

*The Gendarme of Africa: How can France's 2002 Military Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire be explained?*

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A minor dissertation submitted in *partial fulfilment* of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

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**COMPULSORY DECLARATION**

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## Abstract

On 19 September 2002, dissatisfied soldiers in Côte d'Ivoire attempted to overthrow Laurent Gbagbo's regime. In response, France rapidly mobilised its military forces, once again intervening in one of its former colonies. This intervention is all the more surprising given the recent and important reforms in France's Africa policy; reforms which led to the increased disengagement of the French military in Africa. In light of this conundrum, this thesis seeks to understand why France pursued intervention in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002. Moreover, given these wide ranging reforms, I seek to understand the extent to which France's intervention in 2002, indeed, represents something new, or is simply another manifestation of France's traditional way of doing this in Africa.

In answering these research questions, this thesis combines both quantitative analysis and an in-depth case study of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. In applying the results from the analysis to the case study, I find that the French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is largely consistent with, and indeed indicative of, France's historical *modus operandi* in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, I show how France has a plethora of important interests in the Côte d'Ivoire, interests which are shaped by its strong historical relationship with Côte d'Ivoire and which strongly influenced French intervention in 2002.

Moreover, circumstances surrounding the 2002 failed coup attempt, notably the deteriorating situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the empowerment of Jacques Chirac and even the mistrust between Chirac and Gbagbo created the conditions which further fostered military interventions. These factors, it is shown, are largely consistent with the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, thus indicating that, despite important French reforms leading up to the 2002 intervention, very little has changed regarding French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. As such, the results from this thesis indicate that when one of France's important former African colonies is perceived to be under threat, France is bound by historical responsibility and a plethora of deep-seeded interests to deploy its military and attempt to remedy the situation.

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## Acronyms

AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine
COW	Correlates of War
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FN	Forces Nouvelles
FZ	Franz Zone
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMI	International Military Intervention
MPCI	Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest
MPJ	Mouvement pour la Paix et la Justice
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OPA	Ouagadougou Peace Agreement
PDCI	Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
PS	Parti Socialiste
R2P	Right to Protect
RECAMP	Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SSA	Syndicat Agricole Africain
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UEMOA	Monetary Union of West African States
UK	United Kingdom
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPC	Union for the Peoples of Cameroon
USA	United States of America
USCRI	U.S Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Research Problem

On 19 September 2002, a group of middle-ranked soldiers in Cote d'Ivoire attempted to overthrow Laurent Gbagbo's regime. Ascending to power in an election shrouded in controversy, in conditions he himself described as 'calamitous',<sup>1</sup> Gbagbo held onto power for roughly two years before dissatisfied soldiers attempted to remove him from office. While the initial coup plot in the south, notably in the economic capital Abidjan, failed to oust Gbagbo, belligerents managed to occupy large swathes of northern Cote d'Ivoire, including the country's second largest city Bouake.<sup>2</sup>

The rebellion, initially under the auspices of the *Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI), later merged with MPIGO (*Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest*) and MPJ (*Mouvement pour la Paix et la Justice*) to form the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN).<sup>3</sup> This increasingly confident rebel group found in the marginalised northern population a strong support-base, one which shared similar grievances and ethno-religious commonalities with the rebels.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, the insurgency established itself in the northern half of Cote d'Ivoire, where they were to remain in control for almost a decade. Thus, beginning with the initial coup attempt, and after a series of failed negotiations, the country remained partitioned until 2009, when the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) was signed, officially reuniting the country.<sup>5</sup>

Throughout the Ivorian crisis, France played an undeniably important role.<sup>6</sup> Rapidly responding to the crisis, France, on September 22 2002, launched *Opération Licorne* (Unicorn), deploying

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<sup>1</sup>K. Martial Frindéhié, *Francophone African cinema: history, culture, politics and theory*. (Jefferson: McFarland, 2009):154

<sup>2</sup> Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, "The new politics of protection?, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect," *International Affairs* 87.4 (2011): 830

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> Kathrin Heitz, *Through the Prism of the Cinquantenaire: Cote d'Ivoire between Refondation and Houphouet's legacy*, In *Francophone Africa at Fifty*. edited by Tony Chafer and Alexander Keese, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013): 222.

<sup>5</sup> Mike McGovern, *Making war in Côte d'Ivoire*, (C. Hurst: London, 2011): 3; John F. McCauley. "Measuring and Reducing Religious Bias in Post-Conflict Zones: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire." *Political Psychology* 35.2 (2014): 267-289.

<sup>6</sup> The Ivorian crisis (2002 -2011) was perhaps not one long crisis but a series of micro-crises which eventually ended within the toppling of Gbagbo. Thus, the analysis of the Ivorian conflict resembles McGovern's idea that the

600 troops in the hastily deteriorating situation. This relatively small deployment grew rapidly: by January 2003 French deployment had increased to 2571 troops, 14 helicopters, 3 transport planes and 172 troops from Senegal.<sup>7</sup> A few months later, French boots on the ground numbered 4000 and by November there were roughly 5300 French troops in Côte d'Ivoire, the largest single deployment of French forces in Africa since the Algerian war.<sup>8</sup> This sudden decision to deploy troops to the increasingly worsening situation raises important questions as to why the Élysée acted with all possible haste to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire.

Moreover, in the 1990s, France was undergoing important changes to its hitherto consistent African policy, often referred to as *Françafrique*. The death of two key figures of *Françafrique* policy, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the long-serving Ivorian President, and Jacques Foccart, France's 'Monsieur Afrique', was a further sign of fundamental changes to come in French-Africa relations. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union, changing international dynamics, France's infamous role in the Rwandan genocide, as well as domestic and global dissatisfaction with France's Africa policy led to significant reforms.<sup>9</sup> Within France itself, Lionel Jospin, the socialist Prime Minister from 1997-2002, pushed for fundamental changes to traditional 'Gaullist' French policy *vis-à-vis* sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, in the late 1990s, coinciding with increased instability in Côte d'Ivoire, fundamental reforms occurred in France's military, economic and political relations with Africa, with Prime Minister Jospin calling for a 'new partnership' with Africa.<sup>10</sup>

Of note, France sought to reform its security policy *vis-a-vis* Africa, notably through the

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Ivoirian crises were marked by neither war nor peace, only episodes and instances of both (See McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*)

<sup>7</sup> Assemblée Nationale, *Commission de la Défense et des Forces Armées*. Compte Rendu (Report) No. 26 (Paris: 21 January, 2003), accessed July 13, 2015, [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cdef/02-03/c0203026.asp#P36\\_221](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cdef/02-03/c0203026.asp#P36_221); Bruno Charbonneau. *France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa*. (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008a): 160.

<sup>8</sup> Charbonneau. *France and the New Imperialism*, 160

<sup>9</sup> For more on detailed explanations as to why France's implemented fundamental changes to its Africa policy See: Shaun Gregory. "The French Military in Africa: Past and Present," *African Affairs*, 99 (2000); Xavier Renou, "A new French policy for Africa?", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 20.1 (2002); Peter J Schraeder. "Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining US-French Competition in Francophone Africa." *Political Science Quarterly* 115.3 (2000); Rachel Utley, "Not to do less but to do better: French military policy in Africa," *International Affairs* 78.1 (2002); Rachel Utley, "Franco-African Military Relations: Meeting the Challenges of Globalisation?", *Modern and Contemporary France* 13.1 (2005); Institute for Peace and Security Studies, *Managing Peace and Security in Africa: Approaches to Intervention in African Conflicts*, (Addis Ababa University, 2012): 134

<sup>10</sup> Lionel Jospin, "La Politique de défense de la France", *Défense Nationale*, 53.11 (1997): 3-14.

reduction of military personal on the continent, and increased multilateralism of its military responsibilities (notably through RECAMP<sup>11</sup>).<sup>12</sup> Economically, France sought to redefine its economic policy *vis-à-vis* Africa, namely through the devaluation of the *Communauté Financière Africaine* (CFA) Franc and French aid reforms.<sup>13</sup> While these policy shifts represented important changes to French-Africa relations, many argue that, by-and-large, not much changed with regards to Franco-African relations, and while France has certainly restructured its policy, its fundamental actions *vis-à-vis* Africa and its motives for such action have remained largely consistent.<sup>14</sup>

Yet, one strong indication that France was perhaps shifting away from its old habits was France's response, or lack thereof, to the 1999 coup d'état in Côte d'Ivoire. By 1999, Henry Konan Bédié, the successor to the deceased Houphouët-Boigny, became increasingly unpopular internationally and amongst Ivoirians. In response, Bédié was overthrown by General Robert Guéï in a relatively blood-less coup d'état. According to the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, France could have easily rescued the Bédié regime.<sup>15</sup> Yet, other than issuing a statement of condemnation, France remained passive choosing instead not to intervene and restore Bédié to power, as many observers would have predicted.

For some, the lack of intervention was indicative of France's disengagement from Africa's internal affairs, notably through the stern objections of Jospin, who championed French "neither interference nor indifference" policy.<sup>16</sup> While reports suggest that President Chirac dangled with notions of intervention, the political ramifications of saving an unpopular President, it is argued, dissuaded Chirac from taking action.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, the cohabitation between Chirac's conservatives

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<sup>11</sup>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix

<sup>12</sup>Utley, "Franco-African Military Relations", 29/30; Richard Banégas, "France's Intervention Policy in Africa Seen from Below," *European Review of International Studies* 1 (2014): 62.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid

<sup>14</sup>See: Tony Chafer, "Franco-African Relations: No Longer so Exceptional?," *African Affairs* 101 (2002); Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 24; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*; Marco Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa: France's military role in Côte d'Ivoire," *African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review* 3.1 (2013): 88

<sup>15</sup> Institute for Peace and Security Studies, "Managing Peace and Security in Africa", 134

<sup>16</sup> See: Richard Banégas and Bruno Losch, "La Côte d'Ivoire au bord de l'implosion," *Politique africaine* 87(2002/3): 157; Tony Chafer, "Chirac and 'la Françafrique': No Longer a Family Affair" *Modern & Contemporary France*, 13:1 (2005): 16; Institute for Peace and Security Studies, *Managing Peace and Security in Africa*, 134; Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa", 88/89

<sup>17</sup>Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa", 88/89

and Jospin's 'progressive' Socialists, and by extension their divergent views of French Africa policy, effectively paralysed the decision-making abilities of the French state, leading to the success of the coup.<sup>18</sup>

With right-wing elements in Chirac inner circle, notably within the Élysée's African cell and from Michel Dupuch, pushing for intervention and Jospin's Socialists seeking disengagement from African intervention, decisions as to how best to respond to the 1999 coup d'état reached a stalemate. While important, others suggest that the acquisition of power by General Guéï was perceived to serve French interests far more than Bédié ever did.<sup>19</sup> For example, Smith describes how 'he (Chirac) knew Bédié wasn't deserving of (the risk of) French intervention'<sup>20</sup> while Krosiak notes how France decided to abandon Bédié in favour of Guéï, who after training in France, had established good relations with the French political and military establishment.<sup>21</sup> This is all to say that, decision-makers in France, by-and-large, perhaps felt that Guéï would serve the interest of France more astutely than his predecessor, and as such, seemed a safer bet in securing French interests.<sup>22</sup>

France's lack of intervention in 1999, for whatever reason, thus prompted many to believe that France was perhaps removing itself from direct military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, immediately following the 19 September 2002 attempted coup, France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>23</sup> Given the nature of the research problem aforementioned, I seek to understand the motives behind France's 2002 intervention in Côte d'Ivoire.

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<sup>18</sup>Boubacar N'Diaye, *Still Getting Away With it: France's Africa Defense and Security policy*, in Routledge Handbook of African Security, edited by James J. Hentz (Routledge: London, 2014): 308

<sup>19</sup>Daniela Krosiak, *France's Policy towards Africa: Continuity or Change?*, In Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds. *Africa in International Politics: External involvement on the continent*. (London: Routledge, 2004): 61–82; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 158

<sup>20</sup>Stephen Smith, "La France Dans la Crise Ivoirienne: ni Ingérence, ni Indifférence, mais Indolence Post-Coloniale", in *Côte d'Ivoire, L'année terrible 1999–2000*, edited by Marc Le Pape and Claudine Vidal (Paris: Karthala, 2002):312

<sup>21</sup>Krosiak, *France's Policy towards Africa*, 79

<sup>22</sup>Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Fiona McFarlane & Mark Malan, "Crisis and Response in the Central African Republic: A New Trend in African Peacekeeping?", *African Security Review*, 7:2 (1998): 49

## 1.2 Research Question

This thesis thus seeks to determine why France rapidly deployed its military apparatus in Côte d'Ivoire. The primary research question of this thesis is thus:

### 1. Why did France intervene in the Ivorian crisis in 2002?

Certainly, France has been no stranger to military engagements on the continent as it has launched more interventions than any other state in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa (See Table 1). As such, France has often been labelled the intervener *par excellence* in sub-Saharan Africa, and indeed the *Gendarme* or policeman of Africa.<sup>24</sup> In response to the frequency of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, a plethora of scholars have sought to understand the nature and rationale for France's enduring interactions with and interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. While France, leading up to its 2002 intervention, was thought to be actively disengaging from traditional interference in Africa's internal affairs,<sup>25</sup> its sudden intervention in 2002 suggests otherwise. Taking such claims into account, and in further developing a robust understanding of French military intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, I ask several supplementary questions. Specifically:

1. What are the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa?
2. To what extent does France's 2002 intervention in Côte d'Ivoire differ from these trends?

This thesis thus attempts to ascertain French motives for intervening in the Côte d'Ivoire. In complementing the primary research question, I ask whether this intervention is indeed indicative of France's traditional motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, of which there are many, or whether this intervention truly represents a substantive change in French policy *vis-à-vis* sub-Saharan Africa.

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<sup>24</sup> France has long been accused of being the *Gendarme* (policeman) of Africa – intervening more than any other state in the domestic affairs of African states: See Victor-Manuel Vallin. "France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960–2014." *Political Science Quarterly* 130.1 (2015): 79-101.

<sup>25</sup>Jospin, "La politique de défense de la France." ; Chafer, "Chirac and 'la Françafrique'", 20; Renou, "The French Military"; Utley, "'Not to do less but to do better'", 130; Chafer, "Franco-African Relations"

### 1.3 Methodology

To understand why France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the difference between this intervention and other French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, I use a mixed-methods approach. This approach combines both quantitative and qualitative methods and data, and thus attempts to merge an intensive case-study (French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire) with large-N statistical analysis (general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa).<sup>26</sup> The power of such an approach is best illustrated by scholars such as Lieberman who, in his seminal work, notes that the mixed-method approach '*combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more cases contained within the large sample*'.<sup>27</sup> The mixture of such methods thus allows this thesis to utilise the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods, augmenting the power and reliability of the research findings.

Of note, the quantitative analysis is able to provide answers regarding the general nature and motives of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. Through such an analysis, this thesis is able to understand and develop an analytical framework of the general trends regarding motives for French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>28</sup> In order to test these hypotheses, the UCDP/PRIOD (Uppsala Conflict Data Programme/Peace Research Institute Oslo conflict) dataset is utilised. Like other well-known conflict datasets, the PRIOD dataset focuses specifically on tracking armed conflict around the world. This dataset is merged with the International Military Intervention (IMI) data, which measures interventions in Africa so as to ascertain which conflicts experienced French intervention and which did not.

Additionally, data measuring a range of variables are included to test the hypotheses i.e. the possible determinants for French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature review in this thesis gives rise to various hypotheses which can be quantitatively tested. Of note, I find that French economic motives for military intervention are commonplace in the literature. Moreover, the historical connections and links between France and sub-Saharan Africa are argued to further increase the likelihood of French intervention. Lastly, humanitarian concerns by French

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<sup>26</sup>Evan S Lieberman, "Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research", *American Political Science Review* 99.03 (2005): 435-452.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28</sup>Importantly, the high number of interventions both globally and within Africa (including France) means that an adequate sample size exist, which can be tested using statistical analysis.

decision-makers are suggested to increase the likelihood of intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In considering these and other hypothesis, I test the extent to they determine and predict the likelihood of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In doing this, I am able to understand the general trends and patterns of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa.

Additionally, the 2002 intervention is nested within this large-N analysis and thus provides a good case to test the specific findings from the case study to the quantitative framework. Moreover, the analysis of a single case-study, nested within the larger sample of military interventions in Africa, can complement, but also contradict, the findings of a large-N analysis. Small, for example, notes how complementary mixed-methods approaches are able to interpret the results of a large-N analysis and are also able to compensate for the weaknesses of large-N analysis.<sup>29</sup> In this way, the mixed-method approach allows not only an in-depth understanding of the specific factors that determined French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, but further allows for an analysis of the general trends of French motives for intervention.

The combination of methods allows this thesis to understand the extent to which French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is illustrative of the general trends regarding French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to assess the case of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, I conduct an in-depth, thematic analysis of a variety of primary and secondary sources. Specifically, I utilise government documents emanating from the Foreign Affairs and the Defence committees in the French National Assembly to understand the official motives and rhetoric surrounding French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, I incorporate a wide-range of secondary sources in my analysis of French intervention. As much has been written about the Ivorian crisis as well as France's leading role in it, I use a plethora of journal articles, in-depth reports, academically-orientated books and web-based articles to develop an understanding of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. By applying the general trends of French intervention, established in the quantitative analysis, to the extensive literature around France's involvement in Côte d'Ivoire I am able to establish a strong understanding as to why France decided to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire, and by extension the extent to which that intervention resembles or

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<sup>29</sup>Mario Luis Small, "How to conduct a mixed methods study: Recent trends in a rapidly growing literature", *Sociology* 37.1 (2011): 57 - 86

differs from the general patterns of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. The mixed-methodology in this thesis thus provides not only an understanding of French motives of intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, but also an understanding of how, if at all, its motives differ when compared to the general trends and patterns of French motives for intervention.

