South Africa's New Social Movements and their Approach to the Liberal-Democratic State: Differences and Possibilities

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This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

This is an empirical case study of three of South Africa's most controversial and/or well-known social movements, the **Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)**, the **Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF)** and the **Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC)**. It traces the emergence of these movements and places their aims, ideologies and tactics in the context of post-apartheid South Africa and compares their approaches. They have been selected as case studies to provide an example of how social movements representing a majority of poor/working class people have been given political opportunities and space by the introduction of a 'non-racial' capitalist democracy within a neo-liberal configuration.

This research was embarked upon in order to analyse the attitudes of some of South Africa's most important social movements to the new democracy and to provide a comparison between their ideological, strategic and tactical approaches. As the post-apartheid movements are relatively new phenomena, having existed for only a few years, relatively little has been written about them. They are evolving formations, in a society which is still trying to build a stable democracy. As such, there are many dynamics at play in the socio-political landscape of the newly democratised South Africa, and as the form of democracy is continuing to be an important matter of debate, it is here acknowledged that the new social movements have much to contribute to that debate as they critique the institutional system from the outside and from 'below'.

Their internationalist outlook has been considered as an important part of their ideologies, strategies and as one important factor that shapes their future development.

The movements' views of typical democratic structures and behaviour – elections, representation, state policing and security interventions, macro-economic policies – and alternatives to these have been researched and are presented in this study. Comparisons

have been made between the different movements – they are by no means uniform in their ideologies, aims and strategies, though many tactics are very similar – to discern how well they fit into the new democracy and what constraints they meet when attempting to win gains for their constituencies. Their ideological and strategic future development is briefly considered as part of the overall evaluation of their activities and strategic decisions.

This research further seeks to provide an analysis of these movements' position as important civil society formations developing within a liberal-democratic political framework compounded by massive socio-economic inequalities. These movements have adopted strategies to reach their goals that are not always deemed legal or legitimate by the democratic state and government, though the movements justify their actions by invoking the notion of just causes. There is a clash over definitions of legitimacy that creates tensions which tend to polarise the positions of organised communities and the elected political representatives.

How intense this situation becomes depends on a few factors:

1. The tactics of the movements. How far do they threaten profit-making and cost-recovery projects? How much do they disturb 'law and order'?
2. The strategies of the movements. How prepared are they to cooperate with state structures or Tripartite Alliance members?
3. The aims of the movements. Are they reformist or do they challenge the political, social and economic status quo? How uncompromising are the macro-political ideologies of the movements?

Chapter Breakdown

Methodology: The methodological chapter introduces the primary and secondary sources used and the data collected. It provides justification for the selection of the specific interviewees and presents the structure of the interviews.

Chapter 1: The Origin of South Africa's Social Movements provides a brief overview of the democratic transition process and of the socio-economic changes that have subsequently taken place and that have spurred the formation of the new social movements. This chapter argues that while there are continuities between the liberation movement and the new social movements, the latter has emerged independently of the main element of the anti-apartheid movement, the Congress structure, and is most often placed squarely in opposition to the ANC-led government. The chapter also gives an introduction to each of the case studies, including the specific circumstances that led to their emergence and their main aims and grievances.

Chapter 2: The International Context places the South African new social movements in an international perspective. All three case studies have significant international contacts and participate in international events to build campaigns and networks. This chapter briefly explains the importance international contacts and solidarity have had on the case studies and their campaigns and argues that their internationalism allows for a two-way process where the South African movements are being influenced by international trends and can also influence movements from other countries.

Chapter 3: The Struggles introduces the movements in detail. It has mainly drawn on primary sources, such as interviews, pamphlets and official documents, to present the viewpoints of the movements themselves and analyse why they have adopted their specific standpoints. It gives an indication to why the movements exist, how they have changed and developed, what tactics they use and for what purpose. The movements' view of the state and the ANC is discussed to demonstrate the differences and similarities in their ideological positions.

Chapter 4: How Big is the Democratic Space? deals to a large extent with how the movements view the responses they get from the state. Primary and secondary sources are drawn upon to establish a few examples of how the state has intervened in the activities of the social movements, and how the social movements have reacted to these interventions. It is demonstrated that the movements consider police and security interventions in their activities as infringements of their democratic rights rather than attempts to uphold law and order. This point of view is based on their position that despite the fact that they on occasion break the law through their activities, their causes are legitimate and any attempt to undermine the movements reaching their goals are illegitimate and undemocratic.

Chapter 5: Is Representation Working? This chapter draws mainly on primary sources to present the movements' approaches to elections and their opinions regarding the responsiveness of elected representatives. It argues that there are significant differences between and within the movements on the value of participating in election. It also lets the activists themselves explain why they think the democratically elected representatives are responsive or unresponsive to their demands.

Chapter 6: Conclusion. The conclusion draws together and summarises some of the main points illustrated in the previous chapters in order to reach an answer to the research question. It will argue that there are differences in ideology between these three movements, where the TAC is more reformist and the APF and the AEC have ambitions to become socialist movements contesting the state in a holistic and ideologically clear manner. It further argues that the future development of these movements is not automatically determined and they are still growing and changing, impacted upon by their own internal as well as external national and international dynamics.

Keywords: social movements, representative democracy, responsiveness, state intervention, neo-liberalism, reforms, internationalism.

Abbreviations

AEC – Anti-Eviction Campaign (see also WCAEC)

AIDS – Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

ANC – African National Congress

APF – Anti-Privatisation Forum

ARVs – Anti-Retrovirals

AU – African Union

BIG – Basic Income Grant

COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions

FXI – Freedom of Expression Institute

GAP - Health Global Access Project

GATS – General Agreement on Trade in Services

HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus

ICD – Independent Complaints Directorate

IFIs – International Financial Institutions

IMF – International Monetary Fund

KCBDC – Khayelitsha Community Based Development Company

LPM – Landless Peoples' Movement

MCC – Medicines Control Council

MEC – Member of Executive Council

MPAEC – Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign

MST – Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra

MTCT – Mother-to-Child Transmission (of HIV)

Napwa – National Association of People With AIDS

NEDLAC – National Economic, Development and Labour Council

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

NIA – National Intelligence Agency

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NUM – National Union of Mineworkers

OWCC – Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee

Pagad – People against gangsterism and drugs

Saccawu – South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union

SACP – South African Communist Party

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SANCO – South African National Civic Organisation

SAPS – South African Police Service

SECC – Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee

SMI – Social Movements Indaba

TAC – Treatment Action Campaign

TRIPS – Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights

UDF – United Democratic Front

UNAIDS – Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

USA – United States of America

WCAEC – Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (see also AEC)

WHO – World Health Organisation

WSF – World Social Forum

WSSD – World Summit on Sustainable Development

WTO – World Trade Organisation

Introduction

Case Study Selection

This thesis is based upon an empirical case study of three South African prominent social movements. It will examine some of the new social movements that have emerged in South Africa since 1994 and will analyse and compare their ideological, strategic and tactical approaches to the South African state and the new democracy they operate under.

The three movements chosen for this study all emerged a few years after the first democratic election. The **Anti-Privatisation Forum** (APF) operates mainly in and around the Gauteng province while the **Anti-Eviction Campaign** (AEC) is based in the Western Cape. Both these movements were formed in 2000. The **Treatment Action Campaign** (TAC) is a national organisation existing in six provinces and was launched in 1998.

They have been selected as case studies to provide an example of how social movements representing a majority of poor/working class people have been given political opportunities and space by the introduction of a 'non-racial' capitalist democracy within a neo-liberal configuration. They were selected partly because they are, or have been, among the most viable, publicised and controversial social movements in South Africa. They have attracted attention from the South African government, from international activists and organisations, and national and international scholars.

More importantly, they include an extensive range of issues in their struggles, covering basically every area in any modern social setting: housing, water and electricity, health care, education, safety and security, which are the issues community organisations all over South Africa are starting to mobilise around, and as such they articulate numerous typical grievances emerging in the post-apartheid era. The APF and AEC are not centralised organisations but are better described as forums or networks, consisting of

many different locally-based community groups that all have their specific issues that they organise their struggles around, and they therefore represent a wide array of issues and individual groups.

These three movements articulate the interests of mainly unemployed, working class/poor, Black people. While the leaderships do not include a majority of women, most members and supporters in all three movements are women. Thus, the AEC, the TAC and the APF represent a section of society that has benefited comparatively little from the transition to democracy, a section that could benefit from a contestation of the neo-liberal framework and the liberal-democratic parameters entrenched in the new Constitution and the electoral structures. Whether or not these movements represent such a contestation will be analysed in this thesis.

Social Movement Theory

The most important social movement theories – New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilisation Theory – were developed in Western Europe and North America as responses to the emergence of social movements of the 1960s: the women's movement, the civil rights and anti-war movements, to mention a few.[1] The New Social Movement Theory places social movements in the context of large-scale, structural and cultural change and emphasises collective action, while the Resource Mobilisation Theory highlights internal organisational structures and beliefs within social movements, and pays greater attention to the "how" rather than the "why" of social movements.[2]

The theorising of social movements, Foweraker (1994) argues, is attempting to create a universal theory that seeks "to transcend the geography and history of its own genesis".[3] This generalisation is tenuous, and it is doubtful whether it can be applied equally to Latin American social movements as to Western European and North American movements, as theory has the tendency to be formed by the historical and social context within which it first emerged.[4] Shah (2002), studying Indian social movements, concurs.

The context plays an important role in shaping the meaning of terms such as 'social movements'.[5] From these authors comes the importance of taking context and history in consideration when theorising social movements and analysing their strategies, aims and tactics.

The APF, AEC and TAC will all be described as 'social movements', though this term will occasionally be interchangeable with 'organisation', 'forum' or 'network'. There is a debate as to what groups and forums can appropriately be labelled 'social movements'. Diani (1992) correctly states that the label 'social movement' is applied to very different social phenomena, as diverse as revolutions, religious sects, political organisations and single-issue groups. This broad usage of the term leads to "a loss of specificity and theoretical clarity".[6] Diani made a serious attempt to merge perspectives and definitions of social movements from a number of concepts developed to theorise social movements. Bringing together aspects from the Collective Behaviour perspective, the Resource Mobilisation theory, the Political Process and the New Social Movement approaches, Diani arrived at the following definition of social movements:

> A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity.[7]

Ballard et al (2003) places social movements in the sphere of civil society and defines them as

> the organised expression of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family, state, and the market...Social movements are thus, in our view, politically and/or socially directed collectives, often involving multiple organisations and networks, focused on changing one or more elements of the social, political and economic system within which they are located.[8]

Ballard et al cautions about labelling all struggles taking place in South Africa at present as 'social movements'. While some struggles can be defined as such, others are only potentially such phenomena.[9]

A broader definition comes from Goodwin & Jasper (2003):

> Social movements are conscious, concerted and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means. They are more conscious and organized than fads and fashions. The last longer than a single protest or riot. They are composed mainly of ordinary people as opposed to army officers, politicians, or economic elites. They need not be explicitly political, but many are. They are protesting against something, either explicitly as in antiwar movements or implicitly as in the back-to-the-land movement that is disgusted with modern urban and suburban life.[10]

As social movements they include the revolutions of Russia, China and Iran, animal rights activism, women's liberation movements, and some right-wing movements.[11] These and other classifications[12] do not exclude forces that are backward-looking, racist, conservative or militaristic from the definition of social movements. The specific issues that unify groups of people into coherent movements are of less importance than the identities, ideologies, organisational forms and tactics that form the base of a movement. However, Bond (2004) uses Schuurman's (1989) concept to describe urban social movements as

> social organisations with a territorially-based identity, striving for *emancipation* via collective action.[13]

This emphasis on emancipation would set right-wing movements, organisations and networks apart from movements and networks striving for social justice, equality and social inclusion. This research analysis is concerned with the latter kind, which seeks to defend and deepen the gains won through the anti-apartheid struggle, to extend the democratic boundaries and level social inequalities.

An examination of social movement literature demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between different social sections and not categorise every uprising, progressive organisation or identity-based group together under the heading 'social movement'. A movement needs to include a common identity and goals, a more or less informal network of people, and is striving for change through mainly extra-institutional means. Direct democracy (defined as structures where "every member involved in a

certain activity is or can be involved"[14]) is employed to challenge representative democracy, and liberal democracy with its concomitant party system is being criticised and alternatives to it are elaborated. Social movement activists "assume direct responsibility for intervening in the political decision-making process".[15]

TAC, AEC and APF as Social Movements

It has been argued that there is a need for careful classification of social actors. The APF and AEC will be described as social movements as they display a number of characteristics that correspond to many of the criteria set up for social movements. They consist of a number of community-based organisations involved in trying to change micro and macro aspects of the government's socio-economic policies, and they perceive their struggles to be in conflict with the state's class interests. Their members and supporters are united by an identity based on alienation from and exploitation by the present system, and they are simultaneously engaged in trying to undermine the neo-liberal system and participate in subsistence activities based on a more collective and supportive structure.[16] Their tactics are often based on direct action and are decisively placed outside the structures of the state and directed against it, though on occasion less antagonistic engagement forms, such as negotiation, are also a part of the movements' activity repertoire. While they are not necessarily against the participation in the electoral party system, they are actively trying to maintain alternative participatory democratic arrangements within their own organisations, and they display a dissatisfaction with the current democratic representative parliamentary system which they feel is removed from popular influence and under the sway of big capital rather than the voters.

The definition of the TAC is somewhat more complicated. Many characteristics of the TAC would fit the organisation into the definition of an *interest* or *pressure group*. The forms of interest groups may vary from permanent to temporary structures, but they are all situated outside of parliamentary structures and work to influence policy from the

outside, through lobbying, the legal system and/or by influencing public opinion. The common factor of all interest groups is that they

> are all non-publicly accountable organizations which attempt to promote shared private interests by influencing public policy outcomes that affect them.[17]

A shared identity or interest among the members is an important feature of an interest group. The TAC does have the character of a one-issue organisation: the effects of HIV/AIDS on society and its members is the overriding concern of this group, which has had as its main aim to change the government's policy on HIV/AIDS to provide treatment, care and prevention of new infections for people living with HIV/AIDS. The TAC is both interest- and identity-based.[18] The identity is based on people "who believe that social action to secure state provision of necessities is desirable", but the interest in securing HIV/AIDS treatment is the spur behind the organisation's existence.[19]

Despite the similarities with interest groups, the TAC will here be included in the definition of social movements for a few reasons. First, many activists and scholars on social movements in South Africa perceive the organisation as such.[20] Second, while its main aim is to influence government policy, the organisation also runs programmes which provide services, treatment and education for its members and part of the public.[21] As such, the organisation has made a social commitment within its area of interest that goes beyond simply influencing policy. Third, it has started to take steps to cooperate with other organisations which seek change to social issues other than those that concern HIV/AIDS and health care, such as unemployment, poverty and service delivery. Its mobilisation of a large number of people for both protest and education, using tactics that include a wide range of direct action interventions, as well as more traditional lobbying methods, its involvement in campaigns for broader socio-economic change, would make this organisation qualify as a social movement.

Research Rationale

Goodwin & Jasper comment that it is important to study social movements as they are "windows onto a number of aspects of social life".[22] Social movements, they contend, are a main source of both political conflict and change; they are often the first to point out new political issues and ideas; and as they are situated outside of the political institutional system, they are typically the ones that force the 'insiders' to take account of new fears and desires.[23]

> Social movements play a crucial role in contemporary societies. We learn about the world around us through them. They encourage us to figure out how we feel about government policies and social trends and new technologies. In some cases they even inspire the invention of new technologies or new ways of using old technologies. Most of all, they are one means by which we work out our moral visions, transforming vague intuitions into principles and political demands.[24]

This research was embarked upon in order to examine elements of some of South Africa's most important social movements, including their attitudes towards the new democracy and to provide a comparison between their ideological and tactical approaches. As the post-apartheid movements are relatively new phenomena, having existed for only a few years, comparatively little has been written about them. They are evolving formations, in a society which is still trying to establish a stable democracy. As such, there are many dynamics at play in the socio-political landscape of the newly democratised South Africa, and as the form of democracy is continuing to be an important matter of debate, it is here acknowledged that the new social movements have much to contribute to that debate as they critique the institutional system from the outside and from 'below'.

Their internationalist outlook has been considered as an important part of their ideologies, strategies and as one important factor that shapes their development.

The movements' structures, tactics, membership composition and ideologies have been researched. The findings will present and evaluate their views of democratic structures

and behaviour – elections, representation, state policing and security intervention, state-civil society relations, macro-economic policies – and alternatives to these. Comparisons have been made between the different movements – they are by no means uniform in their ideologies, aims and strategies, though they use similar tactics – to discern how well they fit into the new democracy and what constraints they meet when attempting to win gains for their constituencies.

Hypothesis and Research Question

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the immediate goal of the emerging social movements of post-apartheid South Africa is to influence government policy making to meet the most urgent needs of their constituencies. This goal is to a large extent shared by all three movements of this research. However, their ultimate goals are different, which is attributed to the difference in ideological approaches to the liberal-democratic state. The ideological approach is impacted upon by the structural and ideological climate the movements are operating within as well as by internal debates and international trends.

Because they are still in the process of evolving and their ideological and organisational development is fluid the new social movements are – although this is contested by some activists – mainly defensive and reactive. This is shown in their tactics and short-term demands, which are generally geared towards preventing water and electricity cut-offs or evictions, or demanding that the government treat people living with HIV/AIDS. While their campaigns are on occasion successful, none of these movements has as yet managed to sufficiently frame their campaigns in a manner that can be considered revolutionary as opposed to reformist. Nevertheless, they have clear goals, demands and visions that sometimes contradict the nature of neo-liberal capitalism as implemented in South Africa. Do the selected social movements think these goals and demands are attainable under the present political dispensation? Are elected representatives in national, regional and local government responsive to the movements and their constituencies? Can the democratic framework produce the desired results for the social movements? These and other

questions regarding the new democratic dispensation have been put to leaders and key activists of the selected social movements, to gauge whether they consider their role as civil society formations as complementary or in opposition to the post-apartheid government and the socio-political system as a whole.

The central research question is: *What are the differences between the major South African social movements in terms of their ideological, tactical and strategic approaches to the liberal-democratic state?*

The possible implications the existing relationship between the movements and the state may have on their future development as either single-issue organisations or advanced movements contesting the socio-economic and political order will also be briefly evaluated.

To analyse these issues, we need to examine their tactics, ideologies and core interest configurations.

Brief Introduction to the Movements

The **Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF)** consists of 22 community-based organisations and at least three different political groups with a socialist orientation, working in a formalised structure with one paid organiser. It organises mainly in the townships and poor areas of Gauteng. It has a "support base" of about 10 000 people, with one of its affiliated organisations, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) being by far the largest, claiming up to 7-8 000 members.[25] Its main aims are to oppose privatisation in its various forms, to make basic services, health care and housing available to all, and to strive towards a society built on collectivism and solidarity, not individualism and profit-making. It has adopted socialism as its ultimate aim.

The **Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC)** is a movement consisting of community-based organisations affiliated to one network, scattered around townships and poor areas in the Western Cape province. It does not keep record of a membership base, but consists of 18 affiliates. The Tafelsig affiliate does keep count on its membership, and has at present around 1 200 members.[26] Its main issue concerns housing, to stop evictions and struggle for 'decent quality housing for all'. Other issues of great importance to the AEC are basic service delivery, free education and an end to police brutality. The AEC also considers itself a socialist movement.

The **Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)** could probably be described as South Africa's strongest and most influential social movement at the moment. With over 10 000 members and 40 full-time staff, the TAC is well established and well recognised in national and international circles. It is organising to ensure that people living with HIV/AIDS get access to treatment and medication, to eradicate the stigma linked to the virus, and to prevent more infections. Lately, the issue of a unified public health care system providing quality health care for all has found itself on the agenda of the TAC, and the organisation has begun to involve itself in social issues not directly linked to the HIV/AIDS crisis, such as unemployment.

The TAC, APF and AEC have had an impact on the political landscape as it has unfolded in post-1994 South Africa. Their activities have placed issues of HIV/AIDS, service delivery, housing and privatisation on the agendas of local, regional and national governments, and have forced important social and political actors such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) to engage in discussions around what social movements are acceptable to unite with to further their own struggles.

They have emerged as responses to immediate problems: evictions, water and electricity cut-offs and HIV/AIDS, and not as support structures or sister organisations of the former liberation movement. Although the Treatment Action Campaign has links and occasionally coordinates campaigns with elements of the Tripartite Alliance, the general

trend amongst other social movements is a clearly adversarial relationship to the government and its allies. Is it the case that this adversarial relationship stems from a clash of interests, where the constituencies of the social movements demand a more direct inclusion in the decision-making processes regarding their communities?

These three movements cannot represent the entire range of diverse organisations existing inside South Africa. However, because of the extensive scope of issues they organise around, and because of the large number of independent community organisations that are affiliated to APF and AEC in two of the most important provinces, they can be regarded as broadly representative of urban-based community organisations formed to struggle for social equality. The aim of this research is not to reach definite conclusions – the sample is too small, making a comparison with other organisations tenuous – but to provide an overview and comparison of some of South Africa's most important social actors and their attitudes to politics and the new democracy, to trace the changes these organisations have undergone during their brief existence and consider their possible future developments.

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Methodology

This thesis is a case study over three South African social movements. It is an empirical study based to a large extent on primary sources such as interviews, pamphlets, press statements and articles written by activists of the selected social movements. The primary focus of the thesis is to determine the ideological and strategic directions of the movements. This means that much of the accounts and exposé of the movements are based on their own interpretations and opinions of events and the role of the state. From this narrative, an attempt has been made to determine the status of these organisations vis-à-vis the new democracy and its structures and to analyse why these movement have adopted their specific positions, what unites them and what divides them.

Comparisons

This is a comparative study. 'Indeed comparison is the foundation of any systematic branch of knowledge', write Hague et al (1992), and points out some strengths of this methodology. Comparisons enable us to, among other things:

- Determine the correctness of hypotheses.
- Classify politics more clearly.
- Make more substantially based predictions established on generalisations drawn from comparisons.[1]

Greenstein (1998) cautions that comparing societies is not an easy task. 'A series of strategic decisions regarding topics, time-frames, and angles of observation must be taken before any such project can begin.' Societies are multifaceted units with many areas to investigate, and the fact that they are changing over time makes it difficult to fix any research plans, and they therefore need to be regularly reviewed.[2]

This research has chosen to compare similar phenomena: South African social movements that all struggle for social equality for their constituencies in the initial period of post-apartheid South Africa. By doing so, it hopes to shed some light over the state-civil society interaction that changed radically after the introduction of democracy and that is still crystallising. It also attempts to clarify the reasons behind the actions and ideologies of the new social movements and explain their differences in relation to the state and other political actors.

These two comments on comparative methods have been taken into account, and specific areas of comparative units have been selected: the new social movements' approach to elections and representative democracy, to the state, and their tactics, strategies and ideologies.

Interview Process

Semi-structured interviews were held with leading activists in the three case studies to determine the attitude to the liberal-democratic dispensation of South Africa of these social movements. The interviewees were identified on a non-probability basis, with their positions and long-time memberships in the organisations as principal criteria for selection. The researcher has had previous contact with APF and AEC and was thus generally able to select some of the relevant interviewees independently. In other cases, activists were asked to identify relevant interviewees.

The same questions were put to all interviewees (see appendix 1), with the exception of Martin Legassick (AEC), who was given individual questions regarding the issues he has specific insight in (see appendix 2). In the cases of Xolani Kunene (TAC) and Thembeka Majali (TAC), some questions regarding the organisation's structure were left out due to time pressure during the time of interviews. As the TAC has many accessible official documents dealing with its inception and structure that could be consulted, it was felt

these questions could be left out without the overall purpose of the interviews being jeopardised.

All interviews were undertaken on a voluntary, non-paid basis. In some cases, transport fares have been covered by the researcher, as well as snacks during the interviews. R200 has been paid into every organisation's account to thank the interviewees for the time and energy they spent on participating in the research. This payment was made after all interviews were concluded and was not a condition for participation.

The interviews with leading activists were an important source of information. Denscombe (2001) argues that interviews are useful for the purposes of adding detail and depth to narratives, and if the interviews are used to complement other research methods, they can help corroborate facts and be an additional source of information. Furthermore, interviews are specifically useful for unearthing emotions, experiences and feelings.[3] These are the benefits drawn from the interviews made for this thesis, and they served several purposes: to trace course of events and obtain general information; to get an understanding of what different leading members think are the important issues to deal with; to complement and extend the accounts given in official documents, newspaper articles, flyers, etc.

Gathering of Primary Source Material

Four interviews were held with leading members of the **AEC**: **Fonky Goboza** (Provincial Deputy Secretary/Western Cape structure), **Ashraf Cassiem** (Interim Coordinator/Chairperson/Western Cape structure), **Max Ntanyana** (Acting Chairperson/Khayelitsha AEC and Deputy Chairperson/Western Cape structure), and **Martin Legassick** (Political Advisor/Educator). They were selected on the basis of their prominent positions and long-standing membership in the organisation, which enabled them to give detailed and holistic descriptions of events, ideological developments and positions. In their capacities as leading members, they were furthermore democratically

chosen by AEC's members to speak for the organisation and provide official accounts of the organisation's views and activities. Martin Legassick and Ashraf Cassiem were both interviewed in person and over the telephone, for the purpose of clarification and further fact gathering. The AEC has little written material emanating from within the organisation accessible, and its website has not been used as it could not be accessed during the time of research. A few pamphlets and position papers have been accessed through members of the organisation, and the researcher has attended an important event organised by the AEC.

Four interviews took place with leading and long-standing members of the **APF**: **Prishani Naidoo** (Founding Member/Member of Research Sub-Committee), **Nina Benjamin** (Member of Education Committee), **John Appolis** (Chairperson), **Thandekile Dodo** (Regional Coordinator/the Vaal). These people were selected due to their long-term membership, prominent positions, as well as their specific areas of involvement in the APF. As parts of various sub-committees, Prishani Naidoo and Nina Benjamin were able to give responses with specific insights and details of discussions. Thandekile Dodo provided an interesting regional perspective, and John Appolis was a given interviewee due to his position as Chairperson, which is the person chosen by the membership to represent the organisation. A telephonic interview was held with **Ahmed Veriava**, APF member and researcher who has written extensively on social movements in South Africa, for the purpose of clarification and fact gathering. The APF has a website where written material has been accessed (www.apf.org.za). However, the website is not updated very regularly and do not reflect the broader discussion taking place in the APF and its affiliates. Thus, four interviews with leading and long-standing members of the APF were made to complement the written material. Pamphlets, newsletters and discussion papers have been use in conjunction with the interviews.

Two interviews were held with **TAC** representatives: **Thembeka Majali** (Provincial Coordinator/Western Cape) and **Xolani Kunene** (Campaigns Organiser/Gauteng). Because TAC is a national organisation with national variations in campaigns and grades of success, representatives from TAC offices in two different provinces were made.

Xolani Kunene replaced the Gauteng Provincial Coordinator as interviewee due to the latter's absence during the time of interview. Thembeka Majali and Xolani Kunene were strategically placed to provide accounts of national as well as specifically regional events and developments of TAC campaigns. The TAC has a well-developed and regularly updated website (www.tac.org.za) where statements, congress material, newsletters and other primary material can be found. Only two interviews with leading members of TAC were necessary, as relevant written material is easily accessible from the organisation. In this case, the interviews were complementary and served the purposes of clarification and obtaining specific details and opinions. The researcher has attended a few TAC events, such as marches and the inauguration of the 2005 TAC National Congress.

Secondary Sources

Theories of social movements have been consulted through secondary sources. There is an abundant literature on the new social movements, and as there are differences in theory application between European and North American literature on the one hand, and Asian/African/Latin American literature, on the other, a brief overview of the difference from these regions have been made.

Most of the existing literature and research on South Africa's new social movements are written by the activists themselves, or by intellectuals sympathetic to their cause. Thus, many of the secondary sources mirror the views and analyses made by the people making up part of the movements. These analyses are often made by leaders or intellectuals, not by the rank-and-file, and they are based on participation in activities and on interviews with a large number of activists drawn from all levels of the organisations. These articles and analyses were used for several purposes: to provide facts and background to the new social movements; to get an idea of the content and direction of discussions, problems, events and political development of the organisations; to get indications of the ideological positions within the organisations.

All three social movements have been researched by other scholars, South African and international, and a fair amount of material has been published regarding their structures, activities, aims and strategies. APF members have also been, compared to the TAC and the AEC, relatively prolific in their analyses and have been part of writing research reports, articles and analyses of both APF as well as other social movements. Again, these scholars are often sympathetic to the movements and often share some similar approaches to the state and liberal democracy with the movement activists.

Newspaper articles have been treated as secondary sources and used mainly to source opinions of the state's representatives, who are often interviewed when articles covering events of the new social movements are written, cross-check facts, and trace events.

Methodology Critique

It is acknowledged that the views of the leaders do not always directly reflect those of the rank-and-file, however, the views of the rank-and-file as expressed in internal elections and discussions will be acted upon by the leaders according to the organisations' own democratic directives. While the leaders of these organisations do have their own views of the state of the nation and the course their struggles should take, and these views have been recorded in the interviews, there is a recognition on behalf of the leadership that there are different views within the movement. This recognition is important when gauging the position of the social movements as whole units – if and where that is possible at all.

The divide between the leadership/intellectuals of the movements and the rank-and-file, in terms of ideological positions and strategic vision should not be underestimated, and this has been taken into consideration. It seems as if the leadership/intellectuals are aware of this division, which is frequently mentioned and analysed in writings and the interviews made. With this in mind, it is clear that the organisations cannot be treated as homogeneous, fully-developed and ideologically clear units, but as diverse and nascent

groups that is trying to place their everyday struggles in context. It should also be mentioned that even the leadership/intellectuals of the movements are not in total agreement of the direction the struggles should take, and thus the diversity is reflected at all levels.

