the 'Hutu Power'.²³⁹

Observers are additionally critical to the international community. General Dallaire, bypassing Booh-Booh, attempts to bring attention from New York without any success. Information of possibly extermination of Tutsis and stockpiling of arms fell on deaf ears although it is passed on from a close confidant to Habyarimana.²⁴⁰ More worrying, Melvern argues that the warnings from General Dallaire are not presented to the members of the Security Council. The Security Council is not made aware of the situation, and could therefore not make decisions in accordance with Dallaire's notification. According to Melvern, the Security Council sees Rwanda "*not as the smouldering volcano that it really was, but rather as a small civil war*".²⁴¹ However, Paris and Washington have gathered intelligence information on their own portraying genocidal activities, but keep the knowledge to their chests without notifying the non-permanent members of the Council or UNAMIR.²⁴² Kuperman denies the possibility that the Clinton administration possesses this kind of

²³⁸ Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes": 20-6.

²³⁹ The concept of 'Hutu Power' is borrowed from Gourevitch.

²⁴⁰ Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House, 2003), 141-51.

²⁴¹ Linda Melvern, "The Security Council: Behind the Scenes", *Security Dialogue* Vol. 77 No. 1: (2001) 103-5.

²⁴² *Ibid.*: 105.

information.²⁴³ In response, des Forges takes side with Melvern, and argues that US officials know of a possibly genocide.²⁴⁴

Moreover, not only supporting the argument of the American knowledge, Power designates the US to own a special responsibility to the failure of boosting UNAMIR's mandate. Washington and London oppose to exceed the original mandate. For them, the costs and risks of an enlargement are too high. The Clinton Administration is impatient with the Rwanda problem. It is accountable to an anti-UN Congress and has to prove to be selective when it comes to involvement in peace operations. The deaths of US soldiers in Somalia the year before together with the difficult interventions in Haiti and Bosnia dissuade the US Administration from taking more responsibility.²⁴⁵ In fact, the death of the 18 Americans in Somalia triggers a major US reassessment of the validity of peace operations.²⁴⁶ Then there is the incident when Hutu attackers kill the ten Belgium soldiers. With Somalia fresh in memory, the Hutu elite analyses that such a massacre would prompt Belgium withdrawal.²⁴⁷ Their analysis proves correct. Belgian authorities make the decision to pull out, and with that goes UNAMIR's third largest contingent.²⁴⁸ Moreover, the incident confirms the US officials' assumption that Rwanda is Somalia's "twin sister".²⁴⁹ It is clear that the international community is not willing to make commitments to secure a peaceful outcome in Rwanda.

A third test comes when Habyarimana and his allies take advantage of the UN debates whether or not to boost UNAMIR's mandate. Thus, as an attempt to win time, Habyarimana

²⁴³ See Alan J. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 79 No. 1 (January/February 2000): 94-118.

²⁴⁴ Alison des Forges, "Shame: Rationalizing Western Apathy on Rwanda", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 79 No. 3 (May/June 2000): 141-2.

²⁴⁵ Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen", *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 2001) <www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/09/power.htm> (30.04.2004).

²⁴⁶ Harry Summers, *The New World Strategy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 186-9.

²⁴⁷ Samantha Power, "Rwanda: "Mostly in Listening Mode", chapter ten in *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 332.

²⁴⁸ Astri Suhrke, "Facing Genocide: The Record of the Belgian Battalion in Rwanda", *Security Dialogue* Vol. 29 No. 1 (1998): 39-43.

²⁴⁹ Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, "Back to the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 7 No. 4 (2000): 170-75.

is late to set up the BBTG only to apply manipulation and postponements.²⁵⁰ Again, the SRSG arranges multiparty negotiations to diminish the differences between the parties in February. Using the only leverage available, Booh-Booh threatens of withdrawal. MRDN obstructs the compromise, and those to come. Instead, outbreak of violence occurs throughout Rwanda. RPF and other opposition parties boycott final attempts to install the BTGG in the end of the same month.²⁵¹ Then, Tanzanian officials enter the stage and broker a new list of individuals for government positions. Habyarimana rejects the list and renews the demand to include CDR in the TNA. RPF insists that only subscribers to the Arusha process can take up seats. Then, when CDR pledges its support to the peace process the opposition parties question the honesty.²⁵² Neither an appeal from the international diplomatic corps manages to break the impasse.

Facing the impending expiration of the UNAMIR mandate, human rights organisations and other NGOs make pleas with the Security Council. Withdrawal would cause more harm than good, goes the argument. The Secretary-General recommends the extension of UNAMIR's mandate with the, by now, usually bold statement that the Security Council would review the situation and the UN role if the transitional institutions are not established.²⁵³ Within the Security Council, a compromise is reached 5 April and the Council renews the mandate for three new months. Habyarimana, in front of his counterparts at a regional summit in Dar es Salaam, guarantees his commitment to the peace process. Other forces want it otherwise, however, and his plane is shot down as it is to land in Kigali in the morning 7 April.²⁵⁴ A test the UN cannot overcome and virtually proves to be the starting shot for the following genocide.

Two weeks into the genocide, the Secretary-General presents three options for the Security Council concerning the future of UNAMIR: (i) boost UNAMIR's mandate with extended

²⁵⁰ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 208.

²⁵¹ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/360*: paragraphs 12-22.

²⁵² Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 208.

²⁵³ United Nations, "Second progress report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR for the period from 30 December to 30 March 1994, requesting an extension of its mandate for a period of six months", *Security Council Document S/1994/360*, 30 March 1994: paragraph 47.

²⁵⁴ Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000), 111-4.

authority under Chapter VII provision to pressure the parties to a cease-fire; (ii) reduce the operation to 270 personnel to act as an intermediary to seek an agreement on a cease-fire; or, (iii) complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.²⁵⁵ Then, the Security Council on 21 April adjusts the mandate according to the second alternative.²⁵⁶ With this decision, the message to the extremist forces is clear; they could now wage their genocide.

In short, as Khadiagala correctly notes, the peace process in Rwanda demonstrates that there is a gap between the expectations defined in the Accords and the UN's decision-making system. First, the peace process is hostage to an unrealistic timetable. Only thirty-seven days are set aside for the establishment of the transitional institutions. The second gap represents the difference in the nature of resources committed. In general, with the Arusha Accord the parties apply for more resources than the Security Council is willing to set aside.²⁵⁷ Consequently, UNAMIR proves ineffective.

5.1.2.3 Summing Up

This section has been tasked to examine the record of implementation concerning the political leadership of the peace operations. The records of implementation vary between ONUMOZ and UNAMIR.

In Mozambique, the political component manages to guide the peace process effectively. First, the component's leadership is composed of people who are committed to Conflict Transformation. In this, there are two crucial factors contributing to effectiveness: (i) Ajello's interpretation and manoeuvring skills, and (ii) a few powerful people who care deeply about Mozambique and who are able to set Mozambique on the agenda in the right forums. Second, the interim institutions represent the necessary institutional framework in which some of the legacies of the civil war can be overcome, and thereby promote Conflict Transformation. Third, both the GPA and ONUMOZ's mandate give prescriptions for healthy working

²⁵⁵ United Nations, "Special Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR, containing a summary of the developing crisis in Rwanda and proposing three options for the role of the United Nations in Rwanda", *Security Council Document S/1994/470*, 20 April 1994: paragraphs 8-19.

²⁵⁶ United Nations, "Resolution 912 (1994)", *Security Council Document S/RES/912*, 21 April 1994.

²⁵⁷ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda", in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Civil Wars*, eds, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 481-2.

conditions and the right goals so that the political component is given the authority to place the conflict on a peaceful footing.

In Rwanda, UNAMIR's political component proves ineffective in taking the same influential lead and fails to foster a new spirit of trust between the parties. There are many reasons explaining the lack of effectiveness in Rwanda. First, neither Dallaire nor Booh-Booh could demonstrate the same personal qualities as did Ajello. Booh-Booh appears less committed to the peace process. Dallaire performs with good intentions, but lacks however the indispensable strong hand to make the Rwandan parties adhere to the peace agreement. Second, the UN team in Rwanda is not in possession of the same opportunities that the systems of commissions that ONUMOZ could unravel. UNAMIR would not chair a political commission or the like. The Rwandan belligerents are left to themselves to kiss and make up without the Special Representative as the strong leading friend. UNAMIR illustrates that ineffective implementation can hinder transitional arrangements to build the confidence, norms, or institutions that are associated with power-sharing and well-managed transition. Third, UNAMIR's political component is not allocated a mandate that prescribes them with good working conditions and the right goals.

In short, ONUMOZ's political component manages to take control over the peace process, and UNAMIR's political component fails to take the same strong lead.

5.2 Demilitarisation of Combatants: Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Army Mergence

This section examines demilitarisation as an aspect of the Conflict Transformation project in Mozambique and Rwanda. The aim is to compare demilitarisation as prescribed in the two peace-agreements, in the UN mandates, and the processes of implementation. The purpose of this is to demonstrate that demilitarisation is a pivotal aspect of the Conflict Transformation process, and if not secured properly relapse to violence is likely. Whilst examining the two cases, the critical factors for either success or failure appear.

Demilitarisation of combatants is a pertinent aspect of the political dimension of Conflict Transformation. The objective is to exchange military capacity for political benefits.²⁵⁸ The

²⁵⁸ Annika S. Hansen and Brynjar Lia, "The Role of International Security Assistance in Support of Peace Agreements in War-Torn Societies", *FFI Report No 98/05291* (Kjeller, Norway: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt [Norwegian Defense Research Establishment], December 1998).

concept of demilitarisation is broad and encompasses both the practices of demobilisation and disarmament, as well as the integration of former belligerents to unified armed forces. Thus, the section examines some of the military functions of ONUMOZ and UNAMIR.

