TITLE: FACTORS AFFECTING PARLIAMENT'S PERFORMANCE OF BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT IN BOTSWANA

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DECLARATION

I, Keneilwe Pearl Marata, hereby declare that the work on which this thesis is based is my original work (except where acknowledgments indicate otherwise) and that neither the whole work or any part of it has been, is being or is to be submitted for anther degree in this or any other University. I authorise the University to reproduce for the purpose of research either the whole or any portion of the contents in any manner whatsoever.

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To my late mother, your memory lives on.

ABSTRACT

Parliaments are bestowed with core functions of representation, legislation, constituency service as well as oversight and scrutiny of the executive. Parliaments are expected to perform these core functions effectively. While that is the case, the effectiveness of parliaments in doing so is often affected by several factors occurring both from inside and outside of parliament. Legislative scholarship has brought to our attention several factors and conditions affecting the effective performance of parliaments the world over. This study assesses the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has improved or weakened in selected factors affecting parliamentary performance. The selected factors assessed in this study include parliamentary capacity and resources, parliamentary autonomy and internal complexity, formal powers of parliament as well as political party dynamics. The study further assesses the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has effectively performed its budgetary oversight role as a result of its improved or weakened experience with the selected factors associated with better parliamentary performance.

In its analysis, the study makes use of data from various sources including survey data from the African Legislatures Project (ALP), the Afrobarometer and Open Budget Survey (OBS) data. The study also uses data obtained through desk research and interviews. The study is divided into three sections where; Section one presents the introductory chapters 1 to 3. Section two 2 begins the analysis by assessing selected key factors associated with driving change for better performance in parliament as highlighted above. Still in Section two, the study further assesses the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has effectively performed its budgetary oversight role. In its last section (Section three), the study analyses selected key factors associated with making parliament more or less influential in its budgetary oversight role.

This study establishes in its findings that the parliament of Botswana has not experienced adequate growth and improvement in the selected factors associated with driving change for better parliamentary performance. For instance, the parliament of Botswana continues to be faced with challenges of limited capacity and resources. Additionally, parliament has not improved in its autonomy and complexity. When assessing parliament's performance of budgetary oversight, the study establishes that the parliament of Botswana has not effectively performed this role. Thus, this is attributed to its (parliament's) unfavourable experience with

the selected factors associated with better and improved parliamentary performance. Furthermore, the extent to which the parliament of Botswana is able to impact the budget process and thus provide effective budgetary oversight, has been attributed to other factors such as parliament's formal powers. Formal powers of the parliament of Botswana have been found to be limited. Additionally, the country's political dynamics have been found to be unfavourable towards parliament's effective performance.

Drawing from the study findings and conclusions, several recommendations are made, which mostly aim at enhancing parliament's performance, especially as it pertains to its budgetary oversight role. Some of the recommendations made include the need to increase parliament's financial, human and infrastructure resources; establishing specialised offices of parliament such as the Specialised Parliamentary Budget Office; as well as enhancing parliament's committee system to ensure that parliament operates with a well-developed committee system. Other recommendations include; improving parliament's legal framework including other formal rules and processes for parliamentary budget oversight. It is also recommended for the parliament of Botswana to develop and adopt a performance assessment tool for parliament and its committees. In the end, the study suggests further research that analyses in detail the impact of even more factors on the performance of parliament beyond parliament's budgetary oversight role.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AG AUDITOR GENERAL

ALP AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMME

APLESA ASSOCIATTION OF PARLIAMENTARY LIBRRIES OF EASTERN AND SOUTNHERN AFRICA

APRM AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

BDP BOTSWANA DEMOCRATIC PARTY

BIP BOTSWANA INDEPENDENCE PARTY

CPA COMMONWEALTH PALIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION

DAs DONOR AGENCIES

FEC FINANCE AND ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

IBP INTERNATIONAL BUDGET PARTNERSHIP

IFLA INERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF LIBRARY ASSOCIATIONS

I-NGOs INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

IPU INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNIT

MP MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

MPs MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

NGOs NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

OBI OPEN BUDGET INDEX

OBS OPEN BUDGET SURVEY

OP OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PAC PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE

PAP PAN AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

SADC-PF SADC PARLIAMENTARY FORUM

SEMPs SPECIALLY ELECTED MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

SONAs STANDING ORDERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

SPBOs SPECIALISED PARLIMENTARY BUDGET OFFICES

USHR UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction and the Problem

Parliaments, legislatures or assemblies as are commonly known in most jurisdictions in which they exist are the epitome of democracy. Ben-Zeev and Luckscheiter (2012:4) agree that 'strong legislatures are the bedrock of representational democracies'. As the epitome of democracy, parliaments are bestowed with core functions of representation, legislation, constituency service and oversight. Parliament's core function of representation allows members of parliament to act on behalf of their voters and citizens by 'collecting, aggregating, and expressing their concerns, opinions and preferences' (Barkan 2009:7). Through their legislative powers, parliaments exercise the power to make laws and pass policies. As Barkan (ibid) puts it, 'at a minimum, legislatures pass laws. More significantly, legislatures contribute to the making of public policy by crafting legislation and then pass such legislation into law'. Parliament's constituency service function on the other hand involves members of parliament (MPs)' regular visitations to constituencies to assist their constituents and to also take part in constituency development projects aimed at improving the livelihoods of constituents (Barkan, ibid). Lastly, parliament's oversight ad scrutiny function focuses mainly on the activities of the executive, ensuring accountability and effective implementation of policies. Barkan (ibid) explains in this regard that 'legislatures exercise oversight of the executive branch to ensure that policies agreed upon at the time they are passed into law are in fact implemented by the state'. Central to parliament's oversight of the executive is its budgetary oversight function. Through this function, parliament ensures that executive 'spending decisions are in-line with national priorities' (Botswana Parliamentary Committees Manual, 2014).

Parliaments are expected to perform the above functions effectively and thus they (parliaments) are often seen to be instituting certain reforms and changes to position themselves for better and effective performance. However, even as they engage in the reformation activities which bring about the expectation for better and improved performance, most parliaments, especially those in developing countries face numerous challenges. A report by the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (2008:14) reiterates in part that, 'African parliaments face acute challenges. Many lack formal powers and agreed clear procedures. They also lack institutional

capacity; and incentive structures to encourage MPs to exercise their responsibilities'. Another scholar Salih (2005:13), acknowledges in addition that,

> The extent to which African parliaments have been able to discharge [their] generic functions is contingent on several factors, not least the nature of the political environment within which they operate, the strength of political institutions and civil society organizations, and the constitutional arrangements governing the relationship between the legislature and the executive.

While much is known and well-documented about the impact of several factors on the performance of parliaments in the Western world, the experiences of African legislatures have not been adequately addressed. Wehner (2004:1) proclaims for instance that 'historically, the study of the impact of legislatures on policy and budgets has been most fully developed in the United States (Oppenheimer 1983), … we still know little about these issues in non-congressional systems and in developing countries in particular'. It is in this light that this study seeks to draw a better understanding of how the parliament of Botswana has experienced some of the factors known to affect parliamentary performance and how the same parliament has in turn performed its budgetary oversight role, being one of its core allocated functions. The study does this by asking the following questions: *(i) How has the parliament of Botswana improved or weakened in factors associated with better and effective parliamentary performance? (ii) And how has parliament performed its budgetary oversight role as a result?*

1.2. Background on Reforms for Better Performance in the Parliament of Botswana

The parliament of Botswana like other parliaments elsewhere, has been allocated core functions of representation, legislative, constituency service and oversight as highlighted above. And like other parliaments, the parliament of Botswana is also expected to effectively deliver on these functions. And having faced many criticisms on its abilities[1], the parliament of Botswana has over the years engaged in numerous reform activities aimed at enhancing its performance. Reform efforts made by the parliament of Botswana can be traced as far back as the 1980s. For

[1] For instance, Serema (2000) and Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2006) have questioned the ability of parliament to scrutinize the budget and hold the executive accountable especially in financial oversight, which as highlighted above is one of the core functions of parliament.

instance, in March 1988, former Member of Parliament Honourable G.G. Sebeso presented a motion in parliament seeking for Parliament to be an independent institution unattached to the office of the president. The motion read in part that '…this honourable house strongly urges government to take steps to ensure that parliament as a supreme body becomes an independent institution not relegated to the position of a minor department under the office of the president …' (Hansard Report, Friday 11th March 1988, Hansard Report). Another call for reform was made on the 27th of February 2002, when former Speaker of Parliament, Honourable Ray Molomo, commissioned a task force to provide advice and guidance on parliament's independence from the executive. Through this exercise, parliament sought to curtail the problem of legislative over dominance by the executive, by reviewing the role of the legislature, the nature of the legislative-executive relations, the conditions of service and a code of conduct for MPs, the administration of Parliament and parliamentary control over its personnel; as well as the parliamentary committee structure' (ibid). Yet again, in September 2010, the parliament of Botswana appointed another task force, 'to review the recommendations of a previous study on the independence of parliament in Botswana'. In another move, former Speaker of Parliament Dr. Margaret Nasha appointed another task force in 2011, to investigate ways of strengthening parliamentary accountability, oversight and transparency especially the role played by parliament in the appointment and dismissal of Chief Executive Officers of oversight institutions[2].

In addition to the above-mentioned general parliamentary reforms, the parliament of Botswana has also instituted some notable reforms aimed specifically at enhancing its budgetary oversight role. For example, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) which is an important budgetary oversight committee in the parliament of Botswana, was transformed from being a Sessional Committee to a Standing Committee of parliament. As a Standing Committee, the PAC became a permanent and regular committee operating for the life of parliament. This was an improvement from the previous arrangement where the PAC stood to be dissolved at the end of each parliament as is the case with all sessional committees of parliament. Furthermore, while initially the chairperson of the PAC was selected from the ruling Botswana Democratic

2 Oversight institutions considered in the task included the Auditor General, the Botswana IEC, Ombudsman and the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). Each of these agencies plays a role in assisting parliament's oversight work as provided for in their mandates.

Party (BDP), this was later changed to ensure that the chairperson is appointed from the leading opposition political party. This is outlined in the Standing Orders as follows: 'one of such members who shall be a member of the opposition shall be selected as the chairperson by the committee of selection'. Another notable reform has been the seconding of senior audit personnel from the Auditor General's office to parliament. The seconded audit officer serves as the advisor to both the PAC and the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC). This move was deemed necessary as public budgets involve the use of accounting terminologies which ordinary MPs without financial or accounting background are not often familiar with. Thus, the audit officer assists budget committee MPs in understanding and interpreting budgetary matters raised in audit reports. Additionally, while the PAC used to conduct its business in private, this was since changed in 2011 was PAC hearings began to be held and conducted openly with various stakeholders in attendance. Former PAC chair, Honourable Modubule (Mmegi Newspaper, 2012) reckoned that holding the committee's meetings in public had the potential to help 'enhance the committee's oversight role and the accountability process and to promote public participation'. Opening PAC hearings to the public has been accredited for improving deliberations during hearings as committee members began to put more effort in preparing for hearings in order not to appear as ineffective before the public and media in attendance. The same also goes for accounting officers who now come well prepared to avoid being seen as incompetent should they fail to give satisfactory responses to the committee and by the public in attendance. This move by the PAC has also been applauded by the country's media, as captured in the Sunday Standard Newspaper (May 16, 2016) which complements parliament's budget committee stating that, 'we are glad that as a way of showing an itch to grow bigger teeth the committee found it important to have the PAC meetings held in public. Going public was a step in the right direction since it does not only enhance transparency but a way of earning credibility bearing in mind the power dynamics in Botswana'.

With the afore-mentioned reformation efforts, the expectation would have been for the parliament of Botswana to be more effective in the performance of its allocated functions. However, the parliament of Botswana remains challenged and some of its reform attempts have stalled and have been left incomplete. This has led some scholars and contributors in the country such as Dinokopila (2020) label the reform process in Botswana's parliament as 'a piece-meal reform'.

1.3. Research Argument/Hypotheses

This study's research problem and questions are set within the following 3 main arguments; firstly, the study suggests that, over time, the parliament of Botswana has experienced growth and improvement in key factors that drive change for better and effective parliamentary performance. Secondly, the study posits that in addition to improvement in factors associated with driving change for better performance, parliament has also experienced improvement in factors that make it more influential in the performance of budgetary oversight. These improvements have led to the third proposition that, the parliament of Botswana has as a result been better placed to effectively perform its allocated functions especially its budgetary oversight role.

1.4. Research Objectives

In line with the research questions and arguments put forth, this study's main objective is to establish the experience of the parliament of Botswana with selected factors affecting performance as well as determining how the same parliament has as a result performed its core function of budgetary oversight. The study will do so by; (i) assessing the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has improved or weakened in selected factors associated with better and improved parliamentary performance, (ii) assessing the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has effectively performed its budgetary oversight role and (iii) assessing the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has improved or weakened in selected factors making it more influential in budgetary oversight.

1.5. Theoretical Foundations

This study is rooted within the modernization and legislative institutionalization theories. Modernization theory which can be traced as far back as the 1950s, has been strongly linked with changes occurring within societies especially the previously traditional one. At its beginning modernization theory was understood within two ways, the evolutionary and functionalist theories. According to So (1990:19) the two approaches were born in the early nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the industrial and French revolutions. Literature argues that it is the revolutions that heightened the impact of modernization on productivity levels. For instance, So (ibid) proclaimed that the industrial revolution with its application of science and technology, led to rising productivity, a new factory production system, and the conquest

of the world market while the French revolution created a whole new political order based on equality, liberty, freedom and parliamentary democracy. While in its beginning modernization was viewed as a linear process that involved movement away from traditional societies to modernized ones, other modernization theorists such as Huntington (1968:32), have argued that modernization is not simply a process of economic change, it involves 'changes in virtually all areas of human thought and activity', hence it is often viewed as a complex process driven by several factors. Thus, within the modernization scholarship are several indicators of modernization such as industrialization, expansion of media use, increasing literacy and education as well as expansion of political participation (Huntington, 1968; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Apter, 1965). These have shown to drive the transformation of societies and individuals from traditional to modernity. Modernization scholars have argued that although not a modernization variable, age plays a role in changes in individuals and societies. Apter (ibid) argues for instance that, 'a modernization process depends heavily on youth precisely because members of this group are ordinarily the most eager to adopt modern roles.

Modernization in its original conceptualization did not escape criticism. Critics of the earlier conception of modernization showed dissatisfaction with earlier assumptions of a unidirectional and linear transition from traditional to modern settings. Many critics noted that change is not necessarily linear. The unidirectional approach was thus viewed as limiting as it oversimplifies the process. Thus, in Matunhu (2011:67)'s view, 'perhaps the most crippling weakness of the modernization theory is its oversimplified view of social change.' Additionally, earlier proponents of modernization presupposed incompatibility between tradition and modernity as Orobator (1991:273) puts it, 'to many, the two concepts are incompatible and diametrically opposed to each other'. However, modernization and tradition have since been shown to have the ability to coexist (Logan C. 2009; Chinsinga B, 2006; Ntsebeza L. 2003).

Even though as a theory modernization has faced some criticisms, the contributions it has and continue to make cannot be dispelled completely. Inglehart and Welzel (2005:1) have argued for instance that 'although the classic view of modernization was wrong on many points, the central insight – that socio economic development brings major social, cultural and political changes – is correct'. Therefore, the modernization argument remains useful even in this day.

Contemporary literature on modernization has displayed renewed belief in the perspective that socio economic development does bring about long-term changes in people's lifeways, believed to be driven by certain characteristic features of modernization such as rising educational levels, news media use, changing gender roles, wealth and high degree of social mobility and heightened participation among others. Additionally, while modernization argument has mostly focused on changes occurring within societies and to individuals in those societies, recent legislative scholarship acknowledges that modernization changes occurring within society and to the individuals in those societies also reflect within legislatures. Barkan (2004:236) attests for instance that, 'changes in the characteristics of legislators are reflective of changes in society at large'. In addition to the various modernization precepts occurring in societies and thus reflecting within legislatures, scholars such as Apter (1965:79), have argued that factors such as members' age impacts on the performance of parliaments.

Legislative institutionalisation, which as highlighted earlier on, provides the second theoretical framework of the study is anchored within the institutional theory that which views institutions as an important part of political behaviour. Institutional literature refers to institutions as the rules-of-the-game (North, 1990:3), where both formal and informal rules are an important part of institutions. In this way, literature suggests that institutions' formal rules as contained in country constitutions and other legally binding instruments, and help to structure political, economic and social interaction. In addition to viewing institutions as the rules of the game, institutionalization literature (Huntington, 1968; Eisenstadt 1964; Sisson 1973; Kornberg 1973; Welfing 1973; North, 1990:6; Copeland & Patterson, 1994) further posits that as organisations, once established, institutions such as legislatures evolve and constantly alter themselves to attain stability and viability, by developing distinctive qualities, such as 'autonomy, complexity, adaptability and coherency'. These qualities are in turn believed to positively affect an organisation's performance. Hence Hibbing (1988:682)'s assertion that, 'by institutionalizing, a legislative body acquires a definite way of performing its functions'. By becoming autonomous, legislative institutions can function independently. As institutionalization literature suggests, autonomy in organizations is the 'extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently' of their external environment (Huntington, 1968:12). Other scholars have employed the notion of 'boundedness' in reference to the differentiation and independence of organizations from their external environment. As

argued for instance by Welfing (1973:19) that, 'the institutionalization process involves the creation of boundaries, and the system's differentiation from its environment'.

Literature suggests several indicators of autonomy within organizations such as the restricted and slowed entry of new elements into or out of the organisation. Hence membership turnover has largely been used to show how highly institutionalised organisations are. Highly institutionalized organisations experience limited membership turnover thus increasing membership continuity or stability. Organisational autonomy or 'boundedness' is also believed to result in a channelling of career opportunities, where positions of leadership begin to occur from within the institution, following a seniority pattern. As Huntington (1968:12) advances for that 'in a highly institutionalised political system, the most important positions of leadership can normally only be achieved by those who have served apprenticeship in less important positions'. Thus, the length of service in an institution becomes the assurance for progression to positions of leadership.

On the other hand, internal complexity within institutions involves the multiplication of subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and a differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits (ibid). Copeland and Patterson (1994:6) buttress that growth in complexity within parliaments is shown by 'the development of nuanced and representative roles and the creation and maintenance of specialised work groups'. Thus, as organisations institutionalize, their responsibilities and scope of work broaden and where necessary they consolidate some of their activities. Polsby (1968:153) states in support, that growing internal complexity is shown 'when legislatures begin delineating the jurisdictions of committees, by consolidating committees with parallel and overlapping functions, assigning committees exclusive oversight responsibilities over agencies of the executive branch and also providing committees with expanded staff aid'. Thus, growth in internal complexity also involves the expansion of resources allocated for the internal management of the legislature and Opello (1986:305) states in support that, '…complexity can be indicated by the proportion of resources (personnel and money) which parliament allocates for its internal management'. In addition to financial and human resources, Polsby (1968:153) cites the growth of infrastructure or office space allocated to members of parliament as another indicator of internal complexity.

1.6. Significance and Potential Use of the Study

This study contributes towards the limited body of literature on the performance of legislatures in developing countries. As alluded to by Kornberg et'al (1973:473), 'despite their special importance, legislatures in third world countries have received only the most meagre scholarly attention'. Furthermore, legislative literature acknowledges that studies on parliamentary performance of budgetary oversight are mostly developed in the West with much focus placed on US congressional legislature. Wehner (2010:43) states to this end that, 'literature on the US Congress is extensive, and legislative budgeting in parliamentary systems and developing countries in particular remains understudied'. Thus, this is an important subject in the African context where curbing corruption and improving public financial accountability is yet to be realised.

This study pays special attention to selected factors associated with better and improved parliamentary performance. Legislative scholars such as Levy and Kpundeh (2004:211) posit that an in-depth and closer look at factors affecting parliamentary performance in specific parliaments (such as the Botswana parliament), will help to expand our understanding of in-country parliamentary performance issues which scholars have argued vary from country to country. Thus, policy makers and those interested in enhancing parliaments will find value in scholarly research in as far as planning points of intervention for strengthening parliament and its budget oversight committees. This contribution is supported by Tsekpo and Hudson (2009: v) who maintain that,

> Parliamentary strengthening aims to enhance the effectiveness of parliaments through institutional development, through building the capacity of parliamentary staff, MPs and committees, and through putting in place the nuts and bolts of infrastructure and equipment. However, there is little systematic research or analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of parliamentary strengthening. This makes it difficult for those considering whether and how to spend resources on parliamentary strengthening to make well-informed decisions.

1.7. Ethical Considerations

During the initial stages of the study, preliminary interviews were conducted with relevant stake holders such as members of the parliament of Botswana, Committee Chairs, parliamentary staff and many others relevant to the study. In accordance with the University of Cape Town's Ethical Code, an ethical clearance was obtained from the University's Politics Department. The clearance set out the university's ethical code of conduct for researchers. In compliance with the code of conduct, those interviewed were interviewed out of their own free will and the following steps were taken; a consent form was issued and signed by the participants before the interview started. The consent form provided a brief statement explaining the purpose of the study and explained the rights of the respondents and that their participation was voluntary, and they could withdraw from the interview at any time they wished. The consent form also assured respondents anonymity. In addition to these, during the latter/revision stages of the study, some additional interviews were conducted to augment the data where necessary.

1.8. Structure of the Thesis

This study comprises of 10 chapters organised under 3 sections as follows: Section 1 contains 3 chapters where, Chapter 1 presents the introduction to the study, outlining the research problem, research questions, theory and logic as well as the study objectives and significance. Chapter 2 and 3 present the literature review and the research methodology respectively. Section 2 covers three chapters of which two focus on key factors driving change in the parliament of Botswana and the other being on parliament's performance of budgetary oversight organised as follows; Chapter 4 analyses capacity and resources of the parliament of Botswana and Chapter 5 analyses parliament's autonomy and complexity. Chapter 6 maps out parliament's performance of budgetary oversight. In Section 3, the study presents four chapters that focus on the key factors making parliament more influential in its budgetary oversight role. These are Chapter 7, which maps out the growth of societal and economic modernization in Botswana and in Botswana's parliament. Chapter 8 focuses the formal powers of Botswana's parliament and Chapter 9 presents an analysis of the influence of political dynamics in the parliament of Botswana. Section 3 also houses Chapter 10 which presents the study's Conclusions and recommendations for further research.

2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Parliaments as they exist in their modern form today, were originally peculiar to the West (Salih, 2005:3) and thus, legislative literature has been inundated with studies of Western legislatures. Opalo (2019:3) attests that, 'much of our knowledge of the evolution and development of legislatures is informed by research on the high-income established democracies of Western Europe and North America'. Nonetheless, with the advent of multi-party systems following independence in the 1960s, as well as through the democratization process that spread through the continent in the 1990s, parliaments have gained popularity in Africa. As Barkan, Ademolekun and Zhou (2004:214) have argued, 'The evolution of African legislatures since the early 1990s is largely the result of the broader process of political liberalization and democratization that swept the African continent'. Since then, legislatures have become the embodiment of hope for a better functioning machinery of government in Africa. However, all parliaments, including the newly established African parliaments, face several challenges which have in most instances affected their effectiveness as captured by Bolarinwa (2015:24) who outlines that,

> Severe resource scarcity and lack of financial autonomy of the legislature, weak career service in the legislature, and moral crisis of public administration generally have reinforced the 'relative institutional dwarfing' of the legislature compared to the other arms of government. The legislatures are lacking in the needed infrastructures, training and capability for effective performance of the legislative duties.