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[1] Hague, R. et al, Comparative Government and Politics. An Introduction, 3rd Edition, MacMillan Press Ltd, Great Britain, 1992, pp. 23-25

[2] Greenstein, R. "Identity, Race, History: South Africa and the Pan-African Context", in Greenstein, R. (ed.) Comparative Perspectives on South Africa, MacMillan Press Ltd, Great Britain, 1998, p. 1

[3] Denscombe, M. The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects, Open University Press, Buckingham, Philadelphia, 2001, pp. 111-112

The Origin of South Africa's Social Movements

South Africa's civil society was formed under decades of anti-apartheid struggle. Struggles for the right to form trade unions, against pass laws and police repression, and for human dignity and 'non-racial' democratic rights and, on occasion and among certain sections of the liberation movement, for socialism, engaged a vast amount of people from a broad range of sectors: school pupils, workers, students and intellectuals, residents and consumers, fought the racist state with innovative and popularly grounded tactics and strategies. The ANC and its allies, as the dominant component of the liberation movement in the 1980s and 1990s, had in the 1980s two political visions of organisation: the call to make South Africa ungovernable, and to build "organs of people's power".[1]

The ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was established in 1985, and mobilised workers for better working conditions and against the oppression of apartheid, both on shopfloor and political levels. The civic movement was another strong expression of people-based organisation, as was the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF, formed in 1983, consisted of hundreds of community-based and other kinds of organisations and succeeded in building a united front by translating grievances around local issues into national-level politics on a 'non-racial' and multi-class foundation.[2] "UDF and its affiliates signalled the birth of a civil society operating independently of the state, and capable of developing its own views and institutions", comments one academic.[3] At the same time, the position of the UDF and the rest of the ANC-aligned liberation movement that entrenched the importance of multi-class involvement geared the immediate struggle towards the priority of a fundamental political, as opposed to socio-economic, change.[4]

It is in these organisations that the seeds of the new social movements can be found. Issues such as rent increases, exploitation of labour, lack of basic services and other day-to-day grievances were "grounded in direct opposition to the productive and reproductive

oppression of apartheid-capitalism"[5], and with the independence from the state, a culture of resistance and defiance against powerful institutions, built on struggles from earlier decades, was further entrenched and played a fundamental part in demarcating the limits of the transition. These struggles

> endowed the country and the majority of its people with a high degree of effective politicisation and participation, dynamic democratic social organisation and varied collective socio-economic solidarity.[6]

The Negotiated Settlement

The ideology which the dominant liberation movement adopted was that of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), where the national, anti-apartheid struggle was given preference over the class struggle and negotiations were considered the way to usher in democracy.[7] The two stages of the NDR start with the capturing of political power by the democratic forces, which will then use the conquered state power to effect socio-economic equalisation in the material base in the second stage. The understanding of the dominance of this position in the late part of the anti-apartheid struggle is "absolutely crucial" when evaluating the emergence of the post-apartheid social movements.[8] To relinquish the claims for immediate working class power over production and resource distribution had as a consequence to leave the patterns of ownership and control of the natural resources and the means of production in South Africa intact. The course led to negotiations which facilitated the shift from a 'racially' exclusive and discriminatory minority bourgeois regime to a liberal-democratic, 'non-racial' state with civil liberties and representative democracy as cornerstones. Taking place in the midst of the global neo-liberal trend and just after the crumbling of the command economies in the Soviet Union and its satellite states, the negotiations were influenced by the demands of global and domestic capital. The calls for socialism, even as emanating from COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP), two of the three Tripartite Alliance members, became muted as the negotiations progressed. In 1993, one year before the first democratic national elections, one observer wrote that

> [i]t is clear that, regarding social and economic reconstruction, South Africa's democratic and left politicians do not have a socialist strategy and are not developing one. At present they are hoping for some share of power in order to administer an existing structure into which they can introduce some marginal reforms – reforms agreed by, if not promoted by, capital.[9]

What took place was not a social revolution but a negotiated settlement agreed upon by the elite of South Africa, to replace the racist minority state with a parliamentary structure open to all citizens, sustained by a liberal-democratic capitalist constitution, with the basic right to private property firmly entrenched.[10] The two main pillars built by the negotiations became political democratisation and economic liberalisation.[11]

> The real situation is that hardly any change has taken place in the relations of economic power and control. Moreover, in the foreseeable future and in terms of the prevailing system, no such fundamental change is to be expected. With hardly any exceptions, the sources of economic power remain in the hands that controlled them under apartheid.[12]

The negotiations, argue two activists, also placed the ANC government in a "hostage" position with regard to negotiations in general. The institutionalisation of post-apartheid politics by the ANC and the party's approach to nation-building has created an environment where loyalty to the state and the party that heads it has become paramount.[13] This demand for loyalty has been discursively expressed through accusations of 'ultra-leftism' and 'opposition to the democratic consolidation' emanating from Alliance members and government representatives against many of the new social movements. On a more direct level, police intervention has been used in order to deter dissent and uphold the established notion of law and order. This will be dealt with in more detail later in the thesis. Suffice here to note that the context and form of the negotiated settlement has impacted on the post-apartheid state and the policies being pursued by the democratically elected government.

The nature of the struggle under the ANC-led coalition was not challenging the form of the state as such, and no challenge to the borders drawn up during the colonisation era took place. Rather, the aim was to capture the state machinery and extend its use to all citizens of the 'New South Africa', as the post-apartheid state came to be labelled. The

organisations involved in the anti-apartheid struggle did not confront state power *per se* but rather the priorities made by the specific apartheid structures. Especially the ANC and its affiliates were eager to capture state power and use it for equity distribution, not to directly abolish state power.[14]

The creation of a Black[15] elite and the somewhat strained image of a 'Rainbow Nation' (where nevertheless the four 'races' - African, Indian, Coloured and White - created by the need to sustain apartheid capitalism, are in official and popular discourse still accepted as genuine social entities) is an important part of the new liberal-democratic principle of equality of opportunities in a society divided by class. An interesting point made by a South African trade unionist is that affirmative action and the new opportunities for Black people of self-enrichment hides the fact that the poor and the working class will always be Black in a capitalist South Africa.[16] In other words, the measures put in place in a liberal-democratic South Africa to ensure that even Black people have a chance to upward mobility cannot overcome either the class or the 'racial' divisions, but the image of a 'racially equal' society is important in order to maintain social stability.

Continued Inequalities

A substantive part of the transition compromise was made up of the acceptance of economic liberalisation in exchange for Black Economic Empowerment and affirmative action.[17] While the economic liberalisation has benefited all people in the upper classes, the main winners are the Black political, economic and professional elites.[18] Because the nature of the democratic transition included the insertion of a liberal democratic national polity into a globalised, neo-liberal capitalist world system, the class differences – even along 'racial' lines – that were formed under apartheid have not been eroded. In real terms, the first few years of democracy saw the gap in income between 'African' and 'White' households increase, as average 'African' household income dropped 19 per cent between 1995-2000, while average 'White' household income increased with 15 per cent

in the same period.[19] About 10 per cent of 'Africans' are malnourished and 25 per cent of 'African' children are stunted in their growth.[20] Whilst the new social movements have not accepted the illusion of 'racial' equality in the post-apartheid period, their struggles are generally class-based or anti-government rather than 'racially' rooted, alternatively based on universal human rights. "There can be no doubt that these struggles, even if they are defeated in the short term, herald a period of heightened *class* struggle", comments one activist and intellectual.[21] The class struggle does have an authentic basis in the general decline in income of the poor across 'racial' divides, as the income of the poorest half of all South Africans have declined. In 2003 it was claimed that they earned 9,7 per cent of the national income, down from 11,4 in 1995.[22]

The overt class struggles that are brewing in South Africa are directed against the ANC-led government's neo-liberal macro-economic policies, adopted two years into the new democracy. The ANC won the 1994 democratic elections with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as its election manifesto. The RDP was not a revolutionary document. Drafted by COSATU with the aid of community organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and researchers, the RDP emphasised democratisation, nation-building and linked reconstruction to development. The notion of people-driven development as a way to reach economic growth was entrenched in the RDP. However, the RDP did not demand a thorough redistribution of the wealth that had become concentrated in a few hands under the apartheid government, and business was considered an important component for development.

> The RDP can be thought of as an attempted compromise in order to arrive at an agreement that would satisfy all classes. It sought to give something to each sector of society, to please everyone a little bit, and deal with contradictions and opposing needs through discussion and debate.[23]

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) replaced the RDP as the guiding macro-economic policy of the government in 1996. As opposed to the more consultative and inclusive process of the creation of the RDP, GEAR was drawn up by a number of experts, including an economist from the World Bank, and introduced as 'non-negotiable', and the Tripartite Alliance partners were told that they could not contest its

introduction. In GEAR, all references to popular involvement in decision-making have been dropped and the role of the state in developing the economy has been downplayed. GEAR exhibits many typical characteristics known to a neo-liberal structure:

> Its main features include lowered state spending, low inflation, low interest rates, privatisation of state enterprises, labour flexibility, an open economy and export-driven growth. Water, electricity, public transport, telecommunications and other basic services are being privatised or outsourced as part of the Gear programme.[24]

Reduction in state deficits, the removing of price controls and the opening up of the economy to international competition are other elements of GEAR.[25] (Taylor, 2001; 54-55) The commodification of basic services, where the state has withdrawn from its responsibility as direct service provider and has instead adopted the role as service "ensurer", has seen a "dramatic escalation" in the prices of services[26], and is one major point of contention between social movements like the APF and the AEC and the state.

This, however, took place after the state had *expanded* social spending to the previously black majority, who then came to be included in welfare schemes never available before. Thus, South Africa did not take a linear direction to development, and its macro-economic route has been a bit contradictory and is still open to debate.

The social movements that emerged in the late 1990s – "surprisingly quickly" for a newly democratised and liberated society, according to some analysts[27] – responded to problems of everyday life: water and electricity cut-offs, evictions, unemployment and labour flexibility, financial exclusion from schools, the lack of anti-retroviral treatment – they are a "direct response to state policy".[28] GEAR is a main target of many marches and protests of the social movements, demonstrated in slogans and on t-shirts saying "Phantsi, GEAR, phantsi!" [Down with GEAR, down!] As two activists put it: the new social movements

have their origins in the lived, collective struggles of different communities responding to the effects of neo-liberal economic restructuring, ushered in by the ANC-government and embodied in the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy.[29]

They are also a result of the "limited institutional continuity" between the anti-apartheid social movements and the contemporary ones, as the former were incorporated into the democratic state structures and thus left a vacuum where there used to be extra-parliamentary avenues for expressing opposition.[30]

With a steep unemployment reaching above 40 per cent (according to the broad definition which includes unemployed people not actively looking for work), inability to pay bonds and the increased prices on basic services and school fees has become a social problem in post-apartheid South Africa. While there is a severe lack of employment opportunities, quality jobs that provide a living wage are also on the decline, and temporary, casual, part-time and contract-based kinds of jobs are on the increase.[31] By July 2001, an estimated 10 million South Africans had had their water cut off, while an additional 10 million people had their electricity disconnected, mostly for shorter periods, according to a survey by the Municipal Services Project. While the findings of this survey were contested by the government, it is nevertheless argued that the "municipal drive for profitability has led to a massive social crisis"[32], which includes 250 deaths from cholera in KwaZulu-Natal in the middle of 2000. This tragedy erupted as rural residents had to start paying for piped water that had previously been free, and when people started to venture to streams and other natural sources of water, cholera hit the communities hard.[33] In the Western Cape, numerous communities erupted in 2005 in anger against the backlog of 360 000 houses, as patience is running out amongst backyard and shack dwellers. Around 5, 3 million South Africans are today living with HIV/AIDS, and the intransigence on the part of the South African government to refuse to take the epidemic seriously in its early years has led to an enormous waste of healthy lives.

This [socio-economic situation] is the background to the formation of community organisations like the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee, the Western Cape Anti-

Eviction Campaign, the Landless People's Movement, and similar groups. They are scattered all over the country and originate in the townships and squatter camps and other working class areas.[34]

One reason why the introduction of formal democracy has not managed to reduced social inequalities is that

[t]he poor have been unable to win policies which might reduce inequality because classic forms of organisation, such as trade unionism, are less effective, as changes in the labour market exclude the poor from the formal workplace.[35]

The new social movements are attempts to organise poor people, employed and unemployed, in the sphere of reproduction rather than at the point of production. A major part of these movements are unemployed, poor, Black people, of which a majority of the rank-and-file is often women.

Depending on the nature of the issue being taken up and/or policy being opposed, emerging movements are composed according to those directly affected by, and/or with a direct interest in, that issue or the broader socio-political context to which it speaks.[36]

The new social movements analysed in this study – the Anti-Privatisation Forum in Gauteng, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Treatment Action Campaign – are all independent of the Congress movement, the main faction of the anti-apartheid movement. However, there are several overlapping similarities between the new social movements and the former liberation movement. While the new movements are not a direct continuation of this background, they are nevertheless influenced by the past struggles. Some leaders have their roots in the ANC/SACP/COSATU Alliance. Some social movement activists still vote ANC – for various reasons – in elections. The struggles of the new social movements are taking place in a new context, but still use "the traditions, the fire, the experience of the old days", according to one leading activist.[37]

The civics of the 1980s started out "resolutely anti-capitalist", but lost their radicalism after the 1994 elections and entered a corporatist relationship with the ANC. The South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) supported amongst other things the

Operation Lungise campaign, launched by the Johannesburg Metro, ESKOM and other organisations to induce people in Soweto to pay their electricity accounts in full and on time, a campaign that started after widespread protests against electricity disconnections and the formation of the vocal Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee. The late 1990s saw the resurrection of civics in a "new guise", in the shape of the new social movements.[38]

The New Social Movements

The first "mini-wave of struggle" initiated by the new social movements began in earnest in 1999 and culminated in a major show of force and mobilisation during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) taking place in Johannesburg in August 2002. This period, argues one activist, did not constitute a "movement", as the new organisations and struggles evolving did not inherit either a cadre formed by previous struggles, organisations, demands or theoretical perspectives from earlier struggles; all that had to be "created from scratch".[39]

> When we consider the fact that all these crucial and difficult [questions] have to be resolved on an entirely new terrain of politics (for example, we have for the first time in the history of black working class life in this country, a government elected by that black working class), then we have to be sober and understand that the formation of the new movement that will challenge neoliberalism and a black capitalist class will occupy an entire historical period.[40]

Some of these social movements form part of the broad global anti-capitalist movement, both in form and in their ideological outlook and strategies, a movement whose struggles and aims do not diverge very markedly from the 'old' labour struggles waged by trade unions and political parties. While a lot of emphasis is placed on internal democracy and the democratisation of day-to-day affairs is a central matter of debate for these movements, they nevertheless place the issues of social justice and the expansion of capitalism on the political agenda.[41] This is a diversion from the Western European theoretical emphasis placed on social movements as concentrating on 'post-modern' issues that relate to 'humanity' at large rather than on class-based concerns.[42] As was

pointed out earlier, it is important to put the analysis of social movements in its cultural and historical context. In the South African context, class-based issues have a definite position on the agendas of two out of the three case studies – the APF and the AEC – who have made socio-economic inequalities their priority for struggle. The TAC, though the movement seeks to forward aims that encompass everyone living with HIV/AIDS regardless of class status, is also concerned with the issue of poverty as an obstacle to advance the health and social conditions for its constituencies.

This is, then, the general context in which South Africa's new social movements were founded. A scenario where a 'non-racial' society based on the liberal interpretation of equality for all has caused anger, frustration and opposition against nationally directed and locally implemented policies. Let us briefly turn to the specific circumstances that led to the formation of the APF, the AEC and the TAC.

The Anti-Privatisation Forum (Gauteng): APF

The recent stirring of civil society in Johannesburg, home to the APF, has its roots in the acceptance of "corporate globalisation" as the guiding policies by the city's managers in the late 1990s.[43] The introduction of the iGoli 2002 strategy and the plans to privatise parts of the University of the Witwatersrand, which included extensive retrenchments and privatisation and outsourcing of council services, provoked responses from different parts of civil society – students, trade unions and poor communities – which came together to oppose the plans under the banner of the Anti-Privatisation Forum in July 2000. The objective behind the formation of the network was to stop the introduction of privatisation policies in Gauteng, and as such the nature of the initial struggle was defensive and concentrated on reversing privatisation schemes.

The earliest struggles were concentrated on opposing privatisation of water and electricity delivery. However, as new communities joined the APF, the range of issues taken up has broadened significantly, with HIV/AIDS and health care having been added

as a recent concern. The demands of the APF include the re-nationalisation of privatised state assets; free basic services and quality education for all; a clean environment; affordable and efficient public transport system; an end to privatisation of and profit-making on basic services; no to NEPAD; struggle towards socialism.[44]

The APF consists of 25 affiliates, most situated in the townships and shack settlements in and around Johannesburg and Pretoria, and a majority of the membership are unemployed women, pensioners and youth. Since February 2004, when the APF held its first Annual General Meeting, there is a structure of six office bearers which includes secretary, treasurer and a chairperson. One person is employed as an organiser. There are four sub-committees: legal, media, education and research. An Executive Committee meets every two weeks, and all affiliates are represented in the APF structures, though they are autonomous and can organise campaigns and fundraising independently of the APF.[45]

The Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign: AEC

The AEC emerged in 2000 as a response to evictions in the Western Cape. The regional structure was formed as groups that organised against evictions in different townships and poor areas, such as Delft, Valhalla Park and Lavender Hill, started to hear about similar struggle and began linking up with organisations in other communities. The central campaign seems to have started in Tafelsig, which officially launched the Tafelsig Anti-Eviction Campaign in February 2001 and then found itself being contacted by people who for a while had been fighting evictions, though these struggles had been more "hidden".[46]

Supported by a number of city-based NGO workers, trade unionists and free-floating left activists, the Anti-Eviction Campaign started operating at two levels: exploring the prospects of a legal battle and beginning a programme of mass mobilisation.[47]

Like the APF, the AEC consists of a number of community-based organisations that are affiliated to the regional structure and that have a lot of autonomy to wage their own campaigns, and their members are mainly unemployed women and youth. The AEC has an elected co-ordinating structure and an executive, but there is a resistance within the organisation to formal, hierarchical structures.[48] The structures and decision-making processes are more fluid than those of the APF, and "communities" elect people to work on the Western Cape structure. Different people are elected as representatives or coordinators at different times, depending on what their area of expertise and experience of various issues and struggles.[49] The Mandela Park AEC branch has an official position against the institutionalisation of formal leadership structures.[50] How democratic this position becomes in practice is disputed. According to two researchers, the mass meetings held by the MPAEC are open and democratic:

> At these meetings everyone can speak, everyone is obliged to listen and decisions are taken by a show of hands. Discussion tends to be extremely practical and to draw on the many varied strengths of the community. The culture, still promoted by the 'liberation movements', of simply applauding speakers on a platform and endlessly reciting empty slogans, has been decidedly broken.[51]

In opposition to this, a former MPAEC activist speaks about the domination of a few people over the whole structure that developed:

> While mass meetings were held within the MPAEC, they did not attempt to come up with new structures or strategies. The meetings were instead a place where people could bring their problems and get reports regarding ongoing work. These problems were then tackled by a handful of individuals, the visible 'activists', who decide the strategy outside the space of the mass meetings.
> This meant that in 2002 the MPAEC was structured around mass meetings with a permanent chair, and though masses of people attended, no particular efforts were made to ensure full participation. It was simply assumed that since mass meetings were being held, everyone felt able to speak at those meetings.[52]

This former activist instead ponders how an "elite leadership" was developed in this AEC branch, and places more emphasis on the attempts to include all people and make the mass meetings a comfortable space for all to express themselves in rather than the structures themselves.

As is evident in the name, the Anti-Eviction Campaign started out with preventing evictions as their core issue, and the short-term objectives remain the prevention of evictions and the mobilisation of communities. However, as more communities joined the network, more issues of struggle have been added to the list. Water and electricity cut-offs, school fees and social grants are some areas where the AEC is involved. Overall, the AEC is opposed to neo-liberal policies, privatisation and GEAR. One specific demand is a flat rate of R10 per month for water and electricity, and in the housing crisis that has seen poor communities erupt in the Western Cape, the Mandela Park AEC is demanding decent housing for all and that half of all the houses being built in Mandela Park will be reserved for people already living in the area.

During the first years of the AEC's existence, new communities joined regularly. The Vrygrond Anti-Eviction Campaign joined as late as 2003 and started experimenting with different and innovative tactics to mobilise opposition to evictions and other social problems.[53]

The Treatment Action Campaign: TAC

The Treatment Action Campaign was launched in December 1998 as a national voluntary, non-profit association of networks, organisations and individuals to campaign for affordable anti-retroviral treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS. The TAC was originally conceived as a project of the National Association of People With AIDS (Napwa), but then became an independent and powerful agent in the South African HIV/AIDS political landscape.[54] The AIDS epidemic in South Africa is "[p]robably the most devastating single influence on the health of the people at present".[55] At the moment, about 5, 3 million people are living with HIV in South Africa, and HIV/AIDS accounts for up to 25 per cent of all deaths in the country.[56]

The South African government has received much criticism from both local and international HIV/AIDS actors for its slow and ineffective intervention in the crisis, and the TAC has played an important role in organising civil society and using the legal framework to put pressure on the government to implement a comprehensive treatment plan. Starting out with the intention of opposing the pharmaceutical industry, the TAC did not expect the government to deny the link between HIV and AIDS or oppose the roll-out of anti-retrovirals to poor people.[57] However, even if some leading TAC members are open supporters or members of the ANC and the organisation tries to cooperate with the government on its various levels when it perceives that there are benefits in doing so, the TAC is explicitly independent of both the government and the pharmaceutical industry and has challenged the government on many of its policy stances regarding HIV/AIDS when necessary.

The main objectives of TAC are to:

- Campaign for equitable access to affordable treatment for all people living with HIV/AIDS
- Campaign for and support the prevention of all new HIV infections
- Promote and sponsor legislation to ensure equal access to social services for and equal treatment of all people living with HIV/AIDS
- Challenge barriers that limit access to HIV/AIDS treatment in the private and public sector
- Educate, promote and develop an understanding and commitment within all communities of developments in HIV/AIDS treatment
- Campaign for access to affordable and quality health care for all people in South Africa
- Train and develop a representative and effective leadership of people living with HIV/AIDS on a non-discriminatory basis
- Campaign for an effective regional and global network comprising of organisations with similar aims and objectives[58]

The TAC is an ordinary membership organisation, though there is little distinction made between 'members', 'activists', 'volunteers' and 'supporters'.[59] The TAC National Congress, to be held at least every two years, is the highest decision-making structure. The National Congress elects a National Executive Committee (NEC) which is the only policy-making body in between National Congresses, and where COSATU is automatically represented. The TAC consists of a network of local branches and a district structure that elects representatives to the Provincial Executive Council. The TAC exists in six provinces, has about 10 000 card-carrying members and a staff consisting of about 40 full-time employees. 70 per cent of TAC members are women.[60]

In conclusion, the new social movements of South Africa have a long history of struggle and organisation independent of the state to draw upon. The context of their formation is complex and consists of an amalgam of dashed expectations, difficulties to sustain a living and widening class differences, all compounded by deep 'racial' and gender divisions. Their main reason to exist is that the trust in the existing democratic state structures to redistribute power and resources has slowly started to fade, and their leaders have in many cases started to ask the question: Whose democracy is this?[61]

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The International Context

Historically, transnational social movements are a well-established phenomenon and did not emerge from globalisation. Smith & Johnston (2002), for instance, point to the 19th century movements against slavery, against the practice of footbinding, and for women's suffrage, some of which were transnational in scope.[1] As the world has become more integrated and inter-connected, social movements have found and developed new expressions, struggles and opportunities. While the social movements of this research are not transnational – they are nationally or locally based – they are internationalist in their outlooks and have forged important links with social movements in other countries as an important part of their activism.

It is important to get a sense of global developments when analysing the new South African social movements, though they are nationally based and the bulk of their campaigns and struggles are taking place at local levels. The world system, increasingly globalised, has an impact on the socio-economic policies of individual governments, and in turn civil society organise to support or object to these policies. International solidarity and participation in events such as the World Social Forum (WSF) is intrinsic to some of these social movements, which derive ideas and inspiration from international contacts. Linked to a very diverse global social movement, the Treatment Action Campaign, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Anti-Eviction Campaign are actively engaging the global socio-political structure in conjunction with numerous other movements, organisations, networks, trade unions and individuals. Where they are contesting local, provincial and national state structures, they are also part of a global movement of attempted change.

Some Points About Globalisation and the State

The debate on the impact of globalisation processes on the nation-state[2] has also touched on the forms and objectives of social movements. There is a large literature on the role of the nation-state under globalisation with two main analyses crystallising. One view regards nation-states as still powerful, and in some cases even essential in an integrated neo-liberal world, as multi-national corporations need the power and resources of individual nation-states to bolster their expansion when possible, and to cushion them during slow growth. Multi-state organisations are considered as responses to cross-statal concerns, while the role of the nation-state is still very important and is not seen in contradiction to the globalised world system.[3] The other view regards nation-states under globalisation as obsolete or at best inefficient when it comes to tackling internationalised problems. The pressures of globalisation have made states less able to manage social problems, and the spread of crises, technology and information across borders calls for new solutions and democratic institutions that are not grounded in the concept of the nation-state.[4] Despite differing conclusions on how globalisation processes have impacted on the nation-state, most theorists agree that the integration of the world system has accelerated and had an impact on relations between nation-states and within them, between civil society and the state itself.

The position of the state in this world system is an important unit of analysis for many authors on the social movements in the South, and the state is a subject of much debate within some of the social movements themselves. Social movements in the South have emerged as a result of the contradictions within societies that are going through transitions, and are also a response to the role of the state and the division of labour that is being transformed due to the penetration of transnational capital, according to Wignaraja (1993). In many countries, Wignaraja asserts, these contradictions and changes have undermined the legitimacy of the nation-state and the ability of the state to act as protector of the people. Social movements emerged in the South as both neo-classical and Marxists paradigms failed to introduce a change for the better for the majority, and through participatory, democratic processes, people are themselves creating

alternatives to both the state-driven and the market-driven paradigms. By forming grassroots organisations, people seek to counter the poverty they live in. While most of the movements are not revolutionary, they are nevertheless – on a conscious or unconscious level – building alternatives to the state.[5]

Amin (1993) places the focus on the division between the First and the Third Worlds, between the centre and the periphery. The bourgeois centre states are strong and can regulate the development of the world capitalist system, while the peripheral states can control internal class formation but have to lay down their capacities to the demand of the pressures of global capital accumulation. The peripheral state is to a large extent dependent on the evolution of the core states and occupies in the reigning world system a comprador position. Because of the pattern of unequal development found in the existing world capitalist system, the world is polarised.[6] The social movements are in essence waging a struggle against this very inequality and it is objectively speaking an anti-capitalist struggle.[7] Bourgeois democratic states are presented with a "formidable dilemma": "For there are only two choices: either the democratic political system accepts subordination "adjustment" to the world system, and is thereafter incapable of effecting any major social reforms, soon precipitating a crisis for democracy itself; or else popular forces, seizing the means provided by democracy, impose these reforms." Once this happens, there will be a conflict in the global capitalist system, and there will be a move away from a bourgeois national project to a popular national one.[8]

Kothari (1993) further calls for a new ideological framework to explain the changes in the world system, as the old ones are "obsolete". As most ideologies were developed within the context of the European nation-state and around class-based identities, they are not very useful when applied to a "transnationalized world in which the dominant currency is technological as distinct from economic and political. It is a totally different human setting."[9] Two APF activists argue that the new social movements have embraced a diversity of ideologies and organisational and tactical approaches, and they do not adhere to one overarching theory:

> For some, this represents a new theoretical paradigm – one that does not seek to homogenise all experience, thought and action in a single theoretical framework or set of measurable trends. More importantly, though, it is an approach that gives priority to the immediacy of material needs, social situations and political issues that face the poor majority, the local nature of struggles (which has immediate relevance for, and to, the national and the global), and to difference in the context of increasingly universalising experiences.[10]

This has led to a questioning of the traditional understanding of the anti-capitalist struggle, both outside and within the social movements, and they have emerged in a setting where the tactics and strategies of the traditional political establishments to a large extent have failed to offer solutions to the changing conditions of the social situation.[11]

Globalisation, with the concomitant changing role of the state and increased importance of international capital, has influenced the formation of social movements internationally. To start with, the international financial institutions (IFIs) – the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) – are a part of the pattern of global economic and social integration, and have all become a target for social movements the world over – including many South African movements – struggling to create a more egalitarian society. Thus, international institutions and internationalised socio-economic policies spur formations of movements and organisations and shapes demands and concerns. Second, through the intensification of information dissemination as another part of the globalisation progression, social movements in different nation-states can and do easily link up and share experiences, coordinate campaigns and develop alternatives.

> An environment in which a company official can face immediate unfavourable publicity in America and Europe because of actions in Africa, offers considerable scope for activists.[12]

This has benefited many of the new social movements in South Africa, and all of the case studies have created international links and give and receive support from activists and organisations in other countries. Internationalism is a part of their strategies as well as their ideologies, diverse as they are. The researcher and activist Richard Pithouse writes that

> A global counter-project is needed against the globalising mania of imperialism and capital. We must nurture the many genuine acts of trans-national solidarity that occur, and seek to generate others.[13]

However, as Pithouse recognises, international support and alliances must be approached with some care, as there are differences in power and influence between activists and organisations separated by the North-South divide. Internal tensions can arise as resources start to flow from better-resourced Northern movements to the poorer ones in the South, and it should be understood that "the bulk" of the Northern left "has ultimately made deals with its own bourgeoisies to secure a better deal from global domination for its working classes".[14] Thus, the movements in the South, Pithouse advises, should "secure organisationally and ideologically autonomous positions in the trans-national movement of movements against millennial capitalism and push them to become more genuinely global."[15] The access to resources made possible through links with Northern movements and NGOs can create tensions in Southern movements, and there have been instances where individual activists in South Africa have used links and opportunities connected to their Northern contacts to further their personal standing and reputation rather than the aims of the organisation. To avoid this from happening, thorough democratic and transparent procedures regarding the handling of international money and contacts must be put in place and stringently followed. The APF is mentioned as one organisation that is displaying "exemplary practices" in the management of international contacts, but these practices need to be replicated throughout the social movements. The international movements and organisations must also shoulder some responsibility and stop inviting individual activists for visits, and instead ask organisations to nominate their own representatives.[16]

Much of the social movement global contact is maintained via the internet and e-mail, and sustainable networks are built virtually. While these networks are not social movements in their own right, as they are less unified and integrated among the grassroots,[17] they are nevertheless an important part of the internationalism among the world's and South Africa's social movements. This international dimension and contact

exposes to some extent the disparity that exists between APF members in terms of access to resources. As a majority of APF members cannot access the technology used to maintain and create international contact on a regular basis, many activists are disadvantaged compared to the more well-resourced activists.[18]

The Internationalism of the TAC

The TAC is sensitive to the issue of domination and subordination within the global solidarity movement, and makes sure it asserts its independence vis-à-vis its international partners, and the organisation has overruled the preferences of its international allies by making compromises opposed by them, and one cross-national alliance fell apart due to strategic differences.[19]

> We are always careful in our contact with international organisations to stress that we are involving ourselves as equals and are not being told what to do.[20]

There is in the TAC a recognition that the world is not made up of equally financially powerful states and that the HIV/AIDS crisis risks exacerbating the inequalities between and within states. At the International AIDS Conference in Durban in July 2000, the TAC together with the Health Global Access Project (GAP) called for participation in a global march for HIV/AIDS treatment. Concentrating mainly on the poor countries in the world, TAC and GAP draws attention to the premature death of over 10 million people due to AIDS worldwide, and charges that the high prices on medication prevents poor people from accessing life-saving drugs.

