

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

To what extent does Horace present a coherent praeceptor persona in the *Ars Poetica*?

Hamish Williams / WLLHAM001

A dissertation submitted in *fulfillment* of the requirements for the award of the degree of  
Master of Arts in Classical Studies (SLL 5020W)

Faculty of the Humanities

University of Cape Town

2011

#### **COMPULSORY DECLARATION**

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced (using the Harvard convention for citation and referencing).

The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

### **Please Note**

1. I have had to insert the grave accents for some of the Greek font manually on my dissertation, which are therefore missing on the electronic PDF version.

So on page 73, in the Greek quotation (Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X. Orat.* 4), there should be a grave accent over the epsilon in 'men' and 'de'.

Likewise on page 110, in the Greek quotation from Aristotle (Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.1395a), there should be a grave accent over the epsilon of 'de' (x2).

And on Page 118, in the Greek quotation from Aristotle (Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.1395a), there should be a grave accent over the epsilon of 'men' (x2), 'de' (x3), and the final syllable of '¢prepej'.

2. I have also included a copy of my dissertation in Microsoft Word, lest any of the Greek font was distorted in changing the format.

University of Cape Town

## **Abstract**

**MA in Classical Studies at UCT 2011**

**Hamish Williams**

In the ensuing dissertation I explore the extent to which a coherent praeceptor persona may be found in Horace's *Ars Poetica*.

In the first chapter, 'Interpreting the *Ars Poetica*', I commence by reviewing and commenting upon previous critical attempts to explain Horace's poem. This I have divided into three main sections: 'Interpretations of Incoherence', 'Interpretations of Coherence', and 'Authorial Personae'. In the first of these I explore how some critics have denied the possibility of arriving at a coherent interpretation of the poem, which they regard as an unfinished hotchpotch effort. Most notably in this section I illustrate how the *Ars Poetica* fails to conform to the expected form of any one particular literary genre. In the second section, 'Interpretations of Coherence', I examine attempts, particularly Brink's in his *Prolegomena*, to structure the poem into certain fixed aesthetic units, and I then explore some of the difficulties of utilizing such rigorous and tendentious rubrics in a flexible and free-flowing poem. Lastly, in the third section, 'Authorial Personae', I review more modern attempts to explain Horace's poem through the identification of an authorial persona within the text. I proceed to justify my preference for this interpretative method by explaining it both with reference to modern literary theory and ancient poetic and dramatic practice. Lastly, in this chapter I briefly introduce the character of the authorial persona whom I shall endeavour to locate in the *Ars Poetica* – the teacher or praeceptor persona.

In the second chapter, 'The Praeceptor Persona in Play', I commence by trying to build a characteristically Horatian concept of the teacher figure in the *Ars Poetica*, in my section, 'The Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor'. To this end I turn to the *Satires* of Horace, particularly, 1.1, 1.4, and 1.10, where I show that the Horatian model of a praеceptor can be explained through three conceptual criteria – 'instruction', 'demonstration', and 'play'. Applying in turn each of these three conceptual criteria to the text of the *Ars Poetica* I illustrate how the very language of the authorial persona of the poem fulfils these criteria.

In the third chapter, 'The Teacher of Satire 1.4', having established the presence of a Praeceptor persona in the *Ars Poetica*, I turn my attention to the *Satires* of Horace where the most extensive critical work has been undertaken with respect to the character of the authorial persona; particularly, since it has informed my concept of the Horatian praеceptor, I examine the teacher figure of *Satire* 1.4. In the first section, 'Interpretations of the Teacher Persona', I examine and criticise four scholarly attempts to explain the character of the teacher figure in the *sermo*. I identify the mixture of instruction and humour in the language as the key critical concern of these critics. In the final section, 'The Playful Satirist' I then apply my conceptual criterion of 'play' to the discourse of the teacher of 1.4, suggesting that his humour is not incompatible with instruction, but is actually a vital constituent of his role as a praеceptor.

Finally, I give a brief 'Epilogue', summarising my analysis and, more importantly, emphasising the importance of identifying a characteristically *Horatian* model of a praеceptor. A detailed bibliography is then given of the source material consulted and references used through the dissertation.

## Contents

<i>Preface</i>		3
<i>Chapter 1</i>	<i>Interpreting the Ars Poetica</i>	
	Introduction to Interpretations	4
	Interpretations of Incoherence	10
	Interpretations of Coherence	36
	Authorial Personae	47
	The Praeceptor Persona	68
<i>Chapter 2</i>	<i>The Praeceptor Persona At Play</i>	
	The Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor	71
2.1	<i>First Criterion: Instruction</i>	94
	Language of Command	94
	Proverbial Language	109
2.2	<i>Second Criterion: Demonstration</i>	119
	Illustrative Language	119
	Transitional Language	129
2.3	<i>Third Criterion: Play</i>	138
	Sportive Language	138
	Empathetic Language	148
	Summary of Analysis	156
<i>Chapter 3</i>	<i>The Teacher of Satire 1.4</i>	
	Introduction	158
	Interpretations of the ‘Teacher’ Persona	158
	The Playful Satirist	170
<i>Epilogue</i>		182
<i>Bibliography</i>		184

## **Preface**

I have used the Harvard method (author date) of citation and referencing throughout this dissertation. The full details of all works cited and consulted for this dissertation may be found in the bibliography at the end of this work. On occasion I have used footnotes within the text to further reinforce a particular point with additional scholarship or otherwise to explain certain conventions, abbreviations etc. which I employ in my narrative. All sources cited in the footnotes may also be found in the bibliography.

University of Cape Town

## Chapter 1 – Interpreting the Ars Poetica

### *Introduction to Interpretations*

The *Ars Poetica*<sup>1</sup>, known variously as *Liber de Arte Poetica* or as the *Epistula ad Pisones*, is a 476 line hexameter epistolary poem written by the Augustan poet Horace.

Ostensibly addressed to the Pisones – *pater et iuvenes patre digni* (Hor. *Ars P.* 24)<sup>2</sup>, the *Ars*<sup>3</sup> appears, on the one hand, to be designed to give advice to its readers on how to manufacture a quality work of poetic art. We are supplied with suggestions of appropriate subject matter for a literary work:

*rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae,  
verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 310-311)

We are instructed in detail as to the suitable form of artistic discourse:

*et nova fictaque nuper habebunt verba fidem si  
Graeco fonte cadent, parce detorta.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 52-53)

---

<sup>1</sup> All abbreviations of Classical literature and modern Classical journals taken from: Hornblower, S & Spawforth, A. Eds. 1996. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Journal Abbreviations not found in *OCD* have been taken from *L'Année Philologique*.

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all Latin text of the *Ars Poetica* and *Epistles II* has been taken from: Rudd, N. 1989. *Horace: Epistles Book II and Epistle to the Pisones*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Henceforth I shall often refer to the *Ars Poetica* as simply the 'Ars'.

We are told how to provide our creations with a fit order and arrangement:

*ordinis haec virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor,  
ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici,  
pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat;*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 42-44)

We are instructed in what the purpose of our work should be:

*omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci,  
lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 343-344)

And, moreover, we are even lectured in terms of how we should behave in our everyday life:

*qui didicit patriae quid debeat et quid amicis,  
quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes,  
quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae  
partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto  
reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 312-316)

On the other hand, the *Ars* seems to be crafted by Horace to be enjoyed as a work of art in itself. The poem is rich in visual imagery, such as the recurrent humorous picture of the mad ‘inspired’ poet:

*ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte*

*credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas*

*Democritus, bona pars non unguis ponere curat,*

*non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 295-298)

There are several wonderfully constructed pithy epigrammatic verses – purple patches, if you like – within the poem – *parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus* (Hor. *Ars P.* 139); and this is not to mention the ways in which the language itself often seems to reflect ironically the subject matter of a particular passage.

It is essentially the dual nature of the *Ars* to be at once appreciated as a didactic or prescriptive guide to producing poetic art but also to be appreciated itself as a poetic work. In short, it is a poem about poetry. Many interpretations of the *Ars* have ignored its poetic function and examined it purely in terms of its didactic nature<sup>4</sup>, while, conversely, in recent times, the trend has often been to ignore the manifestly prescriptive nature of the work and to read far too much into what the poet is really ‘trying to say’ in the *Ars*<sup>5</sup>. This simple paradox in misinterpreting the *Ars* has encouraged me to try to locate some means

---

<sup>4</sup> For example: Tracy (1948), Brink (1963), Russell (1973a). For further discussion *see below*.

<sup>5</sup> For example: Oliensis (1998), Harrison (2007), Laird (2007). For further discussion *see below*.

by which one might find coherence in a reading of Horace's poem. How might I arrive at an understanding of the *Ars* by which I could both appreciate its aesthetic function, but at the same time not ignore its obvious didactic purpose? Indeed, the *Ars* itself recommends an admixture of 'utility and sweetness'<sup>6</sup> in the formation of any poem.

As the title of this dissertation indicates, I have attempted to locate this coherence by identifying a specific kind of *authorial persona* in the text. But before I reveal the identity of this persona<sup>7</sup> and before I illustrate how this persona can be found within the very language of the poem<sup>8</sup>, it is necessary first to provide some criticism of previous scholarly interpretations of the *Ars* (to date) and to reveal how they have led me to my particular approach.

As literary critics we should consider 'interpretation' to be the fundamental practice of our field. But what does it mean to 'interpret' poetry or, ultimately, any mode of discourse? What is the root purpose of interpretation? Tracing the original Latin term from which the English word, via French, was derived, we find '*interpres*', which is a noun of agency: quite literally it is a person who is concerned with locating a '*pretium*' – a 'value' or 'worth' – between, '*inter*', things. In essence, it is a process of 'translation': just as an actual translator might hope to render a 'value between' two respective languages by means of a verbal or written translation, the literary critic hopes to render a value between the literary or poetic text as it lies before him and his own understanding. I do not wish to become too embroiled in the theory behind this process, but, simply put,

---

<sup>6</sup> Lines 333-334, 343-344.

<sup>7</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, I shall use the term 'persona' as shorthand for 'authorial persona', and not a secondary literary persona within the text.

<sup>8</sup> This will constitute the second chapter of this dissertation.

the desire to interpret a text lies in the assumption that a text is somehow insufficient to be appreciated by itself, that it requires some kind of external semantic property, 'meaning', to be translated, to be interpreted from its raw textual state; to phrase it another way, interpretation denotes an essential dissatisfaction with the existing state of a work of literary art (Sontag 1972: 657). But here is not the place to discuss the efficacy of literary criticism in general – this is the occupation of literary theorists.

Now the interpretation which is bestowed upon the literature under inspection can, in my understanding and experience of criticism, generally adopt one of two forms. An interpretation might endeavour to locate coherence in the given text: it is the job of this critic to piece together the apparent web of intermingling ideas within a text into a 'coherent' framework, an argument which 'sticks together', whose meaning can theoretically be comprehended completely; or, otherwise, the interpretation acts as a deliberate rejection of the possibility of arriving at meaning in the text: it is the job of this critic to illustrate how the text is essentially 'incoherent', that it cannot be pieced together into an organized framework of meaning. The former might loosely be termed the objective approach, since it views the text as an object which is able to be analysed, often through highly structured, almost geometric, methodology; the latter might be termed the subjective approach, which, rather than regarding the text as an object of analysis, tends to illustrate how numerous incompatibilities within the text deny the possibility of fixed meaning, as, for example, in post-structuralist criticisms (Genette 1988b: 69-71).

Naturally there are obvious pitfalls in either approach. Without becoming too embroiled in complex theory, let us briefly consider some common objections to these opposed methods of analysis. The objective, for example structuralist, method tends to

form what Gerald Genette, in ‘Structuralism and Literary Criticism’, calls “systems of latent relations” (Genette 1988b: 68): the analyses tend to construct relationships between parts of the original text which are not always explicitly identified in such a manner and can accordingly be prone to rather tendentious criticisms and indeed, in the worst cases, to invention (Genette 1988b: 68)<sup>9</sup>. Secondly, objective analyses appear to be intrinsically opposed to the notion of textual fragmentation – the possibility of a given work actually being irresolvable – with the result that further subordinate layers of structure are often added to conceal this essential anxiety (Genette 1988b: 68-9).

The subjective approach, on the other hand, in its allegiance to hermeneutics, or the theory of interpretation, often appears to be ‘anti-critical’ in its desire to remain irresolvable; and yet, ironically enough, as J. H. Miller describes in his essay ‘The Critic as Host’<sup>10</sup>, such subjective readings are ineradicably linked to ‘logocentric readings’ – indeed, to employ Miller’s own appropriate analogy, these subjective readings really act as ‘parasites’ on the ‘body’ of objective criticisms, without which they could not possibly exist (Miller 1988: 282-283). A second major criticism of the subjective approach, what E.D. Hirsch refers to as ‘critical relativity’ in ‘Faulty Perspectives’, is the manner in which this method paradoxically sets itself up as a universal: “That this doctrine of critical relativity should itself be the single doctrine exempt from an otherwise universal skepticism rarely strikes its adherents as a damaging inconsistency” (Hirsch 1988: 259).

Now scholarship in Classical Philology has often appeared reluctant to accommodate radical contemporary theories in literary studies, preferring rather to adopt an eclectic approach to the subject, utilising a fair range of philosophies and approaches

---

<sup>9</sup> This is a problem particularly relevant to studies of the *Ars Poetica*; see my section on ‘*Interpretations of Coherence*’ with regard to Brink’s divisions of the poem.

<sup>10</sup> With particular regard to deconstructionist analyses in the case of his study.

of analysis. I myself do not wish to head at this point any further into the nexus of literary theory, which itself can occupy an entire work; rather, utilising what I consider to be the more amenable labels of ‘interpretations of incoherence’ and ‘interpretations of coherence’, I shall endeavour to underline and comment on what has been said of the *Ars Poetica* over the past century and a half of critical scholarship.

### *Interpretations of Incoherence*

Early commentators of the *Ars* from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century seem to base their interpretations of the poem on the notion that it was an incomplete work, that unlike *Epistles* I and the first two letters of the second book, to Augustus and Florus, Horace did not manage to finish the *Ars Poetica* to his accustomed degree of refinement. So what reasons do these commentators give for their judgement? Wilkins, in his detailed commentary of the *Ars*, provides the following popular verdict: “It has been commonly supposed to be the latest of the works of Horace; and the want of structural completeness, which it undoubtedly displays, if regarded as a poetical treatise ‘on the Art of Poetry’, has been considered as a proof that it was never finished, and probably was not published by the poet himself” (Wilkins 1886: 330). This early judgement of the *Ars* is thus concerned with an apparent lack of structure in the poem: the paradox between the subject matter, or content, of the poem and its form, or language, is here the chief object of criticism. There is an expectation that, if the poem were in fact complete, the language and verbal arrangement of Horace would reflect far more *logically* his choice of subject on poetics

or *ars poetica*: “It is sometimes difficult to trace the sequence of the remarks; and digressions and repetitions appear to abound” (Wilkins 1886: 334).

Wilkins in this way raises two important and related critical questions regarding the *Ars Poetica* for us to consider: firstly, is the *Ars* an unfinished work? Secondly, does the *Ars* possess any discernible structure? It seems to me that the first question cannot be handled purely, as Wilkins seems to suggest, in terms of the apparent structural deficiencies of the poem, which at the very most can create the *impression* of an unfinished work. Surely declaring that the *Ars* is an incomplete work would require both historical evidence and obvious physical evidence from the poem itself?

Regarding the latter, does the poem conclude abruptly or awkwardly, *in medias res* (Hor. *Ars P.* 148)? Is there evidence that Horace would have elaborated further? Now unlike the twelfth book of Virgil’s *Aeneid*, in which the story ends abruptly immediately after the death of Turnus, the conclusion to the *Ars* seems quite fitting; indeed, several commentators<sup>11</sup> have pointed out the symmetry in imagery between the opening and concluding lines of the *Ars*: at the start of the poem, the ‘literary work without art’ is given the shape of a monstrous creature, reminiscent of Scylla:

*humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam*

*iungere si velit et varias inducere plumas*

---

<sup>11</sup> Most notably Brink: “It might be argued too that the *Ars* has an open ending, the satiric story of the mad-poet. But I think it more likely that the marked similarity with the initial caricature – poem and poet going wrong from an excess of *ingenium* uncontrolled – suggests a looking back to the beginning, *humano capiti*. Imperceptibly, towards the end, this kind of poem wheels back to something like the initial situation so that a circular movement seems to arise. This is familiar from archaic Greek writing; it has been called ‘ring-composition’” (Brink 1971: 453). And Laird: “Yet that rapid conjunction of ideas and images involving sickness and hybridisation of the human with the bestial does recall the humorous supposition at the beginning of the *Ars Poetica*... This subtly themed ring-composition makes it clear enough that the products of an undisciplined mind are as sick and grotesque as the poet who produces them” (Laird 2007: 137).

*undique collatis membris ut turpiter atrum  
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,  
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 1-5)

While at the end ‘the poet without art’ is transformed first into a bear and then, finally into a leech<sup>12</sup>:

*certe furit, ac velut ursus,  
obiectos caveae valuit si frangere clatros,  
indoctum doctumque fugat recitator acerbus;  
quem vero arripuit, tenet occiditque legendo,  
non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 472-476)

In other words, the monstrous imagery of the poet metamorphosed at the conclusion of the *Ars* recalls the poem metamorphosed at the start. Now given this ‘ring composition’<sup>13</sup> which encapsulates the entire poem, surely there is no need to assume that Horace had anything more to say? Indeed, even if this ring composition is to be interrogated, there is

---

<sup>12</sup> Clearly these verses, particularly noticeable in the phrase *occiditque legendo*, have a comic function, which I shall discuss further in my section on ‘*Sportive Language*’ in the second chapter of this dissertation.

<sup>13</sup> For further discussion on such elaborate poetic structures in the *Ars*, see my section on ‘*Transitional Language*’, in the second chapter of this dissertation. Alternately for a more detailed discussion Brink’s analysis in the chapter ‘Poetic Patterns in the *Ars Poetica* and the *Odes*’ in *Horace on Poetry: the Ars Poetica* is required reading.

no obvious evidence of a lacuna or corrupted text at these concluding lines of the poem to suggest an incomplete work<sup>14</sup>.

And on account of what historical evidence can we firmly establish that the *Ars* was unfinished? Nowhere is such a fact recounted in the ancient sources. The poem itself is only twice cited before the second century A.D., on both occasions by Quintilian (Wickham 1891: 383)<sup>15</sup>. We then have to conjecture as to the possible dates of the *Ars Poetica*. Was it written right at the end of Horace's life, such that he would have had very little time to 'polish' the verses and prepare it for publication? Such an interpretation would certainly suit Wilkins' diagnosis of the *Ars*. There has been much scholarship pertaining to the date of the *Ars*. Let us briefly examine some popular hypotheses. W.K. Smith proposes a late date for the poem on account of the prestige in which Virgil is held alongside Varius, within the discussion of appropriate choice of diction (Smith 1936: 164)<sup>16</sup>. Syme, in common with many other historians, tries to establish the date of the poem through the identification of the Pisones to whom the *Ars* is addressed, but he is left to conclude that no definite relationship can be ascertained between the true historical figures and the addressees (Syme 1980: 341). Some critics have naturally leapt upon the profession of the authorial persona<sup>17</sup> 'of playing the grindstone'<sup>18</sup> as indicative of a late Horace, concerned with literary criticism after he had completed his more creative or

---

<sup>14</sup> For example, although he makes several alterations in the opening 200 lines of the poem, from line 407-476 Rudd's text is entirely in concordance with Brink's, which should suggest to us at any rate, that this section of the manuscript is among the least troublesome. Moreover, Brink, apart from a debate about the sense of *moverit* and a preference for *obiectos* over *obiectas*, does not indicate any significant textual alterations needing to be addressed in the final seven verses of the poem (Brink 1971: 429-431). There is, in short, no indication by either critic that the Horatian text is broken or incomplete at the conclusion.

<sup>15</sup> See note 21.

<sup>16</sup> *quid autem / Caecilio Plautoque dabit Romanus ademptum / Vergilio Varioque?* (Hor. *Ars P.* 53-55).

<sup>17</sup> Out of necessity when discussing the criticisms of other scholars here and elsewhere I have been forced to utilize the term 'authorial persona' before adequately introducing it as an interpretative concept. For further discussion please see my section on 'Authorial Personae'.

<sup>18</sup> Line 304.

lyric works (Rudd 1989: 21); while others have even tried to suggest that the style of the *Ars* is reminiscent of later Silver Age poetry, thus also conjecturing a late date (Dilke 1958: 51-54). There has yet to be a definitive solution to this problem of the date of the *Ars*. Moreover, the matter is further and indeed quite unnecessarily complicated by the modern preoccupation of placing the *Ars Poetica* within *Epistles* II, immediately following the letters to Augustus and Florus: the combined length of the three poems, around 900 lines, might suggest that they form a single book; however, in the collected manuscripts of the Horatian works, the *Ars* only either comes in second position after the *Odes* or fourth after the *Carmen Saeculare*, far removed from the other epistles, which come last or in the penultimate place (Rudd 1989: 19)<sup>19</sup>.

Suggestions that the *Ars* is incomplete, to return to Wilkins' original statement, are therefore exposed to be mere conjecture, seeing that there is neither obvious textual evidence of a broken unfinished narrative nor enough accurate historical information to be able to locate the poem late in the poet's career. Those commentators who profess that the *Ars* is unfinished have done so purely to account for their inability to identify an adequate structure in Horace's poem<sup>20</sup>.

It seems to me that Wilkins' difficulty with the structure of the poem perhaps lies ultimately in a conflict of generic expectations. In his declaration of the lack of structure within the *Ars*, he supplies the following protasis as the cause of his interpretation of incoherence: "if regarded as a poetical treatise 'on the Art of Poetry'" (Wilkins 1886: 330). It is instructive for us to notice that Wilkins should employ a conditional clause

---

<sup>19</sup> For further discussion on the placement of the *Ars*, see Brink 1971: 12-21.

<sup>20</sup> I shall discuss in more detail later, in the section, '*Interpretations of Coherence*', the various objective attempts by critics to locate specific structures in the work, and to what extent they are successful.

here. It in fact illustrates quite well the uncertainty of many critics regarding the genre of the *Ars Poetica*. Let us now examine some of the critical difficulties in designating a specific genre for Horace's poem.

As a starting point, without even sparing a glance at the text, the very name of the work, the '*Ars Poetica*', should suggest to us a type of philosophical or didactic prose treatise. The problem, of course, is that we do not know whether this was the title which Horace himself gave to his poem; indeed, we do not even know whether Horace had in fact created a definitive title for publication (Rudd 1989: 19). Quintilian, as I have already mentioned, bestowed the titles of '*Ars Poetica*' and '*Liber de Arte Poetica*' upon the poem<sup>21</sup>. Wilkins acknowledges the artificiality of these titles and rightly supposes that they might consequently mislead us into a certain predefined approach towards the poem (Wilkins 1886: 333). To put it simply, if we read a poem entitled 'On the Art of Poetry', we will both consciously and unconsciously read it as a didactic treatise. Consider how different the historical reception of Horace's poem would have been, had it been unanimously titled '*Epistula ad Pisones*', as it is in some modern editions, such as Rudd's<sup>22</sup>.

I should add here that there is always a danger for the literary critic of amalgamating the reception of a literary work into our analysis of the work itself<sup>23</sup>.

---

<sup>21</sup> "Originally the work may have been called *Epistula ad Pisones*; certainly its status as an epistle is implied by the grammarian Charisius (fourth century A.D.) who cites the work by the phrase *Horatius in Epistularum*. But Quintilian (first century A.D.) referred to it as the *ars poetica* (Pref. to Trypho, 2) and as the *liber de arte poetica* (8.3.60), and the first of these titles has stuck" (Rudd 1989: 19). Indeed, the fact that Quintilian refers to it as a *liber* does imply that the *Ars* was regarded as a free-standing entity by that time, removed from all the other epistles.

<sup>22</sup> I should probably state at this point that I refer to the poem as the '*Ars Poetica*' throughout this dissertation simply out of convenience and habit rather than any preference for its status as a purely didactic treatise.

<sup>23</sup> In other words, what has been generally termed in literary theory 'The Affective Fallacy', after the essay of the same name by Wimsatt and Beardsley; so, for example, the modern English student often tends to

Certainly, Horace's works in general served an important didactic function both in the school curriculum – "Horace retained his standing as a school author throughout late antiquity, and it is not surprising to find him frequently evoked by the major Latin poets of the period, such as Claudian and Ausonius" (Tarrant 2007b: 281-282) – and in more theoretical or technical treatments of topics such as aesthetics, as illustrated by Quintilian's reference. But such a *didactic reception*, as perhaps reflected in the posthumously-fabricated title '*Ars Poetica*', need not denote that the work itself was crafted by Horace as a didactic treatise; we might, by the same anachronistic approach to literature, entitle Virgil's *Aeneid* a 'didactic' treatise, simply on account of the fact that it played so important a role in the educational syllabus in Antiquity. In this dissertation I shall be far more concerned with confronting the world which takes place within the poetry of Horace, the intra-textual world, than such extra-textual questions as, for example, whether the ensuing generations of Romans did in actual fact regard and utilize the *Ars Poetica* as an instructional text (Volk 2002: 4).

To return to the subject of genre, it is quite useful, as most critics have tended to do when considering how to classify the *Ars Poetica*, to commence our analysis by reflecting on what kind of epistle the work is – that is to say, how it stands in the Greco-Roman tradition of letter writing<sup>24</sup>. To this end, commentators have by and large been concerned with two defining questions: firstly, how does the epistle appear to interact with its addressees? And, secondly, how do we resolve the epistolary form with the hexameter verse?

---

'read himself' according to Shakespeare, Milton, et cetera, far removed from the original context (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1972: 351).

<sup>24</sup> For perhaps the most succinct coherent study of genre in the poem, see Frischer's chapter 'Genre of the *Ars Poetica*' in *Shifting Paradigms: New Approaches to Horace's Ars Poetica* (1991: 87-100).

Regarding the former, it has long been realised that Horace's three longer epistles (to Augustus, Florus, and the Pisones) – often amalgamated, probably anachronistically<sup>25</sup>, into a single book called '*Epistles II*' in many modern editions – present a wholly different tone to those of his first: the initial twenty shorter letters often maintain a familiar quite intimate tone with their addressees, while the attachment of the 'Horace'<sup>26</sup> of '*Epistles II*' to his recipients is far less noticeable (Ferri 2007: 130-1). Moreover, even when focusing solely on the three longer epistles, the importance in the relation of the *Ars* to its addressees seems remarkably tenuous or weak with regard to the overall composition of the work: to illustrate this point, we might, without any obvious alteration to the affect or function of the poem, remove the names of the 'Pisones' from the *Ars* and replace it with any other familiar Roman cognomen, while on the other hand clearly substituting the title of Augustus – *Caesar* (Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.4) from the first epistle of the second book would radically alter our appreciation of that work, seeing that he has been fully integrated into the text as an addressee with his own set of preoccupations, expectations, *etc*: "Thus we find that the addressees in these poems<sup>27</sup> are so precise and, it appears, so controlling of the sort of material to be discussed that the ever-present generalized addressee of didactic poetry<sup>28</sup> vanishes. *Epistles* 2.1 and 2.2, furthermore, rather than aiming to teach Augustus or Florus anything of significance, function primarily as apologies" (Toohey 1996: 149). Indeed, even if we were to have more

---

<sup>25</sup> See Note 19.

<sup>26</sup> In inverted commas so as to distinguish this figure from the historical personage known as Horace; again I have avoided using the term 'authorial persona' until I arrive at that section.

<sup>27</sup> To Augustus and Florus.

<sup>28</sup> Which I discuss as a potential genre for the *Ars below*, after I have introduced the problem of integrating the hexameter verse with the epistolary form.

information on just who the Pisones were, I think it is doubtful whether this would greatly enhance our critical readings of the *Ars*.

Having said that, it must be admitted that there is little concord among critics about the relative importance of the Pisones to the poem, whether they are really just ‘dummy figures’, to use Katharina Volk’s terminology, through which an imagined audience is communicated to, or whether their preoccupations do shape the poem (Volk 2002: 38): some critics, such as Joan Plotnick, point to the obscure reference to Roman satyr plays (or the dramatic focus in general) at the centre of the *Ars* as being directed towards the interests of the addressees (Plotnick 1979: 329-335)<sup>29</sup>; while others, such as David Armstrong, have conjectured that the Pisones invoked in the poem were supporters and patrons of Philodemus and that the *Ars* constantly maintains a style and content reflective of the mores of this Epicurean philosopher (Armstrong 1993: 185-230)<sup>30</sup>. Nevertheless, I should think that the distance which the *Ars* maintains from its generalized addressees – as contrasted with the more ‘integrated’ addressees in Horace’s other epistles – might encourage us to locate the work within the tradition of Greek didactic epistles, such as those of the philosopher Epicurus, where the names of Herodotus or Menoeceus play a minimal, if any, role in the philosophical exposition of the Epicurean system. I am certainly in agreement with Russell as to the relative importance of the historical Pisones to the poem, when he declares succinctly: “It is very much a treatise with dear so-and-so at the beginning” (Russell 1973a: 113).

---

<sup>29</sup> For a different interpretation of the emphasis on drama in the *Ars*, see my section on ‘*Illustrative Language*’ in the second chapter.

<sup>30</sup> In a similar vein of thinking, W.S Anderson attempts to locate a Socratic ‘Horace’ – ‘Socratic style’ and ‘Socratic content’ – in the first four sermons of *Satires* 1.

This characterization of the *Ars Poetica* as a technical didactic treatise where the epistolary form is a mere convention which only pays lip service to the true historical addressees, who are in effect dummy figures, conduits through whom an imagined audience is lectured, has indeed been a popular interpretative stance: “Much labour was spent in this century and the last tracing the alleged derivation of the *Ars Poetica* from the genre of the technical handbook” (Frischer 1991: 87). However, such a critical response does ignore our second fundamental difficulty in designating a genre: that is to say, how do we account for the hexameter verse? The type of technical treatise in epistolary form – we might say in more modern terms, the genre of the ‘letter thesis’ or ‘letter essay’ – within which Epicurus, for example, wrote, was of course presented in standard prose form, not poetic metre<sup>31</sup>.

Bernard Frischer, in his work *Shifting Paradigms: New Approaches to Horace’s Ars Poetica*, has argued quite persuasively that there are three ways in which we can resolve the epistolary form with the poetic: “Once we see that the *Ars* is most likely an independent work in the corpus, three possible ways of classifying it as something other than a handbook come to mind, of which the second two have rarely, if ever, been raised in this century: a verse letter, a didactic poem, or some *tertium quid*<sup>32</sup>” (Frischer 1991: 89). Let us now briefly discuss the potential placement of the *Ars Poetica* within each of these genres, as Frischer outlines.

---

<sup>31</sup> For further refutation of the notion of the *Ars* as a technical treatise, see Frischer 1991: 88, note 3, in which he argues that the classification of the *Ars* under such a heading is largely an anachronistic result of the epistle theses of the sixteenth century.

<sup>32</sup> That is to say, the genre of the *sermo*, discussed further *below*.

The verse letter, of which Horace's first book of epistles is a prime example<sup>33</sup>, is, according to Frischer, defined by a tone which is "informal in spirit and supplies or requests information of some sort from or to a friend" (Frischer 1991: 89); regarding the second criterion, he provides the following definitions by Ps.-Acro and Porphyrio: *epistulis enim ad absentes loquimur, sermones cum praesentibus* (Ps-Acro *Commen. In Horatium Sat. 1.1.1*), and *in sermonum autem libris vult intellegi, quasi apud praesentem se loqui, epistolas vero quasi ad absentes missas* (Porphyrio *Commen. In Horatium: Sermonum Liber Primus 1.1*). It is quite clear in reading the *Ars Poetica*, I believe, that there is no exchange of information, none of the reciprocal discourse which one finds in a verse letter, addressed to an *absent* friend; rather, the Pisones appear to be addressed in the poem as though they were *present*, 'quasi apud praesentem'<sup>34</sup>. As I discussed above, they seem to be the typical generalized addressees of didactic discourse.

There are, moreover, some other formal conventions of the typical verse letter which are conspicuously absent in the *Ars*: firstly, the addressees, the Pisones, are not referred to until the sixth line of the poem: "In all but one of Horace's poems that are indisputably epistles, the addressee is named, or referred to by some form of *tu* or a verb in the second person singular, in the first sentence and usually the very first line. The *Ars Poetica* does not begin in this typically epistolary way" (Frischer 1991: 92); the *Ars*, however, commences in an uncommonly generalized fashion for a verse epistle, a most impersonal discussion on the nature of artistic representation (Frischer 1991: 92).

---

<sup>33</sup> Frischer tracks the development of the genre of the verse letter in Roman literature to Spurius Mummius in 146 BC (Frischer 1991: 90, note 8).

<sup>34</sup> My sections, in the second chapter of this dissertation, on 'Language of Command', in which the teacher of the *Ars* directly conveys commands to the Pisones, and 'Empathetic Language', in which the Pisones are integrated into the text, as though they were present at the time of argument, will offer adequate proof of the principle, 'quasi apud praesentem'.

Secondly, the *Ars* must be distinguished from other Horatian verse epistles in having multiple addressees, ‘father and sons, worthy of their father’<sup>35</sup> (Frischer 1991: 92). A third formal element, quite evident but easily overlooked, is the sheer size of the *Ars Poetica*: at 476 lines it is roughly nine and a half times<sup>36</sup> longer than the average<sup>37</sup> epistle from Horace’s first book, and just over 200 lines longer than the largest verse epistle, to Augustus (Toohey 1996: 149). Given how radically the *Ars Poetica* differs from the verse epistle in its formal structure and in the manner in which it treats its addressees, serious doubts must be cast upon critical interpretations which deem it necessary to place the poem within this genre. It must also be said, however, that Frischer’s first criterion, namely that verse epistles should be ‘informal in spirit’, is perhaps less useful, less facile to distinguish in a writer such as Horace who is almost always conversational in his discourse, never wholly formal or serious, even when he does engage in highly technical material as in the *Ars* (Toohey 1996: 149). Just how ‘Horace’ manages this playful conversational side of his language will constitute a major part of the argument of the second chapter of this dissertation and must now be left until that stage.

As an addendum to this discussion of the genre of the ‘verse letter’, there has been a trend towards referring to the *Ars Poetica* as a ‘literary epistle’, alongside the letters to Augustus and Florus: “the recent tendency to consider Horace’s poem on poetics as a ‘literary epistle’ points to the way in which it can be imagined in an original context: as a poem in the oeuvre of a major Augustan writer, who refined and built on a longstanding tradition of Aristotelian and later Hellenistic poetic theory” (Laird 2007: 132-133). This would appear to represent an attempt to find a mean, a middle ground between the

---

<sup>35</sup> *pater et iuvenes patre digni* (Hor. *Ars P.* 24)

<sup>36</sup> 9.46 times, rounded off, by my calculations.