#### 1.4 Relevance of the topic

France is arguably the most important external actor in Africa, especially with regards to military interventions (see Table 1). France has intervened in Africa more so than any other state and thus it is important to understand the reasons for these continued and large-scale military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. By developing a framework outlining the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, and using this framework to better understand French motives for intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, we can understand the extent to which French motives for intervention are indeed changing or if, as one author puts it, French intervention is just *'old wine in new bottles.'*<sup>30</sup>

**Table 1: Foreign Interventions in Africa 1960-2004<sup>31</sup>**

Interveners	No. of Interventions	% of total interventions in Africa
France	45	34.9
USA	26	20.2
UK	15	11.6
Belgium	7	5.4
Portugal	7	5.4
Other	28	22
Total	128	100.0

<sup>30</sup>Benedikt Erforth and George Deffner, "Mali: Old Wine in New Bottles." *Global Policy Forum*, March 18 2013, accessed May 25, 2015. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52363-mali-old-wine-in-new-bottles.html?itemid=id#26087>

<sup>31</sup>Other states include: Russia, Israel, Cuba, Canada, Germany, Italy, Kuwait, The Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Spain and Yemen.

**Source: International Military Intervention Database 1960-2004**

This change-continuity debate is fundamental to this thesis and can assist in developing an understanding of not only Franco-Ivorian relations, but France's relations with sub-Saharan Africa. This is especially important as France has proven time and again that it is willing and able to 'get involved' in African affairs. Recent interventions in Mali in 2013 (*Opération Serval*), the CAR in 2013 (*Opération Sangaris*) and in the Sahel belt in 2014 (*Opération Barkhane*) are indicative of this urge to interfere. As such, it is important to understand why France intervenes and the extent to which the motivations for these interventions are changing or are remaining rooted in traditional rationales.

### **1.5 Terminology**

'*Military interventions*' – Intervention is often a disputed term within relevant literature. In its most broad understanding, most would agree that interventions involve a variety of direct or indirect actions by one state that seeks to alter or influence the political, social or economic situation of another state. Moreover, there are a range of interventionist actions and tools available to states, notably: economic interventions, diplomatic interventions, humanitarian interventions and military interventions.<sup>32</sup>

This thesis, however, focuses specifically on military interventions. Like interventions, there is considerable debate over whether military interventions are anything different from military invasions, or whether military interventions incorporate other interventions such as humanitarian interventions.<sup>33</sup> Not ignoring these debates, this thesis treats military interventions as the direct movement of troops and soldier from one country to another. As such, this thesis uses the definition of Pearson & Baumann's, who analyse military interventions globally; they conceptualise military intervention as '*the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or*

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<sup>32</sup> For more on types of interventions see: Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "*Crisis, conflict and instability*", (Oxford: Pergamon, 1989); Michael P O'Keefe and C. A. J. Coady, *Righteous violence: the ethics and politics of military intervention*, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2005)

<sup>33</sup> For example see: Martha Finnemore, *The purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force*. (Cornell University Press: New York, 2004): 8/9

*dispute*'.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, as Regan argues, military interventions can occur on behalf of the target government, an opposition force or can remain neutral.<sup>35</sup> Lastly, in this thesis the terms 'target' state and 'intervener' state are widely used. The latter refers to states that intervene while the former refers to a state that have hosted or have been a target of an intervention.

## **1.6 Limitations**

The author has a strong command of the French language and as such will utilise various French-based academic and government sources of information. With that being said, French is a second language to the author, and as such, the analysis of French sources may not be as thorough as with English sources.

With regards to methodology, this thesis used a mixed-method approach. While incorporating both quantitative and qualitative methods and data, the author recognises the pitfalls in such an approach. Of note, the author understands the weaknesses of quantitative analysis, especially with regards to French motives for interventions, of which there are many. Indeed, by quantitatively analysing motives for French intervention, this thesis is in danger of oversimplifying results obtained. This is especially the case as French motives for interventions have changed considerably over time and space. Moreover, individual interventions differ greatly both with regards to the conditions in target states and the intervening state.

Lastly, some variables that may influence French interventions cannot be quantitatively tested. For example, there is a set of literature which hypothesises that first-image motives (decision-maker/individual level) are important determinants of foreign policy decisions.<sup>36</sup> It is often understood that psychological factors and the thought-making processes of individuals, regardless of the other factors, influences the behaviour of states. Certainly, the notion that decisions regarding foreign policy behaviour are affected by individual is important for scholars of foreign policy and military intervention. Yet, testing such hypothesises quantitatively is

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<sup>34</sup>Frederic S Pearson and Robert A. Baumann, *International Military Intervention, 1946-1988*, (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993): 1.

<sup>35</sup> Patrick Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40.2 (1996): 336-359.

<sup>36</sup> Graham T Allison 'Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis'. *American political science review*, 63.03 (1969), 689-718.

difficult and largely rests outside the scope of this thesis. With that begin said, in analysing the case of Côte d'Ivoire, one is able to analyse the effects and roles of individuals with regards to France's intervention in 2002. While this thesis will attempt to identify key motives for French interventions in Africa, this thesis cannot adequately come to terms with all motives and rationales for interventions in all target states. Rather, this thesis attempts to view trends in the motives of French interventions, trends that are holistically applicable to all cases under analysis.

### **1.7 Structure of this study**

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter Two, I discuss the relevant literature on why France intervenes in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically focusing on the relatively robust set of literature regarding French motives for intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. Of note, I consider arguments regarding realist assumptions of intervention and, by extension, how France's 'Gaullist' attitudes towards Côte d'Ivoire shaped its motives for intervention. I further consider the neo-colonialist argument which suggests that France sought intervention to protect its more tangible interests, notably its economic interests. Finally, I consider arguments contending that France's humanitarian concerns in Côte d'Ivoire best explain its 2002 intervention.

Chapter Three seek to answer questions pertaining to the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. As such, I outline the quantitative framework that is developed for the thesis. I take into account various hypotheses and test, using the PRIO dataset, the relative strengths of these independent variables on the dependent variable (French intervention). Using a multivariate analysis, I am able to control for the individual effects of the variables making my results as robust as possible. With the findings from this statistical analysis I am able to develop a robust framework which can outline the strongest determinants of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Chapter Four, I firstly seek to understand why France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire. Using the framework developed in Chapter Three, I further analyse the extent to which the 2002 intervention is indicative of the general trends of intervention. Chapter Four thus demonstrates why France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 and the degree to which that intervention resembles or differs from a typical French intervention.

In Chapter Five, I present my conclusions for the thesis. By linking the literature review, the quantitative analysis and the case study of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, I discuss the overall conclusions and implications of this thesis and its relevance to the existing state of knowledge regarding not only French military relations with sub-Saharan Africa, but Franco-Ivorian and Franco-African relations as well.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the current state of knowledge regarding why France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002. Since the 2002 intervention, a myriad of scholars have presented various arguments in attempts to explain why France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire. The arguments regarding French motives have by-and-large centred on either economic rationale for intervention, intervention as a form of power-politics and a projection of French power in Africa and internationally, and, to a lesser extent, intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is argued to have occurred on the basis of humanitarian concerns. While these different arguments each make important contributions, Regan notes how understanding why states choose to intervene in the affairs of other states is more often than not an elusive task.<sup>37</sup>

In this chapter, the literature on France's intervention in Cote d'Ivoire is complemented by the general literature on onsets of military intervention as well as the literature on French-African relations and French military engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. By doing so, this chapter highlights the broad sets of arguments regarding French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, arguments which serve as important sources for testable research hypotheses in the following chapter. The chapter is broken down into three sections. I first assess the 'Gaullist' arguments surrounding French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire as a means in which France promotes its international status (*grandeur*) and projects its power, not only in Africa but internationally. Secondly, I consider the neo-colonial school of thought, specifically focusing on the French economic motives for intervention. Lastly, I take into account humanitarian arguments for intervention and arguments pertaining to France's objective of preventing bloodshed and ensuring stability.

### 2.2 International grandeur and power projection

As a point of departure, this literature review assesses arguments centred on *realpolitik* which contends that military interventions are foreign policy tools engineered towards securing

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<sup>37</sup> Patrick Regan, *Civil War and Foreign Powers: Outside Interventions in Intrastate Conflict*, (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2002): 4

interveners' national interests, as well as maintaining power relative to other states.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, states, it is argued, intervene when there are perceived threats to the interveners' strategic, national and geopolitical interests.<sup>39</sup> By this logic, scholars argue that France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire with the purpose of quelling perceived threats to its national interests. Indeed, French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire cannot be understood without taking into account France's national interests and the important position of Côte d'Ivoire *vis-à-vis* its interests. To be sure, several authors have shown how France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is inseparable from the Gaullist underpinnings of French decision-makers. Charbonneau, for example, contends that France's action in Côte d'Ivoire were little more than the latest in a series of French attempts to enhance its domination and influence, not only in Côte d'Ivoire but throughout sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>40</sup> Likewise, Banégas suggests that France's military intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was but an attempt to increase its international relevant and status, while N'Diaye and Pascallon suggesting that France's political elite, notably President Jacques Chirac, sought to reengage in African crises and by extension the Ivorian crisis, in a fashion consistent with the tradition of Gaullism.<sup>41</sup> In essence, these authors note how the French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was driven by its need to remain an influential and important actor in not only Africa, but internationally.

This need to remain an influential and important actor is often argued to be rooted in France's longstanding traditional of Gaullism. In fact, Chafer shows how France, dating back to De Gaulle's presidency in the 1950s, has consistently sought international *grandeur* and the need to reassert itself as a global power, especially after World War Two and humiliating colonial defeats in Indochina and Algeria.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, Renou contends that France found in Francophone Africa the means by which it could redevelop and reassert itself as a relevant and powerful actor

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<sup>38</sup>Joseph M Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism." *International organisation* 42.03 (1988): 1; James Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Michael G Findley and Tze Kwang Teo, "Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach", *Journal of Politics* 68.4 (2006)

<sup>39</sup>James Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*

<sup>40</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 149

<sup>41</sup> Richard Banégas, Roland Marchal, and Julien Meimon, "La fin du pacte colonial? La politique africaine de la France sous J. Chirac et après", *Politique africaine* 105 (2007): 19; N'Diaye, *Still Getting Away With it*, 308; Pierre Pascallon, "Le reengagement de la France pour la Sécurité en Afrique", *Geopolitique Africaine* 14 (2004): 211-218

<sup>42</sup> Tony Chafer, "Hollande and Africa Policy", *Modern & Contemporary France* 22.4 (2014): 514.

on the international stage.<sup>43</sup> As such, Charbonneau and Renou assert that Francophone Africa, particularly France's former colonies, was considered France's *pré carré, garde chasse or domaine reserve*, providing France with a historical sphere of influence which strongly resembles the US's Monroe doctrine.<sup>44</sup> Complementing these arguments, Staniland notes that France's sphere of influence in the post-independence epoch, as well as its need to project its power internationally is largely consistent with realist assumptions whereby France has sought to retain and enhance its major-power status.<sup>45</sup> To be sure, Guillot explains that France is often deemed a middle-power, and, as such, has needed to intervene and engage in African conflicts and disputes to justify its importance in the world order, and, for example, to justify its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).<sup>46</sup> The diminishing power of France and the wilting of the French Empire in the Post-World War Two era, as argued, has thus compelled France to find the means to remain relevant, important and influential in the international system. Francophone Africa, it seems, has proven to be the means through which France has attempted to do so.

As such, throughout much of the post-colonial period, France has been argued to use Francophone Africa so as to 'punch above' its international weight and enhance its international relevance and prestige. As famously said by former Foreign Affairs Minister Louis de Guiringaud '*Africa is the only continent where France is still able to change the course of history with only 500 men*'.<sup>47</sup> Similar sentiments have emanated from Former President Jacques Chirac: '*Without Africa, France will slide down into the rank of a third [world] power*'<sup>48</sup> and Former Foreign minister Jacques Godfrain: '*a little country [France], with a small amount*

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<sup>43</sup> Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 7

<sup>44</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 50; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 6

The Monroe doctrine, as a concept, contends that Latin America would be under the exclusive influence and 'protection' of the USA. Similarly, Francophone Africa would be the exclusive domain of France, and as such off limits to other external powers.

<sup>45</sup> Martin Staniland, "Francophone Africa: the enduring French connection", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1987): 56

<sup>46</sup> Philippe Guillot, "France, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention", *International Peacekeeping* 1.1 (1994): 5

<sup>47</sup> Quoted in Jean-François Bayart, "France-Afrique: la fin du pacte colonial", *Politique Africaine* 39 (1990): 47; Vallin, "France as the Gendarme of Africa", 82/83

<sup>48</sup> Quoted in Illisha, "Bleeding Africa: A Half Century of the Francafrigue", *Loon watch*, March 25, 2014, accessed August 8, 2015. <http://www.loonwatch.com/2014/03/bleeding-africa-a-half-century-of-the-francafrigue/>

of strength, we [France] can move a planet because of our relations with 15 or 20 African countries'.<sup>49</sup>

The arguments aforementioned can similarly be applied to the case-study of Côte d'Ivoire. France's military intervention in 2002 has been argued to be the theatre in which Chirac and associates sought to reengage with African affairs, essentially enhancing its power position in its *pré carré* and on the international stage. Indeed, Charbonneau argues that French Africa policy, seen through the case of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, centres on the same issues of influence, subordination and domination within its traditional sphere of influence.<sup>50</sup> When such influence and domination come under threat, as in the case of communist expansion<sup>51</sup> during the Cold War or Anglophone encroachment,<sup>52</sup> France has historically intervened to re-establish itself as the most relevant, dominant and influential actor in the region. Similarly, Côte d'Ivoire has been perhaps France's most successful former colony in sub-Saharan Africa and, as Moncrieff argues, 'Côte d'Ivoire could be held by the French as an example of the success of their broader Africa policy.'<sup>53</sup> Any threat, it is argued, to Côte d'Ivoire and subsequently France's success story, which serves to legitimise France's role in Africa and international importance, would most likely be met by French military intervention. This logic is shared by Tillema who argues that military interventions are premised on realist ideas that states act according to their national interests in which powerful states like France have a greater array of capabilities and resources and are argued to intervene more frequently than minor states.<sup>54</sup> As such, for some the French

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<sup>49</sup>Quoted in Thabo Mbeki, "What the World Got Wrong in Côte d'Ivoire: Why is the United Nations Entrenching Former Colonial Powers on our Continent? African can and should take the lead in resolving their own disputes", *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2011, accessed July 15, 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/29/what-the-world-got-wrong-in-cote-divoire/>

<sup>50</sup>Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 149

<sup>51</sup> See: Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign intervention in Africa: from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge University Press, 2013): 182; Elizabeth Rechniewski, A Small War in Cameroon. *Small Wars Journal*

<sup>52</sup> See: Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace"; Tony Chafer, "The UK and France in West Africa: Towards Convergence?", *African Security* 6.3/4, (2013): 234/235; Asteris C Huliaras, "The 'Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy': French perceptions of the Great Lakes crisis", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36.04 (1998): 593-609

<sup>53</sup> Richard Moncrieff, *French Development Aid and the Reforms of 1998-2002*, (PHD Thesis; University of Southampton, United Kingdom, 2004):147

<sup>54</sup>Herbert K Tillema, "Foreign overt military intervention in the nuclear age", *Journal of Peace Research* 26.2 (1989): 186; Robert A Baumann and Jeffrey J Pickering, "Military intervention and realpolitik", in *Reconstructing Realpolitik*, edited by Frank Wayman & Paul Diehl, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994): 223; Douglas Lemke, & Patrick Regan, *Intervention as Influence in The scourge of war: New extensions on an old problem*, edited by Paul Francis Diehl. (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2004.): 162

intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is another example of an intervention as but 'another foreign policy tool used for pursuing national interests, such as extending power interests'.<sup>55</sup>

### 2.3 France, the neo-colonial power

Certainly, there are elements of truth in the notion that France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is but an extension of its need to project power both on the continent and international. Yet another set of literature, complementing the previous arguments, is centred on France's imperialist interests in Côte d'Ivoire and its need to protect its more concrete interests.<sup>56</sup> In agreement, Lemke and Regan note how powerful states retain important strategic and economic interests in their former colonies and are thus more likely to intervene in order to protect such interests.<sup>57</sup> Yet, the idea that states intervene to protect their interests is certainly nothing new or surprising in international relations scholarship.<sup>58</sup> Regardless, various scholars have sought to analyse the myriad of French interests, not only in Côte d'Ivoire, but sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and have attempted to show how these interests have resulted in French military action.

The underpinning of such thinking is largely centred on France's wide-ranging and well-documented economic interests in Côte d'Ivoire, and indeed sub-Saharan Africa. Among such interests are the myriad of strategically important natural resources, notably uranium and oil, which France has historically depended on.<sup>59</sup> The intervention in Gabon (1964) and Congo-Brazzaville (1997) are perhaps the most clear-cut examples of French intervention to protect

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<sup>55</sup>Seung-Whan Choi, "What determines US humanitarian intervention?", *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30.2 (2013): 122

<sup>56</sup>Ademola Araoye, *Côte d'Ivoire: The Conundrum of a Still Wretched of the Earth*, (Africa World Press: Trenton, 2012)

<sup>57</sup> Lemke and Regan, *Intervention as Influence*, 162: while economic interests are certainly vital to the national interest, economic factors are by-and-large analysed separately in this literature review. For economic determinants of intervention, see following sections.