> In the worst affected countries of the world AIDS will massively increase inequality and poverty, widening the gap between rich nations and poor nations, men and women, as well as rich and poor. People must be allowed to live healthy and productive lives.
>
> Access to treatment for people with HIV/AIDS is essential to promote social and economic development for all.[21]

In 2001, the TAC threw its weight behind the government's policy on the treatment of people living with HIV/AIDS, which among other things mentioned that decreased prices on drugs is a necessity for a roll-out of anti-retrovirals in the public health sector. Consultation with SADC Ministers of Industry and Trade, and Finance and Investment regarding the use of multilateral trade agreements, as well as negotiations with pharmaceutical companies to lower drug prices, are among some initiatives of the South African government, which maintained that

> ...the decision not to implement a large-scale antiretroviral programme in the public health sector is not an ideological stance. It is based on the fact that these drugs, at current prices, still remain unaffordable...[22]

The TAC stated its support for this policy and the government's struggle with the pharmaceutical industry, at the same time as it demanded that Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang accept the necessity of implementing the treatment plan based on generic anti-retrovirals. It also demanded that Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin use his powers to licence all necessary anti-retrovirals and diagnostics necessary for the fulfilment of such a plan, if necessary by issuing compulsory licences against drug companies to be able to manufacture generic ARVs.[23]

The issues of generic drug production and compulsory licences relate to some extent to international trade agreements, in this case the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS). In 1998, 39 pharmaceutical companies took the South African government to court for adopting a legal framework making it possible to import and produce cheap drugs in the case of an emergency situation. The law suit claimed that the TRIPS agreement was being violated. The TAC strongly condemned the pharmaceutical companies who through litigation delayed the implementation of the law and thus "protect their exorbitant profits at the expense of the lives of people with HIV/AIDS".[24] An international campaign started, with over 260 000 people from 130 different countries signing a petition which demanded that the pharmaceutical companies put people before profits.[25] The massive campaign led to the dropping of the case after four years and the

TAC thanked South African as well as international activists for ensuring the "historic victory of good over evil".[26]

Another international campaign that supported the TAC Civil Disobedience Campaign, implemented in 2003 to pressure the government to adopt a treatment plan for the public health care sector, saw demonstrators in Japan delivering 600 paper cranes to the South African embassy as symbols of the 600 daily deaths from AIDS in South Africa. In the Netherlands, 600 tulips were taken to the embassy; in Los Angeles, Washington DC, London and Milan, 600 shoes represented the dead. A united statement came from activists from all over Latin America, Kenyan doctors held a press conference, and other solidarity actions were planned in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Caribbean.[27] Clearly, the aims and objectives of this TAC campaign attracted the attention of activists from all over the world.

Two researchers estimate that TAC's most strategic allies are with international organisations and networks. The support it receives from abroad has led to two significant events: it put a lot of pressure on international pharmaceutical companies whose head offices abroad did not want the image of being seen as unsympathetic to poor people attached to them, and, second, it helped placing pressure on the South African government to roll-out ARVs.[28]

As the prices on drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS is an essential component for the success of the organisation's demands, international agreements and terms of trade are of importance for TAC's campaigns and focus. The TAC extended its solidarity to Brazil, which in 2001 came under pressure from the USA for having implemented a programme distributing free anti-retrovirals to people living with HIV/AIDS; the anti-retrovirals were generic and produced by the state. The US government laid a complaint against Brazil with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the TAC asked Foreign Minister Nkosazana Zuma to present a motion to the South African parliament pledging support for the Brazilian government. The TAC also encouraged parliament to demand that the

WTO drop the complaint.[29] Thus, while the TAC is not concentrating its campaigns on international events, international solidarity has proven an effective mechanism in its struggle for dignity and care for people living with HIV/AIDS.

The TAC is eager to strengthen a Pan-African network of HIV/AIDS activists by sharing its experiences and resources with organisations around Africa:

> There is an emotional bond between us. This country does owe a lot to others in Africa.[30]

This network is also engaging the Southern African development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), and has opened up important issues such as regional inequalities and how global trade regulation affects access to HIV/AIDS medication. While the South African trade negotiator Xavier Carrim is positively inclined towards TAC's experiences, the prospects for constructive relationships between activists and governments in the rest of Africa are to a large extent dependent on the level of democratisation. Kenya and Ghana show some optimistic signs that such cooperation is possible, according to the TAC's International Coordinator, making it "too pessimistic to say that activist-government co-operation is impossible" in the rest of the continent.[31]

Global Diversity

Giugni (2002) stresses that similar global processes can still lead to diverse movements, depending on the previous pattern of mobilisation and resistance. In some cases, the universalising forces of globalisation may lead to a reaction against homogenisation.[32] A South African activist considers the diversity in both demands and forms of struggle and organisation building processes a "key characteristic" of the global movement.[33] This diversity can be both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, it prevents the development of a hegemonic, universal ideology that subsumes all struggles under one theoretical framework. On the other, the global movement is so far fragmented,

concentrating mainly on national and local struggles without a holistic and unified approach to an alternative to the neo-liberal system the movement opposes.[34]

Waterman (2001) argues that globalisation "gives rise to democratic and pluralistic social movements which point to the possibility of meaningfully postmodern (i.e. post-capitalist, post-militarist, post-patriarchal, etc.) global alternatives beyond." However, not all movements of the globalising era are democratic, radical or pluralistic; movements resting on authoritarian, militaristic, apocalyptical structures are also emerging as a reaction to globalised capitalism and its effects.[35]

According to Amin (1993), these movements are "dead ends": "They are symptoms of the crisis, not solutions to it, and exclusively products of disillusionment."[36] The impact globalising forces and integration of the world economy has on popular mobilisation and the shaping of alternatives to increased commodification and transnationalism is not uniform, nor is there any certain outcome for the defiance. Nevertheless, the objectives of the radical, democratic social movements of the world are often similar enough for them to join forces. They are not necessarily united in their strategies and tactics, or even an outline of the society they wish to build, but they all agree that "another world is possible". This "Movement of Global Resistance"[37] consists of feminists, trade unionists, Marxists, Christians, environmentalists and a wide range of other activists. Worldwide, this movement exhibits a hostility to the IFIs, a commitment to participatory democracy and a resistance to commodification and militarism and war. Neo-liberalism – considered by some as the underlying ideology of globalisation[38] and accepted as such here – is rejected as a system.[39]

During these massive assemblies, the rejection of Francis Fukuyama's ominous 1989 End of History concept[40] is explicit, and the adopted slogans – 'No To War', 'Another World Is Possible', 'The World Is Not For Sale' – signals a discontinuity with the reigning neo-liberal world view, which is built upon the hegemony of private property and free markets. The approaches to democratic and economic life that are debated and broadly agreed on in the World and Regional Social Forums are not underlined by a unifying

ideology or tactical choices. They are "general principles, but if they are defended seriously, they have a deep subversive potential."[41] The anti-neo-liberal social movements of the world protest against the WTO, IMF and the WB on global level while contesting local authorities in their own countries and communities, and organisations such as APF and AEC are consciously one part of this movement and participate actively in both World and Regional Social Forums. An APF activist comments:

> While not yet a counter-hegemonic bloc, these movements present an international crisis of legitimacy for the capitalist forces[42]

The key issue for the global resistance movement today, according to two veteran activists, is democracy and its deepening.[43] Not only the representative structures are to be democratised, but there are important discussions on how to democratise the economy, production, the cultural and environmental aspects of living. There is within the movement no consensus as yet on how a deeper democracy will play itself out[44], but the debate is certainly present, and to include production and the economy as areas in need of popular democratic influence equals taking several steps away from the reigning liberal view of democracy. This emphasis on 'democratisation of life' is shared by the APF and the AEC, which attempt to place their demands for nationalisation and an end to privatisation and cost-recovery in the context of a neo-liberal world structure within which South Africa's national macro- and micro-economic policies are determined.

Taken as a whole, the new social movements of South Africa display the contradictory characteristics of being similar and different at the same time. The case studies – APF, AEC and TAC – were all formed in the context of a globalised world where the ANC government adopted neo-liberal policies matching a world-wide trend of de-regulated capital, commodification of basic services, introduction of more flexible labour laws, the opening up of borders and the outsourcing of the social responsibility of the state. Within this framework, communities began to organise themselves in order to alleviate the worst effects of the impact of these policies. All new movements are at this stage mainly concentrating on demanding basic services and the right to health in the form of anti-

retroviral treatment in the public health care sector, rather than a new democratic framework. Their target is state policies and democratic representatives, and while there is an acknowledgement of the fallacy of bourgeois democratic institutions, there is also a will to engage and challenge these structures both from the outside and from within.

The social movements of this study have all responded to the global interconnection by linking up with movements and organisations from other countries, both to seek international support for their local struggles, and to be a part of building an international movement based on their own principles. On an international level, APF cooperates with organisations such as War on Want, the Brazilian landless people's movement, MST, and the Indymedia network, and well-known individual international activists such as Naomi Klein.[45] In Phiri, Soweto, an intense struggle against water privatisation and the installation against pre-paid water meters has been waged for a few years by the APF. This campaign, which includes tactics such as destroying meters and illegally reconnecting disconnected water, has received worldwide support from activists and social movements all over the world. By 2003, over ten international organisations had pledged support to the APF's struggle against pre-paid water meters and adopted a Declaration Against Water Privatisation, which was a part of showing international solidarity and defend basic human rights, according to Penny Bright from the Water Pressure Group.[46]

The opposition to neo-liberalism is an important component of the democratic social movement globally, as well as in South Africa, and the theorists of the new social movements (to a large extent themselves movement activists) do see a clear link between the day-to-day struggles and the global and capitalist context, just like Amin (above) does. It is in this movement generally accepted that neo-liberalism is global and that the struggle against the neo-liberal order both is and needs to be global. One conceptualisation of the new South African social movements characterises their struggles as attempts to defy the homogenising impact of neo-liberalism, as the rule of the market turns all basic life necessities into commodities, and a culture conducive for capitalist accumulation is being introduced. By hitting at "the heart" of global capitalism

in South Africa, the local movements effectively becomes a part of the global anti-neo-liberal movement.[47] Another describes the social movements as the "cornerstone" in the opposition to the ANCs neo-liberal turn.[48] A third analyst and activist maintains that all social movements have in a broad, general manner accepted that the profit-drive of neo-liberalism is the cause of poverty and unemployment, but that within and between the movements there are differing degrees of understanding of the neo-liberal project, and therefore the movements have different strategies and objectives.[49]

The Internationalism of the APF and the AEC

An important part of APF's objectives is to participate in international activist forums, such as the World Social Forum. So far, five World Social Forums have been held. These five Forums, out of which four were held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and one in Mumbai, India, draw together thousands of environmentalists, feminists, Marxists, religious groups, trade unionists and other social activists. The World Social Forums are complemented by regional and sub-regional Forums held in the different continents. Three African Social Forums have been held, and in October 2005 the Southern African Social Forum took place in Zimbabwe, under the heading "People's Resistance to Neo-Liberalism". While the AEC sent one delegate to the Forum in Zimbabwe, APF sent several people and featured very prominently as speakers and panel discussion contributors.

The importance of the Forums, and especially the regional Forums, for the APF and its struggles was captured by Trevor Ngwane, then APF Organiser. The highlight of the Forum in Zimbabwe was the coming together of activists from the whole southern African region, which proved that it was possible to unite across borders and maybe even develop a common political programme against capitalism. United Forums such as this demonstrates the possibilities of struggle and shows that South Africa is not an isolated island. They broaden the views of the participating activists and open them up to the rest of Africa and the struggles taking place there.[50]

A working class united can never be defeated. We have come as the APF to Harare to meet with other comrades and movements from Southern Africa and other parts of the world... We have come to share our anger, our experiences and methods of struggle. We have come looking to build unity and solidarity among all the struggling masses of Africa and the world.[51]

reads an APF pamphlet handed out at the Southern African Social Forum, which emphasised the need for cross-border cooperation in combating capitalism and the social problems associated with it.

The AEC also has an internationalist outlook on its struggle. A recent protest by the AEC together with Jubilee South Africa, an organisation lobbying to cancel the apartheid debt, AEC picketed outside parliament to protest against the merger between ABSA and Barclays Bank, as Barclay Bank's Chief Executive Officer travelled to Cape Town. The merger is indicative of a globalised capitalism at play which does not benefit the poor and the working class and which must be "destroyed", alongside all other forms of capitalism.[52] "Obviously", the AEC's struggle is global as opposed to national and must include other movements around the world and solidarity actions and other forms of support must be shred globally, to counter the international capitalist institutions and structures:

...if we unite as the global working class, I think we'll make a change...[53]

The AEC was also involved in a coalition against the Iraqi war.[54]

Grounding Internationalism among the Rank-and-File

However, a former AEC activist in Mandela Park (MPAEC) makes an opposite claim about the importance international struggles had in that AEC branch.

> While a certain unity was emerging in the Mandela Park community, few 'insiders' saw themselves as part of a wider community of struggle. Struggles in Argentina, Mexico, Seattle, and so on, were abstract and distant. However, struggles in Mandela Park were immediate and concrete, and judging by the influx of 'outside' activists, were the most relevant struggles happening in Cape Town – and possibly South Africa – at the time.[55]

The attempts made in Mandela Park to discuss and learn from experiences of struggle in other countries, and even the struggles taking place in other AEC branches, were "largely unsuccessful". In August 2002, one MPAEC member went to Argentina to share ideas and information, but

> [t]he Argentinian trip was never reported back to the MPAEC or the WCAEC, so there was no way in which to discuss how to share their experiences, their learning, or how to build international solidarity.[56]

In other words, most of the existing analyses of the new social movements, and the analysis made by the leaders of the APF and the AEC, recognise that they are situated within a broad, neo-liberal framework determined by globalising forces, and that even local struggles within this framework have a place in the global hierarchical order. Many of the leaders of the case studies explicitly make clear the link between the local and the global in the objectives they have adopted and the alliances they maintain. However, it should be pointed out that the analysis of the community-based struggles as part of the broader struggle against global capitalism is not necessarily shared by all activists. While many leaders of social movements declare the struggle to be unequivocally anti-capitalist/anti-neo-liberalism and about replacing the representative state with popular participatory democratic structures, the rank-and-file of the movements might not participate in the struggle on that basis, but simply in order to secure a house, or get access to cheaper water and electricity.

If there is a disjuncture between leaders and rank-and-file in the MPAEC on how much emphasis should be put on the international struggle, that disjuncture also exists between 'insider' and 'outsider' activists, where the 'insiders' generally are considering their

struggle as a struggle for the attainment of basic services while the 'outsiders' are looking at Mandela Park as a model for a wide, maybe even global, struggle.[57]

Buhlungu (2004) comment that the APF and other social movements are inspired by global events and anti-globalisation struggles:

> As a result, movements such as the APF claim legitimacy, not only because they are fighting just struggles within their local areas and countries, but also because they are part of a global movement for justice in a world dominated by neo-liberal ideas.[58]

The TAC, APF and AEC are locally placed but globally connected movements that form part of a world-wide structure of struggle. This global connection and trends within the global social movement has the potential to impact upon the internal developments of these South African movements, as they are interlinked within a globalised system, where the exchange of ideas, concepts and ideologies are readily accessible. The future developments of these movements can to some extent be linked to developments in the global neo-liberal order and the global social movement.

Giugni has merged three theoretical models to explain why social movements in different countries tend to take on similar characteristics. Globalisation, while not having a direct impact on the similar structures, reactions and agendas of social movements, does facilitate a number of developments that impact on the perceptions and behaviour of social movement activists. To start with, similar transnational opportunities and constraints are created in an interlinked world, and this can have an impact on social movement reactions and activities. Second, globalisation creates institutional structural affinities in different countries, where political and security intervention tend to take on resembling characteristics in different countries, and the social movements in turn tend to adapt to their institutional opportunity structures in similar ways. Third, globalisation has intensified the diffusion of information and news across borders, making people in different parts of the world feel concern over the same issues.[59]

This, Giugni stresses, is only a "tentative and preliminary contribution" to the understanding of similarities among social movements in different countries.[60] While more research still needs to be done to explain the phenomena of similarities – and even differences – between social movements, there seems to be indications that locally and nationally based social movements are influenced by international and regional trends. For the case studies of this research, developments in the southern African region and the world at large, on official as well as on civil society levels, is one factor that can have a more or less pronounced impact on their ideologies, strategies and even tactics.

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[1] Smith, J. & Johnston, H. "Globalization and Resistance: An Introduction", in Smith, J. & Johnston, H. (eds.) Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., USA, 2002, p. 4

[2] 'Nation-states' are here differentiated from 'states', where 'nation-states' refers to the state apparatus, the citizenry and a demarcated area. The 'state' refers to the internal state apparatus headed by a government or other executive body.

[3] See for example Archibugi, D. "Cosmopolitical Democracy", New Left Review, 4, July-August, 2000; Tanzer, M. "Globalizing the Economy: The Influence of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank", Monthly Review, Vol. 47, No 4, September, 1995

[4] See for example Waterman, P. Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, Continuum, London, New York, 2001; 1999 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development – Globalization, Gender and Work, United Nations, New York, 1999; Monbiot, G. The Age of Consent – A Manifesto for a New World Order, Harper Perennial, Great Britain, 2004

[5] Wignaraja, P. "Rethinking Development and Democracy", in Wignaraja, P. (ed.) New Social Movements in the South – Empowering the People, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1993

[6] Amin, S. "Social Movements at the Periphery", in Wignaraja, P. (ed.) New Social Movements in the South – Empowering the People, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1993

[7] Ibid, p. 82

[8] Ibid, p. 91

[9] Kothari, R. "Masses, Classes and the State", in Wignaraja, P. (ed.) New Social Movements in the South – Empowering the People, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1993, p. 61

[10] McKinley, D. & Naidoo, P. "New Social Movements in South Africa: A Story in Creation", Development Update: Mobilising for Change – The Rise of New Social Movements in South Africa, vol. 5, No 2, INTERFUND, November, 2004, p. 14

[11] Ibid, pp. 14-15

[12] Friedman, S. & Mottiar, S. "A Moral to the Tale: The Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics of HIV/AIDS", abbreviated version, (A case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa), University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2004, p. 22

[13] Pithouse, R. "Solidarity, co-option and assimilation: The necessity, promises and pitfalls of global linkages for South African movements", Development Update: Mobilising for Change – The Rise of New Social Movements in South Africa, vol. 5, No 2, INTERFUND, November, 2004, p. 175

[14] Ibid, p. 174

[15] Ibid, p. 174

[16] Ibid, pp. 184-85

[17] Martin, G. "New Social Movements and Democracy", in Todd, M. J. & Taylor, G. (eds.) Democracy and Participation – Popular Protest and New Social Movements, Merlin Press, London, 2004, p. 46
[18] Buhlungu, S. "The Anti-Privatisation Forum: A Profile of a Post-Apartheid Social Movement", (A case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa), University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2004, p. 17
[19] Friedman, S. & Mottiar, S. 2004, op cit, p. 23
[20] Zackie Achmat, quoted in ibid, p. 23
[21] "Official call from the Treatment Action Campaign (South Africa) and the Health Global Access Project (GAP) Coalition: Global March for HIV/AIDS Treatment", The International AIDS Conference, Durban, 9 July, 2000 (www.tac.org.za)
[22] TAC Memorandum to Parliament, 12 February, 2001 (www.tac.org.za)
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] See also Hjort, L. "Sydafrika, HIV och läkemedelsbolagen", Oberoende, No. 4, 2004, pp. 30-32
[26] COSATU/TAC Joint Statement, 19 April, 2001 (siphiwe@cosatu.org.za)
[27] "International Solidarity Actions and TAC Civil Disobedience on 24 April 2003", TAC E-Newsletter, 22 April, 2003 (www.tac.org.za)
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[29] TAC Memorandum to Parliament, 2001, op cit.
[30] Njogu Morgan, quoted in Friedman, S. & Mottiar, S. 2004, op cit, p. 23
[31] Njogu Morgan, quoted in ibid, p. 23
[32] Giugni. M. G. "Explaining Cross-National Similarities among Social Movements", in Smith, J. & Johnston, H. (eds.) Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, USA, 2002, p. 17
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[34] "For Struggles, Global and National", Samir Amin interviewed by V. Sridhar in Sen, J. et al (eds.) World Social Forum: Challenging Empires, the Viveka Foundation, January, 2004, p. 5
[35] Waterman, P. 2001, op. cit. pp. 210-11
[36] Amin, S. (1993), op cit, p. 87
[37] Löwy, M. "Towards a New International?", in Sen, J. et al (eds.) World Social Forum: Challenging Empires, the Viveka Foundation, January, 2004, p. 22
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[39] Löwy, M. 2004, op cit; "Under a Tree in Porto Alegre: Democracy in its Most Radical Sense." Thomas Ponniah and William Fisher interviewed by Solana Larsen, in Sen, J. et al (eds.), 2004, op cit
[40] Fukuyama, F. "The End of History?", The National Interest, Summer, 1989
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[42] Benjamin, N. 2004, op cit, p. 74
[43] "Under a Tree in Porto Alegre: Democracy in its Most Radical Sense." Thomas Ponniah and William Fisher interviewed by Solana Larsen, in Sen, J. et al (eds.), 2004, op cit.
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[45] Interview with Prishani Naidoo, Founding Member and Member of the Research Sub-Committee, APF, Johannesburg, 1 July, 2005
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[47] McKinley, D. & Naidoo, P. 2004, op cit, pp. 16, 19
[48] Desai, A., 2004, op cit, p. 68
[49] Benjamin, N. 2004, op cit, p. 75
[50] Interview with Trevor Ngwane, Organiser, APF, Harare, Zimbabwe, 13-15 October, 2005
[51] "Who are we?", APF pamphlet, October, 2005
[52] Interview with Fonky Goboza, Provincial Deputy Secretary, Western Cape AEC, Cape Town, 21 September, 2005
[53] Ibid.

[54] Legassick, M. "Ten Years of Freedom: The Case of Mandela Park, Khayelitsha", University of the Western Cape, March, 2004, p. 30
[55] Pointer, R. "Questioning the Representation of South Africa's 'New Social Movements': A Case Study of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign", Journal of Asian and African Studies, 39 (4), 2004, p. 283
[56] Ibid, p. 283
[57] Ibid, p. 274
[58] Buhlungu, S. 2004, op cit, p. 20
[59] Giugni. M. G. 2002, op cit, pp. 20-21, 26-27
[60] Ibid, p. 26

The Struggles

The struggles of the new social movements of South Africa are multi-faceted. They vary in tactics, aims, objectives and political orientation. As the organisations have developed, in terms of membership numbers, changes in locations and constituencies, so have their objectives evolved; neither goals nor tactics are fixed. This is a typical feature of social movements: strategies and programmes are advanced in order to mobilise more people; sometimes a movement begin with a broad programme, only to narrow it down to a few core issues; ideologies of movements change:

> Neither of these components are a priori and static. They evolve. They get changed in the course of the movement. They are in a rudimentary form in some movements and fairly well developed in others.[1]

The Anti-Privatisation Forum (Gauteng)

The original objectives of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) were – as the name indicates – to oppose privatisation in its various forms. The planned privatisation schemes of the University of the Witwatersrand and the Johannesburg Municipal Council were the direct incentive for the formation of this network. Though a more ideologically coherent approach to struggle has developed only in the later stages of its existence, the initial foundational ideology was nevertheless wide-ranging and the immediate objectives were based on longer-term ones. If the short term aim was to stop privatisation plans of key institutions and basic services in Gauteng, the long-term goals were to demonstrate the real possibility of an alternative to the neo-liberal ideology and privatisation as one of its manifestations.[2] One and a half year after its inception, the APF explained:

> The APF's role is to unite struggles against privatisation in the workplace and community. It is open to any organisation or individual opposed to privatisation. The APF links workers' struggles for a living wage and

jobs with community struggles for housing, water, electricity and fair rates and taxes…It provides a forum for communities and workers to share their experiences and strategise collectively.[3]

The original demands included:

- An end to all privatisation programmes and the return of all privatised services and assets to the public sector, including outsourced and corporatised services
- The immediate end and reversal of retrenchments that are the inevitable result of privatisation
- The election of local government candidates who stand on anti-privatisation platforms
- The free supply of 50 litres of water per person per day
- The free supply of the minimum amount of electricity needed for health, hygiene, cooking and heating
- Introduction of a progressive block tariff system where free lifeline services for the poor are subsidised by the rich
- Scrapping of arrears of the poor
- An end to rent evictions and the attachment of household goods
- An end to water and electricity cut-offs
- An increase in the subsidy from national to local government
- The repudiation of the apartheid debt[4]

The short-term goals are considered to be of a more defensive nature, like the prevention of state actions such as evictions and the installation of pre-paid water meters, and these defensive actions are considered as "communities defending themselves" against the state.[5] Privatisation is regarded as a major impediment to the affordable delivery of basic services, and as such the issue of delivery cannot be separated from the issue of privatisation. There is also a clear class bias both in terms of the membership and constituencies of the APF, where the 'poor' or the 'working class' are the people losing out through the privatisation process.

In terms of their short-term objectives, the APF wants to see a situation where there is a delivery of basic services to the working class and the poor people. Basic services like water, electricity, sanitation and also that people have a level of income – so in that sense that's the main objective in the short term, to ensure that there is delivery of basic services to poor people.[6]

There is general agreement among some of the leading members in the APF that the short-term and the long-term visions and objectives are closely linked. The issue of privatisation and payment for basic services and education is linked to the commodification of basic life, and later in the development of the APF, the need for affordable basic services have come to be connected to the decisively long-term vision of a socialist society.[7]

As affiliated community-based organisations have a lot of space to decide upon their own campaigns and approaches to struggle, different branches of the APF also have different ideological priorities. In the Vaal, for instance, the issue of popular education and democratic governance hold an important position in the hierarchy of aims and objectives.

Our aim, actually, because we are aware that most of the people, really, they are being oppressed as of their rights, don't know their rights, you see. So our first project was to make sure that people become aware of their rights…So now we really talk about democracy in the country but it is difficult for us, it's not easy actually to democratise the society if, you know, a large section of the society [is] illiterate…So that's…what we focused on there, to say, no, we need to make sure that at least people become literate in terms of other things, knowing their right, so that's where we focused.[8]

The long-term objective, according to Thandekile Dodo, Regional Coordinator of the Vaal branch of the APF, is social, economic and political liberation through the destruction of the "capitalist framework", and information is an important tool to reach liberation:

That's where now at least we believe that people socially, economically will be liberated if at least they participate and know this, are informed, [then] they are able to make informed decisions in terms of all the problems that actually affect them.[9]

The discussion of whether or not to declare the APF a socialist organisation started at an early stage in the Forum's existence, and socialism was adopted as guiding ideology in 2003:[10] "The vision of the APF is socialism. We call on all movements to explicitly reject capitalism and adopt a working class pro-poor policy in urban and rural struggles", states one recent APF pamphlet.[11] The APF Chairperson, John Appolis, states:

> APF has adopted socialism as...its key objective in the long-term, and it sees the struggle against capitalism as part of that process of achieving socialism – so the struggle for basic services is also a struggle against capitalist exploitation because the basic services are presently being delivered on a basis of profits, and APF wants to see that process being reversed, where...basic services are provided to satisfy the basic needs of the people.[12]

While socialism is on the agenda of the APF, and while members are not contesting the idea of socialism – there is also a number of smaller socialist organisations aligned to the structure as affiliates – there is nevertheless not one uniform understanding of what a socialist society will look like, and the APF does not have a clear programme or vision of a socialist future. The contestations around the issue of socialism concern the nature of such a system.[13] The Education Committee of the APF has, after some delay, started to organise workshops on socialism, as members felt the need to deepen their understanding of the theory and practice of the concept.[14] John Appolis sees the necessity to link everyday-demands with the broad structure of power inequalities as a process that will in itself introduce the question of socialism, which is important as there is a need for the Forum to clarify how the struggle for socialism relates to the everyday struggle for basic services.[15]

The role of the state and the relationship between the state and its citizenry is an important question, yet it also need to be further discussed and better understood within the APF, according to John Appolis. In much of the discourse used by members of the APF there is a clear indication of how the struggle is conceptualised and on which basis it is fought: the state is not considered the protector of poor communities but as the structure responsible for undermining their survival needs and socio-economic

development. Two activists of the APF comment in a research report on state repression of the new social movements that

> [t]he existing state, its institutionalised politics and its socio-economic policies are increasingly being seen, and treated, as a central target of a class struggle emanating from poor communities[16]

They continue to say that the state as "the organic repressive and ideological apparatuses of a class", is in South Africa controlled by the capitalist class, and will remain thus in the near future.[17] Another high-profile APF leader remarks:

> There is now a new state under the ticket of working class aspirations but there has been a betrayal and that is where the clash occurs. There is a capitalist state ruling in the name of the very working class it is smashing.[18]

However, the view of the capitalist state is not very well developed in the organisation. One of the key challenges for the APF and other (socialist) movements is to

> clearly understand the nature and the form of the ANC rule in South Africa, and that means that we need to pay more attention to local government – how it's functioning, how it's operating, its limitations, its constraints, national government, provincial government, how the state is using those institutions to exercise its rule – so that we can first of all understand them and see how we could utilise, engage, expose them.[19]

It is necessary to understand the nature of the capitalist state, to concretise the APF's own struggles and to concretely demonstrate the link between these and capitalism/capitalist neo-liberal policies. Once this happens, the struggle will become stronger and it will be easier for communities to expose the limitations of the government and pressurise it to meet their demands.[20]

The Anti-Eviction Campaign (Western Cape)

The Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) similarly started out as an organisation aiming to prevent certain state actions from taking place; in this case evictions. The short-term goals of the AEC are to thwart evictions and to mobilise communities into preventative action, and to reach an indefinite end to all evictions.[21] Resisting water and electricity cut-offs and claiming household goods as payment for arrears, was also a part of the early AEC struggles. The mobilisation against evictions in one of the most vocal and well-known affiliates of the AEC – Mandela Park in Khayelitsha – gained urgency as people were being evicted without valid notices or summons and had goods repossessed without warning. The police aggression that often accompanied the evictions "brutalised" people, and the lack of response and support from the traditional, ANC-aligned community organisations provided further impetus for the creation of an independent organisation to oppose the evictions, AEC leaders explain.[22] Importantly, the APF supported the formation of the AEC through amongst other things a workshop on the privatisation of basic services.[23] Other organisations the AEC partners with include Jubilee South Africa, the Landless People's Movement, and various local community based groups. One AEC leader says:

> Our struggle, it needs the combination of all of the social movements taking up the struggles, you know, and also organising in particular the working class even also within the trade unions themselves, because the ones that we have been dealing with specifically is SAMWU, NEHAWU and various other social movements.[24]

The general principles of the AEC include opposition to neo-liberalism, in South Africa embodied in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), and privatisation. The right to decent housing for all and basic services are other demands.[25] The AEC wants the municipality to publish a plan for the use of state-owned land and to stop selling off land to "big monopoly companies". Free quality education for all, a law that compels big companies and the state to stop evictions, and to make national and provincial housing waiting lists known to the communities, as the existing lists at the moment are not valid "because it's unknown to the communities", are more concrete demands the AEC is flagging.[26] The main demands at the moment, though, are housing for everyone, "irrespective of colour, race and creed" as well as the complete stop to

privatisation.[27] The longer term goals include a change in laws and a state with "real" representatives, not "imported" ones.[28] All these demands and objectives are interlinked with each other, and the AEC has, like the APF, developed a holistic approach to struggle.