The nature of the disarmament process can take two different forms. Clear victors in wars or interventionist forces execute coercive disarmament. Cooperative disarmament is common in situations where negotiated solutions terminate violent conflicts rather than a clear winner. The following section contemplates the latter, but acknowledges that the distinction is blurred both by peace agreements and through practice. Disarmament is relevant to conflict termination of two reasons: (i) it provides a secure removal of the means to continue warfare; and (ii) it creates a stable environment.²⁵⁹

Demobilisation is the process of complete disbanding or reduction of military units. Berdal suggests that demobilisation takes place at two levels. At the structural level, it disbands military formations, and at the individual level, it releases combatants from a mobilised state.²⁶⁰ Reintegration of former combatants to society is a very important aspect of demobilisation. It helps to break the ties to the fighting unit for the ex-soldiers, and incorporates them to the attainment of financial independence through involvement in productive activities in a civilian costume. The demobilisation and reintegration process involves a range of sequential activities: identifying and discharging ex-combatants; assembling them in cantonment areas; transporting them to their communities of origin; providing benefit packages; providing training; and facilitate transition to civilian life.²⁶¹

Integration of former belligerents in common armed forces is another vital feature of demilitarisation. Provisions for such integration are often made clear in the peace agreement, as is its composition. Nonetheless, if not secured aptly, sections of the armies could feel alienated and resume to violence.

²⁵⁹ Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilisation", in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141.

²⁶⁰ Mads Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil War". *Adelphi Paper* no 303 (London: IISS and Oxford University Press, 1996), 39.

²⁶¹ Nicole Ball, "Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa", in *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, ed. Krishna Kumar (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 86-90.

Successful demilitarisation enhances the chances for mutual trust and reduces the risks of renewed hostilities. Demilitarisation, if executed properly, functions to secure the peace process. The experience of war-torn societies indicates that when effective demilitarisation has not or could not occur, fragile peace agreements could be jeopardised and conflicts reign.²⁶² However, demilitarisation is not a straightforward process. Assistance from a third party would help to exercise the task of verification. Thus, secure the chances for properly and equally implementation of the demilitarisation programme. Finally, verification plays the role to determine compliance or non-compliance, deter cheating, and build confidence between the parties.²⁶³

In short, disarmament, demobilisation, and integration of armed forces are factors necessary to demilitarise politics and thus contribute to Conflict Transformation.

5.2.1 Demilitarisation in the Peace Agreements and in the Mandates

The section examines and compares the issue of demilitarisation as conceived in the peace agreements, and how the UN organises demilitarisation programmes as a specific aspect of the peace processes. In both cases, successful demilitarisation is set out as a precondition for the holding of elections that would mark the end of the peace operations.

5.2.1.1 Mozambique

Protocol IV of the GPA considers demilitarisation in Mozambique. The parties agree to demobilise both of the parties' armed forces and reintegrate ex-combatants to a civilian life; collect all individual and collective weapons; and establish a new 30,000-strong army equally divided between the parties. The GPA demands the withdrawal of the Zimbabwean and Malawian troops for the process of demobilisation to start. To accomplish the programme, the following three commissions would oversee specific processes: the CCF, the CORE, and the CCFADM.²⁶⁴

²⁶² Spear, 142-4.

²⁶³ Trevor Findlay, "Post Conflict Demilitarization: The Role of Verification", paper presented to the MacArthur Seminar on Regional Security in a Global Context, Department of War Studies, King's College, London, February 2, 1999.

²⁶⁴ "Protocol IV Military Questions", in *The General Peace Agreement for Mozambique* [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/moz4.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

However, the GPA is problematic. The parties do not define the numbers of soldiers that would be demobilised, and neither the number that would be demobilised before the ONUMOZ operation would be deployed. The GPA is additionally silent on the issues of government militia and the police. The parties do not define the content of the disarmament concept, and thus leave it to the implementers to decide.

ONUMOZ's demilitarisation programme grows out of the GPA. The mandate defines the task of the military component to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of the FAM and Renamo's forces in assembly areas; their demobilisation; and the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons; the complete withdrawal of foreign troops; and the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups.²⁶⁵ The GPA does not foresee a role for the UN in the formation of the new army, but the Security Council, on the request by the parties, involves ONUMOZ to chair the CCFADM.²⁶⁶

Therefore, the ONUMOZ operation is tasked to execute a demilitarisation program including both the process of demobilisation, disarmament, and formation of the new Armed Forces for Defence of Mozambique (FADM).

5.2.1.2 Rwanda

In Rwanda, the Arusha Accord contains settlements on military issues. The parties agree to demobilise and reintegrate the estimated 35,000 soldiers from both armies, but ignores the problem of financing the ex-combatants; formation of a new 19,000-strong army on a 60-40 percent in favour of the government; establish a gendarmerie; and disengage troops. The parties request a Neutral International Force (NIF) to conduct the demobilisation, supervise the disengagement of forces, and train the new armed forces.²⁶⁷

Consequently, the UNAMIR's mandate is heavily influenced by the Accord. However, the Security Council restricts the mandate in two ways. First, UNAMIR would only provide security in Kigali and not in the entire country as the Arusha Accord prescribes, and second UNAMIR would not sanction a seizure of arms. Further, the mandate authorises UNAMIR to monitor the cease-fire, including the establishment of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and the

²⁶⁵ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/24892*: paragraph 21.

²⁶⁶ United Nations, "Resolution 850 (1993)", *Security Council Document 850*, 9 July 1993.

²⁶⁷ "Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties", *The Arusha Accord* [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

demobilisation procedures; and supervise the integration of the Armed Forces and Gendarmerie.²⁶⁸ The demilitarisation process will start in phase two and fully be conducted in phase three. In short, the military component of UNAMIR is authorised to monitor a restricted demilitarisation programme.

5.2.1.3 Summing Up

The aim of the above section has been to compare the two demilitarisation programmes as prescribed in the negotiated settlements and in the mandates. It is apparent from the exercise that the GPA and the Arusha Accord portray demilitarisation as a vital aspect of the peace process, as do the two different mandates. In both cases, the day that the cease-fire comes into effect marks the beginning of the demilitarisation process and when troop cantonment will commence. Later, demobilisation and creation of the new armies will take place. In both cases, the holding of elections requires the accomplishment of the demilitarisation. Table 5.2.1.3 summarises these findings, and portrays the time schedule for demilitarisation as a function of Conflict Transformation in Mozambique and Rwanda. There are minor differences. Whilst withdrawal of foreign troops is an important aspect to get the process going in Mozambique, this is not an issue in Rwanda. The concept of disarmament is applied in Mozambique, and disengagement in Rwanda. The latter is a weaker and more blurred concept. Disengagement refers to the positioning of the opposing military forces beyond artillery range. Moreover, the Arusha Accord estimates the number of soldiers that would run through the demobilisation program. The GPA is silent on this issue. Finally, the Security restricts UNAMIR's mandate comparing it to the Arusha Accord. ONUMOZ is not exposed to such a limitation.

²⁶⁸ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26488*: paragraphs 21-30.

Table 5.2.1.3: Timetable for Demilitarisation as a function of Conflict Transformation in Mozambique and Rwanda

Steps to be taken	Mozambique	Rwanda
Cease-fire	E-Day ²⁶⁹	D-Day ²⁷⁰
Troop Cantonment	E-Day	D-Day
Formation of the new army	E-Day	D-Day
Withdrawal of foreign troops	E-Day + 6 (until day 30)	Not applicable
Demobilisation	E-Day + 30 (until day 180)	D-Day + 90 (until day 360)
Disarmament/Disengagement	E-Day + 31	D-Day + 90 (until day 360)
Elections	Between E-Day and E-Day + 365	Between D-Day + 360 and D-Day + 660

5.2.2 Implementation of the Demilitarisation Programs

The section below examines the processes of implementing the two different demilitarisation programmes.

5.2.2.1 Mozambique: Giving away the Military Option

To achieve demobilisation the ONUMOZ operation develops a comprehensive program, which combines the short-term goal of troop demobilisation with the long-term goal of social reintegration. To accomplish the former aim, the parties would order their troops to gather in separate assembly areas throughout the country (20 allocated for Renamo and 29 for Frelimo). A team of three military officers and one civilian would register the soldiers, arrange for disarmament and storage of their weaponry, process selected soldiers for the new national army, and finally the team would oversee the formal demobilisation and transport of ex-soldiers. According to the plan, it would take two months to process a soldier. The reintegration program, facilitated by CORE, provides grants to employ ex-soldiers and assists them in participation in community-based economies. Soldiers are additionally offered an 18-month subsidy in addition to their six-month demobilisation payment. They are also given career counselling and problem-solving services.²⁷¹ Thus, this is a programme that constructively would assist the peace process in Mozambique.

²⁶⁹ E-Day is the day on which the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique adopts the General Peace Agreement, i.e. 15 October 1992.

²⁷⁰ D-Day is the day on which the Transitional Government is to be installed.

²⁷¹ Boutros-Ghali. *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 38-42.

As seen above in table 5.2.1.3, the demilitarisation process is intended to start in November 1992 and end in April 1993. However, a slow beginning forces the Security Council to extend the mandate a year, and determines the elections to be held no later than October 1994.²⁷² With the reviewed timetable, the assembly areas in which the demobilisation will occur are set up and function as from February 1994.²⁷³ The actual demobilisation process starts March 1994 and ends five months later, and then the demobilisation accounts for a total of 80,769 Frelimo and 24,649 Renamo soldiers. However, it is not until July that the demobilisation process in fact picks up the pace. There are two main reasons to this. The late deployment of ONUMOZ and the lack of political will by Frelimo and Renamo. To understand the demobilisation process it is necessary to examine these factors more thoroughly.

