INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN RESOLVING GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN A TRANSITION STATE – THE CASE OF TANZANIA

By

LUCAS MIMBI (MMLUC001)

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Supervisor: Professor Michael Kyobe
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that

Investigating the Role of Information Technology in Resolving Governance Challenges in a Transition State – The Case of Tanzania

is my own work, and all sources have been acknowledged through referencing.

.................................................................

Lucas Mimbi
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Finally, to those who in one way or another contributed to the successful completion of this project, thank you all.
DEDICATION

To my wife Leonora, my children Lisa and Lincoln
INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN RESOLVING GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN A TRANSITION STATE – THE CASE OF TANZANIA

ABSTRACT

Many developing countries are adopting Information Technology (IT) to address governance challenges. International bodies and donor countries demand that countries demonstrate how they use IT to provide access and inclusion for all and also to ensure effective governance. However, measuring the role of IT in governance remains a major challenge for researchers and practitioners and more so for the transition economies which are characterised by weak institutions, insecurity, political instability and poor IT skills and capabilities. Limited studies have been conducted to examine this problem in transition states in Africa.

The objective of this research was to measure the role of IT in resolving governance challenges in a transition state (Tanzania) and also identify factors influencing effective governance. An extensive review of literature revealed that governance is a configuration of distinct but interrelated elements. Usage of IT for governance purposes, governance processes and external pressures were identified as major factors (elements) determining the effectiveness of governance. However these interplay making it difficult to measure the role played by IT in governance. The researcher argues that in such a situation, the role of IT is better determined using a configurational approach. This thesis therefore adopted one configurational approach (i.e. the Gestalts approach), to measure the role of IT in resolving governance challenges in Tanzania. Gestalts are configurations or patterns of organisational elements that have attained an adequate level of coherence, fit or unity with one another. Configurational theorists maintain that when elements attain adequate coherence, success is often realised and that the importance of each element in the interaction can best be understood by making reference to the whole configuration. It is therefore proposed in the present thesis that the stronger the coherence among the elements (i.e. IT usage, governance processes and external pressures), the more governance would be effective and the greater would be the role played by IT in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania.

This proposition was tested in an empirical study involving one hundred and sixty-six members of the public in Tanzania. Their perceptions of the three elements were measured in a survey and Cluster analysis and qualitative techniques were used to analyse the data. Three clusters
representing different perceived configurations of the three elements emerged. However, none attained an adequate level of coherence and governance was perceived to be ineffective. This implies that IT has not played a major role in addressing governance challenges in this transition state.

The major theoretical contribution of my research is the use of the Gestalts approach to measure the role of IT in governance in a transition state. The approach offers much potential for measuring complex relationships and addresses the shortcomings of existing measures of IT impacts. The results also have implications for practice. They alert governments to the salient determinants of effective governance in transition states. There isn’t a perfect model of governance. Rather governments need to integrate good Western practices with the established practices that have worked well for the nation. It is also important to understand that weak adoption of IT, weak governance processes and increased external pressures will work together to exacerbate the challenges of governance in transition states. Further, when IT is adopted it is imperative to develop human skills and capabilities to manage, integrate and sustain it. It is also important to realise that governance will be subject to changes over time, therefore the alignment of IT usage, governance processes and external pressures should be done on a continuous basis. Finally it is important to realise that effective governance springs from the recognition that governance is the responsibility of all stakeholders.
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<td>Analysis of Variance</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Freedom of Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>Group Support Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>IATI</td>
<td>International Aid Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<td>ICT4D</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Information Systems</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOICA</td>
<td>Korea International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>NCCR</td>
<td>National Convention for Construction and Reform</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method Coordination</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office for Public Management</td>
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<td>PITF</td>
<td>Political Instability Task Force</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<td>PSPR</td>
<td>Public Sector Process Rebuilding</td>
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<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rich Site Summary</td>
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<td>SOEs</td>
<td>State-Owned Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANESCO</td>
<td>Tanzania Electric Supply Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANGO</td>
<td>Tanzania Association of NGOs</td>
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<td>TCRA</td>
<td>Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNPAN</td>
<td>United Nations Public Administration Network</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisations</td>
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<td>ZEC</td>
<td>Zanzibar Electoral Commission</td>
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PART I

THESIS INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Problem Statement

The international community associates poor political and economic development with governance crisis in transition states (Buduru & Pal, 2010). Following the quest for democracy and good governance by the international community, many former socialist states were compelled to adopt market-based economy and democratisation (Kornai, 2000). The reform wave that swept across Eastern Europe and Africa contributed to the end of a number of authoritarian regimes. Many authoritarian regimes have carried out democratic elections under multiparty systems and some have been replaced through democratic contestation (Carothers, 2002; Lindberg, 2005). While these reforms have led to some political and economic development, they have also created new governance challenges for transition states in addition to the rampant corruption (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000), weak state institutions (Ahrens, 2007; Estrin, 2002) and poor privatisation strategies (Boeva, 2002).

Calls for effective governance have been made (Ahrens, 2007; Buduru & Pal, 2010). Effective governance in public service refers to performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles (OPM, 2004, p. 9). Tanzania is such a country plagued by a high rate of corruption (Lu & Marco, 2010) and, like many others, needs to adopt good governance practices.

The advent of Information Technology (IT) has the potential to reinvent governance and improve public services and development in developing countries (Thompson & Walsham, 2010; Schuppan, 2009). Many countries have implemented various electronic government (e-government) projects to improve public governance (ITU, 2010; Schuppan, 2009). However, evidence suggests that IT by itself cannot achieve this (Dada, 2006; Wright & Capps III, 2010). Existing contextual factors in developing countries generally mismatch with assumptions
inscribed in IT (Heeks, 2003). There is therefore a need to match IT with these other aspects and to understand and measure the role of IT in resolving governance challenges. How exactly transition states can achieve this is not well documented (Hovelja, 2009). This research bridges this gap by examining the role of IT in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania.

2.1.1 Why is it Important to Measure the Role of IT?

Measuring the impact of IT is crucial as many governments across the world are increasingly required by international bodies and donors to demonstrate the benefits of using IT in government to improve public services (Daglio, 2007; UNPAN, 2012). To argue the case for continuing with IT initiatives and future projects funding, IT projects need to be evaluated to understand whether such projects have met their governance objectives (Daglio, 2007; OECD, 2003). Costello, Sloane and Moreton (2007) contend that it is through effective IT assessment that organisations can reach maturity in their use of IT.

However, transition economies experience somehow different challenges from those in more established economies (Ahrens, 2007; Schuppan, 2009). For instance, they are characterised by limited statehood, weak institutions, insecurity, political instability and shortage or poor development of human resource capability (Boeva, 2002; O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 2013). Further, studies indicate that transition economies also lag behind in the use and adoption of IT compared to established economies (Ifinedo & Singh, 2011). How IT plays a role in such environment is still unclear especially in the African context. Walsham and Sahay (2006) and Schuppan (2009) argue that e-governance in Africa has not been extensively studied, and calls have therefore been made to examine challenges in this area (Thompson & Walsham, 2010). However, measuring the impact of IT-enabled government reforms is challenging even in established economies (Ramaswamy, 2009). It requires pooling and mobilising technical know-how, as well as financial and human resources (Daglio, 2007). These challenges are further exacerbated by the lack of evaluation culture, lack of evaluation tools and methodologies, and difficulties in collecting data (Daglio, 2007; Heeks, 2006; Macintosh & Whyte, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011). Still, there is no general agreement on good ways of measuring IT impacts or what is to be measured (Daglio, 2007; Carbo & Williams, 2004; OECD, 2003). The complex interplay of many factors involved in IT implementation (Boudry & Verdegem, 2012; Kleine, 2010) also contributes to the
above challenges. According to Kleine (2010, p. 674), IT impacts should be examined in a systemic and holistic way rather than “trying to make IT fit with a linear conceptualisation of impacts”. However, few or no rigorous models exist to measure the impact of IT-enabled government programmes in a systemic and holistic way. The current study fills this gap by developing the conceptual model, based on the Gestalts perspective, to measure the role of IT in governance.

Existing scholarly articles in Africa have focused mainly on government website implementation (Kaaya, 2009; Oreku & Mtenzi, 2012; Sæbø, 2012), adoption (Kaaya, 2004; Yonazi, Henk & Boonstra, 2010) and on other developmental aspects (e.g. Basu, 2004; Heeks, 2003; Schuppan, 2009). While studies on usage of IT to enhance government services and governance have been conducted, the majority of these explore aspects of e-government and IT relating to changes in the institutions of government, but less on the impact of IT or e-government on citizens and the economy (Burke, 2012). Understanding patterns of societal changes that emerge when individuals interact with Information Technologies is important for building future strategy and practice (Burke, 2012).

Tanzania only recently metamorphosed from a centrally planned system to a free market economy. It is therefore pertinent to monitor how Tanzania progresses with regard to IT use for development and governance. It is also important to assess the level of e-government maturity, defined as the growth levels in a country’s online services and its citizens’ online participation in governance (Ifinedo & Singh, 2011). The current research is not only needed for theory development, but also can provide a useful lens to assess changes arising from use of such technological innovations in governance across Africa. The next section presents the Tanzania background.

1.2 Presenting the Case

1.2.1 Historical Perspective and Governance Challenges in Tanzania

After independence in 1961, the then Tanganyikan government started to develop its economy and mobilise its people to work for their national development. Committed to building socialism (popularly known in Swahili as Ujamaa), Tanganyika adopted an economic policy to enforce
public ownership of means of production. In 1967, the Arusha Declaration was born to implement socialist economic policies. As a result of the Arusha Declaration, all private firms in the country were nationalised and the state became the sole owner of these firms (Ellis & Mdoe, 2003). A self-reliance policy was adopted to ensure the country was self-dependent and provided public goods and services to its citizens. As an underdeveloped nation, more emphasis was made to fight three enemies: poverty, ignorance and disease, as a way towards social and economic development (Nyerere, 1966).

During the socialism era, the government of Tanzania\(^1\) strongly condemned unethical practices in all walks of life, especially in the public service sector. The policy of socialism and self-reliance proclaimed the need to build an egalitarian society emphasising a fair distribution of wealth, and citizen participation in decisions that affected their lives (Milanzi, 1997; Samoff, 1979). Swahili words such as *bepari* (bourgeoisie) and *kabaila* (feudalist) were used to reflect the ethical imbalances that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s (Milanzi, 1997). Ethics were fundamental in the government and were well stipulated in the Arusha Declaration. In order to build an egalitarian society, in the early 1970s Tanzania created codes of conduct for leaders and public service servants to enhance the ethical behaviour in public services. The goal was to build a society free from any forms of discrimination (Milanzi, 1997).

In the early 1980s, Tanzania experienced pressure from within and outside the country which forced changes from a socialist economy to a market economy (Ellis & Mdoe, 2003; Milanzi, 1997). That was the beginning of the end of the values, beliefs and attitudes that had been nurtured in the society for so long. The walk to the new economy and political pluralism started to kill the long-standing ethics which had been established earlier (Milanzi, 1997). In 1991, the Arusha Declaration was replaced by the Zanzibar Resolution which amended the principles of the leadership code (Milanzi, 1997). This was the last nail of the coffin of the *Ujamaa* rhetoric and the socialist-tamed elements of equality, nation building and development. These had all virtually disappeared both in practice as well as in rhetoric (Makulilo, 2012; Milanzi, 1997). Implementation of the Zanzibar Resolution (1991) contributed to erosion and violation of ethical codes, the fall of production and poor service provision especially in the public sector, and bureaucratic inefficiency (Milanzi, 1997). Corruption in the government among entrusted leaders

\(^1\)In 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the United Republic of Tanzania.
has been reported, especially in the procurement of goods and services (Heilman, Kamata & Ndumbaro, 2000). Lambsdorff (2007) defines corruption as a misuse of government power for private benefit. Corruption in Tanzania is classified in two forms: first, grand corruption which is believed not to affect citizens directly. Second, there is petty corruption which affects citizens directly (Heilman et al., 2000). During the second phase of government (1990 – 1995), corruption and tax evasion became rampant and uncontrollable by the state (Bigsten, Mutalemwa, Tsikata & Wangwe, 1999). This situation led to the donor community cutting aid to Tanzania. In connection with corruption, the former President Mwalimu Nyerere delivered a speech accusing top national leadership of allowing corruption to get out of hand. He insisted that the country “reeked of corruption” (Heilman et al., 2000; Kelsall, 2002). Further, privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could not take place in a transparent manner; public firms were sold without meaningful participation of Tanzanians (Bigsten et al., 1999; Hyden & Mmuya, 2008).

Government reforms in different sectors which were implemented have not realised much fruit and the concern for separation between public services and private interest still clouds the economic and social development of the citizens (Ellis & Mdoe, 2003; Hoffmann, 2011). According to Ellis and Mdoe (2003, p. 1370), “it is possible that the real problem for Tanzania is how to achieve the separation between public service and private interest without which private sector growth is continually hampered”. Governance is still a challenge whereby corruption, accountability, transparency and rule of law turn on this challenge, and none of them is likely to be resolved while the public and private roles are so intertwined (Ellis & Mdoe, 2003; Hoffmann, 2011).

Besides the above reforms, transparency is still a challenge. Many critical decisions made by the government are not owned by the citizens due to lack of participation. Major decisions and activities affecting the welfare of the citizens are not communicated to these citizens and decisions are made without their involvement (Hyden & Mmuya, 2008). This problem can be found in local government as well as in central government (Brockington, 2008).

The next section presents the research questions.
1.3 Research Questions

Given the governance challenges explained in the background section and the gaps that exist in IS research, this thesis sets out to answer the following research questions:

**The Primary Research Question**
What role has IT played in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania?

**The Secondary Research Question**
What are the factors that enhance or impede governance in Tanzania?

1.4 Aim of the Study

The primary objective of this study is to measure the role of IT in addressing governance challenges in transition Tanzania. The lack of studies on the impact of IT on governance in transition states in Africa has contributed to limited understanding by institutions on how to address governance problems. Further, measuring IT impacts on governance has been a challenge for many researchers (Macintosh & Whyte, 2006) due to the complex interplay of many factors involved in IT implementation. A new way to measure such interplay is needed as governments are increasingly required by international bodies and donors to demonstrate the benefits of using IT in government (Daglio, 2007). In addition, it is also important to identify factors that enhance or impede governance in Tanzania as this can inform governance policies.

1.5 The Scope of Study

This research focuses on the role of IT in enhancing governance in Tanzania, a transition state moving from a single political party system and planned economy to a multiparty system and market economy respectively. However, Zanzibar, as part of the Union government, is beyond the scope of this study and therefore findings of this study are based on Tanzania mainland. Zanzibar has been excluded due to financial and resource constraints as explained later in subsection (8.4.1). In this regard, Zanzibar is only discussed to highlight the nature of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and as a political context within the United Republic. The emphasis of this study is placed on addressing the problems relating to effective governance in Tanzania and how IT has been used to overcome these challenges. In addition, mobile phones are not within the scope of this thesis. They are only discussed in order to understand how they affect the
information landscape and their impacts on the public sphere. Mobile phones have limitations in offering the full range of complex functions (e.g. Internet connectivity) compared to computers (Bornman, 2012).

1.6 Research Design

1.6.1 Design/Methodology/Approach
This study adopted a positivist stance and deductive approach to measure the role of IT in governance. The researcher argues that this role can best be understood by examining the interplay between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. These three elements are conceived of as interdependent – they influence each other and as such it may be difficult to measure the impact of one on the other using common linear approaches. The researcher therefore adopted the perspective of alignment as Gestalts to examine the coherence among these three elements. Gestalts may be defined as configurations or patterns of organisational elements, constructs or variables that have attained an adequate level of coherence, fit or unity with one another (Miller & Friesen, 1977). One hundred and sixty-six respondents were surveyed. Cluster analysis was then used to analyse responses and reveal the perceived configurations of the three elements. The K–means clustering algorithm (K=3) revealed three clusters representing different perceived configurations of the three elements. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted to gather qualitative data from ten Chief Information Officers (CIOs). Thematic analysis was then used to identify the common views (themes) expressed in the interview transcripts.

1.6.2 Research Limitations/Implications
This study has some limitations. The configurational approach adopted in this study was tested in a static environment (i.e. cross-sectional study). However, alignment is not a one-time activity but a constant balancing act of the organisational aspects (Burn, 1997). It represents a set of relationships which are in a temporary state of balance (Miller & Friesen, 1977). This means that this state of balance may change over time and needs to be studied over time. In addition, organisations coevolve over time due to interactions and as such are not stagnant (Allen & Varga, 2006). Measures of alignment should therefore take this dynamic nature into consideration and probably this would be better captured on a longitudinal study. Future research
should demonstrate the potential of the configurational theory in a dynamic environment. Therefore the conceptual model developed in this thesis needs to be tested in longitudinal studies.

The limitations on generalisation also apply to this study. The findings are based on data collected from one region, i.e. Dar es Salaam; and Zanzibar was not included in this study. Zanzibar has in the past had several upheavals therefore the perspectives of the people in Zanzibar would provide a very good environment for studying effective governance. In addition, the sample of one hundred and sixty-six is not large enough and a cross-sectional nature of this study, both constrain generalisation. Therefore some caution need to be exercised when interpreting the results.

The factors used in this study were carefully selected based on their relevance to Tanzania’s political and social contexts. However, when IT is introduced in a social environment, many factors come into play (Boudry & Verdegem, 2012) and interact with IT (Jain, 2004). This suggests that there could be other key factors not considered in this study that need to be integrated in the model.

The present study covered computers as chief mode of information access and did not cover mobile phones. Future research can integrate mobile phones for they are used to support governance and democratic activities.

## 1.7 Contributions of the Study

### 1.7.1 Originality/Value

To the best of my knowledge, this is a first attempt to measure the impact of IT in a transition state using the Gestalts approach and it provided useful results. Researchers and world bodies have for long been discontented with the measures used to determine the role of IT in governance. Measuring the impact of IT on governance has remained a challenge for researchers due to the multifaceted and interplaying constructs (Macintosh & Whyte, 2006). Yet many governments are required by international bodies and donors to demonstrate the benefits of using IT in government (Daglio, 2007). The present thesis therefore attempts to provide a solution to this challenge.
1.7.2 Theoretical and Methodological Contributions

This thesis has come up with an innovative way to measure the role of IT in governance. This role was measured by determining the perceived level of coherence among IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. Three clusters of different perceived configurations of the three elements (IT usage, governance processes and external pressures) were revealed. Regardless of the nature of the cluster configurations, there was consistency in the way respondents in each cluster perceived the level of coherence, i.e., it was inadequate. This leads to the conclusion that governance was perceived to be ineffective and consequently IT did not play a major role in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania. This approach therefore makes a good theoretical contribution and also offers much potential for measuring other complex relationships between IT, organisational factors and external factors.

In addition, Tanzania was a good choice for the present study. By testing the Gestalts approach in a transition state (such as Tanzania) that is not in an advanced stage of e-government/e-governance implementation, this study provides better understanding of the challenges involved in e-government/e-governance strategy formulation and planning and probably where to place the blame for unsuccessful implementation. This study emphasises that effective governance springs from the recognition that governance is the responsibility of all stakeholders.

The Cluster analysis-based configurational perspective adopted in this thesis was useful in distinguishing three groups of perceptions. This method of analysis allowed the researcher to describe and predict the degree of IT contribution to governance. The Cluster analysis-based configurational perspective constitutes a valid measurement of the role of IT in governance. This is a valuable methodological contribution of this study.

1.7.3 Multidisciplinary Approach Contribution

To accomplish this complex study, many theories drawn from other disciplines were used to inform different levels of the thesis. Theories from economics, public administration, political science, sociology and IT were used to accomplish this study. For example, governance theories were used to inform some of the components of the conceptual model. For several decades, there have been calls by IS researchers to use theories from other disciplines (multidisciplinary approach) in IS enquiry to offer new conceptual and theoretical insights (Heeks & Bailur, 2007).
Therefore, the approach used in this study contributes to multidisciplinary approach to IS enquiry and heeds the calls by IS researchers to adopt this approach (Heeks & Bailur, 2007; Thompson & Walsham, 2010; Walsham, 2012).

1.7.4 **Practical Contribution**

The findings of this study show that the role of IT in governance and subsequent governance depend on the level of alignment between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. These three elements support and reinforce one another. This implies that for IT to be leveraged in governance and ensure effective governance, these elements need to be matched (i.e. should attain an adequate level of coherence).

The study also has some prescriptive implications for government, NGOs and the public in transition states. This study identified many areas requiring intervention and revision of public policy. Poor usage and lack of willingness to adopt IT, ineffective NGOs and poor infrastructure need to be addressed. The findings also show that weak adoption of IT, weak governance processes and increased external pressures work together to exacerbate the challenges of governance in transition states. The findings also show that the pursuit of governance has to be fostered with the nation’s access to a much greater diversity of communication sources. The attention of international agencies and governments are drawn to the fact that models of governance from developed countries may work but not in all aspects. Consideration needs to be given to local economic aspects, cultural aspects and existing resources. It is also revealed that it is extremely difficult to ensure proper coordination of all actors in the governance processes. Sometimes actors may actually not be interested in cooperating at all or they have their own agendas or not willing to accept change or change their perceptions. For instance, the findings revealed a culture of not adopting IT (use emails formally), government not providing appropriate infrastructure and ineffective NGOs. This suggests that certain aspects of governance can be consciously planned, others not or may change. This therefore calls for strong partnership with all stakeholders (i.e. government, the public, the private sector and the international bodies). Governance is therefore a dynamic process which requires continuous alignment of IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. This also means that governance needs to be
evaluated regularly in terms of its contribution to the citizens, particularly at the grass roots-level, if transparency, accountability and inclusiveness are to be ensured.

It is also important to understand that the processes of governance do not reside solely within the sphere of state action and authority. Governance effectiveness springs from the recognition that governments are limited in their capacity and that participation of all stakeholders in these processes is vital.

1.8 Definition of Key Concepts/Terms

This section defines some of the key concepts as discussed in this thesis. However, detailed discussions of the same concepts are given in their respective sections and at the same time other concepts will be defined as the thesis progresses.

1.8.1 Governance

Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2000, p. 236) argue that the study of governance must confront three complicating factors: the configurational nature of governance, the political interests that influence action, and the fact of both formal and informal authority. They state that “governance implies a configuration of distinct but inter-related elements …..including policy mandates; organisational, financial, and programmatic structures; resource levels; administrative rules and guidelines; and institutionalised rules and norms that constrains and enables the tasks, priorities, and values that are incorporated into regulatory, service production, and service delivery processes”. The term “configuration” can be both a process and an outcome (Rouse, 2005). Governance has also been used to represent a process or an outcome. The present thesis defines governance as a configuration of governance processes, IT usage (for governance and democratic purposes), and external pressures. It is considered to be an outcome of the interaction of the above three elements. Further, in the context of this study, the term governance processes refer to the processes needed to ensure governance.

1.8.2 Good/Effective Governance

The term good governance has been used interchangeably to represent effective governance.
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) reports that in the 1992 report entitled “Governance and Development”, the World Bank set out its definition of good governance. This term is defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (IFAD, 1999, p. 1).

It states further that “the essence of good governance was described as predictable, open and enlightened policy, together with a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos and an executive arm of government accountable for its actions”. Most definitions of good governance identify the following elements of good governance: sustainability of structural reforms; property rights and rule-based governance; quality of budget and public investment process; efficiency and equity of revenue mobilisation; efficiency and equity of public expenditures; and accountability and transparency of the public service (OECD, 2007a). However since good governance is considered to mean “performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles” (OPM, 2004, p. 9), in the present thesis the term “effective governance” will be adopted and will share the same meaning as good governance.

1.8.3 E-government and E-governance

Use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) or Information Technology (IT) in governments has been referred to by different names. For instance, Fountain (2001) uses “digital government or virtual government” instead of e-government, other call it “e-gov” (Hu, Pan, Lu & Wang, 2009), even though all these terms have more or less the same meaning. The electronic government (e-government) concept has attracted a hot debate amongst e-government scholars regarding which definition really captures this concept. Yildiz’s (2007) analysis of e-government definitions reveals that there are various definitions provided by international organisations (e.g. World Bank, United Nations), research and consultancy organisations (e.g. Gartner group) and academics. However, a careful examination of many definitions produces similar key terms and objectives. They mostly include use of IT or ICT in government or public services with the purpose of improving service quality or transforming government processes, as mostly identified by Hu et al. (2009). In that regard, this thesis adopts the definition provided by Working Group on E-Government in the Developing World (www.pacificcouncil.org) which defines e-government as:
the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to promote more efficient
and effective government, facilitate more accessible government services, allow greater
public access to information, and make government more accountable to citizens. E-
government might involve delivering services via the Internet, telephone, community
centres (self-service or facilitated by others), wireless devices or other communications
systems.

This definition is preferred over others as it captures ICTs as reform tools and the outcome
(accountability) of e-government use. It is worth noting that e-government and electronic
governance (e-governance) have been used interchangeably as if both refer to the same concept.
To clarify these two concepts, e-governance is derived from the concept of governance. In the
previous subsection, governance is defined as both a structure and process. It encompasses actors
from the state and private sectors. So, the “e” preceding the term governance signifies
“electronic”, implying the means to achieve the process of governance (i.e. the government, civil
society, business etc.) by state and non-state actors. Therefore, e-governance is a more
encompassing term than e-government. According to UNESCO’s (2003) definition,

E-governance is the public sector’s use of information and communication technologies
with the aim of improving information and service delivery, encouraging citizen
participation in the decision-making process and making government more accountable,
transparent and effective.

According to Heeks (2001), e-governance plays three major roles:

(i) Improving government processes (electronic administration – e-administration);
(ii) Connecting citizens (electronic citizens – e-citizens and e-services; and
(iii) Building external interactions with and within civil society (electronic society –
e-society).

1.8.4 Transition and Transition State

The third wave as known in democratisation theories has seen a rapid fall in the number of
dominant one-party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and eastern European countries (Carothers,
2002). Generally, transition is moving from any form of non-democratic regime to democratic
ones (Carothers, 2002, Kornai, 2000). Transition is triggered by political and economic
liberalisation whereby the regime loosens up its stance in some way to expand participation in
politics (Mainwaring, 1989) and increase private participation in the economy (Kornai, 2000).
From the above explanation, a transition state is the one that lies somewhere within a democratic radar screen but has not reached the level of democratic consolidation (Carothers, 2002).

1.8.5 **Information Technology and Information and Communications Technology**

Information Technology (IT) and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) are two related concepts which have been interchangeably used by academics and practitioners. IT refers to hardware, software and telecommunication networks used to acquire, process, store, deliver and share information and other digital contents (Ward & Peppard, 2002). IT is composed both of tangible (e.g. servers, personal computers) and intangible components (e.g. software packages) which altogether perform the functions to affect the information. On the other hand, ICT has been used as a unified framework of various information technologies to support an organisational goal (Maier, 2004).

1.8.6 **Coherence**

The term coherence has been used to describe relationships between organisational elements with respect to performance aspects in strategic management. Scholars have described coherence as the extent to which a set of organisational elements (variables) are aligned to enable organisational performance. For instance the coherence between strategy and structure could be described to be the extent to which strategy and structure are aligned to enable organisational performance. In the present study, coherence is defined as the extent to which external pressures, usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes; and governance processes have been aligned or are consistent to enable effective governance.

1.9 **The Thesis Structure**

This thesis has four parts, namely Part I, Part II, Part III and Part IV. Each part is devoted to covering specific thesis area, but all parts are arranged in a manner that they produce a chronological order of the theoretical foundation of the research process. Figure 1.1 presents the thesis structure indicating the four parts of the thesis and their corresponding chapters.
**Part I – Thesis Introduction**

This part presents the background and problem statement of the thesis and serves as an overall introductory discussion of the entire thesis. Its objective is to present the overview of the thesis or what the thesis is all about. To accomplish this goal, this part has one chapter which is divided into different sections. Each section presents a different discussion in a logical order. In this part, the scope of the thesis and the rationale of doing this thesis are presented. Further, the findings and contributions of this thesis are presented.
Part I
Chapter 1
Thesis Introduction

Part II
Chapter 2
Economic Transformation and Challenges

Chapter 3
Governance

Chapter 4
How IT can enable Transition to Democracy

Chapter 5
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Figure 1.1: The Thesis Structure


**Chapter 1: Introduction**

This chapter presents the background and problem statement to open up and trigger the entire discussion of the thesis. The overview of IS research in transition and established economies is discussed. This serves to highlight the current status of IS research and a subsequent gap in the IS literature. The rationale of conducting this research in transition countries is also presented. The case is then presented by discussing the historical perspective and governance challenges in Tanzania followed by a presentation of the research questions, aim of the study and scope. Later in this chapter, the research design and contributions of the thesis are also presented. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting definitions of the key concepts and terms used in the thesis.

**Part II – Literature Review**

This part presents the literature review of different theoretical and empirical research across various disciplines. The objective of this part is to build a solid theoretical foundation from different theories underpinning governance and IT as an enabler of governance. This part also presents an argument about a need to align IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. It also presents a theory-driven conceptual model connecting relationships between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. This part is composed of five chapters of which each focuses specifically on separate theoretical review, but building on one another’s theories.

**Chapter 2: Economic Transformation and Challenges**

Economic transformation is introduced by reviewing its background and the implications of shock therapy and gradual based reforms. Democratic transition and consolidation theories are reviewed to understand the events, processes and the paths of democratisation. Different models of democracy are also reviewed to highlight their key features. A review of the privatisation concept as one of the major economic reform strategies is carried out to understand its goal in former centrally planned economies.
Chapter 3: Governance
A comprehensive review of the concept of governance and its importance in social, political and economic development is presented. Impacts of globalisation and aid dependence on governance are reviewed to understand how global pressure impacts on governance aspects. This is followed by the review of governance and its challenges in transition states.

Chapter 4: How IT can enable Transition to Democracy
A comprehensive literature review of the role of ICT/IT in political activities such as democratisation, activism, protests, stability and regional integration is covered to understand how ICT revolutionalises the information landscape. Later in this chapter, e-government and web 2.0 as related concepts are discussed and their merits in enhancing government service provision are pointed out. The role of IT in governance is then reviewed to understand its impacts on governance. The concept of the digital divide and negative aspects of IT are discussed to show how they may impede the IT enabled governance. The three elements of the interplay (IT usage, governance processes and external pressures) are discussed and gaps in the literature are presented.

Chapter 5: Alignment
This chapter connects the previous chapter by taking up the complex interdependencies of various factors that come into play in IT implementation. The concept of alignment is reviewed to assist in choosing an appropriate perspective for measuring the role of IT in governance. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting the conceptual model as a synthesis for the entire multidisciplinary literature review. The conceptual model is premised on the Gestalts principles. It is argued that measuring the role of IT in governance can best be examined using the Gestalts perspective which simultaneously considers all variables together.

Chapter 6: Transition and Governance in Tanzania
This chapter presents the discussion on major economic and political reforms in Tanzania. It serves as the extension of Section 1.2 by presenting the actual governance on the ground. Privatisation is discussed as a major dimension of economic transformation,
based on the Washington Consensus prescriptions. On the other hand, democratisation is discussed, highlighting the continued dominance of the ruling party. It takes further the discussion on multiparty political systems by analysing the political sphere while reflecting on the transition process.

**Part III - Research Methodology and Design**

**Chapter 7: Research Methodology**

This chapter presents different positions of IS scholars on the debate about the nature of the IS field and its implications for philosophical assumptions in conducting research. It also presents major philosophical assumptions in IS research in terms of ontology, epistemology, methodology and human nature. Later in this chapter, the researcher presents a positivist philosophy as an appropriate paradigm for this thesis.

**Chapter 8: Research Design**

This chapter presents a discussion on the need to measure the contribution of IT by public perceptions. It then presents a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis. It includes a concise discussion on how data were collected and analysed. A procedure for data collection from respondents and how these respondents were selected is also presented. Ethical issues and how they were addressed in the course of this research process are also presented. Finally, the chapter concludes by summarising the major focal items in the research design.

**Part IV – Research Findings and Discussion**

**Chapter 9: Research Findings and Discussion**

In this chapter, the quantitative and qualitative findings are presented and empirical evidences from the literature review are used to corroborate them. Governance is perceived to be ineffective and IT has not played a major role in resolving governance challenges in Tanzania. In addition, IT usage, governance processes and external pressures are presented as factors that can enhance or impede effective governance.
Part V – Conclusion and Research Implications

Chapter 10: Conclusion, Research Contributions, Limitations and Future Research

Based on the research findings, the chapter presents a conclusion by highlighting the key issues of the entire research project. It also presents recommendations and research contributions in terms of theory, methodology and practice. Lastly, the chapter presents limitations of the research and direction for future research.
PART II

LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER TWO

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND CHALLENGES

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on economic transformation in transition states. The chapter starts by introducing the background of economic transformation. Shock therapy and gradual based reforms are then discussed to understand their impacts on economic growth. Democratisation and privatisation, as two important reform strategies, are also discussed. The chapter summary concludes the literature review in this chapter.

2.2 Historical Background to Economic Transformation

Economic transformation is not a new phenomenon; the first transformation started in the 1960s when partial economic reforms were carried out by socialist countries (Ahrens, 2007). Economic transformation may be defined as “the transition from centrally planned economies towards market economies” (Ahrens, 2007, p. 2). Ahrens (2007) reports that, in 1978, China carried out the first socialist economic transformation towards market-based economy. Thereafter economic transformation became a “global shift” and many socialist countries in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) transformed their centrally planned economy to a market-based economy (Ahrens, 2007). Since 1989 many socialist countries have carried out these reforms based on the Washington Consensus, which prescribed the actions that planned economies needed to take to implement a market-based economy (Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda & Svejnar, 2009). The Washington Consensus to a large extent suggested opening the market for private players and privatisation, as a mechanism, among others, for achieving a western style market economy (Ahrens, 2007; Estrin et al., 2009). Some Asian economies crafted a new hybrid market economy known as the socialist market economy while others in CEE (e.g. Russia) followed western style market economy and democratic political order which were implemented at the same time.
Based on neoclassical theory, replacing central planning with market coordination was a necessary and, to some, even a sufficient condition for successful economic transformation (Ahrens, 2007). State-owned enterprises had to be sold to private investors without consideration of what was needed to be done before such reforms were implemented (Hamm, King & Stuckler, 2012). The lack of theoretical models or appropriate models to guide systemic transformation caused many countries to negotiate their reform efforts between speed and sequence of how such transformations could be implemented (Ahrens, 2007). As a result, economic transitions achieved mixed transformation outcomes. Some countries, including Poland, Slovenia and China, achieved sustained economic growth while others including Russia and Bulgaria experienced “drastic economic stagnation” and only recovered in the second half of the 1990s (Ahrens, 2007, p. 2; Foo & Witkowska, 2011). On the other hand, countries such as Tajikistan and Belarus experienced “economic stagnation due to missing, half-hearted, or partial reforms which did neither fully abandon the old system nor laid the basis for efficient market exchange” (Ahrens, 2007, p. 2).

These reforms were categorised into two approaches. Countries that adopted a “gradual” approach carried out gradual economic reforms, while those adopting a “shock therapy” approach implemented neoliberal economic policies carrying out radical economic reforms (liberalisation and quick privatisation) fast to overcome resistance, to avoid resource misallocation and to avoid transition process irreversibility (Ahrens, 2007; Murrell, 1993). The shock therapy approach dominated the economic transitions within Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and within some central Asian countries, while a gradual approach dominated the practice of policy-making arena within East Asian transition economies (Ahrens, 2007).

Studies indicate that countries that registered economic growth had basic institutions such as institutions for property rights to support a market-based economy. On the contrary, countries which fell into economic stagnation did not establish a basis for such institutions but also did not completely abandon the former system (Ahrens, 2007). The mixed results of transformations provided important lessons for policymakers and reformers. Economic performance was not only largely determined by the efficacy of old and newly crafted institutions but also by their interplay (Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2003). Ahrens (2006, p. 3) notes that economic reforms in less developed countries differ from those in established economies as
those in transition countries “do not take place within an existing, relatively stable institutional order which is changing only incrementally in the course of time. Instead, comprehensive policy reforms and large-scale institutional restructuring need to go hand in hand”. Reform theorists conclude that, although economic institutions (e.g. property rights) matter for an efficient market economy, political institutions such as rule of law, public bureaucracy, among others, also matter (Ahrens, 2007; Buduru & Pal, 2010). They argue that markets developed in a “corrupt or dysfunctional” environment “would themselves become corrupt or dysfunctional” (Buduru & Pal, 2010, p. 514). Good governance has played a key role in countries that successfully carried out economic transition while failures of transition programmes have been linked to bad governance (Ahrens, 2007). Scholars and international organisations agree on good governance as a key component for any transition programme to succeed (Charron, 2011). But what exactly determines good governance and how to achieve it is still a debate far from over (Ahrens, 2007, p. 3). The next section takes a detailed discussion of the concept of transition.

2.3 Transition

The third wave as known in democratisation theories has been characterised by a rapid fall of a number of dominant one-party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern European countries (Carothers, 2002). Since the early 1990s, the term “transition” has been central to political and economic reforms. Generally, transition is moving from any form of non-democratic regime to a democratic one (Carothers, 2002; Kornai, 2000). Transition is triggered by political and economic liberalisation whereby the regime loosens its stance in some way to expand participation in politics (Mainwaring, 1989) and increases private participation in the economy (Kornai, 2000).

Transitions have mainly been categorised based on a regime type. Regime refers to “the rules (formal or not) that govern the interactions of the major actors in the political system” (Mainwaring, 1989, p. 4). Linz and Stepan (1996) categorise transitions into two main regime models.

(i) Transition from Authoritarian Regime

Authoritarian regimes are known for their strict political participation stance. They do not allow elections, and citizens have no political rights, but they allow pluralism when it
comes to economic and social life. Generally, authoritarian regimes do not have a strong ideology, though some variations may exist. It is possible to find competitive and electoral authoritarian regimes in this category (Diamond, 2002). Transition in this regime is less complicated compared to totalitarian regimes as it has to deal with only political transformation. However, there are many variations in the authoritarian regime category with varying ideological stances. The intention of this thesis is not to discuss these variants, but rather to highlight their main political practices.

(ii) Transition from Totalitarian Regime

Totalitarian regimes are guided by strong ideologies that do not allow any form of pluralism. They intervene massively in the economic and social life of citizens (Wintrobe, 1990); hence transition has to deal with both economic and cultural transformations (Planmo, 2002). Although Linz and Stepan’s (1996) categorisation is based on Southern America, and Eastern and Southern Europe transitions, it is applicable in other transitions elsewhere in the world.

Phases of Democratisation

The main objective of all transitions is to move to some form of democracy. Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy as a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (further discussion of democracy is presented in subsection 2.3.6). The “form of democracy” is used here to connote different stages of democratisation. A critical reflection on transition reveals two forms of transition. In the first form, transition is characterised by the demise of authoritarianism. The first form of transition has been described in the literature as the “third wave” of democratisation. In the second form, transition occurs within democratic states or is generally known as transition within consolidated democracies (O’Donnell, 1988). Dahl (1998) contends that democratisation is not limited to post-authoritarian regimes, but also to consolidated democracy. Dahl (1998) argues that even consolidated democracies continue to carry out democratic transition.

Democratisation refers to a movement towards democracy by expanding political participation (Mainwaring, 1989). Democratisation generally takes place in phases, moving from the lower level to the highest. Planmo (2002) identifies three phases of democratisation: liberalisation,
transition and democratic consolidation. The liberalisation phase starts when a non-democratic regime loosens its political and economic stance towards liberal tradition (Carothers, 2002; Planmo, 2002). The regime starts to extend civil liberty in the political sphere by easing repression within the authoritarian regime (Mainwaring, 1989). This can include adjusting policies related to political and economic practices towards a liberal direction. An example of such policy reform is Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestrojka Policy (Priban, 2012). Based on their importance, the second and third phases are discussed in details in the next subsections.

2.3.1 Transition from Socialism to Capitalism

For the past two decades we have seen major political and economic episodes in many parts of the world. These episodes include disintegration of the former Soviet Union, collapse of communism and the demise of most single political party systems (Carothers, 2002). All these reforms marked the beginning of a new system. Kornai (2010) explains the transition in two main transformation forms, namely political and economic changes in the state, which altogether mean a change in system. In a political dimension, a single political party is replaced by a multiparty democracy (Kornai, 2010). This transformation is characterised by an “end to the state-protected privileges of the Marxist–Leninist ideology” (Kornai, 2010, p. 630). The wave of multiparty politics that swept across former socialist European states and Africa demonstrates this transformation. This transformation provides an opportunity for political pluralism.

In the economic dimension, the central bureaucratic control is replaced by market coordination (Kornai, 2010). Privatisation of public corporations is one of the major changes in the economic dimension by which it opens up the market for the private sector (Kornai, 2010; Whyte, 2009). Since the 1990s, central bureaucratic coordination has remained at a minimum in the states where economic reforms took place; while decentralised procedures have increased as mode of coordination (Kornai, 2010). These two changes (i.e. political and economic changes) largely mean changes to the system, that is, the transition from socialism to capitalism (Kornai, 2010).
2.3.2 **Features of the Socialist and Capitalist Systems**

Based on political and economic dimensions, there are distinguishing features of socialist and capitalist systems which are necessary for these systems to function. Kornai (2000) provides the following features for the socialist system:

(i) Political power: Undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist party (Kornai, 2000).

(ii) Property ownership: Dominant position of state and quasi-state ownership which gives no opportunity for private property ownership (Kornai, 2000).

(iii) Mode of coordination: Preponderance of bureaucratic coordination (Kornai, 2000).

Similarly, in the capitalist system, the key features are given hereunder:

(i) Political power: Friendly to private property and market (Kornai, 2000).

(ii) Property ownership: Dominant position of private property. It is important to note that some property ownership can still be in the hand of the state, but dominated by private ownership (Kornai, 2000).
(iii) Mode of coordination: Preponderance of market coordination (Kornai, 2000).

The features presented above correspond to the three blocks 1, 2 and 3 as depicted in figure 2.1. These attributes are necessary and sufficient conditions which must appear in a chronological order for each system to function (Kornai, 2000). Additionally, blocks 4 and 5 are determined by the three preceding blocks and are characterised by the economic actor behaviour and economic phenomena respectively. These blocks concern “regularities and lasting economic phenomena” in which block 4 in the socialist system, state enterprises, are characterised by soft budget constraint; while private firms in the capitalist system distinguish themselves by hard budget. At the same time in block 4 of the socialist system, due to state-owned enterprises, prices are weakly responsive. In the capitalist system, there is a strong responsiveness to price due to market coordination. The fifth block is characterised by the type of the economy, in which the socialist system suffers from chronic shortage economy and unemployment on the job, whereas in the capitalist system, there is no economic shortage, but there is chronic unemployment due to market coordination (Kornai, 2000). According to Kornai (2000), for the system to fully develop, the features in block 1 to block 5 must appear together. Further, features in blocks 4 and 5 must appear in a consistent manner.

2.3.3 Transition Paths

The transition phase starts by changing non-democratic rule to democratic rule. Planmo (2002) argues that transition can take many paths based on who initiates the transition process. Sometimes the transition is initiated by mass demonstration or the army overthrows the regime and takes over the control (Kornai, 2000; Planmo, 2002). The best examples of such transitions are the fall of Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919 and the military coup by Pinochet in Chile to overthrow Allende’s socialist administration (Kornai, 2000). More recently, the world has witnessed the famous Arab Spring, by which several regimes have been toppled through mass protests and demonstrations (Walker, 2011). Countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, among others have been overthrown using mass demonstration. Most political transitions in this category are associated with white terror and violence (Kornai, 2000). White terror refers to violence acts related to resistance towards transition by authoritarian regimes which are generally accompanied by political murders and torture of suspected individuals believed to threaten the
existence of the regime (Kornai, 2006). Another path can be initiated by the soft liners within the regime and developed opposition, which is referred to as “packed transition” (Planmo, 2002). Transition in this path differentiates itself by “velvet revolution”, which happens under the conditions of developed institutions towards democracy or emergence of democracy from the “ruins of the old political regimes” (Kornai, 2000). Some of the countries in the Eastern European region took this path in political changes (Kornai, 2000).

The last path in this discussion is when the regime itself initiates the transition and takes charge of the transition process (Planmo, 2002). This path, according to Kornai (2000), represents a regime “transforming from within” by changing its “mercilessly anti-capitalist” stance to the one which is covertly, “but ever more openly and pro-capitalist stance”. One example in this path is China’s transition (Kornai, 2000).

Non-democratic regimes may take any path towards democracy but, at a point in time, must complete transition if there is no blockage in the way. However, the interpretation on what constitutes a fulfilled transition has not received consensus among reform theorists (Kornai, 2000).

Generally, based on the figure 2.1 above, system change occurs when the regime has dropped the features represented by blocks 1 to 3 of the socialist system and adopted the corresponding features of the capitalist system. Kornai (2000) presents three conditions that must be fulfilled for transition from socialism to capitalism to be accomplished:

(i) The regime must abandon undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist party ideology and replace it with multiparty politics (Kornai, 2000; 2010). This must result in multiparty politics that opens doors for creation of opposition political parties to contest for public offices including executive ones (Alvarez, Cheibub, Lemongi & Przewoski, 1996; Marshall & Cole, 2008).

(ii) The regime should relax the conditions for property ownership, to be interpreted as a movement from state dominant property ownership to private dominant property ownership (Kornai, 2000; 2010).

(iii) The bureaucratic coordination is replaced by market coordination as a chief mode of coordination (Kornai, 2000; 2010).
However, the three conditions discussed above are not sufficient to conclude the transition phase, though they touch political and economic factors. Some have also insisted on the multiparty-election as a sufficient condition (Planmo, 2002). Others say multiparty-election is not enough to mark the end of transition. The researcher also takes this position and puts forward more conditions drawn from reforms and transitology literature. The transition is over when:

A new constitution has been approved, the democratic institutions have started working and the political elites have adjusted their behaviour to the new democratic norms. The remains of the authoritarian structure have been shut down, and new forms of cooperation and competition are established (Planmo, 2002, p. 15).

Kornai (2000) also argues that transition is over when the state of affairs is institutionalised in the society with no possibility of turning back.

### 2.3.4 Characteristics of Transition States and Challenges

The change from one system to the other is characterised by dropping core properties of the former system by replacing them with properties of the adopted system. This means there are features which are produced as a result of transition. These characteristics and their implications for governance are discussed below.

#### 2.3.4.1 Limited Statehood

As the states change from one regime to the other, they may enter a state of limited statehood due to state capacity problems. Statehood is defined as “the central authority structure with a (legitimate) monopoly over the means of violence” (Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006, p. 9). Under normal conditions, a fully functioning government must have the “capacity” and “ability” to make authoritative political decisions and enforce these (Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006). Due to transition, states may lack these competencies. Limited statehood is a deficit of government’s core functions to enforce political decisions and monopoly on use of force, thus rendering to the state ineffective sovereignty (Börzel & Risse, 2010; Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006). Transition countries are characterised by “serious deficits” of monopoly use of power and enforcing political decisions (Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006) which contribute to governance crisis. In many transition countries, “the state is not the only actor that uses force, and that the state is faced with
a wide-spread sense of mistrust in society against the background of its long tradition of brutal force (state terrorism), authoritarian rule and its ongoing failure to maintain public security” (Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006, p. 11).

Limited statehood can be categorised in broad dimensions: territorially (i.e. with regard to specific geographical areas); sectorally (i.e. with regard to specific policy areas); socially (i.e. with regard to specific parts of the population); and temporarily (i.e. with regard to the time horizon). Based on the above dimensions, limited statehood is not only confined to transition states, but also to most modern states (Börzel & Risse, 2010; Offe, 2011). Modern states contain areas of limited statehood. These include lack of central authority to control the entire territory; lack of full possession of monopoly over means of violence; lack of capacity to enforce and implement decisions in some policy areas or with regard to large parts of the population (Börzel & Risse, 2010). In the territorial limited statehood category, Somalia, Indonesia and Brazil represent good examples of the lack of central control of the entire territory. Other governments have central control over their territories, but lack the capacity to enforce some of their laws. For example, China controls most of its territory, but fails to enforce its environmental laws (Börzel & Risse, 2010). Some of the modern states have lacked “Westphalian” sovereignty which gave ways for foreign actors to rule parts of their territories or in some policy areas. These include Kosovo, Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Krasner, 1999).

According to Börzel and Risse (2010), limited statehood is very visible in failing and failed states that have lost their abilities to govern and control their territories. However, functional or territorial control deficits of functioning states have also affected other states. For example, Pakistan enjoys monopoly over the use of force in large parts of the country, but the northern tribal areas are beyond the central government control. Although Mexico enjoys consolidated statehood, its central authority fails to enforce human rights and public security in terms of rule of law and public policy in some areas of Mexico City.

It has been argued that statehood is an essential component for democratisation. Any movement towards democratic governance should first ensure that transition countries establish minimum state capacities (Offe, 2011). The quality of state capacity is summarised by Offe (2011, p. 5) as follows:
State capacity is the quality that allows a state, for instance, to protect its citizens from military or economic harm, to extract and allocate significant fiscal resources, to defend the territory as well as its own monopoly on violence, to establish and maintain an educational system, to legislate and enforce regulatory laws, to provide a measure of social and physical security and welfare and manage succession crises – all this without being significantly obstructed by so-called factual powers, be it criminal gangs and Mafia organisations, separatist ethnic mobilisations, armed forces of civil war, networks of predatory corruption, external political forces on which governing elites are dependent or hostile religious movements.

2.3.4.2 Weak Institutions

Transition states are characterised by weak institutions due to change from one system to the other. In the socialist system, political institutions are developed to deal with undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist type of political power. When the state changes to political pluralism, the state passes through rapture called a “shock therapy” (Tokes, 2000), the condition associated with a rapid demolition of support systems and state enterprises. After the shock therapy, the state has to develop new institutions which can deal with multiparty political systems. Among the institutions to be developed is the independent electoral commission to oversee the process of political contestation and political party activities. Given the legacy of authoritarianism in most transition states, electoral commissions lack the qualities of electoral governance. Electoral governance may be defined as “the interaction of constitutional, legal, and institutional rules and organisational practices that determine the basic rules for election procedures and electoral competition; organise campaigns, voter registration, and election day tallies; and resolve disputes and certify results” (Hartlyn, McCoy & Mustillo, 2008, p. 75).

Electoral commissions, or collectively referred here to Election Management Bodies (EMB), in young democratic states are characterised by lack of administrative capacity and impartiality, coupled by political elite interference. These problems of EMB in democratic transition have been associated with structure of EMBs and the way the chair of the electoral commission and members are recruited. In some instances, heads of state have been directly involved in appointment of these cadres. Due to job security reasons, these officials become susceptible to manipulation by the head of state, such as the president who appointed them; hence their autonomy in discharging duties is compromised (Omotola, 2010a). As such, the oversight role of
the legislature to screen nominees is rendered useless as, generally; the legislative majority is likely to come from the president’s party, which would definitely show solidarity by approving nominations by the head of state. Some EMB chairpersons have been dismissed on questionable grounds, presumably by acting against the authority’s wishes. For instance, two chairpersons of the electoral commission in Nigeria were fired under questionable grounds by the Babangida’s regime in 1989 and 1993 (Omotola, 2010a). On the other hand, the problems of EMB have been compounded by the incompetence of staff in managing electoral processes. Omotola (2010a) also reports that the Nigerian electoral commission has for years depended on a temporary staffing approach by which staff were recruited and briefed on their responsibilities the day before the actual electoral process started. The outcome of this approach may result in a flawed election. Such flaws in the electoral process may even cause problems such as a higher number of voters turning out than the number of registered voters! For instance, Gold (2012) reports that elections conducted in April 2011 in Nigeria registered a voter turnout of more than 100 per cent.

While the EMB structure and its appointment mechanism have impacted on the quality of democracy, parliament is another important institution in a new democracy. In the early stages of institutionalisation of democracy, parliament plays a role in establishing democratic institutions and it is a place where change and transformation are carried out by political parties (Agh, 1995; Olson, 1997). Further, Agh (1995) asserts that parliaments are a central site for a democratic forum, making rules and governing the whole process of political life in the state. Agh (1995) uses the term “parliametarisation” to denote the process of the parliament as a battlefield for political forces, a forum where political forces earn their first degree in political learning and a first stage for the institutionalisation process. Parliamentarisation entails “a set of values and a blueprint of institutionalisation which has to be accepted and internalised by political actors” (Agh, 1995). Agh (1995) also uses the term “overparliametarisation” to refer to contradictory characters of the parliamentarisation that can have a reverse effect in early democratisation. Democratic transitions are generally characterised by overparliametarisation – indicating that:

other political institutions are either missing, half-made or are still weak. Thus the parliament, as a mother institution which produces all the others, is of particular importance, even for the strongest political body (the executive power or government) (Agh, 1995, p. 205).
Institutional and cultural deficits are missing components of a new parliament for it to pursue its functions effectively. Olson (1994) lists the features (deficits) of new parliaments in transition states as follows:

(i) They lack an experienced membership (Olson, 1994);
(ii) They lack a structure of parties and committees (Olson, 1994);
(iii) They lack the support facilities of space, equipment and staff (Olson, 1994);
(iv) They lack established procedures for both raising and resolving policy disagreements (Olson, 1994);
(v) New members in new parliaments are not well-equipped to face their tasks (Olson, 1994);
(vi) The internal organisation of legislatures – political parties and committees – tends to be rudimentary (Olson, 1994); and
(vii) New parliaments experience instability and uncertainty: that is, new institutions such as parliament and political parties are created, without any firm guidelines of either constitutional or practical experience (Olson, 1994).

