

**SPACE AND SPATIALITY IN THE COLONIAL DISCOURSE OF
GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 1884-1915.**

John Kenneth Noyes

Cape Town, August 1988

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John Kenneth Noyes

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Cape Town in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD.

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ABSTRACT

The present study sets out to accomplish two things: first, to demonstrate that space and spatiality is the domain in which discourse partakes of the colonial project, and second, to isolate a number of textual strategies employed in the discursive production of colonial space.

The first aim requires a lengthy theoretical discussion which occupies the first part of the study. Here I develop the thesis that spatiality as a philosophical preoccupation has never been divorced from the questions of signification and subjectivity, and that the production of significant and subjective space is always a production of social space. In support of this thesis, it is shown that vision and writing are the two functions in which subjective space becomes meaningful, and that in both cases it becomes meaningful only as social space. It is thus in the context of looking and writing that the production of colonial space may be examined as a social space within which meaning and subjectivity are possible.

The second aim requires an analytical study of a number of colonial texts, which I undertake in part II of the study. For simplicity, I have confined myself to the colonial discourse of German South West Africa in the period 1884-1915. The central thesis developed here is that discourse develops strategies for enclosing spaces by demarkating borders, privileging certain passages between spaces and blocking others. This organization of space is presented as the ordering of a chaotic multiplicity and, as such, as a process of civilization. The contradiction between the blocking and privileging of passages results in what I call a "ritual of crossing": an implicit set of rules prescribing the conditions of possibility for crossing the borders it establishes. As a result, in its production of space, the colonial text assumes a mythical function which allows it to transcend the very spaces it produces. It is here that I attempt to situate colonial discourse's claims to universal truth.

In conclusion, the detailed analysis of the production of space in colonial discourse may be understood as a strategic intervention. It attempts to use the texts of colonisation to counter colonization's claims to universal truth and a civilizing mission.

PREFACE

This study is an attempt to do justice to the subtlety of colonization. The popular view of colonization tends to view it as anything but subtle; that it is a process relying on brute force, and that the discourse of colonization attempts to reconcile the world-view of the colonizer with the fact of this force. I have always been struck by the simplicity and naivety of a discourse which is supposedly hiding a deeper knowledge of violence. I am convinced that colonial discourse has a more important and a more immediate role to play in the colonization process, and that the violence which it hides is to be found in its very function. What colonial discourse does is to present us with a set of instructions - on how to look upon the world and see only colonial space; how to move through the landscape and cross only colonial space; how to write about the world and mean only colonial space. That other, physical violence which always accompanies colonization comes later, when this unstable colonial space begins to collapse.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Peter Horn, for his valuable advice and assistance at all stages of this project. I am particularly grateful for his constant encouragement, in word and in example, to pursue lines of thought not confined to the rigid boundaries of one particular discipline.

I would also like to thank my family and my colleagues for providing the perfect atmosphere in which to complete what would otherwise have been a most traumatic enterprise: Prof. Reingard Nethersole, for her assistance in the formulation of this project; Dr. Ulrike Kistner and Dr. Gunther Pakendorf, for the interesting discussions on the topic; my students, whose critical reception helped me to formulate these ideas; Ms. Carlotta von Maltzan, for the proof reading of and commentary on the final draft.

I would also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of: the Harry Oppenheimer Center for African Studies, University of Cape Town, from which I

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received a travel grant to visit the State Archives in Windhoek and the Sam Cohen Library in Swakopmund, Namibia; the University of Cape Town, who provided me with a research grant for related research, much of the findings of which are represented here.

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INTRODUCTION

Only able, as soon as it appears, to operate at the interior of reason, the revolution against reason has only ever the limited scope of what is called - precisely in the language of the Ministry of the Interior - unrest.

Jacques Derrida

1. *Background*

The colonial literature of German South West Africa has enjoyed an erratic fate. This concerns its popularity among the general reading public, as well as its reception within the critical apparatus. In a way, this was inevitable for a body of texts which tend toward an unhappy mixture of fiction, personal narrative, tendentious journalism, and propaganda. Furthermore, this mixture was conceived at a time of major political restructuring within German society, and it spoke of one of the most controversial aspects of contemporary politics - Germany's colonial enterprise. This enterprise gave rise to intense debate, and the discourse of colonialism in Germany bears witness to this intensity. One indication of this is the sheer quantity of German colonial literature. My working list of fictional, semi-fictional, and autobiographical works concerning German South West Africa and written between 1884 and 1945 exceeds 160 titles (excluding the work of the most prolific German colonial author, Hans Grimm), of which approximately 90 were published between 1884 and 1914.¹ And this for a population which never exceeded 13 000 Germans, and a colonial reign which lasted only 20 years (and cost the Imperial Government some 280 million Marks).²

The immediate critical reception of colonial literature was as polarized as the support or rejection of the colonial project as a whole.³ Thus while one writer recommends Gustav Frenssen's best-seller, Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest,⁴ "for every school in the German Empire,"⁵ another notes with sarcasm that the argument

1 Referring to German colonial literature in its entirety, Jürgen Bergmann mentions the figure of about 750 first editions between the years 1881 and 1945. He does not state explicitly what type of text he is referring to, but I assume that this is based on a wider field, including a number of non-fictional works which I did not count. Jürgen Bergmann, "Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht: Bestimmungsfaktoren der deutschen belletristischen Kolonialliteratur" (PhD dissertation, Berlin, 1980), p. 64.

2 Wilfried Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1987), pp. 350-1.

3 Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 64.

4 Gustav Frenssen, Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest. Ein Feldzugsbericht [Peter Moor goes to South West. Report of a campaign] (Berlin: G. Grote'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1906). Bergmann notes that Peter Moor had sold 100 000 copies in its first year, and a total of 430 000 by 1945. p. 64.

5 C. Busse, Der Tag (1906), cit. Joachim Warmbold, "Ein Stückchen neudeutsch Erd'..." Deutsche Kolonial-Literatur. Aspekte ihrer Geschichte. Eigenart und Wirkung, dargestellt am Beispiel Afrikas (Frankfurt/M: Haag & Herchen, 1982), p. 96.

of 'Brotherly love', with which Frenssen sought to support the war against the Herero, could only have been formulated by a German pastor.⁶ Nevertheless, the appearance of German colonial literature was accompanied by a lively body of commentary.⁷

The popularity of colonial literature dwindled after the loss of colonies in 1915. In spite of this, colonial literature continued to be produced. In addition, a number of voices continued to plead the colonial idea with passion throughout the following two decades.⁸ The production and commentary of colonial literature continued to gain momentum during the period of rising fascism and the second world war. This is marked by an increase in commentary on the colonial past, bringing with it not only a renewed vehemence in the polemic against the loss of colonies, but also a renewed interest in colonial literature. This took the form of various monographs, articles, and, above all, dissertations.⁹

I do not intend to take issue explicitly with this considerable body of commentary, for a number of reasons. First of all, it lies, for the most part, outside of the time period I have chosen; that is, it was not generated during the period of colonization, and as such cannot be said to have participated directly in the colonization process. It is a retrospective and nostalgic attempt to re-capture a lost past. In addition, the changed framework of colonial discourse within fascism would require a modification of the analytical parameters I will be developing. I am concerned not with a phantasy of colonial expansion as mirrored in discourse, I am concerned with how discourse participated in a real colonial expansion. I certainly

6 L. Berg, "Ein Feldzugsbericht," Das literarische Echo 9(7) (1907), p. 500, cit. Warmbold, p. 122.

7 Thus, for example, the appearance, from 1899 onward of the review Die deutsche Kolonialliteratur im Jahre ..., ed. M Brose, later ed. Hubert Henoch.

8 The titles speak for themselves; for example, Arthur Dix, Was Deutschland an seinen Kolonien verlor [What Germany lost with its colonies](Berlin, 192?); Heinrich Schnee, Die koloniale Schuldlüge [The lie of colonial guilt] (München, 1927) Heinrich Schnee, Die deutschen Kolonien unter fremder Mandatherrschaft [German colonies under foreign mandate] (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1922).

9 Most of these center around Hans Grimm. Again, the titles speak for themselves; for example, Heinz Kindermann, "Der Kündler des Auslandsdeutschtums. Zum 60. Geburtstag von Hans Grimm" [The herald of Germanity in foreign lands. On Hans Grimm's 60th birthday] Kultur (1935); Edgar Kirsch, Hans Grimm und der nordische Mensch [Hans Grimm and Nordic Man] (München, 1938); One important factor here is almost certainly the changes in institutional policies affecting the personnel at German Universities during the Third Reich.

believe that the fascist phantasy would provide a fruitful object for a study similar to the present one, but it would have to be a study in its own right. Finally, this commentary tends, even at its most profound, to be too banal to grant real insight into the workings of the colonial text.¹⁰

Literary studies in Germany wanted little to do with colonial literature after 1945; one reason was a general reluctance to enter into dialogue with the immediate past; however, another reason was almost certainly the fact that the banal enthusiasm of the commentary generated in the more immediate past had managed to overshadow any earlier attempts at criticism of colonial literature. Furthermore, the post-war period with its emphasis on close reading had neither method nor inclination to develop a position from which colonial literature could be dealt with meaningfully.

2. Problems in the analysis of colonial discourse

It was not until the early 1980's that literary studies in Germany began to turn its critical attention to its colonial literature. The theoretical debate surrounding the sociology of literature and the critique of ideology had prepared the way for an appraisal of literary functions within a wider social context. As a result, the concept of the literary object was expanded to the point where 'trivial' and 'tendentious' texts, such as predominated in colonial literature, could find their place within the literary corpus. These studies initially take the form of a demarkation of the field: the historical background, the authors, contemporary socio-political issues and the way these were manifested in the texts.¹¹ The most important longer studies which must be mentioned in this connection are "Ein Stückchen neudeutsche Erd'...." by Joachim Warmbold; and Literatur und Kolonialismus I, edited by Wolfgang Bader

¹⁰ For example, Hermann Pongs "Grimms afrikanische Novellen," Dichtung und Volkstum (1934): 393-399.

¹¹ See, for example, Gudrun Thiel, "Deutsche Literatur in Südwestafrika 1820-1920" (M A dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1981) for a useful general introduction and overview.

and Janos Riesz. In addition to this, the more recent unpublished PhD dissertations of Jürgen Bergmann and Ulrike Kistner should be mentioned.¹²

Of the works available in German, however, I found little which was of real help in tackling the specific problem of space and spatiality, with the (notable) exception of Kistner's study. The reason for this was almost invariably a methodological inadequacy in the sociology of literature and critique of ideology.¹³ In approaching texts as "literature," but being forced to admit that they are "bad literature" (which they are), analysis necessarily limits itself to listing stereotypes, reconstructing the socio-political framework, providing semi-biographical information and/or unveiling ideological attitudes. When such a method attempts to go beyond this, it finds it has very little to offer in the way of actual textual analysis. There is, for example, usually no attempt to provide a detailed account of the strategies which the text employs in the creation of its stereotypes, or, more important, the mechanisms which link it to the social structure in which it functions.¹⁴ Kistner's study is an exception, in that she attempts to develop a framework within which textual analysis of colonial literature becomes a meaningful endeavour. It is also notable that she does not see herself bound to the traditional distinction between pulp literature and *belles lettres*, but speaks of 'colonial discourse'. She is thus able to overcome the (self-imposed)

12 See note 1 above; Ulrike Kistner, "Die kolonisierende Rede. Strukturen eines restringierenden Kodes am Beispiel eines Romans von Martin Jaekel." (PhD dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986). German South West African colonial literature has also enjoyed a fruitful debate in South African academic circles. For example, see Gunther Pakendorf, Of colonizers and colonized: Hans Grimm on German South West Africa (Cape Town: University of Cape Town African Studies Publication, 1985); Gunther Pakendorf, "Mord in der Steppe. Zu einer Motiv bei Hans Grimm und Charles Sealsfield," Acta Germanica 16 (1983); Astrid von Kotze, "Teutonic ladies and their 'savages': thoughts on women writers and their image of the black population of colonial South West Africa, 1900-1914," in Class, community and conflict: local perspectives. History workshop 1984. (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Publication, 1984); Peter Horn, "Fremdheitskonstruktionen weißer Kolonisten," in Perspektiven und Verfahren interkultureller Germanistik, ed. Alois Wierlacher (München: judicium, 1987); Horn, Peter. "Die Versuchung durch die barbarische Schönheit. Zu Hans Grimms farbigen Frauen." Germanisch Romanische Monatsschrift (1985); Dorian Haarhoff, "'Emeralds, ex-gentlemen, Escom and Iscor': Frontier literature in Namibia circa 1925," and "Birds, beasts and flowers: the 19th century travelogue: frontier themes and images in pre-colonial Namibia," both unpublished mss.

13 Kistner has delivered a convincing critique of the methodological shortcomings to be found here, and, rather than repeating what she has said, I refer the reader to her study, part 1.2 "*problématique*," and part 2 "*Textuelle Territorialisierungen*." Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, pp 5-15; pp 16-20.

14 This is my major criticism of Warmbold's book, and is plainly evident in Part B, "Koloniale Stoffe und ihre Gestaltung."

stumbling block which German literary studies inevitably encounters with the question of colonial literature; that is, the belief that, because the colonial text often masquerades as *belles lettres*, it must be approached as such. I am convinced that this masquerade is itself an important strategy of colonial discourse, and that it is ultimately connected to the question of spatiality. For this reason, it is significant that, in her analysis, Kistner finds herself constantly returning to the question of the spatiality of the text.¹⁵

There is another, in my opinion more serious, shortcoming of the approach to colonial literature found in Warmbold's, but especially in Bader and Riesz' study. If it is to avoid repeating the very same strategies which were integral to colonization, a critique of the colonial text must find a way of speaking about its object without attempting to do so from a position of universal knowledge. Colonization always seemed most convincing when it justified itself in terms of a general advancement of the human race, and a general expansion of the frontiers of knowledge. How, then, are we to interpret it when Janos Riesz states in his "Ten theses on the relation of colonialism to literature" that history increases our knowledge of colonial literature by constantly developing the inherent potential meaning of the text?¹⁶ Or that comparative studies would be in a position to overcome Eurocentricity in the study of literature simply by expanding its boundaries to include the literatures of the ex-colonized!¹⁷ Is that not exactly what colonization did? It expanded the boundaries of its knowledge to include the non-European world, and when it did so, it told itself it was developing some inherent potential in the world, and contributing to the

15 See ch. 2: Textuelle Territorialisierungen, and especially parts 2.11, 2.12, 1.16 & 2.17.

16 "In der Geschichte der literarischen Rezeption von Werken, die der Kolonial-Thematik zuzurechnen sind, stellt sich die Aufgabe einer Analyse der sukzessiven Entfaltung des im dichterischen Werk angelegten Sinnpotentials: was erst noch unklar war, wird zunehmend deutlicher, gewinnt schärfere Konturen." Janos Riesz, "Zehn Thesen zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Literatur," in Literatur und Kolonialismus I, ed. Wolfgang Bader and Janos Riesz, Bayreuther Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft 4 (Frankfurt and Bern: Peter Lang, 1983), p. 10. My emphasis.

17 "Die Komparatistik als supranationale und polyglotte Literaturwissenschaft hat in diesem Zusammenhang nicht nur die Aufgabe, die im Lichte der Kolonial-Thematik sich ergebenden Gemeinsamkeiten der europäischen Literaturen im Hinblick auf eine neue Literaturgeschichte Europas zu erarbeiten, sondern auch - durch Einbeziehung der Literatur der ehemals Kolonisierten - unser eurozentrisch geprägtes Literaturverständnis zu überwinden und dadurch zur Entwicklung der 'Weltliteratur' beizutragen." Riesz, Zehn Thesen, p. 11. My emphasis.

advancement of humanity. This, then, is the problem which I intend to address: colonization depends upon this expansion of boundaries in the name of knowledge, and an analysis of colonial discourse must address the specific strategies by which this discourse sought to do so at any one place and time, without itself repeating them.

There is a line of inquiry into the problem of colonial discourse, which I believe more fruitful than an attempt to criticize ideology from an abstract position of superior knowledge, and it is this debate which I will take as my frame of reference. I am referring to the discussion which was initiated in French intellectual circles by the experience of the Algerian war of independence.¹⁸ Without wishing to set up artificial lines of influence, it is important to realize that these authors initiated a debate on colonialism within the framework of psychoanalysis and Marxian theory, together with (particularly in Memmi's case) a certain existentialist input from Sartre, which is still being conducted, particularly in America.¹⁹ In bringing colonialism within the domain of Marxian and psychoanalytic theory, however, a number of problems were also raised, which continue to plague the study of colonial discourse. It is characteristic of a number of studies of colonial discourse that the combination of psychoanalysis and Marxian theory leads to an uncertainty as to the relations between 'socio-economic facts' and 'unconscious facts' in the production of the colonial text.

18 This is most notably the work of Frantz Fanon, Black skin, white masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove, 1965); The wretched of the earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove, 1965); A dying colonialism, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove, 1967); Toward the African revolution, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove, 1967). See also Albert Memmi, The colonizer and the colonized, introd. Jean-Paul Sartre (Boston: Beacon, 1967).

19 See, for example, the publication of the "Group for the critical study of colonial discourse, University of California, Santa Cruz:" Inscriptions (1985-), to name but one example. The initial impetus for the study of colonial discourse in the United States was provided by Edward Said's Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978), a study which owes much to the work of Foucault. In England, Homi Bhabha has developed the colonial discourse debate in an interesting direction by testing not only the ideas of Foucault, but those of Lacan and Derrida. The present study owes much to his ideas. The following articles should be mentioned, "Of mimicry and man: the ambivalence of colonial discourse," October 28 (Spring 1984); "Difference, discrimination, and the discourse of colonization." In Literature, politics and theory. Papers from the Essex Conference, 1976-84, pp. 194-211. Edited by Francis Barker. London & New York: Methuen, 1986. "Signs taken as wonders: questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi, May 1817." In "Race," writing, and difference, pp. 163-184. Edited by Henry Louis Gates Jr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Collected essays originally published in Critical Inquiry, vol. 12(1) (1985), and vol. 13(1) (1986).

relations between 'socio-economic facts' and 'unconscious facts' in the production of the colonial text.

In order to illustrate some of the difficulties which the analysis of colonial literature raises for a method which is not certain whether it is Freudian or Marxist, or both, I wish to discuss briefly Hugh Ridley's Images of imperial rule.²⁰ Ridley's book on colonial literature presents many insights which have been of use for the present study. In particular, I would refer the reader to his informative (though brief) analysis of the relation between colonial literature and the contemporary European socio-economic and political environment.²¹ In the present study, however, I will be adopting an analytical position which I believe capable of overcoming a number of weaknesses in Ridley's method. There are certainly valuable lessons to be gained from a study such as his; however, I believe that if we are to understand colonial literature, we must attempt to see it, not "historically, as a reflection of the European mind," but as a functional component of colonial practice.

The difficulty in Ridley's intent becomes apparent when he states the "method of historical reading" he will employ. Taking O. Mannoni's lead, he begins with a reading of Robinson Crusoe as the symptom, not only of Defoe's "individual neurosis," but also of a collective or group neurosis characteristic of Defoe's Europe.²² This group neurosis is to be understood in its historical specificity, and causes Crusoe to people his island with "embodiments of his own fears."²³ This is in itself a very good thesis, and I will be arguing along similar lines at a later stage. I also agree with Ridley when he implies that colonial literature, as a symptom of group neurosis "reflects its age both in the virtues which it parades and in the shortcomings and blind spots it contains" (though I find the word 'reflect' ill-chosen).²⁴ Finally, I believe it possible to gain valuable analytical insights from the

20 Hugh Ridley, Images of Imperial rule (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983).

21 See particularly pp 50-52.

22 O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: the psychology of colonization (New York: Praeger, 1964).

23 Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 6.

24 Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 6.

idea that "the colonial praxis reflected in colonial literature was an acting-out of domestic pressures and unconscious attitudes."²⁵ These insights, however, should have led him to an entirely different method. If neurosis is indeed group neurosis (and Deleuze and Guattari will put forward good arguments for this case), then how can we hope to find that something which is the "European mind"? We cannot interrogate something like a historical reality, since neurosis establishes its own reality; and in the case of a group neurosis as extensive as that suggested by Ridley, this alternative reality is history. Nor can we interrogate other contemporary texts without first establishing definite criteria for the part they play in this group neurosis. Psychoanalytic theory instructs us, however, that analysis may be seen as a strategic intervention, designed to produce our own text on the basis of another given text which we do not wish to accept at face value, i.e. which gives us reason to believe that it is hiding something. Lacan tells us that the symptom is a metaphor, and that the metaphor produces meaning by the elision of a signifier which has been banished from the signifying chain. This elision is the European mind and we need not look beyond the surface of the text to find it. What we do need to ask is, what has been produced in the production of the symptom as a metaphor? The answer I am offering is the colony as a space in which meaning is possible.

It is because of his disregard for the spatial production involved in colonial discourse that Ridley is able, for example, to regard the colonial landscape as "a morally and politically neutral topic," something which it certainly is not.²⁶ Nor does it do justice to the spatializing work of colonial discourse to attempt to see the landscape as the site of "the range of relationships possible between the literary imagination and the concrete aims of imperial conquest."²⁷ Colonial landscape is not found by the colonizer as a neutral and empty space, no matter how often he assures us that this is so. This is one of the most persistent myths of colonization. Colonial landscape is produced as one possible level of spatiality onto which desire

²⁵ Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 146.

²⁶ Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 63.

²⁷ Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, p. 63.

may be mapped in the service of social production. I will discuss this in more detail in Part II. In his sensitive reading of Kipling's landscapes, Ridley himself goes on to demonstrate this fact, particularly with reference to the ordering work which colonization effects on a chaotic landscape in order to make it more productive.²⁸ Again, however, his conclusion regarding the French writer Psichari is misleading. Here he claims that the "African landscape is one of self-affirmation, not of discovery."²⁹ Having previously shown that discovery, as embodied in the French exotic novel, contains within itself the dialectic of the familiar and the strange,³⁰ I do not see how he can uphold this claim.

Ridley's basic indecision as to the correct method for dealing with the symptoms of a historically specific group neurosis also leads him to a certain confusion regarding the function of literature in imperialism. He is, of course, quite right in not attempting "to systematize colonial fiction in isolation from social and economic factors in Europe," and is certainly correct in examining it "in the explanation and justification which it offered for the practices of imperialism."³¹ This is, however, not where the efficacy of colonial literature lies. If we ask ourselves what colonial literature did, how it worked, not what it reflected, explained or justified, then we will realize that it is one of the many specific praxes which constitute imperialism. It did surely possess a secondary (explanatory or justificatory) role, but it functioned primarily by serving to organize and coordinate a number of other imperialist functions on a different level. I will also be pursuing this function in more detail in part II.

Finally, Ridley shows himself unable to appreciate the function of violence in colonial literature. By seeking to explain those abundant and overbearing scenes of violence in colonial fiction, and particularly that fiction centered around the Herero wars, he states quite rightly that "it was neither in the interests of the settlers, nor to the liking of the German public to fight the battles which German colonial writers

²⁸ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 63.

²⁹ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 67.

³⁰ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 15.

³¹ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 100.

described with such realism... in short, they represented the interests of neither group of their readers.." However, this does not permit the conclusion that "they saw an ideological message behind these depictions, and that even the most pointless violence suggested to them a view of life which they wanted to communicate."³² It is entirely unclear here how the question of individual intent in the production of ideological messages could be answered. I would rather suggest the explanation that, in order to clear a space in which writing is possible, the colonial novelists must enter the dialectic of aggression and narcissism which Lacan describes as fundamental in the constitution of subjectivity as social being. This suggestion is supported by the sheer pleasure with which colonial discourse directs the eye to its scenes of horror. I will be focussing on the importance of this idea in the creation of spaces in which meaning becomes possible as social meaning. The model of literature (which could be termed a "critique of ideology") to which Ridley takes recourse whenever the question of intent begins to subvert the thesis of group neurosis is not convincing. Thus, for example, when he refers to E. Bloch's discussion of pulp literature in order to uncover an essential and potentially revolutionary (in the Marxian sense) tension within colonial literature. I agree with Ridley that this is a valuable idea indeed, but when he discusses this tension as a class tension and a "fearing assent to history,"³³ we ask just what the mechanisms might be whereby these tensions find their way into the colonial text. As soon as we begin to pursue these mechanisms we find that the ideological model runs up against serious problems. In order to avoid these, I will be using Deleuze and Guattari's radical revision of Marxian tenets to claim that tensions within the colonial text must be read not so much on the level of class, but of desire. We will find much evidence in the colonial text for a conflict between an essentially chaotic desire and its manipulation and organization in the service of social production or, more specifically, in the production of spaces whose quality is conducive to social practices.

³² Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 142.

³³ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 30.

A similar problem to that affecting Ridley's analysis is evident in Abdul R. JanMohammed's Manichean aesthetics. The politics of literature in colonial Africa.³⁴ JanMohammed begins by rightly criticising any existing studies of colonial literature which have "examined such texts in a socio-political vacuum."³⁵ However, when we read the introduction, it becomes increasingly clear that he himself is not entirely certain how the relation between the text and social reality are best to be analyzed. JanMohammed takes up the discussion of the dialectic of colonizer and colonized epitomized by the works of Fanon and Memmi.³⁶ As a consequence, he grants a central importance to "the nature of the influence of colonial social structures of works produced within that ambiance."³⁷ This he considers to be a necessity in terms of his object, since literature focusses on socio-political relations, not economic ones.³⁸ This is perhaps correct, but it necessarily leads him to an analysis of his chosen texts as evidence of a "colonial experience," of which he sets out to provide "a phenomenologically accurate description."³⁹ This in turn leads him to the belief that the quality of colonial experience can in some way dictate the main aspects of colonialism upon which textual analysis should focus.⁴⁰ It is precisely here that the weakness of such a phenomenology of colonialism becomes apparent. If we approach the colonial text in terms of colonial experience, we are forcing ourselves to overlook any number of important motivating factors in the production of the text, simply because these factors were not experienced as important. In other

³⁴ Abdul R. JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics. The politics of literature in colonial Africa (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983).

³⁵ JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 1.

³⁶ JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, pp. 4-5.

³⁷ JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 6.

³⁸ "Though it is quite true that social relations are largely determined by economic motives, that the economic imperatives behind imperialism lead to the rise of colonialism, and that the metropole-colony relationship is essentially the same as that between capital and labour, it is the socio-political aspects of the relation between colonizer and colonized that are, from a literary point of view, more significant." JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 2.

³⁹ JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 7.

⁴⁰ "The major distinction in such a society is *experienced* in terms of race, which, unlike the horizontal division that defines class relations, can function both horizontally and vertically: regardless of the native's relation to modes of production or the amount of wealth he may accumulate, he will always be considered inferior by the colonialist." JanMohammed, Manichean aesthetics, p. 7, emphasis in original.

words, we are approaching the colonial text on *its* terms, not ours. I find this unacceptable as the basis for a methodology of colonial discourse-analysis.

A similar problem emerges in JanMohammed's later essay, "The economy of Manichean allegory: the function of racial difference in colonialist literature."⁴¹ Here again, he attempts to employ the concept of a Manichean colonialist aesthetic in the service of a methodology which could do justice to the colonial text in "the political context of culture and history."⁴² When JanMohammed begins to discuss the "affective benefits proffered by the Manichean allegory," however, it becomes clear that he is actually talking about something else - the structure of signification and the uses this structure has in colonial relations.⁴³ I have no argument with him here, save that it would have been better to call this function by its name and leave Manicheism to a specific textual strategy within this general structuring factor of signification which is so important in colonial discourse. This would have led to a better understanding of the subtlety with which Manicheism as a strategy can be activated and deactivated in order to produce the illusion of universally valid meaning in colonial discourse. I will be addressing this issue later.

In this article, we also see JanMohammed's hypotheses leading him directly to what I consider to be the two dead ends of analysis of colonial discourse - author intention and character depiction. The fallacy of author intention becomes apparent when it is tied to a notion of what we might call 'imperialist intention' - the will of the conqueror. It is an important observation on JanMohammed's part when he states that in colonial literature the other world is perceived as "uncontrollable, chaotic, unattainable, and ultimately evil."⁴⁴ This however cannot be explained by the motivating factor of an imperialist "desire to conquer and dominate."⁴⁵ A careful reading of colonialist texts will show us that conquest and domination are an effect, an appearance of imperialist desire. The latter is often as 'innocent' as the desire to

41 JanMohammed, "The economy of manichaen allegory: the function of racial difference in colonialist literature," in *"Race," writing, and difference*, ed. Gates.

42 JanMohammed, *Manichaen allegory*, p. 78.

43 JanMohammed, *Manichaen allegory*, p. 86-7.

44 JanMohammed, *Manichaen allegory*, p. 83.

45 JanMohammed, *Manichaen allegory*, p. 83.

escape the restrictions of European life and experience wide open spaces. In discourse, desire is a textual strategy and JanMohammed's continual reference to what an author does or wants is far from convincing. It causes him to overlook the productive function of desire in the colonial situation, and the role which an aesthetic of the stereotype plays in this production. The fact that Manichean characterization draws borders is obvious. What we should ask is, how are these borders activated productively in colonial discourse. This forces us to confront the Manichean dialectic from an entirely different point of view. It will lead us also to ask whether the dialectic itself does not participate, on a higher logical level, in the Manichean strategy of boundaries. What if, because of its insistence on an original distinction between the fields of discourse and 'actual political practice', an analysis such as that envisaged by JanMohammed, "an analysis that maps [colonial discourse's] ideological function in relation to actual imperialist practices,"⁴⁶ were always destined to reduce itself to that very same "central trope, the manichean allegory"⁴⁷ which it claims to analyze?

3. Outline of investigation

In order to do justice to the complex interaction of subjectivity, signification, and social production in colonization, I will be asking the reader to bear with me in a rather lengthy discussion of how the spaces of meaning and of subjectivity are produced. Only after having offered an explanation of this production will I be asking how these spaces intersect with the spaces of social production, and it is in this context that the production of colonial space will be raised. The reader will appreciate that such a discussion takes us to the heart of the protracted, often very tedious, and no longer highly fashionable discussion surrounding the question of Freudo-Marxism. Rather than surveying a number of the fields in which this

⁴⁶ JanMohammed, *Manichaen allegory*, p. 80.

⁴⁷ JanMohammed, *Manichaen allegory*, p. 78.

discussion has been conducted, I will begin with a discussion of the spatiality of the sign, then address that field of the Freudo-Marxism debate which I believe is most fruitful for the present discussion: the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari.

I will be working, then, with the hypothesis that discourse plays an integral and primary role in the colonization process, and that this role is to be found in a very real ability to organize space into structures conducive to the functioning of the colony.

In arguing this hypothesis, I will be developing the following theses:

1. Space as the object of philosophical inquiry is traditionally bound up with a discussion of positions capable of structuring an ambient field. This structuration extends not only to physical space, but also to what I will call the spatiality of the sign and the space of subjectivity. In the unities which present themselves to us as a subject or a sign, spatiality is preserved as the trace of difference which Derrida uncovers in philosophical discourse.

2. If we are to understand how these unities are mobilized in colonization, we will have to understand the way in which their space is produced as a space of the *socius*. The most important functions which facilitate this production are vision and writing. Both vision and writing have a material dimension. This allows us to derive a materiality of space as the domain in which the production of subjectivity coincides with the production of social form. In the materialism proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, this is not based upon an essential lack, as suggested by Lacan, but upon a productive multiplicity of desire. A materialism of spatiality allows us to overcome the single major weakness of psychoanalytic theory, which, in oscillating between universal validity and specific appearance, repeats the structure of colonial knowledge. In contrast to this, my analysis understands itself as functional: it asks how a diverse and chaotic multiplicity has been organized into a spatial unity - colonial space.

3. Colonization creates discreet spatial unities, and establishes privileged passages between them. This, in turn, creates a logically higher totality. These

passages also stipulate the manner in which it is possible to project one spatial quality onto another; for example, under what conditions it is possible to treat the space of the sign as if it were the same space as that of the subject.

4. This totalization depends upon 'nodal points,' - points of transformation which have the power to separate one quality of space from another by defining the principle of passage. If, for example, a border is to be crossed, it must be crossed at a particular point, in a particular way; and if truth is to be seen, the eye must look from a particular point in a particular way. These points reserve a position for themselves outside of time and space; they are always marked by a leap from the determined and the specific to the transcendental and the universal.

5. The subjective and signifying mechanisms which allow this leap from the specific to the universal always involves an investment in a loss of Being or Meaning. This loss is compensated in attempts to fix subjectivity and signification in physical space - in writing on the earth. As a result, the organization of colonial space becomes increasingly rigid and determined.

6. The increasingly rigid organization of space in colonization is constantly threatening to fragment the totality of space it seeks to create. To counter this, colonial discourse develops a mythic function - it creates an unlimited mobility across borders, and in doing so, it reconfirms these borders within a totalized experience of space. This is what I call the mythical mastery of space.

I will not be attempting to reconstruct a comprehensive socio-historical context. It is not my aim to develop an image of continuity; on the contrary, it should emerge that the space of the socius has nothing to do with continuity.⁴⁸ The aim of my analysis is to show that the colony functions through interconnections of a different kind. Those who are interested in the general history of German South West Africa, as well as discussions of a more specific nature, will find some excellent reference works.⁴⁹

48 This is what Foucault took such pains to emphasize throughout The archaeology of knowledge; trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972). See particularly pp. 3-5.

49 I found the following of interest, to mention but a few: Helmut Bley, South West Africa under German rule 1884-1914 (London: Heinemann, 1971). A. F. Calvert, South West Africa during the

I have attempted at all times to use "space" in a definite way. I am not interested in descriptions of landscape, except where they serve to produce spaces as I define them. I am concerned with the spaces which are opened up in looking and writing, and the way these spaces are transformed as they move from the domains of subjective perception to various practices of movement and spatial organization, and to various inscribing practices.⁵⁰ This means that I will also have to address such questions as "distance," "strangeness," or the "foreign" quality of the colony as questions of space.⁵¹ As a result of this concept of space, I am often more interested in tracing a certain theme through a number of texts than in examining its 'context'. I may therefore be criticized for my tendency to select certain passages from the works I have chosen and analyze them out of 'context'. What I hope to achieve whenever I do this is to show that spatializing textual constructions seem to wander almost at random through the body of colonial texts. The themes I analyze usually possess a coherence of their own which may be modified or enhanced by their

German occupation (London: Laurie, 1916); Horst Drechsler, Let us die fighting. The struggle of the Herero and Nama against German imperialism (Berlin, 1966); Keith Gottschalk, Colonialism, commonage, and proletarianization. A re-analysis of the Bondelswart rebellion (Cape Town: University of Cape Town African Studies Publication, 1985); Department of Publicity and Information, SWAPO of Namibia, To be born a nation. The liberation struggle for Namibia (London: Zed, 1981); V. G. Kiernan, The lords of humankind. Black man, yellow man, and white man in an age of Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); R. J. B. Moorsom, Colonisation and proletarianisation. An exploratory investigation of the formation of the working class in Namibia and German South West Africa (Sussex: Sussex University Press, 1973).

⁵⁰ There are, nevertheless, some extremely interesting studies of literary space, which, while not directly relevant to the present study, are recommendable: Maurice Blanchot, The space of literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982) is one of the finest works on literary space. A useful collection of essays is Alexander Ritter, ed., Landschaft und Raum in der Erzählkunst, Wege der Forschung, vol. 418 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975). Also of interest are L. Gruszewska, "Polish studies in literary space" Essays in poetics 9(2) (Sept 1984): 24 - 32; R. Jarvella and W. Klein, Speech, place and action. Studies in deixis and related topics (New York: John Wiley and sons 1982) - this is not, strictly speaking, a work on literary space, but I found it contained some useful concepts which could be applied to literature; Gabriel Zoran, "Towards a theory of space in narrative," Poetics today 5 (1984). Richard Alewyn, "Eine Landschaft Eichendorffs," Euphorion 51 (1957).

⁵¹ This may be seen, for example, in Peter Horn's essay on the construction of "foreignness" by white colonizers, in which it is shown that the "strange" or "foreign" as a European construction delegates its objects to that realm (or space) defined by the negation of European consciousness. "Im Grunde ist das "Fremde" nichts anderes als jenes Menschliche, das wir aus unserem Bewußtsein, unserer Sprache, unserem Verhalten verdrängt haben: das "Fremde" wird in dem Augenblick geschaffen, in dem das Subjekt aus der Spaltung von Bewußtem und Unbewußtem gesellschaftlich konstituiert wird." Peter Horn, Fremdheitskonstruktionen, p. 405.

'context', or may stand in contradiction to it (I have given a few examples of this interaction), but do not rely on it for their spatializing function.

It is also not my intention to uncover or imply an 'objective event', whose existence may be demonstrated by continual textual references. I would rather choose to speak of textual spaces which are produced in certain discursive practices, and which open onto other spaces 'outside of' the text.

I will not be addressing the question of time directly, although it will become clear that the question of time borders constantly on that of space. As this study was nearing completion I came across the work of Johannes Fabian, in particular Time and the Other, in which I found preoccupations very similar to my own, but from the point of view of time, and with specific reference to anthropological discourse. I found Fabian's central thesis of particular interest: that anthropological discourse creates its object through the construction of a temporal alterity, within which that object may be examined. This alterity allows the object to appear at a distance, which Fabian also recognizes as possessing a spatial dimension.⁵² It becomes particularly evident in his fourth chapter, entitled "The Other and the eye: time and the rhetoric of vision," that the question of time always opens onto the question of space. I will be addressing this opening from the other side, the side of space, where this becomes necessary, and I agree with Fabian that it is particularly in the realm of vision that this is so.

Furthermore, Fabian's central thesis implies that the discipline of anthropology creates its object by establishing a space through the negation of time. In part I, I will be addressing the implications of the creation of space through the negation of time for a theory of the spatiality of the sign. In part II, I will return frequently to the idea that knowledge creates spaces, not only spaces in which its object is defined, but in which it may function as knowledge. I believe that it is not only anthropology which creates the space of its object through the negation of time, but that this is a

⁵² Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other. How anthropology makes its object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. xi.

more general aspect of scientific objects-formation. This applies particularly to the natural sciences as they existed in the late 19th century.

I also agree with Fabian's thesis that, with respect to anthropology, "it is naturalized-spatialized Time which gives meaning (in fact a variety of specific meanings) to the distribution of humanity in space."⁵³ In attempting to gain insight from this thesis for a study of colonial discourse, I would, however, plead for certain reservations. Speaking in more general terms, I would claim that the creation of meaning is a more subtle process. In part I, I will attempt to show how meaning requires a dual gesture which spatializes time in the sign, but which is effective through an elision of this spatializing process. Thus I will attempt to show how, in colonization, meaning produces spaces while developing strategies for the elision of the spatializing process. This is a complex process, in which space is constantly being produced and elided. It is for this reason that I disagree with Fabian's claim that "little needs to be said... about separation and distancing in colonial praxis which drew its ideological justification from Enlightenment thought and later evolutionism."⁵⁴ The second part of this sentence, together with Fabian's insights into the ways in which disciplinary knowledge borders constantly on political praxis, would indicate to me that precisely such a study might be of great use. I hope to be able to demonstrate this here.

A word needs to be said about my selection of primary texts. I may be accused of mixing fictional and non-fictional texts in a haphazard manner. It should emerge from my discussion that the distinction between the fictional and the non-fictional, precarious at all times, becomes even more so with reference to colonial discourse. Nevertheless, I do not wish to claim that no such difference exists. I would rather suggest that the difference lies not in one particular text, but in the various and diverse relations into which a given text may enter at any one time. I have also not attempted to be exhaustive in my selection of primary texts. I have, instead, chosen a number of prose works which I consider representative of the colonial discourse of

⁵³ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 25.

⁵⁴ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 27.

German South West Africa. I have not included lyric or dramatic forms in this study. It may surprise the reader to find that I have omitted the writer whose works come most immediately to mind when the theme of colonial space is mentioned - Hans Grimm, and more particularly his novel Volk ohne Raum.⁵⁵ The reasons are the same as outlined earlier - the nostalgic phantasies of imperial expansion which Grimm (and others) entertained after the loss of German colonies fall outside of the scope of this study, since he is no longer writing within the colonial project.⁵⁶ All translations from primary sources, which are listed under a separate heading in the bibliography, are my own. Wherever I translate from a secondary source, this is stated in the footnote.

Finally, there is a problem of terminology when speaking of colonial discourse. This concerns the land and its inhabitants. The nation known as Namibia has struggled hard to free itself from colonial domination, and has, at the time of writing, still not succeeded entirely; it may thus seem inappropriate to refer to it with the old colonial label. My intention is purely historical - I refer to the territory which, from 1884 to 1914 was known as German South West Africa. The same problem applies to the inhabitants, those who were there before the colonizers arrived. How do we name them, without colonizing them? Even the ethnographer is guilty of fixing relatively static domains, both demographically and geographically, domains which the colonizer will later use when establishing his enclosures. Rather than resort to euphemisms, I have consistently used the colonial terms to denote the colonial 'objects:' "native" and "savage." It is my sincere wish that the reader accept my apologies and read these with the necessary irony.

⁵⁵ Hans Grimm, Volk ohne Raum [Nation without space],

⁵⁶ For those interested in pursuing the topic of Grimm and spatiality I recommend Jürgen Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, pp. 130-132, 148-150; Dieter Lattmann, "Raum als Traum: Hans Grimm und seine Saga von der Volkheit," in Propheten des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Karl Schwedhelm (München, 1969); Ernst Keller, "Ein Volk ohne Raum? Hans Grimm," in Nationalsozialismus und Literatur, by Ernst Keller (Bern, 1970); Peter Zimmermann, "Kampf um den Lebensraum. Ein Mythos der Kolonial- und Blut-und-Boden-Literatur," in Die deutsche Literatur im Dritten Reich, ed. Horst Denkler und Karl Prümm (Stuttgart: Reclam 1976).

PART ONE: SPACE, SIGNIFYING SPACE, SUBJECTIVE SPACE

CHAPTER 1: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE POINT: THE METAPHYSICAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE

*The opposition of our positions is indeed radical;
in this, we are in complete agreement...*
Jean-Francois Lyotard

In this chapter, I will be attempting to provide one of the many possible answers to the question: what is space? It is of the very nature of space that the manner in which the question is formulated will suggest the answer. In this first chapter, I wish to pursue the mode of questioning and some possible answers put forward by metaphysical philosophy. I agree with Cassirer when he insists on a sharp differentiation between mythical and geometrical space - the latter being to a large extent the space of metaphysics.¹ But this qualitative differentiation does not allow us to dismiss a philosophy of space or a geometry as irrelevant to a discussion of literature and related discursive practices.²

The present study is to a large extent a study of the point as a position in space - a position capable of bearing meaning, and of structuring ambient space in a particular way. We begin here with an examination of the point as a vital concept in the metaphysical discussion of space. I will be attempting to show that, even in its 'purest' form, the theories of Aristotle, the point is at all times "contaminating" itself with questions of signification and subjectivity. The reason for this is simple. Subjectivity and signification are themselves spatial. In later chapters I will be seeking to explore the nature of this contamination in more detail, with the aim of showing that a point is always in a relationship with more than one quality of space, irrespective of the quality in which we initially attempt to situate it. Having proven this to our satisfaction, I will then show more specifically that this multiple quality has definite discursive and hence "political" repercussions.

1 ARISTOTELEAN PLACE, MOTION AND SPACE

1.1 *Aristotle's definition of place*

1 Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. Teil II: *Das mythische Denken* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), p. 105.

2 This is evident in a number of recent approaches to the "literary" text, most notably the work of Michel Serres.

When, in the following, I examine Aristotle's concept of space, I hope to show that metaphysics is always in dialogue with its own limits. This is clear in the very origins of Aristotle's concept of space - his attempt to solve Zeno's famous paradox.³

With this paradox, the entire metaphysical discussion of the nature of space is opened up. For, in order to solve the paradox, it must be demonstrated that everything is not in place, or that place itself is not something, or at least that it is something of a different nature than everything else which must be in place.

Aristotle has been called "the philosopher of common sense," the defendant of the beliefs of "the plain man."⁴ And his discussion of space has been seen as an elaboration and systematization of common knowledge relating to objective space. The fundamental position of both of these concepts (objectivity and common knowledge) in Aristotle's philosophy must in turn be seen in conjunction with his mistrust of a philosophical usage of language aimed at introducing complexity on a metaphysical level where there is no objective justification for this complexity - in other words, his rejection of the Sophist tradition as he saw it.⁵

I would like to suggest, tentatively at this stage, that this rejection could also assume the nature of a repression. If this is so, we should, in the following discussion, reach a point where we will be forced to confront Aristotle's silences, the aporia in his system which, without damaging it in the slightest, open onto a certain number of questions (or a certain question) which may not be asked. Let us bear this in mind as we discuss his ideas.

3 In Max Jammer's paraphrase, this says that "everything is in place; this means that it is in something; but if place is something, then place itself is in something, etc." Max Jammer, Concepts of space. The history of theories of space in physics (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 16.

4 Philip Wicksteed, Introduction to The Physics, by Aristotle (London: Heinemann, 1929), p. xxi. See also Aristotle's definition of a "problem" as a function of the opinion of the "masses" - The works of Aristotle, gen. ed. W. D. Ross, vol. I, Topica, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), para. 104b1-18; see also note 38 below)

5 "... the plain man who has not been accustomed to hard thinking can easily be misled by thinkers who have themselves gone astray or by sophists who take pleasure in misleading him. So Aristotle attempts to give precision to the plain man's conceptions, to release him from confusions into which the ambiguities and imperfections of language may have betrayed him..." Wicksteed (1929), p. xxii.

In the Categories, space is described as a continuous quantity, and place is defined in terms of the continent function.⁶ What this means is that "'Space' here is conceived as the sum total of all places occupied by bodies, and 'place' (*topos*), conversely, is conceived as that part of space whose limits coincide with the limit of the occupying body."⁷

It should be noted, however, that in the major work dealing with "space," De Physica, Aristotle "does not advance a theory of space at all, but only a theory of place or a theory of positions in space. However, since the Platonic and Democritian conceptions of space are unacceptable to the Aristotelian system of thought, and since the notion of empty space is incompatible with his physics, Aristotle develops only a theory of positions in space."⁸

The Atomists had argued before him that a theory of the void was a necessary precondition to any concept of motion, since an empty space was required if a body was to vacate a space and move to another space, displacing the body which had occupied this latter space. According to Aristotle, however, the theory of the void is not only unnecessary, it is incapable of explaining motion, and furthermore it is confused in itself.⁹

Aristotle argued that place is distinct from the bodies which occupy it to the extent that it may be seen as a "continent vessel" for these bodies. In rejecting previous attempts to define place (among these Plato's), he presents us with four possible definitions, of which only the final one can be upheld.

From all this [the question of displacement of parts and wholes in motion] the answer to the question 'What is place?' already emerges. For we may take it that it must be either (i.) the form or (ii.) the matter of the body itself, or (iii.) some kind of dimensional extension lying between the points of the containing surface, or (iv.) - if there be no such 'intervenient', apart from the bulk of the included body - the containing surface itself.

Now it is clear that no one of the first three alternatives is admissible...¹⁰

6 The works of Aristotle, vol. I, Categoriae, trans. E. M. Edgehill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), para. 5a8-14, Aristotle, The Physics Vol IV.

7 Jammer, Concepts of space, p. 15.

8 Jammer, Concepts of space, p. 15.

9 John J Drummond, "A note on Physica 211b14-25." The new scholasticism 55 (1981), p. 220.

10 Aristotle, The Physics, para. 211b6-10.

The example which Aristotle uses here is that of a vessel which is the container of a liquid in the same manner as the place "contains" its object. However, as soon as the place of a body is defined in terms of the "interface" of its containing surfaces, the problem of motion presents itself. If a body is contained by another body, itself in motion with respect to a third containing body, etc, how can the place of the first body ever be localized? Aristotle solves this problem by stating that if we follow the sequence of moving vessel-containers we will eventually encounter a vessel-container which is motionless. This is the place of the body. In the example he produces, this seems relatively clear:

... we have as good a right to regard place as 'an immovable vessel' as we have to regard a vessel as a 'movable place'.

And, from this point of view, if one thing is moving about inside another, which other is also in motion, as when a boat moves through the water of a flowing river, the water is related to the boat as a vessel-container rather than as a place-container; and if one looks for stability in 'place', then the river as a permanent stable whole, rather than the flowing water in it at the moment, will be the boat's place.

Thus whatever fixed environing surface we take our reckoning from will be the place.¹¹

We can, however, see here the first indications of a serious problem in Aristotle's concept of space; that is the necessity to ultimately ground all judgments about a body's position in either the identity of subjective judgments about the relative stability of vessels, or else in an innate hierarchical spatial structure of the cosmos. As we shall see, Aristotle takes recourse to both of these solutions.

1.2 *The implication of time: Aristotle and the question of motion*

Although modern physics seems to have made the refutation of the second solution redundant, the problem of the immovable mover is by no means to be simply dismissed as outdated, in so far as traces of this concept follow through into Kant, thus being written into the parameters of what may and may not be thought by

¹¹ Aristotle, The Physics, para. 212a15-21

subsequent philosophy.¹² We should thus not be too quick to reject the second solution to the problem of perception of motion. Indeed, the first solution is in many respects connected to it. This is evident in Derrida's demonstration of elements of circularity in Aristotle's thought - elements which place a high degree of interdependence between language, subjectivity and space.¹³ The very notion of subjectivity is itself intimately tied to notions of language and space. If we trace the etymology of the word *subject* to the latin *subjectum*, we find that it denotes a principle which constantly takes part in a process, even though it may change in this process.¹⁴ In keeping with this, Aristotle's subject of motion has two prime features. It is firstly a change in the position of a body which at all times takes part in that motion. But it can also be a change within that body. Motion is for Aristotle not only the spatial change in place, but it may also mean a qualitative change.¹⁵ In De Anima, He speaks of "four species of movement - locomotion, alteration, diminution, growth."¹⁶

If we differentiate with Aristotle between the motion of bodies and the motions of the soul, we find that it is not only the former which is ordered hierarchically. Both motions are part of a system of active and passive levels of relations in which "the organic parts are suitably prepared by the affections, these again by desire, and

12 "[Der unbewegte Beweger ist nach Aristoteles] nicht erster mechanischer, quantitativ, also exakt bestimmbarer Anstoß, sondern oberstes Ziel eines nicht restlos determinierten Strebens. Diese Vorstellung trägt dem gegenseitigen sich Ausschließen von Bewegungsmöglichkeit und eindeutiger Determiniertheit Rechnung, wenngleich die Vorstellung des unbewegten Bewegers andererseits der Vorstellung eines schließlichen Zuendekommens aller Bewegung und damit dem Übergewicht der Bestimmung in der Spannung zwischen Bestimmung und Bestimmtem entspricht...

Was in der aristotelischen Philosophie nur für den unbewegten Beweger zutreffen soll und deshalb das Moment der Willkür an sich hat, wird bei Kant auf den Raum bezogen and damit auf alles ausgedehnt, insofern es nur vom äußeren Sinn gegeben ist...

In diesem Sinn ist von Kant kritisch zu Ende geführt, was bei Aristoteles in der Vorstellung des unbewegten Bewegers angestrebt war und woraufhin der Aristotelischen Physik zufolge die Dinge als auf das Telos ihrer Bewegung streben: daß Notwendigkeit und Sein in ihnen zusammenfallen sollen." Joseph Simon, Sprache und Raum (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), p. 100-101.

13 This is particularly convincingly demonstrated by Jacques Derrida in the essay "Ousia and gramme," in: Margins of philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Sussex: Harvester, 1982), in which the Greek word *hama* is isolated as articulating and effacing a central aporia in Aristotle's thought on space.

14 Friedo Ricken ed., Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik, (München: Beck, 1984), p. 34.

15 Alexander Gosztonyi, Der Raum: Geschichte seiner Probleme in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, 2 vols. (Freiburg & München: Alber, 1976), vol. 1, p. 102.

16 The works of Aristotle, vol. III, De Anima, trans. J. A. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1931), para. 406a13-14; See The works of Aristotle, vol. VIII, Metaphysica, trans. W. Christ (Leipzig 1895) rev. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), para. 1069a12, Aristotle, The Physics, para. 200b33-201a4.

desire by imagination. Imagination in its turn depends either upon the conception or sense-perception."¹⁷ In the same way that the problem of motion of vessel-continents forced him to postulate a level of place not subject to motion, so the hierarchical or causal ordering of these effects forces Aristotle to question the original cause of motion. Here he concludes that all bodies which are moved "by force,"¹⁸ that is not naturally as the upwards-motion of fire, are moved externally.¹⁹

When the motion we are discussing is human motion, however, there is a moral problem at stake. If human motion is taken in the sense of activity and is always initiated externally, the concept of intention and therefore of ethical self-responsibility becomes meaningless.²⁰ In order to overcome this problem, the motion of animals (including human beings) is differentiated from that of the object, in that the motion of the former is determined externally, but with the qualification that this external initiator is "internalized" through sense perception,²¹ in other words through the act of assigning meaning to the physical world. The actual ethical differentiation between animal and human motion is based upon desire, which in the human mind is the desire for good as a practical goal of motion.²²

Desire, however, according to Jacques Derrida, is not itself the "prime mover." Aristotle himself indicates this when he states that, although desire is the "final or unmediated release of motion,"²³ it is itself moved by the imagination. Since in this interpretation desire is desire for the overcoming of a spatial distance, a lack, the presentation of what is not there, "desire is the desire of presence." Presence itself then "animates all movement by means of the desire it inspires."²⁴

What this means is that the attempt to define place immediately succumbs to the question of motion and in doing so merges with the question of time. Presence

¹⁷ The works of Aristotle, vol. V, De moto animalium, trans. A. S. L. Farquharson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1912), para. 702a18-20.

¹⁸ Gosztanyi, Der Raum, p. 103.

¹⁹ This theme is developed in David J Furley, "Self movers," in: Aristotle on the mind and the senses, ed. G E R Lloyd and G E L Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

²⁰ Aristotle, de anima 417a.

²¹ Furley, Self movers, p. 173.

²² Aristotle, de moto animalium, para. 700b25.

²³ Aristotle, de moto animalium, para. 701a35.

²⁴ Derrida, Quisiam and gramme, p. 52.

itself is, as Derrida shows, subject to an aporia of time which Zeno had pronounced: that time must be thought as comprising endless distinct "nows," but that each "now" must be thought as neither past nor future; that is, outside of time. Aristotle understands time as "the measuring and measured measure of an irreversible elapsation whose elementary structure is understood as a transition from one point to another."²⁵ However, he manages to evade the step taken by Zeno, in which time is constructed as a line. Nevertheless, in doing so, he retains that portion of the paradox which necessitates a distinction between time and "now," adopting a conception of "now" as outside time.²⁶ The distinction between time and "now" is displaced onto that between potency and the act,²⁷ whereby the temporal absence of the past or future "now" becomes the potential presence of the present "now."²⁸

In evading and preserving Zeno's aporia, Aristotle initiates a metaphysical tradition which believes "that it could think time on the basis of a being already silently determined in relation to time."²⁹ The nature of this silently predetermined being is space, and in the following passages I shall present a few examples to show how, since Aristotle, all attempts to think space require a concept of time based on space; and a similar argument applies for the attempts to think time. I am following Derrida here, who speaks of an omission which constitutes the history of metaphysics.³⁰ The presence of this omission in the texts of metaphysics necessitates a reading which apprehends not only what is written, but also the written trace of the unwritten.

Let us return, however, to the two solutions to the problem of perception of a final motionless instance. If we reject the proposition that the real world is structured so as to contain an ultimate position which is absolutely fixed in space or in ethical status, our only alternative according to the Aristotelian system is to

²⁵ Rudolf Bernet, "Is the present ever present? Phenomenology and the metaphysics of presence," *Research in Phenomenology* 12 (1982), p. 92.

²⁶ Bernet, *Is the present...* p. 92.

²⁷ See Derrida, *Ousia and gramme*, p. 60.

²⁸ Bernet, *Is the present...* p. 92.

²⁹ Derrida, *Ousia and gramme*, p. 47.

³⁰ Derrida, *Ousia and gramme*, p. 47.

ground these in the possible identity of subjective perception, representation and the real world. When we pursue this solution, we are lead into the structure of Aristotelean logic.

David Wiggins has shown that knowledge of place is not to be dissociated from knowledge of the identity of things.³¹ Our knowledge of the identity of a thing must be based on the production of so-called identity statements possessing a truth value. An identity statement is defined by Wiggins as a statement linking two noun phrases (as "things") by three logical operations.

(1) The two noun phrases must each, independently and irrespective of whether the statement is true or false, serve to pick out a particular which is strictly referred to (and so directly or indirectly identified under a substance concept) by the speaker...

(2) There must be some substance-concept intended as that under which both particulars fall...

(3)...a substance concept [is deemed satisfactory] for the purposes of conditions (1) and (2) if and only if it is possible to divide up the contents of the world and isolate the [quantity of this substance concept] in one and only one way (See Aristotle 2b29-30)...³²

If an identity statement so defined is to possess truth value, it must furthermore be possible to define a field of each noun phrase in space and time such that the two fields coincide. It is here that the difficulties arise within the parameters of Aristotelian logic. The production of true identity statements pre-supposes a concept of spatiality, if these are to be recognized as true. The concept of spatiality developed by Aristotle, however, pre-supposes knowledge of identity, since the boundaries of places coincide with the boundaries of objects.

Wiggins suggests that this circularity may possibly be overcome by the recognition of certain "privileged" objects which "can be identified by a thinker...without support from the spatio-temporal framework"³³

Candidates for this privileged role are (1) one's own body (2) one's own spatio-temporal location, (3) an object continuously and directly observed by some thinker...³⁴

31 David Wiggins, "The individuation of things and places" *Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. XXXVII (1963).

32 Wiggins, *Things and places*, p. 177-178.

33 Wiggins, *Things and places*, p. 180.

34 Wiggins, *Things and places*, p. 181.

Wiggins ultimately rejects all three possibilities. We need not concern ourselves here with the way in which he develops his argument, nor the attempts to overcome his dilemma in the reply of M J Wood.³⁵ What is important for us is that, in terms of Aristotle's logic and theory of place, knowledge of truth and identity in statements must ultimately be grounded in the existence of a subject as either an infallible observer or as the guarantor of truth by virtue of his identity. The truth value of statements may not be dissociated from the identity of a subject in space. It is this which allows Simon to state that "Die Aristotelische Raumlehre schematisiert quasi die Aristotelische Syllogistik"³⁶

This would seem to lead to the conclusion that a system of knowledge pre-requires the establishment of a hierarchy of subjective authorities similar to a law of knowledge and having access to a conventional language, or else the conclusion that spatial properties may be separated into the geometrically true on the one hand, and the perspectively valid on the other hand, the latter of which cannot be described in ordinary language and must thus be investigated by means of a phenomenology.³⁷

We can see here the price which must be paid for Aristotle's refutation of the Sophist tradition, in particular of Zeno's paradoxes of space and time - speaking the truth about space or time pre-supposes an identity which must be vested in space itself, the speaking subject, or language itself, or all three. When we trace the development of Aristotle's observations on space and time, we shall see that any attempt to think their interrelationship will find itself confronted with the question of representation, and thus of subjectivity and its signs.

1.3 *Positions in space and the Aristotelian syllogism*

35 "What would make these [Mr Wiggins'] privileged cases exceptional, supposing such privileged cases could be found, would be, not that the truth conditions of the relevant identity statements could be specified independently of the notion of the identity of a place, but rather that the person who made the statements in question could know that the conditions were fulfilled without first identifying a place." M. J. Wood, *Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. XXXVII (1963), p. 205 (my emphasis).

36 Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 92.

37 See J. Harrison, "The third dimension." *Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. LXI (1960).

Now it must be emphasized if we are to realize the far reaching consequences of Aristotelian theories of positions for the modern discussion of space, that such a dilemma as that posed by Wiggins is, strictly speaking, a misappropriation of the Aristotelian system. As Simon shows, Aristotle's logic is so firmly grounded in the knowledge of fixed positions mentioned above, that it is not at any place concerned with a proof of their existence.³⁸ Instead, the intersubjectivity which grounds this knowledge is taken as a starting point.³⁹ It is in this sense that we must understand the logics of Aristotle not as a model of the world as represented in language, but as a system of conjunctions which allow us to move from various accepted positions in an argument to other positions which must be accepted as a consequence of the acceptance of the previous positions. Simon is careful to point out that the position (*topos*) as it is understood in the Topica is not to be automatically dissociated from the positions in physical space described in the Physica.⁴⁰ In fact, the structure of motion from one logical position to another calls forth the same criticisms as the structure of relative motion between physical places. Both are based on probability - of perception on the one hand and of representation on the other. In the logics, this probability may be described as "der vernünftigerweise eingenommene 'allgemeine' Standpunkt, für den die Umstände sprechen.

Der 'Ort', den man mit einem Schluß einnimmt, besteht darin, daß man nur noch die formale Struktur dieser gegebenen Aussagen analysiert...die 'Örter' der 'Topik' sind formale Gesichtspunkte auf dem schwankenden Boden wahrscheinlicher Aussagen. Der Raum ist nichts sie inhaltlich

38 "Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the Gods and love one's parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception." Aristotle, Topica, para. 105a5.

39 "Nur äusserlicher "Probierstein" der objektiven Realität eines im Urteil ausgesagten Verhältnisses ist nach Kant die "Einstimmung" aller Urteile verschiedener Subjekte über dasselbe "ungeachtet der Verschiedenheit der Subjekte untereinander" [Kritik der reinen Vernunft B 848/9]. Von solchem äusseren Anschein, von dem her die Objektivität als wahrscheinlich gelten kann, geht Aristoteles in der "Topik," der ersten und für alle weiteren Systeme grundlegenden Logik aus." Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 93. Emphasis in original.

40 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 94, See also E. Rolfes, Introduction to Topik, by Aristotle (Leipzig, 1948), who speaks of "die Ähnlichkeit zwischen einem allgemein verwendbaren Vordersatz und einem Ort im gewöhnlichen, räumlichen Sinne des Wortes." Cit Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 94.

Bestimmendes, sondern ihr über ihren eigenen Bestimmtheitsgrad nicht hinausführendes logisches Verhältnis untereinander.⁴¹

The direction of Simon's argument serves to underline the underlying problem in Wiggins' dilemma, that the structuration of places on the basis of probability is at the same time a structuration of positions of subjectivity. This applies to the physical positions which may be occupied in order to pronounce judgments about the relative motion of objects; it applies equally to the logical positions which must be occupied in order to connect statements of probability in a rigorous manner.

When we consider that the logic which connects sentences in order that true statements may be made, it can be said that language prescribes positions from which positions may be described. This means that the circle of experience, its representation and the confirmation of experience through the formal intersubjectivity of the corresponding representation is supported by preexisting positions at the level of perception and representation. Since they are the competence required for the performance of statements these preexisting positions in turn serve as the confirmation of their reference value.⁴² It seems, then, that we may understand a critique of the metaphysical construction of space as a critique of the development from one position to the next, from this next position to another, and so on. What is primary in such a critique is the stage in this development where the individual positions disappear within the structure which they have grounded.

Above, I have attempted to show that this construction of space is to be understood in the dual sense of an edifice of positions of objects and of positions in

41 Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 94. Emphasis in original.

42 "Es ist aber eine Position vorausgesetzt, von der aus Sätze in ihrem 'Wahrheitswert' verglichen werden, d.h. ein Subjekt, das, indem es einen bestimmten Satz bejaht oder verneint, immer auch schon einen bestimmten anderen Satz als bejaht oder verneint behält....Insofern die formale Logik Logik der Erfahrungs-Wissenschaft ist, ist der behaltene Satz Prinzip gegenüber einem Satz, über dessen Positivität, bzw. Negativität die Erfahrung aktuell entscheiden soll. Die Voraussetzung (durch das geordnete Behalten mindesten eines bestimmten Satzes) vorherbestimmter Subjektivität gegenüber bestimmten anderen Sätzen bedeutet eine Einschränkung der Selbstbestimmung des Subjekts gegenüber diesen Sätzen. Daß Schließen mit formaler Notwendigkeit möglich ist, ist bedingt durch eine dem Subjekt auferlegte Einschränkung seiner Subjektivität, die es sich zwar, indem es spricht und darin anderen und sich selbst verständlich bleiben will, immer auch selbst auferlegt, die, als Bedingung wissenschaftlichen Verhaltens, aber insofern institutionalisiert wird, als das Subjekt aufgefordert ist, die Sätze, die Prinzipien gegenüber anderen Sätzen sein sollen, im voraus darzulegen und sich dadurch seiner Subjektivität institutionell zu entäußern." Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 271. Emphasis in original.

logical argument. In both cases, Aristotle circumvents an aporia which is to become one of the central aporia of metaphysical thought: If a position is the basis of a construction, and this position is, by necessity, without dimension in relation to that construction, how then can the construction itself possess dimension, being?

It was mentioned at the outset that Aristotle is much more concerned in De Physica with developing a concept of position than of space, and it has been indicated that the question of the connection between the two is problematic. On the one hand, space must appear as the composite sum of positions in space; on the other hand, spatiality is given by the *physis* of time, which is itself related to movement and change, and "takes off from the possibility of the analogy constituted by what is traced determined as line..."⁴³ No matter which of these alternatives we seek to develop, we will find the Aristotelean notion of space caught in what Derrida reveals as a circularity of thought. Space determines presence and non-presence, while at the same time being determined by it.

2 KANT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE

2.1 *The opening and bridging of space in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*

If we accord the problematics of space in Aristotle's philosophy the status which Joseph Simon seems to indicate it must have, then we can regard Kant's philosophy of space as a preoccupation with the questions which for Aristotle had not yet attained the status of questions. That is to say, any number of the aporia which Aristotle saw himself able to circumvent, are seen to return in various forms. It is important to recognize that this re-appearance of some of the founding aporia of metaphysics is in itself in keeping with the metaphysical (in particular Kantian) attempt to see knowledge of the world validated in the structure of space. The

⁴³ Derrida, Qusia and Gramme, p. 49.

asking of a philosophical question, or the encircling of a *topos* which could be considered philosophical appears as an *Auseinandersetzung*, a *thesei* which opens a space between a questioning subject and the object of enquiry. In this sense, the interpretation of space plays a decisive role in the modern concept of reality.⁴⁴

The problem with which Kant found himself faced was that the dualistic concept of reality, no matter where the axis of this dualism happens to be drawn, can provide no rigorous (in the sense of possessing general validity) ideal mediating principle, such as time and/or space. And without this principle, argued Kant, the intelligibility of the world cannot be given. The development of Kant's critical philosophy thus revolves around the status which space must have in a revised notion of nature and ideality.⁴⁵

A concept of nature which ties subjectivity to general validity necessarily puts itself in a difficult position regarding the guarantee on knowledge. To put this in different terms, and leading on from the discussion of Aristotle, we may accept that the Aristotelian system of logic is valid as a technique of argumentation (as does Kant)⁴⁶. However, we may only be certain that a syllogistic argument is in fact a progression or a development from one position to another if we can be certain that the initial positions are in fact positions. If we are to take Aristotle's contentions seriously, that a position is such because it may be generally accepted as such, then a

44 "In dem erstmalig von Descartes aufgestellten Dualismus von Denken und Körperwelt, Innen und Außen, Idee und Sinnesempfindung, kam dem Raum in manchen Theorien die Aufgabe zu, die Einheit der beiden mitunter als unversöhnlich gegenüberstehend empfundenen Seinssphären wiederherzustellen bzw. zu sichern. Denn einerseits galt der Raum als etwas "Reales", das der Körperwelt "anhaftet" oder ihr zugrunde liegt. Eine "Zwischenstellung" nahm aber der Raum in metaphysischer Hinsicht ein, indem er als das Bindeglied zwischen Gottes Sein und der Existenz der Welt galt." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 400.

45 "Das Fundamentale Problem für Kant war ein zweifaches:

1. Für die Dualität der beiden Welten mußte ein verbindendes Prinzip gefunden werden, das nicht allein durch die Begriffe von Raum und Zeit gegeben war. Es sollte vielmehr durch die Beschaffenheit dieser beiden das Ineinandergreifen der zwei Welten, das ja der Mensch praktisch beständig erfährt, erklärbar machen. So entstand in der Periode 1770-1781 ein neuer Naturbegriff.

2. Die Verbindlichkeit von Raum und Zeit als "Konditionen aller Erscheinungen" (Brief an Lambert vom 2. Nov. 1770) mußte durch die genaue Bestimmung des Wesens der "Idealität" sichergestellt werden. Dies leistete Kant durch Einführung und Erörterung des Begriffs der "transzendentalen Subjektivität". Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 401.

46 See Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 92.

critical examination of this position rests upon a critical examination of the experience upon which acceptability must always be based.

Experience, Kant argues, is not based on objects but on their perception. This is a far-reaching shift in emphasis which displaces the subjective/objective dialectic onto empirical judgments. What this means is that the structure of reality can be reduced to a duality only on the level of the validity of judgments, and there must be an ideality which links subjective and objective validity of judgments. A judgment can, however, only be said to possess general validity if it is constructed according to a transcendental law - the laws of mathematics or logics. Objectivity is thus founded on ideal laws of organisation of perception. It is this organisation which gives rise to concepts (*Begriffe*).

If we can speak of a logical position at all in Kant's philosophy, it is not based on the common ground of "opinions of the masses," but upon the transcendental laws which structure perception in order to prepare this common ground. Our knowledge of the world is not a knowledge of its objects, but of its laws.⁴⁷

Hence in the development of concepts we are not applying transformational rules aimed at maximizing the "transparency" of the representations of our perceptions; we are illuminating the laws which re-present these perceptions. This is effected by extending the same rules to a higher level from which they may be observed. After Kant, general validity may no longer be thought in terms of "common sense," but must be linked to transcendental laws.⁴⁸ Objective knowledge is structured by a transcendental principle which is strictly mathematical, in that its two main axes, the synthetic and analytic judgments, correspond to mathematical statements and rules, whereby the latter is necessarily a subordinate form of the former.⁴⁹ In applying these rules and statements in order to construct concepts, the

47 "Nicht die Natur an sich, sondern ihre Gesetze und - dies ist für die Philosophie entscheidend - die Bedingungen, unter denen diese Gesetze zugänglich werden, können und müssen sogar erforscht werden." Gosztonyi, *Der Raum*, p. 426.

48 "Die Transzendentalität ist die Grundlage der Objektivität... im Sinne der Überindividualität der Bedingungen jeglicher (menschlicher) Erkenntnis überhaupt." Gosztonyi, *Der Raum*, p. 427.

49 "Mathematische Sätze sind "synthetische Urteile a priori", synthetisch in dem Sinne, daß jeder mathematische Schritt (Beweis, Deduktion) zur Explikation neuer mathematischer Begriffe und damit zu neuen Erkenntnissen führt, a priori weil sie - wie Kant annimmt - im Begriff der Zahl bzw. der

understanding (*Verstand*) is not simply synthesizing two positions to validate a third, it is synthesizing perception to give rise to objectivity by virtue of the general validity of the synthetic judgment itself.

In Kant's transcendental aesthetics, the gesture in which the synthetic structuration of perception occurs is intuition (*Anschauung*), in its dual sense of sensation and conception.⁵⁰ It is possible for intuition to exist in this dual sense because as a sensory faculty directed toward the external or the internal world, it is founded on the formal principle of space or time, a principle which organises it according to the categories of externality, shape, size and relative position; or past, present and future.

We may disregard the conditions of temporality, and note the conditions of the formal principle of space, which Gosztonyi lists as follows:

1. It is not an abstract concept which could be derived from experience, and as such cannot be the property of objects. Here we find the primary and most far-reaching break with the concept of space put forward by Aristotle.
2. It is necessarily a priori.
3. It is singular and unitary, not composed of parts and thus not a discursive or general concept such as that of objects.
4. It is endless.⁵¹

It follows from this definition of space that it is both real and ideal - ideal in so far as it is meaningful only with respect to the world of appearances, and real because it possesses objective validity for this world of appearances.⁵² Objective validity is synonymous with general validity, which means that it is a "subjective condition of sensory perception."⁵³ In the course of this discussion, we will have to

Abzählbarkeit oder in den geometrischen Axiomen die Geometrie potentiell schon enthalten ist. Sie sind ohne Bezug auf Erfahrung... entwickelt." Gosztonyi, *Der Raum*, p. 427. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁰ See Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, para. A 19, B 33.

⁵¹ Gosztonyi, *Der Raum*, p. 431; See also Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft 55 (Frankfurt: suhrkamp, 1974), para. A 23-25, B 38-40.

⁵² Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, para. A 28, B 40.

⁵³ "Sie [die objektive Gültigkeit] liegt der Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit aller Menschen zugrunde, so daß man nur "aus dem Standpunkt eines Menschen von Raum, ausgedehntem Wesen usw" reden kann." Gosztonyi, *Der Raum*, p. 431.

interrogate Kant's implication that space can be conceived as both real and ideal. If we were to attempt to solve this contradiction by equating the two words, the statement would be trivial. If it can then be two contradictory things at once, are these contradictories co-existing contingencies? The nature of space would speak against this. As we shall see, this ideal reality or real ideality bears within it the essential contradiction of metaphysics.