> ...all people should have housing, they must also have health services, they must also have roads, they must also have education, they must all have an integrated approach [to] all of these things, so these demands are just an integration of the whole community living in good social conditions.[29]

The expansion of objectives and struggle areas of the AEC came about as the organisation itself expanded. As more communities came on board, more issues entered the organisation: some communities suffered more from water cut-offs, other from high school fees, other wanted access to social grants.

> So in the beginning it was just stopping evictions, stopping water cut-offs, but as more communities became involved, more issues came on board, but even though there are millions of issues there is still one result, and that is unemployment, payment for health care, exclusions because of school fees, evictions because of non-payment or cannot pay, water cut-offs because of the same thing, repossessions because of the same thing – so all of these things bring one issue to the fore and that is poverty...The fact that people cannot afford to live has been brought to the front of issues.[30]

The AEC has started to link the everyday issues communities organise around to the economy on local, provincial, national and finally global levels, to demonstrate how the system is interconnected and integrated.[31]

The development and additions of issues onto the AEC's agenda have led Fonky Goboza, Provincial Deputy Secretary of the Western Cape AEC, to declare the organisation "a fully fledged social movement"[32] which, among other things, in 2003 established a secondary school for pupils who were unable to study in other schools due to high school fees or the age restriction for mature school pupils. 1 800 pupils studied with the school, with 28 unemployed teachers teaching on a voluntary basis.[33]

In June 2005, the AEC, together with the organisation Socialist Alternative, published some comprehensive demands:

- Abolish the bucket system immediately!
- Introduce legislation to stop evictions by banks and the state.
- Against privatisation of water and electricity – no to pre-paid meters!
- A flat rate of R10 for rent and services – we will pay what we can afford to pay.
- 12kl of free water per month.
- Transparent allocation of housing – publish the waiting lists!
- Public officials to be accountable.
- For a massive programme of public works to build houses and employ the unemployed!
- Local community involvement in approving plans for minimum social standards in all new housing projects.
- Nationalise the big banks and monopolies under democratic workers' control and management.
- Form a mass workers' party.[34]

Since the ANC has "joined in wedlock with the capitalist class", there is little chance that its government will implement the above programme. Therefore, the rank-and-file of COSATU and the South African Communist party (SACP) need to break away from the Alliance and create a new mass workers' party together with social movements.[35]

The anger and frustration with the ANC-led state, on national, provincial and local levels, is marked within the AEC, and it views the state as a state of the 'capitalists', not of 'the people'. The Campaign claims to represent poor people and the working class, two terms that are not necessarily interchangeable in the vocabulary of the AEC leaders. While the working class is seen as an important component of the struggle, and while it is acknowledged that the working class also suffers from evictions and lack of access to basic services, the working class consists, in one leader's terminology, of salaried people and is thus considered as separate from pensioners and unemployed people without an

income (except small state grants). In order to simplify the terminology and make the concepts more accessible to ordinary people, the concept of the working class has been substituted for the term 'the poor'.[36]

The state is perceived as a structure that "victimises" poor people and its privatisation policies are a "social crime".[37] The ANC government is accused of putting profits before people and imposing "neo-liberal violence" onto the poor and the working class and making the rich richer and the poor poorer.[38] The state, on all levels, uses the poverty of people to avoid its delivery responsibility, for example when it comes to the bucket system, which is still in use in many parts of the country:

> [b]ecause they know that's why people cannot afford to take the state to the constitutional court – they take that advantage because those are the poor communities and working class communities.[39]

Nevertheless, the state is a structure to engage with, which is what the AEC has done, both in its tactics and in its discourse. For instance, there is an unambiguous expectation that a democratic state is responsible for service delivery, and the Constitution is supposed to pave the way for service delivery to actually take place. The problem of service deprivation, as presented by the AEC, emanates from a state captured by the capitalist class and that is reneging on its social responsibility and leaves "the poorest of the poor" still destitute. The class character of the state is the determinant, not the state structure itself.

The AEC has, like the APF, adopted socialism as an official ideology, and it is unequivocally anti-capitalist and pro-poor/working class. In discussions with leading AEC members socialism is not a commonly used term; 'anti-capitalism' and 'anti-neo-liberalism' seem more often to be the preferred terms, though the slogan "Phambili Socialism!" (Forward to Socialism!) is used on occasion.[40] There is also a close, albeit informal, cooperation between the AEC – mainly the Mandela Park branch – and the group Socialist Alternative, which is a Trotskyite group that emerged out of the Marxist Workers' Tendency, operating inside the ANC since the 1970s. While not belonging formally to any International, Socialist Alternative is in close contact with the Labours'

Militant Voice of California. The group's central theme is the call for the formation of a mass workers' party by COSATU, which should split from the Tripartite Alliance.[41] This cooperation is expressed through membership in the Socialist Alternative by a few AEC members and the creation of the pamphlet ""We cry for homes": The Western Cape needs decent housing for all!" as well as joint youth workshops around issues such as socialism and the functioning of the capitalist system that have taken place over a period of about two years, mainly in Khayelitsha. Socialist Alternative and the Khayelitsha AEC cooperate on most campaigns and activities.[42] Martin Legassick, Political Advisor and Educator of the Mandela Park AEC, belongs to Socialist Alternative and speaks about the socialist consciousness that exists in the Mandela Park AEC affiliate.

> ...there is also a strong consciousness of neo-liberalism there and also of socialism. I mean, for example, you know the song "I Am A Socialist" – at the mass meetings, that is sung and everybody sings it, you know, very loudly. So they regard themselves as wanting a society based on, not on profit.[43]

On the question of whether there are gaps in consciousness between the leadership and the rank-and-file in terms of this socialist consciousness, Martin Legassick responds:

> There are gaps in knowledge, but there isn't a gap in fundamental ideas. I mean, everybody will be critical of privatisation, of neo-liberalism, for example. But some people may be able to articulate the reasons for that better than others or have more facts...but I mean, I think there's a common consciousness about that.[44]

The Treatment Action Campaign (National)

The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) was formed to build popular and state support for the prevention of new HIV/AIDS infections, for affordable and accessible treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS, and to stop stigmatisation of individuals living with the virus. Starting out as a small group of people demanding medical treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS, the TAC has since branched out in both membership numbers and objectives. Arguably the best known and most popular social movement in contemporary

South Africa, the TAC mobilises thousands of people to its marches and receives support from important international organisations such as the UNAIDS. The goals of TAC are generally based on single-issue, immediate needs, which the TAC has tried to forward through a number of campaigns.

The stated aims and objectives of TAC are to:

- Campaign for affordable treatment for all people living with HIV/AIDS.
- Campaign for and support the prevention and elimination of all new HIV infections.
- Challenge any barrier or obstacle limiting access to treatment of HIV/AIDS in the public and private health care sector.
- Campaign for access to affordable and quality access to health care for all people in South Africa.
- Promote and sponsor legislation for equal access to social services and equal treatment of all people living with HIV/AIDS.
- Fight for treatment for pregnant women living with HIV to reduce the number of infected children.
- Teach ourselves and others about HIV/AIDS treatment.
- Teach people with HIV how to live healthier lives.
- Campaign for an effective regional and global network comprising of organisations with similar aims and objectives.
- Train a leadership of people living with HIV.[45]

The campaign for a comprehensive treatment plan – the Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa ('the Operational Plan'), adopted by the government in November 2003 – was one major victory for this social movement. The Operational Plan lays down directions for the roll-out of antiretroviral medicines, the hiring of more health care workers, the intensification of prevention programmes, the voluntary counselling and testing, and better nutrition for people living with HIV/AIDS.[46] It is directed towards the public health sector, where 42

000 people are accessing anti-retroviral treatment (according to figures from March 2005). This is compared to the number of patients treated in the private health care sector, where 45 000 received treatment in October 2004.[47] The goal of the Operational Plan was to treat over 200 000 people by the end of March 2006.[48] Being far away from that goal, TAC has taken the campaign for a Comprehensive Plan forward to demand that government treat at least 200 000 people by 2006.

Many of TAC's campaigns have revolved around short-term goals with clear indicators of success or failure, such as implementing the Operational Plan, increasing the number of people on treatment, as well as the early campaigns to roll-out drugs to prevent mother-to-child-transmissions (MTCT) of HIV/AIDS, and campaigns against the multi-national pharmaceuticals' monopoly over prices of drugs. The first campaign of the TAC was the MTCT programme, where the organisation demanded roll-out of medicines to minimise the risk for an unborn child of becoming infected by an HIV-positive mother. In 2001, TAC took the Minister of Health and the nine MECs for Health to the Constitutional Court to demand that the drug Nevirapine be made available to pregnant women in the public health care system and that government should implement a comprehensive national programme to prevent MTCT. The court ruling mandated that the national Minister of Health and MECs (except for the Western Cape province, which had already implemented an MTCT programme) were obliged to provide Nevirapine to HIV positive pregnant women giving birth in the public health care sector, and plans for an effective national programme to prevent or reduce MTCT of HIV had to be implemented.[49] At present there are about 1 500 maternity hospitals in the country that have implemented the MTCT programme.[50]

Much of TAC's efforts have been directed towards the pharmaceutical industry, to force manufacturers of anti-retroviral and other drugs used in treatment of HIV/AIDS to lower their prices. The Defiance Campaign of 2000-2001 saw TAC importing a generic anti-thrush drug –fluconazole – from Thailand as part of a campaign to expose the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer as a company that makes big profits out of people's bad health. The generic drug cost below R2 per capsule, while Pfizer was selling it for R30

per capsule to the South African state and at R80 to the private sector. After pressure from the TAC, Pfizer started to distribute the drug free of charge to state clinics. The TAC was also part of organising the massive, worldwide protest against 39 pharmaceutical companies that took the South African government to court to prevent the implementation of a law that circumscribed the TRIPS-related patent rights for some drugs, and the protests led eventually to the dropping of the case.[51] The TAC comments on its campaigns:

> One of the best ways to measure TAC's success is to look at the way the pharmaceutical industry has responded. When we were established drug companies insisted that they were already charging the lowest possible prices for their products in developing countries. Two years later the growing international outrage over the lack of access to AIDS drugs has sent the industry into a panic. Suddenly new and larger discounts are being announced almost weekly.[52]

The organisation has long-term goals for both its internal structure and for society at large. A recently adopted goal – resolved at TAC's 3rd National Congress held in Cape Town in September 2005 – is to increase the number of women and people living with HIV/AIDS in leadership positions in the organisation.[53] Long-term goals relating to society as a whole include ensuring access to better health care services in a unified health care sector.[54] The public health care system is crumbling and is being further depleted by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the TAC has recognised that the introduction of a general roll-out of anti-retrovirals in the public health care sector make up an extra workload for health care workers. With more resources, lives of people living with HIV/AIDS can be saved and improved.[55]

At the moment, there are two health care sectors, one public and one private. But whereas the private sector only caters for a small number of people and the public provides care for the bulk of South Africans, both sectors benefit from state expenditure. The goal is to have one health sector financed by the state which all South Africans can access equally,[56] and the aim of a better health care sector is intimately linked to the aim of providing quality and equal care for all people living with HIV/AIDS.

Recently, the TAC joined forces with COSATU, the South African Council of Churches, the Economic Justice Network, various NGOs and other social organisations to form the Save Jobs Coalition in Cape Town. The rationale behind this move was that the struggle against unemployment, poverty, lack of housing and basic services are all interlinked, and that the struggle against HIV/AIDS and for a quality health care system cannot be isolated from other struggles.[57]

The creation of stable jobs is fundamental not only for the South African economy to flourish, but also to manage and prevent the rate of HIV infections. The effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic are severely felt by unemployed people living with HIV. Besides the "constant insecurity" of where the next meal will come from, unemployed people living with HIV/AIDS cannot access adequate medical treatment or afford to buy life-saving medication.[58] The Save Jobs Coalition is particularly concerned with the deteriorating textile and clothing industry. The imports of textiles mainly from China has sent the South African textile and clothing manufacturing industry into a serious slump, which has caused the retrenchment of thousands of people. Nevertheless, the TAC supports free trade as long as it is "fair", and speaks out against the competition with countries that do not respect basic labour rights, such as China.[59] It is the responsibility of the whole society to manage the unemployment problem, according to the TAC:

> TAC acknowledges that it is not only for workers to fight to save their jobs, but for civil society generally, including employers, schools and all religious and social groupings to help lobby government to set appropriate controls in place on the imports which destroy our local manufacturing industries.[60]

The 2005 National Congress of the TAC endorsed COSATU's call to urgently address high unemployment, the housing crisis and to introduce a Basic Income Grant (BIG), as poverty, unemployment and other social problems are some important factors behind the spread of HIV.[61] The struggle for service delivery in poor communities has also found its way onto TAC's agenda, as the issues of health care, water, electricity, sanitation and infrastructure are

> ...all linked to HIV – I mean, if you don't have access to clean water it's sometimes difficult even to take your anti-retrovirals – so, if for example you are sick and roads are not well maintained, it would be difficult for ambulances to access the patient...[62]

Thus, the campaigns against unemployment and for a unified health care sector are part of the broadening of TAC's initial focus. Still, the focal point of TAC's campaigns is not as broad as that of the APF and the AEC, which are attempting to bring in a holistic view of the struggle as interlinked with social forces both nationally and internationally in the capitalist global economy.

The TAC differs from the above movements in its approach to the state. Being highly critical of certain representatives of the state, more especially President Thabo Mbeki and the Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, the TAC nevertheless enters into close working relationships with the various arms of the state where possible. In the early stages of TAC's existence, the organisation had an amicable relationship with then Minister of Health, Nkosazana Zuma, which included the issuing of a joint statement to declare their intention to work together in the struggle against HIV/AIDS.[63] The TAC has also participated in formal deliberating corporatist structures such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC).[64] Gwede Mantashe, General Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), is pleased with TAC's approach to state engagement, and sees the organisation as one social movement COSATU is prepared to work with, as opposed to social movements that are "narrow, sectarian and divisive in their overall strategy":

> The Treatment Action Campaign has co-operated with Cosatu in all its campaigns. It has allowed the process of engagement to translate into free flow of ideas. Critical to their strategy is the preparedness to engage everybody, including the ANC-led government, even when there are disagreements. In our view such a formation is critical of government when it should be. But the orientation is to change society not just to define it. This is the kind of social movement we will work with.[65]

Nevertheless, TAC has, like APF and AEC, expectations of the democratic government to deliver, and its critique is similarly directed at the failure of the state to cater for people living with HIV/AIDS in a way that saves lives. Class issues are much less pronounced in

the TAC than in the other case studies, and while it is often acknowledged that "[t]he people who die lonely and miserable deaths are mostly, but not only, poor and black"[66], the characterisation of the state is not based on a class analysis. While the TAC is not against the profits of multi-national pharmaceuticals, unless the profit margin makes it impossible for poor people to access drugs[67], the profit motive is seen as one of the fundamental causes of poverty and inequality in South Africa and the world by APF and AEC.

For the TAC, the sectors and individuals in the state machinery that are perceived as responsive and sympathetic to TAC and its demands are appreciated and cooperated with, as in the case of the previous Minister of Health, while the individuals and ministries seen as unresponsive are severely criticised and contested. Thus, the Western Cape provincial government is commended for its intervention in the MTCT programme and its early roll-out of anti-retrovirals, but the same structure is criticised for not taking strong enough action against Matthias Rath[68] (head of the Rath Foundation which is trying to promote its own vitamins as an alternative to anti-retrovirals as treatment for HIV/AIDS). President Thabo Mbeki is criticised for his denialist approach to AIDS – where he claims that HIV does not cause AIDS – and for his use of AIDS denialists as advisors, and the present Minister of Health, is severely lambasted and said to display "gross incompetence, neglect and disrespect for people living with HIV" in her handling of the implementation of the Operational Plan.[69]

The TAC is more inclined to work directly and in close collaboration with established state structures and government officials and representatives than the APF and the AEC and can thus be said to benefit more from the formal democracy that was established in 1994. The presumed reason for this difference will be debated in the analytical chapter below.

The Tactics

There is a range of tactics and approaches employed to carry out the task of building a more humane society, which is the most general description that encompasses the common objective of all new social movements in South Africa, and there is also a difference in how the state and its structures and supporters are engaged. The APF and the AEC considers the ANC-led state to be driving the neo-liberal project and sees (a vaguely defined) socialism as the way forward. Other social movements, such as the Landless People's Movement (LPM) has developed close links and had joint campaigns with the Alliance-partner the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the TAC could consider an alliance with the ANC if that would benefit the struggle for the provision of cheap generic anti-retrovirals. One social movement activist comments:

> These are not merely tactical differences, but rather reflect the lack of a unified perspective on how the neo-liberal project manifests itself in South Africa.[70]

Despite wide differences in alliance formation, ideology and societal analysis, many of the tactics used by these three social movements are nevertheless very similar. Occasionally, activists break the law in order to reach their immediate objectives or make a political statement. All three organisations also employ a wide array of tactics, ranging from civil disobedience and direct action to the use of courts and negotiations with state officials. Direct action methods are tactics that partly signify a social movement.

> Collective actions, which follow the path of acquiescence for social mobility and change in status, are not treated as 'social movement'.[71]

The formations that pursue social transformation exclusively through legally valid institutionalised means are not part of the social movement category. While such tactics can be employed by social movements, their very identity is to a large extent built upon the use of extra-statal, direct action methods that are often deemed illegal in the eyes of the state.[72] All three case studies of this research use a mixture of institutionalised and

extra-parliamentary tactics, as will be demonstrated below, fitting neatly into this characterisation of 'social movements'.

The TAC Tactics

The TAC started out as a tiny group of 15 people picketing and distributing a petition demanding that government develop and implement a treatment plan for people living with HIV/AIDS.[73] Since then, their tactics have involved demonstrations and various types of civil disobedience. The TAC is also making extensive use of the judiciary to reach its short-term goals. As was shown above, the TAC took the Minister of Health to the Constitutional Court to secure the MTCT programme. Recently, the movement applied for an interdict against Matthias Rath, to stop him from claiming that the TAC receives money from pharmaceutical companies until the trial against Rath for making false allegations starts (for details of this controversy, see next chapter).[74] The Christopher Moroka Defiance Campaign, named after a TAC volunteer who died in July 2000 from severe thrush, took a stand against profits on drugs and patent abuse. Parts of this campaign saw TAC members illegally importing a generic version of fluconazole, the drug used to treat symptoms such as thrush, in order to highlight the differences in price between patented and generic drugs.[75]

The TAC has worked through the state structures by making presentations to parliament on the issue of HIV/AIDS, and is thus engaging the state and government on a direct, integrated basis. However, sometimes the organisation's interaction with the state takes more activist forms. For instance, pressure was put on then Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, as early as 2001, to request compulsory licences – to break the monopoly of pharmaceutical patent holders over their products, such as ARVs – and provide the legal framework to allow for the development of generic ARV substitutes, and his office was occupied as part of TAC's civil disobedience campaign, which started in 2003.[76]

The Civil Disobedience Campaign, held in the spirit of the 1960 anti-apartheid civil disobedience campaigns, was launched on 20 March, 2003, to protest against the government's inaction in the face of 600 AIDS deaths every day and to demand "a real partnership that prevents new infections and saves lives" and an anti-retroviral treatment plan to be rolled out in the public sector.[77] The TAC declared:

> Today, we have a democratic and legitimate government of the people. Yet, today we are once again breaking the law. We accept our Constitution. We voted for this government, we accept its legitimacy and its laws.
>
> But we cannot accept its unjust policy on HIV/AIDS that is causing the deaths of more than 600 people every day. Today we break the law to end an unjust policy not an unjust government.[78]

One month later, a coordinated campaign consisting of the occupation of the offices of the Department of Health in Pretoria, the Department of Trade and Industry in Cape Town, marches and pickets in other cities, took place as part of a worldwide day of solidarity with the TAC to put pressure on government to implement a treatment plan.[79]

The AEC Tactics

The AEC also employs occupation of offices as one of its tactics and negotiation strategies, to get attention from officials and the public. In April 2001, hundreds of AEC members, supporters and community members staged a sit-in in the Khayelitsha municipal offices to protest against water and electricity cut-offs and to highlight their demand of a R10 flat rate for services per month. Their approach is sometimes labelled hostage takings, as stakeholders are not allowed to leave the negotiation room until an agreement has been reached.

> No one must leave the room up until we agree, so they usually call it – that's a hostage – but to us that's not a hostage, ja, it's ordinary negotiation.[80]

One example of such a 'hostage' situation can be found in the occupation of the offices of the National Building Society in 2002, where Khayelethu Homeloans was located. The managing director of Khaylethu Homeloans was not permitted to leave until agreement had been reached between the company and the AEC to hold a formal meeting to discuss if accumulated interest on home loans could be written off, as well as other concessions. This and other demands were conceded to and constituted one victory for the AEC, though it did not help people with loans in other banks.[81]

> We met with Khayalethu Home Loans in July. More than 200 of us sat in the whole day. When the boss finally appeared we showed him a videotape of conditions in the houses, and of our struggles. We told him to scratch the arrears and to drop the pries of houses. KHL agreed to scrap the arrears and promised to never again evict pensioners and the disabled. But NBS, Standard, First National are still arrogant and won't move on anything.[82]

Another, more spectacular, hostage taking took place in 2003 and involved a young police constable who was held by a small group of AEC members as a protest against the arrest of AEC leader Max Ntanyana. After a night of negotiations, the constable was released and four people arrested on charges of abduction, assault and pointing of a fire arm, police reported.[83]

The physical prevention of evictions and the moving back of evicted people into their homes are important strategies of the AEC that are direct and confrontational and often result in police intervention. It has been argued that the increasing state security interventions in the activities of the AEC, most prominently displayed in the Mandela Park affiliate, served to intensify and sharpen the tactics of the organisation, which became more aggressive in retaliation for the often violent methods employed by the police. One example of such aggressive tactics are incidents of stoning of commercial vehicles passing on the main road.[84]

Blockades of roads and other strategic public spaces are also frequently used, as is burning of tyres alongside roads. These high-profile public displays of anger and determination are at the same time a reflection of frustration and a calculated way to

attract attention from government representatives and create pressure.[85] Members and supporters of AEC have many times been taken to courts and charged for various law infringements, and even if the AEC sometimes uses the judicial system to secure rights, the law has often worked against this organisation. But the AEC has a broader view of legitimate struggles than the state has laid down, and argues that it is the state's policies that are illegitimate.

> ...we do everything and anything. Some lawful, some unlawful, some criminal in some people's eyes, even though we don't think so...we repossess repossessed land, houses...in the state's eyes it's criminal, but if you look at the issue and the history of the issue, then you'll see it's not so criminal – it's actually people wanting to protect what is theirs...[86]

However, meetings with officials are also part of AEC's tactics, that sometimes produce results. After a meeting with representatives of the Cape Town UniCity in 2002, all evictions and auctioning off of RDP houses in the area of Delft South were stopped. The Interim Income and Debt Manager said that "he did not fully understand the plight of the poverty stricken residents of Delft before the meeting", reported an AEC Coordinator.[87]

Demonstrations, mass meetings and pickets are other, more conventional, methods used by this movement. A recent mass meeting to demand Decent Housing For All – Now! drew together numerous community-based organisations to share experiences and unite around the burning issue of housing in the Western Cape. The mass meeting ended without sketching a way forward for the housing struggle, but it became clear that there is an abundance of socio-economic problems shared by various poor communities on a 'cross-racial' basis.[88]

The different tactics employed by the AEC have produced different outcomes. As shown above, it has happened that meetings and negotiations – with or without a hostage-like situation – have given positive results. By mid-2002, the evictions in Mandela Park had basically been halted by the officials, and the MPAEC takes credit for the cessation.[89]

The APF Tactics

The APF started off with mass actions and protests, but soon started to develop a range of creative and unusual means of struggle and protest that fitted into its ideological agenda. Attempts to directly stop private companies from carrying out implementation of measures to commodify basic services – such as pre-paid water and electricity meters – have achieved some success.

The Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), one of the APF's most well-known affiliates, took on the electricity provider ESKOM through the campaign Operation Khanyisa, which organised electricity reconnections where ESKOM cut off supply. Being part of a broader campaign that included community meetings, marches and demonstrations, Operation Khanyisa was "an innovative and radical tactic, which provided people with an escape from the logic of neo-liberal cost recovery":

> Khanyisa struck at the core of the social relations which enmeshed the provision of electricity: it was an act of defiance, which shifted power relations between residents and the government-owned electricity company…Through Khanyisa, reconnections were transformed from a criminal act into a political intervention.[90]

As pre-paid electricity meters were being implemented, the SECC began removing them and returned them to ESKOM and local government offices during marches and protests: "This is an important aspect of the SECC strategy and ensures that the act remains a collective and public event."[91]

Participatory democracy is an important principle of the APF and one way to realise this principle is to hold community mass meetings where different social issues are discussed and debated. General meetings, report-backs, workshops and mass meetings that involve whole communities are part of APF's structure.[92]

The APF has been part of supporting strikes and encouraged a consumer boycott against Shoprite/Checkers and OK supermarkets as the South African Commercial and Catering

Workers Union (SACCAWU) in October 2003 brought out thousands of workers in a strike against casualisation and labour flexibility. APF appealed to the public to

- Join and strengthen the picket lines outside Shoprite/Checkers and OK shops.
- Discuss the strike at meetings and build the strongest possible solidarity.
- Support the boycott of Shoprite/Checkers.[93]

In this way, the APF brought in workers' issues into their social movement-orientated political programme and designed tactics suitable for the particular protest. The various affiliates do differ on the issue of tactics and alliance building. To provide support for COSATU and workers' strikes and protests is a strategy not everyone in the APF agrees upon, with some affiliates, like the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, actively backing striking workers, while other affiliates are questioning the usefulness of supporting workers. The particular issue of the organised working class has been debated rather extensively in the APF and there is as yet no uniform agreement on the right approach. The differing views are predicated on notions of the COSATU membership as either a privileged group disinterested in the APF's struggles, or as an important constituency to win over, and the division over tactics is related to these strategic differences.[94]

Like the AEC, the APF uses different tactics to attract the attention and support of mainly local government representatives. In their newsletter, an APF writer questions the usefulness of peaceful marches when it comes to achieving the desired result. "All these marches were peaceful, but they never received satisfactory results. This is a clear indication that peaceful marches will not take us anywhere", comments the activist on the outcome of a few marches organised by the APF. The writer asks activists to look at the history of struggles in South Africa and compare the old tactics, such as long stay-aways and consumer boycotts, with the new ones in order to reach more effective results.[95]

In the interaction with communities, community development as a tool to uplift and motivate people is one important component of the work of APF and its affiliates and individual members. In the Vaal, APF members are active in the Tsebo Outreach

Programme, a project that mainly deals with educational rights in communities, and that introduces APF people and opinions to the broader community in an indirect way.[96] Working with youth through cultural activities such as drama, poetry and music, and enacting guerrilla theatre, are other means APF members use to draw attention to socio-political issues or educate and engage sections of the Vaal community.[97]

Direct Action: A Common Denominator

While the tactics of the AEC, and to some extent the APF, are generally more antagonistic than those used by the TAC, the tactic that unites these organisations is the one of initial attempts to dialogue and negotiation with the relevant state representatives before civil disobedience and direct action are being implemented. The civil disobedience is often used either to protest the dismissive attitude of officials or to attract their attention to issues that have long gone without consideration, and in many cases proper official invitations to representatives to attend meetings and discussions have been made before public action is taken. Direct action is, especially among the more ideologically driven movements, an important part of all activities:

> ...'direct action' appears to be the battle-cry of most social movements. Here 'direct action' means open confrontation with the state apparatus in its various forms as the most preferred method of struggle.[98]

Two leading APF members evaluate the tactics of social movements thus:

> [t]he red thread running through social movements in South Africa is their tactics. When members of the Anti Eviction Campaign in Cape Town mobilise to put people back into their homes, or when Khanyisa electricians reconnect electricity in Johannesburg, they challenge neo-liberal power relations. At their core, both tactics attempt to reverse the logic of neo-liberalism by limiting the market's power over people's lives.[99]

Another analysis reads:

Their demands reflect a desire for decommodification of the basic prerequisites of life, their methods of struggle privilege direct action and reappropriation, as in the case of reconnections of water and electricity, refusal to pay for rent, occupations of land.[100]

The tactics of many community organisations are also influenced by the response of the state. According to one survey on the nature of the interaction between the state and the new social movements, as the state fails to deliver on its responsibilities, and as it simultaneously closes down the space for negotiating policy, more antagonistic tactics are often adopted by the social movements. This, in turn, leads to more aggression on the part of the state.[101] The security and political intervention the social movements attract, and the consequences thereof, will be analysed in the following section.

