The politics of leadership organizing in informal settlements: Ambiguities of speaking publicly and mediating conflicting institutional logics

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work. It is submitted to the University of Cape Town, for a Doctoral degree. It has not been submitted to any other university or institution.

Signature: Laura Drivdal
Date: 10.3.2014
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Abstract

This thesis examines the politics of leadership organizing in three informal settlements in Cape Town. Building on the facts that internal informal settlement politics is tense and leadership organizing fragmented and fluid, I focus on the politics of leadership organizing as internal negotiations of how leadership should be organized and what institutional logics should be adapted. The main argument is that the politics of leadership organizing consist of balancing bureaucratic and democratic logics, which are not an act of mimicking or decoupling, but have evolved through historical and context specific discursive practises. The tensions and political negotiations around how to balance these essentially conflicting logics concern to what degree the committees and leaders should engage in bureaucratic and administrative efforts securing order and development, or focus on internal mediation and democratic procedures to keep conflicts at bay.

By analysing leadership, organizing and politics at the informal settlement scale, the thesis is not only covering an empirical gap but also making a contribution to a niche of urban studies grappling with neighbourhood politics in South Africa. In order to contribute to these attempts and explore the politics of organizing, I suggest moving beyond instrumental and outcome descriptions of ‘politics of the belly’, leaders as heroes or villains, and organizations as rational. Instead seeing politics as a means-to-an-end and as arena specific, inspired by a mixture of new-institutionalism and Arendt’s philosophy, I frame politics as a human process of defining common concerns and negotiations over how these should be dealt with through specific ways of organizing. Interlinked with this, a social constructive process approach to organizations and leadership enables an analysis of the grounded symbolical sides of organizing practices and models. Further, within the framework of institutional pluralism, leadership politics entails the acts of balancing conflicting institutional logics by adapting and mediating different organizational models and practices.

Applied to analyse empirical insight from following leadership processes in three informal settlements over three years, the thesis provides insight into how the specific urban conditions of South African informal settlements impact on the politics of forming organizations and leadership.

Despite differences between the settlements, leadership practises and ideals displayed a similar focus on bureaucratic and democratic practises and models, indicating that these practises are institutionalised in relation to specific historic and pragmatic needs of urban informal settlements. Also, context specific behavioural norms restrict the conditions for speaking publicly and increase the need to adhere to bureaucratic and democratic logics. However, these logics are essentially conflicting. Hence, as the leadership committees are hybrid organizations in a setting of institutional plurality, leadership politics consist of balancing and adapting these different logics when tensions emerges both between leaders and between residents and leaders.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCT</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Congress of the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Community Policing Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Graveyard Pond</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANCO</td>
<td>South African National Civic Organization</td>
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Despite the chaotic setting, poverty and marginalization, the heterogeneous collection of residents and the variety of informal settlements, there is a reoccurring referral to ‘community leaders’ and ‘committees’. There are many diverging opinions about these committees and leaders, by residents, by NGOs, news reporters, government officials and researchers. They are described as ‘heroes’ who fight for the improvements of their neighbourhoods, or as ‘villains’ who opportunistically look for links to resources, engage in clientelism and exploit the residents through patronage. Indeed, patronage can be expected in such a setting, and it should also be expected that leaders might have both idealistic and personal motivations. However, the main interest in this thesis is not to form an opinion on or categorize these leaders. Rather, I am interested in how committees and leaders emerge and develop under the specific conditions of urban informal settlements in South Africa, and what this tells us about specific urban conditions.

This interest stems from the observation of similarities in different informal settlements regarding organizational practises and how both residents and leaders talk about organizational models - idealised organisational structures. With the assumption that organizational models are not just practical models but contain and symbolize deeper ideals, discourses and logics, it becomes interesting to look into why certain organizational models are presented. It appears that multiple internal ‘common concerns’, like security, tensions, conflicts and service delivery, are followed by an urge to organize committees in detail, and both bureaucratic and democratic models are highlighted as ideals. This is interesting, as bureaucracy and democracy, as two of the major institutions of modern society (Friedland and Alford 1991) on the one hand are related and interdependent, especially as the predictability and stability of bureaucratic procedures should ensure democratic quality. On the other hand, the organizing logics of bureaucracy and democracy are also contradicting each other (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, Peters 2010), and balancing these is challenging. Basically, my understanding of this contradiction is that bureaucratic organizing logics can be seen as promoting more rigid, specialized and hierarchical organisational models and procedures,
while democratic organizing logics often promote less specialized and more open organizing that can ensure participation and representation. These tensions are mostly examined at government levels in the tension between the bureaucratic and the political sides of the state; however, it seems that these logics are also relevant for politics at a neighbourhood scale. Hence, there is a politics of negotiating and balancing the organizational logics to which the committees and leaders should adhere in different situations.

Furthermore, bureaucratic and democratic organizational models seem to contradict the harsh realities of the settlement’s fragmented socio-political environment. Instead of assuming that portraying such models are mere acts of ‘mimicking’, these portrayals might have deeper roots which are specific to the history and socio-political context of informal settlements. This will be the main focus in this thesis.

1.2 The research problem

Globally and historically, ‘slums’, ‘informal settlements’ or ‘squatter camps’\(^1\) have received attention from a wide range of research disciplines. Historical and populist assumptions that urban informal settlements or slums are disorganized have been critiqued, and it is recognized that such spaces do not need to be sites of chaos and disorder (Whyte 1943, 1955, Wacquant 1997, 2008, Myers 2011). Main current focuses are how such settlements are impacted by national and global politics, how governments deal with these issues, and what social structures emerge out of such heterogeneous populations of low-income residents competing over scarce resources. Further, the particularities of the situation of the urban south, where informal settlements are endemic and often dominate cities, have received much attention during the last few decades, and are described with concepts such as ‘urban informality’ (Roy and Alsayyad 2004). In this thesis, I will not engage any of these major concepts directly as I am more interested in the politics that evolve internally in my specific cases. The main contribution of this thesis is rather aimed at the literature on politics in informal settlement in South Africa, which can be termed a localized niche of urban theory, grappling with South African neighbourhood politics, leadership and organizing.

\(^1\) Although these different concepts contain different meanings which could be debated, I will not engage in debates around these concepts here but choose to mainly make use of the concept ‘informal settlements’ as this is the most frequently used in the South African literature.
Scrutinizing contextual literature, the empirical gap is quite apparent, as calls have been made for analyses of local political and organizational practices in South African townships and informal settlements\(^2\) (Heller 2007, Sinwell 2008, 2012, Millstein 2010, Runciman 2011, Katsura 2012, Meth 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b). Meth (2012) concludes that examination of local political practice should continue to explore on-the-ground realities at the scales below and above the ward committees. Leaders and committees at the informal settlement scale are below the ward committees, but they have no formal definitions and are not formally part of the decentralised local government system, where the ward councils are the lowest level. These leaders and committees are central nodes in internal politics and power struggles in informal settlements, but besides Xaba’s (1994) account on ‘Leaders in Lindale’ (North of Durban), they have not really been the centre of analyses. Ethnographies on the everyday life of informal settlement dwellers (Bank 2011, Ross 2010) provide some indications, but are also not explicit about the formation of committee politics and leadership.

Studying different actors within local politics is important because South Africa is marked by an intensifying competition over the right to claim legitimate representation of ‘poor people in struggle’ (Stokke and Oldfield 2004). Additionally, studies on informal settlement upgrading and housing projects have underlined the need for an improved understanding of social and political dynamics within these spaces (Barry and Mayson 2000, Oldfield 2002, Allison 2002, Bénit 2002, Bähre 2007a, Barry et al. 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Lemanski 2008). A problem might be that most informal settlements case studies concentrate on cases of local government intervention, housing upgrading, or mobilizing towards government, thereby focusing on politics as a state-society issue. I will, in this thesis, look at settlements that are not undergoing a dramatic transformation, but still contain dramatic leadership politics.

Specifically, I will contribute to the lack of analysis of the politics of organizing. A reason for this gap is that politics, also in accounts on ‘everyday politics’, is focused on discussing politics as a fight over resources and as related to the arena of the state. This is visible in

\(^2\) A main difference between informal settlements and townships in South Africa is that informal settlements usually consist of only shack dwellings made of sink and wood, while townships often consist of legal concrete built houses and some shack dwellings. Hence, townships encompass larger areas of ‘formal’ housing, and usually several informal settlements nest within a township. As the three settlements of this study are located within townships, social and political dynamics at the township scale is relevant and literature on townships will be addressed and included in this thesis.
descriptions of informal settlements leaders. They are often portrayed as opportunist power-seeking actors, and have been described as warlords, (Xaba 1994, Morris and Hindson 1994), shacklords (Cross 2005, Cross 2006), and gatekeepers (Adler 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Schärf 2001, Barry and Ruhter 2005, Cross 2005, Barry 2006, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Staniland 2008). They are described as taking and abusing power or are even dictators that rule through fear. Certainly such leaders can and do occur in informal settlements, and deliberately increase in-fighting (Cole 1987, Cross 2006). Especially gatekeeping, which not necessarily involves any kind of visible violence, is likely to be common, due to the difficulties of securing transparency and accountability in this setting. I argue that, in order to understand the deeper sources of politics we need to move beyond notions of heroes and villains.

Hence, the broad coverage is that politics in informal settlements often concerns fights over resources (see e.g. Adler 1994, Barry 2006, Cross 2005, Staniland 2008), but there is little analysis of the deeper meanings behind organizational models. In some of the case studies on one or more informal settlements, surprisingly complex organizational models are mentioned. In other words, organizational models have been mentioned, but have not been analysed as implications of the institutional environment (Runciman 2011). The argument is therefore that, rather than seeing presentations of models as solely strategic, organizational models might display some of the norms and discourses of informal settlement life. It is central to ask how and why certain forms of leadership and organizations develop. By asking these questions, I aim to avoid the polarized debate on leadership power and assumptions that community leadership has only been created by people in search of power.

The problem of the dominance of Marxian and neo-liberal approaches

The dominance of instrumental and outcome-oriented studies of politics, organizing and leadership might be related to the dominance of both liberal and neo-Marxist paradigms in urban theory. Particularly Marxist-inspired political economy accounts, including critiques of neo-liberalism, seem to be popular in urban South African studies. However, there is an emerging critique of the dominance of Marxian-based political economy and its ongoing quest to criticize neo-liberalism in urban theory (McQuarrie and Marwell 2010, McFarlane 2011, Parker and Sites 2012). Also in South African urban literature, the focus on blaming neo-liberalism is critiqued and alternatives to neo-Marxian political economy perspectives are
requested (Mamdani 2001, Parnell and Robinson 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a). Notably, these critiques do not propose that political economy and other Marxian-based studies are unimportant. Rather, they suggest that alternative analytical perspectives could compliment this literature and perhaps provide different insights. In order to comply with these requests, I will adhere to the suggestions of rather applying perspectives from new-institutionalism to urban theory (Lowndes 2001, 2009, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010). This will enable me to move beyond instrumental and outcome-oriented accounts of politics, organizing and leadership, and analyse articulations of plural and sometimes conflicting organizational logics and processes with a social constructivist approach. With this approach I aim to move beyond descriptions of ‘politics of the belly’, leaders as heroes or villains, and organizations as being solely instrumental. It implies that leadership practices and presentations of models are not analysed as ‘truths’, nor as mere results of co-optation and mimicking, but as impacted by the specific historical and contextual norms of the field from whence they emerge. This framework will be outlined below and expanded on in the theory chapter.

1.3 The theoretical framework, the research question and argument

As noted above, I am drawing on the suggestions of applying new-institutionalism, both to add analysis of organizations beyond the dominating Marxian political economy and liberalist Chicago school in urban theory (McQuarrie and Marwell 2010), and to enable analysis of how urban politics is formed in the current context of fragmented governance setups (Lowndes 2001, 2009). This seems uncommon in the South African literature on urban neighbourhood politics, and I will therefore explain and compare these theories in relation to South African urban literature in the theory chapter. For now, I will give a brief introduction. Basically, the framework implies a social constructive perspective for analysing informal settlement organizational models and politics, based on specific ways of perceiving and approaching politics, organizing and leadership:

First, regarding politics, I will combine a new-institutionalist focus on the politics of organizational forms (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall and Taylor 1996) with Arendt’s ideas of politics beyond means-to-an-end (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Villa 1992). This redirects the attention from means-to-end analysis of politics as a fight over resources, towards exploring politics as negotiations over how to organize when dealing with common concerns. Politics is considered as an end in itself (as autotelic) and an essential human
activity instead of merely necessary for creating outcomes or an activity linked to the arena of the state. Further, by viewing politics as a value on its own and fundamentally different from the sphere of the home, where individual and economic issues are the focus, it looks beyond Marxian or neo-liberal approach ideas of politics as instrumental means to an end and as resource fights. This enables analysing political dynamics beyond individual economic survival strategies, even in the marginalized urban populations of informal settlements where there are intense fights over scarce resources. Lastly, if politics requires processes of speaking publicly, bureaucratization that sometimes minimizes public discussions might be a threat, and the classical tension between democratic and bureaucratic organizing logics is thereby relevant to discuss further.

Secondly, new-institutionalism implies a specific way of analysing organizations, based on how they form in relation to their institutional environment. The basic assumption is that institutions, as rather abstract foundations of societies, provide regulative, normative and cultural cognitive guidelines to how organizations form (Scott 2008). Since institutions are defined as the more enduring features of social life, organizations adapt to them in order to increase legitimacy and to improve chances of survival (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This implies a fundamental social constructive perspective, analysing processes and practises of organizing rather than framing organizations as fixed entities (Czarniawska 2008a) and exploring the possible meanings of organizational models, ideals and logics applied and presented. Taking into account the informal settlement context of organizational and social fluidity, I have adapted a recent body of literature of institutional pluralism (Greenwood et al. 2011), reflecting on how organizations, confronted by a complex and plural institutional environment, need to apply and negotiate plural and sometimes conflicting institutional logics (Yu 2013).

Third, the framework includes a similar socially constructive approach to leadership. Leadership is often associated with personalities and psychology, and because leadership contain strong symbolic features, leaders are often portrayed as either ‘heroes’ or ‘villains’ (Collinson 2005). This results in rather normative conceptions of good or bad leaders. Instead, leadership can be analysed as a social phenomenon under constant construction, and the form of leadership does not only reflect the leader himself/herself, but also his surroundings. This is promoted in a social constructive ‘relational perspective’ on leadership,
which directs attention to how leaders are socially constructed in relation to their context and their followers (Dachler and Hosking 1995). Conceiving leadership as contextually situated refocuses the attention to analysing discourses and properties of leadership practises *in situ* (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003, Denis *et al.* 2012), including the incoherence and tensions in leadership discourses and practise (Uhl-Bien 2006). Hence, leaders portrayals of practises and organizational models will not be perceived as ‘truths’, but analysed as socially constructed - as both pragmatic and symbolical reflections of contextual and historical norms/discourses.

This theoretical framework will be applied to analyse the empirical insights gained by following leaders and residents in three of Cape Town’s informal settlements for three years. With this as broad framework, the empirical research question, which initiated this thesis - ‘why are there informal settlements leaders and why do they display similar bureaucratic and democratic ideal models?’ - formed into a more theoretical related question:

*How are context specific conditions of speaking publicly and plural institutional logics informing the politics of leadership organizing in informal settlements?*

This question reflects a move away from a rational-choice analysis of leadership patronage. Rather, it introduces a focus on how leadership organizing is formed in relation to the specific urban context within which it emerges, and how the ongoing negotiations of organizational and leadership models is essentially politics.

The question reflects the main argument in this thesis: That an aspect of the politics of informal settlement leadership organizing consists of balancing contextually evolved bureaucratic and democratic logics.

1.4 Outline of the thesis and sub research questions

**Chapter two**, the theory chapter, will first give a brief review over contextually relevant literature followed by charting the gap to which I will contribute. Further, it will discuss the framework for analysing the politics of leadership organizing, inspired by new-institutionalism, as outlined above. I will indicated implications of the choice of overall theoretical focus on the politics of negotiating and balancing organizational models, which
enables an analysis of politics beyond arenas and economic outcome, of organizations beyond rational and instrumental, and leaders beyond heroes or villains.

**Chapter three** specifies that an empirical gap exists of analysing politics, organizing and leadership internally at the scale of informal settlement neighbourhoods. Thereafter, building on the assumption that historically institutional roots matter, I give an overview of literature and historical accounts mentioning committees and leadership in South African informal settlements. Specifically, three roots of informal settlement committees are identified: The organizing of community policing, the organizing of the township based anti-apartheid social movements, and instalment of committees by external actors. Together these three different roots indicate that organizing and leadership and the scale of informal settlements are shaped through diverging historical processes.

**Chapter four** will reflect on methodology, particularly related to issues of accessing and interpreting organizational and leadership presentations in informal settlements. Throughout the chapter, I will engage in a critical discussion of reflexivity, which is essential in a social constructivist epistemological grounding to increase validity. Pragmatically, I will outline the research design of a multiple case study of leadership committees in three informal settlements. Thereafter, I will outline all the methods applied, and discuss the choice of mostly qualitative methods, linked to how to best answer the research question and in relation to methods promoted by the applied literature (informal settlement and organizational literature). During the three years of field visits, the settlements were visited approximately once a week, following settlement and committee processes, attending community meetings, carrying out interviews and surveys, and engaging in loose conversation with residents and leaders. Especially important and useful was treading lightly in the field, trying multiple methods, triangulating information from different sources and different methods, and observing committee processes unfold over time. In addition to numerous residents, 12 leaders are included in the thesis, but some were visited more often than others.

Thereafter, the four analysis chapters follow. In these, the politics of leadership organizing will be analysed as socially constructed by applying perspectives and theories from institutional studies of leadership and organizing. Explicit contributions to the major research question will be interrogated through a sub-question in each chapter. The two first analysis
chapters will examine the institutional environment by focusing on how informal settlement leaders are socially constructed through context specific organizational practises, and by analysing the conditions of acting politically by speaking publically. This is important as social constructive perspective sees leadership as a social reality, embedded in and inseparable from context (Dachler and Hosking 1995, Osborn et al. 2002, Uhl-Bien 2006). The last two analysis chapters are framed by institutional pluralism theories and looking at how the committees are shaped by and balance plural organizational logics.

Chapter five starts by introducing the three informal settlements of this study. This is important to set the stage, specify the cases and make them comparable. Thereafter, I will shed light on the social construction of informal settlement leaders and committees by discussing some of the contextual specific institutionalised practises that they are informed by. The specific research question for this chapter is consequently:

*How are informal settlement committees and leaders shaped through context specific institutionalised practises?*

Despite the differences between the settlements, there are similar practises that inform the social construction of committees and leadership, reflect some general internal common concerns of informal settlement. Further, instead of simply noting that informal settlements consist of a *bricolage* of discursive practises and that committees are hybrid organizations in a plural institutional environment, I identify and discuss three specific practises: mediating and regulating internal order, mobilizing, and intermediary negotiation. The difference between these practises and the expectations they create sets the stage for analysing the politics of negotiating plural institutional logics in chapter seven and eight.

Chapter six, based on the aim to move from perceiving politics as means-to-an-end towards exploring the political processes of negotiating organizing models, consider aspects of the social-contextual conditions of the internal public realm. This require moving beyond the organizational culture of the committee and look into the specific public culture from which they emerge. As these leaders and committees are dealing with politics in the sense of negotiating how do deal with ‘common concerns’, the institutional environment of the public realm is vital. I will adhere to Arendt’s concept of the public realm (Villa 1992) - the realm in
which issues of the commons are debated, standing in opposition to the private sphere of the home where private issues are carried out. The research question is hence:

What are the conditions of the internal public realm and of speaking publicly?

Two aspects of the public realm will be addressed: the public-private division, and normative or discursive constraints on speaking publicly. In addition to the heterogeneous population and the conditions of poverty, crime, deprivation, fear and inequality, the physical conditions of informal settlements where people live densely and share facilities like toilets and water taps forms a quite particular public setting. Looking at both quantitative and ethnographic elements, this chapter indicates a fragile public realm. Especially, statistical social dynamics, conditions of public space and residents’ relations to the public-private divide will be explored, in addition to how normative ideas related to the stigma of living in informal settlements impact on the willingness of residents to speak publicly. This suggests that the internal public realm provides a tension between urban individuality versus disciplinary norms, which should impact on what organizational models are presented as symbolizing legitimacy, as will be investigated further in the following chapter.

Chapter seven discusses how leaders present and claim legitimacy through displaying both bureaucratic and democratic logics. In line with the new-institutionalist premise that organizations adapt to the institutional environment to gain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 2008), I will analyse how leaders’ presentations of organizing models are reflections of the particular urban environment of South African informal settlements. Specifically, bureaucratic and democratic logics and ideals will be discussed in relation the context of hybrid identities (Bank 2011) and historical discourses of informal settlement life. The research question for this analysis chapter is therefore:

How and why are leaders presenting both democratic and bureaucratic logics in asserting legitimacy with residents?

As the committees are hybrid, the presentations of plural institutional logics are not seen as signs of de-coupling, but will be analysed as grounded in local practises and adjusted to the specific urban conditions of informal settlements. Hence, the specific presentations of
democratic and bureaucratic models will be outlined, and linked to contextual behavioural norms, conditions of speaking publicly and certain historical logics of organizing (discourses). This chapter indicates a specific urban condition, where democratic logics are applied to contrast ‘rural’ traditional models which are linked to the history of indirect rule, while bureaucratic logics are central to contrast the particularly instable and insecure situation of living in informal settlements.

Chapter eight analyses how democratic and bureaucratic logics are balanced and applied in practise to deal with internal tensions, committee conflicts and changes. With the assumption that ‘legitimacy politics’ - how leaders negotiate conflicts and carry out adaptive work though balancing institutional logics (Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013) are relevant to informal settlement politics, committee processes and conflicts in each of the three settlements will be compared. Particular attention will be given to how different democratic and bureaucratic organisational models are applied and promoted in these conflicts. The research question for this chapter is:

How is the politics of balancing democratic and bureaucratic institutional logics reflected in committee changes and conflicts?

It will show how particularly two different democratic logics are central: the discursive historical memories of unity, versus a need for organizing plural voices in the heterogeneous settlements. Further, balancing the democratic procedures with working bureaucratically towards practical administrative-based upgrading is also important. A central problem that when the committees withdraw to bureaucratic administrative work without engaging democratic procedures, leaders might be detached from residents can lead to fatigue and increased tensions due to suspicions of corruption. Balancing these logics is vital in dealing with committee conflicts and changes, and the

The final chapter nine, will return to the research question and discuss how, together, the analysis chapters have answered the research question.
CHAPTER 2 Theorising politics, organizing and leadership in urban informal settlements

2.1 Introduction

In South African urban literature, specific calls have been made to enhance the understanding of local politics and power dynamics at the scale of townships and informal settlements (Heller 2007, Sinwell 2008, 2012, Millstein 2010, Katsaura 2012, Meth 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b). However, most these works are focused on state-society political interaction and less on internal politics at a neighbourhood scale. In this thesis, I will heed this call, giving an empirically grounded analysis of the social construction of ‘community leaders’ and their ‘politics’ in South African informal settlements.

This chapter will centre on how I aim to contribute to urban South African literature, focusing on local politics, by applying a specific theoretical approach to politics, leadership and organizing in informal settlements. This theoretical approach is inspired by new-institutionalism and the recent development of institutional pluralism. In essence, this approach moves away from an instrumentalist and outcome-oriented perspective, which is common in the South African urban governance literature.

The first part of this chapter outlines fundamental insights into the context of South African informal settlement politics. These portray conditions of internal organizational fragility and fragmentation, multiple urban identities and norms reflecting the conditions of instability. Following this is a discussion of the lack of attention to politics of organizational models, identifying three accounts in South African urban literature to which this thesis specifically contributes. The overall theoretical framework of new-institutionalist perspectives on politics, organizing and leadership will then be introduced, which implies moving beyond instrumental liberal and neo-Marxian inspired studies in urban theory (McQuarrie and Marwell 2010, Lowndes 2001, 2009). Thereafter, this theoretical framework will be discussed in detail. First I will outline a combination of new-institutionalism an Arendtian view on politics, which allows an examination of politics as negotiations over how to organize around common concerns, in addition to bringing attention to the tension between
bureaucratic and democratic logics. Secondly, the new-insitutionalist fundament of leadership and organizations as a socially constructed in relation to the institutional environment will be outlined. This enables considering the embedded symbolical and practical values of organizational models. In order to adapt this to the specific context, the more recent theories of institutional pluralism and competing institutional logics is relevant for analysing leadership beyond categorizing heroes or villains, but rather formed by and manoeuvring within a fragmented and complex institutional setting. Simply put, the framework enables a focus on the politics of negotiating organizational and leadership ideals, models and practises.

2.2 Context and conditions of politics in SA informal settlements
Before discussing the gap and theoretical framework, I will outline three streams of literature indicating the background to the tense, fragmented and fluid setting in South African informal settlements. I will not add to these three streams directly, but rather build on and draw them into the analysis.

2.2.1 From government oppression and neglect to government interventions
National politics and policies are significant for the internal developments in informal settlements. Illustratively, here are descriptions of the informal settlement called ‘Crossroads', one of the most well-known informal settlements in Cape Town\(^3\). The settlement and its internal politics from its beginnings in 1975 changed in relation to changing national politics and politics (Cole 1987). In the early years of the settlement (1976-1978), the picture is of a peaceful settlement where the threat of forced removal or eviction and the common struggle to survive ensured that residents from different backgrounds collaborated and even shared a common Crossroads culture (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980, Cole 1987). Kiewiet and Weichel (1980) illustrate how internal organizing developed into a bureaucracy of subcommittees\(^4\), noting that democracy survived well. Related to this, studies of other settlements and

\(^3\) ‘Crossroads’ was one of the first really large informal settlements in Cape Town. It was started in 1975 and was meant to be a ‘transit camp’, but grew to house around 20 000 people in five years (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980).

\(^4\) Describing this system in detail, they write: *The main committee consisted of natural leaders from various parts of the camp elected to office by ballot. This committee became responsible of subcommittees to deal with everyday problems. A bureaucracy developed. There was a committee responsible for sanitation, another for the encouragement of house painting, a youth group, a school committee, a peace-keeping committee, and so on ... More committees developed, - in the end there were dozens of committees, but the whole system was interlinked* (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980: 69)
Townships underline how organizing against crime, due to governmental neglect to deal with internal security issues, became central during this time (Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Shearing 2001, Seekings 2001).

However, a different picture of Crossroads emerges a few years later. Changes in state policy towards intensifying social and political control over the African population through the migrant labour system created tension and violence in these spaces. From 1979, once it had been agreed that Crossroads would be legalized, the struggle for political control within the community and for housing in New Crossroads led to increasing schisms and violence, aggravated by government policies of ‘divide and rule’ (Burman and Schärf 1990:701). Internal fights started between different leaders, which from 1983 escalated into what has been termed an ‘internal war’ in 1986 (Cole 1987, Schärf 2001, Watson 2003, Cross 2005). Cole (1987) emphasises that this tense political climate was shaped by strategies of and interactions between internal leaders and appointed representatives of local and central state.

With the advent of democracy, a different range of state interventions were established. New housing policies demanded more direct interaction between local government and informal settlements on upgrading (Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006). A majority of cases studies on informal settlements have analysed problematic consequences of government-initiated upgrading projects, like community breakdown, internal divisions, misunderstandings, corruption and even crime (Morris and Hindson 1994, Adler 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Allison 2002, Oldfield 2000, 2002, Robins 2002b, Bénit 2002, Huchzermeyer 2002, Barry 2006, Cross 2006, Bähre 2007a, Barry et al. 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Barry et al. 2007, Lemanski 2008, Lizarralde and Massyn 2008, Oldfield and Zweig 2010). It is generally found that conflicts and tension emerge from interventions linked to resources, followed by political conflicts and suspicion around who gets what. When employment is added to the mix, competition and suspicion over positions often evolved into internal fighting (Allison 2002, Skuse and Cousins 2007). Bähre (2007a:81) points out that state development led to fierce and violent conflicts in which mafia-style leaders, rivalling political factions, as well as protesting residents, tried to take charge of the development project. Bénit summarizes:

... 'community' participation in the design and implementation of the development project, which is seen by conventional wisdom as the condition of its success, may also lead to the outbreak of violence (Hindson, Beyerly and
Morris, 1994; Crankshaw, 1996; Huchzermeyer, 2001). It seems rather utopian, and may even be dangerous, to expect social justice to emerge from a social process of participation (Visser, 2001), and to see a fair and democratic compromise in the result of what is often merely violent conflict. (Bénit 2002:48)

The problem is that on the one hand, connections to external actors are essential for development; but on the other hand, external interventions can lead to internal fighting, which again can hamper developments. Technical-oriented interventions are sometimes followed by intervention by contesting political parties (Smit 2006, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Barry et al. 2007, Harber 2011), and are linked to a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, or where external protagonists make use of internal divisions within the communities (Bénit 2002). Additionally, not only local government interventions, but also other actors like NGOs, can cause fragmentation and corruption. Robins’ (2008:78) case study shows that despite an NGOs attempt to create a ‘deep democracy’ when initiating an upgrading process, the settlements leadership established a centralized style of leadership that tightly controlled resources in fundamentally anti-democratic ways.

Some of these studies acknowledge the importance of community capacity and the relevance of internal differences between residents prior to state interventions (Adler 1994, Oldfield 2002, Smit 2006, Lemanski 2008). While Lemanski (2008) raises the point that barriers of language and political affiliation, predominantly tied to racial identity, hinder unity, she acknowledges that diversity does not automatically imply division. Agreeing with Oldfield (2000, 2002), Lemanski (2008) argues that community capacity is strengthened if residents have engaged in a struggle towards a common goal. Oldfield (2002) shows that, despite differences across racial, language and political divides, unity can develop through fighting a common cause. This is similar to how the struggle against state removal in Crossroads united the residents in the early period of its existence (Cole 1987).

Summing up, the studies of linking changes in state policy to informal settlements show how internal conflicts often emerge as a result of external intervention. The notion of ‘becoming politicised’ is linked to this (Bénit 2002, Oldfield and Zweig 2010, Millstein 2011), a notion that I will challenge later in this chapter.
2.2.2 Post-apartheid fragmentation of civic politics and organizing

The major change towards democracy has extensively been analysed as significant to the fragmentation of social and political organizing in townships and informal settlements. In the apartheid period, especially ‘the turbulent 80s’, civil organizations mushroomed and nurtured a strong popular political culture, potentially conservative, but most of all fundamentally attached to freedom and democracy (Desai 2002, Heller 2007). However, with the transition to a new democracy in 1994, township committees and community organizing declined and became fragmented (Adler and Steinberg 2000, Cherry et al. 2000, Heller 2003, 2007, Oldfield and Stokke 2006, Ballard et al. 2006, Dwyer 2006, Robins 2008, Zuern 2011). In my reading, these accounts discuss two specific impacts of this enduring fragmentation on township and informal settlement organizing and politics:

On the one hand, a loss of a unified social movement with a common goal has led to fragmentation into several organizations, which compete over legitimacy claims. There is a range of NGOs, CBOs and social movements who claim to be legitimate representatives of ‘poor people in struggle’ (Oldfield and Stokke 2006:130), and that take up the role of intermediary negotiators between ‘the poor’ and government. Illustrative is also the constant popping up of both protests and organizations or ‘popcorn civics’ (Bond 2005, Zuern 2011:140), incidents of ‘parallel organizations’ (Skuse and Cousins 2007, Drivdal in press), and individuals ‘with several hats’ (moving between positions in civil society as activists, ward councillors as government representatives, local economic entrepreneurs and affected residents5) (Cherry et al. 2000, Harber 2011:34, Zuern 2011:120). The implication is a confusing organizational setting with lack of transparency.

On the other hand, fragmentation can be an advantage as it provides a range of opportunities, and plural civil society can be seen as a sign of a healthy democracy (Habib 2005). Heller (2003) optimistically argues that the decline of the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO), which was intended to coordinate local civic action6 has been accompanied by a revitalization of local civics, and many have described an upsurge of new or alternative civil movements or ‘new voices of protest’ (Heller 2003, Habib 2005, Ballard

5 Cherry et al. (2000) terms this lack of separation between elected representation and civic leadership ‘confused identities’, while Lucas (2000: 172) leans towards an agency perspective and describes a political entrepreneur combining features of a patron, warlord and broker – blending illegitimate and legitimate features.

6 For an analysis of SANCO, see Heller (2007), Seekings (2011) and Zuern (2011 chapter 4).
et al. 2006, Dwyer 2006, Zuern 2011). It enables the urban poor to use a variety of channels, including patrons (i.e. clientelism), civic organization, occupational interest groups and political parties (Cherry et al. 2000). It also enables organizations to use plural strategies; while the previously more ‘united’ social movement protesting apartheid clearly confronted the state, post-apartheid civil organizations are more dynamic and can combine collaborative strategies and confrontational or unlawful approaches (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Thorn and Oldfield 2011, Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011).

2.2.3 Urban identities and norms of order

Common to the two explanation streams above is an analysis of the impact of macro politics and policy on informal settlements. However, politics and organizing does not only develop in relation to external pressure, but internally; micro social systems and socially constructed norms evolve constantly (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012). This is also in line with international literature, which rejects disorganization theories and generally highlighted that ‘slums’ or informal settlements do not need to be sites of chaos and disorder (Whyte 1943, 1955, Wacquant 1997, 2008, Myers 2011). Insights into micro social systems at the neighbourhood scale are particularly prominent in ethnographic research, attempting to resist pre-assumptions based on macro-structural explanation models (Whyte 1943). They analyse social institutions and identities, and, although not always a main issue, indicate how everyday activities impact on organizational processes. I have noticed particularly two findings in ethnographic accounts on South African informal settlement: the notion of hybrid identities and norms of decency and order.

First, it is noted that urban informal settlement dwellers encompass multiple and flexible urban identities (Robins 2002a, Robins 2008, Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, Bank 2011). The notion of urban dwellers’ multiple identities and rationalities is also reflected in contemporary writings on ‘Southern’ urban settings (Pieterse 2010, Myers 2011). Myers (2011:80) describes a modernist and non-modernist mixture of rationalities visible in the mechanisms, norms and forms shaped by urban dwellers, and Robins (2008) shows how informal settlement residents are capable of switching between identities and repertoires. Interestingly, Banks (2011) discusses how multiple partly modernized identities have been present in township life since the 1950s. With such multiple identities, politics around how issues of the commons should be organized can be expected to be complicated.
Secondly, studies striving to make sense of people’s experiences using people’s own everyday life categories have indicated that norms of order and decency are pertinent. These norms are visible in concerns around crime as indecent behaviour and inform internal regulations, indicated in ethnographies of violence and vigilantism (Buur 2003, 2006, 2008, Salo 2004, Buur and Jensen 2004a 2004b). Further, norms of order are influenced by context-specific feelings of marginalization, and stigma, and by the fact that life in informal settlements is signified by uncertainty and instability⁷ (Ross 2010). Residents deal with this instability and the fear of stigma by engaging the discourse of ‘ordentlikheid’, which signifies respectability and decency or dignity (Salo 2003, 2009, Ross 2006, 2010, Jensen 2008). It implies that external appearances are important, being clean and neat and living as decent as possible, in addition to sociability and behaving decently, friendly and modestly (Ross 2005). Although this concept was identified among Afrikaans-speaking informal settlement dwellers, concerns about decency have been documented in Xhosa-dominated informal settlements too, described as the stigma of living in a ‘bad area’ (Bray and Brandt 2007, Meth 2013). Reminded by Simone’s (2010) indication that the complexity of the city educes a multitude of attempts to create order, the norm of ordentlikheid can be understood as a similar process in individuals lives where attempts to portray order might be a reflection of unstable and fragile personal life and futures. The embarrassment and shame that people feel about living in informal dwellings and not houses, is followed by a portrayal of being neat and proper (Ross 2010).

Interestingly, comparing these two insights, a conflict can be sensed when linking urban identities to individual freedom, and norms of decency to socially disciplinary effects. This tension, and its implications for leadership legitimacy, will be discussed further in the analysis chapters, six and seven.

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⁷ She describes conditions where attempts to create predictability and routine in everyday life are punctured by violence and lack, where stability is limited and the even most strenuous efforts often secure only temporary well-being, and where interpersonal and structural violence sometimes intercept to render life in its crudest terms (Ross 2010:5).
2.3 A gap in analysing the politics of organizational models in SA informal settlements

While the contextual accounts above explain the general background of politics and organizing in informal settlements, I am in this thesis interested in the meanings of the very specific organizational and leadership models developed internally in informal settlements and the politics around these developments. I will therefore move to discussing how this seems to be a gap in the contextual urban literature and how I generally aim to approach this gap.

2.3.1 General contextual agreements and the gap of analysing organizational models

Most South African case studies mentioning politics, organizing and leadership in informal settlements highlight the effects of the above described context of civic fragmentation and social and political fluidity. The settlements are depicted as ‘lacking a sense of community’, compromising of social heterogeneity and instability (Cole 1987, Adler 1994, Hindson and McCarthy 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Bénit 2002, Oldfield 2002, Allison 2002, Huchzermeyer 2004, Smit 2006, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Bähre 2007a, Barry et al. 2007, Lemanski 2008). With heterogeneity, some contestations and disagreements should be expected. Illustratively, Bähre (2007a) emphasises that opposing groups continuously develop, because as soon as one is destroyed a new political opponent emerges. Leaders and committees are central in these tensions and are mentioned in several of the informal settlement studies. Linked to Mamdani’s (1996) argument that local despotism infected townships (Heller 2007), these leaders are certainly not romanticized and are more often portrayed as villains than heroes as opportunist power-seeking actors, involved in struggles over scarce resources. They have been termed ‘warlords’, (Xaba 1994, Morris and Hindson 1994), ‘shacklords’ (Cross 2005, Cross 2006), and ‘gatekeepers’ (Adler 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Schärf 2001, Barry and Ruhter 2005, Cross 2005, Barry 2006, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Staniland 2008). To mention some examples, Cross (2005) depict ‘shackleaders’ as ‘quasi-political leaders or gatekeepers’ who claim control over development work and collected payments from rural migrants and followers in the community. In comparing two areas, Xaba (1994) describes how in one area leadership with oligarchic tendencies emerge, while in the other, a strong dictator-like leadership developed out of a

8 Similarly, Seekings (2006) underline that township youth should also be viewed beyond heroes and villains.
‘Hobbesian state of nature’. Undoubtedly, there are opportunities for patronage and power abuse in a context where resources are scarce and transparency low. Further, it is difficult to recognize ‘legitimate actors’:

A critical feature of informal settlement is that there cannot be legitimate representative control. It may be claimed by one or more groups, but this cannot be credibly tested. There is therefore enormous difficulty in creating conflict resolution mechanisms, and the stable, legitimate civil organisation which is a prerequisite for successful formal development and secure neighbourhood life (Adler 1994: 109).

Although this conclusion was made 20 years ago, problems identifying legitimate actors prevail. Drawing the different contributions together, it is clear that leadership politics in this setting is signified by tension and conflicting claims of representation. While this is apparent, there are few studies that go further and reflect over the deeper discursive contents of political, organizational and leadership processes.

Fundamentally, I do not disagree that conflicts and patronage should be expected and do occur informal settlements, but assume that there is more to leadership organizing and politics than this. I am specifically interested in presentations of organizational models and ideals, and argue that analysing the politics of negotiating organizational models can help us understand the grounded complexity of politics in these particular urban spaces. In the literature outlined above, little analytical attention is directed at organizational models and ideals. When organizational models are mentioned, they are often treated as curiosities rather than interesting opportunities for deeper analysis. Heller (2007:18) briefly mentions that surprisingly formal procedures and democratic norms govern organizational life in townships, generally. In informal settlement case studies, organizational models and practises are treated as empirical curiosities (Barry et al. 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007). In a side comment, Barry et al. (2007:185) remark that the Wallacedene community established a sophisticated set of rules to guide the settlement and life within it, enforced by informal courts. Skuse and Cousins (2007) are surprised by the sophisticated organization models applied in their informal settlement case study9. Despite these surprises, they do not further

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9 This is because they argue that it is generally accepted that informal areas do not have street committees, as these are civic structures particular to formal, established townships and thus embodies a specific set of assumptions, values, scope for action and institutional capacity.
discuss how and why these practises and models emerge, except to assume that the formalistic models are results of governmental co-optation or mimicking. A comment on the lack of analysing organizational models is made in the related field of urban South African social movements. In a comment on Sinwell (2011), Runciman (2011) agrees with Sinwell that a greater critical engagement with internal dynamics in organizations is necessary, but comments that Sinwell’s analysis does not go far enough into the dynamics he urges scholars to explore, and therefore Runciman argues that:

….analysis should pay greater attention to the role organizational forms have in shaping movement politics and identity. The lack of attention to the organizational features of social movements is prevalent within the literature as they are generally taken as descriptive rather than analytic features of movements.
(Runciman 2011: 608)

In other words, as the outcome of organizations is the major focus, there is a lack of analysis of the process and meanings of organizational forms.

2.3.2 Relevant steps towards this gap: Community politics and circulation of models

In this thesis, I argue that analysing how politics evolve around negotiating the legitimacy of certain organizational models and practises can contribute to a small field of urban studies within South Africa. Therefore, the main theoretical aim of this thesis is to contribute to a niche within urban ‘governance’ studies, focusing on local governance, politics and leadership in urban South Africa.

Before discussing the theoretical framework that I will apply, I will outline some relevant studies in the South African urban governance literature to which this thesis aims to contribute. In my readings, I found the contributions of Katsaura (2012), Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012) and Skuse and Cousins (2007) particularly relevant.

In relation to politics generally, steps are taken towards analysing political dynamics at the neighbourhood scale. Katsaura (2012) argues that we need to move from a concept of community governance to community politics. This is linked to the problems of romanticizing the local with concepts like community governance and ‘social capital’. The critique of the ‘community’ approach is also evident in some of the studies of informal
settlements, highlighting internal conflicts and problems of representation as outlined earlier.

In a review of the much quoted book *We are the poors* by Desai (2002), Kessel asks: ‘Who exactly are the people making up this "community," and how do they relate to the proclaimed "community leaders"? What defines a "community"?’ (Kessel 2002:1).

Analysing ‘community politics’ as suggested by Katsaura (2012) is one way of moving beyond the traps of romanticizing communities as a conflict-free unit. While I agree that analysis of politics is necessary at any scale of society, I suggest that moving this forward also requires a deeper discussion on what politics is. In the study, he does not define politics directly, beyond describing the *political realm as a realm of power struggles, control, domination, conflict and political partnerships* (Katsaura 2012:339). With this definition and with his referral to Bayart’s classical study ‘the politics of the belly’, it seems he views politics in the African context as a fight over material resources.

As will be outlined later, I suggest that politics, besides direct confrontations over resources, is also about negotiations of models and logics that ‘ought to be applied’ to deal with common concerns. This implicates that, beyond direct confrontations, analysis must include more mundane practices, expression of ideals and norms, and more ‘invisible’ power dynamics. With this perspective, I am more interested in the politics of negotiating organizational and leadership models. This is political, because the models negotiated imply ideas about how common concerns should be solved.

Some steps towards analysing organizing models and leadership in urban South African areas are taken with acknowledgements that multiple organizational practices and models have developed over time. Two accounts are relevant in this regard:

First, and in relation to the contextual features of multiple identities (Bank 2011), I find specifically relevant Skuse and Cousins’ (2007) view that a ‘bricolage of discursive practices’ emerge in informal settlements, and the application of these different discursive practices reflects competency and literacy in community organizing. It fits with Oldfield and Stokke’s (2006) argument that plural organizational strategies and practices are employed by township-based organizations. However, as the notion of a *bricolage* is vague, I am interested
in the emergence of specific patches of this *bricolage* and the politics of stitching together these.

Secondly, Bénit-Gbaffou *et al.* (2012a, 2012b), in investigating urban South African security governance, brings attention to the fact that local leaders are central in the circulation of organizational models. These papers argue that neo-liberalism is useful but insufficient to understand local leadership practises, which have evolved historically in relation to the very specific local and national political developments. It is thereby acknowledged that organizing models have developed over time and imported models are adapted to these contextual and historical practises, in a process of ‘local appropriation of global discourses’. In other words, practises at the neighbourhood scale are impacted by macro politics and policies, but are modified and adapted to specific local contextual practises over time. This process of local appropriation, where local leaders are central fits with Skuse and Cousins’ (2007) claim that global human rights discourses are appropriated into informal settlement discursive practises. I see this process of appropriation as relevant not only to local urban security governance, but also to the politics of organizing at the scale of informal settlement as well. Additionally, the understanding that it is important to include a historical account of the emergence of practises (Bénit-Gbaffou *et al.* 2012a, 2012b) is relevant to this thesis.

Building on and adding to these insights, I will now introduce a theoretical framework based on new-institutionalism and institutional pluralism, which enables an analysis of the presentations and negotiations of sometimes conflicting organizational / leadership practises and models relate to specific contextually developed institutional logics.

### 2.3.3 Introducing the theoretical framework: alternatives to instrumentalist analysis

A reason for the lack of attention to the politics of organizational practises and models is the instrumental outcome focus. McQuarrie and Marwell (2010) ascribe this to the fact that urban theory is dominated by two competing paradigms: Marxian political economy and liberalist Chicago school of urban sociology. Marxian inspired analysis and political economy theories are prevalent in much of the southern urban literature. Frequently engaging in a critique of ‘neoliberalism’ and neo-liberal policies, these studies are highly critical of romanticizing the local (Mohan and Stokke 2000) and of naïve use of concepts like social capital and...
participation\textsuperscript{10} (Oldfield and Stokke 2007, Robins 2008). The structuring effect of capitalism or neo-liberalism and the influence of both international and national neo-liberal policies on slums or informal settlement are significant (Huchzermeyer 2004, Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006, Graham 2006).

However, a recent debate on the limitations of political economy has emerged regarding its neo-liberal critique in urban theory (McFarlane 2011, Parker and Sites 2012), its limitations to address the complexity of urban dynamics in the South (Parnell and Robinson 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou \textit{et al.} 2012a), and its limitations to analyse the complexity of the colonial legacy (Mamdani 2001).

The problems of both neo-liberal and political economy perspectives for analysing politics in informal settlements, is that these often focus on the major outcomes of politics. A similar problem is mentioned in social movement literature; that it has concentrated on the ‘capital P politics’ – collective action aimed at influencing official governmental policies - rather than studying politics in more specialized and localized regimes (McAdam and Scott 2005:11, Scheinberg and Lounsbury 2008). Building on the idea of politics as processes rather than outcome, the focus turns to the politics of the on-going negotiations of organizational practises and modes.

Hence, I will apply neither liberal nor political economy perspectives, but engage a different approach to analysing politics, leadership and organizing. I aim to move beyond instrumental and outcome-oriented approaches that describe state-centric politics or ‘politics of the belly’, organizations as rational entities. I will do this through applying a theoretical framework building on new-institutionalism, which instead of rational-choice, outcome and instrumentalist approaches, analyses the processes and social constructions of politics, organizing, and leaders beyond heroes or villains. This theoretical framework is borrowed from a different field in the South African urban literature. Fundamentally, new-institutionalism is a central direction in political studies with the argument that ‘the organization of political life makes a difference (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall and Taylor 1996). It implies a leaning towards a Weberian frame, which sees power coded into

\textsuperscript{10} Especially participation has been critically debated in South African urban and social movement literature, see e.g. Ballard (2007), Sinwell (2009), Piper and Navdi (2010).
structural design (McAdam and Scott 2005), and the analysis of the ‘micro processes’ of how these structural designs are formed becomes central. This implies analysing the meaning of organizational practises, models and processes, in this case of the loose organizations of leadership committees.