<sup>58</sup>Choi, "What determines US humanitarian intervention?", 122; Findley and Teo, "Rethinking Third-Party Interventions", 830

<sup>59</sup>Mycale Schneider, Nuclear Power Made in France: A Model, (N/D):189-276, accessed June 25, 2015 [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:UjQRxPm8tS4J:www.npolicy.org/books/Global\\_Expansion/Ch6\\_Schneider.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:UjQRxPm8tS4J:www.npolicy.org/books/Global_Expansion/Ch6_Schneider.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za); Paul Melly and Vincent Darracq, "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House* (2013): 2; John F Clark. "The neo-colonial context of the democratic experiment of Congo-Brazzaville." *African Affairs* (2002): 171-192. Guy Martin. "The Historical, Economic and Political Base of France's Africa Policy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23. 2 (1985): 189-208; Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace"; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa"; Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa"

access to natural resources.<sup>60</sup> Related to resource extraction are France's important trade ties with sub-Saharan Africa. Moncrieff, as well as Stojek and Chacha, make notable references to the importance of trade and the degree to which it determines French intervention.<sup>61</sup> In such ways, France has been argued to mimic the general patterns of intervention based on economic interest. This is especially the case as various scholars have shown how strong economic interests,<sup>62</sup> the presence of natural resources,<sup>63</sup> the presence of lootable resources,<sup>64</sup> strong bilateral trade relations,<sup>65</sup> and strong regional economic ties<sup>66</sup> increase the likelihood of military intervention. Scholars have therefore shown how French economic interests are largely consistent with the general literature on onsets of military intervention and are important determinants of French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa.

These patterns of intervention due to economic factors have certainly been incorporated into analyses regarding French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, this line of thought has been well-supported by the work of Araoye who argues that France's real motive for intervention was to protect its concrete imperialist interests in Cote d'Ivoire. Of note, he suggests that the Gbagbo regime was perceived as a long-term threat to French economic interests, providing sufficient motive for intervention, and perhaps the overthrow of Gbagbo.<sup>68</sup> In similar ways, those within

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<sup>60</sup> In both cases, there is strong evidence to suggest that France's intervention was influenced by its need to protect its access to resources. France intervened in Congo-Brazzaville to ensure oil contracts were earmarked for the French oil giant ELF-Aquitaine. Indeed, France supported ex-president Denis Sassou-Nguesso who assumed power, with the military assistance of France, through a four-month civil conflict, thus securing oil contracts and consequent supply of oil, (Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace", 405). In 1964, 600 French soldiers proved instrumental in reinstating the deposed Francophile Leon M'ba in Gabon. M'ba's willingness to protect French oil interest in Gabon, it is argued, spurred the rapid deployment of French soldiers which subsequently led to his reinstatement. (Michael C. Reed. "Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave of enduring French interest." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25.02 (1987): 284)

<sup>61</sup> Richard Moncrieff, "French Africa policy: Sarkozy's legacy, and prospects for a Hollande Presidency", *South African Journal of International Affairs* 19.3 (2012): 17; Melly and Darracq, "A New Way to Engage"; Szymon M Stojek and Mwita Chacha, "Adding trade to the equation multilevel modeling of biased civil war interventions", *Journal of Peace Research* 52.2 (2015): 237

<sup>62</sup> Frederic S Pearson, "Geographic proximity and foreign military intervention", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18.3 (1974): 456

<sup>63</sup> Michael Ross, "How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?", *International Organisations*, 58.1, (2004); 57; Stojek and Chacha, "Adding trade", 237

<sup>64</sup> Michael G Findley and Josiah F. Marineau, "Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars", *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (2014): 16.

<sup>65</sup> Stojek and Chacha, "Adding trade", 231

<sup>66</sup> Jacob D Kathman, "Civil war diffusion and regional motivations for intervention", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.6 (2011): 865

<sup>67</sup> Araoye, *Côte d'Ivoire: The Conundrum*, 152/155

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

the Gbagbo establishment repetitively banged the neo-colonial drum, criticising France for pursuing an imperialist agenda in Cote d'Ivoire. Of note, Mamadou Koulibaly and Charles Blé Goudé, two leading figures in Gbagbo's 'young patriot' movement, embraced a neo-colonial discourse, rallying large-scale support in Cote d'Ivoire against French military intervention.<sup>69</sup>

As such, Piccolino argues that a 'standard narrative has developed, where France's military intervention was presented as demonstrating that France had pursued a clear and coherent strategy of discarding Gbagbo'.<sup>70</sup> Banégas supports such arguments as he states that this rhetoric was the preferred vehicle in which the Ivorian government sought to win domestic and international support and legitimacy.<sup>71</sup> This rhetoric so entrenched, many described the Ivorian civil war as the 'second war of independence', a term in reference to the perception that France's military action was set on destabilising, if not removing, the Gbagbo regime.<sup>72</sup> Similar sentiments echoing neo-colonialism and imperialism have emanated from outside Cote d'Ivoire, notably arguments from former South African President Thabo Mbeki.<sup>73</sup> Certainly, there is historical precedent, specifically with regards to French military action in sub-Saharan Africa, to suggest that France is able and willing to depose African elites, like Gbagbo, who threaten French interest, economic or otherwise.<sup>74</sup> Conversely, France has time and again intervened to protect and reinstate its African allies who have traditionally adhered to and protected French interests.<sup>75</sup> Yet, the fact that France chose not to, initially, take sides in the intervention suggests other, perhaps more important, motives for intervention. In other words, had France's true motives for intervention been the clear-cut removal of Gbagbo, one would have arguably expected France's to simply use its superior military to oust the substantially weaker Gbagbo.

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<sup>69</sup>Mamadou Koulibaly, *Les Servitudes du Pacte Colonial*, (CEDA/NEI, Abidjan, 2005)

<sup>70</sup>Guilia Piccolino, "David against Goliath in Côte d'Ivoire: Laurent Gbagbo's War against Global Governance", *African Affairs* 111.442 (2011): 8; See Mamadou Koulibaly, Antoine Ahua, and Gary K. Busch, *La Guerre de la France contre la Côte d'Ivoire*, (L'Harmattan, Paris, 2003).

<sup>71</sup>Banégas, "France's Intervention Policy", 65

<sup>72</sup> Piccolino, "David Against Goliath in Cote d'Ivoire". 8; Banégas, "France's Intervention Policy", 65

<sup>73</sup>Mbeki, "What the World Got Wrong in Côte d'Ivoire"

<sup>74</sup> See Robert H. Jackson and Carl Gustav Rosberg, *Personal rule in Black Africa: prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982):182 and Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace", 400. They discuss events in Central African Republic where France planned and executed the reinstatement of David Dacko, and subsequently deposed Jean-Bédél Bokassa, a former ally and Francophile. Ironically, hitherto, Bokassa was considered a 'good' Francophile, who would serve French interests in the CAR, as noted by the infamous Foccart in 1966: '*Bokassa was a very pro-France military man*'.

<sup>75</sup>David E. Gardinier, "France and Gabon since 1993: The reshaping of a neo-colonial relationship", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 18.2 (2000): 225; Michael C. Reed, "Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave of enduring French interest", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25.02 (1987): 284

However, this was not what actually happened in 2002, casting doubt on whether this was the true motive of the French military intervention.

Moreover, as argued by Bovcon, the neo-colonial argument regarding French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire was by-and-large superficial as it was incorporated into government rhetoric, aimed at increasing support amongst the Ivorian citizenry, notably the 'young patriots'.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, Charbonneau notes how, despite the neo-colonial rhetoric emanating from the Ivorian government, Gbagbo entrusted large parts of the Ivorian economy in the hands of the French, perhaps indicating the lack of truly substantive claims regarding French economic motives for intervention.<sup>77</sup> He further suggests that vital Ivorian resources, notably cocoa and the growing oil industry were in fact not in French hands, further illustrating the superficiality of the rhetoric surrounding the neo-colonial argument.<sup>78</sup> As such, while there have been strong arguments regarding French economic interests in Cote d'Ivoire, there is certainly no consensus amongst scholars as to whether this is the only, or most important, determinant of intervention in Cote d'Ivoire.

## **2.4 Humanitarian arguments**

Analyses of French motives for intervention have hitherto focused on realist and economic determinants for intervention. While certainly containing elements of truth, there is by no means consensus as to why France intervened in Cote d'Ivoire. Indeed, arguments have been made suggesting that France's intervention resulted from the increasingly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cote d'Ivoire. As such, *Opération Licorne* was launched so as to bring some semblance of stability to Cote d'Ivoire, stability that was needed to find political solutions to the conflict.

At the forefront of such explanations were leading French political figures, notably President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. Indeed, French officials repetitively reasserted how the intervention was motivated by the desire to establish peace and

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<sup>76</sup> Maja Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d'Ivoire and its Ethical Implications", *African Studies Quarterly* 11.1 (2009):14.

<sup>77</sup> Bruno Charbonneau, "The Imperial Legacy of International Peacekeeping: the Case of Francophone Africa", *Review of International Security* 40.3 (2014): 624

<sup>78</sup> Ibid

stability, so as to find a diplomatic solution to the crises. For example, de Villepin stated that the role of the French military in the Ivorian crisis was to stabilise the situation and that one of the fundamental objectives of *Operation Licorne* was without doubt to prevent a bloodbath akin to that of Rwanda in 1994.<sup>79</sup> The importance of the Rwandan experience to French policymakers, it is argued, cannot be divorced from understanding the intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. For example, Smith notes how French officials were able to draw parallels between situations in Rwanda and Cote d'Ivoire, and as such, sought to prevent a human catastrophe resembling the Rwandan crisis.<sup>80</sup> The memory and shame of France's infamous role in the Rwandan crisis, which resulted in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, compelled French leaders to ensure a similar catastrophe did not occur in Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>81</sup> Supporting such notions of humanitarian motives for intervention, Charbonneau notes how the intervention could have come about as a result of French desires to prevent a North-South civil war, with the aim of limiting the bloodshed.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, the fact that France initially intervened so as to protect thousands of French citizens, living in Cote d'Ivoire, further supports the purely humanitarian motives for French intervention.<sup>83</sup>

Indeed, the idea that states intervene for humanitarian reasons has gained increasing currency and popularity in recent time.<sup>84</sup> The rising popularity and legitimacy of the principles of Right to Protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention certainly had an effect on intervening states.

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<sup>79</sup> Assemble Nationale, *Commission Affaires étrangères*, Compte Rendu (Report), No. 21, (Paris: 10 December, 2002), accessed July 13, 2015. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cafe/02-03/c0203021.asp#P33\\_205](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cafe/02-03/c0203021.asp#P33_205)

<sup>80</sup>Stephen Smith, "La politique d'engagement de la France à l'épreuve de la Côte d'Ivoire", *Politique africaine* 89.1 (2003): 123

<sup>81</sup> For more on France's role in Rwanda, see: Alex Bellemey and Nicholas Wheeler, "Humanitarian intervention in world politics. *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*", (2001):101; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 142; Linda Melvern, *A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*, (Zed Books: London, 2000); Daniela Krosiak, *The French Betrayal of Rwanda*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Andrew Wallis, *Silent accomplice: the untold story of France's role in the Rwandan genocide*, (IB Tauris: London, 2014). Alan J Kuperman, *The limits of humanitarian intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, (Brookings Institution Press, 2004):44; Walter Clark and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention", *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1996): 82; Peter V. Jakobsen, "National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the Cold War?", *Journal of Peace research* (1996): 209-211

<sup>82</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 163

<sup>83</sup>Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution", 6

<sup>84</sup>Barry M Blechman, "The Intervention Dilemma", *Washington Quarterly* 18.3 (1995): 1. Also see: Bellamy and Williams, "The new politics of protection", 4-5; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention", *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics* 153 (1996): 1; Bellemey and Wheeler, "Humanitarian intervention in world politics"; Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People", *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (1994): 47-61

Finnemore, for example, argues that military interventions have become increasingly more humanitarian in the post-Cold War era while Bellamy & Wheeler consider the 1990s to be the golden age of humanitarian activism and intervention.<sup>85</sup> The fact that France did establish a buffer zone between the belligerents, did evacuate and protect thousands of French nationals, and took a leading role in the peace negotiations suggests that there were indeed some humanitarian underpinnings to its motivations for intervention. Yet, as has been the case throughout much of recent history, and as argued by Dowty and Loescher, interventions, justified on humanitarian grounds, are often phrased in such ways so to disguise true motives for interventions, motives of a more cynical nature.<sup>86</sup> In fact, Charbonneau goes as far as to argue that the buffer zone, established by the French, served only to legitimise the rebels as important political forces with recognised political grievances.<sup>87</sup> Similarly, Bovcon states that the protection of foreign national essentially legitimised French intervention, allowing France to immerse itself in the Ivorian crisis.<sup>88</sup> As such, while some suggest that France intervened for humanitarian reasons there are certainly arguments to suggest otherwise. In sum, the literature provides important humanitarian arguments for French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. While one cannot deny that these motives were important in spurring French intervention, they are certainly not the only motives, or the most important.

## 2.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has sought to outline the current state of knowledge regarding why France intervened in 2002 in Cote d'Ivoire. In analysing three broad schools of thought, this chapter has highlighted the core arguments regarding French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire and has additionally set the scene for the subsequent chapter.

Of note, I have considered arguments centred on realist notions of France's military intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. Specifically, it was shown how France's need to remain relevant, not only in Africa but internationally, as well as the Gaullist underpinnings of the French political elites, led

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<sup>85</sup>Finnemore, "Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention." 1; Bellemy and Wheeler, "Humanitarian intervention in world politics."

<sup>86</sup>Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, "Refugee flows as grounds for international action", *International Security* 21.1 (1996): 71

<sup>87</sup>Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 163; Bruno Charbonneau, "War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line", *International Peacekeeping* 19.4 (2012): 508-524

<sup>88</sup>Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution", 6

to France intervening in Cote d'Ivoire. The second set of arguments contends that France's intervention can be explained by its imperial interests, notably economic interests, in Cote d'Ivoire. Any perceived threat to these interests, it is argued, will compel France to intervene to ensure such valuable interests are maintained. Lastly, a set of humanitarian explanations to French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire were discussed. Indeed, there are arguments to suggest that France intervened to avoid a bloodbath and ensure stability in Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, the large presence of French nationals in Cote d'Ivoire resulted in France's need to protect these nationals, further suggesting humanitarian motives for intervention.

All three sets of arguments certainly have important explanatory power regarding why France intervened in Côte d'Ivoire. That is to say, in this chapter I have evaluated the relevant literature of why France intervenes, not only in Cote d'Ivoire but in sub-Saharan Africa. These arguments aforementioned, in effect, provide the motivations and justifications for hypotheses in the following chapter. Using this robust set of literature, I proceed to quantitatively test these arguments in order to develop an analytical framework of a typical French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. Adding to the literature, the remainder of this thesis analyses the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, and uses those trends to assess the extent to which French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire represents significantly different motives for intervention, or whether this intervention was simply business as usual for French-African relations.

## Chapter 3: Quantitative analysis of French interventions

### 3.1 Introduction

The examination of the literature in the preceding chapter has highlighted some important arguments regarding French intervention not only in Cote d'Ivoire but also in sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter, I am seeking to answer the supplementary research question: **What are the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan?** In order to answer this question this chapter develops an analytical framework which outlines the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, this chapter investigates what factors are important determinants of French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. By answering this question, we develop an analytical framework which allows us to understand the extent to which the intervention in Côte d'Ivoire complements or refutes the general trends of French intervention.

This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, through a discussion of the dataset I describe the research design of this chapter. Secondly, I discuss the core concepts used to test the variables, as well as how these concepts are operationalised (measured). Thirdly, I conduct quantitative analysis, primarily using the logistic regression model as well as some initial bivariate analyses to test the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. In sum, I find evidence suggesting that France is more likely to intervene in African states with which it has strong colonial ties, strong cultural and linguistic ties, more entrenched economic interests (notably trade). Moreover, I find that the typical French intervention in Africa generally occurs in low intensity (deaths) crises. As such, this chapter is able to develop a robust analytical framework which can be applied the French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire.

### 3.2 Research Design

#### 3.2.1 PRIO dataset

For this analysis, I have selected the most current version of the UCDP/PRIO, which is a continuation of initial data collected by Gleditsch et al.<sup>89</sup> Like other well-known conflict datasets, the PRIO dataset focuses specifically on tracking armed conflict around the world.

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<sup>89</sup>Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset", *Journal of peace research* 39.5 (2002): 615-637.

However, the PRIO dataset differs from other major conflict datasets as it has a significantly lower threshold of what constitutes conflict (25 battle-related deaths per year in which at least one actor is the recognised government).<sup>90</sup> Other major datasets, notable the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, have thresholds which are far higher and thus do not capture as many instances of conflicts and crises of a smaller, less intense nature.<sup>91</sup> The low threshold found in this dataset allows us to investigate more instances of French interventions in these conflicts.