However, amidst the various challenges, parliaments have in Barkan (2009:1)'s words proven to be highly resilient and have emerged 'as institutions to be reckoned with', consolidating their relevance in today's governance systems. Thus, Barkan (ibid) further attests that African parliaments which were once the rubber stamp of the executive, have begun to assert their independence as players in the policy making process, as watchdogs of the executive, and as organisations that matter. The resilience shown by African parliaments have thus caused scholars in recent years to acknowledge their contribution to the advancement of political processes. Olusegun (2015:20) alludes in support that '… African legislatures have been

undergoing development and reform, thus it is arguable that contemporary legislatures in Africa have increased their power and independence. As quite a lot of these legislatures continue to develop the capacity to extend their authority'. Barkan et'al (2010:35) further acknowledges that, 'some of these (African) legislatures have made significant progress in recent years and are asserting their role in the political process'. Such developments within legislatures have however not resulted in lesser challenges for the institution. Thus, many have argued that at the same time, the rise and resilience of African parliaments has not meant that parliaments in this era no longer face challenges. Parliaments continue to face challenges especially those impacting their performance. This is the reason why scholars such as Bratic (2004:4) have argued for instance that 'the role of every parliament depends on many factors, such as the autonomy of parliament, the duration of the process and the speed with which quality budgetary decisions are made'.

2.2. How Modernization and Institutionalization Impact Parliamentary Performance

As alluded to earlier in the study, modernization and legislative institutionalization form the central argument of the study. Various indicators have been used to explain the concept of modernization. For instance, modernization scholars believe that in most instances, it is the younger, highly educated people who are mostly exposed to modernization and its benefits. Hence Barkan (2009)'s position that when it comes to members of parliament, it is often 'the younger legislators, who possess advanced levels of education and professional training that are better at seeking reform within parliaments'. Mattes and Mozaffar (2011:1) reiterated that indeed 'well educated MPs are more likely to see themselves as institutionalists, interested in making public policy and overseeing executive actions'. In their research, where they asked the question 'what is the overall level of education attained?' Mattes and Mozaffar (2011:2) showed that with better education, MPs gain the ability to 'read and understand proposed bills and budgets, to find necessary information as well as to monitor, assess and ask questions about the implementation of legislation by the executive'. Mattes and Mozaffar (ibid) further established in their findings that 'highly educated MPs bring with them important social and political characteristics and experiences that may enhance their performance as effective legislators'. This they say, puts the MPs in a position to understand and ask relevant questions and use allocated resources adequately.

Furthermore, when looking at another modernization indicator which is increased financial resources, Hoffman and Lyons (2014) argued that low salaries are a disincentive when it comes to members committing to their work or even in terms of attracting highly qualified members to parliament. As Hoffman and Lyons (2014:2) put it, 'If legislators are not paid adequately, then candidates are drawn from a smaller pool. You cannot expect to attract good candidates with pay that is lower when compared to other jobs and professions'. Through their findings, Hoffman and Lyons (ibid) established that however small, the effect of higher salaries on legislative performance in the US legislature is 'modest' with some positive effects'. Hoffman and Lyons (ibid) submit that their findings are consistent with other studies, such as that of Keane and Merlo (2010:n.page), who also established that a reduction in MPs' salaries caused MPs to exit the Congress.

In as far as legislative institutionalization and performance of parliaments is concerned, legislative scholars have argued that as institutions evolve, they attain stability and viability for better performance. This is shown in how organizations develop distinctive qualities, such as autonomy, complexity, adaptability and coherency. These qualities are in turn believed to positively affect an organisation's performance. Hibbing (1988:682) asserts in this regard that, 'by institutionalizing, a legislative body acquires a definite way of performing its functions'. Nelson Polsby (1968) is credited within the legislative institutionalization scholarship, for having made the first attempt of operationalizing the concept of institutionalization within legislatures. Through his analysis of the United States House of Representatives (USHR). Polsby (1968:144)'s argument follows that the viability and success of a political system in performing its functions is a result of how well institutionalized the system is. Polsby (ibid) applied concepts derived from the institutionalization theory to show how overtime the USHR

became more autonomous[3], grew in internal complexity[4] and adopted universalistic and automatic rules and procedures[5] in the conduct of its internal business. Although Polsby's work has served as a breakthrough in operationalizing legislative institutionalisation, it however only refers to changes that have occurred within the USHR legislature and does not go forth to show how performance of the same legislature changed as a result. Furthermore, Polsby further does not attempt to elaborate the reasons why the US legislature went through the institutionalization process. Copeland and Paterson (1994:151) buttress that although Polsby's classic work on the institutionalization of the US Congress is sometimes criticised for not dealing more clearly with the causal explanations, it is however an excellent starting point for discussions on the performance of institutionalised legislatures.

Following in Polsby's footsteps, scholars such as Hibbing (1998), Squire (1992) and Gungor (2003)), also analysed the extent of institutionalization within their legislatures. Their main shortcoming was that they only sought to prove the applicability of Polsby's approach beyond the US House of Representatives. And so, like Polsby, they did not show performance changes within their chosen parliaments beyond the extent of institutionalization within those legislatures. Thus, it remains important to understand how parliaments have institutionalized

3 The establishment of boundaries in a political organization is mostly about a channelling of career opportunities. Polsby argues that in an un-differentiated organization, entry to and exit from membership is easy and frequent. Leaders emerge rapidly, lateral entry from outside to positions of leadership is quite common, and persistence of leadership over time is rare. Thus, as an organization institutionalizes, it stabilizes its membership, entry is more difficult, and turnover becomes less frequent. Its leadership professionalizes and persists. Additionally, recruitment to leadership is more likely to occur from within, and the apprenticeship period lengthens. Thus, the organization establishes and "hardens" its outer boundaries (Polsby N. (1968:145-146))

4 that growing internal complexity on the other hand is shown when the legislatures begin '…delineating the legislative jurisdictions of the committees, by consolidating committees with parallel and overlapping functions, by assigning committees exclusive oversight responsibilities over agencies of the executive branch and by providing committees with expanded staff aid'. He further states that this growth occurs in three ways; in the growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, in the growth of specialised agencies of party leadership and in the general increase in the provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid and committees' staffs (ibid:153)

5 Thirdly, movement from particularistic and discretionary to universalistic and automated decision making denotes 'the growth of seniority as a criterion determining committee rank and the growth of the practice of deciding contested elections…strictly on the merits (ibid:160)

and the resulting performance changes within those parliaments. Thus, while the institutionalization hypothesis has brought positive developments in our understanding of factors affecting legislatures' performance and effectiveness, these have attracted criticisms. For instance, Gillan (1991:3) argues that 'the features commonly ascribed to an institutionalised legislature which include low turnover, specialised committees and seniority as the criterion for committee composition and rank, did not monotonically enhance the performance of a legislature'. Furthermore, Gillan (ibid) argues that an institutionalized legislature is neither enough nor is it necessary for enhanced legislative performance. Despite his criticisms of the effect of institutionalisation on performance, Gillan (1991:23) notes at the same time that 'the fact that institutionalisation is neither necessary nor sufficient for enhanced performance should not prove trouble to empirical scholars of legislative change'. However, as Gillan (ibid) further emphasised, the contribution of institutionalization to parliamentary performance should serve as a way of reinforcing that legislature 'must be evaluated within the context of a more complete understanding of the legislative and governmental choice process.' Hence as argued by Rosenthal (1996:194), the institutionalization argument still presents an opportunity for legislative scholars to understand the performance of parliaments today. Rosenthal (1996:185) reiterates further that with some modification the concept can lend powerful support to explanations of current trends in parliamentary development and performance. Many other scholars thus remain positive of the impact of institutionalization on parliamentary performance. For instance, when assessing the institutionalization of the Portuguese parliament and its performance of the legislative or policy making role, Opello (1986:291) maintained that parliamentary performance is indeed related to the degree to which a legislature is institutionalised. Opello (1986: 313) established that in its ten years of existence (at the time of his analysis), the Portuguese parliament had not experienced institutionalization and as a result contributed minimally to the policy making process. And so, he advocates that,

> If Portugal is ever to have a stable, effective representative democracy, the assembly will have to become autonomous… Attention and resources must be allocated to internal processes. The assembly must become an organization that is a prime source of gratification and power for deputies (in reference to those in leadership positions), with its own merit de corps. Such developments would enhance the power and authority of the assembly as an organization and give it the capability to contribute in a significant way to national public policy (ibid: 315).

Other scholars have contributed to this debate, by considering individual institutionalization variables and their impact on parliamentary performance. For instance, Squire (1998) considered how membership turnover, which is an element of autonomy, affected parliamentary performance with a focus on parliament's legislative role. Squire (1998:23) argued that 'higher levels of turnover pose a number of negative consequences for an organization, such as the loss of organizational memory and institutional as well as issue expertise'.

2.3. The Impact of Other Factors on Parliamentary Performance

Beyond the modernization and institutionalization arguments, scholarship has acknowledged other factors impacting the performance of parliaments. For instance, the government system within which a parliament operates, has been cited as an influencing factor in parliament's performance. Literature is inundated with comparisons and debates about parliamentary powers given under parliamentary and presidential systems of government (Szilagyi, 2009; Moe and Caldwell, 1994; Linjpart, 1992). The two systems that have served as the main examples and references in these comparisons are the British Westminster Parliamentary system and the American Presidential system. Scholars have used the two to shape our understanding of the powers given to parliament in comparison to those afforded the executive. For instance, parliamentary and presidential systems present distinguishing features that centre around the confidence of the legislature versus fixed presidential term, popular and direct election of the president versus selection of presidents or prime ministers by the legislature, as well as collective and no-collective executives. According to Linjpart (1992:3), the first two features are based on the distinction between the principle of separation of powers.

The principle of Separation of Powers is based on the fundamental belief that there are three distinct functions of government; the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, which should be discharged by separate organs. The said organs particularly being; the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (or the courts). The basic idea behind separating state powers is that; the same person should not belong to more than one of the three organs of government or that, one organ of government should not encroach upon the powers or work of another or seen to be exercising the functions of another. Thus, the separation of powers doctrine dictates that all government arms must exercise equal power, a requirement that the system of checks and

balances is meant to safeguard. It is within this principle that parliament and the executive are allocated specific functions which for parliament include the role of budgetary oversight.

Parliaments are empowered for their different roles in accordance with the political system under which they operate. Parliamentary systems for instance, by virtue of their design, tend to be conducive to cooperative legislative-executive relations. Under parliamentary systems, there usually exists a clear differentiation between the head of government and the head of state. Another important feature of parliamentary systems is that there is no clear-cut separation of powers between the legislature and the executive. This is mainly because the survival of government is dependent on the support of parliament. Government can be removed by the parliament through a vote of no confidence. On the other hand, the executive may have the power to dissolve the parliament and call for elections. The government is directly dependent on majority support in the legislature. As a result, the composition of parliament and the executive are inherently intertwined, as are their electoral fortunes. As such, when it comes to parliamentary budget oversight, for parliament to fundamentally rewrite the entire executive budget proposal would be tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the government. As Huber (1996:269) puts it, 'members of parliament can certainly attempt to control policy outcomes by submitting, or threatening to submit, votes of no-confidence in the government'.

Presidential systems on the other hand place more budgetary powers to the executive headed by a directly elected president. Hence many argue that in presidential systems, all executive power is invested in the president. Budget-related responsibilities and powers may include the obligation to formulate the annual budget, submit it to the legislature, sign it into law, veto it (in part or in whole), promulgate it, and prepare reports on budget execution. The legislature is thus likely to be more critical of budgets and policy proposals tabled by an executive with whom it may have little in common. Legislative literature assests that some of the most bitterly fought budget wars have occurred in countries with presidential systems of government, such as the United States (Williams and Jubb 1996) or recently Nigeria (Aiyede and Isumonah 2002, Wehner 2002).

Another factor that has been linked to better and improved parliamentary performance is improved political party dynamics. Political parties ensure members' adherence to party policy and intention through party discipline and/or cohesion. Political party scholars have argued that political party discipline makes legislatures more predictable and, in a way, accountable. Furthermore, party discipline is one of the major organizational factors that help parliament to manage its work and accords members of parliament a feeling of safety associated with being a part of the influential team. However, for other scholars, political party cohesion/discipline slows down the work of parliament. Sturanoci (2018:429) argues in support that 'the greater the ability of a party to control the political future of its members in the legislature (through ballot access, funding resources, internal assignments or other critical benefits), the lower individual autonomy of the MPs will be'. Thus, parliament becomes a legislative body which votes for proposed laws which have already been previously negotiated. Political parties *de facto* decide whether a certain bill will become law, which inevitably leads to a reduced, merely finalizing legislative function of parliament.

Political party literature shows that like powers given to parliament, political discipline differs according to systems of government. In a parliamentary system, government must be accountable for their actions and must maintain party cohesion in voting behaviour, whereas in a presidential system, party cohesion is not mandatory. In a presidential system, the executive branch is separate from the legislative branch and is not responsible to the legislature. These two elements of representative democracies have diverse benefits, but also have varied opposition in terms of the degree of autonomy that elected representatives possess. In this regard, parliamentary systems impose party discipline on elected representatives to ensure responsible government.

Parliamentary party groups often seek to ensure that joint voting in the parliament is possible by disciplining the members to the party line and by adjusting controversial opinions and positions inside the party. The cohesiveness of political parties in the legislature varies considerably between the parliamentary democracies: in some countries, the parties strive to be highly cohesive and have almost achieved complete party discipline. Party discipline is in many cases ensured through a system of announced parliamentary whips link to glossary. In

other political systems, relatively few decisions are placed under strict compulsion, depending on the content of the bill to decide on and the required majority of votes.

Many unique aspects of African political competition create incentives that compel members of parliament to forgo many of their oversight powers over the executive during the budget process. More than anything, MPs want to win re-election to their seats in parliament, which means that all of their actions and decisions are taken with this goal in mind. Across sub-Saharan Africa, where political parties are largely nonideological or nonprogrammatic in their policy platforms, and where an inherited history of neopatrimonialism creates dominant party systems in many countries, MPs feel pressure to retain favour with the ruling party leadership and to be viewed as looking after their own constituencies first and foremost (de Renzio 2006: 638; Kasfir and Twebaze 2009: 75). Both of these structured incentives affect the willingness of MPs to exercise parliament's accountability role within the budget process. First, remaining in the good graces of the ruling party generally means not standing in opposition to critiquing the executive's budget proposal and the way in which the executive executed the allocation of budget funds.

2.4. Parliaments and their Budgetary Oversight Role

Parliament's core function of oversight as alluded to in the preceding chapter extends to its oversight of the budget. The budget has been described as the single most important economic policy tool of any government, that sets out national priorities and objectives and how these will be met using public resources[6]. It is thus imperative that parliaments, being the representatives of the masses ensure that national budgets are formulated and implemented in accordance with the needs of the people. National budgets follow a sequence of drafting, approval, implementation and auditing, referred to as the budget process. In many countries that follow the Westminster model of governance, parliament's role in the budgetary process is most visible at the approval and audit stages of the process. While scholarship is in accord that parliament's role in the budget process is an essential component of deepening democracy,

6 Rahul and Komla (2016) attest to the importance of national budgets in their argument that '…the budget is designed to play as a tool for enhancing macro-economic stability, communicating public policy and translating government policies and programs into action'.

the extent to which parliament can perform its role in the budget process has attracted differing views. Thus, scholars such as Wehner (2009), have suggested that despite the widespread formal recognition, the actual budgetary role of national legislatures differs sharply across countries.

Generally, the budget process in most countries entails four stages of budget formulation, budget approval, budget execution and budget oversight. The system of government in place, between parliamentary and presidential systems, influences the powers parliaments wield in any of the stages of the budget process. For most parliamentary systems, the formulation and implementation stages of the budget process are the preserve of the executive. It is at the approval and oversight stages that parliaments are empowered to play a part. Hence parliament's budget scrutiny role is understood in two ways. The first is the approval and authorisation of estimates of government spending needs known as ex-ante oversight and the second is the scrutiny of executive spending done in conjunction with the auditor general commonly referred to as ex-post budgetary oversight (Jacobs, 2012:5). Formal recognition of both parliament's ex-ante and ex-post roles is ascertained through legal provisions and frameworks such as country Constitutions, Acts, and Parliamentary Orders. Many scholars have cautioned however that this recognition for many parliaments has not necessarily translated into effective performance of parliamentary budget oversight[7].

It therefore remains important to consider the extent effectiveness of legislatures in contributing to the budget process. While initially contributors argued that Parliaments were exhibiting less influence over their national budgets, recent literature indicates that parliaments are 'launching efforts to regain a more active role in the budget processes' (Stapenhurst et'al, 2008:53). What remain of limited understanding are the reasons why some parliaments have been able to exert themselves better in this role. Thus, scholars have used formal powers given

7 Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson and Trapp (2008:53) argue from instance that while parliaments are constitutionally empowered to consider national budgets and authorise governments to raise revenues and carryout expenditures, this power is not exercised equally or consistently across countries and parliaments.

under parliamentary versus presidential systems to help our understanding of parliamentary powers for budgetary oversight[8].

Despite the varied views on parliamentary performance of budgetary oversight, legislative scholars have outlined the actual activities that parliaments engage in performing their budgetary oversight role. Budgetary oversight activities occur both inside the parliament chamber as well as within parliamentary budget committees. Legislative scholars such as Shepard (2008:184) have referred to oversight activities as 'the primary means of oversight'. Actual parliamentary oversight activities as elaborated in the earlier chapters (introduction and methodology), include parliamentary budget *questions* and *debates* which occur within the main chamber of parliament. According to the 2017 Global Parliamentary report, 'the committee is probably the single most significant and agile instrument of parliamentary oversight' and it is within parliamentary budget committees that specific and detailed activities of parliamentary budget oversight take place such as; (i) planning and holding budget committee meetings (ii) planning and conducting committee hearings (iii) drafting and producing committee reports with recommendations as well as (iv) following up on committee recommendations.

At the heart of a committee's oversight function is its power to seek evidence from a wide range of individuals and organizations on the subject under investigation. Hearings allow for broad engagement and expert input, which lead in turn to sound, evidence-based evaluation and pertinent recommendations. In as far as reporting is concerned, parliament's budgetary oversight committees are expected to communicate to the plenary via an oral or written report, which explains what has been found in the process of an inquiry and recommends ways to improve the situation in question. Beyond reporting and recommending solutions to matters arising from the audit report, budget committees are also expected to follow-up or track recommendations to establish if these have been addressed accordingly.

8According to Wehner (2010:27) once the executive has tabled the budget proposal before parliament, 'the scope of a legislature to shape budgetary policy is defined by its powers to amend the executive's budget proposal'. Wehner (ibid) further states that strict amendment powers limit the potential for legislative choices in dealing with the presented budget proposals.

2.5. Assessments of Parliamentary Effectiveness in Budgetary Oversight

In the earlier years, parliamentary budget oversight scholars placed much emphasis on parliaments' adoption of budgetary oversight tools for better performance. The central argument being that parliament's performance of oversight can be improved through the adoption of as many budgetary oversight tools as a parliament can adopt. As Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012:21) put it, the 'adoption of many oversight tools was believed to automatically translate into greater legislative budget oversight'. Therefore, assessing parliament's effective performance entailed measuring how many of the oversight tools a parliament had adopted. Thus, Yamamoto (2007) and Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2001; 2004), put forth an inventory of oversight tools which when placed at the disposal of parliament were believed to have the ability to improve its oversight function. Parliaments were encouraged to adopt as many of the oversight tools as possible to improve their performance.

In the latter years, there has however been a shift away from focusing solely on the adoption of oversight tools to considering whether parliament and its budget committees have adequate capacity and resources in terms of; staffing, finances, infrastructure as well as supporting offices such as libraries, research and budget offices. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012:7) argued in their revised approach to assessing parliamentary effectiveness that, 'international organizations and bilateral donors alike have focused too much on the former (the adoption of oversight tools). International and bilateral organisations need to focus not on simply adopting more oversight tools but rather on making legislatures use their oversight tools effectively'. Thus, more emphasis was placed on ensuring better use of available tools for effective performance of allocated functions.

In recent years, assessing parliament's effectiveness in performing allocated functions has not been an easy task. The challenge has mainly been due to the lack of a comprehensive and agreed framework of assessing parliament's oversight effectiveness. This has been acknowledged by Nyamori and Nyamori (2015:285), who stated when addressing the effectiveness of the Kenyan parliament's Public Accounts Committee in budgetary oversight that, 'there is no single framework of assessing PAC effectiveness…'. Nonetheless, even with

the lack of an agreed framework for assessing the effectiveness of parliaments, some scholars have contributed towards these efforts. For instance, Monk (2009:4) has emphasised that reviews on the effectiveness of parliaments in performing their functions must capture the views of four relevant groups that include (i) the views held by government, (ii) the legislature, (iii) the views held by the public or voters and lastly (iv) views held by other stakeholders such as powerful individuals, interest groups and businesses. These groups can all tell an important story about the effectiveness of parliament in performing allocated functions, because as Monk (2009:3) put it, the 'effectiveness of parliamentary committees is largely in the eye of the beholder'.

2.6. Chapter Summary

The literature review sheds light on our understanding of the landscape on the performance of parliaments. The chapter has alluded to the earlier predominance of Western legislative studies with limited scholarly work being done on African legislatures. Nonetheless, African parliaments have shown resilience and scholars have begun to shift their focus to seeking better understanding of parliaments in Africa which face numerous challenges such as resource scarcity and lack of autonomy among others. The chapter has also shown how several factors falling within the modernization and institutionalization categories have impacted the performance of parliaments in other jurisdictions. When reviewing literature on parliament's role of budgetary oversight, the chapter has shown that while budgetary oversight is an important aspect of parliamentary oversight, there is however a glaring limitation of frameworks necessary for assessing effective parliamentary performance including that of budget oversight. Thus, scholars are faced with the challenge of the limited availability of tools and frameworks of assessing effective performance of parliaments. Nonetheless, it remains important for scholars to continue efforts of assessing and understanding parliamentary performance.

3. CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the study's research methodology. While this is a largely qualitative study, it nonetheless also makes use of some quantitative methods. This happens especially where numerical representations of the growth and improvement of some of the factors being assessed are presented. The study uses both macro (parliament) and micro (members of parliament) levels of analysis.

3.2. Conceptualisation and Operationalization of Variables

3.2.1. Factors Affecting Parliament's Performance

Factors affecting parliament's performance of budgetary oversight are grouped into two categories as follows; (i) key factors driving change for better parliamentary performance and (ii) key factors making parliament more influential in budgetary oversight.

