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SECURITIZATION:
THE CASE OF POST-9/11 UNITED STATES AFRICA POLICY

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Abstract

In the wake of Al Qaeda's attack against the United States on September 11, 2001, Africa has gained strategic significance due to the belief that its weak states are a danger to American national security. US Africa policy is now centered on the logic that weak African governments unable to provide for the basic needs of their people and lacking full control of their borders provide both a breeding ground and safe-haven for terrorist organizations. Africa has thus gone from being a marginalized humanitarian concern in the 1990s, to a continent of strategic significance in the US War on Terror (USWOT) in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center, as seen in the fact that American aid to the continent has more than tripled in the years following 9/11.

The purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze the political process behind this shift in policy in order to address the question of who was responsible for this change in US Africa policy and how did they make the change happen. This study takes the form of a theoretical case study, using the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, designed to identify the means by which an issue is placed on the national security agenda, to address this change in post-9/11 US Africa policy. In accordance with this theoretical framework, primary sources from government and non-government agencies including policy statements, speeches and legislative testimonies are surveyed to identify instances of the claim being articulated that Africa represents a threat to American national security and its legitimation and reiteration by an audience.

This study finds that the unified executive branch under the Bush administration and Washington think tanks made the unified claim that the condition of Africa is a threat to US national security and the legislative branch served as the singular audience, legitimating this claim and appropriating dramatically increased and enhanced aid to the continent. The factors of political agency and context are offered as additions to the Securitization Theory framework in this study, and their incorporation in this case determines that the high-level of the agency of the securitizing actors and audience facilitated the legitimation process, as did the use of the contextual factors of the trauma of 9/11 and the American identity as promoters of democratic ideals. These additional factors underscore both the political
power of the actors involved and the techniques they use to support their claims, thereby
developing the political quality of the theory and providing a more complete representation
of the securitization process.
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The Copenhagen School branch of Securitization Theory is particularly useful to this case in its more political approach to analyzing security agenda-setting. With its origins in Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear* in 1983 that expanded the concept of security to include non-military sectors such as economics and the environment, the Copenhagen School was one of the first to combine this broad approach to security with Ole Waever's constructivist focus on the politics of security. As this study is specifically concerned with examining the political process behind the change in US Africa policy, the political nature of the Copenhagen School theory makes it especially useful within the broader field of securitization approaches such as Critical Security Studies theories that are more cultural in nature, using ideas and habits as tools of analysis. Securitization Theory as articulated by Buzan and Waever instead focuses on the choices made and actions taken by actors in an attempt to shape and manipulate the security agenda. The Copenhagen School contends that an issue becomes one of security when an actor makes a claim that it is such, and the audience accepts this claim, thus providing legitimation and, in effect, permission to take actions in regards to this issue that would not otherwise be allowed. This framework is thus useful in the study's attempt to deconstruct these steps undertaken by actors that make up the political process behind the post-9/11 US Africa policy change.

By combining the case of US Africa policy and Securitization Theory in the form of a theoretical case study, this study serves as both an examination of the fluctuating strategic importance assigned to Africa and a critique of the theory itself. The case of Africa is particularly well suited for Securitization Theory as an issue that has experienced dramatic moves on and off the American security agenda. In analyzing the latest move of Africa onto the security agenda, this case functions as a useful measure of the theory's effectiveness in identifying the key factors involved in the securitization process. The case is made that the

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6 The term "actor" is not used in a general sense in this study; it is used only in specific reference to an agent who makes a securitizing claim, and is thus used interchangeably with "securitization actor" and "securitizing actor." In the same vein, the term "audience" refers to the agent who receives the claim. When both actors and audience, or all members involved in the securitization process, are referenced, they are collectively referred to as "agents."

7 As per the explanation in the preceding paragraph, this and all future references to Securitization Theory throughout the study are referring to the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory.
political quality of the theory that makes it useful for the purposes of this study and for Security Studies as a whole is underdeveloped and needs to be enhanced by bringing additional factors into its framework that further this end. The utility of the political properties of the theory are improved by bringing in the agency of the securitizing actors who are maneuvering the political process of agenda-setting, and the context within which they are operating. These additional factors underscore both the political power of the actors involved and the techniques they use to support their claims, thereby developing the political quality of the theory and providing a more complete representation of the securitization process.

In examining the securitization process, the Copenhagen School requires that the speech acts—whether verbal or textual—of the agents involved in the agenda-setting process serve as the focus of analysis. This instruction for the verbal and textual output of the agents under study to be "studied directly" translates into a heavy reliance on primary sources in the case of this study. While the qualitative review of records taken directly from their point of origin is largely a strength and meets the Copenhagen School criterion, a weakness of this approach, as with most research, is the danger of researcher bias in including only those that support the study's hypothesis. In an effort to address this inherent weakness, the span of records surveyed for this study are inclusive of the greatest possible range of sources typically concerned with US foreign policy, from within and without the Washington policymaking community. These sources include government agencies, public policy institutes, special interest groups, and the public at large through opinion polls and media surveys. In the case of each of these sources, an effort was made to collect as many records available as were produced by these on the subject of post-9/11 US Africa policy so as to ensure the broader theme of their approach to this subject would not be lost to a small number of misrepresentative quotes correlating with the hypothesis of this study.

**Concepts and Definitions**

For the purposes of this study, the term post-9/11 refers specifically to the period of time from the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, through the end of 2007. This
cut-off date was chosen due to the availability of public records on government documents used for this study.

_Africa_ in this case refers specifically to Sub-Saharan Africa.

A _claim_ made by an actor is defined by the Copenhagen School as an assertion that a given issue is a security issue, or an existential threat (as is further discussed in the following chapter). In the case of this study, any government documents, policy statements, speeches or other statements that portray Africa in its current condition as an existential threat to American national security are considered to be securitization claims. This includes reference to the physical safety of Americans within the United States as well as their security in maintaining the American "way of life."^8

_Legitimation_ of such a claim is defined by the Copenhagen School as the point at which the claim "gain[s] enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity."^9

This definition is clearly lacking as the threshold of 'enough resonance' is left open to interpretation. For the purposes of this study legitimation is evidenced by clear indicators of the claim that Africa represents a threat to national security. These indicators are legislation passed, money spent and programs enacted based on the rationale of the original claim, that the United States must be protected from the existential threats emanating from the current condition of Africa. In this case, this is measured in terms of increased military and development aid to Africa.^10

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^8 This terminology comes from cited claim articulations presented later in the study.
^10 While certain programs included in the category of military aid are technically managed by departments other than the Department of Defense, such as the Department of State, they are categorized as military aid due to their military- and security-oriented character and their implementation by the Department of Defense. It is also important to note that this study looks at amounts of direct financial assistance provided to African countries as well as programs established to provide aid in the form of training or other service assistance.
It is important to note that such indicators of legitimation are referred to by Buzan and Waever and throughout this study as *extraordinary actions* due to their quality as actions that would not be allowed under ordinary, or non-security, circumstances.

This study makes the case that agency and context are factors integral to securitization. In this case, *agency* refers specifically to political agency, or the power held by an actor as a representative of an institution to achieve a desired end. In other words, an actor's agency is their capacity to achieve a goal (in this case framing Africa as a security issue) due to his or her position of power. Factors considered as determinants of this power, or agency, in this study are the agent's position as either a state or non-state representative, their role in the political process as either a high or lower-ranking representative, and whether there is one or more than one of them acting together.

*Context* is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as "the interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs." This study posits that context is vital in that it is used as a point of reference by actors to increase the relevancy of their securitizing claim. As Thierry Balzacq describes, the "predominant social views, trends, ideological and political attitudes that pervade the context in which participants [of the securitization process] are nested" are drawn on by actors to facilitate the audience's acceptance of their claim. The trauma of 9/11 and the reinvigorated American identity as global promoters of democratic ideals informed the most "predominant social views" or features of the national experience during the time period of this study. Therefore context is seen to be a factor when actors reference the traumatic experience of 9/11 or the national identity in arguing their claim or justifying their acceptance of the claim in this study.

*Organization of the Study*

This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter One provides an analysis of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory as the analytical framework to be applied in this case study. This includes an explanation of needed modifications to the theory.

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The next three chapters apply this modified securitization framework to the case of US Africa policy as it relates to the 9/11 change in the status of Africa as an American national security issue. Chapter Two looks at the background and context of this policy change; Chapter Three looks at the evidence to determine who initiated the change in policy and how; and Chapter Four looks at the evidence to determine who legitimated the change in policy and how.

The Conclusion reviews the answers to the questions found in the case study and determines the result of the study's hypothesis based on these. These answers are also used to provide insight into the agenda-setting process of US Africa policy, as well as the necessary development of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory as it currently stands.
1. The Analytical Framework:
The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory

The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the framework that is used in this study: Securitization Theory as articulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, otherwise known as the Copenhagen School.12 This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section explores four major steps in the evolution of the concept of security and how this has influenced Buzan and Waever in their construction of Securitization Theory as an analytical tool for observing the security agenda-setting process. The second section outlines the analytical framework of Securitization Theory. The third section identifies weaknesses of the theory; two subsequent modifications to the theory are offered for the purposes of this study, and as possibilities for the future development of the Securitization framework. The fourth section briefly summarizes the Securitization framework in its modified structure.

1.1 The Concept of Security

Considering its location within the subfield of Security Studies,13 it seems appropriate that a chapter devoted to Securitization Theory should begin with a look at the concept of security itself. After framing the traditional Realist conceptualization of security, this section details three major challenges leveled at this view that have influenced the development of theories outside of the Traditional Security Studies field, one of which is Securitization Theory; that of 'widening' the concept, that of 'deepening' the concept, and that of reconsidering its very foundations as a positivist subject. At the conclusion of these sections is a brief explanation of how the Copenhagen School has been influenced by each school of thought.

1.1.1 Traditional Security Studies

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12 The third author in the main written work on Securitization Theory by the Copenhagen School, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, is Jaap de Wilde. His contribution to the book, however, was primarily in the chapter focusing on the Environmental Sector. While I recognize his contribution in this subject area, my main focus is on the analytical framework of the theory which was primarily the work of Buzan and Waever, and so I refer exclusively to them as the main proponents of the Copenhagen School.

13 I use the term 'security studies' to refer to the general area within the field of International Relations (IR) that has focused on the concept of security beginning with the close of World War II. I do this for the sake of continuity throughout this chapter, despite some academics' use of the label Strategic Studies when referring to the Traditional Security Studies period.
The longstanding dominance of Realism in the field of International Relations has profoundly affected the traditional view of the concept of security among both academics and policymakers. In accordance with Realist assumptions of the primacy of the state in an insecure anarchical international system in which survival is the bottom line, the traditional focus of Security Studies has been the subject of war—the ultimate threat to this survival in the realist view. The primary goal of security in this perspective then is to maintain peace and prevent conflict through military means. The traditional concept of security has thus been "defined as the threat, use and control of military force."  

The state's role as the chief administrator of military force means that the traditional concept of security is practically synonymous with that of national security. National security in this sense is understood as the physical safety of a citizenry. And the conditions of this safety, in the traditionalist view, are objective indicators of national security that can be understood through rational analyses. Therefore, Ronnie D. Lipshutz recounts, during the height of Traditional Security Studies, national security policy was assumed to be largely the result of the rational assessment, by knowledgeable analysts, of a universe of potential threats, of varying risk, to which a country might be subjected. These clearly defined and bounded threats could be countered by appropriate means, including the development and deployment of new weapons systems, shifts in military doctrine, and payoffs to allies. It seemed, in the scheme of things, a relatively easy proposition to shift the allocation of resources from one threat to another, so long as the new threat was conceptualized in terms of the state and couched in the language of 'national security.'

The Cold War validated the Traditionalist perspective. The widespread danger of nuclear weapons and an intense rivalry between two global superpowers kept state- and military-
centric issues such as weapons-systems, armaments stockpiles, and defense policies at the
top of academics' and policymakers' agendas. As John Lewis Gaddis pointed out, despite
several states' growing economic powers, the bipolar international system "reflected the facts
of where military power resided," seeming to underscore the point that the ultimate end—
security—came down to this form of dominance.17 This view of security in the realm of
policymaking authenticated the Realist conceptualization of security; it would not be until
the last decades of the 20th century that this narrow view would be brought into serious
question.

1.1.2 ‘Widening’ Security

Resistance to the narrow military focus of Traditional Security Studies began to garner
serious attention in the early 1980s.18 Economic and environmental agendas had begun
gaining political ground in the 1970s and were beginning to find a place in the debates of
security scholars and analysts.

Richard Ullman was one of the first in the field to argue definitively that “defining national
security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of
reality.”19 He insisted that any issue—military or not—that threatens to quickly and severely
downgrade the quality of life of inhabitants of a state or narrow the state’s policy options is a
security threat and should, therefore, be included in the conceptualization of security.20
Otherwise, Ullman warns, a state may be caught off guard by serious nonmilitary threats due
to its singular focus on the traditional military realm.21

Joseph Nye, Jr. made a similar point when he expanded the concept of national security to
include more than the mere physical protection of a citizenry. He suggested that a minimum
amount of economic welfare, social autonomy and political status are all standards that

17 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987), 221-222.
18 This is not to say that the notion of security had never previously encountered criticism, as can be seen in
earlier works by scholars such as Richard Smoke and Reinhold Niebuhr.
20 Ibid., 133.
21 Ibid., 129.
should be incorporated into the concept.\textsuperscript{22} While the scope of different wideners' allowance for what issues should be included varies, they are unified in their view that national security entails threats that emanate from sources other than the military sector.

Reaction to the attempt of some scholars in the field to 'widen' the concept of security has been mixed. While the notion of expanding the narrow Realist version of the concept seems to be gaining increasing acceptance in the field, traditional security scholars unsurprisingly stand by the requirement of military conflict (either engagement or avoidance) as the defining characteristic of a security issue. These scholars generally acknowledge the importance of social, environmental and economic issues and the potential benefit of bringing these onto the national (or international) agenda, but argue that the concept of security becomes meaningless as more and more criteria are dropped in order to accommodate any such "large scale evils [as] threats to national security."\textsuperscript{23} As Walt states, "defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems."\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, this view has necessitated the recent custom of dividing the field into separate Military and Human Security sectors, each based on different conceptualizations of security, with the former being existential threats to the state and the latter being threats to a more general well-being of individuals in a particular society.

1.1.3 'Deepening' Security

Early calls to 'widen' the conceptualization of security within the field were matched by calls to 'deepen' it as well. Just as the widening advocates were reacting to the military-centrism of Traditional Security Studies, the idea of deepening security came from dissatisfaction with

the state-centrism of this view. In other words, these scholars take issue with the traditional referent object of security as the state; they do not equate the concept of security with that of national security. They reject the realist assertion that the state is the main actor on the world stage and argue that states are losing their primacy in a world of increasingly powerful transnational actors and threats.25

Based on this logic, scholars such as Ken Booth argue that individuals are the true referent objects of security; at the most basic level, the individuals that make up the state are the ultimate reason for a state to provide security in the first place. Booth argues that states should not be the referent object of security because of their failure in this role; states cannot be uniformly trusted to protect against threats to civilians and are too diverse to be captured in one comprehensive conceptualization of traditional state security.26

Others such as Buzan do not fully buy into the view of the individual as the referent object, but do maintain some distance from the traditional state-centric view in the idea that social and regional collectives can take the place of the state in this position. Buzan acknowledges that while states often are the referent object of a threat, so too can the nation, society or other collective be the threatened agent. Not only can the existence of a state be threatened, but that of a way of life or a particular region or culture.27 For example, the Croatian-Serbian conflict in the early 1990s was a result of a nationalist program of 'Croatia for the Croats' which caused Serbs to deem their culture under threat.28

Critics of the 'deepening' approach to security do not necessarily deny the "irreducible base unit" of security as the individual, but generally reject the view of the individual as the referent object of security as being impractical or simply unrealistic.29 As Waever contends, "There is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of 'security' in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other

threats and referents have any meaning... The concept of security refers to the state."30 Overall, attempts to deepen the concept of security have gained less traction in the field that the widening movement.

1.1.4 ‘Constructing’ Security

Often termed the Third Debate, the constructivist turn in International Relations (IR) theory that began gathering steam in the 1980s includes a range of approaches aimed at dismantling many positivist assumptions inherent in the traditional Realist paradigm. Specifically in the context of security, these approaches are largely united in their rejection of the traditional view of security as an objective measurable state independent of human observation. Instead, security is seen as a continuously constructed and re-constructed intersubjective phenomenon.

