The development of social protection policies in Tanzania, 2000-2015

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Abstract

Tanzania has recently scaled up a piloted conditional cash transfer programme to target the extreme poor across the country. In addition, there has been moves to finalise a national social protection framework and the possibility of introducing an old age pension has been announced. This paper focuses on these three main social protection developments in Tanzania and looks into the role of different bureaucracies and their funding partners in shaping social protection policies. The Tanzanian case illustrates how external agencies influence the development of social protection strategies in low-income countries. Although policy ownership lies with domestic institutions, their ability to develop policies, implement these and document their success is largely depended on the support they get from external agencies. By funding pilot projects and supporting evidence-based publications and promotional events, external actors can play a determining role in promoting specific social protection policy designs. Without strong institutional ownership with the backing of resourceful partners, proposed policies are less likely to get sufficient political support.

1. Introduction

Social protection on mainland Tanzania has long been a low priority.\(^1\) Being a low-income country, Tanzania has high levels of deprivation and high demand for income security, but limited resources to address these issues. Nevertheless, in the past few years, there have been some substantial moves towards developing social protection policies. In 2013, the government approved the implementation of the Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) programme, which is a nation-wide conditional cash transfer programme that targets the extreme poor population. During 2014 and 2015, there were moves to finalise a National Social Protection Framework (NSPF) and the

\(^1\) Tanzania is a union between the Mainland and the Zanzibar islands. As social protection is not a union matter but falls under the jurisdiction of the two regions, the paper only focuses on social protection policies as they have developed on Mainland Tanzania.
possibility of introducing an old age pension was announced. However, the NSPF did not get enacted by government and no actual committed starting date for the pension was confirmed by the time the national elections came in October 2015, and consequently, the fate of the NSPF and the old age pension are still uncertain.\footnote{Unlike on Zanzibar where the old age pension for 70+ was introduced in April 2016.}

Despite these delays, Tanzania has nevertheless taken some initial steps towards expanding its social protection coverage (albeit from a very low starting point). In this paper, I look into the development of these three social protection policies - the National Social Protection Framework, the old age pension, and the conditional cash transfer programme. In presenting a historical narrative starting in 2000, I explore which actors have promoted the different policies and why.

The analysis focuses on the role of the different bureaucratic agencies responsible for social protection and the international development partners supporting the government and its bureaucratic institutions. Through interviews with these stakeholders and the readings of available documents, it becomes clear that there has not been an overall coherent strategy for social protection reform. Rather, the policies have developed through an incremental process where different stakeholders have had distinct interests, resources and abilities to promote their favoured policy options. The World Bank, together with its implementing partner TASAF and the Ministry of Finance, has been particularly successful in promoting the conditional cash transfer programme, which is now in the process of being expanded nationwide. International NGOs, the ILO, and the Ministry of Labour, which have been less resourceful compared to the stakeholders promoting the conditional cash transfer, have sought to promote the old age pension. The development of the National Social Protection Framework have been stalled several times, which can partly be explained by the challenges of dividing institutional responsibility across competing ministries.

The paper is structured as follows: first, the extent of poverty and income insecurity in Tanzania is described and a brief overview of past social protection policies is provided. Then, the overall policy framework and approach to development by the government is outlined. The next three sections analyse the three main recent social protection policies as they have developed, focusing on the national social protection framework, the old age pension and the conditional cash transfer programmes respectively. The conclusion draws together the main lessons from the analyses as they have relevance to social protection theories and actual developments across Africa.
2. Income security in Tanzania

At the turn to the new Millennium, social protection for poor and vulnerable groups in Tanzania was woefully inadequate. A few programmes existed. There were for instance programmes that targeted vulnerable children through advocating children’s rights, improving their access to basic services and providing assistance to orphans. There were also credit schemes and some counselling and assistance for needy women and people with disabilities (Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003). Emergency food aid programmes were also in place to provide temporary assistance for particularly vulnerable groups (poor households in periods of food shortage and refugees) (World Bank, 2011). Nevertheless, common for the variety of programmes was that they were small scale, covering only specific geographical areas or moments (e.g. times of poor harvest), and primarily externally funded. Although a few programmes were implemented by government bodies, the majority were run by (international) non-governmental organisations. A general lack of financial resources and capacity both within government and civil society were compounding factors, but a “lack of political will” also explains the state’s “failure to provide adequate social protection to the poor” (Mchomvu, Tungaraza & Maghimbi, 2002: 19; Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003).

Tanzania is a low-income country with a GDP per capita income of US$ 1,334 and among the poorest in Africa. Despite consistent annual growth rates of above 6 percent since 2001, poverty levels have remained stubbornly high (Malik & UNDP, 2013). Throughout the 2000s roughly a third of the population (34.4 percent) were estimated to live below the poverty line. According to the recent Household Survey of 2011/12, official poverty levels have now dropped to 28.2 percent, which then constitute the first significant decline in poverty in 20 years (World Bank, 2015). While this figure does indicate a decline in poverty incidences, caution must be taken in comparing with past poverty figures as poverty estimations methodologies have changed. In absolute terms, at least 12 million Tanzanians live below the poverty line, which is the same number as in 2001 (World Bank, 2015; Morisset, 2013b).

The official poverty line gives a sense of the extent of severe deprivation. However, the majority of Tanzanians are income insecure. Although, some might succeed in moving above the poverty line, many are equally prone to fall (back) below the line; that is “a large share of the population hovers around the poverty line” (World Bank, 2015: 18). Using a different indicator of poverty (population living below US$1.25 a day) the poor population of Tanzania amounts to 43.5 percent of the total population of 49.3 million (World Bank, 2015). Furthermore, only 11.6 percent of
the economically active population have paid jobs with the government, parastatals and private employers (Osberg & Bandara, 2012: 9); jobs that may have some social insurance benefits attached to them. In general, the supply exceeds demands in the wage labour market and the majority of Tanzanians rely on insecure and seasonal jobs at low wages. This situation reflects an economy where growth has been concentrated in urban areas and in capital-intensive sectors such as construction, mining, communication and banking sectors. Growth has lagged behind in the agricultural sector – a sector that is characterised by subsistence farming and low productivity (Morisset, 2013b; Shepherd et al., 2013: 205).

What is more, the number of households dependent on agriculture has been growing (Osberg & Bandara, 2012). The vast majority (around 70 percent) of Tanzanians live in rural areas, and the inability to improve the agricultural sector and expand economic growth beyond the urban areas is evident in that more than 80 percent of the country’s poor reside in rural areas (World Bank, 2015; Morisset, 2013b). Even if not defined as poor, living conditions in rural areas are generally dismal:

‘People in rural areas are unlikely to have access to electricity and water; are unable to buy essential goods such as soap and clothes; children are typically poorly educated, malnourished and unhealthy; malaria is endemic and kills tens of thousands of people each year; and one in every 25 women dies during childbirth. A significant proportion of the rural population relies on subsistence agriculture and is highly vulnerable to climatic shocks’ (Morisset, 2013b: 27).

