EXPLORING THE PEACEBUILDING POTENTIAL OF DEVELOPMENT NGOs IN AREAS OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO OROMIA AND GAMBELLA REGIONAL STATES

Wondimu Ketsela Mengistu

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the peacebuilding potential of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in areas of protracted conflict in Ethiopia. The findings highlight the potential transformative capacity of these NGOs and the challenges of their peacebuilding work. The research design adopted in this study was that of a mixed design method with an emphasis on the qualitative method. Data was collected through 52 in-depth interviews, a survey involving 120 households, two focus group discussions and various secondary sources. Bivariate analysis and thematic and content analysis were conducted.

The evidence from the empirical findings illustrate that by applying an “indigenous empowerment perspective”, many of these NGOs have incorporated peacebuilding components into their development programmes, and have made significant contributions in five ways. Firstly, their activities have helped to activate and re-establish customary institutions and strengthened their jurisdiction over land, social and cultural issues. Secondly, their facilitation efforts in peace processes have played an important role in the establishment of inter/intra-ethnic peace groups. The facilitation efforts helped in strengthening the pastoralists’ own indigenous laws and in drawing-up by-laws relating to natural resource access, use and maintenance. Laws on murder, theft and injury were reinforced. A legal framework with the capacity to resolve group differences peacefully was developed. Thirdly, the NGOs’ inter/intra-ethnic relations initiatives helped to reinvigorate the “values” of communal resource sharing, to build cross-border cooperation, thereby reducing the incidence of cross-border raids and resource-based conflicts. Fourthly, the NGO cross-border peacebuilding initiatives helped to revitalise economic opportunities; these improved the capacity for trade and also increased the links between traders across the border, thereby creating a reciprocal interdependence and a vested interest in reducing conflict. Finally, the NGO development programmes have, in certain areas, created sustainable access to the natural resources and increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructure; these factors, in turn, contributed to a reduction in the likelihood of resource-based conflict and vulnerability to drought.

The study suggests that if development NGOs operating in those conflict areas are to have a meaningful impact, then their peacebuilding projects need to build on indigenous institutions and local actors. The study also highlights how the present policy of the Ethiopian state has restricted the peacebuilding role of NGOs. The study further posits that the Ethiopian state’s judicial system and its local administration are structurally unable to address the full impact of protracted conflicts and that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms facilitated by NGOs, strategically situated, are best able to play this role. Although it is conceded that NGOs are not the “panacea” for all problems, the findings of this study point to their value.
DECLARATION

I, Mengistu Wondimu Ketsela, hereby declare that this thesis is my own unaided work and that the assistance obtained has been only in the form of professional guidance and supervision; and that no part of this thesis has been submitted in the past for a degree at any other University. The information used in this thesis has been obtained by me while registered as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Development, University of Cape Town.

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Signature                               Date
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development</td>
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<td>AFG</td>
<td>Action for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCFMP</td>
<td>Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Catholic Agency for Overseas Development</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community-based organisations</td>
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<td>CCRDA</td>
<td>Christian Relief and Development Association</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>CISP</td>
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<td>Civil Society Support Program</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>EGBP</td>
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<td>ENDF</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of Red Cross</td>
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<td>ILR</td>
<td>International Livestock Research</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>KIs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Federal Affairs</td>
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<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>NEBE</td>
<td>National Electoral Board of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Pastoralist Association</td>
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<td>PASDEP</td>
<td>Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty</td>
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<td>PPRRCS</td>
<td>Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Program</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Protracted Social Conflict</td>
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<td>RCCHE</td>
<td>Research Center for Civic and Human Rights Education</td>
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<td>RREAD</td>
<td>Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>SNNPRS</td>
<td>Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State</td>
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<td>SORDU</td>
<td>Southern Rangelands Development Unit</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Zuid Oost Azie Refugee Care</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the following: background to the study; the purpose and significance of the study; the thesis topic; the research objectives and assumptions that underpin this study; the clarification of some of the terms used in the study; and, the organisation of the thesis.

1.2 Background to the Study

This study seeks to examine the peacebuilding potential of NGOs in the Oromia and Gambella regions of Ethiopia. Ethiopia comprises more than 80 distinct cultural and linguistic groups. Centuries of interaction between these groups have created a complex pattern of relationships and a long history of competition and co-existence (Markakis, 1989; Zewde, 1991). Their conflict situation involves an intricate network of interrelated causes, with overlapping historical dimensions that exacerbate contemporary conflict (Abbink, 2006). However, many of the conflicts relate to scarce resources and socio-cultural dynamics, and have been relatively small-scale; typically, these were rapidly resolved by applying the various customary conflict resolution mechanisms (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). This history of conflict predates the policy of multi-national federalism.

After 1991, Ethiopia witnessed a transition from the past imperial and military regimes to multi-national federalism. The new regime introduced a Constitution based upon the principle of “ethnic federalism” and self-determination up to secession. The Constitution aimed to “address the claims of ethnic groups in the country of historic discrimination and inequalities and to build a multi-ethnic democracy” (Keller, 2002: 21). Multi-ethnic federalism embraces autonomy and shared governance for nations (Horowitz, 1997) and attempts to address both the psycho-social and structural causes of protracted conflicts.

The regional and local self-government experiment in the country introduced new opportunities and challenges. The Constitution, ratified in 1995, established a federal system with nine regional states based on local language and ethnicity. Technically, minority groups acquired the right to self-determination. Nevertheless, this right reinforced ethno-national sentiments, and “created” and “aggravated” conflicts over access to resources among the small units of the
Federal States (Clapham, 2004:53). It also overlooked widely-used indigenous mediation mechanisms. This affected inter- and intra-ethnic relations and transformed the nature and intensity of conflicts from concession and arbitration to rivalry and conflict (Feyissa, 2003). Furthermore, Clapham (2004) stresses that the newly coined and ethnic-based regional demarcations have adversely affected the historical alliances and long-standing culture of association among various national groups. Currently, points of contestation have included boundary disputes in areas of mixed cultural, linguistic and ethnic affiliations, besides the resource conflicts which already existed (Abbink, 2006; Getachew, 2006). This ethno-nationalist sentiment has been exacerbated further by the diverging identity discourse based on indigeneity, livelihoods systems, and entitlements and has led to serious conflicts causing thousands of deaths, evictions and devastation of property (Feyissa, 2011). These clashes are still seen today (Abbink, 2006).

In response to the prevalent ethnic conflict, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) held a referendum in an attempt to achieve a durable solution to that conflict (Adunga, 2010; Bassi, 2010). For example, the Ministry of Federal Affairs facilitated a referendum to demarcate formally the boundary and to resolve the disputes between the Somali clans and the Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010). As a result, the Borana not only lost access to the most fertile pastures, but lost land in the wetter areas. The Borana especially resent the loss of territory that plays an important role in defining the Borana’s social, spiritual and communal world (Helland, 1982; Legesse, 2000). As the government’s referendum disregards such symbolic and psychological bonds, conflict remains latent. The government’s referendum (2004) eroded the accepted and agreed-upon conflict negotiation mechanisms (Abbink, 2006). This, in turn, forced the federal government to place armed units, known as Mekelakeya, or rapid reaction forces, to contain the outbreaks of violence in those areas. In December 2003, the Ethiopian government deemed it important to use the military to maintain peace and stability in the Gambella region, after the loss of numerous lives. Nonetheless, most of the government-sponsored peace initiatives have failed; few have led to durable settlements. Indeed, according to Feyissa (2009) and Woldemariam (2009) only one-third of the government-sponsored settlements at the official level in these areas have, since 1991, resulted in a sustainable lasting peace\(^1\). This indicates not

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\(^1\)A case in point is when the House of Federation, which is vested with the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution (Article 39 cum 61-62), supervised and resolved through referenda, the conflict between the Silte and
only the limited success of a “top-down” approach towards peacebuilding, but as Abbink (2006) argues, such conflicts cannot be suppressed, contained, or resolved for more than a short period through coercive inducements; the “top-down” approach failed to address the deep roots of the conflict and to transform them, and so conflict remained latent and likely to continue.

Several studies of post-1991 conflicts in Ethiopia have indicated that most conflicts are attributed to psycho-social/psycho-cultural and structural factors (Feyissa, 2009; Tadesse, 2007; Abbink, 2006; Meckelburg, 2006; Clapham, 2004; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). Furthermore, and despite the adoption of multi-ethnic federalism in 1995 with the Federal Proclamation, termed the Intervention Bill (No. 359/2003)\(^2\), Abbink (2006: 391) and others have concluded that “there is a pattern of local conflicts not decreasing according to plan, but continuing and in many cases deteriorating”. In this regard, the Gambella Regional State and the Borana Zone have witnessed substantial changes in the nature, intensity and magnitude of conflict. In Gambella, the sheer number of inter/intra-ethnic conflicts led Borchgrevink and Lie (2009: 45) to describe the post-1991 conflicts as making Gambella “one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia”. For example, from 1970 to 1990, there were fewer inter/intra-ethnic conflicts than the eighteen in the period from 1990 to 2005 (Young, 1999; Abbink, 2006). Between 1991 and 2006, out of a total of 48 inter/intra-ethnic conflicts in the country, twelve were related to the Gambella region (Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma, 2006; Feyissa, 2009). Likewise, in the Borana region, the intensity and magnitude of conflicts have changed, particularly in the Woredas of Yabello, Arero and Moyalle (Abbink, 2006; Bassi, 2010; Adunga, 2011; Scott-Villiers et al., 2011). Between 1990 and 2004, out of a total of thirteen major inter/intra-ethnic conflicts in the Borana Zone, nine were related to the Borana and the Garri ethnic groups compared with five intra-Oromo conflicts (Odhiambo, 2012: 11)\(^3\). The human costs of these conflicts are profound, resulting in up to two thousand deaths and almost one hundred thousand displaced persons (Abbink, 2006). In

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\(^3\) Some important events in the history of conflict in and around the Borana Zone are summarised by Abbink (2006), Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma (2006), Bassi (2010), and Odhiambo (2012). It should be noted that Abbink’s (2006: 408-411), Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma’s (2006: 30-31) and Odhiambo’s (2012: 11) inventories of those local-level conflicts were not complete but they sum up the main intra-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict incidents between 1991 and 2005/6. Their lists mainly left out sporadic and reciprocal conflicts, religious conflicts, and several direct clashes between different local ethnic and language groups.
addition, the violence resulted in a massive loss of assets including livestock, as well as the deaths of hundreds of people, and the significant displacement of thousands of others.

In the light of the continuing debate on the challenges of “transitions to democracy”, post-conflict reconstruction and the state-building process, which are suggested as panaceas for all political and economic problems (Crocker, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004), there are no simple answers to the question of why the level of violent conflict in these areas has not been going down. For instance, Mansfield and Snyder (2007) as well as Ayoob (2007) argue that the transition from a totalitarian regime to a multi-ethnic democratic federation is characterised by frequent and fragmented ethnic conflict. Thus, the “State’s failure to contain protracted conflict and the narrowing down of political spaces to impose order is not as morally indefensible as it may appear at first sight since the state may be struggling to translate their judicial statehood into empirical statehood” (Ayoob, 2001:133). While the aforementioned arguments may justify the current overwhelming support for state coercion to prevent a relapse into cycles of violence and counter-violence, some observers and practitioners, among them Clapham (2002), warn about unintended consequences of these reconstruction projects. Whereas the task of preventing a relapse into violence forced the state to exert concerted pressure to sustain the settlement demands, at times it crushed internal dissent and forcibly assimilated minorities, thereby jeopardising the longer-term goal of sustainable peace. This was the case in Ethiopia, where the government used military force to resolve disputes and banned local political parties which, in turn, bred resentment among other groups, such as the Anywaa ethnic groups in Gambella (Feyissa, 2009). Additionally, given the potentially innovative role that indigenous institutions are playing currently in the promotion of more stable societies in the country and also given only a limited degree of functionality in the judicial system, Abbink (2006) asks whether one should give indigenous institutions a chance. Abbink (2006) concludes that the state-building process that undermines social cohesion and indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms could exacerbate violence and become an additional stumbling block to the peace process. Thus Doe (2009) calls for an ‘indigenisation’ of post-conflict state reconstruction: a project that also accommodates indigenous societies and institutions while promoting unity through the principles of decentralisation and cultural pluralism.
Figure 1. Ethiopia’s political map showing its borders, neighbouring countries and ethnically based states with their self-governing administrations and their own capitals. It also shows the national capital: Addis Ababa.

Source: Maps of World, 2012

1.2.1 Indigenous conflict resolution practices

Recent literature on post-1991 Ethiopian conflict provides more evidence of how an externally-anchored institutional reconfiguration and transformation process has undermined long-lasting cross-ethnic alliances and has endangered customary authority structures. Watson (2003) referred to a rise in the intensity of conflict in the pastoralist areas of Ethiopia, and argued that the source of the conflict was exacerbated further by the pastoralists’ inability to maintain or establish institutions to moderate and govern natural resources-based differences. This shortcoming transformed resource use from cooperation and negotiation to competition and confrontation. Agreeing with Watson (2003), Scott-Villiers et al. (2011:5) contend that
customary institutions have not just experienced difficulties in resolving disputes and maintaining order because of “irrationality of the disorder”, but also because of a weakening of their institutional capacity to handle disputes and maintain pre-existing institutional equilibrium for peace and security. Bassi (2010) further asserts that the current Constitutional arrangement for the ethnic groups has resulted in the co-option of customary institutions into modern governance, particularly judging from current outcomes in the pastoral area of the Borana, thereby destroying their potential to lead the conflict resolution process. In the absence of formal political institutions and a functional judicial system to guide negotiations and address conflict, indigenous institutions have the potential to lay the foundation for reconciliation and peacebuilding. Pavanello (2009) thus calls for the revitalisation of the institutional capacities of indigenous institutions to address contemporary challenges.

While the case for indigenous conflict resolution methods seems strong, critics of such methods assert that these could not address the changes in the nature and magnitude of local conflicts, making it less feasible to advance post-conflict reconstruction. There is also a naïveté in assuming that indigenous methods are the only legitimate ways of resolving conflict. Doe (2009), for example, warns against wholesale resourcing of indigenous resources that perpetuate local systems of oppression, exclusion and exploitation. While acknowledging the limitations of current approaches and the need for improvement, Abbink (2006) highlights the significance of customary procedures for local ethnic groups that help to provide a moral basis for maintaining order. Abbink further contends that the state should actively incorporate them into judicial procedures. From recent practical experience in the Gambella and Borana regions, for example, Borchgrevink and Lie (2009) and Bassi (2010), argue that the state’s judicial system is structurally unable to address protracted conflicts, and reacts to conflict in a coercive, “top-down”, and insensitive manner. In a similar vein, Rahmato (2002) reflects on the role of indigenous informal organisations in promoting democratisation, and asserts that informal organisations, particularly where indigenous conflict resolution has taken place, may not always conform to the normative meaning of “Civil Society”. However, in the absence of any vibrant middle-class-based Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), such informal organisations are instrumental in counteracting the intrusions of totalitarian and corrupt civilian regimes. Zewde (2002) confirms Rahmato’s point by arguing that despite their weakend status these informal organisations continued to exercise a wide-ranging influence in regulating social relationships.
and allowing space for expression, outside of state control. Finally, little or no attention has been given to the role that Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play in peacebuilding.

1.2.2 NGOs in peacebuilding

The transition from violent conflict to negotiated settlement and the creation of new types of relationship are complex issues and require comprehensive, multi-dimensional and multi-level approaches for effective conflict transformation (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Michelle, 2006). More recently, there is a growing body of research that recognises the importance of increased involvement of NGOs, local agents and indigenous resources in conflict-torn areas (Orjuela, 2005; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; O’Brien, 2009). These organisations have gained momentum after they responded to conflicts in Africa and Eastern and Southern Europe in the post-Cold War era (Aall, 2003; Zupan, 2005; Schmelzle, 2006; Neufeldt, 2007). In their policy documents, for example, both the World Bank (1998) and United Nations (1992, 1995) have acknowledged the NGO sector’s contribution to peacebuilding. Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002:7-12) suggest various ways in which the NGO sector could play a meaningful role: it may help facilitate dialogue and negotiation; help to build the capacity of indigenous communities and their institutions for handling conflict; help to provide a neutral forum for dialogue and for community building; and, foster development of the rule of law that reduces the likelihood of violence in divided societies. More specifically, Aall (1996) argues that NGOs view indigenous institutions and their conflict strategies as primary resources for conflict resolution and development, and encourage all stakeholders to take joint ownership of the task of peacebuilding.

In Ethiopia, the importance of “development NGOs” in conflict resolution and peacebuilding endeavours has not yet been fully investigated, but their pivotal role in reconstruction and development was recognised before and after the great famine of 1985/86 (Rahmato, 2002). Their engagement in good governance, democracy, human rights and peacebuilding is a comparatively recent development (Rahmato, 2002, 113-119; Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008) and has received little attention. By undertaking an exploratory study of the peacebuilding potential of development NGOs, this study aims to broaden the intellectual debate in this field. Apart from relief and rehabilitation work, these NGOs have been encouraging local communities to participate in peacebuilding (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008; Ojulu, 2011). In both
regions of Gambella and Borana, the NGOs were instrumental in reinvigorating and formulating innovative approaches to the conflict. They did so through individual and institutional development, intra- and inter-ethnic relationship building and the provision of services. The aggregate effect of these activities was to build the capacity of indigenous communities and their institutions for handling conflict. A precondition for the NGOs’ success in strengthening indigenous institutions was their reliance on the local people and their resources.

Historically, these NGOs were established in order to overcome various aspects of the 1984/1985 drought-induced famine. They aimed to contribute to relief and rehabilitation and to assist government’s poverty reduction strategies. Not all NGOs were established exclusively for the purpose of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. After these formative years, most NGOs are oriented toward livelihood protection and diversification, and natural resource management to enhance the resilience of the pastoralist communities, thereby reducing those communities’ vulnerability to drought related shocks. After 1991, however, NGOs have also become active in new fields of good governance, democracy, human rights and peacebuilding activities and thus have taken on new roles and responsibilities; hence their importance has increased significantly.

In both the Gambella and Borana regions, the initial efforts to integrate peacebuilding were precipitated by a general increase in intensity of violence, the destruction of their development infrastructures and requests or even pressure on the part of government and donors. In Borana, the increasing pattern of protracted conflicts that caused destruction of development infrastructures built over a decade earlier, served as an impetus for such consideration for NGOs such as Care Ethiopia, Goal Ethiopia and Action for Development (AFG). Likewise, in Gambella, the intractability of conflict provided the impetus for working on peacebuilding: the Research Center for Civic and Human Rights Education (RCCHE), Pact Ethiopia and the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) integrated conflict resolution initiatives in response to the increasing outbreaks of violence and conflict in the region. Still other organisations, such as the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) and Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKs) offered a religious rationale for the need to advance peacebuilding.

Nonetheless, these initial and very modest attempts at addressing the causes of conflict through facilitating peace dialogues were carried out by a very small number of NGOs. Their work was
random and isolated, with little effect on the course of the conflict. NGO mandates changed during the late 1990s and early 2000s. First, there was increasing consensus that it is far more difficult for NGOs operating in conflict-prone areas to separate development from peacebuilding (Bush, 1998; Watson, 2001; Schmelzle, 2006). NGOs should therefore integrate peacebuilding approaches into development projects to address the challenges. Second, as has been mentioned previously, the state’s failure to contain protracted conflict and deliver services and resources to socio-cultural or ethnic groups in these regions, led NGOs to step into this vacuum and enter into partnerships with customary institutions. Third, because of the wealth of indigenous knowledge and the existing local institutional apparatus, indigenous institutions were found to be more suitable for building durable peace and creating sustainable development than top-down development practices. Therefore, it was argued, the NGOs could help prepare the ground for organising people for participating, planning and contributing to peace and development projects (Watson, 2001).

1.2.3 Impact of the new Proclamation on the NGOs’ peacebuilding mandates

In recent years, several NGOs appear to have abandoned their focus on peacebuilding and have shifted to long-term development activities. The government promulgated the new Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCS) in 2009. That Proclamation has had an adverse impact on the constitution and operation of NGOs as well as on their involvement in advancing good governance and sustainable peace (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008). As a result, “development NGOs” have suffered a decline in influence since then. Thus, the work of those NGOs which incorporated peacebuilding components in their projects was affected and they were not able to carry out their conflict resolution activities in an unhindered way. The post-2005 election-related crisis has resulted in antagonistic NGO-Government relationships or NGO co-option, and affected the operation of NGO sectors. While this Proclamation reveals long-standing antagonistic relationships between the CSOs and the government, its enforcement signifies the extent to which the space for NGOs has narrowed down. Hence, the study investigates how relations between the government and CSOs/NGOs have affected their efforts in peacebuilding. The study also considers how the mandates of NGOs have been changed, following the introduction of the new Proclamation (PPRRCS) in 2009.
1.3 Purpose and significance of the study
Research on NGOs committed to the resolution of protracted conflict is slowly burgeoning. The focus in the past has been on the NGOs’ roles in rural development and agricultural projects, health, water and sanitation, and education. More recently, studies have highlighted the contribution that those NGOs engaged in conflict resolution could make (O’Brien, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002). It has been recognised that peace cannot be built only by signing peace agreements at the highest political level; on the contrary, diverse networks of individuals and institutions need to be involved in the peace process (see, for example, O’Brien, 2009; Lederach, 1997; Dimond and McDonald, 1996). The importance of a bottom-up approach, which includes the participation of those involved in the conflict, would contribute to an organic and sustainable process of peaceful conflict transformation. Value should be given to indigenous approaches that are integral to the social fabric of grass-roots ethnic groups (Lederach, 1997).

1.4 Topic
The topic of this research is:

‘Exploring the Peacebuilding Potential of Development NGOs in Areas of Protracted Conflict in Ethiopia; with special reference to Oromia and Gambella Regional States’

The first reason for the interest in these two regions is that since 1991 these regions have continued to experience marked and protracted conflicts. The second reason is the richness of indigenous knowledge in the two regions, combined with a wealth of indigenous institutions and their capacity to regulate access to the resources in a drought-prone environment and to resolve disputes (Watson, 2001). Third, while none of the NGOs investigated was established exclusively for the purpose of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, a number of NGOs claim to contribute positively to peace processes in both areas.

The NGO sector regards indigenous institutional practices as a counterbalance to the long-standing political and economic marginalisation of the peripheries by central government. Given these criteria, the Gambella and the Borana Zone of Oromia Regional States of Ethiopia were chosen for this study. Further details concerning the rationale for choosing these two conflict areas are discussed in the “Research Methodology” (Chapter Four).
1.5 Objectives and Assumptions

The following are the main objectives and assumptions that underpin this study:

Objective 1: To examine the policy frameworks that impact on NGOs in Ethiopia.

It is assumed that the Proclamation (PPRCS) narrowed the political space in which NGOs operate in conflict-prone areas. Furthermore, the Proclamation seems to have created, intentionally or unintentionally, a “bogus dichotomy” between peacebuilding and development. Exploring a policy framework that impacts on the NGOs’ operations could identify a policy gap in the Proclamation and as a result, NGOs may be able to reclaim political space for grass-roots initiatives. Both the literature review and qualitative data from key informants provide information on this Objective.

Objective 2: To ascertain the nature of State and Civil Society relationships.

It is assumed that the involvement of CSOs/NGOs in advocacy in the pre-2005 and post-2005 elections-related crises resulted in NGO/Government relationships being marked by antagonism and suspicion on the one hand and by co-option on the other. The Proclamation would appear to reflect government’s suspicion of CSOs by making it difficult for them to carry out their mandates. This Objective will be explored in the literature review and with key informants.

Objective 3: To assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices that are still used.

The indigenous practices of the different ethnic groups, including oral customs and rules, have been used to resolve a range of inter-communal and inter-group conflicts. However, these customary conflict resolution practices are slowly being eroded. Examining and analysing such indigenous practices may nevertheless give them recognition and advance their inclusion into the judicial system. Key informants and focus group members will yield qualitative information on this Objective.

Objective 4: To explore the perceptions of the beneficiaries of services rendered by the NGOs.

The interventions of NGOs have positive or negative, intended or unintended impacts on the beneficiaries’ lives, livelihoods and inter-group conflicts. Moreover, depending on their
particular worldviews and experience of violence, beneficiaries provide different types of information for impact assessment. A project may succeed according to pre-set developmental criteria set out by the NGOs but fail in terms of the beneficiaries’ perceptions (Bush, 1998). Projects that have contributed to positive changes could be transferred to similar areas and those with negative consequences will be able to inform future development endeavours. Qualitative data from focus groups in the two specified regions as well as the household questionnaire will explore this Objective.

**Objective 5**: To explore the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services.

NGOs operating in conflict-prone regions have already conducted impact assessments of their interventions. A project may fail according to pre-set developmental criteria set out by the NGOs but succeed according to broader peacebuilding criteria (Bush, 1998). Exploring such changes brought about by the projects, and re-examining NGOs’ impact analysis would help the researcher to compare the NGOs’ and beneficiaries’ perceptions. Key informants including Program Coordinators and representatives/ directors of NGOs, will provide information on this Objective.

**Objective 6**: To find out which strategies NGOs use to resolve conflict.

It is assumed that NGOs may view indigenous conflict strategies as a primary source for conflict resolution. It is also assumed that NGOs anchor the peacebuilding process around indigenous peace actors. They may revitalise and enable traditional peacebuilding mechanisms to grow and make an impact on the judicial mechanisms. Qualitative data from the key informants and focus groups will address this Objective.

**1.6 Clarification of terms used in the study**

The following concepts and terms, which are used extensively in this study, are clarified below. Furthermore, other significant concepts are addressed in Chapter Two where the conceptual framework is set out.
Peacebuilding

There is no common agreement on a definition of the concept of peace, either for those involved in conflict or for those working on peacebuilding. Its meaning can range from the non-existence of war to non-violence. Galtung (1975) distinguished the existence of two kinds of peace. Negative peace is the cessation of direct violence, and it is not an end in itself, but provides a transitional stage to positive peace. Positive peace includes the absence of structural violence and cultural violence; positive peace entails the structural transformation of the warlike behaviours of communities (Bercovitch and Kadayifci, 2002). Dietrich and Sutzl (2006) rejected any single and all-encompassing definition of peace and they promoted the concept of a “plural peace”, arguing that there are different views and practices of peace in different cultures. In being critical of the neglect of the “plurality of peace” and therefore lacking respect for otherness, Dietrich (2012) identified five cultural variations of peace: modern, post-modern, moral, trans-rational and energetic peace.

Galtung (1996) also differentiated peacebuilding. He stated that peacemaking pertains to the arbitration or negotiation method that takes place among the parties in conflict with the aim of achieving resolution of conflicts. Peacekeeping on the other hand, presupposes third party intervention in buffer-zones (e.g., UN Peace force in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan, or regional organisations in Somalia, Liberia, etc.) to keep apart warring groups from the disputed area and prevent direct violence so that negotiation can recommence. Galtung also stated that peacebuilding addresses the structural causes of conflict focussing also on the social, psychological, and economic environment at the grass-roots level. Similarly, Lederach (1997:20) argued that peacebuilding is more than just a post-conflict reconstruction; it “encompasses,

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4 Whereas “moral peace” recognises peace as a future freedom from the violence and insecurity of existence guaranteed by the authority of the divine God, “modern peace” rejects an apocalyptic promise of peace which takes place in the afterlife, and perceives peace as a contractually organised absence of direct violence enforced by state systems. In contrast, “energetic peace” perceives peace as the establishment and maintenance of harmonious relations between humans, nature and the universe sustained via spiritual and human emotional capabilities such as empathy and compassion. Rejecting “modern peace” claims to a homogenous and universal peace, “postmodern peace” calls for pluralist and relativist interpretations of peace. Dietrich (2012) suggests “Transrational peace” that considers both the modern and the spiritual sphere of human experience to be fundamental for the understanding of peace. “Transrational peaces” attempts to integrate “modern peace” with the “energetic peace” approach and deals with conflicts sustainably by moving away from incompatible systems and exclusive positions to a systemically interactive and inclusive position.
generates, and sustains a full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform a conflict toward a more sustainable, peaceful relationship”.

Peacebuilding is a process that is flexible and that can change in response to the situation and the stage of the peacemaking efforts (Bush, 1998). Bush, in a seminal article, has broadly defined peacebuilding to refer to “those initiatives, which foster and support sustainable structures and processes that strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict” (1998:33). Bush (1998:32) also pointed out that any peacebuilding endeavour, to be meaningful, “has to be reflected in positive changes in the lived experience of those in, or returning to, conflict zones”. For the purpose of this study, the researcher will be using the term peacebuilding to refer to those initiatives that seek to create political, economic, and social spaces, within which indigenous actors’ knowledge is acknowledged, developed and employed as an essential resource necessary to build a peaceful and just society.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Development NGOs
According to Anderson (1996: 638): “NGOs are privately organized and privately financed agencies, formed to perform some philanthropic or other worthwhile task in relation to a need that the organizers feel is not adequately addressed by public, governmental, or UN efforts”. The World Bank defines NGOs as “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interest of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic services, and undertake community development activities”(Aall, 1996: 367). At one level, NGOs are defined as being opposed to State and other pro-profit organisations in terms of their underlying organisational structure and functions. This covers a wide spectrum of institutional functions to include advocacy, human rights and democratisation (Bratton, 1990; Fowler, 1991). However, NGOs could also be defined as voluntary, self-governing private organisations, not devoted to sharing out profit to members and formed for public purposes outside the formal state apparatus but working within the parameters laid down by the State (Clark, 1995; Bratton, 1989b).

Aall (2001:367) defines NGOs as “private, self-governing, not-for-profit institutions dedicated to alleviating human sufferings; or to promote education, health, economic development, environmental protection, human rights and conflict resolution; or encouraging the establishment
of democratic institutions and civil societies”. This definition broadly encompasses three kinds of NGOs: these are the humanitarian NGOs, human rights NGOs and the Conflict Resolution NGOs. The interaction and interdependent operation of these NGOs plays a constructive role in conflict situations.

Prior to 2009, the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice was responsible for registering and regulating the operation and function of NGOs in accordance with its rules and regulations. It grouped the organisations under its auspices into the following five main categories: local or national NGOs, international NGOs, professional associations, civic and advocacy groups, and religious organisations. It categorised non-government organisations as either local or international. These organisations are primarily engaged in development activities, relief and rehabilitation work. On the basis of Article 2 (2, 3 & 4) of the new Proclamation (PPRRCS), NGOs operating in the Gambella and the Oromia regional states can be divided into three groups. The first group is: “Ethiopian Charities” or “Ethiopian Societies” formed under the laws of Ethiopia with not more than ten percent of their funds received from foreign sources. The second group is: “Ethiopian Residents Charities” or “Ethiopian Residents Societies” formed under the laws of Ethiopia and receiving more than 10% of their funds from foreign sources. The third group is: “Foreign Charities” formed under laws of foreign countries and receiving their funds from foreign sources. These distinctions and their implications for peacebuilding are further elaborated on, and discussed in Chapter Three.

In this study, the concept of “Development NGOs” is used to denote those Mass Based Organisations (MBOs) or “Ethiopian Charities”, “Ethiopian Residents Charities”, “Foreign Charities”, and religious institutions that have incorporated peacebuilding goals and/or components alongside other development objectives. Those objectives could include improving relationships between conflicted communities as part of Rural Development or development work as an integral part of their broader programme. The current Proclamation (PPRRCS) does not distinguish between civil societies and NGOs. Article 2 (5) of the Proclamation defines “Mass-Based Societies” to include professional associations, women’s associations, youth associations and similar Ethiopian societies. In the thesis, the conceptions of civil society given above by Chandhoke (2004) and Hadenius (2001) are all used and compatible.
Conflict Resolution

Kriesberg (2001) and Aall (2001) write that conflict resolution is an evolving field of study encompassing many perspectives and methods. Kriesberg (2001:407) also underscores the complexities and multi-disciplinary nature of the term and states that its continued evolvement has made it challenging to define. In a more-or-less inclusive sense Kriesberg (2001: 407-415) defines the term as “an orientation towards changing the conflicts so that they can be conducted constructively in the sense that violence is minimized, antagonism between adversaries is overcome, outcomes are mutually acceptable to the opponents, and settlements are enduring”. The concept of conflict resolution covers a wide spectrum of perspectives, largely depending on the nature and time of conflicts, and ranging from diplomacy at international level to domestic violence, from alternative dispute resolution at industrial level to mediation and negotiation of deep-rooted ethnic and communal antagonism.

Conflict resolution strategies also entail a variety of approaches and programmes. These approaches can enhance the participants’ awareness of their own role in a conflict, thereby transforming how they perceive conflict. They can also help participants to identify their own agency as well as their own practices to resolve conflict or at least ameliorate the situation (Aall, 2001: 372-373). This study perceives conflict resolution as a reduction of antagonism in areas marked by protracted conflict, by using indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms as well as other approaches. Within the context of this study, the terms conflict resolution and conflict transformation are used interchangeably, the latter being linked especially to Lederach’s (1997) conflict transformation approach.

1.7 Organisation of the thesis

This study will be set out as follows:

Chapter One: Introduction to the problem
Chapter Two: Mapping the conceptual frameworks to the study
Chapter Three: The analysis of conflict in the Borana Zone of the Oromia and the Gambella Regional States
Chapter Four: Methodology
Chapter Five: Discussion and analysis of the main findings
Chapter Six: Main conclusions, recommendations and epilogue
CHAPTER TWO: MAPPING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS TO THE STUDY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual thinking within conflict resolution/transformation that underpins this particular study. First, it examines the nature of contemporary conflicts, and the shift in conceptualisation of conflicts from traditional interstate to intrastate conflicts. In the second section, this chapter briefly explores Edward Azar’s analysis of “protracted social conflict” (PSC). Drawing upon a rich tradition of multi-disciplinary researches, in his seminal book, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice* (1990), Azar has presented us with Protracted Social Conflict (PSC), a model of locating the principal sources of contemporary conflict in developing countries. Therefore, the rationale for espousing this PSC model for this study was to ensure that the conflict analysis would be based on a fine-grained analysis and an understanding of the complex web of interrelated and overlapping factors affecting conflict at different levels. In no way is the researcher suggesting that Edward Azar’s model is the only analytical framework to locate the primary causes of conflicts in multi-cultural societies. Detailed and complex frameworks for analysing the sources of contemporary conflicts have already been developed in the field of conflict resolution (Mail et al., 2005; Brown, 2001, 1996, 1993; Mitchell, 1981). The third section of this chapter examines some of the principal conflict resolution approaches in more detail, and considers their empirical and practical orientations that aim at resolving protracted social conflicts. Within this broader setting, this third section attempts to explore four approaches to conflict resolution: these are the “indigenous empowerment” approach (Lederach, 1997; Rupesinghe, 1995, 1996); the multi-track conflict resolution approach (Lederach, 2003; Rupesinghe, 1995, 1996; Burton, 1987, 1990; Azar, 1990); the “interactive conflict resolution” approach (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1991), and the “discursive conflict transformation” approach (Fetherston, 2000; Jabri, 1996). It must be noted that while these approaches do not see any particular method as distinctive, they are nevertheless united in their common ground, which attempts to empower those at the grass-roots level. This chapter then moves on to discuss the limitations of these four approaches as well as the controversy surrounding conflict resolution initiatives in contemporary conflict contexts.
The final section of the chapter presents some discussion on the recent prominence given to indigenous institutions and the role of NGOs, and how they could work together to contribute towards a more sustainable peace and long-term development in conflict-prone areas. Different views about the role of NGOs and the need to consider indigenous institutions as well as the importance of “peace-building from below” in Ethiopian contexts are also presented. Finally the relationship between civil society and the state is explored. The politics of NGO-government relations is particularly important in the case of Ethiopia because these could adversely affect the structure and functions of the NGOs in conflict resolution activities.

However, it is not the purpose of this second chapter to engage in detail with the complex theoretical and philosophical debates about the meanings of NGOs and civil society, which have been rigorously debated by several authors (Keane, 1998; Hadenius, 2001; Chandhoke, 2004). Furthermore a concise overview will be given to indigenous institutions which have also been written about extensively (see for example, Leach et al., 1997, 1999; Watson, 2001; Chambers et al., 1989). This study aims to explore the increasing prominence of indigenous approaches used by NGOs in development and conflict resolution initiatives. The following section briefly examines the nature and sources of contemporary conflict.

2.2 Internal Conflict/Ethnic Conflict
Since the end of the Cold War, globally, the world has witnessed a substantial rise in internal conflicts. This development has resulted in a radical shift in the conceptualisation of armed conflicts from the traditional interstate conflict to intrastate conflicts. Contemporary academic literature characterises these conflicts as follows: “protracted social conflicts” (Azar, 1990); “deep-rooted conflicts” (Burton, 1987); “internal conflict” (Brown, 1996) and “intractable conflicts” (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002). Azar (1990:93) defines protracted social conflicts as “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation.” He underlines that these conflicts are often between communal groups and the state; often in states in which one ethnic or religious group controls the “machinery of the state” and uses it to discriminate against other groups. Burton (1987) characterises deep-rooted conflicts as being based on human needs that are non-negotiable, such as identity, recognition, participation, and security. He argues that identity groups will seek almost any means to fulfil
their needs. Furthermore, he argues that such conflicts cannot be curbed, contained, or resolved for more than a short period through coercion or even by negotiated settlements. Brown (1996:1) defines internal conflict as “violent or potentially violent disputes whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state”. Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002) sum up intractable conflicts as being prolonged, persistent, and violent, being viewed in a zero-sum relationship and as irreconcilable interests competing for needs and values that are essential for the conflicting groups’ survival. These descriptions and conceptions of protracted conflicts, deep-rooted conflicts, and intractable conflicts could apply to the post-1991 Ethiopian context where the nature of conflict has evolved from Civil War (1974-1991) to protracted social conflict.

Additionally, these conflicts are more-or-less confined to “developing” and “underdeveloped” countries and are often termed “ethnic conflicts”. A feature common to many ethnic conflicts is a division between the antagonists along ethnic lines. Kaufman (2001:17) defines ethnic conflict as a conflict arising from a contest for political power and involving “ethnic markers such as language or religion or the status of ethnic groups themselves”. Ethnic conflict constitutes an important subgroup of internal wars for a multitude of reasons; these include its ubiquity, the scale and intensity of violence, its impact on regional stability, its propensity to involve external powers and international actors and its centrality in theoretical and policy debates (Brown, 1996). Lake and Rothchild (1998: 339) conclude: “at the close of the twentieth century, ethnic and other social conflicts are without a doubt the world’s greatest causes of human suffering”. Constructivist theory may argue that there is nothing intrinsically “ethnic” in these conflicts; nevertheless, Lederach (1997) describes them as “identity conflicts”. He then argues that it is critical to address the fundamental needs of the population such as security, recognition, and access; moreover, peace processes can take time and all it takes is for a few extremists to derail the process.

Similarly, the traditional conflict resolution field came under attack and new approaches that were multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural were advocated. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2005:78) state “It seems unlikely on the face of it that a single all-encompassing explanation will be adequate for conflicts of different types in all countries.” Michelle (2006:438) comments
that contemporary violent conflicts “tend to be internal (even if significantly impacted by larger geopolitical realities), asymmetric, involve fragmented decision-making, and are often directed at civilians”. Likewise, Miall (2004) argues that classical conflict resolution theories were developed in response to *symmetric conflicts*, and are unable to provide an adequate basis for the analysis of the new conflicts. These arguments have resulted in calls for a radical shift towards a re-conceptualisation of these theories. For example, Miall (2004:3) proposes a shift from *theories of conflict* to *theories of conflict-in-context*, arguing that in the “context of globalisation our analyses of conflict must give proper consideration to the social, regional and international context.” Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2011) also contend that the field of conflict resolution should include the following: first, it should be at *multi-level*, so that analysis and resolution has to embrace all levels of conflict from intra-personal to the complex interplay in the global world; second, it should be *multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural* within an intricate and interconnected local/global cultural environment; third, it should be *both analytical and normative*; and fourth, it should be both *theoretical and practical* as the field entails a constant mutual interplay between theory and practice.

There is no neat classification of theories dealing with sources of intrastate conflicts. Scholars have struggled to define those structural causes of violent conflict which situate the source of conflict within the socio-political structure (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1991; Keashly and Fisher, 1996) and to relate them to the nature of the protagonists’ and social-psychological conditions. Researchers have encountered difficulties in understanding and explaining the nature and sources of conflict. Michelle (2006) proposed an intermediate level, between social-psychological and structural causes, which tends to combine both factors. To date, most specialists in the conflict resolution field would confirm the existence of numerous actors and factors that need to be taken into account. Furthermore the actual analysis of the conflict has direct implications for conflict resolution approaches because the perception and definition of conflict determines the process and the method for how to deal with conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2011). For example, if violence is caused by structural factors then conflict resolution should focus on addressing issues of rights, justice, and political issues; however, if conflict is caused by psychocultural factors, then conflict resolution should emphasise relationship building and the need to work on eliminating misperceptions, fears, and
hostility between the groups (Michelle, 2006). When both the structural and the psychocultural factors are the root causes, there is a need for structural interventions alongside psychocultural interventions.

The following section briefly introduces Edward Azar’s analysis of “protracted social conflict”. Azar’s (1986, 1990) approach will serve as a key analytical tool for this study together with Lederach’s (1997) seminal work.

2.3 Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

Drawing upon an expansive and decades-long analysis of violent conflict in post-colonial countries, Azar (1990) presents the concept of protracted social conflict (PSC), as a model for understanding contemporary conflict in developing countries. Azar identifies four clusters of causes as the main source of protracted social conflict. These are “group identity”, “deprivation of human needs”, “governance and the state’s role”, and “international linkages” (1986:33-4). The model does not claim that there is a single and encompassing root of violence; rather, it emphasises that the source of PSC is predominantly within and across these four clusters of variables. The model also presents the systematic interdependence of the four clusters of variables, which, however, can be differentiated. Furthermore, these should be seen as interconnected and as both producing and reproduced by conflict. Azar’s (1990) PSC model is a product of multi-disciplinary traditions of conflict resolution ranging from Herbert Kelman to John Burton and Azar tries connecting with these. He makes continuous attempts to reconceptualise the root cause of contemporary conflict associated with interstate conflicts. Azar (1990) is thus concerned with responding to the challenges posed largely by a disproportionate pre-occupation with interstate war and nuclear stalemates that have obscured a proper understanding of prevailing social conflict.

What makes Azar’s (1990) PSC model relevant and appropriate for the prevailing patterns of conflict in post-colonial violent context are: (a) it gives a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the conflict; (b) it highlights the values of the factors and actors that constitute the conflict and that could alter the conflict situation, including the interests and capacities of third parties to influence it; (c) it identifies likely constraints on conflict resolution; and (d) explains how these might be overcome.
These four clusters identified by Azar (1990) as possible causes of protracted social conflict will be discussed in relation to this study.

### 2.3.1 “Group identity”

Azar’s (1986: 31) PSC analysis focuses on the nature of relationship between “identity groups” and the state. Azar uses the term “identity groups” to denote disadvantaged, marginalised and repressed social groups on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity and cultural group. When the societal needs of the identity groups such as security, identity, recognition and other needs are unmet and unsatisfied, then protracted social conflict is likely. According to PSC analysis, the nature of the relationship between identity groups and states is at the root of what Azar (1990: 7) called the “disarticulation between the state and society as a whole”. The state’s machinery is often dominated by one ethnic or religious group which controls and uses it to discriminate against other groups. For example, in Ethiopia the state apparatus has been largely controlled by the Amahra to the detriment of the other ethnic groups (Gebrewold, 2009). Thus the state’s failure to satisfy the basic needs of all and to mediate security, identity protection, breeds social fracture and protracted social conflict. The colonial powers supported one or the other group, and entrusted local political elites to take over the task of state-building after their departure (Doe, 2009). These groups have continued to dominate the politics and economy while excluding other groups and elites in the same country because of their cultural, religious or ethnic background (Gebrewold, 2009). For example, in Ethiopia, historically neglected or disadvantaged minority ethnic groups under authoritarian regimes (1974-1991) were fighting for cultural and political recognition and for local/ethnic identities and they have only recently acquired their cultural and political rights (Abbink, 2006).

Azar relates the disjuncture between state and society in many parts of the developing world to the political legacy of colonialism and to the collapse of the domestic government structure. It is no longer possible, Azar argues, to overlook the influence of the colonial legacy of “divide and rule” and artificially imposed territorial statehood. Colonialism abolished traditional institutions and undermined long-lasting traditional authority structures and social cohesion, thereby side-stepping indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. It is also not possible to ignore the social and political legacy of colonialism or the historical and cultural domination by “a single
communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society” which “strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict” (Azar, 1990: 7). Helland (1996) notes that the Borana and Somali ethnic problem derives from the imposition of boundaries which created obstacles to the pastoralists’ movements in search of pasture and water. The colonial powers incorporated different ethnic groups unequally into a divisive system of colonial power; for example, in Kenya where the Kikuyu were dominant and in Rwanda where the Tutsis were dominant or Sudan where the Arabs have dominated the politics and economy at the expense of the majority ethnic groups (Gebrewold, 2009). In Ethiopia, Bassi (1996) describes how the Italian colonial powers shaped the nature of conflict between the Somali Clans and the Borana Oromo. The Italian colonial structures recruited and armed local Ethiopian Somalis and encouraged groups of Garri and Mareexaan to join the other askari (African troops) attached to the Italian army which carried out the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 (Bassi, 2010). The Somali groups used this superior weaponry to expand southeast into Borana territory, thereby consolidating their control over water and pasture which until then had been Borana (Watson, 2001). Hence group identity or “ethnic identity” has been a key source of conflict in Ethiopia. However, the dominance of one group over the other is also linked to the fact that the stronger and more powerful group will control the resources.

2.3.2 “Deprivation of human needs”

Following Burton (1990), Azar (1990) identified the deprivation of human needs such as security needs, development needs, political access needs, and identity needs as one of the underlying sources of protracted social conflicts. He notes that unlike interests, needs are ontological and non-negotiable, so that, if conflict comes, it is likely to be protracted and often violent. Gebrewold (2009) notes that grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively in the form of civil disobedience and guerrilla war. Azar (1990:9) notes failure to redress these “grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict”. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2005) argue that dissatisfied groups come to articulate their grievances, mobilise, specify goals and strategies, and eventually mount a militarised challenge to existing state power-holders. This is clearly integral to the process of conflict formation, further exacerbated by historical animosity and contemporary resentment against the socio-cultural, economic and political constraints outlined in the previous section. Abbink
Keller (2002) and Clapham (2002), for instance, demonstrate how Ethiopian ethno-regional and autonomist movements of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and others moved from demands for political access and autonomy, through protest to outright rebellion in a demand for secession. This was the background to the liberation war from 1975 to 1991 culminating in Eritrean succession in 1991.

Azar (1990) views protracted conflict as being the result of distorted developments in society: whereas historical context and denial of basic human needs generate protracted conflict, it is made more destructive by exploitative patterns of development, a distorted pattern of governance and a militarised form of politics. The solution, from Azar’s point of view, entails reducing the level of underdevelopment and addressing the other clusters of fundamental needs, such as “good governance, civil politics, supportive international environment, accommodative state,” and democratic political confrontation by communal groups. Azar regards these as preconditions for resolving protracted conflicts (1990:155). Azar related this to an equally broad understanding of “development” and “political access”:

*Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term.* (1990: 155)

This view roughly coincides with Sen’s (1999) distinction between instrumental and substantive human freedoms. Conflict resolution tends to focus on addressing the first while remaining silent on the second. Its very notion hinges not only on an appeal to satisfying unmet human needs but also on the view that selective provision of these needs is not, and cannot be, a means of conflict transformation. Whatever promotes legitimate decision-making capacity, strengthens autonomous development, and sustains civil rather than military politics, is conducive to the meeting of basic needs/human development and can make conflict transformation possible. The Ethiopian context is a good example of how developmental requirements and security needs are still not being sufficiently addressed, perpetuating the dynamics of the conflict relationship.

### 2.3.4 “Governance and the role of the state”

Azar referred to a society in which the state has been “endowed with authority to govern and use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens, and to provide collective goods”.

He then cited “governance and the state’s role” as the critical factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity group needs. Azar (1990:10) takes a governance-oriented view of the sources of contemporary conflict and argues: “Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterised by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs”. A functioning state presupposes a centralised authority able to defend its territory from external aggression and to regulate conflicts within and between elites and economic groups. It should treat all members of the political community as equal citizens from a legal point of view and should deliver services and resources to the socio-cultural or ethnic groups. The failure of a state to provide these functions will greatly exacerbate conflict.

According to Clapham (2004), PSC is prevalent in Sudan, DRC and Ethiopia because of internal political, ethnic, and religious differences and because of their inability to establish institutions to moderate these differences. In short, Azar credits the emergence of protracted social conflict to the collapse of the domestic government structure.

At the state level, Azar (1986: 33-4) cites “highly centralised political structures as sources of conflict” because they “reduce the opportunity for a sense of community among groups”, increase alienation, and “tend to deny to groups the means to accomplish their needs”. He suggests a decentralised political system: “For conflicts to be enduringly resolved, appropriate decentralised structures are needed”. Any such system should “serve the psychological, economic and relational needs of groups and individuals within nation-states” (1986: 33-4). One ethnic group may perceive that state power has been permanently “captured” by another, and is therefore driven to challenge the legitimacy of the state in order to change the situation, as in multi-ethnic regions in Ethiopia. This has also been a feature in a number of ethnically heterogeneous countries, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya and Sri Lanka (Horowitz, 1997). Bermeo (2002) for instance, points to how centralised political systems in multi-ethnic nations have failed to meet minority demands for policy-making authority over education and language. She mentions political and economic discrimination as well as cultural grievances. Gurr (2000), Hechter (2000), and Stepan (1999) suggest a decentralised governance structure as a way to alleviate grievances and accommodate demands within the bounds of “normal” politics. Recently, federalism, together with other democratic reforms, has been conceived as one of the
institutional mechanisms to address and manage inter-ethnic or intra-state conflicts (Horowitz, 1997; Coakley, 2000; Hechter, 2000). For example, in Ethiopia, as indicated above, the EPRDF government ushered multi-ethnic federalism and decentralisation as ways of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy.

Azar also viewed the role of elites/individuals as a decisive factor in the formation as well as termination of conflicts and violence. At the elite/individual level, particularly in the context of an exclusionist political space, ruling elites generally favour the status quo and oppose changes that would reduce their power (Gebrewold, 2009). They manipulate the state apparatus in order to cling to power and block political access to all those who are not part of their own narrow patronage network. The absence of any power sharing arrangement, but with a strong patronage network, gives rise to “all-or-nothing” or “zero-sum game” power struggles (Bratton, 1989a). In this context, political demands are not mediated through formal political institutions. The dominant social group uses the “coercive repression” or “instrumental co-option” to deny political rights to ethnic majorities, usually through a restrictive franchise and emergency legislation (Bratton, 1989b). Ethnic nationalism thus becomes “persuasive” among the populace because it appeals to basic needs, historical grievances and contemporary resentments against socio-cultural injustice that perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict (Brown, 1996). This intensifies further as a political crisis spirals into war. Examples of this process include the Darfur rebels against the Sudanese government; the southern Sudanese against the Khartoum regime; numerous ethnic groups against the Amhara and Tigraians in Ethiopia; various armed and unarmed rebellions against Mobutu in Zaire; and various armed clan-based rebels since 1979 in Somalia (Gebrewold, 2009). All of these groups have been trying to change their society or state to their advantage.

Thus, Azar (1990) argues, ethnic relations can improve through the creation of a stable political order whereby the state’s institutions cannot be captured and controlled by opposing ethnic groups and those institutions cannot be turned into an instrument of ethnic favoritism or ethnic justice. However, the success of this approach relates to the nature and form of the reconstructed state. In short, the state cannot be used as an instrument of privilege for one group over another: inter-ethnic accommodation anywhere depends on a balance of power.
2.3.5 “International linkages”: Global and regional sources of contemporary conflict

Azar views “international linkages” as one of the four main clusters of variables making protracted social conflict prevalent in developing countries. According to Azar, these states experience protracted conflicts for two reasons: first, they are too dependent on the international economic system and the network of political-military linkages; second, they are too weak to contain the impact of regional and global sources of conflict. On one hand, Cold War competition funnelled Soviet and US military and development aid to their allies and fostered power struggles for local, regional and international hegemony (Geberewold, 2009). On the other hand, the end of superpower rivalry over the African continent weakened countries by the withdrawal of external subsidies and support (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005). As a result, governments are weak, borders are porous, and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons is easier across borders (Geberewold, 2009). This facilitates livestock raiding, exacerbating internal as well as regional security implications. For Rotberg (2004), Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, are unstable because of Cold War superpower rivalry and subsequent militarisation of the region. These factors contributed to civil and interstate wars, leading to displacement, refugees, famine and hunger as well as to state weakness and collapse.

Furthermore, some states destabilize their neighbours and contribute to their own destabilization (Geberewold, 2009). For example, according to Tadesse (2007), states such as Sudan and Eritrea increased their military support to rival proxies in Somalia and Southern Sudan, thus spreading instability to the Somali-Borana and Gambella borders of Ethiopia. Tadesse (2007) suggests that the neglect of local and regional actors in Sudan and Somalia has considerably damaged various peace efforts in the Somali-Borana and Gambella borders of Ethiopia. In the global war on terror, Western powers need Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s cooperation in the search for Islamic militants in Eastern Africa (Geberewold, 2009). This means that these countries are increasingly becoming key players in the systemic security apparatus of the Horn of Africa region and in its geopolitics. Therefore, the role of global and regional factors is significant for understanding the prevalence of PSC in these states (Azar, 1990).
In conclusion, this section has outlined a framework for the analysis of contemporary conflict that draws on Edward Azar’s account of protracted social conflict, and then proceeds to “update” it via a “levels of analysis” approach at international, state and sub-state levels.

The following section will focus on conflict resolution approaches that could address the root causes of protracted social conflict.

2.4 Conflict Resolution Approaches

Numerous approaches have evolved out of theoretical assumptions concerning the origins, nature, and dynamics of conflict. Depending on the perceived cause of a particular conflict, conflict resolution may be seen to be structural change at state level, or relational change at conflict party level, or cultural change at all levels. Burton (1990), Azar (1990), Kelman (1991) and Fisher (1997) provide an “interactive conflict resolution approach” aimed at promoting dialogue and creating a favourable atmosphere for the adversaries to overcome “the incompatible beliefs” and transform conflict-habituated systems. In his efforts to increase emphasis on the importance of indigenous resources and local actors, Lederach (1997) presents an “indigenous empowerment approach” that is attentive to short-term and long-term resolution processes. In being critical of the liberal peace intervention with its emphasis on the perspective approach, Richmond and Mitchell (2012: 8-9) suggest “Hybrid Forms of Peace”, that focus on identifying the needs and interests of local individuals and groups, as these issues are often obscured by the prescriptive approach. Focusing on the conflicting parties and the grass-roots, Rupesinghe (1995), Burton (1990) and Azar (1990) also suggest the multi-track conflict resolution approach. The approaches relevant to this research relate to the work of Azar (1990), Burton (1990), Curle (1991) and Lederach (1995a) and as such, suggest a combination of conflict resolution strategies aimed at institutional, group, community and societal levels.

2.4.1 Indigenous empowerment: Empowerment of Indigenous Actors/Institutions

Within the framework of “peacebuilding from below”, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999: 18) underlined the shift in emphasis away from viewing “third-party intervention” as the primary responsibility of external agencies such as NGOs, and towards appreciating the role of indigenous peacebuilding agents. This shift plays a crucial role in addressing what Lederach
(1995a) calls a “cultural gap” in conflict resolution. The outcome of ensuring a successful conflict resolution intervention is a central pre-occupation of “indigenous empowerment”. Firstly, there is a strong tendency to see conflict transformation as a direct outcome of the involvement of local parties with “external agencies supporting and nurturing domestic peace constituencies, developing peace institutions and eliciting culturally sensitive approaches to peace processes” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005: 19). Secondly, the local agencies are seen to represent the proactive side of the intervention and the external agents its passive side. Thus, without reconstructing the local capacity and culture for peacebuilding, there could be no meaningful project and therefore no concrete programme for conflict transformation.

Drawing on Freire’s (1993) notion of a “consciousness-raising” approach, both Curle (1994) and Lederach (1997) have tried to make the case for indigenous empowerment for peacebuilding. Curle (1996) consciously seeks to move away from his original view of “soft muscle” mediation by third party intervention at a Track One level to an empowering approach: “Context-sensitive and which works to empower civil society and to deepen its capacity for non-violent social change” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005: 218). From recent practical experience in Central America, Lederach (1995b, 1997) also starts out with the “bottom up” approach, which underscores “indigenous empowerment for equal rights of self-development” through active participation in the collective decision-making that affects the lives of communities. It should be noted that the distinguishing feature of this model is not simply its support of indigenous empowerment; instead, its main characteristic is the assertion of a positive relationship between “self-development of the people/liberating human potential” and transcending asymmetric violence. Secondly, the model recognises the principle of indigenous empowerment that leads to ownership, people’s agency, and structural transformation (Lederach, 2001).

Lederach contends:

_The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the people in it as the ‘problem’ and the outsiders as the ‘answer’. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting._ (Lederach, 1995b: 212)
The emphasis on empowering local citizens is “to enable the people to articulate those needs and to provide them with capacities and skills to address those needs”; this ultimately increases the control that individuals have over their collective futures (O’Brien, 2009: 43). Furthermore, Miall (2004: 5) argues that if protagonists can be “empowered to explore, analyse, question and reframe their positions and interests”, then it is possible for them to address and transcend the deep-rooted sources of conflicts. For these theorists, conflict resolution is about how parties can move from the perceived “irreconcilable”, zero-sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive outcomes.

Lederach’s (1997) approach has implications for reinvigorating the long-standing reciprocal and dialectical interdependence among ethnic groups in protracted conflicts. For example, Bassi (2010) and Pavanello (2009) note that the current Ethiopian Constitutional arrangement for the ethnic groups has resulted in the de-legitimising of customary institutions into modern governance, particularly in the pastoral area of the Borana. These indigenous practices were sidelined and their potential for resolving conflict was weakened.

Enhancing the capacity of indigenous institutions and actors to address and manage resource-based conflicts through development-related interventions is of critical importance. Furthermore, in the context of the new political narrative of “exclusive ethnic space” the ethnic groups enter into conflict not only because of the erosion of customary laws that legitimise and govern resource rights, but also because of the deterioration of effective means of regulating inter-ethnic relations (Bassi, 2010; Scott-Villiers et al., 2011). In other words, any breakdown in communication reduces social interaction between antagonists; disputes are then less regulated and more likely to escalate because parties come to view themselves as being in a zero-sum relationship (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005). Thus, Lederach’s approach could help to rebuild strong cross-ethnic bonds of trust, cooperation and solidarity, thereby ameliorating potentially volatile situations and creating conditions for successful development.