3.2.1.1. Key Factors Driving Change for Better Parliamentary Performance

The study presents these as a category of factors that have the ability to ignite motivation for better and improved performance by members of parliament thereby resulting in overall improved parliamentary performance. The study uses two key impetus or drivers of change in the form of: increasing parliamentary capacity and resources and growing parliamentary autonomy and complexity.

i. Increasing Capacity and Resources of Parliament

Capacity and resources play an important role in how parliaments and members of parliament perform their allocated functions. As Coghill et'al (2043:14) note, 'in parliamentary democracies, a parliament's capacity is a key factor affecting the functioning of a political system as a whole'. According to scholars (Polsby 1968:158 and Hibbing1988:720), 'parliamentary capacity and resources include most importantly aspects such as personnel, facilities and money devoted to the work of parliament'. And so, to assess the increase of capacity and resources in the parliament of Botswana the study analyses the growth and

improvement of (i) parliament's financial capacity in the form of rising salaries and allowances for members of parliament; (ii) Availability of adequate and improved parliamentary infrastructure in the form of; office spaces and specialized offices of parliament and (ii) availability of adequate and improved human capacity in terms of parliamentary support staff.

ii. Growing Parliamentary Autonomy

Institutionalisation literature explains Parliamentary Autonomy in terms of organisational 'boundedness' where the independence of both parliament and its committees is guaranteed. Parliamentary autonomy has also been explained in terms of membership stability as a result of declining membership turnover. Membership turnover is observed through new or first-time members entering parliament and committees. Additionally, parliamentary autonomy has been conceptualised in terms of increasing internal value of parliament. Increasing internal value of Parliament points to members of parliament's willingness to stay longer in parliament. Members' choice to stay longer in parliament enhances their performance due to the accumulated knowledge and experience gained from their stay in office. Epstein et'al (1997:967) reiterate in part that 'the legislature's power is influenced by the number of careerists who have served for many terms, as they have expertise both in the issues under discussion and in the techniques of constructing and passing legislation'. This is assessed in terms of more members seeking re-election into parliament as well as fewer members exiting parliament voluntarily except through electoral defeat or at the end of their term in office.

iii. Growing Internal Complexity of Parliament

Growing Internal Complexity of parliament on the other hand has been conceptualized in legislative literature in terms of the multiplication of parliament's subunits, hierarchically and functionally. Polsby (1968:153) explains for instance that growing internal complexity is shown 'when legislatures begin delineating the jurisdictions of committees, by consolidating committees with parallel and overlapping functions, assigning committees exclusive oversight responsibilities over agencies of the executive branch and also providing committees with expanded staff aid'. And so, in mapping out the growth of complexity in the parliament of Botswana, the study maps out the number and specialization of parliamentary committees.

3.2.1.2. Key factors Making Parliament More Influential in Budgetary Oversight

The second category of factors affecting parliamentary performance consists of the dynamics that are associated with affording parliament the ability to have a greater impact in its budgetary oversight role. The factors and conditionalities placed herein include; increased societal and economic modernization, improved formal powers of parliament, improved political party dynamics as well as growing internal value of parliament.

i. Increased Societal and Economic Modernization

This study begins the analysis in this category by assessing the increase in societal and economic modernization. Modernization as alluded to in the introductory chapter forms part of the theoretical foundation for this study. Increased societal and economic modernization is depicted through several indicators. The study makes use of the following indicators to show the increase of societal and economic modernization in Botswana and in the parliament of Botswana; a shift from agricultural to industrial economy; rising levels of national wealth; rising middle class; rising education levels; increasing use of news media as well as decreasing levels of poverty. In order to assess the extent of modernization in Botswana by moving away from traditional means of production to industrial means of production, this study employs data from the Botswana national statistics office that shows overtime changes in the country's production activities. Additionally, rising levels of national wealth are shown through the use of data also derived from the national statistics office that employed GDP measures to show the extent of the country's economic growth.

The next indicators of modernization are assessed using data from the Afrobarometer Surveys. For instance, when assessing the rise of the middle class in Botswana, the study uses the Afrobarometer question where respondents were asked 'what their main or past occupation was'. This is because, occupational categories have been found to be used by many scholars in helping our understanding of the middle class. Education is another indicator of modernization, especially because for most scholars' education is taken as a major catalyst for change. Thus, a highly educated society is associated with greater modernization. Using Afrobarometer survey data, the study assesses rising education in terms of the increase of the number of Batswana who have attained some formal schooling all the way up to university or

postgraduate degrees. The modernization argument posits that when people are better educated, they will seek more access to the news media. This is mainly because the media plays a major role in informing people about their livelihoods and leadership.

ii. Improved Formal Powers of Parliament

According to Wehner (2010:47), formal powers given to parliament determine its potential to make changes to the budget as proposed by the executive. Thus, assessing the adequacy and improvement of formal powers of parliament entails a review of (i) the general powers given to parliament as well as (ii) the adequacy and improvement of parliament's specific powers given for budgetary oversight. Formal powers of the parliament of Botswana are given through various instruments such as the Constitution of Botswana and Standing Orders of the National Assembly (SONA).

iii. Improved Political Party Dynamics

Political party dynamics take into consideration the political landscape that obtains in a country. An instance of this is *increased political party competition*. The importance of political party competition in the effective performance of parliaments has been acknowledged by various legislative scholars such as (Hicks, 2015; Banducci, Giebler and Kritzinger, 2013; Alfano and Baraldi, 2011; Bielasiak, 2005)[9]. Some of these scholars suggest that the more intense political party competition for entry into parliament is, the better it is for parliamentary effectiveness As Alfano and Baraldi (2011) put it, 'if political competition is intense, the incumbent politician is [bound to be] more accountable for his actions in office; the incumbent has an incentive for good performance because, otherwise, he can be easily removed and replaced by the public, with challengers'. Therefore, the following indicators are used to

9 For instance, Banducci, Giebler & Kritzinger (2013) and Bielasiak (2005) argue that political party competitiveness is a necessary precondition for a healthy and better functioning democracy. Cleary (2007) further reiterates, 'scholars identify electoral competition as the primary cause of a variety of positive political and social outcomes, including better political representation (Powell 2000), improved economic performance (Przeworski and Limongi 1993), better human rights protections (Beer and Mitchell 2004), and domestic and inter- national peace (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Diamond 1999)'. On the contrary, Sorenson (…), suggests in his writing that a 'lack of party competition may impair government efficiency'.

determine the increase in political party competition; *increased number of contested parliamentary seats*; increased *number of seats won by opposition parties* in comparison to those won by the incumbent party; as well as *decreased average margins between the ruling party and opposition parties*. The outcome of political party competition results in consequences that can either benefit the performance of parliament or disadvantage it such as one party dominance and weak political opposition.

iv. Growing Internal Value of Parliament

Growing internal value of parliament points to members' willingness to stay longer in parliament. The choice to stay longer in parliament has been associated with improved parliamentary performance because through serving longer terms, MPs are able to accumulate more knowledge and experience necessary to effectively deliver on their parliamentary mandate. Thus, staying longer in parliament enables members of parliament to accumulate more knowledge and experience necessary to effectively deliver on their parliamentary and committee mandate which includes performing budgetary oversight. In order to show MPs' willingness to remain longer as MPs and committee members, the study analyses indicators such as *longer term of service* in parliament, *increasing number of MPs seeking re-election* as well as a *decreased number of members leaving or exiting parliament* before completion of office term.

3.2.2. Effective Parliamentary Performance of Budget Oversight

Parliament's effective performance of budgetary oversight is assessed in terms of; (i) *improved performance of budgetary oversight activities*, (ii) *improved internal and external reviews of parliament's performance of budgetary oversight.*

Improved Performance of Budgetary Oversight Activities

Parliament's Performance Budget Oversight Activities take place both in the Chamber and in budget oversight committees being the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).

i. Budget Oversight Activities in the Chamber

Ex-ante budgetary oversight (budget approval) activities in the chamber take the form of budget debates and questions. Debating budgetary matters in parliament requires the use of budgetary committee reports. For Westminster parliaments, parliamentary debates are often scheduled during periods when parliament is in session. Members of Parliament get to ask *questions and debate budgetary issues* as outlined by Yamamoto (2007) that, 'regular questioning can be used by parliament to hold the government to account. Moreover, through questions, parliamentarians can ask the government to clarify its stance on a particular issue or its political course more generally'. In addition to asking questions in the main chamber, members of parliament also engage in budgetary debates where 'oral exchanges of opinions are intended to facilitate the chamber's collective decision-making on certain issues'. Debates can take place on special occasions such as opening speeches or at different stages of the examination of draft legislation.

ii. Oversight Activities by Parliament's Budget Committees

While budgetary oversight activities occur within the chamber or house of parliament as shown above, it is within parliamentary committees that the bulk of oversight activities take place. Yamamoto (2007) states for instance that, 'many parliaments have a parliamentary committee that is called on to scrutinize the implementation of the budget across government departments. In most cases, this is a permanent committee'. The two budget oversight committees in the parliament of Botswana are the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The oversight activities for the two committees differ and shall be elaborated upon below. For instance, the FEC is entrusted with parliament's approval (ex-ante) oversight activities while the PAC performs budget evaluation (ex-post oversight) activities.

Improved Internal and External Reviews of Parliament's Performance of Budget Oversight

According to '*The Better Practice Guide',* effectiveness is defined as 'the essence of what success means for an agency'. While there is no agreed framework for assessing parliamentary effectiveness, this study makes use of David Monk (2009)'s 'Framework of Testing the

Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees'. Monk (ibid) emphasises in terms of committee reports that 'for committee reports to achieve a minimum level of effectiveness, at least one group must rate it as effective. The more groups that consider a report to be effective, and the higher the rating, the greater that report's effectiveness would be'. In his work, Monk presents several relevant groups whose views can be used in determining the effectiveness of parliamentary committees. These relevant publics include; the government, the legislature as well as stakeholders such as the voters and the media.

i. Internal Reviews of Parliament's Performance by Members of Parliament - the Legislature through the African Legislatures Project (ALP)

The legislature is viewed as an important group in analysing effectiveness mainly because as Monk (ibid) puts it, 'the legislature is relevant to committee work because it is the chambers that establish committees and give them their terms of reference…'. The legislature is relevant to committee work because it is the chambers that establish committees and give them their terms of reference, through standing orders, separate resolution or legislation. Legislatures occasionally hold inquiries into committees' performance, with the most common conclusion being that they are effective. In discussing committee effectiveness, it needs to be remembered that committee members are drawn from the legislature. Therefore, the views expressed by the legislature about a committee may well overlap with the views of the committee itself about its work.

ii. External Reviews of Parliament's Performance through the Open Budget survey data

Another group whose views on legislatures' performance are considered important is the stakeholders. Monk (ibid) views stakeholders as 'the various interest groups, businesses and individuals who lobby for political outcomes favourable to them or their views. In the context of committee effectiveness, they are possibly the most important of the four groups considered. Stakeholders tend to be well versed in the issues that influence effectiveness measures involving the government and the legislature'.

3.3. The Data

3.3.1. Data Sources and Data Collection

This study makes use of data derived from several sources such as survey data from the Afrobarometer, the African Legislative Project (ALP) and Open Budget Survey (OBS). The study also uses data collected through desk research and interviews.

Afrobarometer Data

Some of the data used to show societal and parliamentary modernization is drawn from the *Afrobarometer survey data*. Afrobarometer is a comparative series of national mass attitudes on democracy, markets and civil society. The project is implemented by an international network of researchers in universities and non-governmental research institutes, primarily based in Africa. Afrobarometer is dedicated to producing reliable data on public opinion in Africa, which are used by decision makers in government, non-governmental policy advocates, donor agencies and academic researchers. Afrobarometer surveys in Botswana are carried out by academics from the University of Botswana with the help of trained research assistants. The surveys were conducted over eight rounds running from 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017 and 2019. For each survey, data were collected from a sample of 1,200 adults selected from across all twenty-six districts in the country. Selection of respondents was done in such a way that every eligible adult had an equal and known chance of being selected. Questionnaires were administered face-to-face using one of the country's two official languages: Setswana and English. The choice of which language to use when administering questionnaires depended largely upon each respondent's most preferred or understood language.

African Legislative Program (ALP) Data

Another set of data used especially in the analysis of members of parliament's reviews of parliamentary performance is drawn from the *African Legislatures Project (ALP) Survey Data* of 2008. ALP is a comparative study of legislatures and legislators in 20 African countries. As a required principle for all researchers using ALP data, I wish to thank the three co-principal investigators for ALP, Robert Mattes, Joel D. Barkan and Shaheen Mozaffar, for permission to utilize data collected for their study for the case of Botswana parliament. However, the

responsibility for the analysis conducted and conclusions reached is mine alone and does not represent the views of the three co-principal investigators or ALP. The ALP 2008 data set is by far the only available survey data relevant in the analysis of members' reviews of parliamentary performance.

Open Budget Survey (OBS) Data

The Open Budget Index (OBI) is the world's only independent, comparative measure of central government budget transparency. The OBS has created an index, an Open Budget Index (OBI) that measures budget transparency. Countries are assigned a transparency score on a 100-point point scale using 109 of the 140 questions on the Survey. These questions focus specifically on whether the government provides the public with timely access to comprehensive information contained in eight key budget documents in accordance with international good practice standards. Beginning in 2006, the OBS has consistently conducted this survey every second year and Botswana has participated in all the surveys conducted between 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017 and 2019.

Desk Research and Document Reviews

This study also relied on desk research and document reviews which included a review of government documentation and reports such as the Auditor General's Reports; Public Accounts Committee Reports; Finance and Estimates Committee Reports; Accountant General's Reports; Standing Orders of the National Assembly; Parliamentary Committees Manual; and many other parliamentary documents such as the parliamentary Hansard, parliamentary order papers and Parliamentary Committee Guidelines.

Interviews

At the beginning of the study, interviews were conducted with various stakeholders to gather their views and opinions on how the parliament of Botswana and its budget committees have performed with a particular focus on parliament's role of budgetary oversight. The interviews were conducted to also get a better understanding of the challenges faced by the parliament of Botswana and its budget committees in performing their functions. A total of 20 respondents

were interviewed. These included; past parliamentary speakers, past and present Public Accounts Committee Chairpersons and committee members, Parliamentary staff such as Library Staff, Research and Information Services Division, Clerks, past and present Auditor Generals, Committee Advisor as well as Accountant General. Media personnel in the capacity of newspaper editors and journalists were also interviewed. The stakeholders contacted for interview were selected using convenience sampling which is a non-probability sampling technique as determined by the stakeholders' availability and their knowledge of the subject at hand.

3.3.2. Data Analysis

Quantitative data was analysed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), data was analysed longitudinally, to show overtime changes and/or increases of the selected factors in the parliament of Botswana. For the Afrobarometer data, the period of analysis covered the survey years being 1999, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2014. For the ALP data, only cross-sectional data analysis was done. This is because the data available from the ALP was only for the year 2008. On the other hand, when analysing reviews of parliament's effectiveness in performing budgetary oversight, rankings from the IBP were used for the years 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017 and 2019. These were only periods within which questions on parliament's performance of budgetary oversight were gathered through the survey instrument. In some instances, such as when ordering members' age, educational level, professional background, term or length of service, as well as when assessing political party competition, the study engaged a longitudinal observation of the indicators with data sourced from several documents and parliamentary records such as 'Parliament Who's Who'[10].

On the other hand, qualitative data from interviews and document reviews was analysed using Thematic Content Analysis (TCA). Thematic Content Analysis is a method of analysing qualitative data that is usually applied to a set of texts, such as an interview or transcripts. The researcher closely examines the data to identify common themes, topics, ideas and patterns of meaning that come up repeatedly. According to Vaismoradi (2013;400), 'the purpose of

[10] Parliament Who's who is a record of all members of Parliament giving snippets of their biographies and all other background information.

content analysis is to describe the characteristics of the document's content by examining who says what, to whom, and with what effect'.

3.3.3. Data Limitations and De-Limitations

One of the data collection methods as elaborated above is desk reviews. Thus, the study relied on records and data collected from various places including university libraries as well as the parliament of Botswana. However, one of the challenges encountered was poor record keeping as most of information at parliament had not been kept up to date. This resulted in some data gaps where information was never recorded. Nonetheless, the study made use of interviews and readily available data sets to compensate where the desk research was lacking. Additionally, some of the interviews were conducted during the Covid-19 period where movement and contact with people was restricted. However, during the revision period, the researcher was able to contact some of the respondents who could not be contacted during the Covid-19 restrictions.

SECTION TWO: KEY IMPETUS OF CHANGE IN PARLIAMENT AND PARLIAMENT'S PERFORMANCE OF BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT

Section Introduction

This section presents an analysis of selected factors characterised as the key impetus or drivers of change for better parliamentary performance. The study acknowledges that, several factors have been associated with better and improved parliamentary performance. Amongst these are factors that can motivate and drive members of parliament to want to perform better and thus resulting in the effectiveness of parliament. The following factors are assessed in this section; increased parliamentary capacity and resources as well as increased parliamentary autonomy and internal complexity. These factors are assessed in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The section then moves on to assess the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has improved in the performance of its budgetary oversight role (in Chapter 6) following its experience with the aforementioned factors.

4. CHAPTER 4: INCREASING PARLIAMENTARY CAPACITY AND RESOURCES

4.1. Introduction

As already alluded to, parliaments are highly instrumental in the national governance structure. However, if parliaments do not have the necessary capacity and resources, they will fail to achieve what they are mandated to do regardless of any other arrangements made to empower them. The Global Parliamentary Report (2017:33) states in support that, 'even if backed up by formal measures to ensure compliance, a mandate for oversight is meaningless unless parliament also has the resources to implement it'. This chapter assesses the growth of capacity and resources of the parliament of Botswana in terms of: (i) the increase of salaries of members of parliament, (ii) improvement in parliament's physical infrastructure, (iii) the availability and improvement of specialised offices of parliament as well as (ii) improvement in parliamentary support staff.

4.2. Rising Salaries of Members of Parliament

One way of ensuring that members of parliament perform at their best is ensuring that they are paid well. Thus, payment of adequate salaries to members of parliament is viewed as an important tool for motivating incumbent parliamentarians as well as attracting MPs who hold better education and work experience. On the other hand, failure to pay members better salaries arguably leaves parliament in the hands of lesser qualified and less effective members. This argument has been buttressed by Hoffman and Lyonns (2014:2) who posit that 'if legislators are not paid adequately then you cannot expect to attract good candidates with pay that is lower when compared to other jobs and professions'.

Figure 4.1 presents a record of salaries of members of the parliament of Botswana beginning from 2006 to 2019. The data presented shows that overall salaries of members of the parliament of Botswana have been rising over the years. For instance, while MPs' annual salary stood at about P150,000.00 in 2006, it however improved to about P450,000.00 by 2019. This is a positive thing for the parliament of Botswana as it gives assurance to members of parliament that they are bound to get a better pay as the years go by.

Figure 4.1: Rising MPs' Salary Per Annum



Source: Botswana Parliament Salaries and Allowances Amendment Acts

Having established that salaries of members of the parliament of Botswana have been rising over the years, it is also necessary to consider whether MPs are satisfied with their pay. Using African Legislative Project (ALP) data, table 4.1 below, shows that as much as 41 percent of members of the parliament of Botswana are dissatisfied with their salaries. This is in addition to another 51 percent of MPs who indicated that they were very dissatisfied with their salaries. Thus, almost over 90 percent of MPs expressed dissatisfaction with their salaries. Only about 5% of the respondent MPs expressed satisfaction with their pay. MPs' dissatisfaction with salaries as shown in table 4.1 is consistent with outcries about the inadequacy of salaries for the rest of Batswana especially those in the public service. This became more apparent in 2011, when the country experienced one of the longest running strikes where public servants demanded an increase in their low wages. Additionally, some members of parliament in the country have equated their low wages to volunteerism. For instance, member of parliament for Boteti-East, Lelatisitswe (2021) has argued that 'the way their salaries are low, being a member of parliament is like being a pastor as it is more like volunteerism'. Many such comparisons and complaints about the inadequacy of MPs salaries have inundated most local media. When pitted against those of other countries in the region, Botswana MPs' salaries are arguably low. For instance, when commenting about their salaries in comparison to those of other MPs in the region, MP for Selibe Phikwe Honorable Keorapetse has argued that 'if such comparison is

made, …you will come to a conclusion that members of Parliament in this Republic (Botswana) are really volunteers, … who have left their plum jobs'.

Table 4.1: MPs' Satisfaction with Salaries

		Valid Percent for Botswana
Valid	***Refused***	*2.6*
	Very dissatisfied	*41.0*
	Dissatisfied	*51.3*
	Satisfied	*5.1*
	Total	*100.0*

Source: ALP Survey, (2008): How satisfied are you with each of the following: (A) Your current Salary including all allowances as an MP?

4.3. Improvement in Parliament's Physical Infrastructure

When members of parliament have access to better and improved physical infrastructure, their ability to conduct parliamentary business can be enhanced. Parliamentary physical infrastructure includes parliament buildings, MPs' offices and committee meeting rooms. Former Speaker of the parliament of Botswana, Dr. M. Nasha, notes that the first observation of availability of physical infrastructure in the parliament of Botswana is the parliament building itself, which stands tall in the government enclave. The building has two annexes (named Annexe A and Annexe B) adjacent to it. Within these, there are two auditoriums available for use by MPs through their parliamentary committees for meetings and hearings. While the auditoriums are available to committees, they however are not kept for sole use by parliamentary committees as and when they need to. The auditoriums are rather supposed to be booked in advance. Some respondents lamented during the study interviews that this was an indication of the limited and inadequately furnished office space in the Botswana parliament. One respondent further aggrieved that the same auditorium where PAC hearings are held is not equipped with proper microphones. Therefore, while the parliament of Botswana does have the parliamentary buildings, this is not enough as it does not offer adequate office and conference room space for MPs to conduct their committee work.

4.4. Availability and Improvement of Specialised Offices of Parliament

Specialized offices of parliament such as libraries, research units as well as parliamentary budget offices are believed to provide the necessary support to members of parliament. These enable members of parliament access the necessary information they need for their policy making decisions.

Parliament Library and Research Unit

Parliamentary libraries complement the information needs of members of parliament. Literature acknowledges that contributions made by members of parliament should not just be opinion-based but must be based on more objective and scientific research (Raugambwa and Kintu, 2013:3). Mostert (2007:1) further argues that often MPs need access to the right information at the right time. Such information can only be properly sourced from libraries. Since the country's independence of 1966, the parliament of Botswana has had available for its use a library unit under the Research and Information Services Division. The library unit, which was founded at the inception of parliament in 1966, supports members' work by providing quality research and information services that enable them to carry out their allocated functions. The library makes a vast array of information accessible to members of parliament from sources such as books, serials (newspapers and magazines), documents (government reports and parliamentary publications) as well as bibliographies and quick references[11]. In order to enrich the services, it gives to its clientele (mostly members of parliament), the parliament library has established collaborative arrangements with bigger institutions libraries such as those of the University of Botswana, research institutions (like the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, BIDPA), the National Archives and country's Defence Staff College. Furthermore, the library holds institutional membership to several regional and international organizations such as the Botswana Library Association (BLA)[12]; the Association

11 According to library staff interviewed, the library has a wide collection; books (of law, politics, public administration, economics); government reports and publications; laws of Botswana and law reports; Records of Parliamentary questions and answers; Records of Parliamentary debates; national and international Periodicals; Journals; as well as DVDs, CDs, VHS tape, Maps, useful to the work of members of parliament.

12 The Botswana Library Association is an association for information workers, including librarians, documentalists, archivists, and others. It is the national body that represents their interests and helps shape their service delivery.

of Parliamentary Libraries of Eastern and Southern Africa (APLESA)[13] and the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA)[14]. This way, the parliament library can keep up to date with developments in the information services relevant and necessary to enhance MP's work.

Currently, the Botswana parliament library is manned by a total of three staff in the capacity of a librarian and two library assistants. The three service 57 members of parliament as well as all other stakeholders needing library services such as members of the House of Chiefs, staff of parliament and authorised users such as researchers and media personnel. This presents a challenge of shortage of staff. Additional challenges as highlighted by the library staff include a general lack of acknowledgement of the library as a key player in parliamentary work, limited budget, lack of provision of critical resources necessary to facilitate library work such as poor internet connection, lack of equipment like book scanners for digitization of resource materials as well low library usage by members of parliament.