The problems around deployment have consequences for the progress that must be examined in relation to the withdrawal of the foreign troops. At this stage, the Malawian and Zimbabwean troops function as peacekeepers along vital transport corridors.²⁷⁴ The UN assumes their withdrawal could jeopardise the peace project before the UN has been fully deployed. Renamo argues that absence of these biased peacekeepers is a necessity to start the demobilisation. At first, Renamo expresses mistrust to their presence, but the SRSRG assures Dhlakama that they are fulfilling an important task until the ONUMOZ operation arrives. Renamo, in return, proclaims that demobilisation would commence when sufficient UN presence is visible.²⁷⁵

The parties' lack of political will represents the second explanation of the slow pace. The tensions from the violent conflict are still prevalent and the parties share a mutually distrust. Frelimo and Renamo take turns to use the participation in the demobilisation process as an opportunity to negotiate and delay the peace project. Once Renamo stops obstructing the demobilisation process, Frelimo begins to do so. Moreover, the missing political wills take

²⁷² United Nations, "Resolution 850 (1993)", *Security Council Document S/RES/850*, 9 July 1993.

²⁷³ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26666*: paragraphs 5-12; United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/1994/511*, 28 April 1994: paragraph 5.

²⁷⁴ The foreign troops had been and continue to be deployed along the Beira, Nacala, Tete, and Limpopo corridors.

²⁷⁵ For Renamo, sufficient UN presence means 65 percent of the intended deployment. See Afonso Dhlakama, "Letter dated 7 January 1993 from Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama to the Secretary-General requesting urgent deployment of United Nations troops to Mozambique", in *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, United Nations, 170-1.

different expressions that have consequences at the operational level. This issue needs also a comprehensive examination.

From the outset, Frelimo and Renamo locate the assembly areas after strategic concerns rather than presuming logistical precautions. Neither party wants to give the other strategic advantages.²⁷⁶ The issue of accessibility has serious consequences both for the humanitarian situation in the cantonments and for the demobilisation procedure. Continuing disagreements cause delay in the opening of the assembly areas. By the end of November 1993, only 20 out of 49 assembly areas have been agreed to. Ajello intervenes and brokers agreement over the assembly areas, and the remaining areas function from February 1994.²⁷⁷ Thus, the cantonment starts a half-year after the full UN deployment, and year after the originally mandated plan.

In general, Dhlakama withholds his troops in order to preserve his bargaining power with Frelimo. He plays the military and political card simultaneously. Ajello arranges for the Trust Fund. Consequently, he is ready to initiate demobilisation. Then, the FAM is reluctant to demobilise although President Chissano gives impression of wanting it. The president lacks sufficient power over the armed forces. Pressure from the international community helps to give President Chissano the space he needs to conduct his mediation and convince the army to demobilise.²⁷⁸

Thus, the demobilisation process commences four months after troops had begun arriving at assembly points. Once started for real, the process is slow due to the problem in accurate troop statistic. The UN estimates that 81,000 Frelimo troops and 20,000 Renamo troops would be demobilised.²⁷⁹ The lists provided by the parties are however incorrect and

²⁷⁶ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/26666*: paragraphs 5-6.

²⁷⁷ Alden, "Political Violence in Mozambique: Past, Present, and Future": 47-8.

²⁷⁸ Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement", 628-34.

²⁷⁹ Roughly 14,000 Frelimo troops and 1,000 Renamo troops would assemble at their normal bases for demobilisation, and 38,000 and 19,000 respectively would register in the assembly areas. Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 39.

unreliable. Frelimo and Renamo exercise underreporting that increases mutual distrust, and they consequently suspect each other of holding back troops.²⁸⁰

In July 1994, slow progress eventuates in a crisis and the Security Council expresses worries of further delay.²⁸¹ The parties lack full control over their troops that proves to have positive consequences. The lengthened stay, together with the remote locations of the cantonments, contributes to overcrowding and food shortages. Consequently, the situation provokes unrest that is sometimes spilled outside the assembly areas.²⁸² Troops on both sides conceive the demobilisation as an incentive rather than to continue an armed career in the FADM. Ninety-seven percent of the troops want demobilisation once cash payment is known.²⁸³ They protest by various means and demand demobilisation. The worsening situation in the assembly areas increases the unrest. Nonetheless, at the top level both parties demonstrate reluctance to assembly and demobilise troops. They are still holding back their trusted troops from the central region. Those troops receiving green light first from their superiors are those from less vital units.²⁸⁴ The crisis in both armies gradually brings Frelimo and Renamo to find a common solution. Both endorse the principle saying that recruitment for the FADM would occur on a volunteer basis.²⁸⁵ Unsurprisingly, most soldiers choose the civilian life. The parties agree to 15 August as the final date for completion of demobilisation. The pace increases, but due to the amount of troops choosing demobilisation the process is concluded a week later.²⁸⁶ Table 5.2.2.1a shows the demobilisation figures.

²⁸⁰ Richard Syge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 95-8; Assis Malaquias, "The UN in Mozambique and Angola: Lessons Learned", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 3 No. 2 (Summer 1996): 96.

²⁸¹ United Nations, "Statement by the President of the Security Council 35 (1994)" *Security Council Document S/PRST/1994/35*, 19 July 1994.

²⁸² Reed.

²⁸³ Sam Barnes, "Peacekeeping in Mozambique", in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, 171-4.

²⁸⁴ Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Holding the Best for Last", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 5 (July 1994): 5-6.

²⁸⁵ Syge, 98-103.

²⁸⁶ United Nations, "Further Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/1994/1002*, 26 August 1994: paragraphs 6-8.

Table 5.2.2.1a: Cumulative Troop Cantonment and Demobilisation in Mozambique

	Frelimo Troops	Renamo Troops	Total	Percentage of Total
Initial group (1993)				
Registered	13,727	Not applicable	13,727	100
Demobilised	13,727	Not applicable	13,727	100
Assembly Areas				
Registered	43,409	17,524	60,933	100
Demobilised	39,301	14,142	53,453	88
Joined FADM	3,922	3,010	6,932	11
Absent	186	361	547	1
Non-Assembled Areas				
Registered	23,633	7,125	30,758	100
Demobilised	18,260	6,386	24,646	80
Joined FADM	4,594	651	5,245	17
Absent	779	88	867	3
Total				
Registered	80,769	24,649	105,418	100
Demobilised	71,288	20,538	91,826	87
Joined FADM	8,516	3,661	12,177	12
Absent	965	449	1,414	1

The targeted programmes for the demobilised soldiers consume almost \$95 million, proximately \$1000 per person. The international community donates \$83 million and the Maputo government provides \$10,5 million.²⁸⁷

In short, the demobilisation process in Mozambique demonstrates two crucial aspects to success. First, the Mozambican experience explains that civilian control of the armed forces is pivotal. The soldiers are willing to obey political directives made to secure the peace process. Consequently, civilian control helps to prevent the spoiler problem that military factions represent. Civilian control ensures that soldiers carry out what the peace process requires, and comply with the orders from their political leadership. Second, the process demonstrates the importance of offering incentives to the armed forces. It is rational for the military to settle in the barracks if financial compensation is guaranteed. Then looting is no longer the sole bread winning procedure. Recall the long period of fighting in Mozambique, and that troops might have lost their opportunities to gain professional skills to apply in a civilian life. Herein, there are two options. Provide either military salaries or reintegration into the civilian life also with

²⁸⁷ Barnes, 173-4.

financial guarantees. The demobilisation procedure in Mozambique practises both alternatives.

Disarmament represents the second aspect of demilitarisation. The aspect has clearly a lower priority than has demobilisation. Instead, the ONUMOZ approaches disarmament as a component of the process of demobilisation.²⁸⁸ The CFC approves rules saying that the UN personnel would only disarm demobilised soldiers within the assembly areas. There is an uncertainty about the quantity of weapons present in Mozambique. Estimates vary from 1,5 million to 6 million AK-47s, and there is no information about quantities of other types of light weapons.²⁸⁹ Table 5.2.2.1b gives an overview of the arms turned in. In short, the ONUMOZ fails to accomplish an effective disarmament for a numbers of reasons: (i) the parties anticipate reversal in peace process and retain as much weapons as the process allows them; (ii) ONUMOZ fails to set up a conceptual distinction between disarmament and demobilisation, as it has a restrictive mandate to disarm and likewise few resources; and (iii) no continuity of the disarmament after withdrawal.²⁹⁰ The operation collects 222,399 weapons, although the UN does not expect that disarmament is complete.²⁹¹ In short, ONUMOZ does not manage to disarm and collect all weapons.²⁹²

²⁸⁸ Alex Vines, "Disarmament in Mozambique", *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 24 No. 1 (March 1998): 191-205.

²⁸⁹ Chris Smith and Alex Vines, *Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa* (London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defense Studies, University of London, 1997), 18-29.

²⁹⁰ João Honwana, "Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development", in *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*, ed. Ricardo René Laremont (Heineman: Portsmouth, 2002), 204-5.

²⁹¹ Joseph Hanlon, Gil Lauriciano, and Rachel Waterhouse, "Reluctance to Demobilize", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 8 (February 1994): 2; United Nations, "Final report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/1994/1449*, 23 December 1994: paragraph 11; Joseph Hanlon, Gil Lauriciano, and Rachel Waterhouse, "Demob Data", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 14 (February 1995): 11.

²⁹² Some even argue that there were some five million small arms still in Mozambique at this time. These found their way to South Africa at a later stage and contributed to destabilise that country. See Vines, "Disarmament in Mozambique": 192-7.

5.2.2.1b: Disarmament in Mozambique

	Frelimo Weapons	Renamo Weapons	Paramilitary Weapons	Total
Assembly areas	73,673	14,627	43,491	131,791
Non-assembly areas	87,767	2,841	Not applicable	90,608
Total	161,440	17,468	43,491	222,399

The CCFADM, composed of Frelimo and Renamo officials together with representatives from France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, supervises the formation of the FADM.²⁹³ It faces the problem of identifying sufficient numbers of troops to form the new armed forces.²⁹⁴ Both parties are late to submit lists of soldiers to be trained and enrolled in the FADM.²⁹⁵ Moreover, because of the solution to the deadlock in the demobilisation process, the parties agree that the composition of the FADM would happen on a voluntarily basis. Subsequently, only one third of the numbered agreed to in the GPA volunteers for service.²⁹⁶ Table 5.2.13 illustrates that changes in the time schedule also have consequences for formation of the FADM. A total of 11,579 soldiers are enlisted in the FADM by December 1994.²⁹⁷

Financial and logistical constraints make it impossible to have all the trained units in operation.²⁹⁸ Officers from FAM and Renamo share jointly the command of the FADM. With the establishment of FADM, the military structures of the Maputo government and Renamo disband. The most senior officers on both sides are demobilised in August.²⁹⁹

In short, when the FADM is established the parties give away the military option that concludes the process of demilitarisation as a function of Conflict Transformation.