If the intelligibility of the world rests on a generally valid structuration of sensory perception, and if this structuration takes space as its form, the question remains whether space is psychological, logical, or other. If it is psychological, then we find ourselves in the realm of Berkeley's idealism⁵⁴ and we lose the connection between space and objectivity. If it is logical, then its structure must be mathematical, or more specifically, geometrical. This is indeed the direction which, since Descartes, philosophy had taken to explain the nature of space, and it is the solution which Kant proposes.

Kant grounds his explanation of space as both real and ideal in the fact that it is structured according to mathematical and geometrical constraints. These constraints are not to be understood as derived from the understanding (*Verstand*), but as belonging to the realm of sense perception itself. They are immanent in the human ability to gain insight into relations of space by means of intuition. Particular knowledge of space, such as its three-dimensionality, or the fact that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, is thus the result of experience.⁵⁵

However, Kant is concerned not with the experience of relations of space - here he diverges once again from Aristotle's physics - but with the apodeictic nature of the knowledge of space which grounds this experience in that it grounds the basic tenets of geometry - apodeictic because it is given in the basic human ability of intuition. For this reason and contrary to Aristotle, Kant is not concerned with movement as such. Movement of an object is not problematic in Kant's philosophy,

⁵⁴ See William Harper, "Kant on space, empirical realism and the foundations of geometry," *Topoi* 3 (1984), for proof that this is not the case.

⁵⁵ Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, para. A 24, B 41.

since it may be recognized only through experience. It is not a form of a priori knowledge.

It is thus interesting to note that Kant could provide us with two possible solutions to Wiggins' dilemma. Firstly, the continuous observation of a moving object is indeed a guarantee of its identity, since the fact that it moves is a realization gained through experience; and secondly, the fact that we are able to speak of it moving assures us that its identity has already been constructed through the intuitive isolation of its spatial form. Thus the faith in edges which Wiggins sees as one possible consequence of Aristotle's theory of space is not simply a metaphysical prerequisite to the confirmation of identity.⁵⁶ It follows from the active construction of identity through geometric structuration of perception, and this structuration proceeds any observation of motion.⁵⁷

Since space is constructed; that is, it is an assembly of consecutive sensory perceptions, the primary form of inner sensory perception is temporal. This means that external sensory perceptions may always be traced back to internal sensory perceptions, which are constructed successively.⁵⁸ There is, however, a sense in which time and space must be regarded not as hierarchical, but as equivalent in Kant's philosophy. Since time is the axis of change, it is only through space and external intuition that we have access to permanence, to substance. Since external intuition gives rise to geometric figures which are substantial, they may be presented to internal intuition as simultaneously perceived, although they are constructed successively. If this were not the case, we would have no access to substance.

It is important to realise that the fact that the spatial configuration, while embodying a substance independent of time, is in fact constructed in succession,

⁵⁶ "...[if] anyone is more optimistic than I am about the third solution, ...then I suspect that his optimism rests on some kind of faith in the power of edges to mark things off in a way which is proof against illusion." Wiggins, Things and places, p. 202.

⁵⁷ "Der eigentliche Bewußtseinsvorgang ist dabei als eine Aufeinanderfolge von (virtuellen) Sinnes- bzw. Bewußtseinsdaten, deren Einheit lediglich in der Einheit der Synthese, oder - in modernen Termini ausgedrückt - in der einheitlichen, geschlossenen Struktur des Bewußtseins gegründet." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 438. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁸ "Primär ist aber die Zeit, weil sie die Form des inneren Sinnes ist und damit die Sukzession der Bewußtseinsabläufe wie der Bewußtseinsdaten und schließlich die einheitliche Synthese ermöglicht, der Raum hingegen ist sekundär." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 438. Emphasis in original.

since it is in this successive construction that the structure of perception corresponds to the laws which make up synthetic judgments a priori: the laws of geometric relations.⁵⁹ Thus, the active construction of spatial configurations in the intuition itself embodies a pre-existent schema of spatial relations. This schema is the "apodeictische Wissenschaft' (B41) [der Geometrie], darum a priori und allgemeingültig."⁶⁰

Space is virtual; that is, immaterial, yet capable of being activated and ascertained. For this reason, spatial relations can function as schemata; that is, as models which embody the temporal process of conceptualization. The schema is also a spatial abstraction, "die angibt, wie der (abstrakte) Inhalt eines Begriffs durch Aktualisierung verstanden werden kann."⁶¹ What this means is that, in the same way perception must be organized according to geometric principals if it is to succeed via intuition to become Verstand, in other words if spatial relations are to be recognized, so only a certain type of concept can be 'visualized':

Fünf Punkte veranschaulichen die Zahl fünf. Die Zahl tausend kann auf diese Weise nicht veranschaulicht, sie muß abgezählt werden. Der Begriff "tausend" wird erst dann "begriffen", dh im Bewußtsein "realisiert", wenn man weiß, daß er eine genau abzählbare Menge bedeutet.⁶²

3 THE SIGNIFYING POINT: THE METAPHYSICAL SPACE OF REPRESENTATION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF METAPHYSICAL SPACE

59 "Kant will mit der Zurückführung der räumlichen Wahrnehmung auf den "inneren Sinn" und damit auf die Zeit gewiß nicht behaupten, daß das Nebeneinander der Elemente des visuellen Wahrnehmungsfeldes etwa nicht simultan wahrgenommen werden kann. Er meint wohl nur folgendes: Falls eine genaue, und das heißt für ihn: eine geometrisch auswertbare bzw der Geometrie entsprechende Erfahrung von Räumlichem stattfindet, so muß man - d.h. so muß das Bewußtsein in seiner Intention - auf irgendeine Art die Raumgebilde nachzeichnen. Und dies "Nachzeichnen" konstituiert Räumliches, ob es tatsächlich vollzogen wird, oder nur virtuell. Die räumlich Wahrnehmung ist also kein passives Geschehen, sondern setzt die Aktivität des Bewußtseins voraus. Die Erzeugung von räumlichen Vorstellungen bei der Synthese der Sinnesdaten bedeutet die Erzeugung des Wahrnehmungsraumes. Dies ist auf Grund von Kant's Voraussetzung selbstverständlich, da das Bewußtsein von Raum und die räumliche Erscheinungswelt zusammenfallen, weil ihre ontologischen Bedingungen gleich sind." Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 440. Emphasis in original.

60 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 443.

61 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 441. Emphasis in original.; Ernst Cassirer will underline this function of spatial relationships in the formation of concepts when he states that the inherent spatiality of conceptual relations gives rise to the spatial metaphor in philosophy. See Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen.

62 Gosztonyi, Der Raum, p. 441.

3.1 *Kant and the spatiality of the sign*

From this short outline of the status of space in Kantian theory, it should be clear that here, too, the question of space is closely tied to the question of representation. It is this connection which I wish to pursue further in the present section. This is best done by examining the status of the transcendental law which structures perception.

As Gordon Nagel observes, the criticism which Kant has drawn repeatedly with respect to his assumption that Euclidean geometry may assume the status of a transcendental law would only be valid if Kant had hinged his philosophy of space on the dogmatic assertion of the one-parallel system, or on the diagrammatic system of proof.⁶³ The reason why such a criticism is, in Nagel's eyes, not valid, is that Kant is not committed to any one particular doctrine of mathematics, but to the ability of mathematics to generate knowledge by virtue of its system of representation. It is here that the difference between mathematics and philosophy is seen to lie, for "the relationship between mathematical proofs and the symbols in which they are expressed [must be contrasted] with the relation between ethical arguments and their words... The inference is abstract because it is from meaning to meaning, not from word to word. This contrasts with mathematical proof, which does depend directly on its notation."⁶⁴

What Nagel is suggesting here is that in Kant's system, a priori knowledge is not examinable as a truth value in the same sense an ethical argument may be tested for

⁶³ "Since there are two senses of Euclidean geometry, Kant's purported commitment to Euclid can be taken in two ways. He can be taken to be committed to the Euclidean character of space, that is to the description of space given by Euclid's laws. Or he can be taken to be committed to the Euclidean type of proof in mathematics. Kant's critics standardly take it both ways, and they say he is mistaken about the one because he is mistaken about the other. He thinks that space is Euclidean because he thinks that the laws of space derive from what we can intuit or construct; and he adopts the theory of pure intuition to explain how we have and why we have synthetic a priori knowledge of the (Euclidean) character of space." Gordon Nagel, *The structure of experience. Kant's system of principles* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 35.

⁶⁴ Nagel, *Structure of experience*, p. 38.

truth or falsehood. Patterns of sensory experience do not have truth value, but they do have structure, and it is these structures which set up relations of representation. Geometry is the transcendental law which structures intuition, not because of its truth value, but because of its status as a mathematics of spatial relations.⁶⁵ Nagel does not consider it to be of consequence whether these proofs are obtained diagrammatically or by other means, since Kant was concerned not with the truth of mathematical statements but with the projective capacity it possesses as a system of notation.

If Nagel is correct in this assertion, it must have far-reaching consequences, because it is clear that in the above terms, the philosophy of space contains an implicit philosophy of language in the modern sense:

Kant is not in utter opposition to modern philosophy after all. The common ground is the presumption that the mind supplies the form of experience and the senses supply the content. One major difference is in the characterization of the form supplied by the mind. Modern philosophers look to language and logic for examples or models of the forms. Kant looks, initially, to mathematics.⁶⁶

The question which must be asked in evaluating Kant's philosophy of space as a philosophy of representation now becomes: just how far may the analogy be drawn between the production of objectivity through the spatial structuration under the transcendental laws of mathematics on the one hand, and the production of objectivity through spatial structuration under the transcendental laws of language on the other. It is at this point that Joseph Simon's analysis becomes important.

Simon points out that the epistemology of Kant disallows any attempt to ground the validity of language in the linguistic practise of its users, i.e. in the fact that statements may be produced and received.⁶⁷ Language as performance is not accessible to our understanding except via its own structures; as specific behaviour

⁶⁵ It must be borne in mind, however, that the status of mathematics as a practise is an entirely different problem. This emerges from Gaston Bachelard's examination of the relation between mathematics and science in The new scientific spirit (Boston: Beacon, 1986). Here the status of mathematical statements as synthetic judgements a priori becomes identical to their predictive value in scientific practice. This will become important in the discussion of the mapping of truth onto the landscape which characterizes imperialism.

⁶⁶ Nagel, Structure of experience, p. 53.

⁶⁷ Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 191.

its causes remain unknown.⁶⁸ This is of vital importance, since any post-Kantian attempt to refute the implicit Kantian ideas of the determination of language is bound to do so without resorting to factual explanation, unless it is to abandon the very tenets of metaphysics. Factuality is accessible only by way of its appearance and the way in which it may be determined in space and time.⁶⁹

Kant's philosophy rests upon the structuration of experience being determined by the transcendental laws of intuition, and not being based on a dogmatic assertion. This is the essence of his Enlightenment project. According to Kant, the structure of spatiality conforms to this requirement. It is not a fact, nor is it dogmatically asserted; it is the separation which is opened up in knowledge, and upon which knowledge is based. The foundation of knowledge in the structuration of experience rests upon the role of space as "zugleich Form unserer sinnlichen Anschauung und formaler Gegenstand."⁷⁰ Now, if Kant is to maintain one of the central theses of his philosophy, he must show that this statement about the function of space is not a dogmatic assertion. The only way in which this is possible, is if the statement of the nature of space is identical with the nature of space itself.⁷¹

The significance of this for Kant's anti-dogmatic stance is simply that the sentence about space, because it is a sentence, must bear an identical structure of significance and disappearance as the spatial structure itself. It is here that Simon sees a "verdeckte Sprachlichkeit" in Kant's philosophy of space. Indeed, if he is correct, Kant's philosophy of space must also be seen as a philosophy of language.

68 "In [dieser Tatsache] könnte sich verbergen, daß möglicherweise autoritatives Verhalten und Befangenheit des einen Subjekts gegenüber dem anderen nicht nur im Spiel, sondern bestimmend ist. Wenn auch der Hörende sich "verhält", als hätten die Worte des Sprechenden für ihn "Bedeutung", so können sie doch für ihn in seiner Lage eine ganz andere Bedeutung haben als für den Sprechenden." Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 191.

69 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 191.

70 Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 191.

71 "Bedingung ist, daß gesagt werden kann, der Raum habe diesen doppelten Charakter, ohne daß dies wieder ein dogmatischer Satz wäre. Es bleibt aber solange ein dogmatischer Satz, als der Raum als etwas anderes vorgestellt ist als diese Aussage über ihn, so daß vorgestellt sein muß, die Aussage habe sich nach seiner "Natur" zu richten oder aber der Raum nach ihr. Im letzteren Fall schriebe sie vor, was der Raum im Interesse einer antidogmatischen Philosophie zu sein habe, und wäre darin unmittelbar selber dogmatisch, im ersteren Fall wäre ein realistischer Begriff von Erkenntnis, mit seinen dogmatischen Implikationen, die Kant selber aufdeckte, vorausgesetzt." Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 192.

Simon places the locus of the intersection of a philosophy of space and a philosophy of language at Kant's concept of the position, the point, as it must function in the progressive construction of spatiality in outer Intuition (*äußerer Anschauung*).

In order that a structure of space be actively constructed, as discussed above, a point must be simultaneously significant and disappearing.⁷² If it were not significant, it would not be able to bear a relation to the structure as a whole; and because it is significant; that is, it exists in a relationship - it is always disappearing within the structure. It is in the nature of Kant's dual concept of space that a point must be conceived as capable of being apprehended in intuition, and as a position which can be thought; that is, a determined negation of extension.⁷³ It follows from this that the concept, too must be thought in a system and at the same time must mean something which can be intuited. This then, is, according to Simon, the nature of the Kantian sign. It is determined by its position within a system, and as such bears within itself the implicit assumption that a logical notation of thought is possible; at the same time, however, it is "streng intersubjektiv und deshalb streng objektiv gültig."⁷⁴ For this reason, Simon states that Kant is dealing with a notion of language as *physei* as opposed to *thesei*. In doing so, however, he stresses that such a notion pre-requires "die von Kant geforderte doppelte Natur (des Raumes) als formaler Gegenstand und Form der sinnlichen Intuition."⁷⁵

In such a conception, the sign relies on the sign system for its meaning. The geometric signification of spatial relations in a series of lines, points and surfaces creates these figures as significant concepts composed of subordinate figures. Or conversely, the subordinate figure is significant by virtue of its position within a superordinate concept. Thus, it is possible for Kant to sidestep the same aporia which Aristotle had retained and himself circumvented - the problem of how "aus einer Vielfalt von unausgedehnt gedachten Punkten so etwas wie eine ausgedehnte

⁷² Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 192.

⁷³ "Damit ist die Kantische "reine Intuition" analysiert in Bestandteile der Intuition und des die Intuition bestimmt negierenden Denkens. Denken und Intuition verschmelzen in ihrem Begriff." Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 124. See also p. 123.

⁷⁴ Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 125. Emphasis in original.

⁷⁵ Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 125.

Linie entstehen soll."⁷⁶ The point, when thought in relation to a body in space, may be thought only as the negation of space. However, when constructed within a geometrical sign system, it gains significance in relation to the superordinate figures, the lines, of that system.⁷⁷

In Kant's discussion of the synthesis of reproduction in imagination as expounded in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as in the second edition under the heading "The Principle of the Synthetic Unity is the Supreme Principle of all Employment of the Understanding," we may see that his dual concept of space is not confined only to spatiality, but necessarily extends to the central ideas of his critique. If we examine the position accorded the imagination, we see that it is given a mediating centrality which, like all Kant's mediations, promises the coincidence of opposing principles.

A pure imagination, which conditions all *a priori* knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of the imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience.⁷⁸

In Derrida's words, this synthesis which is the function of the imagination "carries along with it the contradictory predicates of receptive passivity and productive spontaneity."⁷⁹

Thus where we speak above of the necessity of the point to appear as a disappearing and signifying moment in space, it is conversely - and Kant makes

⁷⁶ Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 192.

⁷⁷ As Derrida will show, this solution is itself far from satisfactory. The point as conceived by Aristotle as well as by Kant is without presence, only potential and accidental, and exists only by virtue of the presence of the line. However, Derrida shows that the line itself is thought geometrically in terms of its extremities, its end points, and not its parts. What this means is that the extremities as non-points must be continually disappearing, in order to maintain their point quality, while continually reconstituting themselves as points, in order to act as determinants of geometric figures. The only figure in which the point may coexist in this manner with the line is, according to Derrida, the circle. The circle is therefore the metaphysical figure which allows us to think a relation of necessity between mutually conditioned non-presence and presence. See Derrida, Ousia and gramme, p. 60-61.

⁷⁸ Immanuel Kant, The critique of pure reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929) para. A 124.

⁷⁹ Derrida, "The pit and the pyramid: introduction to Hegel's semiology," in Derrida, Margins of philosophy, p. 79.

repeated (if only implicit) reference to this in his discussion of the transcendental imagination - retained and produced if space is to be thought and represented.

We cannot think a line without drawing it, or a circle without describing it. We cannot represent the three dimensions of space save by setting three lines at right angles to one another from the same point.⁸⁰

The Kantian concept of space as we have been discussing it so far is "not yet [by itself] knowledge; it supplies only the manifold of *a priori* intuition for a possible knowledge.

To know anything in space (for instance, a line), I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known.⁸¹

When I seek to draw a line in thought, ... obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations ... and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise.⁸²

The production of space from a point (described here as the "combination of the manifold") requires not only the signifying erasure of the point, but also the graphic retention of the point. The act of drawing, setting, representation, that is to say the production of space is the other pole of the process which is knowledge of space.

Now it must be emphasized that, in representation, this point has been negated, ceases to be a point. It seems then that the negation and graphic retention of the point, which is itself in turn a negation, - that this process, which is the process of signification, centers in the synthetic function of the imagination. That is to say, it centers in the synthesis of perception on the one hand and self-consciousness of the unity of mind on the other. Kant tells us that, for this synthesis to ground knowledge *a priori*, imagination must be productive, as opposed to its reproductive function, which is empirical.⁸³

80 B 154. Kant himself emphasizes the words "drawing," "describing" and "setting."

81 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. B 137-138. Emphasis in original.

82 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 102.

83 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 118.

When Kant speaks of the productive imagination, he is referring to the spontaneous ability to produce sensible intuitions of that which is absent. "Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present."⁸⁴ We can therefore make our interpretation of the Kantian sign more precise and say that it is the spatial construction of that which is absent - a construction whose presence is at the same time dependent upon the absence of its parts. For if we take Kant seriously that a priori knowledge is dependent upon the productive imagination, then the reproductive retention of the manifold out of which spatial figures are constructed is a strictly empirical act. This means that the creation of signs, the generation or production of signs upon which their empirical reception is based, cannot itself ground the figure it produces as a whole presence. The creation of a graphic presence to replace another absent presence labours under this paradox - as an a priori figure, its construction depends upon the erasure of its component parts, and as a whole figure, its significance depends upon the purely empirical reproduction of the significance of its parts.

Language cannot be thought within the Kantian system except as partaking of this contradiction. It builds from the sign (the signifying point) to the sentence and from the sentence to discourse, and in doing so, it determines a corresponding concept of subjectivity.⁸⁵ The subject itself must be created as a sustained coincidence of contradictory predicates, a combination of the manifold of positions of subjectivity. The fact that this is a graphic combination will become very important at a later stage in our discussion.

If it is to contain not only the contradiction of disappearance and significance of positions in the manifold, but also that of the retention of the manifold in some form of inscription, this creation must in turn have its existence as a presentation of non-presence, as a sign. This again follows from the position of the transcendental

⁸⁴ Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. B 151.

⁸⁵ "Der Satz als Satz hält sein Subjekt fest, indem er es verschwinden und in dieser Bewegung das Prädikat an seine Stelle treten läßt. Die konkrete Bedeutung des Prädikats ergibt sich dadurch, daß das Subjekt es bezeichnet, indem es zugleich sich in seiner Subjekteindeutigkeit aufhebt." Simon, Sprache und Raum, p. 193.

imagination in Kant's philosophy - between sensibility and apperception. Again, when we seek the site of the essential resolution or coincidence of opposites in Kant's philosophy of space, we find ourselves at the site of a resolution which is the sign.

3.2 *Space and the sign in Hegel's Encyclopaedia*

In a discussion of Hegel's semiology, Derrida observes that Hegel's concept of the imagination is the place "where the debate with Kant resembles most an explication and least a break."⁸⁶ As we have found implicitly in Kant, we find more explicitly in Hegel the notion of the imagination as signifying imagination, production of signs. And like Kant, Hegel accords the sign the role of coincidence of opposites. The very status of the sign as the site of coincident contradictions, however, must, if we are to remain true to the logic of metaphysics, call this apparent unifying function into question.⁸⁷ Hegel is more explicitly aware of the ambiguous nature - the limit nature - of the sign he is describing, particularly with respect to the necessity of retaining it in some form - in some inscription.⁸⁸

Once again, I would like to turn to the question of the position in space - the point - and attempt to establish the extent to which Hegel is able to uncover, or expose the limits of the Kantian problem of negation of the point in space, and in

⁸⁶ Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 79.

⁸⁷ "Production and intuition, the concept of the sign thus will be the place where all contradictory concepts intersect. All oppositions of concepts are reassembled, summarized and swallowed up within it. All contradictions seem to be resolved in it... but simultaneously that which is announced beneath the same sign seems irreducible or inaccessible to any formal opposition of concepts; being both interior and exterior, spontaneous and receptive, intelligible and sensible, the same and the other, etc., the sign is none of these, neither this nor that..." Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 79. Emphasis in original.

⁸⁸ "The moment of the sign is to be put on account, in provisional reserve. This is the limit of abstract formality. The semiotic moment remains formal in the extent to which the content and truth of meaning escape it, in the extent to which it remains inferior, anterior and exterior to them. Taken by itself, the sign is maintained only in sight of truth." Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 80. Emphasis in original.

doing so, to show how a metaphysical theory of space is necessarily a theory of the spatiality of the sign.

Where Kant avoids the problem of the point as a negation of space, and its relation to a line, which, in turn would have to be thought as negation of the point, we find Hegel taking up this problematic, repeating it, and developing from it a dialectic of spatiality and of language.

If we accept the argument above, that implicit in Kant's philosophy of space is a philosophy of language, then Hegel may be said to take as his point of departure and point of divergence the Kantian necessity that such a language is *physei*, and in no manner *thesei*. For Kant, such a concept of the sign is a necessity because of the central position of formal intuition. For Hegel,

(ist) Formale Intuition ... fehlende Einsicht in die Zeichennatur des Zeichens oder in die Zeichenhaftigkeit der Natur für ein sprachliches Wesen schon vor aller pragmatischen Zeichensetzung. Der formal Anschauende nimmt das von ihm in seiner Form Angeschaute unmittelbar für eine Sache.⁸⁹

Nature, according to Hegel, is undifferentiated, indeterminate and unqualified, and as such corresponds to the spatiality of space. Space, like nature, must be negated if it is to be determinate. And the negation must be a determined negation. Where nature in its indeterminate state is negated in a determined negation, it becomes the content of Hegel's intuition - it becomes operative in the realm of spirit (*Geist*). The activity of the spirit, in negating nature, determines nature as the content of intuition. This content, it follows, is meaningful as different from itself - it is a sign.⁹⁰ It is for this reason that Hegel situates his theory of signs within the philosophy of spirit, as "a chapter in psychology, the science of spirit determining itself in itself as a subject for itself"⁹¹

It is important that Simon speaks of the sign quality of nature "for a speaking being." In the following section, I intend to show that one of the possible negations of space may be developed in conjunction with speech and the voice which produces

⁸⁹ Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 127.

⁹⁰ "Er repräsentiert mehr, als er unmittelbar ist." Simon, *Sprache und Raum*, p. 127. Emphasis in original.

⁹¹ Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 75.

signs - signs which disappear in the moment of their production and thus perform the function of signifying disappearance described above in a seemingly much more pure and ideal fashion than is achieved in the written signifier.

3.2.1 *The negation of space in the point and the spatiality of the sign*

Hegel describes the abstract generality of nature's Being- outside-itself as a non-mediate equivalence which is space. Since such *vermittlunglose Gleichgültigkeit* cannot function as a sign, the signifying aspect of nature - its difference from itself - must lie, at least in one respect, in the negation of space. Hegel makes it quite clear that the negation of space is, firstly, to be found in the point.⁹² Thus when Hegel criticizes Kant, his criticism must at least implicitly mean the latter's inability to come to terms with the difference of the point from itself, and as such with the sign character of nature which resides in the negation of space by the spirit.

In the essays Ousia and Gramme and The pit and the pyramid, Derrida discusses three negations of space in the Hegelian sense. These are the point, time and the voice. In the following, I will show (taking Derrida's lead) that all three of these negations arise from negation in and of the point. I also hope to show that each of these negations is subject to a reversal which takes the form of a graphic inscription and may not be thought as the negation of a negation. It is this reversal which characterizes the spatiality of the sign.

Let us look more closely at what it means for the point to differ from itself. Hegel's philosophy of space is situated clearly within his philosophy by its position in the *Encyclopaedia*.⁹³ According to Hegel, space belongs to the first dialectic

⁹² "Von Raupunkten zu sprechen, als ob sie das positive Element des Raums ausmachten, ist unstatthaft, da er um seiner Unterschiedlosigkeit willen nur die Möglichkeit, nicht das Gesetzsein des Negativen und daher schlechthin kontinuierlich ist; der Punkt ist deswegen vielmehr die Negation des Raumes." Hegel, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Hermann Glockner, vol. 6, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft im Grundrisse. (Stuttgart: F. Frommanns, 1927), para 127. Emphasis in original.

⁹³ I am following here the "architectonic" approach suggested by Derrida in his discussion of Hegelian semiology. See The pit and the pyramid, p. 73-75.

moment of the negation of the idea in nature, the idea outside of itself (*Außersichsein*). As such, it stands foremost in the contradictory status of nature's existence.

Wie sie [die Natur] ist, entspricht ihr Seyn ihrem Begriffe nicht, ihre existierende Wirklichkeit hat daher keine Wahrheit; ihr abstraktes Wesen ist das Negative wie die Alten die Materie überhaupt als das *non-ens* gefaßt haben.⁹⁴

Hegel's positioning of space as the first determination of nature, i.e. of the idea outside itself, requires it to be seen not as a "logical determination," but as the state of being immediate and external.⁹⁵ What the limitation thereby placed on a conception of space thus amounts to is, according to Derrida, that "space is this Being-outside-itself, is this nature to the extent that nature itself is itself outside itself."⁹⁶ Original nature is undifferentiated, unqualified and indeterminate, and corresponds to the spatiality of space. This means that spatiality in this pure sense can become determinate only by negating itself.

Hegel himself mentions two spatial negations of space which are at the same time determinations of space, and facilitate the construction or production of space. These are to be found in the three dimensions of geometry and in the point.

The dimensions of geometry are accorded relatively minor status by Hegel, presumably because they are in themselves indeterminate, and have their differentiation not in themselves, but in the act of differentiation. He describes the three dimensions as "simply differing, completely indeterminate," and as "abstract quantity"⁹⁷

What Hegel is highlighting in this status of geometry is precisely the aporia of the question of *thesei* in the Kantian theory of space. As Hegel states, any question of the necessity of the geometric quality of space "cannot be put to geometry, since it is not a philosophical science, and may assume the prior existence of its object: space."⁹⁸ This means that any necessity which might be accorded any of the figures

⁹⁴ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 193.

⁹⁵ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 197.

⁹⁶ Derrida, *Quasia and gramme*, p, 41.

⁹⁷ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 198.

⁹⁸ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 198.

of geometry (with a few exceptions) may be done so on the basis of the principle of identity of understanding, which in turn "die Verhältnisse begründet und hineinlegt, welche nun zu erkennen der Zweck der Wissenschaft ist."⁹⁹

Im Vorbeygehen kann bemerkt werden, daß es ein sonderbarer Einfall Kants war, zu behaupten, die Definition der geraden Linien, daß sie der kürzeste Weg zwischen zwey Punkten sey, sey ein synthetischer Satz; denn mein Begriff vom Geraden enthalte nichts von Größe, sondern nur eine Qualität.¹⁰⁰

As Hegel notes, any definition would have to be regarded as synthetic in this sense. If we cast our glance back to Kant's theory of space, informed with Hegel's reading, we see the circularity of synthesis surfacing quite clearly. The dual nature of Kantian space, which has been discussed in detail above, grounds the synthesis which gives rise to knowledge. Because of this, it "must also condition the concept of [its] objects"¹⁰¹ A little later, it is stated that "to bring this synthesis to concept is a function which belongs to the understanding."¹⁰² However, Kant states quite clearly that the "mathematics of space (geometry) is based upon this successive synthesis of the productive imagination in the generation of figures. This is the basis of the axioms which formulate the conditions of sensible a priori intuition under which alone the schema of a pure concept of outer appearance can arise."¹⁰³

This successive synthesis begins in Kant (as we have seen) with the point. Hence (if we take Hegel's critique of Kant's axiom seriously) the construction of a concept pre-requires the concept of construction. The construction of space as the difference which arises in its own Being-outside-itself in the concept¹⁰⁴ becomes essential as a determined qualitative difference. This qualitative difference knows three dialectic moments:

a) zunächst die Negation des Raumes selbst, weil dieser das unmittelbare unterschiedslose Aussersichseyn ist; der Punkt. b) Die Negation ist aber, als Negation des Raumes; diese Beziehung des Punktes auf ihn ist die Linie, das erste Andersseyn des Punktes; c) die Wahrheit des Andersseyns ist aber die

⁹⁹ Hegel, Enzyklopädie, para 199.

¹⁰⁰ Hegel, Enzyklopädie, para 199.

¹⁰¹ Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 77, B 102.

¹⁰² Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 78, B 103.

¹⁰³ Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, para. A 163, B 204, my emphasis.

¹⁰⁴ "Der Raum hat als Begriff überhaupt, (und besonders als das gleichgültige Aussereinanderseyn) dessen Unterschiede an ihm, a) unmittelbar in seiner Gleichgültigkeit als die bloß verschiedenen, ganz bestimmungslosen drey Dimensionen." Hegel, Enzyklopädie, para 198.

Negation der Negation. Die Linie geht daher in Fläche über, welche einerseits eine Bestimmtheit gegen Linie und Punkt, und so Fläche überhaupt ist, andererseits aber ist sie die aufgehobene Negation des Raumes, somit Wiederherstellung der räumlichen Totalität, welche aber das negative Moment an ihr hat; - umschliessende Oberfläche, die einen einzelnen ganzen Raum absondert.¹⁰⁵

As this statement shows, and as Derrida emphasizes in Ousia and Gramme, Hegel is following Aristotle quite closely at this position in the Encyclopaedia. To begin with, the enveloping surface, if we are to think it as the true form of space, requires that we begin with the point as "das Erste und Positive," and that it forms the starting point of any construction of space in the dialectic sense.¹⁰⁶ The geometrical construction of space is then to be thought only in terms of a series of consecutive negations. The point negates itself in relation to another point, and, in doing so, allows the line to emerge as the intuition of the point. Similarly, the plane emerges as the intuition of the line. Hegel describes the plane as "the sublated [Aufgehobene] negation of space."¹⁰⁷ What this amounts to is very close to the Aristotelian problematic of place and position, i.e. the question of how to situate the place of an object defined as its enveloping surface. It will be recalled that Aristotle found himself confronted with the problem of movement in the ascertainment of position with respect to enveloping surface. This problem may be restated as a question here: if the truth of space as the enveloping surface pre-requires the point as a positivity, how is it possible that this point be thought as the negation of space? It is, as Hegel observes, possible to think the point as the truth of the enveloping surface, provided we begin with the latter as a positivity. But that will clearly not free us from the aporia of a circularity which we are trying to overcome from Kant. There is an alternative solution which must be examined for soundness. The surface as truth of the point may be thought in terms of a positivity of the point which was, but never is.¹⁰⁸ This is indeed the path that Hegel will take. And, as we will see

¹⁰⁵ Hegel, Enzyklopädie, para 199.

¹⁰⁶ Hegel, Enzyklopädie, para 199.

¹⁰⁷ Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, ed. R. P. Horstmann & J. H. Trede, Enzyklopaedie (Hamburg: Meiner Vlg, 1971). para 256. Cit Derrida, Ousia and gramme.

¹⁰⁸ "Why is *Dasein* in time the truer form (wahrhaftere Gestalt) of intuition such as it may be relevé in the sign? Because time is the relevé - that is, in Hegelian terms, the truth, the essence (Wesen) as Being-past (Gewesenheit) - of space. Time is the true, essential, past space, space as it will have been thought,

presently, it also allows his notion of the sign as a sublation (*Aufhebung*) - as the truth - of space.¹⁰⁹

Just as Aristotle's definition of place as enveloping surface very quickly merged into the question of the truth of space thought as a function of time (in the form of the question of the perception of space in movement), so Hegel's construction of space as the truth of the negation of the point reverses itself, with the result that, in order that the point be thought, space becomes time in its own negation and determination.

3.2.2 *The negation of the point in time: time constituted as space*

Hegel's claim that the first negation of space in space is the point picks up and, in Derrida's reading, repeats the paradox of time which Aristotle opposed in the fourth chapter of *de Physica*. This states that time is not, since it consists of component "nows," none of which can be thought to have existence as time. What becomes important, however, is that the conception of time developed by Aristotle as well as by Hegel is, according to Derrida, necessary as a solution to the contradictions opened up in their respective ideas of space.¹¹⁰ Because the space of metaphysics is constructed as a contradiction which is built on a series of negations, it can be resolved only in a dialectical manner, for it is dialectics which offers a way of thinking the development of contradiction as a movement from potentiality to presence. Since the operation of the negation of space can be thought only

that is, *relevé*. What space will have meant is time." Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 89. Emphasis in original.

¹⁰⁹ Hegel situates a theory of the sign at the moment of synthesis when "the idea comes back to itself after having, if we may put it thus, lost awareness, lost the consciousness and meaning of itself in nature, in its Being-other." Thus, Hegelian dialectics allows us to trace the difference between the constitution or production of space and the production of signs - a difference which threatened to disappear altogether in the aporias of Kant's concept of space. See Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 74.

¹¹⁰ "Aristotle affirms opposites, or rather defines time as a dialectic of opposites, and as the solution of the contradictions that arise in terms of space. As in the *Encyclopaedia*, time is the line, the solution of the contradiction of the point (unspatial spatiality). And yet it is not the line, etc. The contradictory terms posited in the aporia are simply taken up and affirmed together in order to define the *physis* of time." Derrida, *Quasia and gramme*, p. 54.

consecutively, it is temporal. The negation of space then, is time. But a time built on a point which, as has already been seen, can be thought as a positivity only in its absence, its Being-past.¹¹¹

The conclusion which Derrida most rigorously draws from this is that time is space. This is a momentous conclusion to say the least, and yet Derrida sees it as a necessary one within the stipulations of metaphysics and the metaphysical conception of space. He uses it to demonstrate that the attempt to define one in terms of a negativity of the other cannot succeed, for three reasons:

1. First of all, the negativity out of which each is constructed is in itself contradictory. This was already recognized by Aristotle in his rejection of the drawn line as a representation of time. According to Derrida, the same contradiction applies to space. Because the coexistence of the component parts of space as well as of time is a theoretical impossibility as well as a theoretical necessity, the dialectical method (which, Derrida notes, is employed identically by Hegel and Aristotle in the solution of this problem) requires a synthesis.¹¹²

2. It is here that we find the second reason why, in Derrida's opinion, the metaphysical definition of time and space cannot succeed. Each is dependent upon the other as the synthesis which permits the co-maintenance of the mutually negative moments out of which it is constructed or produced.

In effect, simultaneity can appear as such, can be simultaneity, that is a relating of two points, only in a synthesis, a complicity: temporally. One cannot say that a point is with another point; and a point, whether one says it or not, cannot be with another point, there cannot be an other point with which, etc, without a temporalization. Which maintains together two different nows. The with of spatial coexistence arises only out of the with of temporalization. As Hegel shows. There is a with of time which makes

111 "The past and future of time as being in Nature are space, for space is negated time, just as sublated (aufgehobene) space is immediately the point, which developed for itself is time." Hegel, *Enzyklopaedie*, para. 259. Cit Derrida, *Ousia and gramme*, p. 46 n 22.

112 "To speak Latin, the *cum* or the *co-* of coexistence has meaning only on the basis of its impossibility, and vice versa. The impossible - the co-existence of the two nows - appears only in a synthesis ... the impossible comaintenance of several present nows [maintenants] is possible as the maintenance of several present nows [maintenants]. Time is a name for this impossible possibility. Conversely, the space of possible coexistence, precisely that which one believes is known by the name of space, the possibility of coexistences, is the space of the impossible coexistence." Derrida, *Ousia and gramme*, p. 55. Emphasis in original.

possible the with of space, but which could not be produced as with without the possibility of space.¹¹³

The above two basic contradictions in the metaphysics of time and space arise immediately, as it were, from the argumentation of metaphysics. They are, however, just as quickly submerged again in various textual, narrative and rhetorical strategies which Derrida's methodology would seek to untangle.

3. This brings us to the third reason for the failure of a metaphysical theory of time and space. This reason cannot be thought within metaphysics, but must be seen as part of Derrida's untangling procedure, perhaps even its motivation. The assumption underlying the definition of space in terms of time or vice versa is that each possesses an essence when absent. Since the line as the first negation of the point can be thought only in terms of its extremities and not its parts, and since these extremities may be thought only as continuously disappearing and re-constituting themselves, the truth of space, time, can itself have no existence except as a closure whose every moment re-constitutes itself in the moment of its disappearance. And the dialectic production of space is also a production of closures through the disappearance and re-constitution of its parts.

It is, according to Derrida, this disappearance and re-constitution which must be understood in its full gravity if the aporia of metaphysics are to be understood. For that which disappears when it is reached or focused on, but re-constitutes itself as soon as it is abandoned, ignored or left behind, can be granted presence only as that which signifies its own non-being by signifying itself as another.

The presence of the sign is the presence of the point negated in space, but negated in such a manner as to develop its potentiality. Thus the identity which seems to follow from a hopeless contradiction in the metaphysical conception of space and time (Derrida's statement that space is time) is at once the identity which allows signification. The circle whose presence is the negation of the line's

¹¹³ Derrida, Qusia and gramme, p. 55.

delimiting points is the form of unity which allows signification as the bonding of word and concept.¹¹⁴

It now remains to ask how this unity of identity is created as the site of erasure of an impossible contradiction, and how the contradiction re-surfaces as the trace of its own absence. This is the question of signification, and we cannot confront metaphysical space without confronting this question.

3.3 *The primacy of the voice: the negation of space in speech*

3.3.1 *Derrida on Hegel's Semiology*

When we speak with Joseph Simon of the signifying point as a solution to a contradiction in the Kantian philosophy of space, we must recognize that Simon is posing a solution to a problem in the Kantian position which Kant himself did not put forward. The value of Simon's critique is that he shows that the Kantian delimitation of metaphysical thought transposes the contradictions in a theory of space onto the theory of the sign.

This also emerges in Ernst Cassirer's attempt to salvage Kantian space - an attempt which follows similar lines to that of Simon. According to Cassirer, Kant's metaphysics can cope with the essence of space (and time) only by mystifying them.¹¹⁵ Cassirer, like Simon, develops his criticism of Kant's (and of Newton's) philosophy of space in a direction which would attempt to solve the Kantian dilemma by equating spatial qualities with those which modern linguistics has

¹¹⁴ Derrida, *Quasia and gramme*, p. 60.

¹¹⁵ "[Raum und Zeit müssen] beide, mit Kant zu sprechen, zu 'existierenden Udingen' [gemacht werden]. Unter den Gesichtspunkt der Kategorie des Dinges, der bloßen Substanz- Kategorie gestellt und unter diesem Gesichtspunkt befragt, geht das absolute Sein des Raums alsbald in sein Nicht-Sein über, wird er aus einem umfassenden Ding zu einem Uding gemacht." Ernst Cassirer, "Mythischer, ästhetischer, theoretischer Raum," in *Landschaft und Raum in der Erzählkunst*, ed. Alexander Ritter, *Wege der Forschung*, vol. 418 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), p. 21.

uncovered in the sign. This he does via the Leibnizian philosophy of space. Leibniz had attempted to overcome what he saw as problems in Newton's concept of space by treating it as a relation, an order.¹¹⁶ When Cassirer speaks of "order" and "relations," it is apparent that he is speaking of what would now be called a structure. This is because, whereas the concept of existence is ruled by identity, that of a structure is ruled by difference.¹¹⁷ The nature of the spatial structure is, however, that of a signifying structure. The primacy of difference over identity, as Derrida has shown, is the moving force of signification. And signification, therefore, bears within it a gap, lack or distance, which is spatial to the extent that its meaning is gained by a distance to that which is always absent.¹¹⁸

Now the initial moment of the imagination (*Vorstellung*); that is the moment of intuition in which the contents of *Empfindung* are "cast out" into space and time, is, in order that the particular intuition be subsumed under the generality of the ego, also the moment where the contents of *Gefühl* are set in the "particular space and the particular time" of the intelligence.¹¹⁹

In the moment of production of concrete images, this space and time becomes the relation of the concrete images.¹²⁰ However - and here we return to the Hegelian critique of the Kantian sign - the concrete image, which, as *thesei*, does not

116 "...dieser Begriff der Beziehung und der Ordnung schließt ihm nun auch erst die wahre Natur von Raum und Zeit auf und gestattet ihm, beide dem System der Erkenntnis widerspruchlos einzufügen. Die Widersprüche, die sich aus Newtons Begriff des absoluten Raumes und der absoluten Zeit ergeben hatten, werden von Leibniz dadurch beseitigt, daß er beide statt zu Dingen, vielmehr zu Ordnungen macht. Raum und Zeit sind keine Substanzen, sondern vielmehr 'reale Relationen'; sie haben ihre wahrhafte Objektivität in der 'Wahrheit von Beziehungen', nicht in irgendeiner absoluten Wirklichkeit." Cassirer, *Mythischer, ästhetischer, theoretischer Raum*, pp. 21-22.

117 "Im Gegensatz zu dieser Starrheit des Seinsbegriffs ist der Begriff der Ordnung von Anfang an durch das Moment der Verschiedenheit, der inneren Vielgestaltigkeit bezeichnet und ausgezeichnet. Sobald daher, in der theoretischen Gesamtanschauung der Wirklichkeit und speziell des Raumes, der Schwerpunkt der Betrachtung sich vom Pol des Seins nach dem Pol der Ordnung hin verschiebt, so ist damit stets ein Sieg des Pluralismus über den abstrakten Monismus, der Vielförmigkeit über die Einförmigkeit gegeben...Immer handelt es sich darum, das Unbegrenzte zu begrenzen, das Unbestimmte zu bestimmen." Cassirer, *Mythischer, ästhetischer, theoretischer Raum*, pp. 23-24

118 "Such is the strange "being" of the sign: half of it always "not there" and the other half always "not that." The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that which is forever absent." Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Translator's preface to *Of grammatology*, by Jacques Derrida, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. xvii.

119 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 374.

120 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 376.

possess the "Unmittelbarkeit der Existenz,"¹²¹ cannot gain independent existence until the space and time whose relation they are gain content. This happens in the moment of synthesis, in the production of signs.¹²²

For Hegel, the sign is situated at the moment of synthesis where the intelligence is reflected in itself. As such it is the "Einheit selbstständiger Vorstellung und der Anschauung, zu welcher jene als freie Phantasie sich äussert."¹²³ What is of interest here is that this unity determines the object as the other of the subject, as well as the other of itself - it is a unity of signification.¹²⁴

Die Anschauung gilt in dieser Identität nicht als positiv und sich selbst, sondern als etwas anderes vorstellend; sie ist ein Bild, das eine selbstständige Vorstellung der Intelligenz als Seele in sich empfangen hat, seine Bedeutung. Diese Anschauung ist das Zeichen.¹²⁵

Hegel differentiates the sign from the symbol, in that the determination of intuition in the latter is essentially the same as the thought it expresses. In other words, the meaning of the symbol is visible.¹²⁶ The sign on the other hand permits the intelligence a certain amount of arbitration and sovereignty in the determination of meaning. In commenting the passage in the Encyclopedia in which the difference between sign and symbol is articulated, Derrida states that "the production of arbitrary signs manifests the freedom of the spirit. And there is more manifest freedom in the production of the sign than in the production of the symbol. In the sign the spirit is more independent and closer to itself. In the symbol, conversely, it is a bit more exiled into nature."¹²⁷

Thus the story of the production of the sign is also that of the production of space and time in their fullness, only to be negated as non-mediate and unique

121 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 378.

122 "Seine [des Zeichens] wahrhafte Stelle [in der Psychologie oder auch in der Logik] ist die aufgezeigte, daß die Intelligenz, welche als anschauend Zeit und Raum erzeugt, nun ihren selbstständigen Vorstellungen ein bestimmtes Daseyn gibt, den erfüllten Raum und Zeit, die Aufschauung in der Bestimmtheit, die sie vom Stoffe der Empfindung hat, als die ihrige gebraucht, deren unmittelbare und eigenthümliche Vorstellung tilgt, und ihr eine andere zur Bedeutung und Seele giebt." Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 379.

123 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 379.

124 Simon, *Der Raum*, p. 127.

125 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 379.

126 See Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 84.

127 Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 86

presentations (unmittelbare und eigenthümliche Vorstellung) so as to give rise to meaning as something other: the soul dwelling in a body constituted in space and time, or as Hegel puts it,

Das Zeichen ist irgend eine unmittelbare Anschauung, aber die eine Vorstellung von ganz anderem Inhalt vorstellt, als sie für sich hat; - die Pyramide, in welche eine fremde Seele versetzt und aufbewahrt ist.¹²⁸

For this reason, Derrida sees Hegelian semiology as paradigmatic for the subsequent conception of the sign.¹²⁹ This claim may be supported on two counts. First of all, the Hegelian sign partakes of the dialectic of appearance and disappearance which Saussure was later to explicate as linguistic value, analysing it into an associational and a substitutional dialectic. As such, Hegel states that signs are diverse, arbitrary in relation to one another, and collected into sequences which constitute fixed orders.¹³⁰ Secondly, the production of objective meaning from a signifier (or "name," as Hegel calls it) is instituted as the disappearance of a previous purely subjective investment in the signifier. This subjective investment takes the form of a non-reflexive intelligence. In the activation of the sign, this intelligence becomes self-conscious through the function of memory, or as Hegel terms it, *mechanische Gedächtnis*.¹³¹ Later, Lacan will take up these ideas and demonstrate that the space which opens up in the dialectic of the signifier is a space in which the subject is constantly struggling to reconcile a reflexive and a non-reflexive subjectivity. This will be discussed in the following chapter. Let us note for the present that when we speak of signifying space and subjective space, we are making an analytic distinction. Neither can be thought without the other.

It is in this sense that we must understand Hegel's attempt to link the question of signification to the relation between the body (as non-reflective intelligence) and the soul (as self-reflective intelligence). Hegel understands the question of the

¹²⁸ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 379, p. 269.

¹²⁹ "The sign, as the unity of the signifying body and the signified ideality, becomes a kind of incarnation. Therefore the opposition of soul and body, and analogically the opposition of the intelligible and the sensory, condition the difference between the signified and the signifier, between the signifying intention (bedeuten), which is an animating activity, and the inert body of the signifier. This will remain true for Saussure..." Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 82.

¹³⁰ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 382, 270-1.

¹³¹ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 383, 271.

incarnation of the soul of pure meaning in the body of the signifier as the question of pure self-presence confronted by its own death.¹³² It will be shown below that when, in terms of his philosophy of history, Hegel criticizes systems of writing which depend upon what Derrida calls a "spacing" - that is those systems whose dependence upon intuition preserve the contradictions of spatiality - it is primarily this moment of death which he opposes. Death is inextricably tied to the spatiality of the sign. This follows because the process whereby the soul is breathed into the body, or deposited in the material of the pyramid, is the negation of the spatiality produced by the intelligence in intuition.

Intelligence, then, is the name of the power which produces a sign by negating the sensory spatiality of intuition. It is the relève of spatial intuition. Now, as Hegel shows elsewhere, the relève (Aufhebung) of space is time. The latter is the truth of what it negates - space - in a moment of relève. Here, the truth or teleological essence of the sign as the relève of sensory-spatial intuition will be the sign as time, the sign in the element of temporalization.¹³³

What this means is that the intuition, since it is constituted in space and time, must, in order to act as the vessel of a meaning, yield to the intuition of that which would have been present had the intuition not taken its place. As has already been shown, this detour to a presence which has been via the negation of a presence which is, is given in the negation of space in time.

Die Anschauung, die für ein Zeichen gebraucht wird, ist als unmittelbare zunächst eine gegebene und räumliche. Aber indem sie nur als aufgehobene, und die Intelligenz diese ihre Negativität ist, so ist die wahrhaftere Form des Daseyns des Zeichens, die Zeit...¹³⁴

The temporal negation of the spatial intuition of the sign ("ein Verschwinden, indem es ist"), Hegel goes on to say, is achieved in the sound: "...der Ton ist die erfüllte Äusserung der sich kund gebenden Innerlichkeit.

Der für die bestimmten Vorstellungen sich weiter articulierende Ton, die Rede und ihr System, die Sprache, giebt den Empfindungen, Anschauungen

¹³² "The opposition between body and soul is not only at the center of this doctrine of signification, it is confirmed by it; and, as has always been at bottom the case in philosophy, it depends upon an interpretation of language. Visibility and spatiality as such could only destroy the self-presence of will and spiritual animation which opens up in discourse. They are literally the death of that self-presence." Derrida, Speech and phenomena, and other essays on Husserl's theory of signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 35.

¹³³ Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 89.

¹³⁴ Hegel, Enzyklopädie, para 380, p. 270.

ein zweytes höheres, als ihr unmittelbares und den Vorstellungen überhaupt ein Daseyn, das im Reiche der Vorstellungen gilt.¹³⁵

According to Hegel, then, representations acquire Being through the negation of spatiality in the pronunciation of the sign, in speech and its system. Speech becomes for Hegel "sound relevé from its naturalness and linked to spirit's relation to itself, the psyche as a subject for itself and affecting itself by itself."¹³⁶ Or, again, "...sound (Ton) is an externality which in its coming-to-be is annihilated again by its very existence, and it vanishes of itself."¹³⁷

3.3.2 *Writing as spatial re-presentation of spatial negation*

It follows from this that Hegel must assign the production of written signs a secondary position after the production of speech. As Derrida indicates, this has direct consequences for a theory of space.

This relevant, spiritual, and ideal excellence of the phonic makes every spatial language - and in general all spacing - remain inferior and exterior. Writing, according to an extension that transforms our notion of it, may be considered as an example or as the concept of this spacing.¹³⁸

There is a certain difficulty here centering around the question of origins. If writing is to be understood as derivative, its place in Hegel's dialectics would have to be situated at the moment of negation of the spoken sign, where the pure self-presence of meaning would be externalized. It would not be possible to see writing as a synthesis of the internal and external directions of the production of meaning, simply for the reason that it would then become the truth of the voice - the *An-und-für-sich-Sein* of the voice. If, however, writing is to be equated with the death of the self-presence of meaning in the negation of the voice, in what sense can it be understood to be derivative? That is, in what sense can writing re-present the self-

¹³⁵ Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, para 380, p. 270.

¹³⁶ Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 89.

¹³⁷ Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 92.

¹³⁸ Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 94.

presence of the spoken sign although it does not itself bear that same presence, that same punctuality which is, as we have seen, the negation of space?

This question forms the basis of Derrida's critique of Husserl's theory of signs, and in clarifying this point it is worth turning briefly to the argument presented in Speech and phenomena. Derrida takes as the central issue in Husserl's theory of signs the latter's attempt to distinguish between the purely intentional aspect of meaning and its formal extension as a sign. These he distinguishes as expression (*Ausdruck*) and indication (*Anzeichen*) respectively. As Derrida shows, Husserl's effort to avoid a simple reduction of his distinction to that between non-material speech and the material (or physical) sign is what brings him to understand it in terms of the self-presence of consciousness on the one hand, and the negation of space on the other hand. Expression takes place in consciousness, not in nature and space, and as such it corresponds to an interior monologue. The positivity it represents is that of life, and it distinguishes itself from the physicality of the sign by the fact that the latter always refers to an "empirical worldly existence,"¹³⁹ and as such it embodies an absence of self-presence which introduces death into language.¹⁴⁰

The parallels to Hegel's first two dialectical movements of the imagination are apparent. And like Hegel, Husserl concludes that the phoneme must be the most ideal of signs. We must be careful to realize, however, that for Husserl, the ideality of the phoneme is not that of a synthesis, but of an origin - an originary self-presence. The signifier as a phoneme escapes death, not as in Hegel, by a synthesis of the negation of death with the positivity it negates, but because it bears a self-presence which is prior to all negativity. In other words, it has never known the moment of spatiality which characterizes the Hegelian representation of the imagination-in-itself.

¹³⁹ Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 43.

¹⁴⁰ "In the final analysis what separates expression from indication could be called the immediate nonself-presence of the living present... Indication takes place whenever the sense-giving act, the animating intention, the living spirituality of the meaning- intention, is not fully present," Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 37-38.

If the sign is the body which bears this soul, this pure intentionality of meaning, this self-presence, any attempt to think pure meaning (and here we find Hegel the "metaphysician" much more conscious of the limits of his system than Husserl the "non-metaphysician") must think it as the negation of the body in which it is enclosed. The fact of this negation - this is what Derrida sets out to demonstrate - will eventually contaminate any concept of originary self-presence. Self-presence (we have already followed Derrida's argument here) is a non-originary product which "must be produced in the undivided unity of a temporal present so as to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs."¹⁴¹ Derrida sees in Husserl's concepts of expression and indication the need to think a presence which knows nothing of its opposite. These two "significations" then become "two forms of the return or re-stitution of the present: re-tention and re-presentation."¹⁴² This distinction contains at each moment the *re-* of difference, be it temporal or spatial - a difference which will eventually destroy the very possibility of such a distinction. And yet, it is upon the possibility of such a distinction that what Derrida calls the philosophy of the West¹⁴³ - metaphysics - has been built. Inherent in it is the possibility of a subject as the situation of a consciousness never differing from itself, and, opposite this self-consciousness, a signifying ideality which is not dependent on intuition, on visibility, on space. As a consequence, the sign itself must obliterate itself, if it is to have meaning for a subject.¹⁴⁴ Speech becomes the ideality of self-presence, repeating itself indefinitely. It is an "ideal object... freed from all mundane

¹⁴¹ Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 60.

¹⁴² Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 67.

¹⁴³ I will return to this point at a later stage.

¹⁴⁴ "Signs can be eliminated in the classical manner in a philosophy of intuition and presence. Such a philosophy eliminates signs by making them derivative; it annuls reproduction and representation by making signs a modification of a simple presence. But because it is just such a philosophy - which is, in fact, the philosophy and history of the West - which has so constituted and established the very concept of signs, the sign is from its origin and to the core of its sense marked by this will to derivation or effacement. Thus to restore the original and non-derivative character of signs, in opposition to classical metaphysics is, by an apparent paradox, at the same time to eliminate a concept of signs whose whole history and meaning belong to the adventure of the metaphysics of presence. This also holds for the concepts of representation, repetition, difference, etc., as well as for the system they form." Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 51.

spatiality,.. a pure noema that I can express without having, at least apparently, to pass through the world."¹⁴⁵

It follows from the metaphysical arguments which place speech and writing as the re-tention and re-presentation of an absent moment of self-presence that, if there is a spatiality of the sign (spatiality in the sense indicated by metaphysics), it opens up in the inscription and closes - is preserved (*aufgehoben*) or prefigured, or otherwise given to a banishment which retains the mark of that which it banishes - in the voice. All attempts to understand an inwardness of speech must see this inwardness as a "pure difference" to all that which can be excluded from it, in other words, to "space, the outside, the world, the body, etc."¹⁴⁶ This pure difference "...produces sameness as self-relation within self-difference; it produces sameness as the non-identical."¹⁴⁷

We have already followed the argument by which Derrida would equate this production to the production of temporality from the pure difference of spatiality. The conclusion which Derrida draws for writing is that, if the spatiality negated in time is to be erased in pure self-presence, it is necessary that self-presence be conceived as a supplement to the meaning it bears, in the same way it is supplemented by writing. What this supplementation amounts to is the creation of signification by reference to a higher (more idealized and thus prior) level by substituting a signifier for another type of signifier. The circularity of metaphysics which Derrida discussed in *Quisiam gramme* is the determinant factor here, since it is this very circularity which allows the creation of signification by assigning temporal priority to the substituted signifier, which has become a signifier only through the act of being substituted. Writing, it follows, must be seen as the initiating factor and the completion of idealization.¹⁴⁸ In constituting itself as something added on to the fullness of self-presence in speech, however, writing

¹⁴⁵ Derrida, *Speech and phenomena*, p. 75.

¹⁴⁶ Derrida, *Speech and phenomena*, p. 82.

¹⁴⁷ Derrida, *Speech and phenomena*, p. 82.

¹⁴⁸ "This writing cannot be added to speech because, from the moment speech awakens, this writing has duplicated it by animating it." Derrida, *Speech and phenomena*, p. 97.

defers ideality ad infinitum. It is this deferral of difference and spatiality which constitutes the metaphysics of presence as an impossibility and which, if we are to believe Derrida, necessarily means that the history of the West, which is the history of presence, has already ended.¹⁴⁹

If we accept Derrida's interpretation, the crux - in Hegel as in Husserl - lies in the mediating function of writing. As long as the difference which opens in action and signification mediates the ideal universality which is conceived as its *telos*, this universality cannot be reached. As soon, however, as we conceive of a pure meaning without signification, or, in terms of what has been said above, a voice without writing, the writing which has written that voice is effaced. And thus, the voice cannot be spoken of without obliterating that which has produced it. Nevertheless, Hegel attempts to do just that, to write about speaking as if, in terms of a philosophy of history, speech could be spoken without writing.

As Derrida indicates, the prime target of Hegel's offensive against the status of the written sign is Leibniz and his "confidence in intelligence, that is, in a formalizing understanding bearing death."¹⁵⁰ Hegel would have to have regarded such a preoccupation with the formalizing aspect of the intelligence in the same way he regarded the symbol: as a lower stage in the movement of the spirit. Both are tied to the space of the intelligence generalized within the intelligence and removed to the distance of re-presentation. Derrida places "the space of formal abstraction," which was Leibniz's medium of universality, on a level equivalent to space itself.¹⁵¹

149 "The history of metaphysics therefore can be expressed as the unfolding of the structure or schema of an absolute will-to-hear-oneself-speak. This history is closed when this infinite absolute appears to itself as its own death. A voice without difference, a voice without writing, is at once absolutely alive and absolutely dead." Derrida, Speech and phenomena, p. 102. This same conclusion was seen by Alexander Kojève as a necessary result of Hegel's philosophy of history. Alexander Kojève, Introduction to the reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nicholls Jr (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 435n.

150 Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 97.

151 "In assigning the limits of so-called universal writing, that is a mute writing, released from the voice and from every natural language, Hegel also criticizes the pretensions of mathematical symbolism and of arithmetic, the operations of formal understanding. The silence of this writing and the space of calculation would interrupt the movement of the *Aufhebung*, or in any case would resist the interiorization of the past (*Erinnerung*), the relevant idealization, the history of the spirit, the reappropriation of the logos in self-presence and infinite parousia. If the passage through mathematical abstraction, through formal understanding, spacing, exteriority and death... is a necessary passage..., this necessity becomes perversion and regression as soon as it is taken as a philosophical model." Derrida, The pit and the pyramid, p. 105.

Taking up Hegel's plea for the necessity of the development of the spirit in the movement of *Aufhebung*, we would then have to accept the passage from the symbol to the sign as the passage from space to no-longer-space, from death to its absence. And we would have to accept the further passage from the sign to thought as that from which spatiality has been forever banished. Alternatively, we would have to reserve a position for the voice as an originary self-presence, as in Husserl, which escapes death by never assuming substance and spatiality.¹⁵²

Yet, as Derrida points out, the very idea of this passage indicates that *Aufhebung* might not be as simple and safe a movement as implied by Hegel. For to think this passage would be to think a spatiality of the sign from which all spatiality has been banished. If we are to understand the relation between thought and the spatiality of the sign, Derrida suggests we should understand the negativity in which difference has been lost as a machine "in its pure functioning, and not in its final utility, its meaning, its result, its work."¹⁵³ For a philosophy of space, the question would now become: can the working of such a machine be specified? And can it be specified in terms of a space which while signifying (since signifying is its mode of functioning) would signify nothing, not even its own space, not even the fact that it were signifying nothing? These questions lead on from Derrida's problematic of how to name the machine without its product, how to think what is "unthinkable in that it inscribes within itself an effect of pure loss. It would be unthinkable as a non-thought that no thought could relever, could constitute as its other."¹⁵⁴ The task of such a mechanics of the sign would then be to think its spatiality not as an intuition (which is after all the *Aufhebung* of the indeterminacy of nature) but as the work which would be the sign's permanent "non-presence" (because it is permanent), a non-presence which forever refuses to disappear in the production of signification.

It should be clear from the above attempt to define a metaphysical spatiality of the sign, that such a concept of spatiality would have to differ radically from its

¹⁵² See Derrida, *Speech and phenomena*, p. 77.

¹⁵³ Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, p. 107.

¹⁵⁴ Derrida, *The pit and the pyramid*, 107.

metaphysical heritage. Although such a theory of the spatiality of the sign is of great interest, we will not be addressing it here. Instead, let us accept Derrida's critique of metaphysical space as the starting point for another discussion. If metaphysical space is lost in a machinic function which has no privileged relation to truth or identity, and if this loss produces the illusion of such a privileged relation, then it seems to me to be a fruitful path of inquiry to investigate the mechanics of production at work here. For, as I have shown, the production of space is not only a philosophical problem - it is a production of a space in which specific modes of unity seem to prevail. Not only space, but also knowledge, subjectivity and the socius are such unities. In the following chapter, I will be attempting to show that these unities are constructed of functions (which, for want of a better word, I am forced to call "spaces") which are diverse and complex.

CHAPTER 2: THE PRODUCTION OF THE OEDIPAL DRAMA: THE
PRODUCTION OF OEDIPAL SPACE

*OEDIPUS: Nonsense, I must pursue this trail
to the end,
till I have unravelled the mystery of
my birth.*

*JOCASTA: No! In God's name - if you want
to live,
this quest must not go on...*

Sophocles

1 THE SPACE OF DESIRE AS AN IMAGINARY QUANTITY

1.1 *Philosophy and the spatializing machine*

In the previous chapter, I set out to show that space, as we know it within the metaphysical tradition, is the domain where subjectivity and signification enter into a dialectic of presence and absence. As a result, their own specific spatiality, the unity they present, is the product of an act of repression. We followed Derrida's argument that what is repressed is difference, and, in conclusion, we saw that this difference is to be thought as a machinic function which would have to embrace thought itself.

In this chapter, I will turn my attention to the genesis of the productive mechanisms which condition the seemingly united spaces of subjectivity and signification. I will show that if we are to develop a theory which does justice to these unities as they function in colonization, we will have to understand them in relation to the space of the socius. To this end, I will be developing the thesis that vision and writing are the functions which allow subjectivity and signification to appear as unities within the space of the socius. It should emerge from this discussion that the status of the border plays a crucial role in defining the conditions under which these unities can prevail, as well as in defining the conditions under which they can give way to other unities. What I am pleading for is a materialist theory of space.

In the previous chapter, I showed how the metaphysical conception of space has been developed as a function of a boundary - be this the enclosing surface of a continent vessel, the horizon of vision implied by Kant's theory of spatiality, or the dividing line of difference which is crossed and recrossed in the Hegelian dialectic. Metaphysics encircles the present as a space whose spatiality has been erased, opening the way for a critical philosophy which, by uncovering the traces of this banished spatiality, would seek to dramatize the limits of the metaphysical discourse.

When we shift our attention to the specific application of metaphysical discourse - to that discourse which would speak the truth about a specific territory, a specific demarkation of spatiality, a geographical space - we find that, by dramatizing the limits of this discourse's spatiality, we are repeating the work of discourse, which has been to draw this boundary as a mark of enclosure - a line, on both sides of which knowledge is produced as the power which drew the line. In re-tracing the spatiality of a territory which a metaphysical discourse has produced as true, we are ourselves exercising the same discourse. Derrida himself has said as much in his critique of metaphysics. And yet, we must recognise the subtle difference between the way in which we partake of such a discourse when we dramatize the limits of philosophy, and when we dramatize the limits of any of those unities which can function as the domain of truth which discourse establishes.

Homi Bhabha touches upon this when he refers to the essential contradiction of colonial representation arising from a need to articulate difference and non-difference simultaneously. According to Bhabha, the simultaneity of this articulation creates colonial space as a space in which a discourse of resistance is inevitably present in the form of a "hybridity" which "terrorizes authority with the *ruse* of recognition, its mimicry, its mockery."¹

Hybridity is the name of this displacement of value from symbol to sign that causes the dominant discourse to split along the axis of its power to be representative, authoritative.²

This axis of colonial representation is, however, different from the bar of the sign, in that it serves not to erase difference with a promise of presence, but to pursue meaning as the productive display of difference. Bhabha refers to colonial discourse here in terms of Derrida's concept of the double inscription. In doing so, however, he insists that this concept, as Derrida employs it, is inadequate for an understanding of colonial discourse. For Derrida, presence is to be grasped in terms of the transparency of the sign, or, for our purposes, as a negation of the spatiality of

¹ Homi Bhabha, "Signs taken as wonders: questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi, May 1817.," in *"Race," writing, and difference*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986), p. 176. Collected essays originally published in *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 12(1) (1985), and vol. 13(1) (1986).

² Bhabha, *Signs taken as wonders*, p. 174.

the sign. The "reality effect," which Derrida sees as resulting from this transparency, is marginalized. Bhabha, however, suggests that, when it comes to colonial discourse, these "reality effects" are to be understood in relation to a transparency which does not erase difference (or the spatiality of the sign) in a mimetic gesture, but opens the differences of signification and textuality onto a series of other differences and spatialities.

Transparency is the action of the distribution and arrangement of differential spaces, positions, knowledges in relation to each other, relative to a differential, not inherent sense of order. This effects a regulation of spaces and places that is authoritatively assigned; it puts the addressee into the proper frame or condition for some action or result.³

Thus Bhabha sees the reality effect as functioning by equivocation between what he calls "disposal, as the bestowal of a frame of reference, and disposition, as mental inclination, a frame of mind."⁴ This equivocation should be understood as a relationship neither of difference (subject/object), nor of identity (signifier=signified), but as an alignment of two spaces along an agonistic and shifting surface. This surface is not adequately described if we attempt to grasp it as the bar of signification.

We shall see in the following that Bhabha is describing a representative regime very similar to the one Deleuze and Guattari suggest as issuing from the capitalist machine. The authority which aligns differential spaces does so in much the same way as their "quasi-cause." Bhabha is not explicit here, but I take the principle of equivocation by which the alignment is sustained to be what he calls a disavowal in which "the trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something *different*."⁵ This repetition of difference is essential in colonization, for it draws the boundary between the discrete spaces upon which the existence of the colony depends. And it does this at the same time that it holds them together in a kind of concatenation or syntax. I will be arguing in the following that the capture and production of colonial space depends upon the articulation of this boundary. To articulate this boundary is to produce spatial unities whose management and

³ Bhabha, Signs taken as wonders, p. 170.

⁴ Bhabha, Signs taken as wonders, p. 171.

⁵ Bhabha, Signs taken as wonders, p. 172.

maintenance require a specific set of strategies. Colonization sets itself the task of developing these strategies.

In the act of philosophy as Derrida pursues it, it may suffice for us to uncover the traces of difference which de-limit the discourse of metaphysics; but it is precisely this trace of difference which clings to the intuited presence of the borders of the colony (taking the word "border" in the widest sense) and marks it with a transcendental truth value. In the concatenating gesture which draws the borders upon which the colony depends, the difference which marks here from there, within from beyond, is a dividing line which has been displaced from the external limits of truth, beyond which there is only the unthinkable, the edge of the world. This limit has been displaced onto the surface which Bhabha describes and has assumed the function of an internal limit - internal because it is constantly being denied or disavowed. This is possible because the drawing and crossing of borders is necessarily an operation which multiplies itself ad infinitum. As we shall see, this displacement of the limit of knowledge is that which renders knowledge functional in what Deleuze and Guattari call the capitalist social formation. Here knowledge is not motivated, as it is in the despotic formation, by a transcendental desire to which it may then be attached. Within capitalist knowledge, "... every limit is constantly transgressed,... what is important is not the other side of the frontier, it is that both sides are already posited, composed in one and the same world."⁶ Lyotard repeats this elsewhere in more direct terms:

Métèque criticism [criticism from the position of the outsider - J.N.] is the weapon of big companies; it determines boundaries, the outside and the inside, Romans and non-Romans, citizens and foreigners.
All your authors, all your assemblages of words, only reinforce this boundary, this frontier zone.⁷

We find ourselves forced to pose questions centering on the production of the limit, and its inscription within the subject, who is produced alongside it as if he were its natural product. We will find, in following this path, that it is necessary to postulate a spatializing machine which seizes upon the spatiality of the sign (as noted by Derrida), but whose working depends upon different mechanisms. Again, it

⁶ Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Energumen capitalism," *Semiotext(e)* 2(3) (1977), p. 25.

⁷ Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Passages from *Le mur du Pacifique*" *SubStance* 37/38 (1983), p. 94.

is Derrida himself who points to this necessity via the possibility of formulating a textual analysis (which is at the same time a strategic political intervention) on the recognition "that *text*, as I use the word, is not the book. No more than writing or trace, it is not limited to the *paper* with which you cover your graphism. It is precisely for strategic reasons... that I found it necessary to recast the concept of text by generalizing it almost without limit, in any case without present or perceptible limit, without any limit that *is*."⁸

Now if we de-limit the text as radically as this, we run the risk of failing to recognize the fact that some texts are written, others inscribed or doubly-inscribed, and others produced according to gestures which can scarcely be called writing, since they produce meaning *at the same time* that they produces spaces. The limit of the sign produces meaning in the place of the sign's spatiality, simply because neither can present itself except at the expense of the other. This does not apply to the border, which produces spaces by rendering "difference"⁹ visible. Where the text is the product of a deliberate tracing, a limit or delimiting line, an enclosing gesture or boundary, a number of things happen. First, it should be possible to analyse this limit without seeking to apprehend it as a symbol; that is, in terms of the field it has visualized through exclusion. Second, any spatiality to which it may give rise must be understood as encompassing a spatiality of the sign, but also a more pervasive spatiality which has the power to unify a number of disparate spatial levels without producing meaning through mutual exclusion. Third, this line constantly refuses to mean, and in doing so, is constantly reducing itself to the status of the ontological. To put it succinctly, the spatiality of the sign partakes of a broader production of space.

Does this broader field in which the spatiality of the sign functions pose a serious threat to Derrida's theory? In another article on difference in colonial discourse, Homi Bhabha has addressed the problems of *différance* as a theory which

⁸ Jacques Derrida, "But, beyond... (Open letter to Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon)," in "Race, writing, and difference," ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986), p. 176. Collected essays originally published in Critical Inquiry, vol. 12(1) (1985), and vol. 13(1) (1986), p. 366.

⁹ The apostrophes are intended to emphasize that, because of the visibility of difference, it cannot be equated with the difference which Derrida attempts to unveil.

spatializes its field of application.¹⁰ Bhabha takes up Mark Cousins' claim that the notion of lack constitutive of difference in a philosophy of presence must confine philosophy (or analysis) to an endless repetition of the same in the name of a discovery of difference.¹¹ According to Bhabha, the strategy which *différance* employs to bypass this pitfall is "the recognition of otherness as a symbol (not sign) of the presence of *signifiance* or *différance*: otherness is the point of equivalence or identity in a circle in which what needs to be proved (the limits of logocentricity) is assumed."¹² What is interesting here - and I refer to Ulrike Kistner's study of colonial codification - is that this establishment of a border which must be continually crossed in order that the principle of a border be confirmed has a dual correlate in capitalist primary accumulation and in the expansionism of imperialism. Kistner quotes Marx in this connection:

Dieser Widerspruch zwischen der quantitativen Schranke und der qualitativen Schrankenlosigkeit des Geldes treibt den Schatzbildner stets zurück zur Sisyphusarbeit der Akkumulation. Es geht ihm wie dem Weltoberer, der mit jedem neuen Land nur eine neue Grenze erobert.¹³

As Kistner points out, this activity is precisely that of capitalist de- and reterritorialization, as Deleuze and Guattari discuss it. It should be clear from what we have seen of Derrida's critique of the circle of metaphysics that Bhabha's claim is a very strong indictment of his textual activity indeed. Bhabha continues:

What is denied is any knowledge of cultural otherness as a differential sign, implicated in specific historical and discursive conditions, requiring construction in differential practices of reading. The place of otherness is fixed in the West as a subversion of Western metaphysics and is finally appropriated by the West as its limit-text, the Anti-West. This results in a disciplinary gaze upon difference that disavows the castrating and negating return of the gaze of the Other.¹⁴

I would be cautious of Bhabha's critique as identifying a general weakness of deconstructive method. Although it is a constantly recurring theme in his writing, I

¹⁰ Bhabha bases this claim upon Derrida's recurrent reference to "The West" as a spatial limit of the text. Homi Bhabha, "Difference, discrimination, and the discourse of colonization," in Literature, politics and theory. Papers from the Essex Conference 1976-84, ed. Francis Barker (London & New York: Methuen 1986).