<sup>37</sup> Arithmetic mean.

conversational verse epistle, as in *Epistles* I, and the didactic prose epistle, as in the letters of Epicurus, for example, as I have already outlined.

Laird's reference, however, to this movement towards perceiving the *Ars* as a literary epistle as being somehow '*recent*' in critical studies of the poem is, if not an untruth, then at any rate a slight anachronism, as we find Wickham (1891) introducing the three longer Horatian epistles under the collective heading 'General Introduction to the Literary Epistles' (Wickham 1891: 327). In his discussion of the concrete points of contiguity between the three longer epistles Wickham gives the following account: "the comparison of the temperament which the Greeks and Romans severally brought to literature; the indication of the constitutional Roman vice of avarice as tainting literary men and spoiling their work; the complaint of audiences as inevitably lowering the standard of those who wrote for them; the vindication... of the dignity and use of poetry; the disproportionate share given... to drama; the special attack on Plautus; the use of Choerilus as the type of poetaster" (Wickham 1891: 334-335). In short, Wickham's decision here to class these three longer works as 'literary epistles' stems essentially from their perceived shared subject matter, or '*res*', of 'literature', in a very general sense.

Now I do not wish to imply that choice of subject is irrelevant to the designation of genre – epic tends to deal with heroic mythological tales, elegy with love affairs, and so forth – however, as the sole rubric for the inclusion of the *Ars* within this genre it appears feeble to me. What of the formal differences, as Frischer espouses, in the ways in which the addressees are treated in the three epistles? The absent addressee as compared to the present addressee? And what of the frequent technical language employed in the *Ars* (Toohey 1996: 149)? And what of its length? Even when compared to the letters to

Augustus and Florus, approximately 500 lines is far more characteristic of Greek didactic poems: “It is striking that they<sup>38</sup> all preserve the single-book format and that their length is generally in the 500-1000vv. range” (Toohey 1996: 3-4). Indeed, this approach towards classifying the three epistles together generically also seems to ignore the position of the *Ars* within the surviving manuscripts, where, as I have shown previously, it is treated as a single entity, a ‘*liber in ipso*’, rather than being clumped together with the other two longer epistles<sup>39</sup>. There is, lastly, a rather dangerous tendency in genre studies towards the creation of sub-genres and sub-sub-genres (*etc*) in the pursuit of making a work ‘fit’ into a category, however much it might resist. So much for the literary epistle.

Progressing onto Frischer’s second possible generic solution in our quest to resolve the epistolary with the hexameter in the *Ars Poetica*, we have the didactic poem<sup>40</sup>: “It is strange that the case for categorizing the *Ars* as a didactic poem has not, to my knowledge, been made in a serious way during this century: Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura* and Virgil’s *Georgics* certainly show how popular and prestigious was the genre in the mid- to late first century” (Frischer 1991: 90). Before tackling how the *Ars* might compare to such works, I think it is necessary first to question Frischer’s assumption here that the genre of the didactic poem was a well-known and ‘prestigious’ category of literature in the first century BC, purely on the basis of the fact that Virgil and Lucretius had attained a degree of success for their respective *individual* works. In fact it cannot be said that Romans from the period of the late Republic and early Empire even acknowledged the *existence* of such a distinct genre: “It is suggestive that we can find no

---

<sup>38</sup> The Greek didactic poems.

<sup>39</sup> See note 21.

<sup>40</sup> Also referred to by some critics as ‘didactic epic’ on account of the metre primarily.

word in any Latin author before Servius<sup>41</sup> to refer specifically either to a didactic poem or to the didactic genre. In the introduction to his commentary on the *Georgics*, Servius uses the Greek word *didascalice*, which is also found in the fourth-century grammarian Diomedes... Didactic poetry was not generally listed by the critics as a separate genre. On stylistic grounds it was joined with epic and treated as a subset of hexameter verse” (Dalzell 1996: 19-20).

Indeed, we can turn to the *Ars Poetica* itself for evidence of this fact, where, in the discussion of the genres, no mention, either explicitly or obliquely, is made of ‘didactic poetry’ as a distinct category:

*res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella  
quo scribi possent numero, monstravit Homerus.  
versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum,  
post etiam inclusa est voti sententia compos;  
quis tamen exiguos elegos emiserit auctor,  
grammatici certant et adhuc sub iudice lis est...*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 73-78)

Even if we are to include didactic poetry in the broad genre of the epic in hexameter – as Dalzell suggests with reference to a passage in Quintilian, “who in his survey of Greek and Latin authors, listed the didactic<sup>42</sup> poets alongside writers of epic and pastoral” (Dalzell 1996: 20) – it is instructive for our particular purpose in analysing the *Ars*

---

<sup>41</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> century AD.

<sup>42</sup> This is a slightly misleading adjective: rather, writers whom we moderns call ‘didactic’.

*Poetica* to see that the subject matter which the Horatian text recommends for hexameter verse – ‘the deeds and gloomy conflicts of both kings and leaders’ – is quite incompatible with the often highly technical subject of what we customarily regard as didactic poetry. Certainly, to employ a rather rhetorical argument here, I should say that it is most peculiar for an author, who is allegedly writing in the genre of didactic poetry, to omit the slightest mention of this in an historical overview of the literary genres, which lasts for some ten verses in the poem. We therefore need to interrogate whether Horace historically regarded the didactic poem as a distinct coherent genre, and why, if he had in fact acknowledged it as a genre, he failed to give it the slightest mention in a part of his poem where its presence was demanded.

Dalzell, however, in *The Criticism of Didactic Poetry*, argues against the need for a genre to be explicitly recognized by an author in order for that particular author to follow in a certain generic tradition of writers: “It does not follow that because theory was so slow to define the status of didactic poetry, poets did not recognize that they were working in a genre which had a tradition of its own. There were literary codes which marked the distinctness of the genre. The most obvious of these was to appeal to the authority of Hesiod, the *prôtos heurêtês* of the genre. Aratus is praised by Callimachus for following the theme and manner of Hesiod... Virgil describes the *Georgics* as ‘Ascræan song’ (2.176)... it was a common practice among Latin poets to indicate their literary affiliations at the beginning of their work with a graceful nod to their predecessors... These references suggest an apostolic succession of didactic poets who are aware of their common generic links and who see themselves as carrying on a tradition which goes back to Hesiod” (Dalzell 1996: 21-22).

Now to allow literary critics the freedom to ignore entirely the validity of theory<sup>43</sup> and to define the genre of didactic poetry loosely in terms of certain ‘literary codes’ which may be found in a tradition of Greek and Roman writers stemming all the way back from Hesiod, as Dalzell suggests, is and has in fact proven to be a dangerous grant. Just what might these literary codes be? How specific or broad should the criteria be made into which didactic poetry falls? And, since there is no ancient theory for the definite placement of this genre, under whose critical authority do we ultimately rest? Thus we can view Katharina Volk, in her approach of compiling criteria through the ‘empirical evidence’ of certain pre-selected poems (a sort of common-sense method), providing us with four restrictions for didactic poetry: namely, that it must have ‘explicit didactic intent’, a ‘teacher-student constellation’, ‘poetic self-consciousness’, and ‘poetic simultaneity’ (Volk 2002: 36-39). Under this rubric, the *Ars Poetica* fails to survive under the heading of didactic poetry: “Thus, Horace’s *Ars Poetica*, while clearly exhibiting didactic intent as well as the typical teacher-student constellation (the speaker v. the Pisones), does not show poetic self-consciousness (and therefore not poetic simultaneity either)” (Volk 2002: 42). While, on the other hand, Peter Toohey, who provides the somewhat more liberal classificatory criteria of ‘a strong, singular, and persuasive voice’, ‘striking, even sensational subject matter’, ‘marked variety in narrative, textual, generic, even discursive type’, ‘conceptual simplicity’, and ‘a tension between play and instruction’ duly allows for the *Ars Poetica* under this genre’ (Toohey 1996:15).

One gets the impression that these criteria, without any coherent theory backing them up, have been tendentiously construed by these critics in order to match their pre-

---

<sup>43</sup> Or here its somewhat conspicuous absence.

determined selections. Ironically enough, both of these commentators, in order to incorporate Ovid's elegiac *Ars Amatoria* into their classification of 'didactic poetry', have ignored the basic criterion of hexameter verse, if we are to assume that the ancients would have placed didactic poetry within the general class of epic (as Toohey argues). Certainly, it is apparent from the passage cited in the *Ars Poetica* that the ancient conception of genre rested more in the simple matter of metre than such abstract conceptual criteria as 'poetic simultaneity' or 'a tension between play and instruction'; one must question therefore whether a Roman critic of the late Republic, or even a lay reader, would have been willing to list poems written in dactylic hexameter and elegiac couplets under the same generic class. The necessity, moreover, to incorporate such diverse works as those of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*, Virgil's *Georgics*, Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* and even Horace's *Ars Poetica* (with respect to subject, tone of voice, scale of treatment, etc) into the category of didactic poetry has in turn encouraged literary theorists, such as Bernd Effe, to provide a detailed taxonomy of didactic poetry, that is to say, further sub-divisions, as cited in Dalzell (1996: 31-34). Sub-divisions of a sub-genre, which itself is not explicitly identified in any theoretical text during the historical period in question? To the aporetic reader the divisions appear endless, the solutions quite subjective.

Indeed, a theoretical solution to these inherent difficulties in trying to manufacture an adequate system of classification for the ancient Graeco-Roman didactic poem far exceeds the interpretative scope of this particular dissertation, which itself will not be concerned with analysing the text of *Ars Poetica* by genre<sup>44</sup>. Now, although it is rather

---

<sup>44</sup> But, instead, by the language of the authorial persona, see the respective section below. For further studies on the genre of ancient didactic poetry: see Volk, K. 2002. *The Poetics of Latin Didactic*. Oxford:

difficult for us to consider the place of the *Ars* within such a malleable loose ‘genre’, let us briefly consider some manifest ways in which the Horatian poem in a most general sense might conform to, or depart from, other works of Latin literature which are commonly placed by modern critics in the tradition of ‘didactic poetry’, such as the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius, and the *Georgics* of Virgil.

There are perhaps two principal attractions in labelling the *Ars* a didactic poem: the generalizing manner in which the addressees of the poem are treated, and the highly instructive flavour which the work attains on occasion. Firstly, just like “Lucretius’ Memmius, whose relevance to the *De Rerum Natura* is quite problematic” (Frischer 1991: 96), the identity of the Pisones does not seem relevant to the composition of the *Ars*; rather, on the contrary, their identity fluctuates according to the didactic purpose of the poem: “they seem to be critics of poetry in vv.6 and 292; poets in v.24; one a critic (the father) and one a poet (366-369, 385-388); and it is even possible to see their number change from plural (16, 235, 291) to singular (102, 119, etc)” (Frischer 1991: 96). So whereas in a verse letter, as we have seen, the identity of the addressee will shape the content of the epistle, in a didactic poem the addressee takes shape in accordance with the nature of the instructions at a particular point in the poem; there is, in short, no ostensible desire on the part of the didactic poet to characterize the addressees in a coherent manner such that the reader may build up a specific image in his mind of who this addressee<sup>45</sup> is (Frischer 1991: 96). Regarding my second observation, a detailed analysis of how the discourse of the *Ars* functions to give commands on *ars poetica*, to *instruct* – which is of

---

Oxford University Press; Dalzell, A. 1996. *The Criticism of Didactic Poetry*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Toohey, P. 1996. *Epic Lessons: An Introduction to Ancient Didactic Poetry*. London: Routledge. Effe, Bernd. 1977. *Dichtung und Lehre: Untersuchungen zur Typologie des antiken Lehrgedichts*. Munich: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

<sup>45</sup> Plural in the case of the *Ars*.

course at the root of most modern critics' conception of didactic poetry, inherent, for example, in Volk's criterion of 'explicit didactic intent' and Toohey's 'a tension between play and instruction' – will ensue in the second chapter of this dissertation (Toohey 1996: 150).

Toohey provides three further reasons why we might consider the *Ars Poetica* to fall into the tradition of the didactic poems (or didactic epics) (Toohey 1996: 150-151): firstly, the hexameter corresponds to those of Lucretius, Virgil, *etc* from Hesiod; secondly, the length of the epistle is reflective of other Greek didactic poems; and, lastly, “another important feature of the *Ars Poetica* which reflects the traditions of didactic epic is the presence of the illustrative panel... This... is particularly apropos for Horatian verse: it engenders the recommended combination of utilitarian elements... sweetened by the insertion of the 'easier' narrative insertions” (Toohey 1996: 151)<sup>46</sup>. Just some comment now on these points: it seems a rather specious critical methodology that Toohey may here utilize the advent of hexameter to endorse the *Ars*' status as didactic epic, but elsewhere in his work incorporate Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* under the same general heading. On the second point, I have already made the argument against the *Ars Poetica* being considered a verse letter on account of its length; however, although its length does resemble other Greek didactic poems – Toohey provides the example of Nemesianus' *Cynegetica* (Toohey 1996: 150, 204) – if we consider, as Dalzell implies, that didactic poets tended to build upon the efforts of their immediate generic predecessors, then Horace's *Ars Poetica* falls substantially short of Lucretius' six books and Virgil's four, against which he would be judged by contemporary Romans. In other words, if Horace's *Ars* was a genuine attempt at a didactic poem, we might expect a far more detailed

---

<sup>46</sup> See lines 333-334, 343-344 of the *Ars Poetica*.

account of his subject, in order to place it in the tradition of those who had written before him. Toohey's last suggestion, that didactic epics should demonstrate illustrative panels, will form an important part of my argument in the ensuing chapter of how the discourse functions in the poem and must be delayed until that point<sup>47</sup>.

Moving onto specific arguments against the *Ars* being considered a didactic poem, over and above any problems which we might have with the genre itself, several important objections must be raised. Firstly, the *Ars Poetica*, unlike most other didactic poems does not commence with a divine invocation (Frischer 1991: 96); so the first book of Virgil's *Georgics* proceeds in laudatory fashion:

*vos, o clarissima mundi*  
*lumina, labentem caelo quae ducitis annum;*  
*liber et alma Ceres, vestro si munere tellus*  
*chaoniam pingui glandem mutavit arista,*  
*poculaque inventis Acheloia miscuit uvis;*  
*et vos, agrestum praesentia numina, Fauni,*  
*ferte simul Fauniquae pedem Dryadesque puellae:*  
*munera vestra cano..."*

(Verg. *G.* 1.5-12)

And so the poem continues with reference to Neptune, Pan, Minerva, Silvanus, and *dique deaque omnes* (Verg. *G.* 1.21). Contrast the elevated language here – the invocation to not one but multiple gods, the superlative *clarissima mundi* (line 5), the anaphora of co-

---

<sup>47</sup> See my section on 'Illustrative Language'.

ordinating conjunctions to garner a sense of immense scale, the hyperbaton of the main clause verb, *cano* (line 12), right to the end of the sentence to leave the poet breathless – with the opening of the *Ars Poetica*:

*humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam  
iungere si velit et varias inducere plumas  
undique collatis membris ut turpiter atrum  
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,  
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 1-5)

While the Virgilian text soars in lofty descriptive language, the *Ars* is content to plunge at once into a meditation of its subject, here the unity of an artistic work, through a far more playful conversational type of discourse. Indeed, even Lucretius, whose subject, Epicurean philosophy, would rally strongly against any tangible divine intervention in his view of a materialistic world, deems it necessary to fall in line with the tradition of didactic poets by invoking the goddess Venus at the start of his first book.

Secondly, with regard to Dalzell's insistence that didactic poems should somehow reference themselves with regard to their generic predecessors, there seems to be no point in the *Ars* where the poem explicitly relates its own position in accordance with other didactic epics, such as those of Lucretius or Virgil (Dalzell 1996: 21-22). The reference to Virgil in line 55 of the *Ars* pertains to the introduction of neologisms into the Latin language and the biased preference which is often given to writers of the past, such as

Cato and Ennius. It has nothing to do with Virgil's *Georgics* or didactic epic in general. It is in fact not uncommon for other Horatian poems to account for their generic position by citing a predecessor in the field: so *Satire* 1.4<sup>48</sup> alludes to the tradition in which it might be placed by presenting the satirist Lucilius and the writers of Old Comedy, 'on whom he relied entirely':

*Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae  
atque alii quorum comoedia prisca virorum est,  
si quis erat dignus describi quod malus ac fur,  
quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui  
famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.  
hinc omnis pendet Lucilius...*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.1-6)

In short, if the *Ars Poetica* were designed by Horace to stand in the tradition of didactic poetry, we would expect some manifest suggestion of his place in the genre.

At the conclusion to this discussion on didactic poetry, I think it is apt to quote an observation by Brink as to the nature of the *Ars Poetica*: "Its addiction to technicality is greater than that of any other literary satires or epistles. On the other hand the conversational and apparently inconsequential manner equals if it does not surpass that of the other works on poetry" (Brink 1963: 3). How does one resolve the technical didactic element in the *Ars* with the playful conversational tone? Does placing it within the genre of didactic poetry solve this difficulty? Certainly, the *Ars*, as we have seen, departs from

---

<sup>48</sup> Which I shall analyse in more detail in the third chapter of this dissertation.

the formal structure of other prestigious Latin works which we regard as didactic poems nor does it appear willing to place itself in such a distinct generic category, as witnessed in the discussion of literary genres in the poem itself. Moreover, the *Ars* does not give the type of systematic presentation of material which we get over the four books of Virgil's *Georgics* or the six of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*; the argument of the *Ars* is far more free-flowing and conversational – 'it does not follow', to get to the etymological root of Brinks descriptive adjective 'inconsequential', the typically logical structure which we might expect in a more technical account. If we find ourselves, like Peter Toohey, radically re-adjusting our criteria of what we consider to be 'didactic poetry', with all too liberal, quite subjective, categories such as 'striking, even sensational subject matter', 'marked variety in narrative, textual, generic, even discursive type' or 'a tension between play and instruction', in order to fit a seemingly irresolvable work into a specific classification, we might find that the genre itself becomes so conceptually inclusive of a wide range of works so as to be critically useless.

Finally, moving onto Frischer's third possible solution to the genre of the *Ars Poetica* we have his *tertium quid*, the *sermo* (Frischer 1991: 96-97). For Frischer the *sermo* is not so much a distinct literary category which can be identified in a tradition of writers preceding Horace but rather a characteristically Horatian creation, a *Kreuzung der Gattungen*, a deliberate mixing of conventions from different traditions: "Lest the suggestion that the *Ars Poetica* be classified as exemplifying the mixed genre of *sermo*—an *Aufhebung* of the simple forms of technical handbook, didactic poem, and letter—seem strange or unlikely, it may be well to point out that such portmanteau arrangements of genres within genres have been encountered in other periods and literatures (Frischer

1991: 99); apart from such an historical precedent, Frischer provides further justification for this labelling of the *Ars* as a *sermo* by referencing a passage in the first book of epistles wherein “Horace claims that his achievement was due to his *originality*<sup>49</sup> in mixing generic characteristics” (Frischer 1991: 99)<sup>50</sup>:

*libera per vacuum posui vestigia princeps,  
non aliena meo pressi pede. qui sibi fidet  
dux reget examen. Parios ego primus iambos  
ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus  
Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben.  
ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes  
quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem,  
temperat Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho,  
temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar,  
nec socerum quaerit quem versibus oblinat atris,  
nec sponsae laqueum famoso carmine nectit*  
(Hor. *Epist.* 1.19.21-31)

Frischer’s ultimate interpretation of the *Ars Poetica*, as lying within the ‘new genre’ of the *sermo* leads us onto the primary theoretical point of debate in all genre studies, that is the polarity which exists between *the traditional* and *the original* in a given work. If we are studying a work entirely by genre, relating an artist’s production to those who have

---

<sup>49</sup> My Italics.

<sup>50</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all Latin text of the *Epistles* I has been taken from: Wickham, E.C. 1891. *The Works of Horace, Volume II*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.

preceded him, we risk neglecting the extent to which the work is an original creation, its “essential uniqueness” (Dalzell 1996: 3) – a concern which has led post-modern criticisms, committed to the irresolvable nature of the text, largely to reject the efficacy of literary genres (Dalzell 1996: 4); on the other hand, from a practical point of view, genres, in giving points of contiguity – literary codes – between individual works, do “provide the critic with a strategy for dealing with texts” (Dalzell 1996: 6). However, as I have mentioned previously with regard to didactic poetry, when the criteria or codes of a generic category become too inclusive, they risk losing their utility for the critic. Frischer’s allowance for the Horatian *sermo* to include, in different proportions, elements of three root genres (technical handbook, didactic poem, and verse epistle), means that we have poems as diverse as the Priapean Satire (*Satire* 1.8) and the *Ars Poetica* under the same generic title of *sermo* in his system of categorization (Frischer 1991: 98). Of what critical utility is a classification which incorporates such manifestly different poems? What is the basis of similarity?

Furthermore, if ‘Horace’<sup>51</sup> is understood to be constantly emphasising the essential primacy, the novelty of his work – *princeps* (line 21), *primus* (line 23) as in *Epistle* 1.19 – and since, with particular regard to the *Ars Poetica*, he is not overtly concerned with placing his own work inside a specific tradition of writers, we must then question the validity of analysis by genre. Indeed, Dalzell points out that in modern literary studies analysis by genre has become especially troublesome on account of writers who are committed “to shatter the very idea of genre” (Dalzell 1996: 4), far removed from the ‘obliging’ authors of antiquity; and yet this ‘shattering of genre’ is just what ‘Horace’ confesses to in *Epistle* 1.19.

---

<sup>51</sup> Again the inverted commas distinguish between the authorial persona and the historical personage.

In short, when we judge whether the *Ars Poetica* displays coherence in some way, we should firstly, before applying the standards of other literature, attempt to analyse it ‘*in ipso*’ – as far as is realistically possible. Once we have acknowledged the form of the *Ars* by itself, we may accordingly draw comparisons with other works.

Thus far I have discussed some interpretations which identify the *Ars* as an incoherent work: whether through the argument that it was an unfinished poem, and hence by default an inferior work of art, not fit to be analysed, or whether through its mixed allegiance to various generic traditions in Greek and Roman literature. In the following section I shall examine some constructive attempts at locating coherence within the *Ars*, judging the merits and shortcomings of each in turn.

### *Interpretations of Coherence*

While in the last section I utilized the late 19<sup>th</sup> century commentary of Wilkins as a basis to illustrate various critical difficulties which ensued over the following century in interpreting the *Ars*, for this section, regarding attempts to locate coherence in the poem, I shall primarily examine C.O. Brinks’ *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* and, to a lesser extent, *Horace on Poetry: The Ars Poetica*, since they serve as excellent exempla of the structuralist method of analysing a text, and since, on account of their scale, whether rightly or not, they have been viewed as essential to all modern studies of the *Ars*. Also, where appropriate, I shall draw attention to alternate structural

schemes recommended by other critics. After this I shall inspect briefly the interpretations of the Horatian biographers from the early part of the twentieth century, which will in turn lead aptly onto modern persona-based treatments of the *Ars*.

Critically, in his *Prolegomena*, Brink emphasises the essential *dichotomy* in the *Ars* between its didactic and poetic function: “It too offers the teachings of Greek *technologia*. Its addiction to technicality is greater than that of any of the other literary satires and epistles. On the other hand the conversational and apparently inconsequential manner equals if it does not surpass that of the other works on poetry... Horace employs conversation as material for poetic patterns which are flexible and complex” (Brink 1963: 3). Brink is certainly on the right track by identifying the didactic and poetic elements as critical to an appreciation of Horace’s *Ars Poetica*; where he errs, however, is at once – in his very introduction – approaching these two functions of the poem as separate rubrics for judging the work. As I emphasised by using italics at the top of this paragraph, the language of Brink’s criticism here establishes the fundamental notion of a ‘dichotomy’ in his reading of the poem. The poem needs to be ‘cut apart into two’ to be appreciated. Accordingly, his interpretation throughout his *Prolegomena* is really divided strictly into the sections which deal with the *Ars* as a technical treatise and the very final chapter which focuses on the poetic structure of Horace’s work (*Horace on Poetry: The Ars Poetica* does give more attention to the latter). The primary difficulty in understanding Brink’s analysis of the poem lies, I believe, in the disunity between the divisions he creates – we are nowhere told just how the poetic patterns identified in the *Ars* might truly interplay with the more rigorous divisions attributed to it when it is discussed as a treatise. This is why, in the introduction to my dissertation, I have advocated finding an

approach which locates an ‘admixture of utility and sweetness in the poem’, and does not simply pay lip-service to the complexity of the poem.

With this basic difficulty in mind, let us examine Brink’s interpretation of the structure of the *Ars* as a technical treatise. Working backwards through the poem, Brink first identifies the section running from lines 306-476 as concerned with the poet, or ‘ποιητής’: “the beginning of a new section is indicated at 306, and that is the final portion of the poem, dealing with the very general precepts that are to help the *poet*<sup>52</sup> to fulfil his function” (Brink 1963: 5). So this classification then is encouraged by the following lines:

*munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo,  
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam,*  
(Hor. *Ars P.* 306-307)

Clearly the references here to the duty of the writer, *munus et officium* (line 306), and to what shapes the poet, *formetque poetam* (line 307), are viewed by Brink as signalling a new structural section running to the conclusion of the poem where the image of the metamorphosed *poeta* is manufactured.

The second or middle part of the *Ars* is concerned with subject matter, or ‘ποίησις’, and runs from lines 119-294 (Brink 1963: 8). It should be noted here that Brink does acknowledge the difficulties of identifying exact structural divides, and so locates transitional narratives between main sections, such as that between 294-306. Anyway, the central section commences with the following line: *aut famam sequere aut*

---

<sup>52</sup> My italics.

*sibi convenientia finge* (Hor. *Ars P.* 119) – where the phrase *famam sequere* is said to indicate the choice of subject in writing, rather than language; and this division then concludes with the words:

*vos, o*

*Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non  
multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque  
praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 291-294)

The reference to *carmen* (line 292) is perhaps thought by Brink to conclude this section pertaining to ‘content’, although this is highly questionable, as I shall discuss shortly.

Finally, Brink labels the initial part of the *Ars*, from the opening lines of the poem to line 118, ‘ποίημα’, as dealing with form (Brink 1963: 10). So, Horace’s introduction of the dysmorphic Scylla-like poem, as we have already seen, is thought to be concerned with the proper arrangement of poetry, while the conclusion of this section is concerned with how dramatic characters talk, *loquatur* (line 114), in other words, form or language as opposed to subject matter:

*intererit multum divusne loquatur an heros,  
maturusne senex an adhuc florente iuventa  
fervidus, et matrona potens an sedula nutrix,  
mercatorne vagus cultorne virentis agelli,*

*Colchus an Assyrius, Thebis nutritus an Argis.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 114-118)

Thus we have seen that Brink identifies a tripartite structure in Horace's *Ars Poetica*, which deals in order with the aesthetic categories of 'ποίημα', 'ποίησις', and 'ποιητής'. Before I discuss some problems in Brink's analysis, it is necessary to review briefly some alternate structural arguments of other critics, seeing that these will be subject to the same shortcomings as Brink in terms of their methodology. Before Brink's popularising of the tripartite structuring in studies of the *Ars*, many commentators located a bipartite arrangement, although there was disagreement as to where in the poem and by what distinction they located this divide. Hermann suggests dividing the narrative of the poem into parts, not themselves in linear order, according to the number, singular or plural, of the addressed: "Il me semble que l'*Art Poétique* se divise en deux parties. La première à la seconde personne pluriel, s'adresse aux Pisons père et fils. La seconde, à la seconde personne singulier, s'adresse au seul fils aîné" (Herrmann 1964: 507). The first category deals generally with poetry and its history, the latter with advice for the poet in writing (Herrmann 1964: 507). This notion of a bipartite arrangement can be traced back to earlier 19<sup>th</sup> commentators who divided, in the case of Birt, the *Ars* into a section on the 'proper theory on the art of poetry', from the start of the poem to line 295, and into a section on the poet, from line 296 to the end – or more simply put: 'ars' and 'artifex' (Brink 1963: 20). Other potential bipartite divisions have also been suggested along the lines of traditional and original, or Greek and Roman, or even Classicism and Romanticism, to employ these terms anachronistically (Tracy 1948: 113). This method of

structuring the *Ars* has become quite pervasive so that even in more modern scholarship, it is not uncommon for a critic to analyse the poem by dividing it into several – between fifteen and twenty – thematic compartments (Laird 2007: 136).

Now what are the various problems associated with this structural method of locating coherence in the *Ars Poetica*? Firstly, the notional structural units are able to be attacked simply by reading the original text of Horace against these superimposed categories of judgment. So, employing Brink’s scheme of the *Ars* as an example, the implication is that form or language is discussed principally in the first division, content in the second, and the role of the poet in the third. But does this really hold up to close textual scrutiny? As has been seen, the conclusion of the second ‘subject matter’ section is as follows:

*vos, o*

*Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non  
multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque  
praeseptum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 291-294)

Supposedly, if this were the end of a defined section in the treatise, we should expect a concluding remark on the nature of ‘subject matter’. What we get instead is, firstly, a pragmatic instruction to the Pisones to take great care and labour over their work, to spend many days, *multa dies* (line 293), in finishing it – in other words, this seems to belong in part to the ensuing section on ‘ποιητήζ’, which is concerned with the practical

task of the writer. Secondly, and more importantly, when the Pisones are instructed ‘to find fault with the poem, *carmen reprehendite* (line 292), which has not been chastened<sup>53</sup> ten times over to meet the test of the well-trimmed nail’ (Rudd 1989: 199), the *carmen* (line 292) refers not to ‘subject matter’ (as Brink’s rubric would demand) but more to the form or language of the writer, indicated by the metaphor from carpentry inherent in *praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem* (line 294) where the “carpenter uses his nail to test the joints; so the nail<sup>54</sup> must not be chipped or cracked<sup>55</sup>” (Rudd 1989: 199). The appropriate selection of subject matter is hardly as suitable to this imagery as the physical form of the writing itself, which, like the joints in the carpenter’s wood, we can picture the poet with his keen sense of verbal detection, his ‘nails cut to the quick for sensitivity’, checking for *smoothness* – checking the joints between his actual words (Wickham 1891: 417)<sup>56</sup>. Grube, in his review of Brink’s *Prolegomena*, criticises this structural division thus: “no allowance for gliding transitions or patterned deliberate repetitions can justify extending the content section to 294” (Grube 1965a: 78); so, employing similar types of analysis over the text, we may easily locate examples of narrative concerned with subject matter in the opening 118 ‘ποίημα’ lines<sup>57</sup> or both subject matter and form in the final ‘ποιητής’ lines<sup>58</sup>.

---

<sup>53</sup> Literally translated: ‘which much time and erasure have not chastened...’

<sup>54</sup> *unguem*.

<sup>55</sup> But rather it must be *praesectum*.

<sup>56</sup> The metaphor is continued in part in the proceeding narrative in which the mad inspired poets, who rely solely on *ingenium*, or natural ability, rather than artistic care and skill, *ars*, do not bother to trim their nails: *bona pars non unguis ponere curat* (Hor. *Ars P.* 297). Again, the indictment here would not seem to pertain to the subject choice of these individuals.

<sup>57</sup> For example, the discussion of the appropriate subject in genre: *res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella / quo scribi possent numero monstravit Homerus. / versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum, / post etiam inclusa est voti sententia compos: / quis tamen exiguous elegos emiserit auctor, / grammatici certant et adhuc sub iudice lis est...* (Hor. *Ars P.* 73-78). *res gestae* refers not, I think, to language.

<sup>58</sup> So, for example, perhaps the most famous two lines on the relationship between subject matter, *rem*, and language, *verba*, in the *Ars* fall into this third division: *rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae, / verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur* (Hor. *Ars P.* 310-311).

Another related problem with these structural divisions is the way in which they tend to ignore categories in the *Ars* which seem to be outlined far more clearly by Horace. The obvious example which should immediately come to mind is the dramatic focus of the poem, ranging from around lines 89-288 (Grube 1965a: 81). Commentators, even especially competent ones such as Donald Russell, tend to ignore the clear dramatic emphasis which runs through the *Ars* for so long a period, imposing their own general categories of aesthetic judgement over this continuous theme (Laird 2007: 136). There have been several arguments for the strong presence of drama in the *Ars*: Brink views the genre as an excellent means of presenting his second division pertaining to ‘subject matter’ (Brink 1963: 8); while Laird, along with others such as Joan Plotnick<sup>59</sup>, sees it as indicative of the interests of the addressees (Laird 2007: 133). In the second chapter of this dissertation I shall try to account for the focus on drama in my discussion on ‘*Illustrative Language*’.

Returning to the problems associated with the structural divisions, a third difficulty lies in the basis on which these categories are selected by critics – and for this it is necessary to return to Brink. In trying to explain the structure of the *Ars*, Brink bases his whole argument ultimately on a statement by Porphyrio regarding Horace’s poem: *in quem librum congessit praecepta Neoptolemi τοῦ Πάριανοῦ de arte poetica, non quidem omnia sed eminentissima* (Porphyrio *Commen. In Horatium: Carmen de Arte Poetica* 1). Brink then sets out to illustrate how the *Ars Poetica* of Horace was influenced by the writings of this Neoptolemos, especially with regard to the structural divisions of the work. The difficulty, however, is that very little in fact remains of the writings of

---

<sup>59</sup> See my discussion of genre in the previous section, ‘*Interpretations of Incoherence*’.

Neoptolemos, apart from several dubious references from Philodemus<sup>60</sup>, who might have taken these quotations out of the original context (Williams 1964: 188); indeed, even Brink concedes: “In dealing with any critic whose opinions are preserved and assessed by Philodemus we have to reckon both with his debating points and his Epicurean yardstick. With regard to the latter we are handicapped by insufficient knowledge of his aesthetics; but we must at any rate allow for the possibility that his critique is inspired by the doctrines of his school. In applying his strictures he rarely takes account of the setting and context in which he finds opinions that he considers obnoxious. He either seeks out contradictions in the opponent’s arguments or he applies the yardstick of his own theory or he does both” (Brink 1963: 54-55).

And so, even if we are to accept the accuracy of Brink’s recreation of the aesthetic judgments of this Neoptolemos, which goes far beyond the analytical scope of this dissertation, there is very little evidence, either from external sources other than the Porphyrio quotation or from any explicit reference in the *Ars Poetica* itself, to strongly support the insistence that Horace drew directly on Neoptolemos<sup>61</sup> as a basis for a theory of aesthetics: “the conjectures<sup>62</sup> are often attractive, and the ultimate source of many of these ideas<sup>63</sup> is of course Aristotle, but the ideas were common currency in the first century B.C. That they occur in Horace is no evidence for Neoptolemos. So the passage on the role of poetry in human history (391-407) is but a working of the *locus communis* on the power of Logos as old as Gorgias and as young as Cicero. Why assume it *ex*

---

<sup>60</sup> See Brink, C.O. 1963. *Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, page 55, in which the fragments from Philodemus are given, and page 47 for other references to Neoptolemos in ancient sources.

