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**LAND AND CHANGING SOCIAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FORMER
RESERVES**

The case of Lumphasi in Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, Eastern Cape



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Thesis presented for fulfilment of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the Department of Sociology

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February 2013

DECLARATION

I declare that this is my own unaided and original work. Neither the substance nor any part of the above thesis has been submitted in the past, or is being submitted at any other university or institution.

I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another's work and pretend that it is one's own. Each contribution to, and quotation in, this study from the work(s) of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced fully.

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Fani Ncapayi

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, enclosed in a hand-drawn oval. The signature is cursive and appears to read 'Fani Ncapayi'.

Supervisor: Professor L. Ntsebeza

ABSTRACT

This study, *Land and changing social relationships in South Africa's former reserves: the case of Lumphaphasi in Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, Eastern Cape*, is located within the scholarship on land and agrarian reform. It explores historically how land has influenced changes in social relations in rural areas from the time of colonial contact to 2011. Three theses—proletarianisation, de-agrarianisation and re-peasantisation—provide the framework for the study and also help in assessing how the theorists viewed the role of land in influencing social relations in rural areas of the former reserves. Despite the established view of the proletarianisation thesis that land ceased to be important to the lives of rural people, the study argues that land has been, and continues to be, important in the definition of social relations in rural areas of the former reserves. An in-depth study focusing on Lumphaphasi, a communal area in the Eastern Cape, is presented to support the argument.

The empirical evidence challenges the conclusions of the proletarianisation and de-agrarianisation theses, which argue that, since the penetration of capitalism into rural societies, land had ceased to be relevant to the lives of rural people. The study postulates that, while the majority of rural people were converted into migrant workers from the late 1920s, some of these migrant workers did not sever their relations with land-based lifestyles in rural areas. Furthermore, right from the outset, rural people responded to the introduction of capitalism by diversifying their livelihood strategies to include non-agricultural activities.

The study also takes issue with the argument of the re-peasantisation thesis that in the period of land reforms there has been a growth in interest in agricultural land by rural people. The re-peasantisation thesis further argues that rural agricultural land users are peasants. In the context of Lumphaphasi, the study shows that, despite most of them having become wage workers, they retained continuous, albeit varying levels of attachment to agricultural land in rural areas. Furthermore, it shows that the introduction of hired labour by the African farmers and the small landholders in the 1930s changed the character of the peasants into small producers. It is therefore unsurprising that in the period of post-1994 land reform, the beneficiaries chose to produce for the market, thereby adopting capitalist relations of production. Thus, the beneficiaries of the latter land reform cannot be characterised as peasants.

Contrary to the contemporary debates that question the contribution of land reform to the livelihoods of beneficiaries, this study shows that access to agricultural land that rural residents gained through the post-1994 land reform programme has immensely changed the lives of the beneficiaries. Landless residents changed into farmers, enabled beneficiaries to accumulate land and livestock. Subservient rural women developed into powerful and respected community leaders. Gender relations have been radically affected; turning the women into decision-makers, even in relation to issues that have been traditionally associated with men, such as livestock rearing. The women have also become

economically independent. Some beneficiaries have diversified their livelihoods by venturing into economic activities, such as rural transportation businesses. Thus, land is still important in the definition of social relations in South Africa's former reserves.

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GLOSSARY

AAC	All African Convention
A.F.I.S.O.	African Farming Improvement Scheme
ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
BIC	Bantu Investment Corporation
CALUSA	Cala Univeristy Students Association
CAS	Centre for African Studies
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CDCs	Community Development Committees
CDE	Centre for Development Enterprise
CNDC	Ciskei National Development Corporation
CPAs	Communal Property Associations
CRDP	Comprehensive Rural Development Programme
CTA	Ciskei Territorial Authority
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
DARD	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
DBAD	Department of Bantu Affairs and Development
DFC	Delindlala Farmers Co-operative
DLA	Department of Land Affairs
DP	Democratic Party
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DSC	District Screening Committee
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform

ECSECC	Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
HCT	Health Care Trust
HDR	Henry Doubleday Research Association
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IRRDR	Integrated Rural and Regional Development
LAPC	Land and Agricultural Policy Centre
LRAD	Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development
LRDSA	Land Reform and Democracy in South Africa
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NARE	Non-Agrarian Rural Employment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NDA	National Development Agency
NP	National Party
NRF	National Research Foundation
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PLAAS	Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies
PPPA	People's Participatory Planning and Action
PTO	Permit to occupy
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RuLIV	Promoting Rural and Urban Livelihoods
RSA	Republic of South Africa

SADET	South African Democracy Education Trust
SANEC	South African Native Economic Commission
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SLAG	Settlement Land Acquisition Grant
SURUDEC	Sustainable Rural Development in the Eastern Cape
TCOE	Trust for Community Outreach and Education
TDC	Transkei Development Corporation
TNIP	Transkei Independence Party
TRACOC	Transkei Chamber of Commerce
TTA	Transkei Territorial Authorities
UDF	United Democratic Front
UTTGC	United Transkeian Territorial Governing Council
WARD	Women in Agriculture and Rural Development
XDC	Xhosa Development Corporation
XAYCO	Xhalanga Youth Congress

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When the Board of Directors of CALUSA decided on staff development in 1999, it tasked one of its members to interview staff members about their areas of interest. My obsession was with rural development. I wanted to understand the processes that result in the marginalisation of rural areas, although I did not then know that I would end up studying land and agrarian issues. The journey started in 1999, when CALUSA decided to introduce a land programme with the aim of supporting landless people in the former Xhalanga magisterial district. The decision followed an influential study on “Livestock Production in Xhalanga” by Lungisile Ntsebeza (now Professor), which highlighted the chronic shortage of grazing land in the district. Because of my passion for rural development, the Board decided that I should take the responsibility for setting up the land programme. The workshops on South Africa’s land reform programme that CALUSA organised from 2000 for staff and community people, and the study tours to land reform projects in various parts of South Africa, marked the beginning of my journey that culminated in this study.

This journey invariably brought me into closer contact with Professor Ntsebeza who became my mentor throughout. His persuasion led me to formalise my knowledge and experiences by registering for a Masters Degree in 2003. He did not only supervise me in my Masters Degree, but went further, making it possible for his family to accommodate me in their household. On completion of the Masters Degree, he encouraged me to embark on the next stage of the journey by proceeding to register for a PhD. Professor Ntsebeza spent long hours, supervising me during the study, patiently reading through the various draft chapters of this study. He always had the time and energy for discussions of my work, which helped to clarify my often-confused ideas. I sincerely wish to express a word of appreciation to him.

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The passion I have for rural development and land issues originates from my family background. Observations and reflections about family members—from my grandfather to my uncles—who have been farm workers on white-owned commercial farms influenced the passion. The experiences of farm workers reflected in the study also applied to my family. They are a reminder of where I come from.

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Above all, I cannot fail to express my gratitude to my wife, Bongiwe and my two children—Luvo and Sive—for tolerating my long spells of absence from home. Bongiwe has been a pillar of strength as she encouraged me to study further. During my absence, she ably took sole responsibility for leading the household.

Lastly, I dedicate this study to my parents, my late father, Poyoyo, and my mother, Nothobile, who, despite never having been to school, sent us to live with relatives to ensure that the scarcity of schools on the farms did not prevent us from going to school. When my father passed away in 1974, it was my mother who broke her back working to ensure that we received education.

University of Cape Town

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and theoretical framework

Focus and problem

This study explores the manner in which land has influenced social relations in the rural areas of the former reserves of South Africa. The reserves, which have a deep historical context from the nineteenth century conquests and the 'native location' system, are areas that colonial rulers set aside for occupation by Africans; and where the "tribal way of life persisted relatively unchanged" for some time (Houghton, 1955:21). They are also areas "under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities" (Ntsebeza, 2006:13).

According to Borgatta and Borgatta (1992:1852), social relations mean the manner in which class, race, gender and social position influence the way people relate to each other. Social relations also reflect situations of dominance and subordination due to social inequalities, resulting in the domination and subordination of one social category by another, e.g. "ruler-ruled, rich-poor, white-black..." (ibid.). Distribution of resources and rewards influences social relations, as it has a bearing on the social positioning of people in society (Johnson, 2000:285). For this study, social relations refer to the social formations that emerged among rural residents in the former reserves of South Africa because of colonialism, apartheid and the post-1994 land reform programme.

There is broad agreement among scholars that land played a critical role in the definition of social relations in land-based African societies at the time of colonial contact (Bundy, 1979; Maylam, 1986; Hammond-Tooke, 1993). Access or lack of access to land was central in defining the social relations. Bundy (1979) illustrates the point well by showing that inequalities in access to land contributed to the emergence of a group of peasants and African farmers with more land, on the one hand, and, on the other, people with limited access to land who became migrant wage workers. The discovery of gold and the development of capitalism from the 1880s to the 1960s brought about the increasing importance of African labour. Coupled with this development was a progressive decline of the significance of land in defining social relations in the reserves by the 1930s (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979). Active state intervention in the conversion of the majority of rural producers into migrant wage workers and constant deterioration of land and economic conditions in the reserves accounted for many of the changes in the former reserves (Wolpe, 1995; Maylam, 1986). And, as shown in this study, in the 1960s, overcrowding, together with a shortage of labour, compelled a shift in land use away from, and a resultant decline in, crop production, although livestock production by a small section of land-

owning rural producers continued. Rising unemployment in the period of neo-liberalism, and worsening overcrowding and chronic poverty in the reserves led scholars to conclude that there was a shift away from agricultural land use towards non-agricultural activities among rural dwellers (Bryceson, 1997; Bank, 1997). Thus, by the 1980s, the dominant view was that land no longer mattered in the lives of rural people. This study maintains that land has been, and continues to be, important in the livelihoods of a section of landed rural dwellers. By extension, the study argues that land continues to be an important factor in the definition of social relations in the rural areas of the former reserves.

In the contemporary period, from 1994, the debates about the role of land in the livelihoods of rural people have resurfaced. Their re-emergence is within the context of stubborn unemployment, massive landlessness and chronic poverty in rural areas that confronted the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994. To address the challenges, the ANC adopted the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as its election manifesto. The RDP, which included, amongst other strategies, a market-led land reform programme, aimed to address landlessness in the rural areas of South Africa (ANC, 1994:20). The programme failed pathetically to meet the 30 per cent target of land redistribution (Ntsebeza, 2007) and the land reform projects under the programme were also perceived to have failed. At the same time, South Africa's neo-liberal macro-economic policy—Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which was adopted in 1996—failed to create the promised jobs (Heintz, 2003), all of which contributed to the re-emergence of the debates regarding the role of land in the livelihoods of rural people in the period of land reform (Ntsebeza, 2011b:1).

Academics (Manona, 1999; Walker, 2008), analysts and journalists (Bernstein, 2005; Makhanya, 2009), as well as policy formulators (Nkwinti, 2011), have questioned the relevance of the land reform programme. Because South Africa is viewed as an industrialised country where agriculture constitutes a small section of the economy (Walker, 2008; Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2010), the scholars conclude that the role of land and land reform is insignificant in the livelihoods of rural people (Ntsebeza, 2011b:2).

While the counter view acknowledges the proletarianisation of the majority of the rural population, it argues that land continues to be relevant in the livelihoods of rural people (Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Chitonge and Ntsebeza, 2012). According to Moyo and Yeros (2005:9), “the peasantry has not entirely ‘disappeared’, but ... semi-proletarianization has continued to absorb the costs of social reproduction, as these have been systematically ‘expelled’ by capital”. Looking at the impact of land reform projects on rural people in the Chris Hani Municipality in the Eastern Cape, Chitonge and Ntsebeza argue that land contributes to the improvement of the livelihoods of rural people (2012:2). This implicitly means that land still plays a role in defining social relations in the rural areas of the former reserves. This

study agrees with the general thrust of this view because it shows that land has played, and continues to play, an important role in defining social relations among African people in the former reserves.

Originally, the aim of the study was to explore how the land reform programme influenced social relations in the rural areas of the former reserves. It soon became clear that, to be able to show the changes in social relations, the changes have to be traced historically. This realisation influenced the shift in focus from the land reform programme to land generally. A suspicion that the contemporary debates aimed at nullifying legitimate calls for the need to address landlessness in the communal areas of South Africa triggered an interest in this study. The emergence of the debates raised a question about the role that the former reserves would play in a democratic South Africa. This question linked to the broader debates about the future of the former reserves, which is also one of the themes of the NRF Research Chair on Land Reform and Democracy in South Africa.¹ Because of a lack of clarity on what was happening in the communal areas, the author tended to regard every rural dweller as a target of the land reform programme. However, as the study progressed, the question of who the programme needs to target arose. It became clear that it needs to target the descendants of the landholders who persisted with land-based lifestyles, combining them with other activities—migrant workers who continued to invest in land-based livelihoods; farm workers and dwellers, as well as former farm workers and dwellers.

Returning to the contemporary debates, while the study agrees with Moyo and Yeros on the point that rural people continued with land-based livelihoods, it takes issue with the scholars on the appropriateness of characterising this group of rural dwellers as peasants. The point is taken up in the next section on theoretical framework.

The second issue with Moyo and Yeros (2005) relates to whether the continuation of land-based lifestyles is due to the expulsion of the semi-proletariat by capital, as they put it. Regarding the view that land is no longer of consequence in the minds of rural people in the reserves (which is based on the belief that South Africa has industrialised) overlooks a point well-made by Mafeje (1987) that capitalist development in South Africa was never complete. Even at its highest stage of development, South African capital never absorbed all the labour (Mafeje, 1987; Ntsebeza, 2011a). In addition, this study makes the critique that there has always been a small section of rural people that held on to the land inherited from their forefathers. This study addresses itself to this group that, despite proletarianisation

¹ The Land Reform and Democracy in SA: State and Civil Society Dynamics Research Chair focuses on the land question with the aim of facilitating debate on issues of democracy, equity and agency. The Research Chair also promotes research opportunities for students from Masters to post-doctoral level. It is located in the Sociology Department in the University of Cape Town.

and overcrowding, and contrary to the view that land no longer matters to rural people, has continued to use the land right up to the present.

Theoretical framework

This section discusses the theories that inform the study and within which the contemporary debates are located. Three theses are considered in this section—the proletarianisation thesis, which concerns itself with the process of conversion of peasants into wage workers (Byres, 1986); de-agrarianisation or de-peasantisation, which is a thesis about “a long-term process of occupational adjustment, income-earning reorientation, social identification and spatial relocation of rural dwellers away from strictly agricultural-based modes of livelihood” (Bryceson, 1999:4); and re-peasantisation, that deals with the process through which unemployment influences the proletariat to revert to land-based livelihoods (Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Fernandes, 2005). The term “peasant” is highly contested. However, for purposes of this thesis, the definitions of Wolf and Bundy are used. Wolf defines peasants as “rural cultivators; that is, they raise crops and livestock in the countryside, not in greenhouses in the midst of cities or in aspitistra boxes on the windowsill. ... they are not farmers, or agricultural entrepreneurs as we know them in the United States” (1966:2). Similarly, Bundy (1979:9) defines peasants as rural cultivators, but adds that they use own and family labour to produce mainly for household consumption.

Common to all the theses is an attempt to explain changes in rural areas and their implications for the lives of these rural people. Each thesis is discussed, looking at its development and the arguments that scholars present on the thesis. Issues emanating from the theses are highlighted at the end of each thesis. The section ends with an overall comment on the theses and their relevance to the study.

The proletarianisation thesis

The thesis covers the period from the time of colonial contact to the 1960s, which is the period of capitalist development in South Africa. It looks at how the spread of capitalism to African societies effected changes in them.

In his seminal work, *Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid*, Wolpe (1972) periodises the development of capitalism: 1870s to 1930s; 1930s to the advent of apartheid in the 1940s; and the period up to the 1970s. The 1870s to the 1930s is the period of the emergence of capitalism in South Africa where it interacted with two other modes of production: “the African redistributive economies on the one hand; as well as labour tenancy and crop-sharing on white farms on the other (1995:66)”. Because it is inherent in capitalism to demand cheap labour to

maximise profits, the notion of migrant cheap labour emerged. Africans were pushed from rural areas to work in the mines without being totally dispossessed of their land. Their wages were low, as employers argued that their income was supplemented by the land the migrants had in the villages (ibid.) because, by the 1870s, sharing of produce from “land ... held communally by the community” was still dominant, although gradually changing, in the land-based African societies (ibid.:67).

That there were these two modes of production did not mean they were “independent of one another”, Wolpe warns. To him such a situation is not possible. He explains:

In South Africa, the development of capitalism has been bound up with, first, the deterioration of the productive capacity and then, with increasing rapidity, the destruction of the pre-capitalist societies (1995:67).

Between 1870 and the 1930s, the colonial government, and later that of the Union of South Africa, maintained the pre-capitalist system to help subsidise a portion of the labourers’ cost of reproduction. Thus, families of the migrant workers, which remained in the reserves, were expected to support themselves from the limited portions of land they had there. Although Wolpe acknowledges the existence of the two modes (relations) of production in the initial stages of capitalist development, he differs with Frank (1969) and the other scholars who, based on Latin American experiences, have argued that the two modes of production were independent of each other (ibid.). The simultaneous existence of the two modes of production was a contradiction, Wolpe argued. One of them had to go, hence the

accelerating dissolution of these relations and the development, within South Africa, towards a single, capitalist, mode of production in which more and more of the African wage-labour force (but never the whole of it) is ‘freed’ from productive resources in the reserves (ibid.:67).

Consequently, the African subsistence economies faded, with the majority of Africans becoming landless in the reserves (“freed from productive resources”). With the redistributive economic system in decline, capitalism emerged as the dominant mode of production (ibid.). By implication, land had become less important in the lives of rural people than wages as more people became migrant workers.

Notwithstanding the unevenness and protracted nature of the process of proletarianisation, by the 1920s “the overwhelming economic and political power of the capitalist sector had succeeded, whether through unequal terms of trade or otherwise” to subdue the African economy such that it “no longer

presented any significant competitive threat to White farmers” (ibid.:68). Production “of a marketable surplus became increasingly rare, finally disappearing altogether” in the reserves (1995:68).²

The emerging capitalist system operated in a peculiar way. Instead of extracting raw materials from pre-capitalist societies, as is the case with capitalist economies in other parts of the world, the South African capitalist economy relied on the supply of labour power by the pre-capitalist sector. The labour force was “migrant and temporary, returning to the reserves in between periods of work, and [retained] the means of production in the African economy or [had] a claim on such means” (ibid.:68).

The progressive decline in living conditions for Africans in the reserves came to a head in the 1920s. The living conditions had deteriorated to such a degree that landlessness competed with land concentration and some wage workers and their families “did not have supplementary sources of subsistence” in the reserves (ibid.:72). By the 1920s “surpluses were either extremely small or non-existent and continued to decline” (ibid.:73). Thus, Wolpe concluded that land was a “less important element in subsistence” for the majority of rural people (1995:72-73). Beyond the 1920s, conditions deteriorated further with landlessness becoming acute as land became more unequally distributed from the 1940s, and some migrant workers became permanently urbanised (ibid.:76).

It is important to note that, because his focus was on migrant wage workers, Wolpe does not discuss the social groups he identified in the reserves, such as the large section of landless Africans and the smaller group of landholders. Because of the interest in understanding the nature of social relations in rural areas, this study focuses on the social groups based in these areas. Importantly, the fact that impoverishment tended to be associated with landlessness highlights the point of this study about the significance of land in defining social relations.

In his major work, *The rise and fall of the South African peasantry*, Bundy (1979) points out what he views as central to South Africa’s social history:

the transition of a majority of her people – the rural African population – from their precolonial existence as pastoralist-cultivators to their contemporary status: that of sub-subsistence rural dwellers, manifestly unable to support themselves by agriculture and dependent for survival upon wages earned in the ‘white’ industrial areas or upon ‘white’ farms (1979:1).

In this extract Bundy chronicles the processes of the conversion of rural livestock owners and food producers into impoverished migrant wage workers, which occurred between 1870 and 1913, the period on which his study mainly focuses. As he puts it: “This was the crucial period in the

² Various versions of Wolpe’s major work on the proletarianisation of rural dwellers were republished at various times, including the article used in this study, which was republished in 1995.

transformation of the bulk of the rural African population”.³ He cites the following as causes for the changes in rural areas:

diminution of Africans' lands by conquest and annexation, the creation of the 'Reserves', the deterioration of these into eroded, overstocked and overcrowded rural ghettos that function as the supply source of migratory labour (ibid.:1).

With land, “one of the cornerstones of tribal life”, being “wrenched away” from rural people, the subsistence economy could not meet the demands of an emerging cash economy. Thus, Bundy disagrees with scholars who blame the demise of the African producers on the supposed failure of the producers to adapt to the colonial cash economy that was introduced after colonial contact. To him such an argument “overlooks or underestimates” an important “initial period of early prosperity in the reserve areas of South Africa” (Bundy, 1979:3). The period of underdevelopment followed only later. Thus, the history of African agriculture in South Africa can be understood in terms of two phases—the period of peasant expansion (1870 to 1890) and the crucial years (1890 to 1913).

Colonial economic interests spurred the emergence of peasants in the Eastern Cape from the mid-18th century (Bundy, 1979). The drive for capitalist expansion dictated the need for the establishment of trade relations between colonialists and Africans, with missionaries also playing their part in the introduction of marketing in African societies (ibid.:237). These economic interests facilitated the accumulation of livestock and agricultural assets by some Africans (ibid.:29). Additionally, employment of some Africans by white farmers enabled the farm workers to accumulate livestock and agricultural resources (ibid.:36). Further, the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and the development of urban areas such as Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Kimberley, etc. provided further opportunities for accumulation by Africans (ibid.:66-67). The manifestations of the processes outlined above were various groups of peasants that emerged—from poor peasant to rich peasants or African farmers. Thus, the expansion of peasants in the 1870s took root from the early developments which essentially represented the penetration of capitalism into African societies. This is also the period Bundy and other scholars refer to as the period of early peasant prosperity.

The discovery of gold in 1886 led to a restructuring of the cosy relations between the peasants and the colonial government from the 1890s when the government needed cheap labour for the mining, and later, the commercial farming sectors. The land-limiting Glen Grey Act of 1894 and the Natives Land Act of 1913 were some of the interventions the government introduced to force Africans into the wage economy. Consequently, by 1913, the

³ See the Preface of Bundy's book.

African peasant areas showed serious signs of agrarian degeneration, and ... their transformation into teeming rural slums – or the process of their underdevelopment – was well under way. Areas that had been able to provide for themselves, and in favourable seasons to export foodstuffs, were being reduced to a state of precarious self-reliance or already to a dependence upon imported food and the remittance of wages by migrant labourers (ibid.:221).

As the extract shows, there was a deterioration of agricultural production in the reserves. This meant that the African areas could no longer provide for themselves. The reserves had been “reduced to a state of precarious self-reliance or already to a dependence upon imported food and the remittances of wages by migrant labourers” (ibid.:221). He further states that by the early 1950s “a crisis point had been reached in the Reserves areas” (ibid.:226).

Bundy’s reference to the reserves as rural slums and also to the fact that the rural areas were, by the 1920s, dependent on imported food, implies that there was very little or no production in the reserves; thus, land-based rural dwellers had become migrant wage workers. By extension, this also meant that land played no role in social relations in the reserves. Bundy’s timing on the overall decline of the peasantry or reliance on land is too generalised, as ensuing writings, including this thesis, have illustrated the enduring nature of peasantry in several examples of the country (See Delius, 1996; Van Onselen, McAllister, 1989).

On his part, Beinart challenges both liberals and Marxists for presenting rural people as objects in the process of their proletarianisation. He cites some chiefs that, according to him, played an important role in opposing the state and its policies. Beinart thus concludes that segregation “was therefore not simply imposed upon rural Africans from ‘above’ by a state enjoying absolute power; it was constantly negotiated and challenged even as the rise of apartheid led to a steady erosion of the bargaining power” (1995:176).

Although he agrees with Wolpe regarding the conversion of land-based rural residents into migrant wage workers, he takes issue with Wolpe’s thesis about the role of the reserves as providers of cheap labour and the “view that segregation/apartheid was tailor-made to the demands of capitalist mine-owners and industrialists. In his view, capitalist development “did not have to be seen as merely destroying pre-capitalist formations, or African societies” (1995:178); “the migrant labour system was significantly shaped by the dynamics of African societies themselves” (1995:176). The state did not have unfettered power over the African people; there was constant negotiation and challenge between the colonial and apartheid state, on the one hand, and African people, on the other. He supports his argument by pointing out that

many of those who went to work did so in such a way as to avoid full incorporation as settled and permanent wage labourers. In certain instances, controls over migrants, usually young men, were exercised by chiefs and homestead heads to ensure that as many as possible returned home with their wages (ibid.:180).

Two points are worth highlighting here—the fact that pressure was put on the young men who took migrant work to return home; and the expectation for them to bring their wages. From this it can be seen that there was some level of own choice on the part of the African people regarding their participation in the migrant labour system. Thus, Beinart argues that migrancy “arose out of the dynamics of African societies rather than out of demands of the mine-owners” (ibid.).

Beinart concurs with Bundy that the penetration of capitalism in African societies was mostly through trade, together with land appropriation and taxation through which the majority of rural people became wage workers. Like Bundy, he shows connections between peasant development and mission stations. There were “progressive, sometimes Christian peasant communities”, who responded to the market opportunities in the Cape and some of them went on and “achieved considerable prominence as political actors (ibid.). This shows that there was economic and political transformation in social relations in the reserves. Thus, land played a critical role in defining social relations in the reserves.

Although Beinart initially argued that rural dwellers resisted the proletarianisation process, he concedes that at a later stage (by the late 1950s) the communal areas underwent “far-reaching changes in the last century” some of which made rural people “deeply dependent on wages even where they retained access to rural plots and stock” (1995:177). In his concession Beinart argues that eventually, a “vast majority of the reserve-based families depended in varying degrees on both wages and rural production” (ibid.). However, migrant workers retained their relations with rural people. The rural struggles of the 1960s, which “included seasoned migrants” (ibid.:186), is a good illustration of this relationship.

Despite being part of the proletarianisation school, Beinart maintains that land-based lifestyles never ended, as rural residents continued to combine their land-based lifestyles with wage income.

Hendricks, on his part, disagrees with Beinart’s argument that rural dwellers resisted proletarianisation. For him the “state has devised a formidable oppressive machinery, not however for the purposes of retarding proletarianization of blacks, but rather to displace it onto the reserves” (Hendricks, 1990:13). South Africa had “a considerable proliferation of Africans who had proletarianization compelled upon them rather than prevented” (1990:13). In concurrence with Wolpe, Hendricks argues that:

[t]he migratory labour system which involves the forced repulsion of potential urban dwellers back to the reserves has given capitalist development its distinctive form in South Africa. A large portion

of the work force is, due to this system of labour organization, in constant circulation between town and country (1990:8).

Africans did not resist proletarianisation, but were reluctant to enter wage labour because of an abundance of land in the reserves during the initial stages of colonial penetration. When access to land became difficult, the land question became a central issue around which struggles of rural people revolved (Hendricks, 1990:14). In line with Wolpe, Hendricks argues that the land question arose because colonial conquest crippled pre-capitalist African societies, “separating the people from their land and hence creating a wage-labouring class” (1990:14). He disagrees with both the ‘revisionists’ and ‘social historians’ that continued access to land by Africans in the reserves meant that the process of proletarianisation was impeded or the peasantry persisted, as the two groups have respectively argued. “Access to land in the reserves has produced a smokescreen for the real extent of proletarianisation”, he charges (ibid.:15). The process of proletarianisation “has assumed a particular form, shaped by apartheid policy and it has not been retarded, or inhibited or prevented”. Instead, the “vast majority of the reserve population” became “heavily dependent upon wage labour for its survival” (ibid.:16). Consequently, the reserves became the reservoirs of labour where “a mass of human material always” was “ready for exploitation” (ibid.:17). By the 1960s rural South Africa consisted of concentrated villages that were occupied by “displaced proletarians”, who annually moved between their place of work in the broader South Africa and their rural homes (Hendricks, 1990:3). Hendricks makes an important point that argues against the notion that the peasantry persisted. This point will be taken up later.

Key in the proletarianisation thesis is the question about the role of land in the livelihoods of rural people in the reserves. A common view among the scholars is that the importance of land as a factor in the livelihoods of rural people has declined. It has been replaced by labour and wages.

The de-agrarianisation or de-peasantisation thesis

The de-agrarianisation view is basically an extension of the proletarianisation thesis. It shows a shift in land use practices of rural people away from agrarian livelihoods to non-agricultural activities (Mwamfube, 1998; Bryceson, 1999; Iiyama, 2008). What distinguishes it from the proletarianisation thesis is its historical context, which is the period of neo-liberalism from the 1980s (Bryceson, 1999:6).

Although Bryceson attempts to draw a distinction between de-agrarianisation and de-peasantisation, there do not seem to be substantial differences between them. Bryceson regards de-peasantisation as “a specific form of de-agrarianisation in which peasantries lose their economic capacity and social coherence, and shrink in size” (1999:4). On the other hand, de-agrarianisation is “a long-term process

of (1) occupational adjustment, (2) income-earning reorientation, (3) social identification, and (4) spatial relocation of rural dwellers away from the strictly peasant modes of living (Bryceson, 1999:4). Growing unemployment as a consequence of neo-liberalism left scholars pondering the future of rural people. It was at this stage (around the 1980s) that the theory of de-agrarianisation came into the picture as scholars scrambled for explanations. Using experiences from other African states, Bryceson points out that

[a]t times, physical movement of people from rural areas or noticeable transformations of social identities have been minimal although rural-based diversification into non-agricultural activities is taking place and leading to measurable differences in individual and household sources of income. There are innumerable permutations of the de-agrarianisation process, ... (1997:4).

Thus, for Bryceson, income diversification represents de-agrarianisation. She points out that there has been “widespread appearance of ‘income diversification’ and, by implication, occupational shifts in both rural and urban households” (1997:5). The movement of people from rural to urban areas makes the boundaries “between urban and rural areas ... blurred, as some urban households resort to farming and in turn rural households increasingly [engage] in non-agricultural activities” (ibid.:5). Bryceson utilises the term “non-agricultural rural employment” (NARE) to “emphasise the non-agricultural character of the diversification process” (ibid.:5). Furthermore, the shift occurred from the 1960s due to population pressure and drought, which undermined “people’s confidence in agriculture”, influencing them to move to NARE (ibid.:8).

Despite the de-agrarianisation phenomenon, some rural dwellers, especially middle-aged residents, tend to continue with their agricultural activities. Those who continue with agricultural activities often do so because of unaffordability of agricultural products and lack of social security due to “reduction in the value of the pensions of ex-migrant workers” (ibid.:9). Some continue because of social pressure and a fear of being ostracised by other community members for abandoning land-based lifestyles (ibid.:10). Thus, although there may be an inclination towards non-agricultural activities, external compelling factors keep some rural people in agriculture.

Manona observed similar processes of rural social and economic re-orientation in Melani, a village next to Alice in the Eastern Cape, in what he describes as “economic diversification” by rural dwellers (1999:35). Proletarianisation, extended periods of lack of access to land and the emergence of job opportunities in the civil service in the 1970s are some of the factors accounting for de-agrarianisation in the context of Melani (1998:78, 81). Unlike in Bryceson’s case study where rural people combined agriculture with non-agriculture activities, Manona concludes that “[a]s the significance of agriculture has dwindled, the people desperately need residential sites and infra-structural improvements to their

environment rather than land for agricultural production” (1998:81). Thus, overall, rural people have no interest in agricultural land. The implication of this argument is that land plays no role in social relations in Melani.

While Bank (1997) broadly agrees with Manona’s argument, he differs with him in two respects. Firstly, the process of livelihood diversification started much earlier in Witsieshoek (in Qwaqwa). According to him, as the apartheid government embarked on the promotion of African business development in the 1950s, middle-aged former migrant workers seized the opportunity and took over the businesses. This development opened the floodgates as forty “middle-aged men with little or no formal education” applied for trading licences (Bank, 1997:188). Secondly, male residents with large numbers of livestock embarked on “economic diversification and were seldom prepared to sell off all their livestock to finance their retail businesses in case their new stores did not succeed” (Bank, 1997:188). Thus, although there were instances of diversification away from agriculture, land still remained important in the lives of rural residents for keeping their livestock. Thus, land was still an important factor in the definition of social relations in the context of Witsieshoek.

McAllister (2000) concurs with Bank that rural people pursue both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. For residents of Shixini in Centane, “cash contributions from migrant workers and pensioners are an important means of sustaining rural lifestyles, but this does not change the self-image of the residents as rural farmers” (2000:2). Rural people still engage in agricultural activities. McAllister’s case study shows how wages from labour migrancy complements agricultural activities. Thus, there is diversification of livelihoods.

As already indicated in an earlier section, there is currently a more forceful position in the de-agrarianisation debate in South Africa, which argues that rural people do not need agricultural land, but need jobs and houses. It is an argument that is advanced by academics and analysts (Walker, 2008; Bernstein, 2005), government representatives (Nkwinti, 2011) and journalists (Makhanya, 2009). The current view is most disturbing in its implications for the land reform programme.

An issue to be raised about the de-agrarianisation debate is whether the notion of diversification of livelihoods is actually a phenomenon of the neo-liberal period. The essence of the migrant labour system, which came into being in the late 19th century, was the combination of subsistence with wage income. However, a critical point from the de-agrarianisation thesis is that land ceased to be important in the lives of rural people, as other sources of income were preferred.

The re-peasantisation thesis

The last two decades of the 20th century were marked by a decline in food production in various parts of the world (Bernstein, 2001; Ploeg, 2007). According to Ploeg (2007:326-7), the “neglect of peasant agriculture” accompanied by “the rise in food empires” that monopolised food production and distribution, had a hand in the food shortages. In rural areas of developing countries (periphery) “peasants and workers have seen their conditions of social reproduction deteriorate, giving way to a desperate search for economic and political alternatives” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005a:1). Attempts to increase food production saw initiatives such as the Green Revolution (Holt-Gimenez, 2009:146) and investment in bio-energy (Ploeg, 2007:328) being stepped up. Others professed the need to focus on peasant production, hence the notion of re-peasantisation (Moyo and Yeros, 2005a and 2005b; Ploeg, 2007). Fernandes defines re-peasantisation as the “process of (re)creation of the peasantry” (2005:317).

The formation of the “Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST, or Landless Rural Workers’ Movement)” emerged out of a struggle for access to land in Brazil (Fernandes, 2005:317). Land concentration by the *latifundio*, as well as the appropriation of surplus income from land by agrarian capital, sparked the land struggles that culminated in the birth of the MST (ibid.:317-8). Thus, exclusion of the landless people from land ownership and over-exploitation of agrarian workers made conditions conducive for the re-creation of the peasantry.

Furthermore, the failure of capital to absorb labour, which led to marginalisation of a large section of the proletariat, has also contributed to the re-creation of the peasantry (Fernandes, 2005:318). Exclusion of workers by employers, the deterioration of living conditions of workers, and “squatting, rental, sharecropping and contract farming” being allowed are factors that present conducive conditions for re-peasantisation. This presents a contradiction in the Brazilian context where the development of capitalism does not lead to the disintegration of the peasantry, but re-creates it. Through land occupations the “workers resocialize themselves, struggling against capital as well as subordinating themselves to it, because upon occupying and conquering the land, they reinsert themselves into the capitalist production of non-capitalist relations of production” (ibid.). Therefore, it is within this context that the Brazilian land reform programme becomes significant (ibid.:317), and, implicitly, the role of land in the definition of social relations in rural areas of Brazil.

Moyo and Yeros discuss re-peasantisation from a slightly different angle to the Brazilian situation where the failure of capital to absorb labour generates the formation of the peasantry. In their case, they start from a position that the peasantry never disappeared (2005b:9). They argue that various rural areas in developing countries are replete with peasants whose existence is a source of the

emergence of rural movements. In turn, the rural movements have been organised around the demand for access to land, amongst other things. As the scholars put it, the rural movements “are militant on land and agrarian reform, hence the dominance of land occupations in recent times” (ibid.).

The implementation of structural adjustment programmes created fertile ground for the emergence of the rural movements. In Zimbabwe, in particular, structural adjustments have “on the one hand intensified the process of land alienation but on the other increased the demand for land and its natural resources, as a consequence of the generalized decline in sources of income ...” (ibid.:27). This means that land has become a critical resource in the livelihoods of rural people. Moyo (2007) has also argued that land reforms must address the concentration of land among a few African elite people to the exclusion of the majority poor people. Interestingly, Moyo and Yeros refer to these rural people as peasants. Given the level of capitalist penetration into the countryside, especially in South Africa, the reference to rural people as peasants has interesting theoretical or conceptual implications.

While Fernandes seems to have taken it as a fact that the peasantry is being re-created in Brazil, in the view of Moyo and Yeros, the peasantry has always existed. In the latter case, the peasantry is consolidating in this period of neo-liberalism and land reform. However, an overall position coming out of the cases is the continued importance of land in the lives of rural people and, by extension, in the definition of social relations among rural people.

The contemporary period has seen the emergence of debates about the contribution of South Africa’s land reform programme in the improvement of the livelihoods of beneficiaries. There are two strands of argument in the debates—debates about the pace of land distribution; and debates concerning the contribution of land reform to the livelihoods of beneficiaries and to the class character of the beneficiaries (Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 2004; Andrews, 2007; Cousins, 2007; Hall and Ntsebeza, 2007; Lahiff, 2007a). While there is agreement among the scholars that the pace of land distribution is frustratingly slow, there is no agreement on reasons for the slow pace. Ntsebeza and Hendricks (2000) have argued that the inclusion of the Property Clause in the country’s constitution hampers land redistribution. According to these scholars, the Property Clause guarantees the protection of property rights of current property owners, and as property owners, they determine the price of land. This makes it difficult for the state to acquire the land as prices are often too high. Hall (2007) and van den Brink et al. (2007) dispute that the Property Clause is the cause of the slow pace of land reform. Hall maintains that it is lack of political will rather than the Property Clause that accounts for the slow pace. She argues that the South African land market is active; providing about six per cent

of agricultural land annually. But the government has failed to use such markets to acquire land. While agreeing that there was a need for other land redistribution mechanisms, van den Brink et al. state: “That, however, does not mean that land markets should not play a far greater role in land reform than they often do now” (2007:187). The debate about the class character of the land reform beneficiaries arose as a result of the shift by the government from the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), in 1999, to the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme from 2001. The shift occurred amid heavy criticism of the SLAG for transferring land to large groups that lacked cohesion (Hall, 2007; 2009; Moorcroft, 2010; Cousins and Scoones, 2010). The fact that in the SLAG strategy the state provided a grant of R16 000 to households with an income of R1 500 led scholars to conclude that it supported poor households. In the LRAD sub-programme, the state provided grants to individuals that ranged from R20 000 to R100 000, with a requirement for an own contribution in the form of labour, agricultural assets or cash. The inclusion of an own contribution and the fact that one of the stated objectives of LRAD was to promote the emergence of black commercial farmers⁴ influenced scholars into a belief that LRAD was meant for well-resourced people. The policy shift was followed by debates, with some scholars arguing that the LRAD should focus on supporting smallholder farmers (Lahiff, 2008; Cousins and Scoones, 2010). According to these scholars, the introduction of LRAD meant the abandonment of small producers as beneficiaries of land redistribution. However, the class composition of the smallholder farmers that these scholars argued ought to be considered was not clear, a point later made by Cousins: that smallholders⁵ consist of producers that are differentiated in terms of resources—some are able to produce surplus that they send to the markets, while others produce much less (2010:9). Also critical of the SLAG, but equally critical of the focus of the LRAD, another group of scholars has argued that the LRAD focused on black commercial farmers and excluded poor beneficiaries (Ntsebeza and Hendricks, 2000; Greenberg, 2003a; 2003b). Ntsebeza and Hendricks (2000:7) argued: “Only a small group of ... black farmers are likely to benefit” from the LRAD. It marginalised the “vast majority of the rural poor who have the ability and interest to farm” (ibid.). Thus, for these scholars, the LRAD should focus on poor people.

The other strand of the debates focuses on the productivity and contribution of the land reform projects to the livelihoods of the beneficiaries. Hall (2009) and Lahiff (2007b) have argued that group-based ownership of production projects (groups that are owned and produce collectively) fail

⁴ Commercial farmers produce mainly for markets and their motive is profit-making (Smalley, 2013). Further, they usually operate large farm units with massive resources (Cousins and Scoones, 2010), using advanced technology in their operations (Kirsten and van Zyl, 1998).

⁵ Smallholder producers or small-scale farmers focus on production mainly for livelihoods and the promotion of socio-economic development at all levels (Cousins and Scoones, 2010:46). Kirsten and van Zyl (1998:553) add that diversification of sources of income characterises this category of farmers.

to improve the lives of beneficiaries. These scholars cite internal conflicts and the withdrawal of members, among other factors, as contributing to the failure of the projects. While some scholars have also highlighted the lack of support to the projects as the cause for their failure, others have argued that rural people do not need agricultural land, but need jobs and housing in urban areas. Both strands of the debates conclude that land reform has failed to improve the livelihoods of land reform beneficiaries.

Contribution and significance of the study

An overall picture emerging out of the theses is that, while the role of land in the lives of rural people in Latin America had diminished from the 1930s, its role has acquired a new significance during the period of the implementation of land reforms. They show that, while proletarianisation of a majority of rural residents accounted for the decline in the importance of land, rising unemployment stemming from neo-liberalism pushed the unemployed to resort to land for their livelihoods. This study takes a view that proletarianisation in South Africa did not necessarily mean that migrant workers separated themselves en masse from land-based lifestyles. Whilst there was a process of proletarianisation in which the majority of rural people became wage workers, a section of them—especially those that held land under quit-rent—continued to utilise their agricultural land until the 1960s. It was a shortage of land and labour in the reserves that forced a shift in land use from crop production to livestock production from the 1960s. The proletarianisation thesis overlooks such changes and only focuses on the migrant workers' lives in urban areas. It also overlooks the fact that women remained in the reserves pursuing land-based livelihoods while their husbands were away.

The continuation of land-based lifestyles in rural areas of the former reserves does not mean the continued existence of the peasantry, though. The fact that the peasants became migrant workers meant that they became wage income earners. Thus, their character changed, from being peasants into wage workers. The change in the character of rural dwellers changed even more in the 1980s when most rural people become dependent on social grants (see Manona, 1998). Therefore, while this study agrees with Moyo and Yeros on the continued importance of land in the lives of rural people, in contemporary South Africa it cannot be said that the rural dwellers are peasants, as Moyo and Yeros argue. The peasants transformed as soon as they became migrant workers, even those migrant workers that remained attached to land in the reserves.

Further, while unemployment in the period of neo-liberalism and the implementation of land reform may raise new interest in land, this does not apply to every rural resident. Interest in agricultural land is not just a recent phenomenon that has been rekindled by the introduction of the land reform

programme in South Africa. There is well-documented evidence of rural struggles since the early 20th century (Mbeki, 1985; Maylam, 1986; Beinart, 1995), an illustration of the continued importance of land in the lives of rural people. The re-peasantisation thesis overlooks this reality, as does the de-agrarianisation thesis.

Beinart (1995) has shown that some migrant workers maintained the link with their rural villages. Some even continued to invest in land-based lifestyles. In concurrence with Beinart, this study argues that the connection has been retained. Some migrant workers even returned permanently to their villages in middle age to pursue land-based lifestyles. Furthermore, emerging research by the National Research Foundation (NRF) Research Chair in the Land Reform and Democracy in South Africa, which focuses on land use, shows that the land reform beneficiaries use their land to produce food to support their households and some for the markets. A report of Chitonge and Ntsebeza (2012) shows that land reform projects in the Chris Hani District Municipality use their land productively. This means that land is still important in the livelihoods of rural people, and by extension, important in the determination of social relations in rural areas. Furthermore, as will be shown in the case of Delindlala, the view that land reform benefits people with resources generalises and does not take into account specific situations such as Delindlala, where poor people are also beneficiaries. Research and the role of CALUSA—a local non-governmental organisation (NGO)—were critical in the identification of the need for land in Lumphaphasi as well as the acquisition of land. With constant support and where there is no imposition of ideas on the beneficiaries, collective production does succeed and contributes to the improvement of the lives of beneficiaries. The case study of Delindlala, in Chapters 9 and 10 demonstrates the point.

Therefore, contrary to the proletarianisation and de-agrarianisation theses that view the importance of land as having declined from the 1930s to the 1970s, and the re-peasantisation thesis which argues that land only became important in the period of neo-liberalism, this study argues that land has been, and continues to be, an important factor in the definition of social relations in rural areas of the former reserves. Access to land through South Africa's land reform programme effects dramatic changes in social relations in the former reserves. Social status, class and gender relations are being restructured and shaped anew.

Research design and methodology

This being a qualitative study, it used a combination of methods for information gathering. In addition to being based on a case study, it also employed the following methods: review of secondary material—academic, government and non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) publications;

archival research; in-depth interviews; conversations; and participant observation. These are strategies for qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:12). According to Wisker (2008:191), qualitative research is useful in capturing the views of people regarding their feelings and experiences. Qualitative research, therefore, relates to the study of things in their natural state and the interpretation of a phenomenon (Denzin and Lincoln (1994:2). Thus, the study captured views and experiences of people in the study area.

The Case Study – Lumphaphasi

For illustrative purposes and to allow an in-depth study of changes in social relations, a case study of Lumphaphasi in the Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, Eastern Cape, has been used.⁶ A case study “involves studying individual cases, often in their natural environment...” (Sarantokos, 1998:191). Similarly, Lunenburg and Irby (2008:96) state that case studies “are specific explorations” of a variety of situations, including individuals and communities. In a case study, “researchers seek out both what is common and what is particular about the case, but the end result regularly presents something unique” (Stake, 1994:238).

Lumphaphasi came into being after the establishment of the Xhalanga magisterial district in 1865 (Ncapayi, 2010; see also Ntsebeza, 2006). When colonialists persuaded a group of Africans to relocate from Glen Grey to Xhalanga, some of the people settled in Lumphaphasi (Ncapayi, 2010). The village is on the eastern side of the Indwe River, which separates it from the neighbouring white-owned farms. It is about 17 kilometres to the small farming town of Indwe, about 40 kilometres from Cala, and about 35 kilometres to Lady Frere. The village has grown from a few households to the present 420 households.⁷ Lumphaphasi became an ideal choice for the study because it is one of the villages that have been impacted upon by programmes of the colonial, apartheid and the democratic governments. When colonialists were bent on undermining the political power of chiefs by promoting the emergence of African farmers (Ntsebeza, 2006:46), one of the beneficiaries of that project was Solomon Khalipha from Lumphaphasi (Ncapayi, 2010:23). In 1872, Chief Gecelo granted him a 1,250 morgen portion of land in Lumphaphasi, a move that colonial magistrate Cumming endorsed (Ncapayi, 2010:25). Khalipha’s farm, together with five other African-owned farms, formed a buffer separating Lumphaphasi village from the white-owned farms. Solomon Khalipha was

⁶ Sakhisizwe Local Municipality is an outcome of the new municipal demarcation in 2000, which amalgamated the village town of Cala and a large number of the villages of the district of Xhalanga on the one hand, as well as the farm town of Elliot with its white-controlled farms and few communal areas which used to fall under the neighbouring district of Engcobo on the other.

⁷ The information was provided by headman Gungqa in Lumphaphasi on the 28th of October 2008 and confirmed by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), in the Mthatha Office, in 2008.

one of the African farmers that Bundy identifies in his book, *The rise and fall of the South African peasantry* (1979:93). Indeed, he was a prominent farmer in Xhalanga who accumulated land such that, when he died in 1923, he owned three farms and properties at Indwe. In 1964, the area was so badly overgrazed that a surprised white agricultural officer remarked: “This land has been badly misused... It is possibly the worst location in the whole of the district”.⁸ As overcrowding worsened, Lumphaphasi witnessed changes in land use practices from crop to livestock production. When the struggle intensified in the late 1980s/early 1990s and spread to rural areas, Lumphaphasi became one of the first villages where land occupation took place. Its residents were the first to benefit from the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme after its launch in 2001; they acquired a farm in Indwe.

Lumphaphasi was chosen also because it was the subject of an earlier study by the author for his Masters’ Degree⁹ in 2005. The earlier study focused on the demand and struggles for land in Lumphaphasi. Therefore, Lumphaphasi provided a good opportunity for exploring how access to land influences changes in social relations in communal areas. In addition, the author has had prior association with Lumphaphasi through his work for a local non-governmental organisation (NGO)—Cala University Students Association (CALUSA). Because of being known to residents of Lumphaphasi, it was easy to conduct the study and no introduction to the area was needed. However, an explanation of the study was given to residents of the area at a community meeting that was held on the 11th of February 2009. In the meeting it was made clear that the author would conduct interviews and, if allowed, would also attend community meetings in the area as an observer. Verbal permission was granted in that meeting by Headman Gungqa, with the approval of the meeting.¹⁰

Data collection

As already stated above, the following methods were used for data collection: review of documents as secondary sources, archival research, in-depth interviews, and conversations, as well as participant observation.

Secondary sources - review and analysis of documents

For secondary sources, government reports, academic publications on land reform, and the reports of non-governmental organisations on Lumphaphasi were reviewed. Government reports and publications

⁸ Memo written by McGregor; Lumphaphasi (Location No. 12), Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Cala, 1964.

⁹ This was an MPhil Masters Degree in Land and Agrarian Studies in the University of the Western Cape.

¹⁰ The meeting was convened to discuss a request by a mining company to open a coal mine in the area.

provided information on the implementation of the land reform programme in general, and Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) projects in particular. These documents were reviewed as part of the literature review. Some of the information was used to corroborate or supplement information obtained during interviews.

Archives

The study is historical with a scope going back to the time of colonial contact. It was thus necessary to conduct archival research, which was utilised to supplement and corroborate secondary sources, such as published material. “[A]rchives can contribute powerfully to informing” (Morrow and Wotshela, 2005:313), and the archives helped to provide information about Lumphaphasi. Through information from the archives the author was able to reconstruct the history of the area. Thus, the archives “help[ed] in the process of reconstructing meaning” (Tuchman, 1994:321). The study used documents in the offices of the Department of Agriculture in Cala; and archival material in Mthatha, the Cape Archives, the National Library in Cape Town, and the archival records in the Government Publications Section of the University of Cape Town (UCT) Library. Archival records on quit-rent titles¹¹ for Lumphaphasi were accessed in the Cala offices of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. The information is contained in a Quit-rent Register which covers the period from 1917 to the 1940s. The archives in Cala also provided information about land applications and allocations, as well as correspondence between residents and different headmen in Lumphaphasi from the 1920s. These archival documents showed how the Lumphaphasi residents changed over time from being predominantly landholders into becoming predominantly residential stand owners. Similarly, the archives in Mthatha contained records of landholdings in Lumphaphasi from the 1920s.

Two points have to be made about the archives in Cala and their accessibility. The state of the archives in the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development leave much to be desired. Although the archives are in a steel filing cabinet, they are not kept in a systematic manner and they do not seem to be safe. The filing cabinet is in a congested office and no one in the department seems to appreciate the value and importance of the files. For instance, on one occasion when the author approached the office for access to the files, the author had to guide the officer attending him to where the files were kept. He had no idea where they were. In their current state, these important archives run the risk of being lost.

Although the author also tried to obtain archival material from the office of traditional leaders in Cala, he could not gain access to the files. The officer, Ms Mkefa, refused me permission. She argued that

¹¹ Quit-rent was a system of landholding that was introduced by the British government in its colonies. The rent absolved its holders from paying any other form of rent (<http://quitrent.askdefine.com/>. Accessed 19/5/2013). A quit-rent title has weaker land tenure rights than the freehold titles (Ncapayi, 2010).

she did not have the authority to give me access to the files. Instead, she referred me to her senior in Bisho, who was difficult to contact telephonically. The fact that a local officer does not have authority over the files indicates inaccessibility of the files.

Regarding the archives in Mthatha, during the two occasions the author visited them he got the impression that the officers managing the archives did not have a clear idea of how the archives were organised. For example, when I asked for access to archives dealing with land matters in Xhalanga, the officers were not able to give me guidance about which files to look at. Secondly, the author noticed that there was no proper space provided for people using the archives to work in. The limited space did not allow for a number of users to work simultaneously. On the few occasions I used the files, we were congested in the limited space. Ntsebeza (2002) made similar observations about the archives in Mthatha.

Interviews

The study used semi-structured interviews as a tool for data collection from a wide-range of respondents. The interviews were conducted between 2009 and 2011. Two key informants—one in the village and the other an LRAD beneficiary—were used as anchors around which the in-depth interviews and informal conversations were held. The informants are people who are knowledgeable about Lumphaphasi because of their active involvement in development processes in the area. They were able to provide information about the area and also to indicate additional people to be interviewed. Neuman points out that informants help to reconstruct conditions that existed in an area (2006:408). They also referred me to other people they considered knowledgeable about the area. For instance, they helped in identifying elderly people, which helped with obtaining the earlier history of Lumphaphasi. The key informants were Nozolile Qayi and Mongezi Khalipha.

Nozolile Qayi is a land reform beneficiary and is among the key leaders of Delindlala Communal Property Association. She comes from the group of people that were historically landless and were referred to as *amalose*¹² in Lumphaphasi and other areas of Xhalanga (Ncapayi, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2006). Born in Guba in 1958, Mrs Qayi married into a family of farmworkers. In 1975, her new family relocated from the white-owned farms to Lumphaphasi. The family acquired a residential site only in 1989, after the original land owner defaulted on taxes and the land was repossessed.

¹²Local people regarded ex-farm workers who come to the communal areas as *amalose*. The term refers to the fact that these are people with no land of their own. They usually depend on obtaining permission from landholders for a place to stay. More on the *amalose* in the next chapters.

The second informant, Mongezi Khalipha, who was born in 1947, is a senior member of the community and is active in development processes in Lumphaphasi. He is a distant relative of Solomon Khalipha. He once worked as a migrant worker in Gauteng until ill-health forced him to stop working in 1990. He does not have arable land of his own, but uses six hectares of arable land that belong to his uncle. Mongezi is a leader of Masiphile, a communal gardening group of fifteen members in Lumphaphasi. He also has passion for the community development of Lumphaphasi.

Life histories of the informants were documented. Among the questions that were asked of them were: how long their families have been in Lumphaphasi, where they came from, their experiences as residents of Lumphaphasi, the amount of land their families have in the village, how the land is used, sources of income, etc. The interview provided a picture of land ownership, its use and challenges related to land. For instance, the interviews showed that people from outside Lumphaphasi were not allocated land immediately. They remained for some period without land, ending up becoming *amalose*. The interviews also afforded the author an opportunity to understand changes in lives of the Lumphaphasi residents over the years.

A total of twenty respondents were interviewed. The respondents represented a range of people with different socio-economic backgrounds: such as, former farm workers, former migrant workers, descendants of the farm owners, and land reform beneficiaries. The Director of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) in the Queenstown office was also interviewed. Of the twenty respondents, eleven were women. There was a conscious effort to ensure that the views of women were represented in the study. Indeed, women indicated that access to land has improved their living conditions tremendously. Typical of most communities which are heterogeneous, the responses of women respondents reflected different views to those of the men. All such differences are reflected in the study.

Government officials, especially those from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), were also interviewed. The initial interest was to explore their interpretation of the LRAD and its implementation in rural areas of the former reserves; as well as to find out how they saw the implementation of LRAD contributing to improving living conditions of people in the communal areas. In addition, there was a need to gain an understanding of the nature of the support systems that are available within the government for land reform beneficiaries.

Although Sarantakos (1998:308) points out that “individual sources are thought to have limitations”, individual respondents were the main source of information in the study. However, account has been taken of Sarantakos’s argument that “multiple sources offer a broader spectrum of analysis and a higher construct validity” (1998:308), by interviewing various individuals in Lumphaphasi on the same

issues. In other words, conducting the same interviews with a number of people was a way of “minimising or eliminating all foreseeable threats to validity in the research process”, as Mouton maintains (1996:109). The interviews of various individuals also showed that people in communities are not homogenous. However, the differences should not necessarily be viewed as a weakness, but as a reflection of the real conditions of people. Furthermore, information was also solicited from groups and in workshops, as will be shown below.

Every effort was made to ensure that the interviews were tape-recorded. As Leedy and Ormrod (2001:158) recommend, tape-recording the interviews is a means of ensuring the accuracy of the data captured. As a further measure, the author took responsibility for personally transcribing the interviews.

Conversations and interactions

Kvale (1996:5) points out that “conversation is a basic mode of human interaction. Human beings talk with each other... Through conversations we get to know other people, get to learn about their experiences, feelings, and hopes and the world they live in”. In line with Kvale’s position and, as a way of establishing a rapport with the informants and people of Lumphaphasi, between January and May 2009 I attended social occasions such as funerals, community meetings and workshops there. During the process of immersion in the community, I had informal conversations with some residents. For instance, I used an informal conversation I had with Mr Sigqibo Dyantyi during a funeral in Lumphaphasi to identify elderly people that had knowledge of the history of the area. I also listened to conversations of other people during the funeral to obtain insight into the issues of Lumphaphasi.

It is at events such as funerals in Lumphaphasi that I was made aware of community activities that I needed to attend. For instance, Mr Gungqa—the headman of Lumphaphasi—announced the date of a community meeting and what the meeting was to discuss, at a funeral. I attended the community meeting and listened to the discussions of community members around the issue of a mining company that wanted to open a coal mine in the area. More importantly, discussions in this community meeting, that took place on the 11th of February 2009, revealed the class interests that emerged between people with only residential stands, who are generally less resourced, and the more resourced farm and arable land owners. The less resourced residents were prepared to accept the company’s offer, in the hope that this would provide job opportunities. On the other hand, the farm and arable land owners, who constitute the landholders in the area, flatly dismissed the company’s approaches. The latter group also reminded residents and the headman that no decision could be made without the endorsement of

landholders. The fact that the groups took different positions on the matter was a reflection of their different class interests. The discussions also indicated the nature of social relations in Lumphaphasi.

Participant-observation

The association with the local non-governmental organisation—Cala University Students Association (CALUSA)—has allowed me to observe the normal daily activities in the farming groups that included project work, workshops and meetings in Lumphaphasi and Delindlala. This afforded me the opportunity to gain “direct, face-to-face social interaction with ‘real people’ in a natural setting” (Neuman, 2006:379) and to put myself “in the actor’s place and see reality as he or she sees it” (Bilton, Bonnet, et al., 1987; see also Humphreys, 1970). Participant observation therefore offered the opportunity of being part of the “social world” (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994:249).

The author attended workshops in Lumphaphasi, even though some of the workshops were not directly concerned with issues related to the study. The workshops provided an opportunity for me to deepen my understanding of the people of Lumphaphasi. One of those workshops was held for Siyafuya—another group of land reform beneficiaries from Lumphaphasi. During the workshops the author was able to make observations about the issues with which the members of the group were grappling. For instance, relations among members of the group were very tense, and central to this was a disagreement on how the land they had acquired should be used. Members of the group who had only residential sites wanted the land to be used for food production, in addition to it being used for grazing. This group argued that they also needed land for food production. On the other hand, members who already had access to arable land refused to consider using the land for food production. Once again the experience illustrated the nature of social relations between land owners and people with only residential sites in Lumphaphasi.

While attending a funeral in Lumphaphasi in January 2009, the author observed the presence of members of the Delindlala group, which was an indication that they still took an interest in what was happening in Lumphaphasi. The fact that there were beneficiaries of land reform at the funeral of a community member that was a non-beneficiary also indicated how land reform beneficiaries relate with non-beneficiaries. As pointed out earlier, the study is interested in understanding social relations in Lumphaphasi. Participant observation helped the author to have an idea about relations between the group of residents with arable land, who are referred to as landholders, and those with only residential sites, mostly originating from people from outside Lumphaphasi. More will be said in the study about the different social groups in Lumphaphasi.

Data analysis

The analysis was based mainly on the experiences of the individual respondents. The data was sorted and classified according to the themes contained in their responses (Neuman, 2006:468). These themes are used not only to highlight common issues (Flick, 2007:63), but also differences in the experiences of the participants. The purpose of reflecting on the differences is “not to be selective, but [so] that data should be reported in full” (Mouton, 1996:177). Narrative analysis is used to capture and reflect the “quality of lived experience” of the people of Lumphaphasi. This approach helped to “construct the identities and locate” the respondents “in what is happening around them” (Neuman, 2006:474).

Field notes “taken either whilst still in the field or immediately after” (Flick, 2007:26-7) were also used during data analysis. In addition, notes on observations were used to supplement information obtained during fieldwork.

Data analysis included reading and analysing primary (interviews, archival material) and secondary material, such as policy documents, government reports, NGO reports, and published academic works. The process of data analysis helped in identifying social groups in Lumphaphasi and how they related to each other. For instance, it was possible to notice that the residents with arable land wielded more power than residents without arable land. As the study also shows, residents with arable land are mostly *bona fides* of the area and exercised more power than residents with only residential sites, who are also considered outsiders.

Ethics

The study took the following ethical issues into consideration:

Permission or access: Although I am known in the area through association with the NGO, CALUSA, consultations with the residents of Lumphaphasi were undertaken to notify them of the impending study. As pointed out earlier, this took place during a community meeting in the area in January 2009. Furthermore, during interviews, a brief explanation was given to each interviewee about the study and permission was sought to conduct the interview and use the information gained. In addition, the intention to use a tape recorder was declared and permission obtained to record the interviews. On no occasion was permission withheld.

Anonymity: The author ensured anonymity by explaining to each participant that it was their right to remain anonymous if they wished and also asked whether their names could be used. None of the respondents wished to remain anonymous. Additionally, during encounters with respondents, the author made full disclosure of his interests in the study and explained that the study is for his

academic purposes, but that it also seeks to make a contribution to literature about Lumphasi and its people.

Reliability: To ensure reliability of the information and its accuracy, a tape recorder was used to record the interviews. In some instances, photos were also taken. Permission to take photos, as well as to record the interviews, was always obtained from the respondents.

Thesis structure and chapter outline

Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter. The rest of the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part, which consists of Chapters 2 to 4, constitutes a historical overview of changes in social relations in the Eastern Cape. This provides a provincial context to the case study of Lumphasi, which is contained in the second part of the thesis. This part is divided into Chapters 5 to 10. A summary of each chapter is provided below.

Chapter 2: The chapter provides an overview of changes in social relations and social groups in the Eastern Cape from the time of colonial contact to 1913. It shows that colonial contact disrupted independent, self-supporting African societies that relied on an economic system that was based on bartering, with cattle being the central driver of that economic system. Colonial contact introduced a cash economy, which undermined the social organisation of African societies, causing deep social, as well as class, divisions among African people. Consequently, divisions appeared between the *amagqobhoka* (school people) and *amaqaba*¹³, between the progressive farmers and peasants, and between migrant workers and landless African people. However, agrarian lifestyles continued despite the disruptive Glen Grey Act of 1894 and the Natives Land Act of 1913.

Chapter 3: This chapter builds on the previous chapter. Covering the period from 1913 to 1960, it shows how overcrowding and other factors led to the majority of African people converting into migrant workers. By the late 1920s, many peasants had also been transformed into small producers with the assistance of landless ex-farm workers who entered into labour tenancy agreements with them. It is further shown that, despite the conversion of the majority of rural producers into workers, land-based lifestyles continued, as some of the migrant workers and the descendants of the progressive African farmers and peasants of the late 19th century persisted with their agrarian lifestyles until their activities were disrupted by Betterment planning and chronic overcrowding in the late 1950s. The growing African middle class also began to diversify its operations, mixing land-based lifestyles with

¹³ The term *amagqobhoka* refers to Africans that had accepted western civilisation in the form of education, Christianity and the way of dressing. The term *amaqaba* is taken from the term *iqaba* which was in reference to the red ochre that traditional Africans used to adorn themselves with (Mayer, 1961).

income from their jobs as professionals. In his case study of Ncamedlana in Mthatha, Mabandla (2012) shows that a section of the middle class also invests in properties that they rent out to people. And, women had become the main producers in the communal areas.

Chapter 4: Covering the period from 1960 to 1994, this chapter discusses the effects of overcrowding, and, in particular, the noticeable decline in crop production which was overtaken by livestock production. As grazing land was demarcated for residential sites, arable land was, in turn, converted into grazing land. This marked a significant shift in land use patterns. However, the prominence of livestock production meant the marginalisation of women-dominated activities, i.e., crop production. The chapter also discusses the emergence of youth in rural land struggles from the late 1980s, albeit with a focus on land for residential sites. Their involvement in land struggles in the 1990s brought unity and new forms of organisation into rural land struggles which culminated in land occupations on grazing land.

Chapter 5: The chapter is the first of five chapters that deal with the case study of Lumphaphasi. It covers the period from the establishment of the village to 1913, exploring the emergence of social groups such as the African farmers who co-existed with the subsistence producers that were generally divided along the lines of the *amagqobhoka* and *amaqaba*. The *amagqobhoka* owned large individual farms, while the *amaqaba* eked out a living on small portions of land that fell under the jurisdiction of headman Solomon Khalipha, who lived in the village and was one of the most successful African farmers in the Eastern Cape (Bundy, 1979). The chapter also discusses how these initial social and class divisions played themselves out up to 1913, as well as the support of the colonialists to the farmers, the accumulation and disintegration of the farmers and subsistence producers and the emergence of migrant workers.

Chapter 6: This chapter covers the period from 1913 to 1960 and discusses the changes that took place in the area. These include the existence of *amalose* (landless people), most of whom were displaced farm workers that became labour tenants and sharecroppers on the farms of African farmers and the peasants; the way in which hired labour transformed the peasants; the continuation of production (crop and livestock) despite rapid population growth from the 1930s; the decline in crop production in the late 1950s due to overcrowding and labour shortages that resulted from the *amalose's* acquisition of land during the betterment planning land allocations; the absence of family labour as children went to school; and the continuation of livestock production, despite all the problems.

Chapter 7: The chapter discusses developments in social relations from the 1960s to 1994. It shows that, contrary to the dominant view that production had ceased to exist in the communal areas, crop production continued in gardens as arable land was converted into grazing land. As overcrowding

escalated, it unleashed fierce competition between the *abafiki* (new-arrivals or outsiders) also referred to as *amalose* and *iinzalelwane* (*bona fides*) for access to land. As landlessness became widespread, unity was forged between the outsiders and *bona fides* in a struggle for land, which culminated in land occupations in the early 1990s. Youth and former migrant workers were central to the struggle for access to residential land.

Chapter 8: Discussions in this chapter relate to the land reform programme; the debates associated with it, the impact of land reform on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries, and its introduction in Lumphaphasi. It also highlights the important role research and CALUSA played in the introduction of land reform in the area.

Chapter 9: Flowing from the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on developments in Delindlala after land had been acquired—covering the period from 2002 to 2005. It shows that the land reform programme changed landless people into farmers. The chapter agrees with Lahiff (2007b) and Hall (2009); Aliber, 2011) that group-based crop production experienced problems during this period, while individualised livestock production was successful. However, the chapter also argues that group-based production persisted in the project despite the problems. This is because of a commitment of its members to work as a collective, in pursuance of a resolution taken at the inception of the project.

Chapter 10: The chapter, which focuses on the period from 2006 to 2011, shows the commitment of members to group-based production and its success. The argument is that the commitment of the women-dominated leadership accompanied by constant support from different agencies and the government account for the success of group farming. Thus, under certain conditions group-based production does improve the livelihoods of beneficiaries. The chapter also shows that the acquisition of land influenced changes in social relations in Lumphaphasi.

Chapter 11: The concluding chapter discusses the findings of the study. It also summarises the arguments presented in the study, drawing the link between literature and the empirical evidence. The conclusion shows that access to land is still important in determining social relations among rural people.