¹¹ Mark Cousins, "The logic of deconstruction," The Oxford Literary Review 3(2) (1978), p. 76. Cit Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 195.

¹² Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 195.

¹³ Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels, Werke, Bd 23: Das Kapital I (Berlin: Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED 1956-58), p. 147. Cit Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 18.

¹⁴ Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 195.

do not see that a spatialized field of otherness is a necessary goal of Derrida's *différance*. It is true: "what Derrida does is to fix the problem of ethnocentricity repeatedly at the limits of logocentricity."¹⁵ But in doing so, Derrida would have to reply, he is quite conscious of the paradoxical role, and for that matter, the political implications of speaking the limits of a discourse from within that discourse.

It is in the interest of one side and the other to represent deconstruction as a turning inward and an enclosure by the limits of language, whereas in fact, deconstruction *begins by* deconstructing logocentrism, the linguistics of the word, and this very enclosure itself.¹⁶

Nevertheless, I believe that Bhabha is quite correct in posing the question: given the fact of a (multiple) construction of a spatial field of otherness (as the product of what I would call a spatializing machine), is deconstruction capable of an adequate analysis of this place? Or to put the question differently: when confronted with colonial power, is it enough, is it an adequate strategy (does it even deserve the term "strategy") when the philosopher realizes the paradoxical position of a philosopher who does not wish to engage in the discourse which gave rise to this power? Although in the final analysis I will agree with Bhabha in answering in the negative, Bhabha himself shows that colonization cannot be adequately understood without understanding the role played by discourse. And it is my claim that this in turn cannot be understood without a concept of the spatiality of the sign, such as may be derived from Derrida.

Thus, having followed Derrida's de-limiting activity along certain crucial nodes of metaphysical discourse, we may now approach the question of the working of the spatializing machine. We will be doing this by way of a series of tracings, whereby we hope to follow certain productive mechanisms of this machine. It is unavoidable that these tracings remain within the metaphysical as conceived by Derrida. However, I hope that I will be dramatizing not only the limits of a discourse, but the way in which these limits are used; that is, the product which emerges from the spatializing machine, and in emerging, presents itself as if it had produced itself.

¹⁵ Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 196.

¹⁶ Derrida, *But, beyond*, p. 367.

1.2 *Desire, the space of the subject, the space of history*

We may derive from Derrida's critique of metaphysics that the spatiality of metaphysical discourse is not only guaranteed by the temporality which displaces it, but that it is guaranteed by its own structure. The space which the signifying order reserves for the speaking subject intersects with that which history reserves for the subject acting within the social order. These two dimensions of spatiality determine and condition one another mutually, each providing a fictional "context" within which the "truth" of the other might be postulated. Thus the parameters of social space seem capable of functioning as constants within which subjective space may be investigated, or vice versa. It is, however, my intention to investigate this spatiality not as the product of a history - be this the history of the subject or of the *socius* - but as a productive function - a machine - out of which both may arise, and out of which another quantity, truth, may appear alongside them. It is the difference between given spaces and a spatializing function which I hope to preserve in the term "spatializing machine." In order to perform such analysis, it is necessary to approach this machine from along one of the fictional axes on whose intersection it functions. Whereas a theory of the fictionality of phylogenetic space is as good as non-existent (perhaps the closest to such a theory is Freud's *Totem and Tabu*), psychoanalysis has gone very far toward constructing a theory of the fictionality of ontogenetic space. If we are to approach the spatializing machine at work in the production of colonial space, it thus seems sensible to approach it from the insights of psychoanalysis, rather than from those of history.

Lacan has shown that the construction of the subject may be conceived in a number of different ways, all of them centering about a desire for Being, which forces the subject to conceive of representation as providing the only position from which the question of its own being may be confronted. Generally speaking, Lacan tells the story of the subject's spatiality in two phases, both of which are tied to the question of self-perception in vision. Firstly, we see perception attempting to

construct its own body as the space from which it issues forth. Secondly, subjectivity emerges by inserting its self-consciousness into a social space. This is accomplished by gazing on a fictional position which serves to represent itself as a social being, and by gazing upon itself from this fictional position. The second phase of spatiality has not received adequate attention in commentaries on Lacan's theory of the subject, and will be receiving greater attention here, since it is here that the space of subjectivity intersects with a socially constructed space that we must seek the subject of colonization. We will, nevertheless, note a certain colouring of this space with the imaginary space out of which it is built. For this reason, we will first turn our attention briefly to the spatial construction of subjectivity in the *mirror stage*¹⁷.

It is of interest to note that the existence of the subject is presided over by a determination which is neither social nor rational, but spatial. Lacan's mirror stage is described by Anika Lemaire as "the advent of coanaesthetic subjectivity preceded by the feeling that one's body is in pieces. The reflection of the body is, then, salutary in that it is unitary and localized in time and space."¹⁸ Lacan expressly states that this experience of the cohesion of one's own body is a first step in a production of subjectivity which "leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the cogito."¹⁹ Furthermore, the cognition of self as an *imago* possesses a primordial symbolic quality preceding the objectified and universal subjectivity which is given in the "dialectic of identification with the other"²⁰ and in language. The *imago* hence functions as an "Ideal-I," which "situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction..."²¹

Lacan will carry these two aspects of spatial determination throughout his entire work. Emphasizing not the what, but the where of being, he is constantly restating Descartes' famous maxim of being in terms of position.²² And, as we shall see in his

17 Jaques Lacan, "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience," in *Écrits, a selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock 1977).

18 Anika Lemaire, *Jaques Lacan*, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul 1977), p. 81.

19 Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 1.

20 Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 2.

21 Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 2.

22 For example, "I am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to think." Lacan, "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud," in *Écrits*, p. 166.

discussion of aggressivity, social aggression (such as war) seizes upon "limitations of the individual,"²³ which are spatial in nature and which serve to assign him a position in the social order.

It is important for us to note at the outset that Lacan describes the construction of the ego in the mirror stage as a fiction.²⁴ It must also be noted that this initial construction of the ego is not to be confused with the self-reflections of consciousness. It is, on the contrary, prior to such activity. It is a construction characterized by space in so far as it seizes upon visual perception as a mediation "between the organism and its reality - ... between the *Innenwelt* and the *Umwelt*."²⁵ The initial constructions of subjectivity are thus performed as spatial constructions upon which a dialectic of self-reflection as the self-questioning of being may be based. "What is hereby created, therefore, is not a self-consciousness but rather an organizing matrix, a statue ([Lacan, 1949] p 2), and this organizing matrix Lacan calls "I".²⁶ This organizing matrix is something which must be assumed and appropriated by the child, not as the result of an act of consciousness,²⁷ but as an organically vital discovery of "the signification of space for the living organism."²⁸ The dialectic of self-recognition and -misrecognition is not instituted on the level of consciousness, as in the Hegelian dialectic, but on the level of spatiality.

If we can go on to base the dialectic of consciousness encountering itself on this spatial dialectic, as Lacan does, then it seems justified to see in the Lacanian dialectic that signifying spatiality which we have already discussed as sublated in the Hegelian sign. Lacan attempts to grasp the initial spatiality of the subject as an organic necessity marked by the general function of the *imago* in mimesis as well as

²³ John Muller and William Richardson, *Lacan and Language. A reader's guide to Écrits* (New York: International Universities Press 1982), p. 51.

²⁴ According to Muller and Richardson, this fictionality is twofold. Firstly, when the child attempts to situate itself in a unity of its own body perceived as a reflection, "the ideal of total unity, projected onto this alienating identity, is an unattainable one..." (p. 31.) And secondly, the reflection that the mirror bears is subject to all the distortions characteristic of the visual field, resulting in a distorted apprehension of oneself. Although Muller and Richardson mention specifically only that of parity, we shall see later that distortion in the visual field will have to be understood in a much wider sense.

²⁵ Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 4.

²⁶ Wilfried ver Eecke, "Hegel as Lacan's source for necessity in psychoanalytic theory," in *Interpreting Lacan*, ed. Joseph Smith and William Kerrigan, *Psychiatry and the Humanities*, vol. 6 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1983), p. 125.

²⁷ Wilfried ver Eecke, *Hegel as Lacan's source*, p. 125.

²⁸ Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 3.

by a prematurity of the human organism at birth, the latter fact acting upon the *imago* to determine it as something immediate, identical to the self, and yet external, fixed, and not yet "filled" by the self perceived as internal.

As Lacan goes on to say, this perception of the *imago* as not yet oneself "is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the individual into history."²⁹ The recognition of the specular image is thus not simply an appropriation of the spatiality of the body, it is also an appropriation of the temporality of that body as a history. And it is more, the history of the body must be understood as opening up onto the history of a *socius*, by way of the spatial insertion of the self into the social field which marks the end of the mirror stage.

In developing the idea of a "paranoiac alienation, which dates from the deflection of the specular *I* into the social *I*,"³⁰ Lacan is closely following Hegel's construction of consciousness in the dialectic of the master and servant. However, Lacan does not see alienation as socially determined, as does Hegel, but as a quality of subjectivity upon which social existence expands.³¹

And yet, Lacan's discussion of the spatiality of the subject immediately problematizes any attempt to distinguish spatiality from the social domain. It is the task posed in the essay on aggressivity to explain how the subject, collecting itself into an image invested with primary narcissism and aggression, can transfer this image onto other figures which serve to mediate it in the social field. For our purposes it is necessary only to note that this mediatory development aligns the spatiality of the subject with the space of the *socius* by mapping it onto the space of an other.

This mapping is "dependent, in man, on a cultural mediation as exemplified, in the case of the sexual object, by the Oedipus complex."³² The Oedipus complex functions to socialize the aggressivity of the subject by what Lacan calls "the

²⁹ Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 4.

³⁰ Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 5.

³¹ "Hegel locates the unavoidability of aggressivity in the *social domain*. Aggressivity becomes unavoidable because the individual remains individualistic and requires that for any societal rule to be acceptable, it must conform to the wishes of his *own* heart. Lacan, on the contrary, situates the aggressivity in the *spatial dimension* of man." Wilfried ver Eecke, *Hegel as Lacan's source*, p. 133.

³² Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 5-6.

passifying function of the ego ideal, the connexion between its libidinal normativity and a cultural normativity bound up from the dawn of history with the *imago* of the father."³³ Although the subject may perceive itself as a body in the indeterminate oscillation of its own specular gaze, the perception of its individuality is necessarily a perception presided over by the gaze of another - the gaze of the law.

It is this constitution of desire subject to the law that forms the "juncture of nature and culture."³⁴ The social mediation of subjectivity may thus be described as a spatial dimension marked by narcissism and aggressivity, and yet a space in which aggressivity is at least partially surrendered to a sublimation prescribed by the law.

The territoriality of social being seems to be understood by Lacan as an organic necessity, a fact which does not prevent him from criticizing the 'discontents' of civilization resulting from this territoriality. Before moving on to examine the problems in deducing an ontological territoriality from a fictionality of the subject, and more particularly of the role of the Oedipal drama in mediating between the space of subjectivity and that of the socius, let us briefly examine the manifestations of territoriality in the social field, as Lacan sees them.

Although there are far-reaching differences between the two, Lacan aligns himself with Hegel's "ultimate theory of the proper function of aggressivity in human ontology,"³⁵ that is, the dialectic of master and servant.³⁶ It is from this dialectic, Lacan claims, that Hegel "deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of our history."³⁷ What is decisive in Hegel's analysis is the role played by desire. "The satisfaction of human desire is possible only when mediated by the desire and labour of the other."³⁸ We have, however, already noted that the Lacanian dialectic is to be understood not as a dialectic of consciousness, but of space. It follows that where Hegel sees the insertion of the individual into the socius as the work of a desiring consciousness,³⁹ Lacan sees it in the constitution of the space of the subject as the

³³ Lacan, "Aggressivity in psychoanalysis," in *Écrits*, p. 22.

³⁴ Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 7.

³⁵ Lacan, *Aggressivity*, p. 26.

³⁶ The similarities and differences between Hegel's and Lacan's theories of aggressivity are discussed by Wilfried ver Eecke, and need not be rehearsed here.

³⁷ Lacan, *Aggressivity*, p. 26.

³⁸ Lacan, *Aggressivity*, p. 26.

³⁹ Wilfried ver Eecke, *Hegel as Lacan's source*, p. 35.

space of an Other's desire, an infusion which takes place through the mediation of vision. He even goes as far as to state that "it is the subjective possibility of the mirror projection of such a field [i.e. a field "mapped socially, in a way that raises it to the category of subjective membership"] into the field of the other that gives human space its originally 'geometric' structure, a structure that I would be happy to call *kaleidoscopic*."⁴⁰

The spatial dimension of being as social being is genetically derived from a space marked by relatively indeterminate positions of subjectivity and objectivity in a dialectic relation. This allows Lacan to speak of "the relation existing between the dimension of space and a subjective tension, which in the 'discontents' (*malaise*) of civilization intersects with that of anxiety... which is developed in the temporal dimension."⁴¹ The space of the subject as a social space determines subjectivity as absent in the spatial as well as temporal sense. In mapping subjective space onto the space of the other - the social space - the subject invests its desire for being in an image which, as a representation, marks it as not here, and not yet here. Social space is the domain of Freud's death drive.⁴²

Lacan's attitude toward social space is determined by this realization. Hence he shows the same ambivalent attitude to war, for example, which he has toward the Symbolic order as a whole. War, for Hegel, is "a rational form of aggressivity because it subordinates individualistic and particularistic interests to the interests of

40 Lacan, *Aggressivity*, p. 27. Muller and Richardson take this latter term to mean "distorted in myriad ways." (p. 50) From this point of view, Kant's philosophy of space must be seen in relation to vision and more particularly to optics. We may trace a certain analogy here, which may be stretched to the point of comparing the transcendental of Kantian law with the transcendental of the law presiding over the Lacanian Symbolic order. What is important is that this law, although it is the law of the socius, as well as that of representation and of subjectivity, nonetheless bears the traces of these myriad distortions which desire has mapped onto the space of the Other and onto that of the subject's own body. A similar argument is put forward by Frederick Jameson in his reading of Lacan's "*Kant avec Sade*" (*Critique* 191, April 1963) "in which the very prototype of an attempt to construct a rationally coherent (or in other words, Symbolic) system of ethics by the first-named is thoroughly discredited by a structural analogy with the delirious rationality of the second." Frederick Jameson, "Psychoanalytic criticism and the problem of the subject," in *Literature and Psychoanalysis. The question of reading: Otherwise*, ed. Shoshona Felman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1982), p. 370.

41 Lacan, *Aggressivity*, p. 28.

42 "Only at the intersection of these two tensions should one envisage that assumption by man of his original splitting (*déchiement*), by which it might be said that at every moment he constitutes his world by his suicide, and the psychological experience of which Freud had the audacity to formulate, however paradoxical its expression in biological terms, as the 'death instinct'." Lacan, *Aggressivity*, p. 28.

the state, interpreted by Hegel as universal"⁴³. For Lacan, it is the natural form of spatial experience in the field of the *socius*, while at the same time a showplace of the contradictions between the technical requirements of what we might call the "war-machine," and the limitations of the subject in fulfilling such needs. He is, however, less vague in his denunciation of "the barbarism of the Darwinian century."⁴⁴ Darwin's emphasis on natural selection is described as a "laissez-faire of the strongest in competition for their natural prey,"⁴⁵ and should serve in the present context to show how the theories of "social Darwinism" could justify the territorial expansion of imperialism according to the tenets of liberal capitalism. Thus, in terms of Lacanian theory, if we can refer at all to an ideology of the Darwinian era, we would have to qualify it as the representation of a spatial appropriation which provides the very essence of subjectivity within the social space. Lacan prefers to speak of Darwin's success deriving from "the fact that he projected the predations of Victorian society and the economic euphoria that sanctioned for that society the social devastation that it initiated on a planetary scale..."⁴⁶ We are dealing with the mapping of a space infused with desire onto a social space marked by the desire of the Other, and a theory of that mapping which attains the status of a law, because of its ability to represent the desire of the Other as a transcendental value.⁴⁷

These considerations are fleetingly dealt with in the fifth "critical" thesis of Aggressivity in psychoanalysis, which Lacan states as follows:

Such a notion of aggressivity as one of the intentional co-ordinates of the human ego, especially relative to the category of space, allows us to conceive of its role in modern neurosis and in the 'discontents' of civilization.⁴⁸

As Muller and Richardson observantly state,

Perhaps the importance of this final thesis simply consists in the fact that Lacan felt constrained to formulate it, as if to re-affirm his concern for the

⁴³ Wilfried ver Eecke, Hegel as Lacan's source, p. 135.

⁴⁴ Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 26.

⁴⁵ Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 26.

⁴⁶ Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 26.

⁴⁷ Hence, any attempt to justify colonization on the basis of that brand of social Darwinism which flourished at the end of the 19th century may be reduced to a desire for space infused with transcendental law, be this in the form of an ethics of colonization in the discourse of humanism, or a Kantian evaluation of the colonial space through the ideal mediation of scientific discourse.

⁴⁸ Lacan, Aggressivity, p. 50.

social dimension of man, even when dealing with the most elementary processes through which the individual is formed.⁴⁹

We cannot fault the ethical stance which Lacan takes in formulating such a thesis, nor would it be appropriate to criticise him for the peripheral and subdued nature of his criticism of imperialism. What we must ask at this stage is whether this is a necessary consequence of a theory of the spatiality of social being. Should we not attempt to qualify what Lacan takes as the basis of his argument, in order to allow a critique of colonial space which bears more weight than a token gesture of concern, which from the very start is doomed by the force of organic necessity to failure? The direction which such a qualification must take is indicated first of all by Lacan himself, and is closely related to the role of aggression in the appropriation of social space. In the following sections, I will attempt to develop this qualification, taking as my points of departure desire and the Oedipal drama. Let me state here, however, that if Lacan's theory is to be of use in a critique of colonial space, we will have to reverse the all-too popular reading which grants subjective space an experiential and ontogenetic priority over social space.

1.3 *Desire, the space of the socius, the space of the gaze*

Where the subject intersects with the socius, the nature of desire is indeterminate to the extent that it seems inappropriate to speak of a mapping of a space of subjective desire onto a social space infused with the desire of the Other. Indeed, if we read Lacan carefully, it seems inappropriate to attempt to isolate (even analytically) the moments of subjective desire and the desire of the Other. The much-quoted dictum that human desire is the desire of the Other should be sufficient to tell us this.

If we can accept that the genesis of the subject provides for an initial apprehension of the body as the seat of consciousness before arrival at the stage of

⁴⁹ Muller and Richardson, *Reading Lacan*, p. 50.

transitivism aimed at the *imago* of the other,⁵⁰ and if the latter stage provides the social space into which the subject may expand, it does not necessarily follow that the quality of social space is in any way derivative of the quality of subjective space. Indeed, everything Lacan says about desire would seem to point to the opposite being true. Frantz Fanon recognised the importance of this aspect of Lacan's psychoanalysis for a theory of colonial relations as early as 1952, in which he repeatedly implies that social relations structure imaginary space.⁵¹ Let us pursue the manner in which this is effected.

The spatiality of human existence is characterized not only by an indeterminate dialectic of subject and object, but by an investment of these positions with desire, effecting a "stagnation" of "phenomenological moments in social behaviour" and a resultant fixing of positions of subject and object.⁵² Because the very appearance of relatively stable subject and object positions depends on this stagnation of the specular dialectic, Lacan calls human knowledge 'paranoiac'. It allows the subject to enter into a relationship with "his" objects by assuming a coherent ego identity as "that which is reflected of his form in his objects."⁵³ And yet, it is not by means of a subjective projection, nor of an objective affinity that the positions of subject and object are fixed in relation to one another. The space of the specular image opens up into a relatively stable social space in the moment when a transcendental value appears which can preserve this space as a space of representation. And in doing so, it is also preserved (we might say solidified) as a stable field in which vision is functionalized as the privileged mediator of truth. Fanon speaks of a "real dialectic between my body and the world."⁵⁴ He goes on to show that we are dealing here not

50 "This moment in which the mirror-stage comes to an end inaugurates, by the identification with the *imago* of the counterpart and the drama of primordial jealousy (so well brought out in the school of Charlotte Bühler in the phenomenon of infantile *transitivism*), the dialectic that will henceforth link the *I* to socially elaborated situations." Lacan, *The mirror stage*, p. 5. Italics in original..

51 For example, "It may perhaps be objected that if the white man is subject to the elaboration of the *imago* of his peer, an analogous phenomenon should occur in the Antillean, visual perception being the sketch for such an elaboration. But to say this is to forget that in the Antilles perception always occurs on the level of the imaginary. It is in white terms that one perceives one's fellows." Frantz Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 163n25.

52 "Now, this formal stagnation is akin to the most general structure of human knowledge: that which constitutes the ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, identity, and substantiality..." Lacan, *Aggressivity*, p. 17.

53 Lacan, "On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis," in *Écrits*, p. 194.

54 Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 111.

only with a physiological privilege of vision, but with a socially privileged quality of looking which acts upon and overdetermines the physiological. This is, in Fanon's opinion, the essence of negritude as an object of colonial knowledge.

I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the "idea" that others have of me but of my own appearance... And already I am being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am *fixed*.⁵⁵

In keeping with Lacan, Fanon indicates that the symbolic overdetermination of perception negates the physiological as a primary cause.

Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The elements that I had used had been provided for me not by 'residual sensations and perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character', but by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories. I thought that what I had in hand was to construct a physiological self, to localize sensations, and here I was called on for more.⁵⁶

Once the subject has been thus inserted into a statutory system of representation, the genetically prior stage of primary narcissism is attainable only via a representation, and cannot prevail of itself.⁵⁷ Desire, then, invests the space of the *socius* with a transcendental signification out of which the fiction of the subject must be produced. What this would seem to indicate is that specular space gains meaning as subjective space only in retrospect. What the subject was can only be represented by the subject who is through a dramatisation of that gap which the infant in front of the mirror had to transverse, in order to collect itself into an image. The motivation of this traversal of space may thus be represented as the desire of Oedipus only if we realize that Oedipus' desire, by its very definition, infuses that space in which the subject can exist only as absent, both temporally and spatially. What this means is that if we are to question the space of subjectivity as the space of the *socius* we must begin by interrogating desire, and more particularly, desire in the field of vision.

In expanding upon Fanon's initial appraisal of the significance of desire and vision for colonization, Homi Bhabha equates the establishment of colonizer and colonized stereotypes with Freudian fetishism. This he does by way of Said's

⁵⁵ Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 116.

⁵⁶ Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 111. The quote refers to Jean Lhermitte, "L'image de notre corps," in *Nouvelle Revue critique* (1939), p. 17.

⁵⁷ "For if [the Other] is taken away, man can no longer sustain himself in the position of Narcissism." Lacan, *Treatment of psychosis*, p. 195.

observation that between the absolutely new and the thoroughly known "a new median category emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, things seen for the first time, as versions of a previously known thing."⁵⁸ This amounts to an "encapsulation or fixation which moves between the recognition of cultural and racial difference and its disavowal, by affixing the unfamiliar to something established, in a form that is repetitious and vacillates between delight and fear."⁵⁹ Bhabha shows the functionality of this structure in the establishment of colonial relations of power. In establishing vision as the privileged channel through which the stereotype is apprehended, colonization increases "the visibility of the subject as an object of surveillance, tabulation, enumeration and, indeed, paranoia and fantasy."⁶⁰ This paranoiac knowledge which apprehends the space of the colony, just as it does the space of the colonized, is, however, constantly threatened by its very structure.

To put it succinctly, the recognition and disavowal of 'difference' is always disturbed by the question of its re-presentation or construction. The stereotype is in fact an impossible object.⁶¹

The impossibility of the object paradoxically serves to reinforce the privileged status of the visual field, since its characteristic indeterminacy is well-suited to the oscillation between recognition and disavowal which characterizes the latter. I have already shown the importance of this oscillation in the construction of the *imago*. In the representation of the stereotype, however, this oscillation takes on a more complex form. Bhabha speaks of "a tie-up between the metaphoric or masking function of the fetish and the narcissistic object-choice and an opposing alliance between the metonymic figuring of lack and the aggressive phase of the Imaginary.

One has then a repertoire of conflictual positions that constitute the subject in colonial discourse. The taking up of any one position, within a specific discursive form, in a particular historical conjuncture, is then always problematic - the site of both fixity and fantasy. It provides a colonial 'identity' that is played out - like all fantasies of originality and origination - in the face and space of the disruption and threat from the heterogeneity of other positions.⁶²

⁵⁸ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, cit. Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 201.

⁵⁹ Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 201.

⁶⁰ Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 199.

⁶¹ Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 208.

⁶² Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 204.

Bhabha stresses the importance of the resultant ambivalence of colonial representations of subjectivity. It is hoped that in the following discussion it should become clearer why this ambivalence is tied so closely to the subject's spatiality, and why the visual field plays such an important role in this respect. Let us note for the moment that paranoid knowledge, although it fixes positions of subjectivity and objectivity, does so in a manner which is constantly threatening those very positions, and that this has definite consequences for colonial discourse.

Although the 'authority' of colonial discourse depends crucially on its location in narcissism and the Imaginary, my concept of stereotype-as-suture is a recognition of the ambivalence of that authority and those orders of identification. The role of fetishistic identification, in the construction of discriminatory knowledges that depend on the 'presence of the difference', is to provide a process of splitting and multiple/contradictory belief at the point of enunciation and subjectification.⁶³

We shall be returning to the question of the binding of conflictual positions into a subjective identity when we discuss the Lacanian function of suture, and we will be rejoining Bhabha's discussion of the colonial stereotype in this connection. Let us first, however, investigate the role of vision in the constitution of subjective space as social space.

We have seen that the establishment of human knowledge as a self-knowledge of the subject and a knowledge of the object as "his" object is effected by a transcendental desire, and it is this which establishes a social function of the subjective investment of desire in objects. This is "how the *a* functions in its social repercussions."⁶⁴ This is understandable if we take the *a* to be an "*element of ineluctable mediation*" uniting the subject with the Other.⁶⁵ Indeed, it is the ineluctability of the mediation which gives vision its epistemological and structural primacy. What we should further note is that vision not only yields the intersection of subjective and social space; it also structures the subject's relation to a "nucleus," which Lacan describes as "belonging to the real - the real in so far as *the identity of perception is its rule*."⁶⁶

⁶³ Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 207.

⁶⁴ Lacan, The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 1979), p. 113.

⁶⁵ André Green, "Logic of Lacan's *objet (a)* and Freudian theory: convergences and questions," in Interpreting Lacan, p. 164. Emphasis in original.

⁶⁶ Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 68. My emphasis.

The identity of perception in the realm of the real is accessible to the subject and to knowledge either via memory traces or in representation. In the same way that the space of subjectivity is produced in retrospect as a function of the space of the socius, reality is preserved as an encounter (*tuché*) through repetition in the signifying chain.⁶⁷ This preservation, since it bears the elision characteristic of signification, is at the same time a veiling of reality. Where knowledge and representation aim themselves at a truth situated elsewhere and elsewhere, the truth they specify attains the quality of a lack. When the subject encounters its own lack in its desire for a space of being, it also establishes a knowledge of itself as a loss of being, and of its desire as a desire for an object which may repeat the ineluctable mediation in which the space of the subject first appeared. This it attempts to do through an imaginary relation to an apparently lost object.⁶⁸ Thus the *objet (a)* appears to the subject as the form of its knowledge, and as a representation of what is missing from its own being.⁶⁹

It follows that the fiction of the subject is the story of that unthinkable absence upon which knowledge is built.⁷⁰ Whether it appears as knowledge of the self or of reality, knowledge as knowledge of an object separated from the subject in space is built upon an identity which is spatial to the extent that its non-spatial qualities appear to be derivative of an ignorance of the infant subject. What this means is that knowledge is capable of encircling a field of ignorance as a domain of pre-historic mythology out of which knowledge arose and which it must suppress, but which nevertheless persists as its subliminal motivation. Within this domain of ignorance,

67 Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 69.

68 "It is precisely to the extent that this *Objet (a)* comes forth as the object of lack (the *missing* object) that it will operate on two levels: as the revelation of the lack of the Other and as the lack appearing within the signifying process." Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 169. Emphasis in original.

69 "That which is missing in the Other is that which one cannot conceive of. The (-phi) which enters here in the guise of that which does not appear - that is, the Nothing which it is impossible to represent - organizes the confrontation with castration as that which is unthinkable: this gap in the possibilities of thought is filled in by the process of significance ("*significantisation*"), by the mirage of knowledge." Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 169.

70 "(a) symbolizes that which, in the realm of the signifier as lost, loses itself to "*significantisation*." It is the designated subject who resists this loss; at the moment the process of knowledge comes into play, at the moment of *knowing*, something is lost." Lacan, unpublished seminar on Plato's Symposium. Quoted in Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 169. Emphasis in original.

knowledge produces a fictional lost object which may not be thought because it may not be reflected or reflected upon: it is, as André Green says, nonspecularizable.⁷¹

And yet, this loss persists, functions, works. For the subject, it persists as a dual inscription: on memory and in self-representation. The lost object insists in the history of the subject by inscribing subjective space as the space of that loss.

If knowledge is that which comes forth in the place of truth, after loss of the object, shouldn't they be linked to one another by *the marks (traces) of this loss and the attempts to efface them?*

These questions will allow us to consider the *objet (a)* less as a support for the partial object than as the passage of a tracing hand: inscription, letter, *a.*⁷²

What is important for Lacan is that when space opens up to vision as a space of knowledge - a space in which subject and object interrogate one another across a field of representation - that space is itself infused with a desire caused by a fictional lost identity. The spatializing machine not only produces space as the space in which knowledge may appear, it produces it as a space in which the desire of the Other may attach subjectivity to the objects of knowledge by virtue of their ability to signify a primal lost object. And furthermore, it is the appearance of spatiality as the signifying space of vision which allows desire to persist, and in doing so to leap from one object to another in the same motions as those with which it scans the signifying chain of language.⁷³

It is the constitution of reality as an encounter which has been that allows Lacan to speak of the object of knowledge as a screen, upon which reality is projected for the faculty of vision. Lacan equates the screen, as a surface for projection, to what he calls the "stain":

⁷¹ "This appearance of the form of the object of lack brings out the specific focus of our exposé, that is, *the nonspecularizable nature of the (a)*. The course of events is... as if the subject short-circuiting the impossible specularization of lack were to identify itself with the knowledge which, emerging at the site of that loss which brings it into play, covers over this loss to the point of forgetting its existence." Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 169. Emphasis in original.

⁷² Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 171.

⁷³ "The function of assembling, of subsuming, allies itself with the notion of a power which puts things together and which, at the expense of a separation (*coupure*) - operating between the assembling power and the thing presented - *represents*. It is separation (*coupure*) which allows for representation... It is through the very operation of separation that the subject comes forth, or constitutes itself as subject - at the expense of the *object*, it seems to me. As if one could say: the separation (of the subject) is of no importance since the suture (of the *object (a)*) remains. *Desire's sacrifice of the object* renders this real, so to speak. The loss of the object is of no importance as long as desire survives and extends it. Or something along the lines of: the object is dead, long live desire (of the Other)." Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 177. Emphasis in original.

If the function of the stain is recognized in its autonomy and identified with that of the gaze, we can see its track, its thread, its trace, at every stage of the constitution of the world, in the scopic field. We will then realize that the function of the stain and of the gaze is both that which governs the gaze most secretly and that which always escapes from the grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied with itself in imagining itself as consciousness.⁷⁴

As such, the screen, or the stain, functions as *objet (a)*. This it does by acting as a real object capable of entrapping the gaze of the Other. Again, it was Fanon who realized the importance for colonisation of this dialectic of object constitution in the field of vision and determination of the quality of vision. As a result, he has no hesitation in stating that "the white man is not only The Other, but also the master, whether real or imaginary."⁷⁵

We have already seen that the gaze is characterized by a certain indeterminacy, which is given, among other things, by the ambivalent nature of the investment of sight by the subject.⁷⁶ The ambivalent nature of vision conditions the relationship between the gazing subject and the screen, the *objet (a)*. Reality, in offering a surface upon which the *objet (a)* may be projected, appears to the subject as implicating him in the act of gazing. Thus, in gazing upon privileged objects, the subject is not simply gazing, but is constituting himself as the eye from which the

⁷⁴ Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 74.

⁷⁵ Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 138n24. Unfortunately, in the same work Fanon later contradicts this important insight by claiming that "when one has grasped the mechanism described by Lacan, one can have no doubt that the real Other for the white man is and will continue to be the black man." (p. 161n25) Not only is there no indication in Lacan's writings that the dialectic of subjectivity in the social field involves a possibility of a simple reversal of positions; Fanon is also contradicting his important extensions of Lacan's work to the question of the *socius*. If the dialectic of identity and difference is capable of oscillating at random between various positions determined by physiological characteristics (such as skin colour), how do we explain the social fixing of positions of subjectivity and the resulting statutory repression of the colonized subject?

⁷⁶ In the "Three essays on the theory of sexuality" of 1905, Freud had already emphasized the importance of the ambivalence of vision in the polar organization of the drives. (In The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, vol. VII, ed. James Strachey, London: Hogarth 1963) Furthermore, in the same essay, he attempted to relate this polar organization to the appearance of the object as distinct from the body in the anal-sadistic phase (p. 99). In "Instincts and their vicissitudes" (1915) he applies a linguistic model to show that, in the evolution of a drive into its opposite (sadism into masochism, or voyeurism into exhibitionism), the subject maintains a constant investment in the drive, while its object as well as the relation to the subject remain variable. (In Standard Edition, vol. XIV, 117-140.) The relation of the subject to the drive is that of the subject to a verb, in this case the verb "to see." This idea is still further elaborated in 1919, "A child is being beaten." (In Standard Edition, vol. XVII, pp 179-204.) See also Forrester: "The thesis in question, then, is that a neurosis is formed around a 'core proposition', whose structure is grammatically simple, consisting in a subject, a verb and an object. The relation between subject and object is defined by the verb. The verb itself corresponds to the instinct, or, more strictly, each component-instinct corresponds to a class of verbs." John Forrester, Language and the origins of psychoanalysis (London: MacMillan 1980), p. 142.

gaze issues forth, and as such, is gazing upon himself from a position he cannot occupy.

In order to reflect upon itself as a self-consciousness, the subject requires a real surface through which the ambivalence and the self-elision of vision may be mediated. Lacan's split between the gaze and the eye reads here as an implicit elaboration of the Kantian theory of space as the form of outer intuition, only to subvert Kant's theory by showing its dependance upon the law.⁷⁷ Thus the possibility of the construction of a body in space tied to a consciousness in time requires the retention of imaginary lines of vision through memory traces. When the subject gazes upon objects, the implicit return of the gaze inscribes itself in the subject's self-consciousness as one of the radii of a circle, the center of which is occupied by the subject. Consciousness requires a temporal synthesis of spatial configurations under the auspices of a transcendental law. This law is borne by the geometry of light, however, not because of an epistemologically privileged status of geometric axioms, but because of the genetically and structurally privileged role of vision in establishing knowledge in the place of truth. The law presiding over the Lacanian relation of the subject to reality will thus be transcendental only to the extent that desire persists in the transcendental law presiding over representation. Or, as Michel Serres puts it, the earth is measured (geo-metry) by means of just measure (the King).⁷⁸ The reality of objects is given to the subject by virtue of desire's need to abandon the privileged object in search of another. Hence, when Lacan states that "the screen reestablishes things in their status as real,"⁷⁹ he makes the further qualification that "in relation to desire, reality is only marginal."⁸⁰ In other words, the presence of the real surface, the screen, as an object of the gaze, is given only through its ability to function as *objet (a)*. It represents the lack which is the truth of the subject, and which is guaranteed by the traces in representation of an absent Other. This modification of the status of the law is, to a certain extent, a reversal of

⁷⁷ See note 40 above.

⁷⁸ Michel Serres, "Language and space: from Oedipus to Zola," in Hermes. Literature, science, philosophy, by Michel Serres, ed. Josué Harari and David Bell (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), pp. 52-3.

⁷⁹ Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 107.

⁸⁰ Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 108.

Kant. As soon as the question of desire is introduced into the system of *Ding-an-sich*, knowing subject and the complex mediation of representation and its law, we find that this law indeed plays a constitutive role at every stage of mediation, yet it conditions not truth but illusion.

As an example of this function of desire, Lacan discusses the desire of painting as paradigmatic for the presence of the desire of the Other in visual perception. The function of the painting as *objet (a)* depends on its ability to "tame" the gaze; that is, to align the viewer's gaze not with the eye of the painter, but with the gaze of the painter's desire. This quality of the viewer's gaze is designated as a gaze of envy (*invidia*).⁸¹ What is essential in the function of envy is not only the lack of a primal object for the subject, but also the lack of that being which one would have if the gazed-upon object were able to satisfy the longing it arouses. In other words, the envy which characterizes the desire of the gaze is a desire for the being which the gazer lacks, and which is the being of the Other. This is how the *objet (a)* functions. It is experienced as lack, not simply because it isn't there, but because it is visible as the object of the Other's desire. Lacan speaks here of the "taming, civilizing and fascinating power of the function of the picture."⁸² The word "civilizing" is important to us, and may serve to elaborate the implications of Lacan's theory for a theory of colonization. In order to illustrate that this "civilizing" effect of the painting is not to be understood in purely abstract terms, Lacan presents us with two examples of the presence of the gaze of the Other in the painting: the icon and what we might call the jubilant recording of power in a certain type of historical painting. The icon is created under the authorizing gaze of the Other. It is a representation of God, created by God's authority with the aim of pleasing God. More interesting in the present context is the example of the battle scenes on the walls of the Doges palace, in which Lacan sees a "communal" investment in the gaze of the Other.

Let us go to the great hall of the Doges' Palace in which are painted all kinds of battles, such as the battle of Lepanto, etc. The social function... is now becoming clear. Who comes here? Those who form what Retz calls '*les peuples*', the audiences. And what do the audiences see in these vast compositions. They see the gaze of those persons who, when the audience are

⁸¹ Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 115.

⁸² Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 116.

not there, deliberate in this hall. Behind the picture, it is their gaze that is there.⁸³

This has a more immediate historical correlative in the colonial project as initiated by the early explorers in their search for privileged objects which might be gazed upon from the position of the Other. The explorer strove to transport these objects, either in the flesh or in representation, back to that realm presided over by the Other. But in order to desire the representation of the object, the explorer must first constitute desire as the desire of a particular mode of gazing. This initiates an objectification of a certain quality of vision, a process which becomes crucial for the subsequent unfolding of colonial knowledge. Indeed, it is upon the objectification of the gaze that the surveillance of the colonial object will later be founded, at the stage where colonization becomes a matter of encircling and marking spaces. As Bhabha notes, "one has to see the surveillance of colonial power as functioning in relation to the regime of the scopic drive. That is, the drive that represents the pleasure in 'seeing', which has the look as the object of desire. This drive is related to the myth of origins, the primal scene, and the problematic of fetishism, and locates the surveyed object within the 'imaginary' relation."⁸⁴

It is important to stress that the specific quality of this mode of gazing is socially conditioned. The paranoiac fixing of knowledge takes place at all times on a social stage - a stage which opens the space of knowledge as it determines the quality of the gaze in which the objects of knowledge may be apprehended. What this means is that the gazing subject in a strange land produces a relation of knowledge to the objects of vision by the authority of the absent Other whose desire is borne in vision. In a later section we will be investigating how this functions in respect of the practice of colonization and its representation. We will also see that the practice of colonization involves the establishment of a series of strategies for reinforcing the transcendentalism of the Other's gaze, ranging from discursive conventions (such as the form of description in travel reports) to technological appropriations of the gaze (primarily in surveying, but also in the techniques of topographical route description

⁸³ Lacan, Four fundamental concepts, p. 113.

⁸⁴ Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 204.

and mapping) and what might be called the "policing of the gaze" (i.e. the employment of the police and army to enforce a particular manner of gazing on the boundaries of colonial enclosures). We are dealing with a constant dialogue between textual and geographical space. In respect of the Orient, Said notes that

What we must reckon with is a long and slow process of appropriation by which Europe, or the European awareness of the Orient, transformed itself from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic and even military. The fundamental change was a spatial and geographical one, or rather it was a change in the quality of geographical and spatial apprehension as far as the Orient was concerned.⁸⁵

As we shall see, this description is only partially accurate. We are dealing not only with a transformation from the textual to the administrative etc, but a dialogue between the two spatial determinations. Each is unthinkable without the other, and each supports the other. The mastery of space which marks the subject's status in the socius also causes European knowledge to "fatally tend towards the systematic accumulation of human beings and territories... reconstructive precision, science, even imagination could prepare the way for what armies, administrations, and bureaucracies would later do on the ground, in the Orient."⁸⁶

2 THE PRODUCTION OF THE OEDIPAL DRAMA: THE CAPITALIST PRODUCTION OF SPACE

2.1 *The birth (and death) of the subject in the space of tragedy*

As we have seen, spatial knowledge, be it knowledge of the space of the subject or of the space of the world constructed from the configurations of his objects, can only prevail as a representation of a space which was. In the establishment of a signifying space of being, the subject is split into two dimensions, one of which is a signified subject who can speak, represent and be represented only from within this structure of knowledge, but who acts in space not necessarily co-extensive with the space of signification. The other is a seat of consciousness capable of interrogating

⁸⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 210.

⁸⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 123.

its own existence within signifying space. Out of this split arises a subjective space which shares a complex relationship with the space of the world. The development of this relationship in all its complexity is historically tied to the question of the subject as posed by psychoanalysis.

The historical crisis of psychology coincides with the moment when it was no longer possible to maintain a certain position: this position consisted of placing images in consciousness and movements in space. In consciousness, there would only be qualitative, unextended images. In space, there would only be extended, quantitative movements. But how would it be possible to pass from one order to the other? How could one explain that movements might suddenly produce an image, as in a perception, or that the image might produce a movement, as in voluntary action?... It was necessary at all costs to overcome this duality of image and movement, of the consciousness and the thing.⁸⁷

This observation is made by Deleuze in the context of Bergson's and Husserl's respective attempts to link consciousness to the world. We can, however, re-state it in the present context. We have seen that the question of space is not separable from the question of consciousness, and more particularly from that of perception. Nor is it to be separated from the question of representation. As soon as it is posed, the question of space becomes a question of the production of space. We have seen that this question may be framed within the bounds of the spatiality of the sign; that is, the production of spatiality in signification. However, the space of signification opens onto other spaces, without which it is not possible. Speaking about space entails an examination of the ways in which it is possible to move from one spatial framework, one point of reference to another. This movement has nothing to do with the question of truth, and is thus not a question of philosophy, but of fiction.⁸⁸ What paths may be taken to move from one position to another? What transformations accompany the crossing of borders? What spaces can move through others, bearing with them points of reference which might act as seats of consciousness? How might such spaces be layered, so that configurations arise which acquire a certain stability? What happens when we try to re-stratify them - where do

87 Gilles Deleuze, "Image-movement and its three varieties: second commentary about Bergson," in *SubStance* 44/45 (1984), p. 81.

88 "To concern oneself with the founding concepts of the entire history of philosophy, to deconstitute them, is not to undertake the work of the philologist or of the classical historian of philosophy. Despite appearances, it is probably the most daring way of making the beginnings of a step outside of philosophy." Jacques Derrida, "Structure, sign and play," cit. Bhabha, *Signs taken as wonders*, p. 194.

we cut? These are the questions which fiction asks. To situate signification within the subjective and social orders is thus to develop a fiction of spaces.

In the fiction favoured by Freud and Lacan to elaborate the ontogenesis of the subject, the drama of Oedipus, the subject is represented as that being who emerges from a specific traversal of space. This is first of all the space which Oedipus had placed between his own desire and the desire codified in the law. It is, however, - and here the departure from Freud and Lacan begins, even though both point tentatively in this direction - the space of the stage upon which the Oedipal drama is produced, as a socially determinate space in which the subject must, by specular identification, perform all the motions of Oedipus' denial of his desire.

Given the fact of Oedipus in the space of the stage, the question which we must ask concerns the relation of a fictionality of the subject to the material conditions which place Oedipus within this space as a representation of subjectivity within a representing space of being. When we constitute ourselves within the space of the socius by aligning our gaze with that transcendental body into which our own body is about to be incorporated, we constitute ourselves as a knowable object. The knowledge out of which subjectivity arises is itself a reduction "...of desiring production to a system of representation called unconscious,... reduction of the factories of the unconscious to a theater stage, Oedipus, Hamlet; reduction of social investments of the libido to familial investments, onto familial coordinates, Oedipus again."⁸⁹

The tragedy of Oedipus is the tragedy of the man who, in spite of all warnings, will not desist from asking the fated question: who am I? ⁹⁰ In asking this question up to the point where its answer presents itself as the impossibility of his being,

⁸⁹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Sur capitalisme et schizophrénie," in *L'Arc* 49 (1972), p. 50, cit. Charles Stivale, "Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Schizoanalysis & literary discourse," in *SubStance* 29 (1981), p. 47.

⁹⁰ " Let all come out,
 However vile! However base it be,
 I must unlock the secret of my birth.
 ...
 Born thus, I ask to be no other man
 Than that I am, and *will know who I am.*"

Sophocles, *King Oedipus*, in *The Theban plays*, trans. E. F. Watling, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin 1947), verses 1061-1085, p. 55. Italics in original.

Oedipus reduces all dimensions of being to familial relations. If we are to think the question of what we are in terms of familial relations, it can only be thought from the position of Oedipus. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that there is, nevertheless, a path which might re-open the question beyond the bounds of Oedipus and Oedipal knowledge - to circumvent an apparent objectivity yielded in a particular mode of representation, and to interrogate the mechanics with which that representation has been inscribed. This is to interrogate the machine which produces Oedipus as a signifying space, and places him within the space of the stage. Or as Deleuze and Guattari state in a slightly different context, to abandon that form of enquiry whereby "...one retains the apparent movement as it is described on the socius, without taking into account the real instance that inscribes it, and the forces - economic and political - with which it is inscribed."⁹¹

Freud himself seemed to be perfectly aware of the fact that, in placing Oedipus on the stage of psychoanalytic discourse, he was determining subjectivity as that which cannot be known. In his essay, "Einführung in die Psychoanalyse" (1917), he states that "jeder Neurotiker selbst ein Ödipus war oder, was auf dasselbe ausgeht, in der Reaktion auf den Komplex ein Hamlet geworden ist."⁹² We could interpret this statement as meaning that the representation which hides the subject from subjective knowledge represents not the subject, but another representation. It is, presumably, this aspect of Freudian epistemology which authorizes Lacan's well-known dictum that a signifier represents a subject for another signifier.⁹³ Lacan shows that this predominance of the register of the signifier may serve to explain the split structure of subjectivity. In representing the subject in the domain of representation, the signifier draws a line between the subject who speaks and the subject spoken of. We have already seen how this effect of the signifier opens up a space of subjectivity which expands into a space socially determined. It will, however, be necessary to specify more precisely just what the subjective and social determination of space is, how it comes about, and what consequences it has for

⁹¹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking 1975), p. 188.

⁹² Sigmund Freud, "Einführung in die Psychoanalyse," in *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd XI, S 347.

⁹³ Lacan, *Écrits* (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1966). p. 32.

spatial knowledge. In order to do so, let us briefly review the status of causality in the Oedipal structuration of the subject.

In describing the role of the signifier, Lacan states that it acts as a cause of the structure of the subject.⁹⁴ The space of the subject, which we have seen Lacan elaborating as a significant space and a space socially pervaded, is also discussed as a space presided over by a certain causality. Although this causality is by no means unproblematic, I shall not be concerned here with the logical or terminological problems of Lacan's concept of causality.⁹⁵ It seems possible to argue that, at one stage or other not only *causa formalis*, but also *causa materialis*, *causa efficiens* and *causa finalis* are all incorporated into his conception of the causality of the signifier. Whatever the precise nature of causality instrumental in the structuration of the subject, the subject's alienation, which characterizes his spatiality as a social space, "resides in the division of the subject from its cause."⁹⁶ What this amounts to is that the space of the subject, as a virtually social space, is a space presided over by the signifier because of a logical imperative issuing from the binary structure of the latter. This imperative is in keeping with the spatiality of the sign, as elaborated in the previous chapter, that is to say, it issues from a trace of the signifier's absence, which marks its disappearance within a signifying whole. The way in which this imperative can function as cause is indicated by Lacan with the term *vel* - that choice between meaning and being in which the subject is alienated.

94 "Being produced in the place of the Other (the symbolic), the signifier causes the subject to arise there, but at the cost of becoming fixed... That the Other should be for the subject the site of its significant cause merely motivates the reason for which no subject can be said to be its own cause..." Lacan *Écrits* (1966), p. 32.

95 The strongest criticism of the Lacanian conception of causality is probably that formulated by Anthony Wilden, who implies that Lacan "conceals his model of causality in the term 'absence'" - a term which for Wilden is a "covert metaphor for teleonomy or goalseeking." He then goes on to evaluate Lacanian causality in terms of cybernetic theory: "For an ecosystemic perspective, the 'absent cause' is simply the diachronic GOAL or the synchronic REGULATION of the relationship of the subsystem and whatever is defined as its environment. Both goal and regulation involve considerations of constraint, (transmitted) difference, possibility, optimum organization, ideals, and so on, but not the concept of causality as such. Moreover, as Lacan's definition of metonymy as desire already emphasizes, metonymy is not primarily an effect of structure, but an effect of system." (*System and Structure, Essays in communication and exchange* (London: Tavistock 1980²), p. 336-7) The fact that Lacan's discussion of the social dimension of desire attempts (at least implicitly) to give due credit to the systemic dimension of the structuration of subjectivity would, in my opinion, reduce Wilden's critique to a quibble about terminology.

96 Lacan, *Écrits* (1966), p. 32.

If we choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes us, it falls into non-meaning. If we choose meaning, the meaning survives only deprived of that part of non-meaning that is, strictly speaking, that which constitutes in the realization of the subject, the unconscious. In other words, it is of the nature of this meaning, as it emerges in the field of the Other, to be in a large part of its field, eclipsed by the disappearance of being, induced by the very function of the signifier.⁹⁷

What Lacan is saying is that, in tying the field of being to the field of meaning, the signifier imposes a choice between the two - being or meaning. But this is a choice which in either case necessarily excludes that dimension of being and meaning which allows the two to be united in the first place. However, being and meaning, as the intersection of two sets, is not defined as a quantity present to both, but absent from both. This is because, where being has meaning, it no longer is, and where meaning has being, it no longer signifies.⁹⁸

The correlates in colonization are easily established. As Fanon shows, when the colonized subject, the negro, confronts his own being with the knowledge of the white man, reason and being negate one another.

Reason was confident of victory on every level... That victory played cat and mouse; it made a fool of me. As the other put it, when I was present, it was not; when it was there, I was no longer.⁹⁹

The space of alienation into which the subject must expand if it is to acquire subjectivity is the space of Oedipus' choice: being (=the King of Thebes), or meaning (=a place within the familial structure). It is because of the double impasse inscribed in this choice that the human being's birth as a subject takes place in the shadow of death. Lacan makes it clear that this happens in a manner parallel to that described by Hegel in the *Phenomenology*, but with one decisive difference.

Your freedom or your life! If he chooses freedom, he loses both immediately - if he chooses life, he has life deprived of freedom.¹⁰⁰

Because it is not born in an act of self-consciousness, however, subjectivity emerges in a choice which might be called 'fated', in the same way as the choice of Oedipus is 'fated'. The subject's choice is

⁹⁷ Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 211.

⁹⁸ "The *vel* of alienation is defined by a choice whose properties depend on this, that there is, in the joining, one element that, whatever the choice may be, has as its consequence a *neither one, nor the other*. The choice, then, is a matter of knowing whether one wishes to preserve one of the parts, the other disappearing in any case." Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 211.

⁹⁹ Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 119-120.

¹⁰⁰ Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 212.

freedom or death! There, because death comes into play, there occurs an effect with a rather different structure. This is because, in both cases, I will have both.¹⁰¹

The operation (which is a logical as well as a cathectic operation) which unites the two fields persists in the structuration of the subject as a field in its own right - a field which has a logical and cathectic presence, but which, if it can be said to have existence and meaning at all, does so only as an absence. This is the field of desire, which is also that of metonymy. It coincides with the field of signification in the function of metaphor. This operation of conjunction produces meaning by eliding being, and produces being by eliding meaning. And it allows the two to appear to co-exist by the constant disappearance of the authority presiding over its efficacy, an authority which Lacan calls the Phallus. This authority also presides over the Oedipal choice.¹⁰²

The opening up of a space of subjectivity in the difference between being and meaning becomes the concrete manifestation of social space through the elision of that imaginary realm where the two meet. The splitting of the subject is at the same time the subject's origin as a social being.¹⁰³ The unified social space as it appears in the field of the signifier is mapped onto subjective space through an operation whose operant is at all times absent in both subjective space and the space of the signifier, but which persists in the very force of conjunction which keeps the two fields aligned. In Lacanian theory, this force is powered by a lack which cuts through the space of the subject, the socius and the signifier. It is here that Lacan explicitly aligns himself in opposition to Hegel, and those attempts at a dialectic of colonial identity (most notably Albert Memmi) which set themselves the task of applying Hegel to a colonial situation would do well to take note of the basis of this opposition. Lacan states that "... we must bring everything back to the function of the cut in discourse, the strongest being that which acts as a bar between the signifier

¹⁰¹ Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 213.

¹⁰² See Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 212; also Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 251.

¹⁰³ "Here *separare*, separate, ends in *se parare*, to engender oneself... *Parare* is firstly to procure. This is why the subject can procure what concerns him here, a status which we will qualify as civil (*état civil*)."
Lacan, *Écrits* (1966), p. 32.

and the signified."¹⁰⁴ This bar is described by Lacan as "a barrier resisting signification,"¹⁰⁵ since it separates the two orders whose identity signification implies. As such, the spatiality of the sign resides in the bar as explicated by Lacan. This spatiality grants subjectivity its space in the moment it splits the subject into being and meaning, since "... the subject designates his being only by barring everything he signifies..."¹⁰⁶ In the space of signified subjectivity, there emerges a repression of being, which is at the same time a repression of the desire for identity whose signifier is the phallus. For reasons I have already discussed, this space must stand in for the space of a socius.

The key to the Oedipal question of being therefore lies in the fact that it must be posed in spatial terms. It is the same as Lacan's question:

Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier concentric or eccentric, in relation to the place that I occupy as subject of the signified?¹⁰⁷

Oedipus' desire is to know who he is in terms of familial ties, but the only way to pose that question is in spatial terms - as a matter of knowing where he is. This formulation becomes crucial in the scene where Oedipus' "true" identity emerges. And Teiresias had spoken it earlier in the play:

The killer of Laius - that man is *here*;...¹⁰⁸

And when the chorus defines this space within the socius, it uses the following words:

I only ask to live, with pure faith keeping
In word and deed that Law which leaps the sky,
Made of no mortal mould, undimmed, unsleeping
Whose living godhead does not age or die.¹⁰⁹

The question of Oedipus' identity in turn becomes a question of transposing both spaces onto the space of the world "at a place where three roads meet."¹¹⁰ Finally, the space in which Oedipus moves is traced onto the space of the family.

¹⁰⁴ Lacan, "The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious," in *Écrits*, p. 299.

¹⁰⁵ Lacan, "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud," in *Écrits*, p. 149.

¹⁰⁶ Lacan, "The signification of the phallus," in *Écrits*, p. 288.

¹⁰⁷ Lacan, *Agency of the letter*, p. 165.

¹⁰⁸ Sophocles, *King Oedipus*, 449. Watling, p. 38. Italics in original.

¹⁰⁹ Sophocles, *King Oedipus*, 875-878. Watling, p. 49.

¹¹⁰ Sophocles, *King Oedipus*, 716-780. Watling, p. 45-6.

Oedipus is driven back from the narrow defile by Laius' team of horses, insulted by Polyphontes. The fact that the murder of the father takes place at this cross, this interrupted, joined edge, this limit or fault, is a catastrophe. Thus the circumstance is the murder and the law is traced upon the ground. To cross the broken threshold of the word. The essential thing is indeed the bifurcation. As soon as the father is involved, once again we come back to the law, a bifurcation traced onto the family tree: father, mother, son, here again on the graph is inscribed the triviality of the narrative. To the left the one, to the right the other, and incest, as we have seen, is still another connection upon the disconnected. The text turns inside out like a glove and shows its function: the establishment of separations between spaces and their difficult junction.¹¹¹

The question of the position of the subject which is opened up in the Oedipal question of being (or the self-interrogation of consciousness) is of necessity posed within the space of signification. This space is presided over by the absent phallus, the barred phallus, as the signifier of desire - the separation of subject and object, signifier and signified - as well as the operator of their conjunction. The lack which Lacan tells us motivates this dialectic determines the impossibility of positioning the subject at a given place.¹¹² For if the subject's desire is the desire of the Other, then the question of subjective being as posed in the self-interrogation of consciousness always encounters in its own lack of being the lack which characterizes the Other, the barred phallus which signifies the desire of the Other.

The dialectic of the objects of desire... creates the link between the desire of the subject and the desire of the Other...¹¹³

This link establishes subjective space as indeterminate, yet intersecting the signifying chain at that point where meaning elides being- "... at the point of lack perceived in the Other."¹¹⁴ And furthermore:

If he is apprehended at his birth in the field of the Other, the characteristic of the subject of the unconscious is that of being, beneath the signifier that develops its networks, its chains and its history, at an indeterminate place.¹¹⁵

111 Michel Serres, *Language and space*, p. 46-7.

112 "The signifying game between metonymy and metaphor, up to and including the active edge that splits my desire between a refusal of the signifier and a lack of being, and links my fate to the question of my destiny, this game, in all its inexorable subtlety, is played until the match is called, there where I am not, because I cannot situate myself there." Lacan, *Agency of the letter*, p. 166.

113 Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 214.

114 Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 214.

115 Lacan, *Four fundamental concepts*, p. 208. The fact that the mapping of social space onto subjective space in the causality of the signifier renders subjective space indeterminate does not mean that this causality is purely qualitative and not in any way quantitative. It would seem more accurate to say that in its concrete actualization through the mapping onto subjective space, the quantitatively determined space of the socius causes the space of the subject to appear in qualitative terms only. This will be one of the important aspects of spatiality to be discussed below in connection with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of colonization.

It is, however, important that we recognize this indeterminate place of lack not simply as a space which has been opened in the interval of two mutually exclusive positions. The function of the sign is to re-close this gap which has opened in its midst, to synthesize this mutual exclusion by rendering visible the sign's non-identity to itself. It is here that the sign's spatiality appears where the point which positions the signifier disappears. The point of lack in the Other, the desire of the Other, which serves as operant in signification, is the absence of the phallus - symbolic castration (-phi) - and serves hence to elevate the phallus to the status of that object which links the subject to its cause.

This is the reason why spatiality cannot be dealt with adequately if we attempt to think of it as a function of the signifier or of the signified. Nor can we grasp it as a transcendental function residing in a gap between the two. The space of signification functions - works - in conjunction with the production of a spatiality which we come to regard as comprising individual spaces, spaces identical to themselves.¹¹⁶ This function is, however, complicated by the fact that we are not simply dealing with the subject (as a body in space), the signifier (as a virtual space) and the law presiding over concatenation, out of which signification arises. We are also dealing with the origin of spatial knowledge, in which spatiality is determined as the distance between the subject and object of desire. We have already seen that knowledge as knowledge of the world infuses objectivity with lack. The desire by which the subject measures his being can be said to be caused by the positioning of the object within a field of knowledge. The phallus, in linking the subject to its cause, also ties alienated subjectivity to its objects of desire. In the field of the signified (which is the field of knowledge) the world is constructed by a concatenation of objects infused with desire, and for that reason, the phallus appears once again as the law presiding over concatenation, over knowledge. Here Green speaks of the "resectioning of the signified," which, he states, takes place in "this metonymic series of the different

116 "It is here that we encounter the function of cause developed by Jacques Lacan. If, according to Frege, identity to itself allows *the passage from thing to object*, may we not posit that what we have just shown can function as *the relationship of object to cause*? One may conclude that the object is the signifying relationship linking the two terms, the thing and the cause." Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 176. Italics in original.

partial objects," and may be considered to be "represented by the phallus - precisely in that it appears, in the form (- phi), through its different partial objects."¹¹⁷ The word "appears" is not chosen randomly here. What is important is that the phallus as object is present to intuition in the traces of its own absence. It is the law presiding over representation because it is the principle of the signification of the disappearing point, as discussed in chapter 1. As such, it is, indeed, transcendental in the Kantian sense.

If we accept Lacan's basic hypothesis that the space of the subject is a space which has been split by the force of an essential lack and resectioned, and that this operation is presided over by the signifier and its transcendental principle, the phallus, then his conclusions are indisputable. It is this coupling of the signifier and the phallus which marks the co-presentation of subjective and social space as the space of Oedipus. It is a space in which "the phallus constitutes the standard of exchange, the *cause* of exchange."¹¹⁸ What, however, are the consequences if we begin to question the hypothesis that lack plays a constitutive role in the formation of subjectivity? What if this hypothesis is untenable because it can only lead to a tautology of desire, whereby desire can have being only by seeking what it cannot be nor have? When we interrogate the phylogenetic dimension of subjective space, we are forced to realize that causality must be situated elsewhere than in the domain of signification.

2.2 *The cause of cause: situating the Oedipal cut and its re-section*

As long as we confine ourselves to the Oedipal question (what am I? = where is my place within the representation of familial order?), the hypothesis of the causality of the signifier seems perfectly acceptable. As soon as we attempt to survey the space of a socius into which the Oedipal subject is born, however, the matter becomes more difficult. We have seen that for Lacan the subject comes to occupy its

¹¹⁷ Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 176.

¹¹⁸ Green, *Logic of objet (a)*, p. 176.

space under the shadow of the signifier. Furthermore, this space appears in the act of separation which characterizes (and facilitates) signification. As such, the appearance of subjectivity as a space of the socius follows under the auspices of the signifier and its transcendental law. As a model of subjectivity, however, the Oedipal myth finds its validity within historically (and geographically) definable limits. Oedipus can have no claim to universality. This leaves us with a choice. We can either accept Lacan's model of causality as possessing limited validity within specific social and historical constraints. Or else we can attempt to establish its universality by attempting to read the phallus, the Name-of-the-Father, the *objet a*, etc., as metaphors which could be extended at will to virtually any social system. I believe that the latter option would render most of Lacan's insights worthless, simply because they would be deprived of their specificity. I will thus be accepting the former alternative. It now remains to establish the limits of the model. In the course of this investigation, I will be following Deleuze and Guattari's attempts to establish a materialism of desire.¹¹⁹

When the force of the signifier slashes through the subject's desire for identity, it leaves its mark in a form of inscription which Deleuze and Guattari call despotic: "...it is the despot who establishes the practice of writing."¹²⁰ In doing so, the despot grants writing its ambiguous spatiality. Within the despotic machine, we see the inscription of a graphic mark whose trace testifies to the efficacy of a banished voice. The despotic machine characterizes a civilization which is "written, not because the voice has been lost, *but* because the graphic system has lost its independence and its particular dimensions, has aligned itself on the voice and has become subordinated to the voice... In short, graphism in one and the same movement begins to depend on the voice, and induces a mute voice from on high or from the beyond, a voice that begins to depend on graphism. It is by subordinating itself to the voice that writing supplants it."¹²¹

119 Jacques Donzelot, "An antisociology" *Semiotext(e)* 2(3) (1977), p. 36.

120 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 202.

121 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 202. Italics in original.

In this initial process, we find Deleuze and Guattari introducing the outline for a genesis of the sign which might serve as a phylogenetic model for the development of the spatiality of the sign as we have been discussing it. This particular approach is of interest to us, since it is my goal to establish a model for the discursive deployment of spatiality in colonization. Although Deleuze and Guattari are not explicit on this point, they imply that the process of colonization is situated at that point where Oedipus is "installed within the savage territorial machine."¹²² It should be clear from what has just been noted about the function of Oedipus in the structuration of subjectivity that such an installation would create subjectivity as a residue of its own discourse. This has both an ontogenetic (described in section 1.5 of Anti-Oedipus: "The machines") as well as a phylogenetic structural dimension (described in section 3: "Savages, barbarians, civilized men"). It is the latter dimension which makes it possible to describe the structuration of space and spatial knowledge, and of the spatiality of the subject which takes place in the process of colonization. According to Jacques Donzelot, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari "... sketch the evolution of mankind from its origins to the present day," an aspect of the book which "... has been for the most part ignored, which is too bad since here, on the scale of the whole of the human sciences, there is an attempt at subversion..."¹²³ It is via this subversive moment that I hope here to depart from a mode of spatial knowledge which, no matter how "critically" employed, finds itself forced to frame any discussion of colonialism within the boundaries defined by the colonizing act. I hope here to show that a critique of the colony must also be a critique of colonial space, and ultimately a critique of spatial knowledge. For if knowledge is Oedipal knowledge, then any investigation of colonization which does not understand itself as a fiction of space, continually departing from spaces already de-scribed, will simply repeat the gestures of colonization.¹²⁴

It is by allowing the question of desire to precede the question of Being that Deleuze and Guattari hope to find the path that will circumvent the double-bind of

¹²² Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 166.

¹²³ Donzelot, Antisociology, p. 27.

¹²⁴ See R. A. Brinkley and Robert Dyer, "...returns home (Mythologies, Dialectics, Structures): Disruptions" Semiotext(e) 2(3) (1977).

the Oedipal choice.¹²⁵ In the following discussion, I will outline some of the consequences of this priority of desire. I aim ultimately to show that, in the ordering of unified spaces of colonization - be these spaces of subjectivity, signification, or geographical spaces - we are dealing not with a primary binary split and suture, but a unification of diverse and multiple functions. This unification presents itself in psychoanalysis as binary, simply because split and suture are techniques, a technocracy in which psychoanalysis participates. As such, it calls for an analytic response which focusses not on universals, but on concrete relations. As Foucault states in his preface to Anti-Oedipus,

Informed by the seemingly abstract notions of multiplicities, flows, arrangements, and connections, the analysis of the relationship of desire to reality and to the capitalist "machine" yields answers to concrete questions. Questions that are less concerned with *why* this or that than with *how* to proceed. How does one introduce desire into thought, into discourse, into action?

Deleuze and Guattari offer answers to concrete questions because for them "desire is not... interior to any subject, nor does it tend toward an object: it is strictly immanent to a plane which it does not pre-exist, to a plane which must be constructed, where particles will emit themselves, where fluxes will combine."¹²⁶ According to Deleuze and Guattari, the model of subjectivity which may be described by the drama of Oedipus serves to describe not an intrinsic structure of the subject, but the image in which desire appears (as subjectivity) in capitalism - an image which should not be regarded as having any necessary connection to the flows of desire. It is possible to interpret such a claim as a radicalization of the role played by alienation and the gaze in the structuring of subjective space as Lacan explains it. In the end, however, Deleuze and Guattari will have abandoned Lacan's model thoroughly as a kind of tautology of the subject. This is because the Oedipus drama serves to structure desire as that which is outside of the statutory discourse, free-flowing, chaotic, while at the same time naming it as that which effects its own banishment. Psychoanalysis allows the flows of desire to appear only as a function of

¹²⁵ "... *the double-bind is none other than the whole of Oedipus.*" Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 80. Italics in original.

¹²⁶ Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (Paris: Flammarion 1977), p. 108, cit. and trans. Alice Jardine, "Woman in limbo: Deleuze and his Br(others)," SubStance 44/45 (1984), p. 48.

the creation of a social space of subjectivity. Desire aligns itself with signification and the content of desire is thereby determined in retrospect.¹²⁷ What this amounts to is to shift the limit of the statutory discourse (that which divides the social being from the undifferentiated wiles of desire), making it a function of the discourse itself.¹²⁸

It is in this regard that we see the failings of an attempt to found a theory of colonialism exclusively on psychoanalysis. The impasse in which such an attempt must inevitably end is particularly visible in Fanon's indecision whether the synthesis which might end the dialectic of alienation in the colonial situation is to be sought in the specificity of the flesh - "Mankind... digging into its own flesh to find a meaning"¹²⁹ - or the "universality inherent in the human condition."¹³⁰ Fanon's misrecognition of the role of psychoanalytic knowledge in stipulating the object of desire culminates in a displacement of social factors onto a concept of female desire which cannot be distinguished in any way from the "racist" models of desire to which he opposes himself:

If we go farther into the labyrinth, we discover that when a woman lives the fantasy of rape by a Negro, it is in some way the fulfilment of a private dream, of an inner wish. Accomplishing the phenomenon of turning against self, it is the woman who rapes herself. We can find clear proof of this in the fact that it is commonplace for women, during the sexual act, to cry to their partners: "Hurt me!"¹³¹

In his study of the dialectic of colonizer and colonized, which appeared 5 years after Fanon's Black skin, white masks, Albert Memmi is much more cautious of the usefulness of the psychoanalytic approach, precisely because of the way it constitutes its object.

Psychoanalysis or Marxism must not, under the pretext of having discovered the source or one of the main sources of human conduct, pre-empt all experience, all feeling, all suffering, all the byways of human behaviour, and call them the profit motive or Oedipus complex.¹³²

127 "... Oedipus is indeed the limit, but the displaced limit that now passes into the interior of the socius. Oedipus is the baited image with which desire allows itself to be caught (*That's what you wanted!*)" Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 166.

128 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 165.

129 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 9.

130 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 10.

131 Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 179.

132 Albert Memmi, The colonizer and the colonized (Boston: Beacon 1967), p. xiii.

Memmi is moving in the direction of Deleuze and Guattari's critique of both Marxism and Psychoanalysis. However, like Fanon, his attempt to bypass them leads him to a concept of universality which cannot do justice to the colonial situation, or to be more exact, must ultimately agree with the colonial project. Like Fanon, Memmi attempts a critique of colonization's universals from a position of specificity, and of colonization's specificity from the position of universality. This is the thrust of Jean-Paul Sartre's implicit criticism in his introduction to Memmi's work:

The book is... the *formulation* of an experience: caught between the racist usurpation of the colonizers and the building of a future nation by the colonized, where the author "suspects he will have no place," he attempts to live his particularity by transcending it in the direction of the universal... This lucid and sober work may be classed among the "passionate geometries."¹³³

And again later:

The whole difference between us arises perhaps because he sees a situation where I see a system.¹³⁴

In recognizing the problem as a universalizing formulation of the particular, Sartre suggests an alternative which moves yet closer to the preoccupations of Deleuze and Guattari:

Perhaps it would have been better to show the colonizer and his victim both throttled by the colonial *apparatus*, that cumbersome machine, constructed at the close of the Second Empire and under the Third Republic, that now, after giving the colonizers every satisfaction, turns against them and threatens to crush them.¹³⁵

The issue at stake in the representational system of the colonial machine is signs and how they function in the historically and geographically concrete spaces which define the colony and colonial subjectivity. For this reason it is worthwhile outlining the phylogenesis of representation as postulated by Deleuze and Guattari. The aim of this will be to emphasize that the inherent conflict residing in colonial representation and colonial space must be analysed in specific terms, not as a function of a universal structure.

133 Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction *Colonizer and colonized*, by Albert Memmi, p. xxii.

134 Sartre, Introduction to *Colonizer and colonized*, p. xxv.

135 Sartre, Introduction to *Colonizer and colonized*, p. xxiii. Sartre in turn becomes unconvincing where he attempts to reinsert the dialectic of particular and universal into the system (as opposed to the situation), universalizing the machine and particularizing colonizer and colonized. The failings of this approach become visible when he asks us to feel sorry for colonizers and colonized alike, since both are caught in the same machine.

To begin with, Deleuze and Guattari postulate an initial visibility of meaning in the sign, present within a regime of territorial representation. This visibility gives way to that blindness out of which meaning is produced in systems of writing - a blindness toward the world, and out of which truth is born. Finally, a trace of vision re-opens in signification, whereby vision becomes the gaze of the subject by being aligned to the gaze of the despot.