Although not directly applied to South African urban informal settlement, some urban theorists have promoted this perspective. First, two recent papers by McQuarrie and Marwell (2010, 2013) maintain that the organizational sociology of new-institutionalism is relevant, as little attention has been paid to organizations as derivate but also productive of urban social relations. They underscore that the problems with Marxist and liberalist approaches in urban theory are not epistemological or methodological, as they both can be deeply relational, but rather that they often do not give enough attention to organizations as the main object of analysis. This is so because these paradigms treat organizations as derivate of more salient processes such as class struggle, capital accumulation, interpersonal interaction, and local social integration (McQuarrie and Marwell 2010:262). Therefore, they do not include in-depth analysis of the duality and ambiguity of organizing within both more informal and seemingly formal urban organizations.

Secondly, Lowndes (2001, 2009) argues for bringing new-institutional analysis back into the field of urban politics. She contends that new-institutionalism is relevant to analyse the current situations, where the traditional state organizations are becoming weaker with the move to ‘governance and partnerships’, because new-institutionalists analyse informal conventions as well as formal rules and structures. Additionally, she highlight the usefulness of new-institutional analysis in exploring how urban political leadership appropriate their practises in relation to the local institutional environments (Lowndes 2009).

The following sections will further explain the theoretical framework, relate it to South African urban literature, and indicate implications for the analysis that follows in this thesis.

2.4 Perspective on politics: Processes of negotiating organizational ideal models

Although it is suggested that the application of western concepts in postcolonial studies should be avoided (Robins et al. 2008), I find this difficult at a basic level, as the concept of ‘politics’ carries with it a range of theoretical connotations. Assumptions about ‘what politics
really is’ are unavoidable, and impact on the analysis and finding (Leftwich 2004). I will therefore clarify my choice of approach to politics, and how this might differ from the accounts on politics in much of the context-related literature.

When new-institutionalism is discussed in political science, specifically by the main figures March and Olsen (1984, 1989), the primacy of outcomes is challenged. It is highlighted that the process of politics might be more central, that politics are important social rituals, and that ‘the organization of political life makes a difference’ (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall and Taylor 1996). The focus on processes fits with an Arendtian perspective on politics, which also perceives politics beyond struggles for economic outcomes, but rather as a process of forming public opinions about what common concerns are and how they should be dealt with.

This is relevant for this thesis since I am interested in analysing on-going internal processes and politics around the organizing of informal settlement committees and leaders. To further understand the relevance of this perspective I will reflect on two major components: the conditions of negotiating common concerns, and processes of balancing bureaucratic and democratic concerns.

2.4.1 Speaking publicly on common concerns

As noted earlier, a problem with Marxian or liberal approaches in urban studies is that they have in common an outcome orientation and analyse politics mainly as power conflicts over material issues. They thereby contain an instrumental view of politics, as exemplified by Laswell’s definition that ‘politics is about who gets what, when, how’ (March and Olsen 1984:741). Instead of this instrumental view of politics, I will adhere to a commonly seen alternative to a means-to-an-end or outcome view of politics, presented in the writings of Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Parietti 2011). These ideas have generated major debates especially within political theory and philosophy 11. Fundamentally and simplified, I understand her ideas to be based on Aristotle’s division between the ‘oikos’ (family) – the economic sphere and concern of the individual, and ‘polis’ (city) - the conduct of common affairs, which is the essence of politics (Arendt 1958). With this division, politics has a value of its own, beyond the material and instrumental focus of the home and the economy. Crick,

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11 Especially the major debate between the Arendtian inspired republican views of politics versus the liberal, and the Habermasian ‘deliberate democracy’ in between.
in his book *In defence of politics*, seemingly inspired by Arendt, defines politics as a distinctive form of rule whereby people act together through institutionalized procedures to resolve differences, to conciliate diverse interests and values and to make public policies in the pursuit of common purposes (Crick 2005:67). This definition highlights the process focus, and that politics concerns issues of the commons more than issues of the private life of individuals.

With this perspective on politics, it becomes interesting to analyse the processes and construction of ideas around what the common concerns are and how actors dealing with issues of the commons are organized. In relation to this, the concept of the ‘public realm’ is central. Although the boundary between the public realm and the private realm is vague (Fraser 1990), a public realm, more or less detached from both the private/economic concerns and state bureaucracy, is seen as essential for politics to form. It emphasises that participation and public discussions are significant for politics to evolve. Two concerns are connected to this way of understanding politics.

First, postmodern critiques in political theory highlight that the public realm might neglect political conflicts (Villa 1992). However, while the main critique of Habermas’ ‘consensus’ approach is continuing (Flyvbjerg 1998), it is noted that Arendt’s ideas include plurality and agonistic conflict, as she sees the public realm as a space for agonistic action denatured by the normalizing power of the social (Villa 1992). This includes that plurality is not just a condition, but also an achievement of political action and speech (Villa 1992:717). Likewise, Fraser (1990:70, footnote 29) observes that Arendt’s view presupposes a plurality of perspectives and allows for internal differences and antagonism, and is therefore more applicable to this setting than the ‘community’ concept.

Secondly, and more relevant to this thesis, a vibrant public realm requires the willingness of several individuals to engage in deliberating common concerns and to ‘speak publicly’. The problem with imagining actual ‘free deliberations’, is that social norms and discourses discipline what one is willing to talk about. This is the fundament of the well-known

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12 Inspired by Hannah Arendt’s discussions of the ‘the public realm’, Habermas introduced the related concept ‘the public sphere’, designating a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction. (Fraser 1990:57).
Foucaultian ‘power objection’ towards public realm theories (Villa 1992, Allen 2002). With this in mind, some fundamental discussion of discursive powers that impact on the formation or suppression of deliberation (Flyvbjerg 1998) is necessary. In this thesis it will specifically be addressed in chapter six, which addresses some conditions and the possibilities of engaging in discussions about common affairs within South African informal settlements.

Summing up, politics is about negotiating and defining common concerns, what these are and how they should be dealt with. This is relevant at the scale of informal settlements, which, despite internal heterogeneity and fragmentation, have several common concerns that affect the settlements residents as a whole. Negotiations about what these common concerns are and the suggested forms of organizing to deal with these common concerns, are perceived as highly political processes.

**Implications: Moving beyond arenas and Hobbesian ‘politics of the belly’**

**Politics beyond arenas**

The first implication of a process focus on politics is that it should be analysed as an ongoing human activity related to forming opinions of the commons rather than an activity solely connected to certain modern organizations like the state or political parties. The idea that politics evolve around certain grand institutions (like the state and political parties) is termed an ‘arena approach’ to politics (Leftwich 2004).

In studies related to informal settlement politics, the ‘arena’ approach is visible in the tendency to analyse politics with a ‘state centric’ perspective. Although it is argued that community organizing needs a more grounded, complex analysis, which diverts the debate from the polemical understanding of state versus society (Stokke and Oldfield 2004, Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007), a state focus remains, in that politics is referred to as activism directed at the state. Especially in literature on social movements, the state is seen as the ultimate node around which politics revolve; as such movements’ main agenda usually is to change state structures and practises. Organizational practices considered are therefore specific to the state-society relation rather than dealing with internal conflicts. Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield (2011) and Oldfield (2008) discuss everyday politics as practises related to

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13 Arenas here will narrowly understand in line with Leftwich (2004) notion, although arenas could also be discussed as arenas of public spectacles.
accessing the state. Others choose to focus on ‘party-politics’ and political parties as main nodes around which politics evolve (Bénit-Gbaffou 2011, 2012, Fourchard 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper 2012, Sinwell 2012).

Discussing and analysing the politics of state-society relations is undoubtedly essential. However, a problem of the arena focus is that the politics analysed often is visible in active and organized activity, and more indistinguishable everyday processes and practises, which are essentially political, could be overlooked. Also Ballard et al. (2006: 454) note that the political nature of struggles is not confined to parties and the state. The arena approach points at a gap between ethnographic descriptions of ordinary everyday life and the more active and direct political interaction or confrontation with the state. In order to move in between this, I will, in line with Arendts’ philosophy, analyse politics as a process of defining concerns of the commons. This entails examining the everyday formation, negotiation and contestation of organizations that deal with (or claim to deal with) common interests within the informal settlements. Also, Robins et al. (2008) argue that one should research citizenship and democracy that begin from everyday experiences, in particular social, cultural and historical contexts.

This is slightly different from Katsaura’s (2012) notion of ‘micro-politics’, which is also slightly arena focused, as the micro simply signifies smaller scale than the state.

**Instead of economy: the politics of speaking publicly**

A second implication of applying an Arendtian inspired perspective is that politics is seen as significantly different from economic activity, and different from the bureaucratic activity of administrating and regulating activities.

In my observations, it seems that in urban studies of the South generally, with the focus on ‘informal economy’, much attention has been directed at economic activities and the oikos - the organizing of the home, but less at the polis – organizing around public matters in these spaces. Basically, studies of informality are concerned with everyday dynamics in and around informal settlements. Similarly to the critique of the deterministic perspective of ‘disorganization theory’ (Whyte 1943), the urge to move away from ‘the myth of marginalization’ was a main motivation for rethinking informality (Roy 2011, Roy and
As an idiom of urbanization, it marks a move away from a determinist and structuralist perspective towards assuming individuals and groups with innovative agency, shaping their environments and livelihoods. Attention is directed to the rich complexity, ambivalence and resilience in African cities (Hansen and Vaa 2004, Simone 2010). These studies have in common a fascination with the innovative and rapidly developing grassroots initiatives and responses to the failure of governmental service delivery. Yet, the term ‘informality’ remains unclear and there are many different definitions. I will not engage in defining the term here, but simplistically note that the concept is developed from Keith Harts’ assertion of the ‘informal economy’, as is mostly applied in two fields: Urban land and housing, and production and reproduction of the informal economy (Hansen and Vaa 2004). While informality makes sense in relation to material issues like the built environment (housing, infrastructure) and economy, the distinction between formal and informal politics or social organizing makes less sense. Social and political organizing are social processes, which in a common understanding in the intersection between political and organizational theory (especially in new-institutionalism), can never be purely formal or explained by state legislation (see e.g. Lowndes 2001, 2009, Clegg et al. 2006). With new-institutionalism, institutions are defined as inherently informal as they have strong normative and cultural-cognitive sides (Lowndes 2001). Due to these issues, I have decided on minimalizing the usage of the informality concept or the tendency of dividing between informal and formal institutions, which is common in much Southern development literature.

Another way in which the economy focuses is materialising in the analyses of politics as a fight over resources. This might be related to early urban theory problematizing a lack of community bonds and rather individualistic survival mechanisms (Wirth 1938), and disorganization theories highlighting the inability of a community to realize common goals (Jackson 1984). In the setting of informal settlements, it should therefore not be a surprise that there are fights over scarce resources, and that there are residents who engage in politics as power seeking opportunists (Xaba 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Bähre 2007a, Barry et

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14 Although, with broader a definition, it is argued that ‘urban informality’ may be emerging as a mode of urbanization or as a new paradigm for understanding urban culture (Roy and Alsayyad 2004). Roy (2005:148) uses the term urban informality to indicate an organizing logic, a system of norms that govern the process of urban transformation itself.

15 Wirth was inspired by Tonnies’ description of urbanization as the move from ‘gemeinschaft’ (community) with natural, organic forms of group existence, towards a ‘gesellschaft’ (society), which is a much more artificial group (Wirth 1926).
al. 2007, Lemanski 2008, Katsaura 2012). Such Hobbesian analyses of slums are similar to ‘disorganization’ theories, linking conflicts to a lack of social contract and cohesion and the particularly harsh conditions of urban informal settlement life. However, there are also critiques. Heller (2007) argues that while opportunistic ‘politics of the belly’ certainly does exist, it produces a reductionism of urban local politics:

...the broader presumption of the sceptical view that unequal communities inevitably slip into a Hobbesian world of local authoritarianisms produces a reductionism in its own, one in which the very possibility of civil society in Africa is once again, in Bayart’s (1993) celebrated phrase, struck down by the ‘politics of the belly’ (Heller 2007:17).

Agreeing with this critique, I also believe there is more to politics in informal settlements than a fight over resources. Here, an Arendtian approach to politics turns the focus to politics as forming opinions around common affairs. It requires attention to the condition of the public realm and the conditions of speaking publicly. It can be assumed that, to a higher degree than upgraded and legal neighbourhoods, informal settlements face ‘common affairs’ challenges, like being threatened by eviction and receiving shared public services such as communal toilets and water taps. In other words, perhaps more than other neighbourhoods, informal settlements need a public realm where these common affairs can be discussed.

Although not a main focus, some studies have given indications of the condition of the public realm by looking at public – private boundaries and identifying a ‘retreat to privacy’ (Muyaba 2011, Muyeba and Seekings 2012), and by indicating the dangers of township politics (Bähre 2002, Katsaura 2012,). The retreat to the private is problematic if it leads to a neglect of the public realm as distinctively different from the public (state) and the private (individual households, the economic market) (Villa 1992). Additionally, ethnographic descriptions of everyday informal settlement life give insight into normalized practises and disciplinary norms (Salo 2003, 2004, 2009, Buur 2003, 2006, 2008, Ross 2006, 2010, Bank 2011), which impact on conditions of the public realm and indicate limitations of speaking and acting publicly. In my interpretation, ordentlikheid becomes a disciplinary norm that guides personal behaviour and how individuals regulate themselves, also when ‘acting publicly or politically’. This is therefore relevant to understanding the politics that form in this setting, especially as gossip and rumour is widespread in low-income areas of Cape Town (Ross 2010, Bank 2011, Muyeba 2011, Muyeba and Seekings 2012). The authors don’t directly
connect these norms and practices to politics. Certainly, most everyday practices are not necessarily political, but they can be seen as discourses that inform the socially constructed patterns of power. These indicate that although security governance certainly can turn into resource fights (Katsaura 2012), there are deeper behavioural norms that shape both security governance and governance within the settlement.

2.4.2 Problems of bureaucratization

A second discussion relevant when analysing political processes is the problematic relation between politics or democracy and bureaucratization. This relation is one of the most fundamental issues in political science and public administration theory, often inspired by the major work of Max Weber (1968) on the rise of bureaucratic ways of organizing in modern society, and literature on this topic is vast\(^\text{16}\). As noted in a classical new-institutionalist paper by Fiedland and Alford (1991), bureaucratic and democratic logics are two of the most fundamental institutions in modern Western society. Particularly interesting is the tension between these two logics. They are usually perceived as antithetical and balancing them is a major dilemma (Etzioni-Halevy 1983), often played out in the conflicts between bureaucrats and politicians in governments. Bureaucratic logics, according to Weber’s (1968) classic theory, is based on a specific modern\(^\text{17}\) way of organizing that includes hierarchical organizing, and that standardized and written rules and procedures inform action (Etzioni-Halevy 1983:28). While bureaucratic organizing is seen as necessary for providing stability, effective administration and securing transparency through record keeping and predictable procedures, democratic organizing is necessary to be responsive to the wishes of the public and to political debates (Peters 2010). A main problem is that bureaucratic ways of organizing are essentially hierarchical and even authoritative, and can therefore be seen as antidemocratic (Peters 2010). Additionally, a pragmatic problem is that too much politics through deliberations and negotiations slows down development; but on the other hand, fast bureaucratic implementation can lead to detachment and increases chances of suspicion of corruption and hence tension. In any government this balance between efficiency through public administration and opening for democratic deliberation is difficult. However the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy is both paradoxical and complimentary, as

\(^{16}\) As the main topic in this thesis is not to address this debate, but to borrow some very basic insights, the literature included here will be limited.

\(^{17}\) Modern in the sense that bureaucratic authority emerged with the rise of modern science, confronting traditional authority.
an effective democracy depends on an effective and well-functioning bureaucracy that provides predictability and impartiality in the form of securing equality in relation to law (Peters 2010).

A range of studies have analysed what happens when an organizational sector confined to one major institution is confronted by or adapt other institutional logics. Major sectors like the public sector, the private market sector, and the civic sector, are seen as fundamentally different, as their values and overarching aims - reflected in different logics, models and practices of organizing - differ. In a simplified model, major sectors are built on fundamental institutions of modern society: the market sector is built on institutional logics of capitalism, public administration sector on bureaucratic institutional logics, and political actors on democratic logics (Friedland and Alford 1991). A classic example of how major changes appear when institutional logics cross over these sectors is how the ‘family institution’ changed when feminists brought in logics of the market by highlighting gender divisions of labour. More relevant to this thesis, well-known studies of democracy (Skocpol 2003) and social movements (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, della Porta and Diani 2009) are concerned with the threat that bureaucratic logics, through processes of bureaucratization and professionalization, will change civil society towards loosing essential democratic logics. Often, the problem of bureaucratization is seen as a result of governmental co-optation. Selznick’s (1949) study of how a grassroots organization became co-opted into local administration, distancing itself from the grassroots from which it emerged, is a classic in this regard. Co-optation of civil society organizations is often followed by that the civic organizations start to resemble state structures though professionalizing organizational models and practices. Hence, co-optation of civic organizations carries not only the risk of them becoming an extended arm of government, but also that they become disciplined into bureaucratic logics and thereby lose their confrontational political stances.

Arendt’s writing is also relevant to this tension, although she never speaks directly about democracy, only on politics. However, since democracy very generally can be seen as a way of organizing politics with weight on broad participation, it is relevant to draw attention to her major worry that bureaucratization poses a threat to participatory politics (Arendt 1958). Here, similarities between Foucault and Arendt can be drawn by the observation that they are

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18 This can also be related to the classic 4 stages of social movement lifecycles as suggested by Herbert Blumer, where the last stages consist of formalization and thereafter institutionalization (see e.g. della Porta and Diani 2009: 150-152)
both worried about the consequences and developments of state bureaucracy (Villa 1992). Arendt’s concern is that politics would give way to administration and bureaucracies that regulate daily life and render it more uniform (Crick 2005, Wolin 1983). As ‘diversity is the nightmare of bureaucracy’ (Wolin 1983:18), the logic of bureaucratic procedures is to standardize, regulate and simplify complex situations. The consequence of increased bureaucratic practices and detailed regulation with standardized procedures is that it minimizes the need for public discussions. Thereby, bureaucracy becomes a totalitarian force or machinery that removes the need for politics and the possibilities of free action (Wolin 1983, Crick 2005).

Implication: tensions between bureaucratic and democratic logics

A frequent consequence of Hobbesian analysis, which seems to be common in analysing South African informal settlement politics, is a fatigue with politics as a constant fight over resources and a solution of increased regulation, which in essence demands increased bureaucracy. Hence, the tension between bureaucratic and political or democratic logics is relevant, and it is discussed in some South African urban and social movement literature.

In line with international social movement literature mentioned in the previous section, the dangers of co-optation and following bureaucratization is also discussed in African social movement literature. While some studies briefly mention problems of urban projects becoming ‘politicised’ (Bénit 2002, Oldfield and Zweig 2010, Millstein 2011), Robins et al. (2008) and Robins (2008) worry about ‘de-politicisation’ and the ‘NGO’ification’ of the ‘uncivil’ tendencies in social movements. Zuern (2011:118) argues that most civics became less participatory and less democratic at the same time as the state became a formal democracy, as professionalization of participation appeared in civil society, which made discussions of policy increasingly technical and specialized. In development and planning literature, Staniland (2008) and Bähre (2007) mentions that civic organizations became co-opted by the developmental state, disabling them from acting as part of a critical civil society19. Although state co-option does not necessarily lead to bureaucratization, and

19 Especially SANCO has been critiqued for becoming co-opted through its too close relationship with the ruling party, the ANC (Heller 2007, Seekings 2011). Notably, attempts of state co-optation appear before the transition to democracy: the colonial state during indirect rule in 1920 engaged in various attempts to co-opt community policing structures (Burman and Schärf 1990) and the later apartheid state attempted to co-opt ‘community courts’ from 1977-1984 (Schärf 2001)
professionalization of a social movement also often happens as a slow and natural process, the fear of increased bureaucratic logics delimiting democratic logics in the civic field is relevant.

However, in relation to decentralization and participation debates, Heller (2001), in line with a Weberian understanding, acknowledges that democracy requires bureaucracy. He refers to the limits of both technocratic bureaucratic models and grassroots models. In conclusion he argues for a more balanced ‘optimist conflict model’, which recognizes the tension between political mobilization and bureaucratic institutionalization, but is optimistic in that it recognizes the transformative potential of politics and reject that conflicts are a zero-sum game (Heller 2001). Referring to Heller (2001), Oldfield (2008), in examining local-level participatory mechanisms, mentions that formalization at the ward level might be necessary, acknowledging the dilemma that some standardized procedures are necessary for participation but can also undermine and discourage participation.

Although this debate is essential, I am not foremost interested in which of these logics are more important, but rather in clarifying and discussing why and how they are relevant in the politics of negotiating organizational models in informal settlements. This requires further explanation of the theoretical perspective enabling an analysis of how organizations and leaders, who are essential actors in negotiations of the commons, form and apply different logics in relation to their institutional environment.

### 2.5 Theorizing organizing and leaders: new-institutionalism and institutional pluralism

In the following sections, I will explain the social constructive perspective in organization and leadership theories, and outline a framework of specific ideas I will apply to analyse the politics of leadership organizing.

20 He argues that *because participation can never be comprehensive...there is a need to routinize and formalize the process through which participatory inputs are translated into outputs; hence, the technical requirement for rules of transparency, accountability, representation and decisional authority.* (Heller 2001:136). On the other hand, he also acknowledges that the technocratic rationality of bureaucracy fails because it suffers from a sense of rational mutability of the world, and hence some sorts of politics and grassroots democratic initiatives are essential (Heller 2001).
In order to enable an analysis of processes forming organizational practises, ideals, and models, basic theory will be borrowed from the developments of new-institutionalism within organizational sociology. Those unfamiliar with organizational theories might assume a focus on formal efficient management and ‘how to best organize’. In the 1800s and early 1900s, this was true, as scientific management and Taylorism was looking at how to maximize the efficiency of industrial organizations through technical and managerial means. However, since the Hawthorne experiments of the 1920-30s, organization theory took a humanistic turn, in that informality and informal organization was ‘discovered’ (Clegg et al. 2006: 76-83). Since then, particularly institutional approaches to organizational studies, starring figures like Philip Selznick, gained dominance.

2.5.1 New-institutionalism and the social construction of organizations and leaders

Taking into account both internal and external social forces, institutional studies emphasize the adaptive change and evolution of organizational forms and practises… the most interesting and perceptive analysis of this type show the organization responding to a problem posed by its history, an adaptation significantly changing the role and character of the organization. Typically, institutional analysis sees legal or formal changes as recording and regularizing an evolution that has already been substantially completed informally (Selznick 1957:12)

The focus on processes of organizational forms as emphasised by Selznick in this quote, has inspired the development of the very large theoretical field of new-institutionalism 21. Basically, studies that fall under sociological new-institutionalism, are concerned with analysing organizational and leadership practises and processes (Barley and Tolbert 1997, Pettigrew 1997, Czarniawska 2008a), logics (March and Olsen 1984, Friedland and Alford 1991), and symbolical models and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983). This implies an analytical focus on social construction, which also has been taken up in current leadership theories.

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21 I will not go into the vast debates on the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism here, neither the debates around the different variances of new-institutionalism. It should however be noted that I will focus on sociological new-institutionalism, which differs from historical institutionalism and rational-choice (economic) institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). The advantage of sociological new-institutionalism is that it defines institutions broadly including not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbolic systems, cognitive scripts, an moral templates guiding human action, thereby breaking down the conceptual divide between ‘institutions’ and ‘culture’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947).
The process focus

The ‘process focus’ is often inspired by Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) classic *The social construction of reality* (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The fundamental idea is that institutions are socially constructed templates of action, generated and maintained through ongoing interaction, and that organizations are formed and informed by these institutions (Barley and Tolbert 1997). It is essential to understand the difference between the more tangible ‘organizations’ like actual committees, and the vaguer ‘institutions’, which are not social units but can be seen as multifaceted social structures with significant symbolical values. Notably, institutions as a core concept of social science are often defined vaguely and imply different things in different disciplines. Czarniawska (2008b) notes the problem that this perspective on institutions diverges from the everyday meaning of the word, which often sees ‘institution’ as a public administration organization. Similarly, Lowndes (2001) contends that such ‘vulgar institutionalism’ does not acknowledge the difference between institutions and organizations and that ‘weak ties’ can be as important as formal constitutions. To clarify this, institutions can be defined as multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities and material resources (Scott 2008:49). With this broad understanding common to sociological new-institutionalism, institutions can be both norms and rules, and are usually both more historically durable and less consciously ‘visible’ to humans than organizations. This is why bureaucracy and democracy can be seen as general institutions of society, while a specific unit like a specific government department is an organization. The institutional sides of this specific government department, can be seen in the discourses and logics applied which becomes visible in the choices of organizational models and procedures. This division between institutions and organizations is important because it enables an analysis of how organizations are formed in relation to institutions. When the institutional sides of an organization are studied, attention should be paid to how the organization has been influenced by history the social environment, how the organization adapts to centres of power, and how leadership justifies its existence ideologically (Selznick 1957:6). A major focus of institutionalist organization studies is therefore to analyse logics behind organizational practices and the presentations of organizational models, and to link this to the institutions of the environment from which it has emerged. This suggests that institutions provide ‘logics’ that give guidelines, which organizations comply with in order to gain endorsement from important audiences and because logics provide a means of
understanding the social world and thus for acting confidently within it (Greenwood et al. 2011:318).

**Legitimacy and the symbolic sides of organizing: the theories of decoupling and isomorphism**

By focusing on how organizations strive to adapt to the social world, the symbolical sides of organizations become central, especially for gaining legitimacy. The legitimacy focus in new-institutional organization theory is often inspired by Weber, not only through his different authority types (traditional, charismatic and rational-legal)\(^{22}\) but also through his discussion of social practice being oriented to ‘maxims’ or rules, suggesting that legitimacy can result from conformity with both general social norms and formal laws (Deephouse and Suchman 2008).

A central theory is that of ‘decoupling’; suggesting that those organizational models reflect the myths of their institutional environments to gain legitimacy instead of the demands of their work activities (Meyer and Rowan 1977)\(^ {23}\). A related theory is that of ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Like many theorists of public administration, they are inspired by Weber (1968) theories of how bureaucratic forms of organizing are expanding in modern society and that this development is irreversible and hence becomes an ‘iron cage’. Inspired this and by empirical observations, they are asking ‘why is there such a startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practises’, Dimaggio and Powell (1983) and argue that organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. The similarities further indicates that certain institutional logics are dominating modern society, and it is suggested that especially bureaucratic logics are major ideals that organizations model themselves after by implementing bureaucratic organizational models as ‘myths and ceremonies’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This implies that organization models might reflect more the assumptions of

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\(^{22}\) See, amongst others, Etzioni-Halevy (1983:27-28), Scott (2008:13) for a discussion of Weber’s three ideal types, which notably are related to historical developments and were not claimed to exist in pure forms. Hence, when applied, the ideal forms are often misinterpreted. In African literature, the usage of the term neopatrimonial is arguably based on a misinterpretation of Weber, forgetting that he described legitimate types of authorities, not regimes (Pitcher et al. 2009).

\(^{23}\) Further explained, organizations are driven to incorporate the practises and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practises and procedures. Institutional products, services, techniques, polices, and programs function as powerful myths, and many organizations adopt them ceremonially (Meyer and Rowan 1977:41).
Leaders as socially constructed

Leaders are, from this perspective, viewed less as ‘independent brokers and negotiators’, and more as influenced by surroundings, more specifically as socially constructed in relation to their institutional environment (March and Olsen 1984). Consequently, leadership and organizing cannot be explained starting with leadership itself. As discussed by Scott (2008), the institutional environment contains regulative elements, but also more ‘informal and invisible’ normative and cultural-cognitive elements, that provide frameworks in which action takes place - in this setting, for leaders acting publicly. Inspired both by new-institutionalism and by Berger and Luckman (1967), theories and studies of the symbolic sides of leadership have emerged and developed into a segment of leadership literature (Fairhurst and Grant 2010, Denis et al. 2010). These studies also build on a critique of earlier analysis of leadership traits, styles and personalities. Early accounts like Pettigrew (1997) are re-visited (Denis et al. 2010) and expanded with the turn towards a post-modern and constructive ontological idea of leadership, confronting the traditional more Cartesian epistemology of conventional leadership studies (Dachler and Hosking 1995, Hosking 2007). This ‘relational perspective’ contrasts the earlier ‘entity perspective’, which focused on leaders themselves (Uhl-Bien 2006). It views leadership as social reality, embedded in and inseparable from context (Dachler and Hosking 1995, Osborn et al. 2002) and studies how leaders and followers are mutually constituted and co-produced (Collinson 2005). With these as premises, leadership is analysed beyond notions of heroes or villains (Collinson 2005), and rather as process and practice (Parry and Bryman 2006, Uhl-Bien 2006, Crevani et al. 2010, Denis et al. 2010).

24 See Parry and Bryman (2006) for an overview of leadership theory from the 1940s up until the social constructive turn in the 1980s.
Similar to the ambiguity of organizations, social constructive studies on leadership have indicated incoherence and tensions in leadership discourses and practise (Uhl-Bien 2006, Hoskins 2007). When leadership is understood as contextually situated and practically enacted, it is useful to analyse both discourses and properties of leadership practises in situ (Denis et al. 2012). In a much cited paper within this literature, Alvesson and Svenningsson’s (2003) inspiration from organizational literature - Foucaultian post-structuralism and discourse analysis - leads them to analyse the presentations of organizational models not as truths, but as ideals that contrast actual work practise. They thereby argue that leaders’ claimed value-preferences are weakly connected to the bulk of managerial work, and highlight the ambiguity of leadership discourses (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003). Hence, the leader’s presentations adhere to discourses that do not always reflect the limitations of their practises. A focus on how leaders present themselves is also inspired by classical interpretive tradition in sociology. Goffman (1959) displays how any everyday social encounter can be seen as a theatre, where self-presentations are displayed that fit with certain values and norms perceived to be important. Further, Goffman illustrates how especially urban dwellers presents self-defensive sides of themselves, not only through talk but also through the unspoken.

Inspired by these literatures, I will outline how leaders present different forms of legitimacy and ideal organizational models, both in speech and practice.

**Implications: From rational-choice to symbolism of organizational models**

It has been noted that contemporary literature on political and economic organization in Africa is characterized by a retreat from institutional analysis into cultural and rational-choice theorizing (Meagher 2007). The main problem of a rational choice analysis, as discussed above, is that it leaves out how deeper normative and discursive social processes inform decision-making and action. With new-institutionalism as described above, the focus turns to how organizational practises and models are informed by and reflect institutional norms and discourses.

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25 Here it is interesting to note that Goffman’s works is often perceived as a precursor to post-modern sociology, and parallels between Goffman and Foucault in their perspectives on power has been pointed out (Jenkins 2008, Clegg et.al 2006:144-149). Building on Tom Burns’ writing of Goffman, it is acknowledges that Goffman and Foucault had much in common in respect of the normalization of order and the routine everyday ubiquity of power, in its mundane invisibility (Jenkins 2008:158).
Organizational practices and their historical institutionalization

Generally, the focus on practices is promoted in urban southern theory. Simone’s (2010) vivid descriptions of everyday life in cities in the South highlight that the intense complexity of urban everyday life is followed by a human urge to create order and stability. This reminds of Whyte’s (1943) critique of ‘disorganization theories’, by indicating that complex and seemingly disorganized settings are not necessarily followed by disorganization, but rather by a multitude of fragmented attempts to create order. In line with contemporary urban theory inspired by postmodernism and embracing the richness of culture and identity formation taking place in cities (Hubbard 2006), scholars argue for taking ‘cityness’ seriously and improving our understanding of African urban life by examining such everyday practices, as fragmented and fluid social patchworks create crossroads and possibilities in the urban South (Pieterse 2008, Simone 2010, Myers 2011, Parnell and Robinson 2012). This is furthered in urban studies related to South Africa, where calls have been made for increased attention to actual everyday practice at the local level (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004, Robins et al. 2008, Pieterse 2010, Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011, Meth 2012). It is related to the arguments that discussions of politics in African context should be brought back from the realm of the exotic by empirically describing everyday political processes on the ground (Hagman and Péclard 2010), and study how new forms of politics emerge in the urban South (Pieterse 2008).

I will in this thesis focus on practices related to organizing issues of the commons, where leaders and committees are central. In addition to my own empirical insights, some patchworks of organizational and leaderships practice are identified in local studies on South African townships and informal settlements. Ross (2010) indicates that ‘straight-talk’ denoting honest and confrontational practices are particularly valued. Criminological studies mention township security governance practices, which take forms as either vigilantism (Buur and Jensen 2004a, 2004b, Buur 2003, 2006), or community policing /court systems (Bruman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Seekings 2001, Shearing 2001, Dixon 2004, Froestad and Shearing 2012). These practices are rooted in moral ideas on how the commons should look like and are thereby deeply political. Social movement and development literature discuss practices of mobilizing and confronting or collaborating with the state (Oldfield 2000, 2002,
Oldfield and Stokke 2006). Some of these accounts will be drawn together and compared with my own insights in the analysis chapters.

Further, practises that are applied because they are taken for granted rather than by rational choice, usually have historical roots. As highlighted in new-institutionalism, practices become normalized and hence institutionalized over time. Practices become ‘insititutionalised when they cannot simply ‘be removed’ as they now carry symbolic values, and people take them for granted as they become ‘traditions’ of ‘this is how we do things around here’. It is therefore important to understand the historical development of practices. This relates to a central argument posed by Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012a, 2012b), that models are circulated historically before neo-liberal models were invented.

**The symbolical value of organizational models**

Applying institutionalised practises become important not only because they are useful directly, but also because they have values attached to them. Therefore, representing and portraying organizational models and ideals are significant to claim legitimacy. As noted in section 2.2, there are a few informal settlement case studies that mention ‘surprisingly’ complex organizational models, with clear bureaucratic and democratic ideals (Barry et al. 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007). Yet, they do not analyse these models.

Some indications of values of democratic models are mentioned in a few studies. Cherry (2000) argues that the symbolic identification with democratic systems are strong in townships, but that the people inside the civic structures describe the structures as highly democratic while those outside defined them as undemocratic and exclusive. Also, some historical roots to organizational models and logics are mentioned in the social movement literature. One explanation of democratic logics can be found in a note by Zuern (2011:75-76), who links the importance of democratic models to pragmatically organizing a very large movement, and symbolically to contrast the anti-democratic apartheid regime and its indirect rule system of integrating traditional leaders. Besides these observations, I have found little explanations as to why certain organizational models are favoured and perceived as legitimate.
Summing up, new-institutionalism provides an analytical focus on how portrayals of organizational practices and models are reflections of contextual roots and history rather than being solely pragmatic. It provides a possibility to analyse how organizations and leaders are constructed in relation to their institutional environment. Furthermore, since the indications are that the institutional environment of informal settlements is a fragmented and fluid one, I will draw in recent literature on organizational responses to a pluralistic institutional setting.

2.5.2 Institutional pluralism and the politics of negotiating logics

Although still focused on western contexts, recent developments of new institutionalism have added value to understanding a more complex and fluid institutional field than that of stable organizations. These focus on the implications of institutional pluralism or complexity of organizations (Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011, Yu 2013). For an understanding of what institutional pluralism is, it is useful to first understand what it is not, that is, they are not ‘mature institutional fields’, which are signified by more stable priorities between logics, and thereby more stable organizations (Greenwood et al. 2011). Compared to ‘mature’ fields, where priorities between logics are more likely to be stable, organizations face institutional complexity whenever they confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics (Greenwood et al. 2011:318). Facing multiple institutional logics increase organizational instability, variations, conflicts and political negotiations. This is also reflected in social constructive leadership literature with the notion of ‘hybrid leadership’, implying that plural forms of leadership can co-exist in the same context (Gronn 2002).

Towards regaining room for agency: Plural logics rather than isomorphism or decoupling

As highlighted earlier, new-institutionalism poses a central critique of a rational-choice analysis. Actors are given limited ‘rational choice’ as they are adapting to what they believe is appropriate rather than what is calculated as efficient (March and Olsen 1989). Hence, in relation to the classical structure-agency problem26 of determining ‘where structural determination ends and power and responsibility begins’ (Clegg 1989:129), new-institutionalism resembles structuration theory (Barley and Tolbert 1997) in that institutions...
provide frameworks for organizational behaviour, but organizations change these over time and thereby slowly modify institutions. However, a critique of new-institutionalism is that it moved too far into structural explanations, losing sight of possibilities of agency and power. Clegg et al. (2006) maintain that organization theory lost this focus on power after Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Dimaggio and Powell (1983) started analysing the similarities of organization models.

In order to deal with the lack of power and agency, the focus on logics has received renewed attention. What can be termed the ‘institutional logic perspective’ is distinguished from new-institutional theory by emphasising the partial autonomy of actors over social structures (Thornton et al. 2012). It was introduced by Friedland and Alford (1991) to analyse how the inherently contradictory institutional orders of capitalism, state bureaucracy and political democracy shape how individuals engage in political struggles (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Institutional logics are defined as ‘the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality’ (Thonton and Ocasio 1999: 804). In a simplified version, institutional logics may be understood as practises, beliefs and rules guiding an institutional order and providing actors with vocabularies of motive and a sense of self (Yu 2013:106). The room for agency is apparent - a plural institutional field opens up for moving between structures and adapting multitudes of logics, and politics develop around questions of which logics to adhere to.

The regaining of agency in institutionalism is perhaps best formulated in the critiques of decoupling and isomorphism theories (Lounsbury 2008, Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Kraatz and Block 2008, Pahec and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011, Thornton et al. 2012). Thornton and Ocasio (2008:100) argue that, while sharing concern with isomorphism and how cultural rules and cognitive structures influences organizational structures, the institutional logics approach differs from classical new-institutionalism in that it focuses on the effect of differentiated institutional logics on individuals and organizations in a larger variety of contexts. Basically, when assuming a plurality of institutional logics, isomorphism becomes more complicated, as it becomes hard to determine exactly what institutional logic dominates.
Similarly, against decoupling theory, hybrid organizations, which, as defined by Scott (2008) are able to integrate logics in unprecedented ways, respond to permanently competing logics and can have coexisting practices linked to different logics (Pahce and Santos 2010. In other words, contrary to the idea of decoupling which argues that some organizational models are only applied as symbolical myths and are not useful for organizational practice (Meyer and Rowan 1977), the critique raises the point that organizations balance several models that can be pragmatically applied in different ways. Kraatz and Block (2008) stress that decoupling theories must be based on assumptions of what the ‘core’ of an organization is in order to determine if something is decoupled. The problem is that it is hard to find such a core in organizations facing plural logics.

These attempts to bring back a stronger focus on agency are particularly relevant in a context of institutional complexity, like in informal settlements. By discussing how community leaders manoeuvre between different institutional logics, room for agency can be indicated in addition to the structural constraints. Adopting an approach that recognizes structuring effects without losing sight of the possibilities of agency is acknowledged as a central challenge in urban African literature as well (Pieterse 2008). Pieterse contends that *the challenge is to adopt an approach that recognizes the structuring effect of the economy, bureaucracy and discursive diagrams of power without relinquishing an appreciation for agency* (Pieterse 2008:85). In the case of informal settlements leaders, the question of where structural determination ends and power and responsibility begins’ (Clegg 1989) can be posed by asking to what degree the leaders and their committees are structural results of e.g. traditionalism, apartheid structures and neo-liberalism, and to what degree and in what situations the leaders manoeuvre actively between these.

**Legitimacy politics**

Several recent studies have applied the plural logics perspective to analyse the politics of conflicting logics that emerge when several organizational models might be seen as legitimate, in other words ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz

27 Similar arguments are also made in some South African literature: With reference to Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) critique of the lack of power and politics in participatory oriented research, Sinwell (2008) suggests applying structuration theory by Giddens to understand the interrelationship between people’s resistance and domesticating structures. Also Dwyer (2006) mentions structuration theory as one way of overcoming the structure-agency binary in social movement theory. Stokke and Oldfield (2004) rely on Bourdieu’s concept of power and define politics as a symbolic struggle to define existing power relations and legitimacy.
In accounts on organizations facing a plural institutional environment, it is popular to draw on the argument that

...some of the most important struggles between groups, organisations and classes are over the appropriate relationship between institutions, and by which institutional logic different activities would be regulated and to which categories of persons they apply (Friedland and Alford 1991:256).

Thereby, politics emerge around negotiation around which institutional logics to adapt to. In recent studies on organizational responses to pluralism, this focus on contradicting institutional logics has become popular to draw on when analysing the politics of plural logics (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Pache and Santos 2010, Yu 2013).

This is particularly relevant to analysing the politics of leadership organizing. Revisiting Selznick’s (1957) work Leadership in Administration, Kraatz (2009) analyses how situations of pluralism will require organizational actors, especially leaders, to carry out integrative, adaptive and developmental work. In other words, it becomes central for leaders in an institutional complex setting to negotiate and mediate different logics. This does not only give room for agency to the leaders to draw on certain logics at certain times, but also increases the possibilities for confrontations and tension towards these leaders as there is likely to be other preferences of which logics to adapt. It can thereby lead to 'legitimacy politics' that emerge when several models might be seen as legitimate (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013). Importantly, such politics is not zero-sum game, but a generative process through which organizations adapt to changing conditions (Yu 2013). The organizations can be seen as open systems that change and adapt to different institutions, and analysing tensions around competing organizational models thereby gives insight into everyday politics of informal settlement leadership.

**Implications: Beyond decoupling – the politics of balancing multiple logics**

Adhering to the framework of institutional pluralism provides some advantages for the analyses in this thesis, because it fits better with the fluid and fragmented context of informal settlements. There are several indications that the setting of informal settlement organizing is one of ‘institutional complexity’. As outlined earlier, the most frequent used concepts
describing informal settlement life and organizing are ‘fluidity, fragility and fragmentation’. It is stated that informal settlements contain a variety of community organizations, which make use of a variety of strategies (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Millstein 2008). In cases studies comparing informal settlements, both Xaba (1994) and Oldfield (2000) conclude that the form of the leadership and particularly the way they engage with government organizations varies. Oldfield (2002) highlights the fragility and fluidity of community governance, specifically the fragile character of relationships between leadership, residents and the capacity of community organizations to mobilize. Lastly, institutional complexity is indicated when Skuse and Cousins (2007) mention that the committee practises are a *bricolage* of discursive practises – new and old strategies and practises. This fluidity, fragility, fragmentation and *bricolage* of practises indicate that there are several institutional logics which impacts on organizing strategies, practises and models. Last but not at least, it fits with Bank’s (2011) portrayal of how urban township dwellers possess multiple and hybrid identities, which have developed into own forms with a different meaning. It is in line with contemporary southern urbanism literature that acknowledges the multiple rationalities (Pieterse 2010, Myers 2011) and flexible identities (Robins 2002a, Robins 2008, Bank 2011) of urban dwellers.

**The relevance of analysing plural institutional logics: acknowledging plural urban identities**

Further, the notion of plural institutional logics, which confront assumptions of decoupling, enables an analysis of multiple identities.

First, analysing plural institutional logics is relevant in relation to the anti-exoticism debate, specifically to steer away from exotic portrayals of African communities as predominantly traditionalist or ethnic (Pitcher et al. 2009, Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). A few accounts of informal settlement politics focus on ethnicity, traditionalism and kinship (Nustad 2004, Watson 2003, 2009, Meth 2013). Traditional authority is manifested in the significance of witchdoctors / *sangomas* within politics (Meth 2012), and by the prevalence of ‘traditional leaders’ (Watson 2003). Based on assumptions that residents migrate from rural areas, Nustad argues - based on research in a large informal settlement in the mid-1990s - that the leadership resembles more a ‘traditional ideal type’ than a legal-rational in the terms of Weber’s ideal types (Nustad 2004:52-55). Watson (2003) draws on a Weberian framework
and places informal settlement leadership within ‘traditional legitimacy’ and its specific African modification of ‘neo-patrimonialism’. This is connected to the idea of the continuation of the rural in the urban in Africa (Mamdani 1996). However, empirical studies have shown that kinship ties in township areas are weakened (Harper and Seekings 2010) and that neighbours seem to be more important than kinship networks (Ross 1996, 2003, 2010). Robins (2008) agrees that patrimonial and authoritarian styles of politics continue, especially related to struggles over housing, but highlight that these are not timeless neo-traditionalist political discourses, but rather reproduced or hybrid forms related to the conditions of deep poverty. There are also specific critiques of the exoticism of focusing on ethnic traditionalism (Robins 2002a, Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, Bank 2011). Bank (2011) explains that the focus on ‘ruralness’ and kinship in South African townships is linked to the influential work by Mayer and Mayer’s Townsmen and Tribesmen from 1961, which emerged in a period where it was popular to critique Wirth’s (1938) ideas on urbanism as defined by a weakening of kinship bonds. What Mayer and Mayer neglected when focusing on the continuation of the traditional in the urban was the multiple identities and specific adaptations of urban identities of township residents (Bank 2011). Such multiple identities are reflected in the multiple and sometimes paradoxical political practises of informal settlement residents. Bank (2011) further counters the ‘myth of ruralness’ by highlighting that the emergence of cosmopolitan culture in an East London township is more than simple imitation or mimicry of western cultural forms; rather, this culture shows how western cultural forms were absorbed and culturally appropriated. I believe that portrayals of legitimacy, which are strongly culturally related, can be analysed in similar manners; in other words culturally appropriated rather than simple imitations.

Secondly, the notion of co-existing plural institutional logics is relevant to steer away from ‘polemic understandings’ of communities in relation to the state (Stokke and Oldfield 2007). Illustrative here is Watson’s (2009) ‘clash of rationalities’ between techno-managerial government administrators and a marginalized urban population surviving under conditions of informality. The conflict of rationalities Watson suggests is between the logic of governing and the logic of survival (Watson 2009). Although Watson acknowledges that rationalities are diverse and overlapping, the idea of a clash of rationalities does imply a dualism or a ‘polemic’ understanding of state versus society (Stokke and Oldfield 2007), and can lead to a simplification of rationalities drawn on by the urban poor. Hence, logics besides survival
might be analysed as simple attempts of mimicking or results of co-optation. Contrasting this, it is noted that even communities that are less connected to state rule establish their own laws and rules, which remarkably often are similar to state laws and institutions (Schärf and Nina 2001). Additionally, Robins (2008: 166-167) disagrees with the ‘clash of rationalities’ ideas, as informal settlement residents are capable of switching identities and repertoires. Together, this brings attention to my argument that the bureaucratic and democratic models presented by informal settlement leaders might reflect parts of their repertoires rather than being results of co-optation or mimicking. Mimicking can in the language of institutionalism theories can be related to decoupling. The critique of decoupling as outlined above can be brought in to complicate the assumptions of mimicking, refocusing the attention to the intertwining of different forms of rationality and the balancing of plural logics (Lounsbury and Carberry 2005).

Summing up, adhering to the premise of multiple rationalities and drawing on literature that acknowledges ambiguity as central in organizations and leadership, allows an analysis of presentations of plural and conflicting ways in which of informal settlement leaders negotiate and balance different logics, and the politics that revolves around this balancing.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have pointed out the lack of analysing organizational models in informal settlements, and elaborated on a framework, inspired by new-institutionalism and institutional pluralism, that enables an analysis that contributes to closing this gap.