CHAPTER 2

Colonial Contact and Changing Social Relations amongst African Societies in the Eastern Cape up to 1913

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of social relations in African societies in the Cape¹⁴ from the time of colonial contact (between the late-18th and early-19th centuries) to 1913. An understanding of the forces that led to changes in these social relations is important as it forms the basis of the case study on Lumphaphasi, a rural village in what is known today as the Eastern Cape Province. 1913 is significant in that, in this year, the union government of South Africa introduced the notorious Natives Land Act No. 27 which restricted African people to seven per cent of the total land mass of South Africa.

The focus is on how colonialists used land as the basis for effecting political, social and economic changes in African societies. It shows that, by 1913, African societies had been largely transformed—the power of chiefs had been successfully undermined and their functions taken over by white magistrates; a growing number of land-dependent households had been converted into wage-dependent migrant workers; and the African redistributive economic system had been replaced by a capitalist cash economy. The consequence of such far-reaching changes was the emergence of, amongst others, peasants, progressive African farmers and a growing black middle class in African communities of the Cape.

Two interrelated arguments are presented. Firstly, it is argued that land was, and continued to be, central to defining social relations in African societies. Access or lack of access to land defined how people in African communities related to each other. As the chapter will show, people without arable land often became subordinated to people with land. This is illustrated by the fact that chiefs used their control over land to subordinate people that depended on them for access to land. Secondly, the chapter takes issue with Bundy's position that "[s]ubstantial numbers" of rural dwellers had, by the beginning of the 20th century, been "separated from the means of production" (1979:110), implying that this portion of migrant workers had no relationship with land. It is argued in this chapter that there was a portion of migrant workers that did have access to land and that invested their earnings in agrarian lifestyles.

¹⁴ Although the study uses the term "Cape" for the Cape Province, the area under discussion is known today as the Eastern Cape.

The first part of this chapter deals with the pre-colonial period and shows that, at the time of colonial contact, African societies in the Cape operated as semi-autonomous chiefdoms that had a range of political, social and economic systems. The second focuses on the changes in social relations that occurred as a result of colonial contact and highlights the following three issues: the creation of African reserves and the way in which this led to an emergence of new social groups; the impact of colonial contact on social relations; and lastly, attempts by colonialists to marginalise chiefs and the impact of these actions on social relations.

African societies and their organisation at the time of colonial contact

This section sketches a picture of how African societies were organised before the impact of colonial influence became evident in the Cape. Although contact between colonialists and African societies dates back to the time of the arrival of settlers in the 1600s, the late 18th century is pertinent here, as this period of colonial contact marks the beginning of land dispossession and the domination of African societies.

At the time of colonial contact, most African societies in the Cape were organised into semi-autonomous chiefdoms (Maylam, 1986; Hammond-Tooke, 1993; Mafeje, 2003). These chiefdoms were separated from each other by “poorly defined or non-existent” boundaries (Davernport, 1991:111). In areas where the chiefdom consisted of a cluster of chieftaincies, a king or a senior chief would become the head of the chiefdom (Ntsebeza, 2002:30). The lineage was the unit of Nguni society “which had its territorial base in the homestead” (Maylam, 1986:25). Lineages were traced through the “descendants of male ancestors” and tended “to segment, with men hiving off to form their own lineages” (ibid). In line with Nguni traditions, only male descendants could be heirs. The position of a king or senior chief¹⁵ was hereditary and was never decided democratically by the subjects (Ntsebeza, 2002:30).

The king and chief operated through a male-dominated structure of councillors who acted as their advisers (Hammond-Tooke, 1985; Ntsebeza, 2002). Thus, women were not part of the chiefdom’s council. Councillors “were not necessarily of royal blood”, but were chosen on the basis of their experience and skills (Ntsebeza, 2002:30). Although the king could not interfere in the political affairs of other chieftaincies, he still had overall authority over issues of custom, and junior chiefs consulted him about certain rituals and the resolution of disputes among them (ibid:29). This therefore, elevated the king to the status of a father figure in the chiefdom.

¹⁵ The terms “senior chief” and “king” are used interchangeably in this document.

Most amaXhosa chiefs had more than one wife, a factor that encouraged the segmentation of the chiefdom. Because the chiefdom was polygamous, it had more than one homestead¹⁶ to accommodate each wife, who lived in her own homestead. For example, the Great Wife of the chiefdom of the amaXhosa, the wife who gave birth to the heir, lived a distance from the Great Place (Peires, 1975:114). Furthermore, mature sons of the king were encouraged to establish their own chieftaincies, sometimes as junior chiefs within the jurisdiction of the chiefdom (Davenport, 1991:56). This practice is illustrated by the fact that the two houses of the amaXhosa chiefdom – the Great House of amaGcaleka and the Right-Hand House of amaNgqika – developed into separate chieftaincies (Peires, 1975:115). It was through such mechanisms that African chiefdoms in the Cape grew and expanded territorially. Chiefdoms were also expanded by incorporating people from other chiefdoms (ibid).

The king, who was the chiefdom's political head, also performed various other roles that included "executive, military, judicial and religious" duties (Maylam, 1986:31). As an executive, the king sat in on community meetings, listening to the views of his subjects and basing decisions on these discussions. But, although the king took the final decision, it was not he who shouldered the blame for unpopular decisions. The councillors were held responsible and paid the price for unpopular decisions; it was they who would be "eaten up (*badliwe*) by, for example, having their cattle expropriated" (Ntsebeza, 2002:30).

The king handled disputes among the junior chiefs (Davenport, 1991:52). Decisions about security and the army of the chiefdom were also the prerogative of the king, as in the case of Shaka in the KwaZulu chiefdom, who took decisions on whether to have a full-time army or not (Maylam, 1986:31). Thus, the king had wide-ranging powers.

Although there was no democracy in the choice of who became king, as the position was hereditary, there was an element of democracy in how decisions on governance matters were reached. As already pointed out, the king's decisions were "based on consultation, discussion and consensus" (Ntsebeza, 2002:30). Not only did the king hold consultations with his council on daily operational matters, he also convened community meetings of only "married men" to make announcements, as well as to discuss issues that warranted a bigger audience than the councillors (Ntsebeza, 2002:30). Therefore, women and unmarried men did not have a voice in decisions that were taken in their communities.

Furthermore, the authority of the king "was subject to checks", as a way of limiting it. The king's authority was dependent on his "ability to maintain his following and to control key material

¹⁶ A homestead was a combination of households which were not necessarily related. The heads of the households were usually men who were indebted to the homestead head (Lewis, 1984). The household heads might have been loaned cattle by the homestead head to get married or to pay a court fine.

resources” (Maylam, 1986:25). A king without a following had no authority. The control of material resources, such as land and cattle, was central to the chief’s exercise of power, as well as to the expansion of the chiefdom (ibid:25). However, even though chiefs controlled and allocated land, they could not do this without consulting their councillors (Hendricks, 1990:45). Davenport succinctly explained the role of the chief in land allocation:

In traditional society the African chief normally held the land on behalf of his people. He had the power to allocate arable land for use but never outright ownership, though a son could normally expect to obtain the use of his father’s holding. Grazing land was held in common, but the chief could control access to it by the villagers’ livestock (1991:164).

It is clear that the chief did not own the land but merely had authority to control and allocate access to it. Land was allocated to married male members of the community for use by their wives (Mafeje, 2003:2). Using sub-Saharan Africa as an example, Mafeje argues that, unlike in Europe, African land was not alienated or privatised, but was treated as a social good by the community, clan or lineage. The landholder, who had to be part of one of the social groups (clan, lineage or community), was given access to the land by virtue of first occupation. Occupation of the land gave the holder rights to the produce of the land. Differently put, the holder owned the crops produced on the land, but not the land itself (ibid, 2003:3). Only crops and livestock could become the property of the landholder. Rights to allocated land resided with the lineage or clan. Members of the lineage or clan made decisions about the land and its allocation within the clan (ibid).

The chiefdom raised revenue through fealty, as well as the collection of dues and tributes. Subjects accessed land in a community “through the act of fealty to the chief” (*ukukhonza*) (Hammond-Tooke, 1985:311). In return, the chief provided protection to the homestead or household, which also benefited from the redistribution of surplus produce in times of hardship. Homesteads or households paid a variety of dues and tributes, such as death dues for “the death of every homestead head”. In KwaZulu the death dues, which were paid in cattle, were referred to as *isizi* (Hammond-Tooke, 1985:312). Tributes collected included court fines and the proceeds from marriages of the daughters of chiefs (Ntsebeza, 2002:31). Cattle received as payment of dues and tributes became part of the royal stock (Hammond-Tooke, 1985:312). An important point to note is that the dues and tributes were one of the ways through which chiefs and kings accumulated wealth.

A high value was placed on the ownership of cattle and there was an inclination in African communities to favour cattle above crop production. Guy (1987) explains that

cattle were important as the source of subsistence products: milk in various forms, dung for heating and building, for leather and meat. Moreover cattle are self-reproducing and numbers can increase without absorbing a significant increase in labour time. (1987:19-20).

More will be said later about cattle requiring minimal labour.

The king also “provided protection and redistributed surplus in times of famine” to his needy followers, thus ensuring the welfare of his people. The redistribution of resources was not only a form of social responsibility but also benefitted the king directly. For example, through the practice of “*ukunqoma*”, the king loaned cattle to his subordinate chiefs, thereby buying their allegiance. The practice of buying the allegiance of subordinates and subjects was commonplace, especially in the Mpondo chiefdom (Hammond-Tooke, 1985:311).

The fact that there were needy households to which the chief had to provide assistance also indicates that these societies were not homogenous. In reality, there were inequalities both within and amongst communities. The king or paramount chief’s practice of lending cattle to chiefdoms that had limited cattle illustrates that inequalities existed among the chieftaincies. Similarly at the household level, many were indebted to their homestead-heads, which also indicates that some households had more cattle than others. Thus, it can be argued that, at the time of colonial contact, African societies were differentiated into households (including chiefs) that had many head of cattle and those with either fewer or no cattle, as well as those who had land and used the labour of those with no or limited land and livestock, for production.

It is worth noting the manner in which scholars have characterised the chiefs at the time of colonial contact. Whilst Davenport’s view is that the chiefs’ power was limited because they did not have absolute power over land but rather held it on behalf of their subjects, Hammond-Tooke (1985) shows that chiefs derived their power from land allocation. According to Hammond-Tooke (1985:311), they allocated land to the subjects that paid allegiance to them (1985:311). Thus, Ntsebeza (2002) identifies two schools of thought in relation to the chiefs: scholars, such as Tapscot (1997) and Ashton (1967), who believe that the institution of traditional authorities was democratic, and scholars, such as Peires (1975), who view the institution as autocratic. Instead, Ntsebeza correctly views the institution of traditional authorities as dynamic rather than static. Indeed, the institution was not the same at all times, nor the same everywhere.

In terms of social organisation, amaXhosa subjects or commoners were organised into homesteads that settled around water points and woodlands (Peires, 1981:6-7). Access to water, as well as the sizes of the homesteads, determined where humans settled. Where the water point had limited water, a smaller settlement or fewer homesteads would be established. In general, however, homesteads varied in size

from eight to fifteen dwellings that were organised along lineages. Each homestead was headed by the “senior male of his lineage” (Peires, 1981:8). The homestead-head “lived with his wife, his unmarried children, and possibly one or two impoverished relatives”. In a typical homestead, dwellings were “arranged in a semi-circle” around the cattle-enclosure that was “made of mimosa thorn-bushes” (Peires, 1981:3). In the Cape, the homestead dwellings consisted of “pole and reed huts” (Williams, 1978:4). According to Peires:

The 30 metres or so between dwellings and the gate of the enclosure formed a yard (inkundla) where most of the formal and social activities of the people took place. Further down, between the homestead and the water, lay the gardens... (1981:3).

Sorghum was the basic crop for most southern Nguni. Other food products included “calabashes, watermelons, gourds,¹⁷ beans, pumpkins, potatoes, bananas, sugar, tobacco and dagga” (Maylam, 1986:33). Although maize was a foreign crop “from the east coast of Africa, it was also widely planted in the mid-Transkei by the time of colonial contact” (ibid). Crais (1992:19) concurs with Maylam on the production of sorghum, beans and melons in African societies in the Cape. The southern Nguni also gathered wild plants such as “berries, mimosa gum, onion-like roots, and the wild spinach which grew in abandoned cattle-enclosures” (Peires, 1981:8).

At the household level, there was a clear division of labour based on gender and generation. Men attended to “cattle and erected the permanent structures”, such as houses. They also “assisted in the clearing of land, using rough axes made by local smiths, as well as by burning” (Peires, 1981:8). On the other hand, boys were responsible for herding the cattle (Guy, 1987:21), whereas children, in general, were responsible for “protecting the gardens from birds and animals (Bundy, 1979:18). In polygamous households “each wife had her own garden or gardens” (ibid). Women performed domestic work within the household. They cared for their households, taking responsibility for the preparation of meals, as well as the maintenance of household dwellings (Lewis, 1984; Guy, 1987; Bradford, 2000). Women also did the creative work; they sewed clothing, made pots for cooking and wove baskets (Peires, 1981:8).

Guy (1987:24) and Lewis (1984:7) have argued that, despite their critical role in providing food, women were dominated by men in the household. However, contrary to this belief, women were not as powerless as they have been made to appear. As already pointed out, in polygamous households women were the holders of land (Bradford, 2000; Mafeje, 2003). Similarly, Mafeje (2003:3) reminds us that, in African societies, land was allocated only to married men. This meant that, without women, men could not gain access to land. Thus, women were not just passive recipients in male-headed

households, but were a critical factor for access to land for the household. Although the fact that land was allocated only to married men could also serve as a deterrent to men chasing their wives away, I have not come across an actual situation where a man lost his land for chasing his wife away. This provision shows, though, that African societies had regulatory mechanisms that not only protected women in the household, but also gave them some power.

As indicated earlier, cattle were central to the economy of African societies (Peires, 1981; Williams, 1978). This was reflected in the positioning of cattle-kraals in the centre of the homestead (Peires, 1981:14). Because cattle were more dominant than cultivation in southern Nguni communities, there was always a need for better grazing land. For this reason, the southern Nguni did not have permanent settlements. They changed their settlements from time to time, according to the availability of enough vegetation for cattle grazing (Bundy, 1979:18). Besides cattle, the amaXhosa also engaged in cultivation, hunting and the gathering of wild food (Peires, 1981; Maylam, 1986).

Cattle also had social and cultural significance for the southern Nguni people. Socially, cattle provided meat for household feasts, where there was an expectation for “neighbours to attend”. Cattle also provided milk to households. Homesteads even shared meat and grain in the hope of reciprocity from their neighbours in the future (Peires, 1981:10). Thus, cattle helped to build social networks among southern Nguni communities.

Culturally, cattle were central to practices such as the sacrifice of a beast (Peires, 1981:8). The amaXhosa also slaughtered cattle when they communicated with their ancestors (Crais, 1992:19). Cattle were also used for the payment of *lobola* – the dues paid to the family of a woman when she married (Peires, 1981; Crais, 1992). Ownership of cattle enabled males to marry and eventually build their families. Thus, cattle were an important source of “production and reproduction” in the Cape African societies (Peires, 1981; Crais, 1992).

In summary, at the point of colonial contact, African societies had independent chiefdoms that performed political, social and economic roles. Politically, the king or chief ruled through a male-dominated structure of advisers. The chief passed laws and made judgements. Economically, the chief accumulated wealth through fealty, and the collection of dues and tributes. Socially, the chief or king looked after the welfare of his subjects by distributing wealth to needy subjects, a process that also proved useful in ensuring their continuing loyalty. African societies were organised around homesteads that consisted of a cluster of households. Each homestead was designed to ensure that the cattle-kraal and gardens were encircled by the dwellings, making the cattle-kraal central to the households. Cattle rearing, cultivation, gathering and hunting were the key economic activities of households. Access to

¹⁷ Gourd is a member of the cucumber, melon and pumpkin family of plants.

land was critical, as households used it for food production and the harvesting of wild vegetables and fruits. However, households did not own the land but had access to it. There was a clear division of labour in households with men, women and children performing specific roles. Finally, there were inequalities within African societies, with some categories of people, especially unmarried men, beginning to experience the challenge of landlessness.

Colonial contact and its impact on African societies – 1770s to 1880s

Colonial contact had far-reaching political, social and economic implications for African people. It is worth repeating Bundy's summary of the impact of colonial contact on African societies:

At the core of South Africa's social history lies the transition of a majority of her people – the rural African population – from their pre-colonial existence as pastoralist-cultivators to their contemporary status: that of sub-subsistence rural dwellers, manifestly unable to support themselves by agriculture and dependent for survival upon wages earned in 'white' industrial areas or upon 'white' farms. The transition is a striking one, and its external aspects have been described often enough: the diminution of Africans' lands by conquest and annexation, the creation of 'Reserves', the deterioration of these into eroded, overstocked and overcrowded rural ghettos that function as the supply source of migratory labour (Bundy, 1979:1).

The extract aptly captures the manner in which colonial contact transformed the lives of the majority of African people from land-based livelihoods to wage workers. African societies in the Cape were conquered and dispossessed of their land following 100 years (from 1778 to 1878) of fierce wars with colonialists (Bundy, 1979; Davenport, 1991). As Bundy points out, “[w]ithout available land for all, one of the corner-stones of tribal life had been wrenched away” (1979:3). Land dispossession went hand-in-hand with the introduction of the cash economy, which dismantled the “self-sufficient economic order” of African societies (Bundy, 1979:3). However, the decline in the self-sufficient African economic system was preceded by a period of “early prosperity” for a group of African producers who were incorporated into the colonial cash economy, where they prospered economically, despite widespread land dispossession. As a result of this incorporation, these producers had, by the 1870s, graduated into peasants. Some of them consolidated their earnings, having taken advantage of the support that the colonial government and the missionaries had given them earlier. Such groups developed into “progressive farmers” from the 1880s (ibid).

It is worth considering changes in the boundaries of the Cape that occurred between 1778 and 1878. During this period, African chiefdoms lost land through a series of frontier wars that they waged with colonial forces. As colonialists defeated African chiefdoms, they changed existing boundaries,

replacing them with new ones. Each time new boundaries were drawn, African communities and their chiefs suffered massive land losses. For instance, after the first frontier war in 1778, the boundary separating the colonialists from the southern Nguni was set at the Gamtoos River, between Port Elizabeth and Jeffrey's Bay. By the end of the last war in 1878, the new boundary had moved to the Kei River, between East London and Butterworth (Davenport, 1991). Chief Maqoma — from the western side of the Kei River — was one of the amaXhosa chiefs that experienced land dispossession during the frontier wars (Williams, 1978:2).

Defeated chiefs were forced to leave their territories and relocate to other areas. Most of the ceded land was then distributed to white farmers (Williams, 1978:1). Consequently, white farmers found themselves with vast tracts of land at their disposal but with insufficient labour to meet their new requirements at a time when producers at the Cape had to satisfy the British export markets (Bundy, 1979:31-32). Colonialists attempted to solve the labour problem through Ordinance 50 of 1828, which allowed Africans entry into the Cape to work on white-owned farms (Bundy, 1979; Crais, 1992). However, instead of resolving the labour shortage, the Ordinance actually worsened the situation, as it enabled African workers to desert white-owned farms and flee to the reserves (1992:73). The problem was eventually resolved by land-hungry Africans who remained behind after the chiefs had left the conquered territories in the 1840s. Some members of this group became sharecroppers, while others became labour tenants (Crais, 1992:32).

Furthermore, Africans displaced by the *mfecane*¹⁸ drifted from KwaZulu to the south, ending up at the Cape where they took refuge under the amaXhosa paramountcy in the early-19th century (Crais, 1992:31-33). In 1847, about 16 000 of this group of amaMfengu crossed the Kei River with “22 000 head of cattle” to settle in British Kaffraria.¹⁹ According to Bundy:

Having arrived in the colony with a fair number of cattle (noted Robertson), the Mfengu entered agricultural service and by a combination of hard work, parsimony, and concessions 'soon became the chief economic power among the Bantu tribes' (Bundy, 1979:33).

A group of amaMfengu with cattle negotiated their stay on white-owned farms, hence the mention of “concessions” above. Furthermore, amaMfengu worked with the British against other amaXhosa groupings in order to consolidate their position. In turn, the British repaid the amaMfengu loyalty by giving them some of the land of defeated chiefs and by making certain other concessions. Through

¹⁸ *Mfecane* refers to the time of political disruptions and movement of people in KwaZulu resulting from the Shaka wars during the early-19th century (Crais, 1992). *Mfecane* comes from a Xhosa term, *ukufaca*, which means being emaciated due to starvation and lack of proper diet (see <http://africanhistory.about.com/od/africanhistoryfaq/f/Mfecane.htm>. Accessed 15/01/2012). It would seem that during the period of *mfecane* the fleeing people were emaciated due to lack of proper diet.

negotiations and the concessions, amaMfengu managed to keep their cattle which they used to kick-start their economic development.

It should be noted that the conditions discussed in this section apply only to areas where white farmers owned land. In African societies, which are the focus of this study, a different process unfolded.

The creation of African reserves and the emergence of new social groups

From 1847, British Kaffraria and Transkei became home to more and more Africans in the Eastern Cape. As Africans were pushed off white-claimed territory in the Eastern Cape, one group settled in British Kaffraria (now Ciskei), while the other remained in the Transkei. With the power of chiefs effectively undermined and African-owned land drastically reduced, a number of African people lost their land-based livelihoods. This created an ideal situation for the formation of a social group of wage workers within African societies, and, British Kaffraria and the Transkei were to be used as the reserves from which African labour for the colonial capitalist economy could be drawn. As Maylam puts it, colonialists viewed the Transkei as a “labour reservoir if administered as a separate entity” (1986:102; see also ANC, 1987:2). How colonialists categorised Transkei was in line with how colonialists categorised Africa as they divided it into different macro-regions one of which became known as “*Africa of the labour reserves*” (Amin, 1972:106). In this macro-region, colonialists embarked on large-scale land dispossession, pushing indigenous people to marginalised areas “with no means of modernizing and intensifying their farming” (Ibid.). States in this region are also referred to as settler colonies because colonialists also settled in them (Amin, 1972, Mafeje, 2003; Moyo, 2007).

In addition to pushing African people to the reserves, colonialists continued to undermine the power of chiefs within the reserves, replacing them with district magistrates (Mamdani, 1996). Initially, colonialists adopted different approaches to the issue of governance in the two territories. In British Kaffraria, the initial colonial strategy was to use treaties to impose boundaries, without necessarily coming into contact with the chiefs. This approach was applied until 1847, when Sir Harry Smith renounced the system and introduced magisterial rule as “direct rule” (Hammond-Tooke, 1964:515). From this point, magistrates became the heads of the political system, even if only for a short while.

Between 1848 and 1850, the colonial governor reverted to rule by the chiefs, allowing them to exercise “reasonable authority under the supervision of magistrates” (Hammond-Tooke, 1964:515). Chiefs in British Kaffraria were given more authority only after the war of 1850. However, magistrates continued to act “as political agents” (ibid). Thus, while the chiefs enjoyed some limited political

¹⁹ British Kaffraria is the area that became the Ciskei.

power, it was, in reality, the magistrates who held the political authority. This situation existed for a period of five years, until 1855, when magisterial rule was re-introduced. Thereafter, chiefs were still allowed to handle cases under native law, but “were assisted by magistrates” (Hammond-Tooke, 1964:515). From the above, it is clear that by the mid-19th century chiefs had lost political power in the Ciskei.

The imposition of magistrates as a means of curbing the power of rebellious chiefs remained a thorny issue and caused much unhappiness among the chiefs. The tension often led to clashes between the colonialists and amaXhosa chiefdoms in the Eastern Cape. For example, the replacement of Chief Sandile of the amaNgqika by Brownlee in the late 1840s increased tensions that later led to an attack by Mlanjeni on colonial soldiers in the Tyhume valley (Williams, 1978:20-21). Despite resistance, however, colonial expansion continued, as did the practice of identifying and removing uncooperative paramount chiefs, and replacing them with headmen (Beinart, 1995:181-182).

Integral to this strategy of undermining the authority of chiefs, was the way in which colonialists, together with the missionaries, sowed divisions in African societies. Mission stations, which emerged from the 1840s in various African societies in the Eastern Cape, were critical to these developments (Williams, 1978; Bundy, 1979). The first divisions emerged at the level of the chiefs—between chiefs that resisted colonial invasion and those who embraced it. Among the chiefs that resisted colonial domination were “Ndlambe and Chungwa²⁰, Hintsu and Sarhili, Maqoma, Tyhali and Sandile” (Peires, 1981:185). Kama and Mqhayi became collaborators, either fighting on the side of colonialists or refusing to support their fellow Africans in times of war (Peires, 1981:186).

As soon as the Cape was awarded responsible government in 1872, the colonial government targeted the Transkei for take over (Maylam, 1986:100). In the Transkei, colonialists adopted a different approach when dealing with the chiefs. Firstly, unlike in British Kaffraria, they did not take over the whole Transkei all at once, but gradually. Thus, from 1879, the greater part of the territory, with the exception of Phondoland, fell under colonial control (Hammond-Tooke, 1964:517). Secondly, colonialists removed the chiefs and introduced a system of “direct magisterial rule” (ibid:102). Once the colonial authorities assumed control, they carved the Transkei into several districts, placing each under the control of a white magistrate, who, in turn, was responsible to a chief magistrate. These districts were further divided into locations that were administered by government-appointed headmen. Headmen “were mostly district chiefs or ward headmen or in some cases, individuals who had no traditional authority” (Maylam, 1986:102). This meant that, in some instances, junior chiefs or

²⁰ The Chungwa referred to could be Tshungwa or Tshunungwa. It has not been possible to find out what the real name was.

headmen with no connections to the royal family were appointed to positions of authority. In this way, the powers of chiefs were severely curtailed. Even though chiefs still continued to handle cases under native law, they had to refer appeals to the magistrates (Hammond-Tooke, 1964:516). Each magistrate “served as both a judicial and an administrative officer” (Maylam, 1986:102). The magistrates took responsibility for “collecting taxes, dispensing justice, and acting as links between the districts and the administrative authorities in Umtata” (ibid). As Hammond-Tooke explains:

Although, after annexation, the Chiefs had been left in nominal control, their areas were, in fact, administered by white magistrates. Tribesmen had direct access to the court of the native commissioner, all administrative matters such as pensions, social welfare grants, and land affairs were in his hands, and he was solely responsible to the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories for the peace and good government of his area. Derogating even further from the Chiefs' authority was the system of location headmen, paid officials of the Department of Native Affairs under the immediate control of the native commissioner (1964:516).

A clear shift in political power from the chiefs to the magistrates, and, at the local level, to government-supported headmen, can be seen here (ibid). The third colonial strategy regarding governance in the Transkei was the introduction of a district council system in the 1890s (Maylam, 1986:102). The district councils consisted of six headmen and council meetings were chaired by the local magistrate. Four of the members were elected by headmen, while the other two members were nominated by the magistrate. Thus, the district council was, to all intents and purposes, still controlled by magistrates.

The last chiefdom to be annexed was Phondoland, in 1894, thus completing the process of the incorporation of African societies of the Cape into the colonial system.

Colonialism also weakened the economic power of chiefs who, in the pre-colonial era, used their control of land and cattle as a means to raise revenue from their followers. The chiefs from both British Kaffraria and the Transkei lost their land and with this, their economic independence, becoming fully dependent on stipends from the colonial government (Hammond-Tooke, 1964; Maylam, 1986). The pastoral land that had ensured the well-being of cattle was no longer available; it was now white-claimed land. Furthermore, the reduction in grazing land led to changes in grazing patterns which, in turn, affected the capacity of African societies to control cattle diseases. It also undermined their ability to cope with natural disasters, such as drought. This increased vulnerability meant that a drought that African societies had previously been able to cope with “became an irreversible calamity” (Peires, 1981:184). Thus, the reduction of grazing land led to huge losses of cattle, which weakened the chiefdoms and homesteads economically (Peires, 1981:184).

However, it was at the level of households that the most visible and far-reaching changes occurred. New social groups were beginning to emerge from the 1830s onwards. The proliferation of mission stations in the Cape contributed to many of these developments. It was from these mission stations that Western values spread into African societies through the Christian religion and Western education (Mayer, 1980; Jordan 1982; Allen, 1994; Magubane, 1998). Missionaries identified Africans that accepted the Christian religion and worked closely with them, while marginalising Africans that they considered unreceptive to Christian beliefs. Those Africans that accepted Christianity were referred to as ‘school people’ or *amagqobhoka* (even if they were not educated) because of the association of Western values and Western education with Christian religion. On the other hand, Africans who rejected Christianity and Western education were referred to as ‘red people’ (*amaqaba*) (Ntsebeza, 2002:40). Missionaries insisted that Africans dress like Europeans, as a way of measuring the extent to which Africans had accepted Western civilisation. Those who converted were richly rewarded. For example, the Methodist missionaries at Farmerfield – near Salem in the Albany District – bought 6 000 hectares of land, which was divided into lots and given to “converts at a fixed annual rental” (Bundy, 1979:45). Thus, Africans were divided into *amagqobhoka* and *amaqaba*.

Missionaries also impacted on the social life of African households. Keegan (1966:133) points out that the introduction of the Christian religion resulted in the development of “individualistic material values” among Africans. Consequently, practices such as *ukunqoma*, which encouraged the sharing of wealth, fell into disuse, as Africans began to value trading their cattle with Europeans above sharing with fellow Africans. Missionary influence was pervasive. As Africans emulated the Western lifestyle, even their style of building houses changed. They were encouraged to build square houses, and with these square houses, there arose many new needs, such as tables, chairs, etc. Bundy has argued that missionaries caused a “social revolution” in African societies (1979:37). There can be no doubt that the social lives of Africans were indeed being irrevocably transformed.

Economically, the mission stations, which were widespread even in areas such as Phondoland and the Herschel District (Beinart, 1995; Bradford (2000), served as “centres of trade and improved agriculture” (Bundy, 1979:35). As trading centres with African households, mission stations facilitated the introduction of “market relations” in African societies, as well as a reliance on the “cash economy” (ibid).²¹ As a consequence, the use of money began to replace the African system of bartering. For instance, the exchange of cattle for European merchandise, which had increased gradually by the 1820s, was later changed to cash sales. Trade was also increased to include other products such as “hides, and horns of cattle” (Bundy, 1979:30). As Bundy aptly captures it, the missionaries served as “torch-bearers of capitalist social norms and the market economy”. In consequence, “peasant enterprise

amongst the Nguni peoples” became widespread throughout the Cape Colony from the 1820s (Bundy, 1979:35). The aim was to “restructure African societies along lines that would attach them securely to the British capitalist economy” (ibid, 1979:37). Indeed, missionaries helped to inculcate “many of the basic features of capitalism and colonialism” such as “rectilinear plots and buildings”, as well as the concept of private property, which became a common feature in the Kat River Settlement (Crais, 1992:83).

By the 1820s, visible social divisions had developed in African societies with the emergence of peasants. As already stated, at the centre of the social divisions and the emergence of peasants as a social group, was the incorporation of the communal cultivators into the market economy. Some peasants had their origins in the group of Africans that provided wage labour to white landowners from the late 18th century. As will also be remembered, when the Cape colonial government passed Ordinance 50 of 1828, many of the labourers who could not move off white-owned farms, previously, used the Ordinance as an opportunity to leave the farms (Crais, 1992:73). Crais explains:

The emancipated would ‘not accept employment’. They would ‘not work’ for white farmers, preferring to engage in peasant production, hunting and pursuing independent skilled or semi-skilled crafts or taking up casual labour in the towns (ibid:75).

According to Crais (1992:79), by 1829, “peasant production took root most vigorously at the headwaters of the Kat River”. However, peasants were not a homogenous group. They differentiated into various groupings, depending on their level of access to land and how they organised their operations. Between the 1840s and 1870s, the process of peasant differentiation became more visible in the villages of British Kaffraria (Ciskei) and the Herschel district (Lewis, 1984; Bradford, 2000). Bradford adds that women formed part of the peasants. The average size of their arable land was five acres²², which they worked with their children to support their husbands with food production (Bradford, 2000:92-93).

Colonial contact also affected the organisation of African societies with regard to the division of labour which, as already stated, was based on gender and generation. For instance, in the Herschel district, “traditionally pastoralist men took over women’s agricultural work” as a result of colonial influence (Bradford, 2000:86). In what Bradford termed a “gender revolution”, she argues that, in their enthusiasm to promote agriculture, missionaries and colonial rulers influenced African men to forsake their historical pastoral role to become involved in commercial agriculture (ibid). Thus, the way in which labour was divided in African societies was disrupted. Furthermore, colonial land dispossession

²¹ Bundy also refers to the cash economy as the “market economy” (1979:10).

²² One acre is equivalent to 0.404 hectares.

and conquest, which reduced the land at the disposal of African people, affected the ability of married women to access productive land in areas such as Herschel. Consequently, in the 1860s, many women complained about a lack of access to productive land (Bradford, 2000:93). This forced some women to become wage workers: “domestic workers, washerwomen and water carriers” (Bradford, 2000:94).

Young people were not spared the effects of colonial contact; they carried the load of clearing new land for cultivation. In their enthusiasm to promote and increase agricultural production, missionaries demanded the clearing of more and more new land for cultivation (Bradford, 2000:106). This placed undue stress on young men to provide labour.

On the other hand, some household members had, from the 1860s, become wage workers. A number of factors accounted for this development. Firstly, the cattle-killing occurrence (*Nongqawuse*²³) of 1857-58 contributed to the emergence of wage workers (Lewis, 1984:9). The *Nongqawuse* prophecy resulted in widespread cattle-killing, which devastated households and caused famine and starvation. Lewis (1984:13) argues that, with limited options for livelihoods, some African people chose wage work to stave off starvation. Secondly and closely linked to the cattle-killing, was the introduction of hut and quit-rent tax by colonial magistrates. All adult African men and women “had to pay yearly taxes of ten shillings on each dwelling-hut” (Redding, 1996:250). This new requirement created a need for cash that forced a number of people to take up wage labour from the late 1860s (Lewis, 1984; Bradford, 2000). Thirdly, from this time, the whole of southern Africa was affected by a 13-year-long drought (Bradford, 2000:96). According to Bradford (2000:95), “multitudes of oxenless peasants grappled with drought” and poverty in the “female-dominated reserve” of Herschel. Eventually, many rural dwellers “had to seek work” because of the drought (Bradford, 2000:94). Lastly, in areas such as Phondoland, it was the need to purchase manufactured goods that influenced Africans to become migrant workers. By the late 1870s, chiefs and parents encouraged young men to go out to work so that they could purchase manufactured goods, as well as weapons.

Although young men were expected to work for wages, they had to avoid becoming fully “settled and permanent wage labourers” (Beinart, 1995:180). In other words, Beinart argues that there was an element of agency within the people of Phondoland, as they used migrant labour for their needs and interests. Nonetheless, all the above factors contributed to the emergence of a social group of migrant wage workers within African societies in the Eastern Cape.

²³ *Nongqawuse* was the name of the girl that delivered the fateful message on the 18th of February 1856 in Paramount Chief Sarhili’s country, which allegedly ordered amaXhosa to slaughter their cattle and also not to plant their fields with new crops. It is alleged that Nongqawuse promised that ancestors would rise from the dead and help amaXhosa against the hardships they faced at the hands of colonialists (<http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/nongqawuse's-unfulfilled-prophecy>. Accessed 15/01/2012).

By the 1860s, a middle class, consisting mainly of Africans that were associated with missionaries, was beginning to emerge in African societies. In the Herschel district, they were blacksmiths, teachers and business people involved in transportation as wagoners, i.e., wagon-owners who transported goods (Bradford, 2000:94). However, it would seem that the group constituting the middle class was still small in numbers.

By the 1880s, peasants had become a widespread phenomenon throughout the Ciskei and Transkei, as they were no longer confined to the mission stations; indeed, those outside mission stations were in the majority. Importantly, many of these peasants operated on communally-held land, but a number of them also produced on individually-held lands, which they obtained through “purchase or by quit-rent, or lease” (Bundy, 1979:90). Included in their numbers were the amaMfengu, who did not participate in the cattle-killing incident, and preferred instead to purchase the cattle of the starving amaXhosa at reduced prices. They also profited from selling their produce on the ready-made market that emerged when the colonial government was forced to feed the starving amaXhosa (Bundy, 1979:35).

The introduction of a cash economy in South Africa, in general, and in the Eastern Cape, in particular, should be viewed as an integral part of the spread of the capitalist system from the developed or metropolitan countries in Europe to the colonies. The capitalist system drew pre-colonial societies “into the ambit of colonial trade, as markets for metropolitan production” (Alavi, 1982:181). However, the Cape was never viewed as a potential market by the British but, initially, as a strategic necessity and later (after the discovery of diamonds and gold), as a source of raw materials. The discovery of diamonds and gold also created a new internal market to which the African peasantry responded with huge success. Thus, a section of African societies in the Cape was drawn into colonial trade, thereby fulfilling the needs of an expanding European capitalist system (Bundy, 1979:31).

The emergence of “progressive” farmers in African societies

Among the African producers there were also those who produced mainly for the market and were dependent on hired labour. The producers also introduced new crops, such as wheat and maize, and modern equipment like “ploughs, hoes, axes and harrows”, as well as farming methods such as irrigation and tilling (Bundy, 1979:49). This group diversified its agricultural activities, combining the production of wheat and vegetables with sheep-rearing. By the 1860s, such producers could be found in Kamastone and Oukraal. They had up to ten sheep per household (Lewis, 1984:14). According to Bradford (2000:93), in the Herschel district, one tenth of men had an average of four acres of arable land and an average of six cows. Thus, there existed a group of African producers that was better-off than other Africans.

The Gun War of 1881 added impetus to further social divisions in the African societies. Large portions of land within the Transkei were expropriated from defeated chiefs and their subjects and handed over to both white farmers and the missionaries. For instance, the Wesleyan mission station of Shawbury benefited from this process (Bundy, 1979:200). It was, however, not only white farmers and some mission stations that benefited from the war. Africans that were considered loyal to colonialists also gained. According to Bundy:

There were some who served in the Colonial forces, and won their share of military spoils, like those Mfengu who had become rich and independent from the spoils of Galeka war, or the Thembu who had gained considerably by the war, by the capture of large quantities of stock, and others who were rewarded after the war by grants of land formerly belonging to insurgents (ibid:86-87).

It is clear that there were material benefits for loyal Africans after the Gun War. But, there were other economic benefits for some African producers too. During the war, food became scarce and prices rose accordingly. A group of producers “took advantage of the inflated demand and the higher prices for grain and stock occasioned by troop movements” (Bundy, 1979:87). These were “individual peasants and peasant communities, which not only stayed afloat but actually prospered” during the 1880s (Bundy, 1979:86). As a consequence of the economic opportunities enumerated, some of the self-sufficient peasants consolidated their gains and developed into “progressive farmers” (Bundy, 1979:92)—a new social group. The group was small but politically powerful (ibid:92). Some of them held individual properties and made “considerable adaptations, departing entirely from the traditional agricultural economy and competing most effectively with white farmers” (ibid:13). According to Beinart (1995:180), they had “achieved considerable prominence as political actors”. The role played by one of these progressive farmers – Solomon Khalipha of Lumphashi – in land politics in South Africa in the early-20th century is illustrated in Chapter 5. Although Bundy viewed the group as “often conspicuously loyal to the colonial government” (1979:92), as will be seen below, relations between the progressive African farmers and the government changed after the discovery of gold in the late-1880s.

At the same time, some of the African progressive farmers, who were government employees, bought farms (ibid:87). Others had their origins in the mission stations and, for this reason; they were also referred to as Christian peasants (Beinart, 1995:180). No matter what their origins were, however, all these farmers had “adopted a way of life which in its material and ideological aspects closely resembled that of solvent and advancing farmers of other races in South Africa” (Bundy, 1979:92). These African farmers owned large quantities of livestock that included sheep, cattle and horses

(Bundy, 1979; Beinart, 1995). Although he does not call them farmers, Lewis (1984) also refers to the existence of some African people with large numbers of livestock (e.g., up to 850 sheep) in the villages of the Ciskei during the same period.

Inevitably, social relations between these farmers and their fellow Africans changed. They hired non-family labour—and they “endeavoured to get the cheapest labour” (ibid:93). According to Bundy (ibid:92), the responsibilities of this group of farmers

to the kinship group, and their observance of the distributive norms of Nguni society, tended to be replaced by more exploitative social relations and by individualistic and profit-maximising motives” (Bundy, 1979:92).

He goes on to show that the properties of the progressive farmers were starkly different to the properties of the other African people around them and explains these differences as follows:

Their farms – almost only on land they had purchased outright and held as individual proprietors – might be quite large, and were distinctive for the amount of re-investment of capital in the shape of fencing, walling, irrigation, improved stock breeds, and for the adoption of mixed farming (1979:93).

Two critically important issues need to be highlighted at this point. Firstly, the use of wage labour was a defining feature of the African farmers, distinguishing them from peasants who never used hired labour. This also meant that, in addition to the migrant workers, there was a group of wage labourers who worked for African farmers within the reserves. The second issue is that these farmers also leased some of their land “to tenants, labour-tenants and sharecroppers” (ibid:93). Thus, by the 1890s, there were labour tenants and sharecroppers who constituted new social groups in the reserves. This provides a perfect example of how the appropriation of land by one group influenced social relations in such a manner that new social groups emerged as a result. In this instance, sharecroppers and labour tenants emerged because the African farmers who had land were prepared to enter into an arrangement with landless people. Thus, these African farmers, having absorbed the lessons of the new order, were able to appropriate land and resources that enabled them to exploit the labour of others but they did not have sufficient resources to make full use of all the land that they had appropriated. So, they entered into sharecropping arrangements with others that assisted them to accumulate even more resources.

It is equally important to note that some of the progressive farmers sent their children to boarding schools. This led to the establishment of another social group – the middle-class – one that had its origins in the mission schools. The group started organising themselves into structures or organisations of their own (Roux, 1978; Maylam, 1986). This process began from the late 1870s. Although

Davenport creates an impression that self-organisation by Africans started with Elijah Makiwane when he established the “Native Education Association in 1880 (1991:97), Maylam shows that the Association was already founded in 1879 (1987:109). From 1882, this group started mounting an organised response to the colonial onslaught. For instance, when the Afrikaners established the Afrikanerbond in 1882, some African leaders established *Imbumba yama Nyama*²⁴ in Port Elizabeth. In 1883, the South African Native Political Association was launched (Maylam, 1986:108). This was followed by the establishment of the Thembu Church in 1884 (Davenport, 1991; Maylam, 1986) by Nehemiah Tile as part of the African “protest against colonial rule”. Among the growing number of educated African leaders was John Tengo Jabavu who “took over the editorship of *Isigidimi SamaXhosa*” in 1881 and then went on to replace it with *Imvo Zabantsundu* in 1884 (Davenport, 1991:97). These developments indicate that Africans were beginning to realise that they needed to rely on their own structures, rather than on the colonialists. The editorial in the first issue of Jabavu’s paper could not be more explicit. He stated:

The time was ripe for the establishment of a journal in English and Xhosa to give untrammelled expression to the feelings of the native population before the Government and the European public (cited from Roux, 1978:56).

The extract also shows which audience Jabavu thought the newspaper should address. The clear focus on the government and the European public meant the use of English as the dominant language in Jabavu’s communications, which marginalised a section of the African population. This was the central rationale for the emergence of another African-led newspaper a few years later. When Gordon Sprigg passed the Registration Act of 1887, which “excluded tribal forms of tenure from the property qualifications for the vote”, Jabavu convened “a conference of Native Vigilance Associations (*Iliso Lomzi*) in King William’s Town” (Roux, 1978:56).²⁵ In 1892, the same year in which the Franchise and Ballot Act was introduced, another group of Africans that called itself the “Native Congress” (*Ingqungqubela*) was formed under the leadership of Jonathan Tunyiswa of Mount Coke (Davenport, 1991:98). It would seem that the group emerged as a result not only of disagreements “with Jabavu about procedures within the *Imbumba* movement”, but also because of deep social differences between the amaXhosa and amaMfengu (Davenport, 1991:98). Jabavu, who was from the group of amaMfengu,

²⁴ *Imbumba yama Nyama* meant black unity.

²⁵ In the 1880s, the Cape Colony had three major political groupings. Gordon Sprigg led a party of mainly English-speaking whites. According to Roux (1978:55), the party’s support base consisted of white farmers and “inhabitants of the eastern seaports of East London and Port Elizabeth”. The party was both “anti-Native and anti-Dutch” (Roux, 1978:55). There was also the Afrikanerbond, which was the largest in the Cape and was led by Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. Its support base was the Afrikaners (people of Dutch origin) and it was generally hostile to African people. The last political grouping was the smaller group of ‘independents’ who

was accused of being elitist by the Tunyiswa group, which was Xhosa-dominated. Once again, the social divisions of *amagqobhoka* and *amaqaba* seem to have been at the heart of the differences. In 1897, the Tunyiswa group went on to establish its own newspaper called *Izwi Labantu* as a rival to *Imvo Zabantsundu* (ibid:98).

In summary, contact between African societies and colonialist resulted in the political, social and economic destruction of independent African chiefs. By the mid-1890s, the colonial authorities had successfully undermined all the chiefs and replaced them with white magistrates. Land dispossession was important in this process. Social relations changed as the chiefs eventually became government employees that accounted to white magistrates. The influence of missionaries also impacted enormously on the social, political and economic organisation of households. Divisions between the colonial-supported *amagqobhoka* and the despised *amaqaba* emerged. And, as the colonial cash economy gained ground in African societies, it undermined the redistributive role of the pre-colonial African economic system that was based on bartering. The integration of African societies into the cash economy introduced irreversible changes; poor and destitute African households were no longer able to obtain assistance as individualistic practices took root, and new categories of rural dwellers came into being. By the 1840s, small, middle and self-sufficient peasants began to emerge in these African societies. Poorer households emerged as small or poor peasants, who had to resort to wage labour on white-owned farms and in the mining industry in order to survive. Their conversion into wage workers was also expedited by colonial coercive policies, such as taxation. On the other hand, the better-off peasants exploited the changed economic situation, with some developing into progressive African farmers who also sent their children to mission schools. The progressive African farmers introduced new crops, animals, land use methods and implements. They also used labour tenants and sharecroppers on their farms. Thus, by the 1880s, social relations had drastically changed in African societies.

The mineral revolution and increased demand for African labour - 1880s to 1913

The discovery of gold in the 1880s marked a turning point in political and socio-economic developments in colonial South Africa. It “stimulated in South Africa a rapid process of capitalist development that would soon undermine the position of the small-scale independent African producers” (Maylam, 1986:71). Hitherto, colonialists were still interested in the development of African farmers. After the discovery of gold, however, there was a major break in the cosy relations that colonialists and missionaries had with the African producers or peasants, as the interests of African

advocated liberal views. Its leaders were Rose-Innes, Sauer and Merriman. The liberals drew support from

farmers was overtaken by the demand for labour in the mining sector (Bundy, 1979; Lacey, 1981; Davenport, 1991). In pursuance of the new interest in an African labour supply, the colonial government introduced the Glen Grey Act in 1894, which had three interrelated purposes. Firstly, it intended to introduce individual land tenure in African communities. Secondly, the Act aimed to implement a district council system in the Transkei (Hammond-Tooke, 1964:516). Lastly, colonialists used it to introduce a labour tax (Maylam, 1986:103). The Act was applied to parts of Ciskei and in seven magisterial districts of the Transkei between 1895 and 1904: the seven districts were Butterworth, Tsomo, Ngqamakhwe, Idutywa, Xhalanga, Ngcobo and Mthatha. For purposes of this study, the focus will be on the first and the last aims of the Act.

The Act's intention was, amongst others, to convert Africans into wage workers by restricting them to limited arable land in the reserves (Lacey, 1981; Maylam, 1986).²⁶ It "provided for the division of unalienated land in the district into allotments of about four morgen each" which were held under individual tenure (Maylam, 1986:103). Consequently, the Act assisted in increasing the flow of Africans into the wage labour market to serve the interests of the mines and white-owned farms. The Glen Grey Act also empowered magistrates to impose a labour tax on African men who could not prove that they had worked outside of their districts for at least three months of the year (Maylam, 1986:103), thus forcing more African men to become migrant workers.

The first obvious effect of the Glen Grey Act, initially, and the Natives Land Act, a decade later, was a decline in the productive capacity of African societies. This was preceded by an acceleration of the rate of Africans who lost their land between the 1890s and 1913 (Bundy, 1979:110). And, by 1914, "a growing number of individual peasants had become proletarianized". As Bundy puts it, the "economic changes engendered by the discovery and exploitation of gold may be said to have continued, intensified and multiplied the process initiated by the diamond boom" (1979:111). Furthermore, these changes in the interests of the colonial rulers prompted them to look to reserves like the Transkei as a "labour reservoir" (Maylam, 1986:102)—a place where wage labourers could be collected and kept until needed by the mines. For this to work, the Transkei's economic development had to be arrested in order to ensure that its residents became desperate enough to work on the mines and white commercial farms. As shown in the previous chapter, Wolpe correctly drew a link between the development of a capitalist economy in South Africa, on the one hand, and the historical establishment, as well as decline, of the reserves (later called Bantustans/homelands), on the other (1972). The decline to which Wolpe referred was the deterioration of economic and land conditions, as well as the conversion of the majority of rural residents into migrant wage workers. Maylam points out that 61 033 Africans from

English-speaking whites, as well as Africans who qualified to vote (ibid).

²⁶ One morgen is equivalent to 0.8567 hectares.

Transkei had, between 1893 and 1898, become migrant workers. Because of the decline in the reserves, “numbers of Cape and Transkei peasants lost the measure of independence they had enjoyed at the beginning” and became wage workers (Bundy, 1979:110; see also Maylam, 1986:106). Although the process of decline started at the beginning of the 20th century (Bundy, 1979), it became more widespread in the late 1920s (Wolpe, 1972; Maylam, 1986).

A combination of factors accounted for the changes in the reserves. Firstly, there was natural population growth in the reserves. There was also a constant flow of people from the farms to the reserves, which increased the population. As Maylam points out:

[F]rom the 1890s, the Cape began to legislate against African squatter peasants ... restricting African tenancy arrangements on white-owned land. Not only was land becoming scarcer, its productive capacity was also declining as the southern Nguni population increased, bringing about overcultivation and overgrazing (1986:107-8).

Both natural population growth and the arrival of former farm workers led to reduction of both arable and grazing lands as land for residential sites was demarcated from grazing land. Secondly, a devastating drought that affected the whole of southern Africa from the mid-1880s placed further stress on the African population in the reserves (Maylam, 1986; Bradford, 2000). Lastly, state taxation in the form of a hut tax, labour tax, as well as quit-rent, increased the burden on rural residents and forced a number of young African men to take up wage labour.²⁷ Thus, there was an increase in the rate of conversion of rural people into migrant wage workers during this period.

It is important to note that the provisions of the Glen Grey Act did not affect all rural dwellers negatively. Some were able to develop despite the changed conditions. For example, the self-sufficient peasants or *amagqobhoka* continued to engage in economic activities such as the transportation of goods, and the sale of skins, wool, etc. They made full use of the economic opportunities provided by the concentrations of people around the mines and in the urban centres that led to an increase in the demand for certain products (Bundy, 1979). Moreover, the large numbers of mineworkers and people in urban areas who needed food pushed up the price of “meat, draught animals, grain, fruit and vegetables” (Maylam, 1986:104). This also encouraged some peasants to resort to transport riding as a means of making a living. As transport riders, they bought wagons, trained oxen to pull the wagons, and made other preparations to ensure that they were ready to join the teams of riders that the peasants organised to deliver products to the market. In response to the new economic opportunities, some peasants also introduced sheep farming into their operations to supply the wool market, while others introduced new crops, such as wheat, peas, beans, cabbages and fruit trees, to place them in a position

²⁷ G.9-'94. Blue Book on Native Affairs. 1894. See pp. 51. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

to make the most of the new circumstances (Bundy, 1979:76-77). Innovations like these assisted these entrepreneurs and progressive African farmers not only to survive but, in many cases, to thrive, despite the Glen Grey Act and other legislative measures such as the prohibition of both squatting and labour tenancy in the Cape.

However, the changes that the Glen Grey Act introduced into African societies did not fully resolve the question of a cheap labour supply to the mines and white commercial farms. Therefore, extra measures were needed to force Africans to go to the mines. In addition to concerns about the labour shortage, there were also concerns about the way in which successful African producers were competing with white commercial farmers. It is worth noting that in the late 1890s there was a period of “great economic depression” globally, which affected “the economies of the advanced capitalist countries in Europe and North America” and other countries participating in the capitalist economic system (Bundy, 1979:112). In South Africa, struggling white farmers and mine-owners pleaded with the colonial state “to apply extra-economic means to the African peasantry; to break down the peasant’s independence ... and to induce him to part more abundantly with his labour, but at no increased price” (ibid:115).

However, by the beginning of the 20th century, as the economic depression and drought worsened the economic conditions of the peasants, many became indebted. They had “mortgaged their land to whites” and most of them had also lost their livestock (Bundy, 1979:115). Thus, this group became part of the growing pool of wage workers. In addition to them, there were also young and unmarried men who, traditionally, could not be allocated land, as well as those who lived in areas where there was no longer any land left to allocate. Such people contributed to the pool of wage workers, so desperately needed by the emerging capitalist economy (Bundy, 1979:117). By 1907, about 66 per cent of people in Emigrant Thembuland had become labourers (ibid:124). This meant that the majority of the rural residents in Emigrant Thembuland, which, incidentally, also covers the area of the case study, had become migrant workers. By 1910, more and more Africans had become indebted and, thus, forced into wage work. A huge contributory factor to this state of affairs was the effects of the drought which caused massive crop failures in the Transkei. According to Bundy (1979:124), 80 000 Africans left the land to become wage workers. This is the group that he argues “became separated from the means of production” (ibid:110). However, as will be shown in the case study, some of these migrant workers still had access to land in their villages in which they invested both their time and money.

Despite the proletarianisation of Africans, the issue of sustaining a cheap labour supply still lingered, and white commercial farmers and industrialists continued to complain about labour shortages. The colonial government identified sharecropping and labour tenancy on white-owned farms as one of the

factors that undermined its efforts to force Africans to become migrant wage workers (Bundy, 1979:112). This issue was resolved when, three years after the formation of Union, the new Union Government of South Africa introduced the Natives Land Act No. 27 of 1913, which

imposed a policy of territorial segregation with a very heavy hand. It aimed specifically to get rid of those features of African land ownership and share-cropping which white farmers found undesirable, and enlarge reserves to ease congestion and facilitate the recruiting of labour for the mines (Davenport, 1991:234).

As expected, the Act prohibited sharecropping, squatting and labour tenancy on white-owned farms, and, in so doing, removed the last resort that Africans outside of the reserves had to gain access to arable land. This completed efforts by the colonial government to undermine the economic independence of the African producers as part of a colonial onslaught to destroy the power of chiefs and to force landless Africans to provide labour to the capitalist economy. The colonial system of taxation that was administered by magistrates had already eroded the economic base of the chiefs and forced thousands of African men to resort to wage work. The Natives Land Act therefore not only signalled the final demise of the African independent producer, but left the majority of rural Africans more attached to wage income as wage labourers.

Conclusion

Colonialism caused irreversible changes in the organisation of African communities. The once independent chiefs who were willing to collaborate were changed into colonial employees and non-collaborative ones removed and replaced with headmen. The non-cash and redistributive socio-economic system in African communities was undermined and replaced by a cash-based and individualistic economy. Practices that were based on the sharing of wealth, such as *ukunqoma*, were destroyed. As a result, poor rural residents became marginalised, and most of them constituted the ever-growing group of migrant wage workers in the mines and on white commercial farms. However, the migrant workers were not completely separated from the land, as Bundy has argued. By the beginning of the 20th century, some of the migrant workers still had access to land, albeit limited and of poor quality in most cases.

The introduction of the cash economy also accelerated the social differentiation, as well as the emergence of other social groups, in the reserves. Missionaries, in collaboration with colonial magistrates, promoted the division of Africans along the lines of *amagqobhoka* and *amaqaba*. Most of the *amagqobhoka* developed into better-off peasants and progressive African farmers, while the *amaqaba* mainly became poor peasants and, eventually, migrant workers. In the process of social

differentiation, access or lack of access to land was central to the determination of the different social groups. Thus, land was important in the definition of social relations in these African societies, as those with access to more and better land developed and became successful. Africans with more access to land also had more power than those with less.

The discovery of gold and the intensification of white commercial agriculture in the 1880s hastened the incorporation of Africans into the capitalist system and accelerated the disintegration of African economic systems. However, while this does substantiate Bundy's argument that the peasants and progressive farmers had declined by the first decade of the 20th century, some of the peasants, particularly the progressive farmers, were still going strong then. Moreover, they continued to survive up to the 1950s, as the next chapter will show.

Furthermore, quit-rent title holders both on farms and within the communal area continued utilising the land to which they had access. As will be shown in the next chapter, contrary to the established view that production had collapsed in the 1930s, the quit-rent title holders continued to use land for production well beyond the early-20th century. Despite the colonial impact which reduced the land to which Africans had access – thereby undermining African social, political and economic systems and converting the majority of rural Africans into migrant wage workers – land continued to play an important role in the definition of social relations in African societies.

CHAPTER 3

Increased Demand for Cheap African Labour and the Persistence of Land in Determining Social Relations in Rural Areas

Introduction

1913 to 1960 was the period during which the Union government of South Africa passed a number of laws that were aimed at accelerating the conversion of Africans in the reserves into migrant workers. Relevant here are the Natives Land Act No. 27 of 1913, the Native Trust and Land Act No. 18 of 1936, the Betterment Proclamation of 1939 and the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the last of which gave traditional authorities powers to administer land in rural areas. State intervention through these laws both consolidated existing social groups and contributed to the formation of new ones. However, Africans did not passively accept their situation, they adapted and adjusted their land-use practices and continued with their land-based livelihoods, despite state interventions.

Grappling with this unfolding history, scholars (Wolpe, 1995; Bundy, 1979) have argued that, by the 1930s, the peasantry had collapsed, as the majority of rural people had converted into migrant workers. At the same time, these scholars have also argued that the reserves had become labour reservoirs or “rural slums” (Bundy, 1979:221). These characterisations imply that rural people were, by the 1930s, no longer involved in land-based livelihoods, but were merely waiting to be absorbed into the wage labour market. Furthermore, this means that land was no longer important in defining social relations in rural areas.

Contrary to this view of South African rural areas, the argument presented below is that a section of migrant workers continued with land-based livelihoods, and, by extension, land continued to define social relations in rural areas. The scholars mistakenly treat rural residents as a homogenous group, hence the claim that rural areas had turned into slums and the view that rural people had become merely a reserve army of labour. On the contrary, rural people were differentiated along the lines of class, gender and social status, and rural areas were home to a variety of social groups. As will be seen, there is evidence that rural residents continued to produce on the land until the 1960s, when land shortage due to overcrowding made crop production impossible, but a shift in land use occurred. Shortage of family labour, as, by then, children were in school, also contributed to the shift in land use. Land-based livelihoods did not come to a halt, instead, livestock production became the focus of most of those who were involved in land-based livelihoods in rural areas. The Mpondo revolts, which had

been quashed by 1960, were mainly a reaction to stock culling. They also confirmed the importance of cattle as part of the land-based livelihoods of rural people. Thus, the scholars have failed to grasp the importance of the shift in land use practices towards cattle production, which happened from the late 1950s.

Overcrowding in the reserves and the reduction in access to land were marked by three waves of movements. The first started with the implementation of the Natives Land Act of 1913 and ended in the late 1920s. The second occurred from the 1930s to the 1940s, and the third, during the 1950s. More about these waves below.

The period from 1913 to 1930, the end of which marked the fall of the peasantry for the scholars (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979), represents a period of immense difficulties for African people in the Cape, who faced the effects of the Natives Land Act of 1913, as well as the economic difficulties and the deterioration of land conditions in the reserves from the late 1920s. The period from the 1930s to 1960 was characterised by further deterioration in land and economic conditions, a noticeable decline in crop production and increasing dominance of livestock production in rural areas.

The demand for African labour in the mines and white commercial farms: 1913 - 1930

The development of the mining industry, as well as white commercial agriculture, in South Africa led to increasing demands on the Union government to ensure the availability of cheap African labour (Wolpe, 1995; Lacey, 1981). Despite efforts to force Africans into wage labour through the introduction of the Glen Grey Act in 1894, the availability of wage workers was, by the beginning of the 20th century, still unable to meet the labour demands of gold mining and maize production (Wolpe, 1995:62). Additional coercive measures in the form of the Natives Land Act No. 27 of 1913 were introduced, extending the provisions of the Glen Grey Act, which applied only to rural areas, in most of the country.

The 1913 Natives Land Act and its effects on African people

The 1913 Natives Land Act formalised a policy of separation or segregation (Lacey, 1981; Feinberg, 1993). Like the Glen Grey Act, the Natives Land Act aimed to address the labour needs of industry and white farmers (Lacey, 1981:17-8) in that it was used to curtail the development of the “peasant sector” and also “ensured a vast reservoir of migrant labour” in the reserves (Bundy, 1979:242-3). The Union government set aside twenty-two million hectares of land (seven per cent) for use by Africans in the reserves (Feinberg, 1993:68), i.e. the Africans’ access to land was limited to seven per cent of the total

land area of South Africa. Plaatje's famous quotation, "Awakening on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not only a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth" (2007:21), perfectly captures the mood and the pain that Africans felt upon learning that they had become non-citizens in their country in 1913. The quotation also grippingly summarises what Plaatje saw and heard during his tour of the Free State and the Eastern Cape in 1913 to assess the impact of the Act. Indeed, the Act had serious implications for Africans. It prohibited them from purchasing, hiring or occupying land outside of the reserves. In short, the Act was an anti-sharecropping, anti-squatting and anti-labour tenancy law passed against Africans on white-owned farms.²⁸

The introduction of the Natives Land Act drew reaction from African people in general, but particularly, from the fast-growing middle-class, which actively opposed it. Under the auspices of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), deputations and petitions were sent to the government, raising objections to the Bill (Plaatje, 2007:150). Solomon Plaatje, himself, was a member of one such deputation in May 1913, which met Hertzog, who explained his intentions to introduce separate areas where African people could own land (Feinberg, 1993:90). Despite the deputations' efforts to engage the government, their initiatives were of no major consequence to the Union government's policy direction, as the government pressed ahead with the promulgation of the Act.

On 27 August 1913, the Union government set up a Natives Land Commission to determine the areas to be set aside both for African occupation and for European occupation.²⁹ The Commission's report acknowledged that the "Native reserves in the Transkeian Territories are very fully occupied, and there is no land available for Natives from other parts of the Union".³⁰ This meant that people coming from outside of the Transkei would not be able to acquire land, especially arable land, there. Yet, despite this, the government went ahead and applied the Act with negative effects on the reserves in the Eastern Cape.

The Commission also made two other recommendations which are of relevance here. Firstly, it recommended that Africans occupying land outside the area scheduled for occupation by Africans in the Eastern Cape be protected and allowed to remain on the land, unless ordered to vacate by Parliament. Furthermore, Africans occupying mission lands within the area scheduled for whites in the Eastern Cape would be allowed to continue occupying it, as long as the mission stations did not alienate the land to the occupiers. In other words, Africans in the Eastern Cape would not be removed

²⁸ Statutes of the Union of South Africa. 1913. See pp. 438. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

²⁹ See pp. 438 in the Statutes of the Union of South Africa. 1913.

³⁰ Natives Land Commission. U.G. 19/1916. See pp. 3 of Appendix VIII of the Natives Land Commission. Vol. 1. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

from areas they occupied before the commencement of the Act. Secondly, the Commission recommended that Africans who owned land outside of the reserves should be allowed to keep it until they decided to sell. Similarly, the Commission recommended that whites owning land within the reserves should be protected. Thus it seemed that the prohibitions of the Act would not apply to Africans in the Eastern Cape.

These recommendations are important for this study because they confirm what we “are repeatedly told”, as Plaatje would say (2007:157), that provisions of the Act did not apply in the Cape. Indeed, some scholars (Bundy, 1979; Maylam, 1986) point out that the provisions of the Act did not apply in the Cape. These scholars argue that the Cape’s non-racial franchise policy, which allowed Africans the right to vote based on land ownership, meant that the provisions could not be applied. According to them, implementation of the provisions would be in conflict with that policy. Bundy further argues that anti-squatter laws introduced in the Cape Province prior to 1913 had already dealt with the problem of squatter-peasants by this date. To illustrate his point he shows that the Location Act No. 32 of 1909 reduced peasant squatters on white-owned farms from 40 000 to 7 000 by 1931 (Bundy, 1979:137). But, on the whole, the scholars argue that the provisions of the Act did not apply in the Cape Province.

Yet, there is evidence of instances when the provisions of the Natives Land Act *were* applied in the Cape. This could be a question of the disjuncture between what a policy states and what happens in practice. For example, an African in the King Williamstown District who used the land of a white farmer “was warned by the authorities not to resume his ploughing in 1913” (Plaatje, 2007:151). In another district in the north-eastern part of the Cape Province “a fairly prosperous” African that was a tenant to a white farmer was given “a notice to leave his hired farm, on which he had been a tenant since his youth” (Plaatje, 2007:155). The two examples show that the provisions of the Act were applied in the Eastern Cape, despite the existence of the non-racial policy.

In addition, archival material corroborates Plaatje’s observations. The Natives Land Commission recommended the relocation of African farmers who owned farms between Stutterheim and Cathcart to the reserves.³¹ These were Africans who were considered to be in the wrong place, as the argument of the Commissioners shows:

Coming to the question of a justification to dispossess the Native now in occupation, it will be noticed that the farm properties in this district are almost exclusively in the hands of the European. The area is, therefore, essentially a white man’s heritage, and onus is upon the Native to prove why he should be allowed to remain, it being

³¹ U.G. 19/1916. See pp. 10 of Appendix VIII of the Report of the Natives Land Commission. 1916. Volume 1. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

*understood that it is not the intention to solve this difficulty by adopting a patch-work solution which will leave to posterity the evils which have given rise to the present movement. I know of no justification to support the Native view. The force of circumstances opened the door to his entry, and as the circumstances which militated in his favour no longer exist it would seem that he should go.*³²

Although I have not come across evidence indicating that the Africans were moved, in his Native Affairs Commission Report of 1921, J.C. Smuts (Chairman of the Commission) concedes that “there is no doubt that some hardship ensued. Landlords in some cases using the Act terminated contracts to rid themselves of tenants no longer desired by them”.³³ In his concession, Smuts points to possibilities where Africans might have been chased off the farms, as had happened in the cases cited earlier. Thus, there *were* Africans who had lived in the Cape that were moved to the reserves as a result of the Act. This disproves the view that some provisions of the Act did not apply in this area and, therefore, had no effect on the reserves. The evidence provided above clearly illustrates this.

The effects of the Natives Land Act on social relations in the reserves

As we have seen, the Natives Land Act definitely had a negative impact on Africans in the Eastern Cape. The relocation of Africans to the reserves marked the start of the first wave of movement of African people from white-owned farms to the reserves. As can be expected, the result was overcrowding in the reserves from the 1920s.

Overcrowding should not be attributed only to the effects of the Act, though. Natural population growth and the arrival of ex-farm workers from white-owned commercial farms in the Eastern Cape also contributed to the situation. Adult children of existing residents in the Transkei and Ciskei had to be allocated land within these two territories, adding enormous pressure on an already limited resource. The ex-farm workers were driven off the white commercial farms as a result of the mechanisation in agriculture. Just as pressure on the land began to reach crisis point, white commercial agriculture started introducing new implements, which reduced their demand for labour across the different racial groups between 1918 and 1930. As a result, the number of African male farm workers dropped from 70 000 in 1918 to 67 000 in 1930 in the Cape Province. The steepest decline was in the number of

³² Ibid.