Additionally, France has intervened in situation which cannot always be classified as conflicts and as such are not captured by high threshold datasets like that COW dataset. While this may certainly be the case in the PRIO dataset, there is greater chance that such intervention in non-conflict situations will be captured due to the far lower threshold of conflict.<sup>92</sup>

The PRIO dataset, like other major datasets, tracks conflicts on a yearly basis. As such, the unit of analysis in the dataset is the conflict year in African states.<sup>93</sup> To illustrate, the liberation war in Guinea-Bissau lasted from 1963 to 1974. Therefore, the PRIO dataset notes every year of the conflict and considers it a separate event thus making 12 cases of conflict in the dataset. We obtained data on French interventions from the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset which tracks intervention between 1960 and 2005 and code such interventions into the PRIO dataset.<sup>94</sup> The time frame for the analysis is thus from 1960 to 2005, and while I would like to expand the time frame to the present date there is limited intervention data available.

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<sup>90</sup>Lotta Harbom, S. Havard, and M. N. Havard, "UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook", *Codebook. Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo* (2009).

<sup>91</sup> The COW dataset has a threshold of a 1000 battle deaths per year between combatants.

<sup>92</sup> With that being said, some French interventions found within the literature have not been captured by the PRIO dataset, notably in instances where there were fewer than 25 deaths. The author is thus well aware of this limitation, but as will be seen there were enough cases of French intervention to run statistical analyses, regardless of interventions that did not meet the dataset's threshold.


<sup>93</sup> Harbom et al, "UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook", 3

<sup>94</sup> The IMI dataset tracks all interventions in Africa, regardless of whether the intervention occurred during a conflict (with a minimum of 25 battle deaths) or during periods of relative stability, the IMI dataset records such interventions.

### 3.2.2 Dependent variable

The dependent variable in this analysis is whether France intervened in sub-Saharan Africa or not. I thus measure French intervention using a binary code to indicate 0 for a French intervention

Table 2: PRIO Dataset - French interventions in Africa



and 1 for no intervention. I obtained the instances of French intervention from the IMI dataset, which tracks all interventions in sub-Saharan Africa according to the definition developed by Pearson and Baumann: *'the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute'*.<sup>95</sup> From this definition, table 2 shows the total number of cases for the PRIO analysis; France has intervened in 47 of the 469 conflict years in sub-Saharan Africa, roughly 10% of the conflict years in the dataset.<sup>96</sup>

### 3.2.3 Independent variables

Drawn largely from the literature, the independent variables are discussed in which my hypothesised relationships are outlined. For some of the hypotheses in the literature, however, valid and reliable quantitative measures could not be found. For example, I was unable to find a suitable measure for international 'prestige' and *grandeur* which we can use to quantitatively test as to whether states intervene in situations to enhance their international images is beyond the knowledge of the author. As such, I leave such hypotheses to the qualitative sections of this thesis and use the quantitative section to test hypotheses which we can quantify.

<sup>95</sup>Pearson and Baumann, *International Military Intervention 1946-1988*, 1

<sup>96</sup>See Appendix 2 for a full list of French interventions within the PRIO dataset

### 3.2.3.1 Historic determinants of interventions

More so than any other ex-coloniser, France has been argued to intervene in its former colonies for a number of reasons.<sup>97</sup> Specifically, France has been argued to intervene to maintain its influence and domination in Francophone Africa, specifically with its former colonies often proving to be the theatres of such interventions. Additionally, as has been argued, interveners which have strong colonial ties to the target, in the form of political, military and cultural ties are more likely to be involved in the affairs of the target, and are this more likely to intervene.<sup>98</sup> As such, we consider this hypothesis in the quantitative analysis.

***H1: France is more likely to intervene in its former colonies than states which have no historical relationship***

While certainly a key premise in the literature, many argue that France has sought to expand its influence beyond its former colonies. This is especially the case with regards to African states that have strong cultural and/or linguistic connections to France, notably, former Belgian colonies which have long been of interest to France in the post-colonial period. To be sure, France has long been influential in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formally Zaire), specifically France supported President Mobuto with the financial and military aid. Similarly, France has played an integral role in Rwandan Affairs supporting the Habyarimana regime with large amounts of military and financial aid and intervened to assist Rwanda military forces quell external threats, notably from the RPF. France has attempted to include such states in its sphere of influence as thus is more likely to intervene in states which have a linguistic and/or cultural connection with the French metropole.

***H2: France is more likely to intervene in states which have stronger cultural and linguistic ties (francophone community)***

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<sup>97</sup> See Table 1; Amit Singh, "France: Why Intervene in Mali and Central African Republic?", *The Guardian*, February 05, 2013, accessed July 08, 2015.

<sup>98</sup> Renée Edwards, Audrey Mattoon, and Andrew Appleton, "Successful intervention in civil wars: Former colonial status as a missing variable", 2012, accessed April 15 2015. <http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/edwardsmattoonappleton.pdf>: 6; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 149; Lemke and Regan, *Intervention as Influence*, 162.

The measure for both these independent variables is dichotomous. As such, conflict that occurred in former French colonies is coded as 0 and those conflicts in outside of France's colonial sphere are coded as 1. This variable is taken from Hensel's Colonial History dataset and tests as to whether the conflict country was a former colony of France.<sup>99</sup> Similarly, to create the variable for the Francophone connection, those African countries that speak French, including France's ex-colonies, are coded as 0 and all other African states that experienced conflict are coded as 1.<sup>100</sup>

### **3.2.3.1 Economic determinants of interventions**

Trade relations have consistently been posited to determine a state's likelihood of military intervention. France, in this regard, has been no exception as accusations have long suggested that France intervenes to protect its economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in former colonies with which it shares stronger trade relations. In such ways, France is more likely to intervene in states with which it shares strong economic relations, but even more likely to intervene in former colonies with which it shares stronger economic relations. To test French economic interests, I use French bilateral trade relations with sub-Saharan African states.

***H3: France is more likely to intervene in African states, and specifically, former African colonies with which it has higher levels of bilateral trade.***

To test the effects of trade relations on France's likelihood to intervene, I use bilateral trade data collected by Barbiera & Keshk in their COW bilateral trade dataset.<sup>101</sup> This dataset tracks dyadic trade relations from 1870–2009. For the majority of sub-Saharan African states, the dataset starts from the 1960s, although this largely depends on the timing of independence of relevant African states. Specifically, this dataset collects data on exports and imports from country A to country B, and thus, in order to calculate the total trading relations between the intervener and the target I

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<sup>99</sup>Paul R.Hensel, "ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0", 2014, accessed June 16 2015. <http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html>

<sup>100</sup> Because these two variables are very similar in nature, we will test them separately from each other in two separate models. They have a correlation coefficient of .829, a very high value suggesting that they are measuring something very similar i.e. multicollinearity, yet conceptually they are measuring two slightly different concepts

<sup>101</sup> For access to their dataset see: Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, "Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0" (2012): For access to their methodology and codebooks see: Katherine Barbieri, Omar MG Keshk, and Brian M. Pollins, "Trading data evaluating our assumptions and coding rules", *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26.5 (2009): 471-491.

combine exports and imports to create a trade variable (total dyadic trade). Moreover, to make the results as reliable as possible I lag trade by 1 year. As noted by Stojek & Chacha, *'lagging trade values allow us to avoid picking up on trade due to the act of intervention itself such as arms and provisions exported by the intervener to the conflict state, which could significantly bias the results'*.<sup>102</sup>

A myriad of scholars have further made the argument that the natural resources of African states have historically been attractive to the French. A plethora of research has noted how France has intervened to protect its economic interests and strategic natural resources. As such, I contend that there is a relationship between the level of natural resources and the likelihood of French intervention.

***H4: France is more likely to intervene in African states which produce higher amounts of natural resources.***

To measure the level of natural resource production, I use World Bank data which deduces the percentage of a state's GDP that is derived from natural resources. In this instance, natural resources are measured as the *'total sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, minerals rents and forest rents.'*<sup>103</sup> To create a total amount of rents from natural resources, in US Dollars, I multiple the percentages by 100 to obtain an actual amount of official rents extracted.

### **3.2.3.3 Humanitarian determinants**

Altruistic arguments have stipulated that France intervenes in situations and conflicts where there have been high civilian casualties and suffering. Certainly, there is great debate about the merits of such arguments, not only for France but for a plethora of intervening states. Of note, the increasing popularity and importance of R2P as a fundamental principle of military interventions, has necessitated that capable states that are able should intervene in situations and conflicts where human lives are in danger, and in which the state responsible for those lives are unable or unwilling to so do. Certainly, there have been French interventions which have

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<sup>102</sup>Stojek and Chacha, "Adding trade", 233

<sup>103</sup>World Bank, *Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)*, 2015a, accessed June 15, 2015a. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS>,

contained, at least partly, humanitarian underpinning while in other instances an altruistic rationale for intervention has been little more than a smoke-screen to disguise the true motives for said intervention. With regards to late latter, France's important role and intervention in the Rwandan genocide is perhaps the most pronounced example while recent examples of French intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) arguably have strong undertones of humanitarianism. Regardless, I consider such arguments in the analyses and I test the degree to which France's motives for military intervention are centred on altruism, humanitarianism and the principles of R2P.

***H5: France is more likely to intervene in conflicts which have a higher loss of human life.***

Finding a suitable measure for the loss of life during conflict (intensity) has proven to be difficult. This has primarily been the result of the unreliability of casualty figures obtained during the chaos of conflict. However, the PRIO dataset does have a proxy which determines whether the conflict produced total deaths below 1000 persons or over 1000 persons. As such, it codes total deaths under 1000 persons as 1 and over 1000 persons as 0.

Moreover, the literature suggests that the forced displacement of peoples due to conflict and instability has often prompted military intervention. While evidence of this in the case of France is relatively scant, I include the effects of the number of refugee and internally displaced persons on France's likelihood to intervene.

***H6: France is more likely to intervene in conflicts which produce higher numbers of forcibly displaced persons.***

As was the case with the intensity of a conflict, finding reliable data on peoples that were forcibly displaced due to conflict has proven challenging. Yet, the U.S Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) has collected a relatively robust amount of data regarding the amounts

of persons who were forcibly displaced during conflict.<sup>104</sup> This variable has been lagged by 1 year for reasons previously discussed.

#### 3.2.3.4 Control Variables

The hypotheses and variables under discussion form the core of the analysis in this chapter. However, to be as robust as possible, we include some important control variables which potentially impact France's willingness to intervene. Of note, I consider the regime type of sub-Saharan states to be an important proxy variable. This may be the case as interveners may be more likely to deploy troops in countries which have democratically elected governments, but which are under threat from a hostile force. As such, we measure democracy using the Polity IV democracy index which tracks democratic regimes back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>105</sup> We chose to use Polity above other popular indexes; notably the Freedom House as it tracks democracies longer than most other datasets.<sup>106</sup> Operationally, the Polity IV index uses an index of -10 to +10, whereby -10 indicates a full autocracy while +10 indicated a full democratic state.

Besides the democratic inclinations of the target, we also control for the economic development of the target country. We do so as the more wealthy a state the more likely that state will have stronger purchasing power, and thus trading power, on the international stage. Thus the level of wealth in a country directly affects international trade relations and trading power of the target. To test this variable, we use World Bank data which captures the GDP per capita income of each African state found in the PRIO dataset.<sup>107</sup> Lastly, some scholars, notable Regan, suggest that the Cold War had important bearings on state's willingness to intervene.<sup>108</sup> As such, we control using a dichotomous variable whether the conflict occurred during the cold war (0) or after (1).

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<sup>104</sup>For access to the dataset see: Centre for Systematic Peace, *INSCR Data Page*, 2014, accessed June 21 2015. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>,

<sup>105</sup>Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, "Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2002." (2002), accessed: June 30 2015. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf>

<sup>106</sup> Freedom House data, for example, only goes back to 1974.

<sup>107</sup>World Bank, GDP per Capita (current US\$), 2015b, accessed June 26, 2015b. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>,

<sup>108</sup> Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention"

### 3.3 Limitations

Before we proceed with the analysis, several important limitations need to be acknowledged. Firstly, by adding a relatively large quantity of independent variables into the model, we find that the number of missing cases increases. This is largely a result of missing data for the years and countries under analysis, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where reliable data dating back to the 1960s often doesn't exist. As such, there is a diminished sample size in the statistical models.<sup>109</sup>

Moreover, for several of the variables, there is a concern as to whether the measure is valid and reliable. Certainly, this is a concern whenever one attempts to measure concepts, yet I am well aware of such problems of validity and reliability and have chosen the most suitable and accurate measures available to test the hypothesised relationships. By analysing datasets found in peer-reviewed journals and articles I have attempted to select the most reliable and valid datasets available.

As has been aforementioned, the PRIO dataset is unable to capture all French interventions between 1960 and 2005. In fact, 13 interventions captured in the IMI were excluded from the PRIO dataset as a result of those interventions occurring in a non-conflict scenario, thus in situations which don't meet the PRIO threshold. Ideally, I would like to include all French interventions so as to make the results as robust as possible. Despite such a set-back I am still able to analyse the remaining interventions (32 cases of French intervention).

Lastly, drawing on earlier observations, some of the hypotheses mentioned in the literature review are unsuitable for quantitative analysis. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify a quantitative measure for French pursuits of *grandeur* or prestige. Additionally, it would prove difficult to quantitatively test levels of Anglophone encroachment in Francophone spaces. Despite such concerns, I feel that there is enough evidence and quantifiable data to run statistical tests, producing results that can assist in answering the research questions. In sum, there are several limitations to the quantitative analysis in this thesis. However, I feel that no single

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<sup>109</sup>To reduce the number of missing cases, for those variables where there were lagged years but there was no data for the year before, I used data for the current year. This was true for data for: Trade, Population, GDP, natural resources and refugees.

limitation is sufficient to abandon the usage of quantitative analysis in answering the research questions.

### 3.4 Results

In order to test the individual effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable while simultaneously controlling for all other independent variables, we use regression models in this section. The dependent variable in this analysis is dichotomous as it only has two categories.<sup>110</sup> As a result, we are compelled to use a binominal logistic regression, a statistical tool that is similar to multilinear regression but which provides odd ratios for the independent variables. We analyse the results of the PRIO dataset which compares French interventions in African conflicts to conflicts where French intervention was absent. For the PRIO dataset, we implement two models; the first model accounts for the colonial heritage of the African state, while model 2 assesses if the African state was part of the larger Francophone community

From table 3, we can see that the two models are statistically significant. To be sure, model 1 is overall significant ( $p \leq .01$ ) with a Chi-Square of 61.129. Similarly, model 2 is overall significant ( $p \leq .01$ , Chi-Squared: 75.334). These overall significances show that overall the models do a good job in explaining why France intervenes in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, the explained variance of the dependent variables by the independent variables can be found using the Nagelkerke  $R^2$ .<sup>111</sup> For Model 1 the Nagelkerke  $R^2$  is 38.3% while the second model's  $R^2$  is 45.5%. Although these  $R^2$  are relatively large, suggesting the independent variables are strong predictors of the dependent variable, the fact that they are pseudo-  $R^2$  casts doubt over the accuracy and reliability of the variance explained.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> (0 = French intervention, 1 = No French intervention)

<sup>111</sup> The Nagelkerke  $R^2$  is a pseudo  $R^2$  and as such is not as accurate as  $R^2$  found in multilinear regression models.

<sup>112</sup> For a more accurate measure of the model we use classification ratios: Model 1: The overall observed classification ratio was 90.9 % and the predicted classification ratio was 97.844%. Model 2: The overall observed classification ratio was 92.5 % and the predicted classification ratio was 97.844%. For both models, the observed classification ratio was not larger than the threshold ratio (predicted) which, in effect, casts doubt on the reliability of this model. However, the overall significance of the model is  $\leq .01$  and thus, while there are some issues with the model, we can still consider it to be important and reliable.

**Table 3: French Intervention: Logistics Regression Model (PRIO Dataset)**

	Model 1: Former Colony		Model 2: Francophone Country	
	Beta	Odds Ratio	Beta	Odds Ratio
Intercept	91.203	-	81.605	-
Trade <sup>113</sup>	<b>.017*</b>	<b>1.017</b>	<b>.022**</b>	<b>1.022</b>
Natural Resources <sup>114</sup>	-.005	.995	<b>-.005*</b>	.995
Colonial History	<b>2.067**</b>	<b>7.897</b>	-	-
Francophone Country	-	-	<b>3.323**</b>	<b>27.743</b>
Refugees	-.006	.994	-.001	.999
Intensity	<b>1.920**</b>	<b>6.822</b>	<b>1.989**</b>	<b>7.308</b>
Target Democracy	-.106	.899	-.052	.949
Target GDP Per Capita	<b>.034*</b>	<b>1.034</b>	<b>.042**</b>	<b>1.043</b>
Cold War	-.256	.774	.595	1.814
Year of Conflict	-.048	.953	-.044	.957

Dependent variable – reference category: 0 (no intervention)

Model 1:  $N = 274$ , Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 38.3\%$ , Cox & Snell = 20.2%  $p \leq .01$ , Chi-Square - 61.863

Model 2:  $N = 274$ , Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 45.5\%$ , Cox & Snell 24%  $p \leq .01$ , Chi-Squared – 75.268

\* $p \leq .05$ , \*\* $p \leq .01$

To test the proposed hypothesis, I analyse the individual effects of the independent variables.