²⁹³ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/23685*, 30 August 1993: paragraphs 12-3 (1-36); United Nations, Security Council Document 26666: paragraphs 29-31.

²⁹⁴ In Rome, plans had been laid for an army of 24,000, an air force of 4,000, and a navy of 2,000 to give the total of 30,000.

²⁹⁵ Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Training Yet to Start", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 8 (February 1994): 8

²⁹⁶ Syge, 103-4.

²⁹⁷ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/1449*: paragraphs 14-6.

²⁹⁸ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/1449*: paragraph 16.

²⁹⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 42-4.

5.2.2.2 Rwanda: Mobilising for Genocide

In Rwanda, the process of demilitarisation would take place in the second phase. It would focus on the three aspects of disengagement, demobilisation, and integration of the armed forces and gendarmerie.³⁰⁰ The integration would be completed by the third phase. However, the belligerents in Rwanda want it otherwise.

The UNAMIR operation witnesses high-levelled tensions. In the first two months of 1994, there is an explosion of violence leading to vicious demonstrations, roadblocks, assassinations of political leaders, and murders of civilians. In the end of February, the security situation is worsening, and Melvern recalls that “*so serious was the violence that it seemed at times as though it would spiral out of control*”.³⁰¹ Increased military activity replaces demilitarisation. Instead of demobilisation, General Dallaire is made aware of the *Interahamwe* to exterminate Tutsis in Kigali as well as an increased mobilisation. Rather than disengagement, flagrant distribution of arms to militias and civilians from the Rwandan authority takes place in addition to a stockpiling of arms.³⁰² Against its will, UNAMIR supervises polarisation rather than the integration of the armies.³⁰³

As seen above, General Dallaire seeks permissions from the DPKO to take action with military force to sanction a seizure of arms. In practice, Dallaire requests the legitimate use of Chapter VII force and transformation of the multifunctional peace operation to that of peace enforcement. The DPKO declines the approach and encourages UNAMIR to consult Habyarimana with the growing problem. A man alleged to have instigated the mobilisation. In addition, the DPKO instructs the Force Commander to inform the ambassadors of Belgium, France, and the US.³⁰⁴ Moreover, the DPKO argues that the approval General Dallaire demands goes beyond the mandate that “*authorised the mission to contribute to the security*

³⁰⁰ The issue of the gendarmerie is discussed separately in the next section.

³⁰¹ Melvern, *A People Betrayed: the Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, 100.

³⁰² Stephen D. Goose and Frank Smyth, “Arming Genocide in Rwanda”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 73 No. 5 (September/October 1994): 86-96.

³⁰³ Khadiagala, “Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda”, 486.

³⁰⁴ Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, “Request for Protection of Informant”, *fax sent to Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, 11 January 1994* [Available Online] <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/cable.html> [19 May 2004]; Kofi Annan, “Contacts with Informant”, *fax sent to Booh-Booh/Dallaire, UNAMIR, 11 January 2004* [Available Online] <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/unresponse.html> [19 May 2004].

of Kigali within weapons-free zone, but which also made it clear that such a zone had to be established 'by' the parties".³⁰⁵ In early 1994, the DPKO authorises UNAMIR to assist Rwandese police to recover illegal arms. However, the rules of engagement limit UNAMIR that requires the operation to cooperate with local police. To make the situation worse, the police are allied with the Interhamwe.³⁰⁶

Nonetheless, UNAMIR's impotence forces General Dallaire to request more help from New York to boost the mandate. He seeks permission from the DPKO to address the growing problem. Belgian authorities make pleas to the Secretary-General.³⁰⁷ The appeal is passed on to General Dallaire who drafts a response to the DPKO that seeks to substantiate Brussels. He leaves it to Booh-Booh to send it to New York. What Dallaire does not know, is that the SRSG downplays the information and emphasises the limitation in UNAMIR's mandate. The response from New York is as negative as before.³⁰⁸

Thus, both the local leadership of the UNAMIR operation and the DPKO possesses knowledge of the increased militarization. The operation is eager to address the problem but lacks counter productive means. At the same time, the DPKO weighs its support from the Security Council and concludes to continue the lackadaisical provisions. Consequently, the UN's actions, or the lack thereof, stimulate the acts of genocide that follow. The situation is critical. The UN demonstrates illiteracy when reading the Rwandan conflict, and mismanages to comprehend the zero-sum revolutionary nature of the Rwandan conflict. Habyarimana's regime has waged war against its Tutsi population that resulted in the RPF invasion and that culminates in the Arusha Accord. Herein, two factors incite increased violent response from the 'Hutu Power': (i) the peace agreement, and (ii) the Security Council's decision to reduce the strength of the mission.

Subsequently augmented violence occurs on 7 April. Radio stations with bias to the Hutu elite urge Hutus to take vengeance against the Tutsis for their alleged murder of the president.

³⁰⁵ Boutrous-Ghali, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-96*, 32.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 31-2.

³⁰⁷ Willy Claes, "Letter dated 14 March 1994 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium to the Secretary-General expressing concern that the worsening situation in Rwanda may impede UNAMIR's capacity to fulfil its mandate", in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-96*, 244.

³⁰⁸ Lieutenant-General Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 179-81.

Hutu militias start to attack the homes of Tutsis who flee for refuge in communal buildings. At this point, the militia is armed only with knives of various sorts.³⁰⁹ Des Forges dates the large-scale massacres to 11 April at the point when better-armed Hutu reinforcements commence its activities. These are few but armed with rifles, grenades, and machine guns.³¹⁰ Kuperman concludes that until 21 April, only fifteen days into the genocide, that 250,000 Tutsis have been killed. Moreover, that the large massacres see an end by the end of April.³¹¹

Thus, the UNAMIR operation never really comes to core of monitoring demilitarisation in Rwanda. The problems of establishing the BBTG examined in the above section function as obstacles for demobilisation, disengagement, and integration of the two armies. The small amount of international pressure available is not enough to get the peace process on track. In short, UNAMIR proves ineffective when it comes to demilitarisation as a function of Conflict Transformation.

5.2.2.3 Summing Up

This section has been assigned to examine the process of implementing the demilitarisation programmes as aspects of the peace operations in Mozambique and Rwanda. It is apparent from the above that demilitarisation made its ways differently in these two countries. In general, the process concludes positively in Mozambique, and compared to Rwanda it stands out as an effective success. UNAMIR's military component is not allowed, neither by the spoilers in Rwanda nor by the DPKO, to execute demilitarisation. Instead, General Dallaire's troops witness an increased militarization. When this is said, demilitarisation in Mozambique did not process easily. A slow beginning due to the late deployment and reluctance, even ability, on the part of Frelimo and Renamo consequently delay the process. The SRSG demonstrates political and diplomatic skills to reach a solution. Renamo gets its money and international commitment proves solid enough to pressurise the process forward. In contrast, the international community is not willing to take such steps in Rwanda. Demilitarisation proves to be a precondition for Conflict Transformation as it is rarely successful. However, sufficient progress is made in Mozambique so that the parties give away the military option.

³⁰⁹ African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, Second Edition (London: African Rights, 1995), 258-60.

³¹⁰ Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, 211.

³¹¹ Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 2001), 14-22.

Herein, civil supremacy over the military proves to be an important factor in Mozambique. The Mozambican troops are willing to obey orders from the political leaders. In short, ONUMOZ proves effective, whilst UNAMIR demonstrates its ineffectiveness. Again, whilst the international community demonstrates a commitment to the peace process that makes ONUMOZ military component to conclude positively, the UNAMIR lacks this collective support from the international community. Moreover, the UN misreads the zero-sum revolutionary nature of the Rwandan conflict that has fatally consequences.

5.3 The Police Component

This section is concerned with the police component of the peace operations. The purpose is to demonstrate that the performance of the police is pertinent for a peaceful conclusion of the peace processes, and Conflict Transformation as such. The aim is to examine the effectiveness of the police component of ONUMOZ and UNAMIR.

The issues of policing and reform of the internal security sector are relevant for Conflict Transformation. First, reform of the internal security sector is closely associated with the demilitarisation process. In intra-state wars, the conception of internal security and protection from external threats is blurred. Police is often assigned to support the military, and the military deployed to maintain internal law and order. The police become an instrument to protect the state and the regime rather than the general population, as police in a democratic state is assigned to do. Second, restructuring of the police is also important to address the means by which the police have secured the non-democratic regime. In its work, the police apply unconventional methods of torture, illegal detention, and murder.³¹² The human rights abuses persist often after the cessation of hostilities. Thus to avoid further human rights abuses, the style of the police needs to be addressed. Third, demobilisation of ex-combatants makes weapons available that affects the security situation for the general population. Without the necessary infrastructure and an effective police force, the crime rate would rise.³¹³ Hence, to prevent looting the police needs to be present in the transition from war to peace.

³¹² Kumar, "The Nature and Focus of International Assistance for Rebuilding War Torn Societies", 13-4.

³¹³ Charles T. Call and William Stanley, "Civilian Security", in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 303-5.

In short, policing and reform of the internal security sector are relevant for Conflict Transformation to guard the new order. These are important issues in both Mozambique and Rwanda. During the years of non-democratic rule and the violent confrontations, the police forces have acquired the features of 'regime police' and very few of 'democratic police'.

5.3.1 Police in the Peace Agreements and the Mandates

The following section considers the issue of police reform in the peace agreements and the mandates.