I have started by outlining relevant contextual literature that highlight the fragile and fragmented conditions of informal settlement politics, and outlined how this is reflected in specific accounts on informal settlement politics and leadership. This has led me to identify the gap in the analysing of the contextual meanings of certain organizational models in informal settlements, and the politics around negotiating these models. Some steps towards narrowing this gap have been identified, particularly the notions of community politics (Katsaura 2012), hybrid discursive practises in informal settlements (Skuse and Cousins 2007), and the circulation of organizational practises (Bénit-Gbaffou et.al 2012b). Thereafter, I have raised the point that an instrumentalist focus on informal settlement politics and leadership might be related to the dominance of both neo-liberalist and neo-Marxian
perspectives, and introduced the new-institutionalist inspired framework that is suggested to be relevant to urban studies (Lowndes 2001, 2009, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010).

The main focus in this chapter has been on explaining this theoretical framework, relating it to a critical discussion of how politics, organizing and leadership is regularly analysed in SA urban theory. Simply put, the process and social constructive approach that is essential in new-intuitionalism provides a focus on how leadership and organizations develop in relation to institutional environments.

First, the discussion on perspectives on politics has shown that a problem in SA urban literature is an arena and economy-focused portrayals of politics as a resource fight. With the arena focus, ‘politics’ and ‘everyday’ is rather divided; while social movement and development scholars relate politics to the arena of the state, ethnographers describe everyday life processes. Perceiving politics as a process of negotiating common concerns (Arendt 1958, Villa 1992) allows for including the political effects of everyday practises and norms, and enables analysing internal negotiations of organizational and leadership models as political (March and Olsen 1984). Further, as I am particularly interested in the politics of portraying bureaucratic and democratic organizing models, some tensions between these logics – the pragmatic efficiency of bureaucratic versus the deliberative values of democratic logics (Peters 2010) - have been highlighted.

Secondly, I have discussed how new-institutionalism and institutional pluralism enables an examination of organizations beyond instrumental, and leaders beyond heroes or villains. Particularly useful is perceiving organizations and leaders as socially constructed in relation to institutionalized practises rather than solely outcome generation entities (Czarniawska 2008a), ambiguities of pragmatic and symbolical sides of organizing (Scott 2008), and the tensions that emerge when balancing plural institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). This refocuses the analysis towards the symbolical sides of organizing and how leaders portray specific democratic and bureaucratic logics in order to adapt to contextual ideals of legitimacy. Further, the notion of an institutionally complex setting frames the balancing of logics as ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013), which is useful for examining the tensions between bureaucratic and democratic logics. When analysing committee conflicts, it refocuses the analysis from assumptions that conflicts
are induced by interventions towards seeing them as emerging in institutional fields, signified by plurality.

This broad social constructive perspective on organizing and leadership framework will in the following analysis chapters be applied by analysing certain aspects of informal settlement committee organizing and politics. Notably, this perspective has also many shortcomings, amongst others that it does not allow for measuring degrees of representation and legitimacy.
CHAPTER 3 Specifying the empirical gap and outlining historical roots of informal settlement committees

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will specify the empirical gap of analysing leadership and committees at the informal settlement scale, and outline the historical roots of such leaders and committees, based on a literature review.

The constant referral to ‘committees’ and ‘community leaders’ caught my interest early in the research, both in empirical encounters and in reviewing informal settlement case studies secondary data, like reports and news articles. Reviewing contextual literature, I found many studies on organizing and leadership of social movements and of the ward committee system, but little on organizing and leadership internally in informal settlements. As noted by Meth (2012), this is a gap in the literature as much attention has been given to the ward scale but less to local political practise below the scale of ward committees. Hence, I start by clarifying this empirical gap. This includes outlining how informal settlements in South African cities often are islands of informal pockets within townships, and discussing how the committees and leaders in these settlements can be seen as one scale below ward councils.

After these clarifications I outline relevant historical accounts which give a fundament for understanding why there are committees and leaders at this scale. They are mentioned in three bodies of literature, which indicate three different roots of the emergence of informal settlement committees and leaders: First, studies of security and crime in townships / informal settlements indicate the organizing of community policing and justice committees; secondly studies of the township-based liberation movements indicate the organizing of street committees in relation to social movements networks; and thirdly studies of development and planning initiatives indicate the instalment of committees by external actors.

The focus on historical roots is based on a major theoretical premise in this thesis: that organizing logics, practises and models are embedded in taken-for-granted and historically institutionalised practises. Drawing on the fundamental idea in new-institutionalism that
organizational practises can become institutionalized over time (Selznick 1957, Scott 2008), the historical component is important, as institutions do not emerge in a vacuum; they always challenge, borrow from, and, to varying degrees, displace other institutions (Scott 2008:95). The importance of historically institutionalized practises are also reflected in accounts on South African urban politics, which underscore that local power dynamics take their own forms, building on historical roots before neoliberal policies were instituted (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b).

3.2 The empirical gap: leaders and committees at the informal settlement scale
The empirical research gap in this thesis is specified to examining politics, organizing and leadership within the specific neighbourhoods of informal settlements.

As specific neighbourhoods, informal settlements are one scale below townships, often located within townships. Townships cover larger areas and consist mostly of small government-built houses (referred to as matchbox houses), and informal settlements are pockets of occupied land between the housing areas. In other words, in South African cities, informal settlements are formed in smaller pockets of urban land adjacent to core formal areas (Abbot 2004:193). In Cape Town, there are approximately 300 informal settlements, and most of these are located within the townships of the ‘Cape Flats’. An informal settlement can be seen as a political neighbourhood unit where politics plays out, as it is divided by clear borders from the neighbouring formalized areas, has its own name and own leaders or committees, which may compete or collaborate with each other. The leaders and committees are therefore neighbourhood-specific organizations dealing with issues within the borders of its neighbourhood, and not interest-specific organizations, like social movements that aim at changing issues at higher scales like state law, government practises etc. On the other hand, informal settlements are not segregated islands (Abbott 2004) as they are informed and affected by local and national politics and policy.

Although much research has investigated informal settlements, especially when becoming ‘formalized’ through upgrading to formal housing areas, little research has focused on the

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politics of organizing and leadership itself. Instead, the topics of politics, organizing and leadership are mostly examined in studies of established government-related organizations or social movements. In urban South African politics, the relatively new decentralized local government system has received much attention, which consist of ward councillors of a number of adjoining wards represented in the sub-council areas, along with proportional representative councillors (Cameron 2005). How this system actually works, and to what degree decentralization has enabled civil participation is a significant area of evaluative research (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008a, 2011), and particularly ward councils are often critiqued for being dysfunctional29. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the aim is to add to the closing of the suggested empirical gap of examining political practise at the scales below and above the ward committees (Meth 2012). Informal settlement leadership, in relation to other local political structures, are below the ward councils. They are not ‘formally acknowledged’ parts of local government (see figure 1). This needs some specification. Although informal settlement leaders or committees are not simply established in relation to the government setup, it is useful to briefly explain how they fit into the broader organizational situation of the local government structure in Cape Town. The organizational map explains the formal chain of communication between citizens and local government:

29 Most studies of ward committees have displayed their dysfunctionality especially in low-income neighbourhoods, the main reasons being that the ward committees are not operative and a lack of attendance at meetings, that the role and power of ward councilors is unclear, and partisan politics (Buccus and Hicks 2008, Oldfield 2008, Bénit-Gbaffou 2008a, Piper and Deacon 2008, Staniland 2008, Esau 2008, Sinwell 2009). The Ward system is often seen as an obstacle to enhanced participation and other venues for participation at the neighbourhood level might be more significant (Oldfield 2008). Decentralization does not necessarily create greater accountability, and multi layers of politics can paradoxically disempower the most deprived ones (Bénit-Gbaffou 2011). On the other hand, it can also be questioned if practises of local participation are side-lining governmental participatory channels like the ward council (Bénit Gbaffou 2008a).
This model displays the outcome of the decentralization process with the turn to democracy. Informal settlement leaders are relevant in relation to the categories ‘resident’, ‘community-based organization’, ‘ward committees’ and ‘wards’.

The model (Figure 1) displays that the first step for a resident is to engage with CBOs, which are defined on CoCT’s web page that provides information about the Council:

Community based organizations (CBOs) are voluntary associations representing common interests. They are very important to the City for communication and consultation purposes. Each subcouncil maintains a database of CBOs in its own area. CBOs should regularly re-register so information about them is as accurate as possible. They must also ensure that they are regularly mandated to speak on behalf of their communities.

(CoCT online 2014: Community based organizations)
The informal settlement committees could fall into the category of CBOs. Notably, the last sentence in this definition is particularly interesting: that ‘they must ensure they are mandated to speak on behalf of their communities’. It is questionable if ensuring such a mandate is possible in the case of informal settlement committees.

The next step, as displayed in Figure 1, is for the CBOs to engage with Ward committees, which report and advice the democratically elected Ward councillor. Notably, the administrative organizing of local government though sub and wards councils cuts across the townships, and each ward council often has to relate to several informal settlements, all of which are at times competing for resources and the ward councillors attention.

Further, organizational maps are always a simplification of a more complex and informal situation, and often act more as symbols than ‘reality’. The categories are fluid as individuals move in between these or can even take up positions in several of these at the same time. Also, the chain of arrows is not consistent; departments often negotiate directly with CBOs and committee leaders, thereby skipping the Ward and subcouncils. Leaders and committees can engage with this channel but also access local government more directly, either through independent NGOs or social movements or through political parties. This might be due to the fact that the ward committees do not always operate, and each councillor can decide whether to take up issues brought to them by the civics (Staniland 2008). On the other hand, ward councillors often make use of committees and leaders in informal settlements to, e.g. hand out food parcels, and since these practices are not regulated there is no way of monitoring if this is done fairly, creating opportunities for these leaders to act as gatekeepers (Staniland 2008).

With these specifications of the empirical gap – investigating the politics of leadership organizing at the informal settlement scale - I will now bring together different contextual literature, which provides some fundamental indications as to why there are committees and leaders at this scale.

3.3 Three historical roots of committees and leaders in informal settlements

Certainly, ‘community organizing’ happens in all communities and throughout history, and it has been noted that civic organizing in SA has deep roots, dating back to the 1880s (Bundy
2000). I will not go that far back in time, but look into literature that mentions committees (including the more specific ‘street committees’, and ‘community leaders’) in South African townships and informal settlements.

I have found three groups of literature with different theoretical orientations, which, although never the main topic, do give indications of how and why leaders and committees have formed in informal settlements: 1) The need to organize security mechanisms that have emerged since the early beginnings of informal settlements in South Africa (Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Shearing 2001, Seekings 2001, Buur 2003, 2006, Buur and Jensen 2004a, 2004b, Dixon 2004, Froestad and Shearing 2012); 2) the urge to join social movements especially during the fight against apartheid (Zuern 2011, Adler and Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000, Cherry 2000): and 3) increased government and other external involvement especially in the post-apartheid period (Lemanski 2008, Bähre 2007a, Staniland 2008, Bénit 2002). The three roots are analysed in different bodies of literature – criminology, social movement literature and development and planning literature. Each of these three literatures are important for different theoretical developments, but for emergence of leaders and committees at the informal settlement scale, it is necessary to draw them together.

3.3.1 Formation of policing and justice committees

Early historical descriptions of informal settlements often mention community security committees or community policing committees (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980, Cole 1987, Burman and Schärf 1990). Historically, variances of community policing have been observed in townships since the 1940s (Schärf and Nina 2001).30 Occurrences of community policing are related to government’s approach to informal settlements: On the one hand, government strictly and harshly controlled informal settlement in relation to the rest of the city31, and on the other hand, residents experienced a neglect of government attention to security issue

30For an overview over historical developments of community policing in South African townships, see Seekings (2001) and Schärf (2001).

31 In 1948 a series of raids initiated to arrest the ‘illegal’ Africans, and the following decade informal settlements were confronted by a state determined to gain control over the settlements (Cole 1987). Controlled squatter camps’ were introduced as a more indirect form of social control in the 1950s, related to the ‘Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 (Cole 1987:6). The apartheid interventions under the 1951 act consisted of evictions, the mandating of municipalities and land owners to institute eviction proceedings, forced relocation to controlled transit camps, active control over informal settlements and criminalization of land invasion (Huchzermeyer 2010:133). Such interventions continued throughout the apartheid era. Notably, Huchzermeyer (2010:133) argues that while reversed in the Housing Act of 1997, all of these interventions have since found their way back into practice.

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within the settlements. Due to this neglect and residents worries, residents organized their own security mechanisms. The different manifestations of more or less organized practises of dealing with crime have in common a logic of taking security and order matters into their own hands, as this is not provided by the state. Similarly to how vigilantism can be seen as filling a gap that the state is not able or willing to fill (Buur 2006) or as a form of insurgency (Meth 2010), the organizing of security through community courts and street committees in townships are often explained as ‘non-state forms of ordering’ or (Nina and Schärf 2001, Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Shearing 2001) or ‘extra state initiatives’ (Seekings 2001). Further, the line between community policing and vigilantism is often blurred, as they intersect and sometimes are continuations of each other (Buur and Jensen 2004b).

Particularly interesting are the described ‘street committees’ and ‘community courts’, which can be characterised as monitoring and mediating organizations. Community courts can be traced back to traditional structures institutionalized under the colonial system of indirect rule, and were part of an array of social support and control mechanisms created by community members, like informal banks and insurance schemes, lotteries, and alternative medico-spiritual health systems (Schärf 2001). They functioned as subsidiary forms of local government, coexisting along formal apartheid authorities, and spread from the rural areas with the arrival of the first magistrates, to townships and informal settlements across South Africa since the urbanization in the late 19th century (Burman and Schärf 1990). The rural and more traditional roots, however, diminished with the social movements confronting apartheid in the 1980s, taking over the street committees and community courts (Seekings 2001). While community courts had the function of settling local disputes and collecting funds for specific community needs, street committees - ‘homeguards’ - acted as a community police (Cole 1987:18-19). Schärf describes the typical pattern of a street committee:

> Usually they have membership of 50 to 150 households (neighbours), from this membership the committee members are elected and meet at weekends, the rules are ‘common-sensial’, and there are no costs involved. They patrol the streets at night to keep order, settle cases of disputes between neighbours emphasising discussion and education. (Schärf 2001:45)

32This will be further discussed in chapter 7. For a comprehensive discussion on indirect rule described as ‘decentralized despotism’, see Mamdani (1996).
Elaborating on the organizational model, Burman and Schärf (1990: 706) define street committees as ‘the lowest level of a loosely constituted three-tiered system of informal local rule in the townships’, and affirm that they, with few exceptions, are found in all the established townships and informal settlements in Cape Town.

Importantly, community security initiatives have constantly been reshaped and redefined, both in relation to state policies and the political agendas of local leaders (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b:947). Sometimes, security practices of neighbourhood watches have materialized into more formal networks of ‘Community Policing Forums’ (CPFs), which are directly and formally connected to the police.

3.3.2 Formation of street committee networks though anti-apartheid social movements

A second body of literature that mentions informal settlement committees and ‘street committees’ is linked to the time of township resistance movements towards the apartheid system, which led to massive organizational networks, especially in the turbulent 1980s. In South African social movement literature, street committees are described as being formed as result of the mobilizing and protests against the apartheid state (Zuern 2011, Adler and Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000, Cherry 2000). It is argued that this new organizational model revolutionized civic action, as street committees became the key to civic strength in the mid-1980s, and that the networks behind the mobilizing and the protests were street committees (Zuern 2011:74). These are described as a three-tiered network: At the micro level, each township street would form a committee, while the second tier was constituted by an area committee, and a local structure of the civics would constitute the township’s highest representative forum (Adler and Steinberg 2000). Pragmatically, this form was taken due to two needs: the need to keep the organization underground and the need to keep lines of contacts open (Zuern 2011). Cherry describes how the street committees were geographically...
rather than organizationally defined, and the process of establishing committees was carried out in a seemingly inclusive manner though mass meetings:

Leadership made calls at rallies for the structures to be set up and activists in each area played a crucial role in setting up the structures. A general meeting would be called in an area and at this meeting a core group of volunteers would be formed. They would then go around to each street, assisting in the formation of committees by calling meetings of all residents in a particular street. At the street meeting, the residents would elect a committee of between nine and twelve members. (Cherry 2000:93)

With the transition to democracy and the decline of street committee structures under SANCO (Seekings 2011), it might be that argued that such mobilizing also declined. However, Staniland (2008), who accredits SANCO for organizing a hierarchy of street committees, notes that they are still evident in many townships, and he explains the structure in-depth:

In Guguletu SANCO is organised geographically around defined territories, which link together in a hierarchical fashion. At the lowest level exist the area committees, which are comprised of the street committees and residents of approximately five streets. In turn these area committees send representatives to their SANCO branch of which there are four in Guguletu. These branches also on occasion call public meetings. These then link into, and report to, regional and then national SANCO structures. Each of these structures has an executive committee which is theoretically elected at regular intervals. SANCO operates as an umbrella body for the street committees, to which disputes and complaints are referred if they cannot be resolved at the local level (Stainland 2008:38).

This detailed description is similar to the street committees linked to security as described by Schärf (2001) above.

Notably, both loose notions of street committees and practises of mobilising residents against external threats like evictions or to join social movement protests continue to be prominent in informal settlement life. Protests actions continue today, more directed towards state service delivery (Alexander 2010). Some of these are small, and risk becoming trivialized as ‘popcorn protests’, which, compared to more large-scale mass movements, suddenly pop up and immediately die down (Bond 2005).
I perceived a third root of the creation of leaders and committees as establishments of externals who intervene in the settlements. Informal settlements as low-income neighbourhoods have always gained attention and a variety of organized external actors have intervened. However, with the advent of democracy and the dominance of the collaborative governance and participation discourses, there have been increased interventions by a variety of ‘externals’, like local government departments, local, national or international NGOs, CBOs or political parties. There is sometimes a confusing myriad of actors involved in informal settlements, who act, or wish to act, as ‘intermediaries’ between informal settlements and local government. Further, different external actors often establish leaders and committees when they engage with informal settlements.

First of all, government involvement is significant. Notably, Thorn and Oldfield (2011) highlight that informal settlements experience multiple faces of the state: the political through linkages with politicians, the bureaucratic though local government departments, and law enforcers or the court.

The bureaucratic side is specifically experienced through local government departments that are involved in service delivery, like installing toilets (flush- or chemical toilet, sewage collection, waste collection, and access to water taps). This is linked to the changes in policies towards informal settlements towards more ‘participatory’ approaches. As local governments gained responsibilities for securing housing rights for informal settlement residents and / or installing drainage, toilets, and in some cases electricity, a new mode of interaction emerged. The ‘Informal Settlement Upgrading Programme’ of 2004, as a part of the national housing policy, represented a new paradigm where in situ upgrading was stressed as more responsive to poverty and vulnerability than relocation (Huchzermeyer 2006). Related to this, increased intervention and, in line with the broader ideals of ‘deepening democracy’ through decentralization (Ballard 2008), measures are taken to increase

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35 Departments involved include Roads and Stormwater (cleaning drains), Water and Sanitation, Solid Waste Management, Informal Settlement Department and Anti Land Invasion Unit

36 The new Constitution recognized housing as a human right (Huchzermeyer 2010), and states ‘adequate housing’ as a right for all its citizens, the realization of which is defined as a responsibility of the state (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996). In 2004, the ‘Breaking new Ground’ policy paper as part of the housing Informal Settlement Upgrading Programme emerged, which made South Africa one of the few countries that developed a national policy on informal settlement upgrading in response to international campaigns (Huchzermeyer 2004, Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006, Graham 2006).
participation and interaction between local government departments and local communities. The establishment of ward committees was a key component of local government community-based involvement; they would function as mediators between residents and local governments (Oldfield 2008, Heller 2001). However, due to mistrust of or a lack of interest in these mandates (Staniland 2008), local government departments sometimes prefer to work directly with the settlements. The police sometimes establish Community Policing Forums in informal settlements. Health committees are established in order to engage with a subcouncil ‘health inspector’ connected to the local government health department. When large upgrading projects are initiated by local government, community committees or community leaders are sometimes installed (Lemanski 2008, Bähre 2007a:82-83 and Bénit 2002).

The political side of government is experienced through the diverse political parties involved in informal settlements, and recently, renewed attention has been paid to the role of party-politics in such spaces (Piper and Nadvi 2010, Bénit-Gbaffu 2011, 2012, Fourchard 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper 2012, Sinwell 2012). One reason for increased party politics might be the fact that the ward councillors are elected through party representation.37 Similarly to social movements,38 parties need to expand their support base to gain votes, legitimacy and claim representation of certain groups. Especially around election times, volunteers from different parties promoting and signing people up for party membership can be observed in informal settlements. As will be displayed later, the role of party politics is highly debated within the committee and between residents, although party connections can play a significant role for residents in accessing the state (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012).

Further, a variety of NGOs, CBOs or social movement networks also establish committees in informal settlements, as they approach leaders to make them join their networks. Already in the 1980s, as described in the case of Crossroads, international NGOs assisted the inhabitants in building committees (Cole 1987), and it is noted that the involvement by ‘non-state actors’ in informal settlements is increasing (Allison 2002). This increase is linked to the fact that both local councillors and government officials often rely upon civil society to perform quasi-administrative tasks as the capacity of local government to monitor and administer service delivery is limited Staniland (2008:45). Civil society organizations therefore play central

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37 See Piper and Deacon (2009) for a critical discussion of this setup.
38 The line between civil society and parties is often blurred, and committees in civil society can be ‘taken over’ (or established) by parties like the ANC; see Zuern (2011:82).
roles as mediators between local government and local communities, and establish a network of informal settlement committees and leaders as significant sources of mediatory legitimacy. However, their establishment of committees is not always a success, and in a case study of the informal settlement Marconi Beam, Saff (1996:249) writes that as a consequence of a weak community organizing, the NGO has acted as a secretariat on behalf of the civics. Also Robins (2008) discusses an NGO attempt, eventually unsuccessfully, to establish democratic structures in local communities.

3.4 Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter I have specified that, in line with the call to investigate politics and organizing below the ward council (Meth 2012), this thesis adds to closing an empirical gap in examining politics, organizing and leadership within the neighbourhoods of informal settlements. In order to start approaching this gap, I have specified how informal settlement leaders and committees can be seen as one scale below the ward councils, although not formally recognized as such.

Further, in order to start understanding why there are committees and leaders at this scale, I have, on the premise that organizations and leaders emerge due to historically institutionalized practises (Selznick 1957, Scott 2008), identified roots to the emergence of committees in these neighbourhoods. This is in line with the argument that historical roots, prior to the inventions of neoliberal policies, should be reviewed to understand the appropriation of organizational models (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b). Based on a literature review, I have categorized three roots: The organizing of community policing, the organizing of the anti-apartheid social movements, and instalment of committees by external actors. These three roots are linked to different political periods in South African history. First, internal organizing of policing and justice committees have deep roots and emerged in the colonial period of informal settlement history (Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Seekings 2001). Thereafter, the period of heightened activism against the repressive apartheid state led to the establishment of committees linked to social movements (Zuern 2011, Adler and Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000, Cherry et al. 2000). Lastly, the increasing engagement by externals and especially by the more collaborative oriented post-apartheid state has led to the instalment of leaders and committees (Bénit 2002, Bähre 2007a, Lemanski 2008, Staniland 2008). This confirms that particular historical changes in policies are significant for
the development of informal settlements and the relations between informal dwellers and the state.

These historical roots often are not linked, as they are discussed in three different sets of literature with different theoretical orientations. Interestingly, the system of securing grassroots participation through a ‘three-tiered system’ of street committees has been observed by many but connected to different roots. While in social movements literature street committees are described as having been formed as result of the mobilizing and protests against the apartheid state (Zuern 2011, Adler and Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000, Cherry 2000), Schärf (2001) and Burman and Schärf (1990) describe the street committee system as having evolved in relation to internal security measures and community courts. This chapter shows that drawing these together is important. Specifically, it helps to establish that, rather than being linked to only one root, there are possibilities that several of these roots impact the formations of current committees. Related to theories of institutional pluralism (Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011), this outline of plural institutional roots indicates that there is not a ‘lack of institutions’, but rather an organizational field signified by institutional complexity. Lastly, it is important to note that both democratic and bureaucratic grassroots organizational models are mentioned in some of these historical accounts, and these will be drawn into the discussion in chapter seven and eight.
CHAPTER 4 Methodology: Reflections on accessing and interpreting organizational presentations in informal settlements

4.1 Introduction
Starting the fieldwork, I was supposed to explore ‘cross-scale governance’ related to flooding in informal settlements. However, I never got that far. After some months of visiting informal settlements, I still felt I knew too little about general ‘governance’ at this level to move further. Especially, perhaps due to my specific interest in organizational theory, my curiosity about leadership and organizing at this scale led me to carry out more field work and try a range of different methods.

The analytical focus on institutional logics emerged after most of the fieldwork was conducted. Therefore, I will in this chapter reflect on several aspects of methodology: How I came up with the focus, how I encountered the field and what methods I applied in order to get information on organizational and leadership process and practises, and how I interpret these as institutional logics. In other words, this chapter is not only about data collection techniques, but about the whole process leading to the product of this thesis.
I will first clarify how my epistemological grounding in a ‘soft social constructivism’ paradigm affects my overall approach to gathering and interpreting information, and highlight that I will engage in reflexivity throughout the chapter to increase validity. Thereafter, I will reflect on how the topic focus emerged during the research, followed by a discussion of the choice of a (multiple) case study as a research design. Then, the data collection techniques will be outlined with particular attention to validity and limitations. With the range of methods applied, the data covers 12 leaders and numerous residents in the different settlements. Lastly, ethical dilemmas will be considered.

Two interrelated issues will be streamlined through this chapter:
First, much consideration will be given to how the specific field of informal settlements and their community leaders can be approached. Informal settlements are difficult to research, since they change rapidly, are heterogeneous and infiltrated with conflicts. Researching such spaces also carries certain ethical problems, and consideration must be given to how to gain
access and choose appropriate data collection methods. As will be discussed later, I took the
time to tread lightly, spending time trying multiple methods, which also enabled triangulation
of information from different sources and different methods. Particularly relevant was
observing processes unfold over time.

Secondly, to obtain information and to analyse social constructive processes and symbolic
sides of self-presentations in light of interpretative theories, direct questions with concrete
answers are not enough. Analysis of these logics and public presentations are hugely
subjective, and concerns the issue epistemology, which requires discussing reflexivity; the
rigorousness of the research through reflecting on how own deeply rooted convictions
influence the research focus and methodological and analytical choices. Therefore, attention
will be given to explain every step that led to the findings of this thesis, enabling contestation
of these findings. I will reflect on how these choices are influenced by both personal and
theoretical background.

4.2 A constructivist paradigmatic grounding and streamlining reflexivity
Underlying all methodological choices is the researcher’s fundamental alignment paradigms
of ontology (what is reality?) and epistemology (what is knowledge?). Scientific paradigms
are debated humanities and social sciences, and several paradigms are listed. Guba and
Lincoln (2005) outline four broad categories: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory and
constructivism. These paradigms oppose each other, as the constructivist (postmodern)
paradigm evolved as a critique of the positivist research tendency to claim to be able to
objectively measure social ‘truths’ (Guba and Lincoln 2005). It is therefore not advised to try
to incorporate both paradigms for a rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, these paradigms often
‘interbreed’ (Guba and Lincoln 2005). With this in mind, my theoretical focus indicates that I
am more aligned to a social constructivist perspective than a positivist paradigm. The major
empirical question that I could not help moving towards was deeply triggered by my curiosity –
why there are community leaders – and is based on a familiarity with a socially constructive
view of not assuming that leadership is a ‘natural’ phenomenon.

Taking a more constructivist approach to knowledge (epistemology) complicates the research
process, as the interaction of the researcher in the field must be accounted for in several
aspects, compared to the more straight forward paradigm of positivism, which views methods
as techniques / instruments for data gathering (Silverman 2006). With the fundamental critiques of lack of objectivity in interpretive research, some postmodern writers take an anti-methodological stance, preferring the substance (research topics) to the form (methodology) (Seale et. al 2004). I align myself to a critique of the ‘anything goes’ assumption, which sometimes occurs in qualitative research, and to scholars who emphasise aspects of rigorousness and validity even with a postmodern /constructivist paradigm (Seale 1999, Seale et al. 2004, Guba and Lincoln 2005, Silverman 2006, Yanow 2006). I will therefore interrogate my criteria for knowledge claims through assessing issues of reliability and validity throughout this chapter. Reliability concerns the consistency of findings; in other words, that others researchers should be able to find similar answers when conducting the same investigation, while validity implies that the researcher’s observations should strive to be accurate representations (Silverman 2006:282). Accounting for reliability is difficult in qualitative research, but to some degree it can be covered by securing insight into every step of the process and keeping all the field notes in a systemized file with an overview attached (see Appendix A). More important is validity, which in interpretive research is carried out through reflexivity (Yanow 2006). Yanow (2006) highlights that, although interpretive research cannot be objective or rigorous in the way positivistic research claims it can, it can be carefully crafted and systematically carried out and thick descriptions can be rich in descriptions and rigorous in its argumentation. Further, the main ways of securing some validity and to be open to critical investigations is to be open and reflexive about the research process39. Hence, I will reflect over the choices made related to design, methods and analysis approaches throughout this chapter.

4.3 Identifying the topic of leadership organizing

In this section, I will discuss the process of how my thesis topic emerged and my general approach to relating theory and empirical data. This is also relevant to the fundamental task of delimiting what the study units are cases are of, and if they are simply empirical units or theoretical constructs - created by the interests of the investigator (Ragin 1992).

39 On reflexivity on qualitative organizational and leadership research, see e.g. Fairhurst and Grant (2010), Yemba et al. (2009), Clegg and Hardy (2006), Cunliffe (2003).
Generating knowledge through the combination of theory and empirical studies is traditionally divided between an inductive (theory generating) and a deductive (theory testing) approach (Layder 1998). Inductive research, especially grounded theory, is generated by empirical research (fieldwork), while deductive research, conventionally, is carried out by establishing theory first and testing hypotheses. It is generally said that qualitative researchers engage in inductive, hypothesis-generating research (Silverman 2006:56). However, it has been recognized that even though these two approaches - treated as distinct and as opposing each other - are often intertwined in doing research. Layder (1998) presents ‘adaptive theory’ as an alternative approach, which combines the use of theory to lend order and pattern to research data, while simultaneously adapting to the order and pattern contained in this emerging data. The open-ended characteristics of adaptive theory involve that no prior hypothesis (to test theoretical assumptions) needs to be formed, because intentions are descriptive and explanatory (Layder 1998).

Setting up a hypothesis without having a feeling for relevant variables was not an option in my case as the empirical field of informal settlements was completely unfamiliar when starting out the research. Instead, searching for possible empirically grounded variables seemed more appropriate. Rather, I formed the research questions to fit with that I felt was important in the empirical field and in relation to my ongoing reading of literature. Nevertheless, I would not call my approach inductive; as theoretical ideas did more or less unconsciously guide my search for information and a research question. In relation to the discussion if the cases are empirical units or theoretical constructs (Ragin 1992), the cases are, on the one hand, empirical units of committees in informal settlements, but on the other hand they were constructed during my field visits due to my curiosity about why there are such committees and why there are similarities in the presentations of organizational models in different informal settlements. This curiosity regarding presentations of organizational models is likely to be influenced by my theoretical background and my ‘institutionalized’ desire, through years of studies, to employ theories of organizational theory. I had during my studies been fascinated by the social constructive perspective on organizing and leadership inspired by Berger and Luckman (1967), which do not take any organizational forms or leadership for granted, but rather as constructed in social relations over time. This was why I never felt satisfied with the simple answers to how politics unfold and why there are leaders in these informal settlements, and it led me onto the long quest of discovery, which in turn
became this thesis. In this way, this fits with a common critique of ‘grounded theory’, acknowledging that the theoretical framework we have been institutionalized into through years of studying impact on what we look for in the empirical field whether we want it or not.

Notably, this also changed the focus of my thesis significantly from that presented in my proposal, as should be expected in qualitative-oriented studies. Initially, my thesis was a part of a larger research project on climate change adaptation focusing on ‘conditions for cross scale collaboration’\(^{40}\). I engaged in this question by looking at conditions for cross-scale collaboration in informal settlements experiencing flooding, however I soon realized that I was lacking a deeper understanding of fundamental political and sociological dynamics in these spaces. This changed my empirical focus towards a purer sociological account on internal governance, politics and leadership. With this change, the initial literature identified was not compelling, and I went back to look at contextual literature (slums, urbanization, SA informal settlements) in addition to organizational theory. Further, instead of engaging in an intense period of fieldwork, I went back and forth between fieldwork and reading during the three main years of my research. In this way I slowly gained and digested insights while reading. This engagement with theory as an on-going part of the internal empirical research process is captured well in Layder’s (1998) adaptive theory.

4.4 Choice of research design: case study with ethnographic elements

Before describing the actual methods applied in the field, I will discuss choice of overall framework or design of a multiple case study. Fundamentally, I made this choice in order to enable some comparisons of leadership committees in different informal settlements. This choice is also related to the research question and to what design other researchers in similar fields and contexts have recommended.

Regarding the context, slums have been given attention by researchers from a range of academic disciplines since the 18\(^{th}\) century (Davies 2006), and a range of methodological approaches have been applied. Early slum research was much based on statistics, but, especially from the 1920s, several researchers of the urban sociologists of the Chicago School

\(^{40}\) Within much of the climate change adaptation literature, the call for improved cross-scale collaboration is emphasised, however, how such collaboration could be organized, and if the collaboration actually is real and effective, poses numerous contested questions with few answers.
conducted more qualitative and ethnographic research (Whyte 1955). Both ethnographic studies (including more populist accounts by journalists), and statistical surveys or ‘enumerations’ are still ongoing in addition to case studies. Much of the great classic works on slums / informal settlements / shanty towns have been based on ethnographic fieldwork (see Whyte 1955, Suttles 1968), and it is still argued that ethnographies are particularly relevant for studies of urban marginalized groups (Wacquant 2002). Also in South Africa, a few ethnographic books based on several years of fieldwork in informal settlements or townships have been produced (Salo 2004, Bähre 2007c, Ross 2010, Bank 2011). These works each have different focus, but have in common detailed empirical stories and experiences of everyday life, with attention to culture and interpretations of culture. It is argued that ethnographic fieldwork is best situated for understanding and documenting process of cultural production (Atkinson 2004). In this thesis, the process of how leadership is formed and contested is also seen as a cultural production, in line with socially constructed theories.

There is an interesting link here between this ethnographic slum research and the niches of leadership and organizational studies, which I have discussed in the theory chapter. In these social constructivist-based theories, Whyte is celebrated for inspiring research on organizational cultures and informal organization (Jones 1991, Bryman 1991, 2004). Bryman (2004) draws on Whyte to point out:

A greater emphasis on observation might be more likely to capture informal leadership, since the researcher is likely to have an especially good vantage point from which to view leadership as a process, as much as something that formally designated leaders do. Interestingly, one of the most instructive studies of informal leadership—Whyte's (1944) investigation of an Italian–American street corner gang in Boston—was based almost exclusively on participant observation. Whyte’s study showed how leaders emerged in what formally was a leaderless context and how leaders maintained their positions within the subculture. (Bryman 2004:758).

Several others have promoted ethnographic methods in organizational theory (Yanow 2010) and leadership studies (Fairhurst and Grant 2010). In the book Organizational Ethnography, Yemba et al. (2009:3) mention that writing detailed accounts of organizational life is a long-standing tradition, and classic studies on ‘informal organizations and bureaucratic underlife’ written in the 1940s to 1960 include Whyte (1948), Selznick (1949), and Goffman (1959).
Returning to these roots, many organizational sociologists promote ethnographic methods. Related to the institutional logics perspective, which is said to draw strength from triangulating quantitative and qualitative methods (Thornton and Ocasio 2008), it is argued that ethnographic methods are relevant for studying institutional work within organizations, as an ongoing concern in anthropology has been the activities through which people create, maintain and revise institutional forms in everyday life (Bjerregaard 2011).

Thus, although ethnographic methodology forms a central part of my fieldwork, I have chosen to not carry out a pure ethnographic research. A reason for this is that I am not trained in this methodology, but the main problem was that I would have had to learn both isiXhosa and Afrikaans to really get into the daily life and culture. Instead, I choose a case study design, holding in mind that case studies and ethnography are more similar than dissimilar and are often used in combination (White et al. 2009), and that case studies are used by critical and interpretative researchers as well (Willis 2007:239). An important difference is that, as case studies are aimed at providing a holistic and in-depth insight into the cases, they can include a range of data collection methods and compare data emerging from different collection techniques. Additionally, ethnographies are highly specific and do not allow for comparisons. An in-depth ethnographic study of only one informal settlement might have given deeper insights into the specific culture of that settlement; however, it would not enable comparisons could be relevant since there are more than 300 informal settlements just in Cape Town (CoCT 2011). Hence, I decided on a framework of a multiple case study of three empirical case locations before I really knew what my theoretical research focus would be, because I thought it would make it easier to find and compare some interesting trends. I decided that three cases would be a good number, as two cases often lead to dualistic conclusions.

There are several debates on what case studies are and what they should or could do. In this thesis, I will rely on Yin (2001) and Ragin (1992). Yin (2003:13) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Weight is placed on explaining the case in-depth, underscoring consideration of the context. Conducting research on two or more cases is described as a ‘multiple-case design’ (Yin 2003:46). Advantages of multiple case studies are that they can give more general
conclusions, but the disadvantages are that they might not go as deep as single case studies (Yin 2003). In this thesis, the central objective is to give insight into the politics of speaking publicly and articulating conflicting organizational logics; and by comparing committee formations in three settlements, both similarities and differences can be looked into. Notably, I found the similarities in how organizational logics were expressed and practises carried out particularly interesting and I perceive the cases as ‘general phenomena’ (Ragin 1992) of informal settlement dynamics. Therefore, I decided to not compare the settlements systematically by writing up one chapter on each settlement. A focus on similarities dominates chapter five, six and seven. Some fundamental differences are outlined in chapter six and discussed further in chapter eight. The research question is not preliminarily about differences, but rather about identifying similarities in patterns, practises and symbolical organizational models.

**Identifying the three cases**

In order to make the cases comparable, cases were chosen within a similar context; they are from the same area (Philippi) and are all three fairly young settlements and not undergoing any major upgrading schemes. I first encountered informal settlements through shadowing and helping another researcher in the field in April 2010. In May 2010, I contacted an NGO, who introduced me to two community leaders in an informal settlement in Philippi. I decided to appoint them to carry out a monitoring and documenting task of flooding in the area in June / July 2010 (this information was compiled in the reports Drivdal 2011a, 2011b). Further, in order to get more embedded into the setting, I decided to stay for a couple of days in the informal settlement, ‘Sheffield Road’, in August 2010. Later the same month, the three main cases of this study were selected. It was important to not be associated with political parties or local government. For that reason, I was introduced to the settlements through other channels. Kosovo, I knew from the pilot study where had gained some local contacts. GP was identified for me by two leaders from another settlement who suggested that this was one of the settlements with the worst physical conditions. Together, we entered the settlement and asked around for the ‘community leaders’. Lastly, Egoli was suggested to me by another researcher and a former employee of local government.
**4.5 Triangulating data collection methods on contexts and organizational presentations**

Preparing for engaging with the field, I was nervous and insecure as the field (informal settlements) was completely new to me. The empirical focus had been allocated to me as part of a research project, and I had actually never visited an informal settlement in Cape Town before. Further, I read that doing research in the specific context of South African informal settlement might be particularly problematic as there often is internal tension and suspicion (Barry and Ruther 2005), and since you as the researcher can easily be drawn into political battles (Bénit-Gbaffou 2010). As displayed by Seekings (2010), research on political organization and protest in South Africa in different periods gives prominence to certain voices, and the challenge now is to integrate diverse voices. Additionally, Walsh’s (2008) reflection on how academics represent and thereby construct the ‘poor’ is critical, as this construction throughout the fieldwork entails development of power relations that impact on the representations. Thus, I decided to tread lightly, be open and explorative, and test different kinds of methods to see what could work.

In addition to evaluating what methods are feasible to the field, the choice of how to generate data must be based on how logically it would be best to find answers to the research question. As the main question is a ‘how’ question, major focus should be directed to qualitative methods (Yin 2003). It is also maintained that qualitative methods studies are central in urban studies, because they challenge notions of homogeneity and display the diversity and difference in the real world (Watson 2003).

Since case studies can incorporate a range of methods, and the luxury of a doctoral thesis is time, I decided to start field work as early as possible and try different methods. An advantage of combining and comparing data collected with different methods is that it enhances triangulation, which further, is argued, enhances validity (Seale 1999, Yin 2003). Triangulation includes *combining multiple theories, methods, observers and empirical materials, to produce a more accurate, comprehensive and objective representation of the object of study* (Silverman 2006:291). Comparing the data that emerged from written material, observations, unstructured interviews and a structured survey indeed gave me the impression that the situation and perceptions are portrayed differently by the respondents depending on the data method. For instance, it was interesting to observe how individuals...
acted/behaved while ‘hanging out’ with them (participant observations), compared to how they expressed themselves in focus groups / collective dialogues.

A problem with combining different data collection methods is the epistemological paradigm to which they are aligned. It is reasoned that case studies relying on several methods (mainly when quantitative methods are involved) are understood to be more post-positivist, while ethnographic studies are more constructivists (White et al. 2009). However, Guba and Lincoln (2005: 169) highlight that, although mixing paradigms is impossible since commensurability between worldviews are not possible, mixing methods for data collection is possible. Hence, although I used different methods for collecting information, the analytic framing I adhered to in the analysis chapters is well placed in a (soft) social constructivist paradigm. As will be explained below, the quantitative data is used mostly for specifying context, and in a few areas in supporting some of the arguments, but less for analysis. In the following sections I will shortly describe each method.

4.5.1 Secondary data and quantitative survey for contextual deepening
The context is important in case studies. In order to get first-hand insight into these contexts, I collected secondary data and carried out two surveys.

Secondary data: Statistics, news articles, maps and reports
To start with, I read up on all reports and case studies of informal settlements in South Africa that I could find. In some papers I found interesting accounts, which were not really analysed, especially on organizational forms. Some were in footnotes. These will be drawn in and compared to own insights in the analysis chapters.

Further, I collected a range of reports and statistical data on South African and Cape Townian informal settlements, in order to shape a contextual account and make the settlements comparable. As will be discussed in chapter five, it was useful to understand some general informal settlement trends in order to not make assumptions about what is particular and not about the three settlements of this study. Additionally, data on numbers of shacks in the settlements were provided by CoCT reports and it was interesting to compare these numbers and time frames with oral accounts from interviews, which often overstated the numbers.
I also extracted maps from reports and from google.maps, to see how the settlements have expanded over time.

As soon as the three settlements were decided upon, and throughout the period of the fieldwork, I collected all the news articles about these settlements that I could find from 2003 until 2013. All in all I found ten articles mentioning Egoli, four mentioning GP, and 17 mentioning Kosovo (see reference list. Note that I have included only the ones I applied in the thesis). It was also worthwhile studying these articles to see how the journalists interpreted the situations and who they interviewed, compared with my own interpretations and connections.

**Quantitative survey**

Aligning with Seekings (2008) who states that there is still a lack of quantitative social science research is South Africa, I found a lack of quantitative reports on informal settlements (see also Huchzermeyer et al. 2006:25-27). It appears that quantitative approaches are more utilized by government and NGOs than academic institutions.

As basic quantitative information on the settlements was lacking, I decided to carry out surveys in two of the settlements. The third settlement, (Kosovo), had already been surveyed some years ago, and I decided to use this data instead of exhausting residents with another survey.

Since I was not too familiar with these areas, I decided to collaborate with other researchers and copy the questionnaire that an NGO has applied many times to different informal settlements (see Appendix B). It is a relatively standardized questionnaire, and I thought that, since it had been applied many times, it ought to be a useful questionnaire. I also hoped that the NGO could use the data that I generated. Additionally, it should be mentioned that as the survey was carried out in collaboration with two other researchers with different interests, we included some additional questions.

The questionnaires were carried out by walking door to door. I did not do all this work myself, but got some assistance by locally appointed assistants (four in each settlement. The

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41For instance, the NGO called Slum Dwellers International has embraced mapping and ‘enumeration’ (surveying) of informal settlements and as empowering tool for the communities, see e.g. the special issue of ‘Environment and Urbanization’ 2012 volume 24, issue 3.
two surveys covered 279 households (approx. 81%) in GP and 180 households (approx. 52%) in the other settlement (Egoli). For the first survey, two leaders from another informal settlement (that had carried out enumeration in their own settlement) helped us to get started and trained the four settlement representatives. It took five to six days to carry out the surveys in each of the settlements. These assistants were interviewed after the process for evaluative purposes and for a reliability check. The data from the questionnaires were compiled and inserted into the SPSS statistics programme, which I used to develop some graphs and figures. Some of this data was presented back to residents at an open community meeting.

Evaluating the process, I found that the survey generally and some questions particularly did not work well, implying certain reliability and validity problems. Basically, the survey was too long. Some residents indicated that they were tired of researchers that just come to look and to fill out forms. Regarding some of the questions, it was particularly challenging for many residents to answer questions on income. Further, some answers did not seem that plausible. In a report evaluating the census process, a similar issue was reported: One participant admitted that, when asked questions they perceive to be invasive, they tend to give false answers (Stats SA 2004:67). Last but not at least, some questions and subcategories did not work well. For example, the question on choice of health facilities included the option of ‘traditional healer’, and many of the respondents found this funny, and no one ticked that option in favour of clinics. These problems relate to a foundational limitation of surveys with pre-determined questions: people do not get the chance to explain certain complicated issues. For these reasons, I will not use data from those questions that appeared unreliable, only some of the fundamental data like age groups and movement patterns. However, I believe that surveys, slightly better designed than the one I used, could give significant information. For instance, questions could have been posed on networks and legitimacy, on general resident knowledge of and relations to different organizations, on general levels of trust towards community leaders, etc.

However, in reflecting back, the survey exercise was useful in three ways: First, data is important to gain fundamental contextual insights, and chapter five and six has employed some quantitative data for this purpose. For instance, it gave some interesting insights into tendencies, such as the issue of young people living alone and on-migration, which will be discussed in chapter six. Secondly, the data also provided information that can help classify
the cases (see chapter five), and provided a basis for comparison. Comparative studies of informal settlements are necessary and are lacking, and a goal of my research was to make these cases comparable in further research. Third, the actual exercise of carrying out the surveys by walking door to door was hugely interesting. It gave me the chance to walk around through the entire settlement, meeting different people that I later revisited. I thereby carried out observation as I carried out the surveys, which gave me interesting indications on how residents generally react and respond to such external intervention.

4.5.2 Qualitative data on models and practises: focus groups, interviews and participant observation
Quantitative data can lay the foundation to understanding what social process might be important; they cannot explain social processes - in other words, answer a ‘how and why’ question. The main weight in this thesis is consequently on qualitative methods. The main reason for doing qualitative research is to learn from the ground instead of the researcher deciding on pre-established variables that the people encountered must answer. Numerous residents were consulted through these methods, and all in all 12 community leaders from the different settlements. However, I mostly visited two different leaders in each settlement during the field visit period, for the pragmatic reason that these were the ones that had the time and interest to talk to me.