In addition to library services, members of parliament benefit from professional non-partisan and balanced researchers who provide members with the ability to change budgets based on detailed scrutiny that is only possible with detailed analysis (Krafchik, 2004:13). This is in line with the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA) guidelines which state that, 'a parliamentary research service can assist by preparing synthesis and analysis of proposed legislation, policies or programmes considered by parliament'. The parliament of Botswana has a research unit, established to provide evidence-based research support to members of parliament and to parliamentary oversight committees. When developing motions to present to parliament as well as when analysing bills, MPs approach the research liaison for assistance with evidence-based research to support their efforts. There are four researchers within the

13 APLESA is an organization, which strives to promote co-operation by networking and resource sharing thereby creating a forum for information exchange that will support the function of parliaments in the region. The primary mission of APLESA is to establish a forum for professional networking and resource sharing amongst parliamentary libraries in the sub-region.

14 Founded in 1927 in Edinburgh, Scotland, the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) is the leading international body representing the interests of library and information services and their users. It is the global voice of the library and information profession.

research unit available for 57 members of parliament. Thus, like the parliament library, the research unit also faces manpower challenges. Other challenges faced by the research unit is the lack of knowledge of the role of research by members of parliament, which according to the parliamentary research unit leads to the underutilisation of the research department.

4.5. Improvement in Parliament's Support Staff

Madonna and Ostrander (2014: Abstract page) have pointed out the importance of parliamentary support staff. The two observe that,

> 'a modern legislature would be unimaginable without the support of professional staff. Such individuals, while neither elected nor appointed, ensure the smooth functioning of government by performing the myriad of administrative and technical tasks that create legislative proposals, develop cross-party deals, and ultimately lead to an informed vote. Professional staffs do not make a government, but they do multiply its organizational capacity far beyond what elected officials may accomplish alone.'

Toka (2016:1) reiterates in the case of professional staff in the parliament of Botswana, 'employees of government seconded to the national assembly as support staff enable members of parliament to execute their functions effectively and ensure the success or otherwise of the legislators in carrying out their oversight duty'. However, the preceding discussion of Botswana parliament's library and research units has brought to light the challenge of limited skilled staff in the parliament of Botswana. Many respondents cited through the interviews conducted that parliamentary support staff is insufficient and not well-developed to adequately assist parliament in handling its budgetary oversight work. These same sentiments were echoed by one Member of Parliament who stated in an interview that, 'while the availability of qualified and skilled support staff is undisputedly one of the important factors for effective parliamentary performance, many parliaments face the challenge of lack of skilled and qualified staff.

4.6. Chapter Summary

This chapter set out to analyse the availability, adequacy and increase of capacity and resources in the parliament of Botswana. The following capacity and resources were assessed for the parliament of Botswana; salaries of MPs, physical infrastructure, specialised parliamentary offices as well as skilled parliamentary support staff. The chapter has established that the parliament of Botswana does not have enough of these resources and neither have those available been improving. A typical example is with regards to parliament's physical infrastructure which as shown in the chapter is limited as parliament does not have enough office spaces for either parliamentary or committee business. In instances where there has been some form of improvement such as where MPs' salaries are concerned, such improvements have not been well-received, as shown by MPs' dissatisfaction with their salaries. On the other hand, while the parliament of Botswana has in place some specialised offices such as the parliament library and research unit, these offices are however understaffed and underutilised by members of parliament. Furthermore, the parliament of Botswana lacks other important specialised offices such as the specialised parliamentary budget office which is an important parliamentary feature especially with regards to parliament's budgetary oversight role. Thus, challenges of capacity and resources continue to prevail in the parliament of Botswana, as summed up by Member of Parliament Keorapetse (2015) who has lamented that parliament 'lacks the ability, that is, resources, expertise and qualified professional/skilled staff. Parliamentary staff in the PR, editorial and research divisions of Parliament inter alia are inadequate and, in some instances, lack necessary skills to assist MPs. Parliament in Botswana is a department in the Office of the President (OP). It relies on the OP for both staffing and its budget, in contrast with what obtains in other parliamentary democracies'.

5. CHAPTER 5: GROWING PARLIAMENTARY AUTONOMY AND INTERNAL COMPLEXITY

5.1. Introduction

Legislative institutionalization proponents posit that as institutions become more autonomous and more complex, they begin to perform their allocated functions more effectively. Polsby (1968:144) and Hibbing (1988:682) advance for instance that by institutionalizing, legislative bodies acquire a definite way of performing their functions. Thus, this chapter assesses the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has grown and improved in its autonomy and internal complexity. The two are presented as another set of motivating factors which enhance the performance of parliament and its members.

5.2. Parliament's Growing Autonomy

According to institutionalisation scholarship, highly autonomous institutions differentiate from their external environment by establishing boundaries that allow less frequent movement in and out of their organisations (Polsby, 1968:145). By allowing less frequent movement, organizations are able to stabilize their membership. And thus, increasing membership stability which comes a s a result of declining membership turnover, has been cited as an indicator of organizational autonomy. In the case of parliament, membership stability enables growth in MPs' parliamentary career path inside parliament because with less movement, members end up gaining parliamentary work experience. Additionally, parliament's growing autonomy is assessed through increasing internal value of parliament as shown by members' choice and willingness to stay longer in parliament. Members' willingness to stay longer in parliament is shown by actions that include; more members seeking re-election into parliament as well as fewer members seeking voluntary exit before ending their term of office.

5.2.1. Declining Membership Turnover/Membership Stability

Figure 5.1 presents changes in membership turnover in the parliament of Botswana. Membership turnover is determined in terms of percentages of first-time members of parliament following general elections. Results for the first parliament of 1965 do not count because at the time, all members were new and thus parliament had a 100 percent turnover. Nonetheless, with subsequent elections, membership turnover was low as re-election of the

same members, especially from the second to the fifth general elections (1969 – 1979), was most common. Changes in turnover began showing again from the 1984 general election, which recorded a 5 percent increase from the 1979 election with 26% of new or first term members coming into parliament. From 1994 onwards, parliament experienced increased turnover with 2014 and 2019 registering the highest number of first-time members coming into parliament at more than 50 percent of all members coming into parliament for the first time. Thus, from these results, it can be argued that the parliament of Botswana has in recent years experienced increased membership turnover.

Figure 5.1: Percentage of First-Time Members in Parliament



Source: The Road to Botswana Parliament (3rd Edition), General Elections 1965 – 2019

While scholarship on the effects of longer parliamentary terms and thus lower turnover is not yet extensive, legislative scholars who have engaged on turnover effects suggest that low levels of turnover in parliament and parliamentary committees have a positive impact on the performance of parliament. For instance, scholars such as Altman and Chasquetti (2005:237) have argued that the resignation of experienced politicians is accompanied by the loss of expertise and experience in the work of parliament. Altman and Chasquetti (ibid) further suggest that '… high legislative turnover may impede legislators from gaining expertise and seniority and therefore can reduce the quality of parliamentary work'.

5.2.2. Increasing Internal Value of Parliament

Internal value of parliament points to members' willingness to stay longer in parliament. This choice by members of parliament puts them in a good place in terms of their performance in parliament because the longer they would have stayed in parliament, the more they would accumulate knowledge and experience in their respective parliamentary portfolios. Epstein et'al (1997:967) reiterate that legislatures' powers are influenced by the number of careerists who have served for many terms, 'as they have expertise both in the issues under discussion and in the techniques of constructing and passing legislation'. The following indicators drawn from literature are used to determine members' value for parliament or their willingness to stay and serve longer; (i) increase in the number of incumbent members seeking re-election into parliament; as well as (ii) fewer members leaving parliament for reasons other than electoral defeat.

i. Increase in Members Seeking Re-Election

Literature posits that at the end of every term in office, members of parliament face the challenge of seeking a return into office. This is often attributable to MPs who value their work as parliamentary members and thus desire to remain in office and continue to serve their constituents. As a result, such MPs highly seek re-election into office. And with the experience gained from their previous term in office, such members once re-elected become an asset to the advancement of parliamentary and committee work. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of incumbent members of the parliament of Botswana who sought re-election into parliament at different election periods. The results show that over the years (from the first parliament of 1965 to the 12th parliament of 2019), there has been a reduction in the number of parliamentary members seeking re-election. Thus, it can be said that the desire by members of the parliament of Botswana to remain in parliament has been going down as shown by the reduction in percentages of members re-elected into parliament. Yet, in jurisdictions such as Botswana, the dwindling number of MPs seeking re-election may not necessarily be an indication that MPs' do not desire to be re-elected into office. This has been in some instances associated with the controlled nature of primary elections where contesting MPs' are pre-determined through candidate selection arrangements such as the ruling BDP's Bulela Ditswe. Warren (2022) argued for instance that in Botswana, '…Botswana's ruling party primaries facilitate a limited and controlled turnover, decreasing the likelihood of re-nomination of long-term incumbents in favour of political newcomers while still protecting senior ministers…'

Figure 5.2: Percentage of Incumbent MPs Seeking Re-election



Source: Botswana Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Reports, 1965-2019

ii. Fewer Members Seeking Voluntary Exit

Literature posits that members of parliament show great value for parliament when a few of them choose to voluntarily vacate their currently held parliamentary seat even before completing their office term. Thus, other than leaving office following defeat at general elections, fewer members will not voluntarily vacate their office unless it is for involuntary reasons such as old age, sickness and/or death. In parliamentary democracies, bye-elections are often held to fill parliamentary vacancies or seats that become vacant following members who have exited parliament before the end of their office term. In accordance with section 65a (12-13)[15] of the Constitution of Botswana, the Independence Electoral Commission (IEC) of

15 In its conduct of general and bye-elections in the country, Sections 65 A 12 – 13 of the Constitution state thus, 'The Commission shall be responsible for(a) the conduct and supervision of elections of the Elected Members of the National Assembly and members of a local authority, and conduct of a referendum; (b) giving instructions and directions to the Secretary of the Commission appointed under section 66 in regard to the exercise of his or her functions under the electoral law prescribed by an Act of Parliament; (c) ensuring that elections are conducted efficiently, properly, freely and fairly; and (d) performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. (13) The Commission shall on the completion of any election conducted by it, submit a report on the exercise of its functions

Botswana is expected to conduct bye-elections every time a member of parliament vacates their seat before their tenure of parliament is complete. However, while poor record keeping presented a challenge in this analysis, through the researcher's observation, most of the bye-elections held in the country are often as a result of involuntary reasons such as ill-health, death or appointment to a higher office. Thus, it is uncommon for MPs in the parliament of Botswana to leave office before the end of their term, for any other reason except those mentioned above.

5.3. Growing Internal Complexity of the Parliament of Botswana

According to Gungor (2009:4), internal complexity can either be vertical or horizontal where vertical complexity is about the number of hierarchical levels whereas horizontal complexity refers to the number of functions, departments and jobs in an organization. Polsby (1968:153) on the other hand emphasised on the growth of committees as an important measure of complexity and argued that internal complexity occurs when 'legislatures begin delineating the jurisdictions of committees, by consolidating committees with parallel and overlapping functions, assigning committees exclusive oversight responsibilities over agencies of the executive branch and also providing committees with expanded staff aid'. Legislative institutionalization scholarship concurs that parliaments can independently and effectively carry out their allocated functions when they have the right structures and mechanisms in place, which includes a well-developed committee system. Scholarship further emphasizes the importance of committees as the vehicle for the effective running of parliaments. Ahmed (2001:12) highlights for instance that 'committees allow the legislature to (simultaneously) perform numerous functions that otherwise might not be conducted at all. They help parliament reduce its workload and perform different functions more efficiently'.

This part of the study thus assesses the extent of growth of the committee system in the parliament of Botswana, as depicted by (i) increase in the number of parliamentary committees as well as (ii) the specialization of parliamentary committees. Legislative scholarship posits that the increase in the number of parliamentary committees is a straightforward task that

under the preceding provisions of this section to the Minister for the time being responsible for matters relating to such elections, and that Minister shall, not later than seven days after the National Assembly first meets after he or she has received the report, lay it before the National Assembly'.

involves ‘simply counting the number of standing committees’ (Polsby 1968:153) to determine whether the number has gone up or not. Committee specialization on the other hand involves, ‘explicitly delineating the legislative jurisdictions of the committees, consolidating committees with parallel and overlapping functions assigning committees exclusive oversight responsibilities over agencies of the executive branch’. Increase in the number of parliamentary committees and committees specialization have thus been used as indicators of improved parliamentary autonomy as echoed by several scholars (Lees and Shaw 1979; Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Gungor, 2003; Hughes 2006) who advance that the number of committees and their degree of specialization are good indicators of the degree to which a legislature has become institutionalised and has the potential to challenge the executive. The growth of specialisation within parliamentary committees has seen most parliaments gravitate towards establishing what has come to be known as Portfolio Committees. As Molomo (2012) put it, in well-developed parliaments every department of government or ministry has a parliamentary committee assigned to it. This would be the portfolio committee for that department and would be charged with the responsibility of looking into every proposal that the department intends to put before parliament. A portfolio committee would therefore be given authority to exercise the full scrutiny and oversight mandate over that ministry on behalf of parliament.

5.3.1. Increasing Number of Parliamentary Committees and Establishment of Portfolio Committees

In the parliament of Botswana like in other parliaments elsewhere, committees are viewed as an important mechanism for achieving the mandate of parliament. The Parliament of Botswana Committees Manual (2014) stipulates for instance that parliament’s committee system plays an important role in oversight as it allows for a more thorough engagement with issues by committee members. The Parliament of Botswana thus has developed a committee system that entails several committees classified into: standing committees[16], sessional committees[17] and

16 A standing committee is a permanent, regular committee which is established by the Standing Orders, an Act of Parliament, or the Constitution. Parliamentary Standing committees are divided into two, Administrative and Oversight Committees.

17 These are committees appointed at the beginning of a Session of parliament and stand dissolved at the end of the parliamentary session.

special select committees[18]. While today the total number of parliamentary committees stands at 23, this has however not always been the case. For instance, in 2010, Botswana Parliament had a total of 17 committees made of: 5 standing committees, 10 sessional committees and 2 special sessional committees. Additionally, in 2011, the parliament of Botswana instated parliamentary portfolio committees.

Parliamentary portfolio committees are committees designated according to government portfolios to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of government departments and other matters falling under their jurisdictions as Parliament may by resolution determine. Former Speaker of the Parliament of Botswana, Ray Molomo (2012) reiterated the relief that portfolio committees bring for parliamentary effectiveness by stating that, 'as parliamentary business became increasingly cumbersome and unwieldy it became necessary to find a way of dealing with this massive task effectively. The only way was to allocate responsibilities for certain functions of study and scrutiny to different groups of their members'. Thus, as alluded to, in February 2011, the parliament of Botswana restructured its committee system to allow for committee specialization through the establishment of parliamentary portfolio committees. This streamlining of parliamentary committees into portfolio committees followed the amendment of the National Standing Orders of Parliament, (Order 98). These committees as shown in Appendix 1 shadow all Government Ministries. The streamlining of parliamentary committees into portfolio committees followed the amendment of the National Standing Orders of Parliament, (Order 98). These committees are created for the life of parliament and have a special sectoral mandate for a total of thirty-two government ministries and agencies. Although this is seen as an improvement in the parliament of Botswana, it has however been met with opposing views and criticisms. These critical views emanate from the fact that the newly established portfolio committees do not exist for each government ministry as is practice in other jurisdictions.

18 Special Select Committees are appointed by the National Assembly Order on a motion to consider the terms of a Bill or deal with a certain specific matter or inquiry. These are automatically dissolved once they submit their final reports. They often hold public hearings to obtain input from the public.

5.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter set out to explore and show the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has become more autonomous as well as how it has grown in its internal complexity over the years. Using two selected indicators of parliamentary autonomy and internal complexity the chapter has established that the parliament of Botswana has only improved in part, in as far as parliament's growth in autonomy is concerned. For instance, while parliament's growth in autonomy as shown through declining membership turnover and growing internal value for parliament have improved over time, the same cannot be said entirely about parliament's internal complexity. This is because, while parliament managed to streamline its committees and has put in place portfolio committees which in turn increased the number of committees of parliament, this has not been done extensively and thus remains inadequate. The inadequacy is mainly due to the fact that, even after the streamlining of committees, some ministries and departments continue to share portfolio committees where the essence of having portfolio committees is that such committees will specialise and exclusively shadow the work of ministries and departments under which they fall. Thus, the argument by Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2006:38) still stands that, 'Botswana's committee system remains weak and underdeveloped in spite of being the longest democracy in Africa'.

6. CHAPTER 6: ASSESSING PARLIAMENT'S PERFORMANCE OF BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT

6.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters 4 and 5, the study assessed Botswana parliament's experience with key factors associated with driving change for better parliamentary performance. The factors under consideration were greater societal and economic modernization as well growing parliamentary autonomy and internal complexity. Having established the extent of growth and improvement of the aforementioned factors in the parliament of Botswana, this chapter looks at parliament's performance of budgetary oversight. The argument put forth in the introductory section of the study was that over the years, the parliament of Botswana has experienced growth and improvement in factors associated with better and improved parliamentary performance and as a result it would be in a better position to effectively perform its allocated functions, including budgetary oversight. As pointed out in the methodology chapter, this study assesses parliament's performance of budgetary oversight in three ways that include; (i) a general assessment of parliament's performance of budget oversight activities, based on desk research, interviews and the researcher's own observations. Secondly, the study looks at (ii) internal reviews of parliament's performance by members of the parliament as surveyed by the African Legislatures Project (ALP) and thirdly, (iii) external reviews of parliament's performance of budgetary oversight by the Open Budget Survey (OBS).

In the first instance, where the study presents a general assessment of parliament's performance of budgetary oversight, the study combines qualitative data derived from various sources such as desk research, interviews as well as the researcher's own observation of parliament's oversight work. These various sources of information are used to determine parliament's performance of the approval (ex-ante) and evaluation (ex-post) activities in the chamber and within its budget committees. The two budget committees in the parliament of Botswana are the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC) for ex-ante activities and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), entrusted with ex-post oversight activities.

In its second analysis of parliamentary performance, as alluded to, the chapter uses Thirdly, the chapter analyses parliament's performance of budgetary oversight through an assessment of external reviews of parliament's performance derived from the Open budget Survey (OBS) data. The OBS assesses three components of budget accountability system in all countries involved. These three components being public availability of budget information, opportunities for the public to participate in the budget process as well as the strength and effectiveness of formal oversight institutions. The two most prominent formal oversight institutions considered in the OBS are the legislature and the national audit office (Auditor General), which play an important role in budgetary oversight.

6.2. Overview of Parliament's Performance of Budgetary Oversight Activities

There are generally four acknowledged stages of the budget process which include the (i) preparation, (ii) approval, (iii) implementation and (iv) evaluation or audit of the budget. The Parliament of Botswana is given powers for the approval (ex-ante oversight) and evaluation or audit (ex-post oversight) stages of the budget process. The budget formulation and implementation powers are given solely to the executive in the capacity of the Ministry of Finance. Parliament's approval and audit powers are given through sections 118, 119 and 120 of the Constitution of Botswana. These budgetary oversight powers of parliament are expanded upon in Chapter 8 of this study.

6.2.1. Budget Approval in the Chamber

The Ministry of Finance, which is bestowed with the budget preparation powers, prepares all revenue estimates and expenditures and lays them before parliament for approval. Section 119 (1) provides to this end that, 'the Minister for the time being responsible for finance shall cause to be prepared and laid before the National Assembly, before or not later than 30 days after the commencement of each financial year, estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Botswana for that year'. Following the Minister of Finance's tabling of the budget appropriation bill in the national assembly, members of parliament are given the opportunity to debate and question the budget allocations (the appropriation bill). The conduct and practice of the budget debates[19]

19 Yamamoto (2007) explains for instance that '…oral exchanges of opinions that are intended to facilitate the chamber's collective decision-making on certain issues. Debates can take place on special occasions such as opening speeches or at different stages of the examination of draft legislation. In

and questions [20] is guided by the general rules and procedures on parliamentary debates outlined in part three and part four of the Standing Orders of National Assembly (Sections 36 – 46). Section 36.1 of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly (SONA) of Botswana provides in part that, any private member may address a question to a minister relating to a public matter for which he or she is responsible, and either seeking information on such matter, or asking for official action regarding it. Section 46.2 of the standing orders further proclaiming that 'when a 'motion' has been moved, the speaker shall propose the question thereon to the Assembly in the same terms as the motion. Debate may then take place on that question and may continue for so long as any member who is entitled to speak wishes to speak'. These are the procedures MPs follow in the chamber when debating the appropriation bill.

Members of parliament spend approximately two weeks debating the minister's appropriation bill after which parliament is granted another four weeks debating budget proposals for each government ministry. Successful parliamentary budget debates and question sessions depend on the timeliness within which members of parliament receive the budget proposal. Many respondents during the study interviews, expressed concern that members of the parliament of Botswana often get to see the appropriation bill (budget allocations) late. Some researchers in the country such as Phirinyane (2005:63), have echoed the same sentiments stating in part that 'legislators usually encounter budget proposals for the first time during the budget speech in Parliament'. Additionally, while parliamentary debates are a necessary aspect of oversight, the quality of such debates matters for the success and effectiveness of oversight.

6.2.2. Budget Approval by the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC)

While parliament's budget approval activities begin in the chamber, the bulk of these activities take place within the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC). Established through Section

addition, parliamentary debates can address issues that are chosen by parliamentarians themselves or highlight the work of parliamentary committees. The rules on parliamentary debates provide parliamentary political groups with an opportunity to express their view, while also allowing individual parliamentarians to bring particular issues to attention'.

20 Parliamentary questions on the other hand are an accountability tool that gives parliament and its members an opportunity to 'solicit information from the government on matters of public information' (Chibesakunda,2001:79). Parliamentary questions can be in three forms that include; ordinary oral questions, written questions or short notice questions.

106.1 of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly (SONA), the FEC is empowered to 'examine whether funds are well allocated within the limits of the policy implied in the estimates … (as well as) to consider and recommend for approval all proposals by the government entailing supplementary expenditure from public funds for which the sanction of the Assembly is required'. This oversight role by the FEC begins after budget debates and questions have taken place in the plenary. The FEC is expected to meet at such times and such places as may be determined by the committee's chairperson to examine the allocation of funds as provided for in Section 106.3 of the SONA. This provision as many respondents expressed during the study interviews, presents a weakness in the FEC as it shows that the committee does not operate on scheduled meetings but rather meets as and when the chairperson sees fit. However, this is an important stage where MPs in their capacity as FEC members get to thoroughly interrogate budget proposals and make amendments as they see fit. However, some scholars and contributors in the country have challenged the extent to which members of the parliament of Botswana can amend the budget. As Kaboyakgosi (2011:5) put it, 'one of the challenges facing parliament in its execution of the oversight function is that whereas sections 119 and 120 of the Constitution bestow on it the ability to authorize public expenditures, the same sections fail to stipulate the latitude to amend the same budget'. Another scholar in the country Botlhale (2012:60.) observed that despite the elaborate institutional arrangement, parliament's budget amendment powers are limited. Botlhale (ibid) further confers that members of the parliament of Botswana can only 'amend the proposed budget but cannot change the deficit or surplus amount and, if the proposed budget is not approved by the legislature on the 1st of April, the Finance Minister's proposal stands'.