³³ G. 68ED (NATI) COMM. See Annexure “A” to the Report of the Native Affairs Commissions for the year 1921. pp. 15-16. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

female farm labourers, a reduction from 31 000 in 1918 to 22 000 in 1930.³⁴ All of these factors swelled the first wave of movement to the reserves.

The most potent effects of the flow of people to the reserves were on social relations. For example, by 1920, the Transkei had 11 000 married men who, although they paid hut tax, had no access to arable land.³⁵ This meant an increase in the group of landless people in the Transkei. The case study of Lumphaphasi will show that many of the group of people that arrived from the farms, who were known as the *amalose* (landless ones), became the labour tenants of the African farmers and small producers or smallholders in the reserves. In the previous chapter, it was shown that the African farmers had people who were sharecroppers and squatters on their properties (Bundy, 1979). Thus, by the 1920s, there were sharecroppers and squatters, as well as labour tenants in the reserves. The emergence of the latter group meant the development of employer-employee relations there.

The introduction of hired labour into the operations of the peasants signified a change in the character of this social group. The peasants had outgrown their status as peasants who relied on family labour and become small producers or smallholders that used hired labour of labour tenants. The other change in social relations was with regard to how the rural dwellers related to the capitalist economy. The only relations the peasants had previously had with the capitalist economy had been through the supply of their products. Through the process of proletarianisation the majority of rural dwellers had become employees. However, migrant workers still had access to land in the reserves, but because the major part of their income was from wages, they could no longer be considered peasants. Therefore, the proletarianisation thesis has a point that, from the 1930s, there was no longer a peasantry. But, the peasantry had not collapsed, as the scholars have argued (Wolpe, 1995; Bundy, 1979), it had transformed into a proletariat, but one which had access to land.

Developments in the reserves from the late 1920s became the focus of debate and theorisation by scholars in the 1970s. Wolpe has argued that, by the mid-1920s, “surpluses were either extremely small or non-existent and continued to decline” in the reserves (1995:73). There was also the development of “classes” or “strata within classes”, as land became concentrated in the hands of a few and the group of landless rural people started growing (ibid.:75). For his part, Bundy (1979) points out that, by 1913,

African peasant areas showed serious signs of agrarian degeneration, and ... their transformation into teeming rural slums – or the process of their underdevelopment – was well

³⁴ Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing. 1960/61. Handbook of Agricultural Statistics. 1905 – 1950. See pp. 11, 16. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

³⁵ U.G. 22/1932. Union of South African Native Economic Commission. 1930-1932. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

under way. Areas that had been able to provide for themselves, and in favourable seasons to export foodstuffs, were being reduced to a state of precarious self-reliance or already to a dependence upon imported food and the remittance of wages by migrant labourers (1979:221).

Thus, for Bundy, the deterioration of agricultural production in the reserves was clear. Like Wolpe, he argues as though the collapse of production in the reserves was general and affected everyone, equally.

Yet, emerging empirical evidence challenges the arguments presented by these scholars. It shows that, by 1923, Africans in the Transkei owned about one million cattle, two million wool sheep, 27 000 non-wool sheep, one million goats and 152 000 pigs.³⁶ These figures may be considered small for the whole of the Transkei, but, they show that, despite the conversion of a large section of African people into migrant workers and the deterioration of land conditions in the reserves, there were livestock owners in the Transkei. Moreover, many of those who became migrant workers did not consider this to be a permanent situation. This view is supported by Beinart (1995:180), who has argued that migrant workers were mainly young men who went to work to satisfy the “needs created through trade, appropriation of land and taxation”. These young men were encouraged by their parents and the chiefs to seek wage work, but they were never fully “settled and permanent wage labourers” (ibid.). Hendricks (1990) has pointed out that these young men did not have the choice of settling in urban areas because the government’s vision was to make Africans temporal residents in urban areas. Nonetheless, Redding (1993:524) shows that, between 1922 and 1930, Mthatha experienced an increase in cattle numbers. Ainslie (2002:40-41), for his part, shows that cattle figures in the Transkei, as a whole, remained constant from the beginning of the 20th century until the 1990s. Thus, migrant workers did not abandon their land-based lifestyles and land continued to influence the definition of social relations in the reserves, despite the proletarianisation process.

In summary, the reserves had, by the 1930s, various social groups— a group of African farmers on individually-owned farms, which also included some chiefs and headmen; a growing middle-class, whose members were mostly children of the farmers, the chiefs and headmen; a group of peasants with access to arable land within the communal areas; and a growing group of migrant workers, particularly from the group of landless people. There was also a group of labour tenants and sharecroppers in the reserves. The section has also shown that, while there was a growing population in the reserves, land still mattered in the lives of rural people. This is illustrated by the number of cattle the rural residents kept, showing that there was still production taking place in the reserves.

³⁶ U.G. 22/1932. Union of South Africa Native Economic Commission. 1930-1932. See pages 270-72. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

Deterioration of land and economic conditions in the reserves (1930s to 1960s)

1930 to 1960 was a period of momentous developments in South Africa, generally, and in the Eastern Cape, specifically. At a general level, the global economic depression of the late 1920s negatively affected various sectors of the South African economy into the 1930s. The white commercial agricultural sector experienced a drop in profit margins as the export levels of production (e.g., wheat, maize, goats and cattle) declined.³⁷ At the same time, the agricultural sector in parts of South Africa faced two natural disasters that impacted on their operations; a serious drought and a locust infestation destroyed vegetation and ruined production in areas such as Sterkstroom, Molteno and Woodhouse.³⁸ In response to these factors, white farmers reduced their labour force, and some of the retrenched farm workers moved to the reserves (Magubane, 2004). This movement of farm workers to the rural areas marked the second wave in a series of waves of movements.

Importantly, the developments had impact on social groups and also influenced social relations in the African societies. The group of landless people increased and had to enter into employee-employer relations with the African farmers – whose numbers were decreasing – and with the peasants. The groups of both migrant workers and the middle-class grew in size. However, sections from both the middle-class and migrant workers had an attachment to the land.

The period of economic depression, which influenced the developments highlighted above, lasted from 1929 to 1933 (Magubane, 2004:31). Tabata (1974) correctly points out that the roots of the economic depression can be traced to the First World War, in that countries involved in the war incurred huge expenses and accumulated debts as a result. South Africa, “as an integral part of the capitalist world had been hit by the depression” as well (Tabata, 1974:15). The situation triggered a chain of responses from both the government and the organisations of African people.

Reaction of the government to the deteriorating conditions in the reserves

African people in the reserves were not left unscathed by the global economic crisis. As conditions in the reserves deteriorated, the South African government reacted by establishing the Union of South Africa Native Economic Commission (SANEC) on 9 June 1930³⁹ to investigate the socio-economic conditions of Africans both in the reserves and in the urban areas of South Africa. In its report it highlighted issues such as the serious lack of economic development, land degradation and an

³⁷ G68 ED(AGRI) S. Department of Agriculture and Forestry. Annual Report of the Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry for 1935. See pp. 493-5. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

³⁸ Ibid. See pp. 495, 502, 503, 505.

increasing number of people leaving the reserves to seek work in urban areas.⁴⁰ The depressed economic situation resulted in a prevalence of poverty and the dependence of a large section of rural people on remittances from migrant wages in the 1930s (Bundy, 1979:224).

Debates in the House of Assembly in 1932 clearly reveal the seriousness of the situation in the reserves. In one of those debates Mr Payn, the representative of Thembuland in the Assembly, reported that some Africans in the Transkei were losing their cattle due to debts (Hansard, 1932:779-81).⁴¹ This meant that a portion (though not all) of the rural population was struggling financially.

The debates in the Assembly culminated in the formulation of the Native Trust and Land Bill in 1935, which eventually became the Native Trust and Land Act No. 18 of 1936. The Act aimed

*[t]o provide for the establishment of a South African Native Trust and to define its purposes; to make further provision as to the acquisition and occupation of land by natives and other persons; to amend Act No. 27 of 1913; and to provide for other incidental matters.*⁴²

Although the Act aimed to release an additional six per cent of land to Africans to reduce congestion in the reserves, Tabata strongly argues that the Act “was calculated not to relieve the dire landlessness of Africans but to intensify it” (1979:16). Instead of relieving the pressure, the government aimed to force Africans “off the land to work on European farms and in the mines”, he argues (ibid.:16). According to Tabata (1979:16), the six per cent of land released through the Act was used only as the “bait of promised land”. The basis of Tabata’s argument is that the Act still deprived Africans of the right to buy land outside of the already-overcrowded reserves. Mqotsi agrees with Tabata that the Act “intended to modify the provisions of the 1913 Land Act and purported to find a final solution to the land problem” (2008:12). The fact that the Act made provision for evicting Africans from white-owned farms lends credence to the views of these two critics. Chapter IV (37) of the Act provided for the eviction of Africans that were deemed surplus on white-owned farms. Thus, Tabata and Mqotsi have a point when they argue that the Act was merely a pretext for denying Africans access to land.

In addition to the introduction of the Natives Trust and Land Act, the Union government also introduced the Betterment Proclamation 31 of 1939 to implement betterment planning in the reserves

³⁹ U.G. 22/1932. Union of South African Native Economic Commission. UCT Library. Government Publications.

⁴⁰ Ibid. See pp. 13.

⁴¹ Hansard. 1932. Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates. Vol.18. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁴² Statutes of the Union of South Africa. 1936. See pp. 90. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

(Beinart, 1984; Chaskalson, 1987).⁴³ Among the intentions of the betterment planning programme was “livestock limitation and soil conservation” (Chaskalson, 1987:1). The betterment proposals

involved the redivision of land into grazing, cultivating and residential areas. Homesteads were to be grouped together into villages, and people who depended on wages for subsistence were to live in rural townships. Land was to be set aside for forestry schemes and access to wood for fuel was to be controlled (Chaskalson, 1987:1).

Thus, betterment was aimed at re-organising land in communal areas so that residential sites were separated from grazing areas. Chaskalson goes on to argue that the

aim of the ‘rehabilitation’ was to concentrate whatever resources remained in the reserves in the hands of a small number of prosperous farmers at the expense of the bulk of the reserve population who were to be consigned to rural dormitory villages (ibid.).

As noted previously, there were still African farmers with farms on individually-owned land in the reserves. It was this group of farmers that Chaskalson argued would benefit from the implementation of “rehabilitation”.

Addressing the United Transkei Territorial General Council (UTTGC) on 22 April 1941, the Director for Agriculture argued that overgrazing in the Transkei was caused by overstocking, thereby implying that Africans kept more livestock than was necessary. The director further pleaded with the headmen to persuade their people to reduce livestock.⁴⁴ In 1941, the UTTGC set up the Young Committee, to investigate overstocking in the Transkei. In its report, produced on 26 August 1941, the committee unsurprisingly recommended the reduction of stock in the Transkei.⁴⁵ It is significant that the committee and its report confirm the point made earlier about the existence of large numbers of livestock in the Transkei. However, nothing happened with regard to the implementation of betterment planning until after World War II in 1945 (Beinart, 1984:73).

The effects of the deteriorated land and economic situation on the lives of rural people

By the mid-1930s, a growing number of rural people had become landless as access to arable land was reduced and food production compromised as a result of overcrowding and the deterioration of land

⁴³ Another author who has written about Betterment is IB Tabata. See his discussion of the scheme in Tabata, I.B. 1945. *The Rehabilitation Scheme: A new fraud*. Cape Town. All-Africa Convention.

⁴⁴ United Transkeian Territories General Council. *Proceedings and Reports of Select Committees at the Session of 1941. Annual Reports and Accounts for 1941 and Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for 1941-1942*. See Minute No. 38: Overstocking in the Transkeian Territories. pp. 98. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Report of Committee appointed to inquire into Overstocking in the Transkeian Territories. See pp. xxxix.

conditions. In the Ciskei, almost one third of families were landless, i.e., they had no arable land (Bundy, 1979:224). Two categories of landless people had emerged: one that consisted of people who had access to residential land only, and the other, the group of *amalose*, who did not own residential land and thus, were wholly dependent on the land of the farm owners and smallholders.

Although a group of landless people or *amalose* existed already in the late 19th century, the size of this group had increased dramatically by the 1940s. The *amalose* consisted mostly of people who came from white-owned farms. A fall in profits in white commercial farming due to the loss of export markets during the World War II accounted for the retrenchment of farm workers, some of whom moved over to rural areas.⁴⁶ The movement of these farm workers to rural areas constituted the second wave. Some of the landless people were variously called the *izicaka* (servants), *amarhanuga*⁴⁷ (homeless wanderers) or *abalambi*, which refers to starving people (Mager, 1993:766-67). Mafeje refers to *amarhanuga* as people “who go around collecting value specifically from the white farms” (1981:128). In the case study, both the *izicaka* and *amarhanuga* are referred to as *amalose*, meaning loose people. The term *amalose* refers to people who did not have fixed land of their own, but moved around and stayed wherever they were permitted to stay. Thus, this group was dependent on the landholders for access to land. Mager asserts that the *amarhanuga* were despised and not integrated into the communities. This means that, not only was the group landless, it was also marginalised and regarded as outsiders by local people. Therefore, access and lack of access to land played a role in defining social relations in rural areas.

At the same time, landlessness also assumed a generational dimension in that there emerged a group of unemployed and landless, unmarried young men in the rural areas. Mager points out: “[W]hile hundreds of young men went away to work, dozens hung about the rural locations ‘waiting’ – forming rural gangs, preying on young women” (1993:765). These were effects of the economic crisis which constrained the economy’s capacity to absorb labour, as well as conditions during World War II, which affected the economy as export markets become difficult to access.

On the other hand, the emergence of unmarried young men was also caused by the stock culling requirements of the Betterment schemes, which had not only economic consequences, but also serious social repercussions, for African communities. The reduction of cattle affected social

⁴⁶ Department of Agriculture and Forestry. 1940. Annual Report of the Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry. For the year ended 31 August 1940. See pp. 443-444. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁴⁷ Both Mager and Mafeje write *amarhanuga* without an “h” - as *amaranuga* - which is an incorrect spelling in the vernacular. For the same reasons stated earlier, I inserted the “h” in the term. Mafeje draws a distinction between *amarhanuga* and *amaqheya*. *Amaqheya* means farm wage-labourers that have been uprooted from the farms, whereas *amarhanuga* meant people that go in search of valuable material (Mafeje, 1981:128). The

practices such as the *lobola*.⁴⁸ Stock culling meant that some men who wanted to pay *lobola* were not able to accumulate enough cattle. Mager explains:

Rehabilitation measures placed the practice of lobola under considerable strain... The very basis of the exchange of women against cattle was threatened by drastically reduced cattle numbers and endlessly delayed marriages. Nor was this a temporary crisis quickly ended as cattle numbers regenerated. Irreversible processes had been set in motion (1993:765).

Therefore, the scarcity of marriages due to the reduction of cattle numbers had other social effects. Lack of cattle by some families for payment of the *lobola* meant that eloping became common among young rural women (Mager, 1992:766), resulting in households in which males and females lived together without *lobola* having been paid. Such a development had other implications. It will be remembered that a practice was that women gained access to land through their husbands. In other words, they gained access through marriage. However, with marriages scarce in the late 1940s, a growing number of women had no access to arable land in the Ciskei. Thus, by the 1940s, the group of landless people was becoming widespread and consisted of women-headed homes, ex-farm workers and unemployed young men—not a homogenous group.

Similarly, from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s there is evidence of differentiation among rural women. Stockhammer (1965:66) defines differentiation as the development of differences amongst industries which are based on the amount of resources each industry possesses. In the context of this study, differentiation refers to the development of inequalities within the same social groups. The deterioration and shortage of land worsened the precarious socio-economic situation of Africans in the reserves, particularly women. Droughts also contributed to the situation (Mager, 1992). In the Ciskei, poverty was widespread, with women being the most affected. Mager explains the situation:

[I]n the locations beyond the perimeters of the missions, the situation was potentially explosive. Poverty was acute, following the loss of over 12 000 cattle in 1949; hundreds of women and children had lived on handouts for the past few years (Mager, 1992:775).

Thus, by the late 1940s, there had emerged a group of poor and desperate women in some villages of the Ciskei. Apart from rural women that were affected by drought in the late 1880s, rural women that were dependent on handouts were a new phenomenon.

Another group of the rural women was organised and actively involved in the rural struggles opposing the implementation of the Betterment schemes. These were the women whose husbands

implication, then, is that those who went to work for wages on the white-owned farms went with the purpose of investing in valuable material for their households.

⁴⁸ *Lobola* is the payment given over by the bridegroom to parents of the bride for permission to marry her.

were livestock owners, and who, because they were dependent on livestock, were also affected by the stock limiting provisions of the Betterment Schemes (Mager, 1992). Some of them were from middle-class households (ibid.:776). By the early 1950s, this group seems to have been more organised than the other group of women, with its members belonging to women's associations. Mager explains the situation in the Glen Grey district:

[T]he district was well organised in this period. Women's Zenzele Clubs, Parents Associations, Farmers Associations and Stock Reduction Committees existed alongside the Glen Grey Voters Association and branches of the Cape African Teachers Association and the National Council of African Women in many locations (ibid.:776).

According to Mager (ibid.), political organisations such as the All-Africa Convention (AAC), which was formed in the 1930s, were responsible for much of the organisation of rural people, including women, in the Glen Grey area. The AAC was established in 1936 in response to the state's introduction of laws such as the Natives Trust and Land Act of 1936 (Tabata, 1974). In the 1950s, the AAC supported the resistance of rural people to the implementation of Betterment Schemes (Ntsebeza, 2011c:26).

The development of the middle-class, of which some of the women were members, was in the interest of the government. And, since the early 1940s, institutions such as Fort Hare contributed to its growth. For instance, in 1940 it produced forty-three graduates.⁴⁹ That the members of the middle-class had access to land means that while they pursued professional careers, some of them also had links to land-based livelihoods that continued in the villages of the Transkei and Ciskei. The table below shows the extent of production in the Transkei districts.

District	No. of farms ⁵⁰	Farmland in morgen	Production on the farms (bags)		
			Maize	Sorghum	Potatoes
Matatiele	199	161 070	15 000	158	5 151
Mount Fletcher	34	144	15 000	0	278
Mount Frere	26	1 720	50 000	0	88
Tsolo	28	1 758	20 000	0	22
Umzimkhulu	67	62 137	30 000	159	6 346
Engcobo	62	3 224	65 000	0	308
Mqanduli	22	152	47 294	0	128
St Marks	43	209	26 817	0	154
Mthatha	81	9 735	26 817	0	420
Xhalanga	30	1 136	22 000	14	306
Butterworth	28	5 772	27 090	0	381
Idutywa	22	337	23 498	0	30
Centane	36	348	43 161	0	54
Ngqamakhwe	22	668	55 537	0	17

⁴⁹ U.G. No. 42/1941. Report of the Native Affairs Commission. 1939-1940. See pp. 6. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁵⁰ The farms referred to in the table are the farms that were owned by Africans in the districts.

Tsomo	28	343	45 127	0	308
Willowvale	34	172	40 245	0	51
Mbizana	29	160	39 135	0	32
Flagstaff	21	396	60 096	0	1 146
Libode	26	276	60 169	0	50
Lusikisiki	47	20 906	65 878	0	69
Port St Johns	74	3 673	22 279	0	250
Ntabankulu	25	235	49 578	0	55

Table adapted by author from South Africa Agricultural Census No. 25. 1950-1951

Although the table shows that by the early 1950s there was still production, it is evident from the table that crops such as sorghum were no longer produced. These were signs of a decline in production in some districts of the Transkei. These figures show that despite the proletarianisation of the majority of rural dwellers, there were still land-based activities in these districts.

From the early 1950s, there was an emergence of the chiefs and headmen as the ruling elite in rural areas. Their rise in stature followed the promulgation of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, which gave them the allocation of land in communal areas as one of their tasks (Platzky and Walker, 1985:111). As implementers of government policies, the chiefs and headmen became part of the apartheid state. However, like other social groups, they were not homogenous. The Betterment scheme, of which they were supposed to manage the implementation, divided them. One camp in the group supported the scheme, while the other side opposed it. The opponents opposed Betterment because it threatened their control over land allocation, as it proposed that land allocation should be the responsibility of the Native Affairs Department (NAD). The chiefs who considered the proposals a threat to their power joined forces with people who opposed the scheme, mostly livestock owners. They defied the “dipping regulations” and also cut down “commonage fences” (Mager, 1992:773), which were part of the confrontations in areas such as Mt Ayliff in the Transkei and villages in the Ciskei (Beinart, 1984; Mager, 1992). Other chiefs and “well off agricultural producers” opportunistically threw their lot in with the government (Chaskalson, 1987:2). Those who sided with the government were confronted and at times also physically assaulted (Mager, 1992:761). Hendricks and Peires (2011) provide the starkest example of the divisions in the ruling elite. They show that while a section of eastern Mpondoland stood in direct opposition of Betterment, the western side was relatively quiet (ibid.:115-116).

The confrontations during the 1950s marked militancy in the rural struggles against Betterment that had become widespread in the Transkei and Ciskei. Mager suggests that the extent of rural resistance in the Ciskei was because of the influence of the ANC’s Defiance Campaign (1992:774), which started in June 1952 (Horrell, 1953:27). In the Transkei, the AAC was dominant due to the leadership of the attorney WM Tsotsi (Mager, 1992:774-776).

Through these political organisations and other structures, such as the Transkei Organised Bodies (TOB), the middle-class also became deeply involved in the rural struggles (Ntsebeza, 2011c). Ntsebeza shows that political activists such as Govan Mbeki, IB Tabata and RS Canca, who were members of the middle-class, addressed meetings in various villages of the Transkei and Ciskei (ibid.:26). The centrality of WM Tsotsi in the struggles that opposed Betterment also makes him a key figure from the middle-class (Mager, 1992).

The livestock owners were in the centre of things during the 1950s because the scheme threatened them. The ownership of livestock cut across the various social groups: the farm owners; some small producers or smallholders in the communal areas; and landless people, who constituted the majority of the rural residents (Mager, 1992). Again, most members of the different social groups had become migrant workers (Ntsebeza, 2006). The stock culling provisions of the scheme were a major concern for the livestock owners (Chaskalson, 1987; Ntsebeza, 2011c). The refusal to part with livestock by these groups was a sign that land was still important in the lives of some rural dwellers. That some migrant workers were also part of the struggles once more indicates that proletarianisation did not necessarily mean that these migrant workers cut ties with land-based livelihoods.

Importantly, the foregoing discussion shows that there were overlaps between the different social groups. The fact that livestock ownership cut across all the groups highlights the fact that members of this group did not have to own land to raise livestock. Every member of a village had access to communal grazing irrespective of whether he was a land owner or not (Ntsebeza, 2006).

The overall picture from the preceding discussion is that, by the 1950s, relations in rural areas, particularly between the rural residents, on the one hand, and chiefs, headmen and government officials on the other hand, had become antagonistic. Secondly, that livestock owners were so opposed to the provisions of Betterment to the extent of physically attacking the implementers of the scheme illustrates the attachment rural people still had to the land and points to the continuation of land-based livelihoods in rural areas. The fact that access to land influenced relations among the different social groups is also an indication of the continued role the land played in the determination of social relations in rural areas.

The worsening deterioration of rural conditions and the Tomlinson Commission

Between the mid-1950s and the 1960s there were five dynamic social groups in the rural areas. These groups were the ever-growing group of *amalose*, the migrant workers, the middle-class, women, youth and the livestock owners. The dynamism in the groups can be found in the fact that the composition of some of them kept on changing as material conditions changed. For instance, the

composition of the group of migrant workers, which previously had consisted mostly of uneducated people, also included middle-class young men. To appreciate the dynamism it is necessary to look at the material conditions that influenced the developments in these social groups.

By the mid-1950s, the socio-economic conditions had deteriorated so much that the National Party government was forced to devise further measures to arrest the situation. One of these was the establishment in 1954 of the Tomlinson Commission, whose main task was “to investigate and plan the future of the South African reserves” (Platzky and Walker, 1985:112). Among the recommendations the Commission made the one particularly relevant to this study was about land tenure. Although not applied, the recommendations are relevant because they reflect thinking of the Commissioners regarding land matters. In its recommendations, that were surely bound to have major implications for these rural areas, the Commission recommended the division of African people in the reserves into two classes — an agricultural class and a group of people that would “have to find the means of existence outside farming”.⁵¹ From the recommendation, it seems that the Commission envisaged a situation in which only people involved in farming would be accommodated in the Bantustans, while those not involved in farming would be relocated to urban areas to become “employees in secondary industry and tertiary activity, professional classes and entrepreneurs”.⁵²

Although the recommendation was never implemented, it is important to consider what its implications would have been, had it been implemented. The Commissioners wanted the reserves to be occupied by farmers, and landless people would have been moved out of the reserves. In many respects, the proposed approach represented what in other British colonies in Africa was called the Master Farmer Schemes that were implemented in Nyasaland (now Malawi), Uganda, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Kenya (Kalinga, 1993; Green, 2003). In Kenya, the scheme was called the Land Consolidation Programme in 1953 and the Swynnerton Plan in 1954. In Northern Rhodesia the scheme was called the African Farming Improvement Scheme (A.F.I.S.O.). The schemes involved the identification of Africans that were then resettled and given government support to develop as successful farmers. Implicit in the Master Farmer Scheme was the idea of relocating peasants so as to decongest the identified areas (Kalinga, 1993:368-70). Significantly, as the case study will show, similar ideas have re-emerged in South Africa’s current land reform programme.

⁵¹ U.G. 61/1955. Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu areas within the Union of South Africa. See pp. 195. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁵² U.G. 61/1955. Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu areas within the Union of South Africa. See pp. 195. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

Meanwhile, food production levels dipped sharply in the reserves. Increasing overcrowding and the re-orientation of land use practices contributed to the sharp decline in food production. A number of factors caused the overcrowding. Firstly, there were the forced removals of Africans from areas called ‘black spots’ in the white-claimed land from the mid-1950s (Marcus, 1989:6), and secondly, the restructuring of the white commercial agricultural sector. Restructuring of commercial agriculture involved the re-organisation of production and distribution systems so as to make commercial agriculture “more functional and more efficient” (Marcus, 1989:1). This process resulted in, amongst others things, a reduction of white-owned farm units from 116 848 in 1950 to 105 859 by 1960. However, as the number of farm units decreased, the sizes of individual farm units increased. This meant that from the 1950s there was a concentration of land in the hands of fewer owners (Marcus, 1989:7). Farm workers were laid off because of the restructuring process, and they moved over to the reserves. Thirdly, an amendment of the labour tenancy section in the Native Trust and Land Act that was introduced in 1954 forced a number of farm workers to leave the farms for the reserves (Marcus, 1989:58, 69). This massive exodus constituted the third wave of movement to the reserves. The arrival of ex-farm workers represented an increase in the group of *amalose*.

The movement of people from the white commercial farms to the reserves contributed to the decline of crop production in the reserves. As the ex-farm workers arrived in the reserves, they were allocated residential sites on what had been grazing land. In turn, population pressure, as well as the pressure of livestock, on the limited land led to the collapse of boundary fences in the reserves.⁵³ Consequently, the crop production levels in many parts of the Transkei had dropped considerably by 1959,⁵⁴ when compared to production in the 1956/57⁵⁵ season, as shown in the table below:

Table 2: Comparative analysis of food production in the Transkei in 1955/56 and 1959/60			
Maize in 1956/57	Maize in 1959/60	Sorghum in 1956/57	Sorghum in 1959/60
2 731 600	477 694	87 969	97 590

Table adapted from “Report on Agricultural and pastoral production. 1959-1960. No. 2”

The vast difference in maize production is an indication that production was in decline, although sorghum reflects an increase in production. However, the table also shows that there were still arable landowners in the Transkei. By the 1950s, women were the main group responsible for food production as the majority of the men had become migrant workers (Mager, 1998:656).

⁵³ Report of the Department of Native Affairs. 1959. Report for the period 1st January, 1959 to 31st December, 1959. See pp. 45 to 46. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁵⁴ Report of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry. 1963. Report on Agricultural and Pastoral Production. (R.P. 18/1963). See pp. 169. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁵⁵ Report of the Department of Native Affairs for the Years 1954 to 1957. See pp. 55. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

Furthermore, the establishment of community schools from the early 1950s contributed to the shortage of family labour that, in turn, influenced the changes in land use in the reserves. Shortly after coming to power, the National Party-led government introduced the Bantu Education Act in 1953, which, amongst other things, “placed the immediate management of African schools in the hands of Bantu school boards” (Davenport, 1991:338). This move of placing the management of schools in the hands of Bantu school boards, which saw the establishment of a number of community schools, led to a rapid rise in the number of African children in schools, as shown in Table 3. Community schools were established “wherever a stable Bantu community [was] in lawful occupation of an area”.⁵⁶ This means that there was establishment of a number of community schools in the Transkei and Ciskei. In 1958, the Transkei had 1 469 community schools. With the precarious nature of agriculture in African communities it made sense for African parents to send their children to school.

Table 3: School enrolments and number of African teachers

	Nature of schools	1957 enrolments	No. of teachers	1958 enrolments	No. of teachers
Transkei	Govt. schools	6 026	4 643	5 978	4 356
	Community schools	198 514		210 441	
	Farm schools	1 130		1 347	
	Mine & factory schools	15		0	
	Aided missionary schools	4 249		301	
Ciskei	Govt. schools	5 520	3 287	5 674	3 127
	Community schools	126 130		137 319	
	Farm schools	15 104		16 809	
	Mine & factory schools	1 109		473	
	Aided missionary schools	4 187		398	
Total		361 984	7 930	378 740	7 483

Table adapted by author from U.G. 14/1959⁵⁷ and U.G. 51/1960⁵⁸

There was a corresponding rapid increase in the number of children in these community schools compared to the other categories of schools. The impact of children attending school was two-fold. Firstly, it resulted in a shortage of family labour for crop production, which was labour-intensive. This occurred both while they were at school and afterwards, as, once educated, young people, including girls, had to migrate to take jobs outside of their villages since these were not available there. In addition, some children also entered teacher colleges,⁵⁹ which meant that there was an increase in the number of people constituting the middle-class. The table also shows a drop in the

⁵⁶ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. 1958 to 1959. See pp. 46. UCT Library. Government Publications Section

⁵⁷ Report of the Department of Native Affairs. 1958. Report for the period 1st July, 1954 to 31st December 1957. Pretoria. Government Printers. (U.G. 14/1959). UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁵⁸ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. 1960. Report for the period 1st January, 1958 to 31st December, 1959. Pretoria. Government Printers. (U.G. 51/1960). UCT Library. Government Publications Section

number of teachers in the 1960 column. The reason is that the South African government felt that there was an over-supply of teachers, and consequently reduced enrolments for 1959.⁶⁰ The case study will show that, initially, most of the children who went to school came from the landowners. The landowners used the resources they accumulated out of their land to educate their children. Redding (1993:537-8) shows that some of the landholders constituted the middle-class themselves. However, like the rest of rural societies, the youth was not a homogenous group. The above reflects one section of the youth that became educated. The other section remained uneducated. Some young men also swelled the exodus to the cities, increasing the shortage of family labour; young people (boys and young men) found the conditions in the reserves most depressing; and *amakrwala* (young initiated men) were encouraged by their parents to leave the villages and work elsewhere (Mager, 1998:657).

On the other hand, as the table also shows, the emergence of community schools meant the need for African teachers in the schools. Those who became teachers had to leave their villages and take teaching posts in other areas. This also contributed to the shortage of family labour that led to the decline in crop production in the reserves. In addition, the fact that the teachers had to leave their villages for teaching posts confirms the point made earlier about the middle-class being part of the migrant workers. Like the other category of migrant workers, the members of the middle-class maintained their links with land-based livelihoods.

The developments regarding the shortage of labour highlighted above caused the shift from crop production, which is labour intensive, to livestock production. However, continued investment in livestock also escalated the shift from crop to livestock production. With the livestock numbers remaining constant, the increasingly limited grazing resulting from increased overcrowding was under tremendous pressure, leading to the collapse of fencing, which was also cut by the defiant rural residents (Mager, 1992:776). In addition, without fencing to control livestock, crops became exposed and were destroyed by the animals, thus discouraging crop producers. All of the above clearly indicates that, despite serious deterioration of conditions in the rural areas, the residents did not simply abandon their arable land; they changed its use into grazing land.

The shift in land use from crop production to livestock had negative effects on women-headed households. Mager argues that the changes in land use affected women's ability to provide food for their households. Moreover, she argues that, because most women did not own cattle, the shift in

⁵⁹ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. 1959. See pp. 25. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

⁶⁰ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. 1958 to 1959. See pp. 47. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

land use did not benefit them. Instead, they became marginalised, which is why, in the 1960s, it was mostly women-headed households that were impoverished. Hence, they were often found in food queues (Mager, 1992:778). However, the case study shows that, despite the shortage in land use, it is not that women did not have access to productive land altogether. Women still had access to gardens in their residential plots. Furthermore, the communal grazing land remained open to all members of the community to collect natural resources from. Therefore, it is an overstatement to create an impression that there was absolutely no access to land.

Nonetheless, the discussion in this chapter shows that land continued to be important in the lives of rural people. Despite the developments that impacted on rural societies, and the resulting proletarianisation, overcrowding and the shifts in land use practices, land remained central in influencing social relations in rural areas.

Conclusion

It is clear that, contrary to the impression that agricultural production in the reserves had collapsed by the 1930s (Wolpe, 1995; Bundy, 1979), it continued into the late 1950s, although in decline. The decline is attributable to various factors: overcrowding, which led to the demarcation of grazing land for residential sites; the conversion of arable land into grazing land as grazing land became limited; a shortage of family labour, as the children of quit-rent titleholders left their homes for schools; and the absence of men due to the migrant labour system. However, while there was a decline in crop production, livestock numbers remained almost unchanged, implying a switch in land use in the late 1950s. This, therefore, challenges the thesis that, due to the conversion of the majority of rural residents into migrant workers, the land no longer mattered in the lives of these rural people from the 1930s. Despite the proletarianisation, the land still played an important role in determining social relations in rural areas.

It has also been argued that, while there was a conversion of rural dwellers into wage workers, the process should not be viewed as a linear one with the movement of rural dwellers being only towards urban areas. The process has been two-ways. As the majority of rural dwellers moved to urban areas, some sections of the proletariat retained links with rural areas, hence their oscillation between their places of work in the urban centres and their homes in rural areas. This section of migrant workers continued to invest and take an interest in land-based livelihoods in the reserves. Thus, the process of proletarianisation did not necessarily mean the complete detachment of migrant workers from land-based rural livelihoods.

Between 1913 and 1960, the middle-class, migrant workers, landless people, and quit-rent titleholders continued to exist in the reserves. The middle-class, migrant and landless groups all grew in size. The availability of more educational opportunities from the 1950s enabled the middle-class to reproduce itself – hence the growth. A new phenomenon during the period under consideration was the emergence of rural women in an organised form, through their associations. The formation of women's organisations gave them a platform to express themselves and enabled them to participate in development processes in the reserves. Additionally, the series of waves of movement of Africans from the white-owned farms introduced new social relations in the reserves – employer-employee relations. The immigrants became labour tenants of the quit-rent titleholders, particularly the farm owners and small producers or smallholders.

In the final analysis, the continued relationship of the various social groups with land showed the importance of land in the lives of rural people. All the social groups had linkages to the land. Some social groups consisted of landholders, while others consisted of landless people. However, even the landless people had stakes in land because they had livestock with access to communal grazing. For these reasons, these social groups were able to form an alliance to oppose the implementation of Betterment. Thus, land continued to play a role in the definition of social relations in rural areas of the former reserves.

CHAPTER 4

The Era of the Bantustans and its Impact on Social Relations in Rural Areas (1960-1994)

Introduction

The move by the South African government to grant self-government to the Transkei in 1963 ushered in the era of the Bantustans. Through this move, the stage was set for the building of an African middle class that would pay allegiance to the South African government (Molteno, 1977:24). Having been revived through the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the chiefs and headmen were to ensure the implementation of the government's repressive laws against the rural African population in particular. Among these measures were the livestock culling provisions of the rehabilitation schemes, which triggered rural revolts. The chapter shows how the developments influenced changes in social groups as well as social relations in rural areas. Although there were no major changes in the social groups and in their relations with each other, the African middle class grew in size and consolidated during this period. As the socio-economic conditions of rural dwellers deteriorated, the section of poor rural women became immensely impoverished with some actively involved in the rural struggles.

The chapter is divided into two periods: 1960 to 1976, the year that the Transkei was declared an independent homeland; and 1976 to 1994, the year which marked the introduction of the land reform programme. 1960 to 1976 witnessed the escalation in overcrowding and decline of crop production in the former reserves, amid a declining South African economy. The early 1960s saw the granting of self-government to the Transkei, a development that had an impact on the social groups, and thus, social relations in rural areas. Up to 1976, the most significant change was a rapid increase in the size of the middle class in the Transkei and the status of its members. The period from 1977 to 1994 was marked by heightened unrest in South Africa in general, and more specifically, the militant rural struggles against traditional authorities in the late 1980s, culminating in land occupations in the early 1990s. Landless people, who included children of *bona fides* (landholders), continued to exist.

The government interventions and their impact on rural areas: 1960 to 1976

Although rural people mounted militant struggles against Betterment planning from the late 1950s, by the 1960s these struggles had been defeated (Kepe and Ntsebeza, 2011). Kepe and Ntsebeza (ibid)

regard the rural revolts in Eastern Mpondoland as the climax of the rural struggles in the Eastern Cape. The revolts ended with the massacre of eleven people in June 1960, and the sentencing to death of about 30 other people for their participation in the revolt (Kepe and Ntsebeza, 2011:1).

The rural struggles were not isolated occurrences, but were part of political developments in South Africa (Mbeki, 1984; Kepe and Ntsebeza, 2011). Other developments were the Anti-Pass Campaign of 1959 led by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which culminated in the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960 (Plaatjie, 2007:670, 672). The police clampdown on black political leaders, the declaration of a state of emergency, and the banning of black political organisations by the National Party-led government (Kgosana, 2008:152-3), were also part of the developments at a national level.

The national unrests led to the withdrawal of foreign investors from South Africa, which put the South African economy under pressure in the early 1960s (Terreblanche, 2002; Davenport, 1991). This occurrence had negative effects on the white commercial agricultural sector in the late 1960s, with farmers laying off “a high proportion of its workforce” (Cooper, 1987:568) as their profit levels declined. However, the withdrawal of foreign investors was temporary, as there was an immediate economic boom within the 1960s (Gelb, 1987; Habib and Padayachee, 2000). After the investor flight in the early 1960s, South Africa’s economic growth was “among the highest in the world, along with Japan, South Korea and Brazil” (Habib and Padayachee, 2000:246). Indeed, some white commercial farmers introduced heavy machinery, which meant that “[b]ackward, uneconomic methods of farming were being pushed aside in favour of a more aggressive, profit-orientated approach” (Platzky and Walker, 1985:119). The implication of the use of machinery was that white farmers now required a semi-skilled and skilled labour force (Wolpe, 1988:71-2). This led to the retrenchment of farm workers, which was a development that contributed to the increase in the group of landless people in the reserves.

Despite the developments enumerated above, the National Party government stepped up its measures to ensure the control of the movements of rural people (Roux, 1964; Davenport, 1991). In 1959, the government had promulgated the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, which paved the way for the Transkei to become a self-governing territory in 1963 (Roux, 1964; Southall, 1977; Davenport, 1991). Some chiefs were involved in the discussions leading to this declaration. Kaiser Matanzima, a junior chief of abaThembu, was promoted by the South African government and made a paramount chief, as well as the leader of the self-governing Transkei (Ntsebeza, 2006). However, there were divisions among the chiefs between those who supported the system of self-government and those opposed to it. Kaiser Matanzima led the proponents of the system, while Sabata

Dalindyebo – the senior chief of abaThembu – opposed the move. Sabata Dalindyebo also had the support of Tutor Ndamase, the chief of the amaMpondo (Horrell and Draper, 1964:90-92).

The declaration of independence of Transkei rode roughshod over the sentiments of residents in the homeland, the majority of whom opposed the moves to self-government and, later, to independence. Opposition was ruthlessly dealt with under the state of emergency that was introduced in 1960 to deal with the rural revolts and retained by Matanzima until 1976. The state of emergency was introduced in terms of Proclamation 400, which gave the police powers to detain people indefinitely and allowed chiefs to expel people they did not like from areas under their control (Southall, 1977:6). Southall comments:

Not surprisingly, these powers have been used against the Opposition, and the Democratic Party has continuously claimed that it has not been able to hold meetings; indeed, during the pre-independence 1976 election, the leader, H. B. Ncokazi, and the entire executive of the D.P., were detained before polling day (1977:6).

The leader of the opposition – Ncokazi – also received support from Chief Sabata Dyalindyebo, who enjoyed tremendous support in his region (Southall, 1977:9). The African middle class in Transkei was thus not a united force. However, this does not negate the fact that a section of the middle class consolidated its political power based on the benefits that it derived from the homeland system.

Matanzima was able to entrench himself by using the apartheid government's policy of separate development to his advantage. This policy advocated that each racial group develop in its own area (Southall, 1982:1). It also discouraged Africans from undertaking business ventures in South Africa, and, instead, promoted the opening up of African businesses in the former reserves (Davenport, 1991:369). Thus, in 1964, Matanzima's party, the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP), passed the Trade Amendment Act No. 5, which abolished the regulation that barred African traders from establishing trading stores within three kilometres of white-run businesses (Southall, 1982:188). He further used the Bantu Homelands Development Corporations Act of 1965, to promote the development of African entrepreneurs in the Transkei (Davenport, 1991:369). The interventions resulted in growth in the number of African traders in Transkei from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. For example, there were 361 traders in 1963, but by the mid-1970s, the number had grown to 536 general dealers, thirty hotel and bottle storeowners, twenty five garage and filling station owners, fifty seven bus and transport service businesses, as well as forty four Africans categorised as diverse business owners (Southall, 1982:188-90). Thus, through Matanzima's intervention, a social group of African traders had, by the 1970s, established itself in the Transkei. Southall argues that the South African government promoted the development of African traders in the Transkei as part of its

broader strategy of building a class of African business owners that would be allied to the government. As beneficiaries of the former reserve strategy, it was imperative for the emerging African business class to support the homeland system and ensure its success, Southall argues (ibid.).

The irony of the declaration of Transkei as a self-governing territory is that the Transkeians lost their citizenship in South Africa. Consequently, the South African government deported 26 000 Africans out of the Western Cape to the Transkei in 1962 (Roux, 1964:427). This was a confirmation that Africans were no longer regarded as South African citizens, but as citizens of the former reserves – triggering a movement of some African people to the former reserves. This development would have a significant impact on social relations in the Transkei.

The impact of the developments on social groups and social relations in the Transkei

From the time of the declaration of the Transkei self-government, there was a phenomenal growth of the African middle class (Southall, 1982). This middle class could be divided into four categories – the ruling elite, consisting of chiefs and politicians; bureaucrats that were in the administration; teachers and traders (Southall, 1982:173-85; see also Mabandla, 2012:30-35). A legislative assembly was established with four paramount chiefs, sixty chiefs, and forty-five elected members, who constituted the Bantustan ruling elite or the “governing class”, according to Mabandla. Their involvement in the Legislative Assembly meant a revision of the remuneration of the chiefs, from stipends to salaries. By November 1963, the salaries of Paramount Chiefs were set at R4 000, and those of ministers, if not chiefs, were set at R3 400 (ibid.:99-100). The chiefs that were not part of the Assembly received payments according to the number of taxpayers under them. The chiefs with up to 1 000 taxpayer were paid R176, and R448 for those with over 9 000 people (ibid.:100). Furthermore, to ensure reproduction of this group, Jongilizwe College – the school for sons of chiefs – was opened at Tsolo in the 1960s. The College catered for seventy-nine students who were studying agriculture, administration, law, book-keeping, commerce and typing (Horrell, 1962:88).

Moreover, a cabinet consisting of six ministries – Finance, Justice, Interior, Education, Agriculture and Forestry, as well as Roads and Public Works – was also established. The establishment of a cabinet led to the emergence of ministers and a group of administrators and clerks that ran the ministries (Horrell and Draper, 1964; Molteno, 1977). Likewise, the salaries of politicians increased from R800 in 1966 to R3 000 in 1975. These figures exclude allowances that were paid to politicians, chiefs and headmen (Southall, 1977:11-12). Besides income from salaries, the bureaucrats and politicians also accumulated properties which provided them with additional income

from rent (Southall, 1982; Mabandla, 2012). This means that the middle class also used the land in urban areas not for food production but for generating cash.

The administrators and clerks, which is the category Mabandla (ibid.:31) refers to as the “bureaucratic class” constituted the civil servants. In 1963, the Transkei started with 2 476 civil servants of which 1 900 were Africans. The number increased in 1964 to 2 500 (Horrell, 1965:148). In addition, there were also 4 740 African teachers (Horrell and Draper, 1964:84, 99). This group, categorised as “semi-professionals” (Crankshaw, 1997), consisted of teachers, nurses and clerks (Mabandla, 2012:34). By 1976, this number had grown to 16 962 (Southall, 1982:175). The education and income separated the Transkei civil servants from the general population of the homeland. There was a dramatic increase in the monthly salaries of this group - from R54 in 1960 to R169 in 1973. Given the limited economic opportunities and generally low incomes in the former reserves, the remuneration from the government made a big difference to the lives of the beneficiaries (ibid.).

There were further material benefits that the declaration of the Transkei as a self-governing territory brought the middle class in particular. Through Government Notice 421 of 12 June 1962, twenty-three towns in the Bantustan were rezoned for ownership by Africans (Horrell, 1965:152). However, like the migrant workers who also had links to the land in the reserves, some members of this group were already land owners (Mabandla, 2012). According to Mabandla, the middle class in the Ncambedlana area had access to arable land. Thus, there was land accumulation by the middle class.

The last category of the middle class was the group of entrepreneurs that was promoted through the Bantu Industrial Corporation (BIC) and Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC). Because the group was not involved in the production of wealth, but just promoted as allies of the white ruling block, Moltano (1977) refers to it as a comprador capitalist class. Consequently, African shopkeepers and traders emerged. Between 1960 and 1972 about 450 formerly white-owned trading stores were transferred to Africans (Bank, 1994:78).

It was this level of benefit and dependence on the South African state that led Southall (1977) and Moltano (1977) to argue that the black middle class were beneficiaries of the homeland system; and that their interests were in line with those of the South African government. However, except for the semi-professional group (teachers and nurses) and the chiefs, most of the developments were in urban areas. However, the lifting of licensing restriction in 1964 (Southall, 1982:186-187) that barred establishment of trading stores within a two mile radius applied to rural trading licences. Therefore, there were some trading stores that were either transferred to Africans or established by Africans in rural areas.

During the 1960s there was also an immense growth in the group of *amalose* (landless people). As already indicated, there were people who lost their citizenship and were deported to the Transkei after declaration of self-government in 1963. But, the growth was, in the main, due to the forced removals of Africans from white-claimed farming areas to the former reserves. According to Horrell (1962:103), in 1960 there were people that were moved from a 25 052 morgen area in the Cape. Moreover, between 1962 and 1976, many families were moved from White commercial farms to the rural areas. These forced removals were related to the clearing of the so-called “Black spot” areas. The table below gives details:⁶¹

	1960	1962	1965	1970	Totals
Land cleared in morgen	60 579	7 009	31 023	3 005	101 616
Number of families affected	44 295	3 862	310	160	47 627

From Reports of the Department for Bantu Administration and Development 1962-1975

In 1965, people on another 130 011 morgen still had to be moved out of the white-claimed land to the former reserves.⁶²

These removals, together with retrenchments of Africans during this period, resulted in the fifth wave of ex-farm workers and small producers moving to the reserves, causing further congestion there, with negative effects on crop producers. Africans also left white-owned farms for reasons other than retrenchments. Bad working conditions, low salaries and the lack of educational facilities on the farms forced some of them to move to the reserves. The experience of Petros Vantyu⁶³, who reported that in 1969 his family moved from farms in Suurberg in Steynsburg⁶⁴ to Sada in the Ciskei, illustrates this point, as he gave economic reasons and access to educational facilities as some of the factors that influenced his family’s decision to leave the farms. Long distances to farm schools hampered the education of children. In addition, white farmers paid farm workers very low wages and some refused their workers permission to keep livestock on the farms. This often caused tensions and differences with the farm owners. Atkinson (2007) corroborates the Vantyu family experience, namely, that a number of farm workers in the Eastern Cape left the farms due to low wages (2007:120). Atkinson further shows that some families decided to leave the farms in the hope of gaining access to better facilities, such as schools and housing, elsewhere (ibid.:117). Mkhize (2012) also shows that this is still the case even now in South Africa’s era of democracy. Moreover, after the implementation of the

⁶¹ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the Period 1st January, 1960 to 31st December, 1962. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

⁶² Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the Period 1st January, 1960 to 31st December, 1962. UCT Library, Government Publications Section

⁶³ Conversation with Petros Vantyu in the plane from Cape Town to East London, 7 September 2011.

⁶⁴ Steynsburg is a small farming town in the Eastern Cape.

Resettlement programme⁶⁵, word had spread that Africans were being given land in the reserves, which lured a number of families into those areas. Once in Sada, however, Vantyu's family could obtain access only to a residential site, as there was no more arable land available for allocation. The majority of relocated people shared the fate of the Vantyu family.

The exodus of Africans from South Africa to the former reserves during the 1960s that was triggered by all the developments described above had a major impact on rural areas. The influx of people increased the overcrowding in the rural areas, and, as on previous occasions, the size of the social group of *amalose* in the former reserves was enlarged. Although, in the case study, *amalose* did not have access to residential sites, it would seem that there were variations in how the group of *amalose* was accommodated in the 1960s in the Eastern Cape. As indicated in the context of the Vantyu family that moved to Whittlesea, the family acquired residential sites. De Wet (1994) cites similar cases in the Keiskamahoek. This means that by the 1960s there were two categories of landless people – the group without access to either residential or arable land; and those with access to residential sites, but not arable land. Both groups however had access to communal grazing because, as shown in the previous chapter, some of them had livestock and, as community members, they had access to communal grazing land.

By the 1960s, the Transkei had become visibly overcrowded (Molteno, 1977). To address this problem, the programme of resettlement was introduced. It involved the relocation of people from one area to the other within the communal areas. The Resettlement programme, which replaced the Stabilisation programme of the 1950s, was introduced in the 1960s, to bring settlements closer to each other and to separate them from the arable and grazing lands (Hendricks, 1989:307). Nowayitile Xaliphi, a resident from Cala Reserve (in Xhalanga), explained that, before the resettlement, fields and homesteads were positioned closer to each other. This made it easier for people to protect their crops from livestock, as the homesteads separated the fields from the grazing land. To reach the fields, livestock had to pass the homesteads. With the resettlement scheme, homesteads were moved away from the fields, leaving them unprotected.⁶⁶ That is why some scholars argue that the implementation of Betterment, of which the Resettlement programme was part, did not help to address the effects of overcrowding and congestion in the former reserves (Hendricks, 1989; Ntsebeza, 2006), instead, it negatively affected crop production. With fields separated and far from the homesteads, residents could not control livestock to prevent them from getting into their fields. Moreover, with children at school and young

⁶⁵ There were different versions of Betterment planning. In the 1930s the scheme was introduced as Betterment planning. It was revised to Rehabilitation in the 1940s; Stabilisation in the 1950s; and Resettlement or villagisation in the 1960s (Hendricks, 1989:307). Resettlement represented the removal of households from a sparsely-populated area to concentrated settlements (de Wet, 1994:359).

⁶⁶ Interview of Nowayitile Xaliphi on 26 May 2004, Cala Reserve.

men away in urban areas, as shown in Chapter 3, this exposed the fields to livestock. It will also be remembered that stock culling and fencing were the focal points of the opposition to Betterment. Therefore, without fencing and family labour to control livestock from drifting into the fields, crops destroyed the crops. These factors discouraged crop producers, hence the shift to livestock.

Meanwhile, the decline in crop production forced a large section of rural residents to take up job opportunities in South Africa. From 1962 to 1975, there was a progressive increase in the number of Transkeians taking wage labour in the urban centres of South Africa. In 1962, there were 104 575 migrants⁶⁷, 270 000 in 1963 (Horrell, 1965:140), and 311 806 in 1975.⁶⁸ However, rural people did not become migrant workers only because of economic reasons. Mager (1998) also shows that some young people who left for wage work from the 1960s did not leave because of economic pressures, *per se*, but because of material aspirations and the lure of other attractions. As Mager points out: “[T]here were also the attractions of relative freedom from lineage controls, money, clothes and material status” (1998:657). By the 1970s, migrant workers constituted the largest section of the Transkei population (Southall, 1982:208).

As already indicated, the above were people who left the Bantustan to work in South Africa. By the 1960s, another form of labour migrancy emerged in the Transkei – internal migration. This involved workers that, although they left their villages, still worked within the Bantustan. There were 10 000 labourers employed in government programmes, such as public works, in 1964. The number increased to 32 000 in 1965 (Horrell, 1965; 1966). By the early 1970s, more labourers were taken in to work in the irrigation schemes in the Bantustan, such as Ncorha, Qamata, etc. (Horrell, 1971:148). By 1971, more labourers were taken into work in the irrigation schemes in the Bantustan, such as at Ncorha, Qamata, etc. (Horrell, 1971:148).

The women’s association called Zenzele played an important part in sustaining production in the rural areas (Higgs, 2004). Formed in the early 1920s by mission-educated African women, the Zenzele Association emerged out of a merger between the African Women’s Self-Improvement Association and the Bantu Women Home Improvement Association whose roots were in the Eastern Cape (ibid.:120). The association “sought to improve the lives of rural African women by enhancing their subsistence farming and cooking skills and educating them about household cleanliness, basic child care, and health care” (ibid.:119). Although established by educated women, by the 1960s the Zenzele Association also reached out to uneducated women in rural areas.

⁶⁷ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for 1 April to 31 March 1965. See pp. 5. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

⁶⁸ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

In the early 1970s, a new phenomenon emerged in the Transkei – the introduction of seasonal workers by the XDC. A small group of 233 workers was employed to operate the government tractors that ploughed for the residents who did not have tractors. The XDC ploughed for the residents on credit (ibid.).

Professionals were also involved in internal migration. These people included some of the personnel that was taken in to run the Bantustan administration in Mthatha and who came from other districts of Transkei. Teachers also would leave their villages to teach in other parts of the Bantustan.

Similar processes unfolded in the Ciskei. By the 1970s, the Bantustan exported 46 974 of its residents as migrant workers to South Africa. A further 17 770 residents were employed within the homeland.

Moreover, the South African government's strategy of industrial decentralisation, which aimed to slow down the flow of job-seeking Africans to the urban areas, also contributed to internal migration in the early 1970s. Industries were developed away from the urban centres, next to the borders of the former reserves; hence, they were called border industries. By 1972, such border industries had created 85 554 jobs (Davenport, 1991:371). As part of industrial decentralisation, the government also developed settlements for Africans next to the industries, such as Ilinge, Sada, and Dimbaza (ibid:373). The proximity of these settlements to the reserves meant that, unlike migrant workers, Africans who worked in these border industries commuted from their places of residence on a daily basis, increasing the number of rural residents who became wage workers in the former reserve.⁶⁹

The decline of crop production and the persistence of cattle production

By the late 1960s, the decline in crop production had become a worrying factor to the Bantustan authorities. Addressing the Transkeian Legislative Assembly in 1970, Kaiser Matanzima lamented that there was no improvement in agriculture despite the government's interventions. Of particular concern for Matanzima was the decline in crop production (Horrell, 1971:147). Although the authorities apportioned blame to drought during 1968 for the decline, factors other than drought were responsible for the downward trend in crop production. As indicated earlier, overcrowding, shortage of labour and other factors influenced the shift from crop to livestock production.

However, there was some crop production going on, especially cash crops. Crops such as wheat, sorghum, peas, maize, beans, sugar cane and tea were still grown in the Bantustan. Sugar cane and tea were mostly cash crops that were produced for markets (ibid.).

⁶⁹ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1970. See pp. 66. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

Similarly, some production also carried on in the Ciskei. Although Vantyu⁷⁰ pointed out that when his family arrived in Sada in 1969, there were families that were mainly living on their crop production. Cosmas (1970) points out that Sada was established in 1964 by the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) on commonage land of Shiloh, which was established in 1828 as a Moravian Church Mission Station. Among these families he mentioned were the Kata, Mdudu and Jegels families. The Mdudu family mainly produced maize, wheat, beans and peas, while others produced fruit, such as peaches, pears, plums and apples. However, this could be an exceptional case. There was a general decline in crop production in the Ciskei as well (Horrell et al., 1971:122). In 1969, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development expressed concerns about the “abnormally low” crop production (ibid.).

When the South African government consciously provided support towards improvement of livestock in the Bantustans (Horrell et al., 1972:123), this helped the rural dwellers whose land use practices had already shifted towards livestock. Similarly, the Ciskei government supported thirty farmer co-operatives which served as a channel through which its support reached the rural producers. Archival evidence shows that although there was a decline in cattle numbers between 1969 and 1970 in the Ciskei, there was a marked increase in small stock numbers (sheep and goats) during the same period. The increase in sheep numbers led to African stock owners in the Ciskei selling 439 097 kilograms of wool, which brought in an income of R77 896 in 1970 (ibid.).⁷¹ The fact that, in the 1970s, there were some livestock owners who were still able to raise an income from their livestock confirms that livestock production had become important for rural dwellers. As already indicated, the ownership of livestock was not restricted to landholders only. It cut across the various social groups in rural areas – the middle class, the chiefs and headmen, migrant workers, and *amalose*.

In summary, between 1961 and 1976, changes occurred in social groups, which, in turn, had an influence on social relations in rural areas. The main social groups during this period were the landholders, the middle class, the chiefs and headmen, the migrant workers, *amalose* and women. The one group that underwent transformation was the landholders. Up to the end of the 1950s, the group consisted mainly of the farm owners, some of whom were chiefs, headmen and the migrant workers. Members of the middle class also came from, or/and also became landholders. Actually, some of the landholders accumulated land even in urban areas, as part of the benefits of the Bantustan strategy.

⁷⁰ Conversation with Petros Vantyu in the plane from Cape Town to East London, 7 September 2011.

⁷¹ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1970. See pp. 66. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

Although some of the migrant workers were also landholders, the majority of the migrant workers were *amalose* that emanated mostly from the influx of people to the former reserves during this period.

A new group that emerged during this period was a small group of seasonal migrant workers, particularly in the Transkei. This group was part of an emerging phenomenon of both uneducated and educated migrants that worked in urban areas of South Africa, as well as within the Transkei and Ciskei. The uneducated were labourers engaged in various kinds of work, while the educated worked as professionals or semi-professionals, such as teachers, nurses and clerks. This means that the migrant workers were no longer composed only of poor uneducated people, but also consisted of increasing numbers of members from the middle class. Furthermore, because salaries of the African middle class group (especially teachers and nurses) were low compared to those of their white counterparts in South Africa, some augmented their income through ownership of arable land in rural and peri-urban areas, such as Ncambedlana (Mabandla, 2012).

There were also quit rent titleholders that were still involved in subsistence crop production, as well as livestock farming. However, those who owned livestock also included the *amalose* who were allowed by landowners to keep some livestock.. Furthermore, women, mostly the educated, were involved in Zenzele Associations to uplift themselves. The majority of the rural women were impoverished. As will be shown in the case study, the majority of rural married women, both educated and uneducated, were responsible for managing production in the reserves. In the final analysis, the fact that the social groups were linked to land testifies to the point made about the continued importance of land in defining social relations in rural areas.

The period of independent homelands in the Eastern Cape

1976 was a momentous year in South African history, for political developments which gripped the attention of the world. The political “lull came to an end” and black political resistance took a new turn (Maylam, 1986:192). This resistance included student unrests in various parts of South Africa, as well as the “revival of the trade union organisation and militancy [and] ... the growth of the black consciousness movement” (Maylam, 1986:192; also see Walshe, 1983; Davenport, 1991). However, it is developments in the Transkei and Ciskei that are of relevance for this study.

As pointed out, Matanzima retained the state of emergency from the 1960s to the 1980s. Because of that and the fact that Matanzima reigned supreme, the national unrests did not have a major impact on developments in the Transkei (Ntsebeza, 1993). According to Peires (1992), trade unions and the United Democratic Front could not establish a foothold in the Bantustan.

On 26 October 1976, the Transkei was declared an independent state under Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima followed by Ciskei in 1981. As already pointed out, at the centre of the scheme for creating the homelands was a strategy to ensure control of rural people through a co-opted African middle class that became dependent on the South African government (Southall, 1977; Molteno, 1977). Although Peires argues that the Transkeian black middle class was not that strongly dependent on South Africa because the ruling elite in Transkei turned against South Africa in 1987 when Holomisa took over power (1992:366), it is difficult to disagree with Southall and Molteno, particularly given the way in which the Transkei ruling elite immediately put state machinery into action when members of the opposition were detained between 25 June and September 1976 (Horrell et al., 1977:120).⁷² The Democratic Party (DP), under the leadership of Knowledge Guzana, was the opposition party. The DP, together with other opposition parties, was met with brutal might by K.D. Matanzima. Just before the attainment of independence, leaders of the opposition, such as Ncokazi, Mgudlwa, Xobololo and Nkosiyanane, were thrown into detention (Horrell et al., 1977:242-3). In addition, leaders of “many Sotho-speaking people with homes in the Transkeian territory” who “campaigns for the right of Sotho areas to secede from the Transkei before it became independent” were also detained (ibid:243). It is, therefore, true to say that the attainment of independence by the Transkei was surrounded by tensions between those who pushed for it and those opposed to it. However, as Ntsebeza (1993) and Peires (1992) have argued, Matanzima was so ruthless that the opposition was mercilessly crushed. Peires even shows that the United Democratic Front (UDF) and trade unions never took root during Matanzima’s reign.

Impact on the developments on social groups and social relations

The declaration of Transkei as an independent homeland marked a turning point in the development of the African middle class. To start with, the South African government provided technical support to the Transkei, at the time of its independence. In preparation for independence, Matanzima requested the South African government to assist in training Transkeian citizens that would fill government posts at independence. Included among these posts were “Heads and Assistant Heads of departments”.⁷³ He created opportunities for the middle class to accumulate property. For instance, the Transkei government zoned Mthatha “for occupation and acquisition by Bantu persons in terms of Proclamation R. 195 of 1976”.⁷⁴ In addition to the acquisition of formerly white-owned properties in Mthatha by

⁷² These were people who opposed the declaration of Transkei an independent state.

⁷³ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 35.

⁷⁴ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 36.

Africans, the Transkei government embarked on a housing development programme in Mthatha and Butterworth, setting aside 1 200 erven for housing development in Mthatha and 833 erven for Msobomvu in Butterworth.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Transkei National Building Society provided R29 million in loans to Transkeians who wanted to build houses. Additional housing developments occurred during the 1980/81 financial year in Southernwood and Fort Gale. The massive housing development should be viewed in the context of a workforce of close to 7 000 African civil servants employed in the Transkei already by 1977, in addition to members of the legislature.

Thus, the Transkei independence created a large middle class that became urban property owners and salaried government employees. This middle class also had links with the countryside. Some members invested in properties and livestock in rural areas. Furthermore, through the Transkei Development Corporation (TDC), the government provided loans to Transkeians to either purchase or develop their own businesses. By March 1977, the TDC had provided loans to the value of R163 525.⁷⁶ In the following financial year the loans amounted to R71 455 674. Some Transkeian residents ventured into businesses such as transportation and farming, while others entered the hospitality industry by purchasing hotels, holiday resorts, and different kinds of industries, or opened up garages, wholesales and trading stores.⁷⁷ Some of these business ventures were in rural areas and or owned by people who retained links with the rural areas. The increase in the amount of loans dished out shows the aggressiveness with which the Transkei government undertook the process of promoting entrepreneurial development. By March 1981, the TDC had invested R42 962 000 in premises for industrial development and R39 534 000 for residential development. Thus, there was growth of African-owned industries in the Transkei from thirty five in 1976 to eighty six in 1981. And, among its achievements during that year, the TDC listed the transfer of eight garages to Transkeians and the establishment of four wholesale stores.⁷⁸

To ensure the growth of the traders as a social group, the TDC also provided bursaries for Transkeian children to study at the University of Transkei (now Walter Sisulu University [WSU]).⁷⁹ In other

⁷⁵ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 10.

⁷⁶ Income Statement for the year ended 31 March 1977. See pp. 8. In file on the Transkei Development Corporation. Financial Statements. 1976-1977, 1977-1978, 1982-1983. UCT Library, Government Publications Section

⁷⁷ Report of the Chairman on the Financial Statements of Transkei Development Corporation Limited for the Financial Year Ended 31 March 1978. Transkei Development Corporation. Financial Statements. 1976-1977, 1977-1978, 1982-1983. TDC was chaired by F.S.J. Maritz. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

⁷⁸ Annual Report by the Board of Directors for the Financial Year ended 31 March 1981. Transkei Development Corporation. Annual Report. 1981. See pp. 10. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

⁷⁹ Chairman's Statement. Audited Accounts for Year Ended 31st March 1983. Transkei Development Corporation. Financial Statements. 1976-1977, 1977-1978, 1982-1983. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

words the government did not only create opportunities for existing traders, but it also provided a means to ensure that they reproduced themselves. The Transkei government's aggressive investment in entrepreneurial development also led to the promotion of local residents into senior management positions in industries that developed in the Transkei, as the chairman of the TDC confirmed in his report in 1983.⁸⁰

Similar investments in entrepreneurial development in the Ciskei led to the development of African traders and business people. In 1976, the former reserve leadership established the Ciskei National Development Corporation (CNDC), which provided R400 000 for training local businessmen and to create jobs for local people. Indeed, one thousand full-time jobs, as well as one thousand part-time jobs, were created as a result of this intervention. A further fifty positions were created for apprentices to help to develop traders.⁸¹ In its 1981 report, the CNDC highlighted five business ventures that were handed over to Ciskeian people. These included the Masonic Hotel in Whittlesea and the Peddie Hotel. By the end of 1981, the Corporation had invested R124 million in industrial development projects, infra-structure, community services, business development and housing, transport, commerce and agriculture. Industrial development took up the largest share (R59 million) of the funds.⁸²

It should be noted that some members of the middle class were also livestock owners. Through personal experience, one is reminded of the Kama family in Cala that was involved in trading, but also owned livestock, as well as the Sigwela, Solundwana and Nxiweni families that were both teachers and livestock owners. Thus, the middle class pursued multiple livelihood strategies among which were land-based livelihoods.

The governments of both Bantustans also invested in agricultural development, which contributed to the continuation of land-based livelihoods in some rural areas. Archival evidence shows that the Ciskei government employed two strategies – development of infrastructure and human resource development. Firstly, it invested in agricultural infra-structure such as training facilities and irrigation schemes. In line with that, in 1977, the homeland also built hostel facilities for the Fort Cox Agricultural College. Irrigation systems were developed in Keiskammahoek and Peddie, and the Ciskei government settled “*bona fide*” farmers “on economic-sized holdings under irrigation”.⁸³

⁸⁰ Chairman's Statement. Audited Accounts for Year Ended 31st March 1983. Transkei Development Corporation. Financial Statements. 1976-1977, 1977-1978, 1982-1983.

⁸¹ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 57.

⁸² Ciskeian National Development Corporation LTD. 1982 Sixth Annual Report. See pp. 6 and 7.

⁸³ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 57.