The visibility of Deleuze and Guattari's sign is, however, not to be confused with the visibility of symbolic meaning as elaborated by Hegel. In contrast to Hegel, Deleuze and Guattari do not attempt to postulate a visibility of meaning in which the selective intelligence of the subject is itself subjected to an exterior determination of meaning. First of all, where meaning is visible, the question of the subject cannot be posed. Secondly, if the structure of subjectivity in capitalism (Oedipal subjectivity) is to be made compatible with the Hegelian notion of a subjective freedom to determine meaning, the latter will have to be modified to take cognisance of the cut which opens up subjective space.¹³⁶ Deleuze and Guattari avoid the complications which might arise from an attempt to enter into such a dialogue with Hegel by postulating the visibility of meaning as situated prior to the question of subjectivity as it is posed in psychoanalysis. For this reason, a visibility of meaning in the sign cannot function in relation to the Oedipal subject or to the capitalist social order. Instead, it functions where "society is not exchangeist, [but instead,] the *socius* is inscriptive: not exchanging, but marking bodies, which are part of the earth."¹³⁷ The visibility of meaning creates the individual as an individual by situating him/her within the *socius* and within representation. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call the nomadic regime of territorial representation.

What is important here is that inscription (as the installation of visible meaning) has nothing to do with the establishment of a universal system of exchange which

¹³⁶ "But we analysts have to deal with slaves who think they are masters, and who find in a language whose mission is universal the support of their servitude and the bonds of its ambiguity. So much so that, as one might humorously put it, our goal is to restore in them the sovereign freedom displayed by Humpty Dumpty when he reminds Alice that after all he is the master of the signifier, even if he isn't the master of the signified in which his being took on its form." Lacan, "The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis," in *écrits*, p. 81.

¹³⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 185.

would determine subjectivity as a function of the signifier. In the territorial regime, subjects and things are given being by what is written on them, not by what they might be exchanged for. The question of being is not the question of subjectivity, since it is not reducible to the question of what could take the place of the person or thing if it were absent, or inversely, what would have to be absent for them to be present. The space of being-a-person is not thinkable as the spatiality of the sign, since here neither representation nor being incorporates the function of the signifying point. Instead, the spatiality of being-a-person is to be thought as a geography, a territoriality.¹³⁸

Deleuze and Guattari call the space of this inscription a territory for several reasons. It marks bodies in relation to the earth, thereby setting up barriers to the nomadic flows of desire. "The apparent objective movement of inscription" serves the purpose of suppressing the "real movement of nomadism."¹³⁹ What is more, these barriers form segments, which serve as units of transformation from relations of filiation to relations of alliance.¹⁴⁰ This is the territorial transformation. Deleuze and Guattari make it clear that their concept of territoriality does not imply "a principle of residence or of geographic distribution... Only the State will be territorial in this sense..."¹⁴¹ Indeed, it is the earth itself, which, as a "full-body," must be repressed, if the socius is to emerge.¹⁴² What this means is that the production of persons within the socius requires the establishment of a barrier between each individual and his original engendure, in order that he might be defined within the social space of being-a-person. Because the earth is indivisible, the segmentation out of which alliance arises cannot be derived from nor repeated in a demarkation of segments on the earth.¹⁴³ Instead, bodies must be marked.

This entails a twofold spatiality - it establishes the person within the territory of the socius, and it renders meaning visible. Deleuze and Guattari describe this

¹³⁸ "A dance on the earth, a drawing on a wall, a mark on the body are graphic systems, a geo-geography, a geography." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 188.

¹³⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 148.

¹⁴⁰ See Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 185.

¹⁴¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 145.

¹⁴² Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 203.

¹⁴³ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 140.

system as connotative, "... a way of jumping that cannot be contained within an order of meaning, still less within a signifier."¹⁴⁴ A person is created through the jump of the eye from the word, which names a position in the filiative order, to the mark on the body, which designates the body as part of the socius.

As soon as it is inserted into a system of writing, the visuality of the sign which governs territorial representation succumbs to what Deleuze and Guattari call "a kind of blindness."¹⁴⁵ We have mentioned already that writing, by allowing the written mark to stand in for the voice, initiates signification. This it does through a scission which causes graphism to "... [subordinate] itself to the voice in order to subordinate the voice and supplant it."¹⁴⁶ Where the signifier is visible, it bears meaning only through the trace of authority vested in an absent and invisible voice.¹⁴⁷ I have already discussed in detail the numerous consequences of this scission: for spatiality, subjectivity, knowledge. We have seen that for signification to work, the scission must be closed by an operation of suture effected by the operator which presides over scission. In the fiction of psychoanalysis, this operator is designated the phallus, and its operation structures subjectivity as Oedipal. But, according to Deleuze and Guattari, this is only the end of the story. If we are to appreciate the historical, social, or evolutionary nature of this structuration, we must ask how it comes about that the Oedipal structure of subjectivity is *caused* by the workings of the signifier. Deleuze and Guattari are quite content to concede the Lacanian realization that the Oedipal triangulation of subjectivity is, in the last instance, caused by the signifier, provided we recognize that the signifier itself stands within an open system of causation - a system which proceeds from the workings of the despotic machine.

Oedipus would be nothing if the symbolic position of an object from on high, in the despotic machine, did not first make possible the folding and flattening

¹⁴⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 204.

¹⁴⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 205.

¹⁴⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 205.

¹⁴⁷ "... the voice no longer sings but dictates, decrees; the graphy no longer dances, it ceases to animate bodies, but is set into writing on tablets, stones, and books; the eye sets itself to reading. (Writing does not entail, but implies a kind of blindness, a loss of vision *and* of the ability to appraise; it is now the eye that suffers..." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 205.

operations that will constitute Oedipus in the modern social field: the triangulation's *cause*.¹⁴⁸

This object from on high, which characterizes the despotic machine is, in the *final* analysis, equivalent to the Lacanian function of the phallus. The banished voice is proof of the presence of a transcendental object outside of the signifying chain, presiding over it's power to signify that which is absent, and injecting into the chain a continual shifting from one signifier to the next - a linearity, a temporality which appears as an initial negation of the space opened up in the *visuality* of meaning.¹⁴⁹

But, in the *initial* analysis, this voice from on high is the voice of the despot, and the trace of presence which the signifier bears is that of the despot. The despot is able to function as the agent of suture, linking the two realms which have been separated in writing, because of the act of overcoding out of which meaning arises in this regime. Barbarian or imperial inscription overcodes territorial inscription by integrating the closed territorial segments of the latter as working components in the machinery of the former. This overcoding is a radical re-organization of the *socius* - it seizes upon the segmented territorial *socius* and assigns it a different mode of functioning, integrates it into a different system of power and imbues it with a different mode of representation. This is effected because it is of what Anthony Wilden would call a "higher logical type," within which all old meanings cannot help but to mean something else, something new.¹⁵⁰ It is of this higher logical type that the state is born.

When the state appears to supplant the territorial regime, the transcendental unity of the earth is replaced with the transcendental unity of the despot and the machinery of the state.¹⁵¹ This machine integrates the territorial segments as

148 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 267-8. Italics in original.

149 "The subordination of graphism to the voice induces a fictitious voice from on high which, inversely, no longer expresses itself except through the writing signs that it emits (revelation). This is perhaps the first assembling of formal operations that will lead to Oedipus...: the flattening out of a set of biunivocal relations that leads to the breakaway and elevation of a detached object, and the linearization of the chain that derives from this object." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 205-6.

150 Wilden, *System and structure*, p. 171.

151 "... in place of the territorial machine, there is the "megamachine" of the State, a functional pyramid that has the despot at its apex, an immobile motor, with the bureaucratic apparatus as its lateral surface and its transmission gear, and the villagers at its base, serving as its working parts." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 194.

working parts with such ease, because it establishes a higher logical type of filiation and alliance, centered at all times on the transcendental identity of the despot.¹⁵²

The result which this new transcendental unity has on representation is that the graphic, vocal and visual dimensions all "converge toward the eminent unity of the despot."¹⁵³ The graphic mark is the mark of the absent despot's voice; the gaze is the gaze of the absent despot's desire. In despotic representation, this convergence is maintained by the state machinery. It is thus not possible to speak of the reign of the signifier without speaking at the same time of the bureaucratic and state apparatus whereby this reign is installed on the levels of subjectivity, space and knowledge. The scene of the transcendental signifier will be able to act as the cause of the Oedipal triangulation (where it will become the Other, coalescing into the Name-of-the-Father and the detached, self-erecting phallus) because it is that empty position at the apex of the entire structure of despotic machinery, whose efficacy at all levels issues from the fact that its position at the apex is precisely demarkated by the very machinery it supports. It is a limit which is constantly being approached for authority, by the writing hand, and the gazing eye. And although this position can never be reached, as a limit it may be pinpointed exactly. It is true, subjectivity seems to structure itself naturally about this empty position, and we have seen how this takes place, but - and this is what Michel Foucault has repeatedly demonstrated - alongside the affective, cathectic and epistemological imperatives there exists a vast institutional and bureaucratic machinery for forcibly installing persons as subjects, for forcibly socializing them.

Barbarian inscription and the despotic machine give persons subjectivity and a social existence independent of the territories they might previously have occupied - previously in either a phylogenetic or ontogenetic sense. This it does by measuring their spatiality in relation to the signified empty position of the despot, and not the invisible unity of the earth.¹⁵⁴ For this reason, the initial overcoding effected by the

¹⁵² "The despot challenges the lateral alliances and the extended filiations of the old community. He imposes a new alliance system and places himself in direct filiation with the deity..." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 192.

¹⁵³ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 205.

¹⁵⁴ "In the despotic formations, the Oedipal limit is occupied, symbolically occupied but not lived or inhabited, inasmuch as the imperial incest effects an overcoding that in turn surveys the entire social

despotic machinery is at the same time a de-territorialization. The basic territories in which persons emerged in territorial representation, the segments detached from filiation, are overcoded in such a way that their boundaries must become fluid, if persons are to have being. The scission out of which signification and subjectivity arise also cuts into the territory of being-a-person as it existed in the previous regime. As we have mentioned, this de-territorialization enables the state to establish geographic territories. This is because, in the act of scission with which the mark is attached to the voice, the subject is attached to the world as object. We have seen that it is in this attachment that knowledge arises. This world, the earth, is then infinitely divisible, but only in relation to the despot - only as the despot's object.

Alongside the signifier as the bearer of the despot's desire in representation, the state establishes a monetary system as an abstract mediation between the despot's desire and his objects. The appearance of money in the despotic machine does not provide a means of liberating desire as a pre-requisite for a free market; it is a codification of the despot's desire.¹⁵⁵ It enables the subject to codify his relation to the earth as a relation of the despot's desire to the despot's object. It assigns the subject a fixed position in the socius by projecting the space of his subjectivity onto a space of the earth. Furthermore, for reasons I have already set forth, this relation of spaces is codified as a relation of knowledge - the infinite diversity of objects issuing from the division of the earth all become objects of desire measurable by the despot's coins.

On the level of the sign, the introduction of the subject into the socius through the assumption of the despot's desire has a further consequence. The territorial visibility of the sign upon which imperial representation imposes an initial blindness is reopened where subjectivity is inserted into the socius. This is done along lines

field from above (the repressing representation): the formal operations of flattening, extrapolation, and so on, that later belong to Oedipus, are already sketched out, but within a symbolic space where the object on high is formed." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 266.

155 "For without question, money does not begin by serving the needs of commerce, or at least it has no autonomous mercantile model. The despotic machine holds the following in common with the primitive machine, it confirms the latter in this respect: the dread of decoded flows - flows of production, but also mercantile flows (*flux marchands*) of exchange and commerce which might escape the State monopoly, with its tight restrictions and plugging of flows." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 197.

similar to those already described by Lacan, whereby the subject is positioned in space by the force that aligns his gaze with the gaze of the despot. Subjectivity is produced as a function of the socius through overcoding, because every desire is represented as the despot's desire. All organs of all persons through which desire might flow must become attached to what Deleuze and Guattari call the full body of the despot, with the result that the despotic regime is characterized by the immanence of incest.¹⁵⁶

Incest is simulated in the workings of signification by the operation which, in tying every subject's desire to the desire of the despot, inseminates the space of every body with the touch of the absent body of the despot in an act of signification out of which the subject is born. Here the spatiality of the sign is revealed as that space in which the subject appears as a social being, i.e. a space which cannot be detached from the spaces produced by the machinery of the socius. Therefore, the signifying machinery of spatiality, the spatiality of the sign, must be recognized as partaking of a more extensive machinery which produces space as the space of knowledge, subjectivity and representation. If we wish to develop models of this machinery, we will have to do more than interrogate only subjectivity, knowledge or representation, or a combination thereof - we will have to examine the spaces themselves, the boundaries that are drawn, the resultant enclosures, the paths of interconnection, barriers and lines of flux, and we must examine them in terms of the strategies which preserve them and the forces of resistance they evoke. It is through this spatial configuration that bodies, things, words and marks must pass, situating themselves thus within a matrix of subjectivity, knowledge and meaning. This is how I would seek access to the criticism which Deleuze and Guattari offer in respect of Derrida's conception of a graphic machine.

Jacques Derrida is correct in saying that every language presupposes a writing system from which it originates, if by that he means the existence and the connection of some sort of graphism - writing in the largest sense of the term. He is also right in saying that, within writing in the narrow sense, hardly

¹⁵⁶ "Incest is the very operation of overcoding at the two ends of the chain in all the territory ruled by the despot, from the borders to the center: all the debts of alliance are converted into the infinite debt of the new alliance, and all the extended filiations are subsumed by direct filiation... Incest has become possible in the wedding of the kinship bodies and family appellations, in the union of the signifier with its signifieds." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 209.

any breaks can be established between pictographic, ideogrammic, and phonetic procedures: there is always and already an alignment on the voice, at the same time as a substitution for the voice (supplementarity)... He is again correct in linking writing to incest in a mysterious fashion. But we see nothing in this link that would lead us to conclude in favour of the constancy of an apparatus of psychic repression, operating in the manner of a graphic machine...¹⁵⁷

When we attempt to situate the spatiality of the sign within the working of another machine, a spatializing machine, we begin to realize that the arrangements out of which signification arises are concrete arrangements, pertaining to real spaces - geographic regions, the space of things as objects, bodies as social subjects. Hence Deleuze and Guattari's hesitation when confronting any claim to constancy which may be placed upon these relations. I must, however, state categorically here that I am not using Deleuze and Guattari to repeat Foucault's critique of Derrida. The question of whether these concrete arrangements are textual or institutional, discursive arrangements or arrangements of power, cannot be posed as long as we realize that they are spatial arrangements. For spatial arrangements are both. There are paths which might take us from textual spaces to the spaces of subjectivity or of institutions, and back again, and it seems most fruitful to read the texts of the "post-modernist" critical project as attempts to block certain existing paths between concrete spaces and to trace alternative ones.¹⁵⁸

It is, however, precisely this blocking of paths and unblocking of others which is resisted by the Oedipal form of knowledge, and the way in which this resistance is effected is through a displacement of the space of the socius onto the space of familial relations. The suture which the despot authorizes and out of which signification arises is a re-closing of the gap between his own voice and the marks which stand in for it. This suture marks subjective space as the space of the despot, and in doing so, it marks it as the space of the socius. Spaces of knowledge and geographic territories (enclosures) may then be inscribed as functions of this space.

¹⁵⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 203.

¹⁵⁸ This seems to be the direction taken by Edward Said in his essay on the Foucault/Derrida controversy: "For if the text is important to Derrida because its real situation is literally a textual element with no ground in actuality... then for Foucault the text is important because it inhabits an element of power (*pouvoir*) with a decisive claim on actuality, even though that power is invisible or implied. Derrida's criticism moves us *into* the text, Foucault's *in* and *out*." Edward Said, *The world, the text, and the critic* (London: Faber and Faber 1984), p. 183.

This suture has the function which we examined in the previous section; that is, it is authorized by a transcendental signifier; it authorizes signification, and establishes the space of the subject and his knowledge as the space of the sign.

In the capitalist form of representation, in the capitalist machine, the full body of the despot, which we saw was always potentially disappearing because of its limit position outside of signification, is seized upon by the relations of familialism. "It is only in the capitalist formation that the Oedipal limit finds itself not only occupied, but inhabited and lived, in the sense in which the social images produced by the decoded flows actually fall back on restricted familial images invested in desire."¹⁵⁹ The result of this operation is an internalization of the scission of signification. What this means is that the codification of the despot, which measured all meanings in relation to his desire, becomes the codification of Oedipus, in which desire becomes the desire of the Other, at which position the Name-of-the-Father resides with his transcendental object and his Law. But the law of the father is not "...the configuration of the great castrator, but that of equality: equality in the sense of the commutability of men in one place and of places for one man, of men and women, objects, spaces, organs."¹⁶⁰ Because the empty position of the despot, which is perfectly localizable as a position in the socius, becomes a no less empty, yet transcendental position, which must be fixed within a subject if he is to have existence as a social being, it assumes universal proportions. In its encroachment on the signifying chain, universal representation is born. And in representation lies capitalism's universality in every other respect.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 266-7.

¹⁶⁰ Lyotard, *Energumen capitalism*, p. 22.

¹⁶¹ "[In *Anti-Oedipus*] the critical universality of capitalism is outlined as well, the hypothesis that with indifference, the effect of the principle of equivalence - of decoding - the empty space, the void in which the great categories of work and value can be constituted arises in labor or in the capitalist practice of capitalism, and the assumption is made that it will be possible to apply these categories retroactively to systems ('precapitalist' forms) in which the modalities had been covered over by codes, by markings and representations that did not permit a generalized political economics, that is, that maintained political and libidinal economics exterior to one another, the latter diverted into religion, customs, rituals of inscription (tattooing, scarification), cruelty, and terror." Lyotard, *Energumen capitalism*, p. 16. In outlining the retroactive universality of capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari are indicating a historiography similar to Foucault's genealogy, in which the pursuit of universal truth is abandoned for a micro-mechanics of power.

When the capitalist machine replaces the despotic machine, desire no longer aligns itself in the first instance with the desire of the despot, but with the desire of this universal position presiding over signification and familial relations, internalized within the triangulated Oedipal subject.¹⁶² This process of internalization requires a decoding of the social field, which the despot had overcoded by relating all positions of social being to his own body. The question of being no longer presents itself from a position within the social field, but from a position projected onto the space of the family, and ultimately, the space of the subject. Hence Lacan's model of the genesis of the subject, in which the borders of subjective space are determined at the mirror stage by the positions of the child (as consciousness), the object (as mother), and the ambiguous shift between scission and suture which defines the mirror image, and which prepares subjective desire for the desire of the Other.

But Lacan did not go far enough in his situation of the causality of subjective structuration. "The family only expresses what it no longer dominates and this simulation of the social field allows the latter to catch desire in the trap of its primary cathexes and to draw the maximum benefits from the very process of making desire guilty."¹⁶³ It is this changed function of the social field in capitalist representation which require Deleuze and Guattari to qualify the nature and operation of causality in subjectivity. In John Rajchman's words, "Lacan separates the Oedipal function from the family cell itself, presenting it not as a relation between child and family, but between child and a larger "symbolic" order. Next he derives the authority of the father from this order, rather than the other way around... While Lacan's treatment of this theme is quite ingenuous,... it certainly seems objectionable to claim that the *cause* of the father's authority is its symbolic support, or that the authority *is* this support."¹⁶⁴ It is in this claim that we find "... the

162 "Hence desire, having completed its migration, will have to experience this extreme affliction of being turned against itself, bad conscience..." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 217.

163 Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 43.

164 John Rajchman, "Analysis in power. A few Foucauldian theses" in *Semiotext(e)* 2(3) (1977), p. 50. Italics in original. The case is put in stronger terms by Lotringer, when he states that in Lacan's "return to Freud"... Oedipus and castration were turned into incontrovertible scientific truths and the unconscious into an object of pure knowledge reserved strictly for techno-academics." Sylvère Lotringer, "Libido unbound: the politics of 'schizophrenia'," in *Semiotext(e)* 2(3) (1977), p. 5.

extreme importance - but also the indeterminate nature, the nondecidability - of the argument advanced by psychoanalysis' most profound innovator, which makes the displaced limit pass between the Symbolic and the Imaginary, between symbolic castration and imaginary Oedipus."¹⁶⁵

In capitalist representation, the family is "... simply the form of human matter or material that finds itself subordinated to the autonomous social form of economic reproduction, and that comes to take the place assigned it by the latter."¹⁶⁶ This places the family outside of the social field in such a way that the social field may still be applied to it. This application is twofold. First of all, social persons emerge at the site of conjunction of two disjunct forces or decoded flows. These are the flows of labor capacity and capital, which have burst the boundaries of the overcoded spaces of subjective and objective knowledge in the despotic machine. The major thrust of this decoding is an abstraction of the flows of labor capacity and capital, which renders any meaning they might have purely virtual prior to their actualization in the subject; that is, prior to their concretization "in their becoming related or their conjunction."¹⁶⁷ What this amounts to is that the social person, the subject of the enunciation, exists as an image. "They [social persons] are nothing more nor less than configurations or images produced by the point-signs... of capitalism."¹⁶⁸ Secondly, private persons are constituted retrospectively as those persons outside the social field whose form approximates these images - as *simulacra*.¹⁶⁹

When the private person is born as that being to which meaning is given in signification, or to which objective knowledge is given in his relation to the world, this person is located at the site of transformation of abstract quantities into concrete qualities. This site is a conjunction of decoded flows, whose production is part of the de-territorializing work of capitalism. We saw that the de-territorializing

¹⁶⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 268.

¹⁶⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 263.

¹⁶⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 263.

¹⁶⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 264.

¹⁶⁹ "Private persons are therefore images of the second order, images of images - that is, *simulacra* that are thus endowed with an aptitude for representing the first-order images of social persons." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 264.

tendency initiated in the despotic machine was to be conceived as a dissolution of the boundaries demarking the "segments" in which the person had being in the territorial machine. This was effected primarily by the twin agents of money and the signifier. Furthermore, in both cases, the body of the despot authorized a suture out of which meaning arose. In the capitalist machine, this tendency is carried to its completion, with the de-territorialization of labor power (the de-territorialized worker) and the decoding of money (capital). The prime effect of this decoding is that, in contradistinction to the despotic regime, desire is invested not in the despot, but in the de-territorialized flows themselves. "Since everything becomes interchangeable (law of value), nothing, or almost nothing, resists the flow of capital whose economy is one, *at least potentially*, with that of desire."¹⁷⁰ In order that this may come about, there must be a gradual evolution of the despotic machine, so that the decoded flows might be conjoined "in a space that takes time."¹⁷¹ This gradual emergence of capitalism within the spaces it defines by its own conjunctions of decoded flows corresponds to the emergence of temporality as the universal truth of spatiality. This comes about by the production of spaces in which abstract quantities are continually transformed into concrete qualities. As such, all spaces are apparently reducible to the abstract quantities out of which they arose. What must be noted however, is that these spaces arise not in relation to one or other of the decoded flows, but out of the "differential relation" between the flows. The transformation which takes place in the differential relation of labor and capital is a "transformation of the surplus value of code into a surplus value of flux."¹⁷² Wherever spaces exist in which meaning is overcoded with the desire of the despot, the capitalist decoding and conjunction serves to re-establish meaning as the change in capital which can be measured over a certain time period.¹⁷³ The capitalist machine establishes capital itself as the full body of the socius by allowing it to

170 Lotringer, *Libido unbound*, p. 8. Italics in original.

171 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 224.

172 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 228.

173 "In no way is capitalism the reign of freedom, for it too is the mapping back of the flows of production onto the *socius*; and Kapital is this mapping-back-onto; but it must happen *only in the form of profit*, and not at all in that of some gain in sacred power (*numen*), in what Deleuze and Guattari call code surplus value..." Lyotard, *Energumen capitalism*, p. 14. Italics in original.

function as filiative. "Capital becomes filiative when money begets money, or value a surplus value."¹⁷⁴ Money determines the quality of decoded flows as dependent on a concrete relation . This it does by the conjunction of flows.

And thus nothing is left but an enormous moving around, objects appear and disappear, fins of dolphins, on the surface of the sea, and objectness gives way to sheer obsolescence, what is important is no longer the object, a concretion inherited from the codes, but metamorphosis, fluidity. Not a dolphin, but a trail, an energetic trace inscribed on the surface.¹⁷⁵

The well-defined space in which this transformation takes place is the space of the family. The family is activated in the capitalist machine as the stage on which the drama of social being can be played out. Its illusory quality is achieved by its apparent detachment from the social field. This amounts to a binary opposition, an exclusive disjunction between the family and the "... forces and means of production as abstract quantities. Whence a placing out of play of the family, a segregation making it the locale for an abstract equality. The family becomes, then, a deceptive microcosm of what it is separated from, a surface of application of the social field which, while fitting itself over the familial determinations, performs a transmutation of social persons into private persons and vice versa. As the smallest possible theater, the smallest colony of capitalism, the family causes the entire social field to pass into the images of private life."¹⁷⁶

Fanon recognized the importance of this "smallest colony" in the structure of colonial relations. He also realized that the discourse of psychoanalysis, in fixing upon the family, was practising a Eurocentricity which is not to be dissociated from colonization itself.

In Europe the family represents in effect a certain fashion in which the world presents itself to the child. There are close connections between the structure of the family and the structure of the nation. Militarization and the centralization of authority in a country automatically entail a resurgence of the authority of the father. In Europe and in every country characterized as civilized or civilizing, the family is a miniature of the nation... There is no disproportion between the life of the family and the life of the nation.¹⁷⁷

174 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 227.

175 Lyotard, *Energumen capitalism*, p. 15.

176 Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 43.

177 Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 141-2.

He also saw that the Hegelian dialectic comes up against enormous obstacles when it attempts to explain the relations of individual and socius in capitalism.¹⁷⁸ On many occasions, Fanon comes remarkably close to a model of the harnessing of "liberated" desire in the representational system of colonization. Perhaps the weakness of Fanon's analysis is most succinctly stated if we say that he did not develop this insight to its logical conclusion.

The consequences of the function of capital described by Deleuze and Guattari, which I have repeated in a cursory fashion here, are to provide an apparent liberation of desire, while actually directing it in two directions: in the direction of the decoded flows of labor and capital, in which it has virtuality only; and in the direction of the site of transformation of abstract quantity in these flows into concrete quality, i.e. the image of the social person. What this means is that desire is "liberated" into an investment in the social field, an investment which re-presents itself only as an investment in the private person, the banished image of the social person.¹⁷⁹ This is why Deleuze and Guattari refer to Oedipus as the displaced represented of desire.¹⁸⁰ We should note that this final emergence of the *truth* of desire is a determination in retrospect. It cannot be otherwise. Again, this is why the capitalist machine - the machine which produces universal truth and universal history - produces spaces which negate themselves in time, and traces of spatiality which cling to this negation. In capitalism, the spatiality of the sign, which we saw being constructed within the despotic machine, frees itself from the machine out of which it arises, and appears to lead an independent existence, self-determinant and universal. It appears to produce spaces by the power of its own universality.

But what is this spatiality which signification appears to clear for itself? It is the re-territorializing function of the conjunction out of which subjectivity arises. In closing the gap between the disjunct decoded flows of labor and capital, the conjunction inserts the spatiality of the sign into the space of subjectivity. This it does in exactly the same way as the suture of signification, which closed the gap

178 Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 220.

179 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 274-5.

180 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 166.

between being and meaning. But it is important to realize that we are not dealing with the signifier as an operator, and an operation out of which desire is born; we are dealing with desire as an operator, and an operation out of which the subject of the enunciation is born. In the Lacanian model the subject was the site of a negated spatiality preserved in a graphic trace (the unconscious). In the model of Deleuze and Guattari the subject of capitalism arises at a nodal point, a point of intersection of two domains of negated spatiality within the socius, and this intersection produces the trace of that negated spatiality by way of a re-territorialization which we may refer to as the space of the subject. The space of the subject opens onto the space of the world, and is characterized by "transient cathexes causing all territories confined and marked by codes to disappear in their wake - not only on the side of *objects*... but as well on the side of 'subjects', whether individual or social, which can only appear in this transit, as indifferent concretions themselves exchangeable and anonymous, whose illusion of existence can only be maintained at the price of special expenditures of energy."¹⁸¹ Capitalism cannot function without continually displacing the limit it negates in the decoding of flows onto this other internal limit drawn through the center of the subject. The apparent removal of barriers to desire in the liberation of labor and capital is countered by the ever more concrete specification of internal barriers within the socius, barriers which define territories of private existence, territories to which desire can seemingly be confined.

Civilized modern societies are defined by processes of decoding and deterritorialization. But *what they deterritorialize with one hand, they reterritorialize with the other.*¹⁸²

This reterritorialization which encircles the space of the subject as Oedipus is also mapped upon the socius, and serves to define relatively closed groups - so-called interest groups. What is characteristic of these reterritorializations is that they bear the full ambiguity of the transformation of amorphous multiplicities into socially conditioned molar unities.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Lyotard, *Energumen capitalism*, p. 16. Italics in original.

¹⁸² Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 257. Italics in original.

¹⁸³ "These neoterritorialities are often artificial, residual, archaic; but they are archaisms having a perfectly current function, our modern way of "imbricating," of sectioning off, of reintroducing code fragments, resuscitating old codes, inventing pseudo codes or jargons... These modern archaisms are extremely complex and varied. Some are mainly folkloric, but they nonetheless represent social and

For the present, I shall not pursue the model of capitalism suggested by Deleuze and Guattari any further than this. It will suffice here to note that colonial space is not a universal space, but that it must be situated in the phylogenesis of representation, somewhere between the despotic and the capitalist regimes. It will have to be grasped as a historically specific organization of multiplicities into a unity within which subjectivity has meaning.

2.3 *Spatial multiplicity and paranoid knowledge*

We saw in connection with Lacan's theory of subjectivity that human knowledge is paranoid, in so far as it issues from a formal stagnation of the subject and object positions in the specular dialectic. We saw furthermore that this stagnation is effected by the transcendental operator which presides over signification. In the Lacanian model, this operator authorizes subjectivity as a space of representation, and it does this by linking the subject's desire to a transcendental Law. We have also seen that the transcendental signifier functions as an operator when it unites the schism which has opened up in the scission between consciousness and perception, or that between being and meaning. The result is the space of the speaking subject.

Since the causality of the signifier arises in the social formation which Deleuze and Guattari describe as the despotic machine, it should come as no surprise that they also characterize this machine as "a great paranoid machine," and the despot as "the paranoid: there is no reason to forego such a statement, once one has freed oneself from the characteristic familialism of the concept of paranoia in psychoanalysis and psychiatry, and provided one sees in paranoia a type of investment of a social formation."¹⁸⁴ We have seen why it is necessary to project the

potentially political forces (from domino players to home brewers via the Veterans of Foreign Wars). Others are enclaves whose archaism is just as capable of nourishing a modern fascism as of freeing a revolutionary charge (the ethnic minorities, the Basque problem, the Irish Catholics, the Indian reservations). Some of these archaisms take form spontaneously, in the very current of the movement of deterritorialization (neighborhood territorialities, territorialities of the large aggregates, "gangs")... The famous personalization of power is like a territoriality that accompanies the deterritorialization of the machine, as its other side." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 257-8.

¹⁸⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 193.

Lacanian structure of subjectivity beyond the bounds of familial relations into the social field, in which desire is constantly coalescing into and escaping from its own inscription in spaces of subjectivity.

In the despotic machine, the domain out of which the causality of the signifier issues forth, the space of knowledge is defined by the position of the subject as the being of the despot's desire on the one hand and the object as the meaning of the despot's desire on the other. The paranoid knowledge of the despot is immanent in the social field. When this orientation is reduced to the Oedipal triangle, the signifier itself, elevated to a transcendental position, stands in for the despot, transfers his authority to the empty value of (-phi) and becomes a position of universal truth. The structure of knowledge, however, remains the same: a subject tied to his object across the space of a signifying scission - a space which has been unified again in the production of knowledge. And, in capitalism, a social space given by the conjunction of two temporally determined fields. The structure of Oedipal knowledge, however, presents us with a serious problem in the critique of colonial space. We approach the space of the colony as a finished product, a unity whose appearance of monumental homogeneity thinly glosses a multiplicity which seemingly has nothing to do with the colonial space. Our problem is how to chart the interconnections of this multiplicity from a position of paranoid knowledge. However, we must realize that the cut which characterizes Oedipal knowledge does not simply slash through the center of the sign, the subject, the world, making one half accessible to knowledge while banishing the other as its forever absent goal. It provides at the same time an axis along which a multiplicity of spaces are interconnected. And furthermore, this axis may serve as a pathway along which it is possible to move in the act of description. That is, it is possible to speak or write about the space of the subject as if it were naturally coextensive with the space of the world.¹⁸⁵ And, irrespective of the myth of banishment which surrounds

¹⁸⁵ In this respect, Charles Stivale shows that the literary analyses in *Milles Plateaux* (*Milles Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie*, II, Paris: Minuit 1980) are not confined to the purely literary, "... because for Deleuze and Guattari, 'lines of writing conjugate with other lines, life lines, lines of good and bad luck, lines which bring about the variation of the line of writing itself, lines which are *between the lines* written... We want to show that the *nouvelle* is defined as a function of living *lines*, lines of flesh' (p. 238). These are lines by which we and our map are crisscrossed and traced, lines which language must

psychoanalysis, it is possible to move between back and forth the space of self-reflexive consciousness and that of a consciousness without an object. There exist a number of pre-determined paths for doing this. What we must realize is that the multiplicity of spaces gives rise to a space by the manner in which they are connected. In Milles Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari speak of a "stratification" which accompanies articulation, "like the world's creation from chaos."¹⁸⁶ If we wish to dismantle the space of the colony by examining it as a multiplicity of spaces, the question then becomes, how to move from one space to another without re-tracing these cuts, these pathways, along which thought must move in the construction of Oedipal knowledge. How to occupy positions relative to a multiplicity of spaces without these positions being those already defined by Oedipal knowledge. Is such a project feasible?

I believe it is, provided we remain by the machinic model of spatiality which Deleuze and Guattari attempt to develop. This means that we are not concerned with developing another, alternative knowledge of the colony, which is in some way better than that which it replaces, or which might reveal its predecessor as false. What we are concerned with is the mechanics whereby a multiplicity of spaces have been linked, amalgamated, and held together to form a relatively stable spatial configuration, a configuration which possesses certain qualities and in which knowledge is determined as not having access to the chaotic appearance which multiplicity acquires.

Paranoiac knowledge opposes any tendency to develop a mechanics of multiplicities. It collects diversity into a single structure, a single device. This problem is at the heart of any theory of signification, and it is also a problem with which Lacan is constantly at issue in his theory of subjectivity. And yet, the

follow, lines on the hardest of which a signifier emerges and into the lowest of which the subject is born... '...lines which can be those of a life as well as those of a work of literature or art, of a society, depending on the particular system of coordinates retained.' (pp. 248-249)" Charles J Stivale, "The literary element in *Milles Plateaux*: the new cartography of Deleuze and Guattari," in SubStance 44/45 (1984), p. 29.

¹⁸⁶ Three great strata are summarily and traditionally distinguished: physical-chemical, organic, anthropomorphic (or 'alloplastic') Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Concrete rules and abstract machines. Plateau 15, Conclusion, from *Milles Plateaux*," in SubStance 44/45 (1984), p. 7-8.

collection of multiplicity into unity is not situated primarily in textuality or signification, but in what Deleuze calls an arrangement.

The minimal real Unity is not the word, the idea, or the concept, nor the signifier, but the *arrangement*, the configuration. It is always an arrangement which produces utterances... The utterance is a product of an arrangement, always collective, which puts into play, in us and outside of us, populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events.¹⁸⁷

In Anti-Oedipus the arrangement presents itself initially in the overcoding work of the despot, and then in the complementary motions of deterritorialization and reterritorialization which characterize the capitalist machine. Anti-Oedipus focusses its attack on psychoanalysis, because, in the opinion of the authors, it is here that paranoiac knowledge is seen most clearly to be partaking of the social mechanisms of power, while pretending a detached humanistic knowledge.¹⁸⁸ The service which psychoanalytic knowledge yields to these power mechanisms is its isolation of an object which becomes pathological in every form of its self-reflection. This object is the human consciousness with its unconscious structured like a language. "Consequently the individual explored by the human sciences is correlative to a specific form of subjugation. The sickness of man is nothing but his individuality, an untenable construction that requires a continual libidinal investment onto repression. To be oneself or nothing, to possess or to die..."¹⁸⁹ Deleuze and Guattari certainly do not deny repression, but instead of following Freud in locating primary and secondary repression in the realm of the signifying chain, they establish a complex model of syntheses of the unconscious which serves to provide a theory of the relationship between desire and social repression.¹⁹⁰ This relationship serves to link the two regions which are later generalized into the distinction between the molar and the molecular.

187 Deleuze, Dialogues, p. 65, cit. and trans. Jardine, Woman in limbo, p. 49. Italics in original.

188 "Psychoanalytic interpretation, for as much as it seeks causes and goals, explanations and meanings under the protection of an unconscious conceived on the model of a language, remains a tributary to the logic of power." Lotringer, Libido unbound, p. 10.

189 Lotringer, Libido unbound, p. 7.

190 See Rajchman, Analysis in power, p. 52-3. I agree with Rajchman when he states that the importance of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of repression "resides less in the details of the 'three syntheses' of desire than in the possibility it opens to discern a form of its social repression." (p. 54) For this reason, I will not embark on a discussion of the complexities of the three syntheses. For a brief, but useful elucidation see Charles J Stivale, "Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Schizoanalysis and literary discourse," in SubStance 29 (1981), pp. 46-57.

At times we contrasted the molar and the molecular as the paranoid, signifying, and structured lines of integration, and the schizophrenic, machinic, and dispersed lines of escape; or again as the staking out of the perverse reterritorializations, and as the movement of the schizophrenic deterritorializations. At other times, on the contrary, we contrasted them as the two major types of equally social investments: the one sedentary and biunivocalizing, and of a reactionary or fascist tendency; the other nomadic and polyvocal, and of a revolutionary tendency.¹⁹¹

This distinction, however, is not to be understood as a rigid duality. Although Deleuze and Guattari do not specifically refer to them as such, the molar and the molecular are probably better understood as organizational levels, the molecular formations being continually and exclusively invested in molar formations.¹⁹²

The fact that the two levels of organization are inseparably united in one process of production, i.e. social production, means that any attempt to separate the two levels, either analytically, politically, therapeutically, or by other means, must be grasped as an attempt to undermine the molar constitution of social production.

The conjunction out of which Oedipal subjectivity arises creates a molar unity from a multiplicity of investments of desiring machines in the social field. The Oedipal subject and its microcosm, the family, thereby attain a unity which can stave off its actual multiplicity only on the level of representation. As Lotringer notes, the family is not "...the microcosm for society, for it has no more unity save at the level of ideological representation." The creation of representational unities which serve as apparent microcosms are nothing more than "...a basic logico-political manipulation by which capitalism strains to choke off *its own overflowing*."¹⁹³ The fact that these unities exist as relative multiplicities compared to the molar unity which had preceded it in the despotic machine serves only to give the appearance of a liberation of desire. What we are in fact faced with is a reterritorialization of

191 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 340.

192 "There are no desiring-machines that exist outside the social machines that they form *on a large scale*; and no social machines without the desiring machines that inhabit them *on a small scale*... The desiring micromultiplicities are no less collective than the large social aggregates; they are strictly inseparable and constitute one and the same process of production. From this point of view, the duality of the poles passes less between the molar and the molecular than to the interior of the molar social investments..." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 340. My emphasis. If we attempt to grasp the distinction as other than levels of organization, we could reduce the entire project of *Anti-Oedipus* to a redrawing of the signifying scission of Lacanian subjectivity within a widened social context. In doing so we would overlook what might be called its anarchist intention: the liberation of the constituent flows from their organizational capture.

193 Lotringer, *Libido unbound*, p. 7. Italics in original.

multiplicity into the molar Oedipal formation. This happens in the same motion in which there is a deterritorialization of the despotic machine. Because of this, we must be cautious not to situate the molecular organization of the capitalist machine on the level of the individual person, for it is precisely here that the molecular formations of desiring-machines are organized into the molar formations of social being.¹⁹⁴ This transformation is, however, not limited to the creation of the person as a totality. It should rather be understood as occurring wherever molecular multiplicities converge into the unity of an organism. "This unity can be the biological unity of a *species* or the structural unity of a *socius*: an organism, social or living, is composed as a whole, as a global or complete object."¹⁹⁵ It can also be the geographical unity of a colony. This brings us to the point where we can state explicitly that the production of colonial space is an organization and unification of a chaotic multiplicity. By postulating desiring production as the basis of such multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari allow us to develop the idea of a spatializing machine which operates in an entirely different manner from the spatiality of the sign. Instead of continually synthesizing spaces of lack into signifying unities, themselves engraved with traces of this lack, the spatializing machine continually produces spaces (territorialities) - or more exactly, it continually produces a space; and it produces it out of a multiplicity of abstract quantities, the movements of desire across the social field.

The desiring machines are "... chronogeneous machines... bringing into play processes of temporalization...,"¹⁹⁶ and where they appear in space they do so as motion. In the capitalist machine they have assumed the appearance of pure motion towards a lack - towards a space whose spatiality may be described only in terms of that which does not fill it - the void. This apparent dependence on the void as a motivating force characterizes representation, for "... every time that production, rather than being apprehended in its originality, in its reality, becomes *reduced* (*rabattue*) in this manner to a representational space, it can no longer have value

¹⁹⁴ "Doubtless it would be a mistake to contrast these two dimensions [molar and molecular] in terms of the collective and the individual." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 280.

¹⁹⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 342.

¹⁹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 286.

except by its own absence, and it appears as a lack within this space."¹⁹⁷ It is the theory of the void, of lack as an originary motivation which Deleuze and Guattari find so unacceptable. The reason for this is simple: a theory which aligns itself with lack as a motivating force, no matter how revolutionary its intention, is functioning in the same way as the capitalist machine, by situating an absence at the heart of the *socius*, an absence which cannot be filled, since our desire begins and ends there where absence is. This is why Deleuze and Guattari go to great lengths to develop concepts which at first glance may seem hopelessly obscure or contrived. The point which they are trying to press home is that organisms in the widest sense of the word are not ruled by any of the driving forces which have been postulated as originary causes by psychoanalysis or Marxism. Theory, as grasped by Deleuze and Guattari, is intended first and foremost as a means of changing society; and "we cannot change society without simultaneously unhinging the individual and all the power mechanisms that maintain his position (logic, dialectics, meaning)."¹⁹⁸ From the point of view of machinic assemblages, causes are quasi-causes - "...ideas that affect bodies by suggesting actions; arousing passions; by obscuring, clearing, or intensifying conceptions; or transforming emotion (affect) to perception."¹⁹⁹ What this amounts to is to state that cause itself must always be "caused" or constructed ideationally and in retrospect, as a kind of ideology of origins into which theory is continually being functionalized. As a result, theory adopts a rhetoric of truth which is supported by its functionality, and an ideology of functionalism justified by its truth value. It is only from this realization that we can appreciate the complex interrelations of the molar and the molecular.

This is, first of all, a distinction "... between two states of the machine... The real difference is therefore between on the one hand the molar machines - whether social, technical, or organic - and on the other the desiring machines, which are of a molecular order."²⁰⁰ Now these two states of the machine could conceivably relate to one another in a number of ways. There could be a periodic shift from one to the

197 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 306. Italics in original.

198 Lotringer, *Libido unbound*, p. 9.

199 Peter Canning, "Fluidentity," in *SubStance* 44/45 (1984), p. 39.

200 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 286.

other on the temporal scale; or there could be a spatial shift between two distinct fields of molar or molecular predominance within the machine; or there could be an analytical shift, whereby in certain senses the machine is molar, while in others it is molecular; or finally there could be a functional shift from one functional emphasis to another. It would seem most probable that Deleuze and Guattari understand the interrelation between the molecular and molar in terms of the latter two alternatives. First of all, the difference is analytical: "Desiring machines in one sense, but organic, technical, or social machines in the other: these are the same machines under determinate conditions."²⁰¹ What is more important is that the functional difference between the two states gives rise to the notion of an interface between a molar and molecular organization of machines, where the machine which partakes of the two organizations is "... the same machine, but not at all the same régime, the same relationships of magnitude, or the same uses of syntheses."²⁰² This interface marks the limit of the socius, dividing desiring-production from social-production. Deleuze and Guattari attempt to show that this limit exists at any one time analytically. However, they also show that for the space of the socius this limit has been drawn in the temporal dimension, it has been constructed. If the space of the socius can exist as a space, it is because of the limit, which is constantly transforming the multiplicities of the "chronogeneous" desiring machines into molar aggregates. In these aggregates, the machines have "... an existence as *visible* as a plate of steel."²⁰³ But for the analyst of history or of the social space there is another dimension to its visibility. The space of the socius and its visibility is quite different from the visibility of the sign and its dialectic of disappearance and reappearance in signification. The space of the socius does not mask an absent realm of desiring production - the two are coextensive. Thus it is the analyst's task "to discover at the heart of the social molar machines the presence of desiring-machines and the variations of affinity between the two. Hence a primary mechanic's task aimed at studying the incompatibilities in functioning, the immobilizations, by confronting

²⁰¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 287.

²⁰² Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 288.

²⁰³ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 287. My emphasis.

desiring-machines and molar machines."²⁰⁴ The analyst's task lies not in speaking the truth, speaking of Being²⁰⁵ - but in writing, as Deleuze and Guattari define the term:

We speak of nothing but multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentations, lines of flight and intensities, machinic arrangements and their different types, bodies without organs (BwO) and their construction, their selection, the plane of consistency, and the units of measure in each case. *Measures of stratification and measures of deletion, the BwO units of density, and the BwO units of convergence* not only provide a quantification of literature, but define the latter as always being the measure of something else. Writing has nothing to do with signifying, but with land-surveying and map-making, even of countries yet to come.²⁰⁶

This has a number of important consequences for the present project. Firstly, the concept of writing cuts across the disciplinary boundaries separating philosophy from literature, fiction from non-fiction. When we begin to examine the texts of colonialism it will be seen immediately why it is essential to found an analytic of colonial texts on a non-disciplinary theory.²⁰⁷ Secondly, such an analytics may be understood as what Deleuze and Guattari call "map-making." In keeping with this idea, my intention is to reveal the spatial modifications which produce the space of the colony, without having to repeat those same representational gestures which had originally effaced their own violence, veiling it with the apparent truth of its consequences.²⁰⁸ Finally, it is hoped that this might serve as a kind of strategic intervention, an intervention which need not apologize for its remove from praxis, but which is a real intervention.²⁰⁹

204 Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 39.

205 "The tree imposes the verb 'to be', but the rhizome is woven together with conjunctions: 'and... and... and...'. In this conjunction there is enough force to shake up and uproot the verb 'to be'." Deleuze and Guattari, *Rhizome*, (New York: Semiotext(e) 1983), pp. 57-58.

206 Deleuze and Guattari, *Rhizome*, pp. 4-5. Italics in original.

207 Thus Edward Said speaks of "...the great contribution of imaginary and travel literature, which strengthened the divisions established by Orientalists between the various geographical, temporal, and racial departments of the Orient... [F]or the Islamic Orient this literature is especially rich and makes a significant contribution to building the Orientalist discourse." Edward Said, *Orientalism*, p. 99. I will be arguing at a later stage that one of the ways literature partakes of this discourse is to establish a mythological mobility across these divisions.

208 "If the map is opposed to the trace, it's because its whole orientation is toward establishing contact with the real experimentally... The map is open, connectable in all its dimensions, and capable of being dismantled; it is reversible, and susceptible to constant modification... Contrary to a tracing, which always returns to the 'same', a map has multiple entrances." Deleuze and Guattari, *Rhizome*, p. 26.

209 "An arrangement in its multiplicity necessarily works all at once on semiotic, material, and social flows (independently of its possible re-utilization within a theoretical or scientific corpus). There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world), a field of representation (the book), and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather an arrangement connects together certain multiplicities caught up in each of these orders..." Deleuze and Guattari, *Rhizome*, p. 52.

To engage in writing, not as a medium through which Being may be spoken of, but "...in the name of an outside [which] has no image, no signification, no subjectivity"²¹⁰ presupposes a level of reality, materiality, whose existence may be posited outside of the arrangements in which it is given to us through representation, but which is in no way ideal or transcendental. This material surface and the machines that are constantly being connected across it are rendered distinct from the strata of articulation or the various machinic assemblages by what Deleuze and Guattari call their "abstract" nature:

They [the abstract machines] are... always singular and immanent. Contrary to what happens in the strata, and also in the assemblages considered from other angles, the abstract machines ignore forms and substances. This is what makes them abstract, but it is also the rigorous sense of the machine concept. They exceed any mechanism. They are opposed to the abstract in its ordinary sense... Abstract, singular and creative, here and now, real although not concrete, actual though not completed...²¹¹

We saw above that the socius is limited by the continual transformation of molecular flows into molar aggregates and by the possibility of reversal of, or escape (flight) from, this transformation. We also saw that these two formations correspond to two states of the same machine - one participating in social production, the other in desiring production. I concluded that these two states may be understood functionally or analytically. What is important to note is that the Deleuzian project of *une pensee du dehors* would be lost in this transformation were it to be understood in either the one way or the other. That is to say, *pensee* is to *dehors* as analysis is to function. The point is that for the two to enter into such a relationship with one another, a material site (plane or surface) of transformation is required. This site is given by matter in its zero degree of intensity - the body without organs.²¹² Upon this raw-materiality, "space" is either the smooth space of multiplicities or the striated space of molar functions. Let us briefly review these two conceptions of space as outlined by Deleuze and Guattari.

²¹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, *Rhizome*, p. 52.

²¹¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *Concrete rules*, p. 14-15.

²¹² "The two sides of the body without organs are, therefore, the side on which the mass phenomenon and the paranoiac investment corresponding to it are organized on a microscopic scale, and the other side on which, on a submicroscopic scale, the molecular phenomena and their schizophrenic investment are arranged. It is on the body without organs, as a pivot, as a frontier between the molar and the molecular, that the paranoia-schizophrenia division is made." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 281.

The concept of a body without organs allows a materialist analysis of desire by situating desiring production/social production on a material surface. The way in which desire relates to this surface by way of production, recording, and consumption will not only be determined by the type of machinic assemblage which characterizes the social arrangement in question, it will also determine the extent to which production participates in the social formation and the extent to which it follows the positive thrust of desire. The positivity of the intensities which fill the body without organs allow desire to prevail as the pure energy of systems, and ensures that it is not of necessity dependent on the Law which structures language, subjectivity and familial relations.²¹³

The body without organs takes its place as antiproduction in the ontogenetic schema traced at the beginning of *Anti-Oedipus*, repelling and attracting the organs, so as to free desire for production and incorporate it into the stases of recording. The body without organs is produced as the nonproductive in the productive activity of desire, which is to say that its substance is implicated as zero intensity in relation to the partial objects of desire.²¹⁴ Out of the productive and recording relations of desiring-production and the body without organs emerges the "space" of an indeterminate subject as a kind of capture of the object. In this emergence we can already note the transformation coming into effect; that is, the multiple flows of desiring production have begun to collect themselves into a unity. This unity "is a strange subject, however, with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body without organs..."²¹⁵ At this ontogenetic level we can discern a "subject" only because it is implicated by those tracings on the body without organs which it is able to confirm as its own - be these intensities focussed on the materiality of the body without organs, or representations inscribed upon it. In *Milles-Plateaux*, the word *heccéité* is introduced to show the indeterminate spatiality or positionality of this "subject."

On the plane of consistence, a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude... two elements of cartography. There is a very different mode of

213 Rajchman, *Analysis in power*, p. 53.

214 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, pp.1 8-9. See Donzelot (1977), p. 31.

215 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 16.

individuation than that of a person, a subject, a thing, or a substance. We reserve for it the name of heccéité... [where] everything is in a relation of movement and rest between molecules or particles, the power to affect and be affected.²¹⁶

What lends this ontogenetically defined "subject" its molecular indeterminacy, its schizophrenia,²¹⁷ is the fact that the surface of the body without organs, to which it owes its immediate existence, has a spatiality characterized by the indeterminacy of 'dormant' materiality. This is initially described in Anti-Oedipus as a "smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface,"²¹⁸ but in Milles-Plateaux Deleuze and Guattari will speak of "smooth space." It is characteristic of smooth space that it belongs to multiplicities. "From the point of view of theory, the status of multiplicities is correlative to the status of spaces, and inversely: the smooth spaces of the desert, steppe, or sea type are not without people or depopulated, but are populated by multiplicities..."²¹⁹ If multiplicity is to be encompassed in theoretical thought (one hesitates to use the word 'knowledge'), it must be encountered as space. And this space presents itself to theory as an inscription of the body without organs.

The body without organs may be activated ("put into play") in a number of ways, including the "smoothing of space."²²⁰ The smoothing of space is an operation which is performed on the spatial organization characteristic of molar formations - on striated space. In order to elaborate the smooth and striated nature of space in molecular and molar formations, Deleuze and Guattari consider the nature of the lines which define these spaces. Here they seem to be taking up the description of the body without organs presented in Anti-Oedipus:

The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by *gradients* marking the transitions and the becomings, the destinations of the subject developing along these particular vectors. Nothing here is representative; rather, it is all life and lived experience.²²¹

In the transformation of the molecular formations into molar organization, we see at this ontogenetic level that subjectivity emerges with the increased

216 Deleuze and Guattari, Mille plateaux, p. 318, cit. and trans. Stivale, The new cartography, p. 33n13.

217 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 20ff.

218 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 9.

219 Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 10.

220 Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 12.

221 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 19. Italics in original.

representability, retraceability, of these lines. This is as much as to say that it emerges with their increased geometric determination. The link between the geometric determination of the line on the one hand and, on the other hand, the visibility of being, but also the dialectic of disappearance and appearance out of which signification arises, has already been noted. What Deleuze and Guattari emphasize is that this determination of being and meaning can only take place in social space. In the socially determined space of the machinic assemblages, "... the line is subordinate to the point; the diagonal, to the horizontal and vertical; the line creates contour, figurative or not; the space that it traces is of striated nature (*de striage*); the innumerable multiplicity that it constitutes remains subject to the One in an always superior or supplementary dimension. The lines of this type are molar and form an arborescent, binary, circular, segmentary system."²²² In molecular formations the "diagonal is freed, is broken or meanders. The line no longer creates contour and passes *between* things, *between* points. It belongs to a smooth space. The line traces a plane which has no more dimensions than what pervades it; also, the multiplicity that the line constitutes is no longer subordinated to the One, but achieves consistence through itself."²²³ On the body without organs, the geometric organization of lines in striated space gives way to the plane of consistence and its meandering lines, the "tangent of deterritorialization." For this reason the body without organs can accommodate neither meaning nor subjective being; "...it has nothing whatsoever to do with the body itself, or with an image of the body. It is the body without an image."²²⁴

What is important for a theory of capitalism (or of colonialism) is that Deleuze and Guattari posit a "...limit of the socius, its tangent of deterritorialization, the ultimate residue of a deterritorialized socius."²²⁵ It is possible for Deleuze and Guattari to posit a space or surface which limits the socius, because for them, the "social is no longer an autonomous whole but a field of variations situated between

²²² Deleuze and Guattari, *Concrete rules*, p. 10.

²²³ Deleuze and Guattari, *Concrete rules*, p. 10.

²²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 8.

²²⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 281.

an impetus of aggregation and a surface on which flows of all sorts wander."²²⁶ For this reason, it is pointless for us to attempt to understand the relations of desiring-production as a materiality unless we see it "within the phylogenetic perspective that aligns the different stages of history."²²⁷ Capitalism appropriates production while shifting its limits to an internal division which we have described above. In the same gesture, it liberates desire as a productive force while repressing the multiple chaotic thrust of its flows.²²⁸ Here we can begin to see the way in which Deleuze and Guattari conceive of theory as an intervention, as a map of paths to an 'outside'.

The concept of the body without organs is established in opposition to Being and Time, as a smooth space upon which multiplicities may proliferate. What is decisive in the conception of smooth space is its opposition to the space of the State. For smooth space does not only implicate a method opposed to "the philosopher as State functionary (Kant)... the 'method' of a striated space (*cogito universalis*)."²²⁹ It serves as the showplace and goal of actual physical opposition to the State.

²²⁶ Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 38.

²²⁷ Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 31.

²²⁸ "For Deleuze and Guattari repression is inseparable from the self-repression proper to the logic of capitalism, which can only exist by liberating generic production while at the same time containing it within well-defined limits so that it doesn't flee in all directions and escape everywhere. Repression is not an *exterior* condition of capitalism, but rather its *internal* contradiction." Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 36-37.

²²⁹ Stivale, *The new cartography*, p. 26.

PART TWO: COLONIAL SPACE

CHAPTER 1:BORDERS

The question of boundaries is the first to be encountered. From it all others flow. To draw a border around anything is to define, analyse and reconstruct it...

F. Braudel

1 TERRITORIES

1.1 *De- and reterritorialization: writing and the earth*

The concept of the body without organs may be situated within the thought of Deleuze and Guattari as an attempt to accommodate the fact of Being without confronting it as a question. When Deleuze and Guattari decenter the question of Being, this decentering shifts our focus of attention onto a material surface of transformation, upon which the various motions between molecular and molar formations, qualitative and quantitative change may be traced. But how is such a surface to be approached analytically without interrogating its Being? If the question of multiplicity is a question of space, how do we chart the transformation of spatial multiplicity into spatial unity? This question centers around the status of the earth in the transformation from molecular to molar formations. An analytic which is to do justice to the complex process of colonization must address the mechanics of inscription. In this chapter I will show how colonization develops a writing which "captures" space by establishing borders and limited passages across them. This is done through limited modifications of physical space - in the establishment of what I will call "nodal points," that is points capable of differentiating qualities of space where previously no such differentiation had been.¹ This has effects in subjective and signifying space, as well as in geo-political space. I will then show that this strategy is also that employed in the 'expansion of the frontiers of knowledge.' Finally, I will show that this writing necessitates a mythology of mobility which can totalize a fragmented spatiality by an unlimited ability to cross borders. In this way I hope to provide a more specific framework within which the analyses in chapters 2 and 3 may be conducted.

¹ In using this term, I must emphasize the fact that it is not to be confused with the term "node" in linguistics as used by Chomsky and Tesnière. See A. J. Greimas & J. Courtés, Semiotics and language. An analytical dictionary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 213.

Before addressing these questions in more detail, however, let us briefly review the historical framework within which we may speak of such strategies of inscription. Donzelot observes that the historical tendency to the liberation of flows coupled with their ever more rigid regimentation has a definite correlative in the status of the earth as a surface:

The historical process... tends to do one of two things: make the earth an equivalent of the body without organs; or solidify the whole of desiring-production into a mass and rigidify it into meta-organisms, pseudo-worlds, the hidden face of the earth.²

In other words, in retrospect, from the point of view of capitalism, it is always a question of de- and reterritorialization. I have already noted that, in the sense in which Deleuze and Guattari use the word, territoriality is not to be confused with the geographic division, demarkation and enclosure of the surface of the earth which is instituted in the despotic regime. This is not to say, however, that territorialization as a concept has nothing to do with the earth. On the contrary, "territorialization stocks the flows of production on the body of the earth."³ This is precisely why a deterritorialization is said to take place in the despotic machine, in which production is possible only in relation to the body of the despot. The appearance of a transcendental authority, which directs production to itself, gives rise to boundaries indicating enclosures of ownership. This establishment of boundaries, which is fundamental to colonization, is a form of writing - it objectifies the earth, removing it to those nebulous regions which characterize the signified. The overcoding instituted by the despot supports this entire process, since he is the transcendental authority presiding over signification. It is by his gestures that the earth is designated as something else; that is, the earth is always seen through his eyes. For this reason, the writing of borders implies a certain way of looking, just as the writing of subjectivity requires, in the Lacanian model, a certain determination

² Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 31.

³ Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 40.

of the gaze. As Donzelot observes, a pseudo-world of meta-organisms hides the face of the earth.⁴ This is why Deleuze and Guattari say of the State:

It appears to be set back at a remove from what it transects and from what it resects, as though it were giving evidence of another dimension, a cerebral ideality that is added to, superimposed on the material evolution of societies, a regulating idea or principle of reflection (terror) that organizes the parts and the flows into a whole. What is transected, supersected, or overcoded by the despotic State is what comes before - the territorial machine, which is reduced to the state of bricks, of working parts henceforth subjected to the cerebral idea.⁵

Overcoding introduces meaning into the system at the same time that it transects, superimposes and regulates by way of the idea. What this amounts to is a writing about the earth and on the earth, taking the earth as its surface and its object.

The molar lines which characterize striated space appear in colonization as written lines and lines of truth traced across the surface of the deterritorialized earth. There are a number of ways in which this writing can be conceived, and I intend to explore some of them in the following chapter. Let it suffice here to imagine the following scenario:

In the desert, water is a goal, even for nomads. The meandering lines traced by their feet tend to converge at certain privileged points - water holes, power places, and the like. When the traders and explorers, scientific expeditions and missionaries arrive, their oxen/horses/wagons/feet privilege the paths of least resistance, and their goals are defined in different terms. These goals may relate to the land (geographical features, mineral deposits, etc.) or its inhabitants (as in trade and missionary activities). A set of points emerge, between which lines may be traced to yield a grid of pathways. When the railway is to be built, or borders are to be surveyed, or a grid of triangulation is to be established, the land surveyor arrives with the techniques and machines for tracing (near) perfect geometrical (Euclidean) lines across the earth. Their perfection is given by their straightness and by their

⁴ "Delimiting a territory, marking out its limits, taking account of its resources, attributing a Center to it, leaving the surface of the earth in order to enter into the sphere of representation... These two things are inseparable: the relinquishing by the earth of its primary privilege, and the advent of pseudo-worlds, those of the territory and the despot..." Donzelot, *Antisociology*, p. 41.

⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 219.

ideality. We are in the realm of mapping. But eventually, the map has to be applied to the surface of the earth - the railway line is built, roads are built, the ideality of the border crystalizes into nodal points marked by border posts, beacons, fences. But before this, the settlers have arrived, buying or swindling land from the "natives" (who after all, the settlers say - and they are right -, have never owned the land; not in the sense that the despot uses the word). Ideal lines are drawn from a tree to the top of a hill, to a water hole - lines which, similarly, will eventually have to be repeated materially in the form of fences. But what happens to the "natives," whose land is disappearing, and who must be preserved, if not for humanitarian reasons, then because they provide the labor source of the colony? Sooner or later, conflict will arise - they will rebel against the new regime. This conflict will in turn determine the tracing of new lines and the establishment of a network of communication. Initially, the highly formalized system of transportation which the colonizer has established will prove a hindrance to the free movement of troops, and the natives will take advantage of this. Guerilla warfare is born. However, the natives will eventually be defeated. They are then confined to reserves whose boundaries are demarkated by treaty and enforced as real enclosures by the law - by the carrying of passes, the administration of land sale and purchase etc. The list could go on - canals, projected deposits of ore and limits of mining rights, the widening of the artery of roads as it approaches the city, to be interrupted by traffic lights and stop signs, the lines through the urban areas which divide the white residents from the "natives," the lines traced by migrant laborers on their way to the cities or back home again, etc, etc. These are all writings which are traced on the face of the earth in the process of colonization.

This is the one thing that history can do - it can write across the face of the earth; and this is what will provide the focus of the present study. But we saw above that there is another alternative, to make the earth a body without organs - that is to release multiple flows in a manner which may not be utilized in social production. Because of the deterritorializing/reterritorializing work of capitalism,

deterritorialization can become a liberating force in the capitalist machine. In Mille-plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari show how a war machine sets itself up as a nomadic force opposed to the State as a despotic arrangement or as a regulating arrangement in the capitalist machine. We shall see how this opposition attempts to transform the nature of space in the colonization process, and how the colonizing machine replies. If history knows an opposing force to capitalism, this is the claim of Deleuze and Guattari, we must grasp it as a deterritorialization which knows no reterritorialization. What this means is that "...it is not enough to construct a new socius as full body; one must also pass to the other side of this social full body, where the molecular formations of desire that must master the new molar aggregate operate and are inscribed."⁶ Striated space, the molar space of the socius, must itself be transformed into the smooth space of the body without organs - the earth must become the equivalent of a body without organs. Deleuze and Guattari seem to be presenting this revolutionary imperative as a practice which is a Nietzschean affirmation of life - the being of the body without organs as matter, substance, etc. is none other than life, and it is the life of the earth.⁷ And it is also the life of the concept - abstraction.⁸

When molar organization seizes on this life, the indeterminate meandering lines of molecular formations are made to participate in the act of enclosure which characterizes the spatial manipulation of the civilized machine. I would argue with

6 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 377.

7 "The earth is not at all the contrary of the D[eterritorialization]: we already see it in the mystery of the "native" (*natal*), where the earth as ardent, eccentric, or intense home (*foyer*) is outside the territory and only exists in the movement of the D[eterritorialization]. But, moreover, it is the earth, the glacial, which is the Deterritorialized par excellence: it is in this sense that the earth belongs to the Cosmos and that it appears as the material by which man channels cosmic forces. We will say that the earth, in so far as it is deterritorialized, is itself the strict correlate of the D[eterritorialization], to such an extent that the D[eterritorialization] can be called the creator of the earth - a new earth, a universe, and no longer only a reterritorialization." Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 13.

8 "The notion of abstraction is very complicated: a line can represent nothing, be purely geometric, but still not be truly abstract as long as it traces a contour. The abstract line is the one which does not trace a contour, which passes *between* things, a mutant line. It has been said a propos Pollock's line. In this sense, the abstract line is not at all geometric, it is the most living, the most creative line. Real abstraction is non-organic life. The idea of a non-organic life is constant in Mille-plateaux; it is precisely the life of the concept." Gilles Deleuze, Interview with Catherine Clement, "Entretien 1980," L'Arc 49 (rev. ed. 1980), cit. Paul Patton, "Conceptual politics and the war-machine in *Mille Plateaux*," SubStance 44/45 (1984), p. 65.

Foucault that enclosure is the privileged gesture of these molar lines, be this enclosure of an individual, an institution, an ideality or discursive domain, or a nation/colony.⁹ I believe also that this is the nature of the spatial striations to which Deleuze and Guattari refer: they determine the spatiality of the socius by setting up regions of equal potential marked by lines which cannot be crossed without transformations of energy. Hence Lyotard describes "...all territories confined and marked by codes... - not only on the side of *objects*,... but as well on the side of 'subjects'" as "...indifferent concretions themselves exchangeable and anonymous, whose illusion of existence can only be maintained at the price of special expenditures of energy."¹⁰ Furthermore, there exist lines joining fixed points within one of these regions with those of another - molar lines marking privileged passages from one space to another, passages along which energy gain or loss can be channelled into or from another quality of spatial division.

It is not only the despotic regime which knows the moment of deterritorialization. It is gradually merged into the capitalist machinery by way of "the deterritorialized worker... the deterritorialization of the soil through privatization... the deterritorialization of wealth through monetary abstraction."¹¹ However, if this process were to carry on at its own volition with no limit but the external limit of expansion, production would eventually become deterritorialized to the extent that it would exist for its own sake only. That is to say that the deterritorialization of production tends ultimately to oppose social production in the name of desiring-production. This tendency is seized upon by the capitalist machine and forms "...the foundation of political economy properly speaking: the discovery of an abstract subjective essence of wealth, in labor or production - and in desire as

⁹ See Foucault's concept of primary, secondary and tertiary spatialization: *The birth of the clinic. An archaeology of medical perception*, trans. A. M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1986), p. 15-16. Also: "Questions of geography," in *Power/Knowledge. Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977*, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester, 1980). Note also the nature of Foucault's strategic opposition to the unities of discourse, in *The archaeology of knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972). Foucault's discussion of the spatiality of the statement is elucidated by Gilles Deleuze in *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

¹⁰ Lyotard, *Energumen capitalism*, pp. 16-17. Italics in original.

¹¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 225.

well, it would seem."¹² For obvious reasons, this process could not continue unchecked if the socius is to prevail. This is why "civilized modern societies are defined by processes of decoding and deterritorialization. But *what they deterritorialize with one hand, they reterritorialize with the other.*"¹³ We have already seen that the capitalist machine is characterized by this dual motion of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as "mutually enmeshed, or like opposite faces of one and the same process." Furthermore, the reterritorialization effected by capitalism is "the very conjunction of the deterritorialized flows that delineates archaic or artificial neoterritorialities."¹⁴ When the capitalist machine transforms the despotic machine, and the State assumes the function of the regulation of decoded flows, meaning is already something which has been removed from the socius. The coding of production against the socius disappears, and there emerges an apparent reduction of the meaning of social production to desiring-production itself; this reduction is, as we have seen, the reduction of the image of social reproduction to another image. This reduction into an image is a mythic function and is of great importance in the discourse of colonization. It provides a schema or itinerary for linking discursive space to the real space of the colony, and founds its claim to universality.¹⁵

The status of universality exists at the level of representation, but it also pervades the real spaces of the capitalist socius. This is because the conjunction of decoded flows re-inserts spatiality into signification (as we have already seen in connection with the spatiality of the sign), while at the same time apparently returning production to the earth. When the capitalist machine supercedes the despotic machine, the earth is not only divided and owned by the despot, marked

12 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 258.

13 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 257. Italics in original.

14 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 258.

15 "Decoded desires and desires for decoding have always existed: history is full of them. But we have just seen that only through their encounter *in a place, and their conjunction in a space that takes time*, do decoded flows constitute a desire - a desire that, instead of just dreaming or lacking it, actually produces a desiring-machine that is at the same time social and technical. That is why capitalism and its break are defined not solely by decoded flows, but by the generalized decoding of flows... the conjunction of deterritorialized flows." Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 224. My emphasis.

with the despot's desire, charted by his explorers, and inscribed with the knowledge he authorizes, - it is also developed. This is not Deleuze and Guattari's expression, but it seems to me an adequate description of the way in which reterritorialization returns production to the surface of the earth.¹⁶ Land assumes an anchoring status in the triangular relation of land, labor and capital, not only as the showplace of production, but also as production's material origin. And conversely, social production appears as the only possible goal of land. Where the despot colonizes, the capitalist "develops." This is reflected in "land development" projects, in research and development programs, as well as in the development aid provided by the major capitalist nations to the "underdeveloped" countries of the "third world". The despot's appearance, the face he shows the world, is a countenance upon which force is written. If the capitalist were able to show a face to the world, it would bear a friendly countenance, that of the developer. This development should also be read in a moral sense, as a 'development of character'. Thus the cruel inscription of the despot's will on those who transgress his laws is replaced in the modern "civilized" system by the myriad disciplinary mechanisms investigated by Foucault. The capitalist's knowledge does not consist in knowing what the despot wants, but in knowing what is best for us and for the earth. Knowledge in the modern socius replaces the gaze of the despot with that indeterminate gaze of power/knowledge which Foucault describes as an "inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself."¹⁷ Paradigmatic for the emergence of this knowledge is the Panopticon - "the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form."¹⁸ Foucault shows how the Panopticon functioned not only to modify the despot's gaze in the name of an

16 This is always a return - "it goes without saying that ownership of the earth, public or private, is not territorial, but reterritorializing." Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 13.

17 Michel Foucault, "The eye of power" in Power/knowledge, p. 155.

18 Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Peregrine, 1979), p. 205.

expansion of benevolent knowledge, but also to provide an analytic of space, not only as signifying space, but the real physical space of the prison, factory, school, etc.

One finds in the programme of the Panopticon a similar concern [similar to the royal menagerie at Versailles - JN] with individualizing observation, with characterization and classification, with the analytic arrangement of space... the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping and the king by the machinery of a furtive power.¹⁹

This involves a management of space on every possible level. When the capitalist develops space, and develops (disciplines) the subject as a function of space, he fixes production back onto the earth, he develops the earth.²⁰ Furthermore, he establishes the conditions under which it is possible to speak of the objects he has developed. Thus the disciplines become sharply delineated in the form of a specialization of mental labor.

Capitalism arrives at the end of history to show, once and for all, not only what history has always wanted, but also what the earth has always wanted, and more than that, what we have always wanted.²¹ According to Lyotard, the "critical universality of capitalism" suggested in Anti-Oedipus amounts to the "hypothesis that with indifference, with the effect of the principle of equivalence - of decoding - the empty space, the void in which the great categories of work and value can be constituted, arises in labor or in the capitalist practice of capitalism..."²² Because the spaces of capitalism are intensely productive, it demands that the form of intuition in which meanings are sought be gradually replaced by one in which positive - in every sense of the word - relationships (relationships of presence) are produced. Contrary to what Derrida claims - and Derrida himself is the best example of this - writing as we know it today does not erase spatiality with the productive power of an absent presence, it clears fields which are continually being filled by all that is

¹⁹ Foucault, Discipline and punish, p. 203.

²⁰ "... one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique." Foucault, Discipline and punish, p. 218.

²¹ We need only think of the ecological programs of the oil multinationals, for example, in which we are shown how the earth needs to be enclosed into reserves from which industry is banished, in order to rescue the flora and fauna which industry threatens to extinguish. But even here the earth produces capital in the form of tourism. And isn't that what we all most dearly desire - a holiday in some far-away place where we won't have to look at or be looked at by factories and the like?