Poverty is also an urban phenomenon. However, poverty headcounts in urban areas (particularly in the capital city of Dar es Salaam) have consistently been lower than in rural areas. Moreover, in Dar es Salaam poverty has declined by more than 70 percent between 2007 and 2011/12, compared to a decline in rural areas of around 15 percent (poverty has only decreased slightly by 5 percent in secondary cities and towns) (World Bank, 2015).

Thus, it should be clear that “poverty, food insecurity and vulnerability are all ‘mass’ phenomena in Tanzania” (Shepherd et al., 2013: 190). In this context of generalised insecurity, the need for social protection is immense. However, being a low-income country, Tanzania has limited resources and many other developmental challenges that compete with social protection. Nonetheless, even compared to other low-income countries such as Malawi and Ethiopia, Tanzania spends only a tiny amount on social transfer programmes aimed at poor and vulnerable groups (0.3 percent of GDP) (Morisset, 2013b: 21).
One scholar has characterised the social protection framework in Tanzania as an “uneasy conjunction of the dwindling remnants of the (older) ex-ante formal social insurance schemes (pension and provident funds) with the (newer) ex-post targeted social safety-nets which arose in the wake of structural adjustments” (Wuyts, 2006: 5). Regarding the former, there are six major mandatory social insurance schemes, including the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) and a number of Pensions and Provident Funds. However, given their nature of providing for only those working in secure and well-paid jobs in the formal sector, the coverage has been limited to about only 4 percent of the total labour force (URT 2008).

With respect to the latter, there is general agreement that the current programmes are inadequate, fragmented, uncoordinated, and too limited in scope and coverage (Shepherd et al., 2013; World Bank, 2011; URT, 2008). Besides various pilot programmes and NGO-funded schemes, there are a few established programmes, which are important in their provision of social protection to vulnerable groups. For instance, the Ministry of Social Welfare runs a Most Vulnerable Children Programme, which as of 2011 has reached annually about 600,000 orphans and other vulnerable children through the provision of in-kind transfers such as school supplies, clothing and health service cards. Food programmes combined have the widest reach. Hence, 1.2 million people have been reached annually through the National Food Reserve Agency, which sell grain at subsidised prices during times of food shortage; and the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme have been benefitting about 1.5 million people annually through the provision of input subsidies to farmers growing maize and rice. The two programmes characterise a policy response of subsidising goods, which grew out in reaction to the Structural Adjustments Programmes in the 1980s; in this way, they are different to ‘newer’ social protection policies that provide direct benefits in cash or in kind (Harvey et al., 2010). The World Food Programme (WFP) has been running amongst others a school feeding scheme and a food-for-assets programme reaching about 200,000 primarily school children and 54,000 beneficiaries respectively as of 2011 (World Bank, 2011). Although this paper focuses on new social protection policy initiatives in the past decade (i.e. conditional cash transfer, old age pension and national social protection framework), the WFP food-for-asset programme will briefly be discussed later as it has some similarities with the public works element of the conditional cash transfer programme.

In sum, the majority of Tanzanians have no access to social protection provisions and rely instead only on informal systems of support. As Jacques Morisset, Lead
Economist in the World Bank Tanzania Office, stated “[w]hen confronted with financial distress or some other difficulty, over 80 percent of Tanzanian families say they count on relatives and friends for the support needed to get through it” (Morisset, 2013a). Nevertheless, in the past few years, Tanzania has taken some initial steps towards a more coherent social protection system. The most notable recent policy developments are the countrywide roll out of a conditional cash transfer programme (now called Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN)), the government’s promise to introduce an old age pension, and the development of a national social protection framework. In sections 4-6, we explore these three specific policy developments, but first we outline the overall policy framework that reflects the government’s general approach to development and poverty reduction.


Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) papers often constitute the overall poverty framework in many low-income African countries. This has also been the case in Tanzania. However, in the past few years, the Tanzanian government has partly sidestepped the PRS and instead argued that its Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) is the document that defines the government’s approach to development and poverty reduction. As elaborated in the following, the FYDP is much less focused on protective measures and instead centres on production and pro-poor growth.

In order to qualify for the debt relief initiatives, the Tanzanian government together with donors developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy for the years 2000-2003. This was followed by two five-year plans: National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) – also called MKUKUTA I and MKUKUTA II – for the years 2005-2010 and 2010-2015. Much in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and donor priorities for this period, the plans focus on growth, poverty reduction, and governance. Thus, both MKUKUTA I and II have three main clusters: 1) Growth and reduction of income poverty, 2) Quality of life and social well-being, and 3) Good governance and accountability. Under the second cluster the provision of social services as well as social protection to vulnerable and needy groups feature quite prominently. Hence, in MKUKUTA II the operational targets for social protection are: i) Proportion of vulnerable children [...], disabled, and eligible adults covered with social protection measures increased, and ii) Proportion of eligible elderly people reached with minimum social protection increased (URT 2010: 70-71).
The MKUKUTA documents are outcomes of government-donor-civil society consultations typical for PRSPs. At the insistence of donors, these overall development plans have been negotiated through ‘broad consultations’ including also civil society organisations. The MKUKUTA documents are argued to largely be ‘owned’ by Tanzanians and the government that represents them, while being supported financially by the donors. The importance of these documents in terms of policy planning and implementation are essential as is also evident in government budgets where the structures follows the clusters and priorities defined by the MKUKUTA (Ministry of Finance 2013). Still, critics have argued that such consultations have not been inclusive and that in reality the development of the PRSPs, also in Tanzania, has been negotiated by an “iron triangle” of government ministries, donor agencies, and international NGOs, which in turn has led to a depoliticised and technocratic policy process (Hickey & Bracking, 2005; Kinsella & Brehony, 2009; Gould & Ojanen, 2003).

Moreover, although the MKUKUTA is an important policy framework, the government introduced in 2011 the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) 2011/12-2015/16. The government sees the FYDP as the priority document that will move the country forward, whereas the MKUKUTA is a supplementary document dealing specifically with poverty, which is “much to the irritation of some donors, who [have] felt that MKUKUTA ought to be the government’s blueprint for development” (Tripp, 2012: 16).

Thus, in justifying the introduction of the Five Year Development Plan, it is argued in the FYDP-document that with the Government’s Vision 2025 of “taking Tanzania to middle income country status and eradicate poverty” the strategies in place were insufficient. Instead “the planning efforts [of the FYDP] capitalize on the idea that ‘business as usual’ attitude will not surmount these challenges [of Vision 2025]” (URT, 2011: ii-iii). In the opinion of the drafters of the FYDP (the government) something new and different to the MKUKUTA was needed: “MKUKUTA, though designed as an implementation strategy with broader outcomes, it fell short in terms of prioritisation of development issues and laying out specific strategic interventions to realize the objectives of Vision 2025” (Ibid.: 2-3). In fact, the “Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) were adopted as a safety net for the poor, which in the absence of Five Year Development Plans, became the framework to implement the Vision” (Ibid., authors italics).

