Policy Issues and Regional Integration - A Case Study Of
Nigeria's Policy in the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) - 1979-1997.

A Dissertation Presented to the Higher Degrees Board of the University of Cape Town in
Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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Map of West Africa Showing ECOWAS Countries

Fig. 1  Source: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1991
Map of Nigeria

Fig. II

Source: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1999
Abstract.

In West Africa, where most countries attained independence in 1960 or around that time, Economic co-operation and integration have been pursued at different levels with varying degree of successes. This study addresses Nigeria’s policy in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) between 1979-1997. It is an investigation of the forces that have been driving the integration efforts in West Africa. The study focuses on the period between 1979-1997. The analysis proceeds through three phases—Firstly the Alhaji Shehu Shagari Era 1979-1983; secondly, the General Muhammadu Buhari era 1983-1984; finally the General Ibrahim Babangida/Ernest Shonekan/General Sani Abacha eras 1984-1998. The policy posture of Nigeria as a regional powerbroker is the focal point of analysis in relation to specific Protocols of the ECOWAS Treaty. Three policy courses pursued by Nigeria during this period have been the subject of examination in this study: the expulsion of illegal immigrants most of whom were citizens of ECOWAS member states in 1983 and 1985, the land border closure of 1984-1985, and Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG. These policies are analysed in tandem with the Protocol on the free movement of goods, persons and services, the 1979 Non-Aggression Pact, the 1981 Mutual Assistance Protocol and the Protocol dealing with landlocked and Island member states. Other sub-regional forces like the linguistic barriers between the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone speaking states, the involvement of external powers like France, Britain and the United States of America and the regional rivalry between Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Nigeria are also interrogated.

The study concludes that regional integration is the most viable alternative for the socio-economic development and political stability of countries in the subregion. However, because of the disparity in the level of economic development, the issue of free movement of persons should be handled with high political tact in order to avoid a repetition of the 1983 and 1985 Nigerian expulsions. Such moves may not be a contravention of the Protocol in question but will dampen the spirit of ‘oneness’ that is a sine qua non for the success of the Community. Moreover the implementation of such a sensitive Protocol as the 1979 Non-Aggression Pact and the 1981 Mutual Defence Agreement needs a clear mandate to reduce the controversy that arises over the interpretation of such Protocols. This will reduce the regional tensions and acrimony as is manifested over Nigeria’s pivotal role in ECOMOG. Finally, the study concludes that Nigeria has a very significant role to play in ECOWAS. The realisation of the dreams of the founders of the Community is highly dependent on a consistent policy course by Nigeria in the affairs of ECOWAS.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of an academic work of this nature would hardly be realised with a single hand. In this light therefore I must extend my deepest appreciation, love and joy to my parents Mr. Mohamed Wurie Bah, Haja Fatmata Binta Jalloh and my Uncle Mr. A. B. Jalloh, for their unrelenting efforts towards my academic career. My deepest thanks and gratitude also goes to Alimu Bah, Ibrahim Jalloh, Salieu Jalloh, Amadu Bah not forgetting all my other brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, cousins and friends, whose moral support was invaluable during this exercise.

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My sincere thanks and appreciation goes to the Post Graduate Scholarship office whose assistance was of immense value to the completion this work.

Finally and not the least I thank the almighty Allah for my health and well being throughout this exercise.
Dedication

This work is dedicated to all victims of the Sierra Leone Civil war.
DEFINITION OF TERMS.

ACRONYMS:
ACP: African Caribbean and Pacific Countries.
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Countries.
AG: Action Group.
AFRC: Armed Forces Ruling Council.
BCEAO: Banque Centrale de Etats de Afrique de L’Ouest.
CARICOM: Caribbean Community.
CEAO: Communaute Economique de Afrique de l'Ouest.
CAF: Community Armed Forces.
CMEA: Council of Ministers of External Affairs.
CEM: Council for Economic Ministers.
CET: Common External Tariff.
CD: Congress for Democracy.
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States.
ECOMOG: ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group.
E.E.C: European Economic Community.
EAC: East African Community.
EADP: East African Development Bank.
FTA: Free Trade Area.
GNP: Gross National Product.
GDP: Gross Development Product.
ILO: International Labour Organisation.
IMF: International Monetary Fund.
ING: Interim National Government.
LAFTA: Latin American Free Trade Area.
LDC: Least Developed Countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LPA:</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>M.R.U:</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM:</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.P.C:</td>
<td>Northern Peoples Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA:</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C.N.C:</td>
<td>National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIEO:</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>O.A.U:</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAM:</td>
<td>Afro-Mauritian Common Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC:</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS:</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA:</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF:</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC:</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC:</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP:</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SACU:</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.S.A.:</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC:</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP:</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO:</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO:</td>
<td>United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD:</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC:</td>
<td>Central African Customs and Economic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAUA:</td>
<td>West African Unit of Account</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACH:</td>
<td>West African Clearing House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WABA:</td>
<td>West African Bankers Association</td>
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<td>W.H.O:</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION.

The political balkanisation of the continent into arbitrary nation-states elicits from Africa the understandable impulse to restructure the fragmented region into a more coherent and stronger economic and political entity. The African sense of oneness and solidarity also sparks off natural sentiments for increased socio-economic co-operation.

At the economic level, the numerous obstacles to genuine development that individual African countries confront as a result of limited and fragmented economic space have provided an objective rationale and galvanised the African resolve to pursue and achieve the goal of self-reliance. ECA July 1989.

As a historical product of the 18th and 19th century, the European scramble, the partition and the subsequent incorporation of Africa into the world system through colonial conquest, Africa stands at a historic conjuncture. The balkanisation of the continent into minuscule states with no regard for cultural and historical barriers has inevitably created a crisis of survival and economic viability for Africa. Independent African states were exposed to the international political system and were left to fend for themselves in a world characterised by socio-economic imbalances between the western European countries and the newly independent African states. Following the departure of the colonial powers, the balkanised ‘independent’ African states were awakened to a hostile international politico-economic system, which, in most cases, proved to be too advanced for the comprehension of the unprepared ‘successors’ of the erstwhile colonial masters. The current developmental and foreign policy dilemma of these states is so intricately linked to their peripheral status in the global division of labour as suppliers of raw materials to the industrialised world (Dauda, 1986: 1-3).

With the questions and challenges confronting the new African leadership, a collective approach was deemed inevitable if they are to surmount these challenges.

At the first two post colonial meetings in April 1958 and June 1960, African leaders adopted ‘regionalism’ as a vehicle for overcoming the economic constraints imposed by the smallness and fragmentation of their national markets. At the inaugural meeting of OAU in May 1963 regionalism was enshrined in the OAU charter to encourage regional co-operation at the sub-regional level and eventually to merge these blocs into
continental whole (Lyakurwa, 1997: 159).

With several countries achieving independence in the 1960s, the continent was characterised by euphoria and optimism of formal independence and the naive assumption that the inherited institutions, values and imported technology, socio-economic and political development would not create any problems. However, the 1970s turned out to an era of disillusionment, anxiety, and intense re-evaluation of the imported developmental models as well as foreign policy priorities.

The 1980s on the other hand as Shaw (1986) has put it; is likely to be a decade of renewed experimentation, not least among various forms of political economy and a redefinition of foreign policy goals (Dauda, 1986: 159-161). The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and later the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), was seen as a precedent worth emulating. The apparent success of the EEC did influence third world countries to attempt integration schemes of their own. (Robson 1980: 145) The approach to this study is to investigate the efforts by states of the West African sub-region and their attempt to address the socio-economic challenges in the form of regional integration and also to examine Nigeria’s foreign policy of regional engagements in these efforts.

With a geographical spread of about 6,415,401 kilometres and a population of close to 170 million people, West Africa is considered to be an important region. It produces a wide range of commercial crops, including tropical oils (the world’s largest supply) groundnuts, and coffee. The region also produces over 60 per cent of the world’s cocoa. Other important income earning produce includes rubber plantations, livestock and fishing. West Africa is endowed with energy resources such as hydro-electricity (Ghana and Nigeria), coal, and petroleum (Nigeria). Other mineral resources include high quality iron ore, bauxite, copper, tin, columbite, diamonds, gold and maganese.

Nonetheless, the region has witnessed unprecedented cases of starvation and human tragedies resulting from the severe drought, which affected the Sahel in the 1970s (Gambari, 1989). Fresh questions are therefore posed. How can this potentially wealthy region cope with or indeed avoid future socio-economic dislocations and the sufferings caused by natural disasters? How can poorer states in West Africa share in the relative wealth of their regional neighbours? How long will the countries of the
region continue to rely on handouts from Western donor countries, whose assistance tends to come in bits and pieces and in times of crisis often too late? (Gambari, 1991: 16-18). In an attempt to address these questions the various West African states decided though not without controversy, to attempt harnessing their resources for the development of the sub-region. This desire for co-operation can be summed up in the words of Adebayo Adedeji (often referred to as the father of ECOWAS) when he said:

"Economic co-operation among African states is a sine qua non for the achievement of national socio-economic goals and not an extra to be given thought after the process of development is well advanced". (Adedeji in Asante, 1991: 85)

The desire for economic co-operation was also expressed by one of the founding fathers of ECOWAS, the former Nigerian head of state, General Yakubu Gowon who stated that, the case for economic co-operation in West Africa is self evident’ (Gambari, 1991: 14). It would according to him play a ‘fundamental’ role in the development of the countries of the sub-region and in the welfare of the peoples of West Africa.

ECOWAS was finally established in Lagos on the 28 May 1975 with the initialling of the ECOWAS treaty and; the protocols annexed to the treaty were ratified in November 1976, allowing the community to commence its functions. The founder members were, Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta (Campbell, 1978: 7).

Nigeria, by virtue of its population estimated at over 111.3 million (in Africa Report, 1997) the diversity of its resources, the level of higher education and the entrepreneurship of its people, is a dominant power in West Africa. Nigeria was one of the seventeen countries that became independent in 1960, the year, which has been known as the annum mirabilis. After independence she joined the commonwealth and the United Nations. Aluko, (1981) has argued that, the logic of events and the colonial legacy have both largely foreordained Nigeria’s foreign policy options. Thus during the first two years of independence Nigeria maintained close relations with the Commonwealth countries in general and Britain in particular. During the early 1960s she played a relatively hesitant and minimal role in international affairs, not only because she was new to the international system but also because she was relatively weak in almost every sense. But since the late 1970s Nigeria has assumed a more
vigorous posture in world affairs, largely as a result of the great political and economic changes that have taken place in the country, coupled with the oil boom which started in the early 1970s (Aluko, 1981: 1-3). Nigeria has also experienced a series of upheavals unprecedented in African history.

In line with these developments, Nigeria has been playing a significant role in West Africa, in the rest of Africa and the larger international system. Nigeria has become what Franknel (cited in Aluko, 1981), has aptly called ‘a regional power’ in black Africa. While it is true that she is heavily dependent on the great powers, especially the Western countries for her trade, investments and technology, she has been able to use her large internal market opportunities and foreign investments especially in the oil industry, to influence their conduct on African issues. Nigeria’s role in West Africa (ECOWAS) has led to questions such as; how and why has there been a greater focus of attention on the sub-region? Is this posture merely to suit her national interests or can it be described as altruistic? What are the economic, political and security implications of ECOWAS to Nigeria? What are the probable lines of her foreign policy after ECOMOG’s controversial role in Liberia and Sierra Leone?

For analytical purposes (Aluko, 1981), has conceptualised Nigerian foreign policy as three concentric circles. The innermost circle consists of Nigeria’s policy towards her neighbours in West Africa; the inner one is policy towards the rest of Africa; and the outer circle is policy towards the larger international community. This has been the guiding frame by which Nigeria has conducted her foreign relations with the world. The concern in this study is the implication of Nigeria’s policy in the innermost circle that guides her relations with her neighbours in West Africa (ECOWAS). For security, economic and political reasons, the Nigerian Federal government past and present, considers their policy towards, and relations with her neighbours as of utmost priority, hence the effort to establish the Chad Basin Commission and the Niger River Commission in 1964 and the centrepiece of our study, ECOWAS (Aluko, 1981: 1-3)

This brings us to the definition of the research question.

**STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.**

This study examines with the ECOWAS and the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the community. Nigeria’s posture in the community is very outstanding hence the need to revisit her policy as the ‘regional power broker’, in one of Africa’s largest
integration schemes. The inauguration of ECOWAS in May 1975, must be regarded both as an integral part of the wider revolt of the poor nations against the inequities inherent in the present international economic system, and as a consequence of their desire to harness their domestic resources for the welfare of their people, to secure full control of their economies and political destiny, and redress the intolerable imbalance prevailing between the export and the subsistence sectors of their economies. It is only through the collective efforts of the member states and effective co-ordination of the national policies on a broad front that they can hope to transcend the major constraints on their development, and hence the profound inequality in the present pattern of production, distribution and consumption of the international wealth. (Akinyemi, 1978:69)

Nigeria has provided the bulk of financial resources to ECOWAS; nonetheless, her policy in the community has been a changing one. From the enthusiastic promotion of the ideas of ECOWAS in the 1970s, Nigeria under Generals Murtala-Obasanjo regimes began to asserted the primacy of national interest within the country. The civilian government, which succeeded General Obasanjo’s administration in 1979, was also far less enthusiastic about regional economic and financial commitments. Although President Alhaji Shehu Shagari continued the practice of the predecessor regime, (Gambari, 1991), whereby Nigeria supplied oil on soft loan to a number of West African countries such as Ivory Coast, Senegal, Togo and Ghana, the administration did only what was necessary for ECOWAS--no new initiatives were taken. Major-General Muhammadu Buhari who overthrew the Shagari administration was also not very committed to the community as was manifested by his prolonged closure of the country’s land borders and the expulsion of millions of ECOWAS citizens who were tagged ‘illegal aliens’. Although Nigeria’s policy in the community has significantly improved during the General Babangida-Abacha era, however it is argued that, the unsteadiness of the country’s policy in the community has not helped to create a virile regional integration process (Gambari, 1991).

In spite of Nigeria’s leading role in African affairs and being a prominent member of ECOWAS, the lack of success in many of the community’s aims (primarily to improve on the socio-economic development of the sub-region), coupled with the regions unstable nature often manifested in frequent coup and counter coups, and the out break of disastrous wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the face of Nigeria’s fluctuating
policy in the community has generated a lot of interest and debate. Ibrahim Gambari, has contributed to this debate by calling for what he refers to as, "...a new national debate and reassessment of our country's involvement in ECOWAS, which may lead to the building of a true national consensus behind the community based on net gains to us as well as concern for regional solidarity. Such an outcome in a leading member state...can only be to the lasting benefit of the community." (Gambari, 1991: 48) Even after two decades since the signing of the Lagos treaty establishing ECOWAS, the instability in the region has led to economic stagnation and deterioration which has adversely affected the people of the sub-region and has led to a drastic fall in foreign investment. The crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone has diverted the attention of the community from that of improving on the socio-economic development of the region to peace keeping, with Nigeria bearing the bulk of the burden of ECOMOG in terms of finance and manpower.

**Research Question:**

This raises some fundamental questions such as, how has Nigeria with its immense potentials and resources led the march towards West African economic integration? Can the country effectively adapt its national interests and sovereignty to the imperatives of the leadership of regional integration without arousing the suspicion of West African states as to the genuineness of its intentions as a big and potentially powerful neighbour? (Olukoshi et al, 1994: 1-2). Cognate to the above the research question therefore is:

**To what extent has Nigeria's foreign policy contributed in shaping the integration efforts in West Africa?**

So far no attempt has been made at defining foreign policy in this work. This study is about foreign policy but it must be made clear at this point that it is not about the policy science of foreign policy. However for the purpose of this study we are guided by Henry Bienen's (1980) definition which state that; the essence of foreign policy is to understand the interaction between general interests, the goals that are derived from those interests, and the policies that are designed to further the goals and interests on the one hand and the specifics within regions (Bienen, 1980) and countries that allow or constrains the maximisation of goals on the other hand. States try to maximise their positions in a world in which there are many short run and long run conflicts between
goals and interests and between global and regional concerns (Bienen, 1980: 32).

For analytical purposes it is important to preview Nigeria's political development prior to the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975. The post independent and Biafra war time foreign policy of Nigeria, if put into proper perspective will help to lay the contours for future analysis in this study. It is only through historicisation that the peculiarly difficult inception of Nigeria foreign policy development and its transitional process can be comprehensively explained. Similarly, it is important particularly in the context of Nigeria that dominant features peculiar to her foreign policy can be made clear. In short, the historical approach in this chapter is a perspective most inclined to present work with earlier transformation in such cognitive context (Kerlinger, 1986: 45). Therefore the historical approach in this chapter is meant to put Nigeria's evolving role in the West African sub-region in proper perspective.


One of the architects of Nigerian independence Chief Obafemi Awolowo described the country as:

"...a mere geographical expression...the word Nigeria is a merely distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live in, within Nigeria from those who do not" (cited in Onyejekwe, 1978:48).

Most interpretations of modern Nigeria is anything but homogeneous. Such terms as the 'conglomerate society', 'unity in diversity', 'the vertical horizontal mosaic', 'the multi-national state', and 'the geographical expression' represent conceptual attempts to come to terms with this lack of homogeneity (Graf, 1988:7). Before we turn to the process of political developments mention will be made of the country's ecological features.

Nigeria is a land of climatic and ecological diversity with four distinct physical regions. Facing the South Atlantic through the Gulf of Guinea and lacking a strategic position, such as proximity to Suez or command of a much-travelled cape, Nigeria has been far from the mainstreams of world communications. A wrapper of inhospitable natural barriers reinforced this isolation: the Sahara and the malaria-laden coastal swamps
Far North of Nigeria contains some sandy, sparsely covered areas of Saharan ecology, but most of the North is savannah (grassy plateau with scanty forest) which extends south nearly to the Niger and covered Rivers. It is inhabited by a predominantly Islamized agricultural people, the Hausa, who have intermingled with the more traditionally warlike group, the Fulani. There are also various Christian minorities and animists in this region. To the South is a transitional ecology known as the middle belt. Its people, dispersed into smaller, distinct ethnic units, have been kept busy deterring encroachment from the larger groups to the North and South. The third major ecological region, known as the Guinea Forest, is an area of high population density and rainforest agricultural systems, concentrating on yams, bananas, cocoa, and palms products. This rainforest zone extends nearly to the coast where a swampy mangrove area, varying from 10 to 50 miles wide, intervenes. It is predominantly inhabited by the Yorubas in the West and the Ibos in the East, with large belts of other minority ethnic groups in the Delta region (Ostheimer, 1973:3).

The story of British policy toward Nigeria covers a short period in the annals of world history. The acquisition of territory began about the middle of the previous century and was not completed until 1914. The very name of the country was suggested by Lady Lugard only in 1897; moreover, the area which she gave the name did not have a unified administration until 1914; and that constituted a mere personal union under Sir Frederick Lugard as a sort of emperor over two large areas of many native governments. On June 5, 1885, Great Britain proclaimed a protectorate over the coast between Lagos and Rio del Rey, from the banks of the Niger to its confluence with the Benue, and from the banks of the Benue northward through Ibi (Hamilton, 1962).

By the time of its political independence in 1960 Nigeria had had nearly 120 years of different contacts with and incorporation into the global political economy. At different times, by different agencies and through different instruments the North, the East, and the West were acquired, administered and transformed from an almost entirely subsistence economy to a predominantly monetised economy, geared towards exports. Each region specialised in the production of one agricultural product—the North with groundnuts, the East with palm products and the West with cocoa (Shaw and Aluko, 1984:194)
In spite of the 1914 amalgamation which created Nigeria, and of the colonial government’s economic and fiscal policies aimed at maintaining unity in order to further British economic interests, and of other attempts to create ‘Nigerians’ out of the different ethnic groups, Nigeria emerged at independence as a federation of North, East and West regions, each being a veritable nation-state. It is significant in this context that the East and West became self-governing in 1957, a status acquired by the North in 1959 and Nigeria itself only a year later (Shaw and Aluko, 1984: 194).

On October 1, 1960 the Nigerian Federation received full independence, and the whole country became entirely self-governing and free from external political control. Nigeria’s colonial experience had been short and remarkably free from violence. Resistance there was: it began on the day the British arrived and continued to the date they left. Once the colony was ‘pacified’ most protests were non-violent, unheroic; there was neither a Mau-Mau uprising nor a Gandhi. Even compared with the Gold Coast (Ghana), whose colonial experience was similar, the fight for freedom was sedate. When it was over, Chief Awolowo regretted that: “our struggle for independence have produced no martyr - no single hero who is held in reverence and affection by the majority of the people” (Awolowo, 1960: 299). It was in the context of this complex social and economic system that the Nigerian State had to conduct politics, particularly foreign policy pursuits.

Foreign Policy in the First Republic 1960 –1966

“We in Nigeria regard every country in Africa as an equal big or small and we have reasons for sticking to this policy. In other continents these countries are not evenly divided in size or in population and this does not necessarily make the big countries wish to dominate the small ones. If we want peace in Africa, it is most important that we should regard the big and small countries according to their present boundaries as being equal to ourselves...Live and let live in Africa”. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, January 1961.

The central historical fact governing African integration into a world system of states is that it occurred politically, through imperial conquest (and its ancestral forerunners
such as the Atlantic slave trade). Young (1985) has noted that the enduring political fact of this integration, is the accompanying economic incorporation as a subsidiary part of the complex western economic institutions and relationships euphemistically called Capitalism. The structural flaws of the African State system - its fragmentation, lack of cultural logic (political decay arising among other things from)...inherently problematic state-civil society ties-derive from this fundamental historical determinant. In the economic realm the vulnerabilities of African states originate in the externally imposed structure of trade and production, which has made them vulnerable to the fluctuations of the international market for their produce (Crawford Young, 1985).

Post colonial Nigeria had to conduct her foreign policy against this backdrop of socio-economic imbalance created by the colonial encounter. It is popular among political scientists to talk of the widening disparity between foreign policy making in new as opposed to established states. One can easily draw an analogy between planning in the domestic and in the international arenas. Planners of Nigerian foreign policy know less than their American counterparts about the conditions to which they may have to respond, just as domestic development planners find themselves constrained by inadequate knowledge of their own economy’s performance. (Ostheimer, 1973: 161)

The outstanding feature of Nigeria is that it is a federation and that fact has come to colour every important policy, whether in the domestic terrain or foreign (Phillips, 1964). The essence of federalism is the lack of sufficient national consensus to create a unitary state; hence the idea in many minds that it is a “second best” form of government. However, the fact that a federation emerges at all is evidence that some common values are held by leaders from various regions and Nigerian leaders know less than the British came to accept a federal system although with reluctance in some quarters. The result for Nigeria was a federation of three regions and a federal territory. Such decentralisation makes governing difficult enough even after decades of experience as the history of other states have demonstrated. But Nigeria adds to this system another feature - that in which one region is larger than the remaining ones combined in both geography and population. (Phillips, 1964: 7-8)
Independence came to Nigeria at a most critical juncture in the history of West Africa. The federal government took office at the moment when the focus of West African interest was shifting from colonial relationships to the relations of independent African states to each other and to the rest of the world. As Africa’s most populous state, Nigeria was expected to assume a public posture on questions which involved not only the future of Africa, but ultimately perhaps the peace of the world (Dauda, 1986). This expectation meant that the Nigerian leadership had to thread a delicate line in order to assume its rightful place in world politics.

At independence three ethno-regional parties emerged to fill the political vacuum arising from British colonial disengagement. These parties were the Northern based Northern People’s (N.P.C.) supported by the Hausa-Fulani, the Western based Action Group (A.G), mainly supported by the Yoruba and finally the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (N.C.N.C.) in the east supported by the Ibo. Each party contested for political power by mobilising and appealing to ethnic sentiments (Dauda, 1986). Although the N.P.C. and the N.C.N.C. eventually won the elections and formed the first independence government in post colonial Nigeria, through a marriage of convenience, national and foreign policy issues, were perceived and interpreted by the government and opposition A.G. alike from a narrow ethnic and religious vantage rather than broader category of national interest. This in no small measure militated against the formulation as well as effective pursuit of foreign policy goals in the first republic. (Dauda, 1986: 132-133).

According to Schwarz (1964), ‘ambivalent’ perhaps best describes the psychological basis of Nigeria’s early foreign policy. Deeply distrustful and suspicious of any new form of post colonial subjection, Nigeria also envied and wished to emulate western achievement. Anxious not to be associated with capitalism, imperialism, class-structured society, many advocated a distinct approach to the economics and politics, that is an approach that did not fall into either of the extremes- Capitalism or Socialism. However the weight of western influence was very heavy on the Nigerian elite who found it difficult to subscribe to political and economic theories that were totally at odds with the west (Schwarz, 1964).
From the onset, Nigeria’s foreign policy decisions were by necessity compromises between ties with Britain and other western countries prompted by the need for procuring aid and the desire to establish a Nigerian identity. Mention must be made of the fact that, during the terminal colonial period, Nigerian leaders were quite naturally preoccupied with the problems of self-government, and comparatively little time was expended on foreign policy. However the leadership of all the political parties were decidedly pro-west by virtue of their educational backgrounds, ideology and political contacts. Britain’s ‘generous’ outlook toward Nigerian independence offered little encouragement to advocates of a vigorous break away from British influence—except probably to the opposition to the Anglo-Nigerian pact. Most of the significant political elite’s anticipated commonwealth membership and continued close relations with Britain (Schwarz, 1968: 119).

The controversy over the Anglo-Nigerian Defence pact of 1960-1962 reveals the salience of ethno-regionalism in the foreign policy perceptions of the Nigerian leaders. The opposition and pressure against the treaty with Nigeria’s former colonial power emanated basically from the south, especially among the Action Group supporters. Most importantly, the treaty itself was perceived by most of its critics as a clever design to enhance the pro-military capacity of the pro-British northern Hausa-Fulani oligarchy to dominate the federation indefinitely. Although the treaty was eventually abrogated in 1962, the public debate generated further polarised ethnic rivalry in Nigeria’s body politic. (Gambari, 1980: 55) At this juncture it needs to be pointed out that, the opposition to the Anglo-Nigerian Defence pact should not have clouded the relative unity of foreign policy in the First republic, at least when compared to the disastrous divisions over internal politics and policies such as the 1960-1962 population census. All history conscious Nigerians whether Moslem or Christian, or whether Hausa-Fulani, Ibo or Yoruba, (Dauda, 1986) shared deep feelings of race consciousness, which produced a unanimity of opinion on many foreign policy issues. Whatever differences existed between the parties, it did not stop the new Nigerian leadership from subscribing to the popular Afro-Asian concept of ‘non-alignment’. The Nigerians interpreted non-alignment as a pragmatic policy that would allow decisions to be made on the merits of the issues while maintaining flexibility. As the federal Prime Minister Sir Balewa explained to the United Nations:
The Tafawa-Balewa regime’s foreign policy started on a cautious note as has been indicated in the Prime Minister’s remarks about Nigeria’s non-aligned position. For all his Pro-western bias, Prime Minister Tafawa-Balewa was a nationalist who became increasingly concerned with the maintenance of a correct posture for Nigeria on the African stage. His government took a firm line on the apartheid government of South Africa. He expressed his reservations about the white minority government of South Africa and Portugal for their continued political repression of blacks. Moreover, the government of the First Republic declined associate status of the European common Market in the spirit of African solidarity, in spite of the obvious economic advantages such a co-operation would have offered for the sale of Nigerian commodities. When in December 1960, despite vehement protest about the first two nuclear tests, the French exploded their third atomic bomb in the Sahara, Nigerian policy took a sudden lurch. Although the protest had come from all over Africa, Nigeria alone broke diplomatic relations with France, maintaining that the explosion had shown ‘utter disregard for Africans and constituted a grave insult to the government and peoples of this country.’ The French ambassador to Nigeria and his staff were ordered out of the country within forty eight hours and an embargo was placed on French shipping and air traffic. It was not until 1966 that General de Gaulle was prevailed upon to reopen the Embassy in Lagos. After Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) over Southern Rhodesia, the foreign ministers of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U), including Nigeria, resolved to break off diplomatic relations with Britain for its failure to check Smith. However, this time, Nigeria was not among the countries that fulfilled the resolution (Schwarz, 1966).

Regardless of its initial hesitations, Nigeria did not fail in its basic obligations as Africa’s most populous state. In 1961, when African governments split into the radical Casablanca group inspired principally by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and the moderate Monrovia group, Nigeria by virtue of not only its size but also because of some patient
diplomacy, fell into a leadership position of the latter. A conference held in Lagos in January 1962 made serious efforts that almost succeeded in uniting the two groups. However about the last minute the Casablanca group decided not to attend but it is important to note that, that conference produced the germ of the charter of the OAU (Schwarz, 1968: 122).

Nigeria’s position on questions like Algeria, and the racial union of South Africa was already clear, but on others, such as Congo; the great powers as well as other African states eagerly awaited the expression of Nigeria’s views by the Prime Minister. The policy principles enunciated by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in his speech at the UN in October 1960, were shortly translated into action when a Nigerian delegate became the head of the Congo Conciliation Commission. The federal government preferred the super powers to stay off the Congo crisis and allow Africans to settle their own problems without the interference of any external power (Tillman and Cole, 1962).

Nigerian representatives were clearly prepared to accept their full share of responsibility for the settlement of Africa’s problems within the framework of decisions taken by the United Nations. With the penetration of the cold war into Africa by way of the Congo crisis, the Nigerian government’s support for the west came under increasing attack from the East, from other African countries and from segments of public opinion within Nigeria. Some of the neighbouring independent West African states also brought pressure to bear for an open declaration of support for ‘Pan-Africanism’. The apparent victory of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser at the Casablanca conference was an indication of the efforts being made by Egypt to block Israeli plans for technical aid to the African countries. Because of the growing strength of Islam in Nigeria and the close cultural relationships of the Nigerian Northern regional government with Egypt, Nigerian policy makers were peculiarly vulnerable to Egyptian influence. Examples include the opposition to the Defence pact with Britain, the Israeli question also brought ethno-regionalism in foreign policy perceptions to the front. The south always weary of northern hegemonistic tendencies were quick to put pressure on the federal government for the establishment of diplomatic ties with the state of Israel, this was because the south felt that the strengthening of links between Nigeria and the Arab world would be to the advantage of the north. In order to respond to southern
pressure the government allowed Israel to establish an embassy in Lagos, while it refused to open an embassy in Israel as a way of appeasing the north. On the all-important question of Pan-Africanism, Sir Tafawa Balewa took a clear and firm stand that was almost directly opposed to the conception of Pan-Africanism held by Kwame Nkrumah (Tillman and Cole, 1962).

The Nigerian leader appeared to share Houphouet-Boigny's vision of an African union arising out of closer economic and cultural relations between the member states. He emphasised that Nigeria is determined to encourage, as far as possible, the development of co-operation at these levels. A major policy aim of his government is to secure agreement on a plan for improvement of inter-African communications, and transport facilities, pooling of resources for higher education and scientific research, and an expansion of travel. Sir Tafawa Balewa left no doubt as to his views on this issue,

"I must say that I do not think myself that ideas of political union are practicable in the immediate future. I do not rule out the possibility of eventual union but for the present it is unrealistic to expect countries to give up the sovereignty which they have so recently acquired and I am quite sure that it is wrong to imagine that political union could of itself bring countries together...on the contrary it will follow as the natural consequences of co-operation in other fields." (Quoted in Tillman and Cole, 1962: 117).

In a major policy statement Sir Tafawa Balewa emphasised to Nigeria's neighbours that despite its size and population, Nigeria has no expansionist intentions. Although African boundaries were artificial creations of the European powers, nevertheless the Prime Minister emphasised the fact that inherited boundaries should be respected and, in the interest of peace, must remain the recognised boundaries until such time as the peoples concerned decided of their own free will to merge to one unit (Tillman and Cole, 1962: 116-122).

Regardless of the above-mentioned position, it would be impossible to overstress the emotional approbation to articulate Nigerian opinion over terms such as 'Pan-Africanism' and 'African unity'. Pan-Africanism like virtue, was lauded everywhere. It was not difficult to understand the nature of the appeal for African unity. As an
eminent front bencher of the Nigerian People’s Party (NPC), Mallam Mutari, put it, 'whether we like it or not 'blackism' is our answer (Phillips, 1962). We shall have to stand and fall together.' Coupled with the racial identity of tropical Africans, is the common history of all Africans as subjects of European colonialism. Before independence, all Africans seemed to speak with one voice. The common political enemy was colonialism, the common internal enemies were undeveloped economies and the absence of national integration; the common psychological enemy was the debasement caused by the above and the common goal was absolute independence. It was therefore natural that after independence many Africans, including Nigerians, should continue to think in terms of further common African development—in other words regional integration (Phillips, 1962).

Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa echoed this view of economic co-operation when he observed that;

"As regards the principles which must underlie any realistic political co-operation between the countries of Africa, I am glad to tell you that the declared policies of the federal government received universal support, adding that...the object of the Liberian conference was not primarily to settle differences between the nations who attended but to try to create the right atmosphere for international co-operation in political, cultural and scientific matters" (cited in Phillips, 1964: 117).

It was probably the Monrovia conference than any other event, which first brought Sir Tafawa Balewa to international attention. The resolutions adopted at the conference and later the OAU bear the unmistakable imprint of the Nigerian leader (Phillips, 1962).

Britain’s decision to join the EEC in 1961 pushed the federal government of Nigeria to an even stronger Pan-African stand. This was explained by the then Federal Commissioner for finance Chief Okotie-Eboh who stressed that, the conference held in Lagos, Nigeria at that time attaches the greatest importance to the closest possible economic co-operation with other African states particularly, initially, with the other West African states. This according to him will undoubtedly lead to the establishment of at least a West African common market comparable in concept to the present European common market (Phillips, 1964: 118).
The following month in a radio report on a conference held in Addis Ababa, the federal Prime Minister Sir Balewa pointed out that one of the themes which he dwelt on was the need for "...an African common market based on certain groupings—a North African grouping, which will include Sudan; a West African grouping which will extend the river Congo: an East African grouping which will include all Central African countries". He said that co-ordination among such groups would create "a successful African common market which should increase the inter-state trade in the continent. While his plan was not adopted, he added that the conference did welcome a plan to establish an African Development Bank and agreed to appoint a preparatory economic committee "to study in collaboration with government and in consultation with the Economic Commission for Africa, the various African economic problems and to submit their findings to member states" (Phillips, 1964: 118).

It would appear therefore, that Nigerian economic policy has now shifted from Europe to Africa, and that moves will be made to attempt to improve inter-African trade, although the difficulty of such a move for primary producers seem formidable indeed. However, because of the sub-regions heavy reliance on foreign aid and investment and its trade patterns, their trade with non-African states cannot be automatically delinked (Schwarz, 1964).

The last major foreign policy act of the Balewa regime was to organise the Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference on Rhodesia, held in Lagos (the first ever to be held outside London) at Balewa's initiative. This was held in January 1966, just as the First Republic was beginning to make an impact abroad, it was brought to an end in a bloody military coup (Schwarz, 1962).

The census in 1962 overlapped with a major political crisis. A census usually has political overtone and in Nigeria's case, the census was laden with political dynamite. Emotions reached a climax in February 1964 (Schwarz, 1964). For years Southern Nigeria had harboured a deep suspicion that the North's population was much smaller than it had claimed in the 1952-1953 census. These earlier population figures had proven of great significance. Northern dominance of the Federal House of Representatives was based on them. The first result of the 1962 census showed a radically decreased proportion of Nigeria's population living in the Northern region.
After the 1962 census had been rejected by Northern leaders, there were vast migrations of ethnic groups back to their "home" regions. Entire "new villages" were discovered especially in Iboland, and the census became politicised. The Federal Government forestalled this by condemning the 1962 census and revising the figures. The subsequent southern outcry led to a completely new census in late 1963. The results published in 1964, showing a majority retained by the Northerners, was rejected by the leader of the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens, Dr. Michael Okpara, who later became one of key players in the Biafran secession (Schwarz, 1964).

While the N.P.C. leaders had achieved apparent success in gaining control of the central and regional government of the federation, events had destroyed the hopes of many Nigerians that independence would bring democracy and development. Some of these frustrations surfaced in the general strike of 1964. The cohesion of the labour movement coupled with support from outside the labour movement succeeded in paralysing Nigeria during early June 1964. More importantly attention had been focused on the corruption, lack of development and ineffectiveness of Nigeria's first independent regime. In the midst of this rising political tensions the military stepped into the political scene by overthrowing the government of the First republic. (Schwarz, 1964: 158) The Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa, the Premier of the North, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Commissioner of Finance and a lot of other government officials - civilians and military were murdered by the coup plotters (Schwarz, 1964). This heralded the first military take over in post-independent Nigeria.


With the advent of military rule in January 1966, attempts were made to weaken the regional bases of the political class and to strengthen the centre from which there had been significant shift of political power. The first military regime (January-July 1966) under the leadership of Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, shut down regional offices abroad and stopped the regions from sending economic missions overseas. The military government's overzealousness in this context led to the promulgation of Decree 34, which would have made Nigeria a unitary state. The consequences of this decree, given the regions' remaining power, the tenuous nature of the incipient transition to federal supremacy, were the pogroms of 1966, the military coup of July 1966 and the
subsequent civil war. General Ironsi's only foreign policy initiative was to appeal to foreign investors to continue to invest in Nigeria was futile (Shaw and Aluko, 1984: 201).

Less than twelve months before the Biafran secession, General Ironsi, summoned his ambassadors from their diplomatic postings in Africa for six days of consultation in Lagos. The decision to begin with an assessment of the federal government's interests in Africa, was explained by General Ironsi;

"In the whole sphere of Nigeria's relations, the government attaches the greatest importance to our foreign policy. We are aware that because of our population and potentials, the majority of opinion in the civilised world looks up to us to provide responsible leadership in Africa, and we realise that we shall be judged to a very large extent by the degree of success or failure with which we face up to the challenge which this expectation throws on us. We are convinced that whether in political, economic, or cultural sphere, our destiny lies in our role in the continent of Africa" (Stremlau, 1977: 1-2)

Seven weeks later Gen. Ironsi was assassinated, a victim of Nigeria's second military coup in seven months and the country slipped to the brink of anarchy. Aspirations for leadership in Africa had to be abandoned as the formulation and execution of foreign policy became impossible under domestic chaos. The intricacies of the causes of the civil war would not detain us here, although a brief excursion of such event will be made. After the first coup in 1966 Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegu Ojukwu was appointed military governor of the eastern region (Calvocoressi, 1991). The July coup headed by Colonel Gowon was not recognised by Colonel Ojukwu, the pogroms against the Ibos before and after the July coup, made Ojukwu to conclude that the salvation of the Ibo could only be secured by secession from Nigeria. Dissuaded from taking this step at a conference in January in Aburi, Ghana, he nevertheless proclaimed, in May 1967, the independent state of Biafra. Attempts at mediation by the OAU (at Kinshasa in 1967, Algiers in 1968, and Addis Ababa in 1969) all failed. The federal army, expanded from 10,000 to over 200,000 men and women, gradually prevailed in spite of the toughness of the Biafran resistance. While Britain and the Soviet Union supplied arms to the Nigerian Federal government, France supplied Biafra and two of her closest allies Ivory Coast and Gabon recognised the Secessionist State Biafra. (Calvocoressi, 1991: 511)

It was not until late 1967, well into the civil war, that the federal government of General Gowon succeeded in establishing a policy framework for the conduct of
international relations, and Africa emerged as the central focus of Nigeria’s civil war diplomacy. The basic strategy, which prevailed until the end of the conflict in January 1970, was defensive, aimed at limiting Biafran penetration of the international system. Nigeria the would be giant of Africa, ironically found itself tied to a foreign policy that depended in large measure on the willingness of other African governments to maintain a solid front of diplomatic support as a means of discouraging intervention that would foster Biafran independence (Stremlau, 1977: 2).

The Civil War Diplomacy - 1967-1970

The Biafran war marks a turning point in Nigeria’s relations with the world. It saw the erosion of the overwhelming western influence, in exchange for a considerable increase in Soviet presence. By 1968, the volume of Nigeria’s trade with the USSR placed her fourth among African countries, behind United Arab Republic, Algeria and Morocco. At the conclusion of the civil war, the valuable military aid received from Soviet Union had been replaced by new agreements. Nigeria’s recognition of communist China, is a further indication of the new spirit of initiative in her external relations (Ostheimer, 1973).

With its heavily western orientation, Nigeria’s economy was in all likelihood to retain significant trade with Britain and America. There was no doubt, however, that Nigerian leaders felt betrayed in their darkest hour by the west, and have tried since 1970 to identify and develop new sources of aid and trade. The Japanese for example, extended a loan worth $24 million and were the largest exporter of goods to Nigeria, after Britain, the United States and West Germany. During the civil war, British government material support of the federal government was constant albeit materially insufficient from the Nigerian point of view (Ostheimer, 1973).

During 1968 and 1969 many British, Americans and other outsiders fully expected that the conflict will end in negotiations and a virtually independent Biafran State. France with her close African ally- Ivory Coast, one of the four African states- (others being Zambia, Gabon, and Tanzania) to recognise Biafra was clearly counting on this development and encouraged Biafra. The French president General de Gaulle and his
foreign affairs expert on Africa, Jacques Foccart, seemed to view Nigeria in terms of the nineteenth century, when England presented the greatest challenge to France. While France had clearly chosen to sacrifice relations with the federal government, Britain appeared as an ally who could not be trusted. Nigerian attitude toward Britain and her Commonwealth affiliation was clearly expressed in a 1971 editorial in the New Nigerian newspaper report which states that:

“For those member countries that are not inhabited by people of British descent, the commonwealth is no more than an imperial junk yard bordered by strong, almost invisible silken threads from which it will take much more than the normal political courage and will power left in the breasts of the mentally emasculated and suitably educationally conditioned mind of ex-colonial man to escape... it is only by deliberately deciding to leave the commonwealth that we can begin to recreate the political elan with which to move forward under our new steam” (Ostheimer, 1973: 161-173)

The civil war made Nigerian policy makers suspicious of Britain’s sincerity and this widened the gap between Anglo-Nigerian relations, which had hitherto been cordial. At the onset of the conflict, it was clear to the belligerents that since Britain, as the former colonial power, enjoyed a tremendous amount of diplomatic, political, and economic influence in the post-colonial Nigerian state, its stance in the unfolding international politics of the crisis would influence the course of the war. Both sides, therefore were quick to explore the diplomatic possibilities of getting Britain’s recognition and with it, the fringe benefits of arms supplies, technical assistance, relief, as well as the probability of political support by the Commonwealth nations (Osthheimer, 1973). Britain on the other hand was anxious to limit the scale of the turmoil, and far more crucial, to safeguard its own commercial and political interests. These two considerations led to Britain’s vacillation and diplomatic ambivalence at the initial stages of the war. However, once the situation became clearer, with the federal troops regaining physical control of the oil producing regions, and the Soviet Union putting its full weight behind the federal government, the only sensible option left for Britain to safeguard its Nigerian interests was to support the regime Gen. Gowon (Osthmeir, 1973).

However, in spite of the diplomatic and token military support, Britain’s role, in the perception of Nigerian policy makers, was far from total and sometimes duplicity was
suspected, as a top federal government official explained that, Britain supplied the bulk of Nigeria's ground weapons, and in spite of all the emphatic ministerial denials in the House of commons, supplied more arms than the British people realised, nevertheless the strident, and sometimes worthless, parliamentary debates, the hostile mass media, the wavering attitude of some key cabinet ministers, and the refusal to supply the Nigerian Air force with aircraft and bombs, all helped to inflict serious damage to the goodwill that Britain enjoyed in Nigeria (Ogunbadejo, 1996: 15)

As 1968 unfolded, the Gen. Gowon government began to realise that American support, like Britain was not to be unequivocally trusted. The Biafran issue became a political dice in the hands of American politicians. Richard Nixon did not fail to see the political potential of the Biafran issue. Nixon gave what was probably his most eloquent campaign speech on the importance of Biafran relief, which he viewed as 'thwarted by the desire of the federal government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional victory.' In his criticism of the Johnson government's hesitancy, he pointed out that; 'genocide is what is taking place right now- and starvation is the grimreaper. This is not the time to stand on ceremony, or to go through the diplomatic niceties. The destruction of an entire people is an immoral objective in the most moral of wars. It can never be justified, it can never be condoned.' (Osthmeir, 1973: 161-173).

The refusal by Britain and the United States to sell heavy weapons to the federal government, which it needed, for an effective prosecution of the war, was seen as a betrayal by an 'ally in the hour of need'. The Biafran war had the effect of decreasing the cordial relations between Nigeria and her former western allies- Britain and the USA; thus tilting Nigeria's policy towards the eastern bloc and particularly the African continent. Until mid 1967, Nigeria almost relied exclusively on the west for her military and economic requirements. But in August 1967, she entered into an economic, cultural and military aid agreement with the USSR (Aluko, 1981). The Nigerian airforce was henceforth supplied almost wholly with soviet military aircraft, radar and other equipment. Soviet and Egyptian experts were put in charge of the training of Nigerian pilots for the MiG fighters. In June 1970, an agreement was signed providing for USSR geological and mineral investigations into coal, iron ore, and other raw
material resources in Nigeria with the ultimate aim of establishing an iron and steel complex in the country. Between 1968 and 1970, (Aluko, 1981), Nigeria entered into new trade, economic and cultural agreements with the following East European countries: Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Trade with Eastern Europe was being vigorously encouraged than before. For instance in 1964 only 2.4 per cent of Nigeria's trade was with Eastern Europe, but this rose to 4.6 in 1968 (Aluko, 1981). This was largely due to the insufficient military support, which the Federal government of Nigeria received from its Western partners, in its prosecution of the civil war.

In spite of all this, however, Nigeria's trade, economic and cultural links remained firmly with the west. In 1968 about 75 per cent of the country's trade was with Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Of this about 32.1 per cent was with the EEC countries which took 36.5 per cent of Nigeria's total export in 1968, making the EEC the largest single market for her exports. Although Nigerian leaders wanted to reduce the dominance of the west in Nigeria's trade, they were at the same time realistic enough to know that such a principle must not be pursued in any economically self-defeating manner. In short, what the war has done to Nigeria's foreign policy posture according to Chief Anthony Enahoro, "...is to reinforce the country's policy of non-alignment" (Aluko, 1981: 124)

USSR-Nigerian diplomatic rapprochement beginning during the civil war provides an excellent illustration of the now familiar preponderance of pragmatic considerations over ideology, whereby national enthusiasms and rhetoric come second, rather than the other way round. USSR-Nigerian alliance during the conflict is a manifestation that in issues of national survival, the doctrine of non-alignment, more often than not, takes a back seat. Indeed the short-lived Gowon-Brezhnev 'marriage of convenience' conceived within the political framework of Nigeria's post colonial war of survival is symptomatic of policy convergence between Africa's post-colonial states and external powers. In the final analysis, both Nigeria and the Soviet Union gained from the post Kruschevian approach to soviet diplomacy. On the one hand, Nigeria emerged as a united political entity following the defeat of Biafra, while the USSR, on the other hand, cultivated a relationship which not only earned her a multi-million dollar contract.
for Nigeria’s Iron and Steel Industry, but also a diplomatic ally whose support was to prove decisive (at least within the OAU) in the 1975 USSR-Cuban Angolan victory (Dauda, 1986: 142).