²² Lyotard, Energumen capitalism, p. 16.

present when desire is freed as a productive force. The benevolence of capitalist knowledge allows this productive spatiality to appear gradually within the despotic arrangement, in a way that can never be possible for the despot's armies, missionaries and explorers.²³

When we examine the colonial discourse of the late 19th/early 20th century, we must take care to appreciate the complexity of texts which find themselves poised between two different systems of meaning and intuition, two different productive machines - the despotic and the capitalist. I believe that it is possible to read virtually any colonial text from this period (and perhaps any text of 19th century "realism") in terms of conflicts between these two productive machines, between two forms of representation and the intuitions they require.

It would thus be incorrect to attempt to see the colonization of South West Africa purely as a transfer of or integration into the despot's machine. It is true, the despot is there, at that limit to which all values are reducible. We will be encountering him again and again. He is Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, God, Hans Grimm's father; but who is Bismarck, who is Kaiser Wilhelm? When Margarethe von Eckenbrecher describes the celebration of the Kaiser's birthday under siege at Okombahe during the Herero war - "in front of the station, in the shade of a wagon, my husband proposed the toast to the Kaiser."²⁴ - can we be sure that this act of veneration is the expression of a desire which is the Kaiser's? Is it the despot's omnipresence which keeps these people defending the land they have gained, supposedly in his name? Is it not just the opposite - that desire, following its own directions, seizes here on the figure of the Kaiser because he seems to represent everything which these individuals want? After all, it is 'their' farms, 'their' land

²³ This is one reason why Deleuze and Guattari say that the appearance of the (despotic) State is "history's only break" (*Anti-Oedipus*, p. 261). This is in keeping with what Homi Bhabha sees as the eventual aim of colonization: the establishment of a machine whose "predominant strategic function is the creation of a space for a 'subject peoples' through the production of knowledges in terms of which surveillance is exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited." Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 198.

²⁴ Margarethe von Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm. Erlebnisse einer deutschen Frau in Südwestafrika 1902-1936* [What Africa gave me and took from me. Experiences of a German woman in South West Africa 1902-1936](Berlin: Mittler, 1940⁸), p. 139.

which they are defending. The repetition of ceremonies devoted to the fatherland was, in the colonies, little more than the starting point for a liberation from these ceremonies. This is the potentially revolutionary force which Ridley recognizes in the colonial text. The attempt to develop a social 'politics' (for it was never a theory) on the basis of direct colonial experience may, in his view, be read as a recognition of the unsuitability of European form for colonial experience. This is, however, where the revolutionary potential ends, for in the discourse of colonialism it develops into a recognition that the forms in which the European fatherland projects itself are often in direct conflict with the movements of capital. This conflict is also evident as a conflict between the myth of a civilizing mission in colonization and the actual demands of colonial experience.²⁵ Ridley also quotes Leutwein as stating that "the final objective of all colonization is to make money."²⁶

To understand the complex relationship between the binding of desire in the despotic order and its freeing according to the workings of the capitalist machine, we need only witness the constant libidinal outpourings directed at 'Southwest' as a showplace of personal desire.²⁷

At the end of the 19th century the disappearance of the despot is almost complete. Even where he can still be recognized, the thriving capitalist machine has begun to reduce him to a cardboard figure, whose existence owes to the necessities of the flows of capital and labor. We will recall that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, this is a gradual process. And always these flows are mapped onto the coordinates of personal desire. When, in 1884, Bismarck gave the support and

²⁵ Ridley, *Images of imperial rule*, p. 124.

²⁶ Cit. L. H. Gann & P. Duignan, *The rulers of German Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), p. 44, cit. Ridley, *Images of imperial rule*, p. 101.

²⁷ A representative passage is provided by von Eckenbrecher: "I stood at the railing, and my heart was ready to break. Southwest, land of our ideals and dreams, how basely you deceived us! With how much love and hope we came to you. Disappointment on disappointment was what you brought us. You were miserly with your gifts, and you took from us all we had. I leave you with empty hands and a sore heart. And yet, I love you like no other land. A longing wakes even now in my heart. I wish to God I could look again on your defiant cliffs with their deep blue shadows where the baboons and the rock rabbits live. I wish to hear soon again the monotonous songs of the kaffirs as they sit at their camp fires, and the cry of the jackal in the dark of night. I wish to look out over the endless yellow Namib, when the glowing heat of midday rests upon it, or when the silver moon shines through the thorn trees. I wish... I wish..." Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*, p. 153-154.

protection of the German Reich to the colonial project, he was not in any way motivated by a desire to gain new territory, but intended to provide a secure ground for German trade in competition with other nations. It is this desire for a commercial function of the colonies which prevented Bismarck from committing the *Reich* to governing the new territories and inspired him instead to have them administered by private companies.²⁸ It is no longer possible to state that the people live by the despot's will. The movements of people and money, the divisions of land may still occur in the name of the despot, but they are also moving according to the free flows liberated by the capitalist machine.²⁹

The transformation whereby this is effected takes place in the space of the sign. Because of this it appears as one effected in the name of the despot. This is clearly demonstrated by the wording of a proclamation read out by Captain Schering of the "Elisabeth" at the hoisting of the German flag over Angra Pequena on 7 Aug 1884:

His Majesty the Emperor of German, Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, has commanded me to proceed with the corvette "Elisabeth" under His Majesty's protection to Angra Pequena, and to place the territory on the west coast of Africa belonging to Mr Lüderitz under the direct protection of His Majesty...³⁰

However, we must not overlook the significance of the phrasing in proclaiming that the territory belongs to Lüderitz and is under the protection of the Kaiser. Possession remains in the hands of the entrepreneur, whose desire is sanctioned in retrospect as the desire of the despot. And yet, this sanctioning ceremony is necessary if colonization is to be possible. It was through Lüderitz that writing was effected on the earth, but the writing is the Kaiser's, and it is by his authority only

²⁸ Herbert Grundmann, gen. ed., Gebhardt Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, vol. 16: Von der Reichsgründung bis zum ersten Weltkrieg by Karl Erich Born (München: dtv, 1975), p. 124.

²⁹ This transformation is situated on any number of different levels, and appears in a number of different ways. For example, in a discussion of Charles Temple's "The native races and their rulers" (1918), Homi Bhabha mentions the "tension between 'the free and continual circulation' that natural selection requires and the effects of colonial power which claims to assist natural selection by controlling racial degeneracy but, through that intervention, must necessarily impede free circulation." He cites Temple's text as marking "the shift in the form of colonial government, from a juridical sovereign exercise of power as punitive and restrictive - as harbinger of death - to a disciplinary form of power." Bhabha, Difference, discrimination, p. 198.)

³⁰ Cit. E. G. Jacob, ed. Deutsche Kolonialpolitik in Dokumenten, p. 61.

that boundaries can be demarkated. We find this same process at work in the case of the establishment of the Colonial Societies and the allotment of their territories.

The conflict between the social representation of the state (which belongs to the realm of the despot) and the demands of capital is a constant one throughout the history of German colonialism. It becomes increasingly intense when the Herero wars demand a vast increase in Germany's capital commitment to the colony. This is particularly evident in Erzbergers pointed criticism of colonial management.

Does it not make a mockery of Colonial politics as it has been practiced to the present day when one is forced to confront the following facts? In twenty years of activity in times of peace, the German Colonial Society for South West Africa was not able to distribute a single penny in dividends. But in the year 1905, in a time of war, it immediately pays a 20% dividend!... And who pays for this 20% dividend? 90% of it is payed for by the German Empire itself. The gentlemen congratulate themselves on their patriotism. Where does this patriotism lie? It lies in the fact that they have exploited the plight of the Empire in the most shameless manner!³¹

Erzberger seems to be calling the bluff of those who speak in the name of the despot, but are motivated by principles which are already well on their way to heralding the despot's downfall. It is in this framework that Westphal analyses the role of Kaiser Wilhelm II in the colonial venture.

Wilhelm II. gilt als Inbegriff des deutschen Imperialismus: Was Bismarck nur zögernd und widerwillig duldeten - wenn auch zum eigenen Nutzen -, das förderte der Kaiser - der ihn nicht zuletzt auch deshalb entließ - mit aller Kraft: dem Deutschen Reich zu Weltgeltung zu verhelfen, auf das jeder aufhorchte und sich fragte: "Was sagt und was denkt der deutsche Kaiser?"³²

It is important to recognize that in the colonization of South West Africa there are these two tendencies at work: meanings are created in the overcoding work of the despot, but at the same time there is a coupling of de- and reterritorialization in the name of production. The conflict between the two regimes is particularly apparent in the disagreements between the mission and the settlers.

Oftentimes, however, it is difficult to separate the two. This is because, although the arrival of the despot presents the initial conquest of the territory, the final goal of colonization will always be the "installation" of Oedipus: the freeing of production

³¹ Matthias Erzberger, "Rede vor dem Reichstag," cit. Wilfried Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1984), p. 239-240. My translation.

³² Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien, p. 236. My translation.

for the maintenance of the capitalist machine. And furthermore, the despot's representations do not only mediate between his desire and the world, they mediate, phylogenetically, between the codified territoriality of the primitive machine and the decoding, de- and reterritorializing work of the capitalist machine. Looking back from our position of apparently universal knowledge, how could we portray it otherwise? Our very presence seems to prove the necessity of prior structures as preparing the ground for us. As a result, I will not be attempting a strict division of the functioning of the despotic and the capitalist machines. Instead I will be concentrating on those 'in-between' regions of colonization: the primal encounter has already happened and been repressed in representation, and Oedipus is not yet there with a certainty that has banished the despot entirely from the stage. We are still concerned with that regime where space is determined by the two despotic machine-movements which are its prime characterization: writing and looking. I will be attempting to show, however, that the colonizer is always looking on the verge of writing, and is always writing on the verge of a de-limitation, a crossing and re-establishment of borders, which is opposed to writing.

1.2 Lines, borders and nodal points

If it is the aim of colonization to establish a machine whose function is the creation of a specific quality of space, the question which must concern us is how such a spatializing machine functions. I have indicated above that the answer would have to be formulated in concrete terms. For this reason, it is best to begin with an example. Let us consider a story by the well-known colonial author Hans Grimm, Die Geschichte vom alten Blut und der ungeheuren Verlassenheit.³³ Grimm describes the emigration of two young men to South West Africa, sons from a family with a long lineage of nobility, and their inability to come to terms with the

³³ Hans Grimm, "Die Geschichte vom alten Blut und der ungeheuren Verlassenheit" [The story of the old blood and the immense desolation], in Lüderitzland (München: Albert Langen, 1936), pp. 85-148.

desolation of their new home. The topography which the story projects - like so many examples of colonial fiction - depends upon a polarization of space between civilization and savagery. This polarization reaches its climax when one of the sons is confronted by a border post which the occupying South African Union forces had established to mark the limits of the 'Police-Zone':

On the road returning home, five days from Outjo and two days from home as he was travelling, the German had a peculiar experience. The kaffirs said: "Do you see that smoke? There's a camp fire and a tent." Fifteen minutes later they said: "Police live there." And sure enough, a boer policeman came up and asked: "Where are you going?" The German answered: "To Ombangonde! Home!" The boer policeman said: "This is the border of the police zone. No one may leave the police zone for Kaokoland." The German asked: "Then where am I allowed to go? The war is over, and my house is west of here on my farm. I came from there eight days ago. I admit we drove through a short distance south of here because it's shorter, but you must have seen our wagon tracks in the sand." The boer shrugged his shoulders, and each of them only understood half of what the other said. It took two hours before he let the wagon through. What helped most in obtaining permission to pass was the way the two kaffirs persisted with the policeman's kaffir servant. The German said nothing, he just sat and played with the kitten, then the boer stepped out of the tent and pronounced: "You can go to Ombangonde if you belong there, but this is the border of the police zone!"³⁴

On the desert a line is traced, molar in its definition between two points (Outjo and Ombangonde) but molecular in its ability to wander from the track at will, a bit south if the route is shorter there. The line exists as a more or less privileged passage between two spaces: home and the dealer's general store, or in the context of Grimm's story, between the farmer's decay into a savage condition and the link with civilization. But where is the cut-off point? Five days from Outjo and two days from home? - are they home yet, are they still within the sphere of influence of civilization? Grimm is trying to show that the transition is a fluid one - in one direction, necessity drives the farmer to the dealer, but in the other direction there is a flight from civilization. And what is more, the German does not try to resist the transformation which must accompany this flight - the tracing of this line - he doesn't care one way or the other. But when the border post arises out of nowhere (nowhere in Grimm's story does the social machine appear which placed the policeman there), the quality of the line has changed, and with it the quality of the passage between

³⁴ Grimm, *Die Geschichte vom alten Blut*, pp. 115-116.

the spaces defined by home (i.e. savagery) and Outjo (i.e. civilization). The journey becomes a transgression each time this point is crossed, and this is what ties the border as a real border, a line traced on the earth, to a quality of social space and of subjective space. The passage of this nodal point involves a transformation of energy: an investment in the law, in the concept of a line on the earth bisecting the road. This subjective libidinal investment underlines the German's break with the sphere of civilization. As a result, the nodal point has two important effects. It divides individual spaces from one another by specifying the conditions of passage between them, thereby creating the illusion of a border. Furthermore, it specifies various levels of spatial reality, which can only be related to one another in given ways. Thus, for example, the border post dramatizes the discrepancy between physical space, which the German can cross with no difficulty, and another space, which we might call subjective space. This latter space comes into being in the act of speaking, and is initially structured in the rhetorical attitude of the German - the imploring tone of his questions already serves to define the quality of the distance between himself and his interlocutor. This is the space which Lacanian theory tells us is structured by a transcendental signifier. However, the imperative which rules this space is transcendental only in the sense that its ultimate cause (*causa prima*) can only be thought as absent. A materialist analysis of desire, in decentering the question of Being, must situate its concept of cause closer to *causa occasionalis* and *causa efficiens*. Here the structure of subjective space can appear as an effect only in conjunction with a concrete, visible and contingent position - a nodal point, such as that exemplified by the border post. And yet, in spite of its materiality, there is another sense in which the nodal point is transcendental - it is outside of time and space. It is effective because it occupies none of the various spatial fields it separates; nor is it a part of the border itself, since it is the only place where the border may legally be crossed. And it is effective not by its absence, but by its

material presence. For this reason, it cannot be said to exist in the temporal dimension. If it has Being, it is that paradoxical Being of *stigme*.³⁵

Where does the subject stand in the face of this imperative, this causality? What about subjective desire, subjective freedom? Following the episode above, there is an attempt to counter the border post's stratification of space with strategies to smooth the space between home and the dealer's store once again.

But at the end of the first week he drove by night and passed south of the police post to avoid being delayed...³⁶

The question we must ask is: does this nomad strategy reintroduce desiring-production into social production, or does it count as an act of social production, reconfirming the border by willfully avoiding it? The answer is complex, and I would suggest that in one sense it opposes the border with effective resistance. In Grimm's story, it serves to show how easily a determined geographical space may be transformed into a space where only subjective desire reigns. In this sense, the German's journey is a nomadic one.³⁷ When the border post appears, however, subjective desire itself is unable to reverse the transformation which it has effected. Emotionally, the German farmer finds himself increasingly unable to make the journey to Outjo, and he falls increasingly into "savagery." Grimm is certainly not trying to demonstrate this, but the German's problem is not that he has fled from civilization. On the contrary, it is that the quality of geographic space has seized upon the nodal point (the border post) - perhaps it would be more accurate to say it has represented itself in the nodal point - and effected a striation of space on a number of different qualitative levels, one of the most important of which is the subjective economy of the German. The journey he now takes by ox-wagon to avoid

35 See my outline of Derrida's argument regarding Hegel's theory of the point. Part 1, chapter 1,

36 Grimm, *Die Geschichte vom alten Blut*, p. 124.

37 "Foremost among these [the conditions of nomadic existence - JN] is the nomad's relation to space... Nomadic life is essentially en route, and the routes followed serve a different purpose to the roads and highways which enable communication between the parts of sedentary societies: they distribute beings across an open, indefinite space (472). Nomads are essentially deterritorialized, which is not to say that they have no territory. They do have a territory which they are traditionally disinclined to quit unless driven by force. But it is a special relation to that territory which renders the nomad deterritorialized: it is a pure surface for mobile existence, without enclosures or fixed patterns of distribution." Patton, *Conceptual politics*, pp. 71-72. The page number in brackets refers to *Mille-Plateaux*, by Deleuze and Guattari.

the border control may be the same one he took originally, a bit south of the border post - after all, it is even shorter that way. But with the appearance of the policeman, everything has changed - the wagon tracks become a writing in the sand, preserving the traveller's transgression for all to see. This writing is effected under the gaze of a transcendental eye, but this eye itself requires the presence of a tent and a policeman. And because writing issues forth from the nodal point, it also serves to tie discursive space to non-discursive space, organizing these in terms of one another.

Deleuze and Guattari speak of what I have been calling a nodal point in terms of an "arborification of multiplicities."

It is what happens when... stems form segments which striate space in every way and render it comparable, divisible, homogeneous... It is also what happens when the movements of "mass," the molecular flows, conjugate onto points of accumulation or stoppage which segment and rectify them.³⁸

The way these points of accumulation or stoppage function is well illustrated in the establishment of the border post in Grimm's story. This one point establishes any number of distinct fields in geographical space, and certain transformations must occur when it is passed. But these transformations are geographical only on the level of the signified. The geographical enclosure is the end product of the liberation of desire from objects - a liberation upon which signification depends. As such, geographical space becomes a space of knowledge, provided it is entered in a specific way.

Over and above the physical traversal of space, a certain amount of energy is now consumed in the creation of a dividing line with all its geographical, social and subjective ramifications. This is something that can be known only in retrospect, only after the border has been crossed. It is important for us to note that a number of mechanisms exist in order to reduce this expenditure of energy to an investment in a knowledge which transcends the individual spaces and their privileged lines of passage. The border appears to separate two fields, each being created as homogeneous and possessing a distinct quality. Although an expenditure of energy is

³⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, *Concrete rules*, p. 11.

required to cross the border, once the border has been crossed, it becomes clear that this energy takes the form of an investment in a transcendental knowledge. And once this investment has been made, the physical passage from one space to another is no more difficult than before the establishment of the border post. It is simply a matter of the relevant authority pronouncing the words: "You can go to Ombangonde if you belong there, but this is the border of the police zone!" That is to say that de- and reterritorialization, the motions which objectify the earth and naturalize its development, accompany a universalization which groups diverse spaces into a unified space of knowledge, while defining the principle of passage. The establishment of such a unifying principle has been the work of science, first in the name of the despot, and second in the name of universal truth itself.³⁹

Colonization brings with it a quality of space which is stratified, yet held together by a transcendental principle of knowledge. It is no chance matter that, in the 19th century, the armies of colonization are always preceded by the missionaries and scientists, the one infusing space with the desire of an omnipresent despot, the other subjecting it to an omniscient gaze intent upon a tabulation of knowledge. It is this principle which serves to 'capture' the spaces it invades even without a thoroughly saturated occupation of an entire area. Instead, we see the establishment of a matrix in which knowledge is organized into fields. This matrix defines objective spaces in the virtual spaces of tabulation. Johannes Fabian refers here to the "taxonomic game," which "consists of demonstrating synchronic relations of order beneath the flux and confusion of historical events, and the expressions of personal

³⁹ "Until recently, science had convinced us that in the classification of the spaces of knowledge the local was included in the global, in other words that a path always existed between one local configuration and another, that from local configurations one could always move without break or interruption to a more encompassing global configuration. Clearly this assumption implied a homogeneous space of knowledge ruled entirely by a single scientific or universal truth that guaranteed the validity of the operation of passage. Such a space differs qualitatively from a more complex space in which the passage from one local singularity to another would always require an arduous effort." Josué Harari and David Bell, *Journal plusieurs voies*, introduction to *Hermès*, by Michel Serres (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. xiii.

experience... What we get is a hierarchy made up of relationships of order which are sequential and irreversible; hence the seriousness of the taxonomic game."⁴⁰

The game of ordering a chaotic universe into the tabular space of 19th century knowledge is not to be divorced from the manipulations of physical space taking place simultaneously. In the colony, this is accompanied in the first instance by the establishment of nodal points - mission stations, base camps, etc - from which the surrounding space may be qualitatively transformed, and which link different qualities of space to one another. There is nothing idealistic about this procedure. The missionary and the scientist both possess a number of strategies of material intervention to ensure that this transformation is successful. Michel Serres suggests that metaphysics should be regarded as one of these strategies, but privileged because of its totalizing effect.⁴¹ We could even tentatively suggest at this stage that 19th century colonization (as opposed to the invasions, conquests and genocides of, for example, the Spaniards in South America) is characterized by this material capture and metaphysical totalization of nodal points by scientists, missionaries and administrative officials, with the armies only intervening subsequently, when the new equilibrium becomes threatened by forces of resistance. It was an open secret at the time of the German colonization of South West Africa. Bernhard Dernburg, head of the Colonial Division of the Foreign Office, himself stated on 8 January 1907: "Whereas colonization was once carried out by means of destruction, today we are able to colonize by means of preservation. This includes the missionary and the doctor, the railway and the machine, that is to say, the advanced theoretical and applied sciences in all fields."⁴² The army is no longer in the sole service of the despot, but appears as the necessary companion of knowledge, simply because knowledge is only possible as a function of borders which define its field of effectiveness, and only if certain passages between these fields are observed. The

⁴⁰ Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other. How anthropology makes its object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 99.

⁴¹ "Metaphysics is operator, it is the strategic set without which physics and the exact sciences are nothing but partial and dispersed tactics." Michel Serres, "Knowledge in the classical age: La Fontaine and Descartes," in *Hermes*, p. 27.

⁴² Cit. Westphal, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, p. 252 My translation.

borders which define the fields of knowledge in 19th century science function in the same way as borders between geo-political fields - they attain the status of law. The role this law plays will be determined by its constitution as either the despot's desire, or else as a unifying and self-defining principle - a scientific principle. When we examine the relations between the various (European) military powers which established the borders of colonies in 19th century Africa, we see that the borders of colonies repeat the borders between nations in Europe. In both cases, the border is a product of a dialogue which can be conducted only by recognizing certain common interests which transcend the specificity of national interest. In both cases, well defined spaces (the European nation and its political interest) are connected by privileged paths of communication (dialogue and negotiation). These spaces may be regarded as distinct and separate only as a result of the commitment to a common truth which links them. Thus Edward Said notes the political consensus of France and England in their attitude to the Orient -

For despite their differences, the British and French saw the Orient as a geographical... entity over whose destiny they believed themselves to have traditional entitlement. The Orient to them was no sudden discovery, no historical accident, but an area to the east of Europe whose principle worth was uniformly defined in terms of Europe...⁴³

Similarly, Ridley has the following to say of European colonial discourse in the late 19th century:

... even when imperial rivalry dictated a criticism of the imperial activity of another European power, writers invariably formulated their criticism in terms of a common purpose to which all imperial powers had subscribed but which the offending power had failed to live up to.⁴⁴

This basic agreement, without which disagreement cannot be formulated, is fundamental not only to politics, but, as Serres points out, to dialogue itself:

...such communication is a sort of game played by two interlocutors considered as united against the phenomena of interference and confusion, or against individuals with some stake in interrupting communication. These interlocutors are in no way opposed, as in the traditional conception of the dialectic game; on the contrary, they are on the same side, tied together by a mutual interest: they battle against noise... They exchange roles sufficiently often for us to view them as struggling together against a common enemy.⁴⁵

⁴³ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 221.

⁴⁴ Ridley, *Images of imperial rule*, p. 103.

⁴⁵ Serres, "Platonic dialogue," in *Hermes*, pp. 66-67.

The common enemy in every respect is a multiplicity which must be ordered. Domination and truth go hand in hand.

This brings us to the importance of a realist representation - and more specifically the novel - in the capture of space. Realism is able to act as another ordering principle because of a structural analogy between realist discourse, the border post and the tabulation of knowledge. The novel creates reality effects in the same manner as the tabulation and application of knowledge in colonization. This is perhaps best explained using Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope. Bakhtin describes chronotopes as "the organizing centers for the fundamental narrative events of the novel. The chronotope is the place where the knots of the narrative are tied and untied."⁴⁶ As the term indicates, this nodal point has the power to suspend both categories of space and time in order to draw diverse events and places together. When Fabian notes that "for human communication to occur, coevalness has to be *created*...,"⁴⁷ we realize (as Fabian does) that this creation is a textual strategy. Thus it will become apparent that this strategy is not possible without the creation of positions around which diverse times and spaces can be organized. The organizing force is to be found in the peculiar characteristics of *stigme*, whose status as both time and space, but ultimately neither time nor space, were noted in part I. It is precisely in the suspension of time and space that the nodal point draws together diverse levels of temporal and spatial organization. Returning to our example, we may say that the border post in Hans Grimm's narrative acquires an ontological status not by representing something in as faithful a manner as possible, but by suspending the spatial and temporal axes of representation in order to produce a position (*stigme*) outside of representation. One such reality effect is the definition of a subjective space which the reader shares with the actant(s); another would be the description of positions in a landscape by simulating a line of vision to

⁴⁶ M M Bakhtin, "Forms of time and of the chronotope in the novel. Notes toward a historical poetics," in The dialogical imagination: four essays, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 250.

⁴⁷ Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 30-31.

which the reader has access via his/her memory. In all cases, it is in the nodal point or chronotope that the spatiality of the sign opens onto other spaces.⁴⁸

If we pursue this idea further, we will see that in colonial discourse the subject of the statement is capable of functioning as a kind of mobile border post - a position outside of time and space which captures space by its very presence. Thus, in the context of Grimm's story, the border captures a space which can indeed be characterized by a nomadic movement, but which is a space already colonized by the previous sudden arrival of the German farmer. Grimm's description of the arrival of the farmer and his brother at Ombangonde implies another capture of a position and subsequent transformation of space:

His brother said: "I met up with a whole tribe of klip-kaffirs this afternoon. Suddenly they were just there. They live here somewhere in the mountains. They want to work for us once we're started. That'll be worth something. You need to have people."⁴⁹

A space which, from the point of view of the brothers, is completely indeterminate, characterizable only in the vaguest of terms ("They live here somewhere in the mountains"), achieves dimension with the establishment of a focal point which they themselves constitute. It is nothing more than the appearance of the brothers at a fixed point which transforms the surrounding space into one characterized by relations of production. And these relations in turn become spatialized relations of knowledge and of domination. Thus,

In order to keep a distance, but also because of the smell, they did not allow the tribe of kaffirs which had gathered there to live in the gorge.⁵⁰

Although Grimm does not stress the point (simply because it is not in the interest of his narrative strategy to do so), we can see that there is a transformation of space here similar to that which will later take place with the appearance of the border post. As a matter of fact, the effectiveness of the border post as a narrative strategy in the story is precisely this: it displaces the colonizing act of the white

48 As Kistner observes: "Wo Ort und Zeit dermaßen in den zufälligen Treffen zusammenfallen, werden die Koordinaten des Textes als unabänderlich niedergelegt. Mit diesen Koordinaten wird nicht nur der Held, sondern auch die Position des Subjekts allgemein definiert. Dieser Position wird die Garantie des Ontologischen verliehen." Kistner, *Die kolonisierende Rede*, p. 157.

49 Grimm, *Die Geschichte vom alten Blut*, p. 100.

50 Grimm, *Die Geschichte vom alten Blut*, p. 101.

settler onto a conflict between the affect value of the land and the bureaucratic moment involved in its partitioning. Or, to uncover an entirely different dimension of the story, between, on the one hand, the grave conflict between civilization and savagery which the German had internalized and given tragic proportions, and on the other hand the rather stupid way in which the Boer policeman overlooks this tragic dimension. In doing so, he is overlooking what Grimm would like to see as a very German problem transposed onto a German space about to be usurped by South Africa. We shall see in the following section that Grimm's attempt to mark the territory with a sign of German ownership is part of a larger project which marks the colony with the suffering of the colonizer.

But to return to the conflict between the German and the Boer, such a conflict of interest may be historically verifiable, but we should not allow its rhetoric of disagreement to blind us to the initial agreement which makes this possible. This agreement determines the technique of colonization to be employed and explains the similarity in the spatial transformation effected by the farm on the one hand, and the border post on the other. The establishment of the farm creates a field which cannot be entered without the expenditure of a certain energy, which effects a transformation in subjective space. No matter where and according to what indeterminate coordinates the "somewhere in the mountains" where the savages live might have been positioned, as soon as the farm is built, its space becomes a part of the field of the farm. And to cross the boundary between dwelling place and working place involves not only the establishment of a path as a physical line of privileged passage. It also involves a path of privileged subjective transformation which will serve as a technique for adopting the relations of production being imposed - we might speak here of a masquerade. The native arrives at a new space to find not only that the old space exists only as an extension of the new one, but that he/she is also something new. All that is left is memory, and this too is destined to become a form of the white man's writing.

But why is there no need of a border post between the native settlement and the farm? The answer I would suggest is that, for the German brothers, this line cannot be drawn because, as a moral imperative, it has already been violated. From the moment they arrive in the valley, their morality becomes tainted through sexual relations to two native women. When they dismantle the barrier between their race and the other race, their desire has already refused that social imperative which Grimm wishes to raise to the status of truth. By refusing the essential subjective split which the socius installs in its subjects, the German brothers have, for Grimm, already crossed the border.⁵¹

2 ENCOUNTER: GAZING WITH KNOWLEDGE

The discourse of colonization creates positions which define passages into the text and out again - positions which allow the reader to suspend time and space, and to define his/her own subjective space in terms of the signifying space of the text. This is important if we are to understand the function of vision in colonization. Discourse defines space not only in terms of motion across a border, but also by a line of vision separating positions of subjectivity from those of objectivity - a line of vision which is not experienced but imagined. This is theatrical space. Here, the space of the colony is created as a theater stage, on which the human drama unfolds for its white audience. The processes which this drama depicts are classical and conform to the three unities. But there are two moments which are elided here which we would do well to call briefly to mind. Firstly, the direction or perspective of the presentation is erased in the act of imaginary identification, and secondly, the space of the stage is erased in a signifying gesture the nature of which we have already examined. This dual elision characterizes both literary and scientific

⁵¹ For the way in which the subjective split displaces itself onto the split between the familiar and the foreign, and the way this displacement is employed by Grimm, see Peter Horn, Fremdheitskonstruktionen.

discourse. Both share the role of a regimentation of space intended to order the chaos of the savage land or the empty space of "virgin nature." Both involve a presentation to vision and a blindness, which are well described by Bachelard when he speaks of a "dialectics of division, the obvious geometry of which blinds us as soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains."⁵² The spatiality of the literary text, even (and, perhaps, especially) at its most "realistic," is blind in so far as it is not only the spatiality of vision, but of the negation of time.⁵³ It does not see its own truth, but imagines its own presence. Science, too, effects a presentation of principles whose invisibility seems to confirm the necessity of the presentation. How this works for a science of other places ("area studies") has been admirably shown by Edward Said.

We have remarked how, during the nineteenth century in such writers as Renan, Lane, Flaubert, Caussin de Perceval, Marx, and Lamartine, a generalization about "the Orient" drew its power from the presumed representativeness of everything Oriental; each particle of the Orient told of its Orientalness... Such radical typing was naturally reinforced by sciences (or discourses, as I would prefer to call them) that took a backward and downward direction towards the species category...⁵⁴

Although Said does not follow this line, we are dealing here with a scientific principle typified by Hegel's symbolism, whereby the truth of generality is supposedly visible in the specific. But the question is: visible for whom? Or to be more accurate: in whose line of vision must we place ourselves, if we are to see the general in the specific? Here Said refers to the origins of 19th century Orientalism in a "new historical (as opposed to sacred) consciousness.

Such consciousness is dramatic: learning can be arranged on a stage set, as it were, where its totality can be readily surveyed. Addressed to the King [of France], [Bon Joseph] Dacier's preface [to the *Tableau historique de l'érudition française, ou Rapport sur les progrès de l'histoire et de la littérature ancienne depuis 1789* (1810)] stated the theme perfectly. Such a survey as this

⁵² Gaston Bachelard, *The poetics of space*, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon, 1969), p. 211.

⁵³ "And since the work appears, then, as pure deferral, a void or vacuum, it lends itself to being filled up with everything it isn't: with useful meanings, for example, which multiply and change as history progresses. Or this void can masquerade as the prestigious aura that surrounds the timeless masterpiece in its museum case. Yet these apparent travesties, these various ways in which the work is misrepresented and forgotten, sustain it; they protect its essence, which is to disappear. They provide it with its 'space,' which is *not* its location." Ann Smock, translator's introduction to *The space of literature*, by Maurice Blanchot (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 11. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 231.

made it possible to do something no other sovereign had attempted, namely to take in, with one *coup d'oeil*, the whole of human knowledge.⁵⁵

I have already examined what is taking place here, writing is possible when the scientist places himself within the line of vision of the despot and adopts his gaze at the same time that he is giving it content. Where the despot's gaze prevails, spatiality (including the space of the stage) is the space of the sign. Thus it is possible to look past the materiality of the stage to the general truth it hides. This applies as much to the physical space of the stage as it does to the subjective space of an actor, rendered perfectly visible by his dramatic gestures. As Homi Bhabha notes,

Colonial power produces the colonized as a fixed reality which is at once an 'other' and yet entirely knowable and visible. It resembles a form of narrative in which the productivity and circulation of subjects and signs are bound in a reformed and recognizable totality. It employs a system of representation, a regime of truth, that is structurally similar to Realism.⁵⁶

And here we come to the second point made above: where knowledge is on display, the space of the stage must attain universality. We have seen that capitalist universality is attained in retrospect. The same does not apply to the despot - his universality is here and now, since everywhere he looks, everywhere his gaze is carried, the world is imbued with his meanings. Of course it is not necessary (it is in fact not even desirable) that he gaze with his own eyes. The essence of his gaze as a universalizing gesture is its detachment from any body. Indeed, what the despot's gaze elides is the gazing body, the gazing eye.

For this reason, behind and prior to every universal presentation of knowledge, be this on the scientific or the literary stage, is another absent eye which is somehow more real than the eye which gazes on the stage here and now. This is the eye for whom the stage is the space of truth. Now the importance of this absent eye in science and in literature, and particularly in colonial literature, is that this eye was there and saw it happen; and had you or I been there instead, we would have seen the same thing. The following two passages may be presented without commentary

⁵⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 126.

⁵⁶ Bhabha, *Difference, discrimination*, p. 199.

to illustrate this point. The first is one of the final paragraphs in Wilhelm Mattenklodt's Afrikanische Jagden und Abenteuer, and the narrative voice is the editor, Captain Steinhardt:

I don't know how long I sat and thought... I only know that I shouldered my rucksack and gun and climbed down into the valley to fulfill the wish of my friend and companion *Wilhelm Mattenklodt*, spoken through the mouth of his old father - to clothe in my own words and complete by my own inspiration everything which his rough hand, calloused from the plough tail and gun stock, had so hurriedly and incompletely brought to paper before he left for his fourth trip to Africa, driven by a longing for the distant black continent. This day I saw with *my own* eyes again in a magical vision all that he had experienced, and all that he had told me by the camp fire - my own experiences swelled up from out of the rich treasures of my own heart's memories and mingled with all that my friend had tasted of adventure and happy hunting down in Holy Africa.⁵⁷

The second passage is from the dedication preceding Hans Grimm's collection of short stories on South West Africa, Lüderitzland:

My father, from you I learned to cast a long gaze back, and on my path, whose richness I had not earned, I have found the faith of my early years confirmed up to the present day - that, among all men before whom I have stood, you are the man of most character. Your character was not only devout and refined, not only did you command a kingly composure and modesty, but you possessed a hard-earned learning which was naturally opposed to any idle chatter and all kinds of rationalism, and which you had raised to the level of universality.⁵⁸

In one case, the gaze removed from the body by the writing hand, in the other, the father-despot authorizing universality. Both framing the stage of fiction which claims to be truth - a real encounter. Beneath the facade of science, truth, and universal experience, there is an original and specific encounter which is marked by violence. When the gaze of the despot elides the gazing eye, it is in the final instance eliding the moment of encounter, the moment in which something never gazed upon before is placed in the line of vision and prepared for the stage. This is always a moment of violence, since the encircling of an object and a space of presentation cannot be effected without the forceful determination of a hierarchy of subject and

⁵⁷ Mattenklodt, Afrikanische Jagden und Abenteuer [African hunts and adventures], rev. and ed. Hauptmann Steinhardt (München: FC Mayer, 1936), p. 246. Remarkably enough, the editor states in a letter of dedication accompanying the copy I perused that this book "...bears the name Mattenklodt, but is in fact the most genuine Steinhardt, - it is 20% Mattenklodt and 80% my own thoughts and experiences." We need not take this as an admission of falsification or plagiarism, but rather as a sign of the interchangeability of the gaze mentioned above.

⁵⁸ Grimm, Lüderitzland, pp. 7-8.

object positions. One space is for looking and writing, the other is the space of the object - the stage. Let us turn our attention to this moment of encounter.

Even when the colonial encounter is, in the first instance, gentle, compassionate and marked by an urge to mutual understanding, the violence of a will to meaning on the part of the conqueror can always be found hovering in the background.⁵⁹ When we look closer, the violence of encounter lies in the very fact of encounter. As Deleuze and Guattari stress, taking Nietzsche's comments on the origins of bad conscience as their point of departure, the colonizer arrives at once, like a flash.⁶⁰

*They come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext; they appear as lightning appears, too terrible, too convincing, too sudden, too different even to be hated... wherever they appear something new arises, a ruling structure that *lives*, in which parts and functions are delimited and coordinated, in which nothing whatever finds a place that has not first been assigned a 'meaning' in relation to the whole.*⁶¹

This is the violence of encounter, that the arrival of the 'blond beast' is unspeakable, it is unnamable within the sign system of the conquered. Their inferiority is a semicratic inferiority - an inferior ability to harness the power of the sign. Universal truth produces their cosmogony as a hopelessly narrow system of signs hedged in on all sides by the awe they feel for their own ignorance. And yet, this ignorance is not a lack but a quality of knowledge which is produced as lack in the moment of encounter.

Fanon realized that this structuration of knowledge in encounter is a problem fundamental to psychoanalysis. He observes that the unconscious of colonized

⁵⁹ This has been convincingly demonstrated by Tzvetan Todorov, The conquest of America. The question of the Other, transl. R. Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).

⁶⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsches Werke, vol. 8: Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887), 2. Abteilung: 'Schuld', 'schlechtes Gewissen' und Verwandtes, ch. 17 (Leipzig: Kröner, 1919).

⁶¹ Nietzsche, On the genealogy of morals, II, 17, (New York: Random House, 1969), cit. Anti-Oedipus, by Deleuze and Guattari, p. 191. Italics in original. Nietzsche states his attitude to colonization and conquest quite clearly. "Ich gebrauchte das Wort "Staat": es versteht sich von selbst, wer damit gemeint ist - irgend ein Rudel blonder Raubthiere, eine Eroberer- und Herren-Rasse, welche, kriegerisch organisiert und mit der Kraft, zu organisieren, unbedenklich ihre furchtbaren Taten auf eine der Zahl nach vielleicht ungeheuer überlegene, aber noch gestaltlose, noch schweifende Bevölkerung legt." (Zur Genealogie der Moral, p. 382. My emphasis.); or: "Charakteristik des Europäers: der Widerspruch zwischen Wort und That;... Wie der Europäer Colonien gegründet hat, beweist seine Raubthier-Natur." (Nietzsches Werke, vol. 8: "Zu 'Völker und Vaterländer' (Aus dem Nachlaß, 1886)," p. 487.)

individuals in Madagascar, which Mannoni analyses in search of an inferiority complex,⁶² is produced as inferior in the encounter with the new.

The landing of the white man on Madagascar inflicted injury without measure. The consequences of that irruption of Europeans onto Madagascar were not psychological alone...⁶³

Mannoni's retrospective projection of a real semiocratic inferiority onto an unconscious desire for the encounter with a "master race" is quite correctly displaced by Fanon onto the level of the socius.

1. My patient is suffering from an inferiority complex. His psychic structure is in danger of disintegration. What has to be done is to save him from this and, little by little, to rid him of this unconscious desire.
2. If he is overwhelmed to such a degree by the wish to be white, it is because he lives in a society that makes his inferiority complex possible...⁶⁴

Nevertheless, it is clear in the above quote that Fanon himself somehow takes it as given that the psychoanalyst is capable of naming desire in retrospect, and from a position within the sign system of the colonizer. It is misleading to attempt to understand either the psychoanalytic situation or the moment of encounter in colonization by posing the question of an actual superior knowledge of the analyst, or an actual military, scientific or "cultural" superiority of the conqueror. Although Todorov is not explicit in this regard, he indicates that the questions of difference and superiority must be separated if we are to do justice to the problem of encounter.⁶⁵ Obviously, from the point of view of universal truth the conquerors are superior, militarily, culturally and in every other sense - including morally. How could it be otherwise, since, in retrospect, universal truth is theirs, and does not belong to the conquered? The problem is not superiority, but universal truth.⁶⁶

⁶² See O Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban.

⁶³ Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 97.

⁶⁴ Fanon, Black skin, white masks, p. 100.

⁶⁵ "As we have already seen with Columbus, the postulate of difference readily involves the feeling of superiority, the postulate of equality that of indifference, and it is always hard to resist this double movement, especially since the final result of this encounter seems to indicate the victor explicitly enough: are not the Spaniards superior, and not merely different?" Todorov, The conquest of America, p. 63.

⁶⁶ This is also the reason why it would be misleading to explain the lack of Mexican resistance to Cortes by the fact that Cortes' colonization was just another chapter in a long line of colonizations, and wasn't necessarily worse than those which preceded it. Because we are writing in the wake and in the legacy of the Spaniard conquest, no prior "colonization," no matter how blatant a domination, can be regarded in retrospect as colonization. This point must be stated quite clearly. It is not that we are somehow morally no worse than what came before us, it is that we have transformed what came before

Cortés and his army were not the gods for which Moctezuma's nation mistook them - they were gods in the sense that Nietzsche's conquerors were gods appearing "like fate, like lightning."⁶⁷

Conquest is not only, not necessarily genocide, it is also the marking of bodies with the desire of the despot. When the despot gazes upon his signs, he extracts meaning by a surveillance which, in an act of terror, writes the law on the body.⁶⁸ The conquerors arrive not only gazing the despot's gaze, but writing his signs on the bodies of the natives. For this reason, the massacre of the innocents is as certain a consequence of the arrival of the despot as is the very gaze he casts over the land. The fact that the horrifying details of these massacres remain sickening even to the modern mind with its knowledge of Hiroshima and Vietnam, is because of the detached systematicity and moral conviction with which they were perpetrated. It is the same gesture as that which designed the gas chambers at Auschwitz. It is essential that we recognize this gesture - it is that of writing - the subject removed from the object by the mediation of a meaning which is created in the moment of its execution. This writing founds the knowledge of the despot - a paranoid knowledge which Todorov aptly terms "the understanding-that-kills."⁶⁹

Taken from the native's point of view, the first encounter with the white man must remain an unnamed mystery.⁷⁰ And in those rare cases where we do have records written by one of the savages, it is only possible because it is recorded in the despot's writing. Everything is already over, it is too late. The horror with which the

us entirely into a part of what we are. For that reason, we cannot interrogate our precedent on a universal level, - we are universality. After the Spaniards, the only colonization which can possibly follow will have to come from the stars!

67 Todorov cites the following entry in Columbus' journal, which I take as support of the present argument. "One of the Indians taken by the Admiral spoke with their king, telling him how the Christians *came from the sky* and that they were seeking gold." Cristobal ColAn (Columbus), Journals and other documents (New York: Heritage Press, 1963), 16/12/1492. Cit Todorov, The conquest of America, p. 42. My emphasis.

68 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 211. Hence the practice of torture within the despotic machine is "not an economy of example... (that the representation of the penalty should be greater than the interest of the crime), but a policy of terror: to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign." Foucault, Discipline and punish, p. 49.

69 Todorov, The conquest of America, p. 128.

70 "Can we guess, reading Columbus's notes, how the Indians, for their part, perceive the Spaniards? Hardly." Todorov, The conquest of America, p. 41.

invading army is witnessed has become domesticated following exactly that pattern outlined by Freud in his discussion of the way the primal scene is repressed in language. Here too, horror must be spoken in the language of him who has conquered.

Let us return, however, to the case at hand in the present study, and pose the question of encounter. Here the encounter was an indefinite event, quite different from Columbus' arrival in America.

The discovery of America, or of the Americans, is certainly the most astonishing encounter of our history. We do not have the same sense of radical difference in the 'discovery' of other continents and of other peoples; Europeans have never been altogether ignorant of Africa, India, or China; some memory of these places was always there already - from the beginning.⁷¹

Perhaps the original encounter in Africa was the arrival of the Phoenecians, perhaps the Arab traders. In some parts it would have been the Portuguese. But it is only from our point of view that this was not a sudden, absolute event. Africa was always there on the horizon of our memory and imagination. Yet the transformation of Africa into a colonized continent can only be conceived as a series of encounters - encounters which may have been vaguely familiar in advance to us, a kind of conqueror's a priori, but which, in every case, was a sudden arrival of Nietzsche's master race. This is because, with each conquest or colonization, there is a point when suddenly the old system of meaning is nothing but a narrow slice of the new universe which the conquerors have brought with them. Like the encounter of the West with the Orient, the creation of European knowledge of Africa is always either a return to the already known, or an integration into universal knowledge.⁷² This is the essence of encounter. After all, as Todorov observes, it was not in the first instance Cortés' might which allowed the extermination of Moctezuma's people, but the system of signs he brought with him.⁷³

The conquest we are studying is more subtle, more variegated than that of Cortés. One important reason for this is the fact that, in 19th century colonization,

71 Todorov, The conquest of America, p. 4.

72 See Said, Orientalism, p. 58.

73 Todorov, The conquest of America, p. 61-62.

the entire concept of conquest has been elided and replaced by another concept. The strangers arriving on African soil are no longer simply moving from one point to another within the Christian cosmos inhabited by Columbus; they are subjects of European knowledge in search of an object. What this means is that the former saw his very presence on foreign soil as proof that the new world was already a part of the Christian Empire of Spain. Yet even he, if we peruse his journals, was asking the question: how can I use what is here? And if we consider the explorers arriving in Africa from the 17th century onward, we find them asking not only this, but also, does it work in terms of what I am looking for? Let me be more explicit. Columbus' actions, if not his words, tell us quite clearly that the natives he encountered were always already destined to become Christian, just as the new land was always already destined to become the property of the King. The land and the inhabitants of Africa, however, are destined to become an object of study, of science, to fit into a pre-established grid of knowledge and take their place within this tabular space. This point is made by Johannes Fabian when he refers to the medieval infusion of the world with a certain quality of Christian time:

In the medieval paradigm, the Time of Salvation was conceived as inclusive or incorporative: The Others, pagans and infidels (rather than savages and primitives) were viewed as candidates for salvation. Even the conquista, certainly a form of spatial expansion, needed to be propped up by an ideology of conversion... The pagan was always *already* marked for salvation, the savage is *not yet* ready for civilization.⁷⁴

In the expansion into Africa something different is happening. The expansion into a relatively unknown space is paralleled by the prior creation of an empty space in the tabular scheme of universal knowledge, a space which will be filled in the observing activity of the traveller.⁷⁵ The traveller is relatively 'low-profile' and thus infinitely mobile in comparison to the conquering army. He comes in search of knowledge, and finds what he already knew.⁷⁶ As Fabian indicates, conquest in the 19th century is no longer military, but takes place in the name of natural science.

⁷⁴ Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 26.

⁷⁵ See Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 8.

⁷⁶ Ridley, notes this when he discusses the approach to travel embodied in the French exotic novel. "It showed travel to be both an assent to the unfamiliar, involving a loss of identity ('*se depayser*') and a recognition of the strange as the familiar..." *Images of imperial rule*, p. 15.

Ridley has shown how this function of natural history in divorcing science from military might allowed military occupation of the new territories to re-enter through the back door. By way of example, he cites the emergence of a number of geographical magazines in 19th century Germany. These appeared first of all as a rejection of anything which could be associated with conquest by might. The journal Das Ausland (founded in 1828) stated in its first volume:

‘it was reserved for our age to see the unfading and eternally victorious power of the spirit. Civilization forms the inner bonds of nations and conditions their interrelations, independent of the chances of military power...’⁷⁷

Alone the association of civilization and of the spirit with military power and victory should make us highly suspicious of the euphoric call for inner bonds of the nations. Ridley then goes on to show how both this attitude and the more open attitude of prejudice and European superiority which supplanted it equally served the colonial project.⁷⁸ There is a direct development from the travellogues of the enlightenment to the establishment of a discourse of free association between nations in the name of science, to that cultural relativism which was to integrate itself so well into the political project of colonization.

3 CROSSING BORDERS: THE MYTHICAL MASTERY OF SPACE

Deleuze and Guattari have claimed that the capitalist machine works only by breaking down, and this applies equally to capitalist representation - as with all its other spaces, it defines the representational spaces in which it works only by violating them. However, this de-territorialization of representation would ultimately have to lead to an absolute breakdown in communication - to chaos. Thus capitalist representation requires a mythology capable of re-defining a violated

⁷⁷ Das Ausland 1(1) (1828), p. 2, cit. Ridley, Images of imperial rule, p. 53.

⁷⁸ "Even before Germany possessed colonies the ideology had been established which broke up the family of man into separate and primevally warring factions and provided an explanation (and thus a justification) for the destruction of one race by another." Ridley, Images of imperial rule, p. 54.

space and reintegrating it into an image of (at least relative) totality. It must mythologize this very process of breakdown, fragmentation, violation and reestablishment of spatial order. The form which capitalist representation first developed for the process of mythologizing its own spatial breakdown was the novel. Epic form in general, and the novel in particular, traditionally concerns itself with the story of the crossing and re-establishment of borders - as a myth of de- and re-territorialization. Not only does it define between its covers specific spaces of representation and privileged passages between these spaces; it also produces, in the act of reading, borders and passages between various qualities of space - most notably between subjective space as the encapsulated self-sufficient universe of the imagination, and the space of the socius as that support structure within which the individual can withdraw into his four walls and open a book in solitude. As Georg Lukacs shows, the essential function of epic form is its ability to mediate between the spheres of public and private experience, as opposed to the unmediated connection which dramatic form establishes. I read Lukacs discussion of the problem of the public and the private as evidence that the book, as a materiality, can function as a nodal point, defining a border between these two spatial qualities and specifying conditions of passage.⁷⁹

I have already shown how capitalist representation depends upon this passage from the space of the socius to the Oedipal space of privatized subjectivity. I have also indicated that both of these spaces are themselves defined (as qualities of space) by privileged passages between more or less determinate spaces. Where the one system of passages is interrupted, the other is able to be activated. When the book is closed and certain mythical passages across borders are blocked, the passage between the space of subjective imagination and the socius is re-activated and vice

⁷⁹ See Georg Lukacs, *Werke*, vol. 6: *Probleme des Realismus III. Der historische Roman*, ch.2, iii: Das Problem der Öffentlichkeit (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1965), pp. 154-166. Similarly, George Steiner states: "The practise of reading a book to oneself, in silence, is a specific, late historical development. It implies a number of economic and social preconditions... What is implicit is the style of life of the bourgeoisie in an industrial, largely urban, complex of values and privileges." George Steiner, "A note on literature and post-history," in *Festschrift zum achzigsten Geburtstag von Georg Lukacs*, ed. by Frank Benseler (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1965), p. 503.

versa. As such the novel seems capable of playing a role in the alignment of these two spaces. In the following, I will be claiming that this role is itself largely a mythical one, and that it consists in the de- and re-territorialization of those borders within which capitalist representation is possible.

The privileged status of the novel as a mythologizing form of spatial representation is apparent in colonial literature. Within the colonial repertoire, it is always the novel which outweighs other forms in sheer bulk and popularity. Nonetheless - and I believe this to support, rather than contradict the claim I am making - in the colonial discourse of German South West Africa the form of the novel proves itself fluid enough that it can expand its thematic matter to include semi-fictional and semi-biographical material. I would argue that this is because the mythological structuration of space so vital to the colonial enterprise must be extended more definitely in colonial discourse to the spatial organizations normally reserved for scientific and historical knowledge, simply because the connection between the diverse spaces of these discourses must always be more precarious than 'at home'. As a result, the conflicts between various spaces, as well as between various qualities of spatial organization, experience a mythical resolution, not only in the form of the colonial novel, but also in mythical epic forms within discourse in general.

Although the novel occupies a privileged position by virtue of its form, it defines a mythologizing function which is easily transferred to other discursive forms. This it does, once again, by the specification of nodal points, of positions outside of time and space, by means of which borders may be crossed. A myth of unrestricted mobility is unrolled, in order to define the position of a border and the conditions under which it might be crossed. As a result, the border which is violated by this 'mobile nodal point' - the infinitely mobile hero - is re-drawn.⁸⁰ By way of clarification, let us begin with a few comments related specifically to the novel. In her analysis of Martin Jaeckel's Der brennende Busch,⁸¹ Kistner discusses this

⁸⁰ This was also the work of the travelogue, and I shall be investigating its function in chapter 3.

⁸¹ Martin Jaeckel, Der brennende Busch [The burning bush] (Wernigerode: Gottlob Koetzle, 1934).

mythologizing function as a de- and re-territorializing function. She describes the constitution and definition of territories as being embodied in "traditional" novels in the person of the hero:

Erst die Grenze konstituiert einen Raum. In einem Text wird aber eine Grenze erst dadurch sichtbar, daß sie überschritten wird. Dieser Prozeß wird in traditionellen Romanen durch Rolle und Funktion des Helden durchgeführt.⁸²

She then goes on to describe the hero as "ein beweglicher Teil des Textes," who is determined to achieve what she calls a "transzendente Unendlichkeit" in the continual production of new borders through crossing the old.⁸³ Kistner describes this as a reterritorialization which necessarily follows the deterritorializing act of crossing the border, and has as its consequence that "neue Territorialitäten geschaffen oder alte Territorialitäten mit neuen Funktionen wiederbelebt [werden],"⁸⁴ - or, in my opinion, both of these at once. Kistner is careful to define the spatiality of this de- and reterritorialization in the widest sense. When speaking of the displacement of previously valid borders she thus refers to such borders as "Familie, kleinbürgerliche Enge, Karrierestreben, 'Mammon', 'Heidentum'. "⁸⁵

However, Kistner also notes that the strategy of the text she takes as object of her study consists in a unifying gesture.

Bemerkenswert ist..., daß der vorliegende Text die Kollision von Räumen... vereinheitlicht und an das normative Helden-Sujet koppelt, indem der Text die Kollision mehrerer Räume in die Vorherrschaft des einen Raumes verwandelt. Der Held wird als Grenzüberschreiter dieses einen Raumes konzipiert.⁸⁶

I consider this unification necessary in the mythologizing function of spatial representation. As Cassirer notes, this encompassing of conflicting spaces in order to produce a coherent unity is the mythical mode of introducing order into chaos. Myth dramatizes the non-unity of spaces and the resulting conflicts in order to define a super-ordinate unity within which passages between spaces are possible.⁸⁷

82 Kistner, *Die kolonisierende Rede*, p. 17.

83 Kistner, *Die kolonisierende Rede*, p. 18.

84 Kistner, *Die kolonisierende Rede*, p. 19.

85 Kistner, *Die kolonisierende Rede*, p. 19.

86 Kistner, *Die kolonisierende Rede*, p. 19.

87 "Denn auch der Mythos besitzt seine eigene Weise, das Chaos zu durchdringen, zu beleben und zu lichten. Er bleibt nicht bei einem Gewirr vereinzelter dämonischer Gewalten stehen, die der

In order to fulfil this mythical function, it is essential in a realistic text that the subjective mobility of the hero be countered by narrative strategies which are capable of resisting the self-destruction inherent in such mobility. These strategies unify diverse spaces and are the same as those which fix the moving eye as *subjectum* in the Aristotelean sense.⁸⁸ It is, above all, the writer of the travelogue who is endangered by and must attempt to come to terms with the undermining of subjectivity in movement. However, the hero of a novel, as a mobile segment of the text, is endangered in a similar manner.

This is, however, not only of interest as concerns subjective space, but it also affects social space. The borders which the hero establishes and crosses do not define subjectivity simply by mapping themselves onto an empty space. As we implied earlier in this connection, it would probably be more accurate to say that subjectivity can be produced as a spatial quality only by establishing passages to another quality of space - the space of the socius. Where the subject crosses his own borders, he counters the threat to subjectivity by re-drawing them and mapping them onto social space.⁸⁹ This is a textual activity, but it is textual in the widest sense, for it also corresponds to an actual mastery of space upon which spatial subdivision is based. It serves to define possible interconnections and organizations of social spaces, and possible modes of subjective spatiality within the socius. The de-limiting movements of the mythical subject across borders are the same as those of the subject in physical space - not by way of analogy, but because as soon as he attempts to move across the same borders in physical space he becomes the same subject, but with one essential difference. He experiences on his own body the price which must be paid in crossing, which myth elides.

Augenblick entstehen läßt und die der Augenblick wieder verschlingt. Er läßt vielmehr diese Kräfte im Wettstreit und Widerstreit einander gegenüber treten - und er läßt zuletzt aus eben diesem Widerstreit selbst das Bild einer Einheit erstehen, die alles Sein und Geschehen umfängt und Menschen und Götter in gleicher Weise beherrscht und bindet." Cassirer, Mythischer, ästhetischer, theoretischer Raum, p. 25.

88 See part 1, ch. 1, note 14.

89 "Aber mit der Entgrenzung des Helden in das Gebiet der politisch Heteronomen geht deren Eingrenzung einher." Kistner, Die kolonisierende Rede, p. 107.

In the following discussion and analyses, I will be referring to this de- and re-territorializing activity of the heroic subject as a mythological mastery of space. This mastery of space consists of defining passages which connect individual spaces to others, and which define at the same time passages from the space of the subject to that of the socius. The function of such a mastery of space is well demonstrated in the hypothesis put forward by Michel Serres in his reading of the Oedipus myth.

Let us take any discursive chain where space, a space, a singularity of space would appear at a moment, at a link in the series. Then let there be the following decision or choice: either the singularity, for example, is only a discreet unit among others, an -nth term, and we are led down the combinative path, or it is in some way the variable of which the set of the other links constitutes the set of the possible functions.⁹⁰

Although Serres is reluctant to claim generality for this hypothesis, I read his exposition to indicate that it defines not only this particular myth, or myth as a discourse, but also a mythical function within discourse. As such, Serres' discussion provides us conveniently with a possible reading of the way space is constructed through the establishment of passages, not only between discreet spaces, but between different qualities of space. This is indeed what Serres indicates in his discussion of the Oedipus myth. He begins his discussion with "a local singularity of space," which is developed as "a global law that is invariably written as the connection of what is separated."⁹¹ The crossroads at which Oedipus kills Laius functions for Serres as "the sought-for singularity"⁹² - the discreet space which, as a variable, defines other spaces as a function of itself. It operates as what I have called a nodal point. Serres emphasises that this singularity has the power to establish "separations between spaces and their difficult junction."⁹³ Serres is careful to show that this separation and junction takes place in a number of different qualities of space. First of all, the road itself defines a passage between separate physical spaces.

Crossroads: cross, passage of a road across a ribbon that divides space, passing over a crack. Bridge: connection through the disconnected.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Serres, *Language and space*, p. 46.

⁹¹ Serres, *Language and space*, p. 48.

⁹² Serres, *Language and space*, p. 46.

⁹³ Serres, *Language and space*, p. 47.

⁹⁴ Serres, *Language and space*, p. 46.

But Oedipus' journey also defines a passage between separate spaces which are given in terms of the law and the word.

The fact that the murder of the father takes place at this cross, this interrupted, joined edge, this limit or fault, is a catastrophe. Thus the circumstance of the murder and the law is traced upon the ground. To cross the broken threshold of the word. The essential thing is indeed the bifurcation. As soon as the father is involved, once again we come back to the law, a bifurcation traced on the family tree: father, mother son, here again on the graph is inscribed the triviality of the narrative. To the left the one, to the right the other, and incest, we have already seen, is still another connection upon the disconnected.⁹⁵

The particular space under examination here thus serves as a signifying suture in subjective space, according to Lacan's model. This should serve to clarify, perhaps, why psychoanalysis finds this particular myth so fascinating. It serves not only as an allegory for the social construction of subjectivity; it repeats that spatial constellation which the subject must appropriate in order to acquire social Being. But, if we take Serres' claim seriously, that the myth of Oedipus is "not at all the discourse (*discours*) of an itinerary (*parcours*), but, radically, the itinerary (*parcours*) of a discourse (*discours*),"⁹⁶ then we must realize that it is not Lacan who presents us with a reading of the Oedipus myth; the Oedipus myth presents us with a reading of Lacan. What I mean by this is that the discourse whose itinerary Oedipus traces is the same as that which must be re-traced by Freud and Lacan. And yet, there is a vital difference between these discourses - the itinerary and its retracing. This difference is given by the manner in which the discourse of psychoanalysis is able to integrate Oedipus' itinerary into a more comprehensive system of knowledge - a knowledge which must repress Oedipus if it is to speak. This is the ambivalent status of psychoanalytic knowledge against which Lacan is constantly (and so brilliantly) struggling, and it is what will eventually cause Deleuze and Guattari to reject its claims to universality as a complicity with capitalist representation. Serres indicates that this repression of the mythical itinerary in the name of a rational unification of space occurs with the appearance of scientific discourse, and, more specifically, with the growth of geometry.

⁹⁵ Serres, *Language and space*, pp. 46-7.

⁹⁶ Serres, *Language and space*, p. 48.

Reason, as the saying goes, has triumphed over myth. No, it is Euclidean space that has *repressed* a barbarous topology, it is transport and displacement without obstacles that have suddenly taken the place of the journey, the ancient journey from islands to catastrophes, from passage to fault, from bridge to well, from relay to labyrinth. Myth is effaced in its original function, and the new space is universal, as is reason or the *ratio* that it sustains, only because within it there are no more encounters.⁹⁷

It is in this repression of myth that we find the importance of a passage between theoretical and mythical space within the framework of capitalist representation.

Myth retains a knowledge of the chaos across which it charts its passage.

Oedipus' itinerary crosses spatial accidents, bifurcations, catastrophes and loops. Oedipus' discourse (*discours*) is identical to his itinerary (*parcours*). It poses *chi*'s on cracks, crossroads between spatial varieties that do not have common boundaries. This in turn presupposes that before it, in other words, before discourse, there existed a multiplicity of unrelated spaces.⁹⁸

Theoretical space, however, must constitute itself as universally homogeneous, if it is to interrogate itself. What theoretical space represses in its repression of myth is the knowledge of chaos. This repression is effected in the realm of the law - it is the work of the despotic machine. "The earth is measured (geo-metry) by means of just measure (the King). The multiplicity, the dangerous flock of chaotic morphologies, is subdued."⁹⁹

Now, we have seen that the capitalist machine tends less and less to an intervention which subdues multiplicities by rule of law. Instead it tends to release these multiplicities and harness their productivity while at the same time defining conjunctions between disparate flows. When the despotic machine subdues myth, it subdues the chaotic multiplicity which myth has mastered. The capitalist machine allows multiplicity to re-appear, and must therefore of necessity have a different relationship to myth. Chaos can reappear only in the form of the repressed knowledge that once the world was chaotic. This is how I interpret Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of the return of the repressed. The capitalist machine can release the productive capacity of multiplicities only by once again charting an

97 Serres, *Language and space*, p. 52.

98 Serres, *Language and space*, p. 48.

99 Serres, *Language and space*, pp. 52-3.

itinerary of a discourse which would allow a passage and interconnection of chaotic multiplicities.

This process is repeated in the theoretical discussion of space. The more theory interrogates the unified space it has created, the more it tends to invalidate its own laws - the more it tends to break this unified space down into a multiplicity of separate spaces. And these spaces are characterized as separate by the fact that the theoretical principles which prove adequate for any one of them become increasingly inadequate for the others. This is not necessarily experienced as a problem for a scientific worldview which has learned to modify its concept of what a law can and should be. But it is a problem for any of those theories, discourses and practices which depend upon an at least relative homogeneity of space, in order to establish continuity between discontinuous spaces. It is, in other words, a problem for communication. Thus, when theoretical space begins to encounter its own multiplicity, it also encounters myth.

Hence the two great vicissitudes of the nineteenth century. Beneath the apparent unity of Euclidean space, mathematics, turning back toward its origins, rediscovers the teeming multiplicity of diverse and original spaces - and topology emerges as a science. We have not finished nor shall we ever again finish dealing with spaces. At the same moment, in an aged Europe asleep beneath the mantle of reason and measure, mythology reappears as an authentic discourse.¹⁰⁰

To this we might add - at the same moment that Europe perfects its techniques for expanding and transposing its borders without limit, fragmenting universal space into a multiplicity of geo-political spaces, it discovers colonial discourse as a mythical journey which is able to fix these borders in the act of crossing them. Colonial discourse is mythical to the extent that it charts the itinerary of that discourse out of which colonial space is constructed.

I attempted to show in part I that this construction of a mythical totality from a fragmented spatiality is essential to the construction of subjectivity. The subject must construct its space as that space in which it can function as a social machine. Certain spacial organizations, and certain passages between spaces must be

100 Serres, Language and space, p. 53.

privileged. Serres describes the social construction of the space of subjectivity as follows:

My body (I cannot help it) is not plunged into a single, specified space. It works in Euclidean space, but it only works there. It sees in a projective space; it touches, caresses, and feels in a topological space; it suffers in another; hears and communicates in a third; and so forth, as far as one wishes to go... My body, therefore, is not plunged into a single space, but into the difficult intersection of this numerous family, into the set of connections and junctions to be established between these varieties.¹⁰¹

And just to ensure that we do not misunderstand this description as a theory of the construction of a unified and independent space of subjectivity, he goes on to elaborate "subjective space" as a variable which has functions (in both the physiological and the mathematical senses of the word) in social space.

My body lives in as many spaces as the society, the group, or the collectivity have formed: the Euclidean house, the street and its network, the open and closed garden, the church or the enclosed spaces of the sacred, the school and its spatial varieties containing fixed points, and the complex ensemble of flow-charts, those of language, of the factory, of the family, of the political party, and so forth. Consequently, my body is not plunged into one space but into the intersection or the junctions of this multiplicity. Again, whoever fails or refuses to pass like everyone else through the crossroads of these multiple connections - whoever remains in one of these spaces, or, on the contrary, refuses all of them - is treated as ill adapted or delinquent or disoriented.¹⁰²

For this reason, a theory of myth must also always be a theory of political space. In order to demonstrate this, I wish to discuss a few examples from non-fictional colonial discourse which specifically concern the rituals required if a border is to be crossed. These examples are intended to show that, even in the most commonplace and 'innocent' cases, an organization of space involves borders, rituals of crossing, and determined functions of subjectivity. It also involves a level of speaking which is mythical in that it postulates an unrestricted crossing of these borders. Thus, at the same time that colonization is exercising a stringent regimentation of space, it develops a mythological mastery of space. I will thus conclude this chapter with a brief example to illustrate an extreme case of a myth of mobility in colonial literature.

101 Serres, *Language and space*, p. 44.

102 Serres, *Language and space*, pp. 44-45.

A road might be thought of as the most basic form of mobility in colonization - the unit of expansion along which the colonial machine advances across the landscape. This is true to a certain extent, provided we realize that it also determines the conditions under which this advance may be effected. If, for example, we glance at the Decree of 18 June 1912 Concerning Public Roads in the Protectorate,¹⁰³ we find that the very presence of a road divides the land clearly into public and private property.¹⁰⁴ This division implies a clear demarkation of boundaries,¹⁰⁵ as well as a ritual of crossing:

§ 16

If a public road crosses a fenced farm or part thereof, the gates whereby the farm was entered and exited are to be closed securely by the team leader upon leaving.

§ 17

It is forbidden to trespass onto gardens and fields and fenced areas of a farm away from the public road...

Furthermore, the ritual of crossing is bound to certain monetary rights and obligations.

§ 11

Resting by public roads not provided with common pastures for periods longer than 24 hours is not permitted.

If a traveller wishes to remain for a longer period, or makes repeated stops within 10 km on a farm, he is to pay to the owner of the property on demand:

- a) for watering: great cattle, 20 pfennig per head per day,
- b) for watering: small cattle, 5 pfennig per head per day,
- c) for pasture: great cattle, 10 pfennig per head per day,
- d) for pasture: small cattle, 2 pfennig per head per day.

This division is not simply a striation of physical space; it concerns geographic space, but it also designates subjective positions - as positions from which a border may be looked upon, as positions possessing rights and obligations, and as positions to which, given certain conditions, a surplus might accrue. The road, as a line of

¹⁰³ "Verordnung des Kaiserlichen Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika betreffend die öffentlichen Wege im Schutzgebiet (Wegeordnung)," in Akten des Zentralbüros des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements (ZBU) [Files of the Central Office of the Imperial Government], Windhoek Archives, T.III.a.2, Bd 1, p. 11ff.

¹⁰⁴ "If no pastures have been designated along public roads according to § 6, a strip extending 500 m. in breadth on both sides of the road shall be deemed public pasture," Wegeordnung (1912), § 8.

¹⁰⁵ "If public pastures are not fenced, their borders shall be indicated with clearly visible markers." Wegeordnung (1912), § 6.

passage, integrates geographical and subjective space into a mechanism of social production at the same moment that it defines them.

The ever increasing striation of space in colonization gives rise to strategies of resistance - strategies which call the border's bluff simply by crossing the physical space in which the border is absent. Those officials among the colonizers who have defined their subjective rights and obligations in terms of a ritual of crossing cannot automatically achieve the same mobility. This problem is frequently addressed by Ludwig von Estorff in his memoirs of the various wars against the black nations of the colonial territory:

...the major part [of the enemy] had already retreated to the east across the English border... The rest scattered along the southern shore of the Orange, likewise in the safety of English territory. The English authorities watched with approval, and so it did not take long before newly equipped bands had crossed the long border here and there to undertake new raids.¹⁰⁶

Later, von Estorff discovers that this imaginary line may also be crossed by his troops, provided he observe a certain ritual. Thus, in May 1906 he attacks Marinka south of the Orange river -

The skirmish with Marinka had taken place in English territory. I had disregarded my previous reservations in this regard, and the English officer accepted my subsequent apologies.¹⁰⁷

The ritual need be no more than an apology. When, in March 1908, Hauptmann von Erckert crosses the eastern border into English territory, the same thing occurs:

The battle of Seatsub, as it was called, took place about 100 km east of the German border in English territory. I apologized to the English High Commissioner for this *small oversight* and he was satisfied. This was Lord Selbourn.¹⁰⁸

The border is not drawn as a line which cannot be crossed, but as one which may be crossed only in a particular manner. The crossing of the border does not negate it, but underlines the difference between the two fields which it separates. This it does with more efficiency than a simple restriction of any crossing

106 Ludwig von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika 1894-1910 [Travels and battles in South West Africa, East Africa and South Africa 1894-1910], ed. Christoph-Friedrich Kutscher, Unveröffentlichte Dokumente zur Kolonialgeschichte Afrikas, gen. ed. John Meinert (Windhoek: Meinert, 1979), p. 126.

107 von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe, p. 127.

108 von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe, p. 139.

whatsoever. For example, in a letter of 2 Oct 1912, representative Hintrager for the Imperial Governor informs the Regional and District Office that the English/German border may be crossed by troops of both sides.¹⁰⁹ The conditions for this crossing are stated clearly - a veterinary certificate for hooved animals accompanying the crossing, crossing only in emergencies, and no use of firearms without express permission.

The border also has extended effects upon the spaces it divides. The field which it establishes determines a number of subjective functions not directly concerned with the crossing of borders, but which are nevertheless affected by such crossing. These positions are also defined as geo-political, not via an idealistic mechanism of symbolic identification, but via a similar set of rights and obligations as we saw arising from travel on a public road.¹¹⁰ This is evident in a short confidential report addressed to Governor Lindequist on 15 Feb 1906, describing an incident in which a Ltn Trainer crossed the border into the English territory of Walfish Bay to take some wood which residents there had collected and left on the beach. When the latter protested, the German soldiers rounded them up, pointed their guns at them (which Trainer had ordered be loaded with live ammunition), and proceeded to cross the border with the wood. What is interesting here is not the fact of the crossing itself, but the ensuing embarrassment for the acting District Administrator who wrote the letter, since he had only learnt of the incident directly from Trainer while a guest in the latter's house.

Since this is one of the cases where the duties of the official and citizen collide with the obligations a guest must have to his host, I wish to request most earnestly that no official use be made of my report unless this be rendered necessary by newspaper reports or enquiries.¹¹¹

We are faced here with a contradiction between the demands of international law and those of social form. Clearly, it is the crossing of the border which has initiated this contradiction, and the acting Administrator has displaced it into a

¹⁰⁹ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU A.I.d.1, p. 2-3.

¹¹⁰ This is how I understand the editors of Hérodote when, in an interview with Foucault, they speak of "the national internment of the citizen-soldier." Foucault, Questions of geography, p. 73.

