

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

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ec. HISTORY

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Abbreviations

A.M.C.	- Association of Management Committees
A.N.C.	- African National Congress
A.S.C.	- Arts Students Council
AZAPO	- Azanian People's Organisation
AZASO	- Azanian Students Organisation
C.A.N.U.	- Caprivian African National Union
C.A.P.	- Civic Action Programme
C.E.D.	- Cape Education Department
COSAS	- Congress of South African Students
C.P.	- Conservative Party
C.R.C.	- Coloured Representative Council
C.S.I.R.	- Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
H.N.P.	- Herstigte Nasionale Party
H.S.R.C.	- Human Sciences Research Council
J.C.E.	- Johannesburg College of Education
N.E.D.	- Natal Education Department
N.E.U.S.A.	- National Education Union of South Africa
N.P.	- National Party
N.S.M.	- National Serviceman/men
N.U.S.A.S.	- National Union of South African Students
P.A.C.	- Pan-Africanist Congress
P.F.	- Permanent Force
P.F.P.	- Progressive Federal Party
R.A.U.	- Rand Afrikaans University
S.A.C.O.S.	- South African Council of Sport
S.A.D.F.	- South African Defence Force
S.A.I.C.	- South African Indian Council
S.A.I.R.R.	- South African Institute of Race Relations
S.A.N.R.O.C.	- South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee
S.A.P.	- South African Police
S.A.T.C. for W.	South African Teachers Council for Whites
S.R.C.	- Student Representative Council
S.W.A.P.O.	- South West African Peoples Organisation
T.E.D./T.O.D.	- Transvaal Education Department
T.T.A.	- Transvaal Teachers Association
U.C.T.	- University of Cape Town
U.M.U.	- University Military Unit
U.N.	- United Nations
U.N.D.	- University of Natal, Durban

U.N.I.S.A.	- University of South Africa
U.O.F.S.	- University of the Orange Free State
U.P.E.	- University of Port Elizabeth
U.S.	- University of Stellenbosch
W.C.A.B.	- Western Cape Administration Board
Wits.	- University of the Witwatersrand
Y.P.	- Youth Preparedness
Rfn.	- Rifleman
Sgt.	- Sergeant
Lt.	- Lieutenant
Capt.	- Captain
Maj.	- Major
Cmdt.	- Commandant
Col.	- Colonel
Brig.	- Brigadeer
Maj. Gen.	- Major General
Lt. Gen.	- Lieutenant General
Gen.	- General
V. Adm.	- Vice Admiral
Adm.	- Admiral

INTRODUCTION

While the question of the class nature of the State and various aspects of its rôle has been the subject of intense and vitriolic debate, the area of the 'repressive state apparatuses' in general and the military and police in particular has been relatively uncharted by Western Marxists. The 'classical' Marxist writers gave the subject its due importance, but more recently it has been virtually ignored. The library shelves are full of works on the Military by bourgeois sociologists and political scientists, but generally Marxists have avoided the area, preferring more familiar pastures.

South Africa is no exception in this regard. Hundreds of books, articles, papers, and theses have been written from within an historical materialist paradigm, providing a formidable and wide ranging volume of work. But for the most part questions relating to the military and militarisation have been skirted around. With a war raging in Namibia, the S.A.D.F's attempts to destabilise the Southern African region, the military dimension of the conflict in South Africa increasing in significance and with the military having assumed a place in many respects as the dominant state apparatus, this gap is almost inexplicable. Over the last two years, however, a few articles, papers and dissertations have been written which have begun to redress this balance and have added to the empirical and theoretical understanding of the area. (1)

This dissertation deals with the question of the militarisation of education in South Africa. In Althusserian terms it concerns the relation between a repressive state apparatus and an ideological state apparatus. These terms, however, are not completely adequate, for a number of reasons which will not be gone into here. (2) The rôle of the educational apparatus is not purely concerned with deaminating the dominant ideology while the repressive state apparatuses such as the military also have an important ideological rôle. These terms are therefore used loosely and descriptively here.

The focus of this dissertation is confined within definite limits. The prime area of concern is the changing rôle of the military in South African Society, and from the basis of the understanding outlined in Chapter 1, it looks at the military's interaction with the formal education system in terms of a series of practices which have emerged or been developed since the mid-70's. The educational apparatus itself is therefore the secondary area of concern and is examined only in respect to the military's rôle in it. A number of areas are therefore ignored. For example, the question of the ideological rôle of the education system in the military is not considered. Yet the fact that every member of the S.A.D.F. spends a number of years going through the South African schooling system and perhaps higher education as well, obviously has important effects on the military in a number of ways. However, even if it were possible to analyse these effects in any concrete way, it would make the area of research far too broad.

What is being considered therefore is the direct rôle of the S.A.D.F. in black education, white university education and white schooling. In each of these areas the S.A.D.F.'s rôle varies considerably and is not limited to an ideological influence. From within the understanding of the military and the state outlined in Chapter I the kinds of questions asked are:

What are the functions of the military in each of these areas?

Why is the military involved in these ways?

How are these forms of involvement quantitatively and qualitatively changing?

What effects do these activities have on the education system?

What effects do they have on the students concerned?

How have students and educational authorities responded?

What are the broader political implications of these developments?

Although some of the empirical material used comes from virtually uncontravertible, or at least very reliable sources, other information is drawn from areas very much open to dispute such as interviews, discussions and press clippings. Thus opinions given are often of an impressionist

nature. It must also be stressed that the material used probably only represents the 'tip of the iceberg'.

Finally, discretion has been used with footnoting the names of those with whom interviews or discussions were had.

CHAPTER I.

The State, the Military and Education in South Africa.

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The last five or more years have seen the emergence of the military as the dominant repressive state apparatus in South Africa. This has entailed the rapid growth of Defence Budgets, the growth of Armscor and a war economy, the extension of conscription for whites and the increasing incorporation of blacks into the military. It has seen the escalation of the war in Namibia, an expanded S.A.D.F. operational presence within South Africa's borders and an expanded S.A.D.F. presence outside of the South African and Namibian borders through attempts to destabilise other countries in Southern Africa.

The S.A.D.F. has also played a seminal rôle in shifting the dominant ideological discourse through its articulation of the total onslaught/total strategy couplet. This has entailed the development of a 'war psychosis' through the greater military presence in radio, T.V., advertising, newspapers and other areas of the media. It has also led to the penetration of the military into various areas of the education system. In white schools this has involved an expansion of the cadet system, and an S.A.D.F. presence in the Veld School, Guidance and Youth Preparedness programmes. In black schools, through its Civic Action Programme the S.A.D.F.'s rôle can be seen through the emergence of Youth Camps, military visits and displays at schools,

holiday/.....

holiday programmes for younger school children and the increasing number of S.A.D.F. teachers in black rural and urban schools. In the Universities it has seen the establishment of University Military Units, courses run for S.A.D.F. personnel and an increasing volume of research for military purposes. At another level the 'militarisation of education' has involved a changing relation between the S.A.D. and the departments of National Education, Education and Training and Internal Affairs where military initiatives have influenced the direction of educational policy.

These developments have not been the result of military-minded men wanting to get a finger on every slice of the South African pie. Their origins do not lie in conspiracies by military planners behind closed doors. And they have not occurred without problems, blockage and contradictions. The understanding of the 'militarisation of education' used here is rooted in an approach to society which sees its motions in terms of the existence of conflict between classes (understood not purely as 'economic interest groups' but in terms of their relation to the means of production). The State is seen, as Lenin put it, as "a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class contradictions".⁽¹⁾ The rôle of the military in education is therefore seen as an aspect of the class struggle. ✓

1.2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

Much has been written, and fiercely debated, on the class nature of the South African State and therefore in this section no more than a schematic outline of certain aspects of a theory of the State is presented.

The State is not simply an instrument wielded by capitalists in pursuit of their own interests - it is more than the "executive committee for the management of the common affairs of the bourgeoisie

The relation between the economic and the political under capitalism is not one of the direct representation of the former by the latter.

One can speak of the "relative autonomy" of the state under capitalism. This notion does not imply that the State is 'above' the class struggle, unhinged from the economy with its rôle being determined by the personnel within it.

The relative autonomy of the State is a structural feature of capitalism. The starting point for understanding this is the division of labour in the economy.

Under feudalism, while the dominant class (the feudal landowners) had powers of ownership of the means of production, the possession of these means (the ability to set the productive process in motion) remained in the hands of the dominated classes (the serfs) who lived on the land. The extraction of surplus labour time was not an automatic outcome of the existing property relations, but had to be ensured through a series of extra-economic (political, ideological, judicial) coercions. Which meant that the State had a central rôle in the + process of accumulation and therefore was closely tied to the economic interests of the dominant classes.

Under capitalism the dominant class has both ownership and control of the means of production. The working class is therefore separated from the possession or control as well as the ownership of the means of production. The extraction of surplus labour time therefore occurs as a result of the fact that workers have nothing but their labour power to sell. The State is therefore 'freed' from the direct rôle in production process and this sets the basis for its 'relative autonomy'.⁽³⁾

The relative autonomy of the capitalist State is necessary for it to fulfil one of its primary rôles, that of organising the dominant classes. In no social formation does the emergence and

reproduction of classes occur as a unity. The ruling class contains contradictory interests because of the uneven development of the productive forces amongst the various sectors of production. The State has to organise the ruling class into what is sometimes called a power bloc in order to ensure the reproduction of capital (although a particular interest or fraction may play a dominant rôle and be set up as the general interest).⁽⁴⁾

The State's other main rôle is the disorganisation of the dominant classes. The structural basis for this is the 'isolation' effect through which individuals are forced to relate to the State apparatuses as individual legal subjects. This has the effect of blurring class conflict. In 'western' democracies, for example, this assumes the form of individual citizens taking part in the national political community through the existence of universal suffrage, the results of which are seen as the reflection of the expression of the popular will.⁽⁵⁾ This is ensured through the State's organisation and control of the means of repression and of the ideological apparatuses.

However, the State is not an externality which merely intervenes in and is influenced the class struggle. It is neither an instrument, nor is it autonomous. Rather it reflects the balance of class forces in a social formation. As Poulantzas put it, it is the material condensation of a relation between struggling classes and fractions.⁽⁶⁾ Therefore although the dominated classes may not be represented directly within the State's structures (as in South Africa where they do not have the franchise), the interests of the dominated classes necessary have an impact on the State.

Following this approach, the capitalist State cannot be seen as a totally unified, monolithic bloc. Rather, it is an expression of the class struggle (both in its national and international dimensions) and is constantly being moulded by the effect of the relative strengths

of the classes engaged in this struggle. Therefore, an increase in the tempo of struggle by the dominated classes may have profound effects in influencing contradictions within the power bloc - and in contributing to a process whereby the resolution of such contradictions requires a restructuring of State power. For example, in South Africa the upsurge in mass resistance in a number of forms certainly has played a major rôle in leading to the dominance of the military apparatus within the South African State. ✓

This, however, does not imply that the State is simply the scoreboard of class struggle. Part of its relative autonomy is that its form is distinct from that of apparatuses of economic power. It is organised and centralised into a number of specialised apparatuses whose functions are in some senses autonomous from each other. While certain sections of the dominated classes may not be directly represented within these apparatuses, their struggles are directed at them and will effect them. One example is the effect of the schools boycotts in leading to the report of the De Lange Commission. ✓

At the same time the contradictions within State apparatuses amongst and within the dominant classes and fractions are also important in contributing to the specific nature of a particular capitalist State. Each State apparatus has a distinct function and structure and a particular place in the class struggle which leads to power relations which may differ markedly between apparatuses. The specific characteristics and internal contradictions of each apparatus therefore cannot be reduced to the class contradictions in society generally although they do partially reflect them and contribute to their reproduction. (7) For example, ^{the} different balance of forces within the military and educational apparatuses in South Africa has led to sometimes contradictory policies emerging from them. Both apparatuses have been effected by the upsurge in mass struggle but their different rôles/.....

roles in maintaining bourgeois domination in South Africa and their distinct characteristics which include aspects of social relations which may be relevant to but not reducible to class relations has meant that their response to mass resistance has not been identical.

State apparatuses therefore are not merely differentiated according to their functions. They also often reflect the pursuit of contradictory aims and therefore there exists a site of class struggle both within and between various State apparatuses. ✓

The form of any capitalist State depends on its own history and conditions of existence as well as on the precise nature of class struggles at any particular time. (8) Historically the South African State has presented itself in different forms to its various subjects - as a bourgeois democratic nation State to its white subjects and through more overt forms of domination to its black subjects (although the level of incorporation into the central representative State apparatus has been significantly greater for Coloureds and Indians as it has been for Africans). This has led to the description of South Africa as a 'racially exclusive bourgeois democracy'. *Source?*

The historical origins of this aspect of the form of the State lie in the particular path taken by capitalist development in South Africa. This has been covered extensively elsewhere and it is not necessary to go into it here beyond mentioning a few of the factors influencing this development.

Firstly, very early in the development of capitalism in South Africa, the power bloc contained only capitalist classes as opposed to other peripheral social formations in which the pre capitalist ruling classes formed part of the power bloc.

Secondly, the black and white sections of the working class emerged under very different conditions of proletarianisation with, for example, black workers retaining access to limited means of subsistence. (10)

For these and other reasons (racism amongst them) blacks were subjected to different forms of domination by the South African State and different forms of struggles emerged. The White wage earners were crushed in 1922 and then 'co-opted' in 1924 through the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act. Black workers on the other hand were oppressed not only at the work place but also directly by the State. The tendency existed therefore for their struggles to be expressed in 'the people vs. the powerbloc' terms. However, despite the rich history of organisation and resistance including the rapid growth of the trade unions movement in the 40's, it was only in the 50's and early 60's that their struggles, having been led by an increasingly progressive and militant petty bourgeoisie, began to constitute a major threat to the stability of the social formation. At that point the power of the dominant classes vis a vis the dominated classes was sufficient to crush its resistance and to successfully repress it for the next decade.

However, the re-emergence of mass struggle in the 70's, partly as a result of the increasing proletarianisation and urbanisation of the dominated classes through the changes in the nature of the South African economy, has been an important factor contributing to the crisis in the State's ability to confine their struggles. This has led to pressures for reform and co-optive measures such as the President's Councils Constitutional Proposals have been put on the political Agenda.

1.3. THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

1.3.1. INTRODUCTION

The particular approach to the State used is critical in influencing the understanding of political and economic changes which have taken place in South Africa since the mid-70's. An instrumentalist

analysis/.....

analysis, for example one which links crisis in the State solely to crises in capital accumulation, is likely to reduce the significance of political reforms. Writing in this tradition, Simon Clarke dismisses the South African state's political reforms as being sterile and irrelevant to the political struggle in South Africa. He argues that the reason for these changes is found in questions of monetary relations, balance of payments problems and the need for industry to become more competitive in export markets requiring stricter work discipline to ensure the speeding up of the drive for valorisation in the labour process.⁽¹¹⁾ While class struggles are intensified on the factory floor, increased repression is used to prevent these from assuming an overly political form while at an ideological level limited concessions are extended to intensify the divisions amongst the working class.⁽¹²⁾

Clarke writes:

"It should be clear that the current political crisis in South Africa cannot be separated from the crisis in accumulation, but rather that it is the political form of that crisis. The contradiction that besets the South African State is that it has to resolve the economic crises without intensifying the political crisis to such an extent that the very persistence of capital in South Africa is threatened. The economic crisis is the expression of the problems confronted by the production of surplus value, above all in the manufacturing sector. In order to resolve that crisis it is necessary to restructure social relations on the immediate process of manufacturing production in such a way as to increase the rate of exploitation".⁽¹³⁾

Such an approach tends towards being one dimensional. While capital's problems in the realisation of surplus value have

contributed towards the political and economic changes of the last decade, they have certainly not been the sôle cause. Political conflicts are not simple reflections of problems in the drive for valorisation and in South Africa those political reforms which have emerged have been neither irrelevant nor sterile.

The term "Total Strategy" is an ideological construct used to stress, among other things, the necessity for co-ordinated planning at a number of different levels of South African society - economic, political, ideological, diplomatic, psychological, technological and cultural, etc. ⁽¹⁴⁾ There are significant contradictions within and between all these levels. Mono-casual approaches cannot explain the complexity of the problem.

The notion of 'organic crisis' has been used to describe the form and extent of contradictions being faced by the State in South Africa. An organic crisis is one which is of such proportions that tampering with the problems will not resolve the source of the contradictions. It is so deeply and structurally rooted that efforts to resolve it require as Hall, following Gransci put it, a formative response,

"a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new 'historical bloc', new political configurations and philosophies, a profound restructuring of the State and the ideological discourse which construct the crisis and represent it as it is 'lived' as a practical reality, new programmes and policies, working to a new result, a new sort of 'settlement' - 'within certain limits'. These do not 'emerge' they have to be constructed. Political and ideological work is required to disarticulate old formations and rework their elements into new configurations". ⁽¹⁵⁾

The depth of the crisis being faced in South Africa reaches the proportions outlined here. The immediate terrain of struggles (Gramsci's conjunctural) is characterised by political forces which are "struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure" (15) and to cure and overcome the contradictions within certain limits. Yet the extent of the crisis has meant that the response has not merely been defensive. At the same time it must be recognised that the particular nature of these contradictions rooted in the balance of class forces in South Africa has prevented a consistently 'formative' response from emerging.

The term 'total strategy' indicates a conflation of the imperatives of various elements of the power bloc - as Magnus Malan put it: "a united and collective effort which includes diplomacy, politics, economics, local authorities and the military None can go their own way. There must be co-ordination." (17)

What has been apparent is an increasing 'co-operation' between Capital and various State apparatuses through which Monopoly Capital and the military have had greater representation at the top levels of decision making. This, however, does not imply a grand conspiracy between a few big capitalists, generals, academics and politicians. In fact the response has been beset with contradictions both within the bourgeoisie and amongst the bourgeoisie and its supportative classes in the power bloc, one form of which has been struggles within and between different state apparatuses.

1.3.2. ECONOMIC CRISIS

However, before looking at the nature of these contradictions some of the factors which have led to the current crisis will be mentioned.

The question of the expansion of monopoly capital in South Africa is crucial, for its growth requires a continual restructuring

of/.....

of the labour force and this has meant that it has become increasingly contrary to the interests of monopoly capital to reproduce the exclusively racial division of labour and this has been one factor necessitating the withering away of the job colour bar, white trade union privileges and the racist education system.

The crushing of worker organisation in the early 60's led to a 'disciplined' black labour force emerging. After this the requirements of the extended reproduction of monopoly capitalist relations of production were rather for increased skill and training. (1)

not comparable rates as per text.

Since the mid-60's the economy has grown at a faster rate than the white population and this has led to shortages in categories of

supervisory and skilled labour power in both production (technicians, supervisors, artisans, etc.) and distribution (clerical, administrative and sales staff). In 1978 a Chamber of Mines survey indicated that by 1990, assuming a growth rate of 5% there would be a shortage of nearly 1,5 million White collar jobs. (19)

Previously these shortages had been counteracted to some extent by the floating of the colour bar (by bringing low paid black workers to perform functions previously performed by whites, with whites being reassigned 'higher up'). Under conditions of boom in the 60's and early 70's this situation was tolerated with large quantities of foreign investment relying on cheap black labour, counteracting the tendency for costs to rise and the rate of profit to fall. But in the mid-70's the rate of profit fell and with the increasing political turmoil the floating of the colour bar was no longer an adequate method of dealing with the labour shortage. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that over this period the rate of foreign investment began to decline. (20)

One of the ways of counter-acting the falling rate of profit was to raise the organic composition of capital. Both in manufac-

turing and /.....

and in mining (especially with lower grades of ore being extracted) greater relative rather than absolute surplus value required the increasing introduction of machinery and this necessitated a more skilled labour force. As Harry Oppenheimer put it:

7. Skills -
1. Oppenheimer

"The increase in black wages reflects the beginnings of a process of a change over from a labour intensive, low wage, low productivity economic system - typical of industrial development in its earliest stage - to the Capital - intensive, high wage, high productivity system which characterizes the advanced industrial countries". (21)

The increasingly sophisticated technology used in the production process on an expanding scale led to a higher organic composition of capital which meant the relative reduction in the number of workers needed to operate it. At the same time it has introduced a new industrial division of labour in some sectors of the economy between semi-skilled operatives on the one hand and technical/supervisory labour on the other. The result has been a growing demand for semi-skilled operatives and a larger number of migrants losing their jobs which has meant a growing rate of structural unemployment. In the sphere of labour organisation and control the Wiehahn and Riekert reports were partially responses to these developments.

The S.A.D.F. has also been directly affected by the skills shortage and in fact it was an important reason for moves towards the recruitment of blacks. The S.A.D.F. has attempted to increase the size of the Permanent Force since the early 70's partly in order to ensure that new machinery and weaponry could be affectively used. (22)

1. The
Production of
arms
P. Amis

This was stressed particularly after the defeat of the South African troops in Angola in 1975 when foreign military technicians had to be hired to instal, maintain and adapt foreign military technology to South African conditions. (23) The skills shortage, meant

that the military were in competition with the private sector for artisans and other skilled personnel with the S.A.D.F. losing out in this respect. This forced them to make jobs more attractive by increasing rates of pay and benefits and to undertake the recruitment of blacks and women, ⁽²⁴⁾ but this was still not sufficient while the shortages of artisans and others continued in the economy as a whole.

One consequence of the economic crisis of which the skills shortage is a part, has been pressure within the educational apparatus for changes in educational policy in order to deal with these shortages. It is estimated that $\frac{1}{4}$ of a million new teachers will have to be trained if a satisfactory growth rate is to be maintained and thus schools and tertiary educational institutions have a seminal rôle to play in meeting the manpower requirements. ⁽²⁵⁾ Furthermore with the white labour market being virtually saturated there were growing pressures for increasing the number of blacks to meet the shortages, yet black education was not equipped to do this with, for example, only 1,96% of Africans (and 4,4% of Coloureds and 22,3% of Indians as compared with 58,4% of Whites) who started school in 1963 finishing matric, while after only 4 years of schooling 46% of Coloured children and 58% of African children have left school. ⁽²⁶⁾ The reason for this lies in the Verwoerdian educational policy which states that "the financing of Coloured and African education must be placed on such a basis that it does not occur at the cost of White education". ⁽²⁷⁾ Thus while in 1954 Black per capita expenditure on education was 14% of the expenditure on White education it has been estimated that by 1980 the de facto figure was only 11,1%. ⁽²⁸⁾ The education system was becoming incapable of meeting the requirements of capital and the need to modernise and sophisticate it became a priority. The

possibly not the only reason.

De Lange Commission as with other moves towards reform, was partly a response to this pressure.

1.3.3. POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING

Both a cause and a result of these moves towards economic reform has been a restructuring of the power bloc generally and changing class alliances within the National Party (N.P.) particularly.

The N.P. came to power in 1948 as the political organisation of a shifting and highly differentiated class alliance beset with conflict.⁽²⁹⁾ Nevertheless, its power base can be said to have consisted primarily of Afrikaner Capital, small farmers and White wage earners. But with the growth of monopoly capital the distinction between Afrikaner and English capital has become blurred both at an economic level and at the level of political representation. As a result of this (as well as other factors) small capital and the White wage earners have been gradually excluded from the power bloc with the various sectors of monopoly capital drawing closer together and pursuing certain common objectives. However, the 1979 White mine workers' strike, the growth of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (H.N.P.), the 'Nat. Split', and the emergence of the Conservative Party (C.P.) have all been indications of the extent to which this has been a slow and contradictory process. As Saul and Gelb put it: "..... the populist cocoon of the new emerging Afrikaner bourgeoisie is not easily cast aside. Just as reform has its class basis so does resistance to reform":⁽³⁰⁾

The struggle within the N.P. historically took the form of struggles between the Cape Provincial Party which championed the interests of finance capital and the Transvaal Provincial Party which championed Afrikaner agricultural and petty bourgeois interests, with the former moving towards reformism and the latter

tending/.....

tending to resist these moves. ⁽³¹⁾ This struggle between 'verligte' and 'verkrampste' interests has been felt to varying extents in all of the State's apparatuses (although in each one it has taken a distinct form and cannot be seen as a replica in miniature of the conflict in general).

Within the military these contradictions have been resolved decisively in favour of advocating reformist, militarily defensible policies. In the late 1960's the S.A.D.F. began to play a more open rôle in politics alligning itself with the verligte elements while the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the Security Police tended to be alligned with the Party right wing. One effect of 'Muldergate' was to undermine the position of the right within the party and to strengthen the hand of the reformists and the S.A.D.F. in particular. *source?*

1.3.4. UPSURGE IN MASS STRUGGLE

The upsurge in popular struggle has been of vital importance in forcing the State to formulate a total strategy response and in leading to the growth and changing rôle of the S.A.D.F. As Hirsch has written, "whether (intensified exploitation) succeeds depends not on the technical competence of the State apparatuses but on the economic and political strength and militancy of the working class". ⁽³²⁾ And in South Africa particularly, the other oppressed classes can be added to this.

The most significant single manifestation of this was the mass uprising which began in Soweto in June 1976 and continued into 1978. The extent of the uprising was such that for the first time since the early 1960's mass action posed a real threat to the form of bourgeois political domination prevalent in South Africa. The immediate threat was finally crushed by intense State action. It

left an estimated 1000 dead and many more injured and resulted in the detention and bannings of hundreds of individuals and all the Black consciousness organisations. ⁽³³⁾ Its effect was to alter the course of resistance to the Apartheid State and to contribute to the growth of students, community and trade union organisation. ⁽³⁴⁾

The events culminating in the 1976 uprising also significantly increased the pressures for reforms in the education system. One of its causes and its initial area of focus was the discriminatory nature of Black education. This was admitted by the Cillié Commission of Enquiry's report on the uprising released in 1980:

"Discrimination, which has always been considered unjust has engendered not only dissatisfaction but also a great hatred in many. This dissatisfaction and hatred were some of the main factors that created the milieu and spirit of revolt". ⁽³⁵⁾

The 1976 boycotts were followed by the 1980 schools boycotts which among other things revealed the increasing political sophistication of the students. It also probably helped play a rôle in strengthening the imperatives for reform. The education system had clearly failed in its ideological function of inculcating into the consciousness of students the sort of values needed to preserve the system. One solution was to attempt to restructure the system through the H.S.R.C./De Lange proposals.

More generally, it had become clear that the continuation of the process of capital accumulation could not survive open class warfare and therefore the terrain of class struggle needed to be redefined on terms more favourable to capital. The uprisings revealed very clearly the lack of an influential Black supportative class and the polarisation of the African petty bourgeoisie towards the proletariat which meant they were adopting clan positions

antagonistic to bourgeois interests. This strengthened the basis for a number of state initiatives. Wiehahn was partly a response to the economic and political need to increase the significance of the Black new petty bourgeoisie at the point of production and to incorporate it into the State apparatuses. It also strengthened moves to foster the development of an African traditional petty bourgeoisie through the power of patronage of homelands governments and their urban counterparts. (36)

The strengthening of these groups required supportative classes for the bourgeoisie as a buffer against the struggle of the popular classes to help offset the tendency towards the polarisation of the Black petty bourgeoisie to the proletariat and against the power bloc. However, the incorporation of the petty bourgeoisie - the "creation of a Black middle class" is not dependent purely on the wishes of capital and the State. Large sectors of the new petty bourgeoisie as well as sharing some of the same effects at the workplace in their relation to capital as the proletariat, as Black subjects also share a common relation to the State and this has important implications for the class positions adopted.

The 1976 uprising also led to increased western initiatives for reform. Foreign capital pushed for the implementation of labour codes (E.E.C., Sullivan) and Western Governments, for a while anyway, became more vocal in their demands for political reform. Foreign investors needed to be assured of favourable conditions for investment and immediately after the 1976/7 uprising there was a significant outflow of capital and of foreign loans such as those from the I.M.F. Foreign pressures could not be ignored if South Africa was to continue to attract foreign capital on the scale required.

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The 1976 uprising had a further very important effect. It expanded the ranks of the A.N.C. both through thousands leaving the country to join Umkhonto We Sizwe and through contributing to a process through which the A.N.C. reasserted its influence within South Africa. A growing number of the emerging trade union, political, women's, youth, schools and community organisations gave allegiance to the Freedom Charter and non-racialism. A.N.C. slogans, symbols, and songs became popularised and mass allegiance to the A.N.C. grew. It emerged not only as an increasingly effective guerilla army but also as a growing mass movement.

The intensifying war in Namibia and its beginnings in South Africa under Umkhonto We Sizwe, the A.N.C.'s military wing, have contributed more than any other factor to the pace of the growth of the S.A.D.F. The re-emergence of mass organisation and militancy generally and the place of the A.N.C. in this process specifically, have decisively affected the form of the military's changing rôle. The independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have also been important in this respect as South Africa has become more vulnerable to guerilla insurgency than previously. The shifting balance of forces in South Africa has also had some effect in spurring on internal struggles. These developments have been used to add weight to the nation of a total onslaught by communism and terrorism and have strengthened the hand of the military in directing the 'total strategy'.

1.4. 'TOTAL STRATEGY' AND THE RISE OF THE MILITARY

The 'Total Strategy' notion emerged within the S.A.D.F. in the mid-70's and gained momentum after the victory of Frelimo in Mozambique and of the M.P.L.A. in Angola and was given further impetus after the 1976/7 uprisings. These events contributed to the emergence of

three/.....

three related tendencies:

Firstly, the need for the expansion and reorganisation of the S.A.D.F.;
secondly, the necessity for political and economic reforms;
thirdly, the need for greater co-ordination between the military and
other sectors, particularly big capital.

1.4.1. THE EXPANSION AND REORGANISATION OF THE S.A.D.F.

The defeat in Angola in particular led to a realisation amongst the S.A.D.F. top brass that there were insufficient troops to deal with the perceived external threat, the guerilla war in Namibia and the need for an increasing military presence within South Africa.

In September 1976 Magnus Malan became chief of the S.A.D.F. and through his and other military leaders' initiative, the S.A.D.F. was expanded, rationalised and reorganised. Control became more centralised and tighter, greater co-ordination with the private sector was sought, military technicians from other countries were employed, Armscor was developed, training was intensified, commando units were encouraged, the P.F. was expanded and national service was expanded.

The S.A.D.F.'s growth since the mid-60's, and more especially since the mid-70's, has been phenomenal. Until 1960 it consisted of a small force of about 10 000 members with Defence expenditure remaining at less than 1% of the G.N.P. and less than 7% of total government expenditure. Arms were purchased from the United Kingdom and United States. ⁽³⁷⁾ After Sharpeville and the launching of the armed struggle by Umkhonto We Sizwe in 1961 a ballot system of conscription was introduced with a selective intake of 7000 men for nine months. In 1967 nine months universal conscription was introduced partly in response to the guerilla campaign of Z.A.P.U. (aided by the A.N.C.) in Zimbabwe and SWAPO's military wing PLAN's

launching/.....

launching of the armed struggle in Namibia in 1966. However, because of the relative quiet in the next six years the defence budget grew at no more than the inflation rate.

In the early 70's it became clear that the South African Police (S.A.P.) were unable to cope alone with the Namibian war and by June 1974 control in Northern Namibia had been completely shifted to the S.A.D.F. After 1972 military service was extended to twelve months plus annual nineteen day camps over a period of five years. (38)

In 1975 during the Angolan war National Servicemen (N.S.M.) were called up for three months calls of duty, a practice which has continued ever since. (39) In 1977 conscription was increased to twenty-four months plus thirty days annually for eight years. Thus by 1979 the annual intake had effectively risen to 60 000. The 1982 Defence Amendment Act increased the camp requirements to two years over the twelve years after completion of National Service plus twelve days a year until the age of 55. This will take an extra 800 000 men into military service. (40)

The P.F. was also expanded from 13 000 in 1969 to over 23 000 in 1980, although a high turnover and difficulties with recruitment have been experienced in this area. As is expanded on in Chapter 4 a greater number of blacks and women have also been recruited into the P.F. and Commando. Partly because of lower pay, blacks are now being recruited at a rate of increase ^{of} over 20% a year and women at a rate of increase of 10% a year. (41) By 1979 a total of approximately 12 000 black troops were being trained and deployed, (42) and in 1982 there were over 3 000 women in the P.F. mainly in administrative, clerical and other non-combatant capacities. (43)

Defence budgets have also soared - from R36 million in 1958/9 to R970 million in 1975/6 to R2885 million in 1982/3 (with effective military expenditure being over R3400 million) (44) which

is nearly 20% of total government expenditure and 5% of the G.N.P., an average increase of over 20% a year, reaching over 40% in the mid 70's. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

The S.A.D.F's occupational rôle has also grown considerably since the mid-70's and includes: South Africa's occupation of Namibia with 90 000 troops being based there in 1981 ⁽⁴⁶⁾ with 'contacts' between the S.A.D.F. and SWAPO increasing from 500 incidents in 1978 to over 900 in 1979. ⁽⁴⁷⁾; South Africa's raids into and partial occupation of other Southern African territories including Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and the Seychelles, as well as South Africa's support for dissident groups within these countries; intensive patrolling of the South African borders; joint operations with the S.A.P. such as road blocks and house to house searches ⁽⁴⁸⁾ and the S.A.D.F's Civic Action Programme (C.A.P.), discussed in Chapter 4.

1.4.2 REFORM INITIATIVES WITHIN THE S.A.D.F.

An important tendency which can be identified within the military, at least since the mid-70's, has been strong support for the liberalisation of government policy in certain areas. An aspect of this has been a closer alliance between the military and big capital, partly through their common interest in certain political and economic reforms. The need for capital to improve its productivity necessitated the easing of restrictions on the mobility, training and employment of blacks. Significant political reforms are also needed by capital in order to ensure its long term interests of stability necessary for economic growth. For the military, in alliance with 'verligte' elements of the National Party the question has been one of providing "a guarantee for the system of free enterprise" ⁽⁴⁹⁾ which necessitates the removal of certain aspects

of apartheid in order to ensure that some blacks at least be given a stake in the system. But although to some extent there has been a common initiative for reform from Big Business and the military, this closer relationship has certainly not been without its contradictions as will be discussed below.

Since the mid-70's the emphasis in 'Total Strategy' rhetoric has shifted from fighting for Afrikanerdom and racial hegemony to calls to defend economic growth and free enterprise against communism and this has given rise to an emphasis on multi-racialism rather than segregation and White domination. Within the S.A.D.F. this has led to moves to incorporate greater numbers of blacks in its ranks (although here the S.A.D.F.'s inability to find substitute manpower has been at least as important a reason).

The process of the military becoming the champion of the reformist cause and of the dominance of reformist elements within the military has not occurred as a simple uncontradictory reflection of tendencies within society generally. Forces which struggle within State apparatuses tend to take include differences in policy directions, ideological differences and non-cooperation between personnel causing inefficiencies. Elements of these have existed within the S.A.D.F. although mainly because of the tight nature of the command structure and the ability of the 'top-brass' to assert its will, opposition could only be expressed in far more muted forms than in other areas such as education, labour control and allocation etc.

Nevertheless internal conflicts have existed. For example, one consequence of bringing blacks into the S.A.D.F. has been a certain amount of disunity between the relatively progressive "technocrats" and others within the officer corp. According to political scientist Philip Frankel, the emphasis on developing a multi-racial army has come from a small group of officers personally tied into the channels

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linking Defence Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence and the civil executive office, while the majority of officers external to this group have shown a marked resistance to opening up the S.A.D.F. to other 'race groups and especially to opening up the officer corp. ⁽⁵⁰⁾ Combined with the potential for opposition from the ranks both of the P.F.. and the Citizen Force, this has been an important factor in the preference of the military establishment for ethnic units.

Other contradictions also exist within the military. For example, within the Navy and Airforce there is a larger P.F. than in the Army and this led to a clearer and earlier dominance of the "technocratic ideology" ⁽⁵¹⁾ and at times to conflicts with elements in the army where Afrikaner Nationalist tendencies are still prevalent and where the Officer Corp has become increasingly Afrikaner dominated. ⁽⁵²⁾

The impetus for changes within the army in particular and the S.A.D.F. generally came from the events of the mid-70's mentioned above. Until the early 70's the army had been one of the strongholds of the petty bourgeoisie under the dominance of Afrikaner nationalism. Furthermore, particularly in the ranks wages were relatively low and conditions of employment poor. There were close links with the Afrikaner wage earners and there was a general absence of intellectual - technical skill. ⁽⁵³⁾ But the rapid growth of the S.A.D.F. necessitated after the Angolan debacle led to the expansion of technical-administrative positions within the division of labour and a group of officers intellectually and culturally more compatible with the upper ranks of the petty bourgeoisie found in the civil service and executive areas of the government emerged. One result was that a more socially sensitized and managerially oriented ideology gained ground. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ The strengthening of the alliance between this

grouping and the 'verligte' element of the National Party also helped to consolidate its position within the S.A.D.F. (as well as the position of the military in the State generally).

Another reason for the dominance of reformist elements has been the participation in counterinsurgency strategies which has been a politicising experience for many officers who for the first time had to take sensitive political considerations into account through being involved with Hearts and Minds-type activities. This has been particularly important for middle level officers (55), while their superiors have been gaining operational experience over a wide range of political and administrative tasks which have extended well beyond the normal officers duty of the early 70's (56)

The tendency towards reformism within the military has also been strengthened through the institutions which participate in the dissemination of Total Strategy ideology. These include foreign military attaches and intelligence sources whose reports are circulated within the top levels of the S.A.D.F, academic sources (discussed in Chapter 3) which have played^a/vital rôle in familiarising the officer corp with these values, the Joint Defence College and Military Academy (whose curriculum encapsulates these values), the Chief of Staff Intelligence (whose policy of seconding and training line officers before their recirculation into field units is important in strengthening Total Strategy ideas amongst the Officers Corp and through them into the ranks), the Chief of Staff, Personnel (responsible with the Military Psychological Institute for formulating programmes of institutional education) (57) and the Civic Action Officers (whose reports appear to have some influence on general military policy). 'Paratus' and 'Uniform' also play a rôle in this regard. (58) The military's direct output of the Total Strategy ideology is fed through the Ministry of Defence to the executive,

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the media and so on, through numerous military directorates responsible for liaison with the private sector, the media, the Department of National Education and Education and Training and other government departments, as well as through the Defence Advisory Council, the Cabinet Committees, etc. (59)

The dominance of the reformists within the S.A.D.F. has also been assisted by the increasingly tight and centralised structure of the S.A.D.F. which prevents oppositional tendencies developing in any organised form and has helped to assert the hegemony of the technical-administrative upper ranks of the S.A.D.F.

For these reasons the reformist initiative has been more unequivocally dominant within the military than within other state apparatuses and this has allowed it to be the most vocal proponent of Total Strategy.

Foot - though I think the first 2 points only partially account for this dominance - the latter points are more effects of, rather than causes for, the dominance.

1.4.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE S.A.D.F. AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

An important aspect of 'Total Strategy' has been its emphasis on greater co-ordination between the military, other State apparatuses, private enterprise, etc. The stress on this has been closely linked to the process whereby the parliamentary apparatus has diminished in significance relative to the executive in which the military has become increasingly dominant.

The impetus towards greater co-ordination has been stressed as the only effective counter to the 'Total Onslaught'. According to P.W.Botha every state activity needs to be understood as a function of 'Total War':

"The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, ideological, cultural/.....

cultural etc. The striving for specific aims must be co-ordinated with all means available to the State". (60)

The 'Total Strategy' idea has been used to justify and promote this process of the militarisation of the State - the shifting of civil - military boundaries and the expansion of the rôle of military personnel within the State and the private sector. Part of its fabric has been a legitimising device for the increasing repressive rôle of the State and the suspension of civil liberties as part of the counter-revolution-army strategy. (61)

The 'co-ordination' element of 'Total Strategy' therefore has two elements - the S.A.D.F's increasing presence within the various governmental departments and its increasing inter-relation with the private sector. The links with the private sector have taken a number of forms. In 1977 the Armaments Board and National Institute of Defence Research came under the control of the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) which is ^{responsible} to the Defence Planning Committee and falls directly under the Minister of Defence. Its Board of Directors is appointed by the State President and in 1981 included Commandant Piet Marais (Chairperson), Constand Viljoen (the Chief of the Defence Force), Joep de Loor (the Director General of Finance), Dr. Wim de Villiers (the Chairperson of Gencor), and John Maree (Barlow-Rand representative). Leaders of Industry also sit on the Boards of the subsidiary components and are approached to act as consultants to provide input in respect to management problems. (62) Armcor is now the third biggest financial undertaking in South Africa (after Anglo/De Beers and Barlow Rand) and South Africa's arms industry is the biggest in the Southern Hemisphere and the 10th biggest in the world. (63) Its current assets total R1300 million and in 1982 it delivered arms

worth/.....

worth R1400 million. Its share capital is held by the State. ⁽⁶⁴⁾
Armcor also controls nine nationalised subsidiaries. In addition
it generally does not duplicate private sector production facilities
and 40% of the Arms budget spent within South Africa goes directly
to private firms while Armcor spends 80% of its budget on sub-
contracting. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ There are approximately 50 main contractors,
400 subcontractors supplying main components and 1500 others supplying
the nuts and bolts. ⁽⁶⁶⁾ The industry employs 105 000 people
(29 000 in Armcor subsidiaries and 76 000 in private companies). ⁽⁶⁷⁾

The growth of the arms industry, directly controlled by the
S.A.D.F. is clearly beneficial to large sectors of capital. Of
particular significance in the recession, the S.A.D.F. is seen as a
secure client with expanding needs. Also important for sections
of capital is the range of products which contribute directly to
the war effort - transport facilities, accommodation and other
buildings, food and clothing for 200 000 people, and administration,
training, recreational and communications equipment. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

The private sector has also been drawn on at the level of
National Defence Policy making. Top industrialists such as
Mike Roshoit (Barlow Rand), Gavin Relly (Anglo-American),
Christopher Sanders (Tongaat), and Dick Gors (S.A. Breweries) sit
on the 13 person Defence Advisory Council which examines among other
things, the internal operations of the S.A.D.F. and advises the
Minister of Defence about business methods within the S.A.D.F. and
the arms industry. ⁽⁶⁹⁾

Closer Military-Business relations can be through numerous
other formal and informal channels opened up since 1976. For
example, one method of initiating contact, in direct response to
the crises of the mid-'70's, was through the Military-Business
Conference of December 1977 which stressed closer communication

in all issues between top management and military leaders. ⁽⁷⁰⁾
Thus by 1980 P.W. Botha had the confidence to say:

"I want to unite the business leaders of South Africa behind the South African Defence Force. I want to unite the private sector behind the South African Defence Force I think I have succeeded in doing so". ⁽⁷¹⁾

Botha may have been correct in pointing to a greater unity between capital and the military, but significant contradictions continue to exist in this relationship which are unlikely to be ironed out through a closer working relationship between top military and business leaders. The State has to ensure the reproduction of the social formation as a whole and not only the requirements of monopoly capital. There have thus been important conflicts between capital and the military and between the interests of various sectors of capital with regard to the Defence policy.

These have taken a number of forms.

Firstly, the S.A.D.F. has been unsuccessful in competing with the private sector for skilled labour and as a result the rate of turnover of military personnel is between 15 and 20% a year slowing down the expansion of rate of the S.A.D.F. ⁽⁷²⁾

Secondly, the steadily increasing call-up of white males has hit capital in general and small capital in particular severely and has been opposed by some business leaders and the P.F.P. who have called for a larger multi-racial permanent force and less time for National Service.

Thirdly, while the growth of the S.A.D.F. and the arms industry serves the needs of some sectors of capital, a level of Defence expenditure which reaches 5% of the G.N.P. is a significant drain on the economy and is paid for largely by personal and business taxes and through

Sales/.....

taxes which are drawn to a large extent from workers wages. (73)

Fourthly, the S.A.D.F. has had increasing powers of direct a control over capital. The National Supplies Procurement Act (1970) gives the Minister of Defence the power to order any person producing or procuring goods vital to the S.A.D.F. "to manufacture, produce, procure or to supply or deliver or sell it to the Minister". This power was first used in 1975 when companies were ordered to produce tents for the troops in Angola. (74) The National Key Points Act of 1980 (passed in response to A.N.C. sabotage successes) obliges companies to step up security measures to meet with the ministers approval. For example, it provides for the creation of Industrial Commandoes and the storing of weapons and communications equipment. By 1980 633 National Key Points (85% of them operating according to government requirements) had been identified. (75)

Fifthly, despite the promotion of reformism by the S.A.D.F. its political interests are not identical to those of monopoly capital. They have different rôles and constraints. While the S.A.D.F. has played an important rôle in formulating and shifting government policy and is playing an increasingly dominant rôle within the State, it is nevertheless under the formal control of a government department and cannot openly contradict government policy. Thus as late as 1979 Gen. Malan said:

"The Defence Force supports government policy and is responsible for peace, law and order in this country. This policy is the same as that laid down by Dr. M. F. Verwoerd, namely multinationalism and self-determination of nations". (76)

This comment says less about Malan's belief in Verwoerd's ideas than it does about the nature of the political constraints which the

S.A.D.F. is under, constraints directly linked to those under which the verligte wing of the National Party operate.

Yet there is more than a conservative White electorate between the political interests of the S.A.D.F. and monopoly capital. Its primary repressive - 'peace, law and order' rôle in many ways contradicts its 'hearts and minds' rôle. One example is found in the formulation of the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill in which S.A.D.F. personnel had a direct rôle in drafting the clauses dealing with curfews for reasons related to security considerations in the townships. More generally, the S.A.D.F., together with the other repressive State apparatuses has to contain the resistance to the apartheid State and thus uphold all aspects of government policy. While this strengthens the impetus for 'militarily defensible policies' it also means that the S.A.D.F. has to uphold policy which sections of capital would rather see eliminated. (77)

1.4.4. THE CHANGING ROLE OF MILITARY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

This then leads on to the question of the other 'co-ordinating' aspect encapsulated in the 'Total Strategy' notion - that of the military's changing rôle within the State. The S.A.D.F. cannot be said to be synonymous with, or to control the State. Neither can it be said that South Africa is a 'military State' in the same way as this might be said of certain South American military dictatorships. Nevertheless reference to the increasing 'militarisation of the South African State' is not incorrect in that it refers to a tendential expansion of the military's rôle, an increasing dominance of the S.A.D.F. at all levels of South African society. This has not been a smooth or natural process, but rather has occurred as part of intense struggles within and between different State apparatuses/.....

apparatuses. What one can clearly identify is a tendency towards the military playing a more formative rôle within the State - one which is likely to grow (unless there are dramatic political reversals) as the struggle between the people and the power bloc intensifies.

But it would certainly be a mistake to see this tendency as a fait accompli. The language of total strategy has been used to advance this process. The S.A.D.F. is in a state of transition between the rôles of agent and director of State policy. Its advance is inhibited to some extent by the lack of available political alternatives because of the internal and external constraints discussed above and therefore its move forward takes place tentatively. It is in this content that Total Strategy (a sometimes loose grouping of ideological devices, symbols and images) takes on added significance. ⁽⁷⁸⁾ It legitimates a variety of sometimes conflicting strategies in dealing with the current crisis and the S.A.D.F.'s shifting of civil-military boundaries.

In 1977 Senior National Party M.P. _____ was quoted by the Sunday Express as saying that "the government would not be able to meet future demands without giving heads of the DEFENCE FORCE a definite say in the decision-making process in the country" and that "South Africa may ultimately be ruled by a civilian-military junta". ⁽⁷⁹⁾ Although things have not yet reached that stage the last six years have seen important moves in that direction.

Some of the reasons for the military's emerging position as the dominant State apparatus have already been dealt with. The nature of the 'current crisis' and in particular the changing balance of forces in Southern Africa necessitated a rapid expansion in the size and operational rôle of the S.A.D.F. This in itself

increased/.....

increased its significance as a State apparatus. However, ^{the} ~~the~~ particular place which it assumed within the State was partially governed by the nature of the alliance between the S.A.D.F. Top Brass and the Verligte, P.W.Botha faction of the National Party.

The power base within the State of the Vorster-Mulder-right wing of the N.P. was found in the B.O.S.S. and to some extent the Security Police (as opposed to Military Intelligence where Botha had support), as well as in Perskor newspapers, large sections of the Broederbond, within the hierarchy of the Education system, and in the Department of Information. Although until the Muldergate incident political infighting took various forms, opposition to the verligte P.W.Botha faction was expressed through muted criticism of reformist tendencies and through criticism of Total Strategy as a direction which was undemocratic and which opened the way to dictatorship.

The Muldergate incident (initially leaked to the press by Military Intelligence after the loss of R64 million of the Defence Budget to the Information Department Secret Fund (80)) allowed the P.W.Botha faction to assert its dominance decisively and served as a catalyst for a party-political realignment. The result was the assumption of the premiership by P.W.Botha and the achievement of what has been described as "the equivalent in Afrikaner Nationalist terms of a drawn out coup d'etat (81) - one which was to some extent taken further by the 'Nat. Split' of 1982.

This process was seminal in strengthening the hand of the military. Its results can be seen in the institutionalisation of its rôle within the executive. Power has become centralised directly under the Prime Minister (a tendency which will be taken forward by the implementation of the Constitutional Proposals). The Cabinet's rôle in decision making has been reduced and it now leads

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a largely formal existence as a body. Most of its functions have been assumed by six Cabinet Committees (State Security, Finance, Economics, Internal Affairs, Welfare, and Legislation and Parliamentary Affairs) which are answerable only to the Prime Minister and are composed of the Cabinet Ministers and an unspecified number of the Prime Minister's appointees which include military officers and top business men. (82)

The State Security Council exists both as a committee and as a separate security council effectively above the Cabinet Committees and has become the most influential body in political decision making. It was formed in 1972 with the responsibility of helping formulate National Party Policy regarding intelligence priorities. However, since 1977 it has been responsible for co-ordinating all areas of State policy and since 1979 it has been responsible for planning, giving directives to and co-ordinating the activities of fifteen interdepartmental committees, (83) and it now oversees policy decisions of all government departments and semi-State organs. (84) In addition military advisers sit on all fifteen interdepartmental Committees and on most public Commissions set up by the government. There has therefore been a clear tendency for power to shift away from parliament, and even from the N.P. Caucus, towards the non-parliamentary executive - a process taken further by the Constitutional Proposals.