**Nigeria: Post Biafra Impact On African Policy.**

The dominant fact about Nigeria on 12 January 1970, when the civil war guns ceased firing, was the emergence of a potentially stronger united federation. The authority of the central government in Lagos, was and continued to accepted without question by all the constituent units of the federation (Aluko, 1981), each of which has now become too small and too weak to threaten or defy it. The effect of this has been to bring the direction of foreign policy firmly under federal government control. No longer can regional premiers make important pronouncements on foreign policy and give the country the reputation of speaking with ‘too many voices’. The war ‘to keep Nigeria one’ far more than the struggle for independence, has wielded together the diverse ethnic groups who have come to accept the view that their destiny and hopes can be fulfilled only in a stable, and united Nigeria (Aluko, 1981). Alike (1981) alluded that:

Economically, Nigeria has become potentially the richest African country. In spite of the damage and the disruption of the war the economy showed a remarkable resilience that even surprised the Nigerian leadership. The war was financed at a cost of 275 million British pounds without resorting to external borrowing. (West Africa, 28 March 1970) Agriculture expanded so well that more food was produced for the population and part of this was exported to other West African countries like Ghana. In becoming one of the first ten oil-producing countries in the world, her economic prospects seem good. Although her economy is still mainly based on agriculture, some light manufacturing industries developed so rapidly during the war that she can now depend on home production for goods such as textiles, shoes, matches, cigarettes, beer, and other things. International confidence in the economy, which was shaken as a result of the war, was restored. Since the end of the war, there has been a steady flow of public and private investment in the country. However, this did not radically change but rather strengthened the country’s African policy as enunciated by the Tafawa-
Balewa regime. The principles of this policy are five in number:

- The sovereign equality of all African states.
- Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all African states.
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries.
- Commitment to functional co-operation as a means of promoting African unity.
- The total eradication of racialism and colonialism from Africa (Aluko, 1981: 125)

The post-civil war reassessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy concluded that Africa must be the “centre piece” of Nigeria’s diplomacy. The experience of the civil war also made it imperative for Nigeria to pay more attention to the West African neighbours. Of the four African countries which recognised the secession region of ‘Biafra’, one was in West Africa (Ivory Coast). After the civil war Nigeria found that its wealth based largely on the export of crude oil, (Gambari, 1991), began to give it a more positive interest in the developmental needs of the West Africa sub-region. The country’s leadership had vision of a more evenly developed West Africa, in which Nigeria would not be resentment - provoking oasis of prosperity and a sub-regional ‘economic desert’. Never again should West African countries be staging grounds for extra-regional powers attempt to destabilise or dismember Nigeria. Since France was a power that used its considerable influence on the smaller francophone countries for negative purposes during the civil war, co-operation between the states in the region might reduce that influence. Even after independence in the 1960’s, the French speaking states in West Africa retained a series of interlocking networks of relationships, such as OCAM, CEAO, and Conseil de l’Eutente - all of which were heavily subsidised by France. (Gambari, 1991: 18-19)

Before the civil war, Nigeria maintained a ‘good neighbour’ policy in West Africa. But her relations with her immediate neighbours were based on the same principles as those with other African countries. The civil war brought home the fact that security and freedom of the country depended on the security, stability and freedom of her
neighbours. Instead of treating them as other African countries, the Nigerian government now took a closer interest in the internal development in each of them to ensure that hostile forces did not destroy friendly relations. If for instance hostile neighbours surrounded Nigeria she would probably have lost the war. If Niamey, Fort Lamy, Yaounde, Lome and Cotonou had been used as staging posts by the gun-running aircraft instead of Libreville, Sao Tome and Abidjan, the effect on Nigeria would have been more serious. Nobody understands this more than the Nigerian leaders. This is why they could not easily forgive Emile Zinsou, the President of Benin, for allowing Cotonou to be used by the International Committee of the Red Cross early in 1969, ostensibly for sending relief supplies to Biafra and for breaking the federal blockade. President Zinsou’s visit to Lagos later in the year and his explanation that arms and military equipment were not hidden in the relief supplies shipped from Cotonou were not convincing to the Nigerian government. The Nigerian government was happy at his overthrow for he was said to have been manipulated into working against Nigeria by what many Nigerian media have called ‘international do-gooders’ (Aluko, 1981).

However regardless of the betrayal felt by the Nigerian leadership by countries such as, Ivory Coast that supported Biafra they focused their energies on bringing the countries of the sub-region together. The civil war had the effect of creating a novel idea in Nigeria’s relations with her neighbours, that of creating sub-regional economic units that will cut across the linguistic divide in the region (Aluko, 1991). It was firmly believed in Lagos that it was the enormous financial difficulties of President Zinsou’s government that made him give in to the pressure from the International Committee of the Red Cross to break Nigeria’s blockade, and that as long as these neighbouring countries remain financially dependent on France they could easily be manipulated against Nigeria. The Nigerian government therefore committed herself to the promotion of economic development of her neighbours in order to reduce their dependence on any of the regional powers. Nigeria resolved that it will henceforth participate in joint industrial and agricultural ventures with any of her neighbours, as well as in ordinary trade with and economic co-operation, even if such joint ventures involve financial or other sacrifices on her part.(Aluko, 1981: 127)
As part of her drive to reduce her dependence on foreign powers and to help the weaker states in the region, Nigeria made it her first diplomatic priority in the 1970's the creation of an economic co-operation within West Africa. Fortunately, for prospect for co-operation in the immediate areas of the Niger River valley and Delta states in that area refused to support French involvement in Biafra or backed the Lagos government outright. For Niger a country which gambled by supporting Gowon's government in spite of her close ties with France the choice seemed to have paid off. President Harmani Diori, for example on a visit to France in 1968 criticised French policy towards Nigeria and acknowledged the historic, traditional and cultural ties between Nigeria and Niger. At the conclusion of the war Nigeria rewarded Niger by freezing a trade zone between them. A landlocked country, Niger could now send exports through Nigeria to the sea, Nigeria was willing to support Niger's development even at the cost of the competitive position of one of her own main agricultural exports, peanut. Regional co-operation over specific problems of infrastructural development and trade is certainly necessary if Nigeria is to lessen her dependence on the developed countries. (Osthmeir, 1973: 173)

At the end of the war, and as a way of promoting the atmosphere of regional co-operation, General Gowon visited almost all the countries in the sub-region. The Nigerian leadership was concerned with her role in raising consciousness by promoting such concepts as 'negritude' and 'African personality'. A major evidence of this awakening was the establishment of the Frantz Fanon Research Centre, in Enugu, charged with a 'total commitment to the mental emancipation of the Black men all over from neo-colonial mentality' (Gambari, 1991).

As a starting point the agreement between the E.E.C. and Nigeria signed in July 1966 was never ratified nor implemented and eventually it lapsed. Although it presumed to provide substantial economic benefit for both parties the agreement was heavily criticised by the politically conscious and articulate segment of Nigeria's national elite some of these critics argued that, instead of making separate agreements, Africa should negotiate with the EEC as a block. Others preferred the development of trade and economic co-operation among the West African countries as a step towards the establishment of a regional economic community. After the conflict was over, Nigeria
was able to re-examine the alternative strategies to association with the EEC, the country’s options were strengthened by the tremendous economic recovery which she experienced and the huge increase in both oil output especially through her membership of OPEC. The key element in Nigeria’s future dealings with the EEC was the country’s efforts to co-ordinate African state approach to the EEC As General Gown told his host during a state visit of Britain in the early 1970’s, “it is better for a united Africa to talk to a united Europe”(Gambari, 1991).

The Nigerian effort resulted in a joint African negotiation with the EEC, which culminated in an agreement between the European Community and the African/Caribbean/Pacific states in Lome, Togo in 1975, which became known as the Lome convention. After the signing of the Lome convention pro-regionalist argued that if the countries of West Africa were able to sign an agreement to promote trade with the EEC it ought to be possible for them to conclude an agreement for the same goal within the region. This argument spurred Nigeria and Togo - the two countries that played the most active part in the establishment of E.C.O.W.A.S. - to set up an economic union between them. The purpose of the Nigerian-Togolese union was to show that a small, and relatively poor country can engage in an economically rewarding relationship with a large and rich country and to dispel the assumed impenetrable linguistic barrier (Gambari, 1991: 20-21)

The signing of the Lome convention by A.C.P. countries was a triumph for Nigerian diplomacy. The federal government used this victory as a launching pad for the establishment of an economic union in the sub-region. Nigeria’s diplomatic role between 1972 and 1974 was therefore centred on the establishment of such a union that would reduce the influence of France in the francophone states. Since France was a power that used its considerable influence on the smaller francophone countries for negative purposes during the civil war, the federal government saw the formation of E.C.O.W.A.S. as a way or reducing that influence. The greater the distance between France and these countries the more likely that the francophone West African countries would begin to perceive E.C.O.W.A.S as an alternative source of funds, ideas and economic and trade relations. The capacity of E.C.O.W.A.S. to subvert a French influence that had been built over many years needs to be very strong. Nigeria
therefore went on the diplomatic offensive between 1972 and 1974 (Aluko, 1981). As a first step in this direction Dahomey was successfully persuaded to abolish transit tax on all goods going from Togo to Nigeria. During 1973 a number of other West African states signed series of agreements to increase their trade with Nigeria. The restrained and shrewd diplomacy of the Gowon government was greeted with such enthusiasm and confidence by neighbouring states that Harman Diori, the then president of Niger and chairman of C.E.A.O. said in June 1973 that any economic arrangement in West Africa that excluded Nigeria will be unrealistic (West Africa, 11 June 1973). Another trump card was played by the Gowon government in July 1974 when the decision was made to sell crude oil at concessionary prices to African countries that had their refineries. This was welcome by many African countries especially Ivory Coast and Senegal, whose support was crucial to the formation of a pan-West African economic community. These diplomatic moves coupled with the successful negotiations with the E.E.C. in February 1975 directly paved the way for the formation of E.C.O.W.A.S. Olu Sanu, the Nigerian ambassador to the E.E.C. who presided over A.C.P. negotiation with the E.E.C. during 1973 to 1975 said categorically that without the Lome convention it would have been very difficult if not impossible to bring about E.C.O.W.A.S. (Sanu, 1978). The treaty establishing the community was finally signed by fifteen West African states in Lagos, on the 28th May 1975.

By the end of the first decade and a half of the country's independence, Nigeria was showing clear signs of a growing political stability and wealth at home and influence abroad, at least in the West African sub-region and the African continent. Two major elements of potential power have been responsible for this: population and oil resources. With the end of country's civil war and a successful policy of reconciliation, Nigeria as one people constitutes the largest concentration of African people in one country. As a member of OPEC, Nigeria through its oil production quotas has earned unparalleled wealth, especially in much valued foreign exchange. However, these major strengths have also served as sources of weakness. The national unity question has eluded resolution, largely because of the intense competition for a share of the growing wealth among segments of the national elite. To paraphrase a scholar, it is often easy for things to fall apart since the centre can not often hold. The management of the petroleum resources has been so inept and often corrupt that the country's oil 'boom'
has almost become its economic and social doom' (Gambari, 1989:4).
From the above analysis one would draw a direct link between domestic politics and foreign policy in Nigeria. The domestic political arrangement and the manner of conducting political business invariably affect the conduct of external relations. Hence, the history of Nigerian foreign policy has been to some extent related to a search for national consensus behind the major outlines of the country's externally projectable goals and objectives. The absence of a sustained unity of purpose abroad has resulted in the conflict between those who represent what one may call the radical impulse on the one hand and those who reflect a conservative weight on the other (Gambari, 1991). According to Gambari, from this enduring conflict come foreign policy positions, which are often tentative and uneasy compromises. Alternatively, successive post-independence governments have often adopted the loud rhetoric of the radical elements in the country, while quietly pursuing essentially conservative policies abroad. The logic of this asymmetry between radical rhetoric and essentially conservative external policies can be found in the country's economic structure and external economic relations. Other than the energies and resources put into building a wider sub-regional market for future manufactures, which culminated in the establishment of ECOWAS, no serious efforts have been made to change the direction and pattern of Nigeria's economic relations. The pattern of production, consumption, and export ties the country's economy ever closer to the west. Moreover, as the economic situation deteriorates, attempts to find solutions are anchored on the expectations of western aid, investment, or the prescriptions of international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF which are dominated by the west. The net result is what Douglas Anglin, correctly identifies as the policy of political nonalignment and economic alignment (Anglin, 1964: 2).

However, in spite of the limited room that a dependent economy like Nigeria has to manoeuvre in the external realm, the country was able to move from a low-keyed, hesitant and apologetic policy to a more activist, positive and influential role in the 1970s. A number of factors were responsible for this, first the Gowon regime succeeded in effectively redressing the balance of power in favour of the central government in relation to the regions and states. The centralised and hierarchical nature of the military command structure and the military government's decision to
divided Nigeria into twelve, later nineteen, states and the swelling of the federal financial purse helped to end regional challenges to a federally controlled foreign policy. Second, the civil war was fought and won by the federal authorities, but the bitter taste left on the government's tongue by the recognition of secessionist 'Biafra' by some African states required a post-civil war reassessment of Nigeria's foreign policy with a bias for Nigeria's West African sister countries. Third, and perhaps most prominent, was the increasing wealth from oil revenues and OPEC membership, which strengthened Nigeria's capability to pursue a new, active, and effective policy toward Africa and the world in the 1970s (Gambari, 1991). In a bid to shake off the accusation of feet dragging in foreign policy, Nigeria helped to lead the collective African approach to negotiations with the EEC. Caribbean and Pacific countries joined the African states in negotiations, which led to the signing of the Lome Convention, trading Pan-African membership for abandonment of association and reverse preferences. Along with Togo, Nigeria provided the diplomatic impetus and financial backing which made possible the creation of the region-wide Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Gambari, 1989: 5-8). Having followed the path of Nigeria's foreign policy development to the establishment of ECOWAS, the ensuing chapters will focus on attempts at integration in the sub-region and Nigeria's policy role and its impact on such efforts.

PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.

With the coming together of the European Community into a single unit - the EU, the ever growing strength of North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African integration schemes like ECOWAS in West Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa, a thorough soul searching needs to be done if these regions want to be heard in the international politico-economic system. In sub-Saharan Africa, the post independence era has been characterised by experiments at different levels for socio-economic development. Such experiments have ranged from individual national economic policies, to joint regional attempts at formulating policies for the harnessing of their resources for the common good. The failure of most post-colonial economies has generated a lot of interest and debate among politicians and economists, in their
efforts to establish the cause of such failures and to establish formidable sustainable
development policies. Such debates have left political and economic theorists, with a
lack of consensus on the cause of economic failure but one area of consensus is the
fact that the African states are too small and too weak to compete on their own. The
balkanisation of the continent into minuscule states and their peripheral position as
producers of primary materials has awakened policy planners in these regions to the
reality that 'regionalism' is the only answer to these challenges, hence the formation of
ECOWAS in 1975. ECOWAS was established as a measure to address the challenges
facing the postcolonial states- with its primary objective being, the promotion of socio-
economic development in the sub region. However, in spite of the original aims of the
founders of the community, the controversy and lack of success in most of ECOWAS’
aims and Nigeria’s policy role in the community has arouse a lot of interest and debate.
The purpose of this study is therefore to do the following,

PURPOSE.

• Firstly, to investigate the importance of integration to the West African sub-region.
  To investigate the need from which ECOWAS arose and moreover whether the
dreams of the founders have been achieved, not achieved or abandoned.

• Secondly, to identify and examine the significant role of regional powers in
  integration schemes. Here emphasis will be laid on the role of Nigeria as a regional
  power in the operations of the community. This will bring illuminate how Nigeria’s
  policy has been conducted (whether it has been consistent) and its effects on the
  community.

• Thirdly, to assess Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution as part of its policy in the
  community with special reference to the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars. Here
  emphasis will be laid on the establishment of ECOMOG and its effects on inter-
  state relations in the sub-region.

• Finally, this study will examine the role of relatively stronger member states such
  as Senegal, Ghana, Ivory Coast, in the operations of the community.

The significance of this study is to give a broad perspective of efforts by countries in
the West African sub region to come together and moreover;

SIGNIFICANCE

- It will provide the basis for West Africa endowed with a lot of human and natural resources to realise its dream of economic co-operation and integration.

- It will assist to highlight the weaknesses and failures of ECOWAS and will make an attempt to propose a path forward.

- It will greatly enhance the efforts of Nigeria with her renewed vigour in the community to carve a better path to socio-economic development.

- This study will also serve as a reference point for the ECOWAS sub region on the virtues and vices of a dominant power in integration efforts.

- The study will also attempt to provide alternatives to the single power factor (the case of Nigeria in ECOWAS) in integration schemes.

- Finally it will serve as a reference point to other regional organisations like SADC on the effect of a dominant regional power in co-operation schemes.

METHODOLOGY.

This study was conducted using the qualitative research method. The qualitative data for this study has been collected by review of literature, content analysis, extracts from documents, interviews etc. (Corey, 1985:62). Qualitative data occur in a variety of forms: Data can take the form of field notes, interviews, transcripts, documents, pictures and other graphic representations (Atkinson and Coffey, 1996:4). According to Strauss (1987), there is no single way of approaching these materials as qualitative researchers have quite different investigatory styles, let alone different talents and gifts, so that a standardisation of methods...would only constrain and even stifle researchers efforts.

Primary data for study has been collected by a review of policy documents, government statements, ECOWAS protocols, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, and Nigerian Presidential address on foreign policy. Historians have always urged
researchers to rely more on primary sources. Kerlinger defines a primary source as "...the original depository of an historical datum, like the original record kept of an important occasion, an eye witness description of an event, a photograph, minutes of organisational meetings, and so on" (Kerlinger, 1973: 702).

Secondary data includes the review of related literature, journals, monographs, newspapers and magazines etc. Babbie (1979) defines a secondary source as a secondary analysis which "...refers to the analysis of data collected earlier by another researcher for the same purpose other than the topic of the current study (Babbie, 1979: 351) Mills and Huberman view qualitative analysis as being concerned with data that appear in words rather than numbers (1994:21).

In dealing with qualitative materials, then, analysts make problems, grounding them in the everyday realities and meanings of social worlds and political actors, rather than taking problems from policy makers, general theorists, or others (Atkinson and Coffey, 1996). Atkinson and Coffey (1996), stresses that qualitative data analysis requires methodological knowledge and intellectual competence. Analysis is not about adhering to any single approach or set of techniques; it is imaginative, artful, flexible and reflexive. Whatever research strategy is being followed, research problems, research design, data collection methods and analytic approaches should all imply one another. Indeed, for most kinds of qualitative research, they should not even be thought of at different stages in the research process. What is conventionally referred to as analysis is a pervasive activity throughout the life of the research project (Atkinson and Coffey, 1996).

Since the events to be examined in this study occurred between 1979 and 1997, it is logical that the procedures should comply with a sound historical research approach (Kuye, 1989:62). Historical research is defined as "...the critical investigation of events, developments, and experience of the past, the careful weighing of evidence of the validity of sources of information on the past, and the interpretation of the weighed evidence"(Kerlinger, 1973:701).

Since this research is one based on a case study using the historical approach, it is pertinent that the three vital steps within the historical research methodology are
Historical case studies use several approaches in the collection of data. The researcher uses the triangulation methodology for the collection of data. Crude understanding of triangulation often imply that data from different sources or derived from different methods, can be aggregated in some way in order to produce a fully rounded, more authentic, portrayal of the socio-political world. Such a view would imply that the different data types, or different analytic strategies, allow one to approximate with increasing fidelity a single, valid representation of the subject under study (Atkinson and Coffey, 1996:4-14).

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.

Kuye (1989) suggests that, every research is constrained by varying factors, ranging from logistical to financial constraints, which tends to inhibit the gathering of research data. In light of the above, the limitations for this research arise from the following;

- This study covers the period between 1979-1997. That time frame is chosen because Nigeria's policy within the Community during that period has been highly influenced by the frequent change in government both in Nigeria and other member states, which to a great extent helped to shape Nigeria's policy course. Moreover, the changing economic fortunes in Nigeria during this period are also important for this study.

- The reluctance of senior government officials to divulge information and the existence of linguistic barriers in the sub-region also served as a limitation to this study.

- The desire on the part of member states to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is reflected in the selective nature of policy documents.

- The existence of bureaucratic red tape which is characteristic of most countries in...
the sub-region and the selective application of rules and policy also served as a limitation

- Finally, limitation of financial resources and other logistics also served as a constraint to this study.

In spite of these constraints and limitations, they are however not a hindrance to the presentation of a credible and academically viable study of Nigeria's policy dynamics within ECOWAS. The researcher has made full use of authentic primary, secondary and tertiary data in the completion of this study.

Having examined the process of the development of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in the introductory chapter, chapter two will discuss the theoretical framework and literature review for this study. Chapter two will attempt to explore the rationale for the formation of ECOWAS in consonance with theories of integration, putting Nigeria's role into perspective. Moreover, policy making models will be discussed in order to shed more light on the policy making process in Nigeria.

Chapter three will focus on an overview of Nigeria's policy between 1979-1997. This period is divided into two phases: the Shagari-Buhari era- 1979-1984 and the Babangida-Shonekan-Abacha era- 1984-1997. In this section, Nigeria's policy towards ECOWAS with regards to specific specific policies pursued by the different regimes is presented.

Chapter four will focus on the analysis of the research findings. The analysis in this chapter will focus on the specific policies pursued by Nigeria and their implications for ECOWAS. Specific attention is given to the Nigerian expulsion orders of 1983 and 1985 with reference to the ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of persons; the Nigerian land border closure of 1984-1985 and Nigeria's pivotal role in ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990-1997 will be the subject of analysis. The implications of these policies for regional integration and co-operation within the framework of ECOWAS will be examined.

Chapter five will be a conclusion of the study, summary and recommendations will be made for the future course of Nigeria's policy in ECOWAS.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW.

Introduction.

The major challenge facing the African continent this last decade of the 20th century is how to reverse the trend of economic decline which has afflicted the region since the 1970s and to strengthen the capacity of the economies for participation as important and effective partners in the global economy in the next century. One key element in the response to this challenge is the promotion of regional economic integration, which has constituted a significance aspect of the African development strategy. Its merits as a desirable strategy for large number of African states (like ECOWAS) have been well documented in various studies on African development and reflected in virtually all recent internal and external action programmes or guidelines for Sub-Saharan Africa. Of considerable significance is the fact that the smallness of the economies in Africa leads to the perspective that: when combined into larger market behind a common external barrier, it could easily become the nucleus or growth core for West African integration. Among a growing number of scholars and policy makers, there is an increasing awareness that Nigerian-led economic integration offers the most viable path to the economic integration of West Africa. The issue then is how and under what conditions the process of pooling together the structurally weak and dependent economies of the West African states into the realisation of a virile economic union is to be realised. (Asante, 1997:28). This study will therefore focus on Nigeria’s policy within this framework of integration in the West African sub-region. But before examining Nigeria’s policy within ECOWAS an attempt will be made to analyse the international theories of integration within the context of the formation of ECOWAS.

Regional Co-operation in West Africa and The Traditional Theories of Integration.

African countries cannot continue to pursue economic policies and strategies as if all they want is a poor imitation of America, France, England, USSR, or China... the time has come for us to think seriously about evolving a genuinely authentic strategy for development—a strategy for development that is not externally oriented, that is not based on copying other
societies hook, line and sinker, and that does not lead to acculturative modernisation...thus
economic co-operation among African states is a sine qua non for the achievement of
national socio-economic goals, and not an 'extra' to be given thought to after the process of
development is well advanced". Adebayo Adedeji, 1986.

The term integration has become part of the vocabulary of politicians and economists
trying to carve out viable and sustainable economic policies. But before we get into the
intricacies of integration an attempt will be made to give a broad perspective of a
variety of integration schemes. The term integration in fact covers a wide variety of
possible schemes. Given the differences in nature and objectives of these different
schemes, it is important that they are clearly distinguished at the outset. The following
classification of different degrees of integration based on (Balassa, 1961; and
Jovanovic, 1992) is useful reference points:

1. Preferential tariff agreement: In this case customs duties on trade among member
countries are reduced relative to those on trade with non-member countries. An
example of such arrangement in the African context is the PTA.

2. Free Trade Area: Here member countries remove tariffs and quotas on trade
between members in goods originating within the FTA, but retain control over their
own restrictions on trade with non-member countries. The tariffs and other restrictions
applying to external trade will vary from one country to another. For this reasons an
FTA will normally also embrace rules of origin agreement.

3. Customs Union: In this case members not only abolish restrictions on internal trade
(as in FTA) but also impose a common external tariff (CET) on trade with non-
member countries. Rules of origin are then no longer required. The Southern African
Customs Union (SACU) is an example of such an arrangement in the African context.

4. Common Market: This is a customs union, which has, additionally, free movement
of factors of production. Common restrictions apply to the movement of factors with
non-member countries. In the African context ECOWAS was intended to achieve a
common market, though it has fallen far short of this objective.

5. Economic Union: This goes further than a common market in that major economic
policies are (for example, fiscal, monetary, industrial) co-ordinated, and monetary union may be introduced. Examples of monetary union exist in the African context (for example, the CFA and the Rand zones), but these are rather special in nature (because of the role played France or South Africa). These arrangements, therefore, do not really qualify as true economic unions as defined here (Lyakurwa, 1997:162).

For the purpose of this study, this broad definition will serve as a guide in our analysis of integration efforts in the West African sub-region. Economic integration between sovereign states has some claim to be regarded as one of the leading aspirations of international economic policy in the mid-twentieth century, so much so that this era has been termed 'the age of integration' (Harbeler, 1961:1). In the developed world, the desire for integration is reflected in the formation of such groupings as the European Economic Community (EEC), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and many others. A similar interest is also found in Africa and is expressed in a variety of existing arrangements like the ECOWAS and in plans for others. The need for regional economic integration in Africa is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, most African leaders appreciated this need soon after their countries had become independent sovereign states early in the 1960s. Although, they did not always make clear distinction between economic integration and political unity (indeed some, particularly the leaders of the Casablanca group of countries held the doctrinaire view that political unity and the formation of a united states of Africa must precede economic integration), and although very little has been achieved in either fields, yet the decade following independence is likely to go down in African history as the decade of economic and political integration rather than the development decade. In the view of President Nkrumah of Ghana, regional blocs were incompatible with African unity: according to him they not only impeded its achievement but would sap its strength once it had been achieved (Harbeler, 1961: 1).

Following independence most African states had close ties, especially in the economic field, with outside states than they had with each other, and foreign powers thus exercised considerable leverage within the continent. This applied especially to the former colonial powers since the 'mother country' was normally the new states principal trading partner, economic, financial and cultural links between France for
instance and its former colonies (except Guinea, Conakry) were particularly close. To President Nkrumah of Ghana, the relationship smacked of neo-colonialism: he charged the metropolitan powers with granting political independence, while still retaining economic control over their fledglings. He believed that a united Africa, subject to a single government, was the only effective way of ending the white minority rule in Africa (Tordoff, 1997: 260). However, the failure of most post independence African leaders to promote economic development and political stability has not given credence to this view. Moreover the slow progress of attempts at integration has further brought the idea of a united Africa under serious contention.

To further buttress the fact that regional integration is not a recent phenomenon sub-Saharan Africa, there are the cases of SACU and the EAC both of which have existed since 1910 and 1919 respectively. However, the majority of regional economic schemes were established in the 1970s. The motivations behind the establishment of regional integration schemes in SSA have been both political and economic. Most schemes were formed as a result of the disillusionment with the international political and economic systems, which were viewed as being unfavourable to developing countries. Some regional integration schemes such as the EAC and those in the CFA zone were formed at the instigation of the colonisers, with a view to maintaining closer links. The formation of most union also coincided with the era of export pessimism. This school of thought argued that the world trading system was not favourable to developing countries as a result of declining commodity terms of trade against LDCs export, export earnings instability, low trade elasticities and unfair protectionism against LDCs export to developed countries. These arguments were therefore used to justify import substitution industrialisation policy. Most of the regional integration groupings in SSA were formed on the basis of import substitution strategy. The hope was that by widening the market, together with protection of important sectors, economies of scale would ultimately lead to increased intra-union trade and promotion of overall development. However, history has shown that the import substitution industrialisation policy has not only failed in individual countries but also in many regional groupings (Lyakurwa, 1997: 174-76).

Attempts at integration in the post independence era were not only dominated by
economic impetus but also there were political unions. Many attempts were made, both before and after the establishment of the OAU in 1963, to form regional political unions. The successful cases can be counted on the one hand; the union of Ghana and British Togoland in 1957, Italian and British Somaliland in 1960, southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon in 1961, and Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. It is an interesting fact that in each case one or both of the states coming together were formerly UN trusteeship territories and a significant fact that, (Tordoff, 1997) with the single exception of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, every successful union took place before the independence of one or more of the states concerned. Southern Cameroons, which Britain had administered as part of Nigeria, continued under UN trusteeship following Nigeria’s attainment of independence in 1960, and pending the holding of a plebiscite in February 1961. If the 1981, confederal arrangement between Senegal and the Gambia had survived (it collapsed in 1989), the case for Sene-gambia would have proved an exception on both counts since each state was independent at the time of the union and neither was ever under the UN tutelage (Tordoff, 1997).

Failure cases to achieve lasting political union include the Mali federation- Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, and the EAC. Key issues in each case were institutional incompatibility and the perception of incumbent leaders that their political power base was being or would be eroded. The short-lived federation between the former French West African colonies of Senegal and Soudan (now Mali) was particularly instructive in this case (Tordoff, 1997).

It is important to note that, those organisations formed primarily for economic purpose fared better than the regional political unions (Tordoff, 1997:264), though they, too, have had a chequered history. Several of the organisations with limited objectives had a long survival record; among them were the Conseil de l'Etente, the Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), and the Organisation Commune Africane et Mauritienne (OCAM), which became mainly a linguistic and cultural organisation A number of other small regional groupings sprang up in the post independent period, sometime to collapse and resurface; this included the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Senegal River Development Organisation, the MRU, and the CEAO. The PTA CEEAC were other significant non-political groupings that made

Current thinking and debate in many official African circles on the subject of regional integration is centred around the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980 (Lyakurwa, 1997: 161) The LPA called for the formation of an African common market by the year 2000. This was to be achieved in stages, starting with the formation of Free Trade Areas followed by a common market and an economic union. The LPA divided Africa SSA into three sub-regions: West Africa, Central Africa and Eastern and Southern Africa. Each of the sub-regions was to go through the stages of integration before an African common market could be formed (Lyakurwa, 1997). In 1991 the OAU heads of state and government judged the progress made in sub-regional co-operation enough to justify the signing of the Treaty to establish a Pan African Economic Community (PAEC). The Treaty establishing the PAEC provides for the existing sub-regional groupings to serve as the building blocks for the new community, and that the first five years of the new institution will be devoted to the strengthening of these sub-regional groupings like ECOWAS which is the subject of this study (Lyakurwa, 1997: 161).

In relation to the various forms of economic co-operation in Africa, both actual and projected, many important questions are suggested some of which included the following: what is the source of their economic benefits? How extensive are these benefits likely to be? Can economic association without political unity maximise the gains from integration? Under what circumstances is economic association likely to develop into some kind of political association? Is economic integration a stable forms of organisation, or does its continuance seem likely to demand some degree of political unity? (Robson, 1968: 21). These questions make one thing clear, that is, integration can not be looked at from a purely economic point of view leaving out the political dimension. But regardless of this fact, the traditional theories of integration have been used to explain integration arrangements in the SSA. There is however a need to evaluate the relevance of such positions to the efforts of countries in the West African Sub-region-ECOWAS. For the purpose of this study we will concentrate on two of these theories-Functionalism and Customs union theory. An attempt will be made to relate these theories to the rationale for integration in West Africa, which culminated in
the establishment of ECOWAS in Lagos in May 1975.

**Traditional Theories of Integration.**

Functionalism, developed by David Mitrany and Earnest Haas, asserts that the nation-state cannot respond adequately to the technical, economic, and social challenges of modern society. The functionalist approach to international co-operation is premised on the proposition that one can isolate non-political problems, such as social, technical and humanitarian matters, and then concentrate on solving them. In the words of David Mitrany (cited in Gambari, 1991) suggest that: “the problem of our time is not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together” (Gambari, 1991: 2). These can be achieved according to the functionalists by indirectly seeking out areas of mutual interests, which are common, where they are common, to the extent to which they are common. The functionalist puts emphasis on a pragmatic approach to solving practical problems. Functionalists also seek an escape from the vertical divisions of the world (nation-states) by developing, instead, a horizontal approach to common problems. They prefer a problem-solving approach and cite approvingly Lenin’s pronouncement that what matters is ‘not the government of men but the administration of things’ (Gambari, 1991). They entertain the hope that cooperation in economic and social fields may ‘spillover’ into the political fields. The habit of co-operation and the accumulated agenda of constructive work may well bring about federalism by instalments or peace by pieces (Gambari, 1991: 2). The inter-related nature of technological and environmental issues, serves as a strong basis for the position of the functionalist.

According to the functionalist, the relationship between social, economic and technological change on the one hand, and political change on the other, has long been a major concern of political theorists. Some have argued that the political forms and practices are strictly determined by the economic or technological character of societies; while others have suggested that while we cannot infer the political structure of any society from its ‘non-political’ features, these latter do exert continuous pressure on leaders to reconsider and adapt the political system. Functionalists have based their arguments on a distinction between the political and non-political aspects of societies, and postulate an increasing tension between the particularistic nature of the
former and the internationalising implications of the latter, in the modern era. Since the 1930s, this position has been argued most forcefully and widely by the functionalists. As Mitrany in (Pentland, 1973), observes, '...the number of problems which take on a world character is growing apace, partly because we have a better understanding of them...but also because of their technical peculiarities...these new contacts which crowd upon us from all directions can be as much a source of conflict as of co-operation...' (Pentland, 1973: 64-65).

The functionalist further argue that, out of an increasing recognition the imperatives of technological change and the global scale of problems of welfare must develop a network of organisations performing specific functional tasks transcending national boundaries. In Mitrany's words, 'the nature of each function tells precisely the range of jurisdiction and the powers needed for its effective performance. And for the same reason, unlike rigid political arrangements, functional arrangements can be adjusted, when the conditions of the functions are seen to have changed.' (Mitrany, 1966: 61). Beyond this rudimentary level, however, it is difficult to say what the end product of the process of integration thus conceived might look like. However, the traditional functionalists best represented by Mitrany, sees the ultimate goal to be a complex, interwoven network of cross-national organisations performing all the traditional welfare functions of the modern nation-state while at the same time rendering war impossible. In this community there is a perfect elasticity of structures: they develop, as in Lamark's Third law, according to felt need and die out with that need. The functionalist view the integrated system, as a web of organisations meeting all human needs and responding to technological change (Pentland, 1973).

The functionalist further argue that perception of an increasing number of problems, needs and trends outstripping national capacities is bound to result in pressure toward co-operation. One such problem is that of security. The advent of the nuclear age, the developments in satellites and electronic surveillance, and new techniques of espionage, subversion and guerrilla warfare, have challenged the belief that the nation-state can still perform the basic function of protecting its citizens. It is further argued that with the recognition of increased difficulties in purely national social welfare planning, in an age when workers migrate across boundaries, calls for co-operation on
such matters. Interdependence, in short, is a fact which, if acknowledged politically, would dissolve the nation-state system, organising the world not by what divides it but by what unites it (Pentland, 1973).

Another set of factors discussed by the functionalists are those technological developments which, whether perceived or not, set in motion a process of 'planetisation'. These include electronic media and their creation of a global village; the revolution in data processing, the new speed and the scale of transport in all media. (Armand and Dancour, 1966: 299-32).

It is the view of the functionalists that the lag between these changes and changes in the structure of the international political system can not be allowed to persist. The sociological, economic and technological bases of national sovereignty are swiftly eroding, and the future global pattern becoming daily more self evident and more necessary. As problems of a technical (i.e. non-political) nature arise, it is argued, they spawn organisations whose sole purpose is to solve them and whose limits of competence are defined by the nature of the problem itself. As Mitrany says, 'the functional dimensions...determines themselves. In a like manner the function determines its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice the nature of action required under the given conditions and in that way the powers needed by the respective authority' (Pentland, 1973: 77-79). Describing Roosevelt's New Deal as a model for this procedure, Mitrany (cited in Pentland, 1973), observes that 'every function was left to generate others gradually, like the functional sub-division of organic cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow and develop out of actual performance'.

Functionalists view the nation-state as a structural fossil from an era of limited economic and social problems and rudimentary technology. These theorists see the nation-state as the chief barrier to rational organisation for human welfare, because of the ascendancy of politics over the common interest. In asserting both the political reality and the functionalist inadequacy of the nation-state, the functionalist draws an explicit contrast between society-natural, beneficial and flexible, with its widening circle of communal action- and the state, the former servant of society now turned on its own artificer (Mitrany, 1966: 62). Functionalist theory, then, sees the state in
international co-operation as the insect in a carnivorous plant. Attracted ever inward by the benefits it finds that behind it the avenues of retreat are progressively blocked. The mechanism of self-determination, which drives the functionalist process of integration, depends as we have seen not merely on the objective trends but on collective attitude towards co-operation. The core of the argument is that creative association and co-operation in problem solving provides a learning situation in which participants are gradually weaned away from their allegedly irrational nationalistic impulses toward a self-reinforcing ethos of co-operation. As their functional needs are met, people discover the source of their welfare and direct their expectations and loyalties to the international agencies rather than to their states (Pentland, 1973: 82-86).

A general response to the position of the functionalists is that, it over emphasised harmony and integration in modern society. It tended not to accommodate the idea of conflicting interests and the differential power of groups in conflict with others. The idea that different parts of the political system are supportive of everything else, producing unity, seems a distorted way of describing any society. The functionalist directed their attention mainly towards the factors in society, which maintain consensus and stability. Their position can be understood, given the areas of natural science, which they and their social anthropological precursors chose as analogous to social science. Smith (1996) has further argued that functionalists emphasise the importance for society of finding ways to socialise new generations into current values and they look for the contribution which political functions make to the maintenance of social equilibrium. Their central focus is on what holds societies together, what structures and values are functional to its survival. (Smith, 1996:106). Smith further asserts that functionalists can be faulted for not being capable of explaining the very changes that were its raison d'être because it concentrates on the prerequisites of the maintenance of the status quo. The tendency to regard everything that exists, including the characteristics of the political system, as functional and therefore desirable becomes normatively supportive of the perpetuation of existing social arrangements (Smith, 1996:106-107). Having explored the functionalist approach an attempt would now be made to look at integration attempts through projects of customs union.
Projects for customs unions and other special tariff arrangements between states independent of each other politically are today widespread, and many persons look to them as at least a partial solution for the major economic and political problems in the international field. The United States Government has in recent years given strong support to this idea in many ways, and the Committee of European Co-operation established to collaborate with the United States in the execution of the Marshall Plan for aid to Europe, no doubt in response to its interpretation of American wishes, has likewise expressed its sympathy with this idea as relates to Europe. The customs union is only one of a number of possible types of arrangement, which eliminate or reduce the tariff barriers between two or more political units while maintaining tariff barriers against imports from outside regions. Its economic difference from reciprocal free trade unaccompanied by other criteria of customs union is slight, while, if the removal of internal trade barriers is incomplete, its legal and administrative differences from ordinary reciprocity agreements are also slight or questionable (Viner, 1950: 3). According to the customs union focus of integration, the principal objective of integration arrangements is to remove, in stages, such discriminations that may exist in trade and general economic relationships across national boundaries. The significance of national borders lies in the introduction of 'discontinuities whether in trade, inflows of factors of production or in general economic policies'. These discontinuities according to the customs union theorists actually lead to effective discrimination in the economic sphere. Before Jacob Viner's major contribution to the customs union theory, the general view was that because a customs union brings about free trade, they tend to increase world welfare. However, this free-trade world welfare focus has been criticised for neglecting issues concerning the mal-administration of world income and the privileged positions of the developed, capitalist economies in the international system (Viner, 1966).

It is important to note that, the amount of trade created or diverted, is not in itself an adequate representation of the gains or losses from a customs union, because it takes no account of the size of the differences in the production costs of different commodities in different countries. Effectively the gains and losses derived from the establishment of a customs union are represented by savings in costs resulting from the shift of purchases from higher cost to lower cost sources within the union, whereas the
loss relates to the extra costs of producing a commodity in the partner country instead of in the rest of the world. Thus, as Meade in (Robson, 1968) notes, in order to ascertain whether the formation a union represents on balance, a net gain or loss, it is necessary to consider not only the total volume of trade on which costs have been lowered and the total volume of trade on which costs have been increased, but also the extent to which costs have been raised or lowered on each unit of created or diverted trade. Taking this into account, the test becomes whether on balance the 'production' effects of integration are positive or negative (Robson, 1968: 29).

Those who argue that his is a static analysis, which ignores or minimises dynamic aspects of regional integration, further refine Viner’s theory. The political considerations involved in integration schemes, they declare, are of such crucial importance that economic reasoning alone is inadequate as a tool for understanding the process if integration. The conventional integration theories tend to focus on economic effects and issues concerning integration. Their attention is focused at economic factors, which promote more efficient use of resources in customs union. Such use of resources is predicated on the free movement of goods and factors of production, following the elimination of discriminatory policies among member states. Conventional integration theory largely concerns gains that may be derived from changes in existing patterns of trade (Gambari, 1991). Such theory evolved with the developed countries of Europe in mind and therefore illuminated the problems of integration in Western Europe. It tended to make two basic assumptions; - that there is full employment and a given input of resources. - that domestic prices are supposed to reflect opportunity cost, tariffs apart, and hence there is no need to interfere with the market allocation of resources (Gambari, 1991: 7). With this overview of functionalism and customs union theory, we can now turn to the integration efforts in West Africa, which culminated to the formation of the ECOWAS. But before we get into the dynamics of the whole integration process in the sub-region, it would be pertinent for one to explore the political economy of the sub-region.
The Political Economy of West Africa.

The West African sub-region is the largest and biggest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 16 countries and a combined population of about 170 million and GDP of US$ 78 billion (Mansoor, 190/91: 423). The grouping contains Nigeria, Africa’s largest nation as well as one of its smallest, Cape Verde. It includes the Sahelian countries which depend heavily on agriculture and some of the most industrialised economies in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Cote d’Ivoire (16 per cent of GDP from manufacturing), and Senegal (17 per cent of GDP in manufacturing). ECOWAS countries as a group had the best growth performance of all the groupings from 1965 to 1980 but since then have registered the worst performance with GDP declining by 1.8 percent between 1980 and 1986 (Mansoor, 1990/91: 427). West Africa’s modern states fall into two clusters;

One is the corridor of Francophone states stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to Lake Chad in the east. Known collectively as the Sahel (meaning the ‘coast’ of the Sahara in Arabic), they are Senegal, the Gambia-an Anglophone enclave-Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. All of them are poverty stricken ex-colonies of France sharing a common predicament in the face of the encroaching desert. Senegal is a spatial exception; being one of the region’s more prosperous economies. To this group we should add the small ex-Portuguese colony of Cape Verde Island (Hart, 1982).

The other group consists of small coastal states, usually reaching back in a narrow strip through the forest to a portion of the Sudanic savannah: Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin. Of these, the Ivory Coast and Ghana alone have the social infrastructure, population and resources to attempt a reasonably viable political economy. After Nigeria, they represent (along with Senegal), the second tier of independent states left behind by the British, the French and Portuguese.

The region is highly characterised by inequalities. Its colonial inheritance--of dualistic economies, authoritarian regimes and high levels of ethnic consciousness, is not an advantageous one. Nevertheless, despite its unfortunate inheritance and mixed performance, West Africa has emerged as an important actor in the contemporary
arena of global politics. Ambiguities and contradictions in the past and present characterise the political economy of the sub-region; in addition it is a southern region in a global system still dominated essentially by the interest and actions of the North. The discontinuities and dilemmas of 'economic' dependence and 'political' interdependence are revealed most poignantly in the very tenuous and vulnerable form of 'independence' achieved by the countries in the sub-region. (Shaw, 1985: 8).

In the 1980s the sub-region suffered precipitous fall in per capita incomes from levels that were already low. Whereas per capita incomes increased at a moderate rate of 1.4 per cent in the 1960s, this declined to 0.2 per cent in the 1970s and 2.8 percent between 1980 and 1986 and fell further in the 1990s (Sandbrook, 1993:5).

The uneven rates and results of development— with its interrelated political, economic, social and strategic components— have served to exacerbate inequalities and tensions both within and between the states of the region as well as between continental goals and global actors. The reality of West Africa today is that after three decades of political independence, the economic emancipation that was expected to follow closely on the heels of political independence (and to result from the economic transformation of the continent and thus bring about a significantly higher and progressively increasing standard of living for the masses of the people) remains a mirage (Shaw, 1980).

The regions decline is not only limited to a single sector, it covers a wide range of issues. For example per capita income has stagnated or declined. Industrial output has fallen; deforestation and desertification have reduced the productive land area. Rising food imports, declining terms of trade, and capital flight have produced a massive jump in the external debt, which in 1990 was roughly equivalent to the regions GNP and required half of all export earnings to service (Sandbrook, 1993: 5).

Although there have been some structural changes in the regions economies, during the past three decades, the fact is that the West African economy today is still basically underdeveloped: low per capita income, a high proportion of the population engaged in subsistence agriculture, low level of productivity, a circumscribed and fractured industrial base, a high dependence on a vulnerably narrow spectrum of primary export commodities, a transport sector geared largely to the export sector, a sharp bifurcation
between the traditional and the modern sectors, a high degree of illiteracy, low life expectancy, and a predominance of expatriate business enterprise in banking, commerce, finance, industry and management. Although these are some of the factors that point to the region's underdevelopment, they suggest the magnitude of challenges that confront the West African countries (Shaw, 1982: 280).

The classical political economy of Mill and Marx was a fairly sufficient model of advanced capitalism, in which Marx emphasises the class antagonism of capital and labour; but neither paid much attention to political organisation (Mill 1990; Marx 1959). The tendency to treat economic activity as if it were autonomous from the sphere of government was thus shared by both strand of political economy, and it was undoubtedly fostered by the apparent success of the nineteenth century liberal state in promoting Britain's economic development.