Alexander Wendt articulates the constructivist view when he makes the case that states' security games are governed by their intersubjective understandings of constructs such as sovereignty and national identities. In this perspective, “collective recognition is a cornerstone of security.”31 National security interests are defined by actors who are reacting to cultural factors and the norms that these create. In other words, state behavior is shaped by collective norms and social identities, hence security's conceptualization as a socially constructed phenomenon dependent upon cultural interpretation.32

Scholars working in this view commonly place a high value on discourse as an instrument of knowledge and power due to its role in both reflecting and shaping ideas and interests. This discursive focus stems from the fact that language is the medium that constitutes these intersubjective ideas. The fundamental concepts of Traditional Security Studies are

constructs "made intelligible to social agents through the medium of language." Coming from this perspective, Waever drew from language theory when he introduced the concept of security as a 'speech act,' making the case that the language employed by actors determines the status of a security threat.34

Critics of the constructivist turn in IR debates attack the lack of cohesion among authors of works classified under this category. In their view, the Constructivist approach so far offered in Security Studies has failed to meet the requirements of a complete research program. At best, the constructivist approach only deserves consideration as a supplement to traditional approaches.35 For his part, Waever escapes this charge in his self-described position as a 'Post-Structural Realist';36 he uses Constructivism in his approach to security as an intersubjective process, but within the Realist terms of a security issue as an existential threat to state (or societal) survival.37 In fact, he insists that to have real effect on the security debate, the concept must be approached within the terms of the traditional discussion while allowing for the Constructive focus on "operations within [that] field (i.e. speech acts)."38

1.1.5 Summing Up

Each of the above positions in the subfield of security studies has affected the construction of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory. The positions of the traditional realist, the 'widener' and the constructivist-oriented scholar each feature prominently in their theory: in the conceptualization of security as a largely state-oriented, survival-based issue in the traditional sense; as a socially perceived phenomenon in the constructivist sense; and open to any type of issue, military or nonmilitary in the widening sense. The position of the

34 Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 55. Italics in original.
37 Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 53.
38 Ibid., 51.
'deepener' in the field—while ultimately rejected—is accounted for and referenced in their acknowledgment that they "do accept the reminder that in international relations one should be aware of the tendency for the levels-of-analysis scheme to reinforce state-centric thinking." Now that the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of security can be understood against the backdrop of Security Studies, its approach to analyzing national security agenda-setting can be fully explained on its own terms.

1.2 The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory

Introduced in the mid-1990s, the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory is a framework designed to analyze national security agenda-setting. More specifically, it is concerned with deconstructing the political process behind national security agenda-setting. Through the analysis of this process, this theory seeks to answer the questions: How does an issue become a security issue? Who makes this happen? And, how do they do it?

As seen above, the focus on process in answering these questions stems from the constructivist view that social interactions (or processes) are what create norms and ideas held by social collectives. In this case, the view is that two social agents—a securitizing actor and an audience—together provide the interaction necessary to move an issue from the normal political agenda to the security agenda. The two-step interactive process that must be undertaken by these agents to effectively move an issue onto the security agenda is the process of securitization as articulated by Buzan and Waever. According to them, a case of securitization consists of (1) a securitizing claim made by an actor and (2) legitimation by an audience. These steps are described in the following sections.

1.2.1 Securitizing Claim

In order to securitize an issue, the first step is for an actor to make a claim that the issue is a threat to the survival of a designated referent object. The given issue must be portrayed as an existential threat, meaning that if it is not addressed "everything else will be irrelevant.

39 Ibid., 7.
An existential threat is one that threatens the continued existence of the referent object, whether that be a state, society or other entity. War represents an existential threat to a state, just as genocide would be an existential threat to a particular culture or race.

By claiming that something is an existential threat, the actor is claiming the need for emergency security measures to be undertaken to protect against the threat. In other words, by making a securitizing claim an actor is attempting to move the issue outside the normal realm of politics and into the extraordinary realm of security.

The fact that the first step in the securitization process is for an issue to be verbally or textually framed as a security threat underscores the important role language plays in this theory. The Copenhagen School conceptualizes security as a speech act. It is for this reason that Buzan and Waever say that “the way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations.”

Verbal and textual evidence is used to analyze the transmission of a perception of a threat from actor to audience. Following the ‘speech act’ notion that words do not just communicate facts, they can also be performative—that is, they don’t just say something, they do something. Securitization Theory says that by using the language of security in framing an issue as a threat, an actor is effectively initiating the process of raising an issue to the security level, above normal politics. “[I]t is the utterance itself that is the act [of security]. By saying the words, something is done.” In ‘speaking’ security, an actor is thereby claiming a special right to take extraordinary actions to block the ‘threat’ being named.

Here, extraordinary actions are any actions that might not otherwise be authorized were the issue within the normal realm of politics rather than the security realm. This could be the declaration of war, devoting more money or resources to the issue than would be used under ordinary circumstances. Whether or not this right is attained depends on the second step in the process.

41 Ibid., 25. Italics not in original.
42 For further reading on this idea see the same work that influenced Waever’s thinking on the subject by John L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
1.2.2 Legitimation

The second step in a successful case of securitization is legitimation by an audience. Once an issue has been framed as a security threat by an actor, this securitizing claim must be followed up with audience approval for securitization to occur. According to Buzan and Waever, "Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizing actor but by the audience of the speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value?" 44 If the audience accepts that an existential threat is, indeed, in existence, and that the threatened shared value (normally the state, nation or some other collective principle or system45) is worthy of protection, then the use of extraordinary measures to protect against the now intersubjectively perceived threat is justified, whether that be through use of force or concentration of resources in a particular area. The state is now free to take what extraordinary actions are deemed necessary without the bounds of normal political procedure, as the confirmed threat now validates the circumvention of such cumbersome rules.46

It is important to note that Buzan and Waever mention nothing about the existence of some objective threat in 'reality' as a precondition for this process. Rather, when an audience 'takes on' the claim of a securitizing actor and echoes this security language, it is perpetuating and validating a mutual understanding of the appropriate categorization of an issue. This in itself is what creates a security threat, according to the Copenhagen School; a common idea and practice established in regards to an identified subject. This is why Buzan and Waever describe security as an intersubjective and self-referential phenomenon. It is not the issue itself that literally exists as one of security, but the discursive exchange between actor and audience about the issue that constructs the cultural practice of identifying and responding to an object or issue as a threat.47

1.2.3 Summing Up: In the Case of This Study

44 Ibid., 33.
46 Ibid., 25.
In sum, an actor makes a *claim* that an issue is a security issue—that it represents an existential threat to the nation, state or other referent object, and therefore necessitates extraordinary measures being taken outside the bounds of normal political maneuvering. The audience toward which this claim is directed either (a) rejects this claim, thus preventing securitization, or (b) takes on the argument by echoing the same security language in conjunction with the issue in question, thus authorizing extraordinary actions to be taken in response to the threat.

In the case of this study, *claims* are identified in policy statements, speeches, comments, news releases and other documents concerning post-9/11 US Africa policy published by state and non-state agents normally concerned with US foreign policy. Sources on this subject are surveyed from September 11, 2001 through the end of 2007 and analyzed according to their reference to the current condition of Africa as an existential threat to American national security due to its vulnerability to and facilitation of the terrorist threat. Requests for increased military and development aid and funding for new initiatives are defined as securitization claims.

A survey of statements, records and other compiled information from state and non-state entities normally concerned with US foreign policy (other than those agencies that are previously determined to be the actors in the process) is used to identify the *legitimation* of the claim in this study. As specified by Buzan and Waever, evidence of this legitimation is found in the authorization of *extraordinary actions* taken in relation to the claim. In this case this is seen as any dramatic increase in spending, uncharacteristic attribute of that spending, or allowance of circumvention of legal restrictions uncommon to US Africa policy pre-9/11. Evidence of this is looked for in legislative funding of aid and new initiative requests posed by the actors. Outside of the legislature, public knowledge and opinion regarding US Africa policy is gathered and considered from previously published polls and an original survey of relevant media sources on this subject in order to determine the popular extent of US Africa policy securitization among the general public.

1.3 Critical Assessment of the Theory
The theory of Securitization developed by the Copenhagen School has received much attention within the subfield of Security Studies as an innovative and practical approach to policy analysis. The process of securitization—an actor posing an issue as an existential threat and subsequent legitimation by an audience—imparts the scholar with a concise analytical framework with which to deconstruct the political process behind national security agenda-setting. The focus on the speech act offers a clear guide for the security scholar; a claim is traced from its source, the securitizing actor, to its legitimation or rejection by an audience. This is done by reviewing policy statements, speeches, testimonies and other verbal or textual references to the security issue in question made by actor and audience. As Buzan and Waever state, "Securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators." \(^{48}\)

The concise and practical appeal of Securitization Theory is also its weakness, however. The process as articulated by the Copenhagen School does not allow for the full complexity of the agenda-setting process to be exposed. Its two-step claim-legitimation framework needs development in order to more adequately address the who and how questions that are considered in Securitization Theory. This is not an original criticism of the theory. Michael C. Williams, for instance, makes the same point in his argument that "a key challenge for securitization theory is that its presentation of security as a speech act is potentially too narrow to grasp fully the social contexts and complex communicative and institutional processes of securitization at work in contemporary politics." \(^{49}\) Likewise, Matt McDonald labels the framework as "problematically narrow in its focus on the speech act relative to the social and political context in which the act itself occurs." \(^{50}\) Buzan and Waever's focus on the discursive framing of security excludes critical factors in the securitization process; namely, those of agency and context. The importance of these factors and the implications of their inadequate attention in the Copenhagen School framework are explored in the following sections.

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\(^{48}\) Ibid., 25.


1.3.1 Bringing in Agency: Who is the Actor/Audience?

While the Copenhagen School clearly addresses the question of who is behind the securitization process—the ‘claimers’ and ‘legitimators,’ or the actor and audience—the focus on the verbal and textual evidence is limiting. The speech act conceptualization of security is helpful in tracing the pattern of an argument from its inception by an actor to its acceptance and legitimation by an audience, but does not allow for sufficient information about these agents to be revealed that is crucial to the role they play in the securitization process. A more adequate research agenda would address the characteristics of these agents that are driving their success/failure in these roles, such as whether they are a state or non-state entity, what their role in the political process is, and whether there is one or more than one of them. These characteristics all contribute to the political agency of the actor and audience.

As it stands, Securitization Theory largely overlooks the crucial factor of political agency in its exclusive examination of the lingual and textual evidence of who has made a claim of security and who is echoing that claim. While Buzan and Waever do mention that “facilitating conditions” that include “the social conditions regarding the position of authority of the securitizing actor” contribute to the success of a security claim, this receives the equivalent of one paragraph’s attention within their main text on the subject, and is not included within the theoretical framework. This lack of attention to a determining factor in the securitizing process is a serious weakness in the theory. Securitization is by nature a power-laden process in which an actor actively frames a threat in an attempt to convince an audience of its seriousness, or existential nature. The political agency of an actor effectively determines his role as a securitizing agent, just as this power is what allows an audience to effectively legitimate a claim.

For example, any individual can make the statement that “Object X is an existential threat to Americans and therefore Action Y needs to be taken,” thus technically making him a ‘claimer.’ However, the process of securitization is not complete until this claim has been

accepted by an audience that has the power to give sufficient resources to the issue of resolving the "threat" of Object X. The political agency of the actor determines whether the claim will be, in the first place, heard by this audience and, in the second place, accepted as a worthy argument from a worthy source. In other words, political agency—the power to reach a sufficient audience and to be taken seriously by that audience—matters. Put simply, the more political capital the actor has, the more likely that Object X will be, indeed, labeled as a threat and Action Y undertaken. In this way, the advantage that state actors have over non-state actors becomes clear, as does the increased advantage of those within higher echelons of government, and the heightened sway liable to be held by a group rather than a single actor. These factors all contribute to the potency of a security claim.

In the same way, the political agency of the audience is seen to be critical. The role of audience is crucial in allowing for the claim to be heard, considered factual, and legitimated. But who is the audience? In determining this, the motivation of the 'claimer' must be understood. The reason an actor makes a claim in the first place is to mobilize support for action—in this case, Action Y. Therefore, the audience is the group with the authority to provide the allowance and resources to let Action Y happen. Again, it becomes clear that political agency is a determining factor here as the state—and most often the legislature—generally holds this power. 52

It is clear from the discussion above that the agency factor is critical to the securitization process. Due to the importance of political agency in the roles of securitizing actor and audience, characteristics of actor and audience such as their status as state or non-state entities, their status or rank in the political system, and their strength in number merit consideration in a study of security agenda-setting. For this reason, these factors are offered as contributions to the Copenhagen School framework and will be taken into consideration in this case study. These criteria are effective indicators for the level of political agency held by an actor within the process. In this case, the government agency and congressional

52 The Copenhagen School's Securitization theory was originally created as an analysis of the security process in Western democratic states, but a number of studies have dealt with its application outside of these parameters. For an example, see Monika Barthwal's "Securitizing without the State? The Copenhagen School, Non-state actors and non-traditional security threats: A Case Study of Misgovernance as a security threat in Bangladesh," Paper presented at the BISA Annual Conference, University of Cambridge, December 17-19, 2007.
representatives featured will be analyzed according to these benchmarks to determine how their power in making their claim was strengthened or weakened in relation to these factors.

1.3.2 Bringing in Context: How is the Claim Legitimated?

Beyond the issue of political agency in clarifying who drives the process of securitization, the Copenhagen School also overlooks critical factors in addressing how the process is driven. Again, the lingual focus of the two-step process of claim-legitimation sets severe limits that inhibit understanding of the full complexity of the process. This is because the process of how the claim is constructed and legitimated is dependent upon another extra-lingual factor excluded from the framework: context.

Again, Buzan and Waever do show recognition of context as a ‘facilitating condition’ to the process of securitization, but leave this element under-theorized within their work. Matt McDonald attributes this lack of attention to such a critical factor to the Copenhagen School’s desire to maintain the broad appeal of their theory. “The appeal of universalism in the development of a conceptual framework for security is surely in part to blame for some of the neglect of contextual factors.”53 Regardless of the motivation for such an oversight, the brief reference to “features of alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization”54 does not allow for sufficient consideration of such factors. Neither does it adequately explain why the features of a framed threat may be facilitating to the securitization process, which is where the role of context comes into play.

This importance of context in the securitization process is best illustrated by Thierry Balzacq in his statement that “security utterances can only have a meaning ‘for those who know how to interpret them in terms of that which they refer.’ Therefore the meaning of security derives from the mutual recognition [between actor and audience] of the content of the threatening object.” This mutual recognition of a perceived threat is more likely to happen when “the use of that concept resonates with the context in order to increase or win the

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support for the enumerator's policy. In other words, in order for a claim to be found logical by the audience, the lingual argument should be aligned with the perceived external reality, or context, of the audience. If the claim does not make sense when considered within the audience's frame of reference, the chances for its acceptance by that audience are diminished. In the case of Object X, the successful securitizing actor would most likely draw on historically and socially relevant events, symbols or even moods in order to bring the 'threat' of Object X into context. The characteristics of the threat should be congruent with these features of the audience's context, or frame of reference.

Balzacq offers another way to look at the role of context in the securitization process. He makes the point that security claims can be seen to have both spoken and unspoken meanings; the spoken meaning of the claim is its direct lingual message, while context comes into play in the unspoken, or 'cultural meaning' of the claim:

The semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning—knowledge of the concept acquired through language (written and spoken)—and cultural meaning—knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and situations. Taken together, these two kinds of meanings form a frame of reference through which security utterances can be understood.

Here, 'cultural meaning' is another way of describing the perception of a claim based on an audience's context. Their shared outlook, shaped by their shared experiences, is the context within which they are hearing the spoken claim. This underscores the critical nature of context in the securitization process. By incorporating this factor into the securitization framework, the subject of how a claim meets successful legitimation gains clarity and depth. It is for this reason that contextual factors are brought into the framework of this study.

1.3.3 Summing Up: In the Case of This Study

Securitization Theory is better equipped to deconstruct the process of national policy-building when the factors of agency and context are included in its framework. In the case of this study, political agency is brought into the analysis by asking the following questions about the securitizing actor and audience: Are they state or non-state entities? What is their level or role in the political process; are they a higher level government agency official or a lower level bureaucrat or nongovernmental representative? Is there one or more than one institution or representative actor combining forces? The role each of these factors played in the success of the securitization process is considered.

Context is brought into this particular study through attention to the primary features of the American frame of reference at the time of the post-9/11 US Africa policy change. The magnitude of the events of 9/11 in the American experience was undeniably significant; any time agents reference a connection between the existential threat represented by Africa and the traumatic events of 9/11 this is considered a case of context coming into play. In addition, references to the American identity as global promoters of democratic ideals within speech acts concerning US Africa policy are seen as instances of context being used by securitizing agents. In identifying the use of these contextual factors within the securitization process, the study asks: Did these contextual factors play a role in the securitization claiming or legitimation? Was their role subtle, or pronounced? Who referenced these factors? For what purposes?