¹¹¹ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU VIII.c, p. 6.

contradiction in subjective identity - is he first and foremost an official and citizen, or the guest of his host? He solves the contradiction by attempting to separate the two spheres. He takes great pains to emphasize that this report should remain confidential, and that, if at all possible, no action should be taken against Trainer. Furthermore, the solution he suggests to counter such problems as this is that military personnel be prohibited from crossing the border. The presence of the border gives rise to a contradiction in subjective identity, which then leads to a reinforcement of the border.

And yet, the fragmented geo-political spaces with their many borders must be totalized if knowledge is to survey the colony it has created. This takes place in a hierarchy of discourses and administrative functions; but it is also effected in a kind of colonial unconscious - the myth of unrestricted mobility. The form best suited to this myth is, as I indicated above, epic; its genre is the novel, and the most extreme exposition occurs in the sub-genre of the adventure story. This is well demonstrated in Herbert A Klein's Gold am Okoruso¹¹² In this Wild-West style adventure story we see a constant attempt to develop a mythology of a perfectly mobile hero. This hero, whom they call the "Omatako rider," spends the entire course of the narrative tracking others across the desert and being tracked, fleeing from his enemies, hiding and reappearing. What we must note, in order to do justice to Michel Serres' insights, is that the seemingly banal space of this narrative is in fact a political space, in which the work of colonization is mythologized. Note the description of the hero's dwelling place:

I would never had discovered this place if it had not been chosen as a hide by a leopard which I was stalking. It was my contest with him which won me the right to this secret gorge. His skin now graces the wall of the little hut that I built under the overhanging rock. If I had biltong and supplies I would not leave my hideout for weeks. It was a mystery to the natives that I did not use their water holes in the dry season, and suddenly appeared, fresh and well-fed in places where they thought any white man must perish. Finally, legend spread its bright mantle over the mysterious rider. My horse could fly. I could become invisible at will and call, and could see twice as far as normal

112 Herbert A Klein, Gold am Okoruso [Gold in the Okoruso] (Windhoek: Suidwes-Drukkery ca. 1910).

humans, while my bullets never missed their mark, even though I did not need to take aim...¹¹³

And so on. Here is the colonial dream of mobility at its most banal. While the colonial project is busy laying tracks and marking roads across the land, designating borders, issuing proclamations, restricting movements etc., it dreams a dream of unrestricted motion, a mythical smoothing of space. Motion follows the paths of desire, and is profoundly opposed to the state. The Omatako Rider rides rings around the soldiers he meets on the way, who, as the most mobile sector of the state, are nevertheless weighed down with "a number of pack-horses," and move at a slow pace.¹¹⁴ Now, we would be overlooking the subtlety of this seemingly so unsubtle myth if we were to read it on the level of a flight from civilization, or escapism. It is that, but it is more. The colonizing project tends to acquire land simply by moving across it. This is accomplished by way of a writing, which preserves the presence of the colonizer in a timeless (ahistorical) reality which is passed off as the destiny and heritage of the land. I have mentioned this already, and in a later chapter I intend to show in detail a few ways in which this is effected. However, the acquisition of land in the name of a writing requires the establishment of borders and ensuing subdivision. This in turn leads to an ever increasing segmentation and fragmentation of space on almost every level - the administrative, discursive, perceptual, but also on the epistemological level. And this fragmentation brings with it a ritual of crossing, which is constantly violating the borders it has created. The colony must, however, present itself as a unity, not only for the purposes of ideology, but also (and perhaps this is a more important consideration), for the purpose of communication - its very functioning as a colony. It is the myth of mobility which establishes an itinerary of colonial discourse, granting the individual a mythical ability to join all the various spaces and spatial qualities which colonization has fragmented. Even in 1910 (ca.) when this story was written, the type of mobility the hero enjoys was purely mythical. What then has been accomplished with the telling

¹¹³ Klein, *Gold am Okaruso*, p. 26

¹¹⁴ Klein, *Gold am Okaruso*, p. 6

of this myth? It is a restoration of the totality of experience which the capitalist fragmentation of space is constantly threatening and which appears as a specific attraction of colonial space in comparison to European space. The myth allows the subject to move at will across the space of the capitalist landscape without having to pay for his constant crossing of borders with any of those levies on monetary or subjective economy which the capitalist machine always claims as a social sacrifice.

CHAPTER 2: LOOKING

*Soweit der Blick reicht, ein unendlich
Dehnen
Der Flächen, die kein Stromesgürtel trennt,
Darüber hochgewölbtes Firmament,
Fern, kaum noch sichtbar, graue
Bergeslehnen -*

*Das ist Südwest...
Hier kann der Geist ins Unbegrenzte
schweifen...
Heinrich Meyer-Brunslar*

1 SPACE WITHOUT BORDERS: THE AFFECT ECONOMY OF SPACE.

1.1 *The productivity of boundless space*

In the previous chapters, I indicated that looking and writing are the two major modes in which colonization appropriates space by organizing it into a functional network of discreet spaces. In the following two chapters, I wish to demonstrate in more detail how this is effected. I will be arguing that the colonizer arrives in a new territory and surveys it with a gaze which is an initial appropriation of space. It defines spaces of objectivity and establishes relations between these spaces. It also determines the way in which these spaces may be rendered productive. This involves in all cases strategies for mapping universal principles onto specific objects apprehended in vision. The specificity of these objects must be negated in order that they may be integrated into a system of universal knowledge. Since the dialectic of vision is always indeterminate, it must be resolved in a manner capable of preserving fixed positions of subjectivity and objectivity - positions from which it is possible to speak, and spaces of application, in which this speech is valid. For this reason, the goal of looking is always writing. Furthermore, the colonizer is always looking with an informed gaze, a gaze of knowledge, and it is important to recognize that this gaze issues forth from a position which has already been written. The gaze of the colonizer will therefore have to be analyzed as an initial apprehension of the new in terms of the known, a glance situated between texts. This glance is by definition diverse and tends toward the amorphous, and I shall be forced to analyse it as it preserves itself in texts. I shall be concentrating on two general 'fields' of looking - the gaze which takes as its object the body of the native and the native's spaces; and the gaze which apprehends the productivity of the land or of trade.

Before investigating these fields of vision, however, it should serve to illuminate the problem of vision in colonization if we examine two novels which thematize the

attempt to see space without borders. This attempt is, analytically at least, a prerequisite to the colonizing vision, the informed vision which defines discrete spaces of knowledge. In order that borders be defined across the colonial territory, it is necessary that the space of the colony first be shown to be uniform and homogeneous - so universal in qualities that it approaches a state devoid of quality. This idea has been expressed by Homi Bhabha. Bhabha claims that "at the center of the originary myth of colonialist power... is the demand that *the space it occupies be unbounded*, its reality *coincident* with the emergence of an imperialist narrative and history, its discourse *nondialogic*, its enunciation *unitary*, unmarked by the trace of difference."¹ This necessity finds itself in conflict with the need to articulate the colony in terms of difference, which, as we have already seen, opens the spatiality of the sign into the other diverse spaces which the colony comprises. As long as colonization takes as its initiating gesture the gaze into borderless space, signification will always be undermined by the colonial project itself. The site where this tension must be resolved is the space of the subject, and its successful resolution is a prerequisite to social being.

This has two important repercussions in colonial discourse. Firstly, the longing of the individual for a mystical experience of boundless space - which I would interpret as the narcissistic longing of unification with the object - is a constant theme, even in 'non-fictional' discourse. Secondly, this longing is experienced as a primal urge and projected onto the landscape in the form of an essentially demonic quality of non-European space. The indeterminacy of this relationship between narcissistic desire and demonic magnetism must be overcome. This is done by developing a manner of gazing which I will call scientific. The desiring subject looks into boundless space with a gaze informed by a socially determined body of knowledge. This may take the form of scientific principles, or of moral imperatives. The result is in all cases the same - a polarization of knowledge into the self-

¹ Bhabha, *Signs taken as wonders*, p. 176.

reflexion of a coherent subject on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the aggressive projection of desire's chaotic indeterminacy onto the colonial object.

The conflict arising out of the initial apprehension of boundless space initiates a tension within the entire corpus of colonial discourse. Desire is invariably articulated as torn between dissolution in this boundless space and confinement within boundaries - boundaries which allow it to be represented as desire. And invariably, the definition of boundaries and the representation of desire is a productive process, out of which the space of representation appears as colonial space. Before examining in detail an example of this process, let us look briefly at a few typical examples of this desire for boundless space as it expresses itself in colonial discourse.

The boundless space of the African landscape opens itself initially to the European eye. I have tried to show above that the desire which is activated in this elicitation of the gaze seems well explained using Lacan's theory of the imaginary. The following short paragraph may stand as an illustration of this.

Africa! Whoever has once drunk from the enchanted cup, in which the draught of welcome is offered to the guest; whoever has once measured [*durchmessen*] her vast expanses, if only with his eye: he is fallen under her spell for all eternity.²

The seduction of Africa is aimed primarily at a kind of vision which can look into space without focussing on any features which might disturb its homogeneity. However, the specificity of this gaze is always mapping the diverse and multiple flows of desire onto a molar structure. The eye is not permitted to wander at random through boundless space. After all, how could such a vision without qualities be narrated? And more important, how could it be productive? Even the attempt to represent such vision in general terms in the above passage finds itself focussing vision in a determinate line. The phrase: "whoever has traversed its endless expanses only with his eye" pivots about the word *durchmessen* (to cross, to measure precisely), in which the seemingly indeterminate vision into featureless

² Mattenklodt, *Afrikanische Jagden*, p. 5.

space is shown to bear the qualities of the scientific tabulating gaze which must of necessity follow it. To look into empty space is already to measure it.

The reasons for this are complex, and are probably best understood in terms of the Lacanian thesis that it is impossible for a desiring subject to gaze into the world without postulating a position of subjectivity from which this gaze issues forth. And furthermore, this position must always be defined in relation to a social field, within which both subject and object may be situated. What this means for our purposes is that the subject is constantly defining his desire for boundless space in terms of a social field; he is positioning himself in relation to a European gaze, and he is casting this gaze into a space whose boundlessness must be understood in relation to the decidedly non-European qualities of the African landscape. This is evident in the following paragraph:

Wilhelm Hübner gazed into the distance. There was something about the glow of the stars which always enchanted him. He always felt how his heart was expanded and exalted. The stars spoke to him of home, of something great and sublime! And it hurt him to think that they could not see these images at home.³

It is this tension between the need to gaze with the eyes of the socius but to look onto the unknown which will eventually serve to re-align this random longing to the needs of social production. For this reason, it is not by chance that this type of euphoric praise of Africa's boundless spaces so often shifts subtly (or not so subtly) into a discourse on the future of this space as a space which is owned. This is plain to see in the following paragraph:

In this small kingdom of thorns, acacias, stones, grass clumps and fodder bushes a land owner has elbow room on all sides, an endless view into the distance and into the future [*Aus- und Weitblick*], onto coming times and generations, and a rich field for all to work.⁴

The narrative constructs a line of vision into empty space which is at the same time a vision into the future. This duality is borne by the words *Aus- und Weitblick*. And this gaze into the future sees empty space occupied by the descendents of the

³ Hans Walther, "Die Stettiner Sänger," [The Stettin singers] in *Orlog! Novellen von der Pad* [Orlog! Novellas from the road], by Hans Walther (Berlin: Concordia, 1910), p. 37.

⁴ Johannes Dose, *Ein alter Afrikaner* [An old African], (Wismar: Hinstorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1913), p. 448.

subject. Here we reach the crucial point, which is to be developed further below. The loss of subjectivity initiated by gazing into empty space must find a counter strategy which can confirm subjective being. For this reason, it is necessary that the freedom of boundless space be restricted to a potentiality which can never be actualized. Von Estorff cannot get over the idea that freedom is one of the spatial attributes of South West Africa. Comparing the colony to German East Africa, he states the advantages of the former as "...the good pastures, the good air and the great freedom which the land offers its few inhabitants."⁵ This freedom is a constantly recurring motif in the discourse of South West Africa, and is worthy of closer attention. From von Estorff's phrasing, it seems clear that this freedom is to be understood primarily in spatial terms: the 10 000 hectare farms, the wide unfenced spaces, the open plains with their expansive views; all of this seems to support the argument. But we must ask ourselves what the value of spatial freedom might be seen to be. Here we see that there is more than one level of spatial organisation at work, and that there are a number of serious restricting factors which would call the metaphorical value of this spatial freedom into question. This is accomplished in a manner designed to render boundless space productive.

This is achieved initially by limiting it against European knowledge. When, for example, Ludwig von Estorff gazes on an African sunset, he represents this experience as follows:

Like the northern lights, the setting sun casts a crown of rays across the opposite horizon. This performance is indescribably beautiful and sublime. It is as if to compensate the wanderer for the stark, monotonous, meager steppes and their raw, bare, jagged mountain chains. But nature is mighty in desolate places, and in them lies the breath of freedom.⁶

The first sentence addresses European experience, comparing von Estorff's vision to a more European sight. The next sentence places this vision once again outside of the bounds of the familiar and the representable. But the European reader has already been told the nature of the signifier which is inadequate for this experience, and he finds himself positioned firmly in the domain of metaphorical

⁵ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 142.

⁶ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 102.

speech. This metaphorical speech then reverts back to a simple description. Finally, the reader is told of the freedom which may be found here. And this all in the tense of the timeless present. The rhetorics of von Estorff's description tell us how the freedom of which he speaks is to be understood. It does not lie in the dissolution of self in boundless beauty, boundless emotion, boundless space. It lies in the ability to limit language against that which language cannot speak; to cross the border from denotation to the unrepresentable, and to return again; to gaze upon the specific features of a strange landscape and position them within the European system of universal representation. This freedom is an initial capture of space, effected by infusing it with European qualities. This universalizing gaze produces freedom in its ability to cross given boundaries. The mythical mastery of space creates freedom not only in the crossing of borders in physical space, but in its ability to tie this activity to a de-limitation of signification. The crossing of borders is also an excursion beyond the denotative and communicative realm of language, in order to reinforce the spaces which signification reserves for itself - the spaces within which it can function.

An interesting case in point is the novel by Lene Haase: Raggys Fahrt nach Südwest.⁷ Here we see an American heroine who bears with her the entire mythology of the Wild West: her father what we might call a mountain of a man, who let her daughter grow up wild in the young nation. As a sophisticated yet, at heart, still a wild young adult, she travels to South West Africa, only to find that this mythology must be modified in certain ways if it is to be mapped onto a new landscape. In the end she is tamed into a respectable marriage, and abandons the land to settle in Germany. What has been proven? That mapped onto a landscape seemingly unmarked by the myriad physical restraining factors of *fin de siècle* Europe is a series of privileged paths of communication, travel and vision, a network of nodal points and isolated fields. These are all European paths which write a European presence on the face of the land, and all of them have the final effect of restricting her movement physically while at the same time captivating her in every

⁷ Lene Haase, Raggys Fahrt nach Südwest [Raggy goes to South West], (Berlin: 1910; reprint ed. Berlin: Fleischel, 1919)

sense of the word. She is caught up in this network only because she has found herself in a position where she invests a certain subjective energy in it. We will find this hidden paradox concealed again and again in the colonial discourse of German South West Africa - the freedom of its wide open spaces has the power to captivate.

[Raggy] swung up onto the low wall and, leaning on a column, gazed into the still, endlessly sombre and melancholy land. It was as if the drought lay over everything like a dull weight. Everything was dry and cracked, and the air was full of dust.. No moist, refreshing breath of air, no drop of moisture. A majestic stillness lay over the expanse of bushland.

Raggy felt the greatness of this wild, raw land which knew no gentle scenery, no cheerful motif, and it held a strange attraction for her.⁸

For Raggy, this captivation takes the form of a sexual attraction. Time and again, we find her being pursued by men who do not appeal to her in the slightest, and always when this happens, she displaces any possible attraction she might have felt for her admirer in two directions: first onto the freedom of the land...

Raggy did not turn aside, but rode straight ahead, towards the black mountains. Silently the doctor followed her. He watched her with burning gaze, and his breath was heavy.

She payed him no attention. She held the reins loosely and stared into the white, shimmering distance.

She thought of noone, not even of Hans. There was no memory in her.

She had a feeling of an endless, benevolent Nirvana, of being freed from all earthly things.

She always had this feeling in the great, free wildernis.⁹

...and then onto the mythical memory of her father. What is crucial is that these two mythologies intersect in a field characterized by an apparently unlimited mobility. In order to demonstrate this, let us look at a long passage in which Raggy's father and the theme of her upbringing is first introduced.

Since her mother had always been sickly and died early, Raggy had been brought up almost solely by her father, who saw his own spiritual and physical image growing in this lovely wild being. It was no wonder that the proud, almost lonely man gave all his love to this child, whose character was so similar to his. He never let himself be separated from Raggy. On all his journeys, in the wildest lands, in luxury baths, big cities and to famous racecourses, he always took her along. She had the best teachers, and learned from her father, who showed her the whole world, and so she received an education far above standard. Although he was not an American, Mr Warden preferred to live in the United States because of its greater freedom, and so Raggy's nature and ideas gradually became more those of an American than a German. But in all other respects, the wild young girl shared the cavalier lifestyle of her father. Soon she was just as much at home in expensive

8 Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 243.

9 Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 199.

restaurants and hotels, on green lawns and in the elegant world of big cities as any cavalier. It was very seldom that Raggy came into contact with other women, who might have had a refining effect and brought out the feminine side of her character. And so she became somewhat rough, and her behaviour was quite cavalier. So too were here manners and speech, which, in the wide world, no one held against her. Perhaps that was her greatest charm. Sensible people shook their heads, and her German relations, Hamburg aristocrats, were shocked by her upbringing.¹⁰

We can recognize in this description a polarity between the limitless (and thus threatening) expanses of the wide world on the one hand and the confined (and thus sheltering) spaces of domesticated European towns on the other - a polarity characteristic of 19th century German realism. However, this polarity is more than a conflict between traditional values upset by expanding technological horizons and the possibilities which these developments provided for the bourgeois class in the 19th century. What is at stake here is the question of how to reconcile two opposing factors - on the one hand, a real physical mobility which is a prerequisite for capitalist production; on the other hand, the need for a relative immobility which is a prerequisite for subjective identity. When we examine the above passage, we see that the latter is provided by an identification with Raggy's father ("...this child, whose character was so similar to his."), but also with their common mobility itself. Raggy becomes identified with a cavalier, because of her ability to move about and to be at home in restaurants, cities, etc, but also in the wild. In this kind of discourse we find an interesting thing happening: subjective identity is no longer given in a discursive or perceptual relation to a preexistent objective world - the space of the objective world is established by the mode in which a moving eye chooses to represent its own stability.¹¹

Mobility is given on a number of levels. First there is a mobility through geographic space, the movement through "the whole world," a mobility facilitated by those technological means we find being accorded such a major role in the novel: ships and trains. Then there is a mobility from one quality of space to another, from

¹⁰ Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 23-24.

¹¹ As we might expect, this last attempt at a realist discourse will soon give way in German literature to the fractured identity of Expressionist perception, in which this struggle for identity of a moving eye will become thematic.

"the wildest lands" to "luxury baths, big cities and to famous racecourses." Then there is a moral mobility beyond the narrow horizons of bourgeois society. Finally there is a mobility through different qualities of subjective space, a mobility which transposes the freedom of physical movement onto the level of subjectivity. What is important here is that these qualities adhere to different qualities of physical space, so that in order to draw them together into an identity, it is necessary for Raggy to adopt a masquerade, the "attitude of a cavalier," in which she is constantly presenting a mask to the world. Behind this mask a multiplicity of identities proliferates - a multiplicity which threatens subjectivity as it does culture.

Raggy stood a bit beyond good and evil. This was perhaps a result of her unusual upbringing, in which nothing was forbidden. Limits and laws did not exist for her. The will of her father was her only law. Since this will no longer tamed her, she no longer knew, at least in principle, any limits whatsoever, neither social nor moral. In the midst of the most formal society in Germany she felt as free as any Indian on the prairie.¹²

Although in this and the above introductory passage, the narrator presents these qualities in order to glorify her heroine, it is with increasing difficulty that their positive flavour is retained as the novel progresses. Raggy treads a narrow path between a subjective economy which reconciles physical movement at the cost of its own feeling of freedom, and one in which the masquerade fails, and subjectivity is lost to the wiles of the death drive. The problem is one of desire - because of her relation to her father, Raggy does not possess a trace of that naivety on which seduction feeds, and as a result she continually displaces the desire of men onto her own desire for mobility, in all senses of the word mentioned above. Typical of the way in which her desire is related to sensuality and to the sexual advances of men is the following passage:

Ahrens leaned against the cabin wall opposite and observed her with a strange shimmer in his eyes. Because of the breeze, Raggy had carelessly thrown a white veil embroidered in silver over her dark hair. Her arms were folded under her head, and she was listening with dreamy eyes to the sounds of La Paloma.

The electric light did not quite reach into this corner, and only a yellow glow fell on the folds of her dress.

White rays of moonlight flooded her motionless face and lit up the little silver sequins of her veil.

¹² Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 26.

Dahlmann leaned forward in his chair. "How beautiful the Princess Salome looks tonight," he murmured softly.
 Raggy turned her head indifferently, and the dreamy look had disappeared from her eyes. "Don't talk nonsense, Dahlmann! - Why don't you order a few beers instead."¹³

Desire is articulated in the gestures of narcissism (the veil, the dreamy eyes, the motionless face). But what is this desire? As we have seen, narcissistic desire cannot know itself, nor can it articulate itself without becoming something else. Surrounded by men, Raggy always becomes the object of their desire; yet as soon as they attempt to approach her, she either projects a narcissitic subjectivity onto the landscape (as we saw happening above), in which case she is flirting with death, - or else the narcissistic countenance changes, she adopts the mask of the cavalier and we see that her desire was something else. But what? We do not know. And so this is what we begin looking for in the novel. Those who do not guess the answer on page 23 are told soon enough.

"That's just it!" Raggy sighed. Since no one impresses me, I can't marry anyone. I'd feel sorry for the poor guy, I'm sure I'd mistreat him horribly. - The only man who ever impressed me was my father."¹⁴

What is interesting is that Raggy expresses this desire for a dead father as a desire for unlimited motion.

But that was just the problem! She wouldn't be able to stand a life of peaceful bliss.
 She would be driven out again into the wide world, to adventures and dangers, onto the wide ocean, to far, hot countries.¹⁵

This desire is in turn very easily translatable into a romantic longing for unbounded space. Thus when Raggy climbs onto the railing at the bow of the ship taking her to South West Africa for the first time, this is the experience she is seeking:

An endless dark surface spread out before them and merged into the night sky. And through the middle of this dark ocean the moonlight drew an endless road, sparkling in gentle motion, like a wide river of pure silver...
 The ship with its lights, its life and activity, could no longer be seen from up here. Here you stood alone on a small piece of solid ground and drove straight into eternity, into Nirvana.¹⁶

13 Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 59.

14 Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 77.

15 Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 62.

16 Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 74.

This is where the narrator will soon encounter the negative aspects of Raggy's desire. Of course the problem here is the same facing any form of romantic longing. Where the subject flirts with its own fulfilment, it is playing with the death drive. As we have seen, the very structure of Raggy's cavalier identity introduces a tension between the masquerade of identity and the multiplicity it would collect and unify. We have already encountered this phenomenon of the transformation of the molar into the molecular, and we have already claimed that what is important in colonial discourse is the manner in which this desire is mapped onto an object. Just to underline this, however, let us glance briefly at a paragraph in another novel which might illustrate this more clearly.

The endless monotony of the thorn bush came to an end, and the eye was graced with a friendly landscape of meadows and copses, and a ring of mountain peaks. The rider looked about him and said: "I have come to love this land in spite of its barrenness and desolation, in spite of its wildness and drought. I came full of prejudice, like many others, and I gained a new, beloved Fatherland. This much-cursed colony must have a magic power of attraction to be able to hold so many strong men. Yes, South Africa's wide spaces give elbow room to whoever leaves Europe's suffocating narrowness. They give a man great possibilities for the future, immense surfaces meet his hunger for land and give free play to his German wanderlust and urge for adventure."¹⁷

The desire expressed here is the same as Raggy's. But here the context is more easily recognizable. The romantic longing which looks for a space in which it can unfold its phantasies is not to be read as a universal quality of desire. It has specific historical and geographical determinates. And the quality of space which defines these determinates is also not a chance quality. "European confinement" is a political determinate. And similarly, the "wide open spaces" of Africa must always be specified if they are to serve as a stage for this drama of desire.

Raggy, too, maps her desire onto the wide open spaces of the landscape. Even before she reaches South West Africa, she states:

"I have seen the Alps and the Rocky Mountains, and the Himalayas too, but none of those made as strong an impression on me as the ocean or the silent desert. The concept of endlessness does not find expression in the mountains as it does in wide, open spaces."¹⁸

¹⁷ Dose, *Ein alter Afrikaner*, pp. 379-380.

¹⁸ Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 50.

Given this desire, it should be quite clear why Raggy is perceived in South West Africa as a threat to the established order of the colony. For a desire such as hers, the colonizing work of ordering molecular multiplicities into a molar space is nothing but an impediment to the freedom of movement across a smooth space. But let us not deceive ourselves; before she even sets foot in South West Africa, Raggy has objectified her desire in a manner which can only be called colonizing. When she decides to become engaged to Lieutenant Reburg, it is first and foremost the supposed unbounded freedom of a farmer's life in the colony which causes her to commit herself - this together with a transference onto Reburg's fatherly characteristics.

"Now listen carefully, Raggy! In three years my time in South West will be finished. Then I want to say farewell and go farming. - That's always been my plan. - It's not a great life, a farmer's life! But you've got more freedom on your own land... and you say that you love me! Raggy, can you wait that long? Will you be my wife then?" He looked into her eyes with a serious and questioning look.

A feeling of joy rose in Raggy, of peace and shelter in the arms of this good, faithful man.

Perhaps it was possible to tame all these wild urges, this adventurous blood... and to be happy.

And he didn't want to lock her up in Germany in a narrow city life; he was offering her the free, wild life of a farmer in an uncivilized country.

She would always have horses and be able to go hunting... And he was so strong and in love...!¹⁹

For most of the novel, Raggy then experiments with this hypothesis that her desire may be fulfilled in the boundless space of the colony and in the protective (though absent) arms of Reburg. The narrator goes to great lengths to expound the possibilities of free movement in the spaces of South West Africa. Soon after Raggy arrives in Lüderitzbucht, however, we begin to realize that this is only an apparent freedom - there are other forces which serve to regulate the freedom of movement and render it productive for colonization.

Paradigmatic for this development in the colony is the portrayal of the diamond fields. When Raggy first visits the fields, they have not yet been surveyed; they are open to anyone, and a kind of anarchy characterizes the way in which the money-

¹⁹ Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, pp. 89-90.

hungry prospectors relate to their space. Thus Raggy discovers a group of prospectors removing the claim markers of another group.

That was very nice! They tore down other people's posts and put up their own. And then the other people's prospecting posts were simply gone. Why didn't they keep guard over them?
 Since the fields had not been surveyed, no one could prove that their posts had been here. Anyway, what did it matter to her? Who knew how long Mr Kohn's and Mr Schlau's prospecting plates were safe before they met with the same fate.
 In any case, they had planned well, since everything was to be revised by law in the near future!²⁰

What is important in the construction of the colony is not the chaotic, unstable spatial configuration prevailing at this early stage; what will be significant is only the configuration at the time of transformation into a spatial order fixed in representation (surveying) and ratified by the law. We have already observed that this must be effected via the establishment of nodal points which serve to distinguish various discreet spaces.

Raggy's mobility is not simply a mythical mastery of physical space. It is also an attempt to master those spatial imperatives which the socius must place upon individual subjective desire. Raggy attempts not only to cross physical space as if this could be achieved without moving from one spatial quality to another; she also attempts to act within the social domain as if class restrictions, moral standards etc. could not restrict her in any way. Her freedom of movement has only personal affect value for her. As a result, she finds herself increasingly at conflict with the general aims of colonization. The domain where this conflict is carried out is that of communication. The spatial organization of the colony is characterized by a channelling of information which effectively counters its spatial expanse, at least as it affects Raggy. The nature of this organization is to subvert Raggy's projection of desire onto boundless space by reversing this projection and reducing all of her physical mobility to a subjective quality which the inhabitants of the colony then firmly condemn in terms of prevailing moral standards. When, on her very first day in Lüderitzbucht, Raggy goes riding with Dahlmann and Dr Ernst, her complete lack

²⁰ Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 192.

of inhibitions as well as her unusual elegance makes her the object of local attention.

"You're causing a sensation here!" Dahlmann said, smiling.

"Yes, they've never seen anything so fashionable and elegant." Doctor Ernst laughed.

"Strangely enough, half of the ladies here are narrow-minded people from small towns, and the other half are barmaids and other noble creatures of dubious standing."

"Are there no ladies here?" asked Raggy in astonishment.

"Oh yes, a few, but they keep to themselves."

"That's terrible. I thought things were freer here in Africa!"

"Well, you'll see, my lady, South West is just one small town..."²¹

It is through the gossip of this "small town" that the most important spatial transformation in the novel is effected - Raggy's permanent separation from Reburg. Raggy's mobility, in all the senses mentioned above is mustered under the anonymous eye of the speech of the socius - for this is another name for gossip. This gossip restores spatial order in two ways - it reduces Raggy's mobility to a transgression of spatial order which is situated in her subjective constitution, and, by the network it establishes throughout the colony, it reduces the field through which she moves to a perfectly saturated (if imperfectly transmitting) network of communication.

When Raggy notes this fact, she attempts to render it harmless by grasping it in terms of class relations - she regards the gaze which falls on her from among the populace as that ambivalent mixture of spite and admiration which the master finds in the gaze of the servant, and in which the former knows to read his irrefutable superiority.

"I couldn't care less what a few proles gossip about me! I just want to have a look at the land, and as long as I pay, I couldn't care less what the inhabitants think. - When we dock in Hamburg I'm still the lady, and the others disappear amongst the middle-class people."²²

This is of course exactly what will happen in the end. Raggy will discover that her dream of free spaces has not materialized. But at least she has succeeded in retaining the relative freedom to make the "middle class people" (in English in the original) disappear into an indeterminate mass (whereby it remains an enigma

²¹ Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 152.

²² Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 154.

whether the identification of the proletariat with the middle class is to be traced to the author's poor knowledge of the English language, or social theory, or both!). In contrasting these two possible "freedoms," the novel is dramatizing a basic conflict in colonial discourse's mythology of boundless space.

In this regard, Hugh Ridley implies that class-based arrogance, such as that shown by Raggy, is unsuitable to the colonial understanding of its own social structures. Colonial discourse attempted to develop a mythology of a "classless society," or at least a society in which class barriers were relatively flexible, allowing a greater mobility. If we examine this mythology more closely, we can see that we are dealing with a proto-fascist discourse, in which desire of the masses is mobilized for the ramification of capitalist production. When Ridley speaks of an "equality based on achievement and responsibility and not upon inherited money or traditional social status,"²³ I interpret this as a freeing of labour power for a more efficient functioning of capitalist machinery. This is supported by Ridley when he refers to Memmi's "highly critical account of the proto-Fascist social behaviour latent in colonial society."²⁴

As the novel progresses, it becomes increasingly apparent that Raggy's mobility must also be seen as a social mobility. This is a recurrent preoccupation with the German colonial novel, which, as Ridley notes, "most fully illustrates colonial life as an escape into classlessness."²⁵ It is this flight into classlessness that provides the fascist dimension of colonial fiction. Wherever class is experienced as a restriction of individual desire, colonialist fiction presents a mythology of an escape into boundless space which is an escape into classlessness. Thus in Johannes Dose's book, the protagonist - a young officer, Erb von Erbenheim, - is (wrongfully) convicted of stealing a ring to pay his gambling debts. As a result, he becomes an outcast from the nobility. This renders him unable to live in the strictly class-structured society of contemporary Germany, and so he leaves for Africa. He is

²³ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, pp. 126-127.

²⁴ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 127.

²⁵ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 128.

welcomed by his uncle with a myth of classlessness, which the latter spells out as follows:

"...the incredibly sensational story of the son of an aristocratic Councillor of a Provincial Court, who pawned a ring he had found, or that wasn't his, in order to pay his gambling debts.. that was even in the East African newspapers... and that's why I wrote your mother and had you sent out here. There's no room for people like us in oh-so-honourable Germany. But here there's elbow room to make a new, broad-minded Germany... The story's buried. Forget it!"²⁶

Nevertheless, the very formulation of this myth makes it clear that classlessness is to be understood as an abolition of boundaries which are purely spatial. What is being produced here is a freedom of movement. If we return to the argument concerning the conflict between the despotic machine and the capitalist machine, we will recall that this appears as a conflict between a form of production with strongly defined boundaries, and another one which introduces mobility into it. Clearly, this is the conflict with which we are dealing.²⁷

This conflict is also evident in the theme of women's emancipation, which Ridley ties to the question of classlessness.

Women must also be numbered among those glad to have escaped from Germany. Many felt that the active, demanding life of the settler gave to the settler's wife much more responsibility and status than was available to women in Germany. For this reason German colonial fiction remained close to the circles working for women's emancipation. At the same time, however, many women appear to have escaped from Germany for the opposite reason. Because they disapproved of the moves towards emancipation, because the 'modern woman' in Germany horrified them, they set up in the colonies a regressive, peasant style of life, gratefully accepting the simplicity of the demands which this life made on them.²⁸

This conflict is well illustrated throughout "Raggys Fahrt," and we discover at the end that Raggy's experiments in mobility revert to a reconfirmation of the boundaries between the classes, just as her experiments in emancipation serve to prove that happiness can only be found under a benevolent man's thumb.

²⁶ Dose, *Ein alter Afrikaner*, pp. 106-107.

²⁷ For this reason I would only agree to a certain extent with the interpretation put forward by Bergmann that a rigid class structure has been transposed onto African society simply by extending it to include the blacks (*Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht*, p. 77). This model does not do sufficient justice to the subtlety of the colonial enterprise, nor does it take into account that this class structure is, at the time in question, already well on the way to being demolished in Europe.

²⁸ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 128.

This realization centers around the scenes where she confronts a man whom she can compare with her father. In doing so, she will find that (inverting Lacan's formula that man's desire is the desire of the Other) the desire of the father was nothing but the father's desire for her, ("It was no wonder that the proud, almost lonely man gave all his love to this child, whose character was so similar to his.")²⁹ - because of this, she is his master.

Her whole body trembled as in a fever.
He was on his knees before her, begging.
There was not a drop of blood left in her face. She looked down at him with a brutal, mocking smile. "You!," she whispered, brutally grasping his hands, which she held tightly. "I don't want to, do you hear me?!" Her voice trembled. "I'm your master! You!"³⁰

With the knowledge that the one place which seemed most likely to provide her with the longed-for scene of free movement in a boundless space is infused with a network of communication mythologising its own capture of space; and that the one man who seemed most likely to represent her father is, for this very reason, her inferior, she returns to Hamburg, to marry her cousin and settle to a life of domestic bliss. An anti-colonial novel? Most certainly not. For what has been accomplished is a complete and remainderless reduction of a real physical mobility across qualityless spaces and a real desire for flight - a reduction to an individualized quality which, after coming into conflict with prevailing social norms, returns upon itself and presents itself as originating in a self-sufficient individual divorced from these norms. The faults of the socius have been successfully reduced to the weakness of the individual, and this weakness has been overcome.

1.2 *The dangers of boundless space*

We have seen that colonial discourse must construct a boundless, featureless, homogeneous space which may serve as the stage upon which colonial desire may

²⁹ Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 23.

³⁰ Haase, *Raggys Fahrt*, p. 400.

produce its phantasies. Because of this, the even stronger necessity of establishing a rigid spatial order within the colony gives rise to a conflict within the representational mode. It follows that colonial discourse will take great pains to isolate a productive cathexis in boundless space and distinguish it from that romantic longing which bears the seeds of colonization's destruction. Where boundless space cannot be made productive in colonial discourse, it becomes the space of chaotic desire, onto which the death drive is projected. Let us consider a novel in which this is the case.

In Orla Holm's novel Ovita we see an attempt to contrast two different ways of gazing on the landscape.³¹ It is the wide open spaces with their indeterminate horizon and their borderless expanse which yield the demonic quality of the African experience. The gaze which dedicates itself to the borderless expanse is depicted here as the gaze of romantic yearning, and is incorporated in the two "weak" figures in the book, Ina von Keßler and Dr Nielsen.³² Ina responds to the monotonous lifestyle in the colony with a longing for unbounded freedom:

Then I often have a feeling as if I couldn't go on - as if I had to stay there, down below in the valley, while so many people wander past me - While they all climb up to the heights! Standing up there gazing out, so far... over the whole wide world down below.³³

Ina's weakness lies not merely in the fact of her relationship with an unbounded space, but in the extent to which she allows its indeterminacy to seize her. We have seen that, in colonial fiction, we often encounter characters who draw a strength (in social production) from this spatial quality. They do so, however, because of its efficacy in establishing a dialectic of identity which positions the subject at the center of the world. In contrast to this, Ina experiences the romantic gaze as a loss of identity. Her husband, the practical, conscientious commanding Officer at Otjosondo, realises the dangers involved in his wife's attitude.

31 Orla Holm, Ovita. Episode aus dem Hereroland [Ovita. Episode in Hereroland] (Dresden: Carl Reißner, 1909²).

32 See Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 111.

33 Holm, Ovita, p. 16.

Where was it all to end?! Wouldn't they both lose their norm in the end and wander about aimlessly in the grist of African life?³⁴

In stating his fears in this manner, he makes it clear that the ability to contend with the demands of colonial life involves a certain spatial organisation, a certain will which holds subjectivity positioned against another force which is purely chaotic, and aims at the dissolution of subjectivity. In a Freudian reading we would not have far to look for the battle of Eros and Thanatos. For our reading it is important to note the surfaces onto which this supposed battle is mapped in the text. It is here that we encounter the figure of Dr Nielsen, who represents one of the stereotypes of colonial fiction - the European intellectual unable to come to terms with colonial "reality."³⁵ In a progressive slide from the values of civilization into the abyss of racial contamination, Nielsen attempts to develop a "theory of happiness" based on the free energy of natural man, i.e. the Herero.

At the beginning of the novel, we find this connection being implied when we see Ina repeating the privileged gesture of romantic yearning, the gaze from a window, but stressing that this window also borders the space of bourgeois sexuality. The view from this space allows her line of vision to fall on the territory of the Herero.

The married bed-chambers had been furnished up in one of the towers. At night a fresh breeze wafted there, and from the windows one could see over the wide plains with their numerous Herero villages, which looked from a distance like large brown mushrooms, out to the grotesque northern mountains. Here at the window was Mrs von Keßler's favourite place.³⁶

However, Ina's romantic character is described as "unable to immerse itself in a natural mood..."³⁷ Her fault is identified with a bent to melancholy, that disease of civilization which Dr Nielsen wishes to eradicate. When Nielsen is first mentioned, we learn that a missionary had refused him access to a waterhole on the grounds of his immoral association with Herero women. Here the boundlessness of African

³⁴ Holm, *Ovita*, p. 21

³⁵ "Much loved by writers was any plot which involved the visit to the colonies of a person with preconceived, European ideas about how to behave. These ideas were invariably tested against the realities of colonial life and, in a tragic or comic outcome, found wanting." (Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 125)

³⁶ Holm, *Ovita*, p. 23

³⁷ Holm, *Ovita*, p. 24

space becomes a demonic element against which the moral qualities of the European must struggle. "One finds no limits here - degenerates, loses all measure..."³⁸ For First Lieutenant Von Keßler there is no question of succumbing to the demonic force of Africa's boundless spaces. The will which holds them at bay is his sense of duty. There is only one occasion in the course of the novel where we find him struggling between the two, and this struggle is easily overcome:

The endlessness of the sky arched over the wide plains... The many scattered pontocks, their colorless monotony only hazily defined in the distance... A crippling sadness fell over the First Lieutenant... Dismally, he nodded to himself. But then his eyes wandered to the fort, above whose battlements the flag of the Empire was waving proudly in the wind. And it surged through him, the old spirit flared up in him once again: he had to remain strong, he mustn't give in! His principles demanded it - his duty!³⁹

Neither Nielsen nor Ina have access to this ideology. This is what provides for their downfall, and it is manifested primarily in their inability to master space. When Nielsen and Ina meet, Ina has lost herself in the bush, and it is Nielsen who shows himself to be capable of mastering the technical difficulties of traversing African space. It is, however, only a relative capability. Later we find him setting out on two journeys, neither of which he can complete because of his lack of practicality. Ina and Nielsen alike, both representatives of the romantic yearning for boundlessness, find themselves helpless in the face of the real dangers of Africa. Their inability to master space - to organise it and make it work - allows them to fall prey to the chaos of an uncivilized land. In both cases, the gaze which orients itself toward indeterminate spaces assumes a sexual quality. Ina's daydreams at the window align her loss of identity with the danger which sexuality poses to the ego.

Yes, *Frau* Ina's thoughts became more concentrated from day to day, heavier, more melancholy. Only sometimes, standing at the window, when she dreamed out into misty distances of the African world, did her weariness diminish and fall away. Her eyes widened and wandered, searching, to the mountains - - and then suddenly her eyes would close. The immense Sandfeld appeared before her, shrouded in the darkness of night. A nameless fear fell over her, a shivering and trembling - and then she thought she heard the voice of a man...⁴⁰

38 Holm, *Ovita*, p. 43

39 Holm, *Ovita*, p. 232

40 Holm, *Ovita*, p. 117

For Nielsen this danger is a very real one. Whereas Ina remains an ineffectual dreamer, his unceasing urge to put his dreams into practice leads him to live out his own destruction. This takes the form first as a dissolution of the identity which civilization has given him, and is manifested in the burning of his books.

He possessed no more books. What for? Literature on South West Africa, that was just rubbish, written by people who had no idea, like the blind speaking about color.⁴¹

Nielsen's attempt to surrender to the indeterminacy of uncivilized Africa requires that he abandons any form of looking which might be determined by civilization, since such a determination is a falsification in his opinion. As a result of this, he finds himself in a logical impasse which is the predicament of any traveller. His desire to gaze upon something new is a determined wish which can only be formulated from a definite cultural position. As such, it involves a goal, which is the transfer of that gaze back to the civilization from which it has been brought.

The actual purpose of his voyage to Africa, to explore the northern regions of the Herero, had long since been abandoned. To explore the Herero regions, what irony! This area could no longer be called *terra incognita*. Let others write about the Hereroland and its inhabitants; he had set his sites on greater things: a book which would cause people to take notice, a book which would cast light into the darkness..⁴²

And yet, if this desire is to be realized, it must be realized in the realm of writing, a realm which is profoundly antagonistic to such desire.

Colorless, like the landscape which now surrounded him, an image without grace, a work without spirit, that was his criticism of the book which was already finished in his head, and only needed to be written down... And now, since he had failed in his prime goal, he could find no more joy. His gaze wandered with a kind of indifference, almost disparagingly, over the remarkably bitter virginity of the landscape.⁴³

As we have seen in part I, writing involves and evokes a blindness out of which the subject appears to be split, and within whose closed field he must attempt to construct himself. In defining himself through the act of writing, Nielsen is necessarily drawing a border between the space of his subjectivity and the boundless Africa in which he seeks liberation from that very same European subjectivity. This

⁴¹ Holm, *Ovita*, p. 129

⁴² Holm, *Ovita*, p. 118

⁴³ Holm, *Ovita*, p. 121

is not a political problem - not yet. It does, however, have two political dimensions. Firstly, it prepares the way for an implicit attack on those voices in contemporary Germany which were speaking out against civilization, and who were formulating a radical critique of language. This leads us to the second dimension - that the space of subjectivity cannot be confronted except as a socially determined space. Nielsen's attempt to turn his back on his culture, when combined with his desire for loss of subjectivity, is easily mapped onto a real political situation. This is given in the novel by the Herero war, which is portrayed as a state of chaos structurally analogous to Nielsen's desire. In this respect as well we find Nielsen preparing his own death. In the end he attracts the zero entropy which he seeks in African space - in the form of the love which Magdalena, the cunning and deceptive Herero woman, feels for him; in the form of his absolute inability to traverse African space; in the form of his own death at the hands of the people who he had hoped would teach him happiness.

This novel shows us that the strength which the European draws from the encounter with Africa is always in the form of a test which must be passed. It is the encounter with the limits of European Being. In this sense, it is no accident that the encounter which fails the test is presented in the form of a romantic longing. Just as the Romantics seek ways out of the spatial normativity which Kant had summarized in the name of Enlightenment thought, so the "weak" character in the colony seeks the colonial experience as a dissolution of spatial order. The position which discredits this "weakness" from the very beginning is that of an *a priori* knowledge which reveals itself in practice as having always been correct. This is demonstrated in the figure of Kurt von Keßler, who Bergmann describes in these terms:

The sceptical pragmatist did not need to express and discuss his thoughts. He was right to start with, and reality would only confirm this.⁴⁴

The dreams of Ina von Keßler and Dr Nielsen threaten the work of spatial organization which colonization attempts to effect. As such, they also find themselves aligned with those forces of death and chaos which civilization attempts to hold at bay. When we read the novel in this manner, the strategic importance of

⁴⁴ Bergmann, *Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht*, p. 112.

the romantic dreamers becomes clear: they illustrate that the alternative to the colonial project can only be grasped as death and chaos. The colonist who, as Ina and Nielsen, is unable to sublimate or sublimate this urge for an unrestricted flow of desire must face his/her own death.

What is important for us is that the moment at which romantic longing is forced to confront reality and the pragmatist is proved to have always been speaking the truth. This is marked by the outbreak of the Herero wars. The attitude which the Herero had assumed under the influence of the missionaries is portrayed as a masquerade - the repetition of the gestures of civilization while maintaining savagery concealed in their inner beings. When the narrative unmasks this masquerade it shows us that the romantic relation to space flirts with death not only in a metaphorical sense, but in a very real sense. In refusing to contribute to the order of colonial space, the romantic dreamer contributes to the chaos of savagery - the reversal of colonization.

Thus the text leads us through the spiritual agonies of romantic longing into the very real agonies of the Herero war. As such, it manipulates us into a position from which a war of liberation appears to the European gaze, not as a rebellion against the barbarism of colonial rule, but as an extension and consequence of the threat to civilization which follows from the romantic attempt to remove all limits. There is a subtle difference between this primary narcissism and the universality of myth, and it is to be found in the question of representation. What I have been calling romantic longing (quite inaptly, since the Romantics sought the totality of consciousness specifically in the domain of representation) seeks a totality of experience prior to any fragmentation. This is precisely what Oedipal representation tells us we would ask for if desire could speak. Mythical experience, on the contrary, seeks a totality of experience through unifying fragmentation on a higher level. What we must realize is that the narration of primary narcissism and its failure is itself a myth of mobility, which clearly shows where those borders exist which can

only be crossed at penalty of death. And it maps these borders onto real geo-political spaces.

2 KNOWLEDGE AND EMPTY SPACE. LOOKING WITH EUROPEAN EYES.

2.1 *The acquisition of space in vision*

I have already claimed that the discourse of colonization encloses spaces, lending them a homogeneity in the drawing of borders. It releases individual desire from the imperatives of these borders in a mythical mastery of space. Finally, the mythical structuration of passages across borders re-confirms their position and function. The structuration of space is effected on a number of levels, but the goal of colonization must always be to organize geo-political space in such a way that its productivity is maximized. If we bear this goal in mind, the actual physical organization and division of space is certainly not the first "colonization" of space, and I do not wish to claim that it is the most important. Before it is even possible to trace paths and mark borders, there must be a well-defined network of communication between various theoretical spaces, for it is the distinction between theoretical spaces which will determine the nature of the border. In other words, a body of knowledge must be present, whose fields of specialization are capable of being transposed onto physical spaces within the territory. Clearly, we are dealing with a spatial organization which is not purely geo-political. The anthropologist and the geologist, for example, establish fields of spatiality which only intersect at certain points. Yet these points are vital if the practical application of European knowledge is to succeed. It is in the organization of geo-political space that these points of intersection must be coordinated. Geological space intersects with anthropological space as long as the exploitation of mineral ore conflicts with the traditional rights of the indigenous nations. Capitalism organizes geo-political space

so that this conflict can be resolved - in the favour of maximized social production. In colonization, it is the task of mythical space to promote an ideology of freedom which totalizes these strictly defined borders and intersections of spaces into an experience of unlimited mobility.

When the European traveller moves through this complex space, and writes of his experience, he acts as a mediator between empirical observations and the spatial organization which knowledge requires. The organ of mediation is the eye. Vision has a primary function in subsuming given sense impressions under a pre-existing structuration of theoretical space. The informed gaze of European knowledge focuses on an object and defines it as a space in which European power has effect.⁴⁵

Having stated this, it may now be said that, for the mode of knowledge which supported and motivated the various exploratory projects from the Enlightenment onwards, there is a certain sense in which vision amounts to colonization. Without actually occupying territory in the strict sense, the gaze of the traveller establishes spatial order in an unknown landscape through the mediation of informed vision. The expansion of knowledge, which travel took as its goal, relies upon a dialectic of *a priori* knowledge which informs vision, and determined vision which modifies knowledge - it relies upon a visual hermeneutic. This is presided over by a transcendental principle which, I am arguing here, is to be defined in terms of the *socius*. The ordered space which presides over this dialectic is preserved in any of the various scientific discourses which European knowledge reserves for this purpose. The mediating eye which gazes upon the landscape is not simply gathering information. It is experimenting with the possibility of transposing discursive spaces of knowledge onto the landscape. This is why, when we read the documents of European exploration and travel, we are reading various blueprints for the construction of colonies. Indeed, Fabian has suggested that the expedition itself "should be thought of... less as a certain number of people moving from a point of

⁴⁵ It is thus significant that Memmi begins his book with a description of the gaze of the colonizer: "We sometimes enjoy picturing the colonizer as a tall man, bronzed by the sun, wearing Wellington boots, proudly leaning on his shovel - as he rivets his gaze far away on the horizon of his land." Memmi, Colonizer and colonized, p. 3.

departure to a point of destination, than as a kind of mobile colony."⁴⁶ I do not wish to examine this idea in too much detail. The strategies involved here would warrant a study in its own right. I do, however, believe that, given the preceding discussion, I am justified in stating as an "axiom" of colonization that the informed gaze of the European traveller acquires space in the service of colonization. In the following paragraphs, I wish to mention a few important aspects of this "axiom." Then, in the subsequent sections, I will examine in more detail the function of the mediating eye with specific reference to German South West Africa.

The eye of the traveller acquires and organizes space by constantly alternating between the specificity of vision and the transcendental position of universal knowledge. As Said points out, "knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant.

The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a "fact" which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it.⁴⁷

If we consider the mythic mobility of the subjective position in narrative, as outlined in the previous chapter, then it is evident that this mythic function is also integral to the subject of the travelogue. But, whereas the mobility of the hero is given by an unrestricted ability to cross borders, the subject of the travelogue has an additional mythic function - it is not only an infinitely mobile eye, but also a position of universal knowledge. As such, the ego of the traveller is capable of establishing a field of spatial order in the same manner as the nodal point. And it, too, occupies a position which is both material and specific, as well as being outside of time and space. We saw in part I that this dual status of vision characterizes subjective knowledge, and determines the social being of the subject. Looking is always effected from a socially defined position - it is always on the verge of writing. We have seen in connection with Lacan how this is possible, and the Lacanian model

⁴⁶ Johannes Fabian, Language and colonial power. The appropriation of Swahili in the former Belgian Congo 1880-1938. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁴⁷ Said, Orientalism, p. 32

seems particularly applicable when we examine the narrative strategies of explorers' travellogues.⁴⁸

However, we must not forget that we are dealing not only with vision, but with writing. We have also seen in our discussion of Lacan that we need to be cautious of any attempt to accord Imaginary vision a status of priority with respect to writing on the one hand and social production on the other. The colonizing gaze is effective only via a writing, and when the colonizer gazes out over his territory, he does so on the verge of writing. This is not to be understood in a temporal sense; looking does not precede writing. The gazing European positions himself where there is writing and looks out onto spaces where there is not. However, the gazing subject moving through a strange environment is in search of strategies for fixing his passage and lending it, and thus himself, ontological qualities. As a result, he leaves a trace as he moves through the landscape - a writing on the ground and in books. In the following chapter, I shall discuss this writing and the way it takes possession of the space it inscribes.

When the informed vision of the traveller gazes on reality, it apprehends a reality preserved in representation, and, in representing itself, it preserves itself as a cause. We have already seen how this serves to compel a certain investment in universal symbolic representation. This investment is usually well marked

⁴⁸ This point is well made in the following paragraph from Mary Louise Pratt's essay on vision in the travelogue:

"In this kind of writing, the 'face of the country' is presented chiefly in sweeping prospects that open before or, more often, beneath the traveller's eye. Such panoramic views are an important commonplace of European aesthetics, of course, and that undoubtably accounts for much of their appeal here. In the context of exploration writing like [John] Barrow's (*Account of travels into the interior of Southern Africa in the years 1797 and 1798*, London 1801), however, such views acquire and serve to familiarize meanings they may not have on the domestic front. Barrow's own language suggests, for example, the fantasy of dominance that is commonly built into his stance. The eye 'commands' what falls within its gaze; the mountains 'show themselves' or 'present themselves'; the country 'opens up' before the European newcomer, as does the unclothed indigenous bodyscape. At the same time this eye seems powerless to act or interact with this landscape. Unheroic, unparticularized, without ego, interest or desire of its own, it seems able to do nothing but gaze from a periphery of its own creation, like the self-effaced, noninterventionist eye that scans the Other's body." Mary Louise Pratt, "Scratches on the face of the country; or, what Mr Barrow saw in the land of the Bushmen," in *"Race," writing, and difference*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), collected Essays originally published in *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 12(1) (1985) & 13(1) (1986), p. 143.

linguistically. It would be interesting to study such marking in detail.⁴⁹ Let it suffice here to mention that the German language commands two privileged strategies for transforming subjective perception into universal description: the shift from the past tense to the timeless present to suspend the temporality of perception, and the use of the indefinite pronoun "*man*."⁵⁰ Said claims that the "figures of speech associated with the Orient... are all declarative and self-evident; the tense they employ is the timeless eternal."⁵¹ Pratt shows how the timeless present is used as one of the strategies employed "to minimize all human presence, including that of the peoples whose journey is being told. In the main, what is narrated proves to be a descriptive sequence of sights/sites, with the travellers present chiefly as a kind of collective moving eye which registers these sights."⁵² Europeans are also present in the travelogue "as the deleted subjects of passive verbs"⁵³ This deleted linguistic presence should tell us something about the relation between linguistic space and the space of vision. When the text reports, for example, that something "was observed," the absent eye leaves a trace in the form of its organizational effect within the remainder of the sentence. This is also the trace which the traveller leaves in the discourses of the disciplines - a preliminary structuration of the object of vision according to given forms of knowledge. As Pratt observes, "The ideology that construes seeing as an inherently passive act cannot be sustained."⁵⁴

As the space of the world becomes increasingly fragmented through the work of the disciplines and their discourses, we find that the travelling scientist begins to usurp the mythical function of travel and utilize it in the service of universal

49 Greimas and Courtés give some interesting conceptual frameworks for such a study. For example, "spatial disengagement appears as a procedure having as its effect the expulsion out from the domain of the enunciation of the term *not-here* of the spatial category and of thereby founding at the same time both the 'objective' space of the utterance (the *elsewhere* space) and the primordial space - which is recognizable only as a topic presupposition - of the enunciation." *Semiotics and language*, p. 90. They also make a distinction "between utopic space, a place where the human doing surmounts the permanence of being, a place of performances (which in mythical narrative is oftentimes underground, underwater, or in the heavens), and paratopic spaces, where competencies are acquired." *Semiotics and language*, p. 181.

50 These strategies are typical of the discourse of realism. See Said, *Orientalism*, p. 72.

51 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 72

52 Pratt, *Face of the country*, p. 142.

53 Pratt, *Face of the country*, p. 143.

54 Pratt, *Face of the country*, p. 159.

knowledge. The self-effacing leap from the particular to the universal is aimed increasingly at defining a particular space within universal knowledge, as well as the passages of access to this space. Johannes Fabian notes how, in the wake of the Enlightenment, the "topos of travel"⁵⁵ emerged "under the reigning paradigm of natural history," thereby replacing "an earlier, enormously popular genre of mostly sentimental and aesthetisizing tales of travel."⁵⁶ Within the project of natural history, travel becomes an instrument for the acquisition of a knowledge which is structured according to tabular space.

In the episteme of natural history the exercise of knowledge was projected as the filling of spaces or slots in a table, or the marking of points in a system of coordinates in which all possible knowledge could be placed.⁵⁷

Paradigmatic for this understanding of travel were the questionnaires with which the various academies of the natural sciences equipped travellers.⁵⁸ The traveller was instructed before he ever left home to adopt a certain attitude to the sights he was going to see. He was interested in apprehending that which could be positioned within a pre-formed grid, a table of knowledge. This tabulation allowed the natural historian to position himself at a distance to his object. The space of the table fixes difference as a distance between subject and object "by allowing Time to be reabsorbed by the tabular space of classification."⁵⁹ Fabian then goes on to show that the establishment of this tabular space in which knowledge can be fixed serves to privilege still more what was already the privileged mediator of knowledge: vision.

Because knowledge was thought to operate by collecting, comparing, and classifying impressions, the notion of the mind as a naturalist's collection or cabinet encouraged further extension of visual bias toward the spatial. Not only the sources of knowledge, but also its contents were imagined to be visible. Add to this the rhetoric of teaching such knowledge, and the transformation from visible source to visible content is completed. Taught

⁵⁵ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 6.

⁵⁶ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 8.

⁵⁷ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 8.

⁵⁸ See Urs Bitterli, *Die 'Wilden' und die 'Zivilisierten'* (München: dtv, 1982).

⁵⁹ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 147. Here, Fabian takes recourse to Foucault's concept of tabular space, "i.e., the kind of taxonomic space that must be postulated if cultural differences are to be conceived as a system of semiological constructs, organized by a logic of oppositions." *Time and the Other*, p. 54.

knowledge became *arranged*, ordered knowledge, easily representable in diagrammatic or tabular form.⁶⁰

This tabular spatiality has a further dimension: the asymmetry between the field of objects and the field of knowledge. Fabian is interested primarily in demonstrating how this tabular spatialization of knowledge necessarily entailed a negation of the temporal dimension of its object, and how this negation facilitated the emergence of the other as an anthropological object. In doing so, he does not neglect to note the workings of power in this negation of time and creation of the object. The space of anthropological knowledge - the negated time of the other - is a space in which power relations are exercised. The power of the anthropologist over his object is only one such relationship. In the same way that Fabian sees the traveller gazing at the world on the verge of anthropological knowledge, so we must see him gazing on the verge of every other disciplinary spatialization, including that superordinate spacial enclosure which totalizes the colony as a geo-political space. Fabian realizes this when he observes:

Among the historical conditions under which our discipline emerged and which affected its growth and differentiation were the rise of capitalism and its colonial-imperialist expansion into the very societies which became the target of our inquiries. For this to occur, the expansive, aggressive, and oppressive societies which we call the West needed Space to occupy.⁶¹

The empty space of the questionnaire - of tabular knowledge - is certainly not an innocent space: it is synonymous with - I would even suggest that it is *exactly the same space* as - the "empty space" into which European powers were about to expand. The establishment of borders which define individual tabular spaces, the relations and transformations which connect these spaces to one another, the passages which may be thought between individual spaces as well as between different tables, the superimposition of one table onto another, etc. - these are all operations which determine the spatiality of the colony. And they determine it as an objective realm, even before the building of fences and the establishment of border control.

⁶⁰ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 120-121.

⁶¹ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 143-144.

2.2 *Gazing on native spaces*

The theme of empty space is a vital one in colonial discourse, and if we are to appreciate its function we must realize its multi-dimensionality. It serves as a useful ideology of expansionism; it provides a contrasting image to that of overcrowded Europe which began to emerge in the 19th century; it enhances the romantic longing which seeks to transpose primary narcissism onto a landscape in which, for the sake of phantasy, it cannot afford to encounter a human being who is radically other; and it expresses a real inability of the European eye to look at the world and see anything other than European space - a space which is by definition empty where it is not inhabited by Europeans. This latter manner of gazing on the world is not unusual, nor is it by any means outmoded. Jane Tompkins discusses an example from the year 1956, in which Perry Miller describes American history as "the massive narrative of the movement of European culture into the vacant wilderness of America."⁶² Tompkins goes on to show that what, in Miller's case, is simply a rather silly assertion, may be detected as an underlying strategy in a number of less obvious statements. Here she cites an example in which Indian society is described as "divided, self-satisfied, undisciplined and static" as opposed to the "unified, visionary disciplined and dynamic" Puritan society in 17th century New England, and in which the resulting encounter is described as "not... a clash of dissimilar ways of life, but rather the expansion of one into areas where the other was lacking."⁶³ The emptiness of space is not simply given by the absence of human inhabitants, but by the quality of space the natives are seen to inhabit a quality which can only be seen as a lack from the point of view of the European observer.

⁶² Perry Miller, *Errand into the wilderness* (Cambridge, Mass, 1964), p. vii, cit. Jane Tompkins, "Indians': Textuality, morality, and the problem of history," in *"Race," writing, and difference*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), collected Essays originally published in *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 12(1) (1985) & 13(1) (1986), pp. 61-63.

⁶³ Alden T Vaughan, *New England frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675* (Boston, 1965), pp. vi-vii, cit. Tompkins, pp. 63-64.

It is important for us to realize that in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries the definition of the spaces occupied by the native is gradually relegated to a different field of knowledge than the definition and description of the landscape. The point of intersection in geo-political space is marked by the qualitative emptiness these fields assign to their objects. On both levels, knowledge employs textual strategies which will ultimately be utilized in mapping this emptiness onto real geographical space. The creation of different textual and disciplinary spaces for natural man and nature without man will eventually be repeated in geo-political space with the creation of native reserves and nature reserves.

Throughout much nineteenth-century exploration writing on the imperial frontier, this discursive configuration effaces the European presence and textually splits off indigenous inhabitants from habitat. It is a configuration which, in (mis)recognition of what was materially underway or in anticipation of what was to come, verbally depopulates landscapes. Indigenous peoples are relocated in separate manners-and-customs chapters as if in textual homelands or reservations, where they are pulled out of time to be preserved, contained, studied, admired, detested, pitied, mourned. Meanwhile, the now empty landscape is personified as the metaphorical "face of the country" - a more tractable face that returns the European's gaze, echoes his words and accepts his caresses.⁶⁴

The ability of the European gaze to see empty space where there is native society is one of the most important factors affecting the establishment of the new world as an object of knowledge in terms of the European disciplines. This is well demonstrated by Fabian with regard to what is probably the most representative discipline in this regard - anthropology. Referring to structuralist anthropology, but uncovering a characteristic of the anthropological gaze which is recognizable in virtually every European science of the colony, Fabian shows how the space in which anthropological knowledge is expounded requires "a native society that would, ideally at least, hold still like a *tableau vivant*...The illusion of simultaneity (as between the elements of a picture that is contemplated, or between the visual object and the act of its contemplation) may lead to an utter disregard for the active, productive nature of field-*work* and its inevitable implication in historical situations and real, political contradictions."⁶⁵ As Fabian points out, this manner of looking is

⁶⁴ Pratt, *Face of the country* p. 146.

⁶⁵ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 67.

directly inherited by anthropology from the travelogue. We may support Fabian's insight with any number of passages which we might choose randomly from the travelogues of 19th century explorers in South West Africa. Let us glance briefly at a passage from Charles John Andersson.

The Damaras, speaking generally, are an exceedingly fine race of men. Indeed, it is by no means unusual to meet with individuals six feet and some inches in height, and symmetrically proportioned withall. Their features are, besides, good and regular; and many might serve as perfect models of the human figure.⁶⁶

The technique of freezing the native body under the gaze of the European eye in order to establish it as a field of objectivity will extend throughout the discourse of colonization. This is not a development peculiar to colonization. The eighteenth and 19th centuries see an ever increasing will to what might be called symbolic vision in scientific discourses; that is, the will to see universal principles in the specific. This will is marked by the same violence which characterizes encounter. The object can only be apprehended within the field of knowledge if its specificity is elided. This is achieved by reducing it to a symbolic element within the universal knowledge of the conqueror. Once this reduction has been effected, any operations and interventions performed within this objectified space appear as operations within the realm of signification. Their effects are perceived not in terms of specific effects on specific bodies, but as productions of meaning. The space of the native's body becomes a signifying space, whose meaning consists in its ability to disappear within universal knowledge. It is this writing which is absolutely essential if the scientific gaze is to prevail.

The gaze which apprehends the savage is of necessity a complex one. We have already seen this in our discussion of Fanon, where I noted the psychoanalytic complexity involved in asserting subjectivity from the position of the master and holding it suspended between narcissism and aggression, between the absolute destruction of the other through rejection and through assimilation. We have also

⁶⁶ Charles John Andersson, Lake Ngami; or Explorations and discoveries during four years' wanderings in the wilds of South Western Africa (London: Hurst and Blackett 1856; reprint ed. Cape Town: Struik, 1967), p. 49.

seen that, when subjectivity is constituted in discourse the paranoiac structure of knowledge fixes subjectivity in terms of positions defined by European knowledge. As a result, we might expect to find discursive strategies in the discourse of colonialism which establish the space of the native's body as a highly differentiated space of European discipline. This is illustrated in Sander Gilman's discussion of the way in which the medical gaze appropriated the body of the black woman in the service of a theory of aberrant sexuality. Individual Hottentot women and prostitutes were studied with the aim of developing a typology of aberrance. Now, a will to a typology of aberrance is not to be dissociated from the will to symbolic vision, since it must seek in the individual exception a universal principle of deviation. This is evident in the anthropometric studies on prostitutes, which attempted to link their sexuality to specific features such as "asymmetry of features, misshapen noses, overdevelopment of the parietal region of the skull, and the appearance of the so-called Darwin's ear."⁶⁷ Nor is it to be dissociated from a will to positioning the observing eye of the scientist within universal knowledge. Thus Gilman refers to the sexual psychologist Havelock Ellis, who "believed that there is an absolute scale of beauty which is totally objective and which ranges from the European to the black."⁶⁸ This will to objective scientific vision is not confined to the development of universalist theories. It also involves a set of strategies for ensuring that only the universal is seen. That is to say, the scientific eye establishes the body of its object as a space in which certain power relations prevail. The objectification of the body takes part in a "network of power relations [which] ends by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them."⁶⁹ Fabian has shown how certain forms of anthropological "knowledge" merge into the "political," citing the cultural relativism

67 Sander L. Gilman, "Black bodies, white bodies: toward an iconography of female sexuality in late nineteenth-century art, medicine and literature," in *"Race," writing, and difference*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), collected Essays originally published in *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 12(1) (1985) & 13(1) (1986), p. 243.

68 Gilman, *Black bodies, white bodies*, p. 237.

69 Michel Foucault, *The history of sexuality*, vol. 1: *An introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1978), p. 96.

of Margaret Mead as an example. He goes on to show that such an approach is "easily put to work for such nonrelativist purposes as national defence, political propaganda, and outright manipulation and control of other societies."⁷⁰

Anthropology is only one such example. The disciplines which objectify the physiological, psychological, mythical, social, ambient, etc. spaces of the other develop epistemological categories to create a framework within which the other may be secured as other. These epistemological categories rely upon certain spatial strategies for their implementation.⁷¹ The gaze of the scientist gives rise to a space whose universality requires a relative fixing of the spaces occupied by his own gazing eye as well as that occupied by an object. This implies a definition of separate spaces (the individualized space of the native's body, or of his village, or tribe, etc. as the domain of knowledge), as well as defining transformations between various levels of spatial organization (the way in which the specific space of the native's body is to be related to the abstract space of physiological "normality"). This dual definition of spaces serves to tie the space opened up in vision to the discursive spaces of knowledge. The body of the other is created as the site where the discourses of European knowledge link diverse spaces and times. Pratt describes one such discourse of encounter, the portrait of manners and customs, as "a normalizing discourse, whose work is to codify difference, to fix the Other in a timeless present where all 'his' actions and reactions are repetitions of 'his' normal habits. Thus, it textually produces the Other without an explicit anchoring either in an observing self or in a particular encounter in which contact with the Other takes place."⁷²

This is only partially correct. As long as we are concerned with the temporal dimension only, it may be possible to accept that the other exists as a kind of free-floating quality defined in terms of a distance between hypothetical subject and

⁷⁰ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 49.

⁷¹ "When in the course of colonial expansion a Western body politic came to occupy, literally, the space of an autochthonous body, several alternatives were conceived to deal with that violation of the rule. The simplest one, if we think of North America and Australia, was of course to move or remove the other body. Another one is to pretend that space is divided and allocated to separate bodies. South Africa's rulers cling to that solution." Fabian *Time and the Other*, (1983) p. 29-30.

⁷² Pratt, *Face of the country*, pp. 139-40.

object positions; however, as soon as we realize that these positions are transposed without apparent difficulty or misunderstanding onto physical positions, onto bodies, then we see that it is quite misleading to believe that the other is produced "without anchoring in an explicit self or in a particular encounter." It would be more accurate to say that this production takes place in an oscillation between the discursive space described by Pratt on the one hand and the physical space of encounter on the other hand. And, as we have seen, this oscillation has the effect of tying together multiple and diffuse spaces, and lending them the status of universal truth. This leads us to the conclusion that the production of Africa "in the so-called opening up of central and southern Africa to European capitalism in the first half of the nineteenth century"⁷³ was indeed a production of that space which we know as Africa, and those spaces which we know as the native. This was not simply a production "of Africa for European imaginations - ... that is, of ideology in connection with the European expansionist policy there."⁷⁴ The narratives of Africa, the African landscape and its inhabitants produced a space which was equally effective - it worked just as well (or badly) - in the landscape itself as in the imagination or in books. The mechanics of this production are relatively simple: they involve strategies for mapping the timeless qualities of otherness onto specific objects apprehended in vision.

In gazing on the natives, we find, once again, that fictional discourse has a mythologizing role to play. It creates a mastery of the encapsulated spaces which scientific discourse tends to create. The scientist who fixes his gaze on the space of the native's body - epitomized by the ethnographer or anthropologist - creates for himself a paradoxical position. His informed gaze produces the space of the native as a universal space which he himself can never occupy. Yet the hermeneutic nature of his knowledge requires that the border which he draws between himself and the native must continually be crossed and re-crossed, if he is to claim any knowledge

⁷³ Pratt, *Face of the country*, p. 141.

⁷⁴ Pratt, *Face of the country*, p. 141.

more profound than simple descriptions. Consider Gerald McKiernan's description of the 'Bergdamaras':

They kill game enough to furnish skins for clothing, if they do not have permanent abodes; but they are too lazy to dress them, and when the sun shines, they do not need them. The lower class of natives, such as I speak of, have only one aim in life and that is to fill their stomachs, and their energies are all directed to that.⁷⁵

Such descriptive statements require an initial postulate of identity, in order to prove the otherness of the native. How else could McKiernan speculate upon the desires of the native, or project a European class structure onto the native socius? This is the thrust of Fabian's claim that it is possible to recognize in ethnographic discourse "an index revealing (or hiding) the fact that not one but two subjects inhabit the semantic space of the statement. One is the Indian... [or the black - J.N.] the other is the ethnographer..."⁷⁶

The production of the space of the native's body as a space of knowledge might, at first glance, appear to take place in fictional discourse as well. Consider the following passage from the novel by Maximilian Bayer, Okowi - Ein Hererospion? As the title suggests, this book fixes its gaze upon on a particular native and poses the question, friend or foe? In this respect, it could be seen as being paradigmatic for the colonial encounter with the native. Consider the paragraph in which Okowi is first gazed upon:

A tall Herero stepped forward and stood calmly. He wore a loin cloth and his skin was a handsome shimmering brown-black. He carried a heavy club, a kirri, but it hung casually in his hand. He stood there like a statue, in a proud, confident pose.⁷⁷

The similarity to the descriptions which we find in 'non-fiction' and travelogues is striking. Nevertheless, we should not overlook the differences. Firstly, the Herero in Bayer's description retains his temporal specificity. Bayer does not resort to the timeless present to describe his object. Thus he does not adopt the rhetorical stance

⁷⁵ Gerald McKiernan, The narrative and journal of Gerald McKiernan in South West Africa 1874-1879, ed. P. Serton (Cape Town: van Riebeeck Society, 1954), p. 68.

⁷⁶ Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 91.