Focus group interviews
In order to get some initial impression on how people interact, I arranged four focus groups with around 20 people attending each one. The topic of these focus groups were health and sanitation, which is a public issue about which many residents are concerned. The advantage of a focus group is that the participants can discuss issues while the interviewer can observe how different issues are treated and how the group members respond to each other (Silverman 2006:201). In order to be able to observe as much as possible, I employed two women from a health NGO, who live in informal settlements. That way I could sit back, observe and note down the conversation, but it also helped in breaking down the barrier and the expectations of the participants. Thereby, this method functions like a mixture of interviewing and observation.
A main usage for this method is to extract information about the meaning behind the groups’ assessments, information on uncertainty and group processes, and information about what normative understandings lie behind the groups’ collective decisions (Bloor et al. 2001). It is also argued that focus group interviews have the potential to uncover statements and ideas that participants would not have made in interviews or in daily life (Bloor et al. 2001), and they are often used in an exploratory way to get inspiration on possible variables and perspectives that could be relevant (Macnaghten and Myers 2004). For this thesis, some interesting insights emerged regarding barriers for residents to express themselves on public matters. Further, it was interesting to observe how the interaction took place. Many of the participants were very shy to talk, while the leaders, when present, talked a lot and furthermore the other participants asked them directly to take their problematic issue further. Additionally, I found it fascinating how some of the participants who had been to workshops earlier seemed to perform the task of what is expected of them to do in a workshop. Nonetheless, I decided to limit the use of such focus groups. This above all because indications were given that with earlier workshops, expectations were created, followed by disappointments. It was expressed by some residents that they were tired of ‘workshops’ and it was a waste of time.

**Interviews**

Carrying out interviews appears to be the easiest fix and the most popular qualitative method, especially open-ended ones with few questions, leaving room for the participants to elaborate on issues they find relevant (Silverman 2006). Compared to survey interviews, the actors get the chance to explain issues in their own words without having to choose from predetermined categories, and important information can be revealed.

Excluding the informal interviews and discussions with residents, I carried out 47 more organized interviews. Some of these were rather short, intended to follow up specific issues that came up as interesting. I interviewed nine leaders in the three settlements and additionally five in five other settlements. In addition, some of the first residents that moved to the settlements, residents that lived alone, residents that had been engaged in neighbourhood watches, families that were prone to flooding, residents who cleaned the area, and informal traders were interviewed. Although questions were prepared, the interviews
were mostly open-ended and only a few questions were asked. Most of them were not recorded with a voice recorder in order to avoid intimidation of the respondents.

A challenge was that informants often came up with irrelevant information, misunderstandings, and were shy to elaborate on the questions and preferred short answers, like in a survey. Residents came up with much better explanations and seemed to express themselves more easily in random discussions, in other words when I made use of participant observation.

**Ethnographic participant observation, field visits and field notes**

The most significant insights emerged through participant observation with both leaders and other residents over time. Often, the terms ‘participant observation’ and’ ethnographic fieldwork’ are used interchangeably. Both terms entail spending long periods watching people, coupled with talking to them about what they are doing, thinking and saying, designed to see how they understand their world (Delamont 2004:218). However ethnography is a broader term, and partly relies on the method of participant observation (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). In other words, participant observation is more specifically about the method of data collection; which is a mix of observation and interviewing (Delamont 2004).

During 36 months, I approximately visited the settlements once a week, which comes to about 150 days of field visits (see Appendix A). During most of these visits I conducted participant observation with different leaders, but also with other residents. For the most part I engaged in ‘sociological participant observation’ entailing day visits, but I also engaged in an ‘anthropological approach’ by staying overnight in each settlement for some days (Delamont 2004). I only did three overnight stays, because I did not want to waste people’s time. The times I spent there at night did give some interesting insights, an improved feeling of everyday life, in addition to an increased trust by many residents. During the day visits, especially the first year of field visits, I would mostly visit my main contact persons, which often were leaders. They would show me around in the settlement and helped me arrange interviews with residents in their homes. After the first year I felt safe to enter the settlements without arranging it through the contact persons to chat with random people. I also participated in and observed meetings. This included meetings with just the committee,
The importance of keeping field notes of such visits is highlighted in most methodological books on ethnography (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). I always kept a field notebook. If something interesting happened, I followed this up and engaged in conversations. I noted down as much as possible about what happened and what was said. The quotes used in this thesis are therefore mostly the notes that I scribbled down in conversation and open ended interviews. I made sure to write as fast as possible while people were talking to get down as much detail as possible. When leaving the settlements, I added notes about the situation and my interpretation thereof. Hence, these field notes were not only important to glean situated accounts, which I have used much in the analysis chapters, but also for keeping track of own feelings and interpretations, which will be discussed in the reflexivity sections below.

Atkinson (2004:103) mentions that it is important to understand the slow, unfolding and repetitive nature of collective action, which cannot be grabbed hastily through journalistic impression. Visiting the settlement and following committee and leadership processes over time was useful in this research in several aspects:

First, following developments of the settlements by capturing cases as they happen instead of ‘back-casting’ gave insights into processes and since politics is a constant process where ideas, people and organizations come and go. Secondly, visiting regularly instead of for an intense period of fieldwork, only taking one snapshot in time, gave me time to digest and reflect on my encounters. Third, it was useful to gain trust from and make sure that the information I got (and the way I understood things) were as valid as possible, because people often presented themselves differently over time. After the first visits, stories got more complicated. There are some things that you cannot really ask when you first meet people, and it is better wait for them to be comfortable enough with you to bring up more personal and perhaps uncomfortable stories naturally. Getting information about politics and leadership required me to tread carefully, as there are a lot of tensions around these issues. In the first encounters, I did not ask much about this, also because my focus had not yet shaped into the question about the politics of leadership organizing. I will engage in deeper discussions of limitations, validity issues and ethical concerns in the following sections.
4.5.3 General limitations of access and how to get around them

Engaging in fieldwork in an unfamiliar culture has both advantages and disadvantages, and affects access. On the one hand, being a female foreigner had the advantage of not being seen as a threat, related both to gender issues (Silverman 2006:84) and that they could talk privately in their own language if they wanted to hide something. Being a young woman also led to some situations where residents wanted to protect me. In one instance a leader escorted me to my car as a community meeting was unexpectedly announced. I tried to resist as I was very interested to see what was going to unfold, but the leader explained shortly that the meeting was about personal matters and accusations of a criminal offence by a resident, that he worried it could ‘get nasty’, and he indicated it could lead to vigilante violence. I was disappointed, but had not really a choice but to leave. I later found out that it had not turned violent although there had been other displays of anger in the meeting.

Language barriers sometimes limited my access to understanding what was going on in some situations, since I don’t speak the mother tongue of most the residents (neither isiXhosa nor Afrikaans). Yet, I found the language barrier to be less problematic than I expected, as most residents spoke English very well. I did have to ask someone to translate some situations. In public discussions, they would not always speak English, and I missed out on information in some these meetings, although usually asked someone next to me to translate. Observing the interaction between residents and leaders in the meetings was interesting, noting who was talking about what themes, who spoke up and not, and the conformity to specific meeting procedures.

Further, I was worried about getting access to random and ‘unbiased’ residents. I found that I was collecting mainly interesting information on my main contact persons, which mostly were (or became) community leaders. All the leaders I encountered were interested in chatting with me and showing me around in the settlement, and they usually spoke English well. Many residents, however, were shy and would refer me to the leaders. Therefore, it was mostly leaders that helped me identify people to interview, through a ‘snowballing’ process. Thus, I was worried that snowballing carried the risk of being only strategically introduced to ‘allies’ of certain leaders, and I noticed that leaders often dominated conversations with residents. Hence, I needed to apply other mechanisms. I started approaching residents when leaders were not present. I also identified people to interview through the survey data.
Further, after the first year of visits, I started feeling more comfortable, and I visited the
settlement without contacting leaders first, approaching random residents. One way of getting
into a chats with random residents and finding excuses to visit and chat was to make use of
their businesses, for instance someone fixed my car, sewed my clothes or shoes, or I bought
candy or fruit from their small shops. While waiting for my car to be fixed, I would chat
loosely with the people working and hanging around, to get an impression on how they view
politics and the different leaders. Spending such 'informal' time enables residents to inform
the research and give suggestions on topics that they find important, and increased the
chances to observe naturally occurring events, reducing the dependence on interview
accounts.

I will now move to a discussion on reflexivity, which as noted in the introduction is essential
for constructive qualitative research.

4.6 Reflexivity and interpreting the theatre of leadership

Writing up the analysis chapters involves several choices of how to use, organize and
interpret the ‘data’, which is particularly complicated when the range of information is huge,
leaving much room for creativity and interpretation (Denzin and Linkoln 2005). Further, in
qualitative methods, the line between theory and data analysis is not clear cut like in
quantitative methods, and, particularly in constructive qualitative research, the actor’s point
of view should not be seen as ‘truths’ (Silverman 2006). It is also highlighted that research on
political organizing in South Africa needs to go beyond voices and include reflections over
the things that participants do not say (Seekings 2010). Analysing actor’s self-presentations
leaves enormous room for interpretations. Thereby, analysis is ongoing while collecting
information and writing up, and is part of the process of choosing topics, themes and
categories, which are compared to theories, and deciding on meanings of the data
(interpretation). These choices will look clear cut in the analysis chapters, but behind these
choices are both theoretical and personal influences. I will therefore consider reflexivity,
which, as underlined earlier, is essential when discussing an analytical approach and methods
in social constructive-inspired qualitative research (Yanow 2006).

In addition to reflecting on how own institutionalization into a specific theoretical focus
influenced changes in my research focus, more personal reflections are required, as all social
science research is influenced by the researcher’s subjectivity. In ethnographic work, it is essential to acknowledge that the orientations of the researchers will be shaped by their socio-historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:15). Also in social constructive research on leadership, researchers should systematically ask themselves how their research is being influenced by their own social background, preferences and the circumstances under which the research takes place (Fairhurst and Grant 2010:96). As discussed earlier, reflexivity is the way in which qualitative researchers strive for validity and rigour, by including a consideration on how own backgrounds and emotions influence the fieldwork (Guba and Lincoln 2005).

As mentioned earlier, I also used the field note booklets to scribe down emotions and interpretations I made after the field visit in order to be able to track how my emotional condition could affect the interpretations I made. Some of the issues that came up will be discussed in the following sections.

### 4.6.1 Entering and leaving the field

According to Delamont (2004), reflexivity should include reflecting on both entering and leaving the field, and I will consider this in addition to issues of field relations.

Particularly two issues impacted on my impressions when entering the field: The ‘chaos and dirtiness’, and the enormous inequality.

First, I believe that the researchers relation to ‘chaos and dirtiness’ is important. In several writings on slums, there seem to be two opposite encounters: the ones who see a fascinating and colourful space and the other that sees a chaotic, dirty and depressing space. As discussed in the theory chapter, such diverging interpretations are also visible in much of the classical literature on cities, where some would see spaces of possibilities while conservative theorists would rather focus on chaos and despair (Hubbard 2006). It is perhaps this mixture of feeling of exotic and apocalyptic, the intense stimulation of several of your senses (smells, colours, sounds) that meets you when you enter a slum, which becomes visible in the style of writing and representation of the material. For people who like order and systems, this space must be very frustrating, but people who are inspired by complexity would see room for possibilities and entrepreneurship. I would see myself in the latter group, as I am not drawn to order and
neatness, however getting to know residents and their difficult situations was also very depressing and frustrating. Additionally, the intensity varies with the field visits. The first time I visited was a warm summer day, and I encountered a vibrant and colourful sphere, which amplified my interest. On the other hand, on one of the cold and rainy winter days, the mood is incredibly depressing.

Secondly, the visible inequality was shocking. The first visit to one of the informal settlements, which is situated right next to a large farm with a nice house, made a huge impression. As a resident pointed out, ‘even the pigs in that farm have better conditions than us; the pigs have nice houses with electricity’. Seeing and hearing such statements provoked emotional reactions, evident in my field notes from that encounter.

Due to the severe conditions in informal settlements, both encountering and leaving the field was emotionally draining. Worries about what will happen to these people made it hard to leave the field at all. Many of the residents I worked with still contact me, and I actually never really left the field. I do not visit to collect more information or discuss the research in these visits but to follow up on some of the relations I have built, which also carries certain ethical considerations, which will be discussed further in the ethics section.

4.6.2 Field relations with leaders and interpreting the presentations of self

A fundamental dilemma of ethnographic fieldwork is that, when engaging in conversations with individuals over a long time span, one can become too friendly with the ‘informants’, ‘going native’ and identifying with the participants (Silverman 2006:82). This was a problem I worried about from the start, because knowing myself well, when I first engage in deep conversations with individuals and learn about their history and their ideas, I easily become too engaged. It relates to the issue that doing fieldwork involves ‘living simultaneously in two worlds’- that of participation and that of research (Hamersley and Atkinson (2007:89). In other words, participating but at the same time always being distant and never corporately included is a significant aspect of field relations.

Looking at the data collected, much of this centres around observations on what the leaders do and how different leaders presented themselves in social interaction with me as a researcher, with residents, other leaders and other externals. Reflecting over field relations with these leaders is therefore specifically important, as the research is produced in a social
setting where the interaction between the researcher and the ‘research subject’ is not a one-way communication, and the ‘information’ is thereby shaped by several sides of this interaction.

First, it is important to acknowledge the symbolic and emotional value we connect to leaders. Personally, I have always felt an ambiguity toward leadership and authorities, maybe since I grew up in a very liberal family. I was often annoyed with popular accounts of the importance of leadership, and during my undergraduate studies I found constructivist theories on leadership and power persuasive. Yet, during the fieldwork, I did realise that the charisma of some leaders affected my interpretations. This is also reflected in my field notes. As conflicts between leaders are common, I needed to be aware of how leaders portrayed themselves and others to get me on their side (Bénit-Gbaffou 2010), especially when leaders would describe themselves as the legitimate leaders and blame rival leaders for being undemocratic and corrupt. I acknowledge that not taking sides is difficult, as we as humans make moral judgements when observing any situations. I noticed that when chatting to one side about the conflict about the other side, I would feel empathy with the one I was talking to. Moving to the other fraction, my empathy would change. These confusing and changing moral judgements that I could not escape making, made me realize how easy, but dangerous it is to take sides on such matters. By talking to several and often opposing leaders, to residents not involved in the leadership and following the settlements over time, I tried to balance my interpretations, in addition to showing that I did not take sides. Still, it was often hard to not become associated with one side of the conflict. It was also hard to not become upset with the sometimes harsh accusations related to violence. Notably, it is not an aim to discuss which leaders are good or bad, or who is right or wrong in this thesis, as this job is up to judges and law enforcers.

Secondly, as pointed out by Ervin Goffman, even what one would regard as everyday encounters or simple interactions are full of complexities. In the book *The presentation of self in everyday life*, Goffman (1959) describes how humans put up a theatre in every social setting, trying to present certain sides of themselves and actively impact upon others’ perceptions of oneself. Actors tend to adapt to definitions and perceived norms of the setting in order to keep the peace (Goffman 1959). In the social setting of interviews and participant observation, humans might be particularly thoughtful of what the presence of the researcher
implies. They might say what they think the researcher wants to hear, show the researcher what they think he/she want to see, or systematically hide things (Delamont 2004:224). Outsiders, like me, are often seen as a possible source of support or an introduction to a network that could supply resources (especially jobs). I noticed that some leaders picked up my intentions, and adapted their focus on what I seemed to be interested in. In interpreting this, it is essential to not make the mistake of treating an actor’s point of view as an explanation or ‘truths’ (Silverman 2006, Walsh 2008, Seekings 2010). In addition to the advantage of being able to visit and revisit different leaders and residents over time, triangulation of information is important for dealing with contradictory explanations. For instance, observation of what leaders actually do compared to what they are saying in interviews is important. In interviews they would naturally state how important they are, but only by observing that residents actually approach the leaders with issues and by observing community meetings could I assume that they do have some particular roles within the settlements.

4.7 General ethics and dealing with marginalized populations

Formally, in order to get the research proposal approved, I engaged in an ethics clearance process with the UCT Law Faculty. This process included standard ethical considerations in social research, like assessment of informed consent, privacy, harm, exploitation and the consequences for future research (Hammerlsey and Atkinson 2007). Doing fieldwork in the South and particularly in low-income areas has some extra ethical implications; hence issues of exploitation will be considered (Ryen 2004).

Before outlining these reflections, I will make a note specific to the context; that the way in which researchers represented the field is highly sensitive. I realized this by observing public debates around the book Diepsloot by Harber (2011). He, like others before him, was accused in a newspaper article of ‘whitewashing’ and racism in trying to represent a black township with a white man’s pre-judgmental eyes (Ball 2011). This critique fits with a fundamental ethical problem in ethnographic work; that it grew out of a tradition where ethnographers presented research of the ‘primitive others’, often to colonial powers, and can therefore be
called a racist project (Denzin and Lincoln 2005:20). Being aware of this, I tried to step lightly. This also influenced my urge to neither romanticise nor demonize the politics of these places, and to avoid exoticism of slum research (Wacquant 1997, 2008) or of ‘exotic’ portrayals of traditionalist African politics generally (Hagman and Péclard 2010).

**Informed consent**

When encountering leaders and residents, I informed them about the basic intentions of my research. I decided to not make residents sign any papers, the main reason being that there have been reports of scams, and that some residents therefore rightfully are very sceptical about signing papers. Additionally, as raised by Marks (2012), based on her field work experience with public police and political activists in South Africa, the common way of signing consent forms might compromise confidentiality, and crucial information might be hidden by actors, which could undermine the validity of the research. So instead of providing forms to sign, I presented my research and myself verbally, based on the informed consent paper I shaped in interaction with the ethical committee of the Law Faculty. However, as pointed out by several ethnographers, fully informed consent is impossible with participant observation (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:210). It is impossible to tell all the participants everything about your research, because with an ethnographic framework the researcher does not know the course the work will take, because people might not be interested in the research, and because it might change the participants’ behaviour. This is what Marks (2012) terms the tenuous divide between overt and covert research signifying ethnographic fieldwork.

Taking these issues into account, I tried to inform participants as best as I could, also when I changed focus towards committees and leadership. I discussed my thoughts with residents and leaders. I also presented some of the information back to residents in meetings and through compiling reports, however, most residents did not seem interested in the findings but rather in possibilities for aid. Additionally, hiring a few residents as ‘research assistants’, carrying out surveys, small interviews and observations, was also aimed at providing residents with more insight into my work.

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42 This relates to the major and long-lasting debates over the ‘triple crisis of ethnography’; representation, legitimation, and praxis (Denzin and Lincoln 2005:26), but this discussion will not be taken further here.
Privacy and confidentiality
Privacy and confidentiality is secured by keeping the residents and leaders anonymous, and when citing them, by using codes. Children and under-aged were not interviewed. In a few cases, residents did not want to be interviewed, and also in some cases some were reluctant to talk about certain issues, which I respected. The fact that certain information was withheld was interesting in itself and will be included in the analysis.

Harm
As this study did not involve any ‘experiments’ (as in the medical sciences), there were no possibilities of physical harm to the participants. It could be argued that there was the possibility for creating some anxiety with some participants; although I do not believe that this happened in this study. Nevertheless, as these spaces experience some political tension, I made all participants anonymous by coding them when citing, in order to avoid any possible harm through publication of findings.

Ethical dilemmas in the field
Sometimes I was faced with ethical dilemmas due to the particular environment of informal settlements. As raised by Marks (2012), some situations can be morally compromising. As there is much social drama and crime in informal settlements, I did sometimes unwillingly get involved. One example is when I was staying overnight in one of the settlements, drama unfolded over a missing child. A woman came screaming and everyone gathered to try to help her. Her son had been kidnapped by her ex-boyfriend. Some residents turned to me and asked to borrow my car, which I had parked in the settlement, to drive around and look for the child. I could not say no, but I was scared to join as it was already dark. So they left with my car, and several hours later, at night, they came back with the boy. They would not say what happened to the kidnapper, but just stated they had dealt with him, and ‘vigilante’ justice was indicated. I was happy the boy was back, but felt guilty that I perhaps had contributed to vigilante justice.

Otherwise, I managed for the most part to stay away from morally compromising situations, especially because the residents I got close to protected me from such issues, and because I early on learnt to stay indoors at night and stay away from situations that involved alcohol.
Exploitation and reflecting over ‘giving back’

As noted earlier, a moral dilemma I have been struggling with is the fact that while I will get my fine degree, the individuals that I have engaged with and ‘used’ for my research get little in return. The problem of exploitation is pertinent in situations where researchers typically investigate those who are less powerful than themselves or low-income areas like informal settlements (Ryen 2004, Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). As mentioned by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), there will usually be benefits and costs to both sides, but the contributions to the participants are hard to measure. In my experience, although many researchers claim that covering and giving attention to vulnerable people is important in the long run, it seems to me that such research does often not have significant impact on the actual people researchers engage with directly. The feeling of guilt connected to this might be common to researchers in such fields, as also reflected by Bourke et al. (2009:101-102):

I went back a number of times, finding it more harrowing every time. The guilt overwhelmed me …I didn’t change their lives. I didn’t change anything for them. The research changed my own life, but that didn’t matter. The participants live exactly the way they did before.

Some residents did indicate that researchers ‘just come and do their research and then go back to their nice houses’. Perhaps in order to deal with this, many researchers also become activists (Walsh 2008, Seekings 2010). Although I am reluctant to call myself an activist, I did take some measures to at least give something back. First, I did informally ‘employ’ some of the residents to help me, and paid them for their work. This was not only because I felt it was problematic to occupy time that they could have spent trying to earn money, but also for empowerment and increasing knowledge about the research (of course, their input was also useful). Secondly, I made sure to assist where I could, for instance sharing information with NGOs that were establishing projects in the settlements, and helping the lawyer that was defending one settlement in an eviction case. This is in line with the recommendation that

…there are occasions where a researcher should stop being a researcher and engage in action that is not directed at the outcome of the research, however, most of the time, the temptation to abandon the researcher role should be resisted.
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2005:228-229).

I also found it important to not indulge in philanthropic ideas (often including strong paternalistic traits) that I could help these communities to organize better, but to be true to a
constructivist perspective where the researcher is in no position to claim ‘true representation’ and give empirical recommendations on how to ‘better organize’.

**Consequences for further research**

A last point should be made on a sense of fatigue with researchers, which can affect future researchers’ access. Walsh (2008) notes that continuing protests and mobilisations by the ‘poor’ in South Africa has been closely followed and joined by a range of academics and activist who clamber on board to explain, report and comment on the struggle, highlighting that it sometimes increases the fatigue of the actual ‘poor’, as this reporting and commenting does not bring about change. I noticed early on that in Cape Town too there is a broad range of actors engaging with informal settlements, including researchers, NGOs, local government officials and political party representatives. These often make what residents perceive as ‘promises’, which sometimes are not followed up. Unsurprisingly, many residents are tired of such interventions, in the same way they are tired of politicians that ‘just come and promise things but don’t deliver’. During my fieldwork, I constantly had to underline that the research might not have practical outcomes. This was difficult, as expectations of ‘external’ actors are high, and I did notice some disappointment from residents in the settlement that have had little external engagement before I intervened.

Additionally, in order to not exhaust the residents, I tried to make use of data that is already collected, in order to not overload people and make them answer similar questions several times.

**4.8 Summary**

Summing up, I have considered several aspects of methodology and of the process leading to the arguments of this thesis. As the theoretical framework for my analysis is constructivist and interpretive, I have included discussions of reflexivity in the process of finding the topic, framing the research, deciding on and carrying out data collection methods, and analysing the information.

After emphasising that, with a constructivist grounding, reflexivity is important in every aspect of the research process, I discussed how my theoretical background in a socially constructive perspective of leadership and organizing influenced how that became main topic
of the thesis. Due to this theoretical aspiration, I could not steer away from my fascination of the organizational models and ideals presented. Following this, I explained that I decided on a multiple case study framework to enable some comparisons instead of a pure ethnographic strategy, the latter being recommended by both ‘slum researchers’ generally and by social constructivist organizational theorists. However, ethnographic methods, as I highlight in the following section, was one of the most vital methods for gaining insights into processes of leadership and committee formation over time. Following the settlements and some leaders over time was important to gain a broader perspective (rather than taking a snapshot in time), to slowly develop field relations, and to slowly digest impressions and my interpretations of these. Finding answers to the question of institutional logics cannot be answered through a survey data (although it can give some contextual and demographic insights), the analysis chapters are based mainly on reflections over insights from qualitative methods, especially participant observation.

Adding to this, applying a multiple case study design rather than a pure ethnographic design enabled me to make some comparisons and triangulate insights from a range of data collection methods. Looking at information collected through different methods including secondary data, surveys, interviews, participant observation and focus groups, was imperative to see different sides of the informal settlement context and of conflicts between leaders.

Lastly, I have reflected on limitations, interpretations and ethics. As the field of informal settlements is particularly chaotic and carries several ethical concerns, I decided to step lightly, spend much time, and talk to different residents and leaders. This was also important to avoid taking sides.
CHAPTER 5 Introducing the three settlements and the institutionalised practises shaping settlement committees

5.1 Introduction
I tried to ask my research subjects directly why there are community leaders. The answers were always pragmatic, stating that there must be leaders, if not, there will be chaos. Illustratively, a leader plainly explained: ‘There must be leaders, all over South Africa there are community leaders.’ (Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4. 2011). That leaders at this scale are taken for granted indicates, within a framework of new-institutionalism, that leadership or committees are organizations with institutional features. By institutional features I do not mean institutional as in formalized as promoted in informal economy literature (Hansen and Vaa 2004, Meagher 2007). Rather, as discussed in the theory chapter, I perceive institutional features as displaying not only rules, but also norms of cultural cognitive ideas that have become normalized or ‘taken for granted’ over time (Lowndes 2001, Scott 2008:95). Hence, the institutional features of the committee organizations can be seen as the reoccurring taken for granted practises that contribute to the social construction of leaders. These features should be specific to informal settlements, based on some major common concerns that need to be dealt with in this urban setting. This chapter therefore poses the question:

*How are informal settlement committees and leaders shaped through context specific institutionalised practises?*

I will discuss this question by outlining the organizational practises that emerged as significant during the research and that seem to shape leaders and committees in the different settlements. Before discussing how these practises contribute to the social construction of leadership, I will introduce the three settlements and highlight some differences between them. Thereafter, instead of categorizing types of leaders or committees, I will discuss types of practises that are significant in the ongoing social construction of leaders and committees. Through observing leaders in action over time, and in relation to the three historical roots of informal settlement committees outlined in chapter three, I have here categorized three institutionalized practises I found important: mediating and regulating internal order,
mobilizing, and external intermediary negotiation. These three practises can be seen as three significant patches of the ‘bricolage’ of practises (Skuse and Cousins 2007). They are circulating practises (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b), and are often interlinked, but have different purposes, and have evolved into complex practises in the cases of this study. More importantly, they seem to encompass both political and bureaucratic tasks, which lead me to interpret them as micro-government with blurred lines between the democratic and bureaucratic duties.

5.2 Introducing the three settlements

The three informal settlements in this study are all located within the Philippi area of the ‘Cape Flats’. In fact, most of the informal settlements in Cape Town are located on the Cape Flats.

![Figure 2: Location of the three settlements in relation to other informal settlements in the Cape Flats. Copied from CoCT (2011), case study locations inserted.](image-url)
5.2.1 Graveyard Pond informal settlement

When I first visited GP, I found the place to be the most depressive informal settlement I had encountered. It is very cramped and the paths between the shacks are narrow. In the winter, but also on rainy days in the summer, the paths and many of the shacks are flooded, and as the location is particularly low the water becomes stagnant and turns green and smelly. Further, there are very few toilets and no legal electricity. In other words, the physical conditions are particularly bad in GP, and it is viewed by the media as one of the worst settlements (Kabeni 2010, Maseko 2010, Boyle 2011)\textsuperscript{43}.

\textsuperscript{43} Note that these articles have a party political motive and that the settlement is being used in these articles to argue against the political party opponent. Since the first articles, the ward councillor is now from another party, but the conditions in the settlement are exactly the same.
The name Graveyard Pond reflects both the location and physical condition of the settlement. It is called ‘Enyunywini’ in isiXhosa, which means when translated ‘dirty place’. The English name, Graveyard Pond, refers to the detention pond area next to the neighbouring settlement, called Graveyard, which apparently is located on top of some old graves of the early German farmers of Philippi. This is why, according to one resident in Graveyard, the place is haunted.

![Figure 4: Growth of Graveyard Pond. Received by request from the City of Cape Town GIS Department.](image)

Although GP is the youngest of the three settlement cases, it was particularly challenging to find explanations as to how it developed. After chatting to residents in the neighbouring settlements who observed the emergence of GP, it seems that GP did not start with a planned land invasion but expanded rather slowly. Visualized in the image above (Figure 4), the edges of the settlements were occupied first. In 2001, the neighbouring settlement ‘Graveyard’ had filled up, and only around five shacks were located on the edges of the pond. Slowly, over the next few years, a few more shacks appeared around the edges, closing off the pond. The settlement was first counted by CoCT in 2006, estimating a number of 119 dwellings (CoCT 2011). From 2007 to 2009, corresponding with the development of formal (houses in Phola Park /Better Life, the settlement suddenly filled up. The newcomers moved into the low middle area of the settlement, which during winter experiences heavy flooding (see report Drivdal 2011a).
Due to this slow expansion, GP was first not considered a separate settlement, but was part of the neighbouring settlement. Some of the first settlers indicated that there was no committee overseeing the migration (migration regulation is common in many settlements as will be discussed later). However, leaders appeared after the settlement grew considerably. In 2011 GP also expanded as residents in shacks scattered in the areas close to GP wanted to be included. They did not have a functioning committee, and had seen that the community leaders of GP were active, so they hoped to stand a better chance of getting service from local government by joining GP.

Notably, there appear to actually have been ‘three generations’ of leadership committees in the short history of GP. The first generation vanished as one leader was killed and another moved away, the second committee setup dissolved when one leader was arrested and the others accused for corruption, and the third generation seem to have almost dissolved due to fatigue. These processes will be further explored in chapter seven and eight.

5.2.2 Kosovo informal settlement

I was introduced to Kosovo through a student. It is large and confusing settlement, and compared to GP, it seems busier and there is much informal trade within the settlement. As the settlement is very large, it is referred to as compromising of three sections: A, B and C.

Kosovo is arguably the most well know of the three informal settlements, as it is one of the largest in Cape Town and has received much attention both in media, by politicians and by researchers. According to a student report (DIMP 2009), the settlement got its name due to the media attention given to the Kosovo war in the Balkans during the land invasion. The name therefore reflects the struggle against eviction in the first period of the settlement (1999-2000).
Although Kosovo most likely started with a land invasion by a small group, residents with whom I chatted and who claimed to be ‘one of the first persons to stay here’ came up with a similar story: They saw or heard rumours about people cutting down the trees and putting up shacks, and realizing that a new settlement was emerging, they also came to set up their own homes.

Of the three settlements, Kosovo has the most confusing committee setting, and is both currently and historically marked by a high degree of internal fighting between leaders. Kosovo has also had extensive engagement with a variety of external actors. In finding out about the history of the establishments of committees, different histories were given, indicating the high stakes. Only by constantly coming back and getting further pieces of the story, was it possible for me as a researcher to grasp what had happened and what was going on. Further, it was not only confusing for me as an external to understand who the leaders were, but also for residents. Encountering random residents, they mentioned that they were not sure who the leaders were, but what was sure, was that there were and are several leaders and several committees, which often are in conflict with each other.
5.2.3 Egoli informal settlement

When encountering Egoli, the immediate impression is shaped by its stark contrast to the immediate surroundings. The settlement is crammed into a defined island of shacks between green fields with sheep, horses and ostriches (see Figure 6). This is because it is located on urban farmland in the ‘Philippi horticultural area’, which has few informal settlements but is in the midst of political disagreements whether to favour housing or urban farming, as highlighted in a newspaper article (Swart 2012). The farm houses nearby are mostly modest, but seem like mansions compared to the shacks. The immediate visible inequality and difference in living conditions compared to its surrounding areas is shocking. The contrast between the settlement and the surrounding area is reflected by one of leaders, who underlined the visible inequality in that even the neighbour’s animals have better houses and living conditions than the residents of Egoli. It is also made worse by the rumour that the owner of the land who wants them evicted, apparently also wants to use the land to build stalls for his horses. Further, many residents somehow appear more rugged, maybe due to their hard life as farmworkers. Notably, there is a mix of people, most are Afrikaans speaking, but there are also many Xhosa’s and residents from other countries, and different religious manifestations of different Christian churches, Rastafarians, and a few Muslims.

A settlement name often reflects its history and/or its location, but the name Egoli is more uncertain. Some say the name is based on the English/Afrikaans soap opera called ‘Egoli: Place of gold’, which could reflect the hope of the early settlers of a better life than on the farms. However, I was later informed that the name emerged as the first residents sat down and noted the things they don’t want in this settlement: Eviction, Gangsters, Outsiders, Liars, and Intruders. This then made up the name Egoli.
According to the oldest residents, Egoli started with a land invasion by about 64 evicted farmworkers. As they were evicted from the neighbouring farms they used to work on, they decided to settle on this plot of land, which they had often used as a soccer field. It is unclear what year this happened as different accounts are given. Some say it started in 1995, but the map above does not show any shacks in early 1996. It is however a fact that shack dwellers had settled there before the land was bought on the 30\textsuperscript{th} of June 1999 and registered in the owner’s names on 22 September 1999 (Planners without boarders 2011). Also a news reporter mentions that since 1999, the owners have struggled to access their land, and have filed three court cases over the years to have the residents evicted, thus far unsuccessfully (Swart 2010). As a result, residents have been living with the uncertainty of being evicted since 1999, and it should not be a surprise that fatigue is widespread, as the court cases keep coming but no solutions are in sight, and they are still living in limbo\textsuperscript{44}.

This settlement too expanded slowly but is now very dense. Who the main leaders are is clearer here than in the other settlements, especially since they were the initiators of the land invasion and started Egoli. Yet, it is sometimes unclear exactly who all the members of the main committees are.

\textsuperscript{44} The last court case, that took two years and ended in 2012, did also not provide any solutions as the land owner wants his land back but cannot evict the residents without providing alternative accommodation (for eviction laws, see Wilson 2011).
5.2.4 Summary of fundamental differences

It is difficult to measure how many informal settlements and informal dwellings there are, but a count carried out by CoCT show that there were approximately 300 informal settlements in Cape Town in 2008, and in total 134 055 informal dwellings (CoCT 2011). With the high number of settlements, research on informal settlements has exposed the high variation in location, physical form, size, rural-urban linkage, internal poverty and vulnerability (Hindson and McCarthy 1994, Smit 2006). Below is a simple table outlining some fundamental information and differences between the three informal settlements of this study. Note that economic variables are excluded, as economic details are hard to measure, although it can generally be assumed that informal settlement residents are amongst the poorest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approx. no of dwellings 2008</th>
<th>Graveyard Pond (GP)</th>
<th>Egoli</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| History | People started staying around edges in 2001-2003, moved into pond in 2008-2009 | Started around 1996/1999, a group of evicted farmworkers occupied the plot which used to be a soccer field. | Started with land invasion 1999. |


| Service and upgrading situation | No legal electricity. 15 toilets to share. On a 're-location list'. | No legal electricity Shared chemical toilets (no flush toilets) and water taps by the road. | Shared chemical toilets (no flush toilets) 2005: Water taps electricity some areas (DIMP 2009), sanitation system. 2008: Electricity whole area, internal roads with drains. |

| Language demographics | 95% Xhosa, 2.1% Setswana, 1.7% Sesoto, 0.8 Zulu, 0.4% Shona ** | 81.9 % Afrikaans, 16.4 % Xhosa ** | No numbers, but seems mostly Xhosa |

| Household compositions | Average 2.9 persons per household, 22.5% single person households ** | Average 3.9 persons per household, 6.7% single person households** | Average 2.1 persons per household, 33.4% single person households**** |

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45 These numbers should not be seen as accurate as it is very difficult to actually count settlements and shacks, and other reports show different numbers.

46 Legal electricity was installed in 2008; see also newspaper article by Mbiza (2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age demographics</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average age head of household:</td>
<td>Average length of stay (2010): 4.5 years.**</td>
<td>Mostly one committee, consisting of one chairperson, a secretary, a vice chairperson and sometimes 3 additional committee members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31** 22.5% 0-6 years, 16.8% 7-17 years, 50.4% 18-35 years 9% 35-64 years 1.1% 65 + years**</td>
<td>Average length of stay (2010): 9.78 years.**</td>
<td>One old committee, consisting of a chairperson, a secretary and approximately seven committee members, four women and three men. At times, another committee consisting of two to three committee members.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Migration: 51.1% from nearby areas (Philippi), 38.9% from other areas in Cape Town, 10% outside of Cape Town.**</td>
<td>Mainly two committees. The main committee during the research consisted of 15 members, including a secretary, deputy secretary chairperson, deputy chairperson, and treasurer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration: 51.5 moved from different neighbouring areas (of these 22.4% from farm), 30.3% from other areas in Cape Town, 7.3% from Eastern Cape.**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average length of stay (2004): 4.1 years.****</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration: 73.66% from surrounding settlements, 14.3% rural migrants (mostly Eastern Cape), 12.3% from elsewhere. ****</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majority between 21 and 40 years. 31-35 is the largest category, followed by 0-5 and 16-20****.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Table comparing the three settlements. The information is a mix of data collected from interviews and survey and second-hand data. The mix of data does create some problems for comparisons, and the table should therefore not be seen as more than an indicators. Note also that I also applied some of this data in two flooding reports (Drivdal 2011a, 2011b).

Some of this data that seems relevant to understanding basic differences in political conditions will now be discussed.

Size

Figure 3 and figure 7 indicate significant differences in the size of the settlements. The City of Cape Town’s informal settlement count (CoCT 2011) shows that the number of shacks varies hugely, from 10 696 structures to as little as three to four structures. An average

47 Note here that the committees are very fluid and change rapidly and that the organizational models presented do necessarily work in this way.

48 The different sources:
* CoCT informal settlement count 2011.
** Data from own surveys 2010.
*** Armitage et al. (2010).
**** Goven (2007).
number of dwellings can be estimated to be 385 shacks\textsuperscript{49}. In relation to this, Kosovo is one of the largest informal settlements in Cape Town, while GP and Egoli are more close to the average size. The size seems to matter in relation to how well informed residents are about who the main political actors and leaders are. I do not have comparative quantitative data to back this up as this settlement was not surveyed, but by speaking informally to residents during the three years of field visits, fewer know who the leaders are in Kosovo compared to Egoli, where 95.6 \% answered that they know the leaders.

**Language and migration patterns**

It is commonly known that most informal settlement residents in Cape Town have originally migrated from the Eastern Cape. Still, there are no good statistics on this. A survey of three informal settlements in Cape Town, which are assumed to generalizable, shows that the main province of origin is the Eastern Cape - 94.2\% being the statistic\textsuperscript{50} (CoCT 2005). This is also reflected in the language patterns, where the home language of 98\% is isiXhosa\textsuperscript{51} (CoCT 2005). As displayed in figure 7, this tendency fits with Kosovo and GP, however the situation in Egoli is significantly different. People have lived in Egoli for a longer time, and many were born in Cape Town. Figure 7 indicates that only 10.9 \% are from outside the Western Cape, and people living in Egoli have stayed in Cape Town on average for 28.14 year. This is also reflected in the language patterns, as only 16.4 \% speak Xhosa as the main language.

A consequence of this is visible in the family patterns: In Egoli there is a higher number of old residents, a higher number of residents per dwelling, and a lower percentage of residents living alone. A major reason for these patterns might be that they do not have the same opportunity as informal settlement residents migrated from the Eastern Cape: to send children to their relatives in that province and to move back there when they are too old to work. Another issue is that residents’ relation to the area seems to be stronger in Egoli. On the relocation plans, a leader comments: *If you take me away from here you can take me to the graveyard* (Community leader 5, Egoli, 1.9.2010). Especially older people, many of whom were born in the area and used to be farmworkers but have been evicted from the farms, express a fear of being relocated.

\textsuperscript{49} Calculated by dividing the counts of 134 055 dwellings by the 348 settlements.
\textsuperscript{50} The rest compromises of: 3.2\% Western Cape, 1 \% KwaZulu Natal, 0.7\% Gauteng, 0.3\% Northern Cape, 0.2\% Free State.
\textsuperscript{51} The rest compromises of: 0.9\% Afrikaans, 0.5\% isiZulu, 0.1\% SeSotho, 0.1\% SeTswana.
Location and land situation

Location of the settlements is important for receiving local government service delivery. Although they were all first ‘illegal’ as they emerged though planned or unplanned land invasions, only Kosovo is approved for upgrading, as the land that first belonged to a private owner was bought by the CoCT. Therefore, it has received more services from the city such as electricity, roads and more toilets (chemical, as the flush toilet project failed – see Armitage et al. 2010). Compared, both GP and Egoli are struggling to receive services. In GP, electricity cannot be installed as it is located in a detention pond and on a road reserve. In Egoli the city cannot bring services like electricity and toilets\textsuperscript{52} into the settlement as the settlement is located on private land with an owner who wants his property back\textsuperscript{53}.

Egoli also differs from the other settlements in that it is located in the particular ‘urban farming zone’ of Cape Town, as visible in Figure 3. Egoli is one of few informal settlements in the area, which consist of farms and a more mixed-income population. The relation between the settlement residents and the neighbouring areas is sometimes tense. Many resident and leaders feel that the richer neighbours look down upon them. Some of the neighbours indeed want the settlement evicted, as it brings down the value of the area, and as they blame the residents for stealing. Hostility towards informal settlements in more mixed or affluent areas is also mentioned in other case studies (Saff 1996). On the other hand, residents seem also to receive more individual local aid during e.g. Christmas and Ramadan.

5.3 Similarities: organizing practises and the social construction of leaders

Despite these differences between the settlements, there are significant similarities in leadership practises and ideals. Drawing these short introductions together, it shows that in all the settlements, committee organizing might be based on a variance of experiences, including community policing forums, political parties, social movements, ward committees, other organizing forms at township scales, and even work and youth organizations\textsuperscript{54}. This is related to the historical roots outlined in chapter 3. With this complexity, it is clear that the informal

\textsuperscript{52} Toilets are located on the public road and some residents take them into the settlement themselves.

\textsuperscript{53} In October 2010 (11.10) the leaders in Egoli were informed about a by-law that was going to be passed that would overrule that law, but nothing happened.

\textsuperscript{54} Other experiences might count as well, like gang practises, which were indicated once by one leader, as he was talking about the leadership committee in another informal settlement that is not included in my research. This could have been research further as it points to the often thin line between informal security measures and vigilantism.
settlement committees and leaders have not emerged due to one clear organization or institutionalized practice. Therefore, instead of focusing on specific grand organizations like SANCO or CPF, I will look into the multitude of practices that contribute to the emergence of and committees in the settlements. Observing leaders in action over time, I have identified three patches of institutionalized practices: regulating internal order, mobilizing, and external intermediary representation. These will be outlined in the following sections.

5.3.1 The social construction of leaders through practices of regulating internal order
The first stream of practises common to the settlement leaders is, in my observations, practises of community policing and regulating internal order. This is both connected to high amounts of conflicts between individuals or groups like family and neighbours, and the broader anxieties about the high crime rates in the area. As noted in chapter three, the historically most fundamental reason why informal settlement residents started organizing seems to be worries concerning crime and security. In the literature, this organizing takes the forms of loose vigilante groups (Buur and Jensen 2004a, 2004b, Buur 2003, 2006) or more organized community policing initiatives, like organized street committees, self-policing groups, night patrols, and community courts (Bruman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Seekings 2001, Shearing 2001, Dixon 2004, Froestad and Shearing 2012). However, these practises are not organized under specific networks or organizations in the three settlements of this study. Although CPF’s and neighbourhood watches were mentioned, they were not very active. Still, norms and practices of internal justice are significant, apparent in a range of more informally organized practises. Thus, I am here not interested in exactly what formal or informal shape community policing takes, but rather how community policing practises in the settlements of this study form leaders and are infringed with ambiguities of moral logics.

Dealing with household and neighbour conflicts
Like in any neighbourhoods, neighbours and families argue and fight. Drama that unfolds in informal settlements might be especially intense, not only due a lack of formal policing, but also because of frustration and antagonism with the situation of informal settlement life. In many field visits, I witnessed or was told about such conflicts with sometimes severe and

55 Especially in the townships where most of the informal settlements in Cape Town are located. Crime statistics show that the Nyanga police district within which two of the settlements of this study are located have the highest statistics of murder and rape in South Africa; see report ‘Crime in Cape Town: 2001 – 2008’ (CoCT 2009).
violent outcomes. A young father kidnapped his son because his girlfriend left him after a violent relationship. A young mother hanged herself because her boyfriend left her. A woman moved to another settlement because her husband cheated on her with the neighbour’s teenage daughter. An old woman hit her neighbour on the head with a hammer because of a long-standing disagreement. Another woman stabbed her neighbour because she suspected her of having reported lies about her to the police. With the lack of private space, such issues are loudly discussed.

Friends, family and neighbours sometimes assist in solving such conflicts, but leaders were frequently asked to intervene. Leaders are asked to come and solve even the smallest drama, as explained by one resident in GP:

W: Even small things. For instance if the neighbour throw water into my place, we call the committee. So it is a lot of stress for the committee.
L: But why don’t they sort out these things themselves?
W: I don’t know. People here report everything [to the leaders] – they say we have a committee here.
(Resident, GP, 27.2.2011)

A leader in GP similarly explains that a main duty of leaders is to deal with such conflicts:

It [committee work] was more about internal family issues. Because when people go to the police station to report something they send them back and tell them to talk to the community leaders. Because there is several problems we (the committee) sorted out, often better than the police. Cases like if there is someone who throws water or rubbish in front of your house. Or for instance, one lady did not give back the money she owned. The lady who wanted the money back came to me, and I went straight there and got the money for her.
(Community leader 3, GP, 23.8.2011)

When staying with some of the leaders over time, I noticed the traffic of people coming and talking about their problems. Notably, the volume of this work varies between the settlements, being particularly high in Egoli, and between the different leaders. Some, like one of the older ‘mamas’ in Egoli, are approached often. This traffic of residents asking for her advice tires her, and she sometimes complains she is too old for this now and told people they must solve their drama themselves.
If the family or neighbour conflicts cannot be solved by leaders intervening directly, it might be taken to a community meeting. In Egoli, the relationship between shebeen owners and their direct neighbours was an ongoing source of tension, and were often discussed at such community meetings.

A leader in GP explains dealing with internal conflicts sometimes requires that residents and leaders get involved in public negotiations, possibly bringing it to the police:

How we deal with such problems, we first talk amongst the community leaders and the people that are affected by the problem. Then if it is a big problem we might take it to the whole community in a community meeting, or go to the police station.

(Community leader 3, GP, 23.8.2011)

This reminds of the organized conflict resolution through community courts in townships (Shearing 2001, Schärf 2001, Seekings 2001, Froestad and Shearing 2012). Comparing the current detailed practises with the historical organized community policing forms, it appears that the current practises are more sporadic and have developed in own detailed regulative practices. In these settlements, the practises are less organized, and more like taken-for-granted ways of informal settlement life, as leaders often explained that ‘it is just something we do here’. Consequently, it can be seen as an informally ‘institutionalized’ practise.

Organizing against crime
Leaders are also involved in more serious issues like dealing with crime and security.