Table 3 presents the individual effects of the independent variables. Firstly, of the economic

<sup>113</sup>1 unit of trade has been coded as \$10 Million

<sup>114</sup>1 unit of natural resources has been coded as \$10 Million

determinants of French interventions, the trade relations variable is the strongest predictor of French intervention. The dyadic trade relationship between France and African states is both positive and significant in both models (Model 1:  $p \leq .01$ , Beta = .025 and Model 2:  $p \leq .01$ , Beta = .022). As such, higher levels of dyadic trade relations are more likely to attract French intervention. These results thus support the initial hypothesis that France is more likely to intervene in African states which have higher levels of bilateral trade. Furthermore, the exponential B provides information in the form of the odds ratio for the independent variables. As such, the statistics suggest that for every unit increase in trade, France is 1.7%, in model 1, and 2.2%, in model 2, more likely to intervene than not intervening.

Moreover, both the historical/colonial and linguistic/cultural hypotheses are supported by the results. To be sure, table 3 shows that France is 7.8 times more likely to intervene, as opposed to not intervening, in its former colonies, than in other African states with no colonial ties ( $p \leq .01$ , Beta: 2.067). Similarly, the results support the hypothesis that France intervenes in African states which have a cultural connection (same language). As such, France is 27.74 times more likely to intervene in African states which belong to the Francophonie community, as opposed to non-member African countries ( $p \leq .01$ , Beta: 3.323). These two variables, relatively to the others, are very strong predictors of French interventions.

With regards to the humanitarian motives for intervention, there is some evidence to suggest a relationship between the intensity of the conflict and the likelihood of French intervention. The results suggest that France intervenes in low-intensity conflicts; specifically, France is between 6.8 - 7.3 times more likely to intervene, as opposed to not intervening, in conflicts producing a lower death toll (fewer than 1000 deaths), than in conflicts which have a higher death toll (over 1000 deaths). These results, while significant, contradict the earlier-stated hypothesis about France's willingness to intervene in conflicts with increased intensity (Model 1:  $p \leq .01$ , Beta: 1.920; Model 2:  $p \leq .01$ , Beta: 1.989). It thus appears that France often intervenes in low-intensity conflicts, where casualties are relatively low.

Of the control variables that were included in the models, only the GDP per capita of the target was significant (Model 1:  $p \leq .05$ , Beta: .034; Model 2:  $p \leq .01$ , Beta: .042). Thus, according to the

data, France is more likely to intervene, as opposed to not intervene, in African countries which are wealthier. Specifically, when analysing the odds ratio, France is 4.1% (Model 1) and 4.9% (Model 2) more likely to intervene in African states for every unit increase of GDP per capita.<sup>115</sup> It also appears that the regime type has no bearing on whether France intervenes or not. Similarly, regardless of whether during the Cold War or after, France has intervened regardless.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to answer the research question: **What are the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan?** Incorporating hypotheses derived from the literature in Chapter Two, I developed an analytical framework which outlines the general trends of French motives for intervention. The quantitative analysis thus provides some important findings as several hypotheses were supported and some rejected; a summary of the results can be seen in Table 4.

**Table 4: Summarised table of results: PRIO Dataset**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Hypothesis?</b>	<b>PRIO dataset</b>
<b>Trade (H1)</b>	Accepted	More trade – French intervention more likely
<b>Resources (H2)</b>	Rejected (not much evidence available)	More resources – Less likely of intervention
<b>Intensity (H3)</b>	Rejected	Lower Intensity – intervention more likely
<b>Refugee (H4)</b>	Rejected	N/S
<b>Colonial History (H5)</b>	Accepted	Former French Colony – French intervention more likely
<b>Francophone Community (H6)</b>	Accepted	Francophone Country – French intervention more likely
<b>GDP Per Capita (Control)</b>	N/A	Higher the GDP per capita – French intervention more likely
<b>Democracy (Control)</b>	N/A	N/S

<sup>115</sup>1 unit of GDP per capita has been coded as \$100

<b>Cold War (Control)</b>	N/A	N/S
<b>Year (Control)</b>	N/A	N/S

N/S– No Significance, N/A – Not applicable

To begin, we find little evidence for the hypothesis that France is more likely to intervene in African states with higher levels of natural resources. As such, the analysis does not find evidence to support the arguments postulated by a myriad of French intervention scholars.<sup>116</sup> Similarly, we find little support that France intervenes in response to growing numbers of refugees. In the literature there were relatively weak arguments supported France’s humanitarian motives for intervention. The lack of support of the refugee hypothesis supports such claims that altruism is limited in explaining French intervention. As such, the arguments of Blechman, Bellemy and Wheeler, Bellemy and Williams and Kohut and Toth are not supported by the findings in this analysis.<sup>117</sup> With that being said, the results do suggest that there is a connection between French interventions and the intensity of the conflict. However, this connection appears contradictory to the predicted hypothesis. In fact, France appears more likely to intervene in low-intensity conflict as opposed to high-intensity conflicts.

Among the economic variables, there is evidence to suggest that trade is a significant predictor of French military interventions. As such, the hypothesis is supported by the data and can posit that France is more likely to intervene in states with higher levels of bilateral trade. In this way, the findings support the arguments of Moncrieff and Stojek and Chacha, who have suggested that trade relations are vitally important to French-Africa relations, and when those relations are threatened, France is more likely to intervene.<sup>118</sup> As such, the findings suggest that France’s economic interests are important determinants of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa.

Furthermore, the strongest predictors are those variables which centre on the colonial, historical and cultural connections between the intervener and the target. The results show that France is

<sup>116</sup>See: Melly and Darracq, "A New Way to Engage", 2; Clark, "The neo-colonial context". Martin, "The Historical, Economic and Political Base"; Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace"; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa"; Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa"

<sup>117</sup> Blechman, "The intervention dilemma", 1 Also see: Bellamy and Williams. "The new politics of protection", 4-5; Martha Finnemore, "Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention", 1; Bellemy and Wheeler, "Humanitarian intervention in world politics"; Kohut and Toth, "Arms and the People"

<sup>118</sup> Stojek and Chacha, "Adding trade"; Richard Moncrieff, "French Africa policy", 17

significantly more likely to intervene in situations and conflicts in its former colonies. Similarly, France has expanded its sphere of influence as it appears to intervene more in Francophone African countries, regardless of colonial history. The significance of these variables suggests that scholars such as Charbonneau, Renou, Lemke and Regan were correct in their analyses.<sup>119</sup> Specifically, the findings suggest that France is more likely to intervene in its traditional sphere of influence or *pré carré*, where it has traditionally exerted dominance and influence, and with which it has enhanced its international power and relevance. As such, the findings support the realist arguments for military intervention outlined in Chapter Two.

The findings from this chapter highlight some important trends regarding French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, a typical French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa takes place either in a former French colony, with which it shares close historical ties with, or in a Francophone country, which it shares linguistic and cultural ties with. Moreover, France is in general more likely to intervene in either a former colony or Francophone countries with which it shares strong bilateral trade relations, and by extension economic relations. Lastly, France tends to intervene in low-intensity situations and crises, in which the death toll is relatively small compared to other conflicts. As such, the findings tend to support the realist and economic arguments for intervention while little support exists suggesting humanitarian motives for French intervention.

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<sup>119</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 50; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 6; Lemke and Regan, *Intervention as Influence*, 162

## Chapter 4: French Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire

### 4.1 Introduction

In Chapter Three, I developed a framework which highlighted the general trends of French motives of interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter, I incorporate this framework into the analysis of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. In so doing, I engage with the research question: **Why did France intervene in 2002 in Côte d'Ivoire?** Moreover, by analysing France's intervention, in light of the analytical framework, I am able to answer the question: **To what extent does France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire differ with the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa?** This chapter is structured as followed: Firstly, I analyse the variables of colonial history and economic interests, as determinant of general French intervention, with regards to Franco-Ivorian relations, and the consequent intervention in 2002. Secondly, I assess the degree to which humanitarian factors, notably the intensity of the crisis outlined in Chapter Three, affected the French intervention. Finally, I review political events and relationship in France and Côte d'Ivoire, showing how they influenced French intervention in 2002.

In assessing the extent to which French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire differs with or resembles the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, my analysis suggests that there are strong similarities. Indeed, my findings suggest that France's close colonial ties with Côte d'Ivoire have produced strong and intertwined relations and interests notably: historic ties, personal relationships, military connections and cultural (émigré) connections. I further find that France's economic ties with Côte d'Ivoire, through bilateral trade, investment, French aid and France's regional economic interests, are equally, if not more, powerful. At the same time, I find limited evidence to suggest natural resources as a motivation for intervention had any effect on French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, further showing the resemblance between the general motives for intervention and the motives in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover I find that the rapid deployment of French troops, before the crisis became increasingly violent, is largely in line with the intensity findings in Chapter Three, thus demonstrating further the resemblance of the Ivorian intervention to general French interventions. These factors thus illustrate the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa and thus I conclude that the 2002 intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is largely indicative of France's general motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa,

as outlined in Chapter Three. Moreover, I find a series of events and factors surrounding the intervention which contributed to France's intervention. Of note, the perceived deterioration of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, France's need to protect its citizens, and the political dynamics in both France and Côte d'Ivoire are shown to have important bearing of French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire.

## **4.2 The Franco-Ivorian Colonial Legacy and its Consequences**

To understand France's intervention in 2002 is to understand the colonial legacy of Franco-Ivorian relations and how this legacy produced deep and intertwined linkages between France and Côte d'Ivoire. Certainly, the notion that France is more likely to intervene in its former colonies has been well documented throughout the literature.<sup>120</sup> In complementing the literature, the quantitative findings in Chapter Three demonstrates how France is more likely to intervene in sub-Saharan African states which it shares a colonial history and/or a cultural and linguistic connection. In this section, I show that Côte d'Ivoire is no exception and, in fact, is France's most important and symbolic former sub-Saharan African colony. Indeed, post-colonial Côte d'Ivoire, more so than other French colony, holds a special position in the eyes of the French, boasting a highly prized and privileged relationship. This section thus illustrates the strong colonial ties, and by extension post-colonial ties, which served as a precursor to French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, and which are indicative of general French motivations for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa.

### ***4.2.1 Strong Historic Roots***

Historically, France and Côte d'Ivoire have shared a lengthy and strong relationship. This relationship dates back to at least the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as French merchants established nascent trade relations with communities along the West African coast.<sup>121</sup> As European states became increasingly more consumed with the acquisition of African colonies, France, being no exception, sought to solidify its relationship with political entities in West Africa. By steadily penetrating the African hinterland, France made substantial efforts to spread its influence and

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<sup>120</sup>Amit Singh, "France: Why Intervene in Mali and Central African Republic?"

<sup>121</sup>Raw materials such as Ivory and Gold were often exchanged for manufactured products from Europe including Muskets, fabrics, jewellery. Slaves were also traded extensively in present-day Côte d'Ivoire and West Africa more generally.

dominance throughout the region.<sup>122</sup> With the conclusion of the 1884 Berlin conference and the carving-up of Africa amongst the competing colonial power, France succeeded in obtaining huge portions of west and central Africa.<sup>123</sup> By extension, Côte d'Ivoire was assimilated into the French empire, becoming an official French colony in 1893 and remaining firmly under the colonial jackboot of France until independence in 1960.<sup>124</sup>

During the colonial era, France pushed for the development of Côte d'Ivoire, notably through the agricultural sector.<sup>125</sup> Making use of abundant and fertile land, France transformed the largely subsistence societies in Côte d'Ivoire, introducing various crops within a plantation-based economy. Spearheading such transformation was the introduction of rubber, cocoa and coffee in the southern and western belts of Côte d'Ivoire and within a matter of decades these crops flourished to the extent that Côte d'Ivoire became the global leader in the production of cocoa as well as an important international player in the coffee trade.<sup>126</sup> The rapid expansion of the agriculture sector proved to be most lucrative for the growing French settler population and, by extension, the French Empire, who dominated all sectors of the economy.

Yet, the winds of change were in the air and by the 1950s domestic and international pressure spurred France into handing over power to its African colonies. Indeed, by 1960 France had almost overnight granted independence to most, if not all, its African colonies, including Côte d'Ivoire. While its colonies were officially independent, France continued to dominate, if not indirectly control, its former colonies. Coupled with clandestine and pseudo-legal dealings, hinging on entrenched personal connections between French and African elites, this post-colonial relationship or *Françafrique*, as it is commonly referred, appeared to be the norm in Francophone Africa. This was certainly the case for most of France's former colonies, and indeed Côte d'Ivoire, which was often said to epitomise *Françafrique*.<sup>127</sup> In fact, the Franco-

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<sup>122</sup>For a good account of the pre-colonial and colonial European-African relations and the scramble for Africa see; Thomas Pakenham, *Scramble for Africa*, (Harper Collins: New York, 1992).

<sup>123</sup>Goran Hayden, *African Politics in Comparative Perspective*,(Cambridge University Press, 2006):14

<sup>124</sup>Araoye, *Côte d'Ivoire: The Conundrum*,25

<sup>125</sup>Moncrieff, *French Development Aid* 145

<sup>126</sup>Araoye, *Côte d'Ivoire: The Conundrum*, 25

<sup>127</sup>Guinea is one notable example in which the incumbent Sékou Touré refused to maintain close ties to its former colonial master. In 1958, Guinea was the only Francophone African colony to refuse the *loi cadre*, effectively rejecting French rule. In response, France was quick to sever all aid, investment and trade with Guinea effectively isolating the poor region and starving it of vital resources. In reply, Touré famously declared that '*We'd rather be*

Ivorian relationship, above most other post-colonial relations, was deeply intertwined, proving to be the most important and strongest of these post-colonial ties.

#### **4.2.2 The Personal Connection**

One of the most important aspects which explain the proximate and intertwined Franco-Ivorian relationship was the entrenched personal relationships between French and Ivorian elites. This set of relationship was epitomised by Houphouët-Boigny, who, as the newly appointed President of Côte d'Ivoire, proved to be extremely useful to his French counterparts. During the colonial era, Houphouët-Boigny, often referred to as *Le Vieux* or *Papa Houphouët*, was portrayed as a charismatic leader who championed African development. By establishing the SSA (*Syndicat Agricole Africain*) in the 1940s, Houphouët-Boigny successfully campaigned for the end of forced labour, winning widespread support amongst Ivoirians.<sup>128</sup>

Transforming the SSA into the PDCI (*Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire*), Houphouët-Boigny and associates began to challenge French rule in Côte d'Ivoire, albeit in a substantially more passive manner than other African liberation movements. By the 1950s, while demonstrating elements of anti-imperialism, Houphouët-Boigny, the PDCI and its inner circle had developed a distinctly pro-France attitude, and after serving at various levels and functions in the French colonial and national governments in the 1940s and 1950s developed strong ties and friendships with the French elite and proceeded to maintain these ties in the post-colonial era.<sup>129</sup>

After assuming power upon independence in 1960, Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI continued to share a close relationship with the French elite, a relationship which saw both groups benefit immensely. Yet, as argued by McGovern, while the Ivorian elites catered to France's interests, they were equally able to appease and co-opt the domestic constituency. Some suggest that this was a result of the political skills and manoeuvrings of Houphouët-Boigny himself who ensured that he retained key domestic support and thus stability. To be sure, Le Vine describes Houphouët-Boigny as a political mastermind who was adept at '*juggling political institutions,*

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*poor and free than rich and enslaved*': see Wosen yelesh Mekuria, *Modern-day Griots: Imagining Africa, Choreographing Experience, in a West African Performance in New York*, (ProQuest: Ann Arbor, 2006)

<sup>128</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 151

<sup>129</sup> Staniland, "Francophone Africa", 52

*men, interests and power*' in such a way that his regime was considered a model of successful administrative-hegemonic power.<sup>130</sup>

In this way, Houphouët-Boigny and his associates were able to maintain domestic control while serving French business and political interests.<sup>131</sup> Indeed, Charbonneau, for example, describes this relationship as a '*strategic alliance between Houphouët-Boigny, his entourage and France*',<sup>132</sup> whereby the Ivorian elite was able to reap the rewards of buttressing French interests in Côte d'Ivoire, while distributing enough political and economic goods so as to maintain domestic compliance and support. Similarly, Bossuroy and Cogneau argue that "*Under President Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire established itself as the main partner of the former colonial power.*"<sup>133</sup> The personal relationships of Houphouët-Boigny and his entourage with French elites were thus able to enhance and solidify the already entrenched Franco-Ivorian relationship over his 33 year reign of power. In this way, a nascent Côte d'Ivoire was born, with the crucial assistance of Houphouët-Boigny and company, into a deeply connected, if not dependent, relationship with the French metropole.

This culture of strong personal linkages between Ivorian and French elites did not stop with Houphouët-Boigny. In fact, even after his death in 1993, Ivorian and French elites continued to share unusually strong connections. For example, Former President Gbagbo had strong links with French socialists in France, notably Former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the leadership in the Parti Socialiste (PS).<sup>134</sup> Similarly, current President Ouattara and Former President Nicolas Sarkozy have known each other for 20 years, with Ouattara reportedly stating: "*If I had five or six friend in the world, he (Sarkozy) would be one of them*".<sup>135</sup> Similar relationships have existed between Henri Konan Bédié, the successor of Houphouët-Boigny, and French elites, notably Michel Dupuch, and General Guéï, who after training in France, developed strong connections in

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<sup>130</sup> Victor Le Vine, *Politics in francophone Africa*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004): 206 – 210.