<sup>61</sup> And therefore Aristotle in Brink’s organization of the tradition.

<sup>62</sup> Of Brink.

<sup>63</sup> Which we find in the *Ars*.

*hypothesi* in Neoptolemus, even though he did say that poetry should instruct as well as entertain?" (Grube 1965a: 79-80).

In short, Brink's method<sup>64</sup> is strewn with suppositions: firstly, in assuming that Porphyrio had detailed knowledge of the aesthetic theories of Neoptolemus and wasn't simply making a most general remark, which would be of little critical value; secondly, in trusting the contextual accuracy of the fragments of Neoptolemos which survive in the writings of Philodemos; and, thirdly, in assuming that Horace drew directly from Neoptolemus as a source. But perhaps of greatest concern should be the manner in which the artistry of Horace himself should be diminished by an attempt to identify his entire work – or at least that part of it which endeavours to give instructions on a particular subject of '*ars poetica*' – as solely a product of traditions.

In conclusion, criticisms which employ the technique of objective structuring of the *Ars* – whether bipartite, tripartite, or whatever else – are fallible on several counts: firstly, their structural divisions are open to contradiction through a close analysis of the text; secondly, their superimposed structures are refuted by more obvious structural divisions made explicit in the poem itself; and, lastly, the specific categories of the structures more often than not indicate a tendentious inclination on the part of the critic to place the work within a certain tradition, which can in effect undermine any creative originality on the part of the poet, neglecting the more playful conversational side of the *Ars Poetica*.

---

<sup>64</sup> As a footnote to this discussion of structure, it is well worth emphasising again that Brink has written much useful material on the poetic patterns of the *Ars*, focusing on how techniques such as abruptness, ring composition, and gliding transitions pervade the text (Brink 1971: 453). However, as has been said previously, it is not adequately explained by this critic just how these 'conversational' poetic patterns and devices function in relation to the obvious didactic purpose of the work.

Another prominent means of analysing the *Ars Poetica* is the biographic method, favoured by earlier twentieth century scholars such as Sedgwick in *Horace* and D'Alton in *Horace and His Age*. These writers endeavoured, in part, to explain the poetry of Horace by contextualising it. So D'Alton introduces the *Ars* with reference to a period in the life of the poet: "In later life, when his own fame was secure, he felt he had a message to impart, especially to his younger contemporaries who wished to accomplish something in the realms of poetry. He was then less exposed than formerly to the tooth of envy, and on the strength of the position he had won he could speak with an air of authority. He had made many successful experiments in the Greek metres. His mind was now matured, and he had pondered on the theory of poetry" (D'Alton 1917: 250-251). In such a way the *Ars* is portrayed as the work of an almost stoically wise Horace, the infallible sage, who at the end of his span earnestly imparts his knowledge onto the next generation. The problem that subsequent generations have had with these interpretations, following developments in persona theory, is the manner in which the voice of the author is assumed to be synonymous with the historical voice of Horace – that simply by identifying how the authorial persona speaks we may form an accurate picture of who the true author was.

In the following section I shall explain the notion of the authorial persona in general, and then examine approaches to the *Ars* which utilize this interpretative perspective. Moreover, I shall argue for how the persona method allows for a greater degree of interpretative coherence than other means of analysis both in general theory and with respect to the context of Horace's works. Finally, in the concluding section of this introductory chapter, I shall examine the specific authorial persona which I have located in the *Ars*, and discuss just how I intend to judge this figure.

### *Authorial Personae*

The arrival of persona theory in the field of Classical Philology – pioneered by the criticisms of W.S. Anderson on Juvenal’s *Satires* in the late sixties and then by later Horatian scholars such as Braund, Freudenburg and Oliensis – was comparatively late in coming. By contrast, it was applied, for example, to English literary criticisms far earlier in the twentieth century where the creative works of T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound had induced scholars to adopt such an approach: “Popularized by Ezra Pound, given impetus by Yeats, institutionalized by Eliot in his poetry and criticism, the notion of the persona is at the centre of that phrase of modernism which holds that the ‘I’ of a poem is always a dramatized ‘I,’ no more to be identified with the actual poet living in history than the Bishop ordering his tomb is to be identified with Robert Browning” (Eliot 1982: 16). However, before exploring more fully the concept of the persona in literature, it is well worth reflecting its precedent in more abstract thought. In short, what kind of theoretical outlook led to the adoption of the persona in literary criticism?

Just as one might track earlier nineteenth-century structural approaches to literary analysis – with which classicists are quite familiar from the seemingly endless doctrinal laws and strict regulations, in particular, of German philologists – to a highly *scientific*, organized and rational manner of thinking of the world, most manifest, for instance, in a field such as biology where the practice of taxonomy necessitated a complete systemization of the entire natural world, so, in contrast, the tendency to locate personae in literary works stems essentially, I believe, from developments in the concept of the psychology of the individual man, the constitution of his identity, instigated by Freud at

the turn of the previous century and espoused more fully and importantly by Carl Jung. It is to Jung's notion of the 'persona' of the individual, espoused in his work *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, to which it is now necessary to turn.

Firstly, some basic background is needed here: Jung's theory of the human mind, which is aimed principally at the pragmatic end of alleviating the affliction of patients suffering from nervous traumata or neuroses, rests fundamentally on the distinction between the conscious part, that of which a given person is manifestly aware, and the unconscious part of the mind, which, in the case of a mentally ill individual, needs to be analysed and assimilated consciously in order for that individual to overcome his particular malady (Jung 1928: 163). Jung's major contribution to the conception of the psychology of the individual man was in the division of the unconscious into two separate parts, namely the personal unconscious: "The personal unconscious, of which I also speak as the 'sub-conscious,'... contains forgotten memories, suppressed (purposely forgotten) painful ideas... sensory perceptions that were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and, finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness" (Jung 1928: footnote 2, 67-68) – and the super-personal unconscious: "We speak of the latter also as the collective unconscious, because it is apart from the personal and quite universal. For its contents can be found in all minds, and this is obviously not the case with personal contents. The primordial images are the deepest, the most ancient, and the most universal thoughts of humanity" (Jung 1928: 68).

In his discussion of the collective unconscious Jung then discusses the propensity for men to incorporate "certain impersonal, universal, and fundamental characteristics" (Jung 1928: 163) of this super-personal unconscious into their 'personal conscious' –

what Jung also refers to as their ‘real (individual) character’ – to the extent that they adopt a ‘persona’: “this excerpt of the collective unconscious... I have called the persona. The word persona is really a very suitable expression for it; since persona originally meant the mask worn by an actor to signify his role... it is, as its name tells us, only a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that is a substitute for individuality, intending to make others as well as oneself believe one is individual. In reality it is only a role that is played” (Jung 1928: 164-165). The persona for Jung is the inevitable compromise the ‘true individual’ makes with respect to his society; his name, his title, his rank, and his occupation are all part of the face which he is obliged to show towards the world (Jung 1928: 165). The man who then believes his adopted persona – professor, poet, farmer, lawyer, etc – to be entirely synonymous with his ‘real individual character’ (his personal conscious) becomes something of a caricature.

Now quite clearly for Jung the persona, although often obligatory for a man to wear within his social environment, is seen ultimately as a hindrance to his ‘true self’, what Jung calls his ‘personal conscious’<sup>65</sup>, and therefore to his psychic salubrity; the persona must then accordingly be shrugged off in the process of *individuation*: “fundamentally the aim of individuation is to free the self from the false wrappings of the persona” (Jung 1928: 185). Regardless of the psychologically damaging effect of the adoption of a persona upon the mental health a man, which, however true it may be, really goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, one does wonder, however, whether Jung, in suggesting that an individual may attain some kind of self-realization by simply removing his fixed professional public face, is not trivializing the potential *plurality* of

---

<sup>65</sup> Not to be confused with the ‘personal *unconscious*’, see the definition given *above*.

faces or personae<sup>66</sup> or even the *dynamism*<sup>67</sup> of a single persona which a given individual may possess; as Oliensis observes in her study of the Horatian persona: “In any given encounter, this ‘face’ can be saved or lost, enhanced or maintained, effaced or even defaced. Behind the scenes, and sometimes (more or less discreetly) in mid-scene, faces are changed. We are constantly moving between spheres (social, spatial, temporal) that put different valuations and demands on our social faces” (Oliensis 1998: 1). Indeed, the theoretical debate between the realization of the idealized true individual and the pervasiveness of the masked individual or persona is complex and perhaps ultimately irresolvable; it must be said, furthermore, that even Jung does admit ironically enough to there being an element of the individual within the very selection of personae: “But it would be wrong to present the matter in this way without at the same time recognizing that there is already something individual in the particular choice and definition of the persona” (Jung 1928: 165).

Moving on from the psychological ramifications of the persona upon our notion of the individual, quite practically the idea of social personae, putting on masks, should not be *empirically* foreign to us. Consider the following two scenarios. The first: you are attending a mandatory interview for a teaching post at a prestigious university; the second: you are enjoying a few beers in a bar with some good friends of yours. Each situation in turn demands a specific appropriate kind of conduct: for the first, you would act with formal restraint, considered introspection, and perhaps a certain amount of self-deprecation; for the latter, you would act far less reserved, be more garrulous, and more inclined to frivolous light-hearted humour. In essence, for each situation you have

---

<sup>66</sup> I employ the terms ‘face’ and ‘persona’ synonymously throughout this essay.

<sup>67</sup> By this term I mean the potential to change its face.

adopted a certain kind of mask, a persona, a role to fit the social prescriptions. Horace, as we might conjecture from the evidence of the various relationships within his poetry, could have displayed several alternate social personae according to his company: whether he was addressing Augustus, whether he was entertaining his patron Maecenas, whether he was in the company of fellow poets and writers such as Virgil, or whether he was discussing his craft with a younger aspiring poet (Oliensis 1998: 1). For each situation we would expect a different Horace to emerge in the social setting.

Furthermore, as justification of the efficacy of these social personae upon the character of the historical author of a given work – lest the somewhat romantic assumption is raised that the private face of an author is to be entirely removed from the restrictions of his social faces, revealing some idealised true self in the Jungian sense – we need look no further than Horace’s own *Ars Poetica* in one of the more famous passages of the poem, which is concerned with the ethical obligation of the aspiring poet:

*qui didicit patriae quid debeat et quid amicis,  
quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes,  
quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae  
partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto  
reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.  
respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo  
doctum imitatore et vivas hinc ducere voces.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 312-318)

The personae or faces which an author projects into his narrative, *reddere personae* (line 316), are those which he has learnt, *didicit* (line 312), from his own personae or from observation of other personae in society: the mask of a son, a friend, a parent, a sibling, a judge, a military general, and so forth; there is no sense in the Horatian passage that the poetic narrative is to be divorced from reality: the poet ‘holds up a mirror to life’, he is an ‘*imitator naturae*’ in the Aristotelian sense (Abrams 1972: 20-21). Moreover, it is important for our purposes that we recognize that the Horatian passage is not merely recommending that the poet observes social roles, or personae, and projects them into his work as characters within a narrative, as, for example, in drama, but that he himself, in order to produce a literary work, is required to assume and adopt these roles as ‘a learned imitator’, *doctum imitatore*m (line 318). Just what social role in particular the author of the *Ars* assumes will be discussed in the following sub-chapter.

By analogy, just as we expect a given individual to adopt a certain persona in relation to his environment at a particular time and place, so, in literature, we should expect an author to adopt a persona or mask which will situate his own self with regard to his narrative, which will, in short, provide him with a certain stance or position in relation to his narrative. As Gerald Genette, in his work *Narrative Discourse*, identifies, the author (in the case of his study the focus is more on the ‘novelist’ than the poet, satirist, etc) of a work is forced to choose between certain “narrative postures” (Genette 1980: 244), through which the story or narrative may be told to the audience. So what are the different types of ‘narrative postures’ which an author may adopt? From our own experience of reading, we could probably distinguish several different types: the third-

person character within the text, who narrates events as he experiences them; the omniscient narrator who, although not himself involved in the subject matter, seems to possess a complete knowledge of everything that comes to pass; or, perhaps, the first-person speaker who adopts the position of the author within the narrative, speaking as an authority over his subject.

As one potential theoretical means of differentiating the kinds of literary personae which an author may adopt, we can turn to Genette's two way classification of the status of a narrator to a story or narrative (Genette 1980: 248). Firstly, he distinguishes between the *relationship* of the narrator to the narrative: whether he is absent from the story which he narrates, a heterodiegetic narrator (as 'Homer'<sup>68</sup> is absent from the *Odyssey*), or whether he is present in the story which he narrates, a homodiegetic narrator (as Odysseus is present in the story of his adventures which he tells to the Phaeacians); secondly, Genette, provides the criterion of the *level* of the narrator to the narrative: whether he stands outside the narrative, an extradiegetic narrator (as 'Homer' narrates outside the events of the story of the *Odyssey*), or whether he is narrating within the actual narrative, an intradiegetic narrator (as Odysseus is narrating within the events of the *Odyssey*) (Genette 1980: 244-248).

Applying Genette's rubric to the *Ars Poetica*, we can see that the literary face or persona with which Horace, the historical author, presents us is that of the *extra-homodiegetic narrator* (Iddeng 2005: 186-188). So, firstly, he is clearly homodiegetic, seeing that he is very much part of the narrative of the *Ars*, an identifiable character, often evident in the first person singular verbal tense, who interacts with his addressees,

---

<sup>68</sup> In inverted commas so as to avoid amalgamation of the heterodiegetic narrator, 'Homer', with the real historical figure or figures known as Homer.

instructs them, and presents his own *personal* role in relation to his subject, most manifest, for example, in the following programmatic speech:

*ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum  
reddere quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi.  
munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo,  
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam,  
quid deceat quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 304-308)

Heterodiegetic narrators, such as ‘Virgil’<sup>69</sup> in the *Aeneid*, remain removed from the subject of their narrative, acting as impersonal spectators. And, secondly, the narrator of the *Ars* is of course extradiegetic since he is not a secondary character recounting his narrative within another narrative, as Aeneas does to Dido in the second book of the *Aeneid*, but is himself relating his subject on the primary narrative level of the poem (Iddeng 2005: 186-188).

This extra-homodiegetic quality of the narrator of *Ars Poetica* – and, indeed, of the other works of Horace – has encouraged critics to employ the term ‘authorial persona’ to characterize the face which Horace adopts. The phrase itself is conceptually ambiguous, since all potential narrative faces – extra-homodiegetic, extra-heterodiegetic, intra-homodiegetic, and intra-heterodiegetic, if we restrict ourselves to Genette’s organization – are *personae* which an author may elect to adopt, thus ‘authorial *personae*’. What is of course meant by the designation of ‘authorial persona’ is a face or

---

<sup>69</sup> See note 68 above.

persona which presents itself as the true historical author of a work, the façade of the real writer, but which is, as we know, only a specific kind of literary persona, a fictitious creation by the author. The authorial character of this literary persona is encouraged by the particular combination of extradiegetic narrative, which places the narrator on the primary narrative level – a quasi-authorial level – and homodiegetic narrative, which creates an often highly personal narrator, as if the historical author himself were speaking<sup>70</sup>.

Horatian poetry, in general, has been a prime critical target for analysis by authorial persona on account of the pervasiveness of the homodiegetic narrator: “The first person is prominent in all of Horace’s work: *ego* and its oblique cases occur some 460 times in the 7,795 lines of his extant poetry. Indeed, the different poetic genres which constitute his output all seem to have been chosen in part because of the primacy of the poet’s voice” (Harrison 2007: 22). And so accordingly the question of whether there exists a coherent authorial persona across all of Horace’s works has been tackled by critics such as Ellen Oliensis: “the first-person speaker who gradually accumulates characteristics associated with the figure known as “Horace”<sup>71</sup> – friend of Maecenas, friend of Virgil and Varius, son of a freedman, owner of a Sabine villa, author of *Satires I*... author of the *Epodes* and so on” (Oliensis 1998: 2). Although such an extensive investigation far exceeds the spatial confines of this dissertation – whether there is such an ‘accumulation of characteristics’, as Oliensis suggests, throughout all of Horace’s

---

<sup>70</sup> Conversely, there is no great temptation to amalgamate an extra-heterodiegetic narrator with the historical author: ‘Virgil’, the narrator of the *Aeneid*, with Virgil, the writer of the *Aeneid*; nor is there a temptation to amalgamate an intra-homodiegetic narrator with the historical author: Aeneas with Virgil, the writer. It is only when we arrive at the extra-homodiegetic narrator that the critic, especially the historical scholar, is lured into identifying the created literary persona with the true author.

<sup>71</sup> Oliensis employs “Horace” to stand for the authorial persona which is created throughout the Horatian oeuvre, Horace without inverted commas for the historical figure.

works – in the third chapter I shall compare my analysis of the authorial persona in the *Ars Poetica* with that of *Satire* 1.4, identifying certain shared characteristics between the two poems and how the satire might enhance our understanding of the function of the persona of the *Ars*.

So now let me discuss some interpretations of the *Ars* which have drawn on this notion of the authorial persona, judging the respective merits and shortcomings of each, as they appear to me. Ellen Oliensis, in *Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*, has produced one of the more detailed explanations of how the authorial persona might function within the *Ars*. The key to understanding Oliensis' text lies in her explanation of the performance aspect of all Horace's poetry: for her the categories of social personae and literary personae interplay with one another in his work. "It is because Horace's poetry is itself a performance venue that I make no clear, hard-and-fast distinction between the author and the character "Horace". Horace is present in his personae, that is, not because these personae are authentic and accurate impressions of his true self, but because they effectively construct that self – for Horace's contemporary readers, for us, and also for Horace himself" (Oliensis 1998: 2). Oliensis' interpretation of the Horatian mask thus comes to emphasise the social role of the persona towards its audience: "My concern, then, is with the way Horace conducts his life in and by means of poetry. My approach is biographical... I am interested... in the life that happens in his poetry" (Oliensis 1998: 3).

In her interpretation of the *Ars*, Oliensis identifies an authorial persona who is constantly concerned with the opposition between his own poetic authority and the social authority of his audience. In this way, Horace "produces an extremely volatile blend of

authority and deference: a “masterwork” which is also a study in self-defacement, an educational essay which is also an exercise in antididaxis” (Oliensis 1998: 198-199). So the authorial persona of the *Ars* often adopts a discourse which juxtaposes social status with poetic status (Oliensis 1998: 211):

*ut praeco, ad merces turbam qui cogit emendas,  
adsentatores iubet ad lucrum ire poeta  
dives agris, dives positus in faenore nummis.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 419-421)

Here in the direct contrast between *poeta* (line 420) and *dives* (line 421) the implication is that high social status, with the accompanying wealth, negates the potential of a poet through the acquisition of *adsentatores* (line 420) or ‘flatterers’. Similarly, we can witness ‘Horace’ mocking in an ironic tone the assumption that an *ingenuus* (line 383), or ‘man of noble birth’, should naturally possess poetic *ingenium* (Oliensis 1998: 211):

*liber et ingenuus, praesertim census equestrem  
summam nummorum, vitioque remotus ab omni.  
tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva:*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 383-385)

Indeed, the theme of *ingenium* runs through the *Ars* where inherited authority is ridiculed in contrast to artistic authority or skill, *ars*. Oliensis then, throughout the *Ars*, is

concerned with identifying a language of authority – a discourse which the authorial persona of the *Ars* utilizes to subtly create a portrait of himself as “*the master poet*”<sup>72</sup> (Oliensis 1998: 198).

What seems to me most satisfactory in Oliensis’ interpretation of the *Ars* is her attempt to identify a particular kind of discourse – her ‘rhetoric of authority’ – to characterize the authorial persona. Simply put, she has analysed the very language of the persona – rather than having applied her own tendentious rubrics over the text – to try to illustrate the nature of the persona. It seems to me that any study which tries to locate a coherent authorial persona in the *Ars* must indeed illustrate how the language in the text creates such an impression, as I shall in my interpretation.

Although Oliensis’ methodology in defining a particular kind of authorial persona is praiseworthy, I am not entirely convinced by the persona she identifies. Firstly, Oliensis undertakes what the literary theorist M.H. Abrams calls a ‘pragmatic approach’ to criticism (Abrams 1972: 11-12): she focuses entirely on the social purpose and effect of the authorial persona upon the implied audience, ignoring or dismissing the extent to which the ‘authorial persona’ can be appreciated objectively as a coherent constituent of a literary work, the *Ars Poetica*. Clearly, we are stuck between the extremes of a work being appreciated purely in terms of its social context, or, on the other hand, entirely in isolation as a work of art – an approach which acknowledges the social debt of a writer but does not relate every detail of the work to this would surely be preferable. Secondly, I believe that Oliensis’ analysis of the persona of the *Ars* has been devised with a view to creating a coherent Horatian authorial persona, who utilizes this ‘rhetoric of authority’, across several works, including the *Satires* and *Odes*. I do wonder whether one would

---

<sup>72</sup> My italics.

come to the same analytical conclusion if interpreting the *Ars* in isolation<sup>73</sup>. Thirdly, I don't believe that the authorial persona as 'the master poet who speaks in the language of authority' is really quite specific enough for this poem. In short, just what kind of 'authority figure' exactly does the poet Horace present in the *Ars*? Just how is it different to the authority figures in the other literary epistles?

Stephen Harrison comes closer to what I would consider an accurate description of the authorial persona of the *Ars*, identifying "the didactic voice of the instructor" (Harrison 2007: 22). The notion of the persona as 'instructor' seems to incorporate better the scope of the *Ars*: an instructor would clearly engage in a 'rhetoric of authority' with his audience, as Oliensis demands, but he is equally concerned with espousing principles of poetics, which are undeniably important to an understanding of the *Ars*.

Unfortunately, Harrison doesn't proceed much further in trying to characterize the instructor or his language in the poem. In the *Ars Poetica* itself we can bear witness to several different models of instructor, not all of them especially positive faces. At one point we hear the rather authoritative, regimental, and all too pragmatic voice of a typically Roman schoolmaster, demanding calculations from his pupils (Rudd 1989: 204):

*Romani pueri longis rationibus assem*

*discunt in partes centum diducere. 'dicat*

*filius Albini: si de quincunce remota est*

---

<sup>73</sup> Certainly, as I discussed in my analysis of the genre of the *Ars Poetica*, the work does depart from certain formal conventions inherent in the other genres which Horace adopts, such as the verse letter; and, moreover, the manner in which the addressees of the poem are treated is quite different from the familiar tone of Horace's other letters where the addressees are more integrated.

*uncia, quid superat? poteras dixisse.’ ‘triens.’ ‘eu.  
rem poteris servare tuam. redit uncia, quid fit?’  
‘semis.’*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 325-330)

Then later we hear the stern voice of the critic Quintilian, not tempted by remuneration into flattery, who instructs the aspiring poet in strong imperative language (Wickham 1891: 428):

*Quintilio si quid recitares, ‘corrige sodes  
hoc’ aiebat ‘et hoc’; melius te posse negares,  
bis terque expertum frustra, delere iubebat  
et male tornatos incudi reddere versus.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 438-441)

To title the Horatian persona simply as an ‘instructor’ is clearly not specific enough. What is the *character* of this instruction? Just how does he impart his subject? Is he the drill-sergeant schoolmaster? The brutally-honest critic? Or something else perhaps?

What Harrison does again identify, as I did in my introduction, is the problem of how to come to terms with Horace’s claim to be concerned purely with instruction and at the same time his utilization of poetic structures: “Horace is clearly playing with the idea of the poet: in one sense he has renounced traditional poetry, especially the lyric poetry for which he is renowned, and returned to the ‘unpoetic’ form of *sermo*, but that

renunciation is itself made in elegant verse which exploits poetic devices such as the ambiguous metaphor” (Harrison 2007: 33-34). Harrison’s interpretation – and it is one worth considering – seems to locate the Horatian voice in general as one which is concerned with misleading ambiguous self-representations, deliberately shaping and distorting various personae.

Lastly, Peter Toohey’s interpretation of the authorial persona of the *Ars*, which I have already discussed in part in my discussion of genre, comes closest to the model of the persona which I shall be arguing for in the following chapter of this dissertation. His analysis of the *Ars* is focused upon the dichotomy between instruction and play in the voice of the authorial persona: “If all Horace had been concerned about was instruction, then he went the wrong way about things. There are many aspects of the poem, fissures they may be called, which undermine the primacy of didactic instruction. If instruction was not the only purpose of the poem, then what else was? Here I have stressed the intertwined notions of voice and of play. Horace in the *Ars Poetica* substitutes for... serious didactic posture... the ironic, chatty, often humorous, mercurial, and habitually discursive voice which he had produced above all in the *Satires*” (Toohey 1996: 156). Toohey’s emphasis on the importance of ‘play’ is a step in the right direction in analyses of the *Ars Poetica*, and it will form an important part of the argument of my ensuing chapter; however, rather than stressing a dichotomy between these two aspects – an ‘undermining’ of instruction on account of play – where I shall differ radically from Toohey is in uniting the notions of ‘play’ and ‘instruction’ under a more liberal classification in the discourse of a teacher or *praeceptor*, and not merely an instructor<sup>74</sup>.

---

<sup>74</sup> As I stated previously under the discussion of genre, Toohey also identifies the significance of what he entitles ‘illustrative panels’ in the *Ars Poetica*: “Another important feature... which reflects the traditions

Before I proceed further in my explanation of the character of the authorial persona in the *Ars*, I think it is necessary that I justify to an extent my selection of the device of authorial persona in general as a means of establishing a coherent interpretation of the poem. In other words, in what ways is it superior to, for example, structuralist methods of analysis?

What we are essentially doing by identifying and characterizing an authorial persona is *characterising the language* of a text, and by implication the meaning behind the language. We are concerned with illustrating how the language is indicative of the purpose, priorities, motives, emotions, and general scope of cogitations of the specific authorial persona presumed to lie within the text. In this way it is not that different from biographic approaches which endeavour to characterize the language according to the thought of the historical writer.

I have already discussed this matter in part, but it should be emphasised that the relation between the biographic approach and the persona approach in literature is not one of polar opposition but a complex *farrago*: in everyday life we are always adopting a specific kind of role, hence a persona – any individual (even the historical author or poet as the *Ars* itself illustrates) is a true mixture of different masks rather than a fixed character; equally, to view literature as totally isolated from reality is ridiculous, and clearly any role which a writer assumes – be it a poet, a moralizer, a philosopher or whatever else – will have its basis in one of these social roles. I do not believe that we

---

of didactic epic is the presence of the illustrative panel... This... is particularly apropos for Horatian verse: it engenders the recommended combination of utilitarian elements... sweetened by the insertion of the 'easier' narrative insertions" (Toohey 1996: 151). I shall rework the importance of this feature of the Horatian text – rather than being merely a means of mixing utility and sweetness, as Toohey argues – in the section on '*Illustrative Language*' in the subsequent chapter.

should be as concerned with the question of the relative veracity of a literary persona<sup>75</sup> (which has worried many critics) as we should whether this persona can be considered a favourable device for judging objectively a literary text. In other words, what does it mean in literary theory for us to locate coherence in a literary persona of the writer?

In his post-structuralist essay, *What is an author*, Michael Foucault aptly describes critical attempts to identify an author figure in a literary work thus: “The author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning” (Foucault 1988: 209). Although Foucault is concerned with illustrating the futility of endeavours to compartmentalize a work in line with his deconstructionist tendencies (hence, ‘the proliferation of meaning’), his selection of the ‘author’ as ultimately the last recourse of the literary critic (‘principle of thrift’) is instructive to our pursuit. The implication is that the literary work stems from a kind of fundamental reservoir, *a creative power*, which determines the language and meaning of the subsequent text (Foucault 1988: 203). The literary voice or persona is then a coherent projection from this primary creative source. Foucault, although acknowledging the existence of the authorial persona, casts doubt over its constancy in relation to the author: “Everyone knows that, in a novel narrated in the first person, neither the first person pronoun, nor the present indicative refer exactly either to the writer or to the moment in which he writes, but rather to an alter ego whose distance from the author varies, often changing in the course of the work” (Foucault 1988: 205). However, irrespective of the positioning and malleability of this persona in relation to the ideal authorial creative power, I would suggest that at least by admitting to the presence of an ‘authorial alter ego’ in a literary text, Foucault is inadvertently providing us with an interpretative unit, the authorial persona, to locate in a work.

---

<sup>75</sup> I.e. the extent to which ‘Horace’ matches up to Horace, the historical writer.

In effect, the extent to which we locate coherence in an authorial persona will be shaped by the extent to which the ‘creative power’ can be thought to be coherent. In this way it could be argued that attempts to locate coherence through an authorial persona are just as subjective as structuralist methods: whereas the latter suppose a coherent division of subject matter in a literary text, which can be objectively analysed, the former presupposes a degree of coherence in the author himself. I do not deny the subjectivity of my choice of interpretation (although all interpretations, even anti-critical theories ironically enough, are forced to make some or other assumption) but rather all I can do is explain the aesthetic assumptions at work behind my methodology.

The literary theorist M.H. Abrams, whom I find to be one of the more lucid writers in his field, in his essay ‘Orientation to Critical Studies’, accounts for the desire to find coherence in a literary work by the identification of a persona through his definition of the ‘*expressive*’ interpretation or function of literature<sup>76</sup>: “A work of art is essentially *the internal made external*<sup>77</sup>, resulting from a creative process operating under the impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined product of the poet’s perceptions, thoughts, and feelings” (Abrams 1972: 17). If we approach literature with the attitude that a work of art is an external projection of the internal cogitations and feelings of a poet, then it would seem that the most coherent way in which we can read it will be through the voice, the literary persona, which the poet has to adopt as a type of conduit to relate the internal to the external.

---

<sup>76</sup> Abrams names four different types of critical approaches to literature, of which I have already mentioned the ‘*pragmatic*’ in my discussion of Oliensis’ work – the other two are the ‘*mimetic*’ or ‘*representational*’ and the ‘*objective*’.

<sup>77</sup> My italics.

But now apart from general discussions of literary theory, by what distinction should we deem it appropriate to judge a Horatian work in particular by means of an authorial persona? For justification of this we should turn to the critics who have focused on the satires and the voice of Horace in these *sermones*, in particular *The Walking Muse* by Kirk Freudenburg. In opposition to certain modern theorists who consider the persona to be an iconoclastic anachronistic device in analysing ancient literature, Freudenburg manages to illustrate, successfully I think, that the notion of the persona was known to the Augustan poets.

Firstly, part of rhetorical training in the education of every Roman entailed the adoption of certain roles: “Every Roman schoolboy was expected to master the practice of characterization for the sake of projecting a positive, trustworthy image of himself as speaker and a highly negative image of his opposition” (Freudenburg 1993: 4). Tacitus, in his *Dialogus de oratoribus*, alludes to this convention in education by giving examples of the type of diverse subjects or *materiae* which ‘are acted out in schools on a daily basis’, *in schola cotidie agitur: sequitur autem ut materiae abhorrenti a veritate declamatio quoque adhibeatur. Sic fit ut tyrannicidarum praemia aut vitiatarum electiones aut pestilentiae remedia aut incesta matrum aut quidquid in schola cotidie agitur, in foro vel raro vel numquam, ingentibus verbis prosequantur* (Tac. *Dial.* 35). Tacitus’ usage of *agitur* here is most probably a metaphor borrowed from the stage, and the implication would seem to be that the school students, like actors in a play, are trained to adopt certain roles in the selection of fictitious *materiae*.

Secondly, and with particular reference to the *Satires*, Freudenburg has illustrated the debt which Horace owes to drama, in which the notion of a persona, a ‘mask’, was

*physically* manifest to the audience (Freudenburg 1993: 39-40). The importance of the appropriate adoption by the actor of the persona or the mask of the character in drama is in fact mentioned at several different places in the *Ars Poetica* itself:

*ut ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent  
humani vultus. si vis me flere, dolendum est  
primum ipsi tibi; tum tua me infortunia laedent,  
Telephe vel Peleu; male si mandata loqueris  
aut dormitabo aut ridebo. tristia maestum  
vultum verba decent, iratum plena minarum,  
ludentem lasciva, severum seria dictu.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 101-107)

The notion here is that a character's language in a play must match up to the 'face' or *vultus* (line 106) which the actor wears to denote the emotional state of the character he is playing; if the language of the character is delivered poorly with respect to his 'face', *male si mandata loqueris* (line 104), if the persona is not believable, the audience will demonstrate its disapproval through boredom or hostile laughter, *aut dormitabo aut ridebo* (line 105) (Wickham 1891: 398-399). The important word in this passage, which is given emphasis through repetition, is *vultus* (lines 102, 106): an actor is required to put on the 'face' of the character he is playing.

Moreover, on two other notable occasions in the *Ars*, the Latin word for the mask which the actor wears on stage, the *persona*, is explicitly used in the narrative. So, firstly,

when a playwright does introduce a new character on stage, he must ensure that this creation is coherent, that the mask holds up:

*si quid inexpertum scaenae committis et audes  
personam formare novam, servetur ad imum  
qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 125-127)

And as has been already observed in my discussion of social personae, it is recommended that the writer observe the models from life if he wishes to create the appropriate characters on stage: *reddere personae scit convenientia cuique* (Hor. *Ars* 316).

And, lastly, in terms of the poetic tradition in Latin literature, we have Catullus' own loose definition of the literary persona in somewhat vehement terms (Freudenburg 1993: 4):

*pedicabo ego vos et irrumabo,  
Aureli pathice et cinaede Furi,  
qui me ex versiculis meis putastis,  
quod sunt molliculi, parum pudicum.  
nam castum esse decet pium poetam  
ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est...*

(Catull. 16.1-6)

So Catullus' anger here is directed against two individuals, *Aureli pathice et cinaede Furi* (line 2), who endeavoured to characterize the real historical Catullus as *parum pudicum* (line 4) from the evidence of the character of the 'Catullus' from his poetry, *versiculis meis* (line 3). There is, in short, a recognition that the identity which the poet establishes of himself in poetry need not be synonymous with his true identity<sup>78</sup>.

### *The Praeceptor Persona*

It seems to me that the authorial persona of the *Ars Poetica* can be best described as a 'teacher', or, in Latin, a '*praeceptor*' persona.

By identifying the persona as a 'teacher', I do not simply mean an 'instructor' (Harrison 2007: 22). The notion of 'instruction' does not appear to define quite accurately enough for me the function of a teacher: generals, religious preachers, politicians, and, indeed, teachers are all concerned to a large extent with 'instruction'; however, I should think that a teacher speaking in the discourse of a general, or equally a general in that of a teacher, would prove to be a disastrous experiment.