These deficits have a negative effect on the quality of parliament outputs as a centre for incubation of other democratic institutions, including political parties (Olson, 1997). In addition, structure of the new parliaments in transition states have been characterised by high turnover of their members. For instance, Crowther and Roper (1996) report that the rate of incumbent re-election in Romania in the 1992 election was 22 per cent; that means more than 75 per cent of the entire parliament was filled by new members. The same situation has been reported in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Brokl & Mansfeldova, 1995; Malova, 1995). It was found that there was at least a 70 per cent parliamentarian fallout in every election conducted in East and Central Europe in early democratisation (Agh, 1995). The implication for this newness of the members of the parliament negatively affects the quality of deliberation, interactivity and general decision-making (Olson, 1997). Scholars argue that new parliaments have become a place of “chaotic whirling of new and old” parliamentarians with little value to deliberation on behalf of the citizens, and politics has been “running amok” in the transition period (Agh, 1995). Agh (1995) once commented that new

Parliaments have become the symbols of this isolated, self-centred politics, which is far from the common people and from the everyday problems and interests of the
populations concerned. This politics has primarily and typically been made by self-styled and awkward parties that have acted with very low efficiency in the parliaments (p. 207).

In the economic dimension, removing central planning when the state changes to a market economy contributes to institutional challenges. Market economy requires well-developed market and legal institutions to deal with the influx of private ownership (Estrin, 2002). During the transition, former socialist countries privatised state-owned enterprises as a reform strategy towards free market economy. However, after privatisation and market liberalisation, it was clear that a market-based economy needed capitalist institutions to support and safeguard property rights. Nevertheless, many countries lacked institutions such as banking sectors, capital markets and a sound legal framework. Given the lack of state capacity in terms of institutions, many transition countries experienced an economic recession in the early period of the transition (Hamm et al., 2012). On the other hand, countries that possessed a minimum institutional framework in the pre-liberalisation period benefited more than those with weak or absent institutions (International Monetary Fund, 2000). Nevertheless, many transition countries had no developed institutions to support and safeguard property rights in a newly capitalist economy. Consequently, the problems of weak institutions in transition states manifested in other forms of immoral practices. For instance, in former socialist countries it is reported that capital flights, tax evasion and corruption became rampant due to lack of an institutional framework (Hamm et al., 2012).

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1999 produced a transition report reflecting on the tenth anniversary of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The report points out challenges of weak institutions in transition states and concludes that:

Countries that introduced partial reforms have begun the process of dismantling the state’s capacity to govern the economy according to the requirements of the command system without developing the new institutions on which a market-based form of governance could be established. In an environment of weak institutions, firms might see the state as unable to provide the services it once did and incapable of meeting the demands of the emerging market economy (p. 117).
Weak institutions in transition countries cannot handle challenges of newly privatised state enterprises and the pressure of a liberalised economy. For example, weak institutions in the former socialist European countries contributed to low compliance to corporate governance (Estrin, 2002).

2.3.4.3 Political Stability

Democratic transition and political stability are two political phenomena that are rarely separated in modern politics. When one reflects on the democratic transitions initiated in the past few years, it is tempting to conclude that democratic transitions lead to some instances of political instability. Democratic transitions are perceived to contribute to the formation of rival ideas regarding the relationship between democratic transition and political stability. There are those who believe that democratisation leads to political stability and those who insist that it causes instability in transition countries. However, there is also a consensus on the causal relationship of transition and political stability. That is, at some stages, democratic transition causes political instability (Cederman, Hug & Wenger, 2008). Experiences of the Arab Spring in Libya, Syria and Egypt demonstrate the problems of transitions and challenge the very basic assumptions of democratisation and governance (Gause III, 2011).

The source of political instability in transition countries originates from the rapid demise of authoritarian regimes without a proper succession plan. Vorrath, Krebs and Senn (2007) suggest that in the event of open political participation for the majority of the populace as required by the principles of democracy, there are three possible scenarios which each may contribute to political conflict.

(i) Opening of the political arena: Vorrath et al. (2007) claim that when the political arena is open for a wider populace to participate in politics, more participants in the political sphere create some kind of competition which may cause previous elites at the centre to loosen their grip at the periphery. Further, reshuffling the political sphere during the transition may lead to a political power vacuum. In this scenario, Georgia’s experience in the 1990s demonstrates a clear example of political turmoil.

(ii) Political competition: Generally, democratic political competition must produce winners and losers at the same time. In consolidated democracies this is no problem at all as
normally the losers will concede defeat and promise to offer support to the winners. However, in transition countries, conceding defeat has not been easy. Of course, there are reasons for this. Elections have been used as “mere censuses of group strength” and have become polarising agents by which separate groups (e.g. voters and non-voters, winners and losers) are clearly formed. In such circumstances, democracy is strangled and “not necessarily benevolent rule of the majority” (Bekoe, 2010). The losers may feel that they have no chance for determining the country’s future or enjoying the national rewards. The outcome for this kind of polarisation is that the inferior group may decide to use undemocratic means such as violence to achieve their goals. Such political violence was clearly demonstrated by the Hamas and Fatwa movements in Palestinian territories (Bekoe, 2010). Bekoe (2010) also reports that such political violence related to electoral democracy in sub-Saharan Africa happened in Zimbabwe, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zanzibar.

(iii) Sequence of democratic procedures: Sequence and timing of different elections have implications for stability. Holding national elections too early is likely to cause never-ending competition. Further, holding national level elections after local or regional elections have been concluded may destabilise the country. Linz and Stepan (1996) report that, in Yugoslavia, ethnic leaders were legitimatised by regional bodies but not at national level. This practice triggered tensions and division among national and regional segments. This example shows how timing may contribute to instability.

On top of the above scenarios, there are also threats for security and political stability which are normally experienced during the transition. For example, central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) experienced security and political problems during the transition to liberal democracy. The opposition movement that overthrew the communist regimes entered political struggles, bickering and fighting due to a broken coalition (Risse-Kappen, 1991). On the same note, authoritarian regimes are known for political stability due to their repressive tendency in politics (Walker, 2011). In recent years, the Arab Spring has been a top discussion point in international politics. This kind of democratisation refers to rapid topping down of authoritarian regimes through mass demonstration or western-assisted forceful means. We have seen many countries such as Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and now Syria set to fall sooner or later. However, there is one common thing among these regimes. Regardless of regime fall, there is no peace and
all these countries are politically unstable. Authorities are struggling to maintain social order with little success. The researcher can even speculate that during the authoritarian regimes in these countries, there was a relative peace and stability. The researcher’s intention is not to show that authoritarian regimes are not bad – they are; democracy is the preferred way forward. However, the world and especially the West must think twice when it comes to succession from authoritarian regimes and democratisation of natural states. Authoritarian regimes are known for being politically stable and also guarantee stability and peaceful transfer of power (Walker, 2011). In authoritarian regimes,

Democratisation is likely to destabilise the power position of state elites by opening up new opportunities for separatist minorities and other actors to mobilise against the state, a process that is likely to trigger internal conflict (Cederman et al., 2008, p. 518).

Moving from the natural state to an open access society, over a short period of time without having in place the necessary institutions, has proved a failure. North (2009) argues that culture plays an important role in shaping the present by connecting it with the past. Our belief systems are translated into creating a set of institutions based on our culture and experiences, which are unique in every society. Walker (2011, p. 1) asserts that “some cultures have an inherently weak desire for greater freedoms, economic opportunity and democratic accountability; and will acquiesce to despotic rule if their most rudimentary needs are met”. Our notion of democratisation is built on the wrong assumptions, moving from natural states to open access societies is forcing natural states to function like open access societies. This scenario translates into solving economic and governance problems in natural states by using tools of open access societies such as secure property rights, an independent judicial system and other institutions designed for open access societies (North, 2009). Given such a situation, it is obvious that these tools will not work, as environments between the natural states and open access societies are different. Creating institutions and social rules that are required in transition states to reflect properties of open access societies is a long process; they cannot be put in place overnight. That is why in some parts of the world expected results have not been achieved. North (2009, p. 27) notes that:
With different experiences in the Islamic society, to take the classic modern illustration, from Western society, we produce differences of views, conflict, disorder and warfare. We have not solved any of those problems.

For instance, democratisation in Iraq has proved a failure as violence has become the order of the day. The western countries have tried to create democracy in a country that is not ready for such movement; the result “has been a disaster” (North, 2009). Political institutions determine all other institutions, be it economic such as property rights, or legal such as the judicial system. Once political institutions are not well functioning other institutions may also come to a halt (North, 2009).

2.3.4.4 **Shortage of Human Resources**

Human resources are important components in state development. Whatever dependence on technology-assisted functions in economic activities, human resources remain a vital part of any country wishing to develop in any area. Given the socialist policy that shaped former socialist countries, transition countries are always short of qualified human resources in public administration and areas of innovation (Boeva, 2002; Kornai, 2010). Kornai (2010) argues that socialist policies did not provide necessary motivations to develop human resources; as a result, transition countries lag behind their counterparts in the developed world.

There are also other challenges in transition states such as failure to build governance, lack of checks and balances for the market economy, poor ownership of reforms by key stakeholders, and lack of a formal consultation system between government, business and other stakeholders (Boeva, 2002). These challenges relate to the way reforms were implemented. Boeva (2002) asserts that building governance institutions was not a priority in transition states. Further, Carothers (2002) argues that transition and state-building are inseparable and that state-building was ignored during the democratic transitions in most countries affected by the third wave of democratisation.

2.3.5 **Democratic Consolidation**

In the democratisation process, the democratic consolidation phase marks the end of the journey to democracy. To use Linz and Stepan’s (1996) words, democracy becomes “the only game in
town”. It is when necessary conditions for democracy have been established and members of society have become conversant with democratic norms in their way of life (Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, democracy is faced with challenges based on threats to slip back to authoritarianism (non-democracy) or to climb the ladder to more democratic quality stages. Schedler (1998) presents four classifications namely authoritarianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy and advanced democracy to elaborate democratic consolidation. He positioned these regimes in a continuum in terms of democraticness by which an authoritarian regime is placed at the extreme left (non-democratic) and advanced democracy at the extreme right indicating a desired level of democracy. According to Schedler (1998), the continuum produces five dimensions based on the desirability of democratic quality as indicated in figure 2.2.

2.3.5.1 Avoiding Democratic Breakdown

Once the transition is over and basic democratic institutions are in place to ensure that at least free and fair elections are held, and public offices are filled by public contestation, democrats cannot ignore the threat for the already developed democracy (Schedler, 1998). The main task for democrats here is to prevent democratic breakdown from happening due to antidemocratic forces such as coups and drug cartels, which can cause “quick death of democracy” (Schedler, 1998). Democrats see the fall from electoral or liberal democracy to authoritarianism as democratic consolidation. This consolidation is fearfully observed to avoid slipping back to an authoritarian regression.
2.3.5.2 Avoiding Democratic Erosion

In a new democracy, there is also a danger of decay of the basic principles of democracy due to less visible forms of regression (Schedler, 1998). In this type of consolidation, according to Schedler (1998), the effect of democratic erosion is gradual and can force the democracy to fall back to a position between liberal democracy and authoritarianism, forming a hybrid regime (O’Donnell, 1996). Contrary to the former threats of coups and drug cartels, the democratic erosion attacks may cause the “slow death” of democracy (Schedler, 1998). These may include:

State violence as well as state weakness [which] may subvert the rule of law; the rise of hegemonic parties [which] may suffocate electoral competition; the decay of electoral institutions [which] may affect the honesty of vote counting; incumbents [who] may use their privileged access to state resources and to the mass media in ways that violate minimum standards of electoral fairness and equal opportunity; or the introduction of
exclusionary citizenship laws [which] may violate democratic norms of inclusiveness (Schedler, 1998, p. 97-98).

Democrats tend to see “slow death of democracy” associated with the fallback from liberal to electoral democracy as democratic consolidation, but in a negative direction (Schedler, 1998). The negative version of democratic consolidation discussed above is fearfully fought to ensure achieved democracy survives and is sustained (O'Donnell, 1996; Schedler, 1998).

2.3.5.3 Completing Democracy

The first two consolidation types (mentioned above) concern the challenges of protecting already achieved democracies. In electoral democracy, the challenge is to fix lacking ingredients to achieve full democratic rule (Schedler, 1998). History indicates that some countries achieved electoral democracies, but are faced with threats which pose as hindrances to achieve full democracy. These regimes need to clean authoritarian legacies in constitutions to pave ways for full democratic rule. This was done in Chile after 1990’s constitutional consolidation (Schedler, 1998). Another challenge that needs to be swept away is the hegemonic party system. Achieving electoral democracy does not necessarily lead to effective political contestation as it may also be used as a political legitimacy mechanism for leading parties to retain power. Hence, the hegemonic party continues to win national elections without a defeat. It does so through “state patronage, media control, repression and electoral fraud” (Schedler, 1998). A strategy to overcome these constitutional roadblocks is to pass necessary amendments that provide a fair ground for all political parties. Another challenge is to guarantee practices that respect basic political, civil and human rights that can be applied without biasness and selectivity (Schedler, 1998). According to Schedler (1998), for any electoral democracy to successfully move to a full democratic rule, the following sequence of political development is suggested:

(i) State building (Carothers, 2002; Schedler, 1998);
(ii) Legal domestication of the state (Schedler, 1998); and
(iii) Democratic domestication of the state (Schedler, 1998).

But most of “third wave” reforms, including African country reforms, have not followed this sequence. As a result, democratic transition and consolidation have been difficult to accomplish (Carothers, 2002). For instance, the judicial systems, instead of acting as rule of law watchdogs,
have remained as administrators of the rule of lawlessness in some new democracies (O'Donnell, 1996; Schedler, 1998). To achieve liberal democracy, the democratic consolidation from electoral to liberal democracy is accomplished by supplying missing ingredients of liberal democracy (Schedler, 1998).

2.3.5.4 Deepening Democracy

The notion of democratic consolidation towards a more democratic regime can be explained as a positive consolidation. Moving from electoral to liberal democracy is one step further and moving from liberal democracy to advanced democracy is another step towards a much better democracy in the continuum (Schedler, 1998). In consolidation terms this is called “deepening democracy” (Schedler, 1998). The issue of democratic survival, though existing, is no longer a pressing concern for liberal democrats. They are concerned much more with democratic quality that closely matches the advanced democracies (Schedler, 1998). However, western democracies are considered to have close or matching qualities of advanced democracy, contrary to most countries in Latin America, East Europe and Africa which lack these qualities. They fall short in terms of “governmental performance, public administration, judicial systems, party systems, interest groups, civil society, political culture and styles of decision making” (Hale, 2011; Nwosu, 2012; Schedler, 1998, p. 99).

As indicated in figure 2.2, democrats see a change from electoral or liberal democracy to advanced democracy as democratic consolidation. They do so by equating democratic consolidation as democratic deepening towards advanced democracy (Schedler, 1998).

2.3.5.5 Organising Democracy

The previous democratic consolidations indicate either a positive or a negative consolidation. Normally, the positive consolidation is valued and efforts are made towards achieving a higher quality of democracy. On the contrary, the negative consolidation tends to move towards a feared horizon where democracy is degraded. However, this is a neutral notion of democratic consolidation which concerns organisation of democracy (Schedler, 1998). Organising democracy seeks to develop specific basic rules of democracy (institutionalising) and building organisations that “make up the infrastructure of modern liberal democracies”. These include
building “parties and party systems, legislative bodies, state bureaucracies, judicial systems and systems of interest intermediation” (Schedler, 1998).

Following the discussion on the previous page, careful analysis reveals two modes of democratic consolidation – negative and positive. The negative mode is subscribed by those who see a movement from a superior to an inferior form of democratic quality. Their concern is democratic stability and they try to avoid regressions of non-democratic forces. The positive mode is, however, subscribed by those who see a movement from an inferior to a superior form of democratic quality. These are concerned with higher democratic quality; say from liberal democracy to advanced democracy. They strive to climb more steps in the democratic ladder to achieve advanced democracy (Schedler, 1998). These two modes bring us the normative horizon of “either democratic survival or democratic progress” (Schedler, 1998).

The above discussion has clearly explained different democratic consolidations and the key features that differentiate them. Linz and Stepan (1996) summarise the key components that should be in place to achieve democratic consolidation:

(i) An environment for a free and lively “civil society” that allows people to organise autonomously without state interference. This includes the right to join any social movements or associations such as intellectual organisations, women’s groups, neighbourhood associations, trade unions, lawyer associations or religious groupings (Gastil, 1988). According to Linz and Stepan (1996), civil societies are important for democratic consolidation as they can “articulate values, create associations and solidarities and advance their interests” (p. 7). Further, civil societies are known for being able to mobilise citizens for peaceful demonstrations and matches.

(ii) An established “political society” supported by working political parties, elections, electoral rules and legislatures (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

(iii) All major actors such as the democratic government and the state must respect and uphold the “rule of law” to ensure legal protection for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life (Diamond, 2003).

(iv) A “state bureaucracy” to support new democratic government functions. An effective state must be able to “compulsorily” tax and pay for civil servants’ salaries and citizens’
basic services and claim monopoly of legitimate use of force within its territory. Further, the state must have the capacity (effective bureaucracy) to command and regulate functions and activities in the democratic state (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

(v) An “economic society” developed in a market-based economy. Market autonomy and diversity of ownership in the economy play an important role in producing a lively and independent civil society that can contribute to democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Table 2.1 presents a summary of phases of democratisation carried out during the transition by highlighting the key activities/features of individual phases.

**Table 2.1: Phases of Democratisation Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Key activities/Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalisation</td>
<td>Adjusting political and economic policies towards political pluralism and market economy (Carothers, 2002; Kornai, 2000). Privatisation of government enterprises (Kornai, 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Collapse of a non-democratic regime, rapid emergence of a new, democratic system, a new government through national election, establishment of a democratic institutional structure guided by a new constitution (Carothers, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation</td>
<td>Transformation of democratic forms into democratic substance, reform of state institutions, the regularisation of elections, the strengthening of civil society and the overall habituation of the society to the new democracy (Carothers, 2002).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The section on transition pointed out that transition, if successfully achieved, must come to a particular form of democracy. Thus, the next subsection presents models of democracy.
2.3.6 Models of Democracy

This subsection presents four models of democracy, preceded by the definition of democracy and its major attributes. The review of the four basic models of democracy, namely elite-democracy, representative liberal democracy, deliberative democracy and participatory democracy, highlights major activities in each model. Finally, challenges of democracy are also highlighted.

2.3.6.1 Defining Democracy

Scholars agree that defining democracy is a challenging task as it has a variety of meanings to different people. However, they agree on Schumpeter’s definition. Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy as a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. This definition focuses on the institutional and procedural arrangement created to reach decisions on public issues and ensure good governance (Dalton, Shin & Jou, 2007; Shi & Lu, 2010). Other scholars have defined democracy based on the qualities of what democracy should possess. Mainwaring (1989) asserts that most definitions, on top of Schumpeter’s, have incorporated elements of “civil liberty” such as “freedom of the press, freedom of speech and the right to habeas corpus” as important quality elements of modern democracy. However, Mainwaring (1989) contends that holding a competitive election is not a sufficient or necessary condition for democracy. Mainwaring (1989) argues that “a regime can hold competitive elections with broad participation, yet in the absence of guarantees of civil liberties, it is not unequivocally democratic” (p. 5).

Besides the various topologies of democracy, generally there are accepted criteria of which any democratic regime is expected to practise. Mainwaring (1989) presents three basic criteria for democracy as:

(i) Political contestation: “Competitive elections must be the principal route to political office. There must be competitive popular elections for the legislature and there usually are for the president as well in a presidential regime” (p. 5). Further, Mainwaring (1989) adds that coercion and fraud may not be used to determine the outcome of elections.
(ii) Generalised adult suffrage: A democratic regime must ensure that there is a broad adult citizenship accompanied by a well-accepted exclusion of special groups such as the insane and criminals (Mainwaring, 1989).

(iii) Civil liberty: Democracy must enact political rights and guarantee traditional civil liberty for all in practice, including protection of minority rights (Mainwaring, 1989). Kornai (2000) emphasises that the state cannot forcibly obstruct freedom of expression, freedom of the press or freedom of association. Citizens are entitled to freedom of expression without being subjected to punishment, and have rights to information.

Having defined democracy, the next subsections present the different models of democracy as reported in the extant literature.

2.3.6.2 Elite Democracy
As the name suggests, elite democracy is based on individuals within a certain segment of society who can play an active political role in the decision-making process. In this model, the majority of citizens are not part of the key political decision-making population (Pinches, 1997). The role of citizens is limited to periodic political activities such as voting, while other key political decisions are left to politicians. Elite democracy is seen as a “method” for the elites to participate in political contestation and has no intrinsic value whatsoever (Schumpeter, 1942). In between election periods, citizens are isolated in the political arena, leaving political active role to politicians.

2.3.6.3 Representative Liberal Democracy
This model of democracy ensures citizens’ equality and liberty in terms of political channels of influence within the political community (Sorensen & Torfing, 2005). Political equality in this model is guaranteed through voting by which each adult individual is entitled to one vote to elect political leaders. Fair election serves as a mechanism through which government acquires democratic legitimacy (Carothers, 2002; Shi & Lu, 2010). Further, these elections must also be free and held at regular intervals (Dahl, 1989; Dalton et al., 2007). A well-functioning representative liberal democracy requires that decision-making processes are made openly; and uncensored public debates are carried out for citizens to make an informed political choice (Sorensen & Torfing, 2005). To this end, citizens are encouraged to be active in their respective
political parties. Moreover, representative liberal democracy requires that policy processes be carried out in a transparent manner for citizens to hold the political elites accountable for policy outcome (Diamond, 2003; Heeks, 2009).

In a liberal democracy, there are key elements of which democracy is built on as briefly discussed below:

(i) Public welfare: This element seeks to promote public welfare through institutional arrangements that specify appropriate procedures through which to reach good governance (Shi & Lu, 2010). These procedures include “methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 76).

(ii) Cooperation: Cooperation allows citizens to cooperate before they compete. Citizens must be capable of acting collectively to select candidates, articulate preferences, petition authorities and influence policies through their voluntary groups such as parties, associations, NGOs and others (Schmitter & Karl, 1991).

2.3.6.4 Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy is based on participation of individuals to discuss and reach consensus and collective decisions on issues that affect their lives (Wright & Street, 2007). It encourages deliberation through public forums, involving citizens who are affected by the decisions that are made (Bohman, 1998). Deliberative democracy hinges on two elements as discussed below:

(i) Deliberative element: It refers to decision making through argumentation (Habermas, 1984) by participants while respecting rationality and impartiality (Elster, 1998). Citizens are engaged to register preferences and also “talk about those preferences” to achieve democratic legitimacy (Wright & Street, 2007). Further, citizens are given equal opportunities to air their views and accept or reject views aired by others through strong and better argumentation in a free and open dialogue (Bohman, 1998; Habermas, 1984).

(ii) Democratic element: It refers to inclusion of individuals who will be affected by decisions to discuss the matter directly or indirectly through representatives (Wright & Street, 2007).
2.3.6.5 **Participatory Democracy**

Participatory democracy was conceived as a result of the need to expand the political sphere in decision-making processes. Participatory democracy considers citizens’ participation in the decision-making process as a central aspect of political practice (Vitale, 2006). Participation is regarded as a continuous process that can improve the public sphere (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards & Rucht, 2002). As a continuous process, participation is not limited to periodic political engagement such as voting, but continues throughout the decision-making circle (Pateman, 1979). Through political participation, citizens develop social and political capacities (Pateman, 1970); thereby transforming individuals into public citizens (Ferree et al., 2002).

Though democracy ensures political liberties of the citizenry, citizens might decide not to play an active role in political activities such as voting, even though they have that right (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Currently, the voting trend in most countries is falling, which is not a good sign for democracy. Studies indicate that voter turnout rate is decreasing in both old and established democratic general elections (Dalton, 2004). Offe (2011) in his seminal work about the crisis of liberal democracy observes that:

... class-specific turnout rates in general elections are drifting apart, with the least well-to-do showing the lowest interest in voting in elections, and even more so in engaging in the more demanding participatory practices of joining political parties (p. 459).

The same trend has been noted in Tanzania where statistics shows that voter turnout in presidential elections dropped from 72.4 per cent in 2005 to 42.8 per cent in 2010 (African Election Database).

Another challenge with democracy concerns legitimacy and accountability issues. Involvement of international and civil society’s actors in policy and decision-making processes based on their “functional interests” complicates democratic legitimacy and accountability. These “interest associations” are not subject to elections (Schmitter & Karl, 1991); thus posing challenges to hold them accountable in decision outcomes. Further, it has been argued that democracy is not necessarily more economically and administratively efficient than other forms of government, though it can create more open societies than the autocracies they replace (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). The widespread and continuous advocacy of democracy by the international community;
democracy “has lost meaning, as it is now embraced even by non-democrats because of the positive image and legitimacy that it enjoys” to the eyes of the international community (Dalton, et al., 2007, p. 142).

The present section has presented and discussed democracy and its challenges in governance. To complete the literature review on transition, the next section presents the discussion about privatisation as an economic dimension of transition.

2.4 Privatisation

Privatisation is one of the important elements of economic transformation deemed to promote economic development. Privatisation may be defined as “the act of reducing the role of government or increasing the role of the private institutions of society in satisfying people’s needs; it means relying more on the private sector and less on government” (Savas, 2000, p. 2). Privatisation involves the government monopoly withdrawal in business, in part or whole, from what is considered as a public sphere. As described in section 2.2, privatisation was largely prescribed by the Washington Consensus as a strategic option for achieving economic growth in centrally planned economies (Ahrens, 2007). As a result, privatisation has been implemented worldwide to improve economic efficiency in public services.

2.4.1 Privatisation Historical Perspectives and its Assumptions

The government monopoly of running and controlling the economy in centrally planned economies initially proceeded well, with the number of SOEs growing dramatically in socialist countries such as in the former Soviet Union, China and some African countries (Megglinson & Netter, 2001; Yergin & Stanislav, 1998). Many socialist governments became the main players in social and economic life. However, by the 1980s, the socialist policy failed to guide the economy. The socialist governments became too “expansive and too ambitious and sought to be the main player rather than a referee” (Yergin & Stanislav, 1998). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) became inefficient (Kornai, 1992) and contributed to poor economic performance (Yergin & Stanislav, 1998). The lack of entrepreneurial skills and government intervention were among the root causes of poor economic performance in these enterprises. The turning point for national governments was to deliberately carry out economic reforms towards free-market
economy. This was the beginning of the new era, the government withdrawing from controlling the economy by replacing it with competitive market forces (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998).

In the late 1980s, most east and central European and African countries carried out economic reforms to promote social and economic development. The international community pressed for economic reforms to incorporate the private sector in the economy. In response, governments started to privatise SOEs marking “the greatest sale in the history of the world” (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998). In the 1990s, privatisation grew dramatically in developing countries and became an important economic policy (Zhang, Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005). By the end of 1999, US$250 billion was realised as revenues from the sale of SOEs (World Bank, 2001). For the past three decades, thousands of SOEs worldwide have gone private. Privatisation in the former socialist countries has been implemented to improve economic performance by producing products and services that would be competitive in a free market environment (Zhang et al., 2005). Reform theorists maintain that “privatisation has the potential to transform national economies and organisations by infusing a spirit of entrepreneurial risk taking” (Czinkota et al., 2011, p. 324).

2.4.2 The Goal and Methods of Privatisation

The major goal of privatisation has been to promote economic efficiency by reducing government interference in the economy (Megginson & Netter, 2001). This means that privatisation of SOEs has to take place to transfer government ownership to the private sector, of which four methods were involved:

(i) Privatisation through restitution- returning nationalised properties to previous owners (Brada, 1996);

(ii) Privatisation through sale of state property- selling whole or part of SOEs to investors (Brada, 1996);

(iii) Mass or voucher privatisation- using vouchers to enable citizens to bid for shares of SOEs (Brada, 1996); and

(iv) Privatisation from below- developing private new firms to operate in a new market economy (Brada, 1996).
Based on the nature of SOEs, many countries have however employed more than one method to transfer ownership to the private sector (Megginson & Netter, 2001).

2.5 Chapter Summary

The current chapter reviewed two important reforms strategies, namely democratisation and privatisation. The chapter discussed democratisation as a transition that marked the demise of many authoritarian regimes. The chapter further presented the process of transition to democracy and its challenges to governance. The chapter then presented the models of democracy to highlight their key features.

The chapter also reviewed the concept of privatisation as the strategy to reform the economy towards free market. The chapter presented the historical perspective and goal of privatisation. Different methods of privatisation were presented. The next chapter will present governance as a way forward for social, political and economic development.
CHAPTER THREE
GOVERNANCE

3.1 Introduction
The current chapter presents a review of governance and its importance in economic development. The chapter starts by defining the concept of governance highlighting its configurational nature and importance in development arena. The chapter then presents various governance models and their implications for democracy. Factors influencing governance are then presented, followed by governance and its challenges in transition states. Finally, the chapter summary is presented to conclude discussion in this chapter.

3.2 Governance
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2000, p. 236) argue that a study of governance needs to take into consideration the following three aspects: the configurational nature of governance, the political interests that influence action, and the issues relating to both formal and informal authority. They argue that governance is “a configuration of distinct but inter-related elements statutes, including policy mandates; organisational, financial, and programmatic structures; resource levels; administrative rules and guidelines; and institutionalised rules and norms that constrains and enables the tasks, priorities, and values that are incorporated into regulatory, service production, and service delivery processes. Thus governance involves extensive endogeneity rather than the mere summing up of independent elements …. Governance is inherently political, involving bargaining and compromise, winners and losers”.

Risse (2012) also identified various governance configurations which include: colonial rule and modern trusteeships; hierarchical rule by non-state actors: settler colonies, indigenous chiefs, warlords and companies; voluntary delegation of authority by host states to other actors; negotiation systems; non-hierarchical influence by external actors; governance by competition; parallel governance. The term “configuration” is defined by the Oxford English dictionary as “an arrangement of parts or elements in a particular form, figure, or combination”. However the term can also mean a process of making the arrangement of the parts that make up a whole (Rouse,
2005). Therefore, some writers consider the term to represent an outcome, a process or both a process and an outcome.

Since the 1990s, governance has been focusing on the non-hierarchical modes of coordination and participation of other non-state actors to formulate and implement public policies (Börzel & Risse, 2010; Treib, Bahr & Falkaner, 2007). In the present study, actors are individuals, groups of people or organisations that have the capability to influence public policy and decision-making initiatives. Actors include citizenry, governments, businesses, civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and so forth.

Governance consists of both structure and process (Börzel & Risse, 2010). Governance as a structure relates to institutions and actor constellations (Treib et al., 2007). The literature usually distinguishes among the state, competition systems and networks (negotiation systems). As to actor constellations, state governance involves exclusively governments, while both competition and negotiation systems consist of configurations of state and non-state actors e.g. firms, interest groups, NGOs (Börzel & Risse, 2010).

Governance as a process pinpoints the modes of social coordination by which actors engage in rulemaking and its implementation and in the provision of collective goods (Börzel & Risse, 2010). This is different from a traditional model of coordination where binding decisions are made by elected officials within parliaments and implemented by bureaucrats in the public administration (Treib et al., 2007).

Hierarchical coordination usually takes the form of authoritative decisions with claims to legitimacy. Hierarchies are based on institutionalised relationships of domination and subordination which fall in the traditional national-state. This significantly constrains the autonomy of subordinate actors. Non-hierarchical coordination, by contrast, is based on commitment and compliance (Börzel & Risse, 2010).

Governance is considered to be guided by a set of rules that would also ensure quality policy making (Ahrens, 2007). According to Ahrens (2007), these rules should possess the following characteristics:
(i) Must be clearly defined to win economic agents’ confidence and that they can be enforced;

(ii) Must be clearly known and understood by political and economic actors in such a way that they are detectable whether they are observed or not;

(iii) Must be flexible to allow institutional changes that reflect on changes in preferences, technological conditions or specific societal needs from time to time; and

(iv) Must ensure institutional safeguard to prevent powerful political and economic actors from arbitrary change or from circumventing of existing rules at the expense of other actors or society.

These key characteristics of rules have been summarised in four principles of governance as predictability, accountability, transparency and participation (Ahrens, 2007) (see Figure 3.1). These principles are used to characterise the quality of institutions that guide the strategic interaction between different actors in policy-making initiatives (Ahrens, 2007). Further, they are important in ensuring sound management of public resources, an enabling environment for private-sector activities and a productive exchange of information between the public and the private sector (Ahrens, 2007). These four dimensions of governance determine the quality level of governance (i.e. effectiveness) and how governments are prepared to implement socio-political reforms (Ahrens, 2007).
However, predictability provides a far-reaching importance in effective governance to ensure credible commitments by policy-makers to realise policy reforms and economic performance (Borner, Brunetti & Weder, 1995).

Deriving from the concept of governance, the term has also been used with adjectives like good, bad, global, regional, local, corporate and sectoral to reflect multiple contexts and geographical coverage (Knio, 2010). Good governance is what the development partners stress as a precondition for developing countries to achieve social, economic and political development (Buduru & Pal, 2010; Chabal, 2002).

3.2.1 *Good vs. Effective Governance*

The terms good and effective governance have been used interchangeably. IFAD (1999, p.1) reports that in the 1992 report entitled “Governance and Development”, the World Bank set out
its definition of good governance. This term is defined as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”. It states further that “the essence of good governance was described as predictable, open and enlightened policy, together with a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos and an executive arm of government accountable for its actions”. Most definitions of good governance identify the following elements of good governance: sustainability of structural reforms; property rights and rule-based governance; quality of budget and public investment process; efficiency and equity of revenue mobilisation; efficiency and equity of public expenditures; and accountability and transparency of the public service (OECD, 2007b). However since good governance in public service is considered to mean “performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles” (OPM, 2004, p. 9), in this study the term “effective governance” will be adopted and will share the same meaning as good governance.

Effective governance has developed and emerged as an outcome of various concepts drawn from theories based on new institutional economics, rents and rent seeking and new political economy (Gray & Khan, 2010). Effective governance has its origin from the theoretical development in the new institutional economics (Gray & Khan, 2010). Models in the new institutional economics are premised on the assumptions that stable property rights are a prerequisite for the functioning of the market economy (Gray & Khan, 2010). Rents and rent seeking theories have also contributed to the importance of effective governance (Gray & Khan, 2010). These theories are based on the assumptions that state subsidies, restrictions in markets, rents and other politically related incomes do not provide a fertile ground for the market economy to flourish (Gray & Khan, 2010). Lastly, effective governance draws on new political economy theories, which are based on the assumptions that democracy can help to establish property rights and reduce rent seeking behaviour (North, 1990). The importance of democracy in establishing effective governance is based on the belief that democratic accountability reduces corruption and rent seeking practices, which in turn can promote a rule of law and stable property rights (Diamond, 2003; Gray & Khan, 2010). Once the rule of law and properties rights are substantially functioning, transactions cost in the market is reduced, thereby providing the opportunity for economic growth (Khan, 2007). Based on these theories, all governance reforms have been carried out in economic and political dimensions by establishing market economy (e.g. through privatisation) and political pluralism (e.g. through democratisation).
In the international community, effective governance is placed on a wider agenda of development as a prerequisite for social, political and economic development. To achieve effective governance, the government is expected to be effective and adhere to ethical standards by following certain guidelines to improve bureaucracy (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka, 2010). Many countries have documented a code of conduct as a guide for the conduct of the government in public services provision. These guidelines stipulate permitted ethical conduct on how public services should be offered (Buduru & Pal, 2010). At the same time, these guidelines indicate unethical conducts that are unacceptable in service delivery. However, effective governance is a value-loaded concept which endorses an ideal administrative behaviour and rejects behaviour that is unethical or questionable (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka, 2010). In many cases, these ideals, as perceived in the developed world, would involve practising of high levels of democratic representation, transparency and accountability. Effective governance is also relative to the country concerned. It may mean different things in different countries due to variations in institutional characteristics and policy choices (Ahrens, 2007; Andrews, 2010; Rothstein, 2012). Hence what is considered effective governance in the developed countries may not necessarily be so in the developing countries (Andrews, 2010). However, effective governance can only be achieved when state and non-state actors involved in the governing process act as partners. The next subsection briefly discusses these actors.

3.2.2 Actors of Effective Governance

Effective governance literature categorises two broad groups of stakeholders of effective governance, namely the state and non-state actors. The state actors are ones drawn from the government (also known as the first sector) or its affiliates. The state is one of the key actors in the realm of effective governance and plays a major role in determining the quality of governance the state can achieve (Diamond, 2003). Because of its mandate over the state apparatus, to a large extent the state holds more power than other actors in governance (Ahrens, 2007). On the other hand, non-state actors are stakeholders drawn from civil society and private sectors (see figure 3.2). Civil society, also known as the third sector, is composed of various interest group organisations such as bar associations, women's organisations, student groups, religious bodies, election monitoring and human rights groups (Diamond, 1994). It acts as a counterweight to the state to implement particular policies in the governance arena (Diamond,
Within the civil society, there are NGOs, which are special pressure groups of actors (Mason, 2011), defined in Tanzania national NGOs policy (2001, p. 5) as:

... a voluntary grouping of individuals or organisations which is autonomous, non-political and not-for-profit sharing, organised locally at the grass roots level, nationally or internationally for the purpose of enhancing the legitimate economic, social and/or cultural development or lobbying or advocating on issues of public interest of a group of individuals or organisations.

NGOs play a major role in shaping governance by lobbying for governance improvement and monitoring the conduct of public officials (Diamond, 2003; Foley & Edwards, 1996). Another key actor is the private sector (the second sector) which includes businesses at different levels – the market. The private sector inclusion in effective governance as a separate actor different from civil society has attracted much debate (Foley & Edwards, 1996), and there is no consensus on this issue. But scholars agree on its importance in the governance realm. During the era of socialist economy, the private sector was not powerful, while in the capitalist economy the business sector occupied a dominant position in the state economy (Kornai, 2000). In the free-market economy, the private sector becomes one of the key stakeholders in the country’s economic and political development. It serves to safeguard the interest of business investments and ensures national policies promote pro-market led economy. These three actors of governance are considered to be partners playing a push-pull role. But, the civil society acts in between the state and private sector by advocating a socially just balance between a crippling state control.
and unscrupulous free markets. This follows a widely accepted recommendation by the international community in governance reforms (Mercer, 2003).

### 3.3 Modes of Governance

Over the years, decision-making processes in a hierarchical mode of coordination have demonstrated flaws in terms of actors’ democratic representation. It is clear that traditional governance in many states has been plagued by ineffective decision-making and democratic legitimacy problems (Schmitter, 2000). As a result, many states and political systems seek to adapt new modes of governance. “New modes of governance depart from the community method of legislating through the use of regulations and directives by building on the participation of private actors on policy formulation; relying on a broad consultation and substantive input” (Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004, p. 123). New governance is characterised by heterarchy rather than hierarchy, creating a horizontal mode of governance by involving actors from a multitude of stakeholders and civil societies (Smismans, 2008; Sorensen, 2006). New governance is considered to be more efficient in policy-making than market and hierarchical coordination (Provan & Kenis, 2007). It is also considered as a solution to decision-making deadlocks in policy discourse due to its participatory nature (Smismans, 2008).

New modes of governance expand participation of stakeholders to include non-state and state actors in policy-making and extend deliberation of stakeholders to the lowest possible level through decentralisation (Smismans, 2008). For the past two decades, we have witnessed the increasing trend to adapt new forms of governance with the purpose of enhancing democratic representation in societal governance. This trend calls for new forms of governance, which may mean a farewell to sovereignty rule (Sorensen, 2006). The next subsections discuss different governance models.

#### 3.3.1 Metagovernance

The current trend in governing society is moving from government to governance by increasing the number of stakeholders in the governing process. As the number of actors increases, the need for regulation of self-regulation, referred to as metagovernance (governance of governance) becomes apparent. Sorensen (2006) defines metagovernance as a way of enhancing coordinated governance in a fragmented political system based on a high degree of autonomy for a plurality
of self-governing networks and institutions. The implementation of metagovernance changes the role of politicians from a traditional model in which they rule on behalf of the people to metagovernors in the new governance (Sorensen, 2006). In traditional governance (hierarchy), politicians are the sole representative of the people to “control all aspects of the governing process through their monopolised right to pass laws and their firm grip on the state bureaucracy” (Sorensen, 2006, p. 99). On the contrary, in metagovernance, politicians leave the role to govern to stakeholders to govern themselves (Sorensen, 2006).

Most governance theorists concur that metagovernance increases the political governability of political systems by spreading the governing capacity to autonomous stakeholders drawn from public and private sectors (Kooiman, 2000). However, this has both positive and negative implications for democracy. According to Sorensen (2006), there are five positive ways of metagovernance to affect democracy:

(i) Metagovernance increases channels of influence for citizens compared to traditional institutions of democracy;
(ii) New channels of influence increase chances of citizens influencing decisions that affect them (Sorensen, 2006);
(iii) Pluralism – “Increased level of self-governance in institutions and networks increases the space for plural ways of life in society” (Sorensen, 2006, p. 104);
(iv) A high degree of self-governance contributes to improved citizen participatory skills as a result of direct access to the governance process that might increase citizen’s political resources, competencies and efficacy (Sorensen, 2006); and
(v) Communality- Involving a large segment of the population “in society governance might strengthen the social and political sense of communality among the citizens and between political elites and the people” (Sorensen, 2006, p. 104).

The negative implications for democracy, according to Sorensen (2006), are based on four areas as presented below:

(i) Due to involvement of different actors in the exercise of metagovernance, politicians’ control of the decision-making process is considerably reduced, as a result of leaving decision to self-governing actors (Sorensen, 2006). This may lead to ineffective deliberation;
(ii) The high degree of fragmentation and informality of the governing process diminishes the level of publicity in the decision-making process (Sorensen, 2006);

(iii) Members of large firms, organisations or associations and well-educated, experienced sub-elites have considerable advantage of possessing high level of participatory skills compared to those who lack these attributes. These create an imbalance between these groups by which the former may use new channels of influence more efficiently and develop political competences, resources and efficacy than the latter (Sorensen, 2006); and

(iv) Self-governing actors might develop strong internal communality which can undermine the development of links between the self-governing institutions and the broader community (Sorensen, 2006).

3.3.2 Open Method Coordination

Open Method Coordination (OMC) was formulated to guide EU governance in improving the democratic quality of decision-making within the union (Rodrigues, 2001). It emphasises transparency and democratic participation of member states in the process of governance in the European Union (De la Porte & Nanz, 2004). Like any other new governance modes, OMC stresses inclusion of civil society and social partners in the policy-making process (De la Porte & Nanz, 2004). However, empirical evidence shows that OMC is not necessarily efficient participatory governance (Smismans, 2008). Strong stakeholders are likely to veto the deliberation outcome and control actors’ participation (Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004). Another challenge with OMC is that under the principal-agent scenario, the participation of government as well as non-government actors at different levels of policy- and decision-making undermines accountability via the parliament as well as control by the judiciary (Smismans, 2008). This is due the fact that OMC is based on “principles of voluntarism” which is not legally binding and enforceable (Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004).

3.3.3 Electronic Bureaucracy Model

This model refers to the electronic delivery of government services (Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2003). The electronic bureaucracy model already enjoys increasing success at the federal and state levels in the United States and Australia (Kakabadse, et al., 2003). Two
concepts behind this model are "government online" – provision of electronic information through the Internet; and "one-stop shops" where government activities from multiple government agencies are handled by one organisation (Ho, 2002; Kakabadse et al., 2003).

The goal of the electronic bureaucracy model is “to allow for easier, quicker and cheaper transactions with government on behalf of businesses and citizens” (Kakabadse et al., 2003, p. 47). This model focuses on organisational effectiveness and achieving lean organisational structures (Kakabadse et al., 2003). The use of this model requires that individuals and businesses have necessary IT related skills to use the services (Starr, 2010). This creates inequalities between the “information rich” who can gain access to technology necessary to use electronic services, and the “information poor” that cannot (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010; Kakabadse et al., 2003).

### 3.3.4 Network Governance

Social theorists argue that complex social problems are solved better when there is a collective effort by stakeholders than in an individual’s effort context (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Kooiman, 2000). Provan and Kenis (2007) also argue that there must be a “network” to address complex problems to ensure more efficient use of resources and better services to the public. Provan and Kenis (2007, p. 231) define network as a group of three or more legally autonomous organisations that work together to achieve not only their own goals, but also a collective goal. However, the network must be “effective” to realise network outcome. Network effectiveness is defined as an attainment of positive network level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organisational participants acting independently (Provan & Kenis, 2007). Network is a “goal-directed” coordination in which actors or nodes work collectively to achieve network outcomes (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Effectiveness and efficiency of the network call upon participation, collaboration, coordination and control to achieve network goals (Provan & Kenis, 2007).

Network governance ensures that all actors from the private and third sectors are also represented in the network as partners in policy management and implementation (Bang & Esmark, 2009); hence, marginalised groups also play a part in decisions and policies in the network (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011).
Besides the strength of network governance, there are also weaknesses in accountability and control (Hirst, 1994). In a principal-agency environment, political leaders in the state are agents accountable to citizens as their principals. However, in the context of network governance, political leaders are also accountable to, for example, international organisations (e.g. WB, IMF and others) which are not their “democratic principals” (Papadopoulos, 2007). This complicates accountability and control of political leaders.

### 3.3.5 Public-Private Partnership

Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been adopted by state governments as one of the initiatives to address societal problems and enhance governance effectiveness (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Public Private Partnership is loosely defined as the cooperative institutional arrangements between public and private sector actors (Hodge & Greve, 2007). According to Hodge and Greve (2007), PPP is an alternative (new) way of managing and governing organisations that are involved in providing public services. This has become a central tenet of “third way” governments. Private sectors are involved in project financing under certain arrangements (e.g. Build-Operate-Transfer) with the state government (Hodge & Greve, 2010). PPP is seen as the alternative to contracting and privatisation arrangements in which public and private sector experiences are bundled together to provide public services (Hodge & Greve, 2007). The merits and efforts of PPP are centred on issues of effectiveness, accountability, efficiency and service quality.

PPP, as a tool of governance, can last for a long time, even years (Hodge & Greve, 2007). In this case, collaboration becomes important on how the relationship between the private and public sectors is maintained, as more people and private organisations get a market share in public service provision (Hodge & Greve, 2007).

Besides its advantages, PPP also compromises the responsibility of the government to provide public good to its citizens. When private actors such as PPP are involved in public services provision, they always operate on a business gain basis to recover their monies invested in such ventures (e.g. water services). In this case, private actors can deny services for poor citizens who cannot afford to pay for them; which denies their basic right to public good (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011).
3.4 Factors Influencing Governance

3.4.1 Globalisation

Globalisation is a highly contested concept which draws its basic form from an internationalist project of the modern world, liberalism and Maxism (Cerny, 1999). According to Cerny (1999), both liberals and internationalist Marxists see capitalism as converging to a single and common market place of the world. In the contemporary world, capitalism is dominating the global market place, by which capitalists make decisions based on socio-economic logic such as self-regulating market and accumulation of capital, amongst others (Cerny, 1999). It has become common to observe that the flow of capital and investments across countries is achieved more easily than before due to ICTs (Cerny, 1999; Martinelli & Midttun, 2010). State borders have become markedly less important in both political and economic dimensions (Beck, 2000). In favour of the free market economy, national states are compelled to adopt liberal economic policies which favour globalisation, in order to compete in the global market. Such policies, which Waltz calls “golden straitjacket”, specifically address economic parameters such as balanced budget, economic deregulation, openness to investment and trade and stable currency (Waltz, 1999, p. 694).

However, globalisation is a complex phenomenon with a double-edged sword characteristic; it can foster democracy and effective governance as economic reforms are carried out (Beeson, 2001). It can also have a negative implication for democracy and governance. To gain from globalisation, countries are required to carry out policy reform towards transparent trade dealings. Advocates of globalisation insist that globalisation can improve governance when economic conditions in individual countries are improved too. For example, through the process of trade openness among different countries as advocated by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), it can attract capital flow and direct foreign investments to individual countries. In that way, trade openness serves as a catalyst for stimulating economic investments and subsequent improved governance. A study on the impact of globalisation on governance found that openness of trade reduces a country’s corruption level (Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo & Bussolo, 2001). However, other findings indicate that the quality of state institutions plays a role in attracting foreign investments. For example, a study on effects of financial globalisation on developing
countries found that countries with a sound legal and supervisory framework, low corruption, high transparency and effective cooperate governance have a better chance of attracting direct foreign investment (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei & Kose, 2003).

On the other hand, there are various negative impacts of globalisation on state governance. It has been argued that globalisation leads to erosion of state sovereignty. Regional sovereignty seems to take first priority over state sovereignty (Cerny, 1999). Nation-states are required to comply with requirements of a certain regional block such as the EU, East African Community (EAC) and others where individual states are members. There are various studies which indicate the impact of globalisation on national policy. For example, a study on the impact of European integration on recruitment and training of the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) senior officials at the central administration level found that the UK’s national personnel policy was influenced by EU pressure (Maor & Stevens, 2002).

With globalisation, national governance seems to be delegated to supranational agencies. Many international regimes (e.g. NGOs, IMF, WB, WTO) are now taking an active role in regulatory processes and national state governance processes are influenced by private sector actors (Beeson, 2001; Chesterman, 2008). The pressure from these agencies and international NGOs on developing countries is evident when these nations try to enter or ratify key international treaties (Beeson, 2001). Such a situation undermines the democratic structure of governance, autonomy and capacity of state governments to exercise discretion within their jurisdictions in the interests of their people (Cerny, 1999; Chesterman, 2008).

3.4.2 Foreign Aid Dependence

Since the widespread adoption of New Public Management (NPM) in public institutions, governance in different countries has been monitored by the international community. Several international organisations have developed interest to ensure developing countries resolve their governance challenges. The World Bank (WB) is considered to be one of the harbingers of governance in developing countries. Donors and development communities agree on the importance of governance to address challenges relating to political, social and economic development (Buduru & Pal, 2010; Diamond, 2003). As developing countries struggle to fund their development projects, the donor community presses for improved governance as a
precondition for aid flow (Chabal, 2002). Given the limited human, technical and financial resources, development proponents agree that aid to developing countries may contribute to governance improvement when channelled to governments with clear development agenda (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). However, the impact of aid on governance is considered to be indirect through improving the state institutional quality, which in turn provides improved services. Knack (2001) observes that the relevance of aid on effective governance lies within the scope of inefficient institutions and policies, and revenue constraint to pursue improvement in civil services (e.g. training, increase in salary of civil servants). When aid is channelled to fix such weaknesses, it is plausible to associate aid with effective governance. This relationship leads to a notion that a well-functioning state bureaucracy, coupled with sound legal systems, can provide effective and efficient services (Dietrich & Wright, 2012; Knack, 2001). Researchers have found that aid can have a positive impact on governance in improving civil service quality, policy and planning capacity as well as building strong central institutions (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). For example, Durbarry, Gemmell and Greenaway (1998) found that aid has a positive impact on economic growth, which subsequently increases the government capacity to build governance institutions. On the other hand, aid can also block governance improvement. The World Bank report of 1998 on aid dependence in Africa indicates that aid conditionality undermines genuine policy learning (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). It argues that donors have indirectly set policy for developing countries, and governments were found to be reluctant to query this conduct because it would cause a delay of the highly awaited donor funds (Hirschmann, 1993). Further, aid weakens government accountability and development of the civil society, thereby undermining democracy and the rule of law (Knack, 2001). Aid also retards the development of a healthy civil service which undermines democracy and rule of law. Knack (2001) further argues that accountability is only enforced by the taxpaying society by demanding accountability from the government. What aid does is that it shortcircuits the process of paying tax and makes the government to not depend on citizenry tax revenue (Moore, 1998). With aid availability, the government accountability shifts from citizens to aid organisations (Knack, 2001).

According to Brautigam and Knack (2004), aid also prevents government staff from learning skills to effectively manage and administer public activities, due to lack of skills transfer arrangements to local staff in aid-funded projects. When such projects are concluded, they lack
sustainability after a short period and eventually die, due to lack of skilled officials taking over the assignment.

### 3.5 Governance in Transition States

The main objective of economic transformation in transition states is to transform the centrally planned economy to market-based economy. The creation of a market-enhancing governance structure becomes necessary to achieve this transformation (Ahrens, 2007). It is argued that a market-enhancing governance structure is important in providing a high degree of policy adaptability, yielding innovative and growth-promoting outcomes and entailing efficient institutional matrix adaptability (Ahrens, 2007). As explained earlier in subsection 3.2.2, both state and non-state actors are jointly involved in policy-making processes, thereby forming the institutional matrix in a new non-hierarchical model of governance (Ahrens, 2009; Smismans, 2008). The institutional matrix has given rise to new governance structure, opening a wider actors’ base for policy reforms. To implement economic and political reforms, transition states have implemented or are implementing strategies based on four pillars of market enhancing governance structure (Ahrens, 2007). Before the governance discussion is presented, the market enhancing governance structure is briefly discussed to highlight its pillars on which governance is based.

(i) Creating a strong state: Relinquishing of some activities by the states not only changed public service provision, but also increased workload and skill sets requirements to effectively take up new roles in political and economic contexts. As Weber (1958) argues, developing a market-based economy needs a strong state to provide and support economic enterprises in order to realise sustainable economic growth. To achieve this, the state must have the capacity to enforce laws and regulations, and to limit and control government officials from pursuing personal interests (Ahrens, 2007). More importantly, policymakers and government officials must observe maximum impartiality in delivering public services, be independent from powerful actors and act autonomously (Ahrens, 2007). All initiatives aiming to create a strong state should be characterised by stable, transparent and predictable policymaking (Ahrens, 2007).

(ii) Creating economic institutions: Economic transformation needs to create new or reform existing economic institutions to suit a market-based economy. These include institutions
relating to property rights, contracts, market entry and exit, legal and regulatory framework, reliable information diffusion and new technology development (Ahrens, 2007; Hamm et al., 2012).

(iii) Limiting the state: To conform to economic and political transition requirements, checks and balances mechanisms must be established to limit the power of the state. Such mechanisms include independent judiciary (horizontal institutional checks) to enable the government to adhere to the rules, limiting its predatory behaviour and guaranteeing rights of citizens and investors, among others (Ahrens, 2007; Diamond, 2003). In order to deter corrupt practices and rent-seeking behaviour of government officials, institutions for the rule of law must be transparent in reducing the cost of information flow. On the other hand, international organisations such as WTO or IMF act as vertical checks and balances mechanisms to limit the power of the government (Diamond, 2003). Importantly, these checks and balances mechanisms aim at enhancing government accountability (Ahrens, 2007).