6.2.3. Budget Audit/Evaluation by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)

As already alluded to, the parliament of Botswana is also empowered for the evaluation or audit stage of the budget process also known as ex-post budget oversight. For its ex-post budgetary oversight role, the parliament of Botswana relies on the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Section 105 of the Standing Orders of Parliament outlines that the PAC is to perform this role at the end of each financial year by examining the accounts and statements from the Accountant General in conjunction with the report of the Auditor General. To do this, the PAC has specific activities outlined in the Public Accounts Operational Guidelines and the Public Accounts Committee Examination Guidelines. These activities include (i) planning and holding budget committee meetings and hearings, (ii) drafting and producing committee reports with

recommendations as well as (v) following-up on the acceptance and implementation of committee recommendations. Parliament's performance of these activities is elaborated below.

Planning and Conducting PAC Meetings and Hearings

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Botswana parliament holds hearings at the end of every financial year to examine the Auditor General's report as well as receive testimony from accounting officers on critical issues raised by the Auditor General. The PAC uses public hearings to gather information that helps it in making informed analyses and decisions on issues brought to its attention by the auditor general through the audit report. During audit hearings, the committee may also receive written submissions from relevant stakeholders. The frequency of budget committee meetings and hearings has also been used to indicate the level of budget oversight activity within committees, as argued by Pelizzo and Kinyondo (2014), 'to a larger extent, the number of hearings held by PACs reflects their effectiveness'. The Public Accounts Committee of Botswana has been able to conduct and hold required meetings and hearings at the end of every financial year without fail. The success of the PAC in doing this has been highlighted throughout the study interviews and it has led some to view the PAC as the most active and effective committee of the parliament of Botswana.

Producing Public Accounts Committee Reports

At the end of its meetings and hearings, the PAC is expected to prepare and produce reports to be tabled and debated in parliament. PAC reports capture recommendations made on corrective measures to be implemented by various government departments and officials in addressing issues identified during cross examinations. While producing reports is an essential activity of the PAC's oversight task, there however is no provision for a responsible officer dedicated for the capturing of minutes and production of report. This leaves this task in the hands of the committee chairpersons or the committee secretary. This lack of role clarity presents a challenge and, in the end, it is often the committee advisor who drafts the PAC report with the help of junior officers. Nonetheless, through the committee advisor's help, PAC reports are produced without fail, reflecting consensus reached by committee members at the end of meetings and hearings. Committee consensus ensures that recommendations contained in the

report reflect unanimous decisions of the committee especially when the need arises to defend the report before the national assembly.

Following-up on Committee Recommendations

Beyond producing reports containing committee recommendations for corrective action, PACs are expected to make follow-ups to establish acceptance and implementation of their recommendations. The Botswana PAC however does not follow up on the acceptance and implementation of recommendations. Other countries place upon government departments a formal requirement to respond to and implement committee recommendations. Such formal requirement is non-existent in Botswana and thus nothing compels government departments or the executive to respond to or to implement recommendations made particularly by the PAC. This leaves the acceptance and implementation of committee recommendations, to good will and good relations between the PAC and government departments. As stated in the Botswana Public Accounts Committee Operational Guidelines (n.d), 'for the PAC recommendations to be taken seriously by the Executive, it is important that the committee maintains a constructive working relationship with the Government and the recommendation should be value adding'.

The above has resulted in some scholars and contributors in the country expressing dissatisfactions that the implementation of committee recommendations cannot be left to the relationship between the committee and government accounting officers who play a major role in terms of whether recommendations get accepted and implemented accordingly. Depending on good relations has resulted in the same problems and recommendations reappearing in committee reports overtime. Phirinyane (2005:66) has pointed out in part that it is not uncommon in the parliament of Botswana to find statements of audit reports that frequently mention that despite several reminders sent, the committee has not received any response from accounting officers.

6.3. Internal Reviews of Parliament's Performance of Budgetary Oversight

As alluded to at the beginning of the chapter, parliament's effectiveness in performing its budgetary oversight role is also assessed through reviews about parliament's work made by members of the parliament of Botswana themselves. These reviews are drawn from the 2008

African Legislatures Project (ALP) survey data and are used to show how members of the parliament of Botswana rate their parliament's performance of budgetary oversight. The African Legislatures Project (ALP) survey data, assesses the internal reviews of parliament's performance of budgetary oversight as given by members of parliament. The ALP is a comparative study of legislatures and legislators in 20 African countries, and it employs a comparative, quantitative, and multidimensional approach to understand the operations and development of African legislatures. As alluded to in the methodology chapter (Chapter 3), assessing MPs' internal reviews of parliament's performance relies largely on the ALP survey data of 2008. 2008 presented an interesting period in the political landscape of Botswana, especially in the political leadership of the country. For instance, it was during this period that former President Mogae stepped down from office, handing over power to his then vice President Lieutenant-General Ian Khama who according to Molomo (2000:98), was at the time '…brought into government to improve productivity in the public service'. Thus, reviews of parliament's performance by MPs especially those from the ruling BDP would have sought to align and reflect what the party intended to achieve with the move. Additionally, 2008 was a period towards the country's next general election and thus an interesting period to consider how members of the Botswana legislature would assess their own performance during a time that can be termed the most important time in the lifecycle of a politician especially for those seeking re-election.

This analysis begins by assessing MPs' rating of parliamentary debates as an important activity in the approval oversight work of parliament. Table 6.1 below presents members of the parliament of Botswana's view on quality debates in the parliament of Botswana. During the interview, MPs were asked to rate the quality of debates in the plenary and the table shows that a total of about 87 percent members of parliament found the quality of debates in parliament to be good and very good. Only about 13percent of the members interviewed rated the quality of debates in the chamber as poor and very poor. This is a good start because parliamentary debates in Rozenberg (2018:)'s view encourage accountability from the ministers. Members of the parliament of Botswana ranked the quality of the debates in their chamber almost in a similar way as the rest of the other parliaments in the region whose average percent stood at about 84 percent.

Table 6.1: Quality of Parliamentary Debates

		Valid Percent for Botswana	Country Average Percent
Valid	**Very poor**	5.1	5.3
	Poor	7.7	18.1
	Good	66.7	58.4
	Very good	20.5	17.3
	Total	100.0	

Source: African Legislatures Project Survey (2008): How would you rate the quality of debates in the plenary?

As alluded to earlier, in addition to debating bills in the chamber, MPs also get to ask questions on the motions and bills tabled before them in the chamber. And so, asking good and relevant questions in parliament is the starting point for effective oversight because as Martin (2013:1) argues, 'the ability of legislators to question members of the executive is an important feature of many democratic legislatures'. The ALP survey further asked respondents to rate the ability of members of parliament to ask good and informed questions. This question is necessary because when MPs can generally ask good questions in the chamber, when the time comes to debate the budget bill, we believe that they will be able to engage the minister of finance and ask questions accordingly. Table 6.2 below shows that about 86% of the respondent MPs believe that during plenary debates members of the parliament of Botswana are indeed able to ask good questions. A rating of 86% reflects well on MPs' abilities to interrogate and question issues discussed in the chamber. Botswana parliament can be said to be performing better than other African countries that took place in the survey whose average score was about 69 percent.

Table 6.2: Members' Ability to Ask Good Questions

		Valid Percentage for Botswana	Country Average Percent
	Poor	4	14.9
	Good	84	58.5
	Very good	12	11.2

Source: African Legislatures Project Survey, (2008): Thinking of the Committees on which you serve, how would you rate: Members' ability to ask informed questions during public hearings

Beyond the work done in the chamber, members of parliament work through budget committees to provide further and extensive budgetary oversight. As highlighted in the preceding section, it is within the FEC that members of parliament get to thoroughly engage with the budget to determine if allocations are done right and if they are in line with government priorities and plans. This calls for members of parliament to have a good understanding of the budget. To determine this, the ALP survey further asked respondent members about MPs' ability to understand the budget. A good score on this question helps us to establish whether members of parliament do have knowledge of the issues that they are supposed to engage on when interrogating budget proposals. Table 6.3 shows that a little over 60 percent of members interviewed for the parliament of Botswana believed that MPs understood the budget. Close to 40 percent of members expressed that MPs had a poor understanding of the budget. 605 is an average score for the effectiveness of parliament in budgetary oversight. Nonetheless, this was still a better score in comparison to the rest of African parliaments in the study as their average score stood at about 47 percent.

Table 6.3: Members' Ability to Understand the Budget

		Valid Percent for Botswana	**Country Average Percent**
Valid	**Very poor**	7.7	9.3
	Poor	30.8	39.8
	Good	51.3	44.9
	Very good	10.3	2.2
	Total	100.0	

Source: African Legislatures Project Survey, (2008): How would you rate: MPs' ability to understand the details, and ask informed questions about the national budget?

The ALP further solicited views from members of the parliament of Botswana regarding what their take on parliament's performance of budget evaluation was. Table 6,5 shows that where members were asked to rate parliament's effectiveness in monitoring how the executive spends money, almost 74 percent of the MPs expressed that parliament was doing a good (and very good) of job monitoring executive spending, compared to about 54 percent scored most of the countries involved in the survey.

Table 6.4: Effectiveness in Monitoring How the Executive Spends Money is Good

		Valid Percent for Botswana	Country Average Percent
Valid	**Very bad**	5.1	11.1
	Bad	23.1	33.6
	Good	46.2	45.8
	Very good	25.6	8.4
	Total	100.0	

Source: African Legislatures Project Survey, (2008): We want you to rate the effectiveness of Parliament like a scorecard: 1. For each of the following areas, how well or badly would you say Parliament is doing its job? Reviewing how the executive spends money?

Additionally, members of parliament were asked to express whether they view parliament's effectiveness in monitoring how the executive spends money as having improved over the past five years. More than half of the respondents expressed that parliament's effectiveness in monitoring how the executive spends money has improved over the past 5 years, with 64 percent expressing that it has become better compared to only 28 percent who said it had stayed the same. Thus, according to respondent MPs, parliament has been performing its budgetary oversight role effectively and such performance had improved overtime.

Table 6.5: Effectiveness in Monitoring How Executive spends money has improved over the Past 5-Years

		Valid Percent for Botswana	Country Average Percent
Valid	**Do not know**	2.7	7.1
	Worse		14.4
	Stayed the same	29.7	30.7
	Better	67.6	47.3
	Total	100.0	
Total			

Source: African Legislatures Project Survey, (2008): We want you to rate the effectiveness of Parliament like a scorecard: (2) Reviewing how the executive spends money? Is it doing better or worse than five years ago, or have things stayed the same?

Lastly, considering that the bulk of parliament's ex-post budgetary oversight work is carried out by the PAC as alluded to earlier, the ALP survey also asked members of the parliament of

Botswana to rate the Public Accounts Committee's performance on expenditure review. Table 6.6 shows that most members of the parliament of Botswana rated the PAC's role of reviewing government expenditure as either very good (35.9 percent) or good (48.7 percent). Only less than 10 percent of members interviewed expressed that the PAC was doing a poor job of reviewing government expenditure. MPs ranked the PAC's review of expenditure almost similar to other countries' PACs as shown by the country average score which also stands at about 55 percent and 23 percent good and very good rankings. It can thus be argued that respondent MPs have displayed some level of confidence in the work of the PAC.

Table 6.6: MPs Rating of PAC's Review of Expenditure

		Valid Percent for Botswana	**Country Average Percent**
Valid	**Poor**	8.3	13.6
	Good	52.8	55.4
	Very good	38.9	23.4
	Total	100.0	

Source: African Legislatures Projects Survey, (2008): How would you rate the review of the expenditures made by government ministries by (B) PAC

6.3.1. Relations with the Supreme Audit Institution

It has been alluded to elsewhere in the study that in performing its ex-post budgetary oversight role, parliament through its Public Accounts Committee works closely with the country's Supreme audit institution (SAI) also known as Auditor General. A close and good working relationship between the Auditor General and the PAC is necessary in ensuring effective audit of the budget. Stapenhurst et al (2011:77) reiterate that, 'a good relationship between the PAC and the auditor general is critical if the committee is to achieve its objectives of financial oversight.' Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) further observe that this is an interdependence relationship where the audit institution produces reports for the PAC to consider while on the other hand the SAI expects the PAC to provide a public forum for the discussion of its reports.

The working relations between the parliament of Botswana and the Auditor General are provided for in Section 124 of the Constitution. According to Section 114 (3) of the Constitution, the Auditor General prepares and submits audit reports to the Minister responsible

for finance, who shall cause them to be laid before the National Assembly. This arrangement has however been challenged by many contributors in the country who argue that although the PAC in the parliament of Botswana is well-structured and viewed as the most active committee of parliament, the provision calling for the Auditor General to lay his/her report before the minister of finance instead of directly before parliament limits the effectiveness of the PAC. This arguably limits the independence of Parliament in the performance of its scrutiny and control functions on the government. Nonetheless, this problem is checked by section 124(5) of the Constitution which protects the Auditor General from the control and influence of anybody or authority in the performance of his or her functions[21]. Thus, upon receiving the Auditor General's report, the expectation is for members of the PAC to engage with the report as much as they can to ensure adherence to budget instructions.

This section assesses how members of the parliament of Botswana through the ALP survey, rate their interaction with the Auditor General's report which forms the bulk of their budgetary oversight work. The ALP asked members about the quality of the Auditor General's report, its timeliness and whether they as members of parliament can ask good questions about it. Table 6.7 shows that members of the parliament of Botswana rank the auditor general's report highly. This is shown by 95 percent of members in both instances suggesting that the quality of the Auditor General's report is either good and very good or that its timeliness is ether good and/or very good.

Table 6.7: Quality and Timeliness of the Auditor General's Reports

		Quality of the Report	**Timeliness of the Report**
	Very Poor		0
Valid	**Poor**	5.1	2.6
	Good	51.3	71.8
	Very good	43.6	23.1
	Total	100.0	

How would you rate: (A) The quality of the Auditor General's audit reports to Parliament? (B) The timeliness of the Auditor General's audit reports to Parliament?

21 Section 125 (5) stipulates that, 'In the exercise of his functions the Auditor-General shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority'.

At the same time, members have also rated their interaction with the Auditor General's report quite highly with about 74 percent of members believed that members asked good questions about the auditor's report as shown in table 6.8 below.

Table 6.8: Members Ask Good questions about Auditor General's Report

		Valid Percent for Botswana	Country Average Percent
Valid	**Very poor**	5.1	9.6
	Poor	20.5	36.8
	Good	56.4	42.2
	Very good	17.9	3.0
	Total	100.0	

Source: African Legislatures Project Survey, (2008): MPs' ability to understand the Auditor General's reports, and ask informed questions about them?

In the end, this analysis has shown that throughout all the questions asked during the ALP survey, members of the parliament of Botswana rated the performance of parliament quite highly. This is not alarming because as Monk (2009) argued, the views of the legislature themselves may be biased in their judgement of their own performance. Monk (2009) reiterates in this regard,

> In discussing effectiveness, it needs to be remembered that committee members are drawn from the legislature. Therefore, the views expressed by the legislature about a committee may well overlap with the views of the committee itself about its work. Research … demonstrates that committee members generally find their work very satisfying.

6.4. External Reviews of Parliament's Performance of Budgetary Oversight

In this section, the study uses the Open Budget Survey (OBS) data to assess external reviews of parliament's effectiveness in performing budgetary oversight. The Open Budget Survey is conducted by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) to assess countries' accountability

with regards to public budgets. The survey assesses three components of a budget accountability system in all countries involved. These three components being public availability of budget information, opportunities for the public to participate in the budget process as well as the strength and effectiveness of formal oversight institutions. In terms of assessments of parliament's effectiveness in budgetary oversight, the Open Budget Survey assesses whether legislatures provide effective budget oversight by measuring performance on 11 indicators including: consultations with the executive prior to the tabling in the legislature of the draft budget, research capacity, formal debate on overall budget policy, time available to discuss and approve the budget, legal authority to amend the budget proposal, approval of shifts in expenditure budget and excess revenues collected, supplemental budget powers, authority to approve use of contingency funds, and scrutiny of audit reports. The OBS assesses what occurs in practice, rather than what is required by law. Beginning in 2006, the OBS has consistently conducted this survey every second year and Botswana has participated in all the surveys conducted between 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017 and 2019.

Table 6.9 below shows rankings of Botswana parliament's performance of budgetary oversight over the years. The table also presents rankings for selected African countries that also took part in the Open Budget Surveys, for comparative purposes. The data shows that while in the initial two surveys of 2006 and 2008, no questions were asked about parliament's performance of budgetary oversight, in consecutive surveys of 2010 to 2019, the researchers asked about parliament's budgetary oversight role. The data shows that during the 2010 and 2012 surveys, the parliament of Botswana was ranked as having been able to provide moderate budgetary oversight. However, in 2015 parliament's ranking improved, as parliament was then ranked as having provided adequate budgetary oversight. The Open budget survey pointed out on this survey result that while 'the legislature provides limited oversight during the planning stage of the budget cycle it however does provide adequate oversight during the implementation stage of the budget cycle'.

During consecutive surveys of 2017 and 2019, the Botswana parliament's budget oversight performance ranking dropped from being adequate to limited budgetary oversight. According to the OBS 'this score reflects that the legislature provides limited oversight during the planning stage of the budget cycle and limited oversight during the implementation stage of

the budget cycle'. Thus, the parliament of Botswana received a low ranking especially due to its lack of involvement in budgetary oversight at the preparation and implementation stages of the budget process.

Table 6.9: Open Budget Survey Rating of Parliament's Performance of Budget Oversight

COUNTRY	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2015**	**2017**	**2019**
Botswana	*	*	Moderate	Moderate	Adequate	Limited	Limited
Ghana	*	*	Moderate	Strong	Limited	Weak	Limited
Namibia	*	*	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
South Africa	*	*	Strong	Strong	Adequate	Adequate	Adequate

Source: International Budget Partnership, internationalbudget.org, Open Budget Surveys of 2006 – 2019. (**While OBS surveys were conducted in the country for the indicated years, no specific questions were asked about legislative budget oversight in 2006 and 2008. **In 2010 and 2012, no percentage scores were given*)

When comparing Botswana parliament's performance ranking with the ranking of a few other countries in the region, table 6.9 shows that generally a moderate to limited performance of budgetary oversight is often expected for most African countries. This is in exception to South Africa, which has consistently been ranked highly in the performance of its budgetary oversight role. As such, the challenge of providing effective parliamentary budget oversight remains for many African parliaments.

6.5. Chapter Summary

This chapter set out to assess the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has effectively performed its budgetary oversight role. The chapter assessed parliament's performance of budgetary oversight in three ways. The first assessment entailed a general qualitative review of parliament's performance of budgetary oversight using information derived from desk research, interviews as well observations made by the researcher on parliament's performance. The second assessment made use of the African Legislatures Project (ALP) survey data which surveyed MPs' reviews of parliament's performance of budgetary oversight. The last assessment entailed the use of Open Budget Survey (OBS) data that ranks countries'

performance according to their legislatures and oversight institutions' level of accountability in national budget processes.

The chapter acknowledged that whereas the budget process is categorised into four phases of formulation, approval, implementation and evaluation, the parliament of Botswana is empowered only for budget approval (ex-ante oversight) and evaluation (ex-post oversight). It is within these stages that parliament and its budget committees can perform specific activities of budgetary oversight. In the first stage of involvement, the chapter has shown that parliament's Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC) carries the bulk of budget approval activities while the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) conducts most of parliament's ex-post (budget evaluation) activities. The chapter established that parliament in both stages of oversight is faced with some challenges. For instance, while in its ex-ante role, parliament is afforded the opportunity to debate and question national policies including the budget policy, there is however no instrument that specifically details how parliamentary budget debates and questions should be conducted. Thus, budget debates and questions are managed and conducted in line with regulations of any other policy brought before parliament. This is against the understanding and belief that, the national budget is an important policy tool that requires extensive debate and questioning. The chapter also observed that between the two budgetary oversight committees, the FEC is the most inactive. Additionally, the FEC does not receive special recognition as much as the PAC. However, the FEC has better potential to ensure fiscal discipline and accountability in expenditure as it handles budget appropriations before any spending is made. This is contrary to the PAC which only gets to make, inquiries into lapses and misappropriations after monies have already been spent. At the same time, while the PAC is the most active amongst parliament's budget oversight committees, it also still faces certain challenges such as the lack of a formalised requirement for responses to its recommendations. This is a necessary requirement that ensures compliance, as Monk (2009) argues,

> '…the usual way in which the government gives its view of the report is through a government response tabled in the relevant chamber. The formal government response to a report, states what the government has done, or plans to do, with respect to the report's recommendations. It generally also gives reasons where the government has decided not to implement a recommendation.'

Other challenges highlighted in the chapter include the fact that committees do not have a dedicated meeting room or auditorium. Furthermore, for the FEC, meetings to review budget allocations are conducted in private 'unless the house or the committee itself determine to proceed otherwise' (SONA, Section 106.5). In addition, some respondents lamented during interviews while the FEC rarely holds meetings to conduct its duties, it was also unfortunate that even in instances where it does hold meetings to evaluate budget allocations, the committee often only approves requests submitted by various government departments and ministries. The committee rarely ever rejects or alters budget proposals or supplementary request.

In its analysis of parliament's performance using the ALP data, the chapter has shown that members of the parliament of Botswana view their parliament in a more positive light. For instance, MPs rated the quality of parliamentary debates as good, and they expressed that they as MPs understood the budget and often asked good questions in the chamber. Additionally, MPs rated the effectiveness of parliament in monitoring how the executive spends money as good, and they further stated that parliament's performance in this regard has been improving over the past 5 years. The chapter also established that MPs were also of the view that the work done by budget committees especially the PAC was very good.

Lastly, contrary to MPs' reviews and in line with the first category of assessing parliament's performance, the parliament of Botswana has received overall waning reviews on its performance of budgetary oversight as ranked by the Open Budget Surveys of 2006 through to 2019. Parliament's performance rankings have gone down from adequate in 2010 to limited performance in 2019. Thus, according to the OBS, the parliament of Botswana has not performed budgetary oversight satisfactorily over the years. Nonetheless, the poor performance in ranking for parliamentary budget oversight has not been peculiar to the parliament of Botswana. Other selected African countries shown in the chapter have also not performed budgetary oversight satisfactorily. This is in exception of the South African parliament which has been ranked as strong and adequate in all instances.

SECTION 3: KEY FACTORS MAKING PARLIAMENT MORE OR LESS INFLUENTIAL IN BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT

Section Introduction

Section 3 presents an assessment of key factors that make parliament influential in budgetary oversight. The argument carried in this section is that, whether parliament has better capacity and resources or that it is highly autonomous and complex as assessed in the previous section, there are however, certain factors that affect the influence that parliament and members of parliament carry and can exert in their budgetary oversight function. The section assesses selected factors that include; formal powers of parliament as well as political party dynamics. This section nonetheless begins by assessing the growth of societal and economic modernization, which as argued in the earlier chapters of the study, forms part of the study's theoretical foundations. The Section also further presents Chapter 10 which brings together the study's conclusions, findings, recommendations and directions for future research.