The militarisation of the State is further indicated by the placement of military personnel in a number of key positions. For example, within the Cabinet, the former Defence Minister, P.W. Botha is Prime Minister, the former Chief of the S.A.D.F. Magnus Malan is Minister of Defence, the former Deputy Minister of Defence, Kobie Coetsee is Minister of Justice, an appointment which confirmed the demise of BOSS/NIS (now under Niel Barnard - a reformist

academic linked to the O.F.S. Command ⁽⁸⁵⁾ and the rise of D.M.I. Both N.I.S. and D.M.I. are now operating under Botha, Malan and Coetsee. ⁽⁸⁶⁾

The 1983 Constitutional Proposals confirm the tendency away from 'racially exclusive bourgeois democracy'. The rôle of parliament (and particularly the Coloured and Indian chambers) is reduced in significance relative to the rôle of the State President and the executive. Through the implementation of these proposals the military's power will be further strengthened as its aims will be less fettered by the processes of N.P. decision-making.

There remain, however, at least short term limits to a more complete assumption of civil power by the military, including the necessity to maintain the appearance, and something of the content, of electoral politics, the lack of a 'praetorian tradition' ⁽⁸⁷⁾ in the same sense as in Latin America and the pressure of international opinion and resistance from Capital and of large sections of the White population. Perhaps more importantly the intensity of the struggle in South Africa has not yet reached the stage requiring an absolutist State. Notwithstanding the new Constitutional Proposals, the remnants of bourgeois democracy are likely to survive for some time yet.

1.5. TOTAL STRATEGY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE EDUCATIONAL APPARATUS

The question of military dominance within the State does not rest exclusively with its rôle in the top levels of political decision making. The power within different State apparatuses does not necessarily lie exclusively at the commanding heights of Government Departments as is the case with the military apparatus. This is particularly important when considering the S.A.D.F.'s rôle in

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the Educational apparatus and can be seen particularly clearly by the effect of reaction to the H.S.R.C.-De Lange proposals of 1981.

The two most important pressures for educational reform were the failure of the education systems' qualification /allocation function as indicated by the growing shortage of skilled labour and the failure of its ideological-socialisation function as indicated by the 1976 and 1980 boycotts.

The H.S.R.C. Committee was made up of 26 members - 14 employed in government departments, 9 by universities, 2 representatives of teaching organisations, 1 teacher and 1 Anglo-American representative. Of these 6 were Black. ⁽⁸⁸⁾ The Minister of National Education, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, made sure that the Committee would produce what was required, appointing his successor at R.A.U., Prof. J. P. De Lange as Committee Chairperson and making sure that right wingers were in the minority (with only 7 of them clearly representative of this group).

In line with the Committee's terms of reference - to design an educational policy to promote economic growth and an educational infrastructure aimed at providing for the manpower requirements of South Africa and to formulate a programme for making available education of the same quality for all population groups ⁽⁸⁹⁾ - the problems in the education system were expressed in technical terms - inadequate resources, insufficient management, lack of control. It stressed the need for vocational and technical training and it emphasized that formal academic measures were not necessarily the best way of bringing about social change and economic development. Its recommendations included 2 years of compulsory education - 6 years of which are free after which pupils are either 'canalised' into vocationally oriented education or academic education to suit their "individual abilities and the needs of the country", with

a system of streaming being advocated. The report recommends that vocational education be subsidized by the business sector.

Its other major proposal is a 3-tier management system with one ministry of education served by a South African Council of Education to provide broad national policy. The second level would include regional educational authorities and the third level would be based on the local school district.⁽⁹⁰⁾ The direction of the report therefore is to recommend certain reforms without advocating changing the education structure fundamentally. In effect, even if the recommendations had been completely accepted, the education system would remain racially segregated and unequal. ⁽⁹¹⁾

According to the only woman and only teacher on the committee, ✓ Claudia Regnard, the right wing continually leaked its contents to the Transvaale Onderwysunie (T.O.) leading to a right wing backlash.⁽⁹²⁾ from the T.O., the Volkskongress and other right wingers within the Education Departments, and newspapers such as Mondstuk. Dr. Viljoen was particularly harshly attacked. According to one report the T.O. saw a single education department as "the thin end of the wedge" and was not anxious to allow rank and file teachers to be persuaded on its merits: .

"On the one hand the government is proceeding stealthily with reform - quietly expanding the D.N.E. to take over other departments - as it fears confrontation. On the other hand the T.O. is extremely worried about what is cooking. The T.O. is split down the middle, at top level and at grassroots, over what is going to happen in education in the next few months".⁽⁹³⁾

Because of the extent of right wing opposition, much to the chagrin of the P.F.P. and others in the liberal establishment, the

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government White paper insisted that all changes take place within the bounds of State policy and Christian National Education, which meant there would be no single education ministry at least for the time being. ⁽⁹⁴⁾

Thus, despite the wishes of a 'Verligte' Minister of National Education, (Gerrit Viljoen is seen as a Botha man while De Lange is "Constand Viljoen's blue-eyed boy", ⁽⁹⁵⁾) the right wing were able to block moves in a reformist direction. As Regnard expressed it:

"In education - especially in the Transvaal and Free State - the right wing are very strong The Government and the army knew exactly what was going to come out of the Committee but in terms of policy coming out in the Government White Paper they had to play it safe at the official level so as not to alienate the right wing. But the government still allows certain things to happen" ⁽⁹⁶⁾

The continuing, though shaky, dominance of the right wing within education and particularly within White schooling in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and their ability to oppose reformist initiatives is a consequence of the structure and ideological traditions within the educational apparatus. Unlike, for example, the repressive State apparatuses such as the military and police, the educational apparatus does not have a comparable tightly controlled, highly centralised structure. Some autonomy exists at each level - the schools, colleges, universities, teachers' organisations, regional education departments and so on. This allows right wing (as well as liberal) elements a certain amount of ideological leeway.

Christian National Education was one of the keypoints of Verwoerdian policy and the traditions ^{it} served to foster continue to flourish/.....

flourish. As Cape Times Defence Reporter Willem Steenkamp expressed it:

"In education there's a lot of right wing obstructionism. In the Afrikaans community the teacher is almost a cult figure - its a very honoured profession. The Afrikaners are besotted about education as it is traditionally focussed on the children. So the teacher is very important. He is the embodiment of culture and so on. And if you want to initiate reforms you have to carry the teachers with you and many are very, very conservative and rise to the high ranks in the educational hierachy. And some of them certainly don't agree with P.W." (97) ✓

The teacher, particularly in the small towns and rural areas, closely linked to the White agricultural community, is the key to the right wing's control of the educational apparatus. This control is strengthened by organisations such as the Volkskongress, the T.O. and the South African Teachers' Council for Whites. Although it might not prevent certain education reforms, the strength of the right wing within the educational apparatus will certainly slow them down. This is indicated by Steenkamp who goes on to say:

" P.W., as ex-member of Defence, knows the value of grassroots opinion. He wants to do something about the education department, but he's a clever, smart bastard - he's a cool bugger - so he manoeuvres people into the right positions before acting and this is why he takes his time about reform. For example, he wants to include Blacks in the new dispensation but he can't piss off the right too quickly. So the way he will probably go about reforming education is to ensure/.....

ensure that the next administrator of the Transvaal is his own man and then he can take steps to reform the education department.

P.W. listens to the experts and moves carefully, so there may be improvements in the future. But you must also remember that the right wing are still very strong in the Transvaal - especially in education. So Botha is skating on thin ice and he can't stick his neck out any further because something a lot of people forget is that the N.P. is very democratic - he can't overstep the mark because he will be chucked out if he does. The right wing are especially entrenched in education - the Broederbond are well entrenched in education and culture". (98) ✓

Whether the means outlined by Steenkamp will be those which the reformists will adopt in attempting to secure the demise of the right wing in education and whether, or to what extent, they will succeed in the short term is open to speculation. What is clear is that, as yet, the reformists do not have a free hand and until there are significant changes within the power structure of the educational apparatus the ideological rôle of the S.A.D.F., at least in the White schools, will be restricted.

This Chapter has tried to explain some of the reasons for the growth and changing rôle of the military in South African society, the particular forms which this changing rôle has assumed, and the struggles which have facilitated or tempered its continuance. It has been argued that while the military has been the strongest advocate of political reform the educational apparatus has been strongly resistant to reform and this has set the context for some of the problems in

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the military's penetration into White schools discussed in Chapter 2.

Working from the premises established in this Chapter the next 3 Chapters attempt to examine the form and content of the military's presence in the education system, looking particularly at the reasons for and affects of its involvement in each of the three areas researched.

Unlike its place in Black schools discussed in Chapter 4, the S.A.D.F's rôle in White schools is not only growing but is already a central one. It is expressed directly through the cadet and youth preparedness and guidance programmes, visits to schools, through the distribution of S.A.D.F. literature in schools, and through the Veld Schools. However, for the reasons discussed in the previous Chapter, unlike its rôle in Black schools, where the emphasis is on 'multi-racialism', in White schools this has not yet been stressed, and at least until the reformist initiative represented by De Lange has achieved greater dominance within the educational apparatus, it is likely that it will continue to be underplayed. So far, the willingness of the military to push a reformist ideology in White schools has been minimal. The danger of an over-hasty approach was alluded to by the head of the Divic Action Programme at Western Province Command, Major Britz who cited the example of an S.A.D.F. attempt to introduce multi-racial sport in schools in Graaff-Reinet which was strongly opposed by the local Parents Teachers Association. (2) ✓

The S.A.D.F's main rôle therefore seems to be that of intensifying military and 'moral' preparedness against the "Total Onslaught". Its activities help to ensure greater uniformity in the approaches of English and Afrikaans, Rural and Urban, Public and Private schools to this end.

2.2.

WHITE SCHOOLING AND THE REPRODUCTION OF THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY

The education system in South Africa, as in any social formation, functions to mould individuals into the rôles they will play in society. Education policies ultimately serve to reproduce the economic and political system of which they are part, although this does not necessarily occur unproblematically. At the risk of oversimplification, the State attempts to ensure that the education

system serves to produce a correspondence between its products, the requirements of capital and the political requirements of the dominant classes generally.

This means that schooling, together with the family, the media and so on, helps to ensure the reproduction of the dominant ideology. In Therborne's terms it helps develop individuals' consciousness through moulding their understanding of what exists, what is possible and what is right or wrong. (3) This is achieved not only through the curriculum but also through the structures of the schools themselves - the system of hierarchy for instance, which extends from the heads of the education departments, to the inspectors, the principals, the teachers, the prefects, the other pupils to the janitors and cleaners, at the bottom. This hierarchy also helps to ensure the maintenance of the 'hidden curriculum', as Eggleston put it, which is "as one with the official curriculum as an instrument of social control in which students, like teachers, have for the most part only the power to conform". (4) Yet the schooling system is not only required to produce a suitably socialised, docile population; it is also required to produce the necessary manpower for industry and therefore to qualify people for different kinds of work and to allocate them to different places in the class structure of society. (5) In South Africa this occurs primarily on a 'racial' basis - the working class coming from African, Coloured and Indian schools and the majority of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie being educated in the White schools and Universities.

Within Black schooling contradictions exist which have given rise to 'counter-ideologies' seen most visibly during the 1976 and 1980 schools boycotts in which Black students took some of the tools provided by their education and used them to analyse, criticise

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and rebel against the education system and the structures of South African society. Black students united across lines of class and ethnic backgrounds and one result was the development of a 'people versus the power bloc' ideological discourse fundamentally in contradiction with the dominant ideology.

The potential for this to occur - for counter-ideologies to emerge on a significant scale - remain very limited in White schooling. Reforms such as those of the De Lange Commissions proposals may pose something of a threat to White security and combined with the strength of the right within the education system, could help to produce or consolidate an ideological discourse which differs from the dominant one in an anti-reformist or reactionary sense. As far as the military is concerned (although in the long term it is likely to be part of an attempt to counter this tendency which could lead to opposition), at the moment its position in the education system is a cosy one. This does not mean that the process of socialisation in White schools, and the military's rôle in it is subject to no opposition from students. Rather the forces are somewhat unevenly balanced.

At one level resistance does occur within White schooling, usually on an individual basis through forms of rebellion against conformity and discipline such as truancy and other ways of breaking rules which in no way threaten the stability of the system. The potential for this to be expressed politically, would seem to lie almost entirely in the English medium 'elite' urban high schools most of whose students are relatively unthreatened economically by Blacks. As with White university students, high school students from liberal, middle class families have the potential tools to develop some level of political awareness. But unlike university students the social and educational milieu makes it far more difficult for

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this to be expressed in an organised form or for it to extend beyond the limits of a liberal opposition to the government. If it ever does extend beyond these limits it is unlikely to be tolerated. As one White High School student noted:

"I am not claiming that there is a total dearth of activism in White schools and Colleges, but it is sufficiently and effectively suppressed." (6)

Nevertheless exceptions to this tendency exist. For example in Cape Town and Johannesburg organisation of progressive high school students emerged at the time of the 1980 schools boycotts.

However, generally, the military's involvement in White schools exists on ground which is exceptionally fertile. It is not a case of trying to win reluctant hearts and minds as is the case in Black schools, but rather of steering them in the right direction. Organised opposition to the military in White schools is hardly a possibility. At the same time the rôle of the S.A.D.F. and the ideological effects of militarisation generally helps to serve to undermine the liberalism from which any potential opposition could stem.

The schooling system and method of teaching itself hardly encourages the questioning of authority. This is reinforced by the content of the curriculum. History is generally learned from a White point of view, Geography teaches pupils to accept that different racial groups have different characteristics - the fact that they live in different racial areas is seen as natural rather than a product of the implementation of apartheid. Guidance teaches children to respect the flag, the national anthem, etc. Pupils also live in an environment where television, radio, newspaper, bonus bonds, military games, 'photo stories', and advertising structure their view of the military and of society generally.

The photostory book 'Grensvegter' portrays a South African hero fighting against communist inspired 'terrorists', even going as far as stressing racial unity. - "Dis nie swart teen wit nie; daars swart en wit aan alle kante". (7) Many advertisements are directed at soldiers - "Next to inspection, its the closest shave I've ever had : Gillett Contour" - or otherwise capitalise on the militarisation of society. A light truck is a "little tank", a lawnmower fights "the battle of the lawn", a video camera is marketed under the heading "shoot the workers. Its the only way they'll learn". (8) In Church the boys on the border are prayed for while on the radio request programmes, songs are sung for them. Military parades are regular occurrences in most towns and cities, sales of bonus bonds are rocketing, as are sales of light arms. On T.V. Al Venter Military extravaganzas are regularly seen. Even in English language newspapers, whether by legislation or inclination criticisms of the S.A.D.F. are at best guarded.

Thus for most White pupils few, if any, alternatives are offered with respect to the military. Added to this is the fact that many schoolchildren have brothers and even parents in the S.A.D.F. Even those from liberal families have the P.F.P's "shield to protect South Africa from aggression and violence while South Africans seek by peaceful means to find solutions for co-existence" (9) policy to guide them. Certainly counter-tendencies do exist - the "revelations" of South Africa's rôle in distabilising Southern Africa by the English press and the P.F.P, the attitude of some Churches, statements by Black and White student leaders, etc. But these are not likely to affect the attitudes of more than a small, English speaking, economically privileged section of the White high school student population.

For the majority there are no alternatives offered and the

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consequence is an increasing acceptance and absorption of the military ethos. For example, one English teacher recently related how essays were being written describing imaginary border experiences - usually heroic adventures with the enemy not being the 'Japs' or 'Jerries' of American or British comics but SWAPO and the battle ground being Namibia or Angola. (10)

Aside from direct forms of S.A.D.F. involvement in schools this process is furthered by the attitudes of most teachers. For example, in an incident related by one teacher, a group of primary school children were taught to see alien vegetation as terrorists who had come to take over the land and choke out all the inhabitants and therefore had to be destroyed with the eradication being likened to a military campaign. (11)

Many male teachers tell students heroic stories of their border experiences. Examples such as these serve to illustrate the emergence of a militarised ethos within South African schools. Thus most White pupils, whatever their attitude to the government, do not question and usually are not aware of the role of the State or the S.A.D.F. in their education. For the majority attitudes range from unquestioning patriotism to resignation. For reasons seldom politically inspired a few might try and 'get out' of cadets or even the army but are very unlikely to oppose it.

Dealing with the subject of war and ideology, Byely has written:

"Ideology fulfils the function of a specific instrument of war. Ideological means of struggle are specific because, on the whole they influence the course and results of military operations and the war not directly, but through the impact they make on the minds of people, on their world outlook, views, morale, and fighting efficiency. Ideological means are able to strengthen the morale of the troops and the population of one's own country" (12)

With respect to the White population generally and White high school students specifically the military seems to have been extremely successful in this and the process of military indoctrination has been virtually unchallenged. It is on this base that the more direct forms of S.A.D.F. involvement is set.

2.3. Transvaal VELD SCHOOLS

An area where something of the direct and indirect rôle of the S.A.D.F. in White education, as well as of the ambiguity of its relations with the educational authorities can be seen is that of the Veld Schools in the Transvaal. ⁽¹³⁾

According to the Transvaal Education Department (T.E.D.) Veld Schools are an extension of the Youth Preparedness (Y.P.) programmes ⁽¹⁴⁾ and are designed to instil in the pupils a greater awareness of their social and natural surroundings as well as to "counteract those things which prevent our youth from adopting a meaningful style of life based on accepted norms The objective of the Veld Schools is to help the child relate to himself, his fellow man, his moral heritage and his creator as he should, and secondly to identify and develop leadership potential and genuinely prepare him for adulthood". ⁽¹⁵⁾

Veld Schools were officially formed by the T.E.D. auxiliary service of Youth Affairs (whose terms of reference included liaison with other institutions including the S.A.D.F. and other government departments) in 1976. ⁽¹⁶⁾ According to educationist Clare Rossouw, their de facto origins go back to 1972 after a speech made by the Transvaal Director of Education, Dr. Jooste, was sent to principals emphasising the "Total Onslaught", after which the programme was initiated under the guidance of Dr. L. J. Paaques. ⁽¹⁷⁾ According to Paaques "Veldskole is die instelling wat daargestel is om die

eietydse jeugproblematiek te hanteer".⁽¹⁸⁾ In all Pasques' writing moral education - to withstand the Total Onslaught - and setting the youth on the right track appear to be central concerns, with Veld Schools being the natural result. Yet in circulars sent to parents and in the T.E.D. magazine Daybreak these considerations were not mentioned. The camps were promoted as being purely environmental in concern.⁽¹⁹⁾

The Veld schools have expanded rapidly in scale. There are now 11 which catered for 62 548 students and teachers in 1981.⁽²⁰⁾ The majority of the pupils were those who went on the regular Standard 5 and Standard 8 camps. 30016 Standard 5 pupils (out of a total of 43440 ⁽²¹⁾) and 25061 Standard 8 pupils (out of a total of 36959 ⁽²²⁾) attended the Schools in 1981. According to the H.S.R.C's Institute for Educational Research, the reason for choosing Standard 5's is because "they are able to reason intelligently and settle matters for themselves" ⁽²³⁾ and Standard 8's "because many pupils turn 16 and leave school" ⁽²⁴⁾. Both Standard 5 and Standard 8 camps last a week. Other camps run at the Veld School sites are Leadership Development Schools, Vacation Leadership Schools, Annual Leadership Courses for Schools "to provide their prefects, class leaders, cadet officers, student councils in hostels and other school leaders with some training in the task of leadership" ⁽²⁵⁾ and adventure courses.

Although the schools are run by the permanent Veld School staff, teachers from the different schools assist them. In 1981, for example, 1954 teachers attended the schools.⁽²⁶⁾ According to Rossouw the teachers have a relatively minor rôle and are not looked on as being colleagues by the permanent staff.⁽²⁷⁾ The camps are divided by sex and language - boys and girls, English and Afrikaans. Usually 2 or 3 schools combine as most schools are not large enough alone.⁽²⁸⁾

The curricula at all Veld Schools is identical, although partly owing to the influence of their teachers there do appear to be differences in the approach taken to English students from that taken to the Afrikaans students, with the direct nature of indoctrination being marginally heavier with the latter. (29)

Although the Veld schools are publicised as being environmental in nature, this aspect appears to be largely incidental to their function. A Johannesburg College of Education (J.C.E.) report conducted by 5 educationists argues that environmental education is ignored altogether and that, in fact, the Veld Schools help to destroy the environment. (30)

Instead the emphasis is on fighting the Total Onslaught from inside and outside the country, on Calvinist morality and right wing political propaganda. 'Discussion Topics', which are uniformly prescribed at all Veld Schools are preceded by set lectures. Discussion is not permitted until lectures are completed and according to the J.C.E. report, both content and method "is tantamount to indoctrination which is educationally reprehensible". (31)

One of the aims of the schools is to isolate children geographically as well as to distance them from their families, schools etc. They are then frequently told of the universal hostility to South Africa and of the insurgent presence and have to stand guard all night in shifts. Circulars are sent to parents telling them that they need not be afraid of their children being in the bush because at all Veld schools there are military units nearby to protect them. (32)

Considerable emphasis is placed on individual physical prowess, and also on strenuous inter-group competition. The J.C.E. report says that by the end of the week a number of pupils showed signs of physical/.....

physical and emotional strain and stress. This was aggravated by physical exhaustion caused by long hours of compulsory physical activity which included strenuous obstacle courses designed to 'overcome phobias' such as of height or narrow spaces through intensive exposure to them.

The physical hardship is exacerbated by the use of sjamboks, whips and sticks on students. One Veld school principal admitted that a large number of complaints were received about the excessive discipline. Group punishment is also used and group victimisation of the individual is encouraged. Other punishments for those who misbehave include refusing them supper, additional cleaning duties and having to attend additional lectures. According to Rossouw

"there is a military-type discipline - it is very severe. Corporal punishment is handed out liberally and other measures are used as well. For example, at one English speaking girls' camp in August 1981, a girl questioned the instructors interpretation of the 'Total Onslaught'. She suggested that if there were significant changes in the country the 'onslaught' would not be able to achieve its aims. The instructor was irate. The lecture had been given in dim light. He immediately switched on the lights and raved at the girl. She was punished by having to clean out the latrines". (33)

Added to the fear of punishment, the extreme mental and physical pressure on the students during the day tends to make them less likely to question the content of the lecture and discussion topics given in the late afternoon and at night.

Even in the wording of the titles of the topics the nature of the value judgements is explicit. For example: "What has gone

wrong that we do not participate in traditional group activities any more?"; "What steps will you take to prepare the homelands against communism?"; "What is man?" (See Gen. 1 : 26, 27; Ps. 8: 6, I Cor. 6 : 19 etc.)"; "If Earth and the universe had a beginning, how old are they? (Ps. 90 : 4)?"; "How should strikers be dealt with?"; "The war on our border is a clash between 2 ideologies. Do you agree?"; "Can the West and especially America stop Russia's expansionism? Give examples"; etc.

According to the J.C.E. report lecturers compared historical conflicts between settler and indigenous peoples with the atrocities committed against the 'Red Indians', Australian Aborigines, Maories, etc., and denied that a comparable situation had existed in South Africa. In one lecture the explanation given for "world aggression against South Africa" was the covetous and acquisitive intentions of both the Russian and the Western blocs towards South Africa's mineral wealth. (34)

Other lecture and discussion topics include: "How would you gain the support of a non-White for your government?" (35) "Must we rebuild the schools that have been burned down by the Blacks?" "Who is going to pay for the rebuilding of the schools?" (36) "Should I feel guilty because I am White?" (37); "What is the British attitude to the flag? Will they make the Union Jack into underpants? , "Is this any way to treat our National Flag?" (38)

The lecture content only appears to contain pro-government and usually 'verkrampte' viewpoints. of a political and religious nature. For example, children are told: "Since the Bantu have moved out of the area into reserves, birds are beginning to make their reappearance and their numbers are on the increase". (39)

The J.C.E. report expresses concern about such scientific distortions:

"The abundance of scientific factual inaccuracies and theoretical misunderstandings was most perturbing" (40)

For example, a lecture on the creation states that:

"..... After all life on earth was created God came and placed the crown on his work. He created man. Darwin brought us his evolutionary theory and maintains that man descends from the baboon. My dear young friends, his ancestors may have been baboons, but most certainly not mine. Science rejects this theory because, as already mentioned, no animal developed from one kind to another".⁽⁴¹⁾

Religion, is also a central theme with solely Calvinistic and liberal interpretations of the Bible being given. For example, the "Engelse Kerke" are criticised for allowing people to play tennis on Sundays: "Is it likely that people on a tennis court can be thinking about God and his will?" it is asked.

Moral steadfastness is also stressed. At one Standard 8 camp, the girls were told to hand in all the pills and medicines they had with them. Later a search through pupils lockers revealed a pack of contraceptive pills which had not been handed over. The pupil received an angry lecture on evils and immorality of pre-marital sex and was held up to her bungalow mates as a bad example. When she protested that she had been prescribed the pill for medical reasons she was accused of being a liar.⁽⁴²⁾ In lectures the sanctity of marriage, the evils of pre-marital sex and the desirability of having only one sexual partner through life are stressed.

Notes taken directly from a Standard 8 English speaking girls' camp lecture on "Insurgency" give a good indication of the precise extent of the right wing bigotry and is worth quoting extensively:

"Today South Africa is experiencing a total onslaught. Pik Botha recently predicted that the biggest Communist offensive would be concentrated on South Africa. The Communists have many difficulties to overcome

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and they will struggle to do so using every technique they have. Because it is a total onslaught, weapons naturally only play a part, but 80% consists of the silent war.

In South Africa they are trying to get you.

You are the youth of our country - they are not interested in the older generation - you are the leaders of tomorrow. The communist says: 'Give me a child between 0 and 6 and I will win the war'. They are not in a hurry - they want the whole world and they won't stop anywhere. Even today they are in every country as well as the U.S.A. In fact they are in the government of the United States - I know them - I am not giving names but you will see in the 1980 elections.

During the past decade the communists have been coming at a faster rate. We in South Africa have been almost isolated due to their effort. We don't receive any help from the 5 Western powers because of the United Nations, who is against us, influences them

When we get to insurgence there are 3 factors. The first is the destroyer, the insurgent himself. It is not always a person who is active in his own country for example in Angola, the Communists used Cuba. Those behind SWAPO and the A.N.C. are also the same. Luckily P.A.C. is dying.

The second factor is the process of destroying. They must have a goal and a group to destroy - here they will use psychological war. They will try to create

chaos, as we saw in the Soweto riots. They were part of a communist onslaught. They used the youth hoping we would panic but our prime minister was too clever and luckily handled the riots.

The process of destroying may be seen as comprising 3 phases:

1. The building up phase - where they mobilise.
2. The guerilla phase - like the so called Freedom Fighters on our borders. They are not fighting for freedom but for communism.
3. The insurgent phase. This can be seen in the urban terrorism at Germiston Station. In Soweto there are hundreds of terrorists - you must be aware of them. Speak to your servant - she will tell you. If you notice something strange about her don't be afraid to tell the police

They (the 'Communists') want to drive us into self-destruction by infiltration. We may not see them but they get in. They create things like the Department of Information scandal. They use the wedge technique driving one group against another."

The lecture went on to say, amongst other things, how the Communists use the oil and sports boycotts against South Africa (the trouble in Iran being Communist inspired); how the Communists rule the United Nations; how the Communists are trying to undermine the morals of the youth - examples given were Jesus Christ Superstar, bitten apple badges, butterfly badges, footstep badges, blade necklaces, and drugs and dagga (which made America lose Vietnam).

The lecture continued: "How do we deal with the Communist onslaught? First we must be physically prepared. If we have a good army we can withhold the insurgents.

"We must make use of our superior knowledge to outwit the Communists. How do we get this knowledge? Listen to the radio. Read all the papers - English and

Afrikaans. If you get a pamphlet read it but do not believe it. For example, some boys got a pamphlet called Onkeer to influence them not to go into the army - but we must remember the last 4 lines of Die Stem

Secondly, we must be spiritually prepared. Know about the psychological war. We have to stay here - we cannot solve our problems by leaving. Even Kallie Knoetze is not welcome anywhere with a South African passport. Rather stay and fight.

We must believe in God. No matter how strong our army is we will lose if we don't believe in God. We must be like David against the Philistine Goliath and South Africa will triumph against the Red onslaught".⁽⁴³⁾

During the group discussions after the lecture (e.g. How does the war in South Africa differ from World War 2?; Why is the Communist onslaught aimed at the Youth?; Why do we need a strong leader?; What do we do with people like Buthelezi and Matanzila? etc.), The students were informed that Blacks are not as intelligent as Whites and can be easily influenced; that the 'natives' live for today and do not consider the future; the numbers 96, 33, 88 and 66 are dangerous; the Beatles wanted people to become drug addicts; and that they must report any unusual happenings or people to the Security Police. They were recommended the book Was Marx a Satanist to follow up the course.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Although this particular lecture was given in 1979 it does not appear that there had been substantial changes in content by 1982, as was confirmed by a T.E.D. spokesperson.⁽⁴⁵⁾ This was also verified by interviews conducted with 7 students who had attended Veld Schools between 1976 and 1982, as well as by copies of lectures and the /.....

and the J.C.E. report. The tone and content seem to be representative of the views of the extreme right of the N.P. at that time. It is in this context of extreme racist war psychosis without the reformist trappings that the military aspect of the Veld Schools has been inserted.

The camps appear to have a distinctly para-military nature. During the journey to the camp leaders are instructed to maintain firm discipline and to keep the pupils occupied by, among other things, practising Die Stem. Pupils are awoken at 5.40 a.m., have an inspection at 6.30 a.m. followed by flag raising and prayers at 6.45 a.m. On the first day an hour is set aside for the 'issue of equipment'. The mornings and early afternoons consist mainly of physical activities such as hikes, 'service on the terrain', 'survival', 'tracking and camouflage', 'marching by compass' and 'practical field training'. Late afternoons and evenings are filled with lectures, discussions and C.N.E. films. (45)

The J.C.E. report showed particular concern about the para-military trappings such as the obstacle course, games such as stalking the lantern, the human camouflage exercise and the nocturnal obstacle manoeuvre. It concluded that: "we observed the development of outdoor awareness and skills to be very much secondary to the military-style survival at the expense of the veld - secondary also indeed to the propagation of readiness against the envisaged "total onslaught". (47)

In all activities tight regimentation is maintained. For example, the blue group will eat while the green group washes and the red group tidies the bungalows. (48) Teachers are required to mark pupils on their success in various activities such as the obstacle course, where special attention is given to the manner in which they react to various obstacles. For failure 2 marks are deducted,

3 marks/.....

3 marks are lost for swearing and 5 marks are lost for 'taking the Lord's name in vain'. (49)

The S.A.D.F. also has a direct presence at these schools. According to Rossouw a close relation exists between the Camp instructor and the S.A.D.F. personnel from the nearby military units and the S.A.D.F. appears to have at least some influence over aspects of the curricula. (50) According to her both the outdoor hike and the obstacle course appeared to have been set up with S.A.D.F. assistance. Along the night hike, in which pupils are sent off in small groups with little food and have to dig up roots, there are barbed wire fences, booby traps, alarms, mock mines, etc. "set up to create a sense of preparedness of what to expect in the bush". (51)

Army lecturers wearing combat uniforms are frequently used according to a T.E.D. document "to give a foretaste of army life". (52) Furthermore, according to Rossouw, because of the nature of the camps, very often the teachers who go along are cadet instructors at their schools. (53)

The para-military nature of the Leadership Development Courses ("aimed at guidance in the scientific identification of leaders" and attended by 4826 "potential leaders" in 1981 (54)) seems to be even more severe. More intense and 'advanced' lectures are given on Total Onslaught topics sometimes by senior army personnel. Students are also taught (and have to practise) how to use the R.I. rifle and have been known to be shown captured guerilla weapons, and have been told that they were of a lower quality and less humane than those of the S.A.D.F. (55)

One male, English speaking student from Northoliffe High School in Johannesburg, who had been on both the regular and the leadership Veld Schools said that at the leadership school, attended by 160 Afrikaans speaking and 100 English speaking Standard 9's with

two chosen from each school, in addition to the 'normal' para-military activities they went on a 24 hour night hike, did a more strenuous 'hindernessbaan' requiring extensive group effort and advanced map reading and camouflage. He said that the camp had 10 instructors, all of them wearing khaki uniforms, and all having military backgrounds. They were also lectured by active S.A.D.F. personnel on compasses and camouflage. (56) In addition he said that the principal of the Camp (Pilgrims Veld School) was linked to the S.A.D.F.:

"In his opening speech he spoke about the army and how amazing it was. His son was a huge P.F. member and he always came along and wore his army uniform We were divided into groups and had to number off and line up all the time. At inspections we had to stand to attention and when short talks were given we could stand at ease. The Afrikaans students did it much better because they knew the military procedure We were divided into 10 platoons and there was intense competition between them. (57)✓

Veld schools are compulsory for all Transvaal government schools to participate in. A headmaster or headmistress will receive a letter informing him or her of the dates of the Course and giving an outline of the aims of the Course, which reads: "We endeavour to lead the child towards self-realisation, to emphasise his place within the creation and to cultivate his love for the fatherland". The introductory note also claims that the camps "afford the pupils a unique opportunity to discover the reasons for their existence and to identify potential leaders". It closes with a reminder that Veld School T-shirts are available and gives the assurance of "an informative and inspirational week" (58)

For many teachers there is also considerable pressure to participate. Veld Schools are linked to a system of merit promotion for teachers. Principals are informed that a camp will be taking place and that they will be required to provide a certain number of teachers. If teachers do not, or are unwilling to participate, they receive negative points which affect their salaries and promotional

possibilities/.....

possibilities, while if they do attend they receive positive points. ⁽⁵⁹⁾ Those teachers who do not attend a camp are likely to be happy to get the week off.

At many schools attendance for pupils is, de facto, compulsory and for those who show reluctance pressures are considerable. One student who matriculated from Parktown Boys High School in Johannesburg in 1981, said that when he tried to refuse to go to a Veld School the guidance and cadet teacher "publically said that it was because I was a coward. He reacted in this way to anyone who showed resistance". ⁽⁶⁰⁾ ✓ This kind of response was confirmed by all 7 of the students interviewed.

Nevertheless there do appear to have been some examples of opposition from staff and students. For example at the liberal, project orientated King Edward's High School, the teachers and principal were unhappy with the Veld School programme and therefore the principal insisted to the T.E.D. that he would run the programme himself with "much more of an environmental emphasis and less of an S.A.D.F.-type emphasis". ⁽⁶¹⁾ The student from Northcliffe quoted above said that at the Standard 8 Veld School his school attended there was no corporal punishment because of fear of parents complaints. Furthermore, after widespread student and parent complaints about bad food and poor conditions, the school laid an official complaint to the T.E.D. ⁽⁶²⁾ However, these incidents appear to be exceptional and most schools participate willingly in the programme.

Despite the pressures on students to attend the Veld Schools, it would seem that one way or another a large number manage to 'get out' of them (over 11 thousand of the 37 thousand Stand 8's did not attend them in 1981). One student who matriculated from Waverley Girls' High School in 1982 said that despite the pressure some of the Standard 8 girls who had been to Veld Schools in Standard 5

simply refused to go.

It is difficult to be able to assess how effective the Veld Schools are in influencing students' attitudes. However, comments from those interviewed are helpful in providing a generalised impression. The interview with Clare Rossouw was particularly useful in this regard:

"(The response of the students) varied widely. Many of the English speaking kids expressed antagonism but more to authority than anything else. Their attitude was one of : 'The camps are okay as long as you don't take the lectures too seriously'. But these are the same kids who sometimes criticise their parents for being too liberal. Kids I have taught ask their parents: 'Why aren't you like other parents?'. The Transvaal Veld Schools definitely tend to produce greater conformity in kids. However, for the more liberal, English speaking children the Veld school programme is marred by the irrational right wing content. At the camp I went to the kids appeared to be highly intimidated

In an interview with 4 girls and 3 boys who went to the Veld School, all 4 girls and 2 of the boys said they were scared throughout and were not prepared to challenge what was said. This is confirmed by letters to the papers and the T.E.D. journal by scholars. Other interviews with children likened the Veld Schools to Nazi Youth Camps and said that the discipline, night hikes and early morning inspections were more severe than what they later experienced in the S.A.D.F. But then again ^{some} kids were uncritical and said they enjoyed it" (64)

According to another teacher who attended one of the Camps the children were far more racist when they returned and were more convinced about the onslaught against South Africa. She said that "they then understand why they are taught how to build bomb shelters in Youth Preparedness sessions". (65)

These impressions were confirmed by the interviews conducted. They involved 4 boys and 3 girls from Johannesburg English speaking Schools who attended Veld Schools between 1976 and 1981. All are now university students whose attitudes to the Camps is negative. Discussing their responses at the time all said that there were widespread complaints amongst students about the discipline, bad food, lack/.....

lack of safety precautions, exhaustion and degrading treatment. This was expressed particularly strongly by the 2 who had been on leadership schools in addition to the regular Veld Schools. 3 of the 7 said that on their camps students had had serious accidents and complained of snake bites, falls, diarrhoea, fever, pink eye and broken bones and said that these incidents created antagonistic attitudes amongst the students. 4 of them said that at the time they had felt that the lectures were "too right wing" but none of them had challenged the lecturers in any way. Despite this only 2 of the 7 said they felt strongly opposed to the Camps at the time. 2 said they enjoyed them. Both of them also went on leadership schools and said that they had found the regular veld schools less demanding and more enjoyable. As one of them put it: "At the first Veld School I fell for it quite a lot. I'm an outdoor type and it was fun. But by the end of the leadership camp I was more aware of the problems".⁽⁶⁶⁾ The other 3 said they felt neutral at the time.

From the limited information available it appears as though, despite opposition and disinterest from some pupils, the camps do have a considerable ideological influence and work towards breaking down liberal principles which may exist. It is likely that this is the case particularly with Standard 5's whose ability to formulate alternatives is likely to be more limited. ✓

There has been some opposition publically expressed to the Camps from a number of areas. The English press has carried reports about bad food and illness.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The Transvaal Teachers Association (T.T.A.) passed a motion condemning the indoctrination of the Veld Schools after compiling a report highly critical of them. One of the criticisms of the Camps in the report was that "preparedness should not be viewed in the para military tone which accompanies certain activities",⁽⁶⁸⁾ which led to the motion including the point

that/.....

that "war and self-defence have nothing to do with the accepted concept of Veld Schools". (69)

The P.F.P. in the Transvaal has spoken out against some of the excesses of the Camps and has been particularly critical of their pushing N.P. propaganda. As P.F.P. MPC Peter Nixon expressed it:

"Our first criticism of the Veld Schools is an ethical one, the Veld Schools are not what they are advertised to be to parents and children and even principals The real reason for Veld Schools is to prepare the children psychologically to withstand the total onslaught as it is defined and explained by those handpicked lecturers." (70)

Nixon went on to repeat most of the criticisms of the J.C.E. report and said that the combining of half truths with sweeping emotional statements led to confusion and fear in the minds of the children:

"Some of it seemed like the ravings of a fanatic" (71)

The T.E.D. confirmed that Nixon's account of the lectures was accurate and said that the Veld School personnel were chosen by the T.E.D. and based their lectures on topics suggested by the T.E.D. but denied they were intended to indoctrinate children with the N.P. propaganda: They went on to say:

"It is not so much lectures which are given. We are more interested in stimulating group discussion" (72)

Even N.P. supporters have expressed alarm about the goings on at Veld Schools, and according to Rossouw, informally some have been highly critical. (73) A columnist for the Transvaler raised

questions about the discussions of 'racial' issues at the Schools:

"It makes the blood run cold to think these debates could be conducted by discussion leaders with right wing convictions". (74)

One of her main complaints was that in the lecture on insurgency children had been told that the 'Info. Scandal' was not really a scandal but a campaign against innocent leaders like Dr. Mulder.

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Remarkably, the extreme right have also expressed misgivings

about/.....

about the content of some of the lectures at Veld Schools.

According to Rossouw, in the Provincial Council Debates,

"the strongest reaction came from the Treurnicht types who feel that they are expressing a liberal influence. For example they objected to the discussions topic 'What would you do if you were swimming in a farm dam and a Black child started drowning?' - they seemed to think that Black and White children should not be swimming in the same dam in the first place. They also objected to the fact that evolution was discussed". (75)

The T.E.D. have shown no real inclination towards wanting to reform the Veld Schools significantly although they have indicated that there will be more 'open discussion' allowed at the English speaking Camps. (76)

The fact that the Veld School staff are handpicked by the T.E.D. and that despite widespread criticism lecture and discussion topic content does not appear to have changed since 1976, indicates that the right wing direction of the Camps is in line with the dominant thinking in the T.E.D. As Rossouw expressed it:

".....Generally control seems to be in the hands of the T.E.D. where the right wing are very powerful. Also important is the fact that those chosen as instructors seem to be particularly verkrampt The T.E.D. is extremely powerful politically and financially and it is very clearly right wing dominated. So challenges don't go very far" (77)

In terms of the military's aims in White education therefore ^{one} the Veld Schools have an ambiguous rôle. On the _A hand they are important in fostering a Total Onslaught paranoia and war psychosis amongst White youth which is a necessary part of the ideological cement Total Strategy requires. Also they play a direct rôle in ensuring a high level of physical military preparedness which, among other things eases the transition of White males to their military service. In this regard the Veld Schools go a long way towards fulfilling their rôle of complementing Y.P. and cadet programmes and the S.A.D.F. has participated enthusiastically in their programmes.

But on the other hand, despite the ultra-right's expressed

misgivings/.....

misgivings, the direction of the Veld Schools seems to be out of step with the 'multi-racialism' and reformism of the S.A.D.F. top-brass. In the long term it is not in the 'Botha-Malan cliques' interests, either in a party-political or a broader political sense, for a narrow and racist White nationalism to be consolidated amongst over 60 000 White youths annually. Nevertheless, the dominant direction of the Veld Schools has, as yet, gone unchallenged and the S.A.D.F.'s participation in them appears to remain predominantly on the T.E.D.'s terms and at the T.E.D.'s initiative. It remains to be seen whether the 'Nat split' and subsequent party-political realignment will have any effect on the direction of the Veld Schools.

The education departments in the other Provinces appear to be prevented by lack of sufficient finances or fear of opposition, from setting up Veld Schools. However there have been reports that in the Transvaal there are moves afoot to establish Veld Schools for Black school children with Swartkoppies apparently having been chosen as the first site. A Veld School-type camp for Black school children, reportedly run by the Orange Free State Educational Authorities, was held near Bloemfontein. (78) (see appendix 1)

2.4. SCHOOL GUIDANCE PROGRAMMES

Although the effects of militarisation can be seen in a number of forms in school subjects, it is in Guidance programmes that it has been most marked, both through the general content of guidance curricula, and through channelling pupils into the S.A.D.F. through the careers advice offered by Guidance teachers.

In White High Schools Guidance includes classes - usually once or twice a week (79) as well as careers and psychological counselling. Both are undertaken by one or more Guidance Teachers / Careers Councillors. The aims of 'General School Guidance' are said by

the H.S.R.C. to be the following:

- "1. The pupils have to be guided by means of individual and group orientation to explore and understand the demands of life so that they can lead a meaningful life.
2. The identification of pupils with learning, social personality, behaviour and family problems and the solution of these problems." (80)

The H.S.R.C. suggests a 'broad and non-directed approach' (81) aimed at helping pupils to learn about themselves, their families, social competence, change, social awareness, etc. (82), which, of interest here, includes helping people with problems relating to National Service. (83) However, in practice much depends on the ^{and} orientation of different schools, on the emphasis of the Provincial education departments. Although some schools may not carry out the Guidance syllabus completely, nevertheless the guidelines do not leave much room for interpretation. Especially in the younger standards the stress is on teaching citizenship which includes learning about official emblems such as the flag, national monuments, the Communist threat, and the S.A.D.F. although this type of emphasis now seems to be increasingly channelled into Y.P. programmes.

All White schools participate in the registration of pupils for the S.A.D.F. when they are 16 years old. This is compulsory and is usually co-ordinated by the Careers Councillor in liaison with the S.A.D.F. At most schools this process involves more than filling out forms and is accompanied by talks by S.A.D.F. personnel on what to expect in the Army, Navy or Airforce, on how pupils should prepare themselves and on whether to go to University/College or the S.A.D.F. first (with the current stress favouring military service first). The rôle of Guidance Centres in this is stressed by the H.S.R.C.:

"Since large numbers of young men go to the S.A.D.F. directly after school ... it has become essential

to provide them with guidance. Consequently liaison between the S.A.D.F. and the Guidance Centres is essential". (84)

In addition to this the military also has an influence in the process of careers counselling. The S.A.D.F. has been known to send circulars to Guidance teachers stressing the need for pupils to be channelled into the P.F. (85) According to U.C.T. Careers Guidance Councillor, Dr. Niels Lundhead, in practice, Guidance programmes, particularly at Afrikaans schools tend to be 'directive', aimed at placing pupils in positions where they are needed in the economy, and this includes the S.A.D.F. particularly. He also pointed out that both pupils and Careers Councillors at English schools have shown a growing interest in the P.F. recently. (86)

This was also pointed out by Claudia Regnard who sat on the H.S.R.C. Guidance and Y.P. Committee:

"..... at school people are very often channelled into careers according to the perceived political and economic needs of the country with very little counselling and virtually no information given. This involves people being channelled into the P.F. (The Nationalist elements) wanted to define things very tightly. In the vocational area they wanted a strong emphasis on what the government needs and the P.F.. was pushed strongly here" (87)

The S.A.D.F. also participates in careers evenings for pupils (88) and in holding careers exhibitions for pupils. For example one Careers exhibition advertising 'the S.A.D.F. as an employer' in Port Elizabeth last year was viewed by 8000 pupils. (89) The S.A.D.F. and educational authorities also emphasise the need for schools, and particularly the Guidance Centres, to maintain contact with pupils doing their military service. (90)

It is therefore apparent that as well as playing an ideological rôle White schools are playing an increasing rôle in assisting the S.A.D.F.'s recruitment drive by channelling pupils into the P.F.

2.5.

YOUTH PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMMES

Since the late 60's, Y.P. programmes have been a feature of White schools curricula and since 1976 Cadet programmes have been an integral part of these and military influence on them has become more direct. Y.P. programmes have also been increasingly uniformly implemented.

Y.P. is a compulsory weekly subject in all White government schools in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Cape. As well as Cadets for boys (and at some schools for girls), Y.P. programmes place considerable stress on civic duties, patriotism and moral preparedness. To an increasing extent they also involve S.A.D.F. visits to schools, practices for 'terrorist attacks' and so on. Themes are intended "to produce feelings of pride, discipline, patriotism and Christian morality and a knowledge of cultural history" as well as practical training in road safety, first aid, civil defence, etc.

practice,

+ This appears to be the general ^{practice} As the Cadet Master at Alexander High School in Port Elizabeth put it:

"Our aim is to create a general awareness of the situation in South Africa and not to make them into little soldiers. What we want is a well rounded person who can handle any situation. The army doesn't only want people who can march and fight. It also wants someone who is generally aware of everything going on around him. So as well as having talks on the Border situation we also have talks on health, drugs, road safety, and so on" (91)

The Cape Y.P. curriculum sets out its general goal as:

"The spiritual and physical development of each individual as a balanced, effective, responsible citizen who, while acting within the law of God is capable of independent thought and able to withstand the onslaught against his spiritual and physical integrity." (92)

The Cape syllabus provides a typical expression of C.N.E. goals and methods. It is divided into 5 sections: Component, Aims, Specific Objectives, Choice of Methods and Evaluation. Under

the/.....

the Component 'Spiritual Preparedness' one aim is given to be "the development of insight and positive attitudes with regard to good citizenship". One example of the Specific Objectives is "the acquisition of knowledge and development of insight and pride with regard to school and national flags, school and national anthems and school and national coats of arms as symbols of pride and allegiance". Methods, always prefaced with a series of Bible verses, include activities such as practicing drawing the flag for younger pupils, singing and discussing the anthem, while Evaluation involves being tested on these areas.

Another objective is given as being: "Development of an appreciation for the contribution of our heroes and other great historical figures from our past". Activities involve a panel discussion on "When is a person a hero? - emphasis on qualities of leadership", and films on "Eerste Ministers van Suid Afrika" and "Hulde van die Voortrekkers". The section entitled "Development of an appreciation of and sense of responsibility toward upholding the laws of an ordered society" includes a panel discussion on the need for law in an ordered society.

Another section on Objectives are given as "Acquisition of knowledge and development of insight with regard to our Defence Force and the development of positive attitudes towards military duty". In addition to cadets, it includes activities such as "talk by pupil of the school doing his military service to inspire the boys and answer their questions"; "Panel discussion: 3 Servicemen (air, sea, land);" "Excursions to military base"; "Defence Force displays;" "Military processions"; "Juniors : Scrapbook on Border conflict"; "Language Studies - analysis of Die Stem"; "T.V. Programmes and films on Border situation"; "Fish bowl activity : Should we do Border duty?" Evaluation involves a questionnaire on "Positive attitude

and willingness to do Border duty".

In another section the aim is given as being " positive attitudes towards interpersonal relations". Activities include "opportunities for improving esprit de corps, e.g. School bazaar, inter school competition, cadets, etc." In a section whose objectives are "acquisition of knowledge and development of insight with regard to the threat posed to man's spirit by foreign ideologies" activities include "talks on Communism, liberalism and other issues"; "lectures on foreign ideologies"; "theme work on specific ideologies"; and "scrap book of press cuttings on ideological threats to the South African way of life". Evaluation includes essays, tests and questionnaires.

Another component is "physical preparedness". One aim is "acquisition of knowledge with regard to the efficiency of the human body in service to the individual, his fellow man, and God". Activities include: "talk by former pupil on military service" and "any film on military training or the Border conflict".

Another component is safety education whose aim is "... the development of skills with regard to specific techniques of property protection during an emergency situation". Its specific objectives include " skills with regard to specific techniques of property protection and handling of equipment". Activities include night exercises, learning protection measures and change of shifts. Evaluation involves determining senior pupils' willingness to stand guard. (93)

The Transvaal and Free State syllabi appear not to differ substantially from the Cape syllabus. The 1980 T.E.D. Moral Preparedness syllabus for English speaking Schools involves similar activities, although surprisingly it shows signs of a more reformist influence. Emily Hobhouse and Gatsha Buthelezi are cited in a

section on citizenship as "People who have rendered important service to South Africa". This, of course, is combined with the familiar stress on the flag, the Anthem, the Day of the Vow, and the dangers of communism but with the proviso being given that "discussions should be as objective as possible, with no possibility of indoctrination". (94).