In Egoli, crimes like theft and violence is high on the agenda, and is a frequent complaint. In one community meeting, one older woman furiously stood up and shouted ‘we must kill the robbers’, receiving acknowledging comments from the other residents. In another incident, a furious neighbouring small farmer came to the settlement and told the leaders someone had stolen several of his sheep. He said he was so angry now that he would kill that person who stole and did not care if that meant he had to go to jail forever. The leaders sat down and discussed it with him, and although they did confirm that the thief was someone from Egoli,

56 A shebeen is an alcohol outlet or pub without a licence to operate. Shebeens are common in most informal settlements. For a discussion of community-based regulations of such places, see Drivdal and Lawhon (in press).
they managed to calm him down and promised they would confront the thief and arrange more community meetings on this issue.

Ideas of community justice are frequent as many residents perceive police action as non-present or inadequate. In February 2012, a resident was killed allegedly by a resident from another informal settlement, and some of Egoli’s residents called one of the leaders to give them ‘permission’ to find and ‘arrest’ the person themselves. They did not trust the police to sort out this problem, and it is but one example of the lack of trust in the police. The leader refused to do this and told them to go to the police.

In GP too, crime is a major worry. In earlier years, the main leader was connected to a CPF, and residents tell of the period with night patrols and that efforts were made to reduce crime. However, as this leader apparently was killed due to his intense involvement in regulating internal crime, the current leaders in GP feared to engage such issues.

In Kosovo, residents remarked on the danger of being robbed when walking outside at nights or when going to the train station to get to work early in the morning. Additionally, there is an increasing concern with the recent growth of youth gangs and Kosovo appears to be one of the strongholds of one of these gangs. This was a great worry to many residents, and leaders often discussed how to deal with it. Apparently, there had been a neighbourhood watch earlier, which dissolved due to a range of issues, like fatigue and accusations of corruption. One leader constantly asked for aid to restart a neighbourhood watch or a police forum:

> There is a lot of crime here. If there is a crime at Spar, they run inside here to hide…. People from outside come here in the weekends to the shebeens, and they buy drugs. If people see them [the criminals] they kill them. We want to prevent that. The police forum is in between the community and the police. We want a NGO that can arrest people to take them to the police
> (Community leader 9, Kosovo, 6.4.2011)

These problems with crime and ideas of how to collaborate on dealing with these issues were discussed in many encounters and meetings. There have also been interactions with the police, who have held open meetings in the settlements and trained selected residents to carry out neighbourhood watch work. Despite this, in 2013 there was still no operating neighbourhood watch.
Regulation of ‘un-orderly’ concerns: migration and informal economy

In addition to the negotiating practises applied to deal with conflicts and crime, specific preventive regulative practises have emerged aimed at increasing control and order.

Regulating migration

With continuing urbanization, the need for space becomes more severe. A central worry with migration into the settlement, highlighted by both leaders and residents, is the fear that ‘criminals would to move into the settlement’. This fear appears to be a main reason for establishing regulative and controlling practises. As also mentioned by Bekker and Louw (1994), committees are set up to regulate on-migration as it is assumed to lead to conflicts. In a settlement I visited earlier (Sheffield Road), the leaders had a list of people waiting for a shack in which to stay, and they only allowed people from within the settlement that lived in overcrowded shacks to buy houses, in order to avoid allowing ‘strangers’ into the settlement. This example is quite radical, but it seems to be a common rule in all the three settlements that you have to ask and get permission both from neighbours and from the leaders before moving into settlement:

When you arrive, you look for a space, then you ask the people here, then you meet with the street committee. You need to bring papers, proof that you were staying somewhere, so that we can avoid getting criminals inside here.
(Resident and community leader 3, GP, 28.09 2010)

The regulation is practised by monitoring new migrants building or buying a shack, and community leaders oversee the transaction of money from buyer to owner. I witnessed this while staying with one leader in Kosovo. A group of five men came to her home, and to my initial confusion, they started discussing and taking out a large amount of money. They counted the money several times in front of the leader. After they left, I was told that the group consisted of a person who was buying a shack, the owner, and three other witnesses, and that they had some to the leader so that she could oversee and make the payment official. Such practises can of course be exploited, and there are many rumours about leaders taking some extra money for carrying out and ‘administrating’ these transactions.
Community leaders also sometimes produce documents like ‘a proof of residency’ which is necessary for e.g. setting up a bank account, getting a loan, or registering a sim card, and ‘recommendation letters’ for residents who want to move. This also partly entails a mechanism for punishment, because if residents do not behave well, the leaders will not give them a recommendation letter.

This does not imply that the leaders can decide who is going to stay and who not. Even though, as mentioned in Burman and Schärf’s case study of 1990, leaders can evict ‘problematic residents’, this is difficult in practise in the settlements of this study. As evident in Egoli, regulation processes might also be effective at first but then decline in periods of conflict:

I asked for A. when I moved here. Everyone have to ask for permission. But after 2008 it became out of control, because of the owner allied with the new committee. But now it is not a committee any more, everyone is doing their own thing.
(Resident, Egoli, 3.8.2011).

When you come here you go straight to A…with ID. If you are not in the book you not staying here. … But there is a lot of new people now, and they did not go to him, they just came here and stay. Especially here in the back, there are too much people now, and they are making a lot of trouble….. They just came and built. And some sold shacks but come back again.
(Community leader 4, Egoli, 25.11.2011).

It is also difficult to reject people who move in. GP, which is situated illegally in a government-owned area that was not meant for habitation, expanded more or less uncontrolled:

P. from the city told me not to allow the people to build inside there. But all places start like this, once one comes in – a million follows. We also struggle to control people when you tell people not to build they say it is not your land.
(Community leader 1, GP, 9.11.2011).

In Egoli, the owner of the land blamed the leader for letting more and more people stay there. From the leader’s perspective though, it is hard to deny people to move in, as noted by an ex-leader: But we can’t say we have no place when people come, then they must stay in the

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57 To provide ‘proof of residency’ is supposed to be the Ward councillor’s duty, but as he does not have time, in many cases he hands over this job to informal settlement leaders.
bushes with their child...(Resident, Egoli, 16.11.2011). One leader explained that the settlement grows especially through the arrival of evicted farm workers who are hard to reject:

Still today, the government allows farmers to bring people, and if people get evicted from the farms here, where do they run? To the informal settlements. That make the informal settlements very big here by us. Even though we know we can’t help anymore people, because why, the government don’t want us to help more people, but what must we do if a mother and a father and small children come here and say they have no place to sleep? We can’t allow that they sleep in the bush. Ja, we can’t allow that they sleep on the streets, that is not fair. Because everyone got a right to a roof over his head. (Community leader 5, Egoli, 28.08.2010).

This difficulty of denying desperate people to move in shows that control and regulation is not as straightforward as often portrayed in field visits. As mentioned by Barry et al. (2007:172), people may flood into informal settlements despite that local government has asked community leaders to oversee that no more people will be allowed to settle there. However, in Kosovo, some evictions of assumed ‘problematic residents’ have taken place (see also newspaper article by Tsilo 2011), which also has increased tension between residents and some leaders (this will be discussed further in chapter eight).

**Regulating the informal economy**

There is an urge, to varying degrees between settlements, to regulate ‘informal businesses’\(^{58}\), which are ever increasing and in some instances create tension. The tension is linked to the nature of the business, and illegal drinking places like shebeens create much tension as the consequences of this business are more severe for the neighbourhood. Residents connected shebeens to internal crime, hygiene, noises and family conflicts, and both residents and leaders suggest and attempt to control, regulate or even ban them from the area (Drivdal and Lawhon in press). The problems with shebeens might be due to the fact that they are ‘night-time informal businesses’, which also includes the drug trade. When staying in the settlement overnight, it made me realize, as also mentioned in Simone’s (2010) descriptions, how a different regime kicks in when the nightlife takes over. Families and friends visit each other, but many residents are afraid to leave their home, even to go to the toilet, and therefore stay

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\(^{58}\) However, not only informal businesses have discovered the possibilities in these areas. Increasingly, formal businesses like grocery chains establish in the nearby areas, in addition to companies like insurance brokers.
inside the entire night. And even though you are inside, you can listen in on what is going on outside, as the shacks are dense and the walls are thin. The noise from the street dogs fighting and looking for food, the noise from the shebeens and drunk people chatting loudly, singing or arguing, can easily be heard.

Nevertheless, also daytime businesses like small grocery outlets, known as spaza shops, barber shops or food stalls, are sometimes seen as problematic. They are connected with jealousy and suspicion, and competition over jobs which can lead to violence, as evident in xenophobic attacks on Somalian spaza shops. It should be noted here that the jealousy is not only directed at foreigners, but at general ‘outsiders’ who enter to establish businesses like braais, spazas or shebeens, or that simply enter the settlements to sell stuff. There are rumours that people living elsewhere, living ‘in nice houses’, deliberately turn to informal settlements seeking business potential and even own ‘chains’ of spaza shops and shebeens. Such tension has led an urge to regulate these informal businesses.

In Kosovo and GP, leaders often stated that they would regulate businesses, but it did not seem to happen often in practise. In Egoli I did observe instances where spazas were regulated: In October 2011, several of the community leaders were discussing and updating each other on the matter of a person that had just moved to Egoli from another settlement and had started to build a spaza. He had not asked anyone for permission, just started to build. The leaders were worried and suspected him of being a drug dealer. They had called the police, and told the man that if he did not stop building they would take it down and chase him away. In another incident in January 2012, a community meeting took up the case that a woman planned to rent out space in her shack to persons from another area who wanted to start a spaza shop. The leaders did not like this idea, because they, and also other residents, do not like that ‘outsiders’ that don’t live in Egoli enter the settlement to make money. They further pointed at it could lead to competition and problems with the largest spaza shop in the settlement, which is owned by Somalians. This spaza gives the impression of being more or less integrated into the community. As stated by one leader, Somalians who own spaza shops are appreciated because they contribute more broadly to community matters: The Somalians here are nice, they help paying when we need petrol money to go to the court. (Community leader 4, Egoli, 7.2.2012). The leaders therefore suggested that the Somalians should rather help the resident woman start her own spaza and collaborate with her, instead of bringing in outsiders.
**Practises of order and the emergence of leaders**

Summing up, with the need for security and order, several practises have evolved to deal with this, and I have here outlined practises of regulating internal order, practises of organizing against crime, and practises of regulating disorderly concerns. Taking these together, one of the major reasons for leaders and committees to emerge is that someone needs to carry out these tasks. In other words, the idea that these practises are necessary for improving security, has led to the formation of committees and leaders. One way in which certain leaders emerge to deal with these issues is through a ‘natural’ process: Persons who have abilities to solve conflicts are consulted by residents, and a ‘snowball effect’ appears when more and more residents consult these persons and they gain a reputation of being able to solve conflicts. Thereby they are favoured by many residents as leaders, and are increasingly asked to help both individuals and in community matters. Two leaders, one from GP and one from another settlement, explain:

> W: I have this way of solving the problems naturally. I intervene and things will get better.
> M: Also when I told I was dropping, people cried no. Because I used to solve problems. So people are afraid that things will get worse. But some community leaders also do wrong things.

(Community leader Open Space and community leader 3, GP, 1.11.2011).

Also leaders in Egoli and Kosovo pointed out that people kept on coming to them with their problems and ‘forced’ them to be leaders. Of course, such portrayals can be seen as overstatements. In practise however, it does make sense and it is observed that some leaders are favoured for their abilities to solve problems, as also noted by Ross (2010).

**5.3.2 The social construction of leaders through practises of mobilization**

A second stream leading to the construction of leaders and committees is practises of mobilizing, often through holding ‘community meetings’. Such meetings, which are essential to improve democratic participation, are held irregularly, although many leaders claim the meetings are held every week. Several mobilizing practises are applied to cajole people into attending these meetings, including going door to door, putting up posters or announcing the meetings with loudspeakers. Still, these practises are not always followed up, can be random, and difficult as many residents are not present in the settlement much of the time. Hence, there are often residents who claim they lacked information about meetings.
Mobilizing is relevant when facing external threats or opportunities for the settlement as a whole, especially in the early period of establishing a settlement and when facing threats of eviction. When Kosovo was forming (in 1999), such threats led to internal mobilizing, as the owner of the land claimed it back. According to some of the leaders, this was why they started to organize a committee:

In 1999/2000 we decided to have leaders. Because the police and soldiers came because they said that the owner wanted the land. So then we elected leaders who will stand for us.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 20.9.2011).

These leaders went to government to negotiate the eviction, and local government ended up buying the land form the owner in 2004.

Another immediate external threat was the neighbours living in formal houses next to where they started settling. Many of these neighbours first opposed the establishment of this new informal neighbourhood. According to one of the older leaders, the people in the houses were fighting us and burnt down my shack. Because it puts down their value to have an informal settlement next to them (Community leader 9, Kosovo, 19.02.2013). To deal with this threat, some residents actively mobilized more people to come and settle to gain mass and thereby power:

When we started fighting with the neighbours in the houses, we got more people to come and build shacks here so that we were many here. When the people in the houses saw that we were many, they gave up fighting, and we collaborated with them since 2000.
(Community leader 9, Kosovo, 19.02.2013).

In order to speed up the settling process and gain mass to resist the neighbours, Community leader 9 also organized building material from demolition sites, which he sold to people that wanted to settle there.

Egoli too was established through mobilized occupation, as a group of evicted farm workers decided to occupy a piece of land that they had earlier used as a soccer field. After establishment of the settlements, mobilizing of residents continued to be important to mobilize against evictions and to arrange public protest (commonly referred to as toyi-toyi) for service delivery. When important things are happening in the settlement, like negotiations
around service delivery, eviction cases and internal crime, residents are mobilized to join meetings. Several open meetings were held to inform the residents about the eviction court case. Further, protest marches were organized, and when necessary transport for several residents to join both protests or court case meetings in town. Mobilizing also extends to other settlements in similar positions. Some residents have engaged in mobilization at a broader scale by helping other settlements threatened by eviction:

A: We were there – to give them advice. Because we have to come together. They called us there – not only us but a few other informal settlements. I drove all the informal settlement people there. We talked, make plans.
M: There is people that are there that are part of us. We want to take action, make fight…..If we know that things is going to happen there, we must be there in hundreds and thousands.
(Community leader 5 and resident, Egoli, 11.10.2010)

Such solidarity mobilizing with other settlements was less common in the other settlements.

The development of internal mobilizers as leaders

Often, some of the people that started the settlement and also mobilized others to move to the area automatically become leaders. In GP and Kosovo, most of these initiators of the settlements no longer live in the settlement. Only in Egoli is the main person who organized the land invasion and ‘started the settlement’ still the person that appears to be the main leader. At first I was unsure about how many actually knew him in the settlement, but indications from the survey data showed that 95.6 % answered that they know the leaders, and when asked who the leaders are, they usually named this leader. In a community leadership election in 2013, he received 209 of 238 valid votes. At one point, he moved from the settlement, and many residents were worried: He was the first community leader, and they will not let him go (Community leader 6, Egoli, 21.4.2011). This of course does not mean that he is not contested.

Therefore, the need for mobilization leads to the development of particular individuals into leaders. It is related to the expectations that someone should put time aside to work for the settlement:

No one wants to become a leader…But people see what you do, then they force you to become a community leader….The community know how you are active in organizations, so they elect you.
(Community leader 9, Kosovo, 21.4.2011)
In other words, if someone has experience with mobilizing and doing activist work, residents often want them to continue working for the community. The residents who are active in mobilizing become familiar to many residents, especially through the practices of walking door to door to engage residents to join meetings or protests and through regularly speaking up in community meetings. This is also one reason why some leaders find it hard to withdraw, as will be discussed further in chapter seven and eight.

5.3.3 The social construction of leaders through intermediary practices

Mediating with externals, like local government, NGOs, political parties or researchers is in my observations a third common practice that forms leaders and committees. Intermediary practices have increased as an increasing range of externals need organizational units or contact persons in the settlements. Relevant here is the anxiety of co-optation. Related to South African informal settlement organizing, co-optation by the state (Bähre 2007a, Staniland 2008, Zuern 2011), by NGOs (Allison 2002:179) or political parties (Fourc 2012). Hence, as there are multiple externals that intervene at times, chances are that there are multiple attempts at co-opting the leaders and committees.

In Kosovo, there has been much external involvement, especially after the land was bought by CoCT in 2004. This increased interaction between leaders and local government departments when upgrading projects were initiated, like installing electricity, toilets, making roads with speed bumps. Negotiating with local government on service delivery is presented as a particularly important task for the leaders:

P: If there is no community leader, nothing can happen. If there is a problem, people go to the community leader and he contacts government.

N: If there is floods, fires, and other problems, we don’t sleep, we call the City of Cape Town.

(Community leaders 10 and 11, Kosovo 21.4.2011)

The leaders do not only negotiate with the administrative side of local government, but also with politicians, a range of NGOs and social movements, and the ward councillors. I also witnessed the committee acting as mediators between residents and their employers, specifically on jobs within the settlement, like the appointment of internal cleaners. In one committee meeting they negotiated the working conditions and salary of these employees.
with the employer. The employer was not happy with the committee’s involvement and stated that the committee should not be involved in such issues and that he would discuss this matter directly with the employees only.

In GP, there has been less engagement by externals. My own engagement as a researcher, however, brought attention to the settlement, and the leaders were approached by media, a few NGOs and local government officials. In 2010, three of the leaders joined a localized social movement. They attended several meetings, and reported back at their own community meetings what had happened to the other settlement residents. They also received the task to report back to and mobilize more residents, which they did. After some months of meetings and volunteer work, the movement fell apart due to internal disagreements and splits. Yet, the interaction with the movement did provide some contact with local government departments.

Egoli receives much attention by externals, particularly by NGOs, Christian and Muslim organizations, social movements, and volunteer students. Some of these have established ventures like farming projects or soup kitchens, while others are more focused on mobilizing. Due to the settlements location on private land, interaction with the bureaucratic side of local government has been more difficult. Other channels have been used to pressurize this interaction. Further, the leaders have engaged with different political parties. However, it is expressed that external actors, especially political parties, exploit them by making them carry out work for them:

I am tired of parties. Some years ago I worked with ID, after that I worked a long time with the ANC. But I see now that they use us. They do nothing for us. … … They only talk lies.
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 18.2.2011)

Such fatigue with political parties is expressed not only by leaders but also by residents. On the other hand, a resident mentioned that both residents and leaders have engaged in practises where they exploit the political parties in return:

…now when the pol parties are starting to come again, it is our time to exploit them. We put on one t-shirt when one party comes with things for the community, then another when another party comes
(Resident, Egoli, 21.4.2013)
This indicates that the assumption that political parties take advantage of communities to gain votes sometimes is turned on its head, as residents and committees are opportunistic about the attention they receive. As there are several externals intervening at times, leaders and residents use these connections without committing to any one specific external. Hence, they are not really co-opted by one external as might be assumed, but have developed methods of juggling different external links.

**Committee and leaders as appointed or evolved due to external contacts**

Leaders develop through these practices, as externals need some kind of organized contact person when engaging with informal settlements. Externals often require that the settlements are ‘well organized’ in order to engage in collaboration, as mentioned by an Egoli resident who assists the leaders and participates in committee activities:

> Wherever we went they said we must have a committee. Like a council, like the ward councillor, they did not want to talk to us because we were not a committee. And also for the people to have a voice. Before that is was just A.
> (Resident, Egoli, 17.4.2012)

These recommendations on organizing are taken seriously and are one reason for ‘more formalised’ committees to emerge.

Further, as mentioned in chapter three, externals sometimes install committees and leaders directly (Lemanski 2008, Bähr 2007a:82-83 and Bénit 2002). With the government-initiated projects in Kosovo, a few residents were appointed to mediate regarding these projects, and sometimes specific committees are set up:

> If there are developments - people have a meeting and elect committees. When the roads development project happened, I was elected and nominated by the community to be a project committee.
> (Community leader 8, Kosovo 20.9.2011)

This leader was appointed as part of a larger pilot project in 2008/2009 when drainage systems and an alternative flush toilet system were installed (Armitage et al. 2010). Also CoCT’s health inspectors often urge for specialized ‘health committees’ to be established in each of the settlements.
External intervention can also unintentionally create leaders. I experienced this myself as I engaged with residents in GP. From the beginning, I worked particularly closely with one of the residents that helped me out with the survey. I used him as a main contact person throughout the field visits, and I noticed how he changed during the months of interaction, from being shy to more and more outspoken, also in public encounters or encounters with other externals. In one conversation, he pointed how his role as being my contact person impacted on what other residents expected of him: *People appoint me. Because I am involved in development matters, especially after I met you.* (Community leader 3, GP, 22.7.2011).

Further, involvement by a local social movement led to the establishment of a new committee and increased the responsibilities of this leader:

> I refused first to be a community leader. Because for me it is good to work from the outside. So then this thing about PPF came up. That was when I was chosen, when I became leader. The thing that made me involved here was my involvement out there. (Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011)

This indicates that external interventions not only deliberately impact on the social construction of leadership, but also indirectly and unintentionally, as external attention generates the hope for developments among residents generally.

### 5.3.4 Settlement comparison and committees as micro-governments

Comparing the settlements, the three identified practices are relevant to the construction of leadership committees in all three settlements, but to different degrees and at different times:

In GP, practices of dealing with internal conflicts and organizing security seem to have shaped the first generation of leaders. It appeared that a leader in one of the neighbouring settlements (Siyachlala) was involved. She explained that when people started moving into the area, she was consulted by these early residents, and by local government who wanted her to prevent people moving in. When GP’s first home-grown leader emerged it was said that that leader learnt how to organize from the leader in Siyachlala:

> I think we copied this way of having a book – everything – we copied her leadership style and her skills. Michael, he was a good leader. He learnt from N. [neighbour committee leader] how to do the leadership. (Community leader 3, GP, 9.11.2011).
This neighbouring leader had ‘learnt committee work’ from being active in both the Community Policing Forum (CPF) and SANCO, while living in Gugulethu. She helped the new GP committee establish practises and models. However, also here, other leaders have different organizational experiences from political parties like the South African Communist Party and social movements.

In the early years of Kosovo, the need to mobilize against the ‘common enemy of eviction’ was one reason for the emergence of the first leaders. Besides this, and particularly in the later years, it seems that many leaders have emerged due to their involvements with local government, with NGOs, CBOs, social movements or political parties. The experience from such involvement is relevant in the current committee practises. When asking the secretary where he learnt how to organize meetings and keep meeting notes, he explained that he learnt it from another person with whom he previously worked for a savings group in Johannesburg, and he thought it would be good to use this system and keep notes (Community leader 12, Kosovo, 27.3.2012). Another committee member answered he had received training in the ‘the boy scouts’. Others responded that these practices had been picked up as members or local branch executives of political parties. Some had also participated in the ward committee.

In Egoli, the main community leader emerged as he initiated the occupation of the land and mobilised other evicted farmworkers to join him. Further, he has a range of experiences, from working with different political parties to working with organized security measures and different NGOs. He was also involved in the ward committee for three years, as he was one of ten members. During this time, he engaged in informing and talking to the various settlements within the ward and holding open public meetings with. He showed me pictures of these public meetings, and explained that they used to hire a truck to drive around to inform residents about meetings and distribute flyers. Inspired by this, he applied similar methods of mobilizing when arranging meetings in Egoli.

Other committee members in Egoli have experiences from engaging with a variety of NGOs and social movement networks, and contacts with other informal settlements on private land similarly facing an eviction. Additionally, an expansion and formalizing of the main committee manifested due to interaction with the police: In 2005, people in the broader area (Schaapkraaal) came together to fight a common security threat: the legendary serial killer
‘the Jesus Killer’. A loose form of neighbourhood watch had been carried out sporadically, but it became a more formalized ‘community committee’ through collaboration between residents, neighbouring areas and with the police. The committee was set up with formalization of the committee members and through identification cards which stated ‘Egoli Informal settlement community worker’. It had a picture, name, phone number and a stamp. These identification cards were necessary when patrolling the larger area to avoid vigilantism.

Summing up, the settlement committees are constructed through a *bricolage* (Skuse and Cousins 2007) of circulating practises (Bénit-Gbaffou *et al.* 2012a, 2012b). This fits with the observations that a multitude of practises are applied to access and negotiate with local government (Thorn and Oldfield 2011), and the observation that informal settlements committees can incorporate both community policing and mobilizing models into one umbrella organization (Oldfield 2000). This diversity of organizational experiences opens up for many variances. It is therefore difficult to determine where the committee practises have emerged from in each settlement, and it is problematic to link the committee to only one practice as it could end up ignoring the complex expectations of committees and leaders. Consequently, it is important not to link informal settlement committees too closely to only one practice or to assume that they are formed by one broader network organization. Although there are differences between experiences and current setup of committees between the settlements, the three practises do have relevance in all of them and can be drawn in at different times.

Drawing together these practises, it becomes evident that the committees they encompass both political and bureaucratic sides. Further, in my interpretation, they can be seen as micro local-governments acting as regulators, public servants, and political representatives. Mobilization practises can be related to democratic ideas of interaction and participation, and the ‘duties’ of mobilizing and engaging with residents can be seen as part of the political side of the micro-government. On the bureaucratic side, some of the practises of regulating order have evolved into bureaucratic procedures. Intermediary practises, although they also consist of representation practises, often result in increased bureaucracy. This is because intermediary practices imply contacting externals, working with them and carrying out work for them; which often include increased administrative tasks like counting and numbering the
shacks in the settlements (which is necessary for service delivery), arranging additional meetings, and reporting back. Also the ward councillors sometimes delegate administrative duties like providing ‘proof of residency’. Further, a main issue is that the bureaucratic and the more democratic parts are blurred; there are no clear division between who does what within the committees. This underlines that there might be a constant balancing of these practises. Further, if the committees and leaders become specialized into one of these practises, the other practises might be neglected. With increasing administrative work tasks, the leaders might become more detached from residents, which further increase chances of ‘gatekeeping’ or suspicion of gatekeeping. This opens up the debate of the tensions of democratic and bureaucratic logics in chapter seven and eight.

5.4 Conclusion
The three settlements of this thesis display some significant differences. They span differences in size, land situation, and fundamental demographics. The location, if it is situated on private, public or earmarked land is essential to the settlements chances of receiving services like electricity and in situ upgrading. Especially GP and Egoli are struggling with receiving such services, as the residents in praxis meant to be relocated. What the three settlements have in common is that none are receiving upgraded housing, and that they were all established in the period after Apartheid.

Building on the note that there are some overall similarities in committee practises despite the fact that the settlements are different, the second component of this chapter has discussed practises that create the need for committees and leaders. These practises seem to be linked to general features of informal settlements like high crime rates and a need for service delivery. Through these contextual traits, organizational practices have emerged, become institutionalized, and are significant to the ongoing social construction of leadership and committees. I have identified and considered three major practises: mediating and regulating internal order, mobilizing, and intermediary negotiation. These can be seen as three major patches of the ‘briocolage’ of practises (Skuse and Cousins 2007) that establish committees and leaders. Thus, leaders have emerged through a process of being able to negotiate conflicts or tension, through initiating mobilization, and through external contacts.
Further, in answering what kind of organizations they are, the committees could be described as a micro local government, as they act both as regulators of security and migration, as public servants, and as representatives in interaction with external levels. However, they are much more than just bureaucrats; they are community workers in the field, encountering residents and dealing with their problems directly. Additionally, there is no clear division between these tasks. Therefore, the findings that they are shaped in relation to three fundamentally different practises show that they are essentially hybrid organizations. The organizational field of ‘informal settlement leadership’ can be understood as formed by plural institutional logics (Greenwood et al. 2011). This is also underlined by the fact that the bricolage of leadership practise is stitched together in various ways in the settlements, and by that the committees seem to change main focus over time, as priorities between logics are unstable. That leaders are expected to perform plural practises further indicates that internal disagreement might emerge on what these leaders should do or not, and how the committees should be organised. Such tensions will be considered further in chapter seven and eight. However, before this, chapter six will further explore particular urban convictions out of which these leaders and the tensions of logics emerge.
CHAPTER 6 Conditions of speaking publicly in urban informal settlements: public–private relations and disciplinary norms.

6.1 Introduction

There is undoubtedly an ambiguity towards community leaders amongst residents of the settlements. As public persons, they are loved and hated, and a lot of rumours surround them. However, although many residents are unhappy with the leaders, they are reluctant to engage in leadership practises themselves, speak up in meetings, and even attend community meetings at all. In this chapter, I look into this problem by analysing some of the specific social urban conditions for residents to engage in the internal politics of the settlements.

This is relevant to the framework outlined in the theory chapter, which underlines that the (institutional) contexts in which organizing emerge are of fundamental importance. As I am interested in political organizing at the neighbourhood scale, the condition of the ‘public realm’ within the settlements becomes a significant aspect of the context. Therefore, for a first hand insight into how politics in informal settlements might unfold, a fundamental task is to look into the conditions of the internal public realm and for acting politically within in this distinctive urban environment. The focus on the public realm is based on an understanding of politics where ‘acting politically’ implies getting involved in the common concerns of the settlement. In contextual literature, frequent descriptions of informal settlement fluidity and fragmentation indicate that getting involved and acting publicly is problematic. For a deeper discussion of why this is so, the analysis will revolve around conditions for informal settlements residents to deliberate their common affairs. The research question for this chapter is hence:

What are the conditions of the internal public realm and for speaking publicly?

After first outlining how there is a fatigue with participating in community meetings in the three settlements, I will analyse two aspects of the public realm context within informal settlements: residents’ relations to the public-private boundaries, and more normative constraints to speaking publicly. Public-private boundaries, will be discussed by looking into
social dynamics of a fluid and young heterogeneous population, in addition to the actual public spaces where physical conditions of people living densely and sharing facilities forms a unique public setting. These conditions can be related to classical theories of urbanization. The following part will look into how particular behavioural norms are a form of disciplinary power that impact on both the willingness to speak publicly and what is spoken about publicly. Such norms and discourses shaping the conditions of speaking publicly are more often found in ethnographic literature.

6.2 Fatigue with community meetings

Holding community meetings is imperative to engage residents around common issues and to share information for increased transparency. The lack of transparency is evident in the many examples of ‘gatekeeping’ or suspicion of gatekeeping (Watson 2003, Barry and Ruhter 2005, Cross 2005, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Staniland 2008). Especially suspicion around job allocation is a source of tension. Bearing in mind that one of the main issues for residents, especially those who have migrated from Eastern Cape, is getting a job (Hunter and Posel 2012), corruption (or suspicion of corruption) around job allocation is a major reason for heated politics and internal fights (Millstein and Jordhus-Lier 2012). Yet, as improved transparency is desperately needed, the challenge is how to actually improve transparency in these particular neighbourhoods without increased participation on community meetings.

In the three settlements of this study, I observed that it was hard to mobilize residents to participate in public meetings, not only for those held in town or other areas, but also internal meetings.

In Egoli, there were several community meetings during the years of field visits, but they varied enormously in frequency and in attendance. Although the survey showed that 96.7 % answered that they participate in community meetings, there were usually from 50 to 150 residents attending the meetings I observed. The exception was the ‘election meeting’ in April 2013, where approximately 250 residents attended and voted (details of this election will be given in chapter eight). This is the largest assemblage I observed throughout the field visits, but looking at the approximate number of residents in Egoli displayed in Figure 8, 250 persons is still only around one-third of the residents aged over 18 (which I have calculated to be approximately 764). Nevertheless, many residents came but left before the actual voting.
It should also be noted that before the meeting, the leaders put up posters at the spaza shops in the settlements, went from door to door to fetch people when the meetings started, so it did not seem that enough information was the problem. They also waited an hour for more residents to gather, constantly fetching more residents and calling them by using a microphone.

In Kosovo, several meetings were held during the years of my field visits. Although most of these were committee meetings, there were also public meetings. One was arranged by the police, who intended to listen to peoples worries about the high crime rates. Some days beforehand, the police had driven through the settlement several times with loudspeakers to announce the meeting, and asked committee members of the main internal committee to inform as many as possible. The meeting was held openly in the middle of the settlement, which gave the police and some leaders the opportunity to gather more residents to join. Still, only around 100 residents showed up.

In GP, there are few community meetings. During 2011 though, some meetings were held as a movement/network formed in the area in which GP is located. These meetings came to an end because, after a period of discussions, nothing really happened. A few ‘workshops’ were also held with the research I was involved in and as local government health inspectors intervened. The responsibility to help arrange these meetings and to inform and engage residents falls on the leaders, who go door to door to collect people within the settlement. In a conversation with one of GPs most active leaders, he explained that, similarly to other settlements, it is difficult to engage people:

The leader in that settlement doubted that people will come, because they have been promised this and that and they are now tired because nothing happens. Like roads and electricity. I also have the same problem because I see people are slow now. People start to doubt that there will be any change now, so they give up.
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.02.2012)

The fatigue indicated here is clearly linked to the disappointment with earlier engagements, although on different topics. It is a common experience that campaigns develop slowly and sometimes fail. Commitment also seems to some degree dependant on the topic, who initiated it and if it was a first or a follow-up meeting. The meetings often have similar contents, where the same issues are repeated. In the anti-crime meetings, everyone agrees that
something must be done and that neighbourhood watches need to be arranged or improved. In information sharing meetings on e.g. hygiene, residents are taught that they must wash hands.

This fatigue with community meetings can be linked to studies on neighbour relations and show a tendency of withdrawal from the public to the private sphere of the individual households (Muyeba 2011, Muyeba and Seekings 2012). This ‘retreat to privacy’ in low-income areas of Cape Town is linked to accumulating weak neighbourhood relations. A retreat to the private is problematic for the condition of the public sphere, which encourages public broad participation in public deliberation. Muyeba and Seekings (2012) link individual homeownership though housing project to this ‘retreat to privacy’. As evident in the three informal settlements discussed here, privacy is relevant to informal settlements without homeownership as well. The retreat to privacy unfolds in a reluctance of ordinary residents to engage in the public sphere. This can be framed under the ‘community lost’ rubric (Muyeba 2012:43), related to the early urban literature (of e.g. Wirth 1938), which focus on the rapid social transformation and the rise of individualism in the urban setting. Although there probably are more neighbourhood meetings in informal settlements than in other neighbourhoods, it can be difficult to cajole informal settlement residents to attend meetings continuously (Saff 1996).

In order to analyse the retreat to privacy more in-depth, I will now discuss both the social composition and the condition of the public space.

6.3 Public-private boundaries: social dynamics and public space

The ambiguity towards participating in community meetings can be related to residents’ relation to the boundaries between public and private space. Indications point toward a reluctance to engage in public discussions and an urge to retreat to private concerns. Obviously, with informal settlements generally consisting of a desperately low-income population, the struggle to survive and somehow get food on the table for you and your family is a major concern for most residents. However, there are also other reasons for a reluctance to engage in deliberating and dealing with common concerns. In these sections I will consider two fundamental factors: a young ‘individualized’ urban population and a complicated public space.
6.3.1 Social dynamics: Urban individuality, on-migration and household fluidity

Some basic insights into how these settlements are made up socially are important. I will here discuss these two interlinked social dynamics that I found especially interesting: the presence of the young urban individual and ‘on-migration patterns’.

The young urban individual

The first time I arrived at an informal settlement was on a sunny weekend afternoon. The circumstances of the day I arrived (a sunny day and not a miserable rainy and cold winter day), gave similar first impressions of vibrancy that strikes many researchers encountering informal settlements (see amongst others Harber 2011). It struck me that I felt like I had arrived at a festival. It was so pulsating; music was blaring from different loudspeakers, and young people were ‘hanging out’ and ‘checking each other out’. It was not only the music and the excitement of arriving at a new place with lots of other young people that reminded me of a festival, but also the structures, which much like tents, were quite disorganized and had a feeling of ‘temporality’. However, people that come there to settle, mostly with the plan to move on to better conditions, eventually stay there much longer than planned. There are of course a lot of different residents, some large families, and a large amount of very hard working residents getting up before sunrise every morning to travel several hours to go to work, only returning back home after work. As these hard working residents mostly work and then sleep, I did not see them much. The dominating impression of a youthful space reminded me of my own the euphoric rush of managing on my own when I moved away from my family. Proud; because you are managing on your own, exited; because you will meet a lot of other young and perhaps don’t have to obey your parents’ rules. A beautiful young woman in a sexy red dress approached me and asked why I was there. She had arrived in Cape Town from the rural Eastern Cape not long ago, and was now living with her aunt. She was dreaming about working in the fashion industry, and was wondering why I came to this place and was carrying out this ‘boring’ workshop? After the workshop, we noticed a piece of paper left at her chair, where she had written, surrounded by doodled flowers; ‘booooring, so f***ing booorrring’.

My impression of a young and unestablished crowd did make some sense when looking at survey data displayed in the previous chapter. In all the settlements, there are generally a high percentage of young residents, with around half of the population in the age group 18 to
35 years. As displayed in figure 7 (chapter five), my data shows that in both GP and Kosovo, very few (one percent) are over 65 years old. This fits with the CoCT (2005) survey, which shows that the age distribution in three of Cape Town’s informal settlements is 22% up to 10 years, 30% between 11 and 24, 40% between 25-44, 8% over 45, and only 1 % of pensioners over 65 years (CoCT2 2005). Similarly, census data show that household heads in informal settlements are younger than those in formal dwellings: 48% are under the age of 35, compared to 19% in households in formal dwellings (HDA 2012:31). Notably, the age variation is higher in Egoli, and there are more old people: Here, my data shows that the average age head of household is older (39 years compared to 31 years in GP), that 23, 8% are between 35-64 years old, and that there are 2,7% being pensioners over 65.

The tendency towards young individuals might be related to the tendency of generally small households: Especially in Kosovo, but also in GP, a considerable amount of residents live alone, and the average number of persons per household is low (see Figure 8). In one report this is considered to be surprising, suggesting that Kosovo is a temporary stopover for young adults (DiMP 2009:5). In contrast to this assumption, other surveys display similar tendencies: The census data from 2001 showed that 27% of the households living in informal settlements were single person households, and the average household size was 2.9 (HDA 2012). A survey of Cape Town informal settlements show an average household size of 3.4 persons per dwelling and 9.6% single person households – majority male work-seekers (CoCT 2005). Similarly, Smit (2006) notes that the average household size is small, between two and three persons, in his study of five informal settlements in Cape Town, Interestingly, comparing the census data from 2001 to 2011, a tendency of decreasing household is revealed in all the three wards within which these three settlements are located: In ward 80 a decrease from 3.11 in 2001 to 2.91 in 2011, in ward 33 a decrease from 3.17 to 2.88, and in ward 34 a decrease from 3.65 to 2.89 (CoCT 2013a, 2013b, 2013c)59.

On-Migration and household fluidity

An interrelated tendency is that of household fluidity and ‘on-migration’, which underlines the fluid and rapidly changing compositions of residents. Already in 1994, patterns of on-migration, circulatory migration and oscillatory migration was pointed out (Adler 1994, 59 Census 2011 reports for all of CoCT’s wards are available online at the councils webpages; see reference list for web address.

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Cross et al. 1994, Bekker and Louw 1994). On-migration denotes that residents move from one settlement to another or from either a house or a backyard to an informal settlement. Many residents I chatted with informally indicated that when they first came to Cape Town from the Eastern Cape, they would stay some years either with relatives or in a backyard, before they bought or built their own home in an informal settlement. Even though on-migration is a general tendency, single case studies are often surprised by these patterns and term their cases as different. Haferburg (2002:29), in a single case study of the informal settlement Phola Park, displays that 60% had moved in from another neighbourhood in the Cape Flats, and claimed that this settlement is not a ‘typical’ first haven for migrants. Similarly, Goven (2007) contends that there are surprisingly few rural migrants in Kosovo (only 14.3%). Rather than finding this tendency to be surprising, it seems to be the normal pattern when looking at the statistics of other informal settlements. Some of my own data compiled in Figure 7 displayed in chapter five, indicate on-migration: few have moved directly from the Eastern Cape, and the average length of stay is not long. The data from GP shows that only 10% moved in from outside Cape Town. On-migration is indicated in other surveys as well. CoCT statistics state that two-thirds of the residents had lived in a spread of 61 (mainly townships) suburbs of the Cape Town metropolitan area before moving to the current place, and the average length of stay in the settlements was around five years (CoCT 2005:28). Cape Town census data of 2001 show that 63% had lived in the informal settlements where they were counted for five years (HAD 2012). This can be linked to that people move to informal settlements first and foremost to find work in the city (Hunter and Posel 2012), and view their stay as temporary.

In my surveys, it was interesting to observe how residents answered the question ‘why did you move here’. The categories ‘close to family’, ‘close to friends’ or ‘close to work’ were insufficient. Most ticked off the answer ‘other’ and added sentences like I needed a place on my own. Also data collected from five other informal settlements, show that 59% moved to the settlements due to a need of privacy and space, while 20% answered ‘evicted’, 9% ‘high rent’, 5% ‘nowhere else to go’, 3% ‘conflict /violence’, and 1% ‘death of partner/ divorce’ (Smit 2006:109). In open-ended interviews, many highlighted that a move from backyard shacks to informal settlements was an improvement, as backyard landlords gave them trouble. For many young residents, it is the first time they live alone in their own structure, and many indicated that they needed to move away from family who restricted their freedom.
Even for a 45-year old, moving from a crowded backyard shack to the settlement was a relief: *It was better for me moving here, because I was staying with other people and it was hell, here we got our own place* (Resident, Egoli, 3.8.2011).

I observed many different compositions of households, for instance young friends living together. The young women interviewed reflected that they ‘wanted to live on their own’, because it was too crowded in the shack or backyard where they used to live, or that they simply felt it was time to start their own life and move away from their family. They had sometimes experienced fights with their family and needed privacy, and one woman indicated it was difficult to have a boyfriend when you share the bed with all your siblings. Another young woman, who had been living alone for three years and had a full-time job at the airport, stated that she used to stay with her sister, but then her sister got married and she did not want to disturb them. Asking her how she felt about living alone, she stated: *It is not safe. But there are not many nice men* [she giggles]. She explained that it is better to live alone than to live with a man that only gets drunk.

Drawing this together, it confirms that migration patterns and household compositions in informal settlements are often young, fluid and changing (Bekker and Louw 1994, Ross 1996, Spiegel *et al.* 1996).

### 6.3.2 Public space (physical conditions)

Public sphere is dependent on actual public spaces where issues of the commons can be deliberated. Other case studies have also mentioned specific public places where public meetings usually are held. Ross (2010) indicates that the water tap is one such place of community deliberation where residents meet and talk about common issues (Ross 2010: 30-31). Harber (2011) asserts churches and taverns (*shebeens*) are such communal spaces. In an older account, Kiewiet and Weichel (1980) describe how schools, built inside an informal settlement, function as meeting halls. Some of these spaces are present in the settlements of

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60 This also helps to explain the fast growing number of shacks in many informal settlements. As mentioned by one leader in Egoli, his three oldest sons who he raised in his shack, have now moved out to their own shacks near his own, each with wives and their own children. Out of his house, he explains, four more houses have emerged during the 15 years that he had lived in the settlement.

61 It might be that the young unestablished crowd also allows for less traditional gender roles. Once I visited one of the main leaders in GP, he was alone home with the child. I asked him where his girlfriend was. He answered that she had gotten a job in another area in Cape Town, and that she was there only some days. So he had to be home with the son. He did not know exactly when she was coming back.
this study; people do meet at the water taps, and Kosovo and Egoli have several shebeens and churches. Generally, mass meetings seldom occur, are difficult to organize, and might also be related to a general lack of space in most informal settlements. In Egoli, there are two churches made of zinc sheets where many community meetings are held. When everyone does not fit into the church, people stand outside and try to listen. These churches are sometimes used as crèches, or as a shelter for people whose homes are flooded or have burnt down. For grand meetings, an empty field nearby is used, and the loudspeakers, microphones and chairs from the churches are carried outside. Here, the meetings I observed were open meetings where residents could attend and raise their concerns. In GP, there is no space for large community meetings in any of the homes, and the meetings are held at the drain (manhole sewer) in the middle of the settlement. In Kosovo, meetings have been held in open spaces and in church tents, but are mostly held at ‘the office’, which is a container provided by CoCT. Meetings have also been held in halls in other parts of Philippi.

Interestingly, the relation between public and private space is somehow paradoxical in informal settlements. On the one hand, the urge for privacy is expressed in longing for having one’s own house with its own toilet and a garden, and the wish to start one’s own life by moving out of one’s parents’ abode. This urge is physically visible in that many shacks are surrounded by fences and have small patches of private courtyards. If they have space, some residents take one of the public portable bucket toilets into the courtyard in order to have a private toilet. The preference for a private place is also visible in the generally high maintenance given to the private home, while there is a lack of collective maintenance of public areas. Local government department officials express concerned with this and complain that there are residents who dump garbage in the public spaces or who vandalize public toilets. In comparison, most residents keep their shack extremely tidy inside. This could be related to the fact that many residents do not plan or wish to settle for a long time in these areas and therefore do not feel ownership of the space.

On the other hand, confronting this urge for privacy, spatial facts make privacy difficult to uphold in dense informal settlements. One could say that most of the space is public, and residents share toilets, water taps and small patches of open spaces and roads. Due to the physical nature of informal settlements, there are more meeting places than formal settlements where such things take place inside private houses. Since the shacks are small,
and in the summer become very hot (especially zinc shacks), people sit outside. In the winter, especially in Egoli where there is no electricity, people sit together around fires. Children play together and enter whichever shack they please, and people share food. And when catastrophes hit the area like flooding or fires, people affected receive help and often stay at their friends’ and neighbours’ places (see also flooding report Drivdal 2011b). Noteworthy, people do read newspapers, listen to the radio and watch TV, and are often informed about the political situation, which they discuss amongst themselves in these spaces.

Summing up, with these tense relations between public and private physical boundaries, the public spaces are both encompassing and limited. The possibilities of public spaces are manifold; however these possibilities are limited by the withdrawal into the private home space. This might help explain why, in addition to the low attendance of meetings, residents often claimed that they were not informed about certain issues.

6.3.3 Discussion: individuality and retreat to privacy or urban possibilities?
Drawing together the above insights, there might be several pragmatic reasons for the lack of large-scale participation at public meetings and a withdrawal to the private, which are essentially problematic for the public realm to develop, as suggested in Arendt’s ideals (Villa 1992).

First, on-migration contributes to the lack of stability and fluidity of actors involved in the public politics of the settlements. As pointed out by Cross et al. (1994) and Bekker and Louw (1994), on-migration could both be the result of and contribute to internal conflicts and violence. It can increase the fragmentation and fluidity, which can have the effect of a confusing setup for residents. It is seemingly a general problem in South African civil society; there is such an influx of organizations and political parties, combined with corruption scandals that people have become confused and tired of politics. In Kosovo, some residents express that they are tired of leaders and politics because there are too many leaders. Secondly, a major reason for lack of engagement is connected the classical ideas that urban societies are more individualized (Wirth 1938). The fact that many move to informal settlements to get away from family pressure and to sort out their private problems indicates a longing for individual freedom. Further, as raised by Hunter and Posel (2012) informal settlements residents are ‘there to find work’, to sort out their own economic future. Early in
my field work, I tried to identify some Xhosa words, and one of the first words I noticed coming up frequently in conversations was ‘usebenza’ which translated means ‘to work’. Prioritizing a private future might be one reason why many don’t prioritise engaging in ‘community work’, increasing the withdrawal to the private realm. The hard working residents who travel to work before sunrise and get back late in the evening do not have much time to engage in local politics.