---

<sup>78</sup> For the possible arguments against this interpretation, Clay's article on 'The Theory of the Literary Persona in Antiquity' should be consulted: "We should not forget that he makes this distinction in a poem, and, by this very gesture, removes the grounds of his argument. The distinction is so severe that his poetry and by implication the Catullus of his poetry are presented as autonomous. This was, I would argue, a distinction that was unavailable to a culture dominated by public and performed poetry" (Clay 1998: 33). See also, Mayer, R.G, 'Persona Problems: The Literary Persona in Antiquity', pg 66-68, and also more generally against the identification of the persona in the satires of Juvenal and, primarily, Horace, pg 71-78. Iddeng in his discussion of the authorial persona in Roman poetry argues for more flexible critical analyses: "We need perhaps to open for a much more flexible and less constant *I*-poet. If correct, this means that the *I*-poet consequently needs to be comprehended independently based on close readings and contextual studies of each poet and each separate poem" (Iddeng 2005: 198).

In the opening section of my next chapter I shall be arguing for a broader range of concepts to define the function of the Horatian Teacher or Praeceptor<sup>79</sup>. I shall be drawing on certain passages from the *Satires* of Horace – in particular from *Satire* 1.4, and, to a lesser extent from *Satires* 1.1 and 1.10 – which allow for a more ‘liberal’ classification of the task of the teacher than simply the pursuit of ‘instruction’; furthermore, as a means of justifying this Horatian concept of the Praeceptor, I shall be drawing on certain modern works from the analytical philosophy of education, which establish similar criteria for the teacher.

After I have outlined the broader scope of the task of the Praeceptor, my primary undertaking, which will form the bulk of the ensuing chapter, will be to relate the *conceptual* to the *linguistic*: in other words, to identify how the various types of language which the Praeceptor employs in the *Ars* fulfil our established concept of the Horatian Praeceptor. It will be seen that this discourse certainly might at times entail highly instructive language, but equally it might consist of more humorous, playful or discursive types of language, which might not seem manifestly ‘didactic’ in the common critical sense of the word, but which contribute nevertheless to the overall function of the teacher.

Ultimately, my expectation is that by identifying the persona as a praceptor, schooling his audience in the subject of poetry rather than a didactic instructor interested purely in espousing a theory of poetics, we might be able to account for the poetic elements within the *Ars* which have long been deemed irresolvable with the didactic principles. It is my contention that the Praeceptor of the *Ars* will naturally include more

---

<sup>79</sup> Henceforth I shall employ the term ‘the Praeceptor’ in un-italicized form to refer to the authorial persona presented specifically in the *Ars*, while in un-capitalized form it will refer to the general notion of a ‘teacher’.

playful 'poetic' devices and structures in his language as part of the process of leading his audience into a greater knowledge of *ars poetica*.

## Chapter 2 – The Praeceptor Persona At Play

### *The Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor*

To a great extent much of my criticism of other scholarly methods of interpreting the *Ars Poetica* has pertained to the lack of *explicit evidence* in the Horatian poem itself to back up the respective theoretical arguments. If, for example, the *Ars* is to be understood as a didactic poem or epic, as Toohey argues, then why is there no mention of this class of poetry under the discussion of genre in the *Ars*? Or if it is to be analysed under Brink's tripartite scheme of 'poem', 'poetry', and 'poet', then would it be unreasonable to expect corresponding headings organized at specific points in the *Ars Poetica*? These critical methods which endeavour to locate implicit structures and schemes in the text – however true they may be to the designs of the historical writer Horace – run the risk of being perceived as tendentious suppositions.

My insistence, however, that Horace is presenting a praеceptor persona in his poem rests on a particular programmatic passage in the text where the authorial persona *explicitly* identifies his own task or role within his narrative:

*o ego laevus,*  
*qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam;*  
*non alius faceret meliora poemata. verum*  
*nil tanti est. ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum*  
*reddere quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi.*

*munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo,  
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam,  
quid deceat, quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 301-308)

So, first of all, the authorial persona relinquishes the vocation of poet. Unlike the ‘inspired’ poets of the Democritean school (lines 295-301), he would prefer to maintain his sanity, ‘to purge bile’, than to sacrifice his mental salubrity by attempting poetry: “If inspired poetry involves madness, that is, a surplus of (black) bile supposed to cause the melancholia of genius, then... he would rather be rid of it and be sane” (Brink 1971: 333-334). His refusal of the status of poet is further enforced by the strikingly brief diminution of the worth of a poet – *verum / nil tanti est* (lines 303-304) – and most explicitly in *Ars* by the participle phrase *nil scribens* (line 306), ‘he is not going to write poetry’.

Having declined the title of poet, the authorial persona assumes the part of the teacher or *praeceptor* of poetry. So, firstly, there is the declaration of what role he will play, *fungar vice* (line 304), in his narrative: *ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum / reddere quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi* (lines 304-305). His function, just like the whetstone, *cotis* (line 304), in sharpening iron, *ferrum* (line 305), rather than the iron of the knife itself, will be to shape aspiring poets, his pupils, in their duty rather than himself to engage in poetry. As the different commentators of the poem point out, the metaphor which the authorial persona employs here to explain his role in writing his *Ars Poetica* is reminiscent of a well-known declaration by Isocrates, reported by Plutarch, as to how he

chooses to *teach* people to speak rather than to engage in speaking himself (Wilkins 1886: 394): *καὶ αἱ ἀκοναὶ αὐταὶ μὲν τεμεῖν οὐ δύνανται, τὸν δὲ σίδηρον ὀξεῖα καὶ τμητικὸν ποιῶσιν* (Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X. Orat.* 4). And, secondly, of course, there is the persona's explicit verbal declaration, *ipse docebo* (line 306), of his task to teach aspiring poets in their profession, *munus et officium* (line 306). Certainly, I should think that the high concentration of first person singular verbs in this passage, two of which, *fungar... docebo* (lines 304, 306), are in a 'conclusive' future simple tense<sup>80</sup>, reinforced by the emphatic employment of the 1<sup>st</sup> person pronoun *ego* (line 301) and the intensive pronouns *ipsa... ipse* (lines 305-306)<sup>81</sup>, indeed points to these verses as a *programmatic* statement by the authorial persona.

At this juncture, the question will probably be submitted by the sceptical critic as to whether we can in fact trust these verses as a *genuine* defining statement of purpose, a programmatic speech, on the part of the authorial persona in the *Ars Poetica*. Do we believe him when he claims that he will merely play the role of a teacher?

Perhaps our initial reluctance to accept the sincerity of the words of the authorial persona here lies in the curious mixture of authority and deference in his language. Certainly, on the one hand, he is manifestly laying claim to the authority of a teacher of poetry: he supplies a most well-known metaphor of teaching, 'playing the whetstone', to define his personal role; he states his purpose in emphatic language with the intensive pronoun and 1<sup>st</sup> person singular future simple verb – *ipse docebo* (line 306); and, thirdly, in a long series of sub-ordinate clauses, dependant on this main clause verb – *unde, quid*

---

<sup>80</sup> In other words, where the future tense does not so much denote an indefinite period of time in the future, but rather a conclusive remark or statement; so Gildersleeve & Lodge: "The Fut. is often used in conclusions, especially in Cicero (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 162).

<sup>81</sup> *ipsa* (line 305) is in agreement with *quae* (line 305) from the antecedent *cotis* (304), 'the teacher as whetstone', *ipse* (line 306) with *docebo* (line 306).

+ *-que, quid, quid, quo* and *quo* (lines 307-308) – he lists exactly what he will have authority over as teacher, what, in other words, will be the scope of his subject of instruction – *unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam; / quid deceat, quid non; quo virtus, quo ferat error* (lines 307-308).

At the same time as the persona plays up his role as poet teacher, he seems ostensibly to defer the role of poet. His language is pregnant with self-deprecation of various kinds. Most strikingly he commences the passage with the exclamatory phrase, *o ego laevus* (line 301), in which he castigates himself for staying sane (‘purging bile’) and thus not being able to write poetry (Rudd 1989: 201). The register of this self-indictment is deliberately elevated and overly poetic: “In exclamations consisting of interjection and personal pronoun the type *o ego* is poetic and very rare” (Brink 1971: 333), far more common in Latin is the form ‘*o me*’, the exclamatory particle, + the accusative case (Brink 1971: 333)<sup>82</sup>. Secondly, and on account of the preceding poetic construction, the adjective *laevus* (line 301) probably does not here denote a frivolous light-hearted self-indictment – as in ‘clumsy’ or ‘silly me’, as Wickham suggests (Wickham 1891: 417) – but rather, taking its precedent from certain passages in Virgil’s *Aeneid*<sup>83</sup>, comes to signify a grand instance of human self-deception (Brink 1971: 333). So Rudd gives the following English rendering of *laevus* (line 301): “acting against my own interests and perhaps even the intention of heaven, hence ‘perverse’” (Rudd 1989: 201).

Considering the elevated sense of *o ego laevus* (line 301), the full absurdity of this paradoxical statement of the authorial persona should become apparent: in other words,

---

<sup>82</sup> “The Vocative differs from the Nominative in form in the second declension only, and even there the Nominative is sometimes used instead, especially in poetry and solemn prose” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 143); see Hor. *Carm.* 1.2.43, Liv. 1.24.7.

<sup>83</sup> For example: *si mens non laeva fuisset* (Verg. *Aen.* 2.54).

he is calling into question the state of his mental awareness, suggesting that he has deceived himself, *laevus* (line 301), purely on account of the fact that he has *not* lost his mind! His sanity is perverse. And so, accordingly, it ought to become clear that the self-deprecation of the persona here is not an earnest diminution of his own status as a poet, but acts rather as an ironic indictment against the prevailing notions of the inspired poet, who treasures *ingenium* above *ars*, natural ability over skill.

Now proceeding onto the defining statement of the authorial persona as Praeceptor, we can witness a rather bizarre logic at play in the text, indicated grammatically by *ergo*, where the sarcastic self-deprecation of the persona's poetic status (Brink 1971: 335) – *O ego laevus / qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam! / non alius faceret meliora poemata. verum / nil tanti est* (line 301-304) – becomes the primary cause of his adoption of the role of a teacher – *ergo fungar vice cotis* (line 304); it is indeed noteworthy that the authorial persona has in this way sought to preface the most programmatic section of the poem with such ironic self-deprecation. Furthermore, it creates a ridiculous sequence of events whereby the persona's acquisition of the authority of poet teacher is depicted as a very necessary physical means for him to avoid the insanity, the excess bile which characterizes the 'true' Democritean notion of the poet. His mental health is at stake.

The question then stands as to whether we can truly trust the words of the authorial persona here as a defining statement of purpose: does his sarcastic denunciation of his poetic status entirely undermine his ensuing claim to be a praceptor, or is the humour designed simply to soften "the transition to the most directly didactic part of the poem" (Wickham 1891: 418)?

Against the possibility that the Praeceptor is here undermined, a few pertinent points should be borne in mind. Firstly, I would suggest that the ironic playful manner in which the Praeceptor introduces himself and his task would only represent a major interpretative difficulty if we restricted our conception of the Horatian teacher to straightforward serious instruction; if on the other hand, as I shall discuss shortly, the Horatian concept of the teacher incorporates a wider array of criteria, which allows for an admixture of play and instruction, then the casual ridiculous manner in which he is presented to us should cause no major critical concern but would in fact be quite fitting for his character.

Secondly, given that the subject of his instruction is poetry, it is actually quite necessary for the teacher to reference his authority as poet to some extent. Indeed, conversely, if the authorial persona's deliberate diminution of his own authority as a poet were not articulated in such elliptical ironic language, it would be a serious indictment against his ability to teach his subject with any authority: how could he instruct poetry, if he himself had no natural ability, *ingenium*, in this field whatsoever, if he could not 'play the poet' to some extent, if he could not garner the name of a poet, *nomenque poetae* (Hor. *Ars P.* 299)? This, however, is not the resultant effect of his self-deprecation. As Rudd correctly identifies, his decision not to write poetry, 'to purge bile', "represents a conscious and voluntary decision" (Rudd 1989: 201). He does in actual fact possess the ability to write poetry, highlighted by the potential subjunctive *faceret* (line 303), but does not think it worthwhile – *verum / nil tanti est* (303-304) – to sacrifice his sanity to produce the type of true 'inspired' poetry, which the Democritean school in particular demands; rather he will consciously refrain from practicing poetry and instead will teach,

*docebo* (line 306) (Brink 1971: 334-335), which will indeed, as we shall see, allow him ample scope to display his *ars*, his artistic skill and technique in language, to his readers.

Now whereas the Praeceptor expends much energy in describing the task, *munus et officium* (line 306), of the aspiring poet to his pupils, the Pisones, he is remarkably curt about his own task as teacher. What does it mean conceptually to be a teacher? What exactly does his part, *vice* (line 304), entail? His defining verb *docere* is suitably vague and could be translated by a critic to include any number of different though interrelated processes, such as ‘instruction’, ‘informing’, ‘showing’, ‘telling’, *etc*, which may be subsumed under the collective notion of ‘teaching’ (*docere*) (*OLD* s.v. 1-4). In short, we really need a more specific account of the Horatian concept of teaching than what is laid out for us in the *Ars Poetica*. And to this end we should turn to *Satire* 1.4, in which the authorial persona of that *sermo* provides what I consider to be a more complete exposition of the Horatian concept of teaching. In particular I would like to draw attention to the final 40 lines of the satire (lines 103-143) where the authorial persona, in order to justify the specific brand of satiric writing which he elucidated in the preceding part of the poem, provides for us a model of teaching through the characterization of a father-figure in the text, *pater optimus* (Hor. *Sat* 1.4.105)<sup>84</sup>, whose concept of teaching has become fused, *insuevit* (Hor. *Sat* 1.4.105), into the character of the authorial persona and then further developed by the persona, I believe, into his own particular conception of teaching.

---

<sup>84</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all Latin text of *Satires* I has been taken from Brown, P.M. 1993. *Horace: Satires I*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.

So, first of all, the father's method of teaching seems to involve what one might term straight-forward didactic *instruction*, where information is imparted or transferred directly to the pupil. The authorial persona represents this feature of his father's teaching in the following terms:

*sic me*

*formabat puerum dictis, et sive iubebat*

*ut facerem quid, 'habes auctorem quo facias hoc'*

*(unum ex iudicibus selectis obiciebat)*

*sic vetabat, 'an hoc inhonestum et inutile factu*

*necne sit addubites, flagret rumore malo cum*

*hic atque ille?*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.120-126)

The father's teaching or 'shaping' of his son, *formabat* (line 121), is here succinctly described by the persona as being characterized by a language of direct command, *iubebat* (line 121), and prohibition, *vetabat* (line 124)<sup>85</sup>. Although the construction of *iubeo* with an *ut* clause is rare in Latin and unique in Horatian texts, the sense is much the same as the more common occurrence of *iubeo* with the accusative and infinitive (Brown 1993: 137): the verb usually expresses notions of 'ordering', 'commanding', or 'telling someone to do something' (*OLD* s.v. 1, 4). So, for example, in the *Ars Poetica*, we can witness the same verb, also in the third person singular imperfect, being used to denote

---

<sup>85</sup> The actual composition of these commands, the direct speech, will form the second dominant characteristic of the father's method of teaching, *see below*.

this kind of simple didactic instruction, where Quintilius the critic orders the inept poet to delete inadequate verses from his work (Regel 1836: 146):

*melius te posse negares,  
bis terque expertum frustra, delere iubebat  
et male tornatos incudi reddere versus.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 439-441)

Furthermore, apart from the persona's characterization of his father's discourse, the concept of instruction is implied, I believe, by the *pater optimus*' following statement of purpose:

*'sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu  
sit melius, causas reddet tibi: mi satis est si  
traditum ab antiquis morem servare tuamque,  
dum custodis eges, vitam famamque tueri  
incolumem possum; simul ac duraverit aetas  
membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice'...*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.115-120)

So in this passage, the *pater* presents his own priorities as a teacher (specifically a teacher of ethics in this instance): he is not so much concerned with philosophy – with reasons, *causas* (line 116), as to what is better for a man to pursue, *petitu* (line 115), or to avoid,

*vitatu* (line 115) ('which can be left to wise men') – but rather with the practical task of 'looking after', *servare* (line 117), what has been 'handed over to him', *traditum* (line 117), from the past, *antiquis* (line 117) (Brown 1993: 137). What does this phrase *traditum ab antiquis morem servare* (line 117) mean exactly? In a simple physical context, *servare* (line 117) could be used in the sense of 'keeping watch' over a particular object or person (*OLD* s.v. 1). In this instance, however, where abstract ideas are handed over from the past, *traditum ab antiquis* (line 117), the particular kind of 'protection' denoted by *servare* (line 117) must surely be one in which the ideas conveyed from the past are 'preserved' or 'kept for the future' (*OLD* s.v. 6). This process then of simply handing over, *traditum* (line 117), information from the past to the future, from one generation to another, without interrogating the nature of what is handed over – *sapiens... causas reddet tibi* (lines 115-116) – of course implies a kind of straightforward didactic instruction on the part of the *pater optimus*. Instruction then – this process of 'handing over' information directly to his son without further elucidation – is very much at the heart of the father's role as a teacher.

The second major characteristic of the father's method of teaching, which we might term *demonstrative*, is quite explicit in the text and has indeed been commented upon by most critics:

*insuevit pater optimus hoc me,  
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.105-106)

So here the authorial persona explains his *pater*'s chief "mode of teaching the lesson" (Wickham 1891: 57) through the principle of *notando... exemplis* (line 106). The primary sense of *notare* of course denotes the action of physically marking out an object (*OLD* s.v. 1)<sup>86</sup>. Just how we translate this gerund *notando* (line 106) into English really depends on how we understand the grammar of the sentence. If we take *vitiorum quaeque* (line 106) as the direct object of *notando* (line 106) (or of both *fugerem* (line 106) and *notando* (line 106), as Brown and Palmer do<sup>87</sup>), then we might want to associate *notando* more with a verb such as *vituperare*, and so, accordingly, the phrase might be rendered, 'by censuring each of the vices with examples' (Regel 1836: 198). So in Regel's thesaurus of Horatian words he does not even include *exemplis* (line 106) in his classification of the sense of *notando* (line 106), but only gives the following words – *vitiorum quaeque notando* (line 106) – in which case *vituperare* would indeed be the preferred sense. However, if we take the ablative *exemplis* (line 106) directly after *notando* (line 106), the sense of the verb comes, I believe, closer to a verb such as *exprimere* and the phrase attains the sense of 'by showing with examples' (*OLD* s.v. 9d)<sup>88</sup>.

This principle of the *optimus pater* to teach 'by showing' or 'illustrating with examples' is indeed quite apparent in his discourse:

*'nonne vides Albi ut male vivat filius, utque  
Baius inops? magnum documentum ne patriam rem  
perdere quis velit'...*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.109-111)

<sup>86</sup> For all the senses in which *notare* is used in the extant Horatian texts, see Regel 1836: 198.

<sup>87</sup> See Brown 1993: 136, Palmer 1968: 168.

<sup>88</sup> For other examples of *notare* in the sense of *exprimere*, see Regel 1836: 198.

So, for instance, rather than simply prohibiting his son against wasteful behaviour, he provides the models of certain notorious individuals, ‘the son of Albius’ and ‘Baius’, who had become “victims to prodigality” (Brown 1993: 136) in order to warn him against such behaviour. Moreover, it must be pointed out that this teaching method of the father’s incorporates both the illustration of positive – ‘*habes auctorem quo facias hoc*’ (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4. 122), and negative exempla:

*‘an hoc inhonestum et inutile factu  
necne sit addubites, flagret rumore malo cum  
hic atque ille?’*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.124-127)

This is my primary reason for believing that the persona’s introductory description of his father’s teaching, *notando exemplis*, denotes a more general teaching principle of ‘showing with examples’ than ‘censuring vices with examples’, *vituperare*, which would seem to omit instruction through positive illustration.

Lastly, it is perhaps an unintentional irony, but nevertheless instructive for our purposes, to consider that the father’s entire speech, which is concerned with examining the examples of others in his quest to teach his son, is itself an exemplary speech in the discourse of the authorial persona, designed to illustrate how the father enacted his principle of *notando exemplis*. It is perhaps a good indication of how this teaching

method has indeed become infused, *insuevit* (line 105), into the discourse of the authorial persona himself.

Beyond the instruction and demonstration inherent in the *pater optimus*' method of teaching, a third characteristic, the concept of *play*, can be found in the authorial persona's opening programmatic statement:

*liberius si*

*dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris  
cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me,  
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4 103-106)

The authorial persona describes his own discourse, *dixero* (line 104), with the following two comparative adverbs *liberius* (line 103) and *iocosius* (line 104). In particular I would like to consider the sense of *iocosius* here<sup>89</sup>. Perhaps more than any other Latin word, *iocosius* comes closest, I believe, to the characteristically Horatian sense of humour which we find not only in *Satire* 1.4, but also in the *Ars Poetica*. So what does it mean for one to speak *iocosius*? The *OLD* provides the following English equivalents to the Latin adjective, *iocosus*, derived from the noun *iocus*: “fond of jokes or jesting... full of fun or jesting... laughable, funny” (*OLD* s.v. 1-3).

To garner a better idea of the connotations of this word, it is necessary to examine some other contexts in which it is used. Although the adverb *iocosius* (from the positive

---

<sup>89</sup> The usage of *liberius* is less problematic: “*liberius* continues the theme of the proper limits to the satirist's *libertas* (5)” (Brown 1993: 136), which runs throughout *Satire* 1.4.

form *iocose*) is employed only in *Satire* 1.4 in the extant Horatian works, the related adjective *iocosus* is utilized on several occasions by Horace (twice in the *Epodes*, six times in the *Odes*, and once in the *Satires*) (Regel 1836: 143). So *Satire* 1.10, like 1.4, commences with a discussion of Lucilius' stylistic short-comings, after which the persona of the poem gives his own stylistic requirements for a *sermo*:

*et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso,  
defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae,  
interdum urbani, parcentis viribus atque  
extenuantis eas consulto. ridiculum acri  
fortius et melius magnas plerumque secant res.*

(Hor. *Sat.*1.10.11-15)

Firstly, regarding the sense of *iocosus*, the word order of the phrase *et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso* (line 11) clearly gives prominence to the contrast between the adjectives *tristi* (line 11) and *iocoso* (line 11), which are removed through emphatic hyperbaton from their qualifying noun, *sermone* (line 11), and placed at the end of the verse, and which are preceded by the comparative temporal adverbs, *modo... saepe* (line 11). The syntactic contrast is of course meant to heighten the semantic opposition between these two terms; so Brown provides the translation: “and a style is needed which is sometimes *stern*, often *playful*”<sup>90</sup> (Brown 1993: 83). So, likewise, in *Epodes* 1.18 a similar contrast is established in the phrase (Regel 1836: 143): *oderunt tristem iocosi*

---

<sup>90</sup> My italics.

(Hor *Epodes* 1.18.89). The type of humour demanded by *iocosus* seems to be a lighter (i.e. not serious or *tristis*) playful kind of language, sportive.

Furthermore, for my purpose of incorporating this concept of playfulness within the task of a teacher, *Satire* 1.10 provides the following important judgement on the part of the authorial persona: *ridiculum acri / fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res* (line 14-15). Humour, *ridiculum* (line 14), is often far more effective, *fortius et melius... plerumque* (line 15), in deciding affairs than serious invective, *acri* (line 14) (Brown 1993: 185). The language here is almost forensic in word choice, particularly the employment of *secat* (line 15)<sup>91</sup> and *res* (line 15), and, as Wickham points out, seems to recall a passage from Cicero (Wickham 1891: 100-101): *odiosas res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco risuque dissolvit* (Cic *de Or.* 2.58.236).

But undoubtedly the most important prescription as to the importance of play within the task of a teacher occurs in Horace's *Satire* 1.1:

*praeterea ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens  
percurram – quamquam ridentem dicere verum  
quid vetat, ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi*

*doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima?*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.23-26)

While the authorial persona here shrugs off the pursuit of humour for its own sake – where a man simply ‘runs through’ a subject laughing, *qui iocularia ridens / percurram*

---

<sup>91</sup> *multae magnaue secantur iudice lites* (Hor. *Epod.* 1.16.42).

(lines 23-24) – he provides the abrupt, and thus striking, concession, *quamquam* (line 24), that humour is in fact quite compatible with giving serious instructions, *ridentem dicere verum* (line 24), specifically “with telling the truth (i.e. with a serious ultimate purpose)” (Brown 1993: 91)<sup>92</sup>.

In order to give some justification as to just how such playfulness is compatible with serious aims, the persona provides the analogy of teachers, *doctores* (line 26), (specifically the teacher of young children in their elementary education), who coax, *blandi* (line 25), pupils into learning, *discere* (line 26), by offering them certain enticements, *crustula* (line 25) (Wickham 1891: 20). Clearly what we mean by ‘play’ is determined by the audience under instruction, whereas the teacher of young children offers play in the form of physical treats in order to coax his pupils into learning their alphabet, *elementa... prima* (line 26), for the more mature pupil, by analogy, such play might consist of disarming humorous language which both softens and endorses the particular instructions at hand. So, accordingly, in *Satire* 1.4, we can witness the authorial persona, when discussing how he was taught by his father, describing this playful constituent within his character, *iocosius* (line 104), as an inevitable result of the manner in which he was taught, *exemplis... notando* (line 106) (his exact phrasing presents *notando exemplis* as a justification, *hoc mihi iuris* (line 104), for his playfulness). In short, in the Horatian concept of the teacher, the serious is always intermingled with the playful in instructions – why simply *dicere verum* when one can *ridentem dicere verum* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.24), gently coaxing the pupil in the right direction.

---

<sup>92</sup> For further discussion and arguments pertaining to the particular type of humour which the authorial persona of the *Satires* (particularly 1.4) engages in, the third chapter of this dissertation ought to be consulted.

Against the possible charge that the conceptual criteria which I have hitherto established for the Horatian Praeceptor – namely, those of *instruction*, *demonstration*, and *play* – are somehow arbitrary in their relation to the role of a teacher in general, I would like very briefly as an additional justification of the efficacy of these principles to examine certain modern theories within the analytical philosophy of education pertaining to the task of a teacher<sup>93</sup>. In particular, I would like to draw on *Ethics and Education* by R.S. Peters, who seeks to encapsulate the term ‘education’ within three distinctive criteria, concentrating on the relationship between teacher and pupil.

It must, however, be strongly stipulated that, by focusing on the *analytical* philosophy of education<sup>94</sup> and by highlighting the work of one man, although he is regarded as one of the chief proponents in this field, I am not endeavouring to prefer or argue for a definitive modern account of the role of the teacher in ‘education’, which itself would surely demand an entire dissertation to justify; rather I am merely employing this account as a means to *illustrate the relevance* to the role of a teacher, from a general perspective, of the concepts which I have established from the Horatian texts, seeing that this modern account of education establishes similar or related conceptual criteria. Whether Horace or whether Peters are in fact ‘correct’ in their explanation of the task of a teacher is a question for philosophers and frankly not pertinent to my analysis of the text of the *Ars Poetica*.

---

<sup>93</sup> For a good introduction and brief summary of the field of analytical philosophy, see Noddings, N. 1995. *Philosophy of Education*. Oxford: Westview Press, pg 41-57.

<sup>94</sup> There are indeed several other noteworthy modern fields within this school of study, pardon the pun, such as continental philosophy (‘the analytical philosophy of education’ tends to focus on Anglo-American scholarship) and various post-modern interpretations of the philosophy of education.

So Peter's first criterion is formulated thus: "Education implies the *transmission*<sup>95</sup> of what is worthwhile to those who have become committed to it" (Peters 1966: 45). This is then a fairly straightforward commonsensical criterion for a teacher: a subject, which is deemed worthy of study, is transferred from a teacher to the respective pupil. In my discussion of *Satire* 1.4 we have already seen how the *pater optimus* (line 105) puts his trust in the value of the knowledge (particularly ethical knowledge, *morem* (line 117) in the case of that *sermo*) which has been handed to him, *traditum* (line 117), from the past and how he is concerned with preserving this knowledge for future generations – the Horatian model of teacher, in short, is preoccupied with this transmission of his subject, with 'building information into the mind of his pupils', to get to the etymological root of the concept of *instruction* (Schofield 1972: 43).

As an addendum to this criterion, I think it is important to stress that in this dissertation I shall be employing the concept of 'instruction' purely to denote this process of handing over (transmitting, transferring, etc) subject matter, whatever it may be, on the part of the teacher. Too often in Classical Philology, particularly in discussions of the function of the teacher figure or persona in didactic works, the term 'instruction' is employed synonymously with a collective term such as 'teaching'. So in Katharina Volk's explanation of the criteria of didactic poetry, she provides the following principal rubric of '*explicit didactic intent*': "A didactic poem either states clearly, or gives other strong indications, that it is first and foremost supposed to *teach*<sup>96</sup> whatever subject or skill it happens to be treating. Thus, while we are free to imagine that Homer really did

---

<sup>95</sup> My italics.

<sup>96</sup> My italics.

wish to *instruct*<sup>97</sup> his audience in strategy, the *Iliad* itself gives no sign of any such intent...” (Volk 2002: 36-37). Volk has here (and again further down on this page, 37) made use of the verbs ‘to teach’ and ‘to instruct’ as virtual synonyms in this important prescription. If, with regard to our established concept of the Horatian teacher, we were to equate these two terms as comprising a single concept, we would run the risk either of trivialising the plurality of the process of ‘teaching’, the *vice* of the Praeceptor, which has been shown to include at least three separate components, or otherwise we would lose the particular nuance of ‘instruction’ as being concerned simply with the ‘transmission’ of information or facts about a subject. As Dearden states: “The concept of teaching is much wider than that of instructing, which implies an imparting or telling of what is to be learned. Teaching leaves it open how learning will be brought about” (Dearden 1970: 89).

Dearden’s recommendation leads us aptly onto Peters’ second criterion: “Education must involve *knowledge and understanding*<sup>98</sup> and some sort of ‘cognitive perspective’ which is not inert” (Peters 1966: 45). Schofield explains the conceptual difference between Peters’ employment of ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ as follows: “we can have knowledge which we understand, and we can make use of such knowledge, or we can have knowledge which we cannot use, because we do not understand it” (Schofield 1972: 36). Education for Peters is not simply concerned with the transference of a particular subject so that the given pupil might possess ‘raw’ knowledge, but rather it demands that this knowledge be processed so that understanding is brought about. The notion that the ‘raw’ or ‘inert’ subject matter, to employ Peter’s term, conveyed through

---

<sup>97</sup> My italics.

<sup>98</sup> My italics.

instruction, must somehow be processed is represented by the Horatian concept of *demonstration*, where, as I examined in *Satire 1.4*, the *pater optimus* augments and elucidates his subject with reference to various examples, *notando exemplis*, in order that the pupil (in that case the authorial persona) might acquire a better understanding of the dangers of certain vices (prodigality, sexual debauchery, etc). In short, the Horatian model of the Praeceptor not only presents facts, but *enhances* and *clarifies* this instruction for the pupil through demonstration.

Lastly, Peters' third criterion states that "Education at least rules out some procedures of transmission on the grounds that they *lack wittingness and voluntariness*"<sup>99</sup> on the part of the learner" (Peters 1966: 45). So then for Peters the task of the teacher is not simply to transmit prescriptions to his pupils and subsequently to render these in a form understandable to them, through demonstration or other explanatory means, but to ensure that these learners are willing to partake in such activities. Under this criterion we may locate the Horatian notion of *play*, where coaxing teachers, *blandi / doctores* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.25-26), offers enticements<sup>100</sup>, *crustula* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.25), to lure the pupils into following the given prescriptions. As Dearden suggests, in his *The Concept of Play*, teaching needs to acknowledge the wide array of processes by which learning and understanding can be brought about, of which playful activities could constitute a large proportion (Dearden 1970: 89). Indeed, the concept of play has long been a preoccupation for theorists of education, obviously with reference mainly to the formative education of children: Plato "draws attention to the importance of play in learning. He talks very strongly about both the indignity and inefficiency of compelling

---

<sup>99</sup> My italics.

<sup>100</sup> Literally translated: 'that the teachers enticing them...'

children to learn things that they do not want to know... if children can learn things in a context where they enjoy doing what they are learning, especially while at play, then they are more likely to learn it" (Peters 1981: 7).

In concluding this short interlude into the analytical philosophy of education, it must again be emphasized that my basis for establishing a coherent concept of the Horatian Praeceptor lies in the explicit statements made within the poetry of the Roman writer (specifically *Satires* 1.1, 1.4, and 1.10) and that, although such modern philosophical accounts, as Peters', might be useful in clarifying the concepts which I have endeavoured to locate in the Horatian text and certainly in providing reassuring conceptual parallels between the modern and the ancient perspective of teaching, they should not themselves form the basis of my interpretation, which endeavours to locate a characteristically *Horatian* Praeceptor.

Having established my concept of what constitutes the Horatian Praeceptor, it is necessary now to turn back to the *Ars Poetica* in order to see how this Praeceptor manifests himself in the language of the poem. My task will therefore be to relate the conceptual to the linguistic, to illustrate how the language reflects the aims of the Praeceptor. To this end I have divided this chapter into three sections, pertaining to the conceptual criteria of *Instruction*, *Demonstration*, and *Play*. Within each section, I shall suggest how the different types of language, which the Praeceptor employs, fulfil the respective criteria.

It must be stated here that on account of the spatial constraints of this dissertation I shall not be able to analyse the entire text of the *Ars Poetica*, as one would in a

commentary, for example. Having said that, I shall aim at including in my analysis as many different passages as possible and, where appropriate, I shall suggest corresponding linguistic parallels in the footnotes. Obviously, my selection of certain ‘important’ passages from the *Ars* will represent a latent subjectivity in my analysis which I cannot avoid and must therefore acknowledge here.

In terms of the secondary material utilized for this chapter, much of my analysis has stemmed from four prominent commentaries of the *Ars Poetica*: Wilkins’ *The Epistles of Horace*, Wickham’s *The Works of Horace*, Brink’s *Horace on Poetry: The Ars Poetica*, and Rudd’s *Horace: Epistles Book II and the Epistle to the Pisones*. For depth of analysis Brink’s colossal work on the poem clearly reigns supreme in its attention to the minutiae of language in the *Ars* and has accordingly contributed to and complemented much of my interpretation of Horace’s work; Wilkins, though briefer in scope, does provide a degree of intricate linguistic exposition of the poem, although, as befitting a nineteenth century commentary, its primary focus is oriented towards textual criticism of the manuscripts; thirdly, Wickham, far less detailed than Wilkins, supplies a more amenable guide to the poem – in particular, his knowledge of related classical texts provides useful source material with which to compare the *Ars*; and, finally, Rudd offers the definitive contemporary (1989) discussion of the language of the *Ars*, mediating between the earlier stances taken by the nineteenth century commentators and the often overly-ornate interpretations of Brink’s behemoth. In terms of other sources, I have on occasion drawn on fundamental works of Latin grammar and rhetoric, Madvig and Gildersleeve & Lodge, where interpretation of basic constructions is called for.