It has been suggested that any intervention by an NGO in conflict resolution is contingent upon the nature and stages of the conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005: 12). It is suggested that the primary role of an NGO in this situation should be to identify the “ripe moment” (Zartman, 1986) for intervening with conflict resolution procedures (Fisher and
Keashly, 1991). Thus, interventions by NGOs play a complementary role in conflict transformation at all levels: this could reduce the incidence of violence, initiate cross-border communications and improve the quality of judicial proceedings (Michelle, 2006).

The extent to which a given NGO’s “indigenous empowerment” projects contribute towards conflict transformation in practice will be the focus of the fieldwork undertaken in this research. The following section outlines Lederach’s (1997) peacebuilding pyramid model, seen in conjunction with other models.

2.4.2 Multi-track conflict resolution approach in protracted social conflict

Conflict resolution in Ethiopia at all levels has always taken place within a highly politicised landscape. Specifically, political negotiation among political parties has focused on influential politicians with less involvement of the Track Two approaches (middle-range leadership community) and even less about Track Three initiatives (indigenous resources and local actors). Given the history of coercive political negotiations at the top-level, it is not surprising if Track Two and Track Three initiatives are viewed as having “less real power” and influence on the dynamics of peacebuilding and negotiations. Nonetheless, most of the Track One peace settlements have failed to control protracted conflicts let alone build a sustainable lasting peace. The political negotiations between two ethnic-based regional parties in the Gambella Regional State is a good example of how state-centric top-down dialogues among political leaders often fail to address the root causes and sources that generate conflict. The top-level peace process was challenged from the very beginning and was not accepted by various factions, notably by the Anywaa (discussed in detail in the following chapter). The peace process was useful for obtaining a temporary peace, but it typically did not address the underlying grievances held by victimized communal groups. Thus it becomes increasingly important to empower such communities to undertake their own conflict resolution initiatives.

During the past few decades, the “multi-track/multi-level” conflict resolution approach has been advanced as a leading alternative to the “top down/trickle down” approach (Lederach, 1997:45). Lederach (2003), Rupesinghe (1996), Aall (1996), Burton (1990) and Azar (1990) make major contributions in shifting the analytical emphasis from the “simple” one-dimensional intervention
to a “hybrid”\textsuperscript{5} and “eclectic” approach that embraces multi-track interventions. These interventions range from the elite’s formal agreement to participatory local knowledge and wisdom for empowerment, from short-term to long-term development framework, and from an outsider’s neutral approach towards a partnership with local actors. From this shift stemmed two major contributions to the core construct of a contemporary conflict resolution approach. The first major contribution is a shift in emphasis of peacebuilding processes from Track One (a state-centric top-down approach) to include Track Two (non-official) and Track Three (indigenous and grass-roots) initiatives (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005). The second contribution was that interventions by third parties increased emphasis on the importance of indigenous resources and local actors, and led to strengthening of local capacities for indigenous conflict resolution. Therefore, to ensure successful conflict resolution intervention in the face of growing conflict with accompanying conflict transformation, a “multi-track/multi-level” approach became a central pre-occupation of the conflict resolution approach.

Burton’s (1990) and Azar’s (1990) “problem-solving approach”, and Curle’s (1991) “soft negotiation/mediation approach” both seek to create an enabling atmosphere and to promote dialogue for middle-range leaders such as religious, academic, and NGO leaders involved in Track Two initiatives. At this level, third parties may use Boulding’s (1989) “integrative power” to work with constituencies to initiate development projects aimed at long-term problem-solving and intended to erode the culture of violence and sustain the peace processes on the ground. Track Three initiatives focus on promoting transformative dialogues, educational initiatives and conflict resolution training programmes for grass-roots leaders; for example, local leaders and leaders of indigenous institutions. Lederach (1997) contends that with the emphasis on “bottom-up” processes, the “middle-range leaders” can serve to link “top-level” and grass-roots levels. Track Two initiatives can facilitate both the vertical and horizontal flow of information/communication for the parties or their constituencies. Track Two actors should be proactive in order to provide a vertical linkage between different communication spheres and a horizontal linkage between competing issues. The easiest way to effect this synthesis of “a pyramidal organisation” for conflict transformation, it turns out, would be to rely on the coordinated “horizontal” and “vertical” relationships across the three levels to operate by

\textsuperscript{5} According to Mac Ginty (2010) hybrid peace approach refers to the interaction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” peace initiatives that may draw on traditional, indigenous and customary practice.
“pyramidal participation”. Thus Lederach’s solution is the organisation and coordination of genuine participation by multi-track/multi-level parties.

There is evidence that suggests that NGOs operating in both the Gambella and Borana regions adopted a combination of Track Two and Track Three approaches in dealing with their protracted social conflicts. Empirical evidence from the field indicates coordinated “horizontal” and “vertical” relationships across the three levels that adapted to effect “pyramidal participation”. More will be said about this in Chapter Five. The following section deals rather broadly with an “interactive conflict resolution approach” that aims to foster the psychological and political preconditions necessary for peaceful conflict transformation.

2.4.3 “Interactive conflict resolution approach”

The “Interactive conflict resolution approach” was originally called the “subjectivist controlled communication and problem-solving approach” that is closely linked to the works of contingency theorists such as Azar (1990), Burton (1990), Kelman (1991) and Keashly and Fisher (1996). The problem-solving approach is based on a “human needs” analysis and is primarily a social-psychological intervention for addressing protracted conflict (Fisher, 1997). It aims at promoting dialogue and creating a favourable atmosphere that provides the adversaries an opportunity “to search for mutually acceptable outcomes to apparently intractable conflict” at the intermediate or grass-roots levels of divided societies (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005:288). Most recently, in the field of conflict resolution, this interactive conflict resolution approach has incorporated problem-solving activities. For example, Fisher (1997:4) defines this interactive conflict resolution approach as “facilitated activities in communication, training, education or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis, resolution and problem-solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner which addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality”. Fisher’s interactive conflict resolution approach strives to address entrenched patterns that characterise “conflict habituated systems” (Diamond, 1997). It should empower trainees to explore, analyse and reframe their interests (Chigas, 1997), and create an enabling environment for negotiation (Lederach, 1997). It should also increase tolerance and reduce prejudice, thereby transforming attitudes and perceptions and building trust (Fisher, 1997).
Azar’s (1990) PSC model indicates that no conflict can be solved if the negotiation process focuses mainly on a “just” distribution of the contested or scarce material resources. Most of the time, traditional approaches to interstate conflicts focus too much on the contested material resources while ignoring the social-psychological aspect of protracted conflict, thus making traditional conflict resolution strategies ineffectual (Michelle, 2006). Azar (1990) suggests a Track Two approach that entails bringing parties together in an unofficial face-to-face environment where they explore each other’s need for recognition and acceptance. In a similar vein, Jordan and Hartling (2002) places the emphasis on the “relational-cultural factors” that help to shift the discourse from a single worldview of justice and move towards a more relational language of mutual empowerment. In order to move the peace process forward, these writers insist upon increasing the level of trust between the antagonists by addressing mutual needs and fears, employing confidence-building measures, and actively mediating with third parties. For example, Bassi (2010) and Adunga (2010) argue that the Somali-Borana conflict cannot be solved by the government’s referendum approach to the Somali-Borana border demarcation. The conflict between these ethnic groups involves psychological issues, such as diverging identity discourse based on indigeneity, the livelihoods system, as well as the entitlements and citizenship of both peoples going back to the colonial period.

NGOs operating in the Borana and Gambella areas brought together individuals from opposing groups and offered them conflict resolution training aimed at “individual empowerment”; this entailed building conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem-solving skills, identifying conflict-connectors and dividers skills, and human rights awareness. These skills are all important in supporting inter-group tolerance and building trust in areas of protracted social conflict where noticeable support for inter-group trust is lacking. Bassi (2010) and Scott-Villiers et al. (2011) emphasise the disintegration of long-standing cross-cutting bonds as a principal cause of conflict in the pastoralist communities of Borana. Therefore, building integrative ties and establishing relationships and mutual interests were of critical importance. These steps are important not only for breaking set patterns of conflicting behaviours and addressing the dynamics of conflict, but also for empowering parties to negotiate joint and mutually beneficial solutions. Rebuilding the long-standing cross-cutting linkages plays a pivotal role in supporting
collective tenure, customary and territorial rights, customary law, governance and leadership. These issues will be further discussed in subsequent chapters.

2.4.4 “Conflict resolution and development”

In addition to promoting “relationship-building”, Burton (1990) emphasises the importance of satisfying basic needs in order to address the economic causes of deep-rooted conflicts. In developing his understanding of PSC, Azar (1990) associated protracted conflict with exploitative patterns of development and communal discrimination. For Azar, effective conflict transformation requires addressing the structural inequalities and the deprivation of basic human needs; this step contributes towards security, identity and other developmental requirements. There is a growing body of conflict resolution literature which demonstrates a conceptual synergy between development and conflict resolution theories as a strategic model in addressing PSC (see, for example, Lederach 1997, 1995a; Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Curle, 1991). Drawing on this idea of convergence, O’Brien (2009) suggests a critical peace building approach that incorporates both community development and conflict resolution initiatives for communities marked by protracted conflict. Recent empirical research conducted by O’Brien (2009) in South Africa and Northern Ireland clearly demonstrates how development NGOs integrated conflict resolution strategies and how conflict resolution NGOs integrated development strategies in their interventions. In Ethiopia, the identity of minorities and rights of groups are largely safeguarded in the Constitution. However, the on-going socio-economic deprivation of the vast majority, as well as their chronic vulnerability to drought, and limited access to scarce natural resources and deprivation of basic needs are still not being sufficiently addressed. Referring to the link between levels of economic underdevelopment and violent conflict, Collier (2007) and Homer-Dixon (1995) suggest that socio-economic diversification and increased economic growth have the potential to reduce poverty and inequalities which will in turn reduce the conflict. For example, Scott-Villiers et al. (2011) and Pavanello (2009) note that conflicts in the pastoralist communities of Ethiopia are primarily caused by economic marginalisation, economic inequality and deterioration of their livelihoods rather than by ethnic diversity. Their research is based on the assumption that many of these NGOs operating in the study areas have incorporated peacebuilding components into their development programmes and have made significant contributions towards addressing the economic cause of protracted conflicts. The possibility of
practical impacts on the beneficiaries’ lives, livelihoods and inter-group conflicts will be the focus of the empirical work of this study.

The following section will be concerned with the controversy surrounding conflict resolution initiatives. It will look at the limitations of “indigenous empowerment”, multi-track, the interactive conflict resolution as well as the development initiatives as approaches for peace in contemporary conflicts. It also alludes to the structure/agency debate and the importance of analysing power dynamics.

2.4.5 Critique of conflict resolution approaches: limitations concerning the indigenous empowerment, multi-track, and the interactive conflict resolution initiatives

First, generally speaking, the field of conflict resolution has always been contentious, inviting criticism from realists who see the field as “soft-headed” and theoretically uncritical for not placing a greater focus on power and coercion (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2011). The realists critiqued the “soft-power” approaches of conflict resolution as being unrealistic, or as a combination of an idealistic and ahistorical account of the state-building process. Drawing on historical cases of state formation and state building in Europe and Asia, Fukuyama (2004) and Carothers (2003) argue that violence has always been a key ingredient. Fukuyama (2004) describes post-colonial states ridden with protracted conflict as “early modern autocratic stage” and in need of strong state institutions that would guarantee peace and security leading to social and economic development. Gebrewold (2009) highlights the hard power of the state as being indispensable for a successful peace process. For instance, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2011) note the decisive military victory against Tamil military resistance by the government forces in Sri Lanka in 2009. This is seen by realists as evidence for hard power. Looking at the Gambella case where the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), known as Mekelakeya, often intervened to manage and de-escalate conflict, Feyissa (2009) also validates the coercive power of the state in the de-escalation of conflict and bringing temporary peace. Young (1999) notes how the power of the EFDRE settled the power struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable ethnic groups of Gumuz and Berta of the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State.

State intervention is important given the intractability of conflicts that often spread quickly and reach across wide areas of the region. Even where there has been relative stability, the presence
of the military continues to play a critical role in preventing, containing and ending violent conflict. For instance, the federal government has placed Mekelakeya to contain the recurrent outbreaks of violence between intra-Oromo and non-Oromo ethnic groups in the Borana Zone. The federal government is also a major player in influencing the outcome of political negotiations to the extent that it exerts pressure on antagonists and alters the power balance through positive and negative inducements.

As noted above, the theories and practices of conflict resolution approaches recognise the role of the state in “guaranteeing” peace and security. In the case of Ethiopia, Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) argue that reliance on the coercive power of the state alone is inadequate. These writers claim that even though state institutions will need to have a greater coercive capacity, the effect of coercion will erode over time, and it is better to attempt to influence the behaviour of people in conflict situations by the use of the “carrot rather than the stick”. Thus while coercion can restrain violence at least temporarily, it cannot promote lasting peace. A durable peace requires not only the cessation of violence but more, crucially it needs, “bottom-up” peacebuilding. Furthermore, neither customary nor state institutions hold the monopoly of “rights” or “justice” in the pastoralist areas of Borana and Gambella. These institutions are both very active and operational, but with varying degrees of legitimacy in this jurisdiction (See, section, 5.5:131-148). On one hand, the structural incapacity of the state’s judicial and military systems has rendered them less effective in shaping the dynamics of local conflict. On the other hand, it is far more difficult for indigenous institutions to deal effectively with “political” causes of conflict such as conflict over political boundaries, representation and power. Undoubtedly, customary institutions complement the emasculated state structure and could help it to consolidate its institutional capacity. Likewise, Track Two and Track Three initiatives may not completely replace the government role nor could they contain external factors. Instead, they are well placed to complement and assist the peace process by bringing together political elites and community leaders of conflicting parties to explore their grievances (Michelle, 2006). Thus a call is needed for incorporating a hybrid model that combines Track Two and Track Three initiatives for post-conflict rebuilding in protracted conflict areas, especially in Ethiopia.

Second, “indigenous empowerment” initiatives have also received their share of critiques. For example, Watson (2003) notes that such initiatives ignore the significant asymmetry between
conflict groups that determines differential access to resources thus excluding and marginalising some groups. Looking at *aada seera Borana* (Borana laws) that govern resource sharing arrangements between the Borana and Garri Somali ethnic groups, Oba (1996:131) documents contrasting interpretations of the *aada seera Borana*. For the Borana, the law was “designed to protect resource for a common good” and can only work as long as the so-called “guest inhabitants” (those who are not the indigenous Borana but who have been given permission through indigenous mechanisms) accept *aada seera Borana* and recognise its common customs and laws. For the Garri, the customs and laws, which the Borana alone fully understood, are meant to maintain the status quo by controlling access to resources to their own advantage. Therefore, for the Garri, the reinvigoration of these rules and their extension to the ethnic groups is simply reinforcing the Borana hegemony and institutions that “produces and reproduces violence”. Similarly, Muir (2007) expresses the concern that without mobilising cross-ethnic consent in the affected society, such initiatives will be perceived more as an imposition than a compromise. It is therefore necessary to analyse how the use of indigenous institutions might affect the needs of all groups in the future, especially if it continues to be seen as pursuing inequitable justice and accentuating the ethnic divide. The first great merit of Watson’s (2003) and Muir’s (2007) critiques is that they directed attention to the need to study the institutionalised and asymmetric power relations in order to prevent the perpetuation of violence.

In a similar vein, Doe (2009) observed uncritical resourcing of “indigenous processes” which may turn out to epitomise transparent mechanisms for perpetuating local systems of oppression, exclusion and exploitation. Indigenous structures were largely exclusive, “often nostalgic and inimical to minorities, women and justice”. In the case study of Borana institutions, Muir (2007) points out indigenous women were not included in the primary structures of decision-making in natural resource management and conflict resolution institutions. As a result, “indigenous empowerment” initiatives reflect the resurrection of this aspect of traditional patriarchal culture in modern Borana society. Another limitation of indigenous empowerment is that some observers perceive that for all their “idealisation” and potential for conflict resolution, there is still doubt whether these institutions have the legitimacy and capacity to respond to contemporary conflicts. For instance, Bassi (2010) notes the challenge for the Borana indigenous institutions to cope with the change in the nature and magnitude of local conflicts that has
outstripped those institutions’ capacity to manage and contain these conflicts, thereby generating
instability. In a comparable way, Watson (2003) is equally sceptical of the potential of
indigenous institutions to cope with conflict emanating from natural resource management as
well as indigenous capacity for development.

Jabri (1996) and others in the conflict resolution field, have been highly critical of many of the
ways in which third party organisations respond to a crisis. Fetherston (2000), for example,
points out that contemporary conflicts have been analysed in isolation with asymmetric power
relations, thereby obscuring the role of domination and social exclusion that generate and
perpetuate violence. “Third parties attempting mediation” might reinforce and reproduce
asymmetrical relationships (Jabri, 1996:198). In doing so, they may unconsciously interpret
conflict through the dominant discourse and design its resolution accordingly, and they may
simply “reproduce the exclusionist, violent discourse and practices which perpetuate it” (Jabri,
1996: 181). In the case study of the Borana institutions, for example, Watson (2003: 307)
expresses the concern that “the focus on the Borana institution might cause the need of other
ethic groups in the region to be overlooked, and might create inequalities and exclusion, and
exacerbate tension”. In the same way, Abbink (2006) argues that the effort to contain conflict
through indigenous empowerment could overshadow the search for its underlying cause in
contemporary conflict in Ethiopia. Fetherston (2000) urges development agencies to adopt
measures to analyse the structure of relationships that generate conflict, and then transform the
structure by empowering the weaker party.

The Borana and Gambella experience in Ethiopia illustrates the importance of analysing the
discourse that legitimises and encourages reciprocal killings and cattle rustling, leading to
counter raids and attacks. Such an analysis can change negative conflict attitudes at grass-roots
level, and can pave the way to reconstruct an independent counter-discourse that promotes non-
violence (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011).

However, the normative stances of conflict resolution strategies have been challenged on the
grounds that these have some major defects. A big part of the challenge that the third party
approach faces is that it does not limit the scope of its application and feasibility for a
complementary range of third party interventions (Fisher, 2001). This stance is also profoundly
indifferent to the ability of the third parties to engage the conflicting parties and get them to debate on “deep political disagreements” on equal terms (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005:301). Torell (1999) agrees that the capacity to participate in decision-making hinges on institutionalised opportunities for discursive challenges and a critical political culture. However, Warren (1996) argues that it is possible to empower individuals while also denying them power over others though distribution of scarce resources. Furthermore, although the normative stance is able to identify those actors central to the incidence of violence, it has a strong tendency to assume that these actors have the “will and interests” to stop such violence. Nevertheless, this could only be accomplished, Jabri (1996), argues, by a change to the existing power structure following the overturn of asymmetric power arrangements.

Finally, another criticism of interactive conflict resolution is that it has focused on the short-term or immediate impact on attitudes and on positive change at the personal level. Positive inter-group changes are less likely to translate into action at the grass-roots level. Also, this approach looks at behavioural tendencies rather than actual behaviour; deeply prejudiced people tend to avoid inter-group contact (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998; Tam et al., 2009; Malhotra and Liyanage, 2005). Setting controversies aside, there is growing evidence to suggest that inter-group contact has made some inroads into breaking set patterns of conflicting behaviour by offering opportunities for building cross-ethnic ties. Fisher (1997) argues that inter-group contact should be seen as one element of a multi-level and multi-faceted peacebuilding process. It should also be seen as an instrument to complement broad-spectrum peacebuilding processes. Inter-group contact platforms are particularly well suited for communicating the deliberations of key actors and affecting public opinion. Furthermore, choosing key actors rather than ordinary people is believed to have a discernible effect on peace. There is a special reason for this: what distinguishes key actors from nonparticipants is that they are people or groups with a significant influence over the conflict dynamics. They can strongly influence decisions for or against peace, and can “spoil” or undermine peace. By engaging these key actors in the inter-group contact programme, while at the same time exhibiting the attributes and the needs of their corresponding ethnic groups, they could be a link to the broader community (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011). This is what makes them suitable as a linkage between the two. These key actors are part
of a chain that runs from grass-roots through key figures and the “bottom-up” process to the officials of government’ (Lawson, 1988).

Further discussion of the role of indigenous resources and the role of the NGO sector as part of civil society will take place in the following section.

2.5 Indigenous Institutions, development and peacebuilding

This section discusses the following: theorising indigenous institutions, the role of the NGO sector in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and finally, the nature of the relationship between the State and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

Historically, development and peacebuilding have been treated as distinct disciplinary areas, with their own practice, relevance, discourse, and impact on social contexts. However, in recent years there have been attempts to understand their convergence, interaction, and how they could be integrated to contribute towards a more sustainable peace and long-term development in conflict-prone areas (see, for example, Goodhand and Lewer, 1999; Watson, 2001). In the development field, questions have been raised about the capacity of development agencies to bring about longer-term and sustainable development, and their capacity to respond to development-related conflicts without harnessing institutional capacities of indigenous institutions and entering into “genuine” partnerships for bottom-up development (Bush, 1998; Goodhand and Lewer, 1999; Watson, 2001). Theorists on conflict resolution have been critical about the need to consider indigenous institutions and the importance of “peace-building from below” which involves building on local agents and indigenous resources (Aall, 1996; Lederach, 1997; Galtung, 1996; Fisher, 1997). In practice, and instead of focusing on each of these aspects in isolation, there have been attempts to integrate them. For example, development organisations operating in areas of protracted conflict are integrating indigenous institutions into development and conflict resolution initiatives.

The underlying assumption is that integrated conflict resolution and development initiatives built on local agents and indigenous resources at grass-roots could contribute towards a more sustainable peace in societies experiencing protracted conflict. This assumption is grounded in actual practice in the field and in previous research (Goodhand and Lewer, 1999; Watson, 2001;
Lederach, 1995a; Bebbington, 1994; Uphoff, 1996; Bush, 1998; O’Brien, 2009). These themes are at the interface between two areas of work: indigenous institutions and the NGOs’ roles in conflict resolution and development studies. The following section briefly examines the concepts of institutions, NGOs and civil society and their interface in the context of protracted social conflict.

2.5.1 Conceptualising indigenous institutions

It has long been accepted that customary institutions have not just experienced difficulties in resolving disputes and maintaining order because of the “irrationality of the disorder”, but also because of a weakening of their institutional capacity to handle disputes and maintain pre-existing institutional equilibrium for peace and security (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011:5). Moreover, the failure of “state-centric” and top-down development practices, which were technology driven, resulted in serious environmental degradation and the undermining of livelihoods, thereby forcing renewed interest in local institutions and wisdom (Oba, 1998; Tache and Bassi, 2011). The terms “indigenous empowerment” and “social bridging” have been coined in order to draw attention to the importance of local organisational capacity, and have been portrayed as “the missing link” between the local community and development agents in development and conflict resolution (Lederach, 1995; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997; Watson, 2001). Conflict resolution theorists including Lederach (1995b, 1997, 2005), Azar (1990), Aall (1996), Fisher (1997) and Diamond (1997), have all highlighted the significance of indigenous “resources” and their empowerment roles in ownership, people’s agency, and conflict transformation. In the fields of development studies (Watson, 2001, 2003; Leach et al., 1997) and anthropology (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011; Bassi, 2010), attempts have been made to study the convergence among indigenous institutions in the areas of conflict resolution and participatory community-based development. In the current climate of protracted social conflict, with an increased awareness of the role played by indigenous actors and institutions, and their potential for sustainable livelihoods and development, indigenous empowerment has become even more important. Thus, an increasing number of development thinkers and conflict resolution theorists have recently taken up the task of conceptualising and analysing indigenous institutions, and their role in maintaining peace and order. They are also examining the way in which they are used by
different development agents in the region as building blocks for conflict resolution and community-based development.

North (1990:3) defines institutions as setting “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction… [which] define and limit the set of choices of individuals”. Leach et al. (1997:26), writing from an “environmental entitlement framework”, which is a framework for conceptualising society-environment relations, define institutions as “regularised patterns of behaviour that emerge from underlying structure set of rules in use…rules are constantly made and remade through people’s practice”. More recently, Watson (2003), from a natural resource management perspective, defines institutions as having authority to rule and regulate daily behaviours and practices, and to determine individuals’ or groups’ inclusion in or exclusion from rights or entitlements; they regulate conflicts within or between socio-cultural or ethnic groups. Watson (2001) further argues that institutions are more important than determining who should participate in and contribute to social order, and benefit from the resources. An institution comprises a set of rules, practices and group identities, as well as decision-making groups that claim jurisdiction over a given natural resource, including a monopoly over coercion and extraction, for the sake of social order (Smith, 1994). In order to maintain order and establish lasting security it exercises powers over all the people within its jurisdiction (Oba, 1996).

From this viewpoint, indigenous institutions include informal organisations, indigenous practices and knowledge, and regularised practice, customary rules and regulations relating to access to resources. They are dynamic rather than static, and continuously integrate new information from external sources (Watson, 2003; Homann, 2004). Within indigenous institutions, indigenous knowledge is characterised by elements of “ecological particularism”, generated in a local natural environment and under specific environmental relationships, and internalised in culture and practices (Gadgil et al., 1993). Moreover, indigenous knowledge is a “cultural heritage”, being experienced, tested, and transformed by a given community over time, and when transmitted to the next generation it secures the reproduction of social reality (Brookensha et al., 1980). The bearers of indigenous knowledge are indigenous people who share common knowledge, common culture, and common language and who recognise common customs and laws that regulate and govern their relationships (Goemans, 2006: 27). Therefore, indigenous
Institutions constitute an important component in maintaining order and stability as well as development because they are formalised and have the ordered organisational capability needed to pursue collective goals in a predictable and coherent way (Oba, 1996).

In recent years there has been a growing interest in using indigenous institutions as a “bridge” to community development and conflict resolution because they are a “ready-made” apparatus for participatory development (Watson, 2001:15). They promote participatory and sustainable development (Watson, 2001; Chambers et al., 1989). For instance, the Borana indigenous institutions and their knowledge systems embodied a higher degree of grass-roots participation in development. NGOs have been making use of the structure as a “ready-made” apparatus for launching participatory development (Watson, 2001, 2003). Moreover, they argue that the Borana indigenous practices and knowledge are enormously adaptive to precarious and changing environments (Watson, 2001). Watson (2003), writing from a natural resource management perspective, highlighted the potential of the Borana indigenous water and pastoral practices. The interest in these institutions was increased further in the early 1990s, when development agents were disillusioned with the state’s institutional incapacity as a “partner in development” and the failure of top-down development practices. These agents were forced to search for alternative institutions to carry out development (Watson, 2003; Harrison, 2002). Additionally, disenchantment with the state’s failure to govern effectively and to deliver services and resources to the peripheries compelled some commentators to suggest that indigenous institutions were better positioned to empower people to increase their opportunities (Bebbington, 1994).

However today, the indigenous institutions are deteriorating. For example, during the last thirty years the deeply-rooted and indigenous management of natural resources, by the Borana pastoralists, experienced severe external disturbances (Homann, 2004). Whereas a deterioration or lack of capacity undermines the capacity of institutions to provide a tool for participatory development, limited social capital decreases the success, sustainability and appropriateness of development projects. Thus a call is needed to revitalise the institutional and “ideological” capacities of indigenous institutions and to enter into “genuine” partnerships with particular emphasis on the significance of “bottom-up” processes.
A big part of the challenge is how to reinvigorate institutional capacities, and to transcend the conditions that undermine their potential to promote proactive responses, manage conflict, and positively transform disputes (Onwuka, 2009). A further challenge is in combining traditional resolution mechanisms with other processes of promoting transitional justice (Minja, 2009). This process involves empowering the existing socio-political institutions, creating coalitions of various social groups and bridging the differences between the many disadvantaged groups (Katz, 2006). What forces if any, can strengthen and propel institutions forward to peace and development? Many would argue that community based NGOs as well as international NGOs could make a difference.

2.5.2 The role of NGOs in conflict resolution/peacebuilding

NGOs can fill a gap in service delivery and strengthen indigenous institutions for peacebuilding because they view indigenous institutions and their conflict strategies as primary resources for conflict resolution and development; they encourage stakeholders to take up the task of peacebuilding in their own hands (Aall, 1996). According to Katz (2006), NGOs are a significant part of civil society. As indicated in Chapter One, the NGO sector includes non-state and non-market associations, groupings, trade unions, churches, educational and cultural associations; all of these engage to express their fundamental rights (Moen, 1998). Fowler (1991) argues that the political role of NGOs within civil society, their “symbiotic association” with the grass-roots level and their cultural as well as social capital allow them to play intermediary roles as “agents of change” and “catalysts for peacebuilding from below”. By virtue of their existence as autonomous actors and their democratic approach (Bratton, 1989a, 1990; Diamond, 1994), it is argued that NGOs could bolster civil society and reinvigorate grass-roots organisations, thus becoming the driving forces in the democratisation processes, decentralisation and empowerment of the poor and marginalised. They are primed to occupy the political vacuum left by a diminished state.

Globally, after 1991, NGOs became increasingly involved in democratisation and peacebuilding processes in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. This was accompanied by renewed interest in the role of NGOs (Paffenholz, 2004). Whilst NGOs have been actors in conflict prevention and resolution for several decades, international debates on their role in conflict resolution started to
burgeon in the early 1990s (Orjuela, 2005; Aall, 1996; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006). Aall (1996) argues that after many years of being overlooked by powerful states and international organisations, NGOs are now believed to be capable of facilitating peace and reconciliation at grass-roots level in societies split by ethnic or religious conflict. The United Nations (UN), for instance, recognised the peacebuilding contributions of regional organisations and NGOs and civil society groups in the early 1990s. NGOs can be involved in conflict prevention by addressing the deeper structural issues and conditions that are most often at the root of conflict. They can also address the fears and misunderstandings between different communities, and initiate and facilitate dialogues and uphold accepted solutions. Aall (2001) argues that if a culture of conflict prevention is going to be inculcated into the international community’s collective security agenda, there is a need for increased emphasis on the importance of indigenous resources and greater partnership with local actors. In this regard, the concept of “partnership” has become useful because it is closely associated with a people-centered approach, involving indigenous empowerment, greater cultural sensitivity and self-reliance; these, in turn, address the issues of the NGOs’ legitimacy and accountability (Harrison, 2002).

Within the field of conflict resolution, studies have shown empirically that NGOs have made a contribution to the conflict resolution and peace processes (O’Brien, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002). Applying an institutional framework to participatory development and peacebuilding, a number of development agencies initiated indigenous empowerment programmes, and made significant contributions towards building sustainable peace. For instance, in western Africa, Onwuka (2009) demonstrates how the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Council of the Wise revitalised indigenous institutions to address contemporary challenges. In the study of Rwanda, Mutisi (2009) noted the reinvigoration of the gacaca indigenous approach towards addressing the Rwandans’ distress following the genocide of the 1990s and their post-conflict reconstruction needs. She notes that the revitalisation of gacaca courts in Rwanda not only helps to build peace, justice, and reconciliation, but also transforms the nature of conflict. In a similar vein, Wasonga (2009) illustrates how the revival and use of mato oput, a traditional Acholi approach to peace and justice, in northern Uganda, contributed towards trust building, reconciliation, and restoration.
In Ethiopia, various aid and development NGOs have made radical changes to their mandates to respond to the issue of conflict. Apart from relief and rehabilitation work, these NGOs have been encouraging local communities to participate in peacebuilding (Rahmato et al., 2008). For example, traditional approaches to conflict resolution are now being revived and made operational in the pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of the country. In the South Omo zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) traditional structures of elders strengthened by the Ethiopian Pastoralist Research and Development Association (EPaRDA) are now lead actors in mediating inter-ethnic conflicts. An NGO known as Pact Ethiopia, under a project called Stability for Ethiopia’s Lowland Marginalized Communities (SELAM-C) employed a participatory, bottom-up approach and built on traditional pastoral conflict mediation and prevention mechanisms and practices to foster peace more effectively in the communities in the Borana Zone of Oromia Regional State and the South Omo zone of the SNNPRS. The Inter Africa Group has been working on early warning and response mechanisms through the collection and analysis of information in the South Omo zone, Borana zone and Somali region.

A growing number of NGOs (such as Care Ethiopia, SOS Sahel, Mercy Corps, Action for Development (AFD), Gayo Pastoralist Development Initiative (GPDI), Oromo Pastoralist Association (OPA) and EPaRDA) have gained experience of working in conflict-prone areas of Ethiopia (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011; Kurtz and Scarborough, 2012). They use a variety of approaches including facilitating cross-ethnic and border dialogue (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011), and revitalising local institutions and empowering the local community (Tache and Irwin, 2003). Rupesinghe (1995) underlines the significance of building indigenous capacity to handle disputes within a conflict-strife community, a process which will necessarily involve the need for local knowledge of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. Mercy Corps, OPA and others have used an elicitive model in their cross-ethnic Peace Accords in the Borana, drawing on their knowledge of Borana culture to facilitate freedom of movement and access to natural resources by the Garri and Gabra ethnic groups. Participants in a conflict resolution training programme facilitated by Pact Ethiopia have gone on to play significant decision-making roles in the Anywaa-Nuer in the Gambella peace process (PACT, 2006a, 2007). Likewise, NGOs in Borana have built cross-ethnic ties across the Garri, the Gabra and the Borana. These NGOs are a long-term resource for peacebuilding, and are changing resource sharing arrangements. Thus, the
convergence between conflict resolution and development projects could transform the context of conflict. NGOs also work towards structural transformation; for instance, by empowering the marginalised or deprived groups (Curle, 1996; Lederach, 1995a). In Gambella, as in South Africa and Northern Ireland, NGOs help to build the capacity of indigenous actors to demand issues of rights, justice, and political reform.

However, the relationship between the State and CSOs continue to be fraught with tensions and ambiguities and this will be discussed in the following section.

2.5.3 The nature of the relationship between the State and CSOs

One should be cautious not to “mythologise” the role of NGOs in conflict resolution by supposing that they can substitute, supplant, or supplement an inefficient state’s services. On the contrary “they make moral claims that are in opposition to those of the dominant political elite, and they actively challenge and seek to change the forces that fuel and maintain conflict and prevent peace” (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002: 17). The success of NGOs in promoting and building democratic institutions, and particularly in mitigating conflict, presupposes the existence of strong and mature organisational and functional capacities, organic grass-roots relationships and an “open political system”. Organisational and functional capacity is manifested in a form which Chandhoke (2004: 186) describes as the “civility of civil society”; in other words, its decisions and activities presume deliberation, reasoned interaction and conscious procedures as well as stable and non-violent rules of behaviour. It can also be best described in what Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 16-18) refer to as “social capital”, “cultural capital” and a “mobilising structure” for advancing their causes.

An open political system will depend on the nature of the regime, its political culture and the “political space” allowed for non-state actors to take initiatives independently of the state (Riker, 1995: 23). Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002: 18) emphasise that: “The state’s propensity toward repressive behaviour affects civil society organisations’ choice of strategies” (emphasis in the original). The function and operation of the NGOs depend on the “openness of the political system” as it has a direct implication on their legality, mandates and functional and organisational structures. States may manifest their attitudes towards NGOs in different ways to limit their operations. Authoritarian states may formulate proclamations that restrict those Civil
Society Organisations (CSOs) that intend to transgress “boundaries” laid down, thus restricting their mandates, organisational forms, resources and leaderships (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Chandhoke, 2004). States raise the issues of sovereignty and/or the legitimacy of states to act in their own self-interest (Chandhoke, 2004). The States may view NGOs’ active involvement in local political activity as a threat to their authority and clamp down on their activities. International NGOs may be threatened with expulsion and local ones with closure if they oppose the state too vehemently. The nature of civil society is also determined by the stage of “political maturity” of the state. It is a key determinant that defines the extent to which political space is sanctioned for the CSOs (Bashaw, 2008).

Critics have also attacked the over-optimistic perception of the NGOs’ role as facilitators, catalysts, advocates and networking partners and the role they play in reinvigorating grass-roots organisations and being driving forces in democratisation processes. Local NGOs are increasingly used by donors as implementing and executing agents and they can become disconnected from the grass-roots (Marcussen, 1996; Katz, 2006). Bureaucratic rationalisation and professionalisation then undermine the core virtues, such as flexibility, responsiveness, willingness to experiment and take risks. These factors marginalise and disenfranchise efforts by voluntary or solidarity groups within organisations, thereby weakening both the state and civil society (Edwards and Hulme, 1992; Clark, 1991). Moreover, there have been persistent questions on their legitimacy, accountability, transparency and responsibility in Africa (Bebbington, 1994). According to Uphoff (1993), the assumption that grass-roots organisations and NGOs present huge potential for rural development does not mean that they are “inherently or invariably superior” to the state and market: nor does it mean they are more democratic, less clientelistic or rent-seeking than the state (Marcussen, 1996:417).

However, there is some evidence to indicate that NGOs have had some positive impact on the state’s legitimacy and functioning, and this has resulted in positive outcomes for both the state and the NGOs (see for example, Ndegwa, 1996; Fisher, 1998). Clarke (1998), for example, argues that NGOs are able to carry out project-based tasks that neither the state nor the market can achieve. The state can benefit by allowing NGOs to fill this functional gap in service delivery while retaining power, thereby strengthening its legitimacy. Furthermore, Bratton (1989a: 429) asserts that the NGO/state relationship can be complementary when NGOs try to
“occupy space which the state has never penetrated or from which the state elites have decide to retreat”. The same applies where the state is structurally unable to exert its autonomy and/or deliver much needed services. Bratton (1989a) argues there is a strong tendency for the relationship to be conflicting when NGOs through civil society attempt to “reconstitute the political discourse and transgress the boundary laid down” (Chandhoke, 2004: 10). In Ethiopia, conflict resolution has been conceived as a purely political issue, to be addressed by government mechanisms. For NGOs to conduct conflict resolution activities in an unhindered way, they need to forge a partnership with government and work in close collaboration with the state.

The ambiguity of the state/civil society relationship lies in changing dynamics where civil society may need to adopt an adversarial stance when rights are denied or a collaborative stance where civil society could assist the state with development or conflict resolution. NGOs need to work out their stance in relation to the state.

Bratton (1989b) suggests the need for a proper separation of responsibilities and duties between the government and NGOs, to achieve balanced cooperation without infringing the autonomy of either of these actors. Marcussen (1996) recommends that, instead of working to erode the legitimacy of the state, NGOs need to prioritise working through grass-roots movements and organisations as well as collaboration and co-operation with the government. Nevertheless, the approach can be challenged for its implied compromise of NGOs’ integrity, responsibility and autonomy (Fisher, 1998). Bratton (1989a: 430) points out that the relationship is not essentially one-sided and a zero-sum game: “It runs a range of mutual disengagement on one hand and direct confrontation or close collaboration.” Moreover, though autonomous, NGOs need an effective state to guarantee their autonomy; NGOs depend upon the state for political order and adequate infrastructure (Mamdani, 1996; Bratton, 1989b, 1990). The success of maintaining autonomy depends on having a balance between confrontation and close collaboration.

The politics of NGO-Government relationships and the debate about whether NGOs should build complementary or adversarial relationships with the state are very important issues in the Ethiopian context. As indicated above, the government promulgated the new Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCs) in 2009. That Proclamation has had an adverse impact on the constitution and operation of NGOs as well as on their involvement in advancing good governance and sustainable peace (Rahmato, Akalewold
and Yoseph, 2008). This research is based on the assumption that involvement of CSOs/NGOS in democratisation and their attempts to influence the State’s national policy though lobbying and advocacy resulted in NGO-Government relationships deteriorating to the point of antagonism and, suspicion and in some cases co-option. The Proclamation could be seen as the state wanting to contain the influence of NGOs that could erode the legitimacy of the state.

This aspect of the politics of NGO-State relations could adversely affect the structure and functions of NGOs and, in turn, affect their involvement in peacebuilding activities. This assumption is grounded in actual practice as indicated in various researches (Katz, 2006; Chandhoke, 2004; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Bebbington, 1997; Marcussen, 1996; Fowler, 1991).

2.6 Conclusion

The chapter sketched a framework for an analysis of contemporary conflict that draws on Edward Azar’s account of protracted social conflict. Briefly, Azar locates the roots of protracted social conflict in factors such as group identity, deprivation of human needs, governance and the state’s role, and international linkages. These factors were discussed with a view to gaining a better understanding the situation in Ethiopia. Furthermore, conflict resolution approaches and the use of indigenous approaches were discussed. The role of NGOs and their relation to the State were briefly alluded to.

The following chapter introduces the historical and socio-political context of the Gambella and Borana regions examined in this research.
CHAPTER THREE: THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT IN THE BORANA ZONE OF THE OROMIA AND THE GAMBELLA REGIONAL STATES

3. Introduction

This chapter provides a brief overview of the socio-historical and political dynamics of protracted social conflicts in Ethiopia. It is intended to provide only sufficient background to assist readers in locating the roots of protracted social conflict in the Borana Zone of the Oromia and the Gambella Regional States of Ethiopia. This chapter describes the source and evolution of the conflict in each region, provides a sketch of the major parties to the conflict, and gives some background about the relevant NGOs, their genesis, and their relationships to government.

3.1 Conflict Analysis of Gambella Regional State

Much has been written about the Gambella region’s history and the cause of conflict. These sections will reflect the scholarly work already done by researchers from this region. The following sub-section, focusing on Gambella Regional State, presents a summarised historical overview drawn from Feyissa (2011, 2009, 2006 and 2003). Further insights into this rather complex history have been taken from Zewde (2002, 1987), Johnson (1986) and Meckelburg (2006). The purpose of this subsection is to outline briefly the multi-level actors and factors pertaining to the Gambella conflict and to describe their systematic interdependence as this appears from a perspective foregrounding Gambella.

3.1.1 The Gambella context: Location and Demography

The Gambella People’s National Regional State (GPNRS) is in the south-western part of Ethiopia about 780 kilometers from the national capital, Addis Ababa. It is bordered by the Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia Regions to the north, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS) to the east and Oromia to the south. The South Sudan borders it to the west. It has a total population of 306,916 (CSA, 2007). This region has nine districts (Woredas): Gambella, Abobo, Akobo, Gog, Itang, Jor, Jikaw, Dima and Godere special Woreda. Gambella town has a total population of 41,867 (CSA, 2007). The main ethnic groups include the Nuer (40%), Anywaa (27%), Mezhenger (6%), Amhara (8%), Tigray (2%), and Oromo (6%), the Opo and the Komo (3%) and other minorities (8%) (CSA, 2007). The Anywaa
are predominantly cultivators living along the major tributaries of the Sobat River and reside in eight of the nine districts except in Godere special Woreda. The Nuer are agro-pastoralists and are located in Jikaw and Akobo. The Nuer group is further divided into the Gaajak, the Gaajok and the Gaaguang. The Gaajak and the Gaaguang resent the Gaajok’s political domination within the Nuer-based regional political party (Feyissa, 2011). Other groups in the region include the Highlanders who are either “non-indigenous” immigrants, such as ethnic Amhara, Oromo, Tigreans and Kembatta, or they were defined as non-Nilotic people with a “brown” skin colour: they primarily live in Gambella town, Abobo (Anywaa-dominated), and Godere (Mezhenger-dominated) districts (Feyissa, 2011). The region is predominantly lowland with a few midlands. The area’s low population density, coupled with access to pasture and water attracted settlers from both Southern Sudan and other parts of Ethiopia (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009).

The relationships between these ethnic groups are complex and changing and they influence the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflict dynamics in various ways. The Nuer (40%) and Anywaa (28%) are two larger ethnic groups who fought over ethnic identities, local and national representation in government, federal funds, language at schools and land for agriculture (Anywaa) or pasture (Nuer) (Abbink, 2006; Feyissa, 2009). These two major ethnic groups are locked in conflict and dominate the region’s conflict dynamics (Tadesse, 2007). The Sudanese civil wars, also, have forced a significant number of Nuers to cross the border and settle in the Gambella region of Ethiopia. The Anywaa claim that they are indigenous residents of the Gambella area and there is a common belief among the Anywaa that the Nuers and the Highlanders are controlling their resources (Feyissa, 2006). Moreover, the Sudanese civil war has also made modern weapons more accessible and exacerbated the faction fighting and inter-ethnic conflicts (Tadesse, 2007; Meckelburg, 2006). The new conflicts are fought using these arms, causing more casualties than former conflicts that used conventional arms (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Tadesse, 2007). Together with the loss of human lives associated with large-scale cross-border cattle raiding by the Lou Nuer and the Murle from Southern Sudan, all these factors have contributed to the regional conflict pattern.
3.1.2 Historical background and socio political context

- **Incorporation into the Ethiopian State (1898)**

As early as the 1840s, the Turco-Egyptian and the British colonial empires tried to incorporate the region under their rule (Young, 1999). The inhospitable climate and geographical barriers were not attractive to non-natives but outsiders came to the area for short periods in search of lucrative commodities such as coffee, ivory and gold (Zewde, 1987). The quest for territory, however, intensified in the late nineteenth century with the opening of the Gambella trading post and the area’s greater significance to the British colonial aspiration of controlling the Nile valley (Ram, 2009). This trading post was in a place subject to a conflicting jurisdiction of the adjacent trading areas of Egypt, Sudan and Britain. In the wake of disarray from the British colonial empire and the Mahdist irredentist movement in Sudan, Emperor Menelik extended his authority over Ethiopian-Sudan territorial boundaries (Young, 1999). Thus, the Gambella region was fully incorporated into the Ethiopian empire under Emperor Menelik in the late nineteenth century, primarily to counter the threat of British advances from south Sudan (Ram, 2009). This set the stage for a formal border agreement with the British colonial power in Sudan in 1902 delimiting the boundary between Ethiopia and the Sudan (Young, 1999). The Anywaa and Nuer land was divided between the British East African Protectorate and the Ethiopian Empire. As a result of the boundary agreement, most Anywaa have become Ethiopian citizens whereas most Nuer have become Sudanese citizens (Feyissa, 2011). The imposition of colonial and modern administrative boundaries and national borders undermined the long-standing cross-community movement and interdependence on which these communities relied for economic and social wellbeing.

The incorporation of this region not only initiated commercial relations between the governors of highland areas adjacent to Gambella, but also provided an opportunity for a movement of people from the highland to the periphery, notably the Amhara and Oromo; this movement was from north to south west (Johnson, 1986). A system of indirect rule was established, through which the appointed representatives of the central government were charged with the maintenance of order as well as with controlling taxes from the profitable trade (Zewde, 1991). The main concern of the Ethiopian state throughout this period was the establishment and maintenance of the border with Sudan, while the relationship with the Gambella was characterised by benign neglect (Zewde, 1991).
• Resettlement and sedentarisation schemes (1985) and land nationalisation policy

After the period of bureaucratic modernisation started in 1945, the state intensified the process of state building, through the policy of integrating the peripheries into central government, to strengthen its control. Mass resettlement and sedentarisation schemes were introduced in the early 1960s and increased under the military regime in the late 1980s (Meckelburg, 2006). By 1985, the Durge had resettled up to 60,000 Highlanders (Kurimoto, 2005), most of whom were settled on traditional Anywaa territory (Meckelburg, 2006). This invoked a deep sense of injustice on the part of the indigenous people, both towards the central government and the new settlers, marking the beginning of the indigenes vs. migrants discourse (Feyissa, 2006). Thus, a highland community, representing Highland culture and way of life, was established on “expropriated land” while the indigenous inhabitants’ institutions and traditional subsistence economy were devastated (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Furthermore, the Highlanders were mainly non-Nilotic people with brown skin pigmentation (red in local parlance), while the natives were predominantly “black” people (the Nilotic lowlanders) (Feyissa, 2011). This provided a discourse based on skin colour - the Highlanders’ and the Nilotic lowlanders’ distinction - that eventually shaped political thinking in the region.

While this marked the beginning of the indigenous versus non-indigenous discourse, the land nationalisation policy that emerged with the Durge regime from 1974 was more radical. It had devastating effects on the traditional subsistence economy and settlement patterns as well as on the ethnic composition of Gambella (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). An additional issue was the new regional party structure: the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). This was a communist vanguard set up by the Durge and was met with massive resistance from the Anywaa community (Feyissa, 2011). The advancement of the Nuer in the WPE was very much resented by the Anywaa elites. At the same time, there were twice as many Nuers as Anywaa in the WPE’s local administration that entrenched its political power over the region in several ways. The Nuer and Highlanders’ demographic pressures, the disillusionment of the Anywaa elites, coupled with the violent uprooting of Anywaa’s indigenous institutions through Durge’s “cultural revolution”, further exacerbated Anywaa’s opposition to the central government and continued to spread by the late 1980s (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009).
• **The emergence of Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM)**

These historical factors created much discord among the Anywaa, who have come to be identified with rebellion. Furthermore, the continued deprivation of basic needs fuelled public grievances, while “state-building” projects continued to replace indigenous institutions and centralised authority served to stimulate dissent in the peripheries (Young, 1999). The various grievances, fighting over natural resources and structural marginalisation resulted in the destruction of Gambella. In the late 1980s, the Anywaa dissenter crossed the border and established the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM). They started to collaborate with the Sudanese government and the Ethiopian liberation movement in fighting the Ethiopian government (TPLF and OLF), originally for independence but later for autonomy. The armed rebellion of the Anywaa aligned the socialist Durge regime closer to the Nuer-based secessionist Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), fighting for independence from the Islamic North of Sudan (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). As a result, the Durge regime had strongly favoured the Ethiopian Nuer in the local administration, while the marginalised Anywaa joined the GPDM, under Sudanese patronage (Feyissa, 2009). Thus, the Durge authorities allowed the SPLA to set up military training and base-camp facilities in Ethiopian territory and to recruit from the Nuer population, while the SPLA army began counter-insurgency operations against forces aimed at toppling the Durge regime, notably against the GPDM (Gebrewold, 2009).

• **The Sudanese civil war**

A spill-over effect and a deliberate mutual destabilization by Ethiopia and Sudan evolved with geopolitical and domestic ramifications (Tadesse, 2007). The Sudanese support for the Eritrean rebels fighting the Durge regime for independence had already drawn the socialist Durge into the Sudanese civil war, regionalising the conflict (Gebrewold, 2009). The Durge regime was backed by the Soviet Union, whereas Khartoum received US support. While the SPLA received armaments from the Soviet Union via Addis Ababa, Khartoum stepped up its general support for insurgent groups aimed at overthrowing the Durge regime and allowed international actors to assist the anti-Durge uprising from Khartoum. While SPLA soldiers operated on the Ethiopian side, anti-Durge forces were “active on Sudanese soil” (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009: 56). Finally, in 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union took place which led to the end of the Cold War and
it is against that background that the uprising led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) managed to topple the Durge regime, after 15 years of struggle (Young, 1999).

- **Multi-national Federalism (1991)**

After emerging as the victors in toppling the socialist Durge dictatorship and occupying the Gambella region, the GPLF (Gambella People’s Liberation Front) and Anywaa were rewarded by taking control of the Gambella regional state (Feyissa, 2009). They remained the dominant political force during the transitional period (1991-1994). The empowerment of the GPLF was interpreted both by the Anywaa and the Nuer as the recognition of the Anywaa political ownership of the Gambella Regional State; the Nuer elites were identified with the previous Durge dictatorship. In subsequent years, the Anywaa have used this support to renegotiate their political influence and role vis-à-vis the Nuer. They consolidated their own position by designating the Nuer as non-indigenous, therefore, “nominal foreigners without Ethiopian citizenship” (Feyissa, 2009:98). This step marked the beginning of a difficult struggle for indigeneity as well as a bone of contention between the Anywaa and the Nuer. For example, between 1991 and 1992, militant sections of the GPLM attacked civilian Nuer in what appears to be an attempt to discourage the Nuer’s bid for indigeneity and thousands of Ethiopian Nuer citizens fled to the Sudan along with southern Sudanese refugees (Feyissa, 2011). Another violent clash erupted in January 1998 in Itang, an area with a mixed population with two ethnic groups of Openo (Anywaa) and Cieng Reng (Nuer). Here, a family quarrel escalated and 60 people were killed, ten villages burned and 3000 persons displaced before a state of emergency was declared after six months to end overt hostilities.

- **Conflict over Political Ownership of the Regional States**

A spiral of revenge killings followed this Itang incident, fuelled by both sides. In 2002, this political tension escalated into a deadly conflict between the Anywaa and the Nuer (Feyissa, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2005). In June 2002 the political competition between the Anywaa and the Nuer elites manifested itself in the escalation of conflict between the Thiang Nuer and the Openo Anywaa that cost the lives of more than a hundred people and the destruction of many villages (Feyissa, 2009). In response to regular conflict between these ethnic groups, the federal government took a series of political measures including imprisoning and dismissing senior political figures suspected of inciting the violence. In 2003, the federal government dissolved all
political parties and imposed a merger between the GPLM and the Nuer-based party and created new ethnic parties modeled on EPRDF’s People’s Democratic Organisations (PDOs). The government also divided power according to population size. Two subordinate administrations were established. The first of these, the office of the presidency is allocated to Anywaa. The Nuer are compensated with the second of these: the office of the vice-presidency as well as a party leadership. Each side was given a number of devolved powers, but ultimate power was reserved for the regional People’s Democratic Organisations (PDOs), affiliated with the EPRDF.

Nevertheless, this power sharing arrangement satisfied neither the Anywaa nationalists, who demanded the dominant political position, nor the Nuer, who refused to be included in such an arrangement. Although the population of the Nuer was 40% of the region and therefore the Nuer Party could expect an enduring electoral majority, a 34% share of the seats in the regional cabinet was not a triumph for either the Nuer or for the Anywaa whose ambition had never been to share any kind of power at all (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Additionally, the pragmatic political promotion of the Nuer by the EPRDF, dismissal of Anywaa officials from their jobs, suspension of the GDPC, and re-division of the Anywaa district into two separate Nuer and Anywaa zones suggested to Anywaa that their country had been usurped (Feyissa, 2009). These political measures taken by the federal government had alienated a large segment of Anywaa society, framing a new round of conflict between the Ethiopian state and Highlanders and Anywaa. In due course, the dismissed policemen and alienated youth found their way back into the rebellion and joined the Anywaa factions fighting for independence. This development hardened ethnic divisions, and fuelled armed rebellion, which nearly developed into civil war in the region.

The violent ethnic struggles that arose in Gambella aimed to destroy anything that symbolised the federal government’s establishments. These threatened the Highland population who claimed to represent all of the state institutions, and often used the civilian population as a shield. This viewpoint was so pervasive that almost all highland civil servants and business women and men, even those who worked for international organisations, came to be identified with the state (Feyissa, 2011). Accordingly, not only government establishments were attacked but also civilian Highlanders and six road construction workers (Highlanders) were killed. Subsequently, a spiral of revenge killings followed with Highlanders and the Ethiopian National Defence Force.
ENDF) deployed in the region where they indiscriminately killed hundreds of Anywaa, destroying thousands of houses (Human Rights Watch, 2005; Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma, 2006). Displaced people crossed the border to Southern Sudan. The ENDF’s involvement in the massacre was so widespread that almost all Anywaa, even those who were opposed to violence but supported the Anywaa cause, came to be identified with the Anywaa armed groups and the GPLF (Gambella People Liberation Front). The perceived Highlanders-ENDF alliance fed into the Anywaa fears of ethnic extinction and made them conclude that there is no prospect for real autonomy without power. The only solution to long-lasting autonomy according to their thinking was through armed resistance. The government relied on its coercive force merely to make peace that gave rise to increased violence. The Anywaa realised, however, that there was little protection to be provided by the ENDF, and this further contributed to the fear and bitterness in the relations between the Anywaa and the federal government/Highlanders.

3.2 Conflict Analysis of Borana Zone of Oromia Regional State

Comprehensive accounts of the region’s history and the causes of conflict could be found in the works of Oba (1996), Adunga (2011), Bassi (2010) and Scott-Villiers et al. (2011). The following section briefly outlines the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts that relate to access to scarce natural resources in the Borana Zone and their systematic interdependence, spanning the incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire and the onset of multi-national democracy. Further insights into this rather complex history have been taken from Adugna (2010, 2011) and Getachew (2002). The final sub-section looks briefly at Borana indigenous institutions and their natural resource management system.

3.2.1 The Borana context: Location and Demography

The Borana Zone is at the southern edge of Ethiopia. It is one of the thirteen zones of the Oromia Regional State bordered by the Somali and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNPRS) to the east and west, with Kenya to the south. It has a total population of 2,019,383 (CSA, 2007). It is made up of the following thirteen districts or Woreda: Adolana, Arero, Bore, Dire, Gelana, Abaya, Hagere Mariam, Liben, Moyalle, Odo Shakiso, Teltele, Uraga and Yabello. These districts fall between two agro-ecological zones: the semi-arid lowlands to the south and the more humid lands at higher altitudes to the north (Irwin and
Mitiku, 2004). There are many different ethnic groups living in the Borana Zone. In addition to recent arrivals from elsewhere in Ethiopia, members of the Oromo (including Borana, Gabra, Guji and Arsi) and Somali ethnic groups dominate the conflict dynamics in the region; these two groups are the larger encompassing ethnic identities. The Borana Oromo is the oldest branch of the Oromo people and is the main group (Levine, 1974), followed by a smaller number of Gabra living in the Arero, Moyalle and Yabello lowlands (Getachew, 2002). Other minority communities include the Somali groups, who are divided into the Mareexaan, Digodia, and Garri. The Garri, who have forged mutual interdependence with the Borana, are bilingual: “those who live in close proximity to other Somali groups speak Somali languages and the Garri who live close to the Borana speak Oromo, thereby making cross-ethnic allegiances that nevertheless change over time” (Watson, 2001: 8). The Borana are predominantly cattle pastoralists (Bassi 2010). The Gabra, Garri and other Somali groups rely mainly on camels and are highly mobile; they rely on grazing in the Borana plains in the dry season. These distinctions are important as they have implications, as described in the following section, in inter-ethnic conflicts. Those conflicts can be based on the group’s sense of identity as well as on diverging discourses on cattle or camel pastoralism, with contrasting notions of inter-ethnic alliance and entitlement to natural resources (Watson, 2001).

3.2.2 The historical background and socio political context

Protracted conflicts within and between these pastoral ethnic groups of the southern and eastern parts of Ethiopia are not new (Bassi, 2010; Bassi and Tache, 2011). Historically, Oromo, and even intra-Oromo and non-Oromo ethnic groups, clashed over scarce natural resources, such as pasture and water (Oba, 1996). The Borana have previously retained a close alliance with the Garri and the Gabra, but were rather antagonistic towards the Somali (Homann, 2004). The Somali and the Garri began to increase their expansion into the Borana territory from the “end of the 19th century onwards and they increased their control over large parts of eastern Borana” (Homann, 2004: 46). Large-scale expansion had ceased since then, but periodic and reciprocal raiding and resource-based conflicts became the dominant form of interaction (Levine, 1974). In this relatively established situation, moreover, the Somali clans reoriented their strategies of

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6 These include the Amhara, Gedeo, Burji and Konso.
7 Except for the Waata Wondo, a marginalised group of crafts people, the Arsi depend on subsistence farming and animal husbandry, while the Guji are agro-pastoralists (Watson, 2001).
access to resources to avoid competition and conflict and instead, used concessions and negotiation (Getachew, 2002). The Garri and the Gabra allied to the Borana used a *tirriiso* network (patron-client relationship), and enjoyed access to wet-season pastures and permanent water points jointly with the Borana (Oba, 1996: 121). Over the years, living in close proximity, the Borana and non-Borana ethnic groups have developed not only social and economic ties but have also forged a political-military alliance and have waged numerous raids against the opposing neighbouring communities (Oba, 1996; Bassi, 2010).