The section on Values in Life (for Standard 10), has a sub-section on the dangers of communism for South Africa, which shows elements of a 'verligte' line:

"If Russia were to gain a foothold in South Africa she would own about 90% of the world's gold, to start off with, therefore South Africa is the gem of Africa. It would not be too difficult to create upheaval in our country, what with Blacks being 'hard done by' for the last 3 centuries. Were they to be promised the governing of this country in exchange for allegiance with the communists, it would not be a sacrifice for them at all. The communistic ideals would appeal to any suppressed peoples - especially buttered up with promises of education and finance, equal opportunity and equal pay.

The only way South Africa as a nation can ward off communism is to stand together - Black and White - and to show a united front. White South Africa has a lot to answer for, but times are changing; courageous men like B.J.Vorster and Pik Botha have stepped in and are trying their level best to pick up the bits of the shattered relations between Black and White and hopefully they will succeed before its too late". (95).

Whether because it is intended for English medium schools or not, the Transvaal syllabus certainly differs significantly from that of the Veld Schools with respect to its ideological direction and is possibly an indication of political differences within the T.E.D.

The T.E.D. syllabus also includes a section on the Defence Force stressing its value and importance. (96) "The system of National Service is also a positive education in citizenship. The recruit certainly develops pride in himself, the armed forces and his uniform, as well as a love for his country. A more mature and developed young citizen emerges, with new values and knowledge he

did/.....

did not previously have". (97)

The only Province which does not have a Y.P. programme of this nature is Natal. The Natal Education Department objected to it and instead has a programme called Civic Responsibility which appears to have less of a propagandistic emphasis. (98) Nevertheless, Natal has a vigorous cadet programme and the S.A.D.F. have made their presence well felt in Natal schools.

According to Regnard the dominant attitude within the education departments to Y.P. is chauvinistic, militaristic and strongly right wing and this means that at most schools the programmes are overseen by teachers considered to be the most disciplined and patriotic. (99) There also appears to be a strong emphasis on the Y.P. programmes being carried out on a more uniform basis. Until recently a certain amount of autonomy existed in the implementation of syllabi especially at English medium schools. For example, Rossouw mentions how at Pretoria Girls High School the Y.P. programme had no military content and instead had activities like car maintenance courses. (100) Similarly Regnard gives the example of how she used to run the Y.P. programme at Westerford High School in Cape Town by having focuses on rape and other topical issues. But once there was a C.E.D. panel inspection she was replaced from organising the programme by a more conventionally-minded teacher. (101)

The direct forms of military input into Y.P. programmes appears to be widespread. In June 1982, in reply to a question by Mr. Ken Andrew in parliament, Magnus Malan said that S.A.D.F. officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers had visited 33 Cape peninsula English and Afrikaans schools in the previous 5 months, having been invited by school principals. He said activities were in connection with youth preparedness, careers guidance, information with respect to national service, the selection of boys in special schools/.....

schools for National Service, and cadets. (102)

The area of Civil Defence has been particularly strongly emphasized. Pupils help building bomb shelters, (103) while bomb scare drills appear to be a favourite occupation. (104) These are now widely implemented and either run by the schools themselves or with the assistance from the S.A.D.F. For example, at Northcliffe High in Johannesburg, according to one former pupil, "Y.P. periods would always start with an evacuation - the school took it very seriously". (105) One Natal school had a drill which required pupils to make their suitcases easily identifiable by placing stickers on them in order to ensure that no suitcases "containing bombs" could enter the school. In addition no cars were allowed into the school grounds unless identifiable by a sticker, in order to "prevent abduction" of pupils from the school. To ensure the continued effectivity of this exercise the stickers were periodically changed. (106) At St. Agnes Convent in Welkom mock 'terrorist' attacks and counter-attacks are held. Students are told to clear the school in two minutes and are not told the attack is a mock one until afterwards. These 'evacuations' are directly assisted by the S.A.D.F. (107)

It appears that the directly militaristic aspects of the Y.P. programmes are taking precedence over the other activities. Already at a number of co-ed schools the boys are almost exclusively involved with cadet-related activities with the other aspects of Y.P. applying only to the girls.

Outside the Y.P. and Cadet Programmes the S.A.D.F. is also involved in a number of other activities in White schools. An annual essay competition is organised by the S.A.D.F. with cash prizes as an incentive. The purpose of the competition is said to be 'to stimulate interest in the S.A.D.F. among pupils in secondary schools' and these include titles such as "Why I am in

favour of National Service".⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ The S.A.D.F. also runs special schools for immigrant children.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ In all staff rooms and libraries it is compulsory to have editions of the Army Newspaper Uniform displayed,⁽¹¹⁰⁾ while forms are sent to high school students' parents advertising Paratus ⁽¹¹¹⁾ which itself has given an increasing emphasis to White schools.⁽¹¹²⁾ Organisations like the Southern Cross also organise fundraising drives for the 'boys on the Border' ⁽¹¹³⁾ while other schools organise fundraising concerts for this end themselves.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

The extent of the S.A.D.F.'s presence in White schools has led the P.F.P. to raise the issue in Parliament and the Provincial Councils. In the Cape Provincial Council, for example, the rôle of the S.A.D.F. in White schools was criticised by M.P.C's Di Bishop and Frank van der Velde. P.F.P. Chief Whip, **Van der Velde**, said that the schoolroom was not the place for creating a war psychosis in children. He expressed concern that mock terrorist attacks were being set up in all Cape Schools and said that parents should be fully informed about the aims of such visits. He added that the S.A.D.F. drills caused polarisation and racial hatred:

"There is enough violence on T.V. and enough violence in their daily living without having fear pumped into them by the Defence Force A child leaves school and has 10 years of army in front of him and that is time enough to prepare for defending against terrorists... We must instil in our children a desire for peaceful solutions"

Bishop urged that the purpose of S.A.D.F. approaches to schools be probed, that S.A.D.F. activities at Schools be monitored, that parent bodies be consulted and their permission sought for such approaches. The M.E.C. for Education, Mr. W. Bower, replied that Bishop was trying to attribute "sinister motives" to the S.A.D.F.: "This side of the House ignores and treats her presumptuous demands

that/.....

that the Education Department should probe, scrutinize and monitor its activities with all the contempt they deserve" he said. (115)

It is clear that aside from its involvement with school cadets the S.A.D.F. is playing a growing rôle in White schools and that one of the main vehicles of this is the Y.P. programmes in which the general ideological thrust is being increasingly governed by the exigencies of the S.A.D.F.

Not quite clear how much influence by the S.A.D.F. is exerted through the Y.P.

CADET PROGRAMMES

RECENT HISTORY

"The positive influence which the present cadet system exercises on the cadets later National Service is already noticeable. The success of the system may largely be attributed to the excellent co-operation between the Education departments and the S.A.D.F." (116)

Since the mid-70's the schools cadet programme has expanded along with the growth of the S.A.D.F. and has become increasingly incorporated into the school curricula. Officially S.A.D.F. assisted cadet training began in 1976 (117) and it has now reached the stage where it is compulsory for boys in all government schools in South Africa. In 1975 there were 563 000 cadets. By April 1978 there were 125 000 cadets in 587 cadet detachments around the country with R32 million being budgetted for cadet services. (118) By February 1980 there were 154 000 cadets in 626 detachments (119) and by the end of 1983 it is estimated that there will be over 210 000 cadets. (120) Compulsory cadet training for White girls is also planned. (121)

After the 1950's, when most schools had cadets and there was close co-operation between the military and the schools, the cadet programme began to decline in the 1960's, and was effectively replaced by the Y.P. programme run by the Education Departments. (122)

This/.....

This led to an inquiry into the cadet system initiated by the Minister of Defence, "om dit meer sinvol te maak en beter skakeling en koördenering te bevorder". (123) According to the investigation the problem was the lack of co-ordination on all fronts which meant that the S.A.D.F. had no meaningful rôle in the development of the schoolgoing youth in South Africa. (124) A steering committee was set up and in January 1976 the existing cadet programmes fell under the direct control of the S.A.D.F. (although at most schools which had cadets this relation already existed). Emerging from the Steering Committee was the formation of a standing inter-departmental cadet committee with representatives from all the Education Departments and the Army sitting on it. This Committee's brief is to maintain responsibility for interdepartmental co-ordination, to oversee and make suggestions to further the initiation and implementation of the cadet programme which has previously been neglected. Its task has also been to ensure close co-ordination between the education departments and the regional military commands. (125)

In 1978 'Paratus' commented:

"Schools are rapidly approaching the state where the whole cadet programme will be completely integrated into the School system in general and to the needs of the S.A.D.F. in particular". (126)

1.6.2. THE PRESENT CADET SYSTEM

The present system involves the organisation of schools into different categories:

1. For schools where all boys from Standards 6 - 10 participate.
2. For schools who have more than a cadet band and orchestra but where the entire school is not participating.
3. Schools with just a band or orchestra which have not developed the infrastructure of cadet organisation. (127)

To qualify as a cadet detachment a school is supposed to have at

least 36 cadets but exceptions are made for very small rural schools. (128)

According to Cmt. Harding, formerly S.A.D.F. Officer in Charge of Cadets, the big break through in the co-ordination of the Cadet programmes has been the formulation of a cadet syllabus and the promotion of student leadership and cadet officer training. (129)

Since 1978, under the instructions of the Ministers of Defence and National Education, a cadet syllabus has been broken down into various components - with the whole programme being closely linked with the Y.P. programme. Greater emphasis has been placed on the "philosophy behind cadet training", "the organisation of the S.A.D.F, Civilian Defence", "the Nature of the threat against South Africa" and the syllabus includes discussions on various forms of warfare and military procedure. (130)

The other components are drill, band and orchestra, shooting, and practical instruction (fieldcraft, concealment, camouflage, field marches, stalking, tracking, survival and bushcraft). (131) Cadet and Cadet-leadership camps are also increasingly emphasized.

Schools are divided into Commands which correspond to the S.A.D.F's delimitations. For example, in the Transvaal there are 3 Commands - Northern, Northwestern and Witwatersrand. Within each Command cadet competitions are held forming the basis for National competitions. All equipment - rifles, uniforms, maps, etc. and usually band instruments are provided by the area commands. (132)

The Eastern Province Command for example is introducing a differentiated programme with some students doing drill, others doing Y.P. activities such as firefighting, others being involved with the band or orchestra, others doing shooting, etc.

"One of the things we teach them is what to do if there's a terrorist attack on the school. So we divide them into different groups - the firefighting group, the leadership group which takes charge of the situation, makes sure children are taken away, etc., and then the girls/.....

girls will be medical aids. This is the kind of programme we are suggesting to the schools",

said Sgt. Eloff of the E.P.Command Cadet detachment. (134)

According to Eloff, in the Eastern Province, the most significant changes over the last 5 years have been the number of schools involved and the nature of the programmes. In 1977 his area had 35 cadet detachments while by 1982 there were 65 detachments including a number of private schools. As far as the nature of the programmes is concerned he pointed to the increasing involvement of teachers, the move away from programmes being limited to drill and shooting, and the increasing number of Cadet leadership Camps which the Department of Education is now forcing schools to participate in. He also said that the amount of money allocated by the S.A.D.F. to cadet organisation increased by 15% in 1982. (135)

There also appears to be greater uniformity in the implementation of the cadet programmes with the army setting out the basic guidelines and schools attempting to adapt to them.

3.6.3. THE ROLE OF TEACHERS

Aside from the Cadet programme now being compulsory, there are important incentives for schools to implement cadet programmes as rapidly as possible.

Firstly, various perks such as extra staff allocations are offered on the basis of the number of students involved. (136)

Secondly, male teachers are often keen to participate because this often exempts them from doing camps. (137)

However, there continues to be a shortage of teacher cadet officers. (139)

Most male teachers beginning their military service after qualifying are immediately posted to the Infantry School at Quatshoorn where they undergo Union Leader courses and are trained in, among

other/.....

other things, cadet leadership. Unless they are medically unfit or are seconded to the Civic Action Programme they go on to become Cadet Officers.

In 1978 the first group of Education contact students completed their initial period of National Service. A Committee of school principals had given its approval in principle to a system whereby selected teachers serving as cadet officers were seconded to the Army to serve at Command headquarters. The aim of the scheme was to improve the Cadet system by means of interdepartmental co-operation. (139)

Since 1980 the training of Cadet Officers (teachers) has been revamped and has involved a more intensive programme, co-ordinated to involve more teachers on a more active level. For example in the Eastern Province the number of teachers involved in cadet programmes increased by 57% in 1981 and 32% in 1982. According to Sgt. Eloff:

"Most teachers are making an effort to be appointed as officers and most schools have a very positive attitude to the extent that quite a few schools have after hours cadets in order to work through their programmes more thoroughly". (140)

Considerable emphasis has also been placed on the ideological rôle of teachers. As Gen. Constand Viljoen put it to a Pretoria Teachers' Training College leadership Conference:

"Die onderwyser vervul 'n sleutel rol in die paraatmakings proses van die jeug Om die aanslag af te weer verg 'n nasionale spanpoging waarby ook die onderwyser betrek word. As die vormers van one toekomstige leiers kan die onderwyser 'n groot invloed in greeps verband uitoefen In hierdie verband is dit noodsaaklik dat elke Suid Afrikaner loyaliteit toewyding en offervaasdigheid openbaar In ons skole moet die boustone gelê word vir kernsgesonde binnelands verhoudinge. Dit sal bepalend wees vir die welslae van die Regering se huidige misvatief en meehelp om 'n klimaat van onderlinge en respek te skep" (141)

It is clear that male teachers are playing an increasing rôle in Cadet programmes and that the loopholes previously enabling them to

avoid/.....

avoid participating, are closing. Most of those teachers who have completed their military service are required to help with their school's cadet programmes. In addition to this some teachers are still required to do Camps. As an E.P. Command Commandant involved with school cadets put it:

"(Being Cadet Officers) means that many of them get out of camps - all they have to do is promotion courses - but we'll catch up with them in time." (142)

The teachers who are Cadet Officers are usually affiliated to the local Commando unless they choose to remain in the Citizen Force. Under the 1982 Defence Amendment Act this will continue to be the case but their commando obligations will increase to 1000 days. (143) They are required to wear their uniforms on the day of drilling practice.

3.4.4. REASONS FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE CADET PROGRAMME

In a speech delivered in 1979 at a school cadet function, the Director of Education for the Transvaal, Prof. J. H. Jooste made the following point:

"I put it to you. It is not the task of the school to produce combat soldiers. Cadets leaving school should be willing, ready and proud to defend their country" (144)

However the privately owned but pro-S.A.D.F. magazine 'Armed Forces' commenting on Jooste's speech, said that the "new cadet" was beginning to make his appearance, "..... issued with Browns, boots, and webbing, it is difficult to tell them apart from the South African Defence Force ... equipped with R.l. rifles and full webbing they are able to present a very presentable display attack and I understand, are even capable of working with helicopters " (145)

The article goes on to say that the 2 main advantages of the system are the introduction and insight into military life and the

sense of responsibility created which would "ensure that these boys become a disciplined and solid foundation for the future" (146)

According to the S.A.D.F. cadets were introduced for three reasons:

1. for the youth to develop a sense of responsibility and love for their country and National flag;
2. to instil civil defence in the yough;
3. to train them in good citizenship as a forerunner to their National Service. (147)

Although the ideological rôle combined with the activities of the Y.P. programme is important, the greatest emphasis appears to be placed on the area of military training and despite denial by S.A.D.F. spokespersons and educational authorities like Dr. Jooste, the intention seems to be not far off from producing combat soldiers. As the director of school cadets, Col. Viljoen put it, the purpose of cadet training is to prepare the youth for military training as they must be involved in the total national strategy. (148)

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The ideological rôle of the cadet programme is also important in the S.A.D.F's emphasis. According to 'Paratus':

"The cadet system has brought new awareness amongst schoolboys of the nature of the onslaught against South Africa. They recognise and understand the threat and are highly motivated to undergo training and aid them in combating it." (149)

Or as the cadet master at Hoërskool Groote Schuur in Cape Town put it:

"Because of the serious nature of the onslaught it is necessary that boys at school come to understand the Total National Strategy and the importance of fighting in the Army. The Cadet programme is designed to instil this in the boys so that they are ready for the army when they get there." (150)

Thus as well as preparing boys for a quicker transition to a state of combat preparedness, particularly since 1976 the Cadet programme has been used as a propaganda force for the S.A.D.F. and

the/.....

the government with the mode of ideological mobilisation being along familiar anti-communist lines.

The 1976/7 uprising was used by the military to justify and legitimate the extension of the cadet system. An important aim of the cadet system and of the S.A.D.F.'s rôle in White education generally, has been to introduce the aims of 'Total Strategy' and 'Total War' to students before they reach the S.A.D.F. and in this way the potential exists (although, as has been mentioned, the military appears to be moving slowly in this respect) for using the cadet and youth Preparedness programmes to counter the right wing influence in the education system. These programmes also function more explicitly as an anti-liberal and sometimes anti-P.F.P. force in the schools. (151)

2.6.5. CADET PROGRAMMES IN PRACTICE

Interviews conducted with Cadet Officers and other teachers and students from 14 schools in the Western and Eastern Cape and the Transvaal showed a considerable variation in the implementation of the programmes, but also a tendency towards greater uniformity. These interviews, though by no means representing a broad cross section of White South African schools, (152) do provide some indication of the extent of the implementation of Cadet programmes, particularly at English medium schools.

The school with the least developed Cadet programme was Westerford High, an English, Co-ed, Government school in Cape Town. The principal managed to avoid the full implementation of cadets by arguing that uniforms and shooting, for example, were not officially required by pointing to ambiguities in regulations. This meant that until this year cadets were limited to occasional marching for the boys which did not even meet the minimum requirements.

According to one teacher:

"The /....."

"The C.P.A. knew exactly what was going on but because Westerford had a reputation as a 'gifted' and experimental school they got away with it - but it was very much a privileged situation". (153)

However it is believed that uniformed cadets will be introduced there this year. Another Co-ed government school, Pinelands High in Cape Town was, according to a former pupil, ~~was~~ pressurised into adopting a cadet programme in various ways - for example - by threatening to call up members of staff for Camps. (154) They now have a fairly extensive programme which fully complies with regulations. (155)

At the other extreme was Grey High School in Port Elizabeth, an English, boys, government school. There, every boy from Standard 6 to 10 is involved with the programme. For Standard 6's it involves initial training in drill, Y.P. activities as well as one or two adventure-type camps designed to introduce an aspect of military preparedness. These camps include a game called "nats and terrorists". In Standard 7, as well as drilling, they learn marksmanship and first aid. In Standard 8 they do drill and shooting and learn aspects of motor mechanics as well as the rudiments of infantry work such as map reading and camouflage. They also learn about the workings of the R.l. rifle. Aside from parades, the Standard 9's and 10's are mainly involved with military training - concealment and shooting, section attacks and map reading. The Standard 9's also go on a compulsory cadet camp in which activities include a full introduction to infantry work including mock attacks using blanks, thunder flashes and Rl's, "to introduce an element of realism into the exercise" (156) According to Cmdt. Keith Dawe, Officer Commanding both the Grey High School Cadet Detachment and Prince Alfred's Guard, the Camps give the cadets a general orientation to the S.A.D.F. and a good preview to National Service. The Camps also involve films and lectures on military activities. (157)

Grey has /.....

Grey has its own system of rank with student officers having to pass a written and practical examination after being selected to go on a strenuous Candidate Officers' Course.

All boys participate in Cadets for 1 or 2 hours a week, except for those in the band and brass band who practice daily. Grey has 17 uniformed teachers helping with the cadet programme while other teachers help with the administration of the programme. Cmdt. Dawe concluded that the programme was extremely successful because "the Grey boys cope very well when they go to the Army - you can just see from the number of them who become Officers". (158)

All the schools interviewed maintained close contact with the local Command and the Army played a direct rôle in assisting their programmes, especially at those schools with a shortage of cadet officers. For example at Groote Schuur, an Afrikaans Co-ed School in Cape Town, one teacher was solely responsible for the cadet programme which he said limited their activities but this was supplemented by cadet camps and by direct Army assistance. (159)

At Settlers High, an English co-ed school in Bellville, senior cadet officer Major Rens said that the shortage of sufficiently trained staff was an acute problem as there were only 2 Officers for 360 boys. He said that they found difficulty in finding men interested in going on Officer Courses and that therefore the Cadet syllabus was impossible to follow and their programme had to be limited to drill, shooting, an annual camp, the leadership camps and occasional speeches and films. Although the Army did assist he felt there should be more co-ordination. (160)

At most schools Army 'top brass' are present or invited to speak at parades. At Pinelands High the Cape Corps gives an armed display. As their cadet master remarked: "This is important as it gives the S.A.D.F. an opportunity to carry out public relations". (161)

All the cadet officers interviewed found the leadership camps run by the S.A.D.F. for selected groups of boys to be very useful. These camps, usually held during school holidays provide intensive training in which pupils are acquainted with all aspects of Army training - parades, P.T. rifle shooting, guard duties, ambush practice, grenade training and so on. Long marches are also held in which cadets have to make their own provisions for food:

"Soos wafferse bobbejane moes hulle in die randjies tussen die klippe en bosse rondsoek vir 'n lekker vet akkedis of 'n smaaklike pofaddertjie om die ergste hongerpyn te stil! Snags moes hulle tussen dieselfde klippe neskop en die koue wat die kwik soms tot onder vriespunt laat daal het, met mannevoed trotseer" (162)

The pupils who attend these camps are given rank and generally become platoon leaders at school. The importance of leadership was upheld at all schools. For example at the English, boys, government school, S.A.C.S. in Cape Town, one of the Cadet Officers said:

"It is very important that the boys learn to take commands even if it is their best buddy shouting out the commands" (163)

The Education departments are now enforcing the regulation that all schools send boys to leadership camps more strictly than before.

Considerable emphasis is also being placed on general cadet camps which large numbers of the boys attend. In Port Elizabeth, for example, 25 schools attended 33 camps in 1982 - some sending as many as 300 boys. In addition 341 boys from these schools attended the Cadet leadership camps. (164) These camps, designed "to motivate the cadet for his National Service", (165) are usually run by teacher cadet officers assisted by the P.F., local Commando members or University Military Unit soldiers. (166) They involve similar, though less intense, activities to those of the Cadet leadership Camps. Discipline is tight and the procedure the same as that of the Army. The Camps also include a heavy dose of S.A.D.F

For example at one such Camp attended by 315 boys in the Northern Transvaal Paratus noted:

"Die seuns is onderrig in fasette soos die bedreiging teen Suid Afrika, burgelike beskerming, inligting in sekerheid, en wat die praktiese sy betref, en hulle geleer om te drill, te skiet, wag te staan, veldkuns te beoefen en kaartlees te verstaan" (167)

The lowest common denominator which applies to all schools is drill. At some schools this is the full extent of the Cadet programme but this rapidly is beginning to change. For example S.A.C.S. has what one of its Cadet Officers described as "a very low key" programme which involves Standards 8's, 9's and 10's drilling in uniform, until recently with rifles, for 17 weeks a year for an hour a week with no "ideological preparation other than two weeks of orientation in which Army, Navy and Airforce speakers to help prepare the boys for Army life". 9 boys are chosen to go on an annual leadership Camp. (168) However, over the last two years the programme has been tightened up, has become stricter with more emphasis on discipline and on preparation for military service. (169) Although drill is no longer the key component to Cadets it remains important and much emphasis is placed on performance at 'interschool dill competitions.

There appears to be considerable pressure from the S.A.D.F. and the educational authorities for schools to go beyond this required minimum. As Eloff explained it

"Some schools were reluctant or unwilling but this is changing. We've been out to visit every school. I talk to all the headmasters and try to encourage them to orientate their schools more towards cadets. Now the Education Department forces all government schools to participate in cadets even if they are unwilling". (170)

At most schools shooting is an important component to cadet programmes. Whereas previously at most schools which had the facilities/.....

facilities shooting was confined to those in the shooting teams who were excused from drill, nowadays emphasis is placed on all boys participating in shooting, although stress is also placed on excellence in marksmanship in Interschool Bisleys. Cadet and leadership camps also provide training in the use of the R.l. but most schools supplement this with their own shooting programmes. At Groote Schuur for example, matrices are taken on shooting weekends. (171) Oude Malan, a technical dual medium coed school in Cape Town has shooting practices for the whole school at the Police shooting range. (172) At Alexander/^{Road}High School, an English, coed, government school in Port Elizabeth, the boys shoot 2 or 3 times a term with R.l's at an E.P.Command shooting range. The school is building a shooting range at which both boys and girls will learn to shoot with .202's (173)

In 1978 the S.A.D.F. announced that plans were being implemented to remedy the shortage and deficiencies in shooting facilities and that shooting would be extended to include lessons on weapons proficiency, the theory of small arms, rifle range procedures and the care and maintenance of weapons. (174)

Speaking at a Bisley in Pretoria, the Chairperson of the Standing Interdepartmental Cadet Committee and Deputy Director of National Education, Mr. D. H. Meiring said:

"Under British rule South Africa had boasted the finest cadet shottists in the world. However, with the pressures of urbanisation in the past decades many of these skills had been lost. Marksmanship has declined. This should not be allowed to happen, especially with the conditions faced in South Africa Is it fitting that the Bisley is being held in the shadow of the Voortrekker monument". (175)

It is clearly with this in mind that weapons training generally and shooting specifically have been emphasised over the last five years. With a higher standard of shooting amongst cadets, the necessity to spend time on that aspect of soldier's basic training will be

diminished/.....

diminished.

At a growing number of schools activities go beyond drill and shooting. For example at Simonstown High School weekly cadet periods start with drill and then go on to other aspects of the syllabus with each term having a different emphasis. For example the first term is concerned with field training, the second term has extended drilling for Republic Day and in the third term cadets are trained in "responses to rural and urban terrorism" - leading up to the annual camp for 6 to 8 days. Cadets also have shooting regularly and learn how to dismantle rifles. This is all in addition to a 2 hour weekly Y.P. programme. (176)

To maintain discipline during cadet periods various methods are used. At S.A.C.S. boys who "joke around too much" or make too many mistakes have to do push-ups or run around the field with a tyre above their heads. (177) At Simonstown boys are shouted at or caned. At Grey High they are given 2 hours of strenuous "extra parade" after school. All the Cadet Officers interviewed stressed the importance and value of discipline in cadet programmes.

The S.A.D.F. strongly encourages participation in interschool Cadet competitions. As Armed Forces put it:

"The school Cadet system is now in gear and the time is approaching when the ability of the schools' cadets detachment will be accorded greater esteem than the prowess of their rugby teams." (178)

Paratus carries monthly articles on interschool competitions to which great esteem is given. Cups, medals, shields and trophies are given to winning individuals and schools at regional and national competitions for drilling, shooting, and bands. An aspect of the day's competition is usually an S.A.D.F. display and they always involve a 'Total Onslaught' talk by a senior S.A.D.F. officer or an educationist.

The growing emphasis on cadets appears to apply equally to
all/

all four Provinces. Even in Natal, where Y.P. was shunned, cadets are emphasised as much as in the other Provinces. As Paratus noted in 1977:

"The cadet corps in Natal have introduced a full scale training programme for their schoolboys to motivate them towards the National Service they are soon to undertake. Cadetting in Natal has always been strong and it is growing in popularity due to the work of the P.F. helpers and the teachers who instruct in the schools". (179)

However, the increasing pressure being placed on Natal schools to intensify cadet programmes led the Natal Teachers Conference to pass a motion conveying concern to the Natal Education Department about the increasing militarisation of the schools.

"It looks as if the screws are being put on schools to step up cadet programmes in a country which is becoming more and more military conscious"

said Mr. A. P. Jordan who proposed the motion. (180)

1.6.6. CADETS AT PRIVATE SCHOOLS

The emphasis on Cadets has by no means been limited to government schools. Most private schools take part in Cadet programmes. As Sgt. Eloff noted: "although (participation) isn't compulsory for the private schools, most of them do it of their own free will." (181)

He pointed out that most of the private Schools in his area (St. Andrew's - Anglican; Theodor Herzl - Jewish; Kingswood - Methodist; and Marist Brothers - Roman Catholic) participated.

At some private schools the issue of Cadets is seen in terms of traditional military pride by their conservative school boards. This seems to be particularly true of the elite Anglican private schools in the Cape and Natal. The school with probably the most intensive and varied cadet programme in the country is the Cape Town Anglican, Private, Diocesan College School (Bishops). It has its own air section with two airplanes, hanggliders and parachutes.

Those/.....

you could be more specific

Those pupils who join this section receive S.A.D.F. assistance including a camp at the Navigation school at Langebaan. The Navigators section coordinated a fly past by two scholar pilots at the annual inspection. The Bishops' Navy is instructed by the S.A.D.F. and includes an annual camp at S.A.S. Simonsberg. At the Battle School cadets learn to carry logs through obstacles, scale walls and practice leopard crawling. They strip and reassemble R.1's and Bren guns blindfolded, learn 40 martial arts techniques and are trained in drilling by the S.A.D.F. In the electronics section they learn the use of radar and computers where they devise war games. A Signals section has also recently been developed.

Cadets at Bishops frequently use the shooting range and practice dummy grenade throwing. There is also an ambulance section and a quartermaster's store. All boys practice every Friday afternoon but they have to reach a certain standard in drill and physical coordination before being allowed to join one of these sections. The teacher who effectively organised the programme, Major Rudi Paken-dorf (the brother of the Grey High School Rector in Port Elizabeth) is now involved with cadet training in the P.F. with the E.P.Command. An Annual camp is also held for Bishops' boys. As the Western Province Command put it in a letter to the school:

"The trend and spirit of training in progress at your Unit is appreciated by this Command and sets an excellent example to other Cadet detachments" (182)

However the pupils appear to be less universally enthusiastic and their attitudes seem to vary. According to one Standard 9 pupil:

"Some of the boys like it because you have a wide choice of activities, but most think that things are getting too militaristic and the school is overdoing it We had to go on a Cadet Camp with other schools and it was a total waste of time" (183)

However, there are some private schools which continue not to/.....

to have cadets. According to Clare Rossouw at the Johannesburg Anglican Private School St. Stithian's there was strong pressure for cadets. The attitude of the School Committee was one of advocating the need to "instil discipline into youth who are going astray.

..... There's nothing like good military discipline to put them right". But as yet there are no cadets there or at St. John's while St. Martin's only has a cadet band. (184)

In the Roman Catholic educational establishment there has been some conflict over the question of the introduction of cadets. Owing to pressure from the priest in charge of education, the Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the Catholic Youth there are now moves to have cadets phased out of Catholic schools. This has been done at most of the Marist Brothers and De La Salle schools. (185) However the only Christian Brothers College (C.B.C.) school which has refused to implement cadets is that in Boksburg. (186) At the C.B.C. in Cape Town a group of Black students was expelled in 1980 for refusing to do cadets. (187)

The issue continues to be an important one within the Catholic Church with opposition at times being strongly expressed. For example at a Catholic Justice and Reconciliation Conference on militarisation in September 1982 a motion was unanimously passed which noted that "the presence of cadets and drum majorettes assists the S.A.D.F. in the defence of apartheid by training pupils for possible future military service to defend apartheid against fellow South Africans", and resolved to call on the Bishops to abolish cadets. (188)

The Bishops have yet to take a stand on the issue.

6.7. 'GIRLS CADETS' AND DRUM MAJORETTES

Cadet training is not limited to boys. At a growing number of schools - mainly, though not exclusively, at Afrikaans and dual medium schools - girls participate in drill and at some schools in shooting and other

cadet activities as well as in drum majorettes.

In 1980 Col. M. J. Viljoen, the Director of Cadets announced that in 1983 cadets would be made compulsory for girls, (189) but this has now been delayed indefinitely. Nevertheless it is S.A.D.F. policy to 'encourage' schools to introduce cadets for girls and according to Sgt. Eloff, as well as well as being involved with drilling, bands and orchestras at a number of schools, the S.A.D.F. is considering giving them rifles and will be using them for administration, signals, 'terrorist' weapon shows, etc.

"We are trying to get the whole thing of military preparedness into their thinking" (190)"

he said.

The response according to the S.A.D.F. has been positive. As early as 1977 four girls' drill platoons - nicknamed by the S.A.D.F. 'pigtail platoons'-participated in the W.P. Command's Cadet Championships, (191) while by 1979 this number had risen to seven (compared with thirteen boys platoons). (192) In December 1980 in the Orange Free State Cadet Competitions ten girls platoons participated (as compared to fourteen boys) and two girls orchestras. (193) The girls cadet platoons execute the same drills as the boys - in uniform though, at present, without rifles. (194)

At Waverly Girls' High in Johannesburg boys from Highlands North High School come weekly to drill platoons of girls. 'Paratus' patronisingly noted:

"At the beginning of the period, the girls were milling around waiting for the instructors to arrive. It was impressive to observe how boys rapidly formed the girls into their platoons and proceeded to drill and instruct their charges. There was no fooling around and the activities were conducted seriously and in earnest". (195)

However, a student who matriculated from Waverly in 1981 commented:

"The matric Waverly girls were sometimes drilled by Standard 9 boys which we found very degrading. Two

of/.....

of us tried to object but we were forced to go back". (196)

S.A.D.F. camps are also held for girls. They involve similar activities to the boys camps. (197) At a few schools boys also participate in shooting. For example, at Simonstown High, where drill was introduced for girls in 1982, girls are allowed to be involved with shooting if they have parental consent, (198) while at Alexander Road High in Port Elizabeth both drill and shooting will be introduced for girls in 1984. (199)

The reaction of the Cadet officer at Groote Schuur to the question of the participation of girls in cadets was typical of those interviewed. He said that it was important that girls were prepared against the onslaught, "want dis hulle land ook" (200)

There does not appear to be any more resistance from girls than from boys. For example, the issue of womens' participation in cadets and in the S.A.D.F. has been pushed at Veld Schools. At one Afrikaans Camp the girls were asked whether it was fair that the boys had to fight in the S.A.D.F. and not them and whether they should not play a more direct rôle. They unanimously agreed that they should. (201) However, at Pinelands High, according to the Cadet officer only 40% of the girls said they were prepared to go into the S.A.D.F. if called up.

At some schools girls are involved with Y.P. activities while boys do cadets. At other schools they are encouraged to participate in drum majorettes which are closely integrated with the cadet programmes. This applies to both government and Roman Catholic schools. (203) Drum majorettes participate in military parades and cadet competitions. One of the main purposes of 'trompeppics' appears to be to attract crowds to these events.

2.6.8.

STUDENT RESPONSE TO CADETS

It would be virtually impossible to generalise about the responses of students to cadets. At the more 'liberal' English speaking schools the general attitude is likely to be one of scepticism. For example, according to Regnand, at Westerford,

"even with the cadets that they do have the kids see through it. The boys are not convinced, they think its a lot of nonsense. They just laugh at it and say they're trying to make us become soldiers". (204)

But she went on to say that at other schools she had taught at it was different.

The attitude of the S.A.C.S. boy interviewed is perhaps a more widespread one at English speaking schools:

"We don't really like cadets but we have to do it - there is no option. While we are marching we take it seriously - we joke around sometimes but then its back to concentration It is good to know the basics before we go to the Army." (205)

A number of schools have boys who for religious reasons (usually Jehovah's Witnesses) refuse to do cadets. The official policy is to handle these cases delicately. (206) Other forms resistance might take is 'bunking' pretending to be sick and so on.

It is likely, however, that most boys have a more positive attitude to cadets than this. Their ideas about the military are governed by the increasingly militaristic milieu in which they live, while the fact that they will be liable for 4 years of military service will tend to condition their acceptance of cadet training as a useful, if sometimes unpleasant, exercise. The increasing emphasis on interschool competition and the wider range of activities are also likely to make it less tiresome.

2.6.9.

NAVAL CADETS

Another form of cadet activity is Naval Cadets which is voluntary but

pushed strongly by the Navy. Participation by boys in Naval cadets makes it very likely that they will receive the preferred Navy call-up for their military Service.

Boys and girls between the ages of 12 and 18 are accepted for the Naval Cadet Corps course which, according to the Navy is aimed at creating interest in the sea and a possible career in the South African Navy, Merchant Navy or Harbour service.

"By means of sound naval discipline and tradition, the cadet corps aims primarily to help build good citizens. This is an excellent objective since South Africa needs good citizens possibly more urgently today than ever before"

said Vice Admiral Edwards, former Chief of the Navy. (207)

In 1982 there were 10 Naval Cadet bases in South Africa. (4 in the Transvaal (208)). In Cape Town in 1979 there were 50 Officers, 498 boy cadets and 71 girl cadets. (209) The Naval Cadet Corp has existed since 1930 (210) and since 1969 it has been directly under the Navy League's control. (211) Camps are held for both girls and boys, and according to the Navy the training the Cadets undergo prepares them for National Service better than basics does. (212)

Attempts are being made to expand the programme. Paratus

commented:

"..... the introduction of a naval cadet system of similar status to that of the Army school cadet system would seem to be a worthwhile course to pursue". (213)

CONCLUSION

Through the examination of various forms of S.A.D.F. activity in White Schools - Veld Schools, Guidance Programmes, Y.P. and Cadets - a number of tendencies are apparent.

There remain contradictions between the military and educational apparatus which are seen primarily in the limits and possibilities of

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the S.A.D.F's ideological influence in White schools - its ability to counter the right wing dominance of the education departments. In, for example, the S.A.D.F's rôle in the Veld School programme this contradiction is clearly resolved on the Education Department's terms. Because the military's ideological rôle in White schools is limited and subject to the approval of the educational authorities at various levels, it would take a shift in the balance of power between the 'verligtes' and 'verkrampes' within the educational apparatus for the military and to play a more substantial rôle in pushing a reformist, Total Strategy line in White schools. Because most of the coordination with schools is carried out by lower level officers and non-commissioned officers, if the 'verligte' influence is to go beyond the level of annual talks by a senior officer on schools' Founders Days, it would require clear policy directives from the S.A.D.F. 'top brass'. At present, the military's ideological input does not go far beyond the level of stressing the need to counter the Total Onslaught, about which the right wing would certainly not disagree. Nevertheless, the ideological rôle of the S.A.D.F. in this respect remains an important one and is expressed in each of the areas of its involvement.

how much of this was militarization (ideological influence) + how much was formal interaction

The most notable features of the S.A.D.F's rôle in White schools is the rapid expansion in scale, particularly since 1976. The necessity for this is governed by the desire to increase the level of military preparedness and training in order that boys, and later girls, will be able to undergo a rapid transition to being ready for combat. Also important is the need to create a tighter ideological unity in White schools.

It is likely that in all the areas discussed the military's rôle will continue to expand rapidly. The spectre haunting White schools is one of increasing militarisation of all aspects of their activities.

The Rôle of the S.A.D.F. in the Universities

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years the military's involvement in both Afrikaans and English universities has expanded in a number of areas. As the Military's research needs have grown and diversified so an increasing volume of its direct and indirect research work has been undertaken at universities. Afrikaans universities in particular, though not exclusively, play a significant rôle in training and providing courses for military personnel and in feeding professionals into the military. The S.A.D.F. has also tightened its control over National Service obligations for students through having introduced University Military Units (U.M.U's) at all Afrikaans campuses, although as yet it has failed to carry this out on English campuses. The military is also attempting in various ways to play an increasing ideological rôle, particularly at English speaking campuses where considerable opposition to it exists. It is necessary to contextualise these developments within an outstanding of the rôle of the University in South African society.

2. THE PLACE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

The University does not have a single, a priori function in capitalist society. Its functions have tended to vary historically and according to the context in which it is placed. For example in South Africa universities assigned to different 'racial' groups have characteristics which in important respects differ considerably. Because, in a direct sense the military only has a presence at the White universities, the Black universities will not be discussed.

Generally the functions of the university in capitalist society can be said to be the following:

Firstly/.....

1958/ instrumentalist / your class qualifications
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Firstly, the transmission of knowledge within the framework of the dominant ideology in order to reproduce existing class relations. Secondly, the research function which entails the development of new scientific knowledge and ideological concepts. Thirdly, the training of intellectuals for various positions in existing social relations - i.e. the training for positions of authority and leadership in industry, the civil service, the military, education, the Church and so on as well as the training of technical, administrative and intellectual labour power. (1)

At one level it can be argued that all universities serve the interests of the ruling class and the State. University staff and students are drawn predominantly from the 'upper class' and are equipped with the skills and ideas to reproduce these interests. The power structure of the university is organised towards these ends. University Councils at White South African universities are made up of representatives of the State and Capital and all universities are entirely dependent on sponsorship from the State and Capital. At most South African English speaking universities there is a one-third - two-thirds subsidisation formula with the two-thirds being provided by the State. In effect, a total of approximately 85% of all funds come from State sources. (2)

South African universities are State institutions, academics are civil servants with even pension funds being State assisted. Much information has to be returned to the Department of National Education and other government departments. The universities are controlled by an Act of Parliament through the Universities Act and by a private Act, which is a specific version of this Act, which sets out, for example, which courses may be offered. In order to start a new course the approval of the Department of National Education has to be given.

As well as serving bourgeois class interests by placing class

agents in the required positions, the university also plays a specific ideological rôle by instilling and reinforcing in its members the values, aspirations and ideas of the society from which they are drawn and for which they are being moulded. As a speaker at the 1981 NUSAS Congress expressed it:

"The university tries to tell us that those who use their heads have the right to exploit and control those who use their hands, that mental labour is somehow more valuable and privileged than manual labour, and that it is only the privileged few of us who are entitled to the leisure and training that is needed

Why else but to maintain the myth of people's inevitable division into rich and poor are our courses split and fragmented into a 100 separate disciplines, so that we can never see society as a whole and understand the indissoluble link between poverty and wealth as two sides of the same coin? Why else but to stop us discovering the power of collective action are our universities hierarchised and authoritarian?" (3)

However, the university does not always fulfil the functions outlined above adequately, nor does this process occur without important contradictions. Furthermore, the direct rôle of the State and Capital varies considerably between different universities both historically and according to their functions, and therefore the military's ability to ensure its aims varies considerably according to these considerations.

The university is an essentially bourgeois and elitist institution (although this varies considerably from university to university. For example, the 'bush' universities in South Africa are training their students for largely different places in the class structure than the White universities). It produces the skill, culture and ideology which the ruling class needs to ensure the reproduction of the social system. But it is not simply an instrument of the ruling class to be manipulated to its immediate interests. Contradictions withⁱⁿ it are not only the result of external influences and pressures;

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it is not a yacht which is sometimes pulled this way or that by the winds or currents of class struggle until it is firmly set back on course by the firm bourgeois hand on its sails. Rather, like the State itself, it should be conceived of as a site of struggle. The university does not only reproduce class relations but also contains its own contradictions. University policy, for example, should be understood in terms of contradictions within the structure of the university - rather than being an automatic reflection of certain class interests.

In this respect the university does not serve ruling class interests in an unproblematic way. As Dr. David Webster put it:

"The university is not monolithic, it is subject to conflicting demands from many sides, and these are contradictions which can be prised open and exploited " (4)

For example, between and within different departments important differences may exist. The differences between commerce and business science on the one hand and certain arts and social science courses on the other hand may be considerable. This is particularly true at an ideological level. While one function of the university is to develop and reproduce bourgeois ideological relations at a number of levels, particularly within the liberal universities this is not achieved unproblematically. In many disciplines, particularly those of the social sciences, traditional schools of thought are coming under attack from Marxism for a number of reasons related both to the material world and to the internal inconsistencies of the traditional paradigms. Equally importantly, the student movement has played a significant rôle over the last decade or more in challenging the dominant ideology.

The differences between universities are also important to consider. English (5) and Afrikaans (6) universities are both

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'sites of struggle', but these sites are not the same for a number of reasons related to the history and traditions of these universities (liberal and Christian Nationalist), the cultural and ideological backgrounds of students, the direct and indirect influence of the State (the degree of 'relative autonomy' from it), and the influence of capital ('Afrikaans capital' and 'English capital'). These differences also exist to a lesser extent amongst English universities and amongst Afrikaans universities. For example, Stellenbosch having Cape Nationalist traditions and Pretoria having Transvaal Nationalist traditions.

Writing on Universities in England, Jacques identifies the following features of what he calls the liberal or English Universities, (which he argues have only been partially adapted to the needs of monopoly capital):

- "(a) The degree being educational rather than vocational.
- (b) A high staff-student ratio.
- (c) Academics combining research and teaching.
- (d) Relative autonomy of the university from the State.
- (e) Academic self-government within the University.

He argues that these elements rest on the notion of the university's primary function (apart from research) being an ideological and cultural ranking of a "socio-intellectual elite" ⁽⁷⁾ This in turn means that the English university has only partially fulfilled the function of producing the required quota of skilled labour and has led to pressures for the university to expand this function and for it to become more 'vocational' in character, hence losing some of its ⁽⁸⁾ autonomy from the State.

In many respects the South African English universities follow this pattern, both in terms of the notion of the liberal university

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which is held to varying extents and in terms of the attack on aspects of its 'relative autonomy' (9) The universities have partially failed to meet the State's manpower requirements through producing sufficient engineers, scientists, technologists, managers, etc., and through providing insufficient teachers and others with training skills who themselves play a rôle in producing the required numbers of technicians, artisans and skilled workers. In this respect part of the State's strategy has been concentrated on the establishment of the Vista universities and on the development of technical and Training Colleges.

There has also been considerable pressure on the existing universities to turn out a higher level of skilled manpower. For example, the U.C.T. assistant to the principal, Dr. James Moulder recently lamented:

"The main threat to university autonomy is from the Manpower Commission and the business Community. The 1981 Report of the Commission of High Level Manpower said: 'The university's primary responsibility is to produce high level manpower' - there is talk of differential subsidisation to push people into more career oriented studies with the idea being that there are too many people doing B.A.'s. South Africa has not produced enough engineers and therefore the direction of De Lange, etc. is in this area - under the influence and interests of large corporations. I am worried that the university will be forced into greater production of high level manpower. There are subtle and not-so-subtle pressures to strengthen career oriented aspects of university education over the more general academic aspects. We're becoming like sophisticated finishing schools". (10)

The notion of the liberal or 'open' university is also important with respect to the relative political autonomy of the English universities in South Africa.

The extent of the political contradictions within the education system generally can be seen very clearly from the actions of Black school students and Black and White university students since 1976 -

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the 1976 and 1980 boycotts, the anti-Republic Day protests, the formation of COSAS and AZASO and the growth of NUSAS and the forging of alliances between students, workers and community groups. The State has responded mainly with repressive strategies, (11) which have included riot police, bannings, detentions, spies on campuses, expulsion of students and so on. In its intolerance of resistance the State has made use of university administrations on the Black campuses, but at the English universities the administrations have been rather more reluctant to cooperate.

They have shown their dissatisfaction with the State's initiatives at a number of levels. They have been critical of the failure to implement the De Lange reforms which were seen as a big step forward. They want to open themselves to all races and are not satisfied with the quota system. (12) They have usually defended students rights to protest within certain limits and at least at a public level have shown concern over the pressures for a more vocational education. These tendencies are encapsulated in the notion of the Open University. As Dr. Sanders put it:

"My definition of open universities would be those universities which uphold university autonomy and academic freedom. It is important for us to record the steadfast commitment of the open universities to our ideals The English language universities of Natal, Rhodes, Cape Town and the Witwatersrand have often formed a 'United front' in upholding university autonomy and academic freedom. The bonds between these universities have been strengthened by joint staff Associations and by NUSAS." (13)

At least at the level of rhetoric the notion of the notion of open or liberal universities in South Africa contains 3 beliefs:

1. in the universities' independence and autonomy from the government;
2. in the pursuit of neutral and value free knowledge, and
3. in the principle of academic freedom and the belief that the that the university alone should decide who it teaches,

what/.....

what is taught and by whom it is taught, and that academic merit should be the sole criterion for entry into the university. (14)

At times events have shown the liberal image to be rather less secure than the rhetoric would suggest. The administrations of the English campuses, when under pressure, have not been totally averse to taking measures which have been contradictory even to a narrow notion of academic freedom. (15) Nevertheless, the liberal image is more than merely a facade which obscures the 'real' interests the university serves. It has a very real content which directly affects the State's ability to intervene politically, and to a lesser extent, in other ways. The level of freedom allowed to student organisations and the degree of power given to S.R.C's has had a number of important implications. At 4 of the 5 English campuses the S.R.C's are affiliated to NUSAS and Student politics is controlled by well organised student groupings broadly supportative of the Freedom Charter. This has allowed them to politicise students in a direction consistent with the direction of the 'broad democratic movement', to participate in campaigns around a wide range of trade union, community and political issues as well as to engage themselves in struggles within the universities. Notwithstanding the general attitude of the body of students, this potential would not be allowed to materialise at Afrikaans universities. At U.P.E. for example, no NUSAS member or publication is allowed on the campus.

The State has not yet shown a willingness to ride roughshod over the English university administrations by attempting to coerce them into playing the rôle of appendages of the educational and other authorities, although pressures certainly do exist.

This has set important limitations on the ability of the military to penetrate the English universities which do not exist

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at the Afrikaans universities. These limitations and constraints are, however, not absolute and in the past have tended to depend on the level of awareness amongst students of the degree of S.A.D.F. involvement in their universities and on the extent to which student organisations have been willing or able to pressurise their administrations to abide by their own notions of academic freedom in this respect. Despite the constraints which do exist, the military has been playing a growing rôle at both English and Afrikaans universities.

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MILITARY RESEARCH IN THE UNIVERSITIES

In the 1950's, the U.C.T. school of Architecture was approached by the S.A.D.F. and requested to design a suitable bomb shelter, but the request was turned down. More recently, whether by inclination or otherwise, the English universities have been less reluctant to undertake research directly or indirectly for the military. All universities, as well as a number of other institutions of higher education, have been incorporated to a greater or lesser extent into the State's research programme. Particularly through the C.S.I.R. and H.S.R.C. senior students and academic staff investigate and report on various priority areas of industrial, commercial, political or military use to the State. The Official Secrets Act and other legislation, combined with the usually disguised nature of this research makes it virtually impossible to find out what is being done. What is certain is that there are many grants which come with strings attached to military fingers. (17)

The reasons for this are not hard to find. With the expansion of the S.A.D.F. and the growth of Armscor, the military has growing requirements for deep or advanced research. Universities, increasingly geared towards this end, have resources and banks of knowledge, which

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in some areas few military research institutes such as the Rocket Engineering Institute at the Military Academy at Saldhana Bay (linked to Stellenbosch University) ^{can match} But it is neither economical, nor in fact possible for all the military's research needs to be taken care of in this way. According to Willem Steenkamp the universities are particularly useful in doing research in areas like electronic and mechanical engineering, metalurgy, chemistry and even anthropology "Where they are big on understanding your fellow man". (18)

He went on to say that most research is not directly commissioned, "but many university professors are Citizen Force people, so I imagine it is quite easy to arrange". (19)

An example of this is the military research of a social science nature being done through Strategic Studies Departments which exist at most South African White Universities and are run by academics either sympathetic to or directly connected to the S.A.D.F. For example Prof. Hough's prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria puts out a monthly journal of articles and research of military interest. In addition it also "undertakes consultations and contract work", (20) for the military amongst others.