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How Big is the Democratic Space?

The South African social movements analysed in this study have all had violent encounters with the coercive arm of the state during what they themselves label as legitimate expressions of discontent and democratic opposition. The police intervention of the democratic post-apartheid state in the struggles of civil society is a great concern for many leading activists and is often considered by them as a severe restriction of South Africa's democratic limits. According to the APF and the AEC, the reason behind the state's intervention in their activities, some of which are described below, is that they threaten capital accumulation and make demands that local, provincial and national government cannot or will not meet, and as such the intervention has a political and ideological basis.

According to Kothari (1993), the Third World state is under heavy influence of global capital, where the interventionist state has been replaced by 'markets' as the determinant of production and redistribution patterns. In states which have adopted this market-driven ideology, the welfare system is collapsing and resources tend to be directed into military rather than human development, in an increasingly militarised world.

Essentially, the Third World state has transformed from a channel of liberation to a means of oppression of 'the masses' and it is against this that 'the masses' are starting to organise.[1] Behind the state is a structure of corporate capitalism, but the state itself has also taken upon itself a new shape: that of "the corporate capitalist state", which is driven by specific groups of class, ethnic, technological and military actors, who set the stage for a confrontation between the upper and middle classes and 'the masses'. The Third World post-colonial state has degenerated into a technocratic structure that serves only a small group and keeps it in power through repression.[2]

> Today the state is seen to have betrayed the masses, as having become the prisoner of the dominant classes and their transnational patrons and having increasingly turned anti-people.[3]

This analysis resembles the analysis of the APF and the AEC, which have both concluded that the state in South Africa is firmly placed in the hands of capital – domestic and international – and as its main role is to ensure the continuation of capital accumulation, repression as a means to quell popular opposition to its policies is one tool that inevitably will be used, when necessary.

A theorist of social movements in India locates the state's tendency to attempt to suppress social movements not foremostly in its ideological orientation – both "capitalist" and "communist" states tend to apply force to oppositional social movements – but in the classical role given to the state:

> The immediate response of the state to all movements pressuring or challenging its authority is negative. The state assumes the responsibility of holding sovereign power, is the repository of wisdom for 'common good' and manages the public sphere...The state looks at social movements as a challenge to its legitimacy of governance.[4]

Whatever the basic rationale behind a state's intervention in civil society protests, there is an obvious tension between state and civil society that tends to play itself out between the policing/military branches of the state and the more radical social movements, as activists organise to pressure the state to take their interests into account.

The state's police and security branches consist of the police force, the military, the intelligence agency, and, in South Africa, is sometimes working in partnership with private security firms, often deployed to protect municipal or private housing and basic services projects that are occasionally attacked or obstructed by social movement activists. The courts and the legal system, deal with the legalities of social movement activism and meter out punishments for law infringements of direct action, and make rulings on constitutional rights. The courts inhabit an ambiguous position in the relationship between the movements and the state. While analysts of some social

movements consider the courts as an important part of the state's arsenal of means to control and impede the expressions of these movements[5], the TAC is making extensive use of courts to forward their aims. The victory secured as the Constitutional Court ordered the government to supply anti-retroviral medication to people in need is seen as a "breakthrough" which "forced the government's hand", to mention one example.[6] Here, the Constitutional Court is considered as an important asset for social movements to use to win their demands.

The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)

What is considered by activists as the state's hostility towards the popular mobilisation of the new social movements surfaced during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in August 2002 and is recalled by movement members as a 'watershed' in the recent history of state-social movement relations. The Social Movements Indaba (SMI), a network of which APF is an important part, organised a massive demonstration in conjunction with organisations such as the Landless People's Movement and the international landless peasants' movement Via Campesina. The march, one part of a series of protests during the WSSD, was intended to popularise the political and organisational objectives of the new social movements. These objectives included bringing together civil society formations from all over South Africa; bringing together the international and South African anti-globalisations movements; using the WSSD process to consolidate the new struggles and formations; expose the neo-liberal and imperialist agenda of the WSSD and the role of the South African government in forwarding that agenda.[7] While some activists objected to the intention to keep the march peaceful instead of 'storming' the proceedings, the main strategic line among the organisers was to prevent violent expressions of discontent:

> A strategy of frontal confrontation with the armed forces of the state, which is what the "shutting down of WSSD" implied, was inappropriate and not commensurate with the state of class struggle. For certain, it would have played into the hands of the South African state, which attempted throughout the WSSD to

portray the SMI as a violent and reactionary force. The storming of the WSSD would have provided the state with the political pretext to decapitate the new movements.[8]

Despite the peaceful intention – which was, as indicated above, politically and strategically motivated – the march was initially banned (though later unbanned), and in the days leading up to the 31 August – the date of the march – more than 150 activists were arrested and reportedly intimidated by state forces.[9] The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) got involved in trying to broker a deal between the SMI and the police force, and the SAPS attempted to make two parallel marches, the one led by the SMI, the other by ANC-aligned civil society organisations, merge and form one, big march.[10] The Chairperson of the APF commented:

> The police had a political mission to make it a one-sided contest in favour of the ANC[11].

The main march itself, moving from the township of Alexandra to the posh suburb of Sandton, was monitored by heavily armed police and military, including the redeployment of senior police officers from the former apartheid police force to lead the security operation.[12] A leading human rights activist, Yasmin Sooka, recalled how police and military personnel lined every part of the route and kept their guns pointed at the activists as they passed by.[13]

The mobilisation and police response that surrounded the WSSD exposed the division between the ANC/Tripartite Alliance on the one hand and the social movements unambiguously against the government's policies, on the other. In the end, two large marches took place: one under the banner of the SMI and its allies, and one led by organisations supportive of the ANC: the Civil Society (People's) Forum. The former march attracted some 25 000 people, the latter fewer than 5 000.[14] The division into two marches represented a "clear ideological and organisational divide" between South Africa's progressive movements, where the new social movements, according to one APF member, embody a "principled internationalism and the possibility of a non-capitalist future" and a desire to move beyond the narrow confines of bourgeois

representative democracy.[15] Another evaluation of the two marches states that, because of the size of the SMI march, it became

> clear that COSATU and the Alliance in general could no longer ignore the Social Movements. The movements had shown that they were a public political force in South Africa, and more importantly that they were capable of mobilisation.[16]

The SMI march thus represented the culmination of the growth and appeal of the new social movements, especially those around the Gauteng province; with the 31 August 2002 march it became clear that "[a] new mass movement came into existence".[17]

After the WSSD

The WSSD took place at a time when the new social movements had worked out a more comprehensive political perspective, and the occasion provided an opportunity to mobilise a large public against the neo-liberal policies of the ANC.[18] It also became an event that shaped the new social movements' attitude towards the state, and it provided

> ...further confirmation of the ever-narrowing space in the 'new' South Africa, for the exercise of the basic constitutional and human rights to freedom of expression and assembly. If it was not before, it should now be crystal clear that the South African government is hell-bent on smashing legitimate dissent by whatever means they deem appropriate...The ghosts of the South African past are returning with a vengeance.[19]

The period following the WSSD was one of "criminalisation of dissent", according to one activist[20], and social movements and community organisations were met with harsher restrictions on their opposition activities.

> If the WSSD is anything to go by, then South Africa has already entered a new phase of struggle, which will be waged mainly between activists and social movements on the one hand, and the state on the other.[21]

Thus, the state's security intervention was interpreted as a politically motivated attempt to quell and control opposition, and the use of former apartheid police personnel was considered a real provocation.

This phase also saw a stagnation in the development of the social movements of the SMI, in Gauteng and other provinces. The APF and AEC did not subsequently grow in terms of membership in any significant way, and the APF has experienced a high turnover of affiliates[22], and splits within the affiliates themselves have taken place. According to one analysis, there are several reasons for this, including political and organisational inflexibility, the under-representation of groups such as employed workers and students, and a limited range of tactics. Noteworthy, though, is the analysis that the state's intervention is one of the reasons behind the 'lull' that the social movements are undergoing at the moment.[23]

The civil society patchwork that makes up South Africa has changed drastically after the introduction of democracy.[24] While formal NGOs have received a space in the state's structures and have been officially recognised as partners in the areas of policy development and service delivery, community organisations have a rather different relationship to the state. The more informal, "survivalist" organisations and associations of the poor and marginalised are on the whole operating outside and independently of state structures. On the other hand, the organisations and networks most commonly labelled social movements – with clear structures, membership and leadership, as opposed to the more loosely organised community structures – have an "explicit relationship with the state". This relationship stretches between outright adversialism and engagement, and on occasion both.[25] According to the research by some activists, a significant part of the relationship between the state and these movements is the one of conflict, where the private sector, mainly in the form of private security firms, and the courts are important players in shaping the perception of the state as repressive in the eyes of several social movements:

> The local police, the council, and state service providers have come to represent for these communities the primary focus of social movement antagonism.[26]

This antagonism has seen more conflicts breaking out around the issue of service delivery, and the emergence of the new social movements has "profoundly altered the political landscape of South Africa".[27] Where the state considers it its duty to uphold law and order and prevent disruptive popular expressions, the movements demand the right to protest the way they see fit; this clash of interests and interpretation of what constitutes acceptable opposition methods runs like a red thread through the relationship between the state and the new social movements.

The AEC and the State

The AEC, and especially its Mandela Park branch in Khayelitsha, has been deeply affected by the state's intervention, and the attitude of especially the leaders towards the state has been shaped by the pressure from its policing and legal arms. The evictions that were the catalyst for the creation of the AEC in Mandela Park were exceptionally brutal from the start, according to the activists. Max Ntanyana, Acting Chairperson of the Khayelitsha AEC and Deputy Chairperson of the AEC Western Cape, and Fonky Goboza, Provincial Deputy Secretary, recall the beginning of the evictions:

> In September 1999 the sheriffs came to Mandela Park with dogs and teargas and guns…It was as if they were at war. They cordoned off one street at a time and started to evict people. The whole area came out, as well as neighbouring areas, to try and prevent the evictions…People were beaten with batons, shot at with rubber bullets and bitten by police dogs. Teargas blew everywhere. A lot of people were injured and it is lucky that no one was killed.[28]

The intensity of the evictions in turn created an intensity in community responses, and the AEC became the source of much concern for the local and regional government and the local police, which have tried with various means to control the activities of the organisation and its leading members. Max Ntanyana has personally been charged with various infringements 77 times since 2002, according to his own estimation.[29] He and

other AEC members have had 'stringent apartheid era-like' – in the words of one activist[30] – bail conditions imposed on them. Several MPAEC members have at times been prohibited from speaking or participating in mass meetings, from communicating with other members of the MPAEC and from preventing or encouraging prevention of evictions, to mention but a few impositions.[31] While the Mandela Park branch has been particularly hard hit by the legal constraints, members of other branches of the AEC have experienced similar bail conditions and house arrests, which they consider are means of both punishment and activity prevention.

According to McKinley & Veriava (2005), the relationship between the AEC and the state changed markedly when over 300 members of the Mandela Park AEC who protested outside the Western Cape provincial parliament were teargassed by police and 44 people were arrested for trespassing.[32] In June, 2002, the AEC had tried numerous times to meet with the Western Cape MEC for Housing, Nomatyala Hlangana, and invited her to meet with the AEC in Mandela Park, but in vain. As the MEC instead set up a meeting with the Alliance structures and SANCO in the area, the protest outside the provincial parliament was staged.

> ...police surrounded the building, sprayed teargas inside, and arrested 44 of us. Some of those arrested were pensioners and children. We were charged with trespassing – in a ministry of our elected government! Among our bail conditions were that we never appear in Wale Street![33]

The conflict between the community organisation and the local state and the private banks entered a stage of heightened conflict which has been described as a "low intensity war".[34] For these two researchers, it is clear that it was a deliberate choice on the part of the state and the private sector it cooperates with to go the confrontational route rather than to try to ameliorate the causes behind the organisation's resistance:

> The cumulative result of this co-ordinated assault on the MPAEC has been to caricature, criminalise and attempt to crush what was/is a genuine (collective and localised) community response to equally genuine post-apartheid socio-economic grievances.[35]

There is at least one report about MPAEC member stoning and burning several official vehicles, out of which at least one was transporting people. The incident caught the attention of the provincial legislature, where the ANC presented a statement, saying that

> It is clear that the anti-eviction campaign have become a gang of thugs posing as defenders of the people…There is no way we can allow this to continue. These are people who have no respect for freedom and democracy.[36]

The statement demanded that firm action had to be taken against those responsible and called for the cooperation with the community to solve the problems of payments.[37]

Between 2002 and 2003 the state and private banks, with extensive use of the courts, imposed restrictions upon MPAEC's activities, to stop the organisation from preventing evictions. A court interdict prohibited any MPAEC attempt to encourage and/or facilitate defiance against evictions, and the South African Police Service were granted wide powers of arrest and prevention of MPAEC activities; more than 100 court cases were brought against members of the MPAEC during this period. The Sheriff's Office started performing water and electricity cut-offs and was used to repossess household goods from people who were in arrears for bond and basic service payments.

A special police task team, which included the National Intelligence Agency, was set up to deal with the AEC. This task team, the movement says, did not approach the MPAEC as a democratic, open organisation but deployed secret informers to collect information about the organisation's activities, and there are testimonies of abductions, attempted bribery and intimidation used to extort information and co-operation from leading MPAEC members.[38] Community meetings held by the AEC are regularly attended by police under cover and NIA agents whose aims are to identify "leaders and funders" of the AEC[39]:

> We knew we were being watched, and men claiming to be from the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) had questioned [Max] Ntanyana…[40]

> Last week saw the arrest of one of our comrades, comrade Thumi. He disappeared for a day, and police would not say where he was. Apparently during this time he was offered R5000 if he would become a police spy within the AEC. He refused, and has now been charged with 'attempted murder'![41]

These accounts are found in journal articles, press statements and have been recounted in interviews with AEC activists, but no police records have been used, nor has police or intelligence personnel been interviewed for this research. These sources clearly convey the impression and perception these movements have of the state as a repressive apparatus that suspends constitutionally entrenched rights when it feels threatened, and this perception to some extent explains the motivating force behind much of the movement's activities and choices of tactics and strategies. It explains the development the AEC has gone through, from a group of organisations fighting defensive struggles to prevent evictions, to a network attempting to work out a coherent ideology that will rationalise its existence and reasons for protest, and that will provide guidance for the development of strategies and tactics. The obvious anti-statism of the AEC is partly derived from its clashes with police and security forces, and this tense relationship thus impacts on long-term political as well as immediate needs-based aims.

The AEC and its supporters are adamant that the arrests of large numbers of MPAEC members and protracted imprisonment of leaders are used as by the state to subdue struggle and undermine the organisation. They cite the arrests of the over 800 people in Mandela Park who have been arrested for trespassing, intimidation, public violence, as well as other minor infringements as evidence of state persecution. As the charges often are dropped without ever making it to court, they are considered as bogus charges made up to impede the building of legitimate opposition. There is a perception that much of the state's intervention is politically, as opposed to security, motivated.

The large number of arrests, violent police intervention with its concomitant aggressive responses from activists and community members, and the restrictive bail conditions of the Mandela Park AEC activists, possibly constitutes one of the "most bruising" conflicts played out between the state and a community in the post-apartheid era.[42] The uncompromising positions on both sides, based on irreconcilable interests, have caused a

lot of tension, which in turn seems to have cemented and further polarised the positions. The AEC's adversarial relationship to especially local and provincial government structures has influenced and continues to influence the ideology, strategies and tactics of the movement.

The strategy "of no negotiations, only arrests", as the Mandela Park AEC branch has labelled the policing intervention, is headed by the SACP Provincial Chairperson, Leonard Ramatlakane, who is also the Western Cape MEC for Safety and Security. This link to the SACP has led the disillusionment with the ANC to extend to SACP leaders as well, with people holding up posters during demonstration saying "Ramatlakane: "communist" who jails the people".[43] A letter from the Mandela Park AEC to leading SACP member Mazibuko Jara for issuing in the SACP publication *Umsebenzi* in 2003 said that

> ...the Housing Ministry has handed matters over to Ramatlakane to deal with, and his police methods are being supported by ANC councillors and SANCO leaders in Khayelitsha. There is complete insensitivity to traditions of protest and to the context of the so-called 'crime'...The SACP is seen as policing the working class – on behalf of the ANC.
>
> It is not an excuse to claim that Ramatlakane is an ANC minister not accountable to the Communist Party. As an SACP member, the SACP bears responsibility for his actions.[44]

This letter was never responded to by or published in *Umsebenzi*, which probably fuelled the disdain many AEC members feel towards ANC's junior partner, and as is indicated in this quote, all Alliance partners and Congress structures are considered antagonistic to the AEC. This conflict has left very little room for negotiation and has sharpened the AEC's view of the state structures. The view of AEC activists regarding the state's intervention is unambiguous:

> ...as a social movement, actually, we're faced with a massive brutal repression that was coming from the state, where even also most of our people could not attend meetings...I think we've inherited...the past apartheid era into the so-called new bourgeois democracy, which actually does not serve the interest of the working class. And also, the space that we've grappled...is the space that we've created ourselves because we've been resistant against...all forms of repression which the state implemented against us.[45]

The tense situation created internal problems. Internal democracy suffered and much energy was spent on finding and ousting *impimpis* (informers). Opposition to organisation leaders or the main political and/or strategic line became an excuse for labelling activists *impimpis* or NIA agents, and purging of critical activists took place.[46] As the MPAEC's tactics also became more violent, decision-making was concentrated in the hands of a smaller group, excluding the broader community as well as women. Where conflict and antagonism are territories traditionally associated with men, women tend to become secondary players in violent circumstances.[47] Court cases have taken up a lot of time and resources, and the strategies were forced into defensive and reactive mode at the cost of forward-looking planning, and core struggles had to be sacrificed for the task of collecting money for legal defence.[48]

> The paranoia about 'impimpis' must be understood in a context where the operation of the police seems arbitrarily violent...The Internal Complaints Directorate (ICD), which handles police brutality is massively overloaded, and there is no concerted effort by government to deal with this issue. In a country that claims to be so democratic, there seems to be few limits on the extent to which the NIA can interfere in politics.[49]

At the moment of writing, the conflict has subsided somewhat, mainly because the rate of evictions have decreased, but while AEC is still meting regularly as a provincial network the convening of an annual general meeting due to daily arrests and other forms of state interference had to be postponed, according to an activist.[50]

There is, in the interaction between the AEC and the provincial and local state structures, a competition over the notions of 'democracy' and 'legitimacy' and who has the right to define them. The AEC insists that the state's attitude towards it and its tactics is undemocratic and illegitimate, while the state's representatives insist that they are simply keeping and restoring order within a democratic framework by using established structures to undermine illegal activities. This contestation between social movements and the state over the notion of illegality and legitimacy is not novel to the South African context, but something that has been noted in other settings as well:

A particular action can be interpreted as illegal by those who are in authority or support the status quo; but the same action may be interpreted as legal by those who strive for social change.[51]

Thus, the conflict, often violent, between the AEC and the state is in essence a conflict over the definition of what constitutes a legitimate struggle, and what means are deemed legitimate in winning that struggle. The political representatives are adamant that

the law will take its course if people break it. There are legal procedures in this country and they apply to everyone. My position is still that anybody who is a legal owner of a house must be protected by the law. Nobody is going to stand up and start evicting rightful owners from their properties. My job is to ensure the rights of property owners are not infringed.[52]

The activists themselves say that it is the state which is waging terror on poor people:

The Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign arose in response to terror: the terror that poor communities face from the state, when people are evicted and the police and sheriffs move in to seize the meagre belongings of the poor. We say we must stand together to fight against terror, we must fight every attempt from the government to frighten us into submission![53]

The APF and the State

The APF reacted against the police and court intervention the AEC experienced, as well as against the attempts of the state to circumscribe organised oppositional activities, mainly through the much-debated proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill. The perception is that the state is trying to label all oppositional activities as terrorist acts in order to be able to legitimately deal harshly with the burgeoning community organisations springing up around the country.

The APF was subjected to harsh treatment by the police, before, during and after the WSSD as described above, but also during other protests, and their individual affiliates have suffered varying degrees of police brutality. While among leaders of the AEC there is a consensual view of the state as an actor starting to close down democratic space

through repression, the leaders of the APF are not uniformly in agreement that the post-apartheid state is a simple agent of repression serving the interests of capital accumulation. In the words of John Appolis, Chairperson of the APF:

> Ja, I think there is lots of political space for communities – for the APF to mobilise, organise and express their views and opinions...However, there are attempts on the part of the state to limit our capacity to what we call take to the streets, you know, to march, to demonstrate – you have to follow procedures before you can express yourself in the public...[A]nd sometimes, if they feel that your march or your protest does have some elements of security risk or public risk, then they could, say, ban it or not give permission. I mean, we had some instances of that, but on the whole I would not say that there is repressive conditions, and therefore we can't organise and mobilise our communities.[54]

On the other hand, there is also the perception that the APF is being consistently and specifically targeted by the police, and that some of the charges laid against APF activists are made up for the purpose of making the lives of activists more difficult to manage.

> You picket, you are getting arrested, you know – state repression is always there.[55]

There are reports coming from areas where APF's affiliates are waging intense struggles that activists are being targeted by police and the state's security agents. For example, in the township of Thembelihle, massive mobilisation of the community took place as resistance against forced removals of people for the purpose of building a shopping complex. The police began to target the leaders of the mobilisation and employed "consistent harassment", according to activist reports.[56]

In Phiri, Soweto, where the APF affiliate the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) is protesting against the commodification of electricity and water, an intense stand-off between police and private security and community activists started as the installation of pre-paid water meters began in 2003. The APF-initiated Coalition Against Water Privatisation – consisting of the SECC, APF and other civil society formations such as Jubilee South Africa, Ceasefire and the FXI – has had experiences similar to those of the AEC.

The company running water provision in Johannesburg is Johannesburg Water, a company owned by the city council but corporatised and managed by the French multi-national Suez. The attempts to prevent the installation of water meters have met with restrictions such as prohibition to enter the Johannesburg Water work sites for activists and a ban on participation in campaigns and other activities in Phiri. At the peak of activities, up to 50 personnel drawn from the SAPS, the Johannesburg Metro Police and private security firms were deployed around the workplaces of Johannesburg Water to maintain what they consider law and order. The community-based organisations, such as the APF and the SECC, opposing the project have been investigated by intelligence forces, and the activists are convinced this takes place for the sake of gathering information that could serve to their undermine opposition to the project.[57] The Council, on its part, comments that the project will not be stopped, and says that the community was consulted about it, thus it is legitimate.[58]

The APF also has a lot of cases brought against its members, though often these cases never make it to court. For instance, on Human Rights Day 2004, the APF staged a protest, despite it having been banned by the police, to highlight concerns over pre-paid water meters. This move led to the arrest of over 50 APF members, who were held in custody over night. The cases were later thrown out of court without appeal. The protest was planned to take place during the opening of the new Constitutional Court, an event of major importance for the government in establishing further democratic rights. APF is unequivocal in their analysis of the reason behind these arrests:

> ...the fact is that they just used it as a [preventative] measure to keep people out of the way, so it didn't matter that it got thrown out of court...[T]hey didn't want the embarrassment of having a protest like that – you know, at a time when they were now hailing the constitution.[59]

The police instead comments that the march was banned as the Forum had a reputation for damaging property, citing the movement's destruction of water meters and damage done to the Johannesburg Mayor's house as reasons behind the prohibition.[60] The arrests took place when APF members refused to disperse the illegal march.[61] The APF accused the government of denying them their constitutional rights and said that the police had no

legal right to ban the protest: "This was a politically motivated banning because the government was scared our protest would embarrass Mbeki and the bigwigs at Constitution Hill", commented APF Spokesperson Dale McKinley.[62]

The relationship to the police, more especially on local level, is strained in many ways, and includes the perceived unwillingness of the police to protect members of APF's various affiliates and take their cases seriously. A worker seeking the assistance of the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee (OWCC), one of APF's affiliates, to deal with a case of unfair dismissal was shot by unknown gunmen in her home in October 2003. The worker survived the shooting, which she suspected was orchestrated by her former employer. A case was lodged with the police, which were seen as being unconcerned about the investigation; events like this fuelled the perception that the police is biased against members of the APF and its affiliates. The year before, another OWCC member had been shot dead by unidentified people in her shack.[63]

> People are scared and this will just make activists more scared and prevent more people from fighting. It is sad that the fighters against apartheid have become the capitalists who need their money and property protected today. And that it is poor people who are the victims of their police and hired security firms and gunmen[64]

comments the APF in its newsletter regarding the incidents. Thus, there is a clear perception that although the police and the state are not directly involved in intimidation, threats and murder of activists, the local law and order institutions have little interest in cultivating an environment conducive for organisation and democratic opposition outside of the state's reach.

The TAC and the State

The public protests the TAC has organised have not been hit by police violence. The example of a Queenstown march, where on 12 July 2005, 40 TAC protestors were injured as police, reportedly without warning, opened fire with rubber bullets and attacked the

crowd with tear gas and batons during a peaceful protest to demand that the Frontier Hospital roll-out anti-retrovirals to people living with HIV/AIDS,[65] is an exception in the history of TAC protests. Nevertheless, the TAC took the incidence very seriously and organised a march in the same area, almost to weeks later on the 26 July, to demand treatment and "an end to police brutality".[66]

> It will show that TAC will not be intimidated by the police brutality of 12 July and our campaign for treatment at Frontier Hospital will not cease until people on the waiting list for antiretrovirals have access to them.[67]

Influential international organisations threw their weight behind TAC condemnation of police brutality. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) commented:

> UNAIDS has long supported and will continue to support the freedom of assembly and association for people living with HIV. It is imperative for people living with HIV to be able to openly share information about the disease, to learn about options for treatment and to advocate for better care – including access to life-saving treatment.[68]

Organisations from all over the world joined a long list of activists outraged by the incident, providing the TAC's indignation with a lot of legitimacy. There is a restriction on the democracy in South Africa, Thembeka Majali, TAC Western Cape Provincial Organiser, says, where the ANC government is unhappy with people using their constitutional rights such as marching, picketing and putting forward demands.[69] Still, the main view in the TAC is that the steady growth of TAC's marches since the beginning in 1998 proves that the democratic space as laid down in the Constitution is large enough to allow TAC and other organisations to present their demands and have their issues addressed.[70]

The police intervention in the 12 July march did not only breed negative outcomes, either. The planning for the 26 July protest against police violence and for treatment access included meetings with officials from the Eastern Cape Department of Health and

the Frontier Hospital, as well as the police. The positive news, reported in TAC's newsletter *Equal Treatment*, included the accreditation for ARV treatment of four hospitals in the Chris Hani District (which Queenstown falls under) and the establishment of a community forum at frontier Hospital, where TAC will be represented. On the 26 July march, a police officer addressed the protestors and made an official apology to the TAC for the police brutality the marchers were subjected to. A case has been opened for investigation with the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD).[71]

Although not a target for overt police force intervention in their activities, the TAC has nevertheless been subjected to state officials' attempts to discredit the organisation. Being some of President Thabo Mbeki's and Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang's harshest critics, the TAC has received its share of accusations. One example of the attempted vilification of the TAC and its principles is found in the, at the time of writing ongoing, case against the Matthias Rath Foundation. The Matthias Rath Foundation is accused of trying to undermine the government's Operational Plan (the background to this Plan is outlined in an earlier chapter) and roll-out of antiretroviral treatment by encouraging people living with HIV/AIDS in the township of Khayelitsha outside Cape Town to abandon ARVs – which are claimed to be toxic – in favour of vitamins which Matthias Rath, head of the Matthias Rath Foundation, claims can reverse the symptoms of AIDS. The vitamins – which are promoted in other countries as treatment against cancer and heart disease – are distributed through a clinical pilot study which does not have ethical approval, and the Foundation has been under investigation by the Medicines Control Council (MCC) since April 2005.[72]

The TAC has publicly condemned the activities of Matthias Rath and his Foundation. The organisation has asked the court for an interdict preventing Matthias Rath from claiming that the TAC is funded by pharmaceutical companies, and has sued him for making false allegations. A ruling is still pending in that case.[73] The TAC is simultaneously suing the Minister of Health for failing to stop Matthias Rath and his "illegal and dangerous" activities. The Minister is accused of supporting Matthias Rath, and this is considered is the reason behind her inaction in the case.