<sup>131</sup> McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*, 140

<sup>132</sup> Ibid

<sup>133</sup> Thomas Bossuroy and Denis Cogneau, "Social mobility and colonial legacy in five African countries", (2008): 4

<sup>134</sup> Araoye, *Côte d'Ivoire: The Conundrum*, 153

<sup>135</sup> Christophe Boisbouvier, "Cote d'Ivoire – France: Ouattara et Sarkozy Comme Les Doigts de la Main", *Jeune Afrique*, January 26 2012, accessed August 18, 2015. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/143209/politique/cote-d-ivoire-france-ouattara-et-sarkozy-comme-les-doigts-de-la-main/>

the French military establishment.<sup>136</sup> The extent and nature of these deep relationships, which seem commonplace in Franco-Ivorian relations, have only enhanced the inter-connectedness and robustness of the Franco-Ivorian relationship, a relationship which has endured from independence to the present day.

#### 4.2.3 The French military in Côte d'Ivoire

This special, even familial, relationship was supplemented by the strong military ties between France and Côte d'Ivoire. Côte d'Ivoire was among the first former French colonies to sign defence and military cooperation agreements with France,<sup>137</sup> effectively guaranteeing military support in times of domestic upheaval and external threats to Houphouët-Boigny's regime. For instance, in 1971, the French military assisted Houphouët-Boigny in quelling a Bété uprising,<sup>138</sup> which threatened the state with rebellion and secession.<sup>139</sup>



Image 1: French Military Bases in Africa (red dot) and defence agreements (2009)

Source: <http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2009/8/23/114055/036>

As is the case with other former French colonies, these defence agreements effectively guaranteed the incumbents' grip on power. Meanwhile, France benefitted by ensuring friendly regimes retain power through these internationally recognised defence agreements.<sup>140</sup> Furthermore, these agreements allowed French military personnel to be permanently stationed in military bases in Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, since independence France has constantly stationed hundreds of marines in the military base of Port Bouët, near Abidjan, marines who have offered

<sup>136</sup>Moncrieff, "French Development Aid", 162

<sup>137</sup>The first of these agreements was signed on 24 April 1961

<sup>138</sup>One of the largest ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire and historically one that has been marginalised by the Baulé-dominated (the ethnic group of Houphouët-Boigny) political elite.

<sup>139</sup>Boubacar N'Diaye, "Not a Miracle After all... Côte d'Ivoire's Downfall: Flawed Civil-Military Relations and missed opportunities", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 33.1, (2005): 100

<sup>140</sup>For more detailed analysis of the defence agreements see: Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 47-67

extensive training and assistance to their Ivorian counterparts and have assisted the Ivorian state in quelling domestic threats.<sup>141</sup>

The permanent deployment of French troops in African countries is not ubiquitous. In fact, there are only a handful of African countries which host French troops on a permanent basis.<sup>142</sup> Côte d'Ivoire is one such country, further illustrating its importance to France as well as highlighting the special Franco-Ivorian relationship made possible by the colonial ties between the two countries. Importantly, it was this base that served as the launching pad for *Opération Licorne*, as the convenience of having troops on the ground, outside Abidjan, ready to deploy at a moment's notice, certainly affected President Chirac's decision to intervene.

In sum, the military agreements and permanent stationing of French marines in Côte d'Ivoire had assisted in maintaining the status quo in Côte d'Ivoire and have further solidified Franco-Ivorian relations. As noted by N'Diaye: '*the PDCI owed most of its longevity to the presence of French troops and French military assistants*'.<sup>143</sup> In return, the permanent stationing of French troops in Côte d'Ivoire gave France important strategic and military advantages in West Africa, in many cases allowing France to use its military base as a launch pad for troop deployments into situations in the region at large. Côte d'Ivoire, as a result of its colonial ties with France, proved to be strategically and militarily vital to French interests.

#### ***4.2.4 French émigrés and their importance***

This close relationship between Côte d'Ivoire and France can certainly explain the high level of mobility amongst French émigré to Côte d'Ivoire. While French expatriates can be found throughout much of Francophone Africa, Cote d'Ivoire has often been perceived as an attractive location, boasting relative political stability and consistent economic growth and development, with Abidjan often referred to as the 'Paris of West Africa'.<sup>144</sup> As such, the French expatriate

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<sup>141</sup> N'Diaye, "Not a Miracle After all"

<sup>142</sup>Up until the 1990s, France had military bases in Senegal, Djibouti, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad and Cameroon and Gabon and Central African Republic. As of 2009, France had permanent bases in Senegal, Djibouti, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad and Gabon (see Image 1)

<sup>143</sup>Ibid

<sup>144</sup>Howard French, "Abidjan Journal: The Paris of West Africa is Down at the Heels", *New York Times*, August 23, 1994, accessed August 14, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/23/world/abidjan-journal-the-paris-of-west-africa-is-down-at-the-heels.html>

community in Côte d'Ivoire has historically been the largest of France's former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>145</sup> For example, Moncrieff notes that Cote d'Ivoire had constantly had the highest concentration of French nationals in Africa.<sup>146</sup> Exact number of French émigrés residing in Côte d'Ivoire are hard to come by, but Staniland notes that in the 1980s, there were roughly 50 000 French expatriates living in Côte d'Ivoire, substantially more than the second-largest French expatriate community in sub-Saharan Africa (20 000 expatriates in Senegal), while reports suggest that around 15-20 000 French nationals resided in Côte d'Ivoire before the outbreak of the 2002 civil war.<sup>147</sup>

These nationals, many of whom were long-term residents and dual-citizenship holders, held a variety of positions in Cote d'Ivoire, including: teachers, senior-level advisors, *coopérants*,<sup>148</sup> and small-to-medium business owners. The large numbers of French expatriates and the tightly intertwined connections between French nationals and Ivorian society, as argued by Moncrieff, gave the French government a *privileged position to understand and therefore influence Ivorian policy*, with the French being almost '*semi-insider*' to Ivorian politics and society.<sup>149</sup> The historically close relationship allowed, if not encouraged, a large number of French nationals to reside and work in Cote d'Ivoire, solidifying the linkages between these states, further enhancing strong Franco-Ivorian linkages.

In sum, this section has demonstrated the entrenched and intertwined post-colonial relations between France and Cote d'Ivoire. Strong historical relations, far-reaching personalities between French and Ivorian elites, strong military connections and reciprocations as well as a large French émigré population are all products of the strong colonial ties between France and Cote d'Ivoire. Together these factors create a myriad of important French interests in Cote d'Ivoire, interests which have their roots in the colonial legacy. As such, the notion developed in Chapter Three and substantiated in Chapter Three that France intervenes in its former colonies, to protect

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<sup>145</sup>Paul Melly, "Why France Must Tread Carefully in Ivory Coast", *BBC News*, April 12 2011, accessed July 10, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13047838>

<sup>146</sup> Moncrieff, "*French Development Aid*", 144; N'Diaye, "Not a Miracle After all", 96

<sup>147</sup>Staniland, "Francophone Africa", 52; Scott Bade, "*The British Aren't Coming: Why the French Intervene in their Former African Colonies and the British do not*", Honours Thesis: Stanford Centre for International Security and Cooperation (2013); "French Relations with Former Colony Ivory Coast," *Reuters*, 17 December 2010, accessed 16 August, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/17/uk-ivorycoast-france-idUKTRE6BG2VK20101217>

<sup>148</sup>Generally young people working abroad in place of military service

<sup>149</sup> Moncrieff, "*French Development Aid*", 148.

its interests, is well substantiated in this section. I therefore concur with the likes of Charbonneau and Renou, to name a few, who contend that France intervenes in its former colonies, where it has vital interest that must be protected.<sup>150</sup>

### **4.3 French Economic Interests in Cote d'Ivoire**

Besides colonial legacy and its impact on post-colonial relations and interests, strong economic interests, though certainly an important product of colonial legacy, are never far from the discussion of French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, this argument was supported by the literature review in Chapter Two as well as the results from the large-N study in Chapter Three. With the case of Côte d'Ivoire, I find further support to the claim that France's economic interests explain, at least partly, why France regards Côte d'Ivoire so highly and why perhaps France intervened in 2002. As such, the arguments in this section concur with scholars such as Charbonneau, Renou, Lemke and Regan, who contend that economic interests are vital determinants of interventions, and specifically intervention in Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>151</sup> Similarly, it would seem that France's economic interests, as a motive for intervention in Cote d'Ivoire, complement the analytical framework, and are thus indicative of the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa.

#### **4.3.1 French Bilateral Trade**

One key aspect of the economic interest under discussion is Franco-Ivorian trade relations. France and Côte d'Ivoire have historically been close trade partners, especially in the post-colonial era.<sup>152</sup> Such a close trade relation connects states, increasing France interest in the domestic affairs and stability of the Côte d'Ivoire. Data from the PRIO dataset (Table 5) indicates that French trade relationships are significantly larger with Côte d'Ivoire (average: \$1423.27 million per year) than with other African states that France didn't intervene in (average: \$178.18 million per year). Côte d'Ivoire thus seemingly fits well into the analytical framework; when trade relations are stronger and when such relations come under threat, France

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<sup>150</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 50; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 6

<sup>151</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 50; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 6; Lemke and Regan, *Intervention as Influence*, 162

<sup>152</sup> Smith, "La politique d'engagement", 114; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "La France et la Cote d'Ivoire", July 31 2014, accessed August 15 2015. <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/cote-d-ivoire/la-france-et-la-cote-d-ivoire/>

is more likely to deploy troops to protect these interests. Furthermore, this data substantiates the argument that France shares a particularly close economic bond with Côte d’Ivoire, more so than other former French colonies.

<b>Table 5: PRIO Dataset: French Trade (\$Million)</b>		
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Measures of Association</b>
With Côte d’Ivoire	\$1423.27	Eta: .295 P<.01
With other African states	\$178.18	

To further illustrate this point, IMI data supports similar findings (Table 6). Notably, French trade with Côte d’Ivoire, prior to the intervention, was significantly higher (average: \$1027.52 million) than trade relations between other interveners and target states (average: \$89.73million). Furthermore, while these figures support the trade hypothesis, the fact that French trade with Côte d’Ivoire is far larger than with other states that France has intervened in (average \$136.97 million) indicates that France has a far more important relationship (economic and otherwise) with Côte d’Ivoire, even more so than other French colonies.

<b>Table 6: IMI Dataset: Intervener trade relations (\$Million)</b>		
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Measures of Association</b>
<b>France and Côte d’Ivoire</b>	<b>\$1027.52</b>	<b>P&lt;.01</b> <b>Eta: .506</b>
<b>France and target states</b>	<b>\$136.97</b>	
<b>Other interveners and target states</b>	<b>\$89.73</b>	

The case of Côte d’Ivoire thus complements the analytical framework from Chapter Three, highlighting that when trade ties are stronger, countries are more likely to intervene so as to protect such interests. In this way, my findings support the hypothesis of Stojek and Chacha, as well as others, who argued that economic interests in the form of bilateral trade connects states

together and any instability or conflict in one state threatens potential interveners' trade relations with that state.<sup>153</sup> As such, economic ties increase the willingness of states to intervene, especially when these ties are significantly stronger, as in the case of Côte d'Ivoire.

#### **4.3.2 Natural Resource Extraction**

Hitherto, the evidence has suggested that France important trading interests with Côte d'Ivoire. Another variable which has been argued to predict French intervention is the presence of important natural resources. Indeed, natural resources and France's strategic need for them have been well documented in the literature, with scholars, notably Clark, Martin, and Wyss, suggesting that France has used its military power in sub-Saharan Africa to secure access to important resources like oil and uranium.<sup>154</sup> Yet, it appears that interventions motivated by resources have been limited to a handful of resource-rich states, including CAR, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and Niger. Some have even suggested that the 2013 Mali intervention was motivated to prevent conflict spill-over, a spill over that would threaten French uranium interests in Niger.<sup>155</sup>

With regards to Côte d'Ivoire, there is little evidence to suggest that France sought intervention to secure strategically important resources. In fact, as noted by Charbonneau, two of the most important natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire, cocoa and the nascent oil industry, were not dominated by French business interests.<sup>156</sup> Certainly, French interventions motivated by resources have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa. This, however, appears to be the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the findings from Chapter Three suggest similar conclusions. To be sure, the evidence regarding natural resources and likelihood of French intervention is weak. In fact, the evidence suggests that France is less likely to intervene in sub-Saharan states with more natural resources. The lack of evidence regarding French motivation based on natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire thus complements the analytical framework of Chapter Three.

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<sup>153</sup> Stojek and Chacha, "Adding trade", 231; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 50; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 6; Lemke and Regan, *Intervention as Influence*, 162

<sup>154</sup> Schneider, *Nuclear Power Made in France*; Melly and Darracq, "A New Way to Engage", 2; Clark, "The neo-colonial context"; Martin, "The Historical, Economic and Political Base of France's Africa Policy", 2; Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace"; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa"; Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa".

<sup>155</sup> Erforth and Deffner, "Mali: Old Wine in New Bottles"; Elischer, "After Mali comes Niger: West Africa's Problems Migrate East", *Foreign Affairs*, February 12, 2013, accessed July 29 2015 [http://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/Elischer\\_Foreign\\_Affairs\\_2013.pdf](http://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/Elischer_Foreign_Affairs_2013.pdf)

<sup>156</sup> Ibid

### 4.3.3 French Investment

This high volume of bilateral trade highlights the strong and enduring connection between Côte d'Ivoire and France. While trade is certainly important in this analysis, it is by no means the only, or perhaps the most important, economic interest of France. In fact, there are other economic interests that could not be included in the Chapter Three, but which can be taken into account in this chapter, and which assist in developing a greater understanding of France's interests in Côte d'Ivoire, and its subsequent intervention in 2002. For example, French direct investment to African states highlights the importance position of Côte d'Ivoire to French commercial interests. Table 7 shows the top six recipients of French direct investment between 1989 and 2002, with Côte d'Ivoire placed as the fifth largest recipient of French investment. If we consider that France invests more in Africa's largest economies (South Africa and Nigeria) and in Francophone countries endowed with substantial oil reserves (Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville), we can see that Côte d'Ivoire, having a relatively small economy and oil reserves, is one of the largest recipients of French investment in Africa.

<b>Table 7: French Direct Investment in Africa: Top Recipients from 1989-2002 (SUS Million)<sup>157</sup></b>	
<b>Gabon</b>	<b>140.01</b>
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>42.59</b>
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>41.82</b>
<b>Congo-Brazzaville</b>	<b>41.07</b>
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	<b>30.33</b>
<b>Senegal</b>	<b>25.59</b>

Evidence further suggests that France, leading up to the intervention, was still the largest investor in Côte d'Ivoire, capitalising on a range of sectors that had recently been privatised. Indeed, French firms have long been present in Côte d'Ivoire, possessing important investments and controlling interests in various sectors in Côte d'Ivoire. Of note, France Télécom and Orange are

<sup>157</sup>Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Official Development Assistance: Aid Disbursements to countries and regions*, 2014a, accessed May 05, 2015. <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeId=3#>

the biggest cellular companies in Côte d'Ivoire, French group Groupe Bolloré owned 67% of Sitarail which controlled the Ouagadougou-Abidjan rail, Air France controlled 51% of Air Ivoire, and Bouygues has large stakes in the electric company Ciprel and the Compagnie Ivoirienne d'Électricité as well as the national water company SODECI. Moreover, French oil giants, Total and ELF, were part owners of Côte d'Ivoire's oil refineries (Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage) and French banks, notably BNP, Crédit Lyonnais and Société Générale dominated the Ivorian banking sector.<sup>158</sup>

Moreover, before the 2002 intervention there were roughly 500 small and medium sized enterprises, many of them owned and operated by French nationals residing in Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>159</sup> These enterprises made up approximately 30 percent of the Ivorian GDP and accounting for at least 50 percent of government revenue.<sup>160</sup> The large amount of investment further highlights the economic importance of the Côte d'Ivoire to France. Thus, in agreement with Akindès, Côte d'Ivoire has historically been a prodigious recipient of French capital, capital which has been invested in a diverse range of sectors.<sup>161</sup> As such, investment, like trade relations, further enhances the economic importance of the Franco-Ivorian relationship. French investment is thus another addition to the myriad of diverse French interests, which, when under threat, contributes to an understanding of why France intervened in 2002.

#### ***4.3.4 French Aid to Côte d'Ivoire***

Besides trade and investment, Côte d'Ivoire has historically be a major recipient of French development aid, aid which has in effect greased the patrimonial wheels in Côte d'Ivoire and has been partly responsible for Côte d'Ivoire's post-colonial economic growth, as well as the PDCI's ability to maintain control and popular support.<sup>162</sup> To illustrate, Côte d'Ivoire, on average, has received far higher levels of French aid when compared to all other sub-Saharan countries (see Table 8). Furthermore, amongst France's former colonies as well as the Francophone community

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<sup>158</sup> International Crisis Group, "Côte d'Ivoire: No Peace In sight", Africa Report no. 82 (2004), Dakar/Brussels; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 155; Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution", 14.

<sup>159</sup>Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution", 14

<sup>160</sup> Ibid

<sup>161</sup>Francis Akindès, *The roots of the military-political crises in Côte d'Ivoire*, No. 128, (Nordic Africa Institute, 2004):10

<sup>162</sup> Moncrieff, "French Development Aid", 147

in Africa, Côte d'Ivoire has received significantly larger quantities of development aid.<sup>163</sup>

<b>Table 8: French Official Development Assistance (\$Million – Average 1960 to 2000)<sup>164</sup></b>	
Côte d'Ivoire Average	151.4
Former Colonies	56.18
Francophone Community	50.72
African Average	25.39

Like trade and investment, these figures suggest that Côte d'Ivoire and France have a particularly strong relationship, surpassing French relations with other sub-Saharan African states, including its former colonies and the Francophone community at large. Moncrieff corroborates such findings as he notes that *'from independence to the late 1980s, France provided more than half Côte d'Ivoire's net development aid receipts, while Côte d'Ivoire was consistently the highest recipient of French aid'*.<sup>165</sup>

French aid has benefitted not only Côte d'Ivoire, but the French as well. Indeed, Quinn and Simon argue that the allocation of French development aid has changed little over time and still appears to prioritise the French goals of projecting economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural power in Africa.<sup>166</sup> Certainly the presence of vast French commercial and military interests in Côte d'Ivoire, and its symbolically close relationship with the Ivorian elite facilitated and justified the large flow of French aid to Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, the fact that Côte d'Ivoire receives higher levels of ODA than other sub-Saharan countries further substantiates the argument regarding the privileged and important position of Côte d'Ivoire in the eyes of the French.