According to Oba (1996), although the inter-ethnic exchanges involve a certain degree of asymmetry that favours the Borana, they also involve elements of reciprocity and interdependence. For the Borana, strong cross-ethnic ties mean more economic exchange through social networking; for example, guns and household items in exchange for ivory and rhino. They also led to inter-ethnic marriages with pastoralist Somali clans that allowed unrestricted access to the Borana’s wells and grazing lands, particularly the underutilised dry season pasture (Bassi, 1996). Furthermore, for the Borana, these ties helped create a buffer zone to shelter them from more hostile Somali clans; for the Garri and Arjuan, marriage ties are used as a legitimising discourse in establishing settlements in the Borana territories. For instance, Oba (1996) points out how the Garre Somali clans were able to settle in Borana territory and establish small settlements through trade and intermarriage, thereby gaining access to key resources.

- **Colonial period (1887)**

In the wake of disarray arising from the British colonial influence in eastern Africa, Emperor Menelik extended his authority over the Ethiopian-Kenya territorial boundaries and incorporated the Borana region into the Ethiopian empire in the late nineteenth century (Helland, 1996, 2001). This set the stage for a formal border agreement with the British colonial power in Kenya in 1902-1903, delimiting the boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya (Oba, 1996). The Borana land was divided between the British East African Protectorate and the Ethiopian Empire. As a result of this boundary agreement, most Borana have become Ethiopian citizens and a few Borana in the southern have become Kenyan citizens (Helland, 1996). The agreement also divided “tribal-grazing land”, following the “Oromo-Somali” line (Oba, 1996). This meant that Borana pastoralists in Northern Kenya lost access to key water resources in Ethiopia and pastoralists on the Ethiopian side were denied access to grazing areas in Northern Kenya. The boundary
agreement also undermined long-standing and mutually recognised ethnic territories, as well as resource management systems negotiated through customary institutions, on which these communities relied for years. For example, Oba (1996) notes that the Garri and Ajuran clans moved out of such arrangements (“Peace of Borana’, discussed below) and forged a military alliance with the Dogadi clans to control Borana territory.

- **Ethnic Federalism**

In recent years, inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts over the use of natural resources have been exacerbated by many factors. These include: the scarcity of water, recurrent drought, population density, lack of sustainable economic opportunities, change in land use practices and the introduction of irrigation schemes for mechanised and commercial farming (Pavanello, 2009). Since 1991, the intensity and magnitude of these conflicts have changed, particularly in the Woredas of Yabello, Arero and Moyalle (see, for example, Abbink, 2006; Bassi, 2010; Adunga, 2011; Scott-Villiers et al., 2011). Between 1990 and 2004, thirteen major inter/intra-ethnic conflicts occurred in the Borana Zone of which nine were related to the Borana and the Garri ethnic groups and five were intra-Oromo conflicts (Odhiambo, 2012: 11). In recent years, the source of the conflict was exacerbated by the pastoralists’ inability to maintain or establish institutions to moderate and govern differences concerning natural resources, thereby transforming resource use from compromise and negotiation to competition and confrontation (Watson, 2003). For example, major conflicts involving the Borana, Gabra and Garri communities took place in and around the Woredas of Yabello, Arero and Moyalle between mid-2008 and early 2009; these conflicts were over access to and utilisation of, water resources and grazing land. There were also territorial disagreements. The violence resulted in massive loss of assets including livestock, the deaths of hundreds of people, and displacement of thousands of others.

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According to several informants, the Peasant Associations (PAs) of the Arero, Yabello, and Moyalle Woredas have had a history of violence. For example: the conflict among Garri-Somali, Gabra-Oromo, and Boran-Oromo in the Wachille PA of Arero Worada; the conflict among the Guji-Oromo, Boran-Oromo in the Bulbul PA of Arero Worada; and the Mareexaan, Digodia ethnic groups of Udet Worada of Liban Zone, Somali Regional State (2001, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2009 and 2012) (Odhiambo, 2012; Bassi, 2010). The PAs of Yabello Worada such as Surupa, Beldim-Raso, and Char-Dhedhertu have a high rate of violence among the Guji, Gabra, Arsi and Mareexaan. Intra-and inter-Oromo conflicts were also commonplace in the PAs of the Moyalle Worada: between Boran and Garri, Mareexaan and Digodi, Digodi and Borana (2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008). At the time of writing this paper, conflict had broken out between the Gabra and Boran in Arero Worada, spilling over to the Sululta PA of Yabello and killing many people.
Clapham (2004) stresses that the newly coined and ethnic-based regional demarcations have had an adverse effect on the historical alliances and long-standing culture of association among various national groups. These demarcations have forced groups to change their alliances along ethnic lines, negatively affecting historic alliances and resource sharing arrangements (Abbink, 2006). For example, with the adoption of ethnic federalism (1994) the Digodia and the Garri shifted their historic alliance from Oromo to Somali identity, thereby attaining new control over the wells and surrounding rangelands of Eel Lae and Eel Goof in the Arero, Liben and Moyalle districts, which they had used jointly with the Borana for years previously (Getachew, 1996; Bassi, 2010). As a result, the Borana, Garri and other Somali groups have been fighting over these resources in both the Arero and Liben districts. Currently, points of contestation have included boundary disputes in areas of mixed cultural, linguistic and ethnic affiliations, besides the resource conflicts which already existed (Clapham, 2004). For example, the inter-ethnic conflicts between the Borana-Konso and Borana-Garri in and around Yabello in 2008/9 were over administrative and boundary issues. These conflicts led to the displacement of 27,000 people and to raiding and looting of 1500 head of livestock (CORDAID and FSS, 2009). The relationship between Oromo and non-Oromo has deteriorated, coupled with an ethno-nationalist discourse inspired by the elite to gain power (Assefa, 1997). This ethno-nationalist sentiment has led to serious conflicts across the Borana Zone causing thousands of deaths, evictions and devastation of property; these clashes are still seen today (Abbink, 2006).

The introduction of Ethiopian federalism not only exacerbated tensions between the Oromo and non-Oromo, but also aggravated latent conflict lines between Gabra and Borana groups who have co-existed in the area for centuries (Adunga, 2011; Bassi, 2010). After the transition to federalism, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) not only supported the Gabra, but also incorporated them into the local administration and increased their representation in the federal parliament, although they are a minority (Bassi, 2010). In subsequent years, the prospect of the Gabra building an exclusive administrative zone in the Borana territory further contributed to the fear and bitterness in Gabra-Borana and Gabra-Guji relations (Bassi, 2010). Such demands made the Borana fear that their country had been usurped and played an important part in the trajectory leading to the outbreak of numerous conflicts. For example, Bassi (2010) notes that in 1991, conflict first broke out between the Gabra and Borana, after the Gabra attempted to demarcate a separate administrative district in the kebeles of Yabello.
and Arero districts. This marked the beginning of a rancorous struggle for political power, framing a new round of conflict between the Borana and the Gabra who had been at peace for years. In April 2005, after a number of cruel episodes of reciprocal killings, violent clashes erupted in Surupa kebele (Yabello), an area with a mixed population comprising three Oromo groups; the Guji, Borana and Gabra. Thus, a large-scale raiding party formed by Guji attacked the Gabra in Surupa and surrounding villages. In the conflict, more than 35 Gabra were killed, ten villages were burned and 43,000 persons were displaced before the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) intervened to end the conflict.

- **The 2004 referendum**

This pattern of protracted conflict with territorial claims and counter-claims along the Oromia-Somali border persisted over the following decades. In response to the prevalent ethnic conflict, the EFDRE Government ushered a referendum as the only way to achieve a durable solution (Adunga, 2010; Bassi, 2010). Thus, in 2004, the Ministry of Federal Affairs facilitated a referendum to demarcate formally the boundary and to resolve the disputes between the Somali clans and the Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010). As a result, the Borana not only lost access to the most fertile pastures, but also lost much land in their wetter areas; they especially resent the loss of Eel Gof and Tulla Wayu eela and, two [Goofa (El Gof), Laye (El Lae)] of nine well complexes that they had relied on for centuries. Borana identity is attached to these eela and territories not only because they contain natural resources, but also because they play the important role of defining the Borana’s social, spiritual and communal world (Helland, 1982; Legesse, 2000). As the government’s referendum disregards such symbolic and psychological bonds, conflict remains latent.

It also undermined seasonal mobility and access to a vital resource, or destroyed reciprocal arrangements between Borana and Somali pastoral communities and fuelled ethnic conflict (Homann, 2004; Bassi, 2010). It further eroded accepted and agreed-upon conflict negotiation mechanisms and allowed a run-away effect in these ethnic-styled conflicts. This forced the federal government to deploy armed units, the Mekelakeya, or rapid reaction forces, to contain the outbreaks of violence. It also made the parties perceive their situation as being zero-sum: in other words, either losing or gaining resources mainly related to territory endowed with wells, grazing land and ritual places. Neither was prepared to compromise, and the outcome imposed
such massive costs on each other that both parties ended up worse off than they would have been if customary procedures had been adopted (Adunga, 2010). For example, although the outcome of the referendum to a certain degree favours the Somali clans, the result is a loss of the seasonal grazing area they had shared for a long time. For instance, during the long dry seasons in 2008 and 2009 the Garri and the Borana fought two conflicts over their borders in Moyalle, killing 300 people and displacing as many as 100,000.\(^9\) In 2012, the Garri and the Borana fought conflicts over their borders during the long dry season, killing 18 and displacing more than 20,000 people to northern Kenya.\(^10\) Oba (1996), Bassi (2010) and Watson (2003) argue that the disintegration of indigenous institutions and long-standing cross-cutting bonds is a principal cause of conflict. Therefore, indigenous institutions, and establishing relationships and mutual interests remain of critical importance.

### 3.3 The Borana indigenous institutions

The following section looks briefly at Borana indigenous institutions and their natural resource management system. Note that any detailed study of the Borana indigenous institutions is beyond the scope of this study.

In the view of various academic and development researchers, the Borana natural resource management (NRM) system epitomises a case of a remarkably effective and well-managed dry-land area (for example, Homann, 2004; Watson, 2001). This is because of the richness of the natural resources, the indigenous knowledge of the Borana, the wealth of Borana institutions and their capacity to regulate access to the resources in a drought-prone environment (Watson, 2001). Over the years, the Borana had to respond to recurrent drought by digging numerous deep water wells, both *adadi* (shallow wells) and *tulla* (deep wells). They relied on these water points even in the dry season, and divided the rangeland into areas suitable for the wet and dry seasons, moving their herds across these reserves seasonally (Helland, 1982; Homann, 2004). Over the years, the Borana pastoralists produced distinct indigenous institutions and developed local knowledge, which enhanced their resilience against hazards and drought and also preserved their rangelands (Helland, 1982). Furthermore, a stable and organised maintenance system was

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essential for sustainable access to the wells and grazing land, and had to involve cooperation between different users (Watson, 2003). These factors necessitated the development of flexible and strong indigenous institutions and regulations. As a result, the structural frameworks of Borana society, including the nagaya Borana (the peace of the Borana), the Gadaa system, and aada seera Borana (Borana laws) have evolved to provide a complex social structure to govern and regulate access to, and utilisation of, the critical natural resources (Helland, 1996).

The principles of the Gadaa system have been in place for many years and govern the daily lives of the members of these ethnic groups (Legesse, 2000). They control the management of, and access to, natural resources. Gadaa is a customary socio-political system that determines the social stratification of male Oromo based on their age, and defines particular rights and obligations (Legesse, 2000). At the head of the age-cycles is the aba gadaa (father of the gadaa), who is elected in a meeting known as gummi gaayo, (or the meeting of the multitude), performs rituals and gives rulings in the case of disputes, assisted by his gadaa councils. Gummi gaayo takes place every eight years and can be attended by all men in Borana to discuss matters of concern, appoint the aba gadaa, and renew and update aada seera (Watson, 2003). The aada seera is a set of normative principles and verbally expressed norms that govern the Borana way of life and social practices (Bassi, 1996). According to this age-graded system, persons within the age range 40-48 years are known as Luba and are regarded as elders responsible for security and resolving conflicts. The committee of elders consists of individuals from conflicting parties who come together for reconciliation and arbitration (Legesse, 2000).

Access to natural resources is regulated by an intricate web of interrelated and overlapping social structures, entitlements and laws. The Borana as well as non-Borana Oromo must accept aada seera Borana and recognise the common customs and laws that regulate access to these resources (Oba, 1996; Helland, 1996). According to the aada seera, all Borana men, defined by being a member of a Borana clan, own Boranaland (Watson, 2003). Therefore, all Borana have the right to use the water and grazing land. In addition to these general rules, there are specific rules concerning access to and use of land and water. Primary rights to the eela are with the aba knofi (the original excavator of the well or the direct descendant of the aba knofi) (Helland, 1996; Watson, 2003). Access to these resources depends upon being a member of the clan (gosa) of the aba konfi and permission for continuous access is only granted subject to providing labour
for the maintenance of the well, as well as exchange of cattle (Helland, 1982). The person who performs these functions is *aba hirega*, a person responsible for the day-to-day running of the water, appointed by the *aba knofi*.

Similarly, access to *dheeda* grazing land depends on membership of a common *dheeda* (Watson, 2001). *Jarsa dheeda* are elders who are responsible for making general decisions on access to seasonal grazing lands and for resolving disputes. The various non-Borana groups gain access to these resources by establishing links with the *aba hirega* and *jarsa dheeda* councils, but they always retain the status of being a “guest” (Oba, 1996; Helland, 2001). *Aba hirega* and *jarsa dheeda* play crucial roles in ensuring the upkeep of the wells. They organise mobility of herds in the customary pastoral system, provide orderly resolution of conflict and maintain law and order (Muir, 2007; Watson, 2003). *Jarsa dheeda* are also responsible for enforcing the principle of *Dongora Serra*; in other words, regulating unlawful settlement in unfenced grazing land. For example, any person who refuses the decision of the *aba hirega* on the required contribution for maintenance and construction of wells and ponds will be fined from one to five head of cattle. Frequent violations can cause an individual or a group to be denied access to pasture and water; that person can be made into a social outcast and can face severe consequences affecting his or her own entire clan lineage, resulting in a denial of access to basic resources (Oba, 1996).

In years of abundant rainfall, the cattle herds’ rotation is governed by *seera marraa bisaanii*: “the law of grass and water” (Bassi and Tache, 2011). *Seera marraa bisaanii* divides seasonal grazing areas into *Lafa sera roba* (grazing land to be used in rainy seasons) and *Lafa seera bona* (grazing land to be used in dry seasons) (Homann, 2004). According to these rules, the herds are only moved into the waterless rangeland during the wet season, when surface pools are available, and are returned to the well cluster during the dry season (Oba, 1996). During droughts, the Borana tightly regulate pasture and water through herd management (Homann, 2004). Examples include:

- *Kalo* (fencing forage banks for weak animals),
- splitting herds into lactating stationary groups,
- preserving *Lafa haawichaa* (grazing land for the lactating herd),
- sending the non-lactating groups into *forra* (remote dry season grazing areas),
and maintaining a high level of mobility across the forra and wells to make the most effective use of scarce resources.

Violations of these customs and laws often cause numerous clashes between the users. For example, Homann (2004) reported tensions between Gabra and Borana in Dida Hara (Yabello) and in Borana and Garri Web (Arero), due to the violation of these rules. In addition to the pasture and water, aada seera Borana prohibits forest destruction or accessing the forest resources during the wet season because of the value of forests as dry season grazing reserves (Tache and Irwin, 2003). In cases of violation of these customs and rules, abba reera (the cluster head) could discipline the violator with a fine of five head of cattle. This is governed by the principle of Karra Matta which is a customary law enforced by imposing a fine as punishment for unlawfully cutting down natural forest. During prolonged drought, restrictions upon camel pastoralists such as Gabra and other Somali clans are often more exclusive, leading to violent conflicts in the Arero forest area (Homann, 2004). This conflict arises because the Borana use the forest in the dry season whereas the Gabra and Garri camel pastoralists depend on forage leaves from bushes in both the dry and wet seasons (Watson, 2001).

At present, the management of the indigenous natural resources by the Borana pastoralists has been weakened by various factors: these include a poorly-designed pastoral development intervention, the establishment of private commercial ranches, rapid growth of the human population, and, recurrent droughts (Pavanello, 2009; Homann, 2004). The combined impact of all these factors results in serious environmental degradation and destabilizing their coping mechanisms, thereby threatening their livelihood (Homann, 2004). Some observers point out that these management institutions are either idealised or have outlived their usefulness, having failed to develop durable mechanisms to meet new challenges (Watson, 2001). Despite this criticism, it should be noted that the present judicial system has not demonstrated the ability to diffuse tensions; moreover, the failure of “top-down development” practices has made development agencies reconsider customary procedures to empower actors in negotiation and compromise (Abbink 2006, 402). For example, there is an effort by the Ministry of Federal Affairs to institutionalise Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms involving indigenous institutions and their laws. Worada-level conflict management committees including the Worada Administration and Security office, the Justice Office, as well as police and local elders were allocated the task
of ensuring early warning of conflict, and promoting peace building and conflict resolution activities. Watson (2001) also indicates that development organisations are working to revitalise the institutional and “ideological” capacities of indigenous institutions and to enter into “genuine” partnerships for bottom-up development. Here, various NGOs working with indigenous institutions as facilitators have made efforts to enable the community to achieve development (Bassi and Tache, 2011; Watson, 2001). For example, SOS Sahel, Care Ethiopia and Action for Development (AFD) showed a strong commitment to build upon the existing know-how and to work with indigenous institutions as ways of achieving development. Their commitment arose because of the wealth of Borana institutions, their institutional apparatus for initiating participatory development and the history of development practices in the region (Watson, 2001).

3.4 An overview of Government-NGO relationships

Since 1991, Ethiopia has experienced many changes in its system of government and in government policies. These changes led to the proliferation of the ‘Third Sector’ in the country (Rahmato, 2002:113-119). More than 2,305 international, national, and local NGOs participate in various undertakings, with the total number of beneficiaries being roughly 26 million (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008). The emergence of a multitude of international and local NGOs since the 1984/85 famine, and especially after the change of government in 1991, necessitated the creation of a regulatory and coordinating mechanism. In June 1993, the Ethiopian Government introduced the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) to coordinate the activities of NGOs in the country.

Ethiopia’s ratification of the Cotonou Agreements in 2000 was a landmark in the history of Ethiopian CSOs. An important feature of the Cotonou Agreement is the recognition of “non-state actors”, participating alongside governments, in fighting poverty, delivering social services, promoting growth, and fostering democracy and good governance. Participation by CSOs has

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13 The term “NSA” is moderately wide and includes many groups of social and economic factors such as CSOs. The Agreement envisages two major functions for NSAs: a) as service suppliers; b) as collaborators in dialogue or
thus become a legal right in Ethiopia. More than 120 NGOs were legally registered to engage mainly in promoting good governance, democracy, human rights and peacebuilding before the new Proclamation came into force in 2009 (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008). The Cotonou Agreement, which came into force in 2003, encouraged the growth of CSOs.

Prior to the 2005 election, government authorities often criticised NGOs for not taking guidance from the government. NGOs working in activities perhaps deemed “political” were often accused of undermining the role of local government by supporting opposition parties, and disrupting the government-NGO relationship at the local level. Despite the relatively enabling environment, which led to the mushrooming of CSOs, the post-2005 election crisis in the country is considered to be a turning point concerning NGOs. Because of their active participation in advocacy and lobbying, some activities of NGOs were curtailed. Since the 2005 election, a significant number of donors suspended direct budgetary support to the Ethiopian Government, but as an alternative they have begun supporting development through a scheme known as the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008).

The government promulgated the new Proclamation for Regulation, Registration of Societies, and Charities in 2009. That Proclamation has made a number of constructive impacts on the arrangement and function of CSOs/NGOs. It identifies numerous types of CSOs and provides diverse regulatory frameworks for all kinds of Societies and Charities. It also allows CSOs to engage in income generating activities, and this could help them to strengthen their internal capacities and ensure the sustainability of their activities (Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph, 2008).

human and democratic rights, promotion of equality of nations, nationalities, peoples, gender and religion, promotion of the rights of the disabled and children, promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation and, promotion of the efficiency of justice and law enforcement services”.

Moreover, it determines that foreign international CSOs are prohibited from participating in any conflict resolution or reconciliation-related work. However, the Proclamation does not apply to foreign or international organisations operating in Ethiopia “by virtue of an agreement with the Government of Ethiopia” (Article 3(2)).

That Proclamation used source of funding as the criterion to classify organisations as “Ethiopian Charities”, or “Ethiopian Societies”, or “Ethiopian Residents Charities”, or “Ethiopian Residents Societies”, or “Mass-based Societies”. All these are required to register to seek legal recognition:

“Ethiopian Charities” or “Ethiopian Societies” are those Charities or Societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia, generate income from Ethiopia and are wholly controlled by Ethiopians. However, they may [be] deemed as Ethiopian Charities or Ethiopian Societies if not more than ten percent of their funds are received from foreign sources. (Section 1, article 2(2))

“Ethiopian Residents Charities” or “Ethiopian Residents Societies” mean those Charities or Societies formed under the laws of Ethiopia and which consist of members all of whom dwell in Ethiopia and who receive more than 10% of their funds from foreign sources; (Section 1, article 2(3))

“Mass-Based Societies” includes professional associations, Women’s associations, youth associations and similar Ethiopian societies. (Section 1, article 2(5))

The new Proclamation, however, has carefully prescribed the nature of NGOs involvement.

According to the Proclamation:

Those who can take part in activities that fall under Sub-article 2(j) the advancement of human and democratic rights; (k) the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender and religion; (l) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s rights; (m) the promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation; the promotion of the efficiency of the justice and law enforcement services; and (n) of this article shall be Ethiopian Charities. (Section 3, article 14(5))

Ethiopian mass-based organisations may actively participate in strengthening democritisation and election, particularly in conducting educational seminars on current affairs, observing the electoral process and cooperating with electoral organs. (Section 4, article 58(7))

Most of the local organisations that are unable to generate 90% of income from the domestic resource base are reduced to “Residency” rights only. Section 1, article 2(2)-(3) of the Proclamation, when read in conjunction with section 3, article 14(2) (j)-(n), serves to strip most organisations of their right to engage in rights-based activities. In doing so, the Proclamation
reduced the locus of these rights from mass-based organisations to domestically-based resources. This introduced a new element in democratic rights: the debate on the right to participate in section 3, article 14 (2) (j)-(n)) is not only based on citizenship and representing mass-based organisations, but also on the source of funding. The result was an uneasy linkage of two inconsistent criteria for CSO survival; one being citizenship, the other being sources of funding.

The first concern is how far these rights may be circumscribed or stretched on the basis of sources of funding. In other words, even if there were agreement on the legitimate bearers of political rights, such as Ethiopian citizens, how could the source of funding override or obliterate these rights? The question is significant because it strips citizens of rights on the basis of source of funding. The second concern is that the two criteria, domestic resource base and citizenship, are divergent and increasingly so; this is because local resources are inadequate to support meaningful participation and contribution within the country. As is the case in other developing countries and given Ethiopia’s underdevelopment and limited tradition of fund raising, foreign funding is likely to be the main source of funding for the domestic resource base in the years ahead. Therefore, to base rights on funding sources is to disenfranchise growing numbers of local organisations.

Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate and simplistic to assume that these questions had never surfaced in NGO-government forums. During periods of the NGO-government forum, CSOs jointly set up a Legal Framework or Enabling Environment Taskforce to work with the government’s taskforce in drafting and refining the draft law. They promoted an alternative legal proposal that linked the exercise of these rights to citizenship rather than to sources of funding. While the government remained unwilling to recognise their proposal, it allowed “Ethiopian Charities” to engage in income generating activities\textsuperscript{18}, and thereby incorporate their demands into the Proclamation.

The reform drew opponents as well as supporters from those sectors already set in motion by the NGO/CSO consortia, women’s and youth associations, and opposition political parties. On the one hand, the proponents of the Proclamation argue that the reform would enable the mass-based

\textsuperscript{18} Section 9, article 100(1&2) of Proclamation No. 621/2009: Proclamation for Registration and Regulation for Charities and Societies, 6 January 2009
organisations to grow organically from within indigenous institutions. This would help to remould those organisations modelled after foreign CSOs and dependent on financial and ideological support by donors. A government representative who participated in the drafting taskforce commented:

These rights did not vest in the hands of the international NGOs, nor with the local NGOs with any viable and quantifiable memberships. Therefore, the view is, such rights had to be demanded from the government by the membership-based associations through lobbying and promoting the interests of their members, both in the legislative and executive branches of the government (A Staff member, Charities and Societies Agency (CSA), December 2011).

On the other hand, the opponents argue that the reform presented only the political aspect of rights and it equated the sources of funding with only the political dimension. As a result, any reform which recognised the role of mass-based organisations in political movements undermined the contributions of social movements for democratisation. By cultivating its institutional and legal framework but curtailing its sources of funding, the reform drove a wedge between political and social movements, and created an environment for the emergence of party-affiliated mass-based organisations. It is unlikely that these would add value to deliberations about the promotion of democratisation and good governance in society.

Much has been written about the role that NGOs and “non-state-actors” could play in democratisation and conflict transformation (Sen, 1995; Lederach, 1997; O’Brien, 2009). If Ethiopian NGOs were free to carry out these activities, much more could be done to promote peace.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented a brief socio-political and historical overview of the Gambella and Borana regions. The context was set for understanding the factors that shaped conflict in these regions. Additionally, a “levels of conflict” analysis approach was used to illuminate factors that perpetuate and exacerbate conflicts in both regions.

The following chapter discusses the methodology used in this study.
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the reader to the methodological approach to the study. It describes the research design, sample size and selection, research instruments, research assistants, pilot study, data collection approaches, data analysis methods, and credibility and validity. Research ethics and the limitations of the study are also discussed.

4.2 The research design

This study utilises a mixed design method with an emphasis on the qualitative method. According to Morse (2003:190), a mixed design is “the incorporation of various qualitative or quantitative strategies within a single project that may have either a qualitative or quantitative theoretical drive”. This study intended to integrate exploratory qualitative and explanatory quantitative approaches throughout all its stages. Presumably, this has resulted in triangulation of data from various methods and approaches. A description of the study’s quantitative aspects is provided; however, it is important to identify the components of qualitative research that make this the primary method of this study.

Creswell (1998: 15) has provided a standard definition of qualitative research:

*Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on a distinct methodological tradition of inquiry that explores social or human problems. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural setting.*

The notion of qualitative research is based on a constructivist/interpretivist paradigm. In this paradigm, the interpretation and exploration of the lived experiences of people and the meanings that they attribute to particular events are important (Willig, 2001). The researcher also plays an important role in qualitative design and is involved with participants in the empathetic understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Willig, 2001).

Semi-structured interviewing and focus group discussions are the most widely-used method of data collection in qualitative research. According to Babbie and Mouton (2005:289), in conducting qualitative interviews the interviewer has a “general plan of inquiry” or guide to ask questions of the respondents. Thus, this design took into account a deliberate selection of key
informants (KIs) who have a good understanding of the subject matter under study (Babbie and Mouton, 2005). This also involved the negotiation of access to organisations or KIs, and as well as ensuring their commitment to eliciting information (Roche, 1999:110).

A focus group discussion (FGD) is defined as “a carefully planned group discussion designed to obtain perceptions on a defined environment” (Krueger, 1998:88, in Smithson, 2009:358). It enables the researcher to explore the existing indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, and to explore the impact from the perspectives of the beneficiaries. Focus groups are small (about 8-12 people) and usually consist of people with similar interests. The incorporation of FGDs into the overall qualitative design adds to the richness of the data.

In addition to qualitative methods, the use of quantitative methods in this study was essential. According to Patton (2002:14), the quantitative method involves the “use of objective indicators and standardised measures so that the varying perspectives and experiences of people can be fit into a limited number of predetermined response categories to which number are assigned”. A quantitative researcher may use non-experimental methods and a predetermined schedule to measure perceptions of people, including change (De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport, 2005). Non-experimental methods are commonly employed in measuring change through impact assessment (De Vos et al., 2005). Roche (1999:23) defines impact assessment as “the systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes - positive or negative, intended or not- in people’s lives brought about by a given action or series of actions”. This study employed one group post-test design that uses the group itself as a partial control for alternative hypotheses (baseline data/need assessment) by measuring the group’s perceptions of change (Adelman, 1991).

Based on this framework:

- The current study used a random sample of respondents from Gambella Town and the Borana Zone.
- A retrospective approach was employed to reconstruct NGOs’ project indicators in order to ascertain the communities’ perceptions and experience of the NGOs’ programmes.
- A standardised, pre-coded household questionnaire was used to collect data.
- The quantitative analysis is explanatory in nature and serves to determine changes in perceptions. Part of the analysis involved measuring the frequency of occurrence of different characteristics in the sampled population in order to draw conclusions. The
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS evaluation version) for level of change and interactions between variables, was conducted to determine whether group differences in survey responses exist as far as beneficiaries’ perceptions are concerned.

- However, the study does not claim to provide a direct causal relationship between the programme/NGOs’ intervention as an independent variable and any change in perceptions of the beneficiaries as the dependent variable; this is because a control group cannot be utilised because of inherent methodological and ethical challenges (Roche, 1999).

4.3 Sample Size and Selection

4.3.1 Sampling and selecting the KIs

Until 2012, the Ministry of Justice was responsible for registering and regulating the operation and function of NGOs in Ethiopia. The Ministry had a database with the names, addresses, activities and locations of all NGOs in Ethiopia. This database was used as a sample frame to select the NGOs in the study. Moreover, the sampling was carried out after an extensive review had been undertaken. This included an analysis of the profiles of NGOs operating in the Borana Zone and Gambella Regional States, and directories of NGO consortia and available literature on NGOs working in these areas. Twelve NGOs from the Borana Zone of Oromia and twelve NGOs from Gambella Regional State were selected with probability proportionate size (see the sampling procedure diagram, Figure 2, under section 4.3.2: 80). Four interviewees were also selected from representatives of the Charities and Societies Agency (at Federal level) and Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (at local level), who were responsible for registering and regulating the operation and function of CSOs/NGOs in Ethiopia. The selection of KIs was crucial as this study seeks to engage the NGOs using in-depth interviews to examine their relationship with the government, as well as to explore the strategies they adopt to resolve conflict and the changes that have taken place over time. Thus, a relatively large sample of 48 NGO directors and programme coordinators/ project managers and four government representatives were selected for the study (the profiles of the NGOs, key representatives of these NGOs, programmes, interviewees and operational areas, are given in Appendices A and B).
The sampling procedure for KIs and FGDs was as follows:

- As explained earlier, the Oromia and Gambella Regional States were chosen from the nine Regional States of Ethiopia to select the sample for the KIs and FGDs.
- A purposive sampling procedure was used to select these States.
- Using purposive sampling again, Gambella Town in the Gambella Regional State and the Borana Zone in the Oromia Regional State, were selected.
- A total of eighteen NGOs in the Borana Zone and nineteen NGOs in Gambella Town were targeted.
- Purposive sampling procedures were used to select twelve NGOs from the Borana Zone and twelve NGOs from Gambella region.
- Using purposive and proportionate size sampling again, eight International NGOs (INGOs) and four Local NGOs (LNGOs) were selected from each group of twelve NGOs selected from both areas of the study.
- A large number of INGOs were selected compared to relatively few LNGOs because:
  - The number of INGOs is far higher than the number of LNGOs, primarily due to the organisational and functional capacity needed for participation in these remote and underdeveloped regions.
  - In contrast to LNGOs, the selected INGOs exhibited a specific focus on peace and conflict-resolution activities.
- From each of the eight INGOs selected from the two study areas, one INGO director/head (D/H) and one programme coordinator/project manager (PC/PM) were selected. Thus, eight INGO D/H and eight PC/PM were selected from the Gambella region INGOs and the same from the Borana Zone INGOs. Therefore, sixteen KIs were selected from the eight INGOs in Gambella Town and sixteen KIs were selected from the eight INGOs working in Borana. This made a total of 32 KIs from sixteen INGOs.
- From each group of four LNGOs, one NGO director/head (D/H) and one programme coordinator/project manager (PC/PM) were selected. Thus, two KIs from each LNGO were selected making a total of eight KIs from the four LNGOs from Gambella and eight KIs from the four LNGOs from Borana Zone. This made a total of sixteen KIs from the eight LNGOs selected from the two areas under study.
• Thus, 48 KIs were selected from the sixteen INGOs and the eight LNGOs from both study areas.
• Additionally, using purposive sampling, one representative from Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BFED) from each region was selected. Using purposive sampling again, two representatives of the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA) were selected.

4.3.2 Selecting the Focus Group Participants

Two focus group discussions were held in the two study areas. This number was determined to represent all ethnic group members: these included community elders, peace committee members, and youth and women who participated in peacebuilding activities or worked closely with development NGOs. One FGD was deemed to be adequate in each area since the technique complemented the data collected through the household survey and KI interview. The FGD participants were selected using the NGOs’ records and snowballing sampling to obtain a representative selection of views ranging from those of the younger members to those of the senior elders. This was done purposely as:

• elders are considered to be full of wisdom and custodians of the customary laws due to their experience of various cycles of community socio-economic, political and ritual phases including indigenous conflict resolution;
• the youth play an active role in conflict; and,
• development agencies used these groups as a bridge to community development and were active in many development projects initiated by these groups.

It was important to work with these pre-existing inter/intra-ethnic groups who were responsible for resolving conflicts and for managing development projects initiated by development agencies. These heterogenous groups were best able to address the research questions meaningfully given their past experiences and could thus offer rich insights. Powell et al. (1996), suggest the use of heterogeneous groups for both pragmatic and methodological reasons.19

19 Carey (1994) recommends that researchers should comply with the principle of homogeneity to facilitate free-flowing discussion. Nevertheless, work by Kitzinger and Barbour (1999) shows that there are only slight differences when comparing homogeneous and non-homogeneous groups and that these do not suggest that the maintenance of homogeneity is a prerequisite for successful focus group research. They argue that the purpose of the study should dictate the degree of homogeneity, and they go on to recommend that exploratory research could use heterogeneous groups, as they may produce richer information.
In Borana, the FGD was carried out in the Pastoralist Association (PA) of Surupa, Yabello Worada, and Kebele 05 of Gambella Town where the quantitative surveys were conducted. The total number of FGD participants in Surupa was thirteen, consisting of four Gabra, five Borana and four Guji while nine FGD members consisting of five Nuer, three Anywaa and one Highlander participated in Kebele 05 of Gambella Town. The initial target was to have eight participants in each category but for Surupa, thirteen people who were contacted through NGOs and local government officials actually arrived on the appointed day. The FGD sought to understand how the indigenous justice system was applied to resolve conflicts. The FGD also aimed to examine how the NGOs planned and implemented their development and peacebuilding projects through the existing indigenous institutional context. In so doing, it aimed to explore their contributions to peace and development, focusing especially on the role of the indigenous system in conflict resolution. As a result a relative assessment method “before and after” the intervention was used to clarify the former and existing real situation or change within the community (Roche, 1999). The FGD also had the objective of identifying indicators of change that would lay the ground for the subsequent survey and semi-interview schedule held in the area.
Sampling procedure
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

9 Regional States

- TIGRAY
- AFAR
- AMAHAR
- OROMIA
- BENSHANGUL
- SOMALI
- GAMBELLA
- SNNPR
- ADDIS ABABA

Using Purposive sampling of two Regional States (PS)

- Oromia Regional State
- Gambella Regional State

Using purposive and proportionate Sampling size of 12 NGOs from each

1. FGDs - Focus groups discussions (2 FGDs)
2. INGOs - International Non-governmental organizations (from 16 INGOs 32 KIs)
3. LNGOs - Local Non-governmental organizations (from 8 LNGOs 16 KIs were drawn)
4. R/Ds - Representatives or Heads of Non-governmental organizations (24 R/Ds (KIs))
5. PC/PM - programme coordinator/ project manager (PC/PM) (total 48 KIs from 24 NGOs)
6. GRs - government representatives (total= 4 GRs)
4.3.3 Sampling for the household survey

4.3.3.1 Research Setting: Study area and Population

Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of chapter three provided a brief overview of the location of the Gambella and Borana regions. Their demography and socio-political historical background were also described briefly. The following section presents a description of the Yabello district and Gambella Town/ district. It also summarises the research process and sampling for the household survey.

- **Yabello District/Woreda**

One of the districts chosen for the study was Yabello, in the Borana Zone of Oromia Regional State, about 565 kilometers from Addis Ababa in the southern part of Ethiopia. Yabello district covers an area of 5,909 km\(^2\) and has a total population of 102,385 (CSA, 2007). The district contains eighteen rural Peasants’ Associations (PAs) (CSA, 2007). As indicated above (section 3.4 chapter three), members of the Oromo including the Borana, Gabra and Guji groups dominate the conflict dynamics in the region (Bassi, 2010). More specifically, these groups inhabit the Yabello PAs of Surupa and Dida Hara. Additionally, these PAs have a high rate of violence among the Guji, Gabra, and Borana, and symbolise the change in nature and magnitude of intra- and inter-ethnic conflict in the Zone (Bassi, 2010; Odhiambo, 2012). These PAs also display strong indigenous conflict resolution practices, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter. For example, the three groups use the *Gadaa* institutions to negotiate access to natural resources and to resolve disputes. Furthermore, NGOs such as CARE Ethiopia, AFD, GPDA, and GOAL Ethiopia implemented numerous projects aimed at addressing the psychosocial, cultural and economic causes of conflict. These were part of the rationale in choosing these areas for study, as discussed in detail in the following section.

Surupa PA has a total population of 4,368 persons with 685 households. Dida Hara has a total population of 11,755 with 2,458 household units (CSA, 2007). These areas are largely rural with pastoralism as the major economic activity. The Borana are predominantly cattle pastoralists and transhumant while the Guji are agro-pastoralists (Bassi, 2010). The Gabra rely primarily on camels and are highly mobile, relying on grazing land in the Borana and Guji plains in the dry season. Geographically, the Gabra have occupied a very contentious position between the Borana
and Guji groups creating a buffer zone between them; they have shifted their allegiance between the Guji and Borana groups over time, based on access to natural resources (Bassi, 2010; Watson, 2001). During conflict, those Gabra who live in close proximity to Guji groups aligned with those Guji. Similarly, the Gabra who live close to the Borana supported the Borana (Bassi, 2010). For example, the Gabra supported the Borana when violent conflict broke out between Surupa Borana and Guji in May 2006, killing hundreds of people and displacing 24,000 others. SOS Sahel, AFD and Care Ethiopia initiated improved intra-ethnic relations through intra-ethnic cooperation initiatives.

**Figure 2. Map of the Borana Zone (study area)**

Source: Ardajila, 2013

- **Gambella Town**

  The second district in Gambella Regional State chosen for the survey was Gambella Town, which is the capital town of the Gambella district as well as the capital town of Gambella Regional State. As shown above (section 3.1, chapter three) the largest groups in the town are the Highlanders (including the Amhara, the Oromo, Tigre and others), the Nuer and the Anyuwa. These groups dominate the conflict dynamics in the region. According to the 2007 census, the
population of the town was 39,022, of whom 34% were Anywua, 10% Nuer and 56% were Highlanders (CSA, 2007). The town is subdivided into five Kebeles such as ‘01’, ‘02’, ‘03’, ‘04’, and ‘05’. Kebele 02 has a total population of 5,841 persons; with 1,534 households while Kebele 05 has a total population of 7,501 persons with 2,458 household units (CSA, 2007). The area is predominantly urban with different livelihood strategies: the Highlanders dominate the trade and civil sectors, while the Anyuwa are represented in the civil service sector (Feyissa, 2011). According to Borchgrevink and Lie (2009), despite their exclusion from the political process, the highlanders account for 56% of the civil service sector followed by Anyuwa at 36% and Nuer at 6%.

Kebeles 02 and 05 were selected for this study because they experienced a marked level of conflict over the last two decades, ranging from sporadic violent conflicts to organised and systematic violence (Feyissa, 2011). These two Kebeles experienced the worst forms of violence over the last two decades (Feyissa, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma, 2006). As a result more than a hundred people lost their lives, over four hundred houses burned to the ground and ten thousand people became Internally Displaced People (IDPs) (HRW, 2005; Hussein, Kebede and Schaafsma, 2006). NGOs such as the Red Cross, Zuid Oost Azie Refugee Care (ZOA Refugee Care), Pact Ethiopia and ACORD initiated specific projects to deal with these conflicts; these measures included the promotion of customary institutions, as well as supporting intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic peace groups consisting of the Nuer, Anywaa and Highlander residents of Newland and Echuey. They also initiated capacity building programmes for peace committees of elders and also facilitated the activation of customary laws for conflict resolution. The Red Cross initiated livelihood enhancement to promote a new shared interest for the Anywaa and the Nuer in the mixed and conflict-ridden neighbourhoods. For all these reasons, these two Kebeles were selected for more specific focus areas of study.
As briefly indicated above, this study used a sampling frame of the four NGOs from Gambella and six NGOs from the Borana zone to select the beneficiaries (see Table 1). Then, two INGOs from the Borana Zone and two other INGOs from Gambella were selected. Two districts, (Yabello district in Borana and Gambella Town in the Gambella Region) were selected from where these four NGOs are operating. From these districts, four local communities (Kebeles or Peasant Associations (PAs)) were selected. Within each Kebele, thirty households were selected following the framework provided by the NGOs. A combination of purposive and random sampling procedures was used to select households with similar characteristics. This approach was aimed at ensuring that the study reflects a wide variety of perceptions, so that any similarities that may emerge are likely to reflect core impacts (Roche, 1999). However, the sampling method was dependent on acquiring accurate lists of beneficiaries in the selected Kebeles. The NGO database containing the names and addresses of the beneficiaries was used as a sample frame to select beneficiaries. The local Kebele administrations also had “the most reliable data” on the beneficiaries per household because they used the data on a daily basis for
providing services and distributing public resources. Moreover, a pilot study for analysis of power further supported the selection of an appropriate sample for the study (see section, 4.5). It was from the data that respondents were selected using a systematic random sampling procedure. Note the following points below:

In Borana:
- Surupha and Dida Hara, the PAs of Yabello district, were purposely selected for the study.
- Two INGOs (CARE-Ethiopia and Goal Ethiopia) were selected from the NGOs working in these PAs. Goal Ethiopia operates in the Yabello and Teltelle districts and Care Ethiopia operates in all districts of the Borana Zone.
- Using the records of these INGOs as sample frameworks, thirty beneficiaries from each Kebele or PA, who were heads of households, were selected randomly using systematic sampling with a random start.

In Gambella Town:
- Kebeles 02 and 05 of Gambella Town/ district were selected for the study.
- This study purposely selected two INGOs (ACORD and Pact Ethiopia) from five NGOs working in these Kebeles.
- ACORD operates in Gambella Town, Itang, Jikawo and Godere Districts. Pact Ethiopia operates in all twelve districts of Gambella Regional State, including Gambella Town. Kebeles 02 and 05 of Gambella Town were purposely selected from where these NGOs operate.
- Using the records of these INGOs as sample frameworks, thirty beneficiaries from each Kebele or PA, who were heads of households, were selected randomly using systematic sampling with a random start. Table 1 shows the sample of households taken from each Kebele. The findings are linked to the quantitative questions attached in Appendix E.
Table 1: Sample households for the assessment in four Kebeles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zones</th>
<th>Woradas(Districts)</th>
<th>Kebeles (Peasant Associations)</th>
<th>NGOs selected</th>
<th>Sample of the beneficiaries (households)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borana</td>
<td>Yabello</td>
<td>Surupha Dida Hara</td>
<td>Goal Ethiopia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Did Hara Surupha</td>
<td>Care Ethiopia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>Gambella Town</td>
<td>02 Kebele</td>
<td>Pact Ethiopia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>05 Kebele</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>02 Kebele</td>
<td>ACORD Ethiopia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>05 Kebele</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Research Instruments

Three main instruments were used to collect data; these were key informant (KI) interview guides, focus group discussion (FGD) guides and household questionnaires. The choice of the instruments was based on the mix of qualitative and quantitative methodology.

4.4.1 Interview Guide and key informant interview guides

Detailed interviewing took place, using a semi-structured schedule with questions pertaining to the objectives of the research (Appendices C and D). This schedule was used as a guide. The Focus Discussion Group (FGD) guide was designed as a follow-up instrument for generating further information to augment the data generated from the quantitative survey. The guide was used to solicit information; sample guides are provided in Appendix D.

4.4.2 The Household Questionnaire

A standard questionnaire with pre-coded questions relating to the research objectives, was administrated to 120 respondents (heads of households), each one representing a household (see Appendix E). The technique adopted was a face-to-face interview as opposed to a self-administrated questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews were preferred because of the relatively low
literacy level in Ethiopia’s rural community. Thus, a face-to-face interview was considered more practical; moreover, it would greatly minimize the level of non-response with regard to all or parts of the questionnaire. Key sections of the questionnaire included: involvement in peacebuilding activities and change in the level of the incidence of conflict, respondents’ perceptions of “social bridging” schemes, such as cross-community contact, trust, tolerance and social prejudice and the respondents’ evaluations of the NGOs’ livelihoods enhancement programmes, including their assessments of the extent of improvement, such as alleviating the economic and social consequences of conflict. Questions also covered any changes in the level of household income, reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructures, and cooperation in cross-community development. Space was provided for interviewers to note down any detailed comments and explanations during the course of the interview, if these could not be captured in the response categories.

4.5. Piloting the research instruments and setting up KIs and FGDs

A pilot study provides an opportunity to gain preliminary experience of the research areas as well as an opportunity for the researcher to perform reliability and validity tests of the study (Roche, 1999). A short pilot study was conducted to examine the effectiveness of the KI guide and survey questions. The questionnaire and interview guide were administered to four beneficiaries and three KIs, respectively. A review of these data helped the researcher to gather suggestions, and to adapt questions where respondents indicated that the questionnaire was vague or confusing, or needed to be changed from its original format. Based on the results of the pilot study, attempts were made to ensure that the questions were understandable and expressed in a suitable way. The availability of the NGO records, respondents, KIs and FGD participants was also assessed.

The KIs who were met through preliminary appointments included: the Ethiopian Pastoralist Forum (EPF), which is a consortium of 27 NGOs working to promote the pastoralists’ livelihoods through advocacy and capacity building; the Save the Children Federation, a consortium of CARE Ethiopia, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, and Save the Children/UK and US, and the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA), formerly known as CRDA, with 334 member agencies operating in food security, rural and urban development across the country. The researcher also had an opportunity to attend
a two-day annual workshop (27 and 28 October, 2011) titled: “Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative (PLI) Policy Project, Review of natural resources management/enclosures in pastoralist areas”. This took place in Yabello and involved most of the NGO directors and heads (D/H) as well as their programme coordinators/ project managers (PC/PM). This workshop therefore provided a venue for the informal collection of information about NGOs in the region, and this was used to refine the data collection tools.

4.6 Research Assistants

Selecting and training enumerators was a crucial component of the survey method because the researcher does not speak the Nuer and Anyuwaa languages of the Gambella Town. This study involved face-to-face interviews for collecting accurate data in a “non-literate” society. Therefore, a deliberate attempt was made to include not only enumerators who work in NGOs but also outsiders; the intention was to balance experience, objectivity, and acceptance by the community. Also, these enumerators had knowledge of local languages. The research assistants were trained by the researcher himself and oriented in the current research to make sure that they understood the subject matter, the key objectives and research questions. They were also trained to administer the household questionnaire in such a way that vague or non-responses were minimized. As part of the training, the questionnaire was reviewed in detail to make sure that all the interviewers understood the questions properly as well as the response categories.

4.7 Data Collection

4.7.1 Collecting the qualitative data

Discussions with the KIs and FGDs were used to collect the qualitative data.

- In-depth Interviews with Key Informants

The researcher conducted all the in-depth interviews with the 52 key informants (KIs). Most of these interviews were conducted in the offices of the KIs. A small number were conducted in a private place on prior appointment with the KI, if the office did not provide a private, quiet environment. The KI interviews were recorded, with the prior permission of the interviewee, to ensure that all information was captured. In a few instances, the KIs did not give permission; for example, if they felt that their opinions and perceptions might be controversial. In such instances,
the interviewer made an effort to write notes as the interview proceeded. Follow-up interviews to get clarification of some information took place either by telephone or electronic mail with some KIs; otherwise a face-to-face meeting was rescheduled. This was particularly helpful after the initial analysis of the qualitative data, where some findings needed clarity or a second opinion was deemed necessary.

- **Focus Group Discussions**

As indicated in section 4.3.2, two FGDs were held with community members in the study area to assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices and the way that these are adopted by the NGOs to resolve conflict. Those FGDs also aimed to examine the participants’ perceptions and experience of the NGOs’ interventions. The objectives of the study were explained in simple terms to the participants, and it was mentioned that this study was primarily for academic purposes. This was very important for two reasons. First, some of FGD participants were members of local peace committees organised and trained by NGOs and Government; the conflict resolution activities and issues concerning the conflict were sensitive matters. Second, NGOs initiate development projects with the participation of these leaders. Therefore, the aim was to minimize suspicions about the purpose of the research in order to create a free environment for discussion and to avoid raising any unrealistic expectations among the participants. The researcher acted as the moderator while an assistant took notes to back up the taped records. The moderator made every effort to draw meaningful responses from all participants while at the same time attempted not to pressurise anybody to answer any particular question. Although each individual was encouraged to participate actively, it was ultimately the views of the group rather than those of the individual participants that were of interest to the researcher. The nature of the discussion allowed the moderator to probe for details, while at the same time allowed the moderator to keep discussion focused on the key themes and objectives.

- **Secondary Data**

A review of relevant documents, some obtained from organisations through the KIs, took place to capture information relevant to the research questions. An analysis of the new Proclamation (PPRRCS) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP) took place to put the study of NGOs in a proper context. The PRSP guidelines and sector performance reports were reviewed. Other
key reports included reports from the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BFED),
the Department of Development, Cooperation Affairs and Non-Governmental Organisations and
the Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia (2007). All these reports provided crucial data
for the background (context) information, but were also useful reference points during data
interpretation and analysis. Documents specific to peacebuilding and development projects were
obtained from the NGOs’ libraries and some scheme documents from government departments
such as BFED and Federal Affairs. NGO project proposals, baseline studies, and quarterly and
annual progress reports relevant to the research questions were constantly but carefully reviewed;
relevant aspects were incorporated in the discussion of findings.

4.7.2 Collecting the quantitative data using the questionnaire

Quantitative data was collected using a household questionnaire with face-to-face interviews.
This procedure focuses much more on the presumed impact of peace interventions. The
researcher, accompanied by research assistants, would collect data in each Kebele. One
interviewer would interview the individual household heads once. The interviewer would ask the
questions and then tick or fill in the appropriate response on the questionnaire. Interviewer bias,
which can easily arise from face-to-face interviews, was minimized by using standardised
questions, pre-coded responses and daily group editing to check for inconsistencies. There are
several advantages in having a questionnaire administered by the interviewers, such as a high
response rate, clarification of confusing questions and reduction of incomplete responses (Babbie
& Mouton, 2005).

4.8 Data analysis

4.8.1 Analysis of qualitative data

In this study, thematic analysis was employed. Thematic analysis is defined by Boyatzis (1998:4)
as “a process for encoding qualitative data that enables the researcher to discover patterns or
recurrence in the data and classify or describe them logically”. Boyatzis (1998) has offered three
reasons why thematic analysis is useful. First, it provides the researcher with the categorisation
of patterns and a link between any new or emerging patterns observed in the data. Second, it
allows the researcher to employ, systematically, diverse data that could enhance the reliability
and validity of the data analyses. Finally, it provides a link to any patterns that others may have
observed and considered, through theory and conceptual framework (Maxwell, 2005). Therefore, in the case of data from the KI and FGDs interviews, thematic analysis was employed to identify emerging themes and subthemes based on their level of recurrence within the data collected and in line with the key research questions. Qualitative data was analysed in the following manner (Tesch, 1990).

I. First, all interview responses were transcribed from tapes and typed into a Word document.

II. In the second step, the researcher examined the data to get initial impressions.

III. One transcript was taken as a preliminary impression of the nature of the interviewee’s response; it was critically analysed in relation to categories and themes emerging from all the data. Then, categories, themes and patterns were identified in relation to salient themes and language, as well as from the broader background of the research objectives.

IV. These categories and themes were coded using colour coding and were grouped together.

V. An organising system or development of theoretical concepts was developed, in relation to research questions and the available data.

VI. Using the framework as a guideline, the findings were discussed in relation to the literature review and conceptual frameworks.

4.8.2 Quantitative data analysis

Bivariate analysis was the main approach used for the analysis, and it was based on the descriptive design of the study. A computer assisted analysis was done using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS evaluation version). A causal-comparative approach was used to establish any correlation between participation in conflict resolution training and participation in peacebuilding. The approach examined the relationship between NGO intervention and “individual development”, “social bridging” and livelihoods enhancement. Here, it paid particular attention to the relationship between “individual empowerment” and tolerance, prejudice and trust. The change in the incidence of conflict as well as factors contributing to the change were highlighted. Relationships were examined between the NGOs’ interventions and the adoption by participants of new attitudes, new relationships, and their development of joint activities. Their willingness to undertake trade, and to do business with each other, was also examined. Cross tabulations were used to compare participants in conflict
resolution training with nonparticipants. Chi-square tests were done for selected variables to estimate the levels of significance of relationships between those variables and training in conflict resolution. Thus, these tests were deemed more appropriate.

4.9 Credibility and validity

There was a need to establish that the qualitative methods and the conclusions drawn by qualitative research are credible and do not stem from the researcher’s own biases. In research, the term “validity” is used to refer to the “correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account” (Maxwell, 2005: 106). The types of credibility procedures used in this study include triangulation and researcher’s reflexivity.

4.9.1 Triangulation

Triangulation is “a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, 2000:126). It involves the “use of multiple and different sources, methods, investigators, and theories to shed light on a theme or perspective” (Creswell and Miller, 2000:127). In this study, data were gathered from a variety of sources, including the surveys and oral interviews. This served as a basis for triangulation. The use of quantitative as well as qualitative research questions, data analysis procedures, and inferences is also a form of triangulation.

4.9.2 Researcher’s reflexivity

Creswell and Miller (2000:127) describe researcher’s reflexivity as “the process whereby researchers report on personal beliefs, values, and biases which may shape their inquiry”. A researcher’s opinions and potential biases should be acknowledged before the researcher interacts with participants and analyses the data. Creswell and Miller (2000:127) further recommend that researchers should explicitly “acknowledge and describe their beliefs and biases early in the research process to allow readers to understand their positions”. This researcher happens to be one of a generation of activists involved in the Ethiopian University students’ struggle for democracy. The researcher believed that the new Federal Government’s Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCS) was in fact curtailing civil society’s political space especially with regards to the role
of NGOs in conflict transformation. Despite this belief, deliberate attempts were made by the researcher to enter the field with an open mind so as to gain an unbiased account of what was ‘happening on the ground’. Supervision played a key role in this regard where assumptions were constantly being tested. Thus the notion of bracketing or ‘suspension of researcher biases’ was a constant process as the study progressed (Creswell and Miller, 2000).

4.10. Ethical issues

This study was initiated through discussions with government officials, district and local leaders (clan and village elders) as well as with NGOs. Official permission to carry out the research was granted by Oromia Administration and Security Office and by Gambella Administration and Security Office; this was granted after reviewing and approving the proposal. The approval letters also served as an introduction to the Worada Administration and Security Office in each district, in order to gain entry into the community where the research was conducted. To avoid any misunderstandings, it was made clear that the study was not sanctioned by any particular NGO or government agency, and that there should be no expectations from the study; such false expectations could include improvements or inauguration of development projects in the area or more funding, as was the case with most NGOs or government development planning. The respondents duly understood that this research was mainly for academic purposes, and that the results could be used to improve service delivery in the future, if the responsible authorities and agencies chose to make use of the results.

4.11 Limitations of the study

The main limitations of this study have been indicated in the discussion of the methodology (section 4.2: 74). Some other limitations are highlighted below, with ways of minimizing their adverse effects on the study outcome:

- The nature of the research topic raises its own challenges and limitations. The volatile political atmosphere in the country and the unhealthy relationship between NGOs and the government affected the validity and reliability of the research outcome. This gap was reduced by building rapport with the groups under scrutiny.

- The qualitative research design also carries its own limitations. The study relied heavily on cross-sectional data and had a weak design, making it difficult to infer causality. Thus, the
study does not claim to provide a direct causal relationship between the programme as an independent variable and change in perceptions of the beneficiaries as a dependent variable; the reason is that the study is not a longitudinal study and does not have a control group. The quantitative research design, baseline data and need assessments, might not be reliable if these were not conducted systematically, or not accessible or did not contain all the necessary information. This may affect the validity of the research. However, the data were reconstructed from the NGOs’ records and from beneficiaries.

- The quantitative research design could rule out the likelihood that changes could be caused by chance, rather than by other factors such as the NGOs’ projects. However, this limitation was minimized by triangulating the survey findings with the information from the Focus Group Discussions, Key Informants and secondary sources.

- The sample size is small and was selected through non-statistical procedures. This approach is appropriate, since the aim was exploratory rather than explanatory; however, it limited generalizability (Babbie and Mouton, 2005). Nevertheless, this does not preclude transferability and applicability to other similar situations.