For TAC, this is an important case because it shows the Minister's support of unsubstantiated HIV denialist theories.[74]

Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang has stated that the Matthias Rath Foundation "are not undermining the government's position. If anything, they are supporting it."[75] Zwelinzima Vavi, General Secretary of COSATU, said at the TAC Third National Congress in 2005 that the government has failed to provide leadership for combating HIV/AIDS and this constitutes a betrayal. This speech made the Health Ministry accuse COSATU of being driven by "an anti-retroviral drug lobby group, the TAC".[76]

The Matthias Rath situation has demonstrated the opposition between TAC and the government's top officials and their respective approaches to the use of ARVs. The support for Matthias Rath from government officials is considered in and by itself a statement against the TAC and the legitimacy it has built up worldwide. The government's attitude towards TAC and its principles has led TAC Chairperson Zackie Achmat to speculate on whether the organisation is the target of a state-campaign to discredit the organisation.[77]

In an article published in the *Sowetan* in 2003, ANC Youth League Spokesperson Khulekani Ntshangase published an attack on the TAC, accusing the organisation of being a "harmless but very loud pressure group whose salaries are paid by Americans" led by "ultra-left fanatics" for the purpose of distributing "toxic drugs" and "mobilize people against the African National Congress Government".[78] Comparing TAC to the Cape Town-based vigilante group Pagad (People against gangsterism and drugs) which drew a lot of attention from the state and the media due to its violent actions, Ntshangase rather aggressively states that

> Pagad was destroyed so will be TAC!
> But how? The Government should investigate ways of arresting people such as those who campaign for the poisoning of our people. Those that mislead innocent people and those that have no respect for the poor and underdeveloped majority.[79]

In a brief preliminary comment, TAC Chairperson Zackie Achmat responded that the ANC Youth League

> ...has not represented youth. Instead it has been a mouthpiece of irrationality inside the ANC.[80]

In the case of the TAC, the state's hostility is mainly expressed on a discursive level, and no reports of NIA interference in TAC activities or accusations that arrests are used for the purpose of preventing mobilisation and organisation have been found in any TAC sources during the research for this thesis. The TAC is also receiving much support from Ministers and other state officials, demonstrating that the battle over ARVs is, to a large extent, waged by a few high level individuals who do not share the TAC's analysis of the HIV/AIDS crisis and not by a seemingly unified state structure.

Reasons Behind the State's Attitude

Why, then, is policing state intervention taking place to an extent that is noticeable in both scale and intensity, according to activists, and why is it perceived to be part of a political project to silence dissenting voices? The activists of the most radical new social movements have written and spoken extensively on the subject, and they would agree with the analysis which says that

> [t]he state is somewhat more soft with those movements which have reformist demands within the institutional framework than those movements which aim at overthrowing and replacing state power.[81]

This is possibly one of the reasons behind the difference in intensity with which the state approaches the new social movements' activities. As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, all three movements employ tactics that break laws, but the TAC is more open to engagement in the form of cooperation and mutual support with the Tripartite Alliance structures as well as the various government levels, than is the APF and the AEC. The TAC is pursuing a typically reformist vision, which

> does not challenge the political system per se. It attempts to bring about changes in relation between the parts of the system to make it more efficient, responsive and workable.[82]

On the other hand, APF activists say, the state is bent on quelling the activities of the APF because

> we are anti-privatisation, we are anti-capitalist. So that means, really, we are sort of...taking the...riches from them...'Cause remember, socialism isn't about distribution of poverty, it's about distribution of wealth, you see.[83]

Basically, the activists of APF maintain, the APF is an obstacle to the capitalist vision of the ANC, and therefore the organisation must be suppressed.[84] The recognition is that the class-based grievances that have led to the formation of organisations such as the APF and the AEC are definite and real, and the articulation of and organisation around these grievances by these groups have the potential to extend and intensify opposition, something the ANC and the government want to prevent.

The embrace of neo-liberalism by the ANC government and its resistance to any form of threat against this systemic order, is considered to be the underlying cause of escalated state repression. The state in post-apartheid South Africa is likewise considered to be a state captured by the capitalist class and used to serve its main purpose: securing capital accumulation. Repression in the name of protecting private property is one task of the capitalist state:

> The post-apartheid state is primarily the guardian and protector of these dominant economic interests and the guarantor of capitalist property relations.[85]

The capitalist democratic state in South Africa is, according to the social movement analysts and activists, failing to take responsibility for its citizens in terms of providing socio-economic stability and opportunity. For some of the social movement theorists, the state is incapable to fulfil this responsibility, as neo-liberalism by its nature restricts the

development of a democratically controlled, egalitarian and sufficiently redistributive economy. Under the ANC-led government, social conditions have deteriorated in terms of unemployment, increased gaps in wealth distribution, and other areas.

> Even by its own terms, the government's macro economic policies, codified in its programme the 'Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy' (Gear), have not done very well. The net achievement of this programme has been the realisation of the state's deficit targets, but at the cost of employment, poverty and inequality.[86]

The refusal on the part of the government to negotiate the GEAR policy, even with its Alliance partners, has resulted in the closing down of the possibility of constructive dialogue and has served to give engagements between state and civil society a conflictual character. This non-negotiability has extended into other spheres of civil society struggle and resistance, and the new social movements have to act within those constraints.[87] According to Salim Vally, APF activist and a member of the Freedom of Expression Institute, the human rights entrenched in the South African Constitution are important but "tenuous and are sometimes subjected to severe limitations and constraints". Civil and political rights are undermined by socio-economic inequalities, where only the rich can be properly served by the legal system and the protection it can provide. In practice, rights are also often limited, for example through the difficulties organisations often encounter when trying to get permission for a march. But more importantly, these Constitutional rights do not preclude the oppression of certain groups.[88]

> Human rights under capitalism are uncertain as they are often undermined when they are inconvenient or when the ideological state apparatus is no longer able to maintain subservience of the oppressed classes to capitalist class rule.[89]

The AEC has a similar analysis of why they are under violent pressure from the state.

> It's because we are fighting capitalism, privatisation, neo-liberal policies, which actually saw the state enforced to implement down the throats of the working class and the poor communities. So now, the only thing that they saw is to suppress our activities, is to make sure that actually all of the struggle is crushed...[90]

The wave of mobilisation against evictions made the ANC government "very scared" of the AEC, and in order to stop resistance against its policies, repression was implemented, asserts Max Ntanyana.[91]

The State's Opinion

On the opposite side, the view of the provincial government of the AEC protests was that they were disruptive of law and order. The Western Cape MEC for Safety and Security told the Cape Times that the state was going to

> deal with the anti eviction group, which is behaving as if it is representing the state...It's unacceptable that a handful of people run around positioning themselves as people who have the right to allocate houses and evict people...It is manipulating the concerns and real problems of the community and should be brought to order.[92]

The Western Cape government representatives stated that the AEC's objectives are to undermine the MEC for Housing, Nomatyala Hangana, and the whole national ministry. People must "dissociate themselves from this group and these people should be arrested"[93] the Ministry said, as the AEC reportedly had evicted or threatened to evict families moving into houses taken over by banks for the previous owners' non-payment of bonds. While the AEC claims they always have a back-up plan for the families they remove, the political representatives see these and other AEC activities in a different light.

> It is clear that the majority of people in Mandela Park don't want to pay for their houses and are using the anti-eviction campaign for that purpose, and the anti-eviction campaign is intimidating people who try to come forward to pay and we are not going to be intimidated by the anti-eviction campaign.[94]

A more recent clash between the AEC in Mandela Park and officials concerns the Khayelitsha Community Based Development Company (KCBDC) project of building houses in Mandela Park reserved for people living in another part of Khayelitsha. This

controversy is detailed in the following chapter, but clear is that there is a wide divergence of opinions between the AEC and state officials of what is right and wrong in this case. While the AEC claims to be left out of democratic processes in the allocation of houses, the AEC, according to the Housing Ministry, is "ill-informed" and simply "trying to retard progress made by the government".[95] Some officials consider the tactics of the AEC as "illegal activities" that they, the officials, "refuse to be threatened by",[96] echoing the views of the activists who similarly 'refuse' to be 'threatened' by police and security intervention.

The APF has on its part been accused of 'ultra-leftism' and of employing undemocratic methods and tactics. Activists are considered as *agent provocateurs*, misled stooges, unpatriotic, the 'real neo-liberals', by state officials.[97] APF Spokesperson, Dale McKinley, on the other hand, criticised the 2004 national elections manifestos of the main parties for omitting to discuss the issue of suppression of dissent and the "narrowing down of the freedom of speech" and to ensure that dissent was not criminalised:

> For the social movements this is of particular concern if and when they fundamentally disagree with mainstream policies.[98]

The APF is also criticised for being uninformed about the 'true' nature of the privatisation of water in Johannesburg. The Johannesburg Water's Communication and Marketing representative, Jameel Chand, argues that the institution is fully owned by the Johannesburg City Council, and that its initiative *Operation Gcin'amanz*i is upgrading infrastructure and providing free water to the amount endorsed by the World Health Organisation (WHO). In the view of this company,

> McKinley and his organisation represent a tiny minority. Sowetans have demonstrated support for the city's sensible approach to the delivery of services.
>
> The APF is resorting to undemocratic methods to push its narrow agenda. It loses the argument, so vandalises equipment. It is rejected by voters, so assaults them. It takes the criminal route, but complaints when it has to account for its actions.[99]

Again, there is a clear divide between state and organised civil society of what constitutes democratic and legitimate action, and this divide has caused a lot of tension in communities and created a hostile stand-off between political representatives and social movement activists where no-one seems willing to compromise. Both sides accuse each other of being undemocratic, violent and illegitimate representatives of 'the people'. The tension fuelled by the uncompromising positions has the potential to further polarise the two sides.

The issues of freedom of expression, constitutional rights to protest and demonstrate, and the right to be respected by government are very important for the APF and the AEC. The TAC has not dwelled as much on these issues – probably because they have been comparatively sheltered from blatant attempts of suppression – but the indignation over the refusal of the responsible ministers and the President to deal with the Matthias Rath Foundation, despite the campaigning and evidence put forward by the TAC and its allies about the damages its practices can cause, runs very deep, and the organisation is monitoring the government's intervention in community struggles with an open mind.

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Is Representation Working?

The attitude towards elections and representative democracy is not uniform between the different movements, or even within them. While the TAC has not had any structured discussions around the issue of elections, various forms of democracy and the limitations of parliamentary/representative democracy, the APF and AEC have had more extensive debates, though without reaching a consensus on the approach to elections on any level.

The general attitude towards South Africa's democracy in the APF and the AEC is that the new dispensation is a 'democracy for the rich'. The TAC has a less obvious ideological approach and rarely criticises the formal institutional democratic framework, but does acknowledge the adverse effects poverty has on formal democracy. The recent community uprisings – that are not connected to any well-established social movement, organisation or political party – protesting against lack of service delivery and poverty seems to have prompted the TAC to start engaging the issue of a functioning democracy in a more comprehensive manner.

The APF and Elections

The APF started discussing their approach to elections almost from the outset of its existence. As many of the founding members were forwarding the idea of building a mass workers' party, the debate – albeit on an informal level in the beginning – around the issue of elections easily found its way into the APF.[1] The debate was taken up informally in the APF's Coordinating Committee and then a November 2002 workshop on elections debated the benefits and disadvantages of entering APF candidates in the elections. An input on the nature of the capitalist state was made, and the role of the parliament in democratic South Africa was discussed. There was a discussion on the APF's participation in the 2004 national elections with the following alternatives put

forward: should the APF participate in or ignore the elections? If the decision to participate was made, should the APF use the election as an opportunity to mobilise (participate but not vote), vote for another party, or put up an APF candidate? Many different opinions were expressed during this initial workshop, which was attended by close to 60 people.

Among the benefits of gaining seats in parliament were a chance for workers to get a stronger voice in and control over parliament, an opportunity for the APF to elevate its national profile and become known internationally, a chance to oppose the ANC government, and a chance to distribute wealth, stop evictions and fight privatisation. The drawbacks were rather concentrated on the organisational weakness of the APF, which might make it unable to actually win seats. But there were also concerns with the accountability of an APF candidate in parliament. Once elected, an APF candidate could use the floor crossing mechanism and join another party, or simply turn against her/his constituency. The heightened expectations on the part of people who voted for the APF could cause problems, as a change in policies is not an automatic outcome of parliamentary participation:

> If we don't talk to our members about why we go to parliament, they will think we are going to get them free electricity etc. They will have false expectations. They need to know that the reason that we are going to parliament is so that other members know our position, and to fight the system. Members will need to know that we must keep fighting even if we have members in parliament.[2]

Since this workshop, the APF held many discussions and well-attended workshops around elections and produced an election platform in the run-up to the 2004 national elections, and the outcome of the discussions reflected the diversity of the affiliates and their different ideological, as well as strategic, approaches.

John Appolis, Chairperson of the APF, has identified two main strands of thought regarding elections in the new social movements, including the APF and the AEC. One strand is emanating from the autonomists, who oppose any kind of delegated representative democracy and who distrust all state power and political parties. The

autonomists clearly oppose participation in any bourgeois elections and representative structures. On the other hand, there are the 'old left', the Marxist-Leninists, who place the contestation for state power at the centre of the working class struggle. The Marxist-Leninists have a tactical approach to bourgeois elections, but, like the autonomists, they think that mass mobilisation is the most important tactic to reach working class power.[3]

These differences were expressed during the development of the APF 2004 national elections manifesto, where there were calls for both a boycott as well as a tactical engagement with the election process.[4] The process to reach an understanding of and a position on elections in the APF was comprehensive and included a conscious attempt to keep the discussions themselves democratic and inclusive, and discussions on the nature of bourgeois society and elections were a part of the workshops and debates.[5]

Four main positions were identified: one position stressed the importance of an alternative to the ANC government and its policies and argued that the APF should register and stand in the elections. A second position argued for a 'critical vote' on the ANC; that is, maintaining a critical position of the ruling party but still vote for it. This position maintained that millions of people still vote for the ruling party, and therefore it is tactically correct to vote with them and raise the problems of the ANC politics 'from within'. A third position stated that elections have brought no change to the lives of working class and poor people, and so they should be boycotted. The fourth position called for the spoiling of ballots as a way to express discontent with the ruling party and its policies.[6] The final position was an open-ended one: the various affiliates belonging to the APF should decide on an individual basis whether to participate or not, but the APF as a movement would not put forward a candidate, despite the fact that many community members wanted the Forum to participate in the 2004 national elections.

> Generally people from the communities wanted to participate, in one form or the other in the bourgeois elections... the calls for a protest vote or boycott vote was not popular with the communities of the APF. Because the APF did not want to stand, people said they will make individual choices on how to participate in the elections.[7]

While this conclusive position allowed for the continuous autonomy and ideological independence of the affiliates, it has also been interpreted as a limitation in the APF's politics.

> It was a problem...it reflected, I think, in many ways the APF's weaknesses – the discussion on elections – because ultimately we came out with no position, which is the worst kind of position to have...I mean, there was an attempt to have some kind of 'keep unity', which is why effectively there was no position.[8]

A few problems with the APF 2004 election intervention were identified by the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee affiliate. The social movements were divided when they entered the national elections and their weaknesses were exposed, while the aim of exposing the limitations of bourgeois democracy was left unfulfilled. The affiliates and comrades were allowed "to do what they like" and there was no strong co-ordination of the election campaign.[9] One of the criticisms levelled against the discussions was that the issue on whether or not to participate in the elections was brought up too early, and that particular issue then influenced the whole process.[10]

Debates around the 2006 local elections are continuing, and will therefore not be included as data, but it is hinted that these debates revolve more around the nature of participation and the consolidation of an APF election platform which the affiliates that decide to participate can use, rather than the question of whether to participate or not.[11] But the issues that need clarification before these elections, according to Nina Benjamin, a member of the APF Education Committee, include the approach and usefulness of ward committees – should they be contested as a power base or boycotted? How do the APF relate to the local government structures? Are they spaces that can be used for furthering the aims of poor communities or should they be boycotted?

> Now, we're kind of in between that and some of it is unspoken, but at the moment it's a case by case scenario.[12]

In the discussions on the local elections, the question of participation will not be raised early, to allow for these and other issues to be clarified before adopting any positions,

though at the time of writing it seems as if the different affiliates will be allowed to decide for themselves whether or not to nominate candidates. What has not been decided is if the APF as a network will call for a boycott, a protest vote or participation.[13] The crux of the election debate, according to Nina Benjamin, revolves around the issue of how to struggle for reforms and what kind of reforms to struggle for.[14]

Despite the fact that no clear position on the APF's participation in elections has been reached, the debate around the democratic content of the elective process and representation has spelled out some tangible guidelines for the democratisation of the representative system. Conscientious report-backs from representatives to their constituencies is one necessary component of representative democracy that the APF affiliates which decide to put forward a (successful) candidate in the local elections will implement. As is a recall clause; in a case where a candidate does not report back properly, s/he can be recalled and forced to resign her/his position. The organisation to which a (successful) candidate belongs will also have an influence over how her/his councillor's salary is used.[15]

However, even among the affiliates and members of the APF who acknowledge a functionality with elections in order to reach or forward some of the organisation's goals, there is an obvious recognition that the electoral system is but one avenue to use and it cannot be used exclusively. The representative electoral system, even if it involves radical representatives, cannot substitute the extra-parliamentary struggle or realise the goals and aims of social movements. The election of APF/APF affiliates' members into local councils will support the struggles on the ground and give the APF a voice in another space, and "we can be able to articulate some of our ideas on the ground".[16] But in essence,

> [t]he APF will use the election process to intensify our struggles around electricity, water, housing and education and through these and other activities to consolidate our links with other social movements. We think the most important part of elections is not the vote, but connecting around the problems and issues that you face as ordinary workers and youth, discussing these and agreeing on the strongest possible way to

> solve them before the elections, on the day of the elections and after the elections. We think the strongest possible way is through mass struggle on the ground.[17]

The election demands during the 2004 national elections were similar to APF's general demands of free basic services accessible for all, an end to evictions, free quality education for all, free provision of drugs and care for people living with HIV/AIDS, to mention a few. All these demands are transitional and reformist, and possibly theoretically attainable even under a capitalist dispensation. However, the consistent theme throughout the election manifesto is the need to organise for an alternative socio-economic system, where rich people do not hold any power over a majority of poor people:

> We build for a future alternative of socialism where people are put before profits, social justice before exploitation and economic equality before class privilege and greed.[18]

The issue of representative democracy is complicated, but there are strong views within the APF of what the problems with it are. The APF is attempting to organise itself around the principle of participatory democracy, and is thus trying to practice an alternative. According to Thandekile Dodo, APF's Regional Coordinator of the Vaal region, representative democracy prevents self-reliability and makes people dependent on representatives instead of developing a consciousness and become able to participate fully in all spheres of decision-making in their communities and the broader society. This is a double problem, as the representatives do not always act in the interest of their constituencies but have other, sometimes more powerful, interests to respond to.[19]

Participatory democracy in practice becomes a two-way process, where participants in the social process become more empowered through the participatory procedures themselves and as a result are able to become further involved in the running of their everyday lives.[20]

Democracy needs to be supported by other mechanisms in addition to the vote. The political institutional framework of South Africa, as in all capitalist countries, is not

sufficient to sustain democracy as long as it is not extended into the economic sphere as well, and the vote by itself does not guarantee the representation of interests that might undercut capital accumulation, which are the interests of the poor and the working class. The vote under capitalism, in some activists' view, may even undermine the working class and the poor further:

> Their vote really kills them because they vote to be evicted, you know, they vote to be out of electricity and water, and so forth, so that is their reward in terms of their vote, you see.[21]

The official APF platform, adopted before the 2004 national elections, is taking a decisive stance against the way the ANC has used the confidence people give the party through their vote:

> The biggest election lie comes when the ANC says that it is a people's government, serving the people first, when it actually serves the capitalists and their greed for profits first. Today after ten years of ANC rule it is clear that the ANC government has stolen our hope and used the votes of workers and youth to provide strength and profits for the bosses under their capitalist system.[22]

The AEC and Elections

The AEC has not had formal discussions on elections by itself, though it has participated in such debates in other, multi-organisational forums, such as the coalition for decent housing for all, which consists of community organisations from several townships and squatter camps around Western Cape and of which AEC is a part. This coalition raises the slogans of "No Housing, No Vote!" and alternatively "No land, No House, No Vote!", but it is still up to the different organisations to decide on their own whether to put forward a candidate or not. Like the APF, the AEC has decided that any affiliate that wants to stand in the local elections may do so, as the popular view is favouring the participation of an independent left candidate.

Many high-profile leaders of the AEC have very definite opinions of elections in a capitalist setting: the institutions of representation will not further the struggle waged by the poor and the working class, and should not be entered into. However, the rank-and-file are to a large extent eager to put up a candidate in the 2006 local elections, and there is a possibility that one of the most high-profile AEC leaders, Max Ntanyana, will stand as a candidate in the local elections. However, Max Ntanyana, while acknowledging at the time of interviewing that the AEC's position on the pending local elections is not yet established, presents his own views which are carefully thought through: it is not possible to fight bourgeois democracy from within itself. The AEC, he explains, has made inroads and won victories by contesting the system from the outside – to then join the same "rotten" system is "useless". The difference that only one person could make from within the local council structures is also very limited, and without a large number of very radical candidates in the councils, not much change could be achieved.[23] Still, he might be convinced to stand as a candidate, and due to a political power struggle within the ANC in Mandela Park in Khayelitsha, there is a vacuum that could be filled by Max Ntanyana or another person from the AEC.[24]

Like the APF, the AEC sees elections as a way to raise their issues and gain a broader profile for their organisation. The election campaign might make the organisation gain members or support in other forms. The AEC branch in Crossroads is considering participating in the local elections, but as a way to muster a challenge to the ANC rather than to actually use the council as a power base. If their candidate does win, they might decline to take up the seat, as they have then managed to prove that the ANC is not all-powerful, which would be one of their aims in participating in the elections.[25]

The hostility towards the ANC is clear in much of the AEC's rhetoric, and the radicalism in their election comments, issued before the 2004 national elections, are even slightly sharper than the APF's comments, despite an otherwise similar approach to bourgeois elections.

> The ANC government serves the interests of the rich and capitalism. No political party is putting forward a policy in the interests of the working class and the poor. The forthcoming national and provincial elections have no meaning for us – they are only a means for the enrichment of the petty-bourgeois. As the AEC we see no need to participate to enhance 'their' democracy.[26]

Although the AEC formally adopted a position to boycott the 2004 national elections, several AEC members and supporters did vote, some for the ANC. The approach to elections within the AEC at large is complex. On the one hand, there are the leaders who have a clearly worked out, ideologically and tactically grounded attitude towards the representative system, which rejects the value of taking up seats in liberal bourgeois institutions. On the other, there are the rank-and-file who in some cases want to engage in the spaces provided by the new democracy and put forward their own candidates. According to Max Ntanyana, there is a general difference in both principles and consciousness between AEC leaders and average members, which is a result of people being "misled".[27] Other factors must also be taken into account. Some people voted for the ANC because they were afraid to be victimised in case their identity documents did not show that they voted, while others might still have some faith in the effectiveness of the electoral system. If Max Ntanyana stands as a candidate, there is a possibility that he can win a seat, and the people who vote for him will probably do so to demonstrate their independence from the ANC.[28]

The aversion to elections in the AEC is informed by the organisation's rejection of neo-liberal capitalism. Whoever participates in the electoral system in a capitalist democracy will be restricted by the limits of its rules and regulations, and by the limits neo-liberalism places upon any chance to create an egalitarian system.[29] This means, in essence, that the representatives in this system are bound by policies that are anti-poor, by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and other international agreements, by the demands for privatisation of basic services, housing and education.[30] This makes it impossible to effect any real changes from within the system.

> So what we are saying is, ja, sure, if you want to be an independent candidate, please, go be an independent candidate, but don't pull our people into that farce, because it is a farce. There's nothing you can do.[31]

The TAC's View on Responsiveness

The TAC does not have a specific position on elections, and the organisation does not contest elections or plan to contest elections. Its role is to – through intra- and extra-parliamentary means – pressure national, provincial and local government to meet its responsibilities vis-à-vis people living with HIV/AIDS. During local government elections, the TAC encourages its members to be active during the campaigning periods, to question and debate politicians on the campaigning trail in their communities, participate in *imbizos* and engage councillors on the issues of HIV/AIDS, the health sector, and the delivery of services such as water and sanitation.[32] Political parties were urged by the TAC 2005 National Congress to make "concrete commitments concerning health care delivery in local areas" before the 2006 local elections, just like TAC before the 2004 national elections put the issue of a treatment plan on the agenda and demanded its implementation, by the winning party and President.[33] The Congress further resolved that "the upcoming local government elections be used to reflect on and put public pressure on the issue of improving local health services", in line with the task outlined by the TAC to build a movement for a public people's health care service, where quality health care is accessible to all. The Congress resolved to develop a platform and a programme to inform political parties and local election candidates about TAC's demands and local programmes.[34] Thus, the TAC uses the elections as an opportunity to make political actors take positions and make promises regarding HIV/AIDS, without taking sides or digging too deep into the very structures that make up elections.

Not having as ambitious goals as the APF and the AEC for the transformation of society, the TAC is comfortable with engaging and working within the established institutions of the South African democratic framework. For example, the TAC encourages its members on local levels to be active in ward committees, community health committees, water committees and other local structures, to establish TAC's ideas in communities. The TAC considers its activities on local level very important in making its ideas and demands known and implemented. The local level health facilities, district health system and the provincial Department of Health are identified as "critical to TAC's work", and the

scarce and inadequate resources in these health facilities are a great source of concern. Thus, the TAC has resolved to build alliances with community health care workers to demand a people's health service; to mobilise communities around the right to ARVs and other treatment; to strengthen TAC members active in political parties to put TAC's issues on their agendas; and to engage district health and HIV/AIDS structures and build working relationships with the Department of Social Development in the various provinces and districts.[35]

The TAC 2005 National Congress resolved that the organisation would like to build a "constructive relationship" with the Ministry of Health, but if necessary, TAC would "resort to litigation and protest to compel the Minister to follow her duties as laid out in the Constitution."[36] NEDLAC has been one forum where the TAC has engaged both government, business and labour on the issue of HIV/AIDS. According to one of its leaders, the TAC is "neither anti-government nor anti-ANC" and while it is prepared to oppose both structures with lots of fire, "if there is a party composed of the poor it is the ANC".[37] Some analysts draw a comparison between TAC and COSATU in its relationship to the ruling party, though TAC is not a formal ANC ally:

> So, despite its independence and diversity, TAC, unlike most social movements, has a political identity which ensures a relationship with the government and ANC.[38]

The concentration on mainly one issue – treatment and care for people living with HIV/AIDS – ensures that the overriding rationale behind TAC's existence is to reach these immediate goals, not to challenge the democratic structure of South Africa. To reach this goal, the TAC is displaying pragmatic rather than principled strategies and tactics, and is as such free to cooperate with government when conducive for its struggle. In the end, the TAC is amongst its constituency widely perceived to be "an instrument to win treatment"[39] and it is "concerned with the politics of health, not politics *per se*".[40] This pragmatism pays itself out in the decision regarding tactics, and the Civil Disobedience Campaign was discussed at length before embarked on:

> Civil disobedience was a difficult decision because it was historically used against a government most people did not support. There were fears that it would make us politically vulnerable if we seemed anti-government.[41]

The Campaign was initiated because it felt all other avenues of pressure and negotiations were exhausted, and breaking the law to achieve the right to treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS could be morally defended, even under a democratic government. The Campaign is credited with having forced the Cabinet to agree to roll out ARVs, and is considered a success in the history of TAC mobilisation.[42]

The TAC takes the legitimacy of the democratic government into serious consideration when deciding upon campaigns and activities, and is careful not to alienate the constituencies that voted for the ANC government through all-out, head-on antagonism. Rather, a mixture of cooperation and conflict with the government is applied, to achieve both broader support and a successful ARV roll-out. Two researchers of the TAC comment:

> TAC wants the roll-out to work, for it gains little if government fails and much if it succeeds. The issue-based incrementalism which TAC pursues does create an interest in strengthening government which is rare among social movements...As long as TAC relies on government delivery to achieve its goals, they will remain, to a degree, mutually dependant, regardless of the conflict between them.[43]

Rather than to critique the limits of bourgeois democratic institutions, TAC identifies the limitations of an inadequate leadership in the various decision-making bodies as the main problem for the lack of roll-out of treatment and other shortcomings in the government's HIV/AIDS policy. Xolani Kunene, Campaigns Organiser for TAC in Gauteng, expresses the disappointment of TAC when President Thabo Mbeki retained Manto Tshabalala-Msimang as Minister of Health after the 2004 national elections:

> ...we thought he was going to change the minister and have somebody who'll be committed in implementing the policies of the state, the way they are stipulated, but then unfortunately, we're given again the same person. So we are hoping that with maybe the next elections we will have somebody who'll have the matters of health in his or in her heart rather than...the matter of politics...[44]

As has been noted in a previous chapter, the most common approach to South African parliamentary politics in the TAC seems to be an acceptance of the legitimacy of the democratic institutional framework. The Constitution is frequently described as a significant foundation for the democratic structure. If influential politicians are sympathetic towards the goals the TAC has set up for prevention and treatment, these goals can be achieved. For example, the TAC maintains that the Operational Plan, the government's strategy for combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic, can attain its goals of treating 200 000 people by 2006 without making any radical changes to the structure of capitalist society.

> The treatment plan committed to treating far more than 200, 000 people by end of March 2006. This is still achievable, but it will take leadership and political will...Persistent activism and mass mobilization is the only way to create sufficient leadership. We are ready for this challenge.[45]

The main problems lay with corrupt governance, lack of political will and lack of leadership skills among the people in influential positions[46], rather than with the overall system and its structures, and so the TAC is resolute in its critique of the persons it perceives as preventing effective HIV/AIDS programmes from being implemented. TAC acknowledges the criticism levelled against the organisation for being too harsh on the current Minister of Health, but states that

> [w]e offer no apology. This is not an abstract struggle for us; it is about life and death.[47]

The confusing messages coming from the top politicians on the topic of nutrition and anti-retroviral treatment are dangerous and undermine people's ability to access the appropriate information and treatment. The charges about toxicity of anti-retrovirals emanating from important figures such as the President and the Minister of Health make people question the effectiveness of ARV treatment, and the lack of action taken against Matthias Rath and his Foundation, as detailed in the previous chapter, causes a lot of uncertainty with regard to the general prevention and treatment messages. There are two possible explanations for the refusal of the top echelons of government to take a decisive

stance against Matthias Rath, according to Thembeka Majali, TAC Provincial Coordinator in the Western Cape: first, the belief that HIV does not cause AIDS is still a living reality in the President's office, a belief which is fuelled by some of the President's advisors who are AIDS-denialists. Second, the belief that ARVs are toxic and should not be given to African people also clouds the debate.[48] The Minister of Health is undermining the roll-out "by publicly endorsing unproven treatment and doubting the real benefits of antiretrovirals."[49]

While class politics is not explicitly theorised and contextualised in most of TAC's rhetoric, there is a recognition that poverty and economic inequality pose a threat to the consolidation of the newly gained democracy.