Third, although much of the space in informal settlements is in fact public, there are few and small designated public spaces. Perhaps in reaction to this, residents in informal settlements are concerned with carving out a private space. Hence, the longing for privacy which Muyeba (2011) has described is central to residents who have relocated to low-cost formal housing, is relevant to informal settlement residents too, and can be seen as a reaction to the severe lack of privacy within these dense settlements.

Lastly, it is interesting to note that notions of individual freedom seem to have a particular history in South African urban informal settlements. This is controversial, as the colonial and apartheid systems severely limited freedom of inhabitants to move beyond borders and achieve something beyond their space. Yet, within a specific period of the Apartheid system, informal settlements provided more freedom from intervention than townships (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980). As townships were planned in detail and constructed by the apartheid state to keep the working force of the ‘bantu’ people, informal settlements were intermediate, less planned and less controlled. This lack of intervention changed in the 1980s, and also with the advent of democracy several state regulations of economy in informal settlements have been imposed. However, a longing for individual freedom still appear relevant for informal settlement residents, especially by the young residents who have moved to gain freedom from their family, and residents who have moved from backyards into the settlements to gain freedom from repressive landlords.

Although this point towards limited willingness to engage in discussing common concerns in the public realm, there are also particular possibilities, related to Arendt’s idea that plurality

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62 Kiewiet and Weichel (1980:31) display residents pointing out that they generally felt freer in the informal settlement than in townships. One quote is particularly illustrative: He said that people generally felt freer in Crossroads than in the townships and this was one of the factors that helped to generate a proper community spirit. People had the opportunity to improve their situation within a lassies-faire economic structure without the complex restrictions of licences and laws (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980:33).
and conflicts are essential for a functioning public realm (Villa 1992). In urban spaces, such plurality is prevalent, and might create new patchworks and spaces of possibilities (Simone 2010). Both on-migration and the young urban crowd might add to this plurality. Urban youth have been seen as attempting to push urban life in Africa into new directions (Simone 2005), and have been represented as either heroes or villains in South African townships’ political struggle (Seekings 2006). As young individuals might be in a situation where they are not completely ‘institutionalized’, and with migration fluidity, it is possible that the experience they gain from living in other townships and informal settlements count more than the rural experience. Further, the detachment from family and kinship bonds can give room for developments for more liberated politics and a different public sphere than the assumed dominance of the ‘traditional in the urban’ (Mamdani 1996). Additionally, on-migration may add to the possibilities of new and hybrid organizational forms and patchworks, as it increases residents’ experiences with engaging in public discussions in different places. Organizational experience brings organizational learning. Thereby, the circulation of organization models (Bénit-Gbeaffou et al. 2012b) is increased with the on-migration of residents from different townships and informal settlements, and this increases the possibilities of various patchworks of organizational experience and network connections.

However, there are also deeper reasons why residents are reluctant to engage in public deliberations. Importantly, not only attending meetings counts for making up a vibrant public sphere, but also being willing to speak publicly about public matters. Observing meetings, it seemed that many residents did not voice their opinion (sometimes depending on the topic of the meeting). One elderly man, who was one of the first people to move to Egoli, explained: I participate in the meetings at the church, but I don’t speak for the people (Resident, Egoli, 10.8.2011). This moves me to discuss indications as to why there is reluctance to voice opinions, looking into discursive reasons conditioning residents’ willingness to speak publicly. I will in the following sections sketch out some (at times paradoxical) discursive elements of the internal ‘governmentality’, which seeks to inform a reluctance to engage in public discussions and notions of what can be spoken about publicly.

6.4 Conditions of speaking publicly
I will now move from discussing the more pragmatic reasons for a retreat to privacy towards discussing the more discursive limitations on ‘free deliberations’. As noted earlier, some
In contextual literature, fear of ‘power obsessed’ leaders and violent politics is one apparent condition restricting residents from speaking publicly (Katsaura 2012). Additionally, there is a general fear of witchcraft applicable to cases of jealousy about money, children or consumer products (Bähre 2002). Nevertheless, looking beyond fear of violence, less apparent conditions are indicated, like the fear of gossip and rumour, which is widespread in areas amidst low-income areas of Cape Town (Ross 2010, Bank 2011, Muyeba 2011, Muyeba and Seekings 2012). Particularly ethnographic accounts display cultural cognitive assumptions and social norms of behaviour, like norms ‘decent’ behaviour with the notion of *ordentlikheid* (Salo 2003, 2009, Ross 2006, 2010, Jensen 2008).

### 6.4.1 Stigma, marginalization and reluctance of speaking up

As mentioned above, there is a strong stigma connected to living in informal settlements (Bray and Brandt 2007, Ross 2010, Meth 2013). Ross (2010: 29-30) notes that the consequences of the sort of life lived in informal settlements lead to short-term strategizing due to the uncertainties and lack of confidence and a feeling of humiliation, which discourage some residents to speak up for themselves. Such feelings of embarrassment connected to living conditions were expressed by many residents. Both in GP and Egoli residents seemed to display such embarrassment, like the earlier mentioned articulations of ‘living like pigs’. In GP, the conditions are severe as there are very few toilets and the settlement are flooded every winter. As mentioned earlier, the settlement is actually called ‘Enyunywini’ in Xhosa, which one resident reluctantly explained can be translated as ‘dirty place’. Residents in the neighbouring informal settlements gossip about the area. GP residents know about this stigmatization by the neighbouring informal settlements, and told me that they laughed at them when they started building shacks in this area. In Egoli, the divide is between ‘the front’ and ‘the back’ area of the settlement. The front, which became populated first and is less crowded, is by some termed the *the upper class area* (Resident, Egoli, 10.8.2011). This area has larger shacks and more churches, while the ‘back area’ has more *shebeens* and is dirtier.
Feelings of stigma and marginalization become apparent in residents’ reluctance to confront ‘externals’ like NGOs, local government departments, researchers and media. Note here that this does not signify a lack of willingness to establish sought-after external contacts, but to confront and directly disagree with externals that enter the settlements. In Kosovo, where there has been much higher involvement by the municipality in its attempts to upgrade the settlement, many complained that the process had not included them (this has also been observed by a student in the field, see Armitage et al. 2010). However, when I asked if they would be prepared to approach the people who deliver services, reluctance was expressed:

W: The toilets are the main problem. The people that fetch the toilet sewage, they don’t come many times.
L: Why don’t you ask them why they don’t come more often, when they should?
W: No, they would throw it in your face (the sewage)…
(Resident, Kosovo 6.10.2010)

In GP, residents expressed that they felt offended when ‘outsiders’ come into their area, especially if these externals do not explain who they are and why they are there. Yet, it appears that when outsiders approach the settlement, most residents are too shy to initiate conversations, and rather expect to be approached or that one of the leaders should approach these externals. This was also my own experience in the first field visits.

In Egoli, many NGOs have intervened with projects, some of which seemingly are unsuccessful over time. Only one of the leaders have confronted these projects ideas and told the NGOs when their plans were not good for the community as a whole. The same leader argued that there are too much NGOs involvement in the settlement, and that this creates apathy:

There is too much hand-outs in Egoli, so people just sit and wait. And the NGOs exploit it, they make up NGOs sometimes. All the NGOs in the area concentrate on Egoli. The people are spoiled there.
(Community leader 5, Egoli 17.1 2012)

Such apathy is generally expressed by residents who feel marginalized and hope that others will help. Residents frequently ask leaders to sort out things for them, like contacting ward councillors about their own problems. I also experienced that residents would ask me to assist them, for instance, a mother asked me to phone the ambulance to fetch her son, even though the call and service is free.
Despite the above described hope that leaders will deal with the problems of the commons, there is also an aversion towards authorities. This can be connected to the history of oppression and the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle, but might also be related to the presence of the young urban individual as discussed earlier.

6.4.2 Jealousy and fear of expression

Hanging around in the settlements, there is always something going on, and women and men sit around and chat and observe. Much drama is unfolding around family and neighbour issues, which sometimes leads to fighting and violence. Of course, family and neighbour conflicts happens in any neighbourhood, but the intensity and seriousness might be higher here, as the close proximity between neighbours with thin walls makes it easier to hear what the neighbours are up to.

With this intensity, public spheres in poor areas in South Africa are sometimes dominated by exclusion and the fear of expressing meanings (Katsaura 2012). Fear of violence is a valid reason why many residents are scared to engage in discussion around public matters. It is known that leaders who spoke up have been killed or attempts were made, threatened, arrested, and engaged in violent confrontations. Jealousy seems to be widespread, and is often connected to family and neighbourhood conflicts and to jobs. Such jealousy can easily develop into violence or the use of witchcraft (Bähre 2002), and is consequently widely feared. Clearly, this is not a game for the feint hearted.

The amount of jealousy creates a space of fear of expression, and of engaging in leadership. One of the leaders in Egoli opposing shebeen practice, whose shack is in between shebeens, explains that they throw the bombs of the mouths at me when she goes out of the shack. Therefore, she, like many others, stay inside during nights when people are drunk and even violent. On several occasions, it was mentioned by residents that they feared to talk about public problems, e.g. shebeens causing noise because then they could be accused of being jealous of the shebeen owner’s business.

Community leaders are often in the middle of drama as they get involved in solving internal conflicts. In GP, one of the leaders explained the difficulties of acting publicly as a consequence of jealousy and anger:
M: Sometimes people get jealous and got issues. Sometimes you can’t be always right, and sometimes you have to interfere, and then sometimes it doesn’t feel right. If you become honest people who are wrong feel offended. You can’t be good to everyone.
L: So it is hard to negotiate? Don’t people sometimes get angry?
M: For myself I don’t care about that. But sometimes it affects your family…
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.4.2012)

As ‘public figures’, leaders are often targets for suspicion and jealousy. This is widely acknowledged. Talking to a random resident in GP, she knew much about the different leaders, and complained that many of them were not doing enough for the community. However, when I asked her why she did not become a leader herself, she answered No, it is a lot of stress. Maybe someone call you who is beaten by a man, and then he call you names.
(Resident, GP, 27.3.2013)

The amount of diverging rumours about leaders makes it difficult to understand what is going on, not only for researchers but also for residents. The leaders are sometimes suspicious of each other, like this leader who expressed deep anger about another leader:

He is jealous. He is not good; he wants to destroy the meeting. He thinks that he is God; he thinks we don’t have brain and he has to think for us. He is not standing for re-election but he has a friend who he wanted to get elected – but we did not choose him.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 11.2.2011)

Leaders themselves are sometimes the purveyors of rumours, mainly about rival leaders. The same leader as above indicated that another leader was jealous and spreading rumours:

P: He wants to make this place ungovernable. He was trying to make things bad, but we did not listen to him in Kosovo. You know, he was a friend of the candidate we nominated, but now he is an enemy. He is jealous now. He is trying to make us to fight, but we said no, it is enough, we won’t fight.
L: What did he do?
P: He spread rumours. The old councillor – at that times we were fighting, but now we said no.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 17.3.2011)

In Egoli, many rumours circulated around the different leaders, and it has been hard to understand how much truth there are to the different rumours. One example was how one
leader was accused for corruption by selling plots of land within the settlement, claiming that he was the owner of the land. This matter actually went to court, and the leader was found not guilty on this occasion. Counter rumours spread that the residents who started the rumours were bribed with wine and cigarettes to spread these accusations. Even now, as the main actors admit that there was a misunderstanding, there still seem to be resentment.

Cases where suspicion has led to the demise of leaders and committees are also described by Allison (2002) and Barry (2006). An effect of the critical gossip around leaders creates a high level of suspicion (of corruption) and might help to keep actual corruption in check. In all the three settlements, critical accusations of leadership corruption have been raised.

6.4.3 Norms of public behaviour and fear of gossip

Behavioural norms are reflected in how residents condemn others. Behaviour around alcohol is often mentioned, and some make a distinction between those who go to churches and those who go to shebeens. Even a shebeen owner talked negatively about her guests in this manner:

They make me laugh. When they are sober they are nice but when they drink they swear. When they drunk they talk about Jesus, singing church songs, but they don’t go to church.
(Resident, Kosovo 20.9.2011)

This reflects norms of decent behaviour. Such norms are also displayed in ethnographic accounts of daily life in informal settlements, which rather indirectly than explicitly talk about power relations. Relevant here is the notion ordentlikheid (Salo 2003, 2004, 2009, Ross 2006, 2010, Jensen 2008). It signifies respectability and decency, which can be seen in the urge to display decency and properness, related to feelings of marginalization and fears of being judged for living in shacks (Ross 2010). External appearances are important, especially being clean and neat, in addition to sociability and behaving decently, friendly and modestly (Ross 2005). These norms seem to fit with the two predominantly Xhosa-speaking settlements as well, and the efforts to present decency and high morals are perhaps even higher here. Especially regarding appearances, most residents make much effort to appear clean and neat, and keep their home neat and tidy. Mothers often get up before sunrise to clean the home for several hours and preparing everything for their children to go to school.
Connected to the norms of decency, there is a lot of gossip in the settlements, and the fear of being gossiped about is widespread. Muyeba (2011), Muyeba and Seekings (2012) and Ross (2010) mention that gossip is widespread in low-income areas in Cape Town. As the direct fear of violence can hinder participation, less apparent fear of gossip and rumours are also significant. In a situation where you know that people talk about you behind your back, you always watch your words closely. This is indicated by the fact that, while moralizing remarks often were noted in private conversation, most residents seemed reluctant to say the same things publicly. It is particularly evident in the problems around keeping residents from littering. Many paths are filled with rubbish that stink especially in the summer, and in the winter it is a problem that some dump garbage and water with food leftovers into stormwater drains which block the pipes and thereby contributes to flooding and malfunctioning toilets.

The problems can of course largely be explained by inadequate waste collection system initiated by local government and carried out through private tenders. In several occasions during the years of field visits, the waste collection breaks down and rubbish will not be collected for several weeks, piling up next to the collection areas and then spread around by street dogs. This contributes to discouraging residents to try to keep the areas clean. However, many residents also expressed frustration with some resident’s behaviour dumping, but emphasised that taking initiative to stop such action is difficult. This became apparent in the focus group interviews I conducted on flooding and health problems. In a discussion with a group of ‘health club’ residents in Kosovo, it was pointed out that telling other residents not to dump is challenging:

there are conflicts, we are not the same. For example, maybe when someone finished cleaning; you tell them not to drop the water there, but they don’t listen…
(Resident, Kosovo 6.10.2010)

In addition to that moralizing publicly is not effective, one risks being publicly shamed. In another focus group interview in GP, the topic hygiene came up, and an older woman explained that she tried to tell people to not dump the waste, but that they then just laughed at her and called her mentally disturbed. She seemed very pleased to get the opportunity to say this loudly in the meeting, as she got support for her hygiene concerns by the facilitators. However, when one risks to publicly be laughed at when revealing issues of the commons, it should not be a surprise that many prefer not to speak out. It is explained by that ‘people don’t like to get advice and commands from someone at their own level’, as one resident
explains: ‘Sometimes we are like that, if someone tries to suggest something people think they try to be clever...’ (Resident, GP, 26.4 2011). This also includes that residents do not like to be told what to do from internal leaders, as they too are living in shacks and hence are at the same level.

This specifies that if one publicly complains about others behaviour, it indicates an unacceptable arrogance of the person complaining. Therefore, residents might fear to be deemed arrogant if speaking openly about troublesome behaviour, which could affect common concerns of the settlement. This also contrasts the possibilities of privacy and individual freedom, as described earlier in this chapter. Actually, gossip are essential parts of the internal public realm, both as they are significant ways in which news spread and limit the willingness to speak publicly. Further, gossip is indeed essential parts of political practice, as it can, if applied successfully, create conflicts and shift power.

6.4.4 Discussion: disciplinary norms and the public realm
Moving beyond the more pragmatic reasons for withdrawing to the private as discussed in the first section, this section has considered various fears that hinder residents from speaking freely and publicly. As displayed by Bähre (2002) and Katsaura (2012), it should be obvious that fear of violence and witchcraft makes many reluctant to engage in public discussions. However, it is not only the fear of violence that might hamper the motivation to speak publicly, but also the fear of rumours ad suspicions, which always circulate ‘public persons’. In relation to Foucaultian power objection to public realm theories (Villa 1992, Allen 2002), norms and cultural cognitive discourses can be seen as disciplining public behaviour and constraining ‘free speech’. Ordenlikheid seems to be one such norm that impacts on what residents say and how they say it. Notably, I have here only given some indications of disciplinary discourses of public behaviour, acknowledging that these are preliminary and that more deep ethnographic and historical research is needed, looking into what is left unsaid and why (Seekings 2010). Anyway, what is further important is that conforming to such norms and discourses are increased by the fear of rumours, gossip and jealousy. Hence, many residents appear to be reluctant to speak up about common concerns, because they know that people would speak behind their back, since many residents become angry if ‘someone at their own level’ tries to tell them what to do.
Important to note is that the disciplinary norms are not necessarily directly connected to 'ethnic traditional' ideals, but rather a reflection of the particular insecure and unstable urban condition of informal settlements. They are related to feelings of stigma and the marginalization of living in informal settlements, which are countered by portrayals of decency and order. Also other ethnographic accounts show that there is certainly no lack of disciplining moral codes in South African townships, generally (Salo 2004, Buur 2008).

What is further is interesting about the prevalence of such disciplinary norms is that it conflicts with the notion of an urge for privacy as outlined in the first section of this chapter. It shows an urban condition of informal settlement in South Africa that, on the one hand, reflects the classical ‘urban individuality’ (Wirth 1938), but on the other hand a social setting with certain disciplinary norms developed as a reflection of the marginalised condition. It is very difficult to say anything about the balance between these two polarities in my research other than to comment on the tension that it creates between residents and for leaders who act on issues of the commons or speak publicly, which will be discussed further in chapter seven.

6.5 Conclusion

Returning to the research question of the conditions of speaking publicly, the analysis indicates two problematic aspects of the public realm:

First, a tendency of withdrawal to the private due to conditions of social fluidity and urban individuality seems to fit with classical urban theory (Wirth 1938). There is indeed an urge towards privacy, visible not only in the presence of urban young individuals who strive to start and manage their own private life, but also in the reluctance to engage in public meetings. The retreat to the private presents many limitations to the development of an internal public realm, and is relevant to Arendt’s fear that the social will take over the public realm and limit discussions of politics (Villa 1992). However, in contrast to gloomy conditions of a public realm, the analysis has indicated some possibilities for a vibrant public realm too, as there is much public space and as heterogeneous and traditional institutionally detached young residents and on-migration create room for openness to new ideas of organizing politics.
Secondly, cultural cognitive discourses and behavioural norms impact on speaking publicly, and can hence be seen as ‘disciplinary power’ which limits ‘free speech’ in the public realm (Villa 1992, Allen 2002). Not only valid fear of violence (direct power) (Katsaura 2012) and a lack of time or resources restrict the willingness to speak publicly, but also disciplinary norms of acting publicly and fear of normative judgement (Ross 2010). Many issues remain difficult to discuss openly. As the lack of time and fear of violence is quite obvious, the fear of moral judgement is more complex, and I believe I have only touched upon some elements in this chapter. The public realm in informal settlements has been given surprisingly little attention as a topic in itself, but drawing together contextual relevant accounts, significant indications are given. More ethnographic research is needed to understand why regular individuals are reluctant or afraid to engage in public deliberations. This would be interesting to follow up, as the vast majority of research on informal settlement political activity is empirically and methodologically focused on activists63. This might not only improve the understanding of the public realm, but also the limitations of civil society and of ‘participation’.

Adhering to the main theoretical framework underlining that leaders need to be analysed in relation to their specific context within which they emerge (Dachler and Hosking 1995, Osborn et al. 2002, Uhl-Bien 2006), this chapter has shown that insights into the public realm appear essential to understanding the tensions of leadership politics in relation to the residents. The problematic public realm underscores that only a few residents, which are comfortable with the risk of both violence and being gossiped about, emerge as leaders. This is because leaders are individuals who, with different motivations and to different degrees, decide to speak up despite these problematic internal public conditions.

Further, this chapter has added another dimension to the balancing of conflicting logics in the particular urban setting of informal settlements: The paradox that arises by comparing the young urban populations longing for individual freedom, with the continuation of disciplinary norms of order and decency. This is reflected in residents, on the one hand resent being told what to do by leaders, but on the other hand long for more order. How leaders deal with this tension by displaying both bureaucratic and democratic logics, will be discussed further in chapter seven.

63Nevertheless, I have also myself, in this thesis, focused on the activists, much due to methodological constraints as discussed in the methods chapter.
CHAPTER 7 Negotiating bureaucratic and democratic logics in relation to contextually grounded values

7.1 Introduction
The presentations, organizational ideals and models that different community leaders gave in informal conversations fascinated me early in the research. I was perplexed by the sometimes exceptionally sophisticated formalistic representations. As will be illustrated later in this chapter, they would explain in detail the organizational model of the committee, sometimes relating it to the South African Constitution or other formal instances. Democratic ideals were highlighted in these presentations, in models of representation of the interests of residents through securing open meetings and through mechanisms of elections. Bureaucratic models of organizing were also underscored, by portraying standardized committee models and processes. Unsurprisingly, irregularities in the presentations of these ideal and presented models emerged, especially in practically carrying them out. Thus, as emphasised in the theory and methodology chapter, I will not analyse these presentations as ‘truths’ but rather analyse how and why leaders in the context of informal settlements negotiate these democratic ideas of legitimacy in relation to the expectations of residents. Further, I am not trying to analyse if legitimate representation is possible or not, or even desirable. Rather, I am interested in how on different forms of legitimacy are presented and what this can tell us about political tensions of organizing internal public concerns. In this chapter I will concentrate on discussing the contextual grounding of these logics, and the research question here is therefore:

How and why are leaders presenting both democratic and bureaucratic logics in asserting legitimacy with residents?

With the assumption that leaders present models to symbolize legitimacy, the models and ideals presented will be outlined and interpreted in relation to contextual and historical expectations, norms and discourses. This is also building on insights from the various practises described in chapter five and on the indication of a tension between urban youths longing for individual privacy with the moralizing norms of decency as mentioned in chapter
six. The first part of this chapter will outline portrayals of democratic practises and models and discuss how these reflect adaptations to contextual discourses of urban modernity and historical discourses of the liberation from dominating authorities. Thereafter, I will show how bureaucratic logics are emphasised and discuss how these reflect adaptations to urban conditions of instability, lack of transparency and a notion of mature decency. Some of these presentations are in themselves contradicting, but together they do indicate the relevance of bureaucratic and democratic logics.

Further, two assumptions outlined in my theoretical framework will be reflected over. First, when acknowledging that organizations have a dual nature, implying that they have pragmatic and symbolical sides, one cannot analyse an organization by simply referring to the organizational structure or strategic goals (Scott 2008, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010). Rather, as the symbolical sides of organizations are essential for defending their survival in relation to their environment, presentations of organizational models can be analysed as symbolic claims of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983).

Secondly, perceiving the committees as organizations faced with institutional pluralism provides the grounds for outlining several co-existing and grounded institutional logics (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009). This is related to the critique of decoupling, enabling an analysis of how plural internal discourses impact on what models are presented. It fits with the acknowledgement that the committees are hybrid organizations, forming in a context of hybrid urban identities (Robins 2008, Myers 2011, Bank 2011). As the context of informal settlements is signified by plural historical discursive practises and behavioural norms of speaking publicly, committees might include plural logics in order to claim legitimacy. Notably, I am not here considering what legitimate leaders look like, but how legitimacy is presented though different organizational models.

7.2 The favouring of democratic logics

In following sections I will analyse the presentations of modern democratic logics as reflecting both discourses of urban individualism (as indicated in chapter six) and as reflecting historically specific discourses related to the social movements against Apartheid.
7.2.1 Presenting urban modern models rather than traditional

During the early days of my field visits, I noticed that ‘traditional’ models of organising the committees were never mentioned naturally. I considered they did not want to speak about this to me as I am foreigner from ‘overseas’. It might also be that notions of traditional models are stronger in older settlements, e.g. in Khayelitsha. Lastly, some settlements are very mixed, like Egoli, and it would be hard to determine whose traditions count. Generally, my impression is that although there certainly are traditional churches and expressions of cultural traditions, these do not appear to be the most central in the formation of committee structures.

Conversely, even in GP, which appears to have the most homogenous population as most residents are Xhosa speaking, traditional systems were never mentioned. So I decided to ask directly. I asked if the committee had a Xhosa name, but this was first denied. Finally, one leader explained that there had been traditional leaders earlier, but that this system had failed and had little legitimacy:

No, we don’t have a Xhosa name. We removed the names we used before: ‘Sibonda’, which means chief. That name was not good because people then thought they ruled the community and had certain rights and were owning that position. It was not cool. It was not democratic. Even before I started we had already called it community leader and chairperson. Those Sibonda people, they were more in control. At least the community leaders are controlled by the community…..Now when you are a chairperson you are only chairing the meeting. So it is much better these days. Also if you come up with something it must be based on what people want, because if not people will point fingers.
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.4.2012)

This statement underlines the symbolical importance ‘modern’ names and models, not only of committees but of the positions of the committee members. In the quote it is suggested that traditional names symbolize and present negative associations with authoritarian rule, while what is thought of as modern democratic and bureaucratic models are presented as more legitimate. This does not suggest that traditional authorities are non-existent. Rather, it suggests an idea of separation between traditional and democratic rule, each having its own place in society.
Instead of traditional, democratic logics were highlighted. Perhaps unsurprisingly, leaders in all the settlements were eager to explain the democratic election procedures and models of their committee.

In Kosovo, leaders repeatedly referred to ideals like the South African Constitution and fair representation:

We call a meeting, everyone must be there. N… is the chair person. We vote by raising the hand. It is democracy. Every year we have election and people decide who stays.

(Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4. 2011)

N: You must be elected. We stick to the Constitution, you cannot appoint yourself!
J: And you must think that all people are equal, and represent everyone.

(Community leaders 9 and 11, Kosovo 4.5.2011)

Clearly, they here portray that their legitimacy is based on democratic voting ideals. Such systems of voting and references to the Constitutions might reflect the national system as an ideal.

In GP, similar procedures of elections were explained, indicating that the major source of legitimacy is drawn from being suggested and elected by ‘the community’:

L: How are they chosen?
M: We don’t choose us self, we must be suggested by someone else. Then the community vote… If someone wants to leave the committee, we choose a new one.… We usually take one year. But if we chose to select them again then we will put them again.
L: How did you get elected?
M: People choose you don’t volunteer. People who know you suggest you. If people then support you they raise their hand.

(Community leader 3, GP, 28.10.2010)

Also in Egoli, the committee members underlined that they were elected by ‘the people of Egoli’.

Although these quotes on election procedures are examples, it was striking that talk about election processes was brought up every time I asked about the committee structures. The elections are claimed to be held approximately once a year, and open to everyone in the settlement. Individuals are nominated, and residents vote by raising hands. When someone
leaves the committee, someone new must be elected. With this follows a ‘moral obligation’ to serve the public if elected, as expressed by these two leaders:

If you are chosen, you can say no, but it must be a valid statement. You cannot just say no because you got a wife or something like that [laughing].
(Community leader 9, Kosovo, 21.4.2011)

I told I have to get off the committee. I am holding these positions, because it is not like I am a person that likes to be a leader. But at the end of the day I cannot be leader forever. But when I told them they were against it.
(Community leader 3, GP 22.3.2012)

In line with a democratic ideal, the leaders indicated in these quotes that they don’t have a natural ‘right’ to be leaders by way of tradition, but that they are chosen by people and therefore have an obligation to fulfil a ‘civic duty’.

However, as these ideals are important symbolically for portraying and claiming legitimacy, they are hard to carry out in practise. In line with new-institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983) and discursive leadership theory (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003), organizational models and names are powerful as symbols, sometimes more than reflecting actual practises. During the research, I only observed one public voting occasion (details of this election will be given in chapter eight). Besides this incident, I did not find many proofs of mass democratic election of leaders. Rather, most elections seem to include a small collection of particularly active residents, which can be due to residents’ lack of engagement in community meetings, as discussed in chapter six. Further, it is questionable whether these small elections are ‘free and fair’ and as comprehensive as the stated ideals, due to constraints on speaking publicly and the lack of anonymity when voting done by raising hands. Instead of being chosen through grand elections, the leaders are often ‘volunteers’, sometimes self-appointed64. They are being shaped through social processes as described in chapter 5, especially through being able to mediate internal conflicts, mobilizing residents or being appointed by externals. The tendency that the same representatives are committee members over several long periods and the difficulties of engaging new residents to join the committees indicates another pragmatic challenge to the election ideals. Hence,

64 Despite her notion of democratic procedures, Zuern (2011:80) also acknowledge that local civics are far from immune to the power hierarchies operating within the communities in which they were formed. Additionally, it cannot be ignored that some leaders do attempt to rule via patronage (Lucas 2000).
leaders’ presentations of models should not be assumed to be ‘truths’, visible in settlements like Kosovo, where claims of democratic election procedures are particularly frequently confronted and opposed by residents and rivalling leaders. As outlined in the theory chapter, many contextual case studies problematized democratic representation, as it is underlined that a central feature of informal settlements is that there cannot be legitimate representative control (Adler 1994). Although legitimacy might be claimed by groups, it cannot be tested. The main issue in this chapter is however not to judge the degree of democracy, but to analyse why democratic logics are so important to leaders and residents.

7.2.2 Reflecting discourses of urbanity and radicalization in township history

In my interpretation, the resentment towards the traditional and the favouring of democratic models can be related to two specific contextual and historical discourses.

First, the moving away from ‘traditional’ logics can be related to the symbolic value of modernity and urban identity in informal settlements. As emphasised in chapter five, many informal settlements consist of a high number of young urbanized individuals, directed at pursuing their own visions and enjoying freedom from certain authorities. Many of these residents appear to have a somehow detached relation from the rural. One illustration of this appeared in one of the less planned visits I made to Kosovo, where I encountered a random resident who seemed eager to talk about the committee and leaders in his settlement. He highlighted that he opposed the legitimacy of the current main committee, and his main claim seemed to be that they still are ‘too rural’:

So many people come from the villages, I come from a township in East London so I know the urban situation. ….They don’t know city life, because they are from the rural areas.
(Resident, Kosovo, 17.4.2012)

Here, the importance of a modern urban identity was highlighted, particularly in relation to the urban-rural difference. In this quote he indicates that the urban situation needs other organizational models than the rural. He further explained that:

My vision of this place is not like this. Most people here come from the Transkei, they never struggled, they never had toyi-toyi. When I came here I saw that it is not right here. Most people here come from the homelands. They
Thereby, in addition to the lack of legitimacy gives to residents with traditional backgrounds, he indicates legitimacy connected to experiences with anti-apartheid social movements, where the struggle was not only directed at the apartheid state but also at the traditional structures implemented in townships functioning as indirect rule through its connections with the apartheid state (Mamdani 1996). Although I cannot generalize from this quote, it seems that such notions are present.

Whilst visiting leader in GP in her home, her daughter, who was in her early 20s interfered, and started talking about how the young generation must be given a chance because they know democracy better:

They need to let us – the young people – take over. The old people are not up to date, they don’t understand democracy.
(Resident, GP, 9.3.2013)

She had studied one year at a local university, and she indicated that this is because the older people studied under the old apartheid system and hence did not learn much about democracy. Strangely, the mother not comments on this, and let the daughter do the rest of the talking (perhaps also because the daughter spoke better English than her mother). Also other leaders have mentioned that it is an advantage that the youth are more updated and have better schooling, and should therefore be involved more. This shows that some leaders do acknowledge that the urban youth could be an important asset to committee work.

In Egoli, one leader adheres to these ideas and often talked about that the new generation of youth should take over committee work:

But I am finished with politics now; it is time to provide for my family and grandchildren….. It would be nice if somebody younger could take over in Egoli now, not to enrich themselves but to help the community…..
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 13.10.2011)

As the last sentence indicates, he however noted that he found it hard to engage youth in doing unpaid work for the community. Indeed, most of the leaders I have engaged with seem to be in the thirties and fourties, and this generation seems also to be more frequent in attending community meetings as well. As will be discussed later, ambivalence to youth still
remains. There are contradictions in practises and morals related to disciplining youth in urban townships indicate that modern and traditional components might overlap and imitate one another (Buur 2008).

Important to note here is that the displayed resentment towards traditional logics and models confirm the importance of not simply asserting ethnic traditional identities to Africans (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). It does not imply that traditional structures are not relevant to these residents, as many proudly explained to me certain rituals they would perform when going back to the Eastern Cape for holidays. It rather indicates the line that many draw between the rural and the urban and switching between rural and urban identities, which Bank (2011) has displayed as prevailing in townships at least since the 1950s.

Secondly, the resentment towards traditional authorities might be impacted by discourses formed through historical experiences of repressive traditional authorities. Historically, traditional authority roots in urban townships can be connected to certain organized security and order initiatives. Especially, community courts and street committees are mentioned to have roots in traditional organizing (Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001)65, and in the 1960s, township ‘parents courts’ called Lekgotla were dominated by older men with conservative values, often members of the state installed ‘Advisory Boards’66 (Seekings 2001, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b). As described by Glaser, these were aimed at fighting juvenile delinquency, and can be understood as an attempt by the older men to regain authority over the urban youth (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b). Nevertheless, Schärf (2001:52) underlines that although these courts draw substantially on value systems and procedures of their rural counterparts called 'makgotla' and chiefs’ courts, they are adapted to the needs and realities of city life, in that they are less patriarchal and conservative67. A shift signified a transformation of the political leadership and in the moral codes of leadership in the townships after 1976: Whereas Makgotla represented patriarchal power and rural traditions,

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65 Also Skuse and Cousins mention that street committees are traditional forms of governance with an adapted modern framework as they are textured, interpenetrated expression of traditional forms of governance such as imbizos, a form of traditional meeting where a chief listens to his people’s complaints and concerns, within a modern framework of democratic norms and values (Skuse and Cousins 2007:991).

66 Advisory Boards were established by the state to advise local government on the administration of urban blacks, and were usually made up of older men who were identified as community leaders and could assist the authorities in managing township affairs (Baines 1994, cited in Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b:939).

67 The Lekgotla / Makgotla, as described by Seekings (2001) was rather conservative and often aimed at combating juvenile delinquency, and can be understood as an attempt by the older men to regain authority over the urban youth. With the shift from Makgotla to street committees in the late 1970s, different moral codes were drawn into the Makgotla, and additionally a different political agenda (Seekings 2001: 81-86). See also Bénit-gbaffou et al. (2012b: 944-946).
the political radicalization with the 1976 uprising represented the emergence of township youth, who also expressed resentment towards their parents’ acceptance of Apartheid (Seekings 2001)\(^{68}\). Therefore, resentment towards traditional authorities can be found in the period of radicalization of the anti-apartheid movements. Since the social movements fighting apartheid are one of the roots of organizational practises in informal settlements (as discussed in chapter 5), this legacy seems to have left traces of a favouring of democratic and radical logics above traditional ones. Zuern (2011:75-76) mentions that democratic models became central in the resistance movement due to the urge to symbolically contrast the un-democratic apartheid regime, to the pragmatic need not to become too depended on individuals, and the need for support from Western NGOs and states. The marked organizational distance from traditional authority systems therefore became a vital legitimacy source, which is still reflected in the portrayals of informal settlement leaders, as displayed above.

7.3 Charismatic versus bureaucratic logics

As the previous sections have outlined the significance of presenting democratic logic, these following sections will discus the relevance of bureaucratic logics. I will first outline both unbureaucratic and bureaucratic practises and models, and thereafter discuss how they reflect contextual behavioural discourses.

7.3.1 Charismatic leaders and straight-talk

When interacting with residents on community or semi-public matters, the community leaders can take two very different approaches: one charismatic and one more regulative in a bureaucratic way. Charisma is essentially unbureaucratic, as decision-making is sporadic and based on emotional judgements rather than standardized procedures aimed at guaranteeing equal treatment. Unbureaucratic procedures and decision-making in the form of direct confrontations certainly occurred in the three informal settlements of this study. These were particularly carried out by the more ‘charismatic’ leaders in cases where they dealt with internal conflict or crime, and when mobilizing and motivating. Some degree of charisma is significant in almost any kind of leader. In the settlements of this study, there are ‘straight-talk’ leaders who shake things up and who not are afraid of talking loudly:

\(^{68}\) For more on youth politics in townships, see Seekings (1995, 2006).
In Kosovo, the first leaders I engaged with appeared to me to fit into a more formal approach during the first encounters, since she insisted on formal ideal practices in community organizing. She, like most leaders, presented herself as a steady, mature and reliable leader. However her ‘straight-talk side’ became evident after observing her in action after several months of visits, seeing her engagement in tense situations, which in some cases would lead to angry confrontations. When walking around in the settlement, she would often engage in long political discussion with residents, expressing frustration and anger. Further, when residents approached her with problems related to committee politics, she sometimes engaged with much energy. She even admitted becoming violent:

We fight against each other and then we become friends. That lady you talked with, we used to fight, I beat her, and I was arrested by her [she called the police].
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 30.11.2011).

In many situations, she would be the first one to speak up, especially around accusations of corrupt internal leaders. But even outside the settlement she fell into the role of mobilising protests, as I experienced when I visited her at the taxi rank in town where she informally trade fruit and sweets. Informal trading has become regularized here by law and some traders have received legal permits while others continue their illegal trading and are often chased away by law enforcement. On this day, one of the elderly traders was arrested as she refused to leave and continuously screamed loudly. The leader I met with, after hiding her trading goods at a secret spot, was the first of the crowd to intervene. She showed her anger loudly, and shouted at the police for treating an old lady like this. This drama went on for almost an hour, and she did not give up and mobilized others to protest. I was surprised by her lack of fear, and this side that I had not seen before. Her teenage daughter, who stood next to me, explained that her mother often behaves like this.

In Egoli one of the main leaders I engaged with, appeared immediately as a charismatic personality. He had fascinating stories to tell, and compared to many other people in the field, he was very outspoken even during the first encounters. He is well spoken, but in a natural way which seems authentic. I have observed that when he talks in community meetings, residents listen and sometimes cheer, especially when he talks about creating unity and fighting crime and violence. In open conversations, he admits his weak sides and that he has
done wrong things before, which strengthens his authentic image. He talks directly to anyone, and in his own words, he is not afraid of telling people straight to their face what the problems are. He is even not afraid to disagree with externals like politicians, researchers and NGOs. For instance, when an NGO initiated a development project of building a community hall, he told them straight that this would be waste of time and resources due to the threat of eviction. Like any charismatic person, he is both loved and hated, and there are many stories circulating about him. However, he also presents and sometimes favours bureaucratic regulative models.

In GP, many stories were told about an earlier leader called Michael. According to the stories, he was a strict leader who was not afraid of confronting criminals. They explained that he managed to do this because

He was very vocal. He told people straight not behind peoples back. When people throw stuff and litter he told them. And when people try to open shebeen he confronted them.
… Michael was not scared of being killed. He was a Christian and he did not drink.
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.10.2012)

This clear straight-talk approach of not being scared of confronting people was valued; on the other hand, it also appeared to cause his death. Different stories around this emerged, but they had in common that he apparently was not afraid to confront people who were accused of being criminal, and that this made certain people angry.

This valuing of charismatic leaders is highlighted in some ethnographic research. In a section of her book, Ross (2010) discuss how leaders in the informal settlement ‘die Bos’ describes two different conceptions on what it means to be a ‘good leader’: a ‘straight-talk’ and a more ‘ordentlik’ (decent) approach:

One of the committee leaders is widely feared because her mode is extremely confrontational. Angry words burst forth irrespectively of whether one is in a public or private space. Indeed, she seems often to choose to stage straight-talk confrontations in public, an action that reinforces her power by humiliating those to whom she speaks…
Another leader is respected for her calm approach. She usually takes one aside and tells one bluntly but in relative privacy about her complaint. Her approach
does not reveal or debase, it is widely considered to be ordentlik and a sign of good interpersonal skills. (Ross 2010:145)

Both of these approaches are charismatic and unbureaucratic as they underline personalized leadership styles. Ross (2010) further argues that the straight-talk approach is particularly valued:

The second leader’s approach, while valued for its ability to soothe difficult situations, is not necessarily regarded as good leadership. Confrontations couched in proper forms – forms of which marriage councillors and conflict resolvers alike approve – are considered less than authentic and certainly less effective: people value angry performances as reflecting the immediacy and urgency of the moment and motivating action, and many believe that the first leader is more effective than the second. (Ross 2010:145)

This indicates that the charismatic approach is appreciated for its symbolic value of showing the urgency of the action, and for its actual effectiveness. In other words, charismatic practises have both symbolical and pragmatic importance. With feelings of fatigue and marginalization as outlined in chapter six, charismatic leaders might be favoured by residents as they represent someone strong who can fight for their needs, and perhaps also symbolizes a resistance to feeling marginalized. Especially in Egoli, where the never-ending threat of eviction seems to be a demoralizing force, it seems that the charismatic leadership is valued.

However, in addition to charismatic practises, significant bureaucratic procedures have developed in order to deal with problems in a less random way with established and standardized procedures, contrasting the essentially unbureaucratic practises of charismatic decision-making.

7.3.2 Presentations o bureaucratic modes and procedures

Bureaucratic logics are expressed in formalistic ideals of standardized bureaucratic organization models and procedures. In conversations around organizational models with leaders, standardized procedures were highlighted. Many leaders kept talking about how well organized their committees are, and the committee models were portrayed with surprisingly similar formalistic models in the three settlements (see brief overview figure 7). Several bureaucratic models and procedures were indicated:
First, the leaders and committee members in the three different settlements often stressed the formal organization models of the committee. These portrayed models might resemble a government system; ‘employment’ here is not granted on merits, as ideal bureaucratic organizing requires. The most important parts of the model are the ‘chairperson’, who leads the meetings, and the ‘secretary’:

In Egoli, the committee members explained that the first leader is the chairperson, while another leader is the secretary and the others are committee members. There are currently (2013) four women and three men in this committee. Besides the stable position of the chairperson, which always ends up being the main leader who started the settlement and with whom most residents are familiar, the secretarial position seems to be rather vague, and the number of committee members fluctuates.

In GP, a similar committee model is presented. According to the leaders there are six members, including the secretary, chairperson and vice chairperson. The chairperson is the main leader, and the secretary keeps a book, which lists the residents of the settlement.

Of the three settlements, standardized models had the strongest presence in Kosovo, as the detailed quote below explains:

Every year when a new elected committee is made, they select the secretary. 15 are elected, and those 15 must go and elect who is going to be chairperson, deputy chair person, secretary and deputy secretary, and treasurer who keeps the finance – he is the finance minister and he does the fundraising for transportation. The rest are members. (Community leader 9, Kosovo 4.5.2011)

Further, it was mentioned that there is a sub-system to the main committee in Kosovo, and that each street has its own committee, similar to the tiered system described by Zuern (2011).

Secondly, in addition to symbolically clear organizational models, regular and standardized procedures, like having regular meetings, are underlined as being important. In Kosovo, these meetings take place at ‘the office’ provided in collaboration with local government. By residents it is often termed ‘the super shack’ because it is big and is built
with a strong material. Inside, there is an empty desk and a few plastic chairs. On the walls, there are pictures and news-clippings from when local government officials visited the settlement, in addition to an organizational map of the committee stating who the chairperson and the other members are. Such organizational maps or charts can be seen as important symbolical artefacts. The meetings I observed follow formal procedures; the chairperson sits behind the desk and leads the meetings, and the secretary makes notes in the book. The meetings start with a prayer, then the announcement of the agenda, and then discussions facilitated by the chairperson. The chairperson sits behind the desk, and does most of the talking. The main chairperson (during 2011-2013) had many connections to local government officials, and sometimes called them during the meetings to invite them.

In GP and Egoli, there is no office, although it was mentioned as desirable. My impression of the ‘feel’ of meetings I participated in here was less formal. The meeting procedures were however similar, usually starting with a prayer, continuing to announce the agenda. Notably though, meetings where internal conflicts were discussed had less of this feel. The frequency of meetings varies, although the ideal is once a week. In periods, when the committee members are active, when there are developments or court cases, or when there is a felt increase in crime and conflicts, meetings are usually more frequent.

Third, in all the settlements, the committees keep books and some written accounts of the meetings. As mentioned chapter 4, ‘book keeping’ is related to regulative practices of migration and of arranging collections. ‘The book’ usually contains a list of all the settlement residents, their phone number, shack number and sometimes identity number. I was first surprised about the notions of ‘the book’. When first asking why they have such a book, no one was actually able to explain how and when it started, but they just explained that ‘book keeping’ is necessary. In GP, a leader explained that it had always been like this, and speculated that maybe someone come up with this system, to control the people that move here. ... Since at least 1990 when I moved here it was already happening (Community leader 3, GP, 1.11.2011). Clearly, ‘book keeping’ is a taken-for-granted system, which has been ‘institutionalized’ historically, due to internal regulative practices of migration, and perhaps also influenced by a diverse range of external actors like NGOs, social movements and local government. Sometimes there are disputes over who should keep the book, but usually it is the ‘secretary’s’ duty.
Fourth, in relation to some practices that can lead to tensions, like practices of employment and collecting money, bureaucratic procedures are underlined. Many highlight the importance of not accepting payments or bribes, and that they are volunteers and not paid in any way by the residents for the work they do. Sometimes leaders complain that they have to pay for communal issues themselves, like arranging for people to travel to a court case. Worth mentioning here, however, is that in Kosovo some leaders admitted that they did charge small fees, from 50-120 ZAR, to carry out some of their administrative tasks. One leader, who reluctantly admitted this practise, stated that at least, she charged less than the other leaders. She further explained that she needed to charge a small fee because it took much of her time to carry out these administrative tasks.

Contrasting these portrayals, it should not be a surprise that these ideals, models and procedures are not as clear or standardized in practice. Even leaders themselves sometimes unsure about how many committee members there are and who has what position. In Kosovo, there were different answers given; one leader mentioned that there are around 14 committee members, another stated that there are more than 20. Every time I asked, I got a new number, and it seems that none of the leaders are really sure about the number. This confusion might be linked to that this settlement is very large. Further, leaders claim that the committees arrange meetings once a week, but the frequency of meeting varies between the settlements and with time (when there are important things happening – like development of the eviction case, they are more frequent). This indicate that the bureaucratic models might be more ideal than actual, reminding that presentations of models by leaders not be considered as actual truths (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003). Again still, the main point in this thesis is not to judge the degree of bureaucracy, but to discuss why the bureaucratic logic is so important to portray related to the contextual norms and discourses.

In trying to understand these formalistic presentations of bureaucratic logics, which in many ways starkly contrast the chaotic setting of informal settlements, I have identified three reasons why the symbolizing of bureaucratic logics are valued: Norms of mature decency, the urge to retire into stable administrative work, and the value of symbolizing transparency.
**Norms of mature decency**

First, the presentations of bureaucratic models seem to have the value of symbolizing a ‘mature decency’ in relation to norms of ‘ordentlikheid’. Compared to the examples of straight-talk leaders, most current leaders presented themselves more as decent, reflecting ‘proper ways’ of dealing with problems, which often are described as rather bureaucratic procedures than charismatic ones.

The notions of mature decency can be linked to conservative ideals. As noted in the stories about Michael from GP, he did engage in straight-talk, but he was also morally stable as ‘he was Christian and did not drink’. Similarly, in Kosovo, some leaders also seemed to perceive themselves as ‘moral leaders’, and emphasised the importance of being good role-models. In conversations with a leader in Kosovo, mostly taking place in his shack, he underlined how he would never appear drunk in public spaces:

> You cannot sit in a *shebeen* and be drunk, we cannot show in public that we are drunk. If we drink we go to another place (other settlement) and come back sober. People must respect us. We must do things for the community. Also, if there is a job here, we cannot take it, we must always be here, so that people if they fight come to us.
> (Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4. 2011)

Worth mentioning here, I did observe leaders drinking alcohol inside the settlement. One day I visited the leader who made the above statement and found him and his friends drinking outside his home. It indicates how moral values are overstated in self-portrayals.