7. CHAPTER 7: GREATER SOCIETAL AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND IT CONSEQUENCES IN THE PARLIAMENT OF BOTSWANA

7.1. Introduction

Modernization as alluded to in the introductory chapter, is known to bring about changes in the ways people perceive, express and value democracy, its institutions and their own lives. In the earlier years, scholarship presented modernization as a linear and progressive process that involved a simple and direct movement away from traditional to modern ways of doing things. As Luintel (2014:221) put it, 'the linear theory of social change and progress claims that the natural course of society is to move from simplicity to complexity and from tradition to modernity.' Nonetheless, other modernization theorists such as Huntington (1968:32), have argued that modernization is not simply a process of economic change, it involves 'changes in virtually all areas of human thought and activity', hence it is often viewed as a complex process driven by several factors, with many varied indicators. This chapter assesses the growth of modernization in Botswana and among Batswana at large. The argument carried within this chapter is that greater modernization experienced by the country and by Batswana over the years also reflects within parliament. Thus, with greater modernization, the parliament of Botswana is consequently placed in a better position to perform its budgetary oversight role.

Drawing from various scholarly work on modernization, this chapter assesses selected modernization indicators to show the extent to which Botswana and Batswana have increasingly modernized overtime. For instance, when summing up the changes that modernization brings about, Inglehart (2017:138) noted that 'in the long run, once economic development gets underway, certain changes are likely to happen. Industrialization, for example, brings urbanization, occupational specialization and rising levels of formal education in any society that undertakes it. Farther down the line, it brings greater prosperity and better nutrition and health care, which lead to rising life expectancy'. Thus, the chapter assesses the following indicators for the parliament of Botswana; (i) a shift from agricultural to industrial society, (ii) rising levels of national wealth, (iii) decreasing levels of poverty, (iv) rising educational levels, (v) rising middle class as well as (vi) increasing news media use. Having assessed the growth of modernization in Botswana, this further assesses the following in the parliament of Botswana.

Understanding that modernization has been associated with better parliamentary performance, and as the title of the chapter suggests, the chapter further assesses the occurrence of modernization in the parliament of Botswana, the chapter further assesses the growth of some of the modernization variables inside parliament. This follows scholarly arguments that posit that greater societal and economic modernization in the country is also often reflected inside parliament. Barkan (2004:236) buttresses for instance that 'changes in the characteristics of legislators are reflective of changes in society at large'. Hence the expectation being that when Botswana and Batswana increasingly modernize, then the parliament of Botswana would experience the same. Some of the modernization variables further assessed for the parliament of Botswana include members' educational level, members' previous professions or occupational experience as well as members' age. While age is not a modernization indicator, it is however often factored in because it plays an important role in how people are able to adopt changes brought about by modernization.

7.2. Assessing the Growth of Modernization in Botswana

Today, Botswana, like many other previously traditional societies, has evolved to become highly modernized. Scholars and contributors in the country have for a long time argued that at independence, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world, starting off without any favourable conditions (Acemoglou, Johnson, et'al, 2001). However, following the discovery of diamonds in 1967 the country's economy changed radically, as Karsterns (2021:1) put it, after discovery of diamonds, its (Botswana's) GDP and economy grew exponentially'. Thus, Botswana achieved rapid economic development. Jefferis (40 Years of Independence) further maintains that Botswana's 'history over the period since independence has been one of rapid growth, structural transformation, and large increases in real income. Over much of the past 40 years, Botswana has been the fastest growing economy in the world, led by the growth of the mining sector and the country's emergence as the world's largest diamond producer'. Jefferis further argues that 'much has been achieved in the country in terms of economic, physical and social development, and the bulk of the population has enjoyed significant increases in living standards'.

A Shift from Agriculture to Industrial Economy?

As alluded to earlier, modernization scholarship posits that when countries become more modern, they begin to shift their means of production from primary agriculture to become largely industrial economies. Using data from the National Statistics Office of Botswana, figure 7.1 shows overtime changes in production activities in Botswana. Results show a decline in agricultural production, which from the time of independence dominated economic activity at almost 81 percent to being at its lowest in 2015 at 2 percent. On the other hand, manufacturing which had a promising start at almost 28 percent in 1966, has remained limited over the years at below 7 percent. Mining on the other hand has risen overtime from 1.5 percent in 1966 to reach its highest record of almost 45 percent in 1990. Although it dropped from 1995, mining has remained the highest economic activity in the country to date.

Figure 7.1: A Shift from Agriculture to Industrial Economy



Source: Statistics Botswana

Rising Levels of National Wealth?

Another indicator of growing economic modernization is rising levels of national wealth. As a developing economy, Botswana has for many years been applauded as the 'best example' of successful economic growth in Africa. The country's economic growth record is cited in

comparison to its economic stance at the time of independence[22]. When measuring national wealth scholars often make use of countries' Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as reiterated by Siphambe (20112:37) that, 'the most comprehensive indicator of an economy's performance is national income or GDP'. Thus, this study also uses GDP measures generated by the National Statistics Office of Botswana, to show the extent of the country's economic growth. Results presented on figure 7.2 below show an overtime rise in Botswana's GDP per capita from P72,8 million in 1966 to P66,534 million in 2014. However, national GDP levels began dropping in subsequent years to stand at under P25 million in 2020.

Figure 7.2: Rising National Wealth - Botswana GDP Levels



Source: Statistics Botswana

Rising Middle Class

Modernization scholarship argues that there is no single definition for the middle class. Stearns (1979:377) proclaims for instance that, the concept "middle class" is one of the most enigmatic yet frequent in the social sciences. We have made little headway toward anatomical precision'. Nonetheless, most scientists make use of specific indicators to paint a picture of what and who

[22] Almost all authors writing on Botswana's economic growth refer to the fact that the country has risen from being one of the poorest economies in the world to be classified as a middle-income economy (Tsie 1996; Molutsi 2004; Hillbom 2008; Selolwane 2012). Molutsi (2004) states for instance that, 'at independence in 1966, Botswana was a rural society with up to 90% of the population living in conditions of abject poverty'. He further states that, 'economically, the country was backward, and political viability questionable'.

the middle class are. These include levels of income, specific types of occupation, levels of education as well as wealth holdings. This study makes use of the occupational categories argument to assess the growth of the middle class in Botswana. Thus, skilled workers, professionals as well as supervisors and managers are used in reference to the middle class within society.

Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2015 asked respondents 'what their main or past occupation was' and the results are presented in table 7.1 below. The same question was not asked in 2008 and 2012. Results below show an increase in Batswana who hold professional jobs, those who are in supervisory and managerial positions as well as those who are in business. On the other hand, there has been a decrease in the number of people who engage in subsistence farming or work in the farms as well as those who do clerical work.

Tables 7.1: Middle Class in Botswana (%)

Occupation	1999	2003	2005	2008	2012	2015
Never Had a job/Unemployed	16.7	30.3	29.1	na	na	21.5
Subsistance Farmers/Fishermen/Farm workers	3.7	8.6	5.3	na	na	3.8
Business Persons	2	5.1	5.6	na	na	6.4
Professionals (lawyer, accountant, nurse, teacher etc)	8.8	8.4	4.4	na	na	8.6
Managers/Supervisors	0.9	0.6	0.9	na	na	1.8
Skilled Manual Workers (Formal and Informal Sector)	11.4	3.4	9.1	na	na	8.5
Unskilled Manual Workers (formal and Informal sector)	11.6	7.5	9.2	na	na	25.2
Office Workers (Clerical + Government)	1.9	7.6	9.1	na	na	5.8
Other	21	28.5	27.3	na	na	18.4
Missing	22	0	0	na	na	0
Total	100	100	100	na	na	100

Source: Afrobarometer–Surveys 1999 – 2015: What is your main Occupation?

Rising Educational Levels?

Bratton et'al (2005) describe education as a catalyst of change, more especially formal schooling which they posit informs people about how things work in the (modern) world. Higher education has been linked to increased self-awareness and self-expression values which according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005:21) as well as Bratton et'al (2005:205) cause people to break away from old traditional values as they begin to embrace and understand democracy. Education has also been linked to the elements of employment and cash income as the educated often go on to get employed and receive cash payments. And so, Education in the form of

formal schooling is viewed as an important catalyst in stimulating interest in modernity. The more educated people become, the greater they are expected to relate with or identify with many of the modernization precepts. As Moracco and Moracco (1978:71) put it, the fact 'that education is a powerful factor in the process of modernization is uncontested'.

Drawing from Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2015, figure 7.3 below shows levels of formal education amongst Batswana. For instance, Batswana who have no formal education have dropped from 16.8 percent in 1999 to 13.5 percent in 2015. Levels of those who only went through primary school education also dropped from 29.6 percent in 1999 to 20.6 percent in 2015. In terms of attainment of higher education, there has been an increase in the number of Batswana with post-secondary from 0.9 percent in 1999 to 9.1 percent in 2015 and those with university education have also risen from 8.1 percent in 1999 to 12.7 percent in 2015.

Figure 7.3: Levels of Education Among Batswana



Source: Afrobarometer–Surveys 1999 – 2019: What is your highest level of education?

Increasing Use of the News Media?

The news media plays an important role in informing people about their leaders as well as the broader political system (Lekorwe et'al, 2001:22). And so, as a vehicle through which

parliamentary performance is shared with the public, the extent which the public consume media work shows how much the public is willing to receive information on budgetary oversight work. To show the public consumption of news media in Botswana, the study employs data from Afrobarometer surveys on news media use in Botswana. Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2015, asked Batswana the extent to which they have access to and use various types of the media to receive news, these being television, radio and newspapers. Figure 7.4 below presents an overtime prevalence of news media use by Batswana. The data shows that between 1999 and 2008, Batswana have had more exposure to radio news, this changing between 2012 and 2015 with more people reporting to have obtained news from television. Newspapers are the least consumed news media source in the country.

Figure 7.4: News Media Use in Botswana



Source: Afrobarometer–Surveys 1999 – 2017: How often do you get news from the following sources: (a) Radio News (b) TV News (c) Newspaper News (The question was not asked during the 2019 survey)

Decreasing Levels of Lived Poverty?

Modernization theorists often link traditional societies with high poverty rates. Huntington (1968:41), for instance posits that, 'a purely traditional society would be ignorant and poor.' And so, with increased modernization people are expected to experience less of these shortages as they stand a better chance of engaging in wealth generating activities. Afrobarometer

surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2018 asked respondents 'how often [they] have gone without food; clean water; medical care; and medical care?'. Results presented in figure 7.5 below show a rather mixed picture of levels of lived poverty in Botswana. For all the survey years, more respondents reported to have gone without cash income, with the highest level of those who lack cash income recorded in 2012 at almost 61 percent. On the other hand, medical care seems to be the most accessible of all basic necessities in Botswana. Levels of Batswana who have gone without food have dropped overtime from 35 percent in 1999 to 30 percent in 2015. However, those who report to have gone without water have increased overtime.

Figure 7.5. Levels of Lived Poverty in Botswana



Source: Afrobarometer–Surveys 1999 – 2019: Over the past year, how often if ever have you or anyone in your family gone without (a) food to eat? (b) clean water? (c) medical care? (d) cash income?

7.3. Consequences of Greater Modernization in the Parliament of Botswana

The preceding presentation has shown the trends of modernization in Botswana and amongst Batswana at large. As the analysis shows, Botswana has improved in many of the modernization indicators assessed. As some scholars in the country have argued, 'Botswana seems to have defied the odds by creating a successful economy. However, there still remains some challenges with other modernization variables such as lived poverty. Modernization in

Botswana has thus been labelled as an incomplete process. Nonetheless, as alluded to earlier, changes in the characteristics of legislators are reflective of changes in society at large. And so, a similar pattern is expected to reflect in how members of parliament have embodied these. They are thus expected to reflect in parliament. Therefore, the expectation is to find an increase in the number of highly educated members of parliament, increasing number of members with a professional or middle-class background as well as increasing numbers of younger members of parliament.

Levels of Education among members of the Parliament of Botswana

As argued earlier, education in the form of formal schooling is viewed as an important catalyst in stimulating interest in modernity and so the more educated members of parliament are, the more they will view themselves as reformists with a better outlook in terms of their capacity to bring change and reform to parliament. Mattes and Mozaffar (2011:1) further point out that, 'the argument (about MPs' education) assumes that well educated MPs are more likely to see themselves as 'institutionalists'/game changers interested in making public policy and overseeing executive actions'. Mattes and Mozaffar (ibid) buttress that 'highly educated MPs bring with them important social and political characteristics and experiences that may enhance their performance as effective legislators'. Hence the argument that increasing numbers of highly educated MPs will benefit the performance of parliament[23].

Table 7.2 below presents the education levels of MPs in the parliament of Botswana from the 1st parliament of 1965 to the 10th parliament of 2014. The results show that the Botswana parliament has attracted more highly educated members over the years. For instance, while in its early years, parliament had few members with university degrees and even none with doctoral degrees, there has been an improvement with more university degree holders and postgraduate scholars going into parliament.

23 Mattes and Muzaffar (2011) propose that '…being an effective legislation a modern political system requires the ability to read and understand proposed bills and budgets, to find necessary information as well as to monitor, assess and ask questions about the implementation of legislation by the executive'.

Table 7.2: MPs' Educational Level (1965 – 2014)

	1965	1969	1974	1979	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
PhD	0	0	0	0	3	3	2	2	3	3	3
Postgraduate Diploma/Masters	3	3	3	8	5	8	7	11	8	21	30
University Degree/Honors/Diploma	9	3	0	8	16	16	39	32	16	25	48
College/Ccertificate	14	14	14	14	13	13	27	5	5	3	3
Secondary Schooling	11	17	14	17	13	11	14	11	7	7	3
Primary Schooling	3	3	3	3	3	5	2	2	2	2	2
Education Not Known	60	60	67	50	47	45	9	36	59	39	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Botswana Parliament Who's Who

MPs' Previous Occupation/Profession

Another modernization variable that associated with improved performance of parliament/members of parliament is their occupational route. Legislators' previous occupation has been associated with their behaviour and performance in parliament. Available literature on middle class shows that there is currently no single definition that social scientists agree on in terms of defining the middle class (Pressman, 2015:2). Nonetheless, most social scientists agree on certain indicators that characterise the middle class. These include; higher levels of income, specific types of occupation, higher levels of education as well as more wealth holdings. Thus here, the chapter makes use of the occupational categories argument to assess the growth of the middle class in Botswana.

Table 7.3 below presents results on MPs' previous occupations held before their entry into parliament. Results show that the number of MPs coming in with professional background has increased between 1965 and 2014. While in 1965 most members came in from the teaching profession, by 2014, most members came in from other professions such as law, medicine, accounts and university teaching. There has also been a rise of MPs coming in from senior and top government positions.

Table 7.3: MPs' Previous Occupation/Profession (1965 – 2014)

	1965	1969	1974	1979	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
Farmer/Rancher	6	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2
Teaching (Teacher/School head/Headmaster)	14	17	14	14	16	11	0	0	2	5	8
Other Professional (Lawyer, Doctor, Accountant, Lecturer etc)	0	3	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	7	18
Junior Administrators (Government, Non Government)	26	26	22	14	18	13	2	2	7	3	8
Senior Administrator (Government, Non Nogvernment)	6	3	6	11	11	5	0	9	2	13	16
Top Governement Office	0	0	3	3	5	8	0	2	5	8	8
Businessperson	11	14	11	11	11	8	2	9	0	3	3
Political Office (Councilor, City Mayor, Politician)	20	9	6	6	5	3	0	0	5	5	11
Armed Services/Police/Military/War Veteran	0	3	3	8	5	3	2	2	5	3	3
Other (Chief, Reverend,)	3	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Previous Occupation Not Known	14	20	28	28	29	45	93	75	72	52	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Parliament Who's Who

MPs' Age

Lastly, while age is not necessarily a modernization indicator, it is often included in modernization arguments because oftentimes it is the younger people who easily identify with most of the modernization precepts. This is reinforced by Barkan (2009) who argues that reformers in most African Parliaments are 'younger, recently elected legislators who also possess advanced levels of education and professional training'. Thus, considering that throughout modernization literature, attributes of modernization such as education, urban living, news media use, interest in politics and internal efficacy have been used/are believed to be embedded within the young. These are also expected/believed to reflect in younger MPs who are expected to have more modernised performance-oriented mindset.

The presence and increase of younger members in the parliament of Botswana is shown on figure 7.6 below. This occurrence is assessed by considering the age of members at the beginning of each parliament from the first parliament of 1965 through to the 10th parliament of 2014. The results show that in comparison to all other election years, the 1st parliament of 1965, had the highest percentage of younger MPs under the age of 35, at 17 percent. In the consecutive years, only about 5 percent or less of Members of Parliament were aged below 35. The 1st parliament also had the highest number of middle-aged MPs, those aged between 35 to 45 years. From the 3rd general election, parliament has had more elderly MPs aged between 46-65 years.

Figure 7.6: MP's Age at the Start of Each Parliament



Source: Botswana Parliament Who's Who

7.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter set out to establish the extent to which Botswana and Batswana have increasingly modernized overtime. Using selected variables of societal and economic modernization, the chapter has shown that while Botswana has increasingly modernized as shown by some improvement in most of the selected modernisation variables, there are however some aspects of modernization such as lived poverty in Botswana that remain a thorny issue. This is mainly because, despite the country's significant economic growth, some sections of the population still experience shortages of cash income and water. Hence Siphambe (2016) in the Guardian Newspaper of Friday, October 21, 2016, argued that 'it is possible for poverty, income inequality and unemployment, to be growing at the same time as the country is experiencing economic growth'.

The chapter has also shown that to a certain extent, as the modernization variables improved in the country and among its people, the parliament of Botswana also experienced an improvement in some of the modernization variables. For instance, the parliament of Botswana has increasingly been attracting members with higher degrees, something which was not the case before. The same observation was made by Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) who found that the entrance of highly educated MPs is a recent occurrence. While no educational requirements have been placed for anyone wishing to stand for election into parliament except that they should be able to speak and read English (Constitution of Botswana, Section 61), it has been

the case that in recent times more highly educated MPs have made their way into parliament. Additionally, in as far as members of parliament's professional background is concerned, the parliament of Botswana is increasingly attracting members who hold prestigious professional training such as lawyers, accountants, and doctors. This is a change from the case of the first parliament which comprised mainly of members from the teaching profession and those that held junior administrative positions. This follows observations made by scholars such as Hornsby (ibid), that before independence 'many of the political leaders in Africa were teachers. However, with members' age and the proposition that over the years, younger members began to join parliament increasingly, the observation from the data presented is that the first parliament of Botswana had the youngest members compared to consecutive parliaments. This can be attributed to the revolution that came because of external exposure. In the early years, younger people were sent outside the country (mostly to South Africa) for education purposes where they encountered political teachings (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009). Other researchers, such as Hornsby (1989:279) also established that early parliaments in other countries also comprised of mostly young MPs, but later became predominantly filled with middle aged MPs. Hornsby furthers that the Kenyan parliament 'seemed to be aging more than attracting younger members. One of the reasons advanced for this trend is as noted by Hornsby that there seems to be some hostility to younger MPs with much preference for 'mature' representatives (ibid).

8. CHAPTER 8: FORMAL POWERS OF THE PARLIAMENT OF BOTSWANA

8.1. Introduction

This chapter assesses the adequacy of formal powers of the parliament of Botswana and the extent to which these powers have improved to enable better parliamentary performance. The study acknowledges that formal parliamentary powers are an important factor in shaping the amount of influence parliament wields in budgetary oversight. As Makhanya (2012:3) argues, 'the extent of parliament's influence on budget decisions and its budget amendment ability is defined by its formal powers to amend the budget proposals of the executive …'. In assessing parliament's formal powers, the chapter begins by (i) outlining the structure and composition of the parliament of Botswana, (ii) discussing general powers of the Parliament of Botswana and (iii) assessing the extent of parliament's powers for budgetary oversight.

8.2. Structure and Composition of the Parliament of Botswana

The Parliament of Botswana was established through the country's written Constitution of the 1st of March 1965. Sections 57 – 70 of the country's Constitution provide for t he composition of Parliament. Through this constitutional provision, the Parliament of Botswana consists of the President and the National Assembly. The President is an ex-officio member of Parliament and can in this capacity take part in the deliberations of Parliament, including voting. The National Assembly on the other hand is made up of 57 members who are directly elected and six (6) Specially Elected Members of Parliament (SEMPs) as well as the Speaker and his deputy. The 57 members of parliament are elected through a first-past-the-post electoral (FPTP) system which ensures a simple majoritarian win. Molomo (2000:96) emphasises that 'since the first elections of 1965 Botswana has used the simple plurality single member constituency system [which is] anchored in the first-past-the-post (FPTP) or winner-takes-all system and has delivered successful elections'. Molomo (ibid) further notes that this system has served the country fairly well and, in part, accounts for its political stability. On the other hand, the six specially elected members on the other hand are chosen by the President as prescribed in section 58 (2b)[24] of the Constitution. Lastly, the Speaker of parliament is elected

24 Under this section, the president is allowed 'to bring into parliament people with special skills as well as create a balance in government by bringing in women and youth and minorities that did not make it through the elections'.

by members of parliament from amongst themselves or from among persons who are not members of the National Assembly. This is provided for in Section 59 of the Constitution.The Speaker of the National Assembly presides over all the proceeding of parliament.

Some aspects of the structure of the parliament of Botswana have been questioned. For instance, the appointment of Specially Elected Members of Parliament by the President alone has never been questioned as Poteete (2010:4) puts it 'to date, no rival SEMP has ever been presented and the president's SEMP has always been approved'. Furthermore, the appointment of SEMPs into Cabinet as ministers is another departure from a truly parliamentary system. As Poteete (ibid) puts it, 'the possibility for SEMPs to become cabinet ministers represents a further departure from the typical parliamentary requirement that all members of the cabinet must be drawn from directly elected members of the assembly'. This according to Poteete (ibid) further weakens the role of the legislative assembly as a link between the executive and the electorate.

8.2.1. Botswana Parliament's Committee Structure

Parliamentary committees play an important role within parliaments especially in the oversight work of the executive. Similarly, parliamentary committees are an essential feature of the Botswana Parliament. Hence through the Botswana Parliamentary Committees Manual (2014) committees are presented as an extension of the house and are labelled as being beneficial to parliament due to their flexibility to carry out functions that can be performed better in smaller groups. Thus, the parliament of Botswana also has committees classified into; Standing Committees, Sessional Select Committees as well as Special Select Committees. According to the Parliamentary Committees Manual (2014:8), Standing committees are created for the life of parliament and are divided into administrative and oversight standing committees. Parliament's FEC and PAC fall under the latter set of standing committees – oversight standing committees. Sessional committees on the other hand, stand to be dissolved at the end of every parliamentary session and special select committees on the other hand are appointed by the national assembly to consider terms of a bill or any other purpose. In recent years, the Parliament of Botswana introduced portfolio committees which are created for the life of a Parliament with a special sectoral mandate.

8.3. The System of Government

Parliament's powers are given in accordance with the country's system of government. Parliamentary and presidential systems have formed the basis of most of our understanding on powers held by different parliaments around the world. The British Westminster Parliamentary and American Presidential systems have served as the main reference points in the presidential and parliamentary systems are the. Often, presidential systems are hailed for affording parliaments extensive powers while parliamentary systems are seen as having limited powers in the policy arena. Hence some scholars and contributors on the policy powers of parliaments often argue that 'legislatures in parliamentary systems tend to be viewed as relatively weak, mainly because the "fusion" of the executive and legislative branch and dependence by ministers on legislative confidence often leads to concerns that while the legislature notionally controls the executive, the relationship often in practice works the other way around' (Olson 1994, 77). However, this is minimised in systems where the separation between the executive and the legislative arm of government is maintained.