**4.12 Conclusion**

The research methodology presented in this chapter provides a context for the presentation and discussion of findings in the following chapters. Essentially, the study employed a mixed methodology approach with an exploratory qualitative study. This allows for the triangulation and corroboration of research findings. Thematic and content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data, while bivariate analysis using SPSS was used to analyse the quantitative data. The findings are presented in an integrated manner with the qualitative and quantitative findings being presented and discussed concurrently. The next chapter presents the study findings.
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

5. Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the findings of the study. As indicated in Chapter One, the study intended to examine the peacebuilding potential of NGOs in areas of protracted conflict in Ethiopia. Field research conducted in 2011 examined the peacebuilding potential of development NGOs in the Gambella and Borana Zone of Oromia Regional State of Ethiopia. Specifically, this thesis, (1) explores the policy framework that impacts on NGOs in Ethiopia; (2) examines the nature of State and Civil Society relationships; (3) assesses current indigenous conflict resolution practices; (4) explores the strategies including indigenous practices adopted by the NGOs to resolve conflict; (5) examines the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services in their respective regions and (6) examines the perceptions of the beneficiaries about the services of the NGOs. As indicated in Chapter Four, the research design adopted was that of a mixed design method with an emphasis on the qualitative, explorative approach. The findings and interpretation of results are presented in eight major themes as shown in Table Two. The table also highlights the corresponding objectives that each of these major themes address. Furthermore, particular “category factors” are clearly presented in the table. These category factors are linked to the major themes. Various references pertaining to studies that resonate with this study are also set out in the table. The manner in which the table has been constructed provides a logical framework for presenting and discussing both the quantitative and qualitative findings. Thus, triangulation of data will occur systematically as each theme is unfolded and discussed.
5.1. Framework for presenting the Findings

Table 2. Main themes emanating from the Key Informant Interviews, Focus Groups and Survey findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Themes</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Category factors</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>References pertaining to Themes and Categories</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Emergence of Advocacy NGOs</td>
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<td>- Adversarial relationship</td>
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<td>Donors &amp; CSO Partnership</td>
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<td>- EU &amp; DAG</td>
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<td>NGOs &amp; State Partnership</td>
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<td>- Legitimacy</td>
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<td><strong>The New Proclamation</strong></td>
<td>FGD data inform interview</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Change of Mandate</td>
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<td>- Innovative Approach</td>
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<td>- Terminological Issues</td>
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<td>B. The change from “relief and rehabilitation” to development NGO</td>
<td>Objective 6</td>
<td><strong>From relief and rehabilitation to development NGO</strong></td>
<td>FGD data inform interview</td>
<td>Watson (2001, 2003); Harrison (2002); Bashaw (2001, 2008); Rahmato, Akalewold and Yoseph (2008); Rahmato (2000); Bassi (2010); Pavanello (2009); Riker (1995); Muir (2007); Campbell (2001); Campbell (1996); Clark, Jeffrey (2000); Clark John (1991, 1995);</td>
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<td>- Decentralisation policy</td>
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<td>- Incorporating peacebuilding components into development projects</td>
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<td>- The rights-based approach</td>
<td>FGD data</td>
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<td>- Do-no-harm approach</td>
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<td>- Indigenous empowerment</td>
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<td>D. Indigenous conflict resolution mechanism</td>
<td>Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 6</td>
<td><strong>The indigenous institutions</strong></td>
<td>inform interview</td>
<td>Minja (2009); Wasonga (2009); Onwuka (2009); Bebbington (1994); Uphoff (1996); Cleaver (1999); Watson (2001, 2003); Harrison (2002); Bassi and Tache (2011); Oba (1996); Scot-Villiers et al (2011); Bassi (2010); Leach et al. (1997); Muir (2007); Warren (1996); Chambers et al. (1989); Helland (1982, 1996); Irwin and Mitiku (2004); Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen (2005); Muir (2007); Feyissa (2003); Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003); Woldemariam (2009); Abbink (2006); Johnson (1986); Bassi (1996); Legesse (2000); Assafa (1997); Muir (2007); Chambers et al. (1989); Muir (2007); Stepn (1999, 2003); Leach et al. (1999); Homann, (2004); Rupesinghe (1995, 1996);</td>
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<td>- Resilient</td>
<td>FGD data</td>
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<td>- Emphasis on social harmony</td>
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<td>- Responsive and accessible</td>
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<td>- Participatory and resorative</td>
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<td>- Supplements the judiciary</td>
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<td><strong>Partnerships-NGOs, the state and the indigenous institutions</strong></td>
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<td>- Indigenous institution as a bridge for the community</td>
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<td>- Government administrative structures as an entry point</td>
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<td>- Complementation of government and an indigenous institution as entry point</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Themes</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Category factors</td>
<td>Data Source</td>
<td>References pertaining to themes and Categories</td>
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</table>
| **E. Indigenous empowerment**        | Objectives 3, 4, 5 and 6 | • Re/institutionalisation of Customary Institutions  
• Activation of customary laws  
• Capacity building for local government departments  
• Faith-based Peacebuilding Approach | FGD data informant interview  
Table 3 & 4  
Figure 8 & 9 | Bassi and Tache (2011); Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999, 2005, 2011); Miall (2004); Lederach (1995a, 1997, 2001, 2005); Burton (1990); Azar (1990); Aall (1996, 2001); Curle (1994, 1996); O’Brien (2009); Bassi (2010); Scott-Villiers et al. (2011); Zartman (1986); Fisher and Keashly (1991); Bassi (2010); Pavanello (2009); Irwin and Mitiku (2004); Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen (2005); Muir (2007); Steglich and Bekele (2009); Cleaver (1999) |
| **F Multi-track conflict resolution** | Objectives 3, 4, 5 and 6 | • Track One Peacebuilding Initiatives  
• Track Two peacebuilding Initiatives  
• Track Three peace initiatives  
• Peacebuilding from below  
• The need for effective Track One Peace process | FGD data informant interview Survey  
Table 3 & 4  
Figure 4, 9 & 10 | Chigas (1997); Kriesberg (2001); Aall (1996, 2001); Azar (1990; 1986); Burton (1990); Kelman (1991); Galtung (1975, 1981, 1996); Jabri (1996); Fetherston (2000); Kupesinghe (1995, 1996); Miall (2004); Michelle (2006); Boulding (1989); Davies and Kaufman (2001); Diamond and McDonald (1996); Goodhand and Hulme (1999); Goodhand, and Lever (1999); Goodhand, Hulme and Lever (2000); Bercovitch & Kadajfci (2002); O’Brien (2009) |
| **G. Inter/intra ethnic relations**  | Objectives 3, 4, 5 and 6 | ➢ Training as a part of an inter/intra ethnic relations initiative  
➢ Has peacebuilding made a difference? : examining the beneficiaries’ perception of NGO services  
➢ Individual development  
➢ Social bridging  
➢ Livelihoods enhancement programmes | FGD data informant interview Survey  
Table 5, 6, 7, 8  
Figure 6, 7 & 8 | Kelman (1987, 1993, 1995); Tropp and Pettigrew (2005); Tam et al. (2009); Malhotra and Liyanage (2005) Bilton and; Salomon (2004); Diamond (1997); Fisher (1997); Hewstone et al. (2005); Bassi (2010); Scott-Villiers et al. (2011); Kriesberg (2001); Lederach (1995a, 1997); Levy (2001); O’Brien (2009); Abu-Nimer (2001); Liekkind and McAllister (1999); Gebrewold (2009); Collier (2007); Homer-Dixon (1995); EUPPR (2006); CDACLCP (2006); Neufeldt (2007); Menkkhaus (2004); Michelle (2006); Caprioli (2000); Anderlin (2007); Charlesworth (2008); El Bushra (2007); EUPP (2006) |
| **H. Community development**        | Objectives 3, 4, 5 and 6 | Defining community development  
A people-centred approach  
Community development meeting social and human needs. | FGD data informant interview Survey  
Table 9  
Figure 9 & 10 | Carmen (1993); Scott-Villiers et al. (2011); Pavanello (2009); Galtung (1975, 1981, 1996); Aall (1996, 2001); Azar (1990; 1986); Burton (1990); Kelman (1991); Homer-Dixon (1995); EUPPR (2006); Liekkind and McAllister (1999); Gebrewold (2009); Paussewang (2002); Pantuliano and Wekesa (2008); O’Brien (2009); Steglich, Mirjam and Gezu Bekele (2009) |
5.2. Theme A: The State and Civil Society

Five major themes were identified from respondents. The first of these presents the emergence of the civil society sector. The second presents the emergence of advocacy NGOs. The third highlights donors/CSOs/NGOs partnership. The fourth section presents the state and NGOs partnership. The fifth section highlights the new Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCS). These five are discussed below.

5.2.1 The Emergence of the Civil Society Sector

The following sub-section focuses on the period since 1991. It briefly highlights how Civil Service Reform (CSR) and the decentralisation process paved the way for the emergence of an advocacy-NGOs sector. It looks at attempts to reinvigorate grass-roots organisations to promote the democratic process and considers how the NGO-state relationship has shifted as a result. This entails an examination of policy reforms and how certain NGOs fit into the political economy of the new institutional arrangement; their role in the new arrangement is considered, with a look at how this impacted on civil society and government. Some of the issues discussed, therefore, include the following: ideological differences; conflict over resource arrangements; formalising the relationship between government and civil society; and the need for strengthening government and civil society. The sub-section discusses how the nature of government is likely to mould NGO patterns parallel to those observed in emerging democracies. In conclusion, the sub-section extends the argument about the emergence of innovative NGO and government relationships.

- The Civil Service Reforms and Decentralisation and the Proliferation of the CSO Sector

Ethiopia ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favour of decentralisation around the same time that it launched a major civil service reform programme in the early 1990s, as a part of the process of state redesign. The argument behind these policy reforms within the neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) was a double critique: of both the dysfunctional state-centric development approach and its bureaucracy in meeting basic human needs (Olowu, 1999; Chanie, 2007). The state’s inability to produce economic wealth, and its dysfunctional civil service, endemic fiscal crisis, pervasive personal patronage and corruption and economic
disarticulation, and ineffective service delivery hampered any sustained economic and social development (Wescott, 1999). Instead, reformers pushed for civil service reform and decentralisation policies, in the hope that these would set free other actors in the private and non-governmental sectors. Whereas civil service reform sought to reduce the relevance of the state in development as well as reduce the scope and cost of the civil service, decentralisation sought to reduce the role of the state in general, through devolution of power from the central authority to the peripheries; it was thought that this would promote more effective and responsive government. Whilst the state and its bureaucracy would have a reduced role in the economy, the private and voluntary sectors would gain ground to provide public services delivered to the population and enhance government’s capacity to carry out its basic functions; this would promote devolution of power to the grass-roots, and also promote democracy and self-government at the regional and woreda levels (Campbell, 2001). Additionally, it was hoped that decentralisation, through ethnic based regionalisation, would also help Ethiopia to diffuse social and political tensions and ensure local cultural and political autonomy. In the process, the voluntary sector emerged as an alternative vehicle for the provision of the basic necessities of health, education, agriculture and social initiatives. Hence, the role of the donor community, from Wescott’s (1999) point of view, was to support the technical concerns of civil service reforms, and building and sustaining the institutional capacities for economic changes in the country.

During the civil service reform, the government restructured its civil service through privatisation, closure of public enterprises, and retrenchment (Wescott, 1999; Campbell, 2001; Clark, 2000). Since the early 1990s, thousands of civil service employees have left the service. Local government almost crumbled under these reforms but funding channelled through NGOs played a significant role in allowing NGOs to take over functions previously provided by the state. As a result, skilled and professional civil servants have sought roles in the burgeoning CSOs sector while other personnel found employment in the private sector.

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20 They negotiate by imposing coercive conditions on aid. Third World countries then have to adopt these policies as a precondition, by lenders, for lending money to pay a Third World country’s debt.
This is revealed by a representative of an NGO in Borana in the following extract:

...SORDU (Southern Rangelands Development Unit) (SORDU) (a state organisation) had the largest staff and was most successful in implementing programmes like water, road and forage development, veterinary services and rangeland management. Around 44% of SORDU’s funding was reduced by the donors’ institutions; it was forced to reduce its staff...most joined international NGOs. In its early phase, CARE-Ethiopia (an international NGO) became a major partner in SORDU and participated in institution building...after 1991 more international NGOs moved in...all the monies from the funders channelled towards these NGOs...further reduced support to SORDU. Most of SORDU’s traditional services are now run by these NGOs...but these NGOs have particularly short time frames; they are rarely able to commit themselves for more than 2-3 years ahead... they had little or no collaboration with government’s institutions. (A staff member, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, November 2011).

Several informants indicated that the NGO sector had continued to absorb most of the skilled and professional staff from civil service institutions. As a result, the civil service administrative bureaucracy is being dominated by poorly skilled politicians, leading to the politicisation and centralisation of public service delivery at Worada level (Mehret, 2002). This had led to further deterioration in the quality of public services, although NGOs are unable to replace fully the state organisations. The lack of collaborative partnerships between NGOs and local government has been attributed to untrained officials being unable to administer their bureaucracies effectively and civil servants being unable to implement strategies effectively and efficiently (Wescott, 1999). In addition, competition for development resources led to an adversarial relationship between state and NGOs, leading to co-option and suspension. While NGOs’ dependence on foreign resources raises suspicions about the vested interests of donors and local elites, lack of transparency around donor/NGO funding contributed to the adversarial relationships.

Bearing these factors in mind, the following sub-sections describe how these factors played into conflictual relationships over development locations and development priority.

- **Conflict over development locations**

Decentralisation proved to be problematic for various reasons. The politicisation and centralisation of public services delivered by the party members contributed to a lack of collaborative partnerships between NGOs and local government (Chanie, 2007). Local development programmes were perceived as running along ethnic lines and were therefore met with resistance from officials belonging to other ethnic groups. As a result, some of the local
government officials are reluctant to work with the NGOs. Some of the problems were described as follows:

In 2009, we carried out a need assessment at a district frequently hit by water scarcity. It took women up to three hours to fetch water. We developed a proposal and secured funds from a donor. The regional office approved the project but a local administrative officer was reluctant and recommended us to relocate the project to another Kebele (apparently inhabited by his ethnic group). Given the urgency of the matter, we appealed to the regional authorities and provided them with convincing reasons: the desirability...and possibility of its socio-economic benefits. The water was a question of survival for Nyajani whereas it was about authority for the local official...but they (the regional authorities) recommended us to implement as suggested by local officer. We had no option, but to bargain...we agreed to split between the two areas (two boreholes at each area). We couldn’t withdraw the project as we had already collected the money...we had to disburse and finish the project within the stipulated time...and we had to do everything to implement the project. Finally, a donor came to carry out project evaluation...we took them to the project sites. In one of the project areas (suggested by the local administrator), we couldn’t find a single family around the water source. They (donors) were surprised and asked; “Are you joking?”...we explained how that had happened. These were pastoralists who usually move to the river banks during summer. It damaged our image. You know...ethnic-political alliance is deeply interwoven from top to bottom...adversely affecting development interventions. The regional officials and the local administration were from the same ethnic-based political party and we couldn’t bypass these barriers. (NGO project manager, October 2011).

- **Conflict over development priorities**

CSOs aim to contribute towards the national development objectives and strategies as outlined in the PASDEP (See, section 5.2.4: 108-111). However there is tension over government’s resettlement programme; a strategy of addressing the problem of food insecurity in the country. The resettlement programme had been fraught with difficulties at a number of levels, but its association with “involuntary” resettlement of the Durge regime also played a part in its downfall (Feyissa, 2009). Therefore, most NGOs distanced themselves from the much-discredited programme although government tried to justify it on the basis of four pillars: voluntarism, availability of under-utilised land, consultation with host communities and provision of the minimum infrastructure:

The regional government appealed to NGOs and other donor organisations to participate in the resettlement programme and support a larger scale of settlers. We made it clear that our organisation receives funds for twelve months for projects like water development...we explained that funders specified that their funds only were to be used to support the project for which they were granted...this money was normally earmarked and could not be used to defray resettlement...they were not happy about that... (NGO director, October 2011).
Another contributing factor is that government officials complain of the relative abundance of resources brought into Ethiopia by NGOs, compared with the extremely weak capacity of regional and local government departments. Donors require NGOs to set out the capacity-building components of projects in proposals but this is more often carried out in relation to local NGOs or community-based organisations, rather than in relation to local government.

5.2.2 The Emergence of Advocacy NGOs: An adversarial Relationship

The mid-2000s brought about a rapid turnover of politicians and those connected to government as a result of pervasive personal patronage and a one-party state system. Many felt marginalised from the political process and opted out of the state and its structure for ideological reasons. Foreign aid channelled to NGOs helped their redeployment into the civil society sector. The voluntary sector thus began to emerge as a site for those who intended to engage in rights-based activities and the counter hegemonic strategy of challenging state monopoly got off the ground. Thus the process of political democratisation, with the help of these CSOs, gained momentum and was evident in the 2005 parliamentary election. Moreover, the civil society, for the first time, played a very decisive role in the country’s democratisation process by undertaking a vigorous civic voter education programme; this covered the right to register, to vote, on voting procedures, by actively participating in the election observation (Wondwosen, 2009)\(^{21}\). As a result, a number of CSOs came to occupy much of the public space, leading to an adversarial relationship with the state. However, the government often treated the CSO sector with suspicion, accusing them of harbouring opposition members and viewed them as political opponents:

Some CSO members were retrenched political personnel of the collapsed regime...and most of them joined international and local NGOs. They use these platforms to wage their ideological war against state policies. The government is aware of their political standpoint and often depict local NGOs/CSOs as ‘remnants of the military regime...even as a salient face of opposition parties’. This was verified when the founder and leader of Human Rights Organisation, earlier deemed to have close collaboration with the military regime, and who later joined the opposition camp by establishing a new political party. This gave the ruling party room to discredit the credibility and independence of local CSOs to be independent observers of the election. In my opinion, NEBE (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia) followed the ruling party’s discourse and decided not to register local NGOs/CSOs in the election observation. (NGO director, October 2011).

\(^{21}\) For instance, some local NGOs offered a civic voter education programme on the right to register, to vote, on voting procedures, and the duties and responsibilities of the people themselves in the electoral process. Other NGOs trained and deployed 200 election observers in different parts of the country.
However, the CSOs challenged the NEBE’s decision to bar the local NGOs/CSOs from election observation. This was the first major confrontation by a civil society organisation in the post-1991 era. In a campaign against NEBE’s initial refusal to allow local NGOs and CSOs to observe the election, the CSOs presented the first test case to find how serious government really was about democratic processes. The CSOs leaders put the democratic principle to the test not only taking the government to court, but also by winning the case. Many saw the action and the outcome of the court’s ruling as a good omen for the future democracy of the country:

_The campaign to take NEBE to court was the first major test for the rule of law and judicial independence. It was about testing and using institutional structures in place to challenge NEBE’s arbitrary and unconstitutional ruling...it was a great success for CSOs...they obeyed the law. I regard this as a significant step forward in the democratisation process...because CSOs stood for what was right and the government was willing to accept the court’s ruling; the court, in my opinion, made a historic decision, even under an uncertain political environment._ (NGO director, October 2011).

However, many NGOs/CSOs were not able to send the necessary number of local observers since the court ruling came very late. While some of these NGOs were required to renew their licence to seek legal recognition, a government official from the Association Registration Office was given powers not to register any organisations “opposing the ruling party”22. These NGOs found that their activities and programmes were increasingly regulated and controlled, to the extent that government determined their mandates, funding resources and the nature of their relations with local constituencies (Wondwosen, 2009). For example, in the post-election period, the government officially accused various civil society organisations of instigating a revolution against the government through street violence, and threatened to prosecute and ban some of these CSOs23. This allegation led to the arrest of many activists and other individuals working for various NGOs/CSOs (see, for example, Wondwosen, 2009). In the post-2005 election, the clash between NGOs/CSOs and the state either led to the government to attempt to enforce its power or to accommodating some CSOs. For example, at times the government worked to control or co-opt those CSOs that ventured into advocacy or lobbying for the promotion of the rights of the

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22 Civil society joined the opposition parties, and the international election observers in condemning the emergency; this declared a one month ban on all demonstrations and protests in Addis Ababa effective from Monday, May 16, 2005.

23 Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), later renamed to Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA), openly challenged and criticised the government’s justification killings, and detention of civilians protesting against alleged vote rigging and for subsequently declaring emergency laws to ban any political protest for one month.
child, and campaigning against cultural practices harmful to women. At the other extreme, it banned NGOs that advocated for Human Rights, free and fair electoral campaigns or blocked the implementation of policies formulated by these CSO groups.

### 5.2.3 Donors-CSOs/NGOs Partnership

Despite the space being created for the development of NGOs and the paradoxical attempts by the state to “control”, muzzle or co-opt Civil Society, NGO proliferation was encouraged by the injection of significant amounts of development aid to the sector (Campbell, 1996). The participation in democracy building signifies the extent to which the “political space” for NGOs has expanded as a result of bilateral and multilateral development assistance. The three most important instances of this collaboration between bilateral and multilateral donors, CSOs and the Ethiopian government were: first, the European Union Civil Society Fund in Ethiopia (EU-CSF); second, the Development Assistance Group\(^{24}\) and third, the Civil Society Support Program (DAG-CSSP). One joint venture between the donor organisations, CSOs and the Ethiopian government has been financed to an estimated amount of one billion USD by the EU through the European Commission (EC), which manages its development assistance and DAG, a group of multilateral and bilateral donor organisations based in Ethiopia (Cerritelli, Bantirgu and Abagodu, 2008). The purpose of the joint venture is to provide funding to build the institutional capacity of CSOs in Ethiopia. Thus, the issues of democracy building, human rights and good governance became an integral part of CSOs by the early 2000s.

The CSOs are largely financed by the donor community as a part of an elaborate civil service reform to enhance the role they play in service delivery, advocacy and policy formulation as well as their role in creating checks and balances. With more development partnerships between the state and CSOs, with a better quality of public services delivered to the public, there is a good likelihood that democracy and good governance will flourish.

Campbell (1996) has recorded other cases where the conditions laid down by donors have a measurable impact on recipient governments. Two examples are in relation to structural

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\(^{24}\) The DAG is a “consortium” of 26 donor agencies providing development assistance to Ethiopia and was set up for the purposes of information sharing, policy dialogue and harmonising donor support to Ethiopia. Its broader aim was to enable the country to meet the targets set in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The background and structure of DAG can be found at http://www.dagethiopia.org
adjustment programmes or human rights agendas. The notion of autonomous CSOs encouraging reforms has raised concern for some parties. The imposition of conditions became a central characteristic of many donor projects. These projects or partnerships envisage working with government and CSOs, to enhance networking and building good relations with the government. As could be anticipated, there were new challenges that had to be met within this approach as indicated in the following examples.

- **The European Union (EU) and Development Assistance Group (DAG) Civil Society Support Programme**

The European Commission’s Civil Society Fund (EC-CSF) was set up in 2005 and sought to reinvigorate the institutional capacity of CSOs by providing technical assistance and funding to promote rights-based activities. These include peacebuilding, women’s empowerment, human rights and democracy, accompanied by lobbying and advocacy to further these objectives. Tripartite partnerships were set up: these comprised CSOs, the Ethiopian government and the EU. Their purposes were to serve as a mechanism for increasing the capacity of government and local CSOs to deliver services, and to create a collaborative atmosphere for dialogue between the CSOs and the state. As a supplement to the EC-CSF, the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) introduced the Civil Society Support Program (CSSP); its purpose was to help CSOs in promoting democratisation, human rights, advocacy and governance. As in the case of the EC-CSF, the DAG-CSSP main partners are the Ethiopian government, civil society organisations and the private sector. About 2,000 local NGOs were drawn into these initiatives and about one billion USD were distributed over a five year period. These partnerships aimed at bringing citizens, CSOs and local government together in a common objective: to ensure efficient and equitable delivery of service to those areas in real need and to enhance social accountability (Cerritelli, Bantirgu and Abagodu, 2008). They employed a joint planning, monitoring and evaluation scheme that looked at the effectiveness and performance of the civil service, budget information and audits and quality of public services. Although these roles seem to limit the

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25 These partnerships comprised one-third government representatives (from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and Ministry of Capacity Building), one-third from the voluntary sector (directors from the Consortium of Reproductive Health Associations, Christian Relief and Development Association and Poverty Action Network of Civil Society in Ethiopia) and the remaining one-third being representatives from the donor community (European Community, World Bank and CIDA) (Rahmato, Bantirgu and Endeshaw, 2008: 23).
participation of CSOs to “inspection”, it also meant that decision-making devolved to the sectors that understand the problems at grass-roots level, thereby increasing the effectiveness of services delivered to the poor. These partnerships also provided an opportunity for CSOs to contribute to dialogue on development issues, agenda-setting as well as delivery of services. The experts brought together in these partnerships contributed to understanding differences, negotiating compromises, building trust and thereby improving local government and empowering local actors.

However, the funding arrangements were not entirely unproblematic:

*We used to get funds for our core projects on food security, natural resource management and health services...the criteria for the funding were gender sensitivity, involving local partners, sustainability issues, environmental issues, meeting donor’s country strategy and objectives, the area to be covered, the numbers of people served out of the total population, the most cost-effective way of achieving these objectives etc...but criteria keep on changing. These days they include ensuring human rights and good governance, monitoring and evaluating of public services deliveries...they are gradually increasing...diverting from our mandates...getting into the murky areas...we spent a significant amount of time and energy in finding funding resources to maintain our mandates. (NGO director, October 2011).*

Some NGOs expressed fears about the political ramifications of involvement in the contentious areas of human rights and governance. Nevertheless, donors have a great deal of power in defining developmental agendas, by imposing criteria for project proposals. As the funding criteria continue to change, the NGOs are being diverted away from their original purpose. Under the new legal system, NGOs must unequivocally specify their mandates and register at the federal and regional levels; government expects them to fulfill their mandates in the stipulated time. This resulted in a great deal of tension between NGOs and the state.

A further challenge to the donor/NGO relationship is the unstable and irregular relationship between donors and the CSOs. Some NGOs perceive that they are co-opted by donors into new forms of engagement with government; they may also feel marginalised when donors have “good relations” with the government:

*When they (donors) are not on good terms with government, they came up with predefined roles (for CSOs) and just put on the table...pressure (CSOs) to adopt new format...like monitoring and evaluating local governments’ efficiency, responsiveness and accountability in the delivery of basic services. When their relationships improve, they do not make use of our reports and recommendations to negotiate and bargain with the government. (NGO director, October 2011).*
Additionally, NGOs were uncertain about the stability of funding for their projects and were constantly in search of resources to complete projects:

*We were working on rehabilitation of traditional water points for human and livestock consumption. Before our intervention, we carried out a need assessment, developed a proposal, and presented to our stakeholders. We entered the general operational agreement with a donor agency to provide us with funds that cover hand tools, industrial construction materials, masonry work and transportation of stones, sands and construction materials. The donor agreed to disburse (the money) over two years. Generally, the contribution of the community both in cash and in kind was estimated to be 55% whereas the contribution of the donor was 45%. They (donor) stopped after the first disbursement and later informed us that they no longer commit themselves for more than the first disbursement...we couldn’t finish the project. This paved the way for the local government to criticise...even to threaten to suspend us from operating in the area...the community was disappointed...it created uncertainty about the trend of future funding. (NGO project manager, November 2011).*

NGOs had little capacity to enforce signed agreements and they struggle with project and programme continuity, thereby hurting their credibility and adversely affecting their relationship with the local government. This suggests that donors must bear some responsibility for the deteriorating relations between NGOs and the state. They might be able to reduce conflict by specifying their terms of grants (periods of grants and conditions of renewals) and being more open about their development agendas.

However, contrary to these problems highlighted it appears that most funders specified the period of grant, scope of project and conditions for withdrawal of commitment. Withdrawal of funding could happen if there are delays in commencement, unsatisfactory project progress and financial irregularities. Most NGOs enjoyed a trusting relationship with their primary funders. Several factors contributed to the NGOs’ ability to build this trusting relationship and these included: a history of financial accountability, a track record of stability and delivering services efficiently (Cerritelli, Bantirgu and Abagodu, 2008).

Donors do not necessarily determine the mandates of recipient NGOs unilaterally. There are instances when the NGOs were able to negotiate and dictate funding criteria, under which grants could be endorsed and disbursed; those NGOs included their own agenda as a condition for accepting money. For instance, an NGO involved in conflict resolution indicated that:

*...training [in conflict resolution] NGOs is not sufficient to bring about the required change. We have been advocating the donor community to include “do-no-harm” and conflict analyses into their funding criteria of NGO development projects. On this point we are somehow successful in convincing...*
the USAID and European Union, at a higher level. These days, gender sensitivity and environmental issues, do-no-harm and conflict analyses are the major criteria for securing funds in NGO development project proposals. (NGO project manager, December 2011).

The funders demonstrated a clear desire to incorporate conflict sensitive/ do-no harm approaches into their funding criteria. Therefore, the potential for scaling-up these approaches in the NGO activities was more favourable.

In response to the question whether an NGO would accept funding from a source that would try to influence its organisational mandates, a representative replied:

...I do not know of any funder or funds allocated...or intended to influence or undermine the integrity of an NGO or the local government. But the point is...we (Ethiopia) are one of the least developed countries. Let alone the NGO sector, the state is highly dependent on external assistance...it covers one-third of the country’s national budget. It will be unrealistic to assume that there will be sufficient funding from domestic sources to reduce its dependency on external funding and influence. But, we need to look at the achievements of the NGO sector as a result of funding made available ...on poverty alleviation, food security; fighting HIV/AIDs, gender issue...it doesn’t matter if it (funds) comes from international donors and foreign sponsors or local resources so long as we press on these... (NGO director, December 2011).

It appeared that the potential benefits of NGO-donor cooperation greatly outweighed the perceived political interest of donors. Thus, in general, NGOs were more likely to be pragmatic in securing foreign funds to maintain existing work and to develop a collaborative relationship without compromising their integrity and credibility. Moreover, the presence of an autonomous organising body for NGO/ donor relations, the DAG-CSSP and EU-CSF, offered a platform for negotiating and building trust between NGOs and funding organisations.

5.2.4 NGOs and the State Partnerships

Respondents from the NGOs sector focused on the following: the origin of partnership, innovative partnerships, and the possibility of co-option. Two issues arise: the regulatory and coordination focused issue, and programmatic interactions.

- The Origin of Partnership

The origins of partnerships go back to the early 1990s and the reasons for their rise have already been highlighted (See sections 3.4: 69-73). The government enacted various legal and policy instruments and provisions pledging, encouraging and demanding proper CSO/state interactions
In poverty eradication; this fact could indicate the state’s commitment to build a working relationship with CSOs. Moreover, the government’s Civil Society Organisations Capacity Building Program (CSO-CBP), launched in 2004, created an enabling environment for CSO participation, democratisation, delivery of services, and decentralisation. The CSO-CBP policy statement reads:

…it [the government] cannot achieve the objectives of promoting development, reducing poverty, and strengthening democracy set out in the SDPRP simply through its own institutions, agencies and programme but it must work in close collaboration with other development actors. This represents a shift in thinking from previous eras, and a change in the “rules of the game” from one where government monopolises the development process to a situation where promoting development involves a partnership between government, the private sector and civil society.  

(CSO-CBO, 2004:3)

Central to the CSO-CBP notion of poverty eradication, democratisation and decentralisation is the idea of partnership between government and civil society. The CSO-CB aimed at (a) creating an enabling atmosphere for organised CSOs, including capacity building (b) forging a partnership between government and CSOs, and (c) building the inter-institutional capacities of CSOs for enhanced participation in poverty reduction and democratisation processes.

The outcomes have, of course, been mixed. For example, the regulatory frameworks were liberalised and the legal status of CSO/NGO consortia was recognised: bureaucratic hurdles related to registration, license renewal and reporting processes both at federal and regional levels were relaxed (Cerritelli, Bantirgu and Abagodu, 2008). Accordingly, the programme provided an opportunity for building partnerships for working together and to negotiate and build trust. However, political space for policy dialogue remained narrow and NGOs were unable to muster the strength necessary to debate and negotiate on overarching national policies such as political and economic governance. This relationship remains, necessarily confrontational, but marks a critical period in the state-CSOs relationship in the post-1991 history of Ethiopia.

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The Issue of Legitimacy and Representativeness

The government’s view on priorities, CSOs roles and partnerships with the various NGOs was not uniform. The empirical studies reveal two types of partnership. In the one type, NGOs are expected to conform to key national policy directions of poverty eradication and programmatic frameworks provided by the government, thereby excluding NGOs from negotiating on “key national policy issues”. In the other type, the government engages Membership-Based Organisations (MBOs) and Civic Organisations (COs) in human rights, civic education, policy advocacy, women’s empowerment, voter education, and election monitoring activities. While NGOs were required to register to seek legal recognition and enter into operational agreements with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA), the MBOs and COs had to make direct implementation agreements with the government’s Justice Organs, National Election Board and other relevant sector offices. The differentiation of the roles was facilitated by the very theme of the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) policy document and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) Proclamation. The policy drove a wedge between the NGO and MBO mandates; in other words, between the right to participate in political activities and the freedom to be involved in development initiatives. The presumption that these rights should be restricted to citizens was adopted in the PASDEP, which describes the involvement of membership-based CSOs in political activities in the following manner:

\[m\]embership-based CSOs have an increasingly important role to play in facilitating interaction, and mobilising groups and communities to participate in social, economic and political activities. Membership-based CSOs are important actors in helping promote good governance, human rights, and the development of democratic institutions as new structures evolve\(^{29}\). (PASDEP: 2005:177).

The government came to regard membership-based CSOs as legitimate organisations that represent a specific segment of the population; therefore, government was prepared to interact with them. However, some argued over whether such rights should be confined to Ethiopian

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\(^{28}\) Proclamation No. 10/1995 (DPPC Establishment Proclamation) set up an independent public office in charge of registering and entering into agreements with relief and development oriented NGOs before commencing project activities. For more information see Proclamation No. 10/1995 (DPPC Establishment Proclamation), August 24, 1995

membership-based associations, or whether they should also be extended to NGOs with a narrow constituency. Critics pointed out that the right to political participation is limited to a member of the political community as defined by citizenship. International NGOs are not members of the political community and most local NGOs had no quantifiable and demonstrable constituencies, so they are not legitimate bearers of these rights. Therefore, the rights to political participation were limited those CSOs with legitimacy, representation, and accountability.

This view was also widely held among the government officials. For example, a government official directly involved in the Forum raised the issue of legitimacy of representation and efficiency:

> Unlike membership-based organisations, NGOs do not have noticeable memberships and they are not elected to represent the interest of any particular section of the community or the different layers of the population on behalf of which they advocate. On the efficiency issue...these days some of the government departments could deliver services in a more effective way...with small cost. Some NGOs have high operating expenses which adversely affect the efficiency of service delivery. (A Staff member, Charities and Societies Agency (CSA, October 2011).

This comment reflects the view, long held by most government officials, that the NGOs need to be more representative and accountable. It is often felt that NGOs lack legitimacy and are funded externally by foreign aid; they are unable to build a domestic constituency, or to raise domestic funding for survival and legitimacy. Some of these NGOs are also portrayed as “uncivil” and as a “rent-seeker” with an impenetrable boundary interwoven firmly together into an “economy of affection” (Fisher, 1991). Membership and functional relationships are based on kinship ties and they lack accountability. This has precluded their capacity to articulate, present and interact with government on the interests of the community. This issue, with that of partisanship, questions their legitimacy and efficiency; this is a hindrance for their involvement in the political dialogue with the government. Against this background of their formative stage and changing political context, the following subsection will discuss the perspectives of key persons about the impacts of the new Proclamation on their peacebuilding undertakings.

5.2.5. The New Proclamation to Provide for the Regulation and Registration of Charities and Societies (PPRRCS)

Five themes are central to this theme: change of mandate; innovative approach to peacebuilding; a people-centred approach; terminological and conceptual issues; organisational form-
centralisation of NGO management and, perceived reason for the promulgation of the Proclamation.

- **Change of Mandate**

As indicated above (section 3.4: 69-73), the new Proclamation has forced NGOs to redefine their *raison d’être* and mandates, which affects their choice of strategies to translate their goals into organisational output. It is worth noting that advocacy and peacebuilding activities account for less than ten per cent of the sectorial budget of NGOs. Therefore, the effect of the Proclamation was more unfavourable to those local NGOs dealing only with peacebuilding activities such as peace education and cross-community projects. Since these organisations had to receive most of their funds from foreign sources, the new Proclamation forced them either to shut down or to alter their mandates drastically. For instance, a local NGO that relied heavily on foreign funding had to change its mandate to a development NGO:

*Under the new law, we couldn’t continue with our core objectives. We had had two alternatives: to register as an Ethiopian Charity and raise 90% of our funding domestically and to continue our core activities or re-register as an Ethiopian Resident Charity and abandon our goals and change to “development activities”. We found out the first option was unrealistic and we had to switch to development and register as an Ethiopian Resident Charity.* (NGO director, December 2011).

NGOs are flexible institutions prone to organisational and environmental changes (Bashaw, 2001). They adapt their values and choice of strategies according to political climate, resources, and ideological shifts to achieve their goals (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002). Organisations that resist adjustment to the new political climate run the risk of being shut down, but those that play according to the new rules are rewarded with incentives needed to achieve their “new role”. However, the choice of a new strategy can be criticised for its implied compromise of the NGOs’ *raison d’être*. Yet, the choice of mandates and strategies need to avoid the appearance of violating the provisions of the Proclamation. In other words, NGOs had to define their goals and strategies in a manner that corresponds to the provisions of the Proclamation. Adapting new tactics does not necessarily imply abandoning core activities: it could mean striking a balance between playing according to the new rules while keeping the old role. This implies striking the balance between peacebuilding and development in innovative ways.
• Innovative Approach to Peacebuilding

The framework of the Proclamation is a set of assumptions which do not always reflect existing realities on the ground, particularly in the context of protracted social conflict. However, the clash between the Proclamation and realities can either lead NGOs simply to abandon their mandate or can help them in designing innovative approaches to pursue their goals. The adoption of the Conflict Sensitive Approach (CSA) to development is a case in point:

*We have incorporated CSA into our development intervention and this doesn’t contradict any of the provisions in the proclamations. This approach is a scientific method...defined as “a capacity of organisations to design, implement and monitor programmes in such a way that they maximise the positive effect and minimise negative impacts of their development intervention.” It has more to do with designing an appropriate “approach” and less to do with goals. Our goal [international NGOs] is not peacebuilding per se but to support grass-roots initiatives that contribute to conflict transformation...and the government has always been positive.* (NGO director, October 2011).

Distancing themselves from a confrontational relationship with government, some of the NGOs incorporated a “do-no-harm” approach, as found in Anderson (1999), into their development programme. In doing so, they abandoned the other clusters of fundamental needs, such as good governance, peacebuilding, accountable and responsive political environment that are critical for transforming protracted conflicts:

*After the proclamation we employ the Do-No-Harm-Approach. We no longer incorporate conflict resolution or good governance related issues into our development projects. If conflict arises, we report to the government. We avoid clash of programmes...for example, we involve government and local stakeholders.* (NGO director, November 2011).

Some NGOs were critical of this approach and maintained their ‘rights-based” approach to development. For example, an NGO director indicated the following reason for upholding their mandates:

*When we look at the root cause of conflict it is partly because of lack of development and absence of good governance. For us, if there is no peace there won’t be development. Therefore, we haven’t changed any of our mandates.* (NGO director, November 2011).

This view resonates with the broader discourse of “no peace without development” and/or “no development without peace” (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Bush, 1998).
• Terminological and Conceptual Issues

Some of the informants described the Proclamation as ambiguous and poorly drafted but others indicated that it limited their role to that of a relief-development continuum, and subsequently created a sharp division between the “rights-based” approach and development; this adversely affected the targeted communities. For example, to quote one of the informants:

...in this country...children are exploited and women are marginalised...it is completely illogical to curtail NGOs from operating in rights-based activities. For instance, if an NGO intends to register under the name of “Children’s Rights”, it won’t be allowed...but, what are children’s rights? They are rights to food, health care, education and protection...who could prohibit you from working on these issues? It is just about terminological and conceptual issues. Maybe the confusion emanated from government’s attempt to align the proclamation with the international standard so that others would understand it. (NGO director, October 2011).

However, the above quote might be construed as an unequivocal breach of the law or as manipulating legal ambiguity to erode the legitimacy of the state, thereby leading to a conflictual relationship with the state. This issue has also an adverse impact on the government’s decentralisation policy. For example, one of the informants stated:

We are no longer operating on any rights-based activities like women’s rights, peacebuilding...however, the local government has continued to invite us to contribute to these areas because...there are enormous capacity building gaps that haven’t been fully covered by NGOs within the government structures. (NGO director, October 2011).

Another interviewee considers a “rights-based” approach as a critical approach to conflict transformation in the context of protracted social conflicts:

We are working in a very delicate environment...any development intervention which does not embrace a rights-based approach is not a development intervention at all. If NGOs cannot work on these areas, their development programme is not “developmental”. (NGO programme manager, November 2011).

However, not all NGOs agreed that the new Proclamation had negative impacts on their approaches to peacebuilding:

The law doesn’t prohibit them from integrating conflict sensitive approaches into development...conflict is a reality...we always encounter cattle rustling, theft, dismantling our development infrastructures...we cannot turn blind eye on it, keep silent? We are still working...other NGOs think we are allowed to work on peacebuilding. (NGO programme manager, November 2011).
The other concern is the “narrow understanding” of conflict resolution in the Proclamation that led most NGOs to turn away from peacebuilding activities. It is an understanding which equated conflict resolution with only its political dimension. As a result, the same NGOs that recognised the relationship between community development and peacebuilding undermined their own raison d’être:

*NGOs are concerned only about their goals, but not about “how to solve them”. For example, most of the NGOs design projects to secure funds, implement them rapidly to meet a deadline...their structural capacity, staff performance and effectiveness are measured in terms of burning rate [rate of expense]. If you look at their projects, you do not see any conflict impact assessment...this happened because there were knowledge gaps, no tradition of such method and this approach is a recent phenomenon. Thus, what we can say is they have never had a conflict sensitive approach to development before or after the proclamation.* (NGO programme manager, November 2011).

This highly restricted interpretation of the Proclamation forced NGOs to abandon work in the field of peacebuilding. For this reason, the assumption that conflict resolution equals CSA or the do-no-harm approach, which was widely held in most NGOs in the two regions, is likely to undermine development outcomes. Only a proper understanding of the provision in the article that incorporates its conflict dynamics alongside its political moment can check this tendency.

- **Organisational Form- Centralisation of NGO Management**

The Proclamation also affected the NGOs’ organisational structure as well as the resources required to sustain NGOs and help them achieve their goals. One informant states that:

> [w]e used to have branch offices at Yabello, Arero and Guji Woradas. However, after the proclamation, which allocates 70% of the budget to direct development and 30% to administrative costs, we have to centralise our management at Yabello. This has created some pressure ...as we have to stretch out to remote geographical areas. For example, our staff frequently have to travel to our project areas rather than being stationed there for long (NGO director, November 2011).

- **Perceived Reason for the Promulgation of the Proclamation**

The Proclamation could manifest the state’s attitudes towards any CSOs that intend to challenge its legitimacy. However, there is consensus that the relationship between the state and NGOs has historically been adversarial. The following quote from one of the respondents summarises the nature of that relationship:
I should say it [the proclamation] was a cumulative effect of many factors. There had been unnecessary conflicts with government. Thus, the government had some grounds to curtail NGOs’ operation because some of them transgressed their mandates. Many NGOs had been banned even before the election and some NGOs were involved in pre-election and post-election politics, too. It was just what you call; it was the last straw that broke the camel’s back (NGO director, December 2011).

Whilst an adversarial relationship between NGOs and government was given as a reason in the statement above, other viewpoints seem to emphasise the specific issue of elites struggling for political power as being the real reason why both parties were reluctant to engage in constructive dialogue on the Proclamation:

If I could sum it up [the negotiation] in a single word it had been TENSE. In my opinion, there were competitions from both sides...and both stubbornly defend their positions and claim their views were right. There was less willingness on both sides to work together and compromise. This has something to do with our tradition and culture of political leadership [laugh]. There should be some kind of change from both sides for compromise. (NGO director, December 2011).

Thus, it seems as if an exclusive political system, elite factionalism and reluctance to negotiate and compromise all militated against drafting a working proclamation. However, some respondents felt that these elites can arrive at new rules of political interaction through negotiation, and accommodation. This was explained as follows:

We shouldn’t rule out such eventualities...it [the proclamation] was an immediate overreaction to the unfolding political events that threatened their power base. Once the dust is settled down...I hope they will open up the ‘lid’ for CSOs and seek for a new regulatory mechanism. You can’t close and control every movement at a time. It is better to open the space (for the NGOs) and control the other (focus on other movements) (NGO director, December 2011).

One might be tempted to predict that government would initiate reform of the law. Instead, an earlier analysis (Section 5.2.1: 98-101) found that reforms in Ethiopia seem to be occurring because of pressure from below and externally. The initiative to undertake political reform was driven by donor pressure and opposition protesters in numerous cases.

Some see the Proclamation as a mechanism of counteracting opposition NGOs. That means the law can be deployed selectively against political opponents. One of the statements that reinforce this view was made by a federal government official to reassure that the law will not affect the ongoing developmental activities of most NGOs. Rather it is meant:
To put a traffic light or a sign post for some serious abuses and deviances and ....to take administrative measures against foreign NGOs, who under the disguise of NGOs propagate terrorism and collaborate with extremists. (A Staff member, Charities and Societies Agency, December 2011).

This gives the impression that the new law is there to coerce rather than enforce. Some respondents doubt the structural capacities of the government to enforce the law. The core issue in the Proclamation was not limiting NGOs from operating in conflict resolution areas, but to curtail the claim of other NGOs to a right to participate in the political system and aggravate the environment in which they operate. Its effect was simultaneously to contain social movements and to sever their links with political movements.

**5.2.6 Conclusion**

The previous sub-sections outlined how various internal and external pressures paved the way for the proliferation of the NGOs sector and how these forces shaped the relationships between the state, the NGOs and the donors; the sub-sections also examined the implications for democratisation, service delivery, and decentralisation. It is worth noting that the actors and their objectives are enormously diverse and complex; each actor has differing interests, viewpoints and goals. It is also clear from the previous themes that NGOs have made a contribution, though insignificant in comparison to other actors, towards the democratisation and decentralisation processes. What has been less obvious is whether these NGOs were able to act as a counterbalance to the state’s monopoly of the political space or whether they strengthened the capacities of grass-roots organisations to influence the state actions.

It also appears that the level of involvement of the NGOs in pre-election and post-election crises was unacceptable to the government and culminated in a breaking point in its relationships with NGOs. To suggest that the banning would immediately result in conflict would be to offer undue recognition of the NGOs’ contributions. However, the long-term impact remains to be seen as it is too early to identify the adverse effects of the Proclamation on peacebuilding.
Figure 4. Summary of the Findings (Theme A)

**Reasons for the proliferation of the CSO sector**
- Civil Service Reform
- Decentralisation Policy
- Foreign Aid

**Donors-CSOs/NGOs Partnership**
- European Union Civil Society Fund (EU-CSF)
- Civil Society Support Program (DAG-CSSP)

**Focus of the CSO sector**
- Efficient and equitable delivery of service
- Democratisation
- Decentralisation
- Human Rights

**Impact of the New Proclamation (PPRRCS 2010)**
- Change of mandate from a "rights-based" approach to development approach
- Forced them to adopt a Conflict Sensitive Approach (CSA) to development
- Adversely affected their organisational form.
  Centralisation of NGO Management

**The issue of CSO/NGO legitimacy**
- Constituency
- Accountability
- Representativeness

**Adversarial Relationship between the state and CSO sector on**
- Democratisation
- Human Rights
  And
**Working relationship on**
- Poverty eradication
- Rural development
5.3. Theme B: Change from ‘Relief and Rehabilitation’ to Development

This sub-section introduces the respondents’ perceptions of the general context that led to the formation of the various NGOs. It also examines the reasons that influenced these organisations to include peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities in each region.

5.3.1 Relief and Rehabilitation to Long-term Development

While a handful of the NGOs in the sample were established in the early 1980s and a few emerged in the early 1990s during periods of recurrent drought, most were founded in the late 1990s in each region. Data from the field suggest that most of these NGOs were established in order to overcome various aspects of the 1984/1985 drought-induced famine as well as to contribute to relief and rehabilitation works and to assist government’s poverty reduction strategies. None of the NGOs investigated was established exclusively for the purpose of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. After these formative years, most of them are oriented toward protection and diversification of livelihoods, and natural resource management, to enhance the resilience of the pastoralist communities, thereby reducing their vulnerability to drought related shocks. An NGO director described the formative years in the following manner:

We (the NGO) came to Borana to contribute to the alleviation of drought-induced famine. We continued to build on the achievements of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, a programme operated by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). In these marginalised and drought-prone areas...poverty has been prevalent and the pastoralists’ coping mechanisms have been unable to deal with the effects of cyclical droughts. As a result, we had to change our mandate from relief and rehabilitation to (becoming a) development organisation. Since then, this organisation has been working to improve the livelihoods of the pastoralists and enhance their capacity to resist the recurrent drought. (Director, AFD, October 2011).

Another factor that contributed to the proliferation of the NGO sector in the area was the government’s decentralisation policy.

5.3.2 Decentralisation Policy

Following the promulgation of the Multinational Federalism of 1995 which institutionalised ethnicity as an organising principle, the state initiated ambitious decentralisation projects. Shifting power from the centre to the peripheries and empowering the local communities are seen as part of the democratisation processes (Feyissa, 2003). Moreover, the state’s inability to
deliver services and resources effectively to the peripheral pastoralist areas, as well as the increasing awareness of the role played by institutions at the local level, have compelled the state to enter into partnership with NGOs (Watson, 2001). This partnership implies the opportunities for innovations, involving the local community in planning, decision-making, implementation, and management and development projects. While the innovative approaches and their effects differ between these NGOs, of more importance are the common elements in their mandates and strategies, which correspond to the Government’s poverty reduction strategy “Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty” (PASDEP) of 2004. One of these partnerships includes working with NGOs on natural resource management:

The area (Borana) is predominately semi-arid grazing; with limited natural forest often vulnerable to erratic rainfall, recurrent drought, environmental challenges and changes ... [N]atural resource degradation has been a major challenge for grazing livestock. These fragile forests are subject to an increased use that led to conflicting claims and counter claims over the use of the resource... [(this)] often resulted in violent conflicts. In order to address the forest loss situation...our organisation was asked to join Oromia Region, Department of Agriculture, and Forestry Department in the search for new forest management systems. As a result, we established the Collaborative Forest Management Project...towards the end of 1999. (Director, SOS Sahel, October 2011).

Another factor that played a key role in the proliferation of NGOs is the political opportunities that arose, especially after the change of the government in 1991. A director who was involved in the formation of an NGO reported how the NGO sector has been expanding as a result of the prevailing political opportunities under the current government:

This NGO was initiated and established by local scholars who had left for tertiary education in the 1960s and 1970s. After the change of regime in 1991, they decided to come back and establish local NGOs that would serve the community. They found out that there were no indigenous organisations that work for the welfare of the local community in the area and they reached out to the Abba Gadas and local communities to address some of the social issues of the Borana community. (Director, GPDI, October 2011).

The devolution of power from the centre to the peripheries meant, first, that organs of local government and communities came to occupy much of the public space; second, there was a shift of human resources and expertise away from the central government into local government and the NGOs, as discussed broadly at the beginning of the previous theme (Section 5.2.1: 98-101) and section 5.2.2: 101-105). Moreover, the political opportunity provided incentives for individuals to form and use the NGO sector as an alternative mechanism to counterbalance long-standing political and economic marginalisation of the peripheries. It also meant that individuals
could use the NGOs for citizen activism and for advancing development and democracy to exert political leverage in policy formulation.

5.3.3 Incorporating Peacebuilding Components into Development Projects

In discussing the incorporation of peacebuilding components into development projects, informants often cited a general increase in the intensity of violence, the destruction of their development infrastructures and requests or even pressure on the part of government and donors as the main impetus for action. Accordingly, some of the NGOs selected for the study regarded peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities as only small parts of their work, rather than as their central focus.

When asked the reasons that influenced the organisation to include peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities, one of the informants reported:

*We have been serving 4,142 households of fifteen Kebeles; twelve from Taltalle and three from Yabello Worada. We had to include peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation indirectly after ethnic conflicts in our operational areas between Guji and Borana, Borana and Gabra in Surupsa Kebele of Yabello Worada and between the Konso and Borana ethnic groups Harawayu of Taltalle Worada. Thousands of people were displaced, many lost their lives, their houses burned, causing destruction of development infrastructures built over a decade. Due to these conflicts we lost infrastructure we built for the last two decades like schools, health centres, water holes...all dismantled. Therefore, we had to consider conflict issues in our development projects.* (Project Oficer, Goal Ethiopia, October 2011).

NGOs started to incorporate peacebuilding components into their development projects after the conflict. The Research Center for Civic and Human Rights Education (RCCH) Gambella Branch Office, indicated the following in its “Report on the Proceedings of the Annual Peace Conference” dated September 24, 2006:

*RCCH has worked tirelessly for the promotion of human rights and democracy in Ethiopia. Similarly, under the inspiration of human dignity and human rights fortification, the Center has undertaken conflict management and peacebuilding activities in various regions including the remotest corners of the country...[RCCH] has implemented peacebuilding activities in the violence stricken Gambella region of Western Ethiopia since the outbreak of Anuak/Nuer clashes of year 2002/3. In response to the incidents of human atrocities, RCCH has conducted research on the underlying causes of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict in the region, organized trauma healing workshops, peace conferences, and inter-faith dialogues.* (RCCH, 2006:1).
An NGO director described the rationale for, and the process of, integrating conflict resolution work into their mandates in the following manner:

*Sustainable development is possible when there is peaceful utilisation of natural resources. We started to involve local government and the community in development, planning and implementation for conflict resolution. We had to include peacebuilding. [W]e set up different forums including identifying the root cause of conflict and conflict resolution. We were playing a facilitating role... feuding parties, government and (others) sat together in search of resolution to the conflict. We also involved indiscernible actors that fuel or trigger conflict; for example youth and women. When conflict broke out they played a significant role in exacerbating the conflict. (Program Coordinator, Care Ethiopia, December 2011).*

Furthermore, other organisations, such as the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) and Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKS) offered a religious rationale for the need to advance peacebuilding (See section 5.6.5:159-163).

An appeal by regional government was another reason put forward for including peacebuilding activities into the development programme:

*On December 13, 2003, Gambella town experienced some of the worst violence that ever occurred in the region. Many villages on both sides were burnt down, hundreds of people were displaced, and many lost their lives. Many were still living in makeshift houses or hosted by their relatives. The regional government has appealed to NGOs and other donor organisations to participate in the rehabilitation of the returnees and support a larger scale of repatriation. The regional government proposed what it calls “face-to-face community dialogue” between Gambella people…we facilitated numerous peacebuilding conferences, and training sessions. (Director, Pact Ethiopia, December 2011).*

Another factor that influenced the NGOs to incorporate peacebuilding components into their development programme was the flow of funding coming from international donors and NGOs:

*Our donors were wary about the increased intensity of conflict and its impact on our development outcome …they approached us to work on peacebuilding. We welcomed the idea. We carried out a needs assessment, and the assessment confirmed the need to work in peacebuilding along with our development programmes. We developed a proposal and secured funds from a donor. We launched joint peacebuilding projects with other local NGOs, youth and government organisations and the outcome has been very encouraging. (Project Officer, ACORD, October, 2011).*

Virtually every NGO relied heavily on funding from international NGOs and foreign governments. Whilst flow funding coming from donors was given as a reason in the previous statement, some respondents felt that NGOs were pressured to emulate donors’ structural and
functional goals, and were increasingly being used as implementing and executing agents by donors:

*Donors tend to relate food insecurity to conflict, and absence of cross-community trade to cross-border insecurity. USAID, for example, was concerned about conflict and encouraged other organisations to incorporate peacebuilding. Some other donors included conflict analyses as prerequisites for funding an NGO’s development projects. Therefore, the NGOs were forced to include peacebuilding components into their development project proposals. (Project Officer, Mercy Corps, October 2011)*

The heavy reliance of local NGOs on foreign funding appeared to have lured these NGOs into implementing and executing roles prescribed by generous donors. However, the “positives” were seen to outweigh the “negatives” in the collaborative relationship between donors and NGOs aimed at filling the gap created by the weakened state. For example, donors shaped the peacebuilding projects, and local NGOs are increasingly called upon to play a prime role in initiating, facilitating and mediating those peacebuilding activities. The relationship can also be complementary if and when both parties agree upon a proper separation of responsibilities and duties in order to achieve a balanced cooperation without infringing the autonomy of either party. For instance, the local NGOs are seen to represent the proactive side of the intervention and the external agents its passive side. Furthermore, the funding arrangements for NGOs take into account the implications of their development programmes on the local conflict; as a result, many NGOs operating in conflict-prone areas incorporated “do-no-harm” approaches or conflict sensitive approaches.
5.3.4 Conclusion

The previous sub-section of this report sketched some of the dominant features outlined by the respondents about the context that brought about the formation of the NGOs; it included the reasons that influenced those organisations to include peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities in each region. In discussion of organisational formation, informants often cited the 1984/85 famine or recurrent drought, change in regime and the policy of decentralisation as the main causes for their formation. Other events that played a key role in incorporating peacebuilding activities were government and donor intervention. The donors’ funding arrangements have reformed the way in which NGOs design and plan development projects, and
have impacted on the NGOs’ relationships with the donors. The impact on the NGOs’ development approach will be discussed in the following sub-sections.

5.4 Theme C: A Typology of Peacebuilding Approaches

The NGOs across the sample had a tendency to use an eclectic mix of approaches ranging from the “comprehensive” approach to the “rights-based” approach and from the “do-no-harm” approach to the “indigenous empowerment” approach. Not only were the NGOs in the two regions likely to use a mix of approaches, but similar approaches were known and available to those NGOs, providing evidence of increasing inter-organisational and functional relationships. In the study, the NGOs selected activities that were either explicitly or implicitly informed by theories of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Therefore, the study used those theories to understand how the NGOs made such choices. On the basis of these theoretical backgrounds, NGOs have adopted the following approaches to dealing with conflict. These are: comprehensive approach; rights-based approach; do-no-harm approach, and indigenous empowerment approach.

5.4.1 Comprehensive Approach

The comprehensive approach is the most prominent one adopted by the NGOs. This approach is closely linked to the larger theme of “no peace without development” and/or “no development without peace” (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Bush, 2005).

When asked about the link between conflict resolution and/or peacebuilding and the comprehensive approach, an NGO representative interviewed in Yabello indicated that:

*It includes meeting basic needs...protecting and improving their livelihood, building their capacities for sustainable development and increasing awareness about HIV/AIDS. Of course we cannot solve all of them at a time but must be integrated and be process-oriented...we integrated conflict resolution...and peacebuilding is not one-time project...it is a process that must be pursued in time of peace and conflict so that it would bring about sustainable peace in the long-run. It also involves working on the “culture of war”, for example, changing heroic killings. Such kinds of change cannot be achieved overnight. Peacebuilding is, therefore, changing the attitude and perception* (Conflict Prevention and Resolution Program Officer, Mercy Corps, December 2011).