(iv) Capacity building: Policy implementation and rule enforcement require the high capacity of the state, supported by a skilled and healthy workforce, to enhance the credibility of the public sector in a market-based economy (Hamm et al., 2012). The credibility of the public sector is important in enhancing processes of accountability, transparency and participation that would in turn ensure that necessary reforms are carried out to realise economic growth (Ahrens, 2007).

Although many transition states have carried out economic transformation, their experience and outcome have been largely influenced by initial conditions of institutions in individual countries and external pressures which acted as anchors to policy reforms (Ahrens, 2007; Fortin, 2012; O’Donnell et al., 2013). As a result, economic and political reforms have resulted in different economic outcomes. Based on economic outcomes, transition states can broadly be categorised into two groups: (a) transition states which successfully achieved economic transformation based on institutional shock therapy and Western style governance; and (b) transition states that did not follow institutional shock therapy and Western style governance, but carried out economic transformation in an authoritarian environment without a “blueprint” (Ahrens, 2007).
3.5.1 Economic Transformation Based on Institutional Shock Therapy

This group of transition states includes former socialist states in Central and East Europe (CEE). These states carried out political and economic reforms based on institutional shock therapy and Western style governance as largely prescribed by the Washington Consensus. In this group, there are those states from CEE which had prospects of rejoining the EU, pending fulfillment of minimum effective governance standards such as carrying out the judicial system reform to meet EU standards (Noutcheva & Aydin-Dzgit, 2012; Wagener, 2004). These states had also more relatively advanced economic institutions which, coupled with EU accession, helped them to fast track economic and political transition (Ahrens, 2007). Further, prospects of becoming EU members also helped to form and reinforce consensus for democratisation and market-based policy reforms within their societies and also enhanced credibility of domestic policymakers (Ahrens, 2007; Noutcheva & Aydin-Dzgit, 2012). Given the enhanced credibility, investors had trust with government commitments which, in turn, helped to attract foreign investments in these countries (Ahrens, 2007). It can be concluded that these states have managed to perform better in the pillars of market-enhancing governance structures. Hence they successfully achieved economic and political reforms.

3.5.2 Economic Transformation under Authoritarian Environment

Contrary to institutional shock therapy-based reforms, countries that carried out reforms under authoritarian contexts developed a socialist market economy without democratisation. The Chinese transition is presented to highlight market-enhancing governance structure strategies as a case that successfully transformed its economy without following any prior model or “blueprint” for economic transformation (Rothstein, 2012).

Decentralisation of central government by establishing local governments explains China’s economic growth. It is argued that local governments directly controlled Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) that comprised of community public and private firms (Qian, 1999). TVEs as economic enterprises at the grass root levels played a key role in China’s economic growth by paying tax to local governments. Local governments had incentives to manage and control TVEs, as tax revenues from TVEs were retained by local governments and used to provide local public goods (Oi, 1992). Further, due to TVEs’ government ownership, TVEs had access to
loans from state banks and were insulated from ideologically motivated anti-private firm forces by which all these environmental conditions worked in favour of TVEs (Che & Qian, 1998). In addition, China’s accession to the WTO indicated the credible commitment to follow rule-of-law which enhanced the investment atmosphere in the Chinese market and reliability in the eyes of international investors. Further, China devised people-centred policies that led to the society feeling ownership of reforms and supporting government reform strategies. These policies not only demonstrated the commitment of Chinese Community Party to the people, but also improved governance (Gilli & Li, 2012).

Since 1970, China has managed to register economic growth of about nine per cent annually (Gilli & Li, 2012). However, China’s tremendous economic growth has occurred in the absence of rule of law and private property rights institutions (Rothstein, 2012). It was only achieved through national market competition and transitional institutions tailored to operate in the Chinese environment (Ahrens, 2007; Qian, 1999).

### 3.5.3 Democratisation and the Missing Substantive Element

Political transition has taken place in many authoritarian regimes throughout the world and some of them have been replaced through democratic elections (Carothers, 2002). However, most transition states have achieved electoral democracy without real impacts on life of the people at grass roots. Democratisation has mainly concentrated on holding multiparty elections as a major element of democracy (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009), while taking lightly the substantive elements “that are related to socio-economic conditions which create social citizenship” (Nwosu, 2012, p. 23). Nwosu (2012) contends that “social citizenship is created when political rule is based on practices which create democratic spaces for the development of both institutions and members of a political community” (p. 23). These are the objectives of democratic transition which constitute substantive elements of democracy.

The missing substantive elements of democracy in transition states have guaranteed the clinging to power of some authoritarians, regardless of regular elections in a multiparty environment. While elections are necessary conditions of government existence, they cannot be an end to themselves (Nwosu, 2012). Too much emphasis on elections in transition states fails to fill the governance gap (Ake, 2000).
Having introduced the background of democracy, the next section presents the governance challenges facing transition states.

3.6 Governance Challenges

Although transition states face different challenges based on their local environments, most are facing similar challenges of governance, though with varying degrees of severity. This section presents these challenges.

3.6.1 Creating a Strong State

It seems clear that the state capacity is a major component in determining how different public policies are implemented. Many studies have demonstrated that government capacity in terms of institutions have positive impacts on many aspects of citizens’ well-being (Rothstein & Teorell, 2012). Given the lack or poorly developed institutions in transition states, many governance challenges are linked to institutional quality. Consequently, they affect the pillars of market-enhancing governance structures, thereby hampering economic and social development. In the process of economic transformation, many transition states are relinquishing their previous roles as key players in the centrally planned economy, by assuming new roles as regulators under an open-market economy (Ahrens, 2007). While these states are required to withdraw their intervention in the economy, at the same time they are also required to assume new roles such as reducing market imperfection, and generating a system of information exchange between the public and other actors (Ahrens, 2009; Boeva, 2002). These new roles require a strong state with robust political capacities to implement and enforce policy in a new market environment – many transition states lack such capacities. These challenges described by Ahrens (2007) as a “paradox of adjusting state” include lack of administrative, political, institutional and technical capacities. Ahrens (2007) reports that even where successful economic transformation has been achieved, there is still a lack of accountability of government and a weak rule-of-law. The 2012 review of development effectiveness in Africa indicates that “broader challenges of political governance include strengthening the institutions of accountability, expanding the political space for citizens to take part in decisions, consolidating the rule of law, civil liberties and human rights” (UNECA-OECD, 2012, p. 31). These challenges affect the dimensions of governance and must be resolved if transition states are to achieve economic and social development.
3.6.2 Corruption, Transparency and Accountability

Based on the premise of weak institutions, corruption has been identified to be a major challenge facing transition countries (Fayissa & Nsiah, 2013; Hamm et al., 2012; Kaufmann, Hellman, Jones & Schankerman, 2000). The World Bank asserts that corruption is the single greatest hindrance to social and economic development in many developing countries. Corruption undermines all efforts directed at social and economic development, by creating conducive environments for wasting public resources and obstructing “the responsive management of vital public goals such as poverty alleviation, health care and public safety” (Themudo, 2013, p. 63). It is estimated that every year about US$20 to 40 billion worth of assets is lost in transition states through corruption (UNECA-OECD, 2012). Most transition states are still experiencing corruption of varying levels, but the notable trend is that still higher levels of corruption persist (O’Donnell et al., 2013; UNECA-OECD, 2012). For example, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Kosovo and Slovakia have registered higher levels of corruption in the 2013 Nations in Transit Report than in 2012 Report (Freedom House, 2013). However, states such as Slovakia and Estonia are even backsliding in curbing corruption (Freedom House, 2013). The 2013 report by Transparency International indicates that corruption is increasing worldwide and is attacking the governance institutions such as police and the judiciary, among others (Transparency International, 2013). Transparency on the other hand is still a challenge in transition states and more needs to be done to ensure citizens hold governments accountable. African states lag behind in terms of transparency in revenues from oil, mining, gas and budget, compared to other world regions. For example, of 41 countries covered by the Revenue Watch and Transparency’s 2010 Report for open budget index, only one country published significant budget information (Revenue Watch Institute & Transparency International, 2010). Similarly, the Nations in Transit 2013 Report indicates that government accountability and transparency is decreasing across CEE transition states (Freedom House, 2013). There is a lack of transparency and accountability in public tenders with business tycoons and state officials influencing the bidding process to advance their personal interests (Freedom House, 2013).

3.6.3 Communication and Coordination among Governance Actors

Transition states are still faced with challenges of socialist legacy in the governance activities. Non-state actors are to some extent excluded in critical decision-making processes
(Kluvánková-Oravská, Chobotová, Banaszak, Slavikova & Trifunovova, 2009). For many transition states, decentralisation and democratisation are new processes and thus still not well institutionalised in governance activities. These processes and, in particular, decentralisation, require smooth communication among the actors. However, the governments, being key players and strong actors (Ahrens, 2007), are struggling with this arrangement, due to reasons largely related to the existence of socialist or communist legacy. Socialist institutions and newly created institutions (during political and economic reforms) are incompatible, causing coordination failure among actors, in particular the NGOs (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009). NGOs in transition states have emerged as “watchdogs” and consequently they still see themselves as not partnering with the state (Falk, 2003; Nicholson, 2008). For example, NGOs are considered orthodox by the CEE states and, as a result, are not involved in decision-making processes in biodiversity governance (Okraska & Szymczuk, 2004 cited in Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009). There is also a lack of public consultation and decision-making between the actors, due to missing or partially developed institution to enable actors’ interaction and effective governance in most CEEs (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009). This has negative implications for collective choice mechanisms, sanctioning and monitoring processes (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009). Involvement of non-state actors in policy-making requires an administrative or a state culture that guarantees the cooperation with non-state actors as partners to ensure effective governance (Kohler-Koch, 2000) – transition states do not have this (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Lack of coordination between the state and NGOs clearly indicates that there still a mismatch of these two institutions in policy-making (Kluvánková-Oravská et al., 2009).

3.6.4 Proxy and Self-Political Succession

It seems that political elites have learned to adjust their tactics to meet the conditions of democracy. It is becoming common to see the same figures in high office in transition states regardless of existense of democratic contestations. Political elites have managed to manipulate the institutions and laws regarding term limit and political succession (Nwosu, 2012). In some instances and particularly in African transition states, the constitution has been amended to extend the term limits to enable the incumbent heads of states to remain in power (Nwosu, 2012). For example, Cameroon and Uganda are typical cases of self-succession. In these situations, elections are used as legitimate mechanisms to show the world that the head of state is in power.
because he/she won the democratic election (Carothers, 2002). Elections such as these represent a fading shadow of democracy (Diamond, 2002) and fall short even with minimalist Schumpeterian standards (Sakwa, 2011). In some cases, proxy succession has been used to ensure the past head of state remains powerful, by choosing the successor through either influencing the selection process within the party itself or by vote rigging in general elections (Nwosu, 2012). Such a situation is aimed at ensuring a continued grip on influence of the past head of state to limit prosecutions of misrule (Nwosu, 2012). This has even crossed to former socialist states in Europe. For example, the succession of Medvedev Dmitri after President Putin’s second term limit is described as a succession crisis (Sakwa, 2011) and Petrov (2007) refers to it as “regency”. Medvedev Dmitri was chosen by Putin through what analysts describe as a manipulated selection process by which Putin himself influenced the process (Hale, 2011). To ensure that Putin’s legacy continues, he made a comeback as Prime Minister under Dmitri to ensure he could still function “as the grey eminence even if someone else is formally in charge” (Blank, 2008, p. 29). Later, Putin not only used his influence in the political system to accomplish his return to the presidency, but the election was also a highly flawed one – now he is eligible to run for high office up to 2018 (Freedom House, 2013; Hale, 2011).

### 3.6.5 Hereditary Succession Mechanism

In some cases, political succession takes the form of heredity by which a close relative of the head of state takes the high office without meeting the democratic requirements. For example, President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo succeeded his father after his death and thereafter won the presidential election. The same trend was observed in Gabon (Nwosu, 2012). These types of succession not only create succession crises but also demonstrate how successions are manipulated by elections and manipulation of instruments of governance such as the constitution takes place.

### 3.6.6 Free and Fair Elections

The credibility of general elections in transition states is mostly characterised by rare instances of free and fair elections (Nwosu, 2012, Sakwa, 2011). Many transition states have achieved electoral democracy but many of them are rated as below standard. Besides, most elections have been marred with irregularities including vote rigging and other fraudulent means, which
altogether describe a serious democracy deficit (Brown, 2010; Gold, 2012). Elections are taking place in this context characterised by the hyper-concentration of power of the executive branch, low levels of citizen participation, insecurity, inequality before the law, the chronic weakness and disrepute of governance institutions (O’Donnell et al., 2013). All these flaws indicate that the assumptions of liberal democracy underpinning the transition paradigm do not hold. Free and fair elections under the conditions of robust institutions, universal suffrage, rule of law and practice of citizenship are major assumptions which many transition states aspired to achieve (O’Donnell et al., 2013).

Although few countries have registered improvements in governance, many are still engulfed in poor governance and some of them are even backsliding (Freedom House, 2013; Kelley, 2012). The Nations in Transit 2013 Report indicates that the majority of transition states scored low grades in governance aspects such as the electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, corruption and democracy (Freedom House, 2013). Even worse, some of the transition states are producing hybrid regimes characterised by electoral democracy inclined to authoritarianism (Freedom House, 2013; Hale, 2011; O’Donnell et al., 2013).

The governance challenges discussed above not only hamper social and economic development of citizens, but also warrant investigation. Many governments across the world have joined hands to assist transition states to resolve some of the governance-related challenges. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and OECD have been providing democracy aid to enhance governance (Kelley, 2012; Savun & Tirone, 2011; Scott & Steele, 2011). On the other hand, IT/ICT has emerged as having a potential to resolve some of these challenges and many transition states have implemented IT projects to reinvent government and improve governance (ITU, 2010; Schuppan, 2009; Thompson & Walsham, 2010).

3.7 Chapter Summary

The current chapter presented governance and its various models. Governance in transition states was discussed by highlighting the market-enhancing governance structure and its pillars. The chapter also discussed the governance challenges in transition states and showed that many
challenges are due to weak pillars of governance. Importantly, the chapter highlighted that democracy in transition states still has a long way to go, due to a serious deficit of substantive elements of democracy. Given the background in this chapter, the next chapter will present the discussion on how IT/ICT can enable transition to democracy and effective governance.
CHAPTER FOUR

HOW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CAN ENABLE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

4.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to review the extant literature pertaining to the use of IT/ICT applications and their implications for governance and democratic activities. The chapter starts by discussing the roles of ICT in democratisation, political protest, activism, political stability and regional integration. It explains how different IT applications facilitate these political activities in the information society. Different models of e-government are then presented followed by the discussion of Web 2.0 application in government business. The concept of digital divide is then presented followed by the negative impacts of IT on different aspects of governance and democracy. Governance processes are then presented followed by the discussion of interplay between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. IT in organisation is then presented to highlight different perspectives of IT impacts, followed by the gaps identified in the literature. The chapter concludes by presenting the summary of the main themes of the reviewed theoretical and empirical works.

4.2 Information Technology Impact Debate

Over the years, the role of IT has attracted a heated debate among researchers. There are those who contend that IT is a panacea of governance and democracy challenges particularly in transition states. They argue that IT will improve democracy- and governance-related activities (Groshek, 2009; West, 2004). Their argument is based on the fact that IT and in particular the Internet has the capability of being the most interactive and advanced technology the world has ever seen; it provides a suitable channel for user participation thereby increasing the likelihood of bringing about change (Bucy & Gregson, 2001). This argument is further strengthened by the capability of the Internet to host an almost infinite repository of information which increases citizens’ awareness and involvement in self-governance (Groshek, 2009). On the other hand, there are those who posit that IT will not bring about change. They believe that IT, like many
previous technologies such as televisions and radios which largely did not transform societies, will also fail to transform societies (Hornik, 1988).

Apart from these two extreme groups, there are also those who play in the middle ground, saying that IT might play a role in certain activities that might enhance democratic and governance endeavours. They posit that the Internet is useful in linking and bonding people or what Ancu and Cozma (2009) refer to as “people of like minds” to mobilise and create a dialogue within social movement groups (Goldstein, 2007; Howard & Hussain, 2011). IT impacts are a result of a complex interaction of IT and other factors such as social, economic, political and institutional factors where IT is implemented (Wong & Welch, 2004). These factors constrain the transformative capability of IT (Margolis & Resnick, 2000). For example, IT is influenced by the practices of the bureaucracy and reflects the behaviour of the bureaucracy (Chadwick & May, 2003). Adopting and using IT/ICT is moderated by socio-demographic factors such as level of education, age, income and geography (Mossberger, Tolbert & Gilbert, 2006; Norris, 1999). Some communities believe that IT is another kind of social disruption agent. In Armenia, for example, e-transformation is considered to be a second disruption of social life after the fall of Soviet rule (Ramaswamy, 2009). In addition, there is a common understanding that institutions of government interact with IT in a complex and reciprocal way and that many factors come into play when IT is introduced in these institutions (Boudry & Verdegem, 2012; Jain, 2004). The above discussion not only highlights the competing arguments, but also indicates that IT impacts are an outcome of a complex interplay of many factors.

**4.3 The Role of ICT in Democratisation**

New information and telecommunication technologies (ICTs) are changing the political sphere. ICTs and specifically the Internet have been important enablers in democratisation endeavours. Since its public diffusion in early 1990s, the Internet has been lauded as a potent democratising agent (Groshek, 2009). Politicians, economists and other groups have praised the transformative capability of ICTs in social, political and economic development. ICTs are viewed as the best hope for promoting development in developing countries (Schuppan, 2009). Following the technological deterministic view of ICT, the former United States (US) Vice president Al Gore remarked that, from ICT:
We will derive robust and sustainable economic progress, strong democracies, and better solutions to global and local environmental challenges, improved health care, and – ultimately – a greater sense of shared stewardship of our small planet. ICT will spread participatory democracy as well as forge a new Athenian Age of democracy (Gore, 1995, p. 5).

A few decades later, ICT’s democratising potential has evolved and new empirical evidences have been highlighting different scenarios. However, ICT may also have negative effects on democratisation and governance endeavours (discussed in section 4.12) and may be influenced by other factors. In this section, the study reviews the impact of ICTs on democracy.

During the inception of new communication technologies (e.g. televisions, radios, telephones, telegraphs) in the past one hundred years, there was a high expectation that these technologies would affect changes in social and political spheres. However, findings indicate that these technologies to a large extent failed to produce expected changes in societies (Hornik, 1988). Technology determinism of ICTs, and specifically the Internet, has also been professed to democratise the world. With a difference from other communication technologies (one-way), the Internet is flexible and most interactive to facilitate civic engagement and potentially promote democracy (Thornton, 2002). The Internet provides a two-way communication which is capable of providing almost instant feedback to interacting parties, compared to the one-way communication of radios and televisions. ICT empowers citizens and strengthens civil society organisations to enable them to demand effective governance (McNamara, 2003).

Internet penetration coupled with citizens’ quest for democratic institutions has been central to the democratising tendency of ICT. Internet penetration can be narrowly defined as the percentage of the population who are Internet users in a particular country (Nisbet, Stoycheff & Pearce, 2012). At macro level, research findings have shown the Internet’s potential for democratisation or strengthening democracy (Groshek, 2009; Nisbet, et al., 2012). For example, the study conducted by Groshek (2009) using a panel macro data covering the period from 1994 to 2003 in 152 countries, indicates that Internet diffusion is a predictor of more democratic regimes. In developed countries (e.g. US and west Europe) where Internet diffusion is prevalent, the Internet has a positive impact on democratisation. On the other hand, in developing countries the relationship between the Internet and democratisation is higher in partly democratic regimes.
than in authoritarian regimes. The implication of these findings indicates that the Internet democratising tendency is contingent to the level of ICT penetration and existing level of democracy in a particular regime. Further, a study by Howard (2010) found that a robust online civil society is a significant factor in promoting democracy in transition countries. Nonetheless, apart from political and technological factors, a number of studies (e.g. Best & Wade, 2009; Groshek, 2009; Howard, 2010) indicate that other contextual factors such as level of education of citizenry, population and size are contingent to ICT’s democratising tendency. To sum up, ICT can either promote democratic transitions or enhance democracy in already partly democratic regimes (Groshek, 2009).

At citizens’ level, ICT penetration has been found to have a positive impact on citizens’ attitudes about democracy in transition countries (Howard, 2010). The Internet, unlike televisions and radios, empowers citizens to question or respond to authority through its two-way interaction mechanism making citizens active political participants. Citizens who use the Internet are no longer “yes citizens” for political information; they tend to demand answers from the regime authority to quench their thirst for democracy. For example, in China the Internet has contributed to development of critical and politicised citizens to question authority (Lei, 2011). The Internet has empowered political parties and civil societies to mobilise citizens for political change movements in authoritarian regimes (Howard & Hussain, 2011). When citizens’ attitudes change about democracy, it is likely to have democratic citizens who can demand democratic governance. For example, in Norris’s (2011) analysis of 42 countries on the relationship between Internet use and mass media and citizen demand for democracy, Norris found that Internet use leads to democratic transitions in authoritarian regimes. Similarly, Bailard’s (2011) experiment conducted in Tanzania found that Internet use and access lead to citizen demand for democracy.

Some scholars have associated the Internet with the Arab Spring in the Middle East (Howard & Hussain, 2011). For example, in Egypt a study by Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2007 highlights the difference between Internet users and non-users. Internet users have greater demand for democracy than non-users (Nisbet et al., 2012). Table 4.1 presents summary of difference of Internet users and non-users in aspects of democracy.
Table 4.1: Demand for Democracy between Internet Users and Non-users

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Internet Users (Per cent)</th>
<th>Non Users (Per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference of democracy over a strong economy</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference of strong man rule</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe honest, competitive elections are very important</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a negative evaluation of President Hosni Mubarak</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007) and Nisbet et al. (2012)

From these findings, Internet users are more democratically oriented than their counterpart non-users. This is an indication that Internet use contributes to individual democratic attitudes and behaviours to demand democratic governance, which in turn positively influences democracy.

Another study by Nisbet et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between Internet penetration, individual Internet use and citizen demand for democracy across 28 countries. The researchers found that national Internet penetration has no significant relationship with citizen demand for democracy. However, individual Internet use was associated with increased demand for democratic governance. Among the 28 countries in their study, they found that the relationship between Internet use and demand for democratic governance was more robust in democratic countries than non-democratic ones. From their study, the overall implication is that the Internet use has no direct influence on democratisation, but, it does so indirectly through impacting individual users who in turn strengthen and enhance young democracy in transition states. Further, their findings indicate that the Internet may promote democracy in partly democratic countries and countries with high Internet penetration. But, “countries that are highly authoritarian, or not free, such as Vietnam or Zimbabwe, are likely to limit the democratic potential of the Internet regardless of the degree of Internet penetration or level of demand” (Nisbet et al., 2012, p. 262).

Although the Internet’s potential for democratisation exists, it is contingent to technological, social and political factors, among others. But citizen demand for democracy is important where democracy is not freely given by the regime authority. The Internet can empower citizens and
make them democratic; in turn these citizens can steer the democratisation process. The Internet and ICT in general strengthens civil society organisations by sensitising the public to demand for effective governance (McNamara, 2003).

Given the four models of democracy presented earlier (Subsection 2.3.6), ICT can basically facilitate information flow, consultation and decision-making endeavours. Figure 4.1 presents the four models of democracy along with electronic democracy (e-democracy) and the functions it supports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model of democracy</th>
<th>Elite democracy</th>
<th>Representative liberal democracy</th>
<th>Deliberative democracy</th>
<th>Participatory democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main democratic value</strong></td>
<td>Circulation of power through voting</td>
<td>Political equality through voting</td>
<td>Political equality through voting</td>
<td>Realisation of the republican citizenship through direct democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upholding of individual integrity</td>
<td>Participation between elections through parties</td>
<td>Active citizens between elections, through citizen panels and participation in the public debate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main applications of e-democracy</strong></td>
<td>Online access to information for scrutinising the government</td>
<td>Encourage participation in political parties through web sites with discussion forums</td>
<td>Moderated citizen panels online, with advisory status</td>
<td>Online referendums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information to voters about political alternatives</td>
<td>Strengthen connections between politicians and the electorate through e-mail and web sites</td>
<td>Public debate online</td>
<td>Online opinion polls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voting online</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Online access to information for individual participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E-democracy in one word</strong></td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.1: Democracy Models and E-democracy**

Source: Planmo (2002)

### 4.4 The Role of ICT in Political Protest

Over the years, ICTs have played a remarkable role in disseminating information from organisers (senders) to the public (receivers) in a timely and effective manner, to make people act or participate in political protest. The literature describes political protest as activities which include riots, strikes and demonstrations (Ten Ayck, 2001). Political protest aims at confronting the
political authority by visible public demonstration to support or show dissatisfaction with political issues (Livesay, 2003). The new information technologies are shaping the public sphere by revolutionising the information landscape. They are capable of instantly spreading information to many members of the public, covering a wider geographic space. This capability of information technologies is known as “one-to-many” (Meier, 2009). The Internet and mobile phones are playing a major role in mobilising political protests in free and non-free political environments. Many regimes have fallen and more regimes will continue to fall due to protesters largely mobilised through the Internet and mobile phones. Mobile phones and the Internet, for instance, played a major role in mobilising people to take part in the famous Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution (Goldstein, 2007); and the Philippines’ 2001 People Power II Revolution (Castells, 2006). Studies indicate that the Internet and mobile phones have a significant relationship with the frequency of protests. For example, a study on the relationship between protest and the Internet and mobile phones across 22 countries found a significant relationship with protest frequency (Meier, 2009). According to Meier (2009), an increase of Internet and mobile phone users is associated with an increase in number of protests. On the other hand, these technologies have a negative significant relationship with the frequency of protests in repressive regimes, implying that the increased use of these technologies is associated with a low level of political protests in these regimes. Meier (2009) concludes that repressive regimes in low level political protests maintain an upper hand, enough to suppress these protests. On the other hand, IT revolutionalises the information landscape and “empowers civil resistance movements at the expense of repressive regimes in countries with relatively high levels of access” to IT (p. 1).

What conclusion can be made with respect to Meier’s (2009) findings and the implication of the role of IT in governance? The answer to this question points to bureaucratic behaviour towards IT. Ten Ayck (2001) asserts that when IT threatens the wellbeing of the bureaucrats, bureaucrats tend to enforce tight control on IT to prevent dissemination of information. Such a practice would also affect civil rights and freedoms (Gastil, 1988). Such a situation happened in Tunisia’s 2010 revolution, a part of the Arab Spring movement to topple authoritarian regimes. Facebook and Twitter were banned and protesters had to resort to using mobile phones to send short messages to mobilise protesters (Howard & Hussain, 2011). Similar situations also happened in Egypt when the authorities banned the new media applications (i.e. Facebook, Twitter and others) and Internet service providers were given orders to stop working during the Tahrir Square
protests, to prevent protesters from getting information. But, due to the knowledge of technology of the youths, they arranged for back-up connectivity from Israel and elsewhere abroad (Howard & Hussain, 2011). Such examples are many, but the most important point here is that if regimes feel threatened, they would not stand back and do nothing, but will deploy tight control of IT (Ten Ayck, 2001). To conclude, the role of IT in governance will depend on the type of the regime and subsequent bureaucratic practices, processes or behaviour.

4.5 The Role of ICT in Activism

As discussed in the previous section regarding the power of the Internet and mobile phones in political activities, the same logic is used here to reflect the role of new technologies in activism. Political activism is much influenced by the level of information flow in the public sphere. Based on mass mobilisation theory (Kahn & Kellner, 2004), ICTs provide a mechanism to mobilise people to join events of public interest. Activists have been using the Internet and mobile phones to reach a large segment of the population to chart out issues of public interest. They have even facilitated the developing of international networks, forming “planetary citizenry that is using the new media to become informed, to inform others and to construct new social and political relations” (Kahn & Kellner, 2004, p. 88).

Kahn and Kellner (2004) report that major protests such as the “Carnival against Capital” which was staged “against the neo-liberalism and transnational corporate capitalism”, and the “Battle for Seattle” against the WTO, both in 1999, were organised using the Internet. These grand protests attracted hundreds of thousands of activists drawn from various sectors including environmental protection, labour union, anti-capitalism groups and many others. More recently, for example, young activists in Egypt used a combination of the Internet and mobile phones during the drive to toss the Mubarak regime out of power (Howard & Hussain, 2011). However, a different story happened in Syria. Syria’s Assad regime have blocked Facebook and Twitter since 2007 but, after Egypt was toppled down, Assad’s regime decided to reopen them so that the regime could follow the activists’ movements. But activists used Google maps to monitor and authenticate the trusted sources of information (Howard & Hussain, 2011). The power of the Internet in political activism has been found to revolutionise both offline and online civic engagement – a dual effect (Nam, 2012). Nam’s (2012) study found the Internet to be mobilising offline inactive participants and reinforcing offline active people.
4.6 The Role of ICT in Managing Political Stability

Political stability is a critical element in economic and political development. Without stability no economic or political activities can smoothly take place, thereby affecting daily life of the citizenry. Reese (2008) argues that political stability is a “continuous process of governance with varying levels of stability or instability depending on a multitude of internal factors and external factors”. The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) indicates that ICT facilitates political stability based on regime type (Reese, 2008). Autocratic regimes are considered to be more politically stable than other regimes. However, the relationship between ICT and autocratic regimes is that ICT can be used to reinforce the regime and make it retain power (Kornai, 2010; Reese, 2008).

The role of ICT in political stability is derived from the assumption that its penetration in the regime determines how politically stable the regime is. This relationship serves to reinforce the perception of ICT as crucial to the process of political stability, for the governing entities of the contemporary world. A study on Internet penetration and political stability found that a high level of Internet penetration corresponds with a high level of the regime’s stability (Reese, 2008).

The assumption of Reese’s (2008) study is that under the condition of wide Internet diffusion, information is also widely available within the community, which in turn build social ties among citizens and the government, by sharing the information thereby bonding the society, which in turn contributes to political stability. In other words, sharing information prevents civil unrest. On the other hand, political stability can be explained using the case of repressive regimes. According to Kirby (1998), when a repressive regime deploys tight control on ICT, civil rights and freedoms are endangered (more discussion in section 4.12). Such practices may trigger civil unrest (Gastil, 1988). ICT portrays a dual effect as is just an enabler that may serve to further stabilise governance or compound a government’s susceptibility to political instability (Reese, 2008). This implies that the role of IT is dependent on the nation-state policies.

4.7 The role of ICT in Regional Integration

The increasing regional integrations the world is witnessing can be facilitated by ICT fusing regions together. ICT has almost everything to offer in the contemporary world. Regional integrations have been formed by different states such as the EU, EAC and many others; their
members need to keep in touch in a regular manner. To this end, ICT provides a mechanism such as Group Support System (GSS) to governance, by facilitating collaborative dialogue among regional member states, thereby reducing communication barriers. Group Support Systems “are interactive computer-based environments that support concerted and coordinated team effort toward completion of joint tasks” (Nunamaker, Briggs, Mittleman, Vogel & Balthazard, 1996, p. 165). GSS does not only support information access, but also radically changes the dynamics of group interactions through the processes aimed at improving communication, structuring and focusing problem-solving efforts, and establishing and maintaining an alignment between group members and group goals (Nunamaker et al., 1996). Through information access, the use of GSS therefore promotes and improves organisational effectiveness, decision-making processes and productivity (Nunamaker et al., 1996). Given geographical dispersion characterised by regional integrations, ICT takes a central space by providing real-time dialogue in decision-making to formulate policy (Reese, 2008).

ICT advancement comes with potential in different dimensions that affect human development as such people develop “optimistic forecasts for peace, prosperity and the social advancement of humankind” (Reese, 2008, p. 59). But, these deterministic forecasts are not achievable without the necessary institutional preparedness. Although “ICT is capable of connecting states towards knowledge-based societies, it also forces the state to focus on those institutional processes in order to fully take advantage of the technological capability” (Reese, 2008, p. 60). For instance, Reese (2008) argues that any investment in ICT infrastructure creates immediacy for educational investment to produce experts who can manage such ICT infrastructures in whatever direction the state wish to pursue.

4.8 Electronic Government

The use of ICT in government to provide services can be traced from the Internet boom era that took place in the 1990s as one of the strategies to reform the public sector (Yildiz, 2007). Since then governments all over the world have been implementing electronic government (e-government) to improve both internal and external government processes (United Nations, 2008). Traditionally, government services have been provided at office counters where, in some instances, citizens have to stand in queues for extended hours while waiting for services. The arrival of ICT and its use in government, aims at promoting “better delivery of government
services to citizens, improved interactions with business and industry, citizen empowerment through access to information, or more efficient government management” (Basu, 2004, p. 112). In that regard, these initiatives should result in benefits such as “less corruption, increased transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth, and/or cost reductions” (Basu, 2004; Fong, 2009). Further, ICT breaks the bounds of geography and time by enabling access for twenty-four hours every day of the week. Implied is that e-government is a strategic tool for effective governance (Ciborra, 2005; Eger & Maggipinto, 2010). E-government is a new phenomenon in developing countries, imported from western countries. The concept itself is not well understood among scholars and practitioners due to its infancy; various descriptions have been given by e-government stakeholders. Consequently, there is little agreement on the key concept of e-government, resulting to vagueness (Heeks & Bailur, 2007; Hu et al., 2009; Yildiz, 2007). E-government is a complex and multi-sectoral phenomenon applicable to different settings, as discussed in the next subsection.

4.8.1 Sectors of E-government

E-government is a multi-faceted phenomenon that involves a complex interaction of different stakeholders to achieve the overall strategic vision. Given its vision, Siau and Long (2005) argue that e-government is useful in four areas or sectors. These sectors include government-to-customer (G2C), government-to-business (G2B), government-to-government (G2G) and government-to-employee (G2E). It is important to note that other scholars have classified e-government sectors into three, leaving behind the G2E sector. They claim that G2E is part of G2G (Seifert, 2003). Nevertheless, the present study chooses the four-sector classification over the three-sector, as the former conveys a complete picture of e-government and G2E requires a separate and special computer system to handle employees’ management processes. These four sectors are described below:

**Government-to-Customer (G2C)**

E-government scholars assert that government-to-customer or G2C is the primary goal of e-government implementation (Seifert, 2003). The objective of G2C is to provide satisfactory services to customers (i.e. citizens) through the use of online channels. G2C facilitates customer interaction with government agencies to conclude online activities such as paying taxes and
renewing licences (Seifert, 2003). G2C makes public information easily available to citizens through the use of dissemination tools such as websites. Due to citizens’ demands and technological advancement, Seifert (2003) asserts that G2C goals should be targeted at creating a “one-stop-shop” where several government agencies’ services are provided by a central location.

**Government-to-Business (G2B)**

Government-to-business or G2B has received attention among e-government scholars and practitioners alike. Cost-cutting initiatives and competition in the business sectors brought by the use of online procurement arrangements has fuelled the use of G2B. The objective of G2B is to provide better services to business sectors through standardised procurement mechanisms for better quality and value for money (Seifert, 2003).

**Government-to-Government (G2G)**

Government-to-government or G2G entails the interaction within and between government agencies at different levels. Seifert (2003) asserts that data sharing at different levels of government such as local, state and federal requires that internal data and procedures are updated regularly. G2G is not only important in enhancing efficiency in government, but also to law enforcement and public safety. When intra- and inter-agencies collaborate and data sharing is achieved, it is believed that law enforcement and public safety initiatives can be better handled; possibly some security threats or events can even be prevented before they happen (Siau & Long, 2005).

**Government-to-Employee (G2E)**

This sector concerns improvement and effectiveness of government internal functions or processes. This is important in that, if internal processes are not organised, it is difficult for employees to provide better services to customers. Internal employees should be equipped with necessary resources and better administration to prepare grounds for better external service provision. Figure 4.1 summarises the four e-government sectors.
4.8.2 E-government Models

Over the years, many e-government models have been developed by international organisations, scholars and consultancy organisations fulfilling different objectives (Zakaria & Gebba, 2012). Some of them have categorised different phases of e-government ranging from the first phase/stage (entry level) to the highest level (stage four or more, depending on the model). However, the phases or stages in each model are different from one another, creating challenges in their implementation. The next subsections discuss the widely accepted e-government models.

4.8.2.1 Layne and Lee’s Four-Stage Model of E-government (2001)

The four-stage model of e-government developed by Layne and Lee (2001) presents four stages by which e-government evolves from an early stage to the highest fully functional stage. Layne and Lee’s (2001) model is divided into four phases as described below:
Stage 1: Cataloguing
This is the entry stage by governments to present their basic information to the net. Layne and Lee (2001) assert that due to pressure from the media, citizens, Internet-literate employees and other stakeholders who prefer to access government information electronically, governments are compelled to go online to satisfy these stakeholders. However, at this stage, the government publishes non-transactional information such as policies, procedures, directions to locate services and post-service support. Layne and Lee (2001) argue that, at this initial stage, governments lack Internet expertise and also, to minimise risk, a small project is preferred.

In addition, they assert that the public who access information from private websites expect to find the same access channels in government services. As such, government would not like to lag behind, but wants to follow the trend. The advantage of government web presence is to free up staff time and reduce workload that would have been impossible without an electronic presence. Nevertheless, due to partial government web presence, citizens would still use other supplementing service access channels such as phone calls and queuing.

Stage II: Transaction
Layne and Lee (2001) contend that the transaction stage is the beginning of the really interactive platform between the government officials and the citizens. This second stage involves a two-way communication by which citizens are able to access services online, hence saving time of paper work, inconvenience of travel to physical government offices and waiting in queues. At this stage, citizens can interact with the government officials online by filling forms such as tax returns and vehicle registrations. Different from the cataloguing stage, the transaction stage empowers the citizens by offering a democratic channel. Citizens not only fill in forms online, but they can also ask questions and receive answers from the government officials. Further, citizens can also use the online platform to participate in forums by talking directly to government officials. Hence, the transaction stage provides a platform for improved services.

Stage III: Vertical Integration
The two previous stages (stages I and II) set stepping stones for vertical integration. The two stages prepare public services by digitising and automating existing processes. The vertical integration is expected to perform process re-engineering similar to the concept of e-commerce.
In process re-engineering, different levels of government must undergo organisational changes in terms of processes and the concept of government, or what Layne and Lee (2001) call “re-conceptualisation of government services”. They argue that to reap the benefits of e-government, organisational and technological changes should run parallel. At this stage, different databases from different government agencies are integrated and connected to allow data sharing. Transactions can then be populated to different levels of government.

**Stage IV: Horizontal Integration**

At this stage, the horizontal integration builds on the vertical integration to fuse together different services to a one-stop service centre to solve the problems related to “functional walls” or “silos”. In that regard, horizontal integration is the most superior stage which ensures provision of the most improved e-services.

![Figure 4.3: Layne and Lee’s Four-Stage Model](image)

**Source:** Layne and Lee (2001)
Transactions performed in one agency trigger automatic checks against data in other functional units (Layne & Lee, 2001). Different stages of Layne and Lee’s (2001) model are summarised in figure 4.3.

4.8.2.2 Siau and Long’s Five-Stage Model of E-government (2005)

Based on the synthesis of the previous e-government models, Siau and Long (2005) developed a five-stage model to present different progressive stages of e-government. They categorise stages into five interrelated phases intended to capture the overall vision of e-government. The stages of this model include web presence, interaction, transaction, transformation and e-democracy as described below:

Stage I: Web Presence
At this stage, Siau and Long (2005) assert that governments post basic information to their websites regarding office operations such as agency’s vision and mission, documents, office hours and contact information. This stage does not provide interactive features. Therefore, the information provided is generally static.

Stage II: Interaction
This is an entry point towards the full transaction platform of the e-government development. At this stage, government officials and users interact with each other through search engines, emails and official form downloads. But this stage provides simple and basic interactive features.

Stage III: Transaction
At this stage users have the opportunity to perform complete online transactions. Citizens and businesses can conclude online transactions such as tax filling, licence applications and personal information updates. Further, at this stage online auctions and electronic orders can be performed.

Stage IV: Transformation
This stage integrates different departments and functional units to form a single unified web portal. At this stage, automation and digitisation of processes achieved in the previous three stages are vertically and horizontally integrated. Different government processes are re-engineered for seamless service provision. This stage is similar to Layne and Lee’s (2001) model.
of vertical and horizontal integration phases. However, Siau and Long (2005) fused Layne and Lee’s integration stages and named it transformation.

**Stage V: E-democracy**

Based on the long term goal of e-government development, Siau and Long (2005) present the e-democracy stage as a dedicated platform for democratic activities such as online voting, polling and surveys, political participation, citizen involvement, meeting and politics transparencies. This is a last stage of the e-government development where changes of political activities and the overall political landscape are geared to more improved stakeholders’ interaction. Citizens and businesses are encouraged to adapt to new ways of political activities in a democratic arena. The five stages of this model are summarised in figure 4.4.

![Figure 4.4: Siau and Long’s Five-Stage Model of E-Government](image)

**Figure 4.4: Siau and Long’s Five-Stage Model of E-Government**

Source: Siau and Long (2005)

Siau and Long’s (2005) model is premised on the long goal of e-democracy. To achieve this, Siau and Long (2005) emphasise that the stages of their synthesised model are “interrelated rather than separated from each other”, meaning that some stages overlap and reciprocate. However, in their model, the initial three stages are meant for automation and digitisation of existing processes. Automation and digitisation is characterised by what Siau and Long (2005)
call a “big technology jump and culture leap” which sets the ground for the last two stages. On the other hand, the last two stages set the ground for transformation of government processes to support political and democratic activities for effective decision-making – what Siau and Long (2005) call “political reap”.

4.8.2.3 Gartner’s Four-Phase Model (2000)

In the effort to contribute towards e-government evolution, the Gartner group (Baum & Di Maio, 2000) developed a four-phase e-government model. This model is composed of four phases, namely web presence, interaction, transaction and transformation as described below:

**Phase I: Web Presence**

This is a first stage in the sequence of four stages by which the government posts basic information on the website for public consumption.

**Phase II: Interaction**

At this stage, basic interactive features are added to websites for users to contact government agencies electronically (e.g. by email) and to download official documents.

**Phase III: Transaction**

At this stage, users can conclude complete transactions such as licence application and procurement online.

**Phase IV: Transformation**

This is a final stage of this model. At this stage, the government undergoes transformation of the existing processes to provide efficient services. The existing government processes are integrated and unified to offer personalised services. Figure 4.5 provides a summary of the four phases of this model.
4.8.2.4 **Andersen and Henriksen’s Four-Phase Model of E-government (2006)**

Building on Layne and Lee’s model, Andersen and Henriksen (2006) developed a four phase-model premised on user-centric rather than the previous normative models which placed much emphasis on the technological aspect. This model, or what Andersen and Henriksen (2006) call
the Public Sector Process Rebuilding (PPR) model, is based on the notion that, if e-government is to achieve tangible government transformation results, it must focus on the end-users.

The four phases of this model are described below:

**Phase I: Cultivation**

The cultivation phase is characterised by vertical and horizontal integration within government, limited use of front-end systems, and adoption and use of intranet within government. Andersen and Henriksen (2006) assert that at this phase governments have limited use of self-services. But customer can download documents such as forms and complete them offline and return them by either email as attachments or mail them by post. At this phase, governments are still struggling to make sense of IT in terms of objectives and service enhancement. Consequently, they have limited web presence with interface that acts as a “gatekeeper” limiting customer access to online resources.

**Phase II: Extension**

This phase improves the features of cultivation phase by the use of intranet within government agencies and websites with special user interface focusing on external customers (e.g. citizens). Andersen and Henriksen (2006) contend that digital presence at this phase is much improved compared to phase one, but it also faces challenges with integration of old systems and data architecture. In this regard, online services run parallel with manual intervention at some stages of service provision.

**Phase III: Maturity**

This phase identifies itself as a mature phase where Internet and intranet merge to lower customer data processing costs. At this phase, websites present user interface with most of services available online. Self-service is a key distinguishing features of this phase (Andersen & Henriksen, 2006).

**Phase IV: Revolution**

At this phase important transformation, or what Andersen and Henriksen (2006) call “revolution” of data, applications and ownership of data occurs. They contend that revolutionary phase is concerned with data “mobility across organisations, application mobility across vendors, and ownership to data transferred to customers”. Internet transformative capability at this phase
is not only seen as important in mobility of data and services, but “the ambition is to transfer data ownership and the orientation of database infrastructure to the end-users” (Andersen & Henriksen, 2006, p. 243). Figure 4.6 depicts the four phases of Andersen and Henriksen’s (2006) PPR maturity model, indicating key activities in each phase.

**Phase IV: Revolution**
- Data mobility across organizations
- Application mobility across vendors
- Ownership to data transferred to customers

**Phase III: Maturity**
- Abandoning of intranet
- Accountability + transparent processes
- Personalized web-interface for customer processes

**Phase II: Extension**
- Extensive use of intranet
- Personalized web-interface for customer processes

**Phase I: Cultivation**
- Horizontal & vertical integration within government
- Front-end system
- Adoption and use of Intranet

Activity centric applications

Widely applied

**Figure 4.6: The PPR Maturity Model**

Source: Andersen and Henriksen (2006)

4.8.2.5 **Goldkuhl and Persson’s Diamond Model (2006)**

The Diamond model (Goldkuhl & Persson, 2006) is premised on the services categorisation and deconstruction of stage models into three polarities namely separate, general and informative. As indicated in figure 4.7, three polarities are further divided into sub classes as described below:
(i) *Separated vs. Coordinated E-services*

This polarity is equivalent to e-services integration category in e-government stage models. This polarity is divided into two sub classes: Separated and Coordinated. Separated e-services are the ones not integrated and normally produced by one authority, while coordinated e-services refer to integrated e-services by which more than one government agency is involved to supply them. Coordinated e-services are further broken into aligned and fused e-services sub classes. Aligned e-services refer to group of e-services put on one uniting website but identifiable service differences exist. On the other hand, fused e-services refer to fully integrated e-services as single service with no noticeable differences.

(ii) *General vs. Individualised E-services*

E-services in this polarity identify the target audience by which general e-services are meant for the general public, while individual e-services are specially developed to cater for individual needs. In the individual e-services, individual needs need to be known to the supplier or producer of the e-services. However, these e-services are further divided into non-secure and secure sub classes.
(iii) Informative vs. Performative E-services

In this dimension, informative e-services are essentially for one-way communication of which a user can study the supplied information with no possibility of electronically responding. On the other hand, performative e-services are capable of two-way communication whereby the user can act and interact with the producer or supplier of the service online. Similarly, this polarity is further divided into pre-arranged and selected e-services.

4.8.2.6 Zakaria and Gebba’s E-government Service Index Model (2012)

The E-government Index Service (ESI) model is based on user-centric and easy implementation to address the challenges observed in normative e-government models. Zakaria and Gebba (2012) present the ESI model in four independent categories as discussed below:

(i) No-presence Category

This category is characterised by non-existent e-services by which features of the website such as broken links and under construction pages are common.

(ii) Informative Category

In this category, the flow of information is one-way from the supplier or producer of the information to clients. It can include information such as procedures required to accomplish some tasks or form downloading. However, it can include limited search capability for published information.

(iii) Transactional Category

This category is an improved version of informative category. It offers a two-way communication between the government and public. Further, this category divides transaction into financial and non-financial. Financial transactions refer to online payment for the service, while non-financial transactions refer to online submission and file uploading.

(iv) Participatory Category

This category is the most improved in provision of e-services. It includes e-services aimed at providing customer feedback to further improve e-services provided by the public institution. Service enhancement can be accomplished through public opinion received from “digital medium such as feedback form, blogs, forums or any other suitable mean. Additionally, [it]
embraces e-services used in political activities such as online voting and polling” (Zakaria & Gebba, 2012, p. 21).

The above subsections presented various e-government models. As a new phenomenon, e-government has evolved from the typical ICT use in government to support internal functions to connected government where different government departments and agencies share information (United Nations, 2008). Service delivery in public sectors has also evolved from traditional services mode as an initial stage of e-services provision to value of services where inter-organisational linkage and consolidation of government systems are pursued as a new thinking of e-government approach (OECD, 2007b). Figure 4.8 indicates stages of public service delivery from the initial stage to the current new mode of service value archived through connected government.

### 4.8.3 Assessment of E-government Models

E-government models developed by academic researchers (e.g. the Layne and Lee model) and international institutions (e.g. UN) and consultancy organisations (e.g. the Gartner group) so far have set a ground for discussion about their efficacy. A careful analysis indicates that most e-government maturity models are normative and designed with the techno-centric notion rather than user-centric (Coursey & Norris, 2008; Zakaria & Gebba, 2012). Further, most normative models are characterised by a mixture of prescriptive and descriptive elements (Coursey & Norris, 2008). Stage models assume that e-government development starts at the initial stage moving to higher stages with the notion that “more is better” (Coursey & Norris, 2008). However, empirical observations indicate that early stages of development provide a reasonably true picture of e-government development but, beyond web presence and interactivity stages, these models become normative and predictive. Hence, their “accuracy declines precipitously” (Coursey & Norris, 2008). With exception, non-normative models (e.g. the E-diamond model) are user-centric, but complex to implement (Zakaria & Gebba, 2012).

Klievink and Janssen (2009) argue that stage models lack theoretical foundation on which the different stages of e-government development change from one stage to another. They recommend that stage models should be based on discontinuity theory to guide the stages.
Further, other theories such as dynamic theory would have been used to guide the transition from one stage to the other.

![Diagram showing the evolution from traditional government to connected government](image)

**Figure 4.8: Evolving Approach to Public Service Delivery**  
*Source: United Nations (2008)*

The new thinking of e-government is premised on the improvement of service delivery at the front office, which is supported by back-end integrated and consolidated processes along with back-end systems. Through improved service delivery, organisations also achieve considerable cost savings from integration and consolidation of processes and systems implementation approach (United Nations, 2008). The second generation e-government is centred on the concept of “whole-of-government” as described in Australia’s Management Advisory Committee (2004) report Number 4; it refers to “public services agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues”. This is a holistic approach to ICT-enabled governance which departs from the traditional approach by which e-government emphasises provision of e-services (United Nations, 2008). According to United Nations (2008), besides this shift, the main objective of the new generation e-government remains the same by focusing on the “service delivery with value”. Figure 4.8 above depicts the movement from traditional government to connected government with emphasis on improved service.

Within the same concept of “whole-of-government”, an emerging e-government paradigm is pursuing a new direction towards connected governance through the use of ICTs. United Nations (2008) asserts that an e-enabled connected governance is likely to transforms the public sector by
improving the quality of public service such as enhancing efficiency, reducing administrative burden and greater cost saving. As indicated in figure 4.9 below, internal and external processes in public sectors would be transformed towards a better service delivery mechanism as a result of ICTs. United Nations (2008) argues that connected governance through ICTs would improve the internal processes among government departments, both vertically and horizontally, by making the entire operation transparent, thus triggering the overall quality of the internal processes. Once the internal processes are integrated and coordinated, the external functions of the public services will also be provided in an efficient and effective manner, thereby enhancing service delivery and overall improvement in government functioning.

![Figure 4.9: Internal and External E-Government Components Contributions](image)

**Figure 4.9: Internal and External E-Government Components Contributions**


ICT-enabled connected governance needs policy change and internal process re-engineering. United Nations (2008) argues that different systems from different governmental agencies need to adopt common standard in terms of systems, security and privacy, so as to allow data sharing and collaboration. For any successful e-government, the goal is to provide e-participation...
platform to allow stakeholders to participate in policy-making processes (United Nations, 2008). Table 4.2 presents the list of reviewed e-government models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year of publication</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing fully functional e-government: A four-stage model</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Layne and Lee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesising e-government stage models</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Siau and Long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gartner’s four phases of e-government model</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Baum and Di Maio (Gartner Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PPR maturity model</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Andersen and Henriksen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-diamond model</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Goldkuhl and Persson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-government service index (ESI)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Zakaria and Gebba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.9 Web 2.0 Applications

The advent of the Internet has not only transformed the information landscape, but has also revolutionised the expectation of citizens towards information dissemination (Chua, Goh & Ang, 2012). Over the years, websites contents have incorporated Web 2.0 technology to improve the surfing experience. Governments also are striving to deploy Web 2.0 applications to improve online experience in activities such as public service announcements, public relations and intelligence services, and patent reviews (Osimo, 2008). According to O’Reilly (2007), Web 2.0 refers to an emerging suite of IT applications that are interactive, context-rich and easy to use. Web 2.0 opens a participatory online platform that facilitates more inclusive public engagement in the deliberation of policy issues (Coleman, 2005), improving transparency and fostering innovation (Meijer & Thaens, 2010), and enabling collaboration on an unprecedented scale (Chua et al., 2012). The objectives of Web 2.0 applications are the same as of e-government in such a way that Web 2.0 is an extension of the tools used in e-government. For that matter, incorporating Web 2.0 applications in government websites makes government websites simple
and user-oriented; transparent and accountable; participatory and inclusive; and joined-up and networked.

4.9.1 Web 2.0 Applications and Government

Development in IT infrastructure has provided an opportunity for the rapid growth of Web 2.0 applications in private and government sectors. As a result, scholars have classified Web 2.0 applications in different categories based on their functionalities. However, the present study adopts the classification scheme of Web 2.0 applications based on how they can be applied to government activities (Osimo, 2008). For that matter, this classification scheme deals with the applications of Web 2.0 in regulation, cross-agency collaboration, knowledge management, political participation, service provision and law enforcement (Chua et al., 2012). Based on this scheme, Harvey, Palmer and Speier (1997) present four dimensions of information work as discussed below:

(i) Information acquisition – gathering information from sources external to government agencies. Applications that manage this information acquisition include discussion forums and wikis which can be used to solicit opinions concerning issues of concern from the public. Another important application is intellipedia for inter-agencies’ collaboration and sharing intelligence data (Osimo, 2008).