Secondly, the Ciskei government embarked on training, setting up organisations of farmers, and providing farmer support systems. In its farmer training programme, the Ciskei government consciously promoted women's involvement in agricultural development. For instance, women were included in the intake of Fort Cox College in 1977. The inclusion of women in agriculture is significant because, traditionally, women had not been considered for careers in agriculture, this having been regarded as a career for males.⁸⁴ The government also invested in the development of farmer co-operatives. By 1977, there were 20 registered co-operatives in Ciskei. Furthermore, the government provided credit facilities for farmers in order to stimulate agricultural development and introduced extension services that provided farmers with information to improve agricultural methods.⁸⁵ Lastly, the Ciskei homeland government also promoted dry-land farming. Drought resistant seeds were introduced into areas where there was no irrigation.⁸⁶ The introduction of drought resistant crops was also a response to an immediate experience: from 1982 to 1984 South Africa experienced the most severe drought in history.⁸⁷ The Ciskei government targeted livestock production as part of its scheme to promote agricultural development. The Ciskei livestock industry had been credited with contributing "more to the national income than any other enterprise". That was why emphasis was "laid on improving and raising livestock production".⁸⁸ In villages such as Keiskammahoe, some rural residents were still involved in the trading of local produce such as wool. These interventions add credence to the argument about a shift in land use towards livestock production in the reserves. In the context of Ciskei, economic benefits from livestock seem also to have influenced the shift. It can thus be seen that there was still a social group that was involved in both crop and livestock production in the Ciskei in the 1980s. The group might not have been large, but it existed. The group also included women.

In the 1980s, the Ciskei government also took a keen interest on the homeland's youth. In 1983, the government set up a commission to "consider the problems of youth in Ciskei. In particular, the high proportion of pupils who leave school from Standard 2 onwards, and their subsequent frustration and lack of direction was at issue".⁸⁹ The commission, which was led by Prof. J.A. Lambrecht (Rector of the University of Fort Hare), further helped in designing an intervention strategy for the government. Among the commission's proposals, was the "setting up of a youth movement". It argued that the

⁸⁴ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 56. UCT main Library. Government Publications Section.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 57. Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ New Horizons and Opportunities for Ciskeian Youth. Report of an Ad Hoc Committee appointed by His Excellency the President. See pp. 1. UCT main library. Government Publications Section.

youth movement should be built along the lines of similar initiatives in Israel, Malawi and Swaziland.

The concerns about youth in Ciskei should be viewed against the backdrop of discussions around youth development between leaders from various former reserves and the South African government in 1980. It seems that these discussions were also part of a broader discussion taking place nationally about youth in South Africa. Given the central role that the youth played in political developments in the 1970s, their future had become an issue of concern. As can be expected, the discussions about young people at this time often reflected differing perceptions about the youth. One view regarded young people as a lost generation (Bundy, 1992). In other circles, young people were referred to as heroes or villains (Seekings, 2006:1). Ntsebeza (1993:1) regarded the youth a heterogeneous group that “divided into various categories which at times interact with one another, but are at time antagonistic to each other”. Importantly, the fact that there were concerns about youth development indicates that youth was a social group that could no longer be ignored.

By the mid-1970s, some young matriculants and university graduates were employed by the Ciskei Territorial Authority (CTA) (Ntsebeza, *ibid.*:94-5), marking the incorporation of youth into the African middle class. Moreover, the emergence of job opportunities in the civil services of the two homelands influenced Manona (1999) to argue that a shift away from agrarian land use to non-agrarian land uses was occurring in rural areas. Specifically, Manona has argued that rural people are more interested in land for housing and jobs than in agricultural land. Yet, the evidence provided here shows that while rural people may have taken jobs in the civil service and border industries, they did not abandon their land-based livelihoods. As indicated, some sections of the middle class were also arable landholders.

Side by side with the investments the homelands made, a section of people opposed to the Transkei independence became landless, further swelling the group of the already landless. Immediately after Transkei independence, Matanzima started negotiations with the South African government about the incorporation of Lady Frere and Herschel into the homeland. Lady Frere, which, up to 1976, had been part of the Ciskei homeland, was incorporated into Transkei through Proclamation R.179 of 1976.⁹⁰ Although this meant additional land to the Transkei, it is its implications to the residents of Lady Frere and Herschel that make the development important. The residents of the two areas were unwillingly declared Transkeian citizens overnight. One of the consequences of this development

⁹⁰ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 36. UCT main library. Government Publications Section.

was the movement of about 3 000 families out of the two areas to villages in Ciskei in 1976.⁹¹ A further 35 000 people left the Transkei for Ciskei in 1977.⁹² Wotshela (2004) shows that the estimated number of people who relocated out of Glen Grey and Herschel to the Ciskei in the mid-1970s was 65 000. These were families that did not want to be under Matanzima's rule. These emigrants to Ciskei were moved to different areas of the already overcrowded homeland. For instance, 25 300 people settled in Thornhill in March 1977. Thornhill was newly released land expropriated from white farmers in the Queenstown district and incorporated into the Ciskei Bantustan. Another group of 12 600 people went to the Pavet-Bushy Park area (Gordon, et al., 1978:349). Yet another group of 19 610 people was moved from South Africa to the Ciskei in 1979/80. This included the removal of a community near Humansdorp to the Keiskamma valley in Ciskei. By the late 1980s, a total of 142 000 people had been moved to the Ciskei (Davenport, 1991:405). As with all other groups, these could not be allocated arable land upon arrival in Ciskei, because of overcrowding. They became part of the growing group of landless people, whose only access to land was their residential sites and communal grazing land. In this way, the independence of Transkei contributed to an increase in the size of the group of landless people in Ciskei.

Linked to the growth in landlessness was an increase in impoverished households, which in turn, resorted to wage labour. Thus, by the early 1980s, Transkei and Bophuthatswana were supplying the highest number of wage workers to South Africa from the homelands, against, for example, Venda, as can be seen in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Migrant workers in South Africa from the Transkei, in 1980

Industry	South Africa	Transkei	Bophuthatswana	Venda
Agriculture	630 489	80 010	82 384	14 467
Mining and quarrying	400 747	177 838	75 086	7 717
Manufacturing	718 471	64 756	86 149	13 505
Construction	361 558	53 089	42 950	7 530
Wholesale and retail trade	371 898	27 540	64 154	9 013
Government services	485 926	55 673	63 247	13 680
Domestic services	682 279	64 613	133 513	11 634
Other	354 541	31 448	65 933	8 308
Totals	4 005 909	554 967	613 416	85 854

Adapted by author from "Report of the DBAD for the period 1 April 1979 to 31 March 1980. pp 28-9.

However, the fact that a large section of the former reserve population was migrant workers did not affect livestock numbers, which remained unchanged in various areas of the Transkei up to the 1990s (Ainslie, 2002; Kepe, 2002; Ntsebeza, 2002). Kepe (2002:63) shows that, in the 1980s, there were

⁹¹ Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 57. Ibid.

⁹² Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977. See pp. 59

still migrant workers who invested in cattle in Lusikisiki. In an attempt to explain why cattle numbers in the area remained almost the same into the 1990s, he argues that, because cattle were still cheap, it was possible for the workers to buy them. Kepe further shows that about fifty per cent of Lusikisiki households still owned cattle in the late 1980s. Fifteen per cent of the households owned more than ten head (Kepe, 2002:68). The point here is that despite the fact that the majority of the rural population were migrant workers, they invested in cattle production. Thus, besides the middle class that used access to government salaries and business opportunities to accumulate resources and properties, the ever-growing group of migrant workers made use of their wages also to accumulate livestock.

While many landless people in the Ciskei turned to wage labour for their livelihoods, some people died from malnutrition (Gordon et al., 1978:350). The removals of the late 1970s to 1980s led to a crisis of acute landlessness in the late 1980s, which led to land occupations.

Chronic landlessness and the land occupations

By the late 1980s rural landlessness had reached chronic levels. This was due to natural population growth and the relocations of the ex-farm workers in the 1970s to rural areas (Adams, et. al., 1995). The relocations of ex-farm workers were retrenched farm workers as result of an economic crisis that existed from 1974 to 1986 who, as usual, moved to rural areas (Cooper, 1987, Stadler, 1987; Gelb, 1987). The economic crisis also led to retrenchments of migrant workers (Gelb, 1987; Drew, 1995), some of whom returned to their rural areas. The effects of landlessness were that both the children of quit-rent titleholders and *amalose* could not access residential and arable land in some rural areas, hence the desperate situation. On the other hand, rural areas were also a home to migrant workers that were still at work and young people that studied in urban areas, who spent their holidays in these rural areas. Both the migrant workers and the students—who were active in urban struggles through unions and student organisations—used their experiences to influence rural struggles. In Xhalanga migrant workers such as Gwede Mantashe, Moses Mayekiso, Enoch Gondongwana, Mbulelo Ngamlana and Amos Mlungwana, working with the youth, exploited the desperate situation of landlessness to mobilise rural people around the struggle for residential land in the late 1980s and 1990s (Ntsebeza, 2006). The rural struggles later developed into land occupations, initially in Cala town, but later spreading into various other villages in Xhalanga (ibid.:239-43). That is how both the youth and migrant workers took centre stage in political developments in the small towns and rural villages in the late 1980s (Ntsebeza, 2006; Manona, 1999).

In some instances the rural struggles for access to residential land were also combined with the demand for the democratisation of governance in rural areas. For instance, in the Ciskei, one of the significant developments during the Gqozo era was the popular resistance of rural residents to headmen in Ciskei, because of their association with corruption and apartheid (Manona, 1999:7). In villages such as Melani, headmen were removed and replaced with residents associations, an organisational form that was on the rise since the late 1980s. Similar developments occurred in the villages of Transkei, where headmen were pressurised into resigning and were replaced with elected local leaders. An elected headman was installed, for example, in the village of Mnxe in Xhalanga in the early 1990s (Ntsebeza, 2006:240-1). In some villages of Transkei, the move to pressurise headmen was linked to high levels of landlessness and land occupations. As an expression of their need for land, residents demarcated residential sites from grazing land in the 1990s (Ntsebeza, 2006; Ncapayi, 2010).

What is significant is that there was a close relationship between migrant workers, the youth and landless people in rural areas, with the three groups working together to deal with the problem of landlessness. This alliance between urban-based youth and migrant workers, on the one hand, and the landless people in the villages, on the other, also confirms that there is a section of migrant workers that never cut its relations with rural areas.

At the same time, unemployment had become the dominant feature of the South African economy. Rural areas were not immune to this phenomenon. Bank (undated:25) points out that areas such as Flagstaff, Bizana, Lusikisiki, Elliotdale and Willowvale were experiencing high unemployment levels by the mid-1990s. He attributes the rise in unemployment in the Eastern Cape to retrenchments in the mines and the closure of the border industries in the province (undated:25). Retrenched men “returned to their rural homes, and after an initial period of adjusting to rural life, have become involved in ‘building the umzi’ as agricultural workers rather than migrant labourers” (ibid.:29).

This argument creates an impression that there was a stage when migrant workers disassociated from their rural areas and land-use practices, when, as argued above, this has not been the general case. It has been argued in this study that it is precisely because a section of migrant workers did not lose contact with land-based livelihoods but continued to invest in farming and to maintain an interest in rural lifestyles, that it was possible for them to pursue land-based livelihoods when they ceased to be wage earners. Therefore former migrant workers did not transform themselves into producers in rural areas, but rather continued to pursue an interest that some had maintained all along, particularly in the form of livestock production.

By the early 1990s, gender relations in many households, too, had undergone dramatic changes. Women had become decision-makers in their households. Manona shows that in the village of Melani in Ciskei, about fifty per cent of households were women-headed. Some of these households were led by widows (1999:11). He also shows that women were dominant in informal economic activities in the village, such as informal trading, which included livestock trading. Women led households were not peculiar to Melani. The 1991/92 Annual Report of the Transkei government shows that, through the Transkei Agricultural Corporation (Tracor), the homeland promoted the development of women agricultural groups in rural areas like Qamata. However, these were mainly small projects, such as communal gardens, poultry projects, etc. The promotion of communal gardens should be viewed in relation to the overcrowding and conversion of arable land into grazing land in some villages of Transkei. Because the communal gardens were fenced, production became concentrated in them. This also shows that food production had really declined by the mid-1990s.

Women were not only confined to small agricultural projects in the reserves, they also played a critical role in the land struggles of the early 1990s that culminated in land occupations. Ntsebeza has noted in the context of the former Xhalinga magisterial district that in villages like Mnxé, powerful women, such as Madeyi Mguli, were not only household heads but were also central in the politics of the district in the 1990s. There were many others, such as Nolungile Mkwayi in Manzana, who were members of the residents associations and were also deeply involved in rural politics in the early 1990s (Ntsebeza, 2006:243).

Therefore, by the early 1990s, social groups in the rural areas comprised of a small group of landholders, the middle class, a group of landless people, an organised youth, and women. Migrant workers, landless people (women included) and the youth had developed working relations and had a common goal of fighting for access to residential land as one of their aims. However, as a result, antagonistic relations had developed between these groups, on the one hand, and, on the other, some landholders and middle class members, especially those in the civil service, who felt that these developments threatened their land rights. It can thus be clearly seen how land influenced social relations in rural areas. Despite these developments, land-based livelihoods continued to persist, especially livestock production.

Conclusion

It has been shown in this chapter that land continued to influence social relations in rural areas up to the advent of democracy in 1994. This is despite the marked escalation of landlessness in the former reserves from the 1960s. When rural areas became exceedingly overcrowded, African people made an

unplanned, but necessary, switch from crop farming to livestock production, which cut across class and social groups including *amalose*, from the 1960s. This switch in land use practices in the 1960s is illustrated by the fact that, despite overcrowding in the reserves, livestock numbers did not change drastically between the 1960s and the 1990s. Therefore, the switch in land use did not mean that rural people were less interested in crop production. Rather, it was an adaptation that rural people were forced to make in response to the circumstances in which they found themselves. Given their continued use of land for livestock production, it has been maintained that rural people showed interest in agricultural land despite the difficulties with which they were confronted.

It has also been argued that, contrary to the view that rural people had shifted away from agrarian land use practices, land-based livelihoods persisted and land remained important in the lives of rural people. The view in the literature on the shift away from land-based livelihoods overlooks the switch some rural people made in their land-use practices in the 1960s, from crop production to livestock production. Thus, while many rural residents took up job opportunities, some among them continued to invest in land-based livelihoods through livestock production. This explains why livestock numbers remained almost unchanged despite overcrowding in the reserves. Thus, land continued to be important in social relations in rural areas.

The re-emergence of chiefs and headmen in rural areas and the state's role in supporting them meant that traditional authorities became influential in political developments in the homelands from the 1960s. During the period of self-government, they played a prominent role in the apartheid homeland structures of self-rule, controlling people on behalf of the apartheid regime. During the period of the so-called independent homelands, some of these traditional authorities formed part of the ruling elite in these areas. Side-by-side with them were sections of the African middle class, which were incorporated into the homeland ruling elite, as well as into the bureaucracy. The period was marked by a phenomenal growth of the black middle class in the homelands, as the homeland governments supported a group of African traders to take over previously white-owned businesses.

When landlessness reached crucial levels in the early 1990s, *amalose*, migrant workers, women and the youth, jointly waged a struggle for access to residential land. By the late 1980s, landless people were unable to access land even for residential purposes, which affected not only *amalose* but also children of the local people. This situation made it possible for members of the different social groups to form an alliance and wage the struggle. Significantly, in some cases, women became part of the leadership in the struggle. As the case study will illustrate, many of the women that joined and supported the rural land struggles developed into powerful leaders, who were to become influential in land struggles during the period of democracy.

In this chapter it has been shown how some of the social groups were transformed, for example, migrant workers and the landless people. The group of migrant workers was no longer restricted to the poor residents, but also included some members of the middle class. Both groups were involved in internal and external migration. The *amalose* ceased to exist in areas where there were land occupations, as every resident had access to residential sites. However, landlessness was not eradicated, as a number of rural people still did not have access to arable land.

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CHAPTER 5

Social Groups in the Lumphaphasi Administrative

Area – up to 1913

Introduction

The case study of Lumphaphasi is presented with a view to grounding the theoretical concepts—proletarianisation, de-agrarianisation and re-peasantisation—to practical situations and as an illustration of the historical changes in social relations as discussed in the previous chapters. The case study aptly demonstrates the critical role of land in the definition of social relations. All three theses are challenged. The proletarianisation thesis has argued that land-based livelihoods were no longer important by the 1930s, as the majority of the rural people had become wage workers (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979). The case study shows that, while the majority of rural residents had, by the 1930s, become migrant workers, some of them, especially the quit-rent titleholders, continued with agrarian lifestyles until the late 1960s.

Furthermore, it also takes issue with the concept of diversification of livelihoods and the claim that rural residents have less interest in agrarian activities as espoused in the de-agrarianisation debate. The case study shows that diversification of livelihoods did not start in the 1980s as the scholars claim (Bryceson, 1997), but was a phenomenon going back to the late 19th century. It also shows that, although there was decline in crop production in the late 1960s, the continued livestock production in rural areas signals the resilience of land-based livelihoods, even if in decline.

However, the resilience of agrarian lifestyles does not mean that peasants have re-emerged in Lumphaphasi, as the re-peasantisation scholars argue (Moyo and Yeros, 2005a). Indeed, peasants no longer exist in the village and the study shows that rural people consist of diverse social groups. Moreover, it disagrees with the view that those who want land during the period of land reform are retrenched workers (Hernandes, 2005). In Lumphaphasi, the land reform beneficiaries are not a homogenous group of retrenched workers; various social groups are represented, and even these groups are not homogenous in themselves. Among the beneficiaries are descendants of the quit-rent titleholders (most of whom had been migrant workers), ex-farm workers (some of them retrenched but others affected by the removals) and some youth.

The case study consists of four chapters. This, being the first one, focuses on processes that influenced the formation of social groups as well as the shaping of social relations in Lumphaphasi. The chapter shows how the various governments manipulated access to land to influence the formation of social groups and how those groups related to each other. It shows how recommendations of the Thembuland Commission in 1883 laid the foundations for the emergence of social groups in this area. Bundy (1979) has argued that, by 1913, rural areas were degenerating into rural slums, creating an impression that rural people were a homogenous group. Yet, this chapter shows that, by 1913, the African farmers and peasants still existed and were still involved in land-based livelihoods. The African farmers and peasants emerged from the land allocations of the Commission. At the same time, poor residents that were left with limited land became migrant workers from the 1880s. In many ways, the Thembuland Commission was central in the development of the differentiated community of Lumphaphasi up to 1913.

The chapter consists of three sections: the origins of Lumphaphasi; land allocation and the resultant social groups; the Gun War and the Thembuland Commission and social differentiation; response of Xhalanga residents to the Commission recommendations; impact of the recommendations on social relations; gold discovery and the Glen Grey Act; effects of the mineral discoveries and the Glen Grey Act and land tenure issue during the Union Government up to the promulgation of the Natives Land Act in 1913.

Origins of Lumphaphasi

As pointed out in Chapter 1, Lumphaphasi is one of the administrative areas of the Xhalanga district. Although it has not been possible to find the exact date of the establishment of Lumphaphasi, archival records indicate that by the 1870s it was already in existence.⁹³ Its establishment in 1865 is directly linked to the history of conquest and the relocation of communities from the Glen Grey District (see Chapter 1). This was after colonialists had defeated Chief Sarhili and forced him, after 1858, to vacate Emigrant Thembuland, of which Xhalanga was part. As Figure 2 below shows, Xhalanga was the northern part of the area between the Indwe River and boundary line separating Emigrant Thembuland and Thembuland Proper. In other words, Xhalanga was the northern section of Emigrant Thembuland. As the colonial authorities had an interest in establishing themselves in the Glen Grey district, they used the opportunity that the conquest of Sarhili and the freeing up of his land presented to persuade chiefs in Glen Grey to move to Emigrant Thembuland (Theal, 1910; Ntsebeza, 2006). It was hoped that offering Emigrant Thembuland to the Glen Grey chiefs would convince all the inhabitants of Glen

Grey to move (Ntsebeza, 2006:39). Yet, only four chiefs – Ndarhala, Matanzima, Gecelo and Stokwe – moved while four other chiefs remained behind. They were: Zenzile of the amaNdungwane, Mpangele of the amaGcina, Gungubele of the amaTshatshu and Nonesi of the amaHala.⁹⁴

Except for Ndarhala, all the chiefs that moved from Glen Grey were junior in terms of lineage. When they willingly took up the offer to move out of Glen Grey, they saw it as an opportunity to establish themselves as chiefs (Ntsebeza, 2006:39). Gecelo, as a case in point, was a regent who held power on behalf of Mpangele. When Mpangele came of age and was ready to take over the leadership of his chiefdom, Gecelo was reluctant to relinquish power. Thus, Gecelo left Glen Grey in the midst of a struggle for power with Mpangele, with very few of the amaGcina following him (Theal, 1894:110).


Although current literature indicates that after being vacated by Chief Sarhili Xhalanga was taken over by Chief Gecelo (Ntsebeza, 2006), archival evidence shows that originally Gecelo was to occupy Southeyville, while Chief Stokwe was to occupy Xhalanga. When giving evidence to the Commission on 8 November 1882, Joseph Warner (Tembu Agent) pointed out that, initially Xhalanga was supposed to have been occupied by Stokwe. An agreement between Stokwe and Gecelo, which he (Warner) supported, resulted in the two exchanging the land.⁹⁵

⁹³ Report and proceedings of the Tembuland Commission with Appendices and Maps. Vol. 1. (G. 66-`83). UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Minutes of evidence. Report and proceedings of the Tembuland Commission with Appendices and Maps. Vol. 1. (G. 66-`83). UCT Library, Government Publications Section. See pp. 5.

Figure 1



Map taken from the Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1886

Before moving to Emigrant Thembuland the four chiefs set conditions that, if they were to relocate, “their independence should be guaranteed”; payment of their stipends should continue; and they “should enjoy all the privileges they then possessed” (Theal, 1910:46). The issue of the independence of the chiefs has importance as will be remembered from Chapter 2 that, at the time of colonial contact, African people in the Cape were organised around independent chiefdoms. Therefore, by asserting their independence, the chiefs were following their tradition. As will be shown, when the colonial magistrates threatened their independence, some chiefs from the Thembu chiefdom fought against the colonialists in the Gun War of 1880-1881.

Upon arrival in Xhalanga, Gecelo invited the amaMfengu and abaThembu, who were not necessarily his followers, to take up land in the sparsely-populated Xhalanga district, of which Lumphasi was

part.⁹⁶ His aim was to build his support base. Local people recall their grandparents telling them that Lumphaphasi started with fewer than fifteen families. They also remembered being told that the first people to arrive in the village were the Mankayi, Tyhuluba, Khalipha, Lande, Shude, Chewu, Nyambali, Stuurman and Ngcukayithobi families.⁹⁷ The fact that archival records corroborate some of the names mentioned above means that these families must have arrived during Gecelo's reign, for example, Solomon Khalipha arrived in 1872. As will be shown later, Khalipha features as a prominent figure in the early history of Lumphaphasi.

In the main, Chief Gecelo granted large portions of land to the amaMfengu and abaThembu, while allocating smaller pieces of land to his followers within the communal areas (Ntsebeza, 2006:40). Like the amaMfengu, the abaThembu had already been exposed to the influence of the missionaries in Glen Grey, which had been under colonial rule since 1857 (Theal, 1910:277). This, therefore, means that Gecelo allocated most of the land to *amagqobhoka*.⁹⁸ Because Gecelo granted the amaMfengu and abaThembu large land portions in order to solicit their support, he was accused of colluding with the colonialists who endorsed Gecelo's land allocations as his actions were in line with their intention to promote the development of independent African farmers.

Indeed, Solomon Khalipha, who Bundy counts as one of the prominent African peasants in 1882 (1979:93), was part of the group of people that were given the land in Lumphaphasi. Born in 1835, into the amaYirha clan, Solomon Khalipha was a prominent producer. He arrived in Lumphaphasi in 1872, became a headman from 1877 until 1906.⁹⁹ He was also a very influential leader in the struggles for freehold titles in Xhalanga (See also Ntsebeza, 2006). Solomon died at the age of 88 in 1923.¹⁰⁰

Land allocation and social groups in Lumphaphasi: 1865-1880s

When some scholars wrote about rural societies in the 19th century, they tended to emphasise the actions of better-off peasants and place less importance on the poorer sections (Bundy, 1979; Beinart and Bundy, 1987). Consequently, the emergence of a group of large landholders (farmers and peasants) in African societies in the Eastern Cape in the late 19th century received much attention from scholars and overshadowed the existence of other social groups. This view is aptly captured by Beinart and

⁹⁶ Archival records reflect that by 1877 Lumphaphasi was already part of the Xhalanga district. See CMT – 983 – Correspondence files – No. 2/00-2196 – 1906, and the letter titled “Award of retiring allowance to Headman S. Khalipha, Xhalanga”. See also CMT 3/591, Cape Archives.

⁹⁷ Interview of Sunduza Nkomana in Lumphaphasi on 8/5/2010, and telephone communication with Zwelinzima Dyantyi on 15/8/2010.

⁹⁸ The term “*amagqobhoka*” has been explained in Chapter 2.

⁹⁹ CMT. 3/188. Cape Archives.

¹⁰⁰ Dates inscribed on Solomon Khalipha's tombstone on his farm in Lumphaphasi.

Bundy (1987:3) who, in reference to African societies in the 19th century, argued that “by and large rural families retained access to land and continued to produce crops and keep livestock” (ibid). The statement creates an impression of homogenous rural communities with the same access to land. It hides inequalities that included unequal access to arable land. The inequalities are, however captured by Molteno, who observed that in the 1860s, the process of proletarianisation existed side-by-side with the “emergence of a relatively prosperous African agrarian bourgeoisie” in African societies (1977:17; see also Lewis, 1984).

Likewise, residents of Xhalanga and its villages were not homogenous (Ntsebeza, 2006). They were divided ethnically, socially and along class lines. Three factors account for the division of Africans in Xhalanga – land allocation, colonial intervention through the Thembuland Commission, and drought. The first groups of people in Lumphaphasi were from different clans, such as the amaQwathi, amaQwambe, amaGcina and amaYirha (Ncapayi, 2010).

Xhalanga residents further divided socially along the *amagqobhoka*, which, in general, referred to the amaMfengu and abaThembu, and the *amaqaba*, a reference to the amaGcina, who were Gecelo’s people (Ntsebeza, 2006:43).¹⁰¹ The social divisions were in line with divisions in other areas of the Eastern Cape, as shown in Chapter 2.

The land Gecelo granted to the *amagqobhoka* enabled some of them to become prosperous. Solomon Khalipha is a good example. As already indicated he came from the amaYirha clan and acquired 872 morgen of land in Lumphaphasi in 1872.¹⁰² He was an honorary member of the “Emigrant Temboekieland Society for Promoting Civilization” that was formed by the African farmers, through the influence Charles Levey – the Thembu Agent.¹⁰³ Confirming the colonialists’ aim to create a class of African farmers through land allocations, the magistrate of Xhalanga, W.M.G. Cumming, commented in December 1879 that

these men had grown up under the care of the late Mr. Warner, and are pleasing examples of what the native may become under judicious training. They were located on farms, and the right of occupation was secured to them so long as they remained in the country. It is a pity this policy was not more generally adopted, for the result has brought out into obvious prominence the wisdom of it. There is a vast difference between the condition of these native farmers, and that of the people who were left unreservedly under the control of chiefs. Being virtually

¹⁰¹ Minutes of Evidence in the Thembuland Commission (G.66-`83). UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ See report of the Thembu Agent dated 4th January 1877. The report is titled “Report of a meeting of native farmers, resident in this district held at this office, on 22nd and 23rd December 1876”. See pp. 105. Blue Book on Native Affairs. 1877

independent of the chiefs, and freed by their early training from the trammels which custom and tradition have imposed on other natives, they have advanced in wealth and material prosperity ... (also cited in Ntsebeza, 2006).¹⁰⁴

Although Gecelo and the colonial magistrates collaborated in the allocation of land, they did not have the same motives. These aside, however, the central point is that the way in which land was allocated in the late 19th century contributed to making social inequalities stark in Xhalanga and its villages, including Luphaphasi. Land allocation had an immense economic impact on the land grantees. Within a space of four years, from 1872 when the grants were made, to 1876, the African farmers were able to report positively on improvements they had made on their properties. For instance, in a meeting with Levey – the Thembu Agent in Cofimvaba – in 1876, Solomon Khalipha reported the following improvements: a square house and several out-buildings, two kraals; planted 200 fruit trees, four bags of wheat, three and half bags of oats and one bag of potatoes.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Paulus Madliwa highlighted a square house, 222 peach trees, built a watercourse, stone kraal, fenced garden, ploughed thirty-six acres of wheat, and one bag of potatoes.¹⁰⁶

That the farmers were prospering was not accidental, it was due to the support they received from the government. In the same meeting, Levey also introduced the need to form the Xhalanga Native Farmers Association to help the farmers implement the desired improvements. Government support to the farmers would also come through their farmers' association. This meant that the association was exclusively established for the African farmers, and this implied that the colonialists' primary concern was the development of these farmers.

At a social level, the unequal land allocations generated much resentment and strained relations in Xhalanga. The marginalised residents of Xhalanga resented the process and questioned Gecelo about his actions. In his recollections, Gecelo's head-councillor – Jim – told the Thembuland Commission that the amaGcina used to complain: “[H]ow is it you, Gecelo, allow the Fingoes to come in, although the ground is not sufficient for us ...?”¹⁰⁷ Jim also recounted the words of Fuma, another resident, who protested; “[H]ow is it, you place school people on our commonage, where shall our stock graze?”¹⁰⁸ Gecelo's people on communal land felt that there was not enough grazing land. Lewis (1984:23), who points out that the poor and young people in Xhalanga “were up in arms” against Gecelo for alienating

¹⁰⁴ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.33-79). See pp. 91. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹⁰⁵ See report of the Thembu Agent dated 4th January 1877. The report is titled “Report of a meeting of native farmers, resident in this district held at this office, on 22nd and 23rd December 1876”. Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.12-77). See pp. 104. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. See pp. 103.

¹⁰⁷ Minutes of Evidence in the Thembuland Commission (G.66-83). See pp. 29-30. UCT Library, Government Publications Section

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. See pp. 32.

land to other people, confirms the tense relations between Gecelo and his subjects. This also shows that during the early stages of colonial contact the *amagqobhoka* developed at the expense of *amaqaba*. I draw a distinction between the *amagqobhoka* and the school people. The *amagqobhoka* were converts to Christianity, while school people referred to people who, in addition to being converts, had attended mission schools. Although Solomon Khalipha was regarded as an *igqobhoka*, there is no indication in archival material that he went to school. For instance, he used an X to sign documents.¹⁰⁹ The example of Solomon Khalipha who, despite being neither Mfengu nor Thembu, managed to access a large portion of land, shows that it was not entirely accurate that it was only the amaMfengu and abaThembu who had access to large land portions. It is clear, though, that by the late 1870s, enormous class and social divisions had developed amongst the people of Xhalanga and its villages, such as Lumphaphasi.

Gecelo's response to the concerns also contributed to the strained relations between him and the group of *amaqaba*. Instead of listening to their concerns, Gecelo threatened to chase away those who were critical of his actions. Gecelo also benefitted directly from the land allocations. According to Levey, Gecelo's subjects received land only after paying the "chief two or three head of cattle, or a fine horse".¹¹⁰ This example of the way Gecelo acted seems to confirm the point Ntsebeza makes in his book, *Democracy compromised* (2006), about the undemocratic nature of traditional authorities and the fact that they derived their power from their control over land, as well as protection by the state.

Besides the residents in the villages, the magistrates were later also unhappy about Gecelo's land allocations. For a different reason, Levey was unhappy that land was being given out indiscriminately, even to people who did not 'deserve' it. According to him, only "thoroughly civilised men" were supposed to get the land.¹¹¹ As far as he was concerned "it was very desirable to build up a class of civilised men who would leaven the rest of the tribe".¹¹² The colonial magistrates expected the recipients of the farms to meet certain obligations: to "erect a house of the value not less than £50, to plant a fruit garden, and to make general improvements, such as making dams and other improvements in civilization".¹¹³ Farmers who met these conditions received certificates, and the magistrates monitored the land grantees' adherence to the standards.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ Minutes of Evidence in the Thembuland Commission (G.66-'83). UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. See pp. 48. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹¹¹ Minutes of Evidence in the Thembuland Commission (G.66-'83). See pp. 48. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Levey explained to the Commissioners terms set for Africans with farms. He claimed that the terms had been known to the farm owners all along.

¹¹⁴ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.12-77). See pp. 104. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

It can thus be seen that, through the manipulation of access to land, social and class divisions emerged in Xhalanga and its villages. Between the district's establishment in 1865 and the late 1870s, broadly two social groups had emerged — the *amaqaba*, with small portions of land within the communal area, and the numerically small group of *amagqobhoka*, with farms owned individually.

The Gun War of 1880-1881, the Thembuland Commission and effects on the local people

Changes caused by the Gun War of 1880-1881 had long-term implications for residents in Xhalanga. Relations between Gecelo and the magistrates became strained, following Gecelo's decision to participate, with other chiefs, in the Gun War, which some chiefs in Thembuland viewed as a war to protect their independence. As shown in Chapter 2, the chiefs were particular about their independence and they never compromised on it. However, as already hinted, the decision to go to war against the colonialists had far-reaching consequences for the residents of Xhalanga. The Thembuland Commission that was set up after the Gun War brought about further social and class divisions and also re-arranged the way in which land was occupied in Xhalanga.¹¹⁵ The Commission, which John Hemming chaired, started its work on 22 September 1882 and produced its report 31 July 1883. Its aim was to “determine upon the settlement and permanent occupation of the territory lately occupied by the Rebel Emigrant Tembus, the portion of Tembuland Proper known as Maxongo's Hoek, and the vacant lands in the District of Gatberg, now known as the District of Maclear”.¹¹⁶

It recommended that the area occupied by Gecelo be moved southwards from the Drakensburg Mountains and that the area to the north of the new boundary line be designated an area for European farmers. Africans with farms in the area earmarked for the European farmers had to relocate to the area to which Gecelo was forced to move. The African landholders who were forced to relocate received “grants of land ... in exchange” for the farms they “vacated to the north” of the boundary line.¹¹⁷ Thus, Gecelo lost the northern part of his land.

In many ways, the land demarcation and allocations after the recommendations of the Thembuland Commission sharpened the differentiation of social groups in Lumphaphasi, and created conducive conditions for the proletarianisation of some residents after the discovery of gold in 1886. Through the Commission, the colonial authorities fostered social divisions among local residents by labelling them ‘loyalists’ and ‘rebels’. People who either did not participate in the Gun War or supported the

¹¹⁵ Report and proceedings of the Tembuland Commission with Appendixes and Maps. Cape Town: Government Printers. Vol. 1. (G. 66-83). UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. See pp. 1.

¹¹⁷ Minutes of Evidence to the Commission (G.66-83). See pp. 2. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

colonialists became ‘loyalists’, while those who fought against the colonial government were labelled ‘rebels’. The loyal Africans farmers were divided into three classes: first, second and third class farmers. On the other hand, the land of the ‘rebels’ was expropriated and they were forced to move to remotest areas of the Xhalanga district. The new categories overrode the social divisions of *amagqobhoka* and *amaqaba* in that the ‘rebels’ came from both groups. However, the majority of the ‘loyalists’ consisted of Africans on individually-owned land. Thus, the Commission’s recommendations overrode the social and class divisions that had existed previously and laid the foundations for future divisions.

The first class farmers were the large landholders who had made the most improvements on their land. They were allocated “land not exceeding 500 morgen” on quit-rent titles. Table 6 below shows the changes in land sizes of the first class farmers.

Name of farmer	Farm sizes in 1870s	Location of farms pre-1883	Farm sizes post-1883
1. Timothy Makiwane	350	Mzwazwa	500
2. Khalipha (senior)	1250	Uziduli stream	500
3. Solomon Khalipha	872	Indwe River	500
4. Paulus Madliwa	740	Indwe River	500
5. Jonas Tiwani	1500	Xhalanga Mission Station	500
6. Jonas Mtengwane	Not indicated	Embokothwa	500
7. Solomon Mayongo	2635	Xhalanga Mission Station	500
8. Maya Bizwa	Not indicated	Embokothwa	500
9. Morris Mxaku	1710	Luphaphasi	500
10. Jantjie Mgcodo	Not indicated	Near Xhalanga	500
11. Kasana	Not indicated	Tsomo River	500
12. W. Kanyana	Not indicated	Sifonondile	500
13. Samson Petini	Not indicated	Sifonondile	500
14. Mbali Ndabula	Not indicated	Sifonondile	500
15. W. Sambula	Not indicated	Isanzana ¹¹⁸	500
16. Jan Mlonzi	Not indicated	Isanzana	500
17. Fiklandt (Figlan)	Not indicated	Tsomo River	500
18. Luke Kohle	Not indicated	Xhalanga	500

Table developed by the author from the Thembuland Commission Report. 1883

Some loyalists who, prior to the Commission, had failed to meet the requirements and whose land had been less than 500 morgen, benefited by having their land sizes increased, as in the case of Timothy Makiwane.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, landowners whose land had been more than 500 morgen lost some land. Khalipha Shude, Solomon’s father, who had his 1 250 morgen property reduced to 500 morgen,

¹¹⁸ It has not been possible to determine what Isanzana refers to. I could not find it in the map that was produced in March 1883.

¹¹⁹ Thembuland Commission Report (G.66-`83). UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

is the case in point. Eighteen landholders were declared first class farmers and, as can be seen in Table 6, among them was Solomon Khalipha.

Local people in Lumphaphasi have a perception that Solomon Khalipha's farm was not reduced when the recommendations of the Thembuland Commission were implemented.¹²⁰ However, as the table shows, this perception is incorrect. His farm was reduced from 872 to 500 morgen.¹²¹ Some residents have also assumed that he received the farm as compensation for his role in the Gun War. This too has no basis in fact. As shown above, Chief Gecelo granted Solomon and others land in 1872. The confusion may have arisen from the fact that Solomon's father, who owned land in Ziduli, the area designated for white farmers, was moved downwards and his original land replaced with land in Lumphaphasi after the Gun War in 1883.¹²²

The second class farmers received 250 morgen of land on "quit-rent of 20s per 100 morgen per annum".¹²³ They were given less land than the first class farmers because they failed to make the required improvements on their farms. The table below provides details of the second class farmers.

Names of farmers	Sizes of farms pre-1883	Location of farms pre-1883	Farm sizes post-1883
1. Jafta Mvinjelwa	250	Mzwazwa	250
2. Jonas Nombewu	Not indicated	Leuw kop	250
3. John Sigenu	Not indicated	Mbokothwa	250
4. William Sigenu	Not indicated	Mbenge	250

Table 7 developed by the author from the Thembuland Commission Report. 1883

The category of third class farmers consisted of "Natives of known loyalty, good character with small means and irrespective of nationality". Table 8 below provides details of the third class farmers in the Xhalanga district.

¹²⁰ Sunduza Nkomana was interviewed at Delindlala, Indwe, on 21/09/2005.

¹²¹ It was not possible to obtain the size of the farm from the records. However, Solomon's great grandson – Gcinizizwe Khalipha – pointed out in an earlier study that the farm was 872 morgen which Solomon later subdivided into four equal portions for his children (Ncapayi, 2005:46). Other respondents in the village corroborated the information. Gcinizizwe is the son of Hudson, who is the son of Hutchinson, himself being Solomon's son. Gcinizizwe passed on in 2009.

¹²² See the Commissioners' report of 31st July 1883, (G.66-83:9). UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹²³ Ibid. See pp. 9

Table 8 – Relocation and land sizes of the Third class farmers

Names of farmers	Farm sizes pre-1883	Location of farms pre-1883	Farm sizes post-1883
1. Zondika	833	Near Mayongo's farm	15
2. Qamata	Not indicated	Near Tiwana's farm	15
3. Saule	863	Near Morris Mxaku	15
4. Nyelika	561	Ziduli	15
5. J.L. Mama	1125	Ziduli	15
6. Bunyonyo	250	Mzwazwa	15
7. Fani	Not indicated	Near Lumphaphasi	15
8. W.M. Krai	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
9. Duncan Makhohliso	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
10. Jikumlando	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
11. W. Krai (Junior)	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
12. D. Krai	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
13. Dawit (Daweti)	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
14. Dalingozi	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
15. T. Khalipha	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
16. Cimizele	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
17. Maarman	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
18. Ganyaza	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
19. Tengiwe	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
20. Rasmene (Rasmeni)	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
21. Kafila	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
22. Mati	Not indicated	Unspecified	15

Table developed by the author from the Thembuland Commission Report. 1883

Because the group did not make the required improvements on their properties, they received 15 morgen of “arable land at five shillings (5.s) per morgen per annum”.¹²⁴ As the table shows, Zondika's 833 morgen farm was reduced to 15 morgen. Furthermore, the third class farmers were granted the “right of from 10 to 15 morgen of grazing land to each morgen of arable land without further payment”.¹²⁵

Loyalists within the communal areas were allocated arable land not exceeding 15 morgen and, in addition, had access to communal grazing land. However, unlike the third class farmers who received quit-rent titles, these loyalists were issued certificates of occupation,¹²⁶ which had weaker tenure rights than quit-rent titles. It seems that the group who owned farms were given quit-rent titles by the colonialists, not only as a means of softening the blow of their land having been drastically reduced in

¹²⁴ Thembuland Commission Report (G.66-`83). See pp. 9. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹²⁵ Thembuland Commission Report (G.66-`83). See pp. 9. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

size, but also in acknowledgement of their social status. Once again the colonialists strengthened and perpetuated the social divisions to their advantage.

The malice the colonialists bore towards the group of between 300 and 400 ‘rebels’ became clear in how the colonialists decided the fate of the group. In a hard-line stance the Commissioners recommended that the ‘rebels’ be moved to Nququ and Mtingwevu, which was even further “South of those recommended to be given to Native farmers and other loyal Natives”.¹²⁷ This is more than forty kilometres from Lumphaphasi. Moreover, the Commissioners also recommended that the ‘rebels’ be given land on “ordinary tenure for Kaffirs”. This meant that the ‘rebels’ would be issued no certificates of whatever kind “until they had proved themselves worthy of such privilege by their industry, loyalty, and progressive disposition”. And, the group was to be “overlooked by headmen to be appointed by government”. Each individual was given “a piece of garden ground, with commonage for grazing their stock”, and, if any member of the group was found to have engaged in misconduct, such member faced expulsion from the land.¹²⁸ This means that the so-called rebels were only given residential sites and grazing rights, without arable land.

Response of Xhalanga residents to recommendations of the Commission

After the production of the report in September 1882, the Commissioners held report-back meetings with the Xhalanga residents to inform them about the recommendations. The unhappiness the recommendations generated became clear during the meetings, particularly regarding the treatment of the so-called rebels. The reaction was not only from them, but there was solidarity from other residents too. For instance, in a meeting that was held in Cala on 16 February 1883 the African farmers took up issue with the Commissioners and with Levey in support of the ‘rebels’. Clearly agitated by the developments, Solomon Khalipha stated:

*When Tembus came over into this country the Government gave it to them, and the chiefs gave us these lands, which became ours, and the Government approved of this. The point you raise we do not understand. A new law seems to be introduced...*¹²⁹

Solomon was objecting to the conditions prescribed for the ‘rebels’ who were allocated land without any documentation. Gecelo, too, came out on the side of the ‘rebels’:

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid. See pp. 6.

¹²⁹ Thembuland Commission Report (G.66-`83). UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

*You are the only father... This is the first time Government has conquered Tembus. Does the Government the first time it conquers and kills them, kill them a second time after they have given up all their stock and surrendered?*¹³⁰

Gecelo displayed a very different attitude compared to when he had dealt with his followers in the early 1870s when they raised concerns about the allocation of land to the *amagqobhoka*.

That the 'loyalists' raised these concerns indicates that they pledged solidarity with the 'rebels', which shows that, although there were social divisions, it was still possible to build solidarity between the two groups.

The response of Hemming to the concerns illustrates that the colonialists had clearly adopted a hard-line attitude towards the 'rebels'. Despite the loyalists' plea for government leniency towards the 'rebels', Hemming stated:

*I wish to say to all the men who have been in rebellion and have not moved, that you received your orders to move down to where Mr Levey, Mr Cumming, and Mr Stanford would place you. You have not done this. Now you must go; all the men who have not moved will have to go at once to the places assigned you, and build your houses...*¹³¹

From the extract it is clear that the rebels had already been told by Levey, Cumming and Stanford about recommendations of the Commission, hence Hemming reminds them. This was a group of the so-called rebels who were reported to have returned from Mtingwevu and Nququ towards the end of 1882.¹³² The tone of Hemming clearly shows that the government was not prepared to change its position regarding the rebels.

Besides their support to the 'rebels', the farmers reacted to the implementation of recommendations of the Thembuland Commission by pushing for reconsideration of the land tenure arrangements in Xhalanga. Ntsebeza (2006) has shown that the farmers wanted freehold titles just like their white counterparts at *Embokothwa*, in the Ida area. Levey alluded to the issue in his annual report in January 1888, when he pointed to emerging concerns among the African farmers regarding tenure issues. This was after a headman showed his discontent through comments about the insecure land tenure rights of Africans in Xhalanga.¹³³ Two years after the issue was first raised, Levey pointed out that the "question which appears prominent in the native mind is the tenure upon which they hold their lands. It would be

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Thembuland Commission Report (G66-83). See pp. 59. This was in a meeting Hemming, Levey and Gecelo had a meeting with the 'rebels' at Mtingwevu and Ncorha on 16 February 1883.

¹³² See Letter No. 353 of the 30th October 1882. See Minutes of proceedings. Tembuland Settlement Commission, 1882. See pp. xviii.

¹³³ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.6-`88). See pp. 51. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

well to remove any uncertainty that may exist on this subject”.¹³⁴ The experience of having their land sizes drastically reduced by the Thembuland Commission must have made the farmers realise that they needed more secure land tenure.

The farmers also began to take out insurance policies in the 1880s. Although Levey interpreted this as a sign of economic progress on the part of the African farmers, it is argued here that the need for insurance policies was also related to the economic insecurity brought about by the drought from 1886 that caused heavy stock losses to the farmers. The effects of the drought on livestock farmers were severe. Their losses increased when poverty resulting from the drought, led to stock theft, as reports in 1890 confirmed.¹³⁵ This loss of stock through theft was another reason that the African farmers took out insurance policies.

This is also an example of how the African farmers articulated with the capitalist system. By the 1890s, they had become integrated into the system such that they used its instruments to their benefit.

Impact of the recommendations and the proletarianisation of residents

As already stated, recommendations of the Thembuland Commission laid the foundations for the emergence of new social groups and the proletarianisation process in Lumphasi. This section shows that two factors contributed to the process of proletarianisation of the local people – access to limited arable land and the drought. The recommendations of the Commission resulted in a section of the residents having access to limited arable land than the other and consequently, could not withstand the tax demands of the state as well as the need to sustain itself. For instance, while having access to limited arable land, the demand to pay the state-imposed taxes remained. Unable to support their households on the limited land, the group fell into grinding poverty. Thus, wage labour became the only option for its livelihood. Consequently, by 1892 a number of men from Xhalanga joined public works and the mining industry.¹³⁶

A ravaging drought that affected the whole of southern Africa in the 1880s worsened the situation for this group. It made the class divisions in Xhalanga luminous. To start with, the drought had differing effects upon the various social groups in the villages. With government support, the African farmers were able to respond positively to the conditions confronting them. Reporting in December 1886, Charles Levey noted that

¹³⁴ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.4-`91). See pp. 38. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹³⁵ Ibid. See pp. 39.

¹³⁶ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.7-`92). See pp. 89. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

*[n]otwithstanding the depression throughout the district, it is gratifying to find that the Farmers' Tree Planting Association has become fairly established. A curator has been appointed to take charge of a nursery for trees, &c. All the most influential farmers are members of the Association, and a true interest in tree planting is being dispersed amongst the Europeans and natives".*¹³⁷

In addition to being members of the Xhalanga Native Farmers Association, some African farmers belonged to a Farmers' Tree Planting Association through which colonialists promoted the planting of fruit trees. The farmers also received support from the Xhalanga Agricultural Society, which promoted modern agricultural practices, such as the installation of dipping facilities, among the farmers.¹³⁸ Thus, because of the support, the African farmers continued to operate as normal despite the drought.

The most damaging effects of the drought became evident in the residents with less land and resources. While the African farmers took out insurance policies to protect themselves against the drought and stock losses, the rest of Xhalanga's residents were left completely exposed against stock losses. Thus, their economic conditions deteriorated, and the gap between them and the resourced African farmers began to widen, a feature that became more apparent as the years went by.

By 1890, the debilitating drought also left some headmen in Xhalanga impoverished. This situation forced Levey to propose the revision of the headmen's stipends. In his motivation for a revision of the stipends, Levey argued that the stipends would improve the status of the headmen and that the stipends were possibly a way of co-opting the "best class of educated natives, for whom there is now no opening, and who are naturally dissatisfied with their anomalous position".¹³⁹

In a nutshell, the above discussion shows that in Xhalanga and villages such as Lumphaphasi land allocation and a drought contributed in the proletarianisation of residents. Residents with less arable land were vulnerable to disasters and economic pressures; hence they were more inclined to become wage workers than the African farmers were. This resulted in widening of the gap between the farmers and the less resourced residents in Xhalanga generally, and in Lumphaphasi, specifically.

Gold discovery and the Glen Grey Act

Radical scholars see the discovery of minerals and gold, in particular, as the turning point in the proletarianisation of indigenous people in South Africa (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979). This view links with the argument advanced in this chapter about impact of the Thembuland Commission and drought

¹³⁷ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.5-'86). See pp. 80. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹³⁸ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.4-'90). See pp. 33. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

to the people of Xhalanga. The Commission and drought presented perfect conditions for the conversion of rural producers into wage workers, particularly those who were given small portions of land as well as those worst hit by the drought. These could not resist proletarianisation as this arguably became the only viable option for them.

By the early 1890s, the demand for cheap African labour from the mines was already evident. The debate that took place in the House of Assembly on 10 August 1892 confirms the existence of the demand. In the debate, Theron (a Member of Parliament) enquired about how the government intended “to supply the insufficiency of labourers” (Hansard, 1892:334). The concerns about the supply of African labour carried on until 1893. Reporting on developments in Xhalanga, Levey noted in his report of 3 January 1894 that the Xhalanga residents seemed reluctant to offer their labour to white farmers or get into the migrant labour system, except to join the government’s public works locally. As a way of forcing them to take up wage labour, he motivated for the introduction of individual tenure for Africans. He reasoned that individual tenure would force the unemployed Africans out of the locations, particularly *amaqaba*, according to him. He motivated individual tenure because he believed that the economic situation of the group had degenerated in the district, as they had become poorer than the school people.¹⁴⁰

Meanwhile, the discovery of gold marked a change in the good relationship that existed between the African farmers and colonialists, which was influenced by the demand for African labour from the mining sector. The interests of the colonialists changed from wanting the development of African farmers to an interest in turning Africans into migrant workers. A hint in the change in interests of the colonialists is reflected in the Cape’s parliamentary debates in the 1890s.¹⁴¹ During a debate on land tenure for Africans in August 1893, parliamentarians acknowledged that the Thembuland Commission had recommended that individual titles be given to the landholders in Xhalanga, but rejected the recommendation because of fears that Africans would sell their land if they were given individual titles. However, the position of Cecil John Rhodes’, Prime Minister of the Cape since 1890, was firm. He urged members not to push ahead with the motion of individual titles and remarked:

The house was beginning to realise that the time was coming when they would have to decide what they should do to the natives with reference to the large areas they occupied (Hansard, 1893:325).

Rhodes’ remarks indicate that the colonialists were no longer interested in resolving the vexed issue of land tenure in the district (Iiyama, 2008:55). Furthermore, he was aware of reports from resident

¹³⁹ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.3-`89). See pp. 40. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹⁴⁰ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G. 9-`94). See pp. 63.

magistrates who, at the beginning of 1894, reported on the reluctance of the residents of the district to take up wage work.¹⁴² Consequently, the introduction of the Glen Grey Act in 1894 reduced the land sizes of the peasants in the Cape to a maximum of four morgen per household (Lacey, 1981; Ntsebeza, 2006). However, the Act only affected the landholders within the communal areas. Clearly, individual tenure would have made it difficult for the government to take decisions about reducing the land of Africans.

After a delayed implementation of the Glen Grey Act in Xhalanga, it was eventually introduced in 1897. It was only introduced after troubled implementation in other districts such as the Glen Grey, Butterworth, Idutywa and Ngqamakhwe (Hansard, 1894; 1895; Bundy, 1979). Unsurprisingly, the colonial government's attempts to introduce the Act in Xhalanga drew a similar hostile reaction from the landholders (farmers, peasants and headmen). They "warned the magistrate against the introduction" of the Act (Bundy, 1987:155). The headmen also pointed out that the Act would aggravate the difficulties local people were exposed to due to rinderpest and the drought. When the government showed determination to press ahead with the Act, the landholders uncompromisingly opposed the actions (ibid.). One of the reasons for this opposition was that the Act aimed to introduce the District Council, which, in turn, would undermine the voting rights of qualifying landholders (Bundy, 1987; Ntsebeza, 2006). Another reason was that the Act would undermine the landholders' quest for freehold tenure, which they continued to pursue into the 20th century. Solomon Khalipha and Job Renqe were farmers who led the campaign for freehold titles (Bundy, 1987:155). For this reason, Ntsebeza argues that the land tenure issue was at the heart of the opposition of Xhalanga landholders to the Glen Grey Act (2006:69). In addition, the imposition of a landholding limit of five morgen undermined the aspirations of the peasants on communal land who hoped to compete with white farmers (Ntsebeza, 2006:73-4). However, as already indicated, provisions of the Glen Grey Act did not affect the African farmers on individually-owned land. The only impact the Act had was with regard to rights of the farmers to vote in the Cape parliament.

In a nutshell, the late 19th century marked a major reconfiguration of the relations, at a political level, between the loyal farmers and the colonial government. The refusal of the government to grant freehold tenure to the farmers meant their political marginalisation. Thus, by the late 1890s, the "former allies found themselves, if not actually jettisoned, then no longer favoured" by their colonial mentors (Beinart and Bundy, 1987:10). In Xhalanga, the force with which the colonial magistrates pushed the implementation of the much-despised District Council system turned the loyal African farmers into enemies of the government. Even delegations that went to meet the Prime Minister, Sir

¹⁴¹ Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.4-'93). See pp. 64. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

¹⁴² Blue Book on Native Affairs (G.9-'94). See pp. 63. UCT Library, Government Publications Section.

Gordon Sprigg, in Cape Town in 1900 and 1902 could not solicit a positive response (Ntsebeza, 2006:71). Thus, the landholders ended up politically marginalised, just like the group of rebels.

Progress and disintegration in Xhalanga: the effects of the mineral discoveries and the Glen Grey Act

The changed interests of the colonial government resulted in dynamic changes in the different social groups in Xhalanga. Bundy (1979) views the period between 1890 and 1913 as crucial years for the peasantry which was in decline. His characterisation of rural areas as degenerating into “rural slums” (1979:221) creates the impression of a uniform slide into deterioration, and nothing else. This could lead to an assumption that rural people passively watched conditions deteriorate.

Yet, a closer look at Lumphasi shows that the situation was a lot more complex than the picture Bundy paints. To start with, the African farmers fought back politically against their marginalisation as reflected in their struggles for land tenure. At the beginning of the 20th century farmers such as Solomon Khalipha were still leading debates and struggles for freehold title in Xhalanga.¹⁴³ For example, in a meeting between the resident magistrate and the headmen and landholders on 2 November 1902 regarding the District Council, Solomon condemned the implementation of the Council. In a follow-up meeting in December 1902, David Mayongo rejected the district council.¹⁴⁴

A section of the farmers and peasants also fought back economically. They did not only lead the debates about land tenure and the District Council, but some also explored the diversification of their operations and ventured into business. For instance, Veldtman applied for a licence to open a trading store on his farm “Sambula” in 1902.¹⁴⁵ Richard Tsengiwe, who was the headman of Tsengiwe as well as a peasant, was involved in labour recruitment for the mines. During this period he “dispatched many labourers from Indwe” to the mines.¹⁴⁶ Both cases are examples of people who diversified their livelihood strategies by including non-agrarian activities. The examples presented here illustrate that, contrary to the de-agrarianisation thesis which shows diversification as a phenomenon of the 1980s (Bryceson, 1997), in Lumphasi diversification occurred as early as the turn of the 19th century. Veldtman, who wanted to open a business on his farm, is a case in point.

Similarly, other farmers started to accumulate land. For instance, on 26 May 1909, Solomon Khalipha applied to take over his father’s 590-morgen property, which he intended to add to his 500-morgen

¹⁴³ CMT. 3/188. Cape Archives. See also Ntsebeza (2006).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ CMT. 3/188. Cape Archives. .

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

farm. With the permission of his four siblings – Hendrick, Peter, Leah and Victoria Ngcwabe – the application was approved on 26 August 1910. Archival records show that Solomon had to pay £1,180 for the property. In addition to these two properties, Solomon also acquired Lot “A” Lichfield Farm. Solomon used the 259-morgen Lichfield Farm mainly for grazing purposes,¹⁴⁷ which shows that he was still a livestock owner in 1910. As will be shown in the next chapter, Solomon was not the only one who accumulated land and livestock in Lumphasi.

However, Bundy (1979) has correctly pointed out that in the early 20th century some peasants were struggling financially. Indeed, by 1910 Hendrick Khalipha, Solomon’s brother, was declared insolvent. Similarly, Mdulama’s land was attached due to debt.¹⁴⁸ Thus, this shows that some farmers and peasants in Xhalanga were in debt.

Other farmers sold their farms during this period. As an example, Jonas Tiwane sold his farm Tiwane in 1906. The sale of the farm to Caleb Japhta from Qumbu occurred at the time of the retirement of Jonas Tiwane. Its sale happened despite protests against it by family members and some headmen, such as Solomon Khalipha, Duncan Makhohliso, and Job Renge. Family members and some people of Xhalanga signed a petition opposing the sale. However, Stanford (Chief Magistrate) authorised the sale in a letter written on 27 August 1906. The basis of the opposition to the sale was that there was no consultation about the sale of the farm.¹⁴⁹ It was also argued that Caleb Jafta already “[owned] land in the Qumbu district” and the petitioners were “anxious to prevent the transfer of farm(s) in the Xhalanga district to persons from other districts ...” While it is not clear why Jonas Tiwane did not allow family members to take over the farm, it can be argued that external factors influenced his decision. At the time of the sale of the farm, the unresolved issue of land tenure confronted the farmers and peasants. There were also heavy stock losses they had suffered since 1905 due to the rinderpest.¹⁵⁰ Thus, given the enormous challenges the African farmers and peasants were faced with, disillusionment with farming cannot be ruled out as the reason for the sale.

Moreover, Mafeje (2003:4) has argued that, in sub-Saharan Africa, land was controlled and allocated through the clan, lineage and the community. These institutions were used to guard against the alienation of land to outsiders. The same principle seems to have applied in Xhalanga. The district’s residents had a negative attitude towards the alienation of their land to outsiders, as their reaction to the sale of the Tiwane farm illustrates. Those who opposed the sale acted as guardians of the land on behalf of the Xhalanga residents. Earlier on, some Xhalanga residents displayed a similar attitude

¹⁴⁷ CMT. 3/853. Cape Archives.

¹⁴⁸ CMT. 3/591. Cape Archives.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ CMT. 3/188. Cape Archives.

when Chief Gecelo granted land to the amaMfengu and abaThembu in the 1870s. In the next chapter we will see that ex-farm workers were treated in a similar way when they wanted land in the district. As will be shown in future chapters, such an attitude remained with the people of Lumphaphasi well into the 1980s.

Some poor people had also become landless. In 1902, a group of landless people, who were also referred to as the *amalose* (loose people), emerged in Xhalanga (Ntsebeza, 2006:82). Some members of the group were tenants and sharecroppers on the land of “holders of certificates of occupation”. Others were people that were displaced by the South African War who settled on commonage land in Cala Reserve, one of the villages in the Xhalanga district.¹⁵¹ The significance of this is that, by 1902, there were already labour tenants and sharecroppers in Xhalanga, although there is no evidence of the existence of such a group in Lumphaphasi by that time.

A significant group, ignored by most scholars, was the women. Women were discriminated against by colonialists, who often treated them as though they were non-entities in rural societies. Yet, there are indications that women played important roles in the development of their communities, such as the maintenance of the home, ensuring food production and looking after the fields. Bradford (2000) criticises Bundy for overlooking the role of women in the Herschel district who, before colonial interruption, also provided for their households. She shows that women were also key to the households’ ability to acquire land, as unmarried men could not access land. Interestingly, Victoria Ngcwabe needed her husband—Samuel Ngcwabe—to counter-sign for her to transfer her land. Victoria’s situation illustrates that women did not enjoy full rights to take decisions on legal matters. Colonialists never expected women to be landholders. They were always treated as if they were minors and never viewed as independent beings.

The case of Hannah aptly illustrates the above point. A letter written by the resident magistrate, Bell, on 21 February 1903 in response to an application of the widowed Hannah exposes the colonialists’ attitude to women. After the death of her husband in the mines, Hannah and her five children (the oldest of whom was 25 years) had to leave Welkom where her husband worked to be cared for by a relative, Adonis, in Tsengiwe location, one of the villages in Xhalanga. This happened immediately after the South African War through which Hannah also “lost stock and property”.¹⁵² In his letter, Bell recommended that “Hannah be allowed to remain in Richard Tsengiwe’s location until her son Mokwe could obtain a suitable piece of land to enable him to support the family”.¹⁵³ It is interesting that Bell did not think that Hannah deserved to have land of her own that she could use to support herself. She

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² CMT. 3/188. Cape Archives

had to be placed under the care of a relative until her son could obtain his own land. Embedded in Bell's thinking was an assumption that women were incapable of using the land to support themselves. Considering that women were critical for men to acquire land in African societies and the contribution of women in the welfare of the household (see Chapter 2), the colonialists distorted the African tradition and, in the process, undermined the traditional role of women and made them dependent on men.

An emerging picture here confirms Ntsebeza's (2006) argument that the people of Xhalanga were highly differentiated by the beginning of the 20th century. The same holds true for Lumphaphasi. A small section of the population had access to land, while the majority was landless and resorting to wage labour. Women were marginalised from land ownership. Thus, access to land or lack thereof influenced the development of social groups in Xhalanga.

Land tenure issues in Xhalanga in the era of the Union of South Africa

Although Africans in the Cape attempted to lobby for the retention of the franchise clause in the constitution, which allowed them to vote in the Cape parliament, there is evidence of direct participation of the residents of Lumphaphasi in such developments. Instead, they carried on with their struggle for tenure reform. The fact that there was indifference in Xhalanga to the impending introduction of the Union Government is confirmed by district magistrates who assessed the feelings of citizens regarding such a development. In his report of 22 March 1911, Stanford – Chief Magistrate for the Transkei – indicated that the Xhalanga residents were not excited about the impending independence of South Africa. Instead, he reported on agricultural developments in Xhalanga in 1910. In his report he noted that some of the producers used steam threshing machines, while others relied on animals for threshing.¹⁵⁴ This shows that there was still production going on in the district.

However, the issue of land tenure occupied minds of the Xhalanga residents and Lumphaphasi (Ntsebeza, 2006). As such, the quit-rent titleholders (farmers and peasants) were up in arms opposing the survey of the Xhalanga villages. While opposing the survey, they pursued their longstanding struggle for tenure reform by demanding freehold titles in the form of the *Embokotwa* freehold title. Between April 1910 and the end of November 1911 they sent memoranda, deputations and had meetings with the Chief Magistrate.¹⁵⁵ Despite the opposition, the government went-ahead with the survey. Proclamation 241 of 1911 was the instrument the government used to conduct the survey. It

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Blue Book on Native Affairs. 1910. (U.17-1911). See pp. 143. UCT Publications Library.

empowered the government to survey and to establish locations in Xhalanga (Ntsebeza, 2006:84). The Proclamation developed two types of landholders in Xhalanga: “proprietors” who were defined as holders of quit-rent titles that were “issued in terms of Schedule A of the Proclamation”; and “registered holders”, who were “holders of a quit-rent title issued in terms of Schedule B of this Proclamation”. Section 5 of the Proclamation made further important changes in tenure arrangements in Xhalanga. Holders of certificates of occupation or permits to occupy (PTOs) were commuted to quit-rent titleholders issued in terms of Schedule A. In other words, they were made Schedule A quit-rent titleholders. Those residents that did not have PTOs were given Schedule B quit-rent titles.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, it made provisions for Schedule C titleholders, which was land transferred from the original owners to new owners through sales. Lastly, the stipulations of Schedule D were similar to those of Schedule C, except that Schedule D applied to land transferred to a new owner after the death of the original owner.¹⁵⁷ As will be shown in the next chapter, these provisions influenced landholding, the social groups and social relations in the communal section of Lumphasi in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Conclusion

The chapter has also shown how access to land influenced the formation of social groups and the determination of social relations in Xhalanga and its villages from the establishment of the district to 1913. Missionaries and colonial magistrates used land as the means to create social groups amongst the residents, a point Beinart and Bundy (1987) have confirmed. The missionaries, in collusion with magistrates, created divisions amongst the people of Xhalanga along the *amagqobhoka* and *amaqaba* categories and the *amagqobhoka* had access to large portions of land, while the *amaqaba*, under the jurisdiction of headmen, had small land portions. Eventually, African farmers and peasants emerged largely out of the group of *amagqobhoka*. The African farmers held their land on quit-rent titles.

A debilitating drought in the mid-1880s and limitations in landholding imposed by the Glen Grey Act in 1894, forced some poor peasants to join the government’s public works programme and, later, the mining sector, as migrant workers. However, a bias in emphasis on this one section of the rural population hides the dynamics in other sections of the rural population. The processes from this time up to 1913 can best be understood as a combination of development and underdevelopment occurring in the rural areas at the same time. While poor peasants degenerated and became migrant workers on the one hand, on the other, some African farmers and the better-off peasants accumulated land. This

¹⁵⁵ CMT 3/873, Cape Archives

¹⁵⁶ CMT. 3/873. See Proclamation 241 of 1911. Cape Archives.

¹⁵⁷ Union of South Africa Government Gazette. October to December 1911. See pp. 8.

shows that the process of proletarianisation was more complex than Bundy would have it and his characterisation of the rural areas as “rural slums” smudges these dynamics.

The discussion in this chapter has shown that the process of proletarianisation that converted African producers into wage workers was dynamic and not linear. As some rural residents were disintegrating economically and becoming migrant workers, others were accumulating property and diversifying their livelihood strategies. Although the literature cites the Glen Grey Act as one of the key instruments in this conversion of Africans, this chapter showed how the Thembuland Commission was instrumental in laying the foundations for the conversion of Africans into wage workers. This also shows that there were local variations in the changes in social relations.

Centrally, it has been argued that land has been critical to the development of social groups and the definition of social relations in the Xhalanga district and its villages. The emergence of new social groups was dependent on whether or not people had access to land and how much land they had access to. In the final analysis, land was central in the determination of social relations in the district and its villages.

CHAPTER 6

Continuities and Discontinuities in Social Groups in Lumphaphasi (1913-1960)

Introduction

The laws that were passed by the Union and apartheid governments in the period to 1960 contributed to the deterioration of land and economic conditions, thus triggering diverse responses from the social groups in Lumphaphasi. Initially, accumulation by the African farmers went hand-in-hand with impoverishment of the majority of the residents. The allocation of land from 1917 in Lumphaphasi in line with provisions of Proclamation 241 of 1911 resulted in the majority of the residents acquiring small portions of arable land that could not support them. These residents converted into migrant workers as land and economic conditions deteriorated from the 1930s. However, like Molteno who insists that rural residents maintained links with the land (1977:17), the chapter also argues that although some rural residents became migrant workers, they retained their links to the land. Thus, despite the difficulties brought about by the deteriorating economic and land conditions, land-based livelihoods persisted in the village.