The approach clearly shows the high premium that the NGOs place on Galtung’s (1975) notion of positive peace which entails the structural transformation of situations in which the communities find themselves (Bercovitch and Kadayifci, 2002). It also shows how the approach
is geared to a process-oriented, integrated approach. Both Azar (1990) and Burton (1990) contend that meeting “human needs” must be prioritised when attempting to resolve conflict in war-torn societies. In his attempts to combine the “human needs” and to address conflict, Lederach (1997) also presents the comprehensive approach, which is attentive both to short-term and long-term resolution processes.

From the field research, there are instances of convergence between satisfying “human needs” and peacebuilding approaches. When asked how community development could contribute to peacebuilding:

We have a project called Strengthening Institutions for Peace and Development. In this programme, for example, we see the drivers of conflict as both economic and institutional problems. We encourage women and youth to organise themselves for initiating small business, including macro-finance. This would create an environment for communication among the feuding parties... [T]he problems of the pastoralist community are usually water, bush encroachment and range land shrinkages. We also introduced cash-for work to reduce drought-and-war shock related problems. This was designed to give a kick-start for asset building and restocking for reconstruction. Our project is integrated but given the intensity and magnitude of the problem, our contributions to alleviating the whole dynamics of the existing problem is very minimal. (Filed Coordinator, Mercy Corps, November 2011).

While pastoral areas have long been marginalised by successive regimes in the provision of basic services, recurrent conflicts dismantled infrastructures and caused destruction of property and life, and people’s capacity to respond to recurrent drought. Thus the satisfaction of “human needs” was seen as part of peacebuilding activity. Critical of this approach, most of these NGOs employed a “rights-based” approach as a viable intervention approach in favour of “satisfying human needs” when working in these conflict-prone areas.

5.4.3 Rights-based Approach

The second approach, the rights-based approach, is closely linked to Galtung’s (1981) notion of “positive peace” that involves removing structural contradictions and injustices through individual and group empowerment, to claim their respective rights. The solution, from these NGOs’ point of view, is, besides reducing the level of underdevelopment, to address the other clusters of fundamental needs; these include good governance, accountable and responsive government and are perceived as prerequisites for resolving protracted conflicts. Those NGO representatives who were interviewed felt that:
Our assessment shows that lack of good governance, political and economic marginalisation of minorities is partly responsible for poverty-induced conflict. Resolution of these conditions requires a rights-based approach to development, one that can ensure diverse and representative community engagement in leading changes that will empower and thus strengthen the community and ...enable them to demand these rights from those in power. A detailed understanding the underlying causes of poverty and conflict in these societies is an impetus for designing and implementing a rights-based approach. A rights-based approach could raise the awareness of the marginalised communities with regard to their rights and processes through lobbying and making the government accountable. (Pact Ethiopia, Director, October 2011).

Similarly, other NGO representatives interviewed in Gambella pointed out that:

Through our work, we learned that there were limitations to the traditional approach to addressing development and exclusion issues. Focussing solely on service delivery meant that the project was only addressing the symptoms of the community’s problems, and creating a culture of dependence within the beneficiaries. It was important to identify the root causes of the problem and to engage the community in identifying both the causes and the solutions to their problems. This approach promotes dialogue between different groups of the community and creates a sense of ownership over the project by the community. As a result, our programmes and partners in Ethiopia are currently working on the basis of our new Country Strategy for Ethiopia in line with ACORD’s new global strategy which recognises that significant improvement in the lives of marginal communities cannot be achieved without confronting the institutions and policies that perpetuate structural injustice and result in social exclusion and marginalisation. (ACORD, Project Manager, December 2011)

This view roughly coincides with Sen’s (1999) distinction between instrumental and substantive human freedoms; most conflict resolution efforts focus on addressing the first of these freedoms while tending to remain silent on the second.

As indicated previously (Section 5.2.3: 104-108), there has been a shift in donor emphasis, away from a purely service delivery approach towards a rights-based approach. Thus, donor funding arrangements have influenced the objectives of many NGOs, sometimes compelling them to go beyond their original purpose and aims. Below, a representative of an NGO indicated how NGOs integrate the rights-based approach in all development activities:

... At the time, donors stressed the need for developments in good governance, gender equality, and conflict resolution and citizen participation. There were debates that economic development cannot be detached from governance issues. They argued there is enormous “added value” in adopting such [an] approach...NGOs were trained in basic features and principles, and roles on how to monitor and evaluate a project using a rights-based approach. (NGO programme co-ordinator, November 2011)

Donors normally prefer to grant development proposals with orientation towards rights-based approaches...they don’t see significant added value in NGO projects for infrastructure development and service provision. (NGO director, October 2011).
A rights-based approach has become an implicit criterion for funding. A number of informants within the NGO sectors also described that donors were disenchanted with the traditional service-delivery approach. This is a clear example of NGOs undergoing change as a result of the pressure being placed on them by the funders. However, donors were not alone in redefining the scope of community development. Government’s poverty eradication policy has also played a significant role in influencing the NGOs’ mandates.

5.4.4 “Do-no-harm” Approach

Reminiscent of the contemporary conflict resolution approaches as found, say, in Anderson’s (1999) “do-no-harm” development principle, most of these NGOs incorporated “do-no-harm” approaches in their development programmes. The assumption is grounded on the argument that NGOs’ development interventions in the context of protracted social conflict may cause or aggravate violent conflict either by undermining long-lasting values or by raising the stakes of economic competition (Bush, 1998; Schmelzle, 2006). One NGO respondent emphasised that:

> We lobby government and our partners to follow a do-no-harm development approach. It means that before initiating any development programmes in conflict-prone areas they have to understand the local conflict dynamics and the implications of their development programmes on the local conflict. Failure to pursue this approach or misunderstanding the local context...or development programmes uninformed by local conflict dynamics could cause or exacerbate conflict. (Conflict Prevention and Resolution Program Officer, Mercy Corps, October 2011)

There is some empirical evidence to substantiate this fear. There are numerous instances of NGO development interventions exacerbating or creating conflict. For example, according to one of the NGO representatives, the conflict between the Gari clan of Somali and Boran was due to government’s failure to adopt the “do-no-harm” approach to its water drilling project on the Somali-Oromia borders where there was no clear boundary demarcation. According to this account:

> [t]he Borana pastoralist had to travel a long distance in search for water and pasture (since the water and pasture are located at different places). To resolve this problem, the government of Oromia decided to drill for water around the pasture area. However, the area was inhabited by the Gabra, Boran and Gari Somali and they share resources too. The government carried out a series of meetings to create a common understanding over common access and ownership rights to the water point among the three communities. The government started drilling based on the assumption that none of these groups would ever claim exclusive use rights over the water. The Somali perceived that it was an attempt by the Oromia government to claim and legitimise the land rather than just providing water.
They objected to the drilling...and the Boran[a] were furious and they said “how can we not run a development programme in our region.” Finally, it resulted in conflict causing the death of many people and destruction of properties and dislocation of thousands of people. This does not mean the development programme (water) was unnecessary but our development intervention has to take into account the local dynamics and contexts. A government-sanctioned series of meetings was not enough to create consensus and avoid conflict. But conflict analysis should have been carried out; elders, youth, and all stakeholders should have been involved. If this was impossible, it would have been better to suspend the programme. Moreover, they had been sharing resources long before the project and they (communities) could have survived without the state-sponsored water. One cannot say this is the only prescription (water drilling), if you don’t take it you would die. (Programme Coordinator, Care Ethiopia, October 2011).

In these areas, most of the NGOs sought to move away from a “top-down” approach to development that could also lead to further conflict for indigenous empowerment for conflict transformation.

5.4.5 Indigenous Empowerment

The major challenge confronting the various approaches of the NGOs, according to authors of recent studies of the conflict resolution work of NGOs, is to overcome their strong preference for the risk-aversive approach to conflict resolution (see Lederach, 2005). In preferring an “indigenous empowerment” approach, some NGOs argue that the notion of “do-no-harm” is too narrow to address the intractable nature of conflict and include the reinvigorated indigenous capabilities that could be used for empowerment. Distancing themselves from the attempt to have a “top down/trickle down” approach, many of these NGOs have already announced the sublimation of indigenous conflict resolution strategies and any other cultural resources that promote development and peacebuilding (see, for example, section 5.6: 149-163 of this chapter). They designed people-centred approaches and concentrated on building indigenous institutions’ capacity to support a “bottom-up” approach. One of the respondents reported that:

*These communities have a complex indigenous socio-political system that governs its interactions and its relationships. In most parts of the region, this institution has been weakened; however, the system is relatively intact in the Borana area. The Borana people have trust in this institution. Its decisions are more respected than the local government’s decisions. We cannot ignore this institution when we launch any development programme if we really intend to see its sustainability.* (Project Manager, SOS Sahel, October 2011).
Similar sentiments were expressed by another informant:

We do not work on peacebuilding and development directly but our goal is to build local capacities...support community initiatives... for empowerment, to contribute to sustainable development and peace. (Field Coordinator, GPDI, October 2011).

This approach, they argue, recognises the ability of people and institutions to make a difference and to challenge the socio-psychological and structural causes of conflict. This approach has continued to reverberate in most NGOs’ goals and public policies (see, for example, Watson, 2003; Bassi and Tache, 2011).

5.4.6 Conclusion

It should be noted that while these NGOs do not see any particular approach as particularly suitable for conflict resolution as such, they are united in their common ground, which attempts to empower those transformative agents whose struggles take up this stance. Common to all these NGOs is that they seek to reinvigorate indigenous social institutions and to increase indigenous peoples’ participation in and management of the natural resources of grazing land, forest and water and construct sustainable livelihoods and developments. All of these NGOs speak of revitalising local institutions and empowering the local community to take its development into its own hands. Each NGO also speaks of indigenous institutions’ potentials for initiating development projects and conducting conflict resolution. Each NGO also underscores the importance of forging partnerships with Government. While the detail and effect of the relationships between local government and NGOs may vary, complementary relationship benefits have accrued to the NGOs as well as to local government if both are willing to make the joint project a successful one.
5.5. Theme D: Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

This sub-section introduces the respondents’ perceptions of the customary and state mechanisms for conflict resolution and their perceptions of partnerships between NGOs, the state and the indigenous institutions.

5.5.1 Customary and State mechanisms for conflict resolution

Respondents focused on the following: the resilience of indigenous institutions in conflict resolution; indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and their emphasis on social harmony; customary institutions and their responsiveness and accessibility; and, the extent to which customary conflict resolution mechanisms are seen as participatory and restorative and as supplementary to the state judiciary.

- The Resilience of Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanism

Outsiders perceive that any conflict in the peripheries is first and foremost the result of failure of the indigenous institutions to uphold legitimacy and to sustain stability (Scott Villiers et al., 2011). It is the manifestation of old patterns of primitive competition with disputes frequently resolved through violent conflicts, rather than through institutional arrangements or otherwise. In other words, the perception is that customary institutions have failed to resolve disputes and maintain order. This view was vigorously challenged by one of the informants:

*Gadaa system is a very broad system including cultural, social, political...it is like a full-fledged governance system. Its institution governs and manages natural resources such as water and pasture. These are just small portions of the entire system. What has been weakened or has ceased is its political wing that enables it to mobilise and wage military expeditions into its rival groups. But its cultural and social practices have continued to govern and dictate social relations, and to resolve disputes relating to natural resources on many occasions.* (Director, GPDI, October, 2011).

Indigenous institutions, despite constant attempts to co-opt them into the state institutions, made by successive regimes, continued to exercise influence in both conflict resolution and natural resource management.

- Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Social Harmony

Like any social system that purports to maintain its equilibrium, the *Nagaa Borana* sees conflict as a result of breakdown in peace-maintaining institutions and practices (Bassi, 2010; Scott
Villiers et al., 2011). Yet, like any social system, customary institutions are riddled with internal and external disputes and resulting shifts in focus and emphasis. According to a member of a focus group discussion the prospect of violence is continuously present, forcing customary laws to be more accommodative:

There are always disputes over access to natural resources; cattle rustling, theft and reciprocal killings...but these disputes have their own rules and practices which must be dealt with and defused in order to maintain peace and harmony...these require the collective attention and action of every member of the community. There are new types of conflict cases...we have to deal with them...like conflict related to Kallo (private enclosure). The notion of [conflict] a Kallo is a recent one...has been increasing because it has become a coping mechanism from recurrent drought. The most important thing is to ensure the Nagaa Borana and to continue diffuse these conflicts on timely basis effort. (FGD, Korree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

Community peace elders indicated that they have strong institutions in place that could deal effectively with conflicts that threatens social harmony:

We resolve issues of conflict at various levels. In our tradition, we have an institution that responds to such kinds of challenge. Clan elders at two levels; Qae Millo (lineage level court) and Qea goossa (clan level court) usually settle dispute cases...with the exception of a few, most cases are not taken beyond Qea goossa. (FGD, Korree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

Similarly, another focus group discussion member from Gambella indicated how traditional conflict resolution mechanisms play a crucial role in upholding law and order:

There are conflicts over agricultural land, fishing, hunting, even among the neighbouring villages. Such kinds of conflict are usually resolved before reaching the Kwaroo (village headman) in order to contain its spilling over to other villages. Inter-village conflicts are usually resolved Nyieya (Anywaa nobel). (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011).

Unlike the Anywaa, the Nuer settle disputes through ad-hoc assemblages of negotiators from conflicting parties:

In Nuer, disputes are normally settled through negotiations between groups of leaders drawn from the disputing parties called tut wec or gaat tuot “sons of bulls”, and also included a kuaar (priest). There is no king Nyieya of Anywaa or Kwaroo, this ad hoc group is responsible for resolving disputes. (FGD member, Gambella, November 2011)

To ensure social harmony in the face of growing disorder and insecurity, these institutions invoke the authority of Waq in Borana, the divine God, as a divinely guaranteed order to contribute to a harmonious society:
In our tradition... all the conflict resolution cases always begin and end with a prayer...[T]he qallu and senior elder invoke Waq, the divine God, to bless the gathering and lead the elders to make just rulings. ...fine is handed down to the wrongdoer, but we usually encourage forgiveness from the victim and genuine remorse from the offender, as that is what will create genuine peace of the society and maintain the Nagaa Borana. (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

Another member of a focus group discussion, from Gambella, offered a similar account of the Anywaa tradition:

The dispute resolution cases end with a bull slaughtering ceremony, with blessings from the senior elder Nyieya or Kwaaro. Both families of the offender and victim rise up in front of the elders’ council of the Nyieya or Kwaaro and stick a cow or a bull with the spears. Then they fold up the tip of the spears as symbol of “no-place for revenge” and guaranteeing peace. Finally, they slaughter a cow or a bull. Then they split its body into two from its head to tail and share equally. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011).

There are elements of divine justification to preserve and maintain social harmony and resolve disputes immediately. These play a pivotal role in resolving disputes harmoniously and jointly as a community. A member of FGD explained:

The [conflict resolution] ceremonies not only create a feeling of assurance and reconciliation but also increase trust and avoid a curse (biit) by ancestral souls. Murder-related conflict is very sensitive among the Nuer and its settlement is traditionally sanctioned by a ritual, the sacrificing of an ox which symbolizes a covenant (ngot). The offender should honor the ngot to avoid nueer (sin) which could result in bitt. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011).

The very notion of the Nuer’s justice process is founded on a code of reciprocal obligation and a divinely sanctioned moral authority, where moral and social obligations often intertwine (Johnson, 1986). Besides moral and social obligations, there is an impetus to resolve disputes:

It is better to resolve the disputes as soon as possible and repair the damage because we do business, share water and pasture...hence there is need to maintain a relationship even after very serious conflicts. We need to have access to those resources, trade and travel to the other side. Of course, it affects the whole clan lineage of the wrongdoer as they have to live with the guilt of the offender; therefore it affected the whole clan lineage. It is the responsibility of every clan to follow up the true remorsefulness of offender and see that the offender does not get back to the crime again. (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

Thus it would appear that maintaining cross-cutting ethnic ties is prioritised in order to maintain age-old ethnic relations that link individuals and communities to cross-border trade and access to natural resources.
When asked the reason why the entire clan shares the burden of an individual’s shame, a member of a FGD responded:

An individual conflict over fishing rights or injury inflicted on an individual during hunting is considered as the injury to the entire village. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011).

When asked if it was reasonable for a person to be held responsible for a crime committed by another clan member, a focus group member replied:

The wrongdoer’s clan has to endure the penalty since they should have warned the offender and stopped him from committing the offense. (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

According to a FGD member, frequent violations can cause the perpetrator to be segregated from rest of society:

A person who repeatedly commits crime would be a social outcast and face severe consequences affecting his/her own entire clan lineage resulting in a denial of access to basic resources. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011).

The societal control system has a deterrent effect. Interestingly, another FGD member from Gambella indicated how a frequent offender can become a servant either in the victim’s family or for a local judicial officer in the following manner:

The most serious crime is a repeated or premeditated murder. It usually resulted in the offender becoming a social outcast unless the offender performs a ritual ceremony for the purpose of purification. If a murderer surrenders himself to Nyieya or Kwaaroo, then Nyieya or Kwaaroo pays the compensation to the victim’s family and the murderer would become a servant of Nyieya or Kwaaroo. If a rich person pays the compensation fixed by the Nyieya or Kwaaroo then the offender becomes the servant of the rich man. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011).

It would appear the damage or harm caused to the victim is often less important. This is clearly a point that the statutory laws will challenge. An NGO staff member, with widespread experience in conflict resolution and mediation work, offered the following clarification:

Generally, local courts do not rule on conflicts pertaining to access to natural resources or cross-boundary issues because most resources are communal. They usually use indigenous systems, but government courts often deal with crime related to homicide, theft...even these crimes are often resolved through customary rules. But if these cases come to the court, they are dealt with by the statutory [statutory] laws. You see...a court’s rulings are often based on hard evidence and its rulings fail to satisfy the victim and often release offenders for lack of evidence. Therefore there is a high probability that both parties decide to pull out [of] the case to settle in accordance with their laws. (NGO Staff member, November 2011).
It is clear from the above extract that there are gaps between the two legal systems. The reverence for customary institutions and their laws is strongly associated with their emphasis on compensation and repairing social harmony rather than on exacting punishment; the state judicial system focuses on punishment. This invokes the issue of relevance of the state judiciary and its statutory laws.

The following sub-section discusses respondents’ perceptions of the legitimacy of both systems.

- **Customary Institutions are Responsive and Accessible**

Customary institutions and their laws have long-standing heritages and are respected by many people for flexibility and adaptation to modern circumstances (Scott Villiers et al., 2011). When compared with state law they were praised for responsiveness and availability. One Koree Nagaa member, with an extensive familiarity with the work of indigenous conflict resolution offered the popular assessment of the state judicial system:

> government courts are located in urban areas and the judicial process usually takes a long period and is time consuming...wrongdoers are imprisoned then released on parole and the injured person or family is given no reparation...or any apology from the offender or his clan members or his family, it just deepens animosity because it doesn’t redress the injury caused to the victim or the family. (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

Another Koree Nagaa member, extensively involved in inter-clan conflict resolution work, indicated a reason why people rarely rely on the government courts:

> Look... one person murders or harms another or steals a cow or a rapes a girl where one could not spot him. The government court often frees such persons for lack of evidence. A person who intends to rape a girl or a woman normally avoids being sought...in our laws we don’t need a witness to pass down punishment in case of rape because there is less prospect of finding a witness...we normally accept her (a victim of rape) allegation at face value, in case of suspicion we cross-examine the story critically. Moreover, in our tradition it is immoral for a woman to make up such allegations and bring it to the attention of customary elders. What do you expect from a victim or victim’s families to such impunity? Obviously, some would resort to revenge while the powerless end up in lifetime anguish and injustice. Even if the government court releases suspects on grounds of lack of evidence, we still hand down our own penalty and we work hard to discourage people from taking revenge. (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

In addition to their responsiveness and availability, customary conflict resolution methods are celebrated for their participatory and reparative approaches.
Customary Conflict Resolution Mechanisms are Participatory and Restorative

As indicated in section 5.5.1 the indigenous institutional apparatus fosters direct participation of offenders in the process of justice. Unlike the state’s retributive justice system, the indigenous institution is restorative and its emphasis is on consensus, not contradiction (Johnson, 1986; Bassi, 2010; Legesse, 2000). They gather under the shade of the acacia tree (which in itself symbolises peace) deliberate on how to re-establish the social harmony broken down and heal the harm done to the community and victim. An FGD member described the adjudication process in the following manner:

Inter-village conflicts are usually resolved by Nyieya (Anywaa noble) or by Kwaaro (village headman) at Cuud (village court). When conflict broke out between two Kwaaros, Nyieya’s interference is vital for conflict resolution. The defence and the plaintiff have to be present for the case to proceed to trial. However, if the problem is beyond the capacity of the third party, a neutral Kwaaro, the case is normally referred to Nyieya. The Nyieya informs Nyiatuel (a messenger of a Nyieya) to call upon the defence and the claimant to present their case for arbitration. The defence has the right to present his case repeatedly to prove his innocence. The Nyieya, along with the Jocuud (elders of Anywaa people) and Nyikugu (representative of the Nyieya) deliberate on the case. (FGD member, Gambella, October 2011).

The state’s retributive justice system has emphasis on punishing the offender but the customary justice system focuses on forgiveness, creating genuine bonding of society and sustaining peace and order. It does so by engaging the offender, the victim and the community:

When conflict occurs that requires adjudication, the defence and the claimant have to be present to present their case. All sides have to give their side of the story...the cause of the conflict. Then, the elders extensively cross-examine both parties to ascertain and comprehend the state of affairs around the issue. After the deliberation, the elders issue their ruling [T]he guilty party is informed accordingly and urged to accept the guilt by ani balessa dha (am guilty). (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha November 2011).

This participatory method is meant to: (1) address the psychological and physical impact of the harm inflicted upon the victim; (2) reintegrate the offender into the community, and (3) make a pronouncement on guilt and innocence, thereby enforcing a deterrent punishment and making sure that the wrongdoer does not commit the crime again. Undoubtedly, this approach complements the emasculated state structure and could help it to consolidate its institutional capacity.
Supplementing the Judiciary

A discernible change in the legal system of Ethiopia has been developing over the past two decades. State institutions such as the judiciary or the administrative structure realised that they cannot prevent and resolve conflict on their own terms. Pressure from the peripheries and NGOs forced the regime to forge an alliance with customary institutions. For example, there is an effort to institutionalise Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms involving indigenous institutions and their laws. While this alliance reflects the force of indigenous institutions, the relationships fluctuate with changing socio-political circumstances. These relationships range from mutual disengagement on adjudicating conflict cases relating to natural resources to a close collaboration on conflicts related to regional dimensions.

Customary Courts can Deal Effectively with Conflict Relating to Natural Resources

The customary law is not only well equipped to handle disputes about access to natural resources, but its judicial processes also provide a mechanism for restoring harmony. Furthermore, in the absence of strong state institutions, these institutions provide a reliable base for maintaining social order and security. The community is making innovative use of these institutions to manage conflict. A key informant gives the following reason why they still rely on customary means to claim justice in case of conflicts:

*The process for a local court’s adjudication of legal disputes is poorly equipped with immense backlog...often time consuming and the Gadaa ruling takes a day or two... [C]ourt’s verdict cannot supersede the rulings of the Gadaa because it is widely supported and respected. A government court ruling has little effect in deterring perpetrators from committing crimes. The Gadhaaba (equivalent to a policeman) enforces their rulings.* (NGO programme manager, November 2011).

The local community continues to rely heavily on these customary institutions for justice. The state, in attempting to consolidate its legitimacy in these areas, must first build transparent and accountable institutions at grass-roots levels. However, this attempt has led to some conflict with customary laws:

*A person from Guji killed a Borana. We handed over the culprit to police, and within less than a month, the perpetrator was released on bail. Then, we (customary court) restarted adjudicating the matter and suddenly we were ordered not to interfere in government’s work. The offender is walking within the community as a free man while the victim is grappling with the harm. We weren’t*
Another FGD member indicated the government court’s rulings overlook the restorative aspect of justice:

*What we intend to achieve in our rulings is to restore the broken relationships. A few months back, a man killed a person suspected of cattle theft. He was arrested in Yabello. We tried to arbitrate the case but we couldn’t advance because we were told the case was already in police hands. The offender was a family headman responsible for the well-being of the entire family members. We thought the jailing of the offender would make the situation even worse as it could cause more suffering to his children and the extended family members. The offenders and his family were willing to compensate and yet the victim’s family couldn’t get any reparation.* (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

In addition to the external pressure, the customary system is being further challenged from within:

*In the past, the tendency was to use customary institutions. Currently, those who have some contact with urban mores usually prefer the Kebele administrations or the government courts. To reduce this, we got the government officials to take part in the process of customary institution rulings so that it could discourage people from going to the court. Customary institution rulings are binding and respected, even by government bodies. For example, the elders made a ruling for dismantling a private enclosure and entrusted the Kebele chairman to enforce the ruling. The elders punished him with five cattle for refusing to enforce the elders’ decision. He accepted the penalty.* (Koree Nagaa member, Surupha, November 2011).

This success signifies the extent to which the collaboration between the two institutions has been expanded. However, this partnership has been unable to overcome the problem of protracted intra-ethnic conflict.

**The Importance of State Institutions in Addressing ‘Political’ and Regional conflicts**

The state institutions may be incompletely formed, weak, and unable to engineer a lasting consolidation of power to contain violence, but they continue to play a critical role in shaping the dynamics of conflict. There are many basic political and economic functions for which the state is uniquely equipped, not only the guardianship of territorial integrity but also counterbalancing regional effects of conflict. Politically-based conflicts, including territorial claims and political representations, are entwined with the interests of various factions, and require a political solution that involves government.
Referendum: government’s dispute resolution mechanism

The government tried to establish a set of regular institutions, which guaranteed the swift settlement of disputes over regional boundaries (Bassi, 2010). For example, in 2004, the Ministry of Federal Affairs facilitated a referendum to demarcate formally the boundary and to resolve the disputes between the Somali clans and Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010). An NGO staff member who has had worked with both communities commented:

Conflict related to access to natural resources is normal because it can easily be resolved through traditional systems. However, when conflicts are over boundary issues or land claims, the solution is political and that involves government. Moreover, the resolution of such conflicts is time consuming. For example, the conflict between Borana and Gari (Somali sub-clan) around the Wachille involved land claims. Since this regime (EPDRF) has come to power (1991), everyone has been fighting to expand boundaries. The government preferred a referendum as a last resort for resolving these conflicts. Since then, no ethnic group is allowed to cross the boundaries and share the natural resources as before. However, such resolutions are incompatible with pastoralists’ livelihoods because their life depends on mobility. Both groups have lost access to vital resources that exist on both sides. As a result, we do not work on conflicts arising from boundary issues. (NGO programme coordinator, October 2011).

A referendum failed to bring the desired outcome because the disputing parties did not see their judicial procedure in these terms. Their indigenous dispute resolution mechanism was not designed to obliterate seasonal mobility and access to a vital resource, or to eliminate long-standing cross-ethnic bonds. As indicated above, customary concepts of justice were founded on principles of concession, consensus and negotiation sanctioned by reciprocal social obligations and a spiritually endorsed moral order (Johnson, 1986). Therefore, in the pastoralist context, using a referendum as a method for resolving disputes was considered incompatible with the systems of the pastoralist communities. A key informant indicated that the referendum diverted attention from a genuine effort required for addressing the underlying cause of conflict and also ignored pre-existing ways for addressing access to vital resources. Other informants indicated that the referendum has exacerbated tension and conflict as the root causes were not tackled:

Whilst the successive Somali regimes aimed to create [a] greater Somali, the Gari Somali were on the front line to meet this goal. They substantiated this claim by citing the historical allegiance of the Gari to the Somali regime during the Somali-Ethiopian war (1975) and the referendum that was held in 2005, in which they claimed large amounts of Borana land. However, apart from the areas given to them by the Ethiopian government they couldn’t succeed. But they are still claiming wet season grazing areas like Chabi, Ilfatu, Garbi, Buno and Soble, and similarly claiming the dry season grazing areas like Dogogo, Boji, Chichne, Sukela Saglan, Dhakawata, Buke and Qababitata. The Wachille community believed that directly or indirectly the local authorities of Udet Woreda of Liban Zone
mobilise the Gari and Gabra to move towards the residential areas of the Borana and cause destruction of life and property, and deploy militias and police forces to set up settlement in Borana, causing conflict. (NGO programme coordinator, October 2011).

This had adverse implications for the NGOs’ peacebuilding efforts in contentious areas. When asked why some NGOs use a mix of government and customary institutions for initiating conflict resolution projects, an informant explained:

They (protagonists) cannot mobilise the community without the awareness of the elders. Mobilisation for war would not happen without the knowledge of elders. Lack of good governance on the part of the local government also plays a crucial role in either creating or exacerbating conflict. They are also equally important in resolving conflict. That is why we engage and encourage these institutions to work together and find solutions together. For resolving conflict, both have to complement one another. However, at times, there is no consensus; one defies the other’s resolution and decisions often turn out to be competitive and conflicting. (NGO programme coordinator, October 2011).

However, it should not be assumed that they are necessarily in opposition or incompatible. An expert at Conflict Resolution and Transformation Directorate, Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) explained:

Conflicts over access to natural resources are very complicated, and can be effectively resolved through long-standing customary institutions, but when it comes to cross-border cattle trade, the government has to provide security and enter into formal agreement with the Kenyan government over security and taxation. Customary leaders support police in sharing information over potential cattle raiding and alert police because they have the capacity to deal with conflict related to regional and international borders. (Conflict Resolution and Transformation expert, Ministry of Federal Affairs, October 2011).

It seems that the indigenous and state institutions at a local level are quite capable of building alliances and working together. In many instances, the state has vowed to acknowledge and devolve more power to customary institutions, but this has met with scepticism:

However, the contradiction between the formal and actual, between declaration and implementation, rhetoric and reality, remains a palpable one. When we hear the government’s rhetoric, it seems the government is committed to revitalising the Gadaa institution... in practice we can only see that it is getting weaker and weaker [P]ower is being transferred from the elders to the Kebele chairmen. I do not see how this can be seen as empowerment and how the government perceives this in transforming the conflict. The government has to give due recognition to these institutions and it seems there is a gap between government policy and its implementation. I tend to doubt if this is going happen in the near future, though one can see from the government rhetoric that the government believes in cultural diversity...to develop culture and language; also, involve in any programme so that they know their rights. (An NGO director, October 2011).
Conflict resolution is most likely to thrive in the presence, not only of strong local institutions, but also an effective state (Goodhand and Hulme 1999; Goodhand and Lewer, 1999). The neighbouring “old state” of Somali is a case in point. Peace efforts cannot flourish amid political disorder and an inadequate physical infrastructure. Peace depends upon the state for the creation of certain basic conditions of existence, at least in contemporary dynamics of conflict in the Horn of Africa. This implies that peace does not automatically spring up where the state’s power is beyond the control of ripple-effects of cross-border conflicts. For example, NGOs operating in Gambella cited the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 (between the South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) as a turning-point in shaping the peace processes in the Southern Sudan, with huge implications for the Gambella region of Ethiopia. Because of the external alliances, the potential for spill-over effects is always present. For example, if conflict breaks out between Gabra and Borana in Ethiopia, it affects the Gabra and Borana in Kenya. According to one key informant:

*If a Gabra is killed in Ethiopia, then it would affect the entire Gabra clan both in Ethiopia and Kenya because of the family ties.* (Programme Coordinator, AFD, October 2011)

The resolution of such conflict requires, what Jarstad and Belloni (2012) describe as “hybrid peace governance” where a combination of Track One, Track Two and Track Three initiatives are more likely to deliver effective outcomes.

5.5.2 The Partnerships-NGOs, the State and the Indigenous Institutions

Three themes are central to this story: indigenous institutions as a bridge to the community; government administrative structures as an entry point; and a mix of government and indigenous institutions as an effective way of development.

5.5.2.1 Indigenous Institutions as a bridge to the Community and Development

Four themes were identified from the feedback from respondents, on the issue of why development organisations used indigenous institutions as a bridge to community and community development. These were: a “ready-made” apparatus for participatory development; promote participatory development; the sustainability issue; and the competency issue. These four are discussed below.
As a Ready-made Apparatus for Participatory Development

Drawing upon the long history of the state-centric and exclusive natural resources management policy, some NGOs offered an “integrationist” account of indigenous institutions as a viable partnership in development initiatives. These NGOs showed a strong commitment to build upon the existing know-how and work with indigenous institutions to achieve development. For example, when one of the informants was asked why it is important to rely on these institutions:

...our projects focus on pastoralist livelihood resilience enhancement against drought through rehabilitating traditional wells and they assist the community to reclaim rangeland encroached by bush. They (Borana) have traditionally relied upon a variety of “coping mechanisms” when responding to droughts...through rangelands enclosure and digging wells as a traditional way to avert drought... manage to survive in a delicate environment. These institutions are risk-averse and hence are highly suitable for initiating development projects... we rely on these institutions for example, for water development projects we work with the Abba Madda (father of the waters source)...for rangeland development we involve the Abba Dheda (father of grazing land) and Jarsa Dheda (the administrator of this unit of resource). If these local resources can be harnessed, then they can be the means through which local, empowering and sustainable development can be achieved. They are a key for development and stability [W]e have to make use of this ready-made apparatus as an entry point in any development intervention programmes. (Project Manager, Care Ethiopia, October 2011)

Forging an alliance with these institutions is widely believed to provide a range of benefits. It is also suggested as a way of promoting participation in general, by empowering local people with capacities and introducing more innovative approaches and accountability. It is viewed as a way to make development more responsive and efficient.

Promote Participatory Development

In addition to their wealth of knowledge and their institutional apparatus, indigenous institutions are suited to the purpose of launching participatory development; if this could be integrated into development, it would help the process. Therefore, it was argued, relying on these institutions would prepare the ground for organising people for participation, planning and contributing to development projects (Watson, 2001). For example, one of the informants was asked how important these institutions’ knowledge is for launching participatory development:

In the strict sense, pastoralists might not be soil chemists but their indigenous knowledge indicates that the well dug on the red soil had drinkable water while the ones dug on the grey soil had salty water...this knowledge reduced the problem that made their animals ill. Armed with this knowledge, our water development project...mobilised their clan members to contribute cows, labour... to dig the well on the red soil side. Our project purchased industrial construction materials while community
members prepare the local construction material consisting of sand and stone. The well now belongs to the whole clan and is managed by the traditional resource management system that allows for planning and equal use by all clan members. The management committee is also responsible for drawing up a schedule on usage time of the well by all community households and livestock. They are also responsible for allowing members of neighbouring clans to use the well. During the drought period of December 2007 to March 2008, the well served over 800 households and about 1500 herd of cattle per day. (Project Manager, Care Ethiopia, October 2011)

This reflects the dominant view that indigenous institutions promote participatory development and their management is legitimately in the hands of the local people. This legitimises the genuine bottom-up partnership for sustainable development.

Many descriptions are also used to give support to this dominant view, particularly of tensions between the participatory and techno-centric development approaches. This is bound to be more pronounced wherever the indigenous institutions regulate their day-to-day affairs. One example from the field is offered below. Thus, a water development officer spoke about the contradictions between a diesel powered borehole managed by women, and the indigenous borehole governance system.

One example of this [conflict between the two] was an assessment of underground water cisterns regulated by indigenous institutions and a new borehole diesel regulated by women (both systems constructed by NGOs). The rationale varies. For the former, it is important to work with the existing institution because it is highly regulated by indigenous rules. For the latter, women are more susceptible to hardships caused by water shortages; therefore, empowering them through the management of water points would be inclusive and effective. Institutional apparatus for regulating access to the borehole diesel is very weak. In most cases, boreholes powered by diesel are unsustainable because the equipment requires maintenance skills and running costs. On the other hand, a well belongs to the whole clan and is managed by the traditional resource management system that allows for planning and equal use by all clan members. Rights to use the well are obtained by providing labour for the maintenance of the pond. Aba konfi (manager) is also responsible for day-to-day administration and can appoint heryriga (an assistant). Heryriga draws up a schedule on usage time of the well by all community households and livestock. His job is to make sure there is no conflict over the use of the water and to take appeals from people who would wish to come and use the water. He is assisted in this work by hayu - individuals who hold ritual authority to judge. He is also responsible for allowing members of neighbouring clans to use the well. Women managing diesel powered boreholes lack such institutional apparatus to govern utilisation and maintenance. As a result most boreholes powered by diesel are not functioning. (An NGO water development officer, October, 2011).

- Sustainability Issue

In addition to the above description, there were claims that the local government structures are still at early stages of development and may not govern development projects efficiently.
Therefore, there is a lingering scepticism towards the sustainability of development projects that tend to rely on local government at the expense of the indigenous institutions.

Our belief is that, for sustainability of our project and for accountability and reaching out to the grass-roots levels to mobilise and initiate development programmes, the indigenous institution is a viable way. (Project Officer, AFD, October 2011)

In the absence of a strong state structure to manage development projects effectively and deliver resources, the best option was to turn towards indigenous institutions, strengthen their institutional capacities, enter into partnerships and integrate them into the development process. It was thought that this could empower people, include them in the development process and improve environmental and human welfare.

- Local Government Incompetence and Legitimacy Issue

On account of its many failures, the local government structure has lost a great deal of legitimacy, in many places, undermining its potential for forging alliances with development agencies. One informant described this in the following way:

The local government is filled with inexperienced youth with little or no know-how of natural resource management. In places where the indigenous institutions are weakened, Kebele chairmen play significant roles...but they are often incompetent and their management system and rulings are marred by reports of corruption...and bad governance. (SOS Sahel, Project Officer, October 2011).

A NGO staff member involved in an NGO’s participatory need assessment programmes described how a lack of know-how and lack of clear roles in the development programme led the local government structures to be less relevant in forging alliances:

Before our intervention in development, we had to carry out participatory need assessments... [W]e brought the two parties [local government officials and customary elders] in a joint problem identification and implementation programme using the participatory approach. The participants were split into two groups, four with participants from government officials and six from customary elders. The groups were asked to reflect on key obstacles and their roles in tackling these challenges and implementation programmes [pastoralist vulnerability]. Whilst the customary elder’s team came up with long lists of tasks and roles, the local government team couldn’t do the same. They were not happy because they had a minimal role in the implementation programmes...they used to think they could steer any development project initiated in their areas. We had no option but to work with the elders’ team. (Program Coordinator, Care Ethiopia, October 2011).
Thus, the NGO had directly forged alliances with, and initiated development projects with, customary institutions instead of with the local government structure; this met with some suspicion. A local NGO that was keen to be seen as an independent organisation, despite being suspected of ignoring local government structures, tried to gain the confidence of the local government structure:

We need both acceptance and legitimacy. For example, the indigenous structure may have institutional mechanisms and community support while the government has the backing of the law of the country. This limited their role to observation, we consult them...let them know what we are doing. It can discourage the local people who tend to defy the supremacy of the state law. Therefore, for us, it is good to combine the two. (Project Coordinator, GPDI, October 2011).

However, the actual practice of forging alliances with the local government structures remained a challenge because of bad governance. According to a key informant, many development problems arise out of lack of accountability in local government structures:

...in one of the pastoralist associations a Kebele chairman had a private enclosure. Local elders passed a resolution that abolishes his private enclosure and he was ordered to dismantle the enclosure. However, the chairman defied their ruling and even threatened take revenge against them: he vowed to punish them in food aid rationing. He managed to intimidate and manipulate the others, even corrupted a few members to reverse their decision. (Program Officer, GOAL Ethiopia, October 2011)

This observation shows the deep suspicions on both sides and points to the challenges facing NGOs in forging alliances with local government structures. However, not all local structures are corrupt, but some were perceived as incompetent and lacking legitimacy. Yet, there are some NGOs who have difficulties working with indigenous institutions because of their “incompatibility” with the new challenges facing the communities.

5.5.2.2 The Government’s Administrative Structures as Partner in Development

In contrast to the preceding account of the potential of indigenous institutions, some informants indicated that these institutions are either idealised or have outlived their usefulness, having failed to develop durable mechanisms to meet new challenges. Therefore, it is important to bypass tradition and the elders and create a new alliance with Peasant Associations (PAs). The interest in indigenous institutions had faded, and when asked why development agents and local
people had become more sceptical about institutional partnerships of this kind, one of the informants replied:

We usually work with government. The government is mandated to be a conduit to the community and to do community development. We have to go through local government... first, there has been a shift of roles from traditional institutions to Kebele administrations. Second, the current language of development such as achieving gender equality and empowering women in which development goals are articulated and planned has become alien to the elders. The ways they propose and suggest ideas...created many challenges....one speaks of the traditional approach (the elders) and the other (the young Kebele chairmen) speaks of the modern one. Therefore, we work with the young Kebele chairmen as they understand what exactly we want to deliver especially in animal health, new seeds and reproductive health. (Filed Coordinator, CISP, October 2011).

The indigenous institutions are believed to be obsolete and lagging behind current needs as well as less efficient in reaching the development goals of the country. Moreover, some NGOs were co-opted into local government structures to avoid confrontation. One project manager, with widespread experience in development and conflict resolution work, offered this account of bypassing government structures:

I do not believe it is possible to bypass the new local government structures to access the community and initiate any development project. The government has put a Gott and Garee system (Gott vary in size but usually encompass between sixty and ninety households and Garee is roughly thirty households) in place that is closely tied to the dominant political party. The leaders of Gott and Garee are more accountable to the government than to the community. (Project Manager, SOS Sahel, October 2011).

Given the changing political context under the new dispensation, it is understandable why the NGOs forged partnerships with these institutions. However, there are some NGOs that creatively forge a working alliance with both institutions.

5.5.2.3 A Mixed Partnership

The third category warns that leaving any of these institutions out is likely to lead to conflict of various kinds. Instead, they suggest, it is important to look at the way in which the potential of these institutions can be reinvigorated and empowered to establish working partnerships for integrated development:

We involve our stakeholders in launching our programme. We include the community, local NGOs and local government development agents. In the process, we all complement each other in our development endeavour...we negotiate with all stakeholders... instead of bypassing or overlooking them. We have a room for creating a common understanding ... [we] have a meeting every two months
so that we assess our progress. We also have a weekly inter-NGO and governmental session for presenting the progresses of our achievements. (Project Officer, GPDI, October 2011).

A director of an NGO saw NGO relationships with both institutions from an accountability perspective:

*Before our intervention, we carry out participatory need assessments, involving local communities and their institutions, develop a proposal, and present it to our stakeholders...and we create accountability among our stakeholders. Then we present it to the Worada Task Force and to a general community meeting for discussion. They elect a Development Committee of active members to run the project.* (Director, AFD, October 2011).

There is a tendency to draw a neutral and pragmatic account of partnerships. These relationships are not essentially one-sided and rigid. Both institutions can be flexible in forging alliances at different times. For example, when asked about shifts in alliance, one of the informants replied:

*It depends... if it is a new project, we include the Kebele chairman and then the Abba Olla ...we use the Abba Ollas an entry point to the community ... [we] cannot bypass them and access the community at Olla level. We use the Kebele for mobilising the community. You can also use the Olla for mobilisation but Olla is not more than 30-50 Warras (households) and general mobilisation needs maadda level mobilisation.* (Project Officer, Care Ethiopia, October 2011).

In places where the local government structure is weak, NGOs have a tendency to circumvent the local institutions, building alliances with indigenous institutions, community-based organisations, or user groups for implementation of projects. This would create room for engagement between the state, NGOs and indigenous institutions. Such engagement has potential for conflict (Bratton, 1989b, 1990). Therefore, development agents need to construct alliances and partnerships with both institutions.
5.5.3 Conclusion

The preceding sections presented some of the respondents’ views on their preferences concerning those institutions that they use to access the community, forge alliances and initiate development projects. The degree of confidence expressed by the NGOs in the potential of these institutions was found to vary. Nevertheless, there was a general feeling that the indigenous institutions are effective and provide a valuable avenue for accessing the community and for initiating development interventions. While some of the NGOs had moved away from using these indigenous institutions as a foundation for development initiatives, others had integrated the customary and formal institutions to build relations between the state and the pastoralists’ societies. Given the present state of decentralisation and change, shifting alliances are commonplace.
5.6. Theme E: Indigenous Empowerment

The following account of indigenous empowerment unfolds through the following six key themes: (1) re/institutionalisation of customary institutions; (2) activation of customary laws and re-establishment of customary institutions for conflict resolution and natural resource management (NRM); (3) building intra and inter-ethnic relations; (4) capacity building for local government departments; (5) gender issue and (6) the faith-based peacebuilding approach.

5.6.1. Re/institutionalisation of Intra-Ethnic/Inter-Ethnic Peace Groups

The most important achievement of CRT-type NGOs in the Arero, Moyalle and Yabello Woredas (districts) was their support for the establishment of Koree Nagga (Peace Committees) at grass-roots level and at Woreda level. These included School Peace Committees, Conflict Management Forums, Women’s Peace Committees, and district level Peace and Natural Resource Management Committees (see Appendix A for a documented listing of NGOs, strategies adopted by NGOs for conflict resolution, and areas of operation). In Gambella, ROCCRE, Pact Ethiopia and HEKS supported the establishment of the Joint Development Office and a Joint Peace Committee and Community Elders’ Peace Council. Similarly, in 2005, SOS-Sahel in collaboration with Arero District Administration and community leaders from the Borana, Guji and Gabra supported the establishment of the Elders’ Peace Committee (Gaadiwa Naga) in Arero-Mata Garafrsa with the tasks of providing early warning of conflict and working at conflict resolution. Another example is GPDI, which supported the establishment of peace clubs at school as well as women’s peace clubs; this was done with the support of International Livestock Research (ILR). Once these institutions were established, they provided a framework to diffuse conflict concerning natural resources. In other words, the CRT-type NGOs were most successful at reinvigorating the available “cultural capital” for use in peacebuilding. The evidence from the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) sheds light on the relationship between the NGOs’ interventions and “indigenous empowerment”:

Elders from the three clans (Guji, Borana and Gabra) usually come together for opening (the) peace process. Koree Nagaa are established at Ollas (neighbourhoods) and maddaas (area surrounding one water source), Woreda and Zone levels with the task of carrying out early warning of conflict, peacebuilding and conflict resolution. They also meet once a month to assess peace situations and carry out local peace-keeping tasks (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).
SOS Sahel, AFD, Care Ethiopia and Mercy Corps facilitated several peace accords, conferences and forums between Guji, Gabra, Borana and Garri. For instance, consider the Mercy Corps’ negotiation and development of the Negelle Peace Accord Process between the Gari, Gebra, Guji and Borana clans in 2009 and AFD’s Hallona Community Peace Conference and Yabello Worada Peacebuilding Conference between the Garri, Gebra, Guji and Borana at Haro-Bake in Yabello district in 2006 (Care, 2008; Mercy Corps, 2011). These both played a significant role in strengthening pastoralists’ own rules and in drawing by-laws relating to natural resource access, use and maintenance, as well as laws on murder, theft and injury. These laws have some common features, although there is wide variation in their implementation; in the case of a murder, the perpetrator must pay a fine of twenty head of cattle and will be penalised by government law. A thief who steals a cow must pay a fine of five head of cattle:

They (AFD, GPDI, and Care) facilitated the declarations of agreed-upon by-laws for the management of natural resources and resolution of conflicts. In the declaration, the Guji, Borana and Gabra agreed to set up Koree Nagaa comprising the three groups. With the support of the government and NGOs, this peace committee has been working for peacebuilding; we are called the “United Nation Peace Soldiers” (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).

Scott-Villiers et al. (2011) observed that the drafting and ratifying of agreed-upon by-laws had an instant effect on the Walda, Turbi and Rawan communities, especially in information exchange and surveillance; they resumed sharing water and pasture. They are provided with institutional apparatus not only to make laws but also to oversee their implementation and to address conflict over natural resources. AFD’s programme coordinator described the importance of drawing new rules as follows:

At the moment, the causes of conflict have become diverse and complex…and traditional mechanisms are insufficient to deal with today’s conflicts...they needed new skills and new by-laws... build on the old ones (Programme Coordinator, AFD, October 2011).

Thus, a more overarching and inclusive framework of law is required to bridge group differences. Frequently, people drawn from many different communities received little support or follow-up to negotiate, draft and ratify agreed-upon by-laws to govern and adjudicate future disputes. The following extract sheds light on this point:

We (intra-ethnic peace committee) deal with conflict cases. In Surupha, our territory, the three communities reinforced customary law. Laws that deal with access to natural resources, murders, and cattle theft were strengthened. They are not new laws. Guji, Gabra and Borana had always used them
internally, now they apply between us too. In such a way, the number of murder and cattle rustling has been reduced. We have a good experience from the NGOs, we are able to focus on our development, built house, start agriculture, and get clean water... (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).

The reinvigoration of these rules and their extension to the various ethnic groups endows the legal framework with the capacity to resolve group differences peacefully. Indeed, several authors (see, for example, Scott-Villiers et al., 2011; Kurtz and Scarborough, 2012) support an increase in the number of peace committees and participation in conflict resolution practices. To ascertain if the increase in peace committees contributed to peace, Focus Group Discussion participants were asked to indicate the number of conflict cases referred to the peace committees. An elder made the following comment:

I do not remember the number of conflict cases being referred and adjudicated...but we arbitrated a number of conflict cases. We do not know how to write and read but now, we have just come from adjudicating the conflict between a Guji and a Gabra over a Kallo (private enclosure). We all travel across the different Ollas to make peace (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).

We have been playing a significant role and everyone is accepting our ruling. For example, last month someone’s camel intruded into a Kallo and the case was brought to this committee. After we made extensive interrogations, the owner of the camel was penalised with two cows as a fine to compensate the damaged Kallo. There is always conflict over land claims and counter-claims and over natural resources among the Ollas (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).

These examples indicate the NGOs’ facilitation of local conflict resolution and the emphasis placed on “cultural modalities and resources” and the indigenous knowledge they possess to deal with conflict within their own societal settings (Lederach, 1997). Additionally, these NGOs identified the activation of customary laws for conflict resolution and natural resource management (NRM) as a key mechanism to guarantee order. It is believed that the active use of these rules facilitates freedom of movement and access to important resources to mitigate resource-based conflicts and strengthens a group’s resilience mechanisms to cope with drought related shocks.

5.6.2 Activation of Customary Laws for Conflict Resolution and Natural Resource Management (NRM)

The second approach within the theme of indigenous empowerment is the activation of customary institutions relating to NRM. SOS Sahel, AFD and Care Ethiopia view the activation and re-establishment of customary institutions and strengthening their jurisdiction over land,
social and cultural issues as being the keys to stability and to reducing environmental degradation. Whereas activation of these institutions puts the community at the centre of NRM, reliance on them reduces differential access to resources, diminishes social exclusion and reduces conflict. Therefore, Care Ethiopia’s Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (RREAD) project and SOS Sahel’s Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project (BCFMP) aim to transform the conventional, government-led NRM approach to community-based NRM systems. SOS Sahel’s Participatory Forest Management Approach (PFMA), a new collaborative resource management approach, was adopted to revitalise the indigenous institutions and to empower the local community to reclaim their rights to use and manage the natural resources (SOS Sahel, 2008). PFM, with its main objective being to address and resolve conflict and competition over forest resource usage, involves three distinct phases. The first of these is the Investigation stage, where Government forestry departments and forest users apply participatory planning activities to undertake appraisal of the forest resources, access and the existing management rules. The second is the Negotiation stage; here, stakeholders use a joint planning process to initiate dialogue for conflict analysis, negotiate over benefit sharing arrangements and develop the rules and regulations governing forest use. The third is the Implementation stage which involves implementing the signed Forest Management Agreements (FMA) (See SOS Sahel, 2008; Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen, 2005).

To implement FMA, inter/intra-ethnic Forest Management Groups (FMGs) are convened at various levels from grass-roots up to district level. As well as implementing NRM, the FMGs also focus on conflict resolution in the forest priority areas of Arero, Yabello and Liben districts. The groups comprise representatives of local communities and government officials. It is worth noting that the system is not only built from age-old customary systems of community-based control over resources but also from new systems developed by the community, and agreed with local government (Irwin and Mitiku, 2004). In doing so, the NGOs facilitated the legal transfer of resources (use rights to, and/or, ownership rights of) from the government to communities. The reaching of agreements between Government forestry departments and forest users

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30 The legal transfer of the resources and their management systems are not uniform across the PAs. According to some informants, for example, in some areas the management of the forest and rangeland is conducted solely by elders though traditional institutions. In some other places, however, PFM involves local elders, the Jarsa Reera, government bodies, the cluster head and Abba Reera.
increased trust and reliance as well as empowered the capacity of local institutions for NRM and conflict resolution (Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen, 2005):

*FMGs were organised in 31 Maddaas (19 in Yabello, 8 in Arero and 4 in Liban) (and) are fully functional. Moreover, a legally binding document that defines the roles and responsibilities of the government and the community was developed. Currently, they (FMGs) are more effective than local government because the government bodies are not intervening in decisions given by elders on the rangeland and forest. Of course, when they primarily started reinstating the laws, they encountered a lot of challenges from the government officials. But later they settled and signed a memorandum of understanding with government offices to have a shared management. After this agreement those breaking the laws have no other choice than that [of being] ruled by the decision of the elders (SOS Project Manager, October 2011).*

These agreements also reactivated the long-standing method of selective bush firing which was banned during the military regime in 1979/1980 (GL-CRSP PARIMA, 2007b). This practice reduced the rate of rangeland shrinkage attributable to continued encroachment by bush; this shrinkage was reducing the availability of grassland for pasture (GL-CRSP PARIMA, 2007a). The agreements reinstated the community’s ownership, accountability and responsibility. According to the SOS Field Coordinator:

*The government policy (NRM policy) presumed...the local communities were responsible for the continuing destruction of the forest resources. Therefore, it used to be the people who were protected from the forest...not the forest resource. Thus, they (the communities) often used to set fire on the forest because they believed it was a “government forest”... but since (2004) ..... our project intervention ..... we haven’t seen a single forest fire. Moreover, the government forest department used to hire people for planting and logging trees but since its management was transferred to the people, they are the ones who have been participating in seed germination and planting... (Field Coordinator, SOS Sahel, October 2011).*

The FMGs played an important role in supporting local capacity and propensity for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Although difficulties could arise³¹, their work resulted in a genuine bottom-up involvement in the NRM and also provided a forum for discussion, creating shared interests and initiating joint projects for reducing the incidence of conflict. For example, Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen (2005) note that the historically violent conflict over differential access to the forest resources in and around Arero forest has been reduced. That conflict was along ethnic lines among the Borana, Guji groups and the Garri camel pastoralists. Moreover, the

³¹ Irwin, Jordan and Temesgen (2005) emphasised that disputes and conflicts of interest between different groups involved in the new management will continue to arise. However, the intensity and magnitude of conflict appears to have been reduced as negotiation and transfer processes take place to empower the FMGs to handle these disputes.
establishment and effective development of inter- and intra-ethnic FMGs at the local levels in Arero and Yabello provide local communities with the opportunity to participate fully in decision-making in resource use and management; they can influence formal peace agreements. For example, the urban and peri-urban poor whose livelihoods depend on firewood and wild honey collection, and making charcoal, were able to benefit from subsistence use of resources (Tache and Irwin, 2003). The local FMGs are empowered further to adjudicate potential disputes and conflicts of interest between different interest groups. They deal with local problems and conflicts; for example, in the Yabello forest area, FMGs stopped illegal harvesters from within the community. More serious problems or potential conflict cases, such as new farmland clearances, are passed onto the district level FMGs, for higher level negotiation (Tache and Irwin, 2003). The incidence of conflict cases being referred to these FMGs in Yabello is increasing, which could indicate the recognition of the local FMGs as a legitimate and effective means of resolving conflict (See, for example, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). The evidence from the FGD also confirms this:

There are isolated killings and cattle thefts but not major conflicts. The intra-ethnic peace committee members usually meet every month to examine and expose perpetrators and punish them on the basis of the declaration. The committee also demolishes many Kallos and diminished their size. These days, we are also adjudicating several cases relating to trespassing and access to natural resources. We also meet every month to appraise the peace situation of our community for early warning and conflict prevention (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).

There was consensus among the informants that the NGOs helped restore those customary laws that govern the utilisation of natural resources. For example, the principles of Karra Matta, Dongora Serra, Laffa sera roba, Lafa sera bonna and Forra have been activated. Since then, agreement on access to natural resources has been reached by the Borana and by nomadic Garri in Arero and Yabello; this has been done by negotiation rather than by following the previously assumed open access that led to conflict (Irwin and Mitiku, 2004). Following the process enhanced the capacity of the local institutions’ legal apparatus to address and manage resource-based conflicts. The following extract from Care Ethiopia’s programme coordinator in Yabello captures how these laws are employed to govern access to natural resources:

The roles of aba hirega and jarsa dheed (in NRM/rangeland and water) have been reinforced during the conflict resolution processes. They (Gabra, Guji, and Borana) are able to restore rules and regulations that they used in the past to punish those who enter the wet and dry grazing land without the knowledge of the elders. The penalty for grazing in the Kallos without the consent of the elders is
Care Ethiopia, through the RREAD project, rehabilitated wells in Dire and Moyalle, and initiated reera (cluster) based bush clearing and kallo (rangeland reserve) management by jarsa Reera and abba Reera (cluster head). They have been able to restore the rules and regulations used in the past to punish those who entered the wet and dry grazing land without the knowledge of the elders. The penalty for grazing in the Kallo without the consent of the elders is from 1-5 cattle depending on the seriousness of the situation. The Mercy Corps’ Strengthening Institutions for Peace and Development (SIPED) project in the districts of Arero and Yabello aimed at building pastoralists’ resilience to drought by facilitating peace agreements for resource sharing, and by strengthening the capacities of local institutions for NRM (Mercy Corps, 2011). SIPED improved cross-ethnic ties and strengthened the capacities of local institutions to mitigate conflict. This in turn, gave pastoralist groups the opportunity to access natural resources and economic opportunities (Mercy Corps, 2011). The Mercy Corps’ Conflict Prevention and Resolution Program (CPRP) officer indicated that the SIPED project’s most significant achievement was to facilitate sharing of very scarce resources during a severe drought:

*During severe drought in 2010-11, the Garri-Somali, including from Kenya, with more than ten thousand animals had settled moderately better areas of pasture and water around Arero and Yabello districts of Borana zone and Shakisso of Guji-Zone of Oromia. What [all] we did was to bring them together for discussion and work together for the settlement. Rebuilding those relationships was vital for survival of the pastoralists’ livelihood during the drought seasons. During their stay, no major cattle theft and no killings occurred. Occasional cattle theft used to be conceived as ethnic conflict and resulted in massed based conflict but at this time it was just perceived as an individual crime and treated as such. (CPRP officer, Mercy Corps, October 2011).*

Similarly, Kurtz and Scarborough (2012) reported the contribution of the SIPED project towards facilitating freedom of movement and access to natural resources by the Garri and Gabra in the Arero and the Yabello districts during the recent drought. Although such arrangements could be attributed to an age-old cross-ethnic alliance, Kurtz and Scarborough (2012) indicated that such cooperation was not evident in other neighbouring areas where peacebuilding initiatives had not taken place. For example, conflict prevented the migration of the Garri-Somali of Udet Woreda to share the resources available in the Borana of Wachille, Arero Woreda; this exacerbated their vulnerability to drought-shocks. SOS Sahel’s BCFMP contributed to creating conditions that enabled a negotiated access to important resources, thereby reducing conflict and protecting the
forest resource in the Yabello and Arero districts. A statement from SOS Sahel’s Projects Manager provides some valuable insight into these initiatives:

*BCFM contributed to the preservation of the forest resources in Yabello and Arero areas. However, forest resources which were not included in [the] BCFM project were completely destroyed. For example, the forest resources in the areas of Gamato, Gubalo Ate, Edi Lolote [Liban district] were completely destroyed.* (Projects Manager, SOS Sahel, October 2011).