For the nations of West Africa, not even the appearance of a separation of state and economy is plausible. First, their dilemmas are more than those of the post-renaissance Europe or of Victorian England; and second, the synthesis of politics and economics was made explicit by the government of the colonial period, and the successor states have gone even further towards combining the two in public and in practice. Indeed the character of each of these states is the single most important variable in any attempt to understand the region's political economy. After their recent experience of decolonization, West Africa's peoples are now living in a balkanised cluster of English, French and Portuguese speaking states. These are dwarfed by the growing might of the one black African powers that now stands at the threshold of national greatness—Nigeria. Excluding Nigeria, which dominates the Eastern part of the region (Hart, 1982).

However, because of the fragmentation of the African continent, economic cooperation is perhaps more relevant to Africa than to any other developing regions of the world. Using the conventional indicators of economic and social well most African states fall significantly behind Latin American countries and all but a few of the poorest Asian countries (Many factors are responsible for Africa's poverty and underdevelopment. But certainly the small size of most African countries is one factor that inhibits rapid economic transformation (Renninger, 1982: 158). In this vein R.S.
Morgenthau stated that: "the typical developing African nation has a sparse population, small internal markets, limited infrastructure, new and fragile borders, and economies vulnerable to fluctuating world prices" (Morgenthau, 1977).

Nigeria, long before it became rich as a result of oil, was along with the areas surrounding the Senegal and Volta River - one of the regions wealthiest, most densely populated countries. Its citizens outnumber other West Africans by five to three. Its Gross National Product accounts for seven tenths of the regional total. Yet it is not the most developed country in the region. When West Africa decolonised, Ghana and Senegal were both more advanced, however following their relative decline, Ivory Coast now has a per capita income of some $250 higher than Nigeria's, which ranks seventy-sixth out of 126 countries in the world. It is the Sahelian states whose poverty is outstanding, though all but two West African countries lie in the bottom third of the international income scale, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are among the poorest (Hart, 1982).

However, Claude Ake (1981) has argued that in spite of the oil boom of the 1970s Nigeria remained a dependent economy. The oil boom in Nigeria illustrates the tendency of disarticulation and dependence to be mutually supportive. Oil according to Ake (1981) greatly increased Nigeria's dependence, both technologically and financially, particularly in the technological field. Apart from technological dependence the oil industry had very few backward linkages and virtually all forward linkages were external. The bulk of the demand for oil was external. All this meant that the oil industry was externally oriented. Since oil accounts for about 90% of export earnings, it has tended to influence the subsidiary sectors towards an external orientation, thereby exacerbating the disarticulation of the Nigerian economy (Ake, 1981:136).

The fifteen non-Nigerian countries' Gross National Product was and is still less than a tenth of Britain's, a nation with similar numbers of people and only 4 per cent of the land area. It is hard to visualise what an income of a dollar looks like, when every man, woman, and child, in the U.S.A receives a dollar an hour around the clock. On this scale the citizens of Mali spend a year what Americans spend in five days - a ratio of 70:1 (Adedeji, 1970:217). Primary production is the mainstay of the economy of the region. The average share of agriculture, including livestock, forestry, and fishing, in
total GDP is between 50-55 per cent. From the point of view of agricultural production, West Africa can be divided into two main belts of production, stretching from east to west. The forest belt concentrates on growing crops primarily for exports, such as cocoa, rubber, coffee, bananas, and timber. On the other hand, the northern savannah belt, a tsetse fly free area, specialises in livestock breeding and grain production. The volume of inter-country trade within West Africa is very low (Adedeji, 1970: 217).

Thus the lack of progress on both national and regional levels has combined to keep the West African economy in its state of underdevelopment, with the structure of production remaining largely as it was in the colonial days. The region continues to devote our resources to produce for export rather than to produce for our own domestic needs because that is the 'inherited' economic order. In the meantime, West Africa depends on the outside world to supply our requirements and, more often, than not, our basic needs (Adedeji, 1982). It seems to have been forgotten that agricultural production for export, for example, was encouraged nourished, and sustained by the colonial powers because that was in the interest of the manufacturing industries in the metropolitan countries (Adedeji, 1982: 280-282).

Thus, the West African economy is the most open and the most exposed economy in the world, overly dependent on external trade and other external stimuli, foreign technology and foreign expertise. The very strategies of development the African governments have been pursuing since independence, have come from outside, derived as they were from theories of economic development that were developed during colonial neo-colonial pattern of production in Africa. Not unexpectedly those foreign theories of development and economic growth reinforced the economic dependence of the sub-region. They linked the rate and direction of internal socio-economic change with export markets and with the import of skills, technology and capital goods, services, and modern consumer products (Shaw, 1982:283).

The attempt to confront West Africa's development problems today naturally brings to the fore the question of how can we account for the historical process of its having become underdeveloped in the first place. It is no secret that the regional economy is abundantly geared toward foreign trade. Thus an United Nations Commission on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), recent report points out that the intra-regional trade in West Africa constituted less than 3 per cent of trade, compared with 20 per cent in Latin America, 64 per cent in Western Europe, and 7 per cent in Africa as a whole. It is hard to avoid striking superficial attitudes about this external orientation of the 'économie de traits' (Hart, 1982: 25).

It should be realised that the contemporary condition of the sub-region is one of crisis-a crisis of profound and poignant qualities...brought about by; an inheritance of incorporation in the world system and by subsequent transitions in the nexus between the latter's centre and periphery. The cluster of shocks which swept through across the global political economy of the 1970s...from the floating dollar and expensive energy to middle power emergence and super power confrontations...has had massive impact on patterns of Africa's dependence and underdevelopment. The central idealistic myths of Pan-African nationalism and cohesion that all African states are essentially similar and equally free to develop...have been replaced by a new realism of pessimism (Shaw, 1984): states are diverging exponentially with only a minority likely to experience sustained growth. In terms of political, psychology, diplomacy and security realpolitik poses a dramatic almost awesome, set of problems for the region. The contours of the crisis are now quite clear...West Africa (Africa), has been hardest hit of all regions in the 1970s...so that, a century after the treaty of Berlin, the continent as a whole is now more marginal economically than ever: the region which already contributes least to global trade and product in terms of both primary products and manufactured goods. The urgent and emergent debate over alternative strategies poses challenges not only for West African interest but also for extra-African actors, if development should come to this region (Shaw, 1984:73-78).

However the creation of ECOWAS does not seem to have led to trade diversion, since all but 2 percentage points of this increase is accounted for by greater trade with non-ECOWAS Partners. It would appear that while ECOWAS has not generated much new regional trade, an important part of the trade of many of its members has been with other Sub-Saharan African countries, even though this is masked in the overall numbers by the dominant position of some of the large economies that have little regional trade, specifically Nigeria and Ghana (Mansoor, 1990/91: 428).
The assumptions, prescriptions and projections of the years following independence were no longer valid. Instead, 'developmentalist' ideology is being replaced by 'self-reliance' as the contemporary continental motif; the elusiveness of development and the unevenness of growth have combined to force a reconsideration of strategy and scenario on Africa's statesmen and scholars. Adebayo Adedeji One of the chief architects of ECOWAS summed it up thus;

'Africa more than the other third world region, is...faced with a development crisis of great portent...if past trends persist and if there are no fundamental changes in the mix of economic policies that the African governments have pursued during the last decade and a half and if the current efforts to fundamentally change the international economic system and relations fail to yield concrete positive results, the African region as a whole will be worse off compared with the rest of the world at the end of the century than it was in 1960.' (Adedeji, 1977:13-14).

The projection of inequalities in the future has profound implications for both policy and politics; hence the 'great debate' about the continent's development strategy. The alternative World Bank and OAU plans for Africa are based on the assumptions, expectations and projections; they also reflect distinctive class preferences. Agenda for Action favours bourgeois and NIC interests whereas the Lagos Plan of Action is based on more proletarian and peasant basic human need characteristics of the periphery. If 'Agenda' become the continental plan then further inter and intra state inequalities would ensue. If however, the LPA is adopted such inequalities might be contained or even reduced. In short, these two plans reflect different class and country interests both at present and in prospect. The current and projected condition of the region is depressing, no withstanding the utility and vitality of the debate about alternative development strategies. Intra-state inequalities are likely to continue with profound implications for national, regional and continental order and development (Shaw, 1975).

Adedeji articulates the atmosphere of depression well when he asserted that:

'The reality of today is that after two decades of political independence for most African countries, the economic emancipation that was expected to follow closely on the heels of political independence still remains only a hope...thus, the African economy today is the
most open and the most exposed economy in the world, overly dependent on external trade and other external stimuli, foreign technology, and foreign expertise. The very strategies of development the African governments have been procuring since independence have come from theories of economic development that were developed during the colonial and neo-colonial periods to rationalise the colonial pattern of production in Africa...neither high rates of growth or diversification nor an increasing measure of self-reliance and self sustainment has been achieved in the African economy.' (Adedeji, 1982:280).

Given such an unsatisfactory inheritance and trend, Adedeji calls for a more authentic strategy based on indigenous needs, values and life styles. He suggest, idealistically, that the very dismal forecasts can only be avoided if an African programme contains 'certain basic elements'; these are 'self-reliance and self-sustaining' development, democratisation of the development process, delineation, the creation of the right political and social environments, the recovery of self confidence by the peoples of Africa, and the willingness to achieve effective and meaningful 'co-operation' among African states.' (Shaw, 1985: 1-20). With this broad view of West Africa’s political economy we can now turn to the rationale for the formation of ECOWAS.

Rationale for the Formation of ECOWAS.

The West African sub-region is endowed with a lot of mineral and other natural resources, nonetheless the region has witnessed unprecedented cases of starvation and human tragedies resulting from severe drought which affected the Sahel in the 1970s. New questions are therefore raised. How can this potentially wealthy region cope with or avoid future socio-economic dislocations and sufferings caused by natural disasters? How can poorer state in West Africa share in the relative wealth of sister countries in the region? How long will the countries of West Africa continue to rely on hand outs from western countries, whose assistance tends to come in bits and pieces and in times of crises, often too late? (Gambari, 1991:16).

A study of West Africa’s political economy depicts that, the post independent period in the region in the early 1960s indicated striking features of underdevelopment: the predominance of a primary sector, a high concentration of income, sparse diversification in its production system, and an external market far out weighing the
internal trade and co-operation. Hence West Africa requires some form of reconstruction as a group if political independence is to retain its meaning and value (Olaniyan: 1985:2).

In an effort to address these questions and challenges the various West African countries decided to jointly harness their resources for the socio-economic development of the sub-region. This desire for co-operation can be summed up in the words of Professor Adebayo Adedeji when he says; "...economic co-operation among African states is a sine qua non for the achievement of national socio-economic goals and not an extra to be given thought after the process of development is well advanced" (cited in Asante, 1991:85). This desire for co-operation was also expressed by one of the founding fathers of ECOWAS, the former Nigerian head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, who states that "...the case for economic co-operation in West Africa is self-evident." It would according to him play a fundamental role in the development of the countries of the region and the welfare of the peoples of West Africa (Gambari, 1991:14).

The formation of ECOWAS has largely been seen as a product of post civil war Nigeria's foreign policy. After its civil war (1967-1970), Nigeria found that its increased wealth, based largely on the export of crude oil, began to give it a more positive interest in the developmental of the West African sub-region. The country's leadership had a vision of a more evenly developed West Africa, in which Nigeria would not be a resentment provoking oasis of prosperity amid a sub-regional 'economic desert'. (Gambari: 1991:18). The debate about the African development question has been considerably heightened and vigorously sustained by Professor Adebayo Adedeji (often referred to as the father of ECOWAS), and he has been equated to Raul Prebisch of Latin America in the search for alternative development strategies for the continent. While Frank and Todaro, among other scholars, were evolving a radical conceptual framework to challenge the traditional model of development within the context of Latin American experience (Asante, 1991), Adebayo was questioning orthodox assumptions within the context of African development since independence (Asante, 1991). One key aspect of Adedeji's development strategy is the concept of regional co-operation and integration. Adedeji
considers a regional approach, which is linked to the principle of collective self-reliance, as a sine qua non for the achievement of national socio-economic goals. For in no area whether it is- in the internationalisation of the development process or international trade negotiations, debt policy, or adjustment with transformation- can much progress be made without co-operation among African countries. In his view national development efforts have to be supplemented by sub-regional and regional co-operation development efforts. Particularly in the case of Africa where there are fundamental reasons (as outlined in the political economy of West Africa of this dissertation), why domestic efforts may not be optimal in providing at all and/or efficiently the basic requirements for satisfying the social and economic needs of the people. Apart from cultural and tactical considerations, Adedeji (1979) argues that the main reasons `for the pooling of development efforts among countries are purely economic’ (Adedeji, 1979:19-20). This is particularly the case for West Africa (say Africa in general), where for historical reasons many of the countries are at present too small for viable economic activities, particularly in the context of establishing and managing basic industries for the production of agricultural, industrial and natural resources. There is the problem of low levels of per capita income. For these reasons African countries find it difficult to develop on an individual basis. Therefore in the face of fundamental handicaps at the national levels the sub-regional, regional and multinational approach, could provide the answer to region’s developmental needs (Asante 1991:10).

Integration can contribute to the process if industrialisation in a number of ways. In the case of West Africa, the economic size of nearly all the countries inhibits industrialisation through import substitution, growth of domestic demand, or export promotion. The small size of each separate domestic market means that there are relatively few goods that can be produced for the local market in an economic fashion. Such goods are typically consumer items that can be produced by light industries, and once the breweries, cigarette factories, textile mills, and similar establishments come into operation, there is little scope for further industrialisation. The development of an industrial sector geared to export promotion is even more difficult under the circumstances. In both cases the ability to specialise and the realisation of economies of scale are necessary but impossible to obtain when the market is too small (Renninger,
The concept of development is closely associated with the process of regional integration because the integration process has been redefined; it is no longer regarded as merely a supportive measure. Efforts at regional integration are no longer inspired mainly by considerations of pure efficiency, as exemplified by the East African Common Services Organisation; nor are they structured to be only adaptations of doctrine of import-substitution as part of a policy for ‘industrialisation by invitation’ on a regional scale, as in the case of the Latin American Free Trade Association (Asante, 1980). Regional integration is now designed primarily as a tool to combat and reduce external economic dependence, as in the case of the Andean Common Market, and it is being vigorously advocated as a grand strategy for solving the problem of underdevelopment, as in the case of ECOWAS (Asante, 1991:86). The inauguration of ECOWAS in Lagos, Nigeria, on 28 May, 1975 was hailed as a break through in the long series of efforts to institute some form of economic co-operation and integration embracing the entire sub-region, which has a geographical zone larger than Western Europe, a total population of about 160 million people and a GDP of US $125 billion (Asante; 1991:89). Linking sixteen countries, ECOWAS is the first major regional scheme to attempt to bridge the Anglophone -Francophone divide, which bedevilled previous co-operative movements in West Africa. This was clearly explained by Adedeji, the then federal commissioner for economic development in Nigeria, when he said that:

“We are here today to explore the myth that differences in language, culture, and economic level necessarily render impossible the achievement of meaningful co-operation in West Africa. We have precedents to guide us. It is a fact of history that after the Second World War, bitter enemies such as Germany and France are now working together under the umbrella of the EEC. Luxembourg, a relatively small country, is also co-operating with economic giants like France and Germany. In the EEC, there are as many as nine languages. And these countries are no less heterogeneous culturally...Today, the EEC is the richest economic grouping in the world because its members have learnt to share their technological and scientific knowledge which has accelerated their economic growth...If the EEC has taken so many years to develop to the height that it has now reached, we in Africa must be realistic” (Adedeji, 1973).
The event represented the culmination of years of efforts by the West African states to increase the economic muscle, and therefore the bargaining base, of their economies. Through a pooling of economic ‘sovereignty’ their intent is to transform their economies so as to improve the living standards of their peoples and to extend the struggle for political decolonisation into the area of economic decolonisation. Briefly, therefore, the inauguration of ECOWAS must be seen as an attempt by the West African states to enhance their economic opportunities and to reduce their external dependency (Asante, 1991:90).

There continues to be a great deal of interest in co-operation among developing countries. The severe economic instability of the 1970s, which affected both developed and developing countries, drew attention to the growing interdependence of the global community. The necessity of increased and more effective international co-operation is evident to all, and this issue has come to dominate discussions at international meetings. Much of the discussion revolves around the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), or procedures, mechanisms, and adjustments that will lead to a new and more equitable relationship between the developed and developing countries (Renninger, 1982:154). At the same time the failure of the North-South dialogue to produce solutions acceptable to the developing countries has led to heightened interest in expanding co-operation among developing countries themselves. If developing countries had more-extensive links, economic and otherwise, with one another and could rely more upon one another for a greater variety of goods and services, they would be correspondingly less dependent upon the developed world. A major goal of great numbers of the third world including ECOWAS today is to decrease their present massive dependence on countries in the industrialised world. Greater co-operation among developing countries, whether on the regional, sub-regional, or inter-regional levels, is one very concrete way of achieving the goal of building collective self-reliance (Renninger, 1982:154).

The founders of ECOWAS subscribed to the view that; economic integration can help alleviate such an unequal and unfavourable situation with larger number of economic units acting as one will obviously be better able to protect their interests in dealing with the external forces that influence their development prospects. They will be in a better
position, first of all, by being less dependent upon outside forces- the larger the economic unit, the greater will be the opportunities for promoting self-reliance. Second the larger the unit, the greater the economic power that the unit will have at its disposal. As Pentland (1975), commented that "in the third world, free-trade areas, common markets, cartels, and other groupings are based on the belief that in some form of unity there is strength to resist exploitation and manipulation by major economic powers and multi-national corporations, to resolve regionally shared economic and social problems, and to force structural reform of the international economy" (Pentland, 1975:4)

However, judging from the difficulties experienced by more regional groups, such as the EAST African Community and the Mano River Union, and the general history of regional integration in Africa, it is difficult to be optimistic about the chances of a regional Common Market. The basic problem with the strategy of self-reliance is that it presupposes a considerable degree of regional economic co-operation and integration which Africa has tried for a long time to promote with limited success (Ake, 1981:169).

The economic benefits that could follow regional co-operation in West Africa are hardly in dispute. Indeed, some limited co-operation efforts involving the Francophone and Anglophone countries in projects utilising the Senegalese River and Chad Basin have yielded beneficial results. Still, additional economic justifications exist to encourage some states in the region to take concrete steps towards the establishment of a wider system of co-operation in the region. Almost all countries in West Africa earn much of their foreign exchange through the export of primary products—indeed, many of them have a mono-crop economy. They suffered huge financial losses and serious disruptions in the economic planning when the world market prices for commodities fluctuate widely, as they tend to do. A co-ordinated and reorganised production of the crops in the region could strengthen the income-earning capacity of West Africa as a whole, since a wide range of crops are produced there (Gambari, 1991:24-25).

Therefore the arguments for a customs union in West Africa, as in other under-developed areas, rest primarily on the stimulus which such unions might give to the
creation of new productive capacity rather than to the more efficient utilisation of existing resources (Adedeji, 1970:220). However, the position of West Africa is further complicated by two factors: the newness of the nationhood and the lack of any tradition of co-operation. As Nicholas Plessz puts it:

West Africa cannot be compared with the European Common Market, where economic integration affects countries with a long tradition of separate nationhood.... In West Africa...integration would call both for the transformation of the colonial customs unions of former French territories and for the elimination of the division between those territories and the other countries of the region’ (Plessz, 1968: 13).

There is also an envisaged co-operation in the exploitation, internal use, and export of mineral resources. This would undoubtedly lead to expanded production and wealth in the region and to a reduction in costs. Oil, accounts for over 90 per cent of the foreign exchange earned by Nigeria and has had a huge impact on the country’s economy. High quality iron ore is located in Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinea produces bauxite as a principal mineral resource, but Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria are also endowed with that mineral. Copper and tin are extracted in Mauritania and Nigeria, while diamond deposits are located in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. Nigeria is the world’s leading producer of columbite, while Ghana leads the region in the production of Gold and manganese. Joint investments in the exploitation and export of these minerals could raise the income levels of the countries involved. This is even more crucial regarding petroleum and hydroelectric resource (Gambari, 1991:25).

It was further argued that economic co-operation promotes economic efficiency via specialisation and smoothness of trade transactions due to change in the degree and nature of competition and change in uncertainty and unilaterality of trade policies of individual states. In other words, integration brings about a more efficient utilisation of resources and the harmonisation of economic and trade policies ushers in a smooth and orderly system of trade among members of a grouping (Olaniyan, 1985:3).

Another area of economic importance for the region is in the transportation, communication, and infrastructural facilities. The road and railway systems in West Africa, designed for colonial governments’ needs and generally stretching from coast
to interior of the separate countries in the region, hamper the development of intra-regional trade. Commodities tend to move from North to South (vice-versa) and rarely between West and East. The establishment of ECOWAS was viewed as means to improving the communications and transportation networks, in order to improve regional trade and investment. This can be accomplished not by any single country, however financially well off it may be, but by the joint efforts of all states in the region, supplemented with external assistance (Gambari, 1991:25). Thus in conventional theory economic integration will offer net advantages only if the on balance the trade-creation effects far outweigh the trade diversion effects. In West Africa it was perceived that because of the differing comparative advantages of the different countries in the region, an economic will assist them all to rationalise their production patterns, and net trade creation will result (Adedeji, 1970: 219).

Another economic rationale for the establishment of ECOWAS is the potential industrial base that such a grouping holds. Although the resources and population of West Africa give it a potentially strong base for industrial development, this will not become a reality until there is rationalisation and specialisation through a system of regional industries. The possibilities of economies of scale in the production industrial goods are there but will not materialise without positive measures to encourage regionwide investment in industries and community policy on the location of industries (Gambari, 1991:25). A serious programme of regional industrial development, allowing for the establishment of industries to serve more than one country, would also go a long way to reduce the incidence of high unemployment and underemployment, especially in the urban centres. There is also the question of the redirection of trade, and land locked states. The region's internal trade is still conducted largely with the former colonial masters (Britain and France). although other industrialised countries are rapidly becoming important trading partners. However, unless there is a dramatic shift in the present state of international economic order, the terms of trade could not be radically changed by the West African countries. Meanwhile, members of the West African economic community could develop new directions of intra-regional trade, under their control, which would be capable of raising the income of citizens in the region. Moreover, many states in the region are land-locked. They have relied on ad hoc arrangements with, and the goodwill of, coastal states to improve their goods
between ports. With the establishment of ECOWAS and the spirit of economic cooperation, the access of these landlocked states may be regularised and placed on a sounder basis (Gambari, 1991:25). It was therefore felt that, economic integration will increase the level of economic activity through increased trade, hence it permits the exploitation of external economies and inter-industry linkages which also has the effect of lowering the cost of production (Olaniran, 1985:2).

As a prime mover in the negotiations that led to ECOWAS, Nigeria has its own reasons for the regional integration of West Africa. The main ideas behind Nigeria's initiative are political, security and economic considerations. For political reasons Nigeria wants an arrangement that will put an end to colonial divisions within West Africa. Furthermore Nigeria believes that such a step will put an end to border disputes and will be an important contribution to African unity. Moreover, according to Arikpo (1973), the federal military government held the firm view that in order to strengthen the bargaining position of African states with the EEC there must be a West African economic community through which all states in the region will speak with one voice (West Africa, 1973).

For security reasons Nigeria does not want to be surrounded by small countries that are heavily dependent on extra-African powers, especially France, for military, political and economic survival. It is firmly believed in Nigeria that as long as there are client West African states closely tied to European apron strings, Nigeria's security can not be assured. Such states can either be manipulated against Nigeria or used as staging ground for foreign powers who wish to cause disaffection and confusion in the country (Daily Times, 1970).

The experience of the civil war made it imperative for Nigeria to pay more attention to her West African neighbours. Of the four African countries, which recognised the secessionist Biafra, two were in West Africa. The post civil-war reassessment of the country's foreign policy concluded that Africa must be the centrepiece of the Nigeria's diplomacy. By implication, West Africa would be an important focus of the country's diplomatic activities. Never again should West African countries be staging grounds for extra-regional powers' attempt to dismember or destabilise Nigeria. Since France was a power that used its considerable influence on the smaller Francophone countries...
for negative purposes during the civil war, ECOWAS might be used to reduce that influence (Gambari, 1991:19). In most Francophone states the influence of the French government has been pervasive. It is no secret that it has been the cardinal policy of the French government to encourage close co-operation among its former West African colonies in order to counterbalance the weight of Nigeria (Aluko, 1981:17). For many years, French policy had not encouraged economic and other forms of integrations between the former French territories and other parts of West Africa. It was felt that too many co-operations among independent West African states would inevitably lead to a revision of the 'special relationship', which existed, between France and her colonies. Changed attitudes had now brought about considerable adjustment in the special relationship between France and her former colonies. With the disappearance of Charles de Gaulle, the symbol and promoter of French speaking neo-independence, in 1969, French speaking cohesion 'inter se' and with France began to decline. The military leaders along with Ould Daddah of Mauritania publicly began to demand reforms in the operation of agreements governing their relations with France which they had come to see as a web that bound them progressively tighter to France as the latter bled them drier (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986:128). The federal government Gen. Gowon felt that, the greater the distance between France and these countries, the more likely that the Francophone West African countries would begin to perceive ECOWAS as an alternative source of funds, ideas, and economic and trade relations (Gambari, 1991:19).

As a result of Nigeria’s diplomacy, and because of the successful completion of the first Lome Convention which associated the African, Caribbean and pacific (ACP) countries to the EEC in February 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formally established by the fifteen West African states in Lagos in May 1975 (West Africa, 1973). Nigeria’s diplomatic role between 1972 and 1974 included the following. First, Dahomey (now Benin) was successfully persuaded to abolish transit tax on all goods going from Togo to Nigeria. During 1973 a number of other West African states signed a series of agreements to increase their trade with Nigeria. The restrained and shrewd diplomacy of the Gowon government was greeted with such enthusiasm and confidence by neighbouring states that Hamani Diori, the then President of Niger and chairman of the CEAO, said in June 1973 that any
economic agreement in West Africa that excluded Nigeria would be ‘unrealistic’ (West Africa, 1973).

In April 1972, the Heads of Government of Nigeria and Togo met to discuss improvements in economic co-operation in the region. The concluding communiqué called for a meeting of the council of Ministers of Togo and Nigeria to prepare an agenda for a summit of West African Heads of state. This was held in Lome, Togo on 15 December 1973. The meeting attended by fifteen West African countries agreed that the ultimate objective of regional integration is a common market. The Francophone West African states hitherto apprehensive of the disintegration of cultural ties inherited from France and of Nigeria’s domination had come to perceive benefits which could accrue to them from the proposed community (Olusanya and Akindele, 1986:128). Another trump card played by the Gowon government in July 1974 was when the decision was made to sell crude oil at concessionary prices to African countries, which had their own refineries. This was welcome by many African countries, especially Ivory Coast and Senegal, whose support was crucial to the formation of the pan-West African economic community. Finally the successful negotiation of the ACP agreement with the EEC in February 1975 directly paved the way for the establishment of ECOWAS. Indeed, Olu Sanu the then Nigerian Ambassador to the EEC who presided over ACP negotiations with EEC during 1973-5, said categorically that without the Lome Convention it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to bring about ECOWAS (Sanu, 1978).

The ECOWAS treaty, which defines its objectives and the way in which they are to be achieved, aims to achieve an economic community over a fifteen year period in three stages. The first stage lasting two years is to be devoted to fact finding and organisation of the community institutions. During this period no new import duties may not be imposed nor should existing ones increased for member states. In the second stage, lasting the next eight years, there will be gradual elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon in a protocol. There will also be the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital (Ojo et. al, 1985). The third stage, the next five years, will be devoted to the abolition of the existing differences in the member states’ external

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Beyond this, the treaty calls for the harmonisation of agricultural, industrial, economic and monetary policies, including measures on foreign investment, the setting up of joint ventures, reduction of dependence on the outside world and, implicitly the establishment of collective bargaining with the industrialised world (Ojo et al, 1985:171).

From the above it could be realised that the ultimate goal of integration schemes in developing countries (West Africa), is to "...escape from poverty caused by dependence on foreign colonial powers who organised the structure of their economies to suit the needs and convenience of the metropolitan economies" (Renninger, 1977: 79). Regional integration is then seen as a means to change the situation whereby most members of the developing world remain as suppliers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods.

In assessing the relevance of conventional notions of integration to the less developed countries, we may immediately observe that the conditions favourable to trade creation are the very opposite in the third world. Intra-group trade as in the case of West Africa, is a minor proportion of the total trade between member states and the rest of the world. Nearly all West African countries are primary producers and their products are competitive rather than complementary. Moreover, they are heavily dependent on the export of their primary product, while importing immediate manufactures which, in so far as they are produced at all in the region, are produced in very limited quantity and poor quality. It follows that; foreign trade occupies a conspicuous proportion of the GNP and general economic activities of the West African states. Export of primary products or minerals constitutes the major source of foreign exchange earnings. Therefore, the application of the criterion of gain through orthodox customs union theory to integration among the less developed countries appears to be of little or no relevance (Gambari, 1991: 7-10).

Integration arrangements are attractive to developing countries because of the potential opportunities for profitable domestic and foreign investment, which in turn could assist in the mobilisation of unemployed or underemployed resources. Accordingly, the most useful criterion with which to evaluate desirability and benefit of integration in developing sub regions like West Africa, is the potential impact on
factors which would develop should there be no integration arrangement. Put simply, integration schemes in developing regions like West Africa represent the triumph of hope for a better economic future over the experience of grim economic present (Gambari, 1991: 1-10)

According to Renninger, (1977), the ultimate goal of integration schemes in the developing countries is to, escape from poverty caused by dependence on foreign colonial powers who organised the structure of their economies to suit the needs and convenience of the metropolitan economies. However, the point must be made that integration efforts in West Africa have some political motivation. The commitment to political integration within an economic community varies among its members. For example, some members of ECOWAS share the view of President Kwame Nkrumah, who sought an early political unification. General Ignatius Acheampong of Ghana in (Gambari, 1991), saw the formation of ECOWAS as the instrument to “remove centuries of division and artificial barriers imposed on West Africa from outside and to recreate together the kind of homogeneous society which existed before the colonialists invaded our shores” (Gambari, 1991:1-10)

Even among West African States that are not highly motivated by the potentiality of ECOWAS “spill over” into political integration, there is the perception of the economic community as a more pragmatic instrument for the realisation of African unity. Functional co-operation as demonstrated by economic arrangements, can hardly be established and pursued purely for its own sake. On the contrary, pragmatic co-operation is undertaken within some political context however vaguely defined or understood by those involved. Since the birth of ECOWAS some two decades ago, Nigeria has continued to play a central role in the community. The commitment to ECOWAS on Nigeria’s part arises from the recognition of the strategic as well as economic importance of the organisation to the pursuit of Nigeria’s national interest in Africa and the world. However, despite Nigeria’s central role in ECOWAS since its inception, the march towards West African economic co-operation and integration has been painfully slow (Asante, 1997: 28).

Before we examine Nigeria’s policy actions within the Community, it is necessary to discuss the defining characteristics of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In light of this an
attempt will be made at relating certain decision-making models in relation to Nigeria’s policy in the community. These will be discussed intandem with the literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy.

**Decision Making Models and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy - Strategic Options.**

Foreign policymaking is essentially the task of devising strategies that utilise a nation-state’s capabilities to achieve the goal set by its leaders. However, the environments of a national foreign policy decision system poses varying degrees of constraint upon its options and behaviour. In the foreign policy process, decision makers are not constrained solely by the demands made upon them by individuals and groups in their own country who wants to see particular values maximised or even by the pressures and realities of the external environment. They also operate within a decision system that has its own dynamics. At the centre of it stands a bureaucracy, a major function of which is to process relevant information from the external and domestic environments as well as that stored within the bureaucracy itself—to bring it to bear upon a current issue. Even more central is the fact that decisions are made by individuals, each with a distinctive personality. The interplay of the personalities of the decisionmakers, group dynamics as decisionmakers interact, representative processes in the sense that top-level decisionmakers are tied into different bureaucracies and other social groupings, and the qualities of the information processing system determines the issues to which foreign policy makers pay attention and the goals they pursue in the international arena (Merrit, 1975:1-3).

According to Snyder (1958) all activities in foreign policy can be examined in terms of one main form of behaviour, the decision to pursue one course of action rather than many others that might be pursued. Whatever the actors do, and however sound their actions may be, they proceed on the basis of prior choices, and the presence of decisionmaking activity at the core of all political action provides a common focus for the analysis of otherwise disparate political actors, situations and processes. Decisionmaking sustains bureaucracies, dominates legislatures, preoccupies chief executives, and characterise judicial bodies. Decisions lead to policy, produce conflict, and foster co-operation (Snyder, 1958:342).
'From the time they first tried to establish a separate discipline', asserts Roger Hillsman (cited in Olusanya and Akindele, 1980), political scientists sought to understand how decisions of government are made and by whom. This may well be so. But as Hillsman admits, what prevailed then was not the study of foreign policy process, as it is known today. The focus was not on how decisions were arrived at and implemented. Rather, the first approach was an analysis of the legal powers of formal institutions, the constitutional rights and prerogatives of the president and congress. One of the outstanding useful by-products of these early studies was the discovery of the lobbies and interest groups. Ironically it was this discovery that attracted the attention of Political Scientists to the study of the political process. A protest movement arose against the early methods of analysing international politics. The protesters argued that a thorough understanding of international politics could not be furthered by a method, which confuses the ideal with the real (Olusanya and Akindele, 1980: 23-23). This led to the rise of the classical or rational actor model and later the bureaucratic or organisational process models.

In the policy process governments are often confronted with situations that put to test the operationalisations of it policy strategies. The domestic policy process is characterised by compromises and attempts at striking a balance between the various stakeholders in the political system. This situation becomes more challenging when it comes to a country's foreign policy; in other words, when governments are expected to react to often unprecedented events outside their national boundaries. In such circumstances, policy planners often find themselves in situations where they have to respond to events in the international arena, whilst promoting their domestic interests and minimising conflicts abroad.

The complications arising from their basic complexity and ill definition compound policy-initiative. As Simon (cited in Parsons, 1995), argues in respect of ill-defined problems, they require problem-solvers to contribute to the problem definition. Although problems are ill structured, government is highly structured. This fact means that all problems have an organisational or governmental context, which has a major influence on the way in which problems come to be structured. Ill-structured as they are, public issues are not clearly demarcated: we do not know where the one problem
begins and another ends. They overlap, intersect and bump into one another (Parsons, 1995: 89). The policy overlap, intersection and bumping into one another are not uncommon in the international political arena. This is because there is always conflict of interests between different competing forces in the pursuance of their national objectives. The question of national interest plays a pivotal role in determining a country's course of action in the international arena, hence the need to relate the question of national interest to Nigeria's role in ECOWAS.

The concept of national interest is used in both political analysis and political action. As an analytic tool, it is employed to describe, explain, and evaluate the source or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, and proposing policies. Both usages, in other words, refer to what is best for a national society. They also share a tendency to confine the intended meaning to what is best for a nation in foreign affairs (Rosenau, 1980: 283)

While analysts have discovered that the value-laden character of the concept makes it difficult to employ as a tool of rigorous investigation, actors have found that this very same characteristic renders the concept useful both as a way of thinking about their goals and as a means of mobilising support for them. That is, not only do political actors tend to perceive and discuss their goals in terms of the national interest, but they are also inclined to claim that their goals are the national interest, a claim that often arouses the support necessary to move towards a realisation of the goals. Consequently, even though it has lost some of its early appeal as an analytic tool, the national interest enjoys considerable favour as a basis for action and has won a prominent place in the dialogue of public affairs (Rosenau, 1980:283).

Morgenthau (1954), advances that, "...interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed." Morgenthau wrote, emphasising that, the "objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest"(Morgenthau, 1954:9). And exactly what constitutes the interest of a nation? Morgenthau recognised that "the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated",(Morgenthau, 1954:9). but he envisioned
accounting for these contextual factors by defining interest in terms of power. For Morgenthau the power at a nation’s command relative to that of other nations is, at any moment in time, an objective reality for that nation and thus serves to determine what its true interest is and should be (Morgenthau, 1954).

It is important to note that, national interest can not be entirely abandoned. Even though the nation is declining in its importance as a political unit to which allegiances are attached, the process of decline is many decades- perhaps even-centuries- away from an end. Political actors will no doubt continue to make extensive use of national interest in their thinking about foreign policy goals and in their efforts to mobilise support for them. And, to the extent that they do, political observers must take cognisance of the national interest. In other words, while national interest has little future as an analytic concept, its use in politics will long continue to be a datum requiring analysis (Rosenau, 1980:293).

The concept of national interest plays a central role in the process of integration. Nigeria’s policy in ECOWAS, is no exception to this, as there are differing interests in the region ranging from sub-national, national, multinational to regional power jostling in the region. As Nigeria pursues its policy in ECOWAS, there is often an overlapping; intersection and bumping into one and others interest, between the varied actors in the sub-region. It is of both academic and social (i.e. practical) significance to inquire whether the state of the (foreign policy analysis) art today has not thrown up more analytically useful sets of models and theories for the understanding of the foreign policy process. If it has not, in what specific ways may the decision-making models be of use for the understanding of Nigeria’s foreign policy in ECOWAS? (Asobie, 1980:4). Before addressing these issues, an attempt will be made at discussing the process of policy formulation and implementation from the public policy perspective. Attention will be focused on two of the decision-making models; that is, the classical or rational actor model and the bureaucratic or organisational process model. As a result of the extensive writings on Nigeria’s foreign policy it will be pertinent to examine the various writings on this subject. We can identify two categories of writings on Nigeria’s foreign policy, based on their paradigmatic assumptions and implications. These are the realist paradigm and the behavioural paradigms. These policy models will
eventually serve as analytic tools in what has shaped the contours of Nigeria's policy in ECOWAS.

**The Realist Paradigm:** The central organising concept of the realist paradigm is 'power', supplemented by the question of national interest. The central thesis of the realist perspective is that, states, acting through statesmen who personify them, 'think and act in terms of interest defined as power'. The adherents of the realist perspective assert that, this concept gives continuity and unity to seemingly diverse foreign policies of widely separated states and, at the same time, makes evaluating the actions of statesmen at different points in history possible (Asobie, 1980: 8).

The realist perspective takes as it principal unit of analysis the nation-state. It assumes that no other units have any appreciable significance. Other elements of the society merely serve as either components of the nation-states or the environment within which it functions. For instance, two attributes of the state, sovereignty and nationalism, are believed to have such decisive impact on policies of state that the responses of states to external events and issues are explained chiefly in terms of the clashes of nationalises and sovereignties (Asobie: 8).

The bulk of literature on Nigeria's foreign policy reflects the pervasive influence of the realist paradigm on the study and analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy. These writings take the Nigerian State, as their principal unit of analysis. The basic assumption underlying these works is that, in specific terms, the Nigerian government represented by the chief executive and his foreign minister are the principal actors in Nigeria's foreign policy. In the literature on Nigeria's foreign policy, the Nigerian State is reified; it is vested with the attributes of a human person. One frequently meets, in the literature, such expressions as Nigeria's 'pathological antagonism' to foreign-inspired creation of a pan-African security force; Nigeria's attitude of ambivalence and reluctant acceptance of the doctrine of non-alignment etc (Asobie: 8-9).

The propagators of the realist tradition to the study of Nigeria's foreign policy accept that, the Nigerian State is shaped, influenced or, to a large extent determined by the traditional 'elements of national power'. These elements of power otherwise, described as elements of domestic environment or setting include, geographical location, the
economy, military capability, the internal political pressures and occasionally, the nature and ideology of the governing elites. In the realist tradition, too, most of the writings on Nigeria’s foreign policy are predicated on the assumption that, in external relations, the Nigerian State behaves or ought to behave rationally. According to this perspective, to behave rationally, in this context is to pursue the national interest defined in terms of power. Thus Asobie, (1980) argues that the two foreign policy objectives, which are most frequently identified in this kind of literature as constituting a priority for Nigeria, are national security and rapid economic growth. All other objectives are treated in much of the literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy as tertiary or peripheral (Assobie, 1980: 10).

The realist perspective treats the Nigerian State as a homogeneous and unified actor. Only rarely have few authors identified, in their researches, some disagreements or conflicts among policy makers. Even then, such disagreements are identified in respect to the methods and vigour with which Nigeria’s national interests, on which a consensus is presumed to exist, may be pursued. (Asobie: 10).

Finally, some of the writings of the realist paradigm on Nigeria’s foreign policy reflect the assumptions of a balance of power model. These writings perceive Nigeria’s foreign policy as characterised by a struggle by Nigeria to establish herself as a regional power or a leader in Africa. In this bid for leadership of Africa, Nigeria is pictured as being in competition with Ghana or less frequently, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). Some of these works perceives the rivalry for power and influence, especially in West Africa, as a struggle between Nigeria and France (Asobie, 1980: 10).

**The Behavioural Approach.**

The dissatisfaction with the realist approach, which became manifest in the 1950s, gave rise to a protest movement, which was later identified as the ‘behavioural approach’. An important distinguishing mark of the behavioural approach is its focus on individual human beings, rather than large political units or collectivities, as a unit of analysis. Unlike the realist paradigm, the behavioural approach encourages the analyst to look at political actors, first and foremost, as individuals who have emotions, prejudices and predispositions of human beings. (Asobie, 1980: 13). Under the behavioural approach,
not only is the actual human being, as distinct from reified institutions, elevated to the centre of attention but also, more importantly, the political process is related to and explained in terms of the motivations, feelings and personalities of the participants as individual human beings (Asobie, 1980: 13).

Among the numerous writings on Nigeria's foreign policy, Gordon J. Idang in his book titled, 'Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy' (1960-1966), attempts to analyse Nigeria's policy within the wider context of the behavioural approach. The author's purpose was to undertake a systematic analysis of the interaction between the domestic political process and foreign policy, using Nigeria as a case study. The attempt to study and analyse Nigeria's foreign policy from the perspective of the behavioural paradigm was not made explicit, nevertheless it was apparent in several ways (Asobie, 1980). First, there was the frequent reference to the personality characteristics of the key foreign policy decision-makers, their attributes or general dispositions, their perceptions and values, and the impact of those on Nigeria's foreign policy. Second, it is clear that he attached a lot of importance to the question of quantification. For instance he quantified the attributes of the members of the Nigerian House of Representatives and the Senate, the differences in foreign policy perceptions and attitudes of federal legislators, and the main characteristics of the coverage of foreign policy issues by the Nigerian press in terms of timing, frequency and content. Third, his inclusion of a section; on 'Foreign policy Elites', and their dominant attitudes and perceptions and the policy making process as well as the emphasis which he places on the distinction between the 'operational' environment and the 'psychological' environment of the decision-makers reflect an adherence to the behavioural approach (Asobie, 1980: 15).

A few other writings that have touches of the behavioural approach fall squarely in the specific category of studies of decision-making. These are the works of H.A. Asobie (1980), and to a more limited extent, Oladije Aluko (1981)(Olusanya and Akindele, 1980).

**The Bureaucratic or Organisational Process Model.**

For some purposes, governmental behaviour can be usefully summarised as action
chosen by unitary, rational decision-maker: centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximising. But this simplification must not be allowed to conceal the fact that a government consists of a conglomerate of semi-federal, loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders do sit formally and, to some extent, in fact, on top of this conglomerate. According to this model, governments perceive problems through organisational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organisations process; governments act as these organisations enact routines. Governmental behaviour can therefore be understood, according to a second conceptual model, less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organisations functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour (Allison, 1971: 67).

As Allison and Halperin (1971) have explained, the bureaucratic politics model is centred on the assumption that the maker of government policy is not a single calculating decision-maker as the rational actor model suggests. Rather, it is a conglomerate of large organisations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of government. Therefore, the use of the model leads the analyst to an examination of the influence of organisational behaviour on the processes of policy decision-making processes (Allison and Halperin, 1971).

The central thesis integral to this model is the proposition that policy-making involves bargaining between groups of persons representing different organisational interests. As Halperin (cited in Olusanya and Akindele, 1980) puts it, foreign policy is the product of a process of 'pulling and hauling' among numerous individuals, many of them working in large complex organisations or bureaucracies. These individuals may have some shared images of their society, but they also have different interests and priorities: many of them are preoccupied by events at home and deal with events abroad only as those events interact with, and affect their ability to pursue, their interest at home. Consequently, what any government does in any particular instance can best be understood not as a conscious planned and carefully directed effort to influence other states but as a result of bargaining among actors or players positioned
hierarchically in the government. And a foreign policy action that from outside the
government looks like a methodically orchestrated attempt to achieve a well-defined
national interest, may, in fact, represent a shaky compromise between rival elements in
the bureaucracy, each pursuing its own distinct organisational or personal interests
(Olusanya and Akindele, 1980: 31-2).

To be responsive to a broad spectrum of problems, governments consist of large
organisations among which primary responsibility for particular areas is divided. Each
organisation attends to a special set of problems and acts in quasi-independence on
these problems. Each organisation attends to a special set of problems and acts in
quasi-independence on these problems. But few important problems fall exclusively
within the domain of a single organisation. Thus government behaviour relevant to any
important problem reflect the independent output of several organisations, partially
coor-ordinated by government leaders. According to this process government leaders can
substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the behaviour of these organisations
(Hanrieder, 1971:342).

According to the organisational model, at any given time, a government consists of
existing organisations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and
programs. The behaviour of these organisations- and consequently of the government-
relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by
routines established in these organisations prior to that change. But organisations do
change. Learning occurs gradually, over time (Allison, 1971).

The organisational process paradigm postulates that happenings of international
politics are in three critical senses, outputs of organisational processes. First, the actual
occurrences are organisational outputs. For example, Chinese entry into the Korean
war-that is the fact that, Chinese soldiers were firing at UN soldiers south of Yalu in
1950-is an organisational action: the action of men and women who are soldiers in
platoons which are in companies, which in turn are in armies, responding as privates to
lieutenants who are responsible to captains and so on to the commander, moving into
Korea, advancing against enemy troops, and firing according to fixed routines of the
Chinese army. Government leaders' decisions therefore, only trigger organisational
routines. Government leaders can trim the edges of this output and exercise some
choice in combining outputs. But the mass behaviour is determined by previously established procedures (Allison, 1971).

Second, existing organisational routines for employing present physical capabilities constitute the effective options open to government leaders confronted with any problem. The fact that fixed programmes exhaust these leaders do not always perceive the range of buttons that leaders can push. But in every case it is critical for any understanding of what is actually done (Allison, 1971).