1.4 Conclusion

Securitization Theory as articulated by the Copenhagen School offers an ideal framework for studying the case of US Africa policy post-9/11. As a theory concerned with deconstructing the process of national security agenda-setting, it addresses the questions of how an issue becomes a security issue, who is involved in this process, and how so. In accordance with the framework offered by Buzan and Waever, this study reviews textual and verbal records of actors involved in US Africa policymaking to determine whether they feature the claim that Africa represents a threat to American national security and therefore necessitates extraordinary actions being taken in response to this threat. Once this claim is identified, the
textual and verbal records of the recipients of that claim are reviewed for evidence of its legitimation. This is evidenced by their adoption of the same claim in statements concerning Africa and by policy measures authorized that are extraordinary to the case of US Africa policy. In order to bring further insight into the steps of claim and legitimation, the factors of political agency and context are brought into the study. After the actors and audience involved in this securitization process are identified they are analyzed according to their level of political agency. The claims and the justifications for their legitimation are then analyzed according to whether they include references to the context of the national experience.
2. The Case of Post-9/11 US Africa Policy:
Background and Context

In the previous chapter, context was identified as an important factor to be included in the analytical framework of this study. It is the aim of this chapter to examine the context of the subject of this case study, the post-9/11 US Africa policy change. This study considers the trauma of Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11 and the American identity as global promoters of democratic values as the major contextual factors making up the intersubjective frame of reference between the securitization actors and audience in this case. These features of the national experience are examined in the view that they will be seen to play a vital role in contributing to the post-9/11 US Africa policy securitization process.

Before discussing the context of the post-9/11 Africa policy change, however, it is important to consider the pre-9/11 background out of which this change took place. The first section of this chapter reviews the role Africa played in US foreign policy in the years leading up to 9/11, with particular attention paid to its place on or off the security agenda. This follows in chronological order the period of American strategic interest in Africa during the Cold War and the period of withdrawal during the 1990s during which time Africa was largely seen as a site of humanitarian disaster unrelated to American national security. This period includes President William J. Clinton's simultaneous African neglect and humanitarian rhetoric, and President George W. Bush's more blatant pre-9/11 disinterest in the continent.

2.1 Pre-9/11 US Africa Policy

2.1.1 The Cold War: Africa as a Strategic Interest

US Africa policy has historically played a marginal role in the larger scope of American foreign policy. Noted Africanist Chris Alden described the historic US-Africa relationship as one "characterized in the main by indifference and neglect, punctuated by flurries of interest
and action." Since the establishment of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs in 1958, US Africa policy has been most consistently characterized by "bureaucratic incrementalism," left largely to bureaucratic management and rarely coming to the forefront of presidential or upper executive or legislative attention.\(^{58}\) Prior to World War II, the United States had only "three consulates-general, eight consulates, and one consular agency on the continent," and most official decisions on African issues were made in the Department of State's Division of European Affairs despite these issues having been theoretically assigned to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.\(^{59}\) Even after World War II, as much of the Third World began to take on strategic significance in the context of a global geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, African issues were typically outside the scope of presidential or upper executive concern and largely deferred to the former European colonial powers. This fact was underscored by Under Secretary of State George Ball in 1968 when he noted that the US recognized Africa as a "special European responsibility," just as European nations recognized "our particular responsibility in Latin America."\(^{61}\)

Although Africa was viewed unofficially as a European sphere of influence by American policymakers, the United States did maintain an official stand against colonialism which ran contrary to the Africa policies of powers such as France, Portugal and Great Britain. As a previously colonized territory itself, the United States spoke out in support of the growing tide of nationalism sweeping much of the Third World during the middle of the century. In 1941 President Franklin Roosevelt convinced British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to

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58 The low level of attention historically provided US Africa policy is the primary subject of works by scholars such as Peter J. Schraeder, Chris Alden and Donald Rothchild.
60 Stanley Hoffman, in "What Should We Do in the World?" *The Atlantic Monthly* 264, 4 (October 1989): 84-96, references the two camps of US policymakers during this period who approached Third World policy as either 'globalists' or 'realists,' but who were united in their view of the primary purpose of American diplomacy in these areas being the prevention of Soviet influence.
sign the Atlantic Charter declaring that after the end of World War II all non-self-governing territories would be allowed to choose their own form of government.  

This American allegiance to the value of self-determination generally took a back seat, however, when set against strategic interests that arose on the African continent in the context of the Cold War. By the 1950s, fears that weakened decolonized states might be vulnerable to Soviet influence caused American policymakers to reconsider the promotion of African nationalism against the threat of communist expansion. When potentially destabilizing crises occurred on the continent, US Africa policy would be boosted from its typical bureaucratic control to a higher level of executive attention, at least in the case of the country in question. In his study of this period in US Africa policy, Peter J. Schraeder found that in instances where there emerged any "politico-military power 'vacuum' in Africa—historically due to the inability or refusal of a weakened and withdrawing colonial power to maintain order—the tendency [was] for the White House to take a much more active role, sometimes transforming US policy towards the country in question."  

Supporting European powers' colonial policies during such situations not only ensured the protection of the status quo on the continent, it satisfied the American partnership with these vital NATO allies and meant continued access to the military bases under their command. When the question of Moroccan and Tunisian independence came up in the United Nations in the 1950s, the United States abandoned the principle of self-determination due to the strategic position of their military bases just south of Western Europe. President Dwight Eisenhower refused to come to the aid of the Algerian struggle for independence or to help Guinea when French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew support from the struggling African nation after a referendum ended in an unexpected call for independence from France. President John Kennedy, who as a senator had spoken out against the American refusal to aid these independence-seeking countries, backed the NATO

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ally—along with all successive US administrations—in the cases of nationalist movements in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique.64

Given the position of strategic anti-communist interests at the top of the American agenda in these cases, it is easy to see the role Africa played as a means to an end in the context of the global geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union. During this time, Presidential rhetoric concerning Africa almost always framed the continent in the context of the Cold War communist threat to US national security. A memorandum signed by Kennedy emphasized the important role Africa played in the fight against this global threat: "What we do—or fail to do—in Africa in the next year or two will have a profound effect for many years... We [the American government] see Africa as probably the greatest open field of maneuver in the worldwide competition between the [communist] bloc and the non-communist world."65 This statement comes from a president who early in his tenure attempted to stand by Angolan independence movements despite Portuguese colonial policies there. This ambition soon lapsed, however, thanks to Defense Department officials who successfully made the case that Angola's island military bases under Portuguese control were indispensable to vital security concerns in the fight against the communist threat.66

The strategic importance American policymakers assigned to Africa throughout the Cold War can be seen in the amount of military aid, training, political and financial support that was poured into the continent during this time. From 1950 to 1989, $1.5 billion in weaponry alone was transferred to the continent by the United States government.67 Such aid was oftentimes authorized despite clear cases of political mismanagement and human rights abuses in countries such as Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and the former Zaire in the name of American strategic interests.68 Weapons and aid transfers were also just as likely to be covert as they were overt. In the case of Angola, after a political coup d'état in 1974 ended Portuguese control of the country, the United States countered Soviet assistance to

64 Ibid., 51-53.
66 Ibid., 23.
68 Ibid., 9.
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) guerilla group by covertly aiding the rival National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) despite State Department Africa Bureau advice not to become involved with any of the anti-government guerilla factions. Only when the situation was leaked to the media did Congress take steps to ban this support to Angolan nationalist forces due to the American wariness of foreign involvement post-Vietnam. It was not until President Reagan assumed a bolder stance on Third World anti-communist involvement in the 1980s that Congress enabled open aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), another rival faction to the communist MPLA. In fact, the United States continued to increase assistance to UNITA beyond the signing of the peace accord it helped to facilitate in 1988 in an effort to destabilize the socialist-oriented government. 69

2.1.2 The 1990s: Africa as a Humanitarian Issue

The strategic importance bestowed upon the African continent during the Cold War ended along with the collapse of the communist threat. Without connection to American national security interests, US Africa policy was largely reduced to its status of bureaucratic management. As Marguerite Michaels observed in her work on the subject in 1993: "The United States has been retreating from Job's continent since the implosion of the Soviet Union set America free to pursue its own interests in Africa—and it found it did not have any." 70

Any hope that the end of the Cold War might result in the United States adopting a less geopolitical relationship with the continent was short-lived. The one foray into a non-strategic engagement with Africa met with a disastrous end, serving only to reinforce American disinterest. A December 1992 US-backed UN authorization of humanitarian intervention into Somalia marked the first move into Africa by the United States since the

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1840s in which no strategic or economic benefits stood to be gained. Unfortunately, the mood soured when 18 American troops involved in the intervention were killed in Mogadishu in October 1993. The mission's turn for the worse caused an American withdrawal as well as President William Clinton's prompt issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 25. The directive set several new preconditions for American support of proposed UN interventions, the first of which was that it must directly advance US interests. This directive and the so-called 'Somalia Syndrome' were what allowed the US to ignore (and even discourage UN involvement in) the 1993 genocide in Rwanda in which 800,000 people were killed. Indeed, throughout the decade, crises in countries such as Burundi, Liberia, Sudan and the former Zaire were left largely to American neglect.

American policymakers' reluctance to become involved in African conflicts reflected the fact that African issues had lost their status on the American security agenda. In the 1990s, the continent was largely framed as a humanitarian concern; a site of human disasters in the form of war and disease. These issues were not connected to American security interests, instead cited by Clinton as deserving of American aid based on moral and traditional obligation as a promoter of democracy and development.

The President made a trip to Africa in 1998 in which he touted a message of a "new partnership" between Africa and the United States in which democracy and development would be the guiding principles. The US Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson named January the "Month of Africa" to spotlight pressing issues such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic and continuing civil wars. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice frequently emphasized the traditional American commitment to democracy and human rights abroad. In a talk at the Brookings Institution she noted that "[d]emocracies can only flourish if they are rooted in the fertile soil of civic society in which human rights are

74 Ibid.
respected. Our commitment to supporting democracy in Africa, therefore, goes hand in hand with our support for human rights."^75

The Clinton administration's humanitarian rhetoric—while the most prominent aspect of its US Africa policy—did not materialize in active engagement with the continent. The main initiatives of this period were formulations of a new mantra which allowed this proclaimed humanitarian concern to be subordinated to the American disinterest in invested action: 'African solutions to African problems.' This approach was backed by the recent declaration by prominent African leaders of an 'African Renaissance' that accompanied the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Under NEPAD, African governments would receive international support as they moved toward the democratic and free market ideals of the West, thus theoretically enabling 'African solutions.'

One of the first reflections of this 'African solutions to African problems' idea in the Clinton administration was seen in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which was established as a bilateral training program to ready African forces for their own peacekeeping.\(^{76}\) Even this non-American-based program met with resistance, however, as Congressional representatives had little encouragement from constituents to prioritize such issues over popular domestic concerns.\(^{77}\) Originally posed as a program to create a centralized standing African response force, ACRI only passed once it was reduced to a training program available to national African forces, with a number of countries ruled out due to political and human rights concerns.\(^{78}\) The effectiveness of the program was also unquestionably curtailed by legislators' wariness toward financing African peacekeeping that seemed to offer no strategic benefit to the United States.

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76 Letitia Lawson, "US Africa policy Since the Cold War."
77 This phenomenon is one of the central points of Samantha Power A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).
While the new peacekeeping recommendations (which would cost an estimated $200 million a year to implement) were being touted in New York [by UN members including President Clinton], a skinflint US Congress in Washington, DC, was trying to cut even more from the UN's present peacekeeping budget. At one point, members of Congress actually tried to entirely eliminate African peacekeeping in order to meet budget caps.79

Just as ACRI was the peacekeeping manifestation of 'African solutions to African problems,' Clinton's African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was the economic version. AGOA was meant to apply the fundamentals of the free market ideology to US-Africa trade relations and thereby allow Africans to trade their way into their own development without a dependency on foreign aid. The administration attempted to combine economic interests with humanitarian concerns to win support for the program; it was framed as an opportunity to maintain distance from African peacekeeping and meet the moral obligation to eliminate African poverty, all the while serving economic interests. In a talk at the Brookings Institute, Susan Rice stated that "As extreme poverty is checked and the social unrest which often accompanies it subsides, the need for costly intervention by the international community will diminish. At the same time, Americans will reap the benefits of increased trade and investment in Africa."80 Clinton insisted that "As Africa's nations join the global march toward freedom and open markets, our nation has a deep interest in helping to ensure that these efforts pay off." He defined that interest as "[a]n Africa...of greater stability, growing markets, stronger partners."81

Still, just as ACRI, the Africa-based peacekeeping initiative had suffered at the hands of Congress, the Africa-based economic package met serious Congressional resistance as well. Despite the presidential appeal to the American economic agenda and the work of many African affairs lobbyists and representatives in pressing members of Congress in this regard,

the AGOA bill died in the Senate after narrowly passing in the House 233-186. AGOA was signed into law in May 2000 only after President Clinton revived the issue in his State of the Union Address, thereby heightening the pressure on Congress.82

The difficulties met by ACRI and AGOA in their inception are a part of a larger pattern of neglect in US Africa policy in the 1990s. In spite of the Clinton administration's humanitarian and development rhetoric and several high-level executive trips to the continent, a review of the post-Cold War period shows a sharp decline in aid to Africa and little prominence in the administration's foreign policy work. To be sure, scholar Peter Schraeder insists that "the efforts of the Clinton White House [in regards to Africa] must be assessed against the larger backdrop of the president's more activist approach during his second term toward all regions of the world, in which Africa relatively speaking still remained the region of least concern."83 The Department of Defense under Clinton maintained that the US had "very little traditional strategic interest in Africa,"84 and the region ranked last in the 1998 National Security Strategy's "Integrated Regional Approaches to Security,"85 offering some insight into the absence of a US military command center on the continent. Aid to Africa dropped consistently every year following the end of the Cold War, reaching just below $700 million in 2000, well below any other world region.86

Further evidence of American disinterest in the continent during this time can be seen in the ambivalent and lackluster response to the August 7, 1998, US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania by the Clinton administration. Having drastically reduced its intelligence presence on the continent since the end of the Cold War, US officials were ill prepared for the attacks and gathered what was later determined to be flawed information on the incident.

and its perpetrators. Deliberations concerning Department of Defense proposals for response to the bombings were tempered by reluctance to draw the widespread criticism that followed air attacks launched against Iraq and Serbia in the previous two years. In the end, in contrast to the sustained attention issues of transnational terrorism on the continent would receive from the post-9/11 Bush administration, these bombings incurred a brief and reactive response from the Clinton administration. Within thirteen days, the American response to these bombings was concluded in the form of missile strikes on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan that had been (incorrectly) linked to Al Qaeda.

2.1.3 Pre-9/11 Bush Maintains Africa Marginalization

President George W. Bush entered the White House with every intention of maintaining Africa's negligible role in US foreign policy, and certainly with no intention of giving the continent precedence on the national security agenda. As he famously commented on the campaign trail in 2000, "while Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see." Bush was also upfront with his view on the American refusal to act during the 1994 Rwandan genocide; in spite of Clinton's eventual stated remorse for this inaction, Bush said that while "no one liked to see it on our TV screens," Clinton had been right to avoid intervention in any form. These classic realist statements revealed the Bush administration's perception of Africa as marginal at best in terms of US national security interests, and certainly in terms of national security policy. Schraeder observed in 2001 that this disregard for African issues would dovetail nicely with traditional Congressional neglect of Africa, as seen in the cases of ACRI and AGOA earlier in the 1990s. He further noted that

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An important result of White House and Congressional neglect of Africa is that the Bush administration's foreign policy towards Africa, perhaps more so than that directed towards any other region of the world, essentially will be delegated to the high-level bureaucrats and political appointees within the executive branch, leading to an outcome best characterized as 'bureaucratic incrementalism' in which continuity rather than change will mark the administration's policy towards Africa. 91

In conclusion, the movement of Africa on and off the US security agenda is apparent in a survey of US Africa policy prior to 9/11. When connected to the threat of communism during the Cold War, African issues gained prominence on the American agenda as is seen in the amount of attention paid by high level executive officials and the amount of aid and weaponry poured into the continent. To phrase this in the terms of Securitization Theory, Africa was framed in the context of an existential threat and the level of aid and assistance authorized for use in deterring this threat evidenced its accession to the security agenda. The 1990s saw American security interests in Africa replaced with humanitarian concerns that were perceived as having little connection to American interests in general, much less national security interests. The events of 9/11 shed a new light on the American security agenda, thus opening the way for new potential issues, such as US Africa policy, to find adjustment in their strategic significance.

2.2 The Context of Post-9/11 US Africa Policy

"The acid test of a policy...is its ability to obtain domestic support. This has two aspects: the problem of legitimizing a policy within the governmental apparatus...and that of harmonizing it with the national experience." -Henry Kissinger 92

As discussed in the last chapter's analysis of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, the 'national experience' provides the frame of reference for both the actor and audience of a securitization process. The actor is more likely to win legitimation for his claim that an issue is a threat if the claim makes sense within the context of the audience's—or nation's—experience. The following sections look at two significant features of the American national experience that serve as the primary components of the context of the post-9/11 change in US Africa policy.