⁷⁷ Jonk Steffen [Maximilian Bayer], Okowi - ein Hererospion? Eine Geschichte aus dem südwestafrikanischen Kriege [Okowi - A Herero spy? A tale of the South West African War] (Berlin: Weicher, 1910), p. 25.

of the anthropologist. He does not project a universal quality onto his object, although this is presumably accomplished by his reader under the weight of intertextuality. Secondly, the manner in which the native strikes a pose appears almost as a caricature of the anthropological descriptive mode. The effect of this exaggerated action is an elicitation of the European gaze. The native, in striking a pose, is offering his body as an object of vision. Thus it is described as a statue. And like a statue, it provides a possible form for narcissistic identification. This is indeed the role which Okowi is to play in the novel. As the title suggests, the book fixes its gaze upon this particular native and poses the question: friend or foe? In this respect, it reproduces the colonial encounter. The narrative experiments with various attempts to cross the border between the gazing European eye and the mysterious space of the native. Various forms of self projection are attempted, in which the narrative endeavors to 'enter the space' which the native occupies. In the end, Okowi is established as a friend, but in doing so, his unsuitability as a surface for narcissistic projection has been proven. His non-European qualities have been strongly defined. At the end of the book, Okowi says

"If you Germans bring happiness to the land and peace to my poor tribe, then we Mbandjerus will come to you as friends. - There shall be an end to the misery which has been. May you teach my people, that they become wise, strong, and good, like you Germans are!"⁷⁸

In the mythical act of crossing, the border between the white man and the black has been re-drawn.

In spite of the ending, the benevolence of this narrative makes Okowi an exception among colonial novels. And yet, it remains typical in its general strategy of mapping timeless qualities of otherness onto a specific object apprehended in vision, and establishing the specific as a symbol for the universal category. Here we would have to label this category 'The good native who does not resist colonization.' More representative of the way in which the fictional discourse of German South West Africa redraws the border between white man and black man in the mythical act of crossing is Hans Walther's short story, Fräulein [Missy], from the collection Orlog!.

⁷⁸ Steffen, Okowi, p. 236.

In this story, the question is posed whether a mode of mapping timeless qualities of the other onto actual bodies can at the same time facilitate the organization of space required by colonization. Here we see the narrative emphasizing that the decisive point in the strategy of mapping is quite simply whether an attitude - a mode of apprehension - works or not. *Fräulein* is the ironic nickname given to Lance-corporal Ritter, not because he is in any way cowardly or squeamish. On the contrary, he is described as "...a good, competent soldier who could always be relied upon"⁷⁹ The passage in which the narrator tells us of the origin of his nickname is as follows:

Lance-corporal Ritter had been given this name because of a tenderness which dwelt in his strong body, a good-natured softness which his comrades did not understand and which his superiors opposed, so that it did not become weakness. He could not offend anyone or hurt anyone, and he would rather do all the work himself than speak a harsh word to the one who should have done it but didn't. He had gained the nickname because he had once asked to be dismissed from the commando which was to shoot chief Süder.⁸⁰

This is the decisive point. Ritter is incapable of that distancing gaze which the European eye has been cultivating for such a long time, and which allows the genocide perpetrated in the Herero wars. A few pages later this is stated more clearly:

But when it came to the blacks, his good-naturedness was absolutely dangerous. He saw in the black man just another human being, like his countrymen.⁸¹

In other words, Ritter postulates an initial absence of difference between the native and the European. The space of the native's body, which ethnography has worked so hard to delineate, has been reduced hypothetically to the same space as that of the European. The border has been crossed. The narrative corrects this anomalous situation by placing Ritter in a position in which he is forced to shoot a Hottentot girl, whom he had previously rescued from the side of the road, and who is in the process of betraying him and his companions. At the end of the story we learn that the key to his behaviour lies in the concept of duty -

⁷⁹ Hans Walther, "Fräulein" [Missy], in *Orlog!*, p. 171.

⁸⁰ Walther, *Fräulein*, p. 169.

⁸¹ Walther, *Fräulein*, p. 171.

"No! What I did before, what I did afterwards, whether I rescued the child or shot her... it was all the same. - It was my duty." - The man spoke as if confessing.
 "Not to think of oneself!"⁸²

What his companions had interpreted as weakness, what the modern reader might have understood as an admirably humane quality in the face of general brutality, is reclaimed for the colonial project as a commitment to duty which is capable of shifting with equal abandon between the position of compassion and that of a killer. In a way, this makes it more callous than the simple naive obedience of Ritter's fellow soldiers. But it is not my intention to engage in moral speculation. What is important for us is that, whereas his fellow soldiers adopt the attitude of soldiers - they kill because it is their *military* duty, Ritter adopts the attitude of a scientist. He is committed to a more abstract duty, and for that reason, he hypothesizes an equality of mankind. But like a good scientist of his time, he allows empirical data to prove his hypothesis incorrect. We have seen that a hypothetical sharing of experience is the necessary first step in gaining knowledge about the native. But if this shared experience is to become knowledge, it must be processed as a writing. That is, a space must be opened between the eye, which extracts meaning, and the object, whose specificity disappears within a signifying system. In this way, the latter is reduced to an object at a distance from the knowing subject. But in addition, it is this distance which allows such knowledge to become functional - and we have already seen that the functionalization of anthropological knowledge places it always on the verge of effecting a political repression. This is what the fable of Ritter tautologically demonstrates - that the hypothesis of equality with the savage proves itself wrong, not because it testifies to an individual weakness or a sentimental character, but simply because in the scenario which colonial discourse projects as reality, it does not work.

The mythical mastery of space undertaken in colonial discourse becomes more difficult when it confronts the native in his own space, in the setting of a spatial organization which testifies to a structured socius - the native village. What is most

⁸² Walther, *Fräulein*, p. 211.

typical of descriptions of the native village is the sense of loss which the European eye must feel in the face of this spatial order - an order of which the European cannot partake. We may generalize two basic reactions to this sense of loss. The one is open aggression, and the other, more subtle reaction is an attempt to develop a position from which the complexity of native space may be surveyed. The former reaction is typical of narcissistic aggression, and results from the subject attempting to project himself into a space which he cannot occupy. The result is, as we have seen, a paranoiac structuration of knowledge, in which the object is fixed in a field defined by subjective economy on the one hand and the organizational mode of European knowledge on the other. The European eye is in a position to survey a tabloid of native life in its entirety. As a result, we are presented with fleeting images of native space. These are fixed as objects of European knowledge, and almost invariably arouse disgust in the viewer. As an example, the following passage from Raggys Fahrt nach Südwest.

On the beach to the right was a small Herero village, a row of dirty pontocks, built of old sacks and tin cans filled with sand. This village was surrounded by a ring of all kinds of rubbish. An acrid qualm from the campfires mingled with an unbelievable and indefinable stink. Tall, handsome men and women moved to and fro between the huts, deformed by greasy European clothing.⁸³

Note that it is not necessary for the timeless present to be introduced as a distancing strategy. Here the European eye finds itself capable of surveying the space of the native village, and aggressivity manifests itself in open disgust. Note also that the anthropological motif of the "handsome, men and women" is introduced only to display the natives as a caricature of themselves mimicing the appearance of Europeans.

An interesting contrast to this is provided by the Ambo village, which McKiernan describes as follows:

The exterior of his place - which occupied considerable ground - presented nothing but a line of palisades or stockade made of slender poles, about twelve feet high and about a foot in thickness. Small huts were scattered about the walls, and lounging about them were numbers of armed retainers, keeping guard. The entrance was at the eastern side, as are those of all the Okonyama residences. All of them are also built after the same plan as the

⁸³ Haase, Raggys Fahrt, p. 153-154.

chief's, varying only in point of size, according to the wealth of the owner. Passing through the main entrance, which is made to close in case of danger, we found ourselves between two lines of stockade in a passage extending all the way around the place, and only wide enough for two men to pass. Following our guide around to the west-side, we passed through the second line, and followed another passage to the eastward. So on, tracing and retracing our steps, crossing and recrossing winding passages till all but the guide were completely confused, and none of us could have found our way out again without assistance.⁸⁴

As may be seen, this space requires a ritual of entry which is not determined by the European. Nor is it possible to survey this space with the eye, or to map it. Nor could it be described in specific terms. How then is the European to establish any form of knowledge about this space; how is he to represent himself in passage through it?

There are several ways in which colonial discourse reacts to this space. One is to incorporate the spatial structure of the Ambo village into European myth - the myth of the maze. This is the tendency in McKiernan's narrative. Here the space of the native *socius* is accessible via a European mode of confronting the limits of its own *socius*. The crossing from European space into non-European space repeats the crossing which has always been possible from the space of European knowledge to those spaces in which knowledge takes on another form. But in doing so, it allows the crossing itself to be incorporated into a totalized European experience.

Another possible reaction to this space is for descriptive discourse to present a generalized schema of the Ambo village, such as that given by von Eckenbrecher:

An Ambo village is an extensive palisade made of many hundreds of poles. The inside is a confusion of little alleys, a regular maze, in which the various huts are situated. The huts are of different sizes, and their very finely-woven pointed roofs are made from grass. The men, each wife, the grown and half-grown sons and daughters each have a special hut. In addition, there are the store huts and baskets, the beer pots, and the kraals for the large and small cattle. It is difficult for the uninitiated to find his way. The chief's village is built in the same way, only larger.⁸⁵

It is in keeping with the observation made earlier that she presents her description in the timeless present. The aporia of such a schematization is its inability to present any description which could be useful in finding a passage

⁸⁴ *Journal of Gerald McKiernan*, p. 106.

⁸⁵ von Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*, p. 27.

through this space, since the design of the Ambo village is always specifically unknown, even though it may be integrated in general terms into European descriptive knowledge. Von Eckenbrecher is also quite correct in tying this to the fact that the European observer is the other of the native socius - an outsider, a non-initiate. Nevertheless, the detached description can replace that sense of loss which may ensue from the recognition of being excluded from a social order. This is achieved simply by integrating that social order into a more universal perspective - that of European knowledge.

Another strategy would be a shift in rhetorical attitude. Pratt notes the multiple dissociation arising from being placed at the center of someone else's stage, and observes a tendency in the travelogue to parody and self-parody whenever the situation arises where the traveller must appear at the court of the native.⁸⁶ Indeed, McKiernan's account does finally reverie to parody; he portrays the chief as "a child, wanting to play and be amused...

We had at the wagons an electrical machine; he had seen it and nothing would do, but that we must send for it. It worked with a crank and was very powerful. He had a wonderful nerve for holding it, and was highly pleased that he could stand a greater shock than any of our party.⁸⁷

In most descriptions I encountered, however, there is a marked sense of unease as the European is led farther away from a space he feels he can master, and into the heart of a space he must experience as decidedly hostile and other. Thus, for example, Wilhelm Mattenklodt's description of the passage into the center of such a village. When Mattenklodt's hunting party visits the village of the "Ovambo Sultan Niangana," they are taken to see the chief:

His village is hidden in the forest not far from the river. It is surrounded by a high palisade fence covered in matting, behind which a swarm of round huts stoop under heavy grass rooves. Sultan's slaves led us through a maze to the counsel place, where upon entering we were met by at least a hundred warriors, armed to the teeth, crouching and eyeing us with curiosity and suspicion.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Pratt, *Face of the country*, p. 151.

⁸⁷ *Journal of Gerald McKiernan*, p. 107.

⁸⁸ Mattenklodt, *Afrikanische Jagden*, p. 15.

Like von Eckenbrecher, he confidently begins the description of his passage with a distanced observation presented in the timeless present. However, as soon as the distance is negated in the act of passage, he must switch to the past tense. Here the sense of threat is immediately evident. Even McKiernan, states that, "after a long detention," they were "glad to get away."⁸⁹ In all of these reactions, colonial discourse has developed strategies for representing this alien space as a pocket of strange territory within the universal field of European knowledge.

3 TRADE AND KNOWLEDGE, ONE-WAY SPACE.

In the previous section we saw how descriptive strategies serve to orient the gaze of the European on native space in such a way that it could be surveyed and integrated into European knowledge, or rejected as a space of danger or savagery. We saw that this involves a strategy of passage between specific space and universal quality. In this section I shall attempt to show another set of descriptive strategies which shift the focus of the gaze from the timeless present to the future. This is almost invariably employed in the service of development capital; that is, together with the necessity and possibility of developing the land so as to make the colonies profitable. Whereas the colonizing gaze of the scientist looks at the specific and negates it in a universalizing gesture, the gaze of the developer focusses on its specificity in order to negate it within a scenario of capitalist production. This latter gaze is no less a spatializing gaze. It, too, negates the specific temporal determination of vision in order to create a space of knowledge. It, too, is a writing, in which a signifying space is established - a space which produces meaning by the temporal negation of a specific position within a signifying system.

One major institutional factor supporting this discursive strategy was the appearance in the 1880's of various societies seeking to promote colonial

⁸⁹ Journal of Gerald McKiernan, p. 107.

development. Among these, for example, was the *Central Society for Commercial Geography and the Promotion of German Interests Overseas*, whose chairman, Dr Robert Jannasch, composed a revealing travelogue - *A Description of the Kaokoland*, dated 17.3.1885.⁹⁰ The name of the society which Jannasch headed itself informs us in the most direct terms of the strategies involved in the determination of his vision. These revolve around a subtle shift from the discourses of natural science to those of commerce, a strategy which is quite common in travel descriptions of this type. This is certainly to be expected, for these texts set out to portray the land in its potential for German exploitation. The land is apprehended as that which it has not yet become.

Jannasch begins with an 'objective' description of "the land between the 22nd and 18th degree latitude south."⁹¹ He describes in cursory fashion the topography, vegetation, geology and water conditions. In the best style of contemporary discourse, he then moves to the question of land utilization.

The entire region is given over to free nature. Only individual Cimbetas and Berg-Damaras graze their herds on the mighty pastures, which are capable of providing good grazing for millions of cattle and sheep.⁹²

Where descriptive discourse does not allow the land to be depicted as empty, it is shown to be under-utilized, under-developed. When Jannasch gazes at the "wide table-lands," he sees not only "deeply incised gorges and eroded vallies.., whose slopes are covered with dense jungle..," he also sees jungles "...whose volume comprises valuable woods."⁹³ It is not always easy here to distinguish reported vision from hearsay reported as vision, or from phantasy. Nor need we interrogate the truth of these visions. What concerns us is that Jannasch is visualizing the landscape on three levels: in terms of what he sees and can report in the discourse of natural history; in terms of what he has heard ("The Damaras who come here in trading parties constantly complain of the cold during the winters there...");⁹⁴ and in terms

⁹⁰ Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvernements, WA ZBU L.II.a.4, Bd 1, pp. 70-73.

⁹¹ Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvernements, WA ZBU L.II.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70.

⁹² Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvernements, WA ZBU L.II.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70.

⁹³ Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvernements, WA ZBU L.II.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70.

⁹⁴ Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvernements, WA ZBU L.II.a.4, Bd 1, p. 71.

of what might be, the potential of this landscape for German economic interests. It is a typical strategy of this discourse to create a landscape in which these three visualizations coincide. While gazing on the landscape with the eye of knowledge, the traveller gathers the speech of the native into the field of this knowledge and imagines the productive future of the landscape. At the same time, however, he also allows his phantasy to roam freely, projecting various desires onto this landscape. Thus he phantasizes that these are jungles "in which elephants and panthers still roam..."⁹⁵ This phantasy will eventually have to be repressed in the name of knowledge and productivity. As a relatively unpredictable, desiring mode of apprehending the world, it is directly opposed to the interests of the developing gaze. Nevertheless, it will persist in other discursive forms, as an alternate spatial experience. It will serve to define the conditions under which the borders of knowledge may be crossed. The repression of the desiring gaze leaves its trace on all the discourses of the developer and explorer. This leads to certain contradictory positions and tensions which must be resolved if such discourse is to remain coherent. This is well illustrated in a short story by Karl Dove, Auf unbekanntem Pfaden [On unknown paths].⁹⁶

In this story we see a clear description of the way the desire of the explorer - the desire to look on the new - transforms itself into a desire for production of capital in the name of the colony. The story begins with the desire of the explorer in its purest form; that is, in the dual investment in gazing on the new and speaking the unheard-of:

My soul was faced with ever more glowing and intense images of fantastic places where no person had ever set foot, and upon which my own eyes were the first to alight; and of which I would then inform the astonished world.⁹⁷

Indeed, this is exactly what Jakob Krebs experiences. He sets out in search of and discovers a hidden valley of whose existence he has learnt from Missionary Böhm. After penetrating deep into the heart of this hidden and fertile land, which is

⁹⁵ Akten des Kaiserlich Gouvernements, WA ZBU L.II.a.4, Bd 1, p. 70.

⁹⁶ Karl Dove, "Auf unbekanntem Pfaden" [On unknown paths], in Die Kobra. Südafrikanische Erzählungen [The cobra. South African Tales] (Berlin: W S Schmidt, 1911).

⁹⁷ Dove, unbekannte Pfade, p. 70.

teeming with game and has abundant permanent water, he discovers and is discovered by a lost tribe of Nama. Krebs is made their "prisoner" in order to protect the secret of their valley from the intrusion of the white man - that is, he is made their guest and treated like a chief or a sorcerer, but he is not permitted ever to leave the valley. Here a mythology of the Edenic landscape is confronted with the "necessity" of expansion of geographic knowledge and, as we learn, of capital; for this is the decisive point. Krebs discovers diamonds in the valley.

...in all probability, the ground upon which I stood bore riches worth many hundreds of millions.⁹⁸

The natives are of course unable to appreciate these stones in terms of capital value:

My conjecture became certainty upon receipt of a number of other diamonds, which were given to me by the natives; the latter believed that my amazement over the stones I held was simply a sign of pleasure because of their wonderful play of colors.⁹⁹

And this is one reason why the question of whether the valley should be placed under the care of capitalist development or left in secrecy is made to pivot about the presence of the stones. Krebs himself writes

[The success of my explorations] is so important that it could influence the future of the entire German Protectorate in unthought-of ways. And this, too, will have to be credited to me as a remaining achievement for a great and promising colony.¹⁰⁰

It is important to realize that there are two possible ways of interpreting Krebs's desire to gaze on the new with explorer's eyes. We could see it as representative of the despot's desire, a desire which urges him at all times toward writing. Thus Krebs finds himself in an impossible situation where, to tell of his discovery and find confirmation of his great deed, he must leave the valley. This he does only at the risk of death. Thus he writes of his discovery in his journal, and can be reassured with the hope that his writing will grant him meaning when he has no being. And yet, we must be cautious here; Krebs finds it possible to define his desire in such a way that meaning and death are both productive through their presence - whether

⁹⁸ Dove, *unbekannte Pfade*, p. 86.

⁹⁹ Dove, *unbekannte Pfade*, p. 86.

¹⁰⁰ Dove, *unbekannte Pfade*, p. 84.

Krebs lives and tells the world of his own discovery or dies and leaves his written memoirs, meaning is a productive presence.

If success crowns my plan to flee at last the captivity in which I have been held for just a year now.. the world will hear enough of this wonderful place from my own mouth. If I should fail, I must reckon with the not remote possibility that my body will be found somewhere, and at least preserve the most important thing, the course of my explorations, in these papers, so that at least after my death I will gain fame as the first European to set foot in this land.¹⁰¹

Throughout the story there is a constant tension between, on the one hand, the possibility of a productive harnessing of meaning in the name of individual desire; and on the other hand, the necessity to pay for this productivity in meaning with death. This tension persists right up to the last paragraph. Here we are told that it is precisely this productive function of death and signification which has tied individual desiring production to social production and served to enrich the colony.

...he was a great explorer, and if he can really see from up there what transpires down here, then I think it must cause him great joy to know that his deed will not be forgotten. I will have a copy of these notes made at the English Residency in Walfish Bay, and ensure that they are distributed.¹⁰²

And yet, in the final sentence, the fact of death cannot be denied.

And so the unfortunate man will at least find in death the fame which he sought in vain during his life.¹⁰³

The strategy of this text is to present us with the possible mode of personal loss facing the explorer and then transpose this onto a social structure in which any form of individual loss is productive. Capitalist production is able to harness the structure of subjectivity in signification and reverse it, so that the mutual exclusion of being and meaning is subsumed in the name of social production. Being without meaning is harnessed as a productive force, as is meaning without Being.

Earlier in this chapter we saw that the sense of loss which follows when the European eye gazes on "empty" space is resolved in strategies of distancing which fix the object in a space defined by the field of European knowledge. In the visual field, concrete experience is enlisted in order to produce the object of European

101 Dove, *unbekannte Pfade*, p. 84.

102 Dove, *unbekannte Pfade*, p. 88.

103 Dove, *unbekannte Pfade*, p. 88.

knowledge as defining the limits of civilization. When we consider the paradigm of capitalist development in colonial discourse we can see that the process in question is the same. Here, too, discourse defines passages between two different types of space - the universal space of capitalism, which is produced by banishing temporality in the tense of the timeless present (this is the tense we find in the above passages whenever the theme of development is broached); and the concrete space of capitalism which is produced by mapping universal space onto concrete bodies. Thus we might speak of such a thing as the capitalist gaze which situates the landscape and its inhabitants within the field of universal knowledge, while at the same time specifying this universality by concrete relations between bodies.

In order to illustrate what I mean by this second, specifying function, let us turn once again to Margarethe von Eckenbrecher:

As gifts they [the "bushmen"] hold tobacco and salt in great esteem, while they are not fond of sugar. They love to smoke the intoxicating Dagga (hemp). It has been said of the bushmen that they know where diamonds are to be found. I know of a case where a matchbox full of Dagga was been traded for diamonds of considerable worth.¹⁰⁴

Here again, von Eckenbrecher begins with a description in the timeless present, defining the relation of the "Bushmen" to commodities. This we can read as establishing part of the capitalist repertoire of value in terms of the market. The knowledge which is decisive for the trader is the asymmetry of value, and the desire of the market. As such, capitalism always depends upon a concretization of universal abstract principles (the fact that a profit can be made) into a specific relation (what must be sold to whom for how much). This process is described by Deleuze and Guattari as a transformation of surplus value of code into surplus value of flux. According to them, it is money which provides the site of this transformation.¹⁰⁵ The concretization involved in this transformation determines a particular quality of space - that space in which the transformation of the abstract into the concrete may be performed. This is the tautological universal space of capitalism. In the above example, the quality of space opened up between the European eye and the

¹⁰⁴ von Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*, p. 46.

¹⁰⁵ Deleuze und Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 228.

"bushman" as object is specified in terms of a number of passages defined by various flows and their interruption. The desire of the "bushman" is apprehended by capitalist knowledge and interrupted by a flow of commodities (hemp). At the same time capitalist knowledge avails itself of the "bushman's" specific knowledge, which is a practical knowledge (where the diamonds are to be found). It is effective, however, by relativizing this practical knowledge as non-knowledge (the extreme disproportion of value between the matchbox full of hemp and the "considerable number" of diamonds). Thus we find that the space between the subject and the object of colonial trade is defined by an asymmetry of flows between the two. This is the most elementary colonizing gesture which capitalism performs. It actualizes a certain form of codification in an apparently equal trade. But the inequality exists on the level of the code. Capitalist knowledge alone - and not the knowledge of the 'bushman' - has access to this code. This ensures that the flow of value between the two will always be resolved in the capitalist's favour. Capitalist knowledge determines spaces of trade as those spaces across which a number of flows may be initiated, such that the balance of value accrues to the subject of knowledge. And this knowledge is specific and concrete.¹⁰⁶ Colonial discourse is constantly interpreting this 'one-way' space in a number of ways. For one, the description of trade ties universal knowledge (which is capitalist knowledge) to the familiar social-Darwinist theme of the survival of the strongest. The fact that the capitalist knows to read and apply the value of code proves that he is justified in doing so. And furthermore, the fact that the native willingly participates in the ritual of trade and is satisfied with its conclusion proves that he has a similar, if less developed, commitment to the code. Its universality is established in the moment of its specific realization - in the moment of trade. This common commitment to the code is the birth of credit, and once it is initiated, it cannot be stopped. This is evident in the manner in which the natives lost their cattle and their land.

¹⁰⁶ Even McKiernan states explicitly that "much that my route book contained had reference to routes, waters, conditions of country as regards trade and such matters, but of no interest here [i.e., the United States - J.N.]," *Journal of Gerald McKiernan*, p. 25.

The white man was able to acquire stock without financial aid from the State, and having acquired stock, he could graze it on the land on which the despoiled natives had formerly grazed it. The natives, being reduced to penury and being no longer independent, would be compelled to enter into the service of the white man and act as the herds of the stock which they had formerly called their own.¹⁰⁷

And once the commitment to the code has been established, any practical means of applying the code seem justified. Thus, with the promulgation of the 1903 Credit Ordinance, "traders were given... one year in which to collect outstandings, which would be prescribed thereafter, and they fell on the Herero cattle like a pack of ravenous wolves... Apart from the taking of their cattle, there was a gradual appropriation of their land, a process which went on concurrently with the cattle-lifting and grew in proportion as the number of cattle acquired by the white "traders" increased."¹⁰⁸ The manner in which this is initiated is unimpressive, quaint, and innocent. This is well illustrated in the following paragraph:

Usually in the afternoons the natives would come to barter cattle for various articles of trade, flour, rice, sugar, coffee, clothes, shoes... The concept of payment was incomprehensible to many. And so we used stones and coffee beans. My husband placed a handful in front of the person concerned, who then took as many away as he thought the animal he was selling was worth in Marks. When an agreement was reached, the seller of the cattle then shoved as many stones or beans to my husband as the amount for which he wanted to have this or that... It is clear that this kind of barter is very long-winded, and it becomes more difficult, the higher the price of the bartered animal. Cash was almost never used for payment in South West, and even one's own workers were payed as described above.¹⁰⁹

Here we can see clearly that capitalist knowledge brings two bodies together by repeating the flow of commodities and money on the level of representation. The code is firmly controlled by capitalism (since payment is effected in the same mode as purchase). We can also see that this representation of a flow assumes ritual proportions and commits both partners equally to the same passage between the codification of flows and the flows themselves.

As a result, the desire of the colonized is utilized for the purposes of capitalist production, while at the same time the knowledge which the colonized attaches to

107 Great Britain, Report on the natives of South West Africa and their treatment by Germany. Imperial Blue Book (Windhoek, 1918), p. 50.

108 Imperial Blue Book, pp. 50-51; See also ch. 10, pp. 46-50.

109 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir gab und nahm, p. 92.

his desire is denied. What I mean by this is - the trader takes the 'bushman's' wish for hemp seriously, but there is never a hint that the 'bushman' might be correct in his knowledge that hemp is a very valuable substance, while diamonds are virtually useless. Capitalist knowledge must always distinguish clearly between the relativity of specific, practical knowledge and the universality of abstract principles upon which its practice is founded. It is this distinction which allows capitalist knowledge its cynicism, for the morally indefensible act is always specific, and never to be contemplated on the same level as the principle which necessitated it. The distinction between specific and universal knowledge is also that which allows capitalist knowledge to render the actions of the native significant within the system of universal representation. The native may only be moving stones in order to sell a cow, but the capitalist sees in those motions a mirror of himself and his world.

CHAPTER III: WRITING

All women and children who had come to us were given the Proclamation to the Nation drafted in Otjiherero and chased back into the desert.

General Lothar von Trotha

1 OPENING A SPACE OF KNOWLEDGE IN WRITING

1.1 *Writing on the earth/on paper*

In the previous section, I attempted to show that the indeterminacy of a gaze which seeks to realize its desire within a boundless space threatens the integrity of the subject, threatens communication and representation, and is therefore a very real threat to the social order. I also claimed that the way out of this dilemma is envisaged by colonial discourse as a commitment to spatial order. This is defined in terms of fixed boundaries and privileged passages between spaces. The European subject gazing onto a strange object, looking across a strange space, is thus forced to adopt a manner of looking which can serve as an initial ordering of space. In this chapter, I aim to show that the force which renders the indeterminate gaze of desire suitable for the process of colonization is a force which proliferates as writing - in the widest sense of the word. This is quite simply the necessity of developing a representational technique for ensuring that any specific individual positions of subjectivity are appropriated in the service of universal representation.

This will present itself first of all as a question of the subject's mobility in an unknown space. We saw that unlimited mobility has two moments - it threatens the integrity of the subject by releasing desire from its social bounds; and, in a reversal of this release, it defines spaces of subjectivity as a function of the various spaces which this mythic mobility has linked. Lacanian theory attempts to explain, in terms of the structure of subjectivity, why this should be so. We have seen in our discussion of Lacan's theory of the gaze that the gazing subject positions himself in social space by an abstraction of lines of vision relating to a real surface. The problem of the subject moving through an "unknown" space and struggling with the repeatability of his motions exemplifies this manner of looking. This is because the process initiated when the European subject moves through an alien space is paradigmatic for the self-interrogation of consciousness. The lack of familiar objects against which he can

measure himself leads to an initial threat to subjective identity. The subject who retains an identity while moving through a strange space is necessarily placing himself in the position of a transcendental subject, the abstract subject who might at some later time stand where he is standing. He is constructing an abstract transcendental identity which would always move through this same space in the same manner. This is the function of mapping. Here he is representing himself spatially within a signifying system - a symbolic order. As such, his desire is the desire of a transcendental subject given as a position within a signifying order. This signifying order is given as a social space which is, for his purposes, interchangeable with the space of the landscape through which he is moving. In short, his gaze produces the space of the landscape as a social space in which his own position promises the unity of being and meaning. However, mapping is only the most obvious example of this symbolic fixing of the mobile subject. In the following, I will present a number of examples to show that the very mobility of the European in colonial space, like the informed vision of the scientist, issues from writing (in the widest sense of the word) and produces writing - a writing in books and a writing on the earth.

On 24 April 1884, what would later be referred to euphorically as "the birth certificate of German Colonial Politics"¹ was issued in the form of a telegram from Bismarck to the German consul in Cape Town, which read as follows:

According to communications from Mr Lüderitz, the Colonial Officials are in doubt regarding any claim to protection from Germany which may be applicable to his acquisitions north of the Orange River. You are to declare officially that he and his settlements are under the protection of the Empire.²

With this geographical definition, we see the beginning not only of the colony, but also of what will be a constant and often difficult struggle to define exactly what the territory of German South West Africa may be taken to comprise. We will be examining the problems associated with tracing the borders of the territory on the

¹ Cit. Jacob, *Deutsche Kolonialpolitik*, p. 59.

² Cit. Jacob, *Deutsche Kolonialpolitik*, p. 59.

map and transferring these tracings to the landscape in a later section. At the moment, let us note that it is not purely by chance, nor is it a matter of convenience that the birth of the colony must be marked by the issue of a "birth certificate" - that it must be written. The issue of this certificate is the signature which the despot applies to what has in fact been a long and gradual inscription of the earth. The birth of the colony is the result of an ever increasing alignment between a writing on paper and an inscription of the earth.

Prior to Bismarck's official declaration, there existed an increasing activity of writing on the earth - an activity which should be construed in the dual sense of a writing about that region that was to become South West Africa on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an actual tracing on the earth, a marking of the earth with lines capable of bearing meaning. There is, in the early (what we might call preparatory) stage of colonization, a constant dialogue between these two writings on the earth. This takes the form of a proliferation of lines at various levels. At this stage I prefer to speak of lines rather than texts, since the tracings on the earth function more on the level of lines - their organisation into unities which might be referred to as texts is only accomplished at a later stage. Lines on the earth give rise to lines of writing in books, and these in turn allow more lines to be traced on the earth. And attached to lines of writing are 'lines of thought' and 'lines of argument' - these function as means of spatial organization on a level which appears to be universally valid.

The origins of this process cannot be situated definitely, and it is this dialogue which constitutes what we saw Todorov referring to as Europe's ancient memories of Africa. There have always been travellers in Africa, and there have always been strange tales of what they saw. These strange tales define spatial passages which do indeed possess universality. But their universality lacks the essential quality which colonization requires of universal spatial structuration; that is, another set of determined passages which will link it to the specific. Colonization requires a writing which not only traces mythical passages, but maps them onto specific

landscapes in accordance with specific rules. And in colonization it is not the mythic passages themselves which must fulfil the requirements of universality, it is this abstract principle of transformation.

When we refer specifically to the region between the Orange and Kunene rivers, we could establish a definite genealogy of a written German presence, culminating in Bismarck's declaration of 1884. Such a project would be a worthwhile endeavour in its own right, and its form can only be indicated here in the most cursory fashion. We can speak of three rough divisions of writing which are important here, all of which existed more or less independently, motivated by different interests, often at odds with one another, and nevertheless communicating with one another on various levels, and often working together. These writings are defined by the presence of the missionaries, the traders, and the explorers/adventurers.³ These are only approximate categories. To do justice to such a genealogy, for example, we would have to accord the large "Colonial Societies," which were founded for the purpose of economic exploitation of the new territory, a category of their own;⁴ likewise the scientific expeditions. There is a complex interaction of interests here. The scientific expeditions often served to link the interests of the "societies" with those of an "impartial" scientific discourse. And, as we have seen, we only need mention the names of the early societies to see the

3 A study of the type I am proposing is yet to be made. There are, however, a number of very useful and informative studies of these categories. For the role of the missionaries, see K. J. Bade (ed), Imperialismus und Kolonialmission. Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte 22 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1982); Jan de Vries, Mission and colonialism in Namibia (Braamfontein: Ravan, 1978); Horst Gruender, Christliche Mission und deutscher Imperialismus (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1982); Karl Hammer, Weltmission und Kolonialismus (München: dtv, 1981); Heinrich Loth, Die christliche Mission in Südwestafrika (Berlin, 1963). Ridley discusses the literary treatment of the conflict between mission and imperialism (Ridley, Images of Imperial rule, pp. 104-111.) For accounts of travel and exploration, see Eduard Moritz, "Die Anfänge der Erforschung von Südwestafrika," in Koloniale Rundschau (1918), pp. 114-126, 234-249; Paul Ritter, "Die ersten Forschungsreisen über den Oranje" in Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 54 (1942), pp. 153-155. A useful study in English, not only with respect to travel, but for general historical information, is Alvin Kienetz, Nineteenth-Century South West Africa as a German settlement colony (University of Minnesota. PhD, 1976). Kienetz gives a large number of excerpts from travelogues translated into English.

4 See M. Nussbaum, Vom Kolonialenthusiasmus zur Kolonialpolitik der Monopole (Berlin, 1962); R. V. Pierard, "The German Colonial Society 1882-1914" (PhD dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1964); K. J. Bade, Friedrich Fabri und der Imperialismus in der Bismarckzeit, Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte 13 (Wiesbaden: Freiburg, 1975); Otto Diehn, Kaufmannschaft und deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik von der Jahrhundertwende bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (Hamburg, 1956).

important role which the movements of capital played in the growth of the colonial Idea: the *Central Society for Commercial Geography and the Promotion of German Interests Overseas* was founded in 1878 by Robert Jannasch; the *West German Association for Colonization and Export* was founded by Friedrich Fabri in 1880,⁵ and involved cooperation with Woermann; the *German Colonial Society* was founded on 6 December 1882; and together with the *Society for German Colonization*, founded on 28 March 1884 by Carl Peters, was amalgamated into the *German Colonial Society* on 19 December 1887. At a later stage, such an investigation would have to add the very important category of the settler, whose writing then ties in with the writing of the "Societies" by way of the "Settlement Society."⁶

The role of the traders is interesting in this context. Deleuze and Guattari have noted that "writing has never been Capitalism's thing. Capitalism is profoundly illiterate."⁷ In the colonial showplace we find this illiteracy being ushered in by the trader. He does not write in the same way that the missionary and explorer writes, because his activity signifies only itself - it justifies and explains itself without recourse to a higher authority. And yet, initially, in the showplace of the colony, the traces he leaves on the earth are able to be incorporated into the writing which belongs to the despot. This holds true whether we see the despot as the Kaiser, or the Colonial Idea - they amount to the same thing. What is important is that the trader leaves marks on the earth which are subsequently incorporated into a system of meaning revolving around German presence. We shall see presently how this works, particularly in the "opening up" of the colony via a series of pathways. The trader, however, continues to occupy a marginal position within the despotic regime. He enjoys an unusual mobility across borders, and he is able to cross them in a manner which, while confirming their presence, confirms them as an effect within

⁵ Fabri had published a plea for colonization in 1879, entitled Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? Eine politisch-ökonomische Betrachtung (Gotha: Perthes, 1879).

⁶ See Gerd Sudholt, Die deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik in Südwest-Afrika, von den Anfängen bis 1904, pt. 2, ch. 2: "Die Tätigkeit der Siedlungsgesellschaften" (Hildesheim: Olm, 1975); K Frey, "Aus der Frühzeit der weißen Besiedlung Südwestafrikas." in Afrikanische Heimatkalender 27 (1956), pp. 89-104.

⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 240.

the system of flows of money, and not as a qualitatively subordinate division within a homogeneous and universal space. The trader does not master space in a mythical manner, he attempts to render it productive. The mythical mastery of space is only possible in narrative, and, although we find the trader's mobility often mythologized in colonial discourse, the marks he leaves on the ground are insignificant, and if his journey is to be repeated, then only by himself. We will find constant evidence in colonial discourse of the conflict which arises between the mobile trader and the enclosing, bordering work of colonization.

It seems reasonable to assert that, by the early 1880s, these distinct writings had come to align themselves ever more with the idea that they were not only distinct writings in the service of God or Knowledge on the one hand, nor of personal interest on the other hand, but that they were also in the service of German possession of South West Africa. Thus we find statements such as the following being made:

The question has been put to me often enough in recent times, just what von Lüderitz and Germany are doing in Angra Pequena. I answer by showing, partly by way of my own experience, what Germany's sons have, through the most strenuous labours, already accomplished in those parts of South West Africa to which Angra Pequena (and Walfish Bay) are the gateways. When the German flag is hoisted over those harbours, it is not as if some "discoverer" accidentally sailing past were, through ceremonial form, to declare "uninhabited" land his own. For almost 50 years now, Germans have been working there, and have begun to sow the seeds of Christianity and Culture in those wild regions.⁸

Here we can see quite clearly the ease with which the civilizing discourse of Christianity, that of expanding knowledge and trade align themselves in the name of the colonial and national Idea. It is interesting to note that the organization of these writings into a discourse which could properly be called colonial accompanied the administrative organization of the colonial Idea in the form of the Colonial Societies. This is not surprising, when we consider that those who were writing books and articles on their experiences in Africa were often the same as those pleading for German colonization, and again they were often directly involved in the

⁸ C. G. Büttner, Das Hinterland von Walfischbai und Angra Pequena. Eine Übersicht der Kulturarbeit deutscher Missionare und der seitherigen Entwicklung des deutschen Handels in Südwestafrika (Heidelberg: Winter 1884), p. 3-4.

founding or administration of the societies (Friedrich Fabri and Carl Peters). And of course those who believed they stood to gain financially from colonization also did much to plead its case (the steamship magnate Woermann). It would thus be tempting to believe that colonization could be viewed as a well-engineered scheme managed solely by individuals motivated by personal interests. It is, however, important to realize the two conflicting moments at work here. On the one hand, these individuals and societies had a strictly organizational function. That is, they sought to coordinate existing forms of writing and to compile a text which could have definite political effects. On the other hand, however, this activity was not in the service of signification, nor of the despot. Its goal was not the production of meaning, but of capital, and any meaning it might produce in the form of an ideology of colonization was incidental.

The conflict between capitalist development and the colonial Idea also appears as a conflict within government. This became increasingly evident during the Herero rebellion, when Parliament was not prepared to continue financing what it considered to be a grossly mismanaged protectorate administration. This finally led to the dissolution of Parliament and its re-constitution in the so-called 'Hottentot Elections' in 1907, when Chancellor von Bülow, a strong proponent of the colonial Idea, came to power. Bismarck himself had never been very convinced of any advantages of colonization. Thus he stated in 1865

...the advantages one hopes to gain for the commerce and industry of the motherland are founded largely on illusion. As the experience of colonial policies in England and France demonstrates, the costs involved in establishing, supporting, and, above all, retaining a colony are most often in excess of the gains which the Motherland derives from it; and this quite apart from the fact that it is difficult to justify the imposition of considerable taxation upon the entire nation for the advantage of individual branches of trade and commerce...⁹

Even after his official declaration of support, Bismarck was continually reluctant to support the colonial project. He did, in fact, take the idea of a German presence in Africa quite seriously. But, in contrast to the colonial proponents, who saw only (or mainly) the effect which German colonization would have on the

⁹ Cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien, p. 110. My translation.

quality of African space, Bismarck realized that it would also change the quality of European space. Thus on 5 December 1888 he commented to Eugen Wolf, a well known African explorer and proponent of the colonial Idea: "Your map of Africa is very nice, but my map of Africa is right here in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France, and we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa."¹⁰

As a government policy, colonization cannot succeed without attaching itself to a discursive strategy which can represent African space as a function of European space; that is, colonization must be made attractive in terms of the European experience of Europe. This must be accomplished not only by arousing a general passion for exotic and distant lands, but also by a means of argumentation which concerns European experience. On 2 March 1885, Bismarck told the Reichstag: "A politics of colonization is only possible when it is supported decisively and with conviction by the will of a majority of the nation."¹¹ These sentiments were echoed by Dr Miquel, addressing the founders of the Colonial Society: "The colonial question should be a question behind which the entire nation stands."¹² As the colonial Idea grows, we find an ever increasing attempt to define the relation between German space and European space by mapping these spaces onto the rest of the world. Thus Carl Peters:

The colonial movement is the natural culmination of the struggle for German national unity. It was only natural that, having established on the battlefields of Königgrätz and Sedan their position of power in Europe, the German people felt an immediate need to put an end to the wretched and in part despicable status which our nation held beyond the great seas, and at the same time to share in those material advantages which have in all times ensued from the large-scale development of sovereignty.¹³

When the disparate writings on South West Africa begin to organize themselves in the service of the colonial Idea, they function in two ways: firstly, they effect a mythology of colonization, and so arouse the popular imagination to the point where colonization becomes a serious prospect within the European framework of German politics; secondly, they dissolve again into a complex network of what I have been

10 Cit. Born, *Von der Reichsgründung*, p. 125. My translation.

11 Cit. Jacob, *Deutsche Kolonialpolitik*, p. 24.

12 Cit. Jacob, *Deutsche Kolonialpolitik*, p. 24.

13 Cit. Westphal, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien*, p. 100. My translation.

calling "passages" - interconnections between different quantitatively determined spaces and different qualities of space. These passages define spaces by defining the ways in which their borders may be crossed. The work of establishing passages culminated in the Congo Conference in 1884 in Berlin, in which the central issues were the quantitative partitioning of African territory, and the right to maritime passage along the Congo and Niger rivers.¹⁴ It was possible to establish these borders and passages in Berlin in the form of 'Platonic dialogue' only because a series of qualitative passages between discursive spaces of negotiation, the geopolitical space of Europe, and the geo(-political) space of Africa had already been established.

During the main part of the period of German presence in South West Africa the two forces of despotic and capitalist representation will remain relatively distinct. They characterize the process of transformation of the despotic machine into the capitalist machine. In either case, we must recognize the importance of writing as the mediation which allowed German presence in Africa to be translated into the colonial Idea and its mobilizations of people and capital. Writing served, so to speak, as a site of transformation from the indeterminate motions of desire into the presence of German colonizers in South West Africa - a transformation of the molecular into the molar in the space of the sign. Writing served to collect the myriad diverse lines traced by the movements of explorers, traders and scientists, later of settlers and soldiers, but also by the natives, and organize them into a "text" - a unity which could be called the colony. At the same time, it collected diverse statements relating to the colony and collated them into a body of knowledge. And this organisation served as the motivating force which was able to effect the movement of more settlers and soldiers, traders and scientists. The writing which we tend traditionally to privilege as *bellejettres* was no exception to this process. Jacob had already realized this in 1938:

¹⁴ See the report of the Berlin correspondent of the 'Times' on the opening of the Congo Conference, cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien, p. 116.

In the face of this strong increase in the German exploration of Africa, it is quite understandable when ever more German authors made an effort to demonstrate to the German people the advantages and possibilities of owning the newly opened tropical regions.¹⁵

Indeed, I have already put forward the hypothesis that in colonization the *belles lettres* have a vital mythologizing function. Wherever the coordination of various levels of writing, and the passages between various spaces, begin to break down, the belletristic discourse seeks to restore order through the definition of mythical passages.

In the following discussion, I shall be exploring various types of script which serve to mark the earth in the same gesture as they mark the written page. That is to say, the spatiality of the sign, in which meaning is constantly threatened by difference, enters the service of the spatializing machine. The threat to meaning is converted into a production of spatial order, and the text is rehabilitated by its functionality - it works. I will be working with the hypothesis that the energy which converts the loss inherent in the trace of difference into the production of spatial order is an affect energy, and that it is a vital strategy of these texts to harness the inevitable sense of loss arising in the production of meaning. When we ask how this harnessing is effected, we will see that the loss inscribed in the text finds itself compensated in a promise of fullness which the production of spatial order yields. This loss can be an affect loss, such as the fading of stains of German blood where it has marked the earth - a loss which must be preserved for sentimental reasons; or it can be a practical loss, such as the fading of wagon tracks, which need to be preserved for technical reasons. Whatever the reasons, there is the necessity of fixing the script of the spatializing machine in a system of representation which constantly re-inscribes the earth.

1.2 *The script of travel*

¹⁵ Cit. Jacob, *Deutsche Kolonialpolitik*, p. 23.

I now wish to turn my attention to one particular result of the development of a specific technology of travel in the colonization of German South West Africa. I will be attempting to show that this development served not only to facilitate actual physical passages between spaces, but that it is accompanied by a discursive repetition of these passages. Whereas the technology of travel marks the earth with physical passages between spaces, discourse preserves these passages on a number of levels: as the course of civilization, as an itinerary of suffering, as an extension of knowledge, and finally as a script marking the land as a German possession. I shall claim that the ultimate result of this is a contradiction between the technical demands of travel and the discursive repetition of passages. This is resolved in the form of a mythical mastery of space.

In the discourse of German South West Africa, we find that the most important means of crossing space, the ox wagon, is almost always associated with the advancement of civilization and therefore with a self-justification of German presence in the landscape. A typical passage is found in Johannes Dose's Ein alter Afrikaner:

In this inaccessible (*unwegsam*) land, the rough, primitive apparatus of the Treck provides the best service, because its simplicity means that it can easily be repaired. A smooth wooden shaft lies across the necks of each pair of oxen. To the right and left of the neck are two thin boards, the yolk pieces, which are joined together under the neck by a piece of hide. The yolks of the eight to ten pairs of oxen are attached to the treck chain, and only the last team is fixed to the shaft - and the simple apparatus and vehicle which allowed civilization to conquer South Africa is ready. The unsprung wagon jolts and shakes horribly. Everyone curses it. But this crude ox wagon waded through the foot-deep dunes of the terrible Namib, crossed the thornbush steppes, swam the rivers and climbed the mountains. Without it, the war and victory over the Hereros would not have been possible, without it South West Africa would not have become a German land.

They trek from waterhole to waterhole, twenty to thirty kilometers per day, depending upon how good or bad the road is, which was nothing but the track of a wheel.¹⁶

The passage begins by describing the land as *unwegsam* (inaccessible), an adjective which conveniently associates the penetrability of the land (from a European perspective) with the establishment of roads. It then presents us with a detailed description of the means by which this penetration is effected, and

¹⁶ Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, pp. 354-355.

emphasizes its simplicity, durability, but also the hardships which it causes as a means of travel. The penetration of the land is shown to be an ordeal which must be appreciated in retrospect. Note the shift in tense from the description of the wagon and the discomfort it causes (in the timeless present) to the achievements of the ox wagon in the penetration of the land (in the preterite). And this penetration is made equivalent to the advance of civilization. Here the movement of the ox wagon is shown to effect another writing, the script of memory which ties the penetration of the land to personal hardship. We shall see at a later stage that this script becomes very important in writing the German presence on the land. Finally, the paragraph gives away its secret when it makes the progress of the wagon "from waterhole to waterhole" dependent on the quality of the path "which was nothing but the track of a wheel." We see that the penetration of the "impenetrable" land always brings with it this tautological gesture - no one was there first, but the tracks the wagon leaves are always the re-inscription of the tracks left by the previous wagon. The tracks from one waterhole to the next write a pre-existent geographical knowledge onto the earth. From the discussion in part I it should be apparent that the spatiality of the track is of the same nature as the spatiality of the sign: it is a mark which is always already there, and whose priority is erased in its retracing. An ox-wagon is a writing machine. In this respect von Eckenbrecher is more honest:

When I speak here of South West African roadways, these must not be confused with European high roads. The former are nothing but simple paths, often only passable with the greatest danger. They were made by game, zebras, and are now used by human feet, or else they resulted over the years when the driver of one ox wagon tried to follow the tracks which the one before him had left, optimistically thinking: where he got through, I'll also get through!¹⁷

And yet, her honesty is restricted to the admission that the penetration of the land has been a gradual process, and that the white colonizer has not always already been there. The civilizing gesture is also recognizable here, in the series of inscriptions created by the foot of an animal, the foot of a human, and the wheel. It is interesting that this mysterious foot placed between the animal and the wheel

¹⁷ von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir gab und nahm, p. 12.

again reveals a secret of the text. We know that those who travel by foot in this country are either (on seldom occasions) explorers writing European presence on the face of the land, or else they are those faceless natives who have become part of the face of the land. The fact that von Eckenbrecher speaks of these feet in the present tense, as using the paths, tells us that she can only mean the latter. The paths which the wheel traces are admittedly tracings of feet that were there and still are there, but this tracing is at the same time an obliteration of those footprints. This obliteration is not only a physical, but also a textual operation. Here it makes use of the strategy of dissociating human feet from any human individuality, and at the same time associating them with the feet of animals. Where the wagon has passed, knowledge of the marks of the savages is reduced to a European memory of animals. I shall have more to say about this function of memory later in this chapter.

Looking at this passage, we should also ask what von Eckenbrecher has achieved in the first sentence by implicitly asking the European imagination to erase its knowledge of what a road is in order to comprehend the conditions in South West Africa. Her writing signifies a space which the European eye (reading in Germany) can imagine only via the mediation of her words. The script on the landscape and in memory, this script of civilization, is installed as an extension of European language, simply because this language has the flexibility required to encircle new spaces within existing bounds of knowledge. The appeal to European knowledge to "capture" the conception of travel in South West Africa may be equated to the appeal to "capture" the space which this travel inscribes. We must not underestimate the role played by language in this process of inscription, since it is the book which plays this vital mediating role between the inscription of the earth and European knowledge. The mediating function of the book allows any affect investment in the narrative to be transferred with relative ease to an affect investment in the colony. From what we have seen in Part I, we would expect the central agency of mediation between subjective affect investments and an affect

investment in colonization to be a desire for the law. Our expectation is clearly met in the following passage from Raggys Fahrt nach Südwest -

To the right and left of the pad, as the wagon tracks in the sand are called, are the skeletons of many oxen and horses, who laid down from exhaustion and died a wretched death in the waterless desert. Almost all of them had turned their heads into an upward position, and the empty sockets of their eyes stared up in mute reproach at the blue skies.¹⁸

Here, the writing of the wagons also leaves a script of hardship, which serves as an open question mark directed at a transcendental eye. As in von Eckenbrecher's description, we can see exactly where this transcendental eye would have to be situated - in Europe. This is evident in the two symmetrical gestures - the heads pointing upwards with a voiceless indictment and the writer rhetorically appealing to European knowledge to read the specific suffering which marks its limits, and which her language cannot speak. The script addresses the transcendental European eye in order to invoke its gaze. Thus the first sentence informs this European eye that the roads in South West Africa are nothing it has ever seen before and that they have a name that the European has never heard before. This is, incidentally, not an isolated instance. Ludwig von Estorff, for example, says virtually the same thing.

This road was nothing but the track of a wagon and was called "pad"... Some of these desert marches were very strenuous, and could only be accomplished by mustering all one's forces.¹⁹

Now, we would not be doing justice to the strategic function of this invocation of a European eye in order to dramatise the hardship of the penetration of the colony, if we failed to realize that this European eye is specifically a German eye, and that the presence which is being inscribed on the earth is a specifically German presence as opposed to that of the other colonial powers engaged in the "scramble for Africa." Thus we find Dose stating the following:

Swakopmund was and will be a disappointment to anyone. Small and low-built, it lies at the foot of the hideous sand desert, the wide, waterless, God-accursed Namib. But even this Sahara with its fearful dimensions has its claim to fame - to this broad wall of dune, impenetrable without a wagon and shipments of water, we owe the fact that this colony is our possession, and

¹⁸ Haase, Raggys Fahrt, p. 172-173.

¹⁹ von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe, p. 27.

that South West had not long since been taken by the English, but was free for the taking.²⁰

Here it is clear that the type of hardships associated with crossing the Namib by ox wagon is a kind of divine test which a race such as the English would supposedly not be capable of passing. Here the word *Besitz* (possession) is not accidental. This test ensures that the marks of the ox wagon on the sand of the Namib signify not only German presence but also German possession.

The complex script of possession which the technology of travel writes on the earth is intensified when it comes to the question of travel during the wars against the Herero and Hottentot nations: writing is imbued with an affect value which serves to organize textual and geographical space in such a way that marks of suffering are preserved. Here the technology of travel is initially the same -

Cumbersome, pulled by the long rows of oxen, the large wagon rolled on. Now the high, heavy wheels ground through the sand; now a wheel climbed over a rock which lay in the track; grinding and groaning in every joint, it fell back into place... And so we moved on in a long train on a road which was marked by little more than old and new wagon tracks.²¹

It is evident in Frenssen that the movement of soldiers through the colony is extensively guided and determined by the presence of wagon tracks.²² But here we should note two things. Firstly, the nature of the hardship associated with travel becomes much more specific, more affect laden and more intense, and secondly, there arises a strategic need to streamline mobility of troops, by making them less dependent on preexisting pathways, as well as by expanding the network of these pathways. I shall be discussing the intensification of German suffering later, where I will attempt to show how this suffering is converted into a script of possession. Let us first turn our attention to the problem of mobility in warfare.

In the first decade of the 20th century the railway line plays an increasingly important role in the mobility of troops, and is also an important factor in the bitter debate in Germany over whether and to what extent the colony should be financed

²⁰ Dose, *Ein alter Afrikaner*, p. 348.

²¹ Gustav Frenssen, *Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest. Ein Feldzugsbericht* (Berlin: Grottesche Buchhandlung, 1906), p. 49.

²² Frenssen, *Peter Moor*, p. 135.

from the Imperial coffers. The problem of troop mobility is one of the prime considerations which causes von Estorff in 1909 to seek to convince Dernburg of the necessity of a railway network.

I was of the opinion that the country must of necessity be provided with a railway network. A direct connection from Windhoek to Keetmanshoop was absolutely essential if the reduced Protectorate Troops were to ensure the security of the country... [In response, Dernburg replied] that it would surely be possible to convince Parliament that these railways should be built... provided the military motives were placed in the foreground.²³

While Dernburg is clever enough to realize that the need for mobility must be argued in military terms, von Estorff indicates elsewhere that he attaches a moral dimension to the question of mobility.

In order to catch the small and very mobile bands, one had to distribute one's forces over large areas, forming small, mobile units. But these in turn required many small, greatly endangered supply transports, and were always in danger of meeting unexpectedly with superior forces and being defeated. As soon as the enemy met with success, he gained strong reinforcements. This type of warfare is called the "little war." It does not lead to great decisions, but protracts decisions considerably, requires large forces and dissipates them quickly. The more agile and mobile party has great advantages, and these are greater the less his requirements and the better his knowledge of the land. These advantages were on the side of the natives, so that for a long time they balanced the superior qualities of our troops: the greater courage and discipline, the greater strength and better equipment.²⁴

Encountering guerilla warfare for the first time, von Estorff sees himself faced with a dilemma. The vastly superior mobility of the enemy allows it to fight a war which, for him, is essentially cowardly (later he tells us that the character and lifestyle of the indigenous peoples grant them the talent of a war of ambush and deception.);²⁵ and yet, if he is to succeed, von Estorff himself must acquire this mobility. He solves his dilemma by separating the issues into a moral and a pragmatic one: the building of roads and railway lines continues to be a part of the moral responsibility of the colonizer to bring civilization to the land, and the ability to move across the landscape independently of this network becomes a practical matter of acquiring knowledge in order to defeat the enemy. We see the moral value which von Estorff attached to the building of roads in the following passage:

²³ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, pp. 146-7.

²⁴ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 120.

²⁵ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 126

I was, however, troubled by the morale of the men. They had become wild through constant campaigns, and had squandered their high wages in drinks, and then there was the company of the native women... Without hesitation I set out from Windhoek with the major part of the garrison in the direction of Walfish Bay and Swakopmund to the edge of the desert, where I occupied them in road works on the poor surface of the so-called Bayweg.²⁶

And in the following passage we see his conviction (striking as it is when we compare it to the above denouncement of guerilla tactics) that the German troops must acquire the same spatial knowledge as the Hottentots:

The experiences which the Protectorate Troops gained from the rebellion are the following: they must acquire the advantages which the enemy had over us: great mobility, great marching ability, exact knowledge of the land, development of a sense of orientation and knowledge of all means of orientation, including the ability to recognize and read tracks. Whatever the Hottentot could do, the Horseman in the Protectorate Troops must also be able to do.²⁷

This spatial knowledge consists in the ability to read. The Hottentots possess the advantage that they are able to read the writing which the German soldiers inscribe on the earth, as well as the significant lines of topographic and stellar configurations. In addition, their own movements are faster, more efficient, and do not have the status of writing - they are illegible to the Germans. War requires this ability to read the writing of stars, prints in sand, etc, and to use this script to move quickly across the landscape leaving as little trace as possible. This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the smoothing of space initiated by the nomadic war machine. The war machine here seeks to move in non-significant lines, but when it is captured by the State it functions by its ability to read and to write. There is a constant deciphering and re-translation into writing on the earth. It is probably a necessary consequence of his conviction that the war against the Herero and Hottentots is fought on the side of civilization when von Estorff emphasizes that the lines of movement developed by the troops are essentially the same as those desirable in peace.

The fact that South West Africa is now provided with an adequate railway network should also be seen as one of the fruits of our wartime experiences.

²⁶ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 49.

²⁷ Cit. Jacob, *Deutsche Kolonialpolitik*, pp. 297-8; See also von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 156.

The same applies to the continued development of wells in the Kalahari and elsewhere. Here the goals of war and peace go hand in hand.²⁸

This claim is, however, in direct contradiction to the attempt to divorce troop mobility (as knowledge) from the pre-existent lines of the railway. When we read von Estorff's accounts of his experiences in the South West African wars, we find him struggling time and again with the relative mobility which the enemy possesses because of its independence of the roads and railways.

I was soon reinforced by officers... and men... But in spite of that, I could not go in pursuit, since the enemy had fled into the mountains on paths which were, as the natives who knew the land assured me, not passable for our wagons of food supplies and other necessities.²⁹

What is more, we must question his implicit assumption that the aims of peace benefitted from the practice of war. Rather than to claim that one positive result of the rebellion of the natives is an increased mobility of the Europeans, I would suggest that war is a consequence of the increased mobility of the 'peaceful' European invaders. This is borne out if we consider that the establishment of privileged lines of access to all parts of the territory (a tendency which we find greatly enhanced by the demands of warfare) tends to acquire that territory before it is "conquered" in the sense of a military and police network directly controlling the movements of people. This is similar to the effect of the Suez canal described by Said:

De Lesseps and his canal finally destroyed the Orient's distance, its cloistered intimacy away from the West, its perdurable exoticism. Just as a land barrier could be transmuted into a liquid artery, so too the Orient was transsubstantiated from resilient hostility into obliging, and submissive, partnership. After de Lesseps no one could speak of the Orient as belonging to another world, strictly speaking. There was only "our" world, "one" world bound together because the Suez canal had frustrated those last provincials who still believed in the difference between worlds.³⁰

We have already seen that the hardships of travel invoke a transcendental eye which can preside over individual suffering, giving it meaning. This eye also serves to unify space in the manner described by Said. It does this by tying subjective affect investment to a political interest - an interest which functions as knowledge. This

²⁸ Cit. Jacob, *Deutsche Kolonialpolitik*, p. 299.

²⁹ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 70.

³⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 92.

invocation of a transcendental eye which authorizes possession in travel is related to what Fabian observes as a secularization of knowledge in 18th century travel.

For the established bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century, travel was to become (at least potentially) every man's source of "philosophical," secular knowledge. Religious travel had been *to* the centers of religion, or *to* the souls to be saved; now secular travel was *from* the centers of learning and power to places where man was to find nothing but himself.³¹

The advent of the capitalist machine brings with it a decentralization of power and diversification of knowledge. Instead of setting out from the known to a destination which is always already known, secular travel sets out from the known to discover the unknown; but it sets out to discover the unknown as a repetition of the known. Whereas the despot always already knows and owns the world, the capitalist must constantly cross the boundaries of knowledge and ownership. It is by constantly relinquishing ownership that he renders them productive.

This constant crossing of borders is a mythical mastery of space, and it is this mastery that allows the conflict mentioned above to be resolved. The contradictory demands of an increasing organization of space through the construction of physical passages (railway lines etc.) on the one hand, and an increasing need to move independently of this organization on the other hand is, in my opinion, best understood as a conflict between the stratification of space in colonization and the need to counter any resistance to this stratification. Guerilla warfare seeks to master space in ways that the technology of colonialism cannot initially utilize, and the colonizer seeks to counter this by appropriating guerilla techniques into its own mastery of space. The resultant contradiction is resolved in the mythical mastery of space. The ideology of German presence as a civilizing force requires a myth of spatial totality. The power which organizes space confirms itself by defining the passages across the boundaries it draws. As we have seen in our discussion of the crossing of borders, this is the work of the conquering European as a hero, a myth of one who can move about freely, unrestricted by pre-defined lines of travel and unrestricted by borders.

³¹ Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 6.

1.3 *Erasing the marks of the native*

In colonization, there is another marking of the earth with suffering, and subsequent fading of these marks. That is the suffering of the native. Here, colonial discourse establishes strict parameters within which writing is meaningful. However, because the preservation of suffering in writing marks the landscape with a script of possession, colonial discourse must ensure that the marks of suffering of the colonized are obliterated. The initial strategy involved here is a blindness to the suffering of the colonized. However, the texts of colonialism also develop a strategy for preserving the marks of the suffering savage as proof of their savagery. That is, when interpreting these marks (and thereby bestowing upon them the status of legibility), the European eye banishes them from the status of writing. What is preserved is the necessity of their own self-destruction.

It is with a great deal of astonishment that the reader must confront the many descriptions of the trail left by the fleeing Herero as the German troops pursue them into the Omaheke desert at the end of the Herero war. Although it is made quite clear to us at all times that this is the final move in the genocide of the Herero nation, we are asked to read this trail in a manner quite different to the marks left by the suffering of German soldiers. Its meaning, the texts tell us time and again, is not to be apprehended on the level of the extreme hardship which the dying nation is experiencing, but as evidence of their essential lack of civilization; that is, as evidence of the basic justification of the genocide. One of the most striking illustrations of this is found in Frenssen's Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest:

On the following morning we dared to follow the enemy... The earth had been trampled flat as a board over a breadth of about a hundred meters. The enemy had stormed away with his cattle in such a dense and broad mass. Along this path of flight lay blankets, hides, ostrich feathers, crockery, women's jewelery, dead and dying cattle, and staring, dying and dead humans. A terrible stink of old manure and rotting corpses oppressively filled the still, hot air.

The further we progressed in the burning sun, the more pitiful the route became. How low this proud, wild nation had humiliated itself in its deathly fear. Whereever I lowered my eyes from my tired horse, there lay all their possessions in piles: oxen and horses, goats and dogs, blankets and skins. And there lay the old and wounded, women and children. A pile of small children lay, perishing helplessly, beside women whose breasts hung long and limp. Others lay alone, their eyes and noses full of flies, still alive.³²

The operative sentence here is the one describing the transformation of a proud and wild people into something base, animal. In commentating this passage, Bergmann notes that the European observer counters his guilt with the belief "that the Herero are an inferior race and are not capable of suffering as are Europeans..."³³ The Herero die without suffering - but not, I would claim, in order to alleviate European guilt, but in order not to leave marks on the ground. Bergmann himself notes that the soldier who, at the end of the rebellion, observes that 40 000 Herero have died, does so not with a feeling of guilt, but with the realization that the land now belongs to the whites.³⁴ And when, in the passage at the end of the book, Peter Moor's reservations regarding the morality of the genocide are put aside, it is not the lack of suffering on the part of the Herero, but their absolute lack of civilization which is the chief factor in his argument. The Herero can suffer and feel pain, but their suffering cannot assume the monumental proportions of European suffering, because they cannot write. It is the writing of the colonizer which allows him to extract meaning from the pain of the Herero, incorporating this pain into what he portrays as his own cosmic tragedy. Suffering is the basis of tragedy, and out of tragedy, subjectivity is born into the socius. Thus the transitive nature of the Herero's suffering and their inability to write yield their lack of civilization - their inability to comprise a socius.

An inability to write is, however, not necessarily an inability to leave a mark. Indeed, it is the intensity of the mark which is so important in demonstrating its inability to function as a writing. Consider the following description:

The path of flight could not be missed. Their mortally wounded were simply left to perish. The positions of the corpses could be seen from the sickening

³² Frenssen, *Peter Moor*, pp. 162-163

³³ Bergmann, *Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht*, p. 119.

³⁴ Bergmann, *Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht*, p. 119.

swarms of flies, bloated with the poison they had sucked. Carcasses of animals, puffed up in decay by gases; calabashes, household things and all kinds of worthless bits and pieces marked the flight. It was hideous for the Germans to march all day in the gruesome stink.³⁵

The reason I am claiming that this is not writing is its symbolic perfection - its perfect transparency, the remainderless transmission of death without that loss out of which meaning arises. As I stated earlier, it is this attempt to portray suffering as if it were without loss which should horrify the reader. It is the simplicity of this writing - the simple abandon of this gesture with which one nation's demise is made to declaim in the petty tragedy of a 'master race' - which characterizes genocide.

The same reduction of the savage's actions to a chaos out of which writing extracts meaning is evident in those places where the destruction resulting from rampaging natives and their traces on the German farms is described. Thus Frenssen:

...then we came to the first halt, which had been destroyed by blacks. They had burned the modest house, torn down the corrugated iron roof, smashed the few household effects, and taken the rest.³⁶

There is, however, a strategic problem associated with this will to meaninglessness. We have seen that this strategic problem arises in the practice of guerilla warfare, where the German troops find themselves unable to read the traces of the savages. The reason why I include this in the problem described above is that it is, so to speak, its reverse side. What the European eye produces as a lack of meaning is, of course, a system of meaning radically different to the European writing. As such it is also radically opposed to the State. The traces of flight, as we examined them above, are lines of flight, in the sense outlined by Deleuze and Guattari; that is, "a real smoothing of the space, which reacts in its turn on the striated space."³⁷ With regard to the smoothing of space by the war machine, Deleuze and Guattari note that "the lines of flight themselves... always risk abandoning their creative potentialities in order to turn into a line of death, to be

³⁵ Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 407.

³⁶ Frenssen, Peter Moor, p. 41.

³⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 11.

turned into a pure and simple line of destruction."³⁸ Deleuze and Guattari refer to Fascism in this connection, but I would argue that the traces left by fleeing natives are either legible or illegible according to whether they bear death as a sacrifice for the sake of the State (this is the function of genocide in fascism), or whether they bear the State's own potential destruction. It is in this latter function of the line of flight that I would situate the practice of guerilla warfare. "Historically, as well as conceptually, nomads have a particular affinity with the line of flight, since it is along which characterizes lines of technological flight that they invent new weapons to oppose those of the State."³⁹

European discourse has a number of strategies which it employs to re-constitute chaotic flows of desire in the molar unity of social production. These revolve around the fiction of the split subject who has drawn a border between what he may understand as his desire and the space in which this named desire may be called his own - the space of his subjectivity. However, if Deleuze and Guattari are correct, the flows out of which this subject has arisen continue to move at random across and through matter; and these chaotic flows of desire are a constant threat to the subject and his order. The colonizing subject easily visualizes this opposition as a distinction between his European subjectivity and the amorphous realm of savagery. As a result, the savage acts as a surface onto which the European may project that which it can never be - the chaotic flows of desire which move through savage and settler alike. This is the form such a visualization would take:

Alas, this lovely land was under the brutal uprising of de-humanized niggers. Stunned, the horsemen now saw the traces of the widespread murder, came across the rubble of devastated farms, in which the blood and smoke could still be smelt. These burnt-out walls must have been a stately home for South West. Now the windows stare from empty sockets, all mute, dead and destroyed. You can see how, suddenly, in deathly panic, this farmer fled from his pretty house, or was killed in the courtyard. All the bedsheets, sofas and chairs are slashed open, the cupboards choppen up, all glasses and teacups stolen from the sideboard, but the saucers and cognac glasses are left alone, since the kaffirs don't know what they are for. And in the middle of this terrible chaos of furniture, tables, mirrors, trinkets, folders and porcelain, all smashed together and so broken up that it looks like a roller had driven over it, right in the middle there stands a piano, absolutely untouched... The

³⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, Concrete rules, p. 11.

³⁹ Paul Patton, Conceptual politics, p. 66.

Hereros must have taken the instrument for a fetish and left it unharmed, together with a case of Worcestershire Sauce.⁴⁰

The traces which the savages leave on the earth testify to the precariousness of the order which European labour had established. Everything is reduced to a state of chaos. The conflict here is presented in thermodynamic terms. What had been accomplished by the expenditure of European energy is a postponement of the effects of entropy. This is a specifically European endeavour, since it is the work of the savage to unleash the demonic power which this stored up energy contains, and to allow the power of death full play. It is for this reason that the savages appear to the European as "de-humanized." Their actions are our own "Angst, aus der eigenen Kultur herauszufallen, - aus der Kultur, die wir allein als Kultur wahrnehmen."⁴¹ We should however appreciate that this apparent conflict is a relative conflict and is contained as such within the strategies of colonization. The spatializing machine of colonization integrates and renders productive not only the labor of the colonizer, but on another level also the force of death and destruction described by the second law of thermodynamics. In the above example, we can see once again how the European eye focusses on the sight of savage destruction, and, having surveyed the chaos therein, blinds itself to this chaos in order to extract a surplus meaning from what it sees. What is striking in many such passages is the degree of pleasure the European eye can extract from the spectacle of its own culture in ruins. The despise this eye holds for the paraphernalia of European subjectivity - all the precious little part objects - is clearly evident in the intensity with which the narrator partakes of their destruction. And then, having let his desire roam free, he allows his gaze to settle once again on those objects in which the border between desire and the socius is preserved as a border between himself and the savages: saucers, cognac glasses, Worcestershire sauce, a piano. These objects serve as a focal point for a renewed encircling of the space of the socius - a space which has come to include the traces of the savage as evidence of European knowledge. European knowledge preserves

⁴⁰ Dose, *Ein alter Afrikaner*, p. 357.

⁴¹ Horn, *Fremdheitskonstruktionen*, p. 406.

the site of savagery as a place where the order of the European socius is strictly separated from the chaos of desiring production.

This is a re-territorializing strategy, and as such it is more than writing. The script which labor has written on the land postpones death in the name of meaning. The script in books which commentates this other script achieves the same thing. But between the two there is a passage which is defined by death's productivity and plenitude, and has nothing to do with writing. The farmer's death activates the script of labor and the script in books, but in doing so, it focusses desire onto a physical surface, a geographic position, and it organizes the chaotic movements of desire into the space of the socius. It also divides the chaotic space of the colonized from the ordered space of the colonizer.

This is why, when confronted with guerilla tactics such writers as von Estorff always take a moral stance, from which they can confirm their subjective integrity by the very fact that the military machine is inadequate against this type of warfare. Thus, a paragraph such as the following, in which von Estorff expresses concern and frustration, must be followed by one confirming his morality.

This time of defense [Christmas 1905 to March 1906] was a most difficult period, for time and again the mobile enemy succeeded in his ambushes. Furthermore, the animals had to be spread out over large areas, and it was most difficult to keep watch over them and ensure their safety. The agile Hottentots crept under the grazing animals and tried to drive them off while others attacked the watch. Or they were waiting in ambush in the mornings when the watchmen went to their posts. They often succeeded in shooting officers and men and gaining considerable spoils. Our pursuit was always too late, for they found their way quickly onto the southern shore of the Orange, where they were in the safety of English territory.⁴²

Von Estorff then takes recourse to a discourse of 'honourable' warfare, whereby the guerilla tactics of the savages are taken to reflect their inferior character.

The war was conducted in this wild rocky landscape. That alone was difficult enough, since the natives were provided everywhere with the best hiding places for their practice of ambush, for which they are so well prepared by their character and lifestyle. We lost almost as many officers and men in reconnaissance and patrols as in the battles, and in addition, the immense difficulties of this wild land were a great hindrance.⁴³

42 von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe, p. 124.

43 von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe, p. 126.

Onto this inherent baseness of the savage, von Estorff grafts a baseness of the 'jewish' merchants who support them.