Third, organisational output structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must contribute their decision concerns an issue. Outputs raise the problem, provide the information, and make the initial moves that colour the face of the issue that is turned to the leaders. As Theodore Sorensen (1967) has observed: "presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions-particularly in foreign affairs-in the sense of writing on a clean slate...The basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made" (Sorensen, 1967). The organisational model theorists therefore, argue that, if one understands the structure of the situation and the face of the issue-which are determined by the organisational outputs-the formal choice of the leaders is frequently anti-climatic (Allison, 1971).

Three inter-related points emerged from the central thesis integral to the bureaucratic politics of decision making model. The first, is that in foreign policy decision-making, the chief executive does not command; he persuades and coaxes. The second, point is that, individuals do not submerge their political and personal interests and act in the interest of the nation. Their shared images as well as organisational and private interests come to play. The third point is that, a policy consists set of shaky compromises between rival elements in the bureaucracy. In all, a decision is, therefore, the result of 'pulling and hauling' among many players who attempt to advance their divergent or conflicting concepts of personal, group, organisational and national interests. It is stressed too that both the bargaining process and the results are importantly affected by a number of constraints, in particular, organisational processes or procedures as well as shared values (Asobie, 1980:32). An attempt would now be made at explaining the Rational Actor or Classical model of decision making.
The Classical or Rational Actor Model.

In trying to understand the complexities which surrounded the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962, and the critical decisions made by President John Kennedy, Allison proposed three models which he believes would be adequate in providing some explanations to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Kuye, 1989:45). The central questions, which were vital to the explanation of the crisis, were:

- Why did the Soviet Union place strategic offensive missiles in Cuba?
- Why did the United States respond with a renewal quarantine of Soviet shipments for Cuba?
- Why were the missiles withdrawn?
- What were the “lessons” of the missile crisis? (Allison, 1971:2).

In attempting to address these questions Allison (1971:3-5), came up with three propositions through a model application approach. He suggested that:

1. Professional analyst of foreign affairs (as well as laypersons) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought.

2. Most analysts explain and predict the behaviour of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, that is the Rational Actor or Classical Model (Model I).

3. Two alternative conceptual models here labelled as Organisational Process Model (Model II) and a governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model (Model III), provide a base for improved explanations and predictions (Allison, 1971: 3-5).

Allison (1971) suggested that all three models are applicable when explaining historical events but it would be useful to set the respective frames of reference for each situation. He contends that ‘predictions about what nations will do or would have done are generated by calculating the rational thing to do in a certain situation, given specific objective’ (1971: 5).
Having examined other models of decision making, the Allisonian Model I, The Rational Actor, proves to be the most adequate in analysing Nigeria's policy posture in ECOWAS, with specific reference to the 1983 1985 expulsion orders, the 1985 land border closure and Nigeria’s pivotal role in ECOMOG.

Allison suggested that in order to be to apply all three models, a consideration of the questions posed by each model is appropriate (Kuye, 1989:47). Some of the questions posed by Model I are:

1. What is the Problem?
2. What are the alternatives?
3. What are the strategic costs and benefits associated with each alternative?
4. What is the observed pattern of national (governmental) values and shared axioms?
5. What are the pressures in the 'international strategic marketplace'?

Model II analyst would ask the following:

1. Of what organisations (and organisational components) does the government consist?
2. Which organisation traditionally acts on a problem of this sort and with what relative influence?
3. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs (standard operational procedures) do these organisations have for making information about the problem available at various decision points in the government?
4. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs (standard operational procedures) do these organisations have for generating alternatives about a problem of this sort?
5. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organisations have for implementing alternative courses of action? (Allison, 1971).

The key questions posed by Model III include:
1. What are the existing action channels for producing actions on these kinds of problems?

2. Which players in what position are centrally involved?

3. How do pressures of job, past stances and personality affect the central players on this issue?

4. What deadlines will force the issue to resolution?

5. What are the foul-ups likely? (Allison, 1971)

From the above restatements of the required information on all three models, it could be realised that Model I is the most appropriate in analysing Nigeria's policy course in ECOWAS. (Kuye, 1989). Allison's further complements this view of Model I when he stated that "Model I emphasises, on the one hand, the problem and the context that create incentives and pressure for a government to choose a particular course of action, and, on the other, the national (or governmental) values and axioms that create propensities to respond in certain ways" (Allison, 1971: 257-258). Kuye (1989) asserted that Model I examines the actions and decision-making process of a sole-national actor. For Nigeria's policy in ECOWAS between 1979-1997 the following leaders Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, Ernest Shonekan and Gen. Sani Abacha were the sole actors.

**Model I: The Rational Actor**

The first model of decision-making analysis was developed as part of the realist approach. But it was not an explicit theoretical model devoted specifically and consciously to the analysis of decision-making processes. An implicit conceptual model or the 'rational actor model' dominated the point here is that, before the emergence of explicit theoretically and methodically conscious studies of foreign policy, the field. It is further argued that an understanding of the chief characteristics of the 'rational actor' implicit model will enhance our appreciation of the scientific significance of the development of the mainstream explicit decision-making models (Asobie, 1980: 22-23).
A distinguishing mark of the rational actor model is its image of the international society. The international society is pictured as a multi-state system, a system in which the state is either the sole or, at least, the prime actor. And sources of behaviour of the state are looked for in what is regarded as the 'objective realities of its position in the world'. More specifically the action of the state is explained largely in terms of the action and reaction of another states. Overall, the image conjured is that of a world made up of hard, impenetrable, 'billiard balls' hitting one another interminably (Asobie, 1980: 23).

Besides, this implicit conceptual model treats the state as a monolithic entity identical to every other state in aims, motivation and behaviour. Happenings in the international system are treated as actions of state; and actions of state are seen as the aggregate acts of their governments. In turn, the national governments, which are believed to act on behalf of the states, are perceived or depicted as unitary, purposive actors (Ibid: 23).

In spite of significant differences in interests and focus, most analysts and ordinary laypersons attempt to understand happenings in foreign affairs as the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments. Laypersons personify rational actors and speak of their aims and choices. Theorists of international relations focus on problems between nations in accounting for the choices of unitary rational actors. Strategic analysts concentrate on the logic of action in the absence of an actor. For each of these groups, the point of an explanation is to show how the nation or government could have chosen to act as it did, given the strategic problems it faced. For example, in confronting the problem posed by the Soviet installation of strategic missiles in Cuba, Allison, (1971), in using the rational actor model, frames the puzzle: why did the Soviet Union decide to install missiles in Cuba? He then fixes the unit of analysis: governmental choice. Next he focuses attention on certain concepts: goals and objectives of the nation or government. And, finally he invokes certain patterns of inference: if the nation performed an action of this sort, it must have had a goal of this type. The analyst has 'explained' this event when he can show how placing missiles in Cuba was a reasonable action, given Soviet strategic objectives. Calculating the rational thing to do in certain situation, given specified objectives (Allison, 1971)
generates predictions about what a nation will do or would have done.

Thus, the act of deciding is reduced to the 'choice of alternative' means governments can achieve a certain goal. An appreciation of the 'means ends' relationship and of the peculiar conception of means and ends is critical for a full understanding of the rational actor model. In this model, 'means and ends' of states are defined in abstract terms. Thus 'power' is regarded as the chief means to all ends; and 'national security' is taken as the primary and commonest 'ends' or goals of all states. Accordingly, as Arnold Wolfers (cited in Olusanya, 1980), has pointed out, an adherent of this model ideally begins with a 'theory of ends' and proceeds from there to analysis of the quest for power. All the time, he keeps in mind, however, that 'the degree to which power is available or attainable frequently affects the choice of ends'. This is why, the analyst believes, 'prudent statesmen' will always endeavour to 'keep their ends and aspirations safely within the power which their country possesses or is ready and willing to muster' (Asobie, 1980: 23-24) But what does it mean to conceive of behaviour as 'action'? When one thinks of activity as 'intendedly rational' or studies behaviour as goal-directed, what does these notions entail? According to (Allison, 1971), the basic concepts of these models of rational action are:

1. Goals And Objectives: The goals and objectives of the agent are translated into a 'payoff' or 'utility' or 'preference' function, which represents the 'value' or 'utility' of alternative sets of consequences. At the outset of the decision problem the agent has a payoff function which ranks all possible sets of consequences in terms of his values and objectives. Each bundle of consequences will contain a number of side effects. Nevertheless, at a minimum, the agent must be able to rank in order of preference each possible set of consequences that might result from a particular action (Allison, 1971: 29).

2. Alternatives: The rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before him in a particular situation. In decision theory these alternatives are represented as a decision tree. The alternative courses of action may include more than a simple act, but the specification of a course of action must be sufficiently precise to differentiate it from other alternatives (Allison, 1971: 29).
3. Consequences: To each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen. Variations are generated at this point by making different assumptions about the accuracy of the decision-maker's knowledge of the consequences that follow from the choice of each alternative. Thus, the relevant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of strategic goals and objectives (Allison, 1971:30).


These categories formalise the concept of rational action that underpins economic, decision and game theory, as well as the less structured notion that underlies our everyday assumption of human purposiveness both in individual behaviour and in national foreign policy. Thus, rationality refers to consistent, value-maximising choice within specified contexts. The rigorous model of rational action maintains that rational choice consists of value-maximising adaptation within the context of a given payoff function, fixed alternatives, and consequences that are known (Allison, 1971:31).

This paradigm exhibits the basic logic of a cluster of approaches that has been labelled the classical or Rational Actor Model. Analysts who think in these categories package the activities of various officials of a national government as actions chosen by a unified actor, strongly analogous to an individual human beings (Allison: 31-32). An action is explained by reference to the aims of the unitary, national actor. The modern literature of strategy employs a model of this sort. The U.S. response to the Soviet Union's emplacement of missiles in Cuba must be understood in strategic terms as simple value-maximising escalation. American nuclear superiority could be counted to paralyse Soviet nuclear power; Soviet transgression of the nuclear threshold in response to an American use of lower levels of violence would be wildly irrational since it would mean virtual destruction of the Soviet Communist system and the Russian nation. All that was required was for the US to bring to bear its strategic and local superiority in such a way that American determination to see the missiles removed would be demonstrated, while at the same time allowing Moscow time and room to retreat without humiliation. The naval blockade-euphemistically named a
'quarantine' in order to circumvent the niceties of international law—did just that (Allison, 1971:336-7).

An appreciation of the 'means-ends' relationship is critical for a full understanding of the rational actor model. In this model, 'means' and 'ends' of the states are defined in abstract terms. Thus 'power' is regarded as the chief means to all ends; and 'national security' is taken as the primary and commonest 'ends' or goals of all states. Accordingly Wolfers (in Akindele and Olusanya, 1980), has pointed out that, an adherent of this model ideally begins with a 'theory of ends' and proceeds from there to the analysis of the quest for power. He further posits that the degree to which power is available or attainable frequently affects the choice of ends. This is why, rational actor model analyst believe that, prudent statesmen will always endeavour to keep their ends and aspirations safely within the power which their country possesses or is ready and willing to muster (Asobie, 1980: 24).

Whatever the drawbacks of this implicit conceptual model, together with the realist paradigm of which it is a part, it made certain important contributions to the development of a scientific study of international politics. First through its insistence on understanding what international politics is, instead of speculating on what it ought to be, it laid the initial foundations for empirical research. Secondly, its search for 'fundamentals' that underlie political behaviour was an early attempt to introduce into the science of international politics the necessity to explore the essence of a phenomenon instead of accepting its superficial manifestation. Third, the model represented recognition of the significance of the search for uniformities in political behaviour as a basis for the formulation of general propositions. (Asobie, 1980: 24).

Cognate to the aforementioned, and for the purpose of this study, Nigeria’s policy will be examined from Classical or Rational Actor: Model 1. Allison (1971), argues that concepts could be used to sharpen the applicability of the Rational Actor: Model 1 since it is defined as "merely an abstraction or representation of political life" (Dye, 1981:43). This definition is true when "political systems, or elite or groups or rational decision making or incrementalism or games (Dye, 1981: 43) are abstracted from the real world in an attempt to "simplify, clarify and understand what is really important about politics" (Dye, 1981:43). As Thomas Dye (1981) states: "certainly the utility of
a model lies in ability to order and simplify political life so that we can think about it more clearly and understand the relationships we find in the real world... A model should help to direct research inquiry and research into public policy... Finally, a model approach should suggest an explanation of public policy... (Dye, 1981: 43-44).

In assisting any choice options, the following advantages of this model are considered appropriate when analysing Nigeria’s policy in ECOWAS. In the quest for integration in West Africa Nigeria is faced with critical decisions and is at times forced to take tough decisions, whilst attempting not to derail the integration process and destroy its leadership role in the sub-region. The Rational Actor Model 1 has the following advantages.

1. The Rational Model 1 promotes a systematic, orderly approach to the study of policy problems when a national actor is involved.

2. Rational analysis assist in problem definition or the location of decision space, which is considered as a vital, steps in policy analysis.

3. It helps to assist in satisfying the information that is needed by all parties to a policy since all good decisions are based on adequate information.

4. Rational choice can help articulate and clarify the wide range of practical choice and the consequences of various potential alternative choices.

5. It reduces the incidence of hidden value judgement on the part of policy-makers (Kuye, 1989:57). Having explored the discourse on the process of policy making, we can turn to the specific policies pursued by the different Nigerian governments towards ECOWAS during the period under review. With this general background of decision-making models in foreign policy, an attempt will now be made in addressing Nigeria’s policy within ECOWAS.
CHAPTER THREE.


Introduction:

Nigeria has the human and physical resources necessary to manipulate the international system for its national interests in an interdependent world. By the end of the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria was showing clear signs of a growing political stability and wealth at home and abroad, at least in the West African sub-region and the African continent. Two major trends of potential power have been responsible for this: population and oil resources. With the end of the country’s civil war and a successful policy of national reconciliation, Nigeria as one people constitutes the largest concentration of African population in one country. Suffice it to say now that in Nigeria there is a direct link between domestic politics and the making of foreign policy. According to Gambari (1989), the domestic political arrangement and the manner of conducting political business invariably affect the conduct of external relations. The question therefore arises as to whose foreign policy we are talking about? He further argues that, Nigeria’s foreign policy has never been directly related to the masses of the people; rather it is formulated, articulated and implemented in highly elitist circles. Hence the country’s foreign relations have reflected the needs and aspirations of a national super elite of business, bureaucratic, military and traditional ruling groups. Never very cohesive, this national elite is deeply divided along ethnic, regional religious and ideological lines. Hence, according to Gambari (1989), the history of Nigerian foreign policy has been to some extent related to a search for national consensus behind the major outlines of the country’s externally projectable goals and objectives.

The absence of a sustained unity of purpose abroad has resulted in the conflict between those who represent what one may be called the radical impulse on the one hand and those who reflect a conservative view weight on the other. From this enduring conflict comes foreign policy positions which are often tentative and uneasy compromises. Alternatively, successive post-independence governments have often adopted the loud rhetoric of the radical elements in the country, while quietly pursuing essentially conservative policies abroad (Gambari, 1989: 5).
The logic of this asymmetry between radical rhetoric and essentially conservative external policies can be found in Nigeria’s economic structure and external economic relations. Gambari (1989) postulates that, other than the energies and resources put into building a wider sub-regional market for future manufactures, which culminated in the establishment of ECOWAS, no serious efforts have been made to change the direction and pattern of Nigeria’s external trade. Nonetheless, the history of Nigerian foreign policy is not simply an activity whereby, as the French would put it, plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. There have been important shifts of emphasis and use, by the leadership, of the room that a state with a dependent economy has to manoeuvre in the external realm (Gambari, 1989: 6).

According to Ojo (cited in Aluko and Shaw, 1984), two salient and apparently contradictory features have marked Nigeria’s external relations since its independence in 1960 that is, continuity and change. First, despite, several changes in the regime-leadership and the regime-type- there have been an amazing continuity in the substance of the foreign policy. Most analyst find the performance of each succeeding regime to be so much more dynamic than its predecessors as to constitute a ‘new foreign policy’ (Ibid: 190). But differences in dynamism reflect only changes of a cosmetic nature; they are merely changes of style. Fundamentally, Nigeria’s external relations with transnational organisations like ECOWAS, have continued unchanged except in degree and even this appears to follow a natural progression (Aluko and Shaw, 1989: 191).

Similar continuity (in substance) and change (in degree) have been discernible in both political economy and strategies of development. There have been changes in the size, composition and structure of the ruling class, in the rate of growth and development of the economy, and in the mode and style of development planning. But along with these changes are persistent and unchanging social relations of production, increasing salience of state capitalism, and state-financed free enterprise, as well as continued and expanded incorporation into the global economy. Put differently, the political economy is status quo oriented, based as it is on a neo-colonial capitalist order within the parameters of which elite formation is sanctioned and sustained. Continuity in the substance of foreign policy is not unrelated to continuity in the political economy (Ojo, 1984: 161).
In this vein Ojo (1984) argues that, continuity in substance and change in foreign relations and political economy are the product of the interactions of global economy and the Nigerian state and between the latter and domestic formations. Because the global economy has presented the same constraints to successive governing groups, who eschew fundamental change in the political economy but rather share the same basic approach, objectives and strategy of development, the responses have been the same: continuity in search of 'multiple entry visas' into the global economy rather than 'exit visas'. In practical terms this has meant pragmatism, restraint, and a cautious foreign policy of non-confrontation with major powers except over emotionally-charged matters such as colonialism and apartheid (Ojo, 1984).

On the other hand because each succeeding governing group has had different kinds of relationships with domestic socio-economic formations, there have been differences in tactics and style, which individual personalities and the opportunities available to the leaders serve only to exacerbate. Where social formations were inchoate (as in the colonial era) or looked to state (regional) governments for the protection of economic interests (as in the terminal and immediate post-colonial years) the powers of the Nigerian state (central 'federal' government) were circumscribed (vis-à-vis the regional governments) especially in economic matters. The national state merely pretended to act as a referee of economic life while the groups most conscious of their distinct interests and better organised to advance them- the regional governments- regulated the politico-economic life (Rimmer in, Panther-Brick, 1978).

However, as the Nigerian State becomes more powerful vis-à-vis regional government, as tends to happen in all federal states, there is a shift in focus towards the national government in social groups’ competition for benevolence. As a result, the national state is further strengthened. It is thus able to use social formations for its own end rather than the other way round. As the fortunes of businesses, communities and households come to hinge on its favour, the national state is able to play one social group against another and against agents of international forces who count on its benevolence. It has thus been able to exercise a higher degree of tactical and stylistic flexibility in foreign policy, as is manifested in the contunity and change in its external
relations (Ojo, 1984: 192-193).

The second salient feature of Nigeria’s external relations has been the increasing focus on and active, often decisive, role in regional and continental affairs, despite continued and expanded incorporation into the global economy. Since the mid-1960s, and especially after its civil war, Nigeria has gained a pre-eminent standing continentally and, in contrast to its earlier marginality, has internationally become the most powerful black African state, or the first major black power in modern international politics (Mazuri, 1977:2). It is therefore in light of the ‘continuity’ and ‘change’, with regards to regime-change and political economy that we shall examine Nigeria’s policy in ECOWAS.


The Second Republic in Nigeria began with the introduction of the 1979 constitution under Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the President on October 1, 1979. The basic principles underlying Nigerian foreign policy since independence did not undergo any significant change during the Second Republic. These principles were as follows; first, is the principle of the sovereign equality of all states irrespective of their sizes. The second, is the respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states. The third, is the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states. The fourth, is the commitment to peaceful settlement of dispute. The fifth, is the promotion of African unity through functional co-operation. The sixth, is the commitment to the eradication of colonialism, and apartheid in South Africa. The final principle is that Nigeria’s relations with the great powers would be based on non-alignment (The New Nigerian, 1978).

Several challenges faced the new regime as it ushered in the decade of the 1980s. Internally, it had to keep its electoral promises to revolutionise agriculture, improve and expand social services, provide employment to the rapidly grown population especially in the urban areas, and maintain political stability. All these were in the face of sharply declining prices for oil the mainstay of the economy. On the foreign policy front, the main challenge was to maintain the momentum of progressive actions taken since Murtala Muhammed came to power that continued to enjoy the support of the
informed elite (Gambari, 1989). There was an even the more problematic question. In view of the fact that the source of Nigeria’s oil-based national wealth is the West, her national power is anchored in Africa, yet the greatest threat to the country’s African policies, particularly regarding ECOWAS and the liberation of Southern Africa, emanates from the West. How then does the civilian regime, or indeed any regime in Nigeria, interact economically with the West in a dependent manner, while looking vaguely and without deep conviction or sustained effort to the Eastern bloc for models of social justice and national liberation, yet walk in the ideological “non-alignment” middle? (Gambari, 1989:10).

Not unnaturally there was no significant shift in foreign policy from that of Shehu Shagari’s predecessors. The vertical ties continued unabated, though the horizontal ones were not neglected. However, there was a discernible ‘low profile’ in style, with little of the occasional exuberance of the former military regime to ‘confront’ big powers or to assert African leadership by taking initiatives before rather than after an African consensus had emerged (Aluko and Shaw, 1984:212).

However, there were some elements of continuity and change in the basic principles of foreign policy under the Shehu Shagari government as well as in the three concentric circles in which its foreign relations operated, namely relations with the great powers, relations with Africa and relations with neighbouring countries in the ECOWAS sub-region (Aluko, 1988: 6).

With the change of government and personnel on October 1 1979 there was the search for change. Alhaji Shehu Shagari has a totally different personality from either General Murtala Muhammed or General Olusegun Obasanjo. While the two military leaders believed in swift action, Shehu Shagari preferred patience, prevarication, and some form of Hamletish dithering up to the point of not taking any decision at all. Alhaji Shehu Shagari said in 1982 in his annual Foreign Policy address, that his government was not out to court ‘cheap popularity’ adding that ‘in a long distance race, victory belongs not necessarily to the swiftest, but to the sensible runner’ (Shagari, 1982). Given all the personality differences then, one could understand the differences in their style in expressing their respective government’s position to the rest of the international community (Aluko, 1988:27-28).
Under the Shehu Shagari government, Nigeria continued to be guided by the basic principles of their policy towards its neighbours especially those dealing with the inviolability of territorial frontiers, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and the promotion of unity with them through multilateral and bilateral agreements. Bilateral economic, scientific and cultural agreements were strengthened with the Republic of Benin, Togo, Niger, and Cameroon. Indeed by early 1982, the Shehu Shagari government wanted some payment arrangement that would facilitate the importation of rice from Cameroon to Nigeria instead of from North America (Aluko, 1988: 22).

As in the past, the Shagari government tried to strengthen the ties among the ECOWAS states. Apart from supporting the ECOWAS secretariat with financial resources, the Shagari government had taken active part in promoting economic unity in West Africa. Thus in November 1982, President Shagari declared:

"we are pledged to continuing our support for the community (ECOWAS), and to co-operate with other member states to ensure that the community does not become divided against itself." (Shagari, 1982).

The Shagari administration continued to uphold the commitments of the military to the survival of ECOWAS. Nigeria contributes 32% of the annual budget of ECOWAS and hosts its secretariat in Lagos (now relocated in Abuja). Nigeria's new interventionist and rather expensive sub-regional policy was occasioned by the security problems exposed by the civil war. The establishment of the community at great cost to Nigeria was part of the attempt to change the isolationist policy of the first Republic (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985: 193). In his first participation in the deliberations of ECOWAS Heads of State or Government in May 1980, Shehu Shagari declared that his administration 'shall continue to give full support to the community in the realisation of its goals and objectives' (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985). The Shehu Shagari government aided the Sahelian states financially, invested in projects and provided 90-day credit facilities for ECOWAS members buying its crude oil. Nonetheless, President Shagari was unable to reconcile himself to drastic political changes in Liberia and Ghana. The bloody Liberian coup of 1980, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, was met with outright condemnation from the Nigerian leader. The decision not to allow Master-Sergeant Doe of Liberia to attend the ECOWAS
meeting in Lome and the OAU Economic summit in Lagos, was due to Nigeria’s ‘big voice’ in the process of arriving at the moves. President Shagari did not hide his reservation for the Doe administration when he said that:

“...soon after the coup in Liberia, there was an economic summit meeting of the OAU in Lagos. Soon after Sgt. Doe had massacred the leaders of Liberia he wanted to come and attend the OAU meeting in Lagos and we thought that this was an opportunity to discuss the issue concerning recognition of governments formed by people of such temperament, leaders who are blood thirsty. Leaders who had done despicable acts to the embarrassment of Africa, just after washing their bloody hands would walk into the OAU meeting and sit and dine with other leaders of Africa” (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985: 192).

In the case of Ghana, when President Rawlings refused to stop the execution of corrupt leaders and politicians not only did oil stop flowing to Ghana due to ‘technical problems’, it was alleged that Nigeria planned to invade Ghana. In addition, some Ghanaians who claimed to be policemen and had fled from the ‘bloodthirsty’ Rawlings government were given wide exposure in the Nigerian media. Ghana was also asked, in spite of its terrible financial position, to pay up the oil debts it owed the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The decision by the Shehu Shagari government in January 1983, to expel illegal immigrants from Nigeria within two weeks, has become one of the most significant steps in his foreign policy. The decision though not a contravention of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, has left a bitter taste in the mouths of the affected countries, and the general goodwill for the success the community. The protocol on labour mobility has promoted the movement of thousands of West Africans to Nigeria (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985: 192-193).

The Shehu Shagari administration, in view of declining revenues and restlessness within the ranks of non-bourgeois forces internally, was forced to take the extreme measure of expelling aliens. Despite all the pledges made by the Shagari government about promoting regional economic unity as manifested in ECOWAS, in January, 1983, the same Shehu Shagari government took the controversial decision to expel over 2 million illegal aliens, most of who were from other ECOWAS countries within a forth-night (Aluko, 1988:23). The presence of illegal immigrants working in Nigeria in contravention of the Nigerian Immigration Act of 1963 and the ECOWAS protocol on
free movement of persons was becoming increasingly intolerable to the federal
government. The changing conditions and climate of economic boom of the early
1970s accentuated this, while the country was approaching a crucial election that year
and, therefore, becoming increasingly concerned about matters of security. The federal
government therefore announced on 17 January 1983, that all unskilled foreigners
residing and working illegally in the country should leave in two weeks (Asante,
1986:158). The federal government later reviewed the order to allow an extension of
four weeks that terminated on 28 February 1983 was granted to all those employed in
skilled work; regularisation of the stay in Nigeria of the professional and technical
grades provided their employers were able to make adequate representations for
Expatriate Quota slots to be granted for the posts they occupied; all citizens of
ECOWAS member states, Cameroon, and Chad who had been living in the country
prior to the coming into force of the 1963 Immigration Act to remain in Nigeria
irrespective of what they do; and confirmation of the fact that by virtue of section 8,
sub-section 1(a) of the Immigration Act, 1963, the order did not affect employers of

This decision was unprecedented in Nigeria’s relations with her neighbours. From the
late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Nigerians were expelled from Ghana, Equatorial
Guinea, Zaire and few other African countries. But at no time did Nigeria retaliate.
The decision of January 1983 according to (Aluko, 1988), to expel over 2 million
‘illegal aliens’ from Nigeria because of economic and security reasons was as panicky
measure taken without any appreciation of the problems involved and the
consequences of such a decision (Aluko, 1988: 23).

After three years, the leaders of the Second Republic generally failed to meet the
challenges they faced. The economy deteriorated, weighed down with huge internal
and external debts accumulated amidst charges of mismanagement and large-scale
fraud (Gambari, 1989). Nigeria’s social services were in shambles. There were serious
threats to domestic peace and stability, especially after the 1983 elections, which were
accompanied by much dispute and widespread violence. Nigeria’s leadership in African
affairs eroded seriously as the country vacillated on issues such as Western Sahara and
Namibia. The governments intervention in the Chad conflict and participation in the ill-
fated OAU peace-keeping force perhaps led to the unintended and possibly disgraceful consequence of installing a power regime in N’Djamena opposed to Goukoni Waddeye, the Chadian leader who had invited the force in the first place. Moreover, Nigeria’s neighbours had scant respect for the country, and some of them even crossed into its territory and attacked killed civilians and soldiers with impunity (Gambari, 1989: 11). ECOWAS was in a state of tremendous crises. In general, it was as if Nigeria had rapidly slipped back into the policies of subservience to the West and hesitancy in African affairs, closer to the situation in the 1960s. Under Shehu Shagari, Nigeria appeared to be a demographic and economic giant on the continent, but a political dwarf in African affairs. This was reminiscent of the early 1960s when Ghana contemptuously referred to Nigeria as ‘big for nothing’ (i.e. failing to use economic strength for bold action) when African issues were concerned. However, a country may have relatively huge resources without playing a role commensurate to its status or potential. The example of the United States between the two world wars is a clear illustration of such an undesirable possibility. The challenge for Nigeria’s diplomacy was how to translate the country’s potential resources and its power position in Africa into reality by bringing its weight creatively and constructively in solving African problems (Gambari, 1989: 11-13).


The perceived failure of the Second Republic to deal with the nation’s domestic problems and external relations was used to justify the Second Coming of the soldiers. On new year’s eve 1983 the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by General Muhhamadu Buhari and subsequently, he formed the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which took over the running of the affairs of the state. The new military government enjoyed widespread popular support as the New Year of 1984 began (Gambari, 1989: 11).

The twenty-month rule of General Muhammadu Buhari is often remembered as one in which Nigerians swallowed bitter pills prescribed as cure for the country’s ailments. After overthrowing a regime which was generally regarded as corrupt, incompetent, and ineffective, and which brought the country to the precipice of economic collapse, the Buhari regime settled down to take economic, political and diplomatic measures
which it saw as necessary to save the country from collapse (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985). The Buhari regime seems to have interpreted public approval of its emergence as a blank cheque to conduct public affairs in whatever way it deemed fit. While acknowledging the contribution of falling oil revenue to economic decline, the regime believed that part of Nigeria’s problem was the unnecessary attachment to sentimental values and compromise for the sake of preserving national unity in the conduct of the affairs of the state. *It was prepared to make tough and hardheaded decisions designed to bring sanity into the society and solve the country’s problems, no matter whose ox was gored and whose feelings were hurt* (Adefuye. 1992: 108).

In its external relations the Gen. Buhari regime, adopted the same un-sentimental, realistic and hardheaded approach that it has adopted in its conduct of domestic policies. Against the background of what it inherited from the Shehu Shagari regime; a country on the brink of economic disaster, internally infested with crime, (Gambari, 1989) and which was externally threatened by smaller neighbours backed by strong extra-African powers, the Gen. Buhari regime operated from the premise that a credible foreign policy abroad must of necessity start with security and stability at home. The Gen. Buhari regime, was poised to use foreign policy as an effective instrument for rebuilding the shattered economy and internal security. Unlike during the Gen. Yakubu Gowon and Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo eras when Nigeria sacrificed some of her economic interests on the alter of African unity and solidarity, it was clear in Gen. Buhari’s initial statements that where the national interests of Nigeria conflicted with those of our neighbouring states in particular and Africa in general, there would be no automatic yielding to the latter (Gambari, 1989:34).

However, the Gen. Buhari regime did not deviate from the basic strands of Nigeria’s foreign policy among which are the promotion of African unity and solidarity, support for the liberation movements and commitment to the ideals of ECOWAS. One of the very first diplomatic activities of the regime was to dispatch a high powered delegation of members of the Supreme Military Council led by Major-General Domkat Bali to neighbouring countries. The delegation met President Kerekou of Benin, Seyni Kountche of Niger, Paul Biya of Cameroon, and vice-president Tahiru Ganasu of Chad on the 11th, 12th, and 14th January, 1984 (Adefuye, 1985: 111). During the few
months of coming to power, General Buhari tried through diplomacy to improve relations with West African countries. Of great significance was the improvement in Ghanaian-Nigerian relations during much of 1994. Indeed, the relationship between these countries and Nigeria improved considerably that in late 1984, the Heads of State of Ghana, Flt-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, General Eyadema of Togo, General Matthieu Kerekou of Benin, Lt-Colonel-Koutche of Niger came to Lagos for a summit meeting with the Nigerian Head of State, General Buhari. Although at the end of the meeting, a number of treaties and protocols were signed by all the Heads of State to co-operate in security matters and combating smuggling, in extraditing criminals, and dissident elements, no tangible action has followed these treaties. Smuggling and other criminal activities across their frontiers continued for some time. And moreover, Nigeria refused to open its common borders with these neighbouring countries since April 1984 until the military coup of 1985 (Aluko, 1988:39-40). The objective was to assure the countries that the new administration was committed to a policy of good neighbourliness while seeking their co-operation in enhancing Nigeria's security and checking smuggling and hostile activities towards Nigeria (Adefuye, 1985).

The belief that smuggling was one of the major causes of the Nigeria's economic dilemma was instrumental in the decision of the Gen. Buhari regime to close Nigeria's land borders (Gambari, 1989). It was the first indication that the regime intended to pursue firm nationalist policies toward other countries in the region. Despite repeated appeals for the reopening of the borders by the affected countries the border remained closed until 1985 when the Buhari regime was overthrown. In explaining the reasons for the prolonged border closure Buhari's Foreign Minister Agboola Gambari said:

"Security considerations were almost certainly paramount, especially at the initial period. It was strongly believed that some of the politicians who were on the list of most wanted persons had gone into hiding with the intention to flee Nigeria by land through the neighbouring countries. The economic dimension was also very important. The activities of smugglers and currency traffickers were very damaging to the Nigerian economy. Severe loss of revenue occurred whenever goods of Nigerian origin were illegally exported through neighbouring countries." (Gambari, 1989: 53).

There was also large scale but unrecorded flight of Nigerian currency in circulation at
any one time. Furthermore, there was the uneasy feeling that Nigeria's neighbours were cheating the country twice over. Initially their citizens effectively devalued the Naira through extensive currency trafficking. Then with the heavily devalued Naira, they purchased legal as well as contraband goods from Nigeria especially those goods, which the country imported with scarce foreign exchange (Adefuye, 1985: 111). The Gen. Buhari regime came to power with the firm conviction that the Shagari administration had collapsed in largely because of the leadership's inability or unwillingness to take tough decisions to manage the economy in the face of declining oil revenues. Hence one of the first decisions of the new rulers was to adopt measures to put the economy back on track. The closure of the land borders was one of such measures. (Adefuye, 1985: 111).

It is ironic, however, that not withstanding the border closure the Gen. Buhari administration played an important role in the formation of the Quadripartite agreement with her immediate neighbours to the west i.e. Republic of Benin, Togo and Ghana. The process leading to the Quadripartite Agreement began with the arrival in Lagos of a special envoy from President Nyassimbe Eyadema of Togo in 1984 seeking a meeting at the highest level of government between his country and Nigeria, Benin as well as Ghana. The primary concern of the Togolese government was with the activities of Togolese dissidents, who were believed to be operating in Ghana, perhaps with the support of the Ghanaian authorities, and who should be extradited to Togo to face criminal charges (Gambari, 1989: 46).

General Buhari, in reply to President Nyassingbe Eyadema's message, suggested a less restrictive focus to such a meeting of the four Heads of state. He proposed a wider agenda to include co-operation agreements to deal with all illegal trafficking in the sub-region: arms and ammunition, currency, goods, and services. Nigeria's objective was to formalise the trade relationship, reduce smuggling, and check illegal immigration. Co-operation in security matters could also cover extradition of criminals from one country to the other or to others where they might be wanted to face charges and prosecution. It was clearly unsatisfactory that Nigeria and Ghana had extradition treaties with Britain but none with one another or with their neighbouring countries (Gambari, 1989: 46).
The expanded agenda appeared to satisfy Ghana, which could have probably not shown interest in the earlier, restrictive concerns of Togo. Benin Republic was initially cold to the idea of a new and comprehensive system designed to check the illegal movements of goods, currency, and peoples. However, her economy was suffering badly from the continued closure of the Nigerian border. A very shrewd character, President Matthew Kerekou probably endorsed the negotiations for the agreements on the assumption that that was what Nigeria Wanted before agreeing to reopen her land borders (Gambari, 1989: 46).

The Quadripartite Agreement was in three parts. In the first, an extradition treaty, the four parties agreed to extradite to each other, on the basis of reciprocity and according to the rules and conditions stated therein, those persons accused or convicted of specific crimes or offences committed in one country and found in another. However, political offences were excluded from extradition request. The second agreement concerned criminal investigation co-operation between the four signatory countries. Recognising the need to mount a multinational fight against the upsurge of crimes that posed serious threat to the security, peace, stability, and development of the West African sub-region, the four countries agreed to co-operate in searching for persons involved in criminal activities (Gambari, 1989: 46-47).

The third and very crucial part dealt with mutual administrative assistance in customs, trade and immigration matters. The objective was to combat smuggling and other activities prejudicial to the economic, fiscal, and commercial interests of the four countries. Care was taken, however, to place this particular agreement within the framework of ECOWAS. Emphasis was also placed on the respect for equality of parties to the operations of the agreement, which was aimed at promoting the mutual interests of the peoples of the four countries. Smuggling and how to combat it were particularly sensitive issues to Benin and Togo, while Nigeria and Ghana sought strong measures to combat the menace in the sub-region (Gambari, 1989: 47). The agreement was ratified on 10 December 1984 in Lagos Nigeria, by the four countries-Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, and Togo.

For Nigeria, this was a diplomatic triumph. Without giving in to a precipitate re-opening of the country’s borders, it somehow laid the foundation for making border
closures unnecessary. Nigeria was so satisfied with the Quadripartite Agreement that the Federal military government directed that negotiations be commenced immediately to extend their spirit and substance to Niger and Chad. This was, however, not accomplished before the termination of the Gen. Buhari administration (Gambari, 1989: 49).

The Agreement was the major international action of the Buhari Administration in the West African sub-region in 1984. It is indeed a strong testimony of the strong determination of the regime to put considerations of Nigeria’s security above that of the unity of the peoples of the West African sub-region that the government got the Agreement signed without being pushed to a precipice of re-opening the country’s borders. General Buhari attended the 1984 ECOWAS summit but resisted pressures to reopen the border because he did not believe that it was in Nigeria’s interest. He even turned down the offer to be ECOWAS Chairman on the grounds of urgent commitments on the domestic scene. The extent of Nigeria’s commitment to the ideals of ECOWAS began to be doubted by neighbouring countries (Adefuye, 1992: 113).

Although, the Gen. Buhari government has declared its commitment to the survival of ECOWAS as a viable institution, much of its actions have belied this. The closure of the borders might not have been a breach of the letter of the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975; it is a breach of its spirit. To worsen matters, the military government of General Buhari decided on 15 April 1985 to expel all illegal immigrants within three weeks. Over 700,000 mostly West African nationals were expelled from Nigeria, an action which is reminiscent of the 1983 expulsions (Aluko, 1988: 40).

While the 1983 expulsion order affected an estimated 2 million illegal immigrants, the 1985 illegal numbered about 700,000. This second order was issued for much the same reasons as in 1983: the immigrants’ abuse of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons and second, the involvement of these immigrants in crimes. However, the fundamental reason for the order was however, economic: a troubled economy that continued to be badly hurt by depressed crude-oil prices. At a time when jobs were scarce and prices for basic goods were high, there was a tendency to regard aliens in the midst of Nigeria’s huge population as an unacceptable strain on the country’s limited resources (Asante, 1986: 158).
As 1985 progressed and the full effects of the administration’s efforts to revamp the economy and instil public accountability and national discipline began to be felt, public alienation grew. There were reports of widening split among senior members of the Supreme Military Council and rumours about an impending coup. Under such conditions, public interest in foreign policy issues diminished and the administration’s achievements were consigned to the back stage (Newswatch, 1985).

The Gen. Buhari administration did not survive these allegations and speculations. The Gen. Buhari administration was overthrown on 27 August 1985. Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida succeeded as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. During his first broadcast to the nation, President Babangida gave reasons for the change of government and added foreign policy to the areas of public issues in which his predecessor was believed by the military to have failed the nation (Gambari, 1989: 208).


"We are ECOWAS and the ECOWAS is us. This Economic Community has now been in existence for 11 years. While 11 years in the life of an organisation could be likened to but a step in a long journey, I believe the time has come for us to set our sights higher and broaden our horizons... Let us constantly keep reminding ourselves that the ultimate goal of the ECOWAS as conceived by the founding fathers, is the economic and social integration of the sub-region". General Ibrahim Babangida, 1986.

With the coming to power of the new military regime of General Babangida, foreign policy was given high premium. In his maiden broadcast the new President described the foreign policy of his predecessors as lacking in *dynamism* (Akinyemi, 1982). He castigated the Buhari administration’s pursuit of foreign policy: "our foreign policy in the last 20 months have been characterised by inconsistencies and incoherence. It lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood on matters of international concern to enable other countries relate to us with seriousness" (Babangida, 1985). The new regime was no doubt aware of the public criticism of Buhari’s foreign policy posture. Elements of the academic community and the media had pointed to the apparent contradiction between a policy of concentric circles that describe West Africa as the
first scene of action and the act of expelling aliens and closing the borders. The point was made that the aliens were much less of a problem to the Nigerian economy than the Buhari administration thought they were (Adefuye, 1992: 118).

One of the major critics of the Gen. Buhari administration was Bolaji Akinyemi. His appointment as Minister for External Affairs by General Babangida crowned his long involvement with Nigeria’s foreign policy, having served as Director-General, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) for seven years. Akinyemi and Gambari (the External Affairs Minister during the Second Republic) had their ideas of how Nigeria’s foreign policy should be implemented. Gambari has been known to criticise the vagueness of the concept of Africa as the centrepiece of Nigerian policy, urging that areas of priority must be identified (Adefuye, 1992). This much was reflected in the concentric circle approach of the Gen. Buhari regime. Akinyemi on the other hand favours a more assertive and active role cast in the conservative mould for Nigeria within Africa and beyond. He believes that with the huge human and material resources available, Nigeria should live up to its destined role and play for the black people in the socio-economic development of the continent. Akinyemi is basically in support of the concept that Africa as the centrepiece and would want it rigorously implemented (Adefuye, 1992: 118-119).

In a lecture titled “A Farewell to Policy” and delivered to mark the end of his tenure as Director-General, of NIIA, Akinyemi expressed his belief that Nigeria should play a meaningful role in the world. But this according to him can only be possible if the following are guaranteed:

- A stable Nigeria.
- A Prosperous Nigeria.
- A politically stable West Africa and Africa.
- An Economically prosperous West Africa and Africa.
- A Secure West Africa.

After elaborating on what should be done to Make West Africa stable and secure,
Akinyemi advocated an intensification of inter-West African cross-country link. Nigeria should take the lead by engaging in rapid industrialisation in order to export to the ECOWAS and work towards the convertibility of the Naira within the sub-region (Adefuye, 1992:119).

A grandiose, assertive, activist foreign policy with considerable visibility in Africa was Akinyemi’s dream for Nigeria. Within a few months of his assumption of office, he forwarded to General Babangida a set of proposals designed to make Nigeria take her rightful place in the black world. It is therefore not surprising that Akinyemi was opposed to the rather inward-looking posture of Buhari’ foreign policy which seemed to have limited Nigeria’s field of operations He is known to have criticised the border closure and expulsion of the aliens on the grounds that both acts did more damage to Nigeria’s commitment to ECOWAS and OAU than they provided solution to the economic problems (Adefuye, 1992: 120).

One of the first steps taken by the new military government was to reopen the borders with its immediate neighbours, which had been closed since 1984. This was no doubt received with appreciation by the affected countries and the entire membership of ECOWAS who were questioning the pioneering role of Nigeria in the community after the 1983 and 1985 expulsion orders and the continued border closure. The reopening of the hitherto closed borders on the assumption of office earned the administration considerable praise. The signing of the second phase of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, services and goods, as well the implementation of the ECOWAS Insurance Scheme (ECOWAS Brown Card Scheme)-all go to show Gen. Babangida’s commitment to the revival of the regional body (Babawale, 1985:115).

In a bid to show its genuine desire to hold ECOWAS together as one, the Gen. Babangida regime attempted to step into the December 1985 border clash between Mali and Burkina Faso. Although this was done in conjunction with Libya, the efforts of France and the Francophone states (of Nigeria’s intentions) made it possible for France to stage a diplomatic coup against Nigeria in the mediatory moves. In the end, France received a moribund non-aggression defence pact of the Francophone states-ANAD, to take credit for the amicable settlement of the conflict (Babawale, 1995:
However, Nigeria was able to take consolation in the July 1986 ECOWAS summit at Abuja where President Ibrahim Babangida was elected chairman for a second term by unanimous decision. It is left to analysts to decide whether this was out of love or respect for Nigeria, or an attempt by other ECOWAS states to avoid the financial burden that might accompany such a role (Babawale, 1995: 114).

On the bi-lateral front the Gen. Babangida administration made attempts to cultivate good relations as a way of promoting the Community spirit. Prior to the Second Coming of the military in 1984, President Samuel Doe of Liberia’s relationship with the Shehu Shagari administration had been sour after the bloody Liberian coup of 1980. The Shehu Shagari administration had refused President Samuel Doe to take Liberia’s seat at the OAU summit in Lagos in 1980. When the Gen: Babangida regime took over in 1985, Samuel Doe set out to personally cultivate the Nigerian leader conscious of the country’s geo-political importance in the region (Vogt, 1992: 222). Gen. Babangida responded warmly to President Doe’s overtures and Lagos helped to finance and staff a Graduate School of International Relations named after the Nigerian President in Monrovia and Doe enrolled in the school as a student. Nigerian lecturers and Professors were seconded to teach in that school and were paid by the Nigerian government in foreign exchange (Vogt,1992: 222).

However, in December 1987 a new Minister for External Affairs, Major-General Ike Nwachukwu was appointed. It is important to mention at this juncture that his appointment did not change Nigeria’s stand on issues relating to ECOWAS because General Babangida gave Community issues a priority. The major thrust of the Nwachukwu era was in the economic sector. This approach was christened ‘economic diplomacy’. Disclosing the content of the new strategy in Nigerian diplomacy, Nwachukwu stated that:

"The solution to Nigeria’s national economic difficulties demands that we take a critical look at our domestic and foreign policies...Externally, it also requires realistic co-operation with other developing countries. This entails negotiations and activities that will attract foreign investments and other assistance required for the successful accomplishment of our national goals" (Nwachukwu, 1988: 11).