As a former British colony, the parliament of Botswana, would have been expected to operate as a pure parliamentary system, taking after the British Westminster Parliamentary system of government. However, the parliament of Botswana in addition to the Parliamentary system, also exhibits characteristics of the Presidential system of government. As such, Botswana has come to be known as a hybrid system with Nsereko (2004) reinforcing that, 'it is important to note that Botswana operates a hybrid, rather than a pure parliamentary system'. As a hybrid system, Botswana displays characteristics of both parliamentary and presidential systems of government. Two elements that stand out in how Botswana has combined the parliamentary and presidential systems include; the Concept of Separation of Powers and Election of the President. While the country's Constitution does not specifically make mention of the concept of Separation of Powers, an element which is synonymous with presidential systems, the constitution however apportions powers to the three organs of the State. Dingake (2009:5) acknowledges for instance that even though the phrase "separation of powers" appears nowhere in the Constitution of Botswana, the Constitution apportions powers to the three organs of the State, being the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. On the other hand, Section 47(1) of the Constitution provides that the executive power of Botswana shall vest in the President, which power may be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him. Section 86 on the other hand provides parliament with powers to make laws for the peace, order

and good government of Botswana. Secondly, while the selection of presidents in pure parliamentary systems is done through direct election, the president of Botswana is indirectly elected. Molomo (2000) elaborates that the presidential candidate of the party that wins most of the seats in the national assembly in Botswana automatically becomes president of the country. This is further elaborated by Poteete (2010:3) who states that,

> While Botswana's president is elected by the legislative assembly, the president is not drawn from the elected members of the assembly. Each party nominates a presidential candidate, who may contest elections in a parliamentary constituency but is not required to do so. The presidential nominee of the party that wins a majority of the seats in the parliament automatically becomes the president, even if that individual did not contest parliamentary elections …

8.4. General Powers of the Parliament of Botswana

The parliament of Botswana draws most of its powers from the country's Constitution (sections 105, 118, 119 and 120), as well as the National Standing Orders of the National assembly. Through sections 86 – 89, the constitution empowers and directs parliament for its law-making function. Here-in, the constitution stipulates that Parliament has the powers to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the country. Parliament is also empowered for its budgetary oversight role through provisions made in sections 11– 119 of the Constitution. The Constitution further bestows upon the country's President, who as noted earlier is an ex-officio member of the National Assembly with executive and head of state powers. Through sections 47 – 56 the president is given powers to; appoint his vice president, to dismiss cabinet ministers, command the armed forces as well as powers to declare a state of emergency. The president is also given veto powers[25] as well as powers to dissolve parliament at any time according to section 91(2) of the Constitution. While at the time of independence the president enjoyed an unlimited term in office, this has since changed through the 1997 constitutional amendments. One of the consequences of the amendments has been the limitation in the term of the president's term of office which has now been restricted to ten (10) years. The 1997 constitutional amendment also brought in the automatic succession of the Vice-Presidency,

25 All bills that are passed by the legislature need the president's assent to become law.

which according to Molomo (2000:96) has accounted for a smooth political succession in the country.

8.5. Parliament's Budgetary Oversight Powers

In as far as parliament's budgetary oversight powers vary from country to country. As Wehner (n.d) reiterates, 'the nature and effect of legislative engagement vary. Some legislatures write the budget; others approve executive budget proposals without changes'. Different constitutional foundations allow for parliamentary involvement with the budget at different stages of the budget process. However, such parliamentary involvement varies from parliament to parliament based on each parliament's Constitutional provisions. Budgetary oversight literature suggests that most parliamentary systems of government allow for legislatures to only amend and reject budget proposals prepared by the executive. On the other hand, presidential systems empower parliaments to also formulate and substitute the budget (Wehner, 2004:9).

In the case of the parliament of Botswana, its ex-ante and ex-post budgetary oversight powers are allocated mainly for the approval and audit stages of the budget process. The country's budget formulation and the implementation powers are on the other hand, ~~are~~ given to the Ministry of Finance. Thus, the Ministry of Finance prepares all revenue estimates and expenditures and lays them before parliament for approval. As provided for in Section 119 (1) which states that, 'the Minister for the time being responsible for finance shall cause to be prepared and laid before the National Assembly, before or not later than 30 days after the commencement of each financial year, estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Botswana for that year'.

8.4. Improvement in Parliament's Powers

In Botswana, executive powers are embedded in the powers of the president. In addition to arguments about the inadequacies or imbalances of powers between the presidency and parliament, there has not been any reforms to improve these. Thus, after years of being in use, the constitutional powers placed upon the executive in the form of the president and those allocated to parliament have remained the same. This is despite the many calls for constitutional

reform which have come from academics[26], the media and the civic communities in the country. Some legislators in the country[27] have also spoken out against the extensive powers of the president in relation to constitutional powers allocated to parliament. Furthermore, legislators whose work is largely impacted by these imbalances of power have made calls for changes to other instruments that contain formal rules and procedures of parliament such as the Standing Orders of the National Assembly. For instance, Member of Parliament Keorapetse (Mmegi Newspaper, 2015) has urged that,

> '…key to reforming Parliament in the process of democratisation is the review of not only the Constitution and the Powers nor Privileges law, but also the Standing Orders'. The Standing Orders of Parliament are a serious impediment to democratisation of the polity in general and the independence of Parliament, its smooth running and that of Committees in particular. Some rules are actually stupid, obsolete, and unnecessary. Members of Parliament (MPs) find it difficult to comply with some of the rules. Ever since Parliament started, the Committee on Standing Orders and Reform hardly meets to review these regulations'.

Over the years, scholars and contributors in the country (Botlhale 2012; Molomo 2000) have criticised these constitutional provisions of parliamentary and presidential powers as undemocratic. Molomo (ibid) has argued for instance that, 'Despite all the praises the country has received including the conviction that the country is Africa's beacon of democracy, it operates an executive presidency that enjoys extensive powers'.

In as far as parliament's budgetary oversight powers are concerned, whereas the ex-ante phase of the budget process consists of both the formulation and approval stages of the budget

26 See Botlhale E. and Lotshwao K. (2015), The Uneasy Relationship Between Parliament and the Executive; Ganetsang G. (2011), The Time is Nigh for Constitutional Reform

27 As noted by Ganetsang (Sunday Standard, 21 November 2011) who reiterates that, 'at the same time, legislators … table motions seeking constitutional reform. Such motions include one calling for the constitution to provide for direct election of the president and for president to appoint cabinet outside of parliament'.

process, the parliament of Botswana's ex-ante oversight powers are solely given for budget approval purposes. Parliament's approval powers are thus solely given to parliament to either approve or amend budget proposals prepared and tabled before parliament by the Minister of Finance (Section 119 (1)). These powers are elaborated throughout sections 118, 119 and 120 of the Constitution of Botswana. Thus, in Section 118 (3) the Constitution, stipulates that all transactions from the country's Consolidated Fund[28] shall not happen unless they have been authorised by Parliament.

In sections 119 (2, 3 and 4) the Constitution also empowers parliament's Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC), to consider supplementary estimates from various government departments and ministries. The Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC)[29] is further established and empowered through Section 106 of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly. The committee serves mainly to examine whether funds in the national appropriation bill have been allocated within the limits of the policy implied in the estimates[30]. The FEC is additionally empowered through Sections 106:2 (d), to consider supplementary expenditure from public funds for which the sanction of the Assembly is required. As such, parliament's ex-ante budgetary powers lie mostly with the FEC.

While parliament's ex-ante powers are vastly placed upon the FEC, parliamentary scholarship (Wehner 2010:28) suggests that parliament and its budget committees' ex-ante powers should be expanded through additional provisions made for the times when parliament and its committees' contribution to the appropriation bill may be delayed beyond the beginning of

28 The Consolidated Fund holds all revenues and other monies raised and received by government while the Development Fund, whose purpose is to finance social and economic development projects of government is financed through transfers from the Consolidated Fund, loans raised by government and grants made to government.

29 The FEC of the parliament of Botswana consists of seven private members appointed for the life of parliament, with one of the seven members appointed by parliament's Committee of Selection as the committee chairperson. s

30 Other functions of the FEC include; suggesting the form in which the estimates shall be presented to parliament; suggesting alternative procedures in order to bring about efficiency in government administration as well as examining items concerning a part of the estimates of a ministry or ministries for examination during the financial year. (FEC Report, 2014/15)

another fiscal year. In such instances, Parliament's approval and amendment powers can be shown when a decision is made to revert to the past year's budget, so that a budget that was approved by parliament back then remains in use. Other functions of the FEC include suggesting the form in which the estimates shall be presented to parliament; suggesting alternative procedures in order to bring about efficiency in government administration as well as examining items concerning a part of the estimates of a ministry or ministries for examination during the financial year (FEC Report, 2014/15). In Botswana however, there is no provision that allows for reversion to the past budget when approval by parliament is delayed beyond the beginning of a new fiscal year. Instead, when budget proposals for the new fiscal year have not been placed before parliament for approval, the executive is given the discretion to implement its own budget over that which was previously approved by parliament. The Botswana Public Finance Management Act (Rule 7 (1) states to this effect that,

> If the Appropriation Act for any financial year has not come into operation by the beginning of that year, the President shall direct the Minister to issue a warrant authorising the issue of moneys from the Fund to meet such expenditure as may be necessary for the continuation of programmes or projects financed from the Fund in the immediately preceding financial year until the expiration of four months from the beginning of the new financial year or the coming into operation of the Appropriation Act, whichever comes earlier.

The second opportunity given for the parliament of Botswana to exercise budget oversight is at the evaluation phase which occurs post the implementation of the budget. Parliament's ex-post budgetary oversight powers are placed upon its Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The Public Accounts Committee of the parliament of Botswana is established through Section 105 of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly. Its composition, structure and powers are outlined in Section 105 (1) of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly. The orders stipulate that the PAC shall comprise of 10 private members of parliament of which one of the members is to be appointed as the committee's chairperson. The standing orders are specific in prescribing that the member appointed as chairperson should be an opposition party member. While previously PAC chairpersons could be chosen from the party in government, the orders have thus since been modified in accordance with the Southern African Development

Committee (SADC) Parliamentary Forum to have only opposition party members as chairpersons of the committee. Thus, the committee's chairperson is from the leading opposition party in parliament. This reform has given the PAC some independence in critiquing accounts of the government of the day because, 'as a chair from the ruling party, you will not convincingly examine your government and dig out the wrongs or guide your committee accordingly and thus one may be tempted to overlook certain things or even not draw attention of the committee to avoid embarrassing their government'[31].

8.5. Chapter Summary

This chapter set out to assess the formal powers of the parliament of Botswana, with the aim of showing their adequacy and extent of improvement for better parliamentary performance. The chapter started off by presenting the structure of the parliament of Botswana. Th structure of the Botswana parliament as shown in the chapter has some challenges and weaknesses. For instance, parliament in as far as cabinet ministers are drawn from the legislature thereby leaving a lesser number of MPs to perform parliamentary oversight work. Additionally, the provision of appointing Specially Elected Members of Parliament (SEMPs) into cabinet further drains the legislatures. The chapter has also shown that as a member of the national assembly, the president wields more power as most executive powers are bestowed upon him. This is despite the fact that the president is not directly elected by the masses but is a nominee of the party that wins the general election.

Secondly, the chapter also argued that while initially Botswana was categorised as a parliamentary system, the country has however also adopted some features of the presidential system. This has caused the country to be labelled as a hybrid system and it is within this arrangement that the parliament of Botswana gets to draw it powers. For instance, where the parliament of Botswana is faced with limitations in policy powers like most parliamentary systems are, it however still enjoys the prerogative of separation of powers which is synonymous with presidential systems. The chapter has further shown that in as far as parliamentary budget powers are concerned, due to the parliamentary system approach, the parliament of Botswana is only vested with powers to amend, approve and evaluate the budget.

31 Interview with former Speaker of the Parliament of Botswana (2017)

Parliament does not have powers to formulate the budget, nor does it have an input in the implementation of the budget. This has meant that the independence of the Botswana parliament has remained curtailed due to the extensive powers that the constitution places upon the country's executive, especially the president. This has caused an issue of contention amongst scholars and contributors in the country who argue that parliament remains weak and only plays a rubber stamp role over budget decisions taken by the executive. Additionally, the chapter has shown that, parliament's general and budgetary oversight powers have remained the same over time, with limited improvement.

9. CHAPTER 9: POLITICAL PARTY DYNAMICS

9.1. Introduction

This chapter acknowledges that parliament's budgetary oversight role 'takes place in a broader political context' (Wehner, 2004:10) where political parties play a major role in what obtains inside parliament. Political party scholarship suggests the importance of political parties and presents parties as the anchorage for members of parliament as they are first and foremost political party members (except for independent candidates), before becoming parliamentary members (Gidado, 2018:174). Therefore, by virtue of belonging to political parties, members of parliament are often expected to abide by and operate within their political party rules and procedures. It is in this regard that political party scholarship associates the performance of parliament and its members with the influence of political parties. Sturanovic (2018:423) has for instance addressed '…the question of how political parties influence the nature of the parliamentary mandate and the power of parliament in general' with the aim of showing the impact political parties have on the performance of their members. Another scholar, Gidado (ibid) has argued that 'the inaction of the Parliament is a consequence of the impunity that political parties reflect in their different domains.' Thus, this chapter assesses the growth and improvement of political party dynamics in the parliament of Botswana. Growth and improvement of political party dynamics is assessed in terms of increasing political party competition as shall be elaborated upon in the next section. The chapter further assesses the consequences of the extent of political party competition inside parliament, which has a bearing on the effectiveness of parliament.

9.2. Increasing Political Party Competition in Botswana

Political party competition has been identified as a necessary precondition for a healthy and better functioning democracy as it offers citizens a choice in governance (Bielasiak, 2005:331). The more intense competition for entry into parliament amongst political parties there is, the better it is for parliamentary effectiveness. Hence Alfano and Baraldi (2011:5)'s argument that, 'if political competition is intense, the incumbent politician is [bound to be] more accountable for his actions in office; the incumbent has an incentive for good performance because, otherwise, he can be easily removed and replaced by the public, with challengers'. Assessing the increase of political party competition in Botswana takes into consideration the; (i) increase

in the number of contested parliamentary seats; (ii) increase in the number of seats won by opposition parties as well as (iii) decrease in the average margins between the ruling party and opposition parties.

Increase in the Number of Contested Parliamentary Seats

To enter parliament, political parties must first field candidates in constituencies to attain electoral success[32]. Through electoral competition, candidates stand a chance to win seats enabling them to represent their parties in parliament. The allocation and share of parliamentary seats are managed through different electoral systems[33]. Botswana runs its elections through a single member plurality system also known as the first-past-the-post (FPTP)[34]. It is under this system that political parties in the country, amongst them, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), Botswana National Front (BNF), Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD) and many other smaller opposition parties and independent candidates have been competing for parliamentary seats since 1965. Using data from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Botswana, Figure 9.1 below shows the number of contested parliamentary seats by political parties and independent candidates in Botswana, from the first general election of 1965 to the last one held in 2014. In 1965, competition between political parties that were hoping to take over government from the British Colonial Government, started off at a total of 83 candidates. 31 of these were fielded by the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (which later became the Botswana Democratic Party) while a

32 There are however other means that allow for special entry into parliament provided for through various country constitutions and other legal framework. For instance, Section 58 (1b) of the Constitution of Botswana provides for the selection of four "Specially Elected Members" of parliament by the President.

33 Farrell (2001) defines electoral systems as 'the means by which votes are translated into [parliamentary] seats. Linzer (2012) further reiterates that in democratic legislative elections, the set of rules and procedures for converting voters' choices into political parties' seat shares is referred to as the electoral system. There are a wide variety of electoral systems in use around the world, each employing a different set of voting rules, electoral formulas, district magnitudes, and so forth…

34 In defining the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), Norris (1997) elaborates that the FPTP aims to create a 'manufactured majority' that exaggerates the share of seats for the leading party in order to produce an effective working parliamentary majority for the government, while simultaneously penalising the minor parties, especially those whose support is spatially dispersed. With the 'winner takes all' the leading party boosts its legislative base while the trailing parties get meagre rewards.

total of 52 were candidates from the two Bechuanaland Peoples Parties at the time, the Botswana Independence Party (BIP), and an independent candidate. Competition for parliamentary seats dropped in the 1969, 1974 and 1979 general elections. However, from the fifth general election of 1984, there has been an increase in the number of candidates competing for parliamentary seats. The number of challengers for parliamentary seats has increased to reach a total of 192 candidates in 2014 and 210 in 2019.

Figure 9.1: Increase in the of Number of Contested Seats (1965 – 2019)



Source: Independent Electoral Commission Elections Reports, Botswana

Increase in the Number of Seats Won by Opposition Parties

Opposition political parties play a crucial role in democratic governance. One major role of opposition political parties is providing citizens with the hope for an alternate government. As Kumar (2014:166-167) notes, 'the importance of opposition in a parliamentary system cannot be overemphasised'. In their quest to replace the incumbent governing party, opposition parties participate in elections in an attempt to win as many seats as possible to enable the government of the day. In managing political party competition, different electoral systems are used to determine what it takes for the winning party to form government. For instance, through the FPTP, a contending political party in Botswana must secure at least 29 of the 57 seats of parliament in order to be declared the winning and governing party. Compared to others in the region, opposition parties in Botswana have for the longest time enjoyed free and fair political

activity and contest (Osei-Hwedie 2001; Molomo (2000). Although they have by far, individually or as a collective not been able to oust the BDP from power, the question whether the number of seats they secure at every election has been increasing or decreasing, remains important. Figure 9.2 below shows the number of seats won by opposition parties in Botswana versus those won by the ruling BDP since 1965. The results show that the BDP has constantly won more seats than opposition parties combined at every general election. However, in the last five general elections opposition parties have managed to show better performance in the number of parliamentary seats they have won. During the 1994 general election, opposition parties had their best win where they secured 13 of the total 40 seats of parliament. The BDP won 27. During the 2014 general election as well, opposition parties earned another good result by winning 20 to 37 of the ruling BDP, for the 57 parliamentary seats. In 2019, the opposition dropped by one seat to 19 seats.

Figure 9.2: Percentage Increase of Seats Won by Opposition Political Parties (1965 – 2019)



Source: Independent Electoral Commission Elections Reports, Botswana

Decrease in the Average Margins of Victory between the Ruling BDP and Opposition Parties

According to legislative scholars, average margins of victory between competing political parties can be used as a measure of competitiveness. For instance, Narahari (2015) views the margin of victory of an election as 'is the smallest number of votes that need to be changed to

change the election outcome. In a sense, an election outcome is considered to be robust if the margin of victory is large'. Therefore, a decreasing margin of victory shows increased competition between the winning party and the losers which may lead to the incumbent losing power. Figure 9.3 below shows the percentage of margins between the ruling BDP and opposition parties in Botswana. While data on the number of parliamentary seats won overtime as shown earlier, showed that from the first general election the ruling BDP has retained majority of parliamentary seats in comparison to the country's opposition parties, figure 9.3 however, shows that there has been a decrease in the margins of victory between the ruling BDP and opposition parties in the country. For instance, while in 1965 the ruling party had a high victory margin of 81%, this dropped to 55% in 1969. By the 2014 general election, the BDP versus opposition percentage difference had gone down to as low as 30%, picking by 3% in 2019 to stand at 33%. This shows that, while the BDP has remained in power for decades, its popularity among the voters has however, been reducing while the popularity of opposition parties has been on a steady rise.

Figure 9.3: Margins of Victory Between the Ruling BDP and Opposition Political Parties (%)



Source: Independent Electoral Commission Elections Reports, Botswana

9.3.Consequences of Botswana's One-Party Dominant System

The preceding analysis has shown that the political landscape in Botswana has for the longest time been characterised by a one-sided victory that has favoured the ruling party for all the

years the country has gone to elections. This has led Botswana to be viewed as a one-party dominant system. One-party dominant systems are often characterised by performance inhibiting issues such as political party cohesion or control as well as weak opposition political parties. As Alabi (2009:240) puts it, 'Where they exist, their effectiveness as mechanisms for popular control of governments have been threatened by patrimonial one-party or one-party dominance rule'. According to Jager and Du Toit (2012:3), one party dominant systems are 'systems where one party dominates over a prolonged period in an ostensibly democratic system with regular elections and multiple parties participating in elections'. Thus, while Botswana has maintained multi-party politics since attaining independence in 1966, the country has however, only ever been under the rulership of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The country's opposition political parties have only come close to posing a threat to the BDP during the 1994 and 2014 general elections. Hence, Botswana's multiparty system has been characterised as a one-party dominant system. While one party dominant systems may present some merits such as political stability[35], when it comes to the performance of parliament, they present several challenges. Dooreenspleet and Nijzink (2011:1) outrightly argue that 'one party dominant systems are a problem for democracy on the continent'. The main demerit of one-party systems hindering the performance of parliament is political party control or political cohesion. Bogaards and Boucek (2005:1) observe in support that 'domination by one party and the resulting lack of political competitiveness in a polity affect the performance of democracy'.

Political Party Cohesion or Control in the Parliament of Botswana

Political party control or party cohesion often emanates from the side of the ruling party and its leadership such as in instances where party loyalty gets used as a means of members' re-election as party candidates or members' appointment to leadership positions in parliament. Secondly, parliamentary members are expected and forced to vote along their political party lines. Still, in some instances, the ruling party controls prominent parliamentary positions such as chairing critical parliamentary committees like its budget committees in the form of the PAC and the FEC. Lastly, political party control has been shown in instances where the ruling party determines the business of parliament.

[35] Oseni (2012:136) argues for instance that 'The main potential democratic benefit of dominant parties is that there is a relationship between party dominance and political stability'.

The parliament of Botswana has not been immune to political party control issues. As emphasised by a former Public Accounts Committee chair, during the study interviews, 'the ruling BDP indeed does exercise some form of control over its members in parliament. The former committee chair argued that committee members for instance have to report in caucuses where they formulate motions and questions. The former committee chair opined that 'to say the ruling BDP only influences the performance of parliament is an under-statement because the ruling party chairs parliament's Finance and Estimates Committee'. Holding the same sentiments as the former chair of the PAC, former speaker of the parliament of Botswana also stated during interviews that, 'the majority of Parliaments in the Commonwealth, especially those in multiparty democracies, find themselves having to operate under very difficult circumstances in so far as their relationship with the Executive is concerned, Botswana included. Leaders of political parties and the Executive always want to exert pressure on their MPs to "toe the line" as they say it.' The former Speaker further argued that while the only difference is the degree to which they do it, 'Some parliaments are simply worse than others, and MPs feel the pressure to toe the line for fear of being dumped by their parties and being denied the opportunity to be re-elected'. Political party control in the parliament of Botswana has worsened over the years as the former speaker continued to highlight that, 'over the years, this situation has become worse'.

In the recent past, political party cohesion has been vividly evident in the parliament of Botswana during the 2014 debate on the Presidents Pensions and Retirements benefits bill. The vice president at the time led the debate which saw 'the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) Caucus in Parliament using its majority to amend Section 6 (2) of the Act and a big part in the Schedule of the Act uunder the stewardship of then Vice President Masisi, who at the time was Leader of the House. The BDP Caucus vehemently warded off warnings by opposition on supposedly legislating into law benefits that seemingly appeared to suit former President Khama. MPs Wynter Mmolotsi and Phenyo Butale made telling contributions with the BDP Caucus ultimately crushing opposition to pass the amended Act of 2017. From then onwards, it became the law' (Mmegi Newspaper dated Friday June 14, 2019).