<sup>163</sup>In all case aforementioned there is a statistically significant difference between French aid to Côte d'Ivoire and French aid to other groups ( $p \leq .01$ )

<sup>164</sup>Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. *Official Development Assistance*

<sup>165</sup>Moncrieff, "French Development Aid", 147

<sup>166</sup>James Quinn and David J. Simon, "Plus ça change...: the allocation of French ODA to Africa during and after the Cold War", *International interactions* 32.3 (2006): 311

#### 4.3.5 The Franc Zone

Côte d'Ivoire plays an important role in the regional economy and any domestic instability certainly has important economic implications for the greater region, as well as France. To be sure, Côte d'Ivoire is the largest economy amongst the eight-member Franc Zone (FZ) or CFA (*Communauté Financière Africaine*) in West Africa.<sup>167</sup> This Franc Zone, held together by the Monetary Union of West African States (UEMOA), was pegged by the French Franc, and later the Euro.<sup>168</sup> The importance of Côte d'Ivoire in holding this Union, and thus the Franc, together cannot be overstated. For example, according to one report, Côte d'Ivoire contributes more than 40% of the UEMOA's output.<sup>169</sup> This importance means that any destabilisation or conflict in Côte d'Ivoire would send tremors throughout much of the region affecting the economies of Francophone West Africa.

But more importantly are the impacts such domestic destabilisation would have on France and its Ivorian/regional economic interests. France, as the de-facto guarantor of the value of the FZ, has serious interests in ensuring the Union, and by extension Côte d'Ivoire, remains as stable as possible. To be sure, a wide range of scholars note how the FZ has traditionally been used by France to control and shape the economic policies of its former colonies, thereby ensuring its economic interests are protected.<sup>170</sup> Charbonneau, for example, argues that this monetary regime gave France a position of privilege *vis-à-vis* the commercial and financial on-goings in the FZ.<sup>171</sup> Similarly, Martin suggests that the FZ gave France near-total control of money supplies, banking activities, credit allocations in what he deems a 'voluntary' surrender of sovereignty.<sup>172</sup> France's dominant role, evident in these arguments, is indicative of its economic interests in the region, of which there are many. Disaggregating back to the Ivorian case, France would (or could) not allow the most-important member of the FZ to descend into chaos and instability. In other words, it would seem unlikely that, in light of these French economic interests previously outlined, France

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<sup>167</sup> Paul Melly, "Why France Must Tread"

<sup>168</sup> The Euro became the official currency for the Eurozone, including France, 1999.

<sup>169</sup> Nakama Popoh, Special Report: Côte d'Ivoire; From Colonialism to Cronyism, *Ceasefire Magazine*, February 23, 2011, accessed August 8, 2015 <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/report-cote-ivoire/>

<sup>170</sup> See: Guy Martin, "The Franc Zone: Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa", *Third World Quarterly* 8.1 (1986): 205-235; Nicolas Van de Walle, "The Decline of the Franc Zone: Monetary Politics in Francophone Africa", *African Affairs*, 90.360 (1991): 383-405; Guy Martin, "Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33.1 (1995): 1-20; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 59; Nakama Popoh, "Special Report".

<sup>171</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 59

<sup>172</sup> Martin, "Continuity and Change", 12

would stand idly by and watch as its most important economic partner (in the UEMOA) descends into instability and conflict

Bilateral trade, French investment, French aid and France's regional economic interests demonstrate the economic importance of Côte d'Ivoire to France. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire were important in determining French intervention. In complementing the findings from Chapter Three, it seems that France, through this myriad of economic interests, intervened at least partly to defend such interests. The idea that France intervenes to protect its interests is certainly nothing new. Indeed, my findings support the arguments and observations of a range of scholars and commentators, especially regarding French economic motives for intervention.<sup>173</sup> In light of these and other interests, and the rising threat to these interests in 2002, France felt compelled to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire.

#### **4.4 The deteriorating situation in Côte d'Ivoire**

There can be little doubt that such 'structural' interests aforementioned were present during the 1999 coup d'état. Indeed, French interests in Côte d'Ivoire were as pronounced in 2002 as they were in 1999, yet France decided not to intervene in the latter as opposed to the former. This conundrum can partly be explained by events surrounding the 1999 coup d'état, notably Jospin's interdiction and perhaps the perception of Guéï as guarantor of French interest. Yet, in 2002, there were a series of events and factors in France and Côte d'Ivoire which complement the colonial legacy and economic explanations of French intervention, providing additional understanding to why France intervened.

Of note, the attempted coup on 19 September, although failing to remove Gbagbo from power, threw Côte d'Ivoire into the midst of civil war. The well-armed and well-trained FN troops proved to match, if not overwhelm, Gbagbo's forces, resulting in the rapid take-over of northern territory. For France, the 2002 attempted coup and the rebel's swift assimilation of north territory was seen as evidence of the degradation of the Ivorian state and the burgeoning inability of the state to maintain order and territorial integrity.

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<sup>173</sup>Araoye, *Côte d'Ivoire: The Conundrum*, 152/155; Stojek and Chacha, "Adding trade"

France's myriad of aforementioned interests in Côte d'Ivoire meant that it could simply not allow such deterioration to occur. To be sure, in December 2002, the Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin stated that the role of the French military was to stabilise the situation and that one of the fundamental objectives of *Opération Licorne* was without doubt to prevent a bloodbath akin to that of Rwanda in 1994.<sup>174</sup> Similarly, the Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie, in an address to the French National Assembly, stated that France's objective was to stabilise the situation until the arrival of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) forces.<sup>175</sup> As such, government rhetoric consistently phrased the intervention as geared towards "*using force to achieve peace*", "*to master violence was desirable to achieve peace*" and "*a show of forces avoids resorting to force*".<sup>176</sup> Moreover, the official mandate of the intervention was geared towards the establishment of '*the necessary conditions for the search for a political solution*' and '*to allow Ivoirians to define political solutions*'.<sup>177</sup> This official discourse and mission objectives all point to France's need to stabilise the worsening situation and stop the crisis from spiralling out of control.

These motives for intervention further complement the analytical framework, notably with regards to the intensity of the conflict. It was shown in Chapter Three that France is more likely to intervene in low-intensity conflicts and crises, where there are fewer casualties. The rapid French deployment in Côte d'Ivoire, before the conflict escalated and produced greater bloodshed, is reflective of the general trends that France's interventions in low-casualty conflicts. Certainly the notion that France sought to prevent a Rwanda-styled crisis occurring in Côte d'Ivoire is evident in its intervention. That is to say, if scholars, who argue that the consequences of the Rwandan genocide has severely affected the beliefs and attitudes of French policy-makers, are correct, then France's intervention, before the Ivorian crisis escalated into full scale war, can be at least partly explained by its willingness to prevent mass-scale bloodshed akin to Rwanda in 1994. As such, on face-value, the intervention complements not only the analytical framework

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<sup>174</sup> Assemblée Nationale, No. 21

<sup>175</sup> Assemblée Nationale, *Commission Affaires étrangères*, Compte Rendu (Report), No. 40, (Paris: 19 May, 2003b), accessed, July 13, 2015. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cafe/02-03/c0203040.asp#P34\\_309](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cafe/02-03/c0203040.asp#P34_309)

<sup>176</sup> Quoted in Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 149

<sup>177</sup> Charbonneau, B, "Dreams of Empire: France, Europe and the new Interventionism in Africa", *Modern & Contemporary France* 16.3, (2008b): 289/290.

but also various scholars, notably Smith, Charbonneau and Bovcon, who suggest that France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was motivated by humanitarian objectives.<sup>178</sup>

Yet, this need to re-establish order and stability in Côte d'Ivoire cannot be divorced from the historical close relations these countries share. Indeed, had French relations, and consequent interest, with Côte d'Ivoire been of lesser, or of no, value there is reasonable doubt as to whether France would have intervened. The deep and integrated nature of Franco-Ivorian relations, in effect, left France in a position where it could not simply sit quietly by and watch the Ivorian state disintegrate. As such, the deteriorating situation and France's myriad of interests in Côte d'Ivoire meant that France really did have something to lose. While disguised as a purely humanitarian affair, France's engagement in the crisis could not escape its historical responsibility and its deep-seated interests in Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, Alliot-Marie in 2002 declared that France was right to intervene given the historic links and close relations between the two countries.<sup>179</sup> In such ways, arguments put forth by Dowty and Loescher, regarding interventions justified on humanitarian grounds but usually motivated by more cynical factors, resonate in the case of intervention in Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>180</sup> While there are certainly elements of humanitarian motive in France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, it would seem that France's was driven more by the protection of its myriad of interests, which demanded stability, as opposed to a purely humanitarian intervention.

Perhaps of most immediate concern to French decision-makers was the very real danger that French nationals, residing in Côte d'Ivoire, faced. As such, one of the fundamental objectives of the intervention was protecting and evacuating French and other foreign nationals. Indeed, Charbonneau notes that on the first day, France deployed its 600 permanently-stationed troops to protect French, American and other foreign nationals.<sup>181</sup> Similarly, the French Foreign minister on several occasions highlighted the need to protect and evacuate French and other foreign émigrés,<sup>182</sup> while Bovcon argues that '*France legitimised its action in terms of its duty to protect*

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<sup>178</sup>Smith, "La politique d'engagement", 123; Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 163; Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution", 6

<sup>179</sup>Assemblée Nationale, No. 40

<sup>180</sup>Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, "Refugee flows", 71

<sup>181</sup>Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 160

<sup>182</sup>See: Assemblée Nationale, No. 21; Assemblée Nationale, No. 26; Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution", 6

*French citizens on the territory of another country when their lives are threatened and the host country is incapable of, or unwilling to, provide for their security*'.<sup>183</sup> Thus, in the following months France evacuated thousands of French national, including some 3000 nationals from the rebel-held areas in northern Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>184</sup> Certainly, in light of the deteriorating situation, the argument that France intervened so as to protect the thousands of French émigrés residing in Côte d'Ivoire is important in understanding its motives.

The growing strength of the rebels in the north threatened to throw Côte d'Ivoire into a protracted and violent civil war, a threat that simply was not present in 1999. Given the myriad of French 'structural' interests in Côte d'Ivoire, and in light of the deteriorating situation and France's need to protect its interests and citizens, France had little choice but to intervene. Had Jospin been in power in 2002, and given the very threat of civil war and escalation of violence, one could make the argument that even he would have had to have acted, in contradiction to his policy of disengagement.

## **4.5 Chirac and Gbagbo: An uneasy Relationship**

### **4.5.1 Chirac the Gaul**

A further aspect of why France intervened is located within the political climate of both France and Côte d'Ivoire. In May 2002, Chirac was re-elected President of France. Moreover, his conservative party won a majority in the French legislature, putting an end to the cohabitation of 1997-2002.<sup>185</sup> The defeat of Jospin's Socialists gave Chirac a mandate and by extension allowed him to return France to a policy of active reengagement in African crises.<sup>186</sup> Underpinning such reengagement were Chirac's Gaullist beliefs and attitudes *vis-à-vis* France's role in Africa.<sup>187</sup> Indeed, Chirac, whose career dates back to the De Gaulle Presidency, sought to reaffirm France's role as the traditional power in Africa, embedding France in the affairs of its former colonies. Chirac's long affairs with Africa, dating back to his time of civil service in Algeria further

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<sup>183</sup>Bovcon, "France's Conflict Resolution", 6

<sup>184</sup>Assemblée Nationale, No. 26

<sup>185</sup>Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon, "La fin du pacte colonial", 19

<sup>186</sup>Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon, "La fin du pacte colonial", 19; N'Diaye, *Still Getting Away With it*, 308.

<sup>187</sup>Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa", 89; Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon, "La fin du pacte colonial", 19; Roland Marchel, "France and Africa: The Emergence of Essential Reforms?", *International Affairs*, 74.2 (1998): 371

solidified his neo-Gaullist beliefs and from his first election victory in 1995 Chirac continued to make several trips to Africa.<sup>188</sup>

The end of cohabitation was an important development regarding French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. As stated by Banégas: *For the new government, the inaction in the period 1997-2002 contributed greatly to the current African crises... it is therefore necessary for France to (re)'take responsibility' and if need be become involved in military operations in Africa.*<sup>189</sup> Indeed, Chirac and his entourage had little qualm with the use of military force in order to secure French interests and reassert traditional French power in Africa. Breaking away from Jospin's "neither interference nor indifference" policy, Chirac thus sought to reengage with Africa and reassert France as an important actor in African, and global, conflict resolution.

As such, France, in a classic Gaullist sense, saw in its *pré carré*, and by extension Côte d'Ivoire, the means through which it could promote its diplomatic power and thus relevance on the international stage.<sup>190</sup> By becoming involved in important international crises, like in Côte d'Ivoire, and attempting to resolve such crises, France is essentially able to demonstrate how it still remains an important and relevant player on the international scene. After the end of cohabitation, the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire thus proved to be the litmus test of Chirac's policy of reengagement in Africa and Chirac would finally get his chance to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire, something that he was arguably denied in 1999.<sup>191</sup> As such, the evidence tends to suggest that the arguments put forth by Banégas, N'Daiye and Pascallon, concerning Chirac's thought making process, are important in understanding why France launched its intervention.<sup>192</sup>

#### **4.5.2 Gbagbo: An uneasy relationship?**

Meanwhile, in Côte d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo would find in Chirac a cold, if not hostile counterpart. Gbagbo and his *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), with roots in the socialist movement, found natural allies amongst French and international Socialists. Indeed, Gbagbo is

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<sup>188</sup>Chafer, "Chirac and la Françafrique", 15

<sup>189</sup>Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon, "La fin du pacte colonial", 20

<sup>190</sup>Ibid

<sup>191</sup>N'Daiye, *Still Getting Away With it*, 308

<sup>192</sup>Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon, "La fin du pacte colonial", 19; N'Daiye, *Still Getting Away With it*, 308; Pascallon, "Le reengagement de la France"

often said to have had good relations with Jospin's and his *Parti Socialiste* (PS).<sup>193</sup> Conversely, the relationship between Gbagbo and Chirac was luke-warm at best, and only deteriorated as the intervention continued, notably after the 2004 destruction of the Ivorian Air Force and repression of Ivorian protestors by French forces. From the beginning, Gbagbo and company viewed French military efforts in Cote d'Ivoire as a direct threat.<sup>194</sup> Indeed, various scholars note how mutual levels of suspicion and mistrust existed and deepened between Chirac and Gbagbo.<sup>195</sup>

For Gbagbo and his supporters, Chirac and his right-wing entourage, notably within the Élysée's African cell, were increasingly seen as having a neo-colonialist agenda.<sup>196</sup> This outlook was largely championed by Gbagbo's 'young patriots' under the leadership of Mamadou Koulibaly and Charles Blé Goudé, who rallied around an anti-colonialist and anti-French discourse.<sup>197</sup> For Chirac, the idea of having Gbagbo controlling France's most important former sub-Saharan colony did not sit well with him or his conservative entourage.<sup>198</sup> Smith goes as far as to say that: *'in power, Gbagbo was France's postcolonial nemesis, playing a role very similar to the one Mugabe has played in relation to Britain'*.<sup>199</sup>

In hindsight, given the fact that France was instrumental in removing Gbagbo from power in 2011, one can certainly argue that it was France's objective from the beginning to remove Gbagbo from power. For many, the uneasy and mistrustful relationship between Chirac and Gbagbo (and latter Chirac's successor Sarkozy), was further indication of Chirac's real objective in Cote d'Ivoire: the removal of Gbagbo. Yet, the evidence leading up to the 2002 intervention and during the initial months of the intervention does not fully support either argument. Certainly, the luke-warm Chirac-Gbagbo relationship, France's refusal to assist Gbagbo (defence agreements) and arguments that France indirectly legitimised the north-based rebels are all

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<sup>193</sup> Araoye, *Côte d'Ivoire: The Conundrum*, 153; McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*, 16; Moncrieff, "French Development Aid", 163

<sup>194</sup> Piccolino, "David Against Goliath in Cote d'Ivoire", 5

<sup>195</sup> Piccolino, "David Against Goliath in Cote d'Ivoire"; Stephen Smith, "The Story of Laurent Gbagbo", *London Review of Books* 33.10 (2011); Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 169; Charbonneau, "War and Peace", 508-524

<sup>196</sup> Piccolino, "David Against Goliath in Cote d'Ivoire", 5

<sup>197</sup> Banégas, "France's Intervention Policy", 64

<sup>198</sup> Charbonneau, *France and the New Imperialism*, 159, 161,

<sup>199</sup> Smith, "The Story of Laurent Gbagbo", 10-11 Yet,

indicative of Chirac's hostility to the Gbagbo regime.<sup>200</sup> Yet, if Chirac and his inner circle truly sought to remove Gbagbo from office, there is little doubt that France possessed the military capabilities to do so.<sup>201</sup> And yet, as we have seen, France chose to remain officially impartial from September 2002, suggesting the removal of Gbagbo was perhaps not the initial objective of *Opération Licorne*.