The primary objective of the economic diplomacy was the restoration of international
confidence in the Nigerian economy and the attraction of more foreign investment capital to help in stimulating domestic economic activities. When Gen. Nwachukwu took over the control of the external relations in December 1987, priority was accorded to policy initiatives designed to attract support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. In doing this, some administrative adjustments took place within the Ministry and in overseas missions (Adefuye, 1992). A Trade and Investment Department was carved out of the Directorate of International Economic Co-operation with responsibility for (a) stimulating information flow on trade and investment between Nigerian diplomatic missions abroad, the relevant arms of government and the private sector; (b) co-ordinating economic and business information with the relevant economic ministries and the organised private sector; (c) collecting and updating vital trade statistics and economic information for the use of Nigerian missions abroad in their functions of promoting trade and investment; (d) handling trade complaints and enquiries from missions; (e) striving to attract joint-ventures and investment possibilities including debt equity conversion in order to reduce Nigeria’s debt stock; and (f) co-ordinating trade missions abroad in liaison with the Federal Ministry of Trade, the Nigerian Export Promotion Council and other relevant economic Ministries (Adefuye, 1992: 143).

Gen. Nwachukwu’s economic diplomacy had its cultural dimension. It was generally agreed that one way of lessening Nigeria’s dependence on oil was to restore agriculture, the traditional economy of many Nigerians, to its pride of place. In this vein Gen Nwachukwu noted that, “before oil, Nigeria’s economy was based on the peasant farmers who toiled the land to produce our agricultural products which produced 65% of our foreign exchange” (Gambari, 1989:53).

It was believed that if agriculture could be revamped and given the necessary boost, the country would not only be able to feed herself, it would also be able to export, thus improving the foreign exchange situation. The Economic diplomacy ensured the necessary support of foreign governments and international lending agencies to the agricultural policy, which made the small farmer operating in his local environment and in his familiar milieu, the focal point of attention. The Agricultural Development Project (ADP) established in 1986 with the objective of raising food production, farm
income and improving the rural living standard in seven states of the federation was financed by loan agreements concluded with the World Bank (Adefuye, 1992: 144). The focus of the ADP was the small farmer who accounts for 90% of the crop output. International support for revamping agriculture was also secured for the promotion of agricultural co-operatives. Bi-lateral agreements with UNDP, ILO, provided technical assistance for the Nigerian Agricultural Co-operative Management Development Centre in Abuja. The effect of international support for agriculture was a remarkable increase in marketable surpluses (Gambari, 1989: 47).

The ECOWAS sub-region received considerable attention in the course of the implementation of 'Economic Diplomacy'. The cultural justification for ECOWAS has already been made. It is an organisation created to correct what the 1884 partitioning of Africa did by separating kith and kin and putting them in different countries under different colonial powers who then imposed their different cultures including language, systems of government and education on the Africans. Gen. Nwachukwu always believed that:

"...the objective of ECOWAS dove-tails with Nigeria's policies for national development and external relations. It is unnecessary to over-worry about the obstacles which continued attachment of some the Francophone states to France will pose to the realisation of ECOWAS objectives." (Nwachukwu, 1988).

The Gen. Babangida administration strongly believed that the realisation of the provisions of the ECOWAS treaty was important to the survival of Nigeria both politically and strategically (Adefuye, 1992: 145). In Gen. Nwachukwu's view ECOWAS was the most important experiment directed towards economic and social integration in the West African sub-region to which Nigeria is fully committed” (Nwachukwu, 1988). General Nwachukwu quoted General Babangida's statement that

"...ECOWAS remains the most important sub-regional experiment at economic integration on the African continent, a fact which bestowed on us a very heavy responsibility to see it survive and grow as a part of our own contribution to the attainment of an African Economic Community” (Adefuye, 1992: 146)

General Nwachukwu attended all the ECOWAS meetings and directed that bi-lateral talks aimed at promoting trade between Nigeria and other countries should pay special
attention to ECOWAS member states. Thus, following agreements reached during General Babangida's state visit to Ghana between 10th-12th January, 1989, an 18-person Nigerian trade mission visited Ghana to coincide with the Ghana International Furniture and Wood Working Exhibition. Discussions that were held centred on the implementation of relevant ECOWAS protocols and agreements in such a way as to stimulate trade between the two countries. The obstacles to free movement of goods and persons were identified and both sides enumerated the products that can be exported to each other (Adefuye, 1992).

The discussion also focused on the important role of the Banking sector in promoting trade between the Ghana and Nigeria. While recognising some of the shortcomings of the West African Clearing House (WACH), it was agreed that it should constitute a more effective payment system. At the formal meeting of the two sides, they agreed to submit to their respective governments proposals to establish joint-venture projects in a caustic soda plant, coastal shipping services, packaging and in Aluminium smelting (Adefuye, 1992: 146).

The ECOWAS protocol was also the framework within which discussions were held between Nigerian businessmen and their Liberian counterparts, between 19th-26th March 1989. Both delegations shared strong optimism in breaking new grounds in bilateral economic co-operation that would set the pace for other ECOWAS member states to emulate. As in Ghana, the two sides exchanged current lists of exportable products to facilitate the consumption of the proposed bi-lateral trade agreement. It was also agreed that information on market and business opportunities would be regularly exchanged. A body known as the Liberia/ Nigeria Trade Committee, with chapters in Lagos and Monrovia, was set up to monitor agreements reached. The two sides further agreed that, joint venture projects be set up in the tyre, cement, oil exploration and agro-allied sectors (Adefuye, 1992: 147). The policies of the Babangida administration was a demonstration of the fact that, in the process of Nigeria's search for economic opportunities, emphasis was placed on the need for close co-operation with the African neighbours with whom Nigeria shared historical and cultural links (Adefuye, 1992: 147).

It suffices to say now that Nigeria sought...fuller economic co-operation within the
framework of ECOWAS and multi-lateral and bi-lateral institutions like the River Authorities and the Economic Joint commission (Peters, 1997: 212). It is even contended that that it was in the interest of regional integration that the Federal government decided on the establishment of the National Boundary Commission as a specialised border problem-solving institution. The decision by the Government to set up the Commission as its prime agency for peaceful resolution of border conflicts and the promotion of transborder co-operation and good neighbourliness was ostensibly strongly influenced by Nigeria’s ever increasing commitment to regional integration endeavours on the levels of both West Africa and the African continent. The massive financial, material and human resources committed to ECOWAS and the OAU must have facilitated government’s acceptance of the proposal for a supplementary transborder co-operation policy (Obiozor et al, 1994: 82-83).

Obiozor et al (1994) have argued that, it must have been rightly appreciated that regional integration programmes, however brilliantly articulated, would remain mere dream in situations that prevail all over Africa where constituent states are hardly able to see eye to eye on matters relating to shared borders. Trans border co-operation policy would galvanise critical grassroots support in addition to creating out of Nigeria and limibrophe countries a model border conflict-free enabling environment, necessary for the achievement of wider regional integration projects (Obiozor et al,1992: 83).

The major foreign policy move that can be identified with Nigeria in the 1990s is ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Perhaps Nigeria’s (Gen. Babangida’s), most expensive and controversial foreign policy move has been the Liberian-ECOMOG- mission(Babawale, 1995). The stage for Nigeria’s involvement in the Liberia was set at the thirteen session of the Authority of Heads of States which met in Banjul, Gambia, from 28-30 May, 1990 under the chairmanship of Blaise Campaaacre of Burkina Faso. The summit took place against the background of growing incidence of intra and inter-state disputes, which imperilled peace and stability in the region. Particular attention was focused on Liberia where there was extensive press coverage of the carnage and random killings leading to large outflows of refugees (Owoeye, 1993:137).

This development placed severe burden on neighbouring countries. Inevitably
therefore, the issue was of prime consideration especially because there were indications that some member states of ECOWAS were guilty of complicity in the simmering crisis. It was within this context that General Babangida, proposed and received community endorsement for a standing Mediation Committee which ‘should intervene, in a timely fashion, whenever such disputes arise’. The committee was to consist of five members: Ghana, Togo, Mali, Gambia and Nigeria. The Committee set the pace for formation of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was to step in and help resolve the crisis in the war torn Liberia (Owoeye, 1993: 137). The Mediation Committee further agreed to implement the peace plan whose essential elements were:

- That the warring factions observe an immediate cease-fire,
- That an ECOWAS cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) be set up to monitor and supervise the cease-fire, restore law and order so as to create the necessary environment for free and fair elections to be held,
- That a National Conference of Liberian warring factions, political parties and interest groups be held to establish a broad based interim government acceptable to the people of Liberia,
- That general and presidential elections be held within 12 months, That ECOWAS and other International bodies should observe the elections to ensure that they are free and fair; and
- That no leader of a warring faction should head the interim government and whoever heads it should not be eligible to contest the ensuing presidential or parliamentary election. (Bundu, 1994: 2).

Not only was Nigeria to supply a substantial percentage of the soldiers, it also opted to bear a staggering sum of the cost which observers put at 70% of the total cost (Babawale, 1995). The decision to intervene in Liberia itself generated controversy both within and outside Nigeria. One, because some Nigerians thought the government intervened in the crisis to help the then Liberian President, Samuel Doe. Two, the decision itself contravened the OAU charter which expressly forbids interference in the
internal affairs of member states. However, Nigeria had a strategic interest in seeing that the sub-region remained relatively, at least, to other parts of the continent, conflict-free (Peters, 1997:212)

In this vein, General Babangida defended, the ECOMOG action when he said:

"There is no ... gainsaying the fact that when certain events occur in this subregion, depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect Nigeria’s politico-military and socio-economic environment, we should not stand by as a helpless and hapless spectator. We believe that if the events are such that they the potentials to threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, Nigeria in collaboration with others, in this sub-region is duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to either avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity, and harmony" (in Nwachukwu, 1991:104).

In spite of these appeals to regional stability, domestic criticism of Nigeria’s involvement in ECOMOG could be related to the programme of transition to civil rule, which the military administration was implementing. Critics of the administration have always alleged that President Babangida has a hidden agenda to perpetrate himself in power; a charge he firmly denied. However, the critics now drew attention to the January 1993 handover date and raised the possibility that a Liberian debacle may provide a pretext for elongation of the regime’s tenure and military rule (Vogt, 1992: 224). In any case, those who respected the President’s integrity were also worried about the morality of bequeathing a legacy that could turn out to be a ‘Nigerian Vietnam’ to an incoming civilian administration (African Guardian, 1990). Gen. Babangida was keen to allay domestic fears about prospect of ECOMOG, when he said,

"Liberia will not be a Nigerian Vietnam. Our mission there is clear, precise and attainable.’ He also sought to assuage regional anxieties: “Neither Nigeria nor the members of ECOMOG forced their way into Liberian conflict in a manner remotely resembling military adventurism” and added that “The ECOMOG is a peace force, it has no intention and was not established to capture Liberia. In fact, one might ask, capture Liberia for who and from whom and for what purpose?” (in Nwachukwu, 1991).

In the face of criticisms of Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG seen in some quarters within Nigeria as a way of prolonging military rule, there was mounting pressure on the
regime to stick to the transition programme. In early May 1992 widespread disenchantment at sharp increase in transport fares, culminated in a number of demonstrations demanding the resignation of the government. The demonstrations were violently suppressed by the security forces. As the political tempo for a return to civilian rule increased, the Gen. Babangida administration succumbed to the voice of the masses and called an election on 12 June 1993. However, in early June 1993 the ABN leadership obtained an interim injection in the Abuja high court prohibiting the presidential election from taking place, pending the results of its appeal for the extension of military rule until 1997 (McCaskie, 1997: 787).

However, NEC rejected the injunction as invalid and stated that the election would take place as scheduled. The rate of participation in the presidential election of 12 June was relatively low, owing, in part, to the confusion occasioned by the Abuja court action, but inspite of the low turn out, international monitors throughout Nigeria reported that it had been conducted relatively peaceful. Two days later, initial results, released by NEC, indicated that of the 6.6 million votes cast in 14 of the 30 states the SDP had secured 4.3 million and the NRC 2.3 million. In 11 of the 14 states (including Bashir Tofa's, Leader of the NRC, of Kano), Chief M. K. O Abiola (leader of the SDP) was believed to have obtained majority votes. (McCaskie, 1997: 787).

Shortly afterwards, however, the NEC announced that the remaining results would not be released until further notice. This followed further injunction secured by the ABN, that prohibited promulgation of the results; several other applications were presented in a number of courts, in an attempt to delay or suspend the electoral process. Widespread confusion followed, and protests were voiced that the NDSC had deliberately sabotaged the elections. Later in June the CD promulgated election results, which indicated that Chief MKO Abiola had won majority of the votes cast in 19 states and Tofa in 11 states. However in spite of increasing domestic and international pressure, on 23 June, 1993, the NDSC declared the election to be invalid, halted all court proceedings pertaining to the election, suspended the NEC, and repealed all decrees relating to the transition to civilian rule (McCaskie, 1997: 787).

In the face of mounting crisis, Gen. Babangida announced that the election had been marred by corruption and other irregularities, but insisted that he remained committed
to the transition on 27 August handover. Chief M. K. O. Abiola, however, continued to claim, with much popular agreement, that he had been legitimately elected to the presidency. The United Kingdom subsequently announced that it was to review its bilateral links with Nigeria, and imposed a number of military sanctions, while the USA immediately suspended all assistance to the government (McCaskie, 1997: 788). In light of domestic and international pressure, Gen. Babangida announced that an interim national government was to be established, on the grounds that there was insufficient time to permit the scheduled transition to civilian rule on 27th August. On 27th August, a 32-member interim federal executive council, headed by Ernest Shonekan was installed. Ernest Shonekan was designated as Head of State and commander-in-chief of the Armed forces, and the transitional period for the return to civilian rule was extended to 31 March 1994 (Africa South of the Sahara, 1997).

Following the establishment of the ING, Ernest Shonekan pledged his commitment to the democratic process. However, in October, the SDP demanded that Chief M. K. O. Abiola be inaugurated as president, and refused to participate in the next elections. In the same month Shonekan established a committee to investigate the circumstances that had resulted in the annulment of the 12 June presidential elections. But the resultant dramatic increase in the price of fuel prompted widespread anti-government demonstrations, and the NLC announced the resumption of strike action. Meanwhile, the proposed revision of the electoral register was undermined by the refusal of supporter of SDP to participate, and it became clear that the new schedule for the transition to civilian rule could not be met (Africa South of the Sahara, 1997). The perceived failure of the ING to effectively deal with the political crisis following the annulment of the June 12 election, made it almost inevitable for the military to intervene in order to ‘rescue’ the country from total collapse and anarchy.


Consequently, on 17 November 1993, following a meeting with senior military officers, Ernest Shonekan announced his ‘resignation’ as head of state, and immediately transferred power to General Sani Abacha. On the following day Gen. Sani Abacha dissolved all organs of state and bodies that had been established under the transitional process. He replaced state governors with military administrators, he
prohibited political activity and announced the formation of the Provisional Ruling Council (McCaskie, 1997).

Osaghae (1998) has argued that, the projection of the military coup as a voluntary relinquishing of power by the defeated regime was a deliberate ploy to make the new regime acceptable. An announcement of a coup would in all probability have turned the anti-military zeal of civil society against the regime, despite growing demands for the military to intervene because of the inability of the Interim National Government (ING) to deal with worsened national crisis (Osaghae, 1998: 273).

However, from the very beginning the regime faced hostility from the Western powers, who viewed the re-emergence of the military as a major set back for the democratic transition that was on course. At home there were mixed reactions. Given the obvious inability of the ING to deal with the deepening political and economic crisis and the fact that there had been clamours for the military to intervene, there was a muted welcome for the take-over, but many who welcomed it expected no more than a short-lived rescue operation. However, there were a few demonstrations against the coup by University students in Ibadan, Ife and Lagos, while sixty-seven senators issued a statement asking Nigerians to rise up against the military in defence of their rights. In spite of this, ordinary people simply adopted an expectant wait-and-see attitude, hoping that the new regime would be able to take the country out of the abyss (Osaghae, 1998: 274).

The Abacha regime is likely to go down in history as the most despotic government in Nigeria’s post-independence history. The harassment which came from within and outside the country and which created intense opposition and hostility towards the regime from its very beginning gave little or no room for any serious reflections on, or coherent response to, the complex problems facing the country. Osaghae (1998), has argued that, the authoritarian prism through which most actions of the regime were regarded over-shadowed its underlying though poorly articulated nationalism and inward-looking character, which brought it close to the Gen. Buhari regime of old. The nationalist approach to the economic crisis which led, among other things, to the abrogation of liberalisation policies in 1994 and an adamant attitude to Western creditors; the attempts to ‘sanitise’ the country, which seemed to be targeted at the
'sacred cow' elites; and the involvement of key actors of the Buhari regime (including Gen. Buhari himself) in strategic aspects of administration were manifestations of this nationalism and in-ward looking character (Osaghae, 1998: 273).

The regime inherited a most fragile economy made worse by the riots, strikes and other acts of civil disobedience and the resulting state of anarchy, which paralysed the country in the aftermath of the annulled 1993 election. The economic indicators for the 1993/94 showed decline. In 1993 real GDP growth rate was 2.6 per cent and fell to barely 1 per cent in 1994, from 8.2 in 1991, 4.7 in 1991 and 3.6 in 1992. Consumer price inflation was officially estimated at 57.2 per cent in 1993 and over 60 per cent in 1994, up from 44.6 per cent in 1992. Unemployment remained high as retrenchments continued in the public and private sectors. Although oil prices showed marginal recovery, reaching US$16 per barrel in 1994, the oil sector remained in deep crisis because of the huge debts estimated at $800 million owed to the oil companies by the NNPC, and the reluctance of the majors to expand their investments. This led to drastic fall in exploration activities: only 500 million barrels of new deposits were produced in 1993, compared to 1.5 billion in 1991, and by 1994 only fourteen drilling rigs in sixteen locations were active, compared to the thirty-six active rigs in forty locations in 1991 (Osaghae, 1998: 281).

It important to note at this juncture that the Babangida, Shonekan and Abacha eras were characterised by one major foreign policy move within the ECOWAS sub-region, and that is the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. General Abacha on coming to power pledged his commitment to Nigeria's role in the ECOMOG peacekeeping force. By mid-1996, the Nigerian contingent deployed in Liberia had been reduced to a number of about 6000. However, the Abacha regime and some other ECOWAS member states sent additional troops to Liberia to support the conduct of elections in July 1997. The elections were successfully held under the supervision of ECOMOG; the ECOMOG force played a crucial role in providing the much-needed security, in a country where the state security apparatus had collapsed (Africa South of the Sahara, 1997).

Osaghae (1998) has advanced the view that, the hostility towards the Gen. Abacha regime and its harassment both domestically and externally accounted for its foreign
policy being largely reactive and incoherent. The regime concentrated its energies mostly on consolidating its hold on the country and limiting the attempts by the international community to isolate it, and foreign policy was made to serve the need of this struggle for survival and consolidation. The survivalist imperative also partly explains why the government pursued a foreign policy aimed at diverting attention away from the internal crisis and tensions (Osaghae, 1998: 307).

At the West African sub-regional level, ECOWAS remained the major focus, although it was less active than it had been in previous years. This was partly due to the francophone countries that were more involved in the affairs of a parallel economic union - the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UMEOA) - formed in January 1994 following the devaluation of the CFA franc. From that time the francophone heads of states rarely attended the annual summits, and ECOWAS became increasingly an Anglophone affair. But even more important was that most countries in the region were greatly troubled by political instability and economic decline, and were preoccupied with solving these problems. Nigeria herself was in this situation, and between 1994 and 1995 the head of state was unable to attend ECOWAS summits and other crucial meetings. However, in July 1996 Gen. Abacha became chairman of ECOWAS, and Nigeria seemed once again to be playing its rightful role in the organisation (Osaghae, 1998: 307).

In spite of the crisis at home, in 1993 Nigerian troops were dispatched to Sierra Leone, in response to a formal request by the Sierra Leonean government for military assistance to repulse attacks by rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). ECOMOG remained the most important collective undertaking in which Nigeria was involved, but the intractability of the war in Liberia led to threats by Ghana, the other major participant in the peacekeeping mission to pull out. Nigeria also considered pulling out, but the international acclaim for its involvement, which was a good counter-balance to its isolation, dissuaded the leaders from such a move. The ECOWAS summit in Abuja in July 1996 initiated a new peace offensive under which an interim government was formed and the warring factions agreed to disarm and prepare for elections, as is mentioned above (Osaghae, 1998: 307).

The government also pursued other collective development projects, one of which was
the gas pipeline jointly funded by Nigeria, Togo and Ghana, and involving the laying of pipes to supply gas from Nigeria to these other countries. The agreement was signed in September 1995. However, relation with other countries in the region was affected by the government’s determination to contain opposition and dissident activities, as well as the responses of these countries to its isolation by Western powers. For example, relation with neighbouring Benin under President Soglo was strained by that country’s support for dissidents in Nigeria, and its rumoured agreement to have a US military base established there. Relations only improved after Mathew Kerekou, a long-standing friend of Nigeria was returned to power after defeating the incumbent President Soglo, in the 1996 elections. There were proposals by pro-government commentators to reduce assistance to countries like Mali and Sierra Leone which voted against Nigeria at major international forums (Osaghae: 309). However, the regime of Gen. Abacha made efforts to secure the support of other West African states in its struggles against the Western-led international community, including South Africa (especially when it boycotted the 1996 African football Cup of Nations hosted by South Africa). For this purpose, it relied partly on Article 83 of the revised ECOWAS treaty which provides for the formulation and adoption of ‘common policies on issues relating to international negotiations with third parties in order to promote and safeguard the interests of the region’ (Revised ECOWAS Treaty, 1992).

Sub-Regional Stance.

Following the military take-over of power in Sierra Leone in March 1997, ECOWAS leaders expressed their dismay at the action and demanded that the military relinquished power to the civilian government of Tejan Kabbah, which it had overthrown. However, the new military junta did not heed to the warning against its actions and instead went ahead and forged an alliance with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), whose fighting had wrecked havoc on the people of Sierra Leone. The Kamajor hunter militias who had been fighting the RUF for years refused to recognise the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and vowed to fight and return the legitimately elected government of President Tejan-Kabbah. However, as this was going on in the provinces, the newly constituted AFRC/RUF force was busy carrying out a systematic looting of the capital Freetown. Many people were forced to flee in
the face of the crisis and sought refuge in nearby Guinea and Liberia. Freetown was looted, bombarded and wrecked. The Ministry of Finance building and the government treasury were burnt down on the day of the coup on 25 May 1997, with loss of most vital payroll records (New African, 1998: 11). The world reacted with shock and did not mince its words in condemning the act of barbarism that was taking place in Sierra Leone. The UN reacted by passing resolution 1132 of October 8, 1997, which imposed an embargo on Sierra Leone with respect to weapons, ammunition and fuel but not to humanitarian supplies. At the regional level, the ECOWAS leaders were dismayed and distanced themselves from the Freetown military junta thus making it difficult for the junta to establish any ties with the neighbouring states. ECOMOG, the military wing of ECOWAS, was invoked by the regional leaders to restore democracy to Sierra Leone, by maintaining a tight noose on Freetown in order to monitor the UN embargo on the junta.

Under the auspices of ECOWAS a meeting was held in Conakry, between the junta and the ousted Tejan-Kabbah government. At the Conakry talks it was agreed that the government of President Tejan-Kabbah be restored by April 22, 1998. But after the signing of the agreement in October both sides showed themselves mistrustful and recriminations were flying thick and fast. Major Johnny Paul Koroma the junta leader sounded as if he wanted to scupper the whole agreement when he delivered an anti-Nigerian tirade demanding that all Nigerian troops leave Sierra Leone immediately. ECOMOG countered by accusing the junta of being insincere even when they signed the Conakry accord and warned of terrible consequences if it remained intransigent. As their input the RUF who were now in Freetown at the invitation of the AFRC, said that it would not disarm its troops unless its leader Foday Sankoh who was detained in Nigeria was set free. Further talks got underway in Freetown in mid-November attended by General Victor Malu, then commander of the ECOMOG forces in the region. But the junta simply hardened its position saying that it would disarm its own troops because this would mean the disarmament of the national army, something it had not agreed to. At stake was the disarmament of combatants, which should have started at the beginning of December. The deployment of ECOMOG troop across Sierra Leone was lagging behind schedule. Meanwhile ECOMOG continued to tighten sanctions giving priority to blockading fuel product and arms (New African, April
The Nigerian government increased its troops in Freetown to about, 4000 as a way of showing its determination to reinstate the ousted civilian government. In the face of sanctions ordinary Sierra Leoneans continued to suffer and to live in a permanent state of fear. With ECOMOG troops occupying Jui and Lungi, and gradually tightening the noose round the capital, the junta was busy conscripting hardened criminals, giving them only a few days of training before arming them AK 47 rifles (New African, 1998). This and the retaliatory Nigerian bombing raids led to mass exodus of civilians into the countryside and neighbouring Guinea. As the standoff between the AFRC/RUF junta and ECOMOG continued, ECOMOG lost its patience at what it refers to as persistent violations of the Conakry accord and junta provocations and attacks on its forces based at Lungi and Jui. On the 11 February 1998 ECOMOG went on the offensive and after a few days of fighting which left Freetown paralysed the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force succeeded in chasing the junta forces out of Freetown. For several days during and after the fighting, over 120 corpses lay festering in the streets with scavenging dogs feeding on them. Three commercial banks were looted by retreating junta forces. The telephone exchange and power stations were destroyed. The retreating junta forces that had fanned out into the bush and towns nearby regrouped and launched two further attempts to retake the city but the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force defeated them. As part of the process of its mopping up of the city, ECOMOG empowered the local police to search and recover all looted property from homes, Ports, docks and even on the high seas. However, the sudden collapse of the junta resistance from Freetown could have been the tactical decision to retreat into the countryside ands to take the war back into the provinces. This was probably true of the RUF for whom this could simply mean getting back to business as usual because, prior to the coup, their operations were largely confined to the countryside. If they were going to take a last stand it will be on their own territory (New African, April 1998).

In the aftermath of the fighting, ECOMOG drew public and international attention to the potentially disastrous humanitarian situation facing the populations in both the southern and eastern regions of the country. Food and medical supplies had either been exhausted or plundered. However, the progressive deployment of ECOMOG troops
meant that as the junta forces were being pushed from one town to another, they were able to regroup and attack towns and villages along their escape routes. One group was doing just that in the towns in the North such as Lunsar, Kabala, and Port Loko. But there were still bigger prices to fight for, including the diamond mining district of Kono, which has been with or without a rebel war a hotbed of competition among the political elite for the diamond ‘loot’ (New African, 1998: 10).

The international community applauded the restoration of the Tejan Kabbah government by the Nigeria-led ECOMOG force but that applause did not come without much controversy over Nigeria’s single-handed role in the process. Nigeria’s role has raised some fundamental questions, which would be addressed in the analysis of the case.

Finally, Nigeria’s policy within ECOWAS from 1979 to 1997 has been characterised by *continuity* and *change*, mostly in *approach* but not in *substance*. While the Shagari/Buhari regimes had taken actions which made Nigeria’s commitment to the community questionable, the Babangida/Shonekan/Abacha regimes reinforced Nigeria’s commitment to the community through their pioneering role in the Community and moreover in their pivotal position in the operations of ECOMOG. In the next the effects of Nigeria’s policies on ECOWAS and its operations in light of specific actions taken by different regimes in Nigeria will be explained.
CHAPTER FOUR.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY.

Introduction:

Leadership is a vital element in any political system and this is particularly crucial when a group of countries embark on a process of integration, such as ECOWAS. For this involves not merely the maintenance of an existing status quo, but a series of creative acts for which courage and imagination are required as well as the normal political skills of reconciling and resolving conflicts between different sections of the community, (Olaniyan, 1986:130). Pryce (1973), argues that in guiding a process of integration, three functions are of particular importance if it is to maintain its momentum: (a) a strategic function which involves decisions about the general direction the process is to take; (b) a tactical function which is concerned with the selection of specific steps within that overall strategy; and (c) a continuous negotiating function which is directed at building up the coalition of interests and arriving at compromises necessary to maintain a steady inflow of decisions on individual policy issues. He further argues that without the successful accomplishment of these tasks, the projected union is likely to fail, for it will lack a sense of direction, a clearly defined set of immediate objectives and a capacity to maintain confidence in its ability to fulfil the expectations focused on it (Pryce,1973: 41-42).

There is no doubt that Nigeria is one of the leading actors in the activities of ECOWAS. The administration of General Gowon, had sensitised the nation to the relevance of integration in the region and of the continuous role which the country must play if this arrangement is to survive. Thus, the various successive military and civilian governments always recognised this fact. It was in this vain that Chief M.S. Adigun, the Minister of National Planning during the Second Republics, remarked in a policy statement at the ECOWAS Secretariat on 5 June 1984 that:

"Nigeria would continue to play an active role in the affairs of ECOWAS because in it lies to a great extent our peoples ability to liberate themselves from their economic predicaments and socio-political instability" (Nigerian Standard, 1984: 6)

The community is seen as a valuable tool for enhancing future economic development
in Nigeria as it is well articulated in the concentric circle theory of Nigeria’s foreign policy of the period under review- (1979-1997), ECOWAS’s. Thus, over the years, Nigeria has emphasised and assisted in the creation of the structures. Nigeria believes in the building of strong regional institution as a prerequisite for the establishment of a meaningful regional integration arrangement. Its annual contribution constitutes 32.5% of the community’s budget. This is paid regularly in order to ensure the effective operation of the Community’s activities. Further financial assistance has also been extended to the Secretariat located in Lagos (now relocated to Abuja), in times of financial crisis. For example, in June 1985, the Federal government settled a sum of 80,000 Naira, outstanding in respect of rents for the Community’s technocrats, and for similar reasons, the Federal government had given active support to the formation of such regional institutions as the West African Clearing House (WACH) and the ECOWAS bank which are vital monetary and trade missions in the region (The Guardian, 1985: 10). But what remains questionable is the role of Nigeria in the tactical function, which relates to specific steps in the adoption of the strategy for selecting integrative measures. It is generally argued that the Community had in several instances embarked upon ‘white elephant’ integrative measures, which later presented major obstacles to its progress. One typical example is the issue of the free movement of persons within the region (Adisa, 1986: 131).

This makes it important to focus on the integrative measures adopted by ECOWAS in relation to Nigeria’s policy course in the Community. Attention needs to be focused on Article 59, sub-sections 1, 2 and 3, which deals with the free movement of persons vis-à-vis the 1983 and 1985 expulsions of illegal immigrants from Nigeria and the subsequent closure of the country’s land borders between 1984-1985. The analysis will further focus on Article 68, which deals with the ‘Issue of Landlocked States and Island member States’ in relation to the prolonged land border closure by Nigeria with her immediate neighbours (ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 1992: 35 - 41).

Article 58 sub-section 1,2 and 3 which deals with ‘Regional Security’ will be brought to focus in consonance with Nigeria’s pivotal role in the Regional Peace-Keeping force ECOMOG (ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 1992: 36). An attempt will therefore be made at investigating the underlying policy dynamics that precipitated these actions and
moreover examine how, or to what extent Nigeria’s policy posture has helped to shape or reshape the efforts at regional integration in West Africa. This and some other related issues will be addressed presently. Thus, we now turn to the issue of the Free Movement of Persons within the Community vis-à-vis the expulsion of illegal immigrants from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985, most of who were citizens of ECOWAS member states.


The Shehu Shagari administration, in late January 1983, expelled about three million people-mostly from ECOWAS countries- out of the Nigeria within two weeks. This was continued by the Federal Military Government of General Buhari, which came to power in a coup d’etat on 31 December, 1983. The decision, according to Aluko (1985), of the Federal Government of Nigeria announced on 17 January, 1983 by the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Alhaji Ali Baba giving all “illegal” immigrants amounting to about two to three million, fourteen days to leave Nigeria. This created 'the worst international crisis for Nigeria since the end of the civil war in January 1970'. This wrought to Nigeria acrimony and sharp disagreement with friendly as well as hostile international actors in some respects worse than the international reactions to the Nigerian Civil War (Aluko, 1985). Apart from the international castigation that greeted the decision, it is believed to have done some incalculable damage to the stability and progress of the ECOWAS. The expulsion order, though not a violation of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, was viewed in some quarters as ‘dampening’ the spirit of ‘goodwill’ within the Community.

There is no doubt that free movement of labour is fundamental to effective regional integration since this could lead to efficient utility of labour and optimum output in the region. But for this to be realistic, certain conditions must be fulfilled. These, according to Mihailovic (1976), include adequate information system about employment opportunities in the member states and increased social amenities to adequately cater for the needs of emigrants. These are still lacking in most ECOWAS member states. The more experienced regional integration arrangements in Latin America and the Caribbean are silent on the issue of the movement of labour where
this could precipitate political problems because of rising unemployment and economic recession in member states. Even in the EEC where this principle had been accepted, it had remained an ideal on paper rather than in practice, as most Member states have failed to provide the adequate facilities for such movement because of 'national interests'. (Mihailovic, 1976:165-168).

However, labour mobility in West Africa has a long and varied history. Even before colonialism, West Africa, like the rest of the continent, was the scene of mass movements. There was trade and intermingling between the people of the sub-region. Mabogunje (1972) had prior noted that during the pre-colonial period, people “were moving across ethnic boundaries” and, in the process, social norms were developed with “respect to the position of such strangers in different societies,” and various institutions were established to cope with their needs and problems (Mabogunje, 1972: 3-6). Colonialism did not appreciably alter this trend. Rather, it re-created the conditions for the free movements and stimulated such movements through improvements of transportation by rail, road, sea, and air. This practice has continued up to the modern period in the region (Asante, 1986: 150).

Traditionally, the entry (and exit) of the alien is a jealously guarded preserve of the state. Under general international law, a state may be under obligation to admit its own nationals, but the admission of aliens is traditionally the exclusive preserve of the state. Hence, the alien may be refused admission or after admission could be deported in the exercise of discretion by a state, though this may be subject, to limited review by the courts. Although bilateral agreements on free movement, such as that between Ghana and Togo or the exchange of notes between Nigeria and Ivory Coast in November 1964 on visa abolition, have from time to time imposed obligations on these states in respect of each other’s nationals, these obligations have been subjected to far reaching exceptions and have often been enforced on a bilateral level (Asante, 1986: 151).

This traditional picture has been modified by the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons signed in May 1979 and revised in 1992 (ECOWAS Doc., A/ P 1 / 5 / 79 and ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 1992). As far as ECOWAS is concerned, the movement of labour is part of the philosophy of its founders and it is written into the
Lagos Treaty establishing the Community. According to Asante, (1986), the basic principle of the Community is that the economic process must not be distorted, and if goods, capital, and services are to be permitted free movement then it would represent a distortion if labour is not. The ECOWAS Accord therefore provides for the free movement of goods and citizens within the Community. Like the EEC, ECOWAS’ free movement entails the right to accept offers of employment and to move freely for this purpose within the territory of member states, to stay there in order to carry on employment and to live there during employment. This includes the abolition of visa and the right to reside anywhere in the West African sub-region (Asante, 1986: 151).

However, this right to enter, reside, and establish business in any ECOWAS territory is to be accomplished in three stages, all taking a minimum transitional period of 15 years from the definitive entry into force of the protocol. The first stage, which took immediate effect, is the right of entry without visa. The second stage is the right of residence, while the third and last stage is the right of a citizen of one of country to establish business in another country (ECOWAS Treaty, 1979). Under the first stage a citizen of the community has the right to visit any member state than his own for a period not exceeding 90 days without visa requirement. He/she shall however, be required to possess valid travel documents. Notwithstanding these provisions clearly stipulated under Article 3 of the protocol, member states of the Community “shall reserve the right to refuse admission into their territory... any citizen who comes within the category of inadmissible immigrants under their laws.” (ECOWAS Treaty, 1979). However, the provisions of the protocol should not operate to the prejudice of the citizens of the Community who are already in residence and established in a member state, provided they comply with the law in general and in particular the immigration laws of the member state (Asante, 1986: 154).

The ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons has implications for the political, social, economic and cultural spheres of the member states and raises some fundamental questions; To what extent have the citizens of West Africa been prepared to accept their new role of being their brother’s keeper? Have the landlords in West Africa been told to start (now) to condition their minds to accepting tenants from other West African countries who may turn up to work or trade? Are the traders in West
Africa aware that they have to make room for one another irrespective of country of origin but certainly in the spirit of ECOWAS? (Asante, 1986: 155).

Furthermore, James Nti (1980), reiterated that:

Are there enough job openings for all those who seek jobs bearing in mind the level of their qualifications and skills...Are their qualifications acceptable to employers in the host country? If they are, are such employers prepared to place them correctly at the level to which they rightly belong or are the employers prone to take advantage of the fact that such job-seekers are desperate and are prepared to take any job and any salary in an attempt to keep body and soul together in a place far away from home? (Nti, 1980).

These are some of the problems that relate to the free movement of persons, as enshrined in the ECOWAS Treaty. Some of these problems have aroused great deal of apprehension in some ECOWAS member states. This is particularly sharp and penetrating in Nigeria, where a substantial number of ECOWAS citizens have flocked in recent years in search of profitable economic opportunities. According to Asante, (1986), the implementation of the first phase of the protocol has generated such an apprehension and indignation that it prompted the Nigerian government to expel "illegal" immigrants from that country in January 1983 and April 1985, respectively (Asante, 1986).

Under the section of the Protocol currently in force, ECOWAS citizens are not allowed to accept employment without permit (Revised ECOWAS Treaty, 1992). Nevertheless, through various means, the ECOWAS citizens as well as persons from non-ECOWAS neighbouring countries have taken employment in Nigeria without the necessary papers contrary to the Nigerian Immigration Laws. According to Onwuka (1982), a disturbing aspect of this is that, this group is not easy to monitor and thus constitutes added problems to the Nigerian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition to this, the growing bulk of ECOWAS expatriates in the cheap labour market was believed to have negative effect on the cohesive action of the Labour Unions in Nigeria because these 'guest workers', as they are called in the European Community, are not only ready to accept inferior condition of service but are readily available to replace their Nigerian counterparts (Onwuka, 1982: 199-200). The questions then are, what were the domestic conditions that precipitated the expulsion orders? Were the
expulsion orders based on rational decision making and if so what are the implications of relative ‘rationality’ between the member states?

In utilising the Allisonian framework of the Rational Actor Model 1 which sees the international society as a multi-state system, a system in which the state is either the sole or, at least, the prime actor. Allison (1971) posits that, the behaviour of the state is looked at for what are regarded as the ‘objective realities of its position in the world.’ In spite of significant differences in interests and focus, most analysts and ordinary laypeople attempt to understand happenings in foreign affairs as the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments (Allison, 1971:4-5). This model has reduced the complexities associated with the rational decision-making “to a simple matter of selecting among a set of given alternatives, each of which has a given set of consequences: the agent selects the alternative whose consequences are performed in terms of the agent’s utility function which ranks each set of consequences in order of preference” (Allison, 1971: 5). Therefore the actions of the Nigerian governments in relation to the issues which forms the subject of this analysis, will be treated as alternatives chosen from a set of given options, thus applying the Allisonian Model I of rational behaviour in policy choices. For this study we shall focus on the internal factors which determined Nigeria’s course of action and the consequences of these policy moves on ECOWAS. We can now turn to the internal variables that contributed to the actions, of the Nigerian governments and its effects on ECOWAS.

The Internal Dimension.

According to Asante (1986), Nigerian public reaction to the large influx of illegal immigrants into their country, as well as to other developments in the country may be grouped into three main categories. First is the ‘negative employment effects’ of the ECOWAS protocol that have provoked criticism and disgust among some labour organisations, the press, and individuals. For instance, the Gongola branch of the National Union of Construction and Civil Engineering Workers, strongly condemned ECOWAS for having made it possible for contractors in the State to indulge in employing ‘cheap labour’ from ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS neighbouring countries ‘while Nigerians roam about without jobs’. Such indiscriminate recruitment, according to the Union, is a ‘calculated attempt to undermine the Union’s organisation’
However, this position was not pervasive in the Nigerian society. For instance, to private entrepreneurs bent on maximising profit, the presence of this 'exploitable labour force...is 'godsent'. Thus, for the unskilled Nigerian worker, who has been 'outmanoeuvred and undercut,' the ECOWAS citizen is a threat and a rival. Besides, the preference for this exploitable group of ECOWAS citizens as well as ECOWAS expatriate professionals to indigenous Nigerians was believed to have wider implications for the Nigerian economy. This is because it is viewed as undermining the Nigerian Indigenisation Decrees of 1972 and 1977 that reserved certain employment's for Nigerians (Asante, 1986:157).

One factor that is considered today as a catalyst for the expulsions was the widespread religious riots in the Northern parts of the country which, involved some foreigners. The fact that the religious riot in Kano in December 1980, in which over 4,177 civilians were killed as well as over 100 policemen and some 35 army personnel lost their lives, was led by a Camerounian, Mallam Muhammed Marwa, alias 'Maitasine', and that 20% of the Muslim fanatics that participated in the riots were aliens from neighbouring African (mostly West African) states such as Niger, Chad, Cameroun, Mali and Burkina Faso created the widespread impression among many Nigerians that it was illegal aliens who were behind the basic threat to the security in their country (Aniagholu Report, 1981:57).

However, according to Aluko (1990), this is an exaggerated view. This is because even the Aniagolu Report into the Kano religious disturbances in December 1980 did not place the whole blame on illegal aliens. Indeed, the majority of the people who participated in the Kano riots, and similar riots such as Bulunkuntu near Maiduguri, and Kaduna in 1982, and in Yola in February/March 1984, were Nigerians. This they further argued was also true of the armed robbery in Nigeria. It was easy for the government to find an easy way out by making scapegoats of the illegal aliens. While it was surely the case that some illegal aliens had participated actively in criminal activities in Nigeria, it was also true that some of them had contributed positively to the socio-economic development of the country (Aluko, 1990: 422).
The root cause of the religious riots in the North since 1980 was to be found not only in religious fanaticism, but also in socio-economic frustrations of the people. As the weekly magazine, *West Africa*, has put it, ‘the religious riots represented the breakdown of the traditional values of the society of the old North... In short, it is a crisis of modernisation and added that the religious fanatics are simply the bizarre lunatic fringe of a deeper social movement that will take a long time to work itself through’ (*West Africa*, 12th March, 1984). Thus whether the illegal aliens were ever completely flushed out or not in Nigeria, social upheavals are likely to continue for some time in some parts of the country (Akindele and Olusanya, 1990).

The Kano religious disturbances of December 1980 shook Nigeria in two main ways. First, the leader of the fanatical Islamic Movement that started the armed conflict against the Northern authorities and other Muslims not sharing his doctrine the Prophet Muhammed was a *fake* and that he was the true prophet was an illegal alien from Cameroun. Apart from him, other illegal aliens from neighbouring states were involved in the religious disturbances, as given below:

- Niger Republic---162
- Chad Republic---16
- Cameroun Republic--4
- Mali Republic---2

Secondly, according to the Aniagolu Report, these illegal aliens supported by over 6,000 Nigerian Muslim fanatics and subsequently were able to defeat the Nigerian police detachment sent to quell the revolt by killing nearly 60 Nigerian police officers, including some senior officers, while injuring nearly 100 other police officers (Aniagolu Report, 1981:16-17). Indeed, it was said that if the army had not been brought in to suppress the religious revolt with superior arms and ammunition, the ‘*Maitasine*’ fanatics might have possibly affected the whole country (Aluko, 1983).

Although the Federal Government was shaken almost to its foundation, the Shehu
Shagari government soon recovered from the shock. By December 1981, most of those who participated in the violent religious revolt were pardoned and released by the President. Although there were subsequent violent religious conflicts in Borno, Kano and Bauchi states in October 1982, those responsible for them were chiefly disciples of 'Maitasine'. In view of this the Federal government did not take any serious view of the presence of large illegal immigrants in Nigeria. For all of the non-Nigerians that led or participated in the Kano riots had either been killed or deported. (Aluko, 1990: 429).

However, it was the sharp political disagreement and recriminations between Accra and Lagos, after the Ghanaian military coup of 31 December, 1981, as well as the involvement of some Ghanaians in some crimes that was more crucial for the expulsions orders. Aluko (1976) asserted that, it must be remembered that since Ghana’s independence in March 1957, the Nigerian leaders and most Nigerians have regarded Ghana as their rival in the leadership role in Africa, especially until 1970 (Aluko, 1976). Although there was a relaxation, even cordiality in relations between them and especially when the two countries were under elected governments in the case of Ghana from late 1979 until 1981 when President Limann’s government was overthrown in a coup d’etat led by Flt-Lt Jerry Rawlings. During this period, while official relations between them remained friendly, the then NPN Federal government portrayed the then Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) as being anti-Ghanaian. It was even said that the Limann government had to protest in 1981 to the then UPN for killing and harassing Ghanaians in Nigeria (The Sunday Tribune, Ibadan, 13 February, 1983).

But with the overthrow of the Hilla Limann regime, the situation was reversed for two reasons. The Shehu Shagari government did not like the coup d’etat against the Limann regime in Ghana with which it had affinity. Secondly, the Jerry Rawlings government started a quasi-Soviet system of government that was anathema to the Nigerian government but which was viewed with some understanding by the then UPN (led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo). Ghanaian-Nigerian relations were so tense that President Jerry Rawlings government said that the Nigerian government was making preparations to invade Ghana in order to restore the deposed Hilla Limann to power.
Although this had no basis in fact, it was strongly believed in Accra to have substance (Aluko, 1990).

Largely as a result of all this, a number of hostile measures and bitter exchanges took place between Accra and Lagos from January 1981 until the expulsion order in January 1983. Aluko, (1983) argued that, for nearly four months after the Ghana coup of 31 December, 1981, the federal government suspended the shipment and sale of crude oil to Ghana in an attempt to destabilise the Jerry Rawlings experiment. Apart from this, from March until December 1982, the nationals of Nigeria and Ghana were harassed and vice-versa. Indeed, during this period the federal government deported a number of Ghanaians. On 10 January, 1982, many Nigerians were harassed, arrested and detained in Ghana. These included an officer of the Nigerian Airforce (Aluko, 1983). This harassment and detention of Nigerians in Ghana continued into 1982.

While the Nigerian government decided to resume supplying crude oil to Ghana, this was to be based strictly on cash rather than on the 180-day credit facility granted to the Hilla Limann government. But more important were the measures taken to control Ghanaians that had been found to be fraudulent and guilty of crimes. Among those deported from Nigeria during this period were Raymond Kodzo Okuzed accused of defrauding some state governments of one million Naira; and the Reverend Victor Sackey who admitted that he was sent by the Jerry Rawlings government to spy on Nigeria. In November 1982, the Nigerian government deported another fifty-three Ghanaians who were without valid documents and jobs. Against all these cases, the Jerry Rawlings government had protested vigorously-stating inter alia that such acts were regarded as unfriendly (Aluko, 1983).