> Many people feel that despite formal democracy, as poor people, especially black people, our dignity and freedom remains diminished by inequality and poverty. Riots are the product of pain and frustration. People living with HIV/AIDS in our country feel this pain and frustration but riots can never substitute for sustained, persistent activism to challenge inequality.[50]

The goals of the Freedom Charter are "far from realized" for poor and working class people in South Africa, comments Zackie Achmat, TAC Chairperson.[51] But unlike the APF and AEC, the TAC does not dwell too deeply on the structural constraints, which are what the former organisations consider the real obstacles to societal change. The Constitution is seen as an important tool to use in the struggle for treatment and prevention, as it allows legitimate protests to be expressed, and it can be used to hold politicians accountable.[52] Still, individual politicians have much influence over the democratic process itself, and can, to some extent, shape the democracy according to will.

> I think we need to acknowledge that this democracy is being implemented by individuals or by human beings. There are errors. Sometimes you'll think that you're on the right track, and suddenly there'll be a change of mind, especially from the politicians in power.[53]

In the TAC's experience, the individuals in power have played an important role in either enabling prevention and treatment programmes, or in providing stumbling blocs to them.

As has been demonstrated, the present Minister of Health is considered to be a serious impediment to HIV/AIDS education, prevention and treatment. On the other hand, the political leaders of the provinces have very different approaches to TAC and its demands. TAC representatives of Gauteng and the Western Cape are satisfied with the response from the political representatives regarding various HIV/AIDS programmes. The Western Cape regional government was the first province to introduce the Mother-to-Child Transmission (MTCT) programme through a trial study in the township of Khayelitsha. This province was also the first to start the roll-out of the ARV programme and started to treat opportunistic diseases at an early stage.[54] The TAC in Gauteng is also pleased with the response from provincial government.

> ...I'll definitely applaud what our provincial government is doing. If you look at, firstly, the ARV programme, they're almost ahead of all provinces. Helen Joseph [Hospital] is one of the sites that sees more than any other hospital in the country – the number of people who are taking treatment – and the Premier, personally the Premier is also committed to ...the HIV/AIDS programme.[55]

The Gauteng AIDS Council is "one of the few AIDS Councils that [is] functioning" and is holding regular meetings, including the convening of an AIDS Conference in October, 2005, and the Premier is encouraging civil society organisations to get involved in the HIV/AIDS struggle.[56] However, in provinces such as Limpopo and Mpumalanga, the official attitude towards the HIV/AIDS crisis is not responsive enough.[57] The TAC in the Limpopo province is growing and starting to engage the provincial Department of Health, but is being dismissed by political representatives who accuse the TAC of just wanting to "make a noise". After a march to demand treatment in March 2005, the TAC comments:

> The lack of democracy and delivery in the province is being exposed and the provincial government, as expected, is acting defensively instead of addressing the problems.[58]

The connection between democratic governance and delivery is implicitly made, but TAC makes it clear that it is through the space opened up by the democratic transition that their members have been able to organise and put pressure on the elected

representatives. The fact that the number of participants in the TAC's protest marches has grown significantly since the organisation's inception in 1998 shows that the democratic framework is useful for presenting demands and needs to politicians. The general level of political involvement of a population is important for making demands heard, and one reason why the Gauteng provincial government has been so responsive to the TAC is because of the high level of community involvement in the struggle for ARV roll-outs and other campaigns.

> If you look at the history of a township like Soweto, there's no way that if you are the government of the day you can ignore townships like Soweto, because definitely they will come to you and that will show that you are not working.[59]

Gauteng as a province is generally speaking more advanced politically and socially, and the population is therefore more able to be politically engaged and demanding.[60] If democratic depth and content can to some extent be measured by the responsiveness of government officials and representatives to community demands, then the democratic development has been uneven and differs according to province, in TAC's experience. The coordination and organisation of pressure, articulated demands and protests seems to be an important part in how responsive governments are to their constituencies, but the content of the demands, the methods used by organisations, and the popularity of a specific group also seems to matter.

The AEC and Responsiveness

If the TAC has received mixed results of its campaigns and is happy with the cooperation of certain individual politicians, the AEC has no illusions about the ruling party on any level of government. Fonky Goboza, Provincial Deputy Secretary of AEC, comments:

> ...let me first say, councillors are redundant, useless, ineffective, not efficient, just loose cannons that – they see themselves as being employees or careerists of the government of the day, and they only see salaries – they don't see that the community got needs...Owing to the provincial ones – those are the

attachments of the national government – they are the very same useless, ignorant, unqualified…I don't know which words I must use, man…[61]

Max Ntanyana concurs with similar expressions: ANC councillors are "useless" and "redundant" and the national government is a capitalist government which will always put profits before people.[62] Ashraf Cassiem, Interim Chairperson (or Coordinator, the term he prefers to use as it sounds less hierarchical) of the AEC Western Cape, locates the problem of the ANC's neo-liberal turn in the leadership of the party. Ashraf Cassiem recognises that the ANC still attracts votes and support on a significant scale from the working class and the poor, as it is and "will always be the party of the poor" that still commands the status and respect of a liberation movement. Coming from an ANC background himself, Ashraf Cassiem now says:

…for [the ANC] to be representing what it's representing now, I don't want to be associated with it in any space – not even as a liberation movement, you know, I don't even want to be associated with the ANC at all, not even a little bit.[63]

The core problem of the ANC government and the kind of democracy it embodies is that it only includes a small number of people. Democracy under a capitalist dispensation is exclusionary and restricted to a small elite, or the capitalist and upper classes, according to the spokespeople of the AEC.

…we have a capitalist democracy…it just means that if you have money then you can enjoy your democracy. If you don't have money, you don't enjoy democracy. So, that's a weird democracy – I mean, I don't know if you want to call it that.[64]

…the democracy currently does not favour the poor, it favours those that have money – it serves their interests...I'm saying – ten percent of people…enjoys their liberties or democracy, ja.[65]

The attitude toward democracy in the AEC is not completely compatible with the democratic framework introduced in South Africa in 1994. The AEC envisages a democracy based on material equality, participation and community consultation, but the experiences of the democracy under the ANC government do not necessarily include these cornerstones. One recent example of the state's deliberate exclusion of community

members from decisions that impact directly on their lives is the Mandela Park Housing Project. Through this project, 1 000 houses will be built in Mandela Park, Khayelitsha. The project falls under the People's Housing Process and receives subsidies from national government through the Western Cape provincial government. There are two issues of contention that the AEC in Mandela Park has taken up: First, though the houses are being built in Mandela Park, in between already established houses, only 16 have been allocated to residents of Mandela Park; the rest have been earmarked for people of another area in the township called Site C. Second, the residents of Mandela Park were never consulted about the project and have not been engaged in the process, despite the fact that their area is the host community of the project.[66]

Even according to liberal-democratic conventions, the project is falling short of invoking all the rights of citizens, the AEC points out in a briefing paper. It is a constitutional right to equal treatment and no discrimination regarding housing, Martin Legassick of the AEC argues.[67] Furthermore, The National Housing Code of May 2003, as related to the National Housing Programmes and the People's Housing Project, specifies that this project requires "a process of community participation through representation in the decision making processes of the project by representatives of the beneficiary community."[68] This process could also include stakeholders such as neighbouring communities if they will be affected by the project.

> This community participation is supposed to have been achieved well before building is commenced, and indeed before the project is approved by the Provincial MEC. Mandela Park was closer than a "neighbouring community" to the project: it was the host community. However the residents of Mandela Park were kept completely in the dark about this project up to the point where building commenced.[69]

Mandela Park AEC members started negotiations with the housing company, the Khayelitsha Community Based Development Company (KCBDC), to discuss the issue of the distribution of the 1 000 houses, but no change took place. As the KCBDC declined to attend a public mass meeting, organised by the Mandela Park AEC, to discuss employment in the project, house allocation, and other issues, MPAEC considered the negotiations closed.[70] Mandela Park AEC demands that half of the houses built – a

number of 500 – be allocated to Mandela Park residents, but are willing to accept a 30 per cent allocation. The MPAEC approached the Western Cape MEC for Housing, Marius Fransman, several times for negotiations around their housing demands, but the MEC did not agree to the suggestion of an allocation of houses on a 50-50 basis between Mandela Park and Khayelitsha residents, though he did promise to put in R46 million to settle arrears on 800 houses in Mandela Park to prevent further evictions.[71]

However, representatives from the KCBDC are adamant that the residents of Mandela Park were informed about the project and did not object to its commencement, and Marius Fransman insists that the AEC's main grievance is that they want people from Mandela Park to stay there, not from Site C, which is a densely built and overcrowded area.[72]

The conclusion drawn in September, 2005, from the housing building process in Khayelitsha is that

> ...the KCBDC and the MEC for Housing – and, by extension, the City of Cape Town – have not identified the Mandela Park community as stakeholders in the Mandela Park Housing Project, let alone secured their approval for the development of the project. The efforts of the MPAEC, on behalf of the residents of Mandela Park, to negotiate a fair proportion of the houses being built have been rebuffed. The National Housing Code, and the constitution, have been violated. People with equal needs have not been treated equally.[73]

The democratic involvement of constituencies in matters of everyday importance is perceived to be lacking in the established representative structures, and the responsiveness of politicians is not a given but the result of organised pressure and protests. In February, 2005, AEC members occupied some newly built KCBDC houses to protest against the slow pace of negotiations, which included rejections of offers of meetings.[74] The negotiators from the MEC's office changed numerous times, and the negotiations had to start afresh every time a new person took over, which left people frustrated.[75] While the AEC thinks it is their right to participate in negotiations around projects taking place in the communities where they organise and considers the rejection

of such an engagement undemocratic, the MEC, on the other hand, labelled the occupations illegitimate in the Cape Times: "We won't be threatened by illegal activities. I don't see them as an organised structure. Some individuals are trying to derail delivery".[76]

This divergence in attitudes towards what constitutes legitimate action and an acceptable level of responsiveness between state representatives and organised community groups is part of the antagonism between AEC and the state, where the latter is clearly perceived as being unresponsive to its constituencies, thus making elections of its representatives a "farce". Authentic attempts to involve communities are not made, claims the AEC, but to do so could have prevented much antagonism and conflict.

> Any eviction could have been prevented if there was consultation and public participation like they say there is, but we don't have it...We have consultants coming into our areas and reading or print a proposal to the community – they'll get it and then it will be implemented without participation.[77]

If political representatives give in to community demands, their responsiveness is still not considered genuine, but a reluctant compromise in the face of pressure and the risk of growing opposition.

The APF and Responsiveness

The APF has a similar analysis of the concessions the state structures on various levels are making. On the question whether the elected government is responsive to APF's demands, Nina Benjamin, APF Education Committee member, answers:

> No, no, no, no, they're not responsive at all...[78]

The gains made in areas such as education rights and the moratorium on evictions have been realised "purely through fighting".[79] The local governments are rather unwilling to engage with the APF and its affiliates on the issue of service delivery. The "general rule"

of local governments is not to meet with the APF or even respond to memorandum submitted by the organisation or its affiliates.

> In most cases, when we do march, it's because the councils or the local government have not responded to any of the attempts of us to meet and discuss issues with them.[80]

As shown above, the AEC has also experienced attempts to ignore them or disregard their contribution in changing or implementing policy. If community mobilisations by AEC lead to policy changes, it is presented as initiatives coming independently from the local or provincial governments. The rejection of the AEC as a legitimate structure by influential politicians like the Western Cape MEC for Housing reinforces the view that it is excluded from local politics, though it acts as a representative community structure.

The APF affiliate the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), operating mainly in Phiri, has waged an intense struggle against pre-paid water and electricity meters and the commodification of water and electricity. After prolonged campaigns by the SECC, the Minister of Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe, announced that the arrears for electricity bills would be scrapped and put a moratorium on all electricity cut-offs in Soweto, as well as in other townships on the East Rand and the Vaal, but the move was presented as an initiative taken directly by the Alliance and its South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) structures without recognising the mass mobilisations and protests organised by the APF and the SECC.[81] Ironically, after this move, ESKOM began, supported by SANCO, to promote and install pre-paid electricity meters in Soweto, leading two activists to comment that campaigns like Khanyisa "helped shape the adoption of pre-paid technology".[82] The circumvention of SECC's contribution to the moratorium is considered as deliberate and a political tactic used by the Alliance structure to dismiss the influence these social movements do have.

APF Chairperson John Appolis reckons that giving recognition to APF through serious negotiations will raise the organisation's profile and provide political legitimacy to its demands, and so government officials have decided to ignore the structure as far as

possible. The policies of the ANC when it comes to development are falling within the requirements of the international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and as the government is not prepared to change its policies without being forced to through mass struggle, it does not want to enter negotiations, either.[83] Thus, no direct positive responses to the APF's demands are made.[84]

Struggling to achieve recognition and change, AEC and APF spokespeople have identified the structural constraints neo-liberalism places on any attempt to roll-out access to health care, education, housing and basic services for the poor majority. The goodwill, hard work and honesty of individual politicians working to level class inequalities have little significance in a capitalist political economy. An APF activist and academic comments that:

> Many bureaucrats believe that they can make a difference to poverty, unemployment, inadequate education and the welfare system through negotiating the best possible terms in an unequal global economic system. Despite often-honourable intentions, these are most likely irreconcilable with the limitations and capacities of the budgetary, financial and labour market policy of the capitalist economy.[85]

The pressure from strong business interests to keep the ANC on its neo-liberal path has trapped the government in its current policy approach, a path the ANC cannot divert from, and these neo-liberal policies are the reason behind the inability of the government to provide basic services, according to the APF. The change in policies will "definitely not" come from within the ANC itself. The grassroots support, built as democratic structures, was by necessity destroyed by the ANC in order to be able to carry out a neo-liberal programme, and as such any internal pressure has been eliminated, is Nina Benjamin's assessment.[86] While reforms can take place, the struggle for reforms and the defence of gains in a capitalist society are continuous processes and not necessarily struggles that will lead to socialism; based on this analysis the APF has recognised that there is a need to restructure society at large. The local governments, which are often the structures directly engaged by the APF and the AEC, are constrained by the limits imposed by national government and

> ...hence they don't really have the space to maneuver, you know, to address the demands of the people, and therefore there's no reason then for them to meet with us because they can't then...give an undertaking that they will address this or address that because then that will create unnecessary expectations, and create more problems for them. So I think it's also that limited space for local governments and councillors to actually maneuver around the issues of the communities.[87]

The fiscal and political constraints placed upon local governments by the national government then prevent these structures from addressing hard-pressed community needs and make it problematic for their representatives to face communities' demands. The responsiveness of government structures to demands for affordable service delivery, for example the introduction of 6 000 litres of free water per household per month, or temporary moratoriums on evictions, is not only simply the result of hard-won community struggles, but the interventions are also totally inadequate responses in the face of the massive inequality, unemployment and poverty that plagues South Africa. Again, because of the rules of neo-liberalism, it is not possible to fundamentally change the social structure for the better for the great majority.[88]

This might be the most important reason behind the APF's and the AEC's development from defensive community organisations to groups that consciously have adopted an explicitly anti-capitalist agenda: the fact that all reforms within the capitalist framework are constantly under threat of being reversed, and they can never be enough to erase inequality on any major scale. The TAC has a different approach and to some extent different experiences of the responsiveness of how much the political structures can support the reaching of its goals; in many cases these experiences have been positive and are considered accommodating. While still very much a one-issue advocacy group, the TAC has nevertheless started to broaden its aims and is engaging in a broader debate on unemployment and the health care sector. This development might change the perspective of TAC, as it did for APF and AEC, especially as the debate regarding the disparity between the public and private health care sectors will be deepened and the TAC's campaign for a unified public health system seriously begins. TAC does see the

HIV/AIDS epidemic as a serious threat and an indictment of the democracy in South Africa:

> Our president needs to wake up to Aids...We are proud about our 10 years of democracy, but if we want our next 10 years of democracy to be good we need to wake up to Aids.[89]

As for now, however, there is a difference in what TAC on the one hand, and APF and AEC on the other, are expecting from the representative democratic system in South Africa.

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.
[32] Interview with Xolani Kunene, Campaigns Organiser, Gauteng, TAC, Johannesburg, 10 November, 2005
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Conclusion

This research has traced some approaches to the new democratic structure adopted and practiced by three new social movements in South Africa. It has examined the attitudes towards the new space for contestation that was opened up in 1994 and how far the new democracy is perceived to allow for oppositional politics and alternative modes of action and contestation. The new social movements emerging after 1994 are responses to social problems that have not been solved, or that have been exacerbated, under the ANC government. Despite this government being promoted as belonging to 'the people', the movements were formed to pressure the representatives to meet their needs and demands as they feel excluded from the decision-making processes and policy outcomes.

They share the same democratic socio-political context and, to a large extent, their constituencies share similar characteristics in terms of class, 'race' and gender. Still, these three movements display significant differences in their attitudes towards the post-apartheid state. These differences have their roots in the ideologies adopted by these movements, and the ideologies have, in turn, been influenced and shaped by the struggles taking place on the ground, and by the outcomes of these struggles. The formation and development of the Treatment Action Campaign, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Anti-Eviction Campaign is to a large extent related to the attitude adopted by the state structures towards their demands and tactics. The state is similarly reacting towards the new social movements according to how disruptive, challenging or accommodating the movements are perceived to be of the existing social and political order. The movements and the state are locked into a dialectical relationship which has an impact on both the development of the democratic state and on the ideologies, strategies and tactics of the social movements.

This dialectical relationship is compounded by international trends. The South African government is acting within a globalised world where capital is mobile and can thus place serious demands on governments dependent on foreign investment, and neo-liberal ideas

are accepted as normative. Having adopted a macro-economic strategy that seeks to effect social development through economic growth with the support of important international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the government has placed itself in an ideological and policy-making position that is incompatible with the ideologies and policy demands of the social movements, but which is compatible with much of the international trends. The social movements are acting within the same globalised world, and their agendas are likewise influenced by the international anti-globalisation movement which is part of challenging the outlooks of governments, IFIs and the media. Thus, the South African government and social movements are intertwined on two levels: on national and international levels, where they influence each other and in turn are being influenced by international actors.

The new social movements in and of themselves represent a deepening and development of the formal democracy. They are simultaneously evidence of a citizenry that is trying to empower itself and claim its legitimate rights, as well as of the failure of the democratic state to live up to its promises and responsibilities. They organise people in the extra-parliamentary realm of civil society, independent of the structures linked to the ruling party as well as the government itself, and offer an opposition that is not mainly concentrated on winning parliamentary power but rather forcing the government to listen and respond to the grassroots. It has been said about the Treatment Action Campaign that it, through its workshops, meetings and campaigns, gives people an opportunity to engage actively in their own society, instead of being seen as passive objects:

> In this way, TAC implicitly aids democratisation by ensuring that people are better able to participate as democratic citizens.[1]

And in general, social movements are a positive contribution to the new democracy.[2] Their attempts to involve whole communities, through mass meetings, report-backs and branch-level organisation, are indeed attempts to broaden democracy, change the government's ideological agenda and practice an alternative to representative democratic politics. The active resistance to the policies of a legitimately elected government

exposes the limits of representation and demand attention to problems not considered by the elected representatives, and thus keeps the new democracy dynamic and decentralised.

Class

There is not one conclusion which emerges from these case studies of how far-reaching the new democracy is, or how advantageous the new political opportunity structure is for the goals set up by these organisations. While the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Anti-Eviction Campaign do have vague alternative visions of 'another possible world', to use the phrase coined by the international anti-globalisation movement, and while they attempt – with varying results – to implement alternative democratic arrangements in their organisations, the Treatment Action Campaign is more acceptant of the new government and the Constitution.

Considering the analysis presented in the previous chapters, it seems as if this general difference in attitude towards the new state is partly a result of the different emphasis placed on class as an ideological and strategic basis for struggle, as well as on the role and ability of the capitalist state to eradicate poverty and decrease class divisions. The AEC and APF have decisively class-based programmes and the dominant strand in these organisations considers the state an institution dominated by the capitalist class to the detriment of the poor and the working class. As such, their visions of a democratic society, the methods they use and the ideologies and discourses they have adopted, differs markedly from the official vision of democracy and development promoted in South Africa. Organisations such as the APF

> understands its role within a framework of fighting capitalism in the form of neo-liberalism and will not form coalitions with organisations or individuals that support neo-liberalism in any form.[3]

The TAC, on the other hand, while starting to look more closely at the issue of a health care sector that must provide treatment and care for all regardless of class, is waging a struggle that encompasses everyone living with HIV/AIDS. While acknowledging that the lack of ARV roll-outs and the dismal state of the public sector hit the poor section of the population hardest, the TAC is the home for everyone living with HIV/AIDS regardless of class status, and no judgement is made of which class would be more strategically placed to win their demands. TAC leaders also believe that "far-reaching reform is possible"[4] under the present dispensation, and as its main goal is to ensure the roll-out of anti-retroviral treatment, its interest lies in confronting the government when necessary, but cooperating when this seems beneficial for its cause. The government can be either an enabling tool or an obstacle, depending on the inclination of the individuals in charge and how much pressure civil society can muster to have an effect on policy-making. The government is not considered by the TAC as a structure in the hands of a particular class whose class interests are overriding any obvious needs by the majority, but as a structure which can be influenced and steered in the right direction and which is potentially the ally of 'the people':

> TAC is unusual among social movements in its appreciation of the need to change strategic calculations to accommodate formal democracy.[5]

Representation

The intricate relationship between the new social movements, the new democratic structures and the institutionalised groups that head those structures cannot be presented as a simple dichotomy between extra- and intra-state actors. As has been demonstrated, within movements such as APF and AEC there is not one homogeneous view of how functional bourgeois representative institutions are for the working class struggle – there are calls for boycott of all bourgeois institutions as well as for engagement with state structures, for example through the participation in elections. Both AEC and APF are on a recurrent basis attempting to engage the state through discussions and negotiations and are on occasion invoking the Constitution to back up their demands. But there is clearly a

dissatisfaction with the parliamentary democracy that is presented in slogans such as the one adopted by the AEC and their partners in the coalition for decent housing before the 2006 local elections: 'No Housing! No Vote!'. The TAC explicitly accepts the 'non-racial' liberal democratic framework that was introduced in 1994, and seeks to use all avenues of civil society involvement that were opened up in that year: mass action, legal litigations, participation in state structures on different levels. Especially the court system has been effectively used by the TAC.

While the 'non-racial' liberal democratic state and its current representatives, on all levels, have lost significant legitimacy among organised social movement activists, as the often vociferous protests against its policies testify to, the representative structures *as such* are still considered as acceptable options for popular expression and democratic involvement in many quarters of the social movements, and there is often a differentiation made between the state structures and the particular representatives – parties or individuals – that at the moment inhibit and control them. As the outline over the election debates held in the APF and the AEC showed, the calls for a complete boycott of the elections to representative institutions did not win majority positions in either movement, and there is a strong, seemingly mainly rank-and-file driven, lobby for participating in the upcoming local elections as an opposition to the ANC.

Where affiliates of the APF and AEC have decided to actively take part in elections and put forward candidates, the organisations will try to extend the popular control over their representatives, by implementing a recall-clause, rigorous report-backs to the constituencies, and organisational control over the salary of a successful candidate. Thus, even where the representative framework is used as one means to move the struggle forward, its shortcomings are recognised and attempts made to further deepen the democratic impact the electoral institutions have.

It should also be noted that the intensity of the radicalism displayed by these movements might be tempered if one or more of the candidates put up in the 2006 local elections would win, as the radicalism "is to a large extent a function of the movement operating

outside the established institutions."[6] This analysis highlights the moderating influence state institutions may have on participants in the system who automatically are forced to abide to certain guidelines and try to develop solutions to social problems 'from within'. As one researcher comments, there is clearly an ambivalence towards the new democratic order that is displayed in the APF's use of both direct action as well as their involvement in the officially legitimate channels of expression[7]. This conclusion can be applied to the AEC as well, which grapples with similar strategic debates whilst maintaining an ideologically clear-cut approach to the capitalist state structures.

The Alliance

The APF and the AEC will not form coalitions with the ANC, mainly due to ideological reasons, as the ANC is considered an effective vehicle for a neo-liberal agenda, which these movements explicitly reject as a development model. The AEC is also disappointed with the SACP, much due to the central role played by the Western Cape MEC for Safety and Security, who is a leading member of the SACP and who has been officially involved in the clashes between the AEC and the provincial government.

The APF is divided on the issue of COSATU. Some members consider it an essential part of their strategy to win over the COSATU constituency, others that it is more important to organise outside of all Alliance structures. COSATU itself declared in its 2003 National Congress that it was willing to cooperate with progressive social movements – of which the TAC is one – but not with "narrow sectarian and divisive" movements, to which it counts the APF and AEC who are against cooperation with the leading government party.[8] The TAC has joined forces with COSATU in a Coalition fo job creation, and the APF has supported the strike of a COSATU affiliate, the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Saccawu), but there is a debate taking place among APF members and other activists and intellectuals linked to the more radical social movements about the strategic importance of COSATU to their struggles. This debate is as yet inconclusive, but one point made is that while COSATU's attitude

towards the social movements cannot determine the attitude of the social movements towards COSATU, it will nevertheless influence their interaction and attitude to some extent.[9] Again, a dialectical relationship is emphasised, where both sides have the chance to either alienate each other or move towards more corresponding positions.

How this relationship will play itself out depends on a number of factors, including the strategic debates within COSATU and the social movements. While these debates to some extent are based on general ideological differences, they are also are framed by the government's policy changes, by the state's intervention in the communities' protests, and by the change in composition and demands within the social movements and the unions themselves.

Demands

A common interpretation of the position of the new social movements is that they are still largely defensive in nature[10], though this is contested by some social movement activists who see their struggle as a forward-looking movement towards a new kind of society.[11] As has been demonstrated by this research, much of the activities revolve around reversing the extension of privatisation in its various guises, to stop the commodification of basic necessities, to prevent evictions, to demand that the Operational Treatment Plan is being adhered to.

The demands put forward by all the organisations are almost all reformist in nature; most concrete demands, even those emanating from the self-proclaimed socialist APF and AEC, are not totally incompatible with a capitalist economy. Considered on a case-by-case basis, most of the organisations' demands could be positively responded to without directly endangering the whole system of capital accumulation. However, placed in context, and organised into a coherent programme, the demands of all three organisations are potentially subversive of the capitalist order in its neo-liberal form, the system South Africa adopted through the introduction of GEAR in 1996.

The principles guiding neo-liberal ideology sees market forces as the main means of regulation and resource allocation, minimised state interference and cuts in social spending, privatisation and outsourcing of state assets, opening up of markets, and the introduction of deregularised forms of employment.[12] APF's demands to end the privatisation of and profit-making on basic services, to re-nationalise all privatised state assets, to end retrenchments and casualisation – all hit at the heart of a neo-liberal programme. AEC similarly demands the end to privatisation and commodification of water and electricity, the nationalisation of big banks and monopolies, free education for all, and an end to all evictions. These demands, if implemented, would undercut and circumscribe the chances to profit-making – and if the demands for nationalisation of state assets and private banks and an end to privatisation of basic services were achieved, the neo-liberal logic would be severely undermined and threatened.

One of the APF's long-term visions is to contest the view that there is no alternative to neo-liberalism and privatisation.[13] By placing demands that go squarely against the main tenets of neo-liberalism on the agenda, the vision of an alternative organisation of society is embedded even in the more reformist demands. In the case of the APF and the AEC, the demands serve a twofold purpose: to respond to direct infringements of everyday life of poor and working class people, and to subvert the logic of neo-liberal capitalism and usher in a socialist society.

The TAC's demands are decisively placed in the reformist realm, but, two researchers of the organisation claim,

> [t]here is no simple distinction between a campaign which aims to change the structure of society and one which seeks immediate gains. Single issue campaigns may challenge society's ordering, if they seek to redistribute power and resources. Embarking on these campaigns, winning gains and building on these could be the most feasible way to achieve social change.[14]

They continue:

> It is unclear why, beyond the rhetoric of its leaders, a movement seeking subsidised electricity for the poor is pressing for structural change, while one which wants poor people to enjoy free AIDS medication is not.[15]

This question is not irrelevant, and it should be at least considered as part of the issue of how far these new social movements really challenge the new democracy and/or the economic framework within which it resides. It is here argued that the visions of the APF and the AEC are more than simply "rhetoric of its leaders". These visions – limited and vague as they may be – frame the actions, internal education and socio-economic critique and give them a meaning and aim which are different from the TAC's. Visions also impact upon strategic alliances and tactics, the practical implementation of ideology, which can serve to place movements closer to or further way from the official developmental approach.

Nevertheless, as is consistently argued here, the TAC might develop a more comprehensive critique of the national and international socio-economic framework through their nascent campaigns for job creation and a unified health care sector. These campaigns are broader than the demand for treatment, and touch on socio-economic issues that so far have been placed outside of the TAC's main objectives, and as such have the potential to open up new debates and thinking within the movement.

Tactics

In their tactical approaches, the TAC does not hesitate to break the law if necessary to make a statement, and the organisation has a great number of activists who are prepared to be arrested, abused by police and lambasted by important political figures such as the Minister of Health. However, the actions waged by the TAC are more often than not symbolic. The occupation of Ministers' offices during the Civil Disobedience Campaign carried powerful messages about the accountability of elected representatives to their constituencies and constituted at the same time an obvious law infringement. The importation of generic drugs to make a point regarding the high prices of treatment

medicine was likewise an illegal and highly symbolic act that drew a lot of media attention, and thus also served to highlight to the broader public the immorality of the pharmaceutical companies' profit-making in the face of thousands of dying people. As the TAC states, its struggle is literally about the difference between life and death, and there is no mistaking the militancy of their activists and their commitment to the rights of everyone living with HIV/AIDS.

The AEC and the APF also display militancy and dedication to their cause, and have been extensively targeted by the state's security and policing branches as a result. They likewise utilise the newly opened democratic space to demonstrate, occupy, picket and debate. But there is an important element that is part of the AEC's and APF's tactics that is largely missing from TAC's repertoire: that of directly undercutting, minimising or impeding profit-making, commodification and privatisation, the cornerstones of the neo-liberal configuration.