Furthermore, several specific linguistic studies of Latin syntax and poetics have also been employed at the relevant sections.

## 2.1 First Criterion: Instruction

In this section I shall examine how the concept of instruction is conveyed through two types of discourse: a *language of command*, where the Praeceptor transmits his subject, *ars poetica*, directly to his pupils, the Pisones, and, secondly, *proverbial language*, where the Praeceptor uses the weight of traditional discourse to carry the thrust of his instructions.

### *Language of Command*

At the core of the communication of the Horatian Praeceptor must be a language of direct command which manifestly transmits his subject matter to his pupils, the Pisones. This may be softened by other features of language: the Praeceptor may, for example, encourage the pupils through empathetic language, he may indulge in sportive speech to make light of the respective instructions, and he may even self-deprecate<sup>101</sup> in order to reduce his assumed authority; however, ultimately, he could not teach effectively without a degree of what I would call purely commanding language. Now I shall illustrate in the following section just how he achieves this type of discourse, examining, in particular, the moods and tenses of verbs throughout the poem which have a manifestly commanding function as well as other syntactic features of the language which naturally accompany and supplement this discourse of command in the text.

---

<sup>101</sup> As I have already discussed with relation to the programmatic speech of the Praeceptor (lines 301-308).

So, firstly, the most obvious form of commanding language is the second person imperative. The imperative is the mood employed by a writer to convey a direct command of some kind: “The imperative is the mood of will. It wills the predicate be made a reality. The tone of the imperative varies from stern command to piteous entreaty” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 174)<sup>102</sup>. The importance of the imperative mood in the *Ars Poetica* need not simply, I believe, be indicated by how pervasive it is throughout the poem, but rather how its employment is emphasised in the text. So the Praeceptor will often draw attention to the presence of the direct imperative by presenting the addressees of the command in the vocative or nominative case alongside or near the verb. Consider the following three examples:

*credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum  
persimilem cuius, velut aegri somnia, vanae  
fingentur species, ut nec pes nec caput uni  
reddatur formae.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 6-9)

*tu quid ego et populus mecum desideret audi.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 153)

*vos, o*

*Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non*

---

<sup>102</sup> Note that for grammatical works, as Gildersleeve & Lodge and Madvig, the reference is to the page and *not* the paragraph number.

*multa dies et multa litura coeruit atque  
praeseptum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 291-294)

In each instance the second person imperative is made empathic by pointing to the addressee of the command through personal pronouns and proper nouns – *credite, Pisones* (line 6), *tu... audi* (line 153), and *vos, o / Pompilius sanguis... reprehendite* (lines 291-292). The third of these commands is rendered particularly forceful and weighty by juxtaposing the royal genealogy of the Pisones to Numa Pompilius beside the vocative *vos* (line 291) (Brink 1971: 292); moreover, Dickey lists *sanguis* (line 292) as a word of high poetic register, frequently employed to address a large group of men rather than just a few individual men, as in this passage, which obviously adds to the grandeur of the Praeceptor's address (Dickey 2002: 295, 357).

Now seeing that the second person imperative is a fairly strong form of command, it is not used as commonly throughout the *Ars* as other tenses and moods which convey instructions or rules; rather it can be used by the Praeceptor as a potent marker or header for a series of other instructions<sup>103</sup>. So, for example, the following imperative phrase – *tu quid ego et populus mecum desideret audi* (line 153) – does not in itself denote a particular aesthetic direction but rather acts as a “vigorous line [that] introduces the new series of instructions” (Brink 1971: 227):

*si plosoris eges aulae manentis et usque*

---

<sup>103</sup> For other examples of second person imperatives used in the *Ars*: lines 38, 39, 119 (the imperatives here also serve as headings to introduce a longer instructive passage), 141 (in a quotation), 155 (in a quotation), 269, 368, 369, 438 (in a quotation), 459 (in a quotation).

*sessuri donec cantor 'vos plaudite' dicat,  
aetatis cuiusque notandi sunt tibi mores,  
mobilibusque decor naturis dandus et annis.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 154-157)

In other words, although the second person imperative is not quite as common as one might expect in a discussion of commanding language, it tends in the *Ars Poetica* often to lead the way into and thus underscore other highly instructive language.

On the subject of imperatives in the *Ars Poetica*, one would have to cite the Praeceptor's employment of the rarely-used third person plural future imperatives in his discussion of the appropriate register in tragedy and comedy:

*non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunt,  
et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 99-100)

This form of the imperative mood is part of a specialized discourse 'chiefly used in laws, legal documents, maxims and the like' (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 175); Madvig, citing this particular passage from the *Ars* as a prime example, provides the following explanation: "the future [imperative is employed] (which has also the third person) when the request or command is stated with express reference to the time following or some particular case that may occur: it is consequently employed in laws and where the style of laws is imitated" (Madvig 1857: 340). Again, later in the *Ars*, when discussing the

primary purpose of poets – i.e. ‘to delight or to be useful’ (line 333) – the Praeceptor gives another form of the second or future imperative in *esto*:

*quidquid praecipies esto brevis, ut cito dicta*

*percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles;*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 335-6)

By employing such typically forensic forms the Praeceptor is lending a certain formality, strictness and *gravitas* to his commands: he is here laying out some of the ‘laws of *ars poetica*’ for his pupils to follow (Rudd 1989: 167).

As an addendum to this, the question might arise as to why these commands in particular warrant a strong forensic form, while elsewhere instructions may be conveyed through less formal verbal moods. Brink provides the suggestion that the commands here are especially true to Horace’s own poetic practice, particularly, in the second instance, his fondness for brevity: “It has often been noted that this injunction expresses H.’s own practice, in this very passage as e.g. 23, 45, 92, 99-100, 102-3, 119-120” (Brink 1971: 353). The forensic forms would then be a measure of how true these prescriptions are to the Praeceptor himself, to the extent that they have become artistic laws for him. Rudd, less prone to the linguistic supposition of Brink’s analysis, simply states that the legal verbs are indicative of a “prescriptive context” (Rudd 1989: 167). This is certainly true of the imperative *esto* (line 335), which lies in the part of the poem which follows the Praeceptor’s programmatic statement (lines 301-308), his instruction of the social responsibility of the poet (lines 312-318), and the important prescription of the role of a

poet (lines 333-334) in ‘mixing pleasure with utility’; in other words, it is possible that the strong forensic forms might not themselves be of the greatest importance but are reflective of the strongly prescriptive tone which a sequence of narrative as a whole is tending to take.

Furthermore, a usage very similar to the ‘future imperatives’ can be seen in the Praeceptor’s employment of jussive subjunctives to provide a series of established rules (Madvig 1857: 340); this is particularly noticeable in the section on dramatic conventions (Brink 1971: 255):

*neve minor neu sit quinto productior actu  
fabula, quae posci vult et spectanda reponi.  
nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus  
inciderit; nec quarta loqui persona laboret.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 189-192)

Indeed, the jussive language in this section might encourage one to label these verses ‘the laws of the stage’.

Continuing with this theme of legal discourse, on a number of occasions the Praeceptor speaks in what Brink chooses to call the ‘empirical perfect’, in which an action is represented as a fixed law, “proved by experience” (Brink 1971: 376). Madvig provides the following brief general observation of this particular function of the perfect tense: “The perfect is sometimes found in the poets... instead of the present, to express a thing that is customarily done (and has already often taken place)” (Madvig 1857: 289); it

is similarly described in Gildersleeve and Lodge under the name of the gnomic or sententious perfect: “The perfect is often used of that which has been and shall be... usually in poetry, from Catullus on, and frequently with an indefinite adjective or adverb of number or a negative” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 160). As an example, the Praeceptor provides the following seemingly well-known dictum pertaining to poetic license (Wilkins 1886: 337):

*‘pictoribus atque poetis  
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.’*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 9-10)

As opposed to the imperfect, pluperfect or aorist (i.e. perfect in historic sequence) tenses in Latin, which would remove the statement somewhat from the present circumstances, the perfect tense in primary sequence (much like the true perfect tense in Greek) adopted here links the continuous past unto the present state of affairs such that the impression is created of a general or universal law. Elsewhere in the poem such empirical presents denoting accepted laws can be viewed in *omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci* (Hor. *Ars P.* 343) and, in syncopated form, somewhat ironically in the anticlimactic phrase:

*mediocribus esse poetis  
non homines non di, non concessere columnae.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 372-373)

Note how in all three examples the perfects portray the notion of an established law. Moreover, in firm accordance with the definition of Gildersleeve & Lodge, all these verbal forms are accompanied by indefinite numeral references and negatives to reinforce the aspect of universality: so, in the first example, there is emphatic hyperbole in *semper* (line 10), which removes any temporal specificity, while the object of the verb *audendi* (line 10) is the indefinite pronoun, *quidlibet* (line 10); in the second example, the indefinite numeral, *omne* (line 343), is object of the empirical perfect, *tulit* (line 343); and, in the third instance cited, the perfect, *concessere* (line 373) is supplemented with the repeated negatives in *non homines non di, non...* (line 373).

One of the more important verbal tenses scattered throughout the prescriptive language of the *Ars Poetica* is the indicative future simple. Of the uses of this tense by the Praeceptor I would like to consider chiefly the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> person singular, seeing that they are frequently utilized by the persona and are, indeed, the most relevant to this particular analysis of commanding language.

Firstly, one must acknowledge that in Latin the future tense does not only have to imply futurity of action, although obviously this is often its root function in narratives: it can also stand as a polite form of command. So under the functions of the future simple tense, Gildersleeve and Lodge write: “The future is used in an imperative sense, as in English, chiefly in familiar language” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 162). Similarly, in English, we might imagine that a schoolteacher could convey a command using an imperative – ‘finish your homework’, or, otherwise, with a future simple – ‘you will

finish your homework’<sup>104</sup>. The second phrase is neither employed in the interrogative mood nor as an indicative statement of fact, but is designed to stand as a polite command; or as Madvig notes in his section on the imperative mood: “The second person of the future indicative is sometimes used for the second person of the imperative, in order to express a firm conviction, that the command or direction will be complied with, especially in familiar language” (Madvig 1857: 340).

And it is this kind of polite command that we can witness in the *Ars Poetica* where the Praeceptor addresses the Pisones in the second person singular of the future simple indicative rather than with an imperative or prohibitive (i.e. in the subjunctive) form:

*publica materies privati iuris erit, si*  
*non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem,*  
*nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus*  
*interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum*  
*unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex,*  
(Hor. *Ars P.* 131-135)

In this example, it is clear that the future simples *moraberis* (line 132), *curabis* (line 133) and *desilies* (line 134) have been presented as suppressed forms of negative command, i.e. as polite requests, within a conditional clause; they could, however, have been presented as more forceful prohibitions by the Praeceptor, in the form ‘do not tarry over

---

<sup>104</sup> Although the tone may be slightly more imperious in English with the addition of the auxiliary ‘will’ to the main verb, especially if this is given emphasis, whereas this obviously does not occur in the case of the inflected Latin verb.

the common ground, do not care to translate verbatim like a faithful translator', etc (Rudd 1989: 172). The conditional element in the above example certainly does seem to add another level of formality and politeness onto that of the already 'courteous future command'. We can also view instances of this polite command solely within a main clause: as in the form of *moraberis* (line 178) in the discussion of presenting appropriate subject matter in terms of the age distinctions:

*ne forte seniles*

*mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles,  
semper in adiunctis aevoque moraberis aptis.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 176-178)

And again a little later in *promes* and *tolles* (line 183) in the instruction to avoid unsightly events on the dramatic stage:

*non tamen intus*

*digna geri promes in scaenam, multaque tolles  
ex oculis quae mox narret facundia praesens;*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 182-184)

The recurrent employment of the second person singular, not just in the future simple but also often in present and future perfect tenses through the *Ars*<sup>105</sup>, is a typical feature of

---

<sup>105</sup> So for other examples of second person verbal forms in the *Ars*: lines 5, 20, 38, 47, 102, 104, 125, 129, 130, 136, 154, 361, 362, 367, 385, 387, 426, 436, 438, 439, 442, 462 (in a quotation).

the language of Greek diatribes, where the teacher-figure addresses an “imaginary listener or disciple” (Brink 1971: 138). In essence, much of the discourse of the Praeceptor – whether manifestly commanding or not – is *aimed* in the direction of his pupils. His subject of ‘*ars poetica*’ is designed for their consumption.

Moving onto the 3<sup>rd</sup> person future, Brink points out that this can take the form of a ‘potential’ future, which tends to convey a generalizing tone upon the narrative, citing the example of the verbs *exprimet* (line 33), *imitabitur* (line 33) and *nesciet* (line 35) in the following sentence (Brink 1971: 118-9):

*Aemilium circa ludum faber imus et ungues  
exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos,  
infelix operis summa, quia ponere totum  
nesciet.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 32-35)

Now this kind of future tense does not function to mark out a definite span of time in the future, contrasted to the present and past; rather, it denotes what we might think of as a general or universal state. We should observe how such a generalizing tone will tend to present statements almost as universally established facts or laws, quite similar to the manner of the empirical perfect (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 162). Consider perhaps the two most well-known verses from the *Ars*:

*rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae,*

*verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 310-311)

The future, *sequentur* (line 311), although it does logically follow in time from the preceding clause, really here has the grammatical force of presenting a general principle – ‘words will willingly follow a foreseen subject’.

Thus far in this chapter concerning commanding language I have discussed primarily verbal moods and tenses; there are, however, other syntactic features within this general discourse which, although not conveying commands themselves (as only verbs can obviously do), very often supplement and augment the instructions inherent in the verbs – in other words, they provide emphasis for the verbal commands. I have already mentioned how indefinite language accompanies empirical perfects in the establishment of rules and how regular second person imperatives and future polite commands, in fact, are emphasized by vocatives of address or even nominative subjects, as in the following three examples:

*tuque*

*rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus*

*quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 128-130)

*tu quid ego et populus mecum desideret audi*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 153)

*tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 385).

Now I shall examine some features of word order which lend prominence to instructions in general. Firstly, in the prescriptive language of the *Ars* there are several examples of polyptoton – that is to say, the repetition and often juxtaposition of the same root word in a different grammatical form<sup>106</sup>. So in the discussion of the efficacy of neologisms there is a repetition of the impersonal verb *licere* in the ‘empirical’ perfect and ‘generalising’ future simple tense respectively:

*licuit semperque licebit*

*signatum praesente nota producere nomen.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 58-59)

The ‘polyptoton’ has the effect of drawing attention to the key aesthetic concept under discussion here ‘*licentia*’: the Praeceptor is arguing for modern Latin writers to be allowed the same degree of license in adopting new words as their literary ancestors, in the forms of Caecilius and Plautus (Brink 1971: 146). At other places in the poem, polyptoton emphasizes a particular instruction by reflecting the sense of the statement through the organization of the syntax:

---

<sup>106</sup> Technically the term refers to different noun cases but is also often employed by critics for differing verbal tenses or moods.

*atque ita mentitur, sic veris falsa remiscet,  
primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 151-152)

Appropriately, *primo* (line 152) lies at the start of the verse, *medium* (line 152) and *medio* (line 152) in the middle and *imum* (line 152) at the end.

Anaphora, the repetition of a word at the beginning of successive phrases or verses, is another common means to give emphasis to a command through its position in a sentence. So there is the stressed repetition of *multa* (line 293) in the Praeceptor's request for poetic refinement and polishing (Brink 1971: 322): *multa dies et multa litura coerluit atque* (Hor. *Ars P.* 293). The repetition of *multa* (line 293) in two short phrases within a single verse lends a scale of importance to the verbal command of *reprehendite* (line 292) which would be nowhere near as emphatic without the anaphora.

On the subject of emphatic discourse, hyperbaton is common in the rhetoric of the Praeceptor where the customary word order is inverted such that a particular technical term is given prominence. So when talking about the appropriate *ordo* or arrangement of a literary work, the teacher gives primary position to the dependant genitive, which in normal Latin grammar would follow its governing noun, so as to almost provide the subject heading, 'ordo', for this sentence (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430):

*ordinis haec virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor,  
ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici,  
pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat;*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 42-44)

Furthermore, the interjection, *aut ego fallor* (line 42), in which the Praeceptor seems to question his authority in this particular prescription of ‘*ordo*’, might come across as a self-deprecatory phrase on the surface, but in actual fact, as both Brink and Rudd identify, it actually functions as “a fairly outspoken and perhaps humorous insistence on the truism” (Brink 1971: 130): observe the manner in which this phrase is positioned right at the end of a verse and expressed in as few words as possible, compared with the rest of the discussion on ‘*ordo*’, in order not to apportion any great weight to the sentiment that he might in fact be wrong, *fallor*; moreover, the emphatic selection of the 1<sup>st</sup> person pronoun *ego* (line 42) to stand right beside its verb, *fallor* (line 42), seems not a little hyperbolic for a genuine polite self-deprecatory disclaimer. So what is seemingly a self-deprecatory parenthesis turns out to be an authoritative endorsement of the Praeceptor’s instructive language.

Lastly, and most basically, we should not forget to notice how the Praeceptor will give prominence to a precept by providing as few cola as possible in a clause in the form of a short sharp command rather than an elaborate statement (Brink 1971: 197). So, for example, in the instruction ‘either to choose characters for your work from tradition or to invent new ones’ – *aut famam sequere aut sibi convenientia finge* (Hor. *Ars P.* 119) – these two concepts are phrased most economically in the form of noun or adjectival object followed by imperative; in particular the neuter present participle, *convenientia* (line 119) is quite elliptical<sup>107</sup>, which might indeed warrant greater exposition in another

---

<sup>107</sup> As is *fama* (line 119), which normally denotes the concept of ‘rumour’ in Latin, as contrasted with ‘fact’, but which here presents the notion of ‘tradition’ in two short syllables (Brink 1971: 198).

context but really here allows the Praeceptor to express the notion of ‘invention’ in as few words as possible.

To conclude this discussion, the Praeceptor of the *Ars* certainly does engage in a language of direct command in certain parts of the poem. This is identifiable through the employment of specific verbal moods and tenses which convey orders or rules to the Pisones (and, indeed, the implied audience behind these generalized ‘dummy figures’<sup>108</sup>); and this discourse is often backed up by other syntactic features in the narrative which draw attention to the presence of commands. However, although there are indeed words, and lines which are manifestly prescriptive, this kind of purely instructive language is more often than not tempered throughout the *Ars* by less assertive types of discourse which demonstrate the Praeceptor’s desire to see his pupils adopt these prescriptions – he is not simply barking out orders in the manner of a drill sergeant.

### *Proverbial Language*

In the previous section I drew attention to a number of verbal moods and tenses<sup>109</sup> which function to present certain statements in the *Ars* as fixed laws to be taken up by the pupils as irrefutable facts; I would like to explore further this characteristic of the Praeceptor’s discourse through his employment of proverbial language. By the designation of ‘proverbial language’, I am referring broadly to the brief, often quite pithy, common dicta

---

<sup>108</sup> Recalling my discussion on the character of the addressees in the section, ‘*Interpretations of Incoherence*’.

<sup>109</sup> Future imperatives, jussive subjunctives, empirical perfects, and generalising futures.

handed down by tradition, within which we may include proverbs, maxims, aphorisms, adages, and perhaps even well-known parables.

What renders this kind of discourse so especially germane to the instructive pursuit of the Praeceptor is its ability to stand in the text as a universal truth, proved by experience, which the pupils will naturally tend to agree with and adhere to; Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, speaks at length about the importance of traditional maxims, *γνώμαι*, for an orator in presenting facts as truthful to his audience: *καθόλου δε μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἀρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῶι καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ ἀποδείξαντα. χρῆσθαι δε δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ᾧσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς ὁμολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους* (Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.1395a). On a related note, in Horace's *Satire* 1.4 I have already discussed the *pater optimus*' penchant for putting his trust entirely in what we may term "traditional rules of conduct" (Wickham 1891: 58), *traditum ab antiquis morem* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.117), within which category, I should think, we would find many examples of prescriptive maxims and common adages, over and above more logical, *causas* (line 116), forms of explanation for correct ethical behaviour: *sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu / sit melius, causas reddet tibi* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.115-116). In this particular study I shall examine several prominent examples of traditional proverbial language within the *Ars*<sup>110</sup>, discussing how these truisms relate, interact and often endorse the surrounding prescriptions of the Praeceptor.

In the following quotation the Praeceptor criticizes artists, whose works lack unity and congruity in their composition (Rudd 1989: 152):

---

<sup>110</sup> In the order in which they occur in the poem.

*inceptis gravibus plerumque et magna professis  
purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter  
adsuitur pannus, cum lucus et ara Dianae  
et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros  
aut flumen Rhenum aut pluvius describitur arcus.  
sed nunc non erat his locus. et fortasse cupressum  
scis simulare. quid hoc, si fractis enatat exspes  
navibus aere dato qui pingitur? amphora coepit  
institui; currente rota cur urceus exit?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 14-22)

He first supplies the example of an excessively-ornate overly-precious *descriptio*, which might function as a purple patch in a stereotypical epic poem (Brink 1971: 97); the Praeceptor's censure then ensues in a short rather damning phrase – *sed nunc non erat his locus* (line 19), 'this wasn't the place for such bombast'<sup>111</sup>. After this stern condemnation, the teacher provides two more examples of this lack of unity in the artist's designs: firstly, he presents the painter who, although he is commissioned, *aere dato* (line 21) to draw a picture of a shipwreck, requests if he can include a cypress, *cupressum* (line 19), in his work; secondly, we change artistic mediums to pottery where what started out as an *amphora* (line 22), seems ultimately to take the shape of an *urceus* (line 22), a pitcher.

---

<sup>111</sup> Literally translated: 'but now was not the place (both temporally and spatially (Brink 1971: 19)) for these things'.

It is the first of these examples which should concern our study of proverbial discourse. Porphyrio, in his commentary on the passage, cites a well-known Greek proverb “supposed to be asked by a painter, whose forte lay in drawing a cypress, of a man who had escaped shipwreck and wished for a picture of a shipwreck to put as a votive offering in a temple” (Wickham 1891: 391): *μή τι καὶ κυπαρίσσον θέλεις;* (Porphyrio *Commen. In Horatium: Carmen de Arte Poetica* 19)<sup>112</sup>. The question by this humorously limited painter then appropriately over time became a common artistic dictum for any person who wished to “introduce ornaments out of place” (Wilkins 1886: 337)<sup>113</sup>. Now I should think that the educated Roman readers of the *Ars Poetica* would have at once been reminded of this proverbial line and its related context in the specific reference within the Horatian text to a painter’s desire to represent a cypress within a drawing of a shipwreck; moreover, the positioning of *cupressum* (line 19) at the end of its verse along with the preceding ironic phrasing *et fortasse* (line 19) does in fact lend syntactic prominence to this noun as a key word in the passage (Brink 1971: 100). The proverbial sense which would naturally, within a literary context, accompany the word *cupressum* (line 19) – as the *quintessentially* misplaced artistic element – has been adopted quite deliberately here by the Praeceptor to emphatically endorse the concept of ‘artistic incoherence’ in the minds of his pupils. It also forms a suitably negative example to the ensuing prescriptive line *denique sit quidvis, simplex dumtaxat et unum* (Hor. *Ars P.* 23) and also manages to balance the similarly incoherent pictures of *serpentes*

---

<sup>112</sup> The full quotation runs: *hoc proverbium est in malum pictorem qui nesciebat aliud bene pingere quam cupressum. ab hoc naufragus quidam petiit ut casum suum exprimeret. ille interrogavit num ex cupresso vellet aliquid adici. quod proverbium Graecis in usu est, μή τι καὶ κυπαρίσσον θέλεις* (Porphyrio *Commen. In Horatium: Carmen de Arte Poetica* 19).

<sup>113</sup> Brink, it must be said, is less certain as to the proverbial status of this phrase, “whether this is an anecdote rather than a proverb is not known” (Brink 1971: 100).

*avibus... tigribus agni* (Hor. *Ars P.* 13) and *delphinum silvis...fluctibus aprum* (Hor. *Ars P.* 30) on either end of this discussion.

Moving on through the *Ars*, in his discussion of how the speech of dramatic characters should match their allotted fortunes, the Praeceptor provides us with the following warning:

*si dicentis erunt fortunis absona dicta*

*Romani tollent equites peditesque cachinnum.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 112-113)

The audience, *Romani... equites peditesque* (line 113), will find such a play risible, *cachinnum* (line 113), in which the characters' voices do not correspond to their *fortunis* (line 112). As Wickham identifies, the phrase *equites peditesque* (line 113) "is proverbial, from the old military classification *omnes cives Romani equites peditesque* (Wickham 1891: 399)<sup>114</sup>. So how does this archaic Roman military adage enhance the force of the prescription here? Clearly, unlike my previous example of proverbial language, the adage is not employed here to reflect the aesthetic concept under instruction – *si dicentis erunt fortunis absona dicta* (line 112) – but rather it is used to give a certain authority and weight to the Praeceptor's ensuing scorn, *cachinnum* (line 113): so, firstly, judging purely by the syllable count and the attached connective particle *-que*, *equites peditesque* (line 113) is a far more expansive and thus emphatic way of expressing the simple notion of 'omnes'; secondly, as an archaic military formula, it lends a sense of traditional Roman

---

<sup>114</sup> *edixit ut omnes cives Romanes, equites peditesque, in suis quisque centuriis in campo Martio adessent* (Liv. 1.44).

severity or sternness to the warning, almost “as though the audience were organised for war” (Rudd 1989: 168)<sup>115</sup>. Certainly by sharing the authority of his censure with the traditional authority of the *cives Romani equites peditesque*, the Praeceptor’s prescription comes across more as an established fact than if he alone were to direct his laughter at the aesthetic vice under discussion.

Staying in the central ‘dramatic’ section of the *Ars*, the Praeceptor urges his pupils not to sacrifice originality through adopting a hackneyed long-worn-out subject – ‘the common ground’ – through giving a verbatim translation, and lastly through pure imitation (Brink 1971: 211):

*publica materies privati iuris erit, si  
non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem,  
nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus  
interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum,  
unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex,*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 131-135)

The phrase *desilies imitator in artum* (line 134), would seem to be proverbial in Latin, although there is little concord among the commentators as to the actual origin of this phrase. Rudd gives the English proverbial equivalents of “‘painting oneself into a corner’ or ‘finding oneself in a straightjacket’” (Rudd 1989: 172). Beyond being a simple adage Wickham sees in this locution an allusion to a fable: “The figure is from the fable of the

---

<sup>115</sup> There is also what Wilkins titles a slightly ‘sportive’ tone in the adoption of a serious military proverb to describe the seating reservations of the Roman theatre (Wilkins 1886: 357). I shall discuss this feature of the language in greater detail in the third division of this chapter.

goat who was persuaded by the fox to leap down into the well, though Horace is concerned only with the goat's part in the story" (Wickham 1891: 402). Brink, although he is not convinced that the phrase might belong to this exact fable, does admit to "a vivid image which would suit a fable" (Brink 1971: 211).

If, however, the parable of the goat – or something quite like it which was reasonably familiar to the Augustan audience – was in fact directly intended by this common adage of 'jumping into a hole'<sup>116</sup>, it does provide a most compelling albeit humorously exaggerated allegorical lesson for the pupils of the poem on the 'deathly' dangers of excessive imitation. In addition, I believe Wickham could have further backed up this argument for the fable by referencing a later passage in the *Ars* when we do in actual fact happen upon one of those unshaven mad poets being ostensibly 'artistic'<sup>117</sup> within a hole:

*hic, dum sublimis versus ructatur et errat,  
si veluti merulis intentus decidit auceps  
in puteum foveamve, licet 'succurrite' longum  
clamet 'io cives', non sit qui tollere curet.  
si curet quis opem ferre et demittere funem,  
'qui scis an prudens huc se proiecerit atque*

*servari nolit?' dicam...*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 457-463)

---

<sup>116</sup> Literally translated: 'a narrow space'.

<sup>117</sup> In the romantic sense of the word of course.

It is a humorous development in the *Ars Poetica*, and indeed a most instructive lesson for the pupils, that the metaphorical proverbial warning of the Praeceptor to the aspiring poet in line 134 has to our amazement manifested itself in a ridiculously literal situation where we do find a ‘failed’<sup>118</sup> poet in a hole! This type of analysis is obviously highly suppositional but it may not be coincidental in a text such as Horace’s which readily employs ring structuring<sup>119</sup>.

My fourth instance of proverbial language is certainly one of the more humorous passages in the *Ars*:

*nec sic incipies ut scriptor cyclicus olim:  
‘fortunam Priami cantabo et nobile bellum.’  
quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?  
parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 136-139)

After warning the reader against employing excessive imitation and negating originality in a work, the Praeceptor gives a stereotypical narrative opening, which one might expect to find in one of the inferior epic poets who dealt with the Homeric cycle of myths (Wickham 1891: 402), or which, depending on the sense of *olim* (line 136), is an actual quote from one of these poets (Brink 1971: 213). Following this example, the authorial persona gives his judgment on the value, *dignum* (line 138), of such an opening:

---

<sup>118</sup> In the sense of not possessing what the Praeceptor considers ‘ars’.

<sup>119</sup> See my section on *Transitional Language*.

*parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus* (line 139). This is, as a clear allusion to a Greek proverb (Wickham 1891: 402): ὄδινεν ὄρος, Ζεὺς δ' ἐφοβεῖτο, τὸ δ' ἔτεκεν μῦν (Ath. 14.6).

Once again the Praeceptor has chosen a well-known proverb to answer perfectly the preceding statements in the poem. The sense is clear, in trying to reach for too much, *tanto... hiatu* (line 138), in his work, the budding poet will miss the mark entirely by achieving the opposite effect from what was originally conceived, a *mus* (line 139), so to speak. In addition, the Praeceptor doesn't simply supply the proverb verbatim, but he gives it a slight tweaking by providing the descriptive adjective *ridiculus* (line 139) to accompany the noun *mus* (line 139). Indeed, the very sound of these final two words in the verse is rather comical on account of the combination of triple rhyming syllables, *cu – lus – mus*, preceded by the double rhyming, *ri – di*, as well as the monosyllabic conclusion to the line, *mus*: “it receives a comic emphasis from the separation of ictus and accent” (Rudd 1989: 173). One further adjustment which the Latin text makes is to change from the past tenses in the Greek to the future in order “to suit the tense of the question” (Brink 1971: 215): *quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatus?* (line 138). This again is an excellent grammatical example of how the Praeceptor views proverbs as definitive answering judgments to the aesthetic problems he raises, because of their status as ‘traditional truths’.

So, to sum up this section, proverbial language can have several important functions within the discourse of the Horatian Praeceptor. First and foremost, proverbs exist as seemingly universal truths in the narrative because of their long-held status in a particular language as common knowledge; this allows them on certain occasions to

definitively endorse a particular prescription or at other times to function as irrefutable answers to questions being posed. Secondly, proverbs can remove the authority of a statement from the instructor and place it within the hands of the ‘common tradition’, thus allowing the pupils to have a share in its authority, and so in turn rendering them more willing to take up a particular precept<sup>120</sup>. And lastly there is often a comical touch in the employment of these proverbs with respect to the context of a passage, which can have the important effect of softening the predominantly instructive dynamic in the surrounding language<sup>121</sup>.

Indeed, the very fact that the authorial persona of the *Ars* deems it proper to instruct through proverbial language on occasion is a good indication of his character as an accomplished authority on the subject of poetry: ἀρμόττει δε γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίαι μεν πρεσβυτέρων, περὶ δε τούτων ὦν ἔμπειρός τις ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ μεν μὴ τηλικούτον ὄντα γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπες ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δε ὦν ἄπειρος, ἡλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημείον δε ἰκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ραιδίως ἀποφαίνονται (Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.1395a).

---

<sup>120</sup> Which I shall discuss further in a subsequent section, ‘*Empathetic Language*’.

<sup>121</sup> Again, see my section on ‘*Sportive Language*’.

## 2.2 Second Criterion: Demonstration

In this section I shall endeavour to show how the Praeceptor augments his instructions through demonstration with what we may term *illustrative language*; moreover, I shall be concerned also with *transitional language*: that is to say, language which is designed to demarcate for the pupil the various subjects of the *Ars* both with respect to consecutive narratives and across the poem as a whole.

### *Illustrative Language*

In *Satire* 1.4 the *pater optimus* provides illustrations of his ethical instructions and prohibitions to the authorial persona by manifestly referring to the well-known examples of certain notorious individuals:

*viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset,*  
*'nonne vides Albi ut male vivat filius, utque*  
*Baius inops? magnum documentum ne patriam rem*  
*perdere quis velit...*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.108-111)

The principle of *exemplis... notando* (line 106) is thus duly enacted by the father. In the following section I would like to examine how this tendency to endorse or augment the

subject of instruction through illustration is prominent in the language of the Praeceptor of the *Ars*. This analysis will not simply comprise the obvious citation of individual exempla, as in the speech of the *pater optimus*, but it will explain, more importantly, how the very language of the Praeceptor – right down to the level of his choice of diction, his manipulation of the syntax of clauses, etc. – manages to illustrate his prescriptions appropriately.

Let me commence this study by examining a few examples of the characteristic phonetic word play of the *Ars*. Consider the following two lines from the segment in which the Praeceptor lays out for his pupils the behaviour of the various age categories of men:

*multa recedentes adimunt. ne forte seniles  
mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles,*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 176-177)

Now both Brink and Rudd identify the rhyming pair of *seniles* (line 176) and *viriles* (line 177) as being significant here, arguing that the device of rhyme has the force of evoking the inherent balance between the two concepts of ‘youth’ and ‘old age’: “These rhymes are formal means of bringing out features of the content” (Brink 1971: 243). This notion of ‘bringing out features of content’ through language is a clear indicator of the illustrative discourse of the Praeceptor, who here underlines the semantic balance of two abstract concepts through the demonstration of a phonetic balance, so to speak, via rhyme. Indeed, the employment of homoeoteleuton here – the fact that the final two

syllables of the final words in each verse end in identical form – along with the resulting rhyming should mark it out as a deliberate attempt by the Praeceptor to emphasize his subject through the sound of the verse (Brink 1971: 243). Other examples of such rhymes in homoeoteleuta can be found through the *Ars*:

*non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunt,  
et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 99-100)

The rhyming pair of ‘future’ imperatives *sunt* (line 99) and *agunto* (line 100) gives additional emphasis to the already strong “quasi-legal language of enactment” (Brink 1971: 184).