In the meantime, partly because of all these developments, and the involvement of aliens especially Ghanaians in crimes, most of whom had come into Nigeria in 1982, fleeing from the Jerry Rawlings government; and partly because of the policies of the Jerry Rawlings PNDC government in Ghana itself, the federal government directed that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, and the Executive Office of the President should work out a strategy for coping with the situation. This inter-Ministerial committee was responsible for the deportations in 1982. All these events were met with strident strictures from the Rawlings government. (Aluko, 1990:
However, on 3 January 1983 violent attempts were made by armed robbers to break into the residence of the then vice President Dr. Alex Ekwueme, and among those caught by the police were some Ghanaians with their identity papers. This was the last straw. The federal government immediately authorised the Ministry of Internal Affairs to tackle urgently how to deal with what it called 'the menace of the Ghanaians and other illegal aliens in Nigeria' (Aluko, 1983).

Between 6 and 13 January 1983, the top officials of the Ministry were ready with their recommendation for the Minister. At first it was said that they confined their recommendations to the Ghanaians. However, shortly before submitting their final recommendation to Alhaji Ali Baba, the Minister for Internal Affairs, they widened it to encompass all aliens illegally staying in Nigeria (Aluko, 1990: 437).

Another contributing factor to the expulsions was the state of the economy. The parlous state of the economy contributed to the expulsion order. As a result of the combination of mismanagement, inefficiency, and unparalleled official corruption, and the glut in oil world market, the economy that was relatively buoyant throughout most of the seventies slumped by early 1981. Instead of the real growth rate of 7.2% envisaged under the four-year development Plan 1981-1985, there was only a growth rate of 2% in 1981 and, this fell below 1% in 1982. The balance of payments surplus of the country that stood at 2,402.6 billion Naira in 1980 turned to a deficit of 1,500 million in 1982. The foreign reserves of the country that amounted to 5,684.2 million Naira in 1980 had fallen to about 780 million Naira at the end of 1982. The public debt that stood at 9,922.3 million Naira in 1980 had risen to 12 billion Naira in 1982. (West Africa, November 1982).

The austerity measures that were introduced in April 1982 had done little to improve the economy. Inflation in 1982 reached a record level of over 25%. Unemployment had reached an alarming proportion of nearly 20% of the work force. Moreover manufacturing and construction companies who could not easily import raw materials and spare parts, because of the austerity measures of the Shehu Shagari government created more unemployment daily. Given all these factors, then expelling illegal aliens
must have been tempting if partly as a ‘scape-goat’ measure for the failures of the government and partly as a popular move to create jobs for thousands of Nigerians in an election year. Alhaji Ali Baba said on 25 January 1983 that one of the reasons for the expulsion order was to create job opportunities for Nigerians (Akindele and Olusanya, 1990: 433).

Two years later in 1985, the expulsion exercise was repeated when the recently established Federal military government of General Buhari, declared on 15 April that all illegal aliens were to leave the country by 10 May, 1985. While the 1983 expulsion order affected an estimated 2 million illegal immigrants, the 1985 illegal aliens numbered about 700,000. This second order was issued for much the same reasons as in 1983: the immigrants’ abuse of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons and second, the involvement of these immigrants in crimes. The fundamental reason for the order was according to Asante (1986), economic: a troubled economy that continued to be badly hurt by depressed crude oil prices. At a time when jobs were scarce and prices for basic goods were high, there was a tendency to regard the aliens in the midst of tens of millions of Nigerians as an unacceptable strain on the country’s limited resources (Asante, 1986: 158-159). These two actions by successive Nigerian governments in 1983 and 1985, are believed to have sent the wrong signals to the affected countries and the entire ECOWAS sub-region. But irrespective of ECOWAS, Nigeria had to protect its national interests.

**Consequences of the Expulsion Orders on ECOWAS.**

Externally, the consequences of the decision were adverse and hostile. At the larger extra-African level, it provoked spirited attack and even outright denunciation of the Shehu Shagari government as inhumane, callous and irresponsible. It did some serious incalculable damage to Nigeria’s policy posture and standing among the Great Powers, and even in the Third World countries. It was reported that Nigeria lost her bid to become chair of the Economic Commission to Nicaragua at the Non-aligned Conference in New Delhi early in March 1983 because of the quit order (The Punch, Lagos, March, 1983).

Although the then secretary of the ECOWAS, Aboubakar Diaby-Quattara, said the
quit order was not a breach of the ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of persons, it was surely contrary to the *spirit* of the protocol. In any case, the Heads of States of other West African states thought differently from Diaby-Quattara and hence their decision to ask the then chairman of ECOWAS, President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin Republic, to visit Lagos to discuss their concern with the Nigerian leaders. This, President Kerekou did on 16 February 1983. Although the *communiqué* issued at the end of that one-day visit stated *inter alia* that both President Mathieu Kerekou and Shehu Shagari felt that the expulsion order would not affect ECOWAS, the truth is that the next phase of the Protocol due to come into effect in 1984 and which was to provide for the freedom of residence of the ECOWAS citizens within the member states became harder to implement than ever before (Aluko, 1983). Aluko (1983) has further argued that, one of the ironies of the quit order was the weakening of ECOWAS, while at the same time strengthening the economic community of the six Francophone West African states called *Communauté Économique Afrique d’Occidentale* - CEAO (Aluko, 1983).

While it is conceded that technically, Nigeria has not breached any part of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of persons by its expulsion of illegal immigrants, it would seem, however, that this action by the government of Nigeria does struck a blow not only at the *spirit* of ECOWAS but also at the whole concept of West African unity which, has since the Mid-nineteenth century being the main spring behind any effort at establishing a community in the sub-region. Throughout the colonial period, no West African was considered an *alien* by any West African country, especially the four former British colonies of the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Asante, 1986: 159).

Although admittedly, this concept of West African unity would seem to have been modified by the attainment of independence by these countries and by the subsequent establishment of separate national institutions and currencies, it is still an important concept that continues to draw West African countries together. ECOWAS, Asante (1986) asserts is therefore, the only all-embracing institutional expression of this old concept of to which all *stalwart* West African nationalists since the last century---from Africanus Beale Horton of Sierra Leone through Casely Hayford of Ghana, to the
modern nationalists like Kwame Nkrumah and Nnamdi Azikiwe—have made due reference. It has been a ‘symbol’ of West African nationalism and an inspiration to pan-West African thought and activity. And although with the formation of ECOWAS, this concept has been transformed into practical reality and that a living thing is born, it is still a jealously guarded concept that draws West African countries together (Asante, 1986: 159-160).

The West Africa magazine (1983) argues that, any serious distortion of this concept is likely to strike a deep blow at the very foundations of ECOWAS itself. And it is these aspirations associated with this age-old concept that the Nigerian quit orders would seem to have effectively disturbed. Besides, even technically, taking the ECOWAS treaty itself, the Nigerian action is strikingly not in consonance with the general undertaking by the member states of ECOWAS to “make every effort to plan and direct their policies with a view to creating favourable conditions for the achievement of the aims of the community...” (West Africa, April 11 & 18, 1983).

Furthermore, the April 1985 expulsion order, and the way it was applied ran counter to the spirit and ideals of pan-West African solidarity; it was also a flagrant breach of Nigeria’s commitments under Article 14, Clause 2, of the December 1984 regional security agreement signed in Lagos between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, which required a member country to protect other members’ citizens in its territory (Asante, 1986: 160).

The reaction from Ghana, whose nationals were the largest affected—about one million—was very caustic. The Ghanaian Times described the quit order as an ‘electoral gimmick’ by the then NPN-controlled Federal government to divert attention from its failures so that it could be returned to power later in August/September 1983 (West Africa, January, 1983). The Ghana radio and the Ghanaian Times condemned the expulsion order, and said it was a deliberate attempt ‘to create mass hysteria by infiltrating Sudan-trained mercenaries into Ghana to subvert the Ghanaian government’ (West Africa, January, 1983). The Ghanaian Head of State, Flt-Lt. Jerry Rawlings described the alien’s order as a ‘calculated plot’ against his government. (The Observer, London, February 1983).
Cautious not to aggravate the underlying tensions and rivalries that have long jeopardised the dream of regional unity, the governments affected by the quit order—Ghana, Benin, Togo, Niger, Cameroun, Chad and Burkina Faso—remained remarkably restrained in their official response to the expulsions. But the accusations and counter-accusations over the manner in which the process unfolded consumed the largely government-owned media in all the countries of the region, fuelling animosities and highlighting how little progress has been made in the quest for regional co-operation (Africa Report, 1985: 10).

Obed Asamoah Ghana’s foreign Minister explained that:

"I would be less than frank if I were to say that the expulsions have not had any effect on our relations with Nigeria. Certainly they have had some chilling effect, and I think it will be quite some time before our relations can get back to where they were before the exercise" (Africa Report, 1985).

However, from the Nigerian government’s point of view, the expulsions were justified in narrow legalistic terms—an estimated hundreds of thousand of nationals from neighbouring countries were residing in Nigeria in flagrant and deliberate disregard of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons and goods, which at that stage of implementation, limited aliens to only 90-day stays before regularising their status. But to the governments affected, the legal right to expel illegal immigrants was not in question—the motivation for doing so, the logistics of the exercise itself, and its implications for regional and ultimately continental co-operation were. There was a feeling that Nigeria was flexing its muscles in callous disregard of the effects upon its weaker neighbours, many of whom were still reeling from the economic consequences of Nigeria’s land border closures of April 1984 (Africa Report, 1985: 10).

Further, the move aroused a certain amount of indignation, for what country in West Africa does not house its share of its neighbour’s nationals, particularly when drought and famine have spawned a new generation of economic refugees? And who would deny the arbitrary nature of colonial borders, the permeability of West Africa’s frontiers, and the encouragement given not only by colonial administrators, but also by independent African governments to the free flow of labour across national boundaries? Heir to the crumbling economy left by former President Shehu Shagari,
Major-General Buhari’s Federal Military government was making attempts at scaling down the country’s ambitious developments dreams, once inflated by now-dwindling oil revenues, to a more realistic level. Austerity, however, has understandably been a difficult pill for Nigerians to swallow after years of prosperity, for the government’s redressment efforts have signalled rising unemployment, shortage of goods and spiralling inflation affecting millions of its citizens (Africa Report, 1985: 10).

In retrospect, the order issued by the Nigerian government requiring all aliens to regularise their residency permits or face deportation was at least understandable; stark economic realities had provoked similar expulsions at various times in West Africa’s post independence history. Invariably, an opportunity to score points at home by acting upon heightened xenophobia in light of economic distress often engendered a powerful motivation, and for Nigeria, it was much less so. In an interview on Lagos Radio in mid-May, the then Nigerian Chief of Staff, Maj.-Gen Tunde Idiagbon, explained that while Nigeria was concerned about the plight of the citizens of its neighbours, it could not ‘close its eyes to the serious social and economic constraints imposed by the hitherto unrestricted influx of millions of illegal immigrants’. (Africa Report, July-August, 1985).

Although the countries affected by the quit order were highly restrained in their response the expulsion orders still triggered some hostile response from some West African countries. There were hostile reactions from countries like Liberia, Mali, Gabon and even Niger. For instance, President Musa Troare of Mali had previously agreed to visit Nigeria between 11 and 14 February 1983. On 8 February, he sent a polite message saying that on medical advice he was unable to travel out of his country (Aluko, 1983: 439). Likewise, President Omar Bongo of Gabon, scheduled to visit Nigeria on the 18 February, had to postpone that trip indefinitely. President Paul Biya of Cameroun who was to host the summit meeting of the Chad Basin Commission about the middle of February 1983, sent an urgent message to Lagos that that period would not after all be convenient for him (Aluko, 1983).

The Liberian leader Samuel Doe, issued a statement denouncing the quit order, and offered $100,000 to the Ghanaian government to cope with the returnees. As earlier stated, the expulsion order met with vitriolic attacks from Accra. The quit order soured
Ghanaian-Nigerian relations in a way reminiscent of the early 1960s era of Kwame Nkrumah and Alhaji Tafawa Balewa. The government of Hissene Habre, which the Federal government had assisted in critical ways, condemned the alien law as ‘sudden and brutal’. The government of General Koumtche of Niger Republic deplored the alien law as contrary to the spirit of African unity (West Africa, February 1983). The three Presidents of the MRU articulated genuine sentiments when they appealed for an emergency ECOWAS summit on the subject, even though some of them are not without stain (West Africa, January 1983). Coming at that particular time, however, the move though technically in order, does seem to strike a blow at the spirit of ECOWAS, much as Ghana’s own border closure last September, or Sierra Leone’s expulsion of members of the Fullah community in December 1982. All these measures, like Nigeria’s have been conditioned by serious economic downturn, suggesting that this is not the time for advance regional co-operation. Yet the ECOWAS summit in May 1982 in Cotonou set up a committee to investigate new orientations for the organisation, and also to study how to make it work in practice, and Nigeria was in the forefront of those that pressed for ECOWAS to start making real advances. Paradoxically, it is precisely at times of economic hardship that group togetherness should commend itself more (West Africa, January 1983).

Internally, the decision provoked hostile reactions though these were hardly noticed abroad. The main opposition parties apart from the banned NPN party condemned it. The leader of the NPP, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe deplored the quit order, and added that it was bound to damage Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa as well as her commitment to African unity. The UPN led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, described the expulsion order as ‘obnoxious’ and ‘diversionary tactics’ to divert attention from the failures at home. The party promised to nullify the law if voted into power at the federal level in the general elections of late 1983 (Aluko, 1990:439).

Although the Nigerian press were unanimous in their support for the order partly out of ignorance, and partly out of patriotism, a number of articles did appear in many Nigerian news papers condemning the expulsion order as playing into the hands of the opponents of African independence in South Africa and right-wing groups in the industrial western countries while worsening the plight of the black people in the same
white societies of the industrial north. Some commentators expressed similar critical views on Nigerian television sets (National Concord, February 1983).

However, the same nationalistic sentiments which were behind some Nigerians support of their government's quit order were aroused in Ghana by returnees' reports of harassment and violence, and Ghanaian government officials were required to calm the inflamed tempers calling for retribution. In fact, a Ghanaian-Nigerian soccer match scheduled to take place in Accra shortly after the expulsion was postponed in order to avoid violent confrontations. The absence of official recrimination, however, was admirable, given that some hundreds of thousands of Nigerians reside in the countries affected by the quit order, and some form of retaliation, official or otherwise, would not have been surprising (Africa Report, July-August, 1985).

Fears of such a response were aroused when the Burkina Faso government issued a directive requesting all Nigerians residing in the country to report to a military camp in Ouagadougou on May 25. In anticipation that some of its 10,000 nationals were about to be shown the door, the Minister for External Affairs Ibrahim Gambari declared that Nigeria was prepared to receive any of its citizens who might be obliged to leave any other West African country. But the 2,000 Nigerians who assembled at the barracks were advised by the Minister of Territorial Administration and Security, Ernest Ouedraogo, in style characteristic of the Sankara government, that 'in Burkina Faso, we are revolutionaries and pan-Africans. All Africans are at home in Burkina Faso'. The Nigerians were told that there was no question of reprisals or expulsions by the Burkina government, and were instead merely advised to regularise their status if their resident permits were not in order (Africa Report, July-August, 1985).

In most integration schemes like the EEC, EDUCE, CAC etc., the protocol on the free movement of persons has proved to be highly sensitive and controversial. The ECOWAS protocol is unique in the sense that it is more comprehensive and more clearly spelled out than similar provisions of EDUCE (Article 63) and CAE (Article 14), although the objectives and intentions of these provisions are the same as those of ECOWAS. On the other hand, the 1967 treaty of the defunct East African Community made no such provision for the free movement of labour or capital within the region. This somewhat constitutional defect of the treaty proved to be damaging to the
Community. For in 1970 a new labour policy in Uganda reserved employment exclusively for its own citizens, a move that threw 20,00 Kenyans out of work (Ravenhill, 1979:238).

Similarly, and further afield in Latin America, the general treaty establishing CACM committed the five member states to the free movement of goods and services but not of persons. In a region characterised by the frequent overthrow of governments, it was felt that free movement of persons was a political and security issue and not, like free trade, a strictly economic matter falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of Economy. In spite of these considerations, free movement of persons became so pressing a controversial issue in the 1960s that it led to a series of crisis resulting in an outbreak of war between two members of CACM—Honduras and El Salvador—in July 1969 (Fagan, 1970:70-72).

These selective cases would tend to emphasise the significance of the ECOWAS free movement of person's provision. The ECOWAS protocol provided for only a fragmentary freedom. For, whereas in the case of the EEC, for example, the free movement of persons provision confers rights upon individuals justifiable before the national courts, either of their own state or of another member state, the ECOWAS protocol offers no such rights. In the circumstances, a Community citizen who is faced with a deportation order in an ECOWAS member state has no implied legal rights to any hearing (Asante, 1986: 152). Therefore, as a result of this lapse in the ECOWAS protocol that deals with free movement of persons, the expulsion orders of 1983 and 1985, can not be challenged on purely legal grounds but also on the spirit of good will.

With regard to ECOWAS, Nigeria has pointed out that it has been acting entirely within the ECOWAS rules. The Protocol on the free movement of peoples is one of ECOWAS key texts, but it has only been applied so far up to its first stage- the 90-day visa free entry; which is blamed in Nigeria for the influx, although it seems only a contributory cause. One may also, with benefit of hindsight, state that it was perhaps mistaken to advance the 'free movement' aspect of ECOWAS before achievements had been made in other sectors, so that in Nigeria this was the only aspect of ECOWAS that was popularly known (West Africa, January, 1983).
As indicated earlier, the protocol on free movement of persons, is to be implemented in three stages. With the first stage coming into effect, the second stage, which was to come into effect in 1984, had to be suspended due to the expulsions. Under the protocol, a citizen of one ECOWAS country should, starting from July 1984, have an automatic right of residence in another ECOWAS country. But the trauma of the two expulsions, which in several cases affected persons who had been born in Nigeria or have been resident prior to 1960, was such that only a few will be thinking of exercising this right. The expulsions may, therefore, have ensured that the ECOWAS protocol does not advance into its second stage (West Africa, May 1985).

The expulsions may also have impeded ECOWAS progress in other ways. It is important to note that the protocol on free movement of persons, has been the most visible achievement of the organisation so far and for most citizens of the community it is the only aspect of ECOWAS that has had any meaning in their lives. Therefore, its frustration even before it has taken root, seems likely to make ECOWAS even more irrelevant in the public perception, at a time when it needs strong public support in order to overcome the lack of political will that has prevented progress in other areas (West Africa, May, 1985).

Expelling aliens in mass quit order may appear the easy solution to West Africa’s perennial migration of illegal labour and a tempting means of gaining domestic political mileage out of economic crisis. But the experiences of the past have shown that such exercises have failed both to halt the tide of citizens seeking a better life in their neighbours’ backyard and to discourage refugees from famine and drought from heading to the greener south in search of survival. It is even argued in Africa Report (1997) that, no African nation can afford to turn its back on the citizens of its neighbours therefore, for the tables can be easily turned (Africa Report, July-August, 1985).

Nigeria’s actions in respect of the implementation of phase one of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, was not the only source of concern to the community. Many member states, in one form or the other adopted policies that were in outright disregard of the provisions of that phase. However, Nigeria’s expulsion of illegal aliens, twice implemented on a massive scale, as well as the long land border
closure between 1984 and 1985 singled out the country, the erstwhile bastion of pro-
ECOWAS sentiments, as the main crisis point in the implementation of the free
movement policy of ECOWAS. As a result of Nigeria’s actions, it was obvious that
while it atrophied the basic elements of the community residence rights envisaged
under the first draft, Nigeria’s initiative prevented an outcome that might have
signalled the end for the only ECOWAS policy that could lay some claims, even if
token, to implementation (Abutudu, 1989).

Moreover, just as no West African government can deny that its economy has
benefited at one time or another from the free migration of labour, neither can it shirk a
share of the responsibility for the illegal aliens within its borders. It was in recognition
of the economic realities of the sub-region that the ECOWAS protocol on the free
movement of persons and goods was drafted (Africa Report, 1985). Therefore the
1983 and 1985 Nigerian expulsion orders, though not a breach of the ECOWAS
Treaty, are considered to be a contravention of the spirit of the ‘ECOWAS family”
which had led to its establishment. The two orders derogated from the spirit of
goodwill in the Community and moreover it left a lot of questions unanswered as to
Nigeria’s commitment to the Community it had pioneered to establish. The second
phase of the protocol on the free movement of persons which was to allow the right of
residence in any member state of community citizens, which was supposed to come
into effect into 1984 became much more harder to implement than it ever was.

Nigeria’s Land Border Closures - 1984-1985: Consequences on ECOWAS.
The Nigerian military government of Gen. Buhari closed all borders when it first took
power on December 31, 1983. Nigeria kept the borders closed until late January 1984,
as the government wanted ‘to prevent wanted persons from sneaking out of the
country’. The borders were re-opened for a short while. However, the borders were
shut again in late April 1984 to prevent illicit trade and currency smuggling when
Nigeria declared a surprise change of its banknotes. Since the second closure, the
borders were only opened temporarily, to allow the transit of emergency relief supplies
through Niger to Chad. The Nigerian government maintained that the borders were to
be kept closed indefinitely (Africa Report, November-December, 1984).

Of all the border closures that the sub-region has experienced since the inception of ECOWAS, the 1984 Nigerian closure of its land borders to all its neighbours, is believed to have had the most serious impact on ECOWAS; Firstly because of the economic might of the country and secondly due the drought that was affecting all the landlocked states in the region. The drought coupled with the heavy reliance of some of these countries on goods imported from Nigeria worsened their situation. As a result of the prolonged land border closures coupled with the 1983 and 1985 repeated expulsions of large number of illegal immigrants, most of whom were citizens of ECOWAS member states, Nigeria’s commitment to the community was put into question and moreover, it was seen as weakening the ‘regional solidarity’ that ECOWAS was meant to foster.

One major objective of ECOWAS, and organisations like it, is to reduce the restrictions imposed on movement of people across national borders. This objective seems particularly relevant in the West African sub-region, where borders fixed by the colonialists for their own convenience were so arbitrary that they literally divided peoples who have historically been the same. There have been some attempts in the past to build on these historical relationships. Long before ECOWAS was established, there had been the Ghana-Mali union of the Nkrumah era, which however, could not be implemented in practical terms. More recent efforts include the Senegambia Confederation (which has already collapsed), and the proposed Ghana-Burkina union, the details of which are still to be spelt out. Also to be included is ECOWAS itself whose conception is infinitely more ambitious and certainly more difficult (West Africa, May 1985).

In spite of these efforts, what stand out more prominently in the sub-region have been divisive influences. Where as the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons had sought to enhance contacts between citizens of its different member countries, such contacts between citizens have often been impeded by the closures of national borders. Since the ECOWAS Treaty went into force, borders that have been shut for varying lengths of time include the Ghana-Togo border from 1982-1983, the Ghana-Ivory Coast border, the Liberia-Sierra Leone border and Nigeria’s land borders with all her
neighbours (West Africa, May 1985). The question that arises here is why did the Nigerian government decide to close its land borders in spite of the perceived consequences on the neighbouring countries and the spirit of ECOWAS at large?

The weekly *West Africa* magazine has argued at the time that, of the entire borders closure (except the Nigeria one of April) were motivated by political differences, which tended to be short-lived. The Nigerian April closure was for economic reasons and lasted for more than one year. The borders were originally closed in April to facilitate the changing of the Nigerian currency. They however remained closed after the currency change because the Nigerian government wanted to stop the smuggling of goods between these countries. Since then, a regional security agreement has been signed between Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana, but would seem that a satisfactory arrangement for controlling the borders was still not been worked out since the borders remained closed indefinitely (West Africa, May, 1985).

The border closure by the Buhari administration nutured serious irritants in Nigeria’s relation’s with countries in the sub-region. Neither the legality of these measures nor the purely national considerations behind them was seriously questioned by most analysts and commentators. Nonetheless, Gambari (1989) has argued that these decisions did not promote good-neighbourliness. On the contrary they are believed to have undermined the spirit of ECOWAS and Nigeria’s leadership pretensions, not only in the sub-region but also on the continent as a whole (Gambari, 1989: 51).

However, Gambari (1989) further posits that, it was perhaps a testimony to the collective wisdom of the leaders of the sub-region that Gen. Buhari was made chairman of the Quadripartite Agreements and later of ECOWAS, precisely to encourage Nigeria to reopen her land borders and to induce more community-mindedness. It may well be, of course, that these countries and the multilateral organisations in the sub-region could not afford the isolation of Nigeria. They worked hard to coax the Gen. Buhari administration out of pursuing restrictive nationalist policies, which affected the welfare of the sub-region (Gambari, 1989: 52)

In the midst of severe drought and depressed commodity prices, Nigeria’s prolonged closure of its borders was believed to have further weakened the economies of the
affected countries. Niger suffered the most from the closure. Nearly 500 miles from the sea at its closest point, Niger is entirely landlocked, and the immensity of its territory and wide dispersion of its population have always made transportation and distribution of supplies extremely difficult. The closure of the border with Niger meant that all Niger’s imports must pass through Benin, whose ports and highways were inadequate to transport large supplies of food and drought relief then needed by Niger (Africa Report, November-December, 1984).

The border closure also affected Niger’s export revenues, nearly 80 per cent of which were normally derived from sales in Nigeria. Moreover many merchants in Niger lost a fortune when Nigeria invalidated the ‘old Naira’ in favour of new currency. Unable to enter Nigeria to exchange the old notes for new ones, businesspeople watched helplessly as their money became useless. The government of Niger implored Nigeria to re-open the border, but the traditional strength of the CFA franc against the Naira always prompted extensive cross border smuggling, consequently, the then military government in Lagos, stressed that the borders were to remain closed (Africa Report, November-December, 1984).

Consequently, President Kountche of Niger made strong representations, through the visiting Nigerian Defence Minister Gen. Domkat Bali, to the highest leadership of the new regime in Nigeria on the border issue. The closure of the land border adversely affected Niger’s economy, which depended almost entirely on Nigeria for supplies of fuel and petroleum products. Severe shortages of these essential items were already manifest in Niger. In a parting message sent through the visiting Defence minister, President Kountche made the passionate declaration that: “Nigeria will continue to find her proper place in Africa and the world as a whole economically and politically. Don’t let Nigeria down. If you do the whole of Africa is down” (Gambari, 1989: 52). His point was that the destiny of Nigeria remains inextricably linked to the destiny of other African countries. Sometimes, however, this point seems to be more clearly understood outside Nigeria than inside it.

Despite the appeal by President Kountche of Niger for the re-opening of the borders, they remained closed and this created enormous hardship in Niger. There was a drastic shortage of nearly every staple food, including beans, rice, sugar, and vinegar. Oil and
gasoline, normally imported from Nigeria, were in short supply, making it difficult to distribute whatever goods can be obtained. The border closure caused tensions between the neighbours. Nomads from Niger continued to pass through the permeable borders, causing intense resentment among Nigerian farmers, who felt that the Nigeriens were depleting grasslands that were already shrivelled by drought. It was even reported that Fulani herdsmen from Niger raided and attacked several villages in Sokoto State and that at least five people were killed (Africa Report, November-December, 1984).

Benin Republic, which was also affected by the border closure most strongly, made passionate pleas to the Nigerian authorities to reopen the border as early as 11 January 1984. The occasion was the visit to Cotonou by Gen Bali, Defence Minister, to explain the reasons for the change of government in Nigeria and to sketch the external relations of the military regime. Recognising Nigeria’s concern about illegal activities, which dominated bilateral trade and other interactions between his country and Nigeria, President Kerekou assured Gen. Bali that Benin’s security agencies would actively assist in apprehending smugglers and currency traffickers. The host President, however, argued that only with the reopening of the border could normal activities be resumed between Benin and Nigeria, especially in the border areas (Gambari, 1989: 52).

The closure of the Nigerian border also affected Chad in direct and urgent ways. The French were particularly concerned and so were the Americans. President Reagan sent Gen. Vernon Walters, then roving ambassador, to Lagos twice with the special mission of persuading the new administration to reopen the borders or at least allow urgent supplies and relief materials to pass through Nigeria to Chad. Gen. Walters had an unenviable reputation as a special envoy, usually sent by the United States to twist the arms of recalcitrant foreign governments or to convey unpleasant news. By the time of his second visit Nigeria had agreed that the USA could use port facilities in Port Harcourt as well as Calabar to convey supplies, petroleum, and relief materials through Nigeria to Chad. However, for security reasons, Nigeria did not agree to the US’ request to allow the use of Lagos as the main port for the off-loading and transit of these materials to Chad and moreover the land borders remained closed as a matter of
Gambari (1989) advances that, one lesson of the US interventions was that Nigeria’s nationalism could not prevent a powerful state on which Nigeria had come to be economically dependent from achieving its strongly pursued aims. This he asserts has wider implications for the future of our country’s foreign policy, especially in dealing with the west (Gambari, 1989: 53).

Careful not to challenge Nigeria’s sovereign right to close her land border, the Heads of States of the neighbouring countries seized every opportunity available to register their displeasure. In this vain, the Presidents Eyadema of Togo and Kerekou of Benin Republic made frantic attempts to link the reopening of the border with their consent to sign the Quadripartite Agreement in Lagos. Although the impasse that developed on that occasion was broken and the Agreements signed by the four heads of state, the two visiting Presidents remained sour about the issue. President Eyadema’s point was not lost when on Gen. Buhari when he said that the delegates to the next Ministerial meeting of the Quadripartite Agreements, scheduled for June 1985 in Lagos, ‘should be able to travel by road’ (Gambari, 1989: 54).

Nigeria’s actions in respect of the implementation of phase one of the protocol on the free movement of persons was not the only source of concern to the community. Many other member states, in one form or another adopted policies which were in outright disregard of the provisions of the treaty. However, Nigeria’s expulsion of illegal aliens twice implemented on a massive scale, as well as the long land border closure singled out the country, the erstwhile bastion of pro-ECOWAS sentiments, as the main crisis point in the implementation of the free movement policy of ECOWAS (Abutudu, 1989).

These measures, taken or in place in 1985 when the more advanced phase two (Right of Residence) was scheduled for discussion and adoption sent a shock wave of apprehension across West Africa on the future of ECOWAS. Nigeria’s initial reaction to the elaboration of the provisions of the Residence Phase did nothing to assuage this growing diffidence about the Community. In fact it is believed to have heightened them (Abutudu, 1989). It has however been argued that Ghana, the country most affected by
Nigeria's mass expulsion of aliens was the most positively disposed towards the adoption and implementation of Phase Two. Tacit support for advance to the second phase also came from Benin and Togo (West Africa, May, 1985).

For security reasons due mainly to their small size and sandwich location between Nigeria and Ghana. Benin and Togo had initially expressed reservations about the idea of free movement of persons in general. But by that time Nigeria's border closure sealed off their transit economies from their major base in Nigeria, the result was a shift by these countries from reluctant accommodation to open support for any community policies that would ensure that the borders are kept open (Owoeye, 1993: 111).

Thus, the basis of the crisis of free movement in ECOWAS was portrayed in the unambiguous position of the Gen. Buhari Administration that as long as Nigeria's economic crisis persisted, illegal aliens would not be tolerated in the country. While the successor administration of Gen. Babangida kept this in view, it attempted to distance itself from its two immediate predecessors' rather short sighted policies which had virtually isolated Nigeria from the West African sub-region, while immobilising ECOWAS. This took the form of shifting from employment of stalling tactics and active opposition to take off of Phase Two as recommended by the ECOWAS bureaucracy, to an initiative in the form of new proposals which radically altered the earlier idealistic framework envisaged for the implementation of the community policy on residence (Owoeye, 1993: 111-112).

**Inter-State Relations and Nigeria's Role in ECOMOG.**

One foreign policy issue that has been identified with Nigeria in 1990s is its pivotal role in ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The decision of the ECOWAS to send a peacekeeping force otherwise known as ECOMOG into Liberia in late August 1990 has generated debate on the role of this organisation in ensuring sub-regional security. In the wake of foreign military interventions in Africa in the 1970s, the question of regional security was already a major preoccupation for both ECOWAS and the exclusively **francophone** regional grouping, CEAO. Thus, within the framework of these separate groupings, member states adopted protocols on Non-
aggression and on Mutual Assistance on Defence. The ECOWAS protocol was adopted in April 1978 while that on Mutual Assistance on Defence was adopted in May 1978 (Nwokedi, 1992:1).

The stage for Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia was set at the 13th session of the Authority of Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS which met in Banjul, Gambia, from 28-30 May 1990 under the chairmanship of Sir Dauda Jawara of the Gambia. The Summit took place against the background of growing incidence of intra and inter-state disputes that imperilled peace and stability in the region. Particular attention was focused on Liberia where there was extensive press coverage of carnage and random killings leading to a large outflow of refugees. This development placed severe burden on neighbouring countries. Inevitably, the issue was of prime consideration especially because there were indications that some member states of ECOWAS were guilty of complicity in the simmering crisis (Adisa, 1993:137).

However, the fact that Nigeria both dominates the sub-regional force in terms of financial and manpower resources, has created some unease among some ECOWAS member states. This regional approach to development and security related issues is now viewed as a viable option to individual state policies which in most cases have failed to yield the desired results. However, before we get into the complexities surrounding Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG, it is but fitting one to give an overview of the changing international political landscape; which is believed to have lend more weight to regionalism.

The African stake in regional military co-operation has increased significantly in the aftermath of the Cold War. Even before then, the developed world had always shown a marked reluctance to assume responsibility for restoring and imposing order in the continent. External interventions occurred but without the passion, regularity or degree of enthusiasm demonstrated in the Middle East or South East Asia. Such intrusions in the African terrain affect a posture of military adventurism. They exact a high domestic and international price and more than not, pose serious technical and logistical difficulties. Extra-African powers (such as the United State, Britain and France) were thus hard to persuade that such ventures were worth the cost. Big-power police actions took place only in circumstances where there are strong political, economic or

The overall effect of the changing international landscape in the aftermath of "perestroika and glasnost" has been to obviate such tendencies. The United States, which has emerged as the dominant power in the wake of Soviet dissipation, is indifferent to the African plight in the absence of a communist bogey. Colonial powers such as Britain and France, that traditionally have a history of vested interest, have began to downgrade the value of commitment to Africa in favour of moves toward European integration. The consequence is that African interest and concerns have been relegated to the backstage in the new global order (Adisa, 1993: 206).

Ironically, this process of marginalisation is occurring at a time when the African premium on social and political stability has risen astronomically. The democratic wave that accompanied the "wind of change" in Eastern Europe has impacted seriously on the continent provoking a spate of political upheavals in a region already plagued by shaky political structures, social cleavages, religious, racial and cultural tensions, corrupt bureaucracies and deteriorating economies coupled with a process of transformation (Hoffman, 1985). In light of the emerging political landscape, Adisa (1993) has argued that some measure of collaboration for security on a regional basis has thus become essential if the survival and well being of the various states and people are to be assured.

The problem is that, while there are strong political, economic, and social rationale for establishing alliances, working models are hard to find. Two basic variations compete for attention. First are Regional organisations such as the OAU, the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the Arab League. Second are sub-regional organisations such as the CONTADORA GROUP in Latin America, the Gulf Co-operation Council in the Persian Gulf and ECOWAS in West Africa. Experience has shown that the larger regional organisations are somewhat at a disadvantage in field security operations partly because of the ambitious nature of their charters and partly because their size and diversity create an environment that is hostile to collective decision-making in such sensitive areas (Boyd and Brown, 1986:210-211).

Management of security related problems is easier with sub-regional organisations
because of their narrower agenda, smaller size and geographic proximity or coherence which lend them a sharp operational focus. Even so, constraints of political relationship among group members, the fragile nature of political institutions, economic and social structures as well as the diverse nature of political orientation and structure of regimes enjoined in the common effort hamper attempts to concert at this level. The instance of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone and moreover, Nigeria’s dominant role provides a critical test case for analysis in this respect while highlighting the numerous problems associated with the search for viable working models of regional military collaboration in the emerging world order (Adisa, 1993: 207).

However, one should ask why Nigeria should play the role of prime-mover of this initiative while some of Liberia’s more immediate neighbours, who as a result of geographical contiguity are more directly threatened did not contribute as much, and some, such as Cote d’Ivoire, have remained largely hostile to the concept of ECOMOG and refused to work within the Mediation Committee. Secondly, can peace-keeping actually act to restore stability or does it only freeze the conflict at a certain threshold of conflict, either higher or lower, while concrete measures at conflict resolution are required to remove the source of conflict? (Vogt and Ekoko, 1993: 210).

It is often argued that when politicians are confronted with delicate or strategic decision-making, more particularly with international or national issues (like the Liberian conflict), rational approaches to decision making become essential (Kuye, 1989: 45). Allison (1973) states due to the pressures a nation might face either locally or internationally, it might act to move or shape its policy to suit that particular situation. He further states that ‘threats and opportunities arising in the international strategic ‘market place’ move the nation to act in response to that problem’ (Allison, 1971: 33).

According to Allison, in rational decision-theory a problem is reduced to a simple matter of selecting among a set of given alternatives, each of which has a given set of consequences: the agent selects the alternative whose consequences are preferred in terms of the agents utility function which ranks each set of consequences in order of preference (1971:29). Therefore professional analysts of foreign affairs (as well as
ordinary laypersons) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought. Furthermore most analysts explain the behaviour of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, that is the Rational Actor or Classical Model 1 (Allison, 1971: 3-5).

Therefore for the subject under study the analytic approach adopted is the Rational Actor Model 1, which views the actions of a state as a rational and calculated decision. Therefore the Nigerian State will view Nigeria's policy in ECOMOG as a rational decision. However before we turn to the intricacies of the policy implications of Nigeria's flagship role on ECOWAS, a brief attempt will be made to recap on the Nigeria-Liberia relations as is already indicated in the overview of the country's policy in ECOWAS.

The Liberian Crisis.

Liberia, like Ethiopia had a special status among African countries. Liberia prided herself on the fact that the country was never really colonised. Even though slaves liberated from the United States were resettled there, and in spite of the dominant, economic and political influence enjoyed by the American Rubber consortium in Liberia, the country was never subjected to the direct control of the United States government. For this reason, Liberia was a founding member of the United Nations, and, co-ordinated the activities of the Monrovia Group (the coalition of conservative to moderate African states who came together to oppose the spread of communism). Liberia also played a leading role in influencing the philosophical perspective of the OAU (Africa South of the Sahara, 1990:213).

The bilateral relations between independent Nigeria and Liberia, has its foundations in the pre-charter negotiations leading to the formation of the OAU. The Nigerian government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa shared some of the conservative to moderate political philosophies of the Monrovia Group. However, Nigeria, rather than join one group, worked towards the reconciliation of the positions of the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups that made the formation of the OAU possible. On a sub-regional platform, both countries were party to the formation of ECOWAS in 1975.

However, Sergeant Samuel Doe’s assumption of office in 1980, through a bloody military coup, created serious disruption in Liberia’s relations with its neighbours who refused to allow him to participate in the deliberations of the MRU. In fact, Nigeria reacted very negatively to the coup in Liberia of 1980, not only because of the fact that a relatively junior member of the armed forces staged it but also mainly because of the large scale killings of the old political elite and their families. As mentioned earlier on, the Nigerian government refused to allow Samuel Doe to assume Liberia’s seat at the OAU Summit of that year in Lagos. This caused a major diplomatic furore as there were some questions raised on the right of the host country to take such a unilateral decision (New Nigerian, June 1980: 17).

According to Vogt (1993), this diplomatic furore was reinforced by the fact that the Doe coup appeared to have had tremendous support among Liberians and with more progressive governments who saw his action as a movement of the suppressed people against the neo-colonial domination of the Americo-Liberians (1993: 198). However, full restoration of the soured relations was not effected until the military itself assumed power again in Nigeria in 1984 and even with that, it took a concerted fence mending policy by the Liberian authority. The turning point in Nigeria’s relations with Liberia occurred with the emergence of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida as Nigeria’s military president in August 1985. The new Nigerian leader was eager to renew ties with the tradition, which characterised Nigeria’s foreign policy in the 1970s of projecting a leadership position in inter-African affairs. Official relations between the Nigerian leader and his Liberian counterpart developed quickly into a close personal friendship. During an official visit to Liberia in December 1988, Gen Babangida offered economic assistance to this country and gave a cash grant estimated at between 0.6 million and 1 million US dollars to the University of Liberia which in appreciation named one of its faculties the ‘Ibrahim Babangida Graduate School of International Relations. (Nwokedi, 1992: 11).

Gen. Babangida more than any other administration worked to reinforce Samuel Doe as a respectable member of the African leadership. Samuel Doe was initially perceived at home as a progressive whose regime finally removed the neo-colonial dominance of the Americo-Liberians who had treated the indigenous African peoples as second class
citizens, denying them full participation in the country's political and social life (Vogt, 1993).

Vogt (1993) has argued that, the Liberian situation created a receptive audience for consideration of regional initiative to mediate and moderate the crisis for three main reasons. First, the allegation that the different factions engaged in the violent tussle for power in Liberia were sustained by certain states in the sub-region threatened the posture of political solidarity, which the 'ECOWAS family' was seeking to contrive as the agent of economic integration. Moreover, if the ECOWAS concept is to be taken seriously a show of concern was necessary. Secondly, there was a serious danger that if the conflict was allowed to assume greater momentum it might be assimilated into ECOWAS and portends disintegration. Supporters of different factions could interpret third, and more importantly, the prospect of ECOWAS mediation provided the political mandate was sufficiently ambiguous, in different ways. Those in favour of the NPFL probably saw it as a diplomatic device to edge out Doe and facilitate the ascendance of Taylor, while those that supported Doe would be reasonable to suppose that it could provide an avenue for national reconciliation that would not harmful to their prestige (Vogt, 1993:208).

It was within this context that the Nigerian leader Gen. Babangida proposed and received support for the establishment of an ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, a committee that would be charged with the responsibility of deliberating on the increasing wave of inter and intra state conflicts which the region was experiencing. The Nigerian proposal was influenced by the absence of a mechanism within the ECOWAS framework and that of the OAU, for the immediate inter-summit discussion and management of conflicts in the sub-region. The ECOWAS Charter, before then, made no provision for the Secretary General nor the Chairman for the particular year, to initiate action in mediating conflicts between and among its member states. The provisions for the convening of Extraordinary Sessions of the summit of Heads of States was an unwritten provision in the charter of the ECOWAS, and until that time it had never been utilised. (Vogt, 1993: 203-204).

The idea of a standing committee was informed by the need to empower the organisation and its secretariat with greater powers of initiative in delving into problem
situations without the intricate procedure of convening a meeting of all heads of states. The proposal was instigated by the fast deteriorating security situation in Liberia. While thousands of people were being killed by the various factions, the international community did not even discuss Liberia. The gulf war was of greater relevance. Thus it became obvious that only Africans could save the situation (Vogt, 1993:201). However, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia though considered by the countries concerned as an African initiative to save an African situation did not fail to generate controversy and debate. There have been many debates as to whether or not there is a moral and a legal justification for the ECOWAS to intervene in the Liberian civil war. The arguments of those who condemn such an intervention can be summarised in three points. First, the Liberian crisis is an internal affair and any intervention is a contravention of the provisions of the Charter (Article 111-2) of the OAU which forbids interference in the internal affairs member states. Second, ECOWAS is an economic grouping whose Treaty and present structure have not made a provision for such an intervention. Third, by intervening in the Liberian civil war the member states of the ECOWAS created the impression of pursuing a 'holier-than-thou policy since many of these states have Liberian skeletons in their political cupboards (Nwokedi, 1992:5).

The ECOMOG venture became more complicated by Nigeria’s flagship role. That piloting role implies heavy financial and political stakes. The timing is also crucial. Events were taking shape within the context of a changing international landscape and at a critical juncture in the country’s political history when Nigeria was in the throes of a hazard ridden transition process to civil democracy. Again, the political initiative was sponsored when the moral credibility of the Babangida administration had reached very low ebb. Accordingly, the issue of motive was combined with the cost to produce an explosive political package of disquiet which is reinforced at the regional level by intra-community differences within the ECOWAS family arising from francophone scepticism about the purpose of the peace-making mission (Adisa, 1993: 138).

From the very beginnings, the decision to introduce ECOMOG into the theatre of conflict was dogged by controversy. The first sign of ‘things to come’ was that the two francophone members of the Mediation Committee who were party to the decision to
deploy ECOMOG, i.e. Togo and Mali, balked at the prospect of contributing troops. Mali had taken the decision at the onset. Togo, on the other hand, initially pledged a contribution and then retracted on the grounds that a cease-fire must first be put in place. Since Togo knew from the discussions that preceded the peacemaking mission that the decision was not a consequence of exhaustion of all the warring parties, it can be assumed that this was just a pretext. (Adisa, 1993).

What then could have accounted for Togo’s withdrawal? Some diplomatic sources attribute it to its aversion for Ghana a country which Togo had a long-standing border problem. However, it should be noted that both Togo and Ghana had worked amicably together on the Committee that took the decision. Moreover, Nigeria and not Ghana was the pilot of the project and it was inconceivable that the deployment would somehow give Ghana an edge in its border row with Togo. (Adisa, 1993: 139).

The history of political relationship between Togo and Nigeria would normally be factor for consideration in this analysis. President Eyadema of Togo has a history of close personal relationship with Nigerian leaders- with Gen. Gowon in the formation of ECOWAS, and with Gens. Obasanjo and Babangida. There was also the ‘father Christmas’ mentality of diplomacy under Gen. Babangida to take into account. The regime had a legendary reputation for making ‘donations’, which in regional politics translated into economic assistance of various sorts. Gen. Babangida had also made it a duty to develop personal rapport with other leaders in the sub-region, a propensity that paid off in rallying support for ECOMOG among members of the Mediation Committee. This was easy in the case of President Momoh of Sierra Leone who was Gen. Babangida’s course mate at the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna. It certainly influenced the regime of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana that remained steadfast in support of the ECOMOG initiative. There was also the common factor that the four of the five Mediation Committee members had military rulers and could thus contrive military camaraderie as an instrument of common understanding. (Africa Confidential, May 1991).

However that left the civilian Sir Dauda Jawara. Sir Jawara belonged to the immediate school of post-independence governors. He was appalled by the carnage in Liberia and receptive to ‘humanitarian’ proposals for ending the anguish. The fact that Nigeria led
the initiative was an added bonus. Nigeria-Gambia relations have always been cordial. Nigeria has constantly sent judges on secondment to bolster the Gambian judiciary while there is a long history of military assistance. In any case, Togo would be well aware that Nigerian diplomacy was very active in the ECOMOG bid and this meant that, in its usual style, the military-leadership would provide the 'olive oil of economic offerings' if and when required to 'soothe itching hands'. Hence, if President Eyadema of Togo resisted such blandishments, the only reference to be drawn is that a much greater loyalty was at stake and this could only be La Franco-Phonie inspired by pressure from Houphouet Boigny of Cote D'Ivoire. (Owoeye, 1993: 140).