The emergence of labour tenants, drawn from ex-farm workers who had been displaced as a result of the Natives Land Act, provided the African farmers and the peasants with the opportunity to access hired labour. As already indicated in Chapter 3, the introduction of hired labour in the late 1920s transformed the peasants to small producers. This is a transformation that is often missed by scholars who conclude that there was a collapse of production in rural areas from the 1930s (Wolpe, 1995; Bundy, 1979). The chapter shows that, through the use of hired labour, the quit-rent titleholders sustained production until the 1960s, although in decline. The snowballing effects of overcrowding in the 1960s caused more decline in crop production while livestock production gained prominence.

The chapter attributes causes of the shift in land use to two factors: shortage of arable land as it was converted into grazing land due to overcrowding; and the shortage of labour due both to the opening of schools and the acquisition of residential sites by *amalose*.

This chapter takes issue with the scholars' conclusion that production collapsed in rural areas in the 1930s. The scholars fail to appreciate the implications of the introduction of hired labour in the operations of peasants in the 1930s, which led to the transformation of these peasants to small

producers. With women responsible for sustaining production in the reserves in the absence of their migrant husbands, the labour tenants or *amalose* filled this gap and enabled production to continue. Unlike the de-agrarianisation thesis, which implies that livelihood diversification started from the 1980s, this chapter shows that the process started much earlier. It shows that by the 1920s Lumphaphasi residents were already involved in diversified livelihoods.

The chapter is divided into two periods: 1913 to 1930 is the period when the process of proletarianisation gathered momentum as more residents became migrant workers. The second period is from 1930 to 1960. 1960 is significant because it marks the widespread decline in crop production in Lumphaphasi. As overcrowding became more pronounced towards the 1960s, crop production declined and livestock gained prominence.

The government's intervention and its impact on social groups in Lumphaphasi

The promulgation of the Natives Land Act in 1913 had impact on social relations in Lumphaphasi. The promulgation was followed by various developments that had implications for social relations in the village. Bundy (1979) has given a general view that by 1913 rural areas showed signs of degenerating. A nuanced situation unfolded in Lumphaphasi. While some residents experienced financial difficulties leading to their disintegration, others were accumulating land and livestock. This combination of disintegration and accumulation led to increased differentiation amongst the social groups in the area. There was also a transfer of land from the original quit-rent titleholders to their children, especially from the mid-1920s. Like the passing of a baton in an athletic relay, the children carried on with the legacy of their parents albeit in different conditions, as will be shown below. This signified that unlike their parents, the new farm owners were migrant workers, thus, they had direct links with the capitalist economy. Ironically, they did so at a time when the reserves were entering a difficult period of economic and land deterioration – a situation scholars note (Wolpe, 1995; Beinart, 1995; Hendricks, 1990).

As already pointed out in Chapter 3, after the promulgation of the Act, the Natives Land Commission was set up to investigate the effects of the Act on rural people. Like Solomon Plaatje, a national figure in African resistance who gave evidence before the Commission, on 24 January 1914 Solomon Khalipha, from Lumphaphasi also presented evidence to the Commission. In his evidence he did not only express concerns about the Act, he also complained about white people who purchased the land of Africans in Xhalanga – an issue that pre-occupied African landholders in the area since the beginning of the 20th century. To wit, the residents once raised the issue in 1906 when the Tiwane farm was sold to an African from Qumbu. The importance of this issue has to be understood in the

context of the land shortages that had already emerged in the district. Financially, some African farmers were also struggling, a fact Bell, the resident magistrate for Xhalanga, also acknowledged in his evidence to the Commission. He confirmed that, “[s]ome of the native farms are mortgaged”.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, the complaints about lack of access to finances for African farmers that Job Renqe and Jonah Ngcwabe expressed to the Minister for Native Affairs were indications of the financial difficulties some farmers were experiencing.¹⁵⁹

Besides the fact that the invitation of Khalipha to present evidence to the Commission illustrates the influence he commanded in the district and provincially, the issues he raised in the Commission are worth considering. They reflected the sorry state of some quit-rent titleholders in Xhalanga.

However, the situation was not all doom and gloom. Some among the African farmers continued to accumulate land and property. For the most part, the accumulation of land and property was driven by the self-initiative of the farmers, who operated on individually-owned land. The extent of accumulation by some of the farmers emerged in the 1920s. In the case of Solomon Khalipha, the details of the extent of his estate emerged after his death on 2 December 1923.¹⁶⁰ His estate reflected the following:

- Solomom Farm (500 morgen) £1500
- Lichfield Farm “A” (259,40 morgen) £1800
- Khalipha Farm (590 morgen) £780
- Lot No. 23 at Indwe £210
- Lot No. 457 at Indwe £342
- Cash in the account of estate £200
- Claims in favour of the estate
 - Klaas Xipu £ 70
 - William Shude £ 28
 - Acc. Greyling £ 28

According to the Estate, Solomon also invested in two properties in Indwe. Besides the two properties, he had also accumulated 1 349 morgen of land in Lumphaphasi. Archival records also reveal that he loaned people money, and that among these were William Shude to whom he made a

¹⁵⁸ U.G. 22-14. Natives Land Commission. See page 131. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

¹⁵⁹ CMT. 3/873. Also see an undated “Memorandum by Magistrate of Xhalanga” to the Chief Magistrate indicating that Job Renqe and Jonah Ngcwabe wanted to meet the Minister for Native Affairs on the “Land Bank and the Overcrowding of the District”. The attempt to organise the meeting must have been made between 1913 and 1920.

¹⁶⁰ MOOC – 6/92593 – File No. 3912. Also see a “Memorandum of Agreement” signed by Mrs Mina Khalipha in 1924 is a further confirmation of the claim. Cape Archives.

loan of £86 for the purchase of a plot in Lumphasi. When William Shude failed to repay the loan, Solomon repossessed the land. A letter from the Resident Magistrate in Cala to the Chief Magistrate (dated 2 October 1924), confirms this claim.¹⁶¹

Similarly, the estate of Peter Khalipha also from Lumphasi, and a brother of Solomon, shows the amount of land he was able to accumulate.¹⁶² His estate reveals the following:

- 250 morgen Toise Farm in Xhalanga valued at £2500
- 500 morgen Ncapai Farm in Southeyville valued at £5000
- 58 morgen farm valued at £580
- Erf 57 in Cala valued at £70

Land accumulation was one of the ways in which the farmers and peasants reacted to the deteriorating economic conditions in the reserves. While care should be taken not to view relationships simplistically, it is apparent from this particular incident that Solomon exploited the weak financial position of other rural residents. Instead of being supportive, he used his stronger financial position to accumulate property by repossessing from those who failed to honour their debts. To make matters worse, Solomon and William Shude shared the same clan name, amaYirha. This, therefore, also confirms the point Bundy (1979) makes about the exploitative relations between the farmers and their poor fellow rural villagers and relatives. As can be seen, Solomon and his brother Peter Khalipha even invested in property in urban areas, which is an indication of diversification of income.

Although current literature alludes to the fact that some peasants managed to withstand the pressures brought about by the changed relations they had with the government, on the whole, the literature paints a general picture of degeneration of socio-economic conditions of rural people (Wolpe, 1995; Bundy, 1979). This case study provides details on how the farmers were still able to accumulate land in the manner illustrated by the two examples. For instance, it shows that, in Solomon's case, the accumulation was through the purchase of the land from his siblings. In other words, he did not inherit it, as an elder son in the family, which was a common practice in rural areas.

By the 1920s, some Xhalanga residents were no longer confining their livelihoods to land-based activities only. They also attempted setting up businesses. The applications to open businesses in various parts of Xhalanga illustrate this fact. For example, on 7 October 1922, magistrate Bell granted

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Peter Khalipha was one of Solomon Khalipha's siblings. He was married to Sannah and Leah. He had nine children: Mendetyu, Wellington (Thamsanqa), Edward (Zanenkomo), Maud, Mimmie, Miriam, Rachel (Nozimanga), Nomgqibelo, and Nonkululeko. Peter died on 19 May 1927.

Charles Xakaxa of Qhiba¹⁶³ a permit to open a coffee shop in Cala town. Two years later (1924), the same Charles Xakaxa applied for permission to open a coffee shop in his village. The application was opposed by the “headman and people” of Qhiba, and, as a result, it was turned down.¹⁶⁴ Julia Msiya of Engcobo also applied to open a coffee shop in Cala town, in June 1928.¹⁶⁵

As already noted, the applications to open businesses indicated a move by some villagers to engage in economic activities that were not land-based. The applications were a signal that the peasants were beginning to recognise the need to explore other avenues for livelihood given the deteriorating land and economic conditions, but they did not abandon the land. More importantly, the emergence of African-owned small businesses in Xhalanga introduced another social group, that of small business people. As can be seen, these business people had their roots in land-based livelihoods. This is another instance where there was diversification of livelihoods.

This case study shows that some residents of Lumphaphasi diversified some of their activities, which is one of the features of de-agrarianisation. According to the de-agrarianisation thesis, diversification of livelihoods is a phenomenon that emerged in the 1960s. As shown here, the phenomenon was already underway in Lumphaphasi by the 1920s. This confirms my critique of the de-agrarianisation scholars; that diversification is not a new phenomenon, but has been going on since the introduction of capitalist relations in African societies.

Turning focus to the communal section of Lumphaphasi shows that the majority of the population was struggling for livelihoods. State intervention, which broke down communally owned land into smaller pieces, hastened the further disintegration of these residents. Between 1917 and 1918 the government allocated land to sixty-four residents.¹⁶⁶ The land was allocated as Schedules A, B and although not indicated, it is assumed that the majority of the recipients were Schedules C and D quit-rent titles.¹⁶⁷ The land allocations were according to the stipulations of Proclamation 241 of 1911. Although Ntsebeza (2006) refers to the use of the Proclamation in the allocation of land in Xhalanga, he does not provide the details about the Schedules that this case study provides. For instance, he does not discuss

¹⁶³ In official documents Qhiba is spelt as Qiba, but consistent with the author’s earlier indication of his decision to correct the names by using the proper vernacular spelling, Qhiba has also been corrected.

¹⁶⁴ 1/XXA – 5/1/27. File N. 2/4/12 – Native Affairs - Location Administration No. 12 (Lumphaphasi). Cape Archives.

¹⁶⁵ 1/XXA – 5/1/27. File N. 2/4/12 – Native Affairs - Location Administration No. 12 (Lumphaphasi). Cape Archives.

¹⁶⁶ All land allocations referred to in this chapter occurred in the communal land, not on land in private hands such as the farms owned by Africans in Lumphaphasi.

¹⁶⁷ Lumphaphasi Quit-rent Register in the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Cala offices.

what it meant to be a Schedule A titleholder. As Table 9 below shows, the Schedule A peasants were allocated land, which ranged between four and fifteen morgen.¹⁶⁸

Nos.	Names of small landholders	Land sizes in morgen	Year title issued
1.	Duda Ngxowa	4,53	06/03/1917
2.	Khalipha Hutchinson	10,51	06/03/1917
3.	Magawa Silas	15,24	06/03/1917
4.	Mankayi Smanga	12,98	06/03/1917
5.	May Africa	7,21	09/03/1917
6.	Shude Koti	11,23	06/03/1917
7.	Shude Elijah	5,36	29/06/1917
8.	Stuurman Sofonia	7,35	10/07/1917
9.	Zembe Ali	4,15	29/03/1917
Total land size		78,56	

Some of the people that were allocated schedule A quit-rent titles were children of the farmers. Hutchinson Khalipha, for instance, was Solomon's son. Similarly, William Shude's sons, Koti and Elijah Shude, also received arable land in Lumphaphasi.¹⁶⁹ This table shows that as the children of the farmers came of age, they were granted their own land in the communal area. Later it will be shown that some of these children also inherited land from their parents. The fact that there were residents who had more than four morgen stipulated in the provisions of the Glen Grey Act means that there was no adherence to provisions of the Act in Lumphaphasi. Thus, the Lumphaphasi case study provides examples of instances where provisions of the Act were not applied, not only on individually-owned farms, but also within the communal area.

Table 10 below shows a list of Schedule B quit-rent titleholders. Ten residents were allocated arable land with sizes ranging from just over three to four morgen, in 1917.

Nos.	Surnames and names of small landholders	Land sizes in morgen	Year title issued
1.	Gqungqa (Gungqa) Skeyi	3,37	06/03/1917
2.	Limba Mangweni	4,42	06/03/1917
3.	Limba Mantshi	3,26	06/03/1917
4.	Limba Joel	3,26	06/03/1917
5.	Mankayi Vice	3,54	06/03/1917
6.	Mbele Griffiths	3,26	06/03/1917
7.	Ndinisa Mngqalanga	3,40	06/03/1917
8.	Shude Gordon	3,26	06/03/1917
9.	Zembe Cornelius	3,11	06/03/1917
10.	Zembe Jim	3,15	06/03/1917
Total land size		34,03	

¹⁶⁸ Tables 9-13 were compiled using information from the Quit-rent Register of Lumphaphasi. And, the land allocations are for arable land.

¹⁶⁹ See Quit-rent Register for Lumphaphasi.

Compared to the Schedule A quit-rent titleholders, the land sizes of the Schedule B quit-rent titleholders were much smaller. This confirms claims made by residents of Xhalanga that Schedule A land allocations were bigger than those of Schedule B (Ncapayi, 2010:62).

Forty-five residents were issued Schedules C and D quit-rent titles. Table 11 provides the details.

Table 11: Schedule C and D landholders

Nos	Surnames and names of landholders	Land sizes	Date title issued
1.	Diniso Tanduntu	7,56	06/03/1917
2.	Gasu Hendrick	3,26	06/03/1917
3.	Gayiya Mankayi	14,11	05/03/1917
4.	Gayiya Lawu	6,41	06/03/1917
5.	Gqologqa Benjamin	3,40	06/03/1917
6.	Gqologqa Joseph	7,26	06/03/1917
7.	Jabanga Slim	3,84	06/03/1917
8.	Kutshwa David	10,39	06/03/1917
9.	Kutshwa Limba	10,20	10/07/1918
10.	Kunkuma (Nkunkuma) Umlonyeni	19,29	06/03/1917
11.	Lande Bani	16,20	10/07/1918
12.	Lande Jack	3,31	06/03/1917
13.	Lande Zilani	3,26	06/03/1917
14.	Limba Diamond	8,43	29/03/1917
15.	Limba Fantiso	6,19	06/03/1917
16.	Limba Gondwana	8,43	29/03/1917
17.	Limba Kozwana	3,44	06/03/1917
18.	Limba Mbuba	3,26	06/03/1917
19.	Limba Mintolo	13,27	06/03/1917
20.	Limba Ngcabalele	5,16	06/03/1917
21.	Limba Tom	3,56	06/03/1917
22.	Limba Tyesana	4,25	06/03/1917
23.	Mbewu Charles	3,26	06/03/1917
24.	Mbewu Paul	3,26	06/03/1917
25.	Mdlungu Hammond	3,23	06/03/1917
26.	Mdlungu Sambunjane	6,16	06/03/1917
27.	Mdlungu Zenzile	3,35	06/03/1917
28.	Mqana Xitizo	12,53	06/03/1917
29.	Mayi Walter	3,55	06/03/1917
30.	Ngcukayithobi Ndleleni	20,14	06/03/1917
31.	Nase Booy	9,27	06/03/1917
32.	Nqai Mpai	4,59	06/03/1917
33.	Ntunja James	2,27	06/03/1917
34.	Ntunja Liwani	18,68	06/03/1917
35.	Qayi John	6,42	06/03/1917
36.	Rani Zitani	3,40	06/03/1917
37.	Shude Kos	5,46	29/03/1917
38.	Stuurman Fanteni	3,16	06/03/1917
39.	Stuurman Philemon	6,49	10/07/1918
40.	Tyhuluba Albert	13,38	06/03/1917
41.	Tyhuluba Mathew	3,83	06/03/1917
42.	Tyhuluba Petros	15,37	06/03/1917
43.	Yaso Bobotyana	12,56	06/03/1917
44.	Zembe Qamese	9,24	24/09/1918
45.	Zwartbooy Plaaty	3,26	06/03/1917
Total		281,15	

The tables also show that fifty per cent of the people acquired less than five morgen of land. Taking the proposed farm units of the Tomlinson Report, which recommended farm units of six morgen per

family, for the Transkei,¹⁷⁰ the land for most of the landholders would be below the proposed limit. This means that half of the residents of Lumphaphasi could be regarded as poor peasants. On the other hand, twenty-five per cent had more than ten morgen. Those with more than ten morgen qualified to be large peasants, while the other twenty-five per cent were medium peasants because they had between five and ten morgen arable land.

Although the literature argues that the Glen Grey Act affected landholding in the reserves by reducing it to not more than four morgen per household (Wolpe, 1972; Lacey, 1981), the case study shows that the Act was not applied to the farmers on individual land and their children who were allocated land in the communal area in 1917. It will be remembered that the Glen Grey Act stipulated that one-man-one lot of not more than four morgen. Yet the table above shows that children of the farmers were allocated up to ten morgen each.

Unsurprisingly, the tables show that the land allocations were exclusively to men. This shows the exclusion of women from landholding. Moreover, between 1924 and 1927 sons inherited land from their fathers in Lumphaphasi. For example, in July 1924 Matiso Duda took over his late father's land, Ngxowa Duda. Similarly, in March 1926 Hammond Mdlungu took over the land of his father, Sambunjane Mdlungu and Wilson Tyhuluba also inherited the land of their late fathers. This was despite the fact that Hammond Mdlungu had already been allocated about three morgen of arable land in 1917 and Sambunjane had been allocated six morgen in the same year.¹⁷¹

The impact of the government interventions on social relations

As indicated in Chapter 3, the implementation of the Natives Land Act unleashed the wave of movement of people from the white commercial farms to the village. While not suggesting that all African people who moved to the reserves came from white commercial farms, there is evidence that after the promulgation of the Native Land Act in 1913 there were families that moved into Lumphaphasi from the white-owned farming areas.¹⁷² For instance, in June 1925, two families applied for permission to stay in Lumphaphasi, through their household heads, Daweti Jezile and Pati Solani. Jezile who came from Dordrecht applied on 2 June 1925. He owned seventeen cows, fifteen sheep and a horse, and in the application form the applicant indicated that he wanted to come to Lumphaphasi "to reside among

¹⁷⁰ Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa. (U.G. 61/1955). See pp. 115. UCT Library. Government Publications Section.

¹⁷¹ See Quit-rent Register for Lumphaphasi

¹⁷² I/XAA – 5/1/188. File No. N.2/10/2 – NAD – Native-owned and tribal land (Main file). See letter of Stormont Mgudlwa regarding origins of landless people in Xhalanga. Cape Archive.

other natives”.¹⁷³ Implied in his statement is a sense of feeling isolated in the white-owned farms, which could be caused by being put under pressure to leave the farm or made to feel not welcome on the farm. This was possible considering that some white farmers had chased out sharecroppers and squatters immediately after the introduction of the Natives Land Act (see Chapter 3). Pati Solani who had ten cows moved from Molteno to Lumphaphasi because he wanted “to join his relatives”.¹⁷⁴ Similarly, on 25 September 1925, Jacob Dyantyi also applied to settle in Lumphaphasi because there was no land for his livestock on the farm in Dordrecht. He had nine cows, seventeen sheep and eight goats.¹⁷⁵

While there has been a view that the provisions of the 1913 Land Act did not apply in the Cape (Maylam, 1986; Bundy, 1979), Jacob Dyantyi’s claim that there was no land for his livestock on the white-claimed commercial farm where he worked indicates that some white farmers forced farm workers off their farms during this period. This is further confirmation of the cases cited by Plaatje when he toured the Eastern Cape in 1913 (see Chapter 3). These cases suggest that some white farmers used the provisions of the Natives Land Act to push farm workers off their farms. It seems that white farmers either chased away Africans on their farms or made conditions unbearable for these Africans. Therefore, the Act had an impact on the reserves in the Eastern Cape too.

The movement of African people from the white-owned farms to the village, which marked the first wave of movement, led to the emergence of a social group of landless people called *amalose* from the 1920s. Unlike the group of *amalose* that emerged in Cala Reserve in 1902, which was allowed to occupy land in the village (Ntsebeza, 2006:82-3), the *amalose* in Lumphaphasi became landless because they were given neither residential nor arable land. That the group could not access land was related to the internal procedures of Lumphaphasi with regard to the acceptance of outsiders into the area. As outsiders, the ex-farm workers who arrived in Lumphaphasi had to follow certain procedures. The group had to serve a waiting period before being accepted into the community of Lumphaphasi. As the group could not be allocated land during this waiting period, the African farmers and the peasants accommodated the *amalose* as labour tenants.¹⁷⁶ Harriet Stuurman, who was 12 years old in 1930, recalled growing up with people who came from the farms. According to her;

¹⁷³ 1/XXA – 5/1/27. File No. 2/4/12 – Native Affairs - Location Administration No. 12 Lumphaphasi. Cape Archives.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ 1/XXA – 5/1/27. File No. 2/4/12 – Native Affairs - Location Administration No. 12 Lumphaphasi. Cape Archives.

¹⁷⁶ The Labour Tenants Act (Act 3 of 1996) defines a labour tenant as one “who has a right to use cropping or grazing land” of somebody else’s farm, “and in consideration of such right provides or has provided labour to the owner”.

'Abafiki' (newcomers) or 'amalose' (loose people) used to help out the farmers by providing labour. They were not paid money but were paid in kind. They were given land to produce their own food and were also allowed to keep their livestock.¹⁷⁷

The extract talks to the nature of social relations that developed with the emergence of the *amalose* in Lumphaphasi. The extract shows that employer-employee relations developed between the ex-farm workers, on the one hand, and the farmers and peasants, on the other. The ex-farm workers became the employees of the farmers and peasants. As will be shown later, both the African farmers and the small producers utilised the labour of the *amalose*. According to Harriet, besides the payment in kind that the *amalose* received from the farmers and the peasants, the *amalose* also survived by selling wool from their sheep they came with. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the introduction of hired labour to operations of the peasants meant that these peasants who no longer relied on family labour, transformed into small producers. This resulted in the emergence of yet another new social group—the group of small producers who were also migrant workers.

The movement of people from the white commercial farms to the village had serious implications on land in the village. The fact that the families that moved to the village had livestock meant that there was addition of livestock to the ones already in the village. This put pressure on grazing land in the village. However, although landless because they did not have residential and arable land, as labour tenants, *amalose* had access to grazing land of the farmers, those who were accommodated by the farmers. Similarly, those accommodated by the peasants within the communal areas had access to communal grazing.

The issue of inheritance of land in Lumphaphasi raises interesting gender issues. Literature on inheritance takes a general view that women are marginalised and are not allowed to inherit land. According to Goody and Buckley (1973), South Africa is one of the countries in Africa where, despite the fact that African women's labour dominated in agricultural production, women were not landholders because the system of inheritance has always been patrilineal. Only sons inherited land from their fathers (Goody and Buckley, 1973:109-10). In the majority of cases, that was how the inheritance of land was handled in Lumphaphasi.

However, archival records illustrate that there were variations in how some families in Lumphaphasi dealt with the issue of inheritance. For instance, Solomon Khalipha went against the trend followed by other families that allowed only sons to inherit from their fathers. Archival records show that his Will gave his, son Hutchinson, the 259,40 morgen Lichfield farm. And, the main farm, the Solomon "A" Farm, was divided equally for his daughters. Thus, ignoring the patrilineal system of inheritance,

¹⁷⁷ Harriet Stuurman was interviewed in Cala on 29 July 2010. She was born in Lumphaphasi in 1918.

Solomon decided that his daughters would also be given a share of his estate. However, the Will stated that his daughters were not allowed to sell the farm to anyone except a co-heir. In other words, while given the right to inherit, the daughters did not have the right to dispose of the land anyhow they liked. In addition, the Will stated that if Hutchinson died, Lichfield Farm should be inherited by his children.¹⁷⁸ Solomon's Will shows that he believed that his children should benefit equally from his estate and that he did not want to advantage his son over the daughters. The example of Solomon illustrates that there were exceptions to the rule of patrilineal practice of inheritance. The example also contradicts the widely accepted view that rural women were disadvantaged regarding land ownership; showing that in instances like that of Solomon's family, women were treated equally to men. Based on this example, it can be argued that there were women who were landowners in Lumphaphasi.

In closing, by the 1930s Lumphaphasi had the following social groups: the African farmers on individually-owned land. Not homogenous, some members had accumulated land and properties, while other members became poor. There was also a group of small producers, which emanated from the peasants that transformed into small producers. This means that peasants in their original form ceased to exist from the late 1920s; the same period that the peasantry fell according to Bundy (1972:372). The farmers and small producers used hired labour of *amalose*. This was the group of landless people who came from the white commercial farms. This means that employer-employee relations had developed between the landholders and landless people by the 1930s. Although landless, *amalose* had access to grazing land for their livestock. Lastly, but equally important, were women who were largely excluded from landholding, although there were some exceptions. Most single women were poor and struggling to make a living. Although not indicated in this section, there were already migrant workers made up of children of the farmers and peasants and some of the *amalose*.

The period of economic depression and changes in social groups (1930-1960)

The period from the 1930s is generally associated with the economic depression and land degradation in rural areas (Wolpe, 1995; Beinart, 1995). Wolpe has even hinted to the disappearance of production in the reserves by the 1920s (1995:68). During this period, white farmers laid-off a number of farm workers some of whom moved to the reserves while others went to urban areas (Magubane, 2004). This section reflects on government interventions to address the deteriorating conditions impacted on Lumphaphasi. The second part of the section explores how the above developments influenced changes in social relations, including the emergence and/or disappearance of social groups in the village.

¹⁷⁸ MOOC – 13/1/7496. File No. 3912 – Estate of Late Solomon Khalipha. Cape Archives.

By 1931, signs of the land and economic deterioration became evident in Xhalanga and its villages such as Lumphaphasi. In 1931 the marked deterioration in the conditions left the magistrate of Cala, F.J. Kockott dumbfounded. He was shocked about how overstocked and worsened the economic situation in Xhalanga had become. Clearly baffled about what he observed, he recalled that;

*Twenty-five years ago the natives were economically in a better position to the extent that they could then more easily provide for their wants. At this stage their wants have increased at a rate far beyond the rate of their earning ability. Socially they have by education and the influence of religion reached a stage when these influences are decidedly on the wane ...*¹⁷⁹

Part of the reason why Africans were no longer able to provide for their wants, as indicated in the extract, was the escalation of landlessness in the district. Population growth and the waves of movements of people into the area contributed to the escalation of landlessness.

Consequently, in 1932, the government demarcated fifty-five residential and arable sites from the same overcrowded village. The allotments were for schedule B, and a combination of schedules C and D quit-rent titles.¹⁸⁰ Table 12 below provides details of residents that were allocated Schedule B titles from 1932.

Nos.	Surnames and names of landholders	Land sizes	Date titles issued
1.	Konzani John	4,44	27/08/1936
2.	Mbungwana Rwili	3,57	27/08/1936
3.	Mdokwana Bafana	3,53	06/05/1941
4.	Mqana Ncokwane	3,57	24/08/1934
5.	Mzandolo Jim	3,44	27/08/1936
6.	Ndleleni Gantolo	3,57	23/04/1935
7.	Ngcukayithobi Elias	3,46	23/04/1935
8.	Qomoyi Charles	3,24	19/02/1934
9.	Qomoyi Kalpens	3,43	27/08/1934
10.	Stuurman Sogwagwa	4,11	06/05/1941
	Total land	36,36	

Table developed by author from the Lumphaphasi Quit-rent Register

In addition to the ten male residents who were allocated land with Schedule B quit-rent titles, land was also allocated to Schedule C and D title holders, as Table 11 below shows.

¹⁷⁹ 1/XXA – 5/1/27. File N. 7/9/2 – Social & Economic Conditions of Rural Natives – Reports and correspondence – Arrears. Cape Archives.

¹⁸⁰ See Quit-rent Register for Lumphaphasi in the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in the Cala offices.

¹⁸¹ The tables are developed by the author from the Quit-rent Register of Lumphaphasi. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Cala office.

Table 13: Schedules C & D landholders in 1932

Nos.	Surnames and names of landholders	Land sizes	Date titles issued
1.	Bhebheza Alvern	3,57	27/04/1936
2.	Bengo Qwelane	3,23	24/08/1934
3.	Bhabha Sikundla	3,44	27/08/1936
4.	Booi Daniel	3,52	27/08/1936
5.	Booi Wilson	4,86	27/08/1936
6.	Chewu Ntenetya	3,57	27/08/1936
7.	Dyantiy Irvine	3,40	19/02/1934
8.	Dyantiy Siteo	3,56	27/08/1936
9.	Gungqa Makawula	3,57	27/08/1934
10.	Jezile David	3,57	23/04/1936
11.	Khalimashe Morris	4,17	24/08/1934
12.	Khalimashe Siyaki	3,59	23/04/1935
13.	Khandisa Gantolo	3,43	27/08/1936
14.	Khalipha Irvine	3,41	27/08/1936
15.	Lande Fred	4,28	23/04/1935
16.	Limba Whawhani	3,55	27/08/1936
17.	Makhamba Ngqove	3,40	27/08/1936
18.	Masheba Jack	3,40	27/08/1936
19.	Matana Jidini	3,36	24/08/1934
20.	Mbewu Howard	4,17	24/08/1934
21.	Mbungwana Paul	3,10	27/08/1936
22.	Mngqibisa Kedamile	3,65	27/08/1936
23.	Mpindwa Pere	3,54	27/08/1936
24.	Mqana Cottage	4,65	23/04/1935
25.	Mtabiso Ganana	3,55	27/08/1936
26.	Nasiphi John	3,58	27/08/1936
27.	Ncapayi Dam	3,58	27/08/1936
28.	Ndinisa Gunya	3,40	23/04/1935
29.	Ndinisa Zanampi	3,40	27/08/1936
30.	Ngcukayithobi Whittington	3,36	23/04/1935
31.	Ngqukuva Jack	3,42	27/08/1936
32.	Nkunkuma Bikitsha	3,40	27/08/1936
33.	Nqoko France	3,42	23/04/1935
34.	Ntlekiso Jim	3,57	19/02/1934
35.	Nyhakantyha Fumane	3,65	27/08/1936
36.	Nyhakatyha Simayile	3,40	27/08/1936
37.	Nyumbeka Mbotzoza	3,82	23/04/1936
38.	Shicane Cukudwane	3,48	27/08/1936
39.	Shude James Zeki	3,52	27/08/1936
40.	Sonti Mvumbi	3,57	23/04/1935
41.	Stuurman Pangumpu	3,58	27/08/1936
42.	Tyhuluba Simon	3,49	14/11/1939
43.	Walu-walu John	3,58	27/08/1936
44.	Yaso Maweni	3,59	19/02/1932
45.	Zembe Elvis	4,66	27/08/1936
	Total land	163,01	

This means that another 196,37 morgen of land was demarcated in Lumphaphasi in 1932. In addition to the 64 residents that were allocated land in 1917/18, by 1932, there were one hundred and nineteen small landholders. This excludes the African farmers on individual properties.

Archival records indicate that the applicants were migrant workers who were children of local people. There was exclusion of people coming from outside the district whenever land was allocated. This

much is confirmed by a letter written by Stormont Mgudlwa on 4 April 1933.¹⁸² In the letter, Stormont highlighted the existence of landless people, pointing out that these were not people from the district but had come to the district after 1911. He protested over the fact that;

*the group would not be allowed by the people of Xhalanga to acquire land, but were held underfoot as tenants or (amalose) as they are called. They were allowed one way of making a living, to work a small piece of land on a half-share system.*¹⁸³

Stormont's observations confirm Harriet Stuurman's argument in the previous section regarding the treatment of *amalose* in Lumphaphasi. Stormont proposed that the government should purchase farms for the group. The fact that the group continued to exist indicates that the government did not purchase the land. In 1933, Kockott acknowledged the existence of landless people in the district. In his letter to the Chief Magistrate dated 22 August 1933, he noted that there were more than 1 000 landless families in Xhalanga.¹⁸⁴

Although Stormont attributed landlessness in Xhalanga to the arrival of the *amalose*,¹⁸⁵ population growth also contributed to this situation (Ncapayi, 2010). Archival records further show that some of the landless people were children of *bona fides* who had become migrant workers. The archives indicate that a number of migrant workers applied for residential sites during this period.¹⁸⁶ As grown up men, this group wanted their own land, hence the applications for residential sites in the early 1930s. Hazel Bengo, who later became one of the beneficiaries of the land reform programme, was part of this group of migrant workers in the 1930s (Ncapayi, 2010:57).

In the letter Kockott wrote in 1933, he warned against arbitrarily cutting "up areas not approved by the present registered holders of title deeds who are the theoretical owners of the commonages".¹⁸⁷ Kockott referred to the quit-rent titleholders. His remarks highlight the presence as well as the influence the quit-rent titleholders exercised over land in Xhalanga. Moreover, he expressed concerns about the long-term effects of demarcating land in the district. He warned thus:

*I cannot conceive of a worse land calamity than a provisional demarcation of land for survey by an officer who is, say an enthusiast and authority on co-operative societies but who has no eye for land.*¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² I/XAA – 5/1/188. File No. N.2/10/2 – NAD – Native-owned and tribal land (Main file). Cape Archives.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ I/XAA – 5/1/188. File No. N.2/10/2 – NAD – Native-owned and tribal land (Main file). Cape Archives.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ File No. N2/8/3/12 Lumphaphasi. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Cala.

¹⁸⁷ I/XAA – 5/1/188. File No. N.2/10/2 – NAD – Native-owned and tribal land (Main file).

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. See letter dated 22nd August 1933 of the Cala Magistrate to the Chief Magistrate.

He ended his note by pointing out that,

*while provisional demarcation might be a temporary solution under favourable conditions, I consider that the whole land question in these Territories should receive early and very careful consideration before any action is taken....*¹⁸⁹

Indeed, Kockott was correct in his assessment of the need for a careful consideration of the land question in areas such as Xhalanga in view of the growing landlessness.

However, the government introduced relief work through Circular No. 7 of 1936. In the circular, the Secretary for the Native Affairs Department (NAD) advocated the introduction of relief work for rural residents, as a vehicle for enabling Africans to earn some income. This action by the state followed concerns that were expressed by headmen regarding the existence of a group of impoverished women as well as inequalities in Lumphaphasi.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, from the mid-1930s, the economic situation of many rural residents in villages of Xhalanga had become dire, especially for women. This prompted headmen to write reports indicating the precarious living conditions of women. The headmen's reports revealed that women were hit the hardest by the economic crisis. At a meeting with the resident magistrate on 22 April 1936, the headmen painted a gloomy picture of the situation of single women in their villages. They reported that "many women who have no male relatives to support them find themselves in very poor circumstances". In response to the reports the magistrate promised to either "give light labour to these women at Soil Erosion works" or to ensure that "steps will be taken to supply them with food".¹⁹¹ As will be remembered, a similar situation prevailed in other areas of the Eastern Cape in the 1950s. However, research shows that this situation prevailed much earlier in Lumphaphasi.

By the late 1940s, the group of *amalose* had increased due to two other waves of movements of people to Xhalanga and its villages. One wave, which constituted the second wave, was in the 1930s. The economic depression of the 1930s as well as drought forced some white farmers out of farming (Ncapayi, 2010:36). The third wave was linked to the effects of World War II, which, as shown in Chapter 3, affected farming. And, although there were land allocations in 1932, it was only children of local people who were allocated land, who were allocated no more than five morgen of arable land.¹⁹² The *amalose* were excluded from the land allocation. As already indicated, the farmers and

¹⁸⁹ Ibid

¹⁹⁰ 1/XAA – 5/1/65 – Social & Economic conditions – Reports and correspondence. See file N. 7/9/2. Cape Archives.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² See Lumphaphasi Quit-rent Register.

small producers benefited by allowing the newcomers on to their land as labour tenants while they were being assessed and were waiting to be allocated land.¹⁹³

The fact that it was migrant workers that were allocated residential and arable land in 1932 meant that these migrant workers had not abandoned their village and the land-based lifestyles. Thus, their conversion into wage workers did not necessarily mean that they were no longer interested in land-based livelihoods as the proletarianisation scholars (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979) would have us believe. Moreover, the involvement of children of the landholders, some of whom had taken over the land of their parents, means that unlike their parents who only supplied produce to the capitalist economy, the children were also employees in the capitalist economy. The situation of the migrant workers in Lumphaphasi represents what Moyo and Yeros (2005a) refer to as semi-proletarianisation, that is, while these were producers, they were also workers. However, unlike Moyo and Yeros who refer to these producers as peasants, these were workers who spent most of their time in wage employment rather than on land-based lifestyles. Moreover, the case is also an illustration of diversification of livelihoods, which, according to the proponents of de-agrarianisation, is supposed to have only started in the 1960s (Bryceson, 1997:4).

By the 1940s, inequalities in the village were clearly visible. On the one hand, the farmers and small producers continued to develop their land-based livelihoods while, on the other, the majority of the rural residents were drowning in a sea of poverty. For instance, Lerotholi Xhashimba, despite the difficulties brought about by the economic depression, was prepared to purchase a portion of the Solomon “A” farm in November 1941.¹⁹⁴ The transaction not only illustrates that some of the farms were still productive in the 1940s, but also indicates that some people continued to see possibilities in agriculture. Sunduza Nkomana confirmed that he grew up watching the farmers produce and sell their crops (maize and sorghum) to milling companies in Queenstown. The farmers and small producers (quit-rent titleholders) were still able to produce because they relied on the labour of *amalose* as well as on sharecropping with people who did not have enough arable land in the village. According to Nkomana; “[B]ecause the farmers had large arable lands, they used sharecropping to ensure that they are able to produce”.¹⁹⁵ He had this to say about sharecropping;

Sometimes there was unfairness in the practice of sharecropping. The other party was expected to plant, harvest and transport the produce to the shed for storage. It was only then that the land owner would come, to control the sharing of production. Although the practice was supposed to be based on an equal share of expenses and responsibilities, there was very little that the land

¹⁹³ Harriet Stuurman was interviewed in Cala town on 29 July 2010. She was born in Lumphaphasi in 1918.

¹⁹⁴ MOOC – 13/1/7496. File No. 3912 – Estate of Late Solomon Khalipha, Cape Archives.

owners contributed. Yet, I would still expect to get my 50 per cent of the share as the land owner. Therefore, the practice was exploitative to the other party.¹⁹⁶

Among people who were sharecroppers were small landholders such as Irvine Dyantyi who was allocated about three morgen of arable land in 1932. To increase his produce Irvine entered into sharecropping arrangements with the Khalipha family.¹⁹⁷ Unlike *amalose*, sharecroppers had their own residential land, which made them somewhat independent from the landholders they entered into arrangement with. Furthermore, sharecroppers' livestock had access to communal grazing in the village, whereas the *amalose*'s livestock on farms was dependent on permission from the landholders.

The recollections of Nolungile Mbungwana¹⁹⁸ show that in the 1950s the farmers also used seasonal labour. She recalled;

*While I was a young girl in Lumphaphasi, Khalipha used to organise old girls from Ndonga Location to come and work on his farm. We would go to assist in removing weed in the fields (arable land). People who worked there were given money as payment.*¹⁹⁹

Thus, the farm owners continued to use hired labour and sharecropping to remain productive. In other words, the employer-employee relations continued to exist in Lumphaphasi. These social relations existed in seven farms that are reflected in Table 14 below.

Table 14: The African-owned farms in Lumphaphasi in the late 1950s²⁰⁰

No.	Original owners	New owners	Land sizes
1.	Funani (Gagela)	Farm was part of the estate of John Gagela who died in 1958 and bequeathed it to Alfred Gagela.	500
2.	Khalipha Shude	The farm was sub-divided, according to Solomon Khalipha's Will, that it be shared among his four daughters who were married to Patrick Conjwa, Pearce Conjwa, T. Tsengiwe and Canon Xhashimba.	590
3.	Ncamiso Khalipha	The original owner died in 1927. By the 1950s the farm belonged to Lennox Wellington Tsoliwe.	494
4.	Nombayo	The registered holder of the farm died in 1920. By the 1950s the farm was owned by Wilberforce Tyhuluba.	500
5.	Soul	The farm had been sub-divided and had two owners, but was still registered in the name of Soul Tyhuluba who died a long time ago (about 1920).	21
6.	Solomon Khalipha	As per Will, Solomon Farm was inherited by Solomon's grandson Hudson Khuthele Khalipha upon the death of Solomon's son, Hutchinson, in 1924.	500

¹⁹⁵ Sunduza Nkomana was interviewed in Lumphaphasi on 8 May 2010. He was born in the Lubisi Location, in Cofimvaba, in 1934. His family came to Lumphaphasi before he started schooling.

¹⁹⁶ Sunduza Nkomana was interviewed in Lumphaphasi on 8 May 2010. He was born in the Lubisi Location, in Cofimvaba, in 1934. His family came to Lumphaphasi before he started schooling.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ She was born in Lumphaphasi in 1940.

¹⁹⁹ Nolungile Mbungwana interviewed in Lumphaphasi on 18 March 2010.

²⁰⁰ Table adapted from list of farms in Xhalanga compiled by H. Warner, see I/XAA-5/1/188. File No. N.2/10/2.

By the 1950s, the district had about thirty-four farms of which seven were in Lumphaphasi.²⁰¹ During this period, the relations between the *bona fides* or *iinzalelwane* and *amalose* in Lumphaphasi were still tense and hostile. According to Harriet Stuurman, the *bona fides* regarded the *amalose* as *amaqaba* and wanted nothing to do with them. She recalled that as children of the *bona fides* “we did not care about *amaqaba* because there was nothing that linked us with them. Children of *amaqaba* had their separate social activities like *imitshotsho*, and we had ours such as concerts”.²⁰² She further pointed out that because of the divisions, inter marriages between the two groups were also unheard of. She conceded though that, later, education helped to change the relations. She explained;

*We attended the same school. As some of the children of amaqaba got educated, we were able to relate better. Furthermore, as more of amaqaba started working, and some had educated children, there were marked improvements in their houses.*²⁰³

Thus, the differences ran so deep that they even affected relations between children of the two groups.

However, relations among the *bona fides* were cordial and the families supported each other. The supportive relations were displayed during the debilitating drought in 1949, which affected mostly livestock owners.²⁰⁴ According to Harriet, her family, which was in the communal section of the village, grazed its livestock on the Solomon Farm during the drought. Other families used Tyhuluba’s farm. According to her, it was common practice for livestock owners from the communal area to drive their livestock to the farms, which had better grazing land. However, the grazing land was not open to everyone. It was mainly relatives and close friends that grazed in the farms. This means that although supportive, the farm owners were selective regarding who they supported. With relations between *amalose* and the *bona fides* tense, it can be argued that *amalose* were excluded in the support. Thus, they felt the effects of the drought most.

²⁰¹ I/XAA-5/1/188. File No. N.2/10/2 – NAD – Native-owned and tribal land (Main file). See document compiled by Harold White Warner, who the government contracted to investigate land ownership in Xhalanga in the 1950s. The investigation was carried out after there were difficulties in tracing owners of some of the farms. Other areas in Xhalanga that had farms were Mchewula, Tiwane, Mbenge and Mbewuleni.

²⁰² Interview of Harriet Stuurman in Cala town on 29 July 2010. Harriet was born in Lumphaphasi, in 1918.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

Also reflecting on the social relations in Lumphaphasi, Dr Sukude Matoti recalled that some *amalose* preferred to return to the white commercial farms rather than stick with the African farm owners.²⁰⁵ This also explains why, in some cases, husbands took up wage work, leaving behind their families as labour tenants on the African-owned farms. Another reason could be that the attraction of cash wages was stronger than the payment in kind that the African farmers provided. Nevertheless, given the treatment meted out to the *amalose*, it is not surprising that many of them disliked working for the farmers. Compounding things was the persistence of the colonial-engineered social divisions between *amaqaba* and *amagqobhoka*.

However, the experience highlighted above illustrates how nuanced the relations were in the village. In some instances they were exploitative, as Bundy (1979) has argued and has been shown above, but there were also instances where the relations were complementary.

In the 1950s, government support sustained the productivity of the African farmers and the small producers within the communal area of Lumphaphasi. The government sponsored agricultural shows that were organised through the Xhalanga Bantu Agricultural Show Committee.²⁰⁶ For example, on 23 January 1957 Victoria Nkomana, the Secretary for Agricultural shows in Lumphaphasi, applied for a grant for an agricultural show, which was approved on 2 April 1957. The approval authorised an amount of £5 to “be spent on prize articles”.²⁰⁷ On 18 June 1959, the Secretary of the District Authority wrote to the Secretary of the Transkeian Territorial Authority to acknowledge receipt of £100. The secretary of the Xhalanga Bantu Agricultural Show Committee, Mr G. Ncubukezi, received the funds as a grant for the agricultural show.²⁰⁸

The fact that there were still agricultural shows in the late 1950s is evidence that there was still production in Lumphaphasi. Although it was indicated in Chapter 3 that crop production had declined significantly in the reserves by the 1960s, the Lumphaphasi case illustrates that the extent of the decline in crop production was not the same everywhere. There were certainly variances and unevenness in the decline. The difference was caused by the fact that unlike in other places where *amalose* were allocated land, in Lumphaphasi they were not allocated land. Therefore, their arrival in the area did not have much effect on overcrowding during this period, except on the increase on livestock on the communal grazing, as some *amalose* were taken in by the small producers within the

²⁰⁵ Conversation with Dr Sukude Matoti in Elliot on 20 February 2011. He is one of the absentee farmers and also an academic from Lumphaphasi.

²⁰⁶ I/XAA - 5/1/236. File N. 10/15/2 – NAD – Local Council – Local Authority (District & location shows). See letter (18/6/1958) to Treasurer of Xhalanga District Authority. Cape Archives.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

communal area. Land was only allocated to children of the local people this period. The *amalose* continued to provide labour to the landholders (both farm owners and small producers).

As far as issues of rural local governance are concerned, it does not seem that there was much happening in Lumphaphasi, even after 1951. It will be recalled that in 1951 the South African government promulgated the Bantu Authorities Act, which conferred more powers to chiefs and headmen on land administration and governance. However, there is no indication of the effects of this development on Lumphaphasi. Instead, archival records show that when there was a problem about livestock of the Lumphaphasi residents straying into W.T. Marais' farm, it was R.A. Bowen – the magistrate of Xhalanga – that handled the case.²⁰⁹

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that there were various social groups in Lumphaphasi between 1930 and 1960. All of them were attached to the land in one way or the other. The farm owners were economically in a powerful position in that all the various groups depended on them for assistance, e.g. during the drought. A growing group of *amalose*, that were also dependent on the farm owners, also existed in Lumphaphasi. The group became labour tenants of the landholders. There was also emergence of the semi-independent sharecroppers during the period under consideration. Unlike *amalose* who had no land, this group had residential and arable land, in some cases. Also consistently growing in size, was the group of migrant workers, which also included the quit-rent landholders. A differentiated group of women also emerged during this period. Once more, the section has demonstrated that land continued to influence the determination of social relations in the village.

Conclusion

It has been shown in this chapter that the Thembuland Commission laid the foundations for the proletarianisation of the majority of the peasants, while the numerically few farmers and peasants continued to produce until the 1960s. The farmers and the small producers used the labour of the residents without access to arable land. They also benefited from the residents with limited land who became sharecroppers on the land of the farmers and peasants.

Massive inequalities existed during the period under consideration. Land accumulation from the early-20th century went hand-in-hand with the economic and social marginalisation of a large section of the residents who became migrant workers. Furthermore, while there was accumulation of land by some quit-rent titleholders, single women became impoverished and had to get support from the government. The emergence of *amalose* in the 1930s ensured that, similar to other areas of in the Transkei, the quit-

²⁰⁹ CMT 3/1347. See File No. 25/27/1/2, on Boundary Fence: Landula Farm – Goedehoop Farm.

rent titleholders continued to produce until the 1960s. Thus, the view that by the 1930s production had collapsed in the reserves is a generalisation that fails to recognise important local variations.

Waves of movements of ex-farm workers into Lumphaphasi led to the emergence of landless people who became labour tenants or *amalose*, providing labour to the African farmers and the small producers in the village. The introduction of hired labour transformed the peasants into small-scale producers. This transformation happened at the time when the old generation passed on the baton to their children in the 1930s. And, the new generation lent impetus to the transformation of the peasants into small-scale producers, in the process linking their farming operations more closely with the markets. The abundant supply of labour from the landless ex-farm workers who moved into Lumphaphasi contributed to the continued involvement of Lumphaphasi African farmers and small-scale producers in land-based livelihoods, up until the 1960s.

While the flow of ex-farm workers into the village provided much-needed labour, as labour tenants, to the farm owners and small-scale producers, it also caused problems. Not only did the ex-farm workers who were commonly known as *amalose* contribute to overcrowding, but, although they were helpful to the local land owners, their presence also led to tensions between them and the local people. These tensions emerged because the *amalose* believed that local people were ill-treating them. The antagonistic relations between the two groups ran so deep that it even affected children who also did not relate well.

The fact of being landless and resorting to migrant labour did not mean that all the landless ended up becoming permanent workers, a proletariat in the classical sense of the word. Neither did it mean that they lost interest in land. As will be shown in later chapters, some of the *amalose* were involved in community gardens and later became beneficiaries of the land reform programme.

CHAPTER 7

Luphaphasi in the Era of Transkei's Self-government and Independence (1963-1994)

Introduction

The chapter focuses on changes that took place in Luphaphasi between 1963 and 1994. As already indicated in Chapter 4, the period between 1963 and 1976 was the period of Transkei's transition to self-government. The period is characterised by implementation of government's resettlement programme, which resulted in the group of *amalose* acquiring residential sites in Luphaphasi. It is also the period when the South African government stepped up efforts to promote education in the reserves. Both developments had far-reaching implications for food production and the changes in social relations in the village. There was shortage of land and labour that affected land use patterns in the community. The declaration of Transkei as an independent state in 1976 worsened things in the area. The independent homeland's demand for civil servant meant that middle class parents prepared their children for a future in civil service. Villages neighbouring the white-owned farms were flooded by ex-farm workers hoping for better living conditions in the independent homeland. Chronic overcrowding and pathetic shortage of land and labour worsened conditions in Luphaphasi during Transkei's period of independence. Both the farms and the communal areas were negatively affected. A climax of the situation was when both children of local people and the arriving ex-farm workers could no longer access land due to excessive overcrowding in the area. Tensions were high and competition for access to land was unleashed. These conditions provided material conditions for local children studying in urban centres and migrant workers who organised the landless residents to wage the land struggles that culminated in land occupation in the 1992.

The chapter has two main sections: from 1963 to 1976, which shows the impact of overcrowding in the decline in food production, as well as the shortage of labour due to the release of *amalose* and departure of children who went to schools; the second section from 1976 to the late 1980s, the era of Transkei independence marked by an increase in the middle class and movement of rural children that went to school, as well as increased demand for residential sites as the population grew. Lastly, the chapter makes a comment about the political simmering of the late 1980s and the land occupation in 1992.

Conditions in Lumphaphasi during self-government in Transkei

The allocation of residential sites to *amalose* and the development of schools in rural areas are the two main developments that impacted on social relations in Lumphaphasi during the period of Transkei's self-government. The allocation of residential sites to the group freed it from the farm owners, thus undermining the employer-employee relations that existed. On the other hand, the allocation of land to *amalose* in the communal area meant the reduction of grazing land. Thus, crop production in both the African farms and the communal area was negatively affected.

Hendricks (1989) has correctly argued that the implementation of the Betterment planning schemes did not improve conditions in rural areas. Indeed, despite the implementation of Betterment since the late 1930s, land degradation had not changed in Lumphaphasi. McGregor, the Principal Agricultural Officer in Xhalanga, observed this when he visited Lumphaphasi in 1964. The land was so badly degraded that he commented:

This land has been badly misused and the present grazing capacity is about 10 morgen per cattle unit. It is possibly the worst location in the whole district... Conditions in this location have to be seen to be believed and earnest representations are made here for the setting aside of the Trust grazing to assist in the rehabilitation of this land unit... The removal of all dry stock both cattle and small stock is essential to the ultimate recovery of the area... This location is the worst ever planned (also cited in Ncapayi, 2010:63).²¹⁰

McGregor was moved by the overcrowding in the village, hence he recommended stock culling.

However, while McGregor recommended stock culling as a solution to the problem, the local residents were clearly suffering the effects of land scarcity. This can be deduced from a letter of complaint that the residents wrote to the District Commissioner. In the letter dated 27 November 1961, they complained that headman Shude allowed Mr Yaso to build a structure without having consulted the community. They questioned whether headman Shude "has the right to do what pleases him and not the people".²¹¹ The letter shows that the complainants exercised their right to participate in the governance of land in the village. It also highlights the fears that the scarcity of land in the area was beginning to generate in local people and the tensions to which that gave rise.

In many ways, the concerns reflected existing discontent among the residents because of growing inequalities in land ownership in Lumphaphasi. A report of an *ad hoc* committee in 1964 highlighted

²¹⁰ Memo written by McGregor. Lumphaphasi Location (Location No. 12) file, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Cala.

²¹¹ I/XAA – 5/1/188. File No. N.2/8/3/12 – NAD – Lands – Rural Locations (Lumphaphasi).

these inequalities. It reported that out of 333 families in the communal area only 36.9 per cent had access to arable land. This means that 63.1 per cent of the residents had no arable land. In addition, forty-two per cent of the families had neither land nor livestock. The report further showed that only twenty-eight per cent of the families had both land and livestock. By the mid-1960s even among those who had land, about nine per cent had no livestock. Thus, Lumphaphasi had developed into a highly unequal community (Ncapayi, 2010:62).

Indeed, African farm owners who bordered the village, separating it from the white-owned farms, owned the bulk of the land. Moreover, oral evidence shows that by the 1960s, some of the farms were still productive in that they were still selling produce to the markets. According to Nkomana, the farm owners and small producers (*onomokolo*) “were producing on a big scale” (*Kwakuphilwa ngokulima, kulinywa on a big scale*). They produced maize and sorghum that was sold to markets in Queenstown.²¹² Confirming Nkomana’s evidence, Sigqibo Dyantyi mentioned that in the 1960s “the farms were very productive so much that during the harvest time thrashing machines would spend about two weeks on a farm (*omatshini babebhula iiveki nokuba zimbini efameni*)”.²¹³ He was also quick to point out:

But, the sharecroppers and labour tenants were the main people who made the farms productive. There were people in the village that did not have arable land (bebekho abantu abangengabo onomokolo). There were also the families coming from the white-owned farms that stayed on the farms. Most of the farm owners would have up to eight households on their farms. These were amalose.

MamQwathi Mrhawuli confirmed most of what Sunduza said. She confirmed that her family also stayed on Solomon Khalipha’s farm in the 1960s. Recalling their stay and what they did on the farm, she said: “Maize was our main and the favourable crop we planted on the farm. We ate it as our staple food. We would plant it using our seeds and oxen. We also took responsibility for weeding. At the end, we shared the produce with the owner”.²¹⁴ This means that the availability of labour from sharecroppers and labour tenants also made it possible for some of the farms to continue producing in the early 1960s. In addition, some of the individually-owned farms were not affected by overcrowding in the early 1960s. But, more important to note is the continued existence of the social groups of labour tenants and sharecroppers who provided labour to the farm owners.

²¹² Sunduza Nkomana interviewed in Lumphaphasi on 8 May 2010.

²¹³ Sigqibo Dyantyi interviewed in Lumphaphasi on 24 October 2009.

²¹⁴ MamQwathi Mrhawuli interviewed in Lumphaphasi on the 21st May 2005.

By the 1960s, the management of production was largely left to women in Lumphaphasi, as men were away working either as migrant workers or as civil servants. Noluthando Khalipha reported that women were central to the development of agriculture in Lumphaphasi in the 1960s. According to her:

*[A]lthough the households had educated people, in most cases the wives did not go to work, but were house-bound. Staying at home enabled them to take responsibility for food production as well as to look after livestock. The farm owners also used amalose in ensuring production on their farms.*²¹⁵

Thus, she concludes: “Households with educated people had better harvest in the 1960s”. It can thus be seen that some middle class families in the village were also involved in land-based livelihoods through their wives.

Like women from the middle class families, in the 1960s, wives of migrant workers were also responsible for managing production in the absence of their husbands. They worked the fields and looked after livestock. Zwelinzima Dyantyi, who worked in Cape Town, regularly sent money for agricultural inputs to his wife. According to him,

*Nolusapho ensured that there was production in the fields. In my absence she took the responsibility for hiring a tractor to plough and plant the fields. At times I would take a leave from work, during the planting season to monitor the processes. However, my responsibility, most of the time, was just to send money for her to purchase agricultural inputs.*²¹⁶

Thus, women from both the middle class and the households of migrant workers were, by the 1960s, responsible for production.

Another important point from the discussion above relates to the relationship some migrant workers had with their families in rural areas. Zwelinzima Dyantyi’s words confirm the argument presented in the previous chapters that the conversion of the majority of rural residents into migrant workers did not necessarily mean that they had become disinterested in land-based livelihoods in the reserves. Zwelinzima used his income to invest in agricultural assets such as tractors, implements, and inputs (Ncapayi, 2010:66). He was not the only person who invested in land-based livelihoods. According to Harriet Stuurman, Frederick Stuurman, her brother-in law (half-brother to her husband), who was a migrant worker, also invested in land-based livelihoods.²¹⁷ This was further confirmed by Sibathathu Stuurman, Frederick’s son, who boldly introduced himself as being “from a family of

²¹⁵ Noluthando Khalipha was interviewed on the Khalipha farm, on the 25th of July 2010.

²¹⁶ Zwelinzima Dyantyi interviewed in Lumphaphasi on the 26th July 2010.

²¹⁷ Harriet Stuurman interviewed in Cala town on the 13th January 2011.

peasants”. He pointed out that, “Although my father was a migrant worker, he was very serious about farming. When I grew up I herded cattle, as both my father and grandfather had cattle”.²¹⁸

Therefore, to contend that rural residents are a “displaced proletariat” (Hendricks, 1990:3) or a reserve army of labour (Wolpe, 1995) is to undermine the critical role women played in land-based livelihoods. Furthermore, the proletarianisation thesis focuses only on the male sector of the rural population, most of which had turned to migrant work as part of a livelihood strategy. However, as shown above, a section of the migrant workers retained relations with their rural families and invested in land-based livelihoods.

While the farm owners were still able to produce on their farms during the 1960s, overcrowding was beginning to have a serious effect on the communal section of the village. Landlessness, which also affected children of local people, was the main issue. Sigqibo Dyantyi, who was born and bred in Lumphaphasi, was one of the locals who needed residential land. He was part of a big group of young married men (*Sasilugwece lwabafana*) that were allocated residential sites. He pointed out that he was still a migrant worker at the time they were allocated land.²¹⁹ Other respondents confirmed the fact that children of quit-rent titleholders who had come of age were allocated land (Ncapayi, 2010:63).²²⁰ According to Sigqibo Dyantyi, this happened before the massive land allocations in the late 1960s, which enabled *amalose* to acquire residential sites.

Archival evidence also shows that there were applications for residential sites in the early 1960s. For instance, Hyde Dyantyi, Magaqelo Mndini, Jamangile Nkunkuma and Jackson Limba applied for residential sites (kraal sites) on 2 November 1961. However, it appears that, at the time the group applied for land, a controversy already existed over their occupation of land without authority. In addition to these four, Madlamba Mndini was also involved in the land occupation at the heart of the controversy. The land-occupying men argued that Chief Stokwe had given them authority to occupy the land in question and, except for Madlamba Mndini, all of them had certificates of occupation. They claimed to have been advised by the EmaQwathini Community Authority to apply to the Native Commissioner for certificates of occupation.²²¹ In 1965, fifty-eight families were moved from one area and resettled in another in the village.²²² Despite opposition from the local people, more grazing land was carved up for residential sites (Ncapayi, 2010:63). This was also during the implementation of Betterment planning in the area, which was introduced in 1964. The applications were all for

²¹⁸ Sibathathu Stuurman interviewed in Lumphaphasi on the 1st May 2010.

²¹⁹ Interview of Mr Sigqibo Nelson Dyantyi in Lumphaphasi on the 24th October 2009.

²²⁰ Fuzile Eleni interviewed on 11/06/2005 and Fungile Mndini also interviewed on 11/06/2005.

²²¹ I/XAA – 5/1/188. File No. N.2/8/3/12 – NAD – Lands – Rural Locations (Lumphaphasi).

²²² Ibid. See Valuation Schedule of Huts in Lumphaphasi dated (8/01/1965).

residential sites;²²³ meaning that, from 1965, people in Lumphaphasi were allocated only residential sites with certificates of occupation. That no land was allocated for agricultural purposes is indicative of how scarce land had become.

In addition to the children of local people who demanded residential land, the arrival of ex-farm workers immediately after Transkei was granted self-rule also added to the demand for land. The Sthoza family is one of the families that moved over. This was the fourth wave of movement of people to the communal area. Nohombile Sthoza explained that “when we heard that African people would be under another African in the Transkei, we decided to come over”.²²⁴ Harriet Stuurman concurs with Nohombile regarding the influx of new people in Lumphaphasi. She also agrees that the influx contributed to the decline of crop production:

*Conditions changed with the arrival of ex-farm workers in the 1960s... Fencing was destroyed such that you could literally walk throughout the fields without having to cross any fence. Lack of fencing for the fields discouraged producers in using their arable land.*²²⁵

Thus, the collapse of fencing for arable land was a critical issue for crop producers. This was particularly so in the light of the effects of resettlement which moved residential areas away from arable land. The fact that resettlement brought homesteads closer together and separated them from the fields meant that fencing was even more important for the protection of produce from livestock. Rose Mndini articulated the consequences well when she said: “[O]ur biggest challenge has been the lack of fencing. Livestock destroyed and still destroys our produce due to lack of fencing”.²²⁶

The root cause of the decline in crop production, however, was the demarcation of land, which reduced grazing land. Reference has already been made to the shift in land use from crop to livestock because of the limited grazing land. Thus, Betterment planning resulted in the reduction of grazing land that ultimately forced the quit-rent titleholders within the communal area into sacrificing their arable land for grazing. Ultimately, this development resulted in the decline in crop production. This change in land use also meant that even those residents who still wanted to use their arable land for production, were unable because livestock was moving within the fields. These factors contributed in the shift towards stock farming in Lumphaphasi.

²²³ Residential sites are also referred to as kraal sites.

²²⁴ Interview of the Sthoza family in Lumphaphasi on 21 May 2005.

²²⁵ Harriet Stuurman interviewed in Cala town on 29 July 2010. She was born in Lumphaphasi in 1918.

²²⁶ Rose Mndini interviewed in Lumphaphasi on 11th February 2009.

Because of the above factors, livestock assumed a more significance for livelihoods of rural people. That is why the reduction of grazing land was one of the reasons why the residents opposed the implementation of Betterment planning. Harriet recalls:

When we vehemently opposed stock culling, the scheming government retreated temporarily and we naively thought that the battle was won. Instead, the government introduced the demarcation of residential sites as part of betterment planning. The demarcated land was even allocated to children.²²⁷

She goes further to explain why there was opposition to the betterment-linked land demarcation: “[W]here would we keep our livestock if we allowed the carving of grazing land into residential sites?” In other words, opposition to the land allocations in the 1960s was related to concerns about the effects of the reduction of grazing land on livestock. From this point onward, crop production was mainly concentrated in gardens within the residential sites.

Thus, the demarcation of residential sites was the turning point in crop production in the communal section of the community. Instead of relieving pressure on the land, the demarcation worsened it.

The turning point in crop production on the farms came after *amalose* or labour tenants accessed residential sites, which set the *amalose* free from the land owners. This led to the loss of labour on the farms, which affected production. Whereas the reduction of grazing land within the communal area caused the conversion of arable into grazing land, shortage of labour affected crop production on the farms. As already pointed out, the farm owners relied on *amalose* for labour. When Betterment was implemented, residential land became available also to the labour tenants. As the *amalose* could now access their own residential land, they were able to break away from the farm owners and withdraw their labour. Sigqibo Dyantyi explains:

On the farms, the standard of production declined after the departure of labour tenants. They left the farms and got allocated land in the village. They were the ones who ensured production on the farms. For example, in Solomon Khalipha’s farm there were eight families serving as labour tenants.²²⁸

Thus, the implementation of Betterment planning denied the African farm owners the labour they relied on for crop production and in so doing facilitated the decline in crop production and the switch to livestock. This means that social relations changed from the 1960s. Labour tenancy was undermined and the employer-employee relations were also destroyed.

²²⁷ Harriet Stuurman interviewed in Cala on 13 January 2011.

²²⁸ Sigqibo Dyantyi interviewed in Lumphasi on the 24th October 2009.

In the wake of the collapse of the employer-employee relations, other social relations developed. Freed from providing labour to the farm owners and small producers, the *amalose* looked elsewhere for livelihood opportunities. As they did not have access to arable land, some of these new residential land occupiers entered into sharecropping arrangements with the farm owners and small producers. According to Harriet Stuurman, this is how sharecropping became more popular as a livelihood option in Lumphaphasi in the late 1960s. It could also be argued that since it had become difficult to use arable land in the communal area, some landholders became sharecroppers on the farms. Unlike the *amalose* who were landless and thus totally dependent on the land owners, “sharecroppers had their own residential land, but did not have enough land to satisfy their subsistence needs”.²²⁹ Therefore, the land owners did not exercise full control over the labour of the sharecroppers, as was the case with the *amalose*. Harriet explains a typical sharecropping arrangement in these terms:

*The sharecropper prepares the land, ploughs, plants, weeds and harvest. As the owner you only feature when it is time for sharing. You get your half share. ... Depending on satisfaction of both parties about the arrangement, the sharecropping arrangement can be renewed on an annual basis.*²³⁰

Although Harriet paints a picture of a harmonious relationship between the sharecroppers and the landholders, it will be shown later that other residents in Lumphaphasi viewed the relationship as being skewed in favour of the landholders. Those who were critical included some of the quit-rent titleholders.

As part of Betterment planning, the government advocated the “introduction of Brown Swiss Bulls as the approved breed”. The plan also required local people to reduce their livestock.²³¹ Although the government invested in livestock development, the livestock owners continued to favour a different breed of cattle to the recommended Brown Swiss. They chose the Afrikander “because the quality of their land was unsuitable for the Brown Swiss Bulls” (Ncapayi, 2005:53). Nevertheless, livestock farming became the dominant land-based livelihood strategy from the mid-1960s.

Opposition to betterment planning continued until the 1970s. The quit-rent titleholders or landholders within the communal area opposed Betterment planning because of the stock culling provisions and fears about the reduction of grazing land. Resistance took many forms. In some cases, residents simply disobeyed government regulations, such as instructions to move out of identified areas. For instance, a letter from Mr Kota (an Agricultural Officer) to headman Shude on 10 September 1970

²²⁹ Harriet Stuurman interviewed in Cala on 13 January 2011.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ File N2/8/3/12 of Lumphaphasi. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Cala.

confirms that there were people staying at camp GB 3 against government regulations.²³² However, the government easily defused attempts to oppose its measures because the resistance was uncoordinated.