The rise of Chirac right-wing party translated into France actively reengaging in African affairs. His traditional Gaullist beliefs guided such reengagement and France sought to re-create itself as the great power of yester-year. Cote d'Ivoire thus proved to be Chirac's first test for this reengagement and he responded accordingly deploying thousands of troops in the deteriorating situation. While evidence indicates Chirac's hostility towards Gbagbo, it remains unclear whether France sought, from the outset, to remove him from power.

#### **4.6 Concluding remarks**

This chapter has sought to explain why France's intervened in 2002 in Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, using the analytical framework developed in Chapter Three, this chapter strove to understand the extent to which France's motives for intervention in Cote d'Ivoire differed from the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In answering these questions this chapter firstly analysed two of the most notable variables from the quantitative analysis, colonial legacy and economic interests, and applied them to the Franco-Ivorian relations and the consequent intervention in 2002. Secondly, this chapter showed how the perceived deterioration situation in Côte d'Ivoire further influenced French intervention. Lastly, this chapter analysed the political dynamics in France and Côte d'Ivoire, showing how they contributed to the 2002 intervention.

In summation, I have shown how France's 2002 intervention in Cote d'Ivoire resulted from a number of structural French interests as well as several immediate reasons. Of note, colonial ties between France and Cote d'Ivoire have produced strong personal connections between French and Ivorian elites, entrenched military connections, and a large French émigré community in

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<sup>200</sup>See: Smith, "La politique d'engagement; Laurent d'Ersu,"La Crise Ivoirienne, une Intrigue Franco-Francais", *Politique Africaine* 1:105 (2007): 85-104; Charbonneau, "War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire", 514

<sup>201</sup> Institute for Peace and Security Studies, "*Managing Peace and Security in Africa*", 134

Cote d'Ivoire. Of the economic interests, I conclude that France has important trade, investment and aid relations with Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, the importance of Cote d'Ivoire to the regional economy was further shown to be important to French economic interests in Cote d'Ivoire. I further demonstrated that while France has historically intervened to secure access to natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa, there is little evidence that this was the case in Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, these causes of French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire have been shown to be largely indicative of typical French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, in accordance with scholars such as Lemke and Regan, France had wide-ranging and deep-seated interests in Cote d'Ivoire, interests which it needs to protect.<sup>202</sup>

Yet, events in 2002, as opposed to 1999, set the stage for French intervention. Certainly, the deteriorating situation in Cote d'Ivoire and France's need to protect the large French population explain France's initial deployment of troops. Indeed, the rapid deployment of French troops, before the crisis became increasingly violent, is largely in line with the intensity finding in Chapter Three, thus demonstrating further the resemblance of the Ivorian intervention to general French interventions. In other words, the French intervention, occurring before the situation deteriorated and descended into mass violence, is consistent with the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. Events in Rwanda as well as France's infamous role in the wholesale slaughter of Rwandans, has certainly had an effect on the perceptions of French policy makers. The rapid intervention in Cote d'Ivoire highlights such perceptions of fear and France's need to ensure such acts of brutality do not happen again. Recent interventions in Mali and CAR further demonstrate the French urge to intervene in historically-close former colonies to ensure that events akin to the Rwandan genocide never happen again.

But perhaps more important were the political dynamics occurring in France. Of note, Chirac re-election, and his Gaullist underpinnings, translates into France's active reengagement in Africa's domestic affairs. Indeed, these conclusions resonate with a plethora of scholars, who have contended that the Gaullist underpinnings of French-African policy have led to France actively engaging and intervening in Africa's internal affairs.<sup>203</sup> The fact that Cote d'Ivoire was becoming

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<sup>202</sup> Lemke and Regan, *Intervention as Influence*, 162

<sup>203</sup> Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon, "La fin du pacte colonial"; N'Diaye. *Still Getting Away With it*, 308; Pascallon, "Le reengagement de la France"

increasingly unstable, in light of France's structural interests, provided Chirac with adequate motive to deploy troops. Unlike Jospin and company, Chirac is a product of traditional Gaullist beliefs who advocates for France to maintain its traditional role in Africa affairs, yet there is doubt as to whether even the progressive Jospin could have remained disengaged from the Ivorian crisis. The permanent presence of troops in Cote d'Ivoire, a legacy of Gaullist policies, only meant that decision to intervene was all the more easier.

Lastly, while there is noteworthy evidence to suggest that Chirac viewed Gbagbo with mistrust and suspicion, it remains unclear as to whether France's initial intervention in 2002 was geared towards removing him from power. Certainly, events in 2011 have spurred a number of commentators to suggest a French neo-colonialist agenda in Cote d'Ivoire, and indeed there is certainly merit to this argument. Yet, it remains unclear if this was France's initial objective to remove him from power. More likely, Cote d'Ivoire offered to Chirac the setting for which he could reengage with African crises, promoting France as a natural and logical mediator in African crises. The extreme importance of Cote d'Ivoire to France further compelled France to intervene in attempts to stabilise the situation, which is what France did through the *zone de confiance*, and thus protect its interests.

In sum, France's 2002 intervention in Côte d'Ivoire resonates strongly with the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan and is indeed indicative of these trends. Therefore, the importance of France's interests cannot be divorced from understanding why it intervened in Côte d'Ivoire. As such, this chapter has adequately answer the research question: Why did France intervene in 2002 in Côte d'Ivoire and to what extent does France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire differ with the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa?

## Conclusion

The key objective of this thesis was to understand why France intervened in 2002 in Côte d'Ivoire. The fact that France was so hasty in deploying troops to the West African nation is all the more puzzling given the apparent disengagement from meddling in African affairs and the fundamental reforms in French Africa policy leading up to the intervention. This thesis thus sought to reengage with questions pertaining to French motives for intervention in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, in light of French policy shifts *vis-à-vis* Africa, this thesis strove to understand, firstly, the general trends of French motivations for interventions and secondly, the degree to which France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire differs or resembles these trends. While some argue that France was restructuring its actions in sub-Saharan Africa, others contend that this restructuring is nothing more than "*old wine in new bottles*". In response, this thesis engaged with this disjuncture in the literature and sought to understand the extent to which French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire indeed represented substantial policy shifts *vis-à-vis* Africa or whether the intervention is just history repeating itself.

The review of the literature in Chapter Two highlights some important, yet contradictory, arguments regarding why France decided to intervene in 2002. Indeed, there are various schools of thought which offer contrasting views about the intervention. Some suggest that French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire can be explained by realist and Gaullist assumptions in which intervention occurred as a result of France's Gaullist underpinnings and its need to project power both in sub-Saharan Africa and internationally. Similar arguments of a self-interested nature suggest that France was merely pursuing a neo-colonial agenda in Côte d'Ivoire, centred on its economic interests, whereby France's has done what it always does, intervenes to protect its interests. Yet, other arguments contend that France's intervention was motivated by humanitarian concerns in Côte d'Ivoire in which France needed to prevent violence and bloodshed.

In seeking to answer the research questions and locating my thesis within the current state of knowledge, I began by developing a quantitative framework which tested various literature-based hypotheses. Using the PRIO dataset, as well as gathering data for several other sources, I developed a multivariate analysis testing the individual effects of the independent variables on

the likelihood of French intervention. Through this rigorous analysis I developed an analytical framework which outlined the general trends of French intervention. In sum, I found that French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa tends to take place either in a former French colony, with which it shares close historical ties with, or in a Francophone country, with which it shares linguistic and cultural ties. Moreover, France is in general more likely to intervene in either a former colony or Francophone countries with which it shares strong bilateral trade relations, and by extension economic relations. Lastly, France tends to intervene in low-intensity situations and crises, in which the death toll, and by extension intensity, is relatively small compared to other conflicts.

Through this analysis, I concluded that the variables testing self-interested motives were stronger predictors of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa than variables of a humanitarian nature. As aforementioned, this could be due to the unreliability of the data; yet more likely is the notion that the results are a true reflection of the nature and motives of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. These preliminary findings thus concur with the argument of Choi: *'interventions are simply another foreign policy tool used for pursuing national interests, such as securing the supply of oil or extending power interests'*.<sup>204</sup> Similarly, the evidence in the quantitative analysis shares many commonalities with self-interested arguments put forth in the literature review. From this chapter, it became evident that an understanding of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa requires an understanding of France's historical relationship with and its interests, of which there are many, in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Chapter Four, I focused on the 2002 intervention in Côte d'Ivoire and strove to understand French motives for this intervention. Moreover, I incorporated the findings of the quantitative analysis in attempts to know the extent to which French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire differs from the general trends of intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In conclusion, the case of the French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire appears to strongly complement the quantitative conclusions in Chapter Three. As I have shown, France's historic and close relationship is a defining feature of French interests in Côte d'Ivoire and is crucial in explaining intervention in

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<sup>204</sup>Choi, "What determines US humanitarian Intervention?", 122

2002. A closely related feature of these relationships and interests are France's economic interests in Côte d'Ivoire, which are extensive and are indicative of France's larger interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, France's colonial ties, personal connections, military presence, large French émigrés population as well as strong economic interests represent some of its most important interests in Côte d'Ivoire, interests which when under threat compelled France to intervene. Moreover, the perceived deterioration of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, coupled with France's need to protect its citizens residing in Côte d'Ivoire go a long way in explaining French intervention. As such, this almost pre-emptive intervention is indicative for the notion that France intervenes in low-intensity situations, perhaps in efforts to prevent bloodshed akin to the Rwanda genocide.

The comparison between the general and the specific, demonstrated in Chapter Four, thus indicates that French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is indeed history repeating itself. To be sure, French motives for intervention in Côte d'Ivoire have not significantly changed with regards to the use of military force in sub-Saharan Africa. In responding to the current state of knowledge, the plethora of scholars, who contend that French interventions in Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere are primarily motivated by self-interested factor, are supported by this thesis.<sup>205</sup> While, on face value, at least, there have been some important restructuring of French policy towards Africa, the underlying motives for France military engagements appears to remain consistently perverse.

The reclaiming of power by Chirac's conservatives only exacerbated the nature and motives of French military action in Côte d'Ivoire and sub-Saharan Africa. Had Jospin clung to power in 2002, there is doubt as to whether, given the myriad of French interests and the deteriorating situation in Côte d'Ivoire, he would have been able to continue to disengage from African affairs. Indeed in recent history, Jospin protégé, François Hollande, after repeatedly claiming he would follow in the footsteps of Jospin and continue to reform French policy toward Africa, was compelled to intervene in Mali (2013) and CAR (2013), largely due to historical responsibility and entrenched linkages resembling the case of Côte d'Ivoire. It thus seems that the case of Côte d'Ivoire is indicative of French relations and military engagements with sub-Saharan African states that it shares a particularly close and historically significant relationship. As such, despite

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<sup>205</sup>Jospin. "La politique de défense de la France", 3-14 ; Chafer, "Chirac and 'la Françafrique'", 20; Gregory, "The French Military"; Utley, "Not to do less but to do better", 130

what French leaders say and do, France cannot seem to keep out of meddling in African affairs. When very real and important interests are threatened, France cannot disengage from protecting those interests, despite wide-ranging policy reforms and normative rhetoric emanating from every new regime in France.

Looking to the future, the growing importance of multilateral organisations in conflict resolution and the reducing feasibility and costs of bilateral interventions will compel France to continue to restructure its role in sub-Saharan Africa. Evidence of this restructuring can already be seen in the France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, in which France, supported by the UN and ECOWAS, sought to remedy the situation. More recently, France's willingness to cooperate with regional and global bodies in Mali (2013) and CAR (2013) are further indications of the increased multilateralisation and Africanisation of its conflict resolution agenda. France will thus need to continue to adapt to these changing norms if it seeks to remain a relevant and important actor in sub-Saharan Africa. Failure to do so will result in the withering of French power in sub-Saharan Africa and as noted by Former French President Francois Mitterrand: '*Without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century*'.<sup>206</sup>

Yet, even if this becomes the case, this thesis has demonstrated that French motives for intervention are resilient and, despite rhetoric and policy shifts, appear to remain centred on influence and domination of its former colonies and beyond. France's continuing need to remain relevant, and its consistent usage of sub-Saharan Africa to do so, appears to be a defining feature of its political culture and foreign policy. More so than Britain or Portugal, France continues to maintain particularly strong relations with its traditional sphere of influence. These relations have tended to shape France's symbolic and tangible interests in the region which have, by extension, compelled France to remain militarily engaged in African crises.

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<sup>206</sup>Thabo Mbeki. "What the World Got Wrong in Côte d'Ivoire: Why is the United Nations Entrenching Former Colonial Powers on our Continent? African can and should take the lead in resolving their own disputes. *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2011, accessed July 15, 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/29/what-the-world-got-wrong-in-cote-divoire/>

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## Appendix 1: PRIO Dataset variables

Indicators	Type	Coding	Source
<b>French Intervention</b>	Continuous	Coded as 0 if France intervened and 1 if there was no French intervention	Kisangani, EF & Pickering, J. 2008. <i>International Military Interventions, 1989-2005</i> . Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection, No. 21282, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
<b>Natural Resources</b>	Continuous	The total amount in US dollars that the state produced.	World Bank: <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS</a>
<b>Dyadic Trade</b>	Continuous	Total amount of trade in Millions US\$	Barbiera & Keshk in their COW bilateral trade dataset: <a href="http://www.correlatesofwar.org/datasets/bilateral-trade">http://www.correlatesofwar.org/datasets/bilateral-trade</a>
<b>Colonial History</b>	Categorical	Coded as 0 if the state is a former French colony and 1 if it was not.	Hensel, PR. 2014. ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0. <a href="http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html">http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html</a>
<b>Francophonie Community</b>	Categorical	Coded as 0 if the state uses French as a language and 1 if it does not	List of the Francophonie countries where French is the official language in Africa: <a href="http://www.francophonie.org/-80-Etats-et-gouvernements-.html">http://www.francophonie.org/-80-Etats-et-gouvernements-.html</a>
<b>Conflict Intensity</b>	Categorical	Coded as 1 if the conflict produced less than 1000 total deaths and 0 if there were more than 1000 deaths	Found in the PRIO dataset: Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 2002. 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset', <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> 39(5): 615–637
<b>Forcibly Displaced Persons</b>	Continuous	Coded as total number (x1000) of people who were forcibly removed.	Data accessed from the U.S Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI): <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html">http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html</a>
<b>Target Regime (Democracy)</b>	Continuous	Coded on a scale of -10 to +10: From autocratic regime to democratic regime	Marshall, M; Gurr, T & Jagers, K. 2014. <i>Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013</i> . Centre for Systematic Peace. [Available at: <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf">http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf</a> , Accessed: 30/06/2015]

<b>Target Economic Development</b>	Continuous	Coded in US\$, GDP per capita is calculated by dividing the state's GDP by its population	World Bank. 2015b. GDP per Capita (current US\$) [Available at: <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD">http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD</a> , Accessed 26/06/2015]
<b>Cold War</b>	Categorical	Coded as 1 if the conflict occurred during the cold war and 0 if it was after the cold war. The Cold War ended in December 1991.	Author found the date in which the Cold War officially ended (26 December 1991) and manually coded the variable absent of any sources.

## Appendix 2: French Interventions in Africa (IMI) on in PRIO dataset

Year	Target Country	Type of Action (as noted by the IMI dataset)
1960	Cameroon	Anti-Rebel--NYT/LeVine
1960	Chad	Admin. North--Pittman
1964	Gabon	Abort Coup/G.Army-NYT/G.Hist
1968	Chad	Back Govt.-Pittman/ARB/NYT
1977	Chad	Transport Chad Troops-NYT
1977	DRC	Shaba I-ARB/NYT/Keesings
1977	Mauritania	Polis.-WldAlm/T&A/NYT/Hgs/Kees
1978	Chad	Oppose Rebel/Evac.-NYT/ARB
1978	DRC	ShabaII-NYT/ACR/Keesings
1983	Chad	Support Habre--ARB
1986	Chad	Oppose Libyans--ARB/NYT
1989	Comoros	France sends troops and naval vessels to take control of Comoros security
1990	Chad	France sends limited reinforcement to Chad to aid in repelling Libyan invasion
1990	Rwanda	France defends Rwandan government from rebel attack
1991	Chad	French intervenes in Chad to protect French nationals
1992	Djibouti	France mobilised garrison force in Djibouti
1992	Somalia	French troops land in Somalia on humanitarian mission
1993	Rwanda	French troops sent to Rwanda to reinforce existing troops and protect and evacuate French nationals
1994	Rwanda	French Operation Turquoise
1996	CAR	France intervenes in internal conflict in the Central African Republic
1997	Congo	France evacuates foreigners and citizens as part of the "Pelican Operation" in Congo
1997	Sierra Leone	France evacuates diplomats from Sierra Leone
1998	Eritrea	France airlifts foreign nationals from Eritrea capital
1998	Guinea-Bissau	France evacuates nationals from Guinea-Bissau
1999	Ivory Coast	French aid ousted Ivory Coast president after coup
2002	Ivory Coast	French troops safeguard foreigners in Ivory Coast
2003	CAR	France sends troops to evacuate citizens and help stabilise Central African Republic following a coup
2003	Liberia	France evacuates foreign nationals from Liberia
2004	Chad	France provides humanitarian aid and protection for Sudanese refugees fleeing to Chad