In spite of the apparent controversy over the ECOMOG issue, the first Extra-ordinary session of the ECOWAS Heads of states was convened in Bamako, in November 1990. The aim of the session was to consider the report of the Mediation Committee and this meeting endorsed the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia, including the provision of arrangement for ECOMOG. However, it was clear that the deployment of ECOMOG had generated a great deal of dissension among the Heads State of ECOWAS. Vogt and Ekoko (1993) have grouped the issues of contention into two categories:

- The question of procedure; and
- The questions of principles.

The Issues of Procedure.

Some member states, whose views were strongly explained and represented by Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso argued that the Mediation Committee went beyond its mandate in assembling and deploying ECOMOG without initial reference back to the summit of the entire ECOWAS. In light of such discrepancies some commentators interpreted the ECOMOG intervention as an attempt to impose a Nigerian solution—*a pax-Nigeriana*—on the Liberian crisis (Agboli, 1990: 28-29).

Burkina Faso, Cote-d'Ivoire, Senegal and Mali, considered that the establishment of ECOMOG and its dispatch to Liberia were at variance with the mandate which the ECOWAS had given the ESMC. Burkina Faso in particular expressed a strong
disapproval over the dispatch of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force to Liberia “without fully briefing other countries on the exact assignment of such a force” (National Concord, 1990: 29).

It is significant to observe that all the countries that raised objection to the ECOMOG venture were French speaking. Of the five countries that initially sent contingents to the ECOMOG- Nigeria, Ghana, the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea- only Guinea was French speaking. A strong impression was therefore created of an Anglophone-Francophone dichotomy within ECOWAS with regard to the search for a solution to the Liberian crisis (Nwokedi, 1992: 12).

In spite of the fact that Cote d’Ivoire was a party to the decision to set up a Mediation Committee it however did not become a member itself. Togo’s withdrawal from ECOMOG and the subsequent denunciation of Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso, Boigny’s protégé, represented an open acknowledgement by the Ivorian leader that he had been dislocated by Nigeria’s military leadership in the politics of regional diplomacy and must take desperate measures to regain the initiative. To locate the crucial point in conflict, it is necessary to recall in specific terms the language of Gen. Babangida’s appeal for the inauguration of a Mediation Committee;

“Permit me at this juncture to remind us all of the basic principle which formed the foundation stone of our organisation. The noble ideals of the ECOWAS were anchored on solidarity, unity, mutual trust and good neighbourliness... these attributes impose on us an obligation to adopt a conciliatory situations...we can ill afford at this time to dissipate vital energy on inter-state squabbles...” (Journal of ECOWAS vol. 17, 1990: 24).

Thus Babangida seemed to be asking for a political truce at the community level and this request had three possible connotations. First, it called for a symbolic show of collective concern without concomitant practical obligations. The leaders of Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire were therefore quite willing to oblige Gen. Babangida’s appeal. Second, the request appeared as a diplomatic gesture including a tacit urge that the ultimate decision need not be taken to the battlefield. In this vain it has been argued that the implicit suggestion was that since it was apparent that Doe could not hold out much longer, his ‘godfather’ was prepared to help ease him out through the instrument of the Mediation Committee provided he could obtain certain guarantees. This
consideration of weakness also embodied an unspoken threat. That if the total humiliation of Samuel Doe and his 'god father' became the primary insistence, the conflict runs the risk of being assimilated into ECOWAS with a potential for regional political convulsion (Adisa, 1993: 141).

Houphuuet Boigny and Blaise Compraore were willing to concede to Gen. Babangida’s proposals because the idea had its own attractions. Charles Taylor was having problems taking over the Executive Mansion in Monrovia. Classical insurgency has three main stages, the strategic defensive in which an insurgent movement chips away at the superior military strength of a standing force with hit and run tactics, the strategic stalemate in which a certain amount of parity is established and set conventional battles supplement strike and run operations and the strategic offensive, at which stage the insurgent movement has attained conventional superiority and goes in ‘for the kill’ (Bateman, 1970). So when Charles Taylor’s forces decided to strike at Monrovia the inference was that they had reached the strategic offensive level and his inability to take the Executive Mansion inspired serious doubt about his leadership capabilities. Moreover the stalemate in the persisting confrontation within Monrovia exacted a high toll of casualties and devastation and offended international sensibilities while providing an excuse for external intervention on the basis of military humanitarianism Gen. Babangida’s idea was therefore received as a way of overcoming the impasse (West Africa, March, 1991).

In any case the leaders of Cote D’Ivoire and Burkina Faso had ample political and historical justifications for conceding the mediation initiative even if it fell short of the objective. The scheme would cleanse the regional conscience. The idea of mediation was sufficiently noble in political terms while entailing little or no practical risks. Furthermore, previous records of mediation efforts had been unproductive and there was enough historical basis for the assumption that the new effort would also be stillborn. This sense of appreciation is believed to explain the receptive mood that was given to the Nigerian proposal (Adisa, 1993: 141).

It is necessary at this juncture to note that the focal point of Gen. Babangida’s appeal was anchored on the need to facilitate harmonious relationship among member states. In spite of such appeals and reassurances of Nigeria’s no--adventurous stance, Cote
d'Ivoire and her were still suspicious Nigeria's intentions. However the political support which the NPFL received from Libya, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire did not help the regional political squabbles. Apart from the danger of escalation which external intervention represents in a civil war situation, the Libyan and Ivorian intervention in the Liberian crisis was bound to draw Nigeria's reaction for a number of reasons. First, the overall thrust of Libya's sub-Saharan policy as evidenced by its military occupation of Chad between 1980 and 1981 generally created security problems for Nigeria's regional policy. Second, Nigerian leaders remember President Houphouet-Boigny's pro-Biafra policy in the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) which principal objective was the break-up of the Nigeria federation. He considered Nigeria too large for the comfort of its mainly smaller neighbouring francophone states. The Ivorian support in many ways resembles its past pro-Biafra policy. Third, the nature of Charles Taylor's uprising has been unsettling for most political leaders in the sub-region. Finally, Nigeria considers herself as a leader in inter-African politics and so its intervention in Liberia could be seen hypothetically, as an expression of its desire to play a prominent role in the resolution of conflicts within the continent (Nwokedi, 1992: 8).

However, in spite of Gen Babangida's appeal, Houphuet-Boigny of Ivory Coast was opposed to the ECOMOG venture for three main reasons. One was that he deeply resented the Samuel Doe regime in Liberia and wanted to see it humiliated. His motive was personal revenge; the Ivorian Head of State has been supporting anti-Doe forces largely out of a deep grudge against the appalling Samuel Doe. For Samuel Doe in the early days of his regime, had murdered A.B. Tolbert, son of the former President and son-in-law of Houphuet-Boigny. Samuel Doe had promised Houphuet-Boigny that A.B. Tolbert who had been dragged from the sanctuary of the French embassy in Monrovia would be spared. Houphuet-Boigny never forgave this perfidy. He used another of his son-in-law, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, as a base for the 1989 invasion of Liberia, while allowing supplies to reinforce Taylor's men through Cote d'Ivoire (Africa Confidential, May 1991: 3).

It is further argued that Boigny's sense of personal outrage was compounded by the problem of ego control in the wake of the ECOMOG deployment. Boigny indulged in
the familiar, if over-played role, of La sage D'Afrique (Africa's wise old man). As far back as the 1950's he had been a Minister in the French Assembly and this translated into latent respect for the French 'motherland' particularly the Elysee and the Ministry of Co-operation where his voice carried an 'authoritative ring'. Accordingly, the Ivorian leader was piqued by the diplomatic antics of the Nigerian leadership. In particular, he could not tolerate the idea of 'military upstarts' dictating the pace of events in the sub-region without his expressed approval (Adisa, 1993:144-145).

Third, was what Leopold Sedar Senghor had characterised as the 'spirit of Fashoda', - the colonial hangover of Francophone - Anglophone misunderstanding. Precisely this cultural antipathy had motivated the decision to come together in ECOWAS but the cleavage remained. Boigny was concerned about Anglophone machinations. This concern had two aspirations. To begin with, it implied concern about the strength of Ivorian influence. Boigny's influence with France and his country's relative wealth vis-à-vis neighbours assured Cote d'Ivoire a pre-eminent status in Francophone West Africa. The threat to this status came from Anglophone West Africa especially Nigeria and right from its inception in 1975 Boigny saw ECOWAS as vehicle for the mobilisation of Nigeria's influence and tried to derail the idea. Once it was clear that ECOWAS would be a reality, Boigny sponsored a Francophone organisation- CEAO- with a military wing- ANAD- as a counter weight. ECOMOG thus appeared as a signpost of Nigeria's moral ascendancy and Anglophone triumph (Africa Confidential, February 1991).

The composition of ECOMOG lent weight to this assumption and in this context, Cote d'Ivoire's attitude in itself spurred the momentum for the self-fulfilling prophecy. Only Guinea, a Franchophone state with a legendary reputation for dissidence in La Francophonie in the era of Sekou Toure, and which had a defence agreement with Sierra Leone, contributed forces to the ECOMOG military contingent. Otherwise the bulk of the forces came from Anglophone states-Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone. However, the discomfiture of the Ivorian leader was increased by the sense of bravado that seemed to underline Nigeria's resort to active military diplomacy. As one astute observer enthused:

"the involvement of the Nigerian armed forces in Liberia changes the military balance
of power in West Africa and even further afield. The Nigerian military have
demonstrated clearly that it has greater confidence in its ability to influence events
outside Nigeria's borders. Given Nigerian aspirations to regional power, this is of some
significance" (Africa Confidential, February 1991)

The significance for Cote d'Ivoire was that it implied a militant revival of the posture
of Pax-Nigeriana (the drive to impose a Nigerian peace on Africa) of the mid
seventies with critical implication for the character of the Ivorian influence (Adisa,
1993:145).

The situation was all the more compounded by the Byzantine nature of the politics of
the sub-region. Both Burkina Faso and Cootie d'Ivoire took strong exception to
ECOMOG as Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso definitely notes, "... as far we are
concerned the mediation committee of ECOWAS is not competent to intervene in a
member's internal conflict, but when there is a conflict between one member-state and
another, as stipulated in the last ECOWAS summit communique" (African Concord,
August 1990:3). However it has been argued that Blaise Compaore's assertion is not
altogether defensible in the light of the 'Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on
Defence' of May 1981. Although conceptually a distinction is made between external
aggression and internal insurrection in the protocol, there is also a - provision for
specific emergency situations warranting community action; internal armed conflict
which is engineered and supported actively outside and which is likely to threaten
the peace and security of the community (Bassey, 1993:159).

Tom Imobighe (1985) rightly noted that,

'Since it is often too easy for rulers to attribute their predicament to outside
machinations, this provision is likely to involve the ECOWAS in defence commitment of
unknown dimension since it is too easy for a hard-pressed regime to cite external
involvement as a reason for ECOWAS action against even popular internal revolution.
The implication of this provision is that ECOWAS might be so bogged down with
quelling internal revolutions as to have little or no time to prepare for, and deal with
external threats and aggressions' (Imobighe, 1985:119).

The reason for the embattled president Samuel Doe's initial warm acceptance of
ECOMOG was clearly in line with this objective. In this regard his later rejection of the
ECOWAS initiative (concerning an interim government) and refusal to step down did not so much represent a ‘change of mind’ as it was a ‘celebration of the success of the Doe brand of ‘real politick: protracting the façade of his presidency behind a cordon sanitaire of an intervention force locked in battle for supremacy against his arch-rival Charles Taylor. The about turn by Samuel Doe, as one commentator noted, ‘threw spanners in the works ECOMOG. It also aggravated the fears and concern of rebel forces and their backers that ECOMOG after all, might be sympathetic to Samuel Doe’ (Newswatch, August 1990:17).

Bassey (1993) has argued that, in a conflict situation like Liberia, where there is little consensus among the parties to the conflict on the very establishment of the force, and subsequently on the nature of its activities, it is arguable whether the force is to restore a minimum condition for peace it would have to enforce its mandate. As was alter the case, such a move would however, threaten to get the force inextricably involved in the political imbroglio- a situation the force commander Gen. Arnold Quainoo was most anxious to avoid. As he asserted on arrive in Monrovia, ‘in performing its functions, the force will act with complete impartiality and will avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims and positions of the parties concerned... our duty is mediatory. We will act in the interest of peace and unity and not otherwise’(Bassey, 1993: 163-164). What this means in practice is that the ECOWAS force was given a peace-enforcing task while at the same time armed with ‘peace-keeping’

As was initially the case in the Congo and Chad, the force in Liberia was thrown into the crippling dilemma of threading its way between the subsequent mandate for peace enforcement and one of the most fundamental guiding principles for peace-keeping- a firm commitment not to be ‘ party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise’ (Security Council Resolution of August 9, 1960). Having reached a stalemate in the battlefield, the ‘Authority of Heads of State and Government’ of ECOWAS got involved in seeking a resolution of the conflict through political rather than military option (the Yamoussoukro Round), a course fraught with frustration as ECOMOG seeks a consensus that would ‘tie together the slippery eels of Liberian politics’ (Bassey, 1993:164).
From a comparative standpoint, it is a historically invariant truism that the ‘preventive diplomacy’ approach may contain inter-state confrontation given the central authoritative direction which imposes some degree of restraint on both parties, to avoid ugly incidents, the case has been different in a condition of a civil disorder. It is possible to envisage the impartial application of procedures on both sides when state actors are involved. However, in a domestic context, where the mandate stipulates the need for restoring authority to central government, such impartiality clause seems to in appropriate (Bassey, 1993:164).

**ECOMOG and Domestic Opinion**

The anti-Nigerian reflex of Houphuet-Boigny was given succour by domestic disquiet within Nigeria itself about the wisdom and morality of the ECOMOG enterprise. A significant section of the Nigerian populace was apprehensive about the purposes of the peacekeeping regime for various reasons.

To begin with, it marked a radical departure from the country’s traditional defence posture. Since 1975, successive Nigerian governments have constantly alleged that Africa is the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy and in the favourable economic climate of the oil boom in the mid seventies, this perception was given credence by some measure of forceful diplomacy in the continental struggle against apartheid and white minority rule in Southern Africa. However, the strain of bellicosity in the language and conduct of diplomacy was reserved for the so-called ‘Western imperialist nations who were working against African interest’. Thus Nigeria’s attitudes towards its African brothers, especially neighbours in the sub-region, has always been circumspect and at times, wilfully differential. Defence policy took its cue from a political tradition which had been established even before independence when Prime Minister Tafawa-Balewa declared ‘that the visible strength of Nigeria will be a stabilising influence in this part of the world’. The consequence of this is a cautious defensive orientation, which implies that Nigeria rarely gambles her military card in the international arena (Adisa, 1993:146).

Against this background, the institution of ECOMOG and Nigeria’s piloting role in the enterprise became the object of intense public scrutiny. Opposition to ECOMOG
within Nigeria was inspired by serious considerations. There was a suspicion that the objective of the Babangida administration was less than altruistic (The Guardian, June 1990 and African Guardian, October 1990). Prior to the second coming of the military in Nigeria in 1984, Doe had a sour relationship with Nigeria since the Shehu Shagari administration refused to allow him to take Liberia’s seat at the OAU summit in Lagos in 1980. However when the Gen. Babangida regime took over in 1985, Samuel Doe set out to personally cultivate the Nigerian leader conscious of the country’s geopolitical importance in the region. Gen. Babangida responded warmly to Samuel Doe’s overtures and Lagos helped to finance and staff a graduate school of international relations named after the Nigerian president in Monrovia and Samuel Doe enrolled in the school as a student. (Vogt, 1992: 222).

There was therefore a general suspicion that, its lofty declarations about military humanitarianism notwithstanding, the objective of the Gen. Babangida administration in facilitating ECOMOG was to save his personal friend Samuel Doe. The situation was given further fillip in the aftermath of the Orkar coup in Nigeria in April 1990. Samuel Doe visited Nigeria ostensibly to show solidarity to his benefactor after the abortive coup but local newspapers reported that the solidarity gesture was a cover. Charles Taylor’s rebellion had assumed serious momentum in Liberia and it was alleged that Samuel Doe had come to ask for military assistance and Gen. Babangida obliged (Adisa, 1993:146). Accordingly, in the wake of ECOMOG, political and intellectual elites argued that the Nigerian initiative to intervene in Liberia was a function of self-interest—the desire to protect Samuel Doe (Vogt, 1993: 222).

Furthermore, critical public focus on this score was reinforced by the delay in the Nigerian government’s decision to evacuate Nigerians trapped by the civil war in Liberia. Media and diplomatic circles constantly urged the government to evacuate its citizens when the socio-political situation was deteriorating and the Americans, British and other Europeans started to evacuate their own nationals (Owoeye, 1993: 146). President Babangida resisted the pressure by insisting that it would look like a panic reaction; “Liberians” he noted “are our brothers and Nigerians over there lived together with them and see themselves as part of the society. I don’t think it is right for government to create distinctions between fellow Africans over evacuation exercise”
(African Concord, October 1990). However, this was a Pan-African gesture that failed to convince several listeners who interpreted it as meaning that the administration was willing to sacrifice Nigerians to assure Doe’s prestige and seeming inability to control the situation (Vogt, 1992:223).

Moreover, later on, when ECOMOG was deployed and Nigeria began to stress humanitarian considerations and the need to protect their nationals, critics derided the situation as hypocritical and the mandate as overstretched. In this vein the eminent Nigerian jurist, Akinola Aguda, told members of the Ghana Bar Association that:

“even if the states whose nationals entrapped in Liberia were justified in attacking and invading Liberia, such justification can hardly apply for the aims of the Five ECOWAS countries who in effect will be colonising and decolonising it in twelve months” (African Concord, July 1991).

However, others were more concerned with “bread and butter” implications. The Nigerian Tribune editorial of 15 August 1990 touched a sensitive nerve in this respect:

‘Aside from the logistic and other problems, which ECOMOG would face there, is the fundamental issue of the funding of the military operation. ECOWAS members, who are also members of the OAU, are notorious defaulters in the payment of their subscription to the two bodies. Most of these countries do not believe in honouring their obligations to the regional and continental organisations whose charters they had subscribed to’. (Nigerian Tribune, August 1990).

To anchor this point The Tribune reminded Nigerians of the lesson of history in the ill-fated OAU Peacekeeping operation in Chad in the 1980s:

‘Nigeria under President Shehu Shagari sent it soldiers to Chad under the auspices of the OAU on a peacekeeping mission together with troops from the Congo, Senegal and Zaire. At the end, the OAU did not pay and Nigeria had to write off 80 million US dollars. On top of that, the Chad operation was a shambles. The economy has got pretty out of shape since then and Nigeria is now in no position to pick up unsettled ECOMOG bills. We do appreciate that Nigeria has strategic interests in the West African sub-region and in sub-Saharan Africa and it does cost money to execute a leading role inn this wise. In all seriousness, there is nothing for ECOMOG to save in Liberia...ECOMOG should rescue the nationals of West Africa still in Liberia and get out and let Mr. Doe it out to the logical end. Then talks can begin to rebuild Liberia’ (Daily Vanguard, August 1990).
The Labour movement supported this position. In a press release of 20 August 1990, the Nigerian Labour Congress denounced Nigeria's role in ECOMOG on the basis that it is a waste of economic and military resources and further emphasised that, Nigeria's involvement in the Mediation will no doubt place enormous economic and political responsibilities on the country at a time when hands should be on deck to help turn the crisis-ridden economy towards healthy growth. With a 'tongue in its cheek' the statement concluded that instead of ECOMOG, West African leaders should put pressure on President Doe to resign (Adisa, 1993:147).

Some critics based their argument on the feasibility of the project in terms of strategy; they argued that the project was open to question. Part of the problem they advanced has to do with the character of the mission. The enterprise was billed as a peacekeeping mission but since the warring parties were not exhausted, the claim that ECOMOG was sent to enforce a cease-fire was unsubstantial. There was no cease-fire to enforce. ECOMOG itself had to create a cease-fire. The mission requirement meant that at the point of entry, ECOMOG could only intrude as an expeditionary force to constrain hostilities by restraining the NPFL from seeking absolute power by force of arms. Thereafter ECOMOG would embark on the task of peace enforcement as a prelude to putting in place a complex peace-building operation involving supervised elections and perhaps, national reconstruction and administration à la Cambodia. This fear was heightened when President Doe was abducted in a gunfight on ECOMOG premises by Prince Johnsons' troops and subsequently tortured and executed. ECOMOG lost some moral credibility and there were worries on the Nigerian domestic front that the military adventure could turn out to be Nigeria's Vietnam (Adisa, 1993:148).

Furthermore, the travails of the domestic economy and consequent deterioration of general living standards complicated the policy posture of the Babangida administration in this respect. The country was in the throes of serious economic depression in the wake of the governments Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) designed in response to the requirement of foreign creditors. The programme that was in its fifth year by 1990 included a package of economic deregulation, which led to constant devaluation of the Naira, a tendency that fuelled inflation and eroded workers
purchasing power. Welfare conditions worsened as real income depreciated inspiring widespread social discontent (Vogt, 1992:223-224).

With the deteriorating economic conditions, which was triggered by the plummeting of the real income, there was widespread discontent, which occasionally found outlets in outbreaks of riots. Such conditions enervated public disquiet about the financial implication of ECOMOG. When William Keelings, the Financial Times correspondent reported that a substantial proportion of Nigeria’s Gulf War windfall—between 250-500 million US dollars—had been appropriated to sustain ECOMOG and was subsequently deported, the suspicion that pervaded public perception of ECOMOG was intensified (Adisa, 1993: 148).

What further aggravated domestic tensions was the fact that the situation on the ground appeared to be frozen and the endless rounds of negotiations designed to persuade Taylor bore no apparent fruits. There was some measure of public concern about the ‘body count’ of the operation and this was aggravated by the faulty information management strategy of the Nigerian authorities. The controversy was fuelled by inconsistencies on the part of government. The African Concord of 21 January 1991 put the death toll at 750 as at December 1990. Major-General Joshua Dongonyaro, the then ECOMOG field commander, said that only 70 soldiers had been killed. Then Colonel Fred Chijuka, Director of Army Public Relations, put the figure at lower than 50. Quite expectedly, the public was very sceptical about official claims (African Concord, January 1991).

In view of the mounting domestic and regional pressure over Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG, Gen. Babangida appealed to military humanitarianism and Pan-African sentiments when he emphasised that:

"... We should also appreciate the fact that the leadership of the ECOWAS is aware that the entire world is watching and judging our collective capability in mounting effective policy response to the present critical economic, political and security challenges to our sub-region. We also know that there are those who are waiting to see the Liberian crisis as a concrete evidence or indicator of Africa in disarray and in despair, purposeless and without any directional control at this crucial last decade of the 20th century. But above all, we all know that essentially, in Liberia, in spite of minor differences, we are all, first and foremost
reflecting the love we have for our respective countries, our sub-region, Africa, the black world, and mankind" (in Nwachukwu, 1991:108).

Such sentiments by the Babangida administration were taken with scepticism, as some of the domestic critics related Nigeria’s involvement in ECOMOG to the transition to civilian rule. Critics of the Babangida administration had always charged that he had a hidden agenda: to perpetuate himself in power, an allegation which he strenuously denied. However the regime’s tendency to shift the transition date from once it draws near gave fuel to such speculations. Initially, the target date was 1990, and then it was shifted to 1992 presumably October, then December. The date of January 1993 was eventually announced only to be shifted again in November 1992 to August 1993.

Critics also drew attention to the constant changes in the timetable for handover and raised the possibility that a Liberian debacle could provide a plausible pretext for extension of the regime’s tenure and military rule. Alternatively, they argued, Nigerians should reflect upon the implication of bequeathing the ECOMOG legacy- a probable “Vietnam” to an incoming civilian government (Adisa, 1993:148-149).

Responding to the charge of a probable ‘Vietnam’ Gen. Babangida sought to assuage the fears of such critic by indicating that:

Liberia will not be a Nigerian Vietnam. Our mission there is clear, precise and attainable. Indeed, there is no wisdom in comparing ECOMOG, a multilateral peace force, to the Vietnamese and Afghanistan’s experience. Every conflict has its own context and character, and those who take time to study the genesis of the two conflicts they parade as typical examples will soon realise that the scenario they are creating in the Liberian crisis is both false and non-sequitur (in Nwachukwu, 1991:107).

In view of the foregoing analysis it became apparent that the diplomatic initiative was all the more bedevilled by the bitter differences that surfaced among member states of ECOWAS following the deployment of ECOMOG. Although the root causes of the Liberian conflict are local, the operational factors which sustained it are tied to regional rivalries involving Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Libya on the one hand, and Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone on the other. These rivalries are in turn rooted in and sustained by a historical and complex interaction between extra-continental interests (Britain and France) and regional economic, political and ideological imperatives which bedevilled ECOWAS from inception. Such a configuration of factors underscores the
dangerous spiral of linkage between local and systemic influences on conflict in the sub-region, especially when it involves prevalence in civil disorder (Adisa, 1993:165). In spite of Gen. Babangida’s re-assurances to both its domestic and regional critics, Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG and the force itself came under sustained attack on issues based on legality and principle.

The Principle and Legality of ECOMOG.

The deployment of ECOMOG forces generated serious legal controversy. The chairman of the Mediation Committee, Sir Dauda Jawara, tried to pre-empt this possibility. At a briefing given to diplomats in Banjul, he revealed that the then UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar, had written to him wishing the ECOWAS initiative every success and was to be given a full update on the proposed move to endorse ECOMOG actions (West Africa, August 1990). He further noted that he sought legal advice on the matter but concluded that the sort of peacekeeping envisaged did not need Security Council approval. Present also at the Banjul summit was the OAU Secretary-General, Salim A. Salim, who gave his blessings to the enterprise and later urged the permanent members of the UN Security Council to support the subregional initiative (West Africa, August 1990).

However, if the objective was to attenuate criticisms, the strategy did not work. The most important legal and political questions at the centre of the criticism of the deployment of ECOMOG include the following:

- Why should a multilateral organisation that was established for economic integration assume the responsibility for the collective security and management of conflicts in the sub-region?

- To what extent should a multilateral force be utilised in conflict situations that are purely internal to member states and do not involve a second state actor or a foreign power as party to the conflict?

- That the decision to deploy ECOMOG was contrary to Article 3, Section 2 of the OAU Charter and the corresponding articles of the UN which expressly forbid interference in the domestic affairs of member states and that it also violated the
1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression especially Article 2 which demands that: Each member state shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other member states (ECOWAS Treaty, 1992).

- What is the legal basis on which ECOWAS decided to impose a multilateral force on Liberia? To what extent is the concept of humanitarian intervention legally tenable?

- The dominance by Nigeria of the composition and financing of the force has been an equally contentious issue... The issue of the dominance of the ECOMOG initiative by Nigeria and the perception that Nigeria sought, through the ECOMOG platform, to extend her dominance of the West African sub-region also became a bone of contention....

- Finally, ECOMOG was perceived as a force conceived to provide support for President Doe and to perpetuate his regime. Once Samuel Doe was killed the argument then turned to the belief that ECOMOG was designed to impose a government on Liberia. In fact, Charles Taylor argues that the force was largely a Nigerian attempt to impose its agenda on Liberia. (Vogt and Ekoko, 1992:206).

However, such legal criticisms have been found to have substantial flaws. In the first case, the desire to delink the purpose of economic co-operation from regional security is defective. Political stability is a necessary precondition for any for of enduring economic co-operation. The attempt to delink economic co-operation from regional security is a moot point (Adisa, 1993:142). To further reinforce the intertwined nature of the two, the then ECOWAS Secretary General Abass Bundu in an interview held before the 14th Ordinary Session of Heads of State in Abuja, succinctly stressed the point,

"You can not talk meaningfully about economic co-operation and integration by it self without relating to the underpinning of political stability within the sub-region. The two are inseparable and therefore have to be discussed inter alia. It is clear to me that regional solidarity and commitment to integration will be considerably enhanced where political stability becomes a common identity and is also perceived as a shared responsibility"
Also the presumption that the deployment of ECOMOG violates the non-interference clauses in the OAU and UN Charter is subject to dispute for three main reasons. First is on the grounds of military humanitarianism. The OAU Secretary General Salim A. Salim and Dauda Jawara, the then ECOWAS chairman, have placed crucial emphasis on this point. The OAU chief dismissed the criticism as rhetorical and academic;

Before ECOWAS undertook its initiative many, including the African media, were condemning the indifference demonstrated by Africa. The most desirable thing would be to have an agreement of all parties to the conflict and the convergence of views of all member states of ECOWAS. But to argue that there is no legal basis is surprising. Should the countries in West Africa just leave Liberians to fight each other? Will that be more legitimate? Will that be more understandable? (West Africa, May-June 1990).

Salim further added that; “I will rather make a mistake trying to solve the problem than to remain indifferent in such a situation” (West Africa. 1991: 1085). The Secretary General did not think so and could not careless. He added that if the intervention was construed as a legal error it remained proper. Salim’s position derives strong support from changes in the character of UN peace-keeping orientation which has jettisoned the classical conception of peacekeeping which meant conflict containment to embrace multicomponent missions such as human rights overwatch, midwifing political transitions and complex peace building operations including the process of national reconstruction and administration as envisaged in Cambodia (Vogt, 1992: 216). The ECOWAS chairman Sir Dauda Jawara was even more categorical when he noted that: “the wanton killings going on in Liberia has made that country a slaughter-house and the situation could no longer be treated as an internal matter” (West Africa, May-June 1990).

The premise of ‘internal affairs’ is as problematic for the opponents of ECOMOG as it is for proponents. How one may ask, can an insurgent movement such as Charles Taylor’s NPFL, with cadets trained in Libya, a staging post in Burkina Faso and conduit pipe for supplies and transit facilities provided by Cote d’Ivoire seek refuge in claims of internal affairs? (Adisa, 1993:143). Moreover, how can the crisis be treated
as an internal affair when it had spillover effects into neighbouring countries and their embassies become a subject of attack? The current civil war in Sierra Leone is a direct consequence of the Liberian crisis. Added to these, is the fact that by allowing Charles Taylor to assemble his forces in Burkina Faso and using Côte d'Ivoire as a launching pad, with the full knowledge of the governments of these countries, the crisis had already been internationalised before the deployment of ECOMOG. The ECOWAS 1981 Defence Protocol contains clear provisions for the use of Allied Armed forces in internal conflict when there is an indication of external support. This Protocol provides the empowering instrument for the deployment of ECOMOG, with Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso still remaining strong launching pads for the NPFL. Furthermore, the growing importance of multinational companies in the exploitation of Liberia's natural resources further externalised the crisis situation (Vogt and Ekoko, 1993: 208).

The other legal aspect relates to the modality of intervention. Article 16 of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance On Defence provides that "in case of armed threat or aggression" directed against a member states the Authority shall, on receipt of a written request submitted to the current chairman, with copies to other members, decide on the expediency of military action in relation to the provision of Article 6. The issue then is whether this provision was complied with and in what form? In an interview with James Butty, Dr Harry Moniba, the former Vice President of Samuel Doe observed that:

"Incidentally, let me add that the coming of ECOMOG was due to letter written by the Doe administration to the Chairman of ECOWAS asking him to send a peace keeping force. Know because I have copies of those correspondence" (West Africa, February-March, 1992).

Adisa (1993) has argued in this vain that, in the face of such submission, the only plausible objection is about whether Doe at that time had authority to be regarded as the legal President of Liberia. The answer to this question is positive, otherwise why else would Taylor and his men have insisted at the subsequent mediation meeting that Samuel Doe should step down as condition for accepting a cease-fire. Moreover, an insurgent movement has to topple an incumbent before it can lay claims to power. Hence, Charles Taylor's inability to dislodge Samuel Doe from the Executive Mansion
could be regarded as a testimony to the constitutional virtue of Samuel Doe’s position. (Adisa, 1993: 144).

In any case, the refusal to accept the legality of Samuel Doe’s position simply supports the alternative view that there was no government in Liberia, no machinery that can interact with the outside world; only anarchy. Accordingly, individual states had a duty to intervene to ensure the safety of their citizens while the international community (specifically ECOWAS) had the duty to intervene to stop the irresponsible killing of civilians in line with the doctrine of military humanitarianism which as explained earlier on, has been sanctioned by the UN (Adisa, 1993: 144).

The dominance of ECOMOG by Nigeria and the cost of the operations to Nigeria, especially in view of the severe economic situation the country was in, was criticised largely by Nigerians who could not understand the relevance of the situation to Nigeria’s national interests. Other sub-regional actors who were critical of Nigeria’s dominant involvement, especially Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire were, themselves, deeply involved in Liberia and they perceived ECOMOG, especially at the initial stage, as an attempt by the Anglophones to extend their dominance and undermine their national agenda. However, by incorporating the critical states into the negotiating process, especially by ceding the leadership of the peace initiative to Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria appeared for a while to have mended the bridge created between the Anglophones and Francophones. Secondly, the several mediatory sessions and the increasing display of bad faith by Charles Taylor created serious disaffection between Taylor and his supporters who were embarrassed by his constant signature of peace agreements only to denounce them and backtrack as soon as he got home (Vogt and Ekoko, 1993:208).

As a result of Taylor’s ‘soured’ relations with his regional backers, the July 1992 ECOWAS summit held in Dakar did not have difficulty in agreeing to impose a 30 days ultimatum on Charles Taylor to adhere to the terms of the Geneva Accord which stipulated that each warring faction be encamped and disarmed as a prelude to the general elections. However, the consensus that was built in ECOWAS on the management of the Liberian crisis appeared to have broken down again as some of the francophone countries, including President Soglo of Benin Republic who was the 1992
ECOWAS chairman were critical of the decision to implement the sanctions that were imposed on the NPFL controlled areas following the failure of that force to agree to disarmament and encampment. (Vogt and Ekoko, 1993: 209).

The refusal of the NPFL to disarm and to confine its troops to designated areas in keeping with the provisions of the Lome cease-fire agreement, was to leads in June 1991, to yet another mini-summit of the ECOWAS at Yamoussoukro (Côte d’Ivoire), during which a committee of five nations- Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Togo- were named in order to attempt to break the stalemate in the Liberian peace-process. The emergence of this committee was endorsed at the ECOWAS annual summit which took place immediately after, at Abuja (Nigeria) in early July 1991. The committee of five was, in fact, the ECOWAS Observer Group for the Liberian election-a sub-committee of the ESMC-which the larger body had provided for during its first meeting in Banjul in August 1990. (Nwokedi, 1992: 16).

The significance of this new committee seemed to be in its chairmanship being assured by the Côte d’Ivoire whose leader has been a string supporter of Charles Taylor and also, in its inclusion of Senegal thus bringing into the diplomatic fore, Francophone states in whom Taylor appeared to have much confidence. Yet, whereas Senegal was to send a contingent of 1,600 troops to the ECOMOG, the Ivorian leader made moves that suggested that a United Nations peacekeeping force should replace the ECOMOG force in Liberia. But because good judgement prevailed, the committee of five was to invite, from its second meeting, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Ghana as observers at its Yamoussoukro meetings. At the third meeting of this committee in October 1991, another agreement was reached on timetable for the disarming of troop of the warring factions and for the holding of national elections. The Yamoussoukro agreement was to prove once again, a failure owing to differences in its interpretation between ECOMOG and the Liberian Interim Government on the one hand, and the NPFL which set up its own Liberian government on the other hand (Nwokedi, 1992: 17).

Cognate the above it could therefore, be seen that, ECOMOG presented the Gen. Babangida and Gen. Abacha administrations with it greatest challenge on the foreign policy agenda. Previously, criticism of external initiatives were few and unsustained and often times, normally mooted by vociferous critics of the regime who would
condemn the ‘generosity syndrome’ of external relations as profligacy in the midst of want. The tenor of domestic criticism of ECOMOG followed a similar pattern but the sources were not acknowledged critics but the average man in the streets. The criticism was inter-laced with echoes of internal problems and compounded by a measure of francophone hostility at the regional level. This dangerous intersection prompted a crisis of confidence at the governmental level and it soon became clear to Gen Babangida that he could only alleviate the situation which involved, (1) incorporating the Francophone critics into the peacemaking process at the sub-regional level and (2) coming out to make a spirited defence of the policy in a dramatic bid to win public support within Nigeria. (Adisa, 1993: 149).

To incorporate the Francophones, Gen. Babangida had to soothe the ego of President Houphuet-Boigny and the only way to do this was to indulge his grandstanding as Africa’s ‘wise old man’. In this regard, Nigeria needed to take a backseat in conference diplomacy while openly conceeding the leadership of the peacemaking process to Cote d’Ivoire. The negotiation process was subsequently adjusted to accommodate this objective (Adisa, 1993: 149).

It has been further argued that, Houphuet Boigny accepted this position because of the inner logic of his accession to leadership in the peace process. Nigerian diplomacy stressed that as captain of the venture he could ensure the impartiality of the mission and ascertains that the essence was not dislodging Charles Taylor. Similarly, Charles Taylor could now assume that Houphuet Boigny would not preside over a process designed to liquidate his influence. Moreover, the incorporation of the francophone critics into the peace process strengthened ECOMOG. (Adisa, 1993:150).

In essence, therefore, the substance of the controversy that attended the inception of ECOMOG is really political differences in the sub-region and not legal. Intra-community dissensus within the ECOWAS group was a function of political differences, the interests of various leaderships and their personal differences (Adisa, 1993: 144).

ECOWAS’ Liberia experience was significant because it was the first time that West African leaders had questioned the hitherto inviolable principles of sovereignty and
non-interference in internal affairs. Scholars of conflict resolution go as far as to argue that the episode shaped future US intervention in Somalia, and this paved the way for a new era of co-operation between regional institutions and the UN in conflict resolution. In that ECOWAS, recognised the dangers in Liberian spill over for the sub-region, the community paper tiger that many insist it is- in advertently or otherwise made a strong case for interdependence and supra-nationality, to replace outmoded and unworkable concepts of independence and nationhood (Africa Report, 1994: 41).

**ECOMOG/Nigeria and The Sierra Leone Imbroglio.**

ECOMOG’s involvement in Sierra Leone can be traced to the first set of Nigerian troops that were dispatched to Freetown in 1993 at the request of the then government. This force though not initially drawn from the ranks of the ECOMOG forces in Liberia was later to be incorporated into the ECOMOG peacekeeping force. However, it was only after the overthrow of the elected government of President Ahmed Tejan-Kabbah, that the ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone became fully involved in that country’s seven year crisis. As West Africa’s biggest and richest power, Nigeria has taken a proprietorial interest in its neighbourhood. Political observers have argued that, it was inevitable. No one else was so inclined. After the disasters in Rwanda and Somalia, no Western government was prepared to send troops to the region (The Economist 1998: 14).

There is no doubt whatsoever that the Sierra Leone crisis is first and foremost a political crisis, an intra-elite struggle for the control of power. Contests for political control are considered as normal features of modern states especially in so far as they take place within the confines of the constitutional framework. If constitutional means were pursued then there would be minimal dislocations in terms of political transitions. The Sierra Leone crisis is not in this category. By the time the crisis started in 1991, it pitted the government of President Joseph Momoh against the forces of Corporal Foday Sankoh’s RUF, with support from the NPFL in Liberia, who had also resorted to an extra constitutional means in order to remove the former from power or simply acquire power themselves (Nkowedi, 1992: 2).

Nigeria’s Gen. Abacha’s ability to shape foreign policy for domestic purposes was facilitated
by the historic Anglophone and Francophone hegemonic divide and interests in the sub-region. The role of Côte d'Ivoire in the peace process in Liberia was seen as an extension of French ambitions in West Africa because of the alleged relations between the son of the late President Mitterand and the then leader of the NPFL in Liberia Charles Taylor. Britain, by way of Nigeria, helped the US not to lose its only direct sphere of influence in West Africa. The US returned this favour in the case of Sierra Leone where Britain needed US help, again by way of Nigeria, to destroy the RUF and the disloyal army in order to remove the faintest possibility of Taylor's influence in Sierra Leone on behalf of France (New African, 1998: 14).

However, in spite of the marriage of convenience between Nigeria, Britain, and the US over their respective policies on Sierra Leone, the political leadership of the Sierra Leone peace process fell into the lap of Côte d'Ivoire again. This happened by a coincidence of interests between the then Head of State of Sierra Leone, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio and the leader of the RUF Corporal Foday Sankoh. Both leaders had come to suspect and mistrust the intentions of the US, Britain and Nigeria. Brigadier Bio was dishevelled by what he saw as arrogant interference in the domestic affair of Sierra Leone. Britain and the US insisted on 'election before peace' and added the moral authority Commonwealth the UN. The OAU sought to remain neutral here (New African, 1998: 14).

Corporal Foday Sankoh, a veteran of the Congo crisis saw how Patrice Lumumba and the Congo were destroyed by the British and the Americans even at the expense of the life of the then UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. Corporal Sankoh was therefore mistrustful of ECOWAS under the thumb of the Nigerian military establishment. It was this coincidence of interests that drew Côte d'Ivoire to the centre stage of the Sierra Leone imbroglio. Nigeria had offered to host the talks but Freetown had yielded the option of the choice of venue to the RUF (New African, 1998: 14).

Thus Côte d'Ivoire directed the negotiation process with support from the UN, OAU, Commonwealth and the International Alert. Ghana, Burkina Faso and especially Guinea and Nigeria felt left out. Britain was irritated by what it saw as interference in its sphere of influence. When the OAU became accepted by Brigadier Bio and Corporal Sankoh as a more neutral broker, it is alleged that the OAU Secretary General was asked to standoff by Britain and the US as in their opinion, the UN could
not play second fiddle to the OAU. This fact was reinforced by President Kabbah who accused both the OAU and International Alert of being too close to the RUF and elements within the Sierra Leonean army. Despite the clash of interests and interplay of forces, a peace agreement was duly signed and named the Abidjan Accord on 29 November 1996 (New African, 1998: 14).

However, the period leading to the signing of the Abidjan Accord was a turbulent one in the international community. The leadership struggle in UN was in full swing; the US against the perceived interest of France was challenging Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s leadership. Coincidentally, key personalities in the Sierra Leone peace process were candidates to succeed Boutros-Ghali. Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU Secretary General, Amara Essy, the foreign Minister of Ivory Coast and Ould Abdallah, the chief executive of Africa Alert, (New African, May 1998), were all interested in the post of the UN Secretary-General and their names had been put forward along with that of Kofi Annan. Each candidate knew the strength of will of the US and Britain and the importance of winning their votes. These coincidences of interest also came to shape and dictate the pace and temper of the peace process in Sierra Leone. The filling here was the two astride tactics of Salim Salim who was also keen on getting a third term as the OAU Secretary General. Salim got President Kabbah to nominate him and also the support of Gen. Abacha. At that juncture, the coincidence of interests had coalesced with the US and Britain using Nigeria and Guinea to sideline Côte d’Ivoire. At the same time a Guinean senior UN officer, Lansana Kouyate, had taken over as the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS based in Abuja, the Nigerian Capital (New African, 1998: 14).

The whole issue of election before or peace before election became a political dice in the hands of the different contestants. The question of who will finance the exercise also became very contentious, with pledges coming from different quarters. However, despite the pledges from the international community to finance the exercise, only Britain paid up. The ultimate desires among Western governments- the ones in such a hurry to see civilian rule take root in Sierra Leone-was to marginalise the RUF, it would seem. Their belief was that once a civilian government is in place, western military hardware would pour into Sierra Leone to back the government in a last ditch
attempt to annihilate the RUF. But there was no guarantee that this would happen. Crushing the internal revolution will only drive the rebellion underground, to emerge later. So peace talks appeared to be the best approach, notes William Zartman, writing about negotiations in internal conflict, observed that:

"...In principle, negotiation is the best policy for both parties in an internal conflict...Reduction of grievances is sometimes even regarded by rebels as the government way of deterring militants from devotion to the cause; negotiations thus becomes correspondingly difficult, if not impossible. Rebellion becomes a way of life in a culture of violence. Negotiations become difficult in that situation for at least four other reasons as well. First there is no room for compromise on the part of the rebels. Recognition is both the top and bottom line. Whether as a regional secession movement or as a national contestant for central power the rebellion seeks recognition and once this has been achieved only operational details remains to be negotiated. Second there is room for trade-offs, which are the components of bargains. The rebellion issue and commitment are integral and indivisible and the insurgents have little to give up but the rebellion. So the most important deal is made and the agreement to negotiate, leaving only details to trade off when negotiations begin" (in West Africa, March 1996).

It seemed that both the RUF and the NPRC appeared to have reached the stage where they were both prepared to cut their losses and end the carnage that has engulfed the country for the last eight years. Zartman further posits that negotiation offered 'an alternative, somewhere between unattainable triumph and unlikely annihilation' (West Africa, March 1996). However, in spite of the seeming convergence of interest between the NPRC and the RUF, they could not agree on the issue of elections. The RUF agreed that the elections were the best thing for the country but that they were being conducted at the wrong time. In this vein, the rebels demanded that the war should end before elections take place. It stated that the RUF would take part in the elections not as a political party but through the participation of individual members (West Africa, January 1996).

In spite of the objection to the issue of election before peace, the NPRC went ahead with it plans to return the country to civilian rule but on the condition that there is an atmosphere of peace. The rebels on the other hand stressed that they would not co-operate with any of the political parties that would form a new government, if the RUF does not play a major role in the transition from a war-torn society to one of relative
peace. This was a recurring theme during the talks, which were chaired by the foreign
Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, Amara Essy. The RUF insisted that they would not
recognise the presidential and parliamentary elections. The politicians, who were not
represented in Abidjan, said that they could end the conflict. The soldiers on the other
hand believed that they were in a better position to broker peace now that they are
talking to the rebels. (West Africa, March 1996).

This then begs the question: should the return to civilian rule have been delayed so that
the military can hand over power in a conflict-free environment? However, the first
tentative moves to return Sierra Leone to normality - that is, to establish a civilian
government and to bring about peace - were made inside and outside the country in
the first week of March 1996. Elections for a President and a new parliament were
held in areas of the country that were not embroiled in the civil conflict while at the
same time the rebel RUF and members of the government side began talks in Côte
d'Ivoire. With the elections completed and the counting over, it marked the dawn of
the Second Republic under the leadership of President Ahmed Tejan-Kabbah, leader of
the SLPP (West Africa, March 1996).