As has been mentioned the secrecy and nature of research make it impossible to uncover exactly what or how much research is being done for the military. For example Armscor has a total of nearly 2000 firms and sub-contractors. It is likely that many of these firms have contracts with universities for research work. Even the university administrations may not know exactly what research is being done. Moulder put it:

expand?
"Its very difficult to prove that a research project is initiated by the military - you can't prove its actually been commissioned by the S.A.D.F. The laundering effect of the H.S.R.C. and C.S.I.R. is immense". (21).

However/.....

However it is likely that research work directly for the S.A.D.F. is done at all the Afrikaans universities and UNISA and it is known that such work is being done at U.C.T., Wits., and U.N.D. The procedure for commissioned research at English universities appears to be similar.

According to Dr. Pat Wild, Chairperson of the U.C.T. Research Committee, most money for research comes from outside sources such as the H.S.R.C. and C.S.I.R., while other monies come from foundations, donations and private contracts. With the exception of the H.S.R.C., C.S.I.R. and some commissioned research this is usually completely open and university property. The U.C.T. policy regarding private contract work "is in the melting pot at the moment" according to Wild, but generally contracts which require secrecy clauses have to go through the registrar to the principal who has to sign them. As far as research for the State goes, again there is no clearly formulated policy, although with most work a 2 year period is allowed before publishing. As Wild explained it:

"If the State has an interest in university research, such as for nuclear power or the military they will approach the university and confidentially here could be governed by State law".

He went on to say:

"If for example Armscor wanted research done for them it would go through the same mill as other research work and the university could turn this down if they wanted to. U.C.T., in fact does have a contract with Armscor and is currently considering Nucor contracts. As our country moves towards a nuclear and military society more secret research is likely to be commissioned but this will not necessarily affect U.C.T. There are other places such as government laboratories and the Afrikaans and if we didn't get these contracts we wouldn't feel we were missing out". (23)

Although most of the university research done directly for the military may be done at Afrikaans universities it is quite clear that the English universities are not missing out entirely. The information available

mainly/.....

mainly drawn from U.C.T., is not particularly useful because of its paucity, although it does offer an indication of the nature of some of the research the military may find useful.

A look through the U.C.T. Research Report for 1931 ⁽²⁴⁾ shows a number of research projects and theses which could be of direct or indirect benefit to the S.A.D.F. and which might have been commissioned for their use. ⁽²⁵⁾ A few examples of such research are:

Political Science; Soviet Military and External Policy Towards Southern Africa (M.A. - Douglas MacClure); Urban Terrorism in South Africa (M.A. - Michael Morris); The Strategic Maritime Significance of the Republic of South Africa (PHD - H.W.I. Berg Bauer); Public Administration : South African Civil Defence Administration with Particular Reference to the Cape Peninsula (M.Pub.Ad - A de V Smit); Social Work : Bases for Development Planning in Namibia (B.Helm, J.F. Beckman); Electrical Engineering: "Design and Development of a Digital Moving Target Indicator for a Search and Tracking Radar (I.E. Losch); Development of Equipment to Test Gun Ranging Equipment (C.N.R. Natrass); Design and Development of Filters Relating to the Tracking of Aircraft (A. Roux); Velocity Measurement of High Speed Projectiles. . etc.

However according to the procedure outlined by Wild most military work would not be listed in universities' research reports. But occasionally information filters through on other projects of a military nature. For example, according to a student working at the Accoustics Laboratory at U.C.T. underwater radar and ballistics research was being done there for the S.A.D.F. ⁽²⁶⁾ A PHD student in Civil Engineering at U.C.T. said that work was being done in his department for the Navy. ⁽²⁷⁾ A Mechanical Engineering student at U.C.T. said work was being done in his department on ballistics missiles. ⁽²⁸⁾

At U.N.D. an incident occurred in the mid-70's when Prof. Maitland Reed was fired from the university allegedly in connection with doing work in aero dynamics for the S.A.D.F., but was later reinstated. (29)

At UN.D., Prof Judd of Chemical Engineering publically said that more research should be done directly for the military. (30)

At Wits., according to a post-graduate Electrical Engineering student work with computers was being done in his department for the military, (31) while a Wits. lecturer said that a research project for the S.A.D.F. was being done in Mechanical Engineering. (32)

The S.A.D.F. also commissions university students and academics to do research for them outside of the university. For example in September 1982 advertisements appeared in the Sunday Times advertising for ethnographers throughout South Africa to work in the homelands for the S.A.D.F. (33)

From the limited information available it seems likely that as the S.A.D.F.'s research needs expand, so the universities will be used increasingly for this purpose. Most of this research will probably continue to be done for private contractors and will be difficult to detect. Although the threats of student opposition to or exposure of this research, (34) and to a lesser extent partial reluctance by some administrations and academics may deter the military from using the English speaking campuses for directly commissioned research except when the facilities are not available elsewhere, private contractors do not operate under the same constraints. It is safe to predict therefore that as military expenditure swells beyond the 5% of the G.N.P. level, so universities will play a growing rôle in using their laboratories to fight the 'Total Onslaught'.

3.4.

MILITARY CAREERS AND MILITARY-RELATED COURSES AT SOUTH AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES

Another area in which the S.A.D.F. is making increasing use of the

Universities is for the training of P.F. officers. Most practical and theoretical training is done through the military colleges and schools which are an integral part of the S.A.D.F., for example, the S.A.D.F. College, the S.A.D.F. College for Educational Technology, the S.A.A.F. Gymnasium, the S.A. Army College, the Infantry School, the S.A. Army Womens' College, etc. These have expanded their intake at a rapid rate over the last 5 years. (35)

However, the universities and technical colleges are playing an increasing rôle in supplementing this, both through specifically military related courses such as the prestigious B.Mil. degree at Stellenbosch University and through the strategic studies Departments and Courses which exist at most universities.

The reasons for these developments lie in the Military's growing need for highly trained and educated personnel. In addition the cultural gloss a university training provides is also important for officers whose battlefield now includes the board room, the lecture hall, the conference centre and the cocktail party.

In order to train matriculants for future careers as officers, the S.A.D.F. has an in-service training scheme (which may include full time academic training) on full salary. Candidates must be between 18 and 23 years old and have completed their military service. (36) After at least 2 years of officer training (except for engineers and they only have to do 1 year), those with university entrances may proceed to university training. (37) Non officers and particularly prospective artisans are apprenticed for 3 years in one of 66 trades and are usually trained at technical colleges concurrently with their practical training. (38) The S.A.D.F. also runs 2 of its own technical colleges whose status was changed to Technical Institutes in May 1979. (39) The majority of P.F. members who do university degrees seem to do them in engineering, commerce or arts, and the

majority /.....

majority who do post graduate degrees appear to do them in Strategic Studies.

Stellenbosch university has a Faculty of Military Science at Saldanha Bay. It has 11 departments (Military Business Economics, Military Economics, Military Physics, Military Geography, Military Law and Military Commercial Law, War History, Aircraft Studies, Military Political Studies and Military Public Administration, Military Arithmetic and Military Auditing, Sea Vessel Studies and Military Mathematics) and a full time academic staff of 28 - all S.A.D.F. officers with ranks between Lieutenant and Brigadier. (40)

It has students from all four branches of the S.A.D.F. - Army, Navy, Airforce and Medical Corp, including students from the Cape Corp. (41)

The B.Mil. degree, which takes three years, is seen as the key to unhampered rise to the top of the S.A.D.F. promotion ladder. (42)

Post Graduate degrees may also be done. As Paratus expressed it:

"Die Militêre Akademie van Saldanha is die teelaarde vir toekomstige leiers van die S.A.Weermag en die enigste militêre universiteitsinrigting in die land. Van die room van die S.A.Weermag se offiserskorps word hier akademies toegerus." (43)

As well as being linked to Stellenbosch University the Military Academy claims to be integrally involved with the affairs of the Saldanha Community: ?

"We at the Military Academy believe that no military unit can or should isolate itself from the community in which it operates" (44)

The majority of those who study further go on to do post graduate degrees in Strategic Studies - usually at UNISA, (45) which appears to have a particularly cosy relation with the S.A.D.F. ^{in what way?}

However, all the Strategic Studies Departments and Courses have military personnel studying with them. The largest of these is Prof. Mike Hough's Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of

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Pretoria, which has, amongst others Gen. C. L. Viljoen on its Board of Control and a number of S.A.D.F. officers on its staff. As well as undertaking military research, running courses for military personnel and generally operating as a "think tank on military matters" (46) it also plays an important propaganda rôle for the S.A.D.F. - writing articles in S.A.D.F. publications (47) and newspapers, (48) giving T.V. appearances and Conference speeches, justifying S.A.D.F. actions such as the Lesotho raid and generally rolling the drums of war.

The universities of Natal and Wits., as well as all the Afrikaans universities, run strategic studies courses while U.C.T. runs a course in Military Administration. At Wits., it is a post graduate course in the International Relations Department, (see appendix 2) while at U.N.D. it is a post graduate course in the Political Science Department. The U.N.D. Strategic Studies Course under Prof. Frederick Clifford-Vaughn has caused some controversy within the university. Clifford Vaughn is one of at least two S.A.D.F. officers at U.N.D. The other is Prof. Mike Lang of the Chemistry Department who was closely connected with the attempts to set up a U.M.U. (49) Both hold the rank of Captain.

Vaughn set up the Strategic Studies honours and third year courses in 1980. The student work load for this course consists of 5 sub-courses each of which requires a paper to be written:

- Paper 1 - Classical Strategic Theory and Art of War;
- Paper 2 - Nuclear war and Reterrent Theory;
- Paper 3 - Limited War ("revolutionary war" - low intensity operations - guerilla warfare and subversion);
- Paper 4 - Conventional Warfare and Politics of Defence (causes and effects of war. Land, sea and air power. Defence Policies of States);
- Paper 5 - A long essay on a topic in the field as approved by the Head of Department. (50)

The course was approved by the Arts Faculty Board in 1980 despite strong opposition from the Arts Students Council. (51) It is designed for 'part-time' students who need not have a preliminary degree - which in effect means mainly S.A.D.F. officers. (52) The course and the Political Science Department have been strongly attacked by student organisations such as the S.R.C., the Arts Students Council and the Student newspaper, Dome. This led to a university investigation into the department last year but nothing conclusive emerged from it.

At U.C.T. a third year option (worth 18% of the total year's mark while other courses are worth 6%) in Military Administration has been offered by the Public Administration Department since 1980. Under Brigadeer W.H. van den Bos, the course covers topics such as Military logistics, military operations, military manpower and "the armed forces as part of society". (53) The course synopsis says that, "in a South African context many graduates become involved in the National Service system, such knowledge can have practical as well as theoretical value". (54) The content sometimes appears to be close to the level of a National serviceman's lecture notes. For example a section on definitions includes:

"Freedom Fighter : appellation coined by terrorists in an attempt to lend legitimacy, respectability and glamour to their acts. It is seldom clear for what or whose 'freedom' they are fighting, except perhaps their own freedom to act in socially disruptive ways". (55).

The department wanted to extend the course in 1983 so as to make it a 6 month option of the third year course. According to Van den Bos its aim was to try to get more English speaking officers into the S.A.D.F. He said that if they could increase the content of the course they could "make a deal" with the Saldanha Military Academy to allow people who have done it to automatically become administrative officers in the S.A.D.F. (56)

The U.C.T. S.R.C. passed a motion calling for the discontinuation of the Course (57) and the student newspaper 'Varsity', strongly condemned it. (58) The S.R.C. put pressure on the principal who said that he was not in favour of its expansion. The Public Administration Department backed down and its extension was shelved. (59)

Strategic Studies and Military Administration courses and departments are clearly useful to the S.A.D.F. in providing suitable academic training for their officers. As Steenkamp put it:

"They are handy to the army because there's a big emphasis on academic training among the P.F. and further academic training can help their careers". (60)

In the areas where the English Campuses are set there are sometimes no other facilities for academic training of this nature and therefore it is important for the military to have sympathetic bases on these universities.

Careers advice units also play a rôle in channelling students into the P.F. S.A.D.F. pamphlets are freely distributed at Careers Advice Offices and at U.C.T. graduating students are sent S.A.D.F. circulars offering them employment. (61) This was acknowledged by the U.C.T. Careers Guidance Councillor, Dr. Niels Lindhard:

"We give information on a particular job market and we provide statistics for various jobs published by the Department of Manpower. And then we have our placement programme where the personnel managers are sent here, and this includes the S.A.D.F., who like other employees are given the addresses of graduating students". (62)

Most South African universities offer assistance to National Servicemen (N.S.M.) who are studying through them and to those who have recently completed their National Service. The S.A.D.F. offers time off to students wishing to study - usually through U.N.I.S.A. (63) while U.N.I.S.A. offers N.S.M. concessions as far as late registration and supplementary exams are concerned. (64) The S.A.D.F. also offers bursaries worth R7 million to ex-N.S.M. (65) At Wits and U.C.T. late applications/.....

applications from N.S.M. are accepted without penalties and bursaries and loans are arranged without the usual procedure having to be gone through. (66)

Wits, R.A.U., and Natal run courses to acclimatise students who have recently completed their National Service. (67)

It is probably that similar concessions are available at other universities as well.

3.5. UNIVERSITY MILITARY UNITS (U.M.U's)

3.5.1. INTRODUCTION

Between 1977 and 1982 U.M.U's were established at all the Afrikaans campuses, although attempts to do this at English campuses failed, mainly, because of student opposition. Some of these are fighting units, others are standing units, but generally the main purpose seems to be to ensure that N.S.M. at university do camps and remain active so as not to de-learn their military skills.

Students going to universities, technicons or training colleges before doing their military service are usually deferred for the minimum period of their degrees plus an additional of one or two years. For example a B.A. student is allowed 4 years to complete his degree. However, in practice there is some degree of flexibility in this. Deferrals are usually granted up to Masters level degrees. (68)

For a number of reasons the S.A.D.F. seems to be shifting towards a policy of encouraging potential students to do their military service before studying. Firstly, a significant majority of students who go to university at present do not do their military service first. For example, at U.C.T. in 1981 out of 2753 students entering university (1579 males) only 228 of them had been in the S.A.D.F. in the previous year. While only 23 out of 904 students did their military service between their undergraduate and post graduate degrees. This indicates that less than 10% of students

do/.....

do their military service before coming to university and therefore more than 90% are not liable for camps, ⁽⁶⁹⁾ (although the percentage of students who do their military service first is higher at the Afrikaans universities). Furthermore of those students at English universities liable for camps it is estimated that less than 25% of all students do camps each year. ⁽⁷⁰⁾ Therefore, on the English campuses the S.A.D.F. has access to a tiny percentage of students while they are studying. ~~not clear how many are not~~ With the establishment of U.M.U's and a policy of encouraging students to do military service first this percentage would increase significantly.

Secondly, despite the fact that there is a need in the S.A.D.F. for graduate N.S.M., the present situation means that there is a glut of them and most are not used in the areas for which they have been trained. According to Steenkamp:

"the army ends up with more technical people than they can use and many end up not doing a military job at all" ⁽⁷¹⁾

Now that camps have been extended to a total of 2 years over a period of 12 years followed by commando obligations for 12 days a year until the age of 55, the S.A.D.F. will have ample time to be able to make use of the skills of graduates without them having their military service deferred.

Thirdly, a growing number of students, and others, are leaving the country after completing their degrees because of their military service obligations. Since 1976 the numbers who have left have been over 3000 a year and now may be as high as 5000 a year. As the war intensifies more are likely to leave whether for political or other reasons. Those who do their military service before coming to university, particularly if they have completed some of their quota of camps through U.M.U's, are less likely to want to leave.

The S.A.D.F. has not yet tightened up on granting deferments to

students/.....

students, but it does appear to have increased its efforts in propagating the advantages of doing military service first. Surveys done at R.A.U. between 1979 and 1982 for the S.A.D.F. have 'proved' that students who do military service first adjust better academically and socially to university life. (72) These statistics from R.A.U. have been widely used by the S.A.D.F. in articles in 'Paratus' and 'Uniform' and have also been to other publications and newspapers. (73) These and other articles have also argued that school leavers adapt best to the army. The S.A.D.F.'s National Service Guidebook, handed out at schools and at university careers advice offices stresses the advantages of going to university or college first, (74) and reportedly Schools and University Careers advisers, and S.A.D.F. personnel visiting schools are also pushing this.

3.5.2. U.M.U's AT AFRIKAANS CAMPUSES

University Military Units have been set up at all the Afrikaans universities with the maximum cooperation from the administrations and the minimum resistance from students. The first universities to have units were the Universities of the O.F.S. and Pretoria which both set up commandos in 1977.

The U.O.F.S. Commando was established to cater for all liable students, lecturers and administrative staff Major J.L.Steyl of Bloemfontein District Commando. It had 3 companies - one for infantry, one for campus defence (which worked closely with Civil Defence Units) and a support company for N.S.M. with specialist skills. The Commando also catered for members of other units although it was situated on campuses. Students who belonged to it were liable for annual camps of 2 to 3 months and provisions were also made for female volunteer students. (75) The Commando has since become a University Military Unit but fulfills virtually the same function as previously and

members/.....

members are still liable for border camps with the Unit. (76)

The University of Pretoria Commando was established on July 1, 1977 under the command of Brig. G. J. Viviers. It fulfilled a similar function to that of the U.O.F.S. Commando with border duty being emphasised and with the Rector visiting his students by helicopter on their first border camp. This led Brig. Viviers to comment: "in Eenheid wat goed afskop sal 'n goeie eenheid bly". (77)

The University of Pretoria Command is no longer a commando, and now functions as a unit of the army which receives its directives from the Pretoria Head Quarters. Membership is compulsory for all students who have completed their military service. Members participate in 3 or 4 parades a year and in an annual 2 month border camp is held (usually in December but camps are also held in July). Only those involved with administrative jobs in the unit throughout the year are not liable for camps. Members on camps receive normal army pay. The unit is fully assisted by the University in its administrative capacity and uses the university's computer facilities to keep its records. (78)

The University of Potchefstroom's Military Unit has similar activities and is also a fighting unit with compulsory 2 months border camps. As 'Paratus' put it:

"Met die spook van 'n pas afgelope eksamen nog vars in die gehewe was daar skaars tyd vir 'n besoek aan die huis of die haarkapper - eendag student, die volgende dag in uniform - gereed vir diens ter beveiliging van hul land". (79)

This comment was accompanied by a picture with the caption:

"'n Tipiese student in uniform: handboeke in die een hand en geweer in die ander".

At Potchefstroom, being a "Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys", in addition to other activities members are required to march in Church parades. The Rector, Prof. (Colonel) Tjaart van der Walt

offered/.....

offered the following encouragement:

"U verrig n noodsaaklike en waardige diens. Doen dit in Sy lig".

According to Paratus women students stand "rotsvas" behind the men with some wearing T-shirts saying "Vasbyt. Ons dink aan julle en is trots op ons manne" (80) The Unit Commander is Maj. F. Venter (who is also professor of Political Science) said that the men are better prepared and more motivated than those doing their National Service. (81)

The U.P.E. Military Unit was established in 1978 by Colonel Levin **the facilities** with being supplied by the university near the main campus. The unit caters for the approximately 380 students who have completed their military training in the army. (13% of the total number of students). Students have to do 2 month camps in the December vacations (usually not border camps). In addition students can do promotion courses, help school cadet camps, work as instructors for the unit and assist with administration, - all of which counts towards the completion of their camp requirements. As with other U.M.U.S., it is a multi-corp unit and caters for 13 different corps. According to Sgt. van Greuner of the U.P.E.M.U. applications for exemptions go to the exemptions board, "but many students see their camps as a vac. job where they can earn some extra holiday pay". (82) The university also offers a Strategic Studies Course which some of the Unit's officers attend. (83)

In March 1982 it was announced that a U.M.U. was to be set up on the Stellenbosch Campus. The establishment of the Stellenbosch U.M.U. has been the most controversial to date. In a Unit order published on July 14, 1982, male staff members at Stellenbosch were ordered to return completed questionnaires enabling the unit to compile military records about university staff. Liaison officers in all the men's residences were given control lists of all students in their hostels completed from University records. On July 20 these officers

attended/.....

attended a compulsory order group in which they handed over the completed questionnaires. Students liable for camps were told it was a serious offence to ignore the orders issued by their Acting Commanding Officer, Colonel Ivan Bester, who is employed by the University as its "chief risk manager". (84)

According to Brig. S. J. van der Spuy, Officer Commanding Western Province Command, the reasons for the establishment of the U.S.U.M.U. were firstly, that students had to seek exemption from military call-up because of studies and thus enter the job market with up to 720 days of military commitment still hanging over their heads, and secondly, because trained soldiers de-learn their military skills during their years at University. (85) He said that while the Unit would not be active in operational tasks, it could supply men to their parent units for active duty.

The U.S.U.M.U. began functioning in January 1983 and all students who have completed their initial period of military service in the Army or S.A. Medical Services are transferred to it. (86) Students are grouped by corps into various wings and there is constant liaison with the S.A.D.F. Corps Directors to ensure that whatever training takes place is "meaningful and not time-wasting". (87)

Both the 1981/2 and 1982/3 Stellenbosch S.R.C.'s supported its establishment. The 1981/2 S.R.C. President, Mr. Stefan Spies said it was nonsense to suggest, as some had, that the Unit would be used to limit the activities of any student organisation, (88) while the 1982/3 S.R.C. President, Mr. Deon Rossouw said:

"I do not see this as militarisation of the University as such. The Unit was created to allow people to do their camps on weekends and during short vacs. I see this as a favour from the S.A.D.F. which is not available to members of the public - a very reasonable concession by the Defence Force to accommodate students."

Opposition/.....

Opposition at Stellenbosch has been muted but nevertheless present. Most student organisations saw the issue as being too "sensitive" or "dangerous" to comment on.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Nevertheless Col. Bester admitted that "there had been some negative reaction at first but this came almost exclusively from people who are not involved in the Unit".⁽⁹¹⁾ Two letters in "Die Matie" were openly critical. One said that the formation of the Unit "abuses an academic institution to mobilise citizens for military purposes". Another reads: "That an academic institution is used by the military to control personal lives shows to what extent reliance is placed on the Defence Force to alleviate the country's problems".⁽⁹²⁾ Immediately after the announcement of the establishment of the Unit an ad hoc group of students was formed to work out ways of opposing it.⁽⁹³⁾ However, no activities in the form of open resistance or opposition were forthcoming.

The most recent U.M.U. to be set up has been that at R.A.U. On October 28 Gen. Magnus Malan announced that the Unit had been established at R.A.U. and that the S.A.D.F. planned to establish units at technical and training colleges in the future.⁽⁹⁴⁾ The R.A.U. U.M.U. under Colonel C.J.H. Blignaut (head of the Industrial Psychology Department) was opened by Gen. Maj. M. J. du Plessis who stressed the many advantages students enjoyed in having a U.M.U. These included:

"that they could earn additional pocket money, improve their rank, and work off some of their camps."

The Officer Commanding Witwatersrand Command, Brig. J.S. van Heerden said that the Unit would strengthen the bond between R.A.U. and the Army, while the R.A.U. Rector, Prof. De Lange said he was thankful for the task the Unit would serve as it would contribute to creating more disciplined students.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Col Blignaut noted an additional advantage that the Unit would encourage esprit de corps amongst soldier students and promote rivalry amongst universities, while the adjutant Lt. P.H. John

(a lecturer/.....

(a lecturer in Business Studies) said he hoped the Command structure would go some way towards dispelling the army's "wise guy" image of the student in uniform. ⁽⁹⁶⁾ The R.A.U. U.M.U. has its own house on the campus and began enrolling students in November 1982. Unlike some other Units students do not have to have regulation haircuts or wear uniforms on campus. Their activities consist of drill, parades and an annual camp.

The rôle of U.M.U's at Afrikaans campuses appears to be a directly military one. There are no incidents of student 'unrest' to deal with and they do not seem to have any rôle in influencing the general educational direction of the universities.

3.5.3.

ATTEMPTS AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF U.M.U's ON ENGLISH CAMPUSES

While at the Afrikaans Campuses an extremely harmonious relationship has existed between the S.A.D.F. and the University administrations, at the English Campuses the Administrations have not been as accommodating, mainly as a result of student pressure.

In 1981 all the English universities were approached by the S.A.D.F. about the setting up of U.M.U's. Circulars explaining the rôle, functions and organisation of the units were sent to all university principals. However, only at the University of Natal (Durban and Pietermaritzburg) did the S.A.D.F.'s attempts come close to realisation. U.C.T., for example, refused to cooperate.

In August 1981, it was announced that the S.A.D.F. proposed to form a U.M.U. at the University of Natal. Student leaders believed at the time that Natal was chosen for special consideration because of its relatively weak student political leadership and its relatively conservative administration. As with the other U.M.U's the intention was that all full or part-time male students who had completed their military service obligations in the army or medical services would

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automatically become members of the Unit. They would receive formal and informal training during recess periods and would do operational duty during the end of year vacations.

The Natal Principal, Prof. Clarence, immediately responded to the S.A.D.F. announcement and stressed that there were both advantages and disadvantages to the proposed plan. He saw the advantages as being:

firstly, that students would be able to satisfy their Citizen Force obligations in the minimum time with the minimum inconvenience; secondly, they would get specialised training and would get the most out of national service;

thirdly, they would receive a higher level of training because "all members of the unit are of a similar higher intellectual ability"; and, fourthly, the continuity of contact with military matters would help maintain a positive motivation.

He also emphasised that for the university the main advantages would be the elimination of the university having to handle deferments, while for the S.A.D.F. he saw the advantage being that the U.M.U. would help to maintain the morale of the students and would ensure that the soldier was well trained when he graduated. (97)

Clarence also conceded a few possible disadvantages. He felt that some students might feel the university was supporting the government, that students may attempt to "cause unrest" in response, and that "if there were any unrest on campus deployment of the unit to restore order could lead to the alienation of a sector of the student body". But he felt these obstacles could be overcome if the unit's headquarters were not on campus, if the members did not wear uniforms on campus and as long as the army gave its assurance that the unit would not be used in military operations on campus. He therefore suggested that it be formed, under these conditions for both Durban and Maritzburg campuses

and/.....

and that the University supply the S.A.D.F. with the necessary information. (98)

Students and many staff however, felt very differently. The U.N.D. S.R.C. immediately passed a motion the believing clauses of which included: that this was a government attempt to draw the university into its total strategy; that any association on the part of the university with the S.A.D.F. would jeopardise its reputation in the community and its autonomy vis a vis the State; that it would damage the university's reputation with some overseas universities and organisations and may hinder the visits of their members; that many students did not approve of the activities of the S.A.D.F; that the time for camps envisaged, the December vacation, was used by students to work or continue their studies; that students would prefer to do camp while working as their incomes would then be supplemented by their employers; and the formation of the unit would allow the S.A.D.F. access to information which might undermine some student's positions. The S.R.C. therefore expressed its "absolute and total" rejection of the Unit and proposed to mobilise the Academic Freedom Committee, Clubs Societies and Academics to oppose it. (99) Proposing the motion S.R.C. member Tom Cohen said that it was a "total contradiction to have some students serving time in detention barracks because they were conscientious objectors whilst others served in a U.M.U." (100)

The University of Natal Black Medical Campus S.R.C. also opposed the move. In a strongly worded motion they argued that the U.M.U. idea could not be seen outside of the context of the repressive function of the S.A.D.F. In particular, they noted the S.A.D.F. raids into Angola, the intervention of troops in Cape Town and Johannesburg during schools boycotts, and the government threats to bring police into schools to maintain law and order. (101)

The /.....

The U.N.D. S.R.C. then put out a pamphlet giving further reasons for the rejection of the scheme which included:

1. a similar process took place in Nazi Germany in the 1930's;
2. the political situation was likely to deteriorate which would mean a lengthening of student's military obligations;
3. it would affect students academic work;
4. it would affect their Christmas and New Year's celebrations;
5. it would have a negative effect on student enrolment;
6. tensions on campus would increase as had happened in the United States during the Vietnam war;
7. since interested lecturers would be involved in running it, relations between lecturers and students would deteriorate;
8. it would be used by the S.A.D.F. to push its "total onslaught" ideology. (102)

When the issue was discussed by the student leadership nationally additional arguments included that camps might coincide with Congresses and other National activities, that there was no guarantee of the Army keeping its word about it not being used to suppress student activity and even if it did not play this rôle, its presence would inhibit discussion and debate on campuses, the 'benefits' would only apply to a very small group of students - the 10% of campus who were students who had completed their military service, and that there was no guarantee that Military Intelligence would not play the same rôle as the Security Police in spying on students.

At Durban, and to a lesser extent at Maritzburg, the S.R.C. Student Councils and societies mobilised around the issue. Support was given by a number of academics who pressurised the administration and rejected its establishment on the Academic Freedom Committee. Student organisations also threatened to mobilise the campuses against the establishment of the unit.

Other/.....

Other N.U.S.A.S. - affiliated campuses also organised around the issue - mobilising student societies and organisations against the U.M.U's, drawing up arguments, ensuring the support of lecturers and pressurising their administrations. Despite vocal support for the establishment of the U.M.U. from local newspapers, some academics and politicians such as Mr. Vause Raw and Mr. Ranier Schoeman, (103) Clarence capitulated and agreed to drop the proposal.

Since then the S.A.D.F. has made no overt attempt to force the military units issue although there have been indications that the plan has only been temporarily shelved. At Stellenbosch university, for example, the Rector, Prof. Mike de Vries said he could not understand all the fuss made about the establishment of the U.M.U. at his university, because all the English campuses would soon have them as well.

At U.C.T. the issue was again raised publically in September 1982 after a student who had done his military service at the S.A.D.F. stores in Cape Town approached the S.R.C. saying that army berets with "U.C.T. Command" badges had been produced. At a student meeting the S.R.C. President Anton Richman spoke of "alarming reports of continued attempts to establish these units" and called on students to oppose these moves. (105)

There remain strong reasons for the S.A.D.F. wanting to establish U.M.U's at English campuses both for logistical and political reasons, and it certainly does not suit their needs to have them only at Afrikaans campuses. However, the University of Natal incident has shown that if they did try to force their hand they would meet with widespread student opposition - possibly on an unprecedented scale. N.U.S.A.S. has argued that if they did try this it would provide considerable scope for student resistance - for organising and politicising students and for directing their struggle at university administrations /.....

administrations around what would be concrete and realisable demands.

This potential in itself acts as deterrent to the S.A.D.F. Furthermore, there is little doubt that the S.A.D.F. cannot move onto the campuses without the cooperation of the university administrations at least not without consequences they are unlikely to contemplate at the moment. As Dr. Moulder put it:

"There is no way in which the State could compel us to have a U.M.U. At Stellenbosch it was possible because the majority of students and staff would support the government and at U.C.T. the majority wouldn't" (107)

Even if Administrations felt tempted through the carrots or sticks the S.A.D.F. might offer, the potentially explosive effect of student's wrath at such a move would probably be sufficient to make them reconsider. In the immediate future, therefore, the best the S.A.D.F. could hope for then would be to set up voluntary units removed from the campuses which would defeat most of the intentions for which the U.M.U's were intended.

Where they have failed to make ground with students regarding call-ups the S.A.D.F. have made an attempt to do so with Staff. At Rhodes university circulars and questionnaires were sent by the S.A.D.F. to the Rhodes University Staff Association (R.U.S.A.) through the university administration in connection with arranging camps for academics and administration staff in line with the policy of the Defence Manpower Liaison Committee. (108) However, a sub-committee of R.U.S.A. was set up and rejected the basis of cooperation suggested.

1.5.4.

CONCLUSION

What can be seen is that the S.A.D.F. has seen a more structured relation with universities regarding call-ups and camps as being important. At the Afrikaans universities this has been relatively unproblematic because of the nature of the particular relations between the State, the Administrative and Academic staff, and students which

student or staff opposition highly unlikely. As was discussed in 3.2. this relation is very different at the English universities. The liberal ethos and historical tradition of a level of autonomy from the State, the backing of relatively progressive sectors of capital, the social/cultural backgrounds of students, academic staff and administration officials and the existence of strong, disciplined and militant student organisation controlling the arena of student policies - have all meant that the English universities have been able to resist the formation of U.M.U's.

3.6.

OTHER S.A.D.F. ACTIVITIES IN UNIVERSITIES

The S.A.D.F.'s ability to influence students at the English campuses in any direct way is limited by the constraints mentioned above. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to try and make inroads in this respect. S.A.D.F. personnel have on occasion been invited to give talks on these campuses. The Newspaper 'Uniform' is distributed by the S.A.D.F. to universities. In October 1982 two women on each of the S.R.C's were invited by the wife of the Chief of the S.A.D.F. Mrs. Ristie Viljoen to do a 5 day tour of the Namibian war zone. The invitation was accepted by the women on the S.R.C's of all the Afrikaans campuses but rejected by those at the English campuses. N.U.S.A.S. issued a statement saying that the tour was an S.A.D.F. promotional exercise:

"..... the rôle of the S.A.D.F. is to maintain in power a minority ruling group and to defend apartheid. It is engaged in a war against South Africans and Namibians who have chosen to resist their oppression. The invitation is a sinister attempt to give an air of credibility to an unjust war and N.U.S.A.S. will continue to oppose all forms of penetration of the militancy on the university campuses" (109)

The S.R.C's of most of the English campuses also issued separate statements rejecting the tour.

P.W.Botha/.....

P.W.Botha, (110) Vause Raw, (111) and Die Burger (112) condemned N.U.S.A.S. for the stand. Van Zyl Slabbert entered the debate saying that the P.F.P's position had nothing to do with the N.U.S.A.S. position (113) while the U.C.T. vice-principal Prof. John Reid defended students right to speak out in this manner. Reid said that by turning down the invitation,

"students had reflected the feelings of a growing number of the younger generation, the insight of students into affairs like this is very perceptive." (114)

1.7.

STUDENT ATTITUDES TO THE S.A.D.F.

The question of the ideological and political relations between the S.A.D.F. and students arises from the above incident. Without doing comprehensive surveys it would be difficult to draw definite conclusions about the attitudes of White students to the S.A.D.F. Nevertheless, some generalisations can be made with a degree of certainty.

At Afrikaans Universities there have been no incidents of opposition or resistance to indicate any widespread criticism of the S.A.D.F. At most ^{at} universities like Stellenbosch and U.P.E. there is likely to be some support for the P.F.P's position on Defence. At the level of student government there is complete support for the S.A.D.F. The view of the relatively 'verligte' Stellenbosch S.R.C. President, Deon Rossouw is probably fairly typical: He said:

"I think we have a very unusual security situation and unusual situations, warrant unusual measures. The infra-structure created in the country by the S.A.D.F. is to our advantage - it is a necessary thing. In a situation with such a high potential for revolution as ours it would be foolish not to be prepared" (115)

On the English campuses general attitudes are significantly different from those at Afrikaans campuses although this varies from campus to campus and from student to student. From the lack of opposition to the line taken on the S.A.D.F. at S.R.C. focus weeks, in debates, mass meetings and publications, it would seem that a

minority of students would give unqualified support to the S.A.D.F. The 90% who have not been to the S.A.D.F. in particular, would generally be more critical for a wide range of reasons which would include a political reluctance to spend 4 years in uniform, anti-Afrikaans racism and the perception of the S.A.D.F. as being Afrikaner-dominated, aversion to the "excesses" of the S.A.D.F. such as the Lesotho raid, a perception of it as a Nationalist, government institution, and outright rejection of the rôle it is playing for Christian, pacifist, and left wing political reasons. The extent of this lack of support can be seen from the extent of resistance. Since 1977 between 3000 and 5000 people annually have failed to report for military service, although in the 4 years from 1975 to 1978 less than 2500 of them were convicted for this. (116) The majority of these have left the country while others have attempted to evade within the country. Between 1977 and 1981 1000 conscientious objectors were granted political asylum in Britain alone while others have been granted exile status in Europe, North America, Australia and Southern Africa. However, it is probable that most who leave the country because of military service, do so without applying for exile status. (117)

It is likely that the majority of these people are students or former students. A growing minority are politically motivated and go on to be involved in exile groups in Southern Africa or overseas. Most students who intend to leave or evade try to defer their call-ups for as long as possible.

The S.A.D.F. has tried to tighten up in various ways on those avoiding doing military service. In 1981 the South African Army Non Effective Troop Section (S.A.A.N.E.T.S.) was established. An S.A.D.F. spokesperson set out its main aims:

"S.A.A.N.E.T.S. - keeps tabs on, or tries to locate, those men who attempt to evade service by employing various subterfuges - for example the chap who leave university but still applies for a study deferment each year, or

claims/.....

claims he has a one man business facing bankruptcy when it isn't or is holding a non-existent key post S.A.A.N.E.T.S. will come down with a heavy hand on people like this because the underlying idea is fairness - everyone must meet his obligations" (118)

The 1983 Defence Amendment Act also makes draft dodging more difficult by increasing the punishment for being caught. However, these measures will not prevent students and others from leaving the country and whether they will be effective in stemming the tide of draft dodgers within the country remains to be seen.

Another form of resistance has been taken by those students and others who refuse to serve in the S.A.D.F. but who neither evade nor leave the country - commonly called conscientious objectors. In 1981 there were 363 recognised objectors serving 3 years sentences in detention barracks - all of them members of recognised religious denominations by whose tenets they may not participate in war (Jehovah's Witnesses and Christadelphians). (119) Since 1977 there have been 12 conscientious objectors who do not fall into this category. All of these objectors had been students at English universities and most of them had been involved with student religious or political groups. 8 of them have been sentenced since the beginning of 1982. (120) This option has now been virtually closed by the 1983 Defence Amendment Act which provides for a 6 year gaol sentence for those who refuse to serve on non "bona fide" religious grounds.

The most outspoken support for stands of Conscientious Objectors has come from student and Church groups. On the English campuses Christian and political groups have used the issue of conscientious objection to educate students about the rôle of the military in South African society. Since 1979, for example N.U.S.A.S. Congresses and S.R.C's have consistently supported the stands taken by conscientious objectors. The issue of militarisation has also been taken up in other ways by student groups. The Anglican and Catholic National

Student federations have shown increasing opposition to the S.A.D.F. and have put pressure on their Church leadership over the issue. (121) Other groups on campuses have been set up specifically to take up the issue such as N.U.S.A.S. Military Commission (MilCom) from 1978 to 1980, the Wits Alternative Service Group and various ad hoc committees dealing with specific aspects of militarisation. Student newspapers have also given considerable focus to the area. Mass Meetings, Focus Weeks, Seminars and displays have been held on various aspects of the issue. Generally, these have received considerable support from students. One method which the State or anti-N.U.S.A.S. groups have used to attempt to counter this support has been to release pamphlets in the name of N.U.S.A.S. and Student organisations expressing support for the A.N.C. and the Soviet Union. These have been aimed at undermining the support for N.U.S.A.S. and at making it more difficult to take up the military issue.

However, at least as long as "leftist" students continue to control S.R.C's and continue to take up issues relating to the rôle and activities of the military, it is unlikely that there will be a major shift amongst English speaking students towards unqualified support for the S.A.D.F. As the U.C.T. vice-Principal put it:

"Students are being got at by the idea of a total onslaught against South Africa, they are being got at by the proposals of military units on campus and they are being got at by conscription. All this leads to an imbalance in society I don't think it does anybody any good to cover their eyes and pretend opposition does not exist" (122)

CONCLUSION

In terms of the 3 functions of the university outlined in 3.2. the ideological function (the transmission of knowledge within the framework of the dominant ideology), the research function (the development of new knowledge) and the training function (the placing of people in various positions in the division of labour) - the military has certainly

expanded its rôle in South African Universities over the last five years. In each of the areas of its penetration - research, military-related courses, and military units - it is apparent that the particular nature of the English universities has limited the extent to which the S.A.D.F. has been able to use them. These limitations have been most marked in the ideological area - the one which students have the most power to influence.

Meaning?
expand

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to poor scan quality. It appears to be a continuation of the document's analysis.]

...the educational system... the ideological aspect... the military... the S.A.D.F. has been able to use them... the one which students have the most power to influence... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence...

...If we look at the... would not have been... the military... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence...

...This realization and the... the state of... a reflection, have led to significant changes in the... of the S.A.D.F. and its attempts for the military... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence...

...relation to the dominated classes, primarily through the... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence...

...the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence... the ideological area... the one which students have the most power to influence...

...struggle in South Africa

The Civic Action Programme and the Rôle of the
S.A.D.F. in Black Education

4.1.

INTRODUCTION

"The onslaught against the Republic of South Africa is a total one, as is the case with South West Africa Enemy actions are directed against the R.S.A. in the political, economic, psychological and security fields. On its part, the R.S.A. has to act or counteract in all these fields. It speaks for itself that all these actions are to be orchestrated towards the achievement of common objectives"⁽¹⁾

The rôle of the S.A.D.F. in black education is integral to (and probably the most important part of) its Civic Action Programme (C.A.P.) Rather than trying to isolate the educational aspect of the programme this Chapter considers the C.A.P. in its entirety. Because the emphasis on Civic action is closely linked to the S.A.D.F.'s need for blacks to play a greater rôle within its structures, the question of Black participation in the military is considered in some detail.

As has been discussed in Chapter 1, an essential ingredient of the notion of a "total and coordinated strategy" is the emphasis on winning the "hearts and minds" of the people. Increasingly the war has been described by military leaders as being, "80 percent socio economic and only 20 percent military". As Maj. Gen. Boshoff put it:

"If we lose the socio economic struggle then we need not even bother to fight the military one". ⁽²⁾

This realisation and the restructuring of the state of which it is a reflection, have led to significant changes in the 'ethnic' composition of the S.A.D.F. and to attempts for the military itself to play a leading rôle in the '80%' of the struggle by attempting to alter its relation to the dominated classes, primarily through the Civic Action Programme. The necessity for this lies in the changing nature of struggle in South Africa

In Namibia the S.A.D.F. were faced with a situation where their enemy, S.W.A.P.O. had the support of much of the population. As Willem Steenkamp put it:

"The motivation is to win hearts and minds. They want to try and convince the populace that they are better off under the present dispensation than they would be under, for example, S.W.A.P.O. (Mao) speaks of the fish and water theory - the insurgent is the fish and the local population is the water. If the water is friendly the fish will survive Ultimately a Hearts and Minds strategy can't win a campaign, it can only contribute. Its better to get in on the early stages before insurgency starts and before the politicisation process begins, otherwise you start with a credibility gap. In Ovambo it didn't work that way. You should start with the hearts and minds campaign before the political action begins" (3)

Within South Africa the enemy has increasingly been identified as the A.N.C. and those forces sympathetic to it. As has been mentioned, since the 1976 uprisings there has been a revival of A.N.C. activity both in terms of popular support as an emerging mass movement and as an organised political and military force. A wide range of emerging trade union, student and community organisations broadly identify themselves with the direction and traditions of the A.N.C. Furthermore, the increasingly successful and sophisticated A.N.C. sabotage attacks, which are at present used primarily for political propaganda purposes, have enhanced the A.N.C.'s popularity and status internally and internationally and established it as the leading opposition force in South African politics.

A central priority of the S.A.D.F. therefore becomes to remove the political and military basis for this support. As Magnus Malan puts it:

"Bullets kill bodies, not beliefs, I would like to remind you that the Portuguese did not lose the military battle in Angola and Mozambique, but they lost the faith and trust of the inhabitants of those countries. THE insurgent forces have no hope of success without the aid of the local population" (4)

To attempt to secure these ends, a significant aspect of the

S.A.D.F. objective is, in their terms, to win the support of the local population and to eliminate friction points and grievances through good administration and civic action. (5)

4.2.

THE RECRUITMENT OF BLACKS INTO THE S.A.D.F.

4.2.1.

INTRODUCTION

Both in terms of its policy, history and traditions and in terms of its practices in its rôle as an emerging mass movement, non-racialism is central to the A.N.C.'s political programme. The struggle is seen as one uniting the popular classes under the leadership of the working class against apartheid and capitalism. For the S.A.D.F. it is important that the A.N.C. activities generally, and guerilla activity specifically, are not perceived of internally or by the international community, as being directed against White domination. Instead it is important that the struggle is seen as one Black and White versus Black and White, of free enterprises versus the forces of international communism. (6) Black participation in the S.A.D.F. serves to support this idea. Therefore, in S.A.D.F. propaganda, particularly that directed at international audiences, for example, through 'Paratus', great play is made of the rôle of Blacks in the S.A.D.F. (7)

In the 1982 Defence White Paper Magnus Malan set out the policy of the S.A.D.F. towards the recruitment of Blacks:

"It is the policy that all population groups be involved in defending the R.S.A. This means the representation of all population groups in the S.A.D.F., in other words, a Defence Force of the people for the people" (8)

What is clear is that at least at the level of the rhetoric of the Top Brass, a multi-racial Defence Force is a priority. Until 1968 no Blacks had been trained for warfare by the S.A.D.F. and in 1970 Defence Minister Botha stated that his department would only employ Africans as labourers:

"If /

"If the Bantu wants to build up a defence force, he should do it in his own, eventually independent homeland" (9)

However, since the mid-70's the image presented through the English press and 'Paratus' has been one of a Defence Force which allows equality of opportunity -- of Black and White together against a common enemy in a racially integrated army, navy and airforce. Reflecting this image, Cape Times Defence Correspondente Willem Steenkamp said:

"Integration is carried out in a non-tokenistic way. You have Coloured officers commanding Whites and you don't get petty discrimination. So the Black or Coloured man in the Army has self-respect. They know that no post is closed to them on the grounds of race. As a result, that all important principle of upward mobility is unfettered". (10)

However, despite the fact that the military has taken the lead in the reformist moves within the State, nevertheless, the reality of racial integration has tended to lag behind the rhetoric. The form recruitment of Coloureds, Indians and Africans has followed has been ethnic in character. Cynthia Enloe has noted:

"For the three non-white ethnic groups which have now been specifically targetted for wider participation it is a question of balancing the chances for leverage and legitimacy versus the risks of further cooperation and exploitation. The Nationalist-headed Ministry of Defence has deliberately structured the recruitment of these three groups in a manner that underscores its ethnic character. Indians, Coloured and Africans each have their separate military corps. Each has a specific sort of military function..." (11)

Although since this article was written (in 1975) there have been gradual moves away from this form of organisation, as Magnus Malan put it in 1981 the S.A.D.F. continues to strive for making separate training facilities for the different 'race groups'. Where separate facilities are not possible because of operational or other requirement, other 'groups' are required to train with Whites, but only in exceptional circumstances. (12)

One reason why the S.A.D.F. has reviewed its position over the recruitment of Blacks during the last decade has been its rôle in pushing a multi-racial ideology with the emphasis on 'separate but equal' - in line with the ethnic basis of recruitment - often through the assistance of 'traditional' leaders. (13) In S.A.D.F. propaganda great play is also made of the specific fighting qualities and military traditions of different groups. For example, 'Paratus' noted:

".....there remains in each of us the memory of a dapper man in a red coat, the picture of a hardened son of the soil bearing a khaki slouch hat or headdress of waving plumes" (14)

Together with the increased Black recruitment, on an ethnic basis, has come an appeal to Whites to abandon racism. According to Maj.Gen. Boshoff (in 1977) one sickness amongst Whites was their fear of losing their identity. He said that bad race relations had already been identified by South Africa's enemies as a major chink in the armour. (15) Or as Magnus Malan put it a year later:

"Wanneer ek van die 'volk' praat, bedoel ek nie net Blanke Suid Afrikaners nie. Die aanslae teen ons op politieke, ekonomiese, sielkundige, militêre, ideologiese en ander terreine is nie teen een of ander groep van one bevolking nie, maar teen die totale bevolking van Suid Afrika - Wit, Bruin en Swart - gesig so vind U dat Bruin, Swart en Blanke soldate sy aan sy in die operasionele gebied teen ons gemeenskaplike vyande weg." (16)

Thus the propagation of a multi-racial ideology, as well as being used to improve the S.A.D.F.'s image internationally and amongst Blacks internally, has also played a significant rôle in softening up Whites within the S.A.D.F. towards the increased participation of Blacks and has tended to precede policy changes in this regard. As Moll notes, changes in the racial division of labour in the military (as elsewhere) tend to take place after a process of suitable ideological preparation. (17)

A second/.....

A second reason for the increasing recruitment of Blacks is that as the internal conflict intensifies and the military dimension grows Whites will become too thinly spread to effectively counter guerilla activity.

Thirdly, as has been discussed, the turnover of S.A.D.F. personnel has been high, partly because of competition with the private sector. As a cheaper, and relatively secure source of manpower, Blacks have been recruited to counteract this tendency. Despite recent moves to equalise salaries at an officer level, Black wages remain below those of Whites. In 1977 Black salaries averaged between 54% and 63% of White salaries at comparable ranks, ⁽¹⁸⁾ and in 1982 there was only parity between Coloureds, Indians and Whites in the officer ranks and between Whites and Africans parity existed only for Chaplains. ⁽¹⁹⁾

In some respects the form the recruitment of Blacks into the S.A.D.F. has taken has parallels with the situation in Zimbabwe before independence, ⁽²⁰⁾ although an important difference is that in Zimbabwe the war had reached a higher stage by the time a systematic policy of Black recruitment was under way. Already in 1977 Black South Africans (as well as Black Namibians) were being employed in the operational area, ⁽²¹⁾ and by 1982 40% of the forces there were Black and were doing most of the fighting. ⁽²²⁾

4.2.2. RECRUITMENT OF AFRICANS INTO THE S.A.D.F.

Since 1974 the S.A.D.F. appears to have adopted a 2-pronged strategy for the recruitment of Africans. Firstly, their recruitment directly into the S.A.D.F. and, secondly, into the Bantustan units. In 1974 the first Black Namibian unit was set up, in 1975 the first African P.F. unit was formed and by 1979 units had been set up by the S.A.D.F. in Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Northern Natal and in the Eastern Transvaal/.....

Transvaal. ⁽²³⁾ These Battalions - 111, 112, 113 and 121 are strictly ethnically based.