(ii) Information dissemination – unilateral distribution of information from government agencies as sources to users (Chua et al., 2012). Web 2.0 applications responsible for information dissemination include blogs and Rich Site Summary (RSS) of what is popularly known as really simple syndication (Chua et al., 2012). Blogs have been used to facilitate different government activities. For example, blogs were used in a French referendum in the EU constitution (Pascu, Osimo, Turlea, Ulbrich, Punie & Burgelman, 2008). Further, blogs have also been used in political campaigns such as the US 2004 presidential election (Pascu et al., 2008). Given the development of Internet technology, RSS facilitates delivery of information to respective users whenever changes to websites are affected (Chua et al., 2012).
(iii) Information organisation – the representation of information contents for smooth search and retrieval processes (Chua et al., 2012). Website contents through social tagging services (also known as folksonomies) can be searched using user-specified keywords (also known as tags) to generate specific website contents (Goh, Chua, Lee & Razikin, 2009; O’Reilly, 2007). Tagging is more flexible to include multiple and overlapping association similar to how the brain associates things (O’Reilly, 2007). For example, folksonomies have been used in government websites to produce specific web contents targeting a specific segment of the population in Canada (Richard, 2009).

(iv) Information sharing – bilateral information flow among government agencies and users (e.g. citizens, business). Information sharing gives power both to the government and the user to produce information (Chua et al., 2012). Information sharing is important in sectors which need a close cooperation between governments and citizens, such as public safety. Web 2.0 applications that facilitate information sharing include social networks, multimedia sharing and discussion forums (Chua et al., 2012). Most governments these days use social network technologies such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter and similar social media in contacting the public to “raise awareness about government policies and broaden their contact base” (Chua et al., 2012, p. 178). On the other hand, multimedia sharing has played a major role in law enforcement agencies. For instance, Osimo (2008) reports that law enforcement agencies have been able to enhance public participation through sharing of uploaded crime scene photos of vehicles parked illegally in the City of New York. Table 4.3 summarises Web 2.0 applications relevant to government activities.
### Table 4.3: Web 2.0 Applications that Support Information Work in Government Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information work</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples of Web 2.0 applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information acquisition</td>
<td>Gathering of information from sources external to government agencies</td>
<td>Discussion forums Wikis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information dissemination</td>
<td>Distribution of information by government agencies to users</td>
<td>Blogs, RSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information organisation</td>
<td>Representation of content to facilitate subsequent search and retrieval</td>
<td>Social tagging services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
<td>Bilateral flow of information between government agencies and users</td>
<td>Multimedia sharing services Social networking services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chua et al. (2012)

Web 2.0 applications in government businesses have enormous advantages with respect to citizens’ participation. Applications such as blogs make government agencies more accessible to any interested user (Chavan, 2004). Nevertheless, the negative side of Web 2.0 applications has been also identified. Privacy has emerged as a sensitive issue pertaining to Web 2.0 in government websites. Some people consider the Web 2.0 application too intrusive and do not like their postings to appear public without their explicit permission (Osimo, 2008). Another challenge is that given the nature of Web 2.0 applications such as YouTube, quality control cannot be guaranteed, as images posted to multi-media platforms are susceptible to manipulation. Further, destructive behaviour such as insults and political criticisms by some contributors might cause other users to abandon participation in the Web 2.0 channel (Osimo, 2008).
Besides the potential of e-government and Web 2.0 in social and political development, the digital divide (section 4.11) facing developing countries is still a challenge in ensuring universal access to IT. Given the situation, many developing countries score a lower e-government development index compared to their counterparts in developed countries (table 4.4). Although developing countries have been improving their e-government development year after year, they still need to do more to improve ICT infrastructure in terms of physical and human factors (United Nations, 2012).

### 4.10 The Role of IT in Governance

This section discusses the various key dimensions of governance in conjunction with the role of IT in these dimensions. Relevant to IT, five dimensions of governance are identified as public participation (Boeva 2002; Heeks, 2009; Meijer, Burger & Ebbers, 2009), public accountability (Diamond, 2003; Jaeger & Bertot, 2010; Koppell, 2005; Pina, Torres & Acerete, 2007; Steffek, 2010), transparency (Koppell, 2005; Otenyo & Lind, 2004; Vaccaro & Madsen, 2009), collaboration (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Hurbean & Danaiata, 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007) and coordination (Andersen, Henriksen, Medaglia, Danziger, 2012).
4.10.1 Public Participation

Participation, generally known as public participation, is an important principle in the governance arena. For the last two decades, it has been difficult to explain governance, effective governance or democracy without mentioning participation. Political scientists and public administrators alike regard public participation as a key principle in influencing policy and decisions (Boeva 2002; Meijer et al., 2009). Public participation is defined as an involvement in political, administrative and social processes (Meijer et al., 2009). Traditionally, public participation involved citizens and government as active constituents of policy and decision cycles. However, Meijer et al. (2009) argue that many forms of public participation are conducted in an interaction between citizens or what they call citizen to citizen interaction (C2C). C2C has become an important interaction mode in the information age facilitated by new technologies. Public participation is divided into three categories: political participation, policy participation and social participation. These three forms of public participation are discussed next.

(i) Political participation is defined as "those activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structure of government, the authorities or the policies of government" (Conway, 2000, p. 3). Generally, citizens are expected to engage in political activities such as voting in elections, joining political parties or running for public office (Conway, 2001). However, voting is regarded as a weak form of democracy as it does not need much effort to participate. On the other hand, a high degree of political participation strengthens democracy through citizens’ engagement in the political process (Barber, 1984). Political participation may involve citizens taking part in activities such as referenda, public hearings, citizens’ panels, focus groups, amongst others (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Political participation does not only influence decision-making processes but also empowers citizens in political agenda settings (Meijer et al., 2009).

(ii) Policy participation is another form of public participation by which citizens are involved in policy implementation (Desai, 1989; Kim, 2011). Public participation of this form is
common in environmental protection. For example, Desai (1989) reports how citizens participate in implementation of environmental policies in the mining sector.

(iii) Social participation concerns an interaction between citizens (Meijer et al., 2009). This form of participation is important in social capital. Putnam (2000) asserts that members of the same society interact with each other to form social ties (bonding) and members of different societies interact with each other to bridge the different societal boundaries.

Table 4.5 summarises the three forms of public participation.

Table 4.5: Three Forms of Public Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Political participation</th>
<th>Policy participation</th>
<th>Social participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influencing agenda-setting and decision-making</td>
<td>Influencing policy implementation</td>
<td>Creating mutual support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public good</td>
<td>Debated in political system</td>
<td>Debated in administrative system</td>
<td>Realized in social networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance for e-govt</td>
<td>Influencing the political system</td>
<td>Influencing the administrative system</td>
<td>Influencing the public sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research community</td>
<td>Political science</td>
<td>Policy sciences</td>
<td>Sociology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Meijer et al. (2009)

Due to its importance in development and policy rhetoric, private and public sectors have embraced participation to achieve collective objective (Provan & Kenis, 2007). The advantage of participation is to empower citizens to gain some control over policy process and facilitate better policy making and implementation (Diamond, 2003; Kim, 2011). To achieve this, participation emphasises inclusion of relevant stakeholders in policy- and decision-making initiatives (Diamond, 2003).

These three forms of public participation are different but it is somehow difficult to separate them from one another (Meijer et al., 2009). Close interrelationship among these forms have always contributed to the term participation to refer to all forms regardless of the existing taxonomy. Meijer et al. (2009) associate this scenario with the famous Habermas’ (1991) coffee shops in London and Vienna. In these shops, citizens used to discuss social issues and political matters at the same time. The challenge that exists in separating one form from others is difficult, such as:
These coffee houses combined political and social participation. Policy participation can, then and now, not always be distinguished from political participation since influencing policy processes also has an influence on political decisions. Even though we acknowledge that distinguishing the types of participation in practice is not always easy (Meijer et al., 2009, p. 102).

Besides the challenges of distinguishing these three forms of public participation, the present study is concerned with governance by which policy- and decision-making processes are the key issues that influence each other. For that matter, political and policy participations are considered to be relevant to the present study. The discussion of the role of IT in public participation follows next.

Information Technology plays a role in facilitating participation and civic engagement in policy- and decision-making process (Bertot, Jaeger & Grimes, 2010; Heeks, 2002). For example, in Africa, IT has been used to facilitate online forums (e-participation) where citizens discuss government budgetary issues and make decision on how much budget should go to development projects (Heeks, 2009). A study conducted by Kang and Gearhart (2010) indicate that the use of web based technologies increases civic engagement among citizens. Another study by Trechsel (2007) in Estonia, a transition country in the European Union, reveals that in the first e-voting in the 2007 national parliamentary election (Riigikogu, Estonian National Parliament), more than 30,000 citizens used the Internet to cast their votes (e-voting). This is another avenue by which the Internet has provided an alternative platform for political participation in transition countries like Estonia. Civil societies have also taken advantage of the Internet to reach members of the public and engage them online in the political sphere. For instance, Bruszt, Vedres and Stark’s (2005) study in Eastern Europe found that civil society websites provided an interactive platform for users to talk to each other.

### 4.10.2 Public Accountability

Public accountability has become an umbrella term describing different means of accountability in the realm of public governance (Steffek, 2010). The concept of accountability has attracted multiple meanings in both public administration and political science fields (Koppell, 2005). Its importance in organisations and public governance is undisputable. It has become “an icon for
effective governance” (Steffek, 2010, p. 184); and a reflection of many “loosely defined political desiderata such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency and integrity” (Behn, 2001, p. 3–6). Accountability can be defined as a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other (Pollitt, 2003, p. 89). According to Roberts and Scapens (1985), accountability as a social relationship is characterised by the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct. In such a relationship, there must be two parties by which the first party is superior (principal) and capable of appointing and demanding a count of the second party’s conduct, while the second party (agent) is compelled to giving such account (Bovens, 2005). To put this scenario in governance terms, Pollitt (2003) calls an accountor – an individual or an agency (actor, Bovens, 2005) obliged to give account of conduct, while a significant other or an accountee (Pollitt, 2003) or accountability forum – “can be a specific person or agency, but can also be a more virtual entity, such as, in case of devout Christians, God or one’s conscience, or, for public managers, the general public” (Bovens, 2005, p. 184). For effective accountability and within the framework of social relations, Bovens (2005) identifies three elements: (a) Obligation – the actor is obliged to give account to the forum for the conduct including cases of failure (Offe, 2011); (b) Information – the forum can interrogate the actor concerning adequacy of information provided; and (c) Judgment – at the end of account giving, the forum should conclude the session by passing judgement on the strength of information provided by the actor. Figure 4.10 summarises the key processes and relationship in the concept of accountability.
On the other hand, public accountability exists only when there is a public sphere, traditionally known to be the citizenry (Steffek, 2010). Public accountability therefore concerns the social relationship that the public (citizens) hold accountable – the elected representatives for their performance (Offe, 2011; Steffek, 2010). It is a democratic requirement that officials with public responsibilities should be answerable to the people for their performance of public duties (Dowdle, 2006). Seffek (2010) asserts that given the emphasis on citizens in public accountability, it comes very close to political accountability or democratic accountability. Steffek (2010) further argues that:

Elections are the key mechanism of democratic accountability, as they provide an incentive for policy-makers to explain their conduct and an opportunity for citizens to sanction them. The touchstone of democratic accountability is the responsiveness of officeholders to citizens’ expectations and concerns. However, citizens not only expect
public officials to respond to their interests and concerns but also to respect the law, to
treat like cases in like manner, and to spend public funds parsimoniously. These criteria
of good conduct may be assessed not primarily via elections but by judicial review,
financial auditing or hierarchical control within public administration (p. 49).

In public accountability, good performance is normally not a big concern but, when it comes to
poor conduct, it is. Doing justice to both sides of conducts, it is also recommended to reward
public managers whenever they achieve good performance (Koppell, 2005). Next, different
classifications of public accountability are discussed as reported in public administration
literature.

**Types of public accountability**

Several scholars have given different topologies of accountability. For example, Koppel (2005)
categorised accountability based on five overlapping dimensions (Transparency, Responsibility,
Responsiveness, Liability and Controllability). Another popular topology was given by Behn
(2001) who classified accountability in terms of finances, fairness, abuse of power and
performance. Behn’s (2001) four-element topology provides useful insights of accountability but
it pays less attention to the nature of accountability (Koppell, 2005). Related to Koppell’s (2005)
classification, Romzek and Dubnick (1987) proposed a four-type topology of accountability.
Their topology is based on two dimensions of internal and external source of control, from which
hierarchical, legal, professional and political accountabilities are derived. Koppell (2005) argues
that Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) topology usefulness lies in its focus on control. He maintains
that Romzek and Dubnick (1987) mix types which are substantially different. Overall all
topologies of accountability given by different scholars are useful as they have provided different
approaches. However, in the present study, the researcher adopts Bovens’ (2005) scheme of
accountability as it provides a much useful and detailed elaboration of the relationship between
actors. Based on different social relationships between actor and forum, Bovens (2005) presents
several types of public accountabilities as discussed below:

(i) Political accountability: This is a type of accountability which is mostly relevant in the
realm of political sphere. Elected representatives and political parties (collectively
referred to as public managers) are obliged to appear to higher bodies, depending on the
political system in a particular national-state. For example, in the parliamentary system,
public managers would appear to a parliamentary committee for parliamentary-related enquiries (Bovens, 2005).

(ii) Organisational accountability: In this type, public managers are compelled to account for their conduct to organisational superiors. Generally, such accounts are given regularly in daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis. These can be in the form of performance reviews. However, other scholars do not categorise organisational accountability as public accountability, as account giving is confined internally and out of the general public (Bovens, 2005).

(iii) Legal accountability: This type of accountability follows legal procedures and standards prescribed in penal codes, legal procedures, statutes or the like. Public managers are sometimes summoned by courts or specialised tribunals to account for their acts or on behalf of agencies they represent (Bovens, 2005).

(iv) Professional accountability: In this type, public managers who belong to professional associations or bodies such as engineering body for engineers are obliged to give account to these associations and bodies. Professional bodies are bodies guided by codes of conduct that every registered member is compelled to follow. This type of accountability concerns professionals in respective associations. However, in some cases it is possible for public managers to account for their conduct in more than one forum for the same conduct (Bovens, 2005).

(v) Administrative accountability: In this type, administrative forums include auditors, controller and inspectors who receive accounts. In many countries there are well-established national audits that carry out regular audits based on stipulated guidelines and standards. Public managers in public agencies are directly required to account to these administrative forums for their performance (Bovens, 2005).

The objective of accountability in public administration and governance is to ensure that public managers perform their duties as required by the public, at the same time respecting the law by treating like cases in like manner and spending public funds parsimoniously (Diamond, 2003; Steffek, 2010). Diamond (2003) argues that rule of law is impliedly a component derived from accountability.
In the era of new governance (effective governance), public accountability is faced with challenges arising from the fuzzy boundary between public and private. Given the multi-level participation of both state and non-state actors in governance, it is difficult to know exactly whom to hold accountable for policy outcomes (Offe, 2011). Another challenge is based on performance of bureaucracy in a globalisation age. Scholars have argued that failure by states to meet social, political and economic objectives is likely to go unpunished for vague reasons such as “beyond our control” (Offe, 2011). States use “blame game” tactics to escape accountability. The global financial crisis and other global crisis acts are blamed for such policy failure outcomes. Offe (2011) argues that when incumbent government fails to deliver as per citizens’ expectation, there is a tendency of the elites to use “Margaret Thatcher’s Tina argument – there is no alternative” tactic as the mechanism to explain alleged policy failures. Offe (2011, p. 457) also argues that governments have many mechanisms to avoid accountability. These include acts such as “subtle forms of control over the media, government-sponsored information campaigns, the tactical timing of decisions, clientelism and keeping failures secret”.

In the digital world we live in, IT plays a role in facilitating accountability in public sectors. It is presupposed that IT can assist in making different public officials accountable to citizens by deterring unethical conducts of the officials (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). IT can expose the culprits by exposing their wrongdoing, thereby creating deterrence mechanism for individuals thinking of committing unethical acts such as corruption (Livingston & Walter-Drop, 2012). On the other hand, in OECD countries, the use of the Internet in disseminating government information (e.g. financial reports) to the citizens improved financial accountability. Through the Internet, these reports are easily available around the clock (Pina, Torres & Acerete, 2007). Further, the study by Waema and Mitullah (2007) conducted in Kenya in two municipal councils of Nyeri and Mavoko, found that e-government improved financial transparency and accountability in the municipal councils.

4.10.3 Transparency

The development of information and communication technologies has brought about change in the form of information transaction, which has systemised the transparency of governance (Kim, Halligen, Cho, Oh & Eikenberry, 2005, p. 650).
The discussion of transparency goes together with issues related to information in ways such as how it is produced, by whom, to whom and the very means of dissemination. Information is a powerful tool in the political arena. It serves to inform the public so that they can make an informed political decision. Without transparency, politics is bound to fail. In public governance, the main producer and repository of information is the government (Islam, 2006). Its conduct about information disclosure has impact on information properties. Generally, the producer or owner of information has the power to determine what information is transmitted (Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova & Shleifer, 2001). The concept of transparency has attracted various definitions and there is no commonly agreed definition for transparency. Nevertheless, many definitions of transparency focus on “openness” of an organisation. Koppell (2005) defines transparency as openness of the government which results in regular review and questioning. In the present study, the researcher adopts this definition as it captures the actual phenomenon and its outcome. In this definition, there are key elements which hint to us the intention of transparency:

A tool to facilitate the evaluation of public institutions, the information provided needs to account for their performance. At the same time, the public must be able to interrogate the information provided and use it to hold institutions accountable (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005, p. 4-5).

Therefore, it is important to note that transparency and accountability are related in such a way that the former is a literal value of the latter (Diamond, 2003; Koppell, 2005).

Answering the “to whom” question, openness of the government should result in disclosure of information to “the public, the press, interest groups, and other parties interested in the government” (Koppell, 2005). As a result of performance review, “alleged wrongdoing or perceived failure” must be investigated and explained to the public (Koppell, 2005). Information has become one of the basic human rights by which several countries such as the USA, Sweden and many others have incorporated rights for information in various acts including freedom of information (FOI) (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005; Islam, 2006). The trend of adopting FOI laws is encouraging as more countries are providing guarantees to citizens’ access to information from public institutions (Bellver & Kaufmann, 2005). However, the quality, timeliness and relevance of information and how the public receives this information determine the level and quality of
citizen input in policy cycles and decisions. Good policymaking requires timely and up-to-date information and sharing such information, so that citizens can monitor, analyse bureaucracy conducts and make them accountable for their performance (Islam, 2006). Research findings indicate that countries with better information flows are also governed better (Islam, 2006). It is only possible to hold the government accountable if citizens know what their government is doing (Diamond, 2003; Heeks, 2009; Pina, Torres & Royo, 2007). Islam (2006) also asserts that political leaders, who know that information about their performance is available to citizens and which can affect their re-election, tend to be accountable to voters. Therefore, one of the goals of transparency is to ensure that the government designs and implements policies that reflect the will of the people to foster economic, social and political development and reduce poverty (Islam, 2006). Scholars argue that transparency serves different objectives, depending on what emphasis the government is targeting (Otenyo & Lind, 2004). Figure 4.11 indicates these objectives.
For instance, e-democracy and e-governance facilitate transparency to achieve open government initiatives (Fong, 2009). On the other hand, transparency is used to combat corruption in public sectors (Ball, 2009; Bertot, Jaeger & Grimes, 2010; Diamond, 2003).

In open government strategies, IT improves transparency in public sectors by making public information easily available through the use of digital media (e.g. Internet, websites) (Armstrong, 2011; Starr, 2010). Applications of IT have revolutionised the information landscape, as it can make opaque organisation transparent by facilitating information disclosure concerning its practices to the public (Vaccaro & Madsen, 2009). Research findings indicate that use of e-government increases transparency. For example, Guanghua (2009), conducted a study in 2005.
at Nanhai City Government in a transition country of China, found that e-government increased transparency in public expenditure. On the other hand, a study on transparency of websites across 14 countries found that, although IT can increase the level of accountability, it does not directly promote transparency, but is contingent to the bureaucratic behaviour of the agency that built it (Wong & Welch, 2004). Wong and Welch (2004) used the external view approach based on the logic that websites’ openness reflects bureaucratic openness of the agency. Based on their study, they conclude that IT reinforces the existing power relation of the bureaucracy and citizens, rather than changing it. In that regard, IT can be used to control information or sometimes limit interaction with citizens in selected areas.

4.10.4 Collaboration

Achieving effective governance requires that the policy- and decision-making process involve a network of stakeholders (Provan & Kenis, 2007). In the networked environment where contemporary governments operate, collaboration has become important to ensure that all governance actors interact to achieve effective governance (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Provan & Kenis, 2007). Thomson, Perry and Miller (2007, p. 3) define collaboration as:

... a process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions.

In the context of governance, actors can be categorised into groups that comprise of state and non-state actors. All these actors have shared goals to achieve effective governance (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007).

With diverse actors located in different geographies, collaboration among actors can be enhanced by the use of IT. For instance, the Internet has made collaboration easier and possible at any moment of any day and can pull actors together either informally or formally (Thomson et al., 2007). A study by Hurbean and Danaiata (2008), conducted in 2006 and 2007 in the City Hall of Timisoara (local government administration) in a transition state of Romania, indicates that e-government improved communication and interaction with the public. In another study conducted in Slovenia in 2001 and 2004, Hlebec, Manfreda and Vehovar (2008) found that the
Internet was also used for communication within the social network by network members for social support. Empirical evidence on 245 US manufacturing firms indicates that the use of IT positively impacted both intra- and inter-organisational collaboration (Sanders, 2007).

4.10.5 Coordination

Groups of different actors which exist in network governance need to be coordinated to ensure that their efforts result in shared goal achievement (Provan & Kenis, 2007). Coordination refers to “communicating, organising and disseminating information, and keeping partners alert to the jointly determined rules made for governing relationships” (Thomson et al., 2007, p. 4). Effective governance principles require that government decentralise its decision-making structures to allow more citizens engagement in public decisions. Decentralisation of government structures entails that a central position should act as administrator playing the coordinating role within the network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2007). This role includes communicating, organising and disseminating information to and from the citizens, governance interest groups and government agencies.

Diverse actors’ composition in governance requires that the coordination issue must be well addressed to ensure that all concerned governance actors are taken on board. This can be achieved by the use of IT (e.g. the Internet and web-based technologies) to facilitate coordination among actors (Ferro & Sorrentino, 2010; Kim, Pan & Pan, 2007). Research findings indicate that the use of IT in coordination within government departments and with external entities (e.g. citizens, businesses) has a positive impact on coordination (Andersen, et al., 2010). For example, a study by Guanghua (2009) conducted in 2005 at Nanhai City Government in a transition country of China, found that e-government enhanced inter-departmental communication and coordination. On the other hand, the use of IT in collaborative activities is impacted by cultural aspects by necessitating physical contacts among the coordinated parties. For example, a study on coordination within a UK multinational company in China indicates that IT-enabled coordination is only effective when coupled with face-to-face contacts (Liu & Westrup, 2003). This has implications for the sole dependence on IT in some environments and thus calls for consideration of cultural concerns.
4.11 The Digital Divide

Many countries in the world are embracing ICT to improve social, political and economic development. There are also major concerns regarding the widening of the gap in ICT access between the developed and developing world. The adoption and use of ICTs in developing countries is far behind their counterparts in the developed countries (Ifinedo & Singh, 2011). The frequently cited reason for such a difference is the digital divide. Digital divide may be defined as an inequality in access, distribution, and use of information and communication technologies between two or more populations (Wilson, 2006). The divide, between those who have access to ICTs and those who do not, has a major impact on the new network society where access to information and means of communication are no longer considered to be privileges.

In the mid-1990s, when a link between the information society and the Internet become evident, countries in the developed world took initiatives to fight the differences in access to the Internet. They increased investment in ICT infrastructure and established Internet access in public places such as schools and libraries (Planmo, 2002). However, such initiatives increased the digital divide between the developed and developing countries². Although there have been some improvements in Internet access worldwide, still two-thirds of the world population remain unconnected to the Internet (ITU, 2012). The ITU 2012 Report indicates that Europe and America rank higher than Africa. That is, 68.4 per cent of Europe’s population is connected to the Internet; and 53.4 per cent of America’s population is also connected to the Internet. While in Africa, only 12.4 per cent of the population has access to the Internet. According to ITU, the developing world is badly hit by the digital divide – by the end of 2011, only a quarter of the inhabitants had access to the Internet (ITU, 2012). There are also variations in access to the Internet within developing countries whereby Sub-Saharan Africa takes the last position in Internet connectivity. From these statistics, it can be concluded that the majority of the population in developing countries remains unconnected to the Internet. This has negative implications for the “e” initiatives such as e-democracy, e-government, e-governance and the like. The majority remain disconnected from participating in such IT-enabled activities and their associated benefits (Acilar, 2011).

²Countries classified based on United Nations’ M49 standard
The digital divide also affects different social groups based on demographic factors. A number of studies found that access to ICTs is moderated by geographic location, income, gender, education and age (Hill & Hughes, 1998; Mossberger et al., 2006; Norris, 1999). Those who have access to ICTs are mostly found in urban areas where ICT infrastructures are more developed than in rural areas (Sedoyeka, 2012). Research findings also indicate that people with a higher income and a higher level of education have a higher possibility of possessing and using ICTs (Ho, 2002), and are mostly men living in urban areas. Studies on gender and Internet access have consistently reported that women are less likely to use computers and the Internet than their male counterparts. This has been noted especially at the early stages of technology adoption (Ono & Zavodny, 2009). However, the access gap between social groups (women and men) has a tendency to close over time, especially when the technology becomes diffused in the society (Ono & Zavodny, 2009). For instance, Brannstrom (2012) reports that the ICT access gap between men and women in Kenya from 2000 to 2008 was closing and almost diminishing. Based on these results, the gender divide is shifting from the lack of access to the Internet to intensity and frequency of Internet use (Ono & Zavodny, 2009).

Age is another parameter which has been widely reported in the digital divide literature. Research findings indicate that different age groups have different patterns of Internet use. According to a recent ITU report, younger ages tend to use the Internet more than older people in both developed and developing countries. It was found that 77 per cent of those under the age of 25 years use the Internet, compared to 71 per cent of those of the age of 25 years and above in developed countries. In developing countries, 30 per cent of those who use the Internet are under 25 years old compared to 23 per cent of 25 years and older people.

4.11.1 Implications of the Digital Divide for E-Democracy

Earlier in this chapter, the researcher hinted at the impact of the digital divide on various ICT/IT-enabled endeavours. Several studies (e.g. Dobra, 2012; Hill & Sen, 2005; Thompson, 2008) have demonstrated the importance of the Internet in politics and democracy. However, the digital divide has a detrimental effect on e-democracy. If a large segment of the population is kept out of democratic participation because of lack of access to computers and the Internet, scholars suggest that such a situation is bad news for e-democracy. This also applies for all IT-enabled
activities in public undertakings. This also suggests that e-democracy will marginalise people who don’t have access to computers and the Internet (Planmo, 2002; Starr, 2010). However, an Internet pessimist such as Wilhelm (2000) argues that the Internet is a digital replica of the real world; it keeps the status of an existing political sphere. With a slightly different position, Norris (2001) suggests that the Internet serves to reinforce the political activism of those who are already in politics; those who are not politically active lag behind in the digital public sphere. Norris (2001) referred to this phenomenon as “democratic divide” defined as the “differences between those who do, and those who do not, use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilise and participate in public life” (p. 4). Based on the above discussion, it seems there is a tradeoff between equality and inequality in terms of Internet access. When equality is a priority, then e-democracy is not a strategy to embrace as the only political channel for all. Planmo (2002) suggests that key issues concerning the public should be kept off the Internet until most people are connected. Shelley, Thrane and Shulman (2006) argue that the Internet is widening the gap between those who can and those who cannot access the Internet. Further, they argue that “as society becomes increasingly dependent on e-government, social barriers will be compounded if non-electronic voices are marginalised from political participation” (p. 48). On the other hand, inequality is preferred as it is better to have few participants rather than none. Scholars have suggested that inequality cannot be used as an excuse for people to refrain from the Internet. Following the same logic, they argue that if exclusion is a serious issue, then people should also stop debating in print news media, as not everyone can afford to buy a newspaper!

The historical perspective of the digital divide has shaped the meaning we attach to the phenomenon. Earlier, it was a normal tendency to refer to the digital divide as a gap involving access to new ICTs. However, in recent days, the digital divide is taking on a new meaning; it refers to the gap in the intensity and nature of IT use (van Dijk, 2005). This new meaning to the concept of the digital divide or what Hargittai (2002) refers to as a second-level digital divide, has implications for activities performed online. Min (2010) suggests that, given the trend that Internet access is increasing worldwide, “what matters is not access to the Internet, but how people actually use it”. Although, Min’s (2010) remarks may not have a hundred per cent relevance to developing countries’ contexts, given the marginal number of Internet users, but the researcher finds it useful to reflect on what people really do online. Studies indicate that when the Internet access gap is closed, another divide emerges. For example, Min (2010, p. 32) found
that Internet use in politics is not equal for all people. It is largely influenced by one’s Internet skills and motivational factors. Min (2010) suggests that Internet use in political activities creates “usage divide” that contradicts democratic equality in the political sphere. The digital divide is a complex phenomenon which tends to shift to a different layer once one aspect of the divide is resolved (Min, 2010). This serves as a warning bell against the deterministic view of IT and the Internet to bring about “democratic utopia” (Min, 2010, p. 32).

The next section will present the ugly face of IT.

4.12 The Dark Side of IT in Democracy and Governance

The role of IT in democracy and governance discussed in previous sections so far dwells on the positive side of IT, as more enthusiasts suggest; that is, the enhancing capability of IT in governance and democracy. IT may have unintended negative implications that undermine governance and democracy. This section presents the negative aspects of IT in the processes of democracy and governance. Basically, the negative side of IT can be described based on two dimensions: (i) the digital divide and (ii) the negative outcomes due to its use.

4.12.1 Marginalisation of Disadvantaged Groups

To participate in the online forums and other e-governance initiatives needs a certain level of IT literacy, access to computers and the Internet. However, due to digital divide in transition states, a large segment of the population is IT illiterate and does not have access to computer and the Internet either. As indicated in the 2012 ITU report, only 12.4 per cent of the entire population in Africa had access to the Internet by 2011. Further, these are urban dwellers, mostly educated men with considerable economic income (Tolbert & Gilbert, 2006). This means the use of digital platform in public governance and democracy is likely to put people with less income, the aged and less educated at an inequitable position due to difference in digital skills and access to IT resources (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010; OECD, 2003; Starr, 2010). The situation is exacerbated by the fact that a large number of women, particularly in Africa, are already disconnected from governance activities (Shayo, 2011). IT will further disconnect this group of women and other already disadvantaged people from the centre of participatory governance processes (Ciborra, 2005; Davis, 2010). Consequently, few individuals are likely to dominate democratic forums and other e-governance activities (Starr, 2010).
4.12.2 Privacy and Surveillance

The increase in use of IT worldwide is posing a serious privacy concern to many users. While personal information remains private, the Internet is susceptible to cyber-attack. Individuals or groups can easily collect, manipulate and use personal information not directly linked to a legitimate party (Warkentin, Gefen, Pavlou & Rose, 2002). It is the fact that several governments in the world monitor activities of individuals under surveillance programmes for what they call national security (Bremmer, 2010). While surveillance by itself is not a bad thing, it becomes one when information is used to suppress democratic and human rights. For example, Vodafone’s content global head of standards, Annie Mullins, reports that in 2008 private information of individuals was used to identify individuals who were protesting the food price increase of government-subsidised bakeries in Egypt (Espiner, 2009). Many authoritarian regimes use IT to suppress opposition and democratic voices. They control what individuals can see and what they cannot see (Bremmer, 2010). For example, China uses heavy firewall technology to control citizens’ online activities and their access to Internet materials (Bremmer, 2010; MacKinnon, 2011). Given this situation, electronic mobilisation for policy change rarely exists in China (MacKinnon, 2011). To ensure that China does not portray a suppressive ideology towards its people, it has established a “low-tech” mechanism to safeguard its interest online (Bremmer, 2010). Bremmer (2010, p. 4) contend that:

The government has created the 50 Cent Party, an army of online commentators that it pays for each blog entry or message-board post promoting the Chinese Communist Party's line on sensitive subjects. This is a simple, inexpensive way for governments to disseminate and disguise official views. Authoritarian states do not use technology simply to block the free flow of unwelcome ideas. They also use it to promote ideas of their own.

Such controls and authoritarian propaganda activities online afforded by the Internet itself are intended to manipulate online conversations to limit democratic freedom and rights of individuals. These are means of authoritarian regimes to cling to power while allowing a flow of information to its citizens (Bremmer, 2010). As mentioned earlier, IT simplifies these processes thereby increasing the possibilities of such acts to happen (Bremmer, 2010; OECD, 2003).
4.12.3 Hate Speeches and Hate Groups

History tells us on how other communication technologies such as radios were used to incite violence and caused genocide in different parts of the world including Rwanda in 1994 (Livingston, 2011). With more efficient features, IT is even more dangerous than previous mass media technologies. IT is more attractive for committing evil acts as it lowers information cost, persuading individuals or groups with bad motives to accomplish these acts (Livingston, 2011). IT is being used to disseminate information intended to disrupt peace, incite violence and cause political instability (Livingston, 2011).

The Internet has enormous interactivity and anonymity options which persuade individuals to accomplish bias and hate speech acts (Erjavec & Kovacic, 2012). Hate speech may be defined as “an expression that is abusive, insulting, intimidating, harassing, and/or inciting violence, hatred, or discrimination. It is directed against people on the basis of their race, ethnic origin, religion, gender, age, physical condition, disability, sexual orientation, political conviction” (Erjavec & Kovacic, 2012, p. 900). For the recent past, online platforms are increasingly used to propagate hate speech (Nielsen, 2010) and recruit hate group members (Bremmer, 2010). Shiraz, Ngwenyama and Morawczynski (2010) contend that radical hate groups use IT as a medium for meeting and collaborative activities. Hate speech and hate groups psychologically affect victims and cause trauma (Khalil & Hassan, 2013). They terrorise other people thereby undermining their democratic freedom (Shiraz et al., 2010). Terrorist groups are increasingly using the Internet to plan and achieve terror attacks. For example, it is believed that the Internet was used to accomplish the London bombing attack of July 2005 (Lyall, 2006). These acts demonstrate how IT can undermine governance and democratic activities.

On other occasions, the Internet has been used to propagate hate speech and manipulate pictures to incite violence. For example, Singh and Athrady (2012) report that YouTube was used to disseminate images and morphed videos in India’s Assam targeting the North Eastern community of ethnic Bodos and Muslims. As a result, such an act did not only disturb peace and public order but also threatened national security. In Russia, the hate group “skinheads” has used the Internet to upload filmed murderous attacks on dark-skinned immigrants from Caucasus and Central Asia (Bremmer, 2010). These examples and many others demonstrate how IT can be
a very dark tool to undermine security and public order which are important ingredients of governance.

4.12.4 Reliability of Information

The sophistication of new information technologies is challenging the reliability of IT-generated information. Many existing IT applications (e.g. Blogs and online forums) are offering individuals with capabilities of publishing information without a need for an IT expert assistance. It is increasingly difficult to ascertain the reliability of Internet-generated information (OECD, 2003). The Internet is very good in downloading “anything but not good in differentiating things in terms of bad or good” (OECD, 2003, p. 157). Online forum analysts argue that, without regulation, many online forums are dominated by emotional debates, political criticisms and abusive verbal exchange (OECD, 2003; Osimo, 2008). Unfortunately, this practice may not really contribute to policy formulation and probably deters individuals from online participatory governance.

Having discussed the negative side of IT, the next section presents governance processes carefully selected for the present study.

4.13 Governance Processes Relevant to the Present Study

In the context of the present study, electoral processes refer to those processes needed to ensure governance. The following governance processes were identified as important and relevant to governance in transition states as suggested in the literature.

4.13.1 The Electoral Processes

The importance of electoral processes has been identified in the literature as a corner stone of democratisation in transition states to ensure free and fair elections (Ellis, 2009; Norman, 2011). These processes concern issues relating to voter registration (Norman, 2011), freedom of political contestants (Hartlyn et al., 2008), election results (Hartlyn et al., 2008; Norman, 2011) and the electoral laws guiding political contestation (Franck, 1995; Trimble, 1997). Free and fair elections provide an opportunity for citizens to hold politicians accountable (Adsera, 2003;
Diamond, 2003), and are the only mechanism through which governments acquire democratic legitimacy (Carothers, 2002; Shi & Lu, 2010).

However, these elections only provide effective horizontal accountability when electoral processes are effective to guarantee their credibility (Norman, 2011). The literature clearly indicates that electoral processes impact on credibility of elections and subsequent democracy and governance (Norman, 2011). Recognising the importance of electoral processes in democratisation, many international bodies are taking measures to ensure electoral processes in transition states are affective. Measures such as electoral management aid are provided to assist transition states in carrying out credible elections and improve democracy and governance (Kelley, 2012; Nielsen & Nielson, 2010; Savun & Tirone, 2011; Scott & Steele, 2011; Van de Walle, 2012). These electoral processes are foundation for democratisation in transition states.

4.13.2 Processes for Combating Corruption in Government

The international bodies have cited corruption to be a major challenge in transition states (Fayissa & Nsiah, 2013; Hamm et al., 2012; Kaufmann et al., 2000) and many transition states have established anti-corruption strategies including establishing anti-corruption bureau and enacting anticorruption laws (UNECA-OECD, 2012). Processes for combating corruption determine effectiveness of governance (UNECA-OECD, 2012). Many studies include processes for combating corruption in government to measure effectiveness of government strategies in curbing corruption (e.g. Freedom House, 2011; Knack, 2001; Transparency International, 2013).

4.13.3 Non-governmental Organisation (NGOs) Operations

NGOs are important organisations in transition states particularly in those countries where the opposition political parties are weak and not well developed. The literature suggests that NGOs help in creating political society (Linz & Stepan, 1996) and act as pressure groups to demand reforms for governance improvement (Mason, 2011). However, free environment is important for NGOs’ to effectively operate and participate in ensuring effective governance (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Gastil, 1988; Linz & Stepan, 1996).
**4.13.4 Judicial Processes**

The judicial processes were selected due to their importance in ensuring rule of law (Ahrens, 2007, Diamond, 2003; Scott & Sturm, 2006). Judges and prosecutors are primary officials in the judiciary that determine the effectiveness of judicial system through the processes involved in deciding cases. The judiciary is an overseer of rule of law, which can limit the predatory behaviour of the government and other powerful actors (Ahrens, 2007) which in turn ensures effective governance (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Diamond (2003) argues that governance can only be effective if it is strained by the rule of law. That is, ensuring laws are applied equally to all people - impartiality (Ahrens, 2007; Diamond, 2003; Stromberg, 2000).

The next section presents the discussion of governance processes in details.

**4.14 Governance Processes**

Information technology does not act out of context in affecting public organisations. E-government accountability is more about nations and bureaucracies than simply about technology per se. The effect of e-government on accountability of public organisation is affected both by the civil service system within which it is embedded and by its agency-specific organisational characteristics (Wong & Welch, 2004, p. 289)

The role of IT in governance presented in section 4.10 above is largely influenced by the quality of state institutions and/or behaviour of the bureaucracy. State institutions play a major role in determining how IT and different actors of governance perform their democratic functions to improve governance. For example, studies indicate that bureaucrats may use IT to control information or intensify the existing power relation with citizens, thereby limiting the potential of IT in democratisation and effective governance initiatives (Wong & Welch, 2004). Similarly, the government can exercise different mechanisms to limit activities aiming at improving governance such as horizontal and vertical accountability, by using state institutions (Diamond, 2003; Islam, 2006) as discussed below:

**4.14.1 Electoral Laws and Framework**

In the political contestation arena, especially after the general election results have been announced, evaluation of the electoral process is produced – normally tagged with words like
“fair” and/or “free”, in some situations preceded by “not”. Free and fair connote the quality of the whole process of the election. Electoral processes are essential elements of democracy which also determine the credibility of election results (Norman, 2011). Election results would be credible if the processes creating them were followed based on accepted procedures and standards. Fair laws in electoral processes must have two characteristics: i) created and applied through a legitimate process accepted by those to whom the laws are addressed, and ii) must produce just results (Franck, 1995). However, laws can be created by the legitimate process but be unfair because they fail to produce just results or vice versa (Trimble, 1997). Electoral laws that restrict, for example, political participation of the citizenry, cannot produce just election results.

Political participation is one of the democratic rights of citizens by which eligible citizens participate in political activities such as voting in general elections or being voted into public office (universal and equal suffrage) (Conway, 2001; Dahl, 1989). When citizens have opportunities to participate in political decisions, their potential to change state bureaucracy is higher than when there are no such opportunities (Diamond, 2003). For these political engagements to happen, laws guiding the electoral processes must provide a supportive environment for citizens and political candidates to exercise their political rights. However, it is worth noting that voting guarantee is not enough to provide effective political decisions. States are required to guarantee fair electoral governance, encompassing all key activities and rules governing the electoral processes, such as practices and election procedures, electoral competition, campaigns, voter registration, vote counting and certifying results (Hartlyn et al., 2008).

A flaw in any activity in the electoral processes negatively affects the election result and subsequently the quality of governance. There have been reported incidents of disputing election results in many developing countries due to electoral process irregularities. For example, Rawlence (2005) reports that some citizens in Zanzibar were denied voter registration because they were supporters of the opposition political party. And elsewhere, election-related flaws have been reported which gave rise to questionable quality of the election process. For example, Nigeria’s 2011 general election had more than 100 per cent voter turnout (Gold, 2012). In such a situation it is difficult to authenticate the final results of the political contestation. It is therefore
argued that poor electoral governance, of which electoral laws and framework are a subset, hampers democratic voices from being heard and largely prevent citizens from holding bureaucracy accountable (Adsera, Boix & Payne, 2003; Diamond, 2003). So the quality of electoral laws and framework guiding the electoral processes determine the quality of the political participation of the citizenry.

4.14.2 Freedom of the Press and Nongovernmental Organisations

The press is an important sector in informing the public about different issues taking place in the public sphere. Free and independent media act as a conduit for disseminating information from the source to the target. Diamond (2003) asserts that, without the free and independent media, it is difficult to realise transparency in the public sector, as transparency to a large extent depends on the available information. For example, Diamond (2003) further argues that controlling corruption requires a press that is free from intimidation and restraint. Brunetti and Weder’s (2003) study found that countries with high freedom of the press have less corruption. It follows, therefore, that effective functioning of the press depends on how free it is to report violation of governance principles such as corruption. Gitlin (1980) contends that mass media often support political, social and ideological institutions of which they are a part. As transparency determines accountability, it is plausible to believe that once there is no transparency, it is difficult to hold the bureaucracy accountable (Diamond, 2003; Heeks, 2009). This implies that control of political accountability depends on available information among the public (Adsera et al., 2003). This claim is well supported by research findings by Adsera et al. (2003) which indicate that well-informed citizens influence accountability of politicians – as political accountability requires free press to effectively communicate information and citizens also need freedom of information rights to hold the bureaucrats accountable. Diamond (2003) argues that in countries where citizens are free, those countries are also likely to have high level of transparency, accountability and participation.

Turning to NGOs, like press freedom, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also need a free environment to steer the public to demand democratic changes geared to improved governance. Many NGOs have been involved in governance-related initiatives to promote the welfare of citizens. For example, NGOs in India, the USA, Russia, China, Taiwan, Algeria and elsewhere in
the world have organised anticorruption demonstrations demanding changes to control corruption (Themudo, 2013). Nevertheless, such demonstrations, where they were peacefully allowed to take place, is an indication of the freedom of NGOs. NGOs effectively work better in democratic states where freedom and general human rights are respected. But they also require a free and independent media to support their functions in reaching the public and mobilising them to mount pressure on the government. Themudo’s (2013) longitudinal study using two samples of 40 and 118 countries found that civil society is dependent on press freedom for effective functioning.

It is clear from the above empirical evidence that freedom of the press and NGOs are paramount factors in promoting governance. However, the state as the guardian of the public has the obligation to provide such freedom, and protection to whistle blowers. But, this remains at the discretion of the incumbent government. Normally, corrupt governments will not provide reasonable freedom necessary for effective reporting, and may even resort to news censorship (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). In the case of NGOs, it can be said that vibrant NGOs require a democratic state and a strong civil society equally requires a strong and responsive state (Foley & Edwards, 1996). In other words, NGOs and civil societies in general perform better in a free environment. To conclude, how well are the roles of NGOs performed? This question was asked during the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government and the answer was: “Depends a great deal on the political and cultural environment in which civil society organisations operate” (Kim et al., 2005, p. 652).

4.14.3 Independence of the Judiciary

The judiciary, as the apparatus normally constitutionally vested with power to oversee justice, is important in practices of effective governance. As pointed out earlier in this section, the state institution and the nature of the judicial system in terms of impartiality in delivering justice in any country are important determinants of the rule of law (Scott & Sturm, 2006). An independent judiciary ensures that bureaucrats and other actors “stick to rules of the game” (Ahrens, 2007). Overall, rule of law and other governance dimensions largely depend on government institutions to exercise impartiality (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Impartiality refers to the practice of government officials exercising public power to implement laws and policies without taking
account of anything about the citizen or case that is not stipulated in the law or policy (Stromberg, 2000). The rule of law and the judicial system in general are related in such a way that the former is exercised by the latter and both together have impact on governance (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Diamond (2003) argues that:

Governance can only be good and effective when it is restrained by the law, when the law is applied equally to the mighty and the meek and when there are professional independent authorities to enforce the law in a neutral, predictable fashion (p. 5).

The above section presented different components of governance processes and how such processes impact on governance and influenced by government practices. As pointed out in the opening remarks at the beginning of this section, IT does not act in isolation (Wong & Welch, 2004). It impacts on, and is impacted by, external pressures and governance processes while these two elements impact on each other. The next sections present this interplay between IT, external pressures and governance processes.

### 4.15 The Interplay between IT, Governance Processes and External Pressures

Previous sections have established that IT impacts on governance processes and external pressures, while these in turn impact on IT. This section presents the review of literature on these factors.

#### 4.15.1 Impact of Information Technology on External Pressures

This subsection presents the review of literature about the impact of IT on globalisation and foreign aid, by highlighting both negative and positive impacts on developing countries.

#### 4.15.1.1 Impact of Information Technology on Globalisation

Information Technology (IT) is at the heart of globalisation. IT, specifically the Internet, has contributed to the globalisation phenomenon worldwide (Choi, 2010). Behind the development of globalisation is the availability of information across the planet as well as time space at low cost. IT makes information from the production scene available within a fraction of a second to many recipients located in different parts of the world (Livingston & Walter-Drop, 2012). IT has
a tendency of lowering transaction and collaboration costs, thereby helping individuals and countries in carrying out economic activities at a global level (Thiemann, Fleming & Mueller, 2012). A number of studies have found significant relationships between the Internet and economic globalisation. For example, using panel data for 151 countries for the period from 1990 to 2006, Choi (2010) found that an increase in Internet users contributed to the increase of service export and import. A ten per cent increase in Internet users per hundred people resulted in the increase in services trade from 0.23 per cent to 0.42 per cent (Choi, 2010). Many other studies such as of Freund and Weinhold (2004) and Clarke (2008) have found similar results in the relationship between the Internet and import/export businesses.

The Internet also impacts on foreign direct investments (FDI). The Internet facilitates open transactions in business dealings and reduces international communication and search costs (Choi, 2003). Consequently, the Internet reduces entry barriers in international markets as entry costs are significantly lowered (Choi, 2003). It has been also argued that the Internet improves transparency and reduces corruption in host countries, thereby creating a conducive environment for doing business (Choi, 2003; Lio, Liu & Ou, 2011). As a result, international investors prefer to invest in countries with well-developed Internet infrastructures (Choi, 2003). Several studies have found a significant relationship between the Internet and FDI. For example, using panel data from 14 source countries and 53 host countries, Choi (2003) found that a ten per cent increase in Internet hosts or users in host countries increased FDI by more than two per cent. Based on these empirical evidences, IT defines globalisation hence researchers have dubbed it as the technology of the current era of globalisation (Hummels, 2007). On the other hand, IT contributes to inequalities between developed and developing countries in terms of global business participation (Samoff & Stromquist, 2001). As the global society continues to depend on IT, developing countries are left out in most global trade dealings (Ogunsola, 2005). This is due to the fact that IT diffusion and use in developing countries is far less than in developed countries (Archibugi & Pietrobelli, 2003; Ogunsola, 2005). As such, globalisation puts developing countries at a more disadvantaged position in global trade and they can hardly compete with developed countries (Dahlman, 2007; Ogunsola, 2005).
4.15.1.2 Impact of Information Technology on Foreign Aid

The capability of IT to enhance transparency seems to take a central role in monitoring aid effectiveness in developing countries (Killen, 2011). Donor organisations continue to monitor aid effectiveness by assessing how aid money is used to benefit the needy.

Transparency within the recipient countries has become crucial in attracting aid (Ishii, 2001). Christensen (1995) argues that recipient countries have the responsibility of ensuring transparency for aid to be effective, while donor organisations stress the importance of effective aid (Action Aid, 2011). IT has significant implications for aid flow and subsequent effectiveness to developing countries. IT as a tool for improving transparency provides an opportunity not only for citizens in recipient countries, but also for donor organisations to monitor the use of aid monies (IATI, 2013). Initiatives such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) uses IT (e.g. website) to provide aid information to people on the ground from both the aid recipient and donor countries (Moon & Williamson, 2010). Such information, through IT, enables people to scrutinise, make governments accountable and facilitates donors to reach aid decisions (Grönlund, 2010; IATI, 2013; Moon & Williamson, 2010).

4.15.2 Impact of External Pressures on Information Technology

4.15.2.1 Impact of Globalisation on Information Technology

Globalisation and IT processes interact in a complex way by which they support and oppose each other at the same time (Castells, 1999). While IT fuels development of global information society by facilitating information flow from one corner of the planet to the other, globalisation also opens nation-state borders to allow labour movement. As global capitalism continues to shape the contemporary world, labour movement among and within countries is also on the rise (Selassie, 2011). This movement is characterised by the movement of qualified IT individuals from developing to developed countries in search of greener pastures (Amoretti, 2007). Unfortunately, this movement or what is referred to as the “brain drain”, has been enriching developed countries on the expense of poor developing countries (Selassie, 2011). Many IT experts have left developing countries for the US and other developed countries (Rahman, 2007), leaving their countries struggling to develop IT capacity to support IT implementation. The labour market has become globalised in the sense that highly skilled labour is available for hire.
by the highest bidder from any part of the world (Castells, 1999). This has negative implications for the IT industry in developing countries as not only can they not retain IT professionals, but also cannot afford to hire from the global labour market. Developing countries are becoming susceptible to exclusion by globalisation in the information age; and there is a concern that they may be disconnected from the global economy (Castells, 1999).

Castells (1999) argues that globalisation is a connecting and disconnecting phenomenon. When countries are connected to the global network, they stand a better chance to tap the advantage of available ITs and probably leapfrog technologically. In this case, globalisation provides an opportunity for countries to advance their IT industry. Castells (1999) further argues that when borders are open for foreign investments, investors can bring in new technology. Further, opening markets for global investors helps to develop ICT infrastructures, thereby improving the overall ICT sector in those countries. This is based on the fact that investors have both technical and financial resources to develop such infrastructures. For example, South Africa, Ghana and many others have benefited from ICT infrastructures and services built by private investors (Fuchs & Horak, 2008). However, opening borders is not enough. Necessary supporting infrastructures such as suitable policies, reliable electricity and openness in business dealings to support such investments must be in place (Gray & Khan, 2010). On the other hand, globalisation may disconnect countries which do not offer any value or benefit to the global network (Castells, 1999).

4.15.2.2 Impact of Foreign Aid on Information Technology Implementation

Over the years, developing countries have been receiving aid from developed countries and other international aid organisations. These aid programmes have been directed to different public sectors with different objectives but mainly focusing on economic development (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). Recently, foreign aid programmes have been extended to cover democracy and governance. This follows the recognition that democracy and governance are important components in economic development strategies in developing countries (Dietrich & Wright, 2012). The need for inclusion of more actors in decision-making processes at different levels has become vital for participatory policies and decisions. Based on this argument, international organisations such as the United Nations, WB, IMF and OECD declared ICT as core to societal and economic development agenda (Amoretti, 2007). ICTs provide new channels for political
participation and decision-making processes, thereby enhancing democratisation and governance (Amoretti, 2007). Applications such as e-government, e-democracy and e-governance have been identified to be enablers of reinventing government and redefining the role of the state (Heeks, 2002; ITU, 2010; Wong & Welch, 2004).

Due to lack of technical and financial resources, developing countries are compelled to resort to foreign aid to fund their ICT projects. However, foreign aid to developing countries has attracted a debate on whether the ICT sector should be a priority in aid programmes or not (Hosman & Fife, 2008). This debate is based on the premise that developing countries have many pressing human needs such as food and health that deserve immediate attention (Bezmen & Depken, 2004). It is therefore illogical to consider funding ICT projects while people are starving or lack other human needs. The debate to fund ICT projects or not is beyond the scope of the present study. But, many ICT projects in developing countries have been implemented under the umbrella of the ICT for Development (ICT4D) programme. As mentioned above, these projects have been implemented with foreign assistance. Besides the importance of ICTs in societal and economic development, scholars argue that foreign aid in these projects have negative implications for developing countries. Based on the dependency theory, Wade (2002) argues that embracing donor-funded ICT projects for developing countries would lock them into “e-dependency” on the West. Developing countries lack ICT skills, the capacity to produce computers and adapt ICTs (Ciborra & Navarra, 2005; Wade, 2002). Further, it is argued that developing countries are not part of the international community which set standards for computer and ICTs usage, the situation which further complicates ICT implementation in developing countries (Wade, 2002). Such e-dependencies make developed countries (i.e. the West) more beneficiaries of ICT4D projects than their counterparts in developing countries (Ciborra & Navarra, 2005; Wade, 2002). Amoretti (2007) emphasises that ICTs are increasingly tied to “corporations that hold monopoly on know-how” and that many governments have had more challenges in managing them. This would mean that developing countries will delegate their own vision to these entities and probably these ICTs may lose their democratic charge to affect the envisaged objectives (Amoretti, 2007).