5.3.1.1 Mozambique

Protocol IV of the GPA stipulates the reform of the internal security sector in Mozambique, and establishes clear objectives relating to the "depolitisation and restructuring of the police forces". However, the issue is not given much attention. The protocol assigns the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) to perform its functions under the responsibilities of the Government. The GPA says that the police have to adhere to democratic principles, respect the rights of the Mozambicans, and demonstrate impartiality. Moreover, that the police are assigned to maintain law and order, and guarantee a social equilibrium. The COMPOL would verify the PRM, and is entitled to investigate the PRM's activity. The COMPOL would inform the authorities of any irregularities.³¹⁴

The peace agreement makes no provisions for a UN civilian police force to monitor the neutrality of the Mozambican police. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General urges the SRSRG to discuss the issue with Frelimo and Renamo³¹⁵, and the Mozambican parties reach an agreement on the UN's role in police monitoring.³¹⁶ Therefore, ONUMOZ's mandate includes a police component. The deployment of international civilian police (CIVPOL) would oversee the neutrality of the PRM, offer technical assistance to the National Police Commission, and monitor and verify the reform of the police. In addition, CIVPOL would

³¹⁴ "Protocol IV", in *The General Peace Agreement*.

³¹⁵ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/24892*: paragraph 29.

³¹⁶ United Nations, "Letter dated 8 September 1993 from Mozambique transmitting the final document from 23 August-3 September meeting between President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama", *Security Council Document S/26432*, 13 September 1993.

also monitor the conduct of the elections.³¹⁷ The Secretary-General suggests a total police force of 1,144, which the Security Council approves. The Security Council requires that a deployment of CIVPOL have to compensate for a reduction in the military component to avoid increases in the costs.³¹⁸

5.3.1.2 Rwanda

The issue of police is more comprehensively discussed in the Arusha Accord. The parties agree that the prime objective of the 'National Gendarmerie' would be to maintain law and order, and protect the Rwandan citizens. Moreover, it determines that the police must execute its duties in an impartial manner and be responsible to the Rwandan authorities. The parties determine that the strength of the police would be 6,000 men.³¹⁹ As with the army, the composition is 60-40 percent in favour of the government.³²⁰ These men would receive training over ten months.³²¹ The parties do not make provisions for a commission to monitor the gendarmerie, as do the Mozambican parties. In this, the NIF would verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially.³²² Finally, that the agreement proposes that a UN police force to be deployed in Kigali and the nine prefectures.

Compared to the provisions and the requests in the Arusha Accord, the Security Council limits UNAMIR's mandate. The Secretary-General suggests that UNAMIR would be responsible to monitor security through "verification and control" of the police.³²³ The Council disagrees and does not authorise UNAMIR to provide security for civilians. Rather, the mandate limits UNAMIR to "investigate and report on incidents regarding activities" of

³¹⁷ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/1994/89/Add.1*, 28 January 1994: paragraphs 9-11.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*: paragraph 16; United Nations, *Security Council Document S/RES/898*.

³¹⁹ "Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties", in *The Arusha Accords*: Articles 83-85.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*: Article 144.

³²¹ *Ibid.*: Article 142.

³²² *Ibid.*: Article 54.

³²³ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26488*: paragraph 44.

the police.³²⁴ Sixty police officers are required to accomplish this task. The training of the gendarmerie would be completed in the third phase.³²⁵

5.3.1.3 Summing Up

The above section has compared the issue of police reform in the two peace agreements and the mandates. The exercise finds that both of the peace agreements determine that reform of the internal security sector would have to occur. The details of the procedure are however different. Whilst the GPA vaguely stipulates this process, the Arusha Accords prescribe more details. Moreover, it takes intervention from the UN for the Mozambican parties to agree on the UN's role on police monitoring. The role of the UN force is clearer in Rwanda. It is also apparent from the above examination that the Security Council restricts UNAMIR's mandate both from the Arusha Accords' provisions, and the recommendations from the Secretary-General. The strength of the two police components vary noticeably, as ONUMOZ's is significantly larger. Finally, the composition of the police is another difference. Whilst the old police will continue in Mozambique, both members from the old police and RFP would compose the police in Rwanda.

5.3.2 Implementing the Police Programmes

The section below examines the implementation of the police programme in the two cases.

5.3.2.1 Mozambique: Preventing Looting

Although the decision to include the CIVPOL component comes late in Mozambique, the component establishes itself quickly. The first observers arrive in November 1993, then to be almost fully deployed in September, a month before the elections. They are widely deployed around Mozambique. Out of 83 locations, 15 are in Renamo-controlled areas.³²⁶

The Mozambican parties' lack of political will also manifests itself as challenges for CIVPOL. At the outset, the police component faces difficulties regarding access to information and visits to police stations, but CIVPOL solves this problem with the Police Affairs Commission and the PRM. Moreover, Frelimo and Renamo also obstruct CIVPOL

³²⁴ United Nations, "Resolution 872 (1994)", *Security Council Document S/RES/872*: 3(h).

³²⁵ United Nations, "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)", 343-4.

³²⁶ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 45.

from accomplishing its monitoring duties. Whilst Renamo denies CIVPOL access to areas of its control and to establish national police stations, Frelimo restricts CIVPOL admission to government police stations and especially to the facilities of its Quick Reaction Force.³²⁷ Later, a gradual improvement takes place, though Renamo demonstrates reluctance.³²⁸

Observers have rightfully questioned the capacity of just over 1,000 police officers to accomplish the component's mandate within the boundaries of the Mozambican territory. Other difficulties are the accusations that the PRM violates civil and human rights. Alden notes that CIVPOL is only mandated to advise, and cannot act itself nor compel Mozambican authorities to do so.³²⁹ Thus, these violations could not be prevented because the belligerents fail to react to recommendations from CIVPOL. Moreover, Venâncio is critical to CIVPOL as to how it could perform its duties given a lack of knowledge to the Mozambican languages.³³⁰ Jett questions qualifications and the lack of effectiveness due to structural arrangements in the bureaucracy.³³¹ Despite this, CIVPOL investigates 511 complaints (61 are related to human rights violations) within three categories of allegations: (a) illegal detention of civilians; (b) abuse of detainees' civil rights; and (c) criminal investigation involving political motives.³³² Moreover, CIVPOL monitors the electoral campaign and the voting process.³³³ Thus, as Malan suggests, CIVPOL must be considered as a "partial success".³³⁴

On the other hand, the presence of PRM is vital to the peace process. The visible police force hinders lawlessness. With the newly available arms in the Mozambican society, looting could be a part of the reality if the police had been absent. The quality of the police and its degree of effectiveness are not as relevant for Conflict Transformation as the presence of the police. With respect to the peace process, the consequences of an absent police force are more severe

³²⁷ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/511*: paragraphs 34-5.

³²⁸ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/803*: paragraphs 24-7.

³²⁹ Alden, "Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique": 124.

³³⁰ Venâncio, "Did Peace-Keeping Work in Mozambique?", 105.

³³¹ Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 86-7.

³³² United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/803*: paragraph 27.

³³³ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/1449*: paragraphs 19-22.

³³⁴ Mark Malan, "Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Police Reform in Mozambique and South Africa", *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 6 No. 4 (Winter 1999): 174-6.

than that of a biased force that commits human rights abuses. It proves that the content of the policing is subordinated the importance of a visible police so that ordinary behaviour can take place.

5.3.2.2 Rwanda: Fails to Commence its Duties

In Rwanda, there is also a crucial need for the role of the police in the peace process. The police are the local representatives of the state to guard the transition from war to peace. As seen in the sections above, as the chaos engulfs there is a growing need for an effective police force. However, as with the demilitarisation, the reform of the gendarmerie is challenged by the delays to install the transitional institutions.

Herein, the UNAMIR faces the problem to deploy its police personnel.³³⁵ The civilian police come into effect in February 1994 with its liaison section, investigation unit, and monitoring teams. From the outset, CIVPOL encounters allegations of political and ethnical motivated crimes, increased armed robbery because of the ready-made availability of weapons and complaints against the gendarmerie itself. The deteriorating security situation makes it necessary for CIVPOL to patrol.³³⁶ 30 March, the Secretary-General suggests boosting CIVPOL with more officers and thus makes it possible to accomplish the mandate. However, as seen above, the Security Council determines to leave a token force in Rwanda and the police force fails to commence its duties.

5.3.2.3 Summing Up

The aim of this section has been to examine the implementation of the police programme. Reform of the security sector is an important aspect to improve the general human rights situation, and policing is a necessity to secure the transition from war to peace. It is apparent from the above exercise that ONUMOZ is more effective than UNAMIR when it comes to the policing. One of the reasons is the difference in size. Yet again, the growing tensions and the lack of sufficient mandate resources to address this problem represent a problem for UNAMIR's police component as it does for the political and military components.

It is also apparent from the above that reform of the security sector is not so much a necessity as the presence of the police is. The visible police in Mozambique hinders for disorder and

³³⁵ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26927*: paragraph 22.

³³⁶ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/360*: paragraphs 33-8.

thus destructive activities such as looting. The crucial learning experience is that ordinary behaviour can take place. The problem of a biased police force is subordinated and needs to be dealt with on a later stage. In Rwanda, lack of resources makes it difficult to accomplish the mandate, and the Rwandan police is neither able to prevent the deteriorating security situation for the Rwandans.

5.4 Providing Support for Elections

Providing support for elections is the last sub-goal to contemplate. This section follows the same structure as above that starts to discuss the pertinence of elections for Conflict Transformation. The aim is to compare the electoral issue as agreed to in the peace agreements and authorised by the mandates, and the processes of implementation. Then the factors determining effectiveness or ineffectiveness come to eye.

With the ending of intra-state wars through negotiated settlements, elections have been designated in peace accords as the mechanism to end the transition from war to peace. Elections in war-torn societies, post-conflict elections, fulfil primarily two roles. First, they take part of a broader process of national reconciliation and political transformation towards a peaceful society.³³⁷ Second, these elections play a role in the process of democratisation: elections serve to legitimise the government both domestically and internationally; the aim of elections is to initiate and consolidate the process of democratisation; and the ballot box functions to transform the currency for competition from bullets to ballots.³³⁸ In short, post-conflict elections have a function for transforming the conflict from that taking place on the battlefield to that in the National Assembly.³³⁹

³³⁷ Rafael López-Pintor, "Reconciliation Elections: A Post-Cold War Experience", in *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 43-60.