2.2.1 The Trauma of 9/11: Terrorism Securitized

"September 11, 2001, shifted our psychological makeup—the DNA in our minds—with consequences that will not become clear for years to come." —John Lewis Gaddis

In considering the context within which this study takes place, clearly the most prominent feature to take into account during this period is the impact created by the events of 9/11. While debate has been raised over the significance 9/11 has held in terms of fundamental change in international and American policymaking, the trauma of 9/11 as an event that showcased national vulnerability to terrorism in a dramatic and memorable way to the American public is indisputable. Its impact on the American psyche has been the subject of numerous publications in varying academic fields, with most converging on the fact that the threat of terrorism and security issues surrounding this threat have greatly increased in the concern of the average American since the occurrence of the World Trade Center attacks. In the terms of the Copenhagen School, the terrorist threat represented by 9/11 has unquestionably been securitized.

The shock of the attacks on American soil—horrible in their own right—was underscored by unvarying media coverage of the aftermath; the four major American news networks (ABC, CBS, NBC and FOX) all suspended regular programming and provided uninterrupted coverage for the first five days following the fall of the Twin Towers. The Bush administration clearly articulated the gravity of the situation and the terrorist threat, immediately declaring a "War on Terror" (USWOT). Not only was the physical safety of Americans in existential danger, but the American way of life; "The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, DC, New York City, and Pennsylvania were acts of war against the United States of America and its allies, and against the very idea of civilized society... The world must respond and fight this evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life." Nine days after the attacks, President Bush, in his first formal address to the public, told Americans, "Freedom itself is under attack." The message to the public was a clear and united reaffirmation of the potential consequence to Americans if appropriate actions were not taken to respond to the newly prominent threat. Vice President Richard Cheney stated, "The threat is known and our role is clear now. We face an enemy that is determined to kill Americans by any means on any scale on our soil." National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice referred to the terrorist threat when she stated that "there is no longer any doubt today that American faces an existential threat to our security—a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, World War II, or the Cold War."

Parallels have been drawn between 9/11 and the attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into the Second World War and helped to define a new threat to Americans. The 1940s American national security agenda—both in policy and public perception—was heavily defined by the events at Pearl Harbor. Congressional debates over the unification of

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the US armed services during the 1940s were interspersed with calls to "remember Pearl
Harbor." As Bryan Mabee points out, "Pearl Harbor and its connotations of surprise,
unreadiness, and lack of organization were utilized to frame the context of relations with the
Soviet Union, which helped in the creation of new security actors, and a new discourse of
security." In the same way, references to 9/11 and the threat of terror it represents have
accompanied not only the declaration of the USWOT, but the initiation of conventional war
on two countries, as well as passage of The Patriot Act which authorizes a number of
infringements on the civil rights of Americans in the name of security.

Indeed, in the language of the Copenhagen School, examples of extraordinary actions
authorized by the legitimation of the American public are not difficult to identify in the case
of 9/11; Bush himself defined the government's necessary measures in response to the 'new'
terrorist threat as out of the ordinary, saying that "our response involves far more than
instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy
campaign, unlike any other we have seen." Surveys following the anniversaries of 9/11
have continued to show Americans' commitment to the securitization of the terrorist threat
as represented by the attacks on the Twin Towers, with the issue of transnational terrorism
remaining among the highest ranked concerns among the public. In sum, the events of
9/11 stand as a major feature of the national frame of reference for security considerations
in the post-9/11 US policymaking framework. In the chapters that follow, securitization
claims concerning the threat of Africa that are linked by their enunciator to the American
emotional trauma caused by the events of 9/11 are noted.

102 Ibid., 389.
103 These being Afghanistan and Iraq, of which the second is clearly not directly connected to the attacks of
9/11 but was nonetheless associated with these attacks in the beginning of the Bush administration's
campaign to declare the war.
104 President of the United States of America. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
than in the 1990s: Terrorism Worries Spike, War Support Steady," Survey Report, December 12, 2002, and
http://www.ccrf.org/past_pos.php; and George Shambaugh, "A Portrait of America in Turbulent Times:
Public Perceptions and the Political Salience of Terrorism and Other Traumatic Events" (Paper presented to
Institute for Global and International Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George
Washington University, Washington, DC, September 25, 2008).
2.2.2 The American Identity

"Being human, Americans have never been able to live up to their ideals. Being American, they have been unable to abandon them." -Samuel P. Huntington

There is a long history of literature concerned with explaining the ideological orientation of the American identity. Scholars as early as James Bryce in 1891 identified an American predisposition to locating their political beliefs within a system of ideals that came down to "the sacred right of the individual." Seymour Martin Lipset organized this system of ideals into five key principles: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire. In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal initiated the tradition of grouping this collection of democratic ideals together under the title of the American Creed. The common claim is that, while other countries may meet the criteria of these standards in different ways, the American nation stands out in that its members form their sense of community based on communal ascription to the ideals embodied in the American Creed rather than a geographical or other historical or cultural lineage. Samuel Huntington makes this point when he notes the opening of the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." "Who holds these truths? Americans hold these truths. Who are Americans? People who adhere to these truths." His point is the association of liberal democratic political principles with the American identity.

The ideological foundation of the American political outlook has informed its foreign policymaking since its inception. John Ikenberry argues that the liberal ideas that make up the American Creed inform a national grand strategy that promotes these abroad. While

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some have condemned this moral bent to US foreign policy as empty rhetoric or idealist naiveté. Ikenberry asserts that its policies are in fact interest-driven, but that the national experience informs the belief that promotion of democracy, free trade and universal representation ultimately serve American interests (e.g. reducing conflict or increasing wealth and enterprise). The effectiveness of such principles is inherent in their existence as universal truths. This belief is the foundation of the American 'exceptionalism' described by scholars such as Lipset and Stanley Hoffman, who cite a tendency by Americans to see their nation as "a kind of model for humanity, a beacon of truth" to be replicated in the world.

Hoffman asserts that it is the democratic institutional structure of the government that keeps US foreign policy in line with the American cultural ascription to their Creed. The role of the legislature and civil society, larger in the United States than in any other country, requires politicians to cater to the general American identification with these values. It is for this reason that US foreign policy has acquired its reputation for being consistently cast in overly moral or ideological terms. Indeed, when President Wilson asked Congress in 1917 to declare war on Germany, he described an American moral responsibility to "make the world safe for democracy." If American lives were to be sacrificed, he stated, it would be "for democracy...for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all the nations and make the world itself at last free."

This self-perceived identity of Americans as promoters of democratic ideals was effective in carrying the United States through not only WWII but throughout the Cold War period against the Soviet communist threat. It is therefore unsurprising that the introduction of the USWOT has reinvigorated the national identification with this role. Psychological studies conducted after 9/11 have confirmed its impact on the American psyche, with one confirming that the "attacks resulted in immediate and visibly evident increases in

113 Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 20.
114 Ibid., 20.
expressions of national identification and unity throughout the United States. President Bush used this experience to draw on the traditional American identity as an exceptional nation with a mission to advance its liberal democratic values in his 2005 Presidential Address:

America's vital interests and our beliefs are now one. From the day of our founding we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of Heaven and earth. Across the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time.

The post-9/11 call of the Bush administration to honor the American identity as global promoters of liberal democratic ideals is striking when considered against their pre-9/11 realist platform. During the 2000 presidential campaign, future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice argued that American power should not be used for "second order" effects, such as the improvement of humanity's wellbeing. The change in thinking can be seen in the 2002 National Security Strategy that proclaims that "Our principles guide our government's decisions." The potency and relevance of the American identity was revitalized in the face of the post-9/11 terrorist threat; Americans were reminded of their role as promoters of democracy and freedom in the new War on Terror. Thus, the traditional American identity as promoters of the principles of liberal democracy stands as an integral feature of the context within which this post-9/11 case study takes place. Instances

of actors referencing the altruism of the American identity as global 'promoters of democracy' in their claims concerning US Africa policy are considered in the following chapters.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter accomplished two objectives; it laid out the history of pre-9/11 US Africa policy and explored context which provided the background for the post-9/11 US Africa policy securitization process. The first section illustrated Africa's history of fluctuation on and off the American security agenda. It identified Africa's role on the US security agenda during the Cold War as a means to an end in the geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union, and the plunge Africa took off of the agenda once this threat disappeared in the 1990s.

The second section laid out the primary features of the context within which the case of post-9/11 Africa policy resides. These were identified as an acute national insecurity concerning the threat of terrorism following the traumatic attacks of 9/11 and a reinvestment of Americans in their mission to "make the world safe for democracy." Both of these factors carried profound "cultural meaning—knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and situations"120 to Americans in the post-9/11 period covered in this study, thus making up their contextual frame of reference.

3.1 The Claim: US Africa Policy as a Security Issue

3.1.1 Origin of the Claim: The Security-Development Nexus

Following the end of the Cold War, a new trend in the conceptualization of the traditionally compartmentalized issues of development and security began to surface within the international community. The 1990s saw development and security matters become increasingly merged in the logic of leading international institutions charged with the mission of supporting developing countries' advancement. Policy statements of the OECD, World Bank, UNHCR and UNDP began to incorporate an explicit recognition of the need for a mutual accompaniment of development and security. These were based on the circular argument that development requires stability which requires development.

This growing concern with Third World development stemmed largely from self-interest on the part of leading powers. Their concern was that technological and economic globalization was extending the damaging effects of national and regional instability to an increasingly interconnected international community. The political and economic underdevelopment that lay behind such instability in the developing world thus became a global security issue. For this reason, rather than simply providing humanitarian relief to the populations of these regions, the international community—generally by way of the United Nations—began to see a need to address the economic and political development of weak or failing states in an attempt to consolidate their capacity for stability and prevent future violence or other transnational threats that might impede on the safety of others in the international community.

3.1.2 9/11 Brings Security-Development Logic to US Africa Policy

While the gradual conflation of security and development began in the 1990s in the international arena, the trauma of the World Trade Center attacks turned this logic into a

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123 Ibid., 1.
124 Ibid., 15.
central feature of post-9/11 American foreign policy statements. The stability of weak and failing states began to be tied to the securitized issue of terrorism. The point generally made was that Third World underdevelopment can fuel resentment among desperate populations and thus encourage extremist behavior, and can allow terrorist activity to go undetected due to ineffective state institutions. As the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS) stated:

September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states...pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states [because] poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.125

This post-9/11 security-development focus in US foreign policy included a new outlook on US Africa policy. Africa, previously framed as a humanitarian concern with little relevance to American strategic interests, was deemed by the Bush administration "a high priority of this administration" due to its "growing geo-strategic importance" in the post-9/11 security environment.126 The NSS framed Africa as a threat to American security in the context of the USWOT:

In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror... [W]e must help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.127

The Department of Defense opened its post-9/11 National Military Strategy with reference to the threat emanating from the African continent:

There exists an 'arc of instability' stretching from the Western Hemisphere through Africa and the Middle East and extending into Asia... Within these areas...adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks.128

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice echoed the same sentiment when she described the USWOT connection to underdevelopment in a speech at Georgetown University. Rice referenced the need to engage specifically with the African continent after articulating its link to American security:

It was...assumed that weak and poorly governed states were merely a burden to their people, or at most, an international humanitarian concern but never a true security threat. Today, however, these old assumptions no longer hold... In the 21st century, geographic regions are growing ever more integrated economically, politically and culturally. This creates new opportunities but it also presents new challenges, especially from transnational threats like terrorism...129

The US Agency for International Development (USAID), the principle institution committed to disbursing American foreign aid, also featured a description of the current African condition of widespread political and economic underdevelopment after detailing the connection between such issues and the terrorist threat to Americans in a 2002 policy paper:

The terrorist attacks of September 11 tragically demonstrated the character of today's world... More than ever, US security is bound up with the outside world... When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences leap around the world. Terrorism [and other transnational threats] cascade across the borders of

129 Condoleezza, Rice, Secretary of State, Remarks on Transformational Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, January 18, 2006.
weak states [and] endanger the security and well-being of all Americans, not just those traveling abroad.  

The view of US Africa policy as a security issue was offered not only by the executive branch, but by public policy institutions as well. Washington think tanks from across the political spectrum were posing the same link between Africa and American security during the same period of time as the Bush administration. While Africa had previously been given little consideration in these circles as a security issue, after 9/11 many of these institutions began to sponsor working groups and meetings based on the connection between US Africa policy and the 'new' post-9/11 security environment. Just two months after the 9/11 attacks, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) held a briefing on "Africa, Islam and Terrorism;" the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) issued a March 2003 special report on "Terrorism in the Horn of Africa;" the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) established the first Africa policy division of any US think tank which promptly produced a series on the national security implications of the current African condition; and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) sponsored a multi-institutional task force report that cited the need for a comprehensive security-development approach to African underdevelopment as a US national security threat. In a speech on global poverty, then Brookings Institute Senior Fellow Susan Rice also related underdevelopment to the terrorist threat emanating from Africa, citing Al Qaeda's ties to the continent to make her point:

Poor countries with limited institutional capacity to control their territory, borders and coastlines can provide safe havens, training grounds, and recruiting fields for

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132 The USIP, as an independent research institute, is considered a non-state public policy institution for the purposes of this study.
terrorist networks. By some estimates, 25% of the foreign terrorists recruited by Al Qaeda to Iraq have come from North and Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{136}

In conclusion, it is obvious that the framing of Africa by the US executive branch changed in the wake of 9/11. The Bush administration clearly left behind the President's campaign message that the continent "doesn't fit into the national strategic interests," as evidenced by its numerous references throughout every major foreign policy document issued since the inception of the USWOT.\textsuperscript{137} The White House, Defense Department, State Department and USAID each acted as securitizing actors, offering policy documents founded on the security-development logic that offered Africa strategic significance in the context of the USWOT. It is also apparent that think tanks became increasingly involved with the topic of Africa as a national security issue following 9/11. The view espoused by these institutions centered on the unified argument that the current condition of African underdevelopment made the continent vulnerable to terrorist exploitation and incitement. The prevalence of Islam in many African countries, political instability and the known connections to Al Qaeda were all offered as evidence of the danger emanating from the continent.

3.2 The Claim: Military and Development Assistance

Post-9/11 claims that Africa represents a threat to American national security were matched by a reformulation of US Africa policy by the Bush administration. Increased aid to existing accounts, the creation of new initiatives, and the enhancement of old ones were all requested based on the new conceptualization of the continent's strategic significance. Africa's portrayal as a security issue is seen in the lobbying efforts for these changes to US Africa policy, as exemplified by the statements featured in this section, representative of the collection of records surveyed for this study.

3.2.1 Military Aid


the capacities of vulnerable developing countries to secure their border and territories and to mitigate the underlying sources of support for terrorism.\textsuperscript{141}

Regional Counterterrorism Operations

Military assistance programs funded and administered primarily by the Defense Department with some contribution by State and the CIA, regional counterterrorism operations in Africa include the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), and the Maritime Security Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea among others. These programs have all been created since the 9/11 attacks and are intended to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement and military forces in these strategic regions on the continent through direct military-to-military engagement exercises. The CJTF-HOA, headquartered in Djibouti, also served as the first site of American military presence on the African continent and has consistently housed around 2,000 US troops since its establishment.

As in the case of the military training programs, African regional counterterrorism operations are offered based on a rationale of security threats on the continent that link back to the USWOT. For example, the primary CJTF-HOA mission was described by its Chief of Command as engaging in "joint and combined training and operations...to enable regional nations to defeat Al-Qaeda and associated movements and to obtain coalition support in order to diminish underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit."\textsuperscript{142}

Beyond the direct link to the USWOT, an additional strategic interest posed by policymakers in their funding efforts was the threat of disruption to African oil supplies to the US. American interests in energy resources in the region were peaked before 9/11, as evidenced by the May 2001 National Energy Policy Report that states that West Africa is expected to be "one of the fastest growing sources of oil and gas for the American market." The report maintained that, without more oil and gas, the US will face significant threats to its economic


well-being and its national security." However, 9/11 heightened the strategic focus on diversifying energy sources, as dependence on the Persian Gulf became less appealing in the midst of conflict with Middle Eastern powers.

The Maritime Security Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea was initiated largely based on consideration of this strategic rationale, along with its connection to the post-9/11 terrorist threat. US Naval Forces Commander Henry G. Ulrich III related the initiative to USWOT logic by saying the program would increase security and governance "[a]nd where there's security and governance is not where people who we describe as terrorists like to go." Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs Jendayi Frazer made it clear that her department fully supported the creation of such an investment in the Gulf of Guinea, naming both oil and the threat of terrorism as her reasoning: "Achieving coastal security in the Gulf of Guinea is key to America's trade and investment opportunities in Africa, to our energy security, and to stem transnational threats..."