Marinka had few supporters, but he had been incited by English traders, jews, to attack us again. They hoped that the excellent business they had known during the rebellion would flourish once again.⁴⁴

Thus in the trail of the fleeing savage we can recognize the struggle ensuing from the creation of lines of flight and the attempt to re-incorporate these within the State's productive machine. The traces of the savages have become a part of the colonizer's writing. They possess all the prerequisites: the ubiquitous sand as writing slate, the disembodied eye extracting meaning, the cruelty with which meaning has been produced. However, and this is the vital point, the production of meaning by the European gaze must always render the marks of the fleeing native meaningless in themselves - chaotic. This process is so complete that the traces cannot even mean their own shortcomings. They are pure non-meaning, and they testify to pure non-being.

The framing and production of the native's suffering within the space of European tragedy is not restricted to the narrative of war. It is a more general function of colonization and comprises one of the mythical dimensions of colonial discourse. European discourse is constantly surveying its own narratives from a timeless realm in which its diverse and specific suffering becomes meaningful within a totality of experience. This mythical realm cannot afford to encounter any historically determined dimension of suffering which could not be subsumed within its space. It cannot confront the suffering of the colonized. This is why the mythology of the colonized is continually negated in colonial discourse. The colonizer cannot bear to hear the native speaking of his own specific suffering and his own totality of experience, unless he does so within European scientific discourse. Thus the act of negation depends upon a complicity between European scientific and mythic discourses; and this must be totalized within the universal space of European knowledge. This universality is, as I have indicated, given by its ability to move freely

⁴⁴ von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe, p. 135.

across the borders it has drawn. I have said much about the spatial dimension of this mobility. It also has a temporal dimension, given by the memory which European discourse constructs out of the reflexion on its own narratives. The truth value of European discourse at any one moment results from a complex interaction between this totalization of discreet spaces, and the memory of past errors which have been overcome. The native's knowledge is negated on both counts. Where it is specific, it becomes a part of European universal knowledge; and, where it is mythological, it becomes incorporated into European memory of its erroneous past.

From the very start, colonial discourse brings with it a memory of European experience as a grid of knowledge within which the new can be apprehended. We have already indicated that this structures the entire project of exploration as a means of producing scientific statements about new lands. When we look beyond the claims which motivate this project, however - that is the quest for truth -, we find that the memory of European experience has the power to compensate for the sense of loss which automatically accompanies the encounter with the new. This is equally applicable to scientific and non-scientific discourse. It does this by tying subjective experience to a pre-established mode of spatial order, and by mapping this spatial order onto the perception of the strange landscape. This process is comparable to that of transferring personal suffering into a writing on the earth. Here, too, we find that it is in the production or activation of a script that colonial space becomes meaningful and is organized as that space in which experience is European. The consequence of this is that those who are not in a position to activate writing in order to produce spatial knowledge - the colonized - are integrated into the spatializing machine, and, as a result, their memory becomes meaningful only where it is the memory of the colonizer. Furthermore, the knowledge which results from this production finds itself confirmed by all that which it excludes.

In order to illustrate the destruction of the native's memory let us consider the following anecdote. C. G. Buettner wrote in 1884 of how the English commissioner, Mr Palgrave, had taken a number of Herero "including several educated Christians

such as Wilhelm Maharero, eldest son of the...chief of the Herero" to Cape Town, since he considered it "would be expedient for English politics if a few educated Herero came to Cape Town to gain a personal impression of the power and might of England." There they were shown the "steam ships, railways, military installations, schools, printing presses etc." However, when they returned, they could only say to Buettner:

Muhonge, we already knew about all of these things, since you yourself have told us of them time and again, and we have also seen them in your pictures. But we never believed that it really could be so. So we were surprised that it is really as you had told us.⁴⁵

Here we can see what might have been a reversal of the relationships of colonization - a parody. The native is sent to England on a voyage of discovery. However, what results is only a self-parody of the native's knowledge. What he discovers is European memory, which has preserved a place for him in its own field of truth. His only access to truth is via the memory of the white man - a memory which preserves the speech of the native as error. We must be quite explicit here. Memory is not a privileged private possession of the subject. European discourse constitutes memory and develops practices whereby memory is inscribed on subjective space. Thus, while for the colonizing culture, the strange land and its people become the object of scientific knowledge through discovery, the same encounter does not result in a similar discovery for the colonized. They too are confronted with the new, but for them the new is their own land, themselves and each other cast into a foreign mould and seen from the positions prescribed by the white man's knowledge.

1.4 *Writing on the earth with German blood*

The idea that to trace a script across a surface is to mark it as a possession is a recurrent theme which is recognizable in various forms in the discourse of

⁴⁵ Buettner, Das Hinterland von Walfischbai, p. 65.

colonialism. The work involved in crossing a space is preserved in a script which orders that space according to certain principles conducive to social production. The importance of textual space in this ordering process lies precisely in this preservation. We can see from the descriptions of travel in the Herero and Nama wars that the indelibility of the script of travel is much enhanced by the suffering of the traveller. Consider the following descriptions of the hardships of travel by ox-wagon during the Herero war of resistance:

I sat on the chest in the front of the wagon, with my arm, which stung and burned, in a sling. Behind me in two rows in the long Cape wagon lay two sick and four wounded men. The black man beside the oxen raised his long, lean arm for the first blow of the whip and screamed at the animals. Then the wagon wheel jolted against the first stone in the path and fell again, lurching heavily. Behind me, someone groaned with difficulty.⁴⁶

There were seven of us. The lieutenant lay in the front. As the wagon rattled and shook, I could see his pale head ... framed in the front opening... as it swayed back and forth on the sack against which he was leaned, without his eyes opening... The officer had been shot through the chest. Beside me lay Sergeant Willoweit, who had previously been with the Lithuanian Dragoons, and groaned sharply whenever the right rear wheel fell into a hole or hit a stone.⁴⁷

The affect value of such suffering is considerably greater than the discomforts of travel in 'peace-time.' This becomes even more apparent when the mark which suffering leaves on the ground is not a wheel track or a railway line, but the blood of a wounded or dying person. Consider, for example, the following passage written by Clara Brockmann:

And this land must remain German, German to the very marrow. It was certainly bought dearly enough with all the noble blood which its earth has absorbed.⁴⁸

I shall be arguing that this much-broached theme, which is here so succinctly formulated, is not a metaphorical formulation, but that the gesture to which Brockmann and others are referring is a writing on the ground. We have seen that meaning in writing arises where a transcendental eye extracts a surplus value from the exhibition of a sign, and it is in this sense that the nature of the appeal in the text

⁴⁶ Frenssen, *Peter Moor*, p. 90.

⁴⁷ Walther, *Fräulein*, p. 165.

⁴⁸ Clara Brockmann, "Deutsche Frauen in Südwestafrika," in *Kolonie und Heimat* 22 (1909), cit. Warmbold, *Ein Stückchen neudeutsche Erd*, p. 239.

is to be interpreted. Furthermore, the blood which falls on the land is an ephemeral mark, and is all the more imbued with that sense of loss which characterizes writing. Thus the importance of those texts which seek to activate this script is twofold: we are asked to produce meaning by assuming the position of the transcendental eye, but we are also asked to produce this meaning as compensation for that specific loss incurred by writing with blood.

The appeal in the script of blood to a transcendental eye is formulated as a political position, which is grafted onto a geographical space. This becomes apparent if we peruse any of the correspondence concerned with the establishment and maintenance of tombs in the years following the suppression of the Herero and Nama rebellions. The prime concern here is that the grave be maintained in a state worthy of the dead. This may be illustrated by a letter of 17 December 1912 from the commander of the Protectorate Troops, Major Grautoff, to the Governmental representative in Windhoek. Grautoff reports that the grave of a Lieutenant who fell in the Herero war has recently been discovered, but it is "at present in an unworthy state."⁴⁹ Now, if we consider that a tombstone is normally intended as a display; that is, as a sign to be pondered over, with an inscription to be read, we may be struck here by a certain contradiction. When discussing the cost of maintaining the graves, it is constantly mentioned that many of them are "far from the lines of transportaion."⁵⁰ In other words, they will almost never be seen by any "white eyes," except those responsible for the maintenance itself. A paradox? Not if we recognize that the marking of the ground with tombstones is a writing in the most profound sense - its meaning is intended first for the one who writes, and second for the transcendental eye, which is also the position to which the meaning of death accrues.

We will be returning presently to the tomb or grave as a special form of marking positions of death. For the moment let us consider some of the characteristics of the script of blood. In order to understand better the nature of this writing, let us turn to some of the treatments it receives in the colonial discourse of German South West

⁴⁹ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU D.IV.n.13, Bd 1, p. 40.

⁵⁰ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU D.IV.n.13, Bd 1, p. 10.

Africa. Consider, for example, the following request expressed by the dying pioneer, Jobst Renner, in Johannes Dose's Ein alter Afrikaner:

Don't deprive me of my dream, my comfort. Promise me not to leave this land, which we have purchased with so much blood, but to love South West, the Cinderella of our colonies...⁵¹

We can see that this appeal is a complex one. It is first of all an elicitation spoken by a dying person, who in the moment of dying has the right to extract a promise from those around him as a show of love. The voice which would speak this promise would thus have to acknowledge the "purchasing power" of death - its pact with surplus meaning. It is here that the position of the transcendental eye is established. The recognition of death's "purchasing power" is then displaced onto the actual script to which the eye is directed: German blood on/in the land. And the position from which the marks of blood on the land become meaningful is established as a geo-political position: the position which refuses to leave the land because the script of blood has effected its purchase.

Indeed, it would not be amiss to read the entire project of colonial discourse as a tautological appeal to assume a geo-political position from which its script becomes meaningful. Thus we should understand colonial texts, just like Jobst Renner's appeal, as bearing within them reading instructions which are at the same time political and geographical positions. In this way, the text seeks to establish its meaning in that space in which it actualizes its meaning. For this reason, it would be misleading to read a document such as Frenssen's Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest purely as an attempt to dissipate information about the type of sacrifices brought by Germans during the wars with the Herero and Nama, and to clothe this in the form of an adventure story. It is this, of course, but it is more - it is an attempt to stipulate that position from which the mark - the script - of these sacrifices becomes meaningful.⁵²

⁵¹ Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, pp. 440-441.

⁵² Warmbold hints at this in his interpretation: "Da es sich überdies um einen deutschen Krieg auf kolonialdeutschem Boden handelt, der auf höchst eindrucksvolle Weise mit einem deutschen Sieg endet, brauchte Frenssen auch um die Zustimmung nationaler Interessengruppen nicht zu bangen" Warmbold, Ein Stückchen neudeutsche Erd, p. 121.

This involves, however, the additional strategy of presenting this position as always preexisting its actualization - it is always already there. What is elided is the moment of production involved not only in the writing, but more particularly in the actualization of meaning. Thus when Peter Moor discovers the story of German presence and suffering in South West Africa, he discovers it as something which was awaiting discovery - a story waiting to be told.

Now and then they [the old soldiers] would speak of the fifteen-years of battles in the colonies, some or all of which they had taken part in, and of the battles of the past three months. They mentioned many a place where brave deeds were done, and many a bold man, dead and living. I was astonished that, in this land, Germans had already done such great and difficult things, of which I had never heard or read a single word, and that so much German blood had flowed in torment in this hot, dry land.⁵³

The script in blood is a writing which must be incorporated into another text in order to derive its meaning. This does not make it less than writing, for it is the very essence of writing to initiate an endless chain of commentary in search of the loss of meaning which writing always entails. What I wish to stress is that there is a machinery which derives a fullness of meaning at the moment when it chooses to interrupt this proliferation in the name of a production which is not purely textual. This is what I have been calling the spatializing machine, since what is produced here is space.

When the script of blood marks a space as German possession, it thus opens subjective space onto the space of the socius along the lines we saw in our discussion of Lacan's theory of the space of the subject. The apprehension of subjectivity - particularly in vision - pre-supposes both a social space and a material surface upon which the marks of subjectivity may be written, as a barrier against death. In order to illustrate this point, let us consider the following paragraphs from Peter Moor.

He [the old soldier] looked up and spoke with a hoarse, pained voice: "We will still have to be hard and kill for a long time. But in the meantime, as individuals and as a nation, we must strive for lofty thoughts and noble deeds, so that we can contribute our part to the brotherhood of humanity which is to come." He stood and looked thoughtfully across the wide, moonlit steppe, and then back at the still, dead body.

I had often thought during the campaign: 'What a pity! All the poor sick men, and all those who have fallen. It's not worth all that good blood.' But now I

⁵³ Frenssen, Peter Moor, pp. 66-67.

heard a great song, which resounded over all South Africa and the whole world, and lent me an understanding of the matter.⁵⁴

Let us focus on a formal connection between these two paragraphs: the alternate gaze of the old soldier upon the determined, bounded space of the dead body and upon the indeterminate, unbounded space of the open steppes is repeated in the "great song" which Peter Moor situates alternately in relation to the politically determined space of Southern Africa and the politically indeterminate space of the whole world. The relation which these two bear to one another is not only formal, it is also semiotic: Peter Moor's work in positioning his song spatially is an extraction of meaning from the gaze of the old soldier. We are told this in the lines where Peter Moor states that he has come to understand something which he did not understand previously. Let us not begin by asking what it is he has come to understand. Let us rather ask first how he has come to understand. The answer is that he has come to occupy that position which the trooper creates in alternating his gaze between the dead body and the wide open spaces of the landscape. In occupying it as a position from which meaning is possible, he creates it as transcendental. The two of them work together to produce a text which renders the script of death and of spilt blood legible. But it does more than that - and here we can ask what it is that Peter Moor comes to understand. The text which is produced by the old trooper repeats once again the gestures of seeing and hearing, but it repeats them as an instruction for stopping the proliferation of texts at a particular place. It shows how the constant repetition of form in writing can be transformed into a production of geographical space as the ordered space of an ideal socius. This it does by extracting that particular meaning from the dead body which is capable of giving meaning to an undifferentiated geographical space. This is what the trooper calls "being hard": instead of suffering at the sight of blood, he asks us to transform our suffering into a commitment to meaning. Warmbold states this as follows:

Nichts kann den Anspruch deutscher Siedler auf ihre neue Heimat, nichts den Anspruch des deutschen Reichs auf seine 'Schutzgebiete' nach Ansicht Frenssens überzeugender verdeutlichen, als "allein die Tatsache, daß von den

⁵⁴ Frenssen, Peter Moor, p. 201.

außereuropäischen Erdteilen zumeist der Boden Afrikas deutsches Blut, deutschen Schweiß und deutsche Tränen getrunken hat."⁵⁵

This is, in effect, exactly the same appeal which we find in the official imperative to mark the graves of the fallen soldiers and civilians, and to maintain them in a worthy condition. The pain of loss which death must awaken is transformed into a commitment to a social order - an order which may be mapped onto the landscape. As we see in the above quote, the Nazis will repeat this same imperative as an argument for the restoration of the colonies to Germany. The land is marked with German blood, and so the colonies are Germany's rightful possession. What has been lost with the colonies is, however, also the ability to extract meaning from the marks of blood. Thus a call for the restoration of the colonies must be a call for a renewal of linguistic competence.

It is Germans who, with hard work and toil, have built the African colonies of Togo, Cameroon, South West and East Africa. Germans have spilt their blood for them, and their graves are scattered throughout Africa.⁵⁶

The graves in the lost colonies are the site of a double loss: the original loss in death, and the loss of that meaning which had served to postpone death.

1.3 *The grave: script on the earth, script in the heart*

This brings us to another strategy in rendering the script of suffering legible - the marking of the ground with tombstones. I will be attempting to show that these mark positions which can serve as nodal points - as positions at which an organisation of space may be effected in various different spatial qualities at the same time. I will be arguing that the most important connection here is between the marking of the earth and the marking of subjective affect economy: a script in the earth and a script in the heart. But again, this is a script which serves as the

⁵⁵ Warmbold, *Ein Stückchen neudeutsche Erd*, p. 123. The quote refers to Herbert Todt, *Die deutsche Begegnung mit Afrika im Spiegel des deutschen Nachkriegsschrifttums* (Frankfurt, 1939), p. 2.

⁵⁶ Senta Dinglreiter, *Wann kommen die Deutschen endlich wieder? Eine Reise durch unsere Kolonien in Afrika* (Leipzig, Berlin: Hase und Koehler, 1935), p. 9.

signature and at the same time as proof of performance to a contract of sale. Thus it is possible for Dose to gaze upon the graves of nameless soldiers and extract the following meaning:

Hundreds of these wooden crosses are scattered throughout Damaraland and the thorn bush, and testify to the German heroes who gained a new Germany for us with their blood.⁵⁷

Inoted above that the script of blood on the earth becomes meaningful as a result of the production of a position to which this meaning accrues as a surplus. I noted further that this position is defined not only in the texts which may derive meaning from the script of blood, but also from the way in which this script is tied to an organization of geographical space. The discourse surrounding (and marking) the grave is paradigmatic for this process. It defines a position from which the traces of suffering and death become meaningful, and it ties this position to geographical space. As such, we should recognize that the marking of a grave is equivalent to the establishment of a meta-text: a writing about writing.

Mournfully, Erb von Erbenheim stood with his wife at the grave, on which, as a monument, a mighty, rugged, unhewn block had been placed; it has been smoothed only where the inscription stood: the glorious words: 'He was an Old African.'

In that indelible script, which no wind nor weather could erase, the memory of his friend and father had been written deeply and faithfully into his heart.⁵⁸

The sorrow which Erb von Erbenheim feels at the loss of his uncle is sublated in the script on the grave. In preserving loss as suffering and transforming it into a meaningful script, the writing on the grave attains a permanence both in subjective space (as a memory) and in geographical space. This is again not intended as a metaphor. The place to which Erb must come in order to have the script of death activated in the most effective manner is the grave of his uncle - the place where writing ties these two qualities of space together. As stated above, however, the script on the tomb is not primarily a writing to be read. It is a production of meaning which may serve as a production of space. This is demonstrated in the following passage from Peter Moor:

⁵⁷ Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 431.

⁵⁸ Dose, Ein alter Afrikaner, p. 448.

In the narrow, meager garden, where one could see the toil with which German hands had tended it in the sparse earth, lay a pile of white stones. Below them, covered one meter down in the dry land, lay the line-keeper and his wife, who had been ambushed and killed by blacks. The five or six sailors from the 'Habischt,' who maintained the station at present, had nailed a wooden cross from a packing crate and written the names of the dead on it with a blunt pencil, and below: 'Fell at the hands of murderers.'⁵⁹

Here the act of writing marks the grave as that place where order has been created by German labor. The meaning which the grave establishes as the surplus value of suffering is easily transformed into a social imperative: the call for revenge and justice. Once again, subjective space and geographical space open onto social space. In organizing the space of subjectivity as the preservation of a memory - that is as a barrier to death -, the grave is also organizing social space by marking a place where its borders have been violated.

The claim that, in the colonial discourse of German South West Africa, the grave organizes subjective and social and geographical space is by no means far-fetched. We need only consider the administrative discourse generated by the question of erecting plaques and maintaining the graves. Thus we find the suggestion being put forward that, due to the "very considerable difficulties which would be involved in having the plaques erected by the troops,"⁶⁰ this task be handed over to the police. Elsewhere (and just 2 months later), this idea is expanded upon so that the maintenance of graves would also fall under the jurisdiction of the local police authority. In this letter, Major Grautoff draws up a table of various police districts, and assigns the responsibility for specific graves to the corresponding districts. The graves here serve as a position in which a subjectively motivated desire for meaning is tied directly to an imperative to map social order onto geographical space. This is effected via a tabular, spatializing knowledge. We even find one section where Grautoff groups a number of graves together under the jurisdiction of the relevant police authority "once the police station has been established in

⁵⁹ Frenssen, *Peter Moor*, p. 41.

⁶⁰ *Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements*, WA ZBU D.IV.n.13, Bd 1, p. 10.

Nakab."⁶¹ Is the presence of the grave serving here as a motivation for the establishment of a police station?

Even when the extraction of meaning is not so explicit as in the above examples, we can clearly recognize the same function of the grave. Consider the passage from von Estorff:

I visited the battlefield there [in the mountainous regions of Hereroland] and the grave of my brother Otto, who had fallen here on 9 April 1904. A high white cross now stood at the head of the graves, and an iron railing surrounded them. Deep solitude reigned here, the wind played with the grasses of the steppe, and they rested in deep peace.⁶²

Note the way the establishment of a grave as a marker on the landscape effects a multi-leveled script in a striated space: the landscape is marked with a cross and a fence; this point enters into a dialogue with the openness of the steppe (in the same way we observed earlier in an example from Peter Moor); it serves to repeat a memory trace, and to inscribe an affect value onto the landscape.

In the example quoted earlier from Peter Moor, the passage from the grave as a meaningful geographical position to social space is prescribed as following the border between a killing which is criminal and that which is legitimate. When the old soldier ensures us that the perfect socius can only be created if the German soldiers harden themselves to the genocide they are perpetrating (a common plea in the colonial discourse of German South West Africa), the passage from subjective space to social space defines the border between two kinds of killing. Killing is on the nether side of the socius (as murder), or else it serves as a means to a utopian socius. We can also find other examples in which the grave serves to define a passage to a possible utopian social structure. Sometime in the future we are promised a perfect plenitude of meaning, in which the grave will bear the significance of the sacrifice it marks plainly for all to see:

These men [the victors of Great Nabas] are the greatest heroes of the entire Herero and Hottentot war, but they have earned little fame, and their dead have found a modest grave. But in later and more thankful times in the

⁶¹ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU D.IV.n.13, Bd 1, p. 13.

⁶² von Estorff, Wanderungen und Kämpfe, p. 140.

colony, their deeds will be sung and spoken of, and their graves will become a German memorial cemetery.⁶³

This utopian *socius* serves as the motivation for assigning meaning to the grave. The grave as a script always implies the possibility of a *socius* in which the social dimension of meaning will be self-evident. What I mean by this is that the labor involved in establishing a grave presupposes a *socius* which will by necessity read the grave as a script. The underlying presumption of the grave as a mark of the perfect *socius* becomes apparent when we consider descriptions of the native grave as a mark of savagery. Consider this extensive description of the native grave:

Since it was such a magnificent cool morning, we decided to walk. From the heights of Gui-Gams we viewed the broken-down pontocks, and, at Samuel's request, helped him look for the grave of his father, who had died here two years ago. At first we could not find it. Finally, the rascal led us gleefully to a hole, some half a meter deep, in which a few scraps of hide lay. That was the grave. There was not a trace of a corpse nor its shroud of hide. The hyenas had dug up the corpse and had a hideous meal. We couldn't help but ponder on the grisly fact, and cold shivers ran up my spine. The dead man lies tightly wrapped and sewn in skins, as is the custom of the natives... [The hyenas] pull him from his sandy resting place and drag him across the desert... His bones are scattered here and there, and when one rides over the savannah, a bleached skull grins at you, and the open grave yawns and tells a terrible story.

When we whites bury our dead, we take care. We dig the grave much deeper, and weigh it down with stones, then cover the mound far around with the branches of thorn trees. The still sleeper below should be protected from the gruesome beasts.⁶⁴

The phantasy in which von Eckenbrecher indulges here is that of an absolute loss of subjectivity - the consumption of the body which, after death, is positioned in geographical space. When this position is itself destroyed, the meaning which is extracted in death is no longer present, and death is absolute. This is a knowledge which informs virtually all discourse concerned with the grave. And it is a knowledge which is at all times political, since it is always tied to the social conventions of burial. Thus in the following paragraph meaning is extracted from death by a most literal attempt to create a passage from subjective space to geo-political space.

"I know I have black fever... when I'm dead, let my heart be preserved carefully and sent to Germany, where it can be laid in the grave of my mother." The last thought, the last wish of the dying man was his home and

⁶³ Dose, *Ein alter Afrikaner*, p. 447.

⁶⁴ von Eckenbrecher, *Was Afrika mir gab und nahm*, p. 83-84.

his mother's grave. There his heart had remained, and there it will find peace.

This Sanitary Officer was also one of the pioneers who had fought to gain us a new Germany, one of those African heroes...⁶⁵

It is, however, not only the soldier who realizes that his life stands or falls with his ability to preserve himself in a writing which inscribes his being onto the face of the earth, and inscribes geo-political space as a space which has been purchased. The scientist is engaged in the same life and death struggle. This is typified, as Said notes, by the Orientalist Chateaubriand, who attempted to have his name inscribed in the stone of the pyramids.

Writing was an act of life for Chateaubriand, for whom nothing, not even a distant piece of stone, must remain scriptively untouched by him if he was to stay alive... if he had not succeeded in prolonging his life by writing, it [his self] would be merely excessive, superfluous.⁶⁶

Scientific knowledge, like mythology, is a writing which prescribes passages between subjective experience and physical space. The loss which is inevitably incurred in subjective experience (as inaccuracies in observation, the exclusion of background noise, the attempt to disregard chaos) is regained in the establishment of method (as systems for preserving meaning by modifying the physical world).

2 SPACES FOR NATIVES

2.1 *Native reserves: contractual rights*

The conflict between the attempt of the natives to establish an effective practice of resistance and the various strategies developed to counter this is evident in the debates surrounding the question of the native reserve. Here, however, the question of an imposition of European spatial order must be addressed more directly, because of the very nature of the "problem" as perceived by the colonizer, and the solutions proposed. Thus, for example, von Estorff opposes von Lindequist's

⁶⁵ Dose, *Ein alter Afrikaner*, pp. 208-209.

⁶⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, p. 175.

schemes to establish spatial enclosures and divisions to retain the natives on humanitarian grounds.

In Germany, he [von Lindequist] had thought out the scheme of transplanting all the Herero to the South and all the Hottentot to the north, so that in future they could be kept better under control. For this purpose the Herero who had surrendered were initially sent to concentration camps in Windhoek. This measure was all the more incomprehensible, since Lindequist had seen their terrible effects on the Boer families in South Africa. The same happened here. The Herero, who were accustomed to a free life, could not contend with cramped conditions in the narrow tent camps, even though everything was done to ensure cleanliness and good food... The war, the pursuit into the desert and this final senselessness all but wiped out the Herero nation. It was a proud, promising nation. Our duty was to educate, and not to destroy this nation. This was evil and foolish. Later there was a lack of labor in the colony...⁶⁷

But what grounds this semi-humanist discourse, issuing from the mouth of one who had personally participated in the war and the genocide? Von Estorff may have considered von Lindequist's and von Trotha's policies inhumane, but that didn't prevent him from fighting alongside von Trotha at the Waterberg, and subsequently driving the Herero into the desert. How does von Estorff manage to draw the line between honourable warfare and genocide? Where does his policy of forcible proletarianization manage to distinguish itself from von Trotha's unashamed lust for Herero blood, which von Estorff criticized so strongly?⁶⁸ Von Trotha's attitude is apparent in the following paragraph:

My precise knowledge of so many central African tribes, Bantu and otherwise, always proved with absolute certainty that the Negro does not respect a contract, but only naked force. Yesterday, before marching, I tried by military tribunal all rebels captured during the past days, and had them hanged. All women and children who had come to us were given the Proclamation to the Nation drafted in Otjiherero and chased back into the desert.⁶⁹

What is at stake in the conflict between von Estorff's and von Trotha's point of view is the incompatibility of two alternative forms of organizing the chaotic mass of the Herero into an ordered European *socius*. Where, for von Estorff, the Herero must be conquered and integrated into the economic structure of the colony; for von Trotha they have to be eradicated. For von Trotha, the power of Germany must be

⁶⁷ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 134.

⁶⁸ von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe*, p. 117-118.

⁶⁹ General Lothar von Trotha, ms. of 4 October 1904 to Alfred von Schlieffen, in *Lesebuch zur deutschen Geschichte*, ed. Bernhard Pollmann (Dortmund: Chronik, 1984), p. 65. My translation.

marked on a space congruent to the space of German imperial territory, and since the Herero have shown themselves opposed to imperial sovereignty, they must be punished - either hanged or driven so far into the Kalahari that they either die of thirst or cross the border into English territory.⁷⁰ Von Trotha is interested in organizing society not in a functional manner, but in a writing. What this means is that he is intent upon marking either bodies or spaces or both. We can see in this attitude a remnant of the despotic spectacle of torture, of which Foucault has the following to say:

If torture was so strongly embedded in legal practice, it was because it revealed truth and showed the operation of power. It assured the articulation of the written on the oral... It also made the body of the condemned man the place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the dissymetry of forces.⁷¹

This dual gesture of clearing a visible space of truth and power is, as we have already indicated, the gesture of writing, and writing is the domain of the despotic machine. How else could we explain the ridiculous gesture of von Trotha handing a legal pamphlet to those women and children he is about to drive to their death? Where it is not possible to write relations of power on the body of the native, then these must be written on a space from which the native has been banished. This is literally what von Trotha attempted.

Each and every one of the Herero people must leave the land... Inside of the German border, all Herero, with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will not take any more women and children, but will drive them back to their people or have them shot. That is my word to the Herero nation.⁷²

For von Estorff, the mark of German sovereignty is more subtle, more 'humane': the Herero must come to desire the relations of production extant in a white settler colony. That is to say, German colonial power must be inscribed on a space which is individualized and mobile: atomized. It need not be written on the native's body, but must be concretized in the form of his desire. This is precisely the

⁷⁰ "They will have to perish in the Sandfeld or make their way across the border into Bechuanaland." cit. Pollmann, Lesebuch zur deutschen Geschichte, p. 66. My translation.

⁷¹ Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 55.

⁷² "Aufruf General von Trothas an das Volk der Herero, 2.10.1904, in Vorwärts (Berlin, 16.12.1905), cit. Westphal, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien, p. 176. My translation.

process which had been set in motion with the establishment of native reserves and was to be continued after the Herero war. But we must be cautious here of the relativizing moral strategies which capitalism brings into play in its usurpation of despotic desire. The fact that we find von Trotha's paranoid phantasies despicable does not mean that we should find von Estorff's humanism acceptable.

The basis of complicity which allows these two "opposing" views to enter into dialogue with one another is best illustrated by examining the way both open onto a mythology of unrestricted movement in boundless space. In many instances, it is possible to generalize a discourse of colonialism, including fictional, semi-fictional and non-fictional texts. In some respects, however, this is a misleading practice. Colonial fiction often attempts to employ a different set of textual strategies to define a space of the colony. This is nowhere more apparent than when it comes to the question of marking a boundary between native spaces and the spaces of the European. Although from the mid 1890's onward the question of native reserves remains a continual topic of debate in administrative circles, I have been unable to find a single passage in any of the colonial fiction I examined in which this debate, or anything like an official demarkation of native space is mentioned. The reason, I suggest, is the following:

Colonial literature attempts a mythologization of colonial space by confronting two conflicting "economies" - one characterized by the social order, and another which would seek a smoothing of space - a space without qualities - in which boundless space overcomes the European constraints on mobility, and particularly on 'social mobility' - on any attempts to break out of the class structure of German society. As Ridley observes, such constraints were experienced by the colonizer as widespread.

Although German administrators might particularly appreciate their escape from pen-pushing and form-filling, and German soldiers their escape from the rigidly stratified officers' mess, in many other professions people felt that a meaningful life could begin only in the colonies. The various crafts and trades were much more open than in Germany, and individual initiative was far less restricted by tradition.⁷³

⁷³ Ridley, *Images of Imperial rule*, p. 128.

As we have seen, however, boundless space is constantly re-organizing itself into another form, in which the fictional subject must confirm a re-establishment of order, if he/she is not to confront an absolute loss of subjectivity. The fictional discourse of colonization therefore must find a space in which one form of spatial organization must be overcome, and another must be established. The solution which seems to present itself in almost all cases is a displacement of the social causes of constraint onto the level of geographic space. Although there is a certain emphasis on social mobility in the colony (as indicated in the passage quoted above), this is thematized much less openly than is geographic mobility. Unlimited geographic mobility becomes the prerequisite to increased social mobility. Hence Hans Grimm's myth of the *Volk ohne Raum* which was so popular with the Nazis, and which Jürgen Bergmann summarizes as follows:

Die Enge und Gedrängtheit in Deutschland macht seine Menschen physisch und psychisch krank (313), sie macht reinliche Abenteurer zu Schurken, weil sie keine Gelegenheit für ihre eigentümlichen unruhigen Kräfte finden (314), sie zwingt die Bauernsöhne, die auf den kleinen elterlichen Höfen kein Auskommen mehr haben, sich an die Fabriken der Städte zu verkaufen (315) oder in fremde Länder auszuwandern, der Landesmangel ist die Ursache für das Entstehen einer besitzlosen Klasse und dafür, daß diese Besitzlosen heute in Deutschland überwiegen,... ja, diese Raumnot bedeutet den Untergang Deutschlands und schließlich der ganzen Welt.⁷⁴

This displacement of the question of mobility onto the geographical level is already strongly in evidence in the earliest colonial fiction, and is accomplished in two ways: firstly, movement and travel become technical questions - the only restrictions on mobility become the quality of roads, the presence of water, the ability to read traces on the earth etc.; secondly, the space across which unlimited motion is possible must be phantasized as isotropic - that is, it need not be seen to be empty, but the population which exists there must not in any way be permitted to restrict movement.

We have already seen the way in which the technology of travel produces a script of possession - a signature - on the face of the colonial landscape. Furthermore, according to the principles discussed in part I, the capitalist machine

⁷⁴ Bergmann, Imperialismus und Zivilisationsflucht, p. 131. The numbers in brackets refer to Volk ohne Raum, by Hans Grimm (München, 1934).

commands strategies for deterritorializing the territories which this writing produces, and re-territorializing them as spaces which appear to be spaces of subjectivity. This process is well demonstrated in the development of native reserves. Now, the European gaze which would recognize a border of a native reserve, is compelled to look upon a border between an exclusively German space, and a space in which "no foreigner.. [may], without the permission of the State Administrator... dwell, take possession of land, or engage in trade or commerce..."⁷⁵ Such a gaze would be forced to disrupt the reorganization of space described above. It would be forced to admit that its geographical mobility is restricted, and it would be forced to look upon subjective space from a position which it can never occupy - the position of the native. It even finds itself described in administrative discourse as "foreign." Thus, in order to uphold its mythologization of space, colonial fiction elides this gaze.

Nevertheless, the structure of space in fictional discourse tells us something important about administrative restructuring of space in the creation of reserves. The latter discourse follows exactly the same strategy: a displacement of stratified geographical space onto the level of subjective space, with a corresponding smoothing of space within the boundaries of the reserve. But in the administrative discourse of the reserves it is the native's space which is smoothed, i.e. artificially removed from the effects of the state. And this is achieved at the cost of a stratification of the native's subjective space. The reserve is created as a space in which the native retains a mythical sovereignty, but in which this sovereignty is granted on condition of a re-definition of native subjectivity in terms of the colonizer's *socius*. This is particularly apparent in the agreement of 24 August 1898 between Hendrik Witbooi and Missionary Friedrich Judt of the *Rheinische Mission*:

Captain Witbooi grants this Society... the right to settle with its members at the places of their choice and to carry out any construction or development which they might, by their own free judgement, deem advantageous to the economic or spiritual well-being of the natives.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Theodor Leutwein, "Denkschrift über Eingeborenenpolitik und Hereroaufstand" (Berlin, 1904), pp. 71f, Anlage 28, cit. Sudholt, *Die deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik*, p. 151. My translation.

⁷⁶ Cit. Sudholt, *Die deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik*, p. 151. My translation.

The myth of the native's absolute sovereignty ("Captain Witbooi grants this Society...") is only to be achieved in the form of the contract. This is because it grants absolute sovereignty in retrospect, in exchange for something else. The native can prove that he possesses sovereignty over his territory only by giving that sovereignty up. And we find again and again that what he exchanges for this myth of sovereignty is an acceptance of the Law. This strategy of contractually assigning the native specific territories should be recognized as an extension of the strategies of marking the earth with a script of European possession. This emerges quite clearly in the following statement:

No regulations have to date been promulgated regarding the acquisition of unowned land. The Memorandum on the South West African Protectorate with Special Reference to the Period 1 October 1892 to 30 September 1893 (Col. Gaz. 1893, App. N 23) sets forth, however, that only a small part of the Protectorate is actually inhabited and farmed by native tribes, but who nevertheless claim for themselves the right to dispose of extensive areas. The Government, however, has reservations in generally recognizing claims to real estate which the natives base upon a temporary nomadic ownership, since it is questionable whether the concept of ownership did in fact exist among the natives in earlier times, or whether it was not brought to them by the white man. For this reason, it wishes to preserve and protect the natives in their actual possessions, provided they remain faithful and devoted to the German Protectorate Government. At the same time, however, it wishes to determine the exact borders of the tribal territories and allocate these regions to the natives in the form of so-called reserves, so as to facilitate the settlement by Europeans of land not being used by the natives, as well as to put an end to the constant border conflicts. Once the borders of the reserves have been determined, the remaining parts of the Protectorate are gradually to be declared Crown Land, and administered for the economic improvement of the land and to cover administrative costs...⁷⁷

The hypothesis I put forward earlier was that travel leaves traces in texts and on the earth, and that these traces serve as a script of possession. If this hypothesis is correct, then it would seem to me that the claim to ownership which the natives base upon their nomadic movements must be read as a parody of this script. In claiming ownership, they are stating the obvious - that if land can be possessed by crossing it, then they have already crossed the land which the white colonizer claims to have taken into possession. Unfortunately, this parody is rendered ineffectual by the gravity with which the discourse of the colonizer pursues the idea that ownership

⁷⁷ Carl von Stengel, Die deutschen Schutzgebiete, ihre rechtliche Stellung, Verfassung und Verwaltung (München und Leipzig: Hirsch, 1895), pp. 231-232. My emphasis.

must be proven by the existence of a mark on the land. The natives do not live on the land, nor have they marked it with their labor, nor have they (we saw this above) built roads. Therefore, they cannot own the land. The nomad native is phantasized as perfectly mobile and not leaving traces on the ground. As a result, it seems perfectly justifiable to define their territory as self-contained segments of space without quality, bordered from the rest of the colony by the colonizer's boundaries.

The myth of a space in which the native is absolutely mobile will continue to dominate the discussions surrounding reserves and villages. Nevertheless, it disguises an attempt to force the native to participate in the Christian worldview on the one hand, and on the other hand in the capitalist socius. These two forces acting on the native are, as we have seen, essentially at odds with one another.⁷⁸ All conflicts within the administrative discourse regarding native reserves should be read not only in terms of a conflict of interests between natives and colonizers, but also in terms of this conflict of interests between the capitalist and the despotic (Christian) machines. This is also a conflict of interest between the church and the settlers.⁷⁹

As Sudholt shows, Leutwein believed that the complex conflict of interests could be alleviated by establishing definite demarkations separating whites from blacks, and individual "tribes" from one another. This was a relatively liberal notion in the context of contemporary colonial policies, and it should also be seen in light of Leutwein's attempt to take traditional territories and customs into account in the establishment of the reserves. Nonetheless, Leutwein had no illusions about what he was actually accomplishing in his policy of contractual negotiation and reserves. Thus, by way of justification of his policies, he wrote in 1904:

It was hoped that the natives could gradually be accustomed to the situation at hand. In the end, nothing was to remain of their old independence. As was

⁷⁸ "Die Sorge des Gouvernements, daß die Mission durch derartige Verträge auf Umwegen sich für weite Teile des Landes den Besitztitel verschaffen könnte, zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die gesamte Korrespondenz in der Reservatsfrage." Sudholt, *Die deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik*, p. 153.

⁷⁹ "Wollten einerseits die Missionen durch Überschreibung großer Landgebiete Missionsreservate einrichten und damit die Christianisierung vorantreiben, so vertraten viele weiße Ansiedler eine Haltung, die auf möglichste Zurückdrängung der Stämme in enge Reservate abzielte..." Sudholt, *Die deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik*, p. 161.

in fact the case, this kind of peaceful policy was intended to go hand in hand with, in cases of disobedience, a gradual disarming of the natives, together with a dissolution of tribal ties.⁸⁰

The fact that native sovereignty and contractual ability is a myth is easily seen when we examine the way in which such land agreements as the above were seen to be terminated by default as a result of the wars of liberation. This, I would suggest, has nothing to do with the necessities of contractual law, but must be seen in the light of the above argument. The contract is seen to be nullified not because of an explicit breach, but because the native's acquiescence to the colonizer's *socius* was seen by the colonizer to imply subservience in every other respect as well. When this subservience was not accepted by the native, and particularly the Herero and Nama, the Germans regarded the land agreements as null and void. With Leutwein's admission of the failure of his policy, the way was prepared for von Trotha's policy of extermination.

[Now] we know... that a colonial policy based solely on contracts with the natives is, in the long run, not feasible in a settlement colony. Either both races must be placed on an equal footing (Cape Colony), or one must be made subordinate to the other by way of force.⁸¹

The alternative of equality was never a serious proposition in German colonial politics, and Leutwein was aware of this. Furthermore, he had never hidden the fact that the contractual establishment of reserves was intended as a means of acquiring land. In his annual report for 1895-6, Leutwein speaks of the need to reduce the amount of land occupied by the Herero. Bley observes that his method, the regulations regarding government ratification of purchase, amounts to a de-politicization of the decision by reducing it to an administrative matter.⁸² In this year he speaks of a "peaceful" transfer of native land to the whites. Bley describes the process of disinheritance as effected initially by war, famine and drought, leading to economic need which necessitated the sale of land "in the interests of the tribe."⁸³ His parting words as Governor before he made way for von Trotha, in

80 Leutwein, "Zur Arbeiterfrage in den Kolonien," in Koloniale Rundschau (2.2.1909), p. 110, cit. Sudholt, Die deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik, p. 162.

81 Leutwein, Zur Arbeiterfrage.

82 Helmut Bley, South West Africa under German rule, p. 102.

83 Bley, South West Africa under German rule, p. 115.

which he admits the failure of the reserve policy, can thus have only been seen as an admission that a war of extermination might be justified.

2.2 Houses: Oedipal relations

As a result of the default of contractual rights, the question of demarkation of native spaces becomes displaced after the defeat of the Hereros. After the Herero war, the government deliberately stalled plans of the *Rheinische Mission* to establish native reserves.⁸⁴ When we look through the official correspondence concerning itself with this matter, we see an increasing preoccupation with the native villages and dwellings. We have seen how, from the moment of encounter onwards, the European looked upon the native space as if upon the limits of civilization. If the policy of native reserves could not succeed in establishing separate spaces for whites and blacks, it would be necessary to establish alternative strategies for banishing these limit spaces from the space of the colony. These strategies are to be seen as a continuation of the policy of the reserves, but in a different form - that of the forced establishment of private living spaces based upon the European family structure. This continuity will become clearer if we see it in the context of the increasing division between the private and public spheres which accompanied the growth of European capitalism. We would expect the forced installation of the capitalist machine to be accompanied by a forced adoption of the European family structure. This is why architecture is invariably seen as an index of civilization. The social Darwinism of Lewis Morgan states that

house architecture, which connects itself with the form of the family and the plan of domestic life, affords a tolerably complete illustration of progress from savagery to civilization.⁸⁵

This will reach the extreme where in Peter Moor the old trooper can say:

⁸⁴ Bley, South West Africa under German rule, p. 103.

⁸⁵ Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient society or Researches in the lines of human progress from savagery through barbarism to civilization (London, 1887), p. 6, cit. Bergmann, p. 54.

These blacks have earned their death before God and man, not because they murdered the two hundred farmers and rose against us in rebellion, but because they never built houses and never dug wells.⁸⁶

It is for this very reason that architecture becomes not only an index of civilization, but a strategy of colonization. And it is a strategy which changes the representational organization of space.

The colonizer says: your father is your father and nothing else, or your maternal grandmother - don't mistake them for your chiefs; you can go have yourself triangulated in your corner, and place your house between those of your paternal and maternal kin; your family is your family and nothing else... Yes, then, an Oedipal framework is outlined for the dispossessed primitives: a shantytown Oedipus.⁸⁷

This changed nature of spatial representation not only with regard to architecture, but also town planning, administration, health services, etc., is a forced one, and is achieved in the years following the defeat of the Herero through a number of regulations and stipulations. I wish to briefly outline the importance of this process for the present discussion.

Attempts to determine the organization of native space in the years following the Herero defeat may be broadly classified into: attempts to separate the space of the native settlement from that of the whites, and attempts to control the organization within the settlements. Here we are clearly speaking of those settlements which are in the proximity of "white" areas. This is of importance, since the abandonment of the reserve policy implies that the attitude to those settlements in direct proximity to the white areas will eventually extend to native spaces throughout the entire colony. As early as 1905 we find official proclamations appearing which attempt to control movement across the boundaries of native settlements. These invariably had the form of a simple curfew:

Unauthorized entry by whites to this native township after dark, as well as unauthorized loitering in the pontocks, is prohibited.⁸⁸

If the expression of this curfew as a prohibition on whites comes as an initial surprise, let us note that this does not, as in the case of the native reserves, represent

⁸⁶ Frenssen, Peter Moor, p. 200.

⁸⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 169.

⁸⁸ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.1, p. 12.

an attempt to create a space in which the native enjoys sovereignty, regardless how mythical such sovereignty might be. We are dealing quite simply with the necessity of separating the races. In order to illustrate the point, however, let us glance briefly at a letter of 9 August 1912 written by the District Officer of Swakopmund and addressed to the Government, in which he comments on negative reports regarding living conditions in the Swakopmund native settlement. The initial negative reports had been submitted by Missionary Eich in support of plans to build a small native settlement outside of Swakopmund. Eich had supported this initiative because of what he saw to be an intolerable moral situation resulting from the proximity of the dwellings of natives to those of their white employers.

Although immorality is an evil characteristic of Africa, it has never been seen as in Swakopmund. Among the causes of this fact are above all the war and its consequences, as a result of which families have been torn apart, and people of both sexes have, upon returning, been forced to live together in cramped kraals, where every last remainder of shame has disappeared, exacerbated by the fact that the voluptuousness of many white men has brought income to the women and to the men, who act as procurers.⁸⁹

The problem is identified by the missionary as a problem of the breakdown of family structures, and the relative indeterminacy of spatial quality inherent in a situation where white and black are living side by side. This is then incorporated into a moral argument. In the letter responding to these complaints we learn that "the question of sexual intercourse between white and black" is "very delicate." It is however, a practice which must be curbed:

It has long been a scientific fact that this is undesirable - on the one hand, in order to maintain the repute of the white race, and, on the other hand, to avoid half-breeds. This has also been established by the latest studies on mixed marriages. But how to hinder or reduce it?⁹⁰

The possibility of using paragraph 17f of the Municipal Code to disenfranchise those whites married to or living with non-whites is rejected. The reason given is that "such a prohibition would open the door to boasting."⁹¹ The only feasible solution which is offered is the following:

89 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2. (emphasis in original).

90 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1i.

91 Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1k.

For the present, it must be countered by importing white women and strengthening that social consensus which despises sexual intercourse of this kind.⁹²

This letter is also quite explicit in identifying alternative strategies which might impose a formidable system of control on the natives. The first of these strategies is architectural and addresses the problem directly:

Once the city has announced that, for the present, the construction of a general township is not planned, it will be possible to exert more pressure on employers to fit out their natives' houses correctly.⁹³

This is, to all intents and purposes, a relatively innocent undertaking. However, we should not forget that the establishment of architectural regulations necessitates an inspecting body which is responsible for surveilling the space affected by these regulations.

It is intended, first of all, to establish guidelines for native dwellings, then to undertake an inspection of all dwellings, and finally, to engage the police force to ensure gradual implementation.⁹⁴

Due to the conditions in the colony, the surveilling and inspecting body is the police. However, this fact should alert us and make us aware of the possibility that this inspecting activity may be extended into spheres beyond that of building regulation. This would further be expected if we consider the fact that building regulations cannot be divorced from building use. The dwellings are to be constructed in a specific way, because they are to be used in a specific way. And these specifics all rotate around the structure of the nuclear family. Thus the construction of buildings must be accompanied by the introduction of regulations stipulating who may live where.

It will, however, be possible to achieve an improvement if, as part of the guidelines for the provision of native dwellings, it is stipulated that separate dwellings are to be provided for unmarried men and for unmarried women respectively.⁹⁵

So alongside their inspecting activities, the police assume a demographic role - the tabulation and classification of the population they control.

⁹² Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1k.

⁹³ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1i.

⁹⁴ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1i.

⁹⁵ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1k.

In addition, an attempt is to be made to improve the family life of the natives by recording exact information regarding family status in the police register, and to issue natives belonging to one family with, in addition to the general pass, a small metal token with a number designating the head of the family. This is to prevent the women claiming to be married to one person one day and another person another day.⁹⁶

Thus we find ourselves transported within the range of a couple of pages from a "compassionate" and "humanist" concern with dwellings to a strategy of surveillance and classification. We may, incidently see exactly the same development in the question of medical care for the natives:

It may be seen that the city is concerned that something be done for the health of the natives by the fact that a local decree has been issued making regular medical inspection mandatory for coloreds.⁹⁷

The operational word here is "regular," since it implies a means of tabulating and surveilling the population to ensure compliance with the law.

And finally, it is quite correctly (if only implicitly) recognized that this surveilling, inspecting and demographic work is directly threatened by any random mobility on the part of the natives - either across the boundaries of their dwelling place, or across the boundaries of the nuclear family. In order to counter this, another strategy is suggested.

Finally, in order to awaken a sense of thrift among the natives, an attempt is to be made to arrange for the natives to be issued savings books from the Swakopmund Bank Co-op, so that they will not be forced to spend all their money for the maintenance and return journey of relatives from further inland when the latter come on their so frequent visits.⁹⁸

In keeping with the workings of the capitalist machine, these movements are to be curbed not simply by law. This was certainly also the case; however, the District Commissioner seems to have had enough experience to tell him that there are more effective ways of controlling mobility. One of them is, as we saw earlier, to displace spatial stratification onto the level of subjectivity and desire, while apparently allowing a freedom of geographical movement. One way of achieving this displacement is by showing that movement itself is not to be excepted from the

⁹⁶ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1k.

⁹⁷ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1i.

⁹⁸ Akten des Kaiserlichen Gouvernements, WA ZBU W.III.f.2, p. 1k.

commodity structure of the capitalist socius; or, to put it succinctly, that mobility in capitalist society must be purchased with a reinvestment in borders.

3 MAPS

A map is a special case in the representation of spatial relations, since it contains specific information for how it is to be read, and how this reading is to be applied in geographic or geopolitical space. I have, however, already claimed that this projection of meaning onto geo-political space is characteristic of colonial discourse in general, and that this is what allows us to read it as creating spaces in a non-metaphorical way. When we examine mapping as a form of spatial representation, we are concerned with the most obvious example of a structuring of space in the representational mode. Fabian notes that the map functions as a spatialization of knowledge similar to that of a tabular grid.

Maps are devices to classify data. Like tables and diagrams they are taxonomic ways of ordering cultural isolates with the help of categories of contrast and opposition: source vs. variant, center vs. periphery, pure form vs. mixed variant, displaying criteria of quality vs. those of quantity...⁹⁹

Fabian is referring specifically to anthropology, but we can note for our purposes that a spatial display of knowledge such as a map is not only a space in which knowledge is fixed according to certain pre-determined categories. It is also a blueprint for the application of the knowledge in spaces which are equivalent on another level. A map certainly cannot claim to yield a true and complete representation of a space. What it can claim is that it works, provided it is used for the purposes for which it is intended, and provided the rules of transformation from representational space to the other spatial quality strictly followed. This becomes apparent if we look at what the map has become today. A geological map will tell us where a certain geological formation is to be found, but we cannot use it to find the best way to reach a certain village by car. Similarly, a "political" map portrays the

⁹⁹ Fabian, *Time and the Other*, p. 55.

space of a nation as if it were of uniform quality - which, for limited political purposes, it is. We must consult another map to discover that population is not uniformly distributed throughout the territory. If, however, we consult a meteorological map, we will see that the borders on the political map are non-existent.

In this section, I wish to trace some strategies which a political and topographic map may employ in order to define the rules of its application; that is, to define privileged passages to other spatial organizations. The earliest attempts to map Africa arise from a necessity in the technology of travel. The permanence of fixed topographic features must be established, in order to ensure the repeatability of the voyage. Most of the cartographers who produced these maps, however, were conscious of the fact that the map was to be looked at. That is to say, these maps are a spatial representation which allow the passage between phantasy and accuracy to parallel the passage from the space of the navigator's table to the space of a coastline. It is common for cartographers and historians to misread these attempts to combine factual sightings with a free play of phantasy as attempts to obscure a lack of knowledge on the part of the cartographer. Thus, according to Urs Bitterli, on a map of 1668 by Olfert Dampers,

the outline of the dark continent is extremely exact, and a certain latitudinal distortion of the map image may be attributed to the fact that there were still no adequate aids to determining the exact geographical longitude...The hinterland was, however, Terra incognita for him, and since he did not wish to evidence how little he knew of it, he had no choice but to obscure his scientific aporia with the charm of artistic inventiveness, by inhabiting the geographic no-man's-land with all types of animals and remarkable networks of rivers and mountain ranges - a practice which persisted into the middle of the eighteenth century.¹⁰⁰

We should, however, be cautious of interpreting such a map according to too simplistic a theory of reference, precisely for the reason of the changed relation between representation of knowledge and the practical circumstances of its application. The very fact that Dampers included drawings of fantastic animals in the interior of his Africa indicates that we are not dealing with a trigonometric

¹⁰⁰ Urs Bitterli, *Die "Wilden" und die "Zivilisierten," Die europäisch-Überseeische Begegnung*, dtv wissenschaftliche Reihe 4396, p. 48. My translation.

projection of geographical positions, but with a representational device which plays on the ambiguity between the signifier in the discursive mode and the truth value of its signification, or its reference value, or its historical use value. Of course the Portuguese ship's captain and navigator visiting factories on the coast of Africa possessed the discursive competence to read Dampers' map correctly.

Whether we are concerned with a modern map or one such as Dampers', the question of "accuracy," which I would prefer to term "reference," is secondary. What is more important is the question of complicity between the codification of knowledge and its specific application by those who sought to profit thereby (no matter how small, heterogeneous, or ill-defined these "interest groups" were). When changes in specific practices render these specific passages useless, they tend to "prove" the obsolescence of those modes of representation in which these passages are defined. It is only with the growing empiricism coupled to the growing tabulation of discursive representation of empirical facts to create a coherent body of knowledge during the Enlightenment, as well as the necessities arising from the practice of exploration, that this mode of representation becomes regarded as an obstacle to truth. Cartographers from the late 18th century onward prefer blank spaces to imaginary rivers and mountains. In the attempted banishment of metaphoric representation from scientific discourse, truth is produced as a discursive fixing of the relative positions of a transcendental subject and an object delineated in space. And yet at the same time, scientific discourse reserves the right to produce this truth by proving that a previous truth is erroneous. We have already confronted this fact on a number of occasions, and we have described it as the ability of universal knowledge to cross the very borders within which it defines itself. And we have already put forward the idea that this constant crossing of borders produces a mythical mastery of space outside the realm of truth. Let us proceed to interrogate this production of truth through a mythical mastery of space.

As the explorers "penetrate" the interior of Africa in the 19th century, the definition of passages between representational space tends to align itself

increasingly to the colonial project. Hence we find that the practice of confirming a field of truth while producing an earlier representation as error extends itself to the representational system of the savage and its respective knowledge of space. If we examine the navigational methods of inner Africa's early European explorers, we find that they rely almost exclusively on the knowledge of "native guides" to help them reach their goals. And yet, we find them employing various strategies to erase this dependence, and to incorporate the knowledge of the guide into universal knowledge. For example, when Curt von Francois sought a route to the Okavango swamps in December 1890, he informed himself of the position of water in the area from the chief of the !Kung nomads (whom he does not even give a name), a man whom he himself describes as "the single person most knowledgeable of the land." At the same time, however, he redefines this knowledge as a passage between geographic space and the representational space of the map.

The chief... told me that the water situation had been better in previous years. Many of the now dry depressions had been full of water all year. He also claims to have observed that the river bed of the Okaluombe indicated on the map south of Debra had delivered its water to lake Ngami.¹⁰¹

Similarly, when Livingstone set out to explore the Liambey river north of Lake Ngami in 1852, he found his way into this new territory with the aid of a chief Sekeletu, who "received him in a most hospitable manner and was an excellent host for 8 months... For his further journeys, he received from chief Sekeletu 33 boats and a party of 160 men."¹⁰² Andersson likewise relied on a certain Lecholetebe to provide him with boats and guides so he could explore the Teoge river north of Ngami. However, he was forced to interrupt his journey due to an agreement between Lecholetebe and the chief of the Bayeye, whereby the latter did not provide Andersson with the expected provisions when he reached his village. What was clearly an act of resistance to the encroachment of unwanted Europeans on

¹⁰¹ Mitteilungen von Forschungsreisenden und Gelehrten aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten 4 (1891), ed. E Danckelmann, (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn), p. 207.

¹⁰² Petermann, August Heinrich, ed., Mittheilungen aus Justus Perthes' geographischer Anstalt über wichtige neue Erforschungen auf dem Gesamtgebiet der Geographie (Gotha: Perthes, 1855), p. 51.

Lecholetebe's territory was immediately codified by Andersson as an affirmation of his objective knowledge of the nature of the savages:

Not the most alluring promises of presents and rewards had yet succeeded in inducing [Lecholetebe] to assist anyone in this manner... To my great astonishment, but no less delight, and without the slightest objection, he agreed to my proposal. As, however, I could not flatter myself that I had produced a more favourable impression than any other traveller, I suspected deceit of some kind; and the sequel proved I was not mistaken in my conjecture.¹⁰³

When we examine any of the numerous passages describing the unreliability and treachery of the native guides, we can see that the discourse of exploration is constantly crossing the boundary of the native's knowledge, looking back upon the space of knowledge which has just been relativized, and drawing conclusions about the status of this activity. The explorer's constant self-reflection upon his own ability to cross borders into unknown territory is what constitutes his mythological mastery of space. Thus, the manner in which Andersson proceeds with his narrative. After the passage quoted above, we are presented with almost a hundred pages describing the history of exploration of Lake Ngami, its geography, botany and zoology, as well as the appearance, government, mythology, etc. of its inhabitants. Thereafter, Andersson recounts the ultimate failure of his expedition due to Lecholetebe's scheme in the following words:

Mortified and annoyed at the shameful manner in which I had been treated, I was, nevertheless, glad to have come thus far. I had learnt much in this short time..., to say nothing of the beautiful, diversified, and novel scenery which almost daily presented itself to view - which alone was a sufficient reward for my troubles and anxieties.¹⁰⁴

No good explorer of the 19th century - and Andersson is no exception here - would write a book about his journeys without attaching a map across which his movements are traced with a line. The map is the symbolic representation of exploration, and it has the vital function of positioning the subject of knowledge within the objective space of a landscape. I would argue, however, that this positioning cannot take place as an extension of European knowledge without the mythologizing function of the text. The texts of exploration commentate the maps

¹⁰³ Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, p. 439.

¹⁰⁴ Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, pp. 496-7.

they display. The maps present the knowledge, but it is the text which displays this knowledge as a mastery of space. The text, as a mythological account of a passage, reconciles the contradictions between the physical practice of exploration and its representation as knowledge. This mythological function of the text applies not only to the travelogue, but just as well to the administrative and scientific discourses which commentate the problems of mapping. The problems associated with the emergence and development of the science of mapping are comparable to those of exploration, since both practices are characterized by the struggle to find practical ways of applying a theory of geographical absolutes. In the 19th century, this theory is to be found in the form of triangulation and astronomy.

The technique of ascertaining geographical position relative to a "known fixed point" through triangulation had already been developed by Snellius some 250 years prior to Livingstone's and Andersson's explorations of Lake Ngami and the surrounding territory. This was regarded as extremely accurate, and has formed the basis of surveying ever since. However, it is a long and tedious process, and hardly practical for a scientific expedition. The triangulation of a 600 km stretch of German/English border in South West Africa took 5 years from 1898 to 1903.¹⁰⁴ In 4 years, with the use of guides, Livingstone had covered five times that distance across territory unknown to Europeans.¹⁰⁵ It is true, Livingstone was careful to take astronomical sightings from which his position was later calculated by Thomas Maclear, the King's astronomer at the Cape Observatory.¹⁰⁶ However, Livingstone could not have relied upon these readings for any degree of practical accuracy. In fact, in an article of 1894, we still find the would-be traveller being advised against astronomical navigation and being told to mark his route by topographic observation, involving the measurement of travelling time and direction with a clock and compass, noting landscape features, and charting relative topographic position

¹⁰⁴ Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten 17 (1904), pp. 6-26.

¹⁰⁵ Petermanns Mittheilungen (1855), p. 51.

¹⁰⁶ Petermanns Mittheilungen (1855), p. 52.

using a levelled table to which a sheet of paper has been attached and a dioptroruler to draw lines of angular distance between sighted features of the landscape.

The final derivation of the map is left in most cases to cartographic specialists; it is possible for them to construct a map through simple techniques using the charted sightings copied onto tracing paper... In general, the results obtained by route construction and above all by trigonometric sighting charts are much more accurate than astronomical sightings for longitude.¹⁰⁷

When we discussed the Lacanian theory of the constitution of subjectivity in the field of the gaze, we noted that the subject emerges as a position determined by the lines of vision implicating him within a social field. We noted also that the surface upon which such lines of vision projected images was vital in determining the nature of subjectivity in the *soicus*. If we reconsider the above recommendation from this point of view, it should strike us that we are not only being presented with a topographic technique for mapping the subject's position in the landscape, but also with a formula for mapping the *socius* onto geographical space via the mediation of subjectivity. It is the goal of mythological mastery of space to effect this mediation.

As the map progresses from imaginary rivers to surveyed borders, its reference value appears to increase to the point where the passage from the topographic and political field of the map to the geopolitical field of the colony appears to be virtually automatic. The truth value of the map appears to depend upon a banishment of desire and myth. It is by hiding its mythical status that the map fixes relative positions of transcendental European subjectivity and enclosed African objectivity, and produces these positions as political, geographical, and subjective positions, as well as positions from which exchange may take place. And yet, it is possible to show that these positions can exist only by virtue of a mythology of the hero who crosses borders.

Let us consider an example to demonstrate this. The treaties of 1890 between Germany and Great Britain, and 1886 between Germany and Portugal fixed "the sphere in which the exercise of influence is limited to Germany"¹⁰⁸ by enclosing the

¹⁰⁷ *Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten* 7 (1894), p. 14.

¹⁰⁸ Hertslet, E, *The map of Africa by treaty*, vol. 2 (London: Harrison & sons, 1909), p. 901.

space of South West Africa as a mythical space possessing homogeneous political quality. Nevertheless, this enclosure can be effected technically only by establishing a transcendence for which the border is no obstacle. We have already seen on several occasions that dialogue establishes a border of difference by an initial complicity against noise and chaos. In the following example, it should become apparent that, if the border is to be created, this complicity is required not only in diplomatic negotiations, but in the application of certain mathematical principles. I shall attempt to show that when mathematical principles of spatial order are applied to the landscape, certain contradictions arise whose solution is mythical, in that it prescribes a privileged passage of application which has nothing to do with the truth value of mathematics. It has been said that when an irresistible force meets an immovable object, something must give. Now, just as that something is the discourse which formulated this very principle, so too must the contradiction of mathematical principles and their application lead to a principle of application which denies the contradiction.

When the border between German South West Africa and British Bechuanaland was traced onto the "Original map of Great Namaqualand and Damaraland compiled by Th. Hahn, P. D. 1:742 016 (Cape Town 1879)," the town of Rietfontein fell 20' east of the 20th degree in British territory.¹⁰⁹ When Curt von Francois surveyed the route from Stolzenfels to Rietfontein in 1890-92, his observations calculated by Dr C Stechert of Hamburg placed Rietfontein with 19°44'40" well within German territory. The town of Stolzenfels was similarly positioned considerably further west than in Hahn's map.¹¹⁰ In evaluating Francois' observations in 1893, Dr R. Kiepert said:

The considerable displacement of Stolzenfels to the west, which I undertook only with much hesitation, necessitates a shortening of the course of the Orange river, a compression of the areas on both sides of its banks between 19°5'E Gr and the coast on the one hand, and on the other hand an expansion of the region east of 19°5'E Gr.¹¹¹

109 Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten 6 (1893), p. 40.

110 Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten 5 (1892), p. 244.

111 Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten 6 (1893), p. 41.

We are faced here with the problem of relative variables in topographic representation and the difficulty in situating them in a field of absolute truth. If we take the positions of towns as constant and allow the border to be traced as a transcendent quantity, relating trigonometrically to the fixed point of Greenwich, England, then when the position of the towns in question presents itself as variable, the 20th degree, while axiomatically remaining a perfectly straight line, becomes an irregular curve when traced on the landscape relative to these towns. This paradoxical situation can only be corrected by recognizing the transcendent truth of the 20th degree's absolute straightness, and establishing relative positions of individual towns within the objective space of the colony measured within the absolute field of angular distance east of Greenwich.

It may appear that in stating this problem in such a way, I am hopelessly complicating what is a simple matter of an error in taking readings. What I am trying to show is that the application of transcendental principles is always erroneous. The crucial point is the question of which quantities may be produced as erroneous, and how precisely the passage from a representational (mathematical) spatial order to its application in geo-political space is to be effected so as to suspend these erroneous quantities.

As we have seen, this passage is defined according to the myth of mobility across borders. This myth finds its political expression in diplomacy. It should thus come as no surprise to us that the only solution to the doubt which remained when the two teams measured the border in different places was one which combined the practical application of knowledge and political diplomacy. In the years 1898-1903, a joint British and German surveying team ascertained the position of the border relative to its adjacent towns by triangulation and marked it using beacons. This expedition 'placed' the towns of Stolzenfels and Rietfontein where they are today, the former to the west, the latter to the east of the 20th degree.

CONCLUSION

The decision to colonize in Southern Africa means nothing else than that the native tribes must withdraw from the lands on which they have pastured their cattle and so let the white man pasture his cattle on these self-same lands.

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German Settlement Commission

If colonization is the story of borders, their drawing, administration and crossing, then one of the most problematic borders in German South West Africa has certainly always been the northern border with Portuguese Angola:

At the time, the border between German South West Africa and Portuguese Angola was fixed with no consideration to the tribes. A border was determined by simply joining the Cunene River with the Okavango River by a straight line. That is why Portuguese Ambos cross into our territory when they are harassed by the Portuguese, and, likewise, the German Ambos would have crossed into Portuguese territory if they had realized how serious their position was [regarding the possibility of attack by the Germans during the Herero uprising]. The only possibility would have been to attack them together. Portugal tried it alone in 1904. This expedition suffered a total defeat in the not-so-glorious battle of Humbe. A second expedition was planned, but it never materialized.¹

The fact that the northern border bisected the Ovakuanyama nation is a problem which is addressed time and again by various parties, who react to it according to their interests. It is almost universally regarded with regret that what was such a simple gesture on the cartographer's table was to have such unforeseen repercussions when transferred to geo-political space. The Blue Book report issued by Great Britain observes that

The arbitrary fixing of the northern boundary of the Protectorate, which is formed by part of the course of the Kunene and Okavango rivers and a line drawn from west to east between them, had as a result the cutting-up of some of the land of the Ovambos, so that, after annexation by Germany, an unsatisfactory state of affairs was brought about.²

Leutwein, too, refers to the position of the border in 1890 as "arbitrary", whereby his main concern seems to be that "the majority" of this tribe, which he estimated at 70, - 80,000 strong, had been placed under Portuguese jurisdiction.³ He had good reason for regret, since the Ovambos were to become - and particularly in the years following the decimation of the Herero nation - the most important source of labor for the colony.

In August 1915, S. M. Pritchard, the British Commissioner for Native Affairs journeyed to Ovamboland on a routine visit.⁴ At the time of Pritchard's visit,

1 von Eckenbrecher, Was Afrika mir gab und nahm, pp. 25-26.

2 Imperial Blue Book, p 134.

3 Imperial Blue Book, p 135.

4 Major S. M. Pritchard, "Report of the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs in the Protectorate of South West Africa," Windhoek, 1915.

fighting on the Portuguese side of the border had threatened to drive Ovakuanyama refugees into the South West Africa protectorate. This would have caused conflict with those occupying the territory south of the border, since drought had decimated food supplies. Pritchard notes his inability as well as the inability of Portuguese troops to cross the border.

I had already pointed out to [Chief] Martin that as the fighting, of which we had information, had occurred in Portuguese territory, where I had no status, it was a difficult matter for me to take any steps on [Chief] Mandume's behalf; nor could I cross the border into Angola any more than the Portuguese could enter the Protectorate.⁵

When Pritchard related his attitude to Mandume, the complicity between the two European nations who have defined this border is quite clear.

...I warned him that a large Portuguese army had arrived in Angola and that the time had long since passed when a Native tribe, however brave, could engage, with any hope of success, in hostilities with white troops...⁶

When Mandume surrenders to Pritchard and asks to be allowed to settle south of the border, Pritchard cannot guarantee that Britain will permit this.⁷ In desperation, Mandume burns his village and flees across the border. This brings us to the crux of our discussion, for in deciding to take refuge south of the border, Mandume unwittingly calls the bluff of European complicity, and demands to know just where the border lies.

He was very agitated and repeatedly asked to be shown exactly where the border line passed through his country - stating excitedly that the Portuguese respected no borders and would not be satisfied until they had crushed him and his people and driven them far into the protectorate. I assured him that I would visit the Portuguese army in order to arrive at a settlement with its Commander as to the precise locality of the boundary to be observed by both it and Mandume...⁸

Nonetheless, Mandume has placed himself in a position in which he too is forced to enter this complicity. In recognizing the border as significant, he has surrendered (at least in principle) his mobility to the European organization of space. This has serious disadvantages for him. Mandume is concerned that many of his people and cattle are still north of the border. Pritchard informs him that they

⁵ Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 12.

⁶ Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 16.

⁷ Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 17.

⁸ Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 18.

cannot be regained, since the border cannot be violated. Mandume is again concerned about the position of the border. As a result, Pritchard meets the Portuguese commandant and they agree that "...for the present and pending a definite settlement a line running due east to west through Namakunde [the town where they are meeting] should be regarded as the boundary." The 1:500 000 topographical sheet Ondangwa, issued by the Chief Director of Surveys and Mapping, Mowbray (1985) shows the present position of the northern border approximately 9.5 km south of Namakunde. It intersects the Cunene River just north of the Ruacana Falls, and is thus more in keeping with the original treaty between Portugal and Germany. The temporary boundary which Pritchard negotiated would have intersected the Cunene approximately 22.5 km upstream of the present one. They also agree to establish a neutral zone as "... the country falling between the boundaries claimed by the German and Portuguese Governments respectively." Pritchard also suggests "that all reasonable steps should be taken by the Portuguese to patrol the boundary line on their side to prevent incursions of Natives either from the north or the south..." In interrogating the physical position of a border which he cannot see, and in seeking to use it to his own advantage, Mandume has achieved just the opposite of what is in his interests. He has joined in the European complicity which allowed the border to be drawn, and he has sacrificed his mobility.⁹ On both sides of the border, he has become a foreigner in his own land. This is the story of colonization.

The story of colonization does not end. Once it has begun, it continues telling itself over and over again, even after the colonizers have all been sent home. It is one of the ironies of colonization that, out of an amorphous and diverse population, it creates a national identity, a cohesive group which is ultimately strong enough to overthrow the colonizer. And yet, the borders the colonizer drew are still there; when we look at the map of Africa today, we still see 19th century Europe traced

⁹ Report of the Officer in Charge, p. 22.

across its surface. Africa is still trying to recover from its colonial experience. And while it tries, the colonizer is back again, in a different guise, more ubiquitous - multinational corporations, networks of information.¹⁰ The old colonizer was so difficult to overthrow, because, no matter where he was attacked, it transpired afterwards that he had in fact not been there, but somewhere else; the new colonizer's power lies in the fact that he is everywhere. If the concept of revolution is still thinkable today, it must be thought in the face of such a colonizer.

I have attempted to show how colonization organizes space. It is an uncertain and unstable procedure, and is constantly leading to crises and conflicts. The border which the colonizer draws eventually becomes an obstacle to him, and provides a relative shelter for the forces of resistance. Thus, until recent years, the Angolan border seemed to provide some degree of shelter for armed resistance in Namibia. But the colonizer always reacts in the same way; he reserves for himself the mythical ability to cross the border as if it were not there, and he tells himself that this is only to protect the border. And if he destabilizes his neighbors in the process, he tells himself that this is because his neighbors have not respected the border. And when he finally returns to his territory, he congratulates himself that this line across the earth, which no one can see, has been drawn again. Beyond it, he phantasizes a chaos in which he somehow feels the flows of his own desire.

¹⁰ "It is widely accepted that knowledge has become the principle force of production over the last few decades; this has already had a noticeable effect on the composition of the work force of the most highly developed countries and constitutes the major bottleneck for the developing countries. In the postindustrial and postmodern age, science will maintain and no doubt strengthen its preeminence in the arsenal of productive capacities of the nation-states. Indeed, this situation is one of the reasons leading to the conclusion that the gap between developed and developing countries will grow ever wider in the future." Jean-Francois Lyotard, The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Theory and history of literature, vol. 10, gen. ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 5.

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