Donor organisations also have been assisting developing countries in building local capacity through technical assistance. This programme includes training of civil servants who take over
the management of ICT4D projects. However, there has been a tendency for qualified local ICT experts to leave their countries for greener pastures in the West and other developed countries, a phenomenon described by Selassie (2011) as “brain drain”. For example, Rahman (2007) reports that people who were trained under a training assistance programme in IT skills provided by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in Bangladesh, mostly left Bangladesh to work abroad after completing the training. Implementation of ICT4D in developing countries has also been criticised for being implemented without reasonable involvement of the local population in host countries (Toyama & Kuriyan, 2007). This approach has contributed to sustainability challenges. For example, most ICT4D projects have been grounded due to lack of technical support and other resources to make them sustainable (Toyama & Kuriyan, 2007). A number of donor-funded ICT project failures in developing countries have been reported (Heeks, 2002). Such failures have largely been contributed by lack of consideration of social and political contexts of host countries where these projects were implemented (Heeks, 2002).

4.15.3 Impact of Information Technology on Governance Processes

4.15.3.1 Impact of Information Technology on Judicial Processes

The use of IT in the judicial system is of great importance in enhancing operational efficiency, transparency, accountability and data sharing among different stakeholders such as the police force, courts, lawyers and parties (Contini & Cordella, 2007; Fairchild, de Vuyst & Azran, 2006). Judicial systems in many transition countries are characterised by a lack of transparency and missing links to the general public, which severely undermines the provision of justice and their legitimacy in transition countries (Kiškis & Petrauskas, 2004; Velicogna & Ng, 2006). The use of IT in the judicial systems may increase the trial speed and improve allocation of judicial resources. Further, IT can enhance access to judicial defence and other legal information (e.g. court decisions) to members of society (Kiškis & Petrauskas, 2004; Velicogna & Ng, 2006). These processes are very important in dispensing justice and ensuring an improved link between the judiciary and society (Kiškis & Petrauskas, 2004). IT also increases the ability to monitor case activities (e.g. hearings, verdicts) thereby increasing chances of fair trials, impartial treatment and more independence of the judiciary (Kiškis & Petrauskas, 2004; Velicogna & Ng, 2006). On the other hand, IT may have negative implications for the judiciary when it is not
properly regulated. It has been argued that the Internet and social media can interfere with court trials and on-going cases (Janoski-Haehlen, 2011). Because of the Internet, simple comments can easily be posted, copied and republished around the world within seconds. Janoski-Haehlen (2011) argues that such comments, if related to an on-going trial, can seriously complicate court processes leading to mis-trials. They can also result in negative implications for “the integrity of the trial courts and the right to a fair trial” (Janoski-Haehlen, 2011, p. 45). In addition, involvement of judges and attorneys in unregulated access to social media tools can cause serious ethical problems (Janoski-Haehlen, 2011).

4.15.3.2 Impact of Information Technology on Electoral Processes

The election is a fundamental component of effective governance (Omotola, 2010b); and thus a well-managed electoral processes may contribute to the democratisation in transition countries. IT has changed how the electoral processes are carried out. Over the years, there has been a decrease in voter turnout worldwide due to reasons relating to the lack of trust and the convenience of the vote-casting process (Dalton, 2004; Offe, 2011; Trechsel & Mendez, 2005; Trechsel, 2007). Some of the vote-casting centres are located far from other citizens’ vicinity and citizens do not trust politicians as many incidences of vote rigging are reported. The use of IT in the electoral processes has the potential of simplifying electoral processes management in an efficient manner and ensuring high levels of accuracy of electoral results (Lauer, 2004). IT applications such as electronic voting (e-voting) have been in use in different countries, by which citizens cast their votes via the Internet – electronically (Braun & Brändli, 2006). Use of IT tools such as e-voting in elections can help to enhance voter participation and subsequently the decision-making process. It has been urged that, with e-voting, older people, due to their age and possible limited mobility, can easily use the Internet voting system to cast their votes without travelling (Braun & Brändli, 2006). Similarly, citizens in the diaspora can be guaranteed casting their votes without the burden of travelling to polling stations in their countries of origin (Braun & Brändli, 2006). Further, e-voting can significantly reduce voter inconvenience for the general voting population and at the same time eliminate the subjective vote count (Moynihan, 2004). E-voting can also enable direct access to information and facilities for deliberation, thereby tremendously reducing decision-making cost (e.g. the cost of conducting the election) that would otherwise be incurred in the absence of e-voting (Kumar & Vragov, 2009).
Besides their potentials, IT systems such as e-voting also carry risks such as technical manipulation, thus jeopardising the electoral process and subsequent democracy (Moynihan, 2004; Trechsel & Mendez, 2005). The e-voting system can be hacked into and forced to fail, work abnormally or generate wrong election results (Moynihan, 2004). Unfortunately, hackers generally introduce malicious programs at unexpected times and voting systems have been targeted by hackers at “the worst time” ever, such as during the middle of the electoral process or during vote-casting (Moynihan, 2004, p. 519). Another concern is that voters may supply their identities and voting preferences “to a bogus internet site” without their knowledge; such information can be modified and then submitted to the e-voting system as if they are genuine voters’ preferences (Trechsel & Mendez, 2005, p. 32). Unfortunately, such flaws may not get detected by the election administrators and hence wrong electoral results would be reported (Moynihan, 2004).

Another security risk concern has been identified as the secretive nature of commercial internet voting software (Lauer, 2004; Moynihan, 2004). According to Lauer (2004), many vendors do not disclose their source codes (code obfuscation) to outsiders to allow thorough system testing. Such systems may contain bugs – instructions that may not run as intended thereby producing unexpected results. Possible outcomes of these threats can be loss of voter privacy and multiple voting. Other security threats include, among others, virus attacks which can compromise an election and denial of service attacks that can result in disenfranchisement of voters (Lauer, 2004). All these flaws, whether perpetuated intentionally or accidentally, have grave effects on the electoral process and democracy in general. IT-mediated voting systems are not one hundred per cent secure and they have failed to demonstrate election reliability in some instances (Moynihan, 2004). For example, 2013 Kenya’s election experienced IT voting system failure forcing the Kenya Electoral Commission to resort to manual vote counting. As a result, the announcement of election results was delayed for about a week. Similar cases elsewhere have been reported and authorities had to switch to manual vote tallying, for example, one of them was the 2000 US presidential election (Lauer, 2004).

4.15.3.3 Impact of Information Technology on Corruption

Corruption is considered as a great barrier to economic development and rule of law (Chowdhury, Khan & Akter, 2013). It reduces investment opportunities by deterring investors,
thereby reducing economic growth rate (Chowdhury et al., 2013). The literature cites lack of information flow among stakeholders as linked to corruption. This is based on the premise that lack of information makes it difficult for the public to monitor public officials (Mahmood, 2004). IT is a major enabler of transparency and hence a tool for reducing corruption (Bertot et al., 2010). IT facilitates access to information that can trigger transparent rules, laws and transactions (DiRienzo, Das, Cort & Burbridge, 2007). Such processes can enhance the overall transparency and in turn reduces the corruption level (Bertot et al., 2010). A number of studies have found that greater access to information reduces corruption levels (DiRienzo et al., 2007; Garcia-Murillo & Ortega, 2010). Further, IT increases the social cost for corrupt behaviour by its tendency to facilitate online publishing of news to a wider public (Garcia-Murillo & Ortega, 2010). It becomes difficult for individuals to participate in corrupt practices when they know that information about their corrupt behaviour can easily be exposed and made known to the public (Florini, 1999). While IT can be used as a tool to fight corruption, it can also create new means and opportunities for the practice of corruption (Heeks, 1998). It is argued that few individuals who know how to operate IT systems can circumvent IT controls intended to limit corruption and thus continue to gain income from corrupt practices (Heeks, 1998).

4.15.4 Impact of External Pressures on Governance Processes

4.15.4.1 Impact of Globalisation on Electoral Processes

For the past few decades, globalisation has changed the way voter preferences affect the electoral processes and subsequent political accountability. Due to countries’ exposure to the world market, voters are increasingly capable of extracting performance information about political leaders. Such information is used to benchmark and link any performance deviation to “incumbent government policies” (Hellwig & Samuels, 2007, p. 289). Consequently, the ballot box is enhancing political accountability of policy makers in the era of globalisation (Hellwig & Samuels, 2007). On the other hand, it is becoming difficult to hold political leaders accountable in the era of globalisation. Economic integration such as the EAC and EU, characterised by economic interdependence of member states within such regional blocks, reduces democratic accountability (Colomer, 2012). Based on such integration, economic performance has little effect on voting outcome (Colomer, 2012; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007). Political scientists argue
that in the global economy, political leaders have little room to manoeuvre, as many external factors play a role in shaping the country’s economy and public policy. Political leaders use globalisation as a “scapegoat for poor economic outcomes” by blaming unavoidable factors such as economic recession and other global related phenomena, even though such outcomes can be linked to their leadership incompetence (Hellwig & Samuels, 2007). As a result, poor economic performance in more globalised countries is less punished, or voters in these countries do not punish or reward political leaders based on economic performance (Hellwig & Samuels, 2007). Consequently, globalisation weakens electoral accountability (Hellwig & Samuels, 2007), a key process in democratic governance for holding political leaders accountable (Gélineau, 2013).

4.15.4.2 Impact of Globalisation on Judicial Processes

As many nations become encircled in the globalisation phenomenon, litigants in different countries can access regional and global legal justice bodies (Kirby, 2006). Judicial globalisation empowers litigants to seek justice in higher courts designated to different regional blocks. It further improves national court quality by adopting global law principles in deciding cases (Mak, 2013). Such approaches help national judges and magistrates in dispensing justice fairly according to international standards (Kirby, 2006). Following this rationale, many national legal systems have made important legislative revisions and administrative decrees based on international principles (Benvenisti & Downs, 2009). For example, the South African Supreme Court decision that the death penalty is unconstitutional was based on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Similarly, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court cited the ECHR decision on denouncing corporal punishment as both cruel and unconstitutional (Slaughter, 1999). These examples and many others elsewhere in the world demonstrate that national courts accord weight to decisions of “supranational tribunals” as legitimate and authoritative decisions accorded by high quality international judges (Benvenisti & Downs, 2009). Decisions by supranational tribunals are not only reached based on impartiality, but also respect human rights of individuals and engage core judicial functions (Slaughter, 1999). Such judicial global practices enhance national courts’ processes and decisions by guaranteeing protection of individuals against abuses of state power and rule of law (Benvenisti & Downs, 2009; Slaughter, 1999). The most compelling judicial globalisation impact on the national judiciary is that the establishment of international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). For example, the ICC
guarantees prosecution of those who commit crimes against humanity, genocide and war-related crimes, even if their native countries are unable, for any reason, to prosecute them (Slaughter, 1999). On the other hand, international laws have been pioneered by few countries (i.e. developed countries) and, to a certain extent, imposed in developing countries (Benvenisti & Downs, 2009). However, major beneficiaries of global judicial arrangements have been the powerful developed countries, while developing countries have suffered exploitation (Fuentes-Torrijo, 2008). It has been argued that democracy and justice cannot be achieved through international laws that do not include national norms, but through the creation of an international society that recognises domestic judicial and political communities. To substantiate the negative impact of international laws, Pinochet, Chile’s former dictator, was arrested in London because of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act but not as a result of international law (Fuentes-Torrijo, 2008). Further, a German court had to bow to domestic pressure by denying protection of migrants, contrary to a judicial coalition over refugee status (Benvenisti & Downs, 2009). Such acts not only demonstrate how the judiciary can selectively dispense justice, but also fail to protect basic human rights.

Critics of international laws have shown concern over the voluntary nature of such laws. Their claim is based on the fact that not all countries are bound by international laws. Countries are only bound by international laws when they accede to them (Hathaway, 2005). The voluntary nature of international laws has made other countries choose not to ratify international treaties. Another challenge for international laws concerns its enforceability. International laws lack a central enforcing actor which makes them remain fragmented (Hathaway, 2005). Consequently, countries may choose to ratify international treaties with the intention of safeguarding their reputation to the eyes of the international community, but then not complying with them (Hathaway, 2005).

4.15.4.3 Impact of Globalisation on Corruption

Fighting corruption has not been easy, especially in transition countries where state institutions are weak (Hamm et al., 2012). In the globalisation era, inter-trade and financial openness among nations are major global trends determining the level of corruption. Studies have found that globalisation in terms of trade and financial transparency reduces the level of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). It is argued that trade and financial transparency increase firms’ competition,
thereby reducing rent-seeking behaviour; this in turn reduces corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). However, at the early stages of global integration, globalisation may increase the scope of corruption due to a weak regulatory framework (Badinger & Nindl, 2012). A weak regulatory framework in terms of institutional quality may be incapable of catering for the influx of foreign trade (Hamm et al., 2012). There is also a strong indication that the relationship between globalisation and corruption is somehow nonlinear and that globalisation affects corruption, depending on its level, in different countries. For example, Das and DiRienzo (2009) found no effect of globalisation on corruption in lower-income countries, but found that globalisation reduces corruption in middle- and high-income countries.

4.15.4.4 Impact of Globalisation on Local NGOs Operations

The relationship between globalisation and NGOs is interesting; factors or issues that foster globalisation are the same as those fuelling the emergence of NGOs (Mitra, 2001; Naidoo, 2003). The diffusion of new communication technology, among others, enabled by globalisation around the globe, has been instrumental in the rapid emergence of NGOs.

NGOs use communication technology to get connected to and collaborate with other NGOs in other countries, forming a web of partnerships (Diamond, 2003). Increasingly, NGOs are taking the centre stage in policy change due to inequality brought by globalisation phenomena. The world has seen large NGOs demonstrating against violation of human rights, environmental degradation and many other local and international issues (Mitra, 2001). Globalisation has been influential in creating NGOs and forming global NGOs’ ties to lobby for policy changes (Brown, Khagram, Moore & Frumkin, 2000).

On the other hand, globalisation may also negatively impact on NGOs. The growing NGOs’ transnational links and dependence on international NGOs and funding agencies may degrade policy lobbying capacities of local NGOs. Such links may direct local NGOs accountability to funders, turning away from the local populace they purportedly serve (Naidoo, 2003). Further, it has been argued that NGOs dependence on foreign funding agencies may make recipient NGOs lose sight of their original goals (Brown, Brown & Desposato, 2007). As such, some associate NGOs dependence on foreign funding agencies with anti-nationalists agents of western political and cultural values (Prakash, 1988).
4.15.4.5 Impact of Globalisation on the Press

As globalisation continues to bite every aspect of human life, the press and media in general has tremendously changed in recent years. Global media are increasingly covering many countries worldwide, changing the information landscape of government monopoly over news to a more liberal one. A number of news media are breaking national borders to provide news through conglomerates (McChesney, 2003). Global media are improving freedom of information and democratisation (Hong & Hsu, 1999); to a large extent they are able to circumvent the censorship which is normally easily implemented in print media. New information technology has been behind the news explosion as news is falling within the reach of a large segment of the world population (Crowley, 2012). Many print media are now utilising the power of the Internet to publish news online. More than ever, “information is in hands of more people with the ability to communicate anything from anywhere with the touch of a button” (Crowley, 2012, p. 243). As mentioned above, globalisation is improving transparency and in turn improving democracy. However, global media have also a negative implication for the role of media in democratisation and social development. While a number of news outlets is increasing, a number of media owners is also decreasing as more and more conglomerates are formed (Barland, 2005). Conglomerates are becoming more powerful controllers of mass media by determining the contents (Hollifield, 2001). As such, news contents provided by global media are not necessarily the priority of host countries for their people. Consequently, global media seriously lack the voice of the voiceless in developing countries (Reen, West, Abbott & Lambino, 2008). Further, with globalisation, transparency is rising while secrecy is diminishing and the power of government to protect information is fundamentally affected. Such a tendency is threatening stability of governments and national security (Crowley, 2012). Disclosure of classified information can pose a serious security risk to a nation when falling into wrong hands, especially in the current time when terrorism is threatening world peace.

4.15.4.6 Impact of Foreign Aid on Electoral Processes

In recent years, donor countries and organisations have started to support electoral processes by providing election assistance in developing countries under the programme known as democracy aid (Kelley, 2012; Scott & Steele, 2011). Aid programmes by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other donors have devised special aid packages aimed
at democratic transitions in many developing countries. Organisations such as USAID and OECD, for example, have been supporting countries in electoral administration, establishing electoral frameworks and independent electoral bodies to ensure that free and fair elections are achieved in transition countries (Kelley, 2012; Scott & Steele, 2011). Studies have found that such aid programmes improve electoral processes and participation of citizens in transition countries (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán & Seligson, 2007). On the other hand, researchers have found that foreign aid (i.e. democracy aid) programmes have negative implications for democracy (e.g. Djankov, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2008; Wright, 2009). Nielsen and Nielson (2010) argue that increasing democracy aid in autocratic regimes tends to harm democracy by forcing autocrats to consolidate their power by repressing the opposition movements. Such aid programmes can also reduce democratic accountability by incumbent governments. Djankov et al. (2008) argue that aid reduces incentives for accountability when revenues are not raised from citizens’ taxes. Further, election assistance has also contributed to political conflict and flawed elections in other countries (Carothers, 2010). Many states have managed to carry out elections because donors have provided election assistance (i.e. democracy aid), but in actual fact, some countries were not ready for such elections. They lacked necessary governance institutions to support such democratic processes. Consequently, the recent past has been characterised by a high level of election irregularities and post-electoral violence in many countries such as Afghanistan and Nigeria where a very substantial amount of election assistance was disbursed (Carothers, 2010). Such irregularities have caused aid sceptics to question the efficacy of aid towards electoral processes; there is a major concern that foreign “aid providers are pushing post-conflict states into elections before they have sufficiently stabilised” (Carothers, 2010, p. 3).

4.15.4.7 Impact of Foreign Aid on Judicial Processes

There is no doubt that foreign aid helps to solve some of the problems in developing countries when channelled to governments with solid plans and somehow well-developed state institutions (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). International donors have been extending assistance in areas such as training of judges and magistrates, establishing legal frameworks in many transition states (Carothers, 1998; Kelley, 2012; Scott & Steele, 2011). Such aid programmes may help in promoting effective governance through the establishment of sound judicial systems that can oversee the rule of law. Judicial systems can also ensure horizontal accountability by providing
checks and balances of branches of government, which also deepens democracy (Van de Walle, 2012). However, there are negative implications for foreign aid in judicial processes. As mentioned above, foreign assistance to the judiciary includes training judges and other judicial staff. Due to poor remuneration in governments of developing countries, judges, once they have been trained through foreign assistance, tend to leave their positions in government and join the private bar for more lucrative positions (Buscaglia, Dakolias & Ratliff, 1995). Further, foreign aid provides an opportunity for stalling real rule of law reforms. According to Erbeznik (2011), when basic assistance programmes (e.g. training judges, re-writing laws) have been implemented, there is little incentive for real rule of law reforms. The literature on aid points out that when aid flows to developing countries, it subsidises the present institutions, thereby retarding real judicial reforms (Erbeznik, 2011). It is argued that normally reforms are painful and require sacrifices; thus bureaucrats would prefer to retain the status quo as long as still benefits them. Based on this fact, “the incentive for reform is lessened when power can be retained by force or patronage without having to make unpopular reforms” (Erbeznik, 2011, p. 886). Reform efforts are further challenged when high levels of aid provide enormous resources and fringe benefits such as cars, salary increases, study tours that would normally not be available to public officials in developing countries (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). Fewer incentives to reform may mean judicial- and rule of law-related reforms will not be implemented, or reformers in developing countries will do very little (i.e. judicial training, re-writing law codes) to guarantee aid flow (Erbeznik, 2011; Harms & Lutz, 2004). Such aid flows may also enable inefficient institutions to survive much longer (Dreher & Gehring, 2012).

### 4.15.4.8 Impact of Foreign Aid on Corruption

The impact of foreign aid on corruption has been both positive and negative. A number of studies have pointed out that foreign aid reduces corruption (e.g. Charron, 2011; Dunning, 2004; Ear, 2007; Knack, 2001). This claim is based on the fact that foreign expertise can be brought in to aid recipient countries for capacity building to curb corruption which these countries would otherwise not have (Knack & Rahman, 2007; Knack, 2001). Further, the aid conditionality (e.g. governance reforms) currently enforced by multilateral donors helps to improve accountability of aid recipient countries and subsequently reduces corruption (Knack & Rahman, 2007). Recipient countries have to carry out reforms in order to qualify for further aid. On the other hand, it is also
true that an increase in foreign aid contributes to high level of corruption (Knack & Rahman, 2007; Knack, 2001). This claim is based on bureaucratic quality. As foreign aid increases, bureaucratic service quality declines as bureaucrats become unaccountable for their actions (Knack & Rahman, 2007). Consequently, corrupt officials will continue involvement in corrupt practices as the possibility of losing power becomes less (Djankov et al., 2008). It is further argued that an increase in aid compensates for weak institutions and poor state policy, thus providing a fertile ground for corruption (Knack, 2004).

4.15.4.9 Impact of Foreign Aid on the Press

Over the years, press freedom has become an important component in ensuring effective governance (Sturges, 2005). However, availability of information and news to the public in developing countries has not only been undersupplied but also biased, due to government monopoly over news media. As a result, it has been difficult for the public to have balanced news arising from different media houses (Peksen, 2010). Following this gap, many foreign donors have established aid programmes to fund media and promote freedom of the press in transition states (Nielsen & Nielson, 2010; Van de Walle, 2012). For example, USAID has been at the forefront in providing assistance to media to ensure wider population access information. Information has been recognised as one of the human rights and an important component in improving transparency and fighting corruption (Martin, 2011). Foreign aid can facilitate the press to become effective in reducing information asymmetry, bring about transparency (Roy, 2011) and enhance press freedom by enabling journalists to report information freely (Norris, 2004; Themudo, 2013). The press plays a key role in ensuring freedom of information and gives voice to the voiceless (Norris, 2004). These are important qualities of the press in reducing the level of corruption and improving governance. Further, anti-corruption strategies can be successfully implemented when the press is able to support the civil society by providing a far-reaching platform to report corruption practices (Themudo, 2013). Foreign aid to the press is based on the fact that aid gives leverage to the press to effectively inform the mass on issues of public interest and to improve transparency and accountability of public officials. On the other hand, foreign aid has a negative impact on the democratisation potential of the press. As survival is the primary objective of political leaders (De Mesquita & Smith, 2010), there is every reason for these leaders to fight against any threat for their survival. One of the major sources of such
threats is the free press which can be used to mobilise political movement for democratic change. As explained above, foreign aid makes the press more effective in providing news and information to a wider populace. In such an event, political elites may react by controlling freedom of the press to limit its communicative and transparent capability (De Mesquita & Smith, 2010). Such measures negatively affect the opportunities for democratisation.

4.15.4.10 Impact of Foreign Aid on Local NGOs Operations

In the recent past, donor organisations have recognised that governance aid channelled through governments was not at all successful in enhancing governance in transition states (Nielsen & Nielson, 2010). As a result, much governance aid has been flowing through NGOs to make them effective in providing voices for the opposition (Carothers & Ottaway, 2000; McFerson, 2010; Nielsen & Nielson, 2010). Non-governmental organisations are key players in governance endeavours that can help in putting pressure on governments for public sector reforms (Themudo, 2013). Thus, extending aid to these organisations helps them to perform their work effectively, provided that the governments concerned do not interfere with NGOs’ freedom (Nielsen & Nielson, 2010). On the other hand, foreign aid has negative implications for NGOs’ functions and democracy. It is likely that NGOs receiving foreign aid may not respond to domestic agenda, problems and needs; however, they respond to donor interests which are not necessarily those of host countries (Henderson, 2002; Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani, 2009). Many NGOs are caught in the middle – serving their domestic constituents and at the same time serving those of donor organisations. In such a case, based on aid dependence, foreign interests may precede those of domestic constituents. This may limit the potential of NGOs to promote grass root activism and democracy, as NGOs forge a closer relationship with transnational partners than with their respective governments they claim to influence (Sperling, 1998).

Another problem with foreign aid concerns the direct disbursement of aid to NGOs. This approach seems to annoy some governments and they feel threatened by the growing strength of funded NGOs. There is a concern that channelling aid direct to NGOs contradicts “traditional concepts of sovereignty and exceeds traditional boundaries of political intervention” (Carapico, 2002, p. 380). As a result, many “governments have reacted to guard their monopolies over both the means of information and access to foreign funds” (Carapico, 2002, p. 379). These governments, especially those from the Arab world, have enacted laws that make NGOs illegal.
organisations when they receive direct foreign aid; at the same time they continue to crack down on NGOs (Carapico, 2002). Such actions largely limit the democratisation potential of NGOs.

4.16 IT/IS in Organisations

The role of IT in organisations has been a central issue of concern due to different views of IT and its role in organisational change. In this section, theories which explain the relationship between IT and organisations are discussed, citing the key conceptual logic underpinning their orientation.

4.16.1 Deterministic Model

For so long, the impact of IT on organisations has been investigated using a deterministic logic view. This view entails the unidirectional causality nature of IT’s impact on organisations (Markus & Robey, 1988). Deterministic theory holds that IT transformative capability as an external causal agent (Robey & Boudreau, 1999) influences organisational change both at organisational and individual levels (Markus & Robey, 1988). At the organisational level, IT can influence structural change. For example, IT has been identified to decentralise/centralise decision authority (Dawson & McLaughlin, 1986), while at the individual level, IT can influence performance by changing work practices. For example, Barrett and Walsham (1999) found that the introduction of electronic trading in the London insurance market changed the traditional way of risk underwriting. Brokers and underwriters were compelled to adapt to electronic risk underwriting. The new work practice denied them the face-to-face negotiation, which they consider important for their work to foster social relation with clients (Barrett & Walsham, 1999). Although IT benefits are real, over-dependence of IT as the only solution to governance problems can be risky. IT, for example, can also create opportunities for corruption when corrupt employees learn new ways to circumvent the new system (Heeks, 1998).

4.16.2 Contingency Theories

Contingency theory has its roots in organisational research where it is used to study organisation with the emphasis on “one best to organise” (Weill & Olson, 1989, p. 60). Based on contingency theory, IT transformative capability in organisation is moderated by contextual variables known as contingency variables (Orlikowski, 1992). Transformative capability of IT is best achieved
when there is also a best fit between organisational variables, and IT design and use (Weill & Olson, 1989). Early study in IS identified structure, strategy, size, tasks, just to mention a few; as contingency variables in contingency approach. Studies adopting contingency theory treat any of these variables as contingent to performance of IT. However, this approach has not guaranteed expected IT effectiveness and many cases of IT failure have been reported. Scholars argue that IT is influenced by many contextual factors that must be taken into account. For example, Heeks (2005) argues that e-government success is subject to design-actuality gap. IT designed for western countries does not guarantee success in developing countries (Heeks, 2005). According to Adam and Myers (2003), IT tends to impose its own culture when transferred between two opposite cultural environments. For example, e-government in Ghana failed due to inscribed European compliance culture which did not match the local culture (Tettey, 1997).

4.16.3 Giddens’ Structuration Theory

Structuration theory has been widely used in IS research to study IS phenomena and organisational change. The central concept of structuration theory is duality, which is concerned with the “relationship between the individuals and society” (Jones & Karsten, 2008, p. 129). According to structuration theory, “structure and agency are mutually constitutive duality” (Jones & Karsten, 2008, p. 129). Social phenomena are collectively dependent on both “social structure” and “agency” by which human agents “draw on social structure in their actions”; and actions in turn produce and reproduce social structure (Jones & Karsten, 2008, p. 129). Giddens contends that social structures are socially constructed by social agents who consequently determine social properties of human institutions (Giddens & Pierson, 1989). Social practice gives the clue of the social structure existing in a social organisation (Jones & Karsten, 2008). Based on structuration theory, IT’s impact on organisation depends on the actions of human beings in the social institutions (Giddens & Pierson, 1989). Although it is agreed that IT transformative capability exists, its impacts on the organisation depends on how social agents interact with it (Jones & Karsten, 2008; Orlikowski, 1992).
4.17 Existing Gaps in the IS Literature

This section serves to report and reiterate the existing gaps in the extant IS literature covered up to this point to form a theoretical foundation for the present study. This discussion is presented in three major areas:

(i) Bivariate Relationship Assumptions
Most studies conducted on the impact of IT on governance adopted a bivariate approach assuming the linear relationships between IT and governance or governance dimensions. This approach limits the explanatory power of complex interrelationships between IT and contextual factors where IT is embedded. Schuppan (2009) argues that the contextual factors of the countries where IT is implemented matter for its success. Jain (2004) argues that the relationship between e-government and government is a complex one as these impact each other in a reciprocal way. Kleine (2010, p. 674) argues that the impact of IT-enabled government programmes should be examined in a systemic and holistic way rather than “trying to make IT fit with a linear conceptualisation of impacts”. IS scholars have also strongly argued that:

Information technology does not act out of context in affecting public organisations, …[IT] is more about nations and bureaucracies than simply about technology per se. The effect of e-government on accountability is affected both by the civil service system within which it is embedded and by its agency-specific organisational characteristics (Wong & Welch, 2004, p. 289).

Still, there are few or no rigorous methodologies for measuring IT impacts, which Orgeron (2007, p. 1536) describes as a “methodological lapse in the body of knowledge”.

(ii) Geographical Coverage of IT Impacts Research
The extant literature review carried out indicates that most of the studies in IS and specifically studies on impacts of IT have been clustered around developed countries such the US and EU (Pina, Torres & Acerete, 2007; Thompson & Walsham, 2010). Following this anomaly, IS scholars have made several calls for IS research in developing countries with a special focus on Africa (ITU, 2010; Mbarika, Okoli, Byrd & Datta, 2005; Thompson & Walsham, 2010; Walsham & Sahay, 2006). In general, few IS studies have been carried out in Africa. However, there are even fewer studies on IT impacts (ITU, 2010).
(iii) General Coverage

Earlier IT impact studies conducted in developing countries lack an explicit focus on contexts of individual countries, particularly in Africa. These studies have mainly focused on general issues about Africa. The lack of explicit focus poses serious theoretical and practical limitations. Such approaches ignore institutional factors that exist within individual countries which, to a large extent, influence the impact of IT (Schuppan, 2009). There exist many social, political and cultural differences within African countries (Mbarika & Meso, 2008) which demand specific focus on particularities. Further, many studies conducted are desk research with only few studies conducted in a true field environment. Most of the data used in these studies are secondary, hence lack sociotechnical perspective, which is important in studying IT artefacts. Heeks and Bailur (2007) have cautioned that such tendency is not healthy for theory development.

Researchers appear to do little more than sit at their PCs. Per se, this does not invalidate research but large tranches of data, events, opinions, etc., are inaccessible to such researchers. This might, for example, explain the absence from some research of the human, social and political elements that more easily become apparent during direct contact with data subjects and settings (Heeks & Bailur, 2007, p. 257).

Table 4.6 presents the IT impacts studies as reviewed in the literature to identify the existing gaps which the present study intends to fill.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Governance Dimension(s)</th>
<th>Methodology /Approach</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groshek (2009)</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Bivariate (Linear relationship)</td>
<td>152 countries</td>
<td>Internet has a positive effect on democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best and Wade (2009)</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Bivariate (Linear relationship)</td>
<td>188 countries</td>
<td>Internet has a positive effect on democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kang and Gearhart (2010)</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Bivariate (Linear relationship)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>City websites can actively promote civic engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruszt et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Multivariate (Cluster analysis)</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Five genres of online platforms of civic participation: newsletters, interactive platforms, multilingual solicitations, directories and brochures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pina, Torres and Acerete (2007)</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Bivariate (Linear relationship)</td>
<td>19 OECD countries</td>
<td>Accountability depends on context, characteristics of bureaucracy styles and on how information is disclosed. ICTs do not promote financial accountability further away from legal requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wong and Welch (2004)</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Bivariate (Linear relationship and U shape)</td>
<td>14 countries*</td>
<td>Whether e-government promotes accountability cannot be answered completely without knowing what kind of bureaucracy one is referring to in the first place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pina, Torres and Royo (2007)</td>
<td>Transparency (openness)</td>
<td>Bivariate (Linear relationship)</td>
<td>15 countries of the EU</td>
<td>Few websites show clear signs of openness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States
As explained above, previous studies on IT impacts have mainly focused on linear relationships. But, the impact of IT on governance is also impacted by other factors. There is interplay between governance processes, external pressures and IT usage (presented in section 4.15); such interplay cannot be measured by linear approach. The best way to examine such relationships is by adopting an alignment approach.

4.18 Chapter Summary

This current chapter presented a comprehensive review of the role of IT/ICT in different aspects of governance and democracy. These roles are both positive and negative. The concept of digital divide was also discussed, highlighting its implications for IT/ICT-enabled governance. Governance processes were also presented to demonstrate how bureaucracy can control IT or use IT itself to suppress democratic voices. The interplay between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures was then presented, followed by the discussion of the three theories (determinism, contingency and structuration) that explain IT in organisations. Finally, the identified gaps in the IS literature were reiterated and the need for alignment was pointed out.

The next chapter will present the concept of alignment.
CHAPTER FIVE

ALIGNMENT

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the different impacts of IT on democracy and governance dimensions. It presented the interplay that exists between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures and the difficulties involved in measuring the relationship between them. It recommended the adoption of the alignment concept to examine this relationship. The present chapter presents the concept of alignment. Later in this chapter, the conceptual model of the role of IT in governance is presented followed by the chapter summary to conclude the review of literature.

5.2 The Concept of Alignment

Traditionally, implementation of IT in organisations was guided by the assumptions based on technology determinism that ignored the context of an organisation where IT was deployed (Middleton & Harper, 2004). Over the years, IS scholars have recognised that IT transformative capability depends on several organisational aspects of which IT and these elements need to be aligned to achieve success (Middleton & Harper, 2004). The concept of alignment or “strategic fit” has been used to understand and develop solutions to various challenging aspects of organisations (Camponovo & Pigneur, 2004). Organisational performance is influenced by how different inputs are matched (aligned) together to produce desired output in a dynamic environment. Alignment is defined as the combination of “synergy between strategy, organisation, processes, technology and people in order to sustain the quality of interdependence and thus achieve competitive advantage” (Levy, Powell & Yetton, 2001). Given its dynamic nature, alignment has also been defined as a continuous conscious and coherent interrelation between all organisation components, human resources and IT systems contributing to its performance over time (Maes, Rijsenbrij, Truijens & Goedvolk, 2000). Alignment has been interchangeably used with various terms such as “balance”, “coordination”, “fit”, “linkage” and “harmony” (Maes et al., 2000). All these refer to the same concept. To achieve success at organisational level, researchers argue that the relationships among different components of an
organisation must be balanced (Miller & Friesen, 1977; Venkatraman, 1989). According to Venkatraman (1989), there are six perspectives of alignment. These are discussed in the following subsections.

5.2.1 **Fit Perspectives Topology in Strategy Research**

In the strategy research, six perspectives of fit have been identified. As presented in Figure 5.1 below, these include: fit as Moderation, Mediation, Matching, Profile Deviation, Covariation and Gestalts (Venkatraman, 1989).

(i) **Fit as Moderation**

The concept of fit as moderation is premised on the relationship between two variables which predicts an outcome. In moderation terms, the interaction between the predictor and criterion variables depends on the third variable (moderator). According to Venkatraman (1989), the criterion variable is primarily determined by the fit between predictor and moderator variables. For instance, it can be asserted that interaction between organisational strategy (predictor variable) and performance (dependent variable) is moderated by structure (moderator variable).
(ii) **Fit as Mediation**

With some similarity to fit as moderation, Venkatraman (1989) asserts that fit as mediation concerns the relationship between two variables (antecedent and consequent variables) by which there exist a third variable (mediator variable) which produces an intervening effect on both variables. Fit as mediation represents a relationship such that a mediator variable (e.g. structure) is a function of antecedent (e.g. strategy) variable and consequent variable (e.g. performance). With such a similarity with moderation perspective, Venkatraman (1989) contends that fit as mediation and fit as moderation have been used in almost the same situations. He argues that the difference only exists due to theoretical consideration by which the moderator variable can be treated as the mediator variable.
(iii) **Fit as Matching**

Fit as matching is different from the previous two discussed fit types. It does not involve a reference to a criterion variable, but is theoretically defined as a match between two related variables (Venkatraman, 1989). In this case, although criterion variable such as performance is not referred to, the effect of fit between the two variables to a set of criterion variables can be estimated. Theoretical proposition is an appropriate method used to develop fit relationship in matching perspective (Grinyer, Yasai-Ardekani & Al-Bazzaz, 1980).

(iv) **Fit as Profile Deviation**

Profile deviation perspective is the degree of adherence to external profile (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). It can be described as a relationship when an ideal strategy profile is specified for a particular environment. For example, the degree of adherence of business unity to the environment produces two scenarios: i) when level of environment – strategy co-alignment – is high, there will be positive performance, and ii) when level of environment – strategy co-alignment – is low (deviation), the effect will be translated into negative performance (Venkatraman, 1989).

(v) **Fit as Covariation**

Internal consistency or pattern of Covariation is central to this perspective. The internal consistency of theoretically derived elements demands a concurrent consideration of all variables in the fit equation. Venkatraman (1989) notes that:

> If a business-unit strategy in a particular context is best represented as the pattern of consistent, concurrent resource allocations to the areas of research and development, design, manufacturing, and marketing, any one area is insufficient for an effective strategy, which requires consistent attention to all areas (p. 435).

Based on the above illustration, to represent fit as Covariation, researchers need to specify all four dimensional areas of the business unit (Venkatraman, 1989).

(vi) **Fit as Gestalts**

When fit involves more than two variables, researchers apply a multivariate perspective to identify Gestalts (Venkatraman, 1989). The term “Gestalts” has its origin in psychology (Jung,
1971). It is a German word that shares meaning with “a pattern, a whole, a discernible configuration or constellation”. It has been defined as:

An organised entity or whole in which the parts, though distinguishable, are interdependent; they have certain characteristics produced by their inclusion in the whole, and the whole has some characteristics belonging to none of the parts (Gould & Kolb, 1964).

Venkatraman (1989) defines Gestalts as configurations or patterns of organisational elements, constructs or variables that have attained an adequate level of coherence, fit or unity with one another. He emphasises that the various attributes need to be coherent. Both Gould and Kolb (1964) and Venkatraman (1989) also emphasise that the characteristics of a Gestalt are different from and beyond the characteristics of its individual parts in the fit relationship. In addition, unlike other approaches to fit discussed above, the Gestalts approach view individual interactions between pairs of variables only as a part of the overall pattern (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985).

Strategic alignment theorists claim that there exists complex Gestalts among environmental, organisational, and strategy variables, and that these Gestalts are relatively few and different from one another in terms of relationships among variables. These configurations or patterns are however expected to be tightly interdependent and their significance would be best understood by referring to the whole than to the parts. Miller (1981) describes the role of Gestalts as follows: "Instead of looking at a few variables or at linear associations among such variables we should be trying to find frequently recurring clusters of attributes or Gestalts" (p. 5). The perspective of Gestalts also implicitly emphasises the notion of configurational equifinality (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985). Equifinality means that there are many ways or paths to the same end or result. This also means there is no one best way to perform anything.

The Gestalts perspective has been used in the analysis of social change and human perceptions. Hartmann (1946) argues that, the Gestalts principles of closure and pragnanz have significance for the process of social change. Closure is the effect of suggesting a visual connection or continuity between sets of elements, which do not necessarily touch each other in a composition. Closure occurs when elements in a composition are aligned in such a way that the viewer perceives them as connected. The principle of pragnanz (also known as law of entire figure or
configuration) posits that humans have a perceptual tendency to separate whole figures from their backgrounds based on one or more variables, such as contrast, colour and size. In a complex situation we would notice several things, but as we look from one to another, they become figure in turn (Behrens, 1984; Hsiao & Chou, 2006; Skaalid, 1999).

The Gestalts perspective is said to take account of “multiplicity of forces which influence human perception and lead an individual to experience his environment in terms of completed, meaningful patterns” (Daniels, 2004; Wilkinson, 1970, p. 312). According to Korb, Gorrell and De Riet (1989), we perceive something that constitutes a part of the reality of our world in terms of the context in which it occurs. The Gestalt depends on, and cannot be separated from, the environment in which it appears (Korb et al., 1989, p. 1). The term “perception” may be defined as a mental representation, experience, opinion or view about a matter of concern. According to Perrin and McFarland (2011), opinion research aims to ascertain shared mental representation about matters of public concern, that are believed to exist in the public sphere where citizens exchange ideas and information about public matters. It is argued that perception is best understood as an organised pattern rather than separate parts (Koehler, 1992). Hsiao and Chou (2006) used the Gestalts approach to study human perceptions of home page design. They observed that the perception concerning a home page design is not content, graphics, text, or language alone, but all of these elements combined.

In the next subsection the researcher presents the Gestalts perspective adopted in the present study to investigate the role of IT in resolving governance challenges.

5.2.2 The Gestalts Approach Adopted for the Present Study

According to Venkatraman (1989), choosing a particular fit perspective among the six is not a clear-cut exercise. However, he offered some important guidelines that can be used to identify which perspective is more appropriate and relevant to a particular research project. Venkatraman (1989) recommends that selection of fit should be guided by the specification of fit variables as supported by theories in a particular field. For example, he recommends that “in situations involving only two concepts, only moderation, mediation and matching could be considered” (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 440). For studies involving more than two variables, only Profile Deviation, Covariation and Gestalts could be considered. However, Profile Deviation and
Covariation fit perspectives are appropriate when an ideal profile(s) to match with the findings is available. Lack of an ideal profile leaves the researcher with only one fit perspective, the Gestalts, which does not require an ideal profile match. Since the present study is exploratory in nature (i.e. there is no prior knowledge of how exactly the variables would be grouped) the Gestalts perspective is appropriate for this study and the appropriate analytical technique is Cluster analysis (discussed in chapters 8 and 9). In addition, Venkatraman (1989) recommends that the choice of fit perspective should also be in line with the objectives of the research project.

As discussed in the previous chapters, to achieve effective governance, a government has to align various internal and external aspects of the nation. The researcher has also illustrated the complex and reciprocal nature of the interactions between the elements to be aligned (e.g. IT, governance processes and external pressures). Further, Hartman (1946) maintains that “every phenomenon is a result or “function” of the special pattern of forces operative in the finite spatio-temporal field wherein it occurs ….. otherwise stated, “all observable events, objects, or qualities in nature are products of the conditions that create and sustain them” (p. 282). The researcher therefore argues that since effective governance is an outcome of the interplay between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures, the role of IT in governance will be determined by the degree of coherence among the interacting elements. If these elements are aligned (i.e. there is coherence among them), effective governance would be realised and IT would have played a role in governance. The stronger the coherence among these elements, the greater would be the role played by IT in addressing governance challenges. If on the other hand the coherence is weak, (e.g. the elements are misaligned or not balanced), then governance will be ineffective and IT would have played a limited or no role in addressing governance challenges. It is therefore proposed that:

P1:  The stronger the coherence among the three elements (the usage of IT applications for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes and external pressures), the more effective governance will be perceived and;

P2:  The more effective governance is perceived, the greater would be the role played by IT in addressing governance challenges in transition Tanzania.
Further, and as explained in the following chapter 8, the level of coherence and governance would be determined by measuring public perceptions. Respondents may vary in their perceptions of the usage of technology, governance services, exposure to external pressures or effectiveness of governance. Consistent with the Gestalt theory there could be different groups of respondents with similar perceptions.

The researcher therefore proposes that:

P3: Groups of respondents that perceive strong coherence among the elements (i.e. usage of IT, governance processes and external pressures) will also perceive effectiveness in governance in Tanzania

Figure 5.2 below represents the conceptual model of the role of IT in ensuring effective governance in a transition state.

![Figure 5.2: Conceptual Model of the Role of IT in Ensuring Effective Governance in a Transition State](image)
As indicated in figure 5.2 above, the fit perspective chosen for the present study is the Gestalts perspective. The researcher is interested in the degree of internal coherence among a set of theoretical attributes as suggested by Venkatraman (1989). This model consists of five main elements, i.e. external pressures, usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes, effectiveness of governance and the role of Information Technology in governance. The first three elements of the model are configurational variables. The fourth variable (effectiveness of governance) and the fifth are outcomes of the interaction of the three configurational variables. The definitions of these elements and their relationships are presented below.

(i) **External Pressures**
This refers to the perceived degree of external pressures from globalisation, aid dependence and international NGOs. Globalisation pressure is attributed by international agreements while aid dependence and international NGOs pressures are attributed by the conditionality attached to aid (Risse, 2012; Wong & Welch, 2004). It is argued that governments as open systems can be impacted by these pressures causing changes in bureaucracy behaviour, structure and governance aspects (Scott, 1998). Existing literature supports that globalisation pressure impacts governance in transition states (Levitz & Pop-Eleches, 2010; Maor & Stevens, 2002).

On the other hand, aid dependence in developing countries has impacts on governance. The theoretical and empirical base of this claim is provided by scholars such as Brautigam and Knack (2004) and Dietrich and Wright (2012). These external forces exert different levels of pressure based on how individual countries conform to the conditionality (Risse, 2012). Rewards may only be obtained upon achievement of governance improvements (Ahrens, 2006; Donno, 2013). However, external pressures in terms of aid conditionality only make sense when transition states have no alternative funding (aid) from other authoritarian regimes (Kelley, 2012). It is therefore expected that transition states such as Tanzania can bow to such pressures and make governance reforms as a result of.

(ii) **Usage of Information Technology Applications**
This measures the extent to which IT applications are used to support governance and democratic activities. The extent to which IT supports governance and democratic activities has been
identified in the literature in different components of the public sphere domain. The literature on IT in democratisation is well established and confirms that IT impacts on democracy (Groshek, 2009; Howard, 2010). The existing literature also supports the view that the usage of IT has impacts on governance (Ciborra, 2005; Eger & Maggipinto, 2010). However, it is argued that IT impacts on these aspects should be assessed in a broader perspective to ascertain if IT has achieved the “democratic objectives and gains” (Anttiroiko, 2003, p. 125). In other words, to evaluate if citizens and other actors have been able to influence governance activities (Anttiroiko, 2003) at both individual and collective levels (Sclove, 1999).

(iii) Governance Processes
This variable measures the effectiveness of governance processes needed to ensure governance. The literature suggests that the quality or effectiveness of governance processes contributes to better governance (Ahrens, 2006; Diamond, 2003). Governance can only be effective if governance processes are effective (Diamond, 2003). That is, if governance is restrained by rule of law enforced by independent authorities (Diamond, 2003) and electoral processes are fair to realise creditable electoral outcome (Norman, 2011).

(iv) Coherence
This is the extent to which external pressures, usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes and governance processes have been aligned or are consistent to enable effective governance, as discussed in the sections above. The degree of coherence will be indicated by the extent to which respondents matched the three configurational variables. Cluster analysis technique was used to analyse the data as explained in section 8.4.1.12.

(v) Effectiveness of Governance
This variable measures the overall perceived governance effectiveness in transition Tanzania. Table 5.1 presents the variables for the conceptual model and the sources of theoretical works which inform the model.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External pressures</td>
<td>The degree of external pressures on governance</td>
<td>Brautigam and Knack (2004); Ciborra (2005); Eger and Maggipinto (2010); Dietrich and Wright (2012); Bonaglia et al. (2001); Maor and Stevens (2002); Chesterman (2008); Ahrens (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usage of Information</td>
<td>The extent to which IT applications are used to support governance and democratic activities</td>
<td>Howard (2010); Norris (2011); Waema and Mitullah (2007); Hurbean and Danaiata (2008); Liu and Westrup (2003); Norris (1999); Wong and Welch (2004); Sanders (2007); Hlebec et al. (2008); Andersen et al. (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology applications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance processes</td>
<td>The effectiveness of governance processes used to ensure governance</td>
<td>Hartlyn et al. (2008); Adsera et al. (2003); Conway (2001); Brunetti and Weder (2003); Adsera et al. (2003); Themudo (2013); Diamond and Morlino (2004); Scott &amp; Sturm (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of</td>
<td>Degree of governance effectiveness</td>
<td>Anttiroiko (2003); Heeks (2009); Bertot, Jaeger and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 Chapter Summary

The present chapter reviewed the concept of alignment and presented the six perspectives of fit. These perspectives include moderation, mediation, matching, profile deviation, co-variation and Gestalts. The perspective of alignment as Gestalts was adopted to guide the investigation and three propositions were then presented as represented in figure 5.2. It was argued that since effective governance is an outcome of the interplay between usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes and external pressures, the role of IT in governance will be determined by the degree of coherence among the three interacting elements.

The next chapter will present the review of economic and political reforms and governance in Tanzania.
CHAPTER SIX

TRANSITION AND GOVERNANCE IN TANZANIA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the major economic and political reforms and governance in Tanzania. The chapter starts by introducing Tanzania’s profile to highlight key demographic features to paint a picture of the environment in which these reforms are taking place. The reforms are then discussed followed by the status of Tanzanian transition to democracy. Governance is also presented to highlight the key milestones achieved towards market-enhancing governance structure. Finally, a summary of the discussion in this chapter is presented.

6.2 Tanzania: Demographic Profile

Tanzania is located in the Eastern African region and is one of the founding member states of the EAC. It covers an area of 883 600 square kilometres for the Tanzania mainland and 518 000 square kilometres for Zanzibar. In the north, Tanzania borders with Kenya and Uganda while in the south it borders with Mozambique. In the west, Tanzania borders with Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while Zambia and Malawi are in the south-west. Tanzania borders with the Indian Ocean in the east (Figure 6.1).
Tanzania has a population of 44,929,002 people according to the 2012 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) census. Agriculture makes up the major economic sector, employing about 75 per cent of the labour force. Tanzania is categorised as a developing country according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) classification with a literacy rate of 73 per cent (NBS, 2006) and a gross domestic product (GDP) of US $67.9 billion. Tanzanian economy has been growing at an average annual rate of 7 per cent for the past five years. However, Tanzania registered a drop in GDP from 7 per cent in 2010 to 6.4 per cent in 2011. The services industry commands about 48 per cent contribution to the GDP, followed by the agriculture sector. Major exports are minerals and agricultural products of which gold tops the list followed by tobacco (NBS, 2012a).

Tanzania’s telecommunication and ICT in general is not well developed due to lack of supporting infrastructures such as reliable electricity and human resources, amongst others. However, recently, Tanzania has been connected to the fibre optic cable by SEACOM. SEACOM is a marine cable company that provides telecommunication connectivity services (Mutula & Mostert, 2010). Mobile phones penetration has achieved more progress than landline
telephones. By June 2012 there were 28 million users compared to 168,895 users of landline telephones in the same period. In terms of Internet uptake, a large segment of the population still remains unconnected. According to Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TRCA) report, it is estimated that by 2010 there were 4.8 million Internet users (TCRA, 2010). Similarly, according to the 2012 statistics of e-government development index (EGDI), Tanzania is the 139th country among 193 countries worldwide with 0.3311 EGDI (United Nations, 2012). EGDI is the United Nation’s composite indicator which shows the willingness and capacity of different countries to use ICT in public services (United Nations, 2012). The EGDI ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates the minimum while 1 indicates the highest level of service provision using ICT. Table 6.1 presents a summary of Tanzania’s profile.

Table 6.1: Tanzania Country Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (2012 census)</td>
<td>44,929,002</td>
<td>NBS (2012b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (2010 estimate)</td>
<td>US $ 67.9 Billion</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency - CIA (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone – mainlines (June 2012 estimate)</td>
<td>168,895</td>
<td>TCRA (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone – cellular (June 2012 estimate)</td>
<td>28 Million</td>
<td>TCRA (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 Economic Reforms

In the economic domain, the transition from planned economy to market economy was preceded by privatisation of parastatals as one of the economic reform strategies (Mwandenga, 2000). Like many other transition countries, Tanzania was also subjected to economic reforms based on the Washington Consensus prescriptions (Holt Norris & Worby, 2012). Privatisation in Tanzania marked the beginning of a journey to the market economy. Since the late 1980s, many economic policies have been amended to allow engagement of private enterprises in the economy. Among many reforms, the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) was formed in March 1992 to privatise 383 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Bigsten et al., 1999).

Privatisation has substantially reduced the government monopoly and control over market forces. However, there are a few government enterprises such as the power company (Tanzania Electric
Supply Company – Tanesco) and another few utility companies that have remained solely owned by the government (Mwandenga, 2000). Other market institution reforms were carried out to suit the market-based economy. However, privatisation was accompanied by rampant corruption as government officials could set the price of SOEs by undervaluing them and deciding who could purchase them. Tanzania’s economic transformation happened through liberalisation without regulation (Tucker, Hoffman, Mukandala & Billera, 2010), a condition that helped to fuel the already emerged corruption in the pre-reform period, due to shortage of essential goods in the market (Hyden & Mmuya, 2008).

6.4 Political Reforms

Democratic transition in Tanzania was initiated and led by the regime itself under the guidance of Julius Nyerere, the founding father of the nation (Tripp, 2000). It is also worth noting that, according to the Nyalali Report, 78 per cent of Tanzanians surveyed in 1990 favoured a single political party system (Bigsten et al., 1999; Phillips, 2010). Besides the majority favouring a single political party system, the state authority moved forward with reforms towards political pluralism. Based on authoritarian regime characteristics, Nyerere was a powerful and charismatic leader, capable of influencing and initiating the regime’s difficult decisions. He enjoyed what Mainwaring (1989) calls “charismatic legitimacy” in the state. It was very difficult to separate Nyerere and the regime. Mainwaring (1989) asserts that:

The histories of many authoritarian regimes are integrally connected to a single personality. Often, this individual is the only person who can maintain the authoritarian coalition intact. This may be because of his/her particular political skills, or because no one else has the trust of the major actors who support the authoritarian coalition, or both (p. 27).