Another characteristic phonetic feature of the *Ars* is the preponderance of the devices of alliteration and assonance. So, for example, in presenting the typical kinds of ornate descriptive narratives which saturate larger epic works, the Praeceptor supplies the following line: *et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros* (Hor. *Ars P.* 17), which Wickham rightly labels as “smooth and alliterative” (Wickham 1891: 390). Notice how the subject of flowing water is represented phonetically by the smooth final sibilant ‘s’, initiated by *properantis* and repeated in the final three words of the verse *amoenos ambitus agros*, and also by the nasal ‘n’ and ‘m’ sounds in *properantis...amoenos ambitus*. For a verse which has to illustrate an entirely different kind of action to ‘smoothly running water’, consider the following line in the section pertaining to satyr plays: *intererit Satyris paulum pudibunda protervis* (Hor. *Ars P.* 233). So, here, the

buoyant rough-and-ready character of the satyrs is indicated by the repeated rough abrupt ‘p’ sounds in *paulum pudibunda protervis* (Madvig 1857: 5)<sup>122</sup>: the idea would be that just as the smoothness of the Praeceptor’s voice is broken up by the plosive or ‘stop’ syllables (as they are sometimes referred to), so the decorum of high tragedy is broken up by these robust raucous satyrs (Kennedy 1962: 4)<sup>123</sup>.

Lastly, on the subject of sound devices, metre is often made to reflect the pace of a particular narrative. So, in the example already given of a stock line from epic – *et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros* (line 17) – the four dactyls in the hexameter (three in a row at the start of the line) reflect the quick rhythm of the running water (Rudd 1989: 152). Conversely, when the Praeceptor is trying to convey the ponderous weight and gravity of high epic narrative concerned with lofty affairs of kings and wars, he furnishes the line with four heavy spondees: *res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella* (Hor. *Ars P.* 73); moreover, as Brink points out, the repetition of the coordinating particle *-que* (line 73) adds an epic tone to the passage (Brink 1971: 164).

Various rhetorical figures are employed by the Praeceptor to illustrate his aesthetic prescriptions. Two of the most common features in the word order of the *Ars Poetica* – which actually announce themselves in the opening lines of the poem – are chiasmus, that is the deliberate inversion of the order of words in a second clause or phrase from that of the first, and hyperbaton, the displacement of the normal order of words in a clause. So consider the opening sentence:

---

<sup>122</sup> “Of the consonants (*litterae consonantes*) some are mutes (*mutae*) *b, c, (k, q,)* *d, f, g, p, t* which have an abrupt sound... of the mute consonants *c (k, q,)* and *g* are palatals (*palatinae*), *p* and *b* labials (*labials*), *t* and *d* dentals (*dentales*). Some have a harder and rougher pronunciation (*c, p, t, tenues*)...” (Madvig 1857: 5).

<sup>123</sup> “Plosives (= Mutes, = Stops), formed by the complete interruption of the breath” (Kennedy 1962: 4).

*humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam  
iungere si velit et varias inducere plumas  
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum  
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,  
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 1-5)

There is chiasmus in the first verse where the order of ‘adjective-noun’ is inverted in the subsequent phrase into ‘noun-adjective’ – *humano capiti* (line 1) into *cervicem... equinam* (line 1); and again in similar fashion the order of ‘adjective-noun’ in *atrum... piscem* (lines 3-4) is inverted in the corresponding phrase into ‘noun-adjective’ in *mulier formosa* (line 4) (Wilkins 1886: 335-336). But it is perhaps the hyperbaton which is more extreme in this passage: most notably there is the lengthy procrastination of the subordinating conjunction *si* (line 2) to the seventh position in the initial conditional clause, which would occupy the primary position in standard Latin prose (Brink 1971: 86); there is the unusual sandwiching of the prolative infinitive *inducere* (line 2) by the phrase *varias... plumas* (line 2)<sup>124</sup>; and, slightly less irregular, there is the delay of the subject of the *ut* (line 3) clause *mulier formosa superne* (line 4) to the end of the clause<sup>125</sup>.

Now, I should think, such manifest manipulation of word order in the form of chiasmus and hyperbaton warrants some explanation – more than Wilkins’ perfunctory

---

<sup>124</sup> “An adjective usually precedes, but often follows, the word to which it belongs” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430).

<sup>125</sup> “The postponement of the subject is rare and always for definite reasons in the classical period” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430).

“the inverted order... adds emphasis” (Wilkins 1886: 335). The first sentence of the *Ars* paints a monstrous picture for the audience, a Scyllan creature: “the parts of the creature are drawn from each division of the animal kingdom: man, quadruped, bird, and fish” (Rudd 1989: 150); the underlying principle seems to be that a work of art which utilizes an excess of variety in its composition is an abomination, an inversion in fact of the natural order (Brink 1971: 85-86). How appropriate then that the Praeceptor’s language here too negates the natural Latin order for words; that is to say, that the violation of the law of artistic coherence is illustrated in the text by the violation of unity in language (Brink 1971: 86).

Progressing onto the next rhetorical feature of the *Ars* which can have a demonstrative effect in reflecting the subject of a passage, we should consider the device of asyndeton, or the lack of connective particles and conjunctions between phrases and clauses. So, for example, consider when the Praeceptor is warning against the employment of excessive brevity in constructing a poem:

*decipimur specie recti: brevis esse laboro,  
obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi...*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 25-26)<sup>126</sup>

His very language is here characterized by excessive brevity in the lack of any connection (asyndeton) between three consecutive main clause verbs: *decipimur... laboro... fio* (lines 25-26) (Brink 1971: 107-108). Conversely, when describing superfluous overblown language – *qui variare cupit rem prodigialiter unam* (Hor. *Ars P.* 29) – the Praeceptor

---

<sup>126</sup> I have retained Wickham’s punctuation for this sentence over Rudd’s.

correspondingly allows for a far more inflated syntax with a count of 15 syllables out of a possible 17 in dactylic hexameter; moreover, the hyperbaton, where the adverb *prodigialiter* (line 29) lies between noun and agreeing adjective, *rem... unam* (line 29), creates an awkward compound or ‘interwoven’ phrase to utter, so illustrating the type of dense superfluous language under discussion (Brink 1971: 114).

A third rhetorical feature which is visible throughout the *Ars Poetica* is antithesis, the balancing of contrasting words or phrases. So, at line 295, there is a clear antithesis between the two nouns *ingenium* and *arte*, which balance each other on either end of the verse: *ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte* (Hor. *Ars P.* 295). The polarity implied by the positioning of the language is taken up by the Praeceptor in the ensuing narrative, in which natural talent, *ingenium*, is contrasted with artistic skill, *ars*. Moreover, it has been astutely suggested by Brink – since the line itself both displays ‘*ars*’ in its carefully structured antithesis, and also actually promotes ‘*ars*’ in its cleverly-inverted word order, which subtly suggests that *arte* is really *fortunatius* and *ingenium misera* (although the reverse appears true grammatically) – that the syntax here demonstrates the Praeceptor’s preference for ‘*ars*’ over inspired ‘*ingenium*’, typified by the unshaven Democritus-inspired zealot, which develops over the course of the poem (Brink 1971: 330).

Moving onto some broader rhetorical figures which often function over several clauses, there is tendency for the Praeceptor to engage in ‘*μίμησις*’ or ‘*imitatio*’ through parts of the poem. Rather than providing his pupils with defining descriptions or explanations of certain aesthetic terms, ‘*διήγησις*’, the Praeceptor prefers to enact a particular technical term, to reveal its nature through illustration in his narrative. So, for example, when the teacher wishes to explain the poetic device of ‘*descriptio*’, he does not

give a technical definition of this device<sup>127</sup> but illustrates its nature by himself imitating briefly a ‘*descriptio*’ (Brink 1971: 108-9):

*cum lucus et ara Dianae  
et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros,  
aut flumen Rhenum aut pluvius describitur arcus.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 16-18)

Apart from the excessively ornate language<sup>128</sup>, we should observe how the clichéd subject matter of such narratives is adopted here: in *lucus et ara Dianae* (line 16) – “groves were a major topic of τοπογραφία” (Brink 1971: 97), in the overly idyllic setting of the running river, and in the hackneyed reference to the Rhine (Brink 1971: 97-98). It is indeed notable that when the Praeceptor does employ ‘*διήγησις*’ it is ironically presented as a mimetic piece of writing in the *Ars*.

Similarly, at other places in the poem, the Praeceptor’s adherence to *imitatio* can be seen in his near direct citation or paraphrases from famous literature. So, when discussing the appropriate method to commence a work, the teacher manifestly illustrates the concept of *in medias res* (Hor. *Ars P.* 148) by all but quoting the opening lines of the *Odyssey* (Wickham 1891: 402). So compare the following verses:

*‘dic mihi, Musa, virum, captae post tempora Troiae  
qui mores hominum multorum vidit et urbes.’*

---

<sup>127</sup> I.e. I might explain such a technical term in English thus (Brink 1971: 97): ‘a highly descriptive overly-ornate segment of narrative found in epic poets such as Ennius and occasionally Virgil’.

<sup>128</sup> Which I have already discussed *above*.

(Hor. *Ars P.* 141-142)

with the opening three lines of the *Odyssey*:

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ  
πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε·  
πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,

(Hom. *Od.* 1.1-3)

Although the Horatian text is not a direct translation from the Homeric, it is clear – both in the correspondences in vocabulary: *dic* (line 141) to *ἔννεπε* (line 1), *mihi* (line 141) to *μοι* (line 1), *Musa* (line 141) to *Μοῦσα* (line 1), *virum* (line 141) to *ἄνδρα* (line 1), and so forth, as well as in the formulaic syntax of the opening verse – that the pupil is meant to draw this analogy (Brink 1971: 217). Again the illustrative force in the Praeceptor's voice is apparent: he wishes to augment a general artistic principle – starting a work *in medias res* (line 148) – by providing the most well-known example of this in the literary tradition, the *Odyssey* of Homer; in other words, he is not simply satisfied with presenting an abstract idea to his audience, but he feels the need to demonstrate it within the text.

Moving onto the rhetorical device of *prosopopoeia*, there are instances through the *Ars* where the Praeceptor briefly speaks in the voice of some other character. So in the following verses, the Praeceptor picks up the “burlesque nonsensical claims made in the grand style” (Brink 1971: 399) of the ‘would-be poet’:

*‘ego mira poemata pango,*

*occupet extremum scabies; mihi turpe relinqui est,  
et quod non didici sane nescire fateri*'.

(Hor. *Ars P.* 416-418)

At other times in the narrative of the *Ars* the Praeceptor, although not assuming the voice of another person in the manner of *prosopopoeia*, introduces on stage briefly some other character, such as the sycophant to the aspiring poet (line 428) or, later on, the critic Quintilius: *Quintilio si quid recitares, 'corrige sodes / hoc' aiebat 'et hoc'...* (Hor. *Ars P.* 438-439). The key facet to take note of in all these examples is the willingness of the Praeceptor to change at regular intervals the subject of the verses – to actively engage in role-playing within the text – so that he does not simply present what certain characters might say in reported speech but allows them to speak for themselves; he is, in short, using *imitatio* of other voices to enact and illustrate his respective condemnation or approval of the subject at hand, while his own aesthetic judgment, his prescriptions, appear temporarily removed from the content of the text.

In summary, the Praeceptor of the *Ars* frequently employs a type of discourse we might term 'illustrative', which is concerned with backing up what he has stated in his various aesthetic prescriptions and explanations through exemplary language, whether on the level of the syntax and phonology or whether across larger segments of his narrative. Moreover, by presenting constant exempla of what he is instructing rather than simply issuing orders, the Praeceptor is, I believe, placing immense importance in the task of leading his pupils into a greater understanding of *ars poetica*.

## *Transitional Language*

In the first chapter of this dissertation I discussed Wilkins' censure pertaining to the lack of structure in the *Ars Poetica* – its apparent “want of structural completeness” (Wilkins 1886: 330) – and I then viewed the difficulties later 20<sup>th</sup> century critics have had in trying to impose their own tendentious divisions upon the poem. The resulting impression has often been created of a hotchpotch ramshackle effort – a mixture of random prescriptions with some poetic touches here and there by Horace, but ultimately a work without any real organization. In truth, if the poem were *wholly* lacking in any structure, how could the pupils, the Pisones and the implied literary audience, follow such an erratic and loose presentation of precepts? How could they make any sense at all of the aesthetic instructions of the Praeceptor, if these commands confronted them without any context in which to situate them?

In the following section I shall challenge such interpretations of the *Ars Poetica* by exploring how the Praeceptor does in fact give a structure to his lesson through employing what I shall term transitional discourse, that is to say, specific structural devices and patterns within his language which are designed to demarcate and highlight the subject matter across the narrative of the *Ars*. It will thus be observed – in order to relate this discussion to my second major conceptual criterion of the Horatian Praeceptor – that the *demonstrative* thrust of the Praeceptor's discourse is manifest not only in the particular diction and rhetorical devices employed (as I discussed in the previous chapter) but also in terms of *how* his language is displayed across the greater narrative in such a way so as to give a clear structural prominence to his various prescriptions. It must be

acknowledged here that this section is to a large extent a further textual exploration of the discussion in Brink's chapter pertaining to 'Poetic Patterns in the *Ars Poetica* and the *Odes*' in *Horace on Poetry: The Ars Poetica*, which should be consulted for a more thorough explanation of this type of language through Horace's lyric works.

The first structural device of the Praeceptor which ought to be discussed is ring composition, the manner in which later narratives are designed to recall earlier ones in the poem to create the impression of a ring or circular structure in the text (Brink 1971: 453). So at the start of the poem the Praeceptor draws a picture for his pupils of a work of art without any unity (Hor. *Ars P.* 1-5), and, correspondingly, at the end of the *Ars* we are given the picture of the poet who possesses natural ability, *ingenium*, but no sense of artistic unity and skill, *ars* (Hor. *Ars P.* 472-476). Just as 'the work of art without artistic unity' at the beginning of the *Ars Poetica* is appropriately transformed into a hideous creature of myth recalling Scylla, so at the end the 'poet who does not demonstrate artistic unity' is transformed first into a savage bear *furit... ursus* (line 472) and then suddenly into a bloodsucking leech *hirudo* (line 476) – the imagery recalled is that of the grotesque metamorphosis (Brink 1971: 431). By virtue of this ring structure in the text the pupils of the Praeceptor are subtly persuaded to recall and thus reinforce in their minds the opening principle of artistic unity at the very conclusion of the poem; indeed, it is especially ironic that the imagery of artistic disunity should in fact provide the overriding unity to the *Ars Poetica* as a whole.

Another example of such ring structuring on a less grand scale in the poem occurs from lines 12 to 30 where the Praeceptor is clearly concerned with stressing the following precept: *denique sit quidvis, simplex dumtaxat et unum* (Hor. *Ars P.* 23); he is here

implores the pupils always to maintain coherence and unity in their literary endeavours. As an illustration of the dangers of a lack of coherence in a given narrative, he provides the exemplum of an ill-placed *descriptio* – *sed nunc non erat his locus* (Hor. *Ars P.* 19) – and then warns against writing styles which sacrifice unity in their narratives through excessively brief or excessively grand discourse. What has not been commented on in great detail by other critics is the manner in which the Praeceptor encloses this passage in a ring structure with the following two verses, which are used to exemplify artistic disunity and incoherence: *serpentes avibus geminentur, tigribus agni* (Hor. *Ars P.* 13) and *delphinum silvis appingit, fluctibus aprum* (Hor. *Ars P.* 30). One can at once observe the similarities in the chiasmic syntax: in the form of an opening noun of three syllables, an ablative plural, the main verb placed in the centre (which, although it belongs grammatically to the first clause in each case, visually seems to apply to both), then again another ablative plural and a noun of two syllable count; apart from this deliberately-woven reflection in word order, the theme of artistic disunity is embodied in both these sentences by the disturbance of the natural order in the animal kingdom, where serpents are paired with birds, tigers with lambs, dolphins are placed among trees, boars among waves (this, moreover, also reflects the visual imagery at the start of the *Ars*).

Apart from ring structuring, the Praeceptor is also able to link together certain artistic principles across vast portions of his narrative through the marked repetition of a single word (Brink 452-453): so, for example, the Latin word for nail, *unguis*, is utilized on three different occasions in the text (Regel 1836: 333). Firstly, in the following passage:

*Aemilium circa ludum faber imus et unguis  
exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos,  
infelix operis summa, quia ponere totum  
nesciet.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 32-35)

The lowest craftsman's ability 'to represent nails', *unguis / exprimet* (line 32-33), in particular is an indication of the degree of refinement in physical detail of which he is capable, although ultimately he fails to create a 'coherent whole' in his artwork (Wilkins 1886: 340). Later in the injunction:

*vos, o*

*Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non  
multa dies et multa litura coercoit atque  
praeseptum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 291-294)

The Praeceptor recommends that the Pisones take great care and labour, *multa dies et multa litura* (line 293), in refining their work, *castigavit* (line 294), by employing a metaphor from carpentry where the nail checks for smoothness between the joints of the wood (Rudd 1989: 199)<sup>129</sup>. Lastly, in his humorous parody of the inspired Democritean school of poets, it is clear, I believe, in the Praeceptor's clever reference to their not

---

<sup>129</sup> See my discussion in the section 'Interpretations of Coherence'.

trimming their nails, *ungues ponere curat* (line 297), that these poets, although outwardly artistic in appearance, are lacking in artistic refinement and skill:

*ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte*

*credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas*

*Democritus, bona pars non unguis ponere curat,*

*non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 295-298)

Thus through the simple association of the word *unguis* with notions of artistic refinement and cultivation, the Praeceptor is able to link together a principle outlined in a passage from the 32<sup>nd</sup> line of the poem with one from 297<sup>th</sup> line.

Apart from such broad structural connections throughout the poem, the Praeceptor also may announce the start of specific aesthetic discussions with marked subject headings, or, conversely, he may draw conclusions of certain parts with résumés or brief summaries. So, firstly, how does the Praeceptor announce a new subject or how does he change tack in his narrative? Of the following four lines, the first three mark the conclusion to the discussion on the appropriate ages for dramatic parts, while the final line begins a fresh topic on whether dramatic actions, *res* (line 179), should be acted on stage or reported in indirect discourse:

*ne forte seniles*

*mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles,*

*semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis.*

*aut agitur res in scaenis aut acta refertur.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 176-179)

As Brink says: “after the descriptive rhetoric of the preceding piece, there is now a change of subject—marked, as often, by a brusque new beginning—and a change of style: prescription instead of description” (Brink 1971: 245). This swift change in style is firstly signalled by an adjustment in verbal person, tense and voice from the 1<sup>st</sup> person future deponent verb *morabimur* (line 178) to the 3<sup>rd</sup> person singular present passives in *agitur* (line 179) and *refertur* (line 179). Secondly, there is a certain degree of asyndeton between lines 178 and 179: there is no causal or temporal particle or conjunction to lead us gradually into the ensuing discussion – instead the particles *aut... aut* (line 179) suddenly happen upon us without reference to what has preceded. Thirdly, there is a manifest change in tempo, marked by the number of cola: whereas the preceding two main clauses, from lines 176-178, contained a syllable count of 21 (*ne forte seniles / mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles*) and 15 (*semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis*) respectively, the two clauses in line 179 contain 8 (*aut agitur res in scaenis*) and 6 (*aut acta refertur*) syllables. It is clear, therefore, that the Praeceptor is introducing a new subject within his narrative by radically altering the language by brusque or abrupt transitions (Brink 1971: 455-459).

At other places in his work, however, the Praeceptor does provide smoother ‘gliding’ transitions between consecutive closely-related subjects (Brink 1971: 124, 455):

*sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, aequam  
viribus, et versate diu, quid ferre recusent,  
quid valeant umeri. cui lecta potenter erit res,  
nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo.*

(Hor. Ars P. 38-41)

The first sentence of this quotation acts as the conclusion to the section on unity within a poetic work, in which the Praeceptor's final advice is *sumite materiam vestris... aequam / viribus* (line 38-39) such that the pupil doesn't become like the 'lowest craftsman around the Aemilian School' whose *materiam* (line 38) is not a coherent whole – *quia ponere totum / nesciet* (Hor. Ars P. 34-5). This prescription of *sumite materiam* (line 38) is taken up by the phrase *cui lecta potenter erit res* (line 40) in the ensuing relative clause, which duly leads the way into the new discussion of *facundia* (line 41) and *ordo* (line 41) (Brink 1971: 124). The key to the smooth transition here lies in the correspondence in words across these two sentences, which, although not exact synonyms, are close enough in sense to suggest a close link between the two passages: *materiam* (line 38) to *rem* (line 40), *sumite* (line 38) to *lecta* (line 40), and *viribus* (line 39) to *potenter* (line 40), the last of which denotes the sense of 'doing something within one's capabilities' (Rudd 1989: 155).

One final matter to address in this discussion is the manner in which the Praeceptor allows for brief summaries or résumés at the end of certain discussions. After his lecture on the license which should be given to poets, with particular reference to neologisms, the Praeceptor begins a new subject, distinguishing the different literary

genres by matching their content with the appropriate style in terms of the metre (Hor. *Ars P.* 73-76)<sup>130</sup>. In order to reinforce this principle, the Praeceptor concludes the section by providing a résumé in the form of two sharp rhetorical questions, which have the function of looking back at what has been discussed in the preceding twelve lines (Brink 1971: 171):

*descriptas servare vices operumque colores*  
*cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor?*  
*cur nescire pudens prave quam discere malo?*  
(Hor. *Ars P.* 86-88)

So here the rather ambiguous phrase *descriptas vices* (line 86) must refer to the different types or genres of works (whether epic, elegy, etc) while *colores* (line 86) refers to their respective styles (Rudd 1989: 165).

In conclusion, the value of this kind of transitional language lies, I believe, in its ability to provide the pupils of the *Ars* with regular synopses: that is to say, with ‘bridging’ passages which have the ability to introduce succinctly, to revise, or to summarize the more detailed subject matter from the ‘bulk’ of the poem. For example, the brusque transitions between topics, like bold headings, have the function of alerting the pupils to a wholly new subject in the narrative, while the device of ring composition allows for the appropriate revision and emphasis of earlier content. Such synopses are an important facet in the process by which the Praeceptor maintains the coherent

---

<sup>130</sup> *res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella / quo scribi possent numero, monstravit Homerus. / versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum, / post etiam inclusa est voti sententia compos...* (Hor. *Ars P.* 73-76).

understanding of his pupils, without which the poem would come across as a loose arrangement of random precepts.

### 2.3 Third Criterion: Play

Within the concept of play, my focus shall be on *sportive language*, where the Praeceptor ‘plays games on paper’ (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.139.); furthermore, I shall also examine under the rubric of *empathetic language* how the Praeceptor through certain clever role-playing involves the Pisones in his narrative.

#### *Sportive Language*

An important critical problem confronting any interpretation of the discourse of the *Ars Poetica* is how to come to terms with the candidly humorous tone in many verses of the poem. For the purposes of my particular study, we should ask: does this kind of voice greatly undermine the authority of the Praeceptor, calling into question his more serious aesthetic *instruction* and *demonstration*? Does it essentially transform the poem into an “exercise in antididaxis” (Oliensis 1998: 198-199)? Or does this humorous undertone perhaps constitute, as Stephen Harrison suggests, part of the characteristic Horatian technique of deliberate misdirection: the desire on the part of the writer to shrug off any one fixed self-representation (Harrison 2007: 35)? There is certainly merit in such interpretative responses, and, in the third chapter of this dissertation, I shall explore further some of the critical responses regarding the effect of humour upon the Horatian model of the teacher, specifically with regard to *Satire* 1.4.

However, in my own understanding of the *Ars*, the irony is never so weighty, nor the mockery so harsh, that it radically refutes what is said in the other more prescriptive segments of the narrative. Rather, I believe, we should characterize the humorous tone of the Praeceptor, as Wilkins often succinctly identifies within his commentary, as ‘sportive’ or ‘ludic’: a light playful, even comic, humour which has the force both of softening, as opposed to negating, and even at times of subtly endorsing in an amusing fashion the more serious instructional tone elsewhere. Indeed, in my discussion of the concept of play within the model of the Horatian Praeceptor, I drew attention to a passage from *Satire* 1.1, which highlighted the way in which playful activities can be employed by a teacher to entice children into learning: *ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi / doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima?* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.25-26). In my interpretation of the *Ars Poetica* the *crustula* (line 25) being offered by the Praeceptor to entice, *blandiri*, his pupils into learning the ‘art of poetry’ are not actual physical treats but rather, to employ Horace’s own words elsewhere, the ‘games being played on paper’, *illudo*<sup>131</sup> *chartis* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.139). In the following analysis then I shall examine how the Praeceptor makes use of such sportive or playful language by highlighting several rhetorical figures in the poem and by examining how they interact with the neighbouring instructive discourse.

---

<sup>131</sup> According to Regel’s index of Horatian words, various forms of the verb *illudo* can be found on four other occasions in the extant Horatian texts, all of which interestingly are to be found in the *Satires* (Regel 1836: 127). Most famously perhaps in *Satire* 2.8 is Nomentanus’ lament of the lot of man: *heu, Fortuna, quis est crudelior in nos / te deus? ut semper gaudes illudere rebus / humanis!* (Hor. *Sat.* 2.8.61-63). The sense of this passage, I believe, is that the goddess Fortune ‘enjoys playing games’, *illudere* (line 62), with human affairs, *rebus / humanis* (line 62-63) – human beings offer good ‘sport’ for Fortune. This sense of *illudere* is backed up by a passage in the *Odes* (Wickham 1891: 203): *Fortuna saevo laeta negotio et Ludum insolentem ludere pertinax* (Hor. *Odes* 3.29.49) – ‘Fortune stubbornly plays her haughty (*insolentem*) game’. The *OLD* gives the following principal definitions for the verb *illudere*: “to make game of, speak mockingly of” (*OLD* s.v. 1).

Firstly, I would like to consider humorous techniques which function through the creation of extremes. The most obvious example of this in the *Ars* is hyperbole. Hyperbole, or the exaggerated statement, is manifest in the opening passage of the poem (Hor. *Ars P.* 1-5). To represent the concept of the work of art without any unity, the Praeceptor has painted a picture of the most fantastically conceived creature imaginable: “The monster combines the special characteristics of each division of the animal kingdom, of man, quadrupeds, birds, fishes, even of every species of each” (Wickham 1891: 389).

Importantly at the very start of the *Ars Poetica* we are induced by the Praeceptor to laugh at this comically over-the-top image: *spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici* (line 5)<sup>132</sup> – indeed how could we ‘hold our laughter’ at such a ridiculously exaggerated ensemble from the natural world? Now because this hyperbolically-described monster is used to exemplify ‘the work of art lacking in unity’, which is spelled out clearly in the ensuing verses, it is only natural that our laughter is gradually transferred from the supernatural image to the inadequate artistic work itself, rendering this the focus of our ridicule: “within the *Ars*... laughter is regularly the sign not of comic success but of artistic failure” (Oliensis 1998: 205). Humour in this instance is not oriented against the audience or the authorial persona himself but is directed against the subject of artistic disunity, which is turned into a comic spectacle of Scyllan-proportions, while we, the readers, and the teacher knowingly look on and laugh (Oliensis 1998: 202). Furthermore, there is a sense in this line that the *amici* (line 5) are not supposed to laugh – that they

---

<sup>132</sup> In my understanding of the text, *amici* (line 5) is here a vocative of address, picked up by the vocative, *Pisones*, in the following sentence, rather than a genitive dependent on *risum* (line 5) (Rudd 1989: 151). The sense is then: ‘will you, admitted to the spectacle (to look on), hold back your laughter, friends’, rather than ‘will you restrain the laughter of a friend’.

should hold back, *teneatis* (line 5), their ridicule – since they have been ‘admitted to this private viewing’, *spectatum* (line 5) (Wickham 1891: 390); however, the fact that they are still persuaded by the Praeceptor to raise their laughter at the picture created by the incompetent artist, even though they seem to be socially compelled to restrain themselves, emphasises just how ridiculous this image really is.

Another more straightforward example of hyperbole occurs further on in the poem:

*nec sic incipies ut scriptor cyclicus olim:*

*‘fortunam Priami cantabo et nobile bellum.’*

*quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 136-138)

Here the Praeceptor has playfully exaggerated the physical mouth, *tanto hiatu* (line 138), of the second-rate stereotypical epic poet in order to emphasize the inflated bombast which pours forth from it; moreover, there is also a certain amount of comical metonymy in describing the issuer of an epic poem simply as ‘one large mouth’. Once again the poetic censure of the Praeceptor is manifested in the form of his and our shared laughter at the ridiculous comic spectacle, on this occasion, of the wide-mouthed epic poet.

At other times exaggerated speech functions simply to soften with humour the force of the Praeceptor’s instructive language. Exclamations often accomplish this through the introduction of a high inflated poetic register into a somewhat more mundane

subject matter. So in his instruction to the Pisones to ensure that their literary efforts are polished and pruned, the Praeceptor commands:

*vos, o*

*Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non  
multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque  
praeseptum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 291-294)

As Brink identifies, “the nominative of the address, *Pompilius*, and the vocative particle *o*, add to the archaic solemnity (over-solemnity, it would seem) of phrasing” (Brink 1971: 322); moreover, the reference to the addressees of the poem through their unlikely mythical royal genealogy to Numa Pompilius as well as the highly poetic term of address, *sanguis* (line 292)<sup>133</sup> further augments the exaggerated high register of the verse. The humour here lies in the “studied incongruity between the elevated address and the pedestrian subject of *labor*” (Brink 1971: 322), which manages playfully to soften the instructive language of the Praeceptor in the form of the imperative, *reprehendite* (line 292).<sup>134</sup>

---

<sup>133</sup> See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’.

<sup>134</sup> For a similar example of this humorous change in register, I have already discussed the following quotation in my introduction to this second chapter: *o ego laevus, / qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam* (Hor. *Ars P.* 301-2). This is placed right before what is the most manifestly didactic section of the poem in which the Praeceptor enumerates the obligations or duties of the aspiring poet (Wickham 1891: 418) – *quid deceat, quid non; quo virtus, quo ferat error. / scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons: / rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae...* (Hor. *Ars P.* 308-310). The form of the exclamatory phrase *o ego laevus* (line 301) again develops a comically heightened poetic register in the narrative: “in exclamations consisting of interjection and personal pronoun the type *o ego* is poetic and very rare... instead of the established *o me* + accusative” (Brink 1971: 333). See my discussion in my section on ‘The Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor’.

The converse to this type of hyperbolic language is the deliberate employment of understatement by the Praeceptor. Let me first consider the example of anticlimax. The following passage is concerned with illustrating how mediocrity is not accepted in the field of poetry, unlike certain other professions in which it might offer a degree of usefulness (Wilkins 1886: 401-402):

*o maior iuvenum, quamvis et voce paterna  
fingeris ad rectum et per te sapis, hoc tibi dictum,  
tolle memor, certis medium et tolerabile rebus  
recte concedi. consultus iuris et actor  
causarum mediocris abest virtute disertis  
Messallae nec scit quantum Cascellius Aulus,  
sed tamen in pretio est: mediocribus esse poetis  
non homines, non di, non concessere columnae.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 366-373)

Firstly, the prescriptive tone in this passage, signified by the second person verb *fingeris* (line 367)<sup>135</sup> and imperative *tolle* (line 368)<sup>136</sup>, is given initial emphasis through the vocative, *o maior iuvenum* (line 366), and the personal pronouns, *per te... tibi* (line 367). After presenting some professions where mediocrity is in fact acceptable, there is a climactic build up in the final verse of this passage as we discover who exactly ‘does not yield’ to mediocre poets: first, it is men, *homines* (line 373), who vent their disapproval;

---

<sup>135</sup> See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’.

<sup>136</sup> See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’.

then we step up to the divine plane in the form of the gods, *di* (line 373); and, lastly, to complete this majestic cosmic (Brink 1971: 376) tricolon arrangement, the line ends in a farcical bathetic note with the noun *columnae* (line 373), meant to stand for ‘the stores of booksellers’ (Wickham 1891: 423).

In terms of how this type of humour orients itself with regard to the rest of the narrative: it seems that the Praeceptor has become aware of the *instructive* note his language is starting to adopt here – in the form of the second person future indicative, *fingeris* (line 367), second person imperative, *tolle* (line 378), and the syncopated empirical perfect, *concessere* (line 373), presenting the last clause as a law<sup>137</sup> – and has simply, as Wickham puts it, given “a playful turn to the outburst” (Wickham 1891: 423) with this very last word in the sentence, *columnae* (line 373). This is really a case of the Praeceptor acknowledging the authority he possesses as a teacher and playfully poking fun at himself by boiling over into a lofty outburst at the end of which he humorously, but quite intentionally, loses control of his subject. Furthermore, there seems also to be a humorous suggestion in this anticlimax that the approval of men and gods is all very well, but, from a pragmatic perspective of making a living, it doesn’t hurt for the budding poet to sell a few books at the store, *columnae*!

The second major type of humour which must be addressed in any discussion of the *Ars* is the prevalence of witty puns or word-plays manufactured by the authorial persona. In the account of how the various literary genres have assumed different metres, the iambus is duly allotted to drama – i.e. comedy and tragedy:

*Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo;*

---

<sup>137</sup> See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’.

*hunc socci cepere pedem grandesque coturni,  
alternis aptum sermonibus et populares  
vincentem strepitus et natum rebus agendis.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 79-82)

So here comedy, denoted metonymically by the comic slipper, *soccus*, and tragedy, likewise by the buskin, *coturnus*, are said to take the iambic foot, *pedem* (line 80) (Brink 1971: 168). Of course there is a delightful pun here in the double sense of the word, *pedem* (line 80), referring both to the metrical foot in poetry and to the physical foot, both of which *socci* (line 80) and *coturni* (line 80) can be made to apply to, used in their metonymical sense or in their literal sense; as Rudd aptly translates into English: “the foot was found to fit the sock and stately buskin” (Rudd 1989: 164).