Initially all African recruits were trained at 21 Battalion (affiliated to Natal Command) at Lenz. 21 Battalion (which consists mainly of South Sotho and Tswana and is meant to be non-ethnic) is an elite formation. It has been doing operational duty on the Natal and Namibian borders for the past 6 years. ⁽²⁴⁾ The regional units usually do not do operational duty outside of their regions (where they do all their recruiting, applying lower entrance qualifications than 21 Battalion. ⁽²⁵⁾).

In official S.A.D.F. propaganda great stress has been placed on the participation of Blacks in the S.A.D.F. and on 21 Battalion in particular. Between June 1967 and June 1974 10 articles appeared in 'Paratus' on this topic. From 1976 to July 1982 48 articles appeared, ⁽²⁶⁾ and since 1978 a regular column entitled 'Black Man's View' has appeared stressing that "the S.A. Defence Force has taken the lead in fostering public relations among the different ethnic groups. Nobody can feel more at home than inside the services of the Defence Forces." ⁽²⁷⁾

November 1973, as 'Uniform' put it, "heralded a new era in the history of the South African Army" ⁽²⁸⁾ when Magnus Malan gave approval to the establishment of an Army training sector for African soldiers. On January 21, 1974, 21 Battalion was created. After concerted advertising in the press, 16 Africans were recruited for basic training, followed in August by a further intake of 38. ⁽²⁹⁾ In April 1975 authority was received to recruit Africans into the P.F. In December 1975, 21 Battalion moved to Lenz and by 1979 it had 362 African P.F. members. After an orientation course of 17 weeks and 10 weeks of basic training, the troops are required to do 16 weeks of operational training and are then deployed on operational duty usually involving/.....

involving 12 week stints on the Namibian border, after which they are joined by selected recruits from the homeland and regional units. After this most are transferred to various units and commandos in South Africa and Namibia. (30)

By the beginning of 1980 21 Battalion were recruiting over 500 Africans a year (31), which according to the S.A.D.F. is about 1/5th the number who apply. (32) In 1980 salaries ranged from R95. to R240. a month, with the highest rank being that of a Staff Sergeant, and according to Cndt. Swanepoel, the previous Commanding Officer, the chances of promotion are slim. (33) According to 'Paratus', Black volunteer for 21 Battalion mainly because they want to defend their country:

"The enthusiasm among the 21 Battalion recruits was almost unbelievable. Some of them had a comprehensive understanding of what communism and terrorism involves, whereas others only desired to fight for their country All the men were aware of the threat facing South Africa. (34)"

'Paratus' also admitted that there were other possible reasons such as job security, career possibilities and education. (35)

The S.A.D.F. recruits Africans it believes will tend to be supportive of the status quo. Most are of non-urban origin often with already existing family ties to the State apparatuses. (36) Most Africans in the P.F. do not have Section 10 rights in the urban areas and this provides an incentive for joining the Army and also serves as a form of control as they are sent home if they 'misbehave'. (37) The S.A.D.F. appears to take stringent precautions to ensure their 'loyalty'. African volunteers are screened by psychologists, ethnologists and senior S.A.D.F. personnel to check their records and 'personalities' before being recruited and training programmes devote a large portion of time to indoctrination. (38) The positive incentives for remaining loyal are considerable and include housing, pensions and education. Africans can qualify for 21 Battalion with Standard 6,

while/.....

while for the regional units the qualifications are considerably lower.⁽³⁹⁾ With the present unemployment figure being well over 3 million, opportunities of employment elsewhere may be minimal.

The next step in the process of integrating Africans into the S.A.D.F. appears to be officer training and the creation of urban African battalions. In 1979 the S.A.D.F. authorised commandoes throughout South Africa to recruit blacks as part of a support service corps, with volunteers being trained to serve in combat units and being required to do border duty, as well as being involved in area defence.

A spokesperson for the Johannesburg East Commando announced that a plan was being established to "help and protect the people of Soweto".⁽⁴⁰⁾ Magnus Malan recommended that urban commandos such as S.A.S.O.L. Command should include Africans in their ranks.⁽⁴¹⁾ The establishment of fully fledged urban African battalions does not seem to be far off.

As Willem Steenkamp put it:

"The government has learned the lesson from Rhodesia and its only a matter of time before (urban Black battalions) are established" ⁽⁴²⁾

There also appear to be plans to set up rural commandos specifically for Africans in certain areas. In 1979 Mag.Gen.Lloyd said that the S.A.D.F. intended to establish organisations in ^{the} Natal and Kwazulu border areas which could perform certain counter-insurgency actions. He went on to say:

"It is vitally important that the local population regardless of colour, participate in countering insurgency within their own areas. One should bear in mind, however, that terrorists normally return to the area where they were recruited and, consequently, the local Population is expected to turn against and fight their own people" ⁽⁴³⁾

For Africans pressure against joining the P.F. appears to be considerable, especially in the urban areas such as Soweto where the military has been experienced directly as a repressive force. In this respect, Grundy refers to the 1976 Soweto uprising when families

of 21 Battalion members were moved out of Soweto and into the Lenz Camp for their own protection. He also refers to numerous polls which indicate complete opposition to the S.A.D.F. He argues that although the S.A.D.F. may be feared and grudgingly respected it is necessarily tainted by the structure which it exists to defend and concludes that "until White South Africans and their leaders appreciate this their efforts to include Blacks in the defence of South Africa are bound to be frustrated". It is this contradiction which the S.A.D.F. is attempting to resolve through the Civic Action Programme.

4.7.3). THE RECRUITMENT OF COLOURED INTO THE S.A.D.F.

In 1963 Cape Corp was established. Coloured enlistees were not armed and were not accepted as part of the P.F. Their rôle was to fill auxilliary, non-combatant functions, particularly in the navy. By 1967, 490 men had been trained, most of them filling posts such as storekeepers, stewards, chiefs, waiters and engineer room mechanics. (45)

The main reason for the formation of the Cape Corp was its ideological advantage to the S.A.D.F., combined with pressure from the sections of the Coloured petty bourgeoisie. (46) By 1972 it had advanced to being an integral part of the P.F. and by 1974 it had been granted the Freedom of Cape Town and was being described by P.W. Botha as "a feather in the cap of the Defence Force and the Coloured population as a whole." (47)

In 1975 the Defence Act was amended, giving members of the Cape Corp the same status as their White counterparts, meaning, among other things, that Whites were authorised to salute Blacks. 7 Coloured soldiers were given the rank of lieutenant. In August 1976 the first company of Coloured infantry men left South Africa for operational duty in Namibia. (48) By 1977 one quarter of the Cape Corp intake joined the P.F. In that year there were 4000 Coloureds and 750 Indians in the S.A.D.F., together making up 10%

of the P.F. (49)

In 1980 the S.A.D.F. announced that 2612 applications for joining the P.F. had been received in 1979 - 977 Coloureds, 101 Indians and 1534 Africans. All the Indians applied to the Navy, 453 Coloureds applied to the Army, 18 to the Airforce and 406 to the Navy, while all the Africans applied to the Army. This lead 'Paratus' to comment:

"Our manpower recruiting campaign is therefore directed at all young South Africans in a society not plagued by class or caste distinctions and in which merit is the sole criterion of excellence" (50)

One wonders whether the S.A.P. which is now more than 50% Black would make the same claim. (51)

In 1980 the Cape Corp ceased to exist as a separate unit, with existing Coloured members now being incorporated into the P.F. after 2 years of voluntary national service. The Cape Corp now recruits nearly 2000 national servicemen annually (out of over 4000 applicants) - an increase of over 400% in 4 years), meaning that national recruitment drives are no longer as necessary as previously. (52)

Coloureds have been in the Navy as P.F. members for over 14 years (and before that as members of the auxilliary forces). Initially they were employed mainly in administrative, catering and other non-combatant rôles but they are now active in most facets of Navy activity including the commissioned officer echelons, and they have served on all the major classes of warship. (53)

The response of the 'Coloured Community' to the S.A.D.F. is discussed in more detail below. However, it seems that at least partly because of opposition or antagonism to the military in the urban areas, the majority of recruits (up to 95%) come from the rural areas, with most of them being from working class backgrounds. (54) Many join because they cannot find jobs elsewhere. Others join according to one Cape Corps member, because "they just like the guns, they just like/.....

like to be a soldier and they get cheap brandy and beer".⁽⁵⁵⁾ Thus job security, pay, perks and the attraction of militarism seem to be the main motivating factors. These factors are strengthened by the rise in unemployment which has sent a record number of applicants to the Cape Corp, including a higher number of urban applicants.⁽⁵⁶⁾

A Grassroots survey in the Cape Flats on the effects of unemployment suggested that although the majority of those questioned expressed opposition to people joining the army because they were out of work (for example, James Abrahams of Elsie's River:

"People who go to the army are stupid. We should regard them as sellouts. They betray their own people"),

others, like Fannie Hendricks had the attitude of:

"Dit sal alright wees om army toe te gaan. Hulle sal n man n living daar gee" ⁽⁵⁷⁾

In the Cape Corp the officers and many of the P.F. members appear to be drawn mainly from the petty bourgeoisie, and as well as being motivated by job security, important factors include their political backgrounds, promotion possibilities and the desire for status and respectability.⁽⁵⁸⁾ For both officers and men the perception of the army as providing equal opportunities for promotion and relatively high pay are important factors. According to Steenkamp, things are very different with the police:

"A few years ago the police got very pissed off because many of the Coloured police were leaving to join the Cape Corp because pay and conditions were better" ⁽⁵⁹⁾

Despite this, and despite the growing number of applicants for the Cape Corp, opposition continues to be widespread. As Cndt. John Cupido, Officer Commanding the Cape Corp put it:

"..... quite a large part of the Coloured community saw the establishment of the Corp as part of the system, part of the system being the

internal/.....

internal policy of the country, and to a very large extent that hasn't changed yet. Quite a number of people still see it that way, and we must be quite honest about this, there is still a big amount of non-involvement at this stage in this Corp from the Coloured communities, and certainly I think the franchise has got something to do with it. this attitude is still very prevalent

You see the problem is that people see the involvement of Coloureds in defence, as part of the political system, which we as soldiers don't agree with The simple fact is that we as soldiers have divorced defence of the country totally from politics It is our job to make this country safe and to keep this country safe, so that the politicians can operate here. That's our simple philosophy". (60)

2.4. THE RECRUITMENT OF INDIANS INTO THE S.A.D.F.

A separate Indian unit in the S.A.D.F. was formed in 1974 at the Salisbury Island naval training base (now known as S.A.S.Jalsena) after discussions between the S.A.I.C. and the S.A.D.F. The Indian Corp initially found difficulty enlisting volunteers and despite recruiting visits to cinemas in the Transvaal and Natal, and the distribution of brochures showing aspects of navy life to Indian high schools, the White Commanding Officer of the new Indian Corp admitted that at the start of 1975 only 34 men had come forward to fill the 200 places for Indian volunteers. He attributed this to low pay. (61) At this stage, as with Cape Corp members, Indian volunteers were only given weapons to be used in case of self-defence in wartime but they did not perform combat rôles and were confined to auxiliary duties. (62)

By 1977, however, this had changed and recruitment was becoming more successful with 750 being in the S.A.D.F. at that time, having been recruited at a rate of 150 a year. By 1982, according to Cmdt. Johan Beyers of S.A.D.F. liaison, only 1/5th of the number of Indian applicants were selected for each intake. (63)

All Indians serving in the S.A.D.F. are in the navy which has proportionately more Blacks serving in its ranks than either the Army

or/.....

or Navy. Coloured and Indian membership of the Navy's P.F. increased from 17.4% in 1977 to 20% in 1979. They are now also employed in an operational capacity. (64) By September 1980 Coloureds and Indians made up $\frac{1}{3}$ of the entire naval force and 80% of the enlisted personnel on some ships. (65) According to the Chief of the Navy, V.Adm.Putter,

Indians are adept pupils and are specially well suited to the technical and administrative field" (66)

In 1980 Pertals Hablal Singh, 31, became the first Indian officer in the S.A.D.F. However in December of that year, lieutenant Singh resigned his post saying that he was being used for propaganda purposes, was being humiliated by his White superiors and was having less qualified Whites promoted over him, and that he was being discriminated against in pay, benefits and accommodation. (67) This incident caused the Indian Reform to issue a statement saying - that Indians would be urged to stop joining the Defence Force if these allegations proved to be true. (68)

Clearly the rhetoric about equality of opportunity in the S.A.D.F. for Blacks has not been completely in line with the facts. For the reasons discussed in 1.4.4. the process of the integration of Blacks into the P.F. has been a gradual one, fraught with contradictions such as those faced by Lt. Singh.

4.2.5. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPULSORY CONSCRIPTION FOR COLOURED AND INDIANS.

The possibility of conscription being extended to Coloured and Indian men (as well as ^{white} women) was put very firmly on the agenda in March 1982 after leaks about the contents of the 1982 Defence Amendment Act were released to the press. This had been preceded by announcements from Gen. Viljoen and others that the S.A.D.F. intended introducing conscription for Coloureds as the Government was preparing to counter the threats of insurgency and conventional warfare. (64) After

immediate/.....

immediate and widespread negative reaction, the idea was temporarily shelved, but as . was clearly stated, it was certainly not dropped. Magnus Malan said that the idea certainly had been considered and would be reconsidered within the next 5 years. He went on to say that the extension of the military service of White males was a temporary measure. (70)

As early as 1977 P.W.Botha stated at the Cape N.P.Congress that the conscription of Coloureds and Indians had already been accepted in principle. (71) It now seems as if the Government is waiting for the right political moment to take this step. The two reasons given for shelving the plans to conscript Coloureds and Indians were, firstly, that the S.A.D.F. had insufficient finances, facilities and manpower to incorporate them immediately, and it is clear that the S.A.D.F. would have major difficulties if suddenly confronted with over 30 thousand new recruits, and secondly, as the Transvaal National Party leader, F.W.de Klerk put it:

"You can't ask a man to fight for his country if he cannot vote" (73)

The introduction of conscription for Coloureds and Indians now seems to be hinged on the Governments Constitutional Proposals.

According to the Evening Post all the S.A.D.F. generals were in favour of extending the call-up to Coloureds and Indians and for this reason they are believed to have put considerable pressure on the N.P. leadership to extend the franchise. (74) According to Steenkamp the incentive for the current Constitutional Proposals came from S.A.D.F. planning over 5 years ago. (75) However, as the S.A.D.F. have recognised, the major factor preventing them from initiating the move immediately is the likelihood of widespread opposition from Coloured and Indian people.

In February 1982, when the possibility of extending the call-up

to/.....

to Coloureds and Indians was announced, it was opposed by the Labour Party whose standpoint was one of:

"How can I defend my country if I don't have a vote and I'm not recognised in Parliament?"

as the Cape Party Secretary, Mr. Fred Peters, put it. (76) Similarly the Democratic Party in the S.A.I.C. warned that there would be tremendous opposition and said that:

"if the Government expects the Indian community to protect our borders as loyal citizens then we must first be given first class citizenship rights". (77)

Other responses were more vociferous. Hassan Howa said that:

"to have conscription based on the apartheid system and racial discrimination is immoral and to be rejected",

While the Natal Indian Congress issued a statement saying:

"..... we object strenuously to such a measure. Our opposition to military training is not out of disloyalty to our country but out of rejection of the Government's apartheid policy" (78)

It thus became clear that for the extension of conscription to become a political possibility it had to be preceded by the extension of the franchise. For this reason the issue of the extension of the call-up has come up frequently in the campaign against the Labour Party's decision to participate in the proposed new Constitutional dispensation, with opponents claiming that by accepting the proposals the Labour Party is tacitly clearing the ground for the conscription of Coloured and Indians. The Labour Party have responded by reiterating that they would continue to oppose this move until further political rights were granted. (79)

Although the likelihood of widespread resistance and opposition to conscription and the problems in integrating thousands of new recruits have led to the extension of the call-up being shelved for the time being, there continue to be strong reasons for the idea being reintroduced in the near future.

Firstly/.....

Firstly, the converse of the Government's holding back the introduction of conscription for Coloureds and Indians until they have a vote is that once the new Constitutional dispensation is in operation pressure for conscription, particularly from conservative Whites will increase. In fact the issue of Coloured and Indian conscription was used to sell the Constitutional package to sections of the White electorate. For example, at a N.P. information meeting, P.W.Botha, asked:

"Do you want Coloured people fighting on the border or not?"

When the 1100 people in the audience responded affirmatively, Botha said:

"We must then treat them decently. They must not go behind the backs of our sons to fight for the enemy" (80)

In other circles the Constitutional Proposals have been used to sell the idea that the Government is committed to genuine power sharing and if power is to be 'genuinely' shared, then it is important for Coloureds and Indians to be seen to be defending their share of political power. This was expressed by F.W.de Klerk:

"Among the terms of the new dispensation is the guarantee that Coloureds and Indians will get full voting rights. It follows that their responsibilities will increase accordingly, which means they will have obligations to defend these rights". (81)

Therefore the Government and military leaders have made it very clear that the extension of conscription will follow the implementation of the Constitutional Proposals. As Maj. Gert Britz expressed it:

"We believe we should give the Coloureds the opportunity to protect themselves My feeling is that once the Coloureds go on the Voters Roll then they would have given someone the right to act for them and they must return the responsibility. We all have to protect what we have". (82)

Secondly, what needs to be considered is the nature of the war in South Africa. During 1982 it became apparent that the A.N.C. was preparing for a transition to a more advanced stage of insurgency. After a series of visits to frontline States between March and June

1982 Oliver Tambo announced that the A.N.C. was moving from sabotage acts to "attack the enemy face to face" (83) and that it was preparing for a sustained guerilla war, (84) in which increasing importance would be given to the military aspect of the struggle with guerilla activities complementing and giving impetus to a campaign of intensified internal political activity. (85)

It is in this context that the call-up for Whites was extended in 1982. With White males now facing over 4 years military service this source of manpower for the S.A.D.F. has now been fully tapped, especially with the new Act's emphasis on area protection through Commandos and the Civil defence system. Although the S.A.D.F. would find difficulty absorbing over 30 000 Coloured and Indian recruits immediately, this is not likely to remain the case for very long. According to one report, military strategists believe that Coloured and Indian conscription would bring considerable relief to the White population, and would provide a strategically vital boost to South African troops in Namibia and would increase the level of preparedness along South Africa's northern and eastern borders. (86)

The 1982 Defence Amendment Act was a response to the likelihood of rapidly intensifying internal guerilla activity and to the need to prepare for more conventional military activity such as further attempts at destabilisation, (87) as well as to the continuing S.A.D.F. presence in Namibia. In this respect White resources have been stretched to their maximum with the increased call-up being a further drain on White skills. Coloured and Indian conscription would reduce the unemployment rate without draining skills and resources from the private sector to the same extent.

Thirdly, as has been discussed above, the importance of the guerilla war being seen as one of Black and White against Communism and

not/.....

not one of Blacks against the apartheid system, is a further imperative for Coloured and Indian conscription. Therefore militarily, politically and economically, it has become a necessity. However, given the political and logistical obstacles it is likely that the Government will move gradually. A scenario predicted by Major Britz is a possible one:

"..... I'm sure they will be called up soon. They won't call them all up at once - the way its likely to happen is that first they will ensure the registration of everyone. Then, maybe move ahead with the ballot system. But that's just my feeling". (88)

The possibility of the introduction of conscription for Coloured and Indians is supported by the fact that in the Naudé Commission looking into conscientious objection, people with expert knowledge of the Koran and Hindu Scriptures were consulted, indicating that the S.A.D.F. is anticipating future Conscientious objectors who are either Coloured or Indian. (89)

In 1967 the registration of Coloured males for 'cadet' training was made compulsory but never strictly enforced. A first step towards the extension of conscription could be the reintroduction of registration (perhaps, it has been suggested, going 'soft' for a while on enforcement in the more politically sensitive areas and concentrating on the rural areas where opposition would be less vociferous). The next step, as Magnus Malan suggested, could be organising conscription on a ballot basis, as happened at first with Whites. This would tend to minimise both the political and the logistical problems as an initially small member could be called up and drawn into the expanding work of the S.A.D.F.

The question of increasing Black participation in the S.A.D.F. is central to the C.A.P. generally and to the rôle of the military. Black education specifically (with the idea being one of "win their hearts/.....

hearts and minds and their bodies will follow), and it is partly in this context that these questions are considered below.

4.)

THE S.A.D.F's 'HEARTS AND MINDS' CAMPAIGN

"The Defence Strategy of the R.S.A. is a national counter-insurgency strategy involving

- (a) Government and Government departments on central, provincial and local authority level, in respect of all ethnic groups in the R.S.A.
- (b) all Security Forces;
- (c) the organised private sector;
- (d) the News media; and
- (e) the general public.

It calls for action in the political, economic, social, psychological and security fields. Approximately 80% of these actions are non-military although the military forces have a keen interest in it and may, in its secondary rôle participate in such action" (90)

It is the military's direct rôle in the '80%' which will be considered in more detail here. According to Maj. Gen. Lloyd, the S.A.D.F's objectives through the C.A.P. are to secure through administrative and socio economic action, the goodwill, support and cooperation of the local population by alleviating frictions points, grievances and dissatisfaction; by improving their standard of living and by giving them something worthwhile to defend in the revolutionary war. (91)

Lloyd goes on to explain that:

"the S.A.D.F. involved itself in these social upliftment programmes because of the vitally important rôle the Local Population has to play in countering insurgency in the R.S.A. and S.W.A. The loyalty, goodwill and cooperation of the Local Population have to be secured and the insurgents have to be denied every opportunity of exploiting friction points, grievances or dissatisfaction. At the same time the S.A.D.F. utilises the opportunity to demonstrate to the Local Population that they are there to help and to protect them and not to harm them". (92)

Lloyd/.....

Lloyd also warns that when their goodwill and loyalty cannot be won then "we will have to move them out of the critical areas and settle them elsewhere". (93)

The broad and general political objectives of the C.A.P. as Lloyd explains them, can be seen to have parallels in counter-insurgency situations elsewhere. (94) What needs to be defined more clearly, is the particular class, ethnic and geographical identities of various 'local populations' as the S.A.D.F's aims will vary considerably according to these. This was discussed by Maj. Britz, Outlining the differences in the C.A.P's process of political assessment in the Western Cape from that in Namibia, he said:

"With our target group the process of appreciating is the same - but the population is different - its far more complex - you've got Whites, Coloureds and Blacks and you get big differences within these groups." (95)

The S.A.D.F's Civic Action aims for rural Africans are the development of organisation and support for countering guerilla insurgency, while for urban Africans, Indians and Coloured they are far more complex relating to general political objectives such as building a basis for multi racialism as well as to specific military objectives such as preparing the ground for a future Coloured and Indian call-up, breaking down negative responses to the military and driving a wedge into the process of the development of opposition to the S.A.D.F. It must also be taken into account that, as Lloyd points out, the military's rôle in the '80%' is a secondary although growing and particularly deliberate one.

In analysing the success of the C.A.P. in a specific area, it is important to take into account not only the forms in which the dominant ideology 'penetrates' the consciousness of the dominated classes but also to take into account the ideological interpellations from 'below' which relate to the general form and level of political consciousness

as well as to the specific level and forms of organisation in an area of particular importance in looking at the success of the C.A.P. is to consider the extent to which the contradiction between the people and power bloc is articulated in the consciousness of various sections of the popular classes. (96)

In South Africa this relation is often perceived of as being between the oppressed and the Apartheid State. Particularly in the urban areas one of the C.A.P.'s main rôles is to mystify this relation and to obscure the connection drawn between the military and the Apartheid State. In this respect there are important differences in the way which the apartheid state is experienced by urban Africans who have to face the reality of pass laws, influx control, administration boards and so on every day, while urban Coloureds do not face the same level of direct repression, and also experience some aspects of the 'differential incorporation' into the State apparatuses.

Furthermore, the repressive nature of the State is not experienced monolithically. For example, as Steenkamp pointed out:

"People (in the Western Cape) don't bristle at the sight of an Army uniform in the same way as they might at a Police uniform". (97)

Following Therborn ideology can be defined as "that aspect of human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world which makes sense to them in varying degrees". (98) Therefore the dominated classes, even if politically unorganised and inactive, cannot be said to be totally coopted by the ruling class or 'fooled' by its ideology into non-participation. The reasons for passivity include economic constraints, feelings of powerlessness and the lack of awareness of alternatives. Thus there is pressure to accept what exists, what is right or good and what is possible in terms defined by the dominant ideological discourse. (99) Therborn goes on to argue that ideological apparatuses are usually a form of expression

of this discourse through ruling class organisation of power. (100)

With regard to the military one would have to examine, for example, the effect of T.V., advertising, the press, war games, military picture stories on particular sections of the dominated classes, as it is within this context that the C.A.P. operates. At the same time it is also important to take into account 'counter-ideologies' - those interpellations which bring about change from below. As Mouffe expresses ideology is a battleground,

"the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their positions, struggle". (101)

In this regard it is important to consider various forms of political and trade union organisation and activity - mass mobilisation, campaigns and 'grass roots' organisation in developing a 'counter-ideological' discourse amongst the dominated classes with respect to the military.

Particularly in the urban areas it is in this context that the C.A.P. is involved and it is against the development of what Gramsci calls an "expansive hegemony" (which adopts the interests of the popular classes and fuses them through ideology into a "collective will" which forms the basis of political action (102)) which the S.A.D.F. and the C.A.P. in particular are working.

A recent study of the effects of military ideology on youth in a Coloured community in Cape Town, (103) throws some light on these points. It involves interviews with youth group members, Cape Corps members and community organisers in the Hout Bay area. While not being extensive enough to draw any general conclusions from, it does provide some insights into the contradictory way in which military ideology is received in a Coloured working class community. The following points emerged:

1. People generally did not approve of the S.A.D.F. but were non-committal about those who participated in it.

2. People/....

2. People involved with youth, civic and trade union organisations had a better understanding of the S.A.D.F. generally.
3. People generally saw 'communism' and 'terrorism' as enemies and were receptive to the propaganda on T.V. and to picture stories such as 'Grensvegter'.
4. They generally opposed the idea of conscription.
5. Anti-military propaganda had not reached many people.

The study argues that the 'dominant' ideology as perpetuated through T.V., Radio, Schools, and so on, is not accepted and reproduced in its entirety with respect to the military and is combined with "popular democratic interpellations" to form a highly contradictory and ever-changing form of discourse, although the extent to which oppositional elements are incorporated into the ideology of the dominated classes is limited.

In Therborn's terms it concludes that:

Firstly, one can be interpellated as a Coloured, Christian labourer who lives in a racially divided society; that certain things are excluded from the conception of what exists, for example, that S.W.A.P.O. guerillas are not foreigners, the history of resistance, etc.

Secondly, one is told what is right; that, for example, Christianity is good and Communism is evil.

Thirdly, one is told what is possible; for example, that there is no alternative to an unequal society and thus no basis for change. These interpellations combined with economic and other constraints, produce disinterest and feelings of powerlessness. The ideological struggle involves the re-interpretation of what exists, what is right and what is possible.

In the case of the S.A.D.F., on the one hand it is often not experienced directly but shown as neutral, fighting against an external enemy, while on the other hand the police are seen as part of a repressive/.....

a repressive Government. But those who join the army and wear uniforms may be seen in the same light. (104)

In the following section no attempt has been made to undertake the kind of detailed survey which would be necessary to assess the effect of the S.A.D.F.'s 'Hearts and Minds' Campaign or its rôle in education specifically, in any particular area. Rather an attempt is made to provide from the information available a general outline of the C.A.P.'s activities, and therefore comments on the success or failure of the programme in various areas are necessarily tentative and impressionistic.

4.4. THE HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN IN NAMIBIA

Before examining the activities and rôle of the C.A.P. in South Africa, the 'Hearts and Minds' strategy followed in Namibia is considered. This is because, "all the lessons and principles and know how have been and are being applied in South Africa" (105)

As early as 1968 the S.A.D.F. first gave lip service to the notion of civic action in Namibia, with a statement that "military tactics are well and good but they are really quite useless if the Government has lost the confidence of the people among whom it is fighting". (106) This strategy (then called 'social action') was directly influenced by U.S. military efforts in Vietnam at the time. It was described in a restricted S.A.D.F. handbook issued to senior officers as the "application of a well coordinated combination of assistance designed to improve the living conditions of the population, and raise its cultural level. It contributes to winning the 'Hearts and Minds' of the population. Social Action is essentially aimed at reaching the population, thus making it more receptive to psychological action" (107)

However it was only in 1974 (108) after the military had taken over/.....

over command in Namibia that a 'Hearts and Minds' strategy began to be implemented, by which time S.W.A.P.O. had already won considerable support and had strong, national organisation. (109) After that, as Major Britz put it:

"In South West Africa the military took over and they made an appreciation. It became clear that the population is the key to victory - so it went into cultural aspects, medical, socio-economic and so on". (110)

As was the situation in Rhodesia, the S.A.D.F.'s C.A.P. in Namibia is faced with an apparently irresolvable contradiction. On the one hand they are attempting to win the 'goodwill, support and cooperation of the local population', (111) while on the other hand they are engaged in directly repressive activities with frequent allegations of 'misconduct', torture and genocide.

The mistakes of the Rhodesian strategy (112) have been clearly acknowledged, at least in theory, by the S.A.D.F. In a research project done for the military, Capt. J. R. Cilliers argues:

"To the White population the threat facing Rhodesia was an external one rather than that of Black nationalism within their own borders. The local population were in fact the determining factor, not the insurgents. What was required was an awareness that the war could not only be won in terms of killing armed combatants but in gaining the active support or at least neutrality of the increasing numbers of the local population Army commandos realised too late the potential of a politically matured local militia from the people themselves

Capt. Cilliers goes on to examine the gaps in the Rhodesian Civil Action programme:

"Proper protection of the local population and assistance to bring back their standard of living to what it had been before they moved into protected villages created by the Security Forces would have won the support and confidence of the local people. Instead by the overly aggressive use of tactics such as the purely intelligence oriented pseudo methods, Security Force Actions tended rather to be aimed at the local population than in defence of them

In/.....

In the long term the extent to which these methods were used resulted in an undeniable loss of legitimacy by the Security Forces vis a vis the local inhabitants Rhodesian Security Forces were unable to formulate a successful and unified counter-insurgency strategy." (113)

However, despite this official realisation by Military leaders of the problems of the Rhodesian Army's Civil Action programme, it appears that as the war in Namibia has intensified, the effect of the C.A.P. has been minimal and has been superceded by directly repressive activities. This is particularly true of the situation in Northern Owambo and Kavango. Nevertheless, the strategy does seem to be more sophisticated than that adopted in Rhodesia. In parts of Caprivi, for example, it appears to have met with some success.

The goals of the C.A.P. (otherwise called the Supportative Services Programme) in Namibia are clearly stated in a recent article in 'Paratus'

"Supportative services evolve around the principle of building and maintaining a contented, if not prosperous community which otherwise would have fallen prey to subversive S.W.A.P.O. activities which is an imminent threat to all of S.W.A./Namibia's population groups. The discontented community lacking an operational and effective socio-economic structure is the ideal target for S.W.A.P.O. activities

The supportative services programme undertaken by the S.A.D.F. and S.W.A. Territory Force amongst all peoples of S.W.A./Namibia is an effective counter-measure to S.W.A.P.O. subversion of discontented communities and population groups. In cooperation with departmental authorities the military offers assistance in the fields of education, administration, agriculture, health and welfare, nature conservation, veterinary science and technical maintenance Besides being an effective tactical manoeuvre, the supportative services programmes encourage the development of a nation that will be the youngest of the independent States." (114).

The C.A.P. in Namibia, as in South Africa, covers a wide range of activities in which N.S.M. are used in non-military forms of service. They usually work with local Government authorities and sometimes with

Mission/.....

Mission Stations, Churches and private businesses. According to Cmdt. Kleynhans, in Namibia the S.A.D.F. work with the local population in activities ranging from the provision of N.S.M. teachers, hospital and medical services, and agricultural training, to the provision of police constables and the "protection" of local Chiefs and civic leaders

"We are making good progress. We are going all out to make contact with the people"

he said. (115)

Much publicity has been given to these activities by the S.A.D.F. For example border tours for businessmen, journalists, Church leaders, Student leaders, Black chiefs and Black 'Community Leaders' place considerable emphasis of the S.A.D.F.'s C.A.P. activities. After a tour of Northern Namibia in 1978, Gayankulu Chief Minister Hudson Ntsanwini commented:

"We were very much impressed by what we saw, not only by the military aspects, but also what is being done by the S.A.D.F. in building or establishing a physical infra structure for the northern territories as well as what is being done by the Defence Force to win the confidence of the people of S.W.A." (116)

In a letter to the 'Southern Cross', the Catholic Justice and Reconciliation Commission responded to these kind of claims in August, 1982:

"..... one should realise that the civilian administration has collapsed in the operational area and is now being exercised by the armed forces As their financial and technical means are nearly unlimited, superior to those of any civilian administration, they (the S.A.D.F.) exert a very potent influence in certain areas and domains. This is done, for political reasons, to gain the allegiance of the people " (117)

The collapse of civil administration and the consequent shortage of personnel in a number of fields, has meant that the S.A.D.F.'s ability to control public facilities such as education and health has been virtually unlimited. Notwithstanding the widespread opposition from the Lutheran, Catholic and Anglican Churches to the S.A.D.F. the C.A.P.

assists/.....

assists some Catholic and other Missions in the Operational Area. Although the Missions are largely self-sufficient the S.A.D.F. does provide teachers and agricultural advisers to some of them. (118)

In Namibia, as in South Africa, the largest group of Civil Action personnel are trained teachers seconded to schools. In September, 1982 there were approximately 100 C.A.P. teachers in Namibia. (119) As Major Britz explained this:

"The way it worked was that these schools found themselves short staffed. At the same time in our appreciation we found that winning the support of the people by assisting in their development was the key to success winning the confidence of the people is the main factor in countering insurgency. We've got to show people - or rather teach them - to decide for themselves what's better for them and therefore we must supply them with education. People join S.W.A.P.O. because they promise them education " (120)

The area where the C.A.P. appears to have had most success has been Caprivi. This is, according to Steenkamp, because of intense Army patrolling and a powerful 'Hearts and Minds' Campaign, combined with less solid support for S.W.A.P.O., partly because of the presence of C.A.N.U. (121)

'Paratus' described the S.A.D.F.'s activities in the area as involving giving agricultural advise, encouraging cash cropping as opposed to subsistence farming, the provision of teachers, fostering a love for sport and introducing and encouraging Christianity. (122) One aspect of their involvement in education is their running of the Caprivi Training School, the largest in the area, with 3 departments - secondary education, trade training and teacher training. At the Caprivi Training School the new pupils were wary about the teachers in uniform at first, but soon got used to them, according to 2 teachers there. "I doubt whether they even notice them nowadays, What did affect them were the rifles that the teachers brought into the class. Since that has stopped, the atmosphere has relaxed". (123)

Another/.....

Another activity in the area is their involvement in setting up a Caprivian Youth Movement. (124)

The S.A.D.F. has given considerable publicity in its official propaganda and through the commercial press to its work with the San ('Bushmen') people of Caprivi at 31, 36, 201 and 203 Battalions. Their activities are aimed at providing social services for the San in return for their loyalty and their willingness to work for the S.A.D.F. as trackers.

At Omega Camp, for example, 7 N.S.M. teach over 400 San pupils at the Omega Primary School. They are taught in Afrikaans from Nursery School (125) to Standard 3, while at 203 Battalion they are taught from Sub A to Standard 2. S.A.D.F. teachers are at all five San Camps. Class rooms are often tents. According to the S.A.D.F. the pupils show dedication and perseverance and have absolute faith in their teachers, "although their progress is slower than elsewhere" (126)

Their rôle amongst the San also includes providing other social services, and for example, at the Omega base there is also a factory where women make dresses for sale, and a bakery which N.S.M. help to run. 'Paratus' noted that in addition to the provision of education, one of their greatest achievements has been teaching the San people personal hygiene. (127)

'Uniform' explains the S.A.D.F.'s Civic Action rôle in Namibia generally and amongst the San specifically in glowing terms:

"Die Hoof taak van die Suid Afrikaanse weermag in die operasionele gebied is om 'n klimaat van vrede te skep waarin politieke ontwikkeling sonder bemoeing kan plaasvind. Vandag beweeg al die volke van Suidwes-Afrika, ook die Boesmans, na 'n staatkundige onafhanklikheid waarin elke volk die reg sal hê om sy eie toekoms te besluit.

Die premiere taak van die weermag in Suidwes Afrika is om terroriste hok te slaan. Sodoende word 'n klimaat van vrede vir vrugbare politieke ontwikkeling geskep. Al die volke van daardie land, ook die Boesmans, is by die staatkundige ontwikkeling betrokke.

Die Suid /.....

Die Suid Afrikaans soldate het egter 'n belangrike sekondêre taak. Die Ovamboes, Kavangos, Kapriviane en die Boesmans het die manne leer ken as staatsmaker-vriende veral op die gebiede van die onderwys, mediese dienste, landbou en watervoorsiening het one manne hul kant gebring". (128)

The S.A.D.F. have been so impressed with the work of the C.A.P. in I Military area (which includes Kavango and Western Caprivi) that it has awarded it the Sword of Peace for promoting peace, goodwill and good relations amongst its inhabitants. (129)

In return for this 'upliftment' the San have been incorporated into the S.A.D.F. as trackers as well as regular soldiers and almost all of the men are fulltime soldiers. (130) 31 Battalion now has 600 San soldiers with 250 White officers and a total of over 200 San inhabitants. The soldiers have frequently been involved in skirmishes in Angola and on the Caprivi strip and have died in increasing numbers. (131) According to S.A.D.F. personnel they have "an uncanny ability - almost a sixth sense - to detect the presence of an enemy, often predicting a contact minutes in advance. (132) They admit that there is a danger of the San culture being destroyed but argue that there is no alternative. (133)

In Kavango the S.A.D.F. appears to have met with more opposition than in Caprivi (though not as much as in Ovambo because of S.W.A.P.O.'s stronger position there. (134) They are engaged in similar activities to those in Caprivi and because of the extreme dearth of teachers more N.S.M. teachers work in Kavango than in any other area. (135)

One of the Civic Action activities there involves a youth movement, which according to Major Eugene Henrico, who is in charge of the C.A.P. in the area, provides training in Nature conservation, first aid, and needlework as well as providing the youth with anti-S.W.A.P.O. propaganda.

"We are trying to drive a wedge between them and communism, and, for example, we stress the anti-religious aspect of communism",

he said.

The Ekongoro Youth Movement has a membership of 30 000 school pupils of all ages with membership being compulsory. A yearly curriculum is presented in weekly lectures and regular camps. The movement was established in 1975 "to encourage the development of Kavango nationalism", (136) and despite the dropping of the Odendaal plan which envisaged dividing Namibia into independent homelands, the movement continues to push tribal traditions with the 5 traditional chiefs enthusiastically sponsoring it. The movement claims Christian Nationalism as its base, and says that it aims "to transmit Kavango culture to the youth, developing a Kavango nationalism and moulding the youth into better citizens and to give them an interest in agricultural projects and in this way to make a contribution to an agricultural economy." (137) The camps are assisted by the S.A.D.F. and give the youth the rudiments of a military training.

Despite moves such as there appears to be widespread opposition and, in Ovambo, Northern Caprivi and Kaokoland Blacks have been exempt from the draft. After a tour of Kavango in March 1982 a group of Sunday Times journalists wrote:

"We visited the west of Kavango where guerillas are most active. During our stay there we heard of 2 civilians who were allegedly shot dead without questions being asked by the army. There were also first hand accounts of alleged torture and intimidation. While the army is winning the military conflict in the border war, it appears that in Kavango it does not seem to be succeeding in winning the hearts and minds of the people". (138)

The area where the C.A.P. appears to have met with the least success is Northern Ovambo. This is because it is the area with the strongest S.W.A.P.O. support and consequently with the most intense S.A.D.F. presence and therefore the highest number of reported atrocities. In Namibia as a whole most Western observers estimate that S.W.A.P.O. would get 70% to 90% of the vote in a free election. (139) In Ovambo, S.W.A.P.O.'s traditional base where 55% of the Namibian population live, this percentage is likely to be even higher.

In 1978 the S.A.D.F. claimed that S.W.A.P.O. was losing ground in Ovambo because local people were cooperating increasingly with the Security Forces. (140) A year later they had a chance to test this when conscription was introduced for all Namibians aged 16 to 25 because of the failure of the "ethnic" battalion strategy. As the Administrator General put it:

"the aim was 'to give expression' to the feeling that in this field as well, the entire population of South West is handling its own interests and that it is not, as some hostile elements put it, the Boers who are defending S.W.A." (141)

In most of Northern Namibia, and particularly in Ovambo, the scheme was a failure, and the S.A.D.F. had to drop the idea of conscription from the Northern provinces, because of the widespread support for S.W.A.P.O. (142) In the other territories thousands either refused their call-ups or chose to leave and join S.W.A.P.O. In the first 3 months of conscription 8000 joined S.W.A.P.O. (143) and demonstrations were held throughout the country under the theme, "The so-called enemy is your own brother who was forced to leave the country because of repression. The enemy of the South African Army is Who is SWAPO? S.W.A.P.O. A S.W.A.P.O. is the people". (144)

Despite the overwhelming support in Ovambo for S.W.A.P.O. the S.A.D.F.'s Civic Action continues to claim:

"We are making good progress. We are going all out to make contact with the people". (145)

However there are few indications of this progress. An Army officer, Col. Martins, admitted this to journalists:

"In Ovambo I'm not sure the Hearts and Minds strategy does much good because of the large numbers of S.W.A.P.O. there" (146)

Military correspondent Steenkamp also said that the Hearts and Minds Strategy had only limited support in Ovambo because of S.W.A.P.O.'s support. He attributed this to the "tribal factor" - i.e. that the Ovambos/.....

Ovambos are a "group minded" people, and S.W.A.P.O. speaks the language better, but he also admitted that there had been "abuses" by the Security Forces which nullified the effect of the C.A.P. (147)

The recent report of the Catholic Bishops who conducted an extensive tour of the Northern areas throws light on the extent of Security force atrocities. The following is an example from their report:

"Reports of what occurs in the operational area indicate that it is commonly accepted that in searching out S.W.A.P.O. guerillas the Security Forces stop at nothing to force information out of the people. They break into homes, beat up residents, shoot people, steal and kill cattle, and often pillage stores and tearooms. When the tracks of S.W.A.P.O. guerillas are discovered by the Security Forces the local people are in danger. Harsh measures are intensified. People are blindfolded, taken from their homes and left beaten up and even dead on the roadside. Women are often raped. It is not unknown for a detachment to break into a home and while Black soldiers keep watch over the family, White soldiers select the best looking girls and take them into the veld to rape them. There is no redress because reporting irregularities or atrocities to Commanders is considered a dangerous or fruitless exercise."

(148)

According to Archbishop Hurley, because of the atrocities:

"Local communities do not want to cooperate with the Army which they distrust". (149)

The S.A.D.F. are also directly involved in Namibian schools through cadet programmes and N.S.M. teaching in schools. The few examples below provide some indication of the form this has taken. The schools are required to assist with military registration. According to a Windhoek Catholic priest all the Standard 9's and 10's had to register. He said that,

"most opposed and rejected it and tore up their papers although some were unsure and confused. Most of the African children were able to analyse and reject the Government propaganda, but the Coloured children tended to swallow it more than the others. One school in Windhoek had integrated cadets and some of the children who rejected the S.A.D.F. did not draw the connection with Cadets which they didn't appose doing. They didn't relate the marching and parades directly to the S.A.D.F."

(150)

In the Operational area, according to a Catholic sister and former teacher from Northern Namibia, N.S.M. teach in some Catholic schools, wearing uniform. She said that some of the schools did not want the teachers to use guns but the S.A.D.F. said they were part of their uniform. Even the non-military White teachers used 2-way radios and pistols or revolvers. (151)

A priest from Kavango said that all schools including the Catholic schools, have to assist in the filling out of Army registration forms. His school, however, wrote letters to the S.A.D.F. telling them they were involved with education not militarisation. They then discarded their forms and were strongly supported in their stand by the Namibian Catholic Church. They were successful and now the S.A.D.F. tries to get its information outside of the school's assistance.

He went on to say that the structure of education outside of the Catholic and other Mission schools was collapsing and was being carried out increasingly by the armed forces for political reasons. This was often accompanied by torture and beatings of the school children and therefore many of the boys in Kavango joined S.W.A.P.O., which virtually everyone in the area supported. Because of this, he said, nearly everyone was a potential source of information to the S.A.D.F, either through torture or as spies (he said a number of teachers were recruited as spies). (152)

Without more detailed empirical information it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the C.A.P. in Namibia. It does appear, however, that notwithstanding some success in areas such as Western Caprivi the S.A.D.F. is faced with a 'vicious cycle'. The more support S.W.A.P.O. wins the greater the extent of direct S.A.D.F. repression (combined with widespread intimidation, torture and other atrocities), and this reduces the possibilities for the success of the C.A.P.

The/.....

The conclusions of the Catholic Justice and Reconciliation Commission, therefore appear to be correct:

"The results for the army (of the C.A.P.) seem to be poor because repeated detaining, beating and even killing of civilians overshadow the 'positive' aspects and give the people the feeling that they are living in an occupied country deprived of their basic rights". (153)

Some of these lessons are being applied in South Africa and the S.A.D.F. appears to be moving as fast as possible to win "the Hearts and Minds of the people" before the current stage of insurgency develops into a civil war.

45. THE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMME

The functions of the C.A.P. were officially passed on to other departments of the S.A.D.F. on March 3, 1980. According to P.W. Botha this was because these functions were more compatible with those of other sections to which they had been transferred. However Civic Action remained unchanged at the level of aims of service. The C.A.P.'s activities in both Namibia and South Africa had expanded to such an extent since 1974 that it had become necessary to divide the policy making and coordination functions. Therefore in January 1978 a sub-sections Civic Action was established with policy and coordinating functions under Maj. Gen. Philip Pretorius. The executive functions remained primarily with the army. (154)

In answer to a question in Parliament, P.W.Botha said that Civic Actions functions included:

- "the planning and coordination of -
1. programmes for the improvement of the conditions of life and advancement of other peoples by means of guidance, education, training
 2. motivation projects including research, training and production of material for such projects.
 3. public relations.
 4. the planning, establishment and maintenance of military museums."

He went on to say that the personnel strength of the subs section Civic

Action/.....

Action was 184 persons (March 1980) while the personnel involved on the executive functions varied according to the S.A.D.F's requirements and the availability of manpower. (155)

In practice, however, as Botha pointed out, it functions in the same way as previously. The coordination function has fallen under the Communications Department of the Chief of Staff Intelligence ('Com.Ops. '), but in practice there appears to be little separation between the coordination and executive functions and both continue to go under the name Civic Action.

The C.A.P. involves the deployment of N.S.M. in non-military forms of service. They are usually required to undergo normal basic training followed by a 6 month Civic Action course at Kimberley's 11 Commando. (156) Most teachers in the army go to Oudtshoorn and some of them are seconded to Civic Action. After the initial training at Kimberley they are posted to their positions in the C.A.P., usually either to other Government departments or to the governing bodies of the various homelands ('independent' and otherwise), or to South West Africa Command. Under the direction of these bodies they work as engineers, mechanics, sports organisers, teachers, university lecturers, doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, agricultural, legal, and financial advisers, (157) and tourist advisers. (158)

In all cases the S.A.D.F. military authorities are responsible for their discipline. The Basis of their selection, in accordance with the provisions of 16 (2) of the Defence Act is - that the S.A.D.F. has first call on their skills. (159) They are required to wear military uniform which usually includes a 9 mm. pistol. There appears to be careful screening through a strict selection procedure which only allows those whose views conform with the S.A.D.F's to participate. Those with views too far to the left or right are not included. This is clearly shown in a letter from Maj. Gen. (then

Brig). Lloyd/.....

Brig.) Lloyd to Vause Raw:

"The basic aim of Civic Action, apart from assisting the Black man in various fields is to project an image of the soldier as a man of action but who is nevertheless a friend of the Black man and who is prepared to defend him. We want the N.S.M. to teach the Black man whilst his rifle is standing in the corner of the classroom. A conscientious objector cannot project this image. The directors of Civic Action programmes consider these objectors to be completely unacceptable." (160)

Furthermore, C.A.P. soldiers are expected to keep their "eyes and ears open" and to give regular reports on the mood and feeling of the local community and on particular people if necessary. (161)

The C.A.P. in South Africa experiences continued shortages of manpower. This is indicated by the fact that the demand of the relevant authorities for C.A.P. personnel exceeds the supply both in the Bantustans and in the urban areas. (162) The reason for this is, in Maj. Gen. Lloyd's terms, because although 80% of the war effort is social, the military's rôle in this is a secondary, though important one. The repressive functions of the S.A.D.F. take precedence over the ideological ones. This is seen, for example, by the fact that despite the demand of Educational authorities for C.A.P. teachers, the majority of teachers in the S.A.D.F. go to the Oudtshoorn Infantry School.

This problem was expressed by Maj. Britz:

"The problem is that in the homelands there is a huge demand for teachers and other graduates and there are just not enough of them. The other day I put in a demand for 5 more graduates and they told me its like squeezing blood out of a stone". (163)

However, this situation appears to be changing and according to Britz the C.A.P.'s activities have expanded by 300% since 1980. (164) The formal integration of the C.A.P.'s activities into all military departments is another indication of the increased importance given to it.

Nevertheless, there continues to be a fundamental contradiction between the military's repressive activities and its civic action activities. Another comment from Britz brings this home:

"..... in 1981/....."

"..... in 1981, just after the schools boycott we went out there in the townships unarmed and soon the people began to see us as protectors whereas the Cops are seen as prosecutors and not protectors - and sometimes by the way they behave towards Black people, I'm not surprised. In the Platteland Black people run like hell from military vehicles and this is usually because they've had a problem with some difficult police sergeant. The army is there as the protector but not times to defend you. 7 have to attack." (165)

What is clear is that in order to be seen in a positive light the military had to appear not to be playing a repressive rôle.

In an embryonic form this is a similar dilemma to that faced the Hearts and Minds campaign in Namibia. According to Steenkamp Kwazulu and Soweto are the areas where the C.A.P. has faced most opposition and had most difficulties. (166) It is no coincidence that these are 2 of the areas where the repressive activities of the S.A.D.F. have been most apparent.