Following a decision, in 1992, a multiparty system was legalised and many opposition political parties started to operate both in the Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. Currently, there are 18 registered political parties (United Republic of Tanzania, 2010). However, since the first multiparty parliamentary election in 1995, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling party has continued to win national general elections (Brown, 2010; Planmo, 2002).
It is important to highlight some of the issues in political contestation under multiparty system which have characterised the political environment since the 1995. In Tanzania mainland, general elections have been rated to be free and fair, based on some standards of developing countries. CCM has not faced a strong opposition. The once strong opposition party National Convention for Construction and Reform – Mageuzi (NCCR – Mageuzi) under Augustine Mrema in 1995 was no longer a threat to CCM in other general elections. However, in the general election of 2010, CCM encountered a stiff competition from Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), but eventually CCM won the presidential election. The election observers rated the 2010 general election to be free and fair and no remarkable violence and political unrest were experienced in Tanzania mainland. On the contrary, the Zanzibar general election as part of the Union was marred with irregularities. Reports by election observers indicate that vote rigging, multiple voting and violence were experienced with varying magnitude (Brown, 2010). The strong opposition party in Zanzibar, the Civic United Front (CUF) claimed to have won the election in 1995. However, official election results announced by Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) gave the victory to CCM by 50.24 per cent. Following election fraud and political oppression that happened during the election process, CUF top officials rejected the results, vowed not to recognise the CCM-elected President of Zanzibar and boycotted parliamentary sessions (Brown, 2010; Mpangala & Lwehabura, 2011; Rawlence, 2005).

The trend in Zanzibar’s general elections has been similar in that international observers have noted election irregularities. The state organs have been cited partly to favour CCM during the campaigning and election process (Planmo, 2002). The main opposition party, CUF, continued to dispute the CCM victory until the 2010 general election when a coalition government was formed as a requirement of “Muafaka”, an agreement to end the political tension in Zanzibar (Bekoe, 2010). Though political tension between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar has eased as a result of the formed coalition government, there is still much to expect of how a multiparty system in Tanzania would promote democracy. It seems that CCM in Zanzibar cannot easily concede defeat (Planmo, 2002), contrary to the principle of democracy that the only democratic option to win or lose elections is through free and fair elections (Mpangala & Lwehabura, 2011). However, CCM in Zanzibar has been criticised by election observers to have been using
undemocratic means to ensure it stays in power. These means leave a small chance for the opposition parties to win the elections (Planmo, 2002).

6.5 Positioning Tanzania in the Transition

Situating Tanzania in the democratic transition, it can be concluded that the transition in Tanzania is far from over. A new constitution to replace the socialist-based constitution has not yet been drafted (Bakari, 2013). The constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) still indicates that Tanzania is a socialist state (URT Const. Art. 4, § 5, cl. 3). This means that there are issues still operating with socialist legacies. The constitution is a supreme legal act in the state which stipulates the fundamental principles of system adopted by the state (Metelska-Szaniawska, 2009). After the downfall of socialism, it is impossible to function on the basis of the *Ujamaa* constitution in the environment of market economy (Metelska-Szaniawska, 2009). Further, Buyandelgeriyn (2008) argues that transition ends when a complete break with the past is reached.

6.6 Governance in Tanzania

Since the transition in the 1990s, several governance institutions have been crafted to strengthen the pillars of market-enhancing governance structure. Transparency has to some extent improved in Tanzania. This is due to institutional reforms taking place in the public sector. The donor community has helped in enhancing transparency by exerting pressure through aid conditionality (Hoffman, 2011). Financial transparency has been improving, in particular budgetary transparency (Msami, 2011). However, a survey conducted in local government authorities indicates that over 75 per cent of the population do not receive local government budget information (Msami, 2011). Such a low level of availability of budgetary information has contributed to a lack of accountability. Hoffmann (2011) argues that budget transparency in Tanzania does not produce enough of a far-reaching impact in order to improve accountability.

In an effort to enhance governance, Tanzania has created governance institutions such as the Ethics Secretariat, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, the Human Rights and Good Governance Commission, among others (Sulle, 2011). Besides these efforts, governance challenges are yet to be resolved. These are exacerbated by blurred boundaries between CCM and the state as CCM continues to hold power in every aspect of government (Hoffmann, 2011).
There have been too few institutional reforms in key institutions such as parliament and the judicial system to warrant effective governance, as these are institutionally too weak to hold the government accountable (Hoffmann, 2011). Further, NGOs remain too weak to press for more political reforms (Mukandala, Mushi & Killian, 2008; Tucker et al., 2010). Many of these NGOs are not involved in political activities, thus contribute no or little to meaningful institutional change (Hoffmann, 2011). It is argued that transition in Tanzania did not create an environment for effective institutional reforms. This is attributed to the fact that CCM initiated the transition under the absence of citizen demand for reforms – as seen in the Nyalali Report (Hoffman & Robinson, 2009). As such, reforms were carried out to guarantee CCM remains in control over governance, even after multiparty has been introduced; these reforms have done little to reduce the power of the executive branch (Hoffmann, 2011). Many national decisions are generally deliberated on in closed meetings of CCM cadres, with no consultation with other governance actors (Hyden & Mmuya, 2008). Lack of transparency in policy-making and lack of participation by citizens in decision-making processes are still major challenges in Tanzania (Brockington, 2008).

### 6.7 Other Reforms in Tanzania

Several strategies have been implemented to improve governance in Tanzania. Live television broadcasts of the parliamentary sessions have been established to promote transparency and accountability of government to the people (United Republic of Tanzania, 2011). Further, several reform programmes in public services are carried out to promote effective governance. Recently, Tanzania joined an Open Government Partnership, an organisation committed to promoting open government worldwide (United Republic of Tanzania, 2011). To supplement these strategies, Tanzania developed an ICT policy and envisaged to be a role model user of ICT to promote effective governance (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). Several websites (e.g. www.wananchi.go.tz) have been developed for citizens to participate in governance (United Republic of Tanzania, 2011).

### 6.8 Chapter Summary

The current chapter presented privatisation and multiparty systems as key transition elements based on the Washington Consensus recommendation. Privatisation in Tanzania took place in the
absence of regulation, a situation that has been partly blamed of fueling corruption. On the other hand, political pluralism has seen creation of opposition political parties, though they remain weak. The ruling party, CCM, is still powerful and controls the political environment in Tanzania, including the checks and balances structures. Governance challenges are largely attributed to the CCM for being behind the failure to build governance institutions that can bring about political and economic changes in the country.

The following chapter will present the research methodology.
PART III

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

7.1 Introduction

The current chapter reviews research methodology. The chapter starts by discussing the nature of Information Systems (IS) as a trans-disciplinary field and highlights different positions of IS scholars. The philosophical and methodological basis for research design is then discussed to present different approaches in conducting research. The thesis then discusses the philosophical foundations of research in social science and how IS research is related to social science enquiry. The chapter then discusses the three widely used research philosophies (paradigms) in IS inquiry and chooses the appropriate research philosophy for the present study. Finally, the chapter summary is presented to conclude the discussion in this chapter.

7.2 Overview of Information Systems Research

Information systems field is multidisciplinary in nature, with its roots in other social science disciplines e.g. organisational behaviour, computer science, sociology etc. (Fitzgerald & Howcroft, 1998; Galliers, 2003; Walsham, 2012). Due to its nature, IS research exhibits a cross-cultural phenomenon encompassing organisations, individuals, societies, policy issues, ethical issues and others (Galliers, 2003). This diversity has contributed to the debate as to whether IS is a discipline or not (Cordoba, Pilkington & Bernroider, 2012). The debate about IS identity, which eventually determines the nature and domain of IS research, has not received consensus among IS scholars. There are those who consider IS to be a reference discipline with a special focus on IT artefacts (Baskerville & Myers, 2002). An IT artefact refers to the application of IT to enable or support some task(s) embedded within a structure(s) that itself is embedded within a context(s) (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003). The concept of IT artefact was pioneered by Orlikowski and Iacono (2001), and later developed further into the concept of socio-materiality, denoting the interlinking of technology, work and organisation (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Orlikowski, 2007). On the other hand, other scholars such as Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) argue that IS researchers
have not deeply engaged in the central subject of the IT artefacts. They observe that IS scholars have concentrated on the peripheral issues such as theoretical significance of the context where technology is seen to operate, processing power of the IT artefacts, or the like. Such a tendency has caused the IT artefacts to disappear from view, or have been taken as unproblematic once they have been built and installed. These scholars view IT as “not natural, neutral, universal or given”. Impliedly, they suggest that IT is not part of natural science, but, always embedded in contexts such as time, place, discourse and community. As a result, IT is considered to be transitive, passing through different stages such as idea generation, development, use and modification (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001).

Orlikowski and Iacono’s (2001) view has been criticised by other scholars, who suggest that such a view is likely to limit the growth of IS as a discipline (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003). They argue that “when non-IS scholars publish on IS phenomena” in IS-centric journals, “they bring new theories, methodologies and insights” that enrich the IS discipline (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003, p. 190). They further emphasise a broader perspective that may incorporate other reference disciplines, provided there is a focus on IS (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003). With similar views to Benbasat and Zmud’s (2003) position, but a little broader, Agarwal and Lucas Jr. (2005) call for macro studies focusing on the transformative capability of IT in areas such as customer services, organisational structures, and national and global economics. Thompson and Walsham (2010) also share this view by calling for IS research focus on areas that include governance, accountability and civil society. On the other hand, there are those who emphasise the application of IT (e.g. Lee, 2001), implying that the IS field is more inclined towards practices rather than theory (Avison & Pries-Heje, 2005; Shanks, Rouse & Arnott, 1993).

Different positions taken by IS scholars confirm the existence of an identity crisis in the IS discipline. Nevertheless, there is a little consensus among scholars on IT artefacts. Given the diversity of IS research, the rigour of research has been left open to the discipline for interpretation and debate (Baskerville & Myers, 2002; Neufeld, Fang & Huff, 2007). The diversity in IS research has contributed to the use of mixed methods in IS enquiry. In fact, there have been calls for methodological pluralism in IS research (Galliers, 2003; Landry & Banville, 1992; Mingers, 2001; Venkatesh, Brown & Bala, 2013), to which the present study subscribes (discussed in section 8.3).
The view adopted by the researcher in the present study is of IS as a social rather than a technical system; by examining the role of IT in ensuring governance within an environment where there are factors interplaying with one another, the researcher is indeed looking at IS as a social transitive phenomenon.

7.3 The Philosophical and Methodological Basis for Research Design

Research design has been carried out using two main approaches: by either identifying the relevant epistemology first then the methodology, or vice versa. Epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge, how we acquire knowledge and how this knowledge is valid (Hirschheim, 1985). Those who advocate identifying the epistemology first then the method, argue that our assumptions and beliefs are fundamental to our understanding of the world and its challenges (Gadamer, 1976; Weber, 1997). Weber (1997) also argues that when one tries to understand a phenomenon of inquiry is already operating within an existing set of beliefs and assumptions. On the other hand, those who advocate identifying the relevant method first followed by the epistemology, emphasise that strategies of inquiry are applied when one tries to attach meaning to initial research inputs and outputs and how these are linked to known epistemology (Crotty, 1998). In turn, strategies of inquiry are then used to position the researcher’s inclination to the given body of knowledge. The present study approached the research design by adopting the former approach (i.e. identifying the epistemology first, then the method). Consequently, the study subscribes to the notion that the researcher’s beliefs and assumptions are fundamental in making sense of the real world and need to be a priori for research (Weber, 1997). The great philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1803) had this to say:

A priori knowledge must precede any grasp or understanding of the sense data of empirical experience. He argued that there must be inherent, in-born organising principles within man’s consciousness by which any and all sense data is structured, arranged and thus understood (quoted in Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 227).

Based on Kant’s remarks, a researcher always has a way to begin an inquiry, present an idea and advance it to a level where colleagues can question and test it to see if it makes meaning and reality, given the subject of study. After this process, this stage concentrates on the debate concerning the actual frame of reference for the use of adopted stance, in making the meaning
universally valuable and usable. The implication of this debate necessitates the need to present the epistemological paradigm that the researcher is working from before embarking on the method to apply in a study. It has been recommended that researchers identify the epistemology first, then the method, as starting with the epistemology first acts as the base for a given research project (Crotty, 1998; Gadamer, 1976). Having described the two approaches for research design and selected the relevant approach for the present study, the next section discusses the key philosophical foundations of research in social science.

7.4 Philosophical Foundations of Research in Social Science

The previous section regarding the overview of IS research highlighted the diversity that exists in IS field. As Information Systems are largely social in nature rather than being technical systems, they share all characteristics with social sciences; challenges associated with social sciences are the same as those of IS (Hirschheim, 1985). Following this background, the review in this section is set to lay a philosophical ground on which IS research is built. This section presents a philosophical foundation in social science and various assumptions underpinning social science enquiries.

The complexity and lack of consensus on issues concerning IS theories and social science research among scholars have resulted in variations of the use of philosophical terms (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Crotty, 1998). Following this variation, scholars have advanced various topologies representing philosophies applicable in social science research. For example, Lincoln and Guba’s (2000) topology and Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) scheme have both provided useful insights about assumptions underpinning ontology, epistemology, methodology and the nature of social science research and IS research in particular. Nevertheless, the present study adopts Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) scheme to interrogate the various philosophical assumptions in social science research. Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) scheme is considered to be more encompassing in terms of dimensional coverage. It has one more dimension of assumptions about the human nature which is not available in Lincoln and Guba’s (2000) topology.

Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) scheme categorises social science enquiries into two main research approaches, namely subjective and objective. Each of these approaches presents four sets of
philosophical assumptions as applied in social science. These are ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology as presented in table 7.1.

Table 7.1: A Scheme for Analysing Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The subjective approach to social science</th>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>The objective approach to social science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominalism</td>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-positivism</td>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Positivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarism</td>
<td>Human Nature</td>
<td>Determinism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideographic</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Nomothetic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979)

The next subsections discuss these assumptions in terms of debate of oppositely-held beliefs.

7.4.1 **Ontological Debate - Nominalism vs. Realism**

Ontological debate is based on researchers’ assumptions about how the world is made up and the nature of things. Researchers are faced with ontological questions about the reality of the phenomena of inquiry. Are things that exist objective and have they reality external to individuals, or they are products of individual consciousness (social constructions) formed through the action of humans in creating and recreating it in the mind (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991)? The debate on this dimension persists among scholars and has divided social scientists into rival groups. Burrell and Morgan (1979) denote this debate as nominalism vs realism, implying two oppositely held assumptions about the reality i.e. is it given or exist as a product of our mind? Nominalism assumptions hold that social reality is relative, and the social world is mainly names, concepts and labels that in the real sense are artificial creations. On the other hand, realism assumptions hold that the real world has hard, intangible structures that exist irrespective of our labels. The social world exists regardless of how individuals perceive it. The social world also exists as strongly as the physical world.

Besides its usefulness in the ontological debate, the use of nominalism and realism paradigms has attracted debate and is not universally accepted (Monod, 2003). As a result, Fitzgerald and
Howcroft (1998) proposed the ontology perspective of relativist and realist. They argue that relativists believe “socially-transmitted terms direct how reality is perceived and this varies across different languages and cultures” (p. 319).

7.4.2 Epistemological Debate - Anti-Positivism vs. Positivism

Epistemological debate in this dimension is associated with the assumptions held by the two rivals. The relevant questions which drive the epistemological debate are: What forms of knowledge can be obtained and how to sort truth from falsehood? Can knowledge be acquired, or must it be experienced? Answering these questions leads to the position taken by positivists and anti-positivists. Positivists hold the assumptions that one can seek to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for patterns and relationships between people (Hirschheim, 1985). They believe that through hypothetic deductive testability of theory, they generate knowledge by either verification or falsification processes (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). Anti-positivists, however, reject assumptions held by positivists. They believe that to understand the phenomenon of inquiry one must take part (be a participant observer) in the research process and directly experience it (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Based on this belief, anti-positivists reject the belief that social science can create true objective knowledge of any kind.

7.4.3 Human Nature Debate - Determinism vs. Voluntarism

The human nature debate is concerned with the assumptions about the relationship between humans and their environment. The essence of this debate is to identify views about humans – either perceived to respond in a mechanistic or even deterministic fashion to the external world (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In other words, are humans determined by their environment, or do humans create their environment? Are humans determined by their environment, or do they have "free will”? Answering these questions has implications for the way humans are treated in the research process.

7.4.4 Methodological Debate – Ideographic vs. Nomothetic Theory

The previous three debates regarding ontological, epistemological and human nature assumptions determine the direction of the methodological debate and have methodological implications (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Burrell and Morgan (1979) categorised various methods
into an ideographic – nomothetic continuum. Ideographic inquiry involves getting inside a subject and gathering background details and life history. While inside, researchers take part in people's normal lives, looking at diaries, biographies and observing activities taking place in the research setting (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Walsham, 2006). Such methods are common in interpretivist research. On the other hand, the nomothetic approach uses more scientific methods (from physical science) and is mostly concerned with hypothesis testing (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Hirschheim, 1985). In this approach, survey is a dominant method used by researchers. To minimise the risk of observer interference with the data collection process, researchers use standardised research tools such as questionnaires; they take a value-free position in the research process (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Generally, a nomothetic approach adopts statistical techniques to analysing data (Kaplan & Duchon, 1988). So, a nomothetic approach is concerned with methods that consider reality as external and knowledge as objective, a position subscribed by positivists. On the other hand, ideographic approach refers to methods that consider a more internalised view of reality and a subjective perception of knowledge (i.e. anti-positivism). Ideographic methods are based on field studies; qualitative methods such as grounded theory and ethnography are common in this approach. Typical data collection tools are interviews with generally not many statistical techniques involved in data analysis.

Given the differences in philosophical stance, two rival groups exist: objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists examine relationships and regularities between the elements in the phenomenon of inquiry (Hirschheim, 1985). They search for concepts and universal laws to explain reality. Subjectivists focus on how individuals create, modify and interpret the world, and see things as more relativistic (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

The debate concerning philosophy in the IS field is an unfinished business. We continue to see many researchers aligned with one or the other approach given the philosophical stance to which they subscribe. The researcher therefore settles anywhere along the knowledge continuum between the subjective and objective view. Then it becomes a duty for the researcher to produce valid knowledge claims based on the position along the continuum.
7.5 Research Philosophies in Information Systems Research

Information Systems inquiries have mainly been conducted based on positivistic, interpretive and critical research philosophies. Over the years, positivism has been a dominant research philosophy in IS research compared to the other two (Davison & Martinsons, 2011; Mingers, 2001; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Recently, interpretive research philosophy has received a wide recognition and many IS researchers are adopting it in their research projects (Walsham, 1995; Walsham, 2006). However, critical research philosophy is not a widely adopted philosophy in IS research (Myers & Klein, 2011). The next subsections discuss research philosophies (paradigms) with reference to ontology, epistemology, methodology and assumptions about human nature.

7.5.1 Interpretivist Research Philosophy

Interpretivism is an emerging paradigm in IS research which has been promoted by scholars like Walsham (1995). It is based on subjective assumptions about the social world, contrary to positivistic (objective) assumptions (Walsham, 1995).

7.5.1.1 Interpretivist Ontological Assumptions

Interpretivists emphasise the subjective meaning of the reality that is constructed and reconstructed through a human and social interaction process (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). They assume that the social world is not "given" but, socially constructed and reinforced by humans through their actions and interactions. Social systems do not exist apart from humans, and hence cannot be comprehended, characterised, and measured in some objective or universal way (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Due to subjective ontological assumptions, interpretivists believe that the social world does not exist to be discovered as an objective reality, but as a social reality to be interpreted (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

7.5.1.2 Interpretivist Epistemological Assumptions

Interpretivists assume that the social world is constructed through interaction of human beings and interpreted according to social norms. The interpretive researcher forms part of the investigation process through subjective intervention. As social practices are constructed and sustained, interpretive position asserts that the language humans use to describe social practices
constitutes those practices. Thus, understanding social reality requires understanding how practices and meanings are formed and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans working towards some shared goals (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Although interpretivists agree with causal relations, they stress circular or reciprocal causality models, with the intention of understanding actors' views of their social world and their role in it (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

7.5.1.3 Interpretivist Human Nature Assumptions

Interpretivists hold the view of voluntarism about human nature. Voluntarism is based on the belief that man is completely autonomous and has free will to play the role of creator of his environment (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Man is also the controller as opposed to being controlled; man is the master rather than the marionette (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).

7.5.1.4 Interpretivist Methodological Assumptions

Following interpretivists tradition, the appropriate research methods for investigation are field studies (Kaplan & Duchon, 1988). Field studies generate valid interpretive knowledge which examines humans within their social settings (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Contrary to an a priori approach,

… the interpretive researcher avoids imposing externally defined categories on a phenomenon. Instead of the researcher coming to the field with a well-defined set of constructs and instruments with which to measure the social reality, the interpretive researcher attempts to derive his or her constructs from the field by in-depth examination of and exposure to the phenomenon of interest. The categories and themes that emerge out of this approach are intended to closely couple those relevant to the study's participants (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 14).

Interpretive researchers collect data (qualitative) mostly through interviews, by which researchers themselves are data-collecting tools (Walsham, 2006). However, occasionally, quantitative data can also be collected depending on the nature and objective of the study.
7.5.2  **Critical Realist Research Philosophy**

Critical realism is a paradigm kind of triangulation which embraces a pluralism approach (Landry & Banville, 1992). It is based on interpretivism, but holds an intermediate stance which draws some features from positivism, interpretivism and critical perspective. Contrary to interpretivism, it assumes reality as not socially constructed (Dobson, 2002). Critical realism was developed out of the disagreement in both positivism and interpretivism key assumptions which critical realists thought to address (Stahl, 2008). Critical realists believe that all humans are biased and all studies conducted by human beings are inherently biased (Pather & Remenyi, 2004).

7.5.3  **Positivist Research Philosophy**

Positivism has its perspective based on the traditional approach of natural science (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 5) define positivism as an epistemology "which seeks to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements".

7.5.3.1  **Positivist Ontological Assumptions**

Positivists believe that reality exists objectively and independently from human experiences (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The universe is comprised of objectively given, immutable objects and structures which exist as empirical entities independent of the observer's appreciation of them (Hirschheim, 1985).

Positivists hold that the role of the researcher is to "discover the objective physical and social reality by crafting precise measures that will detect and gauge those dimensions of reality that interest the researcher" (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 9). The researcher plays a neutral and passive role in the investigation and distances him/herself from intervening in the investigation (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

7.5.3.2  **Positivist Epistemological Assumptions**

Following ontological assumptions in the positivistic tradition of realism, positivists are concerned with the hypothetic deductive testability of theories. Having its roots in natural science (Hirschheim, 1985), scientific knowledge should allow verification or falsification and
seek generalisable results (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). The law-like propositions of the causal relationship nature, coupled with explanation, prediction and control, are typical in positivist tradition (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

7.5.3.3 Positivist Human Nature Assumptions

With positivist researchers, the relationship between human beings and their environment is of a deterministic nature (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Positivist researchers view human beings and their experiences as products of their environment; one in which human beings are conditioned by the external circumstances (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).

7.5.3.4 Positivist Methodological Assumptions

To test hypothetic deductive theory, the researcher takes a value-free position and employs objective measurement to collect research evidence. A quantitative method such as survey is a typical positivist instrument (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). Based on natural science tradition, positivists accept scientific methods as an approach to knowledge acquisition (Hirschheim, 1985; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

Table 7.2 presents the summary of the three philosophical assumptions based on ontology, epistemology and methodology.
Table 7.2: Summary of Philosophies in Information Systems Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POSITIVISM</th>
<th>INTERPRETIVISM</th>
<th>CRITICAL REALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Positivists believe that reality exists objectively and independently from human experiences (Burrell &amp; Morgan, 1979).</td>
<td>Interpretivists emphasise the subjective meaning of the reality that is constructed and reconstructed through a human and social interaction process (Burrell &amp; Morgan, 1979)</td>
<td>Critical philosophers hold the belief that every state of existence, be it an individual or a society, possesses historically-constructed potentials which are unfilled (Chua, 1986, p. 619). This belief entails that human beings are free and capable of changing their status quo given the potentials that exist in every being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Positivists are concerned with the hypothetic deductive testability of theories. Scientific knowledge should allow verification or falsification and seek generalisable results (Chen &amp; Hirschheim, 2004).</td>
<td>Interpretivists assume that the social world is constructed through interaction of human beings and interpreted according to social norms (Burrell &amp; Morgan, 1979).</td>
<td>Critical epistemology is grounded in social and historical perspectives which entail that there is “no theory-independent facts” that can certainly prove or disapprove theory (Chua, 1986, p. 620).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Positivists contend that, to test hypothetic-deductive theory, research should take a value-free position and employ objective measurement to collect research evidence. A quantitative method such as the survey is a typical positivist instrument (Chen &amp; Hirschheim, 2004).</td>
<td>The appropriate research methods for investigation are field studies. Field studies generate valid interpretive knowledge which examines humans within their social settings (Orlikowski &amp; Baroudi, 1991).</td>
<td>Appropriate methods for critical research are longitudinal in nature to reveal the historical context of organisation and its societal link. Ethnography tends to dominate critical research (Chua, 1986).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.6 Applicable Research Philosophy

It is a recommended practice for a researcher to explicitly disclose the research philosophy on which his or her research is based (Walsham, 1995). Research philosophy is important in providing a researcher with a guide in selection of research approach and available options within a particular philosophy. Dobson (2002) argues that understanding philosophy makes the researcher powerful to argue for different research approaches and confidently select his/her own sphere of activity.

Choosing which philosophy is appropriate for a particular research project is not a simple task. However, the actual choice is guided by the basic belief system referred as a paradigm. Paradigm refers to “the most fundamental set of assumptions adopted by a professional community which allow them to share similar perceptions and engage in common practices” (Hirschheim & Klein, 1989, p. 1201). Paradigm is important in reflecting the researcher’s basic beliefs and how one can produce valid claims given the paradigm from which one is working. Paradigm also provides a sense of belonging for researchers by subscribing to the beliefs and assumptions underlying it. However, this comes with liabilities that the researcher has to bear in his/her research.

7.6.1 Choosing a Research Philosophy

Galliers (1992) proposes that a researcher can choose the research philosophy based on (1) the goal of the study such as theory building, theory extension or theory testing (Dobson, 2002), or (2) the object (purpose) or the phenomenon of inquiry. Figure 7.1 presents different elements that help the researcher to choose the appropriate research philosophy.

![Figure 7.1: Determining a Philosophy](source: Knight (2008))
7.6.2 Research Philosophy for the Present Study

Choosing which research philosophy is appropriate for the present study involves reflecting on the research purpose and context. This study intended to measure the role of IT in governance in the context of a transition state. Based on the literature review carried out in this study, the role of IT is an outcome of three interacting elements: IT usage, governance processes and external pressures (a proposition). All these three elements as presented in the conceptual model (Figure 5.2 depicted in subsection 5.2.2); have to be quantitatively measured to identify the role of IT in governance. Thus, to investigate this phenomenon and draw inferences from the sampled population required quantitative data. Further, to meet the object of this study (i.e. theory testing) required an objective instrument that enables a value-free position of the researcher and that can capture standardised responses (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). Therefore, questionnaires are ideal data collection instruments for the present study. However, recognising the inherent weaknesses in quantitative data, a mixed methods approach was adopted (discussed in section 8.3) and qualitative data were also collected (Davison & Martinsons, 2011; Mingers, 2001).

Given the above explanation, the present study can be described as largely quantitative and deductive in nature with a component of qualitative data. Therefore, the present study adopted positivist research philosophy.

While paradigms help to generate knowledge claims in their respective areas, each paradigm possesses both strengths and weaknesses (Mingers, 2001). It has been suggested to adopt a mixed methods approach in IS research to tap into strengths of individual methods (Mingers, 2001). Figure 7.2 presents the fundamental elements of research based on positivist and interpretivist traditions.
7.7 Chapter Summary

The present chapter discussed the nature of IS research by presenting the different positions of researchers. As a social science field that cuts across many other social science disciplines, there has been a debate concerning the identity of IS as to whether IS research is a discipline or not. This debate, which eventually determines the nature and domain of IS research, has not received consensus among IS researchers. The diversity of IS research confirms the existence of an identity crisis of the IS discipline. As a result, there have been calls for a mixed methods approach in IS research, the approach adopted in this enquiry.

The chapter further presented the philosophical and methodological basis for research design by reviewing the two approaches that are normally adopted by researchers. The first approach or school of thought is supported by those who advocate identifying the epistemology first, then the method. On the other hand, the second approach is supported by those who advocate identifying the method first followed by the epistemology. The present study adopted the former approach to guide the inquiry. The philosophical foundations of research in social science were also discussed. Special emphasis was placed on the objective – subjective debate covering the opposing beliefs of the rival groups. In this debate, four dimensions of philosophical assumptions, namely ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology were discussed. The review continued by covering the three widely used research philosophies in IS enquiries. Positivism, interpretivism and critical realism were discussed and finally positivism was chosen to guide this study. The following chapter will present the research design.
CHAPTER EIGHT

RESEARCH DESIGN

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the concept of public perceptions is introduced, by discussing its importance in revealing collective views of the public regarding issues of public concern. This is followed by the discussion of the rest of the processes and activities of the research design, defined as the arrangement of conditions for the collection and analysis of data, in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure (Selltiz, Wrightsman & Cook, 1976). A research design serves as a blueprint indicating how data are collected, measured and analysed (Phillips, 1971). This chapter discusses all these processes followed by the discussion of ethical issues observed when executing this thesis. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting the summary of the discussions in this chapter.

8.2 Measuring the Role of IT Using Public Perceptions

The objective of the present study is to measure the role of IT in ensuring effective governance in Tanzania. The researcher argues that the role of IT in governance can be measured by public perceptions. The public perceptions approach has been used by researchers to represent the views of the public about issues of interest that are believed to exist in the public sphere. This section introduces the concept of public perceptions.

The term “perception” may be defined as a mental representation, experience or view about a matter of concern. This term is often used interchangeably to mean “opinion” – a belief or judgement. An opinion can also be perceived to be fair, unfair or as reality. The term “public” refers here to the collective that share such a mental representation (Perrin & McFarland, 2011). According to Perrin and McFarland (2011), opinion research aims to ascertain shared mental representation about matters of public concern that are believed to exist in the public sphere where citizens exchange ideas and information about public matters. An opinion survey can unearth and represent the authentic views and beliefs of the public (Perrin & McFarland, 2008). According to UNCTAD (2011), IT impacts can be measured by directly collecting self-reported perception data on the benefits and disadvantages of IT. This demonstrates that public the
perceptions approach is an appropriate measure of IT impacts. However, there are challenges of opinion research such as non-response, proxy responses, question order, question wording and priming, and framing (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Perrin & McFarland, 2011). Non-responses or “don’t know” responses in opinion research arise from various reasons such as uninformed respondents about the issue in question; respondents do not know or simply do not care enough about the issue to offer opinion (Perrin & McFarland, 2011). Proxy responses may arise from questions asked in a too obscure manner for respondents to understand them (Schuman & Presser, 1996). However, researchers use measures such as “uncertain” filter (Schuman & Presser, 1980) and interviews (Perrin & McFarland, 2011) to address some of these issues.

Over the years, we continue to see the use of public opinion perspective in various studies (Bonoli, 2000; Maina, Kitonyo & Ogwell, 2012; Schuman & Presser, 1980; Van Oorschot, 2010), and indeed, the preferences or views of the public have profoundly influenced the choice of leadership, policies of governments and behaviours of legislators and politicians (Brooks & Manza, 2006). For example, Page and Shapiro (1983) found that public opinion on policy influenced policy change in the US. Similarly, Finseraas (2009) found that public preferences influenced redistribution social policy across Europe. Therefore, the present study adopted this approach to measure the role of IT in governance in a transition state. Precautionary measures such as adopting a mixed methods approach were also taken to ensure the collection and reporting of reliable data as discussed in the sections that follow.

8.3 Mixed Methods Approach

The previous section discussed how human perceptions can be used to measure the role of IT in governance. Two major concerns raised against the use of public perceptions have been its inability to provide a representative view of the public and also the genuineness of the opinion in the context of a range of interactional, social and technological cues (Perrin & McFarland, 2011). The mixed methods approach is proposed to mitigate some of these challenges and ensure the collection and reporting of reliable data. This section presents a mixed methods approach in IS research.

The importance of mixed methods approach is well established in the IS literature. Scholars maintain that mixed methods approach improves the rigour and richness of the findings (Davison
According to Mingers (2001), a mixed methods approach combines quantitative and qualitative methods in a single research project. Methodologists argue that quantitative and qualitative methods focus on different aspects of reality and both methods have weaknesses and strengths (Mingers, 2001). Adopting a mixed methods approach compensates for non-overlapping weaknesses in both methods (Fellows & Liu, 1987; Venkatesh et al., 2013); thereby providing richer and more reliable results than when a single method is used (Creswell, 2009; Mingers, 2001). Adopting a mixed methods approach is even more compelling in studies examining IT impacts. It is argued that IT impacts are “far more sweeping and wider than is typically recognised in the IS literature” (Beath, Berente, Gallivan & Lyytinen, 2013, p. ii). As such, “existing theories and findings do not sufficiently explain or offer significant insights into” these impacts (Venkatesh et al., 2013). Researchers recommend that it is always best to use several methods of data collection in studies measuring IT impacts (Bikson, 1991; Venkatesh et al., 2013).

Based on the above account, the present study adopted a mixed methods approach to measure the role of IT in governance. The mixed methods approach in the present study served a purpose of compensating for the weaknesses in both methods (Venkatesh et al., 2013). The next section discusses the actual adopted mixed methods approach.

**8.4 Mixed Methods Approach for the Present Study**

After the decision to adopt a methodological pluralism approach has been made, the researcher is always confronted by questions concerning how such an approach is to be operationalised. However, methodologists recommend that the timing (i.e. concurrent or sequential) of individual methods to be matched with the object of inquiry (Hirschheim, 1985; Venkatesh et al., 2013). It is recommended that for studies examining IT impacts such as the present thesis, concurrent data collection is an appropriate strategy (Venkatesh et al., 2013). Therefore, in the present study both quantitative and qualitative data were collected concurrently (Venkatesh et al., 2013). Given the dynamic nature of both governance and IT, concurrent collection of quantitative and qualitative data was important in enabling the researcher to arrive at correct inferences about the perceived role of IT in governance. In addition, quantitative and qualitative data were integrated at the data analysis stage to allow the researcher to make an integrative view of findings from both methods.
Figure 8.1: Mixed Methods Approach for the Present Study

Figure 8.1 depicts a mixed methods approach applied in the present study. To signify the high priority assigned to quantitative method, qualitative method is shown in faint scripts, indicating its weight in this study. Data analysis was carried out according to accepted practices in respective paradigms.

8.4.1 Survey Method

The previous section discussed the methodological pluralism concept and its merits in IS research. This subsection presents the discussion about the survey method as a primary method in this study.

The survey method is a dominant positivist approach in IS research. Survey is defined as a means of gathering information about the characteristics, actions, or opinions of a large group of people, referred to as the population (Tanur, 1982). Survey research provides numeric descriptions of opinions or trends of the population by studying the sample drawn from a particular population, and generalises or makes claims about the population from the sample results (Creswell, 2009). Survey method is appropriate when researchers:

(i) Seek to understand “what”, “why”, “how” “how many” and “how much” aspects of a phenomenon (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).
(ii) Need to investigate the phenomena in their natural setting (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).
(iii) Investigate the phenomena which occur in current time or have occurred in the recent past (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).
(iv) Investigate the phenomena of which control of the independent and dependent variables is not possible or not desired (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).
In addition to ideal situations where survey method is appropriate, Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) present three types of survey methods based on their purposes as described below.

(i) Exploratory survey: This is used in studies intending to discover details about a phenomenon and trying out new preliminary concepts about it (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).

(ii) Explanatory survey: This is used in studies intending to test relationships of the variables in a population. Test of relationships is done from theoretically grounded expectations about why and how such relationships exist. Researchers adopting this survey clearly specify *a priori* the independent and dependent variables and the model explaining their relationships (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).

(iii) Descriptive survey: This is used in studies intending to describe situations, events, attitudes or opinion about a particular population, but theory testing is not involved (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).

The value-free position of the researcher accorded by the survey method is appropriate for hypothetic deductive theory testing studies such as the present thesis (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Orlikowisk & Baroudi, 1991; Venkatesh et al., 2013). In addition, the survey method brings breadth to the study by its capability to gather data about different dimensions of a phenomenon of inquiry from many respondents (Venkatesh et al., 2013). It also enhances generalisability of the research findings (Dooley, 2001; Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). Therefore, the survey method was adopted in the present study for the quantitative component. The actual adopted type of survey method is discussed next.

### 8.4.1.1 *Explanatory Survey*

Given the various types of survey methods, the researcher is confronted by a question regarding which type of survey method is appropriate to investigate the phenomenon. Choosing an appropriate survey method involves mapping the object of the study within the three types of survey methods. The object of the present study was to measure the role of IT using perceptions. Based on the developed propositions and conceptual model, the study intended to understand “WHAT” role has IT played in resolving governance challenges. In addition, the study intended to identify “WHAT” are the factors that enhance or impede effective governance. Fulfilling such objectives needs an explanatory survey method as it is appropriate for theory testing studies such
as the present thesis. Hence, an explanatory survey was adopted in this thesis. The next subsection discusses the research site (i.e. where to collect data for answering the research questions).

8.4.1.2 Research Site

Where to gather data is another critical question in the research process. The object of the present study was to measure the role of IT in governance in a transition environment. The first condition for this study was that an environment must be a transition country and governance-related activities must have happened currently to meet the conditionality advanced by Dube and Pare (2003) and Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) for using a survey method. Based on these attributes and others described below, Tanzania emerged as a suitable country for conducting this study:

(i) Transition: Tanzania is a transition state moving from socialism to capitalism. Tanzania also adopted a multiparty political system which ended “the state-protected privileges of the Marxist–Leninist ideology” (Kornai, 2010, p. 630). Reforms in political and economic domains marked the beginning of the transition in Tanzania. Although, political and economic transformation initiatives have been under way, the constitution still reads that Tanzania is a socialist state (URT Const. Art. 4, § 5, cl. 3). Given the necessary conditions that mark the end of transition, Tanzania has not met such conditions. These include drafting and approving a new constitution (Carothers, 2002; Planmo, 2002) and creating democratic institutions such as an independent electoral commission. According to Kornai (2000), providing constitutional safeguards for private property and legalising advocacy of pro-capitalist ideologies are some of the key conditions for a capitalist system. Hence, Tanzania is a country in transition.

(ii) Political contestation: Very recently (i.e. 2010), Tanzania held the fourth multiparty election. This is a political activity related to the subject of this research. Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) and Dube and Pare (2003, p. 11) argue that “key aspects are related to the moment data was collected in relation to the time the events occurred”. Thus, this political activity and time of occurrence justified Tanzania as an appropriate research site for an inquiry into the role of IT in governance.
(iii) Governance rating: Tanzania is a more highly ranked country in governance than any other countries in the Great Lake region (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2010). Consequently, this attribute made Tanzania a good site for the present study.

(iv) Adoption and use of IT: Tanzania adopted IT and has been using IT in public service provision to improve efficiency in public offices and promote effective governance as part of the Public Service Reform Programme (International Records Management Trust, 2007). Tanzania’s aspiration in ICT is marked by the government commitment to recognise and support use of ICT in public services to enhance effective governance (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). Following this recognition, in 2003 the cabinet approved the national ICT Policy which, among others, envisaged the government becoming a model user of ICT (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). These also made Tanzania to be a suitable choice for the present study.

8.4.1.3 Sampling Procedure

After the researcher has identified the site where the research will be conducted, the sampling procedure becomes the researcher’s concern. According to Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993), sampling is “concerned with drawing individuals or entities from a population in such a way as to permit generalisation about the phenomena of interest from the sample to the population” (p. 83). The next subsections discuss characteristics of the population and how the sample was selected.

8.4.1.4 Population

To collect quantitative data, population for this study was all computer literate adults (above 18 years old) living in Tanzania who had access to computers and the Internet, and who had been using IT-related services for a minimum of five years. The logic of specifying the age condition was that, in order to participate in public governance (e.g. voting) in Tanzania, one must be aged 18 years and older. The requirement of IT-related competencies is important in that, for someone to effectively evaluate IT impacts on governance, that person must be IT literate and have personally experienced the impact of IT. However, given the digital divide concern, consideration must be given to where exactly in Tanzania would be a suitable place to draw a representative sample. The digital divide discourse suggests that the digital divide is moderated by geography of which a large population of those who have IT and Internet access are normally
found in cities and have higher levels of education (Hill & Hughes, 1998; Mossberger et al., 2006; Norris, 1999).

Due to low levels of Internet literacy in villages and small towns, this study was conducted in the city of Dar es Salaam (a commercial capital) where there is a more educated population and the highest computer literacy level. Dar es Salaam was selected in order to have a suitable sample size to match with the study objective as well as survey method requirements.

In order to properly respond to the survey questionnaire, respondents were also required to have a certain level of education. Secondary education was considered to be the minimum level of education respondents were required to possess. The logic is that any secondary education leaver possesses the minimum requirements necessary to understand basic computer operations and interact with information technologies. Further, it was assumed that respondents, who met the education criterion, were also conversant with the English language enough to interact with the computer and the Internet. Although some computer applications (e.g. Internet Explorer and Google) have been translated into Kiswahili, the national language in Tanzania; most computer and Internet applications are still predominantly in English (Huerta & Sandoval-Almazan, 2007; O’Neill, Lavoie & Bennett, 2003). So the English language was also implicitly considered as one of the attributes of the respondents. All these requirements contributed to the sampling procedure. However, Zanzibar as part of the Union was not included in this study due mainly to financial constraints. But, its exclusion had limited impact on the findings of this study, given the similar features it shares with Tanzania mainland.

8.4.1.5 Sample Structure

Sampling is another concern for a researcher who must establish an appropriate sample which can produce appropriate answers, as posed in the data collection instruments. This involves selecting individual respondents who are representative of the sample frame (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). As effective governance demands inclusion of multiple actors (stakeholders) to participate in the governing process, the governance literature always classifies governance actors into state and non-state actors (Börzel & Risse, 2010; Sorensen, 2006; Treib et al., 2007). State actors are those from, or affiliated to the government, while non-state actors include those from the private sectors (e.g. businesses, civil society, NGOs, etc). Given such a diversity of key
actors, the sample was drawn from the government departments, non-governmental organisations and business sector. The logic of sampling these groups is that the public is composed of people belonging to these sectors but no one belongs to more than one sector. Further, all respondents who did not belong to the government sector or non-governmental organisations were in the business sector. Given the component of Internet in this study, it was also important to consider what segment of the population has substantial Internet access. According to the TCRA (2010) Report, 61 per cent of all Internet users in Tanzania belong to institutions or organisations. Thus these three sectors provided a large segment of the population in terms of computer and Internet access. Further, different cohorts of actors were included in the sample to achieve sampling for heterogeneity criteria, as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994).

8.4.1.6 Cluster Sampling

As discussed above on the diversity of governance actors, it was important to use probabilistic sampling strategies to ensure that all important stakeholders in governance were included. To achieve this, the present study adopted cluster sampling strategy to identify potential respondents who provided quantitative data. The probabilistic sampling technique refers to a sampling approach that ensures each member of the population has an equal chance of inclusion in the study (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). However, due to unavailability of a list of the population which uses IT in Tanzania, the list was developed and a probabilistic strategy was applied. At the first stage, in December 2011, the researcher worked on the list of all NGOs provided by the Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO). From the list, four NGOs were identified and selected to produce individual respondents. These NGOs were approached to produce the list of individuals who met the criteria of IT literacy and experience. At the second stage, from that list, 100 participants were randomly selected to participate in the study. Similarly, Business Registrations and Licensing Agency (BRELA) provided the list of business organisations and the Department of Public Services provided the list of government departments. Four organisations and four government departments were selected from these two lists and, thereafter, 100 were randomly selected from each sector. Finally, the list of 300 respondents in total was compiled as a final sample size. However, the sample size was decided based on a rule of thumb approach. A rule of thumb is an accepted method based on experience and practice used to determine a sample size required in a particular research project.
8.4.1.7 **Quantitative Data Collection**

The above subsection discussed how the representative sample was constructed. Now, the researcher is again confronted by the “how” question regarding the data collection tool. To answer this question, the object of the study and the type of data to be collected are of great importance. Since achieving the purpose of the present study involved testing the propositions, quantitative data are necessary to accomplish this purpose. Then, a data collection instrument suitable for such objective and type of data is the questionnaire. So, quantitative data from a cross-sectional area were collected, using questionnaires. Merits of questionnaires for this study are described below:

(i) They are capable of covering a large sample (Pinsonkeault & Kraemer, 1993; Rowley, 2012).

(ii) They provide the same statements and questions to each respondent, making the data collection process consistent (Pinsonkeault & Kraemer, 1993).

(iii) The researcher does not interfere with gathering of evidence, an ideal condition for hypothesis/proposition testing studies (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Hirschheim, 1985; Orlikowisk & Baroudi, 1991).

However, the disadvantage is that data collection using questionnaires limits responses when some items are not included in the questionnaires.

8.4.1.8 **Instrument Development**

The construction of the survey instrument to measure the role of IT in resolving governance challenges involved two stages: (i) Reviewing the literature to identify relevant constructs and variables to be used. (Available questionnaires to measure different aspects of the conceptual model were also reviewed and where possible some items were adapted in the present study.) (ii) Pre-testing the questionnaire to ensure validity (discussed in section 8.4.1.9).

The questionnaire consisted of three main configuration variables identified in the present study. These were: (1) external pressures, (2) usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes, and (3) governance processes. In addition, effectiveness of the governance variable was also included in the questionnaire to determine the respondents’ overall perception of the effectiveness of governance. Constructs and their measures were derived from the literature review and also from previous studies, as discussed below.
The constructs for external pressures were derived from the literature review (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Knack, 2001; Maor & Stevens, 2002) presented in sections 3.4 and 4.15. Degree of external pressures was measured using two constructs, namely impact of globalisation on governance (GG1 – GG2) and impact of foreign aid and international NGOs on governance (FA1 – FA3). The impact of globalisation on governance is a well-established phenomenon and many researchers (e.g. Bonaglia et al., 2001; Prasad et al., 2003; Maor & Stevens, 2002) have investigated this area. The literature review covered in section 3.4 provided the basis for deriving this construct. Similarly, the impact of foreign aid and international NGOs on governance were derived from the literature review covered in section 3.4. The questions for these constructs were formulated from the literature covered in the sections mentioned. The degree of external pressures was measured using a Likert-type scale of 1(lowest) to 5 (highest) anchored on “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. “Disagree or agree” filter was used to cater for uncertain response as recommended by Schuman and Presser (1980). The same scale (i.e. five-point likert scale) was also used to measure the usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes, the effectiveness of governance processes and the overall effectiveness of governance.

Constructs for usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes were derived from previous research papers (Bruszt et al., 2005; Hurbean & Danaíata, 2008; Liu & Westrup, 2003; Waema & Mitullah, 2007; Wong & Welch, 2004; Norris, 1999), covered in sections 4.3, 4.10 and 4.11. Apart from other normal usage of IT to enhance governance and democracy, a construct for the digital divide implications was included in the survey questionnaire. A number of researchers have suggested that IT usage in governance and democracy marginalises a large segment of the citizenry in developing countries (Norris, 1999; Planmo, 2002; Shelley et al., 2006; Starr, 2010). Usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes was measured using multiple items covering governance and democratic activities. The questions covered six sections, each of which catered for a particular dimension of governance and democracy. The questions for these constructs were formulated from previous studies and also from the literature review.

In addition, responses to IT applications used were also captured (see Appendix B – Part 3). Different types of IT applications commonly used for governance and democratic purposes were derived from the literature review covered in part II. IT applications suggested by Chua et al. (2012) were listed and respondents were asked to tick all relevant applications and indicate the
number of years (duration) they had been using them. Responses to duration question were also used to crosscheck the conditionality of the minimum IT use experience of five years, set forth in this thesis. This list included applications such as email, Internet, Facebook, Twitter, blogs, Lotus Domino, Share point. For those IT applications not listed but which have been used for governance and democratic activities, respondents were asked to specify them in the blank space provided.

The constructs for governance processes were derived from the literature review (see section 4.14) and, also, some were adapted from Freedom House indicators (2010). Freedom House is an organisation involved in governance improvement initiatives worldwide, which has developed variables to measure various aspects of governance (Ghaus-Pasha, 2007). Effectiveness of governance processes was measured using four constructs: the electoral processes (GI1 – GI4, EL1 – EL2), processes for combating corruption in government (GF1 – GF3), non-governmental organisation (NGOs) operations (NG1 – NG2), and judicial processes (IJ1 – IJ2). The questions for these constructs were adapted from Freedom House (2010) and a few were formulated from the literature review covered in part II. Respondents were asked to indicate the agreement or disagreement with the statements relating to effectiveness of governance processes.

The constructs and their measures for effectiveness of governance were mostly adapted from previous research papers (Freedom House, 2010; Koppell, 2005; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007). The constructs covered the key dimensions of governance (i.e. transparency, accountability, collaboration, participation and coordination) identified in the literature review. The questions for transparency, accountability and participation constructs were adapted from Freedom House (2010). Questions to measure collaboration were adapted from the questionnaire developed by Thomson et al. (2007). Since few instruments to measure collaboration exist and those that do are generally not suitable for immediate use in other contexts apart from their original contexts, three items from the questionnaire developed by Thomson et al. (2007) were adapted and adjusted to suit the context of the present study. Questions for measuring coordination were formulated from the literature review. Respondents were asked to indicate the agreement or disagreement with the statements relating to governance effectiveness (see the questionnaire in appendix B).
The questionnaire used in the present study was organised into six parts to gather: (1) demographic data about respondents, and data about: (2) the degree of external pressures, (3) Information Technology applications and experience, (4) usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes, (5) the effectiveness of governance processes, and (6) the overall perceived effectiveness of governance in Tanzania.

Table 8.1 presents the summary of the questionnaire constructs and related details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructs</th>
<th>No. of Variables</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External pressures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Usage of IT applications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>3 (PA1 – PA3)</td>
<td>Bruszt et al. (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>3 (AC1 – AC3)</td>
<td>Wong and Welch (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>3 (TR1 – TR3)</td>
<td>Waema and Mitullah (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>3 (CO1 – CO3)</td>
<td>Hurbean and Danaiata (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>2 (CD1 – CD2)</td>
<td>Liu and Westrup (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>2 (DF1 – DF2)</td>
<td>Norris (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance processes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The electoral processes</td>
<td>4 (GI1 – GI4)</td>
<td>Freedom House (2011); Hartlyn et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes for combating corruption in government</td>
<td>3 (GF1 – GF3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organisation (NGOs) operations</td>
<td>2 (NG1 – NG2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial processes</td>
<td>2 (IJ1 – IJ2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness of governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>3 (TP1 – TP3)</td>
<td>Freedom House (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>2 (AT1 – AT2)</td>
<td>Koppell (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>3 (CL1 – CL3)</td>
<td>Thomson et al. (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>3 (CT1 – CT3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although methodologists recommend the use of existing instruments where possible to maximise reliability and validity of the instrument, it is of great importance that the instrument be validated...
before the actual data collection starts (Kim, 2009). Several stages of instrument validation were carried out, as discussed in the next subsection.

8.4.1.9 Content Validity

Content validity is concerned with whether all variables in the instrument are drawn from the universal pool of items to represent the construct’s entire domain (Straub, 1989). Before the questionnaire was administered, ten experts from academic institutions and IT industry reviewed the survey instrument (questionnaire items, instructions, questions and language) as recommended by Cronbach (1971) and Lawshe (1975) to ensure appropriate responses were gathered. These experts were drawn from the University of Dar es Salaam, the Institute of Finance Management and eThink Tank. The eThink Tank is a Tanzanian group of IT experts which provides IT leadership in the industry. The panel of experts provided useful reviews which were incorporated in the final survey instrument.

As recommended by survey methodologists, a questionnaire was also pilot pre-tested to a small sample of 50 respondents before actual data collection took place. A pre-test is a preliminary trial of a portion or all aspects of an instrument that communicates to respondents what the instrument intends communicating (Kim, 2009, p. 1180). The small convenient sample for the pre-test resembled the target population for the actual research project, as recommended (Lewis, Templeton & Byrd, 2005). The results of the pre-test were reviewed and necessary changes were also incorporated in the final instrument.

Figure 8.2 provides a summary of stages of validity measures that were followed to validate the instrument.
8.4.1.10 **Reliability**

Reliability of the instrument is one of the key issues in research that needs to be tested as part of the instrument validating procedure. It demonstrates consistency of measured items to ensure that data can be trusted (Kim, 2009). Most IS researchers have used internal consistency as a measure of reliability in their quantitative studies. One of the strategies recommended by Straub, Gefen and Boudreau (2005) is to randomise questionnaires items to prevent respondents from leading responses. However, it is recommended that internal consistency of the instrument be measured to indicate how suitable the instrument is to gather data that can generate reliable results. This study tested reliability using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951). Coefficient alpha (α) estimates item-specific variance in a unidirectional test (Cortina, 1993).
Straub et al. (2005) assert that the Cronbach alpha test is highly recommended over other reliability tests in IS research.

Thirteen items measuring the effectiveness of governance processes had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72; five items measuring the degree of external pressures had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71; 15 items measuring the effectiveness of governance had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85; and 16 items measuring usage of IT applications had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90. In all cases, the alpha reliability coefficients of the survey instrument were above the recommended alpha coefficient of 0.70, suggesting that the instrument was reliable (Schmitt, 1996). Table 8.2 presents the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient values for the variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance processes</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External pressures</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of governance</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>usage of IT applications</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.4.1.11 Data Collection Procedure

Data for the present study were collected in April 2012. Before actual data collection started, the researcher applied for ethics committee approval from the University of Cape Town to ensure the study conforms to set ethical standards. After getting the approval to conduct the study, potential respondents were approached and asked to participate in the study. Through the introductory letter, respondents were assured of confidentiality and assured that their responses would be used for academic purposes only. Further, respondents were informed that their participation in the study was optional and they could withdraw their participation from the research project at any stage if they wished to as suggested by (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Although, all this information was indicated in the introductory letter, the researcher verbally explained the same information to improve response rate.
The questionnaires were self-administered and respondents were given three weeks to complete the questionnaire. One week after the questionnaires were distributed, the researcher used a combination of strategies such as making phone calls, sending short messages and emails to remind respondents. This process continued for another week for those who had not yet finished. However, all questionnaires which were completed were collected and prepared for the next process. The whole process of quantitative data collection ended after the allocated three weeks. The questionnaire delivery and collection approach was chosen as it increases response rate by enhancing respondent participation (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). Out of 300 questionnaires delivered to potential respondents, 169 were collected. However, 3 questionnaires were incomplete and thus were excluded from the analysis. The final usable questionnaires were 166 making a response rate of 55 per cent. This sample size is within a recommended range to provide high precision. Fowler (1984) argues that the gains in precision lie within samples between 100 and 200; out of this range, gains fall off. Specifically in Cluster analysis, it is recommended that the minimum sample size should include no less than $2^k$ cases, preferably $5*2^k$ (Formann, 1984), where $k$ = number of variables involved in Cluster analysis. This means that for three clustering variables, the minimum sample size is 40 respondents. Therefore the sample size used (166) in the present study is far more than the recommended minimum sample size for the three clustering variables.