The link between mature decency and bureaucratic logics is reflected in the different practises of by ‘unruly youth’ and older, more dignified leaders. With a rather conservative perspective of decency, leaders describe how they perceive proper negotiations as a better tool than the confrontational protests (*toyi-toyi*) of the ‘rowdy youth’:

> We had a meeting with the council to go to that area over there by Spar….. Me and N…, we are old, we don’t want *toyi-toyi*, we tell people not to do that.
> (Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4.2011)

> People are running out of patience. The people on the other side wants us to join in the *toyi-toyi*. We are doing something but the city is slow. … About the *toyi-toyi*, I told them they are destroying the road, but it is not easy to talk to when they are angry.
> (Community leader 3, GP 22.7.2011)
The scepticism regarding such toyi-toyis is also related to the fact that these leaders are trying to negotiate with local government officials directly.

Paradoxically, some of the leaders who perceive toyi-toyi as disruptive admit that they themselves have been active in such protests when they were younger. The leader from GP who is quoted above, admits that

…before 1994, I was young and also a bit angry with opinions, but I did not join the front row of demonstrations. Of course, you had to join the toyi-toyis, but I was careful then because I did not want to go to jail. (Community leader 3, GP, 17.9.2011)

So too leaders from Kosovo said that they used to engage in more confrontational politics and toyi-toyis when they were younger, but that they now have matured and are engaged in more ‘mature ways of negotiating’. In this way, the decency side of charismatic leadership somehow resembles the generational conflict between the traditionalist elderly and the rowdy youth, as discussed by Seekings (2006) and Buur (2008). In other words, the notion of dignity might be related to the dignity of an elder, and hence it can also have roots in traditional legitimacy.

**Longing for stability and retiring into stable administrative work**

A second reason for the portrayals of well-organized and formal administrative bureaucratic logics might be related to reactions to the fluidity and fragmentation of informal settlement life.

Charismatic leaders who are able to sort out internal conflict and to motivate residents are needed. However, especially mediating internal conflict and security is not only dangerous but also exhausting and unpredictable. Leaders who deal with such issues can be associated with authoritarianism, which is unpopular, and straight-talk easily insults people, which can lead to anger and conflicts. The fear of speaking publicly, as discussed in chapter six, and pragmatic challenges of mobilizing and dealing with residents’ concerns might increase the withdrawal from straight-talk work, into bureaucratic work. This does not necessarily imply that the straight-talk work is attempted solved with more bureaucratic procedures instead, but rather that the straight-talk actions are left hanging. However, charismatic leadership is harder to withdraw from, and increases the settlement’s dependency on certain individuals. The
dependence on such leaders seem to be higher in the two smaller settlements, and became evident when they attempted to withdraw or became less active. Compared to this, bureaucratic practises are ideally less ‘person focused’ and leave room for both rotation of leaders and more administrative positions. As will be discussed further in chapter eight, many leaders express a wish to ‘retire’ or withdraw into more mundane administrative tasks, because they are exhausted with informal conflict mediation and mobilization. Therefore, a reason for bringing in bureaucratic logics, besides the symbolic values of decency and urban modernization, is the longing for the stability that these models provide.

Further, the portrayals of bureaucratic stability might be symbolically important to contrast the instability of everyday life. This is not only important symbolically, but as outlined in chapter five, detailed administrative practises have evolved to increase stability in the settlements by attempting to regulate migration and informal businesses. Also the formal procedures are actual institutionalized practises that are carried out. The keeping of a books and notes of meetings is happening in all the settlements.

The importance of both symbolically and practically working towards stability by applying bureaucratic logics and administrative practises is interesting in relation to Simone’s (2010) comment that the chaos and fluidity of cities in the urban South might be followed by a multitude of attempts to create order. The magnitude of attempts to create orders can be seen as a way of trying to deal with the complexity and fluidity of the city, especially in spaces which are chaotic. In informal settlements, were complexity, fluidity and uncertainties are very high, there is a range of agents which see the possibilities and try to create order out of the chaos, and out of this, rationalized practises and logics of creating order emerge. Rather than assuming that this indicates actual bureaucratization, it can be seen as a general longing for bureaucratization and for the abolishment of fragmented politics.

**Bureaucratic models symbolizing transparency**

Third, portrayals of bureaucratic practises are applied to symbolize transparency, which as underlined in chapter six is a huge problem. Although the procedures are not necessarily as bureaucratic as they aim for, they are needed to deal with issues of transparency and suspicion. Especially practises such as the employing residents for communal work and the collection of money can easily lead to corruption or suspicion of corruption.
Illustrative here is the practice of collecting money for common purposes and for burials, which has been common in informal settlements and townships for decades. Where there are not active burial societies, leaders often arrange money collections for the expensive affair of transporting the corpse back to the family homestead. In both Kosovo and GP, leaders explain that everyone must contribute about 5 ZAR, and committee leaders appoint someone to take care of the collection. Collections of money are also used for other purposes, like paying for transport when leaders need to attend meetings with e.g. local government regarding service delivery.

In GP, residents are suspicious of collections of money for leadership purposes based on their experiences with the second generation of leaders: Early in 2010, a leader was arrested, and other committee members decided to help bail him out by collecting money from the residents. It turned out that these leaders collected more than they needed, and that the money collected was not spent in the way it was intended:

There was a collection of money, everybody contributed with 10 Rand to release the leader [from custody]. So then the community leaders saw that they could get money, so they ended up again that every shack must contribute with 20 rand for the court case. But then they got released for free, so they took the money and used for food for ……. People were angry. So after that they did not want to be community leaders again, and we ended up not having a community leadership structure….

(Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011)

As a result of this experience, the whole committee collapsed, the leaders were dismissed, and for several months after this incident there was no committee at all. A strong suspicion towards leaders remained, and residents still talk about these leaders as criminals. In order to deal with this level of suspicion, the third generation of leaders, which formed around 2010, were first of all reluctant to engage in any kind of ‘money issues’: *We don’t want to collect too much money - the people would think that we eat their money* (Community leader 3, GP, 3.5.2010). However, despite this reluctance to deal with ‘money issues’, some collections were carried out especially to support residents who cannot afford to pay for burials. In one instance money was collected to cover the burial of two children that had died in a shack fire,

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and apparently around 2700 ZAR was collected. In these cases, the community now emphasised bureaucratic practises of ensuring transparent procedures to avoid suspicions. They underlined that they note down every contribution in a book, and hold open meetings in the settlement to tell how much each had contributed:

We had a list and read it in front of everybody. So that everybody knows that their name is there. Because previously there were problems where the community leaders used the money, so we did not want that to happen. The previous leaders – I asked them many questions. Under my own leadership I did not want that to happen. So the other leaders did not read it out to the community about the money that was put together. They must tell the people as it is. That did not happen before.
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.4.2012)

Here, bureaucratic procedures of keeping records, in combination with democratic practises of publicly sharing information of these records are applied to effect and symbolize transparency and decrease corruption suspicions. These procedures are also useful to regulate and keep track of who is donating and who not, thus keeping track of who deserves to get aid later: You don’t have to contribute with 5 rand. But we go through the book to see who is contributing – if you don’t give to others then you also don’t get. (Community leader 3, GP, 3.5 2011). By this means, this practise, which initially was related to mobilization, can also become a mode of control and regulation.

Notably, the unavoidable fluidity of informal settlements and lack of transparency severely put strains on such bureaucratic procedures in practise.

7.4 Discussion of the groundedness of democratic and bureaucratic logics

Drawing the two parts where I have discussed the symbolic presence of democratic and bureaucratic logics together, I am interested in two implications:

First, as I have outlined how both bureaucratic and democratic logics are contextually developed, they cannot simply be viewed as acts of decoupling. Decoupling, in Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) sense, occurs when organizational ideals are presented to reflect what is perceived as legitimate rather than actual practises (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003). Surely, one reason for bureaucratic and democratic models to be applied is for improved interactions with externals, and it can therefore be assumed that these models have been
implemented symbolically to achieve aid and development. As this often can be the case, and in line with the critiques of decoupling theories (Kraatz and Block 2008), democratic and bureaucratic models are not simply a form of symbolical decoupling in the form of ‘mimicking’ governmental models, but are also essential historically and contextually formed parts of the hybrid organizations of community committees. Specifically, I have outlined how both bureaucratic and democratic logics have strong symbolical sides in relation to historical discourses of organizing and behavioural norms reflecting the conditions of informal settlements. Summing up, democratic logics are symbolically significant related to discourses of urban identities (Bank 2011) and related to memories of fighting authoritarianism under apartheid, which has left negative associations towards notions of traditional leadership. Bureaucratic logics, as expressed in standardised organizational procedures and models, seem to reflect a need to confront instability and the lack of transparency, in addition to norms of mature decency. This confirms that these logics are not necessarily only imported to conform to external governmental or NGO pressure, but have developed a grassroots symbolic value in relation to context specific historical and behavioural discursive practises.

These discussions have displayed the importance of analysing the duality of leadership and organizations in an urban context (Lowndes 2001, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010). Specifically important in the social constructive approach to organization (Scott 2008) and leadership (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003, Denis et al. 2012) is that presentations of ideals and models should never be taken as ‘realities’ or truths but as indications of symbolic values of the context within which they emerge. It also shows that in relation to Weber’s types, different forms of legitimacy co-exist in African societies too (Pitcher et al. 2009). In other words, in a context of hybrid urban identities of township and informal settlement dwellers (Bank 2011), the committees and leaders need also to be hybrid, both in practice and symbolically. In relation to the circulation of models inspired by broader politics and policies (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b), the models reflect various historical policies, as change of policy is not absorbed completely. Therefore, it is hard to determine what the core of the leadership organizations are, and hence, neither bureaucratic nor democratic procedures should be assumed to purely be acts of decoupling (Kraatz and Block 2008).

Secondly, comparing the democratic with bureaucratic logics, an inherent tension of the urban condition in informal settlements can be sensed: the tension between individualized
urbanity confronted by disciplinary norms of public behaviour. On the one hand, leaders have to adapt values of urban individuality and modernity, and consequently display democratic logics. In my interpretation, the presentations of democratic models as legitimate does only reflect urban individuality, but also memories of authoritarianism. On the other hand, they also display bureaucratic logics, which symbolize stability and mature decency. As discussed in chapter six, decency and proper behaviour is valued by residents for symbolizing a contrast to the insecure and unstable situation, and hence leaders adapt to these values by holding decent bureaucratic procedures rather than more rowdy and desperate protests. This is also related to the continuing ‘moral panic’ and urge to regulate rowdy urban township youth (Seekings 2006). Hence, in my understanding, the tension emerges in that the expressed longing for freedom and democratic practises connected to urban individuality, confronts the expressed longing for stability which requires bureaucratic procedures. This results in that the essential conflict between democratic and bureaucratic logics becomes relevant; that while democratic logics essentially allow for individual expressions and disagreements, bureaucratic logics standardize procedures and minimize individuality to create stability (Wolin 1983). As will be discussed further in chapter eight, committees attempt to balance these two logics and adapt them in different situations and in dealing with tension and conflicts between committees, but these logics are not set in stone.

7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed how both democratic and bureaucratic models are displayed and have symbolical values as they are grounded in contextually and historically developed norms and discourses. Hence, both democratic and bureaucratic logics are important in relation to portraying legitimacy. Democratic logics, portrayed by election and participation procedures, are brought in contrast to traditional legitimacy. The symbolic values of democratic logics can be connected to two interrelated issues of the specific informal settlements context: discourses around the modern urban dweller and discourses developed in the township based social movements fighting apartheid (Adler and Steinberg 2000, Zuern 2011). Bureaucratic logics, highlighted by adhering to a language of administrative committee models and displaying administrative artefacts like ‘the book’ and ‘the office’, seem to be applied to symbolize mature decency, stability and transparency. The value of decency, stability and transparency can be related to behavioural norms of ordentlikheid, and to confront the actual contextual conditions of instability and lack of transparency.
Hence, in relation to the research question why leaders portray bureaucratic and democratic models, the answer to this is that both these models have specific contextual symbolic values. The leaders adapt the committee procedures and models presented to these logics in order to claim legitimacy.

Two implications have been discussed:
First, it moved the debate from assumptions of mimicking or decoupling to discussing legitimacy politics. In relation to theories of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977), it might be assumed that bureaucratic and democratic presentations are symbolical presentations aimed at achieving legitimacy with external agents. Instead, the analysis shows how both democratic and bureaucratic logics have developed internally in relation to historical and context-specific social conditions of the informal settlements. This adds to the argument that these models are far more than a ‘mimicking of government’, but a reflection of certain contextual conditions. Further, in addition to the fact that urban township dwellers encompass a range of modernist and non-modernist logics and are capable of switching between these (Robins 2008, Myers 2011, Bank 2011), informal settlement committees are hybrid organizational forms, balancing multiple and sometimes conflicting logics and sources of legitimacy. With the acknowledgement that these are hybrid organizations, one cannot simple to determine what the actual ‘core’ of the committee organizations are and what parts are symbolically detached through decoupling (Kraatz and Block 2008). Rather, in this setting, leaders need to constantly negotiate their legitimacy symbolically by balancing both democratic and bureaucratic logics, and this will be further discussed in chapter eight.

Secondly, presentations of bureaucratic and democratic logics reflects a paradox of the urban setting of South African informal settlements: on the one hand the presence of urban individuality implicating a need for democratic practises, and on the other hand the continuation of more conservative values and an urge for stability manifested in bureaucratic practises. While urban identities can be connected to ideals of individual freedom, decency norms can be seen as socially oppressing individual freedom. This implicates that the classical tension between democratic logics of allowing heterogeneity and deliberations, and bureaucratic logics of standardizing and creating stability, is relevant at this scale too.
CHAPTER 8 The politics of negotiating democratic and bureaucratic logics in internal committee conflicts and changes

8.1 Introduction

During the field visits, it was not only in informal conversations or discussions around organizational models that bureaucratic and democratic logics were portrayed. These logics were also portrayed in more tense interactions between leaders and residents, community meetings, and in accusations between conflicting leaders or committees. While the settlements of this study do not currently have plausible prospects of changing into formalized housed settlements, they have all experienced conflicts between committees and leaders. My interest here is how leaders mediate and negotiate bureaucratic and democratic logics to either confront each other or deal with the conflicts.

Therefore, while the previous chapter explained the importance of symbolically portraying bureaucratic and democratic logics in relation to contextual discourses and expectations, this chapter will go deeper into how these logics are applied practically in dealing with internal tension, suspicion and committee conflicts and changes. The research question is consequently:

*How is the politics of balancing democratic and bureaucratic institutional logics reflected in committee changes and conflicts?*

I will discuss how these conflicting logics are negotiated and reflected in committee conflicts and organizational changes in each of the settlements, enabling some comparisons and indicating tendencies.

Recognizing that the committees are hybrid organizations faced with plural institutional logics enables an analysis of the politics connected to balancing these logics (Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013); in this setting specifically, the politics of balancing bureaucratic and democratic logics (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, Peters 2010). This will advance insights into internal politics and conflicts, which several scholars have acknowledged are...
common in informal settlements (see e.g. Barry and Mayson 2000, Allison 2002, Oldfield 2002, Bénit 2002, Barry and Ruther 2005, Barry et al. 2007, Bähre 2007a, Lemanski 2008). Notably, these case studies focus on settlements undergoing major upgrading, and conflicts are often linked to these external interventions splintering internal communities. The three settlements of this study were not undergoing any major externally-initiated upgrading projects during the three years of research\textsuperscript{70}, but as outlined in chapter five, a diverse range of external actors have intervened.

This chapter first considers how, when applying democratic logics in relation to tension and conflicts, two very different approaches can be taken: either building unity and consensus or a more liberal democratic logic of allowing diverse and conflicting politics. Thereafter, I discuss how bureaucratic logics confront the more dynamic interactive and participatory democratic logics.

8.2 Democratic logics and dealing with conflicts in the three settlements

Although a main tension is between bureaucratic and democratic logics, I will first discuss some significant tensions between conflicting democratic logics. Particularly, looking into the history of committee changes and conflicts, the conflicting democratic logics of ‘creating unity’ versus allowing plural representations through e.g. political parties emerges as relevant in all the three settlements.

8.2.1 Egoli: keeping conflict at bay through unifying democratic logics

In Egoli, two sides of democratic logics prevail: securing diverse representation and logics creating unity. One could easily assume that achieving unity would be difficult here, as it is a mixed settlement, similar to the settlements studied by Ross (2005) and Lemanski (2008). However, compared to Lemanski’s case, it does not seem that ‘coloured’ and blacks exist as two different groups and these ‘racial identities’ and language differences severely hindered the potential for cohesive or united organization or agreement. (Lemanski 2008:397). Instead, in Egoli, many residents have learnt both Xhosa and Afrikaans, and party political

\textsuperscript{70} Although some upgrading projects were discussed in Kosovo.
divisions do not appear central. In informal conversations, many have indicated that Egoli is an example of the ‘democratic rainbow nation’.

This does not imply that the heterogeneity is not a threat to unity. Both residents and leaders are very aware that these potential divisions can increase at any time. There are also some racial tensions between the ‘coloured and blacks’. Particularly two leaders, one Xhosa- and one Afrikaans-speaking, are concerned with keeping a lid on such potential racial tensions. When one of these leaders withdrew, the other feared that opportunists would draw on ‘the race card’ to divide people and create tension:

I need a meeting with A. – I need him back in his job. Because it is racism here now. Because his sister is not good, she only talks to some people. One person here (J…), he is against the committee, so he is saying they are racist here, that the colored’s say the black people here at the back are stealing. He said they call people here hottentots. But the youngster here in Egoli are together, they hang out together and they don’t care about race.
(Community leader 4, Egoli, 26.2.2013)

In order to keep such tension at bay, these two leaders applied a typical democratic logic of securing representation of diverse groups, making sure that there was always representation of both Xhosa- and Afrikaans-speaking residents in the committee. When jobs through externals were made available, they made sure that the jobs were rationed out equally among the ‘blacks and browns’, in one of the leader’s words. Additionally, at open community meetings, there are usually translators, which are residents that speak both Xhosa and Afrikaans well.

However, keeping unity is a constant struggle. I was leaving a community meeting in a church shack in Egoli as one of the girls, nine-years old, in a playful manner jumped up on one of the chairs, imitating the grownups with an ironic voice: We must all come together and solve these problems as a community. Then she and the other girls chuckled. Clearly, she had heard these kinds of things many times before. This reminded me that I myself, after 24 months of interaction, had heard these kinds of statements over and over again. It was a reminder that ‘coming together as a community’ is an ongoing challenge.

Although the memory of unity in the settlement is strong related to the fight against the common threat of eviction, keeping this unity alive over several years is difficult. As
highlighted by Oldfield (2002) and Lemanski (2008), fighting such a common case is central, yet, as evident in the case of Egoli, this unity is fragile and perhaps lost over time. Reminded that residents here have been living under the threat of eviction since 1999 when the first court case was brought, it should not be a surprise that many get tired of fighting when there is still no end in sight.\footnote{As mentioned in chapter four, there has been three court cases, the last one started in 2009 and lasted until 2012. This last case too ended with no resolution, as the land owner cannot evict the residents before providing alternative housing. The residents are therefore still living on private land, which hinders infrastructure development.}

Further, although racial tensions were held at bay by applying democratic representative logics, internal fighting between two committees evolved due to other reasons: Tension in the settlement increased in 2009 and 2010, as one committee member left and started his own committee (this committee was also a mixed). A major factor behind this was the frustration with the never ending eviction threat and the court cases that had proceeded for years. One resident, who had moved to the settlement in 2006 and joined the original committee in 2005, was approached by the owner of the land around 2009. This interaction led to a renewed hope that the owner of the land would help with developments such as getting electricity installed. The older leaders were sceptical of this interaction, and as they did not approve, a new committee was formed, referred to as ‘the land owner’s committee’. It represented approximately 130 residents, mostly staying in the most densely populated area, which were said to have the worst conditions, including the most shebeens. These 130 residents received their own shack numbers, and signed papers delivered by the owner of the land in the belief that they would receive electricity. In July 2009, a newspaper article optimistically stated that an agreement was made and they would now receive electricity (Hartley 2009). Nevertheless, electricity never came; the owner backed out of the idea of providing electricity and argued that he rather would work towards finding a place to which residents could relocate, which neither seem to have progressed. The older leaders see this as a confirmation of that the owner is ‘playing with their minds’ and cannot be trusted. The rumour is even that the residents who signed the papers to received electricity actually ‘signed that they agreed to be evicted’ instead, although no eviction occurred.

The broader effect of this new committee formation was increased internal tension. There are still a lot of neighbours who do not talk to each other. Instead, they talk a lot about each
other. Deep suspicion and rumours, and sometimes violence, erupted not only between the leaders but also between the followers of the two different committees. Accusations were made that the leaders were undemocratic and corrupt, and even court cases against each other were filed. With this tense situation, as highlighted by both leaders and residents were that the unity of the settlement was lost:

I can see Egoli for 15 years now, for the past 11 years things where good. But now the owner started coming to the community and spreading rumours. He told people that they have to get me away, then they will get electricity... must start from new now, to build the community. For all those years we were fighting together.
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 18.2)

The conflict cooled down in 2011 as the leader of the rivaling committee admitted that the negotiations with the owner did not go well, and that *We are fighting each other now because of him* (the owner). He further explains:

The things we are fighting for is service delivery must come to the people.... Electricity, water and toilets. They promised they would provide us water and... Also the owner promised us electricity. We were in a meeting with him and they said to us that they are going to put electricity. Afterwards, the police was here and told us we were going to be evicted, the police and the sheriff of the court, it was August 2010.
(Community leader 7, Egoli, 5.12.2011)

This reminds of the ‘divide and rule’ logic that some papers suggest are initiated by externals, especially connected to government (Burman and Schärf 1990, Bénit 2002, Lemanski 2008). Despite acknowledging that the collaboration with the owner did not work out, the tension continued. Both sides kept on blaming each other for various issues and even crimes and violence. Older residents often repeated that the unity of the settlement was much stronger in the early days:

W: Ja, when I came it was nice, but now it is not that nice anymore.
L: Why?
W: Because then everybody stood by each other, but now people don’t stand by each other anymore... It was the new people that came...
W: Earlier there were just churches, now there are also shops and shebeens.
And now there are only 2 churches.
(Resident, Egoli, 18.8.2011)
Although this might be explained by nostalgia, it seems to have relevance, as the numbers of shebeens has increased, and as the tension between the committees has also increased tension between neighbours.

In April 2013 (21.4.2013), a major measure was taken to re-unite the settlement committees through applying a central democratic tool: holding an open election. That morning, I was called by one of the leaders, asking if I could help out by printing some papers at my office for a community meeting. I did not know at first that this was for an election, and when I was told, I was eager to help out by printing voting papers and being an ‘election observer’. In addition to me, two other externals were invited to oversee the process: a priest and a propositional councillor (who is not the councillor of the ward but who often interacts with some of the leaders in Egoli). The meeting took place at an open field next to the settlement. The residents had been informed about his meeting through posters at the spaza shops, and before the meeting started, it was announced through a loudspeaker and several were asked to go and fetch more people directly from their homes. Approximately 250 grownups and a mass of children gathered. In the opening speeches, by a priest, a proportional councillor and one the former leaders all promoted that unity had to be restored to the settlement. The residents gathered seemed to become inspired as they cheered and loudly expressed their agreements regarding the unity focus, and an optimism spread. After speeches, there was an open round of residents nominating candidates. Six residents were nominated, three of them from the original committee. One of the six candidates was however disqualified, as the committee who arranged the election and the councillor noted that ‘druglords and shebeen owners cannot be elected’. Then, the election started. Everyone was handed a small voting note stating: write the name of the person you want to lead Egoli informal settlement in the box. A queue formed at the table where they could write a name on the note and put it in a ballot box. The priest, the councillor and I oversaw the process to make sure there was no cheating and to ensure anonymity. There were a few problems with anonymity, as a few of the older residents could not write and asked us or someone else in the queue for help. It went smoothly otherwise, and after everyone had given their note, the priest and I counted them and gave the results. The five candidates were all included in ‘the new committee’. The main leader, who received an overwhelming part of the votes, made a motivating speech, and in order to restore the unity and trust in the leadership, he promised that the committee would be available every Tuesday evening at the church to listen to people’s concerns.
Summing up, the Egoli leadership engages the unity democratic logic to keep conflict at bay. This unity is also based on a balancing of racial and language diversity, making sure that such representation is prominent in the committee. Still, conflicts are constantly threatening, not only due to suspicions around lack of representations of certain groups, but also due to the fatigue with the lack of development process and the never-ending threat of evictions. Due to this threat, different residents engage with different externals that might ignite the hope of development. This creates not necessarily an intentional ‘divide and rule’ situation, but can unintentionally create conflicts between residents with different connections.

8.2.2 GP: Democratic logics of representation but scepticism of party politics

Similarly to Egoli, democratic logics are connected to working towards unity in GP too. In the early years of the settlement, the committee of the neighbouring settlement Siyachlala was consulted by the residents of GP. However, as GP started to expand, two internal leaders started to emerge: Michael and Madoni. These two first collaborated directly with the leader of Siyachlala, before eventually forming a committee only for GP with an own administrative ‘book’.

Although predominantly Xhosa speaking, residents have originated from different areas of Eastern Cape, and apparently it is difficult to work with people here because they come from different cultures and political backgrounds (Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011). Despite this worry, there was not much tension between internal committees during the three years of field visits. Still, stories were told about a more turbulent history, related to the vacuum after the killing of the first main community leader, Michael, who unified the settlement. Memories of unity were related to his charismatic and unifying style:

When Michael was alive, there was no shebeen here; he did not like that because of crime. And there was not much littering.... And usually every two months he would get a party together, so that people here could get together. That kept us united.
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.10.2012)

However, in 2007 he apparently was killed, which left a vacuum that other leaders did not manage to fill. From 2007 and 2008 different leaders came and went, sometimes fighting
with each other. As explained by one resident, there were a lot of conflicts and many different committees:

There were a lot of committees after him. They chose different ones and it changes all the time. Every five months they changed. I don’t even know their names, only M.
(Resident, GP, 27.2.2013)

This resident could not explain these rapid changes, because she, like many others, did not attend the community meetings after Michael’s death. It seems that, when there is fluctuation in leadership, residents keep their distance, fearful of conflicts behind this fluctuation. As there was no particular committee in the settlement for a time, the leadership in the neighbouring settlement Siaychlala took over again. Then, in the year of the ward councillor election in 2009, a new internal committee emerged in GP, as residents felt that the neighbouring leadership did not acknowledge the specific conditions of those ‘living in the pond’. GP is low lying and worse affected by flooding, and residents in GP complained that the neighbouring leadership did not contact local government who would provide aid.

This new committee implemented a democratic logic of an approximate representation of the number of residents: Normally we select 6. It was not like that before. But the more shacks are coming the more people we need in the committee (Community leader 1 and 3, GP, 28.9.2010). However, there was reluctance towards the liberal democratic logic of allowing party political competition in the new committee. This was because, as one leader explained, they were worried that this would divide the settlement:

M: At one point there was a leader that had this thing of mobilizing and trying to convince people to join a party. But luckily people did not want to be divided.
L: when was this?
M: Around 2009. They called meetings and then they started talking about organizations. But we said no – if you are going to talk about the political organizations you must not call the whole community but only the political party. So people saw it does not work that way. It is a community meeting and not about the politics – but about the problems of this area, the community issues. So now when we have a meeting it is a community meeting. And certain people are part of organizations, but when we have a meeting that must not be shown.
(Community leader 1, GP, 25.11.2011)
This quote does not only illustrate the worry that party politics would divide the newfound unity, but also the perception that issues of the internal commons or internal public issues need a different organization from those of party politics. It is indicated that some kind of unity around the concerns of the commons is necessary, and that therefore the committee working with the public issues must ‘represent everyone’. This is also related to an earlier experience under the neighbouring committee, where political divisions appeared in 2009:

Last time they [the neighbour settlement] were under COPE. So people did not want to join them. But if you don’t join you don’t get anything…. We left them when they broke up with ANC. Not because we did not like COPE but because they did not help us. It was when they elected Ward Councillor. (Community leader 3, GP, 28.9.2010)

Such experiences with conflicts around political affiliations appear common in informal settlements, as also mentioned in other case studies (Skuse and Cousins 2007, Barry et al. 2007).

Drawing this together, the democratic logics in GP are applied in attempts to unite the settlement. Also, particular logics of representation of the amount of residents are applied as the settlement grows. However, there is resentment towards a plural democratic logic of party competition, based on experiences and fears of conflicts.

8.2.3 Kosovo: Allowing political parties but uniting the committee

In Kosovo, working for unity has proved difficult both due to the size of the settlement and due to the long-lasting tension between leaders. More than in GP or Egoli, conflicts in Kosovo seem to be related to macro politics and democratic logics of political party competition. In April 2006 before a local election, a newspaper reported violent fights and connected them to divergences between political parties, as two leaders from two opposing parties rallied to become ward councillors (Makoba 2006). Such party-politics are still often discussed in the settlement. During the early period of my engagement (2010 and 2011), party politics was a hot topic, and there were two committees, one DA and one ANC based. When chatting to leaders from both committees, it appeared that they were engaged in similar practices, therefore could be called parallel community organizations, just with different party associations. Of course, both of the committee’s also claimed full representation of the settlement as a whole, and that they were ‘elected by the people’. One leader from the DA
committee maintained that he was representing a registered permanent committee, termed ‘the resident committee’. He further explained that they had split from another committee, but was not willing to explain why, except stating it was due to ‘political misunderstandings’. Similarly, representatives from the ANC committee were reluctant to explain in-depth why there were two committees, but highlighted that they did collaborate:

L: Why are there two committees?
N: [laughing]. The problem is with the politics……. But it is not right, community leaders are supposed to be one.
L: So do you collaborate sometimes?
N: Sometimes. Even now we try to sit down and talk, for the sake of the people and the development of Kosovo. Like today, they look at the toilets (the health department), and both DA and ANC members are involved.
(Community leader 11, Kosovo, 13.10.2011)

Another leader gave an explanation linking the two committees to representational and democratic rights logics of having different parties to which different residents could turn:

P: If you and your neighbour have a fight, you can go to the one committee to get support and he to the other.
L: Would it be better to just have one committee?
P: Yes but it cannot, because we have democracy and everyone can have an organization. That is why if there is a development project, they don’t want to use the old leaders, so they have meetings and elect new leaders.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo 20.9.2011)

Here, a major problem in Kosovo is indicated; that there are many conflicting committees and leaders. As stated above, it is seen as necessary and useful to have different committees for different issue. However, the same leader that made the statement above later talked about how there now are too many committees:

About politics in Kosovo, and we are tired of it, because everybody is a leader…. Even now we need a space for garden, if she does anything here a person will come and say he is the leader and she is not allowed to do this…
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 23.11.2011)

This multitude of committees not only increased regulations, but also conflicts between committees. A leader who opposed the current main committee, often focused on the difference between party-linked committees and more ‘neutral committees’ that were elected in relation to government-initiated upgrading projects:
Here in Kosovo there are different committees. There are ANC and DA committees. But if there are development projects we elect committees that are not political parties.

(Community leader 8, Kosovo 20.9.2011).

She thereby indicates that politically-based committees are not democratically elected internally, compared to externally installed committees. This distinction is not straightforward in practice, and much of the conflicts between committees revolved around blaming each other for not being elected and being too strongly affiliated to one political party. The different leaders constantly applied democratic logics to downplay the legitimacy of each other.

Due a fatigue with the conflicts between committees and leaders, the tendency over the past few years has been to work towards a ‘united committee’, favouring non-party affiliation. It seems that residents, leaders and externals now view political parties as the main obstruction to development of the settlement. The current committee (2012-2013) has adapted to this discourse and has included representatives from a variety of political parties as committee members. This is also reflected in their new name: ‘Kosovo united committee’. Committee members highlight that in their meetings they do not discuss party politics but development issues. In the committee meeting I observed this appears a valid claim, as the issues discussed were mostly internal upgrading issues. Still, suspicion of party politics is not easy to get rid of. Some residents still blame the committee for favouring DA people especially when job opportunities are brought to the settlement, as the chairperson is DA affiliated, and tension erupted around this. At one committee meeting I attended, four furious residents suddenly entered the office and screamed out accusations. The situation became very tense. The protesters claimed that the residents had not been informed about the service delivery plans (more public toilets), and that the committee only consisted of DA people and were not elected representatives of the community. Members of the committee who state they are ANC affiliated disagreed. The very confusing issue for me was that both the protesters and some of the committee members claimed that they were the ‘real ANC’ members and the others not. The committee ANC members eventually managed to calm the protesters down. After the protesters left, the committee members again underlined that the committee was not about political parties, and that the protest was a planned sabotage by other leaders that had spread rumours and wanted to take over.
Knowing who is right or wrong is very difficult in this case. In a context of fluidity, little transparency, and numerous diverging rumours, it is no wonder that any leadership is, and maybe should be, contested.

8.2.4 Democratic dilemma: unity and consensus or plural democracy

Comparing the three settlements, it is clear that internal tensions and fights between committees can happen in any settlements, but that these conflicts can have different reasons. Related to the argument that fighting a common cause brings unity (Oldfield 2002, Lemanski 2008), the cases of GP and Egoli show that unity might be created in this way, but that this unity can easily be lost again, especially after several years of waiting for unity to lead to development.

More relevant to this thesis, it becomes evident that applying democratic logics and practises are necessary to deal with internal tensions and conflicts. Particularly important are holding public meetings logics, and organizing proportional representation according to the size of settlement and of different groups. A dilemma of allowing plural political party competition is reflected in all the three settlements, as it is seen as another challenge to securing unity. Although political parties are present in the settlements and have their own representatives, most leaders stress that party politics is negative and even irrelevant for committee work in the settlement. One reason for the scepticism to party competition is the experience that politicians ‘only promise and never deliver’, which was repeated by both leaders and residents. More importantly, political parties are seen as a threat to unity, as they support and create different leaders which often lead to damaging internal conflicts.

The ‘unity’ side of the democratic logic can be understood as focusing on deliberations and participation aimed at reaching a consensus. Confronting this focus is a more liberal and conflict-oriented democratic logic, underlining the need for different and antagonistic voices to be heard. At the scale of informal settlements, a pluralist/liberal democracy model is suggested by Lemanski (2008) by arguing that a plurality of organizations might better represent the diversity of communities and secure against elite capture, or to initiate community development forums instead of relying on pre-existing community groups. The fear of elite capture is relevant, yet, the problem of tensions between committees that appear
in the three informal settlements of this study, indicate that such plural committees might also increase conflicts.

The problems of pluralist democracy models are particularly expressed in residents’ and leaders’ negative relations to experiences with political party conflicts. Additionally, a root to the unity discourse can be found in the memory of unity, which was central in the anti-apartheid social movements. In this grand social movement, there was a sense that unity and consent was necessary in the fight against a common enemy (Ballard 2007:19), and the urge for unity sometimes overshadowed internal democratic practise (Adler and Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000). It is suggested that the ‘comrade model’, which was essential in the organization of civic movements in South Africa in the 1970s and 80s, inspired by intellectual activists’ reading of communist ideas, also implies less room for disagreements, as the model gives the organization a disciplinary form (Seekings 2000). For instance, vital democratic logics of the street committee system are described as a mixture of participatory and representative democracy, however, internal limits to broad participation and free democratic discussion appeared when leaders of the United Democratic Front stressed that too much debate and a lack of explicitly defined goals would undermine the project of liberation by weakening the prospect for united action (Zuern 2011:77). In other words, unity is connected to a consensus focus because disagreements can weaken unity. Further, while the regime change to democracy led to fragmentation (Cherry 2000), the memory of unity lived on, underlined by the challenge of shifting organizing logics from comrades to citizens (Adler and Steinberg 2000).

This displays the ambiguity of democratic logics in a setting where discourses of ‘unity’ have deep historical roots, combined with a heterogeneous, fragmented and realistically suspicious population. It relates to the essential dilemma within the democratic logic, being the line between conflict and consensus. In pluralist perspectives on democracy, allowing conflict through political party competition is central. It is also related to the Arendt versus Habermas debate; an essential discussion is to what degree either confrontational politics should be continued or the search for consensus should dominate democratic politics (Villa 1992, Allen 2002)
In these cases, adopting party politics into the organizational structure can on the one hand be perceived as healthy for a liberal democracy enabling different interests to compete. On the other hand, as political parties are associated with conflicts and violence, they are seen as disruptive not only by leaders but by many residents, generally. Therefore, the urge for unity indicates that the consensus approach to democracy is preferred, at least symbolically.

The following sections will look further into how bureaucratic logics further might deteriorate the discussion side of politics.

**8.3 Bureaucratic logics and conflicts around developments in the three settlements**

Bureaucratic logics are specifically applied in practices of securing order, and stability and in enabling external development interventions. As discussed in chapter 7, bureaucratic models have significant symbolic values of order and urban modernity. Bureaucratic practices have also emerged to deal with regulative needs, like the regulation of migration as discussed in chapter 5, and to improve physical developments of the commons with the aid from externals, like government and NGOs. However, an essential dilemma is balancing bureaucratic practices with keeping in touch with residents through democratic practices of mobilizing, holding meetings, sharing information and directly engaging with residents’ problems. The classical problem with bureaucratization is therefore detachment from residents and compromising democratic grassroots practices.

In the following sections I will discuss how this played out differently in the three settlements.

**8.3.1 GP: Longing for bureaucratic procedures and detachment from residents**

In GP, the current committee, following the two first-generations committees, is less and less active and reflects a longing for bureaucratic withdrawal. Slowly but surely, the main leader who used to deal with residents directly, both through securing democratic participatory procedures of open meetings, and through mediating internal family or neighbour conflicts, seemed to withdraw into more administrative practices. This is reflected as problematic by residents, as it compromises more direct interaction procedures, which further detach the
leaders from the residents. Some residents reflect this lack of engagement with internal security as the major problem of the new committee. They complain that, compared to the first leader (Michael), who actively engaged in the settlement’s tensions and conflicts, the current leaders appeared invisible. They express that the committee is not doing anything for them anymore. In 2011, community leader 2, who has been in the committee for four years, explained that there had been a change in the duties of the committee:

There is a bit change. Before then we were only talking family problems, but now we are talking more about development and the way forward.
(Community leader 2, GP, 23.8.2011)

This talking about development however soon dissolved as no concrete plans were made. During the three years of field visits, both practices of mediating internal order and of mobilizing fell into the background. First, this seemed to be due to the fact that more administrative tasks emerged through engagements with local government departments, which gave the leaders tasks like numbering shacks, filling out forms and carrying out surveys. Thereafter, it emerged that the decrease in democratic activity also had to do with fatigue and disappointments. For a period in 2010-2011, many open community meetings were held as the leaders engaged with a local social movement. This movement demanded from the leaders that they mobilize and inform residents, and democratic logics of deliberating on common concerns were applied. One leader highlighted the importance of an ‘accountable process’ where he would attend meetings with the social movement, and then report back to the residents in GP what had happened in the social movement meetings: it was accountable, because we reported back to the communities – every week... We always told them what we heard in the meetings with the city (Community leader 3, GP, 1.11.2011). Nevertheless, as the social movement collapsed due to internal tensions in 2011, these open community meetings declined and the settlement returned to not having very engaged leaders. The leaders felt exploited by the local movement/organization; they had carried out mobilizing work for this organization voluntarily, but felt that the movement left both themselves and GP as a whole hanging. The interaction with local government department also decreased. As the leader who used to arrange meetings was seeking to withdraw, he struggled to motivate and mobilize other residents to take over and arrange meetings:
They rely too much on me to organize community meetings. If I do nothing they also do not do anything…..People are getting lazy now, and waiting for things to happen. We can’t wait for things to come from heaven…
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.1 2012)

I gave them the task to organize a meeting. Everybody can organize a meeting. It is everybody’s job. I met with Y [the other community leader]. She said people phoned her and said there were no meetings.
(Community leader 3, GP 22.3.2012)

When he did withdraw, fewer meetings were held, and since 2013 there has been no functioning committee in GP.

In the period where the main leader tried to withdraw, he expressed a longing for bureaucratic and administrative work and a detachment from working directly with residents. A main reason for withdrawing from mediating internal conflicts and crime is the danger associated with these practices. The dangers are quite real for the third generation of leadership, looking back on the experiences of the two previous generations of leaders. The first leader’s engagement in an internal accusation of stealing, led to his assassination in 2007:

How his death started – somebody stole shoes from another guy – so Michael told him. Then they started pointing fingers and talking behind peoples back, setting out rumours, and then he got shot.
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.10.2012)

This incident has left a prevailing fear of engaging in security measures. The main leader of the current committee is actually the cousin of Michael who was killed, and some residents have indicated that he has similar skills and urges him to intervene in current cases. His girlfriend is worried about this, and wants him to avoid such work.

Further, lessons have also been learnt from the second generations of leaders who also tried to deal with internal security issues. As their approach resembled vigilantism they got into trouble with the law, and two leaders were arrested:

They destroyed a shack of one lady whose son was a thief. It started by that the lady came to the community leaders and asked for their help because of her criminal son. But when she came to them, some other people came up with that they also had been stolen from. So they turned against her, and they wanted to beat the kid. Naturally the woman resisted. So then they destroyed the lady’s shack. Then the lady went to the police, and the community leaders got arrested
and went to jail – even though it was not the community leaders that were the only ones who did it.
(Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011)

Due to these dangers, the main leader frequently expressed that he preferred to work with ‘development issues’ rather than with internal security and with people’s problems. He highlighted that he wanted to withdraw from all involvements in security issues and rather act as an ‘advisor’ to a new committee. The other committee members too seemed keener to carry out administrative work for externals.

Summing up, the current (2013) committee in GP is weak and the leaders have either withdrawn completely or withdrawn into more mundane bureaucratic administrative practises. This is not only because few engage, but because there is a fear and fatigue both with dealing with internal security issues and with mobilizing practises. There has also been a decrease in democratic mobilizing practices and in any kind of negotiation directly with residents.

8.3.2 Egoli: from administration to re-attachment to residents

In Egoli, bureaucratic logics appear to be downplayed compared to democratic logics, as the effort to unite is a major and constant concern of the committee. Bureaucratic logics seem to be played out in relation to externals, like NGOs and local government departments, while democratic logics are more central in internal meetings.

However, in the period 2010 to 2013, the main leader withdrew from the mediating practices, as he was employed by NGOs to administer development projects around urban farming. In this period, there were few community meetings. The projects demanded that he monitor processes and organize other residents to join. He received an ‘office’ some 15 minutes walking distance from the settlements, and started staying there overnight. Eventually his whole family moved in there. When chatting with him during this period, he stated that he now needed to withdraw from the duties of the community work and concentrate on helping his own family. He explained that the work as a leader had exhausted him:

For a long time I have neglected my family, because I was working for the community. It is very hard to be community worker. A councillor he gets money but community worker work for free. And Government never realizes
the community workers….Egoli is now 16 years old, 16 years of hard life. And what does government do? – Nothing. Sometimes I get too much upset, so I want to distance myself from it… But if you are only quiet and do nothing, then nothing will happen….
I have stayed here for a year now (at the house of the NGO), and my life has improved so much. In Egoli I had sleepless nights because I had to worry. If the government could take care, the community leaders would not have to go that extra mile…
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 28.9.2011)

Here, he also explains that leaving the settlement had made his life is easier. Yet, in a later conversation, he expressed reluctance to leave his community duties:

Since I moved from Egoli things are not right there. I cannot live nice when things are going on there. I want to move back, I started the settlement…. The eviction case started again….If I stay here things go backward. ….I must start from new now, to build the community. For all those years we were fighting together….The women who I thought I could leave in power, they need help.
(Community leader 5, Egoli 18.2.2011)

It seemed that tension had indeed increased in Egoli during the two years in which he was not present. Some became suspicious and accused him for corruption. Others complained that he had left them, and that things were getting out of hand. When asking two of the remaining leaders how it was like to be in the committee then, they also complained that they wanted to withdraw:

L: Is it hard to be a community leader?  
AA and E: Very! It is not a lekker job. Next time they must elect another people, we are tired now. They need to give us a break. Sometimes we must buy airtime and call from our own pockets.
(Community leader 4 and 6, Egoli, 21.4.2011)

Eventually, the leader who withdrew returned in 2013, as the NGO projects that had employed him came to an end. As he re-emerged in the leadership role, meetings were held again to discuss common concerns. It became clear that these meetings were necessary not only to ease suspicions and tensions, but to motivate residents fatigued by the never ending conflicts. In other words, although pragmatic projects are useful, it is problematic to focus only on actual projects and to leave out community mediation and mobilizing.
8.3.3 Kosovo: bureaucratization and tensions

Bureaucratization is particular pertinent for the main committee in Kosovo. This might be related to the fact that it has engaged in collaborations with local government departments (skipping the link of working via the ward councillor). According to the chairperson, this committee is registered at the sub-council, and the secretary of the committee claimed they update the sub-council when new people are selected. The committee meets on a Tuesday almost every week, and local government department officers are often invited to attend. The committee chairperson has contact numbers to many government officials, and calls them frequently. The interaction with departments has resulted in the need for committee members to carry out certain administrative tasks of reporting and monitoring internal developments. By increasing administrative tasks, such intermediary interactions increase the bureaucratization of the committee. This becomes apparent when noting that the committee is termed ‘Kosovo United Development Forum’ or the ‘the service delivery committee’:

We are the service delivery committee. The other committee reports in the problems inside. That is the resident committee. It is there for the reports of the community. The guys in yellow, they are still our people but they are all monitoring. We have one committee for each tender who we are monitoring.

(Community leader 8, Kosovo 7.2.2012)

This statement suggests a separation between an administrative unit (service delivery committee) and more a democratic participation-oriented unit (resident committee). This model clearly resembles a government setup of the division between an appointed bureaucratic unit and a democratically elected unit. However, an actual ‘resident committee’ with which the service delivery committee supposedly communicates does not seem to exist in a very organized form. The highlighting of a ‘service delivery committee’ might also be an indicator that the committee increasingly becomes an extended arm of local government bureaucracy, in line with theories of co-optation (Selznick 1949).

The balance between bureaucratic and democratic logics is also expressed by a rival committee, especially by one leader who frequently highlighted the difference between what she termed ‘organizational leaders’ and ‘committees’:

I was appointed by the community, not by an organization. But because Kosovo there are organizations, he says he is a leader. They don’t understand the difference between organizational leaders; they think that when they are
elected a leader of an organization, they say that they also are community leaders.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo 23.11.2010)

Here, she underlines the difference between a democratically elected model (democratic logic) and a more professional, appointed model (bureaucratic logic), despite the fact that all the committees claim to be elected democratically.