The following section highlights how community relations efforts contributed to the on-going conflict transformation in the Borana Zone.

### 5.6.3 Building Intra and inter-ethnic Relations

EPaRDA, Mercy Corps, OPA, AFD and Care Ethiopia have been promoting cross-community contacts for groups in conflict. According to a Chairman of the Oromia Pastoralist Association (OPA) interviewed in the study area, these cross-community interventions were not aimed at resolving conflicts conclusively. Their first objective was to help in revitalising economic opportunities, to improve the capacity for trade and to increase links between traders across the border. The second objective was to reduce the intensity of resource-based conflict by encouraging the “values” of communal resource sharing, and thereby facilitating herd mobility along borders. EPaRDA, AFD and Care Ethiopia adopted different strategies to initiate relationship-building activities between conflicting parties along borders, and sought to bring people together in order to work at reducing the incidence of cross-border raids. For example, in 2009, AFD and Care Ethiopia facilitated experience-sharing tours with the aim of sharing information and forging cross-border relations between Borana, Konso and Hamer communities. In 2008, when operating in the Hamer-Borana corridor, EPaRDA facilitated a peace conference in Hawassa between Borana and Hamer. The conference provided an opportunity to diffuse a long-standing conflict over a cross-border raid that killed a Borana and raided their cattle in 2008. The Hamer community agreed to pay 110 head of cattle and 200 goats to the Borana, and handed over the suspected murderers to police (EPaRDA, 2010). The compensation was a significant achievement for the Hamer-Borana peace process because it was a case that had, for some time, strained relationships between communities across the borders (EPaRDA, 2010). The cooperation also contributed to a reduction in the incidence of cross-border cattle raids, and has clearly had a significant effect on the dynamics of conflict in the region.
Similarly, in 2009, OPA and AFD jointly organised a Cross-border Peace and Reconciliation Conference involving Gabra and Borana from Kenya. It was held in Sololo, Kenya, about 30 km. from Ethiopia-Moyalle. Moreover, OPA facilitated Dukana (Kenya) and Maikona (Dillo district, Borana) peace initiatives in 2009. These initiatives led to “The Dukana-Dillo Declaration”, resulting in the restoration of resource sharing arrangements between Gabra of Kenya and Borana Ethiopia (note that the pasture was in Kenya with the water points in Ethiopia). The initiatives also created Local Peace Committees (LPCs) to prevent and resolve conflict, and to create effective mechanisms for gathering and disseminating information about threats and possibilities of raids (PCI, 2009). To implement the declaration, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) supported the efforts of LPCs in helping the Borana pastoralists, from the kebeles of Arbole, Goray, Qadim and Hoboq (Dillo district), to access grazing areas of Beda Huri, 260 km inside Kenya (CEWARN, 2010a, 2010b). Similarly, following two consecutive failed rainy seasons (2009-10 and 2010-11), pastoralists from Kenya migrated and settled in the Yabelo and Arero districts (Kurtz and Scarborough, 2012). Also, LPCs in the Dukale Kebele of Miyo Woreda and the Anona location of Sololo District in Kenya facilitated resource sharing agreements in which both sides agreed to share resources peacefully (CEWARN, 2010a). A Chairman of OPA with much experience in inter-ethnic negotiation describes how cross-border peace committees of elders were able to reduce the incidence of cattle raids and prevent violence in the following way:

...two months ago there was a regrouping of the same youth from Goray (Dillo, Borana) who planned to launch a cattle raid on the Gabra of Turbi (Kenya)... they (Dillo Local Peace Committee) managed to foil the plan and hand over the suspects to local police...they also informed the other party to take precautionary measures. (Chairman, OPA, October 2011).

At the same time, communities with long-standing inter-group bonds were able to re-establish and re-build trust. They describe their confidence in the capacity of their indigenous institutions to rebuild their cross-ethnic ties:

The frequent meetings reduced mistrust and suspicion among us...with the establishment of inter-ethnic peace committees we share resources; we participate in funerals and weddings. We negotiate access to the pastureland and water points for the wet and dry seasons and move to the other side during the dry season. We no longer suspect they (other groups) would violate these rules. This used to be one of the causes of conflict in our area (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).
It is clear from the above discussion that NGOs played key roles in bringing people together for relationship-building, which assisted access to natural resources; those NGOs also helped communities to cope with severe drought.

The evidence from the FGD also suggests that inter-ethnic peace committees of elders were able to forge strong inter-ethnic networks of engagement and were successful in dispelling certain fears and rumours and in avoiding violence:

A year ago, young people from our group raided our neighbours and one person was killed and at least fifteen to twenty cattle were stolen. Everyone anticipated counter-raids and rumours abounded and spread through frightened communities... words flew round an anxious public like wildfire, and people ready for violence. We immediately sent our delegates and contacted our counterparts to calm down the alarms and rumours about planned raid...negative incidents or intentions had to be quickly quelled. This would not happen if the networks were not created and were not put into practice. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).

These communities were able to implement decisions to refrain from any action that would provoke violent reactions; this prevented conflict.

The following sub-section will discuss the perspective of key persons involved with capacity building for local government departments.

5.6.4 Capacity Building for Local Government Departments

Most of the NGOs operating in these areas are aware of the need for capacity building for local governments and draw a positive correlation between lack of good governance and conflict. Therefore, one way of addressing conflict is to promote good governance for economic and political development. This is because, according to one informant:

Good governance is one method of conflict resolution. (Project Manager, Mercy Corps, October 2011).

Most NGOs responded to the government’s decentralisation policy along the following lines:

In 2008, our assessment of the local institutions’ capacities for good governances revealed a widespread capacity problem in the local governance system, particularly among the new Kebeles of the Somali and Oromia Regions. The politically-assigned local administrators did not have the required skills to handle and address the mounting conflicts. We support the government’s decentralisation policy and capacity building; we even built local courts and supplied office furniture to strengthen the judicial system. We provided short training for the local police officers and judges on human rights and good governance and we contributed to the capacity building of the judicial system.
As a result, abuse of human rights by police began to decrease, judges at the district and Region level began to respond promptly to cases, which in the past were characterised by very long judicial processes which used to take years. (Project Manager, Mercy Corps, October 2011).

The newly reconstituted Worada administrations with feeble local government structures are unable to maintain the rule of law and political order and this diminishes state legitimacy, generating instability and encouraging a culture of impunity. In these regions, cases of power abuse, nepotism, and arbitrary arrests and release on the basis of political expediency abound (Scott-Villiers et al., 2011; Feyissa, 2009). Moreover, lack of coordination among the law enforcement agencies such as the court, police and prosecutors undermines the relevance and legitimacy of each agency. The NGOs stepped into this vacuum:

There is a particularly urgent need for such training in the newly reformed Worada administration in Itang. The Itang (Gambella) local administration is well known for its partisanship. Government officials and the police participated in the conflicts supporting their respective ethnic groups. As one of the largest mixed settlement areas, Itang was given special attention in peacebuilding in the region. Currently, there is a remarkable “peace energy” in the district that surrounds the euphoria on the restoration of the Worada. As “good governance” has become one of the buzz words in government circles there seems to be a favourable environment for organising training for the same. (Program Coordinator, Pact Ethiopia, November 2011).

The NGOs supported capacity building in local government structures to lay the groundwork to build strong state institutions which would provide political order, the rule of law, and conditions allowing successful economic and political development.

Thus, empowering these institutions was seen as a means of conflict resolution.

### 5.6.5 Gender Issue

In Borana, NGOs such as Care Ethiopia, Mercy Corps, AFD and GPDA have clarified their approaches on gender issues. Firstly, these NGOs argue that women are marginalised as a socio-economic, political and cultural group and were thus prevented from participating meaningfully in any decision making processes. Secondly, some claim to have integrated a “gender balance” when nominating or promoting candidates for the peace committees and other positions at various levels. Likewise, in Gambella, NGOs such as Pact and ACORD focused on strengthening the capacity of women for participation in conflict resolution institutions. These NGOs, therefore, have been at the forefront of incorporating women in peace and development initiatives and have tried to maintain at least 33% women’s representation at all levels of their
organisational and operational structures (see, for example, AFD, 2009; Care, 2009a; Pact, 2007). Most NGOs have established guidelines for quotas for women, focusing on gender equality and women’s empowerment, which emphasises the participation of women and men as being necessary for promoting peacebuilding and development. The detailed contribution and impact of these NGOs on women’s empowerment and their participation in peacebuilding activities is referred to in section 5.8.1 and section 5.9.3.

5.6.6 Faith-based Peacebuilding Approach

As indicated in chapter three (Section 3.1: 52-59), the Anywaa and Nuer ethnic groups dominate the dynamics of protracted ethnic conflicts in the Gambella regional states. These conflicts have also engulfed the churches, and as in the case of government institutions, the churches have been “captured” by ethnic or other group affiliations (Pax Christi, 2004). The Mekane Yesus church (part of Ethiopian Evangelical Churches Mekane Yesus) has the largest number of followers among the Anywaa and Nuer (WGBP, 2008). In 1992 the church was split along ethnic lines on issues related to differential access to resources and leadership. The split became more formal when both were accorded the status of synod by the national Mekane Yesus Church in 2001. The Western (Nuer) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (WGBP) has become a separate synod as a result of resentment at the Eastern (Anywaa) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (EGBP) (Pax Christi, 2004). This WGBP separation was grounded in the perception of injustice, fuelled by long-standing political tension. Apart from preaching the Gospel, the churches of all denominations have emphasised the importance of including community development and running small development projects (WGBP, 2008). When one of the church leaders was asked what factors motivated the church to work on peacebuilding, his reply was:

When the conflict among the Nuer, Anuywaa and Majengir reached its peak, resulting in the killing of more than 150 people, the two church leaderships rose up with the initiative from the EECMYPC (Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus Peace Commission Office). In the earlier conflicts, the two leaderships seemed to play a limited role in conflict resolution. They were silent at times. After the first initiative from EECMY, the conflict issue has been taken as one of the core objectives of the two churches. We cannot live without having compassion and Christian love for one another. Both leaderships realised that they had to work together to live in peace. (Church Leader, WGBP, December 2011).

NGOs such as ACORD, Pact Ethiopia and HEKs supported the churches’ peacebuilding initiatives and used them as an entry point for further peacebuilding efforts. These NGOs suggest
that targeting such pre-existing networks is not only critical for peacebuilding, but was the most
effective method of stimulating and maintaining commitment to collective action. One major and
effective strategy that the churches used to bridge the two communities was to institutionalise
cross-ethnic projects into the dominant peacebuilding toolkit. These projects include the
establishment of the Joint Development Office and a Joint Peace Committee under the auspices
of HEKs. The Joint Peace Committee initiative, supported by EECMYP and other NGOs such
as the Ethiopian Catholic Church Social and Development Coordinating Office of Gambella
(ECC/SDCO), has resulted in the establishment of the Gambella Peace and Development
Council (GPDC). Whilst the GPDC was set up with a mandate of joint planning and
implementation of peacebuilding projects, the Joint Development Office was entrusted with
initiating inter-ethnic development programmes aimed at enhancing Anywaa-Nuer relations. The
GPDC was effective in staging a joint Nuer and Anywaa Peace Choir that draw attention from
the two ethnic groups. According to one of the informants:

*In 2004, a joint peace choir was set up. In fact, it was not an easy task because of the language barrier. They travelled along with the GPDC which was involved in peacebuilding conferences and dialogue. The choir intended to build the relationship between the two communities in Itang, Lare, Abobo and Pinyido. They were welcomed by the Itang Parishes and congregations of both Synods, Kebele administrations, police, and delegated members from the neighbouring districts of Jikoaw and Alouro Openo. They presented dramas on the parable of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel (aimed at conveying a message that one should love one’s neighbours) and sang spiritual songs in both languages and inspired the participants of the meetings. It was the first time that the two congregations came together for Sunday Worship. For many people, this was unthinkable but with the help of God it was possible. For example, the Choir won the hearts and the minds of the people... invited even by the Regional Government to give their blessing for peace conferences. The impact was also felt at individual level: people said, ‘I am Simon by name not by being an Anywaa; I am Jonah by name not by being a Nuer’. The same is with religion; we may originate from different families and different villages but we all worship the same God. [The] participants were encouraged openly to discuss the root causes of conflict and seek out solutions. The conference set up nine peace committees and entrusted them with the task of peacebuilding and reconstructing dismantled Anywaa churches (during conflict) and opened them for both congregations. (Church leader, WGBP, December 2011).*

The central role that religion plays in the individual and collective peacebuilding initiatives is
evident from the above quote. Several informants emphasised that inter-faith peacebuilding
schemes were the most effective way of stimulating collective action for peace. This was
because religious values can motivate people either to fight or to reconcile (Abu-Nimer, 2001).
Similarly, religious rituals can be powerful tools in transforming animosity into cooperation.
Mutual trust and interdependence can easily be turned into inter-group solidarity for planning
and carrying out collective action to bridge ethnic divisions (Abu-Nimer, 2001). Individuals operating on a religious or spiritual basis are often better equipped than political leaders to reach people at the level of the individual and subnational group. The qualitative data shed light on this:

A Pastors’ and Evangelists’ peacebuilding workshop was conducted in November 2004, in the compound of Western (Nuer) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (WGBP). This was the first time that the two Synods’ pastors and Evangelists were brought together since their split in 1992. Moreover, members of the other ethnic groups such as Majengir, Opo and Highlanders were invited. The training involved 60 participants from both Synods with the aim of bringing the Synods together to discuss openly and identify the root sources of the conflict. This training was supported by the government and NGOs. For example, the Vice President of the region, Ato/ Keat Tuach, was invited to inaugurate the workshop, and he encouraged the two Synods to work together on peace. The closing ceremony was accompanied by an event whereby the participants were encouraged to write down their sins on a piece of paper; these included sins committed as an individual or as a community towards the other community. The pieces of paper were collected and put into container and burnt. This meant they had got rid of the sins they had committed and could open a new beginning for reconciliation. Participants spoke that they would like to seek peace. (Church leader, WGBP, December 2011).

The church has been given the assignment by the Lord to declare God’s forgiveness to men and women who are repentant (Abu-Nimer, 2001). Before people can be repentant they must acknowledge the sins of which they are guilty. A pastor makes the Gospel relevant to the issues that people are concerned about. The use of rituals and sermons for reconciliation and forgiveness can provide another set of principles for collective action. This can also be used for “meeting the other” and for enriching the perspective of all participants. Participants acknowledged the notion that the positive religious values that support peacebuilding and critiquing exclusionist values in one’s own religion pave the way for learning conflict analysis; this is the first step in dealing with any conflict (Lederach, 1999). For the church leaders and NGOs the moral legitimacy of the church, with its stance of enhancing reconciliation among the devotees, was a real source for building the cultural and social capital necessary for building inter-group relations. Moreover, partnership with the church lent a moral legitimacy to the local government’s capacity to manage conflict:

At the wake of the December massacre and the humanitarian crisis that ensued, the government was desperate to calm the situation. It has sought to use the good image of the GPDC derived from its contribution to Anywaa-Nuer peace to stabilize the situation, and particularly to bring the Anuak refugees in Pochalla back to Gambella. (Church Leader, EGBP, December 2011).
Churches stand out as the main civil organisations engaged in peace promotion in the area. In recent years, there has been a rising interest in how religion can be used in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Lederach, 1999). Lederach’s (1999) faith-based conflict, transformation and peacebuilding model is oriented toward restorative justice. Scholars and practitioners have recognised the critical influence of religious attributes in the escalation and de-escalation of conflicts; these play an equally important role in conflict resolution.

According to one informant, the establishment of separate ethnic-based settlement areas, including institutions of faith and development associations, reinforces divisions and differences and thereby perpetuates tensions. Recognising this, the Joint Development Committee initiated various cross-ethnic development projects:

The NGOs supported Echuey and intervened in the neighbouring Pinykw area where the Anywaa and the Nuer have lived harmoniously for years but where social peace has been disrupted since 2002. These NGOs facilitated a peace dialogue among the Anywaa and Nuer and initiated joint micro-agricultural schemes such as joint vegetable gardens. They also facilitated the process of Echuey Anywaa returnees through dialogue with the community and Worada administration; 65 homes were reconstructed by the Anywaa and Nuers (communities previously in conflict). This activity had the purpose of healing the relationship between the two communities. (Program Coordinator, ACORD, November 2011).

Apart from the provision of social services and reconstruction of social amenities, the church also runs a participatory forest management initiative, which promotes a dialogue between the community and the local government to ensure ultimate ownership of the forest by the community. The church, under the auspices of NGOs, also introduced alternative income generating activities among the Majangir in order to discourage forestland sale (Pact, 2008).

5.6.7 Conclusion

In concluding this sub-section on the faith-based peacebuilding approach, it appears that several NGOs are engaged in the institutionalisation of peacebuilding apparatus to handle conflict and build cross-cutting ties. There seems to be some linkage such as the establishment of the Joint Development Office and the establishment of a joint choir. Several NGOs worked with the Joint Development Office in its peace building projects. The establishment of the Nuer and Anywaa Council of Churches for Peace and Development has been very encouraging, although it is still
in its formative stage and NGOs need to give support to its further development. The detailed contribution and impact of these NGOs towards conflict resolution is referred to in section 5.7.

The preceding sections have presented some of the contributions of the various NGOs. The multi-faceted dimensions of indigenous empowerment have been unfolded through re/institutionalisation of customary institutions.

The following subsection focuses on the nature and impact of conflict resolution in the Gambella region.

5.7 Theme F: Multi-Track Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution initiatives are unfolded in the following themes: (1) initiating and facilitating dialogue among opposition political parties; (2) peacebuilding efforts at middle-range; (3) peacebuilding from below; (4) grass-roots peacebuilding initiatives; and, (5) the need for effective ‘Track One’ processes with government involvement.

This section focuses on the peacebuilding initiatives of NGOs across the three levels in the Gambella Regional State. When focusing on grass-roots peace initiatives, some NGOs adopted a combination of Track One (regional political parties) and Track Two (religious leaders and ethnic groups) approaches in dealing with protracted conflict. These approaches offer classic examples of how Lederach’s (1997) “pyramidal model” for conflict transformation was employed synergistically to address conflict. There is evidence that suggests a coordinated “horizontal” and “vertical” relationship across the three levels that adapted to effect “pyramidal participation”. Hence, the focus is on how the creation of neutral environments and empowerment of ordinary people contribute towards peacebuilding in the new dispensation. The following sub-sections demonstrate how Track One, Track Two and Track Three initiatives were sought to address conflict in the two regions.
5.7.1 Track One-Initiating and Facilitating Dialogue among Opposition Political Parties

As indicated in section 3.1: 52-59, the GPDUP (the Nuer-based Gambella People’s Democratic Unity Party) and the GPLP (Anywaa-based Gambella People’s Liberation Party) are locked in conflict and dominate the region’s conflict dynamics over political power and representation, indigeneity, and other issues. Track One peace initiatives and dividends have failed to trickle down to mid-level leaders and grass-roots community leaders, and have therefore not led to durable settlements. In the absence of formal political institutions that guide political negotiations, political elites used ethnicity to mobilise groups to achieve political goals, thereby leading to protracted violent conflicts (Kaufman, 2001; Lake and Rothchild, 1998). An absence
of inter-ethnic trust and a lack of a supportive political environment gave rise to “all-or-nothing” power struggles (Bratton, 1989a; Bratton and de Walle, 1996). Feyissa (2007: 74) summarised the situation as follows:

The way the regional politics is organized, it is devoid of a scenario of win-win outcomes. Group interest is framed in terms of ‘the code of group amity’ in reference to “the code of out-group enmity”. That is how collective actors design their security, as if inter-ethnic peace depends on intra-ethnic conflict.

The latent ethnic rivalry resulted in mounting tension, spilling over to the Anywaa and the Nuer communities.

After protracted political tension between the GPDUP and the GPLP, deadly conflict broke between the Anywaa and the Nuer in 2002. The trigger of the conflict was a petty quarrel over soap along the Baro River in Itang district but by then the stage was already set for a major confrontation between the two. This conflict spread from Itang to Gambella town and other mixed settlement areas. The scale of violence involved public transport ambushes, throwing hand grenades and destruction of entire villages. (Feyissa, 2007: 30).

The focus of political negotiation over this conflict continued to be on politically influential individuals, sponsored by government, rather than on community leaders and ordinary people. As part of its “conflict resolution mechanism”, the federal government took a series of political measures: high-ranking officials, including the president, were imprisoned; parties were dissolved and restructured under a single umbrella of EPRDF (ruling party); members of the regional police who were accused of inciting and participating in the violence (largely Anywaa) were jailed or dismissed from their jobs; and, the contentious multi-ethnic district was abolished and divided between the Nuer and the Anywaa districts (Feyissa, 2007: 31). These measures, however, were insufficient to address the resentment and the sources that generated it. This prepared the stage for an armed rebellion:

The political measures taken by the federal government, on the other hand, have alienated a large segment of Anywaa society. In fact, what is dubbed as Anywaa banditry that gradually evolved into an armed rebellion is largely organised activity of ex-Anywaa police who were dismissed from their jobs. Failing to sustain their own family and claiming to represent Anywaa discontent, the ex-police officers have resorted to violence against not only government establishments but also civilian highlanders. This has happened because of the categorical association between the highlanders and the Ethiopian state. (Feyissa, 2007: 31).

In the government-led approach the root causes were not addressed and genuine negotiation did not take place; these factors protracted the conflict. A political vacuum was created and the NGOs occupied it, with diverse outcomes for building communication and cross-cutting ties.
NGOs such as ACORD, Pact Ethiopia, and GPDC were involved in a variation of Track One initiatives aimed at overcoming the protracted political tension between the two ethnic-based political parties; the GPDUP and the GPLP. These initiatives emphasised creation of an enabling atmosphere, which included the creation of neutral environments and welcoming spaces for the parties:

Within these terms of government-sponsored negotiation, we facilitated inter-party dialogue to negotiate differences and diffuse tensions. (NGO director, October 2011).

There was consensus among informants that NGOs had no overt influence on the political process at top-level. According to one of the informants:

There was no way that NGOs could replace the dominant party (EPRDF) and broker political negotiation. Whatever role NGOs could play at this level must be sanctioned by the government. (NGO director, October 2011).

However, there was greater agreement that the NGOs did lay the groundwork for building upon government-initiated peace processes. This focused on facilitating a channel of communication between influential leaders of antagonistic ethnic groups. This initiative prepared the ground for a negotiated settlement for the recurring conflict. The NGOs played a central role in paving the way for politicians to get back to the table for dialogue. One respondent indicated that:

...we facilitated a peace dialogue between the Anywaa and the Nuer ....... influential leaders so that they can negotiate their concerns on...the issue of political power and security. The dialogue...generated optimism that more negotiations could be carried out to address one of the root causes of intra-ethnic conflict in the area. (NGO project coordinator, December 2011).

Feyissa (2007: 20) argued the optimistic political environment was “established by default, rather than by design”. Tadesse (2007) regarded state coercion and force, and formal negotiations at the top-level as a turning point. There was consensus that the new dispensation created a new discourse of peace and provided an alternative model for public debate. Once this was accepted into the political debate, the NGOs made use of the optimistic political environment of peace to engage with the elite who are connected to the political leadership as well as the ordinary people (Pact, 2006a). The shift in discourse among the ordinary people, from the language of violence to peace, was used to further peacebuilding efforts at middle-range and grass-roots levels. Therefore, Track Two and people-to-people initiatives followed from the Track One initiatives.
5.7.2 Track Two Peacebuilding Initiatives

Track Two peacebuilding initiatives were organised by the South Ethiopian Evangelical Church Synods, as well as by representatives of the NGO sector, such as HEKs and Pact Ethiopia, to link to the negotiations and the larger political process. This development has already been referred to in this chapter (Sub-section 5.6.5:159-163). In addition, the Gambella Peace and Development Council (GPDC), a consortium of eleven inter-faith groups and the Gambella Intellectuals’ Association\(^{32}\) (GIA) were set up to promote peace, tolerance and co-existence. The church and the NGOs joined forces in convening a peace conference as part of bridging the two communities. The Anywaa and the Nuer political leaders therefore joined this plan and set up a committee that was fairly representative in terms of ethnic groups. Various key participants from NGOs, GIA, and the churches played their part in setting up the alternative dispute resolution apparatus:

...significant change is that elites of the antagonistic ethnic groups which in the past were part of the conflict and who were polarised in accordance with their ethnic group started to come together and analyse the problem of cyclic conflict in the region. They also started to undertake activities aimed at resolving conflicts in a coordinated way, resulting in a decrease of occurrence of conflict between Nuer and Anywaa. (NGO staff, December 2011).

Mention should be made of the role of the Group Four Initiative (GFI) which is an independent peacebuilding body that consists of four intra-Nuer ethnic groups: a Gaajok, a Gaaguang and two Gaajak. Thus, the peace process reached a turning point when the GFI was set up to mediate and facilitate a series of peace dialogues between political elites at different levels. For instance, the GFI and the GIA organised, in collaboration with other NGOs, numerous forums and debates on underdevelopment and conflict transformation issues (WGBS, 2008). They also facilitated inter-ethnic peace dialogues between the Gaajak elites, between the Gaajak and the Gaajok, and between the Nuer and Anywaa elites to diffuse the rising tension. Furthermore, there were attempts to transfer these initiatives to the grass-roots level and to impact public discourse on a wider scale through various peace conferences and the mass media.

\(^{32}\) An association established under the auspices of the regional government to resolve the crisis in the aftermath of December 13, 2003 violence.
5.7.3 Track Three: Peacebuilding from Below
Parallel to the Track Two peace process, NGOs facilitated Track Three peacebuilding initiatives involving grass-roots community leaders and ordinary citizens. The NGOs played a central role in helping those at the grass-roots level to participate in the peacebuilding initiatives. For example, when ex-police officers and students resorted to violence against government’s “indiscriminate killings” in 2002, it was ordinary people such as traditional elders, families of the “rebels” and victims who were involved in a variation of Track Three initiatives; they negotiated a political settlement between the government and “rebels”. Also, they mediated the legitimate concerns of both parties such as the issue of amnesty and guaranteeing the safety of the Anywaa “rebels” as well as the issue of disarmament. One of the informants described the peace process as follows:

After a series of instability and conflict, there was the emerging hopeful atmosphere of peace...we used this opportunity for carrying out further peacebuilding activities to de-polarise the situation. We facilitated a general conference for peace dialogue...they agreed to bring the “children” [also called rebels] home. Secondly, to work with the government in granting the children amnesty so that they would be reintegrated to the community. They elected a team of community elders’ comprising “highlanders”, government figures and women to commence the peace process. Government also played a significant role in sanctioning amnesty and guaranteeing the safety of the “rebels”. In the negotiation processes, the traditional elders and the families of the rebels, from Anywaa communities, also played an important role in brokering a peace deal between the government and rebels. They conveyed the message of the government [to the rebels] that it would not take any retaliatory measures; ......... willingness of the government to grant them amnesty if they were disarmed and abandoned the insurgence. ...the government didn’t take any [retaliatory] measures. The rebel group disbanded; the students went back to schools; the policemen were reinstated into their previous posts, the farmers went back to their villages, all were brought back to their livelihoods. In the process, they realised that they were part of the government body, and the government even offered them job opportunities. Had the government broken its word (amnesty), the problem could have been exacerbated and the rebels could have returned into the jungle. (NGO programme manager, December 2011).

Several informants from this region could point to some critical impact, in which these initiatives played a significant role. One of the major achievements was to bring the parties together for discussions. They worked at finding the root sources of conflict and at resolving it; they ate together, rebels integrated into the community and roads that had been closed because of the conflict were reopened. Even the government military force learned the importance of dialogue and negotiation:

...the rebels fled to the jungle with weapons and they fought back [against] the military, which was sent to crack down on them. But it led to loss of life on both sides. However, on their way back to Gambella town the military realised the risk of an ambush and decided to open a dialogue for making
peace to avoid being ambushed. They raised money to prepare meals, and after protracted negotiation the rebels guaranteed them safe passage and joined them for a meal. (NGO Project manager, December 2011).

Another contribution of the NGOs was to offer training in business skills following the demobilisation of all child soldiers and to engage in cross-border trade; many soldiers opened shops. One of the informants described the reason for supporting the child soldiers:

...following the peace agreement between the government and the rebels, a number of child soldiers came home. Without any real prospects for schooling, marketable skills or job opportunities, there exists a risk of these children again resorting to violence or being recruited into fighting groups. We offered them entrepreneurship and small business skills to start trade...we encouraged those who were interested, to go back to school. (NGO staff, December 2011).

According to Feyissa (2007), however, this optimistic mood was short-lived. In January 2006, some of the repatriated youth were arrested because of their alleged link with a “surreptitious” political movement. This turn of events dashed the confidence that had been created.

5.7.4 Grass-roots Peacebuilding Initiatives

NGOs such as GPDC, Pax Christi Netherland, ACORD and Pact Ethiopia were among the first to recognise and harness the potential of using sport to promote peace, after the 2003 conflict. These NGOs funded games and tournaments between school teams, which are often from communities with different ethnic groups. Participation in sports can break down stereotypes, transform negative attitudes about “the others”, and empower communities to create a less conflict-prone society:

*NGOs were the first to organise football games among youth from the five ethnic groups in Gambella and the neighbouring ethnic groups. Some of the sport activities focus on the promotion of a specific sport like football...it also incorporates an aspect of social integration and reconciliation through games and tournaments between school teams. It targeted schools with multi-ethnic groups that have been sites of violent conflict for years. We organised a public rally involving the youth, women, and all sectors of the society. We prepared and distributed sport kits such as t-shirts with slogans of “peace”. You don’t believe me; the public rally had become an eye-opener. It was an indication of the existence of the seeds of peace. It made us optimistic about the possibility of building peace in the area. Then, we organised a football match among mixed ethnic groups. These games brought youth from different ethnic backgrounds to play in the same team. Sport offers an easy and low-cost interaction opportunity in which the rules of interaction and socialisation are clear. (NGO Project manager, December 2011).*

In addition to funding sports activities that aim at creating cross-cutting ties, NGOs also collaborated with local community groups, artists, and government bodies and arranged music
concerts. This project showed that participants in a concert create a space for interaction and their attitudes and behaviour can assist. Also, the public performance of a concert can have an impact on the audience:

As a result of a number of years living in conflict, there seems to be a conflict fatigue among the ordinary men and women who have shouldered the brunt of the violence. Pact has helped generate “peace rhetoric” through highlighting the peace motif through music, arts and sports. The September 2006 high-profile Peace Day concert was a case in point. Following the concert, people euphorically spoke of the end of violence, referring the era “before the concert” and “after the concert”. People who once considered each other deadly enemies got into “a hugging mood”. In the months after the concert, the trend has been to externalise blame of conflict to outside sources. This symbolic act of scapegoating might not address the root causes of the conflict, but nevertheless in a polarised society such as Gambella, it is relevant. (Pact’s IMPACT Bulletin, 2006:3).

Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002) underscored the significance of cultural activities in addressing conflict and seeking alternative non-violent solutions. It would appear that the concert introduced a new way in which conflict is interpreted and it presented an alternative image of cross-community relations. In a case study example from South Africa, however, Höglund and Sundberg (2008) cautioned not to ascribe too much weight to symbolism derived from sport as a tool for reconciliation. According to these authors the integrative and bridging functions of these initiatives are momentary events, coming and going quickly. Despite some criticism, the Peace Concert increased the confidence of the NGOs in initiating innovative approaches to peacebuilding.

5.7.5 The Need for Effective “Track One” Processes: Government Involvement

Several informants indicated that although the peace facilitation went very well with some results trickling down to the grass-roots level, the big challenge was that the peacebuilding initiatives only took into account the day-to-day manifestation of the conflict:

There has been a relative peace, though fragile, between Anywaa and Nuer... otherwise the conflict is latent in as much as the root causes are not tackled. Four years on, the question of Anywaa Internally Displaced Persons has not yet been addressed. (Pact, 2006b: 37).

This latent tension became manifest in October 2006 when road construction workers were killed, followed by a series of indiscriminate killings of highlanders (Feyissa, 2007). The tension escalated until the federal army intervened to manage and de-escalate the conflict. A project manager working in a conflict resolution project summed up the role of government in the following way:
In this area, whatever peace there is, is marked by the absence of conflict, usually imposed by “Mekelakeya” (Ethiopian National Defense Force). The very presence of the “Mekelakeya” in town had brought about some kind of peace. (NGO Project manager, December 2011).

This demonstrated the coercive power of the military in the de-escalation of conflict and bringing temporary peace. This is important given the intractability of conflicts that often spread quickly and reach across wide areas. Even where there has been relative stability, the presence of the military continues to play a critical role in mitigating and containing conflict:

Nothing explains this more than the highlanders’ panic early January 2006 when the existing defense force left the town for replacement. The entire highlander community was going to leave as well, but the Red Cross calmed the situation. (Pact, 2006b: 19).

This statement clearly demonstrates that NGOs could play a significant role in addressing fears and suspicion, by responding quickly to events that could instigate violent conflict. Given the history of deep-rooted conflicts in the region, the government will continue to play crucial roles in preventing, containing and ending violent conflict.

5.7.6 Conclusion

The preceding section highlighted how Track One, Track Two and Track Three approaches worked synergistically and played key roles in addressing the conflict. The Track One initiative related to political leaders from the GPDUP and the GPLP. This initiative emphasised the creation of an enabling atmosphere, including the creation of neutral environments for the parties. In an attempt to link Track One negotiation outcomes with Track Two and Track Three constituencies, the NGOs involved middle-range representatives of conflicting parties for face-to-face dialogue. The Gambella Peace and Development Council (GPDC), and Gambella Intellectuals’ Association talks are an example of this. Another example would be a dialogue between the Western (Nuer) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (WGBP) and the Eastern (Anywaa) Gambella Bethel Presbytery (EGBP). Track Three initiatives of NGOs involved traditional elders, families of the “rebels”, and victims of the conflict. One could argue that all the three levels have, to some degree, helped to manage and resolve conflict in the communities. Nonetheless, there are NGOs specially geared for Track Three initiatives. At this level, the emphasis is on training grass-roots leaders and “key actors” in the skills and concepts of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Thus, they all have roles to play within their own communities and spread their experiences. The following sub-section will discuss the peacebuilding initiatives of
NGOs at the grass-roots level. The focus is on how empowerment and capacity building of the ordinary citizens contributes towards peacebuilding.

5.8. Theme G: Inter/intra-ethnic Relations

The issue of inter/intra-ethnic relations has the following two major themes: training as a part of an inter/intra-ethnic relations initiative and the beneficiaries’ perceptions of NGO services.

5.8.1 Training as a part of an inter/intra-ethnic Relations Initiative

Respondents from the NGO sector who are involved in conflict resolution training focused on the following: the problem of defining and determining the content of training; the rationale for cross-ethnic training; training as a part of capacity building and empowerment; training as part of a social bridging initiative; and, involving “key actors” as “ambassadors of peace”.

- The problem of defining and determining the content of training

Indigenous conflict management mechanisms influence strongly the approach towards “joint training” projects in the regions. Some organisations have difficulties in adopting the conventional term “training” because of its association with a prescriptive approach, where the trainer assumes an expert role (Lederach, 1995; Fisher, 1997). A director of a capacity building unit, with wide experience of facilitating joint training programmes, offered an account that resonates with Lederach’s (1997) elicitive approach. This latter approach draws on indigenous knowledge that echoes the work advanced by Lederach (1997):

In strict sense of the term, it is very difficult to call it “training” because we, as “trainer”, do not claim to possess many of the skills or concepts to be imparted on the participants. We don’t have a specific model or module or many new skills that weren’t already in their system...for example information exchange on potential cattle raiding...could be called conflict analysis, frameworks of conflict analysis; investigating accusations and incidents or following up could go along the line of conflict management...are all entwined in their daily life. Probably, what is new in our approach is, we promoted the inclusion of women and youth, and put gender issues, and human rights principles on the agenda...[in] accordance with the Constitution of the country. We facilitated dialogues across conflict lines for negotiations. Most of these concepts are already intertwined within the cultural knowledge of a people. They are responsible for generating or devising the training models that are suitable in their locale and the consequences of the negotiation strategies they have chosen. (NGO director of a capacity building unit, December 2011).

This clearly demonstrates, as Lederach (1995a) proposed, the emphasis the NGO placed on identifying “cultural modalities and resources” and the indigenous knowledge and skills that the
participants possess to deal with conflict within their own societal settings. For example, training themes such as *daimtu* (information sharing and investigation) can be termed early warning and conflict analysis. These resources gave NGOs more confidence in initiating contacts and building relationships between antagonistic ethnic groups. Furthermore, since NGOs were already active in the provision of services, they were pressured to work to reduce violence and increase dialogue. They used their formal and informal contacts with the community leaders and key actors to initiate dialogue as a peace strategy that would enable the main antagonists to find a political settlement to the recurrent conflict.

- **The rationale for cross-ethnic training-initiating dialogue**

As previously indicated (Section 5.3.3: 121-123), several respondents argued that NGOs developed contact and relationship-building capabilities because of the escalation of violence, which threatened their own operations. After violent conflict, NGOs worked to encourage dialogue at cross-ethnic level in the belief that it would prepare the ground for a negotiated solution to the conflict. The coordinator of an NGO working in cross-ethnic training highlighted how important it was to initiate cross-community work at the time:

> *They were sharing neither water nor pasture, even though the drought was very severe. They had been apart for almost ten years. One side had grazing and the other had water and neither group would share with the other. Before the conflict they used to interact and marry, do business together, and trade a lot of sheep and livestock, but there have been cold-hearted relations between them. Rebuilding those relationships were vital for building resilience towards the recurrent drought and diversifying livelihoods...for survival of the pastoralist livelihood. Furthermore, such a divide undermines our limited contribution to development because they depend on one another...the reason people fight is because they are very poor. We supported them to open up small trade across the borders. The long-term strategy was rebuilding relationships across ethnic lines for sharing information and economic generation. We wanted to break the silence and initiate dialogue and build the capacity and skills of the participants to spread peace to the grass-roots. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011).*

Thus it would appear that initiating contact and dialogue between the conflicting parties was given high priority. In doing so, the NGO broke a major blockade in the cross-communities relationships. Once enabling environments for dialogue were created, the parties agreed on creating joint ideas for conflict resolution, with a positive effect on de-escalating and resolving the conflict. In other words, the NGOs were successful at reinitiating and re-activating the cultural toolkit available for negotiation to respond to and resolve the conflict. This laid the
groundwork for further negotiations for bridging gaps in intra and inter-ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms.

- **Training for bridging gaps in cross-ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms**

The training aimed to create joint ideas for conflict resolution activities. An NGO programme coordinator described the importance of the training as follows:

> Each ethnic group has its own mechanisms for resolving disputes and has its negotiation strategy for managing access to key resources and for resolving disputes...but it has begun to change over recent decades. At the moment, the causes of conflict have become diverse and complex...and it is insufficient to deal with the inter-ethnic conflicts...they needed to draw new by-laws...build on the old ones. We facilitated joint training programmes...we provide a working environment...participants were drawn from many different communities...reflect on their own attitudes and assumptions, their own underlying interests, concerns and fears, their own goals and ideals. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011).

> We offered little support or follow-up to negotiate or to strengthen the existing intra-ethnic conflict management...they agreed to form a new cross-ethnic peace committee that would represent them and set up information exchange mechanisms, law and surveillance...they also drafted and ratified agreed-upon by-laws to govern and arbitrate future disputes. (NGO Project manager, December 2011).

In the context of multiethnic training programmes, Lederach (1995a) suggests an elicitive training approach to fill the cultural “gaps”. The training created an opportunity for activating the moral authority of those customary institutions that govern cross-ethnic ties over access to resources.

Another important facet of training is capacity building and empowerment of participants.

- **Training as capacity building and empowerment**

Most NGOs are aware of the need for empowering community members locally, through training and capacity building strategies, so that people are able to handle issues themselves. The NGOs are keen to train and build their capacity through conflict resolution training projects with the following objectives:

> Women were included in peace meetings...they were being employed in peacebuilding by various groups...youth were trained in entrepreneurship skills. The elders improved governance and management of natural resources; increased opportunities for income diversification; enhanced alternative livelihoods; increased participation of pastoralists in development planning; enhanced decision-making for pastoralist communities in development activities; and, improved development
planning for pastoral areas, sustainable development and Human Rights. These approaches are the best use of scarce funding resources for peacebuilding. As a result, useful skills become resources for peacebuilding. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011).

It would appear that the training incorporates the elements creating opportunities for youth and women’s participation, providing skills for alternative dispute resolution, as well as community development. This form of training is generally geared towards empowering people to carry out development planning and enhancing alternative livelihoods for their own communities. Another vital aspect of the training is that it helps social bridging.

- **Training as building social bridging**

While some training focused on building an individual’s capacity for bridging cross-community gaps or for resolving conflict, other training sought to influence the attitude and beliefs of “key actors”:

> They all want peace, but they have fears of raids and ambushes by the other...have little information about the intention of the other and that is why they have these problems and doubts...they had stopped sharing vital resources due to fear and mistrust. Everyone was ready with his gun cocked. They hear bad news about the other parties’ intentions. The objective of the joint training was to enhance collaboration and trust among these groups and reduce suspicion and mistrust among the various ethnic communities living across the border. They agreed once again that there should be peace, trade and resource sharing between them. They decided to rebuild cross-border governments and communities to strengthen relationships and actively participate in resolving and preventing violent conflict. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011).

The focus of the training is on building relationships and trust across conflict lines, facilitating cross-ethnic trade and resource sharing. This development has been referred to in sub-section 5.8.2.3: 194-198. At grass-roots level, conflicting ethnic groups started sharing resources and furthermore, cross-border trade is burgeoning.

- **Involving “key actors”: “ambassadors of peace”**

When asked why joint training primarily targeted “key actors” of conflicting groups rather than a broader community, the response was:

> They are with the elders. We have had so many meetings with some of the participants. Participants have generally been drawn from the grass-roots...we call these elders, women and youth the ambassadors of peace. Most of the participants have never held meetings together before, others are meeting for the first time and they still have their own conflicts with them. These people have distinctive kinds of access to those with whom they speak, in many cases having trust and common
language at their disposal, while also having the regular biases of their groups. They have very high levels of influence. People believe that elders are elected because they have the character and skills to behave as they should, and they also have faith in the training that elders get when they are part of the system. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011).

The “key actors” orientation of the NGOs led them to target people who influence the conflict dynamics; they did not target ordinary people.

- The limit of the “trickle-down” effect

When asked if changes at the personal level were translated into action at the grass-roots level, an informant explained:

As to the measures taken so far to contain the occurrence of violent inter-and intra-ethnic conflict....various dialogue forums have been conducted at different levels up to the village level. And these actors are promoting dialogue and peaceful settlement of conflicts in a better way than before. But, still these activities need to be carried out in a systematic and sustainable manner. (NGO programme Coordinator, November 2011).

The evidence from the FGD suggests that this did not happen, at least not automatically, and that “spillover” cannot be assumed. However, the long-term impact remains there to be seen (Section 5.8.2.1: 178-185).

The following sections will examine whether this could contribute more effectively to reducing tension and generating a sustainable and meaningful form of inter-ethnic cooperation; this would include restoring cross-cutting ties and reducing suspicions.

5.8.2 Has Peacebuilding made a difference? Examining the Beneficiaries’ Perceptions of NGO Services

This section examines the beneficiaries’ perceptions of NGO services. The findings are linked to the quantitative questions in Appendix E. They respond to objective 4 of the study: that is, to ascertain the communities’ perceptions and experience of the NGO programmes. The underlying assumption was that all NGO interventions have both positive and negative impacts on the beneficiaries’ lives, livelihoods and inter-group conflicts. Moreover, depending on their particular worldviews and experience of violence, different beneficiaries provide different types of information for an impact assessment. As stated in the previous chapter (Section 4.1: 74), the approach adopted for presenting the findings is triangulation, where findings from various data sources are integrated. The quantitative findings are presented and then compared and contrasted with the findings from the qualitative and secondary data resources. Furthermore, they are
discussed in the light of the theoretical underpinnings of the study as well as related literature. A summary of key findings is presented at the end of the section.

The sub-section sketches some of the key findings from the three-part survey that aimed at evaluating the perception of the beneficiaries toward the NGOs’ services. The first part of the survey explores the impact of the NGOs on “individual development”. This cluster includes two dependent variables: these are involvement in peacebuilding activities, and change in the level of the incidence of conflict. The second part examines respondents’ perceptions of “social bridging” schemes, such as cross-ethnic contact, trust, tolerance and social prejudice. The third part explores the respondents’ evaluations of the NGOs’ livelihoods enhancement programmes, including their assessments of the extent of improvement, such as alleviating the economic and social consequences of conflict. More specifically, these include change in the level of household income, reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructures, and cooperation in cross-community development.

5.8.2.1 “Individual development”

- Conflict resolution training and individual development for peacebuilding

Conflict resolution training attempts to impact participants’ skills and concepts (Fisher, 1997). It also attempts to challenge collective narratives and memories about the dynamics of conflict (Salomon, 2004) and “change people’s hearts and minds”. Finally, this training helps to address entrenched patterns that characterise conflict habituated systems (Diamond, 1997), empowering trainees to explore, analyse and reframe their interests (Chigas, 1997), and create an enabling environment for negotiation (Lederach, 1997). As indicated above (Section 5.8.1: 173-174), the NGOs operating in the study areas brought together individuals from opposing groups and offered them conflict resolution training aimed at “individual empowerment”; this entailed building conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem solving skills, skills in identifying conflict-connector and divider, and human rights awareness. Conflict resolution training is one of the traditional approaches employed to impact positively on the capacities and attitudes of individuals and communities in areas of protracted social conflict. Thus, the training is seen:

... as a forum for learning, where learning itself becomes a meta-goal; for capacity building, where useful skills become resources for peacebuilding; for dialogue, where participants have a safe space for engaging each other on subjects of critical interest; for community building, where people form
alliances and deep bonds as a human infrastructure for peacebuilding; for modeling, where the training staff demonstrates the principles and practices it teaches; and for culture change, where the culture created in the learning community acts as an agent of change within the culture of the conflict habituated system (Diamond, 1997: 353).

Hence, the underlying assumption is that participants in conflict resolution training are more likely to be “empowered” to become agents of peacebuilding since they are presumed to have the skills and positive attitudes needed to become trainers within their own communities (Fisher, 1997). This, in turn, fosters the psychological and political preconditions necessary for peaceful conflict transformation (Kelman, 1982). Based upon this assumption, the study examines the relationship between participation in conflict resolution training and the respondents’ perception of “empowerment”. The results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Training in conflict resolution and “individual empowerment for peacebuilding”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of participants</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you been trained in conflict resolution programmes?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training in conflict resolution and individual empowerment</th>
<th>Built skills and capacities</th>
<th>Did not bring any change</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in conflict resolution training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in parenthesis is based on chi-square tests.

Respondents were asked whether they had been trained in conflict resolution. Table 3 shows that a large majority of the respondents (90%) had received such training. The Table also denotes that 87.9% of the respondents who participated in the training felt that it had built their skills and capacities; this term referred to conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem solving skills and human rights awareness. In contrast, 12.1% responded that the training did not bring any change. Whilst two-thirds (66.7%) of nonparticipants in training mentioned that their individual
capacity had been strengthened, one-third (33.3%) said it did not bring any change. The chi-square test, however, did not show a significant relationship between training in conflict resolution projects and individual empowerment (P= 0.067). The overriding view was that conflict resolution training is not a significant predictor of individual empowerment.

An opinion from the FGD, however, indicated that the NGOs’ interventions had an impact on individual empowerment:

*This Koree Nagaa (Intra/inter-ethnic peace committees) have been set up and provided training on conflict early warning, conflict management and conflict resolution skills. The objective of the training was to build the skills for carrying out an assessment of conflict indicators for developing action plans for conflict prevention in the Surupha Peace Initiative. They also meet once a month to assess peace situations and carry out [a] local peace conference. Some of our people went on experience-sharing tours to the South Omo Zone...learned skills too...we were able to talk about cross-border cattle raids with elders after many years...we participated in a joint dialogue and training programmes...based on the training ... we agreed to share information on potential cattle raids ...return stray animals...we have been carrying out early warning of conflict, peacebuilding and conflict resolution. (Koree Nagaa member, October 2011).*

This view is similar to those of some other authors (Diamond, 1997; Chigas, 1997). For instance, a study by Diamond (1997:337) revealed that participation in conflict resolution training provided participants with “transactional skills and transformational opportunities” to cross-examine their collective narratives and memories about the dynamics of conflict and experiment with different methods that could build a more mutually satisfactory system for peace. From a recent study in El Salvador and South Africa, Chigas (1997) also found that negotiation training contributes to a successful mediation by empowering the protagonists to explore, analyse and reframe their interests; this builds confidence and trust. Furthermore, the skills and attitudes developed by the participants during the training are important variables when analysing their participation in peacebuilding activities; these include trust, willingness to compromise, negotiate and tolerate the values of another ethnic group.

- **Training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities**

The relationship between training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities was examined because it was assumed that (a) the skills and concepts the participants acquired during training would become resources for peacebuilding, and (b) the participants are more likely to become trainers within their own communities and spread their experiences to others. This proposition is widely entrenched in the broader theoretical literature of conflict
studies, which highlights the relationship between “individual empowerment” and participation in peacebuilding activities (Diamond, 1997; Chigas, 1997; Fisher, 1997; CDACLP, 2006). According to these writers, what distinguishes the “key participants” from “others” is the fact that “others” who do not participate in training have a significant influence on the conflict dynamics and are able to “spoil” or undermine peace (CDACLP, 2006). Therefore, the key participants are able to bring some change within the culture of the conflict habituated system (Diamond, 1997).

Furthermore, it was assumed that the personal and group relationship change catalysed by the conflict resolution training would lead to change in political attitudes and actions, or influence the broader community members (CDACLP, 2006). Based upon this assumptions, the respondents were asked if they had participated in peacebuilding activities; in other words, in mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation.

**Table 4. Training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training in conflict resolution</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Significance (P-Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in peacebuilding activities</td>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in parenthesis is based on chi-square tests.

Of the 90% of respondents who participated in conflict resolution training, two-thirds (66.7%) indicated that they had participated in peacebuilding activities very much, slightly less than a third (32.4%) had participated a little and 0.9 % indicated that they did not participate in peacebuilding activities at all. Of those respondents who did not participate in conflict resolution training, 20.5% participated in peacebuilding activities very much, one-third (33.3%) a little and two-fifths (46.2%) indicated they did not participate at all. The evidence in Table 4 seems to support this association between conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities; thus, the percentage of participants in training and peacebuilding is 21.2 percent higher than nonparticipants. In other words, the higher the level of participation in the training programmes, then the higher the level of participation in peacebuilding activities. The converse also applies;
the lower the participation in training, the lower the participation in the peacebuilding activities. Moreover, the chi-square test indicates a significant association between training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities (P=0.000). The test confirms that training in conflict resolution projects run by the NGOs could augment participants’ activities in peace processes, as indicated in the relationship in the chi-square value. The following extracts from the FGDs’ findings capture the extent of the relationship.

*The NGOs gave us training on peacebuilding skills based on government laws and rooted in the customary institutions and laws. They also trained us on how to assess early warning, conflict prevention and work with our neighbours on peacebuilding and development activities at Itang and Lare districts. We share our experience of conflict resolution, conflict early warning and cross-border conflict prevention. We sat down together with other sub-clan elders to find solutions out of impassable situations.* (FGD member, October 2011)

*Twelve intra-ethnic conflict management/monitoring committees were established with the tasks of carrying out early warning of conflict, peace building and conflict resolution. They also meet to assess peace situations and conduct a local peace conference. These peace committees also work in the management of natural resources including access to water, and rehabilitation and maintenance of water sources. We also work on development, health services; we work with the NGOs and government.* (Koree Nagaa member, October 2011).

For NGOs to discover any affirmative responses after years of intervention is encouraging. This is particularly so when we consider the fact that after attending the conflict resolution training, participants had to return to their respective groups and carry out peacebuilding activities and become trainers within their own communities. A close examination of training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities and bivariate analysis of the results in the chi-square value (P=0.000) indicate that the training variable interacts with the peacebuilding variable. This implies that participants in training programmes may be more likely than nonparticipants to be involved in peacebuilding. Furthermore, the qualitative data, such as Diamond’s (1997) finding in his study in Cyprus, indicate a strong relationship between training and involvement in peacebuilding activities. These data offer strong empirical support to the conflict resolution literature, which contends that participants in conflict resolution training are more likely to be involved in peacebuilding activities (Fisher, 1997; Chigas, 1997).

- **Incidence of conflict and factors contributing to change in the incidence of conflict**

Figure 8 denotes that most respondents (93 %) believed that the level of conflict decreased in their area in the last two years; very few mentioned that it increased (2%) and only 5% reported
that it stayed the same. Respondents who indicated a decline in the incidence of conflict cited the following reasons: relative stability in the neighbouring areas (19%), federal government security police (16%), local administration interventions (14.5%), NGO involvement (20%) and local elders’ negotiations (22.5%) (Figure 9). Qualitative information also demonstrated that government structures played a crucial role in de-escalating and managing violent conflicts. This has already been highlighted (see Section 5.7: 137-144).

**Figure 8. Incidence of conflict**

![Pie chart showing incidence of conflict](image)

**Figure 9. Factors contributing to change in the incidences of conflict**

![Bar chart showing factors contributing to change in the incidences of conflict](image)

*Other reasons most commonly recorded include conflict fatigue, improved dialogue and change in cause of conflicts.*
The qualitative data also revealed how leaders representing various ethnic groups, religious institutions, as well as NGOs played a leading role in conflict resolution and conflict prevention. An FGD member attributed the trend to the preventive and capacity building measures being undertaken by NGOs and government to reduce the incidence of conflict:

*Of course with the support of NGOs and government, we drafted by-laws...since the three ethnic groups reinforced the customary laws and have been functional, there has been a decrease in the incidences of murder and cattle theft, which in turn resulted in a decrease in wide scale conflict. One source of conflict was access to water...they built a new borehole. As a result, we no longer need to cross to the other side. We also cooperate in tackling cattle theft. For example, two months ago a Gabra man stole a cow. The elders’ peace committee was able to identify the culprit and locate the stolen cow. The thief was fined 5 cattle heads as compensation. The thief was then handed over to [the] police and jailed for further punishment. (Koree Nagaa member, October 2011).*

This clearly demonstrates how Track Two and Track Three approaches were used synergistically to reduce the incidence of conflict. Yet, it is challenging to demonstrate clearly the extent to which these forces, in aggregate, contributed to the decline in the incidence of conflict. Neufeldt (2007), Menkhaus (2004) and Michelle (2006) point to a fundamental problem in attributing causality; thus, events in conflict environments cannot be predicted, because they are the result of multiple influences. In both regions the state influenced the peace process far more than the NGOs and the local leaders (see Section 5.5.1: 131-141 and Section 5.7: 164-172). For example, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 (between the South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) and government-led negotiations between dominant political parties in the Gambella region, and Ministry of Federal Affairs facilitated referenda between the Somali clans and Borana Zone (Bassi, 2010); these marked a turning-point in shaping the peace processes in the regions. Qualitative data also indicate the importance of NGOs in complementing the peace process where Track One, Track Two and Track Three approaches were used synergistically to address the conflict (See Section 5.7: 164-172).

**5.8.2.2. Training in Conflict Resolution and ‘Social bridging’**

The previous sub-section examined the relationship between conflict resolution training and individual development, paying particular attention to the relationship between “individual empowerment” and participation in peacebuilding activities. The change in the incidence of conflict and factors contributing to the change were highlighted. The overriding conclusion was that “empowered individuals” are more likely to become participants in peacebuilding activities. It was within the context of the conflict resolution training programmes that NGOs also
attempted to build cross-ethnic relationships and trust across conflict lines; the aim was to increase tolerance and reduce prejudice to transform attitudes, perceptions and build trust. This sub-section attempts to examine whether the training programmes helped participants to adopt new attitudes, form relationships, develop joint activities, undertake trade, and do business with each other.

- **Training in conflict resolution and level of cross-ethnic contact**

**Table 5. Training in conflict resolution and level of social contact**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of cross-ethnic contact</th>
<th>Cross-ethnic contact</th>
<th>No cross-ethnic contact</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Significance (P-Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in conflict resolution training</td>
<td>Yes 73 67.6</td>
<td>35 32.4</td>
<td>108 100</td>
<td>0.435*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No 9 75</td>
<td>3 25</td>
<td>12 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in the parenthesis is based on chi-square tests.

The survey findings demonstrate high levels of contact between the communities in a number of environments, particularly within informal group occasions such as weddings, births and deaths, and also cross-border contact. This was generally true for programme participants and the population, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5 reports the results for the relationship between training in conflict resolution programmes and cross-ethnic contact. This relationship is important, because it allows one to assess whether inter-group contact through training programmes makes people more, or less, willing to engage in contact with other ethnic groups. Over two-thirds (67.6%) of respondents who participated in conflict resolution training indicated that they have had some kind of cross-community contact in the form of participation in informal group occasions, such as weddings, deaths and cross-border trade.

It was also assumed that participants in conflict resolution training were likely to have more cross-ethnic contact than the nonparticipants. The findings, however, show that the amount of cross-ethnic contact among the nonparticipants is 7.4% more than among the participants.
Additionally, the chi-square test (P=0.435) indicates lack of any significant relationship between training in conflict resolution programmes and cross-ethnic contact. This pattern was also reflected in nonparticipants where 75% indicated that they engaged in some form of cross-border contact.

One way to address this disparity could be to separate support for cross-ethnic contact from actual participation in cross-ethnic events: participants did not have to cross any border to share resources, nor do they have to cross any border to have a positive attitude towards cross-ethnic contacts. In other words, the respondents who were considered to have “optimal” training in conflict resolution were less compelled to have cross-border or cross-ethnic relations as they might not necessarily need to cross borders either for trade or for sharing resources. Note that 32.4 percent of the respondents indicate they had no contact. However, the qualitative investigation suggested an increase in the general cross-ethnic contact:

The other significant change shown in the project intervention area is that people of Gambella town living in segregated residential quarters based on their ethnic alignment, used to consider passing to another ethnic group’s settlement as a risk; they began to walk in every area[s] of the town freely after the Baro Peace Run Race hosted by ACORD. (FGD member, December 2011).