Following the amendments on the Presidents Pensions and Retirements Bill, the former Vice-President (now President Masisi), admitted to using party cohesion for the BDP to get its way.

The former Vice President has since apologized to the nation for his role in forcing the ruling party MPs to vote the way they did[36]. The impact of political party cohesion in the parliament of Botswana has been summed up by the former speaker who pointed out during the interview that, 'if you follow debates in our Parliament, you will realize that the ruling party MPs have been reduced to sitting ducks at the mercy of ruthless attacks from their colleagues in Opposition. They have been forced to vote against their conscience in a lot of cases and to use their numbers to vote for or against motions they do not believe in'.

Poor Performance of Opposition Political Parties

As shown in the chapter, opposition political parties in Botswana are yet to win an election. This has led many in the country to view the opposition political parties as weak. For instance, Lotshwao (2015:1), forthrightly states that 'Botswana's opposition parties are too weak to unseat the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)'. Some scholars in the country have advanced several justifications to explain the opposition's weakness and its subsequent failure to win power. Several of the reasons put forth for opposition failure include; lack of strategy and ideological weaknesses relative to the BDP (Selolwane, 2002), factionalism and fragmentation resulting in vote splitting (Osei-Hwedie, 2001), the first past the post electoral system which advantages the incumbent party (Molomo 2000a,) as well as lack of campaign resources in the absence of state funding for political parties in the country (Otlhogile, 1991; Sebudubudu, 2003). Lotshwao (2015:2) further enlists poor leadership, especially within the long-time main opposition parties as another contributing factor to opposition parties' weakness.

Further to the weak performance of opposition parties during election time, the performance of their members once in parliament has also been questioned in different forums in the country. For instance, in 2017 member of the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD) Advocate Sidney Pilane expressed concern over the performance of opposition Members of Parliament. He opined that 'little is heard in terms of contribution by opposition MPs. Advocate Pilane who was speaking during his maiden press conference as the BMD leader, stated that the opposition used to be strong and vibrant in Parliament. Advocate Pilane explained that he would love to

[36] Mmegi Newspaper (Friday June 14, 2019) put it on record that, 'in one of the biggest surprises pulled off by any leader, Masisi acknowledged making 'a big mistake' and went further to state, barring the amendment, government would be in a position to 'suspend former President Ian Khama's benefits for engaging in active politics again because he has essentially retired'.

see and hear a united opposition voice in Parliament with robust debate'. He further stated that 'there used to be times when Parliament was led by opposition MPs in terms of debating issues, but currently there isn't much that we hear of our colleagues'.

9.4. Chapter Summary

This chapter set out to assess the improvement of political party dynamics in terms of increasing political party competition and its consequences in the parliament of Botswana. While the chapter has shown that over time there has been an increase in political party competition in Botswana, at the same time, this has not necessarily resulted in any change of power from the ruling BDP to any of the other opposition political parties in the country. Seabo and Molebatsi (2017) sum this up by stating that, 'the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has dominated other political parties in every election since independence in 1966. Debates on factors that account for the dominance of the BDP typically point to weakness of opposition parties, lack of party funding, the electoral system and advantages of incumbency enjoyed by the ruling party'. Thus, Botswana's multiparty system has been characterised as a one-party dominant system.

One-party dominant systems are known for heighted political party control and thus the chapter also assessed the occurrence of political control in the parliament of Botswana. The chapter has shown that the effects of one-party dominance have been felt in parliament of Botswana. Mfundisi (n.d.) sums this experience up by stating, 'the impact of the caucus system depends to a large extent on the calibre of Members of Parliament (MPs) as well as on the influence of the Executive branch on them. The BDP backbench has gone through trials and tribulations since independence. Since the Ian Khama administration, and now President Mokgweetsi Masisi regime, the BDP backbench has been weakened and has become an instrument of the Executive branch for legislative rubber stamping. There are no longer robust debates in Parliament to ensure that the Executive is accountable and acts ethically in the management of public affairs'. Mfundisi (n.d..) further opines that the 'Parliament (of Botswana) has become a lap dog more so because of a sterile and incompetent BDP backbench. And as such, the party caucus system has been accused as crippling to parliament. Thus, the caucus regime is used to legitimise executive decisions and actions devoid of parliamentary oversight'.

10. CHAPTER 10: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

10.1. Introduction

At its very beginning, this study acknowledged the importance of effective parliaments as the cornerstone of proper functioning of democracies. The study pointed out that that as the bedrock of democracy, parliaments are bestowed with specific core functions which they (parliaments) are expected to perform effectively. Amongst these core functions is the oversight role of parliament which entails budgetary oversight. The study further acknowledged that while parliaments are expected to perform these allocated functions effectively, there however exist several factors and conditions that affect their (parliaments) performance. Thus, this study sought to establish the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has improved or weakened in selected factors associated with better parliamentary performance, with emphasis on parliaments' budgetary oversight role.

To achieve its objective, the study set to firstly assess the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has experienced growth and improvement in key factors driving change in parliament. The study categorised the selected factors into two groups of; (i) key factors making parliament more influential in budgetary oversight and (ii) key factors making parliament more or less influential in budgetary oversight. The key factors driving change in parliament employed in the study included; increasing parliamentary capacity and resources as well as rising parliamentary autonomy and internal complexity. Key factors making parliament more influential in the budgetary oversight role on the other hand included; greater societal and economic modernization, formal rules of parliament as well as the influence of political party dynamics. As already alluded to, the study focused mainly on parliament's budgetary oversight role and thus beyond assessing the occurrence of factors affecting parliamentary performance, the study also assessed parliament's performance of its budgetary oversight role. Assessment of parliament's budgetary oversight role entailed, (i) assessing parliament's performance of actual budgetary oversight activities in the chamber and within its budget committees and (ii) assessing reviews of parliament's performance using survey data from the ALP and OBS.

10.2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions

In Chapter 4 the study analysed the growth of capacity and resources in the parliament of Botswana. The study posited that, parliamentary capacity and resources are amongst the most common and highly acclaimed factors necessary for effective performance within and by parliaments. Hence, the availability and adequacy of capacity and resources in parliament has been at the helm of most discussions and efforts aimed at enhancing parliamentary performance. Growth in Botswana parliament's capacity and resources was assessed in terms of; increasing salaries of members of parliament, improving parliamentary infrastructure, availability of specialised parliamentary offices as well as availability and adequacy of skilled parliamentary support staff. The study established that the parliament of Botswana is not adequately resourced and capacitated. This was echoed throughout the study interviews and as echoed by Toka (2018), the parliament of Botswana suffers 'inadequate research skills, lack of regular staff charged with the task of consistently providing support or service for the select committees of parliament'. Other local scholars such as Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie have also opined about the limited availability of infrastructure in the parliament of Botswana. Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie argued that the lack of capacity and resources in parliament extends to all its other roles such as its constituency service function. Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie state for instance that 'constituency offices, although still quite recent, could provide for a good communication structure for they allow constant engagement with the public. Unfortunately, their effectiveness is limited due to budget allocation and lack of adequate equipment and well-resourced support staff to assist parliamentarians fulfil their political and decision-making roles'. Similar complaints have also come from within parliament as for instance, member of parliament and leader of opposition in the parliament of Botswana, Keorapetse (2015) lamented that parliament 'lacks resources, expertise and qualified skilled staff. Parliamentary staff in the PR, editorial and research divisions of Parliament inter alia are inadequate and, in some instances, lack necessary skills to assist MPs'. Thus, in a nutshell, the parliament of Botswana does not have the adequate capacity and necessary resources for better and effective performance of allocated functions including its budgetary oversight role.

In Chapter 5, the study set out to establish the extent to which the parliament of Botswana grew in its autonomy and internal complexity. When assessing parliament's growth in autonomy, the chapter used indicators of autonomy such declining membership turnover as well as growing internal value of parliament. The study established in the chapter that the parliament

of Botswana has neither been more autonomous nor has it improved adequately in its internal complexity over the time under consideration. The chapter established that while the parliament of Botswana had to certain levels improved in autonomy in terms of a decline in membership turnover, this is only lasted for a period of time as in the latter years, the parliament of Botswana has begun to experience heightened turnover. This therefore means parliament constantly receives new members who do not possess the experience necessary for parliamentary work. Parliament has to constantly work with new members and thus the institutional memory is not retained. Additionally, when members do not show desire to remain as parliamentarians a has been the case with less members seeking re-election, this puts parliament at a loss in terms growing the careers of MPs. On the other hand, when assessing parliament' growth in internal complexity, the study has shown that the parliament of Botswana has experienced some growth and improvement in its internal complexity. For instance, the parliament of Botswana has managed to streamline its committees by putting in place portfolio committees which work with the various ministries and government departments. This automatically increased the number of parliamentary committees. However, the streamlining of parliamentary committees has not been fully maximised as some portfolio committees still serve more than one ministry or agency.

After assessing the growth of capacity and resources as well as the growth on autonomy and internal complexity in the parliament of Botswana as the selected factors driving change in parliament, the study went on to map out parliament's performance of budgetary oversight in Chapter 6. The overall finding in Chapter 6 was that the parliament of Botswana has not performed its budgetary oversight role effectively. This was shown from how parliament performed both its ex-ante and ex-post budgetary oversight activities, resulting in unsatisfactory reviews on its performance given by MPs through the ALP survey as well as through the Open Budget Survey data. The Chapter firstly showed that while parliament's budget approval is performed both within the Chamber as well as by its budget committees, it is the latter that carry the bulk of parliament's budgetary oversight work. The oversight activities that mostly take place in the chamber are the debates and question sessions for the budget bill. While parliament is afforded the opportunity to debate and question the budget in the chamber, there is no instrument that adequately prescribes in detail how budget debates and questions should be conducted. The elaborate guidelines are for general parliamentary debates and questions and not specifically for budget oversight. However, as pointed out in the study,

the budget is an important and peculiar policy instrument which as McGee (2007:2) puts it, 'tends to contain the most important decisions, at least for an economic or financial nature, that a government will make each year'. It was also shown in the chapter that the provision for parliament to carry out its budget approval activity is not sufficient in terms of how far parliament can go in adjusting proposed allocations as well as in terms of the time period allocated for parliament to make the amendments. As such, despite being given approval powers, parliament's budget amendment powers are limited as the legislature can amend the proposed budget but cannot change the deficit or surplus amount. Additionally, if the legislature does not approve of the proposed budget by the 1st of April, then the proposals made by the Minister of Finance stand (Botlhale, 2012).

When assessing performance of oversight activities by the budget committees, the study established that between the two budgetary oversight committees of parliament, the FEC has been less active. Additionally, between the two committees, the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC) has not received the same recognition as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). This is despite the fact that the FEC being the first point for oversight has a better potential to ensure fiscal discipline before any spending is done. The PAC on the other hand, makes inquiries into lapses after monies have already been spent. This potential thus remains untapped in the parliament of Botswana. The PAC only comes in post implementation. The study has also shown that even though the PAC is argued to be the most active of the two parliamentary budget committees, certain elements limit its effective performance. For instance, the lack of a formalised requirement for responses to committee recommendations means that its recommendations are not taken as seriously as they should be. A formal requirement is a necessary to ensure compliance. This is in line with Monk (2009)'s argument that, 'the usual way in which the government gives its view of the report is through a government response tabled in the relevant chamber. The formal government response to a report, states what the government has done, or plans to do, with respect to the report's recommendations. It generally also gives reasons where the government has decided not to implement a recommendation.' The reviews of parliament's oversight effectiveness on the other hand, have shown that while MPs themselves rated parliament (through the ALP survey) as providing effective budgetary oversight, parliament has however received waning reviews on its performance of budgetary oversight as depicted through the Open budget surveys rankings.

Having established how the parliament of Botswana grew and improved in key factors driving change inside parliament, as well as how the parliament of Botswana performed its budgetary oversight role as a result, the study further analysed key factors which likely explain parliament's performance as they have been associated with making more or less influential in budgetary oversight. Beginning with the modernisation argument, Chapter 7 established through the use of various modernization indicators that Botswana and Batswana have not completely modernized. While there have been some modernization improvements in the country and the same improvements have reflected inside parliament, some aspects of modernization such as lived poverty in Botswana remain a thorny issue. Hence Siphambe (2016)'s argument that 'it is possible for poverty, income inequality and unemployment, to be growing at the same time as the country is experiencing economic growth'. Extending the modernization analysis inside the parliament of Botswana, the study had proclaimed that similar modernization trends are to be expected inside parliament as those happening in the country. This was influenced by scholarly proclamations that the same way modernization occurs in the country is the same way it will occur in parliament. Thus, the study also assessed the modernization variables inside parliament of Botswana. Similarly, the study also established that the parliament of Botswana has experience incomplete modernization.

In Chapter 8, the study assessed the adequacy and improvement of parliament's formal powers. Beginning with a look at the government system which the study believes has a bearing on the type of powers given to parliament, the study observed that unlike other former British colonies Botswana adopted a purely parliamentary system. This means that the parliament of Botswana operates within a hybrid system that combines both parliamentary system and presidential characteristics. Within this system parliament enjoys aspects such as separation of powers, however still with some limited independence borne in the parliamentary system, which places most powers upon the executive, mainly the president. In as far as parliament's the legal provisions for its budgetary oversight are concerned, the study has highlighted that while the budget process has opportunities for oversight at all the four stages of the process, the parliament of Botswana has only been empowered for the approval and evaluation stages. This has not sat well with many in the country, who desire for parliament to play a bigger role in the formulation stage of the budget. Thus, some scholars and contributors in the country argue that parliament remains weak and only plays a rubber stamp role over decisions already taken by the executive.

Lastly, in Chapter 9, the study analysed the extent of political party dynamics in the parliament of Botswana. The study acknowledged the importance of political parties in the effectiveness on parliaments. For parliament to be staffed with MPs to do the work of parliament, they first have to go through political party competition. Therefore, political party competition is viewed as an important factor in making parliament more influential in its budgetary oversight role. Thus, an increase in political party competition has been presented as an enabler for more influential parliaments. Thus, the study assessed the increase of political party competition in Botswana. The study found that indeed the parliament of Botswana has experienced increased party competition over the years. However, while the parliament of Botswana has experienced increased political party competition, this has not necessarily translated into any change of power as the ruling BDP has remained in power throughout all the years. In the end, the country has become a one-party dominant state. One of the main consequences of one-party-systems in parliament is heightened political party cohesion and/or control. Political party cohesion and/or control has been criticised as inhibiting to parliamentary performance. Botlhale (2012) argues for instance that, 'even though the Constitution of Botswana vests all law-making powers in the legislature, there is an overlap between the legislature and executive in the sense that all 21 ministers and assistant ministers are drawn from the 57 elected MPs. Thanks to these numbers, the front bench often tilts the vote in favour of the government. In addition, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) operates a caucus system that makes its decisions binding on MPs. Those who defy caucus decisions do so at considerable risk'.

10.3. Recommendations

Drawing from the preceding study's findings and conclusions, this study acknowledges that the parliament of Botswana like many other parliaments of Africa remains challenged. Therefore, this study makes the following recommendations with the aim of strengthening and enhancing the parliament of Botswana for better and effective performance.

Increasing Parliament's Capacity and Resources

Having established that the parliament of Botswana has limited capacity and resources, this study recommends for the capacitation of parliament and ensuring that parliament has adequate

resources at its disposal at all times. Capacity and resources are important because as scholarship attests, even if parliament have the right formal measures to ensure performance, if these are not backed up by the right resources implementation of their mandate will remain a challenge. Capacitating parliament should take into consideration parliamentary committees capacity issues as well. Therefore, the first recommendation is for the parliament of Botswana and its committees to be adequately capacitated and resourced. As highlighted through the capacity and resources variables assessed in the study ensuring adequate financial resources, infrastructure as well as human capacity for parliament and its committees go a long way in ensuring better performance by parliament and its MPs. An important missing resource in the parliament of Botswana, which is a common feature of most effective parliaments and hereby recommended for the parliament of Botswana is the Specialised Parliamentary Budget Office (SPBO). SPBOs are important resources for strengthening the skills of parliaments in budgetary oversight because as stated in the case of the SPBO of the parliament of Kenya,

> The Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) is a non-partisan professional office in Parliament whose function is to provide professional non-partisan advice, conduct objective analysis in respect of the budget, finance, and the economy. The PBO was established against a backdrop of weak legislative performance and lack of effective scrutiny and oversight over the budget process. While the Executive had the assistance of a team of technocrats to assist it in drafting the budget, it was too complex for the Legislature to adequately understand and scrutinize it. Thus, for a long time, Parliament played a minimal visible role in the formulation, implementation, and audit and oversight of the budget.

Enhancing Parliament's Autonomy

In the assessment of parliament's growth in autonomy, the study showed that the parliament of Botswana is not completely autonomous or rather has not become any more autonomous over the years. As such, this study recommends for increased parliament's autonomy. While the study used membership turnover and internal value of parliament to assess the growth of autonomy in the parliament of Botswana, the study recommends that beyond ensuring that members of parliament serve longer terms in parliament and in its committees, the independence and autonomy of parliament and its committees from the executive is

recommended. This follows on the recommendation already made above, because when parliament has the proper financial, infrastructure and human resource, its operational independence can be guaranteed.

Improving Parliament's Committee System

Parliamentary committees are today known to be most important when it comes to parliaments' ability to deliver on their allocated functions. This is because committees allow a small group of members to examine in detail and over time a range of complex matters. A well-developed portfolio committee system is necessary as Barkan (2009:215) argued, 'modern and autonomous legislatures that impact on the policy making process are invariable legislatures with a well-developed system of portfolio or ministerial committees, that shadow the ministry, departments and agencies that make up the executive branch'. The study established that although the parliament of Botswana has improved its complexity especially through the establishment of portfolio committees, this however has not been adequate hence the study recommends for the parliament of Botswana to review its committee system and further expand its portfolio committees. The study recommends for portfolio committees to be assigned to each government ministry as a correction to the current status quo where one portfolio committee serves more than one government ministry.

Reviewing and Reforming Parliament's Formal Powers

As pointed out in the study, the parliament of Botswana is only empowered for ex-ante (approval) and ex-post (evaluation) budgetary oversight. However, the budgetary process has other opportunities for oversight to which the parliament of Botswana can be empowered to oversee. For instance, during the formulation stage, parliament can play a role. As Wehner (2004) has pointed out, the US parliament is empowered to formulate and substitute the budget. Additionally, as highlighted in chapter 8, the Public Accounts Committee which performs budget implementation audits, lacks specific powers including powers formally requiring accounting officers to uptake respond to committee recommendations. The study also recommends government to grant both the FEC and the PAC equal recognition. This is recommended because as it emerged from the study, the PAC is the most active of the two committees yet, the FEC being the first budget committee to handle and oversee budget

appropriations stands at a better chance to curb any budget anomalies even before spending can begin. At the same time, it is highly recommended that both the FEC and the PAC must be equally empowered for budget approval and evaluation. It should not be taken lightly that the FEC is less active in its budgetary oversight role than the PAC is, because it does not serve the country well to have a weak approval committee and later expect a good outcome from the audit committee. Therefore, this study recommends for the budget approval function especially as performed by the FEC to be treated as seriously as the budget oversight activities performed by the audit committee (PAC). Additionally, as noted in chapter 3, the budget approval function of parliament and the FEC should not be limited to a certain time period where the minister's proposal obtains if parliament has not approved the proposals by the 1st of April.

Additionally, considering the challenges faced by the PAC when it comes to the uptake of its recommendations, this study recommends that a further improvement of parliament's formal powers for budget oversight should include a formal requirement for accounting officers and executives of various government departments to formally respond to budget committee recommendations. When budget oversight committees put up recommendations, the expectation is for government departments which are the main recipients of the recommendations, to formally respond and state what the government department has done and will do to address the concerns raised in the report. As shown earlier on, there is no formal requirement in Botswana for departments to respond to budget committee recommendations thus making recommendations unbinding to the executive. And thus, the acceptance and implementation of recommendations is merely dependant on 'relations' between the committee or parliament and the executive.

Developing Guidelines and Procedures for Parliament's Scrutiny and Oversight of the Budget

It has been argued in the study that while parliament and its budget committees follow standard guidelines set for all parliamentary activities, there are no guidelines specific to parliament's budget oversight role. For instance, when it comes to debating and questioning the budget appropriation bill, the parliament of Botswana follows the same standard rules for any other bill presented before it for debate. Nonetheless, as argued in the study, the budget is an important economic policy tool that requires specific and elaborate procedures. Therefore, it should be handled differently in terms of ensuring executive adherence and accountability. The

envisaged guidelines and procedures for budgetary oversight should include a standard requirement for accounting officers to formally respond to budget audit queries and recommendations. The envisaged guidelines will also serve as an empowerment tool for members of parliament appointed into parliament's budgetary oversight committees.

Enhancing Political Party Competition

The study has pointed out that, political parties and political party competition are an important aspect of proper functioning democracies. This is more so where political party competition thrives on competition for elections is done on a level playing field with all parties involved having equal opportunity to attain power. Therefore, while it is democratic to hold elections every time without fail, however, if opposition parties competing in an election have constantly failed to produce an alternative government, then there is need for some intervention measures. Hence, this study recommends for efforts to be made to enhance opposition parties for better electoral performance. Such efforts should include but not limited to; political party funding, electoral system reforms as well as Constitutional reforms. Currently, there exists no form of state funding for political parties in Botswana neither is there a law regulating political party funding and thus the study recommends for the adoption of a political party funding act to addresses this shortcoming. Furthermore, continuing to hold elections under the first-past-the-post (simple majority) electoral system has not proven beneficial to the electoral performance of opposition political parties and thus a change to a more representational system is recommended. Finally, a Constitutional reform is recommended to curtail the overbearing powers of the presidency.

10.4. Directions for Future Research

This study assessed a number of factors associated with better and improved parliamentary performance. However, the study acknowledges that there are many other factors and conditions affecting parliament's effective performance of allocated functions, including that of budgetary oversight. As such, this study plays an important role in setting the tone in advancing our understanding of the factors affecting the performance of African parliaments and the parliament of Botswana in particular. This is especially important because as alluded to earlier in the study, African parliaments are largely understudied. Additionally, while the study mapped out the extent to which the parliament of Botswana has grown and improved in

selected factors associated with effective parliamentary performance, there remains room for future research to establish the experience of the parliament of Botswana with the many other factors associated with parliamentary performance. Furthermore, opportunities also exist for additional research on how the other core functions of parliament are affected by the aforementioned factors and conditions.

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF PORTFOLIO COMMITTEES IN THE PARLIAMENT OF BOTSWANA

Portfolio Committee	**Government Ministry and /or Department Served**
Wildlife, Tourism, Natural Resources and Climate Change	- Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources - Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism
Agriculture, Lands and Housing	- Ministry of Agriculture - Ministry of Lands and Housing
Foreign affairs, Defence, Justice, Security and Government Assurances	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ministry of Defence, Security and Justice
Finance, Trade and Economic Development	- Ministry of Trade and Industry - Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
Communications, Works, Transport and Technology	- Ministry of Infrastructure, Science and Technology - Ministry of Transport and Communications
Labour and Home Affairs, Health and HIV/AIDS	- Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs - Ministry of Health - National Aids Coordinating Agency
Governance and Oversight	- State President - Independent Electoral Commission - Ombudsman - Auditor General - Parliament
Education, Skills and Development	- Education and Skills Development
Youth, Sports, Arts and Culture	- Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture
Local Governance and Social Welfare	- Ministry of Local Government

Source: Parliament of Botswana, Parliamentary Portfolio Committees