³³⁸ Krishna Kumar, "Postconflict Elections and International Assistance", in *Postconflict elections, Democratization and International Assistance*, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 7-8.

³³⁹ The record of elections to mark the end of the transition from war to peace has in general proven problematic. For details see Terrence Lyons, "The Role of Postsettlement Elections", in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 216-9; Fen Osler Hampson, "The Role of Third Parties in Ending Violent Conflict", in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Second Edition (Washington D.C: United States Peace Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 394-5.

5.4.1 Elections in the Peace Agreements and the Mandates

The section below examines and compares the electoral component in the GPA and the Arusha Accords, as well as in the two peace operations' mandates.

5.4.1.1 Mozambique

Protocol III considers the electoral issues in Mozambique and sets forth the general principles that would guide the drafting of the Electoral Act. Four aspects need to be highlighted. First, elections are to be held within one year after the signing of the GPA, but the period can be extended. Second, the protocol provides guarantees for freedom of press and access to media, as well as freedom of association, expression, and political activity. Third, it defines the electoral procedures. An absolute majority of the electorate would determine the president in the first round, or to be followed by a second ballot between the two candidates with uppermost electoral support. Proportional representation would determine the composition of the National Assembly. Finally, the National Elections Commission (CNE) would be set up with the purpose to organise, conduct, and monitor the elections.³⁴⁰ The Accords leave many issues relating to the elections vague and subject to discussion.

The Security Council authorises the electoral component to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process.³⁴¹ ONUMOZ's electoral division would accomplish three interlinked roles. First, it would verify that political parties have freedom of organisation and unrestricted access to media, and that the electoral rolls would be properly completed. Second, it would observe the registration, polling, and counting of elections results, and report complaints and irregularities to the CNE. Finally, the component would conduct electoral education.³⁴² In coordination with the electoral division, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would provide technical assistance.³⁴³ It is clear from the ONUMOZ's mandate that the Mozambican parties, through the CNE, share the responsibility for the electoral process.

³⁴⁰ "Protocol III: Principles for Electoral Law and Process", in *The General Peace Agreement* [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/moz4.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

³⁴¹ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/24892*: paragraph 18.

³⁴² *Ibid.*: paragraphs 30-42.

³⁴³ United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 324.

5.4.1.2 Rwanda

The Arusha Accord is vaguer on the electoral issue. It states that democracy is founded on the idea that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that this is expressed through elections. Moreover, the elections need to be “regular, free, transparent, and fair”.³⁴⁴ Finally, the BBTG would have the responsibility for organising and holding the elections at the end of the transitional period lasting 22 months.³⁴⁵ An electoral commission would have the executive responsibility to prepare for and hold the elections.³⁴⁶ International assistance would only play the role as observers. Moreover, the Arusha Accord does not deem the procedures for elections.

Consequently, the Security Council makes few provisions for UNAMIR with respect to the elections. The only task to fulfil would be to monitor the security situation during the final period of the BBTG’s mandate, leading up to the elections.³⁴⁷

5.4.1.3 Summing Up

The peace agreements and the mandates outline that elections would celebrate the end of the implementation phase in Mozambique and Rwanda. Though the GPA is relative vague on this issue, the Arusha Accords is vaguer and only determines elections to be held at the end of the transitional period. ONUMOZ would play a more central role than that of UNAMIR.

5.4.2 Implementing the Electoral Programmes

The following section compares the two peace operations’ support for elections in Mozambique and Rwanda.

³⁴⁴ “Protocol on Rule of Law”, in *The Arusha Agreement* [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

³⁴⁵ “Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing”, in *the Arusha Agreement: Article 22; “Protocol on Miscellaneous and Final Provisions”*, in *The Arusha Agreement* [Available Online] <<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>> [18.05.2004].

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ United Nations, “Resolution 872 (1993)”, *Security Council Document S/RES/872*, 5 October 1993.

5.4.2.1 Mozambique: Celebrating Conflict Transformation

The post-conflict elections in Mozambique signify the final and most crucial test for the peace process. Progress toward elections is, however, necessarily influenced by the many delays in the implementation process. From the extension of ONUMOZ mandate follows postponement of the elections to October 1994. ONUMOZ's electoral component faces many challenges. The processes of voter registration, electoral campaign, and the holding of elections are considered here.

Before the registration could commence, some obstacles needed to be solved. The GPA's vague text on the electoral law obliges the parties to finalise the law. When the parties meet in April 1993, the parties disagree over the composition in the CNE, and the status of overseas voters.³⁴⁸ Again, ONUMOZ's committed leadership resolves the impasse. It takes the personal intervention of the Secretary-General, with subsequent intercession of the SRSG, to resume discussion. The conclusions determine that an independent person would chair the CNE, made up of ten members from Frelimo, seven from Renamo, and three from other political parties.³⁴⁹ The electoral law comes officially into effect January 12 1994. With foreign assistance, the CNE takes up its duties to prepare for elections.

The Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration possesses the responsibility for voter registration. The 8,000 registrars start the process in June. To ensure a comprehensive registration including people in remote areas, returning refugees, and demobilised soldiers, the cut-off date is extended with two weeks until 2 September. When the registration ends, 81 percent of the eligible population is registered.³⁵⁰ In between, however, there have been problems with the completion of registration forms, cards, and books. Moreover, allegations of fraud have been made. Not all accusations are presented to the CNE as formal complaints, and some of those investigated were not substantiated.³⁵¹

The values of the multiparty democracy are new to the Mozambican people. Up until now, they had only been exposed to the Marxist-Leninist rules alien to a competitive party

³⁴⁸ Alden, "Resolution of the Conflict in Mozambique": 124-5.

³⁴⁹ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/26666*: paragraphs 2-3, 9-12.

³⁵⁰ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 56-8.

³⁵¹ United Nations, "Further report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/1994/1002*, 26 August 1994: paragraph 21.

system. Instruction is vital. Then, voter education seeks to accomplish two objectives, i.e. teach Mozambicans (i) how to vote through electoral education, and (ii) why they should vote through education for democracy. The role of political parties need special attention as the relationship between party and electoral representatives for parliament is blurred for many voters.³⁵² One of the main challenges is to reach the illiterate sectors of the population. Innovative campaigns seek to overcome this barrier.³⁵³

The extension of the registration period reduces the campaign period from 45 to 35 days. The election campaign commences 22 September. At this stage, there are twelve presidential candidates, and 3,117 candidates representing the twelve political parties and two coalitions running for parliament.

On the ground, the situation is tense and spotted violent incidents occur, but without seriously threatening the electoral process. More than organised political violence, armed banditry represents the toughest challenge for ONUMOZ.³⁵⁴ Three other major issues test ONUMOZ's electoral component in the campaign. First, it is the problem of the "non-armed opposition" claiming the need for funding from both the government and the international community. Eventually, the former donates US \$15,000 and the latter US \$100,000. Second, there is the problem of fairness. With their party machinery, Frelimo and Renamo outnumber the other political parties.³⁵⁵ The smaller parties have no chance but to compete under unfair conditions. Third, growing tension, nurtured by Renamo's declaration that only victory in key provinces would satisfy the organisation, leads to violent incidents.³⁵⁶ Thus, Dhlakama contradicts himself as he on many occasions has been committing himself to honour the outcome.³⁵⁷

³⁵² Synge, 128-30.

³⁵³ Honwana, "Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development", 207.

³⁵⁴ United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", *Security Council Document S/1994/1196*, 21 October 1994: paragraph 3.

³⁵⁵ Honwana, "Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development", 207.

³⁵⁶ Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Renamo Threats", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 13 (11 October 1994): 1-2.

³⁵⁷ Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Renamo seeks cleaner image", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 10 July (1994): 12.

In the campaign, the political message varies only slightly. The main parties pursue a democratic agenda with liberal policies.³⁵⁸ Whilst the opposition parties argue for fair distribution of power and resources to the central and northern regions of the country, Frelimo advocates continuity and its experience in governance. The international community is responsible for setting post-conflict arrangements on the agenda. Worried that the political outcome of the GPA envisages a winner-takes-all result, and with the Angola experience in fresh memory, the foreign sponsors of the peace process seek to adjust the parties to make provisions for power-sharing. Whilst the opposition parties support the suggestion without a clear uniformed formula for the formation a government, Frelimo is hostile and argues that the elections have to determine the composition.³⁵⁹

In mid October, the 1,200 UN election observers arrive. Furthermore, the international community works to secure Mozambican ownership to the elections. UNDP provides technical assistance and channels the international financial assistance through an electoral trust fund to the electoral operations. Again, the international community, through its representation in the CSC, offers momentum to the peace process and the elections, and uses the donor resources as leverage to ensure continued Frelimo and Renamo participation.³⁶⁰ In short, as seen above, close donor coordination secures a successful conclusion.

Over the three days of the electoral act, some 52,000 polling officers and 35,000 party monitors administrate the 7,244 polling stations. Moreover, just over 2,300 observers monitor that 87,9 percent of the electorate cast their votes.³⁶¹

Whilst the international community is to celebrate the elections, Dhlakama withdraws Renamo and himself as candidates in the elections.³⁶² According to Ajello, there are three

³⁵⁸ Rachel Waterhouse, "Special Political Parties Supplement", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin Supplement* (August 1994): 1-10.

³⁵⁹ The leading pressure comes from US officials. Consequently, ONUMOZ officials feel it is a part of the US strategy to secure Renamo a position. There is a widespread assumption that Frelimo and Chissano will win the elections. See Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Pressure for unity government", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 10 (July 1994): 6-7; Joseph Hanlon, "National unity government?", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 11 (August 1994): 5; Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Prior accord?", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 12 (September 1994): 5-6.

³⁶⁰ J. Micheal Turner, Sue Nelson, and Kimberly Mahling-Clark, "Mozambique's Vote for Democratic Governance", in *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 155-7.