The peace dividend was noticeable in the creation of a safe passage between Anywaa and Majangir areas. As a peace gesture, Anywaa participants in the dialogue invited their Majangir fellows for a wedding. As a result, there is now a free movement and the complementary exchanges are restored. (Pact, 2006a: 42).

It must be noted that these data are only cross-sectional; the results are susceptible to bias due to a very small number of cases and clearly need to be supported by both more controlled and extensive experimental studies and longitudinal research. Nonetheless, there is evidence from societies divided along group lines that promoting inter-group contact as a pathway could reduce prejudice and facilitate cross-community/border contacts (EUPPR, 2006; Hewstone et al., 2005). Thus, although the chi-square value reveals lack of significant association, the descriptive results and the evidence from the qualitative data still provide support for continuing inter-group contact schemes as part of building cross-ethnic contact, and especially, across ethnic and border lines.
• **Training in Conflict Resolution and level of Social Relations (prejudice)**

The NGOs operating in the study areas found that bringing together individuals from opposing groups can reduce inter-group conflict. Much research work has been done on reducing prejudice and bias via inter-group contact; for example, through conflict resolution training schemes. This work shows a significant and positive effect of inter-group contact schemes on reducing inter-group prejudice (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005; Tam et al., 2009; Malhotra and Liyanage, 2005; Salomon, 2004; Diamond, 1997; Fisher, 1997). Furthermore, as reported in the literature review section (2.4.3: 33-34), some writers suggest that the emerging trend of cross-border trade and inter-ethnic development cooperation among these communities is likely to reduce prejudice (Pavanello, 2009).

Based on this assumption, survey respondents were asked a series of questions which have been used previously to assess levels of prejudice (Appendix E). According to Figure 10, over 88% of the respondents had either always felt comfortable (63.4%) or sometimes comfortable (25%) when meeting people from the other community while only 5 percent of the respondents stated they were not usually comfortable. Figures 11 and 12, below, demonstrate that most (85%) respondents would mind if a close relative were to marry a person from the other community. Similarly 85% would be reluctant to purchase goods or services from the other community.

**Figure 10. Meeting people from other ethnic group**
Figure 11. Cross-ethnic trading

If you were purchasing goods or services, would you mind whether the person who owned the business from which you were buying was from the other ethnic community?

Not mind 15%
Mind 85%

Figure 12. Inter-ethnic marriage

Would you mind or not mind if one of your close relatives were to marry a person from the other community?

Not mind 15%
Mind 85%

Table 6. Training in conflict resolution and reduction in social prejudice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not Mind</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>(P-Value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation In conflict resolution training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.081*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in the parenthesis is based on chi-square tests.

Table 6 demonstrates that respondents who participated in conflict resolution training (90%) are more likely to rate prejudice-related questions (a, b, and c questions) favorably (87%) than
nonparticipants (33%). However, the Chi-square test indicates no relationship between participation in conflict resolution training and level of prejudice (P=0.081).

According to the participants of the FGDs, intermarriage still occurs among these groups, but it is often discouraged when sociopolitical unrest is heightened:

"Before the conflict, the three communities participated in funerals and marriages. They used to contribute to the ceremonies in labour and funerals. They used to share the depleted natural resources. After the peace initiative, there is some progress .... we are trying to restore these values, and ties of unity and the NGOs have been working to build upon this custom. Thus, we are trying to farm together now, share labour and resources. (FGD member, December 2011).

"During conflict, the three clans settle along their line of clanship but due to government and NGOs intervention, we encourage them to be neighbours of the Guji, Borana, and Gabra. We also encourage inter-clan marriage thus they would become relatives. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011)

This claim is grounded on the historical realities of these communities. For example, Bassi (2010) and Feyissa (2011) argue that although ethnic settlement patterns are along lineage lines they are interconnected through marriage and other forms of affiliation; they cover wide areas linked by social and marital ties. Today, however, Scott-Villiers et al. (2011) and Feyissa (2006) argue that the social and geographic divisions (including religion) have complicated this structure of social cohesion and social “bridge”, as confirmed in the FGDs:

"[t]here must be inter-marriage between these sub-clans. If we are related to one another through inter-clan marriages, we will be relatives, and relatives [are] not embroiled in conflict. However, we (Boran) do not marry Gabra because of their religion (Islam) and we need to call upon them to share this value. We farm, graze and eat together, but it is the religion (Gabras are Muslim) that created a problem. NGOs argue that it is our right to marry anyone regardless of their religious background. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011)

The quantitative results indicate that inter-group contact can reduce inter-group prejudice (see EUPPR, 2006). However, caution has to be taken not to generalise such findings for two reasons. First, the chi-square value at P=0.081 levels, indicates a lack of relationship between training in conflict resolution programmes and the level of inter/intra-ethnic prejudice. Secondly, these data are only cross-sectional and clearly need to be backed up by more rigorously controlled and extensive experimental studies and longitudinal research. Nevertheless, there is growing evidence from longitudinal studies that inter-group contact can have a positive effect on attitudes in the context of protracted conflict.
Training in conflict resolution and level of tolerance

Survey respondents were asked whether they support the display of the cultural and political symbols of the other community; the purpose of this question was to assess levels of tolerance. The rationale for testing this presupposition is derived from the conflict resolution literature, which suggests that inter-group contact through training may play a crucial role in establishing new and positive inter-group norms (Gebrewold, 2009). This is essential in supporting inter-group tolerance in the context of protracted social conflict areas where noticeable support for inter-group tolerance is lacking. For example, inter-group contact is likely to reduce negative expectations and also reduce fears, suspicion and reciprocal antagonism (Liebkind and McAlister, 1999; Gebrewold, 2009). This should lead to a more positive impression of the other group, and support the socio-political and cultural rights of other groups. This view is widely entrenched in the conflict resolution training manuals of the NGOs.

Table 7. Training in conflict resolution and level of tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you support display of the cultural and political symbols of the other community?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training in conflict resolution and tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase in social tolerance</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased social tolerance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not bring any change</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation in conflict resolution training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in conflict resolution training</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.033*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A large majority (93.3%) stated that they would support display of the cultural and political symbols of the other community. Table 7 also demonstrates the relationship between participation in conflict resolution training programmes and support for the display of cultural and political symbols of the other community. The findings indicate that respondents who*
participated in the training tend to be more tolerant than the nonparticipants (95.4% and 66.7% respectively). In other words, participation in conflict resolution training programmes increases the support for cultural and political symbols of the other ethnic group by an average of 28.7%. The chi-square result (p=0.033) also demonstrates a significant relationship between participation in the training and change in the level of tolerance. The qualitative analysis also highlighted a similar finding:

*Under the peacebuilding project, eighty people from both Anywaa and Nuer groups were trained in conflict resolution skills and learnt human and cultural rights principles. We have to appreciate the unique history and culture of each ethnic group...their rights to promote their culture, educate in their own language. These are very important for the stability of the region. For example, in collaboration with NGOs we organised the International Peace Day concert involving all the ethnic groups of the region: the Anywaa, Nuer, Komo, Opo and Majangir. The youth groups performed songs advocating messages of peace, love and unity.* (FGD member, December 2011).

This example shows the relationship between the respondents’ training and their support of local power over collective matters for ethnic minorities. The finding indicates conflict resolution training that covers group rights is likely to encourage respect for the socio-cultural and political rights of other groups. This relationship is also important, as the Multi-national Federal system and democratic governance in Ethiopia aims to foster inter-group respect and tolerance (Alem, 2004; Woldemariam, 2009). However, additional research is needed to test whether variables such as perceived respect of political and cultural rights, or perceived differences in ethnic group rights, should be embedded in the training programme manual; if so, this might foster tolerance among the participants.

- **Training in conflict resolution and level of trust**

Respondents were asked a series of questions used previously to assess levels of cross-ethnic trust. These asked (a) if they were willing to share access to natural resources (water and grazing land); (b) if they think that most members of the other ethnic group would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance; (c) if they would ask other ethnic group members for different assistance (e.g., labour); and (d) if they think that most members of the other ethnic group would try to return all stray animals.
A large majority (96.3%) of the participants in conflict resolution training indicated that the other community could be trusted. The findings in Table 8 also demonstrate that those respondents who participated in the training are more likely to develop trust towards the other ethnic community as compared to their counterparts (66.7%). This finding implies that participation in the training programmes is likely to increase participants’ trust towards members of the other ethnic groups by an average of 29.6 percent. The results in Table 8 confirm the assumption that participation in conflict resolution training is more likely to affect the degree of “inter/intra-ethnic trust”, as reflected in the significant chi-square value (P=0.003). A number of FGD participants’ views support this claim:

We share the same blood, we are friends and in-laws. We now come together and share our common problems. We share water and pasture and restock the poor after droughts. Our children go to the same school. We all went back to our previous ways of life. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011)

Skilled individuals from the Nuer side helped the Anywaa a lot in the preparation of fishing nets and other necessary tools. And the Nuers participated in the construction of houses (many of the houses were devastated in the locality as a result of recurrent conflicts) for the Anywaa community displaced as a result of Anywaa-Nuer conflict. These days they also began to discuss penalties at community level for animal trespassing, which in the past was a source of conflict. (FGD member, December 2011).

Table 8. Participation in conflict resolution training and level of trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you say that most members of the other community could be trusted?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, could be trusted</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, couldn’t be trusted</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in conflict resolution training</th>
<th>Could be trusted</th>
<th>Could not be trusted</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the chi-square statistic is significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Approximate significance of the value in the parenthesis is based on chi-square tests.
The study showed that respondents who participated in the training had more positive attitudes toward the other groups than nonparticipants. This is important because these groups have traditionally relied upon a variety of “coping mechanisms” when responding to droughts and conflicts. These include: 1) moving animal herds over vast areas in search of water and pasture; 2) managing resources and resolving disputes by way of well-defined social customs and institutions, and 3) “Bussa Gonofa”, a form of social security for rehabilitating the poor after drought. Hence, it was presumed that rebuilding the long-standing cross-cutting linkages plays a pivotal role in allowing freedom of movement, trust and reciprocity. More specifically, it was assumed that they would be more willing to share natural resources, and to rely on each other for support; they would approach members of the other group more readily than would people who are less trusting of the other community. It was also assumed that people who are more trusting of the other ethnic group would be more inclined to act in less negative ways toward them, and be more likely to support collective tenure, customary and territorial rights, customary law, governance and leadership. They would be less likely to view their relationships as being zero-sum and more likely to support the psychological and political environments necessary for negotiation and compromise (Fisher, 1997).

The relationship between inter-group contacts (using inter-group training) and promoting mutual trust for preventing violence after protracted ethnic conflicts forms part of the literature on conflict resolution and reconciliation (Tim et al., 2009; Fisher 1997; Kelman, 1999). This literature contends that distrust of the adversary is a central impediment to political negotiation and compromise (Kelman, 1987, 1993, 1995). The promotion of inter-group contact programmes may support and establish trust that, in turn, promotes more positive inter-group behaviour in societies marked by inter-group conflict (Kelman, 1987; Tim et al., 2009). In inter-group negotiations, trust increases the exchange of valuable information and cooperation and promotes conciliatory rather than coercive bargaining strategies. In order to move the peace process forward, these writers insist upon increasing the level of trust among the antagonists through addressing mutual needs and fears, employing confidence-building measures, and actively mediating with third parties. Inter-group trust could reduce the intensity and magnitude of conflict because “it allows individuals to accept the risk of being vulnerable and to make conciliatory initiatives to the other party with some degree of assurance that they will not be exploited” (Tim et al., 2009: 46).
5.8.2.3 Livelihood Enhancement

In addition to promoting relationship-building, NGOs emphasis the importance satisfying basic need aimed at addressing the economic cause of conflict. The rationale behind diversification of livelihoods is derived from the growing body of conflict resolution literature, which suggests that livelihood diversification could have the potential to reduce poverty and inequalities; this in turn will reduce the likelihood of conflict as well as open up opportunities for a peaceful relationship (Collier, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 1995). These writers, therefore, propose that the socio-economic problems must be tackled to facilitate peacebuilding processes. Based upon these arguments and in view of the NGOs’ role in tackling the economic needs of the disadvantaged, this section will examine respondents’ perceptions of change on their household income, sustainable access to the natural resources, reconstruction of physical infrastructures and on the extent of enhanced cross-community interdependence. The findings partly complement the qualitative findings presented in section 5.9.2: 204-212. The study, however, does not claim to draw a link between changes in economic conditions of these groups and any increase in their support for the peace process. Rather, it is assumed that improvement in economic conditions, with economic interdependence, might lead the beneficiaries (respondents) to support the peace process with the other ethnic groups.
Table 9. NGO intervention and livelihood enhancement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since the NGOs programmes/ services your monthly income has:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the same</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Do you attribute this economic improvement to NGO intervention?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Have NGO programmes created a sustainable access to natural resources (water and grazing land)?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Has it increased cross-community cooperation?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Has it increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructures?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General impact of NGO services on your livelihoods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A little worse</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some improvement</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot of improvement</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Household income, sustainable access to the natural resources and increased (re)construction of physical infrastructures

As shown in Table 9, more than two-thirds (69.2%) of the respondents stated that their monthly income has stayed the same since the NGOs’ programmes and services began, while less than one-third (30.8%) mentioned that it has increased. Those respondents reporting an increase were asked whether this could be attributed to the NGOs’ interventions. In response, more than two-thirds (67.6%) of that group of respondents mentioned that the increased income was not because of the NGOs’ interventions, while less than one-third (32.4%) attributed the change in income to NGO interventions.
All respondents were asked if the NGOs’ programmes had created sustainable access to the natural resources: water, grazing lands and fishing. Most (80%) respondents indicated that the programmes created sustainable access to those resources, while one-fifth (20%) stated that they had not. More than two-thirds of respondents (69.2%) stated that the programmes increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructure such as schools, health clinics and water points; about a third (30.8%) stated that it had not. The FGD findings also confirm this:

*Both humans and animals were able to access a clean water supply near their village without any problems. Before the intervention we used to travel 15-20 km to fetch water and watering our animals was causing conflict... but now can access clean water... near our village [a]s a result, weakened animals and calves, which cannot travel long distance[s] and were expected to die when travelling a long distance with the shortage of water during drought season have been saved. And currently the pastoral community has commenced utilising the Elas (water points)... with good follow up and monitoring of community elders. (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011)*

- **Cross-community trade**

In respect of cross-community activity there was evidence of projects which sought to address the legacy of the conflict, both in social and economic terms. Particularly good examples included the cross-border promotion of livestock marketing, cross-border work to promote the livestock trade sector and to improve cross-border mobility for petty-traders and transhumance. The respondents were asked if these cross-community programmes have enhanced cross-community cooperation. Most (72.5%) responded affirmatively, while 27.5% responded negatively, as shown in Table 9. There is also a growing traditional cross-border livestock movement and trade, helping to forge inter-group cooperation. This encourages cross-cutting ties as it creates a reciprocal interdependence and a vested interest in reducing conflict:

*The (NGOs’) projects constructed roads along the conflict fault lines in the border area. The flourishing cross-border trade is evident in Pinyudho [Gambella] town in the loads of items the tracks are carrying to Pochalla [South Sudan]. Consumer goods are exported from Pinyudho to Pochalla and refugee goods are imported from Pochalla. As a result, many Anuwaa have opened shops, both in Pinyudho and Pochalla. Currently, the bulk of the cross-border trade is carried by vehicles [rather] than by donkeys and camels as in the past. The cross-border trade gives a comparative advantage to the indigenous people.* (FGD, November 2011)

The NGOs’ projects seem to have assumed the notion of liberal theory that trade and other forms of economic interdependence promote peace and economic advantage for both parties. There has been intense debate among liberal theorists about whether economic interdependence created by trade generates reciprocal dependence between trading partners (Levy, 2001: 9-11). As a result,
this issue is well documented (Levy, 2001). The NGOs’ projects have constructed roads along the conflict fault lines in the border area. Businesses have begun to regain traditional markets and rural youth have gained access to education. The increased amount of cross-border trading and the increased access to capital have reduced the economic marginalisation of the targeted communities (See section 5.9.3: 208-209). This finding is consistent with the broader research findings on the socio-economic impacts of many development agencies in Northern Ireland (See EUPPR, 2006).

- **General impact of the NGOs**

The respondents were asked about the general impact of the NGOs’ programmes on their livelihoods: 48.3% of the respondents indicated that the NGOs’ services had made some improvement to their livelihoods, 30.8% stated these had made a lot of improvement to their livelihoods, while only 14.2% indicated these had either worsened or did not improve their livelihoods. This sentiment was also indicated in the qualitative data:

*The mortality of animals susceptible to drought (weak animals, lactating cows and calves) was dramatically reduced because of the positive impact of a key drought reserve intervention. The productivity of cows showed much improvement with milk production at household level increasing three times because of improved productivity of cows. As a result, the availability of milk both at household and community level has shown improvement following the establishment of the pasture enclosure intervention.* (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, November 2011)

The assumption is that a more sustainable access to natural resource, enhanced cross-community cooperation and reconstruction of infrastructure all had a general impact on the livelihood of respondents. Moreover, the relative improvement in livelihood would contribute to reduction in resource-based conflict and vulnerability to drought:

*Conflicts over scarce natural resources such as pasture and water were commonplace. NGOs worked on pasture, rangeland improvement, and water rehabilitation in our vicinity...reducing the distances trekked and often accessing the patchy resources. The intervention obviously reduced drought mortality and enhances survival of those animals vulnerable to drought and further protects the nucleus herd; this implies contribution to natural herd growth and household milk production. Moreover, the increase in private enclosure reduced access for water and pasture. This used to cause numerous clashes. These private enclosures have been dismantled and converted into communal enclosures for communal use and have reduced conflict over herd mobility.* (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, November 2011)
The quantitative and qualitative analyses offer strong empirical support to the conflict resolution literature, which draws a link between the satisfaction of basic needs and peace (Azar, 1990; Lederach, 1997). The data also lend strong empirical support to this literature, which contends that communities with a high level of economic interdependence are more likely to be peace-oriented because of their common interest in reducing conflict.

5.8.3 Summary of Key Findings and Conclusion

This section describes three empirical investigations of the antecedents and consequences of intervention by NGOs in the study areas. It is imperative to review the key findings, acknowledge some potential limitations, and illustrate linkages between key findings before drawing conclusions.

The following are considered to be the most significant findings in this section:

- **Conflict resolution training and “individual development”**

  The “individual development” section of the discussion examined how conflict resolution training is related to individual empowerment, which in turn impacted on participants’ skills in taking part in peacebuilding activities. 87.9% of the respondents who participated in the training felt that it had built their skills and capacities. Specifically, the skills and attitudes learnt during training are important for developing trust, willingness to compromise and to negotiate and to tolerate the values of the other ethnic groups. The evidence demonstrates a significant relationship between the training and “empowerment”, although that evidence is statistically much weaker than expected (P=0.067) (Section 5.8.2.1: 180). The empowerment outcome is more difficult to measure but, as indicated above, many NGOs saw this as being their most distinctive contribution to promoting peace.

- **Training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities**

  The study also indicated that individual development is important for participating in peacebuilding activities. The main purpose was to assess whether participants in the training were more likely than nonparticipants to engage in peacebuilding activities. Analysis of the data obtained from 120 respondents showed that participants in conflict resolution training are indeed more likely (21.2%) to be involved in peacebuilding activities (Section 5.8.2.1: 182). The study
indicates a significant relationship between training in conflict resolution and participation in peacebuilding activities (P=0.001).

- **Incidence of conflict and factors contributing to change in the incidence of conflict**

Most (92.5%) respondents indicated that the incidence of conflict has decreased over the last two years. Key reasons for this decline include relative stability in the neighbouring areas (19%), federal government interventions (16%), local administration interventions (14.5%), NGO involvement (20%) and local elders’ negotiations (22.5%). It is evident that no specific reason is predominant; they can all influence the dynamics of the conflict, but with varying degrees of legitimacy in this jurisdiction. This suggests that conflict resolution intervention needs to be comprehensive and complementary, and also needs to involve these actors and factors (Section 5.8.2.1: 184).

- **Training in conflict resolution and change in the level of individual tolerance and trust**

The second part of this study showed the effect that training in conflict resolution has in promoting positive behavioural tendencies. The results from the survey suggest that those who participated in the training programmes have more tolerance and trust towards the other community. The bivariate analysis also indicates a significance relationship between training in conflict resolution and increase in tolerance (P=0.033) and trust (P=0.003). It is worth noting that the data (see Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8) show that inter-group contact is associated with better cross-community trust, improved tolerance and more positive behavioral tendencies in these settings. In other words, people who have more contact with other communities are more trusting, tolerant and willing to make contact across communities in general (Sections 5.8.2.2: 185-194).

- **Household income, sustainable access to natural resources and increased (re)construction of physical infrastructures**

Regarding the impact of economic enhancement projects, survey evidence suggests the following: in the case of the groups that received NGOs support, the support involved an increase in sustainable access to the natural resources such as water, grazing lands and fishing, reconstruction of physical infrastructure and cross-community activity. Most (79.1%) of the respondents indicated that NGOs programmes had made either some improvement (48.3%) or much improvement (30.8%) to their general livelihoods while 14.2% indicated these had
worsened a little (Section 5.8.2.3: 196). However, the study was unable to establish the extent to which the economic strand was a catalyst for change in respect of peacebuilding processes, although the consequences of economic measures tend to have indirect rather than direct impacts.

The following Theme will discuss the perspective of key persons involved with the community development sector.

**5.9 Theme H: Community Development**

Four themes are central to this theme: defining community development; community development and partnerships; a people-centred approach; and, community development meeting social and human needs.

**5.9.1 Defining community development**

The socio-historical and political context in Gambella, and Borana clearly influenced the way in which NGOs in each region define community development:

> These are pastoralists...now affected by a variety of growing pressures...undermining their drought response and livelihood strategies, including: increasing populations, increased frequency of droughts, conflicts...are today increasingly vulnerable to mounting food insecurity, growing poverty, and escalating conflict. We have to respond to these challenges, but how? Through community development...but it means many things for many NGOs. For us, it has two components: ‘software and hardware’. ‘Software’ development is about people’s development... it focuses on people’s empowerment for self-reliance and building people’s capabilities for controlling their development. It is empowering the community for participation, increasing awareness of the community to plan, identify, and implement development programmes. It also involves behavioural and attitudinal changes through awareness creation for long-term development. Our emphasis is on these issues. ‘Hardware development’ is about supporting and developing infrastructure...but we work on asset building. Our approach is more of ‘software development’ and less of ‘hardware development’.

(NGO Project manager, October 2011).

In a contemporary sense, NGOs regard “hardware development” and “software development” as concepts; they pertain to different development interventions. The “hardware development” approach largely focuses on direct-service delivery and building development infrastructures for reducing resource-based conflicts. “Software development” refers to capacity building, local empowerment, prejudice reduction and confidence-building goals. For those NGOs working at grass-roots, “software development” has always been about enhancing skills and knowledge of
individuals, groups and institutions so that they take responsibility for contributing to sustainable development. In this approach, community development projects incorporated peacebuilding components to contribute towards sustainable peace. A project manager working in an integrated community development describes the goal as follows:

*The main objective [of community development] is to build the capacity of local institutions and individuals for sustainable utilisation and management of the natural resource, which in turn contributes to sustainable development. We do not work on conflict directly, we integrated it into development and...we support community peace initiatives...empowerment, peaceful co-existence to sustain the livelihoods of the pastoralist and contribute to sustainable peace. We believe [I]f there is poverty there might be a conflict and if there is no access to resources or movement (pastoralist mobility) there will be conflict. (NGO project manager, November 2011).*

One way of achieving this goal was to have a holistic approach. A director of an NGO underscored the need for a holistic development programme for reducing conflict. One of the examples given by the director was a project called *Pastoralists’ Livelihoods Initiative Phase I and II (PLI)* relating to conflict resolution:

*It [PLI] is an integrated development initiative that aimed at enhancing livestock and related production, the sustainable use of natural resources and economic growth through diversification, cross-cutting issues such as linking relief, rehabilitation, and development, conflict, gender, and environmental impacts HIV/AIDs. It aims to improve attitudes, reduce suspicions and perceptions about women and minorities. It is process-oriented, a long term process to influence deep-rooted patterns from history and it takes time to change. When there is drought, then there is conflict over scarce resources. Thus, community development is a tool for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. (NGO director, November 2011).*

A representative of a community development organisation made an interesting observation about the rationale for adopting a holistic development approach:

*Conflict and development are related because they have social, political, [and] ecological aspects and conflict affects social cohesion and destroys our development achievements as well. A holistic development approach is responsive to these needs. (NGO representative, October 2011).*

Conflict resolution is seen as a part of any community development process and uses strategies of participatory development for addressing the economic causes of the conflict. Both Azar (1990) and Burton (1990) contend that meeting “human needs” must be prioritised when attempting to resolve conflict in war-torn societies. Drawing on a holistic approach, these NGOs attempt to combine the “human needs” and to address conflict, while being attentive to short-term and long-term resolution processes.
Community development as a means of peacebuilding

Another informant saw community development from the perspective of peacebuilding. The following quote provides an excellent example of the link between community development, conflict resolution and peacebuilding:

*Community development has its own positive contribution to peacebuilding because when we look at the root cause of conflict it is because of lack of development either in the form of satisfying basic needs or lack of good governance or other forms of development. Thus they are interdependent. That is how we understand their relationships. Some others argue that lack of development is the root source [of] conflict and others argue otherwise. For us, if there is no peace there won’t be development, and for us they are interdependent.* (NGO director, December 2011).

Although most NGOs have focused on satisfying these needs, their preoccupation with service delivery caused criticism from other NGOs. For example, one NGO leader commented:

*Presently, for most NGOs at grass-roots level, development means solving the day-to-day problems of the community. But the very essence of community development is not only providing basic social amenities...its essence is to bring about structural change. Peacebuilding and Community Development (CD) converge on many points, and to bring structural change conflict is a hindrance. CD has three core aspects such as building people’s capacities, providing social services and creating awareness that could affect people’s consciousness. If these three core aspects are met, we can see change in perceptions, attitudes and belief... and people can bring about structural change.* (NGO director, December 2011).

For this NGO, traditional basic services and projects oriented towards social welfare (human needs approach) left relatively untouched the structures that sustain and reproduce violence. This critique resonates with Galtung’s (1996) argument that any one-sided approach makes “conflict resolution dependent upon meeting unsatisfied needs”, leaving little room for the asymmetric conflict, and does not bring about conflict transformation.

Community development as empowerment through capacity building

Many NGOs in the sample recognise that capacity building is an important component for building people’s ability to be self-reliant and to face challenges. Only when people have the necessary training and skills can they be expected to cope with shocks. Central components for sustainable development include the ability to respond to recurrent drought and livelihoods enhanced by diversified income sources. Thus capacity building is a core strategy:
Our experience has shown us that merely implementing development alone cannot adequately build the pastoralists’ resilience towards recurrent drought...and improve the quality of life of marginalised communities...we needed to incorporate knowledge, skills and resources transfer to cope with these challenges...to diversify the sources of their incomes and to complement existing livelihoods. We got into training, capacity building and skills dissemination such as in the provision of technical assistance, improved seeds, feed and fodder production. (NGO project manager, November 2011).

Most of the work done by these NGOs involves working with pastoralist leaders to identify vulnerable pastoralists and then get them to work on joint initiatives to respond to drought more effectively, to protect their livelihoods. Thus there is an integrated approach both to life-saving and livelihood protection:

Knowledge and skills transfer is one way of building resilience against hazards and drought. Especially this [2010] drought was severe and we made an enormous contribution to avert the adverse impact. Earlier droughts (2005/2006, 2008 and 2009), .......... they used to wait for government and NGOs support which was limited to relief and rehabilitation...they lost between 70%-80% of their livestock assets and take much longer to recover these assets after drought. Now, what we have done is we have integrated and implemented life-saving and livelihood-support aimed at protecting livelihoods...and also linked disaster management cycle to drought cycle so that pastoral communities are appropriately prepared for drought; enhance the resistance and resilience...could safeguard their productive assets...we are able to see the outcomes. They efficiently used the land, water...also use supplementary feed [fodder] and...They know where and how to get supplementary feed for their livestock during drought. Now, they are in a better position to respond effectively and have more confidence in their capacities to respond to drought and... today [t]hey think “I have to sell some of my emaciated animals and buy supplementary feed so that I can save the remaining productive assets”... they actually value this form of support. There is a change in perception and this had broadened the window for recovery of lost productive capabilities. We contributed to this change. There is a water bank and no one’s life was lost due to water shortage. Therefore, these days they can find solutions on their own, even some of the pastoralists were able to travel as far as to the North Shewa (Central Oromia) to buy supplementary feed to save their productive assets; that would be unthinkable a few years back. (NGO Project manager, October 2011).

These mechanisms have transferred skills and technology to communities. The knowledge has empowered and capacitated them significantly and has helped to sustain key activities in livelihood protection. This has become the starting point to promote sustainability. It is clear that NGOs realise that community development can be achieved only if people are given the necessary training and capacity to pursue alternative livelihoods and diversify their income.

5.9.2 A people-centered approach

The central tenet of community development is that people are assisted towards advancing their own development (O’Brien, 2009). This is summed up as follows:
We do not try to do development work for them...we help them to do the development...build their capacity and this approach is built on traditional systems that existed in the past, the whole point is to put the community at the centre of development planning, monitoring, evaluation and managing...building institutions and empowering the local community to reclaim their right to initiate and manage development initiatives. Instilling a sense of community ownership of programme activities and maintaining their continuity is crucial for long-term development. (NGO project manager, November 2011).

We use a participatory approach...aimed at empowering the community so that local people will analyse and then articulate their needs...relationship with local government and hold it [government] accountable. Once the community has developed the experience and expertise, established networks, and engaged in advocacy, then they do not need our support. (NGO director, October 2011).

If CD only emphasises service delivery, it destined to deal with the signs of the community’s problems, and create a culture of dependence in the beneficiaries. It was important to identify the root causes of the problem and to engage the community in identifying both the causes and the solutions to their problems. (NGO project manager, December 2011).

From discussions with informants, development was linked to individual and group empowerment. This allows people to identify and address the causes of the main problems facing their communities. Conflict transformation is made possible by approaches that promote people’s decision-making capacity, strengthen autonomous development, and ensure long-term development. However, there is a big difference between the concept of participation and the actual practice.

- **Origin of participatory development**

In Ethiopia, the notion of a participatory development approach has existed for a long time (Harrison, 2002). For example, as far as back as the 1980s, Care Ethiopia’s water development projects called for such an approach. Moreover, SOS Sahel Ethiopia pioneered a participatory approach and likewise the Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project (BCFMP) since its inception in 1999. A representative of an NGO indicates:

In order to address the forest loss situation...SOS Sahel was asked to join Oromiya Region, Department of Agriculture, and Forestry in the search for new forest management systems. As a result, SOS Sahel initiated the Borana Collaborative Forest Management Project (BCFMP)...towards the end of 1999. Stakeholders’ analysis, social mapping and negotiation on the right of the forest management... and use ... were the basis for the implementation of BCEMP. The government acknowledged its [BCEMP] merits and urged the adoption of a new collaborative resource management approach that is participatory and empowering. (NGO director, October 2011).
There is little doubt that donors and international NGOs played a critical role in the adoption of participatory development in Ethiopia (Harrison, 2002; Rhamato, 2002). This formed the basis for its proliferation and over the last two decades, the approach has produced a number of good practices; intervention models have been replicated and mainstreamed in the government’s development policy (Harrison, 2002).

- **Participatory development and government’s poverty reduction policy**

The government had already adopted a participatory approach to development in the 1980s (Harrison, 2002) and it was later incorporated into the government’s poverty eradication policy. Most NGOs have undergone a transformation since 2005 and have aligned their development goals with the development priorities and principles of the government’s PASDEP. These priorities and principles are outlined in section 5.2.1: 98-102. Most NGOs responded to the government policy by integrating PASDEP’s priorities and principles into their *modus operandi*. For example, CARE Ethiopia, in its *Strategic Plan* (2007-2012), mainstreamed the participatory process as a “core pillar” with a view to having a lasting impact on redressing the underlying causes of poverty:

*To undertake a highly participatory process that would draw upon the experience and knowledge of staff at all levels of the organisation, as well as the perspectives of key external stakeholders. (CARE International in Ethiopia, Strategic Plan, 2007-2012: ii).*

A project coordinator working at Participatory Forest Management describes the pattern of participatory strategies that have been adopted to address various problems in the areas:

*Most NGOs talk about Participatory Forest Management (PFM), participatory research appraisal techniques, and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Most NGOs adopted participatory methods as the intervention targeted against the source of poverty in the region and envisage the rational use of the available community and government resources. Focusing on awareness raising, capacity building and advocacy and using a wide network of partners, ensured the sustainability of the project. (NGO project coordinator, November 2001).*

There is much debate about the way participatory agendas are generated and implemented at the grass-roots level (for example, Chambers et al., 1989); here, unequal power relationships do not augur well for participatory approaches (Harrison, 2002). Harrison pointed out that the pervasive use of the language of participation glosses over the issues of who defines the content of participation and its actual implementation. Muir (2007) has indicated that participation is
limited to core indigenous leaders rather than including a wide spectrum of the community, and excludes marginalised social groups. In the pastoralist areas, most NGOs engage in partnership with the customary institutions. However, the degree of partnership and participation differs (Tache and Bassi, 2011). For instance, partnerships with indigenous institutions are strong in the field of natural resource management because they have customarily been flexible and can adapt to precarious and changing micro-environments (Watson, 2001). There is evidence that development agents have become more sceptical about customary institutions and pay lip service to participation on health and agricultural inputs. In some instances the notions of “partnership” and “participation” have been challenged (for example, Cleaver, 1999). In most cases the power that dictates the development agenda lies with the NGOs, because of their professional expertise and their access to resources. For example, a number of informants working with the technicalities of soil science and forestry indicated that expert-driven development planning might not necessarily be participatory because local actors may not have the knowledge and expertise. From a pragmatic perspective, most of the NGOs in the sample adopted a mix of “indigenous participation” and “expert-driven” approaches; outside experts provide skills and knowledge that are not available in the communities. Nevertheless, there is evidence from the field that experts and indigenous communities could work together in a genuinely participatory manner on natural resource management and conflict resolution activities. In addition, there is consensus that participation is a key instrument in sustainable development. This approach is linked to the fact that the grass-roots leadership needs to be developed and that empowerment can happen only through capacity building. Furthermore, some of these NGOs have played a key role in facilitating the growth of people’s capacities for handling development projects.

5.9.3 Community Development Meeting Human Needs

A range of NGOs targeted various social problems in the Borana zone and Gambella Region. Some are specifically geared to diversifying livelihoods, strengthening indigenous social protection mechanisms, supporting policy initiatives to protect pastoral livelihoods and, supporting cross-border livestock trade.
• **Drought management systems and partnerships**

Conflict in the pastoralist areas of Moyalle and Arero usually sparked during prolonged dry seasons when the pastoralists would move in search of water and pasture for their livestock (CORDAID and FSS 2009). For instance, a recent conflict between Gabra, Guji and Borana in Surupa concerned the common grazing and watering points and led to the loss of life and property. CARE Ethiopia, AFD, GPDA, ACDI/VOCA and GOAL Ethiopia implemented key drought reserve grazing areas; they rehabilitated traditional water points in the Surupa Kebele of Yabello that created sustainable access to the natural resources. These improvements would reportedly contribute to a reduction in resource-based conflict and vulnerability to drought:

AFD worked on pasture, rangeland improvement, and water rehabilitation in Surupa areas …reducing the distances trekked and often accessing the patchy resources. Water and (the) Natural Resource Development project obviously reduced drought mortality and enhances survival of those animals vulnerable to drought and further protects the nucleus herd; this implies contribution to natural herd growth and household milk production. Moreover, the increase in private enclosure reduced access for water and pasture. This used to cause numerous clashes. These private enclosures have been dismantled and converted into communal enclosures for communal use and have reduced conflict over herd mobility (AFD Project coordinator, October 2011).

Sustainable access to resources and infrastructure created a vested interest in reducing and avoiding conflict. The following extract captures the extent of the NGOs contribution described by a member of *Koree Nagaa*:

*There is peace now (in Surupa). We (Guji, Gabra and Boran) work hard to prevent conflict that could cost human life and livestock ….. and ruin our schools and water points, our livelihoods. Our children were left out of school due to conflict and we also lost everything. AFD, GOAL, Care rebuilt our schools… underground water, and they bought us oxen for asset-building and to start small-scale farming currently; our children have a very good access to schools. We do not want to be dislocated (due to conflict) from our area because there are schools, ground catchments and other infrastructures built by different NGOs (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).*

The CRT-type NGOs prioritised those specific economic factors that tend to lead to conflict. Thus, they aimed to reduce poverty-induced conflict, although their efforts are likely to have an indirect rather than a direct impact on the incidence of conflict.

• **Supporting cross-border livestock trade**

With regard to cross-community activity there was evidence of projects which sought to address the legacy of the conflict, both in social and economic terms. Particularly good examples
included the cross-border promotion of livestock marketing, and cross-border mobility for petty-traders. For example, the ACDI/VOCA’s Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative-Livestock Marketing Project (PLI-LM) upgraded market facilities at Harobake (Yabello) and Dubuluk by creating marketing facilities. This initiative enabled the Gabra, Guji and Borana pastoralists to conduct economically optimal marketing transactions (ACDI/VOCA, 2007). Kurtz and Scarborough (2012) found that Mercy Corps’ SIPED programme significantly improved the extent to which Gabra, Guji, Borana and Garri could access the Harobeke and Finchawa livestock markets, to sell their livestock. However, these writers also note that the Mercy Corps’ SIPED non-target areas reported significant decreases in access to Dellomena, Haro-Dumal, and Yadi during the recent drought due to conflict. As a result of the Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program’s (GLC-RSP) project of Improving Pastoral Risk Management on Pastoral Rangelands (PARIMA) there is an increased level of traditional cross-border livestock movement and trade, which helps in forging inter-group cooperation. This in turn encourages cross-cutting ties as it creates a reciprocal interdependence and vested interest in reducing conflict. As one participant member of FGD states:

There has been trade between these groups (Gabra, Guji, Garri and Borana), and it’s not only livestock trade, it is opening up for communication. It is opening up the market for animal sale, including milk to Moyalle and Kenya. People came here to buy livestock and our people travel to other places and buy camels. We couldn’t sell them to any market and now there is peace and the roads are open...we can sell and buy other items we need... (Koree Nagaa members’ FGD, October 2011).

The NGOs’ projects seem to have implicitly assumed the notion of liberal theory that trade and other forms of economic interdependence promote peace and economic advantage for both parties (Levy 2001, 9-11). The evidence from the qualitative data appears to support this claim. The Mercy Corps’ SIPED programme promoted trade along the conflict fault lines where Borana, Gabra and Garri groups co-exist, in the Somali-Borana border districts of Arero and Liben. Here, livestock trade has begun to regain traditional markets and has increased access to capital for the targeted communities (Kurtz and Scarborough 2012). The following section highlights how community relations efforts contributed to the on-going conflict transformation in the Borana Zone.

The problem of livelihood protection was another major concern for these NGOs.
• **Protecting pastoralists’ livelihoods**

As livestock are the basis of pastoral livelihood and incomes, protecting and strengthening livestock has always been a high priority (Watson and Catley, 2008). Various initiatives have been undertaken. Most NGOs engaged in livestock-based drought responses intended to safeguard pastoral assets by providing emergency animal health services, and supplementary feeding of core breeding animals. A key informant with much experience in protecting livelihoods of pastoralists indicated how the NGOs’ innovative approach to livelihood protection initiatives made a difference:

> In response to the 2006 and 2008 droughts, we intervened to protect core breeding livestock by providing supplementary food. We had to protect these breeding animals and provide livestock feed otherwise it would take up to ten years to rebuild herds after a major drought. We also supported slaughter destocking in drought affected woredas which has resulted in the slaughter of hundreds of cattle and thousands of sheep and goats. We purchased emaciated animals from the pastoralists above market price at the time with the objective of injecting much needed cash into drought affected households...so that they could invest in animal feed and veterinary services for the remaining animals. The slaughtered animals were shared amongst poorer households and in this way the meat supported household food security. (NGO Project coordinator, October 2011).

Whilst some NGOs have been protecting pastoral assets as their central focus, others have tackled the crisis through livelihood diversification strategies.

• **Livelihood diversification**

Since the late 1990s, the NGO sector has come to realise that pastoralists need to diversify their livelihood strategies to mitigate risks inherent in recurrent drought; these risks include the loss of large numbers of livestock, land alienation, and conflict (Little et al., 2001). Some NGOs and government agencies initiated various livelihood diversification programmes aimed at building sustainable livelihoods. For example, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children/UK and US, initiated a livestock products marketing and processing scheme, dry-land products (including gums, and essential oils), promotion of backyard vegetable gardening and small-scale farming; the establishment of women’s savings and credit groups was of vital importance. SOS Sahel Ethiopia and CARE worked with private sector traders to train collectors in techniques for natural gum, incense and myrrh tapping, harvesting, cleaning, grading, and storing. The Save the Children/US provided beekeeping skills, to develop higher-value markets for honey and
beeswax. On the issue of livelihood diversification a senior member of an NGO described the change in the following manner:

We emphasise the most vulnerable sections...those that have fallen out of the pastoral livelihood system... those livelihoods now based on small farming, firewood collection and charcoal making. Supported non-livestock and market driven interventions ...women to engage in milk trading activities...restocking schemes that encourage re-establishment of viable herds. For example, we offered training to improve the quality of milk sold. For vegetable production we distributed improved vegetable seeds, and seed stocking, and use of organic fertilizer produced through composting. In so doing, we contributed to an improvement in their household income. (NGO Project coordinator, October 2011).

A programme co-ordinator in a pastoralist livelihoods initiative describes their contribution:

The mortality of animals vulnerable to drought reduced and milk production at household level has increased three times following the establishment of the pasture enclosure intervention. In general, the community’s livelihood has shown dramatic improvement. (NGO programme co-ordinator, November 2011).

Other organisations have focused on small-scale farming and livestock protection as a priority, given recurrent drought in the area. Small-scale farming projects attract widespread support in that context and NGOs have incorporated these as part of the service they render. Cross-border livestock trade in the regions has been quietly expanding and government is keen to invest in livestock marketing infrastructure and security; after all, cross-border livestock trade is critical to pastoral livelihoods and to the economy of Ethiopia and its neighbours. Another emphasis is on improving the economic conditions of pastoral and ex-pastoral women.

- Supporting women’s savings and credit groups

A project leader, working specifically with livelihood diversification for women, reports as follows:

We supported the establishment of more than 100 women’s income generating groups in Dhas, Diere and Moyale Yabello, Teltele, and Miyo districts [of the Borana Zone]. Seed money was dispatched and we offered basic literacy and business skills training so they are able to keep records. Some of the women engaged in milk trading activities that benefited their household income. Many of these groups have since launched small-scale income generating activities that helped the household to support children’s education, purchase food and cover medical services. I can tell you that women are excellent entrepreneurs and managers of small businesses, provided they have access to the right capital (including credit) markets and resources. (NGO Project manager, November 2011).

The Women’s Income Generating Project (WIGP) has contributed to economic empowerment. For example, in Moyale the women engaged in crop farming as a group and invested in seeds
using their savings; they engaged in water development such as building a pond for their family and traded animals for consumption. Nevertheless, despite the sterling work done by these NGOs, the economic conditions in the two regions are extremely poor. A study by Steglich and Bekele (2009) revealed that NGOs and WIGPs had a significant impact in increasing household incomes, but without customary institutional support the impact of NGOs is limited. A WIGP has the risk of being conceived as a “competitor” or “external” to the indigenous natural governance system and thereby there is the risk of excluding WIGPs from accessing natural resources. For example, one of the women’s groups engaged in livestock trade was denied access to communal water resources on the ground of “use-rights” for their trade cattle during 2008. There was another instance when a Women’s Income Generating Group had lost a significant amount of its capital to the Borana-Konso war, increasing dropout. Institutional support remains a critical means of assisting livelihood diversification; efforts to encourage WIGPs should be made in collaboration with these systems.

Besides supporting women’s savings and credit groups, NGOs are also strengthening customary social protection mechanisms.

- **Strengthening indigenous social protection mechanisms**

Pastoralists have developed strategies to reduce risks to their livelihoods and to cope with predictable shocks. Central to these coping strategies is mobility and herd management, relying on clan solidarity and a social safety net that offers some protection against risks (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008; Panvello, 2009). A busa gonofaa, (Borana traditional, clan-based, herd-restocking system) is coming under increasing pressure due to persistent poverty (Desta et al., 2008). As a result, the numbers of pastoralists leaving pastoralism are increasing every year (Panvello, 2009). Some NGOs emphasise strengthening those strategies involving local people and using their know-how. A livelihood management officer gave a rationale for supporting indigenous social protection mechanisms for livestock redistribution and restocking:

*It takes 8 to 10 years to restore herds after a major drought. We supported busa gonofaa because it [the system] protects a clan member from becoming Qolle (impoverished). Based on the system, we helped the poor pastoral to rebuild his herd by reciprocal monetary exchange or matching two-for-one of core breeding, or, in the case of richer communities, one-for-one livestock. We also supported restocked households with monthly payments to purchase food to ensure high levels of animal health care [for the core breed] for the first six months so that the core breeding livestock are not*
slaughtered or sold to meet household food requirements. (NGO livelihood management officer, October 2011).

Hence, supporting the customary livestock redistribution and restocking mechanism was seen as protecting the livelihoods of poor pastoral households.

5.9.4 Conclusion

The preceding sections have presented some of the contributions of the community development NGOs. These NGOs aspire towards participatory development built on indigenous institutions (Watson 2001, 2003); in practice, though, participation has been limited to the realm of natural resource management (Harrison, 2002). Given the persistent drought, the NGOs development projects give emphasis to early warning systems (EWS), drought cycle management, and livelihood protection and diversification goals. The notions of peacebuilding and conflict resolution are integrated into these projects.

5.10 The Similarities and Differences between the Two Study Contexts

The Borana and Gambella regions are socio-politically different in all respects. Nevertheless, the historical and political dynamics that underpinned these contexts as they moved from a unitary government system to multi-national democracy show some similarities. It should be clear that this thesis is examining the peacebuilding potential of development NGOs in these two contexts. More specifically, the contributions of the NGO sectors that incorporated peacebuilding components into development projects are being studied. The perspectives of those directly involved with the NGO sector at the grass-roots level have influenced some of the comparisons. The following five key themes emerge from both contexts: the socio-political history; the dynamics of conflict; the nature of the NGO sector; framing the nature of the conflict and its solution, and the nature of indigenous conflict resolution.

5.10.2 The Socio-political History

It is important to consider similarities and differences in the nature and characteristics of the regions in which the NGOs operated. In terms of similarities, both regions (a) have witnessed substantial changes in the nature, intensity and magnitude of conflict; (b) have long been
marginalised by successive regimes in the provision of basic services; (c) their intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts become intertwined and regionalised; (d) had experienced colonial rule in the past (at least colonial empires tried to incorporate the region under their rule); (e) the indigenous practices of the different ethnic groups, including oral customs and rules, have been used to resolve a range of inter-communal and inter-group conflicts; and (f) a number of NGOs operating in the study areas have incorporated peacebuilding components into their development programmes, and have made significant contributions towards addressing the economic causes of protracted conflicts.

There were also some distinct differences between the conflicts. The most important of these included size and demographic composition, and the notion of indigenous conflict resolution, discussed below. Demographically, Gambella region is very small compared to Borana. The same was true regarding population size: 306,916 in Gambella Regional State and 2,019,383 in the Borana Zone. The populations in Borana consisted primarily of three major Oromo groups: the Guji, Borana and Gabra, which also were the parties involved in the conflict. In contrast, Gambella was a multi-ethnic society and the conflict was over political ownership of the regional states and territory. Unlike the Borana Zone (which is under Oromia regional state), where demographic size and “distinct” ethnic composition made it a nation, and allowed it to form a state of its own within the federation (Art. 39/3), Gambella is designated as a People’s National Regional State because of its multi-ethnic composition. Accordingly, the regional constitution gave sovereignty in the five “indigenous” nationalities: the Anywaa, Nuer, Mezhenger, Opo and the Komo.

5.10.3 The Dynamics of Conflict

The conflicts had to some degree, specific regional dimensions underlying their causes. For instance, it is difficult to understand the history of these regions without understanding the history of their relationships with their neighbours or their geopolitical importance to the “superpowers”. In both contexts, intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts are intertwined and regionalised. Because of the external alliances, the potential for spill-over effects is always present. For example, if conflict breaks out between Gabra and Borana in Ethiopia, it affects the Gabra and Borana in Kenya. Similarly, Anywaa-Nuer conflicts in Gambella could affect
Anywaa-Nuer relations in the Southern Sudan. For example, Anywaa-Nuer conflicts have forced a significant number of Nuers to cross the border and settle in the Southern Sudan (Feyissa, 2009). In both regions the state influenced the peace process far more than the NGOs and the local leaders (see Section 5.5.2.1:184). For example, signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 (between the South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) was a turning-point in shaping the peace processes in the Southern Sudan, with huge implications for the Gambella region of Ethiopia (5.7: 164-172). To a certain degree both conflicts had their origins in how they were incorporated into the Ethiopian state, the history of the relationship with neighbours or their geopolitical importance to the superpowers (Chapter Three). Assimilation and settlement strategies and strong central government were used to justify successive state-building projects, which attempted to melt all ethnicities and polities within a territory into one national identity (Helland, 1996; Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Thus, another feature common to both conflicts was related to inter/intra-ethnic division, with diverging identity discourse based on territory and livelihoods. These divisions, in turn, largely coincided with and were reinforced by ethnic-federalism, and exacerbated conflict over access to resources among the ethnic groups.

5.10.4 The Nature of the NGO Sector

It could also be argued that the notion of an NGO sector is much stronger in Borana than in Gambella. Despite the fact that there is no single and homogenous NGO sector evident in both areas, NGOs in Borana had a more grass-roots constituency than in Gambella. In Gambella, just as in Borana, there is a proliferation of NGOs. However, the Borana Zone has a relatively vibrant non-profit NGO sector. For example, most of the Borana NGOs had a tendency to use an extensive mix of peacebuilding and development programmes ranging from natural resource management to livelihoods protection, combined with diversification from gender empowerment to building local resilience that provides a strong basis for improving resilience to drought. In Gambella, on the other hand, most of the NGOs focus on emergency aid, health and sanitary projects (see Appendix A). Additionally, in the Borana Zone, more than 25 such organisations serve about one million people (BZBFED, 2011). In Gambella, 22 organisations serve over 300,000 people (See Appendix A). The NGOs referred to in this study have been involved in meeting the objectives of poverty eradication and the Millennium Development
Goals, democratisation and decentralisation. All of the aforementioned could, in fact, contribute towards conflict transformation.

5.10.5 Framing the Nature of the Conflict and its Solution

There were slight differences in how the various NGOs framed the nature of the conflict and its solution, the approaches they employed, and what impact they had on their respective areas of work. First, the ethnic composition, historical animosity and new political discourses of indigeneity, were at issue in each area. Thus, in the case of Gambella, the conflicts were over diverging identity discourses based on indigeneity, livelihoods system and political ownership of the regional states (Section 3.1: 52-59). In Borana the crucial question was how vital natural resources were to be shared between conflicting communities (Section 3.2: 59-69). In both regions, the NGOs assumed that the problem was an absence of a reliable shared-institutional apparatus to diffuse tension and govern fair allocation of resources (Section 5.6: 149-163 and section 5.8: 173-200). In Borana, NGOs such as Care Ethiopia, Mercy Corps, AFD and GPDA were geared towards reinvigorating indigenous social institutions and increasing indigenous peoples’ participation in and management of the natural resources of grazing land, forest and water; the goals were to construct sustainable livelihoods and developments and to reduce the dynamics of the current conflict (Section 5.6: 143-163). Secondly, in Gambella, NGOs such as ACORD and Pact Ethiopia assumed that violence is partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and growing economic hardship (Section 5.7: 164-172). The solution for the first challenge was to concentrate on building “social bridges” and individual empowerment, and for the second challenge, the solution was to focus on building human and institutional infrastructure for peacebuilding. Thirdly, in both regions, NGOs also underscore that basic needs should be satisfied, to bring about a resolution to conflict (Section 5.9: 200-212). The solution is to address the socio-economic problems and resources that perpetuate the dynamics of the conflict relationship.

5.10.6 The Nature of Indigenous Conflict Resolution

The issue of indigenous conflict resolution practices and “indigenous empowerment” appears to have greater relevance for the NGOs operating in the Borana Zone than in Gambella. Undoubtedly, this is again due to the richness of the indigenous knowledge of the Borana, the wealth of Borana
institutions and their capacity to regulate access to resources and resolve disputes (Watson, 2001). Therefore, it was argued, relying on these institutions would prepare the ground for organising people for participation, planning and contributing to peacebuilding and development projects (Helland, 1996). As a result, both CDT and CRT NGOs operating in Borana showed a strong commitment to build upon the existing know-how and work with indigenous institutions as a way to achieve peace and development (Section 5.6: 143-163). They worked to revitalise institutional capacities of indigenous institutions and to enter into genuine partnerships for bottom-up development.

In Gambella this commitment towards reinvigorating indigenous institutions or entering into partnerships and integrating them into the development process is not as evident as in Borana. Again this may be largely due to the weakening of indigenous institutions through constant attempts to delegitimise them, thereby weakening their long-standing cross-cutting bonds and reducing their capacity to handle conflict (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Also, a lack of interest in these institutions may be due to the fact that NGOs and local people have become more skeptical about institutional partnerships of this kind (Terlinden, 2002). Cascão (2013) further argues that cross-ethnic trust and norms of reciprocity that govern their relationships have become weak as the result of the weakening legitimacy of the traditional institutional apparatus. This trend may also be related to the inability of indigenous institutions to cope with the change in the nature and magnitude of local conflicts that has outstripped their capacity to manage and contain these conflicts, thereby generating instability (as conflicts are based on a diverging identity discourse, indigeneity and a livelihoods system). As a result of these changes, indigenous institutions can become less relevant in the context of contemporary conflict.

**Conclusion**

This chapter presents the triangulated findings gleaned from key informants and from interviews and focus group discussions as well as survey data. The field work was conducted in the Borana and Gambella regions. The findings were presented in the format of eight major themes which shed light on the contributions of the NGO sector with regard to peacebuilding in areas of protracted conflict. The sterling contributions of both the Conflict Resolution-Type (CRT) NGOs and the Community Development-Type (CDT) NGOs with regard to indigenous
empowerment, livelihoods enhancement and promotion of cross-ethnic relations have become apparent. One could also argue that CRTs and CDTs have both, to some degree, helped to prevent and/or manage conflict in the communities.

The following, concluding chapter presents a review of the key findings, main conclusions, policy recommendations and concluding remarks.
CHAPTER SIX: MAIN CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND EPILOGUE

6. Introduction

The aim of this study was to examine the peacebuilding potential of development NGOs in the Oromia and Gambella regions of Ethiopia. This chapter will present the main conclusions in relation to the research objectives. Furthermore, upon reflecting on these conclusions, critical recommendations will be put forward. Finally a brief epilogue will bring this report to a close.

6.1 Main Conclusions

The following are the main conclusions pertaining to each specific objective of the study as well as the key categories.

Objective 1: To ascertain the nature of State and Civil Society relationships

- In the post-1991 period, the NGO sector proliferated in size, influence, and scope of its responsibilities. The reasons for this proliferation are varied: they include the civil service reform and decentralisation, availability of foreign funding for local organisations and political opportunity (Section 5.2.1: 98-101). In this period, NGOs were more focused on the economic causes of conflicts rather than concerning themselves with the broader underlying structural causes of protracted conflict (Section 5.3.1: 119).

- By the early 2000s, the role of the NGOs had been transformed to one encompassing the broader agenda of the “rights-based” development approach that aimed to build institutions for good governance and democracy-building (Section 5.2.2: 102-103 and section 5.3.2: 119-121).

- NGOs often cited a general increase in the intensity of violence, the destruction of their development infrastructures and requests from donors and the religious sector as reasons for including a peacebuilding approach (Section 5.3.3: 121-123).

- The state and CSOs are making greater efforts to influence each other. The state attempts to engage or co-opt CSOs into its own policies by promoting national poverty eradication policies and encouraging the NGOs to have the Millennium Development Goals as part of
their agenda (Section 5.2.4: 108-114). While the state engages these CSOs within its development policy dialogues, CSOs use this platform to negotiate and bargain for their own goals (Section, section, 5.2.4: 109).

- The CSOs attempt to influence the state’s national policy though lobbying and advocacy. Here, the state tends to use coercive strategies to influence CSO behaviour. Accordingly, CSOs had strategic choices open to them: either to work in close collaboration with the state in the poverty eradication programmes or to engage in contentious issues of human rights and democracy building, with some state censure (Section 5.2.4: 109-10). This does not mean that these CSOs could not be involved in lobbying and advocacy, and have influence over national policies (Section 5.2.2: 102-103). For example, one strategic pillar of the decentralisation policy was to forge partnerships with the CSO sector. These CSOs have made a contribution, although insignificant in comparison to other actors, to the democratisation and decentralisation processes (Section 5.2.2: 102-103 and section, 5.6.4: 158-159).

Objective 2: *To examine the policy frameworks that impact on NGOs in Ethiopia.*

- The new Proclamation (PPRRCS) has limited the NGOs’ role to that of being placed on a relief-development continuum with any advocacy for human rights being limited. Subsequently this has created a division between the “rights-based approach” and development (Section 5.2.5: 112-113). Furthermore, some NGOs feel constrained from carrying out conflict resolution as part of their development mandate. Needless to say, it is far more difficult for NGOs operating in conflict prone areas to separate development from peacebuilding (Section 5.2.5, 113 and section 5.9: 200-212).

- The new Proclamation forced NGOs to redefine their *raison d’etre* and mandates, thereby affecting their choice of strategies and their ability to translate their goals into organisational output (Section 5.2.5: 112-113). For instance, local NGOs that relied heavily on foreign funding had to change their mandate to one emphasising development (Section 5.2.5: 112). In doing so, they abandoned initiatives concerning other fundamental needs critical for
transforming protracted conflicts; these include good governance, peacebuilding, human rights, and an accountable and responsive political environment.

- Not all NGOs agreed that the new Proclamation had negative impacts on their approaches to peacebuilding. NGOs such as GPDI and AFD adapted their mission and choice of strategies to accommodate the political climate and to be able to carry out their goals in a different way. Since the new dispensation curtailed a “rights-based” approach, these NGOs incorporated a “do-no-harm”/“conflict sensitive” approach (CSA) into their development programmes (Section 5.2.5: 113-114), so they were still able to deal with the conflict although in a circumscribed manner.