Another important contradiction is that between the rôles of the C.A.P. and other State department. Steenkamp saw this as a problem of coordination:

"There's the old problem of the lack of coordination between departments of State - where the Administration Board knocks down your shanty you're not going to be very sympathetic to the State. The problem is that there is not enough coordination between Government departments. You have the Coloured Affairs Department and the Department of Cooperation and Development and they deal with different aspects of policy than the Army. It is important to realise that we're in a pre-insurgency situation at the moment in the urban areas. This means that unlike the operational area you have civilians running the show. In the operational area the admin. officials are subordinate to the military. Here it is different. The Admin. Boards are in charge and the army is subordinate and the Admin. Boards aren't always aware of the problem. While apartheid is still around the credibility gap remains large and you can't work in isolation." (167)

This was also referred to by Britz who spoke of the instability and problems caused for his work by, for example, the Group Areas Act, the Mixed Marriages Act and the Coloured Labour Preference Act. He also referred to the problems faced with the Administration Boards:

"In the/....."

"In the 5 Hermanus Camps for Blacks we had to work with the Department of Education and Training and with the Admin. Boards and we've certainly had our problems with both of them. With the difficulties we've had with the stubbornness and attitudes of the Admin. Boards, it doesn't surprise me that they've got so little credibility amongst Blacks The only solution is to kick their arses and pull them straight because they constantly embarrass us with their attitude to Blacks. (168)

He went on to explain how they could go about 'putting them straight'.

"We in the army realise these things are problems - we can't change them but we certainly can advise Our reports go right up to the Minister. Whenever it involves something which affects our aims we just send a report and they soon put a stop to it. And this has certainly happened before". (169)

However, in this respect the problem remains one of the C.A.P. being used to change attitudes to the military and the State without the structures which help mould these attitudes having been changed.

4.6. THE C.A.P. and the ROLE OF THE SADF IN EDUCATION IN THE RURAL AREAS.

The aims of the C.A.P. in the rural areas as has been mentioned, is as Lloyd put it, to secure the goodwill and cooperation of the local populace in order to prevent or minimise the success of guerilla incursions. It has not been possible to get a complete picture of the activities of the C.A.P. in the rural areas and what appears here are examples drawn mainly from the newspapers, 'Paratus' and interviews. Because of the paucity of this information no attempt at a detailed analysis is given.

The C.A.P. is active in all the 'homelands', 'independent' or otherwise. The Civic Action section at Natal Command Headquarters began to deploy personnel in KwaZulu in 1978, although S.A.D.F. personnel have been in KwaZulu Civic posts since 1976. In August 1979 there were 58 qualified Civic Action personnel working there. 28 of these were medical doctors working in hospitals throughout the territory and there were 11 agricultural advisers. (170)

In September 1982 there were 10 S.A.D.F. teachers in the area. ⁽¹⁷¹⁾
Most of them are working in the rural areas, although in June 1979
Civic Action personnel began to work in the urban areas as well. All
the postings are done jointly by the KwaZulu Government and the Civic
Action staff at Natal Command which also pays part of their salaries. ⁽¹⁷²⁾
The KwaZulu officials are responsible for their control and supervision
and Natal Command for their discipline. Civic Action personnel
maintain regular contact with Natal Command for evaluation purposes. ⁽¹⁷³⁾

A recent Conference for Com.Ops/Civic Action personnel revealed
a number of problems with the coordination of the programme. According
to one N.S.M. most of the Conference was propagandistic in nature but
Civic Action soldiers raised a number of criticisms. Firstly, there
were over 80 posts for C.A.P. personnel but less than 60 N.S.M. were
made available. Secondly, the C.A.P. people in a particular area
or magisterial district were supposed to get together to discuss
tactical issues and on the ground problems faced. There were com-
plaints that this was not happening. Thirdly, there were complaints
that the police and security police were undermining their activity
by "coming in with too heavy a hand". Fourthly, there were complaints
that there was a lack of coordination with Inkatha. ⁽¹⁷⁴⁾

Relations between the S.A.D.F. and Inkatha have always been
sensitive. Officially there is no formal contact (with normal links
being with the KwaZulu Government). However, in reality the N.S.M.
frequently have to deal with Inkatha. Buthelezi's attitude to the
C.A.P. is characteristically ambiguous (as someone once put it - he's
never quite sure whether he's part of the total strategy or the total
onslaught). In January 1980, while expressing appreciation for the
programme as a whole, he condemned enforced wearing of uniforms by
soldier teachers as he said this created qualms of conscience for
Blacks as it appeared that the propaganda value of the exercise was

a priority/.....

a priority rather than a genuine wish to help for humanitarian reasons. (175) A month later the Inkatha Central Committee expressed concern about the wearing of uniforms by teachers and resolved that unless the practice was stopped, it would recommend to the KwaZulu Cabinet that use of teachers from the Army be discontinued. (176) In 1979 the Natal African Teachers Union had passed a motion to the same effect as had the S.R.C. at the University of Zululand. (177)

The S.A.D.F. replied that it was policy that all N.S.M. wore uniform, but a compromise seemed to have been reached when the N.S.M. immediately did away with the bayonets on their rifles and later used 9 mm pistols instead. They also started wearing 'step-outs' instead of 'browns'. (178) After this the issue was dropped by Inkatha. This compromise appears to be an exception for the rural areas. From a reply by Mr. G. S. Bartlett to a question in Parliament it is apparent, that at least in 1978 S.A.D.F. teachers were usually armed and dressed in army uniform. According to Bartlett this was in case "terrorists came into the school and kidnapped the school children". He said they were required to carry their R.1. rifles at all times because if they put them aside, and their pupils sympathised with the terrorists "one could then make a dive for the rifle". (179) *W. Nelson*

In KwaZulu another incident occurred in January 1983 when Inkatha complained that C.A.P. soldiers had asked Ingwavuma villagers what Inkatha did for them and had told them that it was the army who helped supply water during the drought in 1980 and during the cholera outbreak in 1981. Buthelezi gave copies of sworn affidavits from the villagers involved to the S.A.D.F. and said that neither the police nor the army had political responsibilities in the areas they patrolled and he did not expect them to campaign against Inkatha, although he appreciated what the army had done to help KwaZulu, as for example, there were hospitals which would have no doctors without the assistance

of army doctors. After a 2 hour meeting between senior KwaZulu Government officials and military officers, including the Chief of the army Lt. Gen. Jan Geldenhuys, the S.A.D.F. apologised and assured Buthelezi that incidents such as these would not re-occur. (180)

In addition to C.A.P. teachers in Natal there are a further 6 who teach African troops, their families and labourers from literacy level to matric at 121 bn. at Duku Duku. Under the title "Joy is educating a Zulu" 'Paratus' awarded the principle of the Education Centre, Lt. P. Fenton, the title of 'N.S.M. of the Month'. (181)

The S.A.D.F. is engaged in similar activities in the other homelands. With the possible exception of KwaZulu the C.A.P. appears to be busiest in Bophuta Tswana where N.S.M. from North Western Command are serving in the schools, in agriculture, in the colleges and in hospitals. This is done in cooperation with the Bophuta Tswana Government and the Government departments. (182)

Most emphasis appears to have been given to agricultural development programmes where N.S.M. agricultural advisers are working under the auspices of the Bophuta Tswana Agricultural Corporation. Most are soldiers with previous training or experience in agriculture. They provide training for Tswana farmers and attempt to get them to increase production. (183)

The S.A.D.F. appears to be busiest in Tuang in southern Bophuta Tswana which has a population of 15000. There C.A.P. personnel are involved at the Tuang Agricultural College, the Bathlaping High School, Saint Paul Mission School and the Pinagore College.

In 1979 there were S.A.D.F. teachers in 16 schools in Bophuta Tswana because of the severe teacher shortage. In the African areas of Potchefstroom, Klerksdorp, Stilfortein, Orkney and Cartonville a further education programme was launched in 1979 involving school pupils and adults. In these areas, in June 1979, N.S.M. teachers

were/.....

were helping in about 30 schools every day. (184) N.S.M. teachers are also permanently based in Mafeking, near to where the army base is. (185) As well as teaching they help provide sports instruction to Black schools coordinated from the Central Sports Office in Manabatho and from offices in the other areas. They are also involved with providing sports ground facilities and have initiated the building of a community stadium. (186) The medical services they run includes work in both hospitals and clinics. (187)

Groups of Bophuta Tswana school children have been taken on trips assisted by the C.A.P. For example, a group of 30 African standard 9 school children from Maraisdal High School at Tweespruit (associated to the Christian Brothers) visited Cape Town under the auspices of the C.A.P. The school is attended by children of Bophuta Tswana V.I.P's. This programme compiled by the C.A.P. included visits to various Western Cape tourist attractions. According to one S.A.D.F. member:

"They came to Cape Town not quite knowing what to expect from members of the Defence Force After the Camp they all agreed that their initial ideas were quite wrong." (188)

According to the Sunday Post in September 1979 there were between 20 and 30 Civic Action teachers in Ciskei schools. It reported that the Ciskei Ministry of Education had said that there was a shortage of teachers in Ciskei's schools and had confirmed the presence of soldiers in schools. According to Chief Jongilwana there was no friction or animosity between C.A.P. personnel and the students in Ciskei schools. He commended the N.S.M. for the wonderful work they were doing and said that students accepted the S.A.D.F. teachers. However, the Ciskei Department of Education was not happy about the teachers wearing S.A.D.F. uniforms. (189) N.S.M. are also being used there as doctors and as lecturers at Fort Hare University. (190)

In 1980 it was reported that the S.A.D.F. also helped the Ciskei Government set up a work colony of 50 recruits as part of a youth movement programme called In siha YeSizwe (Pillar of the Nation), ⁽¹⁹¹⁾ seemingly on lines very similar to those established in Namibia. According to Sebe his motivations was to establish " a youth movement that will not only keep the wolf from the door but will also occupy our youth meaningfully and profitably for a whole year ". Some of its aims are: "to stimulate love of culture and fatherland; to identify future leaders; and to stimulate a sense of discipline, patriotism, nationalism and love of soil". The S.A.D.F. advises and trains them and the camps are run on military discipline lines. ⁽¹⁹²⁾

In the Eastern Transvaal C.A.P. activities have been going on since 1976. In July 1977 the S.A.D.F. began setting up a permanent presence in Amsterdam, near Kangwane. The main objective of the exercise according to the Commanding Officer, Maj. P. S. Grobler, was to "establish contact with the Black people in the area in order to consolidate the bond of friendship and trust between them and the S.A.D.F." ⁽¹⁹³⁾ According to Paratus the locals were at first apprehensive at the sight of heavily armed men in full kit, but this initial fear gave way to a feeling of trust and cooperation. The second in Command of the section, Rfn. Clive Moore said that the visits served a twofold purpose in that the S.A.D.F. by its presence and actions was gaining the trust of the inhabitants as well as performing a useful civic rôle in the lives of the community. ⁽¹⁹⁴⁾

In the Northern Transvaal, according to a Church worker, Black S.A.D.F. trainees are left near villages for 2 weeks without much food. They are instructed to mix with the locals without wearing uniforms. They then converge on places where there are schoolchildren. He said in one instance when they were asked what they were doing, they said they were recruiting the higher standard of boys for the S.A.D.F.

He said that in the Northern Transvaal they assist in drought stricken areas and help with irrigation. There are also a number of S.A.D.F. teachers in his area who are assisted by the rôle played by Radio Bantu which is used in the classrooms. (195)

In Venda the S.A.D.F. have been involved in Civic Action projects since 1977. As well as providing teachers, agriculturalists and medics the S.A.D.F. has given military exhibitions for the African population. (196)

In June 1981 it was reported that the Northern Transvaal Command had distributed thousands of propaganda pamphlets in Kwandebele and had been doing so throughout the year. This was confirmed by the S.A.D.F. The pamphlets have pictures with captions in bold letters. One has a picture of men with sad looking faces as 2 men with A.K.47's on their sides happily help themselves to a pot of food. Another has a picture of a soldier pointing to a mealie field with the caption: "The S.A. soldier helps you grow them". According to Col. Kobus Bosman the S.A.D.F. was helping people grow their mealies:

".....where there are soldiers - I want to emphasise this - they always do whatever they can to help the people".

One pamphlet shows a happy African family in their kraal with the caption "Live your life as your forefathers did". Another has a picture of a guerilla with snakes coming out of his mouth with the caption: "Don't listen to the evil talk of the trouble makers. It is poisonous". Another has a picture of a man with an A.K.47 over his shoulder talking to a man called Joe. Next to it is another picture with Joe on his back with a knife in his chest. The caption says: "Joe listened to the terrorists ". According to Mrs. Ina Perlman of the S.A.I.R.R. these pamphlets were being distributed throughout the Northern Transvaal. (197)

Statistics are not available from the S.A.D.F. on the total number/.....

to an S.A.D.F. spokesperson:

"The Civic Action teacher offers a contribution of inestimable value. Relations between the Civic Action servicemen (teachers) and the Black students are so outstandingly good that the scholars provide the teachers with information concerning the movements of the enemy" (200)

5. The rural areas with the highest concentration of C.A.P. personnel seem to be those with the highest reported guerilla presence and the greatest S.A.D.F. presence generally. OFS?
6. The rural strategy seems primarily aimed at countering the reality or threat of guerilla activity.

4.7. THE C.A.P. and the ROLE OF THE S.A.D.F. IN EDUCATION IN THE URBAN AREAS.

4.7.1. INTRODUCTION

In the urban areas the C.A.P's activities are far more diverse than in the rural areas and at this stage are not aimed at countering guerilla activity but rather at:

1. Contributing to the ideological aims of 'Total Strategy' through pushing a belief in multi racialism;
2. propagandising about the 'Total Onslaught' militarily and politically;
3. improving the image of the S.A.D.F;
4. softening the ground for conscription of Coloureds and Indians;
5. creating leadership groups sympathetic to the S.A.D.F's aims; and
6. performing a guardian, intelligence gathering rôle.

In the rural areas the C.A.P's activities in schools are just an aspect of Hearts and Minds strategy in these areas. In the urban areas most of the C.A.P's activities concern activities in schools and amongst the youth generally.

The reason for Black schools being the key area of the 'Civic Action's' rôle in the urban areas is not hard to find. As was discussed in Chapter I it was initially within the educational apparatus

that/.....

that the undercurrent of Black resistance reasserted itself. The rise of Black consciousness combined with other political forces lead to the 1976 uprisings. The initial demand for the scrapping of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction lead to demands for the rejection of Bantu Education. By the time of the 1980 education boycotts the level of organisation and political sophistication had developed significantly and combined with the red meat boycott in support of striking meat workers and the bus boycott against increased fare increases in Cape Town, led to the further development and fusion of National political and worker consciousness which in turn assisted the growth of C.O.S.A.S. in the schools and A.Z.A.S.O. in tertiary education institutions.

These words of Bowles and Gintis can be suitably applied to Black education in South Africa:

"The education system has hardly been a fine tuned instrument of manipulation in the hands of socially dominant groups! Schools and Colleges do indeed justify unequality, but they have also become arenas in which a highly political equitarian consciousness has developed among some parents, teachers and students"

(201)

The formative action taken by the State in response to the crisis in education and the contradictions inherent in it have already been alluded to. Suffice to say that the very real material grievances continue to remain - the shortage and lack of training of teachers, the low quality of facilities, overcrowding, uneven subsidisation of African, Coloured, Indian and White education, and consequently the high failure and drop out rates. In some respects this situation has deteriorated since 1976 and 1980 with, for example, the teacher shortage being even more severe than before and therefore the use of N.S.M. as teachers, at least from the point of view of the educational authorities (who in other respects are not always in line with military thinking), has been a stop-gap measure to help ease the shortage.

But the rôle of the Civic Action teacher is very different

from/.....

from that of any other education department functionary. For the more he establishes a favourable rapport with his students, the more he becomes, as Lewin puts it, a functionary of total strategy. (202) His rôle is no more to stem the tide of the educational crisis than is the rôle of C.A.P. Youth Camp instructor to give Black school children enjoyable weekends or the rôle of the C.A.P. sports instructor to improve the standard of Black sport. In each case there are secondary rôles with the primary rôle being to fulfil the political aims of Total Strategy. ✓

4.7.2. THE PRESENCE OF THE S.A.D.F. IN URBAN AFRICAN SCHOOLS

In 1981 the teacher-pupil ratio was 1 : 18 for Whites; 1 : 24 for Indians; 1 : 27 for Coloureds; and 1 : 48 for Africans. The percentage of unqualified teachers (if a qualified teacher has a matric plus a diploma) were : Whites : 3,36%; Indians : 19,70%; Coloureds : 66,14%; Africans : 85%. (203) With this situation existing the offer of N.S.M. who were qualified teachers to educational authorities and principles was one which they could not refuse. ✓

In the urban African schools particularly, the events of 1976 and 1980 had severe effects on the image the S.A.D.F. was wanting to portray. The S.A.D.F. exists as a potential back-up to the S.A.P. No where was this more apparent than in Soweto in 1976, where, despite official denials, there are strong indications that at least commandos and citizen force units were used to quell the uprising (204) and both military and police units wore camouflage uniforms. S.A.D.F. troops have also been used in curbing "minor unrest" in other areas, (205) in manning roadblocks, (206) and in conducting cordon operations (207) and house to house searches. (208) Thus in moving into the township in 1979 the C.A.P. teachers were starting with a considerable credibility gap.

The first/.....

The first report of Civic Action teachers being used in township schools came in September 1979 when the Post reported that S.A.D.F. men teaching in Alafang secondary school in Kattlehong were giving out free copies of the S.A.D.F. Civic Action magazine 'The Warrior' as well as 'The Citizen'. One article in 'The Warrior' stated:

"Some of the frustrated agitators are trying to boost the image of a pitiful old man in a prison, a plain convict, who for all we know, does not even feel like these 'energetic ventures'.

Mr. David Thebahale (Soweto Council Chairman) and his colleagues are the true leaders of the Black people which the Government is prepared to talk to - not the people who claim to be representing the oppressed peoples of South Africa, yet having their own ulterior motives!

The constant claim that the peoples of the Republic of South Africa are downtrodden is sickening, just as naive as the effort to press the Government through Church assemblies to do things which are not the wishes of the majority.

Only the Government has the power to do things in this country. Let us speak through our true leaders, not through convicts like Mandela and others". (209)

The February edition of 'The Warrior', distributed in schools in Soweto, attacked Bishop Tutu and the Post and accused Umkhonto we Sizwe of being responsible for brutal murders. (210)

Bishop Tutu threatened to sue, and the tactics were widely condemned by among others the P.F.P's Defence Spokesperson Harry Schwartz and newspaper editorials. (211) A Post editorial put things in the following terms:

"For some time now the top brass of the Defence force has spoken strongly about the need to 'win the hearts and minds' of the people, ranks as a top priority. Unfortunately, to win the hearts and minds of the people takes more than manipulating newspapers.

It takes the removal of race discrimination and it takes the whole concept of participation in Government. At the moment the majority of our people hate the political system and they see the Defence Force as an extension of that system and a tool to prop it up...." (212)

'The Warrior' seems to have toned down its attacks although it is still believed to be distributed in some township schools. According to one Soweto teacher Paratus is now handed out free to school-

After the extent of opposition faced in 1979 the S.A.D.F. appear to have moved more carefully in the African schools on the Rand and have started introducing N.S.M. teachers in Coloured Schools on the Rand. According to a Catholic Church Education worker in Soweto, despite the teacher shortage, if teachers in Soweto and the East Rand show any sign of political activity or interest they are replaced by N.S.M. (229)

Civic Action N.S.M. are now active in schools in most African townships in South Africa. A few examples are given below from interviews conducted.

According to a community worker active in Pretoria and Soweto, in Mabopane the S.A.D.F. called together all the high school principals in the area and told them to get together their brightest pupils for an excursion that the S.A.D.F. would take them on. They were taken around Voortrekkerhoogte and given lectures on the importance of the S.A.D.F., on the career opportunities it offered and on the virtues of being a soldier and fighting communism. They were then asked to join up on finishing school. They were also given 'Warrior' T-shirts, as were children from Soweto who visited the base. (230)

Children from the Pretoria area with whom the S.A.D.F. has been working have also been told to report the presence of any strangers to the S.A.D.F. (231) This strategy of using children as the 'eyes and ears' of the military seems to be widely used.

An S.R.C. member from a school in Atteridgeville said that the S.A.D.F. had visited schools in the area, spoken to them about the S.A.D.F. and had tried to recruit them. Some were taken on a tour of Voortrekkerhoogte. He also said that there were an increasing number of S.A.D.F. teachers in the area. (232)

A Standard 9 student from a school in Umlazi said that the S.A.D.F. had spoken to scout leaders in the area and the scouts had been taken on a tour of a military base by the S.A.D.F. He also said that

one school in the area the school choir had been taken on a compulsory tour by the S.A.D.F., during which, he said they were subjected to military propaganda. There was opposition from some of the students but they could do nothing to stop the tour. There were also a growing number of S.A.D.F. teachers in the area, he said. Some of the non-S.A.D.F. teachers were aware of the problem but were scared that if they complained they would be fired. (233)

A Catholic nun teaching in Mdantsane said that S.A.D.F. teachers in the townships schools went beyond the syllabus and pushed military propaganda - even as far as pushing military examples in mathematics problems. (234)

Visits from African schools to S.A.D.F. bases appear to be a useful vehicle for S.A.D.F. propaganda. One such visit was to 21 Bn. by Philade school in Heilbron in the Orange Free State. It was attended by 200 African schoolchildren from Standards 3 to 5 and 23 teachers. As well as being served with a military display, refreshments and a hot lunch they were given an address by Maj. G. J. Cloete who told them that they need not fear men in uniform as the army was there to protect them and help them, and therefore they liked having children with them. He went on to stress that

"the A.N.C. and P.A.C. are our enemies and together we must fight them".

He ended by saying:

"Today we are not going to show you how to kill but how we train soldiers and we hope that one day you will join us".

Thereafter Sgt. M. Maji gave them a lecture on the benefits of joining the P.F. (235)

In the Western Cape the C.A.P. have been involved in a number of projects in African schools such as training netball players and drum majorettes at Tembani Higher Primary School, (236) and teaching rugby/.....

rugby to African school children in Paarl with Ian Kirkpatrick. (237)

From the examples given here it seems that despite the early hickups in 1979 and 1980 in Soweto and the East Rand, the strategy of using S.A.D.F. teachers in Urban African schools is now well established and since 1980 there have been no reported boycotts or other demonstrations of student resistance. Although from the information available here it is impossible to draw any definite conclusions on the attitudes of the African students and their communities to the presence of C.A.P. teachers in their schools, if any projections can be drawn from surveys conducted in Soweto showing widespread opposition to the S.A.D.F., (238) the presence of C.A.P. teachers is likely to be no more than grudgingly accepted.

1.3. THE PRESENCE OF THE S.A.D.F. AT COLOURED SCHOOLS

S.A.D.F. teachers have also been making inroads into Coloured schools, particularly in the Transvaal and in Indian schools. (239) In October 1979 the Star reported that S.A.D.F. teachers were teaching at Coloured schools on the Rand (240) although it is believed that S.A.D.F. teachers had been filling vacancies at Coloured schools in Natalspruit (241) and Kimberley since the beginning of 1979. (242) The report said that Eldorado Park High School had 9 S.A.D.F. teachers. According to a teacher from the school, by the end of 1981 15 S.A.D.F. teachers had taught there. She said they carried guns and attributed their presence to the right wing views of the principal who welcomed them. (243)

The teacher shortage in Coloured schools appears to have been most severe on the Rand. In January 1982 it was announced that 14 N.S.M. had been placed in Rand Coloured schools. Eden Park High School, with 27 classrooms for 1000 pupils, opened in January 1982 with no teachers, after which 5 N.S.M. were seconded there. (244)

According to one education official the reasons for the shortage, necessitating the introduction of N.S.M. into Coloured schools were

poor pay, particularly for the lesser qualified teachers, causing resignations, the rapid growth of pupil numbers, and the lack of teachers coming from the Rand College of Education at Crown Mines - the only teachers training college for Coloureds in the Transvaal. ⁽²⁴⁵⁾ Enrolment there dropped by 67% between 1980 and 1982. ⁽²⁴⁶⁾ Both in the Transvaal and in the Western Cape, as well as in other areas, the ⁽²⁴⁷⁾ shortages appear to be most severe in science, biology and mathematics.

There have been no reported incidents of resistance to N.S.M. teachers in Coloured schools. In the Western Cape there are no S.A.D.F. teachers in either African or Coloured schools despite the severe shortages of teachers which was one factor causing the worst ever exam results in Coloured schools in the area leading to calls from the P.F.P. for a parliamentary enquiry. ⁽²⁴⁸⁾ The reason for there being no S.A.D.F. teachers in the Western Cape seems to lie in the likelihood of opposition from teachers, principals and students. This was confirmed by Maj. Britz, who said:

"We have higher priorities and anyway the department is reluctant and the principals don't seem to want it". ⁽²⁴⁹⁾

In the Western Cape however, the Cape Corp have visited some schools. A teacher from a Coloured school in Worcester said that when he was a school child in 1975 the Cape Corp used to come to speak to the Standard 9's and 10's, "telling them how wonderful it was", and that this continues to happen at a few schools. He said that the Cape Corp would be visiting his school the following month, and that whether or not these visits took place depended very much on the attitude of the principal. ⁽²⁵⁰⁾

Interviews with residents of Hout Bay in Cape Town revealed that the S.A.D.F. comes to schools and talks to Standard 9's and 10's about career possibilities in the army and of the benefits such as free clothes and "getting your own gun". ⁽²⁵¹⁾ Civic Action have also

visited/.....

visited a number of schools in the Western Cape mainly teaching sport and showing movies. (252)

A teacher at a Coloured school in Bridgetown in Cape Town said that the Standard 7's had been sent to a Cape Corp exhibition in the Good Hope Centre and a number of them had said that they would join up. When they discussed the exhibition in the class she said the children were confused:

"One boy who is seen as a leader by his class got up and said the Army was the enemy and he wouldn't be prepared to fight for it. But others were less convinced. A number of boys said they had already signed up at the Cape Corp. exhibition. Their attitude was that it was a steady job, they liked to fight and they wanted to defend their country."

"When I asked them who they were fighting against they said it was the communists. They seemed very sold on the Big Russian Bear idea.

I suppose its all the television they watch."

"The principal came in while we were discussing this and he confirmed their ideas of Russian imperialism. He told them that the Russians started wars all over the world to get rich from them

Quite a few of the boys were very interested in joining the Navy. They saw it as just another job where you could get a good technical training and said that even after you have left the Navy you can get a job easily because the people see you as responsible" (253)

4.7.4. YOUTH CAMPS FOR BLACK STUDENTS

Another important aspect of the C.A.P's work amongst Black/school students has been its running of Youth Camps since 1976. (254) S.A.D.F. Camps of this nature are now being run throughout the country but it is in the Cape Province where they seem to have been most extensive. In 1982 16 of these Camps were held in the Western Cape for Coloured students and 5 for African students, while 6 were held in the Northern Cape for Coloured students. (255) In 1981 20 Camps were held in the Cape for Coloured students. (256)

In the Western Cape the Camps are coordinated by the Civic

Action/.....

Action Division of Western Province Command and are run with the cooperation of the Administration Boards, the Community Councils and organisations such as the Lions and the Rotarians. (257) Most are advertised as 'adventure camps', although the programmes seem to vary with some camps being more directly militaristic than others.

The Bergzicht Senior Secondary School Youth Camp in the Western Cape lasted for 5 days. Activities included P.T., Sport, films, tours of the Castle, the Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, the fish hatchery, Jonkershoek, the Simba factory, etc., hikes and picnics, 'discussion sessions' and so on. (258) The propagandistic aspect appears to be subtle through giving the children a good time, although methods like handing out Civic Action T-shirts, and S.A.D.F. magazines like 'Contact' and 'Paratus', and holding political discussions are also used. (259)

According to Maj. Britz the S.A.D.F. tried to

"find out what the children want. We don't force our ideas on them. Although we are there we get other people to lecture" (260)

This was confirmed by a mother whose son went on one of the African schools camps:

"They were taken on hikes and taught to swim. They played soccer with Defence Force members. My son did not speak of any open indoctrination but told us how one captain speaking Xhosa showed them how his gun worked". (261)

However, at least some of the Youth Camps have a less subtle tone. According to a mother from Woodstock in Cape Town, boys from her area are regularly approached to go to Civic Action camps. She said that some 16 year old boys had been approached by soldiers who asked them to go on a 5 day Camp. 3 of them went and were given wooden rifles and overalls. They were made to drill and push trucks in the sand and were given lectures encouraging them to join the S.A.D.F. (262)

A report in Paratus of a camp near Atlantis on the West Coast attended by 112 Coloured students chosen by C.A.P. personnel and principals/.....

principals, said that after being divided ~~into~~ groups of 11 and placed in tents they were instructed in, amongst other things, vehicle maintenance, first aid, and weapon handling. The report said that the aim of the camp was to promote leadership amongst young people. (263)

According to Mr. D. Nell of the Department of Internal Affairs in Natal, the aim of youth camps in Southern Natal is

"to instil leadership in the Youth through adventure, culture and religion".

Activities include negotiating obstacle courses, target shooting and weaponry displays. The students/^{are}marked for their performance in these activities. (264) Camps for Coloured boys in Middelburg are held with the aim of developing leadership through sports and activities encouraging personality_A through competition. Another aim was given as being "to inculcate the South African way of life". (265)

The Camps vary widely in size. One was held for 23 14 year olds from Mbekweni while another (assisted by U.S.K.O.R. the Stellenbosch University equivalent of S.H.A.W.C.O.) was held for 600 Coloured children from Scottsdene. The children are usually chosen to go on the camps by their principals. (266) At most schools "leadership elements" are chosen although the basis of assessing this appears to vary. At one school brighter pupils were chosen, at another the taller children were picked. (267)

At some Camps pupils are accompanied by teachers, (268) at others 'youth leaders', for example from the University of the Western Cape and the Peninsula Technicon, have assisted. (269) but most are staffed by S.A.D.F. members. The Bergzicht camp for example, was staffed by 5 S.A.D.F. soldiers (1 officer) and 2 Cape Corp cooks. (270)

The camps are usually free. Some are run during term time with pupils being expected to make up the lost time. (271) According to Maj. Britz, while on the Camps the army instructors do "a form of

talent/.....

talent scouting to identify leadership elements "The instructors keep in personal contact with these youngsters. Usually they come back to us. If they want to get a project going in their community, we help them..... The army is neutral. It is everybody's army. We are trying to make people realise this and win their trust. And we are succeeding in doing so." (272)

In the Western Cape the camps cater for a wide range of schools groups. As well as the Youth Leadership Camps there are camps for individual schools, for disabled children (273) and for cerebral palsied children. (274) Other camps have been held for groups in other parts of the country such as the Bophuta Tswana Camp (mentioned above), and a camp for 30 prefects from the Ongwedwa Training Centre in Ovambo-land. All are at the S.A.D.F's expense. (275) The ages of the students ranges from 8 to 18.

In the Western Cape there has been widespread opposition to the camps from parents, youth groups, women's groups, community newspapers and the P.F.P. In March 1982 after a series of camps for pupils chosen from 5 Higher Primary Schools in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu, senior pupils and parents complained to the Administration Board about them. One of the main complaints was that the children were being indoctrinated.

One parent complained:

"This is totally unacceptable and it is clear that even if it appears on the surface as an open, informal thing, its obvious that our children are being indoctrinated..... What is more, we as parents are never consulted about matters like this." (276)

Another parent said:

"Had I known the defence force had anything to do with it, I would have refused to let my child go". (277)

Another commented:

"..... it all seems so innocent which in my opinion makes it more dangerous. It is part of a slow, subtle indoctrination process". (278)

The/.....

The source of much of the anger was that parents were only informed in a circular letter from the school principal that their children would be participating in the Camps and there was no mention of the S.A.D.F.'s involvement. As one parent expressed it:

"No-one asked our permission. Nor were we ever fully informed of the facts. We simply received a circular informing us that our children had been selected to take part in educational camps and would be cared for. The next thing we knew, they were being taken from the school premises to Harmanus in army trucks..... We want to ask one simple question. What business is it for the S.A.D.F. to be involved in so-called educational and recreational camps for our children?" (279)

According to Britz the answer was that the S.A.D.F. was in a better position to undertake such projects than other organisations because it had the manpower and means to do it. (280) An Administration Board spokesperson said that the Camps were purely 'informal' and had drawn on other organisations to help as well. (281)

In response to this a pamphlet was widely distributed in the townships warning parents about the camps. (282) It said that the aim of the camps was to recruit Blacks into the army and that the S.A.D.F.'s 'Total Strategy' campaign was aimed at the Black community as a whole and the schools specifically. It warned against people and organisations who supported the army. It went on to say:

"It is not enough that these issues are taken up in Parliament and written about in newspapers. The issue must not be taken out of the hands of the Black community..... We must not allow our vigilance to relax. We must talk about what is happening in our schools. We must speak about it in our civic meetings, trade union meetings, and S.R.C. meetings. We must unite in our efforts to stop the army from interfering with the minds of our children. We dare not forget 1976, and 1980". (283)

The P.F.P. also expressed concern over the camps, saying that the most disturbing aspect was that parents were not consulted. They called for a full scale enquiry to establish the motivation of the camps. (284) Speaking on the issue, Dr. Alex Boraine said that

"if it /.....

"if it proves to be a subtle method of gaining young Black support for the Government then its exposure is to the benefit of these students and parents." (285)

N.E.U.S.A. also responded to the issue and issued a statement saying the camps were intended to create a favourable image of the S.A.D.F. (286)

Another issue occurred in November 1982 which resulted in further organisation around the issue and opposition to the programme. 23

Primary school children from Mbekweni near Paarl were taken to a C.A.P./W.C.A.B. youth camp in Harmanus. According to parents the children got their friends to sign for them after they were told they were going on a picnic and would get football jerseys if they went along. (287)

They complained that the forms stated that the parents would be responsible. Parents also said they had approached one headmaster and discovered that the inspector had put pressure on him to allow the children to be taken to camps, but another headmaster had refused to cooperate. (288)

A mass meeting of Mbekweni residents was organised by the Mbekweni United Womens' Organisation branch and the Western Cape Civic Association and as a result the parents drove to Hermanus and collected their children. (289)

There also appear to be moves to hold youth camps in the Johannesburg Indian and Coloured townships. In Lenasia recently, for example, the S.A.D.F. called school principals together to get their top students to go on S.A.D.F. run youth camps. Similar moves have also taken place in Bloemfontein. (290)

Without more details on Centres other than Cape Town it is difficult to get a national picture of the extent and success of the Youth Camps. However, at least in the Western Cape their effect should not be underestimated. Between 1500 and 2000 students between the ages of 8 and 18, most of them chosen as 'leadership elements' go through them annually. Although some are clearly militaristic in tone others have taken a more seductive form. It is likely that the

outings/.....

outings, sport, film shows etc., do succeed in improving the image of the S.A.D.F. amongst at least a large number of those who go on the Camps, some of whom are unlikely to have had a holiday before. Certainly there have been no cases of opposition from the youth themselves. Contact prints 2 or 3 pages of letters each month from youth praising the camps and thanking the S.A.D.F. While this of course does not provide an accurate assessment of the response of the students, if the letters are genuine (and there is little reason to believe otherwise) they do indicate that the hearts and minds of at least some of the youth have been well won.

On the other hand they do provide a concrete issue through which community camps can articulate their opposition to the effects of the presence of the S.A.D.F. in the Black communities specifically and to militarisation generally. In this respect the widespread publicity given to the "abduction" of children to these camps (as with the issue of the "forcing" of the S.A.D.F. teachers in Soweto) is likely to have undermined the military's position in the Black communities.

47.5. OTHER CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES IN THE TOWNSHIPS

For those children who do not go on the youth camps the Civic Action organises outings to various tourist and other attractions. For example children from the Swartwater N.G.K. Primary School from Darling were taken by Civic Action personnel on a tour of Ysterplaat Airforce base. (291)

Civic Action also organises holiday programmes for children in the Western Cape. This is usually done jointly with City Councils. The Cape Town City Council said that they assist because the programmes teach the children road safety and keep them off the streets. According to Grassroots bright banners, loud music and free cold drinks are used to draw children to the Council's parks where games, talks, film

shows/.....

shows and dancing are organised. ⁽²⁹²⁾ These were advertised in Cape Town newspapers as "Playgroups for school children, with games of all kinds, painting, movies, etc. Under the auspices of the S.A.D.F. Civic Action Unit " ⁽²⁹³⁾ In Cape Town in 1982 they attracted over 8000 children, mainly from the Coloured areas. ⁽²⁹⁴⁾ Their purpose seems to be to improve the S.A.D.F. image amongst children and to influence them into thinking that the army cares for them.

The C.A.P. is also involved with encouraging and assisting 'multi-racial' sport, both to counter S.A.C.O.S' support and to improve the image of the S.A.D.F. amongst sportsmen and women. They have been active in a number of sports. They organise and assist schools rugby where top class rugby coaches are brought in to assist the S.A.D.F. which sponsors the sessions. ⁽²⁹⁵⁾ In cricket they assist the John Passmore Cricket Week (the Black equivalent of the Nuffield Week) ⁽²⁹⁶⁾. They have also sponsored cycle tours and other sports activities. ⁽²⁹⁷⁾

Britz was explicit on the reasons for the S.A.D.F.'s involvement in sport:

"I don't like the word Total Onslaught - it is too often misused. Old Piet Poggendoel in the Platteland thinks that the total onslaught is all about butterflies on jeans and earrings for men. That's nonsense, whatever you want to call it we're fighting an enemy and we're fighting to constantly changing rules so you have to fight in every area your enemy is fighting in. So countering the total onslaught means getting involved with sport. If I was an enemy of South Africa I would work for isolation of sport and that is why we get involved. We have to use multi-racial sport as a weapon against the enemy. So we work closely with the Western Province Cricket Union, for example, and have Omar Henrey and others giving coaching clinics. Our enemies don't like that"

Clearly the C.A.P. regards S.A.C.O.S. as its most significant enemy in the sporting sphere. In Contact a point is made to constantly deride S.A.C.O.S. For example in an article on a C.A.P. rugby coaching clinic in the Platteland it is pointed out that S.A.C.O.S. players participated in it. ⁽²⁹⁸⁾ Bodybuilder Ralph Piers is quoted as

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saying that he left S.A.C.O.S. because he felt international competition was important to anyone seriously interested in sport, (298) and so on.

Britz explained this:

"S.A.C.O.S. and S.A.N.R.O.C. are the biggest enemies of South African sport. Our weapon against them is integration in sport - we use sport as a bridge for racial harmony " (300)

Although the emphasis of the C.A.P.'s activities in the urban area is on the schools and the youth they are also involved in various ways with adult groups. According to Britz, even the ladies club from Wippertal invited them. However, because of the shortage of manpower, and the fact that their priority is the youth, with adult groups they "only go by invitation" (301) Activities have seemed to involve mainly helping Church and civic groups. For example they helped the Malmesbury Moslem Society with their bazaar (which included a civic action quiz and T-shirts for the children), (302) they visited the Moravian Church's Huisvlyt Klub in Goedverwacht (303) and helped the Anglican Church in De Aar establish a Kleurling Komitee. (304)

The S.A.D.F. have also attempted to assist their influence in other ways in the urban areas. In the Eastern Cape, for example, they asked community councils for heroes acres to be set aside "to honour Blacks who have died fighting for South Africa." (305)

A more aggressive policy has been taken in publishing Civic Action work and countering opposition recently. According to Britz the C.A.P. reached 15000 people in his area in 1982 and to keep in touch with them the magazine Contact was started and has been widely distributed. (306) Said Britz:

"There has been a huge demand for youth camps and we don't have the manpower to maintain contact, but we keep in touch through our education development programme and those need to continue which is why we have started the civic action magazine Contact'. There was a need for it and the response has been good" (307)

Contact contains extensive coverage of youth camps and other

C.A.P. activities in the Western Cape. It also contains 2 or 3 pages an issue with letters praising the C.A.P's activities. It has also been used to attack S.A.C.O.S. and Grassroots Newspaper.

48. COLOURED AND INDIAN CADET TRAINING

In 1967 the Training Centres for Coloured Cadets Act was passed. This made it compulsory for Coloured males between 18 and 24 years old to register at police stations or Coloured Affairs Administration offices with non-registration constituting an offence. Despite the fact that this was advertised widely (308) the registration moves were a failure and were never strictly enforced. For example, in 1974, 1975 and 1976 a total of only 27002 youth registered; 6838 were called up, 3056 were exempted, 3108 were admitted to Faure Centre, 1388 were placed in employment and 1640 were issued with discharge certificates after completing 12 months training. (309)

Those who were called up were subject to 12 months service which consisted of a combination of military and industrial training. Initial training consisted of 16 weeks of basics followed by 8 weeks of specialised training and 6 months of applying skills. There were frequent charges of the 'pressganging' of unemployed people through threats of vagrancy charges. (310) In 1979 the Faure Training Centre was forced to close down when a commission found that conditions there were appalling and that trainees were mishandled and badly treated (311) leading to incidents of suicide. (312)

Since then the possibility of the introduction of cadet training in Coloured and Indian Schools has emerged. In 1975 the Theron Commission recommended compulsory military service and cadet training for Coloured high school students. This idea was provisionally accepted by the Government in 1977. (313) In 1978 the S.A.D.F. announced plans for a Coloured Cadet programme similar to that in White schools. (314)

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while according to the 1979 Defence White Paper Coloured and Indian Cadet training "was to be introduced shortly", (315) (after a pilot committee which sat in 1977 and 1978 consisting of representatives of the S.A.D.F. and the Departments of National Education, Coloured Affairs and Indian Affairs had recommended the introduction of the cadet scheme and its implementation was being considered by the relevant educational authorities). (316)

At the time (1978) the Cape Teachers Professional Association rejected the move as "a plot to divide Blacks who are moving towards greater unity Whites in this country are being attacked from all sides and now they are looking for allies. Even if the principals foolishly accepted the cadet scheme our children would reject it". (317)

A number of school principals also spoke out against the scheme predicting a repeat of the 1976 'riots' if it were introduced. The C.R.C. was divided over the issue, initially calling for the voluntary introduction of the programme, while later Mr. Norman Middleton, the deputy leader of the Labour Party said the C.R.C. would welcome the scheme subject to the condition that the system was the same as at White schools and Parents Teacher Associations approved. (318)

In February 1980 the idea was reintroduced when the Director of Schools' Cadets, Col. M. J. Viljoen, announced that:

"Daar bestaan sekerlik geen beter metode om onder die seuns en dogters van Suid Afrika 'n gunstige klimaat tot die bevulling van die land te skep, as deur middel van 'n deglike, doelgerigte en sinvolle kadetprogram nie" (319)

After this another investigation committee was set up looking into the possibility of introducing cadets in Coloured and Indian Schools. It stressed the necessity for and desirability of the move. However according to the Publicity Offices of the Directorate of Cadets:

"sekere probleme word egter nog ondervind maar sodra dit opgelos is, sal daar met die implementering voortgegaan word." (320)

In January 1982 the president of the Ex-Servicemen's Legion, Mr. Bill Francis, speaking at a Cape Corp meeting in Uppington called for the introduction of compulsory cadet training in Black schools. (321)

However according to the Cape Herald there was an immediate negative response from parents and Coloured School principals. For example, the principal of Livingstone High in Cape Town said that

"the idea will never be accepted until pupils have equal rights in this country. Not until everyone in South Africa can play a meaningful rôle in governing this country will the question of cadet training at schools be considered." (322)

Comments from other teachers and principals included:

"At this stage I couldn't imagine that anything else could evoke more opposition from certain sections of the population in this country"

and

"..... anybody who recommends military training at schools knows nothing about education". (323)

Francis' call was repeated in May 1982 by the Chairperson of the Karroo Zone of the Association of Management Committees (A.M.C.), Mr. Solly Essop and a motion introduced by the Graaff Reinet management Committee calling for cadets for Coloured students at schools in the Karroo and Platteland was unanimously passed.

"What our young people need is discipline"

said Essop. Mr. David Curry A.M.C. (and Labour Party) had declined to comment. (324) However, on other occasions the Labour Party has expressed opposition to the introduction of the plan. (325) Mr. Franklin Sonn on behalf of the Cape Professional Teachers Association once again issued a statement rejecting the cadet system. (326)

Despite the opposition the Ex-Servicemen's League wrote to P.W.Botha requesting the introduction of cadets, while individuals in the Cape Corp such as Cmdt. Cupido have also been pushing for it. (327)

In an interview Mr. Bill Francis and Cmdt. Cupido expressed their opinions:

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"We have complete opposition against it by our teaching fraternity. Our teachers just don't want to hear about it, they don't want it in the schools, but we believe that this would be something towards fighting the skolliedom that is in our area. Discipline them, give them something to do and they'll be proud of it and then come back. In the long run we can have a better synthesis. I'm positive about that. Of course people in the teaching profession don't see this",

said Francis. Cupido went on to say:

"should a boy be given cadet training at school and he eventually decides to come into the army, he'll come a better trained man, ready for the future, ready for a military future". (328)

However, because of the resentment and possibility of resistance from principals, teachers, pupils and community organisations, these plans have been shelved for the time being. Nevertheless, things have not stood still and some Coloured schools have introduced cadets voluntarily. (329) This was clearly expressed by Sgt. Eloff of E.P. Command Cadet Detachment in January 1983:

"Cadets are going to be introduced with them (Coloureds and Indians) but its not official. In fact some schools have already started but their programmes are not connected to the army yet. I just got a letter from a school asking us to help them but to do this we have to go through the education department and to get permission from senior army people. But cadets are coming for them as well". (330)

It now seems that the full implementation of the plan will be linked to the implementation of the government's constitutional proposals

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CONCLUSION

Although the S.A.D.F. generally and the C.A.P. specifically are active in most urban areas in South Africa, the extent and form of its activities varies considerably. In each area the C.A.P. does a careful socio-political assessment or 'appreciation' on which particular target groups are identified. (331) The priorities for these larger groups are not necessarily identical. There does appear to have been some experimentation and certain tactical mistakes have been made in the implementation

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of the C.A.P. However, its activities cannot be seen as being random or anything other than carefully planned and there does appear to be a common thread of direction throughout the country.

Certain strategies receive more stress in some areas than in others. In the East Rand, where the educational crisis has been most severe, it is in the schools where the C.A.P. has honed in, putting its resources into teaching particularly. In the Western Cape, where a direct presence in the schools would be particularly risky at this stage the focus has been on youth camps and sport, particularly in the Coloured Community as the strength of S.A.C.O.S. and the growth of youth militancy are identified as developments to counter. In the rural areas Civic Action's resources appear to be concentrated on complementing the counter-insurgency effort.

Within the urban areas the response of the different 'racial' groups would seem to vary. Amongst urban Africans the possibilities for success are severely limited by the effects of influx control and the migrant labour system, Bantu education, as well as racial segregation and political oppression generally. It is possibly significant that vociferous opposition to the C.A.P. (in Mbekwani, Soweto and Cape Town) has come only from African parents and there appears to have been very little vocal opposition from Coloured parents. In the Indian areas the extent of C.A.P. activity appears to be far more limited. From the information gathered it appears that in the urban areas the C.A.P. has been most successful amongst the Coloured youth, although this is in inverse proportion to the level of organisation and political activity generally and around the issue of the military specifically.

The possibilities for the success of the C.A.P. are also limited by the shortage of manpower which means that in most areas its resources are thinly spread. A side effect of this is that the demand for C.A.P. personnel and resources sometimes outstrips the supply which

means that in some cases it only operates on request. This, combined with the lack of resources in the townships and the extensive resources of the S.A.D.F. creates the basis for dependency on the C.A.P. to develop amongst certain groups.

Particularly in the urban areas the most significant area of the S.A.D.F.'s involvement has been amongst the youth and specifically through the schools. However, its place in Black schooling remains less central than the S.A.D.F.'s rôle in White schooling. At the moment the S.A.D.F.'s direct rôle in Black education remains at the level of important interventions which have opened up a relation which did not previously exist. For example, the presence of S.A.D.F. teachers in Black schools necessitates not only a new relation between the N.S.M. and the students but also between the S.A.D.F., the educational authorities and the principals and other teachers. Likewise the youth camps have involved the very important participation of School's principals - voluntarily or otherwise - in choosing the 'leadership elements'. In respect to both students and staff this relationship opens up the possibility for a tendency towards "softening" the image of the State and the military and undermining the development of popular democratic ideological interpellations.

This is countered by the development of oppositional tendencies - some of the forms of which have been discussed above. In both the sphere of education and more generally the C.A.P.'s activities open up new arenas of political and ideological struggle, the forms of expression of which are as yet at an embryonic stage.

Despite its definite limitations, growth of the C.A.P. and of the military's rôle in education should not be underestimated. Particularly in the urban areas the last 4 years have seen a rapid expansion in the ambit of its activities and there is every reason to believe that this process will continue. The development of an oppositional discourse has tended to lag behind in this respect, and particularly in the rural areas and in the Coloured areas the ability of the C.A.P. to achieve its aims has been limited.

CONCLUSION

In each of the 3 areas of the education system examined, it is clear that since the mid or late 1970's there has been an escalating military presence in a variety of forms. In the White schools the clearest indication of militarisation has been the rapid expansion of the cadet system since 1976, while the increasing military content in Guidance and Youth Preparedness programmes and Veld schools is also an indication of this. In the Universities the military's use of research facilities and Strategic Studies courses, the establishment of University Military Units at Afrikaans campuses and the attempts to do so at English campuses are all aspects of this development. The main vehicle of the military's penetration into Black schools has been the Civic Action Programme. The presence of National Servicemen teachers in rural and urban schools, S.A.D.F. youth camps and holiday programmes, S.A.D.F. involvement in Black schools sport and the moves towards the introduction of cadets into Coloured and Indian schools have all been part of this process.

The reason for these developments is found in the expanded rôle of the military in virtually all areas of South African society, which has been part of, and a response to, the crisis faced by capital and the State discussed in Chapter I. The growth of the military presence in South Africa generally has set the basis for the S.A.D.F.'s increased requirements from the education system.

Although the S.A.D.F.'s activities in the education system have taken a variety of forms, 2 broad and related concerns can be identified. Firstly, the S.A.D.F.'s need for the education system to provide for its manpower and training requirements, and secondly, its need for a greater ideological influence in each of the areas considered (while in the Universities a third concern is that for research). However in each area the relative weight of each concern varies.