There is also an etymological pun by the Praeceptor in the verse *Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo* (line 79): supposedly the origin of the Greek word ἰαμβος stemmed from the verb ἰάπτειν, meaning to ‘fling or hurl an object’, which is often employed in Greek in a military context (Wilkins 1886: 351)<sup>138</sup>; in the Latin text therefore the bellicose phrase *armavit iambo* (line 79), although it is obviously used figuratively of the particular metrical verse, attains an amusing literal sense. Indeed, the traditional association of the character of Archilochus as a bellicose poet is referenced by Horace both in the *Epodes*:

*cave, cave, namque in malos asperrimus  
parata tollo cornua,*

---

<sup>138</sup> “send, drive on, of missiles, send forth, shoot...” (LSJ s.v. BI)

*qualis Lycambae spreus infido gener*

*aut acer hostis Bupalos*

(Hor. *Epod.* 6.11-14)

And in the *Epistles*:

*ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes*

*quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem,*

*temperat Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho,*

*temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar,*

*nec socerum quaerit quem versibus oblinat atris,*

*nec sponsae laqueum famoso carmine nectit*

(Hor. *Epist.* 1.19.26-31)

My next instance of punning comes from the central part of the *Ars*, in which the Praeceptor explains how satyr-plays came into existence from tragic performances:

*carmine qui tragico vilem certavit ob hircum,*

*mox etiam agrestes Satyros nudavit, et asper*

*incolumi gravitate iocum temptavit, eo quod*

*illecebris erat et grata novitate morandus*

*spectator, functusque sacris et potus et exlex.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 220-224)

Although Brink regards the word *nudavit* in *mox etiam agrestes Satyros nudavit* (line 221) a highly suspect transmission from the manuscripts and proceeds with perhaps prudish pleasure to eliminate all interpretive responses to the sense of this specific verb suggested by other commentators, I think we can conjecture a rather amusing play on words in *nudavit* (line 221) (Brink 1971: 278-279). In a transferred sense, like verbs such as *protulit* or *induxit*, it could denote the action of the dramatic poet in simply ‘introducing’ or, possibly better in English, ‘revealing’ a new performance on stage<sup>139</sup>; then, very literally, it could also gain the sense of bringing the “Satyrs naked on stage” (Wickham 1891: 411)<sup>140</sup> – which is of course a permissible poetic exaggeration, since, as Rudd points out, satyrs are often depicted in art wearing “loincloths or shaggy aprons” (Rudd 1989: 187). This witty pun could be rendered by a similarly oblique English phrase, such as ‘he soon even *exposed* the wild Satyrs to his audience’.

Again as was the case with the iambus joke above, the Praeceptor has once more introduced an etymological pun in the phrase *carmine qui tragico vitem certavit ob hircum* (line 220). By presenting the Latin term for ‘goat’, *hircus* (line 220), he has alluded to the lowly origin of the Greek term for tragedy, *τραγωιδία*, in *τράγος*, a ‘he-goat’, which was originally given as a prize to the successful playwright (Brink 1971: 277). The force of the humour here lies in the manner in which *hircus* (line 220) exposes the basic sense and primitive context of the ostensibly high genre *tragico* (line 220), such that the reader may amusingly render the phrase *carmine tragico* (line 220) literally as the

---

<sup>139</sup> (*OLD* s.v. 3, 6).

<sup>140</sup> (*OLD* s.v. 1).

‘goat-song’ rather than the somewhat more highbrow ‘tragic hymn’ (Wickham 1891: 411).

In summary, it is his propensity to scatter ridiculously hyperbolic comic images, at times even bordering on the absurd, across his narrative – pictures of mad ‘inspired’ poets stranded within pits and imploring for help (lines 457-463), of mythical monsters devouring children for breakfast (line 340), of obscenely dressed satyrs (line 220) – as well as to invest in clever witty puns or word plays, which lends much of the *Ars* a playful and quite conversational element. This kind of tone in turn functions to soften the highly instructive voice of the Praeceptor which dominates other parts of the *Ars* and induces the audience to follow the prescriptions far more willingly than if such discourse were absent. I think Rudd perhaps best accounts for the playful dynamic in the poem when he succinctly describes the *Ars*: “It is a lively, entertaining verse epistle, written by a well-read man for his friends, who shared his love of poetry and whose company we are invited to join” (Rudd 1989: 34). The sportive humour in the *Ars* is neither designed to mock and ostracise the readers nor to parody the writer’s own portrayal of himself, but rather to serve as playful enticements, *crustula* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.25), to lure us into what might otherwise be a quite technical intimidating discussion of aesthetic theory.

### *Empathetic Language*

In the previous section I examined how the games which the Praeceptor plays with his pupils are manifest through various rhetorical devices and word puns; in the ensuing

analysis I shall consider how this playful tendency in his discourse extends to *role-playing* in the narrative where the Praeceptor on occasion allows for a change in perspective by a marked change in verbal person and number, i.e. from 1<sup>st</sup> person singular to 1<sup>st</sup> person plural, to 2<sup>nd</sup> person singular, and so forth. The propensity of the authorial persona to alter the personal perspective of his narrative is alluded to by Brink: “H’s astonishing practice of partly displaying and partly concealing his personality is at the root of his poetry both in the lyric and the hexameter poems” (Brink 1971: 107). However, rather than interpreting this as a characteristically Horatian attempt to elude a fixed interpretation of his own true identity (Harrison 2007: 35), I would like to consider this role-playing, this change in verbal person and number, ultimately as an indication of the *empathetic* function of the Praeceptor, where he manages both to reduce his own personal authority as a teacher and at the same time increase his pupils’ authority in the narrative in such a way that they might be more gently coaxed, *blandi* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.25), into following his precepts (Volk 2002: 77-79).

To begin, 1<sup>st</sup> person plural verbs clearly allow for a shared perspective of subject between the Praeceptor and his pupils. In the very opening passage of the poem the Praeceptor provides no less than three 1<sup>st</sup> person plural verbs in a single verse within his discussion of the tension between poetic license and poetic unity:

*‘pictoribus atque poetis*  
*quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.’*  
*scimus, et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim;*  
*sed non ut placidis coeant immitia, non ut*

*serpentes avibus gementur, tigribus agni.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 9-13)

Instead of supplying the 1<sup>st</sup> person singular form *scio* to give his affirmation to the common dictum<sup>141</sup> – *pictoribus atque poetis / quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas* (lines 9-10) – the Praeceptor shares his authority as teacher of poetry with his pupils by incorporating them in the plural subject: “here the plural differs from the singular only by an authoritative note” (Brink 1971: 92). He allows the pupils to give their assent, *scimus* (line 11), to this dictum. And, moreover, in order to endorse his acknowledgement (*scimus*) of this traditional poetic license, the teacher gives practical testimony to this precept by briefly transforming both himself and, significantly, his pupils first into poets, *petimus* (line 11), and then into readers or critics, *damusque* (line 11), who duly enact the principle of *quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas* (line 10) (Wilkins 1886: 337). Again, the Praeceptor could have simply referred to his personal experience as a poet and critic, in the 1<sup>st</sup> person singular, as sufficient empirical proof of this aesthetic principle, but has chosen rather to incorporate his audience into the narrative in such a way that he both ostensibly downplays his own poetic authority and raises theirs.

Apart from this sharing of poetic authority, the Praeceptor also ‘invites’ his pupils into the narrative – that is to say he projects their voice into the narrative – on other notable occasions: such as the discussion of the brevity of human life and endeavours – *debemur morti nos nostraque* (Hor. *Ars P.* 63) – marked out by the emphatic reference to

---

<sup>141</sup> The fact that this is a common ‘understood’ law is exemplified by the empirical perfect, *fuit*, see my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’

first person plural in the indicative verb, *debemur* (line 63), subject pronoun, *nos* (line 63), and possessive adjective, *nostraque* (line 63); and, secondly, in the verb, *speremus* (line 331), when referring to the characteristic literary shortcomings of Romans:

*an haec animos aerugo et cura peculi  
cum semel imbuerit, speremus carmina fingi  
posse linenda cedro et levi servanda cupresso?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 330-332)

The Praeceptor is once more allowing a shared perspective of his subject: in the first example (line 63), the pupils enter into the narrative in their very general role as human beings, who are subject to mortality; in the second (line 331), they arrive as typically ‘practical’ Roman citizens<sup>142</sup>.

It is also worth considering how this 1<sup>st</sup> person plural ‘shared voice’ interacts with other verbal numbers and persons. Perhaps the most complex instance of the Praeceptor’s fondness for role playing can be found in discussion on the failures of poets to achieve unity and coherence in their works through an excess of a particular style:

*maxima pars vatum, pater et iuvenes patre digni,  
decipimur specie recti: brevis esse laboro,  
obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi*

---

<sup>142</sup> The Roman ‘practical’ priority in education is exemplified by the preceding speech, in which a school boy is required by the teacher to do sums, arithmetic, for the pragmatic end of looking after his property – *rem poteris servare tuam* (Horace *Ars P.* 329); this is to be contrasted with the artistic prowess of the Greeks (lines 323-324). For a similar usage of the 1<sup>st</sup> person plural, see line 285.

*deficiunt animique; professus grandia turget;*

*serpit humi tutus nimium timidusque procellae;*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 24-28)

It is quite astonishing here how often the Praeceptor is changing the point of view for his readers in this segment. At the beginning of the sentence, *maxima pars vatum* (line 24) would suggest a 3<sup>rd</sup> person singular verb is required; however, the Praeceptor turns abruptly to a 2<sup>nd</sup> person voice by addressing the recipients of the letter in the vocative case – *pater et iuvenes patre digni* (line 24); he then presents the verb *decipimur* (line 25) in the 1<sup>st</sup> person plural, thus placing himself and his pupils in apposition to the subject *maxima pars vatum* (line 24). In the subsequent clause he adopts a 1<sup>st</sup> person singular voice, *laboro... fio* (lines 25-26) as he alone apparently assumes the role of an errant poet; and then he changes to a 3<sup>rd</sup> person plural verb, *deficiunt* (line 27), and finally into an indefinite 3<sup>rd</sup> person singular, *turget; / serpit* (line 27-28).

How do we interpret such a passage? Brink simply believes the transition into and out of the 1<sup>st</sup> person form constitutes the characteristic Horatian ambiguity (Brink 1971: 107). I think, however, with regard to my particular study of empathetic language, what these commentators are overlooking is the extent to which the 1<sup>st</sup> person plural verb *decipimur* (line 25) has the force of governing the rest of the narrative: that is to say, the ensuing statements – *brevis esse laboro, / obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi / deficiunt animique* (lines 25-27) – are all examples of the principle *decipimur specie recti* (line 25); they are, in short, all dependent on a shared 1<sup>st</sup> person perspective. As a result of this it is in fact quite possible that the pupils might unintentionally substitute themselves in

place of the various persons in the examples: note, for example, how the Praeceptor subtly changes from the 1<sup>st</sup> person plural to the 1<sup>st</sup> person singular, *decipimur* (line 25) to *laboro... fio* (line 25-26), such that a pupil of the poem may continue to ‘read himself’ as subject.

Beyond the intermittent sharing of perspective with his audience in the *Ars*, how else does the Praeceptor allow their voice to enter into the narrative? We may infer that the employment of rhetorical questions through the poem is an indication of the assumed objections or interrogation of his pupils; because they themselves, as voiceless readers, clearly cannot query his instruction, the Praeceptor takes it upon himself to *suppose* what these various questions might be (Volk 2002: 79). This is highlighted by the fact that the rhetorical questions in the *Ars* are more often than not dominated by 1<sup>st</sup> person singular verbal forms. Consider the following three examples:

*ego cur, acquirere pauca*

*si possum, invideor, cum lingua Catonis et Enni*

*sermonem patrium ditaverit et nova rerum*

*nomina protulerit?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 55-57)

*descriptas servare vices operumque colores*

*cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor?*

*cur nescire pudens prave quam discere malo?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 86-88)

*idcircone vager scribamque licenter? an omnes  
visuiros peccata putem mea, tutus et intra  
spem veniae cautus?*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 265-267)

In all three of these examples there are strong personal pronouns and adjectives – *ego* (lines 55, 87) and *mea* (line 266) – as well as 1<sup>st</sup> person singular verbal forms, *invidior* (line 56), *nequeo ignoro... salutor* (lines 87), and *scribamque... putem* (lines 265-266). The emphatic 1<sup>st</sup> persons here would then seem to be a ‘response’, so to speak, to the tacit or understood 2<sup>nd</sup> person objections or questioning of the Praeceptor’s pupils; it is as though he is pre-empting what they would ask him, if they were in fact able to. This verbal ‘exchange’ between the Praeceptor and his pupils is further illustrated in the last example given where he changes immediately from 1<sup>st</sup> person verbs back to 2<sup>nd</sup> person verbs directed at the Pisones:

*vitavi denique culpam,  
non laudem merui. vos exemplaria Graeca  
nocturna versate manu, versate diurna.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 267-269)

To conclude this section, I think it is fair to say that the playful dynamic of the Praeceptor of the *Ars* can be located in his willingness to switch roles frequently in the course of his narrative, almost like a game of literary hide-and-seek as he alternately conceals and reveals his own identity. However, in addition to this playful penchant on the part of the Praeceptor, this role-playing, this constant changing of verbal person and number, also serves to lure the pupils, the *Pisones*, further into the subject of the *Ars*, while at the same time moderating the degree of the Praeceptor's own authority. Indeed, if this type of empathetic discourse were somehow to be removed from the *Ars*, the potential for the Praeceptor to coax his pupils, *blandiri*<sup>143</sup>, into taking up these aesthetic principles would surely be greatly diminished.

---

<sup>143</sup> See Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.25-26.

### *Summary of Analysis*

Reviewing my analysis of the *Ars Poetica*, I believe I have managed to illustrate how the different kinds of discourse which the Praeceptor employs in the poem serve to fulfil the three essential Horatian conceptual criteria of teaching: instruction, demonstration and play.

In terms of the first criterion, the Praeceptor manages to transfer his subject to the Pisones primarily through a language of *direct command*, epitomized by highly instructive verbal moods and tenses. I have also shown that this instructive thrust of the *Ars* is represented by the Praeceptor's fondness for *proverbial language*, where the authority of traditional discourse – maxims, adages, proverbs, etc – conveys and transfers certain truisms to the pupils.

Regarding the criterion of demonstration, I discussed how the Praeceptor's language epitomizes the principle of *exemplis... notando* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.106), where the choice of diction as well as various rhetorical devices, both on the smaller syntactic level of individual clauses and across larger segments of the poem, serve to *illustrate* the aesthetic principles under discussion. Moreover, in my section on *transitional language*, I explained how the very structure of the poem is displayed in such a way so as to give a prominent position to the aesthetic principles in the narrative.

With regard to the third criterion, the Horatian Praeceptor's penchant for play was shown to be evident both in his employment of *sportive language*, constituting various rhetorical devices and witty word puns where 'games are played on paper' (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.139), as well as in his tendency to engage in role-playing in his discourse where he

regularly changes verbal number and person. Moreover, in addition to softening the highly instructive tone elsewhere, I suggested, in my section on *empathetic* discourse, that such playful language is in fact vitally important in the Praeceptor's quest to 'coax' (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.25) his pupils into following his precepts.

-----

University of Cape Town

### Chapter 3 – The Teacher of Satire 1.4

#### *Introduction*

In this final chapter of my dissertation, as a necessary supplement to the concept of the Horatian Praeceptor which I have established and have endeavoured to locate in the discourse of the *Ars Poetica*, I shall explore how other modern scholars have tended to explain the Horatian ‘teacher persona’. To this end, I shall turn my attention to the *Satires* of Horace, where by far the greatest critical focus has been paid to the character of the Horatian authorial persona; in particular, seeing that it has played such a large role in determining my concept of the Horatian Praeceptor, I shall examine principally *Satire* 1.4, in which the persona of that *sermo* seeks to explain his own particular brand of satiric writing. After I have presented and commented upon four prominent critical interpretations (those of Fraenkel, Anderson, Freudenburg, and Oliensis) of the character of the ‘teacher’ in 1.4, I shall respond to the prevailing critical concern about how the instruction of this teacher functions in combination with his humour.

#### *Interpretations of the ‘Teacher’ Persona*

Commencing with Fraenkel’s analysis of *Satire* 1.4 in his work *Horace*, it is necessary first to point out that he does not identify the presence or even the possibility of an authorial persona in the text: his interpretation of the Horatian works (1957) predates by at least ten to twenty years most of the earnest critical discussion of authorial personae in

the *Satires*. However, in discussing Horace's aims in writing the poem, he does provide a useful starting point for us in terms of the problems which have come to preoccupy more recent scholars concerned with characterizing this persona as a teacher (Fraenkel 1957: 124-125). Fraenkel introduces the satire by referring to the substantial tradition of self-conscious *theoretical* reflections on poetics in Roman poetry, such as those in the extant fragments of Lucilius, Accius, and Cato, so establishing the belief that there was a natural precedent for Horace to follow in this field: "It was, then, no novelty in itself when Horace undertook to discuss themes which we are accustomed to regard as belonging to the theoretical treatment of poetics" (Fraenkel 1957: 125). But crucially Fraenkel, although paying homage to the origin of this work (as well as of others, such as the *Letter to Augustus* and indeed the *Ars Poetica*) in theoretical treatises, differentiates Horace's poetry from other earlier texts on poetics with the key adversative statement: "But whether late or early, all his writings on problems of poetics, while drawing on a large store of theories, served an eminently *practical purpose*<sup>144</sup>" (Fraenkel 1957: 125).

But – and this is really the point of debate – just what is this practical purpose for Horace in *Satire* 1.4? To what end has this satire been constructed? Fraenkel provides us here with two fundamental aims, and, inadvertently, two resulting faces or personae in Horace's *sermo* (Fraenkel 1957: 126). On the one hand, the writer seems to assume the role of a social preacher, who, directing his satiric invective against various causes, presents the reader with a series of prohibitive exempla of what they ought to avoid: "he wanted to fight against all kinds of prejudice, amateurish slovenliness, philistinism, reactionary tendencies, in short to fight for the new and noble kind of poetry which he and his friends were endeavouring to bring about" (Fraenkel 1957: 125); on the other

---

<sup>144</sup> My italics.

hand, Horace appears to use the satire as a means to instruct his readers in his own personal approach to the art of writing poetry: “[b]ut it is obvious that he wrote them also to give to himself and to his readers an account of what he was attempting to achieve and of the means which he had chosen as most suitable to his ends” (Fraenkel 1957: 125). In both of these cases we are provided with what we might term ‘instructors’, characters who are concerned with handing over a particular subject: the social preacher transmits to us the moral requirements of his satire, the artistic instructor the required aesthetic quality.

Both of Fraenkel’s defining comments on the aims of the *sermo* share the common acknowledgement that this is a work which is essentially outward-looking<sup>145</sup>, which seeks to interact with an audience or, at the least, some kind of close literary circle rather than to confine itself to theory or solitary reflection. The question which has busied later commentators of this poem is just how the persona, this face of Horace, interacts with his audience. Is he simply concerned with *instruction* – a process of ‘handing over’ or ‘transmitting’ – of the relevant moral and aesthetic requirements of his own brand of satiric writing, as Fraenkel seems to suggest?

In his essay ‘The Roman Socrates: Horace and his Satires’ (1982b: 13-49) W.S. Anderson has produced perhaps the seminal modern account of how the authorial persona functions in the Horatian *Satires* (his other important essay, ‘Autobiography and Art’ (1982c: 50-73), is concerned with the justification of the authorial persona in Horatian literature in general, as contrasted with the historical figure of Horace). In a method similar to that of Ellen Oliensis (1998: 2), who locates a coherent Horatian persona

---

<sup>145</sup> In the first case, in his reference to “the new and noble kind of poetry *which he and his friends* were endeavouring to bring about”, and, in the second case, “to give to... *his readers* an account of what he was attempting to achieve” (Fraenkel 1957: 125). (My italics).

interplaying throughout all of his works, Anderson tries to identify a coherent persona through the whole of Book 1 of the *Satires*, which he simply calls the ‘satirist’. So who is this satirist? The core of Anderson’s analysis of the Horatian satiric persona lies in distinguishing it from its generic predecessor, the Lucilian satiric persona. For Anderson – as is laid out in *Satire* 1.4 itself – the Lucilian persona is defined by his *libertas*: “The virtues of such a satirist are relatively obvious: he seems friendly, amusing, frank, and confiding; he can talk seriously or lightly, but you yourself do not have to take him too seriously... we can profitably describe Lucilius’ satirist as *lusor*, a playful individual” (Anderson 1982b: 33).

Now whereas the Lucilian *lusor* is fundamentally defined by his playful countenance, the Horatian satirist, although he permits a good dosage of measured laughter on occasion, is principally, according to Anderson, delineated by ‘*sapientia*’ rather than ‘*libertas*’ – a ‘wise old man’ persona: “Here is the principle distinction between the Lucilian and the Horatian manner: while the former is essentially *lusor*, the Horatian satirist is *doctor*. He is a teacher instructing puerile mankind in serious elementary moral truths, but willing to coax us by his laughing, ironic manner in order to impress his truths more effectively in our hearts” (Anderson 1982b: 35).

The crucial characteristic of the *Satires* which endorses Anderson’s conception of the teacher, the *doctor*, is the persona’s sense of irony. He accordingly links this method of teaching through ironic language with Socratic instruction: “That essential trait of Socratic discourse, irony, is likewise an essential feature of Horatian discourse, and this guarantees his Socratic character” (Anderson 1982b: 38). The degree to which humour is employed and the direction in which it is oriented is the key for Anderson in

distinguishing the Horatian *doctor* from the Lucilian *luser*: “all too often Lucilius let his *libertas* proceed too far, and consequently his laughter became sardonic or mere jesting. Irony is intellectual; it smiles and avoids uproarious laughter” (Anderson 1982b: 38) – in Anderson’s interpretation, the satirist in Horace’s works is not trying to create a spectacle of himself or any other specific person for that matter, but is rather concerned with gently nudging his audience in the right direction, towards the truth, with a laugh (Anderson 1982b: 38): *ridentem dicere verum* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.24). Of course Anderson’s conception of the Socratic character of the Horatian satiric persona goes beyond merely an ironic tone of voice and incorporates aspects of both style and content: “Such Socratic understanding demanded complete disciplining of vocabulary, exact choice of words, a delicate touch in word-order, and improvement of the metre; but the final product was what I call a Socratic style: an intelligent use of all the poetic materials available to the writer of verse satire in order to create an intellectual poetry... Horace fully integrated it with his material, so that it is quite possible to say that the contents followed on the style” (Anderson 1982b: 41).

Now, briefly, let us consider some of the difficulties with Anderson’s interpretation of the satirist as the Socratic *doctor*, the persona who, although making no explicit claims to teach, steers his pupils towards the truth through a form of ‘constructive’ irony<sup>146</sup>. I think that the progress made from Fraenkel’s interpretation of *Satire* 1.4 to Anderson’s is the realization that the satiric persona does not simply function to instruct – to impart the relevant moral or aesthetic knowledge of what constitutes his brand of satiric writing – in the manner of a preacher, but that he is willing to blend his instructive discourse with humorous ironic language, as I discussed in the

---

<sup>146</sup> i.e. humour for the sake of arriving at the truth.

*Ars*. What is questionable in Anderson's analysis is whether we can confidently call this teacher specifically a Socratic *doctor*.

Firstly, I would query whether it is not rather too tendentious an approach to label the style of Book 1 of the *Satires* 'Socratic', simply because Horace makes use of his customary '*brevitas*', careful selection of words, polished verses, and an ironic turn of voice – such language can be found throughout Horace's corpus. Are we then to conjecture that all of Horace's writing is underlined by this persona? Indeed, Anderson's decision to title his persona 'Socratic' ultimately derives from a line in the *Ars Poetica*:

*rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae  
verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 310-311)

Does it necessarily stand to reason that if Horace adopts a Socratic subject, his language and style should also be Socratic?

Secondly, to try to ascribe a single philosophy, rather than an eclectic *farrago*, to the works of Horace has always been a dangerous task – even one so accommodating as the Socratic spirit, which several later philosophical schools claimed as their original inspiration. We can, if we are so inclined, find traces of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Peripatetic doctrine in many of Horace's works without these then serving to define the corresponding discourse of those particular Horatian poems. Moreover, if the persona is definitively Socratic, why then does he not engage to a significant degree in any form of

dialectic in *Satire* 1.4 with some other interlocutor, as we are familiar with from the Platonic dialogues?

Thirdly, with reference to the type of irony demanded by the Socratic *doctor*, can we truly say that the persona of the entire first book of *Satires* – even in the Priapean satire – never utilizes that type of ‘Lucilian’ over-the-top comical humour, designed not to elicit that state of enlightening bewilderment, ‘ἀπορία’, from the audience in the manner of Socratic discourse, but rather designed purely to entertain the reader without immediate thought given to instruction? I believe a re-evaluation of how the humour functions in terms of our broader conception of the Horatian Praeceptor is required in *Satire* 1.4. Lastly, then, on account of the previous observation, we must surely cast doubt on the notion of there being a single coherent ‘satirist’ persona across Book 1.

Although he does acknowledge the critical progress made by Anderson in the development of an authorial persona within the Horatian *Satires*, Freudenburg’s analysis, in his work *The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire*, does represent a major shift in how we are to perceive the authorial persona of 1.4. Firstly, unlike Anderson who attempts to establish a coherent persona – his Socratic *doctor* – for the entire first book of *Satires*, Freudenburg has confined the scope of his interpretation to the first four *sermones* of the book: “To begin this study, I limit myself to the first four satires of Book 1, the so-called *diatribe*<sup>147</sup> satires, for here alone has Horace developed an image of the speaker fully consistent from satire to satire” (Freudenburg 1993: 7)<sup>148</sup>. The notion that

---

<sup>147</sup> My italics.

<sup>148</sup> As a brief addendum, it should be noted here that Freudenburg does acknowledge the difficulties in trying to peg down a specific definition for the term ‘diatribe’, so providing the following description by D.A. Russell as a guideline (Freudenburg 1993: 7): “a lecture or discourse on a moral theme marked by a combination of seriousness with humour and a certain vividness and immediacy in language” (Russell 1973: 29, no 25).

these satires are based upon the Greek diatribe form will be fundamental to this critic's understanding of the *sermones*. So Freudenburg's initial important distinction between his interpretation of the satirist persona and Anderson's lies in the difference in audience or recipient between the Socratic discourse and the diatribe form: whereas the Socratic *doctor* persona should engage in dialectic with his interlocutor, the diatribe persona "pontificates. His interlocutor is a shadowboxer, totally void of personality, outside of time and place; he functions as a rhetorical convenience. He is neither a peer nor a pupil; he is an adversary, an ignorant voice from the crowd" (Freudenburg 1993: 9).

The notion that this authorial persona is not so much a teacher communicating with his pupils, or a receptive audience, but more a preacher-type figure communicating with an adversary, a random man plucked from the crowd, is an important facet in Freudenburg's subsequent explanation of how the persona truly functions here. Freudenburg further characterizes the satirist of the Horatian diatribes by relating him to the tradition of the Cynic moralizer in Greek diatribes: "The satirist is a philosopher, but not a philosopher who demands respect for being original, well read, or polished. His rhetoric, like his philosophy, is homespun... [he is] characteristic not of the professional rhetorician but of the old country sage" (Freudenburg 1993: 12). So whereas Anderson interprets *simplicitas*, *brevitas*, *lucidus ordo* and other such features in the language of Horace as indicative of a measured intellectual 'Socratic' style, Freudenburg points to these same characteristics – as well as other linguistic features, such as a conversational logic, excessive illustrations, and abrupt colloquialisms – as reflective of the unrefined boorish preacher of diatribe (Freudenburg 1993: 12).

However, the recognition of the presence or, perhaps one should say, the *influence* of the simple uncouth Cynic moralizer within the Horatian diatribes is really only half of Freudenburg's analysis. He does not take the view that the Horatian *Satires* are at all instructive in nature, not even the seriocomic instruction of diatribe, as opposed to the ironic Socratic instruction which Anderson recommends. For him the persona of the first four satires resides entirely within a comic world (Freudenburg 1993: 8). The satirist then duly becomes the *doctor ineptus*, a self-parodying instructor of diatribe, plucked out from the comic stage by Horace and inserted into his *sermones*, whose preaching serves not any real didactic purpose but purely as an avenue of self-ridicule. The persona, in short, is acting the fool, making a spectacle of himself in front of a crowd.

So what justification does Freudenburg give for his interpretation of this kind of comic persona in 1.4? He points to the role of the satirist's father as paramount to our perception of this as a *sermo* derived from the comic stage. For Freudenburg this is not the historical writer's true father but the kind of overly exaggerated figure which we can typically find in comedy: "he is the traditional comic *pater ardens*, cleverly adapted from the character of Demea in the *Adelphi* of Terence. The verbal parallels, the convictions, and the characteristics shared between Demea and the satirist's father make the literary influence upon the portrait of 1.4 undeniable" (Freudenburg 1993: 34). And so naturally once we come to appreciate the comical nature of the satirist's depiction of his father, the sincerity of the satirist himself – setting himself up as heir to this ridiculous character – should accordingly begin to wither away in front of us. How can we now consider anything which he says to be truthful?

This is then the general scope of Freudenburg's analysis. Now I would like to consider some critical problems with his interpretation for *Satire* 1.4. Firstly, unlike Freudenburg, most other commentators of the *Satires* do not classify 1.4 as a diatribe *sermo* alongside the first three works (Brown 1993: 89)<sup>149</sup>: it is certainly, as Freudenburg himself confesses, not concerned with addressing any one particular moral issue, as is customary in diatribes (Freudenburg 1993: 7). Certainly, both the highly personalized programmatic language of 1.4 as well as the subject matter, which seems more indebted to the tradition of theories of poetics, as Fraenkel points out, than moralistic discourse, are quite different to the first three Horatian satires, which in turn naturally raises doubts as to whether we can consider this work to be indebted at all to Cynic diatribe, as Freudenburg suggests.

Secondly, I do not believe that Freudenburg makes a suitable argument for the distinction between the serio-comic instruction of Cynic diatribe and the mock-serious instruction from the comic stage. We are told that in diatribe the moralistic preacher often achieves his ends with a fair accompaniment of humour – the implication would then seem to be that the force of the humour in 1.4 is so excessive that it radically undermines this instructive function, creating the comic persona. However, apart from labelling the satirist's father as a hackneyed figure from comedy, Freudenburg does not provide adequate proof of a major difference in the text between the humour of the rustic Cynic preacher and the *doctor ineptus* from comedy. And where in the text does Horace give an obvious indication that his authorial persona is a self-parody? Where does he openly

---

<sup>149</sup> “The first three satires of the book form a related group, and have more in common with, and owe more to the influence of, the Greek diatribe or philosophical street-sermon than any of the others; in each of them, Horace criticizes what he presents as a form of foolish extremism in human behavior” (Brown 1993: 89).

*destroy* – not simply humorously poke at – his authority, which seems necessary for a purely comic portrayal?

Thirdly, if the portrayal of the *pater optimus* is in fact entirely comical, as Freudenburg believes, it is rather striking that he is so effective in transferring his educational philosophy onto the authorial persona himself, who frequently employs exemplary discourse through the *sermo* and, indeed, supplies the *pater optimus*' speech itself as an *example* of how he was taught, ironically reinforcing the concept of *exemplis... notando* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.106); as Brown writes: "The passage is reminiscent of Terence, where the stern father Demea describes his use of the same principle in his son's moral education. But while this gives an extra dimension to Horace's account, it does not follow that it owes more to literature than to life... whereas Horace's father has employed this method with complete success, Demea, unknown to himself, has failed miserably, as his slave's ironic praise in the passage serves to underline" (Brown 1993: 136).

I think, in summary, Freudenburg's interpretation of the authorial persona of 1.4 is a reaction against criticisms of Horace which treat his satires as fundamentally instructive works. However, although admirably demonstrating some of the comic features of the persona, he has travelled perhaps a bit too far in refuting any real instructive function in the satire. Once again, I would call for a broader term than merely 'instruction' to refer to the discourse of the Horatian teacher, such that we can account for the comic element at play in the *sermo*, as I shall discuss in the subsequent section.

Finally, Ellen Oliensis provides the most recent (1998) interpretation of how the authorial persona functions in *Satire* 1.4, which she endeavours to relate to the coherent persona she identifies across the Horatian oeuvre. Oliensis' analysis is very much based

upon the social face of the persona in the *Satires*. For her the authorial persona 'Horace' can never really be distinguished from the historical writer, so that the *Satires* duly become a means by which Horace represents and manages his social face (Oliensis 1998: 16-17). In *Satire* 1.4 this management takes the form of a rigorous defence of his own face: "This defence is already under way in the first three satires... but it is only in the fourth satire that Horace directly confronts his readers' (imagined or actual) negative constructions... At the outset Horace seems to be responding to the charge that he abuses his satiric license by attacking the virtuous along with the vicious" (Oliensis 1998: 17). The defence is reflected by a series of disclaimers, by which 'Horace' seems to shirk his 'external' social authority and responsibility, and ultimately, towards the end of the poem, seems to lay claim to a kind of private authority, as championed by the character of the *pater optimus* in the poem: "The disavowal of ambition also helps to motivate the inward turn that characterizes the satire's final movement. No longer something that amuses or insults a more or less extended public, Horatian satire is now reconfigured as an essentially private and self-reflexive moral activity... As a grown man, the son dutifully internalizes his satiric father, becoming his own ever-present moral instructor" (Oliensis 1998: 23).

The persona suggested by Oliensis then is a kind of self-reflecting instructor, who does not wish to be seen ostensibly lecturing others, represented by his apologetic discourse, but rather provides a model of morality, represented by his father, purely for his own sake. I do wonder, however, when reviewing her analysis, whether Oliensis is in fact not underestimating the playful tone inherent in the authorial persona's self-deprecation: there is a certain irony in, on the one hand, claiming that one speaks purely

for one's own enlightenment and then, on the other, writing and publishing these sentiments for the explicit consumption of others.

I think it is fair generalization to say that most of the critics of *Satire* 1.4 have been grappling with the mixture of instruction and humour in the voice of this 'teacher persona'. How do we resolve these two components? Do we, like Anderson, characterize the persona as a Socratic *doctor*, equating the humour with the kind of ironic instruction for which that particular philosopher was famous? Do we, like Freudenburg, reject the primacy of the instructive voice and instead locate a comical self-parodying authorial persona, the '*doctor ineptus*'? Or, like Oliensis, do we view the *sermo* as an entertaining refusal on the part of the Horatian persona of his social responsibility to instruct? In the following section I shall add my voice to the discussion by applying my third conceptual criterion of the Horatian Praeceptor, 'play', to how the 'satirist' persona (to employ Anderson's locution) teaches in *Satire* 1.4.

### *The Playful Satirist*

In our pursuit as critics to discover how the brand of humour employed by the satirist<sup>150</sup> functions in the poem, we need, rather than turning to Greek comedy, as Freudenburg does, or Plato's characterizations of Socrates in his treatises, as Anderson, to turn to the satirist's very characterization of his own discourse in this same *sermo* as *iocosius* (Hor.

---

<sup>150</sup> As I shall often refer to the authorial persona of 1.4 henceforth.