- The Proclamation also affected the NGOs’ organisational form and resources required to sustain them and help them achieve their goals. For example, after the Proclamation, which allocates 70% of the budget to direct development and 30% to administrative costs, NGOs such as SOS Sahel and GPDI were forced to centralise their management and human resources at Yabello district (Section 5.2.5: 115-116). This created a logistical and administrative burden as they had to reach out to remote geographical areas. Thus, the work of NGOs with regard to peacebuilding was severely constrained.

- In general, there is consensus that it is far more difficult for NGOs operating in conflict-prone areas to separate peacebuilding from development (Bush, 1998; Schmelzle, 2006; Watson, 2001). Some NGOs have therefore integrated peacebuilding strategies into their development projects to address the challenges (Section 5.2.5: 113 and section 5.4.1: 125).

**Objective 3: To assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices that are still used**

- Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have remained resilient despite the new state’s judicial arrangements. Despite the weakening of indigenous institutions for several reasons, they continued to exercise influence in both conflict resolution and natural resource management (Section 3.3: 65-69 and section 5.5:131-148).

- The practice of indigenous conflict resolution in Borana (See section 3.3: 65-69 and section 5.5.1: 131-135) is stronger than it is in Gambella (See section 5.5.1: 13-132 and section
5.10.6: 216). This may be linked to the fact that indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in Gambella work best within ethnic groups and have made intra-ethnic conflict resolution and peacebuilding possible (Greuel, 1971). However, these indigenous mechanisms are insufficient for dealing with inter-ethnic conflicts (Section 5.6.1: 150). Thus, a more overarching and inclusive framework of law is required to bridge group differences.

- The idea of using indigenous institutions has been adopted by some Conflict Resolution-Type NGOs because of their acceptance by parties to the conflict, their emphasis on social harmony, their responsiveness and accessibility. Also, customary conflict resolution mechanisms are seen as participatory and restorative and as supplementary to the state judiciary (Section 5.5.1: 131-136).

- Similarly, Community Development-Type NGOs have used indigenous institutions in their work with communities with regard to community development. Indigenous conflict resolution practices promoted possibilities for participatory development planning and development work (Section 5.5.2: 142-143). The discourses around the use of these indigenous mechanisms range from their feasibility and pragmatic approaches to local empowerment and sustainable development (Section 5.5.2: 143-147).

- There are differences between the indigenous and state’s legal systems. The community’s validation of customary institutions and its laws is strongly associated with its emphasis on compensation and repairing social harmony (Section 5.5.1: 136), rather than on exacting punishment, which is seen to be the sole focus of the state judicial system (section 5.5.1:137). It would thus appear that much more research needs to be done into the state judiciary system and ways of transforming it so that it could incorporate a restorative justice approach which approximates the indigenous ideal of social harmony.

- Respondents felt that neither customary nor state institutions should hold the monopoly of how to mete out true justice, in the pastoralist areas of Borana and Gambella. Both indigenous and state institutions are active and operational, but with varying degrees of legitimacy. On one hand, the structural limitations of the state judicial and military systems have rendered them less effective in resolving local conflicts. On the other hand, it is far
more difficult for indigenous institutions to deal effectively with “political” causes of conflict such as conflict over political boundaries, representation and power (Section 5.5.1:137-141). Customary courts and laws may never completely replace the formal statuary laws in all functions, nor could they address political causes of conflicts. Instead, they are well placed to address local conflict over natural resources (Section 5.5.1:137-138). The state and customary courts need not always interact in opposition but, under certain circumstances, could be complementary (Section 5.5.1:139).

- Respondents indicated that indigenous conflict resolution institutions can adjudicate conflicts over resources, relieving the state of part of the judicial burden of extending authority and delivering benefits to a large conflict-ridden population. The state’s legitimacy could be strengthened through permitting customary institutions to play their roles (Section 5.5.1:140).
- In general, the basic structural features of the Borana system of indigenous conflict resolution remained relatively stable despite the historical changes of the last four decades, whereas the Anywaa’s and Nuer’s systems broke down in several ways within a century of their incorporation into the Ethiopian State. Even among the Borana, where it remained relatively intact, the system underwent significant structural modifications.

**Objective 4: Find out which strategies NGOs use to resolve conflict**

- NGOs have adapted a mix of approaches for dealing with conflict. These include a comprehensive approach, the rights-based approach, do-no-harm approach and indigenous empowerment (section 5.4: 125-130).

- NGOs designed the various approaches centred on human needs, people-centred approaches, and on building the indigenous institutions’ capacity to support a “bottom-up” approach (Section 5.4.5: 129-130 and section 5.9.2: 140).

- Key informants from Gambella indicate that in the absence of strong indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, there is great potential for the NGOs to use faith-based institutions as an entry point for further peacebuilding efforts (Section 5.6.5: 159-163). These NGOs adopted a faith-based peacebuilding approach and engaged in the institutionalisation of
peacebuilding apparatus to handle conflict and build cross-cutting ties. These informants suggest that targeting such pre-existing networks is not only critical for peacebuilding, but were the most effective method of stimulating and maintaining commitment to collective action (Section 5.6.5: 160-161).

- NGOs could be instrumental in reinvigorating and formulating innovative approaches to the conflict. Earlier approaches were previously weakened or overlooked in the conflict resolution toolkit of each region (Section 5.4.5: 129-130).

- NGOs could also view indigenous knowledge and the existing local institutional apparatus, including indigenous institutions, as more suitable than top-down development practices for building durable peace and creating sustainable development. Their reliance on these institutions helped prepare the ground for organising people for participating, planning and contributing to peace and development projects (Watson, 2001).

- All NGOs sought to adopt approaches that could reinvigorate indigenous social institutions and increase indigenous people’s participation in and management of the natural resources of grazing land, forest and water. These NGOs also saw the potential of indigenous institutions for initiating development projects and conducting conflict resolution (Section 5.4.5: 130-131 and section 5.6: 149-163). However, in Gambella, the interest in indigenous institutions had waned, and NGOs in that area have become more skeptical about institutional partnerships of this kind (Section 5.10.6: 216).

**Objective 5: To explore the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services**

- Several respondents from Borana indicated that they were instrumental in facilitating the activation and re-establishment of customary institutions and strengthening their jurisdiction over land, social and cultural issues. Once these institutions were established, they provided a legal framework with the capacity to resolve group differences peacefully (Section 5.6: 149-163). For instance, a number of focus group discussion participants from Borana pointed to an increase in the number of conflict cases being referred to these peace committees, which could be an indicator of the recognition of the local peace committees as being a legitimate or effective means of resolving conflict (Section 5.6.1: 151).
Several key informants from both regions felt that they played a significant role in the establishment of inter/intra-ethnic peace groups and strengthening pastoralists’ own rules and in drawing by-laws relating to natural resource access, use and maintenance, as well as laws on murder, theft and injury (Section 5.6.2: 151-156). For example, respondents from Borana indicated that inter-ethnic peace committees of elders were able to forge strong inter-ethnic networks of engagement and were successful in dispelling certain fears and rumours and in avoiding violence (Section 5.6.3: 158).

Key informants from both regions felt that inter/intra-ethnic relations initiatives such as experience sharing tours are effective in augmenting cross-cutting or integrative ties in societies, and thereby facilitating herd mobility along borders (Section 5.6.3: 157). All lines of evidence strongly support significant positive impacts of inter/intra-ethnic relations initiatives most notably with respect to improving cross-border cooperation, and reducing cross-border cattle raids and killings; these have clearly had a significant effect on the dynamics of conflict in the region (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198 and section 5.9.3: 208-209). For example, key informants from Borana indicated the contribution of cross-border cooperation to a reduction in the incidence of cross-border cattle raids carried out by Borana-Hamer, and Borana, and Garri and Gabra (Section 5.6.3: 158). Similarly, in Gambella, some key informants pointed out how inter/intra-ethnic development projects helped communities to become economically interdependent (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198).

Several respondents from Borana indicated that the promotion of intra-ethnic/inter-ethnic ties between the Gabra and Garri of northern Kenya and Borana facilitated freedom of herd mobility and access to natural resources during the recent droughts, thereby protecting the communities’ livelihood by reducing their vulnerability to drought risks (Section 5.6.3: 155-158).

Some informants from Gambella emphasised that inter-faith peacebuilding schemes were the most effective way of stimulating collective action for peace (Section 5.6.5: 159-163). They indicated that churches were used to bridge the two communities and to institutionalise cross-ethnic projects into the dominant peacebuilding toolkit (Section 5.6.5: 161).
• Several informants from Gambella pointed to some critical impact, in which Track Three peacebuilding initiatives played a significant role. Positive impacts include: bringing the parties together for discussions; helping those at the grass-roots level to find the root sources of conflict and its resolution; helping the shift in discourse among the ordinary people, from the language of violence to peace; facilitating the negotiation of political settlement between the government and “rebels”; and, helping the re-opening of roads previously closed because of the conflict (Section 5.7: 164-172).

• Most key informants reported a number of positive impacts that they attributed to the NGOs’ development projects. These include: diversifying livelihoods, strengthening indigenous social protection mechanisms, supporting policy initiatives to protect pastoral livelihoods and supporting cross-border livestock trade (Section 5.9.3: 207-212).

• A number of key informants indicated that, to a great extent, NGOs have positive impacts in revitalising economic opportunities, which in turn improve the capacity for trade and increase links between traders across the border (Section 5.6.3:157). They indicated that these initiatives were critical in increasing the level of traditional cross-border livestock movement and trade to help in forging inter-group cooperation. Many key informants felt that cross-border trade encouraged cross-cutting ties as it created a reciprocal interdependence and a vested interest in reducing conflict (Section 5.8.2.2:196 and section 5.8.2.3: 208).

• There was overall agreement that integrated conflict resolution and development initiatives built on local agents and indigenous resources at grass-roots helped to contribute towards a more sustainable peace in societies experiencing protracted conflict (Section 5.6: 149-153). Nevertheless, most informants indicated that these initiatives are becoming inadequate in view of the frequent occurrences of droughts, rapid socio-political changes, fluctuations in the nature and intensity of conflict and long-term climatic changes (Section 5.9.3: 209-212).
Objective 6: To explore the perceptions of the beneficiaries concerning services rendered by the NGOs

- Several beneficiary respondents from Gambella and Borana felt that NGOs’ development programmes had created sustainable access to natural resources: water, grazing lands and fishing (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198). Most of these respondents (69.2%) indicated that the programmes increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructure such as schools, health clinics and water points (Section. 5.8.2.3: 198).

- With respect to the impact of NGOs’ cross-ethnic/border initaives, several beneficiary respondents from both regions indicated that NGOs’ programmes have enhanced cross-border livestock marketing, and improved cross-border mobility for petty-traders (Section 5.8.2.3: 196-198). They also point out that cross-border trade has begun to regain traditional markets and rural youth have gained access to education.

- Overall there was agreement among the beneficiaries that participation in conflict resolution training programmes built their conflict analysis skills, negotiation and problem solving skills, and their skills in identifying conflict-connectors and dividers (Section 5.8.2.1: 178-179). Most (87.9%) respondents who participated in the training felt that it had built their skills and capacities (Section 5.8.2.1:179). Furthermore, focus group participants indicated that the skills and concepts learnt during conflict resolution training programmes were important for becoming trainers within their own communities, developing trust, willingness to compromise and to negotiate and to tolerate the values of the other ethnic groups (Section 5.8.2.2: 185-194).

- Of the 90% of respondents who had participated in conflict resolution training, more than two-third (66.7%) indicated that they had participated in peacebuilding activities; in other words, in mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation (Section 5.8.2.1:181-182). This implies that training in conflict resolution projects run by the NGOs could augment participants’ activities in peace processes.

- Beneficiary perceptions in Gambella and Borana indicated that the incidence of conflict has decreased over the last two years. Key reasons for this include relative stability in the
neighbouring areas, federal government interventions, local administration interventions, NGO involvement and local elders’ negotiations (Section 5.8.2.1:183-184). It was found that none of these reasons is predominant; they all have some influence on the dynamics of the conflict, but in varying degrees. This finding suggests that conflict resolution interventions need to be comprehensive and complementary, involving all the above mentioned factors (Section 5.8.2.1:184).

- Several beneficiary respondents, both from Borana and Gambella, felt that the “other community” could be trusted. The great majority of participants in conflict resolution training indicated that they would be more willing to share natural resources, and to rely on each other for support; they would approach members of the other group more readily than would people who are less trusting of the other community (Section 5.8.2.2: 192-194). These findings were important because they could facilitate freedom of movement and access to important resources to mitigate resource-based conflicts and strengthens a group’s resilience mechanisms to cope with drought related shocks (Section 5.9.3: 207-208).

- Overall, several beneficiary respondents from both regions felt that the NGOs’ inter-group contact schemes helped to establish trust, reduce prejudice, and increase tolerance and cross-community contact; all of this, in turn, helped participants to adopt new attitudes, form relationships, develop joint activities, undertake trade, and do business with each other (Section 5.8.2.2: 185-194). This work shows a significant and positive effect of inter-group contact schemes on reducing the magnitude and changing the nature of violence that often exists between groups in protracted conflicts.

6.2 Recommendations

The evidence reviewed in this study suggests seven recommendations for development agencies and policy makers that aim to reduce the pastoralists’ vulnerability to recurrent drought and also aim to reduce the incidence of conflict in conflict-prone areas of the Borana Zone and Gambella regional states.

- First, if development NGOs operating in those conflict areas are to have a meaningful impact, then their peacebuilding projects need to build on indigenous institutions and
local actors. They also need to build local capacities and enhance social cohesion as these are factors that underpin pastoralists’ resilience in the face of disasters and conflict.

- Second, those development NGOs that aim to strengthen pastoral livelihoods and drought resilience in conflict-prone areas need to incorporate peacebuilding activities as a core component since cooperative mechanisms appear to be a pre-requisite for strengthening their resilience to drought-related risks.

- Third, despite the challenges encountered in conflict resolution programmes in the context of protracted social conflict areas, the evidence reveals the importance of “social bridging” projects, and suggests that schemes for improving inter/intra-ethnic relations might be introduced as a key part of the conflict resolution process.

- Fourth, the present judicial system has not demonstrated an ability to diffuse tensions; moreover, the failure of “top-down development” practices resulted in serious environmental degradation and destabilizing of the population’s coping mechanisms, thereby threatening their livelihood system (Homann, 2004). There is a need to incorporate indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms involving indigenous institutions to address community conflicts.

- Fifth, indigenous conflict resolution institutions can adjudicate conflicts over resources, relieving the state of part of the judicial burden of extending authority and delivering benefits to a large conflict-ridden population. The state can become stronger and be perceived as more legitimate, by permitting customary institutions to play their roles.

- Sixth, if NGOs are to play their roles successfully, the state needs to amend the new Proclamation to allow NGOs to extend their mandates to include conflict resolution strategies. The current terms of the Proclamation are detrimental to the NGOs’ funding sources and legitimacy.

- Finally, further large-scale research into aspects of these recommendations could add leverage for substantive policy changes which could benefit the Federal State of Ethiopia and contribute towards a greater peace dividend.
6.3 Epilogue

In conclusion, this study raises three interesting and important dimensions with regard to key emerging issues. These are: the challenge of ending violent conflict; the importance of state institutions in addressing “political” and regional conflicts, and conceptualising the nature of the conflict and its solution.

The future of peace in both contexts remains fragile for different reasons. In Gambella, inter-ethnic politics present a legacy of diverging identity discourse based on indigeneity, livelihoods systems and citizenship (Feyissa, 2009). For example, the Nuer and Anywaa ethnic groups continue to fight over ethnic identities, local and national representation in government, federal funds, language at schools and land for agriculture. Furthermore, the history of Nuer and the Anywaa is one of bitter political rivalry between the GPDUP and GPLP that had made trust building at grass-roots level difficult. The activities of political elites and other factions will continue to engage in political power aimed at destabilizing the region. As a result, the potential for spill-over effects is always present. How the new power sharing arrangement and decentralisation process can continue to exacerbate or contain these challenges will be central to the future of the region. Generally, conflict is latent even though negotiation platforms are set up to tackle the root causes. To reduce full-blown inter-group conflict, effective interventions also need to build inter-group trust, address latent reciprocal mistrust and its related concept of exclusive ethnic spaces.

In the Borana region, the biggest challenge facing the pastoralist communities is addressing the problem of recurrent drought; this affects more than two-thirds of the population. As indicated previously, the livelihoods of pastoralists are becoming increasingly vulnerable because of population growth, climate change, lack of livestock markets, severe restrictions in herd mobility, and breakdown of customary institutions and social relations (CARE, 2010). A recent survey of households affected by drought in the Borana Zone shows the following disturbing trends: poverty is deepening amongst those who are already poor; loss of productive assets and increasing household food insecurity; growing numbers of pastoralists are moving away from pastoralism every year; more and more are having to depend on emergency relief food provision for survival; the resilience of pastoralist communities to drought in Ethiopia will continue to
decline; traditional pastoralism could no longer support their communities (GL-CRSP PARIMA, 2007a; CARE, 2010). For example, conflict in the pastoralist areas of Moyalle and Arero usually sparked during prolonged dry seasons when the pastoralists would move in search of water and pasture for their livestock. Although various NGOs in partnership with government have been trying to addresses the underlying causes of vulnerability as well as diversifying their livelihoods, their efforts are becoming inadequate in view of the frequent occurrences of droughts, rapid socio-political changes, fluctuations in the nature and intensity of conflict and long-term climatic changes.

Given the history of deep-rooted conflicts in the region, the state will continue to play crucial roles in preventing, containing and ending violent conflict. It is also a major player in influencing the outcome of political negotiations to the extent that it exerts pressure on antagonists and alters the power balance through positive and negative inducements. A case in point is how FDRE settled the power struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable ethnic groups of Nuer and the Anywaa of the Gambella Regional State (Section 5.7.1: 166-167). Another example is where the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), known as the Mekelakeya, often intervened to manage and de-escalate conflict in both areas (Feyissa, 2009; Bassi, 2010). Furthermore, there are many basic political and economic functions for which the state is uniquely equipped, not only the guardianship of territorial integrity but also counterbalancing regional effects of conflict. For example, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in January 2005 (between the South Sudan and Ethiopian governments) was a turning-point in shaping the peace processes in the Southern Sudan, with huge implications for the Gambella region of Ethiopia. The NGOs’ Track Two and Track Three initiatives may not completely replace the government’s role nor could they contain external factors. Instead, they are well placed to complement and assist the peace process by bringing political elites and community leaders of conflicting parties together to explore their grievances.

Furthermore, Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) argue that reliance on the coercive power of the state alone is inadequate; it cannot promote lasting peace. For example, although the military and regional authorities intervened to manage and de-escalate conflict, they are short of conflict negotiation skills and lack the cultural sensitivity needed to handle conflict and reinstate durable peace (Adunga, 2010). The significance of customary procedures is still important in the view of
local ethnic groups and so the state should incorporate these customs into its judicial procedures (Abbink, 2006). The rituals and ceremonies performed for conflict negotiation in the social setting has a meaning and purpose “beyond its judicial outcome” (Abbink, 2006:401).

Once it was recognised that not all of the NGOs investigated had framed the nature of the conflict and its solution in the same way, a decision was taken to classify them as either Conflict Resolution-type (CR-type) NGOs or Community Development-type (CD-type) NGOs. As indicated previously, the CR-type NGOs largely identified the main causes of conflict as being the disintegration of long-standing cross-cutting bonds and the weakening of indigenous institutions. The way forward is, therefore, to strengthen indigenous institutions and build their integrative ties and mutual interests. This certainly does not mean that the CR-type NGOs were in any way less dedicated than the CD-type NGOs in addressing the economic causes of conflict. It merely means that they were committed to peacebuilding programmes because they believed that peace is a pre-requisite to freedom of movement and access to important resources, both of which lay the foundations for greater drought resilience. For instance, Care Ethiopia, Mercy Corps, AFD and GPDA were geared towards protecting pastoralists’ livelihoods, diversifying those livelihoods, and supporting cross-border livestock trade; the aim was to foster pastoralists’ resilience to chronic drought.

In contrast, the CD-type NGOs identified chronic vulnerability to drought, limited access to scarce natural resources and deprivation of basic needs, as factors that exacerbate conflict. Thus, their primary focus was building the pastoralists’ livelihood and resilience. These NGOs only incorporated peacebuilding projects as a part of broader efforts needed to address pastoralists’ vulnerability and improve their resilience. Here, then, was the point of convergence between the goals of the CD-type and CR-type of NGOs: the two goals collapsed into a common objective of strengthening the resilience of the pastoralists to climate-related shocks. Not only were the NGOs in the study area likely to use a combination of approaches, but similar strategies were known and available to the NGOs across the three districts. For example: OPA’s inter-ethnic peace conferences, SOS Sahel’s Collaborative Forest Management Project, Care Ethiopia’s rangeland and water development projects, and PARIMA’s and ICRC’s livestock marketing projects, were built on age-old customary systems of community-based controlled resource systems.
After reviewing the relative impact that the NGOs had on their respective areas, the following four key outcomes stand out. These are: re/institutionalisation of inter/intra-ethnic peace groups; activation of customary laws and re-establishment of customary institutions; strengthening inter/intra-ethnic ties; and, addressing economic causes of conflict.

**Re/institutionalisation of inter/intra-ethnic peace groups**

The most important achievement of NGOs in the Borana Zone and the Gambella region was their support for the following: the establishment of *Koree Nagaa* (inter/intra-ethnic peace committees) at grass-roots level and at *Woreda* level, School Peace Committees, Conflict Management Forums, Women’s Peace Committees, Inter-faith peacebuilding initiatives (such as Joint Development Office and a Joint Peace Committee) and district-level Peace and Natural Resource Management Committees (Section 5.6.1: 149-151). Once the indigenous institutions were strengthened and new ones established, they provided the apparatus to diffuse conflict over natural resources and other causes. In other words, the NGOs were successful in reinvigorating the available “cultural capital” for peacebuilding. For example, in Surupa (Yabello), the establishment of the *Koree Nagaa* (peace committee) provided institutional apparatus used not only to draft and ratify agreed-upon by-laws relating to access to resources, but also used to oversee their implementation. They did so through peacebuilding projects that encompass facilitating peace dialogues and peace accords and reinvigorating local institutions for resource sharing and economic opportunities. Likewise, in Gambella, NGOs such as Pax Christi Netherlands and HEKS supported the establishment of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic peace groups consisting of the Nuer, Anywaa and Highlanders. Inter-faith peacebuilding initiatives brought together individuals from opposing groups and, as described in previous chapters, played a significant role in a number of peacebuilding processes.

**Activation of customary laws and re-establishment of customary institutions**

Both CD-type and CR-type of NGOs viewed the activation and re-establishment of customary institutions and strengthening their jurisdiction over land, social and cultural issues as keys to stability and reducing environmental degradation (Section 5.6.2: 151-156). Whereas activation of these institutions places the community at the centre of Natural Resource Management (NMR), reliance on these institutions reduces differential access to resources, diminishes social exclusion
and reduces conflict. Therefore, the NGO projects aimed to transform the conventional, government-led NRM into community-based NRM systems. The Participatory Forest Management Approach (PFMA), a new collaborative resource management approach, was adopted to revitalise the indigenous institutions and to empower the local community to reclaim their rights to use and manage the natural resources. The informants noted that the activation of customary laws helped to tackle protracted conflict over access to, utilisation and management of resources. For example, since the activation of the principles of *Dongora Serra, Lafa sera roba, Lafa sera bona* and *Forra* (Section 3.3:65-69), there has been a significant reduction in conflict between the Borana and Guji and nomadic Garri in Arero and Yabello, over access to forest resources and grazing areas (Section 5.6.2: 151-155). Since then, access to natural resources has been reached through negotiation rather than by following the previously assumed open access. As a result, the organisational structure that evolved organically has been reinvigorated, thereby enhancing the rules and regulations for governing access to the resources and reducing the intensity of conflicts.

**Strengthening inter/intra-ethnic ties**

The promotion of inter/intra-ethnic ties between the Gabra and Garri of northern Kenya and Borana was another important contribution of the CR-type NGOs. In doing this, the CR-type NGOs facilitated freedom of herd mobility and access to natural resources during the recent droughts, thereby protecting the communities’ livelihood by reducing their vulnerability to drought risks (Section 5.6.3: 156-158). The cross-border cooperation also contributed to a reduction in the incidence of cross-border cattle raids carried out by Borana-Hamer, and Borana, and Garri and Gabra. It has also clearly had a significant effect on the dynamics of conflict in the region.

In Gambella, the CDT-type NGOs were instrumental in facilitating the formation of inter/intra-ethnic peace committees that were very active and quite successful in handling disputes (Section 5.6.5: 159-163 and section 5.7: 168-171). Pact Ethiopia’s cross-border peace projects were also identified as important in community development and for addressing issues of social division, providing opportunities for relationships to develop on a cross-border basis and for breaking down suspicion and mistrust between different communities (Section 5.8.2.2: 185-194). Pact
Ethiopia also constructed roads along the conflict fault lines in the border area between Gog town (Pinyudo Woreda/Ethiopia) and Pochalla town (Pochalla County/Sudan). Similarly, EPaRDA, Mercy Corps, OPA, AFD and Care Ethiopia helped in revitalising economic opportunities, to improve the capacity for trade and to increase links between traders across the border of Borana and Kenya (Section 5.6.3: 156-157). These projects promoted cross-border livestock marketing, the livestock trade sector and improved cross-border mobility for petty-traders (section 5.9.3: 208-209). As a result, there was more movement of livestock across borders, forging inter-group cooperation. This creates interdependence and a vested interest in reducing conflict. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the road seems to have made the trafficking of small arms easier with the resulting proliferation of small arms in the area.

**Economic causes of conflict addressed**

CD-type NGOs implemented rangeland and water development, livelihood protection and income diversification, improvements in production and marketing, and improvements in natural resource management (Section 5.8.2.3: 194-198 and section 5.9.3: 207-212). These NGO projects seemed to have made the pastoralists more resilient, with livelihood diversification leading to a reduction in poverty and inequalities; the projects also reduced the likelihood of conflict. For example, in Surupa (Yabello), AFD, GOAL, and Care Ethiopia developed drought reserve grazing areas and water points that created sustainable access to the natural resources, thereby minimizing the amount of travel over long distances that normally resulted in conflict. This has reduced herd mobility and has led to an improvement in livelihoods, which, in turn, contributed to a reduction in the likelihood of resource-based conflict and vulnerability to drought (Section 5.6.3: 157).

Similarly, ACORD and Pact Ethiopia revitalised economic opportunities and the capacity for trade, and also increased links between traders across the border of Gambella and Southern Sudan. Businesses have begun to regain traditional markets; rural youth have gained access to education and, with increased cross-border trading and increased access to capital, the Project has reduced the economic marginalisation of the targeted communities. For example, NGOs such as HEKS and GPDC played key roles in initiating inter/intra-ethnic development projects and helped communities to become economically interdependent. Cross-border livestock trade in the
regions has been quietly expanding and government is keen to invest in livestock marketing infrastructure and security; after all, cross-border livestock trade is critical to pastoral livelihoods and to the economy of Ethiopia and its neighbours (Section 5.9.3: 207-212). Nevertheless, these interventions are becoming inadequate in light of the frequent occurrence of droughts, rapid socioeconomic changes, changes in nature and intensity of conflict and long-term climatic change.

There has also been lingering skepticism about whether these NGOs contributed effectively in reducing conflict and in generating sustainable and meaningful forms of inter-ethnic cooperation that would tackle the roots of conflict in the area. For example, there was consensus among the respondents that the NGOs had limited, and possibly marginal, impact on tackling the intractability of the conflict. This was not unexpected since in the region critical events were influenced either by the political dynamics of the country, or by protagonists in the conflict, or by external events in neighbouring countries. For example, in July 2012, Southern Sudanese Murle attacked and raided the cattle of the Nuer communities on the Ethiopian side. In the conflict, more than 36 Nuer were killed, six villages were burned and 5,000 persons were displaced. Another example is the recent deadly conflict between the Garri and the Borana groups in Moyalle in 2008/2009 and then in 2012. Despite the NGOs’ potential for conflict resolution, there is still doubt whether they have the legitimacy and capacity to respond to contemporary conflicts. There is the real danger of exaggerating the NGOs’ role in peacebuilding on the assumption that they are flexible and closely attached to grass-roots communities and serve as an “agent of change” in peacebuilding.

Studies by Goodhand and Hulme (1999) and by Goodhand and Lewer (1999) reveal that NGOs had a limited impact on reducing conflict but could assist short-term relief support. Goodhand, Hulme and Lewer’s (2000) analysis of the NGOs’ role in “social bridging” in Sri Lanka leads one to be sceptical about their success in “building bridges” to cross ethnic cleavages. Moreover, these contributions should be seen as complementing peacebuilding; one could not expect small-scale NGOs to make a major contribution to the peace dividend but at the same time one should not underestimate their value in the context of protracted conflict. The question of whether the impact at the “micro-level” translates into action at the “macro-level” remains open, but the NGOs’ effect on peace could be discernible in some areas. For example, they played an
important role in facilitating the endorsement of the principle of *Karra Matta* by the *Gummi Gayyo* (general assemblage) with an immediate effect on the communities of Guji, Boran, and Gabra, thereby reducing the incidence of resource-based conflicts.

The approach followed in this study can only provide a partial picture of the NGOs’ impact on their operational areas. Further work is needed to assess their efficacy in reducing conflict. The findings of this study, including evidence from FGDs and survey data sources, offer valuable insights into the impact that NGOs had on the target population. Furthermore, further research into the inter-linkages between the three issues of “indigenous empowerment”, “cross-community relations” and “livelihoods enhancement” would provide more insight into how they are mutually reinforcing. The “indigenous empowerment” strand focuses on institutional development for peacebuilding; the “cross-community relations” strand promotes social cohesion. The “livelihood enhancement” strand tended to enhance resilience to drought and to reduce poverty-induced conflict, although it is likely to have indirect rather than direct impact. The “indigenous empowerment” and “cross-community relation” strands create opportunities for cross-border freedom of movement and sharing resources; they also create institutional arrangements for handling inter-group disputes. This was coupled with economic incentives for cross-ethnic contact and activities, through joint projects such as greater access to natural resources and market opportunities. This inter-linkage could be regarded as indigenous empowerment as it focused directly on the people involved in the conflict and built on indigenous knowledge and institutions.

In conclusion, if the role of customary institutions in peacebuilding is to be effective, then the development agencies and government policy need to recognise them fully, thereby contributing to a viable process of peaceful and sustainable conflict resolution.
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APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF NGOs OPERATING IN THE BORANA ZONE AND GAMBELLA REGIONAL STATE

Profile of NGOs operating in the Borana Zone (key representatives of targeted NGOs, programmes, and their operational areas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of NGOs</th>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Projects related to peace building/conflict resolutions</th>
<th>Principal objective</th>
<th>Cross-cutting strategies related to peacebuilding</th>
<th>Project area</th>
<th>Dur ation</th>
<th>Profile of the respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CARE ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>CDT/CRT</td>
<td>Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative I&amp;II (PLI I&amp;II) (Care Ethiopia, 2006)</td>
<td>To increase resilience to shocks and secure more sustainable livelihoods</td>
<td>Strengthening indigenous technical knowledge and customary institutions for peacebuilding</td>
<td>Arero, Yabello, Moyalle, Dire Dhas</td>
<td>2006 - 2009</td>
<td>programme coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 1984/85</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (READ) (Care Ethiopia, 2009a)</td>
<td>Resilience Enhancement</td>
<td>Capacity building, conflict resolution training and experience sharing tours</td>
<td>Dire, Moyalle, Teltele, and Yabello</td>
<td>2008 - 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced livelihood in Pastoralists area of Southern Ethiopia (ELSE) (Care Ethiopia, 2009b)</td>
<td>Increasing resiliency through improved livelihoods; protection of livelihoods in drought; improving livestock production, health, and marketing; enhancing NRM</td>
<td>Strengthened capacity of organizations and systems in peacebuilding, civil governance &amp; conflict mitigation</td>
<td>Dire, Miyo, Moyalle, Teltele, and Yabello</td>
<td>2007 - 2009</td>
<td>ELSE Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mercy Corps Ethiopia</td>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Strengthening Institutions for Peace and Development (SIPED) (Mercy Corps, 2011)</td>
<td>Strengthening of government and customary institutions; Community dialogues; Joint livelihood activities; Formation of peace committees; and Development of peace accords and resource use plans</td>
<td>Facilitate peace dialogues, develop peace accords and agreements governing the management of natural resources, and strengthen the capacities and linkages between customary and government institutions</td>
<td>Somali-Borana border districts</td>
<td>2010 -</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Resolution Program officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Filed Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ACORD SINCE</td>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Enhancing community resilience (ACORD, 2008)</td>
<td>Improving drought preparedness capacities of local communities by enhancing livelihood assets of pastoralists</td>
<td>Enhance their livelihoods and prevent resource based conflicts, community managed disaster risk reduction process, rangeland management</td>
<td>Dire, Mega, Miyo</td>
<td>2008 -</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>since 2008</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Director</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Many of these NGOs have incorporated peacebuilding components into their development and therefore, they can be both classified as both CRT and CDT NGOs.

The list of projects related to peacebuilding is not complete but highlights the major projects. Information is taken from NGOs’ libraries and their quarterly and annual progress reports, from Borana Zone Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, and from interviews. Largely left out here were projects dealing with a variety of development issues such as community based initiatives, health, education, promotion of backyard vegetable gardening and small-scale farming, the establishment of women’s savings and credit groups.

NGOs incorporated peacebuilding activities as small parts of their work.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Impact Areas</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SOS Sahel</td>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>BCFMP</td>
<td>Working with pastoral institutions, revitalising roles and responsibilities and re-establishing customary mechanisms, rules and regulations for forest</td>
<td>Strengthened traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve conflict between different forest user-groups</td>
<td>Yabello, Arero and Liban</td>
<td>1999 - 2006</td>
<td>Filed Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EPELP</td>
<td>Straightening indigenous NRM Diversifying the livelihood</td>
<td>Building the capacity of indigenous institutions for NRM</td>
<td>Yabello, Arero and Liban</td>
<td>2008 - 2011</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PFSPP</td>
<td>Straightening Indigenous NRM systems</td>
<td>Strengthen indigenous institutions for NRM</td>
<td>Yabello, Arero</td>
<td>2006 - 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PNRM</td>
<td>Facilitate negotiations between forest user groups</td>
<td>Facilitate negotiations between forest user groups</td>
<td>Yabello, Arero</td>
<td>2009 - 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GL-CRSP PARIMA</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Livestock and Cross border trade (GL-CRSP PARIMA, 2007)</td>
<td>Establish market linkage between groups and cooperatives and abattoirs and export enterprises, Cross Border trade, information sharing, natural resources management</td>
<td>Natural resource management, livestock marketing and peace building</td>
<td>Moyalle, Dire, Yabello, Liben and Arero</td>
<td>2007 - 2010</td>
<td>Director Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>GOAL ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Borana Pastoral and Agro Pastoral Community Development Project (GOAL- Ethiopia, 2008)</td>
<td>Emergency response to conflict affected communities. Formal school construction and Small scale infrastructure</td>
<td>Peace education Cross-community peace building projects</td>
<td>Yabello, Teltele</td>
<td>2008 -</td>
<td>Programme Officer Filed Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ACDI/VOCA</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Livelihood Initiative for Pastoralist and Agro-Pastoralist (LEAP) (ACDI/VOCA, 2007)</td>
<td>Livelihood and income diversification</td>
<td>Improve livestock marketing</td>
<td>Moyalle, Teltele, Dire and Yabello</td>
<td>2006 - 2009</td>
<td>Livestock Marketing Officer Filed Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CAFOD &amp; TROCAIRE</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Pastoralist Food Security Local Partner capacity building and advocacy) Trocaire, (CAFOD&amp;SCIAF , 2007)</td>
<td>Food security and access to basic services</td>
<td>Conflict resolution as a component</td>
<td>Yabello, Dire and Arero</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Pastoral issues focal person Filed Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CISP</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Emergency water supply, sanitation and deep wells rehabilitation (CISP, 2009)</td>
<td>Water supply and deep wells rehabilitation</td>
<td>Deep wells rehabilitation</td>
<td>Teltele, Dire and Yabello</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Field Officer Filed Coordinator</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Profile of Local NGOs operating in the Borana Zone & key representatives of targeted NGOs
- Profile of NGOs operating in the Gambella Regional State (key representatives at these NGOs, programmes, and their operational areas)

A) Profile of International NGOs operating in the in the Gambella Regional State & key representatives of targeted NGOs

1. ACORD
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- Capacity building & awareness raising
- Peace building Component
- Research & Advocacy

- Support for the organization of regional, district and village level peace and development committees, youth clubs and children peace scouts
- The identification and development of "People Connecting Initiatives" among conflicting clans and ethnic groups through promoting intercultural exchange and communication through social activities

Gambella, Jhang, Jikawo & Godere Districts
2004 - 2006
Programme coordinator

Director
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.</th>
<th>Pact-Ethiopia</th>
<th>CRT/CDT</th>
<th>Democracy, governance, &amp; peace-building (Pact, 2006a&amp;b, 2008)</th>
<th>Restoration of Community Stability in Gambella</th>
<th>-to increase communities capacity through planning and dialogue to analyse and respond to conflict - to support inter &amp; intra ethnic initiatives aimed at confidence building and strengthening of relations through the provision of s - to strengthen cross border relations between and within communities and relevant government actors through facilitation of dialogues and joint initiative small grant</th>
<th>12 woredas of Gambella Region</th>
<th>2004 - 2009</th>
<th>Programme coordinator Director</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promoting Stability at the Sudan-Ethiopia Border through Enhancing Conflict-Sensitive Cross-borderTrade</td>
<td>to reduce economic marginalisation of the target communities through increased economic opportunities to increase capacity for marketing and trade to increase production and storage of goods to increase access to capital to resolve economic disputes using local trade-related organizations</td>
<td>Pinyudo-Pochalla Corridor, Matar-Akobo Corridor, Lare-Pagaak-Longechuk Corridor and Dimma-Boma Corridor</td>
<td>2006 - 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>HEKS</td>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Promotion of peace and conflict resolution (WGBS, 2008)</td>
<td>The peace component involves organising and funding interethnic workshops that emphasise dialogue between different groups – often centring around church activities encourages ecumenical dialogue to help meeting of minds across religious groups and cooperation between different religions, ethnic groups and cultures.</td>
<td>Gambela Zuria, Lare, Abobo</td>
<td>Program Coordinator Field Coordinator</td>
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<td>Since 1997</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>ZOA Refugee Care</td>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Agri Environmental and Education Project (AEEP) and the Peace Education Project. (Hussein, Girma, &amp; Schaafsma, 2006)</td>
<td>Peace Education Project</td>
<td>Peace Education Project</td>
<td>Dimma, Fugnido, Bonga, Gambela Zuria</td>
<td>2003 - 2006</td>
<td>programme manager Peace education officer</td>
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<td>Since 1996</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Oxfam America</td>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>reduce the risk of future violence in the region -helping communities forge lasting solutions to conflict. -Promoting inter/intra ethnic relations -humanitarian assistance -promote and revitalise traditional conflict resolution practices -</td>
<td>Conflict resolution and Peace Education prevention, transformation, Networking (relationship building)</td>
<td>Human rights training sessions and peace committees also help build confidence between adversaries and resolve disputes Adversary’s together, as well as more traditional conflict-resolution practices when they are more suitable or culturally appropri</td>
<td>Abobo, Pinyindo, and Gambella town.</td>
<td>2003 - 2006</td>
<td>Program Coordinator Field Coordinator</td>
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<td>Since 1998</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>livelihoods protection Health, Water and Sanitation recovery and development</td>
<td>Conflict resolution, peacebuilding, drought preparedness, livelihood strengthening and diversification, and disaster early warning. Emergency aid</td>
<td>Conflict resolution, peacebuilding, drought preparedness, livelihood strengthening and diversification, and disaster early warning. Lare, Goge, Abobo, Godere</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Since 2001</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2009 - 2009</td>
<td>Director Programme Manager</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>MSF Switzerland</td>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Health, Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>Health, Water and medical programmes for refugees, Displaced people due to conflict</td>
<td>health centres, mobile clinics and outreach activities for displaced, and victims of conflict Lare, Lare, Abobo, Pinyindo, and Gambella town.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 1984</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Director Programme Manager</td>
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</table>

B) Profile of Local NGOs operating in the Gambella Regional State & key representatives of targeted NGOs

1. EASTREN GAMBELLA BETHEL SYNOD (EGBS) Anywaa
   Since 1952
   CRT/CDT Evangelism and Social Development Services (EECMY, 2012)
   Reconciliation Community Peace Dialogues Sport and Art for Peace Peace Choir Youth and Women Peace groups
   building relationship and restore trust among the conflict communities in Gambella region Itang, Lare, Abobo, Pinyindo, and Gambella town.
   2002 - 2009 Church Leaders Program Manager

2. WESTERN GAMBELLA BETHEL SYNOD (WGBS) Nuer
   Since 1995
   CRT/CDT Evangelism and Social Development Services(WGBS, 2008)
   Reconciliation Community Peace Dialogues Sport and Art for Peace Peace Choir Youth and Women Peace groups
   building relationship and restore trust among the conflict communities in Gambella region Akobo, Itang, Jor, Jikaw, and Gambella town.
   2002 - 2009 Church Leaders Program Manager

3. Research Centre for Civic and Human Rights Education (RCCHE)
   Between 2003-2007
   CDT training and deployment of educators peace education (RCCHE, 2006)
   sensitizing groups at the grass-roots level Consultation Workshop Workshop on Women’s Rights
   training and deployment of educators peace education Training of Trainer (ToT) Abobo, Pinyindo, and Gambella town.
   2003 - 2007 Program Manager Peace education officer

4. GAMBELLA PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (GPDC)
   Between 2003-2007
   CRT Conflict resolution through stakeholders participation (RCCHE, 2006; WGBS, 2008)
   Reconciliation Community Peace Dialogues Training of Trainers Sport and Art for Peace Youth and Women Peace groups People Connecting Projects
   Joint Peace committee, trainings, experience sharing tours Itang, Lare, Abobo, Pinyindo, and Gambella town.
   2003 - 2006 Director programme manager
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE OF KEY INFORMANTS (GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES)

Sample of key informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>An expert at Conflict Resolution and Transformation Directorate, Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA)</td>
<td>Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A Staff member at Information and communication office, Charities and Societies Agency (CSA)</td>
<td>Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A staff member at Borana Zone’s Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, a section of the Department of Development, Cooperation Affairs and Non-Governmental Organisations (BBFED-DDCANGOs)</td>
<td>Yabello, Borana Zone</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A staff member at Capacity Building Coordination Bureau, the People’s National Regional State Council of Gambella</td>
<td>Gambella Town, Gambella Regional State</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDES

General Background Questions: Formation and mandates

a) Can you give a brief background of the general context that brought about the formation of your organisation in Borana/Gambella (e.g. relief and rehabilitation, education, health)?
b) Why were these initial goals, mission and vision important at that time? (explore)
c) What was the socio-political situation prevailing at the time of formation relating to the prevailing policy and resources?
d) How do you describe the intensity and magnitude of conflict, particularly in this area since 1991? (Probe for: increased, decreased or remained the same) Why?
e) Has your organisation played a role in any conflict resolution activities? If yes, would you describe the role your organisation played in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in your area? (Probe; what do you mean by peacebuilding? How do you build peace?)
f) What reasons influenced the organisation to include peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities? How?
g) What difficulties has the organisation faced in dealing with peacebuilding and conflict resolution? (Probe for: tensions between feuding parties, lack of clear mandates, effective institutional structure and secure institutional synergies regarding peacebuilding)
h) What are the main development programmes in this area? (Probe; how did you carry out these?)
i) Do you see any linkage between development and peacebuilding programmes? (What kind of linkage and how have these linkages affected this work?)

Objective One: Explore policy framework issues that impact on NGOs in Ethiopia

The government promulgated the new Proclamation for Regulation, Registration of Societies, and Charities (PRRSC) (Proclamation No. 621/2009 of Ethiopia (Civil Society Law or CSO law) on 6 January, 2009 and this began to be enforced fully after a one-year grace period ending on 6 January, 2010.

a) My experience with NGOs is that the new proclamation can have both positive and negative outcomes in your operation.
   • What is your understanding of the new proclamation? (Probe for: how it impacted NGOs? Give examples)
b) In which ways has it impacted the mandates, identity, and autonomy of your organisation?
   • How it has made a positive impact?
   • How it has made a negative impact?
   • Are there any changes in the structure, mandate, strategies, administrative structures, funding, activities, etc., because of the proclamation?
     • If yes, would you explain the extent of the change?
c) Would you tell me its specific impact on peacebuilding and conflict resolution work? (Give examples)
d) Did NGOs and government work together on the policy formulation?
e) What roles have NGOs played in influencing government’s position on these issues?
f) What role could NGOs play in peacebuilding/conflict resolution under the new proclamation? (If any, at all) or formulate alternative solutions for peaceful conflict transformation?

g) Would you say that it is desirable for NGOs to continue operating in this community? Would you advocate it to be adopted in other conflict-prone areas of Ethiopia?

h) What overall recommendations/suggestions do you propose for improving the proclamation?

Objective 2: Examine the nature of State and Civil Society relationships.

a) What was the nature of the relationship between the “state structures” (at Federal, regional, Zonal, Worada, and Kebele levels) and Civil Society?
   - What are the difficulties?

b) How did the nature of the relationship affect NGOs’ mandate and organisational and functional autonomy?
   - How did this relationship influence the success of development and peacebuilding activities; beneficiaries in particular?
   - Does the proclamation have anything to do with the election of 2005?

c) How can the relationship between the government and NGOs be improved?

Objective 3: Assess current indigenous conflict resolution practices.

The indigenous practices of the different ethnic groups, including local institutions, customs and rules, have been used to resolve a range of inter-communal and inter-group conflicts in the Gambella and Borana zones.

a) What indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have been working in this area?

b) What are the major sources of conflict in your area (s) of operation?
   - Who are the actors?
   - How do these actors frame the nature of conflict and its resolutions?

c) What is the role of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in resolving these conflicts?

d) What factors explain the success or failure of the conflict resolution process?
   - What elements of continuity exist in indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms over different times?
   - Do conflict resolution mechanisms and outcomes differ according to the types of conflict and resources involved? (for example conflict over resources, over political representation)

e) Were these conflict resolution mechanisms affected by change of regime (for example, during the previous regime and current regime)? If yes, how?

f) What is your perception of these indigenous institutions as a strategy for improving development and peace? Probe for: Strengths, weaknesses, facilitating factors and hindrances and future prospects.

g) What do you consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of government’s conflict resolution mechanisms?
   - How would you describe the relationship between the two strategies?
- Has there been any conflict arising out of this context?

h) How are inter-group conflicts regulated in a context where statutory law has little influence and customary authorities are increasingly challenged?

i) Which institutions were highly effective and valuable, and could be used to ‘access’ the community for launching development programmes?

**Objective 4:** Examine the perceptions of the NGOs about the impact of their services.

a) Looking at the conflict from the critical years, can you identify key events, projects or developments that have contributed to peacebuilding or the resolution of conflict?
   - Can you list them and give a brief description?

b) To what extent did the project(s) play a role or contribute toward each of these events or goals?
   - Can you identify any projects especially pivotal?
   - What are the indicators and how do you confirm your impact? (Probe impact or change indicator)

c) What are the changes that have taken place in this area?
   - Did the project foster or support sustainable structures and processes, which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict?
   - In which ways have changes contributed to reduce conflict? What do you think caused those changes?

d) NGOs operating in conflict-prone regions may have already conducted impact assessments of their interventions.
   - Have your projects been successful according to pre-set developmental criteria?

e) The outcomes of development interventions might not always be positive. They may cause unintended effects such as causing or exacerbating conflict.
   - Have any of your interventions led to such outcomes?
   - What other suggestions would you make to avoid unintended effects? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy level, implementation – or service delivery, community’s involvement etc.)

f) Finally, looking at the region/local area over the last twenty years or of so, what do you think would have happened to the conflict and its resolution without the work of the NGOs?

**Objective 5:** Exploring the strategies including indigenous practices adopted by the NGOs to resolve conflict.

a) What are the strategies adopted by NGOs in conflict resolution/peacebuilding within the societies in which you operate?
   - How did you choose these strategies?
   - How did you organise the projects and decide who should participate in, contribute to, and benefit from, development projects?

b) How do you view traditional social institutions and resources for conflict resolution?

c) What is the relationship between the customary institutions and state structures?
• Which one is preferable for launching development projects and resolving conflict?

d) Which institutions were highly effective in natural resource management and conflict resolution or tackling the inter-linked problems of the development, welfare, and conflict? Why?

e) Institutions are constraining and enabling structures, making possible different forms of social action and organisation, but also limiting.

  • What have been the enabling and constraining factors of both state and indigenous institutions?
  • Would you say that it is desirable for NGOs to continue to adopt indigenous practices in this community?
  • Would you advocate their adoption in other conflict-prone areas of Ethiopia?

f) What other suggestions would you make to help indigenous practices have better impact on peacebuilding and development? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy level, implementation or service delivery, community’s involvement etc.)

Thank you very much for your time and participation
APPENDIX D: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDES

Theme 3: current indigenous conflict resolution practices

a) Most parts of this region have experienced the worst forms of violence over the last two decades. What have been the major causes of conflict in your areas?
   - What are the main factors, historical and contemporary, that contributed to the conflicts?
   - What are the types of conflict and groups involved in conflict? For how long?
   - Describe how the conflict has affected your family and community (give examples).
   - Is there a change the intensity and magnitude of conflict, particularly in this area since 1991? (Probe for: increased, decreased or remained the same) Why?

b) Would you explain the current indigenous conflict resolution practices?

   - Conflict resolution pattern. Indicate the process (es) and the individuals/bodies involved in conflict resolution processes around the following: actors, leaders, processes, procedures and enforcement.
   - What are the processes and procedures involved in enforcement of justice among the Borana/Nuer/Anywaa?
   - How do you achieve justice through these indigenous institutions in resolution of conflicts?
   - Isn’t this against the state’s statutory law?
   - What are the implications of the tension that may exist between customary and formal justice systems and how can this be overcome?
   - How did you resolve the conflicts that broke out with other groups who do not share your mechanism? Are the practices working practically? And how much does it improve peace for people governed by it? What are some of the reasons that are making them still rely on customary means to claim justice in case of conflict?
   - What needs to be done to strengthen indigenous conflict resolution or make it sustainable?

C) Explain the current status of indigenous conflict resolution? (Probe for: weakened, strengthened, or remained the same) Why?

D) Do you think indigenous institutions could adequately respond to the current change in the nature and magnitude of local conflicts? In what way? If not, Why not?

F) What other suggestions would you make to help indigenous practices have a better impact on peacebuilding and development? (Probe: Strategies to be adopted at policy level, implementation or service delivery, community’s involvement etc.)
**Theme 6:** strategies including indigenous practices adopted by the NGOs to resolve conflict.

a) Do you think NGOs should also resolve conflict? If yes, why? If no, why not?
b) Have the NGOs adopted any indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms? How? What has the outcome been?
c) Do all NGOs adopt traditional conflict resolution mechanisms? (Give these NGOs; do they adopt and encourage traditional conflict resolution practices?)
d) How does the involvement of NGOs vary from the conflict resolution methods of formal institutions (state’s judicial system)?
e) How did the NGOs assist in resolve conflict? (give me examples)
f) Do you think the NGOs’ use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms helped to resolve or reduce conflict? In what way? If not, Why not?

**Theme 4:** perception of the beneficiaries about the services.

The groups will discuss whether there is a change in their lives due to NGO interventions and will identify the reasons for these changes.

a) What are the services that the NGOs provided? Would you mention the name of these organisations? Please provide details of the type of development assistance that you received?
b) What difference has the project made to your lives? (Follow-up probing points as per context: decrease in food vulnerability, increase in income, access to markets, confidence, self-help abilities, sense of community, security...).
c) How have the project activities supported you in dealing with the present conflict?
d) What are the aspects that the project must include to reduce conflict and build peace?
e) As you mentioned earlier, different NGOs have been working on schools, water, health, drought...in this area for long time. I would like to know their contributions to development and peace building.
   - Would you tell me the changes brought to your life, the changes in your livelihood because of the NGOs development interventions?
   - First, what was the situation before the intervention?
   - Second, have there been any changes in the situation after the NGOs’ intervention? If yes, what aspects of your livelihood changed?
f) What means did you use to resolve conflicts in your community earlier? Are they still being used? How can they be further developed?
g) What have been the most successful forms of NGO support for you and why?

**Thank you very much for your time and participation**
APPENDIX E: HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

FIELD WORK

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FIELD FOLLOW UP

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1. Demographic Background

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<td>Q2</td>
<td>Sex 1. Male 2. Female</td>
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<td>Q4</td>
<td>Household head: 1. Father 2. Mother 3. One of family male members</td>
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<td>Q7</td>
<td>What is your ethnic background?</td>
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</table>

2. Socio-economic profile
**Q8** Occupation:

1. Work, specify type of work
2. Doesn't work

**Q9** Education (Higher Education Obtained):

1. Cannot read and write
2. Can read and write
3. Primary school
4. Secondary school
5. High school
6. Diploma
7. Bachelor and More

**Q10** Monthly family income/approximate

3. Type of development assistance

**Q11** Please provide details on the type of development assistance that you received (Interviewer: through the project initiated by an NGO/NGOs)

**Q12** Did the NGO explain the beneficiary selection criteria?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) If yes, explain the criteria

**Q13** Do you judge the beneficiary selection criteria as fair and transparent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) If no, why?

**Q14** Were you involved in working with the NGO to plan and design the type and content of assistance that you received:

1. Yes
2. No, the NGO did not ask me to be involved
3. No, the NGO asked me to be involved but I chose not to be involved

(a) If yes, please provide the major development programmes and their objectives that you planned and designed (Interviewer: through NGOs such as PACT, Care Ethiopia).

---

4. **Individual empowerment**

4.1 **Training in conflict resolution**

**Q15** Have you been participated in conflict resolution training offered by any of the NGO working in your area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Q16** To what extent your participation in conflict resolution training affected your skills?

**Instructions**

For the following question, please state to what extent the activity affected your perception. On a scale of 1 to 5 were 1=to a very great extent 2=to some extent 3= 4=very small extent 5= no effect at all

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Increased conflict analysis skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>It gives me the ability to challenge others and how they work in our area and tackle the problems in our area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>I feel that I am good at understanding the problems of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>It strengthens negotiation and problem solving skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>It strengthens identifying conflict-connectors and dividers skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>I become more aware of each other’s differences and similarities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>Increased human rights awareness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Others (please specify)

### 4.2 Participation in peacebuilding activities

**Q17** Did you participate in peacebuilding activities? 1. Very much 2. Yes just a bit 3. Not at all

**Q18** Would you tell me the number of conflicts in which local community leaders are involved as mediators, negotiators, and advisors?

**Q19** Do you believe in possibility of obtaining fair treatment and outcome through these local community leaders?

| 22.1 | Yes |
| 22.2 | No |

(a) If you answered ‘no’ please explain why? __________________________

### 4.3 level of the incidence of conflict

**Q21** Do you think the level of conflict in your area increased or decreased in the last two years?

| 22.1 | Increased |
| 22.2 | Stayed the same |
| 22.3 | Decreased |
| 22.4 | Don’t know |

(a) If Decreased, do you attribute this to NGO intervention?

| 23.1 | Yes |
| 23.2 | No |

(b) If you answered ‘no’ for question what could be the other reasons that contributed towards decrease in the incidents of conflict, please state below_________________

### 5. Livelihood Enhancement

#### 5.1 level of household income

**Q22** Since NGOs programmes/services your monthly income has:

| 24.1 | Increased |
| 24.2 | Stayed the same |
| 24.3 | Decreased |
| 24.4 | Don’t know |
Q23. (a) If you answered ‘Increased’ monthly income, do you attribute this economic improvement to the NGOs intervention?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

(b) If you answered ‘No’ what could be the other reasons that contributed towards an increase in your income, please state below _______________________

c) If you answered the household income has ‘Stayed the same’ despite NGOs support why below _______________________

d) If you answered the household income has ‘Decreased’ state below what could be the reasons for this _______________________

### 5.2 Reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructures

Q24. Have NGO programmes created a sustainable access to natural resources (water and grazing land)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<tr>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

Q25. Have they increased cross-community cooperation? (mobility between the communities, accessibility market, access to basic transportation services)

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<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<td>26.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

Q26. Have they increased the reconstruction of physical infrastructures? (neighbourhoods / community infrastructure destroyed / damaged are constructed, able to restore private property destroyed / damaged during conflict)

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<th>No</th>
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<tr>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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### 5.3 General impact

Q27. In your opinion, what has been the general impact of NGO services on your livelihood?


(a) If you answer ‘a lot’ what has been the impact of NGO services in your livelihood? Please indicate the impact of this on your livelihood.

Q28. What would have happened to you / family/neighbourhood if you did not receive this assistance? 1. Worsened our situation 2. No change 3. Better situation

(a) Explain why? ________________

Q29. What alternative types of assistance would have helped you cope with your situation at the time? ________________

Q30. If you answer ‘Worsen our situation’ what has been the negative impact of NGO services in your area? Please explain________

### 6. Social Bridging
#### 6.1 Cross-community contact

Q31. How willing are you to participate in cross-community activities?


Q32. How often do you participate in informal occasions with them? (e.g., weddings,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Text</th>
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</table>
| Q33      | How often do you cross the border?  
| Q34      | Now we would like to ask a few questions about how you feel when meeting people from the other community?  
(a) Do you feel comfortable?  
| Q35      | Would you mind or not mind if one of your close relatives were to marry a person from the other community?  
| Q36      | If you were purchasing goods or services, would you mind or not mind whether a person who owned the business from which you were buying these comes from the other community?  
| Q37      | In general, do you support the display of cultural and political symbols by the other community?  
1. Yes at particular time of a year 2. Always 3. Some times 3. Not at all 5. Can’t say/don’t know |
| Q38      | How willing are you to allow access to natural resources (water and grazing land) for other community members on the contested pastoral land?  
| Q39      | Do you think that most members of the other community would to return all the stray animals?  
1. Definitely return 2. Probably return 3. Definitely they would not 4. Do not know |
| Q40      | Do you think that most members of the other community would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?  
1. Definitely take advantage 2. Probably take advantage 3. Neither takes advantage nor tries to be fair 4. Probably try to be fair 5. Definitely try to be fair 6. Do not know |
| Q41      | Do you rely on other ethnic group members for different kinds of assistance (e.g., goods, labour, cash, finding employment, entering schools, etc.)?  
1. Definitely try to rely on 2. Probably try to rely on 3. Probably look out for themselves 4. Definitely, I would not rely on 5. Do not know |