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In the White schools the most important consideration has been to increase the level of military preparedness - mainly through the cadet programme but also through the military training aspects of the Veld Schools and the civil defence aspects of Youth Preparedness programmes. The aims here have been specifically to use the schools to perform some of the tasks undertaken by the S.A.D.F. during National Service and more generally to improve the level of military preparedness of all high school students. A secondary, but important consideration has been to help create a suitable ideological climate amongst White pupils and therefore considerable emphasis has been placed on propagating a 'Total Onslaught - Total Strategy - Total War' understanding of the situation in South Africa. Also important has been the military's use of the schools to channel pupils into military careers.

In the Universities the question of the Military's ideological influence has not been a particularly important one. Rather its priorities relate to using the Universities for research and training purposes. Particularly with the growth of the armaments industry, the military's research needs have grown rapidly and in some areas only the universities have the facilities to deal with these. Strategic Studies courses have been used to assist the training of S.A.D.F. officers, while the prime reason for the establishment of University Military Units has been to continue the training of university students who have completed their military training while they are at university.

The S.A.D.F.'s rôle in Black education has been primarily ideological, in the sense that its main aim has been to improve its image, and that of the State generally, amongst the Black youth. An important consideration here has been one of providing for the S.A.D.F.'s manpower needs in a number of ways. Youth Camps, S.A.D.F. visits to

schools and so on have been used directly to recruit Black students into the S.A.D.F, as well as to attempt to create a suitable climate for the introduction of conscription for Coloureds and Indians. The question of the introduction of cadets into Coloured and Indian schools is of particular significance in this regard.

In no way can it be said that the military's specific requirements from the education system have always been completely or easily met. In each of the areas considered important contradictions have existed. For example, some of the military's potential for ideological influence has been prevented by the right wing dominance in areas of the White schooling system. Although the S.A.D.F. has been able to propagate, in general terms, the idea of the need for preparation against Total Onslaught, this has not extended towards pushing the reformist aspects of the Total Strategy notion. Also, though of less significance, there has been the resistance of some English schools to the full implementation of S.A.D.F. programmes.

In the Afrikaans universities there has been virtually no resistance whatsoever to the military in any form. However, at the English universities resistance from students and reluctance from administrations has curtailed the military's ability to secure its aims. A combination of liberal aversion from university administrations and staff to State interference combined with pressure from militant student organisations has prevented the S.A.D.F from establishing University Military Units on English Campuses. It has also limited, though by no means blocked, the military's ability to use university research facilities and courses for its own ends. The S.A.D.F also has virtually no ideological influence on the English campuses.

The S.A.D.F. has experienced considerable resistance from students, as well as their parents and community organisations, in its attempts to penetrate the Black schooling system, although this does

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not seem to have significantly curtailed the C.A.P's activities. In Soweto and East Rand schools the military were able to press ahead with the introduction of National servicemen teachers despite schools boycotts and opposition from a wide range of individuals and groups. In the Western Cape youth camps continue to expand in scale despite opposition from Community groups and parents.

In each of the areas researched it is safe to conclude that the military's rôle will expand and that there is a likelihood for an exacerbation of the contradictions which already exist. In White schools one can predict that within the next few years compulsory cadets for girls will be introduced, and that the S.A.D.F. will attempt to ensure that cadet programmes are more uniformly applied throughout the country. It is also probable that in Youth Preparedness programmes civil defence exercises will become obligatory, and that ideologically and practically these programmes will become increasingly militaristic. The one possibility for conflict in this process could occur if the S.A.D.F became a vehicle for pushing a reformist line within right wing dominated schools. This, however, is not immediately foreseeable.

In the universities it is likely that potential students will be more actively discouraged or prevented from going to university before doing national service and that the extent of the activities of the University Military Units will grow. It is also likely that the universities will be used to an increasing extent for research purposes and to provide military related courses for S.A.D.F. personnel. It is possible that the S.A.D.F. will look for ways to increase its direct ideological influence in the universities. Each of these possible areas of military expansion is a potential arena of conflict with the English university administrations and more significantly with students. If a situation emerged where the S.A.D.F. was determined

to enforce U.M.U's on the English campuses, for them to ensure compliance they might have to make Kent State look like a picnic.

Black schools provide not only the greatest potential for an increase in the rôle of the S.A.D.F. but also the greatest potential for conflict. As the Civic Action Programme's activities expand it is likely that awareness of this and opposition to it will grow in the Black communities. Already schools, youth, trade union, community, women's and other groups are seeing the question of the rôle of the S.A.D.F. as an important issue to raise amongst their members and to organise around. This is likely to increase as the repressive rôle of the military becomes more explicit in the urban areas, and as the possibility for a Coloured and Indian call up becomes a reality. Within the schools the greatest potential for conflict lies in the possibility of the S.A.D.F. making cadets compulsory. Furthermore, as the struggle intensifies, the C.A.P's activities such as youth camps, holiday programmes, National servicemen teachers in Black schools, sports coaching and so on are likely to be increasingly popularly perceived of as being far from neutral.

Thus it can be seen that in each of the areas of the education system discussed, it is likely that the S.A.D.F. will attempt to increase its rôle as part of the process whereby it asserts itself as the dominant State apparatus. However, its success in this cannot be assumed from the intention alone. The penetration of the military into White and Black schools and the Universities is part of a process of struggle. In each of these 3 areas the class forces differ and therefore the nature and intensity of the struggle differs as well.

In some areas of the education system the military's prerogatives will dominate, in others they will be fiercely resisted. What can be safely assumed, however, is that the question of the militarisation of education will become one of growing political significance.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

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65. Financial Mail, November 26, 1976.
66. Star, March 13, 1982.
67. Radcliffe. S.T., op.cit. p.77
68. N.U.S.A.S. op.cit. p.23.
69. S.A.I.R.R., Annual Survey, 1980, p.201.
70. Manpower and Defence - Crucial Issues, National Development and Management Foundation, December 1977.
71. Hansard, May 1, 1980 : 5303
72. Defence White Paper, 1979.
73. Radcliffe. S.T., op.cit. pp.24, 27.
74. Financial Mail, November 26, 1976.

75. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1980, p. 215.
76. Cape Times, October 28, 1979.
77. Frankel goes further to argue that the military's impetus for change is minimal: "There is, in fact very little concrete evidence to suggest that the military is acting as a pressure group for political change in South Africa beyond the limits set by the need to rationalise the present system with the occasional gratuitous concession in a liberal direction. Policy perceptions in the Defence Force are carefully referenced against the interlocking corporate needs of the military and the survival requirements of the White State. The mutually reinforcing race and class tendrils binding South African soldiers to the State are simply too intense and consistent to support the emergence of a genuine national and secular defence establishment geared to the values of change in their own right" - Frankel, P., 1983 op.cit. pp.25,26.
78. See Frankel.P., 1983, Ibid, pp.1415, and Frankel,P., 1980 op.cit., for more detailed elaborations on this idea.
79. Quoted in Progress, April, 1977.
80. O'Heara.D., "'Muldergate' and the politics of Afrikaner Nationalism", W.I.P. 22, 1982.
81. Crocker.C., "South Africa : Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs,1980/1, p.334.
82. N.U.S.A.S.op. cit. p.15.
83. Defence White Paper, 1979.
84. Sunday Times, August 5, 1979.
85. N.U.S.A.S. op.cit. P.15.
86. Sunday Times, October 22, 1978 and May 9, 1982.
87. Frankel. P., 1983, op.cit. pp.19-21.
88. N.E.U.S.A. "De Lange Marching to the Same Order,"1982, p.3.
89. Provision of Education in the R.S.A., Report of the Main Committee of the H.S.R.C. Investigations into Education, p. 1.
90. Buckland.P., The H.S.R.C. Investigation : Another Brick in the Wall?,

Paper presented at the Kenton-at-Glencairn Education Conference,

November 7, 1981, pp.14-22.

91. N.E.U.S.A. op.cit., p.11.
 92. Interview, Claudia Regnard,
 93. Rand Daily Mail, October 5, 1982.
 94. N.U.S.A.S. The Crisis in Education, 1982, pp.18,19.
 95. Regnard, op.cit. p.2.
 96. Ibid, p.2.
 97. Interview, Willem Steenkamp.
 98. Ibid,
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CHAPTER 2

1. Speech delivered by the State President, Mr. Marais Viljoen to Grey High School Cadets, Paratus, August 1981.
2. Interview, Major. G. Britz
3. Therborne, G., What does the Ruling Class do when it Rules, London, Verso, 1978, p. 175.
4. Eggleston, J., The Sociology of the School Curriculum, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977, p.118.
5. Social Review, January 17, 1982.
6. Anonymous, "White Education the lived experience", W.I.P. 14, September, 1980, p.34.
7. Quoted in Cherry. J., op.cit. p.12.
8. N.U.S.A.S, Total War in South Africa - Militarisation and the Apartheid State, 1982, pp.51,52.
9. Varsity, May 19, 1982.
10. Meier. B., "The Militarisation of Education in South Africa", in social Action (ed). Militarisation Focus Speeches, U.C.T. 1982, p.17.
11. Ibid, p. 18.

12. Byely.G., War and Ideology in B. Seminel (ed), Marxism and the Science of War, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, p.288.
13. In the Cape there is a scaled down, voluntary form of Veld School without the militaristic emphasis - called Schools in the Wilds (Regnard.C. op.cit p.2; Rossouw.C., Interview, September 8, 1982.), ... while in Natal schools adventure-type camps have been held ostensibly aimed at environmental education, but in which activities included identifying poisonous plants and being shown how these could be put in water to kill 'terrorists' (discussion with Natal High School student, July 17, 1982).
14. Transvaal Education Department (T.E.D.) Annual Report for the year ending December 31, 1981, p.47.
15. H.S.R.C. Institute for Educational Research, 'Open Air Education in the R.S.A.' Liebenberg.C.R., and P.G.van Z. Spies, H.S.R.C. 1979, p.21.
16. N.U.S.A.S. op.cit. p.65.
17. Rossouw.C., op.cit. p.1.
18. Pasques.L.J. "Die Filosofie van Veld Skole" (T.O.D. handlending), Pretoria, 1978, p.9. * *You should try to translate such quotes - for your new Afrikaans speaking teachers!*
19. Rossouw.C. op.cit. p.1.
20. T.E.D.. Annual Report, 1981, p.48.
21. T.O.D. Onderwysnuusflitse February 1982, p.5.
22. Ibid.
23. H.S.R.C. 1979, op.cit. p.21.
24. Ibid., p.21.
25. T.E.D. op.cit. p.45
26. Ibid. p.45.
27. Rossouw.C., op.cit. p.2.
28. Ibid. p.3.
29. Ibid. p.2.
30. Johannesburg College of Education, Report to the Rector on a Visit to the Veld School at Schoemansdal, August/September 1981, p.24.

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31. Ibid, p. 27.
 32. Rossouw, C. op.cit. p.1.
 33. Ibid, p.3.
 34. J.C.E. Report, op.cit. pp. 7-9.
 35. Veld School Discussion Topic: Insurgency
 36. Veld School Discussion Topic: Race Relations
 37. Ibid.
 38. J.C.E. Report, op.cit. p.25.
 39. Onderwysnuusflitse, December 1979, p.16
 40. J.C.E. Report, op.cit. p.17
 41. Veld School Lecture: "The Creation", pp. 5 and 6.
 42. S.A.S.P.U. National, August 1982.
 43. Wits. Student, May 15, 1979.
 44. Ibid.
 45. Rand Daily Mail, June 17, 1982.
 46. Wits. Student, May 15, 1979.
 47. J.C.E. op.cit. p.25.
 48. S.A.S.P.U. National, August 1982.
 49. Wits. Student, May 15, 1979.
 50. Rossouw.C, op.cit.
 51. Ibid.
 52. S.A.S.P.U. National, August 1982.
 53. Rossouw.C. op.cit.
 54. T.E.D. 1981 Annual Report, p.48.
 55. Wits. Alternative Service Group, 'Militarisation in Education' Non-Violence Forum, Vol. 2, No. 1. March 1982, p.7.
 56. This is confirmed by the H.S.R.C. Report, op.cit. p.22.
 57. Interview with former pupil of Northcliffe High School, September 22, 19
 58. Wits. Student, May 15, 1979.
 59. Discussion with Mary Crewe, Department of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, September 9, 1982.

- 60. Interview with former pupil of Parktown Boys High School, October 3, 1982.
- 61. Rossouw. C. op.cit.
- 62. Interview with former pupil of Northcliffe High School, September 22, 1982.
- 63. Interview with former pupil of Waverley Girls High School, October 10, 1982.
- 64. Rossouw. C. op.cit.
- 65. S.A.S.P.U. National, August 1982.
- 66. Interview with former pupil of Waverley Girls High School, October 10, 1982.
- 67. Eg. Rand DailyMail, February 18, 1977.
- 68. Recommendations from Veld School Report compiled in 1979 by Mr.R.Buwalda and the Education Department and submitted to the Director of Education.
- 69. T.T.A. Motion on Veld Schools, Central Rand Branch, 1980.
- 70. Copy of Notes of Nixon's speech, Tvl. Provincial Council Debate, June 2, 1982.
- 71. Ibid; Tvl. Provincial Council Minutes, June 2, 1982.
- 72. Rand Daily Mail, June 17, 1982.
- 73. Rossouw. C., op.cit.
- 74. Cape Times, June 26, 1982.
- 75. Rossouw. C. op.cit.
- 76. Ibid.
- 77. Ibid.
- 78. Discussion with lecturer from U.C.T. Education Department, December 16, 1982.
- 79. H.S.R.C. Work Committee Report on Guidance, 1981, p.3.
- 80. Ibid. p.13.
- 81. Interview Dr. Niels Lindhard, November 22, 1982.
- 82. H.S.R.C., 1981, op.cit. pp. 23,24.
- 83. Ibid. p.23.
- 84. Ibid. p. 66.
- 85. Discussion with Kingwilliamstown teacher, January 9, 1981.
- 86. Dr. Niels Lindhard, November 22, 1982.
- 87. Regnard. C., op.cit. pp. 1 and 2.
- 88. Paratus, January 1981.
- 89. Paratus, July, 1982.

90. H.S.R.C. op.cit. p.66, Paratus, January 1981.
91. Interview, Mr. Kleynhans, June 10, 1982.
92. Cape Department of Education, Curriculum for Y.P. 1981, p.1.
93. Ibid. pp. 1 - 5
94. T.E.D., Moral Preparedness, 1979, p.1.
95. Ibid. p.55.
96. Ibid. pp. 72 - 74.
97. Ibid. p. 72.
98. Discussion with lecturer from University of Natal, Durban, Education Faculty, August 17, 1982.
99. Regnard. C., op.cit.
100. Rossouw. C. op.cit.
101. Regnard. C. op.cit.
102. Hansard, June 2, 1982 : 971 - 973.
103. S.A.S.P.U. National, August, 1982.
104. Regnard. C. op.cit.
105. Interview with former pupil of Northcliffe High School, September 22, 1982
106. Discussion with pupil from a high school in Northern Natal, April 7, 1982
107. Discussion with teacher from St. Agnes Convent, Welkom, September 14, 1982
108. Paratus, April, 1978.
109. Paratus, September, 1981.
110. Regnard. C. op.cit.
111. S.A.D.F. advertising brochure, "Forewarned is Forearmed Let him read Paratus", S.A.D.F. 1982.
112. Paratus has focused increasingly on education generally and on White schools specifically. Between May 1977 and January 1980 - 64 editions and supplements - there were 23 articles related to the S.A.D.F.'s rôle in education. Between February 1981 and February 1983 - 30 editions and supplements - there were 50 articles on this subject. In both periods approximately 50% of the articles were on White schools and particularly and the other 50% were evenly divided between articles on S.A.D.F.'s rôle in Black education and its rôle in the universities.

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113. Paratus, August, 1980.
 114. Uniform, September 1977.
 115. Cape Times, May 27, 1982.
 116. Defence White Paper, 1982.
 117. Defence White Paper, 1979.
 118. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1978, p. 56.
 119. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1980, p.209.
 120. Paratus, supplement, February 1980, Uniform, April, 1980.
 121. Paratus, Ibid.
 122. Steenkamp. W., op.cit.
 123. Uniform, April, 1980.
 124. Ibid.
 125. Ibid.
 126. Paratus, September 1978.
 127. Uniform, April, 1980.
 128. Interview, Sergeant Eloff,
 129. Uniform, April, 1980.
 130. Paratus, September 1978
 131. Ibid.
 132. Ibid.
 133. Sergeant Eloff, op.cit.
 134. Ibid.
 135. Ibid.
 136. Regnard. C. op.cit.
 137. Meier. B. op.cit. p.18.
 138. Uniform, April 1980.
 139. Defence White Paper, 1979.
 140. Sergeant Eloff, op.cit.
 141. Paratus, March 1981.
 142. Interview, Cmdt. Keith Dawe, June 10, 1982.
 143. Section 44, Defence Amendment Act, 1982.
 144. Armed Forces, November 1979.

145. Ibid.
146. Ibid.
147. Paratus, September, 1980.
148. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1980, p.209.
149. Paratus, July, 1979.
150. Interview, Capt. Tulley, June 23, 1982.
151. Moll. T., op.cit. p.14.
152. 1 English, Government Boys' School in the Eastern Cape; 1 English, Co-ed Government School in the Eastern Cape; 1 English, Government, Boys' school in the Western Cape; 3 English, Government, co-ed schools in the Western Cape; 2 Dual Medium, Government Co-ed schools in the Western Cape; 1 Afrikaans, Government, Co-ed school in the Western Cape; 1 English, Boys, Private school in the Western Cape; 1 English, Co-ed, Government school in the Transvaal; 1 English, Girls Government school in the Transvaal; 1 English, Boys, Government school in the Transvaal; 1 English, Boys, Private school in the Transvaal.
153. Regnard. C., op.cit.
154. Discussion with former pupil of Pinelands High School in Cape Town, June, 19, 1982.
155. Interview with Lt. Harris, June 17, 1982.
156. Cmdt. Keith Dawe, June 10, 1982.
157. Paratus, October, 1982.
158. Cmdt. Dawe, June 10, 1982.
159. Capt. Tulley, June 23, 1982.
160. Interview, Major Rens, June 17, 1982.
161. Interview, Lt. Harris, June 17, 1982.
162. Paratus, October 1981.
163. Interview, Mr. Footman, June 23, 1982.
164. Sgt. Eloff, op.cit.
165. Paratus, supplement, September 1977.
166. Paratus, September 1981.
167. Paratus, May, 1980.

168. Interview, Lt. Burmeister, June 23, 1982.
169. Interview, Mr. Footman, June, 23, 1982.
170. Sergeant Eloff, op.cit.
171. Capt. Tulley, June, 23, 1982.
172. Interview, Mr. Nel, June 16, 1982.
173. Mr. Kleynhans, June 10, 1982.
174. Paratus, September 1978.
175. Paratus, December 1981.
176. Interview, Lt. Nagrini, June 10, 1982.
177. Interview with S.A.C.S. pupil, June 23, 1982.
178. Armed Forces, November 1979.
179. Paratus, September, 1977.
180. Natal Mercury, July 8, 1982.
181. Sergeant Eloff, op.cit.
182. Paratus, April, 1982.
183. Interview with Bishops' pupil, June 7, 1982.
184. Rossouw. C. op.cit.
185. Interview with Sister Bridget of the Catholic Church's Education Commission, September 14, 1982.
186. Discussion with Brother Daley of the C.B.C. in Boksburg, September 15, 1982.
187. Discussion with former student at C.B.C. in Cape Town, December 17, 1982.
188. Catholic Justice and Reconciliation Militarisation Conference, Motion on Cadets, September 17, 1982.
189. Paratus supplement, February 1980.
190. Sergeant Eloff, op.cit.
191. Paratus supplement, September 1977.
192. Argus, September 8, 1979.
193. Paratus, December 1980.
194. Paratus, January, 1981.
195. Paratus, September, 1978.
196. Interview with former student at Waverley Girls High, September 22, 1982.

- 197. Cape Times, December 14, 1979.
- 198. Interview, Lt. Nagrini, June 10, 1982.
- 199. Interview, Mr. Kleynhans, June 10, 1982.
- 200. Interview, Capt. Tulley, June 23, 1982.
- 201. Rossouw, op.cit.
- 202. Interview, Lt. Harris, June 17, 1982.
- 203. Uniform, October 1978; Paratus, January 1983.
- 204. Regnard, op.cit. p. 5.
- 205. Interview, S.A.C.S. pupil, June 23, 1982.
- 206. Interview, Lt. Nagrini, June 10, 1982.
- 207. Paratus, January, 1982.
- 208. Ibid.
- 209. Paratus, July, 1979.
- 210. Paratus supplement, December 1980.
- 211. Paratus, July, 1979.
- 212. Paratus, June, 1980.
- 213. Paratus, February 1983.

CHAPTER 3.

- 1. See Jacques. M., 'Universities and Capitalism - The Present Crisis', Marxism Today, July, 1975, pp. 196/7.
- 2. Interview, Dr. James Moulder, December 15, 1982.
- 3. Bloch. G. "Student Initiatives in the Universities" N.U.S.A.S. Congress Speeches 1981 - A Call for Democracy, p. 13.
- 4. Webster. D., "The Political Economy of Education : its place in democratic struggles, N.U.S.A.S. July Festival, Education : Weapon and Tool, N.U.S.A.S., September, 1982., p.11
- 5. This term will be used to describe Wits, U.C.T., Rhodes, U.N.D., and U.N.P.
- 6. This term will be used to describe Stellenbosch, the University of the

O.F.S., R.A.U., Pretoria, Potchelstroom and U.P.E. (which is 60% Afrikaans speaking); UNISA will not be included under either of these terms.

7. Jacques.M., op.cit. p.197.
8. Ibid., pp. 197 - 200
9. In fact the South African liberal universities have also shown concern about the loss of autonomy of universities overseas. For example, the U.C.T. Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Stuart Saunders said: "..... I view with concern the possibility of damage to university autonomy in Britain, the United States and Australia as a consequence of the shrinking government purse". (The Open Universities and the Next Decade, Talk given at the 1982 Conference of the University Teachers Association of South Africa, July 14, 1982, U.C.T.).
10. Moulder. J. December 15, 1982.
11. At the Black universities the State has also responded with co-optive strategies. e.g. through greater tolerance of Black S.R.C.'s -- under certain conditions.
12. See for example the U.C.T. Statement on the quota system, Cape Times, April 4, 1983.
13. Saunders. Dr. S. J. op.cit. p. 3.
14. This demand for universities to be opened to all races has also been strongly assisted by important sectors of Capital. This situation already exists, de facto, at a post graduate level at most English Universities. The passing of the Vista University Act in October 1981, was partly an attempt to halt this process. The Universities of Cape Town, Wits, and Natal have all refused to participate officially in the Vista project. (NUSAS; The Crisis in Education), op.cit. p.27.
15. For example, while in 1981, the U.C.T. Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Saunders, expelled police spy Jerome Marshall, asserting that, "the university finds the presence of spies on our campus totally unacceptable", at the same time the Rhodes Vice-Chancellor Prof. Henderson, was widely condemned by students and staff for expressing a willingness to give information concerning/.....

concerning students to the Security Police. In 1979 U.C.T. admitted a former police spy, Michael Morris, who had been directly responsible for the banning of a number of student leaders, as a masters student in Political Science despite widespread opposition from students and staff on the grounds that his presence in seminars and on campus posed a threat to the freedom of other students. Ironically, the liberal notion of academic freedom was used to justify his admission. Another example occurred during the anti-Republic day protests in 1981 when Republic Day flags were burned at U.C.T and Wits. An irate response came from the university administrations involving a witchhunt for the culprits. At U.C.T. one was found and fined R75. for "bringing the university's name into disrepute". In 1983 Rhodes attempts were made to restrict the student press but failed because of student and lecturer opposition. Other examples could be found showing the contradictory nature behind the liberal image of the English universities.

16. Discussion with lecturer from U.C.T. Politics Department, August, 20, 1982.
17. South Africa, of course, is no exception in this regard. One half of the world's engineers and scientists working at research focus their attention on military research and development. (Regehr.E. "Militarism and the World Military Order, W.C.C. 1980, p. 3.
18. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.
19. Ibid.
20. Institute of Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, Journal, August 1982, inside cover.
21. Moulder, Dr.J. December 15, 1982.
22. Interview, Dr. Pat. Wild, December 15, 1982.
23. Ibid.
24. U.C.T. Research Report for 1981, U.C.T. 1982.
25. It is of interest that the university's acknowledgement for financial support from outside sources includes A.E.C.I, the Atomic Energy Board as well as the C.S.I.R. and H.S.R.C.

26. Discussion with student working at the U.C.T. Accoustice Laboratory, May 10, 1982.
27. Discussion with Ph.D. student in Civil Engineering, October 25, 1982.
28. Discussion with Mechanical Engineering Student, July 30, 1982.
29. Discussions with 3 U.N.D. lecturers, October 4, 5, 1982.
30. Discussion with U.N.D. lecturer, October 4, 1982.
31. Discussion with post-graduate Electrical Engineering student at Wits, March 7, 1983.
32. Discussion with Wits. lecturer, March 5, 1983.
33. Discussion with UND. African Government lecturer, October 5, 1982.
34. See, eg. Varsity, September 22, 1982.
35. Defence White Paper, 1982.
36. Sunday Times Careers Supplement, October 17, 1982.
37. Cape Times Jobfinder, October 3, 1982.
38. S.A.D.F. Guidance, Vocation Choice and Careers in S.A., 1982, pp. 36-38.
39. Defence White Paper, 1979.
40. Prospektus, Fakulteit Krygskunde, Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 1982, p.1.
41. Paratus, May, 1980.
42. Fair Lady, January 30, 1980.
43. Paratus, May 1980.
44. Paratus, July 1982.
45. Paratus supplement, July 1980; Paratus, June, 1982.
46. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.
47. Eg. Uniform, March 1981.
48. Eg. Sunday Times, March 20, 1983.
49. Discussion with U.N.D. lecturer, October 5, 1982.
50. U.N.D. Political Science Department Handout, 1981.
51. U.N.D. Arts Students Council Motion on the Proposed Strategic Studies Course, July 20, 1980.
52. Dome, March 1982.
53. U.C.T. Public Administration Department, Military Administration Course Synopsis, 1982.

54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. U.C.T. S.R.C. Minutes, September 22, 1982.
57. Ibid.
58. Varsity, October 6, 1982.
59. Discussion with U.C.T., S.R.C. Member, November 15, 1982.
60. Steenkamp. W., op.cit.
61. Varsity, September 22, 1982.
62. Dr. Niels Lundhard, December 15, 1982.
63. Uniform, May 1982.
64. Uniform, April, 1981.
65. Star, February 25, 1981; Uniform, December 1981.
66. Paratus, March 1979; Paratus, December 1981.
67. Paratus, March 1979; Paratus, January 1980.
68. S.A.D.F., National Service Guidebook for 1983.
69. Figures from Mr. Duke Metcalf, U.C.T. Statistics Department, December 15, 1982.
70. If women, Black and other students not liable for military service are not taken into account, the percentage of those who have completed their military service rises to approximately 20%. (At U.C.T. 37% of students are women, 12% are Black and at least 15% of White males are not liable for military service).
71. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.
72. Gouws, S.J.L., "The Integration of the Military Student in the University Life and Ways of Supporting Him", Bulletin vir Dissente, Vol 12, No. 4. April 1980. Articles on this theme have also appeared Vol. 13, No. 4, April 1981, and Vol 14, No. 3, January 1982.
73. For example, Uniform, November 1979; Paratus, January 1980; Paratus Supplement, 1982; Armed Forces, November 1979; Sunday Times October 3, 1982. Star, December 13, 1979, etc.
74. S.A.D.F, National Service Guidebook for 1983, paragraphs 50 - 54.

75. Paratus, February 1978.
76. Discussion with U.O.F.S. student, January 3, 1983.
77. Paratus, February 1980.
78. Statement by a Pretoria University Student regarding Relations between the S.A.D.F. and the University of Pretoria, December 14, 1981.
79. Paratus, May, 1982.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Interview, Sgt. van Greunen, January 7, 1983.
83. Ibid.
84. Argus, August 16, 1982.
85. Argus, August 18, 1982.
86. Uniform, December, 1982.
87. Cape Times, August 19, 1982.
88. Argus, August, 16, 1982.
89. Varsity, October 6, 1982.
90. Argus, August 16, 1982.
91. Uniform, December, 1982.
92. Die Matie, August 5, 1982.
93. Discussion with University of Stellenbosch student, June, 26, 1982.
94. S.A.B.C. 11 o'clock News, October 28, 1982.
95. Paratus, December 1982.
96. Star, October 26, 1982.
97. N.D.Clarence, Proposed Formation of a University Military Unit, U.N.D. 1981, pp. 1 to 3.
98. Ibid, pp. 3, 4.
99. U.N.D., S.R.C. Motion, September 13, 1981.
100. Natal Daily News, September 14, 1981.
101. University of Natal Medical School S.R.C., Memorandum re: Establishment of A Military Unit on Campus, Z.L.Mxkiye, S.R.C. President, September 16, 1981.
102. U.N.D, S.R.C. News, September 1981.

1. Natal Mercury, September 15, 1981.
2. Varsity, September 22, 1982.
3. U.C.T., S.R.C. News, October 1982.
4. N.U.S.A.S., Total War in South Africa - Militarisation and the Apartheid State, 1982, p. 75.
5. Moulder, Dr. J. , December 15, 1982.
6. Consultation with the Private Sector : Implementation of the Proposed Manpower Provision Policy, May 10, 1982, S.A.D.F. Headquarters, Grahamstown
7. Letter from Rhodes University Director of Personnel to Rhodes University Staff Association, June 14, 1982.
109. Cape Times, October 27, 1982.
110. Die Burger, October 28, 1982.
111. Rand Daily Mail, October 29, 1982.
112. Die Burger, October 28, 1982.
113. Cape Times, October 30, 1982.
114. Argus, October 29, 1982.
115. Varsity, October 6, 1982.
116. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1978.
117. N.U.S.A.S. op.cit. p. 8.
118. Rand Daily Mail, November 13, 1981.
119. U.C.T. Social Action, "The Defence Amendment Bill"; Resistance Continues," March, 1983.
120. Of these 7 objected to doing their initial period of military service and 5 objected to Camps. Although 9 of them have objected on primarily religious grounds, either from a pacifist or just-war position, all of them, have had some political content to their stands and there has been a tendency for the political basis to their objection to become more explicit. These objectors have been : Anton Eberhard (Christian/Just War), Peter Moll (Christian/Just War), Richard Steele (Christian/Pacifist), Charles Yeats (Christian/Just/war), Michael Vivuros (Christian/Pacifist), Neil Mitchel (Christian/Pacifist), Billy Paddock (Political/Christian),

Ettiene Emery (Political/Pacifist), Adrian Paterson (Christian/Pacifist), Peter Hathorn (Political), Neil Myburgh and Stephen Granger (not yet tried). (Sadano.B., Ideology and Conscientious Objection in South Africa, and Southern African Economic History Long Paper, U.C.T. 1982; Paddock B., Why I Object to Service in the S.A.D.F., Durban C.O.S.G. 1982; Hathorn. P. Dissension in the Ranks - An Argument for Conscientious Objection, Ad Hoc Support Group, U.C.T. 1983; Press Clips).

121. Seek, November 1982.
122. Argus, October 29, 1982.

CHAPTER 4.

1. Lloyd, Maj. Gen. C.J. "The importance of RURAL Development in the Defence Strategy of South Africa and the need for Private Sector Involvement, Urban Foundation Workshops, Durban, August 10, 1979.
2. Boshoff, Maj.Gen. G.J.J. quoted in the P.R.P. Journal, Progress, June 1976.
3. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.
4. Malan, Gen. M. Speech to the Institute of Town Clerks, Pretoria, quoted in Daily News, June 13, 1979.
5. Lloyd, Maj. Gen. C. J. op.cit. p. 12.
6. Paratus, July 1979.
7. Moll. T. op. cit. p.31.
8. Defence White Paper, 1982.
9. Hansard, August 31, 1970 : 3941
10. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.
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- 15. Argus, April 26, 1977.
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- 18. Hansard May 4, 1977 : 1015 - 1020
- 19. Defence White Paper, 1982.
- 20. The Rhodesian Security Forces were portrayed, particularly to international audiences, as largely Black, although in reality the mobilised war machine was predominantly White. As the Rhodesian Defence Minister put it: "It is a matter of White control and direction, with Black muscle back-up". (Fredrikse. J. None But Ourselves, Johannesburg, Ravan, 1982, p. 233).
The main incentives for Black enlistment were the relatively high pay, and the perks such as free accommodation, food, education, medical treatment and so on. Loyalty was always seen as being dubious and, according to Fredrikse White officers tended to believe that a Black soldier's allegiance was only certain once he had been 'blooded' by killing fellow Blacks. Through their recruitment into the Rhodesian African Rifles and Selous Scouts Black soldiers were involved in much of the killing.
In late 1978 after the White call-up age had been extended to men up to 60 years old by which time the troops were seriously over-extended, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government attempted to enforce Black conscription, but by that stage, largely due to Z.A.N.L.A. and ZIPRA counter-propaganda (through pamphlets, radio broadcasts, publications and physical and social pressure in which anyone in uniform was castigated as a sell out), conscription had very little effect and for the first Black national service intake only 300 out of 15000 called up, turned up. Many others refused to register, refused to report for duty, or saw their call-up papers as the impetus to the border for guerilla training. (Ibid, p 235, 6)
- 21. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1977, p.85

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37. Steenkamp. W., quoted in Moll.T., op. cit.
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44. Grundy. K.W., op.cit. p.14.
45. Elloe. C., op.cit. p.57.
46. Cherry. J., op.cit. p.19.
47. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1974, p.56.
48. Die Burger, November 30, 1976

49. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1979. p. 83.
50. Paratus, April, 1980.
51. Star, November 22, 1982.
52. Cherry. J., op.cit. p.20.
53. Paratus, February, 1983.
54. Cherry. J. op.cit. pp.25,26.
55. Ibid. p. 26.
56. S.A.B.C. 11 o'clock news, January 21, 1983.
57. Grassroots, December 1982.
58. Cherry. J., op.cit. p.26.
59. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.
60. Cupido, Cmdt. J., Interview, September 14, 1982.
61. Enloe. C., op.cit. pp.58,59.
62. Ibid. p. 59.
63. Natal Mercury, August 26, 1982.
64. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1979. p. 13.
65. Newsweek, September 29, 1980.
66. Paratus, February, 1983.
67. Natal Tribune, December 19, 1980; Star, December 19, 1980.
68. Star, December 20, 1980.
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72. Hansard, March 25, 1982 : 3636
73. Cape Times, August 24, 1982.
74. Evening Post, February 12, 1982.
75. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.
76. Evening Post, December 12, 1982.
77. Argus, March 19, 1982.
78. Ibid.
79. For example, Star, February 9, 1983.

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83. Lodge. T., "The A.N.C. in South Africa, 1976 - 1982. Guerilla War and Armed Propaganda", January 1983, unpublished, Xerox. p.10.
84. Star, June 21, 1982.
85. Evans. M., "Attempt at Restructuring : The Rôle of the Military", unpublished, Xerox, p. 9.
86. Evening Post, March 29, 1982.
87. Rand Daily Mail, February 8, 1983.
88. Britz. Maj. G., op.cit.
89. Evans. M. op.cit. p. 15
90. Lloyd. Maj. Gen. C., op.cit. p.10.
91. Ibid, p. 7.
92. Ibid. p. 15.
93. Ibid. p. 11.
94. For example, lamenting Britain's unsuccessful campaign against guerilla insurgents in Aden, Frank Kitson (writing a book used by the British Army) argues that a government fighting against a guerilla movement, needs to work out an overall programme designed to achieve its aim of retaining the allegiance of the population, which should include measures designed to increase the prosperity of the country, as well as measures aimed at the destruction of the subversive organisation. This should involve rectifying genuine grievances, especially those the insurgents are exploiting as part of their cause, and also the implementation of popular projects and reforms - and the military activities involved with crushing the uprising should be tied into the rest of the programme.

He points out that "the important aspect from the point of view of the military officer engaged in countering insurgency is not to know how to build up overall government programmes so much as to understand how totally interdependent all the various measures must be, and how important it is that/.....

that they should not cut across each other On the one hand military officers are required to initiate proposals for wearing down and defeating insurgents which representatives of other government departments have to scrutinize in order to ensure that they do not cut across long term government gains. On the other hand military officers themselves have to vet action proposed by other departments in pursuance of the government's long term aims in order to ensure that it is not harmful to the operational effort there can be no question of the army ever working in isolation". (Kitson. F., Low Intensity Operations, London, Faber and Faber, 1979, p. 52.).

This 'total' strategy of linking civil and military action has been followed with varying degrees of success in numerous situations. For example, Heaton and MacLeod note the rôle played by the royal family in the military-coordinated counter-insurgency effort in Thailand. They frequently visit rural areas and sponsor rural development projects, dedicate schools and government projects, help in stimulating religious growth, rural education and public health. (Heaton.W., and MacLeod.R., 'People's War in Thailand', in E.Band, W.Heaton and D.Alberts (eds), Insurgency in the Modern World, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1980).

95. Britz. Maj. G. op.cit.

96. Laclau. E., Politics in Marxist Theory, Verso, 1979, p. 166.

97. Steenkamp. W. op.cit.

The different perception of the military and the police has also been noted elsewhere. For example, in Brazil aspects of the military's relation to the State resembles an advanced form of that developing in South Africa.

As a labour leader quoted by Johnson noted: "The workers everywhere like the army, but not the police". (Johnson. J., The Military and Society in Latin America, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972, p. 234).

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 101. Mouffe.C., Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 180.
 102. Gramsci. A., in Ibid. p. 184.
 103. Cherry. J. op.cit.
 104. Ibid. pp. 23-32.
 105. Britz. Maj. G. op.cit., p.4.
 106. Star, January 27, 1973.
 107. S.A.D.F., Guide to Psychological Action, August, 1976.
 108. Cape Times, April 26, 1980.
 109. Anon, 'S.W.A.P.O. and the Anti-Colonial Struggle', WIP 23, pp. 23, 36.
 110. Britz. Maj. G. op.cit.
 111. Lloyd, Maj.Gen. C., op.cit. p.7.
 112. Many of the Rhodesian military leaders (such as Peter Walls, Ron Reid-Daly and 1000 others) received their initial training in counter-insurgency work in the British Malayan campaign in 1950 where they were described by British officers as "colour conscious to a degree that was not helpful in the task of seducing aboriginal sympathies from the communists" (Fredrikse. J., op.cit. p. 353)
- This might be one reason why the Hearts and Minds strategy was neglected until about 1973/4 when it was coordinated by the Ministry of Information's Branch of Internal Services. It included propaganda showing supposed guerilla atrocities through pamphlets, films and radio with mobile film units playing a key rôle. (Fredrikse.J., Ibid. pp. 93-95).
- Another aspect of this campaign coordinated by Communications Operations, following tactics employed in Malaya, Vietnam, Mozambique and Angola, was the establishment of 'protected villages', which in effect were concentration camps. Very little was done in the way of rural upliftment schemes, education and so on while the implementation of "the only good terr. is a dead terr" line (where a 'terr' is a guerilla insurgent, while a 'sympathiser' is anyone caught in the crossfire) did little to convince

- unwilling hearts and minds (Ibid. pp. 145 - 157)
113. Cilliers, Capt. J.K., 'Selected Aspects of the Rhodesian Security Forces Counter - Insurgency Strategy : 1972 - 1980', Uniform, January 1983.
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 119. Van Vyverin, Lt., S.A.D.F. Public Relations, Pretoria, Telephone Discussion , January 21, 1983.
 120. Britz. Maj. G., op.cit.
 121. Steenkamp. W., op.cit.
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 123. Uniform, February, 1978.
 124. S.A.S.P.U. Focus, December 1982.
 125. Evening Post, January 23, 1982.
 126. Paratus, February 1983.
 127. Paratus, August, 1982.
 128. Uniform, April, 1978.
 129. Paratus, June, 1978.
 130. Lee. R., and S.Hurlick, "From Foragers to Fighters : South Africa's Militarisation of the Namibian San, in R.Lee and E.Leacock (eds), Politics and History in Band Societies, C.U.P. 1982. p. 354.
 131. Ibid. p. 355
 132. Evening Post, January 23, 1982.
 133. It seems that they are also used to boost the morale of the South African army. One White soldier is quoted as saying: "With the Bushmen along, our chances of dying are slight. They have incredible tenacity, patience and endurance. They've taught me to respect another race" (Time, March 2, 1981). However, they may have become prisoners to their own reputation/.....

reputation with some white soldiers believing that their tracking ability is overrated (Gordon.R.J., 'The Praetorianisation of the Bushmen in Namibia, Theron, p.5.).

The issue of what Gordon calls the 'Praetorianisation' of the San has been one of considerable interest amongst anthropologists and a number of papers have been written dealing with the mobilisation of the San by the S.A.D.F. and the effects of this on destroying the 'indigenous culture'. The transformation of the San, and their use by the S.A.D.F in this way approached what Enloe calls the 'Gurkha syndrome' - where the use of so-called martial races has been a response of 'State elites'. Ethnic groups which cannot control the State apparatuses but can be counted on to be reliable upholders of the State system, are used for military purposes and in the process, military vocations become part of their own sense of 'ethnic identity'. One consequence for the group chosen as the 'martial race' can be an increased sense of ethnic cohesion at the cost of increased vulnerability to state manipulation. (Enloe.C., 'The Gurkha syndrome : State utilisation of Martial Races', in Ethnic Soldiers : State Security in Divided Societies, Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1980, p. 25).

This policy is a common one in military history. It was used, for example, by the British in India, after 1857 when the majority group, the Hindues revolted. After this a martial race policy was followed and minority ethnic groups were recruited for military service. They tended to show loyalty to the colonial authorities and were usually late in backing the nationalist movements, with the effect of widening the distance between the major group and minor ethnic groups (De Witt. C.E., and Gregory. A., "Ethnic Management and Military Recruitment in South and South East Asia, in M.Janowitz (ed), Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives, London, Sage Publications, 1981, pp.96-98).

In Namibia the aim has clearly been to create loyal, malleable allies for South Africa out of indigenous ethnic groups in Northern Namibia.

As Lee and Hurlich put it, by militarising large segments of the population the South African army becomes at once the government of the area, the main employer, the main or sole source of health care, and education, and the dominant source of ideology. This pattern has been repeated throughout Namibia. In all there are now 7 ethnic battalions (N.U.S.A.S. op.cit. p.41.)

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note

S.W.A.P.O. has been highly critical of South Africa's use of the San and has protested to the U.N. about it. Mr. Theo Ben Gurirab, S.W.A.P.O. Chief representative at the U.N. accused South Africa of using them as 'land mine sweepers' against their will. He went on to say:

"The Bushmen being traditionally hunters are being used by South Africans as trackers. In the process they became victims of landmines and guerilla ambushes. It is really tragic that South Africa has to go so low as to use people who are not conscious of what they are doing for her new efforts of aggression in Namibia. These ancient people are lured with tobacco, dagga, the meat to do the dirty job Since they always walk in front of patrolling soldiers in most cases they receive much of the punishment intended for the racist soldiers. Their population being small, our concern is that they might be exterminated. (Lee.R., and S.Hurlick, p.340).

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other
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- 136. S.A.S.P.U. Focus, December 1982.
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154. Cape Times, April 26, 1980.
155. Ibid.
156. Britz, Maj.G. op.cit.
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159. Smail. A., op.cit. p. 3.
160. Lloyd, Maj. Gen. C., Letter to Mr. Vause Raw dated October 25, 1979, concerning provision in the S.A.D.F for conscientious non-combatants, quoted in Smail. A., op.cit. p. 7.
161. Meier. B., op.cit. p. 27.
162. Britz. Maj.G. op. cit.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
166. Steenkamp. W. op. cit.
167. Ibid.
168. Britz. Maj.G. op.cit.
169. Ibid.
170. Lloyd, Maj.Gen. C. op.cit. pp. 22, 23.

171. Van Vuyesin. Lt., op.cit.
172. N.S.M. teacher involved with the C.A.P. in Natal, Interview December 3, 1982.
173. Smail. A. op.cit. p.4.
174. Ibid.
175. Rand Daily Mail, January 21, 1980.
176. Natal Mercury, February 25, 1980.
177. Ibid.
178. Interview with N.S.M. op. cit.
179. Hansard, April 17, 1978 : 4911
180. Cape Times, January 10, 1983.
181. Paratus, December 1982.
182. Paratus, June, 1979.
183. Smail. A., op.cit. p.5.
184. Paratus, June, 1979.
185. Natal Mercury, January 27, 1982.
186. Paratus, June, 1979.
187. Smail. A. op.cit. p.6.
188. Contact, January 1983.
189. Sunday Post, September 20, 1979.
190. Smail. A. op. cit. p.4.
191. S.A.S.P.U. National, April, 1980.
192. Ibid.
193. Paratus, July 1977.
194. Ibid.
195. Discussion with Northern Transvaal Church Worker, September 17, 1982.
196. Uniform, August 1978.
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198. Van Vuyerin. Lt., January 21, 1983.
199. If one works on the basis of 1 out of every 5 C.A.P. N.S.M. being teachers (taken as a low estimate from the figures in Natal / Kwa-Zulu) then the

total/.....

total number of C.A.P. N.S.M. would be 1500.

200. Quoted in Lewin.R., "Black Education, Class Struggle and the Dynamics of Change in South Africa since 1945", Africa Perspective (17), 1980, p. 34
201. Bowles. S., and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, London, 1976. p.252.
202. Lewin.R., op.cit. p. 34.
203. S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, H.S.R.C. 'De Lange' Commission Report.
204. Rand Daily Mail, June 17, 1976.
205. Cape Times, July 8, 1981.
206. In 1981 the S.A.D.F. manned 633 road blocks (1982 Defence White Paper).
207. In 1981 the S.A.D.F. conducted 22 Cordon Operations (1982 Defence White Paper).
208. Rand Daily Mail, April 13, 1978. According to the 1977 Defence White Paper the army's rôle within South Africa is to be "ready on a country wide basis, to quickly mobilise trained forces to render assistance to the S.A.P." Clearly at times this rôle extends well beyond being a merely supportative one and in the urban areas temporary command structures have been set up under the army's control. In October 1980, for example, a "crisis committee" was set up at the E.P.Command headquarters to monitor trade unions, community and schools activity. Under the S.A.D.F's leadership this committee included police, security police, riot police, Administration Board and Department of Education and Training representatives. In June 1980 a similar command structure had been set up in Soweto. (Social action, U.C.T. S.A.D.F : Cutting Edge of Apartheid, March 1983, pp. 5, 6.).
209. Post, September 9, 1979.
210. Sunday Post, March 30, 1980.
211. Rand Daily Mail, April 1, 1980.
- Post, September 9, 1979.
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216. Post, December 9, 1979.
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222. Post, October 14, 1979.
223. Sunday Post, October 14, 1979.
224. Ibid.
225. Citizen, December 3, 1979: Post, November 30, 1979.
226. Voice, December 1, 1979.
227. Post, December 31, 1979.
228. Post, October 4, 1979; Sunday Post, October 14, 1979.
229. Discussion with Catholic Church Education worker in Soweto, September 12, 1982.
230. Discussion with Soweto Community Worker, September 14, 1982.
231. Discussion with Church Youth Worker from Pretoria, March 20, 1983.
232. Discussion with Attridgeville S.R.C. member, October 10, 1982.
233. Discussion with Umlazi, Standard 9 student, October 10, 1982.
234. Discussion with Catholic nun teaching in Mdantsane, September 15, 1982.
235. Uniform, June 1982.
236. Contact, October, 1982.
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243. Discussions with teacher from Eldorado Park High School, December 20, 1982.
244. Star, January 28, 1982.

245. Rand Daily Mail, March 2, 1982.
246. Sunday Times, May 9, 1982.
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264. Paratus, October 1981.
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266. Paratus, June 1981.
267. Argus, March 31, 1982.
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 310. Cape Times, April 19, 1978.
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 312. Cherry. J. op.cit. p. 20.
 313. Hansard April 21, 1977, S.A.I.R.R. Annual Survey, 1978, pp. 54. 55.
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Social Review

Spiked

Time

To The Point

Transvaal Provincial Council Minutes

Work in Progress

INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS

(Interviews are defined here on the basis that set questions were asked and they were either taped or extensive notes were taken. The discussions were less formal).

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3. Claudia Regnard (H.S.R.C. Commissioner and Teacher at Waterford High School), Cape Town, January 24, 1983.
4. Clare Rossouw, (Lecturer at J.C.E.), Johannesburg, September 8, 1982.
5. Dr. James Moulder (Assistant to the U.C.T. Principal), Cape TOWN, December 1 1982.
6. Dr. Pat Wild (Chairperson, U.C.T. Research Committee), Cape TOWN, December 1 1982.
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18. Cmdt. Keith Dawe (Officer Commanding Prince Alfred Guard, and Officer Commanding Grey High School Cadet Detachment), Port Elizabeth, June 10, 1982.
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MISCUSSIONS

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7. Lecturer in U.N.D. Politics Department, October 5, 1982.
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10. Lecturer in U.C.T. Education Department, December 16, 1982.
11. Lecturer in U.C.T. Politics Department, August 20, 1982
12. Student Working in U.C.T. Accoustics Laboratory,
13. Ph.D. Civil Engineering Student at U.C.T., May 10, 1982
14. Post Graduate Mechanical Engineering Student at U.C.T.
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16. U.C.T. S.R.C. Member, November 15, 1982
17. University of the Orange Free State student, January 3, 1983.
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19. Teacher from the Border area, January 7, 1983.
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 25. Pretoria Church Youth Worker, March 20, 1983.
 26. Catholic Sister teaching in Mdantsane, September 15, 1982.
 27. Edlorado Park High School Teacher, December 20, 1982.
 28. Teacher in Worcester Coloured School, October 5, 1982.
 29. Bridgetown, Cape Town, High School Teacher, January 7, 1983.
 30. Johannesburg Journalist, March 15, 1983.
 31. Former Natal High School student, July 17, 1982.
 32. Former Student at Parktown Boys High School, October 3, 1982.
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 37. S.R.C. member from High School in Atteridgeville, October 10, 1982.
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Veld Schools get a facelift after outcry

Education Reporter

The Transvaal's Veld School programme has undergone a complete facelift after pressure from politicians, teacher bodies, parents and pupils to change the contentious course content.