Returning to the issue of bureaucratic logics, the classical problem of becoming detached from the grassroots populace when professionalizing or bureaucratizing (Selznick 1949) applies to Kosovo. Many residents have complained that they don’t know what is going on, and increased amounts of regulations are imposed on them. Additionally, the formality and the bounded space of the office, located on the edge of the settlement, might have contributed to distancing the committee from the residents, not only physically. There are less open community meetings in this settlement than in Egoli and GP. However, compared to other context where such detachments simply leads to the organizations become less visible and less important to the residents, detachment in this context leads to heightened tension and conflicts. Not only does it decrease transparency and provide opportunities for corruption, but it also increases the suspicion of gatekeeping and corruption, and the possibilities of rival leaders to draw on such suspicion when confronting the committee. Interestingly, Kosovo is the settlement where the leadership is the most contested and also where notions of formality are the strongest. Many conflicts emerge when the committee acts as an extended arm of government bureaucracy.

One source of conflicts revolves around regulation of homes in the settlement. De-densification or ‘re-blocking’ is a current favoured strategy promoted by both NGOs and local government and consists of clearing some space by removing and rebuilding some shacks, which is necessary for creating space for installing e.g. toilets. In the case of Kosovo, such regulation of space with assistance from local government has granted some power to the leaders. A resident unrelated to the leaders explained:

The community leaders regulate the new shacks. They work closely with the law enforcement and land invasion. If someone tries to put up a shack here in front of the garage then they call to get them removed.
(Resident, Kosovo, 26.8.2011).
These practises of removing and relocating shacks have created conflicts, which take a long time to resolve. Relocating a few residents from flooded areas to another internal open area took over two years of negotiations between residents, leaders and departments. Further, in one instances of removing certain shacks for de-densification, suspicions arose that the leaders did this deliberately to remove enemies and thereafter sold the space. A practice specific to Kosovo is that when a resident wishes to build an extensions to their shack, the process needs to go through a bureaucratic procedure of registration, which has created tensions. Extending a shack is a normal occurrence in many informal settlements, especially when families grow, and more rooms are needed. In other settlements, usually such extensions are made after a chat with neighbours and / or community leaders. Conversely, in Kosovo, a system was set up that insisted that residents register their wish to extend the shacks in collaboration with a local government department:

Before you renovate you must come here and out your name in the book of the informal settlement department. This is to prevent that people put illegal shacks. They come and check the book twice a week, collect the names and give a paper permit. (Community leader 10, Kosovo, 7.2.2012).

Clearly, this is a continuation of practises to control and regulate migrations into the settlements. This system came with the threat of sanctions: if unregistered extensions were discovered, the committee could call the anti-eviction unit of local government and have the shack forcefully removed. Residents were informed of this new system through word of mouth. Some residents who were already sceptical of the current committee, suspected that the committee was doing this for own gain. I was invited to join a meeting where they discussed this:

P: The leaders called law enforcement to tear down the shack. Because they say the owners do not stay here, and that there are criminals staying here. This shack came here in June 1999; it was one of the first shacks here. Yesterday law enforcement came and demolished but we rebuilt it. This lady stays here.

L: Why do they want to demolish this place?
P: they want to sell the place, they already have customers from other areas. They are going to sell the land for 1500 Rand.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 30.11.2011).
The resident’s claim here is that this regulative power given to certain leaders is illegitimate. Further, she claimed that there was a lack of information sharing and democratic deliberation around these regulations:

P: I don’t know why they suddenly started doing this, maybe J. will explain. They said they had community meetings, but the people here do not know about the meeting.
L: You talked to the other community leaders?
P: No. But yesterday when the law enforcement came we told them we want to meet with those community leaders. Law enforcement said they came here because community leaders told them to. We said those community leaders have to come then. They said they will fetch them, but they did not come. Only the law enforcement came, with a lot of cars - maybe 15, and with guns. It was terrible. So those leaders do not want to talk to us. No warning was given to the inhabitants before they came.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 30.11.2011).

This story indicates not only that the system of micro-regulating and sectioning extensions created anger and tensions, but also that the committee and community leaders involved in this regulation could withdraw from the actual conflict due to their support in external authorities of local government and the police.

Another continuing source of tension revolves around employment, like the appointment of settlement cleaners through local government processes (private companies compete for the tender and the successful bidder then appoints the cleaners, who are residents of Kosovo). The competition to get these jobs is often intense, and the process has been linked to suspicion of corruption several times. In 2006, two media articles explained how the political in-fighting is related to a public works project (Phaliso 2006a, 2006b). The suspicion was both that the jobs were given to people outside Kosovo, and that they employed people from only one political party. In November 2010 such suspicions escalated again as new people from within the settlement were employed to clean the streets. The same suspicions and accusations were alleged. The suspicion was heightened because the selection of the employees apparently did not happen transparently. It resulted in an internal toyi-toyi, the new employees were scared to work and the garbage was not cleared. After a few weeks the settlement was floating in garbage, until some residents set fire to the garbage pile. An online media article reported on this in-fighting (Mquqo 2010). Some residents assumed that it was connected to the party politics. When I chatted to the cleaners, however, they did not
acknowledge that they were involved in politics, but claimed that the allegations were based on a rumour put out by certain leaders, aimed at destabilizing the main committee.

The main point for the discussion in this chapter is not who is right or wrong, or if the tension really was about political parties or not, but rather how significant the need is for increasing transparency through both democratic and bureaucratic procedures. As stressed by one leader, the procedures were the main problem:

People said in Kosovo that the new woman had won this tender. She was supposed to call the community meeting and inform everyone! She did not do that. She just got the people form Fesega….. They said when government was to employ people, everybody must know, and everyone can apply. Then they will draw from a bucket who will get the job – in front of everybody.
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 16.11.2010).

This shows that against accusations of corruption, a mixture of democratic participatory processes and bureaucratic models of written procedures are not just ideals, but also pragmatic suggested procedures for dealing with issues of suspicion and distrust in general. It also highlights that democratic and bureaucratic procedures are both necessary to increase transparency.

Summing up, adhering to bureaucratic logics and shying away from ‘politics’ does not remove the possible political tensions in Kosovo. Rather, it increases tensions as administrative regulations are carried out without consultations, increasing anger, suspicion and accusations. Further, the conflicting logics are drawn into accusations between committees and leaders, highlighting how balancing these logics is highly political.

8.3.4 Bureaucratization from below and the politics of balancing logics

Summing up the similarities and difference between how the leaders balance bureaucratic and democratic logics, two specific implications are observed:

First, comparing the settlement committees, there seems to be a general tendency to embrace bureaucratic logics. In the case of Kosovo, bureaucratization can be partly attributed to co-option by government departments, especially as the committee is called ‘the service delivery
committee’. In Egoli too, a main leader was co-opted to carry out administrative work for an NGO.

Yet, as evident in GP and Egoli, processes of bureaucratization can also be consequences of fatigue with participatory and interactive practises and a longing to ‘withdraw’ into more stable and secure administrative positions. This might also be linked to the fact that, as revealed in chapter six, norms of decent behaviour, combined with widespread gossip, might limit the willingness to speak publicly. Hence, bureaucratization processes are related to both grassroots issues and co-option. In other words, in addition to the fact that co-option is possible, there is a tendency to ‘bureaucratize from below’, in that bureaucratic logics are favoured not only presented to satisfy externals, but to adapt to the insecure urban context. This is also indicated in chapter seven.

Secondly, balancing democratic and bureaucratic logics is problematic in all the settlements; yet there are different ways of dealing with this. Essentially, the main difference between these logics is that while democratic logics are applied to organize discussions and interaction with residents to allow for specific ideas to be heard, bureaucratic logics are focused at administrative and regulative practices to get things done. Clearly, both are needed, but the balancing of these might lead to tensions and conflicts.

In Kosovo, leaders interact with both political parties and local government departments, and much tension has erupted around modelling the committees in relation to either of these. Despite underlining that the committees are not related to political parties, individual leaders’ links to parties are still strong, and necessarily so, as these links provide connections. Extensively highlighted by the committee members, the latest tendency has been to lean more towards bureaucratic models as a reflection of the experiences of the fights that evolved around party politics. However, adhering to bureaucratic logics has also led to tensions. The problem of bureaucratic detachment of the committee from residents is particularly high in Kosovo, physically symbolized by the meetings held inside ‘the office’. This has led to tension and suspicion towards committees and community leaders, and democratic logics are applied in accusations. Suspicion of corruption is particularly high here, and several incidents underscore the popular demand for transparency. This suspicion might be healthy, as it sets barriers that prevent individual leaders from carrying out their own agendas. On the other
hand, protesting and the contesting of leadership in Kosovo can hinder infrastructural
development. Several times, when something external is brought to the settlement, there have
been claims of corruption.

In GP, direct engagements with residents, through dealing with security issues, have declined,
linked to the experience that previous leader who did so was killed. Residents are unhappy
with this detachment, and state that there are no leaders who are present anymore. Also
democratic practises of participation have declined due to disappointments and fatigue, and
the leaders have either withdrawn completely or expressed the desire for a withdrawal into
more mundane administrative practises.

In Egoli, the application of democratic logics seems to be stronger than bureaucratic logics.
This might be based on the experience that bureaucratic withdrawal did not provide many
outcomes for the settlement generally and led to increased tensions. Hence, the latest
developments (2013) are that democratic attempts to secure representation and to keep a
strong connection to the residents is seen as necessary to keep motivations up and tensions
down. Here, meetings are less formal and more open to the audience.

Together, this shows that, on the one hand, working towards practical administrative-based
upgrading is also important, and dragged out negotiations with residents can be seen as
inefficient and hindering development. This is sometimes expressed as an issue that has
become ‘politicised’ (Bénit 2002, Oldfield and Zweig 2010, Millstein 2011), which has
negative connotations. On the other hand, the current tendency to bureaucratization should be
questioned; politics or ‘ politicisation’ might be seen as necessary rather than a problem
(Robins et al 2008). With the lack of public discussions, as evident in Egoli and Kosovo,
suspicions and tensions increase, especially towards administrative procedures that do not
make insights into the decision making publicly available. The suspicion and tensions that
increased bureaucratic procedures can be linked to the classical problem, as raised by Arendt,
that they standardize and simplify complex situations, leading to a neglect of political activity
in the form of speaking publicly and processes of discussing common concerns (Wolin 1983,
Crick 2005). As also highlighted by some South African studies, the problem of
bureaucratization of civic organizations lies in the fact that they might lose their community
connections and cover up tensions (Bähr 2007a, Saniland 2008, Zuern 2011). Although
bureaucratic procedures are needed to ensure transparency, if the committees neglect politics and become a sole administrative unit, corruption or suspicion of corruption might occur that severely endangers the settlement as a whole and hinders development. Hence, maintaining flexible democratic procedures that connect with and mediate between residents is important.

Further, especially the case of Kosovo shows that the conflicts between these logics are drawn into politics accusations. Especially bureaucratic logics are associated with hierarchal and even authoritative forms of governing (Peters 2010) and can consequently be perceived as ‘anti-democratic’. Hence, when residents and leaders accuse the committee they draw on the discourses of bureaucratic or democratic forms to confront the legitimacy of certain leaders. These discourses came up often, in the other settlements too, especially in accusations that some leaders have not really been elected but rather appointed, and in the frequent claims of residents that they were not informed about public concerns.

Thus, beyond the facts that conflicts often are fights over resources, the analytical focus on plural institutional logics and legitimacy politics (Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013) has provided insights into how politics evolve around negotiations over logics and ideal organizational models, and how organizational discourses are central in these policies.

8.4 Conclusion

Summing up, I have in this chapter discussed the how community leaders apply both democratic and bureaucratic logics pragmatically, and the tension that evolve around these logics in practice.

First, I have discussed a central ambiguity of democratic logics: That the consensus- oriented ‘unity’ approach rooted in the discourses of the anti-apartheid social movements (Adler and Steinberg 2000, Zuern 2011), which most leaders see as necessary to keep tensions down, conflicts with a more modern pluralist democratic logic of allowing competition between groups and party-politics. Some degree of party politics seem accepted, however the fear of escalating conflicts make most leaders focus on working towards integration and downplaying party political divisions in addition to cultural divisions. Although plural committees might limit elite capture in informal settlements (Lemaskis’s 2008), lessons from political tensions in the histories of the settlements have led most leaders to favour a unity model.
Secondly, there is an increased tendency to apply bureaucratic logics, not only due to co-option but also due to a bureaucratization from below. A balance that includes both bureaucratic and democratic logics is needed, but tensions can emerge when one of these logics dominate. In all the settlements, periods of bureaucratization has led the less interaction with residents, which further has led to increased suspicion and tension. The challenge to balance these logics is therefore significant, as accusations are easily made by drawing in discourses of organizational models.

Drawing this together and answering the question posed in the introduction, committee conflicts and changes reflect the politics balancing these logics, by the fact that leaders attempt to deal with the conflicts and changes by applying these logics, and by that ‘rivals’ and residents apply these logics to contest certain leaders. Hence, this underscores that politics of leadership organizing could be analysed by a focus on plural competing logics, discourses and ideals of how to organize. From this perspective, politics is not only seen as conflicts over resources, but as also as discursive negotiations over systems and organizational models, evident in that organizational discourses are drawn into conflicts between committees.

This further underlines a room for agency. As there are no set rules for what these committees should be and look like, but rather a multitude of expectations and political challenges, they are in constant formation and change, trying to adapt to these challenges. That different institutional logics can be drawn in at different times also gives the committees and leaders some flexibility. They are not trapped into an ‘iron cage’, but are loose organizations that can attach themselves to different institutional frameworks or jump from one to another. The reflections over the value of party politics are a strong indicator of the ongoing organizational learning and openness to adapt logics. This is a reminder of the argument that community organizations do not necessarily confine themselves to one strategy but create possibilities by applying several strategies (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Thorn and Oldfield 2011). This can be useful for the organizations, but can also decrease transparency and accountability which decrease creates a significant source of suspicion, tensions and conflicts. Thus it also gives committees or leaders the flexibility to oppose each by drawing on accusations of illegitimate organizational ideals, in other words, legitimacy politics are constantly on-going.
CHAPTER 9 Conclusion

9.1 Summary
Before discussing the main conclusions this thesis, which highlight aspects of the politics of negotiating organizational models in the particular neighbourhoods of informal settlements, I will sum up the main argument and the findings of each analysis chapter.

9.1.1 Summary of aim and argument
The aim of this thesis is not to disagree that informal settlement politics is signified by intense fights over scarce resources or that informal settlement leaders sometimes engage in patronage. Rather, this thesis suggests that politics and leadership in these spaces also have other sides, which when analysed, can contribute to the understanding of urban politics in these neighbourhoods. Hence, beyond describing politics, organizing and leadership with instrumental and rational-choice perspectives, the focus on the social constructions of organization and leadership through plural and conflicting institutional logics, has given insight into some significant tensions that continue to inform the politics of leadership organizing. These politics are important, because informal settlements as particular urban neighbourhoods contain several and significant internal common concerns, in addition to several, and sometimes conflicting, ideas around how these common concerns should be dealt with through certain organizational practises and models.

Before elaborating on the main conclusions of this thesis, I will sum up the theoretical framework and the main conclusion of each analysis chapter.

9.1.2 Summary of theoretical framework

Beyond politics of the belly, hero or villain leaders, and instrumental organizing: Social construction and legitimacy politics
Theoretically, I have aimed to contribute to a niche within South African urban studies grappling with neighbourhood politics. In line with some recent suggestions that it might be a problem that liberal and neo-Marxian perspectives dominate urban theory (Parnell and
Robinson 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a), I have suggested that this might be one of the reasons why there is a focus on an instrumentalist analysis of politics, organizing and leadership in informal settlement. This indicates that in order to better understand the politics of leadership organizing in informal settlement we need to move beyond instrumental and outcome-oriented analyses. Therefore, I have in line with the suggestions by the urban scholars Lowndes (2001, 2009) and McQuarrie and Marwell (2010), applied a theoretical framework inspired by new-institutionalism, as an alternative to instrumentalist explorations of organizing and leadership. In the theory chapter, I have outlined and discussed this framework in relation to literature mentioning informal settlement organizing, politics and leadership in South Africa.

First, I have outlined how new-institutionalism promotes a process approach to the focus on politics of negotiating organizational models (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall and Taylor 1996). Combined with an Arendtian focus on politics as processes of negotiating common concerns (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Villa 1992), this has enabled an analysis of the politics negotiating which organizational models should be applied to deal with internal common concerns in the informal settlements. In other words, it has enabled an analysis of politics beyond ‘the belly’. Certainly, there are resource fights and there is patronage, but there is also legitimacy politics and politics of negotiating how organizations that deal with the commons should be organized. Hence, in relation to Katsaura’s (2012) suggestion of ‘micro-politics’, I agree that politics should be studied at any geographical scale or in any space, but suggest that this also requires different ideas and applications of the highly debated concept of politics. The de-connection of politics from the arena of state-based organizations highlights that politics as discussions over common affairs can happen at neighbourhood scales as well. Looking into the politics around institutional logics is therefore also useful to approach the gap between ‘everyday’, as mundane, everyday life described by ethnographers, and ‘politics’ as contestations or interaction with the arena of the state. This is because taken-for-granted ‘everyday’ practises within the framework of new-institutionalism can be viewed as institutions influencing the formation of organizations dealing with politics as common concerns. In the cases of the informal settlements, the analysis (especially chapter three and five) has shown that there are several institutionalised practises that have contributed to the formation of informal settlement committees and leaders, especially dealing with internal conflicts and crime, mobilizing against common enemies, and negotiating with externals.
Drawing these practises together, they are not really ‘micro’ concerns, and it is revealed that the classical tension between bureaucratic and democratic models (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, Peters 2010) is relevant at this scale as well.

Secondly, for analysing organizations beyond instrumental and leaders beyond heroes or villains, new-institutionalism has above all provided an analytical focus on organizations as socially constructed in relation to the institutional environment providing practises, logics, and organizational models (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983, Scott 2008, Czarniawska 2008a). Leaders are with this perspective seen as constructed in relation to their environment too, moving beyond the focus on leadership styles and notions of heroes or villains (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003, Collinson 2005, Uhl-Bien 2006, Denis et al. 2012). Further, the development institutional pluralism and the consequence of ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013), has proven relevant for acknowledging informal settlement committees as hybrid organizations or bricolages (Skuse and Cousins 2007), and hence analysing the politics and tensions of balancing multiple institutional logics. This is particularly evident in chapter seven and eight, where it is explored how leaders balance both democratic and bureaucratic institutional logics to assert legitimacy and deal with internal tensions, or sometimes, to contest other leaders.

Summing up, the theoretical argument is that applying new-institutionalism in urban theory is could be useful for South African urban theory considering neighbourhood politics. In this thesis, it has enabled me to analyse the symbolic sides of organization and leadership models and the politics around displaying these models in the plural institutional setting of informal settlements.

9.1.3 Summary of insights from analysis chapters

I have unpacked the research question and argument through four analysis chapters. In each of these chapters, a sub question to the main research question is posed, looking into different aspects of the politics of leadership organizing in informal settlements. The first two analysis chapters focus on the institutional environment and have displayed how informal settlement leaders and committees can be seen as micro-government fulfilling several practices and that behavioural norms condition the possibilities of acting politically by speaking publicly. This underlines the importance of historical and contextually formed practises and norms. The two
following chapters have indicated the contextually developed importance of portraying bureaucratic and democratic logics, and how tension and politics evolve around balancing these two essentially conflicting logics.

As each chapter on their own has provided interesting insights in addition to adding to the main argument, I will now summarize these chapters and their specific insights.

**Chapter 5: Informal settlement committees as micro-governments shaped by plural institutional practises**

This chapter, after introducing the three settlements and highlighting some fundamental differences in size, history and demographics, suggests that despite these differences, there are certain practises particularly to the informal settlement context that these settlements have in common. Although there is a complex *bricolage* of practises, I have identified three practises relevant to the social construction of leadership committees: mediating and regulating internal order, mobilizing, and intermediary negotiation. In line with new-institutionalism (Scott 2008), I perceive these practises as ‘institutionalised’ in the specific setting of urban informal settlements, and hence they contribute to the social construction of similar leadership committees in different informal settlements. It is also indicated that co-option is possible by a range of external actors, but that for the most part, the committees have several organizational cores that they need to continue balancing. I have argued that they can be seen as micro-governments, as they fulfil both bureaucratic and political tasks. Further, while regulating order and intermediary practises with externals have developed into administrative and more bureaucratic practises, mediating internal conflicts and mobilizing require more symbolically motivating and democratic practises. Therefore, as the leadership committees have to adhere to the multiple practises they are shaped by, they are essentially hybrid organizations, adhering to multiple institutional logics.

**Chapter 6: Tensions of the internal public realm: urban individuality and disciplinary norms**

Chapter six explores an important aspect of politics as negotiating organizational models (March and Olsen 1984) of common concerns (Arendt 1958): the condition of speaking publicly within the settlements. The analysis shows that a central problem of the public realm
in the specific urban condition of informal settlements is that, even though there is little privacy and intense needs for collective action, open public deliberations are difficult in practice. Adding another level of complexity to the institutional environment, the chapter shows how residents’ relations to public – private divisions and norms of public behaviour limit a free public realm. The chapter first outlined the specific urban condition of the dominance of a young, fluid and ‘urbanized’ population, and related this to the reluctance to participate in community meetings. On the other hand, both on-migration and the presence of individualized urban youth increase the circulation of organizational models (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b), which provide conditions for and multiple urban ideals of organizing politics. Thereafter, I discussed how the specific urban condition of marginalization and instability is reflected in feelings of fatigue, fear and suspicion, in addition to the social norms of decency, and how this further impacts on the motivations to act publically. Drawing this together, beyond displaying a problematic public realm, the chapter indicates a paradox in the urban informal settlement’s public realm: That the dominance of a young urban population, longing for individual freedom, conflicts with the socially disciplinary norms of order and decency. This adds to further complicate the politics of balancing conflicting logics that leaders have to engage in.

Chapter 7: Leaders’ presentations of democratic and bureaucratic logics as reflecting legitimacy of the specific urban institutional environment

Building on the previous chapters, chapter seven explores presentations of democratic and bureaucratic logics in relation to contextual norms, conditions of speaking publicly and historically institutionalised logics of organizing (discourses). Borrowing from new-institutionalism, organizations and leaders are dual in nature, encompassing pragmatic and symbolic sides (Scott 2008, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010) and presentations of organizational models are analysed as symbolic claims to legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 177, Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Further, as the leadership committees are faced with institutional pluralism, their presentations of multiple logics are not analysed as signs of decoupling, but signs of ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013). With this fundament, the analysis shows how democratic logics are important to contrast traditional authority - which does not fit with modern urban identities and the memories of organizational logics of the movement against the authoritarian
apartheid system. Thereafter it analyses how bureaucratic logics are portrayed to appropriate behavioural norms of mature decency in addition to providing stability, and transparency.

The difference between the symbolic values of democratic and bureaucratic logics therefore becomes apparent: that democratic logics adhere to radical and modern urbanity discourses, while bureaucratic logics adhere to more conservative norms of mature decency. It points at a problematic urban condition in informal settlements: the tension between individualized urbanity confronted by disciplinary norms of public behaviour.

This contributes to the argument that these conflicting logics are adaptations to the plural nature of the institutional environment of the settlements, especially the plural historical and contextual developed norms, and not mere acts of decoupling or results of co-option.

Chapter 8: The tensions and politics of applying conflicting democratic and bureaucratic logics

With the indications of a tension between democratic and bureaucratic logics, this last analysis chapter has analysed and compared how these two logics are balanced by leaders in dealing with internal tensions, committee conflicts and changes in the three settlements. This related to the fundamental suggestion that a context of institutional pluralism require leaders to negotiate conflicts and carry out adaptive work, and this can lead to conflicts and ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013). Further, the classical tension within democratic logics and between bureaucratic efficiency and democratic consultation (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, Peters 2010) are drawn in.

The comparison shows how the committees in all the three settlements are concerned with balancing democratic logics, which are complicated, as it entails balancing residents’ heterogeneity and with building unity. The tendency is that, although unavoidably present, party-politics is seen as a threat to unity and hence and more a consensus-oriented democratic logic is preferred. Moreover, the classical problem of balancing bureaucratic and democratic logics is that too much bureaucratic administrative work distances the committees and leaders from the residents, which can increase internal suspicion and tension, but on the other hand, too much democratic work unifying and connecting with residents might compromise physical developments. Comparing the settlements, the tendency here seems to be increased
favouring of bureaucratization, not only due to co-option but linked to mediation fatigue and a ‘bureaucratization from below’.

Together, this confirms that important aspects of the politics of leadership organizing revolve around balancing democratic and bureaucratic logics. The balancing of these logics is also drawn into ‘legitimacy politics’ of accusations against leaders and conflicts between committees. These ongoing negotiations of logics, implying ideas on how the committees should be organized, are also a source of tension within the settlements.

9.2 Main conclusions: the politics of balancing bureaucratic and democratic logics

Drawing together the insights from the analysis chapters, the overall conclusion is that the politics of organizing leadership in informal settlements is informed by many tensions, especially since there are no established rules but rather several norms, discourses and ideas about how these committees should be organized. These politics of negotiating how committees should be organized are important because the informal settlements as specific neighbourhoods have especially many common concerns. I further conclude that although there are several institutional logics, democratic and bureaucratic logics are displayed by community leaders as particularly pertinent, due to specific conditions of urban heterogeneity, behavioural discourses and historical organizational memories. Since these two logics are essentially conflicting, much of the politics of leadership organizing revolves around how to balance these.

In addition to this main conclusion, I have made three sub-conclusions, which contribute to nuancing some aspects of politics, organizing and leadership in the particular urban spaces of South African informal settlements.

9.2.1 Rather than de-coupling or co-option: bureaucratic and democratic logics shaped in the specific urban environment

As noted in the introduction, some scholars briefly mention democratic and bureaucratic organizational models (Runciman 2011), but do not analyse these further. Without deeper analysis, it might be assumed that these models are a result of either mimicking external formal organizations like government, de-coupling sides of the committees to strategically
gain legitimacy with externals, or results of co-option by externals. In the analysis, I have shown that although these processes in relation to externals do take place in some cases, bureaucratic and democratic logics also form in the internal relation between leaders and residents, related to internal and norms and discourses. Bureaucratic and democratic logics have evolved both due to pragmatic needs and symbolic conforming to specific historical and urban norms. Bureaucratic logics have emerged both due to pragmatic need for detailed regulation (especially related to internal security as described in chapter five), and to symbolically adhere to context-specific discourses of mature decency and stability (as discussed in chapter six and seven). Democratic logics have emerged due to pragmatic needs to deal with internal tensions (as discussed in chapter eight), and to symbolically adhere to discourses of urban individuality and discourses related to the anti-apartheid struggle (as indicated in chapter seven and eight). Therefore, indications of bureaucratic or democratic logics are not mere acts of mimicking or decoupling, neither necessarily only results of co-option. This analysis has been possible by applying Kraatz and Block’s (2008) argument that a problem with decoupling theory is that one needs to know the organizational ‘core’ from which a thing is decoupled. In other words, it is problematic to describe something as merely symbolic unless we know where the true substance resides, and this is difficult in a pluralistic organization (Kratz and Block 2008:250). Pache and Sanots (2010) argue that hybrid organizations need not hybridise all practises, but can also have coexisting practises linked to different logics.

One implication of terming community leader committees hybrid organizations in a plural institutional environment, is that it is insufficient to fit community leader ‘rationalities’ into one of Weber’s ideal types. Contrary to Watsons’ (2003, 2009) suggestion of ‘conflicting rationalities’, where an informal settlement rationality is contrasted with a bureaucratic government department rationality, it is evident that bureaucratic rationalities is one of the many logics informal settlement residents and leaders encompass. This is in line with the observations that informal settlement dwellers encompass multiple or hybrid political identities (Robins et al. 2008, Myers 2011, Bank 2011). This further implicates that the committees as some sort of public organizations are flexible and adaptable rather than purely bureaucratic organizations, which, in Weber’s terms,

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72 Both Myers (2011) and Robins (2008) also mention a critique Watsons idea of a clash of rationalities.
become inflexible ‘iron cages’. Their development should be studied with curiosity. As they are not iron cages, relevant to Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012b) notion of the circulation of organization models, they can rapidly take up and adapt to a range of organizational models and institutional logics. Especially with the extended interventions by a variety of actors, and with the constant on-migration of residents from different townships and informal settlements, organizational models and practises spread fast. This also underlines that organizational practises and models do not ‘belong’ to a certain organizations. For instance, bureaucratic organizing does not ‘belong’ to governmental organizations, and street committees do not belong to SANCO, but are organizational forms of street committees are carried forward by a range of organizations, as described in chapter five. In other words, organizational practises and models should be viewed as institutions that are carried by a variety of organizations.

Lastly, this underlines that politics in South African informal settlements is more sophisticated than often assumed. This is in line with the suggestions of moving beyond exotic presentations of politics in an African setting in general (Robins 2002a, Hagman and Pêclard 2010), and of ‘urban slums’ generally (Wacquant 1997, 2008), and not treating informal settlements as sites of decay and disorder (Myers 2011).

9.2.2 Legitimacy politics - structural constraints and possibilities

In relation to the polarised ideas of community leaders and power, the analysis chapters in this thesis show that they have evolved through both internal and external pressure, as they are socially constructed in relation to different historically institutionalized practises. Especially in chapter six and seven, I have applied the institutionalist assumptions that organizations cannot be viewed as purely instrumental, outcome-generating units, but are dual in nature because they have to adapt symbolically to the environment from within which they emerge to gain legitimacy, in addition to providing outcomes (Scott 2008, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010). What this implies is that organizations have an inherent ambiguity of actually doing practical work, but also adapting more or less symbolically to their institutional environment (Scott 2004, Czarniawska 2008a). This is the duality of organizations that Lowndes (2001, 2009) and McQuarrie and Marwell (2010) argue should be useful for urban theorists to draw on.
On the one hand, I have indicated several internal structural constraints. There are first of all the limitations of the public realm do impact on the conditions of speaking publicly and leadership formation. Suspicion, gossip and jealousy can destabilize leader’s legitimacy and lead to shifts in power, and change dynamics from solidarity to schism (Barry 2006). Further, I have indicated some norms and discourses that leadership organizing needs to adhere to. These are shaped both in relation to the specific history of South African informal settlements’ relation to the state, and to specific urban conditions of stigma, marginalization and instability. Especially, I found the tension between notions of urban individuality as opposed to the disciplinary effects of conservative values interesting in this setting, as discussed in chapter six and seven. The notion of urban individuality is linked to classical theories of urban individualization (Wirth 1938), expressed by a longing for freedom from intervention, also by community leaders. This however contrasts the disciplinary effects of contextually developed behavioural norms and urges to regulate indecent behaviour. Such tensions have been indicated around youth in townships too (Seekings 2006), and in the urge to morally regulate criminal behaviour (Buur and Jensen 2004b). For this thesis, this urban tension has also some structuring effects on how leadership should be organized, and it has brought conflicting expectations to leadership. Leaders need to adapt to these norms, especially by portraying both democratic and bureaucratic logics. Together, these structural aspects of informal settlement life emphasises that in these settings too, power is not just something that leaders can take or own as a position, but is shaped and reshaped through social interactions and discourses.

On the other hand, leaders are not merely dominated by institutional constraints, and there is certainly room for agency. Here, the recent theories of how organizations adapt to plural institutional demands have proven particularly useful (Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011, Yu 2013). By applying these theories I have shown that, due to the complexity of the institutional setting, there is room for agency, as leaders can manoeuvre within this setting and apply the fitting logic to a specific situation. For instance, I have mentioned how committees and leaders might adapt to several externals simultaneously, and hence, instead of being co-opted, balance between these. Some contextually-related papers have also reflected that informal settlement residents encompass and engage in a range of different strategies in relation to negotiating with government (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Thorn and Oldfield 2011). Additionally, as displayed in
chapter eight, logics are deliberately brought into conflicts, sometimes to solve and
sometimes to fuel these conflicts.

Drawing this together, the focus on legitimacy politics has enabled to include both structural
constraints and possibilities.

9.2.3 The longing for stability and bureaucratization from below?
Lastly, an issue I found particularly interesting is the indications of bureaucracy as developed
from below in this very specific urban setting. I will therefore add some thoughts on how this
related to the extended discussion of problems of bureaucratization.

The bureaucratization from below is played out both symbolically and pragmatically:
Pragmatically, as mentioned in chapter five monitoring and regulating migration for order
and security have led to the use of bureaucratic procedures of counting and keeping books.
Additionally, increased regulatory and bureaucratic practises are also related to the fact that
resident in informal settlements are not living solely in a sphere of informality, but are
integrated into the ‘formal’ sphere of the state and the formal market. Hence, an increased
duty of committees and leaders is to help issue residents with formal papers like ‘proof of
residency’, necessary for receiving mail, establishing bank accounts, registering a car, buying
things on credit, or for receiving grants, whether disability, child grant of pension grant. And
lastly, related to a fear of dealing with politics, crime and internal conflicts, withdrawing into
more mundane administrative positions is tempting for many leaders.
Symbolically, as discussed in chapter seven, bureaucratic logics might be linked to internal
norms and discourses of stability, order and decency. It might seem a paradox that the
fragmented and fragile setting is coupled with a longing for stability, order and rationality.
However, similarly to the notion of ordentlikheid (Salo 2003, 2009, Ross 2006, 2010, Jensen
2008), the symbolic value of bureaucratic logics linked to decency, regularity and formality
can be seen as a reaction to the insecurity and instability that dominates informal settlement
life. In other words, the urge to portray stability and order as counteracting instability
increases the value of bureaucratic organizational practices and symbolic models. Leaders
need to reflect order despite tensions and complexity. Further, both in informal settlement
residents’ and leaders’ reflections, there is a tendency to democratic unity above ‘political-
party’ logics.
This shows that the urge for stabilization and rationalization is also emerging from below. In relation to southern urban theory (Pieterse 2008, Simone 2010, Myers 2011), the multitude of attempts to create order in the chaos of the urban south, are not necessarily state driven. It becomes evident that the instability that signifies informal settlements has attracted a multitude of micro regulation initiatives, and rather than disorganization, a problem is perhaps too many uncoordinated attempts at shaping order develop into competition.

More importantly, this touches upon the problems of bureaucratization. As emphasised in the theory of isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), when bureaucratic organizational models dominate modern society, these models are applied by a range of organizations, making them similar and creating homogeneity. Hence, the problem of bureaucratization is not only a detachment from the residents, which is commonly acknowledged (Selznick 1949) and also mentioned in South African literature (Bähre 2007a, Staniland 2008), but also standardization. This is relevant to the argument that stabilization and rationalization threatens the open-ended engagement which is essential for many residents in the urban south (Simone 2010). Thereby, the bureaucratization from below might increase problems of standardization, which in Arendt’s thinking results from that diversity is bureaucracy’s worst nightmare (Wolin 1983).

Moreover, as highlighted in Arendt’s writing, technical and surgical approaches to dealing with problems might compromise democratic and political processes of public discussions and debates (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Crick 2005). Bureaucratization is related to the encroachment of the social into the public, by the fact that micro regulation of everyday matters or ‘household concerns’ of the oikos take over the public realm (Villa 1992). Mainly, this is specific to modern western societies, and has received numerous critiques. However, the empirical material presented in this thesis indicating increasingly technocratic micro-regulations, show that Arendt’s worry might be relevant here too. The problem is that if detailed micro regulations become the main concern, politics as deliberating common affairs and attempts to organizing democratic practices of inclusive and open deliberations might be neglected. This is relevant particularly when looking at the case of Kosovo, where bureaucratization of the committee seems to be the strongest where the committee is focused more on detailed regulation than mobilizing or discussing common concerns in public meetings. In GP and Egoli, on the other hand, leaders have recognized the tensions that such
bureaucratization brings and are reluctant to a solely focus on micro-regulations. This underlines that politics as negotiating how common concerns should be dealt with is essential, and perhaps one should be careful about the too negative associations with the term ‘becoming politicised’, as it could neglect the importance of confrontational politics in heterogeneous societies (Robins et al. 2008). At least, the case of Kosovo shows that bureaucratic procedures to some degree need to be politicised – if politicised is understood as opening up processes for public deliberations.

The indication of a bureaucratization from below therefore underscores the relevance of further analysing the tensions between democratic and bureaucratic logics when exploring politics and organizing in urban neighbourhoods.

9.2.4 Suggestions for further research
As indicated above, I suggest that there generally is room for continued examinations of the emergence and developments of specific collections of urban organizations with a social constructive and process focus, and that including a notion of the politics of conflicting institutional logics might be specifically relevant to the urban situations. I have also indicated that the on-going tension between democratic and bureaucratic logics seem relevant to apply to urban organizing in the South as well. Social constructive perspectives on organizing and on leadership span an enormous range of theories; there is room for finding several theoretical analytical tools for further research. Current urban theory, inspired by postmodernism, describes heterogeneity and plurality in detail, which is especially relevant in cities of the South. However, the indication that there might also be homogeneity in organizational models is interesting. Therefore, in relation to the idea of ‘bureaucratization from below’, it could be interesting to further engage in the debate between the theory of isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) and its critics, the plural institutional logics perspective (Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Thornton et al 2012) to analyse the organizational models and practises portrayed in different urban settings and by different urban actors.

In relation to the topic of informal settlement leadership, the limitations of only engaging three informal settlements in one South African city suggests that further case studies for comparisons could be useful. There might be significant differences between in leadership
and committee formations in informal settlements in different South African cities, in informal settlements in villages or towns compared to the ones in bigger cites, and even between areas within cities, such as Khayelitsha and Philippi.

Further, more research could be conducted into understanding the public realm. I see the issue of public fatigue and retreat to privacy, which actually is one of the most classical topics in urban theory, as under-researched in the context urban South Africa. This might be due to the fact that there is a focus, both in media and in research, on the people and organizations that speak the loudest and try actively to change the situation. However, this is not the majority of people, and even in informal settlements, it seems that the percentage that actually engages is low. Hence, more research is needed on regular residents instead of organized ones, looking into why they are not involved and what is not talked about and why (Seekings 2010). This requires both deep ethnographic research (like the accounts of Bank (2011) and Ross (2010), and quantitative surveys (like the accounts of Muyeba and Seekings (2012) covering larger amounts of random residents rather than organizations and leaders. This could also benefit the participation debate, and issues of measuring legitimacy and representation, which is important concepts indicated but not fully tackled in this thesis. These could be investigated further, but would also need both qualitative research on what different types or categories of legitimacy or representation that are relevant, followed and tested with quantitative surveys on larger groups.


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## Appendix A: List of field visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.04.2010</td>
<td>Shadowing master student: Interview community activist Kosovo informal settlement /Philippi.</td>
<td>Interview notes</td>
</tr>
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<td>14.04.2010</td>
<td>Shadowing master student: Workshop Kosovo</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.04.2010</td>
<td>Shadowing master student: Interviews residents Kosovo</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.04.2010</td>
<td>Shadowing master student: Interview Disaster Risk Manager</td>
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<td>Meeting NGO, getting network access</td>
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<td>Meeting community leaders Sheffield Road informal settlement</td>
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<td>Interview manager of NGO</td>
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<td>26.05.2010</td>
<td>Interview CBO activists (Embasa/Metro Health Clubs)</td>
<td>Interview notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>June + July 2010</td>
<td>Research assistants monitoring + reporting own areas</td>
<td>Short interview answers, assistant observation notes</td>
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<td>22.07.2010</td>
<td>Meeting with NGO managers</td>
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<td>27.07.2010</td>
<td>Interview community leaders / research assistants Sheffield Road</td>
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<td>5.8-7.8.2010</td>
<td>Stay-over Sheffield Road</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>12.8.2010</td>
<td>Meeting CBO activist, community leader Sheffield Road</td>
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<td>Meet community leaders GP</td>
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<td>21.8-23.8.2010</td>
<td>Stay-over Kosovo</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.8.2010</td>
<td>Meet CoCT official, visit Egoli informal settlement</td>
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<td>27.8.2010</td>
<td>Interview community leaders Egoli</td>
<td>Audio file transcribed interview</td>
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<td>Visit CBO activist, Kosovo, GP, Egoli</td>
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<td>Workshop Kosovo day 1</td>
<td>Focus group interview notes, observation notes, audio files</td>
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<td>10.9.2010</td>
<td>Workshop Kosovo day 2</td>
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<td>28.9.2010</td>
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<td>Activity</td>
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<td>Focus group interview ‘Health Club’ Kosovo</td>
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<td>11.10.2010</td>
<td>Visits all settlements, interview community leaders Egoli</td>
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<td>19.10.2010</td>
<td>Visit GP</td>
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<td>Visit Egoli planning workshop</td>
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<td>26.10.2010</td>
<td>Visit GP planning presentation</td>
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<td>16.11.2010</td>
<td>Visit Egoli, Kosovo, Graveyard Pond</td>
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<td>17.11.2010</td>
<td>Workshop Egoli day 1</td>
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<td>Workshop Egoli day 2</td>
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<td>Interview leaders and residents Kosovo and GP</td>
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<td>14.3.2012</td>
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<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>22.3.2012</td>
<td>Visit all settlements</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.3.2012</td>
<td>Committee meeting Kosovo, visit Egoli</td>
<td>Meeting notes, field notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.4.2012</td>
<td>Visit all settlements</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.4.2012</td>
<td>Visit all settlements</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.5.2012</td>
<td>Visit all settlements, interview ex-leader Kosovo</td>
<td>Field notes, interview notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.5.2012</td>
<td>Visit Kosovo</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>31.5.2012</td>
<td>Community meeting Egoli</td>
<td>Meeting notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6.2012</td>
<td>Visit GP, Egoli</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.6.2012</td>
<td>NGO initiated mass meeting w. Egoli residents</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.6 .2012</td>
<td>Visit Kosovo, GP</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.7.2012</td>
<td>Visit Egoli, Kosovo</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>8.7.2012</td>
<td>Visit leader GP</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>26.7.2012</td>
<td>Visit Egoli, Kosovo</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.8.2012</td>
<td>Visit Egoli attend residents birthday</td>
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<td>13.8.2012</td>
<td>Visits all settlements, ad-hoc meeting GP</td>
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<td>Visit GP, Kosovo neighboring settlement</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>10.9-11.9.2012</td>
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<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>2.10.2012</td>
<td>Visit Egoli</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>Visit Kosovo, interview leader GP</td>
<td>Field notes, interview notes</td>
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<td>30.10.2012</td>
<td>Visit Kosovo and Egoli</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>8.11.2012</td>
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<td>Field notes</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Data</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<td>11.2.2013</td>
<td>Visit all settlements, plan workshop Derek H.</td>
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<td>19.2.2013</td>
<td>Interview community leader Kosovo</td>
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<td>21.2.2013</td>
<td>Workshop Derek H.</td>
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<td>26.2.2013</td>
<td>Visit Egoli</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.2.2013</td>
<td>Interview residents GP</td>
<td>Interview notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2013</td>
<td>Visit leader GP, Kosovo community meeting with police</td>
<td>Field notes, meeting notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.3.2013</td>
<td>Interview GP neighboring settlement leader, interview ex-leaders Kosovo and Egoli</td>
<td>Interview notes, field notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3.2013</td>
<td>Visit Egoli</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.2013</td>
<td>Community meeting Egoli w. councilors</td>
<td>Meeting notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.4.2013</td>
<td>Visit Kosovo, GP, Egoli after rain</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.4.2013</td>
<td>Election community meeting Egoli</td>
<td>Meeting notes, pictures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.4.2013</td>
<td>Visit all settlements with journalists</td>
<td>No notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.4.2013</td>
<td>Community meeting Egoli (evening)</td>
<td>Field notes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Survey form

Note: This survey was copied from an NGO and sightly modified, and applied in collaboration with other researchers for sharing data

Settlement ENUMERATION
This survey is a part of a research project at the University of Cape Town. The enumeration survey collects information on housing conditions, expenditures (and income if possible), employment and sanitation in your community. Please co-operate with the enumerator to fill in this questionnaire. Thank you for your co-operation.

Household Details and (Data)

1) Shack Number

Respondent (occupant of shack): Surname _______________ Names __________________________

2) Age

3) Gender of the head of respondent: Male Female

4) Home Language

5) How many people stay in your house? 1 2 3 3+

6-10) How many people in the house are... 0 - 6 years 18 - 35 years

7 - 17 years 36 - 64 years

65 + years

11) How many people in this household attend school?

Employment, Income & Expense

12) How many people are employed in the house?

0 1 2 3

13) What type of employment are they involved in?

Self Employed Part time/Casual Full Time

Who is employed? ):__________________________________________________
14) Do you receive any kind of a welfare grant? Yes ☐ No ☐

15) What kind of grant do you receive?
   - Disability ☐
   - Child support ☐
   - Pension ☐
   - Refugee ☐
   - Other ☐

16) How many people have any form of income in your house?
   - 0 ☐
   - 1 ☐
   - 2 ☐
   - 3 ☐

17-19) How much are the main expenses per month?
   - Food R
   - Electricity R
   - Transport R

20) What type of transport do you use when going to work?
   - Walk ☐
   - Private ☐
   - Taxi/ Bus ☐
   - Train ☐

21) How far is the place of employment (or where the household head gets the income)?
   (Hours, Minutes of TRAVEL or WALK) _____ Hrs _____ min

22) Use of structure:
   - Residential only ☐
   - Church ☐
   - Pre –school ☐
   - Spaza ☐

23) How many rooms does your house have?
   - 1 ☐
   - 2 ☐
   - 3 ☐
   - 4 + ☐

24) Do you own a car? Yes ☐ No ☐

25) Were you ever approved for a housing subsidy? Yes ☐ No ☐

26) Would you like to state your income level for the purpose of understanding how many households in the community can apply for subsidies? R
**Flooding History**

27-29) Have you ever experienced the following when staying at this settlement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>How often?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27) Fire Disaster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28) Flooding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29) Evictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30) If your answer to 28 was YES, what type of flooding affects you? (Only tick one)

- Under ground water
- Leaking roof/wall
- Real flooding

31) For how long does your house remain flooded? (Only tick one)

- ½ day
- One day
- more than one day

32) If you have experienced flooding, which of these mechanisms are most effective (Only tick one):

- Dig Trenches
- Relocate to family/shelter
- Concrete Floors
- Raise Shack on stones or wood
- Other _____________________________

33) If your answer to 28 was NO, do you think you are at risk to flooding? _______________

If yes, why? _______________ _______________

34) If your neighbors where flooded, would you help them?  Yes  No

35) Have you ever received any warnings or help when flooding? Yes  No

36) If yes, from who? Municipality  NGOs  Community leaders  Neighbors  Others: _____________________________

37) Do you call any authority during a flood?  Yes  No  If yes, who? _______________

38) What do you think could be done to reduce the effect of flooding? (Only tick one)

- Dig more Trenches
- Provide sand
- Provide building material
- Relocation
- Other _____________________________
Migration History
39) How long have you lived in Cape Town?

40) Where are you born / originally from: _______________________

41) How long have you lived in this settlement?

42) Where did you living before you came here? ______________

43) Why did you choose this settlement? Close to family [ ] Close to friends [ ]
    Close to work [ ] Other [ ]

44) How many people do you know (are your friends) here in this settlement? About

45) How many of you relatives are living in this settlement? About

Health & Sanitation
46) Which toilet do you use? Bucket System [ ] Water System (Flushed) [ ] Other [ ]

47) How many people use this toilet? About

49) What health problems have you or your family suffered after a flood? ______________

50) Do you know the community leaders / street committee in this settlement? Yes [ ] No [ ]

51) Do you participate in community meetings? Yes [ ] No [ ] If yes, how often: _____

52) Do you have any other things you want to say? : _______________________

Please Note: All Enumerators have to write their names including dates during the process.

THANK YOU! ENKOSI! Dankie!

ENUMERATOR: __________________________

DATE: ___/ ___/ 2010