³⁶¹ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 61.

reasons for this: (i) Dhlakama receives a document portraying widespread irregularities only to secure Frelimo victory; (ii) he feels that the CNE does not take his complaints seriously; and (iii) he perceives that neighbouring states would support Frelimo even if it re-claims the position on an illegitimate basis.³⁶³ This is the most severe impediment in the election process that threatens the entire peace process. The SRSG initiates flurry diplomatic activities conducted by the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the members of the CSC, Nelson Mandela, and Robert Mugabe.³⁶⁴ Promises to sort out the suspiciousness prior to any declaration of free and fair elections convince Dhlakama to re-enter.³⁶⁵ Consequently, the elections are extended with one day. Once sorted out, the elections proceed smoothly without disruptions.

Voter turnout is very high, with 87,9 percent of voters participating and 91,4% of the ballot cast declared valid. Renamo's withdrawal does not affect the electorate. The poor nature of the communicational infrastructure prevents most voters from knowing of Renamo's action.³⁶⁶ Renamo loses both the presidential and parliamentary elections, but proves to gain more support than expected by many observers. In the presidential election, Chissano receives 53,3 percent and Dhlakama 33,7 percent of the votes. Frelimo wins 44,3 percent of the votes and 129 mandates in the legislative election, while Renamo receives 37,8 percent giving it 109 seats. The three-party coalition, UD³⁶⁷, receives 5,1 percent of the votes and entitles the party to 12 seats in the Assembly.³⁶⁸ Interestingly, Chissano proves more popular than his party, and Renamo more popular than Dhlakama. The results demonstrate that Frelimo and Renamo are the only parties with national appeal. Table 5.4.31 illustrates that Frelimo and

³⁶² Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Dhlakama boycott", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 14 (February 1995), 4-5.

³⁶³ Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace-Agreement", 634-6.

³⁶⁴ United Nations, "Statement by the Secretary-General emphasizing that Mozambique's elections must proceed as planned", *UN Press Release SG/SM/5456*, 27 October 1994; "Message from the President of the Security Council urging Renamo to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the elections", *UN Press Release SC/5922*, 27 October 1994; Macqueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960*, 164.

³⁶⁵ Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 62-3, 286.

³⁶⁶ Turner et al., "Mozambique's Vote for Democratic Governance", 161.

³⁶⁷ The acronym of UD comes from its Portuguese name "União Democrática" (Democratic Union).

³⁶⁸ United Nations, *Security Council Document S/1994/1449*: paragraph 8; Africa Report, "Mozambicans the Clear Victors in Democratic Elections", Vol. 39 No. 6 (November/December 1994): 5.

Renamo feature regional strongholds. The former in the south, the latter in the centre and north. Moreover, it proves that the system negotiated between Frelimo and Renamo ensures adequate representation for them, but with the five percent threshold it denies opportunities for smaller parties.

The SRSG accompanies the announcement of the electoral outcome and declares the elections international free and fairness. However, he admits some problems, irregularities, and disruptions. Nevertheless, none of these could discredit the credibility of the elections.³⁶⁹ Dhlakama and Renamo accept the electoral outcome.³⁷⁰ Nevertheless, Frelimo and Renamo disagree over the voting procedures for the assembly chair. Subsequently, Renamo boycotts the Assembly for three weeks only to realise that this makes it possible for Frelimo solely to pass legislation, and the Dhlakama orders his party back on the bench.³⁷¹ In addition, Dhlakama refuses the special position in the government offered by Chissano.³⁷²

In short, when the elections conclude effectively they satisfy the Mozambican parties and the ONUMOZ operation. The elections mark the end of the transition from war to peace and the implementation. The Mozambican parties and ONUMOZ celebrate Conflict Transformation. For the parties, the elections conquered the impasse of the hurting stalemate, and they serve as an endpoint of the conflict. For ONUMOZ, the elections define a successful conclusion of the mission and allow for withdrawal.

³⁶⁹ United Nations, "Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General declaring the Mozambique elections free and fair", *UN Press Release SG/SM/5488*, 19 November 1994.

³⁷⁰ Dhlakama continues to believe that the elections were filled with irregularities. See Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 65.

³⁷¹ Synge, 141.

³⁷² Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95*, 65.

Table 5.4.3.1: Distribution of seats in the New National Assembly³⁷³

Province	Frelimo	Renamo	UD	Total Seats
Maputo City	17	1	0	18
Maputo Province	12	1	0	13
Gaza	15	0	1	16
Inhambane	13	3	2	18
Sofala	3	18	0	21
Manica	4	9	0	13
Tete	5	9	1	15
Zambézia	18	29	2	49
Nampula	20	32	2	54
Niassa	7	4	0	11
Cabo Delgado	15	6	1	22
Total	129	112	9	250

5.4.2.2 Rwanda: Genocide

Elections in Rwanda would take place at the end of the transitional period. As seen above, UNAMIR encounters major challenges that the operation cannot overcome. These obstacles are so considerable that the UN mission does not hold the arrangement of the elections as a realistic goal anymore. Neither is it on the parties' agenda. The last hope for installation of the transitional institutions sweep away as Habyarimana's plane ironically crashes in the presidential garden, and with that goes prospects for elections that could symbolically end the implementation phase. Immediately, the extremist radio station, RTML, broadcasts bulletins portraying Tutsi responsibility for the plane crash.³⁷⁴ Roadblocks are constructed, curfew is imposed, the Interhamwe militia let loose, and the massacre of Tutsis begin.

In this, the international response to the unfolding genocide follows the same patterns as from the start of the UNAMIR's deployment. Recall that the Force Commander informs the DPKO of the well-planned terror actions towards opposition leaders and the Tutsi group. Booh-Booh adds in the same cable information of a worsening security situation due to fighting between

³⁷³ The data is taken from Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Elections Statistics", *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* Issue 14 (February 1995): 4.

³⁷⁴ For an account of the role the radio station plays in the genocide see Frank Chalk, "Hate Radio in Rwanda", in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, eds. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 93-106.

the Presidential Guard and RPF. As seen above, the Security Council's priority, championed by the US and the United Kingdom, is to withdraw UNAMIR from Rwanda.³⁷⁵

5.4.2.3 Summing Up

This section has been tasked to examine elections as a sub-goal of the Conflict Transformation project. In both cases, post-conflict elections would serve as symbolic endpoints for the implementation phase. They would also function as a resolution of the conflicts. However, it is apparent from the above that the record of implementation is different for ONUMOZ and UNAMIR. ONUMOZ makes sufficient progress so that CNE can organise and conduct the elections. The operation surmounts the impediments in the electoral process. Again, a few powerful actors care deeply to place the Mozambican conflict on a peaceful footing. They make arrangements to exercise apolitical manoeuvres such as the extensive funding for Renamo. ONUMOZ appears partial towards Renamo. On the other hand, however, the SRSG reads the situation carefully and identifies Renamo's needs. Total impartiality could have worked opposite. The transformation of Renamo required special attention from ONUMOZ. In Rwanda, elections are not on the agenda. Consequently, a date for the holding of elections that could mark the end of the implementation of the Arusha Accord is not made. Thus, it is apparent that whilst ONUMOZ celebrates Conflict Transformation, UNAMIR remaining and token force is a bystander to the unfolding genocide.

5.5 Conclusion: The Critical Factors for Effectiveness

This chapter has been assigned to compare and evaluate the Conflict Transformation projects in Mozambique and Rwanda. Four sub-goals of the two multifunctional peace operations have been examined in separate sections. A discussion that portrays the relevancy of each sub-goal for Conflict Transformation has been made. They have been compared as they appear in the comprehensive negotiated settlements, the mandates as they are authorised by the Security Council, and finally the record of implementation. The purpose has been to examine the effectiveness of ONUMOZ and UNAMIR to facilitate Conflict Transformation.

What are the findings of this study? The critical factors that determine effectiveness for a multifunctional peace operation are clear. For analytical purposes, the below presentation

³⁷⁵ Melvern. *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, 130-54.

distinguishes between critical factors at a general level and critical factors as they appear in each sub-programme. The general factors are considered first.

First, support from the international community, and from the US especially, is crucial. Given the composition of the Security Council, it is not possible for the UN to secure a peaceful outcome without support from the US. Washington was willing in Mozambique but not in Rwanda. Scared by Rwanda's "twin sister", the UNAMIR operation becomes half-hearted. It is clear from the examination that without ONUMOZ's presence the parties in Mozambique would have had a difficult job to find a peaceful implementation. The Rwandan parties did not see enough of this support. In this, it is important to note that the international community is represented by a few powerful actors that care deeply to end a conflict. These actors are able to make healthy decisions and provide financial and diplomatic resources.

Second, the Security Council must be able to read the nature of the conflict sufficiently. Only with such analytical tools, the Council can address a particular conflict with a properly designed mandate. Again, this project demonstrates that this was done in Mozambique and not in Rwanda. For example, elections serve as function of conflict transformation in Mozambique and as a solution to the hurting stalemate. This is not true in Rwanda where UNAMIR is not mandated properly to address the conflict specific situation. Herein, sufficient resources are a vital to conclude effectively. The Security Council authorised the two multifunctional peace operations with different amounts of logistics. Whilst the ONUMOZ operation is given enough resources to accomplish its mandate, the UNAMIR operation is not. Consequently, the UNAMIR troops cannot fulfil their duties.

Third, there is a need for successful conclusions of all of the sub-goals as they each substantiate vital aspects of the Conflict Transformation process. The comparative exercise has found that there is a critical interaction between the various sub-goals. Whilst ONUMOZ proves that success in one area affects effectiveness in another area, UNAMIR demonstrates the opposite. UNAMIR has difficulties to guide the peace process that affects demilitarisation and the other areas. Moreover, ONUMOZ's effectiveness in executing the political, military, police, and electoral programme assures an overall successful conclusion of Conflict Transformation in Mozambique. Despite this fact, there is not a need to conclude each sub-programme completely as the section below demonstrates. Nonetheless, sufficient progress must be made to assist the overall peace process.