8.4.1.12 Quantitative Data Analysis
Quantitative data analysis was carried out using statistical techniques to identify clusters. The researcher used Statistica software version 10 to perform statistical analysis such as Descriptive analysis, Cluster analysis, Analysis of Variance – ANOVA and F-test (discussed in section 9.2.1). Statistical technique is capable of testing a priori propositions against empirical data (Chin, 1998).

Cluster Analysis Technique
Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis technique that organises data into meaningful groups or clusters in such a way that objects with more similar multivariate characteristics are placed in one group (cluster) than those in other groups. Thus, Cluster analysis is important in studies involving classification and makes no prior assumptions about differences that exist in a population (Punj & Stewart, 1983).
Of the data analysis techniques that can be used to examine groupings or taxonomies, the commonly used techniques are Factor analysis and Cluster analysis. Factor analysis like Cluster analysis, makes no distinction between dependent and independent variables. However, there is a difference between factor and cluster analyses in that the former reduces the number of variables into small sets of factors to reveal the underlying factors, while the latter reduces the number of cases or observations by organising them into smaller cases or clusters based on proximity (Burns & Burns, 2008). However, Factor analysis is a confirmatory analytical technique, while Cluster analysis is exploratory (Dolnicar, 2002; Venkatraman, 1989). This implies that when the Gestalt's perspective is adopted, researchers perform Cluster (exploratory) analysis to examine groupings. Given the exploratory nature (no prior knowledge of how variables would be grouped) of the present study, Cluster analysis is appropriate for the Gestalt's perspective and was therefore adopted in this study. The researcher reviewed two clustering algorithms and a choice was made as explained next.

### Clustering Algorithms

Clustering algorithms are procedures or rules which guide the sorting process of observations. Selection of appropriate clustering algorithms is critical to the effective use of Cluster analysis (Punj & Stewart, 1983). There are two basic clustering algorithms: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. Hierarchical algorithms progress through a series of procedures that build a tree-like structure through an add or delete elements operation (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). Based on add or delete operations, hierarchical algorithms include agglomerative and divisive methods. Agglomerative methods are centred on adding elements to clusters while divisive methods concern deleting them from clusters. However, all hierarchical algorithms suffer from poor cluster assignment resulting from single pass through data set (Ketchen & Shook, 1996).

On the other hand, non-hierarchical algorithms (also known as K-means or iterative methods) partition a data set into a pre-specified number of clusters to arrive at optimal solution (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). K-means clustering has several advantages over hierarchical algorithms. First, K-means clustering is less affected by outlier elements. This problem is corrected during subsequent pass through data set as observations switch cluster membership (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1992). Second, K-means clustering has the capability to optimise solution within cluster homogeneity and between cluster heterogeneity (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). Third,
K-means clustering is useful when propositions are already developed for the cluster variables. Based on the above account, K-means outperforms the hierarchical algorithm; hence this study adopted the K-means technique to perform cluster algorithms.

8.4.2 Qualitative Method

The second component of this study is the qualitative method. As explained section 8.3, a qualitative method was adopted to compensate for the limitations of quantitative method thereby improving richness and rigour of the research findings (Mingers, 2001). A qualitative method is widely accepted as suitable for capturing subjective data that cannot be collected by quantitative method. Therefore, qualitative data collection was meant to compensate for the limitations of quantitative data by using active probes to collect latent opinions (Perrin & McFarland, 2011).

8.4.2.1 Sampling Strategy

Mixed method sampling adopted in this study was based on the underlying assumption that individual sampling methods are meant to suit different research objectives. When a researcher intends to generalise the findings, then probabilistic sampling is appropriate to yield a representative sample of the population (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). The cluster sampling strategy achieved this, as discussed in the survey method section (see Subsection 8.4.1). Thus, a sampling strategy for qualitative data achieves another purpose in this study to complement the cluster sampling in the survey method.

Purposive sampling is widely used in qualitative studies to increase transferability and has been used along with probability sampling in mixed methods strategy (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Purposive sampling refers to a sampling strategy in which “particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices (Maxwell, 1997, p. 87). This definition points to an important attribute of the sample profile, referring to exclusivity of other settings, persons or events which are not information-rich. In this case, purposive sampling frames are decided based on the expert judgment of the researcher (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Based on the central theme of this study, people who are information-rich in IT are the experts in the IT industry. Considering this important attribute, Chief Information Officers (CIOs) are considered to be knowledgeable people in the IT field who can provide useful information regarding the role of IT in governance.
endeavours. In that regard, qualitative data were collected from the sample drawn from CIOs (or designates where applicable) in public organisations. The purpose of this sampling strategy is to select information-rich cases strategically and purposefully to suit the purpose of the study (Patton, 2002).

Since the researcher knew only a few CIOs in Tanzania, the Snowball sampling strategy was adopted in the present study. In the Snowball strategy, the researcher performs a sequential sampling by first identifying a few respondents who, in turn, recommend other respondents to be interviewed (Myers & Newman, 2007). This process of identifying potential respondents continues until a saturation point is reached. Saturation refers to the point when a researcher has heard a range of ideas and no new information is generated (Casey & Krueger, 2000). The snowball sampling strategy seemed appropriate for selecting respondents to be interviewed in the present study because CIOs normally know one another.

After the researcher has identified the sampling strategy, the researcher then determines the appropriate data-gathering tools, depending on the object of the study. The interview is one of the most important data-gathering tools in qualitative research (Myers & Newman, 2007). The next subsection presents the discussion on interviews and their rationale in this study.

8.4.2.2 Interviews

Planning qualitative data collection involves answering questions regarding which data-gathering method is appropriate to gather data necessary to meet the study object. There are two data-gathering methods in qualitative study: (a) interview and (b) questionnaire. Interview is a widely used data collection strategy for qualitative study to capture the subjective context about a phenomenon of enquiry. Interviews are suitable for studies intended for “gaining insights into or understanding of opinions, attitudes, experiences, processes, behaviours or predictions” (Rowley, 2012, p. 261). Rowley (2012) asserts that interview is an ideal data collection method in the following situations:

(i) Research objectives are centred on interrogating the phenomenon about experiences, opinions, attitudes, values and processes.

(ii) Less is known about the subject to permit the development of a questionnaire.
(iii) Potential interviewees might be more interested in taking interviews rather than another method such as a questionnaire.

On the other hand, questionnaires can also be used in qualitative data collection, depending on the nature and object of the study (Rowley, 2012). For example, generalisation as mostly the purpose of the quantitative studies requires a large sample in which conducting interviews may not be feasible in terms of time. Such a concern is important to consider when one is planning for qualitative data collection. Since the purpose of qualitative method in this study was to compensate for quantitative method limitations by providing more insights of sociality of opinion into a phenomenon (Perrin & McFarland, 2011; Venkatesh et al., 2013), questionnaire could not be used for collecting qualitative data. Further, CIOs are busy people and they may not have time to fill in questionnaires. Taking into such considerations, the interview method was adopted for collecting qualitative data. Rowley (2012) also supports the use of the interview method to collect qualitative data from key respondents such as managers and high ranking officials. All respondents interviewed in the present study were selected on the basis of their willingness to participate in the study.

Given the deductive nature of this study, face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather qualitative data. Face-to-face interview strategy is important in increasing participant synchronisation, which in turn, improves the data quality (Drolet & Morris, 2000). A face-to-face interview method enables the interviewer to note non-verbal cues that may distract interviewees; and the interviewer can react to those cues in constructive ways to return to the interview process (Holbrook, Green & Krosnick, 2003). However, a face-to-face interview has a slow turnaround time. A total of ten respondents from various public organisations were interviewed in this study. Of the ten respondents, two respondents from the same organisations were also interviewed because they had been recommended by other respondents on the basis of their experience and knowledge of national IT strategies. The planning officer was involved in the National Committee overseeing the implementation of ICT universal access projects (telecentres) in rural areas. The IT principal officer was one of the technical committee members involved in drafting the national e-government policy. Table 8.3 presents a summary of the profile of respondents interviewed in this study. The next subsection discusses the development of the interview instrument.
Table 8.3: Summary of Respondent Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Organisation/Agency</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Social Security Fund</td>
<td>Director of IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Public Procurement Regulatory Authority</td>
<td>Manager of IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>University of Dar es Salaam (University Computing Centre)</td>
<td>Chief Computer Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>University of Dar es Salaam (University Computing Centre)</td>
<td>Planning officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tanzania Electric Supply Company</td>
<td>Manager of IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tanzania Electric Supply Company</td>
<td>IT principle Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>National Identification Authority</td>
<td>Director of IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bank of Tanzania</td>
<td>Deputy Director of IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account - Tanzania</td>
<td>Assistant Director of IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Muhimbili National Hospital</td>
<td>Director of ICT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4.2.3 Interview Instrument

The interview instrument was developed based on the literature review. The interview instrument included semi-structured questions intended to solicit respondent opinions regarding the role of IT in governance. In a semi-structured interview, many questions are generally prepared earlier and the role of the researcher is to ensure all questions are answered (Myers & Newman, 2007). Interview questions covered the aspects of three elements (i.e. IT usage, governance processes and external pressures) and the overall effectiveness of governance, similar to those in the quantitative component. The interview instrument was reviewed by IT and research methodology experts to ensure appropriate language and wording were used, and did not include jargon and leading questions. Further, questions were checked to ensure they did not include words inviting “yes or no answers; vague or general; and in any sense, invasive” expression (Rowley, 2012, p. 265). Further, the interview instrument was pilot tested to a small group of members of the academic staff at the University of Dar es Salaam to ensure the instrument communicated what it intended to communicate (Wikman, 2006). This was important to ascertain duration of the interview as well as highlighting areas for improvement (Kim, 2009). After the pilot test, the
final instrument incorporating feedbacks received was finalised for the actual data collection process. The interview protocol that guided the interviews is presented in appendix C. The next subsection discusses the interview process carried out in this study.

8.4.2.4 Interviewing Process

Potential respondents were contacted and requested to participate in the research project. The researcher introduced himself and explained to respondents what the study was all about. Further, the researcher followed the procedure recommended by Rowley (2012), which includes assuring respondents of confidentiality, sharing the summary of research findings, and indicating time the interview would last. Interview schedules were emailed to respondents and the researcher asked respondents to indicate their availability over the next two weeks. Phone calls and emails followed to schedule the interviews. However, the researcher admits that getting all CIOs on the first appointment was not easy. But, for the sake of the information they had, the researcher had to fit into their times to get them interviewed.

Interviews were conducted in April and May 2012, each interview lasting 45 minutes on average. Before the interview started, the researcher asked for the respondents’ permission to tape record the interviews. The interviewees had no problems with tape recording, except for one respondent who declined to be tape recorded when answering the question about political freedom. For this question, the tape recorder was turned off and only interviews notes were taken. However, for all other interviews, the researcher tape-recorded and took notes at the same time. Even though the interviews were semi-structured, the researcher was flexible in exploring interesting lines of research (Myers & Newman, 2007). After a few interviews had been conducted, other respondents were recommended to the researcher (snowballing) by their colleagues and helped in scheduling appointments (Myers & Newman, 2007). To ensure validity of the empirical findings, systematic gathering, reliable recording and transcription of data requirements were adhered to, as suggested by Klein and Myers (1999).

8.4.2.5 Qualitative Data Analysis

Qualitative data in the present study was analysed using thematic analysis technique. Thematic analysis has been widely used to analyse qualitative data and is considered to be a foundational method for qualitative analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is a “method for
identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 6). There are two types of thematic analyses that can be used to identify themes or patterns within data:

(i) Inductive thematic analysis: in this analysis, themes are strongly linked to the data and at the end the themes identified may bear little value to the questions posed to respondents (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Patton, 1990). This approach is also known as a bottom-up way of identifying themes within data and bears some similarity to grounded theory (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

(ii) Theoretical (deductive) thematic analysis: in this analysis, themes are identified based on the theoretical interest of the researcher on the phenomenon of inquiry. It can be said that theoretical thematic analysis is more researcher-driven (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This approach is also known as a top-down way of identifying themes within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

As mentioned above, identifying themes can be achieved by either using the bottom-up (inductive) or top-down (theoretical or deductive) approach. The analytical approach choice depends on the objective of coding the researcher intends to achieve. Braun and Clarke (2006) recommend that if the researcher intends to code the data for a specific research question, then theoretical or deductive thematic analysis is an appropriate technique to use. If on the other hand the researcher intends to code the data without a specific research question (i.e the research question evolves from the coding process), then inductive thematic analysis is an appropriate technique to use. Data coding in the present study was done for specific research questions posed in chapter one. The present study therefore adopted theoretical (deductive) thematic analysis.

Recorded interviews were transcribed, coded and the theoretical (deductive) thematic data analysis technique was used to identify themes from transcripts. The Express Scribe software was used to transcribe the recorded interviews. While the researcher read the entire data set before starting coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006), the researcher read and analysed the transcripts many times to identify themes and categories emerging from the data (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). Initially, the researcher identified a wide range of themes before identifying the most important themes (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). From this range, the researcher identified the main themes
related to external pressures, governance processes, IT usage, governance effectiveness and the role of IT in governance. Results of thematic analysis are presented in chapter 9.

8.5 Ethical Consideration

Ethics in social science research is part and parcel of the research project. Research projects involving human subjects must address issues of ethics. This study addressed ethical issues covering the following key areas as suggested by Babbie (1990):

(i) Voluntary participation: Participation in the study was optional and participants were informed of their right not to respond to some questions when they wished. Further, participants were informed of the possibility to withdraw their participation from the study when deemed necessary.

(ii) Tape recording interviews: Prior to tape recording the interviews, respondents were asked for their permission to tape record the interviews. The respondent who declined the use of tape recorder had only handwritten notes taken.

(iii) Anonymity and confidentiality: Participant responses were treated with a high level of confidentiality by not revealing any participants’ information and were used for academic purposes only. To ensure participants’ anonymity, participants were coded to disguise their identity.

8.6 Chapter Summary

The present chapter discussed the public perceptions approach and its relevance in measuring the role of IT in governance. The chapter also discussed the challenges of public perceptions approach and how such challenges can be minimised. The chapter further discussed the mixed methods approach and its rationale in IS research. The present study adopted a mixed methods approach to heed the call by the IS researchers to improve richness and rigour in research findings. Lastly, the chapter presented an ethical consideration overview of key issues observed when conducting this study. Ethical issues such as voluntary participation of respondents, tape recording interviews and confidentiality issues were presented. Table 8.4 summarises the research design for this study.
Table 8.4: Summary of Research Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>CHOICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>IT to enable effective governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research strategy</td>
<td>Mixed methods: Quantitative, Qualitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection instrument</td>
<td>Survey questionnaires, Semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data analysis</td>
<td>• Statistical: Cluster analysis, ANOVA, F-test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deductive thematic analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Country level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Investigating the role of Information Technology in resolving governance challenges in a transition state – The case of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following chapter will present research findings and discussion.
9.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings and discussion of the study. It starts by presenting descriptive statistics of the primary variables used in the present study. Results are then presented, highlighting the quantitative and qualitative components. Following which, three clusters of perceived usage of IT in governance (informative, participatory and interactive) are presented and their distinguishing characteristics discussed. In closing, the chapter presents the summary of the research findings and discussion reported in this chapter.

9.2 Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics provide an early overview of the findings and help to gain an understanding of the richness and complexity of the data (Howard & Brown, 2000). Calculation of means and standard deviations of the primary variables under investigation were performed. Table 9.1 presents a visual representation of profiles of respondents and IT application used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents group/sector</th>
<th>IT Application used*</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Per centage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government departments</td>
<td>12345</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental orgs</td>
<td>12345</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/private</td>
<td>12345</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1=Internet; 2= Email; 3= Social networks; 4= Blogs; 5= Collaboration package.
Respondents’ affiliation indicates that most of the respondents came from the government sector with 47 per cent, followed by the private/business sector with 36.7 per cent and the last sector was NGOs with 16.3 per cent. All these respondents use IT applications such as the Internet, emails, social networks, blogs and collaboration packages. Further, the number of male respondents was greater than the number of female respondents in government and private/business sectors.

Further Descriptive analysis was done on all configurational variables to reveal the underlying characteristics. Table 9.2 presents descriptive statistics of all the responses measured in the Likert scale of 1(lowest) to 5 (highest) for the main constructs. When considered together, the respondents perceived that IT was used for governance and democratic purposes (e.g. CO2, CO3, TR1, TR2). For example, use of IT has improved information sharing among citizens (CO2). However, many components in this dimension scored below the mean of 4.00. For example, IT was not used to link government departments and citizens (CD2) and the use of IT has not improved interactions between citizens and the government (CO1). Most governance processes are perceived to be ineffective (e.g. GI1, GI2, GI3, EL1, EL2). However, the respondents perceived that NGOs are free and are not intimidated, arrested or assaulted (NG1, NG2) and judges’ verdicts are not in favour of government (IJ1). On the other hand, respondents felt that external pressures impact on governance (e.g. see FA1, FA2). Most items measuring effectiveness of governance indicate low scores below 3.00 (e.g. TP1, PT2, TP3, CL1, CL2, CT1, CT2, CT3), implying governance ineffectiveness. For example, the respondents perceived that government does not interact with citizens to formulate policy (CL1); in addition they perceived that the government is not accountable (AT1). However, respondents felt that citizens interact with one another in public matters (CL3), are free to join political parties/unions (PT2) and are free to use the Internet (PT4).

Table 9.2: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Research Variables (N=166)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External pressures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG1  Impact of economic integration on national policies</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG2  Impact of global corporations on governance</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA1  Impact of foreign aid on state policies</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA2  Impact of foreign aid on government accountability</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>StdDev</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PA1</td>
<td>Use IT for political freedom</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA2</td>
<td>Use IT for freedom of speech</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA3</td>
<td>Use IT to support political activities</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC1</td>
<td>IT is used to support rule of law</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC2</td>
<td>IT is used for monitoring processes</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC3</td>
<td>IT is used to improve citizenry control of the government</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR1</td>
<td>IT is used for dissemination of information to the public</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR2</td>
<td>The public can easily access government information via the Internet</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR3</td>
<td>Government information is provided online in a timely manner</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO1</td>
<td>The use of IT has improved interactions between citizens and the government</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO2</td>
<td>The use of IT has improved information sharing among citizens regarding public affairs</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO3</td>
<td>The use of IT has improved information-sharing amongst government departments</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD1</td>
<td>IT is used to link government departments</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD2</td>
<td>IT is used to link government departments and citizens</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF1</td>
<td>The Internet has enabled me to participate in electronic civic forums than many do not know how to use it</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF2</td>
<td>I can afford to use the Internet services to participate in online forums</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Effectiveness of governance processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>StdDev</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GI1</td>
<td>Fairness of voter registration</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI2</td>
<td>Freedom of candidates to make speeches</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI3</td>
<td>Candidate’s freedom to hold public meetings</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI4</td>
<td>Honest reporting of election results</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL1</td>
<td>Fairness of electoral laws</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL2</td>
<td>Freedom of the electoral commission</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF1</td>
<td>Effectiveness of anticorruption laws</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF2</td>
<td>Freedom of investigative bodies</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF3</td>
<td>Journalists’ legal protection to report cases of corruption</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG1</td>
<td>Government restrictions on NGOs’ functions</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG2</td>
<td>Freedom of members of NGOs</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJ1</td>
<td>Judges’ verdicts in favour of government</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJ2</td>
<td>Prosecutors are independent of political control</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Effectiveness of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>StdDev</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP1</td>
<td>Openness of government decisions</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP2</td>
<td>Availability of timely public information</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to Descriptive analysis, quantitative and qualitative data analyses were also performed. Quantitative analysis involved Cluster analysis to group different IT usages as perceived by the public. Using Statistica software version 10, K-Means clustering technique was used to group clusters according to their means. The researcher started experimenting with six clusters; but later found that a three cluster solution provided the most significant results. Table 9.3 presents the three clusters and analysis of variance values. Since all variables were measured using the same scale (i.e. 1-5), data standardisation was not performed.

Table 9.3 represents mean scores for each cluster of respondents. These mean scores may be different from those of the whole sample as shown in Table 9.2. For instance, while 166 respondents in Table 9.2 had an average score (NG1 = 2.86), 47 respondents in Cluster 1 scored (NG1= 2.70) while 66 respondents in Cluster 3 scored (NG1= 2.62) on average. In this case the averages of these two clusters on the item NG1 did not differ very much from that of the whole sample of 166. In Table 9.3 below, only scores that are 3.50 and above (i.e., representing “Agree or Strongly Agree”) are indicated in bold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>5</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP3</td>
<td>Public information leads to performance evaluation</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT1</td>
<td>Government accountability</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT2</td>
<td>Government fulfilment of citizens’ expectations</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL1</td>
<td>Government interacts with citizens</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL2</td>
<td>Information sharing in government departments</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>CL3</td>
<td>Citizens interaction in public matters</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT1</td>
<td>Freedom to participate in political activities</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT2</td>
<td>Freedom to join political party/trade union</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT3</td>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT4</td>
<td>Freedom to use the Internet</td>
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<td>CT1</td>
<td>Government-citizens participation in policy</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.080</td>
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<td>CT2</td>
<td>Government-citizens interaction in decisions</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.005</td>
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<td>CT3</td>
<td>Citizens awareness of public issues</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.936</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Scores greater than 3.50 were considered to be closer to “agree” than “uncertain” on the five-point Likert scale of 1(strongly disagree) and 5(strongly agree).*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Cluster ANOVA</th>
<th>F value</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External pressures</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GG1 Impact of economic integration on national policies</td>
<td>3.74 2.75 3.21</td>
<td>12.29 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG2 Impact of global corporations on governance</td>
<td>3.64 1.57 3.29</td>
<td>10.54 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA1 Impact of foreign aid on state policies</td>
<td>3.94 2.06 2.16</td>
<td>13.16 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA2 Impact of foreign aid on government accountability</td>
<td>3.94 2.15 2.11</td>
<td>21.83 0.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FA3 Impact of international NGOs on governance</td>
<td>2.70 3.34 3.62</td>
<td>12.37 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA1 Use IT for political freedom</td>
<td>2.96 3.75 4.03</td>
<td>23.41 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA2 Use IT for freedom of speech</td>
<td>3.11 3.72 3.91</td>
<td>10.37 0.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PA3 Use IT to support political activities</td>
<td>3.81 3.42 3.73</td>
<td>13.10 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC1 IT is used to support rule of law</td>
<td>2.81 3.30 3.82</td>
<td>20.20 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC2 IT is used for monitoring processes</td>
<td>2.45 2.91 3.62</td>
<td>22.85 0.00</td>
<td></td>
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<td>AC3 IT is used to improve citizenry control of the government</td>
<td>2.55 3.36 3.59</td>
<td>21.45 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR1 IT is used for dissemination of information to the public</td>
<td>3.83 3.77 4.11</td>
<td>32.93 0.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TR2 The public can easily access government information via the Internet</td>
<td>2.94 3.81 4.09</td>
<td>26.65 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR3 Government information is provided online in a timely manner</td>
<td>2.96 3.96 4.03</td>
<td>22.39 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO1 The use of IT has improved interactions between citizens and the government</td>
<td>2.57 3.42 3.82</td>
<td>25.32 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO2 The use of IT has improved information-sharing among citizens regarding public affairs</td>
<td>3.38 4.23 4.26</td>
<td>22.88 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO3 The use of IT has improved information-sharing amongst government departments</td>
<td>2.83 3.70 4.00</td>
<td>31.70 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD1 IT is used to link government departments</td>
<td>2.72 3.45 3.80</td>
<td>28.98 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD2 IT is used to link government departments and citizens</td>
<td>2.66 3.11 3.83</td>
<td>30.27 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF1 The Internet has enabled me to participate in electronic civic forums more than those who do not know how to use it</td>
<td>3.19 3.74 4.05</td>
<td>13.16 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF2 I can afford to use the Internet services to participate in online forums</td>
<td>2.91 3.83 3.77</td>
<td>11.90 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness of governance processes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI1 Fairness of voter registration</td>
<td>3.21 2.96 3.70</td>
<td>7.33 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI2 Freedom of candidates to make speeches</td>
<td>2.96 2.96 3.64</td>
<td>9.81 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI3 Candidates’ freedom to hold public meetings</td>
<td>2.74 2.55 3.50</td>
<td>17.37 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI4 Honest reporting of election results</td>
<td>2.04 1.77 3.06</td>
<td>32.47 0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL1</td>
<td>Fairness of electoral laws</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL2</td>
<td>Freedom of the electoral commission</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF1</td>
<td>Effectiveness of anticorruption laws</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF2</td>
<td>Freedom of investigative bodies</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF3</td>
<td>Journalists’ protection on corruption cases</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG1</td>
<td>Government restricts NGO functions</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG2</td>
<td>NGO members intimidated, arrested or assaulted</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJ1</td>
<td>Judges’ verdicts in favour of government</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJ2</td>
<td>Prosecutors are independent of political control</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Effectiveness of governance**

| TP1 | Openness of government decisions | 2.04 | 1.60 | 2.76 | 26.05 | 0.00 |
| TP2 | Availability of timely public information | 2.19 | 1.62 | 2.68 | 23.57 | 0.00 |
| TP3 | Public information leads to performance evaluation | 2.15 | 2.26 | 2.98 | 13.04 | 0.00 |
| AT1 | Government accountability | 2.60 | 2.30 | 3.26 | 12.00 | 0.00 |
| AT2 | Government fulfilment of citizens’ expectations | 2.11 | 1.51 | 2.73 | 26.10 | 0.00 |
| CL1 | Government interacts with citizens | 2.53 | 2.06 | 3.32 | 33.25 | 0.00 |
| CL2 | Information-sharing in government departments | 2.49 | 2.42 | 3.41 | 20.41 | 0.00 |
| CL3 | Citizens interaction in public matters | 3.49 | 3.38 | 3.82 | 3.52 | 0.03 |
| PT1 | Freedom to participate in political activities | 3.19 | 3.55 | 4.17 | 15.76 | 0.00 |
| PT2 | Freedom to join political parties/union | 3.34 | 4.06 | 4.33 | 17.65 | 0.00 |
| PT3 | Freedom of expression | 2.60 | 2.92 | 3.77 | 28.83 | 0.00 |
| PT4 | Freedom to use the Internet | 3.06 | 4.15 | 4.14 | 20.85 | 0.00 |
| CT1 | Government-citizens participation in policy | 2.57 | 2.66 | 3.44 | 15.69 | 0.00 |
| CT2 | Government-citizens interaction in decisions | 2.51 | 2.43 | 3.44 | 28.56 | 0.00 |
| CT3 | Citizens awareness of public issues | 2.55 | 2.79 | 3.61 | 26.78 | 0.00 |

*Note: High scores are indicated in bold and scores equal to or greater than 3.50 were considered to be closer to “agree” than “uncertain” on the five-point Likert scale of 1(strongly disagree) and 5(strongly agree).*

### 9.2.1 Validating Clusters

After the clusters have been formed, researchers recommend further tests to confirm if clusters are valid (Dess, Newport & Rasheed, 1993). In that regard, One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to evaluate the equality of means across the three clusters and assess the distinctiveness of each derived cluster. F-tests were also used to test the significance of means across groups of cluster variables. ANOVA and F-tests have been used in Cluster analysis studies by several researchers (e.g. Fabi et al., 2009). F-test confirms that the means across the
three clusters differ significantly (see Table 9.3). In the following section the research presents the analysis of cluster results.

9.3 Results of Thematic Analysis

(i) Themes Related to External Pressures

During thematic analysis, the researcher found that aid dependence was a dominant theme consistent with the external pressure constructs. Respondents indicated that aid dependence was a major factor contributing to policy change and accountability. They felt that aid that has been extended to Tanzania has impacted on some economic policy areas such as taxation and market liberalisation. They felt that the major economic policy reforms are attributable to donors’ demands as the country increasingly depends on foreign support in various development projects. Respondents felt that it is difficult for poor countries to survive without foreign aid; this is when donors prescribe some conditions for Tanzania to meet. According to CIO5,

> When you depend much on donor funds to support country’ development activities, in a way it is like a modern imperialism. Donors have an edge on policy and country direction. They twist [policies] the way they want. If more than half of your budget is a donor dependent, your political power is sometimes influenced by donors.

(ii) Themes Related to Governance Processes

Lack of impartiality/independence of key governance institutions, absence of legal protection and ineffective NGOs emerged as main themes related to governance processes. These themes are discussed below.

Respondents felt that governance processes were ineffective. Lack of freedom of the electoral commission emerged as a dominant theme related to governance processes. Respondents felt that the electoral commission is not free from political influence, thereby performing its functions with bias. The ruling party through its government was mentioned as having influence on the functions of the commission, by which it receives favourable treatments over the opposition political parties. Respondent CIO2 said that:

> When the ruling party breaks electoral law; the commission is like absent but when the opposition does you will see it actively taking action. For example, the law states that election campaigns will end at 6 pm but the CCM candidate one day held a campaign
until 7pm. Neither the commission nor the police took action against this guy. In many occasions the opposition candidates have been taken to police for violation of the same law.

In addition, respondents attributed the existing favour the ruling party receives to the way the recruitment of the commissioner of the electoral body is done. The commissioner is only appointed by the president without any mechanism for approving the appointment by other bodies. This practice seems to contribute to the challenges related to freedom of the commission. Respondent CIO5 suggested that “the commission and the government are so intertwined in such a way that it becomes difficult to separate them”. Respondents also showed concern over reporting of election results. They felt that the processes establishing the foundation for honest reporting of election results are always questionable, particularly at polling stations where opposition party candidates have a greater chance of winning the election. The processes of counting and tallying votes generally take a longer time than expected to complete, thereby casting doubts about honest reporting of election results. Respondent CIO10 said that:

…You can see the number of votes counted suddenly changes and sometimes the number of voters can reflect a larger number than that of registered voters just to favour some candidates.

While many respondents acknowledged that electoral laws are somehow fair, they, however, showed concern over unfair treatment received by opposition parties. It seems that laws are not applied equally among the political parties. This is particularly prevalent when the strong opposition party is involved. Respondent CIO6 said that:

…sometimes you find dirty games are played against the opposition party just to favour CCM [ruling party]. When they [opposition parties] want to hold a peaceful demonstration the police will come with excuses saying that you [opposition party] cannot hold demonstration because we [police] received intelligence that you will disturb peace. I see the police force actions are subjective and rarely block demonstrations organised by the ruling party.

Respondents also felt that the anti-corruption bureau and prosecutors are influenced by powerful actors. They said that the anti-corruption bureau has not been effective in combatting corruption, particularly which involves influential people. Respondent CIO9 said that, “some of the small
corruption issues are somehow dealt with. But when big shots are involved in corruption cases very little is done to prosecute them”. Given the focus on petty corruption cases, respondent CIO3 felt that “powerful people are protected ... you hardly hear about...”. The respondents also felt that the appointment of the bureau chief by the president complicates the effectiveness of the anti-corruption bureau and accounts largely for many failures to prosecute high-ranking government officials. Respondents also felt that journalists involved in reporting corruption cases are not protected by the state, therefore turn away from reporting crime. Respondent CIO7 revealed that “… once the reporter covers a corruption scandal, he will be threatened and some [journalists] have been attacked”.

On the other hand, lack of effective NGOs to tackle governance issues seriously emerged as one of the hindrances for improving governance in Tanzania. It seems that most NGOs have been established for the purpose of enriching owners, rather than as partners for improving governance in Tanzania. Most CIOs suggested that many of these NGOs are ineffective and have contributed little to governance improvement initiatives. Respondent CIO3 revealed that, “NGOs have become business projects. Control [of NGOs] is important because some have been established to enrich or benefit owners”.

(iii) Themes Related to IT Usage
Lack of IT infrastructure, dissemination of information, limited online information, resistance to change/cultural barrier and exposure of malpractice were main themes related to IT usage, as discussed below.

For usage of IT to bring about improvements in governance, a large segment of the populace should have access to IT. Respondents indicated that the majority of people still do not have access to IT. Many respondents were of the opinion that there is a lack of IT infrastructure to facilitate IT access for the wider public. Only a few individuals (mainly from government offices) have access to IT such as the Internet. IT illiteracy and insufficient income to pay for Internet charges were major factors behind IT access gaps within the society. Respondent CIO5 was in the opinion that “IT illiteracy and lack of infrastructures are still challenges and also the cost of internet connection is still high”.

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...even if they [government people] publish in the government websites, but still depends on the number of people who visit and participate in providing opinions. Many people cannot afford to pay for Internet charges (CIO1, April 2012).

The few who have access to IT access it mainly from their workplaces (government offices). On the other hand the government should be able to provide information with far-reaching impacts. Respondents also felt that, in most cases, the information provided by the government in its websites is of limited use by citizens. They felt that currently IT is mainly used for dissemination of information. The information is largely informational (one-way) and has no major impact on governance improvements, due to limited interactive functionality to facilitate interaction (two-way) between the government and citizens. Respondent CIO2 indicated that: “many websites managed by central government organisations do not have much to offer ... they just mention something like our services, press release and forms”.

Respondents also felt that there are still individuals who have not adopted IT in their workplaces due to cultural reasons. Respondents indicated that traditional ways of working are still prevalent and favoured over modern (electronic) ones. Many older employees prefer physical documents (e.g. letters) to those produced by computers such as emails. It seems that IT is struggling to be accepted as a means that can accomplish legitimate communication-related activities. In addition, some public offices do not consider communication done, using IT such as emails, as official. According to Respondent CIO7,

...government officials have not adopted emailing as the official mode of communication. People don’t act on emails; they still want to see a physical letter stamped by the registry. This is still a problem even in courts. Some officials [government] do not check their emails for weeks

Although government departments are somehow well supplied with IT equipment, they still lack full use of IT within their offices. Many government departments do not have their own dedicated email systems; instead they use email systems such as Yahoo and Gmail even for official use. Respondent CIO10 revealed that:

The state house does not have a website. Surprisingly, the directorate of communication of the state house is using Yahoo email account. ... it looks like this country does not
Regardless of the above challenges related to IT usage, there has been notable usage of IT in the transparency realm. Exposing malpractice emerged as a dominant theme relating to transparency in government. Respondents believed that some of the misconducts by government officials were exposed through the Internet. It is thought that IT has helped to a certain extent to deter some of misconduct, as government officials are increasingly afraid of being exposed in the digital media. Respondent CIO4 said that:

One of the major corruption scandals which involved the External Payment Arrears account dubbed as the EPA scandal to siphon money was mainly exposed through the Internet. ... many online forums followed suit that mounted pressure to the government; which caused the central bank governor and the minister of finance to resign. Since then, the Internet has been an avenue where unethical conducts are exposed.

In addition, usage of IT has to some extent reduced the corruption level, particularly at the Tanzania Revenue Authority. Respondents felt that online interaction between the authority and the tax paying community has helped to reduce corruption incidents. They indicated that physical encounters between revenue authority officials and the tax paying community have remained few due to implementation of electronic tax administration. Respondent CIO7 indicated that “...we don’t meet them [authority officials] these days because we pay electronically”.

(iv) Themes Related to Governance Effectiveness
Lack of meaningful participation and freedom of association emerged as themes related to governance effectiveness, as discussed below.

Respondents were also asked to comment on the overall effectiveness of governance. They felt that governance in Tanzania was not as effective as it should be. They were concerned that there is no meaningful participation between the government and citizens that can ensure effective governance. The government generally does not significantly involve citizens in the issues that concern their welfare in policy and decision-making circles. Respondent CIO6 said that:

Level of involvement is limited. You can see before the enactment of the law about new constitution, there was kind of the government push to quickly finish that process and get
a constitution. The government was insisting on doing minor amendments or review of the law establishing a constitution review process and thus did not need to go through citizens’ involvement process. It was only thru massive pressure from pressure groups and political parties which forced the government and its political party to accept wider public involvement.

However, respondents felt that citizens enjoy reasonable freedom to join political parties, social organisations and to participate in political activities, without much interference from the government. Respondent CIO8 said that “everyone has a chance to participate in political activities”. Respondent CIO9 indicated that such freedom of association “… has contributed to the formation of many political parties as there is no restriction on this matter and anyone can register a political party”.

(v) Theme Related to IT Role in Governance
Respondents were also asked to comment on the general question on the role of IT in governance. The digital divide emerged as the main theme relating to the role of IT in improving governance. Respondents felt that IT has not played a major role in governance in Tanzania, due to digital divide related issues. The majority of the populace have no access to IT due mainly to lack of computers, lack of sufficient income to pay for Internet access charges and (or) lack of required IT skills to operate the computer. Respondents were concerned that only a few individuals can access IT while a large segment of the populace has no access. With such a large access gap, it is difficult for IT to play a significant role in governance. Respondent CIO9 indicated that:

IT has not done much on good governance. The limitation is that large segment of the populace is excluded from IT enabled governance due to lack of infrastructures [IT]. If majority cannot access IT, then IT can do little in good governance

The next section will present an integrative analysis of the results for quantitative and qualitative components of the present study.
9.4 Integrative Analysis of Results

9.4.1 Cluster 1 Analysis

Most of the governance processes were perceived to be ineffective except for the few items measuring freedom of NGOs and independence of the judiciary (see table 9.3, only scores above 3.50 represent “agree”). The respondents perceived that local NGOs are free from government interference. For example, the respondents disagreed that the government imposes restrictions on NGOs to prevent them from functioning freely (NG1=2.70) and disagreed that their members are intimidated, arrested, imprisoned or assaulted because of their work (NG2=2.26). This was also confirmed by many CIOs during the interviews. However they also indicated that NGOs need to be controlled as some have been established with personal interest motives. For example, one CIO noted that “NGOs have become business projects. Control [of NGOs] is important because some have been established to enrich or benefit owners”.

Further, the respondents also disagreed that judges render verdicts that favour the government (IJ1=2.44). However, they disagreed that prosecutors are independent of political control (IJ2=2.43). This means they agreed that prosecutors are sometimes influenced by politics. The respondents were uncertain about the fairness of voter registration (GI1=3.21) and also scored low on the remaining governance processes’ items implying that these were also perceived to be ineffective.

On the other hand, the respondents perceived that external pressures impact on governance. As a result, all of them have high scores above 3.50. For example, the respondents agreed that economic integrations impact on national policies (GG1=3.74) and also agreed that global corporations impact on state governance (GG2=3.64) and that there is much impact of foreign aid on state policies (FA1=3.94) and government accountability (FA2=3.94). They did not agree however that international NGOs impacted on governance in Tanzania (FA3=2.70).

However, the respondents perceived that IT was not used for governance and democratic purposes in Tanzania. They think that IT has only been used to support political activities (PA3 =3.81) and disseminate information to the public (TR1=3.83). This was also confirmed by some of the CIOs during the interviews. For example, one CIO reported that “many websites managed
by central government organisations do not have much to offer ... they just mention something like our services, press release and forms”.

The respondents also perceived that governance is not effective. For example, they disagreed that the government interacts with citizens to formulate policy (CL1=2.53) and also disagreed that the government is accountable (AT1=2.60).

Further analysis indicates that Cluster 1 (N=47) has the highest number of male respondents. Among the 47 respondents in this cluster, 25 (53.2 per cent) are male respondents while 22 (46.8 per cent) are female (see Table 9.4). While there are more male respondents than female within the cluster, NGOs have more female respondents than male respondents. In this sector, 62.5 per cent of all respondents are female. Among the total number of 47 respondents in this cluster, the business/private sector contributes the highest number (21) of all respondents, equivalent to approximately 45 per cent (see Table 9.4). Overall, the business/private sector contributes the largest number (44.7 per cent) of respondents among other sectors in this cluster.

Table 9.4: Cluster 1 – Profile of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Sector</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Age Group*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Private</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Key: 1= between 18 years and 25 years old; 2= between 26 years and 35 years old; 3= between 36 years and 45 years old; 4= above 45 years old

Most respondents (51.1 per cent) in this cluster are aged between 26 years and 35 years old, the highest in terms of number of respondents (see Table 9.4). Further, all respondents are college/university graduates and, apart from the Internet and email applications, Facebook is the most used IT application in this cluster – 76.6 per cent of all respondents use Facebook followed by blogs with 40.4 per cent (see Table 9.5). Twitter is the least used IT application in this cluster. Only 8.5 per cent of all respondents tweet.
Table 9.5: IT Applications Used and Number of Users

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internet</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Blogs</th>
<th>Collaboration Packages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USE</strong></td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
<td>36 (76.6%)</td>
<td>4 (8.5%)</td>
<td>19 (40.4)</td>
<td>12 (25.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DON’T</strong></td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>11 (23.4%)</td>
<td>43 (91.5%)</td>
<td>28 (59.6%)</td>
<td>35 (74.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Numbers of respondents are shown in the upper rows while their corresponding percentages are shown underneath.*

Among the sectors, the business/private sector contributes most users of Facebook, blogs, collaboration package and Twitter by 50 per cent, 83 per cent, 74 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. Within the business/private sector, blogs tops the list by being the most used IT application in this sector. Among the sectors, NGOs do not have any user who tweets (see Table 9.6). Further, the number of male IT users is more than that of their female counterparts in each IT application used. But, the number of non-IT users is more than that of IT users in all applications used except for Facebook where the number of IT users is higher than that of non-IT users for both female and male users.

Table 9.6: IT Applications Across Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Sector</th>
<th>Number of Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facebook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Private</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.4.2 Cluster 2 Analysis

Cluster 2 has the second highest mean scores of the items measuring usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes. High scores are shown in bold (see Table 9.3). For example, respondents in Cluster 2 have a mean of 4.23 for the item “the use of IT has improved
information sharing among citizens regarding public affairs”. This means that respondents in this cluster scored highly on this item (Table 9.3, CO2) i.e. agreed that the use of IT has improved information sharing among citizens regarding public affairs. The respondents therefore perceived that to some extent, IT was used to support governance and democratic purposes. For example, at micro level, the respondents agreed that IT is used to influence public policy and decisions (see PA1=3.75); they agreed that IT is used to air one’s views more effectively (PA2=3.72). The respondents also perceive that IT was not used to support accountability processes. For example, the respondents disagreed that IT is used to ensure government officials follow rules, norms and regulations while delivering public services (AC1=3.30), disagreed that IT is used to hold government and its officials liable for their performance (AC2=2.91) and disagreed that IT is used to improve citizenry control of the government or public officials (AC3=3.36). However, the respondents agreed that IT is used by the government to disseminate information to the public (TR1=3.77) and the public can easily access government information via the Internet (TR2=3.81). Further, they also agreed that the use of IT has improved information-sharing among citizens (CO2=4.23) and among government departments (CO3=3.70). On the other hand, the respondents agreed that the Internet has enabled individuals to participate in electronic civic forums than those who do not know how use it (DF1=3.74). They also agreed that individuals can afford to use the Internet services to participate in online forums (DF2=3.83).

The governance processes variable has its many items scored below 3.00, indicating that the respondents perceive them to be ineffective. The respondents perceive that NGOs do not entirely enjoy freedom in carrying out their work. For example, the respondents agreed that the government restricts the functions of non-governmental organisations (NG1=3.83). However, the respondents disagreed that members of NGOs are intimidated, arrested, imprisoned or assaulted (NG2=2.87). They also disagreed that judges render verdicts in favour of the government (IJ1=2.15). The respondents however perceived that prosecutors are not independent of political control (IJ2=2.53). Further, the respondents perceived that external pressures have no much impact on governance. They disagreed that economic integrations impact on national policies (GG1=2.75) and also disagreed that global corporations impact on state governance (GG2=1.57). The respondents also disagreed that foreign aid impact on state policies (FA1=2.06) and on government accountability (FA2=2.15). Further, they also disagreed that international NGOs impact on governance (FA3=3.34).
On the other hand, the respondents in this cluster perceive that there is, to a large extent no effective governance in Tanzania. However, at micro level, individuals have freedom to participate in political activities (PT1=3.55); freedom to join any political party, trade union or any social organisation (PT2=4.06) and are free to use the Internet (PT4=4.15).

Further Descriptive analysis indicates that Cluster 2 (N=53) is composed of 53 respondents of which 36 (67.9 per cent) respondents are male and 17 (32.1 per cent) are female (see Table 9.7). While a number of male respondents is higher than that of females within the cluster, the same trend continues in each sector. However, NGOs are characterised by the highest proportion of female respondents. NGOs have 45.5 per cent of female respondents, the highest compared to 28 per cent and 29.4 per cent of female respondents in government and business/private sectors respectively. Among the 53 respondents, the government contributes 25 (47.2 per cent) respondents, 11 (20.8 per cent) respondents come from NGOs and 17 (32.1 per cent) respondents come from the business/private sector (see Table 9.7).

Table 9.7: Cluster 2 - Profile of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Sector</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Age Group*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Private</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Key: 1= between 18 years and 25 years old; 2= between 26 years and 35 years old; 3= between 36 years and 45 years old; 4= above 45 years old

Most respondents (39.6 per cent) in this cluster are aged between 26 and 35 years old followed by 30.2 per cent of those aged between 36 and 45 years old (see Table 9.7). Respondents with above 45 years of age are the minority in this cluster and only 13.2 per cent belong to this age group.

In this cluster, apart from the Internet and email, Facebook is the most used IT application; 83 per cent of all respondents use Facebook followed by blogs with 60.4 per cent users (see Table
Collaboration packages are the least used IT applications in this cluster. Only 9.4 per cent of all respondents use collaboration packages.

Table 9.8: IT Applications Used and Corresponding Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internet</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Blogs</th>
<th>Collaboration Packages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USE</td>
<td>53 (100%)</td>
<td>53 (100%)</td>
<td>44 (83%)</td>
<td>11 (20.8%)</td>
<td>32 (60.4)</td>
<td>5 (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON'T</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>9 (17%)</td>
<td>42 (79.2%)</td>
<td>21 (39.6%)</td>
<td>48 (90.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers of respondents are shown in the upper rows while their corresponding percentages are shown underneath.

The government sector has the highest number (46 per cent) of Facebook users in this cluster. However, the business/private sector has the majority of its members as Facebook users – 88 per cent. Similarly, the government sector contributes the largest number of blog users (15 out of 32 blog users or 47 per cent – see Table 9.9) within the cluster. On the other hand, the business/private sector has the largest number of its members who use blogs. 11 out of 17 respondents or 64 per cent of all respondents in this sector use blogs, the highest in terms of proportion of users against the total number of respondents in each sector.

Table 9.9: IT Applications Across Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Sector</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Collaboration packages</th>
<th>Blogs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Private</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, all sectors are represented in each IT application with exception of NGOs which do not have any users of collaboration packages. Further, the number of male IT users is higher than that of female IT user counterparts in each IT application used in this cluster. The government sector has the highest representation of users in each application with the exception of the business/private sector which has the largest user representation in collaboration packages (see Table 9.9).
9.4.3 Cluster 3 Analysis

Cluster 3 has the highest mean scores of the variable usage of IT applications for governance and democratic purposes (see Table 9.3 – high scores shown in bold). The respondents perceive that IT is used to support governance and democratic activities in Tanzania. They agreed that IT is used by government to disseminate information to the public (TR1=4.11), they agreed that the public can easily access government information via the Internet (TR2=4.09) and they agreed that government information is provided online in a timely manner (TR3=4.03). Usage of IT in these activities was also confirmed by CIOs, but some indicated a need for more information to be published on government websites which provides a required level of government scrutiny. One CIO, when asked a question on how IT is used to support transparency said that:

*IT has facilitated transparency. If you need a copy of the budget speech and other information such as government tenders you can get it from the website because every ministry has its own website. But to what extent that cannot tell. At least now if you have IT infrastructure you can access some information from the website.*

However, CIOs felt that the government was not disclosing much information online which has far-reaching impact. Similarly, the respondents surveyed perceive that at micro level, IT is used to support citizens’ participation. For example, they perceive that IT is used to influence public policy and decisions (PA1=4.03) and to air one’s views more effectively (PA2=3.91). Further, the respondents perceive the use of IT has improved collaboration among stakeholders. For example, they perceive the use of IT has improved the interaction between citizens and government to develop solutions to social problems (CO1=3.82), improved information sharing among citizens regarding public affairs (CO2=4.26) and improved information sharing among government departments (CO3=4.00). They also perceive that IT is used to link government departments in participatory policy and decision-making initiatives (CD1=3.80) and to link government departments and citizens in participatory public policy and decision-making purposes (CD2=3.83). Many CIOs confirmed the improvement brought by the use of IT. They claim that many government services are available online. Such services have reduced the burden of meeting bureaucratic government employees as many services are available electronically. The use of interactive Internet features has enabled improvement in transparency in areas like taxation. This was noted by one CIO that:

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These days when you import a car you know exactly how much import tax you are going to pay; and you can pay electronically. This has reduced corruption practices at the Revenue Authority because IT has made the process transparent.

When CIOs were asked about how IT is used in information sharing among citizens. Many of them indicated that the usage of IT has kept people together in issues of shared interests. For example, one CIO reported that:

*People these days use emails to convene wedding preparation meeting and to report funeral news. For us we even use emails to convene community policing meeting and to inform each other information regarding security in our area. You know the place I live is far from the city and is still new. With IT things are good, just a click it is [message] there already.*

Some CIOs also indicated that the use of digital means for communications is not well received in government departments as some government officials prefer face-to-face contact rather than electronic means. One interviewee commented that:

*Email usage is equivalent to tradition collaboration arrangement. Though emails are by far more efficient and faster, government officials have not adopted emailing as the official mode of communication. People don’t act on emails; they still want to see a physical letter stamped by the registry. This is still a problem even in courts. Some officials [government officials] do not check their emails for weeks.*

Further, “lack of IT infrastructures” emerged during the interviews. CIOs feel that the government is not doing enough to invest in IT, particularly in government departments. For example, one CIO said that many government departments do not have official email systems. As a result, they sometimes use “Gmail” and “Yahoo” email accounts for official communications. Surprisingly, he further said that even the “director of communication at the state house uses Yahoo email account for official communication”.

It also seems there are still pockets of resistance in adopting IT in Tanzania among old people compared to young adults. This emerged during the interview with CIOs. They say some of the old people (described by one CIO as “Born Before Computers – BBC”) in government departments still resist the use of IT.
The respondents also perceived that at micro level, online forums have marginalised IT-illiterate people (DF1=4.05) and also negatively impacted those who cannot participate in online forums due to lack of sufficient income (DF2=3.77). These responses were also confirmed during the interview of which many CIOs indicated that IT-illiterate people were marginalised in online forums. For example, one CIO noted that:

*People who participate in online forums are those who have access to computers and IT knowledge. The current initiative of the government to establish telecentres and connect every district with optic fibre cable may help to increase the number of online participants.*

However, other CIOs noted that the marginalising effect of IT is not that much as suggested by one interviewee that “IT in Tanzania is not that much developed. So they [people] don’t have much to lose or to be marginalised in that matter”.

Further, respondents in this cluster perceived that IT is used in accountability processes. For example, they agreed that IT is used to ensure government officials follow the rules, norms and regulations while delivering public services (AC1=3.82); they agreed that IT is used to hold government and its officials liable for their performance (AC2=3.62) and improve citizenry control over the government or public officials (AC3=3.59). These responses were also confirmed by CIOs during the interviews. For example, one CIO reported that:

*One of the major corruption scandals which involved the External Payment Arrears account dubbed as the EPA scandal to siphon money was mainly exposed through the Internet. … many online forums followed suit that mounted pressure to the government; which caused the central bank governor and the minister of finance to resign. Since then, the Internet has been an avenue where unethical conducts are exposed.*

On the governance processes, most of the items measuring this variable scored below 3.50. This implies that governance processes are generally ineffective. However, the respondents perceived governance processes to be effective in some aspects. For example, they agreed that voter registration is fairly conducted (GI1=3.70); political candidates can make speeches to address the public during the campaign free from intimidation (GI2=3.64) and can hold public meetings during the campaign free from intimidation (GI3=3.50). Electoral laws are also perceived to be applied fairly to all political parties (EL1=3.52).
The respondents however perceived that strategies to combat corruption are not effective. For example, the respondents disagreed that anti-corruption laws are effective in combating corruption (GF1=3.23); disagreed that investigative bodies function independent of political pressures (GF2=3.23) and disagreed that journalists enjoy legal protection when reporting corruption (GF3=3.26).

On the other hand, the respondents perceived that NGOs are free to do their work. For example, the respondents disagreed that the government restricts the functions of non-governmental organisations (NG1=2.62) and disagreed that members of NGOs are intimidated, harassed or imprisoned (NG2=2.61). The respondents in this cluster also perceived that judges’ verdicts do not favour the government (IJ1=2.83) and perceived that prosecutors are not independent of political control (i.e. disagreed with the statement, see IJ2=3.05).

On the external pressures, the respondents perceived that there is a moderate impact on governance by most items measuring this variable. The respondents disagreed that economic integrations impact on national policies (GG1=3.21), disagreed that global corporations impact on state governance (GG2=3.29) and disagreed that foreign aid impact on government accountability (FA2=3.41). The respondents however agreed that international NGOs impact on governance (FA3=3.62).

On the other hand, the respondents perceived that on average, governance is not much effective. The respondents only perceived governance effectiveness in participation aspects at micro level. They perceived that individuals are free to join political parties, trade union or any social organisation without state interference (PT2=4.33), are free to participate in political activities (PT1=4.17), are free to air their views (PT3=3.77) and are free to use the Internet (PT4=4.14). Further, the government keeps citizens aware of social, political and economic issues (CT3=3.61).