The first moves towards normality were believed to have been achieved with the
swearing in of the new leader. The new government's determination to restore peace to
the war-weary people, led them to engage in talks with the RUF which had been
started by the previous regime in Abidjan. However, it soon became a stark reality that
the establishment of a legitimate government could only be deemed complete with a
negotiated settlement to end the war. The tasks ahead of the new government were
enormous and were more than just clamouring for a return to civilian rule. Some of the
immediate questions that needed attention were; how will the government ensure that
public institutions are stronger than politicians; that people are able to boot out bad
leaders from office through constitutional means; that politicians are held accountable
for their policies while in office; and that the people feel that interests are represented
in government and other public institutions? (West Africa, March 1996). In the midst
of finding answers to some of these challenging issues, the government of President
Tejan-Kabbah was short lived as the army resurfaced and overthrew the one-year-old
civilian government. This action by the military brought them into direct confrontation
with the Nigerian-led West African intervention force ECOMOG.

It is a general contention now that, despite the appalling human rights record of the military establishment in Nigeria and the doubts that Britain and the US express about Nigeria’s willingness to return to constitutional rule, Britain and Nigeria backed by the US, have found a common ground in third policies over Liberia and Sierra Leone. It has been a remarkable coincidence of interests which ignored domestic politics in Nigeria and the fact that Gen. Abacha is generally considered to be an international outcast (New Africa, April 1998). But Nigeria is not anyone’s poodle. Nigeria has staked its national interest in the success of its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in order to break the international isolation, which continued to hamper the political objectives of Gen. Abacha. In Gen Abacha’s eagerness to seek international support or understanding for his democratisation programme, he has inversely isolated Nigeria from most of West Africa. He could not carry his colleagues with him in his pursuit of the military option in Sierra Leone in order to “restore democracy” (New African, April 1998). The motives of Gen. Abacha have therefore been brought into question and it remains to be seen if he had scored the real victory he yearned for. But here, the adage that no one has any use for you after you have allowed yourself to be used is apt. It will be recalled that the decision to intervene in Jun 1997, as soon as the military ousted President Kabbah on 25th May 1997, nearly divided the military establishment in Nigeria. Those who advocated a military solution argued that it would get the US and Britain to change their stance on the domestic politics of Nigeria. However, they were wrong. Yet still the victory in Sierra Leone may produce the same convulsive anger that eats at the vitals of every Nigerian (New African, April 1998).

With the overthrow of the Teejan-Kabbah government by the AFRC/RUF under the chairmanship of Major Koroma, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force was invoked to restore the deposed civilian government. However, this restoration did not come without controversy as was manifested in the Liberian crisis. Whatever happened to non-interference? Meddling in other countries’ affairs, let alone invading them used to be a taboo, even in the best of causes. When Tanzania invaded Uganda to throw out the dictatorial Idi Amin in 1979, it was fiercely condemned. But when the Nigerian troops moved against junta officers in Sierra Leone who had overthrown an elected
government, their intervention was accepted by the world as if Sierra Leone were Nigerian territory and not an independent state nearly 900 miles away (The Economist, June 1997).

Before the coup of May 1997, some 900 Nigerian troops were already in Sierra Leone by treaty: a battalion attached to ECOMOG, the west African peacekeeping force, and a military training team. But no agreement had made provision for intervention to reverse a coup. Nonetheless, on 2 June 1997, Nigerian vessels shelled army headquarters in Freetown, and Nigerian troops seized the international airport and then brought in reinforcements. In return, Sierra Leonean soldiers attacked a hotel where foreigners were sheltering under Nigerian protection. A cease-fire was negotiated and attempts renewed to persuade the coup makers to surrender. The pause gave time for foreigners to escape and Ghanaian and Guinean troops to arrive, helping the Nigeria Force to look more multinational. Most of the usual guardians of international behaviour and rules remained silent. The US would not comment on Nigeria’s intervention, not the least because they had rescued American citizens. Britain likewise. At the UN Security Council there was outrage about the coup but no public comment on Nigeria’s role. African leaders, however, meeting at an OAU summit in Zimbabwe, gave intervention a mandate, albeit retrospectively, by calling on ECOWAS; the organisation that is responsible for ECOMOG, to restore constitutional order in Sierra Leone. And the UN’s secretary General Kofi Annan, also seemed to give backing to the use of force when he told the OAU:

"Democracy has been usurped. Let us do whatever is in our power to restore its owners, the people. Verbal condemnation...is not sufficient" (The Economist, June 1997: 50).

Despite Nigeria’s generosity with its oil and the provision of special credit facilities for its neighbours, it is still not accorded the leadership and dignity of office it feels it deserves in the region. Even after its successful reinstatement of the civilian government of Sierra Leone, Nigeria is getting little international acclaim. It is this feeling of benign neglect and the feeling of being used that could choke the Gen Abacha regime should the expected pay-off not yield results domestically (New African, April 1998).
The Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone, would leave a lot of African ex-presidents, whose pleas for help as they were overthrown went unheeded, must be wondering whether they had been born too soon. Suddenly, intervention in Africa is all right, so long as it is by Africans; it is then politically acceptable in Africa and elsewhere. In Africa, it is called "African solutions to African problems". There is now a growing confidence among some African leaders that the continent can provide such solutions. However, the question is raised, did anybody realised that this might lead to Nigeria being given a free hand in West Africa? (The Economist, June 1997).

However, it now strongly argued that, Nigeria’s domestic interests of late have come to shape the politics of West Africa as represented by ECOWAS. As the US sought to use the UN in its own national interest, Nigeria has almost succeeded in using ECOWAS as a tool for its national interest despite the chagrin of Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Togo. Vulnerable countries like Niger, Benin and The Gambia were alarmed by what appears to be a carte blanche for the military in Nigeria to do what it wants in region just as it does with impunity at home. It is this fear of Nigeria’s sense of impunity that has worried Liberia despite a job well done there. It was the fear of the unintended consequences of the dominant role of Nigeria in the formation of ECOMOG that brokered the compromise role of Ghana to provide the field commander. But after the capture from ECOMOG of President Samuel Doe and his subsequent murder, Nigeria took over the role of field commander and thus the military leadership. The political leadership was in the hands of Côte d’Ivoire and it later shifted to Benin and Ghana between 1990 and 1995. After the seizure of power in Nigeria by Gen. Abacha in 1993 and by the middle of 1994 his consolidation process noticed the international importance of assuming supreme control of both the political and military leadership of ECOMOG in order to bring coherence in the mission of the ECOWAS Authority in Liberia. The US and Britain put their ambivalence over the military establishment in Nigeria aside and provided the backbone of moral and material support to this consolidated thrust (New African, April 1998).

Extra-regional Involvement.

The Sierra Leone imbroglio casts more light on the web of security companies and mining houses associated with conflicts such as the on going crisis in Sierra Leone.
When the attention of the British Parliament and press was drawn to the involvement of Sandline International, a London-based private military company, in the reinstatement to power of Sierra Leone’s President Tejan Kabbah, it brought the issue into sharper focus. This created a great deal of interest and controversy within British political circles. The principal focus of the British parliament and the media was in the possible discomfiture of Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, who had loudly and repeatedly committed the Tony Blair administration to the pursuit of an ethical foreign policy. As the story broke it appeared that Sandline International might have violated the UN’s arms embargo on Sierra Leone by supplying weapons to forces loyal to President Kabbah, with the knowledge of officials and Ministers in the British government. There was the question of how the government would attempt to reconcile its ethical position with the essential role played in the affair by Nigeria, which was suspended from the Commonwealth because of its abuses of human rights and doubts about its commitment to the restoration of civilian rule. (African Security Review, 1998: 73).

However, earlier in 1995, the government of Captain Strasser, seeking to ensure a continued flow of revenue, hired a private military company employing the Gurkhas to help secure the country’s principal diamond and titanium oxide mines against the raiders. This force was however withdrawn after taking losses, and replaced by Executive Outcomes, a company with South African origins, introduced to Sierra Leone by mining interests that had used its services in Angola. Executive Outcomes inflicted heavy losses on the RUF, and also began to co-operate with local rural militias and self-defence units to curb the excesses of soldiers and rebels alike. At some time, Executive outcomes also provided additional training in counter-insurgency to these militiamen (African Security Review, 1998: 74).

Soon after the overthrow of President Kabbah then sheltering in Conakry, neighbouring Guinea, made contacts with Sandline International, a company also associated with Executive Outcomes and Diamondworks. According to the account of events later released by Sandline’s lawyers, President Kabbah initiated the initial contact at the suggestion of Peter Penfold, the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, then sheltering in Conakry. President Kabbah had arranged for funding for the
Sandline operation through Rakesh Saxena, a banker wanted for embezzlement in Thailand and then on bail in Vancouver on charges of travelling on a false passport. Saxena was evidently anxious either to protect or extend his diamond operations in Sierra Leone and was promised that, in return for his financial assistance, a restored government would grant him certain concessions. By the middle of July, Tim Spicer, the head of Sandline, had flown to West Africa to see President Kabbah and ECOMOG. It was after this meeting that Spicer arranged for the delivery of 35 tons of arms and ammunition from Bulgaria, initially to ECOMOG, for onward shipment to the civil defence militia’s. Sandline is also believed to have been involved in coordinating the planning of the campaign to unseat Major Koroma, the provision of logistical support, control of ECOMOG air operations, including the services of two helicopters, and intelligence gathering. (African Security Review, 1998: 77).

On the 27th November 1998, a report appeared in the Globe and Mail, Toronto, detailing the relationship between Executive Outcomes, Lifeguard, Sandline International and a number of mining companies, including Diamond works. It alleged that members of these companies were engaged in planning a counter-coup in Sierra Leone to reinstatement President Tejan-Kabbah. This lack of response was shattered after the reinstatement of President Tejan-Kabbah. At least three more articles appeared in the international press in March about the role of Sandline in President Tejan-Kabbah’s restoration. But it was not until May that questions in the British parliament revealed that a customs investigation was being mounted into the provision of arms to ECOMOG, in possible violation of the UN embargo (African Security Review, 1998).

The main concern in the whole affair was centred on the role played by Nigeria’s military establishment, which was considered an international pariah, and by then under international sanctions. The concern was about the possible support for this mainly Nigerian force and how that would square with the US and the EU’s sanction on cooperation with the late Gen. Abacha’s military regime. In strict legal terms, the EU sanctions do not prohibit the export of military equipment and services to a force of which Nigeria was a part. But EU governments argued that they would have no way of preventing equipment sent to Freetown, for example, from being ferried back to
The major contention was centred on Nigeria’s pivotal role in the whole operation. The assault against Major Koroma, was without doubt, Nigerian organised, Nigerian led, and financed by Nigeria. Kayode Ogunbunmi, writing in the Lagos Guardian of February 15, put it succinctly: “Koroma’s ouster is a victory for democracy, no doubt. But it more so a victory for Nigeria. It should send out a message to potential regional trouble makers that Nigeria will not brook further destabilisation in the region- it a boost to the morale of Nigeria” (The Guardian, February 1998).

The main political actors in the execution of the reinstatement of President Kabbah are Nigerians. Chief among them was Gen. Abacha, Nigeria’s head of state, also chairman of ECOWAS and Chief Tom Ikimi, the Nigerian Foreign Minister and the chairman of the ECOWAS committee of Five on the Sierra Leonean situation. Brigadier Abdul One Mohammed, also a Nigerian the ECOMOG chief of staff and so is Colonel Maxwell Khobe, the commander of the operation in Sierra Leone (West Africa, February 1998).

Compounding the dubious role played Sandline International, was the question of mandate. It was argued that the Nigerians had no proper mandate-they did not even inform other members of the ECOMOG force that they were going to attack- but they have at least paved the way for the return of the elected government. It appeared that no one else was going to get rid of the junta, and a peace agreement among Sierra Leone’s warring parties, signed in Conakry, Guinea, seemed to be falling apart (The Economist, February, 1998).

However, the chairmen of the OAU and ECOWAS respectively welcomed the intervention and gave it their tacit support. Th operation on the face of it was an ECOWAS affair. For Nigerian officers to go into Sierra Leone, they needed ECOWAS’s official backing, once they moved they needed an ECOWAS secretary who would support them. At the initial stage, the ECOWAS secretariat decided to work in the background. But when Lansana Kouyate resumed his duties after relieving Dr. Edouard Benjamin, who was sick at the time, momentum returned to the efforts of the secretariat. However, even during the illness of Dr Benjamin, with the non-aggressive nature of the other members, Nigeria was able to get her views accepted
from one summit to the next, whether in Abuja, Conakry or Lome (West Africa, February 1998).

The initial reaction to the claim that the British government had condoned or even connived over the involvement of the ‘mercenaries’ in a counter-coup and the illegal sale of weapons to President Kabbah, was one of outrage. The Foreign Minister responsible for handling African Affairs denied angrily that his government would associate with ‘hired killers’ and dismissed the allegations as irresponsible rubbish. The Foreign Secretary subsequently supported him, though it was soon apparent that senior officials and diplomats had enjoyed prior knowledge of Sandline’s involvement. Indeed, Sandline’s defence position was rather more expert than the disingenuous one mounted by the British government over its alleged involvement in the sale of arms to President Kabbah. Its lawyers detailed meetings with some British officials, in some of which actual plans had been shared by the company, claiming with some justification that it had every right to believe that its operations enjoyed the support and approval of London and Washington (African Security Review, 1998).

While much of the lively debate in the British press concentrated on the Ministers’ possible lack of control over their officials, or failure of the Foreign Secretary to pay sufficient attention to detail, the broader ironies implicit in Robin Cook’s defence also drew comment. On 8 May 1998, the Times(London) carried the following:

“Had President Kabbah not turned to the private sector, he would still be in exile. He had universal verbal backing; but during and after last year’s coup, the only force western governments used was to evacuate their nationals; Nigerian troops had tried to overthrow the plotters and failed…since the wrath of the ‘international community’ had not the slightest impact on the regime, a rational observer might have expected the British government to be quietly pleased that unorthodox methods had worked. It certainly professed itself delighted at the result. Instead, Sandline has been placed under criminal investigation and Robin Cook, the foreign secretary, has flatly condemned the operation…” (in African Security Review, 1998. 78-79).

The debate in the British circles became centred on ‘Resolution 1132’ of UN which, among other things prohibited the supply of arms to Sierra Leone, was drafted largely by Sir Franklin Berman, chief legal adviser to the ministry. Sir Berman’s interpretation
was that the embargo applied equally to all parties in the conflict, and that on these grounds, Sandline may have been breaching the law. But by the end of May, the UN lawyers appeared to have changed their minds arguing, as had Sandline, that since the Resolution had as its purpose the reinstatement of the elected government in Sierra Leone, then ECOMOG, which was working towards that end with the encouragement of the UN, must enjoy an implied partial exemption from the ban (African Security Review, 1998).

Here it is important to note that Britain despite its position on the Nigerian military, has consistently backed the hire and use of mercenaries in Sierra Leone and justified it by *extraordinary circumstances*. British-related mercenary firms such as the Gurkhas, Executive Outcomes and Sandline have all been engaged in Sierra Leone. And for the first time, the World Bank allowed President Kabbah to use some of its money to pay Executive Outcomes in 1996. What is perhaps more interesting is the fact that, neither the UN nor the Commonwealth has criticised this practice of the hire and use of mercenaries in Sierra Leone. The stipulation in the Abidjan Accord for the withdrawal of all foreign troops within a specific time frame was seen as targeted at Nigeria. However, Britain’s policy justification in Sierra Leone was anchored on the firm belief by both the politicians and civil servants that, ‘you can not appease terrorists and dictators’. A military solution was therefore the preferred option in Sierra Leone (New African, Apr 1998).

In spite of all the controversies that followed the restoration of President Kabbah, *Operation Sandstorm*, as it was code-named, was considered to be a resounding victory. One anonymous West Africa diplomat in London was thrilled by the outcome of the ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone. He put his enthusiasm thus:

"I doff my hat to the Nigerians, who have shown the world that we in West Africa can solve our own problems without too much bloodshed. This is a tremendous success when you consider how the disastrous US-led UN intervention in Somalia in 1993 ended with the so-called peace keepers killing hundreds of civilians indiscriminately" (West Africa, 1998:224).

He further continued that:

"...this proves what we have always been saying – that Africans are capable of solving their problems without resorting to outside assistance, which may not be compatible with the
However, there were those who believed that ECOMOG should have waited until April 22 — when the junta said it would step down — before trying to dislodge the military regime. This view was strongly promoted by the Liberian government whose Information Minister, said disapprovingly: “we think it is pathetic, especially as the deadline is approaching for the return to power of the ousted President Tejan Kabbah under the Conakry Accord. Only peaceful discussion involving all parties under the Conakry Accord is in the right direction” (West Africa, February 1998). Such sentiments as expressed by the Liberian Information Minister did endear his government to the authorities in Freetown and the ECOMOG force in general. This further heightened the accusation of Liberia’s involvement in the Sierra Leone imbroglio, hence Freetown’s claim of ‘bad faith’ by some ECOWAS member states.

Sub-Regional Complicity.

One area of controversy in the Sierra Leone imbroglio has been the involvement of countries like Liberia and Burkina Faso in propping up the RUF. Since the start of the war in Sierra Leone, accusations have been flying thick and fast about the dubious role of Liberia and Burkina Faso. Th Liberians on the other hand, have accused President Kabbah’s Kamajor’s (the traditional hunter militia group which had been fighting on the side of the government) and dissident Liberian groups fighting alongside them of planning to disrupt the new peace in their country. Charles Taylor has threatened reprisals if any attempt is made to destabilise his country from Sierra Leone (Africa Confidential, 1999).

However, many West African leaders find Taylor unconvincing and alarming. They are less worried by his failure to bring peace and development to Liberia than by his regional ambition. The latest diplomatic assault started on 13 January, 1999 when the US government announced it had categorical evidence of Charles Taylor’s material and logistical support for the RUF, and warned him to stop. Nigerian and EU diplomats repeated that they had clear proof that Charles Taylor had supplied and helped to co-ordinate RUF operations in Sierra Leone (Africa Confidential, January 1999).

As a result of this accusation of bad-faith between the two countries, the Liberian
government shut its border with Sierra Leone. This reaction came amidst persistent allegations that Charles Taylor was providing arms to the RUF and its ally the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), to destabilise President Kabbah’s government. Monrovia has constantly denied that it is supporting the rebels. However, leaders of ECOWAS states increasingly becoming bogged down by political problems—decided to act swiftly to reduce the tension. An extra-ordinary meting of the committee of Five on Sierra Leone was quickly convened in Abidjan. Representatives of Togo and Burkina Faso and the ECOWAS secretary joined Foreign Ministers of Cot d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria. There were observers from Sierra Leone, the UN, UK ECOMOG and US. (West Africa, January 1999).

The Liberian Foreign Minister, Omni Captan was ‘ambushed’ by his Sierra Leonean counterpart and the ECOMOG force Commander Gen. Shelpidi. However, Monie Captan denied the accusation and called for an international investigation. In Monrovia, one government official told West Africa magazine that given the UN arms embargo on Liberia did not even have enough weapons to guarantee its own security, let alone hand any over to the rebels in Sierra Leone. He further claimed that Western gunrunners were bringing in weapons through airstrips in rebel-controlled territory in Sierra Leone and leaving with diamonds, which the RUF was using to pay for its arms purchases. At the end of the conference the Committee issued a Communiqué which ‘...expressed grave concern at the aggression being perpetrated against the Republic of Sierra Leone and strongly condemned the activities of the countries which are providing support to the rebels in Sierra Leone, in violation of the decisions of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and government and the UN security council’ (Africa Confidential, January 1999).

However in spite of the denial by the Liberian government, the US claims to have intercepted satellite and mobile telephone conversations between Charles Taylor’s office and RUF commanders. Sierra Leone’s chief of staff Brigadier Maxwell Khobe said that some 2000 former NPFL fighters were sent to Freetown along the AFRC/RUF. Charles Taylor in reaction sent envoys to the sub-region to explain his government’s position. Liberian Vice-President Enoch Dogolea arrived in Accra on the 14 January, 1999 to inform President Rawlings that the Nigerian and US claims were
all lies. The Ghanaian leader bluntly told him that Charles Taylor was stabbing West Africa in the back, adding that the US evidence indicates the close involvement in the assault on Freetown not just of another West African leader (President Compare of Burkina Faso) plus a North African (Libya’s Muammar Gadaffi) were all guilty of complicity. In reaction to Liberia’s involvement in Sierra Leone, President Rawlings ordered all Liberian refugees out of Ghana, telling Vice President Dogolea that if Charles Taylor could afford a war against Sierra Leone, he could afford to look after his own migrants (Africa Confidential, January 1999).

In spite of the apparent involvement of countries like Liberia and Burkina Faso in propping up the AFRC/RUF coalition, the reinstatement of President Kabbah should send a clear signal to all in the sub-region of ECOMOG’s no nonsense stance. With mission accomplished, ECOMOG stands today as probably the world’s best peace keeping model. Credit must go to Nigeria, the leading partner in the coalition to oust the junta from Freetown.

This chapter has explored Nigeria’s policy in the integration effort in West Africa. Starting with a focus on the protocol on free movement of persons and goods and the ECOWAS mutual defence pact in relation to the establishment of ECOMOG, it has illuminated some of the major controversies that Nigeria’s policy posture has triggered. The consequences of the expulsion orders of 1983 and 1985; the prolonged land border closure of 1984; and Nigeria’s pivotal role in the sub-regional peacekeeping force ECOMOG, has been the subject of analysis. Further, it has explained how the use of ‘gun-boat diplomacy’ has been instrumental in an attempt at the establishment of regional stability.
CHAPTER FIVE.

CONCLUSIONS: Issues, Trends, Options and Recommendations.

With the dawn of the new millennium and the ever-growing reality of the 'global village', Africa stands at a crossroads of transformation. If globalisation is as much a threat as an opportunity, could regional integration (like ECOWAS) not serve as a solid platform from which African countries could enter into the global market, not as weak and helpless units, but as relatively influential actors? The options open to Africa are either to 'integrate their economies' in order to compete in the global market or to remain as small units and be 'totally marginalised'. In the West African sub-region, where the path to integration have been pursued since the mid 1970s; and its apparent slow progress, have precipitated questions and research interest such as this one, about the role of sub-regional powers like Nigeria in promoting such schemes. Nigeria's role in championing the establishment of ECOWAS and its continued support for the organisation is laudable; though there have been certain policy shifts, which have had strong consequences on the community. The main question therefore is how can the West African sub-region under ECOWAS with the leadership of Nigeria, initiate constructive and strategic policies to take the leap into the 21st century? In other words the research question, which has shaped the discourse of this thesis, is:

To what extent has Nigeria's policy contributed in shaping the integration efforts in West Africa?

The study of Nigeria's regional policy policy posture in ECOWAS between 1979-1997 has helped to bring certain crucial policy shifts of the issue to the fore. This study has utilised the Rational Actor: Model I as the basis of analysis of Nigeria's foreign and regional policy in the ECOWAS. The study was divided into three phases- the Shehu Shagari and Gen. Buhari eras – 1979-1984; the Gen. Babangida and Ernest Shonekan eras – 1984-1993; and the Gen. Abacha era 1993-1998. The analysis followed Nigeria's policy course since the inception of ECOWAS, to the outbreak of the Liberian civil war and Nigeria's subsequent championing of the formation of ECOMOG; the latest and most controversial policy that could be identified with Nigeria in the 1990's. In the analysis, special focus was given to Nigeria's expulsion of
illegal aliens in 1983 and 1985; the land border closure of 1984 and Nigeria’s latest invention ECOMOG. These policy measures by Nigeria were examined in relation to the ECOWAS protocols on Free Movement of persons, goods and services, and the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence. The conclusions were drawn from the study and recommendations were given in relation to the specific issues examined and Nigeria’s future role in ECOWAS.

The study conclude that, the expulsion of aliens in a mass quit-order may appear to be the easy solution to West Africa’s perennial migration problem of illegal labour and a tempting means of gaining domestic political mileage out of economic crisis. But the experiences of the past, including Nigeria’s expulsions in 1983 and 1985 have shown that such exercises have failed both to halt the tide of citizens seeking a better life in their neighbour’s back yards and to discourage refugees from famine and drought from heading to the greener ‘south’ in search of pasture. It can therefore be concluded that, no African nation can afford to turn its back on the citizens of its neighbours, for the tables can be turned (Africa Report, July-August, 1985: 13).

Moreover, just as no West African government can deny that its own economy has benefited at any one time or another from the free movement of labour, neither can it shirk a share of the responsibility for illegal aliens within its borders. Wage and benefit enticements from host governments and enterprises seeking labour to fuel economic growth were frequently the magnet which drew them in the first instance, and their illegal status was enshrined by employers willingness to hire them. Even if West Africa’s notoriously porous borders were better policed and the myriad bush paths were somehow brought under closer scrutiny, there would still be border guards willing to take a little ‘dash’ or bribe to close their eyes to transgressions of the law (Africa Report, July-August, 1985: 13).

It was therefore in recognition the economic realities of the sub-region that the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons and goods was drafted. The current 90-day limit on residency without papers is only a temporary measure toward the ultimate goal of a West African common market in which the nationals of one country will be able to move and work without hindrance in another (Africa Report, 1985:13).
Generally, the free movement of labour within the West African sub-region could create as many problems as it solved if certain other complementary measures and social cushioning measures are not introduced as well, such as the right of free establishment for the self-employed, social services and housing for migrants, and possibly provisions for vocational training. In West Africa, as in the EU and SADC, the exchange of labour among various national markets cannot rely exclusively on the blind forces of supply and demand, this could lead to results that would be prejudicial to the sub-regional economy and to the migrants themselves... particularly so if there were a lack of knowledge about prevailing conditions in the countries of destination (Lawson and Reed, 1975: 45-46)

The study also concluded that most cross border movements in West Africa under the first phase took place outside the framework of the ECOWAS protocol. The first draft of the supplementary protocol proposed to place all such movements under blanket legality. The major instrument for the attainment of this goal was the attempt to constitute the country of origin of the immigrants as well as the community into the pivot of the free movement policy of ECOWAS. In essence, the ECOWAS route to supranationality was to be charted not by a direct transfer of power from the Member State to the central institutions of the organisation. Rather, this was to take the form of alienation of powers from the migrant receiving state to that of the sending state, with the latter exercising *de facto*, the authority that should be rightly located at the community level. This arrangement would have in principle, made some sense if all member states were equally placed as sending and recipient states or if the issues were simply legal, administrative and technical as the bureaucrats tended to perceive them. However, some states were not exporters of labour while others (like Nigeria), were predominantly recipient of such labour. Furthermore, the kind of reception accorded immigrants tended to reflect the state of the economy (Abutudu, 1993: 113).

However, after the 1983 and 1985 expulsions, the exclusion of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers that constitute the dominant migrant group in West Africa from the category of admissible community citizens under the residence phase, the Nigerian state sought to defuse the political tension, especially emanating from low income
groups which seemingly resented the influx of citizens from the community. Furthermore, through the calculated policy of exclusiveness, only six categories of professionals may be able to take advantage of the provisions of the protocol in Nigeria. Incidentally, these also constitute the high level manpower group, which in the depressed economic conditions of virtually all counties in West Africa, have tended to turn their sight firmly to the industrialised countries of the West where their skills command higher value. Thus, in moving away from a strategy of delaying the implementation of the second phase to a strategy of modifying the phase, Nigeria would appear to have unwittingly, perhaps, promoted a process in which the Protocol's inclusive group would itself be largely excluded by the market forces. Even outside the framework of these market forces unleashed by objective economic conditions, the discretionary regime which governs admission into residence status was another powerful instrument, at the disposal of any member state, of restricting those categorised as admissible aliens under a member state's domestic law. Thus, the proposals put forward by Nigeria were fundamentally based on a consideration of her prevailing domestic economic crisis. However, they also attempted to marry long term interests of the dominant forces of the Nigerian state by retracing the country's step from insularity while ensuring that those conditions which illegal aliens were alleged to have created or exploited to aggravate the country's problems were held in check (Abutudu, 1992:116).

Although Nigeria's expulsion orders have struck a blow at the spirit of ECOWAS as well as the long historical associations and the ethnic affinities that exist among West African countries, they have at the same time given the member states of the Community the unique opportunity to reassess the full implications of the Protocol on free movement of persons with a view to strengthening it by initiating some complementary measures. And one important lesson to be learned from the Nigerian experience is that there is the need for a conscious and systematic public education of the wider implications of ECOWAS its aims and objectives, the benefits to be derived from it as well the costs involved in the implementation of its provisions. Second the social, economic and human problems that arise from the phenomenon of labour migration constitute a challenge to member states of the community. Third, and as a corollary of this, labour movement in the absence of any protective measures can lead
to various social evils such as crime among the migrant workers, unsatisfactory conditions of employment, and damage to the economy and development of the migrants' own country as well as the receiving country. And finally, labour movement has implications for labour and social policies in such areas as harmonisation of national labour legislation of member states, conditions of work, and role of employment exchanges in the machinery for facilitating the geographical mobility of workers (Asante, 1986: 160).

The study concluded that, one other serious barrier to the free movement of labour that ECOWAS governments will have to deal with and for which no provision is made in the ECOWAS protocol under discussion is the issue of social security. Migrants will lose the social security rights they have already acquired or are in the process of acquiring in the country where they have been residing, and will not be able to obtain similar protection in their adopted country. In other words, lack of provision for social security for migrant workers or insufficient arrangements, which mean that the rights acquired in different member countries are, lost, will tend to reduce intra-union labour mobility. Perverse movements may also be generated if the purchasing power of social security contributions differ from country to country (Asante, 1986).

The massive expulsion of ECOWAS immigrants, under President Shehu Shagari and Gen. Buhari, gave lie to Nigeria's support for free movement of nationals among member states. To be certain there may be no more sensitive political issues than granting political rights and job opportunities to non-nationals, as President Houphuett-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire learned in the 1960s when riots greeted his effort to provide Ivorian citizenship to nationals of the Council of the Entente (Thompson, 1972: 143-163).

With regards to the closure of the land borders by Nigeria against some of her land locked neighbours, the study concluded that, such an action often resulted from a downturn toll in a nation's economy. The Nigerian economy, which had started to experience, some 'feverish cold' since the late 1970s due to the oil glut was no longer capable of sustaining a large immigrant community regardless of their origin. For integration therefore to move forward regional power brokers like Nigeria should
avoid taking any precipitate action that will be played upon by dissenting voices in the sub-region. The essence of integration is to help mitigate the hardships of sister countries whose development would otherwise continue to stall or deteriorate.

It is evident that regardless of the effect of the two expulsions, Nigeria was still acting within the scope of the ECOWAS Treaty and this was clearly defended by the then ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Momodu Munu. Moreover, most of the expelled aliens were staying in Nigeria in violation of the country’s immigration laws; while at the same time capitalising on the hospitality of the host nation. Therefore, with regard to these two actions Nigeria can not be accused of derailing the integration process, because it immediately acted to dampen the political effect of the measures on the community. It could however, be said that it some how played to the hands of unwilling states in the whole project of integration.

On the issue of ECOMOG and Nigeria’s pivotal role the following conclusions were drawn. It is important to note that the Liberian and Sierra Leone crisis and Nigeria’s involvement in resolving these crises have focused attention on the nature of crises spreading through the continent in the last decade of this century. In the 1990’s, most African conflicts are intra-stall rather than inter-stall, although they do have a much broader impact by fuelling regional parallel economic in light arms and assets, generating displaced refugee populations, and creating exile communities. Most African conflicts like those of Liberia and Sierra Leone are becoming highly internationalised: both in their effects and the efforts of various parties (like ECOMOG), to prevent, manage or resolve them. They however, reflect the fragility and artificiality of the state system bequeathed to Africa by the departing colonial powers (Riley, 1998).

The study concluded that, with the approval of the two defence protocols in 1979 and 1981, the states of West Africa were considered to have accomplished what the states of the entire continent have not: acceptance of mutual security agreement. The regional rather than continental approach to joint- peacekeeping appears - somewhat more successful in gaining approval of Heads of State. Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS shows that, leadership provides the key to co-operation in West Africa - its nature, extent and
objectives. An agreement on mutual defence does not require prior full-scale agreement on amalgamation. The mutual security initiative within ECOWAS came, from a core of Francophone countries. These states co-operated far more extensively and readily than did former British-administered countries. Ironically, the least predictable behaviour came from Nigeria, whose initiative had been central to the creation of ECOWAS. The removal of Gen. Gowon shortly after the signing of the Lagos Treaty was a sign of serious internal problems. Nigeria experienced five changes of Heads of State between 1975 and 1985; this turbulence and lack of political predictability is by far the most important member state seriously compromised progress in the community (Okolo and Wright, 1990: 174-176).

There is no doubt that the Liberian peace process is an ECOWAS project. Certainly, it came into being as a result of Nigeria’s diplomatic initiative and Nigeria has since continued to play a dominant role in the military and financial aspects of ECOMOG. It is almost certain that a precipitate decision by Nigeria to withdraw from this operation would lead to its collapse. Yet, Nigeria’s dominant role has not tantamounted to the imposition of a Nigerian solution as consultations continued between the members of ECOWAS, more especially in the negotiation process between the different warring factions. Certainly, Nigeria’s initial political and military support for the late President Doe gave the impression that the ECOMOG intervention, which it initiated and led, was designed to buttress the crumbling authority of the Liberian leader. But in the analysis, it has been shown that once Nigeria voted along with the other members of the ESMC to adopt a peace plan in which it was explicitly stated that President Doe had to step aside in order that peace might return to Liberia, this was the clearest evidence of a shift in Nigeria’s policy towards the government of President Doe (Nkowedi, 1992: 17).

Another salient point to note from the Liberian and Sierra Leone crisis and Nigeria’s bold attempt at resolving it through the establishment of ECOMOG, is the revelation of the divergent interests and policies of the West African states. The reason why the NPFL, INPFL and ULIMO and the RUF in Sierra Leone remained active parties in the crisis was simply that some West African states sustained their ambitions: they served as conduits for transmission of material to these groups by external interest. Moreover,
the management of the crisis revealed the logistical and the financial difficulties inherent in an ECOWAS collective security arrangement. Many West African states were neither willing nor able to participate in ECOMOG; nor were they able to contribute to the Special Emergency Fund for the ECOMOG operation in Liberia. It may well be that the economic crisis in most of the ECOWAS member states explains the lackadaisical attitude, but noteworthy is the fact that, there can be no meaningful economic progress in the sub-region in the event of generalised instability, as was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It may well be that, according to Gen. Babangida of Nigeria, divergences and “apparent misunderstandings” are “typical and inherent in the nature of international relations even among friendly countries (Gen. Nwachukwu, 1992: 931). But this truism was exactly why the Liberian and the Sierra Leone crises in particular remain unresolved for almost seven years after ECOMOG’s intervention.

The ECOMOG experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone show that, while national policy guidelines for participation in peace support operations continue to stress them for a comprehensive and lasting solution as a precondition for involvement, there are strong arguments for a far more modest assessment of the attainable goals of intervention. Where a national legal order has lost its efficacy (like in Liberia), to the extent that it no longer protects the citizenry from the grossest of human rights abuses a higher body of law must be invoked - at least until a new legitimacy has been established at the national level. The problem, however, is that the efficacy of international law is widely doubted, and the will to act is often lacking (African Security Review, 1998: 18).

The member states of ECOWAS will have to draw salient lessons from their crisis management in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Their integrative process cannot be pursued in the midst of political turmoil and generalised instability. The two crises have perturbed economic realisations within its immediate neighbourhood, created an unprecedented refugee problem and its peace process has consumed resources, which ought to have been employed differently. What is more, the crisis reveals that both the ECOWAS protocol on Non-aggression and the Treaty on Mutual Assistance on Defence need to be reviewed in order to provide them with appropriate structures and other logistical requisites. On the whole, the nature of the conflicts suggest that the
best guarantee against destabilisation and insecurity, is the institutionalisation in the West African states of a credible democratic political system which functions without let or hindrance. A change in the nature of the state will automatically alter the nature of its political process and, therefore, the pattern of its political succession (Nkwokedi, 1992: 19).

The Liberia and Sierra Leone crises and Nigeria’s involvement have shown that Africa’s artificial political borders, combined with decades of colonial manipulation and economic exploitation, guarantee that the continent’s political jigsaw will provide serious and expensive challenges for peacekeepers. Thus, funding for peace keeping is a critical issue for any government. The potential costs of such operations and the massive logistics commitment for long distance operations are key factors in any decision-making process. Developing countries such as Nigeria can not rush into any peacekeeping venture without careful consideration of the financial implications. Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, have cost the country millions of dollars that could have been diverted for development projects in Nigeria itself or the West African sub-region (Africa Review, 1998: 8).

It could be asked, from an African perspective is, whether the peace is to be kept only at the cost of African states placing their natural resources in paw? By extension, it could also be asked whether those countries lacking the necessary and conveniently exploitable unassigned assets are by implication excluded from such assistance from the private sector. It may be argued that, only if relative security is established, can these resources be exploited and the proceeds taxed for the general good. It does seem evident however that, mining companies and other entrepreneurs, if they can command realisable military assistance, will be in a better position to negotiate concessions than other businesses without such connections. Is the time far-off when private companies will do battle, literally, for access to the natural wealth of Africa, as did the chartered companies of yesteryears? Should this happen, it will be because the movers and the shakers in the UN have ceased to regard Africa as a continent entitled to the consideration of the community of nation (African Security Review, 1998: 80-81).
While peacekeeping and peace enforcement could help stem violence and save lives, it only dealt with the symptoms rather than disease. A military solution (like ECOMOG’S in Sierra Leone) could not be imposed on a political and ethnic conflict. As one analyst has put it, ‘you can not put out local fires with distant hoses’. (West Africa, December 1998 - January 1999). The Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts have shown that the sacred tenets of the OAU, namely, non-interference in the internal affairs of another, can no longer be interpreted literally. ‘Non-inference’ can not mean ‘indifference’. The peace-enforcement activities of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, is today canvassed as a success story and perhaps as a pointer to where Africa should be going. The effort has been generally applauded, but doubts have been raised as to its validity as a model. ECOMOG succeeded, largely because it was funded and staffed for the most part by one of its leading protagonists, Nigeria. More crucially, the question has been, whether an elected government accountable to the people could have been give carte blanche to prosecute the effort for almost ten years now, as Nigeria’s military government has done. And if the tables were turned and Nigeria found itself circumstanced as Liberia had been at the time, and Sierra Leone at the time of writing, was it conceivable that ECOWAS countries could summon the will and resources to set up an intervention force to restore stability in Nigeria? (West Africa December 1998- January 1999).

The regional integration process, just like national economic development, is affected by external factors, and ECOWAS policy-makers have to be very conscious of this external factor. ECOWAS with Nigeria in the lead should take due account of external forces that work to discourage regional integration in Africa. On the assumption that global welfare is enhanced by free trade and that existing world trade pattern is based on comparative advantage, preferential arrangements for promoting intra-regional trade are generally viewed by the international community to be trade diversionary and therefore should not be encouraged (West Africa, 1993: 1257).

Finally, the study of Nigeria’s policy in ECOWAS between 1979-1997 has shown that, in the absence of a clear and consistent policy from Nigeria, ECOWAS will find significant progress extremely difficult. Hence the following recommendations are provided as viable options based on the findings of the study.
Recommendations:
With regard to above stated conclusions, ECOWAS can learn from the experience of the European Co-ordinating Office (European Office for Co-ordination and Balancing of Employment Supply and Demand) and establish an agency like an ECOWAS Citizens Bureau to act as an interregional labour clearing house capable of meeting effectively the need of industry, agriculture, and public services. It should also be capable of serving the interests and aspirations of the working classes by preventing any migration that would result in unemployment in the country receiving immigrants and a shortage of labour in the country from which they migrate (Asante, 1986: 161).

In this respect, it is therefore recommended that, intergovernmental agreements and legislation should lend themselves to organising systematic forms of more permanent co-operation among national employment services in order to make adequate provisions for maintaining a balance between labour supply and demand, based on a standard classification of the skills and jobs.

An agency similar to the EEC’s Administrative Commission for Social Security of Migrant Workers should be formed to specify the ways of assessing compensation between social security institutions of different member countries of ECOWAS and administer and interpret regulations governing this exercise. This agency could inter-alia ensure that there is equal treatment of all workers irrespective of nationality; and establish close co-operation between the social security institutions of ECOWAS countries. The application of the principle of the totalisation of insurance periods will also ensure that the pension rights of migrant workers are not lost (Asante, 1986: 162).

In order to avoid undesirable repercussions on both the strength and the direction of labour movements it is recommended that, ECOWAS establishes social security rights based upon many precedents in international welfare law - such as International Labour Convention No. 48 and the other similar bi-lateral agreements on reciprocity in this field- set during the past five decades, and upon the example of their application in the respective cases.

There are also such other social policy measures as establishment of vocational training institutions for training migrant community workers or the setting up of a social Fund like the European Social Fund designed to complement the free movement of labour protocol (Beever, 1969: 25-47). However, such measures may well seem at the moment to lie beyond the capability and resources of the fledgling ECOWAS. Yet
they are necessary as a first step toward giving the community a 'human face'.

Continuing conflicts in the region demand that comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and management, if the desired integration process is to be realised. Piecemeal approaches have not worked in the past. What is needed is an approach that focuses on the whole sub-region as a conflict system. This regional approach may involve the adjustment of some national borders, the deepening of democratic processes, including the devolution of power and the development of strong, viable local governments (Africa Analysis, 1999:15).

[The study recommends that in light of Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG and the controversy it sparked off, there is the ever-growing need for a regional approach to conflict resolution. Above all, the reduction of poverty, through the redistribution of national or regional resources is an essential way forward. Free movement of labour, capital and in certain cases, a common citizenship, together with the unification of the smaller, poorer states in the sub-region may be a collective way forward. Societies must be demilitarised and the politics of inclusiveness must be introduced. ECOWAS needs to have strength to map out all conflicts in the region and deal them in a regional approach].

Regional integration can not succeed in the face of political instability, as is manifested in the Liberian and Sierra Leone civil wars, which have absorbed much needed resources for development goals. Regional instability therefore retards economic growth and serves as a disincentive to investment (Bundu, 1997: 40-41). [What is needed, therefore, is for Nigeria to co-ordinate some kind of common security arrangement that would safeguard and guarantee the long-term peace and security of the region and meet the needs of all member states. The two protocols dealing with security addresses conflict between member states as well as aggression by external forces, and could form the basis for the consolidation of ECOMOG. With the limited resources at their disposal, member states could extend on-going public expenditure reforms to cover national defence spending, in the context of such a regional security system].

Security and stability must embrace the development of democratic institutions at the national level. Moreover, the required level of regional solidarity and community spirit can be expected to develop by itself, over time, through the accumulation of shared
experiences, growing awareness of the advantages of belonging to the community, or a clearer perception of common interests. This process could be actively reinforced through Nigeria’s promotion of the virtues of regional integration, while propagating knowledge and understanding of how regional co-operation can be used in support of national development goals (Bundu, 1997: 40-41). [Another salient recommendation to note from Nigeria’s involvement in ECOMOG, is, when the need for intervention arises, the basis and the limits should be clearly specified, and the legitimacy of the effort should never be left in doubt].

The question of funding should be properly addressed, considering the fact that very few member states were up-to-date with their subscriptions. There should be a broader role for ECOWAS; creating a civil constituency for peace (Africa Analysis, 1999: 494). ECOMOG should be a permanent feature in order to allow for the deployment of the force at short notice if the need arises. For this to be done however there ought to be a provision that all ECOWAS member countries should pull their weight. It is not fair on Nigeria that it should carry a disproportionate share of the burden all the time (West Africa, February 1998). [The study also recommends that, as a way of getting out of the financial quagmire involved in peacekeeping, Nigeria should champion the establishment of a peace keeping Fund or Bank. This fund or Bank could be set up with help of donor agencies from the developed world, from which funding could be tapped for peacekeeping. The peace keeping Bank or Fund would be advised by military experts as to the feasibility of any operation and would require reasonable guarantees of success before undertaking the venture].

[It is also recommended that a permanent peacekeeping force is built around the framework of ECOMOG and recognition of the various inadequacies in the ECOWAS Treaties and Protocols regarding conflict Resolution. There should be a movement away from the inaction or slow action when conflict erupted].

Preventive diplomacy is the best response to growing regional low intensity conflict, especially in West Africa where the political, social and geographical complexities make peacekeeping unattractive. At the same time, preventive diplomacy requires adequate early warning and the speedy response to a crisis. Moreover individual states should be encouraged to initiate preventive diplomacy, in consultation with regional
neighbours and the ECOWAS secretariat, in order to begin peace negotiations before conflicts escalate (African Security Review, 1997: 12). [Another recommendation is for Nigeria and ECOWAS to concentrate their energies on preventive diplomacy. Therefore national governments and international information should provide early warning networks to avert humanitarian disasters caused either by natural disasters or political conflicts].

[The study further recommends that, Nigeria and ECOWAS should have a proper appreciation of external factors that impinge upon their economies, especially the negative effects of external pressures, and should take steps to contain such pressures. This can be achieved when Nigeria undertake a thorough analysis of given development issues and determine the appropriate options for promoting West African interests. It is only when the region has a firm grasp of its short and long-term interests that it can gauge the true value of any proposals or prompting from sources external to the region].

With the inauguration of a new civilian government in Nigeria, it is hoped that ECOWAS will be given a boost from the perceived stability that the return to civil rule will bring to Nigeria. If the European Union took almost four decades to achieve a common market, ECOWAS should take inspiration from this and put in place real means and incentives for the realisation of its ultimate goal - a common market. Thus as Germany in the EU, Nigeria should bolster its dedication to the Community, which it has helped to create and sustain. Moreover, the Nigerian experience in ECOWAS as unravelled by this study should serve a focal point for the other African regional powers to emulate.
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Appendix i

A Map of West Africa Showing the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) member countries.

The Shaded countries are the original ECOMOG contributing States.
Note that it is only Senegal and Guinea-Conakry out of all the Francophone speaking states that contributed troops to the original ECOMOG force. However, Senegal pulled out after about 14 months.

Source: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.

Appendix ii

A sketch showing the regional involvement in the Liberia and Sierra Leone imbroglios.
Note the link between Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Liberia both as bases and conduits for the RUF's logistical and manpower supplies.
Note the concentration of rebel activities in the Eastern and Southern parts of Sierra Leone - the alluvial diamond mining areas, which have been vital to the sustenance of the RUF war machine.


Appendix iii

A sketch showing the network of Mining and Security companies involved the Sierra Leone crisis, thus further complicating an already complex scene for ECOMOG.
Note that Diamond Works, Executive Outcomes and Sandline International have all been sucked into the conflict in Sierra Leone.

Map of West Africa Showing ECOWAS Countries

Source: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1991
APPENDIX II  Source: Africa Confidential, 1998