Unsurprisingly, international energy consultant David Goldwyn represented a number of energy companies when he made the same point in his testimony to Congress, pointing to the threat to American energy needs should this West African region not be sufficiently protected:

[...]If we want to have energy security at home, we need to focus on promoting stability in the nations we rely on and help them protect the infrastructure that delivers the oil and gas that we depend on... [T]he forces of the Gulf of Guinea

144 See for example statements by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union, January 2006.
147 Other such energy companies making similar arguments in Congressional testimonies on African energy issues include ExxonMobile Corporation, Vanco Energy and Cambridge energy Research Associates, Inc.
states do not have the capacity to protect our oil rigs and facilities. It's a soft target for a terrorist group that is willing to attack...\textsuperscript{148}

**AFRICOM**

The announcement of a US military command center dedicated to Africa, made by President Bush in February 2007, was in itself a securitizing move. By establishing such a facility, the unspoken claim was that the continent is a region in need of focused, high-level military attention, just as those regions already afforded central commands such as Europe and the Pacific.

Spoken statements made in support of AFRICOM did, however, add emphasis to this symbolic claim of Africa as a security issue. Evidence of this claim is seen in the Congressional testimony by General William Ward, nominated Commander of AFRICOM, on the subject:

AFRICOM will support partner nations in the fight against transnational terrorism... By strengthening our partners through capacity building efforts, we will deny terrorists freedom of action and access to resources, while diminishing the conditions that foster violent extremism... AFRICOM's security goals and effects work to prevent attacks emanating from Africa against Americans.\textsuperscript{149}

The State Department fully supported the Defense Department initiative, making the same claim for the need of such a military command structure in Africa. As Assistant Secretary of State of Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull testified:

Africa today is a place of...severe challenges, such as poverty, disease, terrorism, and instability that all together pose critical risks for US interests [therefore] we at State have enthusiastically welcomed the idea of a unified command for Africa...


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
so that they can better work together with us in confronting the common threats we face such as terrorism.\textsuperscript{150}

Also active in claiming the necessity of a centralized US military structure for Africa were the same Washington think tanks. CFR Senior Fellow Princeton Lyman argued that "Africa's nearly seamless borders, interrelated conflicts, and interconnected trafficking networks demand [such] a unified US command structure."\textsuperscript{151} The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Fellow J. Peter Pham told Congress that a central command in Africa was essential and "[g]iven the high stakes involved, nothing less should be expected," and The Heritage Foundation published the piece \textit{Congress Should Support the US Africa Command} in which it called AFRICOM a "critical step" in the USWOT.\textsuperscript{152}

\textit{Summing Up}

Whether spoken or symbolic, the claim inherent to these military aid requests and new initiatives is that Africa, as a security issue, requires security-oriented attention from the United States. The White House, Departments of Defense and State and think thanks were vocal about the need for increased funding for these programs based on their relevance in the post-9/11 security environment. While the issue of energy resources was also used as a rationale for US military assistance to Africa, the primary threat to American national security is cited as terrorism, with even the oil factor related back to the need to avoid Middle Eastern dependency during the USWOT. Nearly every argument made incorporates the logic that African weak states and underdevelopment fosters and insulates extremist mentality and behavior, thereby allowing for anti-American sentiments to fester and potentially manifest as another attack on American soil.


3.2.2 Development Aid

Three of the main features of the Bush US Africa policy are programs that are developmental in nature. Devised by the administration after 9/11, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) came out of the intention to improve the health and governance of developing states, with both focused primarily on Africa. The third program, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), was begun during the Clinton administration but has been extended and promoted throughout the Bush administration. What is significant about these programs is both the increase in attention toward Africa they represent, and the reasoning given for their necessity, as each has been supported in connection with the claim that Africa represents a security threat to Americans.

Official Development Assistance

ODA refers to the total amount of aid provided to sub-Saharan Africa from a range of accounts that are intended to contribute primarily to the overall economic development of the continent, such as the Economic Support Fund, Child Survival and Health, and Food for Education, etc. Arguments for the increase of assistance in this category were part of the broader claim that African underdevelopment is a threat to American national security. President Bush consistently promoted this message, as seen in a 2005 speech excerpt that the "strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror."

The White House's argument for the strategic importance of African economic aid in the post-9/11 environment was mirrored in surrounding departments. USAID drew a clear link between ODA and the USWOT in its primer entitled Who We Are and What We Do: "Aid is a potent leveraging instrument for keeping countries allied with US policy while they win their

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153 Definition of ODA from www.oecd.org
own battles against terrorism. Secretary of State Colin Powell placed the importance of economic assistance alongside that of military assistance by prefacing his request for such aid with a reminder that "our number one priority is to fight and win the global war on terrorism. The budget furthers this goal by providing economic, military, and democracy assistance [to developing regions such as Africa].

The Defense Department also connected ODA to Africa to American national security by reinforcing the link between poverty and terrorist safe-havens. US European Command Director Tallent, in a March 2005 statement to Congress made the point that "[c]ontinued poverty is but one of the many effects of years of tragic violence and instability in certain regions of Africa" and "[e]vidence shows that terrorists intend to take full advantage of this.

Increased amounts of ODA for Africa requested by the Bush administration each year following 9/11 have been supported by continuing references by think-tanks to the same philosophy that a terrorist threat emanates from African underdevelopment. As the CSIS warned:

The threat of terror to US interests in Africa is concrete, rising, and discernible. The probability of another attack on Americans on African soil is high... To be effective, policymakers will have to contend seriously with the very factors that attract terrorists... For this reason, the US response cannot be driven by security programs alone; it also requires sustained attention to economic development, human rights, and democratization.

African Growth and Opportunity Act

Begun by the Clinton administration in 2000, the Bush administration framed AGOA as a way to alleviate the conditions of poverty and underdevelopment that endanger US national security by facilitating terrorism. The logic was made clear: "Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty," therefore "[f]ree markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security strategy."159

In his remarks to the AGOA Forum in October 2001, just one month following the declaration of the USWOT, President Bush aligned the safety of Americans with the safety of Africans in the post-9/11 security environment. Just before outlining the progress brought to African development as a result of the trade bill, he stated:

In the era of global trade and global terror, the futures of the developed world and the developing world are closely linked. We benefit from each other's success. We're not immune from each other's troubles. We share the same threats; and we share the same goal—to forge a future of more openness, trade and freedom.160

The issue of African economic development that lay behind AGOA was framed as a security issue by the Defense Department as well. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Westphal brought the threat of terrorism to the issue in a statement to the media, saying that "[p]overty, unemployment, and lack of capital development exacerbate social and ethnic tensions and create havens for conflict, insecurity and terrorism," thus threatening American national security and requiring aid in this regard.161

In a 2003 Congressional hearing on AGOA, the strongest security-based argument made for continued support of the act came from the Corporate Council on Africa interest group, a trade association made up of businesses intent on raising the profile of US-Africa trade

relations. Council Chairman James Harmon framed the case for AGOA primarily in security terms:

Even more immediate [than the economic benefits of AGOA] are the US national security interests in Africa. Africa's fragile and impoverished states are among the weakest links in the US war on terrorism... The American people have a compelling national security interest in strengthening African economies and democratic institutions, to increase African countries' will and capacity to be strong partners in the war on terrorism.\(^{162}\)

*Millennium Challenge Account*

The 2002 NSS premise that "poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders" was also used to promote the MCA, initiated by President Bush in 2004 to provide additional financial assistance to countries committed to far-reaching economic and political reforms, most of which have been in Africa.\(^{165}\) The economic principles and democratic governance standards included in the MCA have been framed as important to the USWOT in US policy documents post-9/11. The Defense Department's *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* references the importance of effective governance conditionalities in the assertion that ineffective governance benefits terrorism: "Terrorists benefit from physical safe haven when...they gain access to ungoverned, ill-governed, or under-governed space within states that lack effective control over their own territory."\(^{164}\) Similarly, the USAID *Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework* supports the democratic governance focus of the MCA based on the argument that African governments not held to these standards pose a security risk to Americans. The document warns of the danger of neglecting such standards:


\(^{163}\) Of MCA's 18 current grants, 11 are with African countries. This and additional information found online at [http://www.mcc.gov/programs/africa/index.php](http://www.mcc.gov/programs/africa/index.php).

Advancing democracy, as the president has said, is the "testing" and the "calling" of this generation. With the spread of democracy linked to our values and our national security, and with democracy at the heart of foreign policy, we are promoting it worldwide... History teaches us that authoritarian regimes are more likely to harbor terrorists or actively support terrorism.\textsuperscript{165}

This security-based message was used to defend the program to Congress as well. The 2006 budget presentation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (that oversees the MCA) framed the initiative as an answer to the terrorist threat emanating from Africa, citing the 9/11 Commission Report recommendation that

"a comprehensive US strategy to counterterrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people" [and] for these reasons and those described in the body of this report, MCC is requesting the full $3.0 billion requested.\textsuperscript{166}

\textit{President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief}

The economic and political development goals of AGOA and the MCA, framed as vital responses to security threats posed by the African continent, are themselves threatened by the spread of HIV/AIDS. Following a description of how the US must promote African development due to the post-9/11 logic that weak states pose the greatest threat to national security, the 2002 NSS lists HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment in Africa as a part of its strategic plan: "In countries afflicted by epidemics and pandemics like HIV/AIDS... development will be threatened until these scourges can be contained," therefore, "[w]e will...continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS" in states most incapacitated by this epidemic such as those in Africa.\textsuperscript{167}


\textsuperscript{166} United States Millennium Challenge Corporation, \textit{Millennium Challenge Account Congressional Budget Justification to Congress}, FY 2006, 3.

Building off this platform, President Bush announced in his 2003 State of the Union Address the initiation of PEPFAR to provide $15 billion to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic over the next five years. This new initiative by the White House was buttressed by CIA Director George Tenet in his Congressional testimony connecting the African AIDS crisis to American national security:

I'd like to address now a range of key transnational issues that have an immediate bearing on America's national security... The HIV/AIDS pandemic continues unabated...and Southern Africa has the greatest concentration of cases. The national security dimension of the virus is plain: it can undermine economic growth, exacerbate social tensions, diminish military preparedness, create huge social welfare costs, and further weaken already beleaguered states.  

The danger of increasing vulnerability to the terrorist threat due to deteriorating African state capabilities has been espoused by numerous think-tanks as well. The USIP published a report on HIV/AIDS in Africa, dedicating a section to the implications for US national security. A 2006 symposium held by the CFR on US interests in Africa featured the statement that "If we are to sustain an anti-terrorist coalition, we cannot afford a lackluster response to the threat that HIV/AIDS and related problems pose to developing societies." In addition, a paper issued by the CSIS detailed the need for the reauthorization of PEPFAR using a security-centered argument. After referencing the "new" post-9/11 security environment, the paper stated that

security stakes associated with the global HIV/AIDS pandemic have steadily increased... PEPFAR provides a source of goodwill by helping to stabilize disease

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**Summing Up**

It is striking that all post-9/11 US Africa development aid seems to have been uniformly premised at least partially on security claims. Increased amounts of ODA, the continuation of AGOA, and the creation of the MCA and PEPFAR were all offered as vital components of a larger American security strategy in responding to the threat represented by African underdevelopment. Each of these aid areas is rooted in the 2002 NSS commitment to “actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world” due to the assertion that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones,"\footnote{President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 1.} Again, the White House, Departments of State and Defense and the CIA were joined by think tanks in framing these aid programs in terms of US national security.

### 3.3 The Claim: Theoretical Analysis

In accordance with Securitization Theory, an analysis of the claim of post-9/11 US Africa policy as a security issue must consider (1) what was the claim, or the proposed existential threat and its referent object, (2) who were the actors, or those who made the claim, and (3) how was their claim made? These issues are examined below with the roles of political agency and context included in the discussion.

#### 3.3.1 The Claim

Following the events of 9/11, the security-development logic that had been gaining prominence in the international arena took center stage in US foreign policy. In the context
of the USWOT, Third World underdevelopment was framed as a national security issue due to the argument that weak and failing states, unable to provide for their people, enforce laws or monitor activities within their borders, thus serve as breeding grounds and safe-havens for terrorists. In the relative safety of such "under-governed" environments, terrorists are able to work toward and plan attacks on Americans, whether on or off American soil. The terrorist threat to Americans emanating from such regions was presented not only as a physical threat to Americans' safety, but "a threat to our way of life as a free and open society," and thus an existential threat to the American state and the American "way of life." Post-9/11 policy documents and commentary surrounding US Africa policy were in the main related to this existential threat, as seen in the justification for both military and development assistance by the Bush administration.

It is interesting to note the difference between this framing of US Africa policy and the pre-9/11 policy approach to the continent. In the 1990s, as discussed in the previous chapter, Africa was seen in a humanitarian light and NEPAD-oriented goals of development and good governance were tied to economic reforms meant to open African markets to the West. The post-9/11 turn toward a strategic approach to Africa saw the US executive take over the security-development logic of the larger international community and subsequently turn "development" goals into strict attention to strengthening African states' institutional abilities to manage law, order and counterterrorism capabilities. The security-development logic of the UN and larger international community seems to have been thus transformed from a more diversified approach to non-state-centered forms of underdevelopment such as widespread poverty, into a more exclusive state-centered focus on institutional development. This can be seen in the statements concerning the MCA and PEPFAR which are ultimately related back to strengthening the functioning of African state structures through their promotion of economic and health development.

3.3.2 The Securitizing Actors

173 United States Department of Defense and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, February 2006, 5.
It is clear that the institutions making up the US executive branch were acting in unison in attempting to move US Africa policy onto the security agenda. Policy documents and statements made by representatives of the White House, Departments of State and Defense, USAID and the CIA each claimed the need for increased African aid based on the claim that otherwise Americans could suffer the consequences of another 9/11-style attack on US soil. This unified approach to the issue of US Africa policy is revealing considering the longstanding history of rivalry between State and Defense agendas, with Defense generally pushing a security-based argument and State tending away from this line of reasoning. While it may not be unexpected to see the Pentagon framing the African continent as an existential threat to Americans, as a new command center and expanding territorial control stood to be gained based on this rationale, it is interesting to see Department of State officials expressing a clear desire to orient their development assistance around such security-based logic, seemingly contributing to the prominence of Defense in managing African assistance.

The claim espoused by the American executive was also put forth by several Washington-based think tanks and a small number of business-oriented interest groups concerned with African issues, including the CFR, The Brookings Institution, CDG, CSIS, CEIP, The Heritage Foundation, USIP, The Washington Institute, FDD, Commission on Capital Flows to Africa, and Goldwyn International Strategies. In the main, the think-tank community stands out as the primary actors of the securitized US Africa policy claim, next to the executive branch. Their unified voice in articulating this claim is also striking when considering the typical diversity of opinions offered by these institutions according to their varying political leanings.

In looking at who were the actors articulating the claim that Africa represents an existential threat to US national security, it is interesting to note who they were not. Perhaps surprisingly, a survey of publications from US foreign policy and African issues-based institutions, as well as Congressional hearings and testimonies concerning the subject, revealed little use of the security agenda in relation to Africa by organizations other than the think tanks and few special interest groups mentioned above. While one might have expected to find more NGOs or African constituencies claiming the need for increased assistance through use of a security-based argument—as seen in its use by the business-
related special interest groups exemplified by Commission on Capital Flows to Africa and Goldwyn International Strategies who stood to gain from secured access to African resources and markets—use of this rationale by such organizations was the exception and not the rule.

In fact, more common among these African or foreign policy issues-based organizations was a critique of an increasingly "militarized" US Africa policy, as seen in an online statement by the TransAfrica Forum, one of the most well known African-issues special interest groups in the US: "The US government needs to support human rights, democracy, independence and economic development...instead of supporting the Global War on Terror in the Horn of Africa."\textsuperscript{174} This statement implies that development goals are not, in fact, interconnected with terror-related security goals in Africa, and proposes that current developmental needs are not being met due to the Bush administration's propensity for viewing the continent in militaristic terms. A statement to Congress by the president of the NGO Bread for the World, David Beckmann, also exemplifies the message that African underdevelopment is not a security issue and is not benefitted by connection to threat-based security logic: "The MCA should not be used for political [or strategic] purposes. We learned during the Cold War that aid that is driven by strategic purposes is unlikely to reduce poverty."\textsuperscript{175} The issue of African poverty is then discussed with no reference to implications for American national security.

\textit{Political Agency as a Factor}

As was determined in the earlier discussion on Securitization Theory, the factor of political agency is critical to the process of securitization. Political agency, identified in this study by a set of specific characteristics including the actors' status as a state or non-state entity, their strength in number in making their claim, and their status or rank in the political system. In the case of the proposition of post-9/11 US Africa policy as a security issue, these factors clearly play a large role in adding to the strength of the claim being made. The strength of

the claim has been supported by the complete grouping of the executive agencies and great number of think tanks espousing it; their status as either state or elite entities within the foreign policymaking arena; and the individual actors' levels of rank as the representatives of their respective agencies in articulating the claim.