Education also played a critical role in both the decline in land use and changes in social relations in Lumphaphasi during the period of self-government. By the 1960s, the apartheid government promoted Bantu Education, which entailed the establishment of community schools. More than thirty-one community schools were established in Xhalanga. For the schools to be community schools, committees consisting of community members had to be established. The establishment and registration of school committees appear to have occupied the government from 1961.²³³ That same year, a school committee consisting of the following community members was established for Lumphaphasi Community School: Germond Shude (headman), Maphiliba Limba (small producer), Joseph Nqai (small producer), Lulamo Khalipha (farmer), Joseph Tyhuluba (farmer), Margaret Lande (homemaker) and Stephen Limba (small producer).²³⁴ Interestingly, the committee was completely male-dominated with only one female representative in the seven-member school committee. Teachers who taught in the Lumphaphasi Community School were: P.D. Conjwa, D.D. Shude, and M. Kutuka.²³⁵ These were part of a growing group of middle class people in the village. Gcinizwe Khalipha also became a teacher in 1968. In addition to teachers, the village also had nurses and policemen in the 1960s. Deborah and Nomvula Nkqai, for example, were nurses and the policemen were drawn from the Chewu family.²³⁶

Importantly, many of those who followed professional careers were also farm owners. They mixed the incomes from their middle-class jobs with land-based livelihoods. Sunduza Nkomana pointed out that the teachers in Lumphaphasi were also livestock owners.²³⁷ This, therefore, shows that there was diversification of income even in the middle class. Bryceson (1997) shows that income diversification is an element of de-agrarianisation. That there were middle class households involved in land-based livelihoods in the village indicates those households had diversified their incomes in that they had income from both non-agricultural occupations and from agriculture.

However, the foregoing discussion shows that there was interest in agricultural land among the residents. Efforts such as sharecropping are a further illustration of the interest in agrarian

²³² Lumphaphasi Location (Location No. 12) file, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Cala office

²³³ CMT 3/1347. See File N. 12/3/2 – Bantu Schools – Bantu Community Schools – Main File. Cape Archives.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Harriet Stuurman interviewed in Cala town on 29 July 2010.

livelihoods. Therefore, there can be no doubt about the presence of some residents in the village who had interest in agricultural land.

The introduction of community schools brought about changes in social relations and in land use practices. Harriet Stuurman argued that, because the children of *amaqaba* were able to go to school, there was more interaction between children from the two groups (*amaqaba* and *amagqobhoka*). She pointed out that:

*[b]ecause of education children of amaqaba were able to improve their homes. This helped to close the social gap between the homes of amaqaba and those of amagqobhoka. The difference in terms of living standards between the two groups also improved.*²³⁸

Thus, the establishment of a school in Lumphaphasi, which made education accessible, helped to close the gap between the *amaqaba* and *amagqobhoka*. According to Harriet, the ex-farm workers, most of whom became migrant workers, used their incomes to send their children to school. Furthermore, because of improved relations between the *amaqaba* and *amagqobhoka*, intermarriages between the two social groups, which had not been possible before, also occurred.²³⁹

More than anything, the establishment of community schools and the emergence of professionals in Lumphaphasi led to the shortage of family labour. As in the allocation of land to *amalose*, it forced a shift in land use practices and the ultimate decline in food production. Social relations had also changed in Lumphaphasi during this period.

Land use and social relations in Lumphaphasi during the period of the Transkei's independence

The period of independence of the Transkei escalated the changes of the previous period in land use and social relations. In Chapter 4 reference was made to Matanzima's aggressive strategy of building the African middle class through education and the development of African entrepreneurs in the Transkei. Indeed his two-pronged strategy led to the emergence of the professionals, constituting what Southall (1977) refers to as the beneficiaries of the Transkeian independence. In the education front, a number of schools, especially secondary schools were established and attracted children from rural areas who saw employment opportunities in the civil service. The transformation of a branch of the Fort Hare University into the University of Transkei (now Walter Sisulu University) in 1977²⁴⁰ was part of Matanzima's initiatives to promote education and to build the middle class. The TDC was his

²³⁷ Sunduza Nkomana interviewed in Lumphaphasi on 8 May 2010.

²³⁸ Harriet Stuurman interviewed in Cala town on 13 January 2011.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Umtata history. See <http://www.mthatha.co.za/umtata.html>. Accessed 30 May 2012.

vehicle for nurturing the entrepreneurs (Southall, 1977:17-18). There was mushrooming of African-owned businesses in various parts of the Transkei in the 1970s, included in Lumphaphasi. According to Noluthando Khalipha, “the first African-owned business in Lumphaphasi was that of Deborah Nkqayi, a retired nurse. The next business was established in the 1980s by Yekiwe Ngcukayithobi, who was a teacher”.²⁴¹ However, very few entrepreneurs managed to establish themselves in Lumphaphasi. Similarly, some children of Lumphaphasi left the village and went to high schools and tertiary institutions. According to Sibathathu Stuurman, Dr Sukude Matoti who worked, and still works in the University, was instrumental in encouraging and supporting some local children to get educated.²⁴² Both Dr Matoti and Gcinizizwe Khalipha also owned farms in Lumphaphasi.

The above is an illustration of rural residents making attempts to diversify their livelihoods. This was not the first attempt to diversify. The period from the early 20th century is replete with examples of these kinds of initiatives. According to Bryceson (1997:8), middle class and poor households diversify their incomes to stabilise their livelihoods. It would seem that, in view of the challenges with which they have had to contend, the residents of Lumphaphasi also deemed it necessary to explore other livelihood strategies for secure lifestyles. Nevertheless, the developments highlighted above also contributed in the shortage of labour and the ultimate decline in crop production as well as in changes in social relations in Lumphaphasi.

The sharp rise in population numbers in the mid-1970s in Lumphaphasi also had implications for production and social relations in the village. The increase was due to natural population growth as well as the arrival of another group of ex-farm workers. This was the fifth wave of movement of people to the village. Conditions in the village deteriorated drastically in the 1970s, as a number of adult children in the area demanded access to their own residential land (Ncapayi, 2010:65). At the same time, the global economic crisis of the 1970s (see Chapter 4) that also affected white commercial farmers, resulted in the retrenchment of farm workers on the white-owned commercial farms. These ex-farm workers made their way to villages in the reserves. Nqezo, Ntshwenca and Qayi were some of the families that arrived in the 1970s (Ncapayi, 2010:65). Besides being *amalose*, like all the other families before them, the difference in this group is that its members did not get access to residential sites. Although the EmaQwathini Tribal Authority approved the demarcation of seventy-seven residential sites in 1979, the sites were allocated to children of the *bona fides*.²⁴³ The *amalose* remained landless for a long time, some for more than 15 years. For instance, the family of Nozolile Qayi, which arrived in the mid-1970s, remained *amalose* until 1989.

²⁴¹ Noluthando Khalipha was interviewed on the Khalipha farm, on the 25th of July 2010.

²⁴² Interview of Sibathathu Stuurman in Lumphaphasi on 1 May 2010.

²⁴³ Lumphaphasi Location No. 12 File. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Cala.

Agricultural systems, such as grazing management, collapsed in Lumphaphasi due to the increase in the population between the mid-1970s and late 1980s. Archival records show that the government issued instructions that certain communal grazing camps in the village be set aside for 12 months. During this period, Lumphaphasi was also declared a Soil Conservation Area in terms of the Transkei Agricultural Development Act, 1966 (Act No. 10 of 1966).²⁴⁴

Meanwhile, production on the farms had significantly collapsed by the 1970s. Sunduza Nkomana cited a number of other factors that affected production on the farms from the mid-1970s. In his words:

*Firstly, drought was a factor. We had droughts and without means to mitigate their effects, it became impossible to cope as farm owners. Secondly, the younger generation did not have passion for agriculture. Therefore, we had not succession plan. However, the most critical factor was the homeland system of supporting agriculture. The government did everything for the farm owners to an extent of encouraging dependence. It brought tractors, everything, and ploughed for the people. The farm owners paid later. This, therefore, created dependence of people on the government.*²⁴⁵

Here, Nkomana makes an interesting point about how support from the homeland government created dependence which eventually crippled own initiative. This view contrasts with the one expressed by Cross who, in the context of looking at the state of development in the Bantustans, commented that

Black rural production systems are adapted to prevailing economic conditions. These constraints, economic and political, tie them down so severely that an immense gap yawns between South Africa's developed First World agriculture, spoon-fed to high production levels, and the black Third World agriculture of the neglected economic periphery (1988:3).

Contrary to the Nkomana view, Cross suggests that a lack of state support frustrated the development of agriculture in the homelands. However, a closer look at Nkomana's statement reveals that the key to unlocking the apparent contradiction lies in the way in which the state delivers its support rather than in the fact that it provided support. Nkomana, therefore, objects not to the support itself, but to how the state provided the support, and hints at an expectation that support should be provided in a manner that does not undermine the initiative of local people. Notwithstanding this, the Cross extract is important because it indicates that different levels of support were provided to those on white commercial farms

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Sunduza Nkomana interviewed on 8 May 2010, Lumphaphasi.

as opposed to those living in the reserves. The homeland government was not able to support farm owners in the communal areas to the same extent that the National Party government provided support to white farmers. However, what both inputs lose sight of is the limitations of seeking solutions to agriculture in the homelands without seriously dealing with the political question of land ownership in South Africa as a whole. No amount of government support could develop agriculture in the communal areas in the absence of dealing with the problem of overcrowding, as was proposed in the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission. Although the Commission's recommendations were flawed in the sense that they sought to resolve the problem in the homelands without dealing with land inequalities (particularly the extent of land owned by white farmers), the Commission at least realised that agricultural development was dependent upon something being done about overcrowding in the reserves.

Drought is also mentioned as one of the factors that impacted on agricultural production in the reserves. While not wanting to minimise its effects, it should be pointed out that drought was not an uncommon feature of the South African landscape. Yet, in the past the farmers had been able to cope with its impact on crop production. At best, therefore, drought could only have been a contributory factor in an already severely stressed situation.

The labour problem was exacerbated by the fact that most of the farm owners, who had also become middle class civil servants (teachers, policemen, clerks, etc.), started sending their children to urban schools to prepare them for careers in the Bantustan government. The aspirations of the middle class for their children depleted the farms of family labour, leaving behind only wives and elderly people in households. For example, Gcinizwe Khalipha was both a teacher and a farm owner. Although he owned a farm, he was more known as a teacher because of the amount of time he spent in teaching as opposed to farming. Thus, there was a scaling down of crop production, which is labour-intensive, in favour of livestock farming. This was the final blow to crop production on the farms in Lumphaphasi.

It could be argued that there was an abundant source of labour from the large section of residents with only residential stands in Lumphaphasi. In reality, however, most residents were not prepared to work for the farm owners, preferring instead to leave the area to seek work in urban areas. Sharecropping, which was the other strategy used by the farm owners to solve their labour problems after labour tenants moved out, was also rendered less effective over time as it became difficult to control the labour of the sharecroppers.

By the 1970s, a large section of residents in Lumphaphasi had become migrant workers. Yet, they still invested and were involved in land-based livelihoods in the village, particularly livestock. Mongezi Khalipha, for instance, invested his income from migrant work in cattle. He recalled that

*In the 1970s I worked in Cape Town and bought cattle for my parents who stayed in the village. Although the cattle did not develop much due to drought in the 1970s, I used oxen-drawn ploughs to plough and produce food.*²⁴⁶

As can be seen, Mongezi's example and others show that migrant workers continued to take an interest in land-based livelihoods, and investing in livestock, in particular. In some instances, livestock was also used for ploughing, which was a practice most poor families still used. Mongezi Khalipha was one of those who used the practice. He explained that to plough you needed a span of oxen. Because he "did not have enough oxen to constitute a span", he and the Limba family "established an oxen company".²⁴⁷ Thus, livestock was also preferred because of its importance in ploughing. In Mongezi's case, shortage of livestock also affected his household's ability to produce food.

Moreover, because of the collapse of fencing on grazing land and the fact that some arable land had been converted into grazing land, most of the crop production was confined mainly to household gardens. Crop production did not cease to exist, but it continued on a lesser scale in gardens because they were secure as most residential plots were still fenced. The conversion of arable land into grazing land in the communal area ensured the continuation of livestock production, despite the severe overcrowding in the area. While some rural residents may have abandoned land-based livelihoods during this period, others continued to raise livestock as part of a livelihood strategy. Therefore, the shift in land use that occurred was not a shift away from land-based livelihoods, but a shift towards livestock.

As shown above, contrary to Manona's (1999) argument that rural residents no longer have an interest in agricultural land, the evidence shows that some quit-rent titleholders never failed to seek ways to continue with agrarian activities. Despite the difficulties of overcrowding, shortage of labour and other related challenges, they continued land-based livelihoods using strategies such as sharecropping and labour tenancy as the opportunities to do this arose. The interest in agrarian land is patently clear. Like other theses, the de-agrarianisation thesis generalises and fails to capture situations such as those that existed in Lumphasi.

Political simmering and occupations leading to 1994

The acute landlessness that became clearly visible in Lumphasi in the 1980s was a manifestation of the fifth wave of movement of people mainly from the white-owned farms to rural areas. The movement was due to retrenchments that were triggered by the global increase in oil prices in the early

²⁴⁶ Mongezi Khalipha was interviewed in Lumphasi on the 10th February 2010.

1970s (Beinart, 1994:169). As profits for mine owners and white commercial farmers plummeted, workers were retrenched during the 1980s and 1990s (Palmer, 1997:15). These retrenched workers moved to rural areas in the Bantustans, causing land shortages in the 1980s (Manona, 1999:6).

Similar processes also unfolded in Lumphaphasi from the mid-1970s. While in previous periods landlessness was marked by the inability of residents to acquire arable land, it was an inability to access residential land that characterised the late 1970s. As landlessness escalated, there was a build-up of resentment and frustration among the residents. This gave rise to competition for access to residential land and increased tensions among residents, triggering latent and longstanding social divisions.

The influx of ex-farm workers into the village was due to two main factors – retrenched farm workers and farm workers who chose to leave the farms in the hope of a better life in the reserves. The latter group of farm workers was responding to a perception that there were better prospects for the ownership of land by Africans in the Transkei after the attainment of its independence in 1976. This was, therefore, one of the pull factors for the movement of ex-farm workers to the villages after the mid-70s (Ncapayi, 2010:65). As the group moved into the already overcrowded village, there landlessness escalated, which affected the ‘outsiders’ (*amalose*) and the children of the *bona fides* (*iinzalelwane*). The arrival of more outsiders triggered negative attitude on the part of the *iinzalelwane* towards *amalose*. The experience of Nozolile Qayi’s family illustrates the point. As already indicated, her family was part of the group of *amalose* for close sixteen years. By the 1980s, her family desperately needed its own land. This is her account:

When our family arrived in this village, it was difficult to get residential land. Local people had an attitude towards outsiders getting land. When my mother-in-law got land in 1988 from the headman, there was a protest from the local people, wanting to know how she got it when their children had long been waiting for land. The EmaQwathini Tribal Authority resolved the matter by pointing out that she had a right to get land (cited in Ncapayi, 2010:64).

By the late 1980s access to residential land had become almost impossible. Moreover, slackness in the response of government to applications aggravated the situation. As an example, applications that were lodged to the Department of Agriculture in June 1979 were only approved in July 1981,²⁴⁸ a gap of about two years between the date of application and the approval of the application.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Agriculture and Forestry – Agriculture No. 12 – Lumphaphasi Location file in offices of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Cala.

By this time, population pressure on the land had become unbearable, and as a result, infrastructure such as fencing to grazing camps was collapsing. A letter from Mablawuti Ncoko (an Agricultural Officer) to headman Shude on 6 June 1989 confirms this. In the letter, Mablawuti demanded that residents repair the fencing. He further advised the headman that he should be notified if the residents refused to maintain the fencing. Clearly the situation was becoming desperate. It was at this stage that landless residents of Lumphaphasi adopted more militant tactics. Issues came to a head in January 1990, when the community held a meeting to discuss the desperate situation. The demand from residents was that they wanted to return to the places they had been in before resettlement.²⁴⁹ Participants in the meeting decided to occupy land.

Interestingly, the decision was a collective one, involving both *amalose* and children of the *bona fides*. This was a new development in Lumphaphasi, given the cold relations between the two groups. The turning point in the relations was the community meeting (Ntsebeza, 2006:240). Since this community meeting was open to everybody, the needs of both social groups were discussed. According to Nozolile Qayi, the involvement of political youth (*amaqabane*) in leadership of the land struggle helped in bringing both *amalose* and children of *iinzalelwane* together.²⁵⁰ The youth involved were Vusumzi Nkomana, Nkululeko Khalipha, Sibathathu Stuurman, Dalubuhle Nyambali and Mangaliso Nqezo. Vusumzi is a son of Sunduza Nkomana, a farmer in Lumphaphasi. Nkululeko Khalipha and Sibathathu are sons of *iinzalelwane*. Nkululeko is also related to Solomon Khalipha. Dalubuhle and Mangaliso are sons of *amalose* (Ncapayi, 2010:70). Lack of access to residential sites affected both groups; hence, there was a collective decision. It should also be borne in mind that, since there was now more interaction between children of *amalose* and those of *iinzalelwane*, it became easy to unite the forces. Thus, the struggle became more organised than had been the case previously.

The broader political context of this struggle was the opening of political space in the Transkei in the late 1980s, which saw an explosion of political activity in various parts of the Bantustan, including Xhalanga (Chapter 4). In Xhalanga, this was followed by the formation of the Xhalanga Youth Congress (XAYCO), and a series of public meetings organised by unionists from the district, such as Gwede Mantashe, Moses Mayekiso and Mbulelo Ngamlana. XAYCO launched a land campaign, especially for residential purposes. The campaign started with the occupation of land in Cala town, then spread to the rural villages, including Lumphaphasi, which was the first village in the district to experience land occupations (Ntsebeza, 2006).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Conversation with Nozolile Qayi while travelling from Cala to Indwe on the 17th December 2010.

Although participants in the meeting in January 1990 resolved to demarcate residential sites from Landula farm, nothing happened until December 1991, when a decision was taken to revive the land campaign (Ntsebeza, 2006). The plan eventually unfolded after another meeting in February 1992 (Ncapayi, 2010). Both *amalose* and children of the *iinzalelwane* took matters into their own hands and demarcated land for residential sites. This was after the government ignored an application in May 1990 from the residents for residential sites.²⁵¹ According to Nozolile, even though headman Shude tried to oppose the decision and even attempted to stop its implementation by threatening to shoot the group, his efforts failed (Ncapayi, 2010:71).

However, the decision to demarcate Landula Farm for residential sites did not mean that landless people in Lumphaphasi were no longer interested in grazing land, but they desperately wanted residential sites (Ncapayi, 2010:71).

The land occupation had consequences that were far-reaching. It changed social relations in that residents previously without residential sites acquired them and the focus of some of the members of this group then became a demand for access to arable land, as will be seen in the next chapter. Furthermore, the land struggles also helped to build better relations between *amalose* and the *iinzalelwane*. The improved relations between the two groups served as a basis for the next stage in which *bona fides* and *amalose* came together and acquired a farm through the land reform programme. This too will be taken up in the next chapter.

However, some elderly people in Lumphaphasi did share in the positive effects painted above. Some resented the events of January 1992. Minutes of an undated meeting (could be in 1992) between the agricultural officers and residents of Lumphaphasi, reflect this resentment. Among other things discussed in the meeting were concerns about lack of fencing which posed challenges to people interested in food production. A complaint from Ndzamela summed up the feeling of crop producers. He complained that, “[O]ur problem is that livestock destroys our crops in the fields. Our children are at school, we lack fencing to protect our arable land” (*Sinengxaki yokutyelwa zimpahla silimile. Abantwana basesikolweni asinacingo lokubiyela amasimi*).²⁵² Other residents of Lumphaphasi also shared the concerns expressed by Ndzamela. Rose Mndini indicated that, “[s]ince the land occupation, we stopped crop production because livestock damages our crops. Livestock just moves around without being controlled”.²⁵³ The significance of the complaint was that fencing was destroyed during the land occupations, which led to resentment from the elderly people.

²⁵¹ Lumphaphasi File. Agriculture No. 12. Lumphaphasi Location. Department of Agriculture and Rural office, Cala.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Rose Mndini was interviewed on 11 February 2009.

At the same time, livestock owners also complained that crop producers were fleecing them by overcharging for impounded livestock. Nolungile Mbungwana explained that,

[a]s we are surrounded by farms: Khalipha, Tsoliwe, Tsengiwe, Matoti, Gagela, Madlelo, and Gcinizizwe, our cattle used to graze on the grazing land. Things changed as fencing no longer existed and as a result livestock got impounded. We have to pay to get it back. For instance, I had to pay R700 for seven of my cattle that were impounded. Because I did not have enough money, I had to leave one of my cows until I paid the R700.²⁵⁴

Therefore, a large section of quit-rent titleholders did not have many positive things to say about the land occupations.

However, the decline in crop production was due not only to the pressures of overcrowding, but also shortage of labour, as the children were at school and the *amalose* were no longer completely dependent on farm owners and small producers for their livelihoods. Thus, crop producers across the board were affected.

The complaints by livestock owners and quit-rent titleholders illustrate that some people were still interested in agrarian livelihoods. By the 1990s, there were still residents in Lumphaphasi that were showing interest in agricultural land. Moreover, this is a further illustration that land continued to influence social relations in the village. The political changes introduced new possibilities for the people of Lumphaphasi. The changes meant that people in landlocked communities such as Lumphaphasi would have the opportunity of acquiring land outside the communal areas (Ncapayi, 2010). In the next chapter we will see how this possibility was taken up by the residents.

Conclusion

Contrary to the view of some de-agrarianisation scholars that rural people no longer show attachment to agricultural land, it has been shown in the chapter that the residents of Lumphaphasi continued to show interest in land-based livelihoods until the 1990s. This was despite the many challenges affecting their ability to use the land that they faced. Therefore, the view that agricultural land no longer mattered to rural people is challenged.

Although acute overcrowding, alarming landlessness and visible decline in crop production characterise the period covered by this chapter, livestock production continued in Lumphaphasi. The study has argued that although there has been de-agrarianisation, scholars have underplayed the role of livestock production in rural livelihoods. As a result, little appreciation has been shown for the

significance of the shift in land use practices in rural such as Lumphaphasi. Yet, as overcrowding became more pronounced and grazing land scarcer, rural people shifted their land use practices by scaling down crop production in favour of livestock production. De-agrarianisation scholars have failed to engage with the significance of this shift in the development of land-based lifestyles in rural areas and its implications for the de-agrarianisation debate. The diversification of land-based livelihoods from the 1960s did not imply a complete shift away from land use, but instead represented the broadening of livelihood strategies. Some rural dwellers have certainly made occupational shifts away from agrarian livelihoods, but a significant section of rural residents still use land as part of their diversified rural livelihood strategies.

State intervention that aimed at improving socio-economic conditions in rural areas through the implementation of Betterment planning in the 1960s also had far-reaching implications for social relations in Lumphaphasi. The interventions broke the chains of bondage that held the *amalose* captive and freed them from the quit-rent titleholders (African farm owners and small producers), thus denying the latter much-needed labour power. Lack of labour resulted in the decline of crop production on the farms, but did not affect livestock production that is less-labour intensive. Thus, state intervention, which was intended to improve the socio-economic conditions of rural dwellers, had the opposite effect in the end. Crop production declined, and the future of livestock production was threatened as grazing land was reduced. The knock-on effect of this development in Lumphaphasi was that crop producers were unable to utilise even the greatly reduced arable land as uncontrolled livestock destroyed the crops.

As male members of the rural middle class took up jobs in the civil service, and male migrant workers left the area, women assumed the critical role of ensuring the continuation of production in Lumphaphasi. This, however, did not mean that middle class men and migrant workers played no role in the production processes in Lumphaphasi. Many of the middle class men, in particular, were livestock owners who continued to remain involved in production as part of their livelihood strategy. Therefore, although some rural residents were involved in non-agrarian activities, this did not mean that they abandoned their agrarian lifestyles.

A combination of forced removals, the retrenchments of unskilled farm workers by the mechanising white commercial agricultural sector, and natural population growth in the 1960s resulted in a population explosion in Lumphaphasi. The alarming increase in the group of landless people that resulted from this had implications for social relations in the community. Competition for land, an increasingly scarce resource, led to the eruption of serious tensions between the *amalose* and *iinzalelwane* in the

²⁵⁴ Nolungile Mbungwana was interviewed in March 2010.

village. The *iinzalwelane* expected to be prioritised in the allocation of residential land and felt that the *amalose* did not have the right to access land. However, it took the politicised youth and migrant workers to help bridge the gap and ease the tensions between the two groups. This enabled the forging of unity, which led to a common struggle for access to residential land in the early 1990s. The involvement of youth and migrant workers introduced a new capacity for organisation in rural struggles, as was shown in the occupation of land in Lumphaphasi in 1992. However, as has been raised by Ntsebeza (2006), the struggles were not transformative in the sense that they attempted to address the problem of landlessness within the restricted area designated for African occupation rather than to question the skewed landholding patterns in the country as a whole.

It was within the context of experiences of communities such as Lumphaphasi that political debates about the nature of a future South Africa took place in the early 1990s. Both the liberation movements and the apartheid government were aware of the situation in the Bantustans (ANC, 1994:19). It is clear that initiatives such as the World Bank-sponsored workshops and seminars that took place between 1992 and 1993, organised under the aegis of the Land and Agricultural Policy Centre (LAPC), were grappling with the challenges of landlessness in South Africa (van Zyl, Kirsten and Binswanger, 1996:v). Indeed, a “Land Options Conference” was held in Johannesburg from 12 to 15 October 1993 (van Zyl, et al., 1996:v). In the same year, the ANC formulated the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which promised redistribution of agricultural land to landless Africans (ANC, 1994).

CHAPTER 8

The Land Reform Programme and its Significance to Changes in Social Relations in Lumphaphasi

Introduction

The introduction of the land reform programme in 1994 presented possibilities for the resolution of the problems of landlessness and overcrowding in the communal areas of South Africa. As indicated in the ANC's election manifesto – the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – the land reform programme aimed to provide landless rural people with residential and agricultural land (ANC, 1994). Similarly, South Africa's interim and the final constitution promised the same (RSA, 1996). Indeed, in 1994, the three-pronged land reform programme was introduced. Its components are: redistribution “to provide the disadvantaged and the poor with access to land for residential and productive purposes”; land restitution that “covers cases of forced removals which took place after 1913”; and land tenure reform “to improve the tenure security of all South Africans and to accommodate diverse forms of land tenure, including types of communal tenure” (DLA, 1997:7).

Eighteen years on, debates are raging about the impact of land reform in South Africa. Broadly, two positions have emerged. One strand is concerned with the pace at which land was redistributed and issues about the class character of the beneficiaries. The other strand relates to debates about the productivity and contribution of the land reform projects to livelihoods of the beneficiaries. On the whole, the studies paint a pessimistic view that the land reform projects have failed to make a positive impact on the livelihoods of poor rural people. However, as will be shown in the next sections, there is emerging evidence in the Chris Hani District Municipality (CHDM) that seems to be challenging this pessimistic view regarding the land reform projects and their contribution to livelihoods of rural people (Chitonge and Ntsebeza, 2012:2).²⁵⁵ My own work in Lumphaphasi, which is also part of CHDM, confirms the preliminary findings of this study. More about this later.

Against the backdrop of the debates, this chapter traces the manner in which the land reform programme was introduced in Lumphaphasi and the processes followed towards accessing land by one particular group, Delindlala. Important to note here is the role played by research and CALUSA, a non-

²⁵⁵ The research is an initiative of the National Research Foundation (NRF) Research Chair in Land Reform and Democracy in South Africa (LRDSA), previously in the Department of Sociology but currently in the Centre for African Studies (CAS), University of Cape Town. The author participated in both the participatory phase and the survey phase of the study.

governmental organisation (NGO) operating in the area. Two arguments are made in this chapter. Firstly, careful targeting of the people who become beneficiaries of land reform is important in ensuring the success of the projects. Secondly, research plays an important role in identification of the need for land so that the land reform projects respond to the expressed need of people.

The chapter has three sections: the first discusses the land reform programme, followed by a section on the debates about the slow pace of land reform and the contribution of land reform on livelihoods of rural people. The last section discusses the introduction of the land reform programme in Lumphaphasi and the processes that led to the eventual acquisition of land by Delindlala at the end of 2001. The role played by research and the intervention of the NGO are highlighted.

The land reform programme and its significance to landless rural people

When the ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU) introduced the land reform programme in 1994, it aimed at addressing the painful history of land dispossession experienced by the African people (DLA, 1997:7). Chapters 2 - 7 of this study provided detailed empirical evidence of the process and consequences of land dispossession, a legacy which land reform was meant to address. As already stated in Chapter 1, the land reform programme originated from the ANC's RDP policy document and it promised to address land hunger and poverty through the redistribution of agricultural land to landless African people (ANC, 1994:19). This was further endorsed in the country's interim constitution in 1993, as well as in Section 25 of the final constitution of 1996 (Hendricks, 2001). In response to this constitutional imperative, the White Paper on South African Land Policy pointed out that "land is needed by farm workers, labour tenants, and women who need to grow food to feed" their families (DLA, 1997:22). The land policy further argues that those who do not have enough land within the communal areas also need land (ibid). These indicate the intentions of the government; to facilitate the acquisition of land outside of the communal areas by land-needy people in the former reserves (ibid: 30). The case study is on a redistribution project, and, therefore, of the three components of the land reform programme, the redistribution component is the most pertinent here.

Between 1994 and 1999, land redistribution was implemented through the Settlement Land and Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which provided a grant of R16 000 (initially R15 000) to households with a monthly income of less than R1 500 (Lyne and Darroch, 2003:4). The SLAG allowed beneficiaries to use the grant for the "purchase [of] land directly from willing sellers, including the state" (DLA, 1997:ix). Furthermore, the DLA's Grants and Services Policy document states that the grant was to

be used for land acquisition, enhancement of tenure rights, and investments in infrastructure, home improvements, and farm capital investment according to the plans put forward by applicants (DLA, 2001a:2).

Thus, the SLAG grant was flexible and accommodated a range of uses including home improvements.

Groups were established by bringing together qualifying households and assisting them to apply for land. The households were grouped and registered as legal entities through communal property associations (CPAs), which were established in terms of the Communal Property Associations Act No 28 of 1996. The Act aimed to “enable communities to form juristic persons, to be known as communal property associations in order to acquire, hold and manage property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a written constitution; and to provide for matters connected therewith” (DLA, 1996:1). As the aims indicate, the Act expected co-operation among the beneficiaries.

The structure of the grant led to a view among scholars that the SLAG promoted the acquisition of land by large groups, a phenomenon that was referred to as a “rent-a-crowd syndrome” by some critics (Hall, 2010:179; also Hall and Cliffe, 2009:5-7). However, the government suspended implementation of SLAG in 1999 to allow a review of the programme. According to Hall and Cliffe (2009:7), reviews pointed out that the majority of CPAs were dysfunctional with regard to “collective decision-making or in allocating rights and resources to members”.

In 2001, the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme replaced the SLAG. Unlike the SLAG, the LRAD grant was specific and was to be used in the acquisition of agricultural land. Its stated objectives aimed at

contributing to the redistribution of 30% of the country's agricultural land over 15 years; improving nutrition and incomes of the rural poor who want to farm on any scale; de-congesting over-crowded former homeland areas; and expanding opportunities for women and young people who stay in rural areas (DLA, 2001b:1).

The LRAD provided for four types of projects from which beneficiaries could choose: food safety-net projects, which cater for participants that “wish to ... acquire land for food crop and/or livestock production to improve household food security”; equity schemes, where participants “make the requisite matching own contribution, and receive equity in an agricultural enterprise tantamount to the value of the grant plus the own contribution”; production for markets, which is for participants who want to “enter the LRAD to engage in commercial agricultural activities”; and agriculture in communal areas for “people living in communal areas [that] already have secure access to agricultural land, but may not have the means to make productive use of that land”.

On the basis of the objectives of the LRAD, some scholars concluded that it would address decongestion in communal areas by relocating beneficiaries to agricultural land outside of the communal areas (Hall, 2007:89; also see IRRD and HSRC, 2003).²⁵⁶ However, as Chapter 9 will show, the LRAD has not led to decongestion in Lumphashi. As for the critique that the LRAD favours well-resourced people at the expense of poor people (Ntsebeza and Hendricks, 2000; Greenberg, 2003a), their critique focuses only on the provision that targets projects which produce for the markets and ignores the other types of projects. This may be because the government favours this model.

The next section focuses on the impact of land reform on the livelihoods of beneficiaries.

Debates regarding the land reform programme

The two broad views in the debates about the role of land reform in improving the lives of rural people in South Africa are outlined below. One side of the debate relates to the slow pace of land distribution and the class composition of beneficiaries that the land reform programme targets. The other side is grappling with the question of whether land reform contributes to the livelihoods of the beneficiaries or not.

The pace of redistribution and class composition of the beneficiaries

Since the late 1990s, policy implementers (van den Brink et al., 2007), practitioners (Andrews, 2007) and scholars have been debating the impact of the land reform programme on addressing landlessness in rural areas of South Africa. The debates were concerned about the number of hectares of land that have been transferred to beneficiaries. There has been wide agreement that the land reform programme was slow in redistributing land (Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 2004; Didiza, 2006; Andrews, 2007; Cousins, 2007; Hall and Ntsebeza, 2007; Lahiff, 2007a). For example, to illustrate the slow pace of land transfer, Hall (2007:88) points out that: “By 1999 ... less than 1 per cent of agricultural land had been transferred through all aspects of land reform”. This leads Ntsebeza (2007:119) to remark that: “except among hardboiled party loyalists, there is wide acceptance today that the pace of land reform in South Africa is painfully slow”.

Although there is agreement about the slow pace of land reform, divergent views concerning reasons for this slow pace have been expressed. As Ntsebeza (2007) points out, at the centre of the debate is “interpretation of Section 25 of the Constitution”. Section 25 relates to what is now generally referred

²⁵⁶ IRRD is the Integrated Rural and Regional Development, HSRC refers to the Human Sciences Research Council.

to as the Property Clause. While Section 25 provides for expropriation of land “for a public purpose or in the public interest”; and “subject to compensation” that is “agreed upon by those affected or decided by a court”, on the whole it guarantees the protection of property rights of current property owners. One view in the debate argues that the policy provisions are in place but the problem is implementation. Hall has argued that

South Africa has fairly active land markets, with an estimated 6 per cent of agricultural land being transacted each year, but opportunities to acquire land through the market for land reform have been missed (2007:99).

She goes on to argue that

while some commentators have emphasised the limitations presented by the ‘property clause’ in the Constitution at present the most immediate constraint on a more proactive and interventionist approach to acquiring land for redistribution or restitution appear to be more political than legal (ibid.).

In other words Hall maintains that a proactive state can still use the market in the land reform programme. This includes the need for expropriation where necessary. Although van den Brink et al. (2007) have acknowledged that there was a need not to rely on the markets only for redistribution, their overall argument is that the present policy provisions are still relevant. They point out: “That, however, does not mean that land markets should not play a far greater role in land reform than they often do now” (2007:187). This means that they believe that the status quo, which relies on the markets to ensure success of the willing seller-willing buyer principle, must remain. Ntsebeza and Hendricks (2000) take a different view that the inclusion of the Property Clause in the Constitution hampers land redistribution. Ntsebeza asserts:

the provisions of Section 25 in the Constitution are contradictory in the sense that the Constitution protects existing property rights, while at the same time making a commitment to redistributing land to the dispossessed majority. The two objectives ... cannot be achieved at the same time simply because the bulk of the land outside the former bantustans is under private ownership and consequently safeguarded by the Constitution (2007:121).

Clearly, these scholars see the inclusion of the Property Clause in the Constitution as a hindrance to land redistribution.

The other strand on this side of the debate – the class character of those that benefit from land redistribution – arose after there was a policy shift from the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) to the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) in 2001. The shift occurred

amid heavy criticism of the SLAG for transferring land to large groups that lacked cohesion (Hall, 2007; 2009; Moorcroft, 2010; Cousins and Scoones, 2010). As already indicated, there exists a general view that SLAG targeted poor people as beneficiaries. On the other hand, the LRAD focused on individuals who could provide an own contribution in the form of money, labour or in kind. Debates emerged immediately after the policy shift, with some scholars arguing that the LRAD should support smallholder farmers (Lahiff, 2008; Cousins and Scoones, 2010). These scholars thus viewed the introduction of LRAD as meaning the abandonment of small producers as beneficiaries of land redistribution. However, the class composition of the smallholder farmers these scholars argued ought to be considered is not clear. This is a point later made by Cousins: that smallholders consist of producers that are differentiated in terms of resources – some are able to produce surplus that they send to the markets, while others produce much less (2010:9).²⁵⁷ Also critical of the SLAG, but equally critical of the focus of the LRAD, was another group of scholars who have argued that the LRAD focused on black commercial farmers and excluded poor beneficiaries (Ntsebeza and Hendricks, 2000; Greenberg, 2003a; 2003b). As Ntsebeza and Hendricks 2000:7) put it: “Only a small group of ... black farmers are likely to benefit” from the LRAD. It marginalised the “vast majority of the rural poor who have the ability and interest to farm” (ibid.). Thus, for these scholars, the LRAD should focus on poor rural people.

The case study of Lumphaphasi confirms that the pace of land redistribution is slow and illuminates the factors that influence it. In addition, in Lumphaphasi, not only beneficiaries with resources benefited from the LRAD, but also those with fewer resources. This, though, can be attributed to the role of CALUSA, the local NGO about which more will be said below.

The contribution of land reform in the livelihoods of rural people

Another vexed question that informs current debates in South Africa is whether land reform contributes to improving livelihoods of rural people or not. This debate has emerged following studies of the land reform projects. There are two sides to the debate: one side, a pessimistic view, which, although acknowledging some success stories, on the whole, questions the contribution of land reform to the livelihoods of rural people; the other side affirms the contribution of land reform in improving livelihoods of rural people. The pessimistic view is pervasive and is currently advocated by reporters (Makhanya, 2009; 2012), government officials and politicians (ANC, 2007; Nkwinti, 2012), researchers (Anseeuw and Mathebula, 2008; Umhlaba Rural Services, 2008, Aliber et al., 2011) and academics (Hall, 2009; Hall and Cliffe, 2009). However, emerging evidence from current research in

²⁵⁷ Cousins prefers the term petty commodity producers to smallholders because he views these producers as

the Chris Hani District Municipality seems to challenge this dominant and pessimistic view (Chitonge and Ntsebeza, 2012).

Although different in the arguments they advance regarding the projects, proponents of the pessimistic view, on the whole, come to a common conclusion that the projects have largely failed. There are broadly three arguments that prevail: lack of interest in land on the part of rural people and group-based farming which causes land reform projects to malfunction; targeting and recruitment of beneficiaries; and the issue of support – who provides it, and the terms and conditions under which it is provided.

The view that rural people do not need agricultural land, but jobs and land for housing, is cited as one of the factors for the failure of the land reform projects (Bernstein, 2005; Makhanya, 2012). Bernstein's institution, Centre for Development Enterprise (CDE), also supports this view. She argues that South Africa is urbanising, thus the pressing need is for redistribution of land in urban areas. Land reform for agricultural purposes is not necessary, she argues (2005:13). Makhanya has become one of the avid critics of the land reform programme. He believes that there is no need for the land reform programme. Re-iterating what he had said previously, Makhanya wrote:

This son of peasants has previously written in this space that our country is wasting time, money and energy trying to get an urban-inclined population to love the land. Just observe the hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile land that lie fallow. So why would you want to interfere with commercial farming in order to satisfy a mythical desire for agricultural land?²⁵⁸

To him, the implementation of land reform is tantamount to an unnecessary waste of land and resources. The view that rural people do not need agricultural land has been shown through empirical evidence in previous chapters as flawed and will not be discussed in this section.

Group-based farming is also viewed as contributing to the failure of the land reform projects to improve livelihoods of beneficiaries. According to Hall (2009), the structure of the LRAD grant forces beneficiaries to acquire land as groups, hence the dominance of group-based farming. She categorises group-based farming into: “group-based ownership and production” which “involves not only joint ownership of the land but also the pooling of assets and labour”, including herds of cattle (2009:26); and “group-based ownership with household production” in which it is only the land that is managed jointly, but production happens at a household level (ibid.:26-27). Whilst group-based ownership with household production exists, it is not as common as the former. Hall views group-based ownership and production as a failure. According to her, this model has produced “similar outcomes to those it was

integrated into the capitalist system which forces them to produce for it.

intended to remedy”. Further, plans to “engage jointly in production have sometimes failed to get off the ground” (ibid.:27) and “non-realisation of project plans” fuels conflicts and “competition over resources (ibid.). She concludes that, in group-based projects, land “underutilisation is widely reported, and there is substantial evidence that livelihood benefits have been very limited” (ibid.:55). Similarly, Lahiff (2007a:6) also opines that “group access to land for large-scale agriculture” has failed. He argues:

This can be seen as a business model of sorts but, in practice, the business element has often either failed to get off the ground or actually involves only a small proportion of the community members (ibid.).

Lahiff regards the cause of the failure as being the unequal commitment by members of labour and resources to the projects. As a solution to the problem, Lahiff argues that

sub-division of land (even informal sub-division) and individualisation of agricultural production (to the household level) has the potential to be a more inclusive model, that is appropriate to the skills and resources of community members and delivers more immediate and tangible benefits (2007a:8).

Although also critical of group-based farming, other commentators take a general view and do not distinguish the group-based farming models to which they refer. A study of six land reform projects covering the Western Cape, Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga undertaken by Umhlaba, ARRDRRI (Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute) and Phuhlisani Solutions found that the failure of a number of the projects was

associated with internal conflict, loss of interest among beneficiaries and beneficiary defection, deterioration of farm infrastructure, limited production and marketing, poor business plans, low levels of experience, financial problems and insufficient emphasis on institutional design. (Umhlaba et al., 2010:ix).

According to these institutions, the source of problems experienced by groups is their failure to manage interpersonal relations within the groups which escalate into internal conflicts. Similarly, Anseeuw and Mathebula (2008:ix) highlight the existence of inequalities and internal conflicts in groups. For them, the internal conflicts in the projects are due to the failure to pay attention to processes leading to the establishment of the groups. The overall conclusion from the various views is that group-based projects have failed to improve livelihoods of beneficiaries.

²⁵⁸ Makhanya, M. (19 February 2012). Apartheid denialism drives a knife into belly of black SA. <http://www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2012/02/19/apartheid-denialism-drives-a-knife-into-belly-of-black-sa>. Accessed on 3/6/2012.

Targeting and recruitment of beneficiaries is also viewed as affecting the performance of the land reform projects. However, there are different views on what the effects are. Aliber et al. argue that, because the LRAD targets well-resourced people as beneficiaries means it fails poor people. They point out:

We have observed that communal area dwellers and communal area farmers are almost systematically neglected by land redistribution. To the extent either were drawn into redistribution, it was generally as recruits to help populate SLAG applications that had no real reference to their situation or their interests (2011:245).

It would seem that the neglect of communal dwellers is due to a perception that they are poor. These writers add that, because of its grant structure, LRAD also marginalises farm workers, despite the government's rhetoric that farm workers and farm-dwellers are the "key target group" (ibid.). This position is very similar to that taken by some scholars who critiqued the LRAD, arguing that it targets well-resourced beneficiaries at the expense of poor people (Ntsebeza and Hendricks, 2000; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 2004; Greenberg, 2003a).

It would seem that the above applies to projects that are led by government officials. A different situation seems to prevail where land reform projects are initiated by farmers who want to sell. In collaboration with estate agents, who also act as consultants, the farmer who wants to sell a farm recruits his workers and where the farm workers cannot meet the price of the farm, other people from surrounding communities are also recruited (Aliber et al., 2011.:58). For example, in the case of Makhamotse, a land reform project in Limpopo, the consultant who led the process of forming the group persuaded the farm workers to recruit people in the surrounding village (ibid.). As a result, the project was plagued by internal fights and the ultimate withdrawal of members. Thus, targeting and recruitment is viewed as a contributory factor to the failure of the projects.

The issue of support to land reform beneficiaries is a vexed one because it is viewed differently by commentators. While some complain about the lack of support, others highlight the manner in which the support is provided as contributing to the problem of the projects. Hall and Cliffe (2009:2) aptly capture the dilemma of support. They argue that

[u]nderutilisation of redistributed land is widespread and has been attributed primarily to three factors: an enforced structure of group farming; the imposition through business planning processes of commercial and capital-intensive production models inappropriate to the needs and capabilities of beneficiaries; and a chronic problem of insufficient (or absent) support, extension services and market access" (2009:2).

Umhlaba et al. cast more light on the nature of the support:

The shaping and planning of land reform projects in South Africa has been characterized by the over-reliance on external agency, particularly during the early years. Business plans, which were usually prepared by consultants, were not adequately internalized by the land reform beneficiaries and in some instances completely unrealistic (2010:27).

Thus, the imposition of ideas is the main problem regarding support. This view is further confirmed by Minister Nkwinti's address to the Assembly on 7 June 2011, where he noted that his department "had not been successful in ensuring all 2.9 million hectares of land given to beneficiaries remained productive. The department had therefore been forced to introduce its recapitalisation programme".²⁵⁹ Therefore, the department was looking for consultants to serve as mentors "to help turn around 852 land reform projects at risk of collapse" and make them "commercially viable and productive".²⁶⁰ As can be seen, failure is equated to inability or lack of capacity in the beneficiaries to use the land commercially.

On the other hand, Lahiff points out that the land reform projects struggle to access support services such as "credit, training, extension advice, transport and ploughing services, veterinary services, and access to input and produce markets" (2007b:31). He reminds that this lack of support services should be viewed in relation to the general withdrawal of support services to farmers by the state. However, commercial agriculture continues to get support from various other sources, such as commercial and co-operative providers, but, land reform projects and small-scale farmers struggle to get support. The support that is provided by provincial department of agriculture and non-governmental organisations seem inadequate, as only few projects access it. Similarly, Jacobs et al. argue:

Currently, no specific institution has responsibility for driving and coordinating the provision of post-transfer support to redistribution beneficiaries, and little has been forthcoming in the area of financial resources to fund such assistance. Ad hoc arrangements persist, with an array of institutions providing support in areas such as extension services, credit, training and infrastructure (2003:19).

These writers further indicate that, in most cases, the support is provided only after the land is transferred.

From the discussion above, it is clear that the issue of support is problematic in that, it is often absent and, where it is provided, it is not in line with what beneficiaries want. This issue, thus, needs to be viewed critically.

²⁵⁹ Nkwinti, G. (7 June 2011). Nkwinti sets land reform deadline. <http://www.flyafrika.info/forums/showthread.php?39199-Nkwinti-sets-land-reform-deadline>. Accessed 3/6/2012.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

Anseeuw and Mathebula (2008) point to three land reform projects in Limpopo that they consider success stories, one of which is worth closer examination. This is a restitution project that involves 427 beneficiaries on 7 148 hectares of land that covers various farmers. The project started operating in 2004 and has been getting support from Nkuzi – an NGO – and the Legal Resource Centre. Nkuzi helped the members of the project to draft their constitution and continues to monitor and support the project (ibid.:41-42). According to members of the project the constitution “reflects their concerns and desires” (ibid.:42), indicating that members have both internalised and own the constitution.

A lesson from the example of Nkuzi is that support to the projects does not have to come from the government, NGO support is also critical. What also makes the NGO support important is that it is not a once-off support, but continuous as shown here.

As pointed out earlier, the debates on the contribution of land reform to the livelihoods of beneficiaries paint a pessimistic view. However, Chitonge and Ntsebeza (2012) provide an optimistic view regarding the land reform projects in the Chris Hani District Municipality (CHDM) in the Eastern Cape. Preliminary findings of a study conducted between and 2009 and 2010, show that most beneficiary households have more livestock and better access to food than non-beneficiaries (Chitonge and Ntsebeza, 2012:19-20). According to the study,

[t]here are notable differences between land reform beneficiary and non-beneficiary households on many indicators such as the number of livestock owned, household assets, monthly income and expenditure, unemployment, crop production and self assessment of general wellbeing.²⁶¹

The study focused at the household level to assess whether there has been improvement in the livelihoods of the beneficiary households or not. They explain reasons for choosing such an approach: “Our focus is on the household level variables mainly because livelihood dynamics can be better captured at household level than at the individual or project level” (2012:8). The findings show improvements in the livelihoods of beneficiaries. Thus, the situation of the land reform projects is not as gloomy in CHDM as has been made out in the Limpopo province. Detailed empirical evidence from Lumphasi and Delindlala Agricultural Farm, which is the subject of my current case study, corroborates the findings by Chitonge and Ntsebeza.

A general point to make about the debates is that they focus mostly on projects that are in the commercial farming model, hence the over-emphasis of the assessment on economic benefits of the projects. For instance, Anseeuw and Mathebula point out that:

²⁶¹ See <http://www.landreform.uct.ac.za/Initialfindings.html>. Accessed on 15/05/2012.

The most observable fact is the overall negative trajectory of all the land reform projects in Molemole. This is demonstrated in the gross project income, which reflects the production level of a project. The project's average gross farm income is R37 147 per year (2008:34).

Similarly, Aliber et al. (2011:67) state that:

The overall net earnings from Makhamotse's orchards was a loss of about R26 000. However, it is important to note that these sums only take operational expenses into account, whereas in reality Makhamotse was at the same time attempting to restore some of the fencing (R20 000 for materials), acquire new micro-sprinklers (R11 700), repair one of its water pumps (R9 700); and of course it was also trying to service various loans (2011:67).

The use of the economic performance of the projects as a yardstick does not take into account other benefits the projects provide to the beneficiaries. Yet, as Dlamini shows, having access to land also has benefits other than money:

Providing poor people with access to land and improving their ability to make effective use of the land that they occupy are central to reducing poverty and empowering them and their communities (2008:24).

This also shows that land reform contributes to livelihoods of rural people. Davenport (2008:35) shows that land reform contributes to improvement of the livelihoods of residents in Grahamstown, Bathurst and Fort Beaufort. These are residents that have used the land reform programme to access municipal commonage land. According to Davenport (ibid.), the beneficiaries use the commonage for fuel wood, medicinal plants and livestock rearing. Cousins and Scoones make a similar point about the contribution of land to livelihoods of rural people. They point out that:

In rural economies land is seen as a basic livelihood asset ... from which people produce food and earn a living, and comprises cropland, grazing land and common lands from which a range of natural resources can be harvested (2010:42).

In their research in CHDM, Chitonge and Ntsebeza also point out that the land reform projects contribute not only economically, but also in non-monetary ways. They argue:

[T]he role of land is not restricted to quantifiable monetary or material improvements, but is conceived broadly to include non-material aspects such as enhanced sense of justice, self-esteem, security, dignity and self-respect (2012:2).

As will be seen from the next chapter in particular, the current case study concurs with the optimistic view that land reform makes a contribution to the livelihoods of rural people. It also shows that the

land reform programme influences changes in social relations in rural areas. The next section focuses on the introduction of land reform in Lumphaphasi.

Introduction of land reform in Lumphaphasi: the role of research and CALUSA

Research has immense potential to influence change in communities. Among the characteristics of Participatory Action Research (PAR) cited by Buckner (2004:1) are that it fosters “direct benefits to those involved in the research process” and also “results in change in practice”. This applies to the experience of the people of Lumphaphasi. While not suggesting that it was PAR that was used in Lumphaphasi, research was instrumental in facilitating the introduction of the land reform programme in Lumphaphasi. Indeed, research was of direct benefit to the people of this community and it led to change in their lives. Eventually, on 15 December 2001, forty people from the community became owners of a 2 029 hectare farm that is next to the small town of Indwe.

This section traces the processes leading to the introduction of the land reform programme and the eventual acquisition of land by Delindlala in December 2001. It shows the critical role research played in influencing the processes, as well as the role of CALUSA. The critical point the section makes is that research is important in assisting in identifying the expressed needs of land needy people so that land reform responds to such needs. Proper targeting of beneficiaries with an interest in agricultural land is critical for the success of land reform projects. Another important point is that groups that have been supported not only when they acquire land, but before that, have better chances of success. The case of Nkuzi also illustrates this.

Up to 1999, land needy people of Lumphaphasi had been trying to resolve their need for land by focusing within the same overcrowded village. The people of Lumphaphasi were unaware of the existence of the land reform programme, indicating that the people of Lumphaphasi were not part of the national debates with regard to the land reform programme. It confirms Chambers’ argument about the marginalisation of rural communities that are “remote from town and communications, or removed ... from the centres of trading, discussion and information” (1983:110). Although raising it within a different context, Kepe and Ntsebeza (2011) make a similar point about the marginalisation of rural people. Thus, these people never imagined a possibility of acquiring land outside their village.

The turning point was a workshop CALUSA organised in March 2000, where Lungisile Ntsebeza reported findings of his study on “Cattle production in Xhalanga district” (Ntsebeza, 2000), in which Lumphaphasi was also one of the research sites. Ntsebeza conducted the study in 1999 as part of his research work for the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS – now Institute for Poverty,

Land and Agrarian Studies).²⁶² The shortage of grazing land was highlighted as the main challenge for stock producers in the Xhalanga district and, in particular, its villages such Lumphaphasi (Ntsebeza, 2000:53).

As a board member of CALUSA, Ntsebeza alerted its members to the problem of land hunger, particularly grazing land. He advised the organisation to focus on this problem, for it to be of assistance to communities. Having taken this on board, there was agreement within CALUSA that there was a need to make use of the land reform programme to address the problem. An outcome of the discussions was a workshop at which findings of the research were discussed and Ntsebeza introduced the land reform programme to communities. He pointed out that communities with land need such as Lumphaphasi could obtain assistance from the government through the land reform programme (CALUSA, 2000). As Buckner (2004) puts it, the researcher uses research to empower and not to exploit the community, as occurred in this case. Ntsebeza further advised participants interested in the land reform programme to work with CALUSA to address their land needs (CALUSA, 2000). Subsequently, CALUSA was requested to work with the communities to “take up the matter of land and government support to stock farmers with the Departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture respectively” (CALUSA, 2000:17). The workshop was attended by representatives of twelve communities in the former Xhalanga magisterial district, including Lumphaphasi.

The information that was shared during the workshop had an immense impact on the people of Lumphaphasi and on future processes in the area. There was an immediate reaction to the information. For instance out of twelve communities that were represented in the workshop, Cala Reserve and Lumphaphasi showed interest by following up on these discussions. They indicated to CALUSA that they needed assistance to acquire land for grazing and food production. Both communities are landlocked – Lumphaphasi is sandwiched by a mountain range on its eastern side and bordered by farms of the African farmers on the west; and Cala Reserve is surrounded by other villages, making it impossible for it to provide residential land to its growing population and cater for livestock grazing at the same time.

The research had a transforming effect on CALUSA too. Ntsebeza used the research to persuade the organisation’s board and personnel to adopt a land programme, increasing its relevance to the needs of the communities. A two-pronged land programme was developed: one component focusing on land access to assist landless communities to acquire land through the land reform programme, while the land use component promoted organic farming in communal gardens in villages of Xhalanga

²⁶² Up to 2003, Ntsebeza worked as a researcher for the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape.

(CALUSA, 2000). Thus, the research informed CALUSA about land hunger and the need for the land reform programme in Lumphaphasi and Cala Reserve.

Origins of the agricultural group in Lumphaphasi

At the time of the workshop in March 2000, there were already agricultural groups in various villages of Xhalanga, including Lumphaphasi. The existence of the agricultural groups is closely linked to CALUSA, which is one of the two NGOs that Ntsebeza (2006) mentions in his major study of Xhalanga entitled *Democracy compromised*. The other one is Health Care Trust (HCT). CALUSA was established in February 1983 as an education-oriented association. However, from the early 1990s, the organisation shifted to participatory rural development approaches and later, to a focus on land issues. The initial shift was influenced by CALUSA's adoption of a participatory development approach called People's Participatory Planning and Action (PPPA). This was after the organisation joined the Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE – formerly known as Trust for Christian Outreach and Education), a national network of organisations with offices in various parts of South Africa (CALUSA, 1993). At this time, participatory development approaches, which had as a central tenet the granting of more control and voice to community people in decision-making processes (Jennings, 2000:1), made a strong impression on development activists and NGOs in South Africa. As part of the shift, CALUSA established community development committees (CDCs) to co-ordinate development processes in various localities. As part of the shift, the organisation became instrumental in the establishment of community projects, such as agricultural projects in various villages of Xhalanga,²⁶³ mostly in communal gardens and residential plots, almost the only land available for this purpose.

By 1998, CALUSA started promoting organic farming, which, according to HDRA (Henry Doubleday Research Association),²⁶⁴ “involves using techniques to achieve good crop yields without harming the natural environment or the people who live and work in it” (HDRA, 1998:1). Organic agriculture is

an ecological production management system that promotes and enhances biodiversity, biological cycles, and soil biological activity. It is based on a minimal use of off-farm inputs and on management practices that restore, maintain, or enhance ecological harmony. The primary goal of organic agriculture is to optimize the health and productivity of interdependent communities of soil life, plants, animals, and people (McGuire, 2003:1).

²⁶³ See CALUSA Annual Reports 1993-1996.

²⁶⁴ Henry Doubleday Research Association is a charity that has been leading the *organic* agriculture movement in the United Kingdom. It is involved in research and promotion of organic gardening, farming and food production (www.allworldlinks.com/k/560/hdra-the-organic-organisation.html). Accessed 19/05/2012.

Luphaphasi was one of the areas in which the organisation promoted organic farming in communal gardens, which were dominated by women, as most men were migrant workers (CALUSA, 1998; see also Ntsebeza, 2006).²⁶⁵ Women were also dominant in community development committees (CDCs), which boosted their confidence.²⁶⁶ By 1998, two gardening groups, consisting mainly of people with only residential sites, operated in Luphaphasi. According to Nozolile Qayi:

*Our gardening group consisted of a mixture of people that ranged from people with only residential sites to a farmer such as Sunduza Nkomana. He was actively involved in the group because of his love for development. In MaQwathini, Zwelinzima Dyantyi was also involved in a gardening group.*²⁶⁷

The group came together in 1998 after being encouraged by Ntomboxolo Tsengiwe from CALUSA, to form groups that would assist in tackling development challenges in the area. Nozolile recalled:

*Eventually, we met and formed groups. CALUSA organised training for us on different things we showed interest in. Some people were involved in leatherworks, making items such as leather bags, sandals, belts, etc. Others obtained permission from Nosithile Makhamba to use her garden for food production.*²⁶⁸

Initially, the group approached Gcinizizwe Khalipha, great-grandson of Solomon Khalipha, and his family for access to arable land in 1998. However, the attempt to use Khalipha's land failed as the family reneged on the agreement and the idea fizzled out. It was at this point that the discussions about the existence of the land reform programme took place. Thus, members of the agricultural group in Luphaphasi later formed the nucleus of applicants for land reform.

Preparing the applicants for the land acquisition process

Between March 2000 and February 2001, the organisation focused on developing its staff's understanding of the land reform programme, as well as other government policies (CALUSA, 2000:3). From the beginning of 2001, the process of assisting the communities to acquire land started. Towards the end of February 2001, two CALUSA workers – Ntomboxolo Tsengiwe and the author – took eight delegates from the two communities to the Department of Land Affairs (DLA – now the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform [DRDLR]) in Queenstown. The purpose of the trip was to find out more about the land reform programme and its grant system. The eight delegates were: Nozolile Qayi, Nosamkele Eleni, Zwelinzima Dyantyi and Sunduza Nkomana, who represented

²⁶⁵ CALUSA Annual Report 1998.

²⁶⁶ CALUSA Annual Reports from 1996-1999.

²⁶⁷ Nozolile Qayi interviewed at Delindlala on 3rd of February 2011.

Luphaphasi; and Mcebisi and Bobby Ntamo, Nosebenzile Fani²⁶⁹ and Nomvuzo Nopothe, as representatives of Cala Reserve (CALUSA, 2007²⁷⁰; Ncapayi, 2010). At DLA, the delegation met Monde Sukula—the DLA officer—who explained how the programme worked. He pointed out that the grant ranged between R20 000 and R100 000. Those interested in accessing land should identify it themselves and start negotiations with the owner before the department could provide assistance, he advised (CALUSA, 2001:27). During the meeting, the officer also informed the delegation of two farms that were on the market. One of them was Thornhill Farm near Indwe, whose owner was Etienne Cloete.²⁷¹ The other one was in Ugie. Some members of the delegation from Luphaphasi knew the Thornhill Farm well and immediately expressed an interest in it. Given this interest, the officer facilitated a meeting between the farm owner and the delegation on the same day, which was held in the DLA boardroom, as the farmer happened to be in Queenstown. The two CALUSA workers also joined the meeting, to support the delegates as they discussed with Cloete (CALUSA, 2001).²⁷² The 2 029 hectare farm is about 10 kilometres from Indwe, off the R56 road from Indwe to Dordrecht. Inclusive of equipment, the total price of the farm was R1.3 million, and without the equipment, it would sell for R1.1 million (CALUSA, undated:2).²⁷³

The NGO workers ensured that the delegates followed, and were comfortable with, each and every step of the process. When the delegates showed interest in the two farms, the workers advised them to have a reflection session before taking decisions. Thus, the meeting with the farmer was adjourned. During the adjournment, the workers advised the delegates to visit the farms, to assess them; and to report to their constituencies before taking final decisions (CALUSA, 2001; Ncapayi 2010). The delegates reached an in-principle agreement, pending endorsement by other members of both groups, that the two communities would acquire the farm jointly. The delegates asked CALUSA to notify the farmer in Indwe about the intention to acquire his farm and to make arrangements for a visit to the farm by members from both communities. Lastly, each group was to organise a meeting with its members to report about the farm, discuss the idea of a joint application, and to finalise the list of applicants. The groups were also asked to suggest names of people to form part of a Co-ordinating Committee to lead

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Nosebenzile Fani sadly passed on towards the end of 2011.

²⁷⁰ Unpublished CALUSA document titled “CALUSA Reflections on Developments in Delindlala from 1999 to 2006”.

²⁷¹ Etienne Cloete was the provincial executive member of Agri-Eastern Cape – an organisation of white commercial farmers. Agri-Eastern Cape is an affiliate of Agri-South Africa, the national organisation of white commercial farmers.

²⁷² Indwe is a small town that historically serviced the white farms. It is about 20 km from Luphaphasi. Since 2000, Indwe has been part of the Emalahleni Local Municipality, which is an amalgamation of three towns – Dordrecht, Indwe and Lady Frere.

the process. A follow-up meeting, to report on progress, was to take place within two weeks (CALUSA, 2001:27).

In the follow-up meeting, there was agreement to keep the members that formed the delegations to the DLA as the Co-ordinating Committee. They reported that their constituencies endorsed the idea of a joint application for the farm. Each group chose 30 members as applicants (CALUSA, 2001; Ncapayi, 2010). The bulk of the members came from people that were already part of the agricultural projects in Cala Reserve and Luphaphasi. Thus, the criterion used for applicants was current involvement in agricultural activities. The issue of criterion is relevant because it relates to the issue of targeting and recruitment that is raised in the debates.

CALUSA assisted the groups in applying to the DLA for the LRAD grant and also played a liaison role between both the DLA official and the farmer, on the one hand, and the two groups, through a co-ordinating committee, on the other. However, the process was not a smooth one. There was suspicion and reluctance on the part of the applicants to divulge information to the department when it requested a list of their assets. As indicated in CALUSA's Annual Report,

communities raised concerns about the purpose of the information required by the government regarding the assets... A fear that was raised by applicants was that maybe this was a ploy by DLA for the communities to divulge their assets and, thereafter, the government pounces on them. People quoted the approaches used by previous governments, who would display good intentions when introducing their policies, but communities ended up losing in the process. An example people used was when the previous government introduced "betterment schemes", the government reflected good intentions, but at the end, individual families in communities lost some of their land (2001:28).

The applicants provided the information after CALUSA called the DLA official to come and explain the purpose of the information.

While waiting for the department to respond to the application, CALUSA organised information and exposure visits to enable the communities to learn from other land reform projects. For instance, at the beginning of March 2001, a visit was organised to Gallawater Farm, which is between ten and fifteen kilometres south of Whittlesea and about forty-six kilometres from Queenstown.²⁷⁴ Without going into detail, it was found that the group there faced serious challenges: members of the Co-ordinating

²⁷⁴ Gallawater is a land reform project next to Whittlesea. Moseki (2008:15) inaccurately claims that the farm is north of Queenstown, and south of Whittlesea. However, since Whittlesea is actually south of Queenstown, the farm cannot be both south of Whittlesea and north of Queenstown. Both Whittlesea and the farm are south

Committee learnt that there were on-going internal squabbles about the control of resources, members disobeying the rules of the group, as well as a lack of financial resources to develop the farm (CALUSA, 2001:29). Towards the end of March, CALUSA also took ten delegates from both Lumphaphasi and Cala Reserve to Uphaphe Empowerment Centre in Durban to expose them to a variety of co-operatives. In April, Uphaphe reciprocated and visited the communities in Xhalanga. The Community Based Organisation (CBO) Network from KwaZulu-Natal also visited the communities in Xhalanga twice, in April and May 2001. Both organisations shared their experiences with the communities with which the NGO worked (CALUSA, 2001:30).²⁷⁵

Intricacies of the land acquisition process: the LRAD and group size

A further challenge on the rocky road was the issue of the size of the LRAD groups. On two occasions the department turned the application down because the group was considered too large. In a meeting called to discuss the developments which involved both communities, Monde Sukula (DLA officer) and the farmer suggested that the Lumphaphasi group should take the farm because it had more assets than the Cala Reserve group. Members from Lumphaphasi opportunistically agreed with the suggestion. This caused tensions and accusations between the groups, which necessitated the mediation of the NGO workers (CALUSA, 2001; Ncapayi, 2010). The organisation stressed the need for co-operation among them, and as a result, it influenced the groups not to allow the situation to cause them to break ties. The Co-ordinating Committee was retained to allow interaction between the groups (CALUSA, 2001). The official advised that the thirty members of the Lumphaphasi group include their partners as applicants, resulting in the group being sixty members again. The official's justification was that the number would not matter because, as the applicants applied as husband and wife, it meant they constituted 30 households. The list was resubmitted with the approval of the officer (Ncapayi, 2010).

While the group awaited the outcome of the application and, as the possibility of the group getting the farm was becoming stronger, there was more focus on putting systems in place. Towards the end of October 2001, CALUSA had a workshop with the Lumphaphasi group to discuss and adopt its draft constitution (ibid.:31). CALUSA assisted the Lumphaphasi group to develop its constitution, which was adopted and signed on 25 October 2001. The group named themselves Delindlala, which means to defy hunger. An executive committee of nine members, consisting of five women and four men, was elected. Its members were: Zwelinzima Dyantyi (Chair), Zithulele Ntshwenca (Deputy-Chair),

of Queenstown, while Lady Frere and Dordrecht lie to the north of Queenstown. According to Moseki (2008:19), Gallawater Farm is 900 hectares in size.

²⁷⁵ Since this study is not on the role of NGOs, this thesis does not engage with debates and discussions on role of NGOs.

Nosamkele Eleni (Secretary), Nozolile Qayi (Deputy-Secretary), Nolist Dyantyi (Treasurer), Nolikhaya Makatesi, Sunduza Nkomana, Nopasile Nqezo and Ngqele Mabala. The executive committee also serves as the Management Committee of the farm. The DLA officer was also present to preside over the signing of the constitution (CALUSA, 2001:31).

There followed a series of planning workshops, which endorsed the project's constitution. In preparation for the imminent take-over of the farm by the group, it was taken through a planning process. At the last planning workshop in November, members of Delindlala discussed rules relating to livestock management on the farm, including how much livestock would be allowed per member on the farm (CALUSA, 2001:30-31). They made the following decisions:

- a) Members would not relocate to the farm, but take turns to be there, a group of 10 people at a time for period of a week.
- b) Eventually, Delindlala should have its own livestock. Nevertheless, in the interim, each member was allowed to keep 10 cattle and 50 sheep. As the livestock of the collective increased, the individual livestock would gradually be phased out until only livestock of the collective remained on the farm. Crop production would be done collectively on the farm.
- c) Each member would contribute R40 as joining fee that would assist in covering costs until the farm generated its own funds.
- d) Goats would not be allowed on the farm, since, given that fencing on the farm was inadequate, they would create many problems with neighbours.