The new syllabus will come into effect this term. According to Mr Eddy Brown, president of the Transvaal Teachers' Association, the decision to review the veld school programme came about largely as a result of TTA representations to the Transvaal Education Department.

"We had serious misgivings about the content of the Veld School course, particularly the political nature of many of the lectures.

"As a result of negotiations with the TED over the past year, a commit-

tee was set up to review the syllabus, and the results look very good — on paper," said Mr Brown.

The syllabus is split into three subject topics: youth preparedness, outdoor education and low-risk adventure training.

Where it differs from the previous format is in the shift of emphasis.

Army personnel will no longer be used to lecture to the pupils, and more stress is to be placed on nature lore, geology, geography and astronomy.

The low-risk adventure training is designed to allow children to test their physical prowess — without having to do forced exercise.

Previously there were numerous reports of exhaustion, minor injuries and broken limbs sustained by pupils who were forced to do strenuous obstacle courses.

This report indicates that the Veld School reforms suggested as a possibility above will soon be implemented. It remains to be seen whether the present Veld School staff will be replaced, in what direction the ideological input will be aimed, whether army personnel will have any role in the future and whether these reforms will also apply to leadership camps.

Another example of the S.A.D.F.'s influence in English Campuses

Relating to the far right

Campbell (BA Hons) is in the International department at Wits. He is also an avid supporter of security police, detention trial, bannings and the African army's raids into and Lesotho.

The latest edition of *Paratus* a special periodical of the African Defence Force' is billed as 'a senior of the Department of International Relations'. He has a long article entitled 'for cross-border strikes terrorist concentrations'. He is being the most junior of the I R department to the university. Campbell's article certainly does not give the impression of a 'military history specialist' as he is called in the article. The article contains the following gems of right 'specialist' insight:

South African public must be 'more aware of the terrorism, and reject terrorist propaganda being against the Security

must be 'no artificial imposed on the depth into which the SADF can

tion without trial has nature of every successful insurgency campaign. Campbell goes on to examples of Malaya and as a justification for without trial (it is employed, he says, by 'the impeccably democratic

unions will be and are of ANC infiltration; controlled trade union used to help bring havoc to the country. well, giving a laundry 'reds under the beds' which colour his whole on to claim that 'the universities, newspaper parties (no doubt are being used to subtle propaganda

The editor of Wits Student looks critically at the recent outburst of a Wits academic in a defence force magazine.



R K Campbell - 'military history specialist'

attacks on the Government or other key institutions of society such as the Police or SADF in order to demoralize them and so making it easier for the 'Spear of the Nation' to become effective'.

Towards the end of his article Campbell gets even more vitriolic and states incisively 'Some of the ANC's most effective agents are, and will be, white. They will be especially dangerous'. To counter this 'special danger' he suggests that the Security Police should 'continually monitor all sectors of society regarded as sensitive'. (This would no doubt include all universities, 'liberal' churches,

newspapers, students and their telephones, mail etc.)

Campbell, showing his training in human physiology also states 'It must never be forgotten that terrorists look like perfectly ordinary people'.

He concluded that raids in neighbouring countries and security police vigilance must be stepped up. 'Containment', he states 'is not the aim.' 'Destruction is.'

Chilling stuff. But tragic as well. Under the disguise of academic freedom the Wits International Relations department actually teaches 'truths' like the above. In the name of

tolerance the university has allowed the I R department to hire embarrassing clowns like Paul Moorcroft to air their right-wing eclectism in classes.

Last year Moorcroft did a second year course on Rhodesia and is the author of the biggest P R boost ever on the SADF- 'South Africa Superpower'.

An essay due this week in International Relations II asks: 'The lesson of Rhodesia for South Africa is clear: There is no such thing as a fair settlement if it is imposed or dictated from the outside.' Discuss 'total strategy' in the light of this statement.'

The head of the department is also an internationally acclaimed conservative, who has penned articles for the SMA newsletter and other conservative 'journals' in the last few years.

Campbell has been described by an I R student as 'The Professor's blue-eyed boy'. It shows.

But can there ever be room on this campus for individuals who condone the actions of the security police and who applaud when fellow academics and students are detained or banned?

Can there be academic tolerance which extends to allowing blatant falsification and which condones the incalculable of paranoia and right wing propaganda? Surely not.

All those concerned about academic freedom and basic justice cannot allow those who would, if they could, kill off any spirit of free inquiry and curiosity, to operate within our academic environment. It is not a contradiction in terms to argue for the exclusion of those academics who are a threat to the very freedom of thought which allows them to operate in the first place. Campbell, if this *Paratus* article is anything to go by, is a threat to all those who value knowledge as a means towards the liberation of people.

EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEW WITH CLARE ROSSOUW (LECTURER AT
JOHANNESBURG COLLEGE OF EDUCATION), SEPTEMBER 8, 1982.

- Q. Can you say something about how Veld Schools were formed?
- A. They were formed in 1972 after a speech made by Dr. Jooste was sent to the school principals. It emphasised the "total onslaught" and so on but no-one really responded. But soon after that the programme was implemented. The founding father was Dr. Pasques who in his M.A. and PH.D. theses goes on long raves about the need for moral education, setting the youth on the right trace, etcetera. And this was a clear indication of the programme's political intentions yet in the circulars sent to parents and T.E.D. magazine, 'Daybreak', the total onslaught was not even mentioned and the camps were put forward as purely environmental.
- Q. What is their relation to the South African Defence Force? How much military involvement is there?
- A. There is quite a close relation. Circulars are sent to parents telling them that they need not be afraid of their children being in the bush because at all veld schools there are military units nearby to protect them. At the veld school both the outdoor hike and the obstacle course appeared to have been set up with South African Defence Force assistance. The night hike is 48 hours long. Pupils are sent off in small groups with little food and have to dig up roots, etc. There are barbed wire fences, booby traps, alarms, 'mock mines' and so on, set up to "create a sense of preparedness of what to expect in the bush". The obstacle course is extremely severe and can only be negotiated in groups. It was set up by the South African Defence Force. The South African Defence Force also gives lectures on military preparedness and the instructors wear combat uniforms.
- Q. What about the girls' camps? How does the military aspect affect them?
- A. At the girls' camps lectures are given stressing the total

onslaught and the need for military preparedness. At the Afrikaans camp they were asked whether it was fair that the boys had to fight in the South African Defence Force and not them and whether they should not play a more direct rôle. They unanimously agreed that they should. When I suggested that any career could mean playing a rôle for their country they were very surprised.

The Veld schools programme is part of the Youth Preparedness programme devised by Dr. Pasques. Cadets are also part of the Y.P. programme. Very often the teachers who go on the camps are cadet instructors although they have a relatively minor rôle and are not looked on as being colleagues by the permanent staff. The Curriculum is drawn up by the T.E.D. but there appears to be a strong S.A.D.F. influence over this.

Q. Do all veld schools have the same curricula?

A. Although the principal of Schoemansdal Veld School said that he had drawn up the curriculum, it appeared to be the same as that at all the other veld schools. Some say there are differences in approach to the English kids from the Afrikaans kids with the indoctrination being heavier with the latter. But the instructors and curricula are the same so the differences cannot be very significant.

Q. What is the political direction of the veld schools? Do they fit in with reformist initiatives?

A. In the Transvaal Provincial Council the veld schools were strongly attacked by Peter Nixon of the P.F.P. and they have also been criticised informally by reformist Nationalists for their right wing ideological content. But the strongest reaction has come from the Treurnicht types who feel that they are exercising a liberal influence. For example, they objected to the discussion topic 'What would you do if you were swimming in a farm dam and a black child started drowning?' - they seemed

to think that black and white children should not be swimming in the same dam in the first place. They also objected to the fact that evolution was discussed. But generally the control seems to be in the hands of the T.E.D. where the right wing are very powerful. Also important is the fact that those chosen as instructors seem to be particularly verkrampt.

Q. How are the camps organised in terms of age and sex?

A. The camps are divided by sex and language. There are boys camps and girls camps and English and Afrikaans camps. Most schools are not large enough and usually 2 or 3 combine. The programme is very similar for the Std. 5's and the Std. 8's. For the boys and the girls the programmes is similar, although girls are taught that they need some education before they are married, but once married they must look after their husbands and children and pass on their knowledge to the children, although its nice for them to remain aware of world events so they can be involved in discussions.

Q. How are the children disciplined?

A. There is a military-type discipline - it is very severe. Corporal punishment is handed out liberally and other measures are used as well. For example, at one English speaking girls' camp in August 1981, a girl questioned the instructor's interpretation of the total onslaught. She suggested that if there were significant changes within the country the 'onslaught' would not be able to achieve its aims. The instructor was irate. The lecture had been given in dim light. He immediately switched on the lights and raved at the girl. She was punished by having to clean out the latrines.

Q. What was the reaction of the students to all this?

A. It varied very widely. Many of the English speaking kids expressed antagonism but more to authority than anything else. Their attitude was one of: "The camps are okay

as long as you don't take the lectures too seriously." But these are the same kids who sometimes criticise their parents for being too liberal. Kids I have taught ask their parents : "Why aren't you like other parents?" The Veld schools definitely tend to produce greater conformity in kids. However, for the more liberal, English speaking children the veld school programme is marred by the irrational right wing content. At the camp I went to the kids appeared to be highly intimidated. In an interview with 4 girls and 3 boys who went to the Veld school, all 4 girls and 2 of the boys said they were scared throughout and were not prepared to challenge what was said. This is confirmed by letters to the papers and the T.E.D. journal by scholars. Other interviews with children likened Veld Schools to the Nazi youth camps and said that the discipline, night hikes, early morning inspections were more severe than what they later experienced in the S.A.D.F. But then again, other kids were uncritical and said they enjoyed it.

There are numerous examples of the kind of bigotry I've mentioned.

At one English speaking girls' camp a favourite theme was the decadence of Western Rock Music. They played one Donna Sumner song which the instructor said was highly erotic - I thought it was maybe mildly erotic. They were then asked what their thoughts were on it. One girl said it reminded her of her mother saying goodbye to her. Another said it made her angry. When asked why, she kicked a log and said that the song made her wish that she had her boyfriend and not the log lying next to her. Both were punished and victimised.

Much seems to depend on the attitude of teachers and many kids who don't want to go are victimised in their schools.

Q. So are most schools supportive of the Veld School programme?

A. Most are very positive. The teachers are sometimes not

happy/.....

happy with the programme but are glad for the opportunity to get the week off. For example, K.E.S. was not happy with the programme so the principal insists on running the programme himself and has much more of an environmental emphasis, and less of an S.A.D.F.-type emphasis.

Q. How have the T.E.D. responded to the criticisms of the programme?

A. They have promised that there will be changes and during 1982 from what I've heard there was less dogmatism at the English speaking camps - and they have allowed more 'open discussion'.

Q. How closely are the Youth Preparedness Programmes linked with the Veld School programme?

A. They are not really directly linked although both are under the T.E.D. But in effect there is still a certain amount of autonomy in the Y.P. programmes and what they do is up to the schools to a certain extent. For example, at Pretoria Girls' High the Y.P. programme had no military content and instead they had things like car maintenance courses.

Q. What about the private schools?

A. There are no Youth Preparedness programmes at private schools although most of them have cadet programmes. The issue of cadets is often seen in terms of an almost colonial military content with colonial military pride being the motivating force. This is partly because of the conservatism of most school boards. For example at St. Stithians there was strong pressure for cadets to "instil discipline into youth who are going astray ... There's nothing like good military discipline to put them right". But as yet there are no cadets there or at St. John's while St. Martin's has a military band. As yet most private schools in the Transvaal don't have cadets. But in Natal there is strong cadet competition between the private schools.

Q. Have there been significant challenges within the T.E.D. to the direction of Veld Schools?

A. The T.E.D. is extremely powerful politically and financially, and it is very clearly right wing dominated. So challenges don't go very far. In the Cape there have been moves to have Veld Schools but it is not yet financially or otherwise viable there.

INTERVIEW WITH CLAUDIA REGNARD (Teacher, Westerford High,
and De Lange Commissioner) JANUARY 24, 1983.

De Lange: in the Cape recommended that Youth Preparedness be scrapped. I chaired the Guidance Committee and we requested that teachers not be allowed to express their political leanings because Youth Preparedness is used for this purpose.

In 1979 I went to a National Conference on Y.P. and I was horrified by the kinds of things that were being said, for example, that those wearing badges with pictures of bitten apples were under Satan's influence. The attitude was both strongly chauvenistic and militaristic. It requested that cadets be more rigidly enforced and perks be given to schools which do implement cadets properly - e.g. that staff who are involved as Cadet Officers be exempt from camps. In this way Westerford has been pressurised to have cadets; and if girls do it as well they get an extra staff allocation because perks operate on the basis of how many pupils are involved with the cadet programme.

Drum majorettes are also a big thing at many schools, both to ensure military discipline and to have girls supporting the boys. In all staff rooms and libraries it is compulsory to have editions of 'Uniform' - At Westerford there are about 6 in the library and 6 in the Staff room.

Youth Preparedness offered at school forms deliberate links with the army.

Guidance involves both career and psychological counselling, but at school people are very often channelled into careers according to the perceived political or economic needs of the country with very little counselling and virtually no information given. This often involves people being channelled into the Permanent Force. The army itself gives career advice which is usually little more than slotting into gaps in the economy. On the De Lange Commission the more progressive elements wanted it divided into psychological and vocational components. The

Nationalist/.....

Nationalist elements snapped up on this but they wanted to define things very lightly. In the vocational area they wanted a strong emphasis on what the government needs and the Permanent Force was pushed strongly here. In the psychological area the approach was a pedagogical or moulding one which stifles individuality.

The question of Veld Schools was also discussed in the Guidance Committee. In the Cape there are no Veld schools - just the School of the Wilds which is a scaled down version without the militaristic emphasis. In the Transvaal where most headmasters are purely Nationalistic, the kids are further brainwashed in the Veld Schools while in their schools they are offered no other outlets and their guidance classes are directional.

In the Y.P. programmes at most schools the stress is very much on patriotism. For example they have to learn the names of the Cabinet Ministers. The emphasis is very much imbedded in C.N.E. One of the recommendations of the De Lange Commission was that C.N.E. be abandoned but the government White paper refused to accept this.

In terms of the attitudes of some of the people and what the Committee revealed, the Y.P./Guidance Committee was a shattering experience.

De Lange was Constand Viljoen's blue-eyed boy. The Government and the army knew exactly what was going to come out of the committee but in terms of policy coming out in the Government White Paper they had to play it safe at the official level so as not to alienate the right wing. But the government still allows certain things to happen. An education college in Johannesburg allowed blacks in unofficially. The Government knew about it but it turned a blind eye. Had an application been made it would have been turned down flat.

In education - especially in the Transvaal and Free State - the right wing is very strong. In De Lange there were a

number of ultra-right wing Broederbonders, i.e. Dr. Cinqo, Prof. Jooste, Mr. Steyn, Prof van Loggerenburg, etc.

Their strategy was one of not arguing and saying very little. They had to sign their names to the report but when there were controversial questions they didn't argue or they just didn't turn up when votes were taken. The most conservative report was the one on teacher training which was chaired by van Loggerenburg but that has now been reopened and a new committee chaired by Boyce has been set up.

There were also more left leaning people on the committee like myself and Franklin Sonn (who in his own right is quite conservative) - we were more vociferous and they couldn't afford to have someone like Sonn walking out.

I think that although the government knew De Lange well, they misjudged him - he has a sense of universal responsibility which goes beyond his own ideas. But for the government to have accepted the report would have alienated the right wing. In fact what happened was that the right on the committee continually leaked its contents to the T.O.A. - such as the recommendation that a single ministry be established - and there was quite a right wing back lash, so the Cabinet decided to play it safe. Koornhof accused it of being unscientific but De Lange answered that a scientific investigation couldn't reveal anything except what the committee revealed. So all the main recommendations - even that calling for mother tongue tuition - were rejected.

The Y.P. and Guidance Committee mainly consisted of academics who had proved themselves by the number of papers they had written. The Whites came mainly from the Transvaal, and they almost all thought the same way and carried the vote.

When cadets were discussed it was expressed that girls either do drummies or things like posture and grooming when the boys do cadets. At most schools the Y.P. programme revolves very definitely around C.N.E. and is explicitly designed to

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ensure that Christian, moral standards are upheld. The programmes are usually overseen by the teachers considered to be the most patriotic and disciplined with very little regard taken to educational questions. As well as cadets and drum majorettes, the programmes include things like Good Citizenship, Civil Defence (which involves preparation for attacks on the schools - this has been strongly advocated since 1976) and Fire Fighting, etc. For example one aspect of the Y.P. programme strongly advocated it to hold a two week long practice for evacuation in the event of a bomb scare. Important to all this is to instil fear of the outside world at an early age.

In the present government policy on Y.P., Guidance and Teachers Training (which still exists) says: "What we must teach children is a sense of gratitude to the country of their birth - a preparedness to lay down their lives in preservation of their White identity". It goes on to say that the aspiration of the White population is to guard its identity. "The young must render service borne out of gratitude. They must be prepared to sacrifice all as future citizens. This entails a responsibility for taking up a discriminative standpoint."

At Westerford we've tried to do things differently with the Y.P. programme and have had talks on things like Rape rather than the things that the Education Department advocates. Like other schools the programme is organised on a standard by standard level but ours was different. However, we're now going to have a panel inspection so I've been taken off organising the programme and it is likely that we'll move to having a more conventional programme.

Westerford managed to get out of cadets for a while by arguing that uniforms and shooting were not officially required. Mr. Gibbon twisted some of the things which were ambiguous. The guys had to march occasionally but this didn't even meet the minimum requirements. The C.P.A. knew exactly what was going on but because Westerford had a reputation as a "gifted" and experimental school they got away with it - but it was

very /.....

very much a privileged situation. Even with the cadets that they do have the kids see through it. The boys are not convinced, they think its a lot of nonsense. They just laugh at it and say they're trying to make us become soldiers. But at other schools I've taught at its very different. The teachers in charge of cadets are sometimes very racist - they reinforce prejudice by giving commands ridiculing other race groups.

INTERVIEW WITH WILLEM STEENKAMP (Army Captain and Defence Reporter on the Cape Times) JANUARY 25, 1983.

Q. Can you say something about the reasons for the implementation of the Civic Action Programme and how effective it is?

A. We used to call the C.A.P. WHAM (Winning Hearts and Minds). It is carried out in the operational area, the homelands and in the cities. It has definitely done some good in many ways. In many of these areas the general education of teachers is bad and the input from the Defence Force helps to improve this. The average Ovambo teacher, for example, is not well qualified and there is also a severe shortage. So teachers who are called up are deployed in the Civic Action Programme and they certainly help the situation. I know one chap who's a matriculant who intends going in to teaching and he's doing very well in teaching in the operational area. The kids liked him Of course the C.A.P. embraces other things like forestry, agriculture and so on - especially in Caprivi. I think it can only do good. You've got to take a broader view of this thing. One day when the soldiers are gone and there's peace then the kids can never lose the education these army teachers have given them, regardless of the political outcome.

Q. What about the C.A.P. in South Africa? To what extent has there been opposition?

A. Well, KwaZulu and Soweto seem to have been the most difficult areas. But I think that the majority of parents can only approve of it - except for the radicalized ones. But the average parent will approve because their kids are getting things better and many of the black teachers are poorly qualified.

Q. Why does the S.A.D.F. want to implement the C.A.P.?

A. The motivation is to win the Hearts and Minds. They want to try and convince the populace that they are better off under the present dispensation than they would be under, for example, SWAPO. I think a quotation from Mao is

useful here. The army holds Mao in high regard - I went on a course where they had this quotation from him up on the wall. He speaks of the Fish and the Water theory - the insurgent is the fish and the local population is the water. If the water is friendly the fish will survive. This is why the insurgents try to operate, as far as possible, in densely populated areas where they can get food, shelter and so on and therefore Western and Central Ovamboland are the areas where SWAPO is strongest - the water is friendly there. So what the army does is turn Mao's precept around - if the water is hostile, the fish cannot survive, and while the local population might still provide shelter and food to SWAPO because of fear they will also provide information to the authorities.

- Q. How effective is the Hearts and Minds strategy in an area like Ovamboland where SWAPO seems to have widespread support?
- A. You can't look at the situation in isolation. In an area like Central Ovamboland, the Hearts and Minds Strategy can only have a limited effect. This is because of the tribal factor - SWAPO are dealing with their own people, and you know, especially with the African, blood is thicker than water, and you can never overcome that factor. SWAPO speaks the language better and the Ovambos are a group-minded people.
- Q. How do the kinds of military abuses of power described by the Catholic Bishops affect the Hearts and Minds Campaign?
- A. Well there certainly have been abuses - about that I have no doubt. It's a war situation and no matter how pious your strictures for the man in the field might be, to the corporal on patrol on his own, these rigid strictures may become a little wavery Not everything goes by Geneva Convention standards. There have been abuses but not on the scale noted by

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the bishops. Their intention was to lump together grievances that they could find in order to ensure that action was taken. But amongst that were things that were a lot of bullshit. I think they were taken for a bit of a ride. Many clergy support SWAPO. But as I said there are abuses and every abuse nullifies the effect of the C.A.P.

The area where it has worked best has been in Caprivi where SWAPO has been almost totally nullified. The army has combined intense patrolling with a powerful Hearts and Minds Campaign. This combined with a weaker tribal factor has been effective. C.A.N.U. joined SWAPO but the Ovambos tend to be arrogant and so there have been tribal splits and some of the C.A.N.U. types have come back under the amnesty as some of them rebelled against SWAPO. So in Caprivi the C.A.P. has worked well.

But ultimately a Hearts and Minds Strategy can't win a campaign, it can only contribute. It is better to get in on the early stages before insurgency starts and before the politicisation process begins otherwise you start with a credibility gap. In Ovambo it didn't work that way. You should start the Hearts and Minds campaign before the political action begins. Its better that way.

Q. What effect do the apartheid policies and institutions have on the success of the C.A.P. in the urban areas?

A. There's the old problem of the lack of coordination between departments of state - when the admin board knocks down your shanty you're not going to be very sympathetic to the state. The problem is that there is not enough coordination between government departments. You have the Coloured Affairs Department and the Department of Co-operation and Development and they deal with different aspects of policy than the army. It is important to realize that we're in a pre-insurgency situation at the moment in the urban/.....

urban areas. This means that unlike the operational area you have civilians running the show. In the operational area the administration officials are subordinate to the military. Here its different the Admin. Boards are in charge and the army is subordinate and the Admin. Boards aren't always aware of the problems. While apartheid is still around the credibility gap remains large and you can't work in isolation.

But in the Western Cape amongst the Coloureds the army is not regarded with the same dislike as the government. This can be seen by the number of people who volunteer for the Cape Corps. Unemployment is an important factor but not the only one - many of them go on to join the Permanent Force. What is most important is firstly that the army is much less colour conscious than society at large. Integration is carried out in a non-tokenistic way. You have Coloured officers commanding Whites and you don't get petty discrimination. So the Black or Coloured man in the army have self-respect. They know that no post is closed to them on the grounds of race. As a result that all-important principle of upward mobility is unfettered.

Things are very different with the police for example. A few years ago the police got very pissed off because many of the Coloured police were leaving to join the Cape Corps because pay and conditions were better.

In the army there is no tokenism about integration and in the Cape most Coloured people dissociate it from the Coloured Affairs Department. We often look at people in terms of blocks - but that's not always correct. Amongst Blacks, Coloureds and Whites you get radicals, conservatives and moderates. And including the radicals the army generally goes down well. People don't bristle at the sight of

an army uniform in the same way as they might at a police uniform.

Q. With this in mind what is the possibility of conscription for Coloureds and Indians?

A. At this stage a universal Coloured and Indian call-up would be disastrous. What it depends on is the constitutional proposals. And if the constitutional proposals prove to be beneficial I think there will be no more bitching than amongst Whites.

Q. While reformists are dominant in the military, in education conservatives appear to still have the upper hand. How does this affect the kind of influence the military is attempting to have in education?

A. That's a very interesting question. In education there's a lot of right wing obstructionism. In the Afrikaans Community the teacher is almost a cult figure - its a very honored profession. The Afrikaners are besotted about education as traditionally everything is focussed on the children. So the teacher is very important. He is the embodiment of culture and so on. And if you want to initiate reforms you have to carry the teachers with you. And many are very, very conservative and rise to high ranks in the education hierarchy. And some of them certainly don't agree with P.W. A big problem is that many of the Transvalers don't realise that culturally speaking the Coloureds are really Whites - their whole outlook on life is White. You can say they are aggrieved Whites. In the Transvaal they don't know the Coloured and still think of them as a tribe and are opposed to integration with them and could obstruct the process through failing to implement reforms. Now if the new dispensation goes through P.W. will try to get things through. He was the Minister of Defence as you know and he is acutely aware of the situation

in this country because for many years he has been receiving information from intelligence reports which deal only with facts and they don't give a damn if the big shots don't like the facts. Now I'll tell you something else - he received intelligence reports five years ago telling him that it was imperative that he include Coloureds in the political decision making process and he's carried this out.

Now take someone like Piet Koornhoff - he's very different - he is a politician and not a military man and he doesn't understand the importance of military intelligence reports. He was warned five years ago about the squatter problem and he did nothing about it. But P.W., as ex-minister of Defence, knows the value of grassroots opinion. He wants to do something about the education department but he's a clever, smart bastard - he's a cool bugger - so he manoeuvres people into the right positions before acting and this is why he takes his time about reform. For example, he wants to include urban Blacks in the new dispensation but he can't piss off the right too quickly. So the way he will probably go about reforming education is to ensure that the next Administrator of the Transvaal is his own man and then he can take steps to reform the education department.

P.W. listens to the experts and moves carefully, so there may be improvements in the future. But you must also remember that the right wing are still very strong in the Transvaal - especially in education. So Botha is skating on thin ice and he can't stick his neck out any further because something a lot of people forget is that the National Party is very democratic - so he can't overstep the mark because he will be chucked out if he does. The right wing are especially entrenched in education - the Broederbond are well entrenched in education and culture.

Q. Can you say something about how the cadet programme and the Youth Preparedness programme have emerged in their present forms?

A. When I was at school in the late 50's all schools had cadets and there was quite close co-operation with the military in them. In the 1960's they started going down and schools started saying they were a waste of time and you got the beginnings of the Y.P. programme which is run by the Education Department. In the 70's they began realising that this was not the best thing so they started bringing cadets back on a universal basis. I'm not sure exactly how this will affect Y.P. which is not aimed directly at the military - it is more of a brainwashing programme with cadets being part of it.

The cadet part is aimed firstly at preparation for National Service and especially at building up the cult of the leadership group who usually make the officers of the future. Its not a case of direct brainwashing but rather an attempt to cultivate the military spirit. South Africans are a funny people. They are said to be warlike but not military in nature. They fight hard but they are not regimented - especially with the Afrikaners. And what Cadets is trying to do is to create the mental preparedness for military training.

In the old days it was just drill and shooting 4 times a year. Nowadays its much more complicated - you have camps, shooting, mine awareness drills - and all this is based on military drill - it's the real thing and it helps the process of adjustment to the barracks.

So the re-emphasis on cadets in the mid-70's was actually a return to the former situation which existed when I was at school when every school had it own detachment until it declined in the 60's. Its a similar situation to the arms budgets of the 70's.

They looked big but in fact defence had been neglected

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in the 50's and the early 60's so equipment was outdated. The big budgets were part of a process of catching up and I suppose the situation with cadets is analogous.

Q. To what extent do the military use the universities for research?

A. The military makes use of the university for deep research. They are banks of knowledge which no research institute can match. The universities are particularly useful in doing research in areas like electronics, engineering - especially mechanical and electronics, metalurgy, chemistry and even anthropology where they are big on understanding your fellow man. There's not that much directly commissioned research but many university professors are citizen force people, so I imagine it is quite easy to arrange.

Q. What about military oriented courses such as Strategic Studies Courses? How useful are they to the S.A.D.F.?

A. They are handy to the army because there's a big emphasis on academic training among the Permanent Force and further academic training can help their careers. The Strategic Studies Courses are useful in this respect although they're not primarily or exclusively for military purposes. Some of those doing these courses have not actually served and just take the courses to broaden their knowledge. The Strategic Studies Institute at the University of Pretoria operates as a think tank on military matters - they advise anybody - of course including the S.A.D.F. - and in a way its an extension of the Pol.Sci, Department.

Q. Why is the S.A.D.F. placing so much emphasis on University Military Units?

A. I don't believe they're trying to win the Students' Hearts and Minds. Its more an attempt to tighten

up /.....

up administration especially with regard to deferrments and so on and to ensure people remain well trained. As far as I can see they're holding units, not active military units. Students at U.C.T. are worried they will be called up to suppress riots but I don't think it will work that way. They just take the student and put him in the U.M.V. and this prevents him from getting away with deferrments. I think U.C.T. is over-sensitive.

Q. What affect does opposition to the military on English speaking campuses have?

A. At the moment opposition does not have that large an effect because relatively few people are involved. The number of students who are prepared to leave or go to jail is still quite small. But on the other hand many of these people are well educated and they are needed. But the average bloke is prepared to serve. In fact the army ends up with more technical people than they can use and many end up not doing a military job at all. So its not that important as yet but it is worrying. What loses out the most is not only the army but rather the country as a whole.

Interview with Major Brit, Head of Civil Action, Cape Town Castle, January 19, 1983

Q Can you explain something about why and how Civil Action emerged and the kinds of activities it is involved in?

A It first began to be seen as a priority in South West. Previously the cops did all the counter-insurgency work and internally the police were responsible for security and the same thing applied in South Africa. But soon things got too complicated militarily and that is the point where the army became directly involved. This was decided, of course, at the top level when, like for example in Malaya, the police couldn't handle things anymore.

The problem with the police is that they're normally not politically oriented. With the military its very different. In South-West the army started taking control of the situation and practically the military commanders operate in a very different way. The military command first does an appreciation of the situation. Here many factors are considered - time, the terrain, ethnic and traditional values, the nature of the population and so on. For the military commander the first thing is to make this appreciation. The army, unlike the police, is not oriented towards convicting terrorists - that is very much a secondary thing - we're interested in what makes the terrorist tick - what made him go there and this kind of information we get from our interrogation reports.

One of our main aims is to build up good relations with the population - to be seen to be helping and defending them. In a revolutionary war such as in South West the population is the main target group. This is very different from a conventional conflict where you have the building up of two forces - mobilisation and counter-mobilisation. Time and money are very important. World War I and II were not long relative to the level of advancement and the time taken for mobilisation. But in the Six Days War the Israeli economy couldn't survive that level of activity for more than ten days. The same with the Falklands.

In a revolutionary war it is a very different situation. The population is the target group and so its not so much a case of two forces meeting each other. The population group is the target group in the operational area.

Also a revolutionary situation is not time bound. In fact time is used by the revolutionaries - it leads to financial deterioration, it affects authority, it causes internal political fragmentation such as is happening in South West now.

In SWA the military took over and they made an appreciation. It became clear that the population is the key to victory - so it went into cultural aspects, economic aspects, educational aspects, medical, economic and so on. The people are mainly tribal and have a strong sense of cultural identity and I think they've been unfairly thrown into the western oriented system. One chief I know in Kavango said that in his area they introduced the western voting system of democracy and he was voted in as leader and became the chief minister but he had to give up his position as chief and he lost respect because of this. The point is that most blacks don't understand the system but western standards demand it.

Anyway, the SADF has been placing teachers in schools but with education people are being forced into western time and they are introduced to a demanding, time consuming world. In Kavango in 1974 there were three matriculants out of a population of 63 000. Most of the schools were small bush schools and most teachers had about standard 5 or 6 in the kraal areas and by our standards that's low, although many didn't need to go to a higher school because reading and writing were seen as education.

In SWA the missions were the pioneers - they were the first 'civilised' people to make contact and the church had the function to education and it provided literature and this had its effect. Some of the parents were literate but by today's standards this happened very slowly. So little Tim goes to school and then maybe he goes on to a higher school such as at the mission. (The mission schools are subsidized by the government and in the bush are usually protected by the military. In 1974 there were only two high schools and since then in Kavango there have been two or three more build.) Anyway this has a snowball effect - a need is started. So Tim ends up more qualified than the bush teacher.

Q To what extent are the military involved in staffing these schools in South West?

A The way it worked was that these schools found themselves short-staffed. At the same time in our appreciation we found that winning the support of the people by assisting in their development was the key to success. In South West 80% of what the SADF does is development work and only 20% is the blood and guts military work. But the media - and that includes the SABC - in unfair - they always talk about who has been killed but they don't talk about all the teachers are doing.

Anyway to come back to Jim's story - suddenly he has to go to high school - away from his tribal situation and he is put into a room with a bed which he's not used to and its a traumatic experience - it has a destabilising effect on him. For example the western diet because black education is standardised - but they're now changing this because the army is aware of the problems. But its a slow process. Tim has different teachers who are very clever, new subjects and he's away from his tribal situation and traditional environment and this makes him vulnerable. In our military appreciation we are aware of this and therefore winning the confidence of the people is the main factor in countering insurgency. We've got to show people - or rather teach them to decide for themselves - what is better for them and therefore we must supply them with teachers. People join SWAPO because they promise them education. Also the military advises that the medium of education is English because this is what the people want - they think you can go a long way with English. The military people are aware of this. We send trained teachers to the schools - there are hundreds of teachers in the SADF.

Q What are the priorities for the Western Cape?

A Here in Cape Town we're working with urban coloureds and blacks so we want graduates because some of these black and coloured people are on a par with you and me intellectually. But the problem is that in the homelands there is a huge demand for teachers and other graduates and there are just not enough of them. The other day I asked for five more graduates and they told me its like squeezing blood out of a stone.

But the teachers we send are highly qualified. In South West they're there in full uniform giving a very high standard of education and training and the increased demand created by our efforts has forced the authorities to build high schools. The withdrawal of the SADF would mean the withdrawal of most of their teachers. Economic development also has to be taken into account - our presence creates lost of job opportunities and has helped the country economically. For example in Oshikati Che has opened up a factory because of the thirsty soldiers and the same thing with a food canning factory. New demands and new markets are created. The point is with education and our other activities such as agriculture, health care and so on, if we're not there who will be? The standard of living ripples out....its the same

with the missions. One Catholic mission in Kovango has done an incredible job - we used to stop over often - at the clinic people would give whatever they could afford. We help these missions with doctors etc. We help the health services. The army doctors could then refer patients to specialists.

The mission schools are largely self-sufficient but we assist them. The military can help, for example, by providing advanced agricultural knowledge - but it takes time to change attitudes. We supply agricultural personnel and through our combined know how we have helped establish a far better meat standard and now they will change their attitudes through the incentive of money and the market. It's important to develop in the right time according to the right rules. You have to get to know the people and this is the key to success in South West. It's a political problem and this is the main part of the army's task.

But don't get me wrong the 20% of blood, sweat and tears is also necessary. The revolutionaries don't want the 80% to take place.

I think one problem is that were still suffering from a hangover from the colonial days. To them the ethnic and cultural aspects did not matter. For example, in drawing boundaries they were drawn on degrees of maps and this meant that tribes were split in two by these boundaries...and this helps the agitators. They don't want the education to take place from us - it doesn't suit their needs.

Q How has this been applied in South Africa?

A All the lessons and principles and know how have been and are being applied in South Africa. The military is an ideal tool to use in a process like this. I always tell my guys that the army can remain neutral in a party political sense. The military won't change with a party political change - I would be quite happy to work under a PFP government but I'd be the first to resign if the HNP got in. But people with completely different backgrounds and political views are in one team working for the same aim - the big thing is to believe in what you're doing. Some guys are even doing camps here voluntarily because its stimulating work and the proof of this is that its succeeding.

With our target group the process of appreciating is the same - but the population is different - it's far more complex - you've got whites, coloureds and blacks and you get big differences within those groups. You get different kinds of whites - those from the northern and southern suburbs for example. And your coloured community here is very complex. There is a lot of instability caused by many factors such as legislation like the Group Areas which has had an incredible destabilising effect; also the Mixed Marriages Act etc.

But despite all these problems we've had tremendous success. There has been a huge demand for youth camps and we just don't have the manpower to maintain contact but we keep in touch through our education development programmes and these need to continue which is why we have started the Civic Action magazine 'Contact'. There was a need for it and the response has been good.

As I was saying we must remember that its only about 16 or 17 years since coloured education became the responsibility of the state. Many people still remember Verwoerd's speeches about the black people not needing to know maths and this makes them suspicious of us.

At the same time there are big differences between the urban and rural coloureds. You have a small group of highly educated coloureds who are an established middle class and then you get the rest. There are no traditional authority structures like in Kovango. Then there are also the legal complications I mentioned before.

With the urban blacks it is also a very difficult situation - they're very restricted by laws. One black guy who works with us - Philip Myuleti - his father walked from Rhodesia to the mines, and then he left the mines and walked here. Now he's got a good job and a phone - all things a middle class family would have - but I'd like to help him get a better job - but then you run into laws like the Coloured Labour Preference Laws. We in the arm realise these things are problems - we can't change them but we certainly can advise. But the political problems complicate the situation. Take this guy, he's born here, he won't go back to the Transkei and therefore it is our job to accommodate the urban black. We in the army can advise on these problems.

For example, in 1981, just after the schools boycotts, we went out there in the townships unarmed and soon the people began to see us as protectors - and sometimes by the way they behave towards black people, I'm not surprised. In the Platteland black people run like hell from military vehicles and this is usually because they've had a problem with some difficult police sergeant. But the army is there as the protector but sometimes to defend you have to attack.

People here accept the man in uniform - we take educational films and go out into their areas. We make contact in schools and with community groups and committees. We liaise with the school principle and if he agrees we work out an educational and information programme. Even the ladies club from Wippental invited us. We also give lectures on road safety and bring in guest speakers. At the end of a month or so everyone knows and accepts the soldier. But we only go by invitation - we don't want people to think we're forcing this down their throats - as that Grassroots article said. We work with anyone who wants us - even at Stellenbosch University we work with their equivalent of SHAWCO, USKOR.

Q To what extent has there been opposition in the black communities to your activities?

A Take for example the Muslim News (Fri Dec 3, 1982), they have this article on us. They're responding because they see something they don't like. It's the same with that Grassroots article. I don't blame them. If I was an agitator I would also be very opposed to Civic Action because it destroys what they're trying to do. But it has little effect and we've responded to the Grassroots' lies in our latest edition of 'Contact'. Once we start working with people they learn what the army is all about and they go for it and the word spreads. We get phoned from the funniest places....The more we work in an area the more we learn about how to handle things.

Q How many youth camps did you have last year?

A In 1982 we had 22 youth camps in our area - much of the Cape Province - we had six in the Northern Cape, we had others in Vredendal, Stellenbosch and Hermanus where we've had five for black kids. We've usually had good cooperation from departments such as with the divisional council because we had problems in finding sites - but the Lions and Rotarians were very helpful. In the Hermanus camps for blacks we had to work with the Department of Education, Training and with the Admin Boards and we've certainly had our problems with both of them. With the difficulties we've had with the stubbornness and

So all this goes towards building up stability. If the PFP were in power we would still be playing the same role.

Q What kinds of changes have there been in the Civic Action Programme over the past few years?

A Well in the past three years it has grown by nearly 300% but we still have very severe shortages in manpower, both here and elsewhere.

Q Where are people trained?

A Most are trained at Kimberley at the 11 Commands when they do their basics and elementary training in Civic Action. Some of them are trained in Outshoorn where most of the teachers go. The teachers there do leader group training and then if they're not medically acceptable for infantry training they come here.

Q What kind of cooperation is there with the homelands?

A There's very close diplomatic cooperation and mutual aid. There's a big demand for Defence Force teachers.

Q Why are there no SADF teachers in Cape Town?

A Well there are a number of reasons. The teacher shortage here isn't that severe so we have higher priorities and anyway the department is reluctant and the principals don't seem to want it as they haven't asked us yet. But in other places - Kimberley, Natal, the Transvaal we have teachers in full military uniform although usually they don't take guns.

South Africa has a very effective military machine - when aggression is necessary our boys have got it but at the same time we show great care of the local population. I was involved with Operation Protea and was very impressed with the way the local population was treated. I don't believe these stories about killing women and children. I was in 32 Battalion for a while so I know what the blood and guts is all about. If there is killing of women and children that's a sickness. If we start throwing our Christian principles overboard then our unity will break. This is why the enemy is trying to polarise the church - this is the total onslaught, not the butterflies and earrings.

At some meetings, -for example in Picketburg, the HNP tells people not to fight in the army because they say Botha and Malan indoctrinates you there. As far as I'm concerned that's the same as some agitator encouraging national service resisters. Our enemies will use the far right because they want polarisation and fragmentation. That is the total onslaught and knowingly or unknowingly some people are playing into the hands of the revolution.

Q Are there any moves to get coloureds and Asians to play a greater role in the SADF?

A Yes. We believe we should give coloureds the opportunity to protect themselves although there is still some opposition from a few people outside of the SADF. For example, in Swartland there was some opposition from whites to the coloured commando. But we sorted this one out eventually. You see, the educative process goes both ways - to the conservative whites as well as to the blacks. So we make an appreciation of the situation and then we act so as not to polarise people. And by using the Burger we won the whites over to the idea.

attitudes of the Admin Boards it doesn't surprise me that they've got so little credibility amongst blacks. But fortunately they're disappearing and anyway we'll have to reconsider working with them. The only solution is to kick their arses and pull them straight because they constantly embarrass us with their attitudes to blacks.

Q When you work with groups in the black communities, who decides on the programmes to be followed?

A Well, we help with drawing up the programmes but we always ask them what they would like. For example, sportwise we draw up programmes together. We've helped a lot in this area. One of our projects was the John Passmore cricket week which is the black equivalent of the Nuffield week. We reach a lot of people through sport. All in all we reached about 15 000 black and coloured people in our area last year. By working in sport we don't only improve their understanding of us but we also help improve their sport. In two years of involvement with the Passmore week the standard of their cricket has risen dramatically. It's a fantastic achievement and will help multi-racial cricket become socially acceptable and not just be window dressing - and I don't deny there has been window dressing at times in the past.

Q Why do you get involved with sport?

A I don't like the word Total Onslaught - it is too often misused. Old Piet Poggenpoel in the Platteland thinks that the total onslaught is all about butterflies on jeans and earrings for men. That's nonsense. But whatever you want to call it we're fighting an enemy and we're fighting to constantly changing rules so you have to fight in every area your enemy is fighting in. So countering the total onslaught of South Africa I would work for isolation of sport and this is why we get involved. We have to use multi-racial sport as an weapon against the enemy. So we work closely with the W.P. Cricket Union, for example, and have Omar Henry and others giving coaching clinics. Our enemies don't like that.

Q Who are the enemies?

A SACOS and SANROC are the biggest enemies of South African sport. Our weapon against them is integration in sport - we use sport as a bridge for racial harmony. The kind of mutual communication we've managed to has been fantastic. The way I look at it is that in South Africa there is enough sun for everyone so give everyone his place. What we in the army are doing is working for evolutionary change against revolutionary change, but it's a politically neutral way of action.

You know we have coloureds working for us - this is very important on the youth camps - we also use them in the rugby clinics - which are multi-racial clinics.

Q What kind of opposition have you faced from whites to your approach?

A Only in Graaff-Reinett did we have real racial problems because the white schools didn't want multi-racial sport. But sport breaks down racial conflict, but the Parents Association didn't want it. But gradually this will change. The military is there to create stability. If you've got an unstable defence force then you've got an unstable community and government.

The way we handled the situation in Graaff Reinett was to do an appreciation. We reckoned that the only two things these people read are the Bible and the Burger. Now you can't change the Bible so we got the Burger to come and do a story on the black sportsmen who said how they saw it as their duty to defend South Africa. And when the whites read this they started changing their atti

My feeling is that once the coloureds go on the voters role then they would have given someone the right to act for them. And they must then return the responsibility. We all have to protect what we have. The two biggest problems in calling up coloureds and Asians are the lack of money or facilities to incorporate them and the possibility of opposition. But I feel that if you have a vote you have to have a responsibility and I'm sure they will be called up soon. They won't call them all up at once - the way it's likely to happen is that first they will ensure the registration of everyone. Then maybe move ahead with the ballot system. But that's just feeling.

Q How is the Civic Action Programme coordinated?

A It is an integral part of army operations and is coordinated by the Communication Department of the Chief of Staff Intelligence which advises the Minister of Defence. In fact, our reports here go right up to the minister whenever it involves something we feel affects safety or security in any way. Even if there's a problem with another government department, if they're doing something which affects our aims we just send a report and they soon put a stop to it. And this has certainly happened before.

Q What are the political aims of the Defence Force?

A You cannot divorce the Defence Force from politics because ultimately it's for achieving. But its political aim is a broad one - you could call it the Christian Democratic system, harmony and development. Different parties use different ways of achieving this broad end. The PFP and the NP have a similar goal and the aims of the SADF are broad enough to include both - they just have slightly different ways of getting there.

For us here in Civic Action one of our aims is to counter the lies put out by likes of Grassroots and Muslim News. Those people just haven't got their facts straight. To counter them is certainly part of our broad political aim.



Interview with Sergeant Eloff, Warrent Officer in charge of Cadet Detachment,
E P Command January 7 1983

Q What role does the E P Command play in coordinating cadet programs?

A We assist with the training of cadets and we train the teachers to become cadet officers - they use their initiative to give the kids military discipline. This year we've introduced a number of new things or extended them - for example the vac camps with teachers in charge in which the cadets have to learn, among other things, survival in army conditions - for example going without food and water, etc. We also help with drilling, teaching military discipline and how to act in crisis situations. Then there's the April leadership course in which we get leaders from each of the schools and train them in army situations. We also help with organising the band camps and with various cadet competitions such as drill and shooting. This applies to all the schools in the area.

Q Can you outline the kind of programmes the E P Command helps with during cadet periods?

A What we're trying to introduce - and it has been introduced at most schools is a sort of differential programme - some boys will drill, some will be in the band, others will participate in Y P programmes like firefighting, etc. The E P Command sends instructors to help with all these activities. We're divided into four groups here as well as Head Quarters at the Algoa training base and are involved with instructing the civilian teachers, the commandos as well as the cadets in this regard. For example, we here are in charge of the whole Group 6 area - P E, Uitenhage, etc. The training programme goes on throughout the year and as well as drilling and shooting we show them military uniform, what its like to work in the army, we give them security lectures, lectures on the border duty, on crisis situations and so on. But we try to rely on teachers as much as possible for the implementation of the programme - for dividing the cadets into groups. One of the things we teach them is what to do if there's a terrorist attack on the school. So we divide them into different groups - the firefighting group, the leadership group, etc. takes charge of the situation, make sure children are taken away, etc. and then the girls will be medical aids. This is the kind of programme we are suggesting to the schools.

Q What other activities are the girls involved in?

A At a number of schools they are already doing drilling and are involved in the bands and so on. We are thinking of giving the girls rifles and are trying to get the whole thing of military preparedness into their thinking. We will also be using them for administration, signals, helping set up terrorist weapon shows, etc.

Q What kinds of changes have there been in the cadet programmes over the last five or so years?

A Five years back the E P Command only had 35 cadet detachments but as the onslaught has intensified we've pushed for more and now we have 65 detachments - this includes most of the private schools like St Andrews, Theodor Herold, Kingswood and Marist Brothers. To have a cadet detachment a school is required to have 36 cadets but some very small schools with fewer are fighting to have their cadet detachments and we encourage this.

In 1982 the number of teachers involved increased by 32% and in 1981 it increased by 57%. Most teachers are making an effort to be appointed as officers and most of the schools have a very positive attitude to the extent that quite a few schools have after hours cadets in order to work through their programmes more thoroughly.

The Department of Education is now forcing schools to have internally run camps and to send boys to leadership camps. In 1982 341 Port Elizabeth boys attended leadership camps.

The camps are attended by all the 25 schools in the P E area - in fact this year we had 33 camps in which most of the boys in the schools attend - Muir sent 300, Grey 65, Cillie sent 150, P E Techniese Hoerskool had six camps of between 60 and 130 boys. These camps are usually attended by E P Command people and we also help with the camp sites and catering - but we suggest that they use their own officers. They also make use of the commando units in their areas - all schools are affiliated to a commando unit. The army gives a very large sum of money for cadet organisation and this increases each year - last year it went up by over 15%.

Q What about coloured and Indian schools?

A Cadets are going to be introduced with them but its not official. In fact some schools have already started but their programmes are not connected to the army yet. I just got a letter from a school asking us to help them but to do this we have to go through the education department and to get permission from the senior army people. But cadets are coming for them as well. Then, as I mentioned, the private schools are also involved and there are many blacks in those schools, and they also do cadets.

Q With the increasing intensity of the total onslaught what direction do you see cadet programmes moving in the future?

A We're moving increasingly towards preparing boys as National Servicemen and to instilling a positive attitude to the SADF. And I think we're succeeding.

We're preparing them in six different ways: 1) For a preparedness for, and an awareness of, the onslaught from outside the country; 2) for civil defence kinds of activities - we're pressing very hard in this direction because the army is preparing to fight an area war; 3) for security - they must be aware of it and aware of preparing their schools for it; 4) for survival in any situation including their own situation; 5) for looking after equipment - anything from their bicycles to cleaning rifles; 6) for the acknowledgement of the cadet of himself as a person. We therefore encourage awards for excellence - in shooting we've started giving army medals and if someone finishes a course we give him a badge for this to show he did the course. This brings the whole thing of leadership into it - we're taking this aspect very seriously. In the army you're taught to think as part of a group but here we try to concentrate on specialised training - which is a good preparation for leadership in the army. Also with the girls playing more of a role now we are moving towards greater concentration on civilian awareness.

Q Are you moving towards greater uniformity in cadet programmes?

A You can't have a totally uniform programme which is exactly the same for all schools because different schools have different situations - for example, a large school in P E and a small border school. As the situation changes so, to some extent, the training will have to change - that is why we have groups and we encourage greater uniformity within each group ie. E L, P E-Uitenhage, etc. We set out the basic guidelines but its not possible to have everybody doing the same.

Q Do you have opposition to cadet programmes from any schools?

A Generally the teachers and the army's attitudes towards each other is very positive and there is a big increase in interest in schools in cadet programmes. But some schools were reluctant or unwilling but this is changing. We've been going out to visit every school - I talk to all the headmasters and try to encourage them to orientate their schools more towards cadets. Now the Education Department forces all government schools to participate in cadets even when they are unwilling. Although this isn't compulsory for the private schools most of them do it of their own free will.

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