The gathering of prominent institutions moving to place Africa on the US security agenda is relatively large, considering the tendency for foreign policy issues to incur conflicting viewpoints and approaches within the policymaking arena. The complete unity of the executive branch, discussed above, combined with a number of prominent Washington think tanks from across the political spectrum, created a significant conglomerate of actors making the securitizing claim in this case.

It is important to note the status of these agencies as state and elite entities. The American executive branch formulates the policies to be debated and considered by the legislative branch and so unquestionably plays the frontline role in the foreign policymaking process. Think tanks, though non-state entities, play an elite role in this process; these institutions represent a powerful voice in the Washington foreign policymaking community, continuously informing the discussion within this community through research and analysis of selected policy issues. The combined political capital of these agencies as leaders within the Washington policymaking arena certainly affected the weight ascribed to their unified claim.

The third important characteristic of these actors' agency is their level of rank in the political system. The incidents of claims articulated in this case are not informal sound bites from obscure bureaucrats making their views known within the ranks of their respective institutions. The individuals articulating the case that US Africa policy is a security issue have been some of the top-ranking representatives of their respective institutions. In the case of the US executive branch, the political capital of broad policy publications such as the NSS, National Defense Strategy, and Fragile States Strategy stem from their attribution to

the President, Secretaries of Defense and State. The high level of agency carried by these top level officials and those just under their rank in these departments, strengthens the clout of their argument. The same is true in the case of the individuals making this claim from the public policy institutes listed above; these are not unknown commentators, but Senior Fellows and prominent figures within the Washington inner circle of foreign policy players.

In sum, the framing of post-9/11 US Africa policy as a security issue was articulated by a well-numbered gathering of high level representatives of the utmost elite Washington foreign policymaking actors. The amount of political agency owned by the securitizing actors in this case was most certainly great, as evidenced by these factors.

3.3.3 How the Claim was Made

Context as a Factor

In this case, we see that both the trauma of 9/11 and the American identity as promoters of democratic ideals abroad, reinvigorated by the events of 9/11, are referenced by actors to bring resonance to their claims concerning US Africa policy.

The context within which the policymaking community was operating during the time of these claims was one permeated by an overwhelming national fixation on the threat of terrorism. Allusions to a likely terrorist attack on American soil—paralleled to that of 9/11—are found throughout the securitizing claims concerning US Africa policy. These arguments spell out, with frequent and descriptive references, the alignment of the current African condition with the imminent threat of terrorism, and illustrate for the audience exactly what the end result of unfettered African-grown terrorism could be, aligning their claims with the shock of the 9/11 attacks. Just as Al Qaeda was able to strike and kill 3,000 Americans in one day, these terrorists "will be able to bring violence to our home shores."177

References to the "lessons learned" from 9/11 run throughout arguments concerning US Africa policy in order to draw on this insecurity, insinuating that if appropriate threat-prevention measures are not taken, then another such attack could be the result. Once the "lesson in terrorism" that "history teaches us" is iterated, the need to increase aid to Africa is posed, typically accompanying descriptions of its weak states as "havens" and "breeding grounds" for terrorists, "sanctuaries" for terrorists...from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks," "where terrorists can congregate and prepare for operations with relative impunity." The continent is posed as "a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism" that "evidence shows...terrorists intend to take full advantage of." Increased aid to Africa is needed to combat the spread of terrorism and thus save Americans from another 9/11. As "[h]istory teaches us...we should not lose sight of the high risk that accompanies failure."

In addition to the trauma of 9/11, another significant contextual factor of the period covered in this study—the reinvigorated self-image of Americans as global promoters of democratic ideals—is drawn upon by actors attempting to securitize US Africa policy. The 2002 NSS which laid the foundation for the Africa policy claim placed the post-9/11 commitment to resolve the "poverty, weak institutions, and corruption [that] can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks" on a platform of democracy and freedom promotion.

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The NSS reminds Americans that these are universal ideals—"non-negotiable demands of human dignity"—and that it is "our responsibility [as Americans] to lead in this great mission." A USAID policy outline of the implementation of its aid programs designed to promote democracy in regions such as Africa echoes this message:

Advancing democracy, as the president has said, is the "testing" and the "calling" of this generation. With the spread of democracy linked to our values and our national security, and with democracy at the heart of foreign policy, we are promoting it worldwide.

Outside of the executive branch, public policy institutions' claims concerning US Africa policy are found to reference a general "American generosity" and desire to contribute toward humanitarian endeavors. These are for the most part brief mentions of a national tradition of honoring such ideals in policymaking, as seen in a CFR task force report calling on the government to "maintain its historic and principled humanitarian concerns, while broadening the basis for US engagement on the continent." It should be noted, however, that these references are not only less frequent in comparison with state executive documents, neither are they as emphatic in this element of their message. In comparison, the commentary on US Africa policy as a security issue found in high level executive sources is laced with direct and consistent calls on Americans to view increased engagement with the continent in the context of a national obligation to support these issues; by framing the security-development objectives of US Africa policy in the context of a traditional promotion of American democratic values, the entire policy framework is posed as an extension of the national identity.

In sum, it is clear that context was drawn upon by actors consistently throughout the articulation of their claims concerning post-9/11 US Africa policy. While the trauma of 9/11 played the larger role, this and the American identity as promoters of a morally based foreign policy were both drawn upon as prominent features of the national experience in an attempt to increase the audience's identification with the claim.

3.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the claim that post-9/11 US Africa policy is a security issue, identifying the actors who made the claim and how they made it. As established in Chapter One of this study, the factors of political agency and context were to be considered in this process.

The claim was first examined in its broad characterization of post-9/11 African issues as national security issues, and then in its formulation in reference to requests for increased or new military and development assistance programs. Claims were also considered in their symbolic form, as seen in the act of increasing the request for military-related aid for Africa and in the plans to establish of a new US military command center for the continent.

The evidence gathered from sources concerned with US Africa policy revealed that this claim, in its broad form and its application to military and development assistance needs, was primarily espoused by a unified executive branch and relevant think-tanks. Political agency was determined to be an integral factor in their role as actors, as these institutions' level of agency is extremely high in the foreign policymaking establishment. This agency was compounded by their strength in number and united message, and their articulation by representatives of the highest ranks within these institutions. The actors drew upon the context of their audience by relating the claim to the trauma of 9/11 and the American identity as global promoters of democratic ideals. Use of the latter contextual factor was used to a lesser degree than the former, limited mostly to high-level executive policy documents.

As the second and final step of the Copenhagen School's securitization process, the act of legitimation of the claim from the last chapter is the subject of this one. It should be noted that the end result of the securitization process of post-9/11 US Africa policy has not been held to be a mystery in this study. Indeed, this thesis was introduced with a description of the increased strategic significance of Africa with reference to the dramatic increase in aid to the continent. The significance of the question of legitimation in this case is found in discovering the attributes of the legitimation undertaken.

It is the aim of this chapter to identify (1) the audience who is the recipient of this claim and (2) the effect of the techniques used by the actors to support their claim on this audience. In other words, the point is to determine who legitimated the claim and how they were convinced to do so. Once the audience is identified, it will be analyzed according to its level of political agency, and its legitimation of the US Africa policy claim will be analyzed according to whether the contextual factors referenced by the actors played a role in facilitating this legitimation.

To identify these attributes requires an examination of the indicators that an acceptance of the claim of Africa as a national security issue has taken place. Considering the actors' claim in this case is centered on requests for increased and enhanced aid to Africa, evidence for acceptance of this claim is looked for in the response to these requests. This includes the immediate legislative response as well as the wider response in the public arena. The legislative approval process is examined to determine not only that the requests are authorized, but that the logic behind this authorization is based on the security-oriented rationale posed by the actors. In the same way, the public dialogue concerning US Africa policy is examined for evidence of a widespread acceptance of this claim. The public's position is determined using previously published opinion polls as well as an original survey of media sources typically representative of popular US foreign policy information.
The first section of this chapter establishes the case that the securitizing claim of post-9/11 US Africa policy has, in fact, been legitimated. The second section lays out a more comprehensive collection of evidence for this legitimation, again divided between the categories of military and development aid. The third section reviews the findings of the previous sections in the terms of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory with the additions of political agency and context included in the analysis. The fourth section summarizes the chapter's conclusions.

3.1 The Legitimation: US Africa Policy as a Security Issue

From its inception, the portrayal of Africa as a national security issue based on the post-9/11 terrorist threat found support in the legislative branch. The logic that weak African states unable to provide for the basic needs of their populations and without adequate control of their territories can provide a breeding ground and safe-haven for anti-American extremists began to surface in debates among legislators concerning African issues. Congressional representatives were open in their endorsement of this message, as seen in a statement by Senator Nancy Kassebaum-Baker in a hearing on the Commission for Africa Report:

As President George W. Bush has said, persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair, and when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror. 'Development provides the resources to build hope and prosperity and security,' unquote. There are no better words, I think, Mr. Chairman, to describe the importance of Africa's future and our common interest.186

While direct quotes of the administration's claim were more the exception than the rule, executive branch language and descriptions of African issues began to be adopted by Congressional representatives in their own reflections on proposed bills or appropriations. For example, the parallel between statements by the Defense Department in its National Defense Strategy and Representative Edward Royce, respectively, is obvious:

The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unable, and in some cases unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving access open to hostile exploitation.¹⁸⁷

It is clear that in the fight against terrorism, no region can be ignored, and that is especially true of Africa. The general weakness of African governments, as well as the civil strife which exists in several countries, makes parts of the continent hospitable grounds for terrorist operations.¹⁸⁸

Senator Russ Feingold also echoed this message to confirm the status of US Africa policy as a national security issue in the context of the USWOT:

It is abundantly clear that the US national security...and the ability of African countries to achieve their full growth and development potential depend upon improving and expanding governance and accountability so that legitimate grievances are addressed and extremism cannot take root.¹⁸⁹

While these examples of Congressional commentary on US Africa policy represent a clear legitimation of the Bush administration's framing of the issue, evidence of the securitizing claim's salience outside of the capitol building is not so easily found. In keeping with the standard policy information flow from the policymaking community to the wider public, this study surveyed a group of leading American newspapers to determine whether the view of Africa policy as a security issue had extended beyond this elite community. A search of these news sources revealed that over the period of time covered in this study, from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2007, a total of 13,253 news stories on the subject of Africa were printed, with less than 18 percent of these connected to the subject of

national security and less than 8 percent connected to the subject of terrorism, with the possibility that some of these overlap, giving stories associated with both subjects double representation.190

Considering the visibility of US foreign policy issues in the American public forum, especially following the attacks of 9/11 and the assumption of a global war on terror, the absence of the Africa policy claim is noteworthy, if not foreseeable. Conventional knowledge suggests that a security-oriented interest in Africa might provoke the attention of a wider audience. In reality, however, the lack of coverage on African issues—much less those that frame the continent as a security threat—is a continuation of a longstanding history of such neglect in the US media. One study spanning a period of forty years, from 1955-1995, surveyed the role of Africa in the US media and reported that less than 1/3 of 1 percent of the coverage was devoted to African countries.191 More recent evidence of this trend can be found in a Harvard University-sponsored online research engine that takes daily samples of global news coverage of each region of the world. News topics gathered from this source consistently show relatively low American news coverage on the region of sub-Saharan Africa in comparison with other regions, such as the Middle East, Europe or Asia.192

In sum, as the Congressional dialogue concerning US Africa policy reveals, the message "that weak states...pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states" because "poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks"193 found an accepting audience in the US legislative branch. Congressional hearings held after 9/11 on the subject of Africa policy virtually all saw some reference to the national security risks emanating from the African continent. This claim of Africa as a security threat did not extend beyond the legislature in any significant way, however, as the

190 Using Lexis-Nexis Media, the author conducted a search for "Africa" in the headlines of the New York Times, New York Post and Washington Post. Results were then sorted according to their listed subject tags as either "national security" or "terrorism" as provided by Nexis-Lexis Media. This search was repeated with the name of every country in sub-Saharan Africa in order to ensure no possible Africa-related stories were missed should "Africa" not appear in the headline.


media during this time period did not carry this message, nor much message at all concerning the continent.

4.2 The Legitimation: Military and Development Aid

The acceptance of the post-9/11 argument that Africa represents a threat to American national security is further evidenced by the increase in aid to the continent and the authorization of new or enhanced security and development initiatives based on the logic articulated by the executive branch and think tank community. Commentary and dialogue used among legislators to facilitate these policy changes echo the same argument, verifying their ascription to the security-based motivation for such changes.

Outside of the capitol building, legitimation for increased development and military aid to Africa is, again, difficult to locate. Given the earlier revelation of Africa's overall lack of attention in the media, it is not surprising that these policy changes have not found a significant public audience by which to be either legitimated or rejected. However, if the search for a relevant public opinion on the issue of US Africa aid is widened to include US foreign aid as a whole, there is a clear trend in the American populace's view of the need for an increase in such government spending; they are against it. A Gallup Poll conducted from 2002 to 2007 consistently found each year that around 60% of the population believed too much foreign aid was being included in the federal budget. This does not speak well for the likelihood of a widespread legitimation of drastic increases to the US Africa aid budget among the American public. In fact, it appears as if American public opinion ran directly contrary to that of the legislature during the period of this study.

4.2.1 Military Aid

Legitimation of the argument that the conditions in Africa merit increased and enhanced American military engagement is clearly seen in the rise in such activity authorized for the

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194 By year, the results were 63% in 2007, 64% in 2006, 54% in 2005, 60% in 2004, 2003 was not included in the Gallup Poll publication, 53% in 2002. News Service. "World Affairs Survey." Gallup Polls Social Series. 2002-2006.
continent since 9/11. This includes an increase in the funding for military training and counterterrorism operations as well as the endorsement for AFRICOM. The legislative commentary concerning these policy changes evidences the securitized US Africa policy logic guiding them.

**Increased Funding**

The military training programs and regional counterterrorism operations the Bush administration framed as vital responses to US national security needs on the African continent received significant increases in appropriations granted by Congress following 9/11, according to a review of Foreign Military Assistance Reports published annually by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. In light of the history of US Africa policy neglect in aid levels as discussed in Chapter Two, such a change in funding levels represents a clear case of extraordinary action legitimated by the legislature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Foreign Military Aid to sub-Saharan Africa 2001-2006 (in millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Military Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unified Command</td>
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<td>Peacekeeping Operations*</td>
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<td>Regional Center for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service-Sponsored Activities</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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Beyond the monetary increase in the appropriations granted for these military training and counterterrorism operations funding accounts, the nature and characteristics of some of these programs provide evidence of legitimation of a security claim, as they too represent shifts from standard policy implementation. The authorization of such extraordinary policy changes evidences the audience's acceptance that US Africa policy, as a security issue, necessitates such a break from the norm. Shifts in the management and function of US Africa military training programs and counterterrorism operations were all based on this underlying logic, whether they were enhancements to old operating procedures or new conceptions of such aid provisions.

One of the earliest indicators of the legitimation of the claim that enhanced security measures were needed in US Africa policy came just three months after 9/11 in the form of an augmented peacekeeping training force. Congressional approval of ACOTA supported a shift from the earlier version of the program that trained African forces in non-lethal peacekeeping operations for a more "robust" version of the program that would significantly expand these forces' capabilities. In December 2001, the Bush administration began its re-conceptualization of the program, moving it from peacekeeping assistance to training in lethal force capabilities. Five months later authorization was provided for the initiative, evidencing early Congressional acceptance of the argument that weak African states unable to control their own territories merit enhanced security assistance beyond previously set operating procedures.195

The lethal-capabilities addition to ACOTA was followed shortly by authorization for the same enhanced training level to another training program proposed in the wake of 9/11. The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was initially authorized by Congress in 2002 as a temporary Defense Department appropriation for education in strategy and doctrine provided by the US to foreign militaries, but was granted permanent authorization and lethal status the following year, making the program the same

as the State Department-funded IMET program. The significance of the CTFP's funding through the Defense Department as opposed to the State Department is seen in its avoidance of legal restrictions imposed on IMET concerning eligible participants, in effect opening up the same training provisions to those agents barred from IMET. And as with any comparison of funding via the State versus Defense, the expedited processing and lesser amount of Congressional oversight required of military-financed programs are major differences as well. The appeal of these attributes to Pentagon policymakers can be seen in the large increases in CTFP appropriations since its inception. The legislative approval of this program and its subsequent enhancements and funding, based on the military's description of CTFP as the epitome of its "adjusted security cooperation efforts to the new realities of a post-September 11th world," also evidences legitimation of measures taken outside the realm of normalcy for pre-9/11 Africa military assistance.