The second resolution concerning collective livestock and crop production on the farm is most relevant, because it placed the project in the high-risk group identified by Lahiff (2007b) and Hall (2009). The scholars have argued that group-based ownership and production projects tend to fail because of the failure of the collective to carry out plans. Whether this argument is correct or not will be pursued in the next chapter, which relates the progress of the project.

Meanwhile, the trials of the application continued unabated. Towards the end of November 2001, the Provincial Director – Mike Kenyon – refused to approve the application of Delindlala because he felt that “the group was too big and the project did not illustrate that it would be able to employ people” (CALUSA, 2001:34). The department proposed the reduction of members of the group from sixty to forty. It should be noted how the Provincial Director imposes a particular farming model to the group, which confirms what the debates have raised (Hall, 2009; Aliber et al., 2011). Nonetheless, the development unleashed another period of intense lobbying and communication between CALUSA and

the beneficiaries on the one hand, and the DLA on the other. Electronic communication between the author and the Provincial Director of DLA bears witness. Writing on behalf of the organisation, the author wrote:

*It came as a surprise to us when we learnt that DLA was not happy about the size of the group. All the above actions were premised on the understanding that DLA accepted the business plan, CPA constitution, and was supportive of the whole process. On the 10 December 2001, Mr Sukula visited CALUSA, to inform it that there were concerns about the size of the group. One of the issues he pointed out as DLA's concerns was that the Department (DLA) doubted if the project would be able to employ all 60 members. DLA, thus, decided to reduce the group from 60 members (30 families) to 40 members.*²⁷⁶

He went on to point out that:

*DLA assumes that the group intends employing itself on the farm. In the planning workshop of November, the group agreed that they will not employ anybody, instead they will work co-operatively on the farm, guided by the Management Committee.*²⁷⁷

Members of Delindlala were equally frustrated. Nozolile Qayi's comment captures the level of frustration and anger among the members:

LRAD is not meant for poor people like us. It excludes us from being beneficiaries because we do not have resources to match the government's grant. The government still has to cater for us in its land reform programme. We need land for agriculture and livestock. We cannot develop within the village because of overcrowding (cited from Ncapayi, 2010:91).

Twenty members were excluded from the list, despite the protests. The group took occupation of the farm on 15 December 2001. Table 15 below provides details of the beneficiaries as at December 2001.

²⁷⁶ See an "External Memo" from Fani Ncapayi to Mike Kenyon, Provincial Director, DLA. The document is in a file on "Land Access issues" in CALUSA offices.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

Table 15: Details about the beneficiaries, including assets in 2001²⁷⁸

Names of beneficiaries	Employment status	Cattle	Sheep	Size of land
1. Bengo Hazel	Ex-migrant worker	8	20	8.1 morgen ²⁷⁹
2. Bengo Sizakele (Hazel's son)	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
3. Bomvana Nolinothi	Homemaker	4	25	Residential site
4. Bomvana Reuben (Ncedile)	Ex-migrant worker	4	25	Residential site
5. Chopiso Mistake	Ex-migrant worker	4	25	Residential site
6. Chopiso No-Andile	Homemaker	4	25	None
7. Dyantyi Isaac Zwelinzima	Ex-migrant worker	3	17	8 morgen
8. Dyantyi Nolusapho	Homemaker	0	25	None
9. Dyantyi Oliver T.	Ex-migrant worker	3	17	8 morgen
10. Dyantyi Nolist Kokoni	Homemaker	8	25	None
11. Dyantyi Sigqibo Nelson	Ex-migrant worker	0	63	Residential site
12. Dyantyi Nowinas	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	None
13. Eleni Zalusile	Ex-migrant worker	3	15	8 morgen
14. Eleni Nosamkele	Ex-migrant worker	3	14	None
15. Eleni Ndoyisile	Ex-migrant worker	4	15	Residential site
16. Eleni Nosisi Bomvana	Homemaker	0	0	None
17. Khalipha Nowinara	Ex-migrant worker	16	6	Residential site
18. Kandisa Noforest Selina	Homemaker	6	0	Residential site
19. Kutshwa Sizakele	Ex-migrant worker	8	0	Residential site
20. Kutshwa Nobuntu	Homemaker	0	0	None
21. Mabala David Ngqele	Ex-migrant worker	7	0	Residential site
22. Mabala Nobandla	Homemaker	7	0	None
23. Makamba Nosayinethe	Homemaker	14	0	4 morgen
24. Makatesi Nolikhaya	Homemaker	1	0	None
25. Makatesi Zinikele	Ex-migrant worker	3	0	Residential site
26. Mbadi Eunice Funiwe	Homemaker	1	8	Residential site
27. Mbungwana Zabedela	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
28. Mndini Fungile Swartbooi	Ex-migrant worker	0	7	Residential site
29. Mrawuli Tiki	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
30. Nqezo Nobonephi	Homemaker	9	0	Residential site
31. Nkomana Sindiswa	Homemaker	7	0	None
32. Ntshwenca Zithulele	Ex-migrant worker	8	0	Residential site
33. Nyambali Victoria N.	Homemaker	3	0	Residential site
34. Nyambali Kanyisa	Migrant worker	0	0	None
35. Qayi Fuzile	Ex-migrant worker	8	0	Residential site
36. Qayi Nozolile	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	None
37. Qezu Tambiya Piet	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
38. Sthoza Krokrelwa N.	Ex-migrant worker	3	7	Residential site
39. Yaso Tandeka	Homemaker	2	6	Residential site
40. Zaku Bhejile Johannes	Ex-migrant worker	3	0	Residential
Totals of livestock		154	345	

²⁷⁸ The table was developed by the author from profiles of the applicants. See File on LRAD applications, in CALUSA offices.

²⁷⁹ Land was historically measured in morgen.

The table shows how differentiated the group was, both in class and social terms. Some of the ex-migrant workers are also arable landholders, the group referred to locally as *iinzalelwane* or *onomokolo* (arable land owners). *Iinzalelwane* constitute 12.5 per cent of the beneficiaries. They are descendants of the African farmers and peasants. A large group of the beneficiaries own residential sites only. Although there are also children of the *bona fides* among them (such as Chophiso Mistake, Dyantyi Siggibo and Mndini Fungile), the majority of them are the *amalose* or *abafiki* (outsiders). Of the forty members of Delindlala, 52.5 per cent had no cattle and thirty per cent had no sheep. Thus, there were beneficiaries that had no resources. Yet, the critics of the LRAD have argued that it favoured people with resources and excluded the poor (Ntsebeza and Hendricks, 2000; Greenberg, 2003a). The case of Delindlala illustrates that such an argument makes generalisations. What is significant in this case is that the NGO's role was critical in pressurising for the inclusion of poor people in the group of beneficiaries.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the possibilities the introduction of the land reform programme presented to rural communities. It has shown that despite the slow pace of land redistribution the land reform programme has changed the lives of beneficiaries, as illustrated in the case of Delindlala has shown. It enabled land needy residents in overcrowded communal areas opportunities of acquiring land outside those areas.

The chapter has highlighted the importance of research for identification of need so that the land reform programme responds to the expressed need; identification of beneficiaries who have an interest and demonstrated ability in working the land; and ongoing (as opposed to once-off support to the beneficiaries). The case of Lumphasi has also demonstrated how government officials are able to impose plans onto projects, which confirms what the debates identified in the land reform projects.

Two issues that relate to the debates were discussed in this chapter: it has been shown that the argument that the LRAD has favoured well-resourced beneficiaries over poor people is a generalisation that is at odds with what happened in Delindlala, and the decision by its members to produce as a collective and eventually own livestock as a group seems to be setting them up for failure, if the arguments of some scholars are to be believed (Lahiff, 2007b; Hall, 2009). The next chapter will show whether the case of Delindlala confirms the debate or not.

CHAPTER 9

Overcoming the initial problems of collective crop and livestock production in Delindlala

Introduction

This chapter challenges the key argument of Hall (2009) that group-based projects have failed to improve the livelihoods of beneficiaries. According to Hall (2009:27), conflicts erupt in these projects and cause members to withdraw due to the “non-realisation of project plans and subsequent competition over resources”. Lahiff (2007b:8) also claims that group-based projects “fail to get off the ground”. While Delindlala, which is also based on collective ownership and production, has indeed encountered these problems, it did not collapse. Instead, the support given by CALUSA and other agencies enabled the project to overcome the initial problems of collective production. During this process, gender and class dynamics changed among members of the group: women took over leadership of the project, while there was also massive accumulation of livestock by individual livestock owners. There was also increased integration of youth in the activities of the project. It is shown in Chapter 10 that, as collective production became established in Delindlala, the project not only contributed to the livelihoods of its members, but also influenced changes in social relations in Lumphaphasi since the group continued to reside there rather than relocate to the farm.

The period covered in this chapter is from 2002 to the end of 2005. Between 2002 and mid-2003, the land reform beneficiaries were faced with serious problems in their endeavours at collective crop and livestock production. However, the period from mid-2003 to 2005 was characterised by a move towards success in these areas, and indeed, marked the turning point in Delindlala.

The initial period with problems for collective crop and livestock production

From the beginning of 2002 the management committee of Delindlala had intentions of ensuring that collective activities ran smoothly on the farm. This is illustrated by the project’s first meeting on 7 January at which the management committee, together with CALUSA workers, discussed matters that had been left unfinished in 2001. One of those issues left hanging was the plan of the project, which had been developed in November. The committee and CALUSA decided to hold a workshop on 29 and 30 January “to finalise plans on how the group would work on the farm” (CALUSA, 2002:15).

Discussions in the meeting also focused on preparations for a meeting with Mr Burgess, a neighbouring white farmer who wanted to lease land from the group. This was a very important meeting for Delindlala because it would help in addressing its problem of lack of capital to finance operational costs on the farm, discussions about which had started among members of the management committee already in December 2001. The meeting with Mr Burgess was set for 10 January and at that meeting, Delindlala signed a two-year lease agreement amounting to R23 530 per annum for 572 hectares of land.²⁸⁰

At the workshop on 29 and 30 January 2002, conducted by CALUSA, all the members of Delindlala together set about developing a strategy for how the forty members would collectively work on the farm. Also discussed was what had to be done about the five families of farm workers that the original owner had left on the farm (CALUSA, 2002:15). In his opening remarks in the workshop as chairperson of Delindlala, Zwelinzima Dyantyi commented that:

In a workshop CALUSA ran for us in the pre-school, in 2001, I told Liwani²⁸¹ that I got tired of workshops where we are fed and go back with nothing concrete. I told him that I want to get to a stage where I am able to feed my family (... ndamxelela uLiwani ukuba ndadinwa kukuya kwii-workshop apho sifika sityiswe izinqe zeenkukhu, ndigqibe ndigoduke ndingenanto ndibuya nayo. Ndamxelela ukuba ndifuna ukude ndikwazi ukondla umzi wam).²⁸²

He further commented that:

Liwani assured me that something concrete was to come out of the workshops. He boldly challenged me that if, after a year, nothing positive comes out of the workshops I should climb a mountain and tell people in the village that CALUSA is a liar. Although I saw the acquisition of a farm as a dream then, I see now that the dream has become real. CALUSA knew what it was doing.²⁸³

While Dyantyi's comments indicate initial doubts about the possibilities of their owning a farm, which were shared by other members of Delindlala and people outside the group, they also reflect the hope that existed and confidence in CALUSA. However, this hope was still tinged with doubts. For instance, Nombuso Nyangwa shared with other CALUSA workers a remark that was made by Saki Mninzi – a community member of Manzimahle – when he heard that CALUSA had assisted a group of people to acquire a farm. Nombuso reported that Saki gave the farm only a year of existence before in-fighting

²⁸⁰ See Minutes of Management Committee Meeting of 7 January 2002. Delindlala minute book. Delindlala offices.

²⁸¹ The Liwani Zwelinzima Dyantyi refers to is Siphwo Liwani, one of the staff members of CALUSA, who facilitated in the planning workshop.

²⁸² Notes in "Field notes". Personal notebook of the author for 2001/2002.

²⁸³ Ibid.

would erupt (CALUSA, 2002). This is the context within which the planning workshop took place; one in which there were serious doubts about group farming.

In the workshop, two decisions were taken regarding the strategy of working on the farm. Firstly, teams of members, that would take turns in working on the farm, were set up. It was agreed that every member had to ensure that they went to the farm when it was their turn. Members who, for one reason or another, were unable to go to the farm had an obligation to send their representatives, but the members had to report to the management committee first. Secondly, during discussions in the workshop members raised an issue that there were members that were non-livestock owners who were suffering when on the farm because they did not have the means to feed themselves. Their situation was also exacerbated by the fact that there was no crop production yet on the farm. A resolution was taken that livestock owners should contribute two litres of milk per day to the non-livestock owners. Members argued: “there should be equal share of benefits by everyone on the farm”.²⁸⁴ This meant that all members of Delindlala that had cattle neither on the farm nor in the village should benefit from the shared milk.

There was further agreement that all members of Delindlala should make monthly contributions of R30 towards the costs of medication for livestock on the farm. Because livestock owners shared their milk with non-livestock owners, the latter were expected also to contribute in this way. Furthermore, an asset management committee, which consisted of Dyantyi Titshala, Eleni Zelusile, Khalipha Nowinara, Mrhawuli MamQwathi and Kewana Mbulelo was set up during the workshop. The committee became responsible for Delindlala’s assets, especially equipment.²⁸⁵

Importantly, the decision to share milk of individual livestock was in line with the group’s objective of fighting poverty. As Table 16 below shows, Delindlala had thirty-two livestock owners.

²⁸⁴ See notes taken in the workshop of 30 January 2002. Delindlala minute book, in Delindlala farm.

²⁸⁵ Notes taken in the workshop of 30 January 2002. Delindlala minute book in Delindlala office.

Table 16: Livestock owners and their stock in Delindlala in 2002²⁸⁶

Names and surnames of beneficiaries	Cattle	Sheep
Bengo Hazel	8	20
Bomvana Nolinothi N.	4	25
Bomvana Reuben (Ncedile)	4	25
Chopiso Mistake	4	25
Chopiso No-Andile	4	25
Dyanti Isaac Zwelinzima	3	17
Dyanti Nolusapho	0	25
Dyanti Oliver T.	3	17
Dyanti Nolist Kokoni	8	25
Dyanti Siggibo Nelson	0	63
Eleni Zalusile	3	15
Eleni Boniswa (nee Kutshwa)	3	14
Eleni Ndoysile	4	15
Khalipha Nowinara	16	6
Khandisa Noforest Selina	6	0
Kutshwa Sizakele	8	0
Mabala David Ngqele	7	0
Mabala Nobandla	7	0
Makatesi Nolikhaya	1	0
Makatesi Zinikele	3	0
Makhamba Mlandeli	14	0
Mbadi Eunice Funiwe	1	8
Mndini Fungile Swartbooi	0	7
Nqezo Nobonephi Nopasile	9	0
Nkomana Florence Sindiswa	7	0
Ntshwenca Zithulele	8	0
Nyambali Victoria N.	3	0
Qayi Fuzile	8	0
Sthoza Krokrelwa N.	3	7
Yaso Tandeka	2	6
Zaku Bhejile Johannes	3	0
Totals of livestock	154	345

The table shows that eighty per cent of the members were livestock owners. About forty-seven per cent of the livestock owners owned more than ten cattle and sheep each. Sheep owners with more than ten sheep each constituted forty per cent of the livestock owners. Only six per cent of the livestock owners were members with more than ten cattle each. The rest of the members (53 per cent) had fewer than ten sheep and cattle each. Of these, men constituted only forty-seven per cent, while the rest was women. This shows that women had the least livestock in the group.

The need for funds for maintenance of equipment and operational costs for the farm was the first problem that the group encountered on the farm, but the lease agreement with Burgess brought some relief. On 8 February 2002, the management committee held its first meeting following the workshop, to discuss two pressing problems confronting the group – the fact that the tractor and the vehicle needed repairs, and planting of crops on the farm. One tyre of the tractor needed to be replaced at a

²⁸⁶The table was adapted by the author from profiles of the applicants. See File on LRAD applications, in CALUSA offices.

price of R2 000. Delindlala's vehicle also needed repairs that required an amount of R640. Members needed the tractor fixed urgently because they wanted to plant crops before the planting season was over. The group was able to fix the equipment from the funds of leasing the land. However, because the group had limited time to plant, members decided that only crops for consumption by members should be planted. Indeed, five bags of potatoes and 2 000-cabbage seedlings were planted.

From the beginning of March 2002, some members of Delindlala displayed a lack of commitment to activities of the project. This emerged in the meeting of the 1st of March 2002. During discussions about the problem, some members, especially Zelusile Eleni who was also involved in the transportation business, argued that a month working on the farm was too long. They wanted the period to be reduced to a week. It seems that this group was worried that spending a month on the farm they would mean a huge loss of income from their transport businesses. However, members decided to continue with the original arrangement of a month. Other members highlighted the problem of transport costs from Lumphaphasi to the farm. They indicated that they did not have the means to travel to the farm. It was therefore agreed that Delindlala's vehicle would be used to transport members from the village to the farm and back.²⁸⁷

By April 2002, the teams set up to work on the farm had collapsed and some members were not coming to the farm (CALUSA, 2002:31). This emerged again when CALUSA visited Delindlala to monitor the work of members of the group that were trained in organic farming. As part of a practical demonstration of the training, 2 000 cabbages, spinach and carrots were planted on the farm (ibid.). An agreement between CALUSA and the participants in the training was that the trainees would maintain the garden, as part of demonstrating their grasp of the training. During the visit, CALUSA personnel realised that things were not working well. The vegetables had died due to neglect, and members did not implement ideas they were taught during the training. It was realised during the meeting that the failure of members to implement plans was because those members were also taxi owners who transported people between Indwe and Lumphaphasi. This explains why some of these members preferred to work on the farm for a week than a month, because they wanted to have more time in their transportation businesses than in the project. The situation caused tensions among members of the group.²⁸⁸

It is also worth noting that the affected members were exclusively men who were also livestock owners. For them it was not necessary to be on the farm all the time because their livestock grazed on their own in the veldt. On the other hand, those who were committed to working on the farm were

²⁸⁷ See Minutes of the meeting of general members of Delindlala on 1 March 2002. Delindlala minute book.

²⁸⁸ Conversation with Nozolile Qayi on the way to Indwe from Cala on 16 October 2010.

mostly members without or with limited livestock. This group was interested in collective crop production. This shows the existence of a tension between individuals who were interested only in the development of the livestock of individuals and members that were committed to Delindlala's objective of collective production.

By April 2002, the livestock owners in Delindlala had a problem of security for their livestock as people in the neighbouring villages constantly destroyed the boundary fence. In a meeting of the group on 3 April 2002, it was reported that the boundary fence of the farm was either loosened or cut down allegedly by people from the neighbouring villages of Machubeni and Mgwala. Linked to this problem was the fact that there were villagers who trespassed on the farm for game hunting. In the meeting members further discussed ways of dealing with the problems. The following proposals were made: that Delindlala should request that the headmen of these two villages allow members of Delindlala to address these communities; that there should be patrols on the farm; and that the management committee should report this to the police in Lady Frere and Indwe.²⁸⁹

By July 2002, Delindlala had run out of funds. The executive reported to the general members on 26 July 2002 that there was only R1 061.53 left from the R23 530 that Mr Burgess had paid in January 2002 for lease of land. The shortage of funds seriously affected the group's ability to meet its financial obligations. For instance, the farm was unable to pay its electricity bill of R1 721.41 as well as the telephone account of R161.00.²⁹⁰ The situation in Delindlala was saved by Vodacom who deposited R18 000 to Delindlala in September for the lease of land for its reception pole.²⁹¹

In September 2002, the problem of lack of commitment of members to the farm still existed. This emerged in a meeting on 23 September that the group had with CALUSA. It was highlighted that due to the lack of commitment of members to the group resulting in only few members always being on the farm, it had become difficult to contact Delindlala telephonically. Because these few members on the farm were overstretched, there no one to attend telephone calls.²⁹² This showed the extent of the problems in Delindlala.

Measures to deal with the problems

Through a participatory development approach, CALUSA continued to provide various forms of support to Delindlala, as was the case in 2001. The support included accompaniment, training in

²⁸⁹ See Minutes of the meeting of Delindlala on 3 April 2002. Delindlala minute book.

²⁹⁰ See Minutes of the meeting of Delindlala on 26 July 2002. Delindlala minute book.

²⁹¹ See Minutes of Delindlala committee meeting on 14/09/2002. Ibid.

²⁹² See Minutes of the meeting of Delindlala and CALUSA on 23/09/2002. Ibid.

various aspects, planning and evaluation. In most cases the support was linked to the issues members of Delindlala were dealing with. For instance, during Delindlala's meetings with Mr Burgess, CALUSA accompanied the members of the group to give advice where necessary. CALUSA also paid monthly visits to Delindlala, to monitor progress and problems. The visits were linked to the monthly meetings of the group. Furthermore, in August 2002, CALUSA trained the executive members of Delindlala in basic bookkeeping after a realisation that there were funds the group was handling and that proper records and reports had to be developed and be kept (CALUSA, 2002:19).²⁹³ Malerato Nkonyane (the DLA Regional Director in the Queenstown office) acknowledged the support that CALUSA gave to Delindlala in her speech during the launch of Delindlala on 25 April 2002. She pointed out that, although the group was big, the department accepted its application because it had the backing of CALUSA (CALUSA, 2002:17-18).

Given the persistence of the problem of lack commitment by some members to activities of the group, in September 2002, CALUSA realised that there was a need for a more effective intervention strategy in Delindlala (CALUSA, 2002:42). The organisation resolved to adopt an interventionist approach, which meant a change from the monthly monitoring visits to weekly planning meetings in Delindlala. CALUSA therefore led the group's planning sessions on Mondays and the evaluation sessions on Fridays (CALUSA, 2002:19). However, while CALUSA clearly wanted to see the group operating smoothly given the negativity about group farming that existed in the public domain, the organisation was also mindful that, for the processes to be sustainable, local leaders had to take the lead, hence the gradual handing over of power. Nosamkele Eleni (secretary of the group) and Nozolile Qayi (the deputy secretary), as members that were closely involved in the weekly planning and evaluation sessions, became the obvious choices to lead sessions.²⁹⁴ In line with its commitment to participatory processes, CALUSA also discussed its intervention strategy with members of Delindlala on 31 October 2002. CALUSA personnel pointed out that they had resolved to visit the group on a weekly basis. The CALUSA members also re-emphasised to members of the group the importance of ensuring that they operate according to their constitution and as a collective.²⁹⁵

CALUSA also used experiential learning as a strategy to impart knowledge and to influence change in the practices of Delindlala. For instance, the organisation took members of Delindlala on a learning trip to Ilingelihle Farmers Association in Cradock (CALUSA, 2002:19) to enable the members to learn from the experiences of a similar project. One of the things learnt on this visit was recording the attendance of members in project activities to ensure that project shares are allocated in accordance

²⁹³ See also Minutes of the Management Committee meeting on 23/05/2002. Ibid.

²⁹⁴ See Delindlala meeting of 31/10/2002. Delindlala minute book.

²⁹⁵ Minutes of the meeting of Delindlala on 29/10/2002. Ibid.

with the commitment each member made to the project. The lessons were shared with other members of Delindlala in a meeting in October 2002.²⁹⁶

The organisation used the experience of Ilingelihle to facilitate a reflection session by members of Delindlala about the situation of their group. During the session, members acknowledged that things were not working well in Delindlala. For example, Reuben Bomvana remarked that “it is clear that CALUSA has seen what we are doing on the farm. We need to change our ways.” On her part, Nolungile Mbungwana said: “I apologise on behalf of the group for not implementing the plan agreed upon. Although I still need the farm, we also need a leader to lead us on the farm”.²⁹⁷ The reference to a need for a leader meant the need for a farm manager. Zithulele Ntshwenca had already been nominated the farm manager in the general meeting of Delindlala on 22 October 2002.²⁹⁸

As of November 2002, there were indications that the intervention was making an impact. The commitment of members was revived, although some members continued to default. There were improvements in activities relating to collective crop production on the farm. The decision in November by the group to scale up crop production illustrates the point. The members decided to plant more crops and decided to increase the land under production. For instance, compared to 1 000 cabbages that were planted at the beginning of the year, 5 000 cabbage seedlings were planted this time. Five hectares were used to plant maize, another two hectares planted with maize and pumpkins, and four hectares with potatoes (CALUSA, 2002:19). This is also confirmed by a report the chairperson of Delindlala presented to one of the weekly planning meetings on 8 November 2002. In the meeting, a plan for the next week was also discussed.²⁹⁹

The improvement in collective crop production in Delindlala that was noted in 2002 was further confirmed by an improved harvest in 2003. In April 2003, the farm produced 165 bags of potatoes compared to 100 bags in 2002. Fifty-four bags were shared among members, while the other 111 bags were sold to villagers in Lumphaphasi. The project also produced cabbages, pumpkins and maize. Some of the produce was sold in the village, whilst members consumed the spinach (CALUSA, 2003:19). Because there is no indication in the records of the project that the produce was shared by those who participated in production, it is assumed that it was shared among all members of the project, even those that had defaulted in coming to work in the farm.

The issue of shares from produce of the farm came up in Delindlala’s meeting at the beginning of 2003 as a question as to how people that do not participate in activities of the project should be dealt with

²⁹⁶ See Delindlala meeting of 22/10/2002. Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Minutes of Delindlala meeting of 31/10/2002. Ibid.

²⁹⁸ See Delindlala meeting of 22/10/2002. Ibid.

when produce is shared. A response from Fuzile Qayi was that “it is a person that has been involved in the production process that has the right to the produce. What will someone who was not involved in the production process harvest?” (*kuvuna umntu olimileyo, ongalimanga uvuna ntoni?*).³⁰⁰ Thus, people who did not participate in processes of food production have no right to the produce. However, the issue was not resolved, because in a meeting on 2 May 2003 members of the group took a decision to share among all members of the group the pumpkins produced on the farm.³⁰¹ This also shows that collective crop production continued in Delindlala.

Although erratic, from the beginning of 2003 extension officers visited the group, mainly to identify needs and problems of the project. For instance, at the end of January, Mr Mnguni visited the group to introduce Mr Tokwe of Umthonyama, a training organization, to introduce the training programmes it provides.³⁰² At the beginning of May 2003, Delindlala members had a meeting with extension officers, to discuss training needs of the group. During the meeting, the extension officers were impressed by the manner in which the project planned its work.³⁰³ This a proof that some members of the group had begun to take greater responsibility for processes on the farm.

The year 2003 was a difficult year for livestock owners. They suffered stock losses due to animal diseases that were prevalent in the winter period of this year, and stock theft. Mistake Chophiso was one of these owners: “My cattle died then because it needed vaccination. After the vaccination, I had no further deaths of cattle”.³⁰⁴ The absence of a prompt response and very erratic extension support from the Department of Agriculture worsened the situation for the project’s stockowners. As for the problem of stock theft, it emanated from the boundary fence separating Delindlala and Machubeni communal area having been cut down by people who wanted to graze their livestock on Delindlala’s land. Also, the problem of game hunting by some villagers in Machubeni and Mgwawana also persisted. These problems undermined the security of livestock on the farm (see also CALUSA, 2003:20).³⁰⁵ For instance, it was reported in the meeting of the group on 18 January 2003 that on one occasion cattle from the village of Mhlanga were found grazing on Delindlala’s land and one of the cows from the farm was seen wandering in the nearby village of Mrhoshweni.³⁰⁶

²⁹⁹ See also Delindlala meetings of 8/11/2002 and 20/11/2002. Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Minutes of the meeting of Delindlala on 18/1/2003. Delindlala minute book.

³⁰¹ Minutes of a meeting of Delindlala on 2/5/2003. Ibid.

³⁰² Minutes of a meeting of Delindlala and the Department of Agriculture (undated – possibly in late January 2003)

³⁰³ See minutes of a meeting of Delindlala and Mr Martins and other agricultural officers, 2/5/2003.

³⁰⁴ Mistake Chophiso interview in Delindlala, 6 May 2005.

³⁰⁵ See Minutes of a meeting of Delindlala on 18/01/2003. Delindlala office.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

To assist in the problem of livestock diseases, CALUSA contracted Luthando Ndondo, an independent local farmer-trainer in Cala, to provide stock management training and support to the livestock owners in the project (CALUSA, 2003:20). In addition, through its partnership with the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), Dr Thembela Kepe organised funds to purchase medication for the livestock. Furthermore, Dr Kepe assisted in exerting pressure on the veterinary services of the Department of Agriculture to vaccinate the livestock. The intervention helped to curb further stock losses through diseases.³⁰⁷

For stock theft, Delindlala made attempts to engage the community of Machubeni in discussions. Members of the management committee of Delindlala attended some community meetings in Machubeni, to address the community. Despite this, the problem continued, forcing the members of Delindlala to report it to the police who on some occasions came and chased some people and their dogs on Delindlala's land (CALUSA, 2003:20). In May 2003, a meeting was held in Machubeni between Delindlala, the police from Lady Frere and the community to discuss the problem of Delindlala. Its outcome was the establishment of a community police forum (CPF) that involved representatives from the various villages, the police and Delindlala.³⁰⁸

Despite the above challenges, individual livestock owners were very happy about the development of their livestock on the farm. Responding to a question from the extension officers in a meeting on 2 May 2003, Sunduza Nkomana indicated that "there is a big difference in our livestock now. The number of cattle has increased and the quality of wool in our sheep has also improved".³⁰⁹ As will be seen, this was further confirmed by Chophiso. Members attributed these improvements to the quality of grazing land on the farm.

The experience of Delindlala from the beginning of 2002 until mid-2003 clearly confirms the argument of Lahiff (2007b), Hall (2009) and Aliber et al. (2011) that collective production in group-based land reform projects was failing. The scholars have highlighted problems in ensuring commitment of members to project activities. In their study of land reform projects in Limpopo, Aliber et al. (2011:237) argue that it "confirms the now-conventional wisdom that group-based projects are problematic – especially where the group is large". Indeed, as shown above, individual livestock production made better progress compared to collective crop production in Delindlala.

While individual livestock production progressed, this section has shown that collective crop production had teething problems in its first eighteen months on the farm. However, unlike the other

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Minutes of meetings of Delindlala and CALUSA on 13/03/2003 and 7/5/2003. Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Minutes of a meeting of Delindlala with extension officers on the farm on 2/5/2003. Delindlala minute book.

land reform projects, Delindlala did not collapse, despite the problems. The availability of constant support from CALUSA enabled Delindlala to survive the initial difficult period. This shows that with constant support, even group-based ownership and production projects can survive. This will become more evident in the sections that follow.

The move to greater collective production in Delindlala

The period from mid-2003 to 2005 is characterised by growing interest in collective crop and livestock production among members of Delindlala. This is despite the fact that the earlier period of collective crop production was characterised by teething problems. The availability of sheep initially, and cattle later, for the collective meant the introduction of livestock for the collective. This was in addition to collective crop production. The climax in the period was the eventual taking over of the leadership of Delindlala by women who injected energy in the group.

In May 2003, some members of Delindlala started enforcing the resolution that was taken during the planning phases for members to donate sheep to the collective. According to minutes of Delindlala meetings, after a period of failure by members to donate the sheep, from May to July 2003,³¹⁰ some members did make their donations from mid-July 2003. Constant reminders by members about the donations resulted in some members eventually making the donations.³¹¹ Households, instead of individual members, were expected to make the donations.³¹² From 17 July 2003, an unspecified number of members made their donations of the sheep. In a meeting of the group on 17 July 2003, Titshala Dyantyi boastfully asked members to go and view the sheep that had been donated. In his remarks regarding the donations, Zwelinzima Dyantyi stressed that “everybody should donate their sheep and stop making excuses, because without the donations, members will have no claim in Delindlala” (*wonke umntu makhuphe igusha zikaDelindlala, singabe sisenza amabali, ngoba ukuba asizikhuphi asinalifa kuDelindlala*).³¹³

At the same time, members of Delindlala desperately needed finances to plant crops for the collective. Discussions in the group’s meeting in August show the desperation as well as the interest some members had in seeing to it that collective crop production also continued. In the meeting, Zwelinzima Dyantyi proposed that the Land Bank be approached for a loan for crop production. Nolist Dyantyi opposed the proposal, and proposed that Mr Burgess be approached for a loan instead. Other members

³¹⁰ Minutes of the management committee meeting of Delindlala on 14/5/2003. Ibid.

³¹¹ Minutes of a general meeting of Delindlala on 16/6/2003. Ibid.

³¹² Telephone communication with Nozolile Qayi, 28/6/2012.

³¹³ Minutes of a general meeting of Delindlala on 17/7/2003. Ibid.

in the meeting also supported the latter proposal.³¹⁴ It is not clear whether the group did get the funds from Mr Burgess. However, the fact that Delindlala had increased its land under crop production in 2004 means that the group overcame the problem of funding. Importantly, the discussion about raising funds for crop production confirms the claim made earlier about the interest members had in collective crop production.

Towards the end of 2003, the leadership of Delindlala ran its meetings and programmes mostly on its own with less involvement by CALUSA, displaying that the local leadership had developed confidence to run its affairs without the organisation. The leadership of Nosamnkele Eleni, Nozolile Qayi and Zithulele Ntshwenca (the farm manager) was at the centre of the processes taking place in Delindlala, with CALUSA more in the background.

From the beginning of 2004, Nozolile Qayi – as the deputy chairperson of the group – started showing her power. In the first management committee meeting of the group in January 2004, she pointed out that the matter of lack of commitment of some members to the activities of Delindlala needed to be resolved. She told members that, because of this unresolved issue, only six members were involved in the planting of cabbages that January. Consequently, there was agreement in the meeting on the revival of sub-committees, through which members would participate in Delindlala activities.³¹⁵ The idea of reviving sub-committees was taken to the general meeting of the group on the same day. The following sub-committees were re-established: assets management, the management of fields, livestock management, and the farmhouse care. Nozolile Qayi re-iterated her point in the general meeting that “members who fail to commit their labour to activities of the group should be called to order immediately” (*umntu ongafuni kwenzanto eyenziwa ngabantu simxoxise ngelo xesha*). She raised this in view of discussion about the need for weeding in the fields.³¹⁶ Clearly, Qayi was beginning to stamp her authority in the group.

The discussions in the meeting also focused on what should be planted in 2004. Members agreed that cabbages, potatoes and beans be planted. Maize was excluded because members felt it was late to plant it.³¹⁷ By this time, more than twenty hectares of land was cultivated for collective crop production. The project used seven hectares to plant potatoes and also planted 6 000 cabbages (CALUSA, 2004:10). Additionally, the group also planted hay to provide feed for the twenty-eight sheep of the collective (CALUSA, 2004:10).

³¹⁴ Minutes of the Management Committee meeting on 18/8/2002. Ibid.

³¹⁵ Minutes of the Management Committee meeting of Delindlala on 5/1/2004. Delindlala minute book, Delindlala office.

³¹⁶ Minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 5/1/2004. Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

The growth of livestock that is owned collectively did not deter individual members from raising their livestock. In 2004, there were 612 cattle and 980 sheep that belonged to individuals on the farm. Some livestock owners boasted about the improved reproductive rate of their livestock on the farm (ibid.). MamQwathi Mrhawuli indicated: “Because livestock is well fed due to the improved grazing land on the farm, the cows mate while they still have calves”.³¹⁸ Mistake Chophiso was even more specific about the improved reproductive rate of his cattle: “my cattle calves yearly”.³¹⁹ This shows that livestock numbers increased at a faster rate in Delindlala than was the case in the village, which also confirms Hall’s argument that individual production tends to be more successful compared to collective production in the land reform projects.

During his visit to Delindlala at the beginning of 2004, Dr Kepe of the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) assisted in lobbying for the provision of veterinary services to Delindlala. Since then there were more visits by these officers to Delindlala. At the beginning of February 2004, the group had a meeting with Dr Ntondini from the Department of Agriculture, Dr Kepe and CALUSA personnel, at which the diseases livestock owners experienced on the farm were discussed. Dr Ntondini also introduced Mr Faniso, an extension officer that would be working with the group. According to the minutes of the meeting, the officers explained the diseases for which the department takes responsibility.³²⁰ The livestock was vaccinated. PLAAS also donated funds for the purchase of medication for the vaccination of livestock (CALUSA, 2004).

Delindlala also continued to improve its plan through holding strategic planning sessions from time to time. For instance, in May 2004, Delindlala had a strategic planning workshop, which was facilitated by CALUSA. This was three years after acquisition of the farm. During the workshop, members decided to diversify by including fruit production on the farm. They identified peaches, pears, apricot and apples for this purpose.³²¹

Towards the end of 2004, the confidence of women had grown to the extent that they openly challenged men in meetings. In their meeting on 6 October 2004, a debate emerged between members who demanded that lucerne be planted and those who wanted maize to be planted instead. At issue was the fact that the decision to plant lucerne had not been taken in a meeting of the group, but by certain individuals. The debate boiled down to livestock owners who wanted lucerne and non-livestock owners who wanted maize for household consumption. Livestock owners were mostly men and women were dominant in those who wanted maize. Eventually, those who argued for the planting of maize won the

³¹⁸ MamQwathi Mrhawuli interview in Delindlala, 21 May 2005.

³¹⁹ Mistake Chophiso interview in Delindlala, 6 May 2005.

³²⁰ Minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala with officials from the Department of Agriculture on 5/2/2004

³²¹ Delindlala planning workshop on 20/5/2004.

debate. Men who had initially decided to plant lucerne apologised for having taken the decision without the involvement of all members.³²² This debate illustrates the growth in confidence of women and the changes in power relations within Delindlala. The debates also show that women were a driving force behind collective crop production on the farm.

In 2005, the Department of Agriculture gave the project more attention and support than in previous years. According to Nozolile Qayi, the government provided support in agricultural infrastructure development. She pointed out:

We got support from CASP³²³ to renew the farm's boundary fence and the camps. The previous owner had done away with crop production and, as a result, had converted arable land into camps. The Department of Agriculture assisted in fencing the arable lands to enable us to plough them. The department also installed an irrigation system to fifteen hectares of the fields. The total costs for this work was R300 000.³²⁴

Mr Martins from the Department of Agriculture in Dordrecht corroborated Nozolile's claims. He stated: "They wanted assistance to make improvements on their farm. For instance, they applied for fencing material, which was supplied by the Department of Agriculture".³²⁵ According to the group's minute book, Mr Martins came to the farm in January 2005 to introduce two contractors that would do the fencing for installation of the irrigation system.³²⁶ The installation of the irrigation system was completed in August.³²⁷

The decision of the members to revive the fields on the farm shows the determination among some members to continue with collective crop production. This was despite the problem of lack of commitment of members to collective crop production. Indeed, the produce from collective crop production had increased to 700 bags of potatoes and 317 bags of maize being harvested in June 2005. Collective crop production continued mostly because there were some women who ensured it. For instance, when there was reluctance among members, especially men, to go to the fields to harvest potatoes, women insisted that all members should go.³²⁸

³²² Minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 6/10/2004.

³²³ CASP is the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme by the Department of Agriculture.

³²⁴ Nozolile Qayi interview in Delindlala, 3 February 2011. Delindlala minute book.

³²⁵ Interview of Mr Martins in Dordrecht, 21 November 2006.

³²⁶ Minutes of the meeting between Delindlala and extension officers (undated).

³²⁷ See also minutes of the meeting between Delindlala and the contractors on 25/8/2005. Ibid. In the meeting the extension officers wanted to find out if Delindlala members were happy about the irrigation system.

³²⁸ Minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 27/6/2005 and undated between Delindlala and CALUSA. Ibid.

Furthermore, the funding from the National Development Agency (NDA) for the establishment of a dairy in Delindlala encouraged members of the group to discuss introducing dairy cattle for the collective. NDA transferred R75 000 in June 2005.³²⁹ In pursuance of the idea of the dairy, in August, members of Delindlala resolved to purchase a cooler for the dairy from the funds. NDA later also gave Delindlala further funding for the purchase of the dairy cows.

By 2005, members of the group debated the issue of youth involvement in Delindlala activities. However, there was no clear strategy of how the youth would be integrated. For instance, in a planning workshop of Delindlala in September 2004, members agreed that a partnership between Delindlala and the youth be developed, but there is no indication how this was to be achieved. It was the idea of introducing a dairy on the farm that provided a way of integrating youth into its activities. In pursuance of the idea, five members were chosen for training to run the dairy: Thembelani Dyantyi, Thando Bengo, Nolikhaya Makatesi, Nosayinethe Makhamba and Zelusile Eleni.³³⁰ Two of these were young people – Babini Dyantyi and Thando Bengo, children of members of Delindlala. Nozolile Qayi made this point in a workshop of Delindlala on 20 September 2005.³³¹

The addition of a dairy into activities that constituted collective production shows determination on the part of members that were committed to collective production. Although it has not been possible to determine how many of the members of Delindlala were committed to collective crop production, it is clear that this group was gaining power and influence in the group.³³² This determination to pursue collective production has to be viewed in the context of palpable benefits the farm provided to individual livestock owners. The households of livestock owners continued to register better benefits compared to collective crop production. Mistake Chophiso's response to the question of the contribution of the project to his household is emphatic:

*Even though I am unemployed, I am able to meet my commitments. For example, I used eight cows and some sheep to pay lobola for my son. My other son has just finished his university education. He graduated last month. Funds for his education also came from the livestock. I recently bought a vehicle and because I am unemployed, I sold almost 30 sheep for it. It cost me R60 000, which I paid cash.*³³³

³²⁹ See minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 27/6/2005.

³³⁰ Minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 29/8/2005. Ibid.

³³¹ Notes taken in a workshop for Management Committee of Delindlala on 20/9/2005. See also Minutes of a special general meeting of Delindlala (undated). Ibid.

³³² There is no indication in the Delindlala records who these members were. Identifying the group has also been made difficult by the fact that, in several meetings of the group, members found it unnecessary for the secretary to read out those members that defaulted.

³³³ Mistake Chophiso interview in Delindlala, 6 May 2005.

The extract shows how successful individualised production was on the farm. Some members of Delindlala, especially women, diligently ensured that collective crop production also provided benefits to members.

Despite the above developments, Delindlala still had to resolve its longstanding issue of lack of commitment of members to activities of the project. A decisive moment on the issue came in September when Delindlala members took bold steps towards resolving the matter. Working with CALUSA, they developed a code of conduct which provided that action be taken against members who failed to participate in the group's activities. Linked to this was a resolution to pay those members who committed more labour in the project. Nozolile explains:

*A decision was taken that members that committed their labour to the project be paid a monthly amount of R300 per person. This was also extended to members who contributed during the ploughing or weeding periods. Each member was paid R30 for each row worked. This ensured that everyone who made a contribution benefited from the project. This also encouraged members to show more commitment to the project to the extent of willingly spending more time on the farm.*³³⁴

Consequently, Nosamkele Eleni argued for adoption of a principle of “no work, no pay” in Delindlala, which meant that people who did not come to work in the project's activities would not be paid.³³⁵ This principle was in line with a resolution taken in a management committee meeting on 9 August 2005 that members that will benefit from collective crop production are those who have been working on the farm.³³⁶

Almost at the same time, members of the group took a decision to effect changes in the management of Delindlala. Due to ill-health, Ntshwenca, who was the farm manager, was replaced by Nosamkele Eleni. Zwelinzima Dyantyi also wrote a letter of resignation as chairperson of the group, citing health reasons.³³⁷ Instead of accepting his resignation, members of the group allocated his responsibilities to his deputy, Nozolile Qayi (see also CALUSA, 2005:15), who, together with Nosamkele Eleni, had been leading processes in the project since the beginning of 2003. They became the logical choices to lead the group.

The taking over of leadership by these two energetic women happened at an opportune moment because more developments were on the way. In September 2005, the longstanding problem of lack of

³³⁴ Nozolile Qayi interview at Delindlala, 10 February 2009.

³³⁵ Notes from a workshop for the development of Code of Conduct for Delindlala members on 29/9/2005.

³³⁶ Notes from the Management Committee meeting of Delindlala on 9/8/2005.

³³⁷ See also undated letter of resignation from Zwelinzima Dyantyi.

capital for activities of the farm was also resolved. Delindlala's application for funding to NDA was eventually approved. This meant that the project had R752 540 in funding for setting up the dairy. The funding provided for the building of a milking parlour, a cooler, a tractor and a milking machine (CALUSA, 2005). As part of the conditions for the funding, NDA required the group to register as a co-operative, because it viewed Communal Property Associations (CPAs) as having weaker legal provisions compared to co-operatives.³³⁸ Members of the project were trained in the Co-operative Act. According to Nozolile Qayi, there was also a month-long training of the management committee on governance matters in September 2005.³³⁹ The training helped the project to strengthen its internal management systems and structures in preparation for the funding. However, the transfer of funds was delayed until the end of 2006.³⁴⁰

In preparation for the dairy, a delegation of four people from Delindlala and a worker from CALUSA visited a dairy farm in Kokstad to find out what the dairy requires. The four were Nolikhaya Makatesi, Nosayinethi Makhamba, Thando Bengo and Thembelani Dyantyi, who were among those chosen by the group to be trained in running the dairy. Following the orientation, members of Delindlala decided that the four members and Nobunthu Khutshwa would be responsible for managing the dairy (CALUSA, 2005).

These were radical changes on the farm, which Nozolile Qayi welcomed as necessary. The changes meant the replacement of elderly members by women that were comparatively younger. Qayi welcomed the changes because she felt that "the old-guard delayed progress" (*abant' abadala babambezel' umnxilo*).³⁴¹ Thando Bengo concurred with Qayi. He argued that when in leadership, the elder guard refused the younger generation space to introduce new ideas on the farm. The old-guard was also very cautious and refused to spend money, hence the view that they delayed progress.³⁴²

The year 2005 ended on a high note with the many developments that occurred in Delindlala. While livestock of individual members increased, there was also an increased focus on collective production on the farm. During this period collective crop production increased and there was the introduction of sheep for the collective. Additionally, preparations for the establishment of a dairy on the farm went ahead. These developments went hand-in-hand with an emergence of women as a force to be reckoned with on the farm. The next chapter will show us how these developments unfolded.

³³⁸ This was communicated by Nokulunga Skeyi of NDA to the committee of Delindlala in September 2005, before the NDA released funding.

³³⁹ Conversation with Nozolile Qayi on the way from Cala to Delindlala on 16 October 2010.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Conversation with Thando Bengo on the way from Cala to Delindlala on 16 October 2010.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the developments in Delindlala from 2002 to mid-2003 confirmed the argument by Lahiff (2007b) and Hall (2009) that collective production in land reform projects posed problems that caused these projects to fail to improve the lives of beneficiaries. The period was characterised by serious problems that affected the collectivisation of crop production on the farm. On the other hand, individual livestock production remained highly successful in Delindlala. However, the argument about the failure of collective production in group-based land reform projects is challenged by the developments on the farm from mid-2003. While there was an increasing emphasis on collective crop and livestock production, the project grew and did not collapse, as was the case with some of the projects in Mpumalanga and Limpopo.

Constant support from CALUSA, initially, and other institutions, later, saw the group sailing through the problematic period. The tradition of discussion of issues also enabled the project to confront and overcome some of the problems. The commitment of women to collective crop and livestock production ensured the persistency of collectivised production in Delindlala. With fewer or without livestock, women viewed collective production as a way through which they could benefit from the project. The active involvement of some of the women in the project's activities put them in a stronger position to take over leadership of the farm from 2006 and took the farm to a different level in its development.

This chapter has also shown that groups with members that were selected from people who have always shown an interest in agricultural land through their activities, given systematic and continuous support (including training, exposure trips) stand a good chance of survival. The farm's case illustrated how the group started out largely dependent on the support of the NGO, but gradually took charge of the project. This is the virtue of a support programme that is not imposed on the beneficiaries, but respects their views and assists in the implementation of those views.

The chapter has shown that, although not yet successful, conditions have been created for group production to take root in Delindlala. The success of group farming is demonstrated in the next chapter. However, by 2005, the developments had impacted on class and gender dynamics among members of the group. In class terms, individual livestock owners managed to use the land to accumulate more livestock which improved their economic conditions. There was also the emergence of women as leaders of the project. As will be shown in next chapter, these dynamics had an immense influence on changes in social relations in Lumphasi.

CHAPTER 10

Influence of land reform on changes in social relations in Luphaphasi

Introduction

This chapter, which covers from 2006 to 2011, continues the discussion from the previous chapter, which challenges the view of Lahiff (2007a) and Hall (2009) that the land reform projects pursuing collective production fail to improve the lives of beneficiaries because such projects often collapse due to non-realisation of plans. According to Hall (2009:27-8), group-based projects succeed in situations where production happens at a household level. This chapter shows that in Delindlala, which is a group-based project, two production models existed – group-based crop production and livestock production. The latter was, until 2007, predominantly individually based. It is argued that, since the implementation of land reform, there has been a marked improvement in the social status of women who were historically marginal to local development processes. They have become recognised leaders in their project, in Luphaphasi and beyond. Delindlala has also had a tremendous impact on the economic conditions of both women and livestock owners on the farm. The project has enabled the accumulation of livestock and assets by some members. Thus, the project has not only improved the livelihoods of its members, but has also influenced changes in social relations in Luphaphasi.

However, as pointed out in Chapter 9, problems associated with group-based crop production were experienced, as livestock owners became reluctant to commit their labour to crop production. Only twenty-five members (62.5 per cent) of the forty participated in crop production on the farm. These were mostly women and men with limited or no livestock. At the same time, livestock owners succeeded with their livestock production, at the same time remaining members of the project and continuing to enjoy benefits from it. This situation triggered a struggle between these two competing production models that was eventually resolved in 2010, when the group decided to implement its resolution of 2001: to limit the livestock of individuals in favour of increasing stock of the group.

The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section on group-based crop production from 2006 to 2011 shows that, unlike livestock production, group-based crop production was successful. The second section reflects on livestock production and its challenges in Delindlala, which were characterised by continuous tensions. The third section discusses the role of development agents in

supporting the project. The fourth looks at benefits Delindlala provides to its members, and the last section looks at the influence of land reform on social relations in Lumphaphasi.

Crop production in Delindlala: 2006-2011

As already indicated, crop production in Delindlala was conducted for the benefit of the group as a whole. Unlike the projects in Hall's and Lahiff's writing, group production on the farm was, as will be shown below, a resounding success. The success, however, was not without its problems. Indeed, the year 2006 was not a good one. Heavy rains in January 2006 resulted in flooding on the farm, which broke one of the two dams with resultant washing away of the fields, causing damage to crops and animal feed. The newly installed irrigation system was also damaged in the process. Although the leadership of the project informed the Emalahleni Local Municipality, the Department of Agriculture and the Chris Hani District Municipality (CHDM) about the disaster, the project received no support from these government institutions.³⁴³

The failure of the government to provide assistance in addressing the damage affected the implementation of Delindlala's plans. Because of the damaged fields and irrigation system, the project had limited land under irrigation, thus affecting crop production. Consequently, the leadership of the crop production suspended activities until the damage would have been repaired. However, the suspension was lifted as soon as the leaders realised that the government would delay in fixing the irrigation system.³⁴⁴

The project also encountered instances of poor discipline from its members. For instance, in March 2006, the brothers Sibongile and Siyabulela Chophiso and Thando Bengo, used the project's tractor without authority from the asset management sub-committee on the farm, damaging it in the process. As on other occasions, the leadership discussed and resolved that parents of the affected youth take responsibility for the costs associated with the damage to the tractor. Indeed, the parents did take responsibility and the tractor was repaired.³⁴⁵

Despite the problems, the leadership of the project showed a resolve to forge ahead with group-based crop production. Among other things, the leaders invested in skills development for members. For instance, in June 2006, the project's management entered into an agreement with the Department of

³⁴³ Minutes of the management committee of Delindlala on 1/2/2006. Nozolile Qayi has also acknowledged this in her speech during Delindlala's celebration, 23/05/2012.

³⁴⁴ Minutes of the management committee of Delindlala on 1/02/2006.

³⁴⁵ Minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 14/03/2006.

Labour for the training of members in animal husbandry, poultry and farm management.³⁴⁶ The training was helpful in that some of the trainees used the newly acquired knowledge to start poultry production on the farm on behalf of the collective, beginning with 250 three-week-old chickens. The profits realised from the sale of poultry were used to purchase a second-hand harvester for the project (CALUSA, 2006:18), which also helped in crop production for the group. The training thus helped in preparing the members to produce and manage assets of the collective.

Moreover, although Delindlala did not produce crops in 2006 because of the damaged dam, the management still ensured the availability of feed for the sheep of the collective. In July 2006, Delindlala produced 360 bales of turf (CALUSA, 2006:17); further proof that, despite the problems, the project leaders persisted with production for the collective.

Towards the end of 2006, the project's management doubled its efforts in mobilising resources for further development of the project. As an example, with the support of CALUSA, the group's leadership developed a proposal with which it approached the National Development Agency (NDA) for financial support in the development of a dairy section on the farm. They succeeded in obtaining funding for the purchase of a tractor and implements by Delindlala (CALUSA, 2006:17).

Thus, although group-based crop production in the project was mostly fraught with problems during 2006, by the end of that year there were already signs that it was succeeding. It is the determination of the group's leadership in pursuing crop production for the collective that accounts for the persistence of group-based crop production in the project. This is a point Mr Martins, the extension officer of the Department of Agriculture (now Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries – DAFF), also acknowledged at the end of 2006 when he remarked that

*(w)e are lucky in our area because Delindlala consists of people from the same village. An added advantage for the group is the members' perseverance in what they are doing. Thus, there have been no conflicts among the members.*³⁴⁷

The perseverance is linked to the resolution the group took in 2001 to work as a collective in fighting poverty.

In 2007, Delindlala started to scale up food production on the farm. These efforts received public affirmation as the group started winning prizes in various farmer competitions for being the best land reform farm. It began in mid-2007, when the Women in Agriculture and Rural Development (WARD)

³⁴⁶ Minutes of the meeting of the management committee of Delindlala on 19/6/2006.

³⁴⁷ Mr Martins interview in Dordrecht, 21/11/2006.

invited women of the project to participate in a district farmer competition.³⁴⁸ The women were invited to make a presentation to adjudicators. The presentation by the leaders on Delindlala's history, progress and problems encountered was rewarded by the group being selected as the best land reform group in CHDM and receiving a gift voucher of R 1 500 for the purchase of animal feed. Additionally, out of excitement, one of the white commercial farmers from Queenstown, who attended the occasion, donated a Friesland heifer to the group. As winners of the district municipality farmer competition, in August 2007, the project participated in a provincial competition in Port Elizabeth.³⁴⁹ These achievements attest to the success of the project with group-based food production in 2007.

By May 2008, group-based food production picked up yet again. The group planted 40 000 cabbages that were sold to formal markets, Lumphashi and the surrounding villages (CALUSA, 2008). As in the previous year, Delindlala won prizes in farmer competitions.³⁵⁰ According to Nozolile Qayi, in 2008, Delindlala won two prizes for its crop production. She explains:

*There was an assessment of land reform projects in the Chris Hani District Municipality, which also involved extension officers. Central in the assessment was to look for projects that took the initiative and did not wait for support from the government. Delindlala was again chosen as the best project and received the first prize of R13 000.*³⁵¹

The project went on to represent the district in the provincial farmer competition, where it won a second prize of R25 000.³⁵²

However, a number of challenges confronted the leadership of the project in 2009. Firstly, there was the emergence of different interests among the members in the project in the second half of the year. This was triggered by a drought that led to competition between the members involved in crop production and the stockowners, for access to the irrigated land. The drought increased the demand for irrigation on the farm, while the remaining dam did not have enough capacity to cope with all the irrigation needs. Furthermore, only a limited area had irrigation infrastructure, as some of the infrastructure had still not been repaired after the floods in 2006. As in all situations, the scarcity of resources required prioritisation of needs. This was when the different interests emerged; with the male-dominated stockowners wanting to use the limited irrigated land for production of animal feed,

³⁴⁸ WARD is a government-sponsored organisation of women that works with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) to promote participation of women in agriculture and rural development. It was launched in December 2006 (http://www.dfa.gov.za/images/rural_women07.pdf. Accessed, 31/8/2012).

³⁴⁹ CALUSA Quarterly Report, July to end September 2007. CALUSA Office.

³⁵⁰ Nozolile Qayi interview in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

while the other side, that is women dominated, wanted the fields for food production. Eventually, the group advocating the use of the water for food production prevailed in the discussions. Thus, the fields were used in food production for the benefit of the collective.³⁵³

Nevertheless, there was a decline in food production because of the drought and shortage of water. Consequently, Delindlala also failed to participate in the annual farmer competition in 2009.³⁵⁴ Observing the difficulties of Delindlala, Mr Martins from DAFF assisted the group in mobilising resources to invest in further development of the farm. Working with the organisation, Promoting Rural and Urban Livelihoods (RuLIV),³⁵⁵ Mr Martins linked the group with another development agency, Sustainable Rural Development in the Eastern Cape (SURUDEC), for support.³⁵⁶ In August 2009, SURUDEC approved a grant of R4.9 million for the project.³⁵⁷ As will be seen below, the funding carried conditions, including a requirement for the project to restructure and to emphasise production for the markets. This marked the beginning of changes in the project's food production model.

By 2010, the project had developed a clear plan about land use on the farm, especially the arable land. Fourteen hectares were used for production of sorghum, four hectares for potatoes, one hectare for onions, while cabbages were planted on six hectares – up from just one hectare in 2009.

During the 2010 planting season, the project put in 40 000 cabbage seedlings compared to 800 in 2009. The group also harvested thirty bags of potatoes, most of which were sold at R30 per bag. Although members consumed some of the produce, most of it was sold to local markets. This marked the first attempts of the project to produce for the markets. Extension officers successfully negotiated with Boxer Stores and KwikSpar in Lady Frere for Delindlala to sell its produce. Later on, the officers also assisted the project to explore markets in other towns such as Dordrecht, Cala and East London.³⁵⁸ The project sold some of its produce in Luphaphasi and the surrounding villages. Thus, the group did not only focus on formal markets, but also focused on informal markets, thus directly contributing to

³⁵³ Nozolile Qayi interview in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

³⁵⁴ Nozolile Qayi telephone communication, 12/6/2012. Nozolile also confirmed this in her speech during the celebration of Delindlala's achievements, 16/05/2012.

³⁵⁵ RuLIV is an East London-based non-profit organisation of multi-disciplinary professionals that provide support services on aspects of rural and urban development. It renders the services to village-based community development organisations, NGOs, the private sector, Local Municipalities, Provincial and National Government and State agencies (<http://www.ruliv.org.za/>. Accessed 10/11/2012).

³⁵⁶ SURUDEC is a European Union-Republic of South Africa joint programme that is implemented through the Eastern Cape Office of the Premier (OTP). The programme provides funds for poverty alleviation to community initiatives.

³⁵⁷ Nozolile Qayi interview in Delindlala, 3/02/2011. See also Minutes of the management committee meeting of Delindlala and representatives of RuLIV, 21/8/2009. Delindlala minute book.

³⁵⁸ Nozolile Qayi interview at Delindlala, 03/02/2011. See also See also Minutes of the management committee meeting of Delindlala and representatives of RuLIV, 21/8/2009. Delindlala minute book.

poverty alleviation in communities. Those members who participated in weeding, harvesting and production of the produce also received shares from the produce.

As in previous years, the project was judged the best land reform project in CHDM and won a prize of R45 000 following an assessment by agricultural officials from Bisho and a journalist from the *Farmers Weekly* of all the participating projects. The assessors also visited Delindlala and took photos to verify the production.³⁵⁹

However, that the project won in farmer competitions did not mean the problems had been overcome. Although intermittent, acts of poor discipline among members continued in Delindlala. These involved cases of abuse of the group's vehicle. For instance, in September 2010, some members used it for personal purposes without authority. The project's members discussed the problem and resolved that the vehicle should not be used for personal purposes.³⁶⁰

In 2011, Delindlala further stepped up its crop production by increasing its cabbage production from 40 000 to 60 000. According to Nozolile Qayi, the increase in production was influenced by the availability of the new markets mentioned previously³⁶¹.

The project's participation in farmer competitions was also a motivating factor. In 2011, the farm was chosen again as the best land reform project in the district and received a first prize of R20 000. It proceeded to, and won a second prize of R30 000 in, the provincial farmer competition.³⁶²

This section has shown that, contrary to the projects where group-based crop production collapsed (Lahiff, 2007a; Hall, 2009), there was a consistent rise in group-based crop production in Delindlala from 2007. As will be shown later, sustained systematic support from CALUSA, initially, and later from other institutions as well, account for the developments on the farm. Furthermore, a committed group of about twenty-five members was responsible for crop production. However, the fact that crop production depended on a section of members of the project means that Hall's characterisation of the production model in group-based land reform projects as "collective production" (2009:26), implying involvement of all members, did not apply in Delindlala. Nonetheless, group-based crop production had become successful in the project.

³⁵⁹ Nozolile Qayi interview at Delindlala, 03/02/2011.

³⁶⁰ Special meeting of Delindlala members in September 2010.

³⁶¹ Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.


³⁶² Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011. She also confirmed this in her speech during the celebration of Delindlala's achievements on 16/05/2012.

Livestock production and development of tensions in Delindlala

Unlike crop production, which was always for the group, livestock production was, up to 2010, predominantly for individual stockowners. Moreover, while crop production experienced problems and only became successful from 2007, livestock owners were successful from the beginning of the project. There was an increase in their livestock, providing tremendous benefits to stockowners' households. The success of stockowners confirms the argument by Hall (2009) that individual production has been successful in group-based land reform projects. However, the commitment of the project's leadership in pursuing collective production saw the leaders also introducing collective livestock production in the project. This was despite the reluctance of livestock owners to support the idea as they wanted to focus on their own livestock. This reluctance resulted in the development of tensions between the stockowners and the members who wanted livestock for the collective. The situation was ultimately overcome when members of the project resolved in 2010 that stockowners should reduce their livestock on the farm to make way for the livestock of the collective.

Individually-owned livestock production

By 2006, Delindlala saw a tremendous increase in the livestock of individuals. It should be noted that stockowners constituted 52.5 per cent (21 out of 40 members) of the beneficiaries, while 47.5 per cent had no livestock. As will be seen later, among the beneficiaries with no livestock were wives of the stockowners, women-headed households and young men. As shown in Figure 2 below, sheep had increased from 345 in 2001 to 969 in 2006.



Graph developed by the author from records in Delindlala (May 2011)

At the same time, there was also an increase of the cattle of individuals from 154 to 262 over the same period. The growth in the number of livestock occurred despite the stock losses sustained because of diseases and theft. During the period under review, some stockowners had also sold their livestock (CALUSA, 2006).

However, between 2006 and 2009, there was a clear decline in livestock numbers on the farm, as shown in Table 17 below. The decline was due to two factors – stock sales and stock theft.

Years	Sheep	Cattle
2006	969	262
2009	800	329

Table adapted from CALUSA Annual Report, 2010

No-andile Chophiso confirms the stock sales as she points out that in 2009 “we reduced our livestock by selling it so that it is manageable”.³⁶³ Indeed, that household sold ten sheep and six cattle during the shearing. According to Siggqibo Dyantyi, stock sales provide income to their households. As he puts it: “We sell livestock so that we can have livelihoods (*sitya imfuyo*)”.³⁶⁴ Moreover, the stockowners, as in previous years, also suffered losses through stock theft. People from the neighbouring villages of Machubeni and Mhlanga destroyed the group’s boundary fences, leading to some stock losses. This emerged in various meetings of Delindlala where the problem of the farm’s boundary fence was regularly discussed.³⁶⁵

At the same time, the leadership of Delindlala resuscitated the discussion about the livestock of individuals on the farm that had been put in abeyance since 2001. This action was prompted by the competition that developed in 2009 between crop producers and livestock owners for the irrigated land on the farm. The drought that caused dependence on irrigation on the farm triggered this competition. However, the issue had remained unresolved into 2010, as livestock owners hedged and sought postponement of the discussion (CALUSA, 2009:13).

In March 2010, the discussion was resumed. As in the previous year, sharp differences emerged between members interested in livestock of the collective and some stockowners. While there was a standing resolution that members with more livestock on the farm would reduce the numbers to ten cattle and fifty sheep per household, some stockowners opposed the resolution because it threatened their interests. Ncedile Bomvana, one of the stockowners opposed to the resolution, pointed out that Delindlala came about because of a realisation that stockowners could not develop in the village due to overcrowding. He argued that the reduction of livestock of individuals would put the stockowners in a similar situation to that in Lumphaphasi. Although Bomvana argued as if stockowners were denied the right to keep livestock on the farm, the resolution allowed them to keep some livestock. The resolution sought to ensure that accumulation of livestock by individuals did not disadvantage other members. Nozolile Qayi explains:

³⁶³ No-andile Chophiso interviewed in Delindlala, 03/12/2010.

³⁶⁴ Siggqibo Dyantyi interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 24/10/2009.

³⁶⁵ See Delindlala’s Minute Book, Delindlala office.

*Although the livestock of some members was above the limit on the farm, when we started to enforce the resolution, some of them were still reluctant to reduce their livestock when told to do so. The members preferred to take the livestock back to the village. In any event, these members spend most of their time in the village and less on the farm.*³⁶⁶

While it had never been anticipated when the resolution was adopted that some stockowners would return their livestock to the village, they did just that. Such a development has implications for the debate about land reform and the decongestion of rural areas. Scholars have argued that the implementation of land reform will lead to relocation of beneficiaries from the villages to the farms, thereby decongesting rural areas (Bank and Minkley, 2005; Hall, 2007). Yet, the beneficiaries of Delindlala are not relocating. This shows that experiences of the implementation of land reform cannot be generalised.

However, while a resolution had been taken about the number of livestock of each member on the farm, members have not been denied the right to keep livestock altogether. The fact that some stockowners have returned their stock to the village indicates the need to reconsider the issue, not in terms of discarding the limit, but to explore alternatives for those with more stock. Specifically, when the issue was discussed there does not seem to have been reference to the various categories of grazing land on the farm and their current use. For example, the grazing land can be divided into three categories – unsafe land, leased out land and committed land. Unsafe land is closer to the neighbouring villages, where the project has been experiencing problems of destruction of the boundary fence. Beneficiaries are reluctant to use this land for livestock as a result. The second category comprises 550 hectares of land that, since 2002, has been leased out to Mr Burgess. The committed land is land currently set aside for livestock of the collective. The first two categories of land could be leased out to the stockowners so that they do not have to take their livestock to the village. This would mean mutual benefit to both the project and the stockowners because it would bring income to the project, while the stockowners would also develop their livestock. This is an issue that needs further exploration by members of the project.

Although the resolution to reduce the livestock of individuals was taken in 2010, its effects became more evident from 2011. There has been an immediate and palpable decrease in the number of livestock of individuals on the farm. Some stockowners sold some and returned some of their stock to Lumphaphasi. A complaint by Mongezi Khalipha that beneficiaries who returned their livestock to Lumphaphasi were crowding local stockowners out confirms the return of livestock to the village.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁶ Nozolile interview at Delindlala, 10/02/2009.

³⁶⁷ He made the remark in a workshop CALUSA organised for villagers in 2010.

There was also clear decline in livestock numbers on the farm. Table 18 below shows the decline in livestock, especially sheep, in Delindlala in 2011.