The tactics employed by these movements are serving several purposes. Beyond the very immediate goal of accessing necessary basic services that have been discontinued due to inability to pay, Prishani Naidoo, APF Founding Member and Member of the Research Sub-Committee, describes how the illegal reconnection of water and electricity is used to explode the notion that there is no alternative to commodification of basic services and how the reconnections became a concrete and direct way to re-appropriate basic services.[16] The obstruction of Johannesburg Water's implementation of pre-paid water meters in Phiri, Soweto, made the project "seriously delayed by resistance" and fall several months behind schedule, causing the council-owned but privately managed company to loose a large amount of money.[17] These and other tactics, such as the prevention of evictions, that are directly disruptive of the state's and private stakeholders' financial recovery and profit-making ventures, are

> responses to an immediate need that alone is insufficient to solve the long-term problems facing the constituencies, but represents an essential component in the dialectical relationship between practical action to ensure daily survival and the deepening of a radical critique of capitalist power relations.[18]

The struggle against pre-paid meters is thus more than an economic struggle. Placed in the neo-liberal context, the action of destroying pre-paid meters also becomes a symbol for resisting the individualisation of the responsibility for accessing basic services. By resisting the enforced individualism, a demand for a more collective mode of organisation and decision-making is implicitly made, as is the demand that service delivery is the responsibility of the state, not the individual citizen. The rejection of commodification of basic necessities such as water becomes a rejection of the commodification of life itself and a demand for a society that puts people before profits. As such, the pre-paid meters have simultaneously a very real impact on poor and working class people's ability to access water and electricity, and a symbolic status:

> *The meter is the most profound symbol of neo-liberalism. It brings together its two most important characteristics, the commodification of the basics for life and the development of new forms of control. Through the pre-paid meter, life is turned into a site of accumulation, and people cut themselves off. This is our brave new world!*[19]

To refuse to pay for water and electricity and to refuse to move out of homes seized by the banks for bond defaults is to reject the neo-liberal logic. In the sphere of reproduction, where most struggles of the new social movements are situated, the refusal to pay becomes "the basis of strategic interventions against capital":

> For South African movements, the refusal to pay is an important condition of their interventions. It is effective not only in the manner in which it undermines capitalist accumulation but also in its de-ordering of neo-liberal forms of rule.[20]

As has been demonstrated, for analysts and leading activists of the APF and AEC, there is no doubt about the direction of its struggles or the anti-capitalism implicit in their tactics. However, there are questions emanating from within about how deeply entrenched these analyses are. The defensive struggles waged on the ground have not yet translated into a holistic campaign against the capitalist system *per se*, despite their potentially subversive implications. For instance, one APF activist observes, the prevention of evictions under the banner of the AEC has not developed into a broad

campaign against the state's market-drive approach to housing, and the rank-and-file of the APF and AEC at large still consider their struggles as immediate, engaged in to realise reforms within the capitalist system:

> There is a danger, therefore, that the 'anti-capitalist' leaders of the movements could find themselves becoming increasingly impatient with a base that retreats when the state reforms the worse excesses of its market-driven policies.[21]

Ideologies

It is clear that the community struggles taking place are not in the first place aimed at overthrowing the state but at holding the elected government accountable for its promises and responsibilities, which is a key objective for the social movements, especially on local level. In this sense, their struggles are aimed at effecting "a radical change in the character and content of democratic governance."[22] However, the demand for this "radical change" is, firstly, implicit. Secondly, it is based on the immediate failure of the present policy-makers' to respond to their constituencies, not on a clear ideological understanding of the fallacies of the capitalist neo-liberal system. This understanding is being developed in the APF and the AEC through political education, as has been established in the preceding chapters, but according to the activists driving the education programmes, there is still a long way to go before there is a sufficiently coherent grasp of the meaning of socialism and the impact the capitalist structure has on the everyday life of communities before these movements can claim the status of fully-fledged socialist, anti-systemic movements.

It should also be pointed out that the fact that attempts are made to hold the present representative system 'accountable' to its citizens implies that there is a recognition that there is a – small but real – possibility that the system can actually do so. On the other hand, should the system fail to provide for its citizens, it can be exposed as a systemic failure as opposed to a local anomaly of neo-liberalism. The APF and the AEC are trying to deepen the understanding of the system, of capitalism in its neo-liberal form, among its

members. The international contacts, the solidarity with activists around the world that is given and received by the APF and the AEC may be one of the more effective tools for these organisations to use when trying to demonstrate the fallacy of a global system as opposed to a specific South African malfunction.

While continuing to place reformist demands to the government, the APF and the AEC have concluded that their ultimate goals can never be met under a capitalist dispensation. On an ideological level, the aspirations that include the de-commodification of basic necessities, the collectivisation of social organisation, and the democratisation of economic control, would in effect mean that these two movements would close themselves off from anything else except localised, issue-based negotiations with representatives of the bourgeois state.

In practice, though, the engagement with recognised officials regarding social issues such as services delivery and evictions continues, and does on occasion bring positive results. While this seems to happen too rarely to influence the general view the leaders of these organisations have of the ANC-led representative structures – that they are unwilling and/or unable to respond to their constituencies' demands – the strategies of these two organisations are employed within the existing democratic framework and must as such take all avenues of influence and expression into consideration.

The TAC is waging a more limited and issue-based struggle, and can thus be more accommodating in its analysis of the democratic government. The constraints imposed on the ability of the TAC to achieve its main goals – to introduce accessible treatment for all people living with HIV/AIDS in the public health care sector, to develop an affordable quality health care sector for all, and to prevent more HIV infections – are not as inhibiting, as has been proven by the successes the TAC has secured. The Operational Plan is not yet fully functioning and needs to be taken more seriously by decision-makers, according to the TAC, but the fact that such a Plan exists and has started to provide treatment and care is testimony to TAC's ability to mobilise people and put pressure on the government, as well as of how flexible bourgeois institutions can be.

By virtue of not having adopted a staunch anti-capitalist or anti-ANC position, the TAC might be more in tune with the broad community base and is capable of drawing support from a more diverse base.

> The APF, unlike the TAC, has not been able to achieve a moral hegemony, as in the case of TAC with their campaign for the free distribution of antiretroviral drugs. A clear case has been made by the TAC of the moral bankruptcy of the South African government, whereas the APF still has a long way to go in mobilising the broadest sections and sympathy of society.[23]

The TAC's struggles are by itself considered reformist and attainable within a capitalist framework, and so there is no disjuncture between TAC's campaigns and their everyday struggles, and their gains have by other social movement activists sometimes been attributed to the government's defence of the poor and

> [TAC's] approach has been to see these victories as a legitimisation of the state's pro-poor policies, thus further entrenching the hegemonic project of the ruling class.[24]

The State

This might be an important reason why the TAC has enjoyed a higher level of tolerance from the state so far: the organisation does not lay claim to undermining the capitalist base of the South African economy and has no aspirations towards a wholesale systemic change. As has been shown, TAC is not against profit-making *per se*, or even the patent laws that are being used to keep monopoly over the manufacturing of drugs and keep their prices high:

> We realise that drug companies need incentives to manufacture new medicines and to recover the costs of researching and developing their drugs. We also aren't opposed to pharmaceutical companies making a profit. But it is clear that something is very wrong when patent protection keeps the prices of life-saving drugs so high that millions of people are dying, while the pharmaceutical industry continues to be one of the most profitable in the world.[25]

The TAC goes on to explain that to introduce generic drug manufacturing in Africa "will not affect drug company profits" as so little of it is made in this continent.[26] Thus, the TAC has framed its demands in a pragmatic approach that displays an awareness of the constraints imposed by a capitalist economy without seeking to challenge it. The reformist struggles of the TAC are not presented as anything else but reformist, and accurate as their criticism of the government and some of its representatives may be, the responsiveness of some local and provincial governments to TAC's demands is enough to sustain its confidence in the effectiveness and democratic value of representative institutions in and of themselves.

Significantly, the TAC is not criticising the macro-economic policies of the government and is prepared to build an amicable relationship with the state's representatives when that is conducive for its goals, which creates a marked difference between itself and social movements such as the APF and the AEC. However, besides the ideological and strategic positions on the state, the TAC also considers its approach a matter of important tactical choice. The ANC still commands considerable support on the ground, and the legitimacy of the democratic government is something "activists forget at their own peril."[27]

> A major tactical error would be to lose support among our members as other social movements have done when they are seen to be threatening democratically elected leaders.[28]

The involvement of the TAC in broader campaigns against unemployment and poverty is both a sign that the organisation's social outlook has broadened, and it may at the same time serve as a catalyst for a more politically critical direction, as happened with APF and AEC when more issues were added to their campaigns. At the moment, though, TAC representatives see no contradiction in achieving an improvement in the health sector within the existing context:

In terms of improving the health system, it's still a long way to go, but we will achieve that. I'm saying this with confidence because I know that when TAC embarks on something, we usually achieve it... We might not achieve it this year, we might not achieve it next year, but it's a long-term goal.[29]

State Response

The government has paid attention to the new social movements in the form of police and security intervention of the kind detailed in the chapter on state responses, but besides the day-to-day emphasis on law and order, political recognition has been given from the highest levels of the state to the politics and tactics of these movements. Rather than considering the more left-wing movements as a natural addition to the new democracy, that can challenge entrenched ideas and policy-making from the viewpoint of the continued disadvantaged communities, they are often portrayed as insidious forces working to undermine the gains the South African democratic transition has made. President Mbeki has argued that:

Our movement and its policies are also under sustained attack from the domestic and foreign left sectarian factions that claim to be the best representatives of the workers and the poor of our country. They accuse our movement of having abandoned the working people, saying that we have adopted and are implementing neo-liberal policies...The resultant false characterisation of our movement and its policies enables the left sectarian factions to explain why they wage a struggle against the national liberation movement, while being perfectly comfortable with the reality that, in this regard, they occupy the same trench with the anti-socialist forces they claim are their sworn enemies.[30]

Within statements like these and actions like police brutality, conclude the APF and AEC, lies the need to defend a market-based, neo-liberal structure that severely inhibits the government's redistributive intentions and at the same time uphold the impression that the situation for poor people is improving; when the basis upon which ANC's policies rest are threatened or challenged, all attempts possible are made to undermine and discredit the groups from where the challenge came.

This is what Shah (2002) argues: that the state is more "soft" with reformist social movements than with movements that have more ambitious objectives.[31] It can also be argued that the more antagonistic and disruptive tactics a movement displays, the more targeted by state forces does it become, as it is considered a serious threat to social stability. The APF and the AEC meet two of the suggested criteria for the state's often negative attention: they have official ideologies that aspire to be socialist, and their tactics are often severely – and deliberatively so – disruptive of private and public infrastructure projects, official meetings and other events. Though the TAC is rarely as disruptive in their tactics as the other movements, the organisation has broken the law a number of times to make its demands heard. Still, these legal infringements are, as demonstrated, not accompanied by revolutionary rhetoric or a critique of the macro-economic system of South Africa and the world, and the difference in the state's attitude towards the three movements indicates that the TAC's tactics are then not considered as destabilising, challenging or uncompromising as those of the APF and the AEC.

The impact the social movements have had on policy making and their successes in securing moratorium on evictions and debt write-offs signify some important trends in the South African democratic transition. Firstly, the democratic space is large enough for permitting new social movements to organise and mobilise against government's policies. The TAC has managed to effectively use this space to rally people around specific issues and consolidate a large membership and support from important national and international actors, and the freedom of expression and organisation has provided communities with room for articulating their needs and demands. The contradictory trend according to the movements is, second, that this democratic space for some of the movements is being undercut and circumscribed.

The AEC and APF consider the motivation behind the state's intolerant response to their activities as an attempt to weaken their campaigns and aims because they run contrary to the requirements of the South African capitalist economy. As much as the leaders of these organisations are clear that theirs is an (at least implicitly) anti-capitalist struggle, they are convinced that the state and its representatives see their struggles the same way,

hence its hostility to them. Having resolved to adopt a liberal democratic dispensation where one important condition for the transition was to leave all major ownership patterns intact, the government has no choice but to quell any serious, organised, contestation to this order.

The response to the movements' mobilisations in the form of police brutality during evictions and demonstrations is always considered as repressive and undemocratic, no matter what laws the activists break. This attitude has its roots in the basic ideology of the APF and the AEC: that their struggles for greater equality and popular control over resource distribution are intrinsically legitimate, while the government – democratically elected or not – is supporting illegitimate capitalist interests and is thus reneging on its mandate to uplift poor and working class communities. As such, the government is prioritising the needs of a minority over those of a large majority. To attempt to suppress popular demands and uprisings is undemocratic in a capitalist setting, as the suppression is employed to protect capitalist interests such as undemocratically controlled and illegitimately obtained private property.

The state's police and intelligence intervention and attempts to discredit the movements and their campaigns is a source of major concern for most activists. The TAC, relatively sheltered from any overt suppression, was forced to respond to the suppression of their demonstration in Queenstown as a tactic of intimidation used against them, and has criticised the government's unreasonable attitude towards the spontaneous riots against the crisis of poor living conditions taking place all over the country during 2005, which saw politicians threaten people with the NIA and blame the protests on vaguely defined "sinister forces".[32]

While state intervention is not on the same level as during the apartheid era (though some activists have drawn a close comparison, as was shown in previous chapters) social movements feel that the state's reaction has become more severe since they reached status as a serious community-based opposition after the WSSD in 2002, and it is clear to them why: they pose a threat to the ANC-led government's political hegemony and the

economic policies they are pursuing. The situation is made more complicated due to the legacy of the apartheid security services machinery, which has ushered in its personnel, mindsets and practices into the new democratic state.[33]

For APF and AEC, and to some extent TAC, the suppression of marches and the vilification of movements to undermine their cause and popularity is a serious flaw in the democratic system. Here, the bias of the state towards the rich comes out in force, as poor people who are alienated from the capitalist system are being attacked when claiming what is rightfully theirs. The state's claims that it is restoring law and order is dismissed as attempts to hide the real pretext for security intervention: to undermine the anti-neo-liberal class struggle. In the mean time, the state insists it is the legitimate democratic channel for social change and development, and attempts to pressure it to change policies through means that either undermine profit-making and cost-recovery mechanisms and/or break the law are in this democratic setting illegitimate. The two sides are locked in a relationship characterised by uncompromising positions polarised in terms of ideologies, opinions of what constitutes legitimate action and expectations of the democratic state.

Representation

The kind of democracy adopted in South Africa in 1994 rests on a partial separation between the political and the socio-economic spheres, where democracy is synonymous with the capitalist combination of free markets and representative electoral arrangements. The South African Constitution is attempting to reconcile socio-economic rights with the protection of private property, a protection reinforced to some extent by the global influence of advanced capitalism. As two APF activists argue:

> The result has been a perpetual 'crisis of democracy' wherein institutionalised practices of representative democracy such as elections make little difference since the key societal decisions are taken by 'the market'. In this context the emergence of new social movements is a contestation of this narrow vision of democracy.[34]

According to Paul Hirst (1988), one of the problems with representation as a procedural mechanism of democracy is that there is a conceptual conflation between choosing political representatives and the actual laws and policies. In fact, voters select the people who are involved in decision-making on the basis of general political platforms, but not the decisions themselves, and thus "[a]n election is not a pure expression of the peoples' will but a choice between a small number of political parties."[35]

In South Africa, the ANC's reliance on this conflation is sometimes drawn upon in order to legitimise policies that are met with popular objection and present them as 'the peoples' will'. This approach can be distinguished in President Thabo Mbeki's attitude towards protests against the Igoli 2002 plan, introduced in 1999 and captured by one social movement activist:

> At this time, Mbeki was using the phrase, 'The people have spoken', to imply that if people had voted for the ANC they must support its neoliberal policies and shouldn't now oppose them.[36]

Here, the notion of elections to government and parliament as the ultimate manifestation of the reach of peoples' power has been taken to its conclusion and is expressing the problematic contradiction highlighted by Hirst. It has been argued that the fact that most social movements have opted to stay outside of the political institutional framework in South Africa is a sign that the established political structures, mainly accessible to the general public in the form of elections, are not considered as effective avenues for forwarding the interests of the poor and the working class:

> The existing state, its institutionalised politics and its socio-economic policies are increasingly being seen, and treated, as a central target of a class struggle emanating from poor communities.[37]

Again, this is the analysis of leaders and intellectuals involved in the social movements. Whether or not the rank-and-file of the movements consider their disinterest in election and their choice to stay outside of the available state negotiating structures as a conscious class-based tactic has, as shown above, been questioned. For different reasons, some APF and AEC members do vote for the ANC in elections, despite partaking in activities

opposing the local councillors or national government representatives, and it is demonstrated that many rank-and-file activists want to participate in elections, albeit with their own candidates. Thus, there is an ambiguous approach to institutional politics within these movements that is not fully resolved.

The local governments are the main targets for community discontent, both in terms of dwindling voting and active protest, but also in terms of direct engagement and attempted negotiation. The commodification of basic services was facilitated by a drastic decrease in grants and subsidies flowing from the national government to the local governments and city councils, responsible for service delivery. Local government had to resort to privatisation, cost-recovery measures and commercialisation of basic services in order to make up for the shortfall in revenue caused by the subsidy cuts. One result of this process was a "huge escalation" in basic service use costs and an increase in cost-recovery measures such as water and electricity cut-offs.[38] A second result is the corresponding dissatisfaction and counter-organisation in poor communities, and the state's intervention trying to control the expressions of frustration and mobilisation. The conflict playing itself out between the state and poor communities is in danger of structuring a "self-reproducing discourse of marginalisation and repression."[39]

The privatisation and corporatisation of basic services serve to keep decisions regarding their management out of the general public's hands, which is given little or no influence over operations or accessibility. It can be argued that even if not all social movement activists or supporters are consciously seeking to overthrow or undermine the capitalist system of capital accumulation, they are nevertheless demanding a say in how basic services, housing and health care are being distributed and controlled, and as such they do pose a direct challenge to the democratic deficit inherent in a representative system where material necessities are placed in private hands or forced into a regiment of cost-recovery and profit-making; a challenge against the system where political democracy is seen "as some sort of neutral principle floating somewhere outside material relations".[40] Perhaps the best characterisation of the new social movements is presented in these quotes:

> While organised resistance under neo-liberalism might be limited, it is significant in that it represents a real challenge to long-held ideas that change cannot happen except through those institutions acceptable to capitalism, and speaks to an incipient movement attempting to forge alternatives to capitalist relations in the here and now.[41]

> The movements may be seen as a political project in the making, but this is dependent on continual processes of political clarification through struggle.[42]

All the social movements – TAC, APF and AEC – are challenging the narrow, institutionalised view of democracy. By building popular movements that are independent of the state and the government party, they are contesting the liberal notion that democracy equals the successful institutionalisation of free and fair elections to parliament and local government structures, freedom of information, expression and organisation, and the safety from arbitrary violence, to mention the most important liberal democratic values. Their very organisation and claim to be heard by representatives that often either ignore their demands or only give in after sustained mass action points to two things: that the elected representatives are not automatically responsive to its constituencies, and that this is recognised by the people of these organisations. They refuse to take the new democracy for granted and have understood that to make the electoral and constitutional structures resemble any kind of democracy, they will have to use them alongside mass action and extra-legal activities.

The Impact

All the social movements analysed here have made an impact on the South African socio-political landscape and policy-making. The ESKOM electricity arrears write-off of R1, 4 billion in Soweto and other Johannesburg townships in 2003 was a deal signed between SANCO and ESKOM, but there is recognition coming from other quarters than the APF and its SECC affiliate that it is these social movements that set the whole process in motion and forced the agreement to be signed. The *Mail and Guardian* editor, Ferial Haffajee, and journalist Vicki Robinson commented:

> While they were not part of the negotiation or the signing of the agreement, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) were undoubtedly part of its genesis. For two years both organisations have highlighted the electricity crisis in the Gauteng townships in ways that have lit a spark among the communities they organise.[43]

These writers then labelled the write-off "a huge moment".[44] As has been shown earlier, the AEC has managed to compel the state to put a moratorium on evictions in certain areas and has succeeded in brokering deals regarding bond repayments. The TAC has made an obvious impact on HIV/AIDS policy through its blend of the "use of power with engagement".[45] "I can't imagine that the ANC's shift in policy around Aids would've happened without the influence of the social movement", says one civil society analyst.[46] It has been noted that the ANC and its Alliance partners are responding to the mobilisation of the new social movements by setting up their own community structures, such as SANCO, in order to keep the initiative over community organisation and negotiation with the state without giving any legitimacy to the social movements outside of the Alliance structure.[47]

The role of the mobilisations around the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) is considered an important milestone in the development of a radical, community and grassroots based opposition to the democratic government. The massive WSSD march on 31 August 2002, detailed in the chapter on the state's response, afforded the social movements a "grudging recognition" from all forces to the right of the movements, including the members of the Tripartite Alliance: "Probably on this day the South African political landscape was irrevocably changed".[48] From this day, the government had to take notice of left-wing forces organising among its own traditional constituency in opposition to its policies, and it had to start engaging these forces on a serious note. Haffajee & Robinson concur:

> In an era of impotent electoral opposition where talk is ample, but ideas thin on the ground, the social movements are proving a feisty young force. And as much as the government may lampoon them for practising the politics of the impossible and the irrational, it's clear they're making a mark where it counts – on power.[49]

Conclusion

As should be clear from the above analysis, the answer to the research question –

What are the differences between the major South African social movements in terms of their ideological, tactical and strategic approaches to the liberal-democratic state?

– involves multiple factors and complexities. It has been established that there is a difference between the TAC on the one hand and the APF and AEC on the other, where the former finds itself more comfortably inserted in the new democracy. By taking a multi-class, undoubtedly reformist approach to civil society organisation, the TAC is, through its popular mobilisation that often brings positive results to their struggles, adding value to the liberal democratic set-up without challenging its basis. The APF and AEC are taking advantage of the democratic space opened up post-1994 and their organisations are an integral part of a liberal democracy which, in theory at least, encourages a vivid, exploratory civil society. However, their long-term aims and some of the tactics they use are diametrically opposed to the conception of a democracy resting on the right to private property where "the deliberative process and day-to-day supervision over the government are well protected from the influence from the masses".[50]

By reconnecting water and electricity, by refusing to pay arrears or move out of houses, they attempt to take control over the distribution of resources in the form of basic services and housing, to remove private control down to collective community level, and as such APF and AEC are, albeit on a small level, posing a challenge to the hegemonic liberal democratic concept and the neo-liberal logic.

Still, there is sometimes a difference between the symbolic significance of the community struggles and the tactics employed, and the immediate reasons behind them; a difference between challenging specific policies and the neo-liberal system as a whole. Many of the struggles, against water and electricity cut-offs, against evictions, for the roll-out of anti-retrovirals, are defensive and necessary for the immediate reproduction of

basic life. As has been demonstrated, there is still no uniform or well-developed view of an alternative to capitalism or neo-liberalism, and the word 'revolution' has not yet been internalised in the lingua of these movements.

The TAC does not have any ambitions to change the liberal democratic system, and the organisation is comfortable with its role as a social movement pressing for policy changes within it. The organisation does not aspire to move into the political sphere of government and parliament, or change the representative system. It has managed to effectively make use of the institutions put in place to secure a democratic representative system, such as the courts, corporatist structures like NEDLAC, and it has built cordial relationships with several state structures and representatives. While its demands do entail the allocation of more funds in the public health care sector, and internationally, its demands for cheap, generic anti-retrovirals would marginally cut into the profits of pharmaceutical monopolies, the organisation does not demand any major change in macro-economic policies or neo-liberal concepts of service provision and housing.

The APF and AEC, which display many similarities in terms of demands, tactics, international outlook and analysis of the state and the capitalist system, inhabit a different position. At this stage, they are struggling to secure and, where space is given, expand access to services and housing. These struggles are in analyses framed and presented as anti-systemic, and they are working towards developing a serious critique of the system as a whole while experimenting with alternative democratic structures within their own organisations and affiliates.

Both the APF and the AEC are planning to bring in new ways of democratisation in the existing representative structures if they are successful in the local elections, and their suggestions of how to deepen democracy and accountability are very similar. As is demonstrated by their diverse debates on elections and subsequent decisions to let the individual affiliates decide whether or not to participate with candidates, there is not a wholesale rejection of the democratic structures as such, and there are important sections of these movements that see benefits with participating in the system. The APF and AEC

furthermore raise important concerns about the state's intervention in their struggles and put the state's security response in its socio-economic and historical context, and have as such also a watchdog role in monitoring the new democracy. Their reformist demands serve multiple purposes: of alleviating direct crises caused by withheld service delivery, of stretching the limits of the capitalist society and force representatives operating within it to respond to their constituencies, and of creating an awareness of alternatives and the importance of struggle as a mans to develop such alternatives.

In the end, all three social movements are still relatively new on the political scene, and all of them have already passed through changes in terms of members, aims, breadth and width of issues they struggle for. It is possible that the TAC will be radicalised as a result of its broadening view of struggle that has developed; this is what happened to the APF and the AEC as more communities with different issues joined together in movements. It is also possible that the APF and AEC will be more moderated if they win a few local council seats. If a closer relationship between COSATU and the APF develops, it will add a new dimension to the struggles of the APF, as a large section of employed workers will be an important part of their campaigns, as opposed to a majority of unemployed people, youth and pensioners. Such a relationship is highly dependent on COSATU's attitude, and will most probably only develop alongside a radicalisation of the trade union and its distancing itself from the Alliance structure.

Depending on changes in the international balance of forces and the developments of the global social movement, it is possible that the movements will adapt according to a new world situation. By participating in important global social movement events and by building international solidarity, all three movements are simultaneously a part of influencing and directing political trends. The TAC has attracted international interest and acclamation for its struggle for the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, and the APF is a driving force in regional Social Forums where numerous African civil society structures participate to discuss political and social direction for their movements. The AEC has been visited by scholars and activists from all over the world, who often testify

to having been inspired by the movement. Thus, these movements are placed in yet another reciprocal relationship, on international level.

The final conclusion is that the TAC is for now at ease with its role in democratic South Africa, while the APF and the AEC have serious ambitions to undermine the neo-liberal capitalist system as a whole and to introduce alternative ways to produce, distribute and control resources, to move the control over resources out of the hands of the few and into communities. So far, however, they are very much "a story in creation"[51], with a vision which is developing amidst immediate, reformist and direct struggles.

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[2] McKinley, D. & Veriava, A. "Arresting Dissent: State Repression and Post-Apartheid Social Movements", Research Report: Violence and Transition Series, CSVR, 2005

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[4] Mark Heywood, quoted in Friedman, S. & Mottiar, S. 2004, op cit, p. 14

[5] Friedman, S. & Mottiar, S. 2004, op cit, p. 13

[6] Buhlungu, S. "The Anti-Privatisation Forum: A Profile of a Post-Apartheid Social Movement", (A case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa), UKZN, 2004, p. 20

[7] Ibid, p. 8

[8] Greenberg, S. & Ndlovu, N. "Civil society relationships", Development Update: Mobilising for Change – The Rise of New Social Movements in South Africa, Vol. 5, No 2, INTERFUND, November, 2004, p. 40

[9] Lehulere, O. "The New Social Movements, COSATU, and the 'New UDF'", discussion paper, August, 2005, p. 2

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Appendix 1: Questions for TAC, APF and AEC Activists

1. Why does this organisation exist? How and by who was it founded?
2. What other groups do you cooperate with on a regular basis?
3. What are your short-term goals and objectives?
4. What are your long-term goals and objectives?
5. Have your objectives evolved since your organisation was formed up to now?
6. Are your members in general in agreement about the goals/objectives and the methods you use to reach them?
7. How broad/big is the popular support for your goals and objectives? (Estimates based on what?)
8. How broad is the popular support for the methods you use to reach our goals and objectives? (Estimates based on what?)
9. Is the democratic space in SA big enough for you to campaign the way you want/need?
10. Are the elected representatives (on all government levels) responsive to your demands? Generally? Some representatives but not all?
11. Why/why not are they responsive to your demands?
12. How do you notice whether they are responsive or not?
13. Is it possible to reach your goals under this kind of dispensation? How will it happen/why can't it happen?
14. Does your organisation have a position on elections? What is it? What positions came up during the debate on elections?

Appendix 2: Questions for Martin Legassick (AEC)

1. What is the relationship between the AEC and Socialist Alternative?
2. How developed is the socialist consciousness in the AEC?
3. Is there a gap between the leadership's consciousness and that of the rank-and-file?
4. How does the partnership between the AEC and Socialist Alternative manifest itself? Campaigns?
5. What is the Coalition for Decent Housing for All?
6. Have discussions on elections been held in the AEC? What is the AEC's approach to elections?

Interviews

Anti-Privatisation Forum

John Appolis – Chairperson, Johannesburg, 29 June, 2005

Nina Benjamin – Member of the Education Committee, Johannesburg, 29 June, 2005

Thandekile Dodo – Regional Coordinator (the Vaal), Johannesburg, 29 June, 2005

Prishani Naidoo – Founding Member and Member of the Research Sub-Committee, Johannesburg, 1 July, 2005

Trevor Ngwane – Organiser, Harare, Zimbabwe, 13-15 October, 2005

Ahmed Veriava – Founding Member and former Head of Legal Sub-Committee, telephonically, 17 January, 2006

Anti-Eviction Campaign

Ashraf Cassiem – Legal Coordinator and Interim Coordinator, Cape Town, 4 October, 2005, and telephonically 17 January and 16 February, 2006

Fonky Goboza – Provincial Deputy Secretary, Cape Town, 21 September, 2005

Martin Legassick – Political Advisor/Educator, Cape Town, 25 October, 2005, and telephonically, 17 January, 2006

Max Ntanyana – Acting Chairperson, Khayelitsha AEC/Deputy Chairperson Western Cape AEC, Cape Town, 5 October, 2005

Treatment Action Campaign

Xolani Kunene – Campaigns Organiser (Gauteng), Johannesburg, 10 November, 2005

Thembeka Majali – Provincial Coordinator (Western Cape), Cape Town, 3 November, 2005

Events Attended

Opening Rally of the TAC National Congress, Cape Town, 23 September, 2005

Mass Rally: Decent Housing For All, Now! O.R. Tambo Hall, Khayelitsha, Cape Town, 17 September, 2005

TAC March: 200 000 People on ARVs by 2006!, Cape Town, 17 february, 2005

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