The effective bypass of legal restrictions seen in the creation of the CTFP is evidenced again in the circumvention of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) by the Defense Department in its engagement with an increasing number of African countries. ASPA prohibits military engagement with countries that have not signed a bilateral agreement with the US guaranteeing that Americans will not be transferred to the International Criminal Court. Based on the claim that the national security interest is at stake in security cooperation with these countries, the Bush administration issued 17 waivers to African countries during the period of this study. While the White House was able to issue these waivers without legislative approval, support of these exceptional directives is seen in the 2006 Congressional decision to permanently rescind the restriction on IMET training that had been granted through these waivers. This move, based on Defense Department claims that the restrictions impaired military relations with allies in the USWOT

197 United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest FY2001-FY 2007, Part II Description of Programs.
"in ways that undermine[d] US national security,"\textsuperscript{199} served as legitimation of the security-based rationale.

This theme of extraordinary actions authorized in the interest of national security is also identified in the Section 1206 capabilities provided to the Pentagon in 2006. Born out of a temporary provision for the Defense Department to fund Iraqi and Afghan military training without the involvement of the State Department, the original Section 1206 authorities were deemed necessary due to extenuating war-time circumstances that warranted circumvention of the standard bureaucratic and untimely State provisions process.\textsuperscript{200} In 2006, Congress extended these powers for another three year period and removed their geographic limitation to Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on the joint State and Defense argument that other allies in the USWOT required readily available funding for counterterrorism training needs, the singular authority\textsuperscript{201} of the Pentagon in funding and implementing such training was authorized for extension.\textsuperscript{202} Since the inception of the expanded Section 1206, Africa has already seen significant growth in its share of the funding as evidenced by the jump from $13 million in 2006 to $44.9 million in 2007. These funds are used in the military training and counterterrorism operations accounts previously discussed.\textsuperscript{203}

\textit{AFRICOM Authorized}

The authorization of a US military command center dedicated exclusively to Africa is perhaps the ultimate legitimation of a securitized Africa policy. When the President announced his intention to create AFRICOM in February 2006, he was making an unequivocal claim that the continent merited the highest and most centralized level of


\textsuperscript{201} The Defense Department's use of these funds in selected programs and countries must receive approval by the State Department, the planning, implementation and funding are all through its own accounts.


American military attention. Congressional approval of the command center legitimated this claim and its underlying security-development logic, as seen in AFRICOM's command structure. Unlike other command centers, AFRICOM is staffed by high level officials from the Department of State and USAID in addition to the Department of Defense. A senior US diplomat serves as Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA), ranked at the same level as the Department of Defense Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). Alongside the DCMO, this diplomat manages programs associated with "nontraditional" security-related issues such as de-mining, disaster response, security sector reform, and peace support operations.204

This incorporation of development objectives into the military command's defense framework is notable in its reflection of a growing theme also detectable in the military aid programs above; the security-development logic underlying the securitization of post-9/11 US Africa policy is manifested in increasing Department of Defense control over what has been a Department of State-managed aid structure implemented by military personnel. Indeed, the introduction of training programs under direct Defense Department management and the Section 1206 funding account allowing the bypass of important State Department and Congressional oversight stipulations evidence the leadership shift occurring in the larger picture of post-9/11 US Africa policy management. AFRICOM's structure reinforces this new trend in US Africa policy, as seen in the equally-ranked civilian and military deputies' lines of command to the same boss—a four star general.

**Audience Commentary**

The realities of increased funding for military aid initiatives and an authorized Africa Command are evidence of a successfully securitized US Africa policy in their own right. Indeed, the actors' success in moving this policy issue onto the security agenda is inherent in the nature of the approved aid and command center as tools of national security. However, the dialogue surrounding this authorization process also serves to prove the motivation of the audience in complying with such requests. The statements highlighted here are

representative of the wider survey of such legislative statements in that they evidence a consistent parallel with the Bush administration's and think-tanks' arguments in the case of both funding to the new and old programs discussed above, and the creation of AFRICOM.

Representative Edward Royce was one of the earliest supporters of increased assistance to the continent, and from the beginning based his description of the need for increased military aid to Africa on the security-development logic articulated by the actors, stating that "Security is an essential foundation for Africa's development. With the development of terrorist sanctuaries in Africa, we have an increasing stake in the continent's peace and in its stability." He repeated his support for increased military aid in another hearing, using the language of Brookings Senior Fellow Rice to do so: "Africa...has been frankly described as the soft underbelly of the war on terror.... We need more resources devoted to these [counterterrorism] pursuits in Africa."  

Representative Donald Payne voiced support for increased funding for regional counterterrorism operations following a reminder of the importance of African states in the USWOT. He makes the case that American failure to fund such assistance initiatives would contribute to the failure of these states to contain the terrorist organizations in their territories, following the lead of the Bush administration message:

[The CJTF-HOA] was created...because the Horn of Africa is a key region of counterterrorism... We must support these African governments with resources and support if we expect them to be able to do an adequate job [in counterterrorism]. We don't fight terrorism by isolating countries and cutting them off from foreign investment in terrorism.

Despite the clear focus on the connection between the condition of weak African states and the imminent threat of terrorist attacks on Americans in post-9/11 US Africa policy

discussions, Congressional dialogue surrounding military assistance in the Gulf of Guinea region also evidences the legitimation of the energy-based argument that American dependency on oil—and increasingly African oil—makes US Africa policy a security issue. Again demonstrative of a number of other legislative statements on the subject, Royce's support for military aid in the region draws on this logic:

The importance of US oil production in the Gulf of Guinea points to developing a strategy to protect this production from terrorism, and this raises critical concerns about the role of the US military in the region and its relations with African militaries.208

Summing Up

The funding increase to accounts responsible for US Africa military training programs and regional counterterrorism operations and the authorization of AFRICOM represent military aid policy changes that legitimated the Bush administration post-9/11 US Africa policy claim. The change in funding involved a number of extraordinary measures validated through appropriations, such as enhanced training programs, waived legal restrictions on program participation, and new programs granting the Defense Department increased capabilities and discretion within the military aid framework. These changes were the result of Congressional legitimation of the securitized US Africa policy claim as seen in their adoption of the securitizing actors' logic in their commentary in relation to these topics.

4.2.2 Development Aid

A significant and steady rise in ODA, the extension of AGOA, and the authorization of two new programs—the MCA and PEPFAR—all evidence Congressional legitimation of the Bush administration's securitized approach to post-9/11 US Africa policy. Legislative approval based on the claim that African underdevelopment represents a security threat to the US is seen in Congressional discussion surrounding each of these policy changes. In

carrying with the theme of the growing leadership shift identified in the management of military aid, so too do changes in the US Africa development aid structure signal a loss of State Department and USAID power to the Defense Department in this regard.

**Increased Funding**

In accordance with the executive branch's requests for increasing resources to apply toward Africa, ODA received a substantial boost in the years following 9/11, going from $1.3 billion in 2001 to $4.6 billion in 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ODA Assistance (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,375.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,372.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4,065.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,602.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,567.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Official Development Assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (in millions)**

While this marked increase in ODA represents a clear break from past appropriations levels to the continent, the distribution of these aid dollars is what is striking. In a study conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2005, the international organization reported that US ODA increases were being used to augment security sectors rather than purely for development. In Africa, the primary recipient countries were found to be "either petroleum exporting countries or countries whose support had been enlisted in the USWOT, such as Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan." In fact, another study by the CSIS confirmed that the share of ODA assistance provided through the Defense Department rather than USAID or State had gone from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005. Such ODA dollars are incorporated into the "nontraditional" security activities conducted through accounts such as Section 1206 discussed above. This shift in aid

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distribution, consistently legitimated by continuing Congressional appropriations, evidences the securitization of US Africa development assistance post-9/11.

**AGOA Extension**

Framed by the Bush administration as an important investment in alleviating the poor economic conditions in Africa that can foster extremist sentiments and thus strengthen recruitment efforts of terrorist organizations, the US Africa trade initiative has enjoyed widespread Congressional support post-9/11. In contrast to the struggle endured by the Clinton administration during the 1990s in passing the original act, AGOA has been consistently amended and extended by Congress in accordance with the Bush administration's requests with relative ease. Originally set to expire in 2008, AGOA has been extended to run through 2015.²¹¹

**MCA, PEPFAR Authorization**

Again, following executive branch descriptions of development and HIV/AIDS as endangering the USWOT in weak and failing states, Congress authorized both the MCA and PEPFAR. These programs have seen substantial increases in assistance to Africa. While the appropriations numbers are not reported according to geographic region, a solid majority of both accounts' resources go to sub-Saharan Africa, as intended in their inception.²¹²

| Millennium Challenge Account (in millions) |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 2004            | 2005            | 2006            | 2007            |
| 994             | 1488            | 1752.3          | 1752.3          |


SOURCE: Department of State Function 150 Congressional Budget Justification FY2006-2009 (Actual aid numbers confirmed 2 years after disbursed.)
Note: Numbers are total MCA funding; not available by geographic region.

Global HIV/AIDS Funding/PEPFAR (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<td>2700</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>4500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PEPFAR Making a Difference: Funding Fact Sheet [http://www.pepfar.gov/press/80064.htm]
Note: PEPFAR appropriations begin FY2004.

Audience Commentary

Congress' authorization of increased ODA funding, AGOA extension, and the MCA and PEPFAR all provided legitimation of the securitized US Africa policy claim due to their passage based on its underlying logic that underdeveloped African states represent a security threat to Americans. Legislators' use of this executive branch US Africa policy claim within their own commentaries on the subject confirms the passage of the development aid programs based on this claim.

Representative Mark Green summed up the securitized post-9/11 US Africa policy message exactly in the hearing on MCA implementation:

"One reason that I think this legislation proves so popular among members is that I think all of us have an understanding that in the long range generational battle against terrorism that we are involved in, it will not simply be enough to fight terrorism on a military level... Instead, we are looking for ways to sow seeds of hope and opportunity in areas that have been controlled for too long by despair."²¹³

Similarly, Senator Richard Lugar listed the benefits of AGOA, MCA and PEPFAR after acknowledging that "[o]ur nation sees more clearly in the post-September 11 world how our

own wellbeing is connected to progress on the African continent." He later focused on AGOA, stating that "if you wanted to get into an argument over textiles, you need to extend the argument to American security."

Representative Barbara Lee also legitimated the administration's claim in her call for development aid to be used alongside the military assistance being offered to Africa in the USWOT, saying that:

we believe that it is important to approach the issue of terrorism in a very... comprehensive manner, and we need a strategy that, yes, is part military, but also goes beyond military in terms of addressing poverty reduction, developments, aid, and trade... Desperate people do desperate things.

A statement made by Representative Henry Hyde in a hearing on HIV/AIDS also framed PEPFAR and the larger US Africa foreign assistance framework in the context of the USWOT and, thus, American national security:

[Strategy is defined as 'the science and art of using all the forces of a nation to execute approved plans as effectively as possible during peace or war.' In sub-Saharan Africa where the extended family is the only Social Security, AIDS has quickly claimed the wage-earning population... We've already come to the gruesome realization that this scenario creates an enabling atmosphere for religious extremism and terrorist activity... This creates a clear and present danger to our national security.

Summing Up

The legislative authorization of the Bush administration’s requests for increased ODA, the extension of AGOA, and the establishment of the MCA and PEPFAR all provided legitimation to the post-9/11 claim of US Africa policy as a security issue. As evidenced by the Congressional commentary in relevant deliberations, these were all passed based at least in part on the logic that African underdevelopment presents a "clear and present danger" to American national security due to its potential as a terrorist breeding ground.

The changed nature of ODA distribution patterns since 9/11 has also evidenced the legitimation of this securitized approach to US Africa policy, as seen in the OECD study’s finding that such aid is increasingly being directed toward African countries that are strategically relevant in the USWOT. This is reflective of the larger institutional shift seen happening between the Departments of State and Defense, as more and more aid responsibilities seem to be moving under the Pentagon’s direction.

4.3 The Legitimation: Theoretical Analysis

As instructed by the Copenhagen School, an analysis of the legitimation of post-9/11 US Africa policy must identify (1) the audience who is the recipient of this claim and (2) the effect of the techniques used by the actors to support their claim on this audience. These issues are considered below along with the factors of political agency and context that are included in the securitization framework used in this study.

4.3.1 The Legitimation

As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, the successful legitimation of the securitized US Africa policy claim was not held to be a mystery in this study. The drastically increased amounts of aid to Africa from the US is clear evidence of extraordinary action taken in regards to US Africa policy when set against the negligence of the continent by the US in the 1990s. Further evidence of extraordinary action is found in the authorization of military training programs taken to a lethal level, waived restrictions on participation in such programs, and the creation of new programs that involve less Congressional oversight and funding stipulations, such as the CTFP and Section 1206 account. Collectively, these instances of
expanded executive branch leeway in managing US Africa policy have seen power shifted more and more toward the military side of the equation. Indeed, this growing trend in Africa policy direction moving away from the Department of State to Defense can be seen as an emblematic projection of the legitimation of the securitized claim of post-9/11 US Africa policy.

Further confirmation of the legitimation of this claim and its accompanying security-development logic is found in Congressional dialogue surrounding post-9/11 US Africa policy. It is clear from the arguments made by legislators for these policy changes that the message that weak African states provide a breeding ground and safe-haven for terrorists was immediately accepted and incorporated into their own commentary on the subject. Their use of this Bush administration security-development logic, focused on centralized state development at the expense of more widespread development needs, in supporting military and development aid requests confirms the legitimation of the US Africa policy securitizing claim, as well as ascription to this post-9/11 version of such logic.

4.3.2 The Legitimating Audience

The role of the audience in this case is clearly filled by the legislative branch. Not only is all evidence of legitimation of the securitized post-9/11 US Africa policy claim found within Congressional records, the intention of the actors to focus their arguments on the legislature seems apparent. Beyond the broad policy documents issued by the White House that are meant as a public elaboration of the government's foreign policy plan or passing reference in requisite program descriptions on departmental websites, USAID, Departments of State and Defense claims regarding Africa are generally found in either Congressional testimony or in speeches made to public policy-focused institutions such as think tanks or interest group forums—neither considered representative of the larger American populace.

Indeed, the lack of coverage in the media and the opinion poll finding that Americans desire less spending on foreign aid suggest that the American public was excluded from the process. It is worth noting that the most visible coverage of Africa provided to the public during this time period was in association with the "One Campaign" to "Make Poverty History" and the
2005 "Live 8" concert series—both widely promoted celebrity-infused programs that spotlighted Africa in a non-strategic, humanitarian light. Further, based on the fact that the poll opinion that foreign aid should be decreased applied to US foreign policy as a whole—inclusive of clearly securitized regions such as the Middle East, the case can be made that even if they had been included the public would have rejected the claim that US Africa policy as a security issue required increased aid.

Political Agency as a Factor

The relevance of the political agency factor in the case of the audience could not be clearer. The general public—with the least amount of political agency of any potential actor in the policymaking process—is excluded entirely. On the other hand, Congress owns a level of agency ranking with that of the executive branch in general policymaking. Of the measures of political agency identified in this study as the status of the agent as a state or non-state entity, their strength in number, and their status or rank in the political system, two speak to the legislature’s strengthened agency in the role of audience. The Congress’ status as a state entity contributes to its level of agency in the process; as the holder of the purse strings for requested aid accounts and proposed programs or institutions, it controls the ultimate success or failure of any proposed policy changes. The level of the agents making the legitimation in the legislature—Senators and Representatives—all collectively manage this vital role, evidencing the relatively uniform level of elevated agency of each of the representatives in speaking on the subject of US Africa policy and its proposed appropriations. Only the measure of the number of agents included in the legitimation does not contribute to the high level of political agency carried by the audience in this case. In the absence of public engagement with the topic, Congress is left alone in the legitimation or rejection of the claim; it is important to keep in mind, however, that although its political capital is not increased with additional sectors joining in the legitimation determination of the legislature, neither is it diminished.

4.3.3 How the Claim was Legitimated

217 See www.one.org and www.live8live.com
Context as a Factor

The personal motivation for the legitimation of a securitized approach to post-9/11 US Africa policy cannot be evidenced and reported in the same way that authorized aid policies and statements of support for these policies can be. However, the weight of the use of contextual factors by the actors to build the relevancy of their claim with the audience can be detected to some degree based on the reflection of these same references in the audience's commentary surrounding their legitimation of Africa policy changes. In reviewing the statements made by legislators concerning the subject of US Africa policy as a security issue, it appears that context did play a role in the facilitation of the claim's legitimation based on the references to the trauma of 9/11 and the American identity within these.