The section below recalls the critical factors for effectiveness in each sub-goal. Thus, the section portrays the degree of progress needed for an overall successful conclusion.

First, a peace operation needs to enjoy the political guidance of the peace process. To take an influential lead, political guidance needs to entail three components. First, the leadership of the component needs to be composed of people who are committed to Conflict Transformation. Second, to secure political guidance the political component must be designed a mandate that prescribes them with good working conditions and the right goals. Third, it needs to include the right institutional framework. In short, ONUMOZ's political component has the privilege of being assigned all of the above, whilst UNAMIR's political component lacks the same dispensation.

The management of the spoiler problem is herein a crucial aspect. Both of the peace operations run into this problem, but the way they are handling it is different. ONUMOZ manages to identify the problem and its solution effectively. Again, UNAMIR fails to do so. The former controls and manoeuvres the situation so that the parties perceive Conflict Transformation as an incentive. In Rwanda, CDR with its extremist ideology is not dealt with, and the total spoiler is allowed to jeopardise the peace project. Again, the cases demonstrate that the management needs to be sensitive to the conflict specific situation.

Second, the exercise comparing the demilitarisation programmes explains several critical factors for effectiveness. Demilitarisation is a long-term project that is unfeasibly to conclude over a short period. The Mozambican case illustrates that a successful conclusion of the demilitarisation project is not a precondition for Conflict Transformation. Nonetheless, ONUMOZ makes enough progress in the area so that the parties give away the military option. In contrast, UNAMIR's progress is not sufficient. This illustrates that demilitarisation is a vital part of the continuing process towards transformation. Such attempts are rarely successful. Another learning experience from the exercise is that the military component needs to be innovative in nature to overcome obstacles. ONUMOZ proves to be smart when breakdowns are apparent and facilitate solutions. A key is the incentives given to the Mozambican troops to ensure demobilisation. In contrast, UNAMIR suffers consequences as the operation lacks the resources and the support from New York to consider innovative solutions when information of the unfolding genocide is known. A UN peace operation has to be intelligent when things go wrong and when violence escalates. A final critical factor with respect to the demilitarisation programme that determines success is civil supremacy. The political leadership of both Frelimo and Renamo benefits from its control over the military

troops. Herein it helps that the soldiers in both camps are tired of the warfare and seize the opportunity to regain the civilian life.

Third, the comparison of the police components shows that visibility of the police is important so that the ordinary life of the people can continue. It is a question of presence or absence for the police where the answer needs to be that of visibility. Problems with the police need to be addressed on a later stage. The crucial point is that chaos and lawlessness must be avoided. Moreover, the problem with the biased and corrupt police needs to be confronted on a later stage.

Finally, important aspects of the effectiveness are also located in the implementation of the electoral programme. In Mozambique, post-conflict elections represent the opportunity to solve the conflict. The parties accept elections as the method to solve the violent dispute. The elections represent somewhat more than a symbolic end of the conflict. The nature of the conflict determines the elections as the milestone. The hurting stalemate had been one of the factors paving the way for peacemaking. Either side had contemplated neither victory nor defeat. The parties have also given away their military option. This makes the elections the key event. The elections represent the ultimate objective and provide the final addition of the transition from war to peace in Mozambique. They have different implications for the Mozambican parties and ONUMOZ. For the parties, elections are seen as the way to solve the conflict and determine the winner. The parties see this procedure as legitimate and acknowledge their commitment. For ONUMOZ, elections are a useful short-term indicator to conclude effectively if the parties accept them as free and fair. Remember, the UN needs to analyse and address the nature of the conflict properly. Whilst UN manages to identify and tackle the mutually hurting stalemate between Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique, the same organisation fails to diagnose the Rwandan conflict to that of a zero-sum revolutionary nature. Only by accurately analysing the conflict the appropriate means can be applied. For these reasons, elections are never achievable in Rwanda.

In short, the ONUMOZ operation is able to address the root causes of the Mozambican conflict and manages to reverse the destructive processes that accompanied the violence. ONOMUZ makes attempts to take the best out of Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation to exercise the positive task of ending the conflict and not only the negative task of reducing violence. However, the distinction between negative peace and positive peace seems here problematic. First, it is difficult to measure the latter that rather must be seen as a process than an end in itself. This leads to the second point as a problem

occurs in trying to set out criteria for positive peace, and especially in connection to the question of positive peace for whom. A person in Maputo compared to a person in Kigali has a different opinion of what constitutes positive peace. Even, these different perceptions could differ from the perceptions in the academia. Moreover, the Mozambican might not be satisfied with the situation of today and say that sufficiently transformation of the context has not occurred. Subjective perceptions are connected to the concept of positive peace. Nonetheless, as from the day ONUMOZ withdraws neither of the parties have resorted to violence to further their interests. Recall, in contrast, UNAMIR fails to build the necessary conditions for an effective conclusion of the transition from war to peace and is not able to place the conflict on a peaceful footing.

In sum, the critical factors that determine success of failure are to be found at a general level as well as in each sub-goal of Conflict Transformation.

Conclusion

This has been a study about the ending of conflicts. It examined the UN capacities in Conflict Transformation activities through the deployment of multifunctional peace operations in Mozambique and Rwanda. It has been a study of how the UN sought to transform violent conflicts into the state of being non-violent conflicts. Thus, a study that examines the process of creating a self-sustaining peace (positive peace), and not only examining how to reduce the risk of resumption of violent conflict (negative peace). Herein, the study favoured the concept *Conflict Transformation* as an extension of the term *Conflict Resolution*. Thus, it has been a comparative case study of Conflict Transformation in Mozambique and Rwanda. The study was divided in five main chapters.

The first chapter presented an outline for a theoretical framework in which the multifunctional peace operations was understood. A discussion of the relevancy that Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation each has for a theory of third party intervention determined that Conflict Transformation offers the best alternative when the aim is to establish positive peace. Nonetheless, these approaches are supplementing each other. The fulfilment of the positive task, i.e. the end portraying social justice and a sustainable positive peace, requires the transformation of the conflict. Both favourable components of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution are needed to assist the Conflict Transformation approach. There would be shortcomings when one approach alone is applied, and an accumulated approach is needed to reduce the risk of resumption of violent conflict and the establishment of a self-sustaining peace.

The second chapter gave an account of the evolution, typology, and different cases of UN peace operations. It showed that the Security Council has been able to authorise mandates that are more comprehensive after the Cold War. Consequently, multifunctional peace operations have been deployed to secure the implementation of comprehensive negotiated settlements,

and thus assisted in the ending of conflicts. A typology of peace operations was made together with empirical examples. Herein, the chapter emphasised the multifunctional peace operation. Then, six multifunctional peace operations deployed in the beginning of the 1990s were shortly discussed with respect to their mandate, outcome, and the critical factors determining the outcome. The exercise found that not only do the many concepts of peace operations vary in breadth and depth, but the multifunctional peace operations also are different in nature.

The third chapter examined the conflict specific situations in Mozambique and Rwanda in four sections. First, the causes of the conflicts are different. In Mozambique, the flawed Portuguese decolonisation, interventions from Mozambique's white minority regimes, and Frelimo's failure in the course of policy actions cause the conflict. In Rwanda, in contrast, the creation of the 'political identities' through the two social-revolutionary processes triggers the fighting. Second, the natures of the conflicts are different despite that both are intra-state conflicts. Whilst the Mozambican conflict reaches a hurting stalemate, the Rwandan conflict portrays a zero-sum revolutionary nature. Mozambique is subjected to a stronger involvement from the neighbouring countries than the involvement of Uganda in Rwanda. Moreover, at the international level the superpowers are not heavily involved in the Mozambican conflict. The superpowers of the Cold War are more or less absent in Mozambique, and France is the only major power at play in Rwanda. Third, peacemaking became possible because the nature in both of the conflicts changed, and the parties developed an interest in negotiations. The outcome is two comprehensive negotiated settlements. It is important to recall that whilst the Mozambican belligerents face a hurting stalemate, RPF possesses the strongest card in Rwanda and could possibly have overthrown the government if the fighting had continued. Finally, the belligerents in both of the conflicts invite the UN to implement the settlements, and the Security Council authorises ONUMOZ and UNAMIR as two multifunctional peace operations that share both similarities and dissimilarities.

Then, in chapter four, a comprehensive assessment of the multifunctional peace operations in Mozambique and Rwanda followed. The chapter considered four different sub-goals of the multifunctional peace operations' mandates: the political component, the military component, the police component, and the electoral component. The assessment of each sub-goal followed the same outline in which its relevancy for Conflict Transformation was discussed. ONUMOZ and UNAMIR were compared in two parts: (i) the sub-goal as conceived in the peace agreements and as mandated by the Security Council; and (ii) the record of implementation. In general, ONUMOZ must be considered a success, and UNAMIR a failure.

In conclusion, the chapter identifies the critical factors for effectiveness. It was distinguished between the general factors and the critical factors as they appeared in each sub-programme. In general, support from a few powerful actors representing the international community, and especially the great powers; sufficient resources; and the relative successful conclusion of each sub-programme are all vital for the effectiveness. The exercise also identified the critical factors for success and failure in each sub-programme. First, the peace operation needs to enjoy the political guidance of the peace process in which the management of the spoiler problem is a crucial task. Second, there are several factors determining the effectiveness of demilitarisation: it is a long-term project unfeasible to conclude quickly; neither is demilitarisation a precondition for Conflict Transformation; the military component needs to be innovative in nature; and civil supremacy is vital. In all, these factors were found in Mozambique but not in Rwanda. Third, policing is important to prevent disorder and destructive activities so that the ordinary lives of the people can take place. Problems with the police can be postponed to a later stage. Finally, the peace operation needs to be innovative in nature and the international community, or at least a few powerful actors, must demonstrate sensitivity to the peace process so that a successful conclusion of the elections can be made. Herein, representing the uppermost vital factor for effectiveness, the UN needs to diagnose the nature of the conflict properly.

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