*Sat.* 1.4.104) – as ‘playful’ or ‘sportive’<sup>151</sup>. In the following study, by examining certain rhetorical devices and word puns, I shall suggest how the same playful humour which I endeavoured to locate in the language of the *Ars Poetica* may also be readily located in the voice of the satirist of 1.4.

I commenced my study of the type of humour employed in the *Ars* by focusing on techniques which functioned through the creation of extremes. In particular, with reference to the opening verses of the poem concerned with the shaping of a Scyllan-proportioned monster (lines 1-5), I examined how the Praeceptor was able to endorse his criticisms of what he considered inept works of art by providing hyperbolic ridiculous images in the text, from which both he as authorial persona and his reading audience could stand removed and make fun of. Just like in the *Ars*, the satirist persona of 1.4 makes frequent usage of such comical hyperbole by poking fun at inept satirists in the text, turning them into physical spectacles, the objects of his jokes. For example, consider the following lines in which an overly derisory satirist, who spares no one in his ardent desire to furnish his works, is metamorphosed into a raging bull (Palmer 1968: 162):

*omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas.*

*‘faenum habet in cornu; longe fuge: dummodo risum*

*excutiat, sibi non, non cuiquam parcat amico;*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4 33-35)

---

<sup>151</sup> For my discussion of the Horatian concept of ‘play’, see my section ‘The Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor’.

Here this nameless hostile satirist is not even permitted the chance by the authorial persona to present himself on the stage of the *sermo*, as in the case of the profligate Crispinus earlier<sup>152</sup>, but is described in bull-like form, *faenum habet in cornu* (line 34): “[a] satirist is like a wicked ox, to whose horns a wisp of hay was tied as a warning that he was dangerous” (Palmer 1968: 162). This description is clearly a comical exaggeration, presented in the form of the exclamations of those who pass close to him, of the derisory satirist’s characteristic hostility towards others. He duly becomes the butt of the joke, a ridiculous creature to be avoided by us.

But it is not just such disreputable individuals as Crispinus and Fannius who are granted a rather ridiculous entrance into the *sermo*, even the esteemed Lucilius – who, as the satirist says, stems in the tradition of the genre from the masters of old comedy, *hinc omnis pendet Lucilius* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.6) – is presented somewhat peculiarly on stage. If we are to translate the text literally in terms of his physical description: firstly, he can be viewed wiping his nose clean – *emunctae naris* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4. 8) – next we see him reciting verses while standing on one leg – *versus dictabat stans pede in uno* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.10) – and, finally, he is described as flowing along muddily – *cum flueret lutulentus* (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4. 11). Certainly one would have to concede that the first two descriptions of Lucilius can possess positive metaphorical senses. *emunctae naris* (line 8) may denote in some cases a man of keen scent and thus sensitivity (Brown 1993: 128); or, perhaps more relevant to this satire, it may be used to describe a man who understands humour: “properly one with a well-wiped nose, hence, one who has that organ in a fit state for appreciating the ludicrous” (Palmer 1968: 158). And the expression *stans pede in uno*

---

<sup>152</sup> Crispinus’ bombastic language is comically compared by the satirist to ‘goat-skin bellows’, *hircinis follibus auras* (Hor *Sat* 1.4.19), and by metonymy ‘empty wind’ (Palmer 1968: 160).

(line 10) is proverbial in Latin for someone who can accomplish a given task with great facility (Wickham 1891: 50).

Now had either of these descriptions of Lucilius been offered in isolation, I would have little reason to doubt the positive portrait created of the famous satirist; however, the combination of these two physical expressions with the obviously critical epithet *lutulentus* (line 11) does in my interpretation manufacture a burlesque image of the famous satirist: an absurd picture in the mind of the reader of a man standing on one leg in the middle of a muddy stream while picking his nose. Our laughter or, at the least, our bemusement at this bizarre portrait, manufactured by these mixed metaphors describing Lucilius, is accordingly utilized by the satirist persona to warn us of the vices of the Lucilian style – that is a certain crassness and coarseness in shaping his poetry, a lack of refinement, which is obviously built up and reflected in the uncouth physical description of the man:

*garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem,  
scribendi recte: nam ut multum, nil moror.*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4. 12-13)

So once again we can see how humour is important in endorsing the criticism and instructions of the satirist. In the above example it is also apparent that the authorial persona builds up a ridiculous picture in order to soften his ensuing criticisms.

On the subject of exaggerated discourse, I would like to consider the effect of exclamation on the surrounding narrative. I examined two notable instances in the *Ars*

*Poetica* (lines 291-294, 301-302) where the Praeceptor amusingly heightens the register of a passage when providing an instruction: in these examples the authorial persona is showing that he is cognizant of the fact that he is manifestly giving orders to his audience, that he is traversing instructive discourse, by deliberately going over-the-top for a brief portion of the narrative, making a scene of himself. Such comically self-parodying speech rarely lasts for more than a few lines in the text – never so long, I believe, as to radically refute what has been uttered, but so as to simply poke fun at his own voice. So, similarly in 1.4, the satirist warns the readers against men who mock others behind their backs:

*absentem qui rodit amicum,  
qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos  
qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis,  
fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere  
qui nequit, hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.81-85)

The question then for the literary critic is whether the weighted anaphora – *qui... qui... qui... qui... qui... hic... hunc* (lines 81-85), the archaic vocative of address and ‘forensic’ future imperative – *Romane, caveto* (line 85), and the emphatic pronoun, *tu* (line 85), merely denote great solemnity in the prohibition, as both Palmer and Brown maintain, or whether they go a little too far, and so actually poke fun at the austerity of the speech. This is certainly not a facile question to solve, especially in the absence of the actual tone

of voice of the satirist, as in a recitation. However, I would firstly point to the emphatic juxtaposition of the personal pronoun, vocative of address, and imperative, which are all directed towards the second-person recipient, as exceedingly tautologous – to the extent that it draws unnecessary attention to itself. Moreover, one should also observe that this heightened register suffers an abrupt bathetic fall in the ensuing line, which resumes the standard conversational register of much of the poem in second person present tense, *videas*:

*saepe tribus lectis videas cenare quaternos,  
e quibus unus amet quavis aspergere cunctos  
praeter eum qui praebet aquam;*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4. 86-88)

This sudden change in the register of voice from the solemn archaic imperative tone to present conversational should be surprising to us and mark out the solemnity as not a little ridiculous.

Next, in this discussion of sportive discourse within *Satire* 1.4, we should consider, as in my analysis of the *Ars*, how the satirist persona plays games with words or how he makes use of puns in the text. So after the opening 38 lines of the satire, in which the authorial persona enumerates some of the shortcomings of other writers in the genre, we are given a seemingly earnest refusal of poetic status on the part of the satirist (Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.39-40); however, as we proceed further along this personal ‘*recusatio*’, this self-deprecation of poetic ‘*ingenium*’, it becomes less clear whether his refusal of status is to

be taken seriously or not; this culminates in a climactic passage which Ellen Oliensis describes as “a serpentine sentence that at once flaunts and disavows poetic ingenium” (Oliensis 1998: 19):

*his, ego quae nunc,  
olim quae scripsit Lucilius, eripias si  
tempora certa modosque et quod prius ordine verbum est  
posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis,  
non, ut si solvas ‘postquam Discordia taetra  
Belli ferratos postis portasque refregit’,  
invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae.*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.56-62)

Here the deceptively-simplistic argument which the satirist persona is ostensibly presenting against a satiric work being considered ‘poetic’ may be paraphrased thus: “a man coming across the phrase “foul discord” would know he was dealing with a fragment of poetry; not so with the plain language of satire, which is distinguished from prose “merely” by meter and word order. Destroy these... and there’s not trace of poetry left” (Oliensis 1998: 19). True poetic ‘*ingenium*’ is thus defined by a high register, whereas satire is simply imitating the rhythm of poetry in a lower ‘unpoetic’ register.

However, when we match the language of the satirist up against his professions of what constitutes a poetic text, we notice a rather ironic disparity. As Oliensis remarks, while he is superficially renouncing poetic ingenium in his subject matter, he is at the

same time flaunting his poetic ability, specifically in the form of *'compositio'*, in the language (Oliensis 1998: 19). Let me now examine the arrangement of the Horatian language a little more closely. For the quintessential example of what comprises poetic language the satirist quotes a passage from Ennius, alluding to “the temple of Janus, whose doors were kept open in time of war” (Brown 1993: 132): *postquam Discordia taetra / Belli ferratos postis portasque refregit* (line 60-61). While the diction of this passage might be considered ‘elevated’, as opposed to the *puris verbis* (line 54) of satire, the word order is relatively simple, almost pedestrian: opening with a subordinate conjunction, followed by nominative subject with agreeing adjective, genitive, accusative objects, and verb in final sentence position (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 429-430). We are then persuaded to compare this language with the supposed ‘prose in versified form’ of the satirist.

What we should notice above all in the satirist’s discourse is the way in which he plays around with word order so that meaning is reflected through language. So, for example, we can observe when the satirist suggests to his readers to break up the regular quantities and rhythms of a given text – *eripias si / tempora certa modosque* (lines 57-58) – that he is actually himself breaking up, *eripias*, the rhythm here by, firstly, splitting a quite short clause over two verses and then by the implementation of hyperbaton in the first sentence position of the verb, the slight delay of the conditional conjunction, and the noun objects placed at the end (quite a different order from the passage of Ennius) (Wickham 1891: 54)<sup>153</sup>. Then, in the subsequent clause, in an elaboration of the previous sentiment, when the satirist asks that the reader invert his sentence such that the first word takes final position, and final first, we can witness a similar inversion or chiasmatic

---

<sup>153</sup> Again for standard word order, *see* Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 429-430.

structure in the language of the authorial persona in *prius...posterius... ultima primis* (line 58-59) where *prius* (line 58) moves from first sentence position, after the introductory conjunctions, to final in the form of the related adjective *primis* (line 59). And, thirdly, and perhaps most strikingly, there is the phrase, *disiecti membra poetae* (line 62), where again the metaphorical picture of a dismembered poet, signifying writing which has been torn apart, is displayed graphically in the hyperbaton of the noun, *poetae* (line 62), removed from its adjective, *disiecti* (line 62), as though these words were being pulled apart in the very text (Brown 1993: 132).

Indeed, it is worth noting, as Oliensis points out, that the metaphor of the physically dismembered text, augmented and enhanced by the '*compositio*' of the satirist persona, by his artful weaving of words, is at once more powerful and perhaps 'poetic', we might say, than the revered text from Ennius: "Indeed, his sustained metaphor of the dismembered Orphean text far outdoes the obviously 'poetic' but relatively tame personification of Discord to which these lines purport to pay tribute" (Oliensis 1998: 19). It is important to realize here that word play, such sportive language in the Horatian text, does not undermine the instructional aims of the passage but is actually a vital constituent within the satirist's discourse as a teacher. The ironic contrast between what the authorial persona is stating and the form of his language is designed to teach the audience: to elicit their laughter at a superficial interpretation of what constitutes a poetic work, and so accordingly to broaden their appreciation by this very irony of how poetry is to be judged.

Further examples of this witty word play in the satirist's language may be found in his ironic refusal of poetic status:

*agedum, pauca accipe contra.*

*primum ego me illorum, dederim quibus esse poetis*

*excerpam numero: neque enim concludere versum*

*dixeris esse satis; neque si qui scribat uti nos*

*sermoni propiora, putes hunc esse poetam.*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.38-42)

It has been suggested quite persuasively by Brown in his commentary on the *sermo* that the satirist's language in this particular passage is quite intentionally designed to appear "awkward and 'unpoetic'" (Brown 1993: 131). He is playfully trying to mimic the discourse of an 'unpoetic' writer in order to back up his claim that he ought not to be considered a poet (a claim which we take seriously at our own peril). This awkward 'unpoetic' language is indicated firstly by the quite cumbersome overly emphatic juxtaposition of three pronouns, *ego me illorum* (line 39), at the beginning of the verse (Brown 1993: 131). And, secondly, less severe but still noticeable, there is a degree of hyperbaton in the sentence in the placement of the relative pronoun in the second sentence position after its verb, *dederim* (line 39)<sup>154</sup>, and in the separation of the genitive *illorum* (line 39) from its governing ablative *numero* (line 40)<sup>155</sup>, perhaps creating the impression of a man who does not know how to assemble his words fittingly (Brown 1993: 131).

---

<sup>154</sup> "Interrogative Sentences begin with the interrogative, subordinate clauses with the leading particle or relative" (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430).

<sup>155</sup> "A dependent Genitive usually follows the governing word" (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430).

Following this passage, the satirist then gives an indication of the type of ‘inspired’ person whom we might deem a true poet, as compared to the writers of comedy and satire, who are only poets by virtue of metre (Palmer 1968: 162):

*ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior atque os  
magna sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem.*

(Hor. *Sat.* 1.4.43-44)

Whereas in the previous narrative the satirist was imitating the discourse of an inept poet, now he is surging into a higher poetic register in order to indicate to the audience the type of language which is fitting for such poetry – and also, ironically, and quite intentionally, to show himself worthy of this particular view of how a ‘true’ poet should speak. Firstly, there is a tricolon arrangement, which is typical of high poetry such as epic, in the build up of the nouns – *ingenium* (line 43), *mens divinior* (line 43) and *os / magna sonaturum* (line 43-44) (Brown 1993: 131); the increase in syllable count in these nouns phrases – 4, 5, and 7 – to give the appropriate climactic effect should be observed. Secondly, there is the rather ornate metonymical employment of *os* (line 43), literally ‘a mouth’, to stand for a voice, rendered in prose Latin, for example by *vox* (Wickham 1891: 53). We can favourably compare this diction where the satirist is imitating epic or generally high poetry with a passage from the *Ars Poetica*, in which the Praeceptor gives an example of the inflated bombast typical of this kind of inspired poetry (Wickham 1891: 53)<sup>156</sup>:

---

<sup>156</sup> Other instances in which *os* is used to denote ‘a voice’ in speaking in the Horatian works (Regel 1836: 212): *Epist.* 2.1.126, *Ars P.* 94, *Carm.* 4.2.8.

*Grais ingenium, Grais dedit ore rotundo*

*Musa loqui, praeter laudem nullius avaris.*

(Hor. *Ars P.* 323-324)

Within this discussion of the authorial persona of *Satire* 1.4 I have presented other important critical interpretations of the model of the Horatian teacher: from Fraenkel's simple notion of an instructor of the moral and aesthetic requirements of satire, to Anderson's Socratic *doctor*, to Freudenberg's *doctor ineptus*, and to Oliensis' self-reflecting instructor. These differing interpretations of how the 'teacher figure' functions in the *sermo* are to a large extent a result of how the critics perceive the humorous tone in the Horatian satire. Does the humour radically undermine the instructions of the satirist persona? Or does it perhaps constitute an instructive irony, leading us laughing towards the truth? My particular emphasis on 'playful' or 'sportive' humour in the language of the satirist, I hope, represents a move back towards a characteristically Horatian model of the Praeceptor, which we can find in the explicit statements of the *sermo* itself, rather than relating Horace's text to what we find in Plato, or Greek comedy, or what we try recreate from the society, the historical circumstances of the Roman poet.

## Epilogue

At the start of this dissertation I posed the question as to whether a coherent Praeceptor persona could be identified in the *Ars Poetica* of Horace. It ought to be clear at this stage that my response to this is an emphatic ‘yes’. I have endeavoured to illustrate in this dissertation how the various types of discourse which the authorial persona employs manage to fulfil certain criteria – instruction, demonstration, and play – which form the Horatian concept of the Praeceptor.

I hope that, even if my specific conceptual criteria were in one way or another to be rejected, my analysis represents a step in the right direction in constructing a characteristically Horatian concept of the teacher or *praeceptor* figure in the *Ars Poetica*, as well as perhaps in other more instructive *sermones* such as *Satire* 1.4 and 1.10. This method seems far more preferable to me than approaches to limit Horace’s originality and artistry by measuring the *Ars* against a fixed genre such as the ‘didactic poem’. The assumption in such analyses is that there are certain fixed textual markers which comprise a genre and render a literary work essentially ‘didactic’ or not. Frequently, as I discussed with reference to Volk’s analysis of ‘didactic poetry’ (which I have placed in inverted commas to express my doubt over the validity of this genre in general for interpretations of ancient literature), the *Ars*, deemed too poetic and conversational in style, fails to pass the critical test of what is supposed to be ‘didactic’.

Such interpretations, I believe, are guilty of a far too rigorous scientific approach to the question of whether a literary work endeavours to ‘teach’ or not, negating the multiple different means by which this task may be brought about. In Horace’s

conception of the teacher, we are given a far more liberal classification of the task of the Praeceptor: certainly straightforward didactic *instruction* is part of his role, *vice* (line 304), to transfer his subject to his pupils, the Pisones and the implied literary audience; however, he is also concerned with *demonstration*, with clarifying his precepts through illustrations in his text, as well as with *play*, whereby his language is designed to soften the instructive force of his discourse and to gently coax his pupils in the right direction. These last two criteria, as I showed in my analysis of the discourse of the *Ars Poetica*, allow the Horatian authorial persona to engage in poetic structures and to utilize artistic techniques in his poem, while still serving to teach in the broader sense which he has allowed for this process.

If I were ultimately compelled to suggest a succinct generic designation for the *Ars Poetica* – seeing that critics will inevitably try to situate the work with respect to Horace’s other poetic efforts as well as to those of his contemporaries – I would classify it under the rubric of ‘*educational sermo*’. The term ‘educational’ in the modern sense, as I discussed earlier in this dissertation with reference to Peters’ work in the analytical philosophy of education, would tend to signify a broader scope for the role of the teacher than simply ‘instruction’; while, clearly in form and in its treatment of its addressees, Horace’s *Ars Poetica*, as Frischer points out, comes closer to some of his satiric *sermones*, such as 1.4 and 1.10, than his epistles.

-----

*Bibliography*

Abrams, M.H. 1972. Orientation of Critical Theories. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 1-26.

Alexander, W.H. 1938. *Spe Longus*. Horace, *Ars Poetica* 172. *CJ*. 33(4): 226-228.

Anderson, W.S. 1982. Recent Works in Roman Satire (1968-1978). *CW*. 75(5): 273-299.

Anderson, W.S. 1982a. Roman Satirists and Literary Criticism. In *Essays on Roman Satire*. Edited by W.S. Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3-10.

Anderson, W.S. 1982b. The Roman Socrates: Horace and his Satires. In *Essays on Roman Satire*. Edited by W.S. Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 13-49.

Anderson, W.S. 1982c. Autobiography and Art in Horace. In *Essays on Roman Satire*. Edited by W.S. Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 50-73.

Anderson, W.S. 1995. *Horatius Liber: Child and Freedman's Free Son. Arethusa*. 28: 151-164.

Armstrong, D. 1989. *Horace*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Armstrong, D. 1993. The Addressees of the *Ars Poetica: Herculaneum*, the *Pisones* and Epicurean Protreptic. *MD*. 31: 185-230.

Auden, W.H. 1972. Writing. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 636-645.

Axelsson, B. 1945. *Unpoetische Wörter*. Lund: Gleerup.

Barthes, R. 1972. Criticism as Language. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 647-651.

Barthes, R. 1988. The Death of the Author. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 167-172.

Bell, A.J. 1923. *The Latin Dual and Poetic Diction*. London: Oxford University Press.

Benham, A.R. 1955. Horace and his *Ars Poetica* in English: A Bibliography. *CW*. 49(1): 1-5.

Benjamin, A. 1988. Introduction. In *Post-Structuralist Classics*. Edited by A. Benjamin. London: Routledge. 1-6.

Bowditch, P.L. 2001. *Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Boys-Stones, G.R. 2003. Introduction. In *Metaphor, Allegory and the Classical Tradition*. Edited by G.R. Boys-Stones. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1-5.

Brink, C.O. 1963. *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brink, C.O. 1969. Horace and Empedocles' Temperature: A Rejected Fragment of Empedocles. *Phoenix*. 23(1): 138-142.

Brink, C.O. 1971. *Horace on Poetry: The Ars Poetica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brink, C.O. 1995. Second Thoughts on Three Horatian Puzzles. In *Homage to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 267-278.

Brown, P & Levinson, S.C. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals on Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, P.M. 1993. *Horace: Satires I*. Warminster: Aris & Philips.

Campbell, A.Y. 1958. Two Notes on Horace, *Ars Poetica*. *BICS*. 5: 65-68.

Clark, D.L. 1957. *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Clark, M.E. 1983. Horace, "Ars Poetica" 75-78: The Origin and Worth of Elegy. *CW*. 77(1): 1-5.

Clark, M.E. 1991-1992. Quintilius' *Ethos* as Critic of the Poet: Horace, *AP* 438-44. *CW*. 85: 229-231.

Clay, D. 1998. The Theory of the Literary Persona in Antiquity. *MD*. 40: 9-40.

Coffey, M. 1976. *Roman Satire*. London: Methuen and Co Ltd.

Coleman, R.G.G. 1999. Poetic diction, poetic discourse, and the poetic register. In *Aspects of the Language of Latin Poetry*. J.N. Adams and R.G. Mayer, Eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21-93.

Connolly, J. 2009. The Politics of Rhetorical Education. In *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric*. Edited by E. Gunderson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 126-141.

Corbeill, A. 2010. Rhetorical Education and Social Reproduction in the Republic and Early Empire. In *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*. W. Dominik and J. Hall, Eds. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 69-82.

D'Alton, J.F. 1917. *Horace and his Age*. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Dalzell, A. 1996. *The Criticism of Didactic Poetry*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Dearden, R.F. 1970. The Concept of Play. In *The Concept of Education*. Edited by R.S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 73-91.

De Man, P. 1988. The Resistance to Theory. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 355-371.

Depew, M & Obbink D. 2000. Introduction. In *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons and Society*. M. Depew and D. Obbink, Eds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1-14.

De Saint Denis, E. 1963. La Fantaisie et le Coq-à-l'âne dans l'*Art Poétique* d'Horace. *Latomus*. 22: 664-684.

De Saussure, F. 1988. The Object of Study. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 2-9.

De Saussure, F. 1988. Nature of the Linguistic Sign. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 10-14.

Dickey, E. 2002. *Latin Forms of Address*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dilke, O.A.W. 1958. When was the *Ars Poetica* written? *BICS*. 5: 49-57.

Dilke, O.A.W. 1973. Horace and the Verse Letter. In *Horace*. Edited by C. Costa. London: Routledge. 94-112.

Dominik, W. & Hall, J. 2010. Confronting Roman Rhetoric. In *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*. W. Dominik & J. Hall, Eds. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 3-8.

Duckworth, G.E. 1965. Horace's Hexameters and the Date of the *Ars Poetica*. *TAPA*. 96: 73-95.

Duff, J.W. 1936. *Roman Satire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dunn, F.M. 1995. Rhetorical Approaches to Horace's *Odes*. *Arethusa*. 28: 165-176.

Effe, Bernd. 1977. *Dichtung und Lehre: Untersuchungen zur Typologie des antiken Lehrgedichts*. Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Eliot, T.S. 1972. The Function of Criticism. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 77-84.

Elliot, R.C. 1982. *The Literary Persona*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fairclough, H.R. 1913. Horace's View of the Relations between Satire and Comedy. *AJPhil*. 34(2): 183-193.

Ferguson, J. 1956. Catullus and Horace. *AJPhil*. 77(1): 1-18.

Ferri, R. 2007. The Epistles. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 121-131.

Foucault, M. 1988. What is an Author? In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 197-210.

Fowler, D. 2000. The Didactic Plot. In *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons and Society*. M. Depew and D. Obbink, Eds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 205-219.

Fowler, D.P. 1995. Horace and the Aesthetics of Politics. In *Homage to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 248-266.

Fraenkel, E. 1957. *Horace*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Frank, T. 1918. Horace on Contemporary Poetry. *CJ*. 13(8): 550-564.

Frank, T. 1935. Horace's Definition of Poetry. *CJ*. 31(3): 167-174.

Freudenburg, K. 1993. *The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Frischer, B. 1991. *Shifting Paradigms: New Approaches to Horace's Ars Poetica*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Frye, N. 1972. The Archetypes of Literature. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 422-433.

Genette, G. 1980. *Narrative Discourse*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Genette, G. 1988a. *Narrative Discourse Revisited*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Genette, G. 1988b. Structuralism and Literary Criticism. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 63-78.

Gildersleeve, B.L. & Lodge, G. 1903. *Latin Grammar*. London: Macmillan and Co.

Gini, A. 1991-1992. Platonic Tmesis in Horace's *Ars Poetica*. *CW*. 85: 227-229.

Gowers, E. 2005. The Restless Companion: Horace, *Satires* 1 and 2. In *The Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire*. Edited by K. Freudenburg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 48-61.

Grube, G.M.A. 1965a. Review of Prolegomena. *Phoenix*. 19: 77-82.

Grube, G.M.A. 1965b. *The Greek and Roman Critics*. London: Methuen & Co Ltd.

Habinek, T.N. 1998. *The Politics of Latin Literature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harrison, S. 1995. Some Twentieth-Century Views of Horace. In *Homage to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1-16.

Harrison, S. 2007. Horatian Self-Representations. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 22-35.

Hendrickson, G.L. 1897. Are the Letters of Horace Satires? *AJPhil*. 18(3): 313-324.

Herrmann, L. 1964. Les Deux Parties de l'Art Poétique d'Horace. *Latomus*. 23: 506-510.

Hirsch Jr, E.D. 1988. Faulty Perspectives. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 254-263.

Hirst, P.H. 1970. The Logical and Psychological Aspects of Teaching a Subject. In *The Concept of Education*. Edited by R.S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 44-60.

Hooley, D. 2010. Rhetoric and Satire: Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. In *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*. W. Dominik and J. Hall, Eds. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 396-412.

Hornblower, S & Spawforth, A. Eds. 1996. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Iddeng, J.W. 2005. How shall we comprehend the Roman "I" poet? *C&M*. 56: 185-205.

Innes, D.C. 1989. Augustan Critics. In *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Volume I*. Edited by G.A. Kennedy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 245-273.

Innes, D.C. 2003. Metaphor, Simile, and Allegory as Ornaments of Style. In *Metaphor, Allegory and the Classical Tradition*. Edited by G.R. Boys-Stones. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7-27.

Jakobson, R. 1988. Linguistics and Poetics. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 32-57.

Jung, C.G. 1928. *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*. London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox.

Kennedy, B. H. 1962. *The Revised Latin Primer*. London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd.

Kennedy, G.A. 1992. Is Horace's *Ars Poetica* a Parody? *AJPhil*. 113(3): 441-442.

Kenny, M. 1935. The Critic looks at Horace. *CJ*. 31(3): 183-188.

Kilpatrick, R.S. 1986. *The Poetry of Friendship*. Alberta: The University of Alberta Press.

Kofman, S. 1988. Beyond Aporia? In *Post-Structuralist Classics*. Edited by A. Benjamin. London: Routledge. 7-44.

Konstan, D. 1995. Introduction: Viewing Horace. *Arethusa*. 28: 141-150.

Kühner, R. 1912-1914. *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*. Hannover: Hahn.

La Drière, C. 1939. Horace and the Theory of Imitation. *AJPhil*. 60(3): 288-300.

Laird, A. 2007. The *Ars Poetica*. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 132-143.

Leidl, C.G. 2003. The Harlot's Art: Metaphor and Literary Criticism. In *Metaphor, Allegory and the Classical Tradition*. Edited by G.R. Boys-Stones. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 31-54.

Levi-Strauss, C. 1972. Incest and Myth. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 546-550.

Lewis, C.T. & Short, C. 1879. *A Latin Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lindsay, W.M. 1894. *The Latin Language*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lodge, R.C. 1947. *Plato's Theory of Education*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, Ltd.

Lopez, J.F. 2010. Quintilian as Rhetorician and Teacher. In *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*. W. Dominik and J. Hall, Eds. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 307-322.

Lowrie, M. 2002. Horace, Cicero and Augustus, or the Poet Statesman at *Epistles* 2.1.156. In *Traditions and Contexts in the Poetry of Horace*. T. Woodman and D. Feeney, Eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 158-171.

*Liddell, Scott & Jones: A Greek-English Lexicon*. 1968. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lyne, R.O.A.M. 1995. *Horace: Behind the Public Poetry*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Madvig, I.N. 1857. *A Latin Grammar*. Oxford: John Henry and James Parker.

Marchesi, I. 2005. Traces of a Freed Language: Horace, Petronius and the Rhetoric of Fable. *Cl. Ant.* 24: 307-330.

Mayer, R.G. 2003. *Persona* Problems: The Literary Persona in Antiquity Revisited. *MD.* 50: 55-80.

Miller, J.F. 1993. Apostrophe, Aside and the Didactic Addressee: Poetic Strategies in *Ars Amatoria III*. *MD*. 31: 231-241.

Miller, J.H. 1988. The Critic as Host. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 278-285.

Mitsis, P. 1993. Committing Philosophy on the Reader: Didactic Coercion and Reader Autonomy in the *De Rerum Natura*. *MD*. 31: 111-128.

Moles, J. 2007. Philosophy and Ethics. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 165-180.

Muecke, F. 2007. The Satires. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 105-120.

Noddings, N. 1995. *Philosophy of Education*. Oxford: Westview Press.

Ogle, M.B. 1916. Horace an Atticist. *CPhil.* 11(2): 156-168.

Oliensis, E. 1998. *Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Otis, B. 1964. Review of Prolegomena. *Gnomon.* 36: 265-272.

*Oxford Latin Dictionary*. 1968-1982. Oxford: London Clarendon.

Palmer, A. 1968. *The Satires of Horace*. London: Macmillan.

Pender, E.E. 2003. Plato on Metaphors and Models. In *Metaphor, Allegory and the Classical Tradition*. Edited by G.R. Boys-Stones. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 55-81.

Peters, R.S. 1959. *Authority Responsibility and Education*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Peters, R.S. 1966. *Ethics and Education*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Peters, R.S. 1970. What is an Educational Process? In *The Concept of Education*. Edited by R.S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1-23.

Peters, R.S. 1981. *Essays on Educators*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Plotnick, J. 1979. Horace on Satyr Drama. *CW*. 72(6): 329-335.

Podlecki, A.J. 1969. The Peripatetics as Literary Critics. *Phoenix*. 23(1): 114-137.

Porter, J. 2009. Rhetoric, Aesthetics and the Voice. In *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric*. Edited by E. Gunderson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 92-108.

Ransom, J.C. 1972. Criticism Inc. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 228-239.

Reckford, K. 2002. *Pueri Ludentes: Some Aspects of Play and Seriousness in Horace's 'Epistles'*. *TAPA*. 132(1/2): 1-19.

Regel, G. 1836. *Index Verborum: Horatius*.<sup>157</sup>

Richards, I.A. 1972a. *Communication and the Artist*. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 106-111.

Richards, I.A. 1972b. *The Two Uses of Language*. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 111-114.

Richards, I.A. 1972c. *The Four Kinds of Meaning*. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 115-120.

Roby, H.J. 1874. *A Grammar of the Latin Language*. London: Macmillan and Co.

---

<sup>157</sup> No information regarding location and publisher given.

Roggen, V. 2008. The Effects of Genre on the Value of Words: 'Didactic poetry versus Satire'. *CQ*. 58: 547-564.

Rudd, N. 1960. Horace on the Origins of *Satura*. *Phoenix*. 14: 36-44.

Rudd, N. 1966. *The Satires of Horace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rudd, N. 1989. *Horace: Epistles Book II and the Epistle to the Pisones*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rudd, N. 1993. Horace as a Moralist. In *Horace 2000*. Edited by N. Rudd. London: Duckworth. 64-88.

Russell, D.A. 1973a. *Ars Poetica*. In *Horace*. Edited by C. Costa. London: Routledge. 113-134.

Russell, D.A. 1973b. *Plutarch*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Russell, D.A. 1981. *Criticism in Antiquity*. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd.

Rutherford, R. 2007. Poetics and Literary Criticism. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 248-261.

Savage, J.J.H. 1968. The *Aurea Dicta* of Augustus and the Poets. *TAPA*. 99: 401-417.

Scheffler, I. 1960. *The Language of Education*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas.

Scheffler, I. 1970. Philosophical Models of Teaching. In *The Concept of Education*. Edited by R.S. Peters. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 120-134.

Schofield, H. 1972. *The Philosophy of Education: An Introduction*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Sedgwick, H.D. 1947. *Horace*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Shklovsky, V. 1988. Art as Technique. In *Modern Criticism and Theory*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 16-29.

Siegel, H. 1988. Knowledge, truth and education. In *Education, Knowledge and Truth*. Edited by D. Carr. London: Routledge. 19-36.

Smith, W.K. 1936. The Date of the *Ars Poetica*. *CPhil*. 31(2): 163-166.

Sontag, S. 1972. Against Interpretation. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 652-660.

Syme, R. 1980. The Sons of Piso the Pontifex. *AJPhil*. 101(3): 333-341.

Tarrant, R. 2007a. Horace and Roman Literary History. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 63-76.

Tarrant, R. 2007b. Ancient Receptions of Horace. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 277-290.

Tate, J. 1928. Horace and the Moral Function of Poetry. *CQ*. 22(2): 65-72.

*Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. 1900-2011. Leipzig.

Thomas, R. 2007. Horace and Hellenistic Poetry. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 50-62.

Toohey, P. 1996. *Epic Lessons: An Introduction to Ancient Didactic Poetry*. London: Routledge.

Tracy, H.L. 1948. Horace's *Ars Poetica*: A Systematic Argument. *G&R*. 17: 104-115.

Valéry, P. 1972. Poetry and Abstract Thought: Dancing and Walking. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 254-261.

Volk, K. 2002. *The Poetics of Latin Didactic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Watson, L.C. 2007. The bogus teacher and his relevance for Ovid's *Ars Amatoria*. *Rh.Mus.* 150: 337-374.

Wellek, R. 1972. Literary Theory, Criticism, and History. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 552-563.

West, D. 1967. *Reading Horace*. Edinburgh: At the University Press.

White, P. 2007. Friendship, Patronage, and Horatian Sociopoetics. In *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*. Edited by S. Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 195-206.

Wickham, E.C. 1891. *The Works of Horace, Vol. II*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wilkins, A.S. 1886. *The Epistles of Horace*. London: Macmillan and Co.

Williams, G. 1964. Review of Prolegomena. *JRS*. 54: 186-196.

Williams, G. 1972. *Horace*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wimsatt, W.K. & Beardsley, M.C. 1972a. The Intentional Fallacy. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 334-344.

Wimsatt, W.K. & Beardsley, M.C. 1972b. The Affective Fallacy. In *20<sup>th</sup> Century Literary Criticism*. Edited by D. Lodge. London: Longman. 345-358.

Wiseman, T.P. 1988. Satyrs in Rome? The Background to Horace's *Ars Poetica*. *JRS*. 78: 1-13.

Witke, C. 1970. *Latin Satire*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.