Table 18: Comparative analysis of livestock ownership in Delindlala

	Cattle			Sheep		
	2001	2006	2011	2001	2006	2011
1. Bengo Hazel (Thando)	8	19	8	20	140	80
2. Bengo Sizakele	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Bomvana Reuben	4	8	0	25	50	0
4. Bomvana Nolinothi	4	7	7	25	50	10
5. Chophiso Mistake	4	16	0	25	63	0
6. Chophiso No-andile	4	16	0	25	63	0
7. Dyantyi Zwelinzima	3	9	18	17	52	59
8. Dyantyi Nolusapho	0	7	0	25	50	0
9. Dyantyi Titshala (Thembelani)	3	8	6	17	51	53
10. Dyantyi Nolist	8	7	0	25	51	0
11. Dyantyi Siggqibo	0	12	2	63	58	0
12. Dyantyi Nowinas	0	0	0	0	0	0
13. Eleni Ndoysisile	4	16	8	15	73	28
14. Eleni Nosisi Bomvana	0	0	0	0	0	0
15. Eleni Zalusile	3	15	0	15	72	0
16. Eleni Boniswa	3	5	0	14	30	10
17. Khalipha Nowinara	16	8	0	6	0	0
18. Khandisa Selina	6	16	8	0	44	14
19. Khutshwa Sizakele	8	0	0	0	0	0
20. Khutshwa Nobuntu	0	3	0	0	1	2
21. Mabala Ngqele	7	2	0	0	0	0
22. Mabala Nobandla	7	2	0	0	0	0
23. Makatesi Zinikele	3	9	4	0	0	7
24. Makatesi Nolikhaya	1	3	2	0	0	3
25. Makhamba Nosayinethi	14	7	0	0	0	0
26. Mbadi Eunice Funiwe	1	3	6	8	15	4
27. Mbungwana Zabedela	0	0	0	0	0	13
28. Mndini Fungile	0	0	0	7	4	2
29. Mrhawuli Tiki	0	0	15	0	0	14
30. Nqezo Nopasile	9	12	9	0	30	9
31. Nkomana Sindiswa	7	2	0	0	0	0
32. Ntshwenca Zithulele	8	21	15	0	60	58
33. Nyambali Victoria	3	4	0	0	0	0
34. Nyambali Khanyisa	0	0	0	0	0	0
35. Qayi Fuzile	8	5	0	0	6	0
36. Qayi Nozolile	0	6	0	0	6	0
37. Qezu Tambiya	0	0	0	0	0	0
38. Sthoza Krokrelwa	3	13	0	7	0	0
39. Yaso Thandeka	2	1	0	6	0	0
40. Zaku Bhejile	3	0	0	0	0	0
Total livestock	154	262	108	345	969	366

Table developed by author from information obtained from Delindlala documents

The table illustrates that by 2006, 82.5 per cent of the beneficiaries were stockowners, while the other 17.5 per cent had none. Compared to 2001, some beneficiaries who previously did not have livestock had acquired it by 2006: out of the eleven members who had no livestock in 2001, two had acquired it in 2006. Firstly, there was a decrease in the number of stockowners from 52.5 per cent in 2006 to 47.5 per cent in 2011. Ten per cent of the beneficiaries had more than fifty sheep per member on the farm.

Thirty per cent of the stockowners had fewer than fifty sheep each, while another 22.5 per cent had no sheep on the farm. The latter group consists of members who, because of advanced age, stopped participating in daily activities of the farm from 2010. In terms of cattle, 17.5 per cent of the beneficiaries had more than ten cattle on the farm, while 22.5 per cent had fewer than ten. The other sixty per cent of the beneficiaries have cattle compared to 27.5 per cent that had no cattle. Secondly, stockowners also reduced their livestock. The decline is related to the enforcement of the decision taken in 2010 about reducing the livestock of stockowners. As an example, Sindiswa Nkomana, Zwelinzima Dyantyi, Sigqibo Dyantyi, Mistake Chophiso, Ndoysisile Eleni and Zalusile Eleni reduced their livestock on the farm.³⁶⁸

A further confirmation that the decline in livestock is linked to the decision taken in 2010 were developments at household level in the same year. Some stockowners sold their livestock and purchased vehicles. For instance, Zithulele Ntshwenca, Sigqibo Dyantyi, Zwelinzima Dyantyi and Titshala Dyantyi had vehicles.³⁶⁹ Some of them are involved in rural transportation as an extra non-agricultural activity. This indicates that some stockowners used their livestock to invest in other activities.

The experience of Delindlala is not unique. Funokuhle Agricultural Project is another example of a land reform project where livestock and land acquisition helped to improve the situation in the household. In addition to purchasing a vehicle, David Kiyane, the head of this family project, has also sent his grandson to an agricultural college and he is now in the final stages of his studies. To achieve these developments, Kiyane sells his livestock and produce. Like the study by Chitonge and Ntsebeza (2012), these examples demonstrate that livestock ownership is critical in the livelihoods of beneficiaries of the land reform programme.

The development of livestock of the collective in Delindlala: 2006-2011

While there was development of livestock of stockowners on the farm, the number of livestock for the group also increased in 2006. The livestock came from two sources – contribution of sheep from members and donations from institutions such as the Department of Agriculture and NDA, which also contributed cattle and sheep. By the end of 2005, the project had twenty-eight sheep from donations by members. After the NDA's approval of a grant of R752 000 to the project for the development of a dairy (mentioned above), a discussion involving Delindlala members, CALUSA fieldworkers and

³⁶⁸ Thembelani Dyantyi interviewed in Delindlala, 11/7/2012.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

Nokulunga Skeyi from the NDA took place and a decision was taken that some of the funds would be used for the purchase of dairy cows (CALUSA, 2006:17).

In August 2006, the group also received a donation of five Nguni bulls and eight Merino sheep from the Department of Agriculture (now the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). The department made the donation through the Dohne Research Institute in Stutterheim.³⁷⁰ According to Nozolile Qayi, the project also received a donation of twelve Nguni heifers and two bulls from the government.³⁷¹ Mr Martins confirmed the donation of livestock by his department to Delindlala.³⁷²

At the same time, discussions about construction of the dairy in Delindlala started. The members decided to build a milking parlour. They also decided to install a cooler for the storage of milk. The construction of the milking parlour started in September and was completed in December 2006.³⁷³ However, the purchase of the dairy cattle was delayed until the beginning of 2007, when the rest of the funds came through.³⁷⁴

Indeed, in February 2007, the group purchased nineteen Friesland cows and a bull from the NDA grant. Women were central in these developments. Nolikhaya Makatesi recalled the day when they brought the cattle from Mr Burgess, standing where the truck offloaded them:

Women in Delindlala ululated as we arrived with the cattle. Out of excitement, and without consulting the men, we decided to slaughter a goat to celebrate the development".³⁷⁵

The arrival of the dairy cows required the availability of people to be responsible for the management of the dairy. A five-member team was set up at the end of February 2007 for this purpose. The team consisted of Nobuntu Khutshwa, Nosayinethi Makhamba, Thando Bengo, Nolikhaya Makatesi and Thembelani Dyantyi.³⁷⁶ Three are members of Delindlala, while Bengo and Dyantyi are children of members of the group. Essentially, the team became responsible for running the dairy on behalf of the collective. The members of the team also participated in crop production on the farm.

Women also made important interventions in production processes on the farm. An illustration of this was when they noticed that the dairy cows were starving in 2007. The starvation of the cattle was accompanied by a marked decline in milk production on the farm from 200 litres to only thirty-five

³⁷⁰ Minutes of Delindlala members with agricultural extension officers on 30/8/2006.

³⁷¹ Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 10/02/2012.

³⁷² Mr Martins interview in Dordrecht, 21/11/2006.

³⁷³ See Minute book of Delindlala on 8/08/2006.

³⁷⁴ Special meeting at Delindlala on 1 December 2006, see also minutes of meeting on 4 December 2006. Delindlala minute book.

³⁷⁵ Nolikhaya Makatesi interview in Delindlala, 10/02/2009.

³⁷⁶ Minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 28/2/2007. Delindlala office

litres per day because of the shortage of feed. Nozolile Qayi brought the issue to the attention of other members of the management committee; prompting a decision by the group to buy feed for the livestock.³⁷⁷ In June 2007, Delindlala purchased 400 bales of lucerne from Cradock for R14 800, which restored production to 200 litres of milk per day³⁷⁸ and the surplus to the farm's requirements was sold to the public.³⁷⁹

The introduction of the dairy influenced a change in emphasis of the project's production activities from crops to dairy, which was brought about through the involvement of key and active members of the group in the dairy. This change had an impact on the continued organisational development support CALUSA provided to the project: because dairy production required specialised technical skills, which the NGO lacked, the role it played on the farm became minimal from 2007.³⁸⁰ This paved the way for more involvement of other agencies such as NDA, RuLiv and the Department of Agriculture in Delindlala. The department assisted the project to obtain a contract for supplying milk to the cheese factory in Dordrecht. However, internal problems experienced prevented the group from supplying its milk to it. Eventually, Delindlala sold the milk to the neighbouring villages, including Lumphaphasi (CALUSA, 2008:12).

The focus on dairy farming had implications for individual ownership of livestock in Delindlala. It meant that the livestock of the collective would increase—a situation that threatened stockowners because they were required to reduce stock, and led to their reluctance to support the development of the livestock of the collective.

By 2008, the co-existence of group-based and individual-based livestock production models had become difficult to manage. Stockowners had become visibly reluctant to participate in collective livestock production. According to Nozolile Qayi,

[a]lthough there was an agreement before getting to the farm on what to do on it, when we got the farm members changed their minds [about supporting the idea of collective livestock ownership on the farm]. ... As members of the group we had different interests".³⁸¹

³⁷⁷ The shortage of feed was caused by Delindlala's inability to produce enough feed because of the damaged irrigation system and a drought that affected farmers in 2007 (CALUSA, 2007).

³⁷⁸ Minutes of a special management committee meeting on the farm, 2/5/2007.

³⁷⁹ See Minute Book of Delindlala for 2007, in project's office.

³⁸⁰ Siphon Tabo interviewed in CALUSA offices, Cala, 30 July 2012. Siphon Tabo is a programme officer who worked with the CALUSA-supported land reform projects, including Delindlala.

³⁸¹ Nozolile Qayi interviewed at Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

Competing interests on the farm led to suspicions among some members that stockowners did not care about the livestock of the group. This followed the death of three rams of the collective at the beginning of 2008. Nobonephi Nqezo specifically blamed the stockowners for failing to “save the rams that had been sick since December” 2007.³⁸² These were signs of a simmering tension between the individual stockowners and some members of the group that wanted collective ownership of livestock on the farm, especially women.

The tensions became more pronounced in 2009. The increase in both the livestock of individuals and that of the collective, growth in confidence of the women leaders to confront the issue about the livestock of individuals on the farm and the reluctance of stockowners to participate in activities of the collective account for the escalation of the tensions. The livestock of individuals continued to increase at a fast rate. At the same time, there was also growth in the number of livestock of the collective. For instance, in 2009, the collective had sixty-two cattle and fifty-two sheep. Furthermore, reluctance of livestock owners to participate in the project’s activities made the leadership realise that it was time to resolve the matter. The approval of Delindlala’s application for funding by SURUDEEC, which focused on the development of livestock of the collective, was another factor that made the management to push the issue about livestock of individuals on the farm. Nonetheless, the group decided to suspend the discussions until the following year (CALUSA, 2009).

A donation of livestock from DAFF in 2010 resulted in further increase in livestock of the group. Nozolile Qayi proudly explains:

*In 2010, Delindlala had sixty-one cows that have since calved. All the thirteen Nguni cows calved, meaning that they are twenty-six in number. There are also ten Friesland cows on the farm, which include twenty-six heifers. The total number of cattle of the collective is sixty-two. This excludes two Friesland cows that were sold. In addition, the collective currently has fifty-five sheep on the farm.*³⁸³

At this point, the individual stock owners, feeling threatened, grudgingly accepted the growth in livestock of the collective.

By 2011, the number of the project’s livestock had grown still further: from sixty-two to sixty-four cows (including dairy cows) and seven calves. The sheep had also increased from fifty-five to fifty-nine. This increase occurred despite the fact that there were stock sales in 2011. For instance, most of the Friesland dairy cows acquired in 2007 were sold, being replaced by their calves. Similarly, the

³⁸² Minuntes of a special meeting of Delindlala members on 10/2/2008. Delindlala minute book.

³⁸³ Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 03/02/2011.

group sold the sheep that were initially donated by members. Thus, the current dairy cattle and sheep consist of the first generation from the original stock.

Two issues are worth highlighting in this section—the importance of livestock in the livelihoods of rural people, and the issue of decongestion of communal areas through land redistribution. The experience of Delindlala demonstrates that ownership of livestock effects positive changes in the lives of stockowners and that livestock is an important source of income in the livelihoods of rural people, ably confirming the argument made in Chapter 7 in this regard. Secondly, the view that the implementation of land redistribution will decongest communal areas (Bank and Minkley, 2005; Hall, 2007) is challenged by the experience in Delindlala which differs from that portrayed in the literature. Moreover, the decision by some stockowners to return their stock to the village shows that land redistribution does not necessarily lead to decongestion of communal areas. In other words, the implementation of land reform does not lead to the permanent departure of beneficiaries from rural areas.

Delindlala's development and the role of development agencies

The discussion of the land reform projects by Lahiff (2007a), Hall (2009) and Aliber et al. (2011) has occurred in a context where the projects were given no support. However, Delindlala has received systematic support, initially from CALUSA (2006 to 2007), which focused on organisational development and governance matters. This support influenced the project's main aim of using the land to fight poverty through production for domestic use by its members and the community of Luphaphasi. However, the involvement of other agencies such as NDA, the Department of Agriculture and SURUDEK, from 2007 to 2011, meant changes in the production approach of the group. Unlike CALUSA, these agencies provided funding and technical support to the project. The agencies also influenced the project to produce for the markets. The discussion on this section is on the support and its influence on changes in the production model in Delindlala. The implications of this production model on agrarian transformation in Delindlala are also highlighted.

As shown in Chapters 8 and 9, CALUSA provided sustained support to Delindlala during the earlier years of development. The NGO attended the project's meetings, planning sessions and also monitored the implementation of plans.³⁸⁴ It has already been indicated that in 2006 CALUSA supported Delindlala in acquiring funding from NDA. As an organisation that is committed to participatory democracy and egalitarianism in its approach,³⁸⁵ CALUSA promoted a bottom up approach.

³⁸⁴ See various minutes of meetings of the Management Committee and general meetings of Delindlala in 2006.

³⁸⁵ See CALUSA's Constitution. CALUSA Offices.

Participatory democracy is one of the values underlying the People's Participatory Planning and Action (PPPA) strategy that the Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE) introduced to its affiliates, including CALUSA. Because some of the leaders of Delindlala participated in workshops organised by CALUSA and TCOE, they were also introduced to these principles of participatory development/democracy. Thus, the commitment of the project to production for the collective should be viewed in relation to the influence of CALUSA. Linked to this was also the determination of the leaders to produce for consumption by members and for the community of Lumphaphasi.

A change in the financial position of CALUSA from 2006 had implications for the development of Delindlala. As in other NGOs, funding constraints forced CALUSA to scale down its operations (CALUSA, 2006:7). Consequently, the organisation played a secondary role in Delindlala, with the Department of Agriculture and NDA assuming the primary role. This started with the funding that NDA provided to the project between 2006 and 2009 for development of the dairy. From that point, the production approach of the group gradually changed from production for domestic consumption to production for the markets.³⁸⁶ For instance, NDA encouraged the project to supply its milk to the cheese factory in Dordrecht (CALUSA, 2006). In July 2007, NDA sponsored a strategic planning process for Delindlala, which prepared the project to supply production to the markets (Ibid., 2007:12).

The situation changed further from 2010, during the period of SURUDEC's involvement in Delindlala. The agency's grant of R4.9 million made it a major role player in the group's development. Centrally, the funding aimed at improving the farm's agricultural activities through the introduction of "beef, lucerne, broiler chickens and entrepreneurship" in addition to the dairy, sheep and vegetables on the farm.³⁸⁷ As a major role player, the agency pushed that production be for the markets more than was the case previously. Thus, Delindlala's production approach shifted and embraced capitalist relations that are characterised by "production for sale rather than own use (Bottomore, 1983:64)". Indeed, the project's produce is delivered to stores such as KwikSpar and Boxer Stores in Cala and Lady Frere, as well as the fruit and vegetables market in East London.³⁸⁸

There has also been the emergence of employer-employee relations on the farm. Some members and children of the beneficiaries constituted a group of fifteen full-time workers on the farm in 2010 (CALUSA, 2010:17). Since 2012, the number has changed to nine workers. The workers receive a monthly wage of R1 300 each.³⁸⁹ Among the workers are five members that have been responsible for

³⁸⁶ Sipho Tabo interviewed in CALUSA offices, 30/07/2012. He is a programme officer for CALUSA who worked with a various land reform projects, including Delindlala.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Telephone communication with Nozolile, 12/6/2012.

³⁸⁹ Telephone communication with Nozolile, 12/6/2012.

the dairy since 2007. These employees relieved the elderly members from participating in daily activities of the project because they were “not able to cope with work on the farm”.³⁹⁰

Given the fact that Delindlala produces for the markets, a challenge is posed to Moyo and Yeros who have argued that “the peasantry has not entirely disappeared, but semi-proletarianised” (2005:9). Delindlala members cannot be regarded as peasants because of their use of hired labour (even if from their own members) together with the fact that the group produces for the markets. Neither are the members commercial farmers, but small producers, some of whom also engage in non-agricultural activities such as rural transportation.

SURUDEEC also introduced changes in the management of the farm by contracting Farm Vision to mentor the leadership at Delindlala for two years. Thembelani Dyantyi, a son of a member of the project, was chosen by the group to lead the project and was mentored as the future farm manager.³⁹¹ However, the association of elderly with the project was maintained in that some still serve in the project’s management committee, which meets weekly to plan with the workers. Furthermore, the general membership is kept informed about developments in the project through fortnightly general meetings.³⁹² Thus, unlike in most capitalist ventures where workers are excluded from decision-making (Bottomore, 1983; Wood, 1981), current workers are also members of the management committee of the project, e.g. Nozolile Qayi, Nolikhaya Makatesi and Nobuntu Khutshwa. This differentiates Delindlala from other capitalist ventures.

These developments have serious implications for the project. One of the implications is that the project no longer provides produce at discounted prices to community members. As Cousins would put it, the project’s operations are “dominated by the logic of profit and loss within competitive markets” (2010:9), in that everything that is produced on the farm currently goes to the market and there is no longer a distinction between sales for the markets and to community people.³⁹³ The fact that the project has embraced capitalist relations means that it is no longer concerned about producing to fight poverty in their community, but is concerned about profit making. The developments also have implications for the agrarian question, which are explored in the concluding chapter.

³⁹⁰ Thembelani Dyantyi interviewed in Delindlala, 11/7/2012.

³⁹¹ Author’s notes taken in a meeting in Delindlala on 23 and 29 March 2010.

³⁹² Thembelani Dyantyi interviewed in Delindlala, 11/7/2012.

³⁹³ These were remarks made by Nozolile Qayi, Nobuntu Khutshwa, Nolikhaya Makatesi and Nosayinethi Makhamba during discussion on the farm with Prof. Lungisile Ntsebeza, Prof. Peter Laurence, Dr. Horman Chitonge, Zwelakhe Moni, Siphon Tabo and the author on 10/10/2012.

Contribution of the project to the lives of the beneficiaries

As already hinted, Delindlala has impacted immensely on the socio-economic status of beneficiaries, highly contrary to the negative picture painted of other land reform projects in Limpopo and Mpumalanga (Lahiff, 2007a; Anseeuw and Mathebula, 2008; Hall, 2009). Women have developed confidence to express themselves and challenge their male counterparts, having outgrown the inhibition they previously displayed. Nozolile Qayi gives an example that demonstrates the confidence of women in the project:

If there is a decision that has to be taken, we discuss collectively (men and women) and come to a decision. Like a decision we took recently about members' contributions for the medication of livestock of the individuals. Because we do not have the same number of livestock, we had an argument that the contributions be proportional to the number of livestock of members. Some members with more livestock selfishly expected to contribute equally to people that have less livestock. We eventually reached an agreement that members with more livestock will contribute more... I personally raised the issue.³⁹⁴

Furthermore, the social status of women such as Nozolile Qayi has changed significantly. She has become an active and recognised leader, not only in the project but also beyond. She explains how this happened:

I attend meetings of farmers, which make me known by other farmers. In those meetings I do not just sit and listen, I speak because if you do not participate nobody will notice you.³⁹⁵

She is also in the leadership of Women in Agriculture and Rural Development (WARD) in CHDM. Both her active participation in WARD and that of other women such as Nobuntu Khutshwa, Nosamkele Eleni, Nosayinethi Makhamba and Nolikhaya Makatesi also contributes in the development of their confidence.³⁹⁶ Through WARD, Qayi has become influential beyond Delindlala and Lumphaphasi to the broader CHDM. Furthermore, her involvement in CALUSA's Board of Directors, since 2003, boosted her confidence and changed her social status³⁹⁷ from when she was recruited to the board as a community leader.

There are also immeasurable economic benefits that the project has provided to women. It has made some women independent economically. Nozolile Qayi explains:

³⁹⁴ Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

³⁹⁷ See Minutes for various meetings of CALUSA Board. CALUSA offices, Cala.

*There are many benefits in being part of the farm. I have cattle and sheep, even though not much. The livestock numbers have not increased much because we sell some of it from time to time. When schools opened this year, we sold a cow in preparation for our child who studies at the University of the Western Cape. These are the reasons I say there is benefit in having a farm.*³⁹⁸

Table 18 shows that although she had no livestock in 2001, by 2006 she had sheep and cattle. However, by 2011 she had no stock because she sold them to pay for her child's university education. Moreover, the farm also provides her with a monthly income of R1 300.³⁹⁹

Nolikhaya Makatesi, a widow with no other income except what she gets from the farm, confirms Qayi's claims. She points out that income from the project assisted her to make improvements to her household:

*I was able to purchase household items such as a fridge from the income from the farm. My children are also at school. Yet other residents who have not benefited from the land reform programme are unable to do what we do as the land reform beneficiaries.*⁴⁰⁰

The case of Makatesi confirms an argument by Chitonge and Ntsebeza (2012) about land reform in improving households of beneficiaries in the CHDM. Additionally, Nobuntu Khutshwa, another widow, also became economically independent because of the project. According to her, although her husband's death occurred at a time when their son was about to go to the initiation school, she still managed to send him and to organise *umgidi* afterwards.⁴⁰¹ She claims that the tremendous support she received from other members of Delindlala, as well as the monthly income she gets from the farm, assisted her. According to her, the members of Delindlala contributed in various ways towards the success of her son's *umgidi*. If it were not for the moral support she received from the members, she would have withdrawn from the group. While her husband was sick, she seriously considered withdrawing from Delindlala because of hardship, but other members who understood her situation encouraged and gave her moral support.⁴⁰² In other words, the members of Delindlala also became a social support system for Nobuntu Khutshwa. Thus, the project also plays a social role.

Monthly income is not the only benefit that some members of Delindlala derive from the farm. There has been a marked improvement in livestock numbers of beneficiaries. As Table 16 has shown, some households saw a significant increase in their livestock within the period of four years from 2002. For

³⁹⁸ Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Nolikhaya Makatesi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

⁴⁰¹ *Umgidi* is a ceremony organised to mark a son's return from the initiation school.

⁴⁰² Conversation with Nobuntu Khutshwa in Delindlala, 17/06/2008.

instance, by 2006, the sheep of Thando Bengo had increased almost four times, while that of the Dyantyi households doubled. Similarly, the cattle doubled in 2006 for Bengo, Isaac Dyantyi and Titshala Dyantyi. This shows the material benefits the project brought to its members.

The experience of Delindlala is not unique. Funokuhle Agricultural Project is another example of a land reform project where land acquisition and livestock helped to improve the lives of households. In addition to purchasing a vehicle, David Kiyane, the leader of this family project, has also sent his grandson to the Middleburg Agricultural College and he is in his final year of his studies. Kiyane sells his livestock and produce to finance these achievements. Thus, the above instances demonstrate the contribution of land and the ownership of livestock (which is critical) in the improvement of livelihoods of the beneficiaries.

Land acquisition also contributes to food security in households. Because of the project, members spend less money on food since they obtain some from the farm. According to Nozolile Qayi,

*(m)embers also get a portion of the produce as their share during the harvesting period in July/August. Each member also got a share for contributing when weeding in the fields. On top of that, each member of the project gets a standard share from the produce for being a member of the farm. The standard share is irrespective of whether the member has worked or not.*⁴⁰³

The various benefits the members of Delindlala derive from the project can thus be summarised as follows:

- a) To livestock owners, the project provides free access to grazing land for up to fifty sheep and ten cows per member. Members pay for livestock that exceeds the limit.
- b) All registered members of Delindlala have a claim to the income made from collective crop and livestock production on the farm. For instance, in July 2011, members received dividends of R2 000 per household.⁴⁰⁴
- c) Members that participate on the farm receive a daily share of vegetables, such as spinach, cabbage and green peppers.
- d) Delindlala also provides job opportunities to both members and residents in the area. Currently nine members are employed as full-time farm workers with a monthly wage of R1 300 per member.

⁴⁰³ Nozolile Qayi interviewed at Delindlala, 10/02/2009.

⁴⁰⁴ These were remarks made by Nozolile Qayi, Nobuntu Khutshwa, Nolikhaya Makatesi and Nosayinethi Makhamba during discussion on the farm with Prof. Lungisile Ntsebeza, Prof. Peter Laurence, Dr. Horman Chitonge, Zwelakhe Moni, Siphon Tabo and the author on 10/10/2012.

Villagers are called to assist from time to time, especially during shearing, planting and harvesting periods.

The evidence presented in this section has shown that, contrary to the argument that the land reform projects fail to improve the livelihoods of beneficiaries (Lahiff, 2007b; Hall, 2009; Hall and Cliffe, 2009), Delindlala has an immeasurably positive impact on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries. The experience of the project clearly shows that, given support, group-based land reform projects do contribute to the livelihoods of beneficiaries. A question that still has to be answered concerns the influence the implementation of the land reform programme has had on social relations in Lumphaphasi. To this I now turn.

The influence of land reform on social relations in Lumphaphasi

The implementation of the land reform programme has had an immense influence on social relations in Lumphaphasi. As will be remembered, members of Delindlala had resolved not to relocate from Lumphaphasi to the farm. This has resulted in the emergence from the beneficiaries of a social group of farmers in the village. The beneficiaries used the resolution to the fullest in that they continue to hold on to their arable land in the village. As will be shown below, indeed, some beneficiaries are determined to keep their land; contrary to a view among some scholars that land reform helps in reducing the overcrowding in communal areas as beneficiaries relocate to the farms (DLA, 1997; 2001; Bank and Minkley, 2005; Hall, 2007). Policy implementers, too, made the same assumption. For instance, outlining his strategy of LRAD implementation in the Eastern Cape, the Provincial Director of the Department of Land Affairs – Mike Kenyon – argued:

*In these unfavourable circumstances and with DLA's very limited resources we are asking ourselves how we can make the best impact. It is in this specific context that I am suggesting that one tactic is to deliberately get the emergent farmers out of the communal areas into freehold areas where they will have to succeed or fail on their own (there are just not enough CALUSAs to provide on-going support to these projects) and then try to focus whatever attention and resources we can mobilise from municipalities, Dept Agric, NGOs, etc. on homestead production within the communal areas.*⁴⁰⁵

Kenyon makes two points in the extract. In the first instance, the department would deliberately target people with agricultural resources (equipment and livestock) who would be given land outside the communal areas to develop into commercial farmers. This means promotion of large-scale farmers,

which would be a continuation of what the colonial and apartheid governments promoted among white farmers. Secondly, he indicates his intention to keep the smallholders within the communal areas.

That the experience of Delindlala differs from the view that land reform will lead to decongestion of rural areas means that the idea does not apply everywhere. The Delindlala members do not intend to relocate to the farm as they regard themselves as members of the Lumphaphasi community. The idea of the beneficiaries wanting to keep their arable land in communal areas while also participating in the land reform project is not something new. The beneficiaries' behaviour in this regard is no different to that of some white farmers who also own properties in towns. These actions reflect strategies for land accumulation by these rural dwellers.

The implication of the fact that the beneficiaries continue to be community members of Lumphaphasi is that it has led to an emergence of a new social group of farmers (*amafama*) in the village. Lumphaphasi residents have expressed mixed views about this development. Some residents in the village regard members of Delindlala as farmers that contribute positively to the village. Speaking in glowing terms about the beneficiaries, Mdumiseni Duda explains why he regards them as farmers:

*I see rapid increase in the number of livestock of the beneficiaries. Even the members who have brought their livestock back to the village, the livestock has increased. There is certainly a change in their livestock. The other issue that I observe from the beneficiaries is that when we need something we buy from them. This is mutual because we support them and they support us. Thus, I regard the beneficiaries as farmers.*⁴⁰⁶

Rosemary Mndini has also made positive comments about the beneficiaries. To her the beneficiaries are helpful to the residents in Lumphaphasi: “[T]he land reform beneficiaries contribute a lot in Lumphaphasi. We purchase livestock from them for our social activities. They also provide us with milk”.⁴⁰⁷

On the other hand, some residents view the members as self-centred, with no feelings for the non-beneficiaries. Mongezi Khalipha, for instance, is among local residents that have complained that Delindlala does not provide job opportunities to the villagers. According to him,

[t]he members of Delindlala know that we do not have jobs here in the village. As farmers, they should open up jobs and get people from the village to work on the farm. The beneficiaries should also realise that households are not the same. Some households are

⁴⁰⁵ Electronic message from Mike Kenyon to the author dated 17 October 2003. See File “Land Access Issues File” in CALUSA offices, Cala.

⁴⁰⁶ Mdumiseni Duda interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 17/02/2009.

⁴⁰⁷ Rosemary Mndini interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 11/02/2009.

*poor and have nothing to eat whilst others have the means. Local people should be the ones turning down job opportunities from Delindlala.*⁴⁰⁸

For different reasons, Nosinothi Xekethwane is also critical of the role Delindlala members play in the village. She has argued that

*[t]he land reform beneficiaries are of no assistance to the local people. If they were helpful, they would sell their produce such as maize and pumpkins to the villagers. Instead, they come back from the farm carrying produce for themselves.*⁴⁰⁹

Although some non-beneficiaries are critical of the members of Delindlala, their complaints confirm how the land reform beneficiaries are viewed. They are viewed as farmers who, because of their social and economic status, should create jobs for, and provide produce to, the villagers.

However, Nolikhaya Makatesi and Nozolile Qayi counter both allegations. Nozolile has pointed out that, from time-to-time, the project does provide jobs to the people from Lumphaphasi and the surrounding villages:

*Sometimes we have people that are not members of Delindlala working on the farm. We have taken a decision to take people from outside when there is more work to be done on the farm. We take people during the shearing period as well as during the harvest season.*⁴¹⁰

In her response to the claim that the project does not provide produce to the villagers, Nolikhaya Makatesi refuted it by pointing out that the beneficiaries “sometimes donate farm produce such as cabbages to households when there is a funeral or a social occasion in Lumphaphasi”⁴¹¹

Similarly, livestock owners in Delindlala also argue that they support local people in Lumphaphasi. Sigqibo Dyantyi claims that the project has adopted the principle of selling livestock to the Lumphaphasi residents at discounted prices. He explains: “[W]e do not charge high prices to the residents. We discuss among ourselves as farmers and agree on prices to charge the people from Lumphaphasi”⁴¹²

However, things seem to have changed since 2010, after the introduction of SURUDEK in Delindlala; the project now operates along business lines with profit-making being the main concern. Thus, there

⁴⁰⁸ Mongezi Khalipha interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 10/02/2010.

⁴⁰⁹ Nosinothi Xekethwane interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 17/02/2009.

⁴¹⁰ Nozolile Qayi interviewed at Delindlala, 10/02/2009.

⁴¹¹ Nolikhaya Makatesi interviewed in Delindlala, 10/02/2009.

⁴¹² Sigqibo Dyantyi was interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 24/10/2009.

are no longer special prices for goods sold to the residents of Lumphaphasi.⁴¹³ This represents a marked shift from the original position of the group of fighting poverty by producing to feed themselves and the community, before selling the surplus. The shift is one of the consequences of the project's decision to produce for the markets.

Furthermore, the implementation of land reform has also introduced new social dynamics in the village. For instance, although Delindlala has operated on a principle that members have a right to express themselves on matters of the project, some members of the project do not apply the same principle to other residents of Lumphaphasi. This was demonstrated in the community meeting mentioned earlier, convened to discuss a request from a mining company to open a coalmine in Lumphaphasi. Among the *iinzalelwane*⁴¹⁴ who were extremely unhappy that the previous community meeting had accepted the request from the mining company⁴¹⁵ were two members of Delindlala, Zwelinzima Dyantyi and Sunduza Nkomana. In a private discussion with the author, they were even more concerned about the lingering question of what would happen to their land rights in Lumphaphasi. At the meeting⁴¹⁶ the fact was raised that the majority of the residents who had taken the decision were from the group of *amalose* (also referred to as *abafiki* or *omabhulwini* – referring to ex-farm workers). Underlying this is an implication that *amalose* have no right to take decisions about land in Lumphaphasi, as this is the prerogative of the *iinzalelwane*. Nosamkele Eleni, another member of Delindlala, further pointed out that the headman had no right to hold a meeting that excluded landholders. Dyantyi went further and reminded the meeting that it was the arable landholders (*onomokolo*) and the farm owners (*onofama*) who had the right to take decisions about land in Lumphaphasi.

The above shows a change in the behaviour of some land reform beneficiaries when in the village. It also illustrates that some of the beneficiaries assume dual identities in that, on the farm, they respect the project's rules, adjust their behaviour, and comply with the rules, but in the village they invoke their privileged backgrounds.

The increase in confidence in some women members of Delindlala has seen dramatic changes in gender relations in Lumphaphasi. As shown in the context of Nosamkele Eleni, some women are able to express themselves in community meetings. The fact that she questioned the headman for holding a meeting without the landholders, for instance, highlights the influence of land reform, among other

⁴¹³ This came out in conversation with Nozolile Qayi, Nobuntu Khutshwa, Nolikhaya Makatesi and Nosayinethe Makhamba at Delindlala, 10/10/2010.

⁴¹⁴ These are also the *bona fides* or the descendants of the original landholders in Lumphaphasi.

⁴¹⁵ Although they are both members of Delindlala, Dyantyi is an *inzalelwane*, while Sunduza is one of the farm owners in Lumphaphasi.

⁴¹⁶ The author was a participant observer in this community meeting.

factors, on gender relations in the village. As indicated in Chapter 8, there has also been a long history of involvement of NGOs in development processes in villages of Xhalanga. Thus, the influence of the NGOs over the years cannot be discounted in this change of attitude in women. Nevertheless, this highlights the level of confidence that has developed among some women in the project.

However, the growth in confidence of women cannot be generalised. Nolist Dyantyi, for example, an elderly member of the group shows reluctance to openly challenge men. According to Nolikhaya Makatesi, Nolist is supposed to have appealed to other women to be moderate in their debates with men. This means that there are other women, not only in Delindlala, that are still reluctant to raise issues against men.

Conclusion

The chapter set out to engage with the contemporary debates advanced by Lahiff (2007b), Hall (2009) and Aliber (2011) in questioning the contribution of land reform in the livelihoods of beneficiaries. It has been demonstrated in this chapter that under given conditions access to land contributes in the livelihoods of rural people. Evidence has shown that, in Lumphaphasi, the land reform programme has led to the emergence of a social group of farmers. The evidence has also shown that the implementation of land reform has transformed people with limited land not only into farmers, but also transformed the class position of some beneficiaries from owners of residential land to property owners, as well as to employers of the residents of Lumphaphasi and the surrounding villages.

Access to land has also influenced changes in social relations in Lumphaphasi. Delindlala's case study has shown that, contrary to expectations that the beneficiaries would relocate upon acquisition of the land (Bank and Minkley, 2005; Hall, 2007), the beneficiaries retain their residential and arable lands in the village; leading to land accumulation and differentiation among them and residents in the village. Thus, instead of decongesting the communal area, land reform has enabled land accumulation by the beneficiaries. These factors have influenced the mixed views of residents about the beneficiaries – some viewing them in a positive light while others regard them as self-centred. Besides the views of the residents confirming a change in the socio-economic status of the beneficiaries, they also reinforce the view that land reform influences changes in social relations in Lumphaphasi.

Lastly, the evidence provided in this chapter has also thrown down a challenge to the re-peasantisation thesis as presented by Moyo and Paris (2005), which regards rural producers in the period of land reform as peasants. They have argued that “the peasantry has not entirely ‘disappeared’, but semi-proletarianised” (2005:9). However, unlike peasants, who derive their livelihoods from land, depending on family labour and producing mainly for household consumption, Delindlala members use hired

labour to produce for the market. Furthermore, the livelihoods of the project's members are not solely based on land, but on a variety of other non-agricultural sources such as rural transportation, government social grants and remittances from relatives in urban areas. Given the above factors, land reform beneficiaries such as Delindlala members cannot be regarded as peasants as has been argued by Moyo and Yeros (2005). The beneficiaries are neither peasants nor black commercial farmers, as the government would like them to be, but smallholder producers.

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CHAPTER 11

Findings and conclusion

This study explored the manner in which land influenced changes in social relations in South Africa's rural areas. The question for the study arose out of longstanding debates among radical scholars, social historians and liberal scholars who have debated the significance of land in the lives of rural people in South Africa. There has been broad agreement among scholars that land played an important role in the definition of social relations in land-based African societies at the time of colonial contact (Bundy, 1979; Maylam, 1986; Hammond-Tooke, 1993). However, disagreements have emerged regarding the role of land in changing social relations between the period of mineral discovery and the development of capitalism up to the 1960s and beyond in South Africa. Scholars of the liberal tradition have argued that the land ceased to be an important factor in the lives of Africans because, among other reasons, agriculture had collapsed in rural areas. They cite the use of primitive agricultural methods as one of the reasons for the collapse of agriculture in African communities (de Kiewiet, 1936; Houghton, 1955; Marais, 1967).

From the 1970s, a persuasive view in response to the liberal position emerged. It argued that the penetration of capitalism in African societies during the period of mineral discovery had, by the 1930s, converted the majority of land-dependent rural residents into wage workers (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979). According to this view, which is also referred to as the proletarianisation thesis, the conversion of these rural residents into wage workers rendered land unimportant in the lives of rural people. Following on this line of argument, scholars who observed rising unemployment, worsening overcrowding and chronic poverty in the reserves during the period of neo-liberalism concluded that rural dwellers have shifted away from agricultural land use towards non-agricultural activities—deagrarianisation (Bryceson, 1997; Bank, 1997; Manona, 1999). The implication of these debates is that agricultural land is viewed as unimportant in the lives of rural people and thus, in defining social relations in South Africa.

In the post-1994 era of democracy in South Africa, scholars have also argued that group-based land reform projects make little impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries (Lahiff, 2007b; Hall, 2009; Aliber et al., 2011). According to this view, group-based land reform projects succeed only when production is individualised (Hall, 2009). Similarly to the proletarianisation thesis, this view implies mainly that

group-based land reform projects have little role in the lives of the beneficiaries, and therefore, have no influence on social relations in rural areas. A more conservative position within this debate argues that land reform projects have failed because rural people have no interest in agricultural land, but only in land for housing and urban jobs. Implied in this latter view is that there is no need for land reform in South Africa and, by extension, land has no role in changing social relations in rural areas.

A counter view has argued that land continues to contribute positively to livelihoods of rural people (Carter & May, 1997; May & Deininger, 2000; Moyo and Yeros, 2005a). Moyo and Yeros (2005a) maintain that land-based livelihoods continue to exist among the rural residents in Southern Africa. The decline in food production in the last two decades of the 20th century in various parts of the world (Bernstein, 2001; Ploeg, 2007) as a result of the “neglect of peasant agriculture” (Ploeg, 2007:326-7) accompanied by the monopolisation of food production and distribution by multinational companies, has resulted in rural people reverting to land as part of their attempts to increase food production (Holt-Gimenez, 2009:146). This phenomenon led to a notion that the “process of (re)creation of the peasantry” was underway (Fernandes, 2005:317). However, Moyo and Yeros have argued that various rural areas in developing countries are replete with peasants whose existence is a source of the emergence of rural movements. According to Moyo and Yeros, peasants never disappeared. Nevertheless, common among the scholars is a view that agrarian land is important in the livelihoods of rural people.

Moreover, emerging evidence on land reform projects in South Africa also challenges the contemporary view that regards agrarian land as no longer important in the lives of rural people. The evidence shows improvement in the socio-economic conditions in households of land reform beneficiaries (Chitonge and Ntsebeza, 2012). Chitonge and Ntsebeza argue that “the acquisition of land has improved, in some cases vastly, the socio-economic conditions of beneficiaries” and that “the land reform beneficiaries are able to improve their livelihoods with very limited or, in many instances, no support from the state” (ibid.:1).

This study contributes to these debates. It has been argued that, contrary to the dominant view, access to agricultural land has played an important role in the determination of social relations in African communities after the discovery of minerals in South Africa. While the proletarianisation thesis makes a valid point about the conversion of the majority of rural people into migrant wage workers, this does not mean land had lost its importance to these migrant workers. Some migrant workers continued to take an interest and invested in land-based livelihoods. Indeed, the combination of land-based livelihoods and wage income meant the diversification of livelihoods, but this did not mean lack of interest in agricultural land as the de-agrarianisation thesis argues. Furthermore, diversification of

livelihoods did not start in the 1960s as is claimed, but has been in existence in African societies since the period of colonial contact. Finally, while the study agrees with the view that land is still important in the lives of rural people, it differs with Moyo and Yeros (2005a), who characterise rural residents pursuing land-based livelihoods as peasants. The fact that land reform beneficiaries combine agricultural activities with non-agricultural activities means that, while these beneficiaries use land as part of their livelihoods, they are not solely dependent on it as peasants are.

For illustrative purposes and an in-depth study of the changes in social relations, Lumphaphasi, a communal area in the Sakhisizwe local municipal area, Eastern Cape, has been the focus. For an understanding of the role the land played in the definition of social relations in these different periods, the study traced the changes historically from the establishment of Lumphaphasi in the 1860s to 2011. This community was chosen because it has seen the implementation of government programmes in three different eras: the colonial, apartheid and the democratic.

The allocation of land to loyal African farmers and the marginalisation of people who fought against the colonial administration (also referred to as rebels) during the Thembuland Commission in 1883, contributed to the proletarianisation of the majority of these rebels. The arrival of former farm workers removed from white-owned farms, after the promulgation of the Natives Land Act in 1913, led to the emergence of landless people in villages such as Lumphaphasi. The African farmers and small landholders took the ex-farm workers in as *amalose* (or labour tenants), a process that accounts for the persistence of land-based livelihoods in rural areas. When the apartheid government implemented Betterment planning in Lumphaphasi in 1964, land was allocated to every resident, including *amalose*. The allocation of land to *amalose* meant that they were no longer dependent on the African farmers and small landholders, thus, had more control of their labour power. Indeed, most of them withdrew it, contributing to the decline in crop production and the dominance of livestock production in rural areas. The constant flow of people from white-claimed farming areas to rural villages resulted in chronic overcrowding and the near collapse of crop production from the 1970s. However, livestock production continued while crop production was mainly confined to residential sites and a few communal gardens. Thus, despite the overcrowding and general collapse of crop production, some descendants of the African farmers and landholders continued with land-based livelihoods until the 1990s. It makes sense then that, during the period of land reform, Lumphaphasi residents were the first in the Chris Hani District Municipality to benefit from the LRAD programme in 2001.

Below is a summary of the chapters and evidence contained in them to support the claims made in this study.

Chapter 2 discussed African societies in the Eastern Cape from the time of colonial contact to 1913. Using land to influence changes in social relations in these African societies, the colonial government dispossessed land from African societies; changing the political, economic and social systems of these indigenous peoples. Without land, the chiefs lost their power and authority. The redistributive economic system practised in African societies was also undermined by the colonialists' introduction of the cash economy, which eroded the sharing culture among African communities. In their zeal to promote western civilisation, in collaboration with colonial magistrates, the missionaries promoted social divisions between *amagqobhoka* that were favourably disposed to the missionary influence and *amaqaba*, who were not. The deliberate allocation of more land to *amagqobhoka* accelerated inequalities and led to the marginalisation of the *amaqaba*. It was from these inequalities that the African farmers, peasants and poor Africans emerged. With the redistributive economy successfully undermined, African social practices of wealth sharing such as *ukunqoma* were replaced by individualistic practices. Consequently, the African farmers and the peasants, with better access to land, became linked to the emerging cash economy and progressed, while the majority of the African population with precarious access to land became suppliers of labour (as migrant workers) to this emerging capitalist economy, especially after the discovery of gold in the mid-1880s.

With chiefs successfully marginalised by the late 19th century, the middle class that emerged from the African farmers occupied, initially, the critical position of leading the struggles of African people. Ironically, the political goal of the middle class was not to resist incorporation into the colonial system but rather to demand recognition and incorporation into the system. Ultimately, by 1913, African societies in the Eastern Cape consisted of a weakened group of chiefs and headmen, comparatively few (but powerful) African farmers, the peasants, an emerging African middle class and migrant workers. Thus, it was demonstrated in the chapter that access or lack of access to land was critical in the development of these social groups and the determination of how they related to each other.

Chapter 3 (1913 to 1963) covered the period both radical scholars and social historians characterise as the period of accelerated proletarianisation, wherein the majority of rural dwellers became migrant workers. The conversion of these rural dwellers into migrant workers by the 1930s influenced the scholars to conclude that the peasantry had collapsed (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979), implying that agrarian land was no longer important to these rural people. Using archival material and literature, the chapter has demonstrated that, rather than collapsing, the rural dwellers continued to produce until the 1960s. Moreover, while men became migrant workers, women remained behind pursuing land-based livelihoods (Mager, 1998) despite the difficulties these women encountered. In addition, some migrant workers retained relations with rural areas and even invested in land-based lifestyles. Crop production declined because of chronic overcrowding and shortage of family labour caused by the influence of

education (job opportunities and schooling of children) in rural areas from the 1960s. However, livestock numbers remained almost the same from the early 20th century to the 1990s. This shows that the decline in crop production did not mean lack of interest in land-based lifestyles by rural people. Rather, it means that overcrowding and the shortage of labour caused a shift in land use from crop to livestock production. Furthermore, the rural struggles against stock culling, which culminated in the Mpondo Revolts in 1960, were a sign that rural people still had livestock (Ntsebeza, 2011c). This was further proof of the persistence of land-based livelihoods.

Chapter 4, which engages with the de-agrarianisation debate (Brycesson, 1997; Bank, 1997; Manona, 1999) covered the period from the 1960s to 1994. Contrary to the thesis, it is argued that although there was an escalation of landlessness and the decline of food production in rural areas due to excessive overcrowding, land-based livelihoods continued because of the persistence of livestock production. As in previous periods, the movement of ex-farm workers and population growth accounted for the overcrowding. The government's resettlement programme, which forced Africans into closely-organised settlements, was implemented during this period (De Wet, 1994). Resettlement also enabled landless *amalose* to acquire their own residential sites; rendering them free to choose not to work for the landholders. This undermined the labour tenancy practice, with negative consequences on crop production. At the same time, the allocation of residential sites to more people reduced grazing land from which the residential sites were demarcated. With grazing land massively reduced, stockowners exerted pressure on holders of arable land. Eventually, livestock took over arable land for grazing, while crop production became confined to gardens in residential sites.

The granting of self-government to the Transkei in 1963 further worsened the decline in food production. The convergence of the interests of Matanzima and the South African government in the development of the African middle class led to an astronomical growth of this social group in the Transkei from the 1960s (Molteno, 1977; Southall, 1982; Mabandla, 2012). A large section of this group joined the emerging Transkei civil service. Some took up posts in government administration, while others became teachers, police officers, health professionals and technicians. Some constituted the emerging group of entrepreneurs. Similar developments also unfolded in the Ciskei from the 1970s to the 1980s (Southall, 1982). The development had effects on the concept of migrancy in that it was no longer restricted to the migration of the generally uneducated and mostly rural men to the mines and urban centres. Since the early 1960s there was also migration of educated men and unmarried women to urban centres within the homelands to take up jobs in the civil service. Like the migrant workers, the middle class also had an attachment to agrarian land in rural areas. Some members of the group also invested in land and properties in urban areas. With men from middle class and poor households away at work, women managed the production in rural areas. Middle class women set up their own

organisations, such as Zenzele, which promoted agricultural activities that were mostly restricted to communal and residential gardens (Higgs, 2004). With most of the men away and children at school, crop production suffered from the shortage of labour, hence the further decline in crop production in rural areas.

The granting of independence to Transkei in 1976 and Ciskei in 1981 worsened overcrowding in the communal areas from the mid-1970s; increasing the group of landless people. These people were also forced to the homeland by the economic crisis from the 1970s that resulted in the retrenchments of farm workers on white-owned farms, triggering an exodus of these ex-farm workers to the homelands. Here they joined the children of the *bona fides*, also called *iinzalelwane*, who were landless as there were no longer land allocations due to land shortage in many villages. This situation culminated in land occupations, resulting in landless people demarcating residential sites, in some rural areas in the early 1990s. Children of *iinzalelwane* who studied in urban centres and migrant workers led these actions. However, that the demand in the 1980s was for residential sites did not mean that rural people no longer wanted agricultural land, as Manona (1999) argues. Livestock numbers remained almost the same, which shows continued interest in land-based livelihoods. Furthermore, crop production also continued, albeit confined to gardens within residential sites.

Like Chapter 2, Chapter 5 covered the period up to 1913, focusing on Lumphaphasi. It is demonstrated that the implementation of recommendations of the Thembuland Commission of 1883 and drought were critical in the proletarianisation of the poor section of the residents of Lumphaphasi. The scene was set by land allocation by Chief Gecelo, with the approval of the local magistrate that influenced social differentiation and the formation of social groups in Lumphaphasi in the 1870s. Large portions of land were granted to amaMfengu and abaThembu that were regarded as *amagqobhoka*, whilst the majority of residents—dubbed *amaqaba*—remained with limited land. This led to the emergence of African farmers such as Solomon Khalipha and others in Lumphaphasi before the Thembuland Commission was established. The classification of residents as recommended by the Thembuland Commission exacerbated the divisions between the loyal African farmers and the marginalised rebels with limited land. These divisions in landholding laid the basis for social, class, and spatial divisions that endured for a long time in Lumphaphasi. When drought struck in the mid-1880s, affecting food production, it was from the marginalised and poor people that migrant workers first emerged. Being poverty-stricken, wage income became the only way out for this group. Meanwhile, the African farmers, led by the influential Solomon Khalipha, continued to develop, also waging a struggle demanding freehold titles from the colonial government. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the proletarianisation thesis, showing how, at a local level the process of proletarianisation unfolded.

As in Chapter 3, the proletarianisation thesis, and in particular the collapse of the African peasantry in the 1930s is challenged in Chapter 6. It is argued in the chapter that, despite views to the contrary, the Natives Land Act of 1913 led to the relocation of people from the white-owned farms to Lumphaphasi and other villages in the 1920s. These people became *amalose* or labour tenants in Lumphaphasi; providing labour to the African farmers and peasants. Access to labour enabled the African farmers and the peasants to continue with land-based lifestyles beyond the 1930s. Consequently, the peasants transformed into small producers from the late 1920s. This happened at a time when children of the peasants and the African farmers were taking over from their parents. In addition to using hired labour, unlike their parents whose relationship with the capitalist economy was as suppliers of produce only, these children were also migrant workers. This means that the new generation ceased to be peasants.

Natural population growth from the early 20th century led to land demarcations in 1917 and 1933, which catered for children of local people and excluded *amalose* in Lumphaphasi. The four-morgen per household stipulated by the Glen Grey Act was disregarded during the land allocations in 1917, as some residents were allocated land in excess of the four morgen. However, land shortage forced authorities to allocate less than four morgen land parcels during the demarcations of 1933. Poor residents and those with less arable land constituted the group of migrant workers, some of whom retained their relations with land-based livelihoods. Another group of the residents with limited arable land opted for sharecropping arrangements with the African farmers and the small producers to supplement the production on their limited land.

Another wave of movement of ex-farm workers to Lumphaphasi between the 1940s and 1950s, as well as natural population growth, resulted in extreme overcrowding and subsequent demarcation of residential sites from grazing land. The reduction of grazing land led to the conversion of arable land into grazing land, and in turn, to the decline in crop production by the late 1950s. As crop production declined, livestock production gained dominance in the livelihood strategies of rural people in Lumphaphasi. Thus, while the majority of rural people had converted into wage workers, this did not mean the collapse of production in rural areas as claimed by advocates of the proletarianisation thesis, instead some wage workers continued to hold on their land, adapted their agricultural activities and continued with land-based lifestyles into the 1960s.

Contrary to the position of the de-agrarianisation thesis, which suggests that rural people lost interest in agricultural land during the period of neoliberalism, as in Chapter 3, Chapter 7 has shown that, in Lumphaphasi, land-based livelihoods persisted until the 1990s. The chapter showed that the implementation of the resettlement programme in 1964 contributed to the conversion of arable land into grazing land in the village. The resettlement programme resulted in *amalose* and the children of

iinzalelwane acquiring residential sites, hence the shortage of grazing land and the ultimate conversion of arable land into grazing land. With access to their own residential land, *amalose* withdrew their labour from the farms, thus contributing to the shortage of labour for crop production. At the same time, the promotion of education by Kaiser Matanzima from the early 1960s, with the aim of building the African middle class in the self-governing Transkei, led to the establishment of schools in rural areas. Thus, rural residents, especially the African farm owners, sent their children to schools in preparation for careers in the civil service of the homeland. The departure of children for schools contributed to the shortage of family labour for production. Nevertheless, as already indicated, livestock production persisted; meaning the continuation of land-based livelihoods in Lumphaphasi until the 1990s.

Although the declaration of Transkei as an independent state in 1976 meant absorption of more descendants of the African farmers and peasants into the middle class, as the homeland's bureaucrats, civil servants and professionals, this middle class continued to invest in livestock in rural areas. At the same time, more children were sent to school, further depriving the households of the critical family labour. In addition, the arrival of more people from the white-owned farming areas made production impossible due to overcrowding. Thus, the shortage of labour and land dealt a final blow to crop production by the 1970s, which by then was mostly managed by middle class and poor women. Middle class women were also affected, as some of their husbands became civil servants in urban areas while others were teachers, like Gcinizizwe, husband of Noluthando Khalipha. Because of overcrowding, most food production became confined to household gardens in residential plots and communal gardens.

Like migrant workers, middle class men also continued to invest in land-based livelihoods, particularly livestock, as the case of Gcinizizwe Khalipha showed. Contrary to the de-agrarianisation thesis that rural people showed no attachment to agricultural land, Chapter 7 has shown that the residents of Lumphaphasi continued to show an interest in land-based livelihoods until the 1990s. This was despite the many challenges that affected their ability to use the land.

The arrival of more people in the village from the late 1970s caused a population explosion. These were people affected by forced removals and the retrenchments due to the global economic crisis of the early 1970s. Unlike the previous periods, children of local people could no longer access land due to overcrowding, as was also the case with the ex-farm workers. Although this initially caused competition for access to land between *amalose* and *iinzalelwane*, the politicised urban-based youth and migrant workers mobilised this group of landless people to wage a struggle for land in the late 1980s. This culminated in the land occupation and demarcation of residential sites in 1992. However,

the fact that the demand during this period was for access to residential land did not mean that these rural people were less interested in land-based livelihoods. Access to residential land was the only option open to them. Thus, to argue that rural people had become less interested in land-based livelihoods is mistaken and disregards this group of people who continued using land despite the difficulties the African land users faced.

Chapter 8 engaged with three contemporary debates on land reform in a democratic South Africa. Firstly, it discussed the argument that the LRAD favoured well-resourced beneficiaries over poor people (Ntsebeza and Hendricks, 2000; Greenberg, 2003a). Secondly, it discussed the view that rural people have no interest in agricultural land, but rather in housing and jobs in urban areas (Manona, 1999; Bernstein, 2005; Makhanya, 2012). Finally, the chapter engaged the view that group-based land ownership with production projects have failed (Lahiff, 2007b; Hall, 2009). The chapter has demonstrated that these debates are based on generalisations and are at odds with practice in Delindlala. Although more than forty per cent of the beneficiaries had no livestock, they still acquired land through the LRAD. Pressure from the group, supported by CALUSA, a local non-governmental organisation (NGO), persuaded the government to allow people with limited resources to acquire land. The fact that the beneficiaries are residents that have always been engaged in land-based activities refutes the claim that rural people have no interest in agricultural land. The chapter has also highlighted that despite the negativity associated with production by collectives, members of the project decided to produce as a group and to own livestock as a group. Thus, the argument that the land reform programme does not improve the livelihoods of rural people was put into disrepute in this chapter. It has been argued that the land reform programme changed the lives of beneficiaries and produced owners of land and other assets from some of the *amalose*. By enabling land-needy residents to acquire land, it changes their status into farmers. It was further argued that the role of research and NGO support was critical in ensuring that the land reform programme responds to the expressed needs of land-needy people. While research helped in identification of the beneficiaries that have an interest in working the land, ongoing support to beneficiaries assisted in laying the solid foundations on which Delindlala was established.

Chapter 9 acknowledged that from 2002 to mid-2003 the developments in Delindlala confirmed the argument by Lahiff (2007b) and Hall (2009) regarding problems of group-based production models in land reform. However, the chapter has taken issue with these scholars' characterisation of group-based land reform projects as collective production. Instead, the chapter has shown that in Delindlala, production is carried out by a small group of people on the farm on behalf of the entire group, hence the claim that in Delindlala it was production for the group rather than collective production. Although in the initial period—from 2002 to mid-2003—group crop production experienced serious problems,

individual stockowners were highly successful in the project. Their stock developed and contributed to improvement of the households of stockowners. However, from mid-2003 crop production for the group improved; thus challenging Lahiff and Hall's arguments about the failure of group-based production in land reform projects. The success of Delindlala was attributed to a number of factors. These include that its members were people who were always linked to agricultural activities in Lumphaphasi. The project also created space for accumulation of stock and assets among both the stockowners and women. The case study of Delindlala illustrated that CALUSA encouraged the independence of the group, hence the gradual takeover of the project's leadership by a determined women-led leadership from 2005. Systematic and constant support from CALUSA and, later, other agencies that included training and exposure trips, helped to keep the project going. In addition, the commitment of women to production for the benefit of everyone in the project ensured the persistence of crop production on the farm. Moreover, close and active involvement of women in the project put some of them in a stronger position to take over leadership of the farm from 2006. Indeed, the project created a basis for women and men to relate as equal partners.

Contrary to the contemporary debates that question the contribution of land reform to the livelihoods of beneficiaries (Lahiff, 2007b; Hall, 2009; Aliber, 2011), Chapter 10 has demonstrated that the land reform programme has irrefutably changed the lives of the beneficiaries socially and economically. As a result of the land reform programme, a social group of farmers emerged in Lumphaphasi from residents that were previously land-needy. Furthermore, land reform changed gender relations in a positive way. Women who previously were economically dependent on their male partners have become economically independent and improved their households. In addition to the material benefits, women also developed into confident leaders on the farm, in Lumphaphasi and in the district.

Moreover, contrary to the expectation that land reform beneficiaries would relocate to the farms (Bank and Minkley, 2005; Hall, 2007), the beneficiaries retain their communal land in addition to their newly acquired farming lands. This means that the beneficiaries use land reform to accumulate land, livestock and other assets. At the same time, the presence of the beneficiaries in the village has influenced social relations in Lumphaphasi.

Thus, this study has challenged the argument that the land reform programme does not improve the lives of beneficiaries. Like the historical debates about the role of land on lives of rural people and its influence on social relations, one of the findings of the study relates to the immense influence of the land reform programme on social relations in Lumphaphasi.

Findings of the study

Below are the six key findings that relate to the study's main question:

1. This study contributes to the theoretical debates about the process of conversion of rural people into wage workers. Chapter 5 has illustrated how the process of proletarianisation unfolded in rural areas such as Lumphaphasi. Land allocation by the Thembuland Commission in 1883 together with severe drought also in the 1880s, laid the foundations for the process of proletarianisation in Lumphaphasi. The implementation of recommendations of the Commission resulted in the emergence of new social groups—the loyal African farmers with quit-rent titles and the marginalised so-called rebels. These two new social groups cut across the earlier social groups of *amaqaba* and *amagqobhoka*. Archival evidence has shown that as descendants of the loyal African farmers and peasants of the late 19th century, some of the quit-rent titleholders persisted with land-based livelihoods into the 21st century, while land deprivation and drought with their resultant poverty forced most of the rebels to become wage workers from the 1880s. Moreover, the demand for cheap African labour after the discovery of gold during the same period accelerated the process of proletarianisation in Lumphaphasi.

2. Secondly, contrary to perceptions of local people that the African farmers received the farms as compensation from the colonial government during the Gun War and the Anglo-Boer War, the study has shown that the farms were granted to *amagqobhoka* before these two wars. It has been shown that the African farmers in Lumphaphasi benefitted from land allocations by Chief Gecelo, who attempted to build his own support base by inviting the abaThembu and the amaMfengu to come to Xhalanga where he allocated them large portions of land in the 1870s.

Linked to the above and contrary to the belief of local people, such as Nkomana, that Solomon Khalipha's farm was not reduced when recommendations of the Tembuland Commission were implemented, this study has provided empirical evidence showing that all the farms were reduced from their original sizes after the Thembuland Commission. In the case of Solomon Khalipha, his 872 morgen farm was slashed down to 500 morgen after 1883. Thus, the study contributes to local knowledge.

3. The third finding, which also adds to the theoretical debates about proletarianisation, is that the conversion of the majority of rural dwellers into wage workers did not necessarily lead to the fall of land-based livelihoods in the 1930s, as argued by scholars who wrote in the 1970s (Wolpe, 1972; Bundy, 1979). Chapter 6 has illustrated that despite proletarianisation, some of these migrant workers retained relations with their families in Lumphaphasi, and some even used their wages to

invest in land-based lifestyles. The wives of migrant workers continued with agricultural activities. On the contrary, rather than collapsing in the 1930s, these peasants transformed themselves into small producers by hiring the labour of the group of landless people or *amalose* in the 1920s. The introduction of hired labour with *amalose* as labour tenants marked the transformation of the peasants into small producers that continued producing until the late 1960s.

4. The shortage of land and labour in the 1960s caused the shift in land use practices from crop to livestock production, which has been misconstrued as a reflection of a waning interest in land-based livelihoods by rural people. Through archival and oral evidence, Chapter 7 demonstrated that the acquisition of residential sites by *amalose* and the impact of education led to the shortage of labour from the 1960s, which influenced the shift in land use in Lumphaphasi. In addition, Matanzima's promotion of education in the Transkei meant that children of farmers in Lumphaphasi went to school, leaving households without family labour for production on the farms. While land allocation in the 1960s aimed at addressing landlessness, it actually led to the shortage of labour in these communal areas.

The chapter also demonstrated that overcrowding, which paralleled many villages in the Ciskei, was the main factor that influenced the shift in land use in the communal area of Lumphaphasi. Due to overcrowding, some grazing land was converted into residential land, causing shortage of grazing land that put pressure on arable land. Ultimately, arable land was sacrificed and converted into grazing land; a development that marked the shift in land use practices in Lumphaphasi.

5. As Chapter 8 has demonstrated, group-based land reform projects can be successful if their establishment is informed by research that is used to identify the exact need for land and the target group. The chapter illustrated the need for creative and innovative solutions to problems as they emerge, rather than predetermined one-size-fits-all formulae. Furthermore, well-planned and constant support enables the projects to reflect and learn, thus, ultimately becoming independent. Yet, the government is not geared to provide such support, hence its tendency to resort to consultants. Because consultants operate along business lines, they are unsuitable for provision of sustained and participatory-oriented support to these projects. Besides the two institutions, NGOs become the critical providers of the support.
6. The land reform programme contributes to the socio-economic lives of the people Lumphaphasi. The pessimistic view of the failure of the land reform projects underestimates their contribution that has transformed social relations in rural areas such as Lumphaphasi. As shown in Chapters 9 and 10, Delindlala has radically changed the position of women and made them socially strong and

economically independent. The study has shown how Nozolile Qayi, Mistake Chophiso and Nolikhaya Makatesi have been able to send their children to school, even to university. Livestock plays a very critical role in the transformation of lives of the beneficiaries. The manner in which land reform changed the lives of beneficiaries in Delindlala highlights the necessity of land reform as a vehicle for poverty eradication. The case study illustrated that land reform is critical, particularly in a context where there are limited livelihood possibilities. Thus, there are dangers in making generalisations about failure of the land reform projects and the negativity surrounding the role of the land reform programme.

Limitations of the study

As in other studies that have a specific focus, this study has limitations in that there are issues that came up but were not dealt with, on which this section turns.

The study did not focus on the various categories of farm workers. For instance, it did not focus on farm workers that were affected when the farm was transferred from the original white owner to the new owners. There is a need to assess how the implementation of land reform impacts on the socio-economic situation of this group. Given arguments by Wegerif et al. (2005) about the displacement of farm workers during the implementation of land reform, it is important that a study be conducted to investigate the socio-economic impact of the displacements. Although it was shown in the study that some of the farm workers left the farm and applied for low-cost housing in the surrounding local municipalities, it is not clear what the impact of this is on the former workers' lives.

Linked to the above, the study also did not attempt to assess the conditions of farm workers on the land reform farms. This is particularly important given the indication that, from time to time, Delindlala employs seasonal labourers. It will be important to follow this up to assess the conditions under which the seasonal workers are employed. How different are their conditions on the land reform farm compared to those of seasonal workers on white-owned commercial farms? It is important to investigate this because it will indicate the attitude of the land reform beneficiaries towards the farmworkers. In instances where farm workers or dwellers do not move when the farms are redistributed, such people become farmworkers or dwellers on the land reform farms. It is imperative that the conditions of this group are investigated, given that land reform also aims to address the tenure rights of people such as farm workers whose tenure rights are insecure.

There is an indication in the study that youth, which is under-represented in Delindlala, is being integrated in the project. A thorough investigation of this phenomenon is important, as it will throw light onto a question about the aspirations of the rural youth, so that interventions are properly targeted

at the expressed need of the youth. The investigation can provide lessons that can help in efforts to deal with the general complaint that the youth are not interested in rural development. Such an investigation also needs to focus on the youth that do not have connections with land reform projects. If rural development is to succeed, it needs to take into account the aspirations of the youth. This is an important issue given the fact that the government seems to be paying greater attention to rural development, as captured in South Africa's *National Development Plan: Vision 2030* of the National Planning Commission (NPC) (2011).

Although the shift by Delindlala from producing for domestic use to production for the markets brought in immediate cash to the project, the effects of the shift on members of the group are not yet clear. Specifically, this study did not consider how this shift to capitalist relations affects the lives of the beneficiaries and how the capitalist model affects operations of the project.

In conclusion, Southall has argued that the middle class became the beneficiaries of Transkei's independence. The case study of Lumphasi has shown that rural women are the predominant beneficiaries of South Africa's democracy. Notwithstanding the concerns about the government policies, such as the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGF) and the Traditional Courts Bill (TCB), that threaten the rights of rural women on issues of rural governance and land ownership, these rural women have benefited from South Africa's democracy. Some of them have outgrown the fear of expressing themselves in community meetings. This is due to the rights the democratic period has granted them. They utilised the space afforded to them. Furthermore, ownership of land, as already pointed out, has boosted their confidence and made them economically independent. Ultimately, this confirms the main argument of this thesis that land played, and continues to play, an important role in the determination of social relations in South Africa's rural areas.

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