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3 Interview with official at the President’s Office Planning Commission.
There is no doubt that the FYDP is the primary document in the government’s approach to development and poverty reduction. When the previous President Dr JM Kikwete (2005 – 2015) spoke about ending extreme poverty, he highlighted the strategies of the FYDP, not the MKUKUTA.\(^4\) Two aspects of the FYDP are worth highlighting in order to understand how the FYDP also expresses the government’s approach to social protection: how the Vision 2025 narrates the challenges facing Tanzania, and how the FYDP reflects a productivist strategy in “realising the Country’s aspirations as stipulated in the Development Vision”.\(^5\) I elaborate on these two aspects in the following.

The work on the Development Vision 2025 started under President Mkapa in 1995 and was unveiled in 2000. The Vision was developed through discussions with domestic stakeholders including “Honourable Members of Parliament, all political parties, leaders of various religious denominations, women and youth organisations, chambers of commerce and industry, farmers, professional associations, renowned personalities in our nation’s history and ordinary Tanzanians”.\(^6\) Hence, the Vision is a truly Tanzanian document although probably reflecting more the views of the political-economic elite than the broad Tanzanian population.

The Vision highlights various impediments to development where the first is “Donor-Dependence Syndrome and a Dependent and Defeatist Development Mindset”. As elaborated:

> ‘The mindset of the people of Tanzania and their leaders has succumbed to donor dependency and has resulted in an erosion of initiative and lack of ownership of the development agenda. […] The mindset … has neither been supportive of hard work, ingenuity and creativity’ (URT, 2000: 8).

In suggestion solutions to this state of affairs, the Vision suggests:

> ‘The effective transformation of the mindset and culture to promote attitudes of self-development, community development, confidence and commitment to face development challenges and exploit every opportunity for the improvement of the quality of livelihood is of prime importance. The effective ownership of the development agenda coupled with the spirit

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\(^4\) E.g. Keynote speech by President Dr J. M. Kikwete, at the USAID Forum on “Frontiers in Development: Ending Extreme Poverty”, 19 September 2014, Washington DC.

\(^5\) Prime Minister Hon. M. P. Pinda, in opening speech at the “3\(^{rd}\) Annual National Policy Dialogue” at Ubungo Plaza, Dar es Salaam, 26 January 2012.

\(^6\) President B. W. Mkapa in Foreword to the 2025 Vision (URT 2000).
of self-reliance, at all societal levels, are major driving forces for the realization of the Vision. Tanzanians should learn to appreciate and honour hard work, creativity, professionalism and entrepreneurship’ (URT, 2000: 17; italics by author).

In the analysis of the development of the conditional cash transfer programmes (Section 6), it is clear that issues of community development and self-reliance feature prominently. The political elite’s concern with the Tanzanian ‘mindset’ remains prominent. Thus, the new President Dr J. Magufuli has emphasised the main drawbacks in Tanzania as corruption, poor management, waste of public resources, and “a culture that encouraged laziness and did not reward hard work”.7

The Vision’s overall aim is to transform Tanzania from a least developed country to a middle-income country by 2025 (URT, 2000). The government views the FYDP to be the formal implementation tool in meeting this aim. The objective “is to unleash Tanzania’s latent growth potentials […] by the targeting of strategic priority interventions to move Tanzania to a higher growth trajectory coupled with a shift from an Agriculture-Based to an Industry-Based economy”.8 Specific strategies include addressing infrastructural bottlenecks, increase the pool of skilled labour, improve the business environment, and enhance productivity in agriculture.9 Clearly, the focus is on engineering productivity and enabling pro-poor growth. Any strategies aimed at the poor relate to “attracting investments, particularly in areas where the poor are more involved” (URT, 2011: 10) and therefore any growth strategy including the poor “must involve substantial growth of agricultural productivity and allow most of the rural population to benefit from such growth through selling the increased produce domestic and export markets” (Ibid.: 17).

To sum up, the Tanzanian leaders’ approach to development and poverty reduction prioritises growth and productivity and less so protective interventions. The government acknowledges the importance of the poverty reduction strategy papers (MKUKUTA I and II) and international development agencies maintain some substantial influence through these policy documents, specifically in the policy areas where they are the main funders. However, the actual and final policy decisions sits with the president, key ministers and high-level public officials. The lines between

9 Keynote speech by President Dr J. M. Kikwete, at the USAID Forum on “Frontiers in Development: Ending Extreme Poverty”, 19 September 2014, Washington DC.
the CCM party and the state are blurred, and despite factions within the ruling party and increased political leverage of politicians at the local level, there is agreement among political observers that the core of the ruling CCM government control policy making in a centralised and top-down manner (Booth et al., 2014; Hoffman, 2013; Lofchie, 2014; Therkildsen & Bourgouin, 2012). Consequently, the policy perspectives by the top leaders as outlined here carries through to the different bureaucracies and implementing institutions working on developing specific social protection strategies. Considering the overall aim of the Vision 2025 and the FYDP, social protection measures appear of lesser importance than productive strategies and there may have been less urgency in pushing for an overall framework. Certainly, as we shall see in the following, the process of development a National Social Protection Framework has been rather slow.

4. National Social Protection Framework

The process of developing an overarching framework to coordinate various social protection efforts in Tanzania has been quite long and is at the time of writing still not complete. The drawn-out process reflects an institutional battle between key Ministries, where the Ministry of Labour has moved more into the shadows behind the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance. The issue of dividing institutional responsibility also illustrate the move from a narrower and more compartmental concept of social security to a broader notion of social protection, which include more areas of engagement and hence require the inclusion of a broader range of institutions. The following narrative starts at the turn to the new Millennium when, as elsewhere, poverty reduction became the dominant development goal.

In 2003, the government enacted the National Social Security Policy under the Ministry of Labour, Youth Development and Sports. This process had started in 2001 and was done in consultation with a range of stakeholders (URT, 2003). The document’s definition of social security is in line with the ILO conceptualisation of social security being a three-tier system consisting of 1) social assistance, which are non-contributory assistance to poor and vulnerable groups; 2) mandatory schemes, which are contributory insurance payments through employment; and 3) private savings, as in voluntary savings schemes for retirement and insurance against events such as ill health and loss of income. Stated objectives include to:

‘Widen the scope and coverage of social security services to all citizens; Harmonize social security schemes in the country […]'; Reduce poverty
through improved quality and quantity of benefits offered; [...and] Establish a social security structure that is consistent with the ILO standards but with due regard to the socio-economic situation in the country’ (URT, 2003: 12).

By mid-2000s, the problem of the fragmentation and limited scope of social protection in Tanzania was increasingly recognised. Two developments were set in motion that, at least initially, had the Ministry of Labour in a central role. First, in 2008, the Social Security (Regulatory) Authority Act was enacted, which set the ground for establishing the Social Security Regulatory Agency (SSRA) in 2010 (URT, 2009). The SSRA falls under the Ministry of Labour and its primary role is to harmonise and regulate the social security schemes in order to extent coverage (UN, nd). In the beginning, the agency received funding and technical assistance from the ILO and the World Bank, but now it only gets limited external funding.\(^\text{10}\) Although the agency sees itself to have the mandate to cover all aspects of social security, including social assistance,\(^\text{11}\) the agency primarily works to improve the legal framework, access to and coverage of social insurance schemes.\(^\text{12}\)

The second development was the setting up of a Social Protection Working Group around 2007-08, which worked towards developing a National Social Protection Framework (NSPF) to coordinate social protection efforts more broadly.\(^\text{13}\) The Working Group was co-chaired by the Ministries of Finance and Labour together with UNICEF\(^\text{14}\) and worked in consultation with a variety of stakeholders from government, civil society and international doors. In October 2008, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (not the Ministry of Labour) published a final draft of the NSPF. In this document, social protection is defined:

‘in a comprehensive manner to include traditional family and community support structures, and interventions by state and non-state actors that support individuals, households and communities to prevent, manage, and overcome the risks threatening their present and future security and well-being, and to embrace opportunities for their development and for social and economic progress in Tanzania’ (URT, 2008: 1).

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\(^{10}\) Interview with senior official at SSRA 17 April 2015.
\(^{11}\) Ibid.
\(^{12}\) Interview with Irene Isaka, Director General of Social Securities Regulatory Authority in Tanzania Invest 14 January 2014.
\(^{13}\) Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014, and senior researcher at REPOA 29 April 2014.
\(^{14}\) Interview with senior official at SSRA 17 April 2015.
With the draft NSPF document, one could say that the groundwork was now done to commit “the country to a stronger approach to social protection, including social transfers” (Shepherd et al., 2013: 190-91). However, in the years that followed the draft document was not enacted by the government. As late as mid-2014, social protection stakeholders that had been part of the process of developing the NSPF were unsure what the status of the NSPF was. The Ministry of Finance was regarded to be championing the process, but it was speculated that the NSPF had “fallen victim between two elephants fighting” in which the less resourceful Ministry of Labour was losing ground to the Ministry of Finance.

Later in 2014 and 2015, there was a push to get the NSPF enacted. A Task Force (consisting of MoF, TASAF, SSRA among others) under the leadership of the Office of the Prime Minister was established by government to finalise the framework, and according to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the government was expecting to have the Framework approved by June 2015. The UN agencies, as long-term partners of the process, have been keen to support a move towards a coherent social protection framework and specifically in mid-2015 they pushed to assist the Task Force in developing a final framework that could be approved by the cabinet before the election in October 2015. The support included technical assistance and funding of analyses, stakeholder consultations and consultants. However, the NSPF did not get approved by cabinet before the elections and at the time of writing its fate with the new government is uncertain.

Still, social protection efforts continue. The Task Force within the Office of the Prime Minister provides the overall coordination, but it is the Social Protection Working Group, co-chaired by the Ministry of Finance and UNICEF that meets regularly and keeps oversight over social protection issues and programmes (UN, nd). The Ministry of Finance is thus centrally placed in defining the specific path that social protection efforts in Tanzania take. The involvement of resourceful and coordinating ministries in social protection (as in the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Prime Minister) also reflects the broadening of policy areas considered to be important in addressing income insecurity. Social protection include

15 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014, and senior researcher at REPOA 29 April 2014.
16 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014.
17 Presentation by Dr S. Likwelile, Min of Finance, 17 December 2014, International Conference in Arusha.
18 Interviews and conversations with officials at ILO and UNDP.
19 The organizational structures of government ministries and agencies may change with the new government.
social security as regulated by the Ministry of Labour and the SSRA, social safety nets in cash or in kind, the delivery of welfare services by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, vulnerable groups and livelihood programmes and so on. Over time, concepts like productive livelihoods, community development, and self-reliance have become more firmly included in approaches to social protection responses (e.g. the TASAF programmes as discussed in Section 6), which also reflects the governments approach to development and poverty reduction as discussed in Section 3.

The central role played by the Ministry of Finance in social protection is well exemplified by the big international conference entitled Social Protection: Building Effective and Sustainable Systems for Equitable Growth, which the Ministry facilitated with support from the UN, UNICEF, ILO, UNAIDS and EPRI (Economic Policy Research Institute) in Arusha, 15-17 December 2014. The conference was attended by several ministries, implementing agencies (including SSRA and TASAF), donor agencies, domestic and international NGOs, and social protection experts and researchers. The overall purpose of the conference was arguably to gather domestic support for the upscaling of the conditional cash transfer programme (see section 6). However, the conference was also an opportunity for the Ministry of Finance to cement itself as the main promotor of social protection in Tanzania.

The conference ended ceremoniously with the Minister of Finance, Hon. Saada Mkuya Salum, signing the Arusha Declaration on Social Protection in Tanzania. In itself a pompous name, given that the Arusha Declaration of 1967 refers to Tanzania’s famous statement of African socialism, Ujaama, the Declaration of 2014 was not an outcome of elaborate debate at the conference, but rather a document drafted by key stakeholders and then presented to the audience. The declaration states to be “A guide to Action: Towards a nationally owned social protection system for the poor, vulnerable and marginalized” (URT, 2014). The declaration holds a promise:

‘Tanzania reaffirms her commitment to adopt the National Policy Framework for Social Protection […] with the aim of undertaking reforms of existing social protection measures to reach the poor and vulnerable better. The framework shall progressively extend coverage of social protection measures to all’ (URT, 2014).

20 Including this author.
It is argued to be in line with the overall development plan (FYDP) and poverty reduction strategy (MKUKUTA): “This national commitment aligns pro-poor goals of the key social sectors like health, water, education and those of social protection programmes like TASAF” (Ibid.).

The Declaration is not a legal document gazetted by the Government and it is not a replacement of the National Social Protection Framework. Probably it can be regarded as a statement of the government’s commitment to social protection. Another interesting outcome of the 2014 Conference was that the Minister of Finance stated that there is a “political will for social protection, particularly on implementing universal pension for elders”. She elaborated that the Government was at the initial faces towards introducing a pension system for the elderly. That it was the Ministry of Finance who made this announcement might be seen as a blow to the Ministry of Labour, who had otherwise been the main government entity involved in promoting the idea of a social pension for the elderly, as will be discussed in the next section.

5. Old Age Pension

Initially, during the 2000s, the idea of a non-contributory old age pension was promoted by international NGOs, the ILO and some international donors. Only later, did the Ministry of Labour also seriously look into the matter. However, in the end, the Ministry of Finance made a promise to introduce a social pension for the elderly, although it is still unclear whether this promise will turn into actual delivery.

According to one study in the early 2000s, “the elderly are the least supported” with only the International NGO, HelpAge, paying attention to “the impoverishing forces facing the elderly” (Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003: 69). It was with the assistance of HelpAge and REPSSI (Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative) that the KwaWazee pension fund was started in the Nshamba villages in the Muleba District, north-western Tanzania, at the end of 2003. The project initially started small-scale with the intention of learning about the lived realities of elderly people and to identify ways to respond to their needs. However, as more funds became available, KwaWazee developed into a cash transfer programme with the aim of providing poor and vulnerable people over the age of 60, including those caring for children without parents, with regular cash payments in the form of pensions and child benefits. The programme expanded to other villages in the Muleba district and by 2007, there were

21 Speech by Hon. Saada Mkuya Salum, Minister of Finance, 17 December 2014, International Conference in Arusha, as recorded by author.
nearly 600 pensioners who received a monthly cash transfer of TSh 6,000 (US$ 5) plus an additional child benefit of TSh 3,000 for each (grand)child cared for (Hofmann et al., 2008; Kessy, 2014).

Although the KwaWazee project has remained rather small scale in reach, the project has played an important role in documenting and evaluating the impact of a regular pension cash transfers for the well-being of pensioners and their families. An evaluation of the project was published in 2008 with a strong justification of its value for policymaking: “There is very little documentation in Tanzania on social pensions or social assistance for older people. Thus, the KwaWazee scheme can be regarded as a step towards the introduction of more such provision in Tanzania” (Hofmann et al., 2008: xiv). In line with other studies of social cash transfers elsewhere (e.g. UNDP & ILO, 2011), the evaluation report documents a range of positive impacts of pensions on older people. Thus, to highlight a few aspects, the regular pension payments improve the household economy so that the pensioners are better prepared for crisis such as drought and illness and they are more self-reliant with the biggest parts of the cash transfer being spent on basic food and basic needs (salt, soap and shoes). There were also notable improvements in the overall health status and psychosocial wellbeing of pensioners, just as children in homes receiving cash transfers experienced better material and social wellbeing. Following the evaluation, the report recommends the consideration of a universal pension scheme (Hoffman et al., 2008).

The civil society organisations involved with the KwaWazee project have continued to put the importance of an old age pension on the agenda. Other stakeholders have added their voices too. In 2006, the Department of International Development (DFID) of the UK Government funded an ILO-led feasibility study. The study provided a micro-simulations for Tanzania and Senegal to test different social policy options and their potential impact on poverty at household levels. For Tanzania, it was argued in the report that a combination of universal old age pension and child benefit “would achieve a reduction in poverty rates of 35 per cent, with even more substantial effects for individuals living in households with children and elderly (a drop of 46 per cent), which face the highest poverty risk” (Gassmann & Behrendt, 2006: vi). This study of micro-simulations built on an earlier ILO study (Pal et al., 2005) that assessed affordability of social protection from a macroeconomic perspective and concluded that a basic social benefit package would be affordable in most African countries, if governments were willing to provide sufficient budgetary commitments and international donors some intermediate support.
The ILO was also involved, when in 2008 the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Development undertook a Social Protection Expenditure Performance Review. In this study, it was highlighted that the feasibility of a universal non-contributory old age pension should be investigated as there was a high rate of poverty among households containing older people (ILO, 2008). Based on that recommendation, the Ministry of Labour, in collaboration with HelpAge International, and with funding from the German Federal Ministry of Economic, embarked on a study to assess the feasibility of introducing a universal old age pension. The study offers an analysis of the costs, fiscal sustainability and financing option for an old age pension and included inputs from a broad range of government, parastatal, non-governmental and private institutions. In the report, it is argued that achieving old age income security is key to realising Tanzania’s national development potential. Implementation of a universal social pension is both technically possible and fiscally sustainable and would contribute to achieving a wide range of national development objectives. The social pension represents a cost effective investment in broad-based social and economic development and would be a major step towards achieving the rights set out in the Tanzanian Constitution (Ministry of Labour, 2010: 8).

Around the same time, the independent research institution REPOA published a report, which analysed the material well-being and living arrangements of Tanzanians 60 years of age and older and assessed the affordability of a universal pension. In line with the report from the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Youth Development, this report also argued that an old age pension would substantially decrease poverty – that it could “lift over 3 million Tanzanians out of poverty” and that it would be affordable (Mboghoina & Osberg, 2010).

In the years that followed, HelpAge and its partners in the KwaWazee project continued to lobby for an old age pension and to provide evidence on its value, for instance with an evaluation report published in 2014 (Heslop & Hofmann, 2014). Furthermore, the SSRA under the Ministry of Labour was tasked with running additional feasibility studies and designing the programme. Hence, the announcement in 2014 to look into introducing a pension was maybe not entirely unexpected. However, with the push to find funding and implement the PSSN (see the next section) there was uncertainty among donors and civil society as to the government’s actual commitment, or at least ability to implement the programme.23

22 Interview with senior official at SSRA 17 April 2015.
23 Unlike the government of Zanzibar, which have committed to introduce an old age pension by April 2016. Interview with senior official at HelpAge on 13 October 2015.
As one donor mentioned, since they had already committed to fund the PSSN, they would not be willing to fund yet another social protection programme – even if they would have preferred an unconditional categorical pension to the conditional programme.\textsuperscript{24}

6. Conditional Cash Transfers

Since 2013, the Tanzanian government has worked to implement the nation-wide Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) programme, which is a conditional cash transfer (including elements of public works and livelihood enhancement) targeting the extreme poor (calculated as about ten percent of the population of 50 million). The ambition set in 2013 was to reach at least 1 million food insecure households (TASAF, 2015). As described in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, the road to the PSSN started with small community development projects implemented by TASAF (Tanzania Social Action Fund). Thus, the PSSN has its roots in traditional community-based projects aimed at improving livelihoods and lifting people out of poverty. The World Bank has been the main driver of introducing the conditional cash transfer programme. Increasingly, it has built a strong alliance with its implementing partner, TASAF, and also the Ministry of Finance. The strong productivist notion in the PSSN is much in line with the government’s approach to development and poverty reduction as outlined in the FYDP in 2011.

The PSSN is the biggest cash transfer programme in Tanzania and its development is the focus of this section. It is nevertheless important to note that during the same period (2000-2015), the World Food Programme (WFP) moved from strategies of food aid to food assistance, which has included the implementation and expansion of a food-for-asset programme to cover annually 250,000 beneficiaries (WFP, 2011).\textsuperscript{25} The WFP has had its presence in Tanzania since the mid-1960s where it has delivered emergency food aid to reduce chronic food insecurity; until the turn to the new millennium, food programmes were the primary modality of delivering emergency relief across most of Africa (Seekings, 2014). However, despite decades of delivering food supplies to affected individuals, food aid has achieved little in terms of reducing chronic food insecurity (Devereux, 2012). Thus, food assistance has been introduced to represent a new philosophy in supporting food security efforts in which food or

\textsuperscript{24} Interview with donor official 21 April 2015.

\textsuperscript{25} In addition, the WFP has as also mentioned earlier a school feeding scheme (food-for-education), now reaching more than 700,000 school children annually. The WFP also runs nutrition and HIV/AIDS programmes reaching some 150,000 beneficiaries annually (WFP 2011).
cash is provided in ways that seek to build human capacity, community assets and production in order to enhance long-term resilience (Harvey et al., 2010).\(^{26}\) The food-for-asset programme falls within this philosophy as the programme seeks to encourage low-income food-insecure households to participate in activities that can contribute to long-term food security. As explained: “Food will be an incentive to participate in asset-creation activities and participants will receive take-home rations during the lean period when access to food is poor and prices are high” (WFP, 2011: 4).

Apart from offering food instead of cash, the food-for-asset programme is similar to the public works element of the PSSN where the focus is also on incentivising beneficiaries to build community assets in return for benefits. Yet the TASAF and WFP programmes have run more in parallel than in a coordinated manner, and it is only recently that the two agencies have started to discuss how better to align their programmes. From the perspective of a WFP official, the World Food Programme has not always seen themselves as fitting neatly into the policy box labelled ‘social protection’. In their overall strategy design, the food-for-asset falls under climate change, the school feeding programme under education, and the nutrition programmes under nutrition/health. Still, WFP officials have shared lessons on relevant pilot programmes with TASAF (such as a small cash transfer programme to mothers) and were also consulted in the design of the PSSN.\(^{27}\) As we have seen in the cases of the national social protection framework, and the old age pension, the development of policies involves a whole range of stakeholders. This is also the case with the development of the PSSN, as we shall see in the following, although it has primarily been driven by the World Bank in collaboration with TASAF and the Ministry of Finance.

### 6.1 From community development to CCT pilot

In 2000, the government established a programme to “facilitate improvements in socio-economic infrastructure in rural and peri-urban communities under TASAF” (Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003: 35). The programme falls under the President’s Office and was formed as “part of the Government of Tanzania’s strategy for reducing poverty and improving livelihoods by stimulating economic activity at the community level” (Evans et al., 2014: 10). In wording, the programme falls in line with the government’s Vision 2025 in which dissatisfaction with previous attempts

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\(^{26}\) Interview with official at the World Food Programme, 29 April 2015.

\(^{27}\) Interview with official at the World Food Programme, 29 April 2015.
at rural development and poverty reduction is expressed, and in which the idea of self-development is promoted to effectuate transformation (URT, 2000). At this stage, TASAF was more akin to a community development programme rather than simply a cash transfer programme. The main purpose was to oversee smaller projects, which were decided, managed and implemented by the communities; such projects included the construction and improvement of community social services (basic health-care facilities and schools) and infrastructural assets. Poor and vulnerable households were identified by community leaders together with TASAF officials, and targeted households could become part of public works programme (receiving income for work on community assets) or other smaller income generating projects (Lerisse, Mmari & Baruani, 2003; Evans et al., 2014).

TASAF I ran from 2000 to 2005 and was then followed by TASAF II, which continued in much the same way with the aim of “empowering communities to access opportunities so that they can request, implement and monitor subprojects that contribute to improved livelihoods” (TASAF, 2008: v). TASAF II covered 121 local communities on Tanzania mainland and supported the improvement of access to and use of basic social services and assisted food insecure households and vulnerable individuals through public works subprojects and income generating activities (TASAF, 2008). According to the UN, TASAF I and II “achieved impressive results in facilitating community access to social services through infrastructure projects such as schools, health facilities and water points reaching 7.3 million people in TASAF I and 16.1 million in TASAF II” (UN, nd).

During TASAF II, the idea of a conditional cash transfer programme took form. The World Bank has been the primary funder of TASAF since its inception, and from around 2005 the Bank organised international workshops and exchange travels so that TASAF staff and other key stakeholders could learn about social protection interventions and programmes elsewhere.28 With the assistance of the World Bank, the TASAF started to design a cash transfer system around 2006-07. The basic elements of the suggested pilot programme is similar to many other World Bank supported cash transfers in the Global South (Hall, 2007). Thus, an initial pilot project should run in a few districts (with already identified control group communities); the project should – as was already the case within the TASAF programmes – target the poorest and most vulnerable groups who should receive a small regular cash transfer based on certain conditions. According to TASAF officials, conditionality was regarded as important politically in a context where the idea of co-responsibility as a positive behavioural attributes features prominently,

28 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014.
whereas it is feared that cash transfer programmes could otherwise be perceived as handouts.29

In one way, the suggested conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme differed to programmes elsewhere that have tended to be managed and implemented centrally. In Tanzania, the targeting of beneficiaries and the monitoring of the programme were to be done at the community level with a strong influence of the people living within the community. Thus, CB (community-based) was added to the abbreviated name of the proposed project to be CB-CCT. In the proposed design, it was suggested that the CB-CCT pilot programme would work most cost effectively if building on the already existing structures that TASAF had built in the communities that had benefited from previous programmes.30 The government agreed to the project and it was started in 2009 with the first cash transfer payments done in January 2010 (Evans et al., 2014).

Three districts, that had been part of previous TASAF programmes, were selected for the pilot project: Bagamoyo (70 km north of Dar es Salaam), Kibaha (35 km north-west of Dar), and Chamwino (500 km west from Dar). The pilot covered 5000 households in 40 communities within these three districts, with another 40 communities serving as control groups (Alaedini, 2013). Community organisations were heavily involved in various activities related to the implementation of the programme, including identifying potential beneficiaries, explaining the programme to community members, and in “applying peer pressure for compliance with the program conditions” (Evans et al., 2014: 11).

The process of targeting was designed to ensure community involvement and commitment:

‘Targeting was done by Community Management Committees (CMCs) under the oversight of the Village Council (VC), the local governing body, and with the endorsement of the Village Assembly (VA), which consists of all adults who live in the village. The CMC was democratically elected by potential beneficiaries and endorsed by the VA. Targeting was done using screening forms designed to identify vulnerable children and elderly people based on […] criteria, which were defined by the communities themselves’ (Evans et al., 2014: 14).

29 Conversations with TASAF officials 15-17 December 2014.
30 Interview with senior official at TASAF 9 May 2014.
The criteria for identifying vulnerable children and elderly people related to poor health, being without caregivers and experiencing severe deprivation. Beneficiary households were paid bimonthly. The amount ranged from a minimum of $12 to a maximum of $36; these figures were based on the food poverty line and depended on the number of people in the household. Conditions attached to the cash transfer related to ensuring that children go to primary school and that both children and the elderly visit health clinics. The idea behind the conditionalities was to foster long-term improvements in health and education indicators among the beneficiaries. Whether beneficiaries were living up to the conditions were monitored every four months through a process that included TASAF and the Community Management Committees with support from district staff, health centres and schools (Evans et al., 2014).

6.2 From Conditional Cash Transfers to Productive Social Safety Nets

The pilot conditional cash transfer in Tanzania built on community development projects as implemented by TASAF and with the bulk of funding from the World Bank. The projects had a specific focus on poverty reduction and included a strong emphasis on supporting beneficiaries to be capable of helping themselves and escape the poverty trap. The ideas of productivity and co-responsibility has remained strong elements in developing the policy design as the CB-CCT moved to become a nationwide programme (the PSSN). These ideas are also supported by the government’s overall development strategy as reflected in the FYDP, which was also produced during this period.

As the CB-CCT was a pilot project, monitoring and evaluation was of course essential components. Some documentation are internal reports developed by or in consultation with TASAF for its own internal use and in sharing with its government counterparts and international development partners.31 However, there are also publicly available reports and documentation that have been shared more widely. In the following, it is described how the World Bank and TASAF have organized events and disseminated reports in order to gain support for the upscaling of the conditional cash transfer programme.

Already in June 2010, the World Bank and TASAF organized an international conference for participants across the global south to engage in a Public Works

31 Interview with senior official at TASAF 9 May 2014.
Learning Forum. TASAF were to showcase its public works programmes as implemented in TASAF I and II and the forum would engage in sharing knowledge and expertise among World Bank officials and their country-level counterparts and to “catalyse improved understanding and know-how on the role of public works programs as part [of] national safety net and social protection agendas” 32

In 2011, the World Bank published a report on Tanzania with the sub-title Options for a National Productive Safety Net Program. The report “explores the role safety nets and transfers can play in reducing poverty more rapidly in Tanzania” (World Bank, 2011: i) It is not an evaluation of the ongoing CB-CCT programme, but instead engages itself with the question of how a social safety net system is not just a mechanism to reduce poverty and improve human capabilities (as in the CB-CCT), but also a means to increase productivity of beneficiaries so that they can help themselves escape poverty. In advocating for conditional cash transfers with a ‘productivist’ element, the report suggests:

‘…the primary focus of reducing poverty clearly needs to remain on re-engineering growth to reach poor Tanzanians. This means raising the productivity of subsistence agriculture, improving markets and access, investing in education and infrastructure, and encouraging smallholder cash cropping and small business. But judicious transfers to the poor can complement these efforts and hasten reduction of extreme poverty. A central role of safety net transfers is to equip the poor to participate more fully in this growth process, and to bridge ‘gaps’ that are preventing them from realizing potential income gains. “Smart” safety nets can increase their productivity (by building human and physical capital); allow the poor to take on higher-risk, higher-return activities (for example using fertilizer); and increase the returns to their labour (examples include small cash transfers that allow women to undertake petty trading; or subsistence farmers to buy food, and thus shift some of their land to cash crops)” (World Bank, 2011: 54).

In conversations with TASAF officials, they have emphasised that the idea of ‘productivity’ was important in building political support for an upscaling of the CCT programme. 33 This emphasis seems understandable given the political leaders’ focus on ‘unleashing Tanzania’s latent growth potential’ as discussed in Section 3.

32 Media Briefing Note circulated by TASAF and the World Bank’s Social Protection & Labour Department for the workshop that took place 14-18 June 2010.
33 Conversations with TASAF officials 15-17 December 2014.
Gathering evidence from the pilot was another important aspect in ‘selling’ the programme. Although only published in 2014, a World Bank led evaluation report provided important information about the impact of the CCT pilot, with a mid-term review in 2011, draft versions of the report and presentations of key findings being available earlier (Evans et al., 2014). The report is extensive and thorough in its assessment of impacts on beneficiary communities, which can be summarized as follows:

‘On the whole, the community-based CCT program led to improved outcomes in both health and education. Households used the resources to invest in livestock, in children’s shoes, in insurance, and—for the poorest households—in increased savings. This suggests that the households focused on reducing risk and on improving their livelihoods rather than principally on increasing consumption. There is also evidence that the project had positive effects on community cohesion’ (Evans et al., 2014: 8).

Based on the experiences of the TASAF I and II (including the CB-CCT pilot), their evaluations and reports as exemplified above, the government decided in 2013 to design and implement a countrywide Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) programme (UN, nd). The PSSN was argued to be “fundamentally a conditional cash transfer program, complemented by a seasonal intensive public works labor program” (Morisset, 2013b: 42), which follows well in line with the CCT pilot and the public works aspects of TASAF I and II. Thus, at this point, the Government committed itself to the PSSN as part of its overall strategy to overcome the persistence of extreme poverty in the country. This move was widely championed by the Department of Poverty Eradication within the Ministry of Finance. Incidentally, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance was previously the Director of TASAF.

Even though there was a decision to implement the PSSN, the actual implementation and upscale of the programme country-wide required additional funding. The World Bank had been the primary funder of TASAF I and II, including the CB-CCT, but was now looking to the government to turn its initial support into actual budgetary commitment and to other donors to be co-funders. In December 2013, the World Bank launched the report Tanzanian Economic Update 2013 at an event attended by

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34 At least one earlier version of the report has been circulated and researchers also presented their initial findings.

35 Interview with senior official at the World Bank 7 May 2014.

36 Conversations with officials at UNDP and DFID.
government officials and donor partners. In the report the World Bank specifically
promoted the idea of “lessening extreme poverty by transferring cash directly to the
most vulnerable groups” and advocated that “[t]he scaling up of this program [CCT
to PSSN] to achieve national coverage could result in significant reductions in
extreme poverty without excessively high expenditure” (Morisset, 2013b: iii; x-xi).
World Bank officials challenged the Tanzanian government “to seriously invest in
social protection if it really aims to combat poverty”,37 and sought to provide good
arguments for why the government should “give money to Tanzania’s poor”.38

Another important event that can be seen as a clear attempt by the Ministry of
Finance to get domestic political support for the PSSN is the aforementioned
international conference in Arusha 15-17 December 2014. A range of Ministries
related to social protection broadly were represented by their Deputy Ministers,
including the ministries of Education and Vocational Training; Community
Development; Health and Social Welfare; State, Prime Minister’s Office of Regional
Administration and Local Government; Home Affairs; and Labour and Employment
(only the Permanent Secretary).39 The Deputy Ministers were given the tasks of
chairing different sessions and as such, their active participation was ensured. The
programme included a wide variety of presentations on experiences of social
protection programmes internationally, regionally, and within Tanzania. Although
there were presentations on categorical pensions schemes such as exists in Lesotho
and as implemented by KwaWazee in Kagera region, the majority of presentations
focused on targeted and conditional cash transfers, including experiences of
combining these with public works. Listening to all the presentations, the main
message coming across was hard to miss: that giving cash transfers to the extreme
poor has a range of positive impacts that goes well beyond the costs of such
programmes. This is of course in line with the experiences across the Global South
in the past 10 to 15 years, but it is also noteworthy that potentially controversial
issues were ignored, such as the questionable impact of conditionalities and the
challenges of targeting in countries where the majority is poor and administrative
capacity is limited.

There were some, who felt that the World Bank and TASAF were glossing over
possible difficulties in the pilot programme and potential challenges in upscaling. As
one civil society activist said: “it is all praise and I don’t believe that it [the pilot

38 The Citizen, “Should government give money to Tanzania’s poor”, by Jacques Morisset, World
Bank’s Lead Economist for Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda, 17 December 2013; accessed 23 March
2015.
39 The conference as attended by this author.
programme] didn’t encounter any problems”.

Some donors were also not particularly keen on certain aspects of the PSSN, particularly the use of conditionalities. Nevertheless, DFID and SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation) have joined as the primary donors alongside the World Bank. The UN bodies (operating under the UNDAP – United Nations Development Assistance Plan) also support the PSSN programme on the fringes with technical assistance and training to strengthen the capacity of TASAF and other implementing institutions. Some of the main rationales put forward by the donors to support PSSN was that this was a programme already in existence and that the government had made it clear that it wanted the PSSN as the main poverty reducing social protection strategy. The programme furthermore fitted with overall donor strategies of reducing poverty, improving education (especially for girls) and contributing to employment and income security among the poorest.

As should be clear by now, the road to the PSSN has been driven by the World Bank together with TASAF. Through the implementation of TASAF I and II, and CB-CCT pilot, the two entities have built a foundation on which it seemed only natural that TASAF should implement the country-wide programme. The nature of the programme, with elements such as conditionality and public works/productive economic activities, fits well with the World Bank’s approach to social protection as minimum safety nets that should assist beneficiaries to escape poverty (Hall 2007). TASAF officials themselves use a language akin to that of the World Bank. They emphasise that beneficiaries should ‘graduate’ out of the programme within three years; they regard social pensions as problematic and inefficient as you cannot ‘graduate’ and because a universal pension will also include non-poor beneficiaries; and they see conditionalities as essential in ensuring that beneficiaries prioritise health and education and in building political support. With the emphasis on productive self-reliance and co-responsibility rather than protective entitlements and rights, they have also been able to ensure that the PSSN fits with the development approach laid out in the FYDP. TASAF officials are, not surprisingly, passionate about the PSSN, which has placed them centrally in the Government’s poverty reducing efforts. From running quite small-scale community projects, TASAF has – together with the World Bank – pursued the idea that productive social safety nets is

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41 Interview with official from DFID 21 April 2015.
42 Interview official at ILO and UNDAP Coordinator, 9 May 2014.
43 Interview with official from DFID 21 April 2015.
44 Email correspondence with Official at the Swedish Embassy 10-13 April 2014.
45 Conversations with TASAF officials 15-17 December 2014.
the obvious choice in terms of social protection, and TASAF has become the main entity to take this key social protection policy country-wide.

7. Conclusion

Policy-making is rarely a smooth process, where overarching frameworks define specific policy designs so that they together form a coherent whole. Instead, as the case of social protection policy development in Tanzania shows, policy-making can be a lengthy, incremental and somewhat haphazard process, where different actors put forward their ideas and try to promote their preferred policy design. In this process, a range of factors have been determining in defining the social protection path taken in Tanzania.

Changing concepts: Internationally, there has been a move away from using the traditional concept of social security to embrace instead the broader notion of social protection. Social protection includes not only social insurance and social assistance, but is open to a variety of policy areas that can improve livelihoods and reduce poverty. This trend is reflected in policy developments in Tanzania. The TASAF I and TASAF II projects as they were implemented in the 2000s were primarily poverty alleviating community projects and did not as such fit the classical understanding of social assistance. However, as these projects developed into the PSSN programme, the element of social assistance (cash transfer) is firmly included while the programme has also retained some of the original ideas of productive livelihoods and community developments, which are now regarded as natural parts of a social protection strategy. With the move from social security to social protection, the Ministry of Labour and its social security agency (SSRA) have lost some of their previous centrality in this field, as social security (generally narrowed down to social insurance) is only one aspect of social protection. Instead, the field of actors that can play a role has expanded so that it requires coordination at a higher level (Office of the Prime Minister) and include partners that before did not necessarily see themselves as social protection actors, such as the World Food Programme.

Institutional ownership: It is plausible that the process of developing an overarching national social protection framework has stalled in part because different institutions are anxious to maintain or gain a prominent role in a policy area that has received increasing attention amongst donors. The Ministry of Labour has been in the driving seat of developing a social security policy and in developing feasibility studies on an
old age pension. However, the Ministry seems to have been bypassed somewhat by the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office, which are positioned in more coordinating roles of social protection. Particularly, the Ministry of Finance has taken on itself to promote the PSSN and also announced the introduction of the old age pension. Implementing agencies will also naturally seek to promote themselves. TASAF has been successful in moving itself from implementing targeted community project and the pilot CCT to the rollout of the PSSN nationwide. It has helped TASAF to have the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank as resourceful partners.

External actors: Particularly in low-income countries like Tanzania, international donor agencies have a prominent role in influencing policy. Although the ILO and international NGOs have promoted the idea of an old age pension, the World Bank has been most successful in supporting the move towards developing a conditional cash transfer programme. Whereas the other agencies have had limited funding, the World Bank have been able to fund the TASAF programmes and the CB-CCT pilot, which laid the groundwork for the PSSN. As part of this, they have also been able to support various events and workshops and the publication of reports, which have been used to successfully sell the PSSN programme to the government and other donors.

Learning: Feasibility studies and impact evaluations have been important elements in defining social protection policies in Tanzania. TASAF and the World Bank have produced a constant flow of publications that have supported them in developing the PSSN and to garner support for the programme. International NGOs, the ILO, the Ministry of Labour and the SSRA have similarly promoted the idea of an old age pension through feasibility studies and evidence-based reports although maybe not quite as persuasively as the TASAF and the World Bank. Whether intentionally or not, the TASAF and the World Bank have also been able to sell the PSSN as a production focused programme, which fits well with the government’s overall development approach as defined in the Five-Year Development Plan.

Timing: Status by the end of 2015 is that the PSSN programme has the go-ahead and is moving forward. The National Social Protection Framework was in the process of being finalised and the introduction of an old age pension had been announced. However, as Tanzania had its elections in October 2015 and a new President came in (although from the same party) the fate of these two policies are uncertain. Ministries are being restructured and some new actors coming in. Only time will tell whether these political changes will merely delay the processes set in motion or more fundamentally alter the course.
References