It is clear that the actors in this case did well to draw on the audience's context as post-9/11 Americans highly sensitive to the threat of transnational terrorism to the United States. References to this aspect of the securitized US Africa policy claim were highlighted by many of the legislators making their cases for increased aid to the continent. For instance, Representative Jim Kolbe cited the horrific and ominous nature of the terrorist threat revealed by 9/11 to explain his support for military aid to Africa, following up a description of the benefits of such aid with the statement that

the president marked the six-month anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks in a speech that included the following comment, quote, 'We face an enemy of ruthless ambition, unconstrained by law or morality. Against such an enemy there is no immunity and there can be no neutrality,' unquote. I agree with those remarks of the president and I agree that this war against terrorism is not finished, and no one can say for certain that the terrorists will not attempt to strike again here in the United States someplace. 218

Just as Representative Kolbe referenced the unprecedented threat posed by transnational terrorism and incorporated a reminder of the imminent danger of another attack on American soil, other legislators commonly either prefaced or concluded their remarks on US Africa policy—whether in regards to a specific aid initiative or not—with some at reference to the traumatic attacks of 9/11, seemingly in order to give gravity to their message. Examples include a statement in support of HIV/AIDS funding prefaced with the fact that this is "especially poignant at this time when we're fighting a war abroad and the fear of terrorism is ever most on our mind;"219 a statement validating heightened funding requests begun with the assertion that "[t]he events of September 11 require that we take a new approach to our foreign assistance programs;"220 increased African aid justified with the qualifier that "[o]ur nation sees more clearly in the post- September 11 world how our own wellbeing is connected to progress on the African continent;"221 the point that "US policies toward all regions of the world have been forced to adjust to the post-September 11 world"222 opening a hearing on US Africa policy two months after 9/11; and more than one call for increased attention to Africa's "terrorist breeding grounds" begun with a reminder that Americans could not afford to neglect African security or development issues "in the wake of September 11th." 223

In addition to the contextual factor of post-9/11 trauma, the factor of a "distinctly American internationalism" based on the worldwide promotion of democratic ideals also shows up in these records, although to a lesser degree. References to "the moral imperative to act"224

were made within a larger argument for the strategic relevance of the policy issue in question. A statement in support of the MCA by Senator Lugar is representative of a number of legislative statements that included brief reference to the American identity in conjunction with an overarching security-oriented message; he focused on the strategic importance of the program in the context of the USWOT before concluding with an acknowledgement that it would also serve "the altruistic American desire to help others achieve the prosperity that we are so fortunate to enjoy in this country."225 Similarly, Representative Royce’s statement in support of AGOA warned that if African development issues were neglected "our growing security and economic interests on the continent would suffer, as would our humanitarian character."226 Another case made for AGOA included the fact that its extension was important "in the grim sense of the war on terrorism, but even more important in the idealism of the American people," and that along with the security interests at stake, "the compatibility of [this legislation] with our humanity and our idealism is important and so we need to be thinking through that likewise."227

While references to the American identity did not seem to hold the same level of resonance with the Congressional audience as did the trauma of the attacks on the World Trade Center, as seen in their lesser number than those of the "lessons" of 9/11, both the trauma of 9/11 and the American identity were incorporated into the audience’s commentary surrounding US Africa policy. These references evidence the effectiveness of the Bush administration and think-tanks’ use of context in framing their securitizing claim.

4.4 Conclusion

The objectives of this chapter were to identify the audience of the post-9/11 US Africa policy securitization claim, and to determine if this audience was effectively influenced by the actors’ use of contextual factors in legitimating this claim. After verifying the legitimation of the claim that post-9/11 US Africa policy is a security issue through Congressional

statements echoing this message, this study concluded that the legislature was the sole audience in this securitization process and, due to the absence of this message in the media and public opinion polls showing a resistance to foreign aid spending, that the American public was excluded from this process and likely would not have legitimated the claim if it had been.

Authorization of military and development aid requests were shown to evidence legislative ascription to the post-9/11 US Africa policy claim as seen in their inclusion of extraordinary actions and a larger subtle but growing trend in Africa policy direction and leadership away from USAID and the State Department to the Department of Defense. Indeed, the increasing role of the Pentagon in US Africa policy 2001-2007 stands as symbolic but dramatic testament to the strength of the security-based orientation of the Bush administration's Africa policy claim.

Congressional commentary surrounding the authorized policy changes revealed that the context of the trauma of 9/11 and the American identity as global promoters of democratic ideals had an impact on the audience, as seen in the repetition of these factors within these statements.
Conclusion

In view of the recent dramatic aid increase and establishment of a new US military command center on the continent, the purpose of this study was to take a closer look at the post-9/11 change in US Africa policy. Specifically, this study critically analyzed the political process behind this policy change. Government documents, speeches and policy statements were surveyed to address the question of *how the post-9/11 change in US Africa policy took place.* Who initiated the change, and how? And who verified, or legitimated, this change, and how?

It was the hypothesis of this thesis that this recent change in US Africa policy has been an elite-driven process, initiated and carried through by high level state representatives. It also expected to find that these representatives achieved this change by drawing on the post-9/11 concern with the threat of terrorism and the traditional American identity as promoters of liberal democratic values abroad.

The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory was used to inform the accuracy of this hypothesis in analyzing the post-9/11 US Africa policy change. To answer the question of who initiated and verified the change, records of appropriated policy changes and the commentary surrounding the topic of US Africa policy as well as these specific policy changes were examined to determine who the actors were who were making a claim that US Africa policy is a security issue, and who the audience was who legitimated this claim and thus authorizing extraordinary actions to be taken in regards to it that would not otherwise be allowed. In accordance with the theoretical discussion in Chapter One, the factor of political agency was considered in analyzing the role of actor and audience; this meant looking at the status of the identified agent as either a state or non-state representative, their role in the political process as either a high or lower-ranking representative, and whether there was one or more than one of them acting together.

Regarding the questions of how the policy change was initiated and verified, the factor of context added to the theoretical framework in Chapter One was considered according to its role in increasing the likelihood of the audience's acceptance of the actor's claim. The commentary of the actors and audience used to evidence their identity as such were reviewed
to determine whether contextual factors—namely, the trauma of 9/11 with its associated high level of insecurity in relation to the threat of terrorism and the reinvigorated American identity as global promoters of liberal democratic values—were drawn on within their arguments for either the claim or legitimation of post-9/11 US Africa policy as a security issue.

**Analyzing Who**

A survey of state and non-state policy documents, speeches, and other records relevant to US Africa policy determined that the US executive branch under the Bush administration and a large portion of the well known Washington-based think-tank community served as the primary actors in making the claim that post-9/11 US Africa policy is a security issue. Together, these actors attempted to move the US Africa policy onto the security agenda by articulating the central claim that African underdevelopment represents an existential threat to Americans due the fact that weak states unable to provide for the basic needs of their people and lacking full control of their borders provide both a breeding ground and safe-haven for terrorist organizations. Military and development assistance programs alike were justified on the basis of this security-development logic. Policy requests related specifically to West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea also cited the rationale that the US need for African oil is a national security interest, but these claims were generally related back to the central claim of the threat of terrorism on the continent, and in any case served the same objective of framing Africa policy as a security issue.

Just as interesting as the identity of the actors who were making this security claim is the revelation of who they were not. While the strength of the security-development logic in framing the condition of Africa as necessitating increased resources would seem to appeal to related NGOs and interest groups interested in addressing issues such as poverty or hunger alleviation, relatively few of these organizations were found to be using this claim in their arguments in support of US Africa aid initiatives during the time of this study. Indeed, the most vocal argument coming from organizations of this type were condemning the reach of
the security-based claim underlying post-9/11 US Africa policy, as seen in the TransAfrica Forum's critique of the "militarization" of assistance provided to the continent.228

The role of the audience was determined to be exclusively filled by the US legislative branch. A lack of public exposure to US Africa policy in general meant that the securitized framing of this policy outside of the capitol building never had much chance of widespread salience. Further, public opinion polls conducted 2002-2007 showed that the large majority of Americans thought the government was spending too much on US foreign policy expenditures, making the probability of their support for increases to Africa unlikely even had they been included as a part of the audience. The discrepancy in opinion regarding the post-9/11 US Africa security claim between Congress, who legitimated its securitized framing by the administration, and the general public, who very likely would have rejected it, serves as additional evidence that the sole audience in this case was the legislature considering the end result of successful legitimation reached by the actors.

**Political Agency**

Considering the actors and audience involved in this case, it is clear that political agency played a large role in the securitization of post-9/11 US Africa policy. The high level of the actors presenting the case for increased military and development aid to Africa within their representative agencies—from the President in his Union Addresses to the Nation, to the Department Secretaries, Military Command Generals, Bureau leaders and policy institutes' Senior Fellows—contributed to the strength of the claim. Similarly, the actors' status as state or elite institutions added to this strength, as evidenced by their status as state institutions tasked with the responsibility of formulating policy, and elite public policy groups operating within the inner circle of the foreign policymaking arena. The actors' strength in number also increased their political agency; USAID, CIA, Departments of State and Defense united presentation of the Bush administration's security-oriented message of African underdevelopment is significant considering the history of interagency rivalry between these departments, especially in relation to security matters. The larger unification of this claim

with foreign policy think-tanks across the political spectrum is also notable given the tendency for the same policy divisions to extend into this larger policymaking community.

The role of Congress as the audience also evidences the importance of political agency as a factor, as does the absence of the American public. As the most distant outsiders to the inner Washington policymaking ring, members of the general public have little voice in foreign policy issues if not united by some cause or measure of concern to motivate their representation. Therefore it may be seen as little surprise that an attempt to alter the placement of a policy issue already located outside of this range of concern would be left to its place in the margins, keeping a safe distance between a proposed change in policy and possible raised concerns or objections. In possible accordance with this logic, the post-9/11 US Africa policy security claim was focused on transmission to legislative and elite audiences, as seen in the lack of presentation to media outlets and the presentations of this claim being identified in speeches presented and dialogue entertained within these policy institutions and legislative reports.

Even in its singular role as actor, the legislative branch's level of political agency balances that held by the group of securitizing actors. Its status as the state entity in charge of appropriations grants Congress ultimate authority in determining the fate of proposed policy changes as either proceeding into working form, or failing without financial support. The level of the agents making the legitimation in the legislature—Senators and Representatives—all collectively manage this vital role, evidencing the relatively uniform level of elevated agency of each of the representatives in considering the proposed appropriations in relation to US Africa policy.

Analyzing How

Context

Requests for both military and development aid for the continent incorporated the security-development logic of the post-9/11 US Africa policy claim. In making the case for increased funding or new or enhanced initiatives in conjunction with the national security threat posed by African underdevelopment, the executive agencies and think tanks acted to facilitate the acceptance of their claim among legislators by drawing on the context within which the audience was operating to increase the relevance of their message to the audience. In an effort to align their claims with this "frame of reference" of the legislative branch, actors connected the securitized claim of US Africa policy with the trauma of 9/11 and the resultant high level of insecurity among Americans concerning the "new" terrorist threat, and the post-9/11 reinvigorated national identity as global promoters of liberal democratic values.

References to the "lessons" of 9/11 ran consistently throughout the Bush administration's and think tanks' claims regarding US Africa policy. Drawing on the traumatic evidence of American vulnerability to the threat of transnational terrorism experienced that day, these references attempted to parallel the conditions of African underdevelopment with the US failure to address such conditions in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, with the obvious consequences. Just as Al Qaeda was able to strike and kill nearly 3,000 Americans in one day, terrorist organizations unmonitored by weak African states "will be able to bring violence to our home shores" if left unchecked. Such was the basic argument for military aid to African countries, while development aid was informed by the logic that these organizations are supplied by conditions of underdevelopment that generate frustration, hopelessness, and extremist sentiments, creating "a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism" on the African continent, thus necessitating development aid to protect Americans from another attack on the homeland.

In a clear indication of the audience's resonance with the actors' use of the 9/11 experience to bring relevancy to their securitizing claim, Congressional statements surrounding US

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230 Term taken from Chapter 2 section on Bringing in Context.
Africa policy requests drew repeatedly on this experience. Reflections of the same references to the trauma of 9/11 used by the executive branch and think-tanks were adopted in statements made by legislators in relation to US Africa policy as a security issue, indicating the success of the use of this contextual factor in facilitating the securitizing claim's legitimation. Both military and development aid proposals by the administration were considered and approved by legislators in light of the fact that "[o]ur nation sees more clearly in the post-September 11 world how our own wellbeing is connected to progress on the African continent."233

Similarly, securitizing claims concerning post-9/11 US Africa policy were also buttressed by calls for the audience to consider their identity as global promoters of democratic ideals. Such references to the post-9/11 reinvigorated national identity framed African underdevelopment as a moral imperative to provide increased aid to the continent. The use of the American identity to increase the resonance of the US Africa security claim was primarily monopolized by the President in speeches and in Secretary of State and USAID publications formally outlining US Africa policy. Indeed, the most common and dramatic instances of drawing on the post-9/11 renewed American identity to facilitate the US Africa policy security claim are seen in these more formal policy statements. For instance, it is in the National Security Strategy that the President prefaces the argument that African development facilitates terrorism with the proclamation that

The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.234

While references from other executive and think tank sources can be found, such illustrative and idealistic statements fit more naturally within formal speeches or policy outlines, these being generally issued by the highest levels of executive office and therefore aimed at a more widespread appeal according to the President's and other Cabinet-level officials' role in

"selling" US foreign policy to Americans. Possibly a testament to the more practical nature of legislative discussions concerning policy issues, the Congressional deliberations on US Africa development aid contain only a moderate number of brief references to "the humanitarian character" and "idealism of the American people."

Regardless of the dominance of the contextual factor of post-9/11 trauma over that of the American identity, the effective use of context as a tool to facilitate the securitization process is clear. The US executive branch and public policy representatives all drew on the American national experience, or intersubjective frame of reference, to increase the likelihood that their claim would be seen as relevant by their audience; the legislative branch took on the same contextual points of reference within their validations for legitimating this claim.

The Case of Post-9/11 US Africa Policy

Validating the Hypothesis

In view of the findings of this study in relation to the agents responsible for the initiation and legitimation of the securitization of post-9/11 US Africa policy, the hypothesis that this has been an elite-driven process, initiated and carried through by high level state representatives is found to be correct. The unified US executive branch and prominent foreign policy think-tanks as initiators of this change, combined with the US legislative branch as the legitimator of this change, make up the uppermost echelons of the Washington foreign policy establishment. This case of securitization has unquestionably been an elite-driven, managed and executed process.

The lack of coverage of the securitization of post-9/11 US Africa policy both in the news and in academia motivated the hypothesis that this has been an elite-centered process and, indeed, was found to have informed the exclusion of the American public from the securitization process in this case. In virtual isolation, the central players in the Washington foreign policymaking community successfully securitized US Africa policy in the years following 9/11. This securitization has informed a significant change in the American aid
profile on the continent since 9/11, as seen in the drastic increase in aid levels, the creation of AFRICOM, the MCA, PEPFAR, and the military training programs and regional counterterrorism operations on the ground, all based on the premise that the current condition of Africa poses a national security threat to Americans; a national security threat about which the general American public is generally uninformed.

The proposition that the securitization agents achieved this change by drawing on the post-9/11 concern with the threat of terrorism and the traditional American identity as promoters of liberal democratic values abroad was also right. Both of these contextual factors were used, although not in even distribution. The role of the American identity as global promoters of democratic ideals was primarily limited to broad executive policy papers such as the National Security Strategy and incorporated into only a moderate number of legislative statements. On the other hand, the context of 9/11 and the corresponding rise in insecurities related to the "new" terrorist threat was drawn upon throughout executive, legislative, and think-tank Africa policy statements in relation to requests for increased aid.

*Copenhagen School: Additions to the Framework*

As the case of post-9/11 US Africa policy has evidenced, the factors of political agency and context serve as integral components of the securitization framework, strengthening the political quality of the theory. They clearly provide increased depth to the answers of who initiates and legitimates the securitization process, and what techniques they use to strengthen their objectives within this process. In this case, the framing of US Africa policy as a security issue took place among highly elite agents; the indicators of political agency included in this study provide a clarity of distinction between these and stand as a measure of the power wielded in the process by the various agents—a vital factor in the role of these agents within the securitization process.

Additionally, the contextual factors played an integral role to the examination of this case. The strategies used by actors to facilitate the legitimation by the audience provide immensely expanded insight into the securitization process as a whole; the use of contextual tools to facilitate the relevancy of a message is a natural part of any political process, previously
missed by the Copenhagen School. With an inclusion of these factors, the strategies adopted by agents to increase their chances for success are highlighted, and given the level of importance that they naturally serve in the process, whether captured or not in theoretical analysis.

Conclusion

The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory well serves the case of post-9/11 US Africa policy. The political nature of the theory, enhanced with the inclusion of the factors of political agency and context, provides for a thorough examination of the political process behind the visible movement of this policy onto the security agenda. A survey of the textual and verbal statements of the actors influencing this policy change reveals that Africa has regained its Cold War status as a strategic interest, now in the context of the USWOT. The political properties of Securitization Theory highlight in these statements the elite nature of this policy change, and a growing Defense Department dominance within this shift. The revealed agents of the change in policy, as well as the changing nature of the policy itself, stand as testament to the usefulness of the Copenhagen School's application to the case of post-9/11 US Africa policy.


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