Further Descriptive analysis indicates that Cluster 3 (N=66) is composed of 66 respondents of which 47 (71.2 per cent) respondents are male and 19 (28.8 per cent) are female (see Table 9.10). It is clear that male respondents use IT more than female respondents (Ono & Zavodny, 2009). While the number of male respondents is more than that of female within the cluster and in the government and business/private sectors, NGOs have equal numbers (4 respondents) of female
and male respondents. Among the 66 respondents, the government contributes 35 (53 per cent) respondents, 8 (12.1 per cent) respondents come from NGOs and 23 (34.8 per cent) respondents come from the business/private sector (see Table 9.10).

Most respondents (23 respondents or 34.8 per cent) in this cluster are aged between 26 and 35 years old followed by 16 (24.2 per cent) of those aged between 36 and 45 years old (see Table 9.10). Respondents aged above 45 years old are the minority (13 respondents) in this cluster – 19.6 per cent. Those aged between 18 and 25 years old are 14 accounting for 21 per cent of all respondents in this cluster.

Table 9.10: Cluster 3 - Profile of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/ Sector</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Age Group*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>8 11 9 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1 3 3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Private</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>5 9 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>14 23 16 13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Key: 1= between 18 years and 25 years old; 2= between 26 years and 35 years old; 3= between 36 years and 45 years old; 4= above 45 years old

Apart from the Internet and email applications, Facebook is the most used IT application in this cluster. 69.7 per cent of all respondents use Facebook followed by blogs with 47 per cent while Twitter is the least used IT application with only 11 per cent (see Table 9.11).

Table 9.11: IT Applications Used and Corresponding Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internet</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Blogs</th>
<th>Collaboration Packages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USE</strong></td>
<td>66 (100%)</td>
<td>66 (100%)</td>
<td>46 (69.7%)</td>
<td>11 (16.7%)</td>
<td>31 (47.0%)</td>
<td>14 (21.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DON’T</strong></td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>20 (30.3%)</td>
<td>55 (83.3%)</td>
<td>35 (53.0%)</td>
<td>52 (78.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Numbers of respondents are shown in the upper rows while their corresponding percentages are shown underneath.

Among the sectors, the government sector has the largest number of Facebook users; 24 out 46 respondents or 52 per cent of all Facebook users belong to this sector (see Table 9.12). However,
the business/private sector has the majority of its respondents who use Facebook – 73 per cent. This is the highest percentage among the sectors. Further, the business/private sector has the largest number of collaboration package and twitter users in this cluster. 57 per cent of all collaboration package users come from the business/private sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Sector</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Collaboration packages</th>
<th>Blogs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Private</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This number is greater than the combined number of collaboration package users from the government and NGOs sectors. Similarly, 55 per cent of all those who tweet belong to the business/private sector. However, the government and business/private sectors contribute equal number of blog users (14 users each) in the cluster. But, in terms of individual sectors, the business/private sector has the majority (14 out 23 respondents or 61 per cent) of its respondents who use blogs.

Overall, all sectors are represented in each IT application though with varying number of users with NGOs being the sector of least users in each IT application (see Table 9.12). Further, the number of male IT users is more than that of female counterpart in each IT application used in this cluster. However, when considered in terms of individual genders, female twitter users are proportionally higher than male users. 26 per cent of all female respondents tweet compared to 14 per cent of male respondents who tweet.

9.5 Discussion of Findings

9.5.1 Usage of IT across Clusters

This subsection presents a general discussion of findings observed across all the three clusters with regard to IT usage. Across all the three clusters, the findings indicate that there are more male IT users than their female counterparts (see Table 9.4, Table 9.7 and Table 9.10). These
results are in line with many IT usage studies. Existing studies of IT usage indicate that males are more likely to use IT than females (Broos & Roe, 2006; Chen & Wellman; 2004; Norris, 1999). Further, consistent with the existing empirical studies on IT usage, this study finds that the majority of those who use IT as indicated in all three clusters (see also Table 9.4, Table 9.7 and Table 9.10) are mostly young people than old people (Acilar, 2011; Enoch & Soker, 2006; Loges & Jung, 2001). Having presented the general discussion, the next subsections will present discussion based on the findings observed in each of the three clusters.

9.5.2 Cluster 1

Cluster 1 respondents are mainly from the business/private sector and mostly aged between 26 years and 35 years old (see Table 9.4). Cluster 1 has the largest number of female respondents compared to those of female respondents in Clusters 2 and 3. Facebook is the most used IT application in this cluster (see Table 9.5).

In Cluster 1 (see Table 9.4), the respondents believe that IT has been used for publication of information on websites and form downloading. They feel that IT has not been used for governance purposes and external pressures are still high (see Table 9.3). The respondents perceive that to a large extent, IT has not been leveraged to enhance governance (see for example, Table 9.3, PA2=3.11, AC1=2.81, AC2=2.45). They however perceive that IT is used to support engagement in general political activities (PA3=3.81) and dissemination of information to the public (TR1=3.83). During the interviews, CIOs indicated that IT development in Tanzania is still at infant stages with many applications implemented in isolation. They also reported that some government websites only disseminate information to the public and provide basic forms download. These results also corroborate Kaaya’s (2009) findings that Tanzania government websites are still at early stages of development with many of them being at first and second stages of website development and e-government services. Some websites provide interactive features to allow online services (Kaaya, 2009). In the initial stages, information flow is one-way from the government to the public (Chadwick & May, 2003; Zakaria & Gebba, 2012).

Similarly, many components of the governance processes have low scores indicating that governance processes are not effective (see Table 9.3, GI1=3.21). Respondents disagree that
electoral laws are applied fairly to all political parties (EL1=2.43) and they also disagreed that the electoral commission functions without the government interference (EL2=2.02). CIOs showed concerns regarding the electoral commission particularly, its structure and appointment of its high level officials by the president. This suggests that Tanzania lacks an independent electoral commission and confirms Hoffman and Robinson’s (2009) findings. These results also confirm the attributes of many electoral bodies in transition countries which point out the excessive executive power of the head of state. Generally, head of states in transition countries appoint top officials of governance institutions without being confirmed by other governance institutions such as the parliament or professional bodies (Omotola, 2010a). Lack of independent electoral commission is a grave democratic deficit that may not guarantee free and fair election (Scott & Steele, 2011).

Cluster 1 respondents also perceive the government is not free from pervasive corruption. They feel that anticorruption laws are not effective in combating corruption (GF1=2.32), investigative bodies do not function independent of political pressures (GF2=2.11) and journalists do not enjoy legal protection when reporting corruption (GF3=2.32). The reasons given by CIOs during the interviews include the appointment of bureau chief by the president and lack of journalists’ protection by the state. Results on legal protection of journalists corroborate findings by Hoffman and Robinson (2009). According to Hoffman and Robinson (2009), the state has press legislation which not only suppresses freedom of the press, but also deters journalists from criticising the ruling party or the government. *Mwanahalisi* weekly has been suspended several times and recently was indefinitely suspended due to reasons related to allegedly publishing information that is not in the interest of peace and good order (Hoffman & Robinson, 2009). Altogether, Tanzania lacks press freedom and this indicates lack of elite commitment to the fight against corruption (Themudo, 2013). Protecting journalists, particularly those involved in reporting cases of corruption, is important if the fight against corruption is to succeed.

The usage of IT in Cluster 1 can be explained based on the nature of the business sector and IT application used. As indicated in Table 9.4, Cluster 1 is composed of mainly the business sector respondents and Facebook is the most used IT application in this cluster (see Table 9.5). It is argued that members of the business sector are more likely to use IT for business related purposes rather than for governance and democratic purposes. The literature shows that the
members of the business sector dominantly use IT and, in particular, social networking technologies for business purposes such as marketing campaigns (Pagani, Hofacker & Goldsmith, 2011). It is further argued that, for IT usage to support governance and democratic activities, people must have an information seeking intention (Utz, 2009). However, research indicates that many young people like those reported in Cluster 1 (see Table 9.4) do not actively search for governance and democracy information but rather encounter such information while performing other online activities (Kohut, Keeter, Doherty & Dimock, 2008). As a result, the online information reaching individuals with limited active information seeking in such unintentional encounters fail to produce political efficacy. Political efficacy is defined as a feeling that political and social changes are possible and citizens can have a role to bring about these changes (Campbell, Gurin & Miller, 1954). It is therefore argued that members of the business sector may have been encountering governance and democracy information online unintentionally (Kohut et al., 2008). Consequently, such information produces what Kushin and Yamamoto (2010) refer to as paradox effect – exposing users to greater information while insulating them from gaining the political efficacy it offers. Facebook users like those in this cluster have been identified as victims of such unintentional encounters (Utz, 2009). This suggests that respondents in this cluster receive information through the Internet, but are caught unaware to fully exploit its potential in promoting governance. Consequently, the external pressures from international organisations and the donor community mount, due to poor governance. This scenario explains well the interplay that exists between usage of IT, governance processes and external pressures. In other words, the failure of IT usage to support governance contributes to high external pressures (i.e. aid conditionality, globalisation). The findings in this cluster also suggest the managerial model of which the only active player here is the government, which simply pushes the information to electronic platforms (dissemination) while the onus is on users to access it (Chadwick & May, 2003; OECD, 2003). It appears that members of Cluster 1 use IT mainly for informative purposes. According to the E-government service index (ESI) and UN (2005), informative use of IT for governance involves basically form downloading, description of procedures for completing enquiries and search functionality. These results indicate that IT in this cluster can, based on Sein and Harindranath’s (2004) categorisation, be viewed as a tool. The tool view entails that IT is used as a means to achieve
something (in this cluster – getting information) and it is a means of communication (Sein and Harindranath, 2004).

In summary, Cluster 1 is characterised by patterns (Gestalts) of weak adoption of IT for governance, weak governance processes and high external pressures working together to exacerbate governance challenges.

### 9.5.3 Cluster 2

Cluster 2 respondents are mainly from the government sector contributing 47 per cent of all respondents in this cluster (see Table 9.7). Respondents in Cluster 2 are mostly aged between 26 years and 35 years old, use Facebook the most compared to those in Clusters 1 and 3; and are mostly male (see Table 9.8).

In Cluster 2, respondents perceived IT has been used for governance and democratic purposes in about half of the items of this variable. The results indicate that IT is used to facilitate information-sharing among citizens and dissemination of information from the government to the public (see Table 9.3, C02=4.23, TR1=3.77). Respondents agreed that IT is used to influence public policy and decisions (PA1=3.75) and to air one’s views more effectively (PA2=3.72). Cluster 2 respondents also perceived government information is provided online in a timely manner (TR3=3.96) and the public can access it via the Internet (TR2=3.81). However, IT is not used to support the interaction between citizens and government officials (see Table 9.3, CO1=3.42). This shows that the public is treated as a passive actor (Chadwick & May, 2003) and, as such, no meaningful impact on policy processes can be realised (Bruns & Swift, 2010). This is a missing link between citizens and government in the policy and decision processes of which citizens are denied the democratic role as interlocutors (Chadwick & May, 2003). Such a situation could be amended by the presence of effective NGOs which can take up a role to link the government with forums from citizens-to-citizens engagement (Bruns & Swift, 2010; Foley & Edwards, 1996; Mercer, 2002). However, this depends on how effective NGOs are to lobby for policy change. Based on the descriptive statistics, Cluster 2 has the largest number of NGOs respondents compared to Clusters 1 and 3. It was expected that given their abundance (see Table 9.7); NGOs would take up the role of policy lobbying effectively to compensate for the missing interaction between citizens (.i.e. public) and government. Available evidence regarding NGOs
in Tanzania indicates that NGOs are weak (Green, 2010; Mukandala et al., 2008; Tucker et al., 2010) and financially incapable of funding their operations on their own. As a result, they depend heavily on foreign donor financing arrangements to keep them running (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Green, 2010; Mercer, 2004). The implications for donor financing pave a way for shifting NGOs accountability from local constituencies they claim to represent to foreign donors (Assad & Goddard, 2010; Henderson, 2002; Mercer, 2004; Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani, 2009; Sperling, 1998). According to Mercer (2004), NGOs in Tanzania are “increasingly disconnected from their constituencies as they shift their gaze upwards and outwards, enveloping themselves in the concerns of international development discourse and donor-managed reforms” (p. 56). This situation translates to the fact that work of NGOs reflects the interests of donors and international financial institutions more than the “concerns of poor Tanzanians” (Mercer, 2004, p. 56; Themudo, 2013). Consequently, it is not surprising that to some extent the pressures from external forces are low (compared to scores in Clusters 1 and 2 – see Table 9.3), as many NGOs meet external conditions. This line of argument is well supported by the study by Assad and Goddard (2010) on NGOs' accountability and accounting for funding in Tanzania. They find that accounting processes and practices within NGOs are influenced by donors and satisfy conditions of donors in enhancing legitimacy and credibility of NGOs. Given the level of IT usage in this cluster, it appears that members of Cluster 2 use IT for participatory purposes. According to Zakaria and Gebba (2012), participatory use of IT for governance involves government provision of e-services related to customer satisfaction to solicit public opinion regarding agency’s services. Digital media such as blogs, forums, feedback forms, online voting and polling can be used to provide e-services.

In summary, Cluster 2 is characterised by patterns (Gestalts) of moderate adoption of IT for governance, weak governance processes and low external pressures. Analysis of the effective governance scores (see Table 9.3) shows that only 3 out of the 13 items that measured effective governance were agreed upon. Therefore, moderate adoption of IT for governance, weak governance processes and low external pressures work together to a small extent resolving governance challenges.
9.5.4 Cluster 3

Cluster 3 respondents are mainly from the government sector contributing 53 per cent of all respondents in this cluster (see Table 9.10). Cluster 2 has the largest number of male respondents (71.2 per cent) compared to those of male respondents in Clusters 1 and 2. Cluster 2 respondents are mostly aged between 26 years and 35 years old and use Facebook the most (see Table 9.11).

In Cluster 3 (Table 9.10), IT is perceived to have been used for governance and democratic purposes in all items of this variable (see Table 9.3). At micro level, respondents perceived that IT is used for participation. They perceived that IT is used to influence public policy and decisions (PA1=4.03); to air one’s views more effectively (PA2=3.91) and support engagement in general political activities (PA3=3.73). Further, the respondents perceived that IT is used for collaboration among stakeholders. For example, they perceived that the use of IT has improved the interaction between citizens and government (CO1=3.82), improved information-sharing among citizens (CO2=4.26) and improved information-sharing among government departments (CO3=4.00). These results were also confirmed by CIOs. Interviews results highlight the improved interaction between the government and citizens attributed to the Internet. They feel that the interactive features of the Internet were used in enhancing government services by providing them electronically. Cluster 3 has a largest number of respondents from the government sector and a largest number of male respondents compared to Clusters 1 and 2 (see Table 9.10). These attributes coupled with dominantly male and young respondents give Cluster 3 respondents an advantage of more access to and usage of IT (Ono & Zavodny, 2009). Hence, Cluster 3 respondents use e-services the most compared to the other two clusters. These e-services reduce the burden of physical visits to government office as citizens can download forms from websites (See Table 9.3, TR1=4.11, TR2=4.09; TR3=4.03), “pay government tax electronically”, ask questions and get answers from government electronically (Andersen & Henriksen, 2006). Some of the CIOs feel that such online interactions with government officials has helped to reduce corrupt practices in government agencies such as in the “revenue authority”. As corruption is an indicator of weak institutions (Aslund, 2000; Kaufmann, et al., 2000; Sakwa, 2011), it can be concluded that IT usage has helped to fight corruption in Tanzania and to some extent reduced the impact of weak institutions. Further, CIOs’ interview responses also indicate that IT is used to keep people together. The respondents responses also indicate that IT is used to
share information among citizens regarding social, political or economic issues (see Table 9.3, CO2=4.26). This suggests that IT has been used to form and sustain social networks in providing collective goods (Livingston & Walter-Drop, 2012). From the CIOs’ interview results, the formation of a community policing group indicates a form of governance under the arrangement of non-state actors to provide security services (governance good) operating from below (Livingston & Walter-Drop, 2012). By lowering information and coordination costs, IT facilitates information availability, contributing to the formation of these informal groups that serve the immediate needs of communities such as security (Livingston & Walter-Drop, 2012; Livingston, 2011). In this cluster, the formation of a community policing group also suggests a deficit of state security policy which describes features of limited statehood. The deficit due to weak state institutions leads to a governance gap in providing goods of governance. IT-enabled collective action and coordination can be used to fill these “gaps in governance capacity” (Livingston & Walter-Drop, 2012, p. 9; Livingston, 2011; Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006). In this cluster, IT has been used to form a network of non-state actors to provide security services (goods of governance) filling the security service gap left open by inefficient or weak state institutions (see Table 9.3 CL3=3.82, CO2=4.26). Thus, it can be concluded that IT usage has to some extent helped to curb the problem of limited statehood.

On coordination activities, IT is used to link government departments (CD1=3.80), and government departments and citizens in participatory public policy and decision-making purposes (CD2=3.83). While CIOs confirmed these responses, they also raised concerns over cultural barriers of which digital means of communications are not well received in government departments. It seems that some officials prefer face-to-face contact rather than electronic means. This is particularly evident for old people described by one CIO as “Born Before Computers (BBC)” who find it difficult to adopt IT and new modes of work. These findings suggest the existence of a cultural barrier and resistance to change. These findings also support those of Molony (2006) who find that small business owners in Tanzania preferred face-to-face contact with their customers. Findings of this study also corroborate Liu and Westrup’s (2003) findings on UK multinationals operating in China. They find that IT-enabled coordination is only effective when coupled with face-to-face contacts.
Further, respondents in this cluster agreed that IT has been used in enhancing accountability. They perceived that IT is used to ensure government officials follow rules, norms and regulations while delivering public services (AC1=3.82); to support the performance monitoring process of government and its officials (AC2=3.62) and to improve citizens’ control of the government (AC3=3.59). Interview results suggest that IT is also used to deter unethical practices by exposing the wrongdoers. These results also corroborate findings by Livingston (2011) who found that IT usage helps in establishing non-state mechanisms of accountability in areas of limited statehood in Africa. Based on CIOs’ interviews, the Internet is also used to bring shame to culprits in the eyes of the community, as Livingston and Walter-Drop (2012) contend. This is also in line with the literature that explosion of information afforded by IT usage facilitates formation of informal institutions and enhances accountability in the contexts of limited statehood (Livingston, 2011; Siegle, 2012).

While IT has been used to support aspects of governance, CIOs’ interview results point to the lack of IT infrastructure. It seems also the problem of IT infrastructure in a wider context exists, even in high government office. The use of private email accounts such as “Yahoo” and “Gmail” as reported during interviews suggests lack of infrastructure at both micro and macro level. This result corroborates findings by Kabanda and Brown (2010) who found that Tanzania lacks IT infrastructure. IT implementations that currently exist also suggest that a fragmented approach was used.

On the other hand, IT has negative implications for a particular segment of the population. Online forums have marginalised IT illiterate people (DF1=4.05) and also negatively impacted those who cannot participate in online forums due to lack of sufficient income (DF2=3.77). These results confirm findings by Acilar (2011) who find that the majority of the population in Africa is left out in online democratic forums due to the digital divide. By the end of 2010, Tanzania had 4.8 million Internet users out of the population of over 40 million people (TCRA, 2010). Such a small number of Internet users confirms the negative side of usage of IT for governance as suggested by Starr (2010). The usage of IT for governance in environments such as this of Tanzania further disconnects the marginalised population from the political centre (Davis, 2010).
This cluster appears to have matched most of the items measuring the three interplaying elements compared to Clusters 1 and 2. However, the level of coherence among elements in this cluster is not so great. There are still some areas where respondents indicated uncertainty (see for example, Table 9.3 – JI2=3.05, CI1=3.32, GI4=3.06, EL2=3.02) which suggest a cautious response. Normally such a cautious response especially from a government official may well suggest it is still not that good in those areas. As indicated in Table 9.12, Cluster 3 has a largest number of respondents from the government sector and a largest number of male respondents compared to Clusters 1 and 2. These attributes coupled with dominantly male and young respondents give Cluster 3 respondents more exposure of IT than those of Clusters 1 and 2. This exposure contributes to extensive use of IT perceived by the cluster. Chadwick and May (2003) argue that e-democracy, in forms of online participatory initiatives such as blogs and other forms of electronic forums, promotes democratic processes. Conceptually, international organisations such as the World Bank and United Nations link e-government with e-democracy; and the level of openness of websites is associated with democracy in developing countries (Amoretti, 2007; Wong & Welch, 2004). At this particular juncture, IT, particularly websites, provides an interactive environment between citizens and the government, thereby improving governance (Katchanovski & La Porte, 2009; OECD, 2003). This is what has been the objective of governance reforms which distinguish themselves from traditional administration (Chadwick & May, 2003). As it has been established, openness of government websites reflects the bureaucratic behaviour and performance (Katchanovski & La Porte, 2009). It is therefore plausible to argue that IT usage has improved transparency to some degree, that the international agencies are convinced Tanzania is making progress and, as such, the pressure and influence they imposed are subsiding. Given the level of IT usage, it appears that members of Cluster 3 use IT for interactive purposes. According to Andersen and Henriksen (2006), interactive use of IT for governance involves the provision of the public with an ability to download forms, e-mail officials and interact with officials through the website.

In summary, Cluster 3 is characterised by patterns (Gestalts) of strong adoption of IT for governance, moderate effectiveness of governance processes and moderate external pressures. Analysis of the effective governance scores (see Table 9.3) shows that 7 out of the 13 items that measured effective governance were agreed upon. These scores indicate some level of disagreement or concern with the effectiveness of governance in Tanzania. Therefore, strong
adoption of IT for governance, moderate governance processes and moderate external pressures work together to some limited extent resolving governance challenges.

### 9.5.5 Analysis of Coherence in Clusters

Cluster 1 respondents perceived usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes in (2/16) areas, perceived effectiveness of governance processes in (3/13) areas and perceived external pressures in (4/5) areas. Cluster 1 coherence among IT usage, governance processes and external pressures can be described to be weak. It is not surprising that Cluster 1 did not perceive governance in Tanzania to be effective (see Table 9.3, they did not agree with any of the items measured). There were not many matched items in the three measured variables. IT is perceived to be used in only two out of ten areas (i.e. low), perceived effectiveness of governance processes in three out of thirteen areas (low) and perceived external pressures in four out of five areas (high). It can therefore be concluded that Cluster 1 did not attain an adequate level of coherence among IT usage, governance processes and external pressures (Venkatraman, 1989).

Cluster 2 respondents perceived usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes in (9/16) areas, perceived effectiveness of governance processes in (2/13) areas and perceived no external pressures at all (0/5). The coherence among IT usage, governance processes and external pressures is still weak when one considers that they perceive many governance processes are still ineffective. It is again shown that Cluster 2 respondents did not perceive governance in Tanzania to be that effective (see Table 9.3, they only agreed with 3/15 items). The numbers in each variable of the three configurational variables in Cluster 2 indicate mismatch in a number of areas between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. It can therefore be concluded that Cluster 2 did not also attain an adequate level of coherence among IT usage, governance processes and external pressures (Venkatraman, 1989).

Cluster 3 respondents perceived usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes in all (16/16) areas, perceived effectiveness of governance processes in (7/13) areas and perceived external pressures in (1/5) area. This suggest some level of coherence but still not that strong when one considers that there are still a number of governance processes (6/13) considered to be ineffective. This is confirmed by their perception of the overall effectiveness of governance in Tanzania. They only agreed that governance was effective in 6/15 areas measured. Cluster 3
therefore has not also attained an adequate level of coherence among IT usage, governance processes and external pressures (Venkatraman, 1989).

In summary, the respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of governance indicate that Cluster 1 perceived no governance effectiveness at all (0/15), Cluster 2 perceived governance effectiveness in only (3/15) areas while Cluster 3 perceived governance effectiveness in (6/15) areas. Though with varying degree of coherence, all the three clusters show partial coherence patterns. These findings show that none of the clusters perceived a strong coherence among the three elements measured (i.e. external pressures, usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes, and governance processes). This is also confirmed by the perceptions of the effectiveness of governance across the three clusters – None of the clusters perceived that governance in Tanzania was very effective.

My proposition P1 is therefore supported: i.e. the coherence among usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes and external pressures was perceived to be weak, therefore governance is also considered to be less effective (ineffective) in Tanzania.

Consistent with the theory of Gestalt which predicts that the stronger the coherence among usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes and external pressures, the greater would be the role played by IT in addressing governance challenges, this study found the coherence among usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes and external pressures to be weak, it was also confirmed that governance across all the three clusters was less effective. It can therefore be concluded that the role of IT in governance is also limited. Therefore proposition P2 is also supported. That is when governance is perceived to be weak, so will be the role of IT in addressing governance challenges in transition Tanzania.

Further, public perceptions on issues relating to usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes, effectiveness of governance processes, external pressures and effectiveness of governance differ in some aspects across the three clusters. The respondents sharing or differing on certain aspects of the above elements belong to different clusters. For example, Cluster 1 respondents perceived weak coherence among usage of IT, effectiveness of governance
processes and external pressures, consequently they did not think there is effective governance in Tanzania. Cluster 2 respondents perceived weak coherence among usage of IT, effectiveness of governance processes and external pressures; consequently they did not perceive governance in Tanzania to be that effective. Cluster 3 respondents perceived limited coherence among three elements (they perceived effectiveness in certain areas but not all), consequently they perceived to some limited extent effective governance in Tanzania. It can therefore be concluded that the proposition P3 is supported. That is groups of respondents that perceive strong coherence among the three variables (i.e. usage of IT, governance processes and external pressures) will also perceive governance to be effective in Tanzania is supported.

The findings show that coherence among the three elements (usage of IT, governance processes and external pressures) is weak across all three clusters. All three clusters did not attain an adequate level of coherence, consequently respondents perceived governance in Tanzania to be less effective. It can therefore be concluded that IT has played a limited role in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania. These results are consistent with previous studies of IT impacts. For instance, Ojo et al. (2013), in their study in Ghana, found that providing access to mobile phones to women head porters was insufficient to meet their livelihoods, information and service needs and to use the opportunities provided by these technologies, unless the low literacy challenge is addressed. The present study confirms the assertion that IT is not a panacea of governance and democracy challenges as many IT proponents have suggested (Groshek, 2009).

This study also identifies IT usage for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes and external pressures as factors that determine effective governance (enhance or impede). These three factors support and reinforce one another and a need to align them is critical for effective governance. Their impact on governance is based on the level of coherence among them. The findings also show that weak adoption of IT, weak governance processes and increased external pressures work together to exacerbate the challenges of governance in transition states.
CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION, RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS
AND FUTURE RESEARCH

10.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has presented the research findings and discussion. The present chapter introduces the conclusion by restating the research problem and the objectives of the study. The key findings of the study are then discussed and conclusions drawn. Based on the research findings, the chapter then presents the research contributions to different beneficiaries followed by limitations pertaining to this research project. Suggestions for future research are also presented to close the chapter.

10.2 Conclusion

Governance has emerged as a top agenda in development forums and countries worldwide are required to adopt principles of effective governance. The international community associate poor social and economic development in Africa with poor governance. Tanzania is such a country plagued by high rate of corruption (Lu & Marco, 2010) and like many others, required to adopt effective governance practices. Given the potential of IT to reinvent governance and improve public services, many countries have implemented various e-government projects to improve public governance (ITU, 2010; Schuppan, 2009). However, evidence suggests that IT by itself cannot achieve this (Dada, 2006; Wright & Capps III, 2010). Existing contextual factors in developing countries generally mismatch with assumptions inscribed in IT (Heeks, 2003). There is therefore a need to match IT with these other aspects and to understand and measure the role of IT in resolving governance challenges. How exactly transition states can achieve this is not well documented (Hovelja, 2009). Bridging this gap, the primary objective of this study was to measure the role of IT in governance in a transition environment. The secondary objective was to identify factors that impede or enhance governance in Tanzania. To achieve these objectives, the study adopted one configurational approach (i.e. the Gestalts approach), and Cluster analysis.
The perceptions of one hundred and sixty-six members of the public were measured and Cluster analysis and qualitative techniques were used to analyse the data. Three clusters representing different perceived configurations of the three elements emerged. However, all three clusters did not attain an adequate level of coherence among usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes, governance processes and external pressures. It can therefore be concluded that respondents did not perceive governance in Tanzania to be effective. IT is perceived to have been used only for informative, participatory and interactive purposes, suggesting that IT currently is not the main tool for enhancing governance. It is therefore concluded that IT has not played a major role in addressing governance challenges in transition Tanzania. The researcher also concludes that generally IT has not brought about much societal change as many people still do not enjoy democratic rights.

This study identifies IT usage (for governance and democratic purposes), governance processes and external pressures as factors that can enhance or impede governance. These three elements need to be aligned and on a continuous basis as governance changes over time. The findings also reveal that weak adoption of IT, weak governance processes and increased external pressures work together to exacerbate the challenges of governance in transition states.

The findings also show differences in perceptions about IT usage in Cluster 1 and Cluster 3. Cluster 1 shows IT usage in two out of sixteen areas while Cluster 3 shows in all sixteen areas. Table 9.10 shows that respondents in Cluster 3 are mainly from the government sector. IT use in this case was mostly available to those working in government. The benefits of IT have not been devolved to other institutions, parties and civil-society organisations as reflected by the responses in Cluster 1. The study also reveals the paradoxes of IT. While those in government can use IT there are some who are marginalised in the democratic forums due to resource limitations and poor connectivity. Thrane and Shulman (2006) argue that when non-electronic voices are marginalised from democratic participation, social barriers are generally compounded. Sorensen (2006) also argues that involving a large segment of the population in governance strengthens social and political sense of communality among the citizens and between political elites and citizens. In the present case, the use of IT for governance tends to widen the gap between those who can and those who cannot access computers and the Internet (Thrane & Shulman, 2006). A number of researchers have expressed their concerns regarding
marginalisation effects of IT usage for governance and democratic purposes in developing countries (Acilar, 2011; Davis, 2010; Starr, 2010). These are serious pitfalls in development of IT for governance that need to be addressed and possibly avoided by countries planning for IT implementation.

The findings also suggest that implementation of IT in Tanzania did not consider country’s contexts. Heeks (2003) argues that e-government projects in developing countries fail due to lack of consideration of country’s contexts. Heeks (2003) maintains that the main causes of e-government projects failure in developing countries are “design-reality gaps”. These gaps refer to difference between the current reality on the ground and assumptions inscribed in the system design (Heeks, 2003). Heeks also argues that gaps may arise from e-government systems designed for Western countries, from donors who fund such projects, from governments in developing countries and from consultants (generally from developed countries). It is always the case that government, donors and consultants rush for quick fixes for development problems in developing countries without consideration of the contexts in which these IT systems will be implemented (Heeks, 2003). The lack of infrastructure even in high office – the state house, as reported by one CIO represents a far reaching challenge in IT adoption. Saebo’s (2012) findings on e-governments in Tanzania suggest that techno-centric approaches were used to implement these systems. This could also be the cause of the problem of IT adoption in Tanzania as normally these approaches ignore local contexts (Heeks, 2003; Schuppan, 2010).

This study also finds that there are still pockets of resistance to adopt IT in government offices especially, among the old people (described by one CIO as “Born Before Computers – BBC”). These findings are consistent with those of Saebo (2012) who found that the culture of traditional paper-work in Tanzania hinders the use of IT in workplaces. However, this cultural barrier suggests existence of Ujamaa (socialism) legacies. Changing mind-sets that have been institutionalised for many years is a long process. This also indicates how transition can take many years before it is completed (Kornai, 2000). Since the early 1990s, Tanzania has been in the transition and many things are still operating with socialist legacy. For example, the new Constitution has not been drafted (Bakari, 2013) and the current one still indicates Tanzania is socialist state (URT Const. Art. 4, § 5, cl. 3). These situations complicate the transition process and economic transformation currently underway. The government should assume a lead role in
cultural change initiatives and address constitutional matters to conform to political and economic stance the country aspires to achieve.

The findings also indicate that citizens interact to discuss social, political and economic matters (see Table 9.3, CL3). Such an interaction was also reported by CIOs. They generally interact to discuss social matters such as “wedding preparation”, “funeral” and community security – “policing”. This arrangement points to collective actions for public matters at community level governance suggesting that Tanzania has not abandoned Ujamaa completely. Majority of Tanzanians believe Ujamaa represents principles of freedom and equality of access to social services (Makulilo, 2012).

Ujamaa has also been useful in maintaining the unity and strong sense of national identity that helped Tanzania to avoid the ethnic and regionalist politics that have proved so dysfunctional in many countries (Askew, 2006; Landau, 1998). However, these political and social gains are linked to President Nyerere’s leadership and Ujamaa policies (Tripp, 2012). This indicates that Ujamaa had some elements of effective governance which are still useful to the present. Further, it is not the change from one form of governance to the other that matters the most, but the need to sustain this with appropriate leadership. Crafting and sustaining appropriate governance structures is a precondition to successful transition.

The findings also show that there are basically very few checks and balances in the current system in Tanzania. The lateral influence that would have been brought in by NGOs and IT communication to neutralise vertical authority seems not to be working. NGOs have not impacted on governance as it would be expected. Checks and balances mechanisms need to be addressed if Tanzania is to ensure effective governance.

The above section has presented a conclusion as drawn from different aspects of the thesis. The next subsection will summarise the conclusion relating to the research questions posed in chapter one.

**10.2.1 Reflection on Research Questions**

The result of the investigation into “What role has IT played in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania?” is the degree of coherence among external pressures, IT usage and
governance processes. Among the three clusters, results indicate that only Cluster 3 achieved some level of coherence among the three elements, though still a weak coherence. If results of Cluster 3 were to be considered alone without those of Clusters 1 and 2, it could be plausible to say that IT has played a role (to some extent) in resolving governance challenges and could be possible to describe the kind of role played. However, consistent with the Gestalts perspective (holistic view – Venkatraman, 1989), all the three clusters did not attain adequate levels of coherence. This means that IT has not played a role in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania. Since the study did not find any role played by IT in the first place, the description of a role (i.e. the what) could not be established. Therefore the primary research question posed in this study has been answered to a great extent.

Similarly, the result of the investigation into “What are the factors that enhance or impede governance in Tanzania?” is built on the Gestalts perspective. The present study finds that external pressures, IT usage and governance processes are the factors that enhance or impede governance in Tanzania. The results of Cluster analysis confirmed that these three factors support and reinforce one another, thereby enhancing or impeding governance based on the degree of coherence among them. This means that when they are aligned (i.e. are in harmony), they enhance governance. If on the other hand they are not aligned, then they impede governance. It can therefore be concluded that the secondary research question posed in the present study has been answered.

10.3 Research Contributions

10.3.1 Theoretical Contribution

The Gestalts approach to measuring the role of IT in governance is a new approach that has not (to the researcher’s knowledge) been used to measure the role of IT in governance in a transition state. This role was measured by determining the perceived level of coherence among IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. Three clusters of different perceived configurations of the three elements (IT usage, governance processes and external pressures) were revealed. Regardless of the nature of the cluster configurations, there was consistency in the way respondents in each cluster perceived the level of coherence, i.e., it was inadequate. This leads to the conclusion that governance was perceived to be ineffective and consequently IT did not play
a major role in resolving governance challenges in transition Tanzania. This approach therefore makes a good theoretical contribution and also offers much potential for measuring other complex relationships between IT, organisational factors and external factors.

In addition, Tanzania was a good choice for the present study. By testing the Gestalts approach in a transition state (such as Tanzania) that is not in an advanced stage of e-government/e-governance implementation, this study provides better understanding of the challenges involved in e-government/e-governance strategy formulation and planning and probably where to place the blame for unsuccessful implementation. This study emphasises that effective governance springs from the recognition that governance is the responsibility of all stakeholders.

The public perceptions approach adopted by this study was useful in measuring the elements of the conceptual model. Consistent with the Gestalt theory of a whole, the public perceptions approach helped to capture the perceptions of the public that are believed to exist in the public domain and enabled the researcher to achieve good results. Studies on public perceptions are not only important in analysing and interpreting future policy situations relating to IT; they are also important in identifying different policies that are required to harness IT for the benefit of society. This study identified many areas requiring policy reforms by studying public perceptions - comments on NGOs being ineffective, slow adoption of IT for governance, lack of infrastructure, online forums marginalising illiterate citizens (paradoxes of technology).

To accomplish this complex study, many theories drawn from other disciplines were used to inform different levels of the study. Theories from economics, public administration, political science, sociology and IT were used to accomplish this study. For example, governance theories (Chapter 3) were used to inform some of the components of the conceptual model (Chapter 5). For several decades, there have been calls by IS researchers to use theories from other disciplines (multidisciplinary approach) in IS enquiry to offer new conceptual and theoretical insights (Heeks & Bailur, 2007). Therefore, the approach used in this study contributes to multidisciplinary approach to IS enquiry and heeds the calls by IS researchers to adopt this approach (Heeks & Bailur, 2007; Thompson & Walsham, 2010; Walsham, 2012).
10.3.2 Methodological Contribution

The Cluster analysis-based configurational perspective adopted in this study was useful in distinguishing three groups of perceptions. This method of analysis allowed the researcher to describe and predict the degree of IT contribution to governance. This study therefore demonstrates that the Cluster analysis-based configurational perspective is a valid measurement of the role of IT in governance. This is a valuable methodological contribution of this study.

Over the years, IS researchers have maintained that methodological pluralism approach in IS research offers new theoretical insights, and calls have therefore been made to adopt this approach (Heeks & Bailur, 2007; Mingers, 2001; Venkatesh et al., 2013). This study adopted quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the role of IT in governance. This approach (quantitative and qualitative) was useful in getting rich insights about the role of IT in governance. The comment on existence of cultural barrier to adopt IT among old people, for example, could not be captured by the quantitative method; but was captured by the qualitative method during the interviews with CIOs. Therefore, this study also contributes to the methodological pluralism approach in IS research and heeds the calls by IS researchers to adopt this approach.

10.3.3 Practical Contribution

The role of IT in resolving governance challenges and subsequent governance depend on the level of alignment between IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. These three elements reinforce and support one another. This means that for IT to be leveraged in governance and ensure effective governance, these elements need to be matched (i.e. should attain an adequate level of coherence).

The findings also suggest that institutions responsible for governance processes need to be reformed. For example, reforms are required in electoral body to ensure it is independent of other forces (Hartlyn et al., 2008). Similarly, the judicial system needs to be reformed to ensure impartiality in dispensing justice and enforcing the rule of law (Scott & Sturm, 2006; Velicogna & Ng, 2006). Institutional reform is a prerequisite for IT to be effectively leveraged in governance (Jain, 2004).
This study also has some prescriptive implications for the government and NGOs. The model developed in this study can be used as a source of recommendations for building strong governance in transition states. In relation to the impact of IT on governance processes and external pressures, the findings in Cluster 1 and Cluster 3 help us to realise the paradoxes of IT. On the one hand, IT may be ambiguous, that is not all good and not the panacea some of its proponents make it out to be (Groshek, 2009). It is therefore important to heed Johnson's (2001, p. 216) advice and realise that the danger lies in thinking that the Internet for instance is inherently democratic. IT may be ambivalent, it can lead to good as well as bad outcomes with regard to governance and democracy. On the other hand, IT is necessary as revealed in Clusters 2 and 3. This means then that the pursuit of democratic governance could be fostered with a nation's access to a much greater diversity of communication sources.

As African countries share many governance challenges (e.g. corruption, lack of transparency and accountability) with Tanzania, this study provides a useful lens through which changes arising from use of technological innovations in governance across Africa can be examined.

The attention of international agencies and governments are drawn to the fact that models of governance from developed countries may work but not in all aspects. Consideration needs to be given to local economic aspects, cultural aspects and existing resources. It is important to understand that the processes of governance do not reside solely within the sphere of state action and authority. Governance effectiveness springs from the recognition that government are limited in their capacity and that the involvement or participation of all actors in these processes is critical.

10.3.4 Recommendation for Practice

Infrastructure should be considered to be an important element for information society and the contribution of IT in enhancing governance. To accommodate large segment of the population, practitioners and policy makers should think of the effective strategies such as effective use of the SEACOM’s optic fibre cable to connect public places (e.g. public schools and libraries), increase the number of community access centres (e.g. Internet kiosks, telecentres) and establish IT training in all public schools including primary schools. Further, all other IT supporting infrastructures such as reliable electricity and legislation to safeguard citizens' privacy, ensure
information security and data protection should be in place. The government commitment in using ICT in governance as indicated in the ICT policy document of 2003 should be translated into actions. It is understood that Tanzania has done substantial investment in ICT, but it is equally important also to encourage the use of these technologies within the government departments. Importantly, the pitfalls in development of IT for governance need to be addressed and plans for new IT implementation should consider these pitfalls carefully. If public administrators are able to properly marshal economic resources available to them in improving the quality of their human resources as well as procuring required technological infrastructural facilities; it is likely that positive outcomes on effective governance development will ensue.

The findings suggest that governance in a transition state in Africa should be based not entirely on the Western world governance model but should be driven by African values – i.e. should be a combination of traditional values of Africa (e.g. traditional methods of accountability as seen in Ujamaa) with modern techniques of governance that work.

The findings also show that it is extremely difficult to ensure proper coordination of all actors. Sometimes actors may actually not be interested in cooperating at all or they have their own agendas or are unwilling to accept change or change their perceptions. For instance the study revealed there was a culture of not adopting IT (use emails formally), government not providing appropriate infrastructure and ineffective NGOs. This implies that certain changes in a country’s governance structure can be consciously planned, others not or may change. This therefore calls for strong partnership with government, the public, the private sector and the international bodies. This also shows that effective governance does not necessarily reside solely within the sphere of state action and authority. Recognition that governments are not the only players in governance is crucial and integration of participatory elements should be considered in the design of governance. In addition, governance is a dynamic process which requires continuous alignment of IT usage, governance processes and external pressures. This also means that governance needs to be evaluated regularly in terms of its contribution to the citizens particularly at the grass roots-level if better transparency, accountability and inclusiveness are to be ensured.
10.4 Limitations of the Research

This study has some limitations the researcher needs to highlight. The configurational approach adopted in this study was tested in a static environment (i.e. cross-sectional study). However, alignment is not a one-time activity but a constant balancing act of the organisational aspects (Burn, 1997). It represents a set of relationships which are in a temporary state of balance (Miller & Friesen, 1977). This means that this state of balance may change over time and needs to be studied over time. In addition, organisations coevolve over time due to interactions and as such are not stagnant (Allen & Varga, 2006). Measures of alignment should therefore take this dynamic nature into consideration and probably this would be better captured on a longitudinal study. Future research should demonstrate the potential of the configurational theory in a dynamic environment. Therefore the conceptual model developed in this thesis needs to be tested in longitudinal studies.

The limitations on generalisation also apply to this study. The findings are based on data collected from one region, i.e. Dar es Salaam; and Zanzibar was not included in the present study. Zanzibar has in the past had several upheavals therefore the perspectives of the people in Zanzibar would provide a very good environment for studying effective governance. In addition, the sample of one hundred and sixty-six is not large enough and a cross-sectional nature of this study, both constrain generalisation. Therefore some caution need to be exercised when interpreting the results.

The factors used in the present study were carefully selected based on their relevance to Tanzania’s political and social contexts. However, when IT is introduced in a social environment, many factors come into play (Boudry & Verdegem, 2012) and interact with IT (Jain, 2004). This suggests that there could be other key factors not considered in the present study that need to be integrated in the model.

The present study covered computers as chief mode of information access and did not cover mobile phones. Future research can integrate mobile phones for they are used to support governance and democratic activities. Given these limitations the next section discusses the direction for future research.
10.5 Suggestions for Future Research

Development of IT and ICT in general is advancing quickly and political and social conditions in developing countries are also dynamic. The perceptions of governance also change over time. Future research must therefore further demonstrate the potential of the configurational theory in a dynamic rather than in a static environment. Therefore, the conceptual model developed in this study needs to be tested in longitudinal studies. There is also a need for further longitudinal studies to assess the impact of the factors influencing the use of IT for governance purposes. Cluster 1 respondents indicated there was failure or slow adoption of IT for governance. There was also evidence of negative complementarity where both weak adoption of IT and weak governance processes appear to work together to exacerbate governance challenges. These factors and their causes can best be understood through a longitudinal study covering a larger sample size.

Some respondents were of the opinion that local NGOs made limited contribution to governance effectiveness and international NGOs were not that influential in transforming governance practices. Future research needs to examine the extent to which the inclusion of outsiders (e.g. NGOs) can overcome some of the problems associated with weak governance in transition states. To what extent are the appropriate outsiders available? To what extent are such outsiders able to influence insiders to change? Future research can provide answers to these questions.

Future research is also needed to test the model developed in this study with more items of the configurational variables while maintaining the same logic binding the elements of the model. For example, there are various governance indicator variables developed by different international organisations (e.g. World Bank) which are used to measure governance quality. These indicators have various items that can be adapted and tested in this model. Similarly, more items under governance processes can be adapted and tested in this model.

The model and its underlying propositions developed in this study have proved its efficacy in Tanzania’s settings. Although developing countries share some similarities, they also differ significantly (Mbarika & Meso, 2008). Tanzania’s political and social conditions might be different from those of other countries. Future research can test the model in other developing countries.
Another area for future research concerns a wider coverage of technology applications supported by ubiquitous computing devices (e.g. mobile phones) in the public sphere. IT applications provide different enabling functions in different dimensions of governance and democracy. Social network application like Facebook, for example, is currently available in most modern mobile phones. Given the potential of mobile phones in political mobilisation (Goldstein, 2007); mobile phones can be integrated in future research.
Appendices

[Insert Appendix A - Ethics Committee Approval Letter]
Appendix B

Questionnaire

Department of Information Systems,
University of Cape Town
Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701
South Africa

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: Investigating the role of Information Technology in resolving governance challenges.

Transition states experience governance problems as a result of political and economic reforms sweeping developing countries towards multiparty politics and market economy. As part of my academic fulfilment, I am seeking to understand the role of information technology in enhancing governance in public service sectors focusing on Tanzania which is in transition from socialism (Ujamaa) to capitalism environment.

Your participation in this study will be greatly appreciated. The study should take about 10 minutes of your time and it is voluntary. The information provided will be kept confidential and used only for academic purposes. A summary of the findings of the study will be made available to interested participants.

To enable timely report compilation, I would like to have the completed questionnaire by 28th April 2012. In case of any questions regarding the questionnaire, do not hesitate to contact me at: Lucas Mimbi, Cell: +255 784 944625,
Email: Lucas.Mimbi@uct.ac.za or lmimbi@yahoo.com

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation
Yours sincerely,

Lucas Mimbi
Part 1: Demographic data
Section 1: Personal profile
Please tick only one:

Gender: Male□ Female□
Age: Between 18 years and 25 years old□ Between 26 years and 35 years old□
Between 36 years and 45 years old □Above 45 years old □

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation type</th>
<th>Government □</th>
<th>Nongovernmental Organisation (NGO) □</th>
<th>Business/Private □</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td>Secondary school □</td>
<td>College/University □</td>
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Part 2: External pressures
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements by TICKING only ONE number corresponding to your choice (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither disagree nor agree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree).

1 Section 1: Impact of globalisation on governance
GG1 Economic integrations impact on national policies 1 2 3 4 5
GG2 Global corporations impact on governance 1 2 3 4 5

2 Section 2: Impact of foreign aid and international NGOs on governance
FA1 Foreign aid we receive from international organisations (e.g. IMF, World Bank etc.) impact on state policies 1 2 3 4 5
FA2 Foreign aid impact on government accountability 1 2 3 4 5
FA3 International NGOs impact on governance 1 2 3 4 5

Part 3: Information Technology applications and experience
Please tick all the Information Technology applications you use and state how long you have used them.

Internet _______ Duration ____________
Email ___ Duration ____________

Social networks (please specify: e.g. Facebook, Twitter, MySpace etc.) _______ Duration _____

Blogs (online forums) ___ Duration __________

Collaboration packages (please specify: e.g. Lotus Domino, Share point etc.) ____ Duration _____

Other (please specify) __________ Duration __________

Part 4: Usage of Information Technology for governance and democratic purposes
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements by TICKING only ONE number corresponding to your choice (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither disagree nor agree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree).

1 Section 1: PA1 IT (e.g. Internet, websites, blogs, emails, social network technologies – Facebook and twitter) is used to influence public policy and decisions 1 2 3 4 5
PA2 IT is used to air one’s views more effectively 1 2 3 4 5
PA3 IT is used to support engagement in general political activities

2 Section 2:
AC1 IT is used to ensure government officials follow rules, norms and regulations while delivering public services
AC2 IT is used to hold government and its officials liable for their performance
AC3 IT is used to improve citizenry control over the government or public officials

3 Section 3:
TR1 IT is used by government to disseminate information to the public (e.g. government budget information via the website)
TR2 The public can easily access government information via the Internet
TR3 Government information is provided online in a timely manner

4 Section 4:
CO1 The use of IT (e.g. Internet) has improved the interaction between citizens and government officials to develop solutions to social problems
CO2 The use of IT has improved information sharing among citizens regarding public affairs (e.g. social, political or economic issues)
CO3 The use of IT has improved information sharing among government departments

5 Section 5:
CD1 IT is used to link (network) government departments in participatory policy and decision-making initiatives
CD2 IT is used to link government departments and citizens in participatory public policy and decision-making purposes

6 Section 6:
DF1 The Internet has enabled me to participate in electronic civic forums than those who do not know how to use it
DF2 I can afford to use the Internet services to participate in online forums

Part 5: Effectiveness of governance processes
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements by TICKING only ONE number corresponding to your choice (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither disagree nor agree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree).

1 Section 1: The Electoral processes
GI1 Registration of voters is conducted in a fairly manner
GI2 Candidates can make speeches to address the public during the campaign free from intimidation
GI3 Candidates can hold public meetings throughout the campaign free from intimidation
GI4 Election results are honestly reported
EL1 Electoral laws are applied fairly to all political parties
EL2 The election commission functions without the government interference

2 Section 2: Processes for combating corruption in Government
GF1 Anticorruption laws are effective in combating corruption
GF2 Investigative bodies function independent of political pressures
GF3 Journalists enjoy legal protection when reporting corruption

3 Section 3: Non-governmental organisation (NGOs) operations
NG1 Government restricts the functions of non-governmental organisations
NG2 NGOs are intimidated, arrested, imprisoned, or assaulted
### Part 6: Overall perceived effectiveness of governance in Tanzania

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements by TICKING only ONE number corresponding to your choice (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither disagree nor agree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Section 1: Transparency</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP1</td>
<td>Government decisions at all levels are openly done and I am kept aware of their outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP2</td>
<td>Government officials avail right information timely about public affairs to the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP3</td>
<td>Based on available government information, I can evaluate government performance</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>Section 2: Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT1</td>
<td>Civil servants (elected and appointed) can be held accountable as a result of their actions or decisions in delivering public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT2</td>
<td>The government fulfill citizens’ expectations (e.g., reducing poverty, increasing economic activities)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>Section 3: Collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CL1</td>
<td>The government interacts with citizens to jointly formulate public policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL2</td>
<td>Government departments share information to provide better public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL3</td>
<td>Citizens interact to discuss social, economic and political matters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>Section 4: Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT1</td>
<td>I have freedom to participate in political activities (e.g., free voting, contest for public office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT2</td>
<td>I have freedom to join any political party, trade union or any social organisation without state interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT3</td>
<td>I have freedom of expression to air my views without any state interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT4</td>
<td>I freely use the Internet without any state interference or restrictions</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5</th>
<th>Section 5: Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT1</td>
<td>The government organises citizens to take part in participatory public policy formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT2</td>
<td>The government communicates information to citizens to jointly effect public decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT3</td>
<td>The government keeps the citizens aware of social, political and economic issues facing the country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thank you for completing this survey. If you wish to receive a report on the outcomes of this study, please provide your email address: ..................................................
Appendix C
Interview Protocol

Section 1: Interviewee demographic data
Please tick only one:
Gender: Male □ Female □
Age: Between 18 years and 25 years old □ Between 26 years and 35 years old □
Between 36 years and 45 years old □ Above 45 years old □
Occupation/Position…………………………. Organisation………………………….

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation type</th>
<th>Government □</th>
<th>Nongovernmental Organisation (NGO) □</th>
<th>Business/Private □</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td>Secondary school □</td>
<td>College/University □</td>
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Section 2: External pressures
1: Do economic integrations impact on national policies? Please explain
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...........................................................................................................................................
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2: Do global corporations impact on governance? Please explain
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3: Does foreign aid impact on national policies and government accountability? Please explain
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...........................................................................................................................................

4: Do international NGOs impact on governance? Please explain
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Section 3: Usage of IT for governance and democratic purposes
1: Has the usage of Information Technology improved your participation in public policy- and decision-making processes towards effective governance? Please explain
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...........................................................................................................................................
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...........................................................................................................................................

2: Has the usage of Information Technology improved accountability of the government and public officials? Please explain
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...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................

3: Has the usage of Information Technology improved transparency of government business regarding its performance? Please explain


4: Has the usage of Information Technology improved collaboration among government departments, citizens, NGOs and the general public in enhancing governance? Please explain


5: Has the usage of Information Technology played a role in improving coordination among government departments, citizens, NGOs and the general public in enhancing governance? Please explain


6: Has IT-enabled participation marginalised IT illiterate people? Please explain


Section 4: Role of IT in governance (general)
1: Has Information Technology improved governance in public service sectors? Please explain


Section 5: Effectiveness of governance processes
1: Are electoral laws and election framework fair? Please explain.


2: Are government practices on citizens’ right to organise in political parties fair? Please explain.


3: Is the anti-corruption unit responsible for fighting corruption effective? Please explain


4: Are government practices towards freedom of assembly and demonstration fair? Please explain

5: Are nongovernmental organisations free from government pressure? Please explain

6: Is the judiciary independent of the influence of powerful actors? Please explain

Section 6: Effectiveness of governance in Tanzania
1: Is the government transparent in public policy- and decision-making processes? Please explain

2: Is the government accountable to its citizens? Please explain

3: Is citizen participation in setting national policy- and decision-making fair? Please explain

4: Are government collaborative strategies with stakeholders effective? Please explain

5: Does the government coordinate stakeholders for participatory deliberations? Please explain
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The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, Art. 